

Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs History Project

AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is October 2, 1996. This is an interview with Ambassador Robert L. Barry done on the behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy. Bob and I are old colleagues having worked in Yugoslavia back in the 1960s to put this in context. Bob, could you tell me about first when and where you were born and something about your family?

BARRY: Well, I was born in Pittsburgh in 1934 and I spent the first five or six years of my life there, but my father was in the Army Air Corps reserve. He had been a pilot in World War I and was active in flying when he was not doing his regular job. He was called to active duty in 1940 before Pearl Harbor and so I spent the next several years as an army brat traveling around to one military post to another. We finally settled in Philadelphia after the war and that's where I went to high school. I went to college then at Dartmouth College starting in 1952 graduating with the class of 1956 where I majored in international relations with particular emphasis on the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Eastern European history and all that kind of thing.

Q: At Dartmouth, did you find was there any, let's see when did you attend there?

BARRY: '52 to '56.

Q: So, the Cold War was really beginning to crank up about that time?

BARRY: Yes, and of course, my father was called to active duty again in the Korean War, so between 1950 and 1952 I spent more time in military bases around then and so this was really kind of the height of the Cold War.

Q: Was there any thrust to what you were getting at Dartmouth, I'm just trying to figure out how the students and the faculty looked on the international relations front. Because you were still in what was termed in my generation, too. I graduated from Williams in 1950, as sort of the silent generation. I'm not sure that we were that silent. Did you get any?

BARRY: Well, the president of Dartmouth at that time was a man named John Sloan Dickey who had been active in foreign affairs in the State Department or some related

agency during the UN formative years. There was a lot of enthusiasm about the UN. There were some very good people on the faculty at Dartmouth at that time who were Soviet experts who were some of the people who worked on centrally planned economies and all that kind of thing. There was a very active program in great issues that everybody had to take so you had to attend as a freshman lectures on the main issues of the day. So, it was a rather internationalist campus. The international relations major was quite small. There were only about seven or eight of us. There was an interdisciplinary major who had a lot of economics and political science, courses in foreign cultures and things like that. So, that was kind of a self-selected group of people that were particularly interested in what was going on in the outside world.

Q: Well, were you at all pointing yourself towards the Foreign Service at that time?

BARRY: It was something that had entered my mind, but I was part of the Naval ROTC regular program which was a scholarship program which you took an exam for in high school. Basically the navy paid for your full college education with the idea that you would get a regular navy commission when you graduated. The hope was that a lot of people would stay in as a career. I had not ever particularly thought I would, but at least my immediate post college fate was pretty much decided by being in that program.

Q: Well, when you graduated in 1956 did you go into the navy?

BARRY: No, not right away. I got a scholarship to Oxford, something called the Reynolds Fellowship, which was not as prestigious as the Rhodes, but actually did have more money. I got a leave of absence from the navy to go take that scholarship up. When at Oxford I studied both the field of politics, philosophy and economics, but also, I spent a lot of time at Saint Anthony's College which was the place where they did a lot of graduate work on the Soviet Union, international affairs. The chancellor of the college I was in was Allen Bullock who had done a history of Hitler and the rise of fascism. They were all kinds of fascinating people there who knew a great deal about this part of the world, so I had a fairly enjoyable time there. I traveled in the meantime to Eastern Europe for the first time. In fact, I embarked upon an effort to go to Hungary during the Hungarian Revolution in 1956.

Q: October '56.

BARRY: 1956. Well, it was not October when I left, it was December when I left because of the fact that we had to go on term leave, but the events in Hungary were still taking place in December of 1956. In fact we did get across the border into Hungary. The Soviets had not yet come all the way down to the border and so the Hungarian Resistance still controlled a little bit of the territory across the Austrian border, but the last remnants were coming out, going across the mine fields, getting themselves blown up and things like that. I was always happy to tell the Hungarians in later years that I first came to the country illegally during the period of the Hungarian Revolution. I also got to Yugoslavia at that time, twice as a matter of fact. In fact, that's where I met my wife who was then studying in France. She joined a bunch of us who were in fact on our way to Hungary at

that point. As I say, when we got into Hungary we discovered the tanks were moving toward the border. We kind of gave that project up for the time being and went to Yugoslavia instead. That was kind of an early acquaintance.

Q: What was your impression of Yugoslavia? You were there in late '56?

BARRY: Complete silence. I've never seen a place that was as silent as Zagreb. That day we got off the train in Zagreb there was not a car in sight. All you could hear was the sound of people walking up and down the street. It was grim and gloomy and dark. This was December. Poor. I remember how unsmiling the people were. It looked the way you thought a communist country would look when you had read about all the grimness of the communist economic regime. When were you first there?

Q: About that time, except I went during the summer and it was a little more pleasant. We went down to Srebrenica and I was in Frankfurt and we took a trip there and we kind of liked it but, of course, I think winter in the city and summer on the coast are two different things. Well, then you finished your scholarship and then what?

BARRY: Then I did three years on a destroyer out of Newport, Rhode Island where we spent a lot of time in fact in the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. Then in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf in some of the early patrols we had in that area. So, in fact, it was while I was in the navy that I took the Foreign Service exam in Milan. I managed to get a day off from the ship, went up to Milan, took the exam and then came back and rejoined the ship. It was an interesting three years. I had rather hoped that my specialization in this part of the world would lead me to an assignment in naval intelligence, but no they wanted people who would go on the ships. So, I did that time. I'm not sorry in retrospect that I did.

Q: Well, when you were on the destroyer you went up, what patrolling in the Red Sea?

BARRY: Yes, the Middle East force was the predecessor, but we'd had it there for several years before I did it. I did it in '58 and '59, but we were sort of taking over from the British in showing the flag and sending our destroyer around from Bahrain to Kuwait and Basra and places like that.

Q: I have to ask, did your destroyer get a bad case of hepatitis or not because I was in Dhahran at that time as the vice consul and we had one of those destroyers come in and they'd eaten shell fish in Naples or something. We had to practically to take out the entire engine room staff of it.

BARRY: No, we escaped that although I did get into personal trouble because I was in charge at that point of the wardroom mess and the person who does that has got to buy food. We ended up in Eritrea and I found a bargain in rabbits and bought a large quantity of rabbits to stock the wardroom with which none of my fellow officers didn't like so much, but no we escaped the disease field.

Q: Your time in the navy because you really were in much more of an international cruise

mode you might say than many of your colleagues with the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Did this do anything at all to whet your appetite for the Foreign Service?

BARRY: Well, by that time I had pretty much decided that was what I wanted to do. I had spent a fair amount of time traveling around Europe as well while I was in the university. At the same time I got a Ford Foundation Fellowship just before I got out of the navy. The Ford was one of these early foreign affairs training fellowships, which was for two years and so that was to attend the program on East Central Europe, at Columbia University. So, I'm getting out of the navy. I had passed the Foreign Service exam, but had not at that point been called up for orals. So, I went to Columbia and did a lot of work both on Eastern Europe in general on this program, which was rather like the Russian Institute. It was Henry Roberts who was the head of the program at the time and they had a bunch of bright young professors there. Among the ones who arrived the same year I did was Zbig Brzezinski who had just moved from Harvard to Columbia. Actually my specialty there was Yugoslavia. I started to learn Serbo-Croatian at Columbia and did a history degree, too. My history thesis was the 14th Century Empire of Stephan Dushan. I never thought at the time that that would again become relevant with the whole issue of Kosovo had become a matter of history.

Q: History was just yesterday in Yugoslavia.

BARRY: Well, it was much more distant then that it is today I'm afraid.

Q: Were you married at this time?

BARRY: Yes, Peggy and I got married as soon as I got out of the navy and we went to live in New York together. Actually we took a honeymoon again in Europe and spent a good deal of that time in Yugoslavia and traveled up and down the Dalmatian Coast and that was the summer and it was much brighter and better looking.

Q: You took the Foreign Service exam when?

BARRY: '58. No, it must have been '59.

Q: Do you have any recollections of how it was conducted and what sort of things you were asked?

BARRY: Well, of course, the written exam was fairly much like the Scholastic Aptitude Test. It was a general knowledge kind of exam. So, in that sense I don't know if it was all that different from what people take today. The oral exam I took after I was at Columbia and that was very different than it was today. The purpose of the examining panel was to back you to the wall and see how you reacted under these circumstances, that is to exhaust your supply of knowledge on any given subject and try to embarrass you about it and see how you responded to being under pressure. I remember that they were quite successful in exhausting my field of knowledge. They said, "Well, young man since you were in the navy, you will know the answer to the question which we're about to ask,

which is, presuming that the three mile territorial waters limit will change to a 12 mile limit in international law, which straits are now open to transit by war vessels or civilian vessels would be closed?" I managed to mumble through a couple of them, but I missed most of them. "Well, you know something about Eastern Europe. Name all the rivers that flow into the Danube" and that kind of thing. Then they would ask you a question about some event of the day. I guess the event of the day that was still high in peoples' minds was Suez, so the question was, take a position on the Suez Canal controversy of 1956 one way or the other and defend it and that kind of thing. So, it was a much more testing kind of experience. As I got up from the chair I was, I noticed that the whole chair was soaking wet as I had been sweating through this thing. They said, "Do you think you passed?" I said, "No, I don't think I passed." They said, "Well, tell us why you don't think you passed." I explained that I didn't think I knew as much as I should have about this, that and the other and finally one of them winked at me and said, "You did pass."

Q: Well, that's a far cry from the way it is now as an attempt to almost take it out of the hands of people and make sure that the fairness is incorporated.

BARRY: I did a tour as an examiner once for a few weeks and I must say that I didn't enjoy the experience at all. You weren't even allowed to ask people what made them think they wanted to join the Foreign Service and as a result we got a lot of people who didn't really want to join the Foreign Service and who didn't have much of an idea about what it was like.

Q: When did you come into the Foreign Service?

BARRY: I entered in February of '62. I hadn't yet finished the two years at Columbia, but at that point the Foreign Service said come now because my name had been on the register as long as it could be without my being removed from it. If I wanted to come in at all, I should come in then. Also, I said, this is a good deal for you, you're paying good money to send people to the same program that I'm in at Columbia, I'm being paid by the Ford Foundation, why don't you extend the thing and let me stay? They said, "Well, we don't really believe in this kind of thing. We don't send junior officers to Eastern Europe anyhow. You're studying Eastern Europe. We may never have a need for you in Eastern Europe. So, if you need training, we'll decide what kind of training and we'll give it to you so, leave the program." So, I did, but I managed to complete my degree after coming down to Washington in February of '62.

Q: Well, I assume you went into the basic officers' course, the A100 course?

BARRY: I did.

Q: Can you give a little feel about the type of people who were in there and what the training was like?

BARRY: Well, of course the average age of the people was considerably below what it is today because at that point the maximum age for entry was 32. Most of them had done some graduate work or some military or both. It was about 85% or 90% male. There were

about five or so women, most of who did not stay on because they got married and at that point you couldn't stay in under those circumstances. I think if I'm correct, all of them were white. Most of them were from the usual Ivy League colleges and that kind of thing. The course itself was taught by two mid-level Foreign Service officers who were in charge of the course at that time. It was clearly not a much sought after assignment I wouldn't have thought. The one person I remember shocked my wife and a couple of other wives whom she became close friends with at the time because the wife was talking to our wives saying well your first duty in the Foreign Service is to be at your principal officer's or ambassador's house right on the dot no matter what happens. She was giving the example of when her son had fallen off a ladder when they were in some God forsaken place and they thought that he had broken his back. But the ambassador was having a reception and so they went off to the reception without knowing what had happened to the son. This was in fact somebody German who had married an American Foreign Service officer, but it didn't do much to make the idea of the government appealing to the people like Peggy. There was a good side to the thing in that there was a good deal of sensitivity training, playacting and telling you how foreigners felt differently about your personal space around you and whether you pointed the sole of your feet at them or not. There was a consular segment that was much more focused on getting the regulations memorized than I guess is the case today. There was a fair amount going around of sort of kicking the tires of other government agencies to sort of see what they did and that kind of thing.

Q: When you got out of there again, we're talking about '62?

BARRY: '62 was the time I came up for assignment. Actually there were two of us at the time who were very keen on going to someplace in the communist world for our first tour even though it had never been done before. I guess the person who had been the junior officer assignment person had listened to us both carefully and I think he had been assigned in that part of the world himself. Anyhow, he must have put in a good word for us because Tom Niles and I had both been in the same class were both assigned to Yugoslavia for our first tour. So, then there was Serbo Croatian training. While waiting for the course to start, I worked on the Yugoslav desk. I think it was Clayton Mudd who was the desk officer at that time. The first thing I ever had to deal with was the Artukovich deportation case. Andrej Artukovich was the Interior Minister of the fascist government, the Ustasi government of Croatia during World War II, notorious for having kept a jar of eyeballs on his desk as a paperweight that had been gouged out of the Serbian prisoners' gypsies, etc. He had gotten into the U.S. in the aftermath of World War II under an assumed name. His brother was a prominent contractor in California. Although Artukovich was fairly quickly identified and there were a long series of efforts to get him deported, the brother had good connections in California and his efforts were periodically turned back. I do remember that being one of the very first issues that I'd tried to deal with when, actually it was in terms of answering congressional letters explaining why this guy was still here.

Q: You took Serbian?

BARRY: I took Croatian, no actually the teachers were Serbian. They were a couple of Serbian cavalry officers and they made fun of the Croatians and their penchant for substituting real Croatian words for what they claimed were loan words. One of their favorites was cravat, which is a word, which the French took into their vocabulary through Croatian cavalymen who wore these little things around their throats. The Serbian teachers were fond of saying that the Croats during this period of linguistic purification insisted that cravat was a loan word. They were going to call it what it really was, okovratnidopupchanik, around the neck to the belly button. Yes, we took a shortened version of the course. We took a 16 or 18 week version.

Q: Well, I went through the same two teachers. I took it with Yankovich. In many ways I look back and it was a pain. At one point Larry Eagleburger and I think Jim Lowenstein, we were all stuck with Popovich, who was very opinionated. I think halfway through we were going to have them all of the 10 or 11 months and we revolted and demanded that they switch around and very begrudgingly they let us. In many ways I found that being exposed to these Serbs was a very good introduction to the mentality of Yugoslavia which still holds good today.

BARRY: Yes, I think it was probably better for the culturalization than it was for the language because these guys were neither of them too good about following the drills and things like that. We escaped early and I always did feel afterwards that those courses were too long because both Tom and I succeeded in getting a four in Serbo Croatian after we'd been out there for the same amount of time after we'd been in the course for say 18 weeks and out there for another six months in the place. Ours was just as good.

Q: Tom Niles came in his first job, with me, I was chief of the consular section. You went to Zagreb, what were you doing?

BARRY: Well, I was the junior officer trainee, which meant that I was supposed to circulate through all of the different aspects of the consulate. I started out in the consular section. Chips Chester was the head of the consular section. Then I did administrative things. There was a guy who was named Frank Newton; he was the administrative officer. Then I did political economic work first with George Jaeger and then Sam Lee who was the number two political economic officer. Actually Joe Godson was the consul general there first and he was a fascinating person. He was an ex-labor person who came in through the AFL-CIO. He was labor attache in London and labor attache in Belgrade and then was consul general in Zagreb. He had very good Serbo-Croatian and was on good terms with Vladimir Bakorich, the local head of the party and one of the key associates of Tito's. Then the second consul general while I was there was Carl Sommerlatte who had been in the Soviet business before that.

Q: When you got there, it was still '62 when you arrived?

BARRY: No, by this time we're in February of '63, by that time we had been through the A100 course then on the Yugoslav desk waiting for the language course to begin. The language course began in the fall, took 16 weeks of language and then out there.

Q: What was the sort of political economic situation that you saw from the Zagreb perspective?

BARRY: Well, in the first place when we arrived there it was the deep freeze. I don't know if you remember the winter of '63 in Central Europe, but it was the coldest winter on record. It was so cold that we took the train from Paris to go to pick up our cars in Germany and all of the heating in the cars froze, the pipes burst, the toilets were frozen. My wife was pregnant at the time and we were also cold and I think Tom Niles and Peggy and I all sort of huddled together for warmth in one lower bunk in the railroad car. When we got to Zagreb all of the coal was frozen into the railroad cars. So, there was no coal available to heat anything, so the Palace Hotel which we stayed initially, the waiters were all wearing overcoats and getting out of bed itself was a hazardous operation. We finally moved to the Esplanade Hotel which did have heating, but that of course, cast a pall on the whole economy because the industry had come to a grinding halt and food was short and all that. It was a rather atypical introduction to the place. It was actually not so much different than being there in '56 in the first place although a lot of progress had been made in the interim.

Politically, I would say, this was before the Croatian cultural revolution or whatever you want to call it was before the crowd around Bakarich made a play for more political and economic autonomy. Although they still complained bitterly about the fact that the products of Croatia and Slovenia, the hardworking honest toilers of Zagreb and Ljubljana were sent down to develop the backward Serbs, the good for nothing Albanians and all that. There was strong tension in the air about the fact that they were essentially paying to develop the rest of the country. When the summer came the economy was no so bad. There were no shortages of food or anything like that. There was a strong secret police element in most things. They kept a pretty close watch on various signs of restlessness among the Croatian natives. The Cardinal at that time, of course the Croatians are always Catholic during the war period the Cardinal had been notoriously pro-Ustasi and pro-Nazi and this was the successor who was there then who was quite nationalist. I would go to the churches around town and listen to the kinds of things people would say from the pulpit particularly from the Franciscan Monastery. It was really quite nationalist in what they had to say about the Serbs.

Q: When you say nationalist, you mean Croatian nationalist as opposed to Yugoslav nationalist?

BARRY: No, I mean Croatian nationalist. This was, the Croatians thought of themselves as the 1,000 year culture.

Q: Instead of being 500 years under the Turkish yoke, which is what I got in Belgrade?

BARRY: Right. There were still lots of remnants of the Austrian/Hungarian monarchy there because Croatia had been part of Hungary in the pre-1919 federation. There were still a lot of countesses and counts who were left over from that period who were more attached to that sort of north-south axis rather than to the forced marriage with the Serbs.

It was still worth your life to employ a Serb and a Croat together in your household. I guess it was Mrs. Peggy Beam, the ambassador's wife when they were there earlier. The Serb and the Croat in the household were after each other with knives and things like that. There was a lot of nationalist particularism, but on the other hand, most of the people we knew thought of themselves first and foremost as Yugoslavs. Peggy stayed there to have our first child and we had a Yugoslav doctor, a Dalmatian who could not have been more pro-Yugoslav and put down the Croatian particularism and all that. I mention that simply because we're in touch with the same person today and you couldn't imagine a more ardent Croatian nationalist who has nothing good to say about anything except Tudjman. So, it certainly was not evident to any of us then that this was, that the problems of history and nationalism were ever going to come back to the degree that they had during the World War II. People were still getting over the experiences of World War II, some of the horrors of the death camps and the terrible things the Croats and Serbs did to each other in that period. I think the general impression among us all was that this was an antagonism that would not ever come back and that although there were still some remnants of these old feelings leftover from the 1940s and before, that federation would last.

Q: How about in your work, did you have any, can you talk a bit about consular cases or what type of consular work you were doing?

BARRY: Well, a lot of this was kind of similar to Lawrence Durrell, if you've read, as I'm sure you have "esprit de corps" and some of those stories he wrote about old Yugoslavia. One of my first consular cases that I can recall was that I heard from a truly irate American who was staying in the Palace Hotel that I had to come over there right away to deal with the situation that had developed around his wife. I got there and found a huge mob scene going on. I began to sort it out and figure out what happened. What had happened was that this woman had been preparing to go to bed and in the process of doing so was in her bathrobe and had put a lot of pink plastic curlers in her hair. She then went into the WC [water closet] and sat on the toilet and in reaching up to flush it, pulled the overhead chain that caused the water closet to fall on her head. This upset her husband, who called the management of the hotel and raised an ungodly squawk. The management of the hotel reacted by calling everybody. They had a doctor, they had the local tourist board, they had the police and they had of all things the plumber who had originally installed the plumbing in the Palace Hotel back in the time of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. They're all in there yelling at the top of their lungs, the poor woman was suffering some kind of concussion from having this thing fall on her head. I managed to finally clear all these people out and work out what the story was. The story from the hotel was, it was not their fault. This facility was installed in the good old Austro-Hungarian days. This was the man who did it, he's a well-known craftsman, the best materials were used. She must have mistreated the facility by somehow pulling it at a strange angle from which you probably would have had to stand on the toilet itself and pull it over here and subjected it to this unpredictable strain which caused the thing to fall on her head. We're not going to charge you for it. Otherwise, we'd naturally make her pay for repairing it. So, this led to a long negotiation after which the final outcome was that she was allowed to depart the hotel without having to pay for it. She stayed there that

night, but that was one kind of tourist mishap.

Another was a very large woman, an American citizen of Greek origin who in fact spoke nothing but Greek. She was so large, in fact, that she could not turn around inside a train car which had caused her to... While she was going to go to the bathroom in the train at the time the train was passing through the large tunnel that goes between Austria, or Italy I guess it is and Slovenia... But this was a dark tunnel. The lights in the train kept going on and off and as she thought she was backing up into the WC on the train. She in fact was backing out of the train into the tunnel. She found herself lying there in the tunnel bruised and broken here and there. We had to go and retrieve her. She again, did not speak anything but Greek and we didn't speak any Greek except my consular assistant spoke some classical Greek. So, classical Greek and modern Greek exchanged, this woman had then to be placed in a very large caissonlike cast that went sort of head to toe which further made her difficult to move around. As I recall we had to try to find a plane which was landing in Zagreb that could fly her to wherever she wanted to go that had an exceptionally large hatch so that she could be moved into the plane.

I guess another memorable occasion was when Jackie Kennedy visited, this was after John F. Kennedy's assassination which I'm sure you've experienced also. It had a terrific impact.

Q: It really did. I mean I was abroad and I came back the next day and I was on leave with my wife and all the flags were half mast and going across the customs guards, I mean they were weeping and it was something.

BARRY: We had so many candles put in front of the consulate that it broke the glass in the front of the consulate and there were people out there all night praying and things like that. It had a very deep and lasting impact. I remember it was our pediatrician who told us about Kennedy's death, which we had trouble absorbing at the time. Anyhow, it was several months after that that Mrs. Kennedy came to Yugoslavia on Charles Wrightsman's yacht. I was detailed to sort of go along as escort officer or helpmate because she did have the Secret Service with her, not on the yacht, but in our little Volkswagen which we sort of bounced along the coast while Mrs. Kennedy and Lee Radizwill were on the yacht. In fact, she didn't get off except once in Dubrovnik and we joined her in Dubrovnik. They had kept it very secret that she was there and didn't want to be bothered by anybody. But the word got out and there were thousands of people in the streets in Dubrovnik trying to get a glimpse of her. In the event, she walked around the city a little bit. She said she couldn't stand the crowds of people and went back and spent time on the boat with her afterwards. She was talking about how she didn't mind being the center of attention when her husband was alive, but now that he was dead, it was too much to have to put up with all this crowd scene. So, it was a fascinating time to be able to have an opportunity to spend some time with her.

Q: Did visas cause any particular problems for you?

BARRY: Oh, yes. Well, visas are always a problem. The idea was that people were not bona fide non-immigrants and indeed many of them were not. In many ways there were

little areas of Croatia in particular which had closer ties with the United States than they did with the surrounding countryside in Yugoslavia. These were people whose ancestors had immigrated long ago or whether the husband had left and gone to sea or something like that, hadn't been heard of for a long time, they depended on social security payments often. Other times things pension checks had been sent from the United States and we'd go to verify these social security recipients were still alive. We'd go back into these isolated villages in the Lika and you had to walk several miles from the nearest road. My consular assistant and I would show up and people would assume that we were relatives from the United States and they were all dressed in clothes that had been sent to them from the U.S. It was that kind of disjunctive economy, so naturally because so many people had ties in the United States, most of the people who came for non-immigrant visas were considered to be ineligible.

Q: When you were working in the political section, what type of things were you doing? What sort of contacts did both you have and Joe Godson have?

BARRY: Well, Joe of course, had very good contacts with the top political leadership in Croatia. Bakarich, who was the head of the Croatian communist party, and other people who were in charge of the government there. He could get some good information from them about what some of the problems were, some of the disagreements were between the federal government and the Croatians. They were not shy about complaining about the fact that the economy was being run badly, that they weren't getting their fair share and things like that. I spent more of my time covering what was the beginnings of the sort of intellectual basis for Croatian particularism which was a group around a magazine called Praxis. This was a philosophical journal that got started about '64 I guess and the people around them were people at the university and people in the social sciences who were basically in favor of more pluralism and in favor of reducing the dominance of the Serbs, sort of smarting under Serbian dominance. This later became a cause celebre after I had left when Tito decided to crack down on this tendency of Croatian intellectuals. I spent a lot of time also following what was going on in the religious circles. I got to know some of the Catholic clergy there and spent some time up in Slovenia, too because that was part of our consular district calling on people and talking to people there. They had a similar kind of intellectual quasi rebellion going on in Slovenia at the time. But this was, these were not big issues at this point. I don't really remember what the differences were between the Belgrade embassy and Zagreb consulate at the time. I know that Joe Godson in particular, Joe asserted his right to send in reports without clearing them with the political section in Belgrade and I think that caused some unhappiness at the time because it tended to differ from the view in Belgrade about some of these issues. I guess also we spent a fair amount of time on commercial things, for example, the annual Zagreb fair which always had large numbers of American companies present and Tito always attended and things like that. It was a time when the ambassador always came up in Belgrade. In fact, I remember the first one of those occasions was one in which Ambassador and Mrs. Kennan came up from Belgrade and we all went to a play given in Serbo Croatian based on Eugene O'Neill's The Iceman Cometh which in Serbo Croatian turns out to be as I think I will never forget I Leder Dodje. O'Neill has got a great deal of dialect in his English language and it was all faithfully translated into incomprehensible

Serbo-Croatian and it also was quite long. I think it went on for four hours.

Q: If this is the one I think it is, the New York critics said “The Iceman Cometh, the critic goeth.”

BARRY: Well, that’s right except the critic in this case was my wife who was something like eight months pregnant who was sitting there on this hard bench with the Kennans and other such dignitaries. She didn’t feel as if she could go, so we sat through all that at the time. But there was also a good deal going on in the cultural scene in Zagreb. The Croats all naturally feeling that they were cultural and the Serbs weren’t, but whether it was, they did have very good music there, they did have a good opera. They had a lot of theater and the theater was sometimes, it was often I would say of the read between the lines type, so there was something to be gained from trying to interpret what was going through peoples minds by the plays they showed and the kinds of statements were being made by those plays.

Q: Did you get any feel for how the people in Croatia and Slovenia look at the Soviets at this time?

BARRY: As the good friends of the Serbs and therefore, not to be trusted too much, I guess. This was still of course in the period of tension between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. I think it was around ‘65 if I recall correctly when Khrushchev came to Belgrade and there was a plane crash.

Q: There was a plane crash at Dedinje, I think, of some Soviet military people who had taken part in the “liberation of Yugoslavia” and the whole plane just came in and hit the hill.

BARRY: Yes, as usual there’s always conspiracy theories and there are conspiracy theories around that as well, why did it happen. But I think it’s fair to say that the Croats were always more in favor of the break with the Soviet Union than perhaps the Serbs were. They believed that trade with the Soviet Union was always to their disadvantage. If they were helping to subsidize the Serbs they were also helping to subsidize the Russians. There was a Russian consulate in Zagreb. There were a number of others. There was Austria, there was French, there was British, there was Italian and all that, but the Russians I guess kept a pretty low profile at the time.

Q: Did Slovenia play much of a role as far as you all were concerned or were you pretty well hooked to Croatia?

BARRY: Well, we spent some time in Slovenia. We did a fair amount of commercial work and we’d go traveling around with some of the firms, Sloveniales and there were joint ventures. There were joint ventures between Dow and INA at the time, which was just getting started. There was the petrochemical industry. There was some, there were a number of American companies that were interested. Most of them were interested in Slovenia and Croatia it seems to me. We spent a lot of our time pursuing those, but I think

in terms of the political role that Slovenia played, it played it more in Belgrade than it did in Zagreb. We'd go up and visit some of the players in Slovenia who used to sort of commute back and forth to Belgrade.

Q: Did the security service, the UDBA, cause any problems for you all?

BARRY: Well, I remember assuming that they were omni present in the sense of tapping our phones and probably wiring the consulate, but I don't recall any particular incidents of harassment. This was a period of U.S. Yugoslav relations were pretty close where we had an active PL480 program, a military training program, all those kinds of things, so I don't recall the security people were heavy handed.

Q: I didn't have that either the time I was there. Let's stop here at this point and pick it up the next time. You're going to leave Croatia and whither?

BARRY: Whither? To the office of Soviet Union Affairs in the State Department.

Q: In 1965?

BARRY: 1965.

Q: Okay.

Today is the 23rd of December 1996. Bob, okay, we're off to 1965 is it?

BARRY: '65 and in those days getting into the cadre of Soviet specialists was kind of difficult and I guess the reason that I ended up there was because our consul general, our second consul general in Zagreb was Karl Sommerlatte. Carl had been in Moscow and guess he and Mac Toon had served together at one time or another. As I was beginning to think about my next assignment, Karl wrote to Mac, who was Director of EUR/SOV, on my behalf. In fact I guess the same thing happened to Tom Niles who was in Belgrade because we were both junior officers in the same class and we both got sent back to work in Soviet affairs. I worked in the bilateral section and Tom worked in the economic section.

Q: You were there from '65 to when?

BARRY: '67.

Q: '67 okay.

BARRY: The key there was to grab the brass ring that would have provided you with the softest and nicest assignment in the Foreign Service which was to go on from Soviet affairs to take advanced language training at the U.S. Army Field Detachment R in

Garmisch, Germany. When we both arrived there we both asked well, how do we get on this particular bus? The answer was well you take early morning lessons every in season for two years and get your Russian up to a three and you can go do Garmisch. We religiously did that in addition to working on the desk. We went off every morning and did our early morning Russian across the river in the old Foreign Service Institute.

Q: So, you were doing bilateral affairs?

BARRY: I was the junior person on the bilateral section. The office director was Mac Toon and I started out sort of doing pick up, answering congressional letters. The person I worked most closely with was Virginia James who was a tradition in the Foreign Service herself. I think she had joined the State Department in about 1924. She'd come to Washington and had worked in the government during the First World War and then she was one of the early people, I guess she was originally a secretary, but she developed a strong interest in the Soviet Union and this was the old office of East European Affairs before it was divided up into East Europe and the Soviet Union and of course, before we had relations with the USSR. She had kept a long record of dealings on behalf of political prisoners, dissidents, American citizens who had gotten in trouble one way or another in the Soviet Union and had no relations. She had been present in 1934 when the relationship was finally opened as the result of the Roosevelt-Litvinov agreements. In fact I think she had something to do with having typed up one of the agreements or something like that, but she had been involved with in particular religious dissidents. People like Alexander Dolgun who was an American Jesuit who had been in prison for many years and she had carried all his correspondence forward. She drafted all the notes and so that was my sort of initial job, working with her on trying to get people out of the USSR.

Q: Could you just explain to somebody who is not maybe familiar the language? When you say bilateral relations? What is that as compared to what is not bilateral?

BARRY: The Office of Soviet Affairs was divided in that time to four different sections. There was one office director. Then there were bilateral relations which had to do essentially with the strictly relationships between the U.S. and the USSR. It dealt with consular matters; it dealt with things like property. It dealt with things like bilateral negotiations on a consular convention which is one of the things that I worked on later on. In essence, anything that only had two parties involved, the U.S. and the USSR. There was a multilateral section, which dealt with things like arms control and the international conferences which the USSR, and the U.S. were concerned. The multilateral section worked on UN issues, so that section was actually involved in the broad range of political issues. There was an economic section which dealt with trade and trade relationships and the various kinds of restrictions on U.S. trade with the USSR and there was a cultural affairs or exchanges section which was what handled the things like people to people exchanges, the international research exchanges for Fulbrights and helped to regulate the two way flow of scientific and technical change and all that.

Q: How would you describe during this '65 to '67 period our relations with the Soviet

Union?

BARRY: They were, I would say, not at rock bottom, but they were far from prospering. There were a lot of espionage cases at that time on both sides. That was something that our section handled. The relationship was getting ready to expand in the sense that we had an interest in reopening the consulate, which we used to have in Leningrad or St. Petersburg. The Russians were interested in opening a consulate in San Francisco. That was an issue on which I worked. We were negotiating a U.S./USSR consular convention which provided for rules for dealing with American citizens or Soviet citizens for that matter who were in trouble in one another's country provided rights of access to arrested citizens and the rights of consular officers in each other's country to certain kinds of immunities and so forth. That was quite controversial because there were many in the congress who felt that opening a new consulate would simply be a new outlet for Soviet espionage in the U.S. We argued that we needed a new window on the USSR more than the Russians needed a new window since they already had the large relationship in New York. This was something in which Mac Toon was very interested because he felt that it was important to get more posts in the USSR. We were dealing with property issues also. This was the time when we began to negotiate for new embassy sites in both countries. This was a very long lasting negotiation I guess still continues to this day in terms of the new facilities that we had built or are still building in Moscow. This was something that I was responsible for later on in my time on the desk. This was where I got introduced to the fact that the compartmentalization of our security business is sometimes self-defeating. I did not have the kinds of clearances that would have been required in order to be fully apprized of what some of the concerns on the parts of the other agencies may have been. For example, one of the things that we agreed to and I was responsible for agreeing to was allowing the Russians to take a lease on a summer place that was around Berryville, Virginia. I had checked this out with the FBI and others at the time and it came back okay, so we told the Russians to go ahead. Only after that did I find that this particular site was located on top of a sensitive relocation site for the U.S. government which none of the people I was dealing with in the U.S. government knew about. But it turned out that the Russians were moving there for their summer holidays. It came out in all the press that here is this thing that is built over one of the air exhausts or near one of the air exhausts to one of these big old government relocation sites. We went through a long discussion with people about the location of what is the current Russian embassy in Mt. Alto. It wasn't the first place we ended up. We looked around at several places including some of the old estates in and around downtown D.C. All of which were objected to for some reason or other by local neighborhood groups. We couldn't get the zoning change to do this. We ended up for a while there it was going to be at the old National Bureau of Standards where so many embassies are now located. That turned out not to be feasible because of the fact that they wanted to divide it into smaller plots to provide more sites for other embassies. Mt. Alto was a government property and again we went through the process of checking it out with people. I think all of us who were dealing with this weren't fully clued in as to what the problems may have been. I think in fact this was not finally concluded during the time I was there, but some time afterwards. That whole issue and the conditions of construction and who would do what in terms of embassy construction on both sides is an issue that was important and frustrating because

every time you thought that a solution was in your grasp it sort of disappeared again which it still does to this day I guess.

Q: I might point out for the record the problem with the Mt. Alto site became very clear from the papers and all was that it dominates the skyline of Washington where with line of sight one can eavesdrop on the Pentagon and everybody else. That wouldn't be the type of knowledge or abilities that would get to a desk officer. It was the sort of thing that would be kept from you. Only our people and the KGB knew what they could do I guess.

BARRY: Well, there was an interagency committee on internal security which was one of the committees left over from the Eisenhower period and that contained representatives of all the different intelligence agencies and these decisions, in fact, were cleared with this committee, but evidently the people who were looking at it were not the people who were defending against electronic intelligence, but the people who just wanted to keep an eye on the Russians themselves and this was a pretty good site to do it from. There was specialization even in the internal security agency about who does what to whom.

Q: What did you find dealing with say prisoners and consular cases of people and all during this '65 to '67 period? What was the Soviet attitude? Were you able to say come on why don't we settle these things and just get these people out of your hair or was it difficult?

BARRY: Of course this had been going on for years ever since 1934 when the relations were first established and some of the things in the Roosevelt-Litvinov agreement provided for various kinds of things like freedom of religion for people living in each other's country and things like that. The Soviets were never very well disposed to all of this, but they were quite accustomed to getting notes from us especially on the occasion of any kind of high level meeting where our officials would normally have sort of tucked away in their pocket a list of people that the Congress was concerned with or a list of diplomatic notes that had been sent in the past. We made quite a regular practice of sending notes to the Soviet foreign ministry on behalf of prisoners of one kind or another or American citizens or people who we claimed were American citizens and they claimed were not dual citizens and questions of access to arrested Americans and things like that. We dealt essentially with the consular division of the Soviet embassy here on occasion it came to the attention of Ambassador Dobrynin when he would be called in by somebody or the DCM who was at that time Yuli Vorontsov, who is now their ambassador to the UN.

You know, every once in a while you would get satisfaction on a case or two, but it was not what you would call a wholesale kind of operation, it was a retail operation. Some cases and they took a very strict view of what was espionage and what was subversion and things like that and could not easily be talked out of some of that. Of course, there were a lot of people who were dual citizens. A lot of people who had gone back to Russia during the 1930s, who had come here in the '20s and '30s and then had gone back during the Depression and were legitimately dual citizens. The purges had then picked up and they had been sent off to one camp or another. A lot of them were in Mordovia, which is

where a big chain of camps were where foreigners were dealt with. There were some very interesting books written during that period. For example, I mentioned Alexander Dolgun, who finally got out, who was a Jesuit priest and a book was written about him which had a lot to say about life in the camps in the '30s and '40s. Virginia James, as I say, had an absolutely remarkable memory and had a file cabinet full of all these cases going back to the beginning of time. She was the one I think who told me about the time that they moved from the Old Executive Office Building to the then new State Department, that is the old section of the State Department was our new home after that. I guess it was Walter Stoessel who had been the desk officer or the office director as it was and in the middle of the afternoon there was a truck that pulled up and they took all the safes and got them into the back of the truck. They issued Walter a shotgun and rode over to the new State Department and unloaded everything there. So, she had an absolutely wonderful memory of all these things. She died rather recently about four or five years ago at the age of 95 or 98 or something like that. She was living out in Fredericksburg, Virginia. In fact I wrote something about her in the Foreign Service Journal in the '80s, something about her activities and her wonderful concern for all these people.

Q: Did you find that there was always a quid pro quo with the Soviets. I mean if they let somebody go they always had something or not?

BARRY: Well, if you're talking about espionage, yes. If you're talking about things where there were direct concerns of the KGB and we had one of their people or any time we arrested one of their people you could pretty well expect them to find somebody on our side to arrest. Frederick Barghorn is an ideal example of this perfectly innocent example. Barghorn was a Yale professor and I guess this was in the early part of the Kennedy administration. It was before I got into this. He was there on one of the early academic exchanges and we had picked up a real honest to God Soviet spy, somebody then came up to Barghorn on the street with a rolled up newspaper and handed it to him. He was pounced on by the KGB. The rolled up newspaper contained military secrets and so Barghorn was put in jail. Kennedy raised a hell of a squawk about it because this was clearly a case of purely doing this for purposes of developing an exchange. In the event they backed down and let Barghorn go. I forget the exact outcome as far as the Russians. It may be that the Russian was not prosecuted because the U.S. Attorney didn't feel there was enough evidence, but it was not, we were told at the time, a deal. Usually when it came down to espionage cases there was some kind of an exchange. Then later on when it got to dissidents there such as Sakharov and others.

Q: Was this during the time, the '65 to '67 time?

BARRY: No, later.

Q: Why don't we pick it up?

BARRY: Well, in the future it came to the point where they were asking for exchanges in order to release dissidents. A different story.

Q: Were there any particular sticking points in the time you were dealing with the consular treaty?

BARRY: Oh, yes, it was a very sticky issue altogether. In fact, I think it was ratified during my time on the desk. The sticking points had to do with rights of access and notification. We insisted on a time certain, three to five days, for notification.

Q: We're talking about arrest cases?

BARRY: We're talking about American citizens. What we wanted to be sure of is that we had the right to go into a jail and see the person and talk to them. In the Barghorn case for example, which was the immediate precedent to that which caused some of the concern led to the consular treaty Barghorn was held for weeks without any American having access to him. That was the case under Soviet law in general. You could be held without access to a lawyer, relatives, or anything like that as long as the case was still in the hands of the procurator general, that is, the person doing the investigation. It was only when the decision was made about whether to bring the person to trial or not that he was allowed access to a lawyer. So, we were very anxious to have this pinned down in terms of I think it was one to three days for notification and three to five days for access. The Russians wanted a much more flexible kind of terminology like within a reasonable period of time and the shortest possible time. We negotiated about that for a very long time. The Russians wanted to have in the convention provisos for opening posts and we did not want that because we realized that it would make it difficult to get through the congress. We wanted to have it strictly on the basis that this is something that enhances our ability to protect American citizens in the USSR and represents a real step forward in terms of how the Russians can treat our people. It guess it was Bill Shinn, who was then head of the consular section in Moscow. He was then engaged with a case of another American, Newcomb Mott, who was kind of an innocent abroad who had gone up to Kirkenes in the very northern part of where Norway and the USSR meet in the Arctic and for some strange reason and crossed the border. Well, I guess it reminds me of this young American who just swam naked across the Yalu River from China into North Korea and had to be released and then committed suicide later. Actually the cases are rather parallel. This young man simply walked across the border up around Kirkenes and ended up in a border town which at that time Soviets had opened to Norwegians to come in and go shopping at certain fixed times. They bought them in in busses and things like that. This kid just wandered into the town and he was picked up and charged with espionage. We were not allowed access to him. They tried to trade him for a Soviet spy - I think, a UN person we had picked up. We wouldn't have anything to do with it. He was being transported from, I guess Murmansk, to Moscow where he was going to be interrogated further and tried, and he died under somewhat mysterious conditions on the train. I think it's pretty clear what had happened was he had cut his own wrists and committed suicide, but there were also claims at the time that he was murdered by the Soviets, but we had not access to him and that was another issue that was very prominent then. I remember Bill Shinn at that time made several trips to Murmansk, which is where he was being held and had a lot to do with the case. A book was written about that, too, charging as usual that the embassy and the State Department didn't do enough for this young man and

claiming that he was murdered. That was another reason that caused us to want to have specific guarantees about what we needed to do in terms of U.S. citizens. The FBI didn't like the consular convention because they didn't want Soviet consulates here in this country. I can't remember what position the CIA took. I think they were probably in favor of it because it allows them to have more posts in the USSR. But, it was fought hard over in the congress and it did win the necessary two-thirds majority and I think was ratified in '67, '66.

Q: Was there any property say confiscated during the Czar at the Revolution or something that we're still trying to get out?

BARRY: Actually that's sort of another story because I ended up being the first person who was opening up the first consulate in the USSR. One of the first places we looked at was our old embassy in St. Petersburg, which is now a marriage palace. It's probably a brothel by now or something that makes money. As it turns out, it was too small for us and it was in a poor location in terms of our desire to have a free standing building. It's still there. It's quite elegant. Angus Ward, who was in Moscow in '34, went up to reopen the building and found all the old files still there and transferred them back to Washington. Of course, at one time we had a whole bunch of consulates. We had consulates in Vladivostok and along the Trans-Siberian Railway and things like that all to which came to an end after the Revolution or some of them were reopened during World War II for Lend-Lease and then closed down again. But we were eager in particular to get into Leningrad.

Q: Well, while you were on the desk, obviously you were sort of the new boy on the block with your ears wide open and listening, what was your impression of the Soviet hands at that time? This was sort of the elite.

BARRY: Mac Toon was the dean of the Soviet hands at that time and he later went on to be ambassador in Moscow. He had a long experience and I would say a justifiably low opinion of Soviet politics. He was very I would say rough edged in his feelings with the Soviets and he'd made no secret of it to them. When he finally was nominated as ambassador the Soviets took an awfully long time giving him agreement, but they finally did after they were told that this was whom they better take. There were a lot of other people on the desk some of whom like Vlad Toumanoff had come from Russian background, others like Paul Cook having been an academic expert and worked on this for a long time. The deputy director was Jim Pratt, who later went on to be political counselor in Moscow at the time that I was there. I guess the multilateral section had many of the stars of the then Soviet field. Kempton Jenkins and Bill Luers were there. Generally there what they had was people who were experts in some other part of the world and the Soviet Union at the same time so they had China hands and Middle East people and things like that who were also doing an apprenticeship in Soviet affairs. Always a good group of people, actually not so many of them continued on the Soviet business for one reason or another. Carroll Woods was the head of the bilateral section. I don't think he ever went back to Moscow. The exchanges section had been before a part of the bureau of cultural affairs and then the bureau of cultural affairs had split up and it

was divided up into an office of East European exchanges which dealt with Eastern Europe. The Soviet part of it got attached to the political desk.

Q: What was the impression when you were on the desk of the Khrushchev leadership and I think probably while you were there he was deposed, wasn't he? How did that sort of hit what people were talking about?

BARRY: I'm trying to remember. If such a major event happened it's strange that I wouldn't have been involved in it somehow at the time or made a bigger impression on me.

Q: Somehow I have the feeling that it happened... I was in Belgrade and left there in June of '67. I'm quite sure I remember Khrushchev being on the outs. Did you get any feel for Khrushchev?

BARRY: This was the time when this was the post missile crisis detente period when there were a lot of things going on in terms of new directions in arms control beginnings and things like that. I'm going to have to refresh my memory about all this because it doesn't I guess my nose was too close to the grindstone to have.

Q: Well, fair enough I mean all of us were doing things and I mean this was how, you know, how any office operates. Then did you get on to the Garmisch-Partenkirchen gravy train or not?

BARRY: I did. I guess the other thing that I did during that period on two or three separate occasions was to go up to the UN General Assembly to be sort of general handyman, note taker and things like that and to help deal with Soviet affairs from that angle in a very minor way. In fact I remember the first year I was up there I was told by the political counselor at the U.S. Mission to the UN since I was a Soviet hand I ought to go out to the airport and meet all these distinguished Soviet experts who were coming in to be there for Rusk's discussions with Gromyko. I took one of the mission's big cars out to the airport and I was picking up Tommy Thompson and Chip Bohlen. These were names that were familiar to me, but I couldn't recognize one of them if they stepped on me. I went out there in my best meeting and greeting style and said to the wrong one, "Hello, Ambassador Bohlen. My name is Barry." He looked at me and said, "I'm Thompson, he's Bohlen." I felt about better later on because after serving as a section chief for a year in Thompson's embassy I went down the elevator with him on his last day there and he obviously didn't know who I was. I guess that in those days of course there was always a bilateral with the Russians and they always brought the ambassador back from Moscow, Bohlen was at that time the special assistant to the secretary on Soviet affairs. This was the early times of the Jewish Defense League and all the activities of the mission to the UN and there were these various other issues going on at the time.

Anyhow after two years of laboring in the vineyards, both Tom Niles and I did succeed being sent to the Garmisch gravy train, which was as advertised a very nice experience.

The first thing we did when we got there was to take a six-week trip through Eastern Europe and the USSR. The army set this up, of course they have all these foreign area specialization programs and in most of them they indeed send the military officers to the country in which they are specializing, but that wasn't possible in the USSR. So, they created this institute made up largely of people who had recently defected from the USSR who had come back from the Vlasov armies or who had gotten out in the '20s and '30s and had been in Europe and were attracted to this place. Because they came from different periods of immigration, some of them came from the KGB, some of them came from the GRU, some of them came from the foreign ministry. They didn't get along very well. Some of them were Chechens; they didn't get along very well with each other. It was a place where they carried out all their arguments in Russian so you were forced to work hard on your Russian and there were usually three or four of us State Department, USIA, NSA people who were there for each class.

The military program was two years. We did one year and as a familiarization tour we went to, I guess we went through Intourist as a tourist group, we got Intourist guides and all that, but we started out through Czechoslovakia and Poland and then into the Baltic States and to St. Petersburg and to Moscow and then we took the train and plane all across the USSR and spent four or five days on the Trans-Siberian Railroad and then came back through the southern tier, through Kiev and through Romania and Bulgaria. So, it gave us a good, if gray initial look because it all took place in October and November. It was very hard to get into a kind of conversational situation with Russians because the Intourist guides knew we were from the so-called famous spy school and were eager to isolate us as much as possible, but still wanted our money. On the Trans-Siberian for example, you'd get thrown willy nilly into discussions with Russians. It was fascinating, sort of a first impression which was one of great hardship at the time. We thought Poland was pretty grim, but when we got to the USSR and began to look at places like Bratsk and Novosibirsk and places like that we realized what a gray and dull life it could be. The Russians were fascinating and I have enjoyed Russians ever since. Of course we got to know a lot of Russians in Garmisch, one of the more recent emigres, I guess had been a defector who'd been, had something to do with the military, but he was somebody in his thirties and very critical of course of everything he saw around him among the Americans. It turned out later he was probably a plant because he redefected after being there for a couple of years. He wrote a series of articles about the spy school, which greatly exaggerated its abilities. I remember he came over to the house one day and said something about, "Well, you Americans are crazy about guns. I look around and I see all your children are playing with guns. It's a violent society." I was saying that this was healthy because it taught you how to argue in Russia with Russians. Just at that point my three-year-old son came walking into the room with a new Christmas present which was a big gun, so big he could barely carry it.

There was also a very fascinating couple there who were from the old NTS which was a sort of left-wing populist anti-Bolshevik group that had a lot of connections among intellectuals in Russia. They had something to do with Sinyausky and Daniel and they introduced us to the Russian writers of that time and made us read them in Russian. That really gave us an excellent introduction into the underground and dissident literature of

that time. So, that by the time we got there we not only had picked up about Russian military terminology, but also, were able to discuss intellectual questions pretty well.

Q: How did you find the American military related to this part of the training or was this more I mean did you kind of divide yourself up into the military in wanting to know how to say, "Take me to your 155 mm canons" while you at the same time tell me about your intellectual.

BARRY: Well, it was interesting. The army of course, is very different from the navy or the air force. The army does have a genuine and successful foreign area specialization program and they do usually use the people who graduate from these programs as their attaches and later. In serving with people who had done this I have much more respect for the army attaches, not that they aren't all good people, but that the people who went through this FAS program were basically head and shoulders above others in terms of their knowledge and breadth and interest about the country. Yes, there were some people in the group who were nuts and bolts people. Of course, in the FAS program you maintain your original specialty. Some of them were intelligence specialists, others were combat arms specialists. This was the Vietnam period, so a lot of them were either coming out of Vietnam or were going into Vietnam. In fact one of the sad things about the school was that so many of the people who were trained there never went on to do anything in the Soviet area. They ended up going back to Vietnam or getting involved in other things. I think that these were all people who were genuinely interested in the USSR. This was at the time when this was considered to be the main national security challenge so it was more than the location of the nearest howitzer that they were interested in.

Q: I interviewed somebody not too long ago about the army, the National Defense University who said that he was told before he went and he said it was true, he said that you can characterize the air force as being the most non-intellectual group of this. The navy as being really rather narrow as far as what they knew and the army would be just like us speaking just like us in the Foreign Service in a way with a broader view.

BARRY: I think the army does a better job of giving various kinds of postgraduate training. Both the navy and the air force don't promote you unless you have been able to hold increasing command responsibilities. You can't get to be an admiral unless you've commanded a capital ship. The amount of time that you get to spend on out of area interests is considerably smaller. I went to school with the newly frocked generals and admirals, this so-called Capstone course. I think it's even true at that level. The NDU gets them sort of at an earlier stage, but there again I thought that the army people were generally broader and more inclined to have done training in areas like political science or MBAs or something like that. But their foreign area specialization I think has been a great success. The problem with it is that many of them get selected out before they ever make colonel.

Q: So, this would have been '67 and '68 you were at Garmisch? Then where did you go in '68?

BARRY: I went to Moscow. Everybody went to Moscow, that is Tom and I and George Humphrey who was the third person of our class all went to Moscow together. I was lucky or perhaps it was before I had worked on the consular convention for Toon in Washington. I became head of the consular section when I arrived there. Usually the routine was that you would spend the first year as a junior officer in the consular section or in the administrative section or someplace else and then go on to a second year in which you'd do something else. I got the head of the consular section job. In fact I relieved classmate of mine at Dartmouth who had introduced me to my wife, Sam Fry, who had been in Trieste when we were in Zagreb. So, I had an interesting year in the consular section. This was not a time when the consular section was terribly busy. We did have a few arrested Americans as a result of the closing of the borders in Iran. Anyhow it had diverted the drug smuggling trade which normally went through Kabul to Europe from Afghanistan without ever going through the USSR. But, when that got shut off because of Iran, these people started to fly from Kabul to Tashkent to Moscow and then out to the West. The chief of police in Kabul ran the drug sales business and what he would do was he would sell a consignment of drugs to somebody who was going through Tashkent and would tell the people in Tashkent that these people were coming and they were arrested. The drugs would come back and get recycled. So, there were a lot of hapless people who were caught up in this and who were in jail variously in Tashkent and then in Moscow. I went to their trials in Tashkent, which led me to spend at least five or six different trips down to, Tashkent using the new consular convention I got to have access to them in the prisons.

I got to visit the Butyr'skiya prison in Moscow. These were prisons that were left over from the time of Catherine the Great and had been very little improved since and they're described in all of the various literature by people like Solzhenitsyn, but it was fascinating to be able to go into these places and meet the Americans and to sit through these trials. By that time I had sort of developed an interest in Soviet law because that was part of what we were doing with the consular convention and so forth. We had a lawyer that we picked up in Tashkent who represented all these Americans going to the trials. He was Jewish and got a chance to see some of the tension that existed in Central Asia between the Russians and the Uzbeks or the Kazakhs or whatever of course they told you it didn't exist, but of course you get down there and talk to people and they would. One Uzbek told me that his son was chasing a Russian who had stolen his bicycle and chased him into a Russian apartment building where he was stoned to death in the courtyard of the apartment building. They never could get any of the local people to develop an interest in taking this to court or anything like that. We learned about how to make a sensational appeal and got all the relatives and so forth to write character witnesses. Eventually I think most of these people got released before their terms were out. There were some efforts to trade them for espionage, people in the U.S., but of course, we weren't at all interested in doing that.

Q: Who were these Americans?

BARRY: These were people who were in the early days of sort of wandering around the

world. Usually they were coming back from the Far East. They'd been in Thailand or some place like that. They were not professional couriers, they were just young people in their twenties who had gotten into the drug culture and were told that this was an easy way to make enough money to keep yourself traveling around the world and just to carry this stuff along.

Q: How did they exist in the prison systems?

BARRY: Well, I'm sure it wasn't easy. They were allowed to receive packages from outside. They, I don't think any of them were physically seriously mistreated. These were people, who were used to sort of living on the thin edge anyhow. They were glad to get out.

Q: It sounds sort of like the way it was in Greece. I was there '70 to '74 and we had a lot of them and they were put in a Greek jail, it wasn't great, but they really didn't have to do anything, they just sat in the jail and contemplated their naval until eventually they were let out.

BARRY: No, these guys had to work. I think they were first imprisoned and tried in Tashkent, then they were brought to Moscow and then they were transferred to camps in Mordovia again where they did things like making brooms and things like that. They complained that the quota was set too high. They could never get enough to earn any money and that kind of thing.

Q: How about life in, you were in Moscow from when to when now?

BARRY: Well, I was there from '68 to '70. Then we were supposed to go and open the consulate in Leningrad, but that was delayed for a year so I came back and went back in '71 and I was there from '71 to '73, but this time in Leningrad.

Q: Speaking about the Moscow time, how was life there then?

BARRY: It was very insular because there was a lot of fear of fraternization and restrictions on fraternization on both sides. Of course the Russians were not very easy to get to know either. The diplomatic community did a lot of entertaining of each other. Insofar as one got to know Russians, these were the dissidents; these were the artists mostly. This was where many people who were there at that time still have paintings by Kropovnitsky or Kukhin or people like that because these were the only Russians you really could meet on a regular basis. You could in fact deal with some of the correspondent. Later on the second year there when I was dealing with substantive things I was talking to people like Evgeny Primakov, now the foreign minister, and people like that and you had more to do with the foreign ministry. In that first year there were lots of wonderful cultural things to do. The Taganka Theater was in its heyday and we used to catch as much of the theater as we could because this was where if you were watching a play about 17th century France, you were sure it was really about the current Soviet Union and things like Bulgakov and Master and Margarita and things like that. We could travel of course with the restriction that you had to let people know in advance where you

were going and they sometimes would not let you go or tell you at the last minute that the place was closed. The embassy had an active travel program and so we went out in addition to these consular visits and got around a fair amount. Of course, there was the theater and opera and music which was all very good. The apartment living was not bad I would say. There were various apartments scattered around town most of which we still have today. Superior I would say to the compound style of living that existed in Belgrade and later to our regret we put into effect in the new building that we have in Moscow.

There was there of course, a good deal of obvious harassment. I think it was my first year there that there was a Pravda correspondent in New York who'd had his car stolen by a genuine auto thief. The car was found several days later in a junkyard or some place with all of the seats taken out and the battery and everything like that. I was going to an art exhibit in the Menage, which is right in front of the National Hotel right across from the Kremlin, and I took my big ugly Ford station wagon. At that time we were only allowed to have American cars and so I had this station wagon which I absolutely hated. It was sort of a bilious green and it was full of stuff from the commissary. I got out of my car and a militiaman was standing right there. I went into the Menage, saw the exhibit, came back and the car was gone. I said to the militiaman, "Where's my car?" He says, "What car?" So, I figured out that this was no doubt retaliation and indeed it was so precise retaliation that in the same number of days after they, the police called the embassy and said, "We found your car unfortunately it doesn't have any tires, it doesn't have any engine, it doesn't have any of this stuff, but please send the embassy tow truck down to pick it up." I said, "Well, I don't really think I'll do that. I fortunately have my car insured by the Soviet government insurance agency. Ingostrakh. You tell me the car is a total wreck, I'll have the insurance company come and take a look at it." That infuriated them of course because the last thing that the KGB expected to do was to have the Soviet insurance company pay me for the car. Apparently some of this fury was picked up later in terms of what we heard from the telephone conversations that were going on at the time. But the insurance company paid, I took the money, I went to Finland and I got myself a new Volvo station wagon for the same amount of money. Jake Beam, who was then the ambassador, managed to assign me to go up to be present at the beginning of the SALT Talks in Helsinki as a means of being able to let Peggy and me go up to pick up the car. So, that turned out all right.

Q: Were there any problems during this first time you were there in '68 to '70 as far as provocations for you or your family or anything like that?

BARRY: I mean there were the kinds of things where we would say we were going out and we would forget something and come back to the apartment and find that the wires were all hanging out of the walls because they had started to improve the listening devices and that kind of thing. Actually one of the, I guess we took a nanny with us who was not a very bright woman, but she fell in with a Russian who lived somewhere in that same complex and it turned out the Russian's uncle was one of the people that monitored our tapes and she got taken into the room or found the room where they had all these tapes running, but provocations in the sense of the kind of thing one usually thinks of, entrapment, no. But it happened to other people and we were actually probably

excessively warned to keep our heads down. We arrived there on the day before the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia. All social contacts were forbidden, deep freeze in relations so that first year was conditioned very much by all that. Yes, I remember one of the first things I don't know how we fell into this group, but there was a group of Russians who were clearly very much disenchanted by all this. We were doing something with them, which involved watching the hockey game between Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union in which the Czechs unexpectedly beat the pants off the Russians. This was a case of great celebration by the Russians who were there who were feeling pretty bad about what had happened.

Q: Obviously you were focused on consular affairs. This was early Brezhnev, wasn't it?

BARRY: Early Brezhnev.

Q: What were you getting sort of from your colleagues who were dealing more with the government than?

BARRY: Because of the Czech thing we had not very much to do with the government at that time. This was the time when we had hoped, when Johnson had hoped to have the beginning of the SALT negotiations at the end of his term. This was the time when Vietnam was escalating and there was lots of propaganda about Vietnam. Actually we in the consular section were not all that busy and so we did have time and inclination to do a fair amount of reporting as well. I took my particular specialty, Soviet law, especially Soviet criminal law, and followed a lot of the cultural things going on. I think George Humphrey did some of the same things. We were both scheduled to go on to the political section for our second year there. I remember that I sent a memo to Coby Swank, the DCM at that time, a copy of which I still have someplace saying, here we are sitting down here with not enough to do for three of us in the consular section. We'd really like to supplement what the embassy is doing and other things and so please give us assignments and things to do. I think really during that period we spent as much time doing reporting as we did doing consular work.

The consular cases, well there were some interesting protection cases. I remember one automobile accident out and around Smolensk where Americans had been in a crash. It was still possible to drive your car although it was kind of hard to do in those days. So, we went out to visit these people who were in a regular old hospital in the back woods. The regular old hospitals in Moscow weren't so hot, but out there in the countryside they had nothing. They were sort of in these gurneys along the wall of the corridor of the hospital. Because they had been so smashed up in their faces the treatment that they had used to reduce the suffusion of blood was leeches. The daughter was a registered nurse and was initially kind of horrified by it, but as she saw how this all worked, she thought well this isn't such a bad idea after all.

Q: What was your impression of Soviet law? Did you get a feel for it beyond what happened with Americans, which would be almost atypical? With others I mean was it a solid working system did you feel?

BARRY: Well, it was very much slanted in favor of the State. By the time a case had proceeded through a preliminary investigation a decision had been made as to whether the person was guilty or not. The only question was what the degree of severity of the sentence should be. In a way this is true of any Napoleonic code country because the procurator or the investigator has the task of both prosecution and defense as it were. We did go to a fair number of trials, just to Russian trials where you can walk into courtrooms and sit down just to be able to observe the nature of the proceedings. They had a judge and they had two so-called peoples' assessors who were sort of the functional equivalent of a jury-people who were not trained in the law, but sat in with the judge to help make up their minds on things like this. The legal community was very much under the gun under the communist party and we were in a case for example of some of the people who we got to know because they were defending Americans were occasionally people who were before people who had defended dissidents. They were certainly not good for your legal practice to do that kind of thing and you could get yourself removed from the Lawyers Collegium, which was the group of lawyers who dealt with these things, if you were too assiduous of your defense of somebody.

The other thing we did a lot of in those days was to go to lectures, the so-called knowledge society ran lectures on international affairs, on domestic affairs and people who held the title of lecturers of the communist party would go around and appear in so-called red corners of the housing units and in other public venues to sort of give people the low down of what was going on in the world or at home. Then the various deputies at election time would go out and lecture and sort of present themselves to their constituents as then would-be representative in the parliament. These were generally much more revealing than the newspapers, they weren't supposed to be for foreigners. If they knew you were a foreigner they wouldn't let you in, but we would sort of dress up looking our most Russian and we would buy subscriptions to the lectures and we'd go to the door and pay our two rubles and walk in and sit down. I think in many ways that was the most productive reporting we had on domestic political issues and some foreign policy issues. I mean I recall going to these appearances of deputies and being convinced at the very depth of cynicism about the political system because the people in general were complaining and dismissing whatever promises they heard. I mean, there was this one woman who stood up in one of these lectures and said that, "I've been coming to these lectures for 20 years ever since the end of the war. You're the fifth deputy that's come up here. Every time one of you comes I say in 1944 an artillery shell came through the wall of my apartment and the next day somebody put up some boards to keep the cold out, but nobody has ever come to repair it since." She said, "I'll bet you will say that you will see to it that somebody comes and repairs my apartment, but I'll bet you that ten years from now that wall will still be unrepaired." Indeed, when I was back in Moscow a few weeks ago as an election observer I ran into the same kind of complaints by people about their elected representatives. People would ask questions about Vietnam and doesn't the war in Vietnam mean that there's no way in which we and the Americans would get along. The lecturers would essentially say, "No, no, I mean the Vietnamese have got their own problems. It's very important for us to get along with the Americans" and that kind of thing. At the same time you'd hear some of the most scandalous stories about the kinds of

subversion that the American Embassy was up to and things like that, but these lectures were I think a very valuable insight into the society.

Q: You were in the political section from what?

BARRY: This was '69 to '70 and to my surprise I was double hatted. The person who had been the Middle East person, was Norman Anderson, was somebody who genuinely knew something about the Middle East, but for some reason or other they were short on people that year, maybe somebody had been expelled, but I was partly the multilateral section and partly the internal section. The multilateral portfolio I had was the Middle East which was interesting because that was the time in which we were carrying out first quadripartite and then bilateral negotiations with the Soviets about the Middle East in the wake of the '67 war. The idea was to develop a framework for peace talks and of course the Soviets wanted to be co-chairman and wanted to establish their own droit de regard over events in the Middle East. We were eager to keep them out, but on the other hand, their relationships with the Egyptians and the Syrians and such was such that we couldn't entirely exclude them. This was the time that Joe Sisco was assistant secretary. Roy Atherton was the office director in charge of the bilateral negotiations so they were coming back and forth and Joe and Roy would come and we would have discussions with the Soviets in hopes of developing this bilateral track into something that would allow more progress to take place in the four power forum which is what we preferred, but which the Soviets didn't really want to play ball and they didn't want to emphasize the bilateral part of it. So, it was there that I got to know Primakov who was the Middle East correspondent of Izvestiya who is now the foreign minister and a lot of people in the foreign ministry in the Middle East division and in the Americas division. While on the internal side I followed things like some of the dissident trials and I guess developments in, the Sinyausky-Daniel case and all that kind of thing. That was a quite interesting combination of things to do.

Q: Our ambassador was Malcolm Toon the whole time you were there?

BARRY: No. Toon was office director in Washington and later deputy assistant secretary. He didn't come to Moscow until the '80s. My first ambassador was Tommy Thompson and the second year it was Jake Beam.

Q: Could you tell a little about how first Thompson and then Beam ran, I mean your impression of how they both ran the embassy and how they, what you were getting from them about?

BARRY: Well, Thompson was very distant. It was his second time there. He'd had a marvelous first tour during the Khrushchev period where things were quite open and he was able to go to receptions and talk to Khrushchev and talk to all the key people. The second time the relationship was not doing well to say the least. This was in the early Brezhnev years and so it didn't have the sort of spontaneity it had before. I think he was not in the best of health at that time and I think he really didn't feel he needed an embassy. He was the person who knew everything there was to know about the place and

so he was a rather distant figure I say after being there for a year and then going to his staff meetings every week. I know he didn't know who I was.

Q: I had the same feeling in Belgrade with George Kennan. He would go around and say, "What do we hear from the political section, Alex? and from the consular section?" You know, I mean and all this I realized he never really focused on who I was. Let me, wait a second, this just went off.

BARRY: Jack Beam was a different sort of a person and his wife Peggy was a very engaging person who wanted to involve everybody, very warm. I guess Beam was in Prague at the time of the invasion, so had been there before of course but it had been right after the war. He didn't have the long background in Soviet affairs that Thompson did so he was sort of feeling his way and of course he's a very laconic sort of personality, but somebody who was always interested in what people had to say. So, I think he and the embassy felt more engaged than before. The two DCMs who were there were first Coby Swank and then Boris Klosson. They were both very good. Basically it was a very good embassy both of those years. Stape Roy was there in the multilateral section with me at the time and Tom Niles and many others who'd gone on to very distinguished careers.

Q: Did you notice any difference (I mean obviously you were not at the level where you would feel it unless it came sort of ajar,) but the arrival of the Nixon administration in '69 on relations with the Soviet Union and Henry Kissinger was the national security advisor?

BARRY: Well, I had a lot to do with that later on, but I think the first awareness that I had of it was a trip by Kissinger to Moscow which they had not advised me that he was coming. I guess the only way that Jake found out about it was when the foreign ministry called him and invited him to go say goodbye to Henry as he left which I can say was not taken very well, not only by the ambassador, but by the other officers. I think in that period these Middle East negotiations were going on in the Nixon administration. There was the bilateral thing that Joe Sisco was doing, so in that sense, in some ways things had thawed out since the invasion of Czechoslovakia. At that stage the Russians all assumed that Nixon was going to be a extreme anti-communist and were the propaganda was very anti-Nixon and there were not great expectations.

Q: All right, why don't we end this at this point. We'll pick this up, what happened in '70 did you go back?

BARRY: I was designated to be the advance party for the consulate in Leningrad, but without going back to the States, for one reason or another I ended up coming back to the States and going to USUN for a year.

Q: Okay, so we'll talk about USUN in 1971? Okay? Good.

Today is the 4th of October, 2001. I think there's been about a five year gap, hasn't there? But, really we're picking this up in 1970, the summer of 1970. This would put you in time with the UN autumn session and all that.

BARRY: I came back originally because my father was ill. Also they weren't ready yet to open the offices in Leningrad. They hadn't been able to find adequate space, so I went back to my sort of home base EUR/SOV and they said, "Oh, we need somebody in New York." This was a time of the Jewish Defense League and the terrorists attacks against the Soviets.

Q: You might explain a little for somebody who isn't too familiar with what this was.

BARRY: This was a radical Jewish group led by Rabbi Meir Kahane and their issue was Jewish emigration, but their instrument of choice was attacks against Soviet mission personnel. They were really quite radical. It went beyond harassment; there had even been a couple of shots fired through school bus windows and things like that. So, the school buses were attacked and it was particularly virulent in New York and so they needed somebody to go up there and work with the Soviet mission and also to act as a political advisor on the staff of USUN. There were people who felt with the Russians who had served in Moscow and spoke Russian so we went up there. Finally found a place we could afford to live in.

Q: It's always a major problem, isn't it?

BARRY: Well, we ended up in a place called Scarborough on the Hudson in a house that had been owned by John L. Lewis's daughter, the mine worker union leader. It was a beautiful view, but it was a terrible commute. Anyhow, this was during the period when Charles Yost was the permanent representative at least at the beginning phase of my time. I remember being in and meeting with Ambassador Yost when somebody handed him a piece of paper from the news wire that announced that Nixon had announced the appointment of George H. W. Bush as permanent representative, something that profoundly disturbed Yost who had no advance notice of it. The rest of us who wondered what a congressman from Texas could possibly contribute to this. In the event George Bush was, I thought, a very excellent permanent representative because he didn't know much about the whole thing he tended to rely more on his staff than Yost did. My particular series of events had a lot to do with him over time. There were other things going on in the UN as well. We were dealing with the Russians about the Middle East. That had just been my portfolio at the embassy in Moscow and so we continued discussions about the idea of co-chairmanship or the quadripartite efforts to promote aid to a settlement. This was of course still during the pre-detente period, but was sort of the beginnings of the flowering of the detente to be followed by the summit in 1972 in Moscow. This was still the period of feeling one another out.

Of course, there was a lot going on in the Security Council and of course, that involved us a good deal. One of my jobs as it were being the junior person who was supposed to go out and try to twist other delegates' arms to support U.S. positions on one issue or

another and by and large it was a very interesting year. At the end of that year, Bush asked me if I didn't want to stay, but I had by that time invested quite a lot in going to Leningrad. I did, by the way, stay in touch with George H. W. Bush over the years. He is an inveterate note writer, so whenever something came up he would sort of handwrite notes to people that he'd known at that time. When he went to China when he was vice president, that connection remained. In fact it was when I was nominated as ambassador to Bulgaria in 1981 he called to give me the word that the White House had approved this. I wasn't there. I was walking the dog or something, so Peggy got the call from Vice President Bush and made the somewhat naive mistake of asking him if he knew New Hampshire. He said he knew every drug store in the whole state. Anyhow, we at that same time had bought a house of our own in New Hampshire.

Q: Where in New Hampshire?

BARRY: In a place called Rindge, which is down on the border with Massachusetts near Mount Monadnock. We had just moved into this place. It was a small town of about 1,200. I went to Leningrad in July and Peggy stayed in New Hampshire. We made the arrangements so that she could come out from New Hampshire. She had to pack an awful lot of food and things like that at that time going into the USSR.

Q: I'd like to back up and talk a little about the UN. I would imagine that the Soviet delegation would be just absolutely mad as hell about this Jewish Defense League stuff. Were you able to mollify or do anything on that?

BARRY: They were mad as hell and I don't blame them for being mad as hell. The New York police were less than 100% into doing something about this, so a lot of what we did was pressure on the police and on the mayor to take this more seriously. Of course, the argument we used is well we're very vulnerable to reciprocity in these things. I knew about that firsthand because I had already had my car destroyed the year before in Moscow as a matter of reciprocity. Somebody had stolen a car belonging to a TASS correspondent in New York and the car was eventually found stripped of everything. So, exactly the same thing happened to my car by coincidence. It was stolen from in front of the Menage, which is in the center, by the National Hotel in the center of Moscow. I found it exactly the same number of days all torn up. So, the Soviets foreign ministry called and said you've got to come and get your car. It's a mess, but these things happened. I said no that I wasn't really interested because I happen to have insurance with the Soviet State Insurance Company, in Ingostrakh, and they would pay for it all. I hated the car anyhow and since at that time you had to buy American cars, but I then managed to go up and buy a Volvo with the money that Ingostrakh gave me. I think it annoyed the KGB considerably to find that they had somebody else and that the Soviet government had to pay for their reciprocity.

Q: How did you find the Nixon administration, this was early days, in about when you arrived about 18 months. How did they treat the UN, because the UN has often been particularly on the Republican side sort of a focal point of unhappiness or something?

BARRY: Well, obviously, Bush was in with the Nixon administration and when he became permanent representative I think that he was an advocate for making better use of the UN. This was really before we had any of these deep ideological UN feelings, before we had had the problems with payment of the dues and so forth. In issues like Southern Africa where we were beginning to work on independence in places like Namibia and Northern Rhodesia and places like that, the UN was an important tool. When it came to the Middle East, although I guess we were in many cases facing a defensive battle against the resolutions which would have created problems with Israel it was nevertheless an important place. We had annual consultations where the president came up and met with other heads of state. We had the secretary of state to go up at the beginning of every session of the general assembly for two or three weeks. We'd have a round of bilateral discussions with all kinds of people. Whenever Gromyko came to the UN he came down to Washington and met with the president and that kind of thing. I think it certainly, the relationship with the UN when they got their own person in there, you know Bush had a voice and he was a member of the cabinet.

Q: Did you get involved in Jewish migration that issue of from the Soviet Union?

BARRY: Oh, yes. I mean this was a field that I was involved in when I was head of the consular section in Moscow. It was a political issue that continued to be. Then it was before the Jackson-Vanik legislation had headed the agenda, but it was a very prominent public issue then. In Dobrynin's memoirs says he could never understand why the leadership of the Politburo was so adamant on this issue, that he would have thought it would have saved all kinds of problems one way or the other for them to allow Jewish emigration. In '73 it went up to something like 40,000 and then there was negotiation about a quota of 60,000 or 50,000 that went on in '74, but then detente crumbled and that was cut off again entirely. In the early days it was considered to be treason if you wanted to leave and that was a view held very strongly by the KGB and by the conservative members of the Politburo and they carried it on.

Q: Did the fine hand of Henry Kissinger at that time, the national security advisor come across your radar?

BARRY: It didn't really come into the things that were going on at the UN. It certainly did later on in '72 when I was in Leningrad and that was the time of course when Kissinger came to town to prepare for the summit and didn't even tell Ambassador Beam that he was there until he'd been there for four days and then he just called in to announce that he'd been there. This really angered and humiliated Ambassador Beam. At the time I was at the USUN and hadn't really emerged as an issue.

Q: Then you went to Leningrad. What was the background of opening up Leningrad?

BARRY: We had had consulates in the USSR before the war. We had a consulate in Leningrad, which had been in the location of our previous embassy in St. Petersburg. We had, during the war, a consulate in Vladivostok. These were shut down after the war and during the period of concern about internal security and the McCarthy period and so

forth. The USSR kept travel restrictions on Americans in the Soviet Union and we had reciprocated by putting restrictions on their travel in the U.S. Mac Toon in particular, who was the director of Soviet affairs in the late '60s, believed that it was important for us to open more windows on the USSR because he felt that we were more restricted in the information that we could gather than they were in what they could get through open sources in the U.S. He worked on the issue of a consular convention with the USSR which could give us greater rights in terms of access to arrested citizens and regulate citizenship cases and things like that. This had slow going in the congress because they were very suspicious of anything like that. They thought that it was going to lead to the opening of many Soviet consulates in the U.S., which the FBI was against. We made the argument that the two things were divisible, that we could have a consular convention without having consulates. Then the consular convention did go through the congress. It was ratified. We then used it to good effect in being able to insist upon access to arrested Americans in three to five days and all those regulations that went along with it. Then the discussion began of reciprocal consulates in San Francisco and in Leningrad. By 1970 there had been agreed in principle, but of course the great problem was premises. They didn't want to give us anything that would be either too centrally located or would enable us to carry out intelligence operations that they didn't want us to do and of course our people had the same problem in San Francisco. They got themselves a quite desirable space in a high location in San Francisco and they offered us quite unsatisfactory office premises that had common walls with a building on both sides, which was bad from a security point of view.

The consul general at the time, Culver Gleysteen, was quite happy with the consul general's residence, which was a small palace, which had been occupied at one point by one of the Czar's mistresses. He was in favor of moving in, but the question of office space had not been satisfactorily resolved. So when I went there in the summer of '71, our office and our living space was in the Hotel Astoria. It was at least a step up from where they wanted to put us, which was the Hotel Baltiskaya, fit only for spies and dogs. We worked out of a suite in the Astoria and lived there with our three children, dog, and a teacher we had to bring along for our children. There were at that point two other families there, and the consul general and his wife. That circumstance, well it was quite interesting.

Q: You were there from 1971?

BARRY: Until '73. Because this was a place where there had been no NATO diplomats before, the local KGB had not yet quite caught up with the surveillance issue. So, in that sense it was more open than Moscow, although at times I think that I was used as the training vehicle for the KGB because I would always have three or four cars following me at the same time.

There were lots of things that went on there that you could gain access to you which you wouldn't have had access to in Moscow. Public lectures or quasi-public lectures or closed party meetings were some of the more interesting events. By sort of looking as much like a grungy Russian as possible you could walk into these meetings because they often put

posters on the wall advertising that there was going to be a discussion by a party instructor at a closed meeting. You could go in there and listen to all this stuff and later report on it. Of course we didn't have any classified communications facilities so the way we'd do that is we would write it out in longhand, take it down to the train from Helsinki to Moscow because there would be an American on that train as a courier. You'd run down to the train station about midnight and stick your envelope through the window to the courier who would carry it down to the embassy.

We sometimes got very interesting information that ended up on the president's desk. One of them this was at the time that I think Kosygin was in Vietnam we were bombing Haiphong. We did this when Kosygin was there, and we did not know if this meant that the Nixon summit would be called off. I was in this closed party meeting at the time when somebody raised this question and the answer from the party instructor was, "No, we discussed that in the party and we have decided that this meeting must go ahead, that it is possible to have reductions of tensions despite U.S. actions in Vietnam." That was the first time we'd heard anything about that through all of our various sophisticated intelligence gathering. That bit of information sort of floated to the top. In Moscow I would run around from one of these things to another and listening to what they said about both economic and political issues and international relations in general and in Leningrad I did the same.

Q: Well, I've heard from others, too, saying that during these discussions, the public would come in and ask quite frank questions and they'd get quite frank answers, completely different from the gobbledygook that came out of Pravda or something like that?

BARRY: Exactly. That was I think probably our most valuable political reporting source.

Q: Did you have much contact with the Soviets?

BARRY: Much more than we did in Moscow. Eventually I think after about six months of living in the Hotel Astoria we got into our apartment. We got a quite nice apartment. It actually was a six-room apartment that had seven families in it before we moved in. It had been built of course as a one family apartment and then we went through it once and a local diplomatic service corps was showing us this possibility. In each of the six rooms there were families, and one room was divided in half, so there were two families in there. The people who lived there were not unhappy to be moved out because it meant that they went back to the top of the list for a separate apartment as opposed to a communal apartment. So, we moved in there and we were the only foreign family in the building. In Moscow of course we lived in a completely segregated facility with guards outside who kept the Russians out. We had some fairly substantial personal contacts with the neighbors in the building including a navy lieutenant commander who invited us to dinner at his house. The people upstairs from us were I think there because of the listening devices that were directed at us, but their kids came and played with ours. So, we had Soviet children in the apartment playing and our children went out and played hockey with them. We knew the sort of dissident crowd; artists and one person that we

knew quite well. He used to come by; he began to ask us about Nixon's plans for when he came to Leningrad. I could tell this wasn't a smart thing to talk about in front of the microphones. He didn't reappear in our lives again until three or four years later when he turned up on our doorstep in Washington. What had happened to him was that he had been arrested and taken to an insane asylum and had been committed. His mother was a doctor of some kind, so she got him out, but only to get an exit visa and he was required to go immediately to Israel. He didn't like Israel much either so he got out of there. I think he ended up at the Thunderbird School of Business in Arizona. Then he came back to Washington. Anyhow, that was the kind of experience that we also knew quite well. We knew the painter Rukhin and his family, he eventually died in a fire in his studio, which some people accused the KGB of setting.

Well, we spent a lot of time preparing for the Nixon summit because one of the features of that was a side trip to Leningrad where there was a very detailed program of things for him to do. Our job was to ensure that the palace at Pavlovsk, which was one of the gems of the Czarist era, was properly prepared for the Nixon visit. That included replacing the Turkish bomb sights with real toilets in case the president or his wife needed to use them. Everything went smoothly, but within six hours after the Nixons left the toilets were removed again and reassembled at some party chieftain's place. The head of the local party organization at that time was Romanov as in the Czars and one of his notable adventures was that when his daughter got married he got all of the Romanov porcelain table settings out of the Hermitage and set the table for the wedding. I remember things were broken presumably as a result of throwing them around during the party. But Romanov was quite a hardliner and he was a full member of the politburo at that time.

Q: He was considered one of the heirs presumptive, too, wasn't he?

BARRY: For a while.

Q: For a while.

BARRY: There was a longstanding rivalry between Leningrad and Moscow and the other thing that Romanov got himself into was the support for the idea of making Leningrad the capital of the Russian Federation. They would keep Moscow as the capital of the USSR, but all of this, I mean that was how Kirov got himself in trouble back in 1934. So, I think Romanov overstepped himself. There was a lot of sentiment for Leningrad as being a more European city.

Q: Did you notice a difference between the thrust of what you call political and cultural life between Leningrad and Moscow?

BARRY: Well, certainly the theater in Leningrad was very active. As today there are dozens of beautiful theaters. The Kirov Ballet and the opera was eclipsed by the Bolshoi, but of course it had a proud tradition of its own. All the people of Leningrad thought they were more cultured than the people were in Moscow.

Q: Unlike those “nekultarni” in Moscow?

BARRY: Right. We did run into a lot of the former aristocracy one way or the other, walking the dog. Peggy ran into an elderly woman who was left over from the old days and still had the part of her old apartment, but then people were, once you announced who you were and why you were there, then obviously they knew that you were a dangerous person to be around. We had a dacha on the Baltic Sea north of Leningrad which was a very nice place to spend weekends and go skiing on the ice in the Baltic and drive to Finland and so forth. The diplomatic community was much smaller than in Moscow. Our closest friends were the Finns. Of course, their main task aside from maintaining friendly relationships with the bear at their doorstep, was to pick up the odd Finn who had forgotten to get back on the boat after coming over on the weekend to get cheap Vodka. The Finns knew the country quite well. We were standing on the review stand for the parade for the great October socialist revolution and a Cuban colleague gave us all Cuban cigars and our Finnish colleague gave us all Finnish Vodka to keep us warm. There were no other NATO countries that were represented at the time.

Q: How about American tourism or West European tourism, I mean, the great cultural center. Was there much going on?

BARRY: There wasn't very much going on then. I mean we had occasional American cultural groups coming through, but it was I think still pretty much off the beaten track.

Q: How about the Nixon visit, how did that go?

BARRY: It went smoothly, but there were certainly some rough parts leading up to it. I remember Peggy Beam being absolutely enraged by this marine major who was part of the advance. He was running around the house checking it over for the Nixons and Mrs. Beam was talking about how we were going to do the dinner here and his response to her was lady get out of here. We're doing this and we don't want you to be hanging over our shoulder all the time. So, I don't think from that point of view it went well. All advance parties can be very difficult to deal with. This was probably the most difficult one I can remember.

Q: Did you have much contact with the embassy I mean were there courier trips back and forth?

BARRY: Yes, we went down once a week or every couple of weeks. People from the embassy came up to visit us, particularly the attaches.

Q: Was there a feeling that having Leningrad, I mean you were there obviously in the early days, was it a good thing, was everybody pretty pleased?

BARRY: There was certainly no feeling that what we were reporting was in any sense undermining the embassy reporting or anything of that sort.

Q: What about the Baltic States? Could you talk about the special treatment relationship we had with them and your role in that?

BARRY: That was part of our consular district. While the ambassador and senior people in the embassy were not allowed to be in the Baltic States because of our non-recognition policy, because we had the consular mandate could and did travel extensively in Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia. It did give us an insight into the depth of feeling there about Russian domination, the depth of the feelings against the Russians. Also, of course it was on a much higher economic level than most of provincial Russia. So, going to Tallinn, for example was a treat in more ways than one. They of course, did have a lot of contact across the Finnish gulf, across the Baltic Sea with Finns, Scandinavians. The KGB was pretty active there, they looked for any signs of nationalism getting out of control.

Q: Did you when you were looking at Leningrad at sort of the closer you get to the West, the more things sort of seem to be a little closer to less more barbaric or civilized, it's long term, but did you get a feel for sort of how the Russian economy and the Russian, I mean the Soviet system was working there that was any different than what was seen in the Moscow optic?

BARRY: They did have a lot of heavy industry in Leningrad. I guess I would say that it was probably some of the best heavy industry they had. Defense industry and as we later found out when we entered some of these factories that had been off limits before, they were really state of the art. They tried to explain why they were so far advanced in one segment of the economy and so backward in others. The kinds of metal presses they had to use for example to make containment vessels for nuclear submarines were fantastic things. Later when I went to visit one of these factories after 1991 they had turned it into a consumer goods production claiming they were making beer-brewing machines using the same presses. I don't think it was ever economical. Also, by the way when we were there one of our interests was Murmansk, which was so important during World War II. A couple of times we went up to visit there because many of those people who died in World War II convoys are still buried in the graveyards of Murmansk; these were monuments to the sacrifices made by the Americans to keep Russia in the war something that was not a very popular theme at that time. Some of the more crude anti-American propaganda again goes back to the '60s was the story of the Colorado Beetle. I don't know if you remember that story, but the American potato beetle began to move across Europe in the 1930s. It got to Czechoslovakia about 1948 or '49 and moved from there across gradually to infest larger and larger areas of the Warsaw Pact. There was a famous poster that was up all over the place that showed millions of these little beetles with CIA written on their sides being dropped out of airplanes by parachutes. The story was that this was an effort to sabotage the economy of the former Soviet Union or of the Warsaw Pact. There's a famous incident that Ellis Briggs talks about in his book, Farewell to Foggy Bottom. Anyhow Ellis Briggs talks about receiving a diplomatic note from the foreign ministry talking about the depredations of the potato beetle and citing its Latin name and insisting that the U.S. stop this aggression against the Czech people. He wrote a marvelous note in response. The conclusion was that the potato beetle and he gave its Latin name should never be able to gnaw away at the ties of friendship that join the

Czech and American peoples.

Q: What about, were you having any problems with people seeking asylum, that sort of thing?

BARRY: Well, from time to time we would get feelers from some people who either wanted to be recruited or who wanted to entrap us into a recruitment situation and you never could be sure how to respond to those things. I turned them over to the person on the staff who was responsible for that kind of thing. One day on a park bench I sat down next to an old man who really looked as if he had lived through hell. He said that he had been in the Polish army in 1939 and after the collapse of Poland he had been taken with many others to labor camps in the USSR and in this case he had been in a uranium mine in Central Asia. Of course the conditions there were appalling. He said that at one point after Stalin died, he was still restricted to living in that area although the labor camp was closed down. But he had managed to conceal himself on the roof of a freight train that made its way across the steppes and had ended up in Belorussia and had sought out Polish consul and the Polish consul had said, "Oh, yes we'll be glad to help you, but you just have to go across the street here to get your papers regularized." Of course, across the street was the KGB and they immediately sent him back to Central Asia. I guess he had suffered terribly from this train ride because he'd frozen large parts of his body. He went back to the camp and by this time it was 1973 and he had been allowed to leave the area and come back to Leningrad or Moscow, but not ever back to Poland. That was the kind of tale you'd heard from people in those days.

Q: Was there any problem with harassment or enticement or that sort of thing?

BARRY: I was certainly regarded as and publicly identified as being with the CIA, so yes, close surveillance, but I didn't suffer any active harassment, nor did my family. I think as long as you didn't try to trick these people by trying to get out from under the surveillance it would be okay. Now there one of my colleagues did suffer some active harassment and dangerous situations including some kind of confrontation on a bridge.

Q: The initial staff of our consulate general, how many Americans were there?

BARRY: Four.

Q: The consul general was.

BARRY: Culver Gleysteen.

Q: He's part of the three brothers, Dirk and Bill. Bill Gleysteen was my ambassador in Korea at one point, but the three brothers sort of went separate ways in the Foreign Service. How did he operate?

BARRY: He and I did not get along particularly well. His wife, Flicka, was an extremely difficult person I would say. He was very interested in the care and maintenance of his palace. He was not much into the reporting side of things and I think while I was stirring

up the pot by doing all this stuff he wrote me an efficiency report which downgraded my reporting while at the same time the DCM put me in for the reporting award. So, it was kind of an uncomfortable relationship. He was I would say the least successful of the Gleysteen brothers. I think it bothered him. He was the son of missionaries in China and he used to talk about the hardships of his life in Beijing.

Q: What was again I mean, you know, we keep looking at the Soviet Union and the whole Soviet economy was to collapse in less than 20 years from the time you were there. I mean both the political and the economic system really went down. Was that at all, from your observation or others, was this at all a thought in our minds that this is a limited system or how did we feel? I'm trying to capture the time.

BARRY: I don't think any of us thought that, least of all Dick Nixon. It's interesting what Putin said in his speech to the Bundestag the other day, that we listened a lot more to the Soviet Union when they were adversaries than we do today to Russia when it wants to be a partner. We were still living under the impression that Khrushchev tried to create with Sputnik and we were going to be overtaken by Russia. Zbig Brzezinski perpetuated the idea of the arc of crisis, an aggressive growing system that presents a threat to us that will only become more serious over the years. Of course that was also fostered by those intelligence analysts who thought that there was an advantage in making the adversaries seem more capable than it really was because it would be helpful in terms of getting more money for our own.

Q: There is sort of a thesis that Kissinger and his twin almost, Richard Nixon, felt that the Soviet system... We were playing almost a defensive game at that time that the Soviet system looked so powerful it was hard for democracies to stand up to them?

BARRY: Well, certainly if you, found Dobrynin's memoirs particularly interesting in that regard because I think Dobrynin recognized more of the weaknesses of his own system than Kissinger did and of course this whole idea of carrying this all out in great secrecy made it even more difficult to manage.

Q: When the news of the Kissinger secret visits and all, did this permeate sort of a real unhappiness or dislike or something of Kissinger that would sort of permeate our American diplomat group?

BARRY: Oh, sure. Of course, Dobrynin had full access to Kissinger and the discussion that went on between them were not made available either to the embassy in Moscow or to the Secretary of State or anything of that kind. Ambassador Beam wanted to establish equal access himself in which he was not particularly successful and of course Gromyko much preferred to have this handled in Washington because Dobrynin was able to free wheel in ways that Gromyko himself was not. The system in Moscow was very rigid and in every discussion about the Americans and American policy had to be approved by the Politburo. But Dobrynin was free to talk on a what if basis, so I think during that period there were one or two discussions between Beam and Gromyko, but because Beam was not aware of any of the things that were discussed in the Dobrynin channel it didn't work very well.

Q: How about the Vietnam War? We were beginning to disengage, but how did that play in Leningrad?

BARRY: There was a rather vociferous propaganda about the incursion into Cambodia, the bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong and all that. It certainly didn't lead to any personal hostility. I do remember when Jane Fonda ended up in Moscow and came down to demonstrate against American policy in front of the American embassy and was whisked away by the KGB because this had not been a planned demonstration. She was heard to exclaim when she was bundled into the car, "Heavy man, heavy."

Q: Oh, lord. Then in '73 wither?

BARRY: Back to Washington. I looked around for something to do to remain involved in Soviet affairs, but there wasn't anything open at the moment. My old friend and colleague Kempton Jenkins got in touch with me and said how would I like to run the USSR division of the Voice of America. It sounded interesting to me because instead of getting to manage one-third of a secretary, there were 140 people there, and three or four divisions. The Russia division, Ukrainian, Uzbek, a couple of others, Georgian, Azeri. So, I took that and came back and found it quite interesting. It was at the time of the beginning of the unraveling of detente. It was the time of the growth of dissent and the impact of Sakharhov, Solzhenitsyn and all that. The people working there, most of them of course were emigrants. Different waves of immigrants, some were from before the war, some of them were, one of the leading people there was a Chechan who had been a member of the institute of red professors and he had defected and I guess probably made his way to VOA. Anyhow, there were some who were Jewish and there were some that were anti-Semitic and they spent a lot of time fighting with each other. The Ukrainians would fight with the Russians and all that sort of thing so it required a firm hand often. Also there was the usual stress and strain of the State Department telling us what to report, what not to report. We've seen it again recently about reporting the comments of Osama Bin Laden and of course the idea of many of the people there is that we are journalists just like any other and we report all the news whenever we see it. Kissinger was particularly upset about the amount of attention paid to Solzhenitsyn and Sakharhov and we would regularly hear from our colleagues at the State Department or from the USIA regional office that we had to tone this down. At some point I did because it was getting to the point where every other sentence was about this and nothing else was being reported. Then of course the people who I told not to do it so often went to the press and complained there. But it was an interesting experience. There were some wonderful young people there who had learned Russian as exhibit guides. Jill Dougherty from CNN was one of them and she was able to broadcast in fluent Russian and on the air all the time.

Q: But, you were there from '73 until?

BARRY: Until mid-'74 I guess. In mid-'74 the job of deputy director at EUR/SOV came up much to my surprise because I was then a fairly junior FSO-3. I was asked to take this

job. There were three, four deputies I guess, but this was the senior deputy and so the other people were senior to me. I guess I took it over from Stape Roy who went on to the China desk. I moved over then and shortened my tour with VOA.

Q: With the VOA at that time when you would get complaints from the State Department or elsewhere, you know, that you're overdoing this, let's not exacerbate our relations too much. How were these treated?

BARRY: I basically used my own judgment. I mean, I realized that we had to report all these things with credibility. I did also realize that there was a point beyond which we were doing what Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe were supposed to do.

The other thing that was going on at that time was Watergate. I heard lots of complaints including from the Russians about why you're reporting all this stuff about Watergate. As Dobrynin's memoirs indicate the Russians never could believe that somebody as skillful as Nixon would have gotten himself into this kind of situation and that it couldn't be fixed overnight. A lot of our people in the staff didn't like reporting this stuff either, they thought it was not in our national interest to be airing our dirty linen, but that had to be reported for credibility. There were two lines of news reporting, one was the English reporting which was translated into Russian and carried and that I didn't have anything to do with because it was just a matter of automatically translating it. But then there was an awful lot of stuff that was original, it was either features or filler or news items from within the USSR that would be of particular interest. At one point I was warned about what we were saying in Uzbek. Now nobody in the management staff spoke any Uzbek. The guy who was the head of the Uzbek service was probably somebody who had been involved in the para military actions against the Soviet Union during or after the war. I did finally hire somebody who did know Uzbek an academic from the outside who could come and tell me what was going on and it turned out that what was going on was pan-turanian propaganda. We had to get rid of him.

Q: Where were you getting your material?

BARRY: We had correspondents in the USSR. We had stringers. We had both English speaking correspondents and Russian speaking correspondents. A lot of people in the periphery who would pick things up that were in the Russian language journals.

Q: Were you considered, or were you looking over your shoulder at the BBC Russian service?

BARRY: Oh, yes. Well, we were complementary in many ways. We exchanged visits, the head of the division in the BBC and I listened to them to see if they had things we didn't and so forth. It was difficult to adjust to because when you went to work you stayed until everybody has gone home. Of course, VOA was on 18 hours a day so I had to get used to the idea that you don't stay in the office all the time you're on the air. This led to a more relaxed existence than might have otherwise been the case.

Q: Were you getting much feedback from the Soviet Union on what you were doing?

BARRY: You'd get regular complaints from the Soviet press about what was going on. One of the big issues was did we read some dissident documents. RFE and RL did that. I drew the line at reading large, long texts out loud on the air and wanted them simply to make excerpts. We'd certainly hear from groups in this country when they didn't like something that was going on. Usually, because some of the individuals within the Service would go and complain to them.

Q: You must have been carrying on a sort of a little war with all these various groups all of whom who had probably fought each other or something at one time or another?

BARRY: Yes, but I mean in general I would say that a lot of them, most of them were people who were generally interested in even handed journalism. They realized that this was lacking there and we should not imitate them, so I had particular respect for the person who was the head of the Russian service Victor Frantsuzov who was a very respected person within among the listeners. He was a sort of Walter Cronkite of the Russian service.

Q: In '74 you went to back to SOV and you were there until when?

BARRY: I'm trying to remember, let's see, when did Carter come in?

Q: Carter came in in '77, January of '77.

BARRY: Okay, when Carter came in I went over from SOV to be the director of UN political affairs. I was in EUR/SOV from '74 to '77.

Q: What was sort of the structure of SOV and where did you fit in?

BARRY: The director was Mark Garrison, deputy director was me. There was a director of bilateral affairs or the head of the office of bilateral affairs I think was Jack Scanlan. There was the director of the multilateral affairs office who I think was Sherrod McCall. There was the director of economic affairs. There was a director of exchanges. That was Sol Polanski, so there were four heads of offices.

Q: It must have been difficult because this was again during the Kissinger era, I mean he was very much.

BARRY: The era was extremely frustrating.

Q: Because the things that you knew nothing about was stirring around all the time, weren't they?

BARRY: And yet we were being asked to write papers for senior people to go do things and we knew that for everyone of these things there were two briefing books. There was a real briefing book that had been put together by people who were in the know and there

was the briefing book that we struggled to put together and had to sort of guess at what was going on.

Q: Was there any effort made to say, "Come on fellows let's straighten this out?"

BARRY: This was a job that had to be done above our pay grade. This was Bill Rogers' problem and Art Hartman was Assistant Secretary. They left some things to us, bilateral issues, and we tried to get involved in the arms control business and we wrote papers on that, but I doubt that any of them had much resonance. Hal Sonnenfeldt when Kissinger came over to be Secretary of State, Sonnenfeldt and his crowd sort of ran Soviet affairs directorate of their own.

Q: He was counselor of the department?

BARRY: Let's see, he was at INR at first. Then I guess he went over to be a staff member at Kissinger's NSC and then he came back as counselor and he had a bunch of aides working for him.

Q: Should I mention that? I'm just coming to that part. I'm interviewing Hal now and I'll be doing it next week or something. I mean was it a heavy-handed operation?

BARRY: Oh, yes. Of the one bridge between us all I guess Bill Suhinn had been in SOV I guess and then he went over to work on Hal's staff. He was somebody who would share things with us. The rest of them would not. I think if Sonnenfeldt or Kissinger ever found out that he was sharing anything with us it would have been too bad for them.

Q: During '74 to '76 how did you see, you say detente was becoming falling apart?

BARRY: It was falling apart in part because of Soviet activities in the third world and I guess this was the time of Angola and of Cuba getting involved. It was falling apart because of domestic criticism of and it was falling apart in part because Brezhnev himself was in decline and was unable to delink the solution of the SALT agreement with another summit. They had summits in '72, '73 and I guess '74 was the last summit and by that time U.S. critics were already accusing Nixon of using the Soviet card to hold onto power. They had a number of agreements on the prevention of nuclear war and all this stuff, which were under attack by the right wing, including right wing democrats. This was the period of Jackson-Vanik and the insistence on agreement to a quota of immigration before SALT I could be ratified.

Q: Were we seeing Brezhnev as somebody whose sort of hold on power was getting weaker maybe because of age?

BARRY: No, I don't think we did at all. In fact it was at that point that we saw Nixon's hold on power reducing. I think we underestimated the degree to which Brezhnev's hardening of the arteries had affected him. Of course if you read Dobrynin he never had much of a free hand in many of these things because of the need for consensus among the Politburo, on all the various initiatives that would be taken. The area where Brezhnev was

most confident because of his position before of being in charge of the military industrial complex was essentially SALT, but he had opposition from both Grechko and Ustinov about a lot of these issues. Marshall Grechko, the Defense Minister, and Ustinov, the member of the Politburo responsible for military production.

Q: Were you seeing any affects with the so-called China cards at that time?

BARRY: This was the time of the Usuri River clashes between Russian and Chinese troops. There was widespread rumor at the time that Brezhnev had sought U.S. acquiescence in a Soviet nuclear attack on China, something I don't think was ever put that boldly but I suspect there were fairly strong hints of it. Of course, Kissinger definitely had a strategy in mind of linkage. China played a large part in this linkage. There was more stress and strain about the third world I think about Cuban activity, it got worse as the situation deteriorated until finally in 1979 with Afghanistan that it went all away. It was a steadily building cycle of things.

Q: Were we looking at, you know the Soviets were making a significant investment in Africa, were you sort of talking to our people in the African bureau and trying to figure out what the hell, what does this really mean, or was it just in general, I mean, they're spreading their influence and this is a bad thing?

BARRY: Well, I think what we figured it meant was that they had an ideological commitment to this and they believed in that part of the idea of peaceful coexistence which sort of amounts to what's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable. In Dobrynin's explanation of it, the issues having to do with the third world were not in the hands of the foreign ministry at all, they were in the hands of the international department of the CPSU headed by Boris Ponomarev who really believed in the ideological commitment. Dobrynin wonders out loud, what kind of a dog did we have in this fight? Why were we interested in it? He says, look at the situation now, did we make any lasting gains in the area? Of course, then there was the whole Egypt-Israel issue, the six day war, the resupply, Soviet resupply of the Egyptian armed forces in was it '72?

Q: '67 was it '67? Then there was the October war, which I think was '72.

BARRY: That's right. Well, that put a major strain on the whole relationship, too because at that point they had alerted some paratroop units and they began to resupply things. We both did in fact at the time.

Q: Did you have a feeling, you know I sometimes try to get the attitude, that Kissinger because of his great diplomatic triumph if you want to call it that was the opening to China, was a little too much on the Chinese side than on the Soviet side or not?

BARRY: I thought so at the time and I still do. Although he was frequently denying that he was doing any of this because of a desire to get at the Soviets I concluded that was very much what he was doing. He made little effort to disguise it.

Q: Maybe this is a good place to cut off because you in early '77 after Carter came in you left the Soviet office and went where?

BARRY: To be head of the office of UN political affairs.

Q: It was just you were doing that from '77 to when?

BARRY: It was about 14 months I guess because then I was working for Bill Maynes who had been a colleague of mine in Moscow and at some point along there he had a vacancy as deputy assistant secretary in IO and I moved up into that job. I guess that was about 14 months after that.

Q: All right. So, we'll pick this up in early 1977 when you went into the political affairs dealing with the UN. This is part of IO?

BARRY: Yes, this was sort of the main political bureau. This was sort of the powerhouse of IO. This was the job that Dean Rusk had had in his time and so forth and we dealt with all political issues.

Q: Joe Sisco at one point?

BARRY: Yes, right. We did the instructions to the mission. We did anything involving political affairs, arms control, that kind of thing.

Q: Well, we'll pick this up next time and dealing with issues that you were dealing with.

Today is the 28th of November, 2001. Bob, 1977 you were in IO as you described it. What were the periods you were with IO?

BARRY: I was Director of the UN Political Affairs in '77 and '78 and then I became the Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Economic Affairs in IO, so altogether it was about two years.

Q: So '77 to '79 or '78?

BARRY: Yes, '79. Basically this of course was the beginning of the Carter administration. My old Moscow colleague, Bill Maynes, was the Assistant Secretary and we were good friends; Andy Young was the Permanent Representative in New York. This was the period when we were very much involved in the Rhodesia Zimbabwe issue, Southwest Africa, trying to promote the decolonization of what was left of the colonial regimes in Africa, working on South Africa of course and the usual Middle East question. UN political affairs was divided into two segments. One of them basically dealt with African issues and the other segment of it dealt with Middle East and there was a third group that worked on UN arms control issues. So, there was a lot of things involved in preparations for the annual general assembly. In fact one thing I remember distinctly was

making my first ever trip to Latin America to talk to the countries there about upcoming issues in the general assembly. I got a picture for how narrow some of these peoples' interest were. I was in Panama and I was talking to the deputy minister in charge of UN affairs about the situation in I guess it was Botswana and wouldn't Panama be interested in sending some people in a peacekeeping force and they said yes, very interesting. It was later at dinner that the guy said to me that he didn't know things were that bad in Bolivia. He'd just gotten the continent wrong. This was a very active period. Of course, the Carter administration placed a lot of value on Andy Young in the UN. He was and I guess Jim Leonard was one of the deputy representatives in New York who was dealing with lots of arms control issues at the time. I guess at some point along there the person who was in charge of international economic affairs got an embassy or something anyhow there was a vacancy there. Although I didn't really describe myself as an economist, Bill Maynes asked me to take that job and of course, basically all UN issues are political not economic no matter whether they're called economic or not. This was over sight of things like the UNDP, the International Atomic Energy Agency. The agencies like UNICEF and so forth.

Q: I'd like to stop here and go back to this time when you were dealing with the political affairs. In the first place to get an idea it varies with administrations and personalities. How did IO work with our delegation at the United Nations headed by Andy Young? In other words, how would you describe the working relations?

BARRY: I think there were personal relationships were very good because Bill Maynes was close to Andy Young and so forth, but Andy was not what you would call a person who went by the book of his instructions. He kind of freewheeled on a lot of things, which caused some discomfort in the administration particularly on Middle Eastern issues, because he was not particularly a friend of Israel on many of these issues. So, there were some concern of course, there were always articles in the press about where is the administration going. The republican right was critical of many of these things. As far as Jimmy Carter was concerned Andy Young could do no wrong. Other people in other offices in the State Department were sometimes upset by him, some of the areas where the UN delegation developed its own policy.

Q: Did you get people from NEA coming to you and saying you know, this is out of line and all this, or do something?

BARRY: I don't think they came to me because they realized that nobody was really capable of instructing Andy to do some of these things, but certainly there was a lot of frustration about it. I don't think in the final analysis that any harm was done. It was more of sort of the loose canon syndrome.

Q: Were the negotiations that were going on, did you say it was Rhodesia. Rhodesia was settled by this time?

BARRY: It was I think the early days of Mugabe's administration, but as I recall at the beginning of this period it was still going through the process of they were moving away

from UDI to the departure of the white Rhodesian regime and of course we were supporting that effort.

Q: Did you get involved much on the African negotiations?

BARRY: Only in the sense of writing instructions for the Security Council or the general assembly kinds of things. The face to face negotiations were done by Andy and by a couple of his deputies.

Q: Don McHenry.

BARRY: Don McHenry.

Q: Was this the first time that you had really dealt with the United Nations?

BARRY: Well, no I had been in the delegation to the UN when George Bush came in as permanent representative I was there for a year. I'd been up to the UN for a number of occasions at the time of the general assembly. They used to send people up to be note takers, that was the general debate period. So, I'd been up to the UN a couple of times. U.S. sympathy for the UN I think declined steadily from say 1946 to the present almost, but it did not reach the kind of standoff that happened in the '90s. So, the UN still was an instrument of choice on a lot of issues and it enjoyed pretty good public support.

Q: How about the IO bureau? How did you feel under Bill Maynes and all his, did you have much clout do you think in the Department?

BARRY: Well, I think it had clout in the foreign policy community because of course Andy was a cabinet member and they did participate in all the cabinet meetings. You've got some very good people in the bureau at that time, Tom Niles, was one of the deputies in the UN political area. Of course, Gerry Helman was the deputy assistant secretary for political issues. So, it was a good bureau I think. It had considerable respect.

Q: Then on the economic side, what were your major focuses?

BARRY: The major focus was trying to shape the way in which the UN economic agencies carried out their mandate. Of course UNDP had a major role in developing economies around the world. UNDP's representatives were in most developing countries and this was a major focus of U.S. development assistance policy. IAEA was an important thing at that time if you were working on proliferation things. There were a bunch of smaller agencies. UNIDO, the private sector work that UN agencies carried out. So, it was a major task at that time to ensure that the head of UNDP continued to be an American. In the event we carried out a successful campaign to hold that job for an American. I was only in that job for about six or eight months I guess, when I was asked by George Vest to come over to the European bureau to be the deputy assistant secretary for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This created something of a conflict in my mind because of course I was really close to Bill Maynes and he'd given me this important job and to leave it and go somewhere else was not an easy thing to do so I

finally said, "Well, I'll leave it up to the system. They can decide where I can go." So, then I guess it was early in '79, probably January that I went to the European bureaus.

Q: From your position when looking at the development program and all, how was the UN development program? I mean, how did they mesh? Did they conflict? Were there any problems?

BARRY: The idea was that the UNDP was supposed to be the coordinator of development assistance in every country so in addition to whatever programs the UNDP put in place, they were supposed to coordinate bilateral donor assistance programs. The USAID director in that country was supposed to work with UNDP and that worked or didn't work depending on personalities as usual. UNDP had a lot of technical assistance programs, a lot of training programs, but they didn't have the big bucks infrastructure projects that for example we did. It was a I think it was a good agency, but like other UN things it all depends on the quality of the people you have because of the requirement for universality. As often as not, the head of the UNDP in a country was somebody they wanted to get out of the country and send somewhere else.

Q: So, then you moved over to the Soviet desk? So, your job was?

BARRY: Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Q: And you did this from early '79?

BARRY: To '81.

Q: What was the state of relations in '79 to '81, well the first things really went through a change, but when you arrived there in '79, the Carter administration had put a lot of emphasis on trying to change things around.

BARRY: Well, of course, the previous period had been the decline and fall of detente. The Carter administration came in with a high emphasis on human rights and they desired to make a change in the way, which we carried out our strategic arms program so that we could get things through the congress. So, this was a period of considerable distrust on the part of the Soviet leadership. Brezhnev was still alive, but he was weakened at that point. He had had a number of small strokes and was certainly not able to think on his feet. The period started out with insistence on the immigration issue, Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn and so forth. I think one of the early steps was Carter's letter to Sakharov, which caused a great stir in the Soviet Union. Now, Marshall Shulman was then the Special Advisor to the Secretary for Soviet Affairs. As it turned out, I learned later why he wanted me in this job. Because I had at some point when I was in the office of Soviet affairs filled in for Hal Sonnenfeldt at the UN association which was about to take a trip to Moscow. Cy Vance was on that delegation and Marshall Shulman was putting it together. Apparently the briefing I gave was something that had favorably impressed Marshall and so that's why I got this job. I was closely involved with Marshall and of course he was close to Vance. But Brzezinski and the people at NSC took a different line.

So, that was a constant struggle throughout that period having to deal with that. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was in 1979, and preparations for martial law were underway in Poland. So, it was a period of considerable turmoil. In arms control we sought deep cuts in land based nuclear missiles going beyond those that had been agreed in SALT. It was clear to me, and I think to Marshall, that it was never going to happen, it was too radical a departure. You couldn't pass over ratification of SALT to revise the agreement before it was ratified was definitely not going to work. Although I don't think people either didn't care or didn't realize it. It was ominous that we were going to do this. We went to Moscow as part of the delegation led by Vance and Harold Brown to present this to the Soviet leadership and I recall telling his people at that point, Les Gelb in particular that I could predict with considerable certainty that they were just going to reject this out of hand which they did. There was considerable disappointment and bitterness at the delegation that there had been so little progress.

Q: This was the Vance trip where he went to there and was shot down?

BARRY: Yes, in a press conference before we even got out of town, by Gromyko.

Q: Were people still moaning over why the Soviets didn't play along or something. I mean to have a new administration, a new Secretary of State that rebuffed sort of publicly right at the beginning, a damn fool way to start off an administration in terms of sort of a certain amount of good will?

BARRY: This was a year into the administration and the initial steps had not been very promising. The Soviets have always been more comfortable with republicans than with democrats. The emphasis during the campaign and the emphasis during the early days of the administration and the persona of Brzezinski I don't think promised very much to the Soviets. It's also clear from reading Dobrynin's memoirs that at that stage in particular the machinery of the Soviet Union was pretty much on automatic pilot. Nothing happened without the politburo endorsing it whereas Brezhnev was in a state of physical decline, the people who had a lot to say were people like Gromyko and Ustinov and they were not very they were disappointed in the failure of detente as they saw it and the state of the U.S. Soviet relations had been going down in the Nixon period. The Soviets still did think that Watergate was basically the accomplishment of the enemies of detente and they couldn't understand how a thing as trivial could have caused the downfall of the Nixon presidency.

Q: It wasn't on your watch, but obviously you were sitting there I mean meeting with them. What was the feeling in '79 when you came in, why did the promising period of detente under Kissinger and all had fallen this way?

BARRY: I think first and foremost the two sides have different expectations from the idea of detente. The Soviets felt that this was a commitment to geopolitical parity, that the Russians would be full partners. The two superpowers in the world, that there was a commitment to the whole arms control area to parity in all kinds of weapons, the Russians and their development of weapons systems and the deployment of the SS-20

missiles in Europe we saw as decoupling, as decoupling the U.S. from Europe. It was this whole thing combined with in '79 in Afghanistan, which was very much seen by Brzezinski as the crisis of the drive of the Soviet Union toward the Persian Gulf towards Pakistan in the south. We had at that point considerable debate about what to do about the invasion of Afghanistan. I remember one of the rather heated discussions on arming the mujahedeen and the release of Stinger missiles and the idea that once you have let these things out of the box you'd never get them back in again. Of course, I was just reading a commentary by Brzezinski again who was asked about the wisdom of this in light of such events and he still says that the result of the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan was actually the dissolution of the Soviet Union. From our point of view, we saw many people on our side saw the issue of peaceful coexistence as a method by which what's mine is mine and what's yours can be negotiated. So, that whole concept I think had been signed up by Kissinger on this agreement for the prevention of war was very much under attack by people who felt that signing up to this declaration was an unwise decision at best.

Q: When you got there in '79 was there a feeling we were going to try to repair relations or I mean on the State Department's side where the Brzezinski and the National Security Council the Brzezinski group was almost moving in a different direction?

BARRY: I don't think it was that stark. I think that on individual issues, particularly arms control issues because to a large degree the compass of the U.S. Soviet relations had increasingly been linked to the strategic arms limitations talks. I think our goal was to try to get the strategic arms agreement behind us, ratified, and then to move on in this and other arms control areas. I think that we realized the depth of irritation of the Soviet leadership didn't want public engagement of the president in some of these human rights issues. But, it wasn't that they wanted to destroy U.S. Soviet relations and we wanted to build them up. I think we placed more value on keeping a steady course in the relations and trying to proceed based upon what had been accomplished before. Of course a substantial amount of my time was spent on Eastern Europe. That was a little different in the sense that this was not Marshal Shulman's area. There was a lot going on around Eastern Europe at that time and I made a couple of trips out there. Yugoslavia was important post at that time. Larry Eagleburger was the ambassador. There were a number of bilateral issues. This was a time when the relationship with Czechoslovakia was very bad because they were still under the post Prague spring period. I'd say I spent half of my time on Eastern Europe things.

Q: Who were on the Soviet side of things how we and we obviously went to December of '79, but Marshal Shulmann what was his role and what was his background?

BARRY: He was a long time Soviet expert. He had been in the government back in the Truman administration. He was at Columbia. He was head of the Russian studies program at Columbia. He was a close friend of Cy Vance's and somebody who had a very good understanding of the Soviet Union. He was also a wonderful person. I was very close to him personally. He was not terribly well-equipped for the bureaucratic sword fights that go on in Washington. He was too nice a person. There were certainly

lots of occasions in which Brzezinski took out after him publicly.

Q: You know, sometimes when you put two people from the same academic institution together I mean they spent all of their lives fighting each other at least I mean that's what academics do kind of.

BARRY: Well, I don't think Marshal was much of a bureaucrat. Brzezinski, actually I knew Brzezinski, I went to Columbia back after leaving the navy, Brzezinski had just come down from Harvard and I took a course from him. I don't think I took a course from Marshal. Brzezinski, I think, reflected the heritage of his Polish ancestors about Russia.

Q: How did you all evaluate the decision making process of the Kremlin? This was prior to the invasion of Afghanistan.

BARRY: It was pretty clear from Dobrynin's memoirs what it was like at that time. That is, although Brezhnev was a dynamic and innovative personality in the early stages of his career, by that time he was not at all. Everything passed through the Politburo and the conservatives on the Politburo had the upper hand. The people who had put a lot at stake for the improvement of the relations with the U.S. and the development of detente were by that time pretty well discredited because of the failure of the policy from the point of view of the Soviet Union. People like Ustinov, who was the head of the military industrial complex, people like the defense minister, Grechko, certainly had a much stronger position. The attitude was, we're going to hold to our course because this was something that we'd decided upon and it's right and we're not going to adjust.

Q: What was the role of Gromyko at that time?

BARRY: Well, he was a candidate member of the politburo. He was not an equal voice with the full members and he had always been a conservative in the sense of somebody who was inflexible particularly at that stage of the game when he realized that where the Politburo was going. He personally found Carter and Brzezinski irritating.

Q: With the Soviet Union we've come up to the events of a larger part of '79 when all hell broke loose and Iran and Pakistan. In the first place, did the takeover of our embassy in Iran have much of an effect on what we were doing?

BARRY: The U.S. government can at best deal with three crises at a time or two crises at a time and the whole Iran thing preoccupied the government throughout that period near the end of the Carter administration. Then of course as far as this arc of crisis here is concerned in the sort of idea the this was a dangerous aggressive move by the Soviet Union that certainly was the mood that Brzezinski set at the time.

Q: Had we been following Afghanistan and its relations with the Soviet Union very high in our lookout list?

BARRY: It depends on what time you're talking about. I think in the early '70s it was not, but towards the end of '79 certainly their activities in Afghanistan and the increasing involvement of the Soviet Union were in our favor, were periodically warning them don't do this, don't do that, especially in late '79 of course it didn't have much of an effect. If you look at it now from the point of view of the Soviets, they looked at it as a defensive move because they saw that the so-called progressive forces in Afghanistan were losing out. Dobrynin's memoirs say that after the decision was made in the politburo in late '79 to go into Afghanistan and the military came to Ustinov and Andropov and said we can't do this. You're asking us to carry out a task that we're not trained for, equipped for and they were told no, this is the decision of the politburo, you go back and do it.

Q: When the Soviets came in I guess it was just around Christmas time?

BARRY: Yes, it was Christmas time because I was on leave and I had to come back.

Q: Were you, was there, I won't say confusion, but I'm trying to figure out what the hell this was all about because it seemed to be one communist regime was replacing another communist regime and you know, the commitment of the armed forces into another country, is a very major thing.

BARRY: I don't think there was much debate about what it was about. The question was what kind of sanctions do we take as a result of this. So, I think I came back at Christmas and spent a lot of time drawing up the usual lists of well we ought to do this, we ought to do that. The issue of grain sales, the issue of Olympics I guess. Plus the usual small things and on the issue of support for mujahedeen covert action and all those kinds of things.

Q: One draws up these lists of sanctions, but is there a feeling of I mean you know this is a case of don't stand there, do something even though you know you're doing something that's not of any.

BARRY: Yes, I think there is a certain amount of truth to that. Although it was a clear idea that you couldn't just react by saying that we had given several public warnings about the consequences of going into Afghanistan - this is because we had pretty good intelligence of the preparations to go in before although not exact timing - you could tell what was going on and on the border then was a build up in that direction. Having given the public warnings we better do something, an action or a consequence. So, I don't think anybody who was doing this felt there doing this against their better judgment although some of things like grain sales were hotly debated at the time.

Q: Where you looking for any indicator that this might be unpopular within the Soviet Union or did it not really make any difference?

BARRY: I don't think public opinion in the Soviet Union was a factor at that point.

Q: What about within the Soviet Union were you seeing any you know doing this time

were you seeing any changes in the Soviet Union as far as well, public opinion, but just the leadership or the way things were being dealt with?

BARRY: It was a period of stagnation and they themselves now call it in retrospect a period of stagnation and so there was not much going on either economic reform or political organization. It was a regime with hardening of the arteries.

Q: I imagine that the Kremlin watchers and trying to find out who was going to succeed, Brezhnev or did it make much difference?

BARRY: Yes, I think there was a lot of speculation, but after all Brezhnev hung on until when was it, '84? He held on for a long time. During that period of course we had the summit in Vienna for the signing of the START agreement and I recall we had tried to revise the agreement by putting a last minute proposal to Brezhnev to cut some more heavy missiles. But I recall coming into the Hofburg in Vienna and I was in the vicinity of Brezhnev as he was brought in and he could not even lift his legs to move up the steps. Two great burly security people had to lift him up the steps, kind of like a sack of potatoes and when I saw that I thought that anybody who thinks that Brezhnev is going to suddenly agree to a revision to this agreement that he's coming in to sign has got to be crazy.

Q: Well, did you get involved before we leave the Soviet Union, did you get involved with any of the debates over what sort of whether to arm the mujahedeen?

BARRY: Yes, there was a lot of discussion of that and there was a lot of realization, but once you put these weapons in their hands and began to encourage people from around the Muslim world to come in there you were breeding something that could not easily be controlled in the future. So, there were various kinds of arguments. For example, there was a requirement when the war was over you've got to turn back the stingers. That wasn't very realistic. There were a lot of people, myself among them, who argued that we were doing something that was irreversible, but the prevailing view in that case came from the military and the NSC. Not from the military maybe from the OSD, but not from the joint chiefs of staff.

Q: I would suspect that the military would be, it doesn't like other people to get a hold of their goodies.

BARRY: Yes, there was some talk about this falling into the hands of terrorists.

Q: Well then moving on sort of over to the Eastern European thing. What sort of thing, Poland, how did we see things in Poland in '78?

BARRY: Of course, this was a period of considerable tension inside Poland. This was the growth of Solidarity. We understood the Soviet concerns about the situation in Poland; as it is we had some pretty good intelligence sources inside the senior Polish military telling us about preparations for martial law or some kind of effort by the Soviets to put this

under control. I forget when John Paul II became Pope, but that obviously had a tremendous effect on opinion within Poland.

Q: It was around '78 or something like that.

BARRY: I became a very close friend of the Polish ambassador here, Romuald Spasowski, and his wife. He later defected in 1981 and we had many long discussions. We were providing food aid to Poland and things like that. Spasowski would first of all tell what his instructions were and then tell me why he didn't agree with them. His wife was deeply religious and he was not. After the Polish Pope came in he began to rapidly move in her direction and became a devout Catholic. I think, in fact, his family was Protestant. Wanda herself was extremely outspoken. They would go to meetings of the Warsaw Pact, ambassadors and dinners and things like that and later come back and tell me about all the things that transpired during those events. In fact, finally as he was beginning to get closer and closer to a decision not to defect we had several of their things in our safe deposit box because we knew when he left he would be unable to go back to the embassy and get these things. So, we understood that pressure by the Soviet Union on Poland was getting more and more serious as time went on.

Q: Well, the feeling was that if martial law was declared the Soviets might move in?

BARRY: Yes, and that debate clearly had gone on and did go on in Moscow at the time. Again it was the Soviet military, who said that this was not something we can do, but they did have some preparations for this and we were aware of those preparations. This was not so much '79; it was more '80 to '81. This was after Afghanistan by that time.

Q: Well, was there concern after Afghanistan that the Soviets were in a sort of defensive role in the offensive?

BARRY: Yes, that was certainly the view that most people had about Afghanistan. When it comes to the Warsaw Pact and Poland, I think that was clearly seen as a defensive move to avoid the crumbling of the Warsaw Pact and of course the East Germans were egging the Russians on saying that they can't tolerate this type of discipline in Poland without having to spill over the rest of it.

Q: Were we making noises to the Soviets first of all, don't do this.

BARRY: Yes, around '80 or '81 we were saying it publicly, we were saying it privately. There was not a discussion that took place that did not have that as an underlying theme and what the consequences would be and so forth.

Q: What were the consequences seeming at the time?

BARRY: I don't think anybody was thinking military, but more of the same, more sanction. I think that after the declaration of martial law in '81, we decided to cut off grain sales to Poland.

Q: Were you given any pressure from the Polish American community?

BARRY: Oh, yes, and of course, in this case the Polish ambassador who was on the side of the Polish-American community. Gronowski was postmaster general in the Carter administration. Of course, there were a lot of very prominent people including some of the people in the Voice of America who were also prominent Polish Americans.

Q: In Czechoslovakia, was this beyond the pale at that point?

BARRY: Yes, there was nothing going on there. It was a hardline regime and after '68 they were sort of consigned to the dust heap.

Q: East Germany?

BARRY: Well, I mean we had diplomatic relations. We had an ambassador there, but again it was not movement.

Q: Hungary is always a little bit squishy, wasn't it?

BARRY: Yes, and the Hungarians were innovative in terms of their economic policy, the relationship with the Hungarian government was pretty good. I made a couple of trips there. They were trying to be sort of bridge with the Soviet leadership and to try to moderate some of the things that were coming out of Moscow at the time.

Q: What was the sort of the East European reaction when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan?

BARRY: The Hungarians looked at it from 1956 in a sense. They were not involved. There were some contingents from some Eastern Europe military that went into Afghanistan but it was not something that they were enthusiastic about. It was not seen as a Warsaw Pact issue. I also think that they felt that the Soviets had bitten off more than they could chew.

Q: Romania and Ceausescu?

BARRY: Romania and Ceausescu had a special close relationship. They were unliberal in domestic policy, but in terms of foreign policy, they were carrying out a separate course. They were always presenting themselves as a potential opening to somewhere or other. Of course, they had brokered some of the openings to China in the Nixon administration. It was certainly seen as the most important of the Warsaw Pact countries and again we devoted a lot of attention to what the Romanians were saying and doing on issues like Afghanistan. They were outspoken critics of what the Russians had done.

Q: Were we trying to put any pressure on Ceausescu to loosen up in his own country and his human rights side was pretty appalling?

BARRY: Well, yes, I do recall calling a meeting with the ambassador from time to time

and taking him to task about one thing or another going on, but I don't think anybody had any serious thought that Ceausescu was going to turn over a new leaf. A sort of trade off was that if you could be seen to be active in the foreign policy sense side that that was a fair enough trade off for domestic repression.

Q: Bulgaria, did it, was it again sort of?

BARRY: No, nothing was happening in Bulgaria.

Q: Speaking of contenture of Eastern Europe, did any, what was your impression of how the embassies operate? Did any of them have or did any of them at all affect dealing with the congress?

BARRY: During the Cold War the Poles always had an effective embassy under Spasowski; they spent a lot of time talking to people in congress. The Romanians, also the Romanian ambassador, were active. The Romanian ambassador, Cornelin Bogdan, was a very outspoken person rather critical of Ceausescu and I think he finally also ended up leaving the government and living here. Of course the Yugoslavs that was the time when Loncar was ambassador and he was quite effective as well.

Q: Now, lets talk about Yugoslavia during this Soviet '81 period. Tito was dead by this time, wasn't he?

BARRY: Tito died, well I went to his funeral, so it must have been '79, something like that. Well, we had Loncar here who was a very experienced person- he was ambassador in Indonesia in '65 in "the year of living dangerously" and so forth. I was also quite personally close to him and his wife. Eagleburger was very effective in Belgrade- he was doing a lot at that point to promote stability in Yugoslavia in the post-Tito era and to provide various kinds of assistance in exchanges and things like that in trying to promote economic reform.

Q: It appears in a way that the threat of the Soviet Union doing something in Yugoslavia was probably one of the main causes of keeping Yugoslavia together after Tito. Do you think that was the way?

BARRY: Well, of course that had been the thrust of U.S. policy to Yugoslavia on and off since 1947. Vance had seen Afghanistan and what had happened in Poland, and there were concerns in Yugoslavia that something similar could happen there. It certainly caused the Yugoslavs to take a serious view of any kind of separatism or anything of that kind within Yugoslavia itself. But I don't think we thought seriously that there was much of an issue of Soviet intervention into Yugoslavia at that point.

Q: Well, I mean, probably in hindsight, but at the time, did we seem really concerned about the break up of Yugoslavia with Tito gone?

BARRY: I don't think so, we were concerned about how the leadership was going to

straighten itself out and how the system of rotation was going to be with a real effect to economic reform or anything like that, but I don't think anybody at that point thought seriously that Yugoslavia was on the verge of breakup.

Q: Well in '81 the Reagan administration came in. How did that, did you feel that there was, after the election and before the transition took place, was there sort of a feeling of oh my God we're going to go back to the that sort of Cold War. Ronald Reagan had had this reputation.

BARRY: Oh, yes, most decidedly and when the transition team appeared it was kind of scary in terms of what they were saying about policy particularly towards my part of the world. Well, in the last administration they had decided to pick me up for ambassador to Romania. But when Eagleburger was designated as assistant secretary, he told me that one of the conditions was that we had to get rid of all the people who had worked on Soviet affairs in the last administration and so I was one of them and should be prepared to go when the new administration came in. It was Dick Pipes who was the transition person for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and it was clear talking to him that things were going to be reversed. So, come the 20th of January I left, I stayed on for a couple of weeks and the administration of the State Department sent my name over to the White House for Romania, but then Jesse Helms discovered that there was a professor from a small college in North Carolina who had been a Fulbright student from Romania. His name was David Funderbark and he had written to Jesse and tried to get an appointment with the Defense Intelligence Agency as a Romanian expert. They decided he should be ambassador.

Q: So, you're talking about Funderbark?

BARRY: Yes, so he got the Romanian appointment. So, as a consolation prize they put me up for Bulgaria, which is not a very exciting prospect, but it was better than walking the streets.

Q: So, you were ambassador to Bulgaria from when to when?

BARRY: '81 to '84.

Q: Did you have any problems getting confirmed?

BARRY: No.

Q: So nobody cared, nobody.

BARRY: Certainly it wasn't an issue- no political appointees wanted the job nor did anybody much care.

Q: I think from the political point of view Eugenie Anderson was there.

BARRY: That's right, she was back then. A long time ago. Everybody kept saying that she spoke such wonderful Bulgarian it turned out that it was the voice of her interpreter they were all talking about.

Q: You mentioned that the state of relations with Bulgaria was just on deep frozen or something?

BARRY: Well, deep frozen and there was the issue of Markov, the guy who'd been hit with the umbrella in London, and then there was the assassination attempt on the pope.

Q: Yes, I was about to say this, I mean, when you arrived there had you known that Bulgaria was sort of becoming the terrorist center of Eastern Europe or one of them?

BARRY: Of course, there was a lot of talk about this. The issue of the involvement of Bulgaria and the secret service in terrorist activities probably was somewhat exaggerated. Clearly they were involved in the assassination of Markov. There was never any evidence that they were really involved in the assassination of the pope and there was a big effort to demonstrate otherwise. The CIA couldn't come up with any positive connection. Zhivkov of course thought that this was particularly aimed at him and at one stage of the game he took me aside and said to me, "You know we're having lots of problems with the Soviet Union ourselves. They are not being very sympathetic to us. They are not giving us the same kind of subsidies that they used to for our economy and so forth. If you can arrange for the American press to stop talking about our involvement in the assassination of the pope, America could become our best friend and we could be in a position to reverse our alliances." I said to him in a polite way, "Well, if I were powerful enough to do that I wouldn't be here in Bulgaria." But, clearly he felt that he was personally being victimized by the U.S. government and I guess there's some speculation that there were some elements that the Bulgarian secret service were involved in this without the knowledge of the government itself. There was never any hard evidence.

Q: Well, in the first place you mentioned Claire Sterling. You might explain who she was.

BARRY: She's an author of who was resident in Rome and wrote a lot of books. She was a right-wing ideologue and it was her book on the papal assassination which was the primary evidence for this. Now, of course, Casey was the head of the CIA at that time and the instructions from Casey were to find out about this. I think the agency tried hard to find out about it, but there was no clear evidence. This Turk who was involved was the person who pointed the finger at the Bulgarians but he was kind of crazy himself.

Q: I mean this was a failed assassination attempt?

BARRY: Yes, he was shot and wounded, but not killed.

Q: How about relations with Yugoslavia? As an old Yugoslavia hand you must have been dealing with this.

BARRY: Yes, David Anderson was in Belgrade at that time and we visited back and

forth quite a few times. Of course the Yugoslavs had always been anti-Bulgarian. The Yugoslav ambassador in Bulgaria had been the editor of Politika and was a very smart person who had a lot of information about what was going on in Bulgaria so we exchanged information a lot. His house was burned down and he suspected that the Bulgarians were behind that. This was of course the Macedonia issue. The Yugoslavs really thought the Bulgarians were probably involved in efforts to trying to destabilize the situation in Yugoslavia.

Q: How about Bulgaria's relations with Romania?

BARRY: I don't think there was much going on there. The issue of relations with Turkey was more active because this was the period when there were a lot of Bulgarian Turks who wanted to leave and the I guess the Turkish consul in Plovdiv was shot at.

Q: We had a Turkish consul in Los Angeles was killed around that time, too, no that was earlier, much earlier by the Armenian Revolutionary or something. I mean, were we trying to do anything to sort of keep the Turks and Bulgarians living quietly with each other?

BARRY: Well, we made a lot of representations to the Bulgarian government about treatment of the Turkish minority, that they should be allowed to basically give them equal rights. There was an effort at that time to make all the Turks to change their names to Slavic names and forbid people from speaking Turkish. We argued with them about that. Of course, the Bulgarians were death on the Reagan administration. Interestingly enough at that point Armand Hammer came through. He had always prided himself of being in with whoever was in with the Kremlin at that time, but he couldn't get Andropov to give him the time of day. So, he came to see Zhivkov to intercede with Andropov to receive Armand Hammer which eventually I guess Andropov did although it was not a marriage made in heaven.

Q: What was the role of the Soviet ambassador?

BARRY: Oh, he was an amusing character. Of course, he had just come from being second secretary of the provincial party organization in Kazakhstan and he and his wife used to have dinner together occasionally and say oh we were treated like kings out there. The second secretary was the de facto ruler of the republic.

Q: Kazakhs, but the power behind that, the eminence grise was the party secretary.

BARRY: Well, he had complained about the Bulgarians not being as nearly as ready to do their bidding as the Kazakhs were. There were some stresses and strains in relations at that time and of course the Russians had been bleeding themselves dry subsidizing these economies. They sold oil to the Bulgarians at comecon prices which were one-tenth the world market prices and the Bulgarians would turn around and sell the oil on the world market at their prices and it didn't appeal a lot to the Soviets. All of these kinds of things that kept the Bulgarians going were subsidies from Moscow and the subsidies were being

cut back and that caused a lot of stresses within the Bulgarian body politic. There were some people rising at the time within Bulgaria who were potential challenges to Zhivkov who prided himself on being the longest serving anybody in Eastern Europe, but that was all contained because Zhivkov kept shifting people around to make sure that they didn't develop a power base.

Q: How did you find dealing with Zhivkov?

BARRY: His daughter was actually more interesting. Ljadmila Zhivicova, who had gone to Oxford and spoke English well, and she was an annoyance to the Soviets because she was fond of saying things like, "It was the missionaries who taught the Russians how to speak or write and put the language in writing so that the Soviets were not really Bulgarians, they were Greek," but nevertheless the Bulgarians claimed them and she asserted the strong superiority of Bulgarian culture and all those things. Eventually she died and the suspicion around was that the Russians had poisoned her. Zhivkov himself was a not very interesting personality I would say. He was kind of colorless and he had houses in every town. He was worse than Tito in terms of villas per capita.

Q: You were there in the early years of the Reagan administration, taking a very strong hard right Cold War attitude at the beginning. Maybe I'm over characterizing this, but did you find sort of instructions or requests or something coming out of there at the beginning? Was it difficult to deal with from the State Department?

BARRY: No, not really. I guess the issue we had to deal with most publicly was the issue of the Pershings and the SS-20s and all of that kind of thing, but we didn't have any trouble presenting that issue as being an issue that had to be faced. Bulgaria was not very high on the list.

Q: Well, you left there in '84. I think this is probably a good place to stop. Where did you go?

BARRY: Well, eventually, I went off for a year. I was a diplomat in residence at Dartmouth. Then from there I went to the head of the U.S. Delegation to the Stockholm Conference on Confidence Building and Security Measures in Europe for a year and a half.

Q: Good. Well, we'll pick that up then. Great.

Today is the 6th of December, 2001. Bob, let's talk a bit about Dartmouth. You were there from '84 to '85?

BARRY: Yes. Dartmouth was my alma mater and I didn't have anything immediately to do after I left Bulgaria so I talked to the president of Dartmouth who had been a year ahead of me at Dartmouth and I became the first John Sloan Dickey Fellow. They had

started the Dickey endowment, named that for the president of Dartmouth at the time I had been there who was also one of the founding fathers of the UN and this endowment had a fellowship, so as a diplomat in residence I was also the Dickey Fellow. Although I wanted to teach courses for credit, the faculty wasn't particularly interested in that. So, what I did was lecture in other peoples' courses and gave a seminar not for credit on issues having to do with arms control. That was a pleasant year. Our kids, our two sons were in school respectively at Amherst and Yale, so we had a chance to spend time with them. I helped start the International Affairs Journal that they started up during that year.

Q: Well, in the first place what changes did you notice at Dartmouth and in the student body?

BARRY: Well, first of all Dartmouth, when I had been there it had been an all men's school. Now it was coeducational.

Q: Didn't girls ruin it?

BARRY: No, actually the place was improved greatly by the addition of women. I think it was a better school academically and a better school socially and all that. Of course, there had been a lot of new building in connection with that in terms of new dormitories and new science buildings and things like that. We also were ski instructors for young children. This was a program that the college put together so we spent time doing that as well.

Q: How well informed did you feel the students were regarding foreign affairs?

BARRY: Well, the only students who sought me out were people who were positively interested in it. In general, however, I would have to say, they were less well informed than they were when I had been there as an undergraduate because Dickey had set up this so called Great Issues program. Everybody was required to take it. This brought in speakers from all over the world and we were required to read the foreign affairs stories in the newspapers everyday and things like that. So, overall I would say there was decline in interest in foreign affairs. The people I talked to were the people who came to my seminars and were people who were interested in foreign affairs.

Q: You did find and interest in the Foreign Service?

BARRY: Yes, but it was a self-selected group.

Q: Where did you feel that knowing the phantom of the faculty and all, where did you feel the students were bound by and large?

BARRY: Well, I suppose most of them were bound for careers in business, which was the case, when I was there as well. Not so many for government jobs of one kind or another.

Q: I don't think I, talking to faculty members at Williams, said well, it is a little hard to

get overly excited about training these future investment bankers about culture and all that. Were there any issues that particularly were roiling in the campus at all in the time?

BARRY: Well, this was the early days of “Star Wars” and so there were the discussions of arms control, that was a major topic of discussion, but we had experts on both sides. But other than that, I don’t think there was anything in particular. It was not a very activist time. These were the days of the end of the first Reagan administration. The student body was marginally I think pretty conservative.

Q: Well, then after your year in ‘85, whither, you went to where?

BARRY: Yes. The Stockholm Conference on Confidence Building Measures and Security in Europe had been going on for almost a year. Jim Goodby was the head of the U.S. delegation, but he had a family crisis and had to come home. I was asked to take his place. I was delighted to do so, but just before I had left for Stockholm in September or August of ‘85, our younger son, Peter, died in a fishing vessel accident in Alaska. That was quite a shock to us and I had a real question about whether I should go ahead and go off to Stockholm or not under the circumstances. George Vest who was then Director General of the Foreign Service was very kind in advising me to go ahead and do it and was in agreement to send Peggy out from time to time to visit me there because it was going to be fairly intensive negotiations. I was supposed to go in August, but we had to take care of the burial of our son and all that kind of thing and we also began something that was all absorbing for Peggy, after I left. This was to try to improve rules having to do with fishing vessel safety. I had been in the navy myself and I was shocked to learn that the boat that my son was on was more than 70 years old was in terrible shape, had no life saving equipment onboard, that the skipper had been on cocaine. So, we decided that we would lobby with the congress to get this regulatory regime changed. The Jones Act, which is the basic law governing maritime affairs specifically, forbade any kind of regulation for fishing vessels. So, without legislation you couldn’t even require a fishing vessel to have a life raft onboard. So, in August or September I looked into all this and began to contact people about it, but in mid-September I left and went to Stockholm and left this in Peggy’s hands. She became quite active and testified several times in Congress; the net result of this was that there was congressional legislation passed that required fishing vessels to have survival equipment onboard and people would be trained to use it. That incidentally has had an impact on safety in fishing vessel industry. In fact, there’s a CNN special that is coming out in a few days that in part deals with our role in this fishing vessel issue, but it also has to do with some of the more recent fishing vessel accidents.

Q: Where was the opposition coming from, the fishing industry?

BARRY: Fishing vessel owners who did not want to have the additional expense of this. The Alaska Delegation in Congress was against it because they are pretty libertarian on these issues. There was a proposal to require that there be survival equipment in return for a cap on tort claims having to do with deaths in the fishing vessel industry and that was something that the trial lawyers were strongly against. On the other side, Peggy put

together a coalition of mothers of people, girlfriends and wives of people who had been killed. They testified and we got some pretty good support from a number of people in both houses of Congress including the chair of the Merchant Marine Fisheries Committee of the House and so eventually, although it wasn't until 1988 that the law was finally passed, but it did go through.

Q: Well, with a tragedy comes a blessing I must say. Okay, you left for Stockholm in '85?

BARRY: '85.

Q: There until when? I just like to get this down.

BARRY: Until I think it was September of '86.

Q: Can you talk about what the issues were?

BARRY: This had been something that the Russians had strongly wanted because they were very much in favor of the security basket of CSCE, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This was something that was under the auspices of CSCE. It was the first arms control conference to be done under CSCE auspices. The purpose was to create a structure of confidence building measures having to do with conventional forces which would help to provide early warning of unusual military events, to require people to advise of major military maneuvers, to invite observers, etc. The key controversial issue was on site verification. This was something the U.S. strongly insisted upon and of course the Russians strongly resisted. The participants of course included all the CSCE members. So, it was the neutral and non-aligned as well as the Warsaw Pact and NATO. We had by far the toughest position in NATO. It was driven by the Pentagon, as you will recall there was some considerable tension between Schultz and Weinberger about these issues in general. At that point we had broken off all other arms control discussions with the Russians. So, this was the only arms control discussion that involved Russia and the United States at the time and thus it took on an unusually high public profile. In fact whenever Jim Goodby and later I came back to the U.S. for consultations we were received by the president, the vice president, the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, the whole national security team to provide reports about progress in negotiations. I'm quite sure it was the wish of many in the office of the secretary of defense to have this thing not succeed because among other things, they were not so keen on having onsite verification of the U.S. military activities, but it had to be a two way street. My Russian opposite member was a man named Grinevsky, a very intelligent, very cultured Soviet diplomat and we got along well personally, but of course, there had been no progress for a very long time. By the time I got there, there was a kind of deadline of, the clock was supposed to run out in I think it was August of 1986 and as we got closer to that deadline the discussions accelerated. Of course, this was the time of Gorbachev and so it was we were trying to figure out whether Gorbachev would put a new face on the negotiation. The sticking point was, as I say, the on site inspection and we had said several times we would walk away from the negotiation in the absence of any strong provision on on site verification. We didn't have a lot of support in NATO for that. I

think many people in NATO thought it was unrealistic. The neutral and non-aligned had their own reasons for not liking on site inspections. The Swiss, for example, have got a kind of volunteer force that depends a great deal on secrecy and the secrecy of where their bases are, where their arms are stored, things like that. The Swedes, for that matter, had the same kind of system in place. The idea that they would have to open their borders to on site inspection to see about military maneuvers or to check about whether reports of where their troops were stationed or where their exercises were being held didn't appeal very much to them. But we kept the pressure on and they were of course back channel discussions with the Russians as well. I think we made it clear that without this it was, the U.S. was not going to take part in this negotiation and it was going to fall apart. I guess the key factor came in probably August of '86 when Marshall Akhromeyev who was the chief of the general staff came to Stockholm and announced that yes, Russia had changed its mind about on site inspection. They would be willing to do it, not only would they be willing to do it, we would find that they were more enthusiastic about it than we were. But then of course, they wanted to include things like on site inspection in the United States. They wanted to include operations of naval vessels and things like that none of which we could agree to. The deadline for the negotiations to conclude came and went. We stopped the clock and pretended it was still August as it went into September and eventually we got within sight of agreement. This made the Pentagon very unhappy.

Q: Excuse me. But, while you were doing this I imagine you had American military observers observing you?

BARRY: Well, my delegation was made up of representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the State Department, the CIA, and USIA; it was a big delegation.

Q: There must have been, I mean, were the battles being fought on your delegation, or were they reporting to their masters and it was.

BARRY: The answer to that question is yes to both parts of it. The battles were fought within the delegation, and particularly the OSD contingent was reporting back to the OSD.

Q: OSD is?

BARRY: The Office of the Secretary of Defense. That included Richard Perle, who was the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs then at the Pentagon. In the end game there were several discussions of course with the chiefs in the tank at the Pentagon and so forth that I had participated in, but in the end I guess it was a discussion between Weinberger and Schultz and the president and the vice president. The last instructions I got were basically that I had a green light to get the best deal I could. That was leaked to the press, I presume by the Pentagon, which of course made the whole end game extremely difficult.

Q: Oh God yes.

BARRY: Here I was trying to get more out of the whole negotiation at the end and here the press had it that I was free to agree to anything that I wanted to. We did hold out successfully at the end. I think it was kind of strange because I would go to see Reagan when I came back on these things and we had these discussions in the Oval Office. It was clear to me that he didn't have a clue about what this was all about, but it was the only arms control discussion going on so it was important. I think this was the stage at which Reagan beginning to change his mind about dealings with the Soviet Union. Having this be a success rather than to have it collapse was a major issue at that point.

Q: Who was the national security advisor?

BARRY: Bud McFarland.

Q: Did he play much of a role?

BARRY: No, at least not that I saw. Schultz has written about this in his own memoirs that the main issue was between State and Defense. My deputy was from DOD, but he was a very constructive force in all this because he well understood the military aspects of the whole thing and certainly was not interested in seeing the whole thing collapse. As I say this thing came to a conclusion in September. It was the first ever arms control agreement providing for on site inspection, so it got, it was a precedent setting event because of course the subsequent discussions of theater nuclear weapons also had to provide for on site inspections. One of the reasons we were holding the line so much here was to make that sure that that precedent was set for the future.

Q: How did you find, I mean, when you're talking about onsite inspections at that time, what were you talking about?

BARRY: We were talking about the ability to send in a team to let's say that the Russians said there was a major military exercise going on in an area that was not open to foreign travel in the Soviet Union and we chose to use one of our quota of on site inspections to go there and see if it was in fact the kind of exercise that they had notified. We would be allowed to send a team in on very short notice and be escorted around to see what was going on. Or they didn't notify of an exercise, but that we detected that one was one going on, say a mobilization exercise or a transfer of forces or something like that, we would be entitled to go in and look at that, too. Now there were reciprocal rights that the Russians had in Europe, at the end it was very difficult to bring the Swedes and the Swiss and others along because they had assumed from the beginning that this would never succeed and we would never get an on site inspection regime. When it became that the Russians and the Americans were going to agree on it, they began to worry about their own defense plans.

Q: Well, was there any thought, I mean these being neutral powers of saying okay, you're out of it?

BARRY: That would not have worked. No, there wasn't any thought given to it because

the Russians would have said it has got to be for everybody.

Q: Because neither were part of anybody's pact and let me just put the. So, I mean you have, how did you reach this accord?

BARRY: Well, what you always do in these things it has to be by consensus. If one country opts out, then there's no agreement, but there was a lot of public pressure on this at this time. Of course, the neutrals and non-aligned, being holier than thou, always accusing the U.S. of not wanting real arms control, so it would have been awkward for them to opt out on the basis of their unwillingness to see inspections on their own territory.

Q: I mean you do have this imbalance, the Soviet Union is part of, you know it considers itself part of Europe and so you would have an exercise in Kazakhstan and you can go there, but you can't look and see what's happening in Kansas?

BARRY: Well, that was a point that the Russians did not cease making, but we said this is the whole CSCE is about territory of Europe, admittedly Europe to the Urals, but that doesn't include the continental United States.

Q: Were they beyond the Urals through Kansas?

BARRY: I don't recall whether that was a sticking point or not, but we just said no and that was about it. I mean we were quite credible in saying that this did not turn out the way that we wanted, we would back out of the whole thing. I think I said it on every occasion when I made a speech, which I did fairly often.

Q: Did, I mean, how did you find Defense, what was Defense's attitude?

BARRY: Their attitude was arms control agreements with the Soviets are worthless, that they don't live up to them, that we would get into these prolonged negotiations and the benefits are outweighed by the costs of doing these kinds of things and so we shouldn't be involved in them.

Q: Did you find that Richard Perle was a driving force?

BARRY: Well, I'm not sure that there was any difference between Perle and Weinberger on these issues. The Joint Chiefs took a much more relaxed attitude in fact the Joint Chiefs figured there was some useful information that would come out of this that we didn't have ourselves before and therefore the benefits in fact outweighed the cost. So, as usual, there was a difference between the Chiefs and the civilian leadership.

Q: I would think, you know, just looking at it as a situation in those days that I mean we had a hell of a time penetrating the Soviet Union and looking at things, they had us covered from A to Z practically with spies and all in fairly open society, so you know, I think this would be, I would think the CIA would be delighted for example.

BARRY: Oh, the CIA was for it. The arms control and disarmament agency was kind of two minds, the head of ACDA at that point was Ken Adleman and he was on the Weinberger side of the issue. It was a good delegation. We did an awful lot of public diplomacy traveling around to the CSCE member states, meeting with them and having press conferences and all that trying to build support for this. It got a lot of coverage in the U.S. since it was the only game in town at the time.

Q: How about some of the other players, how did the French fit into this?

BARRY: The people who were most enthusiastic about this and pressed hardest for an agreement and were most upset sometimes about our hardline position were the Germans. This was of special importance to Germany because it had to do with the movement of conventional forces. Moves that could be threatening.

Q: That's where the battle would be fought.

BARRY: Yes. The Nordics were all very much engaged in this with Stockholm being the host of the conference and so the Swedes played an important role.

Q: How about the, you know, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, were they jumping to the Soviet?

BARRY: There was no daylight between any of the Warsaw Pact members on these things.

Q: Were you able to see a difference when you were talking sort of on the side to save the Poles or something like that or were their delegations pretty disciplined?

BARRY: I don't think their delegations did a lot of freewheeling discussions. My main effort was devoted at keeping the NATO caucus together because we would meet on a regular basis and there was a lot of potential for dissent within the NATO group, so you had to keep them in line. I remember the Portuguese became particularly difficult. Well, Portuguese are often that way and the Italians were pretty soft on most of these things. The other main effort was with the Russians themselves. So, that was where I spent most of my time.

Q: Were the British fairly solid?

BARRY: Yes, I think they were. Nobody was as hard over as we were. So, we were the sort of whip with a NATO hoop.

Q: Did they sort of roll their eyes when Weinberger was mentioned?

BARRY: Yes, they certainly knew within our own delegation the differences were quite clear because the OSD representative would go around and threaten they would pull the

plug on the negotiation if there was any sign of weakness on the delegation position.

Q: Were other talks going on at this time? I'm always a little confused on this. There are the three baskets. There was the one that was on borders and to acknowledge that the borders would stay firm, which is what the Soviets wanted very much. They wanted to keep the order line.

BARRY: Well, by this time of course the Helsinki Final Act was long since put to bed. That was 1974. So, this was part of the Final Act. After the Final Act was approved the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe had a quasi-permanent presence in Vienna, but this sprung out of the conference and it was a separate activity under basket one. It had long been the Russian desire to enliven the security aspects of the dialogue as opposed to the economic or human rights baskets. This got started in I guess it must have been '83.

Q: What was driving the Soviets in this?

BARRY: Well, as you say they were most interested in developing the security basket. They wanted to emphasize the permanence of the division in Europe. They wanted to have a security forum in which they participated and they still do for that matter. You see this now going on about NATO because they don't like the idea that NATO makes decisions about things and then brings it to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and tries to get OSCE to make decisions having to do with things like Macedonia or Central Asia or things like that. They wanted to keep; they wanted to have a voice in European security issues.

Q: What about, where stood the nuclear arms control type things, nuclear and conventional?

BARRY: Nowhere at that point because we had broken off the strategic arms discussions. The question about theater nuclear weapons was hung up at that point. Remember the zero option, we were saying that the only possibility was both sides to withdraw intermediate range nuclear weapons from Europe. I think towards the end of this period the discussions about intermediate range weapons got started again. Paul Nitze was the head of the U.S. negotiating team and that was concluded sometime later. There had been the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks (MBFR), but they were also suspended at that time. At the time I went there, there was nothing else going on in terms of arms control discussions. MBFR started up towards the end of that period or became active toward the end of that period and finally ended up in the CFE Treaty, the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe.

Q: Were you getting any inclinations or more than that that the Soviet Union was beginning to have, you know, a leadership crisis, wither it was going and all that sort of thing?

BARRY: Well, by that time, at least by '84, the leadership crisis was over because

you've buried Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko and Gorbachev was in and Gorbachev was talking about Glasnost and restructuring and Perestroika and all that kind of thing. We got the indication towards the middle of '85 was that the Russians were less rigid in issues like the on site inspections and that opened the way for CFE and theater nuclear weapons discussions.

Q: Was there concern that the Soviets might start cranking up again under a new more vigorous leadership or not?

BARRY: You mean, was there a threatening posture? I don't think so. I mean the whole emphasis in the Gorbachev period was deal with the problems at home. Of course, this was during the "Star Wars" period so they were being driven hard to keep up with us in terms of spending and nuclear conventional weapons.

Q: Was there any concern at that time about some sort of an agreement, I mean when you had these things going between the Soviets and the Europeans and the United States that somehow or another West Germany and East Germany might join together as a neutral lump in the middle of Europe?

BARRY: Well, that was always an underlying fear that people had about the neutralization of Germany and it's a fear that the East Germans had as well because the East Germans were not pleased at all about glasnost and perestroika. Gorbachev came to East Germany and publicly advised them to loosen up on things and that sort of began the crumbling. I think the greatest concern at least among the State Department people was that we would further open the gap between ourselves and the rest of NATO on arms control issues and that this would weaken our posture.

Q: Well, anyway, were you getting anything from our headquarters in Heidelberg saying you're really opening up a can of worms or something like this?

BARRY: I think generally the U.S. command in Europe was happy enough with this whole thing. It did in fact make life simpler for them to have advance notification of conventional military activities. Of course, all of our guidance came through the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We didn't get any lateral discussion, but I did go to visit both SACEUR and CINC/USACEUR, the usual people.

Q: Just to capture the period, I mean, while we were looking for this, this was not a time when we were particularly concerned about a sudden build up in a dash through the Fulda gap by the Warsaw Pact forces was it?

BARRY: That was the original focus for the American forces in Europe. They were poised to repel such an activity and the theory was that in order to do such a thing there would be a period of preparation where people would be operating out of garrisons. It was the desire to capture "out of garrison activities." That drove this issue of on site verification because we would get indications that an infantry division had moved its equipment out of garrison and was moving somewhere else, but they would do it by night

and we wouldn't see it and so that's why we wanted to have this ability to inspect.

Q: Were we getting any, were you getting from your military colleagues, the CIA or something readings on the state of military preparedness and effectiveness of the Soviet forces?

BARRY: Well, we certainly had had all the intelligence that anybody else had at that time, both the compartmentalized intelligence intercepts, satellite activities and things like that, but there was not really a sense that this was an empty shell, that it was, that the Soviet military was in poor condition. This may have been the case when you got back into the hinterland, but the front line divisions in East Germany and so forth were in pretty good shape.

Q: Yes, that's my understanding. Well, then, you left in '86?

BARRY: The thing was concluded in September of '86.

Q: It was concluded. Then what?

BARRY: Well, then I didn't have anything to do immediately so I came back and sort of sniffed around at what might come next.

Q: By the way, in having worked on a hard negotiation like this and coming out with a treaty, did you, you would think the State Department would say, "Boy we got something for you after doing that."

BARRY: Schultz made a public statement of praise for the delegation and me personally. Anyhow eventually well, actually I guess they were looking for somebody to be the chief operating officer of the Voice of America and the job was first offered to Jim Goodby who didn't want it. He told me that they were looking for somebody to do this and so I went to talk to the head of the Voice of America, Dick Carlson and lacking anything else to do I agreed to take on that job. I was the deputy director of the Voice of America which was a largely management job at that point. Before I'd been on the Voice of America as the head of the USSR division. Dick Carlson was not much of a hands on manager, so that, the budget the reshaping of the Voice of America to cut out some services and add others and so forth were all in my department. It was not a sixteen hour a day a job.

Q: But in a way you wanted this, didn't you, with a certain amount of decompression coming back home?

BARRY: Well, not particularly, I'm not for decompressing, it was the best thing available at the time. Charlie Wick was then the head of the U.S. Information Agency; a very close friend of the president's of course and certainly of the hardline persuasion. The Deputy Director of the U.S. Information Agency was Marvin Stone who'd been the editor of Newsweek and was also kind of a hands on person at USIA. I think most of that

period which went from '86 or maybe it was the beginning of '87 until it must have been '89 I guess was involved with trying to stay within the budgetary parameters, trying to do things like increase what we're doing in China at that time which was a big issue. We were broadcasting to China, putting in new transmitters around the world. We had just reached a deal to create a whole wave of new transmitters- one was to be in Israel, one of them was in Thailand, and one somewhere in Turkey I guess. We were doing those things. Those were big capital investments. I ended up for my sins being in charge of one of the stupidest projects that we ever put together, which was TV Marti.

Q: Oh, God. Yes.

BARRY: I was given this job to do I think intentionally by Wick, thinking to get somebody who was a career diplomat responsible for this would give it a degree of respectability it might not otherwise have had. This was driven by the Cuban American Foundation, which had a great deal of influence. Jorge Mass. I spent a lot of time with Jorge. We said from the outset that technically it was not going to work, that it's much easier to jam television signals than it is to jam radio signals and that short of putting it on a ship or something that would bring it close to shore, which would run all kinds of other dangers, you couldn't ever beat the physics of it. No was not an appropriate answer. So, eventually we came up with this idea of putting this big barrage balloon over the Florida Keys and we put the antenna up on top. The balloon flew away occasionally, but that was another story. It would send the signal down to Cuba, but of course it couldn't get through the jamming. Some people could get it between the hours of 2:00 and 3:00 in the morning or something like that, but it was basically for the benefit of Jorge Mass and the Cuban American Foundation rather than listeners. It's still going on today.

Q: Was this more of an employment opportunity for their people a sort of patronage or actually they watch it in Havana and Miami?

BARRY: No, I don't think they could watch it in Miami and of course, we were forbidden by law to broadcast it to the American public. No, it was basically part of the liberation philosophy that eventually, well, I guess it was kind of like driving the Russians broke that eventually would cost so much to jam the thing and that would help to drain the Cuban economy. But it was very popular among the people down there. Well, eventually for that and other services to the USIA I got the Distinguished Honor Award from USIA, but I was always a little bit embarrassed by it.

Q: Did you get caught in the crossfire between Carlson and Wick? My understanding was that they didn't get along.

BARRY: Yes, I guess that's true. I think that was just personality.

Q: I think Carlson ended up as ambassador to the Seychelles or something?

BARRY: He did, he did. I honestly don't remember what it was they argued about, but they did.

Q: But anyway, you've mentioned before and everybody whose dealt with the Voice of America says it's like dealing with a United Nations and all the animosities are just intensified between different nationalities, between different groups, politically, you know. Did this hit you?

BARRY: I was used to that because I had been on the USSR division before and even among the Russians, the Russians are depending on when they emigrated and whether they were Jewish or not Jewish. They had huge fights going on so it didn't particularly concern me. There were some commentators who were from the right wing fringes. One worked for the English language division that would occasionally do things that were out of line. There wasn't a lot you could do about that. They had their own supporters in the right wing press in the U.S. and whenever you tried to rein them in you'd have something come out of the other side where they would go to their sponsors and say something. Of course, being from the State Department made you suspect in and of itself.

Q: Oh yes. Cookie, pushy pinko.

BARRY: And trying to shape the news to fit American foreign policy.

Q: Did you get involved with putting at this stage of the game, technology was changing. Did you get involved in almost the theology of short wave versus satellite?

BARRY: Yes, there were two new developments. One of them was to use medium wave and FM by feeding our material to local stations, which would then carry them. When we put such a thing into effect in Europe, which I had my serious doubts about because in order to appeal to the age group that you wanted to appeal to on FM or medium wave, you had to make it mostly a disc jockey show. We would put a lot of effort into this and it didn't really pay off, but it was popular in Congress. Then of course, this was the period of WorldNet. That was television and I don't think a terribly successful thing, but this was Wick's big issue and what we did was to piggyback our radio signal on the WorldNet satellites so you could pick off a radio signal and local stations could get the right to pick up what we had and use it. We were at the same time building these new short wave systems, but the listenership to short wave was declining.

Q: Yes, what about say with China, did China pose any particular, really more political problems as far as what we would broadcast to it?

BARRY: Yes, of course, there was a strong push for Radio Free China. One of our long time rivals was Radio Free Europe, so whenever there would be an issue with a country coming up, the idea would be to start a new radio free something or other. Well, we've seen it again with Afghanistan. People have again come up with this. That was always a debate going on, whether we should build more of these "free radios," but the more you slanted the news, the less credible to become Radio Free Europe, which was a surrogate radio station that pretended to be a station that came from within. It was reporting on local news where you don't have a lot of sources to go on so if you're speaking only to the dissident community you lose a lot of other listenership in your preaching to the

converted. We were always advocates of trying to make sure we had balanced coverage and not coverage of just one aspect of things.

Q: In a way Wick had his idiosyncrasies and all, people in USIA kind of look back at a certain fondness with him because he got money.

BARRY: Oh, yes, he was very close to the president, but a lot of that money went to WorldNet.

Q: WorldNet being, could you explain what WorldNet is?

BARRY: It was a worldwide television broadcast and the television was fed by satellite to local television stations around the world who could pick off what they wanted from the satellite and replay it on their own television stations. So, a lot of the content was press conferences, speeches by prominent public figures and things like that. It would be broadcast from studios in Washington, it would be sent by television and picked up there.

Q: Not terribly interesting.

BARRY: Not terribly, no, it all depended on the willingness of other stations to use the material.

Q: Well, then you did this really for about two and a half years?

BARRY: About two years I guess. Then the Bush administration came in and as usual there was a full-scale changeover in the State Department. So, I went to see the new undersecretary for management Ivan Selin. I said, "Look I've been over there at VOA for two years. I don't want to spend the rest of my life there. I don't know anybody now in the hierarchy in the State Department. I think I could be of some use. What I would really like to do eventually is go to Moscow, as ambassador, but you know, in the meantime, could you find something for me?" So, he gave me a special project, which was to change the way in which we processed refugees from the USSR. That was at the time when they were allowing large scale Jewish emigration and most of these people, although they might have applied for an exit visa to go to Israel, really wanted to go to the U.S. We had moved a very large number of the several tens of thousands of them to a place in Italy where they were held while INS went through its endless process of trying to figure out who was eligible, who could come in and Selin said, "Well, we've got to stop that. It's costing too much. We need to process them in Moscow." The embassy in Moscow didn't think this was feasible. The immigration service was certainly against it, but I was given this, perhaps because of my success with TV Marti, as a project and spent the next several months trying to do this. That was the time that the embassy in Moscow had this fire and it was being rebuilt; we structured the embassy so that we had this huge area where you could interview several dozens of people at the same time. We found a lot of people who were retired Foreign Service people who went back there and took on these interviewing jobs. We hired an outside contractor to do all this and eventually it worked. I remember once overhearing a discussion between some people from the Bureau of

Consular Affairs and INS saying this was absolute nonsense, it will never, never work. Selin was also a determined kind of person. Of course, the OMB and everybody else was for it because it was going to save us a lot of money. As I say, eventually it worked. We got through a backlog of people we didn't have to send them to Italy anymore. It required some negotiation with the Soviets about the extension of these peoples' exit visas because it sometimes couldn't be done over the period of two or three months that they usually give you exit visas for.

Then in 1990 I had just been given the job of chief negotiator for the Open Skies Treaty. In the meantime, the wall had come down and the Congress had put together, a big package of aid for Eastern European democracies, the SEED Act, which involved several hundred million dollars of assistance each year. Larry Eagleburger was Deputy Secretary at that point. I had written a memo to Ivan Selin saying, "You can't handle this money through this traditional AID bureaucracy. They've never done this kind of thing. You need to have a dedicated office working on this project." Eagleburger was the coordinator of the whole thing along with the deputy secretary of the treasury and the chairman of the council of economic advisors. Selin passed my memo on to Eagleburger who bought off on it and made me the head of the Office of Eastern European Assistance reporting to the deputy secretary. We organized that. We got a bunch of talented people, many of them quite junior, but also some colleagues from before who'd been on the delegation in Stockholm and we set up this office. The first thing we did was say to AID, look you've got this idea that you're going to send retired AID employees to make a needs assessment in Eastern Europe. What are they going to do? They're going to go to the U.S. embassy and say, "Well, what do you think they need here." It's going to take you almost a year and in the meantime Congress is going to say, "Where is the money going?", so "Why don't you just drop that whole thing? Cut out the middle man, don't hire the retired AID employees and we can tell you what they need because we'll go directly to the embassies and to the governments concerned and come up with projects for you to spend the money on." I mean, they didn't like it, but Eagleburger was quite capable of stiffing the director of AID and the person who was the assistant administrator Carol Adleman, Ken Adleman's wife, was quite prepared to go along with this. She saw that that was where it made sense to do this. So, we set up a lot of programs.

We had some new ideas, such as these Enterprise Funds, which took some of the money appropriated by Congress and created a revolving investment fund. We brought together a bunch of people from the private sector to manage that and they were supposed to invest in small or medium sized businesses that needed to be privatized. Some of these were a big success. The Polish American Fund was a great success. Others were failures because of the quality of the management that went into it. But we resisted the idea that there would be AID missions in each of these countries. We said this is bureaucratizing the whole process. Let's find some new ways of delivering assistance and of course, this was a huge pot of money. I think at that point it was \$500 million and so everybody from around town was coming to want a piece of it. Some of it was spent quite well; things like the National Endowment for Democracy, NDI, the Republican Institute. They all put good programs in these countries. We sent a lot of people from the business community out there to work in newly privatized firms to try to improve management. We set up some legal reform things, the American Bar Association projects. There was a lot of

business interest in going out there to do some of these things, but there was a plethora of consultants hanging around.

Q: I was going to say, I mean there is a, I won't even call it a cottage industry, it's a manor industry, I mean, all these big universities have got grad students and professors they want to send out to consult on various projects which is great for the graduate programs and universities using American AID money, but not much gets translated. Were you having to fight that?

BARRY: I don't think we did any of that then. There were lots of people who wanted to do it. I don't think we funded any of that kind of thing. All I know was that they were talking about the Marriott Brigade in Poland for example, because the Marriott Hotel in Poland was full of consultants of one kind or another, investment bankers and things like that who were coming over hoping for some kind of restructuring process that would work. Later on of course, after the breakup of the Soviet Union in '91, the Russian project came in there, too. For a while it was under me as well. One of the things that we set up was the Eurasia Foundation, which was modeled on the Asia Foundation. We took a chunk of the money that was appropriated and gave it to this new foundation to provide a quick response program so that if there are projects worth doing, it doesn't have to go through the very slow cycle of planning that you do with AID. That turned out to be a very successful thing. It's probably had the best reputation of any of the things that we've been involved in.

Q: You keep mentioning having to bypass AID. Was it your feeling that AID had become too much of a bureaucratic?

BARRY: Well, in the first place it never worked in transitional economies. They all were people who had experience in AID work, people who worked in Latin American, or Africa, or Asia, or developing countries. It's a different set of problems. The initial response had been well, we'll get our people who know the AID business to go out and do assessments of what was needed in say Poland and our answer to that was no this was a different set of problems. Also, their cycle is a slow one. I mean they have to have a program design. The design has got to be approved in Washington. The design has got to be looked at by the appropriations committees and finally there has to be congressional notification. All of that cycle takes about a year. We couldn't wait that long. We would have been faced with vast criticism that the Congress had made this money available and we couldn't spend it. Eventually, they got with the program, but they didn't like it because it was clear that what we were doing was trying to take as much of the decision making power as we could out of their hands and put it into the hands of people who we thought could act faster and the other they didn't like at all. They didn't like the Eurasia Foundation.

Q: Did you get involved with ethnic groups, I'm thinking about the Latvian Americans, the Polish Americans and the Hungarian Americans?

BARRY: Oh, yes and we certainly had to pay close attention to them. Polish Americans in particular. We had to make sure that they were represented in things like the enterprise

funds. We also had to spend time with the new governments in these areas and get their views about what should be done. We spent a lot of time in particular with the Czechoslovakian government; Polish government, Hungarian government and we kicked off this whole thing with a White House conference. We brought all kinds of people from around the country from the business community, from the ethnic communities and had to keep the channels of communication open to with all these people.

Q: Was East Germany sort of given to Germany itself?

BARRY: Yes, we didn't put any money in East Germany.

Q: I guess the Germans would take care of that. What was your impression of going down through this, let's talk about the Eastern European thing, how about the Polish government? Did you find it pretty responsive?

BARRY: Yes, particularly the finance minister, Balcerowicz, who was a great advocate of shock therapy which didn't work in the short run, but did work in the long run.

Q: Explain shock therapy.

BARRY: Well, the idea that you have to introduce reforms across the board and as quickly as possible. As an example of doing things the other way, the Polish finance minister often cited, if you want to change from driving on the left hand side to driving on the right hand side, you don't do it one street at a time, you've got to do it all at once. So, the decontrol of prices, the opening up of stock exchanges, the privatization and so forth all was supposed to fall into place in one fell swoop and of course, that created a lot of dislocation in the short run. The Czech Prime Minister, Vaclav Klaus, was a big advocate of this. One of the issues of this was how do you do privatization? Do you do it by having investment banks come in and examine the firm and redesign it and then sell it to domestic or foreign investors? That's a very expensive and slow system and Klaus and the Poles as well came up with voucher privatization where they create a set of vouchers representing the value of the state owned enterprises. Those vouchers are given to the population and then they traded the vouchers depending upon their value and the new management comes in and things like that. It's still under dispute as to whether that was the right way to approach these things. It worked pretty well in Poland. They didn't do it in countries like Hungary. Each of the countries chose their own way dealing with privatizing state enterprises. Many of these enterprises were defense industry enterprises. How to convert defense industry that was an issue that we tried to come to terms with. I remember going to a place in Estonia that had created containment vessels for nuclear reactors for submarines and they were proudly showing us what they were doing to convert this to civilian use. They had this huge room full of machine tools that was probably five stories high that was designed to produce these containment vessels with a tolerance of a couple of microns and they were using it to create vats for fermenting beer—probably not the most economical use of that machinery. The treasury department played an important role when it came to macro economic policy and work with the IMF and the World Bank and the U.S. executive directors and so forth. John Robson, the Deputy

Secretary of the Treasury, was an active player in all this.

Q: How did you find, say the Baltic countries, how did they respond?

BARRY: Differently. I mean the Estonians were probably the quickest to do economic reform and of course the Nordic played a big role in working with them. Latvia was probably the slowest and of course the issue that took too much of their attention was dealing with the Russian population in trying to assure that the Russian population would be treated somehow civilly.

Q: How about Hungary and Romania?

BARRY: Hungary had been moving along the path of reform already, so they were probably the most progressive of that bunch. We put a lot of effort in Hungary into working with the Hungarian parliament to encourage investing. We helped General Electric to buy a light bulb plant in Hungary, which turned out to be a big success. There was some discussion of putting automobile assembly plants in Poland. I think General Motors did that. So, we did a lot of work also with U.S. companies who were interested in investing there. We spent a lot of time, well Romania was the least reform-oriented let's see, Ceausescu was killed in '89.

Q: '89, December of '89.

BARRY: So, the country was a mess after that. Still is for that matter. We put a lot of effort in Yugoslavia. This was the period when Markovich was Prime Minister. He was trying to put together his economic reform package, which recommended itself to the IMF and the World Bank. We traveled there a couple of times. Of course, there was a lot of resistance to privatization and that I think was the real key to the breakup of Yugoslavia. It was not nationalism per se. It was the reluctance of people like Milosevic and others to see the commanding heights of the economy turned over to the private sector, which was part of Markovich's program. So, although much was made of the issue of Kosovo and Croatian nationalism and so forth, I think the basic motivating force was they didn't want to lose this opportunity of controlling the economy. To this day in places like Bosnia or Croatia or Serbia the right of the ruling party to put its people on the managing boards of these companies is the most carefully guarded right of all and there is little enthusiasm for any real steps in the direction of privatization. In '91 we had put together a program, and we were about to get funds from the World Bank, but it was too late. We went there, Eagleburger and I and others. We called in all these people one by one. Tudjman and Milosevic and everybody we could find and told them what the consequences would be of the breakup of Yugoslavia. Of course, at the same time, the Austrians, and to a degree, the Germans, were whispering in the ears of the Slovenes and the Croats, saying, "All right, get out of Yugoslavia quickly as you can."

Q: So, you had in a way as we were looking at the economic results of the breakup of Yugoslavia.

BARRY: We strongly supported Markovich. We thought he had the capability of holding the country together because the economic decline of Yugoslavia had already long since begun. But he did not have much of a political base. He had neglected to build up a political support system. So, at that time the CIA had already done its estimates. About the only time I'd ever known that the entire U.S. intelligence community was united in predicting this disastrous outcome of the breakup of Yugoslavia. Our pitch to Kuchan in particular was that your pullout could trigger civil war.

Q: Kuchan being?

BARRY: He was the head of the Slovenes in Slovenia and he was the most eager to get out and the one who had been the most told by the Austrians and the Germans that they would find a nice home in Europe if he got out of there. Our pitch to them was don't even think about it without having made some agreement about minorities particularly in Croatia because we know that Croatia will probably go out the door and then you'll have the problem of the divisions within Croatia. All of which of course, turned out to be absolutely true, but Kuchan in particular was stubborn about this. I guess after we went there Baker went there and made a sort of halfhearted attempt to try and talk them out of it. By that time there was a lot of pressure from the Congress. There was a lot of pressure from the Europeans and Baker sort of said, "Well, I wash my hands of the whole thing."

Q: Yes.

BARRY: Then we started relief flights into Sarajevo at the end of my time there. It was the first at that point after the situation had blown up in Croatia when we had several discussions with Izetbegovich who came to Washington and then Bosnia decided to declare its independence. The last two holdouts were Macedonia and Bosnia who rightly saw that their going down this path of independence was going to create tremendous divisions within their countries. By 1992, the siege of Sarajevo had begun and we began to fly the first relief flights in.

Q: What about the rest of Europe I mean you say you had had a piece of the action when the Soviet Union broke up and you had the stands?

BARRY: It initially came to our office and then it moved over to Rich Armitage who took over. Armitage had been working on something to do with the Philippines and he was looking for something else to do and the initial idea after the division of the USSR was to ship in relief supplies. These were left over from the Gulf War. There was a major effort to fly these MREs into all these places.

Q: MREs are meals, ready to eat? In our time we used to call them K-Rations.

BARRY: Right. This was a very popular effort with Baker and Margaret Tutwiler so this Soviet thing eventually ended up in Armitage's backyard. By that time, my papers had already gone over to the White House as they wanted me to go to Yugoslavia as ambassador. I wasn't terribly eager to do this, especially since I had several times told Eagleburger you're really sure you want to send an ambassador to Milosevic who is not

going to be one of our favorite characters. Eventually they decided not to and then Eagleburger said, "Well, here are a bunch of countries that are going to need ambassadors. Pick one." I picked Indonesia.

Q: Okay, well this is probably a pretty good place to stop. We'll pick this up the next time when you're off, you left out of not being sent to Yugoslavia then Belgrade, which would have meant Milosevic and all that. We had a charge there at the time?

BARRY: Yes. Well, Warren Zimmerman was the last ambassador there and it had been set up that I would succeed him.

Q: Okay, then we'll pick this up when? When did you get set to go to Indonesia?

BARRY: It was the spring of '92 and I went there I think in July of '92.

Q: All right. We'll pick it up there.

Today is the 14th of December, 2001. Bob, in the first place did you have any problems getting confirmed to Indonesia?

BARRY: No, not at all. It was not a country that was very high on the congressional screen at the time. In fact it still isn't despite all the things that have happened because it's sort of over the horizon. There were obviously some issues concerning Indonesia which the Congress had some interest in. Human rights, East Timor, the issue of military training, but you know in many ways Indonesia was kind of like Yugoslavia, that is the American relationship with Indonesia was forged in the Vietnam period where we were concerned about the growth of communism in Asia. So we had had a pretty good relationship going back to the immediate post war era. We had trained their military; we had provided lots of assistance to them. One of the reasons I picked Indonesia in fact was because of ex-AID director for Indonesia was working with me on aid to Eastern Europe and when he heard that Indonesia was a possibility he said that that would be a very interesting place to go. As indeed it was. So, I guess to be honest about it, the greatest resistance I had was not from the Congress, but from the East Asia Bureau.

Q: Oh, yes.

BARRY: Because I was parachuted in on them by Eagleburger and they had had somebody in mind themselves to go out there.

Q: I can't remember, Bob, had you had any Asian experience at all?

BARRY: No, none whatever.

Q: Well, you'd been to Eastern Bulgaria I guess.

BARRY: That's about as far East as I got. But they were cordial in accepting me.

Q: Well, you were by the way in Indonesia from '92 to when?

BARRY: The summer of '95.

Q: Before you went out, you did your reading and getting briefed?

BARRY: Did some Indonesian language training and so forth, but I also spent a lot of time with the business community because I was in the process of remaking myself for the third time. I had remade myself from an arms control Soviet specialist into a transitional development assistance person and then the now third remaking was to be a promoter of American business. We had lots of big business interests there ranging from oil companies to mining companies and a lot of power companies and that kind of thing.

Q: When you were getting ready to go out did you sort of without anybody telling you or did you mentally have your own list of agenda in your portfolio when you went out there that you wanted to do?

BARRY: Well, having worked closely with Eagleburger, Eagleburger was very big on promoting American business. I didn't have to be told that that should be my central priority in Indonesia. Of course, the other things, questions like human rights, trying to get military training, the IMET program going again and the overall problem of trying to understand a very diverse huge country which I had never known anything about before. In fact, when I first came home to tell Peggy that we were going to Indonesia, I bought a book on the way home that told me for the first time that Bali was in Indonesia which rather delighted Peggy. Actually the first experience we had in Indonesia was a truly remarkable one because we got to know various people who had a long acquaintance with Indonesia and one of them called up one day and said oh you must go to the cremation. I didn't understand what she was talking about, I thought she meant coronation, but no, cremation. Indeed we did. It was the raja of Bali and they have periodically ritual cremations for people who have died, not just one person, but hundreds of people at a time. So, even before presenting my credentials, we went off to Bali and went through this truly remarkable ceremony. Thousands and thousands of people and they build these huge cremation towers.

Q: Pyres?

BARRY: Well, not pyres. They are, well they are several stories high, depending upon the dignity of the person being cremated. Each one of them is carried by a thousand people because they are so huge. So, we went there and we went to the palace of the raja, a very educated person who had been the foreign minister of Indonesia back in the '50s and were welcomed into his family and we went through a ceremonial dinner for 5,000 people and then all of these pyres were carried up to a hill where they were burned. The raja invited me to the position of honor sitting next to him where he smoked a big Monte Cristo cigar watching the pyre go up; then all of the ashes were gathered together and

taken down to the coast where they were put in outrigger canoes and sent out into the sea where they were scattered on the ocean. Going up the hills they had to zigzag because they wanted to make sure that the spirits got confused and didn't find their way back somehow. So, it was an amazing experience. That was my first lesson in the diversity of Indonesia. Of course, the Balinese are Hindu, not Muslim. There is a variety of Hinduism I had never quite experienced before.

Q: What was sort of the position the governmental position both just sort of as a government, Suharto I assume at the time, but also what was that position and then what was the financial situation when you got there?

BARRY: Well, the Indonesian government was at that point rather annoyed with the U.S. because we had cut off military training and had said a number of critical things about them. This was still the Bush administration that just became more pronounced during the presidential campaign. The relationship with the U.S. had always been a close one particularly with U.S. business. In addition to Mobile's big LNG operation and this mining operation, the copper mine in Irian Jaya and another big oil operation in Sumatra. We just had a very active business community, probably 10,000 American businessmen living there at the time. What was the rest of the question?

Q: Well, I was just wondering, Suharto's role was firm, I mean, as we saw it at that time?

BARRY: It was very authoritarian. There was no crack in the facade. There was an opposition lead by Megawati Sukharoputri, the current president, but it had no traction and periodically her headquarters were burned down or something like that because the Suharto's forces were not allowing any opposition to take place. I mean this was a period of prosperity for Indonesia and certainly the positive part for Suharto period was although there was a lot of corruption and businesses had to do some unpleasant things, it was quite profitable for American businesses to be there, so the business community was happy with things as they stood.

Q: Were there any at that time because we're very close to the time, it wasn't just Indonesia, but Thailand and other places, I mean, there had been too many cozy loans, I mean the economy was not on firm ground. I'm talking about throughout Asia.

BARRY: That was later. In '92 none of that had appeared.

Q: So, was anybody I mean your economic counselor was saying, "Boy, we may have a problem here" or something like that?

BARRY: There were problems with the banking system as there always are in countries like that, but the income was going up. Essentially a lot of the work that was being done was for investment coming in businesses, which had migrated south. In other words, you started out with having a lot of labor intensive stuff done in Japan and then it moves to Thailand or Southeast Asia and then labor becomes too expensive there and it moves south to Indonesia or China. A lot of the controversy about Indonesia at that time was

about outfits like Nike and what they did for their workers, or were going to do for their workers and controversy about then human rights. We did investigate some of those issues at the time.

Q: How about what was the impression you gained both through meeting and dealing with and your embassy with Suharto at the time?

BARRY: Suharto was a typical Javanese prince, that is his whole aura was, he didn't say very much, it was hard to draw him out on any subject. You had to deal with him through the foreign minister or his great protégé, B.J. Habib, who later became president. Habib was treated by Suharto like a son. He was unpopular with the military. There was no question that he was a charismatic person and a modernizer in the sense that he set up an Islamic organization which was a modernizing outfit called the Association of Muslim Intellectuals. A lot of my dealings with Suharto were through Habib and I would make a suggestion about something they ought to do and he would go see Suharto and come back and tell me the decision. Even though I did spend a number of times in conversation with Suharto I seldom got anything.

Q: So, he wasn't in a way the man to see really, I mean, he might be the man to make his decisions, but you dealt with others.

BARRY: The vice president was a former commander of the army, the minister of defense when I got there was Benny Moerdani who had close ties with the U.S., but was strongly nationalist. The state secretary was the sort of path of communications with Suharto himself and Habib was then the minister of science and technology. Those were the people to see.

Q: How did you find your embassy?

BARRY: It was a good embassy. Many of the people there were repeaters. One of the things about Indonesia is it is sort of addictive. People who go there usually come back again a second or a third time. My predecessor as ambassador had had three assignments in Indonesia.

Q: Who was that?

BARRY: John Monjo. He spoke fluent Indonesian. The DCM was on his second tour, the political counselor was on his second tour, the defense attaché was on his third tour and that kind of thing.

Q: Well, did you have to spend a bit of time sort of establishing yourself?

BARRY: Well, I did have to spend a lot of time traveling when I first got there. One of the first trips I made was from one end of Indonesia to the other. I was in Aceh first because it was the key place both in terms of the longstanding separatist trends in Aceh, but it was also where we had a major oil company interest. Then with Habib on one of

his airplanes I flew from Aceh all the way to Irian Jaya. A distance of some 4,000 miles. We had an attaché aircraft there we used that liberally to get around the country to get to know as many people as possible and to take with the embassy with you on all those trips.

Q: You mention Aceh, was there a rebellion going on at that time?

BARRY: There has been a constant state of rebellion going on in Aceh since the time of the Dutch. The Dutch lost more soldiers in Aceh than any other war the Dutch ever fought. So, all of those centrifugal forces were present then, but kept under control by Suharto.

Q: What was our thinking, were we concerned that some of these centrifugal forces might actually take place, in other words in Sumatra or at least part of Sumatra might peel off or something or was this?

BARRY: Well, I think it was a worry because of the example of Yugoslavia. When I came there it was known to Indonesians that I had previously been destined to go to Yugoslavia and so the press was saying oh well the Americans think we are going the way of Yugoslavia, that's why they're sending this guy here. Of course, later on we sent Bob Gelbard there after he had been the czar of the Balkans and that sort of underlined that idea. It wasn't anything we particularly wanted to see happen. We could foresee if there were such an event that would take place, it would be very bloody.

Q: But, we didn't see it, I mean when you look at Yugoslavia, you know this is going to be a very destabilizing within that part of Europe all over, at least that's the potential. Did we see if Indonesia fell apart, this would cause problems?

BARRY: Well, we certainly saw it that way, but the Australians saw it a lot more clearly because if there were an event in that country ten times as large as Yugoslavia, the nearest place for the refugees to end up would be Australia.

Q: So, the concern was really more refugees?

BARRY: Well, no, the concern was, I mean, we knew that it would be very bloody. There would be lots of killing that would take place. You go back to 1965 the "Year of Living Dangerously," the word amok is the loan word that we have from Bahasa Indonesia and you'd still go around to the villages and you'd find somebody in a wooden cage in the middle of the village and the explanation was this was somebody who had run amok. Once an Indonesia runs amok he reaches for his machete and goes after the neighbors. As we saw and as we see now in places like Mallaca.

Q: Let's talk a bit about the business community. What did they want from the embassy and what could the embassy do for them?

BARRY: Well, concretely we could give them lots of advice, we could intervene on their

behalf with the key players to get permission for various things to be done. For example, the idea of private electric power generation was just getting started and there was an American company called Mission Energy that wanted to build a very large combined cycle power plant. When it came to getting permission to do that kind of thing there was potentially a lot of corruption involved. There was potentially the idea that you had to get one of Suharto's children involved in the thing so we were called on in that case to try to run interference for them. This was GE who was ready to put some capital into this, but they wanted some assurances that this was going to work out all right, so Jack Welch came to Indonesia and asked.

Q: He was the CEO of General Electric?

BARRY: CEO of General Electric. He wanted my advice about whether he ought to go ahead with this thing or not. This was the inception of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, APEC and the first APEC summit had been held I think in Malaysia, but the APEC summit was scheduled for Indonesia in 1993 and Clinton came to that summit. We were active in trying to promote APEC and trying to insure that the climate for business was improved and the corruption was kept under control and so forth.

Q: How did American business particularly at the top level deal with the fact that Suharto's family, the sons and daughters were seen to be involved in everything? I mean it was a form of, it was corruption, I mean, but.

BARRY: Well, they dealt with it very carefully because of the foreign corrupt practices legislation. Take for example, Mission Energy, they would not allow any Suharto relatives to get in on the deal, but their coal contract was with a company which had Suharto's children's involvement in it. Probably they paid an excessive price for the coal, but it was that kind of arm's length relationship. One of the biggest interests was the Freeport Macmoran copper and gold mine in Irian Jaya, truly remarkable thing. Irian Jaya is very mountainous and this particular copper mine was about 3,500 meters. There was even a glacier there almost on the equator. The CEO of Freeport Macmoran was sort of a remarkable figure from Louisiana, best known for his Elvis interpretations.

Q: Elvis Presley, yes, deceased star, rock and roll star.

BARRY: Anyhow, he would periodically come out in his private 767 and distribute liberal gifts around to everybody, but not of the kind that was sort of an envelope full of money, but he was sort of skating along the edge of foreign corrupt practices act I suspect.

Q: For one thing, we're talking about the foreign corrupt practices act which we were the first to put this sort of thing in and it was considered to make us operate at a considerable disadvantage?

BARRY: Oh, well, that's quite true, it did because none of our major competitors were under the same kind of constraints. The OECD finally did put into place a requirement

that bribing be criminalized, but that was well after I left, so say the French Total Oil Company or the Siemens which also had many interests in the country, they were certainly actively into corruption.

Q: In a way, say the Indonesians and this probably worked in other countries, sort of understand the rules we operated in, I'm talking about at the bigger level and we were still getting contracts because we could come up with a pretty good deal or not?

BARRY: Yes, I mean, when we told them several times that yes, you can get a deal from Siemens, for example, and there will be some payback for you, but the deal will be much more expensive because there is no free lunch. The money for the bribes gets added onto the contract price. Also, I think for political reasons the Indonesians felt it was desirable to have the Americans involved as much as possible in the country. The business connection was valuable.

Q: Did you have any contact with the Suharto family, the sons and daughters and all?

BARRY: I stayed away from them. I did know the son-in-law Prabowo who was a general in the army and had been the commander in East Timor for some time and we did run into some of the children at social occasions, but I never entertained them.

Q: I mean, was this sort of a deliberate thing? I mean, these people, there was an odor about them that you wanted to watch out for?

BARRY: Absolutely.

Q: How about the East Timor situation? What was it when you arrived?

BARRY: There had been an outbreak of violence in East Timor occasioned by a visit by an American ambassador a couple or three years before. Ambassadors had not visited East Timor for the last couple of years before I arrived and I thought it was important to get out there and see it for myself. I went there early in my tour of duty and went back several times, three or four times. I traveled around the country and got to know the bishop and some of the missionaries that were working there. Of course I got to know the military commander both in East Timor and in Denpasar because the regional military command was there in Bali. Actually one of the things that I was proudest of during my tour of duty was the project we got started in East Timor which had been under the Portuguese. They had a lot of coffee plantations, but these coffee plantations had been neglected. The army was in charge of the Timorese economy, that's how they supplemented their income and they paid very little to the coffee growers for coffee and then sold it on the world market for much higher prices. Somebody who was a long term resident of Indonesia gave us the idea of organic coffee growing because they hadn't had fertilizers because they were too poor and the kind of coffee grown there was a high value coffee so in fact with some funding from AID we got this thing started and it grew very fast. We bypassed the army for marketing. Eventually Starbucks, for example, began to buy some of this organically grown Timorese coffee.

Q: Just for the record, Starbucks being an American coffeehouse chain, extensive

coffeehouse chain.

BARRY: Anyhow, several thousand people eventually got involved in this and I understand that it is thriving today in independent East Timor. So, we were looking around for things like that, projects that were going to generate income for the Timorese and loosen the grip of the army on the economy out there. Also, we were constantly on the backs of the army about excessive force being used in trying to deal with the Timorese insurgency. The head of that insurgency Xanana Gusmao was captured or surrendered to the Indonesian military in '94 I guess it was and jailed. Eventually with a visiting congressman we went to see him in prison to insure that he was being well treated. Of course, he is now the president of East Timor. One of the highlights of my time there was just on the eve of Clinton's arrival for the APEC summit when a whole bunch of Timorese jumped over the fence of the embassy and set up camp on the embassy grounds. We had to intervene quite vigorously to keep the army from trying to come into the embassy grounds and haul these guys out. Eventually when Clinton came they were still on embassy territory and they were demanding to meet with Clinton and talk about East Timor.

Q: These were East Timorese?

BARRY: Yes. Then after Clinton left we had the issue of trying to make sure that they did not leave the embassy grounds and go directly to jail. Eventually, they were allowed to leave and many of them went to Portugal.

Q: How were we getting news? Did we get much news about what was happening in East Timor?

BARRY: Well, this was the age of the Internet so a lot of the information came through the Timorese emigres, some of them from Australia and some from Portugal. We had embassy people there quite often. The Australians had somebody in residence there who worked on aid issues. Of course we had the largest intelligence organization in the world there, the Catholic church and spent a lot of time talking to the papal nuncio, who traveled back and forth fairly often. Of course Bishop Belo was one of the leading pro-independence people in East Timor and we had a lot of contacts with him. I knew the governor pretty well and when the governor would come to Jakarta he would call on me and when I went there I would talk to him. He had been educated under the Portuguese, the first governor, and the second governor, and came from more proletarian class. I guess he had been a truck driver before, but in time he became sort of a confidant and would come to me despite what he had to say publicly about the magnificent Indonesia rule and would talk about what needed to be done to give them more running room.

Q: As you were there, where did you see East Timor going? Independence, war, sovereignty, get the army out, I mean what?

BARRY: Well, I tried to persuade the Indonesians that it was much in their interest to let East Timor go, that it was clearly a drain on the economy that was damaging their

reputation internationally and the foreign minister certainly agreed with that and periodically would try to intervene with Suharto to try to make that case to him, but the military felt very differently about it partly because they were so much involved in the economy. The military budget of Indonesia is about 30% of the cost of the military and so the military commanders were required to make up the rest of their expenses from the local economy. East Timor was a leading source of income. The army argued and Suharto believed that once you let one province of Indonesia go, the rest of them were going to want to break away, too. This goes back to the 1950s when the CIA was involved with an operation in support of Mallacan independence and a federated Indonesia. In fact, we got caught with a CIA person flying a bombing mission a la the Bay of Pigs and that whole episode was still fresh in the minds of many.

Q: Which brings up a topic, how well do you feel you were served by your station?

BARRY: Quite fine. We didn't have any kind of major operation going on there. We were involved in some intelligence collection, but there was no policy difference of any kind. The defense attache was a very experienced person with lots of ties. One of the most respected Americans in Indonesia had been a three time defense attache named George Benson who had very, very close ties with all of the military. He was at that point a retired colonel and he was involved in advising oil companies and other businesses. He came all the time to see the generals. He would come and talk to me and talk to John Hazeman who was the defense attache then at my time. When it came time to try to get a message across to the military it was often most effective to send our defense attache over and say, "Look, now I'm on your side. I've been trying to get military training restarted, I've been trying to improve ties with the defense department, but you've got to understand that if you do this, the reaction is going to be that" and I think that restraining the military, for example, from trying to break into the embassy and seize the East Timorese.

Q: What was the training issue? You've mentioned this a number of times.

BARRY: Well, ever since 1948 we've been involved in a close relationship with the Indonesian military. We were of course in 1946 or '47 leading advocates of Indonesian independence from the Netherlands. Then because of the domino theory, we were involved in the strengthening of the Indonesian military, sending them equipment such as C-130s and training many of their officers here in both military and political military issues. It was the so-called International Military Education and Training, IMET. The year before I got there we had canceled IMET because of the human rights issue.

Q: The human rights issue being focused on East Timor?

BARRY: No, in general the military was involved in governments at the provincial level and they were heavy handed, not only in East Timor, but also in Aceh and Sumatra and anyplace where there was sort of rumbling of dissent, the military often went in with excessive force. This caused a great deal of unhappiness especially among outfits like Amnesty and in the congress there was a move to cut this off and by the time I got there it had been cut off and there was a lot of resentment on the Indonesian side. The U.S.

military was unhappy about it, too. Of course, that was the age of the CINCs and CINCPAC, commander-in-chief, Pacific came frequently to Indonesia. The right of passage of U.S. war ships through Indonesian waters was very important to us and of course we had our special forces that came and trained in Indonesia and so trying to restart the relationship was a priority of mine. One of my predecessors twice removed was Paul Wolfowitz who was at that point Under Secretary of Defense in the Bush administration and of course he had an active interest in this whole thing.

Q: Well, while you were there in the '92 to '95 period were you ever able to get it restarted?

BARRY: Partly. We got something called expanded IMET, which concentrated, on training in human rights. So, they would come to a war college or something like that, but they would take a curriculum that had a lot of international military law and stuff like that.

Q: Did you see while you were there the Indonesian military changing its approach? Do you think they were getting the message?

BARRY: Several of them did. The younger generation of people I think were beginning to reform, but there was a category of people around Moerdani who had been the previous head of the army who were very nationalist and they were very afraid that any kind of loosening of the ties would end up in the disintegration of the country.

Q: What about Australia? It was the other.

BARRY: Well, the Australians and the Japanese were the two other major countries involved. Japan had, as you can imagine, very extensive investments and the Japanese sent some of their most able diplomats there. Their ambassadors there were top notch and likewise the Australians. Of course, they were all knit together in APEC.

Q: Well, I would imagine that the Japanese would be completely, almost completely focused on trade?

BARRY: Well, of course they were interested in protecting their investments and the Indonesians were heavily in debt to Japan so they wanted to make sure that the debt service was taken care of. But, in order to do that they had to be interested in the politics of the situation in order to make sure and there was really no difference in outlook between say myself and the Japanese ambassadors there about need of some kind of reform process.

Q: The Australians, how did you see their role in it?

BARRY: Australia unlike the United States recognized the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia back in '75 and so they were inclined to downplay the Timorese issue although quite conscious of the fact that it was something that might come an issue in the longer term. I don't think their outlook was much different from our own.

Q: How did the when you shortly after you arrived there they had the APEC?

BARRY: It was a year after I arrived.

Q: And Clinton came and all, what was your impression even beforehand of the Clinton administration approach? Was there a different one?

BARRY: Well, initially of course the issue of human rights was greater than it had been, Clinton had said some things during the campaign about independence for East Timor and things like that, but there was an interesting sidebar here because when Clinton had been governor of Arkansas, one of the leading Indonesian business banking families (I should say Indonesian Chinese because they were like many of the rich people in Indonesia a Chinese family), the Riadys had bought a bank in Little Rock and became quite close to Clinton. So, James Riady went to the inauguration and I remember seeing a film clip of himself with Clinton. He emerged as a channel to the Clinton White House which later turned into a scandal because the Riadys contributed money to the campaign. That was one of the things that was investigated during one of the many investigations going on in the Clinton period. The Riadys, being Chinese, were critical of a lot of the things that Suharto and the military did, but they were critical quietly and they were in the meantime doing deals for example with Wal-Mart to open a big retail outlet in Indonesia and building big housing developments and things like that. I guess when Clinton was there for the summit he had an unpublicized side meeting with the Riadys, went to their house and so forth. It caused the Suharto government to treat the Riadys more leniently than they might have otherwise.

Q: Oh, the games. Did you have, Winston Lord I guess was Assistant Secretary for East Asia. What did he have, did he have much interest in East Asia?

BARRY: Well, he did, but he was I think never quite pleased with his own role in Indonesia. He had been on the trip that Ford made to Indonesia in 1975 and Henry Kissinger had been on the same trip when Lord was Kissinger's executive assistant. It was widely rumored, but never admitted, that in 1975 the Indonesians had given Ford and Kissinger and Lord advance notice of their intention to move into East Timor. They had gotten if not a green light at least a yellow light. Now it has come out as some of the papers from that period have been released that the response of Kissinger or Ford was, "Well, if you're going to do it, do it quickly and get it over with." Of course, subsequently, Lord and his wife in particular had become major human rights activists and so the issue of what had transpired then was a sensitive one and I think colored some of his approach to Indonesia.

Q: He didn't want to get too involved?

BARRY: There weren't really any big geopolitical issues at the time that would have required this. It was kind of as I would say off the beaten track in terms of congress and things like that.

Q: What about Islamic fundamentalism. Was that a concern or not?

BARRY: No, not much. This is a very syncretic form of Islam. Much of Indonesia has got Islam late, in its period of decline. Much of Islam came to Indonesia from China, not from Saudi Arabia or places like that. One of my good friends at the time was Abdurahman Wahid, who later became president of Indonesia. He was the head of the largest Islamic organization. He was a graduate of the University in Cairo and so forth, but a very moderate person. I remember once that he and I were meeting with a bunch of Islamic youth and they were going on about the terrible things in Israel and how awful the Jews were and he took out after them in no uncertain terms and called them all stupid and said, "If you people were half as creative and well educated as the people your age in Israel, this country would be a lot better off." There had been a period back in the '50s when the Islamic political parties wanted to do things like bring in sharia law, but that was stopped by both Sukarno and later Suharto. The military was a very secular organization and was very cautious about political power of the Islamic parties. In Aceh there was some movement in the direction of fundamentalist Islam, but again it was suppressed by the military.

Q: What about the indigenous Chinese? What was the situation of them?

BARRY: Well, I remember in '65 when 500,000 of them were killed. Most people think of overseas Chinese as being the rich businessmen and indeed among the rich businessmen most of them were Chinese, but there are also poor Chinese and you can go to any of the provinces around the country and find, the Chinese may be involved in trade, but they certainly weren't doing well by it. They ran the kiosks and things like that. So, there was a lot of resentment and periodically when I was there, there was a big riot in Sumatra where the people went out and burned the Chinese stores and houses.

Q: Were the Chinese important politically, the rich Chinese or did they keep out of it?

BARRY: Only behind the scenes. They were important because they were closely tied to the Suharto family and most of the things that were done with the Chinese was in partnership with somebody in the Suharto clan, but they couldn't pretend to any kind of public political position because it was too unpopular.

Q: Were you still having to deal with the allegation that we supplied the Indonesians with a death list in '65?

BARRY: It came up occasionally from one source or another, but you know, I had it on good advice that even by a person who was primarily accused of this, Bob Martens, that there was no truth to this. There are some people in the U.S. who still held that view.

Q: What about Cornell during that Sukarno period and for a while afterwards, Cornell was one of the major intellectual centers regarding Indonesia and the United States, the university and usually cast a very critical eye on what we were doing and all. Was the Cornell syndrome still going or not?

BARRY: Well, my Deputy Barbara Harvey was a product of Cornell. She had studied at Cornell and later taught in Australia and she was somebody I particularly selected as somebody who really knew her way around. She'd done a lot of research on that period.

Q: I mean was Cornell still kind of the powerhouse regarding American intellectuals?

BARRY: Well, no, by this time the graduates of Cornell had spread out around the country I guess there was an important center at Northwestern. There were of course the people in Indonesia, the technocrats, who were in charge of the economy were known as the Berkeley mafia because they had studied at Berkeley and the leading people of academics who came out were, yes, there were Cornell people among them, but they were not predominant.

Q: How about the Philippines? Did the Philippines play much of a role I mean they are both two large island nations and all, did they clash at all?

BARRY: Well, they weren't clashing, they were in APEC together, but, well you have to understand that Suharto he felt his role as the senior person of the largest country in the region gave him the right to be the leader of Asan in which he often clashed with Mahatir in particular.

Q: In Malaysia.

BARRY: There was absolutely no love lost between them. It goes back of course to the period of confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia, Mahatir was on the verge of boycotting the APEC summit in Indonesia and there was a lot of criticism flying back and forth between the two. As far as the Philippines were concerned, there wasn't much going on.

Q: You weren't having to, I mean nobody was, there were no big island disputes or anything like that?

BARRY: Not really. There were some with Malaysia, particularly concerning the border between Northern Borneo and Kalimantan.

Q: Was this the time when we were beginning or had withdrawn from the Philippines?

BARRY: Yes, we had withdrawn and that was one of the reasons why over flight and naval port visits and so forth in Indonesia were important to the U.S. military. We had some ships that used to come into Indonesian shipyards for repair, mostly to keep the Indonesian shipyards busy. On one occasion we had a carrier in the area so we flew a lot of the senior Indonesians to the carrier and they got to watch our carrier flight operations and so forth. That kind of military to military and political military contact was important.

Q: Were we thinking of perhaps in time of some crisis that we couldn't even think about at that time but keeping the relationship up with Indonesia because it might be occupying a good piece of real estate?

BARRY: Oh yes, that had been a consistent factor of our relationship with Indonesia for 50 years and it occupied a huge piece of real estate and it was very important to us to be able to use that for innocent passage at least.

Q: Were there any other things, issues that I haven't?

BARRY: There was a period there soon after the Clinton administration when Clinton had the idea of appointing the ex-governor of Hawaii to my job and they had even asked for agreement from him and then it turned out to be politically undoable because he had gotten into a big fuss with Jesse Helms before about flying the Hawaii flag above the American flag at the capital and there were issues about the money and so forth. So, that all went away, but there was a period when I thought my term of duty was going to be cut short.

Q: There's nothing more satisfying than being an ambassador and having a new president come in and pick somebody whose going to hang around for a while and become controversial.

BARRY: Well, in the event one of my old colleagues and friends, Stape Roy was ambassador in China at the time. He had been scheduled to go on to Thailand, but as my tour of duty came to an end they decided to send him to Indonesia instead, so it was a very amicable turnover.

Q: Well, then you left there in 1995?

BARRY: Yes, and by that time I had been career minister for something like 12 years so failing another appointment that I had to retire and so I did and got involved in some business operations with Ivan Selin.

Q: Who had been the former?

BARRY: Under Secretary for Management and head of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, but he wanted to do some power projects in Indonesia and so I got involved in that. I got involved in some consulting work and became a member of the board of directors of an oil company, Union, Texas Petroleum and was sort of going along happily involved in these things when I got a call in the end of '97 from Bob Gelbard who ended up being the ambassador to Indonesia saying, "How would you like to take over the OSCE Mission in Sarajevo?" Well, my initial reaction was, "Well, no I wouldn't thank you because I've got a lot of other things I have to do and I'd have to give them up if I went off and did this." But eventually they found a way where I could maintain my directorship and so forth and be on a personal services contract to go out and do the OSCE thing. I was reluctant to do it because I didn't anticipate that Peggy would want to

come with me, but in the event she did. I was only asked to do it for six months until we had the 1998 elections. So, I said all right I'll do it and when I got out there I found it to be a fascinating job and the final analysis stayed there for three and a half years. The OSCE of course, started out as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and produced the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. My friend and mentor George Vest told me the other day that Kissinger kept saying, "Well, what do you want to be involved in the CSCE thing for? It's just a nuisance." George always felt that it had a lot of potential for various things and felt certainly justified by the role that OSCE has taken and put into the field these very large field missions. My mission was the first large field mission and of course, its role was specified in the Dayton Peace Agreement. The UN had fallen into very bad odor at that time after the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia which failed to protect any so-called safe areas including Srebrenica so they wanted to put another organization in there. So, a lot of the civilian implementation was assigned to OSCE including the administration of elections, the drafting of election regulations, the protection of human rights, military restructuring and military verification and the effort to try to democratize political parties. So, it was a mission when I arrived of about 1,000 people, 27 offices around the country, headquarters in Sarajevo, some 30 countries involved in the staff of the mission; my deputy was German and the political director was Russian. The heads of the regional offices were variously Italian, German and French and so forth, so it was a very multinational operation. Each country seconded its own personnel to this. The U.S. had the largest contingent. This had been a huge dispute at the Dayton Agreement period because the U.S. and France both wanted the job of head of mission this and finally it came to a discussion between Clinton and Chirac that decided that the issue in favor of the Americans, but then we did live with some resentment about that.

Q: Who would be the head of the?

BARRY: Well, it would be an American or a Frenchman.

Q: I would have thought the French as far as the Bosnians were concerned be rather bad odor because they hadn't performed very well when they were part of the UN-peacekeeping force.

BARRY: Well, they also were seen as being very pro-Serb. The French didn't see it that way.

Q: Well, I'm just thinking this might be a good place to stop Bob, because I'd like to spend a full time doing this. We'll pick this up the next time when you're off to Sarajevo in 199?

BARRY: January 1998.

Q: '98. We'll do that and cover that time then. We've just said you've been appointed, but we really haven't talked about how it worked or what you were doing or things like that.

Okay, today is the 8th of January, 2002. Bob could you tell me what your job was and how it was created?

BARRY: The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina was created by the Dayton Agreement and the Mission was launched in December of 1995. Bob Frowick was the first head of the Mission and this was the first large overseas field mission that OSCE ever put in place. You will recall that the UN was not in very good odor at that time particularly because of the problems with UNPROFOR and so these duties which had in other cases been assigned to the UN, were assigned to OSCE by the Dayton negotiators. It was quite a large mission. We had about 250 internationals and about 750 nationals; we had 27 offices around the country, headquarters in Sarajevo, regional centers in places like Banja Luka, Mostar, and Brcko.

Q: How about Pale?

BARRY: No, Pale was a stone's throw from Sarajevo, so you could easily go up and see Mr. Karadzic when you needed to, but Banja Luka was really what later became the center of Republic of Srpska, the capital of it. The task assigned to OSCE by the Dayton Agreement was first and foremost the conduct of elections and by conduct I mean everything connected with elections. The regulations, employing and training the people who ran the election, administering the election, counting the votes, implementing the election afterwards and so forth. We also had the responsibility of implementing human rights. We were responsible for human rights institutions like the Ombudsmen. We had a quite large field staff that dealt with getting people back their property, implementing property laws. We had a democratization department, which was training people how to operate in a democratic society, working with political parties. We had a section that dealt with military stabilization, that is inspecting to make sure that the requirements of the Dayton Agreement in terms of demilitarization were kept. Later on that turned into an effort to reduce the size of the armed forces and the expense of the armed forces. We had a department that dealt with implementing the elections after they were carried out, that is trying to enforce some power sharing. So, it was quite a large operation. The Swiss who were then the OSCE chairman in office in 1996 provided a Swiss military support unit that did logistics, provided an airplane and all in all it was a big operation. The deputy was traditionally German, the head of the political department was traditionally Russian, we had 30 nationalities represented on the staff and I'm pleased to say we had quite a large representation of women- about half of the senior staff were women and one thing that I put in place when I arrived there was the process of converting international positions, professional positions to national positions, that is to let Bosnians be in positions that previously had been filled by internationals thereby taking people like the drivers who also had law degrees and putting them in instead as national lawyers and so forth. So, that was the institutional arrangement.

Q: Well, just to get a clip, had the UN, did the UN have any more role there or not?

BARRY: The UN was assigned one role in Bosnia and that was international civilian policing. There is a UN mission there, but the role was limited to training and patrolling with the police. The police were a real problem institution, still are today I might add, but that was the role of the UN. The senior civilian representative was the high representative. This was a post created by the Dayton Agreement also. He was given coordinating responsibility. The first high representative was the ex-Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt and that turned into a large office with ever increasing powers as civil implementation lagged behind the military implementation. The military force was there by the time I got there had been reduced from 60,000 to some 30,000 and it was called SFOR, the stabilization force, traditionally headed by an American four star now a three star general and their task was to enforce the local military provisions of Dayton which was not very difficult to do because the military was exhausted.

Q: You're talking about the military in Bosnia?

BARRY: The Serb military and the Bosnian military. Under Dayton they were divided into two armed forces, two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina predominantly Muslim, but also the Croat minority and Republika Srpska (RS). Serb entity, which pretended to full sovereignty, although this was not provided for in Dayton. There was always a struggle between the central authority and the council of ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the entities, particularly with the RS.

Q: By the way, could you comment a bit on the name which struck me right from the beginning which really shouldn't have happened. They called it something like the Republic of Serbska in the middle of something because it sounds like it gives it much more of an identity.

BARRY: Well, that was in fact a big problem of the original Dayton Agreement. This was however what emerged with the bargaining with Milosevic. Indeed the RS has a constitution, which provides for sovereignty of the country. It had what pretended to be a foreign minister. It tried to carry out its own relationships as an independent state with others and that was a constant struggle between the central authority, the international civilian administrators and the NATO military to try to keep that in place. In fact, when I arrived there, the day I arrived there, was a good example of that because we had been trying to implement election results in Srebrenica. You will recall this is the place where the great slaughter of Muslim men in particular took place, some 7,000 were killed. People were allowed to vote where they were before the war. Now Srebrenica had been a majority Muslim area, but of course after the war and after the ethnic cleansing, it was now almost entirely Serb. In the election of 1997 which was a municipal election, the Muslim refugees had come out in large numbers and had voted heavily for Muslim candidates so the election result dictated that the Srebrenica government would be 80% Muslim. Now there was a huge struggle in trying to implement this because the Serbs would not allow the Muslim councilors or anybody else back into the town so on the day before I had arrived my deputy was at that point the acting head of the OSCE Mission had tried to go to Srebrenica.

Q: Who was that?

BARRY: His name was Richard Ellerkmann. He was a German and he had driven there in a convoy protected by the military and but then there had been a big demonstration to prevent them from entering the town. They had attempted to pull him out of his armored car. Who knows what would have happened afterwards? There was a helicopter that was accompanying the convoy that crashed because of the weather. Anyhow it was a very nasty incident. That was just on the day I had arrived there so from that point onward one of the key tasks was to try to push the government of the RS into line. There had been an extraordinary election for the RS parliament that had been held in November of 1997 and as a result of that and then as a result of a vote in the new RS parliament which the international community had certainly attempted to influence. Mrs. Plavsic, a Serb woman was elected president of RS and she opted for cooperation with the international community, leaving the SDS and forming her own political party.

Q: The SDS being what?

BARRY: This is the Serb Democratic Union, the party of Radovan Karadzic, the people who were the main aggressors of the war. Karadzic himself was in hiding at that point. He was and still is sought by the international community because he was indicted by the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the UN organization set up to try people for war crimes. But he still had a heavy influence on the party exercised through the Serb members of the tripartite presidency, one Serb, one Croat, one Bosniac. The Serb was Krajisnik, now in the Hague, where he still awaits trial together with Plavsic who was indicted later. They were all in Pale at that time although when Plavsic took over as president she moved the capital of the RS from Pale on the outskirts of Sarajevo to Banja Luka which helped to civilize or urbanize the Serb politicians.

Q: Did you sort of get a feeling as I did from just reading accounts of the war that it was a little bit, the war with the Serbs a little bit like the hillbillies versus the flatlanders and Pale being sort of the hillbilly capital?

BARRY: Yes, that's certainly true. In addition the people who came and who were its worst participants in the war were not from Bosnia at all. These were gangs of paramilitaries from Serbia itself who were involved in ethnic cleansing and some of the worst atrocities of the war. These were people who had fought in the early stages of the war in places like Vukovar to drive the Croats out of Serb areas in Croatia. People like Arkan and that crowd, were the worst participants. Serbs had had a large population in Sarajevo in fact the leaders of the parties were not hillbillies at all. Karadzic was a professor of psychiatry from Sarajevo University, Plavsic was a professor of biology from Sarajevo University. Many of the leaders on all three sides were university professors. Being a professor or a doctor of something gets you further in politics in the former Yugoslavia than it does in most other countries in the world.

Q: When you arrived there, in the first place, what did the State Department or government or anybody tell you before you took over this job. I mean, here you're taking

the president's shilling in a way, I mean at least to begin with. Somebody is saying, "Bob we want you to go out and make sure this happens" or do this or that or did you get much instruction? Were you sort of tossed into it?

BARRY: I spent some time in Washington before going out, not very long in fact, only about two or three weeks because I agreed to take the job on the 15th of December and I left on the 8th of January as it was necessary to get somebody out there right away. But I spent some of that time with Bob Gelbard who was then the sort of Balkan czar and his office of Balkan implementation. This was an organization set up in 1995 to be directly responsible to the secretary outside the bureau of European affairs. It was Gelbard who recruited me for this thing. The main task was to prepare for and hold the first set of countrywide elections which were set for November of 1998 and so I was sent there with the idea that I would conduct these elections and that would be it since I did not want to commit myself for a longer period. But of course, I knew something about the country to begin with. I read into the intelligence material and about what was going on. A central task that we saw for ourselves was taming the nationalists and this was an uphill struggle. We made a serious mistake in 1995 by thinking that early elections were going to solve the problem and be the exit strategy for the military. In fact, early elections of course simply confirmed the legitimacy of the nationalist parties who had led the country through the war. The three nationalist parties were the Croatian National Union, the HDZ which was made up largely of Croat nationalists under the protection of Tudjman in Croatia, the SDS led by Krajisnik but under the sponsorship of Milosevic in Belgrade and the SDA led by Izetbegovic, arguably the victim during the war, but also, a strongly nationalist devout believer in Islam who really wanted to create a state under Bosniac that is Bosnian Muslim dominance. These three parties were the victors; all of the elections that we held except for the last election in 2000 where finally we did manage to break the monopoly of the nationalist parties. But all elections were marked by an effort to stir up racial ethnic distrust because that was the way of driving the people back to their political base. So, the election campaign periods were marked by the use of hate language and worse sometimes- assassinations of people campaigning for the wrong party and corruption and things like that and so that was part of our task to control that.

Q: One of the things that most of us in the Foreign Service or in government really never think about are elections. I mean elections are kind of held and yet there is a major infrastructure in any country that have had these things of people who know how to do it. I mean, when you arrived there, what sort of cadre did you have to put together elections?

BARRY: We had had two elections before I arrived, three actually, so it was under my predecessor Bob Frowick that we built this up. In the first place we created an election commission responsible for organizing all aspects of the election. It was made up of both nationals and internationals. As head of the OSCE Mission I was the chairman of that commission and the rules dictated that if the chairman decided differently than all the other members of the commission, the chairman's word carried. So, we had representatives of the three national groups represented on the commission. When I came I expanded the commission to bring in independent figures from the Bosnian community

who were noted for being anti-nationalist. The best known of them probably was Zlatko Dizdarevic who wrote books about the war he was a correspondent for the newspaper, Oslobozhdjenja. We altered the balance of that commission. But in on the field on election day it takes about 35,000 people to run an election. The people who sit in the polling places were organized by our various field offices. We tried to find people who had had previous experience in elections, but as you know Yugoslav elections were noted for 99% pro-Tito votes so we had to find people who were prepared to look at this as an exercise in building democracy. The incentive was that we paid them well.

Q: I was one of the 30,000 for the I guess the '97 vote.

BARRY: Well, these were the international supervisors. I'm talking about the 35,000 Bosnians who ran the polling stations. Whenever we had these elections in the early days we brought in international supervisors in every polling station and that amounted to about 2,500 people. In later days those numbers were reduced, but the international supervisors were theoretically in charge. They could overturn a decision by the local polling station committee if required and they were responsible for making sure that all the rules were observed, as they should have been.

Q: As you were going on this, did you, was there sort of a feeling on the American side was this different from other ones, that somehow if you get people to vote, you know, democracy, then all of a sudden good things would happen?

BARRY: Well, that was certainly the view in '95, but we learned that this wouldn't necessarily happen because the bad guys were voted into office and they remained bad guys. At the point that I arrived we recognized that our task was to try to organize the nationalists out of office. That meant changing the rules under which the elections were held. We had to draft an election law. In fact the idea originally had been that that law would be drafted by the Bosnians themselves, but no progress was made on that. One of the things that we worked on was trying to put into the election law reform elements that would favor the parties that were democratic. Most parties believed in the principle of democratic centralism, as all of these parties were left over from the days of Tito.

Q: Accused Tito.

BARRY: So, as we were organizing the elections we were also trying to produce elements of reform. For example, we required by fiat that one-third of all candidates for political office had to be women. Not a natural tendency among Balkan political parties, but we insisted that any party that did not produce one third female its candidates would not be allowed to run in the election. We also had the power to dismiss candidates, forbid them from running for office, to remove people after they were elected for noncompliance with rules and regulations which we didn't use too often, but when it came to some of the worst nationalists who were using hate language and things like that we did not hesitate to remove them.

Q: Did you find as you were doing this, I mean somehow I think in this field the term

often for Americans when we start getting involved in these things is well, "How naive you are" and Europeans tend to feel they are much more sophisticated. Sometimes I question this, but did you run across this sort of attitude among your international staff?

BARRY: I don't think so. I think the international staff was rather idealistic to start with or they wouldn't have been there. The people who came, initially were seconded to the OSCE by foreign ministries. But by the time I got there most of those people had gone and the people who were coming were people who'd been in non-governmental organizations before. Many of them had been election supervisors who liked what they were doing and wanted to stay. The Americans in the mission were obviously a minority. Of the senior staff of about 30, only about seven or eight were Americans. The Europeans were motivated by something very important. They wanted to do something for the Bosnians, but they wanted to do something for the Bosnians in Bosnia and not have them become refugees and come to Norway or Sweden or Germany or wherever. So, the idea that you could produce a real working political and economic body there that would create or allow economic development to take place, allow the 40% unemployment rate to be reduced to give people a sense that there was a future in this country was a motivating force for the people there. A lot of the people were young. We called them Danube groupies at first. But they were also highly motivated. They were not jaded, foreign office types.

Q: Yes. They'd seen it all and you know, which is I think one of the problems often we have come with a little fresher look. It may be naive, but it's fresher than, but you weren't suffering from that over sophistication?

BARRY: Oh, I don't think so. We believed it could be done or else people like myself wouldn't have spent three and a half years there. I'm not sure how much it was done, it certainly ended up better as I left as I left than it did when I arrived. There still remains a lot to be done. I think the worst problem was the lack of any feeling about what a market economy was about. The initial breakup of Yugoslavia was not about nationalism, it was about the economy. Markovich was trying to reform the economy, trying to get rid of the idea of social ownership, trying to privatize and that was a challenge to all of the local satraps, resisted very strongly especially by Milosevic and Tudjman. They used the rallying cry of nationalism, but the purpose was to maintain control over the commanding heights of the economy, as the communists used to call it. That stayed in peoples' minds after the war no matter how much lip service was paid to the idea of private ownership and market economy and so forth. Political party leaders were mainly interested not in being elected to office, but being on the managing boards of the state owned companies. Unfortunately I think it is equally true of the opposition that later came into office, the social democrats. Those were the things that were fought about most strongly and the big cash cows, the state companies like the PTT or electric power generation were also sources of large amounts of money for political parties. We fought that throughout the period without a great deal of success. The World Bank and the IMF were interested in macro economic stabilization. In that sense they wanted to make sure that they set up a currency board, they tied the convertible mark to the German mark and they did a good job with dealing with inflation and making sure that the currency was sound, but they

didn't succeed in breaking the barriers to foreign direct investment and that meant that the unemployment rate remained in the area of 40% throughout the whole time.

Q: Well, you look at Bosnia and you see a thin line to the coast, I guess they had it, did they make the coast, I can't remember now?

BARRY: Yes, they did as they did before the war as well. Bosnia had had a small strip of coast at Neum. Actually this goes back to the period of the Ottomans and the Venetians because that piece of coast was designed to be a buffer zone between Dubrovnik and the Ottoman Empire. But there was a rail line, which ended up in Ploce which, was in Croatia and the other exit was on the Danube at Brcko. But both the rail lines were cut off, first because the Croats were very reluctant to allow access to Ploce and because Brcko was a problem area and the Danube was all silted up.

Q: A number of questions here. One, there was this problem that I recall reading about where it was found that an awful lot of the money that went into enterprises there that was given by international funds or loans or whatever it is ended up being siphoned off for corruption and all that sort of thing. Was this a major problem?

BARRY: That was a news item, but it was not accurate. Yes, there was and is a great deal of corruption, but it was not money that had been channeled in by the international community. The real corruption was in the revenues that came to the government, whether through turnover tax or whether it was through state-owned companies. A lot of that money was diverted for illegal purposes. Of course there was a huge organized crime faction that operated there, smuggling was a huge business and the evasion of customs duties, the payment of bribes to people for favors done by the government was a real issue. The money that came in was largely reconstruction money and like most international aid money it didn't really flow to people in Bosnia at all, it flowed to companies in the countries that provided the aid who came in and built the new housing. We tried very hard to go after corruption. We in fact, the OSCE, developed a bill of particulars against the Prime Minister of the federation, Mr. Bickacic who was guilty of all kinds of fraudulent activities as Prime Minister. We presented this in hopes that there would be a criminal prosecution. We finally had to dismiss him because he was carrying these things on, the attitude of Izetbegovic's political party was that this is a tradition that we have. He wasn't doing it for himself, he was doing it for the good of the party. The old story was that we in the Balkans never had our own state, so it was okay to steal from the government. Now the government is us, but we haven't really learned that so we're still stealing from the government, but we're stealing from ourselves.

Q: Did you find that, how did you deal with say the various sections, I mean with Izetbegovic or with Pompavich or others, is it Plavsic?

BARRY: Plavsic.

Q: And others. How did you deal with that?

BARRY: Well, they were always compliant. In other words, you'd go to see them and you'd say, "Look this is wrong, you've got to fix it" and they would always say, "Yes," but then they wouldn't do it. I remember my first interview with Krajisnik, the Serb member of the presidency. Of course he would always begin with this lecture about Serbian history. We got about ten minutes into this and I said, "Wait a minute. Now I know about this because I did my dissertation at the university on the empire of Stephan Dushan in the 14th century, so I might know more about this than you do." You would always go to see them and they would say, yes, yes, yes, and then they would go on and do the same old thing. Often the only way of affecting these things would be to punish them for their activities by removing some of their candidates, as eventually hauling Krajisnik off to the Hague. In those cases the party affected always presented themselves as an injured party. Their constituents would generally support them. Some of the things we did were quite successful in public relations terms. For example, there's a huge problem of people living illegally in other peoples' houses they'd occupied after the war. Many of these people were politicians so we passed a rule saying if you're illegally in somebody else's house you can't hold office, you can't run for office. That was generally very well received by the public.

Q: Did you find Bob, that there was a new generation coming along, not necessarily in age, but people beginning to look at things a little differently?

BARRY: Oh there were, but they were leaving. UNDP took a poll and the poll discovered that 60% of the people below 25 planned to leave the country. We brought some people back, attracted them back for example to work for us because we paid them more than domestic employers, but the young people were turned off by politics and the job opportunities for graduates of Sarajevo University were very slim indeed. There are some promising people on the horizon, but Sarajevo itself is not the same kind of multicultural place that it once was. To get anyplace in politics you have to make peace with the nationalists. I remember a person I knew that had been in England during the war, had gotten a medical degree and gone to work in a teaching hospital in England and came back and went to the main hospital in Sarajevo to look for a job. The first question they asked was what political party do you belong to. His answer was, "Well, I don't belong to any." They said, "Well, unless you want to join the SDA, Izetbegovic's party, there is no job for you in this hospital or anyplace else in the medical profession in Bosnia." That was kind of a carryover from Tito's days when you had to be a member of the communist party. Even then the medical profession and judiciary were not as politicized as they are today.

Q: I used to see this as seeing exchange students, this was back in the '60s who would come back on the academic or medical side and find it wasn't party as much as they hadn't, they didn't belong to the old boys' club, I mean they had gone to some place out there like Harvard or Yale and what the hell was this. They hadn't graduated from Belgrade U and so they weren't going to get anywhere.

BARRY: Yes, cronyism is part of the issue and was certainly part of the issue in the judiciary or police.

Q: Did foreign companies come in and start asking what are the opportunities for going here? I'm talking about companies that could come in and perhaps generate jobs and all that?

BARRY: Well, yes, and they did come and we encouraged them to come. I had an idea when I first arrived there that you could bring software companies in and of course there are a very large number of well-educated engineers in Bosnia. The information technology people that we had were very good. They could do software writing, but the whole atmosphere was anti-foreign investment. It took 16 separate authorizations for a foreigner to start a company and of course in each place you had to pay somebody a bribe. One of the things that you had to get was a certificate from the ministry of defense saying that the formation of this company be it a bakery or whatever would not undermine the national defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The attitude toward foreign investment was give us your money, do not participate in management and we will take care of it for you and provide you with some minimal return on that money. They would invite Japanese industrialists to come and talk about investing and of course, when they heard this sort of routine, they would laugh. Although Turkey of course was very eager to support a Muslim entity in Europe. The Turkish ambassador finally said, "I'm not inviting anymore people here to talk about investments because you people are simply unreal about what you expect." Of course, the old economy was already decaying or decayed in 1991. Under Tito's regime, the Yugoslav economy subsisted basically on the theory of nonalignment which meant let's say that Libya would get a Yugoslav construction company to come there and do something, but then they wouldn't pay them for it. Big industrial firms like Energoinvest had died already on the vine and there was no hope of restoring them although the government kept hoping they would. Peggy, my wife, was involved in small business because she was working with a group that had been started by the Norwegians called Bosnian Handicrafts which took refugee women and their knitting and marketed these things largely to foreigners. But the tax collectors came every week to make sure that all the taxes were paid. Nobody pays taxes except for small business who don't have any alternative and banking transactions were terrifically expensive. So, it was a real struggle.

Q: Let's talk about the economy. You're looking at this, I mean this sounds terribly discouraging I mean how did you and your staff get yourself up to continue because you know if the economy doesn't work and if you can get the unemployment below 40%, I mean really start to make the economy work, if you can't get to that because of attitudes and other areas like resources and all that. How did you gear yourself up to you know, just getting on with the job?

BARRY: Well, the main responsibility for the economy was with the office of the high representative. They were not terribly effective with everything that was done. Clinton appointed a special ambassador initially to deal with trying to straighten out the economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, later he worked all around the Balkans. He was quite effective.

Q: Who was that?

BARRY: Oh, I've forgotten his name. We pressed hard on privatization trying to get the big cash cows privatized. The theory that had been developed was voucher privatization. Not a very effective way of doing it. Of course it was fought all the way along by political vested interests.

Q: What is voucher?

BARRY: Because it had been social ownership before, workers got vouchers which could be turned into stock. An individual private company could be sold on the open market, but this was fought by the vested interests because they wanted Russian style privatization whereby the assets of the company are stolen, the company is reduced to a shell and it is then sold to its current managers for a song and then the company is restored afterwards and the managers get rich. So, we tried to fight that. We removed some of the people who had been in charge of privatization. We passed a regulation saying that if you are on the managing board of the state company, you can't hold political office. That created great gnashing of teeth, but we got rid of several thousands of people who were both elected officials and on managing boards. We preached the idea of private enterprise to the opposition parties, the social democrats in particular. The idea was that when they came to power they would truly change the way they dealt with the economy. In the event they were pretty much like the rest of them, when they did finally come to power.

Q: What about, you had a Russian deputy. How did that work? Where was he coming from?

BARRY: Oh, I went through three of them I guess during my time there and they were all very different. None of them were particularly trying to push the Russian point of view. In fact the first one turned out to be a really excellent political officer who knew what was going on in the country, but the Russians wouldn't extend him I suppose because he wasn't giving them inside information. He stayed on in his private capacity. Actually I got along well with all of them. They were not very good managers. The sections that they presided over generally let everybody do what whatever they want to do.

Q: Speaking of managing and all this, I just finished an interview with Bill Farrand, who was in Brcko. I never quite understood. He explained it to me, but I never quite got the feeling. He seemed to be under almost separate orders of some sort of amorphous European entity.

BARRY: Well, he was under the Office of the High Representative (OHR). The job of the Brcko administrator was created at the Bonn summit of 1997, by the steering board of the peace implementation council. The administrator of Brcko was under the office of the high representative, but with very wide latitude as to what he could do in Brcko. Bill and Gary Matthews who then followed him in that job and Henry Clark who's there now were subject to some degree of guidance from OHR, but basically this was an American

enclave where the American military was stationed.

Q: I mean did you get involved with that or was that something sort of over the horizon?

BARRY: We got involved in it in terms of elections and in terms of knowing it was there, but it was not within the end of OSCE, the office of the high representative. The principals of the international community were the commander of SFOR, the American general, the high representative himself, who by the time I got there was a former Spanish foreign minister and later became Petritsch, the Austrian. The head of the UN mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina started out to be a Finn, Elizabeth Rhen, then it became Jacques Kline, and American and the head of OSCE. Plus, the representative of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. So that was the international steering board.

Q: Well, again I feel for this community working, the international community because as an observer I was on a main road, I can't think of the name of the town now, but it was between Sarajevo and Tuzla. It was a good size town and we kept getting visited by people wearing white suits and military, I mean I've never seen so many observers. It was going fine, there was no problem there, but my God we spent all of our time sort of entertaining these people who came through. But anyway I was just saying there were so many observers and this must have gotten in your way didn't it in things or not?

BARRY: At election time in particular, these people were out there to keep an eye on whether there was any sign of violence or effort to interfere with people. Yes, there were probably too many of practically everybody. When I first arrived there I called for a streamlining of the international community so there was a clear distinction of roles, an idea whose time was probably still not come although they're talking now about ways of reducing the number of people involved and making the responsibilities clearer.

Q: How did you feel about the elections? I mean the two places I did one in a Muslim area and another one in outside of Dervantar, which was essentially Serbian, and I was impressed. There was a certain variety of votes. I mean it wasn't all just for one person, obviously Serbs got the most in Serb areas and Muslims got it the most in others, but the election itself seem to go fairly well.

BARRY: Yes, I think they went well, the only trouble was the outcome. The idea that you'd get people to vote for parties that supported the concept of multiethnicity that is of sharing power with the other group in your town never got very far. It went progressively further each time to the point where in the last election in 2000 the parties were able to put together coalitions that excluded all the nationalists, but the tendency was at election time to remember all the bad things your Serb, Muslim or Croat neighbor had done wrong and try to elect a strong figure who would be able to protect your national interests.

Q: Speaking about the nationalists, you have Karadzic and a Mladec who was the general and both of these are indicted war criminals and all. Did you get involved in trying to get them?

BARRY: If the 30,000 or 60,000 strong military was not able to get them, I don't think the unarmed OSCE was in a position to get them. We certainly tried to urge the military to take a more active role in all of this. The trouble with the SFOR or IFOR military command structure was that the control of the forces on the ground still rested with the sending government, despite the fact that there was a four star general in charge of this thing. He could tell the French to do something and the French would turn back to Paris and the French would say, "Well, screw you, we're not going to do it." The areas where Mladic and Karadzic were reported to be were under French control. Now I think Karadzic and Mladic both went back and forth a lot. Mladic spent most of his time in Belgrade, Karadzic slipped back and forth across the border with Montenegro, but the military intelligence would deny that they knew where he was. That's because they didn't want to know where he was. The marching orders were, well, if you run into him somewhere all right, well, we'll take him, but he had a body guard, 150 people, heavily armed and SFOR was not particularly eager to do this. There were various attempts that were made including the insertion of some U.S. special forces with the task of doing this, but for one reason or another it never came to pass.

We insisted and finally it happened, but only recently, that the SDS the Serb nationalist party, had to expel indicted war criminals from the party. We threatened even to forbid the SDS from running unless they did this. Now finally it's been done, but I don't really expect Karadzic to end up in The Hague any time soon.

Q: Speaking of sort of the military side, I recall when I was in Derventa that we were briefed by a British army captain who was quite bitter about you Americans, talking to me about training the Bosnian army and we wanted, his idea was don't train anybody and keep it disarmed and we were. Could you explain about the issue of training?

BARRY: Well, this goes back to the idea of "lift and strike." If you remember in the early days of the Bosnian war the idea that came from the Democratic party in the campaign of 1992 was that we should lift the arms embargo against the Bosnians and use NATO air to strike the Serbs. After the war, the code word became train and equip. This was heavily sponsored in the U.S. Congress. Before the war, the Yugoslav army was essentially Serb, so the people who were officers, the people who had military training, were Serbs and the army of the Republika Srpska was closely tied to the JNA, the Yugoslav National Army. So, the idea was you had to deal with this problem by training and equipping the armed forces of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This all got started in 1994 and '95 when a private company made up of retired U.S. military called MPRI played a very heavy role in advising the Croatian military in their offensive against the Serbs which ended up driving the Serbs out.

Q: Was this a sort of CIA type sponsored private company?

BARRY: No, it was not CIA sponsored, but it was funded by the U.S. Congress. It was overt and not covert. But then after the war we continued that. I had my own misgivings about it because I felt that this was creating an imbalance and was also creating an armed

force that was much too large for any legitimate purpose other than going to war with each other again. But it still had a lot of support in the U.S. The Brits and the rest of NATO generally didn't like the program, but it was something that we stuck with and the Pentagon was keen on it and it was a big money maker for the people involved. The Brits were the most competent among the military there and they made a lot of fun of us about our force protection requirements. All of our people went along in armed convoys, on patrols and armored vehicles and so forth.

Q: Flak jackets, buttoned all the way up and all.

BARRY: Their people of course having spent all this time in Northern Ireland were pretty good of getting out among the people and talking to them. Ours have progressed over the years, but it was still a much too heavy, armored force for what was really required.

Q: Was there concern about Islamic fundamentalists? You know there were reports that a lot of these people were coming from Middle Eastern countries during the war and then they settled in and all?

BARRY: Yes, there was concern about it. It was not a very large-scale phenomenon. There were a number of mujahedeen who had come and formed a special unit in the Bosnian army and these carried out a lot of activities not approved under the laws of war. Some people have been indicted for it since. Some of these people stayed and they lived in a former Serb village in the federation where they really controlled the village. Some of these people were connected with al Qaeda; one of them was arrested in Turkey carrying a Bosnian passport where he was recruiting people to go fight in Chechnya. We insisted on several occasions that these people had to leave. It was part of the Dayton Agreement. In fact, Izetbegovic in particular was not at all eager to drive these people out. He felt he owed them a debt of gratitude for working with them during the war. They were finally moved out of the village that they were in last year and scattered around. We continue to find people who have Bosnian passports who have no real claim to Bosnian citizenship and in fact some of them were found in Afghanistan, the passports at least of people who had been involved in this. Of course, as you know this is not very firm ground for fundamentalism although there are some people in Bosnia who are Islamists in that sense. There was wing within Izetbegovic's party which always wanted and still wants an Islamic state under Sharia law which would involve the creation within the federation of a strictly Islamic state in the expulsion of Croats and Serbs and so forth. These people have become stronger within the SDA as time was going on, but as they have gotten stronger, the party has gotten weaker.

Q: Did Kosovo sort of hang over you like a cloud? Did you see any connection between what was happening in Bosnia, trying to put this thing together and the threat that has been there God knows how long of Kosovo all of a sudden the Serbs making a move on to Kosovo?

BARRY: No, it didn't loom very large unit of course the war came. At that point it

certainly was overhead in the sense that we had continual noise of warplanes going overhead all the time. I think that the primary goal of everybody concerned including the Bosnian Serbs was not to get drawn in. We spent a lot of time talking to the Bosnian Serbs about distancing themselves from all this. There is among the Bosnian Serbs a group that would like to see the RS become part of Yugoslavia or Serbia. There are three separatists factions. There are the Croats who would like to see Bosnian Croats become part of Croatia, there are the Serbs who would like to see it become part of Serbia and then there are the Islamists in Bosnia who would like to see an Islamic state created there. This is what people were fighting about during the war, but we had taken a very hard line saying that you all signed up for this deal, you can't get out of it by holding a referendum or something like that, so live with it.

Q: Did you find that the bombing really not so much of Kosovo, but of Belgrade and the area around it, did that have any effect on weakening the hold of the attraction of a greater Serbia do you think?

BARRY: Yes, I think it did, not as much as the final departure of Milosevic and the departure of Tudjman from the scene. When they both left and new governments came in which at least paid lip service to the idea of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as an independent state, that decreased the attractive power of separatism. But every time the Kosovo Albanians say we've got to have an independent Kosovo, this causes people in both Belgrade and Banja Luka to say well if that's the case then we need compensation in the form of joining the RS to Serbia.

Q: How about during the Kosovo war Montenegro was making noises about both distancing himself from greater Serbia and maybe even becoming independent. Did this have any effect on what you all were doing?

BARRY: The international community's position is that redrawing the map of the Balkans would have serious consequences in terms of independence for those entities within Bosnia which feel that they should be independent. So, our advice to Montenegro was autonomy, not independence and of course now that Milosevic is gone, pressure on Montenegro to stick with the federation has increased I think.

Q: You haven't mentioned dealing with the Croats. How did that play out while you were there?

BARRY: Well, I suppose that was in some ways the most difficult problem that we had. The Croats felt themselves a threatened minority. The HDZ was a highly centralized, highly paramilitary party especially after a coup within the party in 1999 in which a military wing of the party took over with the sponsorship of Tudjman. They felt cheated by the Dayton Agreement. They felt they needed to have their own entity and many of them felt that they ought to secede and join Croatia, which Tudjman welcomed, but of course, the post-Tudjman government just hated the idea.

Q: Why did they hate the idea?

BARRY: The Croats and Bosnia are known as sort of hillbillies of Croatia, hardheaded, stubborn, involved in all kinds of criminal activities and it would be sort of like inviting the Mafia to dinner. The Social Democrats in particular in Croatia can't stand the sight of them. It would also shift the balance in favor of the old HDZ in Croatia which was a party on the way out. There were very many people in political life down there who deserved to be indicted and some of them probably still will be. The Croatian generals, Tadjman's generals were heavily involved in Croat politics there in Bosnia. The foreign minister, for example, was widely suspected to be among the list of people about to be indicted for war crimes. We tried hard to root out some of these people and some of the rules for elections were designed to undermine the monopoly rule of the HDZ in Croatian politics. In fact, in the 2000 election we did something that I at the time had reservations about, but the high representative was in favor of it and the steering board was in favor of it. We changed one rule that the Croats were very fond of which gave essentially the HDZ a monopoly in the upper house of the federation parliament and the ability to block everything that went through. They then called for a referendum on election day, which would, be a referendum sponsoring the idea of independence for Bosnian Croats. We said they couldn't do it on election day and they went ahead and did it anyhow. We then removed a number of people from office and removed some mandates from the HDZ, which caused a big dustup with the international community. We tried hard to work with moderates and of course, you could divide Croats by where they lived. If they lived in exclusively Croat areas which were largely in what used to be called Herzegovina, a coast area, they were pretty much all hardliners even the Franciscan priests down there had been hardliners and were from the day of Ante Pavelic.

Q: Oh God yes, I mean you know the burning the church at Gleena and all that. The little brown brothers were not nice people.

BARRY: Now they're all through that area, there are monuments to the freedom fighters of Ante Pavelic. But the people who lived in mixed areas were much more moderate including the Cardinal and the priests that lived there and so forth. So the moderates created a new political party, the NHI, but it never has gotten any traction in the majority Croat areas which are still heavily hardline.

Q: What about the situation on Mostar? I mean it's sort of a nasty thing with a cross on one side and the Bosniacs on the other?

BARRY: We spent a lot of time on that. We had Americans running the OSCE in Mostar like Gary Matthews. It's gotten better over time, but of course, you go to Mostar, this is like Gallipoli. They fought each other from across the street for two and a half years and the destruction was huge. So, for a very long time it was considered worth your life if you were a Bosniac across the river to come onto the Croat side. We did sponsor and support a moderate Croat Neven Tomich who worked with a moderate Bosnian who tried to unify the administration in the city and so forth. But Tomich was eventually expelled from the HDZ because he was too moderate and the Bosniac was at odds with the rest of the SDA, so in a way keeping that division going was in the interest of both nationalist parties.

Q: What about the big problem of resettlement?

BARRY: It's going faster now in the last two years than ever. I think there were 70,000 minority returnees last year and this year it is projected to be 100,000. You often wonder why these people want to go back. If you are a Muslim refugee from Srebrenica do you really want to go back and live among these people again? But they do and they are, roots run very deep in this part of the world. So, we concentrated on trying to get people's property back for them. We intervened. We'd go and fire the municipal authorities who were not promoting this. We would write legal briefs for them. We would help them file the applications and over time we've had some considerable success in getting people back their homes, but of course, you can imagine, the local politicians had moved into the houses that were vacated by the minorities, so we fired the politicians. I think that the return process is coming to an end. People who have stayed out, are going to stay out.

Q: You know you look at, when I was in Dervantar which is close to the Croatian border, there are houses that have just been blown up all along the way.

BARRY: Oh, well that's what they did including after the war so the people wouldn't return.

Q: Well, of course, they blow up the mosques there.

BARRY: Now these places are being rebuilt. In the Serb majority areas in the RS, Muslims are returning. There are Croats returning to the RS from Croatia. There are communities being restarted, but this is coming at a time when there is not nearly as much money as there used to be for reconstruction and housing. The demand now for minority return exceeds the supply of houses for them to come back into. Then you have to fight all these trivial things like how do you get an i.d. card, how do you get your electricity reconnected, and how do you get water because the local authorities don't want to provide these things for these people in these areas.

Q: You left there in 2001?

BARRY: Yes.

Q: When?

BARRY: Well, finally in July of 2001. I had planned to leave in the fall of 2000, but at that point the U.S. didn't have a candidate to succeed me and I was asked to stay on, so I stayed on for the implementation of the 2000 elections. I left in July. Well, I left initially in May because that was the time I had planned to, but I was asked to formally maintain the job as head of the mission and until an appointment of a successor was arranged.

Q: Who was that?

BARRY: Bob Beecroft. There was a fight between the British and the Americans about who would get the thing. The British finally withdrew the name of the ex-general who was a candidate. So, Beecroft came in July. I went back in June to turn the thing over and left then.

Q: What was your feeling about whither Bosnia when you left in '01?

BARRY: It depends on what happens at the next election because the next election is going to be in the hands of the Bosnians. The OSCE is not going to fund it; it is not going to supervise it. They finally did pass an election law. The nationalists badly want to get back in power. The SDA and HDZ are conspiring with one another to return to the status quo ante, which was that we will support you in anything you, the Bosnian nationalists want to do as long as you let us the Croatian nationalists do whatever we want to do. If that happens, if the nationalists win again and if the effort to contain the SDS and the RS fails, then I think the international community is going to give up on Bosnia. If on the other hand the so-called alliance parties, the alliance for progress, the social democrats, the non-nationalist Croats, the current prime minister of the Republic of Serbska, Mladen Ivanic, who was a moderate economist. If they succeed in holding onto power, then I think the country has a future. The future would be determined by what the citizens of the place are going to want to do. Most of my friends, and I have a lot of friends there that say, well if this thing goes back to the nationalists we want out of it. Most of the people who worked for us are saving up their money so that if the time came when they wanted to get out they had enough money to be an immigrant and a candidate and all that.

Q: Well, Bob, just to sort of end this up, are you doing anything, have you gotten involved in anything since then?

BARRY: I think I'm going to go out and be an examiner for the board of examiners. I volunteered, well, I went out to Kosovo and thought about taking a job in Kosovo, but I found Pristina forbidding and I found the SRSG Hans Haekerup forbidding, too. Haekerup has now quit after only a year. I announced my availability to the OSCE if the U.S. wants to take the position of head of mission of OSCE in Georgia, I would be happy to go there, otherwise.

Q: I just wanted to ask, how did your wife find living in Sarajevo?

BARRY: She loved it. She has founded a U.S. NGO to support this Bosnia handicrafts outfit. She is deeply involved in that still and she got very much involved with women's groups there. I think it was as fascinating an experience for her, of course, it had been our first post in the Foreign Service. She spoke the language and enjoyed it immensely.

Q: Okay, well, we'll stop at this point.

End of interview