The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR TIMOTHY MICHAEL CARNEY

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
Initial interview date: June 24, 2002

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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is June 24, 2002. This is an interview with Timothy Michael Carney. This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy. Let's start at the beginning. When and where were you born? Tell me a bit about your parents and family.

CARNEY: I was born in St. Joseph, Missouri, July 12, 1944. My father at that time was in the Army. It was World War II. My mother was the daughter of a surgeon in St. Joe, a volatile, irascible kind of man, my grandfather. I have no memories of him. My father's family was from Omaha, Nebraska, originally, having been from Wichita, Kansas. I knew his side of the family very well. My late grandfather was with Cudahy Packing Company for years and years and years. He ultimately had a stroke and died at about age 65. The Army basically beckoned to Dad, who after he got out and was demobilized went to law school at Creighton in Omaha and then tried to make it in insurance and law and ultimately decided to go back into the Army about 1948.

Q: Where did the Carneys come from?

CARNEY: The Gaelic is O'Kirnaugh (phonetic) from County Donegal in Ireland. The transliteration into English produces either Carney or Kearney. The Carney clan was based in Randolph, Massachusetts. There are 2-3 pages of us in the Boston telephone directory. The branch that I'm a twig of moved off to Wichita. In fact, there are some famous Carneys. About 30 years ago, two of my second cousins and some of their friends were sitting around at the plant working a half day shift on Saturday and wanted to get out and go hunting in the afternoon – pheasants beckoned – and one of them said, "It's a shame there's no place where we could just grab a hamburger and maybe get us a soft drink or a beer and get on out." "Maybe we can do something about that." So they started a little business they called Pizza Hut. These are the rich Carneys.

Q: Did your father go to college?

CARNEY: He did. He was the first one in the family actually to get a degree. It was from Creighton. My late uncle, John, also went to college but I don't believe he ever finished. My mother also was a college graduate.

Q: We'll talk about her side in a minute. Had your father graduated from college by the time he went into the Army?

CARNEY: That's a good question. I'm not sure I have the answer. He went into the Army in '42 and he would have been 21 or 22. So my guess is he had gotten an undergraduate degree from Creighton, from which he also got his law degree.

Q: Was he an officer?

CARNEY: Oh, no. In his World War II experience, he was in Ordnance and an enlisted man.

Q: And then he returned to the Army in '48?

CARNEY: About then, yes.

Q: What did he do then?

CARNEY: He went into the Judge Advocate Generals Corps, a far different pursuit than what one watches on TV now courtesy of the Navy. He was assigned first to Fort Myer. We lived at South post Fort Myer. Then almost immediately, in January of 1950, he went to Germany.

Q: What was your mother's maiden name and what was their background?

CARNEY: Their background was also Irish. Whereas the Carney clan came to the U.S. in the 1840s or '50s, I cannot tell you when the Byrne clan came, but it was equally old. Neither my father nor my mother had the right to own property in Ireland, which means their grandparents were not born in Ireland, which suggests mid-19th century arrival here. I had not tracked the migration west, but Grandfather Byrne wound up in St. Joe, Missouri, around the turn of the century and established his medical practice there.

Q: Your mother went where to college?

CARNEY: She went to Duchesne in Omaha, where she and my father met.

Q: Where did you start going to school as a boy?

CARNEY: My earliest memories of school are in Bad Tolz in Germany. Dad was with the First Infantry Division, one of the elements of the U.S. occupation of Germany, the last 3 or 4 years. I started in kindergarten and then moved through various U.S. military schools in the 3 years we were in Germany.

Q: How did you find the schools?

CARNEY: I don't have any memory of those schools at all except the torture of trying to learn penmanship as a left hander.

Q: Were they still saying that you had to do it with the right hand?

CARNEY: No, but they wanted us to shape letters the same way as right handers do. If you do that, you have the paper tilted the wrong way in such a fashion that you tend to smear what you've written with your left hand crossing over it. That's basically where a lot of left handers get that peculiar cramp and top down style of holding their pens or pencils.

Q: I guess that's gone out the window for some time now.

CARNEY: Oh, yes. In fact, it wasn't until I got to college that I actually turned the paper around the other way and began to write with a backhanded slant.

Q: After the German stint, where did you go?

CARNEY: Dad was assigned to Fort Bliss, Texas, so there we were in hot and dusty Fort Bliss next to El Paso.

Q: How did you find Texas?

CARNEY: I have very little memory of it except that it was hot and dusty. We did go off to White Sands Proving Grounds for a fire power demonstration.

Q: Did you find that you were interested in sports or reading?

CARNEY: It was probably at Fort Bliss where I have my most vivid memories of getting interested in reading. I was about 10 and I began reading a whole set of boyhood adventure novels written by that stable of authors, one of whom was Millicent Benson, also known as Carolyn Keene. My sister was reading her Nancy Drew adventure stories. I started reading Tom Swift, Jr. He was more the Flying Lab and things like that. Tom Swift, Sr., a turn of the last century set of novels for boys were by Victor Appleton, who I guess, also was a construct… I finally 4 or 5 years later came across some of those in one of my relatives' libraries and found them delightful, too. Rick Brant Electronic Adventures. Then there was a third series as well: Tom Corbett: Space Cadet.

Q: Did this attract to you to the scientific world or was this a reading exercise?

CARNEY: It was basically the impulse for the college I chose to attend.

Q: By the time you moved along, where did you go to high school?

CARNEY: Various. If you count junior high school, I was in the 7th and 8th grades in Taipei, Taiwan, the Taipei American School, and then started 9th grade in Junction City, Kansas, right next to Fort Riley. I spent 2 years there. Then my last 2 years were at Christian Brothers High School in St. Joseph, Missouri.

Q: How old were you in Taiwan?

CARNEY: About 12.

Q: Did you get any feel for the Far East?

CARNEY: I did. I was fascinated by it. I liked the food. Chopsticks provided no challenge even left handed, although the Chinese were a little appalled from time to time to see someone actually using their chopsticks in the left hand. Incredibly green, lush. People were poor. There were an incredible number of peasants in Taiwan. There was a history that I was old enough to be aware of: of the ruthless men in Nationalist Chinese occupation of Taiwan following the communist victory in 1949. Our houseboy at the time had invited us over to his house in Tamshui and we went and met his family and enjoyed the Taiwanese version of Chinese food. Yes, it sparked an interest in the Far East as well.

Q: How did you find being an Army brat?

CARNEY: I loved it. I didn't mind the travel. I don't seem to have had any trouble making the relatively few friends that I ever hung out with as a preteen and teenager. It bothered my brother and sister a good bit having to cut the ties and then forge them anew whenever we moved. We moved very frequently: 10 elementary schools and 2 high schools. In that sense, the Foreign Service was almost sedentary.

Q: Looking back on it, did you find that the military education, moving from place to place, do you think you came out ahead or behind?

CARNEY: Probably high school was the most crucial period on the education side, and I was behind, but that was the result of the parochial schools that I attended in my 4 years of high school rather than military schools. I think if you look at education, certainly up until high school, if a child reads, you just expand his or her horizons enormously by trying to guide that reading insofar as a parent can.

Q: At home were current events or literature discussed around the dinner table?

CARNEY: No. I don't believe so to the best of my recollection… There was a good bit of discussion on grammar and vocabulary and the use of language, which is very American, as we Americans became more broadly literate. It's almost like etiquette. But on issues, I don't recall much discussion of the issues of the time. The Kennedy presidency was quite hotly discussed around the house, the family being Roman Catholic by background. Other than that, certain foreign affairs issues – corruption in Taiwan, for example. There was a murder case my father was involved in, in his capacity with JAG on Taiwan and then subsequent riots.

Q: Was this the one where they sacked the embassy?

CARNEY: Yes. It was in '57.

Q: That was a major incident in American-Taiwanese relations.

CARNEY: And it was understood as such by even someone as young as I. We lived in Peitou, which has always amused people who know Taiwan since it's known for its sulfur baths and houses of ill repute. At 12, I was intellectually curious but not particularly interested.

Q: What about some of the kids who were 14 and 15? I think being tossed into that sort of environment would make it either an education or a problem?

CARNEY: It was both. I was in the 8th grade. I was 13. The word circulated that some of my classmates had contracted VD of one form or another and weren't shy about flaunting it. It was a strange hothouse kind of a place. The group that I hung around with, the few of us who lived in Peitou, because we were not in the housing area of Tianmu or Yang Min Shan, we would sneak out and buy $30 worth of firecrackers. We would wander off to friend's houses or a hotel known for its nighttime hobby and put a cigarette through one end of the fuse and then wander away and see the result, all this at about midnight. Things that would just shock and horrify me now. Very good spirits but nevertheless aspects of ugly American to it.

Q: Was your family orthodox Catholic or lax Catholic?

CARNEY: Churchgoing, but I didn't get a background feel for very… Not deeply into the devotional side.

Q: You went to parochial high schools?

CARNEY: Yes, but that was solely a function of having been in the States at the time and the fact that my father was in Korea for my last two years of high school. His was not an accompanied tour.

Q: Where was the school and who ran it?

CARNEY: The first one was run by nuns of no great intellectual capacity in Junction City, Kansas. They might have been Benedictine sisters. They were not up to running a modern high school. There were only 140 in the whole high school. Of course, I didn't realize this at the time.

Q: You think of nuns running the more elementary schools where the fathers take over at the high school level, at least for guys sort of to keep control.

CARNEY: Then the Brothers were very good at that in my second school, which was not coed.

Q: In high school, was there anything that particularly engaged you?

CARNEY: Not sports. I've never been particularly active in sports, although I did play Pony League hardball in Taiwan - a confusion of left handed and right handedness. I throw right handed but I am left handed and my left eye is dominant, which means you can't possible realize your potential if you're in that kind of a peculiar arrangement.

I did develop photography and ultimately became the yearbook photographer as well as editor and thoroughly enjoyed that. That came largely out of a Fort Riley experience when a bad boy was sent down to live with his uncle, presumably because of the belief that the military family is run on military discipline. He taught me darkroom techniques and I acquired a decent camera then and began a hobby that has continued lifelong.

Q: You graduated from high school in what year?

CARNEY: '62. The movie "Where Were You in '62" rang a lot of bells.

Q: Did the military attract you at all as a career?

CARNEY: It didn't. My father had great hopes that I'd go to West Point, largely for the finances of it, but I wasn't interested.

Q: Where did you go to college?

CARNEY: I went to MIT.

Q: How did that come about?

CARNEY: It was the only school I wanted to go to, and the only one to which I applied. This came from my readings in the adventure novels.

Q: How was it to get into MIT in those days?

CARNEY: Now it would be impossible. In those days, it wasn't easy, but I succeeded.

Q: Did you know anybody there?

CARNEY: No. I had never met anybody from the school except in fiction.

Q: Did you go to MIT from '62 to '66?

CARNEY: Exactly.

Q: Let's talk a bit about MIT. What was it like when you arrived?

CARNEY: We drove up from Atlanta, where my father was stationed at Fort McPherson. He had an old friend in the Boston area. We went out to dinner and got me installed in the dormitory, which at the time was by the great Finnish architect Alvar Aalto, his only building in the United States, Baker House, serpentine, located on Memorial Drive in Cambridge. I had two roommates. I was in a triple. There was a housing crunch among undergraduates at the Institute. I didn't want to join a fraternity, although I did go to some of the rush… I certainly didn't have enough money to consider a fraternity. At that time, MIT was about $1,500.00 tuition a year and a year's education would have been about $3,000, which seemed like a lot of money. I owed around $10,000 by the time I graduated and ultimately joined the Foreign Service.

Q: Did you find that you were competing with kids from Bronx High School of Science? Some really first rate institutions at the high school level were kicking their kids there.

CARNEY: I was extremely deficient in science and, especially, math as a result of both my own education and, I ultimately came to realize, as a result of my own lack of talent. The talent just simply hadn't been explored and I did not have the abilities in math and science to think of the careers in those fields that I had thought I was so interested in. So I tease my Foreign Service colleagues that basically I failed my first physics course at MIT. I said, "Well, you know, you fail the sciences, you go to diplomacy."

Q: Many people I've talked to have embarked on an engineering or a medical or a science course and after the first couple semesters have found that this was not for them and moved elsewhere. But being at MIT, there is nowhere else to go within the school, or was there?

CARNEY: That's just it. Partly I'm stubborn, comes with the Irish extraction. And partly if you looked at MIT even in those days, there was an enormously capable and well respected department of political science. There was also a terrific economics faculty. Paul Samuelson was teaching the basic course.

Q: Generation after generation grew up on Samuelson.

CARNEY: Exactly. He wrote the basic textbook.

There was also a growing, but of no reputation, humanities department. Everything at MIT is numbers and all the courses have numbers. When MIT people get together, you basically talk numbers. "What course were you?" "I was 6. What were you?" "I was 21," talking electrical engineering versus humanities. The humanities department was divided into history, literature, and philosophy. The area that MIT is much better known for is linguistics. Noam Chomsky was there. But that was an entirely separately department, 23. I cascaded from physics to biology and tried to make up and get a leg up on the biology side by taking at Harvard summer school a year's worth of physical chemistry. I just simply wasn't any good at that either. You didn't have to be a modern biologist to realize, even in 1963 or '64, that modern biology would require every single element of the panoply of modern mathematics and modern physics. I just simply didn't think I had the mathematical capability to handle all of that, so I dropped in my junior year into history with biology as a science minor.

Q: Were you able to find mature people to talk to?

CARNEY: No. Never did. Partly that's my own character.

Q: I'm not sure that these schools were that well equipped. I suppose they were there if you really wanted to go out and do it. In my time in college, I never really talked to an adult about where I was going.

CARNEY: Mentor? There was no concept. There was a bit of it with upperclassmen but at MIT the upperclassmen were all in engineering or science for the most part.

Q: Did you feel like a fish out of water at all?

CARNEY: No, I was regarded as a little strange, but there was a niche for people doing humanities as well. There must have been 20-30 of us who graduated in '66 in humanities and science or humanities and engineering, which is what the degree is called.

Q: Any particular element of history?

CARNEY: Many of the courses were taught by visiting professors. The history faculty at MIT was weak, but had someone of reputation who had jointly written a book, *China, Japan and the West*. He was also a Cambridge City Councilman. The visiting professors were very impressive: A woman anthropologist from Wellesley; and an extremely solid anthropologist from Yale. Some younger lecturer rather than professor types from Harvard, who mainly focused on anthropology and Asian history. The Asian history is what led me, along with the issues of the day, to my first post.

Q: Were you keeping in mind… Had Taipei embedded itself as far as a place of interest in the Far East?

CARNEY: The Far East was of interest and I had experience there. I had also met my first Foreign Service person there. As one of the scholars from the 8th grade, I was among the ushers at the high school graduation. I recall ushering the ambassador's wife to her seat. That stuck with me as well.

Q: While you were at MIT, you had the Cuban Missile Crisis and Kennedy's assassination and the Cold War and all. Did this intrude much?

CARNEY: I took more history courses and only one political science course, Lucien Pye's graduate course in Asian political systems. As noted, one of the history courses I took from a professor whom I still, to this day, admire was also on China, Japan, and the West. So, the focus, anthropology, political science, and history, was the Far East.

The issues were the Kennedy assassination, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and a number of the events of the period, including Vietnam to a small degree and mainly with anti-war activists. All got discussion in the dormitory, but not much because the focus was so heavily on science and engineering and everybody was working like dogs. The Institute was never an Ivy League party school.

Q: Did you meet the Harvard types? Was this a different world?

CARNEY: It was a different world. At the 25th alumni reunion, my wife and I were with a group of friends who have stayed together – we were in Baker House from freshman year on and we've kept in touch – and we were at the black tie dinner concluding the events. My wife said, "You know, you all so clearly enjoy each other's company. You must have had a great time at MIT." The table went dead quiet. Finally, Stu Shapiro, who is in New York as head of the computer science department at the University there in Buffalo, said, "You know, no, we didn't have a good time. I certainly didn't. I graduated 2nd in my class of 800 high school students. I got to MIT and I could hardly get out of the bottom quarter of the class, and I worked all the time. No, it wasn't fun." There were good times, but it simply wasn't fun.

Q: Well, it can be a little like basic training. You remember some of the people you were

with through basic training but it's not something you'd want to go back to and do again.

CARNEY: Exactly.

Q: Did you get to enjoy the delights of Boston at all?

CARNEY: To a degree, but largely because I tended to stay over holiday periods and over the summers.

Q: Your father's family was away?

CARNEY: I didn't find being at home that congenial after I got old enough to think for myself. My parents were in the process that led to a divorce when I was about 20 years old.

Q: That's very difficult. Was your father of a military mind of "This is the way things are done?"

CARNEY: No. He was a lawyer.

Q: So there's always 3 sides to every question.

CARNEY: And a certain benign neglect.

Q: So there wasn't this rebellion against the military-type mind.

CARNEY: No. As we all look at the various modern attempts to determine character, I don't think he had a military mind.

Q: It's interesting showing the influence of people on you.

CARNEY: He was not all that pleased when I chose the Foreign Service. He thought that I was leading him along and I had joined the CIA.

Q: As you were getting close to graduation with a history major, what was in the offing?

CARNEY: I thought about graduate school. I applied to Brandeis but not with any great enthusiasm. I also looked at how much money I owed and knew I'd have to borrow more to do graduate school and couldn't and wouldn't depend on the family. It seemed to me that getting a job was a better idea.

Q: A debt of $10,000 in those days was just overwhelming.

CARNEY: Even though it was mainly that federal loan program at 1.25% interest.

Q: But still, just to pay it.

CARNEY: Exactly. In those days, that was more than the annual salary of an incoming junior officer.

Q: So what did you do?

CARNEY: I took the Foreign Service written exam with about 24 other people from MIT and passed it. Then did the oral down at USUN in New York and passed that. Of course, it was the time of the buildup of the Foreign Service for Vietnam. That's why I passed. The passing mark is always a function of intake.

Q: Do you recall how the oral exam went for you?

CARNEY: It was 3 balding portlies. It was the old style oral. It was essentially a set of questions such as, "If your ship starts in Seattle and goes through the Panama Canal to New York, what do you pick up and what do you offload at each port?" That might have been someone else's question. One that I recall is, "You are advising a foreigner on tourism in the United States and he wants to know about interesting and great homes in America to visit. Where would you send him?" The last question: "Suppose the U.S. had not made the Louisiana Purchase. Trace the course of history of the U.S. and Europe thereafter." I found that fascinating. I ultimately had us at war with Great Britain over what would become the west of the United States.

Q: Had Vietnam really crossed your radar much?

CARNEY: Absolutely. There were marches. There was an anti-war movement. Students for Democratic Society were active. One of the people I knew in the dorm was part of it.

Q: I would have thought MIT being more outside the… didn't have the kids with the leisure time to go out and strike.

CARNEY: There was enough leisure and enough smart kids who were looking at the issue that there was an active but small group.

Q: Did you have any feeling about the Vietnam War?

CARNEY: I didn't except to the extent that there was no question you had to oppose the communists wherever you could.

Q: You came into the Foreign Service in 1966?

CARNEY: No. I passed the test and got on the rank order register but asked to delay it for a year. My mother was then married to a fellow who worked for Volkswagen, and Volkswagen of America had scholarships to study abroad for employees. I won several thousand dollars and went off to France for an academic year, delaying my entry into the

Foreign Service as a result. I wanted to learn French because it was the language of diplomacy, so I thought.

Q: You went there from '66-'67.

CARNEY: Right.

Q: Where did you go?

CARNEY: To Grenoble, which was just gearing up to become the Winter Olympic site in '68.

Q: How did you find that?

CARNEY: I found all the American girls seemed to carry a block of hashish in their back pocket which they would scrape into their cigarettes. That is perhaps an exaggeration, but a fair number were. Grenoble was the center where many of the Pieds Noirs had established themselves from Algeria. It provided an interesting tone of intense political discussion and criticism of metropolitan France.

Q: You were there a year before the student events of '68.

CARNEY: I did not see any barricades.

Q: Did you find the French student body a more volatile crew?

CARNEY: I didn't have much experience with the French student body. The people who didn't speak any French like me were in courses with other foreigners. I gave up on the university because it had a classic language teaching classroom methodology, and discovered the Institute of Phonetics where they did audiovisual method, more like FSI taught when I took courses there after joining the Service. But you were still with foreigners. There were relatively few French students who were all that interested in foreigners except the guys trying to hit on the girls.

Q: That was still the time when one assumed that the French would just assume any foreigner of any ilk would go away.

CARNEY: Well, the major event that I can recall in that period was the film "A Man and a Woman" came out and the Ford Mustang, to the astonishment of anyone who knows anything about cars, became the vehicle of choice. People couldn't buy one because they were students. They fell in love with it because of that film.

Q: It was a great romance story and it had cars.

Did you come away with any feeling about France at all?

CARNEY: I did. I liked the French approach in many ways. It is very different. There are two aspects of French engineering… One struck me then and the other has struck me since. One is the Citroen. What an interesting way to design a car. The second is - they do the same with shotguns. The French double barrel shotgun does not have a hinge pin. You don't push a lever and the barrels then fall to expose the chambers. Instead, it has a breech that slides and you pull up a couple of ears and slide the breech back: A unique approach to aspects of engineering.

I went out to the reactor near Grenoble at the French nuclear center. We were standing around a heavy water reactor and I looked over into the pool. We had a tour guide. There were about 12 of us looking at it. I asked him, "Isn't that the Cherenkov effect down there?" This basically causes a blue color to result from the absorption of… It was the first time I had seen it. Normally, I wouldn't have asked anything. My French was pretty shaky at that point. He said, "Yes, it is just that." We began a discussion that was a little too hard for me to follow in technical… atomic physics in French. Fascinating. So I maintain my engineering interests to this day.

Q: Citroen was a delightful looking car with that suspension. It really is one of the most beautiful cars ever designed.

CARNEY: The DS.

Q: How did you come out Frenchwise?

CARNEY: When I joined the Foreign Service, I got a 2+ and required 8 weeks of French to get me up to a 3 to get off language probation.

Q: You came in in '67?

CARNEY: Right. June 22nd.

Q: Describe your class.

CARNEY: There were 72 of us, 57 State Department Foreign Service officers and 15 from USIA. It was a period that, I think, was later reversed when everyone was regarded as a Foreign Service officer, which is what should have been forever. There were a number of people in it who ultimately came to considerable prominence. Ned Walker was in the class. Bob Blackwill was in the class. Bob had nowhere near the drive, nor did he show the qualities that generate controversy to this day.

Q: He is ambassador to India (and subsequently returned to the NSC Staff) and there have been articles who don't like his management techniques.

CARNEY: He's very abrasive according to what everyone says. I haven't seen enough of

him- (end of tape)

But I haven't seen enough of Bob Blackwill to comment one way or the other. There were a number of other people who ultimately became celebrities. Eleanor Hicks was a black woman from Cincinnati who wound up Consul in Nice. Then she was to go to Laos as number 2 and decided to leave the Service ostensibly to get married, but I don't know what the real reason was. I haven't heard from her. She and I stayed in touch for a number of years. In other words, it was a class with far more women than is usually the case and one with a very disparate group of interests. There was an MIT Ph.D. in it as well, who only lasted a tour, as you might expect. A Ph.D. at the time was gross over education for the Foreign Service.

Q: Was there an attitude towards Vietnam? How was that viewed within the class?

CARNEY: That was still the period when junior officers could be assigned to Vietnam. There were about 12 of us who were. Only 2 of us volunteered, me and John Forbes. John's father was then commander of the 199th Light Infantry brigade, which was in Vietnam during the period of our A100 course. There were 1 or 2 people who had been in Vietnam. Ward Thompson, who was assigned to Denmark. They were not going to assign someone who had served in the military, which showed good common sense. Ed Adams and Ruth McLendon were running that A100 course. Vietnam was intensely a focus because it was the march on the Pentagon year, the summer of '67, where all the hippies and trippies went and linked hands around the Pentagon together to cause it to jump up into the air and fall back and collapse. My logic was, this was the single most important foreign policy action and I wanted to be there to see what it's all about.

Q: It was known as "seeing the elephant." Did you get involved with organizations like JFSOC (Junior Foreign Service Officers Club)? This was a time when youth was everywhere… You were a generation born without original sin until you reached the age of 30 and then you were beyond it.

CARNEY: I was 22 when I came into the Service and then turned 23 shortly thereafter. But I did the basic course, 8 weeks of French, and then I was in Saigon on the anniversary of the Marine Corps, November 11th, 1967. So, from June 22nd to mid-November was my period in Washington.

Q: So you really didn't have much time.

CARNEY: No. I did go to JFSOC's July Fourth ball. It was at the Smithsonian.

Q: Was there a Foreign Service spirit or was it pretty disparate?

CARNEY: Well, we were all FSO-8s going on Career Ambassador wandering around trying to absorb as much as possible. I remember bearding George Vest about the lack of utility of NATO when our group went to see him. He did chuckle and said, "Why at this

point, especially considering what NATO has become?" We were just all over the bureaucracy looking at things, including a trip out to CIA with its auditorium where the acoustics are such that nobody can hear anybody including the lecturer. A question about assassinations arose from one of my classmates who was particularly politically engaged. It was he who asked (Secretary of State) Dean Rusk about Vietnam when he came to speak to us, noting the seeming failure of our policies there.

Q: How many of your class went to Vietnam?

CARNEY: It was about 12. But most were assigned to the CORDS program via language training. They learned Vietnamese. I was upgraded in French.

Q: So you were sent to the embassy in Saigon?

CARNEY: That's right.

Q: You served there from when to when?

CARNEY: November of '67 until June of '69.

Q: What were you doing at the embassy?

CARNEY: I did two things. I was a rotational junior officer. My first rotation was in the political section which was fascinating and confirmed that that was the kind of work I wanted to do. I wound up doing the airgram on the biography of the newly elected Vietnamese parliament, and then following youth and student affairs.

Q: Who was the ambassador and how was the political section structured?

CARNEY: There were 80-plus people on the diplomatic list in Saigon at the head of which was Ellsworth Bunker, and at the bottom of which was Timothy Carney. I felt like an FSO-9. In fact, the first time I met Bunker was in the elevator, which I was reluctant to board while he was in it. He just said, "Come on in." The political section had 22 or 23 "real" officers in it and a large number of Agency people in what was totally nominal cover.

Q: They were their own section, weren't they?

CARNEY: They were all over the town. There were a lot of Agency people there.

The head of the section was Tom Recknagle with Ted Heavner as his deputy and then Galen Stone replaced Tom. There was an external unit and there was a political-military unit and there was an internal unit and, also, a provincial reporting unit. That last was an innovation for Vietnam which had a number of officers with good language skills. I would have been part of the internal unit doing my biography.

Q: What was your impression of the national assembly's caliber, of the people in it and its effectiveness?

CARNEY: I didn't have much feel for it from the biographies I was doing. I have never been brilliant at understanding things from reading about them. It was only when I started to meet members of the Senate and the Assembly that I realized what an inadequate group it was for South Vietnam to be dealing with the threat from the North.

Q: How did you go about doing this? Where were you getting your information?

CARNEY: Files, and talking to my colleagues, and running pieces of paper through them and that sort of thing. Then, of course, I began to develop my own contacts, including teaching English to a Vietnamese Senator. More valuable to understand what was going on was my work in the area of youth and student affairs.

It was in that latter area that I came in contact with General Lansdale's staff. He had a peculiar and not very influential role at that time, in contrast to his days in the 50s in the Philippines and in Vietnam. His young staffer working on student matters was Charlie Sweet.

Q: Did you find your French useful?

CARNEY: Not until I moved from the political section to the commercial section. Then it was vital. You just had to have it.

Q: You arrived there in November of '67. What was the situation like?

CARNEY: The feeling was things were moving. There seemed to be a congealing of South Vietnamese authority, and a growing capability and competence. I was in no position to challenge that. All the information I was seeing seemed to support it up until the Tet offensive.

Q: We move to January/February of '68. Where were you?

CARNEY: I had gone to bed at the hotel. There was such a lack of housing, I was in a hotel from November until I got an apartment in April of '68. I shared that apartment with another political officer. I had gone to my Vietnamese teacher's house for a Tet party and had drunk entirely too much. Exceptionally, fireworks were permitted for the Tet celebrations. I woke up in the morning to an enormous amount of fireworks and got back to sleep and then got a call from the embassy saying, "Don't come into work."

Q: What hotel were you in?

CARNEY: The New Saigon Hotel, which was just past the palace and the Cercle Sportif.

Q: It wasn't a short distance to the embassy. It wasn't right around the corner.

CARNEY: No, it wasn't. Normally we took a bus or a shuttle.

Q: What was happening in the hotel?

CARNEY: Well, it was full of mainly USAID people due to the circumstances of my arrival and who I got hooked up with for the initial housing assignment. We were basically on the roof of the hotel looking at what was going on around town – air strikes and firefights. A helicopter crashed on the roof of the COMNAVFORCV headquarters about 3 blocks away. Bullets would go overhead, sounding just like they do in the movies. Interesting stuff.

Q: Did you feel this was what you had been paid to do as a diplomat?

CARNEY: I knew it. There wasn't any doubt. I had no doubt that any amateur status had been revoked. I was always astonished when my colleagues didn't seem to grasp that in later years.

Q: Did you have any weapons?

CARNEY: I arrived with a .32 automatic that I had bought at Interarmco in Alexandria, but only recall actually wearing it two or three times in the 18 month tour. I had been on the freshman pistol team at the university, had hunted and shot birds using a shotgun… I had respect for firearms, but certainly wasn't afraid of them.

Q: Did the Viet Cong come close to your hotel?

CARNEY: They were on the grounds of the nearby Presidential Palace or on the grounds of a hotel on the other side of the Presidential Palace, but we're talking 6 or 8 blocks.

Q: When were you able to get back to the embassy?

CARNEY: Two days later. I went up and found the windows all awry in the office. The rocket propelled grenades that had hit the embassy's attractive outer shell, which was in fact a blast screen, had caused enough pressure to wrench the window frames out of the building wall. There was a fellow in full body armor and helmet with an M-16 sitting in my office from the 101st Airborne Division. Those people were withdrawn within a day or two.

Q: Was there a feeling that the attack on the embassy was a bad thing, that it had been stopped?

CARNEY: The feeling was, it was brilliantly conceived by the Viet Cong - it was a Viet Cong operation. The NVA clearly wasn't involved – that they had done their best, and it wasn't good enough, that we had responded to the surprise with a successful defense, but

that the effect in the United States was clearly what the Vietnamese communists had intended.

Q: Were you getting any feel for how this was playing in the United States?

CARNEY: We would see TV and newspapers. There was no lack of information on how America was looking at it.

Q: Was there a feeling that the media was the problem or part of the problem?

CARNEY: There was a feeling in that way which I didn't know enough to share, and wasn't going to take without knowing more about it. I met a number of journalists there, some of whom I came to know, and am in contact with to this day. It was clearly an odd time. I was a little puzzled as to why we didn't know more about what the Viet Cong were up, to considering how many people there were from the various intelligence agencies – NSA, CIA, DIA - all over the town of Saigon and upcountry as well.

Q: Did the embassy seem to be either in disarray or functioning or puzzled?

CARNEY: It was more or less business as usual – carry on, let's focus on what we're doing. Arch Calhoun was Minister for Political Affairs there, to be replaced by Martin Herz. (I don't remember when Martin Herz came in.) I only felt it at the time… This is analytical, and I only felt it at the time by its absence: There is no leadership in the Foreign Service. Foreign Service officers, most of them, do not know how to lead even if they have the basic talent for leading. This was very conspicuous by its absence. People were more or less left to cope.

Q: I think this is a failing but it's an attitude… Everyone does their job.

CARNEY: Exactly.

Q: You're lead by indirection. "It would be nice to have somebody do something about such and such" and then you're somebody who's supposed to go out and do that.

Was your bailiwick still the national assembly?

CARNEY: I moved to youth and student affairs.

Q: Were the students pretty quiet during this period?

CARNEY: I'm not sure I can remember. I was talking with student leaders. The Vietnamese in general were very good at manipulating students through their leaders. The leaders were very good at grasping when they were being manipulated and allowing themselves to be manipulated to the point that they could get their own agenda satisfied as well. The leaders that I dealt with were very smart, well connected across a range of

political fronts, very active, but I didn't see what they were doing that would be effective, nor did I see what their ultimate goals were. One of those leaders ultimately made his way to the U.S. as a refugee and got in touch with me, having changed his name to Freeman to celebrate his escape from Vietnam.

Q: I noted that students were sort of against things and protesting but it was pretty hard to come to say "Let's make peace with the communists."

CARNEY: Exactly, especially after the Tet offensive.

Q: What was the attitude you were getting about how the Thieu government responded to the offensive and where it was going?

CARNEY: Bunker shortly, at Washington's urging, began a set of conversations with Thieu himself, as I recall, that Steve Johnson, who was in the political section external unit then, essentially went along as notetaker for, and wrote up the cables. This was all focused on "What do we ultimately do? How do we engage in negotiations?" It was leading up to the Paris meetings.

Q: How did you see yourself in this? Did you want to get out in the field? Was Vietnamese such a prerequisite that this was sort of…

CARNEY: Vietnamese was an absolute prerequisite. It was my introduction to that and made me understand that I couldn't be a political officer unless I had at least one of the languages of whatever country I might be in. In any case, the rotation that was coming up was into the commercial section. That was after the May offensive in '68. I went to the commercial section.

Q: You were doing that from May of '68 to when?

CARNEY: June of '68 to April or May of '69. Then I went to do a protocol related job for the ambassador's office.

Q: Let's talk about the commercial section. Who was your boss?

CARNEY: The boss was Richard C. "Dick" Devine. Above him was Bill Sharpe, an AID official. The commercial section was under the joint economic section, State and others. I can remember wondering if I was in good hands because one of the last things I did as political officer, was to be at a meeting of a delegation, possibly a Congressional Delegation, with the economic counselor at which there was talk about what all of Southeast Asia was doing. There was nothing coming back to the visitors, and I interjected, "Well, this all might be related as part of the way that this new Association of Southeast Asian Nations develops." ASEAN was founded in '67 or '68. The economic counselor didn't seem to have heard of it and didn't know anything about it. A little alarm bell went off in my head.

Q: Let's talk about commercial life at that time. In the middle of the war, one doesn't think about a commercial officer.

CARNEY: Well, this was deliberate. There was a commodity import program, a CIP program, and a major effort to get business going between American suppliers and Vietnamese buyers using U.S. government money to help fund all of this. That was the period when the Department of Commerce still did the World Trade Directory Report, the WTDR. I got actively involved in that. We were also working with the Vietnamese Directorate of Foreign Trade. Dick Devine's only rating comment that rests in my mind was that I was able to measurably improve relations with the Vietnamese official who was the director for foreign trade because I could speak French with him – in other words, wasn't insisting that he use his non-existent English or a translator. I can't remember any specific thing.

Q: Sometimes when you get two systems coming up against each other – the American commercial system and the Vietnamese commercial system, which I suppose is probably a mixture of French and Chinese bureaucracy – were we having a lot of trouble with trade disputes?

CARNEY: Relatively little, but there were lots of issues about corruption and corrupt practices and bribing officials. The commercial office also had as one of its other functions monitoring excess property sales from the military. That was a very difficult thing to do. There was a huge amount of scrap brass being generated – lots of scrap metal from vehicles that weren't maintained well or had battle damage. There were several Vietnamese firms that were dealing in melting down scrap. Very complicated set of inspections and investigations and that sort of thing.

Q: At that time we didn't have a federal law against anti-bribery, did we?

CARNEY: Not to the best of my recollection.

Q: It came later. Were the French in there using their…

CARNEY: I do not recall any specific detail of French embassy/French government commercial action. Their embassy was still in Hanoi and they had a consulate general in Saigon. I think they were much more political than they were commercial and just simply let longtime business contacts between France and Vietnam carry the trade side. I could be mistaken.

Q: Were the Chinese dominant in trade?

CARNEY: The commercial market part of Saigon, Cholon, actually means "Big Market." There was an enormous Sino-Vietnamese community, but it was Sino-Vietnamese, which is a bit more congenial than the Chinese community in Cambodia proved to be.

Q: Was there a solid commercial life at that point?

CARNEY: Very solid. Very active. Everything from importing Mercedes Benz to the sale of scrap steel and imports of textiles and cloth and cotton. Lively market activity. Electronics. Tools. Machinery. Various parts and bits and pieces for repairing their tools and machinery and consumer goods.

Q: You mentioned corruption. Were we trying to root out corruption?

CARNEY: We were more interested in where it applied to political matters – who was buying whom, who was renting whom, and what the quid pro quo was. I do remember being waved off corruption stories in the political section partly because of lack of evidence and partly because of a philosophical belief that we couldn't totally impose our standards on other cultures.

Q: Also there was the thing that comes up again and again that if there is what we call corruption, if reports go back to Washington, they get leaked and they give ammunition to the enemies of doing anything with X country. So, you can report it once, but if you continue to report it, it isn't helping at all.

CARNEY: The most complicated and difficult intersection of this problem was with our allies, the Filipinos, the Koreans in II CORPS, enormous problems of corruption, and the Thais, of course. Whenever the commissary would get a shipment of tape decks in, you would see these three elements with their people there all with the proper amount of MPC (military payment certificates in lieu of green dollars) and their ration cards in hand to buy out 200 units that would ultimately be sold to the black market.

Q: I remember watching Thai contingents marching in and all buying things they obviously needed like shampoo and feminine products and the like, all getting exactly the same thing and then coming out and piling into a truck while the provost marshal got red in the face watching this. There wasn't much you could do about it.

CARNEY: Exactly.

Q: It was very difficult. Was there talk of saying, "Well, we're trying to get goods in like this to help absorb the excess money so it doesn't move into inflation?"

CARNEY: I only remember that from my Cambodian days.

Q: I remember hearing this at one time.

In '69, you moved over to protocol?

CARNEY: Briefly, yes, and the only thing I can remember doing in that was counting up

the number of general and flag officers of the United States in Vietnam, which had reached 107 for 500,000 troops.

Q: What was your impression of the leadership of Ambassador Bunker?

CARNEY: I didn't really have an impression of him. He was far too remote for me to get much of an impression. I am going to be interested to see the biography that Howard Schaffer is now doing.

Q: As far from being in Vietnam, did you belong to what might be called a coterie of junior officers there? Were you getting together with them?

CARNEY: Yes, a number of us hung out together. I used to play a lot of bridge with some of them as well. Then there was a very active social life within the younger people of various embassies and some Vietnamese as well. But there was much less of that and I had much less time for it. Certainly after the Tet offensive, things got intensively busy.

Q: Could you discern a divide that often happens when we've got a controversial policy of the junior officers wanting to get out and change the world and the more senior officers wanting to keep things the way they are?

CARNEY: No, I didn't see anything like that. The junior officers got engaged with Vietnam as Vietnam is, especially the language officers. They developed a deep interest and affection for the country as a country apart from the issues of war and policy. We generally recognized that what we were doing was not going to effect the independence of South Vietnam. We didn't know how to do it any better except that there were clearly some things - our relations with the Saigon government, our approach to enhancing the capabilities of the South Vietnamese army – that just simply weren't being properly addressed until General Creighton Abrams became MACV Commander and started to work on it after Westmoreland's unlamented departure. Those issues of how do you get Thieu and his government to govern seriously? How do you make the South Vietnamese armed forces capable? And what to do about corruption, not only of South Vietnamese entities, but also among our allies and elements within ourselves? Those three were touched on heavily. There was some discussion of the Phoenix Program, but it was more on whether it was succeeding rather than the morality of it or whether it was right.

Q: This was the elimination of the Viet Cong infrastructure using polite terms.

CARNEY: Assassination.

Q: How about the CIA? Did the CIA junior officers mix?

CARNEY: I knew one fairly well who was there under an alias as I subsequently discovered when we ran across each other elsewhere in the world. He seemed to be okay but no great shakes. That realization persisted throughout my career.

Q: Did you develop a group of people who went through the Vietnam experience who stayed with you and you kept in contact with? Was there a distinct group?

CARNEY: Not really. What I found was, people who had that experience over the years generally had better judgment on what was possible to do diplomatically, and indeed with the entire quiver of our foreign policy tools. People who didn't have the judgment notably include mainly people engaged in the Middle East, because so few people with that specialty ever went to Vietnam, plus they had their political masters here in Washington, the Israeli lobby breathing down the necks of whatever they might report or try to recommend… Basically the Vietnam hands in my experience just seemed to have their head better screwed on their shoulders.

Q: You left when?

CARNEY: June of '69.

Q: Had promises been made that if you went to Vietnam the world would be yours?

CARNEY: No, I never understood any such promise.

Q: So what happened?

CARNEY: I went to Lesotho.

Q: Did this come as a surprise?

CARNEY: Elaine Schunter was the personnel officer at the time in Saigon. Elaine and I got along pretty well, partly because she felt guilty that she had failed to file the first efficiency report, and delayed my movement from FSO-8 to 7 for six months. The time didn't concern me at all. The assignment to Maseru came in and she said she didn't know where it was. Well, neither did I. She said, "I think it's Africa, but I'll call you back." She called me back and said, "Oh, you don't want to go." They actually had the post report. She sent it over. To this day, I can remember how it starts: "Snakes are not a problem if common sense precautions are taken. The grass airport lands flights twice weekly from Johannesburg." The initial paragraph reads, "Lesotho is inhabited by the Basotho people, all of whom speak Sesotho. The king of the country is Moshoeshoe." Every term had its phonetic pronunciation. It just goes on and on like that. It was my second assignment, so I decided, of course, I'd go.

Q: You were there from when to when?

CARNEY: About August of '69 to about July of '71.

Q: Had a significant other appeared at this point?

CARNEY: Not at this point.

Q: You'd better describe where Lesotho is and the circumstances of its development.

CARNEY: Lesotho was one of the three British High Commission Territories in southern Africa. It is the only one totally surrounded by the Republic of South Africa. It was founded on the run from Shaka Zulu's impis in the first third of the 19th century by Moshoeshoe I, who took refuge on a hill that was very easy to fortify and defend against the weapons that the Zulu impis were using. They fought off the various Zulus, then fought off the Boer moving out of the Cape in the trek of the 1830s. But through astute statesmanship and advice from a set of Protestant missionaries who had arrived in the 1830s as well, the Basotho managed to get themselves inserted as a "flea in Queen Victoria's blanket" and became a protectorate of the British in the 1860s or '70s. It maintained that status until it looked as if the British were going to merge the High Commission Territories with South Africa in the period after WW I. But the ascension of Jan Smuts and the United Party in South Africa and, while not apartheid, a growing effort to limit the freedoms of blacks in southern Africa, caused the British to delay. Then with the 1949 electoral victory of the Nationalist Party as the Afrikaners had out bred the English speakers, the continuation of those three High Commission Territories was guaranteed. The Brits just simply were not going to turn them over to apartheid South Africa. In the mid-'60s, they regained their actual independence, which they all three hold to this day.

U.S. Policy was to support the independence, and prove the viability of black run states in southern Africa. We wound up with, first, a rotating chargé d'affaires and then resident embassies headed by chargé d'affaires because Senator Fulbright didn't want us willy nilly to put full fledged embassies in all of black Africa, which was politically a mistake. That ultimately changed as the chargé were upgraded in the '70s to ambassadors.

Q: When you arrived on the grassy airport-

CARNEY: I didn't. I flew into the nearest large South African town, Bloemfontein, one of the three capitals of South Africa. The judiciary is headquartered in Bloemfontein. Bloemfontein exists on land stolen, by the British under Captain Warden's 1855 decision, from the Kingdom of Lesotho of the epoch. It's a 90-mile ride from Bloemfontein Airport to Maseru Bridge across the Caledon River. My predecessor met me with every sign of relief in his eyes, Peter Jones, son of Ambassador Jones. I think Peter himself got an embassy. I arrived in dusty Maseru to take up residence at the house we were renting for the junior officer, there only being 2 Foreign Service officers, a Secretary-Communicator, a USIA representative, a Peace Corps director, and a couple dozen volunteers.

Q: What was your impression when you saw this?

CARNEY: This was pretty close to the end of the earth but it looked interesting. It didn't take any time at all to realize that the people in Lesotho were very squared away, warm,

welcoming, and solid.

Q: What was the government like?

CARNEY: It was an elected government under Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan. A year after independence, there had been parliamentary elections which the Basotholand National Party, the BNP, had won, and Leabua Jonathan of a chiefly family had become prime minister. Their opposition was the Basotholand Congress Party, which was very leftist for the time under Ntsu Mokhele. There were elections scheduled for January of 1970 as well, so we were approaching an electoral period when I got there in August.

Q: Was there a king?

CARNEY: The king was the great grandson of Moshoeshoe, Moshoeshoe II.

Q: What was his role?

CARNEY: He was a constitutional monarch at that point.

Q: Was he a tribal chief as well?

CARNEY: He was. There was a political party, the Marematlou Freedom Party, that supported enhanced powers for the king, but they were very much of a minority.

Q: Who was the chargé?

CARNEY: Initially and for a temporary period it was Edward A. Dow, Jr. He was there with his wife, Virginia. He was an old India hand and Indonesia hand, but he had come from somewhere in North Africa to do this just before he retired. He was old Foreign Service, a good man. He was replaced by Stephen Gurney Gebelt, who had at one point been chargé in Salisbury before he became chargé in Maseru, and had had any number of other posts.

Q: Had you had any briefing as far as Africa goes?

CARNEY: I vaguely remember being so urgently needed that no time was available even for the Area Studies course at FSI. If I left Saigon in June and got to Maseru in August and I had home leave I didn't really have time for much. I remember Oliver Crosby was the director of AF/S. I had some conversations there in Washington, but nothing else sticks in my memory.

Q: As you arrived there, had you picked up just by reading or being a student, did you have any feeling about what was happening in South Africa?

CARNEY: No, but that was clearly what I ultimately wound up doing: South Africa

watching. Lesotho, you can pretty much grasp in three months. I had enough contacts that I knew what was going on especially after the coup in January of 1970.

Q: How did the coup come about?

CARNEY: The prime minister aborted the elections in mid-count and took over because his party had lost.

Q: Did this make any difference from our point of view or was this just watching a group of people who had their own way of doing things?

CARNEY: It made a difference because it affected the Peace Corps mission. We drew it down dramatically. It certainly affected the view of Lesotho as a democracy. But it didn't ultimately keep us from putting in an ambassador and then installing a resident AID mission. AID had previously been effected by the Office of Southern African Regional Affairs. The relationship just ticked along.

Q: Let's talk about working within Lesotho. How did you find dealing with the government?

CARNEY: The relationship with the government… We were very interested in community development and development in Lesotho in general. It's a rocky country with much of the best land having been acquired by the notorious Captain Warden 100 years previously. As a result, the ambassador's self-help fund, all $10,000 munificent dollars of it, was under my control. The chargé rarely wanted to go out to an opening or anything, so I was all over the country at the opening of a village water system or a dam or a schoolhouse that we had built or that we had helped to fund the materials for or to build. Up until the coup of January 1970, relationships were very straightforward with the usual demarches for support on UN-related matters at General Assembly time. Entertainment of government officials and the whole panoply of people active in Lesotho, including the small number of embassies proceeded in traditional foreign service style. The Brits had an active high commission. Taiwan had their ambassador there in those days.

Q: Were the South Africans calling the shots?

CARNEY: Not at all. The South Africans were in an interesting position. They were willing to second civil servants to Lesotho. The chief justice of Lesotho, Geldenhuys, was a South African, and a number of officials from the South African government were seconded. There wasn't an embassy and relationships were conducted on sort of an ad hoc basis. We had had a visit of the notorious minister for Bantu affairs, Piet Koornhof. One of my earliest recollections of South Africa watching from Lesotho was when he returned to be interpolated or maybe just to answer questions in parliament. Asked if he had not sat down and dined with Kaffirs. He said he had indeed but he had done it for his country, not because he enjoyed it. This was likely in February or March of 1970 as parliament sits in South Africa, or did, in January, during the summer in the Cape.

Q: What was the Peace Corps doing and how effective were they?

CARNEY: I didn't know how effective they were. I didn't have any clue whether or if they were effective. I knew that they were all out, for the most part, in villages, many engaged in teaching. This was before the Peace Corps became so active in hands-on development projects.

I built a volleyball court in my backyard with the assistance of Peace Corps volunteers who liberated some cement and poles to put the net up. Every Saturday and Sunday afternoon, the Peace Corps came over for volleyball. Whoever was in Maseru was welcome to come. I had taken up with a British girl at that time, so there was more of a social aspect to some aspects of life than professional.

Q: How did you find the embassy? How was it run?

CARNEY: There were only three Americans in the embassy itself: the chargé d'affaires, myself (I was also consul), and a secretary who was also a communicator. One of the things I had done in Washington was to acquire backup communication training on the HW28, a glorified telex. We had a receptionist who was very capable and a driver. I think there was a handyman and a driver as well. We were in an office building until we negotiated with the landlord of a number of our properties to build a chancery. We got the land allocated by the chief of Maseru itself and used a lease purchase agreement to acquire the building that is to this day the U.S. chancery in Maseru, Lesotho. We moved in there in late 1970. Assistant Secretary David Newsom came down as part of an Africa trip to dedicate the building. It was right next door to the house that was rented for me. The house next to me was the PAO. The one next to that was the secretary-communicator. So, we had sort of an American row on the main drag coming from the border point up into downtown Maseru.

Q: How did you find the place run?

CARNEY: The chargé d'affaires was very much old school. He basically let things run by indirection rather than active leadership. One of his predecessors had actually taken the job too seriously and had the secretary taking work home at night. That man and I subsequently had a conversation about 15 years later. We ran into each other in the cafeteria. In Maseru we had overlapped for a week. I had come from Saigon and almost laughed out loud at him when he asked if I had done something within an hour of his having asked me to do it. He had so clearly lost his sense of perspective and proportion. He seemed to recall that event. He said, "As I look back on Lesotho, I went over the top." That's not a direct quote, but sort of an implicit apology is how I took it and I think is how he meant it. I said, "Well, you should have seen what came after you." One of his predecessors wound up being relieved.

Q: What happened with his successor?

CARNEY: That man basically was sent to Lesotho, kind of put out to pasture, because he

had had problems with alcohol before. But the prime minister's coup, as he aborted the 1970 elections, caused a series of problems of violence in the country, and included the arrest of members of the opposition party, and some deaths. The extra stress ensured that he could not keep his drinking under control. He would have occasional episodes and these episodes unfortunately were at parties when he would, out of nowhere, seize on something another guest might say, and most intemperately verbally attack them. After a number of these, he wound up doing the same at the chancery with me. I just left the office, went back to my residence, at which the secretary-communicator shortly appeared, also shaken. We had a drink together, wondered what to do. I had pretty much decided what I was going to do when the chargé arrived. He apologized for whatever he *might* have done, which is the usual non-apology, and argued that if we were going to make any report, we should hold off because he was a sick man, not likely to last much longer. He left and I immediately called the administrative officer in Pretoria who had regional responsibility for the posts and followed with a letter. We got an inspector in three weeks who ultimately recommended that the man be relieved, but it took another 4 or 5 months.

Q: That's always the problem. This put a burden on you as a junior officer.

CARNEY: Fortunately, I had the Saigon tour. It was an enormous gyroscope. I suppose it built a reputation for me as able to handle a range of conflicts.

Q: Speaking of conflicts, with the coup business, were we getting any signs of interest from Washington about it?

CARNEY: There was a successful effort to moderate the policies of the new coup government. Chief Jonathan publicly said to "Time Magazine" in an article on Africa's "durable popinjays," "I've made a coup and I'm proud of it." But the chargé, who could be most effective, would go over, and in the most dispassionate manner point out alternatives and suggest behaviors that would preserve Lesotho's international position. Many times, that advice was on how to deal, for example, with unhappiness over Peace Corps volunteers who were reflecting the opinions of the people of the areas they were resident in, as to the illegality of the regime. I think it kept Chief Jonathan's government from excesses to which it would have given itself. There was also a deputy prime minister who was torturing people in his residence in downtown Maseru, screams coming out and what have you, and this was a matter of some concern as well, even in pre-human rights Washington.

Q: What about before and after the coup? You mentioned making demarches on UN votes? I would think Lesotho would be one of those countries where we could for modest support, financial or what have you, be up for grabs? Or did it vote with the African Union?

CARNEY: I think Lesotho generally voted with the OAU, but not so outrageously. Lesotho, with Taiwan resident, wasn't voting for Red Chinese UN membership, for example. Because it had that vote at the UN and the cable was a circular, I just went in and did it.

Q: This is a good place to stop. The one thing we haven't covered in South Africa watching

and reporting on.

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Today is July 11, 2002. You were in Lesotho. We didn't cover relations with South Africa.

CARNEY: We didn't, but that's probably alright because we did no reporting on South Africa itself from Lesotho. There was a bit of coverage of relations between the Lesotho and the Boer but nothing of great significance. It was an odd period in Lesotho when many senior civil service positions, and indeed the Chief Justice himself, were not only South Africans, but an Afrikaner. The Chief Justice apparently had no trouble justifying the state of emergency that Chief Jonathan declared on January 23, 1970 when he aborted the elections in mid-count and threw the opposition leadership into jail.

Q: So the justice system was sort of rigged to keep the ruling group in power?

CARNEY: I don't think it was calculated in the rigging. It was generic to the structure of the appeals and the high court that you would have South African civil servants in that. The police, by contrast, did not have South Africans in it. The Lesotho Mounted Police – there was no army at the time – essentially was officered by the British, funded by their ODA. It included officers with experience in Aden, one of the men whom I knew. They were the officers for the Lesotho Mounted Police.

Q: Have we pretty well covered Lesotho?

CARNEY: Yes.

Q: You left there in '71.

CARNEY: Yes, to study Cambodian. I had asked to study Chinese and was a bit disappointed in getting Cambodian. I had landed at the Phnom Penh airport on my way from Saigon to Bangkok at one point during my tour in Vietnam. I can recall being back here in Washington and a particular friend of mine, Stephen T. Johnson, who's the son of the late U. Alexis Johnson, invited me over to the Johnson's for dinner. I mentioned to U.A. Johnson that I had hoped to get Chinese. He said how fascinating he was sure that Cambodia would prove to be as a tour. And he was right.

Q: You took Cambodian for a year.

CARNEY: Ten months.

Q: Here at the Foreign Service Institute?

CARNEY: At its old location.

Q: What were you picking up before you went out there about Cambodia and the culture and how things were going from your teachers and just getting ready for it?

CARNEY: To start with, our actual presence there was enormously controversial. You'll recall Kent State when we invaded Cambodia.

Q: That was the spring of 1970.

CARNEY: Right. Your memory is better than mine.

Q: Well, I was in Seoul, so I can recall that.

CARNEY: The teachers were quite a good crew. One of them is a friend to this day. We were all at dinner at a mutual friend's house just 3 weeks ago. Kem Sos… Madeleine Ehrman was the linguist. It quickly became the sort of Gestapo interrogation style of language learning. I was the only student. I have a high aptitude and used it to try to push the learning of the language. An interesting language: Words are essentially one syllable unless they're borrowed from Pali and Sanskrit. No tones. But the alphabet – and thank God it has one – is based on a 4th century Indian script, so it's affectionately known as "worm tracks." The number of vowels and diphthongs are many more than exist in English, which causes a certain complication to us English speakers when we try to pronounce it correctly. But there were no surprises in the language. Once you get the alphabet down, the grammar is very straightforward and it's a question of building vocabulary. FSI hadn't yet learned that you've got to get students capable of reading or they're never going to build vocabulary, but that ultimately came.

The culture… There were no Cambodian restaurants and very few Cambodians in the U.S. in those days: Refugees from the Sihanouk period were people like my teachers for the most part. Very little was published on Cambodia in English at that time. I got a few books in French. A political memoir came out: Jean Claude Pomonti's *Courtesans aux Partisans*. But I don't think I got that until I got to Cambodia. Lots of gushy stuff existed from the Kennedy period, even from the '50s from the Eisenhower-Nixon period. I think Vice President Nixon visited Cambodia in the Eisenhower era. But nothing really gave me any clue as to what Cambodia was beyond the fact that Cambodians built Angkor Wat, which is to this day one of the wonders of the world, the largest single religious structure on the planet.

Q: Were you able to visit or did they make arrangements to talk to some of our people who were coming out of there on leave or something like that?

CARNEY: The problem was that we had broken relations with Cambodia in about 1964. The Aussies ensured our interests. There were no resident official Americans until about 1969 or '70 even. So there wasn't anybody. Frank Tatu was the desk officer. Frank was a wonderful, very particular Foreign Service officer, clearly has his own drummer and his own fifer. He had gotten so interested in Cambodia he had actually done a "Chronology of

Developments Affecting Cambodia" on the country dating back to the Funan period in the 3rd or 4th century AD. I eventually updated it, since I thought it was so worthwhile, when I finished my tour there.

Q: You were there from '72 to when?

CARNEY: To the day a battalion landing team of the U.S. Marines from the USS Okinawa removed the Embassy staff April 12, 1975.

Q: When you arrived there, you were really the new boy on the block. I think the view of somebody who has just arrived is different than somebody who's an old hand and comes back. What was your observation when you got there?

CARNEY: I got there late April 1972, which is the beginning of the rainy season. It's the same monsoon that India has. I was to replace Don Jameson. Don stayed, which was good because that meant there were two language officers in the political section. The embassy was very complicated in its structure. There was a huge military equipment delivery team (MEDT) with a brigadier general in charge, the late John R.D. Cleland, who had his own particular view of the way things should be run. Emory Coblentz Swank was the ambassador, who left in '72.

I got to town and my quarters were not ready. I was going to a house that Elena Adesso, the Ambassador's secretary, had had. (If Elena's around, her service is so rich that she would be extremely valuable for this program.) But the house wasn't quite ready, so I was put in the hotel that had been known as the Royale. The times were somewhat eviler, and it was now known as the Phnom, after the nearby small hillock after which the capital is named, because we had a republic instead of a monarchy. But it was the massive walls, that yellow color of colonial French official structures that had persisted into the independent Kingdom of Cambodia: Ceiling fans, air conditioners that sometimes worked. I went up there.

Either the first or the second night, I had met a journalist from the *Domneung Peel Prik*, which means "Morning's News." It's a little more impressive in Khmer than the translation. I'm sure I could give you a more elegant translation. It was the late Ly Eng, who was at that time having an affair with one of the foreign correspondents there, whose name I won't mention. No need for posterity. We had talked a little bit. His English was better than my Khmer, so we basically spoke in English. (I would often feign to speak no French to ensure the conversation proceeded in Khmer.) I went up to bed the second night. It could even have been the third night. But having been in Saigon before, and knowing that Phnom Penh was subject to being rocketed, I also knew enough to keep an outfit at the side of the bed so that I could immediately get into it in case I had to go downstairs and take shelter from rocket fire. Sure enough, 122 millimeter rockets began coming in. I rolled out of bed, dressed in my black knit outfit and dark trousers, slipped a handgun into my belt under my outfit, and went downstairs.

Equally surely enough, Ly Eng was there and he said, "I've heard that there have been some

people killed near the railway station which is quite close to the hotel. Let's go see what's going on." He and I went out. I think we were in a car rather than on his motor scooter, but I don't remember. Sure enough, this little kid had been chopped up by a chunk of casing from this 122mm rocket, and was dead with his mother disconsolate. Ly Eng asked some questions, a working journalist. Then we heard a lot of automatic weapons fire from further south towards the suburb of Takhmau, and we drove down there to see what was going on. We were stopped at a checkpoint. There was a Cambodian general officer. I was able to follow part of the discussion in Khmer. I had gotten a 2+ rating in speaking when I finished the language course. But I had enough to be able to follow part of the discussion. (Even with a 3 or often a 3+, it's very hard to follow a discussion in which everybody is jumping in and ideas are half expressed and seized on. You need basically a 4 or even a 4+ in any language to do that.) But I got enough to know that there was a serious firefight going on further south and it would be dangerous to go further. We did not. We went back.

Of course, I was introduced to the country team the next morning and reported all of this to the astonishment and horror of Swank and the late Tom Enders, then DCM, but not to my boss, William Harben. But one didn't do that. You weren't supposed to put yourself at risk, which struck me as a very bizarre way to do foreign affairs reporting in a war. You have to get out, meet people, and be out of the embassy as much as you possibly could. That started the tour in Phnom Penh.

Q: Why don't we describe the embassy? The ambassador was Coby Swank. How did he operate? What was your impression of him?

CARNEY: He was extremely personable and engaging but he was the ambassador. There was a huge distance between a second secretary, an FSO-6, and basically I didn't see much of the ambassador or of the DCM for that matter … except I can remember one particular time… Cambodian internal politics was a matter of despair for Washington. Basically, we were regularly ordered not to report on aspects of Cambodian internal politics because it made life too difficult for people running the policy in Washington. It was an early reinforcement of my lesson from Vietnam not to let Washington tell the embassy what it could and couldn't report. The corruption of the Foreign Service reporting process was well accelerated in Cambodia. This was the case and Tom Enders lent himself to that.

I was the duty officer one night and in those days the duty officers slept overnight in the chancery. The newspapers come out at night to be read in the morning, the Cambodian press. I was reading a couple of the Cambodian papers. This was 6 weeks or so after the presidential election which was structured. "Free and fair" would be unlikely words to put to it. Lon Nol was of course elected president. He and one of the 3 or 4 people who had made the coup with him… This was Sisowath Sirik Matak, from one of the minor branches of the Cambodian royal family. Monarchs in Cambodia have alternated from the 1840s or '50s from the Norodom branch of the family, of which the present king, Sihanouk, is a member, to the Sisowath branch of the family. Sirik Matak never had a chance to be king, but he was in the Sisowath branch. The French had bypassed his uncle in 1941 because his uncle was a graduate of the French military academy and far less tractable. The French

decided to their cost that 19 year old Norodom Sihanouk was infinitely more tractable, so Sihanouk became king in 1941 at age 19.

But Sirik Matak was so annoyed at the result of the way the presidential election was run and counted that he announced that he had "withdrawn confidence" in the government of Lon Nol. I looked at that and said, "That can't be right." I got my dictionaries out. A Cambodian-speaking Soviet diplomat, Igor Kossikoff by name, and I had come to know each other, which was extraordinary in those days. He actually gave me a copy of the 1933 French-Cambodian dictionary, 2 volumes. I was looking words up. I had to be absolutely sure I had it right. That's a pretty significant development: One of the people who had engineered the overthrow of Sihanouk withdrew confidence in the ongoing government of the country!

So I wrote it up and then I typed a cable. Even in those days I had figured out that you could not be at the mercy of secretaries and communicators. I had already learned in Lesotho how to run an HW28, which was then the one time tape code machine of State Department small embassy choice, and I knew how to do the green telegram forms and typed the cable up. It was on the political counselor's desk in the morning. I had gone home to have breakfast and shave and shower and what have you. I got back to the office and went up to the DCM's office – he had it by then, Bill Harben having signed off on it – and he said, "Is your translation correct? Did he really say this?" I said, "Here's the paper and the translation is correct." He just shook his head. It wasn't in that context but a later, similar one that Tom Enders said, "What a bunch of losers." Of course, they did lose.

Q: Tom Enders was the DCM. He was a major figure. How was he both as an intellect and a powerful personality? How did you find him at that time?

CARNEY: The intellect was real. Definitely smart and always looking at an issue to see whether it was real and what could be done about it if it wasn't going in a direction that would serve U.S. interests. What he didn't have was the sense of when things were going so badly that we had to try to get Washington to focus and change policy. It was always trying to do something, rather than to recognize and to make the judgment that things weren't possible and we had to do something else. That is a weakness of our service. If you only spend 2 or 3 years in a place, you can always think that you can hold it together until you leave.

Q: I think you're pointing to a real problem. Tom Enders, this was his only excursion into Asia. He later was in charge of Latin American policy.

Did you feel there was a division between the ambassador wanting not to over report on the complications of the situation which would imply the weakness of the Cambodian government which we were supporting and Tom Enders and the political section that said, "This is important stuff?"

CARNEY: Far from it. Enders was, if anything, even more willing to accept strictures on

reporting.

Q: Were you and Don Jameson chafing at the bit wanting to get things out?

CARNEY: It was the political counselor, Bill Harben, who was chafing. This was before the dissent channel was established and there just didn't seem to be any way to deal with this problem at least at my level of seniority.

Q: Often there is a way. Some places nobody ever goes to, but I imagine that Cambodia was pretty much on the circuit of people coming out to Vietnam to see what the hell was going on.

CARNEY: You know, it really wasn't. We had at various times Vice President Agnew, Governor Connelly, and only one CODEL with Bella Abzug on it.

Q: She was such a…

CARNEY: Elemental force?

Q: Elemental force with her polka dot hat and all. But also she was easy to dismiss, wasn't she?

CARNEY: I think that's basically it.

Q: She was opposed to the war.

CARNEY: Opposed to the policy.

Q: So whatever came out of there wouldn't be considered a considered report.

CARNEY: Yes, but ultimately all of that added up to an end to funding in the effort in Cambodia, which caused us to evacuate and the Khmer Rouge to take over.

Q: Was there any visit by the Senate team of Lowenstein and Moose?

CARNEY: I don't remember one when I was there. But just before I got there… It might have been Moose and the late Chuck Meissner who visited when I was there. But there was a Lowenstein and Moose visit before I got there where the journalists had them out to a restaurant called the Tavern just opposite the post office, very close to the Mekong river and fed them that wonderful Cambodian delicacy known as "somlaa kancha," which is marijuana chicken soup. It immobilized them for 24 hours.

Q: Marijuana is mixed in with it?

CARNEY: It's cooked with marijuana leaves.

Q: Were you getting desk officers, others, coming?

CARNEY: I don't recall a large number. Of course there weren't very many visitors because there was a "head space" problem. There was a decree, I think from the Congress, that there be no more than 200 official Americans in Cambodia at any given time. So whenever we had anybody come in, people would have to go out. It got complicated.

Q: The Embassy used a commuter plane, didn't it?

It would come in in the morning with military on board to take care of supply matters or something.

CARNEY: We had all of that. And then it would leave.

Q: What was our relation from your perspective to the Lon Nol government when you arrived?

CARNEY: Basically the leadership of the mission was always over giving advice and suggestions on how to do things. The military mission was trying to upgrade the capacity and to prevent the Force Armée Nationale Khmere [FANK] from embarking on adventures that cost it dear when it tried to use its enthusiasm to kick the Vietnamese out of the country, lacking the command and control and tactical skills or even basic training to be able to do so. They just simply got waxed in Operations Chen La I and Chen La II.

In the meantime, behind the Vietnamese shield, the Khmer Rouge were building up their capability. By '73, the insurgent effort was very heavily, if not entirely, Khmer Rouge against the government.

Q: Were the politics centered on personal wrangling? Was it a sense of nationality?

CARNEY: It was personal wrangling in Phnom Penh, who was up and who was down, who could pay the cost of an air conditioner to get an audience with Lon Nol's wife, for example, and what would happen if you did get such an audience? Could you get a job? How much would you have to pay if you became governor of such and such a province? That sort of thing.

Corruption was a major issue. A number of us more junior people decided that one of the areas that we had to focus on, an area totally unacceptable, was what we called the "traffic in jeeps," U.S. provided M151, A1, and A2 U.S. military jeeps that became civilian registered and were driving all about Phnom Penh with people's wives, mistresses, and children. We actually did a list… People started taking license numbers down. There were 4 or 5 of us who did this, including one or two of the military attaches. We did an airgram with all the jeeps we could find civilian listings were matched against the registration numbers at the Department of Motor Vehicles, and the source of origin insofar as we could

determine it from the engine number. This outraged the MEDTC chief, the late General Cleland, whose classic comment that will live forever was, "GAO can make a case against us on this." (end of tape)

Q: You were mentioning that General Cleland had his own particular view. What was that?

CARNEY: That was, "I've got my marching orders. I'm going to effect them. I'm going to build these people up to defend themselves and go for it."

Q: Were you seeing that these efforts were getting diverted?

CARNEY: Of course. As in almost any organization, there were plenty of people who do not have, or do not see, a vested personal interest in making something happen that can't, and can judge things rather more dispassionately and accurately. Some of his staff were that way.

Q: But the program went on?

CARNEY: Of course.

Q: You had served in Vietnam and now you were in Cambodia. Did you feel that the political wrangling and the corruption were worse or equal to what you had seen in Vietnam?

CARNEY: I didn't make any comparisons. It didn't seem to serve anything. What was clear was, one effect of the corruption was that it was so widespread and so well known that it was sapping popular confidence in the Lon Nol government and in popular will to resist, all the more so because Sihanouk for all of his faults had been accepted as monarch and more to the point, Sihanouk had by May of '70, two months after the coup, become the leading figure in the resistance. The Khmer Rouge used him as their drawing card.

Q: Wasn't he in Beijing?

CARNEY: Yes. He had been on a trip abroad to Moscow and on the way back the coup took place. He landed in Beijing and stayed there.

Q: Was the thrust of our embassy at the top that we were going to make this government work and let's try to make it sound good?

CARNEY: Absolutely.

Q: Did we have anything like looking in the provinces?

CARNEY: Ultimately, the CIA put some people upcountry but that didn't happen until '74

and they did not speak Cambodian.

Q: The CIA had been the precipitating cause of Sihanouk throwing us out, hadn't it?

CARNEY: I'm not sure. There had been a number of problems when operations were uncovered in earlier years, the name Victor Matsui is in the press in the 50s or 60s. Our support for Diem in Vietnam was a proximate cause, as I recall.

Q: Who else was in the embassy, some of the reporting officers?

CARNEY: Some? Don Jameson – Peter Collins replaced him. On the economic side, that section was joint with AID, so it was a different approach to reporting. Bruno Kosheleff was there in that section. Also there was an economist who was looking at larger aspects, Phil Berlin. I can't remember whether he was macro or micro. There were a couple of assistant military attachés who were pretty good: Allen Armstrong was one of them; Mark Berent was the assistant air attaché. Then the station was relatively small. It had 2 good reporting officers on the clandestine services side. One clandestine services officer was very smart, but simply couldn't recruit agents, which must make you wonder why you're in the CIA.

Q: What about USIA? Were we doing much there?

CARNEY: It was inadequately covered. None of the journalists held any candle, much less any respect, for U.S. policy or what the embassy had to say about events.

Q: Was the press relatively free?

CARNEY: The Cambodian press was rambunctious and relatively free, very scatological and earthy in its metaphor and editorial cartoons.

Q: When you arrived, how was the military system of the Khmer Rouge judged?

CARNEY: For a long time, far past the reality, the Khmer Rouge were regarded as the mere auxiliary of the Vietnamese forces. My view of it was signally limited because I did not have an SI [signals intelligence] clearance. I was never shown that material. That suddenly became clear to me one day when Tom Enders came down and said, "The prime minister has given me this. It looks kind of interesting. See what you can do and maybe report on it." I took a look at it - this was in '73. It was two long interviews by the Cambodian services of individuals who had been teachers and who had gone to the Khmer Rouge after the coup late in 1970, if not in '71, and had subsequently rallied to the government. Basically, these documents had who the Khmer Rouge were: The Communist Party of Kampuchea. It had individuals who were in it, their names - these were people who had disappeared from Phnom Penh into the bush - their revolutionary names or aliases.

I translated it. Fortunately, the interviews were in French so I could easily translate it.

Translating Khmer at that point would have been damn near impossible for me. I sent it around for clearance. I did it as an airgram. It should have been a telegram. The NSA representative to the embassy came down and said, "You've got to get this out right now." I couldn't figure it out. Finally it dawned on me: the intercepts, all the radio stuff, had the revolutionary names of these people rather than their real names and this made the connection between a revolutionary name and an individual. A very significant intelligence coup. So, we got that out. One of those people subsequently published a book which came out in late '74 called "Sranaoh Proloeung Khmer," which I translated as "Regrets for the Khmer Soul" and others have translated "Regrets of a Khmer Soul." I suspect the latter is a better translation. He, by the way, survived the Khmer rouge, wound up working for the CIA on the Thai-Cambodian border in 1979 or 80, and is now here in the U.S.

Q: Amazing. Were we getting reports that the Khmer Rouge was really something different?

CARNEY: We were getting reports because my predecessor, Andy Antippas, was hearing reports that in 1954 after the Geneva Accords, a number of the Cambodian revolutionaries, who were not given any status as a result of the Accords – Sihanouk wouldn't have it – those people boarded Polish ships and went to North Vietnam. There were a few thousand of them. Those people began reinfiltrating after the coup. By '72 or so, some of them were being executed or they would disappear. Clearly the indigenous Cambodian communist movement decided that these were the thin edge of a pro-Vietnamese wedge and were purging them. That ultimately led, after the Khmer Rouge victory, in about 1976, to the establishment of the torture/execution center at the Toul Sleng High School through which roughly 18,000 cadre were interrogated, tortured, and executed in the Khmer Rouge period.

Q: Was there anything in the Khmer character that would lend it to this type of thing? Or was this sort of an import of French intellectuals, nonsense carried to the nth degree?

CARNEY: The Cambodian communist movement has basically 3 strains. One of them is Vietnamese. Essentially it was the Vietnamese who brought communism to Cambodia. The second strain comes from a group of younger Cambodians who went off to France to study in the late '40s. The late Pol Pot himself - his real name is Saloth Sar – got a scholarship and went off to study radio electronics. He was even in Yugoslavia building agricultural projects at one point and doing Socialist International duties. The third strain is completely indigenous. The deputy secretary of the communist party of Kampuchea's standing committee, is Nuon Chea, although did get some education outside of Cambodia, in Bangkok at one of the universities there – it might have been Thammasat University. So you had those 3 strains in the party.

Marxism must have seemed attractive if you were not a royalist. Then the idea of Leninism, that there would be a party with a leading role in the revolution, was even more attractive because it meant they were the leading role, were in charge. And so the Cambodian communist party was definitely Marxist-Leninist. You have to throw Lenin in there because that's how you do your leadership.

To answer your question specifically, there is no more or less in the Cambodian character that lends itself to that kind of nonsense than there is in anybody else's character, including our own.

Q: The ruthlessness with which this was carried out – you might say the extreme logic – just seems to be excessive.

CARNEY: It's, in fact, no different than Stalin or Mao or Idi Amin or Hitler. It was less systematic. There is a book in the process of being done now by an American academic whom I first met when he was just becoming a graduate student – he was in Cambodia – Stephen Heder. Steve stayed with us the first 3 or 4 months of this year (2003) while he had a fellowship at the Holocaust Museum. His studies are pretty convincing in showing that, however bad the Khmer Rouge were, they were nowhere near as systematic as the Nazis, that defining an out group initially caused a lot of slaughter, and a lot of it was revenge for roles taken during the civil war, but you just didn't have that machine that the Nazis built. Maybe it was because the Nazis had to operate on a larger scale. Cambodia never had more than 8 million people or so.

Q: And it didn't have the infrastructure.

CARNEY: Right.

Q: Were you seeing a growing sense of foreboding, people looking over their shoulder or seeing this thing as being inevitable?

CARNEY: No, there was growing apathy. My own view was mistaken. It was that the Khmer Rouge are going to win. There is certainly no stomach in America for continuing to pour money into Cambodia, much less Vietnam. Yes, there are going to be executions. Unless they get out, we're talking a few thousand people who will be chopped. And then Cambodia will more or less be Cambodian. Certainly it will be on the left side. But I never envisaged the scale of what the Khmer Rouge did, beginning with the evacuation of the cities.

Q: One of the mistakes that we made in evaluating Vietnam was that we saw somehow the Chinese and the Vietnamese being together like lips and teeth.

CARNEY: Utter nonsense. The Vietnamese had a much greater role in creating and sustaining the Khmer Rouge than was initially… Initially they were believed to be totally in control. That was not the case. But the role was infinitely greater - Steve Header's book is going to document that – for an infinitely longer time than anyone can imagine. For example, I had incredible difficulty when I was at Cornell after leaving Cambodia – I had a State Dept.-funded academic year – and I did a monograph, a Data Paper in the series of the Southeast Asia program, "Communist Party Power in Kampuchea." It included an introduction to the party and what we knew about it and the translations of some documents,

part of Ith Sarin, and "A Short Guide to Party Statutes," that was a captured document I managed to find, and a number of issues of the Cambodian youth publication "Revolutionary Young Men and Women." I had an incredibly difficult time translating it. I had Kem Sos help me and he couldn't make head or tail of it, largely it was because the terms were taken from Vietnamese. The intellectual capital of communism came through the Vietnamese. It just didn't make any sense in Cambodian.

Q: I spent 5 years in Yugoslavia and an awful lot of stuff that came out of that part of the communist world didn't really make sense. I mean, a lot of jargon.

CARNEY: Exactly. But they had used it by the time you got there, and it was in currency. This was all stuff that never existed in the language before. My Khmer at that time was maybe 3+/3+, 3+/4. I thought it was me until I got hold of Sos and then a separate translator. They couldn't make head or tail out of it either.

Q: Was there the feeling that the Cambodians would essentially reject the Vietnamese?

CARNEY: There was no doubt.

Q: But was there a feeling that the Vietnamese… You had a lot of North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, didn't you?

CARNEY: No, there were relatively fewer Vietnamese troops in Cambodia at that point. There might have been in the highlands on the southern edge of the trail, but not as far across as they had been during the Sihanouk period, nor when they were destroying elements of Lon Nol's forces.

Q: Was there a general feeling that if they succeeded in overthrowing the South Vietnamese government that they would hack out quite a bit of Cambodia?

CARNEY: The longstanding Vietnamese desire dating back certainly to the 19th century was to make Cambodia and Laos fiefdoms. Indeed, the Vietnamese tried to do that in the mid-early 19th century, including insisting that Cambodian royalty wear Vietnamese court dress and dress their hair Vietnamese style. If you look at the position of Cambodia, the essential geopolitical reality was that Cambodia was a football between Vietnam and Thailand. The Thais ultimately ended Vietnam's dominant position in Cambodia in the 19th century. Then the Cambodians fled to the French for protection in 1863 with King Norodom.

The Vietnamese in the modern political era, the 20th century, decided they wanted to create an Indochinese federation of communist states. That was the goal they had in creating and supporting the Cambodian communist party in 1950 or '51. The strategic belief was that if the Vietnamese got control of Laos and Cambodia, Thailand would be threatened because there is a major invasion route between Cambodia and Thailand at the town of Aranyaprathet, which is a geographical area that is flat and is ideal cavalry country.

Historically, the Cambodians invaded through that Watana Gap when they gained suzerainty over what is now modern Thailand. It's perfect tank country in the modern period. The Vietnamese are known to enjoy tank warfare. So, for larger strategic reasons, blunting those Vietnamese objectives was in U.S. interests.

Q: Were the French playing any role while you were there?

CARNEY: The French indeed had an embassy, but they were not particularly active, certainly not in support of Lon Nol. Their embassy ultimately was the refuge for what was in the international community after the Khmer Rouge came into the city on April 15.

Q: I'm always interested in capturing the impression of the officers at your rank going out and doing the reporting, learning the language and all, the foot soldier in our diplomacy. What was your impression and that of your colleagues of Lon Nol and his government?

CARNEY: It was clearly not going anywhere. Incompetent. Corrupt. Lon Nol himself was a Cambodian mystic of very little popularity, and less leadership. Clearly it couldn't come out right. It was so obvious that I came to be puzzled as to what Washington could be thinking about the U.S. role in Cambodia, however much the Cambodians merited being free of Sihanouk and of the Vietnamese.

Q: What was the residue of feeling about Sihanouk within the embassy? They hadn't been there during his time.

CARNEY: There wasn't any question that Sihanouk's dead hand on Cambodian politics had led to the then current impasse. He would buy people off or have them exiled or even killed so that he could stay in charge.

Q: So there was no feeling that he was a white knight or anything like that?

CARNEY: The feeling, which Swank's ultimate successor, John Gunther Dean, came to was that Sihanouk was an element of the solution. As flawed as he was, he was the only possible way the U.S. could get out and try to ensure that there was a brake on a communist victory.

Q: You were there when John Gunther Dean came in?

CARNEY: Yes.

Q: I've had some interviews with him when he comes in from Paris. Was there a difference?

CARNEY: Complete and total difference in the way he did things. He was interested in learning as much as he could about all the disparate elements of Cambodian society. I put him together with youth and student leaders and with some monks at one point basically to

help give him as broad a view of Cambodian society as he could possibly get.

Q: What was the result of this?

CARNEY: I think it helped him form his view of the need to move quickly towards some kind of negotiated solution, a controlled solution, as he has publicly put it.

Q: What was happening? Did you feel the play was mainly in Washington?

CARNEY: Yes, no question.

Q: The play was both in Washington and Vietnam centered?

CARNEY: Yes. In fact, I have a good friend who is an English journalist, William Shawcross, who visited me at Cornell in that period after the war, and we discussed that very issue and decided the word "sideshow" was adequate to describe the view of Cambodia.

Q: What book did he write?

CARNEY: "Sideshow: Nixon-Kissinger and the Destruction of Cambodia."

Q: In a way, were we that much of a player in Cambodia? From what you're saying, you have an incompetent government and a military that was also incompetent.

CARNEY: Let me add here this isn't to say there weren't some good soldiers who were good; some leaders paying their troops, doing the job, and seriously fighting. There were plenty of those. But on the whole the national leadership and the military leadership were both corrupt and incompetent. It is the usual contradiction, to borrow the Marxist word, of the situation.

Q: What could we have done about it anyway? In some ways I often feel that we absorb all the sins of whatever happens on ourselves. If the South Vietnamese couldn't make it and the Cambodians couldn't make it, it's our fault. How do you feel about that?

CARNEY: I don't think it's as stark as that. The elements that are there include our unwillingness to analyze those situations before we jump in with both feet. That is certainly the case in the Cambodian situation. But we were surprised by it. Sihanouk was doing what we wanted and he was giving us the information on where the Vietnamese were. We were hitting them. Then he'd shout and scream in the press. But we were getting what we wanted out of it. We were surprised when the coup took place, there isn't any doubt about that. I've always believed that that was an action by Lon Nol and his people that had nothing to do with the U.S. We might have known about it at certain levels that there was something coming but-

Q: We weren't even in the country in those days.

CARNEY: Well, we were close enough to people doing the coup. We likely had a heads up at the intermediate level.

Then the first thing we did was transfer some weapons to Lon Nol's coup government from captured stocks in Vietnam. Then Sihanouk went on the air and basically called for the Cambodian equivalent of a jihad against Lon Nol and his people with Chinese and Vietnamese support. The Soviets had an embassy in Phnom Penh, but they were basically encouraging the Khmer Rouge, too. It unraveled. Kissinger has an interesting comment. He said, "Sometimes you just have to pick the least bad option as you see it at the time." I think that's where you're going. There is a whole lot of truth to it. At no point did we ever step back and look at Cambodia and weigh it and say, "This situation would be better resolved if we went to the Chinese and Sihanouk and the Vietnamese and said, 'How can we best restore peace in Cambodia?'" It was never an option.

Q: I'm trying to capture your observation at the time. Was there any way to extract Cambodia from what was happening in Vietnam?

CARNEY: I didn't see it.

Q: I found it very difficult. If nothing else, it was a supply channel. You couldn't take them out and put a cordon sanitaire around Cambodia.

CARNEY: All the more so because Sihanouk, in fact, had effectively ended that supply role.

Q: The Chinese probably didn't have any representation there, or did they?

CARNEY: I think the Chinese embassy had been closed. The Soviets were there.

Q: How did the thing unravel? What was happening to you? Talk about the ambassador.

CARNEY: It unraveled because the Khmer Rouge gained in size and strength and competency. They began seizing government artillery units and pieces and began shelling Phnom Penh with artillery as well as rockets. A 107 millimeter rocket has a 5-7 kilometer range, which is pretty close. Your 105 millimeter artillery piece has got an 11 mile…

Q: There was that period when supplies were coming up the Mekong.

CARNEY: And they closed that off in early 1975. And then we tried an airlift, 700 tons a day by air in those days with the cargo craft we had. It cost too much.

Q: When did you see the end?

CARNEY: When we ended the aerial bombing of Indochina in 1973.

Q: It was the B52s that were…

CARNEY: They could do quite a number on a 1 by 3 kilometer stretch of territory. No stone would be on top of another there as a result of such an attack.

Q: That was in '73 that we ended that?

CARNEY: Right. August sticks in my mind.

Q: Were you packing up the silver?

CARNEY: Let's say I moved some of my effects out in early '75. My ex-wife and daughter - I got married in Cambodia – stayed until early '75.

Q: Where did you meet your wife?

CARNEY: A cocktail party in Phnom Penh. She's Cambodian.

Q: What's her background?

CARNEY: Teacher. Her father had been a district chief, which was an appointed position from the central government rather than elected. Her late brother had been extremely active and close to Lon Nol's brother, Lon Non, and the 2 of them were working with the CIA early on.

Q: You were married in Phnom Penh?

CARNEY: Exactly. In '73.

Q: As a political officer, I can't think of a better source of getting a feeling about… What were you getting from your wife? Was she getting more and more nervous?

CARNEY: No, she wasn't. She was part of the Cambodian elite that was glad Sihanouk was gone, didn't have any respect for Lon Nol, much closer to Sihanouk's cousin, Sisowath Sirik Matak and that royalist side, although she was also close to some of the military wives. I never really got serious political views from her on where the country ought to go and what the prospects were.

Q: Particularly when shells came in…

CARNEY: '75, that last 4 months… It was New Year's Eve of '75 that the Khmer Rouge began a major set of attacks around Phnom Penh city. Then every week was further downhill, including closing the Mekong and what have you.

Q: What was the embassy doing at this point?

CARNEY: Dean was trying to get Kissinger to start talks with no success. I'm sure he's gone into that in some detail. I was talking to my contacts, including senior Buddhist monks. It just was clear that there wasn't any way out.

Q: With these aircraft coming in with supplies, were we trying to get people out?

CARNEY: Not until March. We drew the embassy American staff down the end of March and then we started moving Cambodians out that were associated with us.

Q: How about your wife and child?

CARNEY: They had gone earlier. I sent them off in February.

Q: Was there a time when you saw that this was going to be it?

CARNEY: It would have been sometime around February or March of '75. I was supposed to be shipped out with the rest of the non-essential staff. I went to the DCM, Bob Keely, or maybe the political counselor, Ray Perkins, and I said, "Look, it doesn't make any sense not to have a Cambodian speaker here. It would be a good idea if I stayed." He said, "So you want to stay?" I said, "Yes." He said, "Let me talk to the ambassador." So I stayed.

Q: Was it an embassy that was… One thinks of what happened in Saigon with our ambassador there who was living in a wonderland almost and was not making the proper preparations.

CARNEY: Not the case in Cambodia. Keely had to go out because he had a bleeding ulcer but he came back. He and Dean were looking at making sure that the people who should got out with us, that everything was properly destroyed. In fact, I can remember the day we choppered out, April 12. The political counselor and I drove to the prime minister's house and there was a cabinet meeting in session. Long Boret was prime minister. He had already been called because we were offering places for all the Cambodian cabinet and their families. Nope. Only one went with us: the minister of youth and sports and his wife and one or 2 kids.

Q: They thought they could make a deal?

CARNEY: To this day, I'm not sure I know what they thought. They had their own plans ready. They had helicopters positioned in the Olympic stadium to fly to Thailand if they couldn't make a deal. In fact, they used them except Boret didn't make the helicopters and was executed.

Q: Were horror stories coming in about the Khmer Rouge?

CARNEY: Ken Quinn did a wonderful airgram from Vietnam in ’73 about what Khmer Rouge rule was like when they began taking over parts of the countryside in southeastern Cambodia near the border. It was prophetic, but at the same time when you read that and when you heard the horror stories you could argue that these were the exigencies to which the movement was forced due to B52 targeting, due to the difficulties of mobilizing the countryside to fight Phnom Penh, which is the way I looked at it. In fact, it prefigured what they were going to do when they were in charge. They basically decided to empty Phnom Penh because they didn’t want any networks left in place or any focal points for civil disturbance.

Q: Were units of the Lon Nol government army going over to the Khmer Rouge?

CARNEY: No.

Q: What was happening the last day or 2? What did you do?

CARNEY: I think I had some people over the night before, let some of my in-laws know… I told them to come and pick whatever they wanted up from the house, the storeroom, which they did the next day. I had some journalists over. We finished the champagne. I think I dropped by and gave some money to the usual people, the tennis trainers at the Cercle Sportif, without… Well, everybody knew we were going. It was very much an open secret by then.

Q: What about your wife’s family?

CARNEY: Some of them decided to go. None of them asked me for space on the U.S. airlift, interestingly enough. Like so many Cambodians, they figured that they were small enough fish that they would survive.

Q: And then what happened?

CARNEY: They didn’t. Well, her father didn’t, nor did her mother. All of her sisters and brothers but one wound up on the Thai-Cambodian border, where I found them in ’79 and took them to the refugee camp inside Thailand that the UN was running. Many of them are here. Others are in Canada.

Q: You went off in a helicopter. How did that work?

CARNEY: Marines came in from the USS Okinawa, a battalion landing team, to secure the airfield, which was a field not too far from the embassy near some civil servant housing. When we finished off the last destruction - everybody had at most a file drawer with a couple inches – we got all of our telephone locator pads, remembered to throw those away, too, and they were burned, took the flag down, tried to get the shield down but couldn’t do it, it was too firmly in, so we left the shield. Dean got the flag. I did some pictures

eventually printed with the story in the Department of State *Newsletter* about a month or 2 later, including one of Dean with the flag. We piled into vehicles and drove up to the field and boarded the CH53s and went off to the Okinawa, which then steamed for Thailand. We got off at Utapao the next morning.

Q: Then what did you do?

CARNEY: I stayed in Bangkok for a couple of months processing Cambodians out of the consular section. It was wild and wooly.

Q: While you were there, was this when the reports came in about what the Khmer Rouge…

CARNEY: Not yet, although just before I left Thailand to go off to Cornell for my academic year, a refugee, Sin Mao, appeared at the consulate. I was brought in… He had been in the United States, and had gone back to try to get his family out, which he did. They walked out. I sat down with him and said, "Okay, what happened?" He gave me chapter and verse. I did a cable on it which included the evacuation of Phnom Penh, the fact that there were checkpoints at least on the route he took-

Q: You're talking about the- (end of tape)

You were talking to this Cambodian who said the Khmer Rouge had ordered the complete evacuation of Phnom Penh.

CARNEY: What they had said was that "You can go back to your native village." So, if you were an ethnic Cambodian, you almost surely had at least your grandparents from a particular native village. This particular refugee figured it out, and he said that his particular native village was in the far northwest of the country near the Thai border. He was moved out of town north across the Mekong in the direction of Kompong Cham. It was there at a ferry point that the Khmer Rouge gave little half sheets of paper that had mimeographed fill-in-the-blank portions on it. In the upper left hand corner was a rather interesting logo. In Cambodian, it read something that roughly translates, "Exodus Reception Committee." You filled out what your name was, who was with you, and where you were going. That was your pass to get to the villages. That was Khmer Rouge policy to take the new people from the cities and to deposit them in the village and to build or forge them into a modern Cambodian communist man or woman. Well, this fellow was aware that it was at that point that former military were separated out and he assumed executed. He carried on and heard several other stories of these executions and got out. That was the first solid report on what was happening with the people after the Khmer Rouge victory. It was several months later when you began to get more refugees coming to Thailand talking about all the horrors that we now know.

Q: When you got to Thailand, what was our policy towards Cambodian refugees?

CARNEY: It was in flux. It was basically… We weren't quite sure what to do, so we put them all in a camp. You heard about former employees, people who were coming over, government officials who made it out in their helicopter lift, people who came in by boat from the seacoast of Cambodia, and then people started making their way across the border. Then you had the refugee lift with the initial wave and then we began – and I was out of it at that point, out of direct contact with it – then we established our refugee policies, who was a refugee and who wasn't and that sort of thing.

Q: You left Cambodia when?

CARNEY: April 12th with the evacuation of the embassy.

Q: When did we leave Saigon?

CARNEY: April 30th.

Q: So it was all one in the same.

CARNEY: It was all of a piece.

Q: So were the Cambodians moved into the Saigon evacuation?

CARNEY: No, it was separate and stayed separate. I think Cambodians were ultimately moved from Utapao to Guam.

Q: You went to Cornell.

CARNEY: I went to Cornell. It was rather interesting because that was a hotbed of the anti-war movement.

Q: I've had people who served in Indonesia spit when they say the name Cornell.

CARNEY: That's because of George McT. Kahin and Benedict R. O'G Anderson and a whole bunch of people whose hearts were believed to be on their sleeves for the communists.

Q: Was this Cornell assignment… We had an awful lot of people coming out of Vietnam…

CARNEY: Oh, no, this had been made before.

Q: So this was a regular assignment.

CARNEY: Yes. University training in Southeast Asian studies.

Q: Let's talk about Cornell at that time. This must have been very interesting.

CARNEY: It was. Early on I gave a lecture to the Southeast Asia crowd. You had had two Cornell turkeys, D. Gareth Porter and George Hildebrand, who had quickly written a book called *Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution* arguing that the Khmer Rouge had evacuated the cities to take the people to the food. It was such a piece of nonsense, but it was warmly welcomed in the conclusions and logic embraced by all of these people who had no judgment, much less any history related to Cambodia. It began to become increasingly clear by the end of 1975 that something was wrong in Cambodia.

I decided that for the second semester I would do a monograph as part of the modern Southeast Asia history course I took under Prof. David Wyatt. I can't tell you how many hours I put in on it. It's unreal. I'd do my classes, and then I'd go in and wrestle with these translations and then do the library research to get a background on Cambodian left-wing politics including microfiche of Cambodian newspapers. Cornell is a wonderful resource in that way. I gave the draft as my final paper for that course. I got an A. I went back to become number 2 at Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodian Affairs in Washington.

Q: At Cornell, were you up against the Cornell establishment in Southeast Asian studies?

CARNEY: No. George Kahin was not in residence. I don't know how he would have reacted. Ben Anderson was very correct. The graduate students there, a couple of them were delightful people. Jon Wiant would be a very good person to talk to. He's basically in INR now. He was there studying Burmese affairs. Bill O'Malley was there studying Indonesia. Bill lives in Australia now. I think he works for the Australian intelligence analytical wing that Milton Osborne used to be part of. I can't remember the name of it. There were a number of other people, including Stephen Heder, who had evacuated with his first wife and was getting a Ph.D. Steve was still a lefty in those days. It took him a while to swing from the far left back to center, which he did.

Q: Did you find that your courses were taught by…

CARNEY: Nothing of the sort. It was a university. I was taking Southeast Asian art from Stanley J. O'Connor, a terrific course. The Johnson Museum there at Cornell has got quite a good collection. You can put your hands on an Angkor era bronze and stone and Indonesian art from Majapahit all the way down to Srivijaya, and other art, including ceramics, from Vietnamese surroundings. That was enormously valuable. Professor O.W. Walters was doing the ancient Southeast Asian history course. He had been a Japanese prisoner in Singapore during the unpleasantness and was a terrific historian, really solid. I did Frank Golay's course in developmental economics, very valuable. Wyatt did the seminar in Southeast Asian history in the second semester. He, too, is a professional focused on history. I didn't do anything in the government department. I decided that was pointless. That's where Kahin was. I did take though the graduate course in… There was a graduate seminar in Southeast Asian history that Ben Anderson taught which included what happened in Indonesia in '65.

Q: Did you find yourself at odds?

CARNEY: Not particularly, no. I just disagreed with people. They knew it. When I gave my lecture on what happened when the Khmer Rouge took over, I astonished people by whipping out a copy of this mimeographed form, because nobody yet had had a copy of it except within U.S. government circles. This made people say, "See, it really was organized." Well, yes, there was an effort to organize it. But the fact that they did it, however inadequately organized, was what was at issue. And there was one sort of dyed in the wool anti-war activist there who would occasionally call up Cora Weiss and say, "He said it again." But everybody knew her and she was kind of a truculent individual who was playing with part of a deck. She was indulged. I indulged her, too.

Q: Everybody understood where she was coming from.

CARNEY: Exactly. And that she wasn't that smart because, as the Russians put it, "The roof has slipped."

Q: I think this is a good place to stop. We're in 1975. Is there anything else we should talk about at Cornell?

Let's pick that up next time. This must have been a very difficult time for your wife, wasn't it?

CARNEY: We were in the process of separating, so, yes, it was even more difficult. But she was living with one of her brothers in a flat in Paris. We were arguing about whether she ought to stay there or come to the U.S.

Q: Very, very difficult.

We'll pick this up next time. Was there anything left of the peace movement at Cornell after this?

CARNEY: There wasn't, nor was there much left in the way of joy at the… There was actually. There was a Cambodian fellow from an organization based in the U.S. called GKRAM. That expanded to "Group of Khmer Residents in America. It was an acronym for support for the opposition to Lon Nol and his government. He gave a talk at Cornell. It was he and a Vietnamese named Ngo Vin Long. Long was your typical slick Vietnamese in his tweed jacket and his tie and here was this Cambodian, the foil for the Vietnamese - they were both left-wingers – in his leather jacket and an open shirt explaining how he had helped do propaganda for FUNK, Sihanouk's united front, and that he was planning to return to Cambodia. He did and he ended up dead. He was not in accordance with what the Khmer Rouge wanted. That was the sole period that I saw joy in victory by the opponents of the United States in Indochina.

Q: It's an interesting thing that's never really been well looked at. One can't help feeling

that as soon as they stopped drafting young men who were getting out of college, the urgency was… One almost would think there was a certain amount of self-interest.

CARNEY: Rather than principle.

Q: Yes.

CARNEY: It was interest, not principle, speaking economically.

Q: We'll pick this up next time in 1976 when you're leaving Cornell and moving to the State Department.

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Today is September 25, 2002. 1976. The bureau was called EA in those days?

CARNEY: Yes, East Asia.

Q: And you were dealing with Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Your boss was Jim Rosenthal?

CARNEY: That's right.

Q: Who else above him?

CARNEY: Bob Miller. Art Hummel was the assistant secretary. But there was a transition period. '76 was an election year. In January of '77 or shortly there afterwards, Dick Holbrooke came in as assistant secretary. Bob Oakley was the DAS. He did Southeast Asia.

Q: You were doing this work in the EA bureau from '76 to when?

CARNEY: 1978. Then I started to learn Thai and went to Udorn. In late '78, I arrived in Udorn. That meant until about January '78 I was in the EA/VLC. It was January of '78 that I went to Thai language training.

Q: You covered what?

CARNEY: Basically the most important thing we covered was the potential opening of relations with Vietnam. Jimmy Carter announced as a policy that the U.S. should have diplomatic relations with every country. One of the early efforts was a meeting between Dick Holbrooke and a senior Vietnamese negotiator, maybe Xuan Thuy, in Paris in March, April, or May of 1977 in an effort… I can remember going with Dick to the Vietnamese embassy, which of course was shuttered, photographing the whole place so that we would have a little archive to be able to present to the Vietnamese side if we got that far, but we didn't. The first thing the Vietnamese insisted on was $3.25 billion. This was the promise

that Richard Nixon had made as part of the first set of Paris talks which everybody in the United States decided had been grossly overtaken by the events of the Vietnamese communist victory in 1975. Raising that amount was a signal error by Hanoi and it delayed establishing relations until 6 years ago.

Q: Before you went there, you were dealing with Vietnamese affairs. Were you picking up this as going to be a major theme? Or was this something that sort of popped up at you?

CARNEY: In what sense?

Q: When you go with Dick Holbrooke, you had already been on the desk for a while, 6 months, in looking through it, had this $3.25 billion-

CARNEY: It came out of the blue. I was not at the time anything close to being a specialist on thinking in Hanoi, although I acquired a little bit of specialization when I subsequently was posted to Bangkok. I really didn't think… I did not study Vietnamese before I went to Saigon for my first post back in '67. I was amazed that they actually seriously raised the $3.25… It seemed to be serious on their part. It wasn't just a tactic.

Q: It sounds like, "Okay, we'll get that, but you've got to give us this."

CARNEY: Exactly. It really seemed to be serious.

Q: How did we react?

CARNEY: There was instant congressional action. It might even have been an amendment to legislation that we would not pay it.

Q: But at the negotiating table-

CARNEY: I was in Washington. Jim Rosenthal was with Dick in Paris. There were a number of meetings and they just simply couldn't move the Vietnamese. Let me recall where the Woodcock Commission fit in this. The related significant development was Leonard Woodcock's leading a commission to Vietnam. He also tried to visit Cambodia. In Beijing, the Cambodians returned unopened the U.S. request for-

Q: Who were the Cambodians?

CARNEY: It was the Khmer Rouge at this point.

Q: I don't imagine that you felt much was going to happen.

CARNEY: No. In fact, I can recall I was called down to make a few comments on Cambodia as the Woodcock Commission was getting underway. I simply don't have any dates for you. I think it was before the talks in Paris. It was that commission which

essentially opened the prospects for talks up. They asked me about Cambodia. I said, "They're not going to welcome you. They're not even going to respond to you." It was clear… I was enough of a specialist on Cambodia that I knew that the Khmer Rouge were simply not having anything to do with anybody except the Chinese at that point. The decision was nevertheless to push and try to open a channel with the Cambodians as well.

Q: You had Cambodia, too?

CARNEY: I was the Cambodia desk officer, but I was a de facto deputy in the office. I did a lot of the drafting of the papers. You know how little it takes to chuff junior officers. The action memo came back and had comments by President Carter on it. Always nice to know the President's reading your stuff.

Q: What were we getting… Were we getting pretty good reports of what was happening in Cambodia?

CARNEY: No, we weren't. When I got back to Washington in '75, I had been in Bangkok after the fall of Cambodia in April 1975, and I had had a chance to interview some people who had made it out the following week. So, we already knew that the evacuation of the cities was planned. This fellow gave me an actual form that he had had to fill out from the Exodus Reception Committee. He was clever enough to move all the way north. I had also talked to a couple of other people who had made their way out. The station in Bangkok was getting some reporting as well. All their networks were topsy turvy, if not destroyed, in the Khmer Rouge emptying of the cities and the effective end of international communication and travel within and to Cambodia. The CIA was just gearing up. They had very few Cambodian speakers and were probably relying on the Thais for what was actually happening in Cambodia.

While I was at Cornell before joining the desk, I had produced a monograph of just under 100 pages which was an identification of the people running Cambodia as the Communist Party of Kampuchea. I traced what I was able to dig out of its history back to the 1951 founding by the Vietnamese as the Cambodian People's Revolutionary Party. Then I had gotten copies of one or 2 party youth magazines and one or 2 party magazines that I translated at Cornell to produce the monograph. But the key sources were 2 reports by the teachers who had rallied to the government in 1973 after spending about 9 months in the bush with the Khmer Rouge. They were appalled that there was a communist party. So we had a pretty good idea of how bad things were. On the Hill, I backstopped Dick Holbrooke and the fellow who was going to replace me, Charlie Twining, who was then the Indochina watcher at the U.S. embassy in Bangkok. They appeared before the House on what had been going on in Cambodia in '77 and it took a year to get those talks underway.

Q: Was the full horror of this coming out?

CARNEY: Not until '77. The press had begun to pick up in mid-late '76 but you still got this argument from American academics. A 1975 book praised the Khmer Rouge for taking

the people to the food, arguing that you couldn't the get food to the people. It was the most desperate nonsense by academics D. Gareth Porter and George Hildebrand, neither one of whose reputations has survived intact as a result of that absurdity.

Q: Having gone to Cornell in the belly of the beast…

CARNEY: Their side had won.

Q: Were you seeing a series of apologetics coming out?

CARNEY: By '77, people who had any intellectual integrity at all – and I can name one of them: Dr. Stephen Heder, who is now at SOAS in London, who was in Cambodia from '73 on, evacuated, went back to Cornell, had enough of an inquiring mind and good sense that while he didn't rule out that something was going on there that was bad, he was nevertheless, at least in the first year or so, more willing to give the Khmer Rouge the benefit of the doubt. He subsequently, when he himself had a chance to talk to Cambodian refugees and ultimately got an INR contract to do so – I was the managing officer for the contract – changed. But, he didn't go 180 degrees to favor the Vietnamese as some of the Australian academics did; for example, Ben Kiernan, now at Yale which has had the bad judgment to give him tenure as a professor. Ben flipped 180 degrees because he was totally a socialist. If one set of leftists weren't any good; to wit the Khmer Rouge, then he flocked to the other set; to wit the Vietnamese. It was just the most bizarre sort of thing.

Q: I find it very hard to gain a great deal of respect for so much of the academic community because it's playing with concepts. When you start doing that without the real grounding of how things are done in the field… There are a lot more grays, patterns don't work, models don't work.

CARNEY: Yes. You wind up compressing and skewing and filing the facts to fit your model.

Q: I would think this whole Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia directorate… I would think there would be a real problem. These places, except for Laos, you couldn't get to.

CARNEY: Yes. Laos, of course, had its own problem because there was a communist government that took over there. The king of Laos was effectively in reeducation. He died there. The Thais had the interest in Laos and certainly didn't want the Vietnamese to continue to hold the whip hand there. I visited Laos in '76 after I did Cornell. I went up to Vientiane, actually had lunch with one of the Soviet diplomats, the fellow whom I described in our previous chat as having located a Cambodian-French dictionary from the '30s when we met in Phnom Penh. He didn't hold much stock in the Lao as effective managers, much less as communists.

Q: I take it Laos had almost disappeared from everything since the takeover practically.

CARNEY: Well, it's still one of the few communist governments left in the world, but it's responded to the U.S. concerns on prisoners of war and missing in action. There is now a bridge the Australians built across the Mekong from Thailand. The last ambassador there was Wendy Chamberlain. She is now back here as well, having left Pakistan because she couldn't have her kids with her.

The only thing I can remember from that period on the desk was the Woodcock Commission, negotiations with Vietnam that didn't go anywhere, and the beginning of interest in the public at large, notably in Congress as well, on the terrible situation the Khmer Rouge were creating in Cambodia.

Q: I'm trying to get your feeling about this. It's a cause. It's almost a cult: the missing in action. You must have gotten involved in that.

CARNEY: I did, but this was not a huge issue at that particular time. As the League of Families of Prisoners of War/Missing in Action got organized, and with the politics of the issue in Washington, when I came back from Indonesia in 1990, the issue was completely and thoroughly joined. When I wound up on the NSC staff, I had particular responsibility for that as director for Asian Affairs (Southeast Asia). I essentially replaced one of the gurus of that movement, Richard Childress, an Army officer. At the time, it was not that much of an issue.

Q: But did you feel and then maybe others around you feel that there were prisoners of war sitting off in bamboo cages somewhere?

CARNEY: No. We assumed that everybody was dead or had defected if there were any live Americans there. Richard Garwood when he surfaced essentially confirmed that.

Q: He was a deserter, wasn't he?

CARNEY: Yes.

Q: It never made sense to me why… What was in it for anybody on the Vietnamese side of keeping people hidden? But it became a cult really.

CARNEY: It did.

Q: Still is.

CARNEY: To a degree, yes.

Q: In a way, you had in the truest sense sort of a watching brief on these countries. There wasn't a hell of a lot we could do.

CARNEY: Exactly. Of course, we had implemented sanctions, both foreign assets control

and a trade embargo, on all 3 – or was Laos not under such heavy sanctions? Certainly Cambodia and Vietnam were. I don't remember the status of Laos. We still had an embassy in Vientiane with a chargé d'affaires.

Q: Were you there when the Chinese-Vietnamese war went on?

CARNEY: I was in Thailand as consul in Udorn. This was in response to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in late '78/early '79.

Q: But you were there when that happened.

CARNEY: I was in Udorn.

Q: There isn't much else to talk about, is there? What was your impression of when Dick Holbrooke took over the bureau?

CARNEY: There was a lot of glamour there. His wife at the time was Blythe Babyak, (everyone got married having relationships got married if they wanted a senior position in Carter's administration). Part of the glamour was wisps of scandal and what have you. Ms. Babyak fueled all of this by an article she wrote. I can still remember the lead sentence, which is brilliant: "There is plenty of sex in Washington, DC, but the only romance is with power." That says it extremely well.

Dick had enormous energy. This was before computers. You'd go to see him and he'd be sitting there typing a little note out to the secretary. He'd be on the phone at the same time and then talking to you. That's the quintessential Dick Holbrooke, whom over the years I've come to know a lot better, and to admire for imagination and determination and sheer toughness. Not only did we work together… I remember doing the briefing book for him for the House Committee appearance on the situation in Cambodia. I had failed to put an index in it. It was the first briefing book I had ever done. Remember, I'm a field mouse. I'd never served much and never wanted to in Washington. As soon as he said it, I said, "Got ya." I got it back to him within an hour and a half or so with a proper index. I can remember being in the first row as he and Charlie twining were testifying. A question would come up and it would be the usual: "Flip, flip, flip," and then he'd have the text and he would draw from it. He never bothered to read it. He would put his own ideas and experience in, having been an old Vietnam hand himself. Smart. Active. Had the bureau firmly on the map. But completely the opposite of an Art Hummel. He wasn't as measured in any way. Perhaps to this day Dick can never be described as "measured".

Q: After 2 years, you went off to Thai training?

CARNEY: I went off to Thai language. I had to get a 3 in speaking in 6 months and did.

Q: Why was that?

CARNEY: They really wanted somebody to replace John Finney, who had been my predecessor as consul in Udorn for the northeast of Thailand.

Q: How did you find Thai?

CARNEY: Actually pretty easy. There are no more violent diphthongs in Thai than there are in Cambodian. The Thai was grammatically pretty forward. Cambodian and Thai have a lot of cognates borrowed back and forth from each other as well as from Sanskrit and Pali. Thai is a lot easier to read because you don't do stacked consonants the way you do in Cambodian. The only difference is, Thai has tones, but the tones are regular. If you see a Thai word written, you immediately know what the tone is once you internalize the grammar of tones, as it were. But I never got to speak Thai as well as I speak Cambodian partly because there are so many English speakers in Thailand. I couldn't pretend, as I did in Cambodia, that I didn't speak the major European language. I pretended I didn't speak French in Cambodia. I couldn't do that with English in Thailand.

Q: So you went to Udorn. You were there from when to when?

CARNEY: About August of '78 until I was effectively transferred to the political section in Bangkok in about '80. But in practice, I was in Udorn a little less than a year because the Vietnamese kicked the Khmer Rouge out to the malarial and insalubrious Thai-Cambodian border region, and Mort Abramowitz, who was ambassador in Bangkok then, asked me to come down and take, not exactly residence on the Thai-Cambodian border, but spend 3-4 days a week out there to find out what was going on inside Cambodia. I wasn't doing refugees. It was basically Cambodian internal politics. By then, Desaix Anderson had replaced Charlie Twining as the Indochina watcher in the political section in Bangkok.

Q: Let's talk about Udorn. First, were you married?

CARNEY: I was separated at the time and in the process of divorce.

Q: What was the situation in Udorn the year you were there?

CARNEY: It had been a major American base. There was a huge signals intercept station there known as the Elephant Corral, one of those circular antenna arrays that really does look like a miniature stadium. There had been an Air America facility there. CIA had a huge operation out of there. The base did not have U.S. bombers or jets. It was regarded as not close enough to Vietnam. Those bases were over in Nakon Phanom and Ubon, both of which were in the consular district.

It was 16 provinces that I covered with 15-16 million people. Poor. The predominant image of the entire area was twofold. Trucks with big dirty balls of string, which was kenaf, that was grown for its fiber to be made into ropes. You would see the kenaf being retted, soaked in water, until the connective tissues dissolved and then they were made into these huge dirty balls of string. The second thing you would see were concrete aprons with chips of

"monsamparang," cassava, being dried out so that the prussic acid content would vanish and then it would be pelletized into animal feed for export mainly to Europeans. Those were very predominant images.

Glutinous rice was the staple, although there was plenty of number one long grain and white rice grown as well in the region. Silks… The southern border tier of the region was along the northern border of Cambodia and had been part of the Cambodian Empire. You'd see Cambodian style temples from the Angkor period scattered throughout that part of northeast Thailand and some even further. The empire extended as far as Luang Prabang further north in Laos in its glory days.

Q: You had a Vietnam boundary?

CARNEY: No. Laos. The tri-border area was Laos, Cambodia, Thailand. We also had 3 refugee camps, one for hill tribe people in the extreme northwestern part of the region, the part that abuts the north of Thailand where Chiang Mai is the regional capital effectively. Then there were two camps for ethnic Lao.

Q: How was the area adjusting to the fact that the Americans and the GIs and all had pulled out? This was a tremendous investment and all of a sudden the guys aren't going out to the…

CARNEY: It was an interesting problem because it was Dan O'Donahue- (end of tape)

The adjustment of the region to the pullout of the American presence was ongoing. We actually closed our information center in Khon Kaen, where the regional university was located towards the second year of my incumbency in Udorn. It turns out that, ironically enough, road building was the economic key. The developmental economists would argue that they had predicted it. The northeast of Thailand was not only a base area for prosecuting the war against Vietnam, it was also a center of Thai communist insurgency. There was thus a focus on building up road networks that would give the military access to the areas of danger, and the economic benefit of that was derived because they opened all that area up to the market. So, all those dirty balls of string and all that cassava essentially helped add to the regional income in a way that brought about enough prosperity to undermine the communist party of Thailand completely. A few years after I left the CPT bellied up.

Q: Was there fighting going on while you were there?

CARNEY: By the CPT? Yes. They were still fighting with the government on a very small scale.

Q: What was your impression of the Thai army as a fighting force?

CARNEY: The northeast had a major regional Thai army headquarters at Sakhon Nakon,

which was between Udorn City and Nakhon Phanom. It also had a major sub regional headquarters that built up after 1979 in Surin, a Thai-Cambodian border province, heavily ethnic Cambodian where there is an elephant roundup every year in October or November as the dry season begins.

I got to know the Thai army pretty well after '79, as I was going along the Thai-Cambodian border. One of the things I would do would be to stick my head into a Thai military post, which was usually company level, and I had enough Thai, although I confess it wasn't good enough as I'd have liked. I'd get into these camps and find an enormous suspicion, so thick you could cut it with a knife. It would take me about 15 minutes of just talking and smiling and joking, dealing with English, finding out where people were from in Thailand, whether they had ever been to training in the U.S. at Fort Benning, advanced infantry or something like that, to break that ice and establish my own bona fides after which I could drop in anytime. If the commander wasn't there, the deputy commander wouldn't have any trouble talking with me. I found they were generally militarily ready. They had pretty good equipment and communications.

But every now and then I would uncover a very bizarre reality. For example, at one base, I came in, and saw they had brand new U.S. made 106 millimeter recoilless rifles. That's a very fine weapon. We knew that there were Vietnamese tanks on the other side of the border and the 106 will do a number on any tank the Vietnamese could get up to the border, often a PT76 amphibious model or sometimes a T55, which I think is the Chinese made copy of the T54. I carried a copy of one of those little booklets on weapons of the communist world just so I could identify things if I came across them because I had never been in the U.S. military. I said to the captain commanding the base, "You've got the new 106s." He said, "We can't use them." I said, "Why not?" He said, "You see this little barrel alongside the 106 barrel?" I said, "Yes." He said, "That's a .50 caliber machinegun barrel and there is a particular spotting round that is used for that. We can't spot, so there is no point wasting 106 ammunition if we're not sure where we're shooting." That duly appeared in my next cable. The next thing I know, the Defense attaché, who was insufficiently diligent in being out at border where the threat actually was - I would have thought those attaché guys would have been all over that border - They weren't.

Of course, as soon as the Pentagon read that, their immediate cable out to the DATT was, "No 106 spotting rounds? How Please" There was a JUSMAG that was part of the U.S. mission there that got the more serious question from whatever the Defense entity is that does such procurement and assistance. That was amazing. I can remember a cable…

Basically the Thais felt the threat. It is particularly the case that that part of the border around the town of Aranyaprathet, which means "Forest Country" in Sanskrit, is a traditional invasion route between Cambodia and what's now Thailand. The armies at Angkor Wat conquered the Mon by moving through what's called the Watana Gap. It's great tank country for the most part. The escarpment comes around across the northern border of Cambodia with Thailand. Then there is a set of hills that come up from the south. Then you've got the gap. The town of Aranyaprathet is right in the middle of it. It's a clear

shot to Bangkok. We used to argue the only thing that would stop Vietnamese tanks if they rolled would have been the Bangkok traffic. (Ambassador) Mort Abramowitz was trying to get the U.S. to commit to refurbishing and delivering some of our older tanks, the M48A5. He wasn't getting anything. He got commitments in principle, but no delivery date, no numbers, no nothing. He finally got annoyed and sent a cable out – I still remember it to this day – "I'm going to see Prime Minister Prem tomorrow morning. He's going to ask me about the tanks. Do I give him the same old crap or are you going to get me an answer?" Outstanding! And he got his answer: "Yes," including such and such delivery dates.

Q: Was the feeling that there was a threat to Thailand?

CARNEY: There were 2 aspects of the threat. One was the potential military threat. You knew Vietnamese capabilities. We didn't have any idea what their intentions were. My own view was that the Vietnamese would not be coming across that border, that it was entirely too much for them to bite off, and that strategically they were looking to consolidate an Indochinese federation, something that had been their goal since the '30s, and intimidate Thailand, which they thought they were capable of doing. They believed the Thais were perfect subjects for intimidation.

But there was also the refugee issue. There were huge numbers of Cambodians, 200,000-500,000, who had fled to the Thai-Cambodian border and were in makeshift camps all up and down the border, some of them disguised as refugee camps were in fact Khmer Rouge-controlled populations from which they drew their own recruits and rations.

Q: I want to go back to Udorn. What was the consulate doing?

CARNEY: The consulate was doing a combination of classic consular things – Social Security checks, protection and welfare, a crazy American lady in the brown dress whom we finally got out of our consular district to Bangkok.

Q: What was her problem?

CARNEY: The Russians have introduced me to this wonderful phrase: roof has slipped. She just wasn't all there. There were Americans who had retired from the Air Force mainly who were married to Thais. They were getting checks. They were dying. Work with their effects and what have you. There were some visa issues. We issued non-immigrant visas. Then there was the whole question of reporting on the insurgency. There was a branch of the station in Udorn. There was a whole refugee operation that we helped monitor. AID was still involved. It hadn't yet drawn down and disappeared from Thailand. There were AID projects going on. I had a small self-help fund that I administered. Then there were the whole refugee questions as well as watching what was going on in Cambodia from refugees from Cambodia who made it into northeast Thailand. Then there was the question of the internal politics of the northeast as they bore on Thai national politics. It's always been a volatile area both in terms of politics and food due to poverty.

Q: What kind of government did Thailand have?

CARNEY: One of the Pramot brothers, either Seni or Kukrit, was prime minister. There were 2 or 3 coups when I was there, one of which failed, a military coup.

Q: If you're having the coup a month type government, the politics of what's happening up in Udorn don't make a lot of difference, do they?

CARNEY: Well, the coups didn't succeed. That's what was interesting, that Thailand was emerging from that coup a month period into what it is today, which is much more stable and electoral.

Q: What was our estimate at the time of the communist insurgency? Who was sparking it?

CARNEY: It was basically pro-Chinese. But my memory is not… I wound up doing that aspect of Thailand for a little less than a year. Then I moved almost full-time to Bangkok to do Cambodia.

Q: This was not the equivalent of the Viet Cong.

CARNEY: Absolutely not. It was too small.

Q: It was more an irritant?

CARNEY: It was a little more than that, and it was a matter of great public debate as well. There is lot of leftism in Thai intellectual thought generated, to some degree, in response to all the right-wing activity of the Thai military, and given currency by the excesses of the Thai military right-wing side and the political right-wing as well. The Thai king presides over it all and had gained the stature sufficient to keep things from getting out of hand, as he did. The king was directly involved in making sure one of the coups for sure did not succeed.

Q: Did you feel the military had a heavy hand or did they seem to know what they were doing?

CARNEY: They were entirely too heavy-handed. There wasn't enough of the J5 civic action aspect.

Q: Let's move on. You really began from about '79 on to work with political reporting along the border.

CARNEY: Mort Abramowitz sent me to Aranyaprathet in September '79.

Q: You were involved with this until when?

CARNEY: I replaced Desaix Anderson in the political section as the Indochina watcher, so it would have been until May or so of '83.

Q: What was the situation on the border?

CARNEY: There was a certain amount of tension because the Vietnamese intentions weren't known. That eased as the Vietnamese began to withdraw their troops out of Cambodia. At the same time, the refugee crisis continued. Mrs. Carter visited. We had 2 congressional delegations in '79 that visited Cambodia traveling through Bangkok. Senators Danforth, Baucus, and Sasser, the last the leader of the delegation in about August of '79; and then a women's congressional delegation mixed American and Australian visited about a month and a half later. I was essentially staff/language facilitator for both of those trips.

You saw the international effort inside Cambodia led by UNICEF and the International Committee of the Red Cross begin to address questions of famine inside Cambodia. You had an enormous effort to send seed and food, rice seed and milled rice, across the Thai-Cambodian border at Aranyaprathet. Then you had people coming in and out including one defector, Dy Lamthol, whom I had met in the foreign ministry when I was with Senator Sasser's delegation. He wound up on the border. You slowly began to get a U.S. effort together with the coalescing non-communist Cambodian resistance, one side led by people like Prince Sihanouk, the other non-communist side more republican under the leadership of the late Sonn Sann. It was a complex…

Q: I've talked to people who have been involved with this who have said that the Khmer Rouge was the only real fighting force and that the other groups that were palatable to us, non-communist groups, really weren't very effective and so whom do you arm if you want to get this Vietnamese dominated government out?

CARNEY: What happened was, the Chinese and the Thais made sure that the Khmer Rouge were armed. We, the Malaysians, and Singaporeans made sure that both of the non-communist sides were armed and trained, including 3 training camps in Malaysia.

Q: Did we then work to keep them fighting each other?

CARNEY: They had their own working relationship. They had established a coalition largely under Malaysia, Singapore, and Thai insistence. It was that coalition and all this was pretty well described in the books by Elizabeth Becker and Nayan Chanda. That kept the pressure on. The Vietnamese, once the Soviet Union collapsed, were under pressure from the Chinese that included an unsuccessful invasion. Nevertheless, victory or not, the Vietnamese were aware that their northern neighbor was interested and serious, and essentially Hanoi had to come to terms, which happened in the early '90s.

Q: We're talking about '79 to '83.

CARNEY: That was the period in which the organizational structure of a Cambodian resistance coalesced. It became clear then that the Vietnamese could not succeed in establishing a client regime in Phnom Penh that would itself be able to deal with the Khmer Rouge and the non-communists.

Q: Our policy such as it was, we did not want to see a unified Indochina.

CARNEY: That's correct.

Q: That would be a Vietnamese Indochina.

CARNEY: Yes. We were essentially in support of the Thais on this because Thailand was then a treaty ally. In fact, it still is. The Manila Pact was not informally dissolved yet. At the same time, there was a lot of animus still towards any Vietnamese objectives. It was assumed correctly that they were against U.S. interests.

Q: Did you get involved in strategic negotiations?

CARNEY: I had a serious disagreement. Burt Levin was the DCM. Mort Abramowitz was the ambassador. Burt and I disagreed on whether the U.S. ought to support the non-communist resistance. It went as far as a draft dissent cable that Mort Abramowitz looked at and said, "Let's see if we can't work this out." Jim Wilkinson, who was then political counselor, did a little bit of drafting magic to get the cable out as a front channel cable rather than a dissent.

Q: The fact that you had the ability to go one way meant that you could bring a dissenting view into the mainstream rather than…

CARNEY: Rather than having to leave it.

Q: A dissent cable is good for the soul but it's not sometimes as effective.

CARNEY: Which is why Jim recast it slightly but left the essence of it intact, which is that U.S. interests…

Q: What were you advocating?

CARNEY: U.S. support for the non-communist resistance, military. Burt Levin didn't believe it was worth doing, didn't believe they could ever be effective nor that it was in U.S. interests to do so.

Q: Were there concerns about supporting this non-communist group that you might be encouraging a group of people to stick their nose up… The 2 most powerful forces there are the Cambodian backed Vietnamese…

CARNEY: That was not a powerful force. That was a Cambodian… It went through several changes of name. Let's call it the Cambodian People's Party.

Q: Who was…

CARNEY: Hun Sen was the foreign minister then. It was even before he became prime minister.

Q: You have that on one side. You've got the Khmer Rouge on the other. These nice guys are in the middle. They would strike me as being exposed.

CARNEY: The nice guys though could handle the Phnom Penh forces. They couldn't handle the People's Army of Vietnam. But the People's Army was beginning to pull out.

Q: Did you find yourself involved in negotiating, helping, the forces? What are we going to call these people?

CARNEY: We used their names. Sonn Sann's people were the Cambodian People's National Liberation Front, KPNLF. Sihanouk's people ultimately became the ANS, the Armée Nationale Sihanoukiste. I didn't wind up doing the actual help. That was run in a combination of AID, CIA programs. In Washington, retired is David Merrill, who ran that for AID. He is a former ambassador to Bangladesh and was an AID person. He works for Nathan Associates at this point.

Q: You were gathering material?

CARNEY: I had a reporting brief, but I would stick a nose into policy when it seemed that things weren't going in the direction that they could or that would serve a broader goal.

Q: You describe yourself in Washington as a field mouse, somebody who likes to go out. Here you weren't a Bangkok mouse, but again you were a field mouse. You were out there. Did you find yourself in conflict with the city slickers back in our embassy in Bangkok? Were they seeing the same thing you were?

CARNEY: The disagreement I had with Burt Levin was the only one I can remember of any significance. Burt had never served in Vietnam and had his own views of the direction things ought to go. I think he might have been more of an odd person out on what ought to happen in Indochina, certainly farther out than Mort Abramowitz was.

Q: How did you find your relations with the NGOs who were working with the refugees? They have their own caste and there was quite an establishment there.

CARNEY: There was a huge establishment. Some of them thought I was a spook. Others for the most part, some of whom I had worked with in the refugee camp for Lao in Nong Khai, essentially knew where I was coming from – International Rescue Committee, people

like that. Medecins Sans Frontiers, because I speak French, I got along well with them. The director there was Claude Malhurin, who wound up as a secretary of state in France at one point. I don't remember his portfolio exactly. They knew I was with the embassy. I would drive one of those big white Australian made Chevrolets. There was a big U.S. effort on the border. There was a separate refugee section that Lionel Rosenblatt was running. Mike Eiland was his deputy. A pretty good relationship. See each other, talk. None of these refugee entities spoke Cambodian.

Q: Did you find yourself dragged in again and again for issues?

CARNEY: No. I'd often be dragged in just for what's going on more than anything else. Whenever Mort would take anybody to the border, and he took a lot of people, including EU commissioners like Madame Agnelli and some of the ambassadors, he came up with Marshall Sitthi, the Thai foreign minister then, and I wound up doing a three way translation in English, Cambodian, and Thai, which was very difficult. I was a resource person because I had so much background in Cambodia and acquired a huge background in Vietnam. As Desaix left, I wound up with Ed McWilliams as second man in the external unit. Ed was subsequently involved in the Afghanistan thing.

Q: Did you get involved with Rosalyn Carter?

CARNEY: Oh, yes, because of her visit, I went up with the advance team to advance the sites that she was going to including the refugee camp at Sakao, which was Khmer Rouge-controlled villagers. Then she went to the Phu Phan Palace in Northeast Thailand. The Thai king has palaces in all the regions. She showed up for lunch there with the king.

Q: Were you with the visit when she went?

CARNEY: Yes, I was wandering around as a potential resource but never did anything as I recall. I took some pictures.

Q: Was there concern about these camps, that the Khmer Rouge was getting too powerful in them?

CARNEY: I frankly had less focus on what was going on in the camps. What I was looking for were people who were new, could tell me what was going on inside Cambodia, crops or politics.

Q: What were you picking up about Cambodia?

CARNEY: That there was clearly an effort to create a Cambodian government. Even before I went down to the border, I did an airgram from Udorn because I was listening to Radio Phnom Penh. The airgram in early '79 set forth the structure of the Cambodian government as it existed, showing that there were people who had 3 or 4 different hats and people were moving from job to job. It hadn't yet gelled but it was in the process. Who held what job,

kind of a "Who's Who" of Vietnamese-controlled Cambodia. Over the next year, I was able to establish that the military had begun to gel itself – staff, equipment, training, that sort of thing. This was all essentially drawing on FBIS, and then mixing it with information from the people whom I interviewed. I did a piece in *Asian Survey* on that at one point. My argument was that the Vietnamese had to create a functioning Cambodian armed force that could deal with the non-communists and the Khmer Rouge if they had any hope of a new version of the Indochina Federation, one of voluntary participation rather than Vietnamese control. My conclusion was that the verdict was out. I had my doubts, but it was something everybody had to keep his eye on.

Q: In a way you had the absolutely horrendous, monstrous regime of the Khmer Rouge so that when the Vietnamese came in, it was certainly welcome and a lot better for humanity's sake.

CARNEY: But they stayed too long. The problem was that there have always historically been Cambodian suspicions of Vietnamese motives. The whole of South Vietnam, at least up to just north of Saigon, was Cambodian at one point, called even today, Kampuchea Krom, lower Cambodia. The Cambodians know that, and they know the Vietnamese had designs on Cambodia. (They recall) that great period in the 19th century when the Vietnamese had sent court dress for Ang Mai, the queen of Cambodia. That Vietnamese effort was only halted by a serious Thai effort in the 1830s and '40s. They had joint suzerainty at one point. As for the Thais, it's more like family and cousins. The Vietnamese are just weird as far as Cambodians are concerned. They don't fit. They aren't Theravada Buddhists for one thing. And they have these weird Chinese customs.

What happened inevitably and predictably… One of the reasons why I had currency with the NGOs was because I was published on Cambodia. The monograph at Cornell on the Cambodian communist party and *Asian Survey*, '80, '81 issues on Cambodia. I was published on the substance of the issue.

Q: I've talked to people who were in Thailand later on who said the NGOs who dealt with refugees became very proprietary.

CARNEY: Oh, they always do, of refugees. Like the NGOs that do wildlife: "our elephants." It's the same thing.

Q: At a certain point, you want to stop people from being refugees or screen them out, get them back in-

CARNEY: Which we did in Cambodia but that wasn't until the early '90s.

Q: You couldn't at this point, but were you seeing this proprietary thing?

CARNEY: Oh, yes, inevitably. What impact did it have on policy? The whole focus was humanitarian relief at that point. There wasn't much of a "Don't you dare touch our

refugees."

Q: There wasn't any real alternative at this point, was there?

CARNEY: No.

Q: You were talking about a war going on. You couldn't force people to go back.

CARNEY: Well, the Thais did, 30-40,000 in early '79, and the legacy of that - people managed to work their way back to the border after a few months – was something that the embassies, including ours, were determined not to see repeated.

Q: Were any other embassies involved in this process?

CARNEY: The French to a big degree. A lot of Cambodians wound up in France. The Europeans in general, lots of concern. The political side of it had the Malaysians and the Singaporeans involved.

Q: Did you run across Malaysians and Singaporeans?

CARNEY: They were mainly dealing with the Agency. I would run across them because they knew who I was from the publications. Every now and then I would run across a Thai who would say, "But you don't deal with Cambodia. You're not with so and so." I said, "No, I'm on the diplomatic side."

Q: It's interesting, there are a lot of people who did a lot of reading about the area and there really wasn't much literature about it.

CARNEY: There was a huge amount, but not always in English.

Q: So this stood you in very good stead.

CARNEY: Yes.

Q: Had we started any program of orderly departure?

CARNEY: Yes, we started sending people to Saigon for the interviews over there while I was still in Bangkok. Otherwise I wouldn't know about it. If you gave me a few names, I might remember who was doing it. They were part of the refugee office. Or they might have been part of the consular section.

Q: I think they were part of the consular section.

Did the impact of the Chinese-Vietnamese war have any reflection where you were?

CARNEY: No, except that the Chinese demonstrated their bona fides, and the Thais were therefore encouraged in their cooperation with the Chinese to keep the Khmer Rouge viable.

Q: You left in '83.

CARNEY: Yes.

Q: Same ambassador the whole time?

CARNEY: Oh, no. We had Dan O'Donahue when I got there. Mort Abramowitz replaced him. Then John Gunther Dean replaced Mort. John Gunther Dean had been ambassador in Cambodia before the evacuation.

Q: Were there any differences with these 3 men?

CARNEY: Oh, sure. Huge differences of style. None of them was entirely compatible with the Thais. In fact, of all the ambassadors I know – and that includes Dave Lambertson and the guy who was just there before Skip Boyce (who is in Indonesia), Will Itoh. Thais are funny. Because they've never been colonized, they have a different outlook. To get along with Thais at any level, you need a Third World style. Dan O'Donahue is too irascible. Mort Abramowitz is too much of a policy wonk. Dave Lambertson is too reserved and quiet. John Gunther Dean was too bombastic. Will Itoh was basically too junior. Unger would have been the name the Thais remember.

The thing about the Third World is that you cannot pretend you're interested in culture and geography and people and what's happening because most people in the Third World are underemployed and have enough time that they do a lot of people watching and your insincerity becomes manifest. So you can't be insincere on the one hand, and if you're not generally interested, which lamentably the case for too many senior… By the time you get to be that senior in the Foreign Service, even your career people, there seems to be, unfortunately, a failing of all those impulses that sent us abroad in the first place. I can remember, we were up in northeast Thailand. We had gone to the Thai army command at Surin. We were driving back to Bangkok, quite a long drive. We stopped at Phanom Rung, a Cambodian temple site on a very high hill from which you can see right to the edge of the escarpment south and then into Cambodia. We stopped and got grilled chicken and sticky rice and some Thai som tam, the green papaya salad that can be so spicy. Mort (Abramowitz) said, "You know, you young guys, you really have…" He didn't say, "You have it made," but it was a sentiment similar to that. He himself wanted to be back in Bangkok thinking about policy and who to talk to in Washington. It's unfortunate.

Q: It's one of the things I've found in this oral history program. People say, "Well, you have to have somebody who is an ambassador who did this." When we first started this, we kind of skipped over the junior years very quickly and moved up. Very quickly I realized that some of the brightest thoughts, the best analyses of what was going on came from

people who did reach senior ranks but when they were younger they could get out and around. When you get down to it, an ambassador is a prisoner there and if he goes out he's a showcase; he's trotted around.

CARNEY: It's even worse now because you've got all the security with you.

Q: Yes. So they don't really get out and around. A junior and mid-career officer is out there, often doing a lot of the grunt work which is the…

CARNEY: A political counselor is the best job I ever had to get a feel for a country. Oddly enough, in the Sudan, I was able to do more of that than I ought to have been able to do because there was no staff (once the Americans were drawn down and commuting from Nairobi). I actually wound up having to write the Human Rights Report, the Political Reporting Plan, and all of that.

Q: The remove of the ambassador often from really what's going on…

CARNEY: On the other hand, you've got a Paul Wolfowitz in Indonesia who was absolutely brilliant and wife Claire, they're now separated. (She) had been an American Field Service student in central Java. As I said to Paul one time, "You're a first tour officer as ambassador. Your interest and enthusiasm for Indonesia is palpable." Indonesians responded to it. You got that fellow who had been in Pakistan, who was before or just after Stape Roy, and the guy wasn't interested and that conveyed itself. You lose an ability to communicate especially in the Third World. In London or Paris or Bonn it still matters, as that one politico who spoke French replacing Pamela Harriman… But basically in the Third World you have to have it to be effective. With Thais, John Gunther Dean was more effective than many even though he was always saying, "I did this and I talked to that person and I saw the king more times than you did" and that sort of thing because he was so interested that- (end of tape)

I was married in May of 1983.

Q: What was the background of your wife?

CARNEY: My wife, Vicki, is from Spokane, a second marriage for me, first for her. She went to Thailand as a Christian volunteer and taught English in Chiang Rai in the northwest of Thailand and then moved down to Bangkok to teach English at Chualongkorn University. She had just become a freelance journalist when I met her in August of '78. After a few months, we started courting. When I went down to Bangkok to do the Thai-Cambodian border, we became even closer and decided to marry in May 1983. We did and then Vicki and I went to Pretoria, South Africa, where I became political counselor in July of '83.

Q: Was this a jolt for you to all of a sudden end up in Pretoria?

CARNEY: No because my second posting had been in Maseru, Lesotho, so I did have the

Southern Africa background. The Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, the very sound and capable Chet Crocker, had his own candidate for political counselor in Pretoria, but I had been promoted, had gotten the Director General's award for reporting for my work in Thailand, and essentially Chet didn't have his way.

Q: Did this cause a problem?

CARNEY: Ultimately I think he was glad. It took a while.

Q: But did you feel that you had some fences to mend?

CARNEY: I knew that I had some fences to mend and did so first by inviting his special assistant, Robert Cabelly, a complicated figure, to stay with us. He was arriving in Pretoria on one of his regular visits about a month or 2 weeks after Vicki and I arrived. We didn't have household effects. The welcome kit… We had Robert stay with us and then did a dinner party the night after his arrival and met some South Africans, some of whom are friends to this day.

Q: Who was Robert Cabelly? What was his role?

CARNEY: He had been in the private sector. I think he had worked for Goldfields and was fairly well plugged in in aspects of Southern African society. Chet Crocker found him very congenial as kind of a special assistant to do imaginative memos, and to try to meet with people and find out what was going on in ways Chet apparently felt he wasn't getting from either embassy or CIA reporting. So Robert would come down. He'd talk to the head of the South African Intelligence Service and to the security police and to Pan African Congress types as well as a certain number of journalists and economic and financial people. He was not viewed in any friendly manner by either the ambassador, Herman Nickel, a political appointee and former "Time Life" executive and reporter; who got kicked out of South Africa in the early '60s when he was the Time bureau chief. The DCM thought I was unwise in inviting Robert to stay with us.

Q: Who was the DCM?

CARNEY: Walter Stadtler.

Q: You were in Pretoria from when to when?

CARNEY: '83 to '86. My personal portfolio was Namibian independence, so I was in Windhoek every 6 to 8 weeks.

Q: What was the situation in South Africa and Namibia at that time?

CARNEY: There are 3 or 4 aspects of the situation there. There are 3 consulates in the country: Durban, Johannesburg, and Capetown. Basically the marching orders were to

understand the Afrikaner and to work with the Afrikaner to see if there wasn't scope to begin a movement away from apartheid. Two, you had an ongoing civil war in Angola with a massive Cuban troop presence and the South African role in support of (rebel) Jonas Savimbi. The object was to get rid of the Cubans to try to bring about a resolution of the war. Three, Namibia, the South Africans had refused in the late '40s to put Namibia, for which they were the League of Nations mandatory, under the UN Trusteeship Council and had at various times abortively tried to get Namibia absorbed as part of South Africa itself. There was an active insurgency under Sam Nujomo, the current president. We can talk about Sam's ambitions. Having just recently been in Namibia, I have a good feel for it.

Then we had the issue of what was going on in black politics in South Africa itself. Just as we got there, there was a constitutional referendum that opened up parliament to participation by Indians and Coloreds, Coloreds being the mixed race group. That ignited black South Africans, who were themselves divided in 3 groups. One would have been the ANC supporters through the United Democratic Front. The others would have been those who totally rejected any possibility of a white role in South Africa, the PAC or Pan African Congress. The ANC was multiracial. The third was the group that was essentially Zulus, under not the king but the effective prime minister, the hereditary prime minister of the king, Gatsha Buthelezi, and his Inkatha Freedom Party. It was a very complex internal racial, ethnic, political situation.

You also had a complicated white political situation, but the bottom line in the white political situation was, the Afrikaners were in charge and most of the English speakers were glad of it. However much they babbled and wrote, they didn't vote for highly Progressive Federal Party, that at that time was the main white opposition in parliament.

Q: You were in Pretoria, which is a heart of Afrikanerland.

CARNEY: Exactly, but we spent every 6 months in Capetown when parliament sat. There were a number of people on the embassy staff who moved from Pretoria to Capetown with the ambassador and his secretary, DCM, and his secretary, political counselor, and secretary, and one political officer.

Q: Let's talk about Pretoria first. Was there almost a problem in dealing with the Afrikaners? Were they politically in the U.S. being put beyond the pale?

CARNEY: Well, at the period we arrived, mid-'83, there was an era of good feeling. The Afrikaners had accepted that Chet Crocker did not have horns and a tail as they had initially been led to believe, partly by their supporters here in the U.S. They saw Chet in particular working on the Angola question, which was very much in their interests. On the Namibia question, there was a growing consensus in South Africa that it would ultimately be independent. They were hoping that they would set the terms for independence, and who would be in charge and they were hoping that Dirk Mudge of the Republican Party and his people would be the political majority there, that maybe they could even do a deal that would effectively marginalize the Southwest African People's Organization, SWAPO, that

was actually fighting a low level insurgency with no great success against South African troops.

Q: Was the South African government beginning to feel the strain of supporting forces up in Angola and then fighting this low grade war in Namibia?

CARNEY: Not until 1984.

Q: What had happened by that time?

CARNEY: You began the state of emergency in South Africa and black response to the constitutional referendum and its outcome, and you began to see a more effective Cuban-Angolan opposition to South African incursions into southern Angola. The handwriting was pretty clearly on the wall in '84.

Q: How did you find the Afrikaners?

CARNEY: My wife and I both found them serious, engaging, ruthless, but they had the real interest. Except for the communists, entirely too many of the English speakers were willing to exploit, enjoy, live well, and then run for home when they ultimately would have to.

Q: Basically like suburbanites.

CARNEY: We got into it immediately. The second night we were in Pretoria, we drove to Johannesburg to go to a play at the Market Theater. It was "Master Harold and the Boys." Roger Daley and his wife, Dalene, were in Johannesburg at the consulate. I had been at their wedding in Durban in 1969 when I was in Lesotho and Roger was posted in Durban, so we had instant welcome and a set of people who were not your normal embassy groupies. One of our earliest experiences was at the State Theater in Pretoria where the Brit who was head of Sigma Motors was there, basically told Vicki, "My dear, the only reason I'm here is this is the best place in the world for a white man to be." That kind of set the tone for the experience.

Q: The United States worked hard to develop better race relations. The language that was used in the 1950s is just absolutely unacceptable.

CARNEY: You'll find if you look at the 1950s volume of Foreign Relations of the United States, that the apologetics we were using in South Africa, considering our own racial situation in the U.S., were fairly torturous, very unconvincing. I read the volume because we had them in the embassy. I would occasionally cite from that as I was talking to South Africans.

Q: We were touting democracy and yet we really didn't have it.

CARNEY: We did not have racial justice in the U.S. Separate but equal.

Q: Sounds like apartheid in translation.

CARNEY: It was hypocritical at best.

Q: How did you find operating with the Afrikaners?

CARNEY: It was odd. The second or third day in the embassy, we were in the same building that the South African security police was in. It was sort of an arcade on the ground floor. I went down to have a wurst of some kind at Heinz and Gertie's, a little stand in the arcade. I wandered out. I was walking along and there was a shop window that attracted my eye, so I looked at it, and then I saw that I could go around the corner because the window extended. I went around the corner and said, "I think I'll wander in." I turned back and came face to face with this guy and he closed his eyes and shook his head and said, "Oh, shit." He was following me. He was one of the security police people following me. I just smiled at him. He shook his head. My predecessor was the late Dennis Keogh. Dennis was harassed by the security police from time to time. They never got to where they harassed me, but my successor, the late Robert Frasure, was harassed seriously. He laid himself open to it.

Q: This is it. Did you sort of set yourself off on a course of saying… We were trying to be as open as possible and get out and meet as many people, which I take it the South African government did not want us to do.

CARNEY: Well, actually, ultimately, whenever I went to talk to the military people, there were always 2 of them. They ultimately made a decision… Cabelly could never see anybody without Pik Botha's man for Angola and Namibia, with whom I just stayed in Capetown, David Steward present. They basically decided the Americans were learning too much about what was going on and that this was they felt inimical to their efforts and interests and operations.

Q: How did you operate?

CARNEY: I just did. I called people up and went over to see them, invited them over to the house. We had a huge Thanksgiving dinner with usually 30-40 people – black South Africans, security/military South Africans, columnists; my gunsmith was in one of them. I was deliberately trying to throw together a mix as often as I could so that… We had one dinner party where we had Gaby Magemola of Barclay's Bank and his wife. He was complaining, "Why can't I live in Houghton?" He had a good bank job. The then wife of the group economist for Standard Bank, Niko Czypionka, Lynette, said, "You know, you wouldn't want to live there. The sand blows into your swimming pool all the time." That kind of conversation, as mindless as it sounds in this day and age, never took place in any forum of South African society. Essentially the U.S. embassy was very active in trying to get that sort of buzz going. All the members of parliament in Capetown, we'd always be out with members of parliament. We were especially active with USIS making sure that the IV

program included members of parliament, as many Afrikaners as possible to get them exposed to the U.S. If you look at who, among Afrikaner politicians who were with DeKlerk in ending apartheid had been on the IV program, you would agree it was a notable success.

Q: Were there problems with dealing with black Africans?

CARNEY: There were. The consulate in Johannesburg was particularly jealous because that was their role. But my deputy, Margaret, McMillion, who is now ambassador in Rwanda, was the black politics officer in the political section in Pretoria. I wouldn't hesitate to go see Bishop Tutu or Cyril Ramaphosa, then labor leader, to go to some of the homelands to talk to the late Enos Mabusa, or to go to Gatsha Buthelezi or Oscar Dhlomo in Zululand in Natal. But my own portfolio was heavily concentrated in Namibia, and where I personally did black politics was essentially there.

Q: What was the situation in Namibia?

CARNEY: Again, it was a South African effort. There was an Administrator General who ran the place. There was a Southwest African Territorial Force that was commanded by a South African defense force major or lieutenant general. There were occasional incursions by SWAPO units across the Angolan border trying to get into the farming areas for what we would call today terrorist activities. At the same time, Windhoek was a charming, lively place with a very German air about it. Lots of Germans balanced the Afrikaners off. Certain active politics there, including an internal wing of SWAPO, whose leaders I would meet when I went. We were part of something called a contact group of 5 countries. We would have contact group meetings in the bubble in the U.S. embassy or its equivalent French or British facility.

Q: Was there strict apartheid in Namibia?

CARNEY: No, there were plenty of people… There wasn't even strict apartheid in South Africa. It was breaking down in South Africa, too. In fact, the Group Areas Act went when we were there in 1986, something that opposition member of parliament Helen Suzeman had fought in the 30-plus years she had been in parliament. An Afrikaner National Party MP acknowledged it when the vote passed. Albert Nothnagel allowed that it was a victory of the honorable member from Houghton, Helen Suzeman, who had fought successfully against the act for her entire parliamentary career. Things were breaking open. Washington couldn't see it.

Q: Were you feeling the Washington pressures in which you had on one side the conservative Republicans who were in command at this time saying, "You know, it's good for business and let's not mess around in South Africa?"

CARNEY: That was there, but there were U.S. sanctions. They started in '84.

Q: But this came more from the democratic side?

CARNEY: It succeeded.

Q: Were you running into the contradictions?

CARNEY: Black South Africa was saying, "Look, the U.S. administration is not interested in us. It's only the Congress that's keeping your feet to the fire." And to a degree they were right. On the other hand, you then wound up with the very unseemly spectacle of the Black Caucus in the U.S. taking responsibility for the end of apartheid. I was there for that – Mandela's election in '94 – which is just ludicrous. It was essentially South Africans who came to the right set of conclusions. Our pressure helped, but it was by no means determining.

Q: Was the name Mandela a force?

CARNEY: Yes. He was the imprisoned leader. His wife was out and a darling of the embassies. Some diplomats were seeking to have affairs with her. One of them succeeded. She's 20 years younger than Mandela, was on her own, and was basically a woman of appetites and desires which she would indulge.

Q: Was she an asset or a liability?

CARNEY: She was a liability. The ANC came to recognize that, largely due to her comment "with our necklaces and our matches we shall liberate this country."

Q: The necklaces being tires.

CARNEY: Exactly, with petrol. And a last cigarette was offered.

Q: Was there concern at the time… When I was in African INR back in the early '60s, we used to talk about there being a night of long knives.

CARNEY: There was a considerable concern about that. It was given substance by this practice of necklacing and stoning believed police informers and that sort of thing.

Q: How did the police behave?

CARNEY: They shot everybody. And then the murder squads were out, too. There was no doubt that… Ruthless is an Afrikaner characteristic as well.

Q: How were we received by the government?

CARNEY: It was an era of good feeling but that gradually changed to where by 1986 the state president, P.W. Botha, was denying permission for any officials to go on IV trips, for

example.

Q: Why had that changed?

CARNEY: It was perceived that we were in opposition to P.W.'s view of what South Africa ought to look like, and we were. We always were. They decided we were no longer willing to work with them, that we were insisting on change in a way that they simply weren't willing to do.

Q: Did you feel that Crocker's view of constructive engagement was beginning to have teeth in it?

CARNEY: Absolutely. I was all for it, behind it, and working with it.

Q: Explain what you were doing to constructively engage.

CARNEY: Getting to know as much of Afrikaner polity and society as possible. I was perhaps deficient in not going to the churches. But certainly on the political side, both government and opposition, because there were Afrikaners in the Progressive Federal Party, mainly from the Cape but they were Afrikaners. Also getting to know just ordinary Afrikaners, which I would do through my hobbies of shooting and hunting and book collecting, that sort of thing. Making the point clear that South Africa couldn't stay where it was. The question was, "How are you going to evolve?" Entering those debates and arguments. Listening to South Africans, especially Afrikaners, saying, "You killed off your problem" or "Your problem is so small you don't have it" and replying, "Do you want prosperity here? You're going to have to give black South Africans who are earning your prosperity a share of the profit." It was at the same time not wagging fingers and being in your face. (Ambassador) Herman Nickel was particularly gifted at taking U.S. policy and turning it into speeches and articles that would make the point in a way that was completely grasped, but without offense by Afrikaners and English-speaking South Africans alike. He was very good at that, as you would expect from a journalist of his background and standing.

Q: What about the universities there?

CARNEY: I had a rough go at Rhodes University in Grahamstown. The answer is, yes. One of my efforts was with the head of Rand Afrikaans University in Johannesburg, who was also head of the (Afrikaner) Broederbond at the time, Professor Pete Delange.

Q: The Broederbond was what?

CARNEY: The Broederbond and the ANC were created in 1912 with very different goals. The Broederbond aimed to build the place of the Afrikaner in his own country, they feeling seriously and correctly put upon by the British. The Broederbond underlay the victory of the National Party in 1948, defeating Jan Smuts.

Q: Could you get in and talk?

CARNEY: I did: Down at Rhodes University, very good conversation. Lots of unhappiness from black students. The U.S. role with Savimbi. One student who was very active in the United Democratic Front said, "You've got Savimbi. You've got his head under your arm. You're carrying him forward like a football. How can you expect to do anything in Angola?" My answer was, "Both sides have asked us to help mediate. You can criticize the U.S., but the fact is, the MPLA has asked us to be part of the effort to bring about a solution."

Q: Rhodes was…

CARNEY: All the South African universities except RAU and maybe Potgeitersrust – I'm not sure about Stellenbosch – had black students.

Q: How was that working?

CARNEY: Slowly, few, but beginning.

Q: Going back to Namibia, what was your impression of this contact group and how they worked together?

CARNEY: We worked very well. We and the Brits were particularly good at working together. My opposite number, Graham Archer, had one of his staff doing Namibia. He didn't do it himself. So we had the most senior level going in, except when an ambassador would go over. And we all sort of saw roughly the same people and pushed the South Africans, mainly then Foreign Minister Pik Botha and his staff, to implement UN Security Council Resolution 435.

Q: Why was this effective? It sounds like the South African government could kind of say, "You're a bunch of outsiders giving me advice. Thank you very much. There's the door."

CARNEY: Well, there was a UN Security Council resolution, which has the force of law. The South Africans were in an impossible legal position because they failed to give their League of Nations mandate over to the UN Trusteeship Council. Practically speaking, the Russians had bellied up. Angola made a deal to kick the Cubans out and began negotiations with Savimbi. There wasn't any reason to keep Namibia.

Q: Was Namibia doing anything positive for South Africa?

CARNEY: Well, it's got all the diamonds in the world, and uranium. The South Africans signed the NPT, so that maybe became less urgent.

Q: In a way, was the diamond cartel-

CARNEY: The CSO, Central Selling Organization. They were very active.

Q: What was their stand on this?

CARNEY: "That's politics. We do business."

Q: But politics intrude into business.

CARNEY: Well, then we need to talk about Tiny Roland and that whole interesting role that he had. I regret Frasure's death because he was much more aware of it than I am.

Q: Who was he?

CARNEY: Tiny Roland was a London based investment figure who had a finger in every insurgency pie in Africa. He died of melanoma in the mid-'80s. He was active in Sudan, South Africa, Angola, everywhere.

Q: What role were the French playing?

CARNEY: I can't remember. Friendly but not as active as we.

Q: But essentially this was a group that worked together.

CARNEY: Yes.

Q: It wasn't split.

CARNEY: No, it wasn't. It was one of the early formations of those kinds of multinational groups that actually tries to get things done.

Q: The Germans were there. Namibia was formerly German. And the French and British.

CARNEY: And the Dutch were there.

Q: Were there concerns that the South Africans were trying to split you up?

CARNEY: No, not to my knowledge. We were the most active. Chet (Crocker) or one of his deputies, first Frank Wisner and then Chas Freeman, were in the area every 3-4 months. Big effort on Chet's part to move things. He saw that apartheid was stultified, that P.W. Botha couldn't go any further than their constitutional referendum that he had passed in 1983. So, his focus shifted to Angola.

Q: Did you find that within the embassy you were all on the same team? Or did you find that the junior officers were pushing to get out and do more?

CARNEY: More junior staff would argue that we were too close to the power structure and that we needed to do more with black South Africa, but it was a question of emphasis, not of fundamental policy.

Q: How did you find dealing with the black African leadership? Were you caught between the Inkatha and the ANC?

CARNEY: No, you just saw everyone. One of the last things I did just before leaving the job in mid-'86 was the Pan African Congress successor called AZAPO (Azanian Peoples Organization) had its national congress in Durban. It was open to the embassies. I went down with Vicki, my wife, and we had the political officer at the consulate in Durban at the congress. I can still remember, a delegate from Namibia came over, Rukoro, and as he was walking up to be seated in an honored place, he looked down and said, "What are you doing here?" You had access. I think that was the bottom line, despite black criticism that the US Administration was too close to the Afrikaner apartheid government.

Q: Did you sometimes get the feeling that there was a split in the administration between what Crocker was doing and maybe more conservatives coming out of…

CARNEY: I didn't. Honestly, I was a field mouse. I wasn't paying attention to Washington.

Q: By the time you left in '86, what was your feeling about our sanctions?

CARNEY: I never believed they were a particularly good idea. I always held to the argument that it was better for the U.S. to stay engaged and invested because I could see things starting to change in South Africa. It wasn't that we were pushing against an open door because there was plenty of resistance to change. But I'm not sure sanctions were the best way to foster that change.

Q: It was removing the American influence from the industrial base. From our point of view, under their own internal pressures, they were making much more room for black participation.

CARNEY: Yes, exactly. You lost that as people divested and sold out to local companies and what have you. But in fact, the key aspect of the process was the recognition by South Africans, notably Afrikaners, that if they wanted to prosper they had to give blacks a share. That's what ultimately did it. The sanctions might have helped but only in the sense that there was a risk that they would become general. The Brits, for example, I talked with the provost of Cambridge, who had the daunting challenge of doing the annual lecture… The most noted precedent was from his predecessor many years removed, John Maynard Keynes. Cambridge was going to divest from Barclays bank, so Barclays got out (of South Africa). That sort of thing might have been more encouraging of the process than just strict U.S. sanctions themselves.

Q: Was there the equivalent in South Africa of a chattering class, the intellectuals?

CARNEY: Yes, Nadine Gordimer, Andre Brink, J.M. Coetzee, Alan Patton, and a few others.

Q: Did they have much influence?

CARNEY: Yes and no. Their literature and their views were out everywhere and the press was very active. The *Rand Daily Mail*, that bellied up and became *The Star* and what have you… You also had a humorist, Peter Dirk Uys, who is still active, who was brilliant, taking the mickey out of the entire Afrikaner establishment. As his name betrays, he is, in fact, an Afrikaner. It was all out there waiting to coalesce and it did. But it took somebody like Frederick Willem De Klerk to do it.

Q: Was he much of a figure when you were there?

CARNEY: Yes indeed. He was minister. But he was regarded as conservative. I never met him. His then wife was regarded as even more conservative. They were divorced and she was subsequently murdered in an apparent robbery and break-in. One of the journalists whom I saw regularly… We were talking about De Klerk at one point. He was the obvious successor of P.W. Botha as leader of the National Party because he was the head of the Transvaal wing of the National Party. This journalist had interviewed him and put the question to him, "Does not survival of the Afrikaners mean Afrikaners must be dominant?" He did not get a good answer, an answer promising of a future of an end to apartheid in that discussion with De Klerk. That was '85.

Q: You left there in '86.

CARNEY: Yes.

Q: When you left, what were your thoughts of whither South Africa?

CARNEY: It's on its way to change. I figured by 2000 it would have changed, that apartheid would have been ended. I did not predict it would be as early as '94.

Q: How did you feel it was going to happen?

CARNEY: Evolution. The Afrikaners making a deal. There wasn't any doubt in my mind.

Q: Did you feel that there was a special… that within the African South Africans, was there a mindset that they could probably do this without being nasty?

CARNEY: Right. I saw that, too. There still remained a reservoir of relative goodwill among ordinary black South Africans. In the leadership by the time we left had begun to see... first the same reporter who was at that initial dinner with Cabelly, Pete Muller, had

gone up to Lusaka to interview ANC leaders and published his interview in the leading Afrikaans daily, *Rapport*. That sort of process had gotten underway as well.

The big problem was what do you do with the ANC that was so clearly dominated in its executive by the South African Communist Party? That answer came when the Soviet Union bellied up about 1990.

Q: This was a major concern of ours?

CARNEY: I don't know. It was a major analytical concern of mine as I looked at what could be done in the future.

Q: Was there the feeling that if things go on the way they were…

CARNEY: It would be a great obstacle, the SACP.

Q: Were the Libyans messing around?

CARNEY: No information.

Q: I think this is a good place to stop. Where did you go in 1986?

CARNEY: For a sabbatical year, Una Chapman Cox, to do an independent investigation of modern wildlife conservation – America's role.

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Q: Today is November 1, 2002. Could you explain what the Cox Foundation grant was and why you picked this?

CARNEY: Let me note that Roy Atherton, who headed the Cox Foundation for so long, died recently. It's a great loss. The foundation was launched by a grant from Una Chapman Cox to give Foreign Service officers a chance to get some diversity in their educational background for professional benefit. I applied at the absolute last minute when I was leaving South Africa, had in South Africa renewed my interest in wildlife, both the conservation side and the hunting side, decided that this was obviously something that was of increasing importance and value and even figuring even more and more in U.S. foreign policy, said so in my application, and succeeded in getting a grant for a year of independent study of what modern wildlife conservation is all about.

Q: How did you go about this and what did you pick up?

CARNEY: I first wanted to find out what the structures and institutions and what the theory and policy of wildlife conservation is, what the ethos and philosophy was and is to this day. I started with a trip to Switzerland to talk to the Worldwide Fund for Nature, which is what

the World Wildlife Fund had just become, transformed in a meeting that it had in Italy. The essential ethos was established by the World Conservation Strategy in about 1990 and that was, and is to this day, sustainable use, which is that wildlife resources are renewable and that if they are used in a manner that can be sustained rather than essentially destroying the resource, there is no reason why we can't use them forever. Sustainable use could be everything from hunting and fishing to ecotourism to game farming, any of a number of ways to do that that is not destructive of the actual principle of the resource. It was very congenial. As a hunter I certainly believe that. As a conservationist, I also believe it.

There is an enormous argument between the preservationist, those who would contend that wildlife should never be touched, that it is some sort of moral failing, if not an actual crime or at the very least a sin to shoot or otherwise harm wildlife. Those are the preservationists. The conservationists argue that due to the growth of population and the resulting decrease in habitat, there is an absolute requirement to manage wildlife, and that includes the sustainable use of wildlife either through hunting or through culling of what are scientifically deemed "excess" numbers of animals, excess to the carrying capacity of the land. It's a big argument on elephants to be specific.

Q: When you talk about wildlife conservation, this does not include fish?

CARNEY: One of the things that I've done in the years since is watch closely the progress on the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). Every 2 years, there is a conference of parties signatory to that. I actually attended COP in Nairobi 2 years ago as an unpaid delegate attached to the Safari Club International Observer Group. Stakeholders in wildlife are afforded observer status at the conferences of parties. There is one about to launch in Chile, the biannual meeting of the parties signatory.

There is a separate set of treaties on marine mammals. The Endangered Species Act in the United States also specifically deals with it as does a biodiversity treaty. There is a philosophical argument that the CITES convention is outmoded, and their Biodiversity Treaty ought to be the main vehicle for the conservation and the sustainable use of the variety of species, including fish.

Q: What is biodiversity?

CARNEY: It's essentially a treaty which seeks to halt or at least limit to the extent possible the extinction of species which continue at a fairly galloping pace.

Q: In '86, what was the status of wildlife preservation?

CARNEY: There was an argument with no compromise between the preservationists who contended it was immoral to use in whatever fashion species of wildlife for human consumption, and the contrary view that not only did you want to use them because there is a hunting instinct in the species, but it is the only way to manage the species which would otherwise destroy their environment and wind up extinct in the long run in any case.

Q: Was there any spillover between hunting buffalo in South Africa and raising cows in Arkansas?

CARNEY: The domesticated species do not figure. This is the trade and trafficking of endangered species. The argument – and probably elephants are the best example – elephants have attracted enormous emotional content – partly people anthropomorphize animals – Dumbo the Flying Elephant is probably the best example – partly there is a genuine regret at the death of such a large animal that could live to be 70 years old before its last set of teeth wear out and it can no longer nourish itself. Lots of emotion. Lots of spillover there. But no direct relationship with the domesticated species.

Q: It would seem to be there would be a real problem in that a lot of these arguments that we're putting up in Switzerland and in the halls of the United States is all fine, but when you're talking about an awful lot of the wildlife that's concentrated in quite poor areas – Africa, Southeast Asia – where the people 1) need meat and 2) a little money from people who want to hunt goes a long way.

CARNEY: You're touching the real essence of the problem. As many Africans see it, do-gooders from the West are trying to tell them what to do with their resources. The Humane Society is particularly at fault here. It has actually threatened various governments demanding that they either end hunting or enact very strict legislation, otherwise the Humane Society will work to end tourism. That is a specific example from South Africa, where the culling of elephant in Kruger Park sparked such Humane Society tactics. There are a couple of books to read on the subject. Cleveland Amory's "Mankind" will give the green moral repugnant point of view. Raymond Bonner's "At the Hand of Man…" Bonner is a "New York Times" correspondent who was living in Nairobi. His wife, Jane Perlez, was the "Times" bureau chief there. It gives the opposite view of unhappy Africans.

At the same time, you have this very day Richard Leaky, who is well known for his many writings not only on paleoanthropology, but also on aspects of wildlife. Mr. Leaky, recently head of the Kenya Wildlife effort, argues that you really must not reopen the commercial trade in elephant ivory and elephant parts – skin and meat and what have you. Kenya strongly opposes the southern African elephant range states' opening their production to commercial trade. That is largely (in my analysis) because Kenya and East Africa is corrupt and their governments are incompetent, and there is not enough money in the warden system, and, moreover, it has been the officials there who have been largely responsible for poaching elephants and selling the ivory to the Hong Kong ivory carving market. In southern Africa you are much more regulated. But, because there is no trade in elephants… For example, in Zimbabwe you are seeing the elephant herd burgeoning to the point that Mopani forests are turning into savannahs with consequent effect on other species.

Q: What was the result of this '86-'87 period for you? Did you write anything?

CARNEY: I did. I produced a paper and was going to have it published by the Foreign

Service Institute but they took so long to get the publication in process – almost 9 months - that I essentially said… There were aspects of congressional funding that needed to be done on a multiyear rather than a one year basis. All of those had changed and would have required my updating the paper, so I had it withdrawn from publication and I circulated it privately.

Q: In '87, whither?

CARNEY: In '87 to Jakarta as political counselor. I had known the ambassador, Paul Wolfowitz, when he was Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs. I had taken him around the Thai-Cambodian border when I was in Bangkok in the political section. I called in about December of 1986. The political counselor job was still vacant. Dennis Harter was the incumbent and was scheduled to leave. I called up. Dick Howland was DCM. Very quickly I got myself named political counselor in Jakarta. Vicki and I arrived about June.

Q: You were there in Jakarta from '87 to when?

CARNEY: To '90.

Q: Let's talk about Paul Wolfowitz. Today as we speak he is a figure of great controversy over… He is number 2 in the Department of Defense and is considered one of the major leaders in promulgating a war against Iraq. How did you find him as a thinker, as a leader, and as a person?

CARNEY: After we had been together for about 6 months, we were talking and I said to him, "You are in an ideal situation in your present job." He had started the conversation by observing that the deputy chief of station, an old friend of mine, someone who introduced Vicki and me to each other in Bangkok in the earlier years, and I seemed to be among the few people in the government overseas who got the most out of their foreign assignments. I responded that I thought he was in an almost ideal situation. He had all the enthusiasms of a first tour officer overseas. This was his first foreign posting. At the same time, he got it as ambassador, so he was able to do the policy as well.

He merits his reputation as someone not very interested in management. On decision-making he would delay his decision-making to the very last possible second with consequent impact on the bureaucracy that was trying to implement the decision. It was sometimes very difficult to get people to scramble to move forward on it. At the same time, he is enormously intellectually gifted and honest, willing to ask all the tough questions, to turn the issues upside down and have a look at them, to probe and demand a more thorough look and to demand that drafters and political and economic officers look at their own assumptions as they put together recommendations and even regular, ordinary cables.

Q: What was the political and economic situation and relations with the U.S. in Indonesia when you arrived in '87?

CARNEY: I think I can encapsulize it by giving you a concrete example. The Suharto government had been in power 21 years. Suharto effectively took power in 1966 after the would-be coup of 1965 known as Gestapu in Indonesian. The children of Suharto had begun to become very active in business affairs with corruption rampant, sweetheart deals the norm. After I had been there 3 to six months, I got my colleagues in the political section to look very closely at what was happening in Indonesia. We put together a cable which argued that the Suharto government had exceeded the norms of Indonesian society when it came to corruption and mismanagement, but not yet the tolerance. That cable went into Washington causing a certain stir but it was well enough argued that it convinced everyone. What's interesting is that it took about 10 years for it to be crystal clear that they had exceeded the tolerance by then as well.

Q: When you're setting up a standard country… where do you figure out what the corruption norms are?

CARNEY: I'll give you an illustration. For years, the late Mrs. Suharto, whose given name was Tien, was known as Ibu or "Madame" Tien. Madame Ten Percent. In Indonesia, the phrase was "Sepulu percent biasa lebi banyak coruptsi," which exactly means "Ten percent is normal. More than that's corruption." By the time we had gotten there, Mrs. Suharto had become known as Ibu Fifi, Madame 50/50.

Q: We always have this problem that if corruption is endemic and really bad at the same time we have a stable regime in a difficult neighborhood, there is the problem about reporting on corruption. If you over report on corruption, which is within the bloodstream of the system, pretty soon it will start leaking to the press. Congress will say, "That's a corrupt regime" and disregard it. So, you are not really moving… Diplomacy is supposed to be living with a country for the most part. Did you feel pressure on you on this corruption thing to say, "Okay, we've told them what it is. Let's lay off?"

CARNEY: Once we did that cable, there was much less internal embassy need to report every single incidence of corruption. There was a big AID program there so that had to be carefully watched. There was an enormous effort to get American business in there. Power plants in West Java were of considerable interest to a number of businesses in the U.S. On the other hand, corruption was pretty well covered in the press. You could make sure that FBIS picked up and translated such reports, which they did. I don't have a recollection that there was great difficulty making sure that the extent of corruption was known to Washington. Nobody had a cable slapped down. There was no effort from the ambassador or the DCM to explicitly limit aspects of reporting, at least not until John Monjo got there.

Q: Were we doing anything about this or were there any repercussions?

CARNEY: Probably the most interesting aspect of what we did was the remarks that Paul Wolfowitz made in the period just before his departure. He had earned such a reputation as someone seriously interested in and concerned about Indonesians themselves and about

Indonesia in general, that he was able to make points which included corruption in his public comment and even to the finance and bank people and even to Suharto himself.

Q: How about American business? How did they feel about it?

CARNEY: One of the leading American businessmen there was and is to this day a fellow named Jim Castle. Jim was recently quoted in the wake of the Bali terrorism act of last month. Jim and I were at Cornell when I did that academic year. That's where I met him. He was finishing his Ph.D. in Indonesian studies. If you knew the system there, and often that would mean having an Indonesian partner, you could do business. The problem then, as it is now, is that the legal system was totally subject to bribery and corruption or localitis and you could not rely on the legal system to prosecute a claim against an Indonesian partner or a violation of a contract. You had to do it Indonesian style.

Q: I think this would mean that an American business that came in would come in and really try to extract the maximum as quickly as possible on the theory that they weren't sure how long they'd be there so rather than trying to develop long-term foundations for this trade, just get in and get ready to get out.

CARNEY: Yes and no. The business which is the largest and longest running there is Freeport McMoRan. It's a spinoff from Freeport Sulphur. They signed the first or second contract with the government that replaced Sukarno's in about 1966. That was to run a copper mine in what used to be called New Guinea. They have been there mining copper ever since. That's quite a long... We're talking something that's very simple. You basically reduce mountains to ore and concentrate the copper, pipe it down to a port and ship the product off to a smelter in Japan. There are lots of impurities in that copper and those pay all the costs of the mining. Impurities are gold and silver. The copper is pure profit.

Q: As political officer, what was the political situation?

CARNEY: The political situation was controlled by the government party, Golkar, with a little bit of opposition politics there, but nothing to any great extent. The Islamic movement was in 2 parts, a rather conservative movement based in Surabaya run by the man who became the successor to Suharto and was then turfed out to be replaced by Megawati Sukarno Putri, a fellow named Abdurrahman Wahid, whom I can recall having at dinner at the house when I was political counselor, and then a modern Islamic movement known as Muhammadiyah, which is currently run by a fellow named Amin Rais, who was a contender to replace Abdurrahman Wahid but couldn't mobilize the wherewithal to do so.

Q: Let's talk about these parties. Where did they fit in the fundamentalist versus more liberal spectrum?

CARNEY: Muhammadiyah was modernizing whereas Wahid's was... Fundamentalism is such an easy term to use. It was much more orthodox.

Q: Was the orthodox turning to the Koran as the absolute word.

CARNEY: In the 1930s Sukarno and his fellow members of the Indonesian independence movement met in a major youth conference and decided that Indonesia would be a secular state and that although the Javanese are by far in the majority, the national language would be a trade language, which is essentially what was spoken in Malaya, which is the Bahasa Indonesia of this day. To keep Indonesia together - it is such a diverse state - the political philosophy has been secular, diverse, and plural. Christians, Hindus as is the case of Bali, and Muslims together in a single state. This was challenged with the separatist movement in the far western part of the island of Sumatra, known as Acheh, that began a separatist rebellion that the army was particularly ham-handed in trying to put down.

Q: Was there an anti-western core in Islam?

CARNEY: No, not at all. There was a period in which the East Timor situation once again went on the boil. Indeed I made sure that the first trip I took as political counselor outside of Jakarta was to Dili in East Timor to inform myself on the Indonesian effort to suppress the East Timorese independence movement, and to look at what Indonesia was doing to make unity with Indonesia attractive. Had a good chat with the military commander there and argued strongly to him, because he contended to me that there had been a number of courts martial for abuses of human rights in Indonesia, that those needed to be publicized, first of all to make the point among the troops, but second to burnish Indonesia's reputation under considerable pressure for human rights violations. It seemed to me that there wasn't much likelihood that the Indonesians would do the right thing and convince East Timorese that they wanted to be part of the greater archipelago.

Q: With the East Timorese, how long before had it been when Indonesia moved in on this?

CARNEY: They moved in '75.

Q: When you got there, did you see any indication that their role had had any effect?

CARNEY: The city wasn't shot up. They (The Jakarta authorities) were opening immigration, to let a lot of traders in from Sulawesi and from some of the other parts of the archipelago. And there was an increasing effort to build teak forests. I remember looking at one in the eastern part of East Timor when we flew out of Dili. Essentially there were lots of Indonesian doctors there. That was one of the programs to try to build bridges and make unity with Indonesia attractive. But the philosophy was, "You do what we want and we'll both be happy."

Q: How about this Acheh situation? Where is that?

CARNEY: The far west of Sumatra. The last year we were in Indonesia, there was a wonderful film done by an Indonesian director produced in Indonesia called "Tjuk Nyak Dien." Tjuk Nyak Dien was a woman who led one of the rebellions against the Dutch at

about the turn of the 20th century. The last trip I made was to Acheh itself. I had an Indonesian friend who organized a contact who was delighted to be my host because he was Indonesian police. Everybody thought he could keep a watch on what I did. I went along, didn't take anyone, even a Bahasa speaker, with me. I had studied Indonesian at home in the period of the posting but did not speak Bahasa well enough to do serious political work. I had a 2 at the best. I went through the Dutch cemetery in the capital there. The Dutch lost a lot of men in their effort to subjugate the people of Acheh including several generals, knights, and the cemetery is remarkable. It's kept up very nicely. It seemed to me that you had ham-handed military effort, almost a parody of the hearts and mind effort the U.S. ran in Vietnam, that was not going to be successful. But I accepted the logic of Indonesians, that if you began letting go of places that were part of Indonesia itself from the independence days, you would risk enhancing the centrifugal forces to the point that Indonesia would fly apart, which I did not see in anybody's interest, least of all the U.S.

Q: Were you able to sound out what the Achenese leaders wanted?

CARNEY: I talked to a number of people there. They were very cautious talking to me. To an extent it was clear there was a general desire to stay with Indonesia if it was at all possible. But remember, Exxon, now Exxon Mobil, has its largest money spinner in the form of gas fields just off the coast of Acheh. They were not realizing a sufficient return on those resources.

Q: How about dealing with the Indonesian government? Did you mainly deal with the ministry of foreign affairs?

CARNEY: Basically I dealt with the ministry of foreign affairs and the parliament. A very good relationship with the foreign ministry, both the Americas desk, international organizations desk, and the minister himself, Ali Alatas. This became solidified when Indonesia took up the task as host of the Jakarta Informal Meetings to try to bring about a resolution to the situation in Cambodia. My expertise was well known since I was published on Cambodia and knew all the players.

Q: Did you get involved in this?

CARNEY: Very much. It was the Jakarta Informal Meetings. I was the central watcher for that process and did the reporting. We were not formal observers there, so I would have to run around and chase Cambodian and Indonesian participants to find out what had gone on at the meetings.

Q: What was your impression of these meetings?

CARNEY: That they weren't going to produce results because it was a little too early, but it was good to get ASEAN engaged in trying to push the Cambodian process forward. The French were particularly egregious. They were very unhappy with the Australians. The French continued to believe that Indochina was their bailiwick. The Australians, as an Asia

and Pacific power believed, as it turned out correctly, that they had important things to say and do to help bring about resolution of the issue. Probably the best anecdote on this was at the very last of the JIM meetings, the Australian foreign minister, volatile Gareth Evans, who now heads the International Crisis Group operating out of Brussels, a group that Mort Abramowitz founded just after he was at Carnegie... The French had been going around throwing banana peels under an effort the Australians launched for a peace plan for Cambodia. This became well known to the Australians that the French were pooh-poohing and dismissing the Australian contribution. At a press conference, Evans started out saying, "Ladies and gentlemen, I want to make it clear that contrary to what has been published in the press, I have never called my French colleagues 'perfidious frogs.' I have called them, in fact, "perfidious fucking frogs." That sort of set the tone of Australian-French relations which continued to the UNTAC period in Cambodia itself.

Q: Did we have any role in this?

CARNEY: We did not. We had a watching brief.

Q: What did we hope would come out of this?

CARNEY: We didn't know. We were willing to let it go forward and see what might happen. I really didn't have a clue what Washington was thinking about. They were avidly devouring the reporting we did, which was copious. But essentially at about this time there was a Cambodia conference in Paris that went nowhere. But the issue seemed still to be in a military phase with the Chinese supplying guns and ammunition to the Khmer Rouge through Thailand, the Malaysians and Singaporeans supplying guns and ammunition to the non-communist Cambodians through Thailand, and the U.S. supplying non-lethal equipment through AID money (it might have been ESF) also through Thailand, with the CIA actively keeping tabs on the situation also through Thailand.

Q: Of course it was a very difficult situation. You wanted to get the Vietnamese out but you didn't want the Khmer Rouge to take over again.

CARNEY: Exactly. That situation finally broke loose in 1990 or '91 when the 5 permanent members of the Security Council together with the UN Secretariat began a series of meetings with the Cambodian parties that ultimately resulted in the Paris Agreements of 1991.

Q: What about the politics of Indonesia? You've got this huge state - lots of people, lots of islands, lots of distances. Did their parliament represent the various groups or was it dominated from a center and orders just went out?

CARNEY: Essentially the government party, GOLKAR, was the main player in parliament. There were also a number of appointed members of parliament which meant that there might have been debate in parliament but parliament was a rubber stamp.

Q: As the head of the political section, who were the people that you really wanted to find out who was doing what to whom?

CARNEY: I would talk to the various people in Golkar, Golkar being a movement rather than a political party. You would get various traits and tendencies in Golkar and talk to some of the Golkar leaders. We worked with people who were not in parliament but were politically active such as Abdurrahman Wahid and the Islamic groups. The DATT worked with the military because the military then as now continued to see themselves much as the Turkish military do, but without the constitutional mandate to ensure stability in the Indonesian state.

Q: Did we have problems with the Indonesians?

CARNEY: We did not. You knew 'tho that it was going to come apart because Suharto was not bringing up a successor. The fellow who eventually and briefly succeeded him, an islander named Habibi, was basically an engineer who was the head of the state aircraft industry. Indonesians produce parts for F-16s and were building their own version of a medium sized civilian aircraft, a turbo jet. There was state of the art equipment to produce aircraft parts, better than Thailand, in fact. But there did not seem to be a serious effort to look at a transition in politics much less an opening up that would begin to let Indonesians feel as if they were part of the government of the country.

Q: Were you there when the Marcos regime fell in the Philippines?

CARNEY: I think that had already happened. I think Cori Aquino was already in.

Q: They looked similar.

CARNEY: Well, maybe from a distance, but up close the big difference was the role of the army in Indonesia as opposed to the Philippines?

Q: Where did the army fit in?

CARNEY: The army saw itself as the guarantor of the stability of the state.

Q: But were they?

CARNEY: They were. The other big difference between the 2 nations is that everybody in politics in Indonesia remembered what happened after November of 1965. The figures ranged from half a million, to well over that, dead in the chaos that followed on the assassination of the generals and the cleanup under Suharto. Nobody wanted to see that happen again because Indonesia's so big and centrifugal. The fear was that kind of chaos would destroy Indonesia.

Q: The Cornell school blamed the United States for the slaughter after the failed coup,

when the generals were killed in '65. Was this at all a myth or something going around in Indonesia?

CARNEY: I had been at Cornell from 1975 to '76, so I was steeped in the Cornell mythology of Indonesia. Ben Anderson, a prominent protagonist in that, was my faculty advisor. The late George McT. Kahin and his wife Audrey were on sabbatical at that time. I never really bought that. Barbara Harvey, who did a Cornell monograph on Permesta - "Half a Rebellion" I think she called it - was in Surabaya as consul general then. She came out of that Cornell tradition as well. Of course, Cornelians were always in Indonesia. Jim Castle, whom I mentioned as a businessman, was there. And any number of people were there doing field work for their Ph.D. dissertations- (end of tape)

Indonesian officials always viewed Cornell graduates with a jaundiced eye because of the legacy of that widely published Cornell Paper (on the coup). But there was no impact on relations with the range of Indonesians I dealt with, who included academics, think tank people, Indonesian military. I didn't have that much to do with Americans.

Q: Were we doing anything with the Indonesian military to get them to be a little less ham-handed?

CARNEY: I know the DATT [defense attaché], Colonel Jay Mussels, was very active with the Indonesian military. He and I worked very closely together. At one point we used the DATT aircraft to fly an ostensible political counselor's trip to Ambon, Biak, Jayapura, Merauke, the capital of West Timor, Kupang, and then Sumbawa and Bali, where I got off and met Vicki. Terrific trip. We met any number of military and civilian officials throughout the eastern part of the archipelago that way. Lots of effort on behalf of the DATT working closely with the Ambassador - both Paul Wolfowitz and John Monjo to push a little bit with relatively little success.

Q: How were things going in Borneo and Irian?

CARNEY: Borneo was one place I did not get to. There didn't seem to be too many issues there except those created by the effort on the part of the government to send migrants from the overpopulated parts of Java to Borneo. In Irian or the Indonesian part of New Guinea, I visited some migrant villages where life was pretty basic. It was clear that the effort couldn't possibly succeed. It just cost too much to ship people out of Java and then provide them with the wherewithal to begin a new life. It wasn't like the U.S. where people essentially used their own resources to fund their movement west.

New Guinea is an amazing place. I have talked about the copper mine that Freeport had. I visited the capital of the province, which used to be Hollandia and is now Jayapura, Victorious City or City of Victory in Sanskrit. The middle part of the island, the Baliem Valley, where as cold as it is, people are essentially naked. And Merauke itself where you have the emus wandering around and emu eggs are sold. Biak Island to this day has the caves infamous from World War II. The Japanese garrison refused to surrender and allied

troops rolled gasoline drums into the caves and ignited them with tracer gunfire. Bones are still being brought out of those caves. A Japanese association dealing with missing in action and war veterans comes annually to conduct appropriate rites for the remains. It's a remarkable place.

Q: Looking at this from your perspective, you've got the problem of corruption, diverse area, huge distances, and then overpopulation particularly in Java. When you left in '90, how did you see this coming out?

CARNEY: I thought they would have a mess in the transition away from Suharto. I wasn't in doubt about that. But I also thought that there was enough depth in educated citizenry and breadth in potential governing class that they could manage the transition. I did not think it would fall apart.

Q: Had American education made an impact there?

CARNEY: Certainly on the economic and financial side - we're talking the "Berkeley mafia" and then its successors, Chicago, Cornell, and Princeton. No question. A major role on the part of the U.S. This was why one became so unhappy with the effort to isolate the Indonesian military through an end of the IMET program and military sales which happened after I left.

Q: Did you have any contact with Megawati Sukarno and her group?

CARNEY: None whatsoever. They were not players at all nor did they seem to have the potential to be players.

Q: What was the lean at the embassy on Suharto and his coterie?

CARNEY: As I think I've explained, a belief that they were on the edge of exceeding the tolerance with a later departure a serious possibility as a result.

Q: What was a possible scenario? Were you all thinking of a military coup?

CARNEY: No, we weren't at that time. Suharto was such a clever politician. He had essentially marginalized those who might think of a coup. Notably at that time it would have been (General) Benny Murdani, who once he lost his command in classic Indonesian fashion, his power was attenuated.

Q: You were there '87 to '90 when the Soviet Union fell apart. Did that have any effect?

CARNEY: That was a fascinating period. Indonesians were deeply interested. You had American thinkers being brought out to talk at Indonesian think tanks like the one run by Yusef Wanandi, aka Lim Bian Kie, and his associates. Very much attention being paid by Indonesians themselves. That was what opened the possibility for a solution in Cambodia.

The Soviets were the ones funding the Vietnamese who were in turn active in Cambodia. This was a particular aspect that Indonesians, Thais, Singaporeans, and Malaysians focused on. It also helped bring the Soviets - about to become Russians - into the fold for UNSC effort to solve Cambodia.

Q: Did the Japanese play any role there?

CARNEY: The Japanese had an enormous aid program to Indonesia. We instituted a policy of cooperation with the Japanese in the hope of helping to influence how they used their aid in Indonesia. They had a very capable set of political officers and a fellow who is also a Cambodian specialist was posted in Indonesia.

Q: I'm a navy buff. What ever happened to that Soviet cruiser that Khrushchev gave to Sukarno?

CARNEY: I have no idea.

Q: It's probably at the bottom rusted away by now.

CARNEY: Yes. The Indonesian navy was fairly active but mainly in a coastal role and we were always worried that they were going to try to close one of the straits, which under international law they had and have no right to do. Even though we hadn't signed the Law of the Sea, we stated we would act according to its provisions. I think we eventually accepted the Indonesian "archipelagic concept" with the straits not part of it.

Q: Did Singapore and Malaysia play any role at all?

CARNEY: Singapore was intensely interested in stability in Indonesia and always worried about it. The Malaysians and the Indonesians have a territorial dispute over parts of Borneo and problems with Islam as well because Malaysia is an Islamic state and Indonesia is not. And you had (private) Malaysians supporting the separatists in Acheh. A very complicated relationship.

Q: Did you get any impression about how well the Indonesians were represented in the United States?

CARNEY: It's very spotty, always has been. You have an occasional ambassador of amazing breadth and competence, but most were too Javanese to get along in the States, not willing to push themselves forward, thinking they didn't have to meet with staffers because they were an ambassador and ought to be meeting with congressmen or senators.

Q: This is one of the great mistakes anybody who comes to the U.S. makes.

CARNEY: Except the Australians, the Canadians, and the Brits now.

Q: What about the American community? Was this a factor in anything?

CARNEY: The businessmen were very interested. The ambassador was often called upon to use his weight on behalf of businessmen and it worked pretty well. When the ambassador decided to get engaged, he could move things.

Q: Were you there when John Monjo came?

CARNEY: Yes.

Q: How was he as an ambassador?

CARNEY: He worked very well for the business community. The Indonesians thought he was an odd duck. He wasn't really interested in Indonesia. He might have been in earlier postings there, but he ceased to be interested in Indonesia. He spoke good Bahasa, but as designer Iwan Tirta put it one time, "He speaks Bahasa to Americans and serves bad food to his guests at home." That reputation colored the Indonesian view of this tour.

Q: How was the social life there?

CARNEY: It was essentially at home or at someone else's home. Lots of dinners, receptions. Vicki and I had dinners regularly including receptions for CODELs. We'd have a whole lamb, for example. Or depending on who was invited, we once or twice had Babi Menado, which is roast pig, north Sulawesi style. I hunted in west Java once or twice, brought back a wild pig, and served it at dinner. There was a whole crowd there, pick up food. The pig was off in one corner, not identified. There wasn't any left.

Q: We're talking about a Muslim state.

CARNEY: A Muslim population.

I had an Indonesian friend who was involved in refugee affairs because there was a boat people camp, one of the other neuralgic issues. His name was Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed. I asked him about that. He would hunt these wild... They're basically feral pigs, pretty big, 300 pounds. He said, "You know, babi is the Indonesian word for pig and nobody eats pig. But these wild pigs are known in Javanese as *chaleng*. Like every good hunter, I always eat what I hunt. Chaleng is not a babi."

Q: What about the boat people problem?

CARNEY: They would be assembled at a camp-

Q: These would be Vietnamese?

CARNEY: Essentially, although there were some Cambodians, too. In fact, we had some

Cambodians bribe their way to Jakarta itself. We had a refugee officer in Singapore, Carol Courtney, who came over and talked to some of these people. They were generally treated well enough. I suspect by now those camps are long emptied and everybody's gone.

Q: What were we doing?

CARNEY: Interviewing to see if they fit our category for early movement to the United States. The French would do the same.

Q: How about the role of the Australian embassy in Indonesia? You've got this vast continent with hardly any people in it and just above it you've got this vast area with too damn many people in it.

CARNEY: Well, I got along very well with the Australians. They had some very good people there. The DCM, David Irvine, did a book on the Indonesian shadow theater. Knowledgeable. You're correct. Indonesia is the classic threat in all the Australian contingency planning, which the Indonesians found very amusing, arguing that there wouldn't be any way for the military to get through the traffic to get across the island to the south coast to have an invasion. I used to tease the Australians that the biggest danger to their continent was if the Indonesian population would line up on the south coast and everybody would take a leak, the resulting tidal wave would inundate Australia. They had the grace to laugh.

There are 100,000 or so Australian tourists a year in Bali. The problem was, and I think I've referred in earlier discussions to the views of one of my guys when I was consul in Udorn, that it's an easy, convenient, and sometimes illuminating way to look at peoples as if they have a switch in the brain, a binary switch. The Thais can be viewed as looking at things as either sranuk, fun and engaging, or not sranuk, which is very bad. The American switch is, is it true or is it false? The British switch is, is it of proper class or is it not? The Indonesian, especially Javanese, switch is, is it refined, halus, or is it coarse and crude, kasar? Australians are the living definition of coarse. There is a built-in problem between the Indonesian political elite, essentially Javanese, and Australia, and that will persist forever. Australians are not going to change.

Q: You might say their working class origins, they're proud of them and this is how they present themselves.

CARNEY: Almost sometimes deliberately crude.

Q: Then in 1990 you left before the Gulf War.

CARNEY: I left in about July of 1990. I did not have an onward assignment. I went to New York to be the EAP Bureau advisor to the U.S. General Assembly delegation at USUN there. Thoroughly enjoyed that.

Q: Did you get involved in the Gulf War?

CARNEY: No, that would have been the Middle East people, not the Far East people.

Q: Any particular issues you were dealing with?

CARNEY: I was sent as a Cambodia specialist, but by then the permanent 5 had taken the issue so completely under their belts that Cambodia wasn't an issue at the General Assembly that year as it had been since the Khmer Rouge were booted out of power. So I wound up doing driftnet fishing. Fascinating.

Q: What was the issue of driftnet fishing?

CARNEY: A driftnet is a miles-long net that sits just under the surface. Unfortunately, it catches everything, including birds. These things are regarded as anti-conservation. There was an effort to ban driftnet fishing. I think there already was a ban but this was to tighten it and it succeeded as part of the appropriate UN...

Q: Were you up against the Chinese and the Japanese?

CARNEY: No, the big driftnet fishers are the Japanese and certain Europeans. I think the Italians were using driftnets in the Med. Lots of room for correction here. Maybe the Spaniards. But that effort succeeded. The General Assembly runs from September to just before Christmas. That's the only thing that stands out in my mind.

Q: After that, whither?

CARNEY: Back to the EAP bureau overcomplement to do the first EAP bureau program plan. That is when the State Department finally decided to get serious about budgeting. It's since been turned into both bureau and mission. It's not called a "program plan" anyway. A "performance plan" maybe.

Q: There was this thing that came out in the '60s, a matrix of... What was this?

CARNEY: That had died. This was a serious effort that continues to this day on the part of the Department to get a handle on what the U.S. wants to do in a given bureau, what resources are available to do it, how to measure it. Sylvia Stanfield and I collaborated on producing the first one for the EAP bureau.

Q: I imagine there are a lot of bruised heads.

CARNEY: Nobody really thought it would ever go anywhere. We continually bird-dogged the various country directorates, and managed to get a promising structure in place and get it published. I think the next year basically the embassies had to do them as mission program plans.

Q: What were you doing after this?

CARNEY: At the Asia Society annual dinner I ran into Doug Paal who was the senior director for Asia on the NSC staff. Essentially there wasn't a DCM job that anybody was willing to offer me. Doug offered me one of the directorships for Asia on the NSC staff, so I took that. I did that March/April of '91 until about February of '92.

Q: This would have been the end of the Bush administration.

CARNEY: The elections were in '92. It was the third year.

Q: What sort of issues were you dealing with?

CARNEY: Cambodia and the U.S. effort to work with the Perm 5 to bring about a negotiated solution there. Of course, there was the Philippines and that was fascinating. Then there was China and the most favored nation issue, which Doug Paal did. But the Philippines and the Pacific Islands were in my bailiwick. The question on the Philippines was, they were essentially... We had closed Clark (Air Force base), but we really wanted to stay at Subic Bay (Naval Base). The Philippines wanted to charge us way more money than we were willing to pay. The State Department, (Assistant Secretary) Dick Solomon, (DAS) Ken Quinn, were arguing to (Secretary) James Baker that we ought to pay it. I didn't know where to come down on that. I wasn't a Philippine specialist, but it seemed to me that we were being held up. I knew we wanted to be able to project our power, but I wasn't sure whether we needed to have a base in the Philippines to be able to do that, especially with the Soviet Union being in the process of bellying up. We went over to the Joint Chiefs to the appropriate office to talk about the Philippines on day, and I listened to them talk about how militarily needed it was. I got back to the office and called Jim Wilkinson. Jim had been political counselor in Bangkok when I was political officer there in the '80s, and he had been number 3 or 4 at USUN when I had spent that 3 month period there the previous year. He had gone as Polad at CINCPAC. He was in the process of divorcing and ultimately remarrying. I called him and I said, "I don't understand what's going on with the Philippines." He said, "Let me talk about it." He called me back and said, "The CINC goes not believe that we need to have a base in the Philippines. We do not need to be forward based. We can have a logistics nose there but we don't need to have Subic Bay as a base." I did a memo through Doug Paal to Brent Scowcroft saying that. Doug had a note on it back from Scowcroft that said, "Mighty strange memo." But that was it. Once the CINC decided that we did not need to have the facility at Subic Bay, that ended it. My argument was by no means original with me. In any case, we needed a new, more mature relationship with the Philippines. The way to get it was to leave our bases in the Philippines and bring the Filipinos into a more serious and mature partnership with us. That seems to be to be what's happened since then.

Q: What was the feeling? Was it that the Filipino political system, did they want to get rid of the United States or did they figure they had a prime patsy as far as money was

concerned and "Let's just sock it to 'em?"

CARNEY: I don't know. I have never been to the Philippines. I guess all of those elements are there. The relationship with the U.S. is enormously complex and emotional and laden with our colonial period there, our effort to educate, and our response during and after World War II. But it was clear that that relationship was in a sclerosis back when I was on the NSC staff and we needed to do something. Once the military decided we could get along without bases there, State couldn't say that was very interesting. Solomon couldn't see it. Ken Quinn couldn't see it.

Q: It's interesting because normally the State reaction would be "bases are a pain in the neck. Everything begins to revolve around them." I can think of the Azores with Portugal way back and the Asmara camp that completely skewed our relationship with the Ethiopians. Somalia. And Greece. Normally we just want to get rid of them and have State be the proponent.

CARNEY: When was Solomon ambassador in the Philippines? I think it might have been after that. It would be interesting to listen to Dick now.

Q: This was a temporary job?

CARNEY: Yes. I was in a holding pen. When the Paris Agreements for Cambodia were signed in October of '91, it was clear that a senior U.S. official was going to be part of the mission. Yasushi Akashi was ultimately named SRSG, and I went up to New York and talked to him in December or January of '92. He wasn't sure what he wanted me to do. It might have been human rights or something else. He talked about the elections. I remember saying to him, "There is a key aspect of those elections. Given what's happened in Cambodia, people have to know their vote's secret." These were going to be the only elections the UN had ever actually conducted. I said, "But more than that, they have to be assured that their village's vote is secret lest the victors ultimately wreak wrath through denial of development monies just to make an example of the village that did not vote for them." Akashi was so taken with that that he decided I ought to be director of information and education, which is what I went to Cambodia with the UN to do.

Q: So you went to Cambodia from when to when?

CARNEY: March 25 of '92 to August 1, '93.

Q: Talk a bit about Akashi.

CARNEY: Akashi, very Japanese, career UN, played things pretty close to his vest much to the annoyance of the other UN people who were part of the UN mission to Cambodia known as the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia. He was extremely good with Sihanouk, not bad as a diplomat. He was okay for that job but he needed a lot of stiffening and the stiffening came to a degree from his deputy, Behrooz Sadri, also a career UN officer,

but more so from the Force Commander, an Australian, John Sanderson, who wound up head of the Australian forces and, now in retirement, is Governor of West Australia at Perth.

Q: How did you operate with him?

CARNEY: Very much hands on; one on one direct contact. He had a daily staff meeting for the senior staff. He would have, every 6 weeks or so, a meeting with my division, Information and Education, looking at things we were setting forth.

Q: What were you doing?

CARNEY: We were doing about 4 things and we were doing it in print, which included posters, comic books, leaflets, pamphlets, and posters and banners. We were doing it in radio, radio broadcasts to provide information on what the UN was doing in Cambodia in the first place and then on what you as a Cambodian had to do to register to vote, where to vote. Then we were evening the information playing field by giving the various political parties a platform to voice their views. Then we were doing all those things through TV as well. We had a TV studio which ultimately proved able to produce an hour of TV a day. Our radio effort came to produce 15 hours of programming a day, live from March 1993 to the end of the UN Mission.

Finally, the Paris Accords gave to the UN Transitional Authority control over specific fields of governance - military, administration, and information, press. There was a Civil Administration component set up as part of the UNTAC structure and the head of that, a French judge, gave to various other components the right of control over their specific area. So, my division had control over the field of information, which essentially meant enforcing what we drafted in conjunction with the 4 Cambodian parties (except the Khmer Rouge who boycotted the drafting effort), the Media Guidelines, whereby if there was a violation of fair comment or libelous statements, we would order a right of reply by the offending media.

That was a fascinating year and a half partly because of the control dimension, but even more so because of the very great complexity, including trying to stand up a radio broadcast facility from “not even a paper clip” as one of my staff members described it. We did it... First of all, you had the programming aspect. We programmed basically through soap operas - aunt, uncle, nephew and niece - all this in Cambodian – beginning with nephew wondering who those people in the blue berets are. Then it went on to more complicated soap operas that had a man with a gun come into their house on stilts and say, “It doesn’t matter what Radio UNTAC says, you all are going to vote for my party.” Then when he left the aunt would say, “Why did you tell him we’d do that?” The uncle would say, “You can tell him anything, but your vote is secret. You vote the way you want. You can even take bribes from him and you can vote the way you want. They’re the ones who are wrong and they’re intimidating us. We can lie to them. It’s okay.” That’s a specific example of one of our soap operas.

Q: You were saying on the vote that the ballot is secret. That I can take. But when you say that you can't tell how the village voted, that gets very tricky.

CARNEY: It turned out to be easy to do. They moved the ballot boxes from each constituency voting place to the province capital and mixed them all together and counted them there.

Q: We're so used to having a local vote.

CARNEY: You're right, there is a philosophical argument that you really do want the local vote, but in the circumstances, the electoral component, run by a white Zimbabwean as it turned out, much to the UN's chagrin, they were looking for diversity, essentially accepted my argument that secrecy outweighed other considerations.

Q: Who were the contending parties?

CARNEY: There was a raft of 24 or more parties, but the essential contending party was the incumbent, the Vietnamese installed authority, the Cambodian People's Party. There were 2 non-communist parties, but the main one was a party that was run by Prince Sihanouk's son, Norodom Ranarith, and a separate non-communist party run by a former Cambodian republican, the late Sonn Sann that was not sufficiently active and got very few seats as a result.

Q: Did the Khmer Rouge...

CARNEY: The Khmer Rouge ultimately refused to participate in the process, did not canton their troops as required by the Paris Accords, did not play the radio broadcast tapes that we gave all the factions to play until we got our own radio broadcast facility 4 months before the elections. Essentially, as I argued just after the elections in a seminar in Singapore that has since been published, the Khmer Rouge decision doomed them as a force in Cambodian political life, which is no loss.

Q: No, it's no loss at all. Often the group will feel they can avoid something and if they guess wrong, time moves on.

CARNEY: They tried to have it both ways for a long time with 2 of their senior figures who were resident in Phnom Penh for a long time, months, looking at creating another United Front style political party. Ultimately Pol Pot decided that they wouldn't take part, they would try to sabotage the elections and see if the Khmer Rouge could reemerge as a coalition player in a future Cambodia. That just simply didn't work because they lost their foreign support completely, and the other Cambodian parties were able to come together to form a sufficiently strong military to resist them and even ultimately if necessary to crush them.

Q: Did the Chinese play a role in this?

CARNEY: The Chinese, I dealt with them pretty regularly. They played a forthcoming role in this. They had several people on the UNTAC staff, including a couple of Cambodian speakers. My division, however, had almost all of the foreign speakers of Cambodian. If I had thought about a Chinese, I would have asked Beijing to give me one. But I just didn't think about it. I had 15 foreigners who spoke Cambodian, 15 of the 45 expatriates in the Information and Education directorate.

Q: While you were doing this, did the State Department have any say or do anything?

CARNEY: In order to join Akashi's staff, I formally resigned from the Foreign Service with right of reemployment, and joined the UN Secretariat. Article 100 of the charter specifies that members of the Secretariat will only take orders from UN officials. I think that's why the Department insists that people formally resign even if they have rights of reemployment. In the 18 months I was with the UN, I was not a Foreign Service officer, which had the collateral benefit of enabling me to sue Radio France International when their local correspondent broadcast an entirely too clever piece accusing me of being a CIA agent in deep cover in the UNTAC apparatus with the goal of denying to the true victors, the Cambodian People's Party, the fruits of their electoral win. I took them to court in France. I ultimately won one franc in damages and $8,000 in legal fees, which didn't cover what it cost.

Q: Were the French playing a role in this?

CARNEY: Yes, indeed. They tried to torpedo the Australian effort to have General Sanderson as force commander by giving an extra star to their Brigadier. The Australians then gave an extra star to their man, who wound up a 3 star. The Frenchman was a 2 star. Loridon was the Frenchman's name.

Q: What was the French game?

CARNEY: Well, it was L'Indochine Francaise. "We're the ones who have the experience and the background here." But, they didn't have any Cambodian speakers. I can't imagine what they were thinking. I tried to get a French woman who was particularly gifted at Cambodian studies, but she was working for this Centre Nationale de Recherche Scientifique and wasn't interested, so I got an East German, an Australian, a Brit, a Canadian, and a bunch of Americans.

Q: Did you find the UN apparatus in New York a problem or not?

CARNEY: It was a great problem, and (UN Secretary General) Boutros Ghali did not shine. He initially on his first visit to Cambodia argued that we really didn't need a radio broadcast facility. I had on my way to Cambodia stopped in Bangkok and the Thai foreign ministry press head, Sakthip Krairaiksh, who is currently ambassador in Washington.

Sakthip and his wife, Benjapa, were at Vicki and my wedding- (end of tape)

I stopped in Bangkok and talked to Sakthip Krairaiksh about using the joint VOA –Thai AM transmitter at the airport to broadcast UNTAC material because it was maybe a million watt AM transmitter and it could be heard in Cambodia past the Mekong. Sakthip said, "Yes," but USIA had to agree. I sent a message off through the embassy in Phnom Penh - we had a chargé d'affaires at that time, Charles Twining - and the word we got back was, "Of course, you can have 4:00 AM as your timeslot." That was so inadequate that I mobilized Akashi to get hold of rather more senior people than the head of USIA. We got a couple of slots at prime time. So, we sent our tapes to Bangkok for VOA to play on AM, as well as the various FM stations of the Cambodian parties. Thais were very active, very forthcoming on this. I used my contacts with a Thai of some dubious background, a businessman who was close to the Thai military intelligence side, to get me a trip to the Thai border to go in and see the Khmer Rouge. We got there but they wouldn't receive me.

Q: What about the Vietnamese, the Hun Sen regime? How did you find dealing with them?

CARNEY: I personally dealt with Hun Sen and irritated the hell out of him on any number of occasions. The radio broadcast facility got under his skin because we were basically telling it like it was, and it didn't make him happy particularly when we began to broadcast the electoral results that went against the Cambodian People's Party. Ranarith's party won about 46% and Hun Sen's party 38%, so they essentially lost the election.

Q: Why did the French have a particular dog in this election?

CARNEY: Basically they argued for realpolitique that Hun Sen was the strongest and his people were the most capable and besides that, they weren't going to give up governing the country anyway.

Q: At the end of this, when the election came, was there any apparatus to make sure that the election took hold?

CARNEY: That was a weakness of the Paris agreements. The only entity that persisted after a constitution was drafted - and the end of the UNTAC period was defined as the ratifying of the constitution - was a UN human rights center. There wasn't a real follow-on. That's a flaw of the drafting of the Paris Agreements that you can argue by hindsight, and indeed it has been argued in any number of publications. What happened after the elections was, the People's Party was very reluctant to accept the results. There was a little bit of theater when one of Sihanouk's sons, who was close to Hun Sen and other leading figures in the People's Party, staged a secession of a number of the eastern provinces of Cambodia. Akashi was stiffened in his resolve by Sanderson and a number of other UN senior figures and that secession failed, but the compromise that resulted was a co-prime ministership of Hun Sen and Norodom Ranarith. That government persisted until 1997 when Hun Sen essentially ran a coup and took over all by himself.

Q: Were any of the people that you knew in Cambodia still around, or was that whole class wiped out?

CARNEY: I wondered that myself. A number of people got out, including some of my ex-wife's relatives. My first wife was ethnically Cambodian. When I went to Phnom Penh the first time with Senators Danforth, Baucus, and Sasser in 1979, I found myself looking at all the small crowds around us when we were on the street in Phnom Penh and realized I was looking for somebody I knew. I ran into some people that I knew on the Thai-Cambodian border, and helped them, including some of my ex-wife's relatives, and brought them to the refugee center at Khao I Dang. But when I was back with UNTAC, almost the first thing I did was, I asked where one could play tennis. I went over and there were a number of the entraineurs, the trainers, whom I had learned and played with at the Cercle Sportif in the period I was there, all of them a bit older. A couple of them had died, but most were still there. Of the political figures, there were very few. Most of those people had either gotten out or been caught and killed by the Khmer Rouge, so I didn't see anyone there. But of course, I had known a lot of the new figures from the period of negotiations that I had sat in on as NSC staff member, as well as people whom I had met with the 2 CODELs that visited in '79 and the one in 1981.

Q: In '93, you left there.

CARNEY: Left, right.

Q: Where did you go?

CARNEY: Peter Tarnoff importuned me to go to Mogadiscio to give political advice, in the way of essentially replacing April Glaspie, to the unhappy Admiral Jonathan T. Howe, who was Special Representative of the Secretary General.

Q: That should be a story in itself. We'll pick it up at that point.

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Today is February 27, 2003. We're to 1993. What happened?

CARNEY: My wife, Vicki, and I left Phnom Penh on August 1. This was some considerable time - 6-8 weeks - before the UN mission actually ended. But my argument was that the work of Radio UNTAC and the UN media effort was essentially done. It was now up to the new government, both the winners and the losers in the election, working through a Constituent Assembly to put together a Cambodian constitution that was the effective end of the UNTAC mandate. But my own seemed to have come. The large bulk of UN presence in Cambodia was beginning to be self-defeating. The reality was that just too many foreigners were in too prominent a set of positions. I was happy to leave.

I went to Namibia to do some big game hunting. Had talked a bit about an onward

assignment. I cannot recall if I even saw a bid list, but it was clear that there wasn't anything being offered and I'm not sure if anything was of huge interest. I got back to Washington partly to discover, falsely as it turned out, that I had been TIC'ed out. Having joined the UN, I got an efficiency report from a Special Representative of the Secretary General. There was also some bad information given to the board.

Q: Explain what TIC means.

CARNEY: TIC is the "time in class" rule. I had been regarded as having been too long in class at the first level of Senior Foreign Service rank. Those are the two things I can remember. Then, Peter Tarnoff, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, asked me to come have a chat. I did. He suggested that it would be enormously useful if I would go to Mogadiscio. The American who was the Special Representative of the Secretary General had been Brent Scowcroft's deputy on the previous National Security Council staff, Admiral Jonathan T. Howe. He was in serious need of political advice. The UN apparently didn't agree. The aptly named James Jonah was the relevant Under Secretary General, and he didn't want another American in the mission in Mogadiscio. That had to be fought all the way up to (Secretary General) Boutros Ghali before I was finally processed by the UN bureaucracy. I arrived in Mogadiscio in early December of 1993.

I stopped in London on the way because all of this to-ing and fro-ing with the UN had given me about 6 weeks to actually learn something about Somalia, as incredible as that might sound. I read a number of books and discovered that the grand old man of Somali studies was Ioan Lewis, not to be confused with the Islamic scholar whose name is Bernard Lewis. I called either SOAS or LSE and they were delighted to give me his home phone number. No such thing as privacy in the UK, thank you, except if you try to put salacious photographs of somebody in the newspapers, no matter how prominent they might be, as Fergie found out one time.

I called him up, said I could stop through London. He was delighted, gave me the name of the tube stop and walking directions to his house. Indeed, I did stop through London. I went over and had a terrific interview with someone who actually knows Somalia and was appalled at the direction the UN mission had taken, the transformation of it from a humanitarian mission, UNOSOM I, United Nations Operation in Somalia, to UNOSOM II, the latter being what we're doing in Afghanistan now, and what we hope to do in Iraq, which is to say, nation building.

In fact, he bustled away, made some French press coffee, which if I can't get espresso is my next favorite, brought some Scottish shortbread out, and the two of us sat down. He looked me in the eye and said, "You know, Somalia is a contest between American high tech and Somalia low cunning." He left no doubt about who was winning. He was right. When I got there, it was a zoo. The headquarters of the mission was the former U.S. embassy compound that Jim Bishop had so belatedly evacuated during the Gulf War. Everything had been ripped out and then reinstalled, with trailers put in as modular housing for the UN staff. Howe basically didn't want me there, that was pretty clear. April Glaspie

he was willing to tolerate because she's not only an Arabist, she was a former ambassador. I had never been an ambassador, and I was a male State Department type, which is generally anathema to a certain mindset in the military.

He basically wanted me to take over running the pitifully inadequate information education effort that the UN had going there. They didn't even have their own radio station. This is in a country which essentially lived by oral tradition, poetry, and being articulate and fast on your feet verbally. A remarkable lack of comprehension of what Somalia was all about- Quite apart from the chutzpah up front, in your face, confrontational Somali national character. An amazing place.

Howe was at the end of his string there and demonstrated that even a flag officer in the armed forces of the United States does not have to be a leader. I can remember one 5 minute discussion in a staff meeting that he chaired on what to do with used sandbags. The man found his horizon so circumscribed as to be bounded by used sandbags, a reflection of his own personality as well as the situation.

Q: When you arrived there, why were we there and where were we, the West, in the scheme of things?

CARNEY: In a nutshell, the death of the dictator, Mohamed Said Barre ultimately caused Somalia to fall apart. It fell apart into its components, and its components can best be described by a Somali proverb: "Me against my brother, my brother and I against our cousins, we and our cousins against" and so on and so forth. Your atomic unit was the subclan. It was the family really, but the subclan was the real nuclear unit of Somali society. One of the largest subclans, extending into clans were the Habr Gedir, of which your late Mohamed Aideed's son is the most prominent figure in the Mogadiscio area of Somalia today. There are about 6-12 larger clans like the Habr Gedir and they tend to be geographically based. They have been at war with one another throughout the entire historical period and probably well beyond. The drought and looming famine of the late '80s along with Siad Barre's death caused an implosion in Somali society that essentially resulted in military action by those clans that had the wherewithal to acquire guns. That's what the United Nation's first mission, that was a humanitarian mission, stepped into. It did the job. People did not starve to death in wholesale quantities.

Then there was pressure - and I cannot recall why, partly because I was in Cambodia at the time with UNTAC - to transform the humanitarian mission into one of nation building, presumably so that Somalia would have the capacity to deal with such emergencies in the future. It wasn't done, probably could not be done. Somalia remains to this very day a nation - in Somalia, everybody speaks Somali, most everybody is a Muslim, but it's not a state. There is no national government. It's also divided into at least two fragments: Somaliland, which the British had under their aegis; and Somalia, which was Italian Somalia until given over to the British after one of the world wars. The third Somali entity is Djibouti, which is made up of Somalis but very heavily under French influence. In fact, the French ambassador who was in Haiti when I was there is currently ambassador in

Djibouti.

Q: When you arrived, what was the conventional wisdom? Did you talk to the State Department? Were they saying, "We've got to get the hell out of there?" Where were we at this time?

CARNEY: When I accepted Peter Tarnoff's invitation, I went down and essentially put myself in the hands of the Somali Working Group, which was under the aegis of David Shinn. That working group let me know that we were at the near end of UNOSOM II. This was a month and a half, maybe two, after Blackhawk Down, August of 1993. There was an effort by the U.S. military to capture a number of Aideed's lieutenants, Mohamed Farrah Aideed having been deemed responsible for the death of a number of UN troops who had tried and failed to capture his clandestine radio station. Aideed knew he needed a radio station. Why the UN couldn't figure it out that the UN needed one, too was beyond me at least until I got there and met some of the people in charge.

The effort to capture Aideed's troops went badly awry. There was inadequate sharing of knowledge about the operation. There was no serious rescue force prepared to go in on the ground if they had to. Helicopters were shot down by rocket propelled grenades, either B40 or B41 model as the Vietnamese named them or RPG2 or RPG 7 if you want the NATO nomenclature. The air was filled with gloom. There was a broad and correct assessment that the UNOSOM II mission had failed, and that that failure would be sealed by pulling out with its tail between its legs in the not too distant future. And that is what happened.

Q: This was a UN effort?

CARNEY: Yes, but it was a UN effort with a difference. It was one of those United Nations hybrids that had a major U.S. military component much in the way of the subsequent mission to Haiti which went off in '94 and then became blessed by the UN. The U.S. military was in the UN nominally under the command of a Turkish Force Commander, a general officer, but, in fact, answerable to Washington with a number of stovepiped - a jargon term which means operations that were conducted in secrecy from other elements of the U.S. military or diplomatic efforts, much less from the UN itself. It simply was a hopeless mishmash of incompetent people engaged in a combination of murder and slapstick.

Q: Were these incompetent because of the situation or were they just incompetent people for the task at hand?

CARNEY: It was both. The situation was inherently not understood and thus was not being adequately addressed, and the people in the field certainly in the leadership just simply weren't up to figuring things out and grasping what to do. The political level in the U.S. was also fairly clueless.

Q: What did Tarnoff tell you? Was this a thing of "Clean up the mess and get the hell out"

or was it "Carry on?"

CARNEY: To the extent I remember, it was not very specific, but it was strongly put to me that Admiral Howe had bad instincts and worse judgment, and that I ought to be able to help provide a bit of a rudder in the right directions. What were those directions? I do not remember anything specific.

Q: By this time, you had the distinct impression that there was no confidence in Admiral Howe?

CARNEY: Very well put.

Q: Hadn't he worked in the State Department?

CARNEY: He had been the head of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. They should have figured it out then.

Q: How did you and Admiral Howe interface at that time?

CARNEY: Because of having dealt with so many UN people, he thought I was there to get myself a chunk of the action, be "in charge" of something, and "be" rather than "do," which is a classic UN phenomenon, someone who wants to be at a higher rank with a title rather than to do anything that might expose them to criticism should it not work. Thus, very few UN bureaucrats will take any risk. He didn't seem to understand that I didn't want to be there at all, but as I was there, I would be giving my best advice on a whole range of subjects about which I had some considerable experience, notably including information but also I had been in Vietnam. I don't think he had.

Q: Was April Glaspie there at the time?

CARNEY: No, April had gone. She was at that point director of Southern African Affairs.

Q: Were there any people within that UN structure, American or others, who you felt knew what was happening?

CARNEY: Yes, indeed, there were a fair number of people. There was also a U.S. mission there that had seen Bob Gosende come and go, a former career officer at the Information Service who was ambassador and then left. He had gone, and he was replaced by an officer who has just retired but who's working with AID now, Richard Bogosian. Howe was backed up by a pretty capable staff, a UN information officer who had come out of retirement, an early phenomenon in the nature of "when actually employed." There was a more junior officer, a fellow who is now DCM in Kampala, who was nominally attached to the UN but they wouldn't pay for him, named Don Teitlebaum. Don had a really good feel for what was going on on the ground. There was also a UN political officer named Ken Menkhaus. Ken knew very well what was going on. There was a Nigerian who seemed to

have a clue what was going on. Shortly after I arrived, Bangladesh's former ambassador to the U.S., Ataul Karim, arrived to take the job that Tarnoff said I would be taking, the senior political advisor to Jonathan Howe. Karim you'll recall from my comments on the Cambodian days where he was the non-Cambodian or French-speaking head of the political element of the Special Representative of the Secretary General's office in Phnom Penh. Karim and I to this day get along well. He is very low key. He's smart. But the situation was clearly not going anywhere. In fact, it didn't.

In early February or late January 1994, a CNN report noted the UN spokesman had said that Admiral Howe would be leaving. This was Admiral Howe's first intimation of that. Rather than play games, he told New York that he was going to leave the end of the first week of February. I decided I had therefore ended my mandate from Under Secretary Tarnoff, and I left the day after Howe did. The entire UN mission pulled out within a couple of months.

Q: Were you talking to our military guys there? What were they saying?

CARNEY: I decided that there was a disconnect between the UN Special Representative's Office and staff and the U.S. commander, so I went over and chatted with him, a two star. I'm an Army brat, so I can talk military if I have to, especially with all those additional years in Vietnam and Cambodia when the shooting war was on. It was quite a good chat. It was very candid for the first chat. It's very difficult to say some things. But it was clear that the military seemed to believe it was in a no-win, hopeless situation, and I would guess that was partly as a result of what was coming out of backchannel from the Pentagon on the political side in the U.S. Mr. Clinton was...

Q: He inherited the Bush war and was sort of trapped with it.

CARNEY: Yes, as he inherited Jean Bertrand Aristide in exile in Washington from Haiti.

I tried a couple of things. One of them was, there was clearly a need to make some points in the U.S. I tried to prepare for Howe a set of talking points to use with the editorial board of the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* when he was back over Christmas of 1993, and urged that he try to get on NPR and similar radio programs, which he did. He did not need to be sold on that. He just needed to be pushed in that direction a little bit. The man had no judgment in how to do foreign affairs. For example, there is on the Christian side, the Sermon on the Mount in the 8 or 9 Beatitudes. On the Islamic side, there is a very similar set of prescriptions. For example, among the Beatitudes is: "Blessed are the peacemakers for they shall be called children of God." Well, if you look in Sura 2, the Cow, of the Koran, you will find about Verse 12 the same thing, but cast in the other direction. The quote is something to the effect of, "There are those who call themselves peacemakers, but it is really they who are the mischief makers on this earth." Several stanzas further down, you come across, "And woe unto them." It seemed to me that in the Christmas season, this was a perfect message that could be put in Admiral Howe's remarks for the New Year to the Somali audience. He wouldn't touch it with a 10 foot pole. "Can't have Christians quoting Muslim scripture." What nonsense.

Q: In a way, it was frustrating but at the same time I would think that you would feel there was nothing you could really do there anyway. Did you feel something could have been done?

CARNEY: I didn't know. The answer is, you never will unless you try. You put that in suspension in the back of your mind and go for it. We did do a couple of good trips upcountry. I worked closely with a fellow who was Special Forces, going off to be the commander in Fort Lewis, and with a fellow who was a nephew or a grand nephew of a former Secretary of State, Stetinnius, who was working on a program that has since become installed all around the world, a sort of ICITAP improvement of the criminal justice system, both by upgrading the police and trying to upgrade the courts. We tried to help broker a relationship in Belet Weyne, where the Germans had succeeded the Italians as the main UN force. Then we were in Baidoa and one other place which I cannot recall the name of, but it was essentially pastoral. Remarkable. It enabled me to acquire some frankincense which proved to be great stocking stuffers for Christmas of 1994. I couldn't find any myrrh. Frankincense is essentially a gum Arabic, and is readily available.

I got to know Somalis. If you understand what they are, you can deal with them. You make the wrong assumptions and you can be dead. Very interesting place. But just simply the West, and certainly the U.S., did not understand it well enough to make a decision to engage. That was a mistake. That was bad policy.

Q: You mentioned that you had picked up the feeling that there are an awful lot of time servers in the UN going for the position as opposed to the job.

CARNEY: Yes, that's true. That began to change as you increased the tempo of field missions where, if you didn't produce results, people noticed it. But in the period of most of the UN's history, with the deadlock between the U.S. and the USSR over a number of issues, it did not pay to be a UN bureaucrat who raised your head too high. There were numbers and numbers recruited who learned that lesson. Particularly if you were from the Third World you lived fat, you did little, tried to draw as little attention to yourself as possible except where you would look good rather than necessarily be good. I ran into that on the Cambodia mission. A remarkable bunch of incompetents sent out from the UN headquarters.

Q: You left in early '94. There is always a taint of anybody who's been involved in essentially a failed mission. Did you find this?

CARNEY: I didn't. I immediately, thanks to April Glaspie, went to Lakhdar Brahimi as Special Political Advisor in the UN observer mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) for the elections that brought Mandela to power. I met a number of characters who will figure in our subsequent chats. Susan Rice was on the NSC staff and became Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. I got to know a number of UN people who I've stayed close to as well a seeing again Reg Austin, who had been in Cambodia as the head of the electoral unit.

He was head of the electoral monitoring aspect of the UN mission in South Africa. He was a Zimbabwean. Interesting mission.

Q: You came right back and went to this election. You were in South Africa from when to when?

CARNEY: In Johannesburg... I want to say I arrived in March, but I will have to check that. I stayed through the election in May. Then Brahimi asked me to stay on an extra month, which I did.

The election itself was fascinating. First of all, there was a pre-Brahimi mission led by Angela King. She did not have enough horsepower and Brahimi did. He was a former Algerian foreign minister, Special Representative of the UN for the Congo. Then sent to South Africa as the Secretary General's man for the South African elections. Brahimi immediately recognized that I could be enormously useful. He picked the slice of my experience with white South African politics from when I had been political counselor in Pretoria from '83 to '86. Indeed I did know a number of white South African politicians and of course black South African politicians. He had a little stable of special political advisors - an Egyptian who is active now, another American who was a professor at City College, an African specialist who is now in the DC area. I had dinner with him the other night - Herbert Weiss. Brahimi had his own team which has continued with him now, a fellow whose name betrays an Armenian background, Seryadarian, an Iraqi Ala Almaman, who was chief of protocol, is in Bosnia now, if I'm not mistaken rather than in Afghanistan with Brahimi.

Brahimi was exceedingly good working with the very competent South African negotiators and that negotiating process included Rolf Meyer and Leon Wessels, and the ANC people also engaged in it. The big problem was getting the Zulu prime minister, Gatsha Buthelezi, on board the effort. He had been an early ANC member. He had become creator of the Inkatha Freedom Party, the political wing of the Zulu. Over the years of his return to South Africa, Inkatha had become very independent. The Zulu never accepted to become a Bantustan, to become independent themselves in the vision of the apartheid government so that all black tribes would have their own and rather small quasi independent mini states. The Zulu completely refused ever to buy into that. It looked, and the ANC began criticizing Gatsha because he was so clearly a pole around which Zulu were rallying, rather than joining the ANC itself. Negotiations succeeded in getting Gatsha to participate at the very last minute.

Q: Your role was just to watch this?

CARNEY: No, it was to talk with the political figures, find out what was going on, see if there were any grievances that the UN needed to address, see if there were any trends that were leaning in an unhappy direction. At the election itself, I joined other UN monitors at polling places.

Q: You have a white government. You have a challenging ANC, an opening up of the electorate for the first time.

CARNEY: A number of other parties as well.

Q: Yes. What was the role of the UN?

CARNEY: The mandate was to monitor the elections and see if they were free and fair. But in fact it was bigger than that.

Q: Could you talk about what you were...

CARNEY: As nearly as I could tell, a major effort was at facilitating, where needed, early identification of any problems, facilitation of their resolution so that the elections could go forward smoothly.

Q: How did you get involved?

CARNEY: April Glaspie.

Q: But I mean, with this UN mandate, what were you doing?

CARNEY: I was basically advising Brahimi on what was going on in white politics and notably in the Afrikaner political elements.

Q: What was going on with the Afrikaners? This had been the group that had been the most adamantly opposed to black rule.

CARNEY: Yes. A personal friend of mine was the chief of staff for Frederik Willem De Klerk, the State President. It was De Klerk who had looked at the situation in South African with his close friends and decided that P.W. Botha's, his predecessor's, direction was going to produce chaos if not bloodbath. It was De Klerk and his associates who decided there had to be a negotiation. Mandela had to be let out of jail, and South Africa had to move forward as a non-racial state with apartheid ended. Now, not all Afrikaners agreed. But what De Klerk did was, he set a referendum among whites for the very direction that I've outlined. That referendum passed overwhelmingly. But there were nevertheless strong, armed unhappy, ultraconservative whites who insisted De Klerk was wrong and there could never be a unified, non-racial South Africa.

Q: As the election approached, was everyone looking at these ultraconservatives and saying, "Is there going to be an assassination or an armed uprising?"

CARNEY: There were plenty of incidents. There was a bomb at the airport. There was a major bomb downtown which killed a number of people and set off what could have become a major riot that was damped down. There were clear provocations certainly done

by these very right-wing Afrikaners. It didn't work. Mandela was able to keep the lid on.

Q: How did the voting go when you watched this?

CARNEY: It was interesting. I myself went to Sharpeville of historical fame, where the major riot over Bantu education took place that essentially set South Africa on its course for the last third of the 20th century. I went to a number of other places where there had been serious riots and important killings of rioters and activists. Everybody wanted to vote. The first place we went to was in Soweto. There were two polling stations. There was about to be a riot there because people were breaking into line and the lines were enormous. There weren't quite enough ballot boxes. We helped bring over one of the peacemakers, which was a title given to younger men in their 30s who were part of- (end of tape)

These young men were part of (black) civil society groups organized to help effect the transition by acting at the very local level to resolve conflicts and disputes. A couple of them came over and restored order. They had the mandate of the ANC and everybody knew it.

Q: You stayed on after the election.

CARNEY: Yes. It turned out that there wasn't any real need to have me around. But Brahimi wanted enough of a staff so that he could do things as needed. I left at the end of July.

Q: This would be July '94.

CARNEY: That's correct.

Q: What happened?

CARNEY: I was in Namibia hunting. This would have been about August. I got a telephone call from Robin Raphel. Robin at that time was Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs. The South Asia Bureau was new at the time, had about 28 employees. The bureau itself had a budget smaller than the embassy in Tokyo. Robin called. She had been refused when she asked about hiring somebody on as her Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. The bureau was so small it only had one DAS. She concluded that I might be a good candidate. So she called up and actually got through on the telephone. She asked if I'd do it. I talked with my wife and said I'd be delighted to come on board. The bureaucracy blessed it and I reported in to the South Asia Bureau in about September of '94.

Q: And you were there until when?

CARNEY: Until about June of '95.

Q: How did you find the South Asia Bureau having been cut off from the Near Eastern

Bureau? Was it in limbo?

CARNEY: I never knew the Near Eastern Bureau. I had never served in either South Asia or the Near East. The bureau made eminently good sense, except that it clearly should have had added to it the various Stans: Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, maybe even Kazakhstan. But that hasn't happened.

The issues were important. India was just emerging from its socialist phase and becoming more market economy oriented. Pakistan and India continued at each other's throats, both of them with burgeoning nuclear weapons programs. The Chinese were involved in enhancing Pakistan's nuclear and missile capabilities. The Indians continued to tweak Pakistan and try to beggar it by forcing more and more of its revenues into military expenditures. In the meantime, you had the situation in Bangladesh which was an unhappy political catfight of Begum Zia and Sheik Hasina being the ladies at issue. You had the Tamil Tigers continuing their insurgency in Sri Lanka, an insurgency which as you and I sit here seems to be in the process of mediation. Fascinating place. I had been to Nepal after Vietnam. That was my only experience with the region.

Q: How did you find yourself handling this? What were you doing?

CARNEY: Basically the DAS was the bureau manager, so I was working closely with the administrative officer for Near East and South Asian Affairs. I believe those were still together back in those days. I was working especially to recruit officers for the various positions, an annual exercise. Making sure efficiency reports got written. Helping make sure that speeches got written for Robin Raphel, including drafting a speech that she gave at the Asia Society on the U.S. and the region. And then traveling to the field to show policy level interest. A DAS is the lowest policy rung in the State Department. I visited India twice, Pakistan twice, Nepal once, Sri Lanka once.

Q: Afghanistan was off limits at that point?

CARNEY: For Afghanistan, I went up to Peshawar and spent 24 of the busiest hours I've ever spent literally from breakfast on in meetings with Afghan figures.

Q: What were we trying to do with Afghanistan?

CARNEY: Basically back in those days there were a couple of things we were looking at. We were trying to get the Stingers that were missing back. I was following that. We were trying to broker some sort of arrangement to produce rational government in Kabul. At the same time, we were seeing the Taliban begin their conquests in the Pushtun areas of Afghanistan.

Q: How did you find relations between our embassy in Islamabad and New Delhi?

CARNEY: The irony there was, at that time, Frank Wisner had just gotten to New Delhi.

Frank is an elemental force. He and I had a very to the point discussions. He was pushing for U.S. tanks for India. I said, "Frank, why would we give the Indians tanks that they could use against Pakistan?" He said, "Oh, no, they want them against the Chinese." I said, "Frank, this is never going to happen. Let's drop it." He did. He wouldn't hesitate to call 18 people in Washington behind the Assistant Secretary's back to get something done. I think he figured it out.

Q: There was the little matter of the Himalayas, too.

CARNEY: Exactly. Yes, the Chinese were a threat. They had come across the Himalayas. But to my knowledge they were not in tank country when they did so. It was at high altitude.

Q: Very high altitude. In fact, we were having problems with our embassy supply because the Cosmoline kept crystallizing and all that.

CARNEY: Then you had John Monjo as ambassador in Islamabad. John and I go back to Jakarta days where we had one unhappy set of experiences. He was perfectly professional in dealing with the visiting firemen, quite a nice dinner there. John came back and went into the Inspection Corps. I believe he's retired now but continues to inspect.

Dealing with the Pakistanis was interesting. They had at the time in Washington a former journalist as ambassador who just left about 6 months ago from her second posting under a very different government as ambassador here. She was Meleeha Lodi, who was the essence of all that's good about Pakistanis, which is to say, they're funny, they're smart, you can talk to them about anything, they're never on a high horse, unlike Indians, and they're not pretending to be something they aren't, which Indians and, unfortunately, Americans can do entirely too often. For example, clearly, the embassy in Washington had briefed the foreign ministry on the antecedents of the visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary. The Foreign Secretary when I met him was taking the mickey out of me. "What is your background in South Asian affairs?" He knew I'd never served in the region. I looked at him and said, "Well, aside from a visit to Nepal, I'm considerably informed through the works of George McDonald Fraser." He looked at me and said, "Ah, Flashman." He got it. That was it. It broke the ice. We could talk. It didn't take him long to figure out that on those areas of the brief that were of considerably vital interest to the U.S. and Pakistan, I was up to speed.

Q: For the record, Fraser wrote a series of books on Flashman, novels that were very funny but very good historically on dealings during the time of the Great Game in that area.

CARNEY: Yes. In fact, it goes all the way through the wars with the Sikhs, the Sepoy mutiny, everything is covered, as well as any number of Flashman's other experiences in wars of the 19th century, including the U.S. Civil War.

Q: He was with John Brown, at Custer's last stand, and was sold as a slave. It's a wonderful set of novels.

CARNEY: Yes.

Q: Did you find within the bureau... Here these people were untimely ripped from the NEA bureau, which remains a very strong bureau mainly devoted to Arab-Israeli affairs. Did you get a sense of freedom, "Oh, now we can do it on our own" or the fact that they're out of the limelight?

CARNEY: To a person, the people in the South Asia Bureau were delighted at having gotten away from their colleagues in the Middle East. South Asia had always been neglected. The realities of the issues and U.S. interests in South Asia were not being served in the combined bureau.

Q: Where did Iran fall?

CARNEY: Iran was and is in NEA. Persians with Arabs, what can I say?

Q: Did you find a divided bureau in that there were either Indian hands or Pakistani hands?

CARNEY: I didn't. Everybody had served in both countries. There aren't enough posts. And in Bangladesh as well, East Pakistan, if you will. There weren't enough posts for anyone who specialized in that area to become a client or an advocate of one country over another.

Q: What was the feeling about whither Afghanistan?

CARNEY: By the time I left, I can't recall whether the Taliban had Kabul or they were marching on it.

Q: I think they came in in '96.

CARNEY: They were marching on Kabul. The conventional wisdom was that once they got out of the Pushtun areas that they were going to be in trouble. But that did not prove to be the case largely because your Panjshiris were in Kabul at that time, including the chap who was assassinated on September 10, (Mohammed Shah) Massoud. He, (the Uzbek Abdul Rashid) Dostom, and the other leaders could not get together to face the threat of the Taliban.

Q: Was there a concern about "We've got to do something" or was there any feeling that maybe the Taliban would be a good thing?

CARNEY: In the South Asia Bureau there was very little feel that the Taliban would be a

good thing. They were regarded as too much influenced by conservative Pakistani Islam, and too absolutist in the way they dealt with their own people.

Q: Did you have the feeling that we were letting the Pakistanis, that this was another Somalia and we'd better stay away from this?

CARNEY: Nothing like that. Nobody was looking at it that way. There was no interest in the U.S. going back into Afghanistan.

Q: We didn't even have an embassy there.

CARNEY: No. Of course, we had the chancery and we had somebody watching it, an old Afghan employee, but there was no resident staff and nobody was accredited from offshore, the argument being that there was no real government in Kabul to be accredited to.

Q: Did Nepal raise any interest?

CARNEY: It did because a communist prime minister was elected. I met him in December of '94. He didn't stay in office long. He was turfed out in Nepali politicking within a couple of months.

Q: How about China? Was there a watching brief on China or was there a feeling that China had reached its limits and they weren't moving in or trying to do too much?

CARNEY: Everybody accepted the Indian view that their primary threat was from China, but it didn't seem a threat likely ever to materialize. So, everyone would nod sagely when they'd hear that from an Indian and then you'd go on to what's real and what's real was trying to get their economy shaped up. They were in the process of creating that computer mecca at Bangalore. U.S. business was very interested in India, an India that was moving out into the real world economy.

Q: What about Kashmir? Was this considered an annoying distraction by us?

CARNEY: Kashmir was one of the real issues. That was one of the briefs that I had to speak to the Pakistanis and the Indians about. I never did get a serious Indian recognition of what was wrong with that place. What was wrong with it was, they didn't want to be part of India, it's as simple as that. I don't to this day know how they're going to resolve that. The Indians do have the power. They are the regional power, there's no doubt about that. But how long they'll let that running sore stay open is...

Q: Was this as emotional an issue with the Indians as it seems to be?

CARNEY: It depended entirely on who you talked to. For some, yes, but by and large, I got the impression it was an issue that was being worked rather than an issue that was passionately held and felt. But then the Indians would often give you mixed signals on how

they dealt with issues - it's part of national character - or how they deal with other people, their own families. I never got enough of an understanding of Indians to make a definitive judgment.

Q: How was Pakistan viewed?

CARNEY: The problem with Pakistan was, they had ordered all these F-16s from us that we weren't willing to deliver because of the legislative prohibition relating partly to their nuclear weapons effort. There is enough of an India lobby in the U.S. that there are people on the Hill who will delightedly operate legislatively against Pakistan. This was the case. The U.S. was in what I believed to be the unacceptable position of not being willing to deliver the F-16s that had been ordered nor being willing to refund the money that had been paid.

Q: This was the thing I found astounding. This happened with Libya and other places. They pay for planes and then they don't get them.

CARNEY: Yes.

Q: I would have thought that there would have been enough fuss... I guess once they paid for the planes, then there is no countervailing lobby on the part of the Texans who make the F-16. If they got their money, they don't care.

CARNEY: Anyway, I found it distinctly wrong. It was wrong for the United States to be in that position.

Q: How did you find the Indian lobby?

CARNEY: Arrogant for the most part. Unrealistic. An odd bunch of people.

Q: It's an emerging group like the Jewish lobby and the Greek lobby.

CARNEY: Except that the Indians would turn around and shoot themselves in the foot often enough that this group would have to reform and go into damage control, rather than being able to push forward. Now, what's happened with the Jewish lobby is something similar in the last couple of years, but that's a relatively newer phenomenon.

Q: How did you find Robin Raphel as an administrator of this program?

CARNEY: Well, Robin had the problem that she was perceived as having gotten the job - she went from political counselor in Delhi to Assistant Secretary of State - solely because she had been at Oxford the same time Bill Clinton had been there and was regarded as a friend of Bill, which was not, as I saw it, the case. She had an entree because of that old friendship, but it had nothing to do with the way she was able to do business on the scene. First of all, she is very smart and her focus is totally policy-oriented. She is an economist

basically but... I enjoyed working with her. She had a way to pick out the important issues and she also had a pretty good disabused view of people that she was working with.

Q: You were there for a relatively short time.

CARNEY: Yes. That was bizarre.

Q: You left there in '95?

CARNEY: I left there because in October of '94 I got a letter from (Director General) Genta Hawkins saying, "Thank you, you're TIC'ed out, goodbye" and then I got a telephone call from (Undersecretary for Management) Dick Moose saying, "How would you like to be ambassador to Sudan?" I said to Dick, "Dick, that wouldn't be my first choice." I said I'd talk with Vicki and get back to him in the next day. I hung up and my secretary, Sue Shay, had been listening on the telephone and came in and said, "Hmm, all beach, no ocean." Great.

Q: You accepted this.

CARNEY: Yes. As Robin said to me, "You know, you're out if you don't do this. I'm not going to quibble about it at all." Gib Lanpher replaced me.

Q: So you were in the Sudan from when to when?

CARNEY: I started reading in in January of '95. I had my confirmation hearing in late May. I arrived at post in mid-August and presented credentials September 11, 1995.

Q: When did you leave?

CARNEY: On February 7, 1996, the entire diplomatic and administrative and technical staff of the mission was withdrawn. We wound up living in Nairobi at a much reduced level of staff with one consular officer resident in Cairo. We commuted monthly to Khartoum ostensibly because it was not safe to be resident in Khartoum.

Q: When did this all end?

CARNEY: For me it ended November 30, 1997, when I left Khartoum to come back and read in in detail and go on to Haiti.

Q: Okay. Let's talk about the Sudan. What was the situation in '95?

CARNEY: The situation was bad. As David Shinn, who was then Director for East African Affairs said, there was some doubt that there would even be a U.S. embassy resident in Khartoum. There was doubt on three accounts. The first was, my predecessor had apparently been recommending that we reconsider having an embassy there. The second is

that we were about to refuse *agrement* for the man whom Khartoum had designated as ambassador to Washington. The third was, there was an increasing surveillance of embassy American staff by non-Sudanese and some by Sudanese themselves in Khartoum itself, as well as a heightened rhetoric against the United States allegedly seen as arming the (rebel) SPLA, seeking an overthrow of the authorities in Khartoum, and otherwise plotting against the Sudan as shown by the various trials related to events in New York City.

This resulted from the reality that a coup d'etat in 1989 had overthrown the elected leader, a modern figure, but from a traditional political movement, Sadiq El-Mahdi, whose millenarian great grandfather had defeated Chinese Gordon, Governor General of the Sudan in 1885. The people who took over were essentially political Islamists with allegiance to the National Islamic Front whose intellectual figure was, and to a degree, remains to this day, Hassan Abdullah Turabi. The coup itself was run by a major general - at the time, he might even have been a brigadier general - Omar Bashir, who is to this day president of the Sudan. The U.S. opposed the coup, as we do with such events against elected leaders anywhere.

The political Islamists thought political Islam was on a roll around the world and began disrespecting American interests, notably by inviting terrorism financier Osama Bin Laden to take up residence, which he did in '93; by becoming a locus of something called the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference PAIC), that held an activist Islamist venting session annually, and by expanding relations with Middle Eastern terrorist groups. The new authorities were also prosecuting vigorously the civil war against the south, whose grievances had long been regarded as legitimate by Americans among others, and violating human rights in Khartoum as well. It was not a happy time in relations.

Q: Did you go with your wife?

CARNEY: I did. I told Dick Moose that I would not go without my wife. In fact, my predecessor had figured out that previous withdrawals of non-essentials and dependents were based on information of no real substance. He had gotten Washington to change the no dependents rule in late '94/early '95.

Q: Was there any problem in getting confirmed?

CARNEY: Absolutely not.

Q: So, if you want to go there...

CARNEY: You can go. Nancy Kassebaum was the only person on the Committee (when a number of us going to Africa went for confirmation hearings).

Q: What were they telling you on the desk before you went out there?

CARNEY: Well, I pretty much repeated... I was reading in, so I was seeing the cables as

well as listening to David Shinn and Joe Fishbein, the Sudan desk officer. You had a huge humanitarian relief effort underway. The Sudanese government and the main rebel faction had signed an agreement which permitted the United Nations to create an Operation Lifeline Sudan. That operation was flying food and medical relief into an enormous number of destinations in the south except when they would be denied. You had the International Committee of the Red Cross active in both Khartoum and in the south with a several hundred bed hospital at the UN operations base and airstrip in northwestern Kenya at Lokichokio. You had an alphabet soup of NGOs there, Catholic Relief Services, CARE, Norwegian People's Aid, the latter was not part of OLS, and is widely regarded as helping smuggle arms to the SPLA. Very complicated.

In the period I was ambassador you saw the resurrection of two issues. One was slavery and the other was religious persecution, both attributed to the intolerance or the active prosecution by the government of Sudan.

Q: How were you welcomed when you arrived?

CARNEY: By Lufthansa late at night. We had come from Brussels, where we had stayed with friends, and had picked up probably salmonella poisoning. Very hot summer and there was a very good coq au vin. My wife had a worse case of it than I did. Basically we got into Khartoum and the Chief of Protocol was at the plane to welcome us, the DCM or chargé d'affaires in fact, a couple of staff as well. We went over to the residence, quite a nice residence. A glass of champagne with everybody. Tumbled into bed and went into the office the next day where my wife duly visited the nurse practitioner who is still there, a Scotswoman married to a Sudanese.

Q: How did you find you dealt with the government, with Bashir?

CARNEY: When I presented credentials September 11, we did the ceremony not in the presidential palace which had leaked due to a heavy rainstorm, but in a different, modern building. He invited me to sit down and we talked a little bit about some of the issues, including a UN C-130 that had been denied flight clearance by the Sudanese authorities. I suggested that he revisit that issue. I noted US concern with "foreign guests," implying the terrorist groups. He suggested I travel all around Sudan. I promised to keep the Foreign Minister busy with requests to do so.

I got hold of the public affairs officer who was the only real serious Arabist at post; she spoke great Arabic. We began an immediate effort to know the Sudanese press, had them all over to the residence for an evening, including Sudan TV with a camera crew that arrived. Started under, at her suggestion, small meetings with intellectuals in the National Islamic Front, and was basically in a mode to listen, which these people found refreshing.

I think also they had begun to figure out that political Islam really wasn't on a worldwide roll, and that Sudan had to be more responsible to take its place in the international community. This had been particularly driven home to them because on June 26, not quite

two months before I arrived, the Sudanese had been exposed as having been accomplices before and after the fact of the attempted assassination of (Egyptian President) Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, where he had gone for an OAU summit. The hit failed, and three suspects fled back to Sudan and they were traced in flight. They had clearly benefitted from serious support by the External Security Bureau of the Sudanese government.

Q: Was this security bureau acting independently?

CARNEY: They were not acting independently of Turabi and the party, but it isn't clear to me that Bashir at his level was witting of the extent of support and of the details of the operation. He fired the head of the External Security Bureau and was very short with Turabi. Turabi suggested at one point that Bashir come over and discuss it. Bashir said, "I'm the president. You'll come over and see me." There was a little testiness in their relationship, a testiness that ultimately three years later resulted in Turabi's eclipse politically, and then his being put in prison three more months later.

Q: What were we trying to do regarding these various terrorist groups which had set up their nests within the Sudan?

CARNEY: The answer changes over time. In 1995 to start out with, we were trying to get the Sudanese government to monitor the groups that we thought were surveilling our people and bring that surveillance to a halt. That was the first thing we were trying to do. There were several demarches made to that effect.

Q: Our concern being what?

CARNEY: Personal security, fear that there would be some sort of terrorist operation against our people. We were also trying to get the Sudanese government to recognize that it was not acceptable to support international terrorism, that terror was not an acceptable way to go about changing things. I think the Sudanese had accepted that by May of 1996 when they asked Osama Bin Laden to leave at our behest. This is a very complicated aspect of the relationship.

Q: Osama Bin Laden at that point, how did we view him?

CARNEY: We viewed him as an important terrorism financier resident in Sudan, that's all.

Q: This was before the bombings of our embassies in Dar Es Salaam and Nairobi.

CARNEY: That (bombing) was '98. Khobar Towers and what have you were in '96. Bin Laden was not implicated in any specific acts of terror or murder except against the Soviets in Afghanistan, where he earned his reputation.

Q: There was this massive relief effort in the Sudan for the non-Muslim south. What was in it for the Muslim north to let this go on?

CARNEY: Well, there were millions of (displaced) southerners in the north who were getting relief as well. Clearly, the government then didn't have to provide relief for its own people. That was one. The other thing is that because the government gave the okay on flight destinations, it could to a degree control where that relief went. If there had been no agreement, Katie, bar the door. Anybody could have flown anything in that the Kenyans permitted.

Q: And the Sudanese didn't have the capability of stopping these flights.

CARNEY: No. Their air force was minuscule. Since '95, they have acquired helicopter gunships, but no air defense aircraft to the best of my knowledge.

Q: What was the role of oil there?

CARNEY: None at that point. The area from whence oil was being pumped - and that pumping began in '98 - had been proved by Chevron before it left Sudan about 1983. That concession had been acquired by a Vancouver, Canada company named after Frank Herbert's favorite planet, Arakis, in his novel "Dune." That company sold out to Talisman, which is itself in the process of trying to sell to the Indians. The exploitation area in the south is an area peopled by the Nuer tribe just south of the political dividing line between north and south Sudan. Since '98, you've been pumping about between 200,000 and 350,000 barrels of oil a day. It's worth about half a billion dollars to the Sudanese government. The Chinese take all the oil that is not actually refined in Sudan for the Sudan's own needs. The Chinese have 40% of the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company.

Q: But when you were there, they hadn't come on line.

CARNEY: No, but it was being formed. Occidental was looking into moving there. One of the NSC people basically leaked all the details of that to the "Washington Post," where it duly appeared and helped scare Occidental off.

Q: The Sudan at one point was a great grain source. How stood Sudan economically?

CARNEY: Sudan is in an interesting situation. It's a million square miles in surface area. It's the biggest country in Africa. It has 29-30 million people. The Nile forms at Khartoum itself. The two main sources are the Blue Nile and the White Nile, the Blue Nile from Ethiopia and the White Nile from Uganda. Another major tributary from Ethiopia, is the Atbara. You have an enormous potential for grain. Some of that potential is realized in an area known as the Gezira, that is between the Blue and White Nile rivers. The British created a gravity flow irrigation system there which grows cotton and sorghum.

Sudan could do a lot more with the water. There is a sugar enterprise established on the White Nile about 200 kilometers south of Khartoum which is known as Kenana. In the last

growing season, they produced 400,000 tons of cane sugar. I was down there in January (2003).

Q: Was there any feeling that Sudan should concentrate on developing its wealth?

CARNEY: No, the entire discussion on Sudan was overwhelmed by political Islam, by the terrorism question, by the civil war, and by human rights questions.

Q: Human rights was completely concerned with the south or was that...

CARNEY: No, by no means. There were a range of human rights concerns. You had suppression of political rights in the north including abduction into ghost houses, beatings, and interrogations there. You had an element of the sort of fundamentalist approach that's more common in Saudi Arabia where the relatively high position of women was seemingly being put at risk. That never really materialized. You had the issue of abductions of African tribes by Arab nomads known as "slavery" tolerated by the government. You had the question of intolerance towards Christians which took the form in the Khartoum area of the refusal to permit more churches to be built but not actual closing or prohibition of church going; and then a strong effort to create rice or- (end of tape)

A strong effort to create rice or millet Christians among the refugees from the south. Of course, there was no possibility to change the government peacefully. The coup government was in charge. Major set of human rights concerns, all of them in the context of a welcome to this alphabet soup of Middle Eastern terrorist groups.

Action against U.S. interests: Support of Iraq, for example, during the Gulf War. And then our own bad intelligence. In late January of 1996, the CIA formally withdrew 140 reports that had been filed in '93 or thereabouts that had been the basis for reducing staff and withdrawing dependents. The source was deemed a fabricator and embellisher. A second source in late 1995 argued a plot by Sudanese authorities against Tony Lake's life (in the first Clinton administration he was Advisor to the President for National Security Affairs). That source was dropped, ultimately deemed... It was a very complicated situation. When the Sudanese in March of 1996 began to respond to U.S. concerns on the terrorism front, it was not taken seriously in Washington for a couple of reasons that did not become clear for years and years.

Q: What were the reasons?

CARNEY: The first one was, the track record was so bad you had to be skeptical whether Khartoum was serious. But in fact, they booted Bin Laden out in May of '96. In late June of '96, they let someone come out from Washington to photograph two (military) training camps that we asked to visit. I was on that trip, so I know it happened. Then in early '97, there was a letter from (President) Bashir to President Clinton and from Foreign Minister Taha to new Secretary of State Albright inviting U.S. counterterrorism teams to come and discuss American concerns with Sudanese officials, none of which were ever seriously

responded to. Strobe Talbott ultimately responded as Acting Secretary 2 or 3 months later.

Q: You were ambassador then?

CARNEY: Yes.

Q: What were you getting from Washington? Why weren't they responding?

CARNEY: The NSC was hard over. Dick Clarke and Susan Rice.

Q: There wasn't any feeling that there was some give there?

CARNEY: No willingness to test the Sudanese to see if they were serious. I believe that this was ultimately explained because Ms. Rice and her collaborators genuinely believed the Ethiopians, Eritreans, and Ugandans were going to give enough support to the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army to cause enough victories by the SPLA to collapse the regime in Khartoum. That was never stated policy. Stated U.S. policy was always to get Khartoum to change what it did, NOT to see a change of regime in Khartoum. But in fact, that second agenda seems to have bee there. That agenda finally failed when Eritrea and Ethiopia went to war in '98.

Q: This was a war that killed a lot of people over nothing.

CARNEY: Exactly. Basically Uganda and Ethiopia in particular were very active and in direct support of major SPLA military efforts beginning about March of '97. Those efforts succeeded in taking some important garrison towns in the south but didn't go as far as Juba, which is essentially the capital of the south. It is to this day in government hands.

Q: Did you and Washington view this civil war... Did you see a split there that maybe eventually it would become a nation? It seems hard to think that a non-Muslim south and a racially different south was going to take over the north of Sudan.

CARNEY: That was never going to happen. Anyone who would have thought that would simply not have understood what Sudan's all about. The most that would have happened was, the north would have let the south go, secede. That is a possibility today in the peace negotiations that are going on in Kenya.

Q: Were we thinking in those terms?

CARNEY: We were not. U.S. policy has always been, if Sudan can preserve its integrity, so much the better. Creating yet another landlocked state in central Africa doesn't make any sense unless there's no other way.

Q: Were the Egyptians playing any role?

CARNEY: Of course. They must. The Nile is so utterly vital to Egypt that Egypt is paralyzed around the question of the Sudan with, too often, Egyptian hopes and fears outriding their analyses.

Q: What were their relations with the Egyptian ambassador?

CARNEY: There wasn't one. Their relations were so bad that they did not have ambassadors in each other's countries. The chargé d'affaires was a nice young man but he wasn't important. It was the Egyptian intelligence people on the scene who were the important ones. I would go to Cairo when I was in my offshore phase regularly, as I did to Asmara and Addis Ababa and Kampala and talk with the principals about Sudan: to the head of Egyptian intelligence, Omar Suleiman; to (President) Isaias Afwerki in Eritrea; and (President) Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia; and to Yoweri Museveni in Kenya; and of course to Daniel Arap Moi once or twice in Nairobi.

Q: You mentioned you went to a training camp. What was that all about?

CARNEY: Washington had questions about two particular camps. The assertion was that not only were these alphabet soup terrorist groups doing R&R in Sudan, but they were also engaged in actual military training. The one camp we went to was the military academy. It was the wrong season. The camp was empty. It's the cool season that the cadets are there. But there were some facilities of interest and they were duly photographed. The next camp we went to had people in training, but they were put to us as being members of the militia, something the National Islamic Front created when they came to power, sort of a popular militia, paramilitary types who backed up the military in fighting in the south. To the extent I could judge - and I do not speak Arabic - they were indeed Sudanese. They certainly didn't look like Arabs from other countries in the Middle East, as dark as Sudanese tend to be. They were field-stripping AK-47s and otherwise engaging in that kind of training.

Q: What about your relations with non-governmental organizations?

CARNEY: There were more of them there than there were terrorist groups. Basically we had an AID office there programmed for humanitarian affairs. They were the principal contact with the U.S. NGOs anyway. Naturally I would have them over to the residence whenever I could and would brief them. Every time I commuted in, there would be a morning briefing for the NGOs. Good relationship. I would see their opposite numbers in Nairobi and I would go into the south to look at their operations in the south as well, telling Khartoum that I was ambassador to all of the Sudan and hence I would be going into the south, too.

Q: How about this? What were you finding in the south? Was there a government there?

CARNEY: Not really. It was essentially a military government. The SPLA has a political movement, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement that was created in response to just these questions and criticisms that they don't really have a government, that it's a military

government. I'll be there the end of next month, so I'll be able to tell you whether there's one there yet or not.

Q: Was this a unified movement or was this just an endemic thing that had been going on...

CARNEY: The rebellion started in 1955. The first phase ended in 1973 with a 10 year hiatus and then it resumed due to some political clumsiness and bad faith on the part of the then dictator of Sudan, Jaffar Nimieri. The movement that helped resurrect the civil war in 1983 became the SPLA. It's essentially a movement of the Dinka ethnic majority, but has greatly broadened over the past 20 years. They have had considerable difficulty bringing other ethnic groups along with them, a problem of the south, and that is one of the realities of Sudan today.

Q: When you went down there, what were you saying? "Can't you all learn to live in peace with each other?"

CARNEY: No. I was saying to the southerners, "If you're going to fight a rebellion against the north to have your grievances, that are legitimate, redressed, it is not effective if you're so disunited. It seems to me that as the largest of the movements, the SPLA has the responsibility to make the compromises that would effect unity." That was my position with the southerners, with the Dinka. (SPLA/M leader John) Garang and I further talked about that in May of 2001. I had a chat with him in Nairobi.

Q: While you were in Khartoum, what was the embassy doing?

CARNEY: Let's take the period after February of '96 when we were offshore. The Secretary's instruction was that the embassy stay open with flag up every day and the FSN staff at work. Periodically one of the American members would commute in and stay a week or 10 days. We never were permitted to stagger it in such a way that there was always an American present but at least half the month there was an American present. This was a hell of a way to run a railroad. The AID office director was an American woman married to a Sudanese. She stayed until the cruise missile attack of August of '98 and then she was withdrawn to Kenya, but she's back now. It was very difficult. There is a requirement annually for the chief of mission to certify the adequacy of management controls. I signed it the first year, June of '96. In '97, I refused to sign it. I sent a cable in saying, "I will not sign any such undertaking because I do not believe we have effective management controls in the circumstances."

Q: Let's talk about this rather peculiar thing of moving out but coming back in. It doesn't seem to make much sense.

CARNEY: The precedent was what the Secretary's office drew on to fight off the importunities of (CIA Director) John Deutch and (Secretary of Defense) Bill Perry, who wanted the whole mission closed - Perry because he'd have to evacuate it, and Deutch because the CIA station had fled in mid-December already, and the fact that nothing had

happened was putting their position increasingly in an impossible situation. The precedent was found in Lebanon when the mission was drawn offshore to Cyprus.

Q: It sounds like the station, the CIA presence, in the Sudan had been crying wolf and nothing had happened.

CARNEY: That is basically it, yes.

Q: And Perry being there as Secretary of Defense-

CARNEY: Was worried about having to devote assets and fly them more than 1,000 miles to effect an evacuation.

Q: That's a long way to get people out of there if you're going to do it.

CARNEY: He was relying on Deutch, his former deputy, to advise him on the politics of Sudan, not willing to trust the State Department's view.

Q: When you got these orders, did you try to turn them around?

CARNEY: We had worked against them since November of '95, including a trip back to Washington to talk to Dick Moose and his people, and then to meet in the situation room at the White House on the issue.

Q: Did you feel that State gave in on this?

CARNEY: Yes.

Q: Why?

CARNEY: Because (Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs) George Moose had no stomach for a fight. Dick Moose was only concerned about protecting Americans, and nobody else was willing to take Deutch on. Deutch changed his mind when I chatted with him in Nairobi in April or May of 1996, and then again in Washington in June of '96.

Q: It does seem like sort of a write-off of the Sudan.

CARNEY: Yes, it did. It struck me as not in the interests of the United States. I made the point repeatedly.

Q: You kept up with this until when?

CARNEY: I was in Khartoum for three weeks last month.

Q: But I'm talking about as ambassador.

CARNEY: Until November 30, 1997.

Q: Were you replaced by somebody?

CARNEY: No, I'm the last accredited U.S. ambassador to Sudan.

Q: Looking at this, you keep going back there. Have things changed? How do you feel about this?

CARNEY: Things have changed. That's what is interesting about it.

Q: Has it gotten more dangerous?

CARNEY: Far from it. What happened, and again this is partly speculative, once it became clear that the regional allies could not be counted on to cause the collapse of the government in Khartoum, the Clinton administration changed policies. In May of 2000 the Clinton Administration sent an FBI-CIA counterterrorism team with a 6 point agenda to deal with the Sudanese authorities on U.S. concerns about terrorism. When I visited in January of 2001, just before the inauguration, I spoke with the head of the External Security Bureau and his deputy. I was retired at this point for more than a year. They said they thought they had satisfied all 6 of the American concerns. The Bush Administration apparently agreed because in May of 2001, they asked Chester Crocker to be special envoy to the President for Sudan. Crocker turned it down. The Administration several months later turned to Senator John Danforth, who accepted and was rolled out in a Rose Garden ceremony on September 3, 2001. The events of September 11th caused some to think that Sudan should be a target, but Colin Powell by the end of October publicly said Sudan had satisfied U.S. concerns on terrorism issues.

Senator Danforth began his work and in January of 2002 succeeded in getting the two main protagonists in the fighting, the government and the SPLA, to satisfy his 4 conditions to show willingness to have the U.S. help mediate a solution. In July of 2002, on the 20th, the government and the SPLA signed a memorandum of understanding at Machakos, Kenya agreeing on the two most contentious issues dividing them. One was the question of the extension of Islamic law which was to be a subject of local/provincial referendum. The other was a timetable after which the south would have a referendum to see if it wanted to stay united or to secede: Six and a half years. After that, beginning in August, when I happened to be in Khartoum on a separate trip, they began the peace talks to operationalize that memorandum of understanding and continue with the next session set for the end of March, along with an interim session on a different track set for the 4th of March to discuss the fate of three areas that are formally part of the north of Sudan that want to be part of the south.

Q: When you came back, what did you do?

CARNEY: I was a little surprised because I had gone for my confirmation hearing in October for ambassador to Haiti. The Senate approved on November 16th. I said "Goodbye" and then went from Khartoum to Washington to start reading in on Haiti. My wife joined me and we spent Christmas with her folks in Spokane and arrived in Port-au-Prince on January 8, 1998. I presented credentials a week-

Q: You were there for how long?

CARNEY: Until the end of December 1999.

Q: What was the situation in Haiti when you went there?

CARNEY: If you look in the "New York Review of Books," you will see in the March edition a long description of what Haiti's all about taken in the guise of a review of a book that's just come out on "Haiti, Predatory Republic." It was in the presidency of Rene Preval who had been the alter ego in many ways of Jean Bertrand Aristide, and selected for the presidency because the Haitian constitution will only let you have one term at a time. You can have another term, but it cannot be consecutive. Aristide was reinstalled by the U.S. in '94. That became a UN mission shortly thereafter. He stepped down in '95 at the insistence of the White House. His term had started 5 years earlier. Preval was elected and ran a non-government for 5 years, holding the place warm for Aristide to return. The country went to hell politically; in terms of drug transit center; and economically, and that's where it is now under Aristide's resumed presidency.

Q: What were our concerns with Haiti?

CARNEY: Our concern was no governance, no development, insufficient effort at stalling the drug transit trade from the Cali cartel in Colombia that would send its go-fast boats on a 10 hour trip with a ton of cocaine to Haiti to be transshipped through the Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico and home free to the U.S.

Q: What did you find when you got there?

CARNEY: A traffic jam. We got there on a Sunday, thank God, when there isn't a traffic jam. But on Monday, every car that failed the Florida inspection was sent off to Haiti. Haiti's not very big. It's 8,000 square miles. 25,000 square kilometers. Just amazing. Eight million people. No trees except at the embassy residence, which had one of the larger forests and bird sanctuaries on that part of the island. People who simply wouldn't get together for the national good. Remarkable. A polity that was fragmented with Jean Bertrand Aristide at his retirement residence essentially running things, or putting spanners in things that he didn't want to see run.

Q: How did you view the Aristide style... What was he? He was touted as being our guy?

CARNEY: Yes, but he wasn't. He was more of the same (style of traditional predatory

Haitian leader). A great pity. He could have been so much more, but he wasn't.

Q: Prior to that, there had been the Duvalier stuff, the military dictatorship. But what was Aristide doing?

CARNEY: He was a priest. He became political while he was a priest and then he essentially left the priesthood in order to marry. He's got two children now. His wife is said to be corrupt. He himself certainly tolerates corruption as a way of using and manipulating people. Interesting.

Q: Did you deal with him at all?

CARNEY: Oh, yes, I saw him once every 4-6 weeks.

Q: Was he just biding time to come back again?

CARNEY: Yes, no question. Whenever I'd ask Washington for a policy review, I'd get sent Tony Lake, who was by now in his new career but also sort of a dollar a year man for the U.S. government. Lake was the one who was so fond of Aristide. He's even a godfather to one of Aristide's daughters.

Q: Was there any disillusionment there?

CARNEY: On Tony Lake's part?

Q: Yes.

CARNEY: Yes, absolutely, but no effective way of dealing with Aristide.

Q: As ambassador, how did you deal with the government?

CARNEY: At all the levels on all the issues that we had with them whether it was trying to make sure the airport was secure, and I dealt with the prime minister on that one. We threatened to end U.S. flights to that airport. I was prepared to do it. The airport became secure.

Q: What was the problem?

CARNEY: It was just lack of access controls and lack of will to enforce them where they did exist. That's a small thing. I did get the Attorney General, Janet Reno, to increase the size of the DEA office from one person to 8. Here we were arguing that Haiti was a transit point for 15-20% of the cocaine arriving in the U.S. and we had one DEA guy there.

Q: Had the Colombian dealers more or less bought their...

CARNEY: They were in the process of doing that. They have done so to a much greater extent now, I understand, but nobody has stayed bought anymore, and I'm told the Colombians are now starting to bypass Haiti just because it's such a mess.

Q: How about the boat people?

CARNEY: We continued to monitor that but that issue had ended well before I got there. We would monitor the building of boats so we had an idea of when they were ready to go. And the Coast Guard would interdict these migrants at sea and we would just return them to the port of Port-au-Prince, give them enough money to make their way back home by bus.

But the problem and the salvation of Haiti is its diaspora, mainly in the U.S. Anywhere from 400-800 million dollars a year gets sent back to Haiti and it's a margin of survival on the one hand, and a margin of fees to buy your way onto a boat for others. It was the most unusual situation because, to his credit, (Deputy Secretary of State) Strobe Talbott knew that things were going to hell in Haiti and Bill Swing had tried to keep a lid on the reporting.

Q: Bill Swing had been ambassador?

CARNEY: Yes, before me. And I took the lid off. We actually had Fulton Armstrong, the NSC Haiti staffer, and David Greenlee from the State Department, who was Special Haiti Coordinator, come down and argue for the suppression of reporting, which I just laughed at. I said, "What are you going to do, send me to Haiti?"

Q: What was the problem?

CARNEY: The problem was with the Hill, which was looking at Haiti and saying, "What are you guys doing down there?" They were getting obfuscations. This was the earlier period when Jim Dobbins was accused of lying to the Senate, and they believe it to this day, confirmed by the State Department Inspector General on the issue. Dobbins was on the NSC staff, a special guy for Haiti, having replaced Dick Clarke. Fulton Armstrong was in there with either Jim or his successor. It was foolish. Luckily, when I would come up to Washington, I would be candid with people on the Hill, my argument being, "Yes, how are we going to deal with it? This is an approach that may or may not work," but I could never get a policy review.

Q: Was overlying the whole thing, "If we don't do something there, you're going to have a hemorrhaging of boat people coming out?"

CARNEY: Yes.

Q: And on CNN showing people drowning.

CARNEY: (The worry was that) it wasn't going to hold together long enough for our Administration to be over. That's was what was going on.

Q: It was a band-aid, but it's holding it tied up together.

CARNEY: Right.

Q: Was there much of a lobby within Florida or New York?

CARNEY: There was the Black Caucus.

Q: How seriously did they take it?

CARNEY: Very seriously. I had Mr. John Conyers (D-MI) down a couple of times. Charlie Rangel (D-NJ) was there. Senator Dewine (R-OH) was regularly there. Senator Bob Graham (D-FL) as well. There was a lot of interest in Haiti.

Q: But again, no matter how you slice it-

CARNEY: It was going south.

Q: So what would they say?

CARNEY: They would say to Aristide, "You've got to do the right thing" and Aristide would say, "Of course" and he wouldn't. It was interesting. It's now broadly recognized that Aristide is part of the problem and in a way part of the solution.

Q: But do you feel realistically that there's any answer?

CARNEY: Oh, sure, you've got to get rid of Aristide, but it isn't anything I would say publicly.

Q: We got rid of the-

CARNEY: The Haitians have got to get rid of Aristide.

Q: Yes, but I mean even if you get rid of Aristide, is the society such that it's like Somalia - somebody else will come up?

CARNEY: Possibly. There is no guarantee in a place like Haiti.

Q: Was there an international presence there?

CARNEY: A Representative of the Secretary General was there, a former British foreign affairs officer, Julian Harston was there. He was replaced by an Equatorial Guinean. There

was a UN police effort helping to train the police, helping to professionalize and modernize them. It was basically undercut, undermined, and defeated largely by Aristide and those cronies around him who seek their own material advantage.

Q: So, with Aristide, material advantage was what was coming out of this?

CARNEY: To give Aristide his due, it isn't so much that he likes to live well. It's that he knows so many people do that they'll do what he wants in order to get access to it. It's a tool rather than an end. Power is what he wants.

Q: As the ambassador, did you feel you were doing more than keeping your finger in the dyke?

CARNEY: There were some things we were doing that were positively good - the humanitarian aspects of our AID project, for example. Half a million kids got lunch from our monies every school day. There were some efforts at microcredit underway to help bring together a much broader entrepreneurial class at the very basic level. Those were serious, useful things. The efforts by the U.S. Coast Guard to help mentor a Haitian coast guard that would have its role not only in saving lives but also in drug suppression was sound and well founded. But that's very few. The ultimate problem was the desire on the part of those who held power to use the police and the judiciary as a tool for their own self-aggrandizement. That's what Aristide is all about.

In the long run, the fostering of a civil society in Haiti was the most important aspect of American aid to Haiti in the second half of the 90s.

Q: Did you have a problem with you and your officers of looking at this and not throwing up your hands and saying, "Oh, the hell with this?"

CARNEY: Absolutely not, for the most part. Once it became clear that I wanted Washington to know what was going on, that's what my officers did. Let me also say that it was by no means the most brilliant set, as a set, in my Foreign Service experience. But the staff was plenty good enough to figure out what was going on, to write it up, and to send it to Washington. The economic side was particularly good.

Q: It's hard for people to go to a place where you're dealing with losers.

CARNEY: Yes.

Q: All of us have felt this.

CARNEY: Like Tom Enders in Cambodia.

Q: At a certain point, you say, "Oh, God, why am I here?" You want to be with people who have a certain dynamism.

CARNEY: That was mitigated a bit by a belief that Washington wasn't doing enough, that to a degree it was somewhat our fault, it wasn't just the Haitians.

Q: Did Aristide still maintain an aura in the U.S.?

CARNEY: Oh, yes, and in some circles he still has it. Parts of the Black Caucus to this day say, "The only problem is, we're not supporting Aristide enough." Many of those people are on the board of the foundation which Aristide created.

Q: You left there in '99?

CARNEY: Late December of '99 to retire.

Q: I guess this is a good place to stop. It's been fascinating. You ended up in our last session with some real winners: Somalia, Sudan, and Haiti.

CARNEY: I joke that I looked at the progression and decided I'd better put my papers in. They might have been going to send me to Washington next.

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Q: Today is November 26, 2003. This is an addendum to a previous interview. Tim has in his retirement gotten involved in the Iraq war. Could you tell me how you got involved and what you did?

CARNEY: I'd be delighted. It was basically an odd way to get into it. My first notion that things were beginning to look serious in Iraq was in November 2002 when I was invited to the U.S. Institute of Peace on November 25 for a session on lessons learned in previous peacekeeping efforts that might be applicable to administering Iraq. The meeting at USIP brought together a number of people with experience in previous peacekeeping missions - myself in Cambodia, for example, Peter Galbraith in former Yugoslavia, Bob Perito for his efforts in Haiti and peacekeeping and civil police work in general, a fairly large number of other people, all of whose names I do not recall. Elliott Abrams, then on the NSC staff, was the notable participant in the meeting. The agenda was to look at a number of key questions. The one that received the most focus was screening or vetting the Iraqi civil service to determine who was unacceptable, who one had to hold their nose and keep in order to run a bureaucracy effectively. We talked about civil police. We spoke about the need for an effective media and a number of other topics were judged as well.

I had basically dropped out of anything related to Iraq after that. I had a couple of other projects on my own.

Q: Had you had any feel at the time as an informed layman of the situation in Iraq?

CARNEY: I didn't have much of a feel for Iraq at all. I had never served in the Middle East. Sudan is in the Africa Bureau. I don't speak Arabic, don't pretend to be an Arabist. I was vaguely aware that in April of 2002 the State Department had begun its Future of Iraq project, but I had no substantive knowledge of it whatsoever. It just seemed to me to be a good idea. But I knew that if indeed we were going to go to war there, we had to have a sensible idea of what to do in the post-war period.

Q: This group that was talking about Iraq at the Institute of Peace, was there any consensus or thrust that came out of that?

CARNEY: If there was a thrust, it was that administering Iraq was going to be complicated and needed a lot more thought. I understand from one of my colleagues in the consulting job that I do now, that there was an effort by the NSC to put a team together at about the same time.

Q: Then what happened to you? This was November 2002. You moved on. What sort of work have you been doing?

CARNEY: I then went to Khartoum in January for 3 weeks or so to do the first photo shoot on a book project that my wife and I and a British photographer, Michael Freeman, and his wife had conceived and sold to both the Sudanese rebels and the government in Khartoum. We came back. I went off to do some consultancies related to a national security strategy planning in NATO PfP (Partner for peace) countries at the George Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen in Germany. I was sitting at home March 12 when I got a call from (Deputy Secretary of Defense) Paul Wolfowitz, who asked me to join the effort that had been stood up in response to President Bush's determination in January (NSPD-24) that there should be an Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) located in the Pentagon that would concern itself with Iraq after a possible military victory.

Q: Did you accept or not?

CARNEY: I said to Paul that of course I would accept, but I would first have to speak with Jay Garner, head of ORHA. I did. I met with Jay on Friday, March 14. In the meantime, my wife let a couple of colleagues know that Wolfowitz had given me a call. One of those colleagues was Robin Raphel, for whom I had worked as her deputy when she was Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs. Robin, then Vice-President at NDU, had been tapped by the State Department, and was with Barbara Bodine in training at Fort Meade. Robin let the Middle East Bureau know that Wolfowitz had called me and I got a call on Thursday, March 13, from Jim Larocca, DAS in the Middle East Bureau, who pretended that I was on the State Department's list, and suggested that I might want to go to Iraq as the Senior Advisor in the Ministry of Industry and Minerals. I told Jim that I was going to see Jay Garner the next day and I wasn't sure what I wanted to do there. He suggested that I let Jay know that the State Department had me in mind for advisor in the Ministry of Industry and Minerals.

Q: What is the background in ministry of minerals?

CARNEY: The Ministry of Industry and Minerals in Iraq... basically, we had no current information on it.

Q: It's the oil ministry, isn't it?

CARNEY: No. I subsequently learned the information was outdated. It was that Ministry that, at least in the pre-first Iraq War period, was responsible for procurement for material for the weapons of mass destruction programs, and at the same time had under its aegis a number of state owned enterprises that ran everything from electricity in Baghdad to the dairy to vegetable oil to the sulfur industry. Oil was itself a separate and large ministry.

Q: How did you feel? Did you feel right away that this was a tug of war?

CARNEY: I knew it was a tug of war because I had called some people whom I knew well and had gotten an initial briefing on the unseemly food fight between State and Defense over Iraq, some of which was in the newspaper by then. I met with Jay. He was the Director of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, a retired Army lieutenant general who had successfully and brilliantly run an operation in the Kurdish areas of Iraq in 1991, Operation Provide Comfort, that responded to humanitarian needs. I sat down with Jay. He was bustling and in a hurry because he was leaving with the people who had been recruited at that point on Sunday, the 16th, for Kuwait, to establish the ORHA offices ready to move into-

Q: The war had not started at that point?

CARNEY: The war had started March 9. There was a fear that there would be a catastrophic collapse and instant victory, and that the postwar administration would need to be in place urgently. So, Jay was ready to take the team that he had built at that point. That's why Robin Raphel and Barbara Bodine and others were in training at Fort Meade. They needed to know how to get in and out of chemical weapons gear, and how to pull the trigger on a Beretta 92F pistol.

I spoke with Jay. We talked about it. I let him know that Jim Larocca had me in mind for what. He asked what I had thought. I said I only had a brief chance to look at things, but it occurred to me that his organization might need an ombudsman because there were sure to be major problems dealing with Iraqis. They would have claims and grievances and it might make sense to have a cool, practiced head in a position to help redress them and ensure that the civilian administration would function properly in relation to Iraqis. He said he wasn't sure what he'd want me to do, but for sure I ought to get out there. He introduced me to a fellow who had the capability of organizing contracts and said, "Do what you can to get out as soon as you can."

Q: So it was very unstructured at this point.

CARNEY: Yes.

Q: You were just a guy who had been around the block.

CARNEY: Exactly.

Q: Did they have any idea about who you were or what you'd been doing?

CARNEY: Paul Wolfowitz had called him and let him know that I had worked for Paul as his political counselor in Jakarta and that he found me somebody who ought to be on Jay's team. After talking with each other a while, I took Jay's measure and he took mine and we decided mutually and separately that we'd make a good mix to work together.

Q: So then what happened?

CARNEY: Monday, the 17th of March, I got hold of the State Department. I had tried to talk to Ruth Whiteside, but she was not available. She was then the deputy director general and deputy head of Personnel at State. Not reaching her, I spoke with a woman named Catherine Austin who offered me a WAE (when actually employed) status to go to Iraq. That was not acceptable. There wasn't enough salary in it. Moreover, I had been working actively as a consultant at that point for more than 2 years. I decided that Ms. Austin didn't have the horsepower to discuss the issue and I needed to speak with Ruth Whiteside. I didn't get a call back from her, so I called the fellow at the Pentagon whom Jay had introduced me to. He organized a contract with SAIC, which is a large contractor that works from government contracts. SAIC signed me up by Friday, March 21st, and I was on a plane the 23rd for Iraq.

I was on a plane with a group that was going to fulfill the contract SAIC had won to create an indigenous Iraqi media, an effort that has proved to be inadequate at best, anemic, underfunded, poorly staffed, and badly directed.

Q: It doesn't sound like you had much time to consult with anyone who was there.

CARNEY: I didn't. I got a pretty full briefing on the Future of Iraq project, but had none of their documents. I found it astonishing that the director of that State Department effort, Tom Warrick, had initially been consulted and then was put aside by Pentagon authorities. I had an indication that the Pentagon was very unhappy with Arabists at the State Department who were believed to be unwilling or unable to believe that any Arab - Arabs in general, much less Iraqi Arabs - would have any hope of seeking or achieving democracy for their nations.

Q: As you went out there, did you feel that you were in an ideological situation where there was a set within the Pentagon that "This is the way it's going to fall out?"

CARNEY: No, I can't say... I had a clear indication that the Pentagon was in absolute charge, that the State Department was in general churlish, that the Pentagon was being equally or more churlish because they delayed for more than 10 days the clearance and approval for travel of a number of people the State Department designated to join Jay Garner's staff, mainly retired ambassadors or active duty former ambassadors such as, in the former category David Dunford, then in retirement in Tucson. Robin Raphel was at that point Vice President of the National Defense University. A number of other people were with them and regarded as hostages to the State-Defense argument over Iraq.

Q: You landed in Kuwait when?

CARNEY: The 23rd of March and moved into the Hilton Villas complex which was housing the ORHA crew the 24th of March.

Q: Where was the war at that point?

CARNEY: It was being vigorously prosecuted. I cannot remember exactly how far we had gotten but there had been... The previous two days an Exocet had hit the pier in Kuwait itself.

Q: Talk about the atmosphere and what you were doing and what you were picking up? In a way, you were the new boy on the block.

CARNEY: It was frantic. The Hilton Villas complex had a number of villas with the target audience rich Arabs and other Gulf nationals who simply wanted to get away to Kuwait with their families and relax. I was in villa 904 which ultimately grew to have about 8-9 people in it. I had taken the maid's room because it was so small with bunk beds that I figured I would at least have a room of my own. It did have an attached bath. Perfectly comfortable. There was an effort to get military equipment out to people who didn't have it. I didn't go through any training in chemical gear. I was able to get out so quickly with SAIC and it was clear that it wasn't going to be necessary even at that early stage.

There was an ongoing series of meetings. ORHA was organized in a military fashion to effect a political-military mission. You had the command element, Jay Garner and his deputy and others, a large group of retired mostly lieutenant generals. You had the staff elements as close to them as possible. Then instead of brigades and battalions on the wings, which is the military organization, you had the "pillars" out on the wings. There was a pillar for reconstruction that was run by AID's retired former senior official Louis Lucke. You had a pillar for humanitarian affairs that was run by retired ambassador George Ward, who was at the U.S. Institute of Peace and who had, like me, organized his contract through USIP rather than accepting a WAE status. Then you had the ministerial wing, advisors for all those ministries except those ones of the 23 ministries that would have been involved in reconstruction. That was under a lawyer and former partner of Pentagon (Undersecretary for Defense Policy) Douglas Feith. That chap's name was Mike Mobbs.

There was a planning effort to go forward to deal with the problems we thought we might have administering Iraq. The focus was very heavily on potential refugee and humanitarian emergencies, especially possible famine following military activities. As we know, neither of those actually materialized. The ministerial group was not well led, and never really gelled as a body partly because many of its heads were held up as hostages in this State-Defense argument.

Q: The ministerial group were civilians?

CARNEY: Yes, very heavily civilians.

Q: State Department types.

CARNEY: State and AID and officials from a number of other agencies. There was a Treasury team that would have been at the central bank and the finance ministry, and a Dept of Agriculture fellow for the Ministry of Agriculture.

Q: Were there any people who ran things, former mayors of cities?

CARNEY: There was nothing like that.

Q: This has always sort of astounded me that we didn't have...

CARNEY: I'm told that Mayor Giuliani, the former mayor of New York, was approached to run the entire operation and he declined. I don't know if that's true.

Q: But your group didn't...

CARNEY: We had almost no one who had a background in any of these things. You perhaps read last week's issue of the "New Yorker." There was a Harvard Ph.D. named Andrew Erdman in his 30s who wound up as the senior advisor in education who did quite a good job. If you read George Packer's article in the "New Yorker" of last week, you'll see that. Erdman, whom I saw at an Iraqi tribute ceremony that the Secretary of State presided over on November 24th, is now on the NSC staff working under Bob Blackwill. There were some serious people from the Department of Agriculture, a very competent officer, the senior advisor for the agriculture ministry. The Ministry of Trade ultimately had Robin Raphel as its senior advisor. She ultimately became Mike Mobbs' replacement when Mobbs left Iraq.

Q: Mobbs was the...

CARNEY: The partner of Douglas Feith, who proved to be inadequate as head of the ministerial pillar. Walter Slocombe was eventually named Senior Advisor at the Ministry of Defense to which the Ministry of Military Industrialization was joined. He was fundamentally missing in action for the first month of operations due to other commitments.

He is the one who is said to have been behind the very bad decision to totally disband the Iraqi army.

Q: That's been looked upon as... Jerry Bremer at least made the announcement.

CARNEY: Bremer replaced Jay Garner May 12th and made two initial mistakes. One was that. The other was the sweeping deBa'athificaiton effort.

Q: Had anybody brought up.. I was in Germany sometime after the end of World War II. There was the famous document, the "Frageboten." Almost every German of adult age had to fill out a questionnaire: "What did you do?" Every German of a certain age knows that intimately. Was there any thought of... It was a sorting through who was relatively clean, not completely clean.

CARNEY: To the extent the occupation of Germany was looked at, it was dismissed because it had had the luxury of years of planning. The administration of Iraq, which in law is indeed an occupation, was moving so fast that nobody had the time once we got on the ground in Baghdad, which took a month, to look at those kinds of lessons.

Q: Was the question of the army and what to do about it and the Ba'ath Party and what to do about it discussed in your group?

CARNEY: It was only discussed at the senior level. The only one in the ministerial pillar who had anything to say about it was Robin Raphel, who was part of the senior Bremer staff. On deba'athification, Robin sat down with (Foreign Ministry Senior Advisor, retired Ambassador) David Dunford and myself to look at what was going on. One of the midlevel people, a woman named Margaret O'Sullivan, who had been part of the Policy Planning staff at State, tried to get in it, and I basically tossed her out, saying, "This is ambassadors talking." Very capable, but it wasn't a place to have junior people with little hands-on experience, as the three of us discussed.

Q: What were you talking about?

CARNEY: About how to save Bremer from himself. The initial discussion on the Ba'ath was so sweeping it would have been totally self-defeating. The effort was to establish exceptions, the grounds for exceptions, and basically to produce something that had a capability of functioning on the one hand, and being acceptable at large, notably to Iraqis, on the other. There was no doubt that Iraqis were unhappy that so many senior Ba'athis continued to be in positions. The initial policy, Washington's policy, a policy that Jay Garner enunciated, and that I enunciated to the Ministry senior staff and to the Director's Manager of the State Owned Enterprises, the 52 under the ministry's aegis... Remember that Iraq is not a Third World country. It's not Afghanistan. It's not Africa. It is a Second World country. It's much more like Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union. The government owns most of the means of production. Of the roughly 150 state owned enterprises, if that many, 52 with 100,000 employees were under the aegis of the Ministry

of Industry and Minerals. The Ministry itself had a staff of only 621. There were 12 Directors General. Then you had Director General equivalent, Director Manager, as head of the state owned enterprise itself.

The policy at the time was, members of the Ba'ath Party could stay on the job unless they were guilty of gross human rights violations, had been active in production of weapons of mass destruction, or had supported terrorism. That didn't quite hold because some of these people who were senior Ba'ath Party members were objectionable to the employees of the enterprises they led. There were 4 cases by May 4th where I, in consultation with the Ministerial Management Committee that I named after I had a chance to take the measure of the Ministry senior staff, replaced those 4.

Q: Why?

CARNEY: It was more personality and style than it was Ba'ath Party membership. They simply alienated their work force, either by being arbitrary, shouting at people or being arrogant. For these four cases, it was an issue of labor-management bad relations.

When Bremer came in, his first proclamation of May 16 stated, senior members of the Ba'ath Party - there were 4 levels of senior party membership - were all automatically excluded from public life. Full members of the party at a junior level could continue to stay on unless they were senior management of either industries or ministries or government agencies. Those junior full party members who were at such senior management level needed an exception to stay on, as did any senior full party member whom we deemed necessary to continue the job. That was Robin Raphel's contribution to a more rational program.

Q: Any of us who served in... I served for 5 years in Yugoslavia. You looked upon membership in the Communist Party or whatever it was at certain levels... You had to be. You paid your contribution and there were communists and there were just people who were members of the party. Even fairly far up, because of their position, they had to. There is a lot of difference in this. Was the Ba'ath Party different than the Communist Party in this regard?

CARNEY: The quick answer is, we didn't know. We knew very little about the Ba'ath Party. The only decent description of how the Ba'ath Party was structured that I ever saw was in Phebe Marr's book, *Modern History of Iraq*. It talked about a number of levels of membership. There was no list of senior members from FBIS, CIA, British intelligence. There was no description of how one was recruited into the Ba'ath Party or advanced within the Ba'ath Party. There was some argument made to Bremer that produced a figure of 30-40,000 Iraqis who would be removed from public life. No indication who it would be.

As it turned out, senior full party membership was not a function of job. As I discovered when I began to get appeals from employees of the various state-owned enterprises, there

were very few senior full party members among the 60 Directors Manager and Directors General of the Ministry. There were 6 maximum. Everyone else was either a full party member at the junior level or candidate member of the party. I discovered that to advance from junior party member to senior party member, you actually had to submit your name and stand for an election. There was an electoral process within the ranks of the party itself. That produced the reality of what I called "shop floor firkas." A firka was the lowest of the 4 senior levels of membership. There were any number of shop floor people who had advanced, tried to advance, to firka because you got extra money if you were at that level.

Then there was the group that came in to see me, 2 men. They had been prisoners in Iran for 18 years after the Iran-Iraq War, the longest held until 1998 or '99. They were automatically made the lowest senior level of the Ba'ath Party by decree. They had not stood for election. They hadn't gone through party candidacy. I argued by memo to Bremer in late May or early June that we needed to make automatic exceptions for all such cases except where the individual actually stood for election to the next higher level. Then you could argue that a person had bought into Ba'athism. Never got a reply. NOTE: I since learned that Bremer issued an Order excepting these people in December 2003.

Q: Let's go back a bit. While you were sitting in Kuwait, was there this group that the Defense Department had put together of Iraqi exiles sitting around?

CARNEY: No, they had not yet arrived. There were a few of them, but they had not yet arrived.

Q: Was anybody serving as an advisor on what was happening in Iraq?

CARNEY: No.

Q: You had all these people who defected or got the hell out.

CARNEY: There were some Iraqis who would come through, some people who passed themselves off as tribal leaders, who met with Jay Garner, but basically, no.

Q: Did Jay have a big notebook full of the plans?

CARNEY: There was an effort to do a unified mission plan which ultimately produced a very badly drafted document that I have in my computer that was never used.

Q: Was there a feeling of either disorganization or "We're going to have to do this off the top of our heads?"

CARNEY: Yes. Everybody knew it was ad hoc. Everybody knew that we were going to have to get to Baghdad and make do. And the looting started around April 8 or 9 when the troops took Baghdad and it dismayed all of us. The ministerial wing had submitted to the Combined Forces Land Component Commander, CFLCC, a list of 24 sites that needed to

be protected and that document was never acted on. Nor by hindsight was there the will or even the capability to protect the sites that needed to be protected except the Oil Ministry and the Ministry of Military Industrialization that had split off from the Ministry of Industry and Minerals in the mid-'90s and became the locus of Iraqi efforts to clandestinely procure WMD related equipment.

Q: In a way, there wasn't a plan.

CARNEY: There was no plan.

Q: What was Jay Garner doing?

CARNEY: He was pep talking. He was regularly at the various meetings to discuss everything from how to vet senior civil servants (never came to a conclusion) how the city of Baghdad was going to be organized and governed (that had a good focus from Barbara Bodine. Her deputy, AID official Ted Morse, also retired, and Australian Lieutenant Colonel Keith Schollum, who was the chief of staff of that effort)...

The object was to get to Baghdad and get to grips with the situation. The focus was heavily on the most immediate needs: health, water, sanitation, electricity.

Q: What about Basra? The British were just going to take care of that?

CARNEY: No. The civilian component had 3 geographic elements as well - one for the north to be centered on Mosul. A general retired was the head of that, one on Jay's staff. The south, also a retired general, was to have its own element as well. The center, which included Baghdad, was under Barbara Bodine.

Q: Were you all feeling the hand of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld or his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, in this initial phase?

CARNEY: The essential problem was, the civilian mission needed to be out in front and the instructions from the Pentagon were that nobody would say anything to the press. The Pentagon's focus, understandably but inadequately, was on the military effort. Part of the result of that was that the military for the most part had no clue and less interest in what the civilian effort was thinking about or planning to do. There was considerable interface especially between the ORHA staff and the Civil Affairs element of the military. Civil Affairs was part of the J5 or the planning element, and the Civil Affairs Command is an important part of the U.S. Army that draws on reservists, mainly professionals. The plan was that shooters would go in; Civil Affairs would be behind them. Civil affairs would make contact with all the ministries. When the civilians under Jay Garner got there, the Civil Affairs officers would be able to introduce them to the ministerial staffs and we would have a smooth transition into operations, but it didn't work.

Q: What happened?

CARNEY: The ministries were looted and for the most part burned where they had not been bomb or shell damaged. In my case and the case of the British fellow, Simon Elvy, who was the Senior Advisor at the Ministry of Planning, we first toured his building April 26th, 2 days after we got to Baghdad. It was essentially unusable, but was relatively intact except for the looting of anything that could be carried away except anything you could read. The library was still intact. There had been fires at one or 2 places but census records were still there. We went over to my ministry, which had 2 U.S. tanks guarding the complex. The Ministry of Industry and Minerals and the Ministry of Higher Education were in the same complex.

I learned from the U.S. lieutenant who was in command of the 2 tank detachment that a fellow in a blue blazer and a shirt and tie appeared every morning about 8:00 to see if there was anybody with whom to make contact. I subsequently met him the next day or the day after. That began my contact with the senior staff of the ministry. He was a Ph.D. in metallurgy from Imperial College in London, Dr. Walid. I then met him and the rest of his colleagues that afternoon in a meeting inside the secure zone on the west bank of the Tigris near the Republican Palace, a meeting organized by an Iraqi who had become close to Jay Garner, a fellow named Saad Al-Janabi who had been close to one of Saddam Hussein's sons, but was forced to flee in the 90s. Janabi had the rest of the senior staff of a number of ministries, including mine, present at this facility. Those from Industry and Minerals included Dr. Walid.

Q: What had happened to the ministry?

CARNEY: The ministry had been hit by a bomb or two, and then apparently some arsonists had gone in and tried to burn part of it. It was a very modern high rise building with a lower building attached to it that was severely bomb damaged. There were some out buildings that now served for a weekly meeting of the Deputy Minister and senior staff, the Minister having been one of Saddam Hussein's relatives, and been arrested and was under interrogation at U.S. facilities.

The Sunday meeting with a number of Directors General and the Deputy Minister resulted in the establishment of my relationship with them. They suggested that the Deputy Minister become the Supervisor. I accepted that and introduced him to the press 4 or 5 days later. He answered questions quite well. But there were second thoughts and it was clear that the Deputy Minister was regarded as far too Ba'athi by his colleagues. I essentially arranged with a number of Directors General to remove him. He and I talked on the appointed day in early May and I told him it was time he moved on from the Ministry... He said, "Why don't we do this by election?" He was confident he would win such an election. This was at the Thursday meeting of ministerial senior staff and state owned enterprise directors. I said, "Yes, let's do it that way." We opened the meeting by his announcing his resignation, suggesting elections, call for nominations. He nominated himself. One of the directors general nominated a colleague, Director for Planning, Mr. Mohamad Abdel Majid Al'ADin- (end of tape)

We then retired, the 2 candidates retired, and all of the foreigners retired - myself, Lieutenant Colonel Jackson, the Civil affairs officer working with the Ministry, and the Iraqi-American who had joined my team from the Pentagon-sponsored IRDC group (not to be confused with Ahmed Chalabi's group the INC), Dr. Ramsey Yusef Jiddou. We retired to let the directors general and directors manager debate. They chose Mr. Mohanad by a vote of about 38 to 2. The Deputy Minister said he accepted the vote, and that he would leave. Mr. Mohanad said, "No, we'd like you to stay on as an advisor." It worked. This was all described in a "Time Magazine" piece in mid-May of 2003.

Q: With the group that you were working with, were they ready to get back to work?

CARNEY: Absolutely. I knew from the first meeting that I had - it was confirmed in the second meeting - that Iraqis were the ones who could do it. At the second meeting, I was presented with a list of priority industries that needed to be put back on stream as soon as possible to answer the emergency needs. The focus was on the dairy, the vegetable oil factory, and a couple of chemical industries that produced chemicals for water purification, for example, and housing and construction materials to do repairs. These industries needed electricity because they were intact and had inventories and could resume production if they had enough electricity. Very squared away, imaginative, creative, and impatient.

Let me add here that there was no... I could communicate this but there was nobody who was doing anything with it. The State Department was unhappy with me. I had gone off line in search of my former OMS from Sudan and Haiti and asked if she would come to Baghdad and work with me. She said she would be delighted. Barbara Bodine had communications directly with the State Department. (I would occasionally send a memo to her for information even though I was in bad odor at the State Department.) The reply that indirectly reached me was that the Undersecretary for Political Affairs, Mark Grossman, said that I had taken a Defense Department contract, so there was going to be no State Department secretary to support me. That sort of pettiness, small mindedness, was unworthy of a U.S. effort that had such priority and to this day is so urgent. Remarkable and unsurprising.

Q: Garner lasted how long?

CARNEY: He lasted until June 1, but he was replaced when Jerry Bremer arrived May 12.

Q: Had Garner fizzled?

CARNEY: Jay Garner had argued when he took the job that he was only going to be there for 3 or 4 months. That was all he was willing to spare from his business. If he visibly taken hold and succeeded, I think he would have been pressured to stay. But he clearly was not the right man for the job.

Q: Where did you see the problem?

CARNEY: It was his unwillingness to be out in front with the media, sharing, on the one hand a vision of what the political-military effort sought to achieve with the international press, but also unable to communicate to Iraqis that same vision. That remains somewhat improved but is a continuing serious deficiency.

Q: Had the Iraqi exile group-

CARNEY: There are a number of Iraqi exile groups. It's very important to distinguish among them.

Q: From your point of view, did you have any group that you were working with?

CARNEY: The only people I was working with were a group known as the IRDC Iraqis. They were based at Crystal City. They were essentially specialists and experts whom the Pentagon wanted to come out and join the ministerial advisory teams. This chap, Ramsey Yusef Jiddou, who holds a Ph.D. and had been on the staff of the Ministry of Industry and Minerals in the Survey State Owned Enterprise, was among them. Many of those people, however, thought they would come out and instantly be the new minister and needed to be disabused when they arrived.

Q: It sounds like you inherited a professional corps and that people who had been outside really weren't going to add... The Crystal City people weren't going to particularly add...

CARNEY: That is broadly correct. However, I found that the Crystal City people, IRDC Iraqis, what they added was knowledge of the players based on their earlier time before they fled Iraq, and in some cases a very good judgment of how to deal with complicated situations. For example, there was an effort by Shia groups to put their hand in control over the Ministry of Industry and Minerals working through some of the state owned enterprises.

Q: You're talking about a religious element.

CARNEY: No, it was a political element in the guise of religion. You can't separate them in a place like Iraq.

Back to Jay Garner, he had no real feel for the media. Worse, he did not have the weight. He was Donald Rumsfeld's man, unlike Bremer, who was a special presidential envoy. Also, he was a retired lieutenant general and he would not tell Rumsfeld where to get off when he needed to.

Worse, the structure of command in two ways was totally inadequate to the mission: On the one hand, you had the military structure I described - command element, staff elements wrapped around it, brigades, battalions at the wings. In our case, it was command element, staff elements, all named in military fashion - C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, etc. - and the pillars, reconstruction, humanitarian, and ministerial out at the wings. In the military, that works

partly because of the amount of people you have in brigades and battalions but mainly because you have good communications. We had no communications except shanks' mare. You had to walk from your location in one wing of the Republican Palace to find anybody to do anything. We had no telephones, no radios, except Thuraya satellite phones that only work outside in direct line of sight with the satellite unless you had the unavailable docking stations.

Q: How did you all view the looting? Was this spontaneous or was there those behind it, a plan? Why wasn't it more contained either by our troops or by Iraqi forces?

CARNEY: There were no Iraqi forces. The police had fled. The army had self-demobilized. The looting was and is a stain on the honor of the U.S. military, resulting from incompetent, inadequate military planning and execution. There is no possible justification for it. That stain was set by the absurd remarks of the Secretary of Defense who essentially argued, "Boys will be boys. After a time of oppression and repression, who can be surprised at looting?" The answer is, no one who has ever done any of these missions was surprised that there would be an effort at looting. What was surprising was, there was no effort to contain it.

Q: What about the electric grid system? That was destroyed. Had that been destroyed by bombing or looting...

CARNEY: Some of the grid was down because of bomb damage. Some of the towers were down. Much of the power comes up from the south. Then you began a set of looting to get the metal from the transformers on the one hand, and from the high tension power lines on the other. The grid was old. There was sitting in boxes a Siemens effort of $30 million in new equipment and Siemens engineers had been in Baghdad ready to install it as the war started and of course they fled. The question was, did we let that Siemens contract be executed or did we cancel it and have someone else do it? After some discussion, Jay decided to let Siemens finish its contract because the money had already been paid. A huge need for more power generation. Jerry Bremer said last month that Baghdad city had finally come up to pre-war electric production. He had said that in early June and lied.

We had the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in there attached to Baghdad city. Serious Iraqi power engineers working on it. Basically an inadequate effort in terms of money in the first instance and the delivery of equipment and security to ensure that what was replaced was not stolen again. Much of this is a function of an inadequate number of U.S. troops in Iraq. We're not capable of doing security, nor was there any plan to bring a civilian police effort in to on the one the one hand fill in where the Iraqi police force had disappeared, and then the other to train a new Iraqi police force.

Q: Was the feeling that this would all sort itself out?

CARNEY: The mission hoped for the best. It operated on the best case solution which was the Iraqi army would melt away, the coalition would seize Baghdad and the rest of the

country, the civil service and the police would be more or less intact, the political-military mission of Jay Garner would go in and become the head and direct what remained and within a few months Iraq would be prepared to make a transition and gain the reins of sovereignty back into their own Iraqi hands.

Q: Had there been the equivalent to announcements saying, "We're coming in, but we expect you to come back to your posts and we're going to restore order except without Saddam and company?"

CARNEY: There had been such announcements but nobody really knew what was going to happen. Iraqis were so glad Saddam Hussein was gone. Of course, they were dismayed at the looting, especially of hospitals. They were dismayed at the lawlessness. The weather wasn't so bad that the electricity was absolutely critical, but as the coalition failed to perform in providing services, you got where we are now. So much time was lost that the population, which was wary and suspicious of U.S. motives in particular, decided that we were not partners to bring Iraq into the 21st century; we are occupiers, which indeed we are in law; and perhaps we do have our eye on Iraq's oil. There was enough of a population that believed that that when the insurgency finally got itself organized - and it took months - in April, there was a shooting in Falluja but that was the U.S. military overreacting to demonstrations and that area has gone down however since then. But it took the insurgency some months to get to where it could begin to strike. Unfortunately, while I don't think it has much active support among the populace, there is a certain tolerance. There aren't enough people who are willing to support these insurgents because we didn't establish early enough the credibility of our intentions. Very unfortunate.

Q: When Jerry Bremer came in, was there a feeling of, "Okay, now we'll put this thing together?"

CARNEY: By then there was some doubt that we had the capability to get it together in a sufficiently timely manner. Jerry to his credit brought in as his Chief of Staff (State Department manager) Pat Kennedy, who put in some organization. Jay Garner's own "C" staffs were remarkably incompetent, with a couple of notable exceptions. The communications person, Colonel Conway, was hopelessly incompetent. The personnel office and the finance office basically understood the problem, and did their damnedest to get things organized but they were relatively small. By the time I left, there were more than 1,200 on Jerry Bremer's staff - that was June 16th - and it wasn't enough. Remember, I did the UN mission in Cambodia. There were more than 2,000 civilians in the UNTAC mission and 3,000 civilian police, and 20,000 troops for a chapter 6 Mission in a country one third the size and population of Iraq.

Q: Was the feeling that this was being controlled from the Pentagon, trying to make this as small an outlay as possible? Or was it just that the forces were not even available back in the States?

CARNEY: On the military side there was no doubt it was Rumsfeld's effort to try to keep

it as small as possible. On the civilian side, the ORHA side, it was clear there was not enough planning done to decide who would be needed to do what.

Q: In your particular ministries, did you get involved in the search for weapons of mass destruction?

CARNEY: I did not. It was clear that Industry and Minerals had had nothing to do with that for at least 10 years.

Q: You say you had this meeting of ambassadors with Barbara Bodine and all trying to figure out how to make the system...

CARNEY: Barbara Bodine was in the central pillar and she was on the other wing of the palace. She had gone in early May, and was not part of Robin Raphel's discussions on the deBa'athification structure. It was basically Robin, David Dunford, and myself.

Q: What did you feel you could do and what effect did this have?

CARNEY: Essentially introduce the notion of exceptions and how they would be processed.

Q: But nobody really thought this thing through?

CARNEY: No, it was very ad hoc.

Q: When Bremer arrived, he almost immediately announced this.

CARNEY: He arrived May 12 and May 16 put out the proclamation on deBa'athification. I don't recall the date of the proclamation on disbanding the army.

Q: But it was about the same time.

CARNEY: Yes.

Q: Was this something that had been in the works?

CARNEY: DeBa'athification was, as I earlier explained... The new policy came with a few days' warning. There were enough days' warning that I had met with the senior staff the previous Thursday and I basically said to them that I could not provide any details on what they all had no doubt heard about, that there was an argument in Washington on the question of deBa'athification. I told the assembled group of 40-50 Iraqis that it was an intensely political matter, that I would follow it and try to get the news to them in as timely a manner as possible but I could not tell them where it was going to come out but it was clearly a serious matter that would require their attention. I believed then, as it turned out wrongly, that all of them were at least junior full party members and many of them more

than that.

Q: Did you feel that the system of management at least at the ministry where you were working, that Saddam Hussein had had a method of administering on the management side that left its mark or not?

CARNEY: Yes, but it seemed to be very individual, ad hoc. The Director of Planning who became the Supervisor, Mr. Mohanad, was not a Ba'ath Party member at all. He had been Deputy Minister and was removed from that job because he refused to join the Ba'ath Party. Another director at one of the state owned enterprise had run afoul of Saddam Hussein's good friend who was put on the enterprise management committee against his objections. That almost caused this fellow to be fired completely. But he wasn't. Interesting.

Q: Did you find within the ranks of the civil service competent staff?

CARNEY: In the Ministry of Industry and Minerals, yes. But that's very much of a technocrat ministry.

Q: Did you find that...

CARNEY: Let me add that one of the creative solutions to issues from the Ministerial Management Committee was a suggestion to me that all of the heads of state owned enterprises be put to the test of elections and that elections begin with committees on the shop floor who would ultimately produce candidates for the top job. The management committee of a state owned enterprise that had hitherto been heavily appointed by the ministry itself, that those jobs would become open to election from within the enterprise itself as well. We began that process... I checked out with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) lawyers, with the Judge Advocate Generals staff, and the response was, "Yes, but the coalition has the final authority on who will be permitted to be the director manager." Bremer's office argued that there were too many frivolous elections around the country. My counter to that was, "This election took place within the context of the law creating state owned enterprises and therefore it was in accordance with Iraqi law and practice." My argument was accepted.

That set of elections was very far advanced by the time I left. Three or 4 new Directors Manager had been nominated by the Enterprise Committee that resulted from this process of elections. One of them needed an exception because he was a junior but full party member, not a senior full party member but a full party member. Of course, at the management level, he needed an exception from Bremer himself which I understand much later was granted.

Q: Within this ministry, who were you in the charts? What role did you play?

CARNEY: I was the ultimate authority.

Q: But you were not an expert in what the ministry was doing?

CARNEY: It didn't take me very long to become expert. The Ministry was, on the one hand, effecting procurement for inventories of state owned enterprises and had any number of bank accounts overseas as a result. On the other hand, it was supervising and naming the essential members of state owned enterprise management itself. The challenge was to get a handle on who was who in this process and who could do the job. It didn't take long. It didn't take 3 or 4 weeks to figure most of that out.

Q: I would have thought that just in the normal course of events that any country anywhere in an enterprise you would find there would be cables or whatever... The Shia mafia, the Sunni group, or what have you, or everybody belonged to a clan.

CARNEY: There was some of that, especially the issue of who was Shia and who was Sunni was there. But it was pretty clear and my knowledge was greatly aided by the Iraqi-American, Ramsey Yusef Jiddou, who could help sort my way through some of that. I found in general that the Ministry Iraqi staff was focused on dealing with the problem as much as on dealing with personalities.

Q: You mentioned that they had bank accounts abroad-

CARNEY: The Ministry.

Q: They had procurement. At that point we were kind of on the outs with Germany, France, and Russia, who I thought would have been major sources for supplies. Were we being nasty about these contacts?

CARNEY: No. I gave you the example of the case of Siemens.

Q: You weren't put on a short leash as far as outsourcing.

CARNEY: There was no procurement going on in the entire period I was there.

Q: But that had to be a major thing. Were you cranking up to go out? You'd have to.

CARNEY: We were, yes. I had asked the Ministry to look at the procurement needs. Some things were already in the pipeline and were sitting at ports waiting to be delivered, needing security to move from Amman, for example, across that dangerous road to Baghdad.

Q: When the Bremer group took over, was there a change?

CARNEY: There was a change for the better and the worse. On the economic side, Peter McPherson, who had been Deputy Secretary of the Treasury and head of AID, came in. He is currently President of Michigan State University. At the same time, a number of Republicans who volunteered to come to Iraq on the economic side came in. A fellow

named Rueben Jeffrey. Another named Douglas Combs, the latter having been an assistant to the Secretary of the Navy. All of them generally had a conservative economic agenda, were concerned with the perpetuation of state owned enterprises.

Peter McPherson proved to be particularly inadequate on the economic policy front, notably in what seemed to be an effort on his behalf in mid-June to cripple state owned enterprises, which in my view was in violation of the fundamental law (Geneva Conventions) under which an occupying power could not either alienate or reduce the value of the assets of the country it was occupying. There is a memo of mine to that effect which circulated broadly in the U.S. and British governments, the last memo I wrote on June 15.

On the political side, by mid-May, Ryan Crocker, who is now at the National Defense University, then Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Middle Eastern Bureau, NEA, was working to effect a governance structure. Retired Ambassador Hume Horan was part of that. In other words, there were finally some senior Arabists on the scene. Ryan was replaced by Scott Carpenter from the (State Dept.) Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Bureau who has inadequate Middle Eastern experience to credibly replace Ryan. But the ambassador to Kuwait, Dick Jones, has since moved to Baghdad to head that effort both politically and economically. Fortunately, Mr. McPherson is now back at Michigan State.

Q: By the time you left in June, were you sensing an urgency about "Things aren't getting together the way they should and we've got to do something?"

CARNEY: You can find a full expression of some of that unhappiness in the piece that I did in the "Outlook" section of the *Washington Post* of June 22, 2003. Two days later, I was at the Pentagon for a debriefing with Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. We sat down for 15-20 minutes and he took notes, just the two of us, as I explained some of the problems as I saw them. Donald Rumsfeld asked John Hamre of CSIS to lead a team out to Iraq to look at the problems at the end of June and CSIS gave an alarming report and recommendations to Rumsfeld that is on the CSIS web site about July 5.

Q: How did you leave your Ministry?

CARNEY: We had lunch and they gave me a small product of one of their state owned enterprises, the hand made carpet factory. My deputy, a mid-level Department of Commerce officer, Rick Ortiz, took over, and I was in fact not replaced. I thought the Ministry was sufficiently squared away that any problems were not of lack of organization or determination or imagination in the ministry, but rather of incompetence on the part of the Coalition. I genuinely believed that I was no longer of value added to the effort. That's partly why I didn't ask to extend my 3 month contract.

Q: Did you have any feel for where the problem lay at the top?

CARNEY: I reflect on it and think the problem lay with an inability of mainly Americans to bring Iraqis more deeply into our councils, to rely more heavily on Iraqis, and to move in

the direction of putting increasing sovereignty back into Iraqi hands. That's where the problem lay. We just wanted to stay in control.

Q: You mentioned that local elections had been part of the process in Iraq for a long time. This was not a new thing. There was an electoral mindset already within the country.

CARNEY: I'm not sure I grasped that as more than beyond the boundaries of the state owned enterprises.

Q: Did you have the feeling that this Governing Council that was named was going to go anywhere?

CARNEY: I wasn't in Iraq when it was named. But I do know that the very name came from the late UN Special Representative of the Secretary General, Sergio Viera De Mello,. Bremer and his people were thinking of calling it a "political council." Sergio, with whom I worked in Cambodia and with whom I dined in Baghdad before I left-

Q: Who tragically was killed.

CARNEY: Yes. He basically had a pretty sensible view as he began to settle in in Baghdad.

Q: It sounds like you came back pretty discouraged.

CARNEY: No. In fact, I wasn't because I developed an appreciation of the competence and capabilities of Iraqi and to this day maintain that whatever the absurdities of the Coalition authorities' inadequacies and wishful thinking, Iraqis will actually do the job. They really do have the competence. My caveat is on the security front, where there continues to be a need to capture or kill Saddam Hussein and dishearten his loyalists and those who would operate in his name and to build a competent Iraqi military police and intelligence capability to deal with the Islamists who would use violence as well as the Saddam loyalists.

Q: Do you have the article you wrote for the "Post" in your computer?

CARNEY: I do not, but it is in the "Post" archives. The Outlook section. Unfortunately, I discovered I had given my last copy of the actual newspaper away. The archives section is just the text rather than the photos that accompanied it.

Q: Are you keeping up with anything in Iraq these days?

CARNEY: I generally follow it. I had an opportunity to go back to Baghdad as a consultant for some businesses that were interested there, but that has not materialized.

Q: Are you optimistic? How do you look upon Iraq as joining the family of democracy?

CARNEY: I don't know. I wouldn't look at it that way. It's too cosmic. I think the best case scenario is an Iraq next year, probably towards the end of the year, which is more stable with a relatively representative government chosen probably through a limited form of election. There will still be Coalition troops there because the security situation will not be totally answered. But most elements of sovereignty, political and economic, except for security and defense, will be in Iraqi hands and decisions made by Iraqis.

Q: Do you have the feeling that it's going to be difficult for us to let go of things?

CARNEY: We're in the process of doing so. That's why Bremer was back in Washington. There is a very good story in the "Post" this morning from Rajiv Chandrasekharan which indicates that Grand Ayatollah Sistani put out a fatwa June 28 on the basis of mistaken information in which he declared that a constitution could only be written by elected Iraqis. Bremer and the White House came to terms with that reality when Mr. Bremer came back just a week or 2 ago and then took back the notion that an interim authority with an interim law would be created and from that Iraq would proceed to elections and a national constitution.

Q: Did you have much contact with the American military while you were there?

CARNEY: With the Civil Affairs side in particular. Of course, there was plenty of active duty military who were the staff elements of Jay Garner's effort.

Q: By the time you left, there must have been a real feeling of elation of how quickly this went, wasn't there?

CARNEY: The military effort that ended April 9 with the end of major hostilities was brilliantly done with 2 exceptions: failure to secure the lines of communication at the outset - and that of course resulted in the contretemps in which (Private) Jessica Lynch found herself - and secondly a bold use of helicopters for assault that came a cropper because they had to fly over enemy-held territory in which many of them took fire that damaged them and reduced their capabilities and effectiveness.

Q: I think we can end this session.

CARNEY: Alright. Hope it was useful.

Q: I'm sure it is.

End of interview