

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training  
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

**RALPH N. CLOUGH**

*Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy*  
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## INTERVIEW

*Q: Mr. Clough, I wonder if you could give me a little about your early background. Where did you come from?*

CLOUGH: Well, I grew up in Seattle, born and went to school there. Graduated from the University of Washington, 1939. But I had a brush with China during my college years that really directed my future.

When I was a freshman at the University of Washington, I applied for and received an award for an exchange scholarship at Lingnan University in Guangzhou (Canton), China. I hadn't particularly been interested in China before that, I had been studying Spanish. I had four years of Spanish in high school. I was majoring in foreign trade at the university and hoped to get into business with Latin America. But suddenly came this offer to go abroad, and I was interested in traveling. It happened to be China; it could have been Argentina or Germany or whatever. So I went off to China.

And after a year as a student at Lingnan University, I was hooked. I started studying the Chinese language. I came back and took second-year Chinese at the University of Washington, and finished up with a major in economics and business and a minor in East Asian Studies. I went on for the Masters at the Fletcher School in order to prepare myself for the Foreign Service examination, to fill in some of the gaps that I hadn't had in my undergraduate work. Took the Foreign Service exam in the fall of 1940 and the oral exam in early '41, and was appointed to the Foreign Service in April of '41. I was assigned to Toronto as a probationary post, which we had in those days.

*Q: I wonder, could you talk a little about what you saw, because going to China... In the first place, wasn't your family a little bit nervous about going to China, because the China incident was in full swing, wasn't it at the time?*

CLOUGH: No, it wasn't in full swing. Actually, the Lukouchiao incident that set off the full-scale war between Japan and China was in July of '37. I went out in September of '36. There was war, intermittent battling in North China, but it was mostly a kind of encroachment process of negotiation, intimidation and so on as the Japanese encroached from Manchuria into North China, and finally set off the full-scale war by that attack on Lukouchiao in July of '37.

But I went in '36, and at that time, the Province of Guangzhou had been governed by a warlord, Chung Titong. Just before I arrived in Canton, or Guangzhou as it's known now, the central government succeeded in prevailing over the local warlord. They sent him on a world tour and took over the province. At that time, Guangzhou Province still had its own currency, which was at a different rate with the US dollar from the national currency (it was

five-to-one rather than three-to-one), and the process of bringing Guangzhou into the national system was underway.

*Q: Obviously, you were a young lad at the time, but what was your impression of the Kuomintang government?*

CLOUGH: In that year, the Kuomintang government was very popular among the students. Although it was felt that it was moving too slowly to resist the Japanese, there was a lot of patriotic pressure. They started an ROTC program on the campus that year. It created some problems, because the officers spoke Mandarin and the local students mostly spoke Cantonese--they couldn't understand each other. But there was tremendous pressure on the government to stand up to the Japanese, resist encroachment.

In December 1936, when Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped at Sian by the Communists in an effort to pressure him into a united front against the Japanese, the first reaction on the campus was gloom. People had regarded Chiang Kai-shek as the best symbol of resistance against Japan, the best leader against the Japanese. Now he was captured; no one knew what was going to happen to him. It was a very sad few weeks while he was held by the Communists and by some of his own troops from Manchuria, who were involved also in the sequestering.

In any case, the result was they worked out a deal for cooperation between the KMT and the Communists against the Japanese. Chiang was released, sent back to Nanjing, along with Chang Hsueh-liang, the nationalist general who had collaborated with the Communists in holding him. There was rejoicing in Guangzhou. It was around Christmastime when the news came of his release, and there were firecrackers going off all over the city and great joy that Chiang Kai-shek had been released and that a united front of resistance against the Japanese was developing.

*Q: Did you have any feel for incipient Communist movement in the students at the time?*

CLOUGH: No, not at that time. The Kuomintang was the symbol of nationalism. The Communists were far off in the northwest. There was no significant underground Communist movement.

*Q: The enemy was warlordism.*

CLOUGH: No, the enemy were the Japanese. As far as the national government was concerned, the warlords were a problem, because they still hadn't gotten control of the west and the southwest. Even in the south, even Guangxi Province, next to Guangzhou, was governed by a couple of warlords with whom the KMT had to make deals. In resisting the Japanese, the KMT had to make deals with the various warlords in order to get the use of their forces against the Japanese. And that's one of the things that, over the long run, weakened the KMT.

*Q: Then we move back to your Foreign Service time. You were in Toronto from '41 to '42. What were you doing there most of the time?*

CLOUGH: Oh, I was doing the usual things. You know, it was so-called probationary period. The system at that time was that you reported for one year, usually at a nearby post, so it wouldn't cost much to send you there.

*Q: Why didn't they send you to Vancouver?*

CLOUGH: Well, that would have been a little too... No, I was envious of a few friends who got sent to places in Western Europe. That was *really* foreign service. Toronto...not much foreign about that. So I did border-crossing cards, passports, a variety of consular work. And then I had a short period of doing of economic reporting.

The idea was that you'd spend one year at your post and then, assuming that you qualified, you were brought to Washington for six months of training before you went off to your first real Foreign Service post. But in my case, the war intervened. In December of '41, the war with Japan broke out. The training period for Foreign Service officers was canceled, so we were sent right on from the probationary post to another post.

*Q: Then you served in Tegucigalpa in Honduras from '42 to '45. What were you doing there?*

CLOUGH: My first job was in charge of a consular section. I did the whole range. I was the Vice Consul. I was the only consular officer. Not the only one who had a consular title, but the one in charge of the consular section. There were a couple of more senior officers, Second Secretaries and Consuls, who did other work but could supervise or fill in for me. But that was the main focus for the first year.

And then my second year, an officer was assigned, a Second Secretary and Consul, and he preferred the consular work. He didn't care much for cultural relations, cultural affairs, which at that time were conducted by the Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs, Nelson Rockefeller. All of the cultural activities were conducted under his agency, and it involved such things as running a cultural institute, English language programs.

There was also an office of the Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs in Tegucigalpa, which had its own head. And they did such things as sending a station wagon around the country with a mobile motion picture outfit that would show movies to the campesinos out in the countryside. This was during the war, and we had a big effort on to demonstrate to our allies in Honduras that...

*Q: Was Honduras in the war?*

CLOUGH: I can't recall whether they actually declared war or not, but they were very much... [HONDURAS DECLARED WAR ON JAPAN, GERMANY, AND ITALY IN DECEMBER 1941.]

*Q: They probably did, at least I know they did in the United Nations.*

CLOUGH: They cooperated very closely with us in any case, rounding up Germans. There was a newspaper that had been run by a German. A number of Germans were interned, sent off to the United States. Not very many Germans in Honduras, but there were a few. And there were always rumors about German submarines in the Caribbean, people with spotlights off the shore, and reports would come back.

We had a sizable staff at the embassy. We had an Army Attaché, we had an FBI guy, it was called something else I've forgotten, Attaché or Civil Attaché or something.

*Q: The FBI was running our counterintelligence in Latin America.*

CLOUGH: That's right. They did a lot of reporting on military and intelligence matters. We also had what passed in those days for an aid program. We had a public health doctor, who had a small staff working on public health projects.

We had an agency, I forget what it was called, but their job was mainly to find rubber trees in the jungle in Honduras, to tap the rubber. Natural rubber was in very short supply, of course, and there were several people who employed Hondurans to go out and explore the jungle and find rubber trees.

*Q: What was the political situation in Honduras?*

CLOUGH: In Honduras there was a dictator named Tiburcio Carías Andino, who had been in power for quite a long time. I think he came in about the same time as Roosevelt, about '33. He was leader of the Blue Party, the Asunas. The Colorados, the Red Party, was the opposition; they were out. It was a pretty straightforward sort of dictatorship. I remember one editorial in the government newspaper, *La Epocha*, which talked about "continuismo," the continuance in office. And the article said there were three great continuístas in the world: Carías, Roosevelt, and God--in that order.

*Q: Were we sort of relaxed with the situation there?*

CLOUGH: We were concerned about the Caribbean. Of course, the big problem was that shipping was halted in the Caribbean, for all practical purposes. The banana trade was completely eliminated, and that was the most important industry in Honduras, growing bananas. Two American companies, United Fruit Company and the Continental Fruit Company, had big plantations in Honduras. And when it became impossible to ship the bananas to the United States, the whole industry just went to pot.

*Q: Was it because of the submarines, or was it because the shipping was just being used for public purposes?*

CLOUGH: Well, both. Primarily that the shipping was drawn off for other purposes. We needed troop ships, and we needed to supply the war fronts, so there just wasn't enough shipping, and it was too risky. There were some submarines, I think, that operated occasionally in the Caribbean. In any case, it became necessary to do something to try to relieve the unemployment in Honduras, particularly in the banana regions. So it was decided to put in a PWA-type project, build a road from...

*Q: PWA being part of the New Deal, Public Works Administration.*

CLOUGH: Public Works Administration of the '30s. We allocated some money to hire people to build this road. There had been no road between the capital, Tegucigalpa, and the north coast, which was the primary agricultural area. There was a lake, Lake Yojoa, a big lake in the middle, so a road was built from San Pedro Sula, the biggest city in the north, up to the lake, and there was a ferry across the lake, and then from the end of the lake on over the mountains to Tegucigalpa. It was very rugged country, a lot of mountains, difficult road building. Eventually, they built a road around the lake, also, so you didn't have to depend on a ferry. But that was our main AID project in Honduras, to provide work for a large number of people. Very labor-intensive sort of work.

*Q: Were you sort of champing at the bit about your China business, or how did you feel?*

CLOUGH: Well, I stayed interested in China. I had the good fortune that sometime during this period the State Department sent a notice around to all the offices saying that the military had developed a series of language records, about 50 or 60 different languages, and they were using these in the program (I can't recall the acronym) that the Army ran in many universities for teaching various languages. One of the languages was Chinese, and they developed a set of records and a couple of booklets that went with them for learning spoken Chinese.

This was very attractive to me, because I hadn't had much spoken Chinese, my Chinese had been written. The spoken Chinese I learned in Guangzhou was Cantonese. I had to change my pronunciation to Mandarin in order to take second-year Chinese at the University of Washington.

Our professor of Chinese there, Knight Bickerstaff, was a historian, not a linguist. He was pressed into teaching language courses simply because they had no one else. His teaching of language was to take a sixth grade Chinese primer on the history of China, and we plowed through that, learning the characters as we went along, including some rather unusual characters that you wouldn't normally come across in conversation.

So when I saw this set of records offered to any Foreign Service post, I wrote in and asked them to supply Tegucigalpa with a set of the Chinese records, which they did, no questions asked. I found them very useful in building up some capability in spoken Chinese, because I still had the ambition to go to China.

The last two years I was in Tegucigalpa, I did this cultural relations work, running the Cultural Institute and language programs, and handing out American publications to prominent people and so on.

*Q: Speaking about that, did we have target audiences? I don't know Honduras, but I'm assuming there was basically a fairly well-to-do elite that pretty well ran things, and maybe there was some military, and then there were the peasants. Were we pointed towards the...*

CLOUGH: We were primarily pointed toward the elite, although we had this program of films that went out into the countryside and showed the films to illiterate peasants. I sometimes wondered what they thought of these war films showing tank factories in the States and so on. Not much relevance to their individual lives. They always attracted a crowd, because there was very little entertainment in the countryside.

*Q: I heard somewhere that they had cartoons about malaria control with mosquitos done by Walt Disney Studios. They'd see the mosquitos blown up to movie size and they'd say: "My God, what big mosquitos you have in your country! Ours are just little ones." You had a non-career Ambassador most of the time you were there.*

CLOUGH: That's right, John Irwin. He was an ex-newspaperman from Tennessee, a good friend of Cordell Hull, which is how he got the job.

*Q: You were a new officer looking at it. What was your impression of how he went about his business and operated?*

CLOUGH: He was a very amiable person and very well liked by the Hondurans. He had a lot of friends. He didn't speak the language, unfortunately, and he was too old to learn it. He did make an effort. Every Fourth of July, he was coached by one of the other officers on a speech that he would make when the diplomatic corps and government officials were invited to the embassy for the official occasion. And he would go through this speech rather laboriously. We were always talking about war, of course, the war was on, but we could never get him to say "la guerra." He would always say "la gwerra."

Anyway, he was a good man to work for, rather easy going. He did have a problem with his chief Military Attaché, who had the unfortunate habit of listening to everybody who came into his office and sort of reporting what was said to him verbatim, sending it off to Washington without much attempt to verify whether this was true or not. He did have a very smart Warrant Officer, who did the typing, and he would sometimes leave out whole paragraphs of stuff that he thought was too off-the-wall. The Colonel never noticed it. So the Ambassador, when he went on leave and consultation in Washington on one occasion, tried to get his Military Attaché changed, but he wasn't successful. The State Department didn't have much influence with the Defense Department in those days.

*Q: I guess this was a good place to bury people.*

CLOUGH: I suppose, I suppose. He probably wasn't a highly regarded combat officer.

*Q: Then in 1945, you were able to get out there.*

CLOUGH: In 1945, the reason I got out was that I was drafted. I had wanted to use my Chinese, and I had written to the China program. The Navy was running a China program in Colorado, and training people to become China specialists in Naval Intelligence. That attracted me, so I wrote to them and tried to get into that program, but they said my eyesight was too bad. It didn't meet Navy standards.

*Q: The Navy, I recall at the time, was death on bad eyesight.*

CLOUGH: That's right, so they turned me down. And then the next thing, the Army wanted to draft me. So they said report either to the closest place, which was Panama, or your home city, which was Seattle, where I'd originally registered for the draft. So, of course, I chose Seattle, because I had a wife and a small son at that time, and I wanted to take them back and establish them with her parents for the duration, while I went off to be drafted.

So we all went back to Seattle, and I went down and reported to the draft board. They gave me a physical and said, "Well, you're Okay for limited service, but we're not drafting anybody for limited service right now, so just wait." And so I waited and audited some Chinese courses at the University of Washington.

Eventually, the State Department was ginning up the San Francisco conference to set up the United Nations. They needed to send about half of their Public Affairs Division out to San Francisco to handle those problems during the conference, and they were very shorthanded in Washington. So they discovered that I was sitting there doing nothing in Seattle, and they said, "Come back to Washington, get your papers transferred to a local draft board in Washington, wait there, and work while you're waiting."

That seemed reasonable to me, so I went back to Washington and worked in the State Department, the old War Navy Building, what's now the EOB. I was there for several months, the spring and early summer of '45.

While I was there, of course, I went around and got acquainted with the people in the China Division. They were shorthanded; they needed people to serve in China. I worked it out so that I would get assigned to Kunming as Vice Consul when I finished my stint in the Public Affairs Division.

*Q: Where's Kunming?*

CLOUGH: Kunming is in southwest China, not too far from Burma. It was the place where the Burma Road ended, and where there was a great airlift going on at that time from India

into Kunming. They had a huge airfield there and a large number of American Air Force people stationed there.

*Q: Before we move there, did you have any impression of the China Desk? How were they looking at things in 1945?*

CLOUGH: It was wartime, and I knew relatively little about China or our relations with China. I'd been down in Tegucigalpa for the past three years.

After the end of the war with Germany, of course our efforts were concentrated on the Pacific. One of the things we were doing was bringing in as much matériel as we could, over the Hump, to supply the Nationalist forces against the Japanese, while we hit them in the Pacific. So our whole China effort was aimed at resisting the Japanese. There was an effort by the Japanese to drive toward Kunming from south China through...

*Q: To wipe out those airfields that were bombing.*

CLOUGH: Yes, they did capture airfields in Guilin, a couple of airfields in Guangxi Province. And they were moving toward Guizhou and trying to come toward Chungking and Kunming from the southeast. So that a lot of the air sorties by the American Air Force, which had succeeded the Flying Tigers, were trying to stop that penetration by the Japanese.

*Q: Were you getting any feel while you were in Washington about the Stilwell-Chiang Kai-shek disagreements, because it was about that time, wasn't it?*

CLOUGH: Stilwell had been eased out before that. Wedemeyer was in Chungking, along with General Hurley. I did get some murmurings about problems between General Hurley and his Foreign Service staff in China, but not very much. I was pretty innocent when I went off to China.

I got on the plane early July of '45, and I had to go through North Africa and India in order to fly into Kunming. I had a low priority and I was bumped.

*Q: Vice Consuls don't amount to very much in a wartime situation.*

CLOUGH: That's right. I was bumped in Casablanca. I was bumped in Cairo. I was bumped in Karachi. I was bumped in Calcutta. But I didn't mind, because it gave me a chance to see a little bit of those places that I'd never visited before. And then, finally, I flew in over the Hump into Kunming and became Vice Consul there.

*Q: Was it about August or so?*

CLOUGH: No, I got there in July.

*Q: Before the war ended.*

CLOUGH: Before the war ended. I had been there a few weeks when the war ended.

*Q: What was the situation in Kunming as far as your office and your work was concerned?*

CLOUGH: My assignment was Political Officer, which was new to me. I'd maybe written a couple of attempts at political dispatches in Toronto, just to try my hand, but I didn't really know much about political reporting. But that was my assignment in Kunming.

Bill Langdon was the Consul General there, and he had a staff of, I suppose, five or six officers doing consular work and political work. But it was small, very self-contained.

We lived in a compound that had once been the Governor's mansion. It had a big wall around it, and a huge gate, and a number of separate buildings inside. We used part of the buildings for offices and part were our living quarters. A two-story building in the center was our living quarters. Very simple. We had no flush toilets. We had toilets that had to be emptied every day by the servants. We ate together in a central mess on the first floor of the large building. It was very interesting.

We were next door to a dormitory where a number of professors from the Southwestern United University lived. This was a university that had been set up by Peking University, Tsinghua University, primarily, when they moved. They had to move out of Peking, and they set up again, finally, in Kunming. They were sort of a hotbed of anti-KMT sentiment. The people there belonged to the Democratic League, which was an opposition group promoting a more democratic system, coalition with the Communists of some kind. I think it was not long before I got there, I can't recall exactly when, a well-known professor named Wonido was assassinated in Kunming. It was quite a political sensation at the time. I talked with a number of these professors, did some reporting.

*Q: Did you have any feeling on your reporting that your Consul General was saying: Lay off this? Or was there sort of a world-your-oyster, as far as whatever you saw, you could report on?*

CLOUGH: As far as I recall, he was pretty easy going in that respect. I don't recall his having any fixed... Well, he must have had fixed views. He was a strong-minded individual.

I recall, particularly, we had an American professor who taught English at this university, and he had been there a long time. He had been in Beijing before and then moved with the university. He and Langdon used to argue. They would sit at opposite ends of the lunch table (he ate his meals with us), and they would argue about anything. They both loved to argue, and they always took opposite sides on whatever the argument was. I remember, this fellow's name was Bob Winter, and his favorite remark at some point in the argument was always, "Langdon, you're talking out of McGuffey's Second Reader."

*Q: What was your impression and, you might say, of the others there, of the KMT and its doings in the Kunming area?*

CLOUGH: I wasn't really there long enough to get much of a grasp. I was there July, August, September, about three months, and I was transferred to Chungking, so I was just beginning to establish my contacts and so on, which, in a new environment and a new function, for me takes time.

*Q: It takes time in any case. Now in Chungking, you got there in October of '45?*

CLOUGH: I arrived just a couple of weeks after General Hurley had left, so I never met him. And I was never caught up in that "Hurley versus the Foreign Service, the China Service."

*Q: Were you getting any of the aftershocks of that whole thing?*

CLOUGH: Yes, I began to get that once I got to Chungking and talked to people there. It was evident what had been going on.

*Q: What was the problem?*

CLOUGH: I think the problem was a very strong feeling on the part of the political reporting officers that the KMT was declining, that it was in a very weak position, there was a lot of corruption. It had a big army. Its forces outnumbered the Communist forces by a considerable amount, but it seemed to be so inefficient and so incapable that the reporting that went in from Chungking on the KMT, by people like Jack Service and Ray Ludden and John Davies and so on, was uniformly unfavorable to the KMT. I mean, they saw the feet of clay.

But Hurley didn't like that. Hurley felt it was exaggerated, that it was unfair to the KMT, that the Generalissimo was somebody we ought to support, and by this kind of reporting we were undermining him.

*Q: Did Leighton Stuart take over as Ambassador right after that?*

CLOUGH: No, he didn't, not right away. The first change was the employment of General Marshall, who came in December of '45. He came as a result of Truman's decision for the United States to mediate between the Communists and the Nationalists and try to work out some sort of coalition government. General Marshall was sent to carry out that mission.

Walter Robertson was the Chargé d'Affaires when I arrived. He had been an Economic Officer in Australia during some part of the war, and then he was sent to Chungking as Economic Counselor. He was a former Richmond banker. When General Hurley left, he became Chargé, and was Chargé for several months until General Marshall arrived.

I remember Robertson saying, when he read the instructions about the US function in mediating and trying to set up a coalition government, "Well, we have a variety of means by which we can put pressure on the KMT, but I don't see any way we can put pressure on the Communists." So he was rather pessimistic about the future, although he worked at it. He was named by General Marshall as Director of the Executive Headquarters in Beijing later on when the operation moved up there.

*Q: Was the Marshall mission, was he really going there... Did he become Ambassador?*

CLOUGH: My recollection is that he was, for a short time, before Leighton Stuart was appointed. I think it was a temporary arrangement, but he had responsibility for things beyond just the mediation mission.

I recall my own personal experience. I was a Vice Consul, Third Secretary, so I had rather menial assignments. One of the things I did was to write letters, memos to the Foreign Ministry complaining about invasions or damage done to foreign mission premises by the KMT military. This was happening here and there around China. The missionaries would complain to the embassy, the embassy would go to the Foreign Ministry and complain about it. That was one of my jobs.

Another job I was assigned in the aftermath of the war, and after General Marshall came, was to work on a project, which he conceived, of turning over to the Foreign Service a lot of the equipment that the US military would be leaving behind in China when they pulled out.

They had all kinds of stuff that they had used for their war purposes, and it wasn't worth shipping back to the United States. We were going to turn it over to the Chinese at one cent on the dollar, or something like that. But General Marshall thought that before we turned it over to the Chinese, the embassy and the six or seven consulates in China at the time ought to have first call on any of that material that we could use. Most of it we couldn't use. It wasn't suited to...

*Q: Anti-aircraft guns and all...*

CLOUGH: No, but there were a few things that could be useful: light bulbs, trucks, Jeeps, pots and pans, a lot of things of that sort. So I was designated by General Marshall to visit the various consulates and to draw up with them a list of the kinds of things that they could use.

So I thought about this, and I thought, you know there is a problem. One of the things that would be most useful to consulates around China would be generators, because the electric power was notoriously bad in China, it was always going off. If we had our own generators, we would be independent of that problem. And that was one thing that the military had quite a few of.

The problem was that I didn't know anything about generators or how big a generator you needed for such and such an installation. So I went to General Marshall and said I needed an engineering officer to go with me, somebody who knew something about electricity, electrical engineering.

And he said, "Well, all of our engineering officers are very busy in China. I don't know that we can spare any."

I said, "I happen to have a brother who is a Lieutenant at an aviation engineering battalion in Okinawa, maybe he could be freed."

So General Marshall said, "What's his name and serial number?"

I gave it. The next thing my brother knew, he was sitting peacefully in a tent in Okinawa, he got this message marked "Gold" from General Marshall: "Report to Shanghai." He didn't know what it was all about. He knew that I was in Chungking, so he suspected that I had something to do with it.

So I went down to Shanghai, and after several days in a hotel there, reporting daily to the headquarters, my brother and I finally encountered each other. I saw him sitting in the dining room in the hotel. It turned out we'd been going to different places and had never encountered each other. But we finally got together, and we made a tour of various consulates: Beijing, Tianjin, Qingdao, Hong Kong.

*Q: What was your impression of a consular establishment, the people? Here you had a chance. Obviously, you were a junior officer, but you'd been around for awhile. What was your impression of what they were doing, but also the people there and our operations there?*

CLOUGH: I had a chance to meet some of the older China Language officers, people like Bob Smyth, who was Political Counselor in Chungking. Later on, after I went to Beijing myself as a language officer, I met Harry Stevens, who was Consul General in Beijing for a short time before Edmund Oliver Edmund Clubb arrived. I saw in the *Foreign Service Journal* the other day he just died at the age of 92.

Harry Stevens, I remember him particularly, because in June of '46 I was appointed Language Officer to study Chinese in Beijing. I was the first of the post-war crop of Chinese Language Officers, so I reported to him. His idea of how to learn Chinese was to take the dictionary and memorize each meaning of each character. But he didn't stay long, he was soon succeeded by Clubb.

*Q: We had a very extensive consular establishment in China at the time.*

CLOUGH: We did. We did, but it was still a very disturbed period. It wasn't a normal period. There were still a lot of military around. Our own Air Force was engaged in

transferring Nationalist troops across Communist-held areas into Beijing, Tianjin, into Manchuria. There was a unit of US Marines stationed in Beijing and in Tianjin, also, and they were responsible for the safety of that rail line, which was attacked by the Communists from time to time.

On the one hand, there were these negotiations going on at the top level. Zhou En-lai with Chiang Kai-shek. Chang Chun was the chief Nationalist negotiator. They had this elaborate Executive Headquarters set up in Beijing, with a large number of field grade officers whose job was to go out in groups of three--American, Nationalist, Communist--and check on reports of clashes between Nationalist and Communist forces.

This was a little later. I sort of jumped ahead of my story. During the period when I was touring the consulates to make up lists of things they required, I didn't have much chance to find out what was going on in a political sense in these places, because I was concentrating with the general services officer trying to make lists of stuff. And I spent only two or three days with my brother at each place.

I was struck particularly by Hong Kong, which we reached early, maybe it was January, February 1946. All of the houses above a certain level on the peak had been stripped. Nobody lived there. When the Japanese occupied, they had been abandoned, or the owners, mostly foreigners, had been interned. The houses were empty. The Chinese simply took out the wires and plumbing and everything else that was movable, leaving the shells of the houses. And that's the way it was when I got there in 1946. It was a sad sight.

*Q: After you finished this tour, were you getting any of the rumblings of Hurley making problems back in Washington?*

CLOUGH: Yes, we were getting reports on that. And we were also very much concerned with the negotiations that were going on and the attitude of the Chinese. We had particular contacts, as usually happens, with the Chinese who thought like we did about democracy in China, people in the Democratic League. We had contacts with the Communists as well. Zhou En-lai had an office in Chungking.

We moved down from Chungking to Nanjing. The whole embassy moved in early '46. One of my jobs first was to go down there and take over from the officer who was the first one sent down to Nanjing to rent houses for embassy personnel who would be moving back to Nanjing, which was the capital where the government would be moving. And, of course, there was great competition for housing, everybody was going back at the same time. He did a good job of renting a number of houses.

Then I was sent down to run the motor pool and to handle the shipment from Chungking on LSTs of office furniture and stuff.

*Q: LSTs being landing ship tanks.*

CLOUGH: Yes. They had some on the Yangtze, which were sent up to Chungking to pick up all this stuff. They were good for carrying that kind of cargo. They just let down their front flap on the bank and everything could be carried off. So we rescued all of this pitiful furniture out of the embassy in Chungking, very simple Chinese-made desks and chairs and so on, but we figured it was better to bring it down and use it than junk it and have to buy new. So that was my principal job in Nanjing until I was sent up to Beijing for language study.

So, as you can see, I was not one of those engaged in the political side of the embassy, but I did know the people who were more active in that work. John Melby, for instance. I knew John very well. He arrived in Chungking while I was there, and then we were both stationed in Nanjing. And then later, when I came back after my language study, I was assigned to the embassy in Nanjing, so I got to know John fairly well. And Ray Ludden was another Political Officer.

They were, I would say, generally rather pessimistic about the way things were going. The war was continuing sporadically here and there. The Executive Headquarters system had not successfully created a cease fire. Both sides were throwing accusations at each other. And the worst thing that was going on was the terrible inflation, which was already underway in Chungking and spread over the whole country. That continued right up until '49 when the Nationalists were driven off the mainland.

*Q: One of the people, of course, who figured very strongly in our policy for the next decade, really more than that, was Walter Robertson. And you saw him when he was within the service and not a dominating figure. What was your impression of him, and how was he looking at things at that time?*

CLOUGH: I think that quote that I gave you about how to deal with Nationalists and Communists generally typified his view. He felt that we had no effective way of putting pressure on the Communists. If they wanted to create a civil war, we couldn't stop it. He tended to blame the Communists more than the Nationalists when negotiations broke down.

*Q: Did you feel that there was any sort of almost a generational thing in the Foreign Service there?. I mean, the older officers tended to maybe see where the KMT had come from, and the fact that they had initially been a force of reform, whereas the younger officers coming in there were looking at things as they were at the time and finding the KMT being corrupt?*

CLOUGH: I think there may have been that sort of division. I guess the officers that I knew best in Chungking were Bob Smyth and Knight Bickerstaff, who had been my professor at the University of Washington. He was a temporary Foreign Service officer in Chungking doing political work. And they both knew the KMT from the earlier days and had this historical perspective, which, I agree, some of the younger officers didn't have. Although

the younger officers, in a way, had a longer perspective, because people like Jack Service and John Davies had grown up in China.

*Q: You went to the language school then in Peking from '46 to '47. How did that operate?*

CLOUGH: We had to start from scratch. There were no teaching materials available. One of the books we were given, for instance, was a two-volume work by a Colonel Aldrich, an Army Colonel who had prepared this, pre-war, for the use of foreigners in China wanting to learn Chinese. It was very ill-designed for the uses of the Foreign Service. It had very little of political or economic interest in it. It mainly dealt with how you run a household in Beijing, how you talk to your Number One Boy and your cook.

*Q: Sort of kitchen Chinese in a way.*

CLOUGH: It was more than kitchen Chinese. Within its realm it was very sophisticated, and it taught you characters that you'd never encounter anywhere else, but not of much use in the Foreign Service.

There was a young China specialist named Thurston Griggs, who had also been an exchange student at Lingnan University. He was also from the University of Washington. He had been there the year before I went, so I met him after he came back, and got some tips on the program at Lingnan. Anyway, he somehow (I'm not sure just how) found his way into the Foreign Service, and he became the director of the language school. He'd had some graduate work in Chinese.

He hired about a dozen Chinese as instructors. About half of them were engaged as tutors, the other half were preparing materials, getting extracts from newspapers, documents, and things that would be useful to us in our Foreign Service career. So we had six students, initially, and 12 teachers. Pretty good teacher-student ratio.

Each of us studied in our own houses. Most of us lived in a little compound there called Sankuon Miou, a number of Chinese-style houses in a good-sized compound with a swimming pool.

*Q: Was your family with you at the time?*

CLOUGH: We had our families with us. Actually, I was the only one who had been in China, and I was assigned to language school from a job in China. My family came and joined me when I went to the language school in June of '46. The other students came from other places, and they came with their families.

Our tutors came around to visit us. We had fixed hours each day for tutoring--one hour with this teacher and another hour with another teacher. About half of our time was tutoring, the other half was independent study. It was a very good program, we learned a lot. We spent a lot of time going to plays, to movies, to Chinese church, any place we could take advantage of to get some practice with our Chinese.

*Q: When one is a language student, in some ways you're a little freer than you are at almost any other time to get out and meet people. Were you getting any feeling from the people you were meeting about the situation and how things were going?*

CLOUGH: Yes, we spent time with students at the universities, for example. Generally speaking, the students were very critical of the KMT. They were also critical of the United States. There was a famous case of an alleged rape of a Chinese student by an American Marine, and that occupied the newspapers for quite awhile. So there was a widespread feeling among the students that the United States and the KMT were in the wrong, and that we were not really backing democracy.

The Communists had considerable appeal. They were seen as more upright, less corrupt. And they had this vision for the future: a peoples' China that would not be at the service of the compradors and the rich people, the Kotuns and the Sung. Compradors were merchants who served as middlemen with the foreign merchants in the Chinese market.

*Q: You then went back to what was now our embassy in Nanking. You served there from '47 to '50. What was the situation when you got there, and what were you doing?*

CLOUGH: I was given the title of Chinese Secretary, which is a title that doesn't exist anymore.

*Q: That sounds like the old British Foreign Service. They had an Oriental Secretary, actually, in Egypt or something like that.*

CLOUGH: Anyway, my job, about half of my time, was taken up with the documents that went to and from the Foreign Ministry. Normally, as you know, in a foreign post, in an embassy, you write to the Foreign Ministry in your language, and the Foreign Ministry writes back in their language, and you have to do the translation.

But in Nanjing we had such a heavy volume of correspondence, in those years, with the Foreign Ministry that they simply couldn't have kept up if we depended on them to do all the translating, we'd be too far behind. So we had a staff of translators, who translated both our notes to the Foreign Ministry and the ones that came back from the Foreign Ministry. That way, we more or less kept up with the flow of correspondence.

My job, as Chinese Secretary, was to check the translations to make sure that these translators were accurately turning the English into Chinese and vice versa. The rest of my time I was a political reporter, or sometimes high-level interpreter going with one of the Counselors at the embassy to talk with some high-level Chinese official.

*Q: Could you describe a little about the embassy. Leighton Stuart...*

CLOUGH: By the time I was assigned to the embassy, Leighton Stuart was there as Ambassador. He had a strong commitment to try to get this coalition to work out. He was China-born, he grew up in China. He had been president of the university for years. He wanted China to be a peaceful, progressive place.

He had many, many connections, both on the Communist side and on the KMT side. He knew many of these people personally, had known them for years. For example, the head of the Aliens Affairs Office in Nanjing City was a man named Huang Hua, who had been a student of his at Yenching University and then gone over to the Communists and worked his way up in the ranks. He had meetings with Huang Hua on several occasions. This was reported in Stuart's own autobiography and in the dispatches that were written during the period. I'm sure a lot of this is reproduced now in FRUS.

*Q: Were you getting any sort of instructions as you did your reporting? What were you, particularly, looking for?*

CLOUGH: We were looking for rays of light, I suppose, in this gloom that surrounded the political situation. The negotiations were not progressing. Of course, Marshall left long before I came back in '47 to Nanjing. He later became Secretary of State, I've forgotten just the timing of this. [JANUARY 1947]

In any case, we talked to people in the government. We talked to professors and businessmen. We studied the publications of various kinds that came out with all kinds of rumors and stories about politics, much of which was not fact. It was very hard to sort out fact from fiction in this confused period.

And this was the worst period of inflation. People were scrambling to try to make ends meet. I can recall how the embassy had to send a truck to the bank to get a truckload of currency. Each of us got an allowance of local currency, as part of our salary, in order to pay our servants and to buy things that we needed on the local market. We'd line up at the accounting office in the embassy and each of us would get a mail sack full of bundles of notes.

*Q: I understand at that period of time nobody bothered to unbundle notes.*

CLOUGH: That's right. I don't know how many million each bundle stood for. But I'd take my sack back to the house, and I would pass out the appropriate amount to each of the servants (I think we had about three servants at the time), and they would rush off to the market to buy something before the currency lost any more of its value. They'd try to turn it promptly into rice or cloth or gold coins or whatever. It was a hectic time.

Now the political situation was simply going from bad to worse, because in the middle of '46, the civil war broke out in full scale. The Nationalists, at first, made an advance. They captured Yen-an up in Shaanxi Province. They seemed to be making progress, but it was an illusion, because they had disregarded Marshall's advice about Manchuria. He had felt that

they couldn't maintain themselves in Manchuria. They had Shenyang and Changchun, several cities, but the countryside was mostly controlled by the Communists. He felt they simply couldn't keep their supply lines open, which turned out to be the case.

Gradually they lost the battle for Manchuria and then the battle for North China. And finally, in '48 the climactic battle, the so-called Huai-hua battle north of Nanjing, was fought. Millions of men on either side. The Nationalists lost, and that was the end of them. For all practical purposes that was the end of the KMT.

But we could see it coming, you know. We'd go into the embassy and our Military Attaché would put a map up and give us a briefing on the latest military situation. Any layman could see it was going badly for the Nationalists.

*Q: Of course it only came up later, but was there any feeling there was anything we could do about it? A few years later, it was: Who lost China? How did that feel? You were there at the time.*

CLOUGH: I was there, and those of us who were in the embassy and in touch with our American military were strongly opposed to getting any more deeply involved. You remember General Wedemeyer was sent out on a mission to tour China and see what might be done. He went, together with Phil Sprouse, who was the Director for Chinese Affairs at the time.

The Wedemeyer report was so negative, I guess, to the Nationalists that it was not published for a considerable period of time. It became one of the political footballs back here in the United States. But Wedemeyer's judgment was that it would have required an enormous investment of American military to maintain the Nationalists in China. And in the opinion of those of us in the embassy, it was not worth it. We couldn't support this collapsing structure.

I recall one occasion when Congressman Walter Judd came out. We had an evening session with Walter Judd, and he kept saying "What can we do? What can we do?" And none of the embassy officers had any very good ideas. It was a gloomy session, and I think he came away with the feeling that those China specialists in Nanjing are not much good, they can't think of any useful things for the United States to do at this critical point.

*Q: Judd was China-born, too, wasn't he?*

CLOUGH: I can't recall, but of course he was a missionary in China for years and years.

*Q: He was a missionary and then a very influential Congressman on the Right in the political spectrum in the United States.*

CLOUGH: He was a very strong pro-Nationalist, along with Senator Knowland from California. Those two, I think, were the outstanding ones.

*Q: Were we making any effort that you know of to make contact with the democratic groups?*

CLOUGH: Oh, yes, we had contact with those people all along. But as always happens in a situation when you have two strong antagonists fighting each other, the people in the middle tend to be very small in number and very weak. They wanted something which the Americans approved of very much, they wanted some democratic, peaceful arrangement. But the two sides who held the power weren't interested in what these people were peddling. They wanted their own views to prevail.

*Q: How about your contacts with the KMT at the Foreign Ministry? What was your impression of how they were operating?*

CLOUGH: They were very professional. Ninety percent of what we did with the KMT didn't have much to do with the high politics of the situation. We negotiated a trade treaty, for example, that consumed a lot of time and effort. We had an aid program going in China. We had a very active cultural affairs program. The Fulbright Program was started in China; it was the first country where we had a Fulbright Program.

*Q: So as things were falling apart, the chairs were being rearranged on the deck of the Titanic. This was a very slow collapse, wasn't it?*

CLOUGH: Yes. It tended to accelerate as it got toward the end. In the beginning, when I was in Chungking, I would say the prevailing view in the embassy was that if we could not work out a coalition agreement (and people were rather pessimistic that we could) between the Nationalists and the Communists, then China was in for a long period of civil war. Very long. People did not think the Nationalists could be defeated. On the other hand, they didn't think that they could defeat the Communists, and therefore it would drag on and on. No one, in 1945 or '46, would have predicted that by 1949 these huge Nationalists armies with all their equipment and so on, so much superior in material terms to the Communists, would be reeling back in total defeat.

*Q: Well, you had the climactic battle. It was near Nanjing, wasn't it?*

CLOUGH: It was north of Nanjing, a couple of hundred miles.

*Q: How did you all view it there, and then what happened to you after that?*

CLOUGH: We could see that the Communists were winning the civil war. It was very evident, particularly as the Huai-Hua battle developed and the Nationalists began to use desperation measures to try to shore up this place with airlifts and that place. It was obvious they weren't going to be able to do it. Therefore, the government was going to have to move, because Nanjing would be immediately threatened once they couldn't hold the ground to the north. There was talk of forming some sort of line along the Yangtze River to

hold the Yangtze, but it wasn't that formidable an obstacle to the Communists as it turned out.

So we had to divide the embassy. The government prepared to move. It was going down to Guangzhou, Canton. And we sent the larger part of our embassy. I guess this was late '48 when we did this. Louis Clark, who was the Minister Counselor, headed the group that went down to Guangzhou. Leighton Stuart stayed on, along with all the other Ambassadors in Nanjing, with the exception of the Soviet Ambassador who moved down to Guangzhou. I think the senior Foreign Service officer was Johnny Jones, who was a Political Counselor.

So we were there, and we anticipated the Nationalist withdrawal and the Communist arrival, which occurred in late April. I think it was April 25th that the Communists came in. There was an interim of about 24 hours, between the time that the police and military from the Nationalists pulled out and the Communists forces came in, when there was some looting in the city, some disorder. But not too much. It didn't affect any of us.

When the Communist troops came in, they were very orderly, and they informed us that we had to stay in our compounds. For the first few days they wouldn't allow us out. They posted sentries at the gates and wouldn't allow the foreigners out. But within a few days we got a notice from this Aliens Affairs Office, which had been set up.

You have to remember that in April of '49 there was no central government. The People's Republic of China had not yet been established. This was simply a military government, and the Aliens Affairs Office was the office that was set up to deal with the foreigners. We assumed that we could function in a consular capacity, as we had done in Manchukuo. After the Japanese took Manchuria, we never recognized Manchukuo. We never had any diplomatic relations with that government, but we kept our consuls there, and we dealt with the local government on a consular basis. Never had any serious problems. I think the Japanese accepted that. And that's what we had done throughout Latin America. When there was a change of government, we'd keep our consular officers on, and we'd deal with the successor, whoever it was. So we thought we could do that in China, but the Chinese Communists took a different attitude.

They sent a notice around to all the embassies in Nanjing saying: "You people have no official status whatsoever. You're just ordinary citizens, and you're not allowed to leave the city without permission from the Public Security Bureau. There's an eight o'clock curfew. No one is allowed on the streets after eight o'clock. And if you have any business, you have to deal with this office and present your business in the form of a written statement in so many copies in Chinese and English, or Chinese and a foreign language, whatever your language is." So that was the setup that we encountered.

We did have this incident involving Leighton Stuart's quarters. Early on, the first few days of the occupation, some soldiers wandered into his house early in the morning before he was out of bed. They intimidated the servants, and they bulled their way upstairs into his bedroom, actually, where he spoke to them in Chinese and explained that this was foreign

government premises, that they were violating the law by coming there and so on. But they didn't pay much attention.

One of my jobs was to go to the Aliens Affairs Office and make a protest of this invasion of our Ambassador's quarters by soldiers. So we wrote it all out, and I went down to the Aliens Affairs Office. The first problem I had was to get in, because you had to fill out a form at the gate, all this in Chinese, saying who you were, what your position was, what your business was, who you wanted to see. So I filled this all out, saying that I was the Second Secretary of the American Embassy.

The gatekeeper said, "No, you're not. You have to say you're the *former* Second Secretary of the American Embassy." And I argued with him. I said, "No, as far as *my* government is concerned, I *still am* the Second Secretary of the American Embassy."

So we argued awhile, and then he took the paper and wrote "former" in front of it and took it in.

So I went in, and I made my protest to the appropriate official. In fact, this was Huang-Hua himself. He lambasted me. He said, "You have no right to make a protest. You have no status. You're just an ordinary citizen."

We found out later that these soldiers were tracked down and they were punished. We heard indirectly, but they wouldn't acknowledge our protest.

*Q: Why did we hang on there?*

CLOUGH: The theory was (and this was a theory widely shared among the foreign Ambassadors in Nanjing at that time) that the Nationalists were on the way out, that they were losing the civil war, that they were going to be driven off the mainland, and that the best way to make the adjustment to the new government that was taking over was to keep our Ambassadors there so we would have some representation. We could begin a dialogue and work out the arrangements. That was the theory, but in fact it turned out to be much more difficult than anybody anticipated.

The British, in January 1950, recognized the People's Republic of China, which had been established on the 1st of October 1949. But they were not allowed, immediately, to set up an embassy in Beijing, which was the new capital. The Communists were not going to use Nanjing as the capital, they were going to set up in Beijing. The British had to send a negotiating team to Beijing to negotiate the terms under which they would establish a mission there after they had recognized.

They had a special problem that nobody else had. They had a consulate in Tamsui in Taiwan, which they didn't close down. Taiwan, of course, was still under the control of the Nationalists. The Communists wanted them to close that down, and they refused. As a result of which, the British were not able to send an Ambassador to Beijing for about 20

years, until the early '70s, when they finally closed their Tamsui consulate. They had only a Chargé d'Affaires in Beijing.

*Q: Did you ever hear anyone talking about: Well, let's get the hell out of here and go back when the spirit is right? This hanging on seems, in retrospect, a bit odd.*

CLOUGH: As far as we were concerned, that's what we did. But we only did it after we'd been there from April '49 until February of 1950 when we finally pulled out. We pulled out because there had been a number of problems.

First, we'd had the imprisonment of Angus Ward, our Consul General in Manchuria, Shenyang, and his staff, and they were held for a long time. And then there was an incident involving a Vice Consul Olive in Shanghai, who was mistreated by the police.

So there was concern that, as you say, we weren't accomplishing anything by staying there, that we might as well pull out. Because as long as our people were there, they were to some extent hostages. They could be arrested or mistreated.

The final straw, as far as we were concerned, was when they confiscated a piece of property in Beijing that had been embassy property. They simply took it over. And at that point, we said, "Okay, well, we're pulling out." We moved our people down to Shanghai and closed the embassy.

We tried to negotiate for a ship to come and take us out of Shanghai, but the Nationalists were bombarding Shanghai and Nanjing, sporadically, from Taiwan during that period. The government said: "It's too dangerous to bring a ship into Shanghai, you can't do it." So we finally worked out a deal to bring the ship into Tianjin and take everybody on the train up to Tianjin, and we got the boat out to Hong Kong.

*Q: Were you getting instructions from Washington telling you to keep hanging in there?*

CLOUGH: We were doing useful things, I think. We were reporting on the situation in Nanjing. After the first few days, we could move fairly freely around the town. Not outside the walls, but within the town. We could talk to people, and we could report on what the newspapers were saying. They had taken over the former *Central Daily News* and turned it into the *Shenwa Rebao*, the new China daily published in Nanjing. And we also got newspapers, sometimes, from other parts of the country. We could analyze what they were saying, what campaigns were going on.

*Q: How did you get your communications in and out?*

CLOUGH: We had our own radio. We had our own broadcasting, transmitting set, encoding equipment. So we operated entirely by radio. For months, we didn't get any pouches in or out.

*Q: If somebody left China, they couldn't get back in?*

CLOUGH: No. That's right. So when Leighton Stuart left, we had to negotiate for his departure. It was decided by June or so, well, certainly by the time that Mao Zedong made his famous "Lean to One Side" speech, which was of July 1, 1949, that there was no point in keeping our Ambassador there any longer. We had an Air Attaché there with an airplane, so we had to negotiate the terms for the Ambassador to leave with the Air Attaché to fly to Okinawa, with some other people from our staff. We reduced the staff considerably.

We had a problem, because the Communists had established a system of guarantors. If any foreigner wanted to leave China, somebody who stayed on had to guarantee that nothing that he did would be damaging. In other words, they wanted a hostage for everyone who left. And we had to negotiate this for the Ambassador, as well, since they regarded him as only an ordinary citizen.

*Q: I talked to somebody not too long ago who was supposed to be going up to Manchuria and was a guarantor for almost everybody towards the end. And then he stayed. He was a little bit worried about getting out.*

CLOUGH: That might have been Phil Manhard.

*Q: It wasn't Phil Manhard, it was somebody else. We've done Phil Manhard, but I can't remember who.*

CLOUGH: Anyway, that's what we had to do. Have you interviewed Lee Bacon?

*Q: That's who it was. He was the one.*

CLOUGH: After Johnny Jones left, Lee Bacon, the Consul, became the senior Foreign Service officer in Nanjing.

*Q: How did you all feel? Did you feel that this was a transition period and that there were signs that the Communist authorities were probably going to open up? Was this hope, or was there anything to sustain this?*

CLOUGH: Yes, I think we were optimistic. We drafted a telegram, I guess probably the summer of '49, to the effect that the Nationalists were losing the civil war, that it was important for us to maintain some connection. It was a longish cable in which we sort of analyzed the whole situation: the declining fortunes of the Nationalist government, the almost-certainty that the Communists would be taking over as a new government. But we expressed the view that, in time, strains would develop between the Soviet Union and China, in spite of the lean-to-one-side views expressed by Mao on July 1st, and that we should wait for that time, take advantage of what we felt then would be a growing division between the Soviet Union and China.

*Q: Was Washington, did you have any feel for...*

CLOUGH: I think that telegram was later utilized by the Secretary of State when he met the British Secretary, Nevin, at some meeting, mid-Atlantic meeting or something. The British Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State talked about China, and I think this telegram from Nanjing was one of the exhibits. I didn't know that, until I got to Hong Kong and looked in the files. In one of the Top Secret files I found this telegram right next to the report of the meeting with Nevin.

*Q: You then left, you went to Hong Kong, is that right?*

CLOUGH: We had a lot of problems that maybe Lee Bacon has told you about in more detail. We had labor problems with the staff at the embassy, who were stimulated by the Communists to organize themselves into a labor union and demand a high severance pay that the State Department was not very keen to pay out. So there was a lot of negotiating going on, on that issue. We finally came to an agreement.

*Q: By the way, what had happened to your family? Had they gone by this time?*

CLOUGH: No, they were still there.

*Q: Still there. So you went out en famille.*

CLOUGH: Yes. Actually my wife died in Shanghai, so I went out with our two sons through Tianjin.

*Q: Well, just as the State Department goes, I'm surprised that with the death of a wife you weren't taken out, no matter what.*

CLOUGH: This happened right at the end. We were on our way out. So I was then reassigned, assigned to Hong Kong.

*Q: Did you go home?*

CLOUGH: Oh, yes, I went home. I had home leave and consultation, then went back to Hong Kong, where I was in charge of political reporting, the political section of the consulate general there.

*Q: When you were back in Washington, now we're talking about 1950, what was the feeling there about the situation that you were getting? You were the people who were dealing with it.*

CLOUGH: You were beginning to get this Who-lost-China syndrome by that time. The people in charge of Chinese Affairs, Phil Sprouse, the Director, and Tony Freeman, the Deputy, were feeling it very, very strongly. I've forgotten just when they left those jobs, but after they did, they never again were given an assignment in China.

*Q: In Hong Kong, you were doing political reporting.*

CLOUGH: Primarily, on the mainland. It was our only remaining nearby post where you could get information about China. We also had the Korean War. The Korean War had just started in June, and I arrived in Hong Kong about July or August.

*Q: How did you view the Korean War? China didn't come in until later, in the winter, late fall. How did you view the Korean War, with just the Koreans fighting the Koreans? Did you all at the post in Hong Kong see this as an expansion of Communism and that Chung might be the next...*

CLOUGH: The most immediate question was whether the Communists would stop at the border of Hong Kong. They took Guangzhou in, I guess it was late '49, and they were moving south in May 1950. They took Hainan Island. They were at the border of Hong Kong, and nobody knew whether or when they might cross the border, because there was no way of defending Hong Kong militarily. The British couldn't defend it. So we had a rather tense period there in which American dependents were advised to leave. The British did not advise their people to leave, but the American Consul General, Walter McConaughy, made that decision.

Then the next question, of course, was: What would happen in Korea? Would the Chinese get involved? We had reports of the Chinese moving troops from south to north, toward Manchuria. These were rather persistent and rather well-established. So that was the main question coming at us from Washington. They wanted any information that we could get on what the Chinese attitude toward Korea was. We scrambled around to pick up every scrap of information we could, bearing on that issue. That was our prime directive at that time.

You may recall that in late September, Zhou En-lai made a speech in which he warned that they couldn't tolerate the destruction of a neighboring country, or something to that effect. At about the same time, we got a warning through Ambassador Pannikar, the Indian Ambassador in Beijing, from Zhou En-lai, to the effect that we should take this seriously. And there began to be reports then of an occasional Chinese being captured in northern Korea.

The question then was: Were the Chinese serious? Were they going to come in, in force, or were they just trying to intimidate us or deter us? MacArthur decided, on the basis of his intelligence, that it was the latter, and he issued his famous statement about getting the boys out of the trenches by Christmas. Went ploughing full steam ahead.

*Q: Over the 38th Parallel and all that. Well, they were already over the 38th Parallel by that time.*

CLOUGH: The Inchon landing was September 15th, and they moved north quite rapidly over the 38th Parallel. The question was whether they should go all the way to the Yalu.

I was getting reports. I remember I had one White Russian informant in Hong Kong, who had connections in Manchuria. He had lived in Manchuria, and he would get messages from time to time. I remember once he told me that the Chinese were having people put tapes on their windows in the event of bombing, a suggestion that perhaps they were expecting to get involved in the war in Korea.

The most notable incident was when we had a Chinese, who came down from Beijing. He was known to the consulate general there, particularly to Howard Borman, who was in my section in charge of translating Chinese materials, the Chinese press and magazines. He had known this man, and the man had given them some information about developments in Beijing before the consulate general closed down and pulled out. He turned up one day in Hong Kong, and I had him, with Howie, up to my house (didn't have him come in the office). He told us that there had just been a very important meeting in Beijing at which all of the members of the Democratic League and the other so-called democratic parties had been called in, and they had been told that there was a new slogan: "Resist America. Help Korea." And that there was going to be a full scale campaign on this all over China. This was the first word we had of it. So we reported this. We didn't know that this man was a hundred percent reliable, but we had some confidence in him, and we reported it on that basis. Turned out to be accurate. He went back into China and was never heard from again.

I should say that that message from Pannikkar, the Indian Ambassador, was not taken as seriously in Washington as it turned out it should have been, largely because of Pannikkar's own views. He was known in Nanjing as being very pro-Communist, and he wasn't regarded as an entirely reliable intermediary. I've often thought afterwards that if Zhou En-lai had given that message to, say, the Norwegian Ambassador in Beijing, instead of the Indian Ambassador, it might have been taken more seriously.

*Q: In Asian relations, we've always looked on the Indians with a certain amount of suspicion, I think.*

CLOUGH: Particularly in relation to China, because we always felt they were pro-PRC in most issues.

*Q: With Vietnam and all we never... so that as an intermediary they didn't carry the weight. In your reading the papers and all this, were you seeing anything about getting ready to go into Korea?*

CLOUGH: We saw the usual attacks on the United States, of course, but it was very hard to interpret those as to what they would actually do. I remember (you could probably find this telegram in the file somewhere) from time to time we sort of added up the pros and cons as to whether the Chinese were planning to come on a large scale. And we came down on the side that they probably weren't.

I think that was based on a misreading of the Chinese. A feeling that, after all, their country was less than a year old (their government was established just about a year earlier). They

still were in the process of consolidating their rule in China. They were poor. They had a long road ahead of them. Was this the time to get involved in a full scale war with a country like the United States, which was the most powerful military state in the world?

There is an article, which will be coming out in the latest issue of the *China Quarterly*, written by a couple of students who were here at SAIS, Chinese from the PRC, based on interviews that they had with senior Chinese officials and some materials that have been written since then, about the decision to enter the Korean War on the part of the Chinese. Apparently there was a big debate in senior circles in China about whether it was wise to do this. And finally, Mao Zedong made the decision. He had been convinced, ever since '48 or '49, that sooner or later they would have to fight a war with the United States, because it was such an implacable, imperialist enemy. And that if they were going to fight such a war, Korea was the best place to do it. [Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited," *China Quarterly*, 121 (March 1990), 94-115]

*Q: When you look at this, so that's Mao Zedong, and on the other side you have MacArthur, who also had very firm and fixed ideas, too. So no matter what was being fed into both sides as far as rationale, an awful lot depends on, at the top, the ideas of whoever's leading.*

CLOUGH: That's right. Presuppositions.

*Q: Was there a difference, or were you sharing views from those who were watching China, say, from Japan and MacArthur's headquarters?*

CLOUGH: We got very little of that traffic. We didn't really know what was going on between MacArthur and Washington.

*Q: Washington at the time was relying on you to give everything you had, but there was no real sense of direction that you were supposed to go this way or that way or anything, was there?*

CLOUGH: No, I don't think so. Of course, we heard the rumblings of all the McCarthy attacks on Foreign Service officers. We were concerned, but I never found that that affected our reporting particularly. Perhaps we were in a more fortunate position, because we were in the period of war with China, and everybody was hostile to China.

*Q: So there wasn't the matter of looking at them as peaceful, peasant agrarian reformers. How about Walter McConaughy, who was the Consul General part of the time you were there, what was your impression of him and how he saw the situation?*

CLOUGH: I found him a very good boss, perhaps partly because he gave me a free hand. He very rarely made any changes in the things that I wrote for reporting to Washington. He was not a China specialist himself. He was trained in Japan, initially. But he was a very good officer, I thought, good instincts and good reasoning. He wasn't afraid to make

difficult decisions when he had to, as when he advised Americans to withdraw dependents from Hong Kong. It wasn't entirely popular, as you can imagine.

*Q: You were one of a growing corps of new China hands, as opposed to old China hands. Old China hands were more from missionary families and all. Normally, when you become a specialist in something, you have orientations towards different groups in the country. And here you are with the Communists being as nasty as they could be and yet a thoroughly discredited Kuomintang sitting there. It would be very hard for an American Foreign Service officer to identify with and root for one or the other of them. How did you feel about this situation there?*

CLOUGH: I felt that China was a huge country we were going to have deal with one way or another, whether we liked it or not. My job was to find out as much as I could about what was going on, what were the trends internally, as well as in their foreign policy.

This is for our later interview, I guess, when I was in the Office of Chinese Affairs, but I felt that the economic policies followed by the Communists in the late "50s were going to be disastrous for them. If you looked at their demography, if you looked at the very small proportion of budget they were putting in on agriculture, it was clear they were going to have food problems. And, of course, within a few years, they did.

*Q: So while we were looking at the immediate and, you might say, almost tactical, intelligence-type information, we were also looking at the long-term picture. Were you able to get fairly good ideas of what was going on, from the various newspapers and the people who came in?*

CLOUGH: Not really very good. It was spotty. For one thing, they were reluctant, particularly in those early years, to put out any reliable statistics that an economist could use to put together what was really going on. So it was rather impressionistic, what we learned in Hong Kong.

And there were also a large number of peddlers of information, who wanted to sell it, who wanted to gain access to American visas or something. They were very troublesome, because there were so many phonies. And it wasn't always easy to spot the phoney.

The CIA was very new in those years. We had a small unit of CIA people in the consulate general, whose job was to gather covert intelligence. They had money to pay people for intelligence. We didn't. As political officers, people would come to us wanting something, and we were never able to offer them anything. Which was probably just as well, because what you got for money was less likely to be genuine.

I recall one case of an individual who had come to me and offered information about what was going on in Guangxi Province (the second province back beyond Guangzhou), and this was of some interest to us. The main rail line to Vietnam went through Guangxi. I listened to what this fellow had to say, then, by accident, I was able to get hold of a newspaper that

came from Guangxi that told about a severe accident, burning of a bunch of railway cars, that had occurred in the city of Wuzhou. I read about this and the dates and so on. And so the next time this guy came in (he claimed to be able to go back and forth to Guangxi Province), I began to question him rather closely about the dates when he was in Wuzhou. He claimed to have been in Wuzhou when this happened, but he never said a word about it, which pretty well convinced me that he wasn't there. It was too juicy a morsel not to have reported if he had been there.

*Q: A lot of information has come out, obviously. Now, in 1990, looking back on it, how do you feel our reporting was at that time?*

CLOUGH: I'd say it was pretty spotty. It would be interesting to go back now and make a careful survey of what was being said. I think we were fairly cautious. We weren't inclined to be taken in by the more extreme claims of the Communists.

I was there mostly during the Korean War and for about a year after the war ended. I think one of the things we were concerned about, of course, was Soviet-Chinese relations. Those relations, as far as we could see, were getting stronger and stronger, because of the close military relationship, the supply of large amounts of tanks and planes and all kinds of military equipment, which continued after the war.

I recall one occasion, it must have been '54, it was after the Korean War, and I left Hong Kong about July '54, so maybe the spring of '54, Joe Alsop came through.

*Q: He was a newspaper columnist.*

CLOUGH: Yes, but he had also written a big article for the *Saturday Evening Post*, in which he had a new theory. He had been in touch with people in the Pentagon, and he had gathered up some military terms like "division slice," which had to do with the supporting units you needed in order to support a division, and he was following the Soviet resupply of the Chinese military. He had concocted a thesis that at the rate that the Soviets were building up the Chinese military forces, that by a certain date, about a year from then, a year, maybe two years, they would have enough force on the southern border of China so that they could just overwhelm Thailand, Indochina, it would all become part of China.

*Q: There's a little problem of terrain.*

CLOUGH: I took issue with him, I argued with him. I said, "You know, if the Chinese wanted to do that, they wouldn't have to have all this Russian equipment. They've got manpower to burn compared with these countries. They could go down there and take them over. You're building up a house of cards here, based upon a lot of calculations, which really don't... It's the intention of the Chinese that's important, not what they happen to have in the way of military equipment." But he brushed that aside. He'd made up his mind and wasn't going to listen to anybody out there.

*Q: One last question on this, and then we'll have an interview another time. Were you getting anything from the State Department, or by word-of-mouth corridor talk or anything about: Boy, watch this McCarthyism business, I mean, for the China hands?*

CLOUGH: Oh, yes. We were getting quite a lot of that. Not formally, but through the back door.

*Q: What was the thrust? What was the problem? How did you see it?*

CLOUGH: It worried us, because, after all, we were China specialists, we were China language people. But we were not caught up in it, because we were not in responsible positions at the time that China was lost. All of us, who were trained after the war, were the new generation, and we were, I think, reasonably confident that nothing serious would happen to us, because the whole attitude of the United States toward China had changed.

We had had the Korean War, which had created a kind of semi-permanent state of hostility between the United States and China. For at least several years after that, we were concerned about the next move on the part of the Sino-Soviet bloc; it was still a bloc in '54. And it was evident that they were already beginning to strengthen the Viet Minh. The Chinese were giving help to the Viet Minh. They had been extending their railroads down to the border so they could get equipment down more easily. That was our main concern, this and a lot of the propaganda that was coming out. In '54, I think the Huk movement was still quite active in the Philippines. The various Burmese civil wars were going full tilt.

*Q: The Red Flag, White, Black Flag or whatever it was.*

CLOUGH: Yes, and the Communists in Malaysia were still fighting very vigorously. Northeast Thailand had its own Communist rebellion. There were Communist rebellions all around. So we were very much concerned with what seemed to us to be a Sino-Soviet advance into Southeast Asia, the next move by Communism.

*Q: How did you feel, from, you might say, the corps of China hands, about the permanence of Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT on Formosa or Taiwan?*

CLOUGH: We didn't have a lot of confidence in the future of the KMT on Taiwan. Of course, once Truman had made the decision to put the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait, then it was obvious that the Communists didn't have the military capability of overcoming that kind of obstacle. So, in that sense, the KMT was safe. But I don't think those of us who had been associated with the KMT in China had any confidence that they could turn things around the way they actually did. It was quite a remarkable feat.

*Q: Okay, I've taken up a lot of your time, and I really appreciate this. We'll get back for another interview later on.*

*Q: August 9, 1990. This is an interview with Ralph N. Clough concerning his time with the Department of State. This is being done on behalf of the Foreign Affairs Oral History Program. Ambassador Marshall Green will be asking the questions.*

*Q: Ralph, may I say first of all that our careers, at this point of your career, began to overlap. You were at the National War College '54-55. I was at the National War College the following year, '55-56. You came out of the National War College and went into the Office of Chinese Affairs in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, as they called it at that time. I, when I got out of the War College, went to the same bureau to become the Regional Planning Advisor. Both of us were working for Walter Robertson--a great man, but a very, very strong, ardent supporter of Chiang Kai-shek and had absolutely no use for the more balanced view that some of us took with regard to Chinese issues. However, he was very much the voice of the Administration at that time and had the strong support of the China lobby, we used to call it. Now, let me go back then to your arrival in the State Department to work on the China Desk, or, at least as I understand it, you were the Deputy Director of Chinese Affairs.*

CLOUGH: That's right. Deputy Director to Walter McConaughy.

*Q: Now in 1955, when you arrived there, I'm wondering if you could tell me a little about your work in the bureau and the problems you faced in that period of '55 to '58.*

CLOUGH: Our China policy had just come through the period of late '54, early '55, when we signed a defense treaty with the Republic of China. The Formosa Resolution was passed authorizing the President to intervene in any attack on off-shore islands, which he considered to be part of or preliminary to an attack on Taiwan. So that had happened in early '55.

*Q: That was after the first off-shore Taiwan Strait crisis.*

CLOUGH: That's right. In January of '55, the Chinese Communists had attacked and occupied Yijiangshan Island, which was one of the Dachungs, and then we assisted the Nationalists in withdrawing their troops and civilians from the Dachungs, because they were beyond...

*Q: Was that the only place where they attacked? They didn't attack Quemoy or Matsu?*

CLOUGH: Later they did. That was the main attack. I don't recall whether at that point they had fired some shells at Quemoy and Matsu, but I don't think so. They occupied Yijiangshan Island. They launched a very effective amphibious assault.

*Q: That's just off the shore of...*

CLOUGH: Zhenjiang Province. It's north toward Shanghai, and it was beyond the range of the fighting...

*Q: Are they still there today?*

CLOUGH: Oh, yes.

*Q: So they permanently occupied them.*

CLOUGH: These islands have always been considered part of China.

*Q: So what was our military operation designed to do then in '55?*

CLOUGH: In '55, our military operation was designed to help the Nationalists withdraw from those islands, because they were considered too far away...

*Q: How many people did they withdraw?*

CLOUGH: Oh, I can't recall the exact figures, but it was ten thousand or more.

*Q: So that the capture of those people would have been quite a blow, then, to Taiwan and to the Republic of China.*

CLOUGH: Yes. And in exchange for Chiang Kai-shek's agreement to withdraw, with our help... We weren't willing to help him defend those islands, so he had to withdraw.

*Q: So it was a very limited operation.*

CLOUGH: Very limited operation, but it involved, at least implicitly, a greater commitment by us to the other off-shores, the bigger ones, Quemoy and Matsu particularly.

*Q: But it was still left unclear as to whether we would defend those islands if they were attacked.*

CLOUGH: That's right. We would never give an ironclad commitment. What we got from the Congress was the Formosa Resolution, in February of '55, which gave this authorization to the President.

*Q: And only if those islands were attacked as part of an attack upon Taiwan itself would we come to the help of those on those off-shore islands, as I recall.*

CLOUGH: That's right.

*Q: So then in '58, when the Chinese Communists, as we used to call them in those days, launched this artillery interdiction against Quemoy, then they made the declaration that*

*this was the first step towards Taiwan, and thereby gave, really, Dulles the ammunition he needed for invoking the agreement we had with the Republic of China with regard to defense.*

CLOUGH: That's right, although we still did not intervene militarily in defense of the off-shore islands. In other words, our forces weren't involved in combat. We moved the Seventh Fleet in...

*Q: But we escorted them to three miles off shore.*

CLOUGH: We convoyed the supply ships to within three miles, but we did not engage in combat, nor did we agree to the bombing of mainland airfields by the ROC Air Force.

*Q: So this period when you were a Deputy Director really involved these two incidents, although one was pretty much over.*

CLOUGH: I left before the '58 crisis began.

*Q: I thought you left before the '58, because Larry Lutkins, I think, replaced you.*

CLOUGH: No, Ed Martin. Ed Martin came from London.

*Q: But Ed Martin became the Director, didn't he?*

CLOUGH: Well, I was the Director. I became the Director in '58. I had been Deputy, but I was barely in the job before the agreement was reached to open the ambassadorial talks with the Chinese Communists in Geneva.

Secretary Dulles sent Ambassador Alex Johnson to Geneva, August 1, '55, to open those talks with Wang Pingnan, the Chinese Communist Ambassador from Warsaw. Alex was at that time Ambassador to Czechoslovakia. They met in Geneva amid great press attention, hundreds of press people there at the first official relatively high-level meeting between Americans and Chinese Communists.

There had been an international conference in '54, at which there were somewhat distant encounters. That was the conference at which Dulles was accused of having refused to shake hands with Zhou En-lai.

Anyway, I was sent to be the advisor to Alex Johnson at those talks in Geneva, and I was there for probably two and a half months. We reached our first agreement with the Chinese on the return of civilians, which was, from our point of view, the number-one object on the agenda. We signed that agreement in September.

*Q: What civilians are we talking about?*

CLOUGH: We're talking about a group of people who were detained in Communist China, about 40 or so.

*Q: So they'd been there for five years or so.*

CLOUGH: Some of them were missionaries who had been there a long time.

*Q: But I mean they'd been there since the takeover.*

CLOUGH: Many of them had been arrested at the time of the Korean War. And there were also 13 American Air Force people who had been shot down.

*Q: How did you persuade the Chinese to release these people?*

CLOUGH: The Air Force people, they released on their own. They announced, on the day that Wang Pingnan arrived in Geneva, that they were releasing the 13 military people. As Wang Pingnan put it: to create a good atmosphere for the talks, which it did. Then we began negotiating on the return of the civilians. It was a very complex negotiation; took about six weeks.

*Q: That was really the major achievement of these, we used to call them the Warsaw Talks, but the antecedents of these, of course, was Geneva. Were they held in Vienna at any time?*

CLOUGH: No.

*Q: Started in Geneva, then went to Warsaw.*

CLOUGH: That's right. We got this agreement signed. A number of these imprisoned Americans were released, came home, but not all of them. The Chinese then wanted to go on to other subjects. They wanted a Foreign Ministers meeting. They wanted exchange of correspondence between the United States and China. They wanted lifting of the American economic embargo on China.

*Q: I take it that this was all bad news from Taiwan's viewpoint.*

CLOUGH: Oh, yes. Even the fact that we had sat down to talk with them was bad news from Chiang Kai-shek's viewpoint. They were very nervous about what was going on in Geneva, because it was kept very secret. After the first few meetings when some scraps of the proceedings leaked out in Washington, Dulles clamped down and restricted all of the correspondence to and from the State Department and Geneva to a very small number of people in Washington so that this wouldn't happen again.

*Q: Did we keep Congress informed of this?*

CLOUGH: I'm not sure exactly what arrangements we had with the Congress during this period, but we kept them generally informed. We kept Chiang Kai-shek generally informed, but, of course, he wasn't confident that we were telling him everything, which we probably weren't.

*Q: But the principal effort was made to get the Americans released and back.*

CLOUGH: That's right, that was the first order of business.

*Q: That seems to me a very defensible position for us to be taking with anybody. That's the kind of thing we would have to do. If we didn't do it, there would be a lot of questions raised as to why we weren't doing it.*

CLOUGH: Of course.

*Q: So did we more or less explain our talks with the Chinese in those terms?*

CLOUGH: Yes, that was the main emphasis in the beginning, because that was what we were talking about.

*Q: And then Beijing tried to make use of this to expand our relationship.*

CLOUGH: That's right.

*Q: Knowing the discomfiture this would cause in Taipei.*

CLOUGH: Not only discomfiture, but eventually, they hoped, a shift of our diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing. But they made a mistake in that they wouldn't release all the Americans. They had evidence that some of them actually were spies. Most of them were accused of being spies.

*Q: And those cases lingered on from year to year.*

CLOUGH: Those cases lingered on, and we took the position that we couldn't go on to talk about other things in Geneva until they had released all the Americans. They had to fulfill their first and only agreement with the United States before we could talk seriously about closer relations.

We soon moved on to the Taiwan issue, and we demanded a renunciation of force with respect to Taiwan, which they would not give. Their position was that the Taiwan issue was composed of two parts: a domestic part and an international part.

The domestic part was their own problem, and they didn't want any foreign interference. That was the problem of reunifying China, ending the civil war, bringing Taiwan under PRC control.

The international part was what they called the US occupation of Taiwan, American interference in Chinese internal affairs, interference in the civil war. Civil war was not over, because Chiang Kai-shek had not been totally defeated and he still occupied a piece of Chinese territory. So they wanted to separate the two. And they said they could not renounce the use of force against Taiwan so long as the United States was interfering there.

*Q: Ralph, did that become sort of the permanent sticking point in these talks?*

CLOUGH: Yes, it did become the permanent sticking point. It went on for years. We put forward a number of drafts. We exchanged drafts (these later were made public) on this issue of renunciation of force. They were willing to sign a general renunciation of force with the United States--they wouldn't use force against the United States--but not with respect to Taiwan. We weren't satisfied with that. We wanted it to be specifically with respect to Taiwan.

So as time went on, the intervals between meetings got longer. We had less to talk about. We were just repeating what we'd said in previous meetings. After about two and a half months, I came back to Washington and somebody else was sent to take my place. Ed Martin, actually, became the advisor at one point.

*Q: What was the job of the bureau itself? More or less to write the instructions?*

CLOUGH: Yes. In fact, when I came back to Washington, that was my principal job, to draft the instructions to Geneva for the talks. Then Walter McConaughy and I would take them to a meeting with Dulles and the legal advisor, Herman Flaiger, and Walter Robertson. Usually there were just the five of us in those meetings. Dulles himself went over the instructions line by line, made changes here and there, and approved it. Then the telegram would go out.

*Q: But after the return of this first group of Americans, the talks really didn't achieve much, did they?*

CLOUGH: No, they didn't. They became rather sterile.

*Q: They gave us an opportunity to quiet some people by saying we were at least in touch with them.*

CLOUGH: That's right, and we could say that we'd had more high-level contacts with the Chinese after awhile, say we had more high-level contacts with them than most countries did.

*Q: And the families of those who were still detained in China must have been after the State Department all the time.*

CLOUGH: Of course.

*Q: And so at least, again, we were able to answer them that we were trying to do something about it. There were very compelling reasons, in other words, practical reasons, for conducting the talks, even though they seemed to be going on and on like a broken needle.*

CLOUGH: Yes. It got so that really the only thing we'd agree on at the end of each meeting was the date for the next meeting. Even that dwindled off, because by the winter of '57, we proposed... The State Department wanted to transfer Alex Johnson from Czechoslovakia to Thailand, make him Ambassador to Thailand. Obviously, it wouldn't be convenient to commute from Thailand to Geneva for talks, so they wanted to have Ed Martin, who had been his advisor and had the rank of First Secretary at the embassy in London, to represent the United States against a Chinese of appropriate rank to continue the talks.

But the Chinese said no. They said, "We agreed at the beginning these were to be ambassadorial-level talks. We have great respect for Mr. Martin, but he's not an Ambassador. Therefore, we can't continue the talks on that basis." So we had no agreement, and the talks were de facto suspended.

*Q: The Chinese representative was Wang Pingnan at that time?*

CLOUGH: Yes.

*Q: What kind of a person was he? Alex seemed to rather like him.*

CLOUGH: He was a very correct, professional diplomat. He did his job. He repeated whatever he was told to say at the meetings, but there was a little give around the edges. At one point in these talks about the civilians, before we reached agreement, we'd come to a sticking point, and so he and Alex Johnson arranged to have dinner together without the advisors, just an interpreter and themselves, to talk about this, and then they made some progress.

*Q: Now I'm leaping ahead in history, but looking back from the time Nixon went to China, to those Warsaw talks, do you think they had any influence at all on China's decision to enter into talks with the Nixon Administration and the invitation to Peking? In other words, did they have any lasting, subtle effect on US-China relations?*

CLOUGH: I think they had some effect. I think if you read Ken Young's book on the early period, he talks about the Quemoy crisis at considerable length, and the meetings. I was involved in those, too. I had just been in my job at Bern a few weeks, long enough to have our second daughter born there, when I was sent off to Warsaw to be Jake Beam's advisor at the talks there.

If I could go back for a minute, what happened was that the talks were suspended from about December of '57, and there were no talks in the early part of '58. And about June, I

was by this time the Director for Chinese Affairs, we decided that we ought to try to get the talks started again.

We looked around Europe for an appropriate Ambassador, and we decided on Jake Beam, who was Ambassador at Warsaw at that time. It would be convenient to have him deal with the Chinese Ambassador at Warsaw, it wouldn't involve commuting. Jake was also a Soviet specialist, a person who knew something about Communism, and had also served in Indonesia, so he knew something about East Asia. He seemed to be the logical choice.

So we were just about to make the proposal in late June of '58, when the Chinese came out with a blast against us for suspending these talks. That caused us to hold off on making the proposal. We didn't want to seem to be reacting to this kind propaganda rhetoric, so we held off a few weeks.

Then we made the proposal later, I think in early August. By that time I'd left the department, Ed Martin had taken over as Director. And the Chinese didn't respond immediately.

The next response we got was the August 23rd commencement of the bombarding of Quemoy. So that brought the idea of talks right into center stage. Dulles made his speech at Portsmouth, then Zhou En-lai made his proposal that talks be resumed, and we agreed on Warsaw. And I think it was about the 10th or 16th of September, mid-September sometime, when we sat down in Warsaw to have the first talks.

*Q: While the shooting was still going on.*

CLOUGH: The shooting was still going on, right.

*Q: (Kennedy) Excuse me, I wonder if I could just interrupt for a second. Could you give a little feeling for the atmospherics when you would sit down for instructions with Dulles and Walter Robertson and McConaughy and Flaiger. What was their attitude towards these talks?*

CLOUGH: They took them very seriously as a way to keep in touch with a very important adversary of ours at that period, with the hope that the effort to at least promote a more peaceful atmosphere in the Taiwan Strait would be successful. I don't know what Dulles had in mind as sort of long-term, whether he thought these might lead eventually to a diplomatic relationship with Beijing. He might have.

*Q: Just one more thing about your role in these talks. You spoke Chinese, were you actually interpreting for our side?*

CLOUGH: No, I was not the interpreter. At the Geneva Talks, we had an Army officer, Bob Eckvald, who had grown up in China, missionary child, spoke Chinese well. He had been

interpreter at P'anmunjom at the end of the Korean War, so we drafted him as our interpreter. I was the advisor, I helped to draft statements and messages.

*Q: But you could understand, of course, the conversation both ways.*

CLOUGH: Yes, I could understand.

*Q: That was a big advantage. With your background in China, having served in Kunming, Chungking, Nanjing, and Beijing, you must have had a great deal of subjects to discuss with Wang Pingnan's assistant or others on that delegation. Did you have any such?*

CLOUGH: No. There was no outside contact, and that was the difficulty. It was a very formal sort of set up.

*Q: So Alex and you and the interpreter would be on one side of the table...*

CLOUGH: And a note taker from the consulate general in Geneva.

*Q: So there was no contact then, except between the principals.*

CLOUGH: That's right. Occasionally, we might exchange a few words before or after a meeting, but not much.

*Q: That's very interesting.*

CLOUGH: In Warsaw, we were given the Mysliwieckich Palace by the Polish government as a place where we could meet. It was nicely arranged for this purpose, because we had separate entrances. We'd go in separate entrances, and we had little rooms where we could gather and consult about our tactics and so on before we went in, then the meeting room was in the center. We'd go in from opposite ends.

*Q: Having worked for both Alex and for Jake, two of our leading Foreign Service officers who reached high positions, I was wondering if you noticed any major differences in their style of approach to the problem, whether one had a strength the other lacked, or vice versa? Let's put it this way, were they equally effective, would you say, in handling this rather interesting and delicate and unique job? Alex, for one thing, tends to be quite talkative; Jake tends to be rather taciturn. And I was wondering whether the differences in their personalities and the way they articulated made much difference in terms of their negotiating capacities.*

CLOUGH: It's hard to judge, because the situations were so different. In '55, there was no fighting going on. It was relatively calm. The Chinese Communists were in a period just after the famous Bandung Conference, where Zhou En-lai had taken a rather mild attitude toward the United States, so that things were more relaxed. In Warsaw, when we began, it

was very tense. Nobody knew how far this war was going to spread, or what the intentions of the Chinese or the Soviets were at that point.

*Q: Do you think that the Warsaw Talks had anything to do, really, with what actually eventuated in the resolution of the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958?*

CLOUGH: Let me add something to the question earlier about the two Ambassadors. My impression of Alex Johnson was that he was more broad-gauge. He had a sort of broader view of the negotiations, and he did more of the actual drafting of reports on meetings and recommendations for the next meeting. Jake left more of that work to me. There was that difference between them, aside from the more tense atmosphere that just grew out of the situation.

Now, as to what effect the talks had on the conflict. Ken Young gives them considerable credit (I think more than they are actually due) in his book on negotiating with the Chinese Communists.

I've always felt that what really impressed the Chinese was the rapid massing of the Seventh Fleet in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait, and the fact that we were willing to convoy ships. We took a very hard line. I think their effort against the off-shore islands was, in part, a probe to see where the United States stood. Mao Zedong had just come back from Moscow the previous year, where he had talked about the East Wind prevailing over the West Wind. In '58, they were getting their "Great Leap Forward" started. They were in a period of high confidence, and I think he wanted to test the United States on the Taiwan issue.

*Q: Since I was handling this Taiwan Straits crisis as Dulles principal assistant, working on the problem, I would tend to agree with you, as opposed to Ken Young, with regard to the impact of the Warsaw channel in the resolution of this issue. I would agree with you that the US military commitment and our apparent willingness to go pretty far... We didn't have any air involvement. There were very, very tight restrictions on what we were doing, but obviously we had the capability of extending it. Furthermore, when the Chinese Air Force did start circling around in the combat area, that they were shot down by the Republic of China airplanes that were equipped with Sidewinders. I think that also had a little bit of impact. But, overall, it was an effort to strangle Quemoy and prevent supplies from coming in. When we brought these two large LSTs on station, with all the small craft that could swim out of them, which were manned by "Chinats" as we called them, GIC, it was clear that we had the capacity to resupply the islands at long last. I think that they wanted to take the initiative and not be seen as having lost out, and that's when they came out with their first announcement. Now I don't think that the talks in Warsaw had much to do with the outcome. But what I would like to hear from you is something that has long intrigued me about that second Taiwan Strait crisis, and that is whether the relationship between the Soviet Union and China, which had been rather disturbed by the Sputnik in 1957, had resulted in what seems to be a growing antagonism between Beijing and Moscow, whether that was reflected in any way in the talks, or in the crisis itself.*

CLOUGH: We couldn't sense it at the time, I must say, honestly. Looking back, we know a lot more, of course, about what was happening between those two countries at that time. But we didn't sense this tension, that the Chinese themselves elaborately attacked the Russians for lack of support in '63, when the big polemic exchange occurred. There was one thing about the meetings in Warsaw that we had considered when I was still on the desk in Washington. We knew that if we selected a Polish building in which to meet, it would be bugged. The Poles would listen in. And we assumed that what the Poles heard, they would pass on to the Soviets. That didn't bother us too much. We thought it was useful for the Soviets to know what we were saying to the Chinese, and what they were saying to us, at this particular point.

*Q: On the other hand, the Soviets had supplied the artillery and most of the shells that were being expended on the islands by what we used to call the "Chicomcs," PRC is a better word to use these days. In other words, the Soviets had the capacity for turning off the supply of these shells, and therefore it could have been a factor in the decision of the Chinese to call off the shelling. But as you say, we didn't know much about the depth of the Sino-Soviet breach. We knew that there were tensions between Beijing and Moscow at that time, but the full flavor of the Sino-Soviet split didn't become manifest for another two or three years. When I arrived in Hong Kong in 1961, it was already clear that this feud was blowing up.*

CLOUGH: Because in 1960, the Soviets pulled out all of their...

*Q: That's right, they pulled out. And the Chinese ability to depict the Soviet Union in the worst possible language was used. In other words, our translator and our political officers in Hong Kong soon ran out of language to use, because it kept intensifying, and the Chinese had ways of describing people in those scatological terms that we just lacked.*

CLOUGH: I've always felt that, in respect to the Sino-Soviet relations, the evidence that we had broken the blockade was of vital importance. Because if you look at the dates of Khrushchev's first message to us and his second message, which was the more intemperate one and the one which the President refused to accept, the more intemperate one was sent after the blockade had been broken. I've always felt that the Soviets felt they weren't taking as much risk then, because the actual fighting was going to diminish.

*Q: Of course, when you say "blockade," you're really talking about an artillery interdiction, and the fact that we were able to get supplies ashore, whereas we were receiving these reports from CIA, largely from their people on Quemoy, that depicted the island as just about running out of supplies and obviously of the Howitzer shells and things like that that they had expended, so that we were at the point ourselves, almost, of yielding and calling for some kind of international approach to it. Dulles had gone up to New York to call for a U.N. resolution calling for the neutralization of the off-shore islands, which I thought was a crazy idea, but it was that desperate.*

CLOUGH: So we were making proposals, too, through the talks in Warsaw for such things as neutralization, cease-fire. We put a lot of emphasis on trying to get a cease-fire. And all of these ideas were rejected flatly by Beijing.

*Q: Of course, you can't achieve through talks really much. They always reflect the realities, the scene, and that's what was happening. Is there anything else about that particular period of your career, when you were in CA, Chinese Affairs Department and in Warsaw, or shall we move on to your next assignment?*

CLOUGH: There's sort of a link between the two. I was in Warsaw with Jake Beam for three years, from '58 to '61. The first six months, I was based in Bern, but then I was transferred in January to London. Really, I commuted from London.

*Q: So really, your Bern and London assignments, basically, were still China-related assignments.*

CLOUGH: I was still China-related. People often assume, because I was from the East Asian Bureau, that I was doing that job in London (they always had an East Asian guy in London), but I wasn't. Frank Galbraith was there at the time, he was doing that job. I was put in London only to facilitate my commuting to Warsaw. They gave me a job in the political section reporting on the Conservative Party and dealing with relations between Britain and Scandinavia, but that was the lesser part of my job. I had to keep up on what was going on in China, and I had to make a trip every few weeks. In three years, I made 25 trips from Warsaw.

*Q: It's a pretty long, frustrating business.*

CLOUGH: Yes.

*Q: Sort of matches Phil Habib's performance in the peace talks on Vietnam in Paris, where he stayed on year after year going through the same threnody.*

*Q: (Kennedy) Weren't you the subject of a Congressional inquiry at one time?*

CLOUGH: Oh, they got me mixed up with Cal Maillard, our interpreter, who was also stationed in London. The two of us used to go back and forth to Warsaw. He had told some newsmen about how he spoke Chinese to some counterpart in the Foreign Ministry, and somebody in Congress decided to make fun of the State Department: Here's this guy specially trained in Chinese, but he's living in London. It didn't amount to much.

*Q: Really tenuous charge. So when we're talking then about your Bern and London assignments, we're really talking still about the Warsaw Talks.*

CLOUGH: Yes, that was my primary function in those places. Although after the talks slowed down and they didn't occur very often, they were able to spare me from London for other jobs.

For example, in 1960, I was sent to the Law of the Sea Conference in Geneva for about six weeks. That was headed by... a lawyer in New York, the name escapes me. Anyway, he headed the Law of the Sea delegation. It was the last effort to get worldwide agreement on what we called the US-Canadian proposal for Six Plus Six: a six-mile territorial sea and a six-mile fishing zone. This failed by one vote. Anyway, that's beside the point.

The point is, they were able to spare me in London, because the talks in Warsaw dragged out. I had to go once from Geneva while I was on this special assignment to Warsaw and back for a couple of days. And then on another occasion I was sent with the Librarian of Congress to Hong Kong and India to look into the situation of refugees from China. We spent three or four weeks on this round-the-world trip and writing up the results. So that shows you that the demands in Warsaw were not very pressing.

Then I was transferred in July of '61 to Taipei. This is where the two things get linked together. Because when I arrived in Taipei, one of the first things that was going on at that point was the question of the admission of Outer Mongolia to the United Nations. It was linked to the admission of Mauritania. And Chiang Kai-shek was threatening to veto this proposal, because they regarded Mongolia as part of China, not an independent state, just a Soviet puppet, and therefore it couldn't become a member of the United Nations.

But the threat to do this was infuriating a lot of Africans, who wanted to see Mauritania get in. And Africa was a very important area for the Republic of China. To maintain its position in the U.N., it had to have the support of a lot of African countries. They were coming into the U.N. as independent states in increasing numbers, and we needed their vote on the China representation issue. So one of my early chores in the first week or two after I got into Taipei, was to talk to Foreign Ministry people, to persuade them not to take this foolish act.

*Q: They probably agreed with you, didn't they? It was the old man who was holding out.*

CLOUGH: Yes, it was the old man, and he...

*Q: But they must have tried to convey to him that this was a disastrous policy in terms of upholding their position in the United Nations.*

CLOUGH: Yes, I would hope so. Anyway, he finally desisted, and that crisis passed. In early '62, we began to get reports. Drumright was the Ambassador in Taipei when I arrived. I was the DCM, and this Mongolia crisis occurred while he was there. But then in March, the following year, he went on home leave. Averell Harriman had become Assistant Secretary, and he didn't care much for the position that Drumright took on the Taiwan-China issue. Harriman, I think, wanted to see some movement on the China issue.

So Drumright proposed that on his way home he stop off in Manila, where there was going to be a Chiefs of Mission Conference, to which Harriman was coming. Harriman said, "No, you go right on. We'll have our DCM in Taipei come to represent you."

*Q: So you were at that Chiefs of Mission meeting in Baguio in 1962. Because you remember I had made a presentation as Consul General, Hong Kong, with regard to what was going on in China and what the implications of this were. It delighted Harriman, because basically what I was pointing out was information that supported the thesis that we should be taking another hard look at what our basic China policy should be. And, of course, Chester Bowles, who was Harriman's superior at that time, being the Under Secretary, also shared that same point of view. And, furthermore, at that Chiefs of Mission meeting, you'll recall that Harriman was really quite dictatorial, and he was very short and sharp with certain people at the conference, particularly Sam Gilstrap, who was our Consul General in Singapore. You must have sensed, in other words, in 1961 when you arrived there, that the Kennedy Administration was taking a rather different look at the China policy, which was very difficult from your viewpoint, because they were leaning a bit in the direction that was going to make it very uncomfortable for our representatives in Taipei.*

CLOUGH: That's right, but I think the experience on Mongolia had a somewhat chastening effect on the Kennedy Administration, because they hadn't realized the strength of the Nationalist views and how it would affect the China lobby. After all, Kennedy had got in by a rather narrow margin. Schlesinger later said in his book that they had a talk about the China issue, and Kennedy said that we haven't got the political support to do very much on China. Let's leave that for the second term. And, of course, he never had a second term.

*Q: So you must have succeeded Rankin, did you?*

CLOUGH: No. Drumright succeeded Rankin. See, Rankin went up there as Chargé in the early '50s, and then he was appointed Ambassador.

*Q: So who did you succeed?*

CLOUGH: I succeeded Joe Yager.

*Q: I see. Well, now tell me about some of the problems.*

CLOUGH: Let me tell you about the problem of '62, because this is where the Warsaw Talks and the situation in Taiwan are linked together.

After Drumright had left we began to get these reports about preparations by the Republic of China to do something militarily about the mainland. You had no doubt reported to the Chiefs of Mission Conference about how bad things were on the mainland. There was starvation and all kinds of problems that the PRC was having after the collapse of the "Great Leap Forward," so Chiang Kai-shek was encouraged to feel that maybe there would

be some sort of rebellion on the mainland, and that the time would come for him to move in with his troops.

So he started, secretly. He didn't inform us what he was doing, but we found out. He started getting certain units prepared. He imposed a defense tax to raise money. Of course, the Communists got word of this, and they moved some additional air units into Fujian Province, opposite Taiwan. And this disturbed our government, so that Kennedy, through the Warsaw Talks, informed the Chinese Communists that we did not intend to back Chiang Kai-shek in a military attack on the mainland.

*Q: Or take advantage of their internal problems.*

CLOUGH: Yes. And later he made the same statement at a press conference in public.

*Q: That was really quite an important statement, wasn't it?*

CLOUGH: It was a very important statement, and it cooled the ardor of the people in Taiwan.

*Q: I had forgotten that the statement had been made at that high level.*

CLOUGH: I'm not sure that the Warsaw channel was quoting the President, but he himself made the statement at a press conference.

*Q: See, I get involved in this thing, too, here as Consul General in Hong Kong. The Governor of Hong Kong called me in one day to urge that I get in touch with our government in Washington and our embassy in Taipei with regard to the way Chiang Kai-shek was using Hong Kong as a launching base for certain covert operations against railroads and that sort thing, kind of spoiling operations. That was kind of a lightning rod that might bring the war into Hong Kong somehow. He was very unhappy over this. I sent this message on to Washington and never got very much of an answer with regard to it. And I went up to Taiwan. Actually, I think I must have spoken to you, certainly spoke to Drumright to urge that some action be taken on this, because it was making for a very bad relationship with Hong Kong and the British. Furthermore, these little needling operations, all they were doing was causing the Chinese Communists to be all the more alert and to bring more forces to bear in the area and stirring up, in other words, a dangerous crisis situation. Meanwhile, China was going through the last toils of the "Great Leap Forward." Conditions in China were very, very bad. Refugees were beginning to flow over the border into Hong Kong. That happened in May 1962. So that there was always this concern that China might lash out in desperation. And that's where that assurance came in. Not only that we weren't going to help Chiang Kai-shek in any of his operations, but we weren't going to try to take advantage of their internal problems.*

CLOUGH: So then we get back to your longer-term question: What effect did the Warsaw Talks have on the decision the Chinese made in '69 or '70, '71 eventually, to open up relations with us?

It's interesting that in some of the talks in the early part of the Kennedy Administration, they made some proposals to China. They offered grain to China. Having heard about the famine conditions, they offered grain, which the Chinese rejected. They offered to have an exchange of correspondence, which we had earlier not been willing to do. The Chinese had now shifted their ground. In the early period, they were proposing things, and we were saying, "No, not until you renounce the use of force and release all the American prisoners." In the '60s, it got turned around, and they began to say: "No, we can't have any improvement of relations with the United States until the Taiwan problem is settled." And so they rejected these initiatives that we took in the early '60s, and the talks became very sterile through the mid-'60s. Of course, they were in the Cultural Revolution. For a couple of years there, they practically had no foreign policy.

*Q: When would you say the Cultural Revolution started, '65?*

CLOUGH: It started in '65, and the worst period was through '67 into '68. By '68, the military was taking over and calming things down, but the Chinese date the Cultural Revolution as ten years, running until the death of Mao in '76, because the Gang of Four took over...

*Q: But already by '69, why, things were limited to...*

CLOUGH: The severe fighting between various groups of Red Guards and troops and so on was ended by '69. But the thing that happened that affected the Chinese most, I think, with respect to relations with us, was what the Soviets were doing.

The Soviets began, about '64, to build up their forces on the Chinese border, and this process continued. That disturbed the Chinese, because during the Cultural Revolution, the anti-Soviet polemics became very strong. In fact, they attacked the Soviet Embassy in Beijing. Then in 1969, there was this actual military clash, two military clashes on the Ussuri River.

*Q: But what were the relations between Taiwan and the Soviet Union then? In view of the growing bitterness between Beijing and Moscow, was there an inclination to try to take advantage of that in some way, by either side, that is, by either Moscow or Taiwan?*

CLOUGH: No. No, there were rumors. I mean, people in Hong Kong were passing around rumors about meetings between people from Taiwan and the Soviets, but I don't think there was anything to that. Our relations with the Soviets in those years were such that if we thought that Taiwan was trying to make some kind of deal with the Soviet Union, we would be very upset. And they were very dependent on us.

*Q: But I was thunderstruck when I talked with Chiang Kai-shek in 1969, just before I became Assistant Secretary, to find him thinking that all this Sino-Soviet split was a lot of propaganda designed to fool the Western world. Now clearly that was not the case, and surely that couldn't have been believed by people in the Foreign Office. Did they feel that the old man was sort of losing his marbles, or whether anybody in the professional capacity who shared the Jimo's views...*

CLOUGH: Well, they used to express those views. Of course, I wasn't in Taiwan in those years. I had left Taiwan in '65.

*Q: Yes, but I was just saying that the Sino-Soviet split was clear from '61 onward, and clear to a lot of us before that time.*

CLOUGH: But it wasn't just the Jimo. A lot of people in Taiwan were saying this is just a fake, it's being put on, a show to deceive the West, because it served their interests to get the West to believe that. It would prevent the West from making any move to draw closer to China.

*Q: Oh, yes, the multi-polarization of the world was something they certainly didn't want to see. So as long as you had a Cold War atmosphere...*

CLOUGH: In taking this view, there was an element of wishful thinking. There was also an element of calculated policy, to convince the Americans and others that nothing was to be gained by trying to improve relations with Beijing.

*Q: Yes, well, of course we were moving in that direction. And in 1962 onward, we were making certain moves to allow certain Americans to travel to Communist China. We had under consideration moves to change our foreign access control regulations so that Americans could buy things that came from mainland China. These things must have been known to the authorities on Taiwan and must have been discomfiting. Furthermore, within the State Department, we had broken up the China Desk so that there were two desks. It was no longer just CA controlling China, where almost all the attention of the desk was focused on Taiwan, but there was another desk set up, called PRCM, which basically was the PRC and Mongolia.*

CLOUGH: And Hong Kong.

*Q: And Hong Kong. That meant that all of a sudden the PRC and Mongolia, you might say, had representation in the State Department, which they had lacked before. Did this kind of thing come to the attention of Taiwan? Caused some concern I imagine.*

CLOUGH: Oh, yes. I think that any move...

*Q: And then Roger Hilsman made this speech in 1963.*

CLOUGH: That was quite disturbing to the people in Taiwan, where he intimated that we would keep the door open to possible improvement of relations with Beijing.

*Q: How did they take the death...*

CLOUGH: It's interesting (this is a sidelight, but if you don't mind my throwing it in, it's current), that since June 4 last year, the government in Beijing has been accusing the United States and the West of trying to promote "peaceful evolution" in China--the peaceful evolution of Communism into Capitalism. That's the main charge that they make against us. And one of the things that people in the Institute of American Studies have been researching is to find statements by Americans which support that accusation. One of the things they cite is Roger Hilsman's speech of 1963.

*Q: Which, by the way, gave, I think, Dean Rusk considerable agony, because he had not had proper clearance on it. But since the speech had such a good reaction in the American press as a whole and the academic community, Rusk acted as though he was entirely in favor of the speech. But I think it came as something of a shock to him, too. There is an awful lot to cover, of course, during this particular period, but one thing that I would be most interested in is what was the reaction in Taiwan to the assassination of President Kennedy? That occurred, of course, while you were there.*

CLOUGH: That occurred while I was there, and the reaction was shock...

*Q: But in as much as he and his Administration seemed to be moving towards a civil dialogue, discourse with China, and beginning to open up travel and trade...*

CLOUGH: You know, not much of that had happened under Kennedy. That really came later under the early Nixon, those signals.

*Q: No. No, there were certain moves that were already made at that time. I know, because I was the Deputy Assistant Secretary back there, called back by Kennedy to look at our China policy. And I was working with Hilsman and didn't do...*

CLOUGH: So some moves were made in that period, too.

*Q: That's right. So there were moves made in that period. Therefore, if not Kennedy, certainly people like Harriman and Bowles and others who were working under him. And the new Administration, in general, wasn't taking at all the rigid views that were taken under the Eisenhower Administration. And what I was wondering was, when Kennedy's death suddenly occurred, whether this was greeted with any kind of, even relief, in Taiwan?*

CLOUGH: I don't think so. My impression... It's a long time ago and I...

*Q: They could never say so, I was just wondering whether you sensed that there was a...*

CLOUGH: No, I think the main reaction was uncertainty as to how this happened, for one thing. And for another, how this would affect US policy. I don't think anyone was confident that a Democratic successor, Lyndon Johnson, would necessarily be any more friendly toward them than Kennedy had been.

*Q: Well, maybe. Of course, McGeorge Bundy was continuing on with the Johnson Administration, and so were a lot of other people. And so was Bobby Kennedy, for that matter. Now meanwhile, of course, we were getting more deeply involved in the war in Vietnam.*

CLOUGH: Exactly. That's the next thing.

*Q: It seems to me I'd be very interested to know a little bit about what you thought our policy should be with regard to Taiwan and its relationship to the war in Vietnam. In other words, did we look to them to be a source of supply? Did we look to them to be a source of any kind of support of operations?*

CLOUGH: Yes, we did. I was present when we notified them, in '65, that Johnson had taken the decision to put in 25,000 ground troops in Vietnam. Chiang Kai-shek's reaction was interesting. He questioned whether American troops would be very effective in the kind of war which was going on in Vietnam. Of course, he had his own ulterior motives. His view was that you don't really solve things in that part of the world until you get rid of the Chinese Communist regime.

*Q: But basically they must have greeted this American involvement in Vietnam with some relief, didn't they?*

CLOUGH: It became clear fairly soon that we were going to have to depend on them to support the military operations. Early on in the '50s, when I was in the State Department, we had appropriated \$20 million to improve an airfield near T'ai-chung to accommodate the B-52, the big aircraft, in case we might need it. It didn't become an American base, but we created the facilities there so we could use it. And then, when the Vietnam War came, we did base aircraft there. We had refueling aircraft for the B-52s, which came from Guam, and we had transport aircraft to take things into Vietnam. Taiwan was also important as a place for repair and maintenance. They had very good facilities at Air Asia, which had CIA antecedents. They could repair fighter aircraft, overhaul engines, overhaul tanks, trucks and so on.

*Q: Was this capacity used?*

CLOUGH: Yes. Yes, it was quite important during that period. And, of course, Taiwan, Taipei was a very important R&R place for people coming out of Vietnam, American soldiers. So there were various ways in which Taiwan became important, and this...

*Q: Did Taiwan benefit economically from the war?*

CLOUGH: Yes, sure. It benefitted economically, and it benefitted diplomatically from this. The demonstration of how important Taiwan was in this containment...

*Q: And in as much as China was giving active assistance, not active ground force assistance, but giving lots of supply assistance and encouragement, it would seem to us at the time, to North Vietnam, that, again, it would be greeted with some relief, I would think, in Taiwan to realize that now we saw that really our enemy was Communist China, and that all this propitiating of Communist China was certainly something we wouldn't continue in this atmosphere.*

CLOUGH: Yes, and that was what happened, actually. I was in the Policy Planning Council from '66 to '69, and I was responsible for East Asian Affairs. I came up with a couple of minor things in the field: international relations, dealing with international organizations where we would soften our position a little bit with respect to Communist China and Nationalist China.

But the IO was still dominated by Ruth Bacon and people who still were acting very vigorously against any slippage at all. During the Vietnam War, I think Dean Rusk felt that it would be a mistake to divert any attention from getting that war ended to doing something about China.

*Q: Yes. Well, you bring up the name of Dean Rusk, and of course this looms large in all we are talking about. Because there was a man who was very deeply committed to upholding the position of the Republic of China, diplomatically and otherwise. A man who took a very strong view on the Cold War and also the war in Vietnam. He is not the kind of man who would ever back down. This must have been considerably comforting to Taiwan, to know that Dean Rusk was Secretary of State. Probably just gave them the same kind of assurance that they had when Dulles was the Secretary of State.*

CLOUGH: I think that's true. What was happening in the United States, though, in public opinion and in the Congress, was that the kind of almost automatic support for the ROC against the Chinese Communists, which had existed in the early '60s, was dissipating. Do you remember the Congressional hearings that were held in '66, at which John Fairbank and Bill Barnett and others testified? What was Doak's phrase? Can't recall, something without isolation.

*Q: Were you aware at that time, either when you were in Taipei or when you were on the Policy Planning staff, of the basic hostile feelings between the Chinese and the Vietnamese? In other words, I had always assumed, even when I was Assistant Secretary during that period, which was '69 to '73, that the relationship between Beijing and Hanoi was, if not amicable, they both recognized the importance of staying in there together. The idea that any kind of latent hostility could break out between the two of them never occurred to me. Did it to you?*

CLOUGH: At some point I began to read some of the history of Chinese-Vietnamese relations. And, as you know, the history is one...

*Q: I didn't have the luxury of reading back in history. Because I think if one did, one recognized that this was always an underlying possibility. Well, just to go back once again to the relationship between the Soviet Union and Taiwan. I recall there was a Soviet merchantman that was seized, I've forgotten what it was...*

CLOUGH: Yes, the Tuopsi.

*Q: It was held indefinitely there. Were you involved in that case?*

CLOUGH: No. I don't think it happened while I was in Taiwan. But those seamen were held there for years and years. I think some may be still there. But I don't think they'd be prevented from leaving now if they wanted to.

*Q: To me, it made absolutely no sense for the Republic of China to hold on to those people, unless they really believed that Moscow and Beijing were working hand in glove, which seems incredible that they should ever have thought that after '61. What about the troop-community relationship? We had a lot of forces on Taiwan, and we had the Taiwan Defense Command there. We had a lot of men in uniform coming in and out. How did the people on Taiwan view our military and our military presence? Was there a kind of a nationalist reaction against it at all?*

CLOUGH: There was some. The attitude was mixed. On the one hand, most people felt that they were threatened by Communist China and that the United States had come to the rescue, and that it was necessary to have these American troops around in order to defend Taiwan. And so they were willing to have them.

And then various elements of society benefitted by running a black market with stuff out of the American PX and commissary and that sort of thing. A lot of people were employed by the American MAG (Marine Air Group) and other American military who were assigned there. We had one of the largest MAGs in the world; I think we had 11,000 people in it at one point.

But there was a certain amount of friction, because the Americans, of course, were far better off. Their living standards were much higher. They drove cars around. Sometimes they had accidents, they'd run into a Taiwanese.

*Q: And there were red light districts, undoubtedly, that flourished around a base presence.*

CLOUGH: And then there was this case in '57 when an American serviceman shot and killed a Chinese, the Reynolds case, which resulted in the sacking of the US Embassy by a mob.

*Q: That's right, and scattering all these officials papers around the streets, picked up, spuriously, by a newspaper in Bombay which printed all these things. They were very incriminating, but they were false documents. But we couldn't tell the world that they were false documents, because in proving that they were, we'd be giving away some of our secrets. So we just had to live with this situation. That's going back too many years, I was just wondering. I would gather from your remarks that there was sufficient feeling of being embattled, of being pretty lonely, certainly up against a great power of Red China, that to have a friend and to have a trip wire, by having a friend there was very important, certainly from the government's viewpoint. But down the line amongst the people there were these feelings.*

CLOUGH: Yes, there were personal frictions that you get when any large foreign community is imposed on another, but they weren't very strong. For the most part, the people in general were friendly to Americans. There was very little unfriendliness.

*Q: My general impression from meeting Chinese Nationalist officials was that they were pretty decent people to work with, and that it must have been a fairly pleasant experience dealing with the Foreign Office in Taipei. Is that a correct surmise?*

CLOUGH: I think that's right, although there were issues on which we disagreed.

*Q: But they were reasonable, they were rational.*

CLOUGH: Yes, they were rational. Most of the people in the Foreign Ministry were Western-trained, they were graduates of American universities, many of them, and they were friendly and...

*Q: Meanwhile, the standard of living in Taiwan was going up. Was it perceptibly going up while you were there?*

CLOUGH: Oh, yes, it had already started, although the real takeoff had not occurred in those years. It was underway in the early '60s. You were talking about relations, though, between the United States and the Republic of China. The real shock came in '71, when the announcement was made that Kissinger had been to Beijing and that President Nixon would go there, actually.

*Q: Where were you at that time?*

CLOUGH: I was retired. Of course, I was going back and forth to Taiwan frequently. I was writing a book for Brookings on East Asia, and then later I wrote a book on Taiwan. So I have made a lot of trips back and forth, kept in touch. And the shock later in the Carter Administration, when we actually established relations with Beijing and broke relations with Taipei, was demonstrated by the crowd that gathered when Christopher arrived representing the department, and his motorcade was attacked by people with sticks and...

*Q: But a great deal of your efforts when you were in Taiwan must have centered upon upholding the Republic of China's position in the United Nations.*

CLOUGH: Right. That was...

*Q: That must have taken up a high percentage of your time.*

CLOUGH: It took more of the department's time, I think, because we had to deal with countries all around the world. Every September, or a few months before, we'd send out these messages and try to line up all the support for the annual vote on the Chinese representation issue. Up until about '61, we were able to get support for not considering the issue, just...

*Q: No, but in your position in Taiwan, though, it would have been very important there, from your viewpoint and our national viewpoint, that the Republic of China do all possible to maintain its diplomatic standing, and that it certainly maintain the support of countries, Africa and so forth, who had voting powers in the United Nations.*

CLOUGH: That's right. They spent quite a lot of money on Africa. They sent out these agricultural technical advisory teams to African countries. They had a...

*Q: They called it a Viking program, didn't they?*

CLOUGH: Yes, I think it was, at one point. They had plots of land in Taiwan to which they invited Africans to come and learn about agriculture. They had a steady, very large-scale interchange. I think at one point they had teams in 20 or more countries.  
[Operation Vanguard was the US Public Law 480 Agreement with the Republic of China]

*Q: And they did a good job, too.*

CLOUGH: They did a good job, and this was appreciated by the Africans. And this was a way of maintaining this diplomatic link and getting that crucial vote every year.

*Q: And have fewer White men around in Africa telling the Africans what to do or how to do it.*

CLOUGH: And H. K. Yang Hsi-k'un, who was the Vice Minister in charge of the African operations, was very good. He spoke French, and he had a feeling for how to deal with African leaders. He knew them all. He traveled back and forth frequently.

*Q: I know that when I was back in the department, few things impressed me more favorably about the Republic of China than its efforts to maintain its diplomatic position through these kinds of helpful support of African countries. And they had the kinds of agricultural technicians and so forth that were just needed. They knew how to make proper use of*

*remanure and things like that, where we were using chemical fertilizers. Their technology, in other words, was a little bit more applicable to...*

CLOUGH: And also, as individuals they were willing to go out there for a year or two or three without their families and live under circumstances which were pretty spartan, whereas American aid people wouldn't do that.

*Q: And they didn't have to have commissaries and other things that tend to create divisions. So you retired, you say, in 1969. But before you retired, I see that you were at Harvard for a couple of years.*

CLOUGH: When I came back from Taiwan, I was there for a year, '65-'66.

*Q: What were you doing?*

CLOUGH: I was a diplomat-in-residence. I was at the Center for International Affairs for a year at Harvard and Associate of the East Asian Research Center.

*Q: And what you were working on basically was China?*

CLOUGH: Yes. Well, I wasn't doing a single research project. I did a paper on China, the Chinese representation issue, during my time there. But mainly it was a sort of place to catch up on the current state of the disciplines. I audited courses from Sam Huddington in political development, from Merle Fainsod in Soviet politics, a course on Japanese politics. Spent my time reading up in these areas.

*Q: And then you went to the Policy Planning Council.*

CLOUGH: Yes.

*Q: What exactly was your role there? Were you the Far Eastern specialist?*

CLOUGH: Yes, I was the Far Eastern specialist. I used to attend the weekly staff meetings that Bill Bundy had, so I kept in close touch with what was going on, and occasionally undertook special jobs for him. For example, he asked me to draft a memo on the name of the bureau. Was Far Eastern Bureau any longer proper, or should we change it? And I recommended the East Asia and Pacific change.

*Q: Oh, did you? You were the one who suggested it.*

CLOUGH: Yes. It was around, people were talking about it. I didn't originate the idea, but I put it in a memo to him and made that recommendation.

*Q: Did he actually change his title while he was in...*

CLOUGH: Yes. He became Assistant Secretary of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

*Q: What year would that have taken place?*

CLOUGH: Oh, must have been about '67 or so. I can't recall exactly.

*Q: I see. That was when I was in Indonesia and...*

CLOUGH: I spent a lot of time in that policy planning job on Singapore, because the British had announced that they were withdrawing their forces east of Suez, which meant Singapore, and we were very concerned about the future of Singapore. And there were differences of opinion within the government. People in the Pentagon wanted to try to get base rights and that sort of thing. So we had to produce a paper on US policy toward Singapore, and I chaired an inter-agency group, which produced a paper on that subject over a period of...

*Q: Who was the Director of planning staff at that time?*

CLOUGH: Henry Owen. Ross Dow had just gone to the White House Security Council.

*Q: Quite a difference between Ross Dow and Owen.*

CLOUGH: Yes. Owen had been the Deputy and he was made Director.

*Q: But Henry Owen was one of our real authorities on economic issues, with a long background in that field.*

CLOUGH: But one thing that the Policy Planning staff did not have responsibility for was Vietnam, so my East Asia job excluded Vietnam.

*Q: Vietnam was very tightly controlled in the State Department, I think pretty much between Rusk and Bundy. Of course, Ball was involved, but Ball was increasingly at variance with Rusk's views on this issue.*

CLOUGH: Joe Yager, who was the Deputy to Henry Owen, was asked at one time to do some planning or recommendations on Vietnam, but I never got involved in that.

*Q: (Kennedy) With Singapore, where did you come out? What was the recommendation?*

CLOUGH: Oh, I've forgotten the details now, but I felt it was a fairly successful job of modifying some of the more extreme and unrealistic views the military had about Singapore at that time.

*Q: You see, with the great switch-around in Indonesia, really the whole domino theory lost a great deal of its credibility. When Indonesia turned from being a hostile country to being*

*basically a friendly country, and the formation of ASEAN in 1967, the fear that we had, which I think was justified... In other words, I think that the domino theory was tenable up to that point, but after Indonesia, which represents one-half of Southeast Asian area and population, suddenly turns around the other way and is linked in with Thailand, and Thailand looked as though it was becoming fairly secure, the idea that there were going to be dominoes falling other than in Indochina, became rather hard to support.*

CLOUGH: It was still being used though.

*Q: It was still being used, but...*

CLOUGH: In the rhetoric in the early '70s, I think it was pretty common, especially the...

*Q: I said, and I made this comment in my book that I'm writing right now, that I think that the domino theory lost its tenability after 1967. And I think we had justification to force the pace to find some ending to the war in Vietnam at that time. Basically, the war in Vietnam was designed to prevent the fall of other countries. Then it became largely a matter of honor, getting out of Vietnam.*

CLOUGH: With credibility.

*Q: Credibility and not leaving a friendly country in the lurch and so forth. And of course there, we went up against the obduracy, intransigence of North Vietnam, which I don't think anybody reckoned would be as intense as it was. They were just an impossible nut to crack. All the concessions we were willing to make they never really responded to. They were single-minded in their determination, and the more they lost in the war, the stronger their resolve was, because they had less to lose, you might say, by continuing the war, because they had lost so much, and they were so deeply committed. So you left the Policy Planning in '69, retired.*

CLOUGH: First thing I did was to write a book on US policy toward East Asia, looking at whether there was substance to the domino theory. I tracked the history of containment and how we built this chain of alliances around China. I took a worst-case position. I said: Suppose that we lose the war, that North Vietnam takes over all of Indochina, what will be the effect on Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Burma?

*Q: That's exactly what they're probably worrying about right now in Washington with regard to the Middle East: Do we have dominoes that are going to fall?*

CLOUGH: I concluded that those countries were pretty resilient, and that Vietnam was going to be heavily occupied with its own problems in Indochina for a long time, and it wasn't going to have much extra strength to mess around with Thailand or other countries. My book came out in January; Saigon fell in May. So I was fortunate in having taken that presumption.

*Q: Then when you look back on your career, every single one of your assignments really has been China-related.*

CLOUGH: No, not every one.

*Q: I'm saying after Honduras. But starting with Vice Consul in Kunming, way back in 1945, up until 1969, twenty-four years, every one of your jobs had a China relationship.*

CLOUGH: That's right, even the one in Switzerland, which I didn't expect.

*Q: Isn't this unique in the Foreign Service?*

CLOUGH: It's not unique in the Foreign Service, because if you go back before World War II, that was the case with most China language officers. But post-World War II, I think it probably is unique.

*Q: That's right. Now, you've written more than one book. Tell me, looking back from the extremity of all your tasks related to China, what are some of the general conclusions that you would draw from that total experience?*

CLOUGH: About China itself?

*Q: China itself and our relationship, particularly our policy, because after all, your involvement with China was a US policy relationship to China. It wasn't a detached academician looking at China and puzzling out what was going on in the country and what the people were like and so forth, you were really focused on the relationship between the United States and China.*

CLOUGH: My feeling is that the United States as a nation doesn't have a very clear-eyed view of China. A lot of specialists on China are better positioned, but if you look at our history, it's a swing from one extreme to the other.

We have the Chinese Reds swarming in hordes and attacking our troops in Korea, hostility to China that existed for many years after that, very strong hostility, China lobby and so on.

Then Nixon goes to China, and everybody wants to go to China. You have a period when China is extremely popular. We establish diplomatic relations, it becomes even more so. The US government rushes to establish all kinds of exchange programs. You have every Cabinet officer vying to go and sign an agreement, even though he didn't take the trouble in advance to find out if he had any money in his budget to take care of these exchanges that he was promising to have with the Chinese. There was a period of euphoria, particularly in the early '80s, about China that cooled some after they started attacking us on our arms supply to Taiwan, '81-'82.

As I say, we don't look very clear-eyed. Even Reagan, when he made his trip to China, came back in Alaska talking about the Chinese as if they'd turned into capitalists.

*Q: Don't you think that American attitudes, particularly our policy towards China, reflects a rather emotional attitude towards China? We have kind of a love-hate relationship with the Chinese. The Chinese people we basically like very much. Particularly when they're doing the right things, we fall all over ourselves in adulation. But a lot of this also reflects this love-hate relationship the fact that China turns it on and off. You have this two-step-forward, one-step-back kind of policy that goes on and on. And, hopefully, right now I think we're in sort of the end of their one-step-backward phase, where we're going to move into a two-step-forward phase when once again there will be a flood of emotional attachment to China, and the Chinese will be seen once again as great friends of the United States.*

CLOUGH: But what we have to realize is that China is a huge, developing country. It's so enormous that no other government has the kind of problems that they have in just administering over a billion people. They are underdeveloped; they are backward in many respects.

*Q: And very Sinocentric.*

CLOUGH: Very Sinocentric, although that's changing. They're beginning to open up. But we have to allow for these swings in Chinese policy. There are going to be more swings before they settle on any sort of permanent democratizing government.

*Q: But each swing will be accompanied, I think, by kind of an emotional reaction, which in the case of China seems to be sharper than in almost any other country.*

CLOUGH: That's right, and I don't understand exactly why that is.

*Q: Would you share my conclusion, in looking back over my years of dealing with China and Japan, that in the case of China and Japan, we've had specialists in the State Department who were China language men or Japanese language people, the China language people tended to see China pretty much as the center of things, the Japan language people saw Japan as the center of things. The China language people tended to be sympathetic to China. The Japanese tended to be a little bit lofty, and they somehow looked down a little bit on China. In other words, there was a tendency to share the attitudes of the countries in which we had our specializations. I was a Japanese language man, and I was out in Tokyo before the war. It was very difficult for anybody to be both friendly to China and Japan. Now I think one of the great things that happened in 1972, when Nixon went to China, was that all of a sudden you could be both sympathetic to China and to Japan. You could see them both as friends. Up to that time, it was really very difficult.*

CLOUGH: One or the other.

*Q: And I think you found the same thing was true of Kissinger and Nixon. I think they saw, particularly in Zhou En-lai, a kind of world statesman, a guy with whom they could really talk and interact, whereas their dealings with Japan were mostly in the economic field, in which they didn't have any particular interest or expertise. And there was therefore a tendency, I think, to side pretty much with China, you might say, as opposed to Japan, although both Nixon and Kissinger recognized the great importance of Japan and all of that. But I'm just saying, once again, emotionally, they tended to be a little bit on the China side, you might say, of the equation, as opposed to Japan, which I think helps to explain the Nixon shakos [?] and they way the treated Japan at that particular time. And I don't think the Japanese have ever quite forgotten that, those shakos. But in more recent years that has changed, and I think today we have a much more balanced view, that people can look at the two countries much more objectively and not have a kind of a bias one way or the other.*

CLOUGH: Yes, the current period is interesting, because we have quite a lot of Japan-bashing, and we also have a great deal of criticism of the Chinese leadership.

*Q: That's right, but it's a kind of equal bashing, rather than being on one side or the other. I was wondering if you had any other broad-gauge reflections on the US-China relationship. I realize that you're pressed for time, possibly.*

CLOUGH: Maybe because I was myself an exchange student in China in the '30s, I've always felt the importance of exchange of students. And since 1980, we've had a tremendous exchange going on with China. We have today about 40,000 Chinese students still in this country. I think the largest number we have from any country is from China. The interesting thing that happened after the Cultural Revolution ended in '76 and Deng Xiaoping took over and adopted his reform policies and his open door toward the outside, was that you began to have these older, American-trained students, who had been in this country in the '30s and '40s, come out of the woodwork. They began to appear. They were heads of think tanks, they were senior officials in ministries and so on. And they began to get in contact with their old friends here, many of whom were Chinese-Americans who had come over here and stayed in this country. We had a network of links that I think is unique. No other country in the world has that kind of relationship with China.

*Q: And those people are still there somewhere.*

CLOUGH: Those people are still there. In fact, they are being added to every day, ever since 1980, the numbers that have come here, and many have gone back. We have visiting going back and forth. It's been affected significantly by the June 4 events last year.

*Q: (Kennedy) You're talking about Tiananmen Square, the crackdown in 1989.*

CLOUGH: That's right.

*Q: Let's just focus on that Tiananmen Square for one moment, June 4, 1989. Since Deng Xiaoping had seemed to be moving in the direction that we would all wish China to move*

*in, modernizing and beginning to open up its markets, and beginning to think a little bit more in terms of private enterprise, what suddenly reversed all this? Did he suddenly feel threatened by the students and by the threat of Democracy and what it meant to the Chinese Communist Party?*

CLOUGH: He didn't see it as the threat of Democracy, he saw it as the threat to the power of the leaders. Deng Xiaoping has never been a man committed to Democracy. He is a Communist leader, and he's committed to the role of the Communist Party in China, although he did make an effort in the '80s to draw a distinction between party and government to try to separate them more than they'd been in the past. He did open up the country. He adopted reforms which expanded the private sector in China very substantially. But he did not back political reforms. He did not want a truly democratic system. I don't think he understands what a democratic system is, or what a free press is, how it works. To him, movement in that direction means instability, disorder, and a threat to the leadership.

The problem that he faced in the spring of '89 was that, first, the unexpected happened when Hua Bong died suddenly. There were great student demonstrations of support for him, which started off this whole thing. These continued through the Gorbachev visit, which made it very awkward and difficult for the leadership. They couldn't respond very effectively. All the time this thing was building, there were serious differences within the government as to what to do about all this. And they delayed and delayed until it got to the point where they felt they had no choice but to use force. It had gone too far.

*Q: Yes, but when those democratic forces began to be released and the students, particularly, in the forefront, those are things that are very, very hard to control anyway. Had the students been willing to proceed in a more orderly manner, rather than conducting themselves the way they did, do you think that there wouldn't have been this reversal in China? In other words, if the students had acted with more restraint, recognizing that you have to move step by step, rather than convulsively, because a convulsion is almost bound to invite a convulsive reaction...*

CLOUGH: Yes, I think that's fair to say, that if the students had been more moderate... The problem is that as they gained ground, as they saw the government's reactions were ineffective, particularly when the government sent in troops without arms, and those troops were surrounded by the people, and their trucks were blocked from moving, I think there was a feeling of euphoria, a feeling that the city was really in the hands of the people, not the government.

*Q: But then, to any leader it must be a distressing spectacle to see the streets all jammed with people and demonstrators, and garbage collecting in piles, confusion in general. They want order.*

CLOUGH: And people calling for the downfall of Deng Xiaoping and the overthrow of the government.

*Q: That's right. You know, the whole thing almost inevitably invited the reaction that came. It's very hard to contain the force and momentum of a drive, represented by the students, towards Democracy, particularly when they have broadcasts from all around the world that were more and more aware through their students...*

CLOUGH: That is the other thing that happened. Because of Gorbachev's visit, there was a large contingent of TV representatives in Beijing, many of whom stayed on as these demonstrations continued in order to cover it. So that when the crackdown occurred, it was thoroughly covered by the world TV. This has never happened before, I think, on that scale. So that the government...

*Q: So that then there was the feedback, because the students were realizing that they were world figures.*

CLOUGH: Yes, they were interviewed by...

*Q: They were not only standing for Democracy in China, but they were sort of the vanguard of the democratic movement throughout the world.*

CLOUGH: It's going to take a while for a different sort of regime to develop in China, although the economic reforms are continuing to a certain degree, and the openness to the outside is certainly there. The Chinese continue to want foreign investment and foreign trade, but on the political side there is not much forward movement. I get the impression that the, at least apathy, if not hostility, of the general population toward the leaders is strong.

*Q: Is this one of these situations where we just have to wait until the old men pass from the scene? Or are things likely to move a little faster than that, hopefully?*

CLOUGH: I think probably the key will be with Deng Xiaoping.

*Q: That's who I mean by the old men.*

CLOUGH: Yes, he had some old men around him, but whether any one of them will be able to manage it as he has, in his absence, I don't know. That remains to be seen. But there is another element, though, in China that shouldn't be overlooked, and that is that people in general don't want disorder. Having gone through the Cultural Revolution, which was more disorder than anyone bargained for or wanted, they don't want that to happen again.

*Q: I think that's a very important point.*

CLOUGH: And so there are a lot of people who may not like the degree of repression that's going on, but they don't want to see the system break down.

*Q: I think that's a very valid point, particularly in light of the Cultural Revolution.*

CLOUGH: And the older people, who have been through the Cultural Revolution, are more likely to feel that than the younger ones.

*Q: And then, of course, when you get outside the cities into the rural areas, what you're talking about is even more profound in this feeling.*

CLOUGH: Yes. There, what happens in Beijing doesn't have much to do with them.

*Q: Where the traditions they have are stronger, why, the forces of resistance to Democracy will inevitably be greater. What you're really talking about is a vanguard of Democracy, largely in the form of students in the cities.*

CLOUGH: The other thing that's happened in China with the economic reforms is a very considerable degree of decentralization of economic decision-making, down to the provinces and even the cities.

*Q: But, you know, don't you feel that one of the things that's happening now in China that's sort of a hopeful sign is that the influence of Taipei, Taiwan is really beginning to radiate out into the accompanying coastal areas of China, and even to cities like Hong Kong and Shanghai. I talked to somebody who came back from China the other day, and he said he ran into hundreds of Taiwan businessmen. They're putting a tremendous amount of investment in the Jinmen area, Amoy area, so that you have a feeling that there is a kind of harmonization process that's going on now that adumbrates a possible eventual solution in which there is a blending process, where China mainland becomes more, not democratic, but oriented more towards business, and where, obviously, the Chinese as a race have an extraordinary, native business acumen. These are kinds of qualities that may in the long run prove to be of great importance. The same way in Hong Kong. I'm not so concerned that China is going to take over Hong Kong, so much as that Hong Kong's influence is going to invade China.*

CLOUGH: Take over the hinterland.

*Q: You already see it.*

CLOUGH: The reason I wanted to answer that question is because I'm currently engaged in writing a book on that subject, relations between Taiwan and the mainland, which have been developing extraordinarily rapidly since late '87, when Chiang Ching-kuo decided to allow people in Taiwan to visit the mainland.

I was in Taiwan last August. I was in Taiwan again in January. I was in Xiamen and, Beijing in January. I was back in China in June. Went to Shanghai, Guangzhou, Nanjing, Hainan Island, and will be in Taiwan again in November.

I'm trying to put together what is happening in this fast-moving situation, but it's certainly true that the businessmen of Taiwan are moving rapidly. They've invested approximately a billion dollars on the mainland so far. Trade is growing. Probably a million people from Taiwan have visited the mainland over the past couple of years, three years. The government in Taiwan is trying to slow the process. They're in favor of it, but they don't want it go too fast or too far.

And they're disturbed about the continuing efforts by the PRC to isolate them internationally. The latest example: getting the Saudis to break relations with Taipei and establish them with Beijing.

So I think the influence of Taiwan on the coastal provinces is growing. At present, it has mainly an economic effect, but ultimately I think it will also have a political effect.

*Q: But isn't this also important in terms of the leadership and the leading figures on Taiwan, who never had any contact with the mainland, in other words, they were born in Taiwan, that there would be a tendency, in other words, for a Taiwanese separatist thinking, not a movement, because a movement would be rather dangerous, but they might be thinking themselves. But as long as there are these increasing ties with the mainland, business ties, essentially, and travel and so forth, that helps to keep that danger down of a Taiwanese separatist movement, which would be very, I think, almost a casus belli with Beijing. This is something that I used to worry about a lot, and that was a Taiwanese independence movement. And I have a feeling that one of the principal reasons (obviously, the principal one was their fear of the Soviet Union) why Zhou En-lai welcomed the rapprochement with the United States was his fear of a Taiwanese independence movement. And when, in our communiqué at Shanghai, we gave assurance that there is but one China and so forth, in other words, we allied ourselves with the view of Beijing that there is only China, we distinctly turned our backs on any kind of Taiwanese independence movement. And these were things that we talked about with them before the President's trip to China. And I think this is one of the things that, obviously, underlay Beijing's desire to move towards the rapprochement with the United States.*

CLOUGH: Oh, I think that's right. I think, though, that while we did turn our back on formal Taiwan independence, we also insisted in that communiqué that any resolution of the Taiwan problem be peaceful. And from the Chinese Communist point of view, the Beijing point of view, that means that we're still interfering in the domestic affairs of China.

*Q: But that shows you how strongly they must have felt on the other issues to be willing to make that compromise.*

CLOUGH: That's right. That's right. No, it's a very great compromise. Because, as I said earlier, for ten years or more they were saying: Nothing can be done with the United States until the Taiwan issue is resolved.

In '71, they had decided: We will go ahead, despite the fact that the Taiwan issue hasn't been resolved. We'll change our relations with the United States and see if that will lead, ultimately, to a resolution of the Taiwan issue. And that's what they've been working toward.

But on each side, they have a bottom line in their dealings with each other. In Beijing, the worst thing that could happen would be a formal declaration of independence, because they would then have to intervene militarily, probably, to try to prevent it. From the Taiwan side, the thing they worry about most is military intervention from Beijing. And these two things work with each other.

The threat of military intervention is used by Beijing to prevent independence of Taiwan, whereas Taiwan can always hold in reserve the threat to go independent if they should be attacked.

But both governments are in favor of this increasing interchange that's going on between them, the trade, travel, visits of newsmen back and forth, although no newsmen have yet come from the mainland to Taiwan, but they're drawing up the regulations to permit that. They both favor this, because each sees its advantages to it.

The mainland sees it as a way of ultimately drawing the authorities in Taiwan into some negotiation and bringing them into China as part of the one-country, two-systems arrangement, just as they are bringing Hong Kong in.

In Taiwan, they won't accept that. They won't accept that they will become a local government under Beijing. The government there has not adopted this, but the scholars are talking about a slogan: One country, two governments. Beijing says: There's no such thing under international law, you can't have one country and two governments.

If you take a public opinion poll (and many have been taken of people in Taiwan) of how many people in Taiwan favor independence, the most that any of those polls have got on that issue is about 15 percent in favor of independence.

But if you ask the question a different way: How many of you would be willing to become a subordinate government under Beijing? you get about 99 percent against.

*Q: It's interesting, though, that the Democracy movement that has swept Eastern Europe has not been replicated in East Asia. And I think it goes back, partly, to an observation you made earlier about how people who have been through all of the stresses of the Cultural Revolution and, of course, the wars of independence before that, all the convulsions and the wars (almost all the wars since World War II have taken place in East Asia), that these people are sick and tired of convulsions, and they basically want to have a better way of life, and that they think they can better achieve that with some kind of a rather firm hand at the tiller. That in the long run, if you have to make your choice between a Democracy and confusion on the one hand and an autocracy and order on the other, they would opt for the*

*latter. That may not be true of the upcoming generation, but that's been true of the existing generation that's been through all of this. Would you agree with that?*

CLOUGH: Yes, I think that's right. But there are two other factors in Eastern Europe that don't apply in either China or North Korea or Vietnam. And that is that in some, at least, of these Eastern European countries you had a tradition of Democracy. I mean, there was Democracy before, and so they've got something to go back to. They are much more strongly influenced by Western, democratic ideas than the people in Asia have been. And the second thing is that those Communist governments were put in place by the Soviet Union. They were, in that sense, alien to those countries. So you have a strong nationalistic element in the overthrow of the Communist governments in Germany and Poland and Czechoslovakia, which you don't have in either China or North Korea.

*Q: Yes, those are good points. I agree. I think that perhaps the time has come to draw this to an end. I can only say, Ralph, that you are indeed one of our great China, not just scholars, but a man who has been out on the firing line of the Foreign Service dealing with these problems in China and other parts of the world. But another thing is that your whole career has been so directed towards China to almost a unique degree. And I think the conclusions that you have drawn, particularly here at the end, reflect a lot of mature thinking about the China problem. And my guess is that probably you are in a position to make more mature judgments, based upon wider experience, than almost anybody dealing with the problems of China. And I certainly found it very enlightening and refreshing, this interview. I appreciate it very much.*

CLOUGH: Thank you very much, Marshall. I enjoyed doing it with you, an old colleague, recalling the days when we used to work under Walter Robertson.

*Q: I find these interviews very interesting, because they certainly spark an awful lot of things that are latent in the back of your mind and also some fresh ideas. Those last observations you made about that relationship between Europe and Asia is very well said.*

CLOUGH: What one really should do is to prepare for these interviews by going through the FRUS for the period, reminding yourself of those things, but I didn't have time to do that. And, of course, much of that stuff isn't out yet in public form.

*End of interview*