

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

CURTIS C. CUTTER

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
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INTERVIEW

Q: This is February 3, 1992. This is an interview with Curtis C. Cutter. This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies, and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy.

I wonder if I can get a little about your background: where did you come from, where were you born and educated--that sort of thing?

CUTTER: I was born in Sacramento, CA, and raised there. I went to C. K. McClatchy High School and to the University of California at Berkeley. Both of my parents were born in Sacramento, and my grandparents were born in the immediate area of Sacramento. Sacramento was a place with roots.

Q: When were you born--what year?

CUTTER: October 27, 1928.

Q: The year of the Dragon. It's my year, too.

CUTTER: From Berkeley and I went directly into the service.

Q: What service did you go into?

CUTTER: The Army.

Q: The Army. This is during the Korean War?

CUTTER: The Korean War. I had been in the ROTC at Berkeley, so I was called to active duty. I served at Fort Ord, Fort Gordon in Georgia, Camp Roberts and the Atomic Proving Ground at Frenchman's Flat, Nevada. I was then briefly in charge of the honor guard at the Presidio of San Francisco, and then went overseas to Korea.

Q: Sounds as if you were in the Military Police.

CUTTER: I was. Fort Gordon was the training center for the Military Police. Perhaps the most interesting of these stateside assignments was the experience at Frenchmen's Flat. My MP company was in charge of the security for the atomic maneuvers that were held there. Substantial units were assembled in trenches about 2000 yards from ground zero. An atomic bomb was dropped from a bomber and exploded. After a brief waiting period we were to simulate an attack on objectives near ground zero. Animals (mainly sheep) had been tethered at varying distances from ground zero. The sound of their screams and the

total desolation of the area after the blast created a scene from the inferno. What the long term effects of this exercise will have been on the human participants is still unresolved.

Then I went to Korea and was assigned to the prisoner of war program, interviewing prisoners and trying to separate the communists from the non-communists.

Q: Did you get involved in the Cheju-Do business?

CUTTER: I was on Cheju-Do and Koji-Do, both.

Q: It was Cheju-Do, wasn't it, where the general was taken?

CUTTER: Correct. I wasn't there at that time but was there shortly thereafter. Actually, we moved the non-communist North Korean prisoners to the southwest and set up a camp there.

Q: I have done some interviews which cover the Cheju-Do business. We're looking at the international affairs field, not just Foreign Service, per se. Here you were, a young officer in the Military Police. What were your marching orders when you got to dealing with Korean and Chinese prisoners of war? How did you feel and what were your...

CUTTER: Well, the problem was that we really didn't have adequate personnel. There were thousands--tens of thousands of prisoners, and very small detachments were assigned to police and guard the prisoners. The only thing that made it feasible was the fact that a great number of the prisoners were not hostile. They were basically anti-communist, so that, to a considerable extent, they were helping to keep the situation under control. As long as the prisoners were mixed, communist and anti-communist, there was this potential for real trouble. I got there at the time when they were trying to correct some of the problems that had gone before. What they were really concentrating on was a program of separating out communist from non- communist, so that they could put the communists under a tougher kind of security situation. The non-communists were sent to camps where they had much lighter security surveillance.

The process was a very informal one. Basically, a prisoner would enter a room where there was an interviewer and an interpreter. He'd be asked a couple of basic questions about his background and his political orientation. If he acknowledged that he was a communist, he'd go out one door. If he acknowledged that he was an anti-communist, he'd go out another door. That was the process. The Chinese prisoners that were identified as non-communist were eventually sent to Taiwan. The Korean prisoners that were identified as non-communist were sent back to the Korean mainland, and special camps were set up for them.

Q: Well, were you involved when Syngman Rhee opened the gates and let all the prisoners out. Were you there at that time?

CUTTER: No, I wasn't.

Q: Well, when you came back, when you had this experience, which was really an interesting perspective on what became the guts of our foreign service experience, the concern about Communism. You got it at a very early age and in a very real, practical way. Did this have any carryover to your later interests in the Foreign Service?

CUTTER: Well, certainly the war experience was a watershed in making up my mind on what I wanted to do in life. I had graduated from Berkeley in psychology and planned on being a research psychologist. The involvement in Korea definitely made me think more about what I wanted to do with my life. It seemed to me that there must be an easier way to solve international problems than shooting people and that foreign affairs might be the answer. If you went into a profession that was there to try to mediate and negotiate solutions to questions before they reached the shooting stage, maybe you were doing the right thing.

Q: Well, how did you get into the Foreign Service?

CUTTER: Well, when I got out of the service...

Q: That was when?

CUTTER: That was in 1953. I took the G. I. Bill and went to the Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales in Geneva, the graduate institute of international studies. I spent a year--really, four semesters there, studying international affairs, international law, international economics. I decided that I wanted to enter the Foreign Service, but I went back to Sacramento where I had some chance of employment while I went through the lengthy application and appointment process. So I took and passed the exam while I was working in Sacramento.

Q: So you came in then...

CUTTER: In February, 1957.

Q: What was your first assignment?

CUTTER: Well, actually my first assignment was before I even went to the FSI. I walked in the door, and they said that they were holding a small group of us until another class began and that we would work in Personnel. Our job was to extract data from active duty officers' files for some project they had going on. It was a very enlightening period because it allowed me to see what a career looked like.

Q: I had the same experience. After I got out of the FSI, waiting for onward assignment. I found it was one of the most fascinating short times....

CUTTER: Absolutely. It put me in awe of Foreign Service Inspectors, actually. Of all the reports I found in those files in those days, the ones that really made people come alive were the Foreign Service Inspectors' reports.

Q: Well, did this put you off as far as the Foreign Service was concerned, or anything like that?

CUTTER: No, no I don't think so. I think, on the contrary, it seemed to me that it was a relatively fair system, as I looked at it then, especially with the checks and balances that were imposed by the inspection system, which in those days was probably more thorough than it is today.

Q: Well, I think that now it's more mechanized. Well, how did you find your training in your class? I mean, was it adequate?

CUTTER: You know, I remember very little of it, actually. About half way through I was taken out of my class because I had been chosen by the man who was in charge of Far Eastern Personnel, and was being assigned to Phnom Penh as Administrative Officer, to be his assistant. So they pulled me out of the FSI course and assigned me to the Mid-Career Officers' Administrative Course. I thought, at the time, that administration was a dead end career choice. Everybody in my class sympathized with me, but actually it turned out to be an excellent assignment.

Q: Oh, sure.

CUTTER: I was given much higher level training and more specific training and was sent out to be Earl Cleveland's assistant in Phnom Penh. He understood that my future interests weren't really in administrative work, but it was a wonderful way to begin. I spent a year as the assistant administrative officer. Cleveland gave me a lot of responsibility. I did many things that you don't normally do in the service. I negotiated contracts for new apartment buildings that were being built and helped with the design of the buildings.. I even got the offer of a bribe. I was negotiating and beating the French contractors down, and all of a sudden one of them interrupted the conversation and said, "Why are you doing this? The first three months' rent goes to you." So I added that up and said, "Fine, we'll just subtract that amount from the total," which surprised them greatly.

Q: Well, you were in Phnom Penh from 1957 to 1959. What was the situation there at that time in Cambodia?

CUTTER: I felt that in many ways the U. S. position there was questionable. We had sent an ambassador named Carl Strom to Phnom Penh. He was a very fine, honorable gentleman, but he was an officer at the end of his career. He was a mathematician, a very precise sort of person. He had been mainly an administrative officer most of his career in the Foreign Service. He had absolutely zero rapport with Prince Sihanouk, who was, as you probably know, an entirely different kind of character, very open, outgoing, very

spontaneous. Strom was almost the direct opposite. He was almost introverted and a very serious, point by point kind of person. There was very little personal relationship between the two men, at a time when Prince Sihanouk was Cambodia. Strom, I think, was also somewhat intimidated by both the Department and our Vietnamese policies at the time. He seemed to feel that in some way what he was doing in Cambodia was meant to support what was happening in Vietnam. He felt he could not take a different line than was being taken there.

Q: He was somewhat deferential?

CUTTER: Deferential, yes. I can give you an example. Carl Strom and I played a lot of bridge together. We even won the worldwide bridge tournament. So as a junior officer he gave me a lot of access which I would not have had otherwise. Even though, after a year, I had moved to be the consular officer, he let me sit in on lots of meetings of one kind or another and all of his staff meetings. So I had an interesting view of what was happening at the post, although, of course, as a junior officer, I wasn't in any way able to have much influence on what was happening. But one incident occurred in, it must have been 1958. The Vietnamese were rather aggressively trying to realign the frontier between Cambodia and South Vietnam. There was an incident where they had moved some border posts five or six kilometers into Cambodia and then put them in again. Sihanouk wanted the missions in Phnom Penh to send representatives to see what had happened, because, obviously, the Vietnamese were encroaching on his territory. He wanted to document this for the international community.

When this request came to our Embassy, the Ambassador met with his staff, especially the military attachés, to decide what should be done about it. There were some strong opinions--mine amongst them--that if this were true, then Sihanouk had a legitimate case, and that we ought to go there and take a look. If there were real evidence that this had happened, obviously, the position that the U. S. ought to take was that this was unacceptable, and we should talk to our Vietnamese friends about rectifying the situation. But after some correspondence back and forth between the Embassy in Saigon and the Embassy in Phnom Penh, it was decided that, in fact, it would be very bad if we went down, if we made our presence at this event. The Ambassador refused to send anybody along. A number of missions did send people, and it was fairly clearly established that the Vietnamese were moving these border posts. This was the kind of thing we did. Actions in favor of the Vietnamese, which began to alienate Sihanouk.

Q: Well, you said that you felt rather strongly. Obviously, you were a junior officer and carried little weight. But did others at the Embassy feel that way, too? I mean, was this the sort of thing where maybe we should get out and be a little more active for "our" country, you might say?

CUTTER: Well, at least it seemed that there was a question of equity involved here. There was a great possibility that the Cambodians, in fact, were the injured party. Of course, the whole pressure of U. S. policy at that time on Cambodia was to get them out of their neutral

stance. The harder Sihanouk resisted that, which he did, the more pressure was exerted on him to do it, and the more entrenched our attitude became that Sihanouk's policy was really unacceptable. There were people in the Embassy who took a different line--for example, the political officer, Bob Barrett, subsequently an ambassador in Africa. Bob was, I think, one of the people in favor of our taking at least a more neutral position on this and trying to see where the facts lay. But the military and Agency [CIA] representations there didn't feel that this was in the US interest.

Q: They were trying to keep the Vietnamese content, I suppose.

CUTTER: That's right. And Durbrow [Elbridge Durbrow], who was our ambassador in Saigon at the time, was very strongly opposed to our doing anything that would upset his clients.

Q: You hear of those cases called "clientitis." Sometimes a little "clientitis" helps. On the Cambodian side, we should have been a little bit more responsive, rather than just to the other side?

CUTTER: Well, it seemed clear to me as a relative newcomer to this game that Sihanouk actually made a lot of sense. And that what he was trying to do: keep Cambodia uninvolved in the bigger battle that was going on in Indochina made a certain amount of sense from the Cambodian point of view and that if we were to look at it at all sympathetically, we would be trying to reinforce his position within Cambodia, rather than to weaken his position and allow other kinds of forces to move in.

Q: Was there concern about the communist forces within Cambodia at that time?

CUTTER: At that time they were not a serious problem. There were some small, guerrilla operations, but I did, in fact, drive everywhere in Cambodia in my own private vehicle. I visited all of the rubber plantations. I had a boat and took trips up the Mekong River almost up to the Laotian border. You never felt a great concern about your personal safety. There were some areas, that is, a few areas between Phnom Penh and the coast, in that little mountain range near the Gulf of Thailand, where there were still some active guerrilla activities. This is 1957-59. But in general the country was not in a state of unrest at that time. As a matter of fact, it was very prosperous.

Q: Well, were you there when William Trimble came as ambassador?

CUTTER: I was there.

Q: Was this a change?

CUTTER: Well, it was certainly a change in personality, to some extent. But, again, they sent an officer at the end of his career, a very distinguished officer, but one who had very

little sympathy, I think, for Cambodia or its situation. And, once again, was not the sort of person who could have made any direct, personal connection to Sihanouk.

Q: He was a soft-spoken, Baltimore gentleman?

CUTTER: He was a soft-spoken, Baltimore gentleman but who believed in very strict, protocolary kinds of behavior and ran the post as though it were a post in Europe, actually, and was not a person who could have developed the personal rapport with the Prince that was absolutely the essence of foreign policy in Cambodia. You know, we would have been much better off having sent a young, 40-ish officer who wouldn't have minded partying until the wee hours of the night, occasionally.

Q: Well, then you left Cambodia. I take it there were no major incidents when you were in Cambodia?

CUTTER: No. Well, there was the beginning of an incident because of a warlord, not a left wing, but a right wing warlord, Dap Chuon, who had his headquarters in Siem Reap, which is the town right near Angkor Wat. This was a favorite place to take high-ranking American visitors because he was so blatantly pro-American. I remember taking Senator Hickenlooper in to see him. Dap Chuon got a kind of dreamy look on his face. He said: "Senator, last night I dreamed a dream of a giant eagle which spread its wings over my country and came to rest down here in the jungles to protect us." He said, "You know, it's amazing. Here you are, here with me. You are another symbol of this protection that we're going to fall under." Of course, the Senator ate this up. Dap Chuon was very good at this kind of thing. He knew how to work on people. Eventually, of course, Sihanouk couldn't tolerate his independence and eventually he closed down his operations. He did close down his operation but found in the process that Dap Chuon was on the payroll of the Agency and had direct contacts with people in our Embassy who were then PNG'd [declared persona non grata] from the country. So this was just one other element in developing a state of mind in Sihanouk which was very, very negative towards the United States.

Q: You might add for the record that Sihanouk now, in 1992, is playing a limited role but is currently the Chief of State of Cambodia.

CUTTER: And it'll be a very important role, at least as important as Juan Carlos' role was in Spain, because he has that ability to mobilize people that practically no other politician has. He was one of the most popular leaders I've ever encountered. I watched him campaigning in those days, watched him addressing the people. He was immensely popular--and still is, I think.

Q: Well, then, you left Cambodia and came back and worked on United Nations affairs, is that right?

CUTTER: I did...

Q: From 1959 to 1962. How did that come about?

CUTTER: Well, who knows? The assignments process is mysterious because from the very day I entered the service I'd expressed an interest in specializing in Latin America, so, once again, this assignment didn't seem to be connected with what I wanted to do in the long run, but it turned out to be a fascinating assignment. I was assigned to the Office of Dependent Area Affairs, which was subsequently merged with United Nations Political Affairs. It was headed at that time by a man named Ben Gerig who was "Mr. UN Mandates and Trusteeships."

Q: Was he a UN employee?

CUTTER: No, State Dept. He had worked, though, at the League of Nations headquarters in Geneva and had worked from the very beginnings of the mandate system. He joined State as a civil servant, and headed that office. He had just an incredible wealth of knowledge, but he was definitely a gradualist at a time when changes were coming very rapidly in dependent area affairs.

Q: Oh, yes, we're talking of the period from 1959 to 1962, for example, which was the blowup or blossoming of Africa, and of other places, too.

CUTTER: Ben and I got along very well, actually, and I considered him a mentor, learning an enormous amount from him. But there were tensions between an older man at the end of a distinguished career and a younger, perhaps, more aggressive man. Ben was very much of a gradualist. He felt that the dependent areas were working towards independence but that the process could not be greatly speeded up. Careful preparations were necessary to get people ready for independence. I took a somewhat different view. My attitude was that, whether we liked it or not, independence was coming. The best thing for us to do, from a policy point of view, was to start moving in the direction of supporting the countries that were moving towards independence. There were good reasons for this. First of all, there was our anti-colonialist history as a nation. The United States had been born in rebellion against a colonialist power. We had honored our obligations to the Philippines and given them their independence on schedule following World War II. The Monroe Doctrine, while dictated by national self interest, was an anti-colonialist document. Our position had always been fairly consistent on this point. It just seemed to me that U. S. policy ought to be to support the independence movement as strongly as we could. Well, this was right at the end of the Eisenhower years, and most of my memos to Ben ended up in the files. Fortunately, we had an election in 1960, and the White House immediately called for new policies towards the emerging countries.

Q: You're talking about the Kennedy Administration?

CUTTER: Right.

Q: Well, tell me. I mean to go back to the early time when you were there. Did you find that there was a pretty substantial influence of the French and the British, and the Portuguese weighing in, plus our NATO commitment and saying, well, all of that is fine, but you really have to prepare, and very condescending, I am sure. But how did you find this?

CUTTER: Oh, there was definitely the feeling that the old boys had to get together and almost vet each other's speeches before they were given at the Trusteeship Council or the Fourth Committee, or wherever. Certainly, when Henry Cabot Lodge was there, there was no getting off the reservation. You were definitely going to coordinate your approach on these issues with the British and the French--and to a lesser extent with the Portuguese, the Spanish. But definitely the British and the French. We were almost in lock step with them at that point.

Q: How did you find the British and French representation at the United Nations...

CUTTER: And Australian.

Q: In your particular bailiwick. I mean, were they more enlightened or were they representing what you would say were the Old Guard? How did you find them?

CUTTER: Well, they assigned very able people to this, because they considered this very important business. Most of their people came from the colonial service, those they sent to the UN. They had long backgrounds in colonial administration. They were very able people, but with an entirely different frame of mind, I think, from those who might have felt that now the time had come when we just aren't changing the approach. Mason Sears was there at that time as our representative on the Trusteeship Council. Mason was, I think, probably a step ahead, in many respects, of the Administration in terms of what he thought should be happening. Mason had gone to Africa on a visiting mission, and I think that the effect of that had changed his views considerably about how the U. S. should approach this whole question of independence. But the Department overrode him whenever he tried to move towards a more liberal position in terms of the whole approach to trusteeship matters, independence matters. The Department generally overrode him.

Q: At your level did you have people that said, "Well, this is all very fine, but our NATO commitments are such that...Was NATO the overriding..."

CUTTER: No, NATO wasn't really waved at you as a reason why you had to placate the French or the British. I think that right up to the end of 1960, as long as the Eisenhower Administration was in office, there was a general feeling that "go slow" was good for everybody. It was good for the Africans, it was good for the Pacific Islanders. They weren't ready for independence. Independence was the goal, but we had to go much slower and make sure that there was a good infrastructure in place. I'm not so sure, now that I'm older, that... But at the time it didn't seem to me reasonable that...I don't think that in political terms it was reasonable. The movement was just out of control.

Q: Well, just at this particular period, did the Belgian Congo, I mean it was going to absorb the United Nations later on. But was it as much of a blip on your radar at that time, or not?

CUTTER: Well, it raised a blip on people's radars in that, as you studied the various areas and got a feeling of where they stood in terms of preparation for independence, it was pretty obvious that the Belgians had done one of the worst jobs of getting their people ready for independence of any of the colonial powers. They had trained fewer people--fewer doctors, lawyers.

Q: The figure that is usually quoted is three to five college educated natives out of this huge nation. They had done nothing...

CUTTER: The British, I think, in general, were doing the best job. The French were doing a good job, also. They had a lot of people that were being trained, were being sent through university in France.

Q: The French were much more integrated...

CUTTER: They had a better approach than the British. There was less of a barrier between the peoples. But the Belgians were terrible, and the Portuguese, of course, were equally bad. It was plain, I think, even at that point, where the problem areas would be. Certainly, one would have thought that the British areas would have had the smoothest transition. I concentrated basically, by the way--on the Pacific.

Q: I was just going to ask about the Pacific, because, really, nothing moved on that until the 1980's.

CUTTER: We took a very paternalistic attitude, and of course defense considerations were uppermost in our minds when we talked about the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. It was very difficult to get the Defense Department to move. They considered that the Trust Territory was a wonderful bastion for them out in the Pacific, as the island groups were fairly disparate and didn't have a unified approach to this whole question of what their future should be. They had never seriously considered independence, I think, on most of the island groupings. They were still fairly satisfied with the American administration. They didn't have the pressures that you had in Africa and elsewhere. You didn't have that kind of volatile situation. And we were doing a reasonably good job of training people, bringing people on, into Hawaii for advanced training, sending people back, and incorporating Micronesians into the administration. So that we didn't have the same kinds of pressures, I think, but they were there--they were incipient, even at that time. In traveling through the islands you could get a feeling that this was a problem that had to be solved fairly soon. Which we didn't do, by the way. We kept fooling around with various formulae but never did come up with one that held the area together.

Q: Well, in dealing with this, did Puerto Rico get thrown in your face all day?

CUTTER: All the time. This was the time when the Cubans were very active in trying to get Puerto Rico on the agenda of the United Nations. One of our biggest activities was to fend this off. We spent an enormous amount of energy, almost as much time as we did on the China question, keeping Puerto Rico off the agenda, claiming, basically, that Puerto Rico had already had its basic act of self-determination. In fact, I think that was true. I think that was a legitimate defense.

Q: Was there ever the feeling on the Puerto Rican affair, "OKAY, fellows, you want to talk about this, go to Puerto Rico, do what you want.?"

CUTTER: No. There was never that feeling. The feeling was that travel was open to Puerto Rico. Anybody that wanted to get on the airplane and fly down there could do so, and we said that. But to allow a visiting mission from the UN, an official visiting mission, to go to Puerto Rico, would be in some way to admit that the United Nations still had some say-so over our administration of Puerto Rico. We weren't prepared in any way to admit that.

Q: You say that you had pressure from Lodge, who had very tight control over things. Wadsworth was there for a relatively short period?

CUTTER: A very short period, and then Adlai Stevenson came.

Q: Because the Kennedy Administration had quite an impact on areas, particularly Africa, how did you react to the arrival of Stevenson and "Soapy" Williams as the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs?

CUTTER: Some of us were jumping for joy. The first thing that happened was, right after the inauguration, we got a memo from the White House--Dick Goodwin, actually, was the person who was overseeing our activities. We got a memo from them, saying that they wanted to see some new initiatives. Ben Gerig called me in the office and said, "Let's take a look at some of your old memos, Curt." That was very nice. We pulled out a lot of memos that I had done and a couple of other people in the office had done and sent those forward to Goodwin. Ben asked me to go over and talk with them in the White House, which was heady stuff. I don't think I'd recognize Dick Goodwin to this day because he sat his entire time with his feet on his desk. I was dodging backwards and forwards from one side to the other, trying to see his face. We outlined what we thought were some new initiatives we could take in terms of more forthcoming positions from the African point of view or from the Asian point of view. They liked it. They basically bought in to the things we proposed, and we didn't have any major shakeup in our office. We were able to keep going right along and interfaced relatively well with the new team up in New York. I found them delightful to work with. I used to go up there fairly frequently for meetings.

Q: How did you find Adlai Stevenson as somebody who was running an Embassy, essentially?

CUTTER: Well, my first encounter--I sat at the end of this long conference table on the first day I was there, I guess. He was sitting at one end of the table, and I was sitting at the other end of the table. The person in charge of my visit said, "We have Curtis Cutter here who will be here for the meetings of the Fourth Committee and the Trusteeship Council." Stevenson leaned forward and said, "Now, tell us something about yourself." That's just the way he was. On a number of occasions I had to draft speeches for him. He would seldom look at them before he went into the General Assembly. He'd take your draft up to the podium, and a speech would come out that incorporated all of your facts, but it was beautiful, Stevensonian rhetoric. You'd think to yourself as you sat there: "Why didn't I say that?" Then he'd come back down and say: "That was wonderful! I really appreciated it." All you'd basically done was give him an outline.

Q: Well, what was the reaction in the Fourth Committee of your British, French, Belgian, Portuguese, and Spanish colleagues--Australian, too. Did they sort of say: "Oh, my God!"

CUTTER: There was a lot of unease. Certainly, there was a very tense period and a lot of behind the scenes work at the ambassadorial level to try and get us to modify some of our positions--go a little slower on the approaches that we were taking. In the final analysis we weren't, I think, quite as forthcoming as most people in Washington would have liked us to be, but much more forthcoming than we were in previous administrations.

Q: Well, how did the Belgian Congo crisis, which really occupied us as much as Vietnam did for a time, affect you? Were some of your European colleagues saying: "See, I told you so!"

CUTTER: What were the dates of this?

Q: I can't remember. About 1961 or so.

CUTTER: Right. Well, there are two lessons. One was the lesson that those who wanted to go slow took from it, which was that these people are not ready for independence. I think that a lesson that others took was that, "look, here you see the evils of this kind of colonial administration. They hadn't prepared these people for independence. They had done nothing, really, to build the infrastructure--the human infrastructure--and repression isn't going to be the answer. Certainly, the way the thing has played out, you can do a lot of second thinking about it, but the seeds of all this were planted by a very repressive, colonial administration, an administration which saw this as a business enterprise, not as a human enterprise at all.

Q: Did you feel, while you were dealing with United Nations affairs--you were based in Washington, weren't you? Did you find that the Bureau of African Affairs under "Soapy" Williams had a fairly major influence on how you dealt with this? How did you feel about the group around him?

CUTTER: Well, "Soapy" Williams had a strong role, but don't forget that at that time United Nations Political Affairs was the office I was in. It was headed by Joe Sisco. Joe was no pushover for anybody.

Q: He was considered the "operator's operator" in Washington.

CUTTER: Definitely. There wasn't going to be any policy decision that Joe didn't have a strong influence on that dealt with the UN. We all called him "Jumping Joe." You could be sitting at your desk, and suddenly he'd rush into your office, grab you by the shoulders and say: "Come on, we're off." And you'd find yourself sitting in the Secretary's office, some assistant secretary's office, doing battle for what were IO's [Bureau of International Organization Affairs] positions. "Soapy" William's group did not run roughshod over IO. That's for sure. On the other hand, a lot of their positions coincided with positions that we were quite willing to take. There was some consensus there, and I don't think that there were any grave conflicts on colonial policy between IO and AF. On the contrary, we found that we were pretty much in agreement.

Q: What about the Europeanists? I mean George Ball. You must have found yourselves up against another, very strong set of people.

CUTTER: That's true. There were certainly people in the Department who tried to moderate these positions. But don't forget that the White House was more on the side of change. The Europeanists had other positions that they were very interested in, in protecting and defending and pushing. They were, I think, willing to give some leeway to a more aggressive, anti-colonialist position by both IO and AF than they would have been under other circumstances, given the pressures coming from the White House.

Q: So there were no particular pressures on the part of Averell Harriman, who at one time was in charge of East Asian affairs. But I take it that Laos and all that and the People's Republic of China sort of absorbed him, so that nobody was saying, "Go out and do something, island-wise."

CUTTER: Well, you know, we were very much in the throes of the Cold War at that point, and trusteeship and Pacific Island matters were basically a Department of Defense matter. That was an area where even the most liberal minds in the Department would find themselves blocked any time they would try to come up with something.

Q: It's never been very high on our agenda, including today, is it?

CUTTER: Well, of course, we've now made our bed out there, so to speak--made our arrangements, for better or worse. That's a whole chapter, actually, the way in which we administered the Trust Territory. During the Eisenhower years we had a High Commissioner out there by the name of Del Nucker, whose views were fairly sound views, as I look back on it. In his view, the most important thing was not to build a set of expectations among the islanders which their island economies couldn't support. You

should try and design programs which were commensurate with the resources that were available there. That meant keeping the islands, to some extent, underdeveloped, in certain ways. Of course, this view was looked on as being very reactionary by the Kennedy Administration. Then a lot of money was poured into the Trust Territory and all kinds of things were done which might have seemed good at the time. But now that you look back on it, it was clear that those islands, on their own, would never be able to support this. The only way they could support this kind of an infrastructure was to have continuing subsidies from a colonial power or a patron of some kind. They would never be able really to stand on their own feet.

In retrospect, the Del Nucker approach, in some ways, was quite realistic. He felt that what you needed was a lot of people with a secondary grade of education and a few people with a college education, who would come back and be the top administrators. Then you would have people who would have simpler but more practical skills who would provide the rest of the administrative infrastructure. We went way beyond that. We began to bring people out in great numbers, created a lot of unrest, a lot of dissatisfaction with the situation. And this dissatisfaction will continue, because basically those islands will never be able to support the kind of society that they see in Hawaii or in the mainland U. S. That's what we exposed them to.

Q: Okay, then, what happened after you left United Nations affairs in, what, 1962, and I sort of lose track of you until 1965. What were you...

CUTTER: Well, in 1962, Joe Sisco wanted me to stay on in Washington. For a lot of personal and professional reasons I wanted to get on with a change in my career. I'd already been three years in UNP [United Nations Political Affairs], and the prospect of spending a couple of more years there, while fascinating as it was really a lively place, was not in line with my long term career plans. I wanted to get on with my Latin American career. And I had an opportunity to go as a political officer to Lima. I've seldom seen Joe Sisco more angry than when I told him that I was opting to go to Lima instead of staying on with him in UNP. Perhaps that was not the right career choice. People who stayed with him and were part of his inner circle were carried along through the service very well. But I went down to Lima as political officer and never regretted it.

It was a fascinating three years. I arrived there at the time that the military junta had come into power, nullifying the elections of 1961, and were allowing all of the same candidates to recontest the election in 1962. They allowed all of the same candidates, with the exception of the Christian Democrat, who dropped out of the race and threw his support to Belaunde Terry, who was the Accion Popular [Popular Action] candidate. As we in the Embassy set about analyzing what was happening in the elections, there were two streams of thought. One was that the Apristas [APRA--American Popular Revolutionary Alliance] were unbeatable. Although they'd won in 1961 and the military hadn't been willing to accept them, they would win again in 1962. There was no way of beating them. They were the mass based party. But if you looked at the election returns of 1961, you could see that it had almost been one-third, one-third, and one-third; 30% each, with three parties, Odrista,

APRA, and Accion Popular, and with the other 10% going to the Christian Democrats, who had now thrown their support to Belaunde. Simple mathematics seemed to say that, if everybody goes back to the polls and votes the way that they did before, Belaunde will win. So we in the Political Section made that our prediction. The DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission] and the Agency people were absolutely convinced that the Apristas were going to win. We had to take this issue to the ambassador, who at the time was J. Wesley Jones, and argue our case. He came down on our side. As a result we went on the record predicting that Accion Popular would win in the elections.

Q: I think that that is very interesting for somebody looking at how the Foreign Service operates. Here is the Political Section. In a way an election is not all election, but by calling an election correctly this establishes credentials for other times when...Is this how you felt about it? Or was it just a game?

CUTTER: No, it wasn't just a game. In many respects it became an internal struggle because in the Political Section we felt it was very important that we begin to make contacts with Accion Popular, as we were predicting that they were going to win the thing. The Embassy traditionally had almost no contacts in that sector of Peruvian society. The previous ambassador, James Loeb, had had very strong contacts with the Apristas...

Q: James Loeb was a non-career ambassador from New York.

CUTTER: He was a publisher in the newspaper business and very strongly committed to the Apristas. As a matter of fact, once they had lost the election and were thrown out, he had to leave the country because the military identified him very closely with the Apristas.

We made a very strong effort to get out and develop ties with the new, emerging people in Accion Popular. Several of the people I nominated for leader grants--one had the famous family name of Mariategui. And as you may or may not know, Jose Carlos Mariategui is one of the most famous names in Peruvian politics. Both the Apristas and the communists claimed him as their founder. His "Seven Essays Interpreting Peruvian Reality" were a fundamental work there. His son, Sandro Mariategui, a very close adviser of Belaunde's, was looked on by some in the Embassy as a communist. He was one of the people I recommended as a leader grantee. When his name went before the Consular Section, they told me that there was no way in which they could send this person to the States. They said that he was a communist. I said, "What proof do you have that this man's a communist?" They immediately trotted out the fact that he had spoken at several communist rallies. I very quickly pointed out to them that these rallies were, in effect, rallies in honor of his father, Jose Carlo Mariategui, and that it was perfectly normal for a son, on an occasion when his father was being honored, to stand up and say a few words in honor of his father. Eventually, it was resolved in favor of his going on a leader grant, and he was the first minister of finance in the first Belaunde government. There were some bloody, bureaucratic battles over, not only Mariategui, but several other people we proposed as leader grantees, because they were looked on as dangerous leftists, in the Peruvian political scheme at that time.

So it wasn't just a game. It wasn't just adding things up. It was really trying to look ahead to predict who will be in control and trying to have some kind of contact and influence with those people before they actually came to power. Once people are in power, it's an entirely different thing to go to them and try and win their confidence and become intimate with them than it is before they're in power.

Q: Well, I take it, too, that in Peru, as in other places, people were looking at where the United States, through its Embassy, was coming down, didn't they?

CUTTER: Whom they were backing?

Q: Whom they were backing, whom they were contacting, that type of thing.

CUTTER: Yes, I think that all during the Cold War this was a major problem for us, everywhere in the world. I think that a lot of missions felt some restrictions in contacting people who could in any way be identified as being too far to the Left. In many countries in Latin America those were the very people who were going to shape society. For good or for bad, they were people who, I think it was extremely important, for us to know and to be in touch with. There were a lot of constraints on doing that at that time. There were a lot of pressures, a lot of reasons why, I think, it was considered somewhat risky to develop ties and contacts and openings to those groups. It was looked at, from an overall point of view, as giving aid and encouragement to elements that were probably inimical to U. S. interests, if you had too great contacts in those areas.

Q: So that the Cuban outcome, with Castro, weighed heavily on everything we did in Peru, would you say? We didn't want any more Castro's. Is this the...

CUTTER: Yes, there was that. Very definitely that. No more Castro's. Certainly, the approach that was being taken early in the Kennedy years--and in the Johnson years as well--was that the way to beat communism is to be an active agent for social and economic reforms in Latin America.

Q: So, you felt comfortable with how we were working there?

CUTTER: Fortunately, in my situation I never felt that there were any wraps being put on us. You could go out and seek out the people that you felt were really going to be influential, no matter how far to the Left they were. It wasn't going to have any immediate repercussions on your own career. And those were, in fact, the very people who probably were going to have a real impact in the long run on Peruvian society. They were, in fact, the only people in Peruvian society--and in most of Latin America--were the people on the Left who were talking in important ways about the kinds of changes that were necessary.

Q: How did you feel about the role of the CIA at that time in Peru?

CUTTER: You know, the people who were there, that I knew, in the Agency--and I don't know how much we can...

Q: Well, this is UNCLASSIFIED, but...

CUTTER: Well, the people that I knew were very professional and probably as understanding of what the fundamental causes of political unrest were in Peru, as we were. While their major mission there was to keep a close eye on the very radical, militarized Left, there was a clear understanding on their part that social and economic change was necessary. Elements of society that were willing to do this in a democratic way were to be encouraged, even if they were fairly radical in their approach. As long as they were willing to stay within the constitutional boundaries, they were people to be considered seriously. This was not always the case in Latin America. I think that the Agency has had a reputation which it has earned of supporting elements which were very reactionary.

Q: How about our military? Here you had a military junta taking over for a while. Were they overly comfortable with this or not?

CUTTER: Well, the Peruvian military is very unique in many respects. It had had a very strong, radical element in its Center of Higher Military Studies (CAEM) for a number of years. Some of the farthest Left of the democratic elements in the country were professors at the Military Institute. Most of the military officer corps came from what I would call lower middle class Peruvian society. So the Peruvian military was not a reactionary force at all, in the Peruvian context. It was, in many respects, a radical force. If you take a look at what happened when the military came back into power late in the 1960's and during the 1970's, you can see that they really were, in many respects, one of the most radical elements in Peruvian society. They were not tied to the oligarchy in the way the military is in many countries in Latin America. They brought about some of the most radical social and economic change that ever has been carried out in Peru, once they were in power, after they threw Belaunde out in 1968.

The relationship between our military and the Peruvian military was always rather distant. It wasn't a close one. It became especially distant when we refused to give them...The big issue, of course, was the F-5.

Q: The F-5 being an all-purpose, small jet aircraft?

CUTTER: Very easy to maintain, a modular aircraft. You could take off units and put new units on it. And the Peruvians wanted it. We had actually designed it pretty much for those kinds of conditions. I was, by then, back in Washington as the desk officer for Peru. We very strongly supported selling the F-5 to Peru because the alternative was that they were going to turn to the French or the Russians and get equipment from them. I'm jumping around here...

Q: That's all right.

CUTTER: Congress felt, for a number of reasons, the IPC case, this all gets very complicated. The IPC case...

Q: The IPC is the International Petroleum Company, which...

CUTTER: The military was going to nationalize. That was part of the problem, but a major part of the problem was that there were people in Congress who felt that you shouldn't be selling sophisticated aircraft to these poor countries. If they had limited budgets, those budgets were better dedicated to economic, education, and health things than spending on sophisticated airplanes. But what they weren't willing to understand was that the military had the power to determine what percentage of the budget they were going to get. They were going to buy aircraft whether we wanted them to do so or not. In many respects it was far better for them to buy the F-5, which was a relatively inexpensive aircraft, and very inexpensive to maintain, than to buy an aircraft like the Mirage, which was a very complicated airplane, a very sophisticated airplane, and much more expensive. When we refused to sell them the F-5, under pressure from Congress, it became politically unfeasible for the Administration to fight it. They immediately turned to the French, bought the Mirage, and that began a division, a split, that became ever wider between the U. S. and Peru. They began to turn more and more to the Soviets, not just the French, but the Soviets, for military equipment and advice. As we began to enact certain other measures to punish them for their actions on the IPC case, to slow down our military aid program, and to do a number of other things, the Peruvians just became more and more convinced that we were not a long term partner. They got more and more comfortable in dealing with the Soviets and dealing with the French and accepting aid from wherever it would come from. I think this began a period of slide in U. S. relations with Peru which probably had very negative effects in the long run, mainly in Peru, of course, but also in our interests in Latin America.

Q: Well, was the Alliance for Progress doing much while you were there in Peru?

CUTTER: Yes, they were doing a lot, and we had the Peace Corps there. It was a time when, certainly from 1962 on, when Belaunde (Fernando Belaunde Terry) was in power. His programs were tailor made for the Alliance for Progress. It was a kind of movement where he wanted to get out to the grass roots. He had a program of "picos y palos para la revolucion sin balas," picks and shovels for the revolution without bullets. That fit right in with the Alliance concept that you had to get out there and start building infrastructure. You had Peace Corps people all over Peru, you had a lot of programs which were designed to dovetail with the Alliance for Progress. Then, of course, Belaunde had his great dream of the Marginal Highway of the Andes, whereby he was going to build this super highway from the South of Peru to the North east of the Andes and open up all of that area, which was basically virgin country, for population settlement. People could move there and homestead, and this would stop the campesinos from moving to Lima and concentrating in the shanty towns there.

The trouble was that in many ways it became an obsession for him to get this road finished. More and more of the resources available for Peruvian development were concentrated on building the highway. More and more political problems began to grow up around his focus on this one project. That, plus the corruption which seeped into the government--not at the presidential level, but at the cabinet level. You know, they have a two-tier system. The president does have the power to rule and reign, but he has a prime minister under the Peruvian Constitution. The prime minister, Manuel Ulloa, unfortunately, was a corrupt individual, who brought in a number of people who were not as interested in social change, social reform, as the president was. The military, after a while, became very frustrated with the speed of development, the speed of social change and eventually this, along with the confrontation with the US over the IPC case, eventually led to a military takeover.

Q: The military takeover occurred when?

CUTTER: As I recall, it was October of 1968.

Q: Well, the new administration in Peru had come in when you were in Lima. Is that right?

CUTTER: Right.

Q: Because of these contacts, how did that work?

CUTTER: It went rather smoothly. I think that we had ameliorated the feeling that the U. S. was antagonistic toward them to a great extent by the time Belaunde took office. Of course, Belaunde himself was very pro- American. He was educated here in the U. S., was completely bilingual in English. He graduated as an architect from the University of Texas and taught at the University of Miami. He had long and close ties with the U. S., so, although he was definitely a reformer and saw that some of our actions in Peru had not been in favor of that, he was prepared to work with Kennedy, very definitely, and with Johnson. I think that working relationships, almost from the beginning, were good. The IPC case, however, always hung over U. S.-Peruvian relations as a problem that had to be solved. Pressures to nationalize the major petroleum producer in the country had always been strong and there had always been a commitment on the part of Belaunde's party to nationalize it. This was a problem which was under constant negotiation during that time period.

Q: Did you get any feel from the IPC people as to how they were treating this? Were they understanding of this?

CUTTER: This was a subsidiary of EXXON. EXXON took very much of a big picture view of this. This was a very small operation for them. It was a profitable one and, in many respects, a very useful one for Peru. I think that they were willing to negotiate out a solution, but they wanted compensation, and adequate compensation. That was the sticking point. The Peruvians felt that the IPC had long since amortized their investment there, that compensation should be very minimal. IPC felt that this was a very valuable resource and

could see this case being used as a precedent in other countries. Exxon wasn't prepared to write the IPC off without giving it a good, college try. Of course, we had the Hickenlooper Amendment on the books.

Q: Could you explain, for the record, what the Hickenlooper Amendment was?

CUTTER: It was an amendment which said in rough terms that there could not be any expropriation without just compensation. If there was, in fact, expropriation without compensation, the U. S. would have to take this into consideration in any of its programs in the different countries and would have to cut back on its assistance.

Q: Well, when did the expropriation of the IPC occur? Did it happen when you were...

CUTTER: No. It occurred when I was on the desk in Washington. We did, in effect, freeze all of our programs in Peru. We never publicly acknowledged that. We told the Peruvians, in fact, that as long as they were dragging their feet on the question of compensation, it was going to be difficult for us to resolve some of these other issues.

Q: Well, coming back to the time--you were on the desk from 1965 to 1967.

CUTTER: Right.

Q: You had the F-5 issue and the IPC issue here with a reformist government that you didn't want to drive down. How did this play out in ARA, the Bureau of Latin American Affairs, with you as a desk officer, and with the higher echelons within the State Dept and the government?

CUTTER: Well, the problems we had were not departmental problems. I think that everybody in the Department would have been willing to work through to some kind of an accommodation with the Peruvians, as far as the IPC and the F5 were concerned. Congress was the problem. Congress was playing a very active role in trying to micro-manage foreign policy at this particular time. On the F-5 issue we eventually had to bow down to Congressional mandates and not sell them, or there would have been consequences for other programs. The IPC issue, as we discussed, was dictated by legislation which was the Hickenlooper Amendment. So the area for us to maneuver in was restricted by Congressional limitations. I think that the Department would have been able to have come to some solution of the IPC problem--and the F-5 problem, for that matter--which would have made a lot of difference in long term relations with Peru. Given the political dynamics in Washington, we weren't able to do that.

Q: Well, were there any particular players in Congress who were stronger than anyone that you can think of?

CUTTER: Obviously, Hickenlooper himself, although I'm not sure that he was still in the Senate, at that point. The House was very active, and I'd really have to refresh my memory...

Q: I was just wondering whether...Sometimes you have these issues which really are the result of one or two people deciding that this is what they want to do.

CUTTER: There were definitely a couple of key players. I can't recall what their names were.

Q: When you left the desk in 1967, did you have a feeling that things were really going downhill?

CUTTER: I definitely had the feeling that relationships with Peru were getting increasingly difficult and that the situation there was not improving at all, both internationally and domestically. Long term prospects were not any brighter than they had been than when I had first come into Peruvian affairs in 1962.

Q: In a practical sense what were the consequences of having poor relations? I mean, Peru is a long way away, and there are other countries and all that. I'm trying to go back to the time. What was the concern?

CUTTER: History is a stream, and it's hard to tell what would happen if the stream had been diverted in one direction or another direction. But it's clear, I think, that had we had better relationships with the Peruvian military and had the Belaunde administration not allowed these kinds of issues like the F-5 and the IPC thing really to inhibit our cooperative relationship with Peru, we might have had greater success as a partnership in attacking some of the domestic problems that are really at the root of Peru's present day problems.

Q: We have this major insurgency going on, called the "Shining Path," I think...

CUTTER: Sendero Luminoso.

Q: ...which is affecting everything in Peru.

CUTTER: It's affecting everything. It's far more radical than anything that was happening in Peru in the '60s. There were a couple of guerrilla movements in those days, but they were mild, agrarian reformers, compared to the bunch that's in there now. This is a Maoist, Khmer Rouge kind of xenophobic movement. But that's all another subject.

Q: You left Peruvian affairs in 1967 and you were back on the international side. You went to the OAS [Organization of American States] for, what, about two years?

CUTTER: Well, it was basically a year.

Q: This is 1967 to 1968. What were you doing?

CUTTER: Well, it was kind of interesting. Bob Sayre was then Deputy Assistant Secretary for ARA. Linc Gordon was the Assistant Secretary, and they had appointed Sol Linowitz as the Ambassador to the OAS. The Bureau, I think, knew nothing about Sol Linowitz. They wanted to have somebody whom they had some confidence in, I guess, to work with him in that office. So I was made his Special Assistant. And a delightful assignment it was.

Q: Sol Linowitz kept being brought in for various, major assignments. What was his style, as you saw it, during this period of operations?

CUTTER: He'd come, of course, from the private sector and had been the chairman of the board of one of the most successful corporations in the country.

Q: That was Xerox.

CUTTER: Yes, Xerox. He'd left Xerox as an extremely wealthy man, all on the basis of his holdings in Xerox. So he came to government as a man with unbelievable mobility, independence. One of the most brilliant men that I've ever had any contact with. He was one of the fastest studies. He could literally speed read a stack of cables two inches thick in 20 minutes and remember, two months later, what he read there. He just has an incredible mind. An extremely impatient man, not a man who's comfortable with bureaucratic procedures. A lot of my job was to try and keep peace between his demands and the bureaucracy's way of operating.

Linowitz came on board feeling that what he had to do was to bring the OAS back to life. The way to do that, in his view, was to get a secretary general who would be a man of action, somebody who would take this rather sleepy organization, a kind of backwater in many ways--it had been for many years just a tool of U. S. policy--and try to make it something real, something that had goals of its own, had some spirit and spunk. And it might even stand up to the U. S. if the U. S., in fact, was wrong about some issue. So his major goal during the year I worked with him was to get Galo Plaza elected secretary general of the OAS. Galo Plaza was an Ecuadorian, had been a football player here in the United States, gone back and after a career in business had been elected president of Ecuador. He was a man of considerable presence and standing in his own right and had a rather independent turn of mind. A man who interfaced very well, I think, with the Kennedy approach. He saw the Alliance for Progress as a very useful operation, but he wasn't going to be pushed around by anybody, not by the U. S. or by anybody else.

We spent, I guess, a major part of that year getting Galo Plaza positioned. He was our candidate. There's no question about it. There were some other, second rate candidates being pushed very strongly by Latin Americans. They didn't particularly want this to become an active and aggressive organization, even though I think that it was in their long term interest to be such. We spent a good deal of our political capital that year, getting Galo

Plaza elected and were successful. I think that he turned out to be a reasonably good secretary general.

Q: Did you find Linowitz a quick study in all...How did he relate to the Latin Americans? I would have...

CUTTER: Very well. Unfortunately, he didn't speak Spanish and still doesn't, although he's spent a lot of time working with Latinos and is the head, as you know, of the Inter-American Dialogue today. He has a personality which is very simpatico for Latins. He is the kind of person who likes to stand nose to nose with you and convince you. And he likes to talk about ideas. He is a very spontaneous person--all those things, I think, endeared him to the Latins. He was a very quick study. He very quickly understood what the basic problems underlying Latin American affairs were. And I think that the Latinos were very pleased with that. In negotiating situations he's a master. He's a lawyer by training. He's a person who gets a quick fix on what the essential elements in any negotiation are. He was willing to understand what the other guy's point of view was, as long as it didn't detract from our own position, and to try and work around that and try to get a meeting of the minds on that issue. He put in a sterling performance on the Panama Canal negotiations, but that came later on, down the road.

Q: How well did he integrate with the Johnson Administration?

CUTTER: Well, I can tell you one anecdote that probably illustrates that as well as anything can. One day I was in his office, and a call came from the White House. The President wanted to see him. No agenda was specified. He turned to me and Ambler Moss, who was my assistant at that time and later was our Ambassador in Panama, and said, "What do you suppose the President wants to talk about?" Well, we came up with all kinds of things related to Latin America that we thought he might want to talk about. The Ambassador [Linowitz] took off for the White House.

He came back about an hour and a half later, ashen. I'd never seen a man who was so shaken and so changed in the hour or an hour and a half he'd spent over in the White House. He sort of sat behind his desk. I'd never seen this very ebullient man so down. He said, "I want to tell you that I've been through one of the most amazing experiences of my life." He said, "I walked into the Oval Office, and the President welcomed me warmly and sat me down in front of the fireplace, sat down across--just the two of us--and said: 'Sol, you're doing a fine job on Latin America. I want you to know that, want you to know that I'm pleased with what you're doing. But you know, you're out there a lot on the university campuses, speaking, and you're doing a wonderful job. But you never talk about Vietnam. I want you to know that I know about that, and we need all the help we can get at this point. I wish you would be a little more supportive of our position out there. I want you to go out there and talk about Vietnam, about what I'm trying to accomplish, and I hope you'll be able to do that for me.'" And Linowitz said: "Mr. President, I came on board, not because I approved of your Vietnam policy, but because I thought you had a very good fix on Latin America and that I could be of great help to you in that area. I'm doing my best. I'm doing what I can, and I'm

doing something that I believe in. And that's the reason I'm so effective on university campuses. Because when I go out there, I'm talking about something I really feel inside of me. It's something that I feel very comfortable with. But I don't feel very comfortable with what's going on with your Vietnam policy, and I could not be a very convincing spokesman for that." I'm paraphrasing, of course. He said: "I don't think that I'd be able to do that."

Well, he said, at this point the President went ballistic. He roared around the office, shouted, used the worst kind of Texas country language, and hill country language and barely let Linowitz get a word in edgewise. Finally, when this tirade stopped, he turned to Linowitz and said: "What are you going to do about it?" Linowitz said: "Well, sir, you'll have my resignation on your desk in the morning, if that's the way you feel about it." The President stopped, looked at him, and said: "Resignation? You're doing a fine job on Latin America. Now, if you can't do this favor for me, just get back there and do the best job you can."

Linowitz left the Oval Office and came back and said to us: "I've never been spoken to that way in my entire, adult life. What should I do about it?" We talked about it and said: "Well, you've still got a mandate. If you want to continue doing it, we think you should." That is, in fact, what happened. He continued working to the best of his ability, and the President never bothered him again about Vietnam.

Q: Well, you move from this obviously rather heady atmosphere, once again, to a quieter place which didn't turn out to be so quiet. You were off to Brazil.

CUTTER: Actually, I went to Stanford for a year, in the master's program in Latin American affairs.

Q: And then you went to Porto Alegre in Brazil.

CUTTER: Well, I'd asked for that. Actually, when they came to me on the Peruvian desk, I'd pretty much lined up my life, I thought. The people in Personnel were very cooperative. I was doing a good job in the Department, I guess. They wanted to keep me happy, and they had agreed on a year's study at Stanford and then to move on to be a Principal Officer in Porto Alegre, Brazil. My principal interest at Stanford was Brazilian economic history. So I really spent a year preparing myself for this post. Rio Grande do Sul is called the cradle of presidents. It's like Virginia is for the United States. It's produced more presidents than any other part of Brazil. So, although it is little known here, it's a city of three or four million people, a dynamic, industrial city. It's always had a very explosive political situation. A lot of political movements have started in Porto Alegre. If you couldn't be principal officer, which I couldn't be at that stage of my career, in Rio, Porto Alegre was certainly the place to be in Brazil.

I'd told Linowitz, when I went to work for him, that I'd only be there for a year. At the end of that year, once again I had this problem of breaking away. He didn't think I should do anything so mundane as going back to school, that I could accomplish much more in

Washington doing what I was doing. I said, no, this was something that I really wanted to do in terms of my long term development. I left, and I still think it was a great choice. First of all, I had a wonderful year at Stanford. It was very stimulating to be back in an academic environment where you could sort of kick ideas around and not worry about the political downside of them. I think it's very important in an officer's career to have that opportunity to get away. You probably did that with the Senior Seminar. It was a crucial time for me in my personal life, sort of to take a step back and look at what I was doing. So I think that that university year was extremely valuable, and I recommend it for anybody that really wants to think seriously about foreign affairs and what they're doing. So, from there I went directly to Porto Alegre. I spent a full year at Stanford, including a summer of intensive Portuguese. Instead of coming back to the FSI [Foreign Service Institute], they let me take it at Stanford.

So I arrived in Porto Alegre during a period when, as you know, there was a military junta in power in Brazil. The U. S. was seen in intellectual and "left" circles as the author of that coup, which I think is totally unwarranted. Nevertheless, we're given credit for a lot of things that we shouldn't be given credit for. So the role I saw for myself in Porto Alegre, in addition to the normal, consular functions, was to try and build some kind of an outreach to the intellectual and journalistic community there, and try and rebuild some ties between the Consulate and that group. I arrived there in November [1969] and had made progress by the time March rolled around in developing some pretty good contacts.

Q: This was in November of 1969?

CUTTER: Yes, 1969, and now we're talking about March, 1970. I was having a great time, to be quite honest. The whole south of Brazil was part of my consular district. By then I had visited all of the capitals in that area and gotten to know people pretty well. My wife Christiane was happy. She was born in Germany and grew up there. (She is American now.) Rio Grande do Sul is a very strongly German area, so she was very valuable in getting to know people who were movers and shakers in that area. We were also getting to know the literary community, the artistic community, and lots of people who would give you access to what was sort of the "out of power" element. And at the same time I was developing very good relationships with the governor and the military.

It all came to a halt in early April [1970]. We were coming home from a dinner party. Christiane was sitting in the front seat. I was driving and we had a banker friend from San Francisco, Hovey Clark, in the back seat. We were driving through a rather obscure area in Porto Alegre, when all of a sudden a car cut us off, bumped my front fender. I had an American station wagon at that time, a big Plymouth Fury. This was a smaller, European car, a Brazilian built car. I thought, "Oh, heck, now we will have a discussion over who is to blame." I was just about to get out of the car when these men started jumping out of the other car. They had stockings pulled over their faces and were carrying machine guns. So, given some of the things that had happened in Brazil up to that point, I knew what was up. Our ambassador had been kidnapped...

Q: Burke Elbrick.

CUTTER: Yes. The Japanese Consul General in Sao Paulo had been kidnapped. You just had the German ambassador in Guatemala assassinated. So I was pretty much aware of what was happening. To digress for a minute, I had a driver who was an ex Brazilian paratrooper. We had discussed what we would do in a situation like this, had it occurred. We were both in agreement that we didn't want to be, just rolled over on our backs. If it looked like it was possible to get away, we were definitely going to make a move in that direction. There had been too much of people just throwing up their hands and saying, "Here I am. Take me." I guess there was some of that mental preparation going on there.

The minute I saw those guys jumping out with their weapons, I just put my foot on the throttle. My wife says that I just said: "Here we go." And both she and Hovey Clark very wisely threw themselves on the floor of the car. They had seen what was happening and threw themselves on the floor. I managed to hit the last one getting out of the car, knock him up onto the hood. He was lying there, with his machine gun for a couple of seconds and then I hit the front of their car, knocking it out of the way, and took off. The leader of this group--he was the only one carrying a pistol--stopped another terrorist from machine gunning the car. He took careful aim at the back of the car and fired. One of the shots hit me in the shoulder and knocked me against the steering wheel. My wife asked me what was wrong when she saw me go forward like that. She says that all I said was "Damn it, I've been shot."

Clark in the back seat, who was a former Foreign Service Officer, by the way, said, "Curt, if you can keep going, don't stop! They're right behind us!" So I put my foot on the throttle and made some of the hairiest crossings of major intersections that you've ever seen. And eventually, they stopped their small car and went back to see what had happened to their associates. We continued on to our house, the official residence, where there were always a couple of guards on duty. Of course, as we pulled up, tooting the horn, there was no guard in sight. My wife got out, ran into the house, to try and see what was happening. Hovey Clark stayed with me and tried to help me out of the car. About the time we reached the stairs that went into the house, the guards did appear. They were asleep in the back yard. Fortunately, the terrorists hadn't continued to follow me. If they had, we'd have been in deep trouble. We called for an ambulance. None came. Eventually, the neighbors drove me to a hospital. It was kind of funny. We went first to a neighborhood hospital, which was a really more of a clinic. Nuns came to the door and said: "No, no, we don't take those kinds of cases! You'd better go to the Municipal Hospital." And it's true, if you're ever shot, don't go to a small hospital. Go to the hospital in the area where they're used to handling gunshot wounds. In Washington [DC] that happens to be G. W. [George Washington Hospital], or DC General. Don't go to Sibley [Hospital] or don't go to someplace else if you're ever shot, because they have no experience in handling those kinds of cases. So they took me in, and the young surgeon on duty had handled countless gunshot wounds, I guess. He put me in intensive care and took care of the problem in a very professional way.

That started a very interesting period. I, of course, had just spent a year at Stanford, doing a Masters program on the economic history of Brazil. I wasn't prepared, just because of this incident, to leave. My attitude was, I wanted to stay. There was no question in my mind that I could stay on in Porto Alegre. I didn't think that this was a reason to leave. After the fact, of course, the Brazilians assigned a veritable platoon of guards to be with us at all times. We had six children living with us at that time in Porto Alegre, some of whom were going to local schools. That meant that they were now accompanied by an armed guard at all times as was my wife. We were getting, after the incident, constant threats from radical groups, because they weren't very happy with our escape which resulted in the eventual capture of the three terrorists who were involved in my kidnapping. So there were bomb threats and all kinds of threats against me and my family. However, eventually, I wanted to go back to the States and have somebody take a look at my wound and then go right back to Brazil. So the Department brought us out. Brought out the whole family for medical consultation, and we were supposed to go back. But while we were in the States, the Department decided that my family could not go back. I could go back, I could stay as long as I wanted, but my family was not going to be allowed to go back. There was no way they could assure adequate protection for a wife and six children. So we dispersed the family, and my wife went to Europe to stay with her family. I went back to Porto Alegre. It was obvious that I could only stay a limited period of time. So I began an orderly process of disengagement, visiting the authorities, saying my good-bye's, and preparing to leave.

And then the frustration began. It started, actually, while my wife was still there. One of the big problems that was facing U. S. and Brazilian policy at this time was the whole question of human rights violations by the junta. There was a big debate about whether or not these human rights violations were real, or whether they weren't real. Whether these were just leftist allegations. Or whether they were, in fact, true human rights violations. Of course, this was a very muted kind of thing. A lot of our programs in Brazil depended on our not finding them in violation of human rights provisions. So the Embassy was very careful about what they would report to Washington about human rights violations. Even after the Elbrick affair and even after my affair. There was very little hard evidence, except for hearsay evidence, about what was being done by the military to repress the Left.

One of the things that grew out of this experience was that the military and the police in Porto Alegre began to see me as somebody they could talk to very frankly and to see my family in the same light. One of the first episodes that occurred was that the lieutenant in charge of our security bragged at considerable length about the measures they were going to take to solve this case to my wife. And he described in some detail the kinds of methods they were going to use if they ever caught these people, to see to it that they got them all. He was very graphic in his description of some of the things he could do, including a fellow that they called "The Mad Dentist," who was a guy who flunked out of dental school, whom they hired. They would put people in...strap them into a dental chair, and this guy would go ahead and perform dental care on them with drills and what have you, whether they needed the dental care or not. My understanding is that this is pretty excruciating. Then they described "The Tank," into which they could dip people, upside down, hold them in there

until they were nearly drowned. Well, they went on at some length with pretty graphic descriptions of what they could do.

It seemed to me, regardless of what my personal situation was, that this was very germane to U. S. policy and that this couldn't be ignored. We did some fairly substantial reports from Porto Alegre. The reporting chain was from Porto Alegre to the Embassy and from the Embassy on to Washington. After I went back [to Porto Alegre], actually, I was even given a tour of police headquarters and shown the torture facilities. So there wasn't too much doubt that human rights violations were taking place and of a fairly serious nature. Now, of course, you enter the whole domain of the argument of whether these kinds of things are necessary. They argued that they were. Otherwise, you'd have further kinds of incidents like mine. But the facts were plain. They were doing horrible things. And they were doing them in a fairly organized and systematic way. This was something that we put on the record, very plainly, to the Embassy. I must say, today, that I'm not sure whatever happened to our reports which we sent to the Embassy, because later, when I was back in Washington, I looked in vain for some sign that these reports were in fact part of the record. They may very well be although I couldn't find them. All I can say is that, on the human rights issue, the facts were plain.

Q: Well then, you made your calls and then the Department...You decided that this wasn't going to work, with your family...

CUTTER: Well, I made my farewell calls. The Department...we sort of agreed that I would phase out over a period of months, because I wasn't going to stay there without my family. It was obvious that if they wouldn't let my wife go back, I had to leave. But, I wanted to do it in an orderly fashion. So I went back [to Porto Alegre] in mid-April [1970] and stayed till mid-June. During that period I made my farewell calls. I very strongly recommended that my vice consul who was black, Bob Lane, be put in charge. Bob was one of the finest officers in the service. He was a fairly junior officer, but I thought that he was quite ready for those responsibilities. Furthermore, he'd gone all through this period. He understood it very well, and I thought that it would be good for a lot of other reasons. He'd bumped into a lot of prejudice, in Porto Alegre and I thought it was good for us, as a country, to show that we were not going to knuckle under to the kinds of pressures that were put on us to do something about putting a black officer there. The Department went along with my recommendation, finally. It was the beginning of a brilliant career for Bob. You probably knew him along the line.

Q: I've run across his name. I can't...

CUTTER: He ended up deputy assistant secretary in consular affairs.

Then began one of the few times that I was down on the service, because, although they had made it pretty plain that I should leave eventually, the assignment process didn't come up with anything for me. Frankly, the Department behaved very badly during this whole episode. I'll be blunt about that and put it on the record.

Q: Wasn't this a period when the Department didn't know how to deal with these things.

CUTTER: I guess that they didn't know how to deal with them, but they didn't even know how to deal with the human problems that were involved. [Ambassador] Burke Elbrick was great. He jumped in his plane, flew down, right after this happened. He brought his personal physician from the Embassy to take a look at me and made sure that I was getting good medical care. He was in constant communication. I never heard word one from the Department of State. Not one communication did I receive from the Department of State. None. Zero. During this entire period. It's sort of mind boggling. I almost felt that what I'd done was wrong, that what I should have done was turn myself over and made an effort not to embarrass the Department by being taken hostage. Actually, there were some officers later who said to me that I'd done the wrong thing by escaping from this situation and that I'd imperiled lives. So there were two schools of thought. When it came time to reassign me, I had become, not as I was to some people, I guess, a sort of hero, but a problem. Now they had to find an assignment for someone they thought they had taken care of for three years. And now I was back in the system again and needed to be reassigned. Obviously, they had to find something reasonably good for me. So we went through an off and on period, and finally, it became embarrassing. The Consular Corps had given me a farewell, the governors had given dinners in my honor, and I was the lamest of lame ducks. So I just sent a message to the Department, saying that I was going on annual leave. I could be found in Rome, where my wife had moved the family into a small pension. If they wanted to get in touch with me, I'd be there and would check in with the Embassy on a regular basis. When they had an assignment, let me know. At this point I had really reached the end. So I did that. I flew to Rome, at my own expense, and just waited there for, what, six weeks--no, four weeks. I spent four very delightful weeks in which I'd check in every morning at the Embassy to see if there was news of an assignment. A series of things went on, and I finally ended up in the Political Section in Madrid. Ambassador Robert C. Hill, had heard about my availability and said, "I don't care what happens. I want this man here in Madrid. I'll make room for him at the Embassy here some place, somehow." So I was assigned to the Political Section in Madrid and the system had nothing to do with it. The system did not come up with an assignment for me.

Q: It's incredible.

CUTTER: I'll tell you, it took me a long time to feel comfortable as a Foreign Service Officer again after that.

Q: Well, I think there was this time...I know when Burke Elbrick, when he came out of having been captured. He had been my ambassador in Yugoslavia. I've always held him as the top of the professional staff. He was treated very badly, too. It was embarrassing. For a period...I think later, particularly after Diego Asencio was kidnapped, all of a sudden they decided, "We're not going to do this any more. We're going to treat these people as special cases to do something for, rather than to try to forget about." This was...It was a very peculiar period.

CUTTER: Well, the Department, I will say, gave me the award for heroism, which was a nice thing to do. But I also understand that it took some strong lobbying by people in the Department to get it done.

Q: I'm sure it did.

CUTTER: I didn't know anything about it, but people later told me that there were forces in the Department who were opposed even to recognizing...

Q: Well, it was a very peculiar period. Going back to the psychology of it, and you were a psychology major, if something happened to you, it was somehow your fault, which is, of course, a horrible thing. Because, 1) it isn't your fault; 2) it already reinforces this feeling that anybody has who gets caught in one of these things, "Gosh, if I'd only taken a left instead of a right turn, or something..."

CUTTER: I wouldn't be here. Well, that's patently absurd because those men, for example, who tried this thing on me, had been following me for weeks. I mean, it was just a question of time.

Q: I think it's important to talk about this here, for somebody who looks at our history of how we dealt with things, to realize the psychology that was going on. Very, very odd.

CUTTER: Well, I've never figured out the psychology, I haven't figured it out. I think there is, at the basis of it, a slight guilt, that it's something that the Department itself, as an institution, can't do anything about. I mean, these things will happen. If you put people in a situation which has inherent dangers there is some chance that something like this will happen. You can see it now in the security precautions we're taking all over the world, there is this idea that if you just take enough precautions, you can, somehow, avoid this kind of thing happening. If something like this happens, maybe you haven't taken enough precautions. If it happens to one of your outriders, in Porto Alegre or some place, gee, are we to blame? Did we put these people at risk in a situation and maybe we could have done something, or they could have done something, somehow, to control the situation better. So there may be a little guilt. And then, how do you deal with that? How do you look me in the eye afterwards, after this has happened? How do you reconcile your feeling of guilt that maybe you let them down, in a face to face encounter with them?

Q: Well, there's also just the plain bureaucratic one of--you're just a problem, rather than saying, " Gee, there's a problem. Let's do something about it."

CUTTER: Or, here's somebody, you know, who has just, perhaps, done something right. Maybe you ought to reward them in some way for what they've done. Believe me, I think that right on that day, in my career, a career that had been going steadily straight up, my career plateaued for a certain amount of time, as a direct result of that incident...

Q: Bureaucratically, it's horrifying to think of how that happens. But from what I observe in how the system works and these interviews, you pick this up.

CUTTER: I think, up until then, I had been among the first people promoted in my class each promotion. I seemed to be on a fast track in some ways, but then I did hit a plateau. I was then almost five years in grade. Nothing really changed. I think I had sterling efficiency reports from Madrid. Certainly, the inspectors, when they came through Sevilla, when I was consul general there, said it was the best managed post they had inspected in the Foreign Service, which may or may not be true, but it certainly was an accolade that indicated that I was doing something right. There was definitely a hiatus in my career, and I attribute it entirely to this disruption in Porto Alegre.

Q: Damnedest thing. Curt, I wonder if we could cut it off here and do this another time.

CUTTER: Happy to. There is enough blame to go around in a situation like this because, when I first arrived in Porto Alegre, there were two security people from the police, trying to follow me around. The first few times, actually, that I went out with this escort, the first occasion I remember, my wife and I went to an opening of an art gallery in the center of the city, which we'd been invited to. When we came out of the place, we couldn't find our escorts anywhere. We spent a half hour, going in and out of bars, up and down the street, looking for those two stalwarts. During that time we were much more exposed than at any other time. We finally found them, dragged them out. We just found that there was such lackadaisical security.

Then a fellow came down from the Embassy, an Agency man who was supposed to be following terrorism in that country. One of the key questions I asked him was: "What do you think that the status of this kind of activity is here in Porto Alegre," he said, "Aw, you're lucky. You're in the one part of the country in which there is no chance that this will happen. They've really got this thing buttoned down, down here, and I don't see that there's any possibility of this kind of an occurrence." You know, that's my expert, from my government, telling me this. The governor then asked me, "Do you really feel it's necessary for this security detail?" With that background, I said, "Well, you do whatever you want. It doesn't seem to me that I... Sometimes they don't seem to be around when I need them." So they pulled the security detail off. This was in the first month or 60 days that we were there. So, you can probably hindsight this and say, if I'd kept those guys along, maybe this wouldn't have happened, or maybe it would have, who knows?

The Ambassador did travel with a security detail, and it happened to him anyway. Those two guards assigned to me, I'll tell you, wouldn't have been of much help in that situation. But you always have that little doubt in the back of your mind.

My view on this had been conditioned, to some extent, by the Russian attaché in Argentina who had put up a fight. He was a gun toter, if you remember, and he had put up a fight and gotten away. To me, it seemed that all the Westerners rolled over on their backs, and the Russians had some courage. They stood up to these guys, so I guess this influenced my

attitude, which was, "I'm not going to be...If I have a chance, I'm not going to be one of these guys who just rolls over, in a situation like this."

Q: Well, you've got to make instantaneous decisions.

CUTTER: And if you've already predisposed yourself to taking a certain kind of action, then you're able to take that kind of action faster.

Q: In retrospect, you did the right thing. I mean, this is a personal point of view. Well, then, we'll pick up about Madrid at our next get together.

CUTTER: All right.

Continuation of interview: March 3, 1992

Q: Curt, we were talking, we had just sent you off to Madrid. You had sort of been in this limbo before because of the State Department. I'm referring to it as a "institution" which really didn't want to deal with you on your potential kidnapping situation. You mentioned that the ambassador in Madrid said, "Okay, come on over." He was a non career ambassador, Robert C. Hill. How come he picked you up to come there? What motivated him and what was he like?

CUTTER: Well, Robert C. Hill was actually a very interesting person. He had held a number of ambassadorial posts, always in Republican administrations. When the Republicans were out of power, he was always one who spent a lot of time working for the party. So that he was usually rewarded when the party came back into power. He was very conservative but he had a certain admiration for people who would take direct action. I think he saw what I had done in Brazil as something that he could identify with. He was a former football player and really believed in getting out there and being aggressive about things. He was not very sympathetic about the Department's wishy washy attitude about getting me reassigned. I think he just felt, "Hey, here's a guy I'd just like to have on my staff. He's the kind of person I think I could identify with." I think he probably thought I had a more conservative outlook than I did.

I will say for him that one of the most interesting parts of my service in Madrid was actually watching him evolve. During the year and a half I was there he went from being unalterably opposed to having any contact with the emerging opposition in Spain to a much more open attitude. Several of us in the Embassy finally brought him around to the point of view that these are people that are going to have to be dealt with and that it was important for the U. S. ambassador to hear their point of view. We began to organize little groups here and there, where he would drop in and sit down and listen and have an exchange with the left about what was concerning them and what was actually going on behind the scenes in Spanish politics. He didn't want to do it openly. That might have looked as if he was challenging Franco and the administration. But he was quite willing to do it quietly. As a result of these encounters and, as a result of his growing disenchantment with the Nixon

White House by the way, he was quite willing to listen and, I think, changed his positions on a number of issues fairly substantially before he finally left Spain.

Q: Well, why would he be disenchanted with the Nixon White House? This is very early Nixon. We're talking about 1969-70. Nixon just came into office in..

CUTTER: No, actually we're talking about 1970, 1971, and 1972.

Q: Oh.

CUTTER: He had actually spent a lot of time, working closely with Nixon when Nixon was not in office. During the years when Goldwater ran for the Presidency...Nixon, to get himself back in the good graces of the party, went out and campaigned very rigorously for Goldwater around the country. Hill was his aide de camp. Went around with him, sort of ran the headquarters while Nixon was out on the stump every day, was there waiting for him when he came in in the evenings. This process, this close association with Nixon was a very disagreeable experience for Hill, I think. Hill was a man who came from a rather patrician background in New England. To watch Nixon operate who he really felt was basically a vulgarian in many ways was a shocker for him. He always told the anecdote that one of his main jobs was always to have a drink and a dirty story ready for Nixon when he came back from a day's campaigning. And the dirtier the story, the more scabrous the story, the better Nixon liked it. He'd just sort of sit down and lap it up. After a little while this grew very thin for Hill. He had to find a new, dirty story every day and tell it to Nixon. And furthermore, he wasn't a person who liked that sort of thing. He just found the man personally somewhat repugnant.

Then he began to hear rumors through his friends in the White House, people like Finch and Rumsfeld who eventually left the White House who were also not comfortable with what was happening in the Nixon White House, with Haldeman and Ehrlichman. They paid a visit to Spain. I was their control officer, but they spent a lot of time with the Ambassador and a number of us and were planning to leave government because they were not happy with what was going on in the White House. The enemies list, and all of this kind of thing that they mentioned specifically. As a result, Hill was moving away from the administration--quietly, but making very disparaging remarks in private about what was going on in Washington. Well, that basically sums it up, I think.

Q: Well, you as a political officer...

CUTTER: Right.

Q: What was the political situation? Let's sort of break this into two parts. There is Seville, but we're talking about Madrid. You were in Madrid from when to when?

CUTTER: I was there from August, 1970, until January, 1972.

Q: What was the political situation like, from our eyes?

CUTTER: Well, it was the waning years of the Franco administration, when you had what they called the "Opus Government."

Q: You mean "Opus Dei?"

CUTTER: That's right. Several of the ministers, including both the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Planning and Economy, Lopez Bravo and Lopez Portillo, were members of the "Opus Dei." One was actually a celibate member. Lopez Portillo was a lay person but he was actually living in an Opus home, a residence.

Q: You might explain what Opus Dei was.

CUTTER: Opus Dei is a religious movement started in Spain, which is fairly conservative in its outlook. It believes in education and training and hard work as the ways to get ahead in life. It is very conservative in its religious doctrine. It was responsible for building, perhaps, the best private university in Spain, a university which is very much focused on business-oriented kinds of training in Pamplona. It sponsors schools all over the country and has expanded into an international movement now. Opus is very active in Latin America and has had some influence in the rest of Europe. It tends to draw on people who are very concerned about the directions that society is taking and want to take some action to improve society, but improve it in a conservative direction. So it gets very dedicated followers, usually fairly comfortable, in many cases wealthy followers. But its people who do have a conscience, a conscience of a particular kind, but they do have a conscience.

Q: Well, how was this manifesting itself in the Spanish context?

CUTTER: Well, what it brought to power then in the so-called "Opus cabinet" were technocrats, people who believed that Spain could be modernized through a series of planning moves. In other words you would, by organizing economic development in a certain way, bring about conservative economic change, but with a philosophy that "rising tides lift all boats." The way they attacked it was, as they called it, "mortgaging the coast." They opened up the coastal areas of Spain to rapid development, usually by foreign investors, focusing on the tourist trade. And they used the foreign exchange that was being earned by the coastal development to invest in infrastructure development in the interior of Spain that foreigners were less interested in, building new roads, investing in plant, building infrastructure in towns and villages, so that foreign investors would come in. Of course, in Franco Spain there was a tremendous amount of state-owned industry. Monies were pumped into that to modernize them and to move the economy along. What you had was a very dynamic government under an aging dictator. Actually, the average age of the cabinet under Franco during his last years was the lowest in Europe--about 42 years of age, as I remember. You had very young, very dynamic people in office--dynamic, in a conservative sense. They weren't people who were greatly concerned...Well, that's not, that

wouldn't be accurate. They had a social conscience, but their view was that if the top prospered...It was very much like the Reagan approach to economics in this country.

Q: Called "trickle down."

CUTTER: Right, "trickle down" economics. If you could get the industrial and entrepreneurial sectors of Spain moving and going and get investment at that level, eventually it would lift everybody.

Q: Well, of course, there too, unlike the United States, things had really stagnated for a long period of time.

CUTTER: They had stagnated. Yes, of course they had stagnated during the war period. And in the post-war period Spain was isolated by actions of the allied powers. So it was very difficult for it to develop then. The real boost came when Western Europe began to prosper and you began to have tourism, which could take advantage of this phenomenon I had described earlier. As they came to Spain and the foreign currency started coming in. The other thing, the other aspect of Spanish development in this period was, of course, the fact that with Western Europe booming, lots of Spanish laborers were able to go north to find jobs. And that meant that there were substantial remittances coming back to Spain. So the two flows of capital towards Spain were coming at a very propitious time. You had an aggressively, pro-development government in power. You had lots of foreign exchange flowing into the country through tourism, and you had a lot of foreign exchange flowing into the country through remittances from Spanish laborers. The combination began to develop sort of a critical mass in terms of development in Spain. You begin to have this very positive investment in the infrastructure and in industrial development.

Q: Well, I know that I was in Greece at the time, and one of the things that was debated a lot was, "My God, we can't go the Spanish route because they have sold away their birthright." The entire coast was considered a German enclave. The talk was that the Germans brought all their salami and all and sort of froze the Spanish out. They lost their coastline without an awful lot of gain from it. How was that perceived in Spain at that time?

CUTTER: Well, I think that the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Spain now is, I think, a developed country by almost all measurements. They took themselves from very serious underdevelopment to where now Spain is literally booming. Although there are still some structural problems of unemployment, especially in the South, Spain, I think, is miles ahead of most of the other countries on the periphery of Europe. The approach, certainly in the long run, has proved to have been a good one. But, they'll never be able to unbury the coast. It is buried in tons of concrete, and very ugly development in many cases. So they can't undo that. But the rest of Spain has very definitely prospered, as a result.

Now the other thing that was very important was that this Opus group, while conservative, was extremely honest. They were very dedicated and extremely honest people, so that there

wasn't corruption. Franco himself, actually, was a fairly incorruptible kind of person. The structure of the government was an honest one. Nobody was ripping it off, while this development was going on. It was really being turned around and put back into the society.

Q: Now, again, we're trying to go back to this time. In the Political Section how did you see what American interests were there and how did we pursue those?

CUTTER: When I arrived in August of 1970, the base agreements were the big issue between Spain and the United States. The major negotiations on the base agreements were already completed. What was being negotiated, when I got there, was the Status of Forces agreements, which were subsidiary to the main agreement. Status of Forces agreements are agreements which govern the way your forces will be treated by the domestic power, when they are stationed in that country. I spent the first eight months I was there, working on the base agreements. I practically never went to the Embassy. I went to the Ministry of Defense, where we were having these meetings. The biggest issue was the amount of extraterritoriality we would have, and how many benefits our military would receive which the average Spaniard could not receive. In other words, import privileges for vehicles and food for the commissaries and extraterritorial rights on the bases, freedom from being hassled by the Spanish police and being subjected only to U. S. military policemen, and things of that kind. That was the big issue that was at stake: how far these rights should go.

It was fairly clear to me at the time that, while the Spanish military were willing to go along with us, and were actually going to be the dominating force in the negotiations, the people from the Foreign Ministry were very unhappy. They felt that the long term effect of this was going to be very negative. Their reading of the situation was that the Spanish people already were becoming annoyed with the special privileges that American servicemen had, especially as Torrejon Air Base was right there in Madrid, the capital city. Spaniards of all walks of life could see the Americans with all kinds of special privileges--special stores they could shop in, goods that were not available for the Spaniards, cheap gas, all kinds of things, so that they could drive their big gas guzzlers along the small Spanish roads. These were all things that were very irritating to the average person in Spain. The Spaniards were very definitely pushing. What they would have liked on the Foreign Ministry side was to close down Torrejon and to limit severely these extraterritorial rights that the American servicemen had. But, as I say, they were overridden by the military. Franco went along with the military, so that we got our way on almost every issue. We got our way, but I was convinced that, down the road, we'd have to pay the price for it. One of the reasons that the Torrejon was finally closed and we were forced out of our facilities in Spain went back to these negotiations in the early 1970's.

Q: Well, did you find...In other interviews I've done, dealing with other base agreements, one of the dynamics in this was that...It's been said that the military--and I'm talking about the American Department of Defense--legal side has no appreciation or had no appreciation of the situation abroad. And that they wanted everything that they could possibly get with no "give" at all. So often the negotiation was really not with the Spaniards

or the Portuguese or what have you, but with the Department of Defense legal side. Did you find this?

CUTTER: Well, any time you proposed backing off on our demands in these areas the Defense Department closed in very quickly and would say, "No, no way." There was no appreciation of the domestic impact as far as the military negotiators went. There was the occasional officer who could understand the argument if you made it that in the long run, you were doing yourself a disservice by pushing for more than the Spaniards really wanted to give. I think that a certain arrogance had grown up, that what we want, we should get, because we were there, defending Western Europe. Certainly, there was the feeling at this point in Spain that Franco would back us in our demands and that the political authorities in Spain were not necessarily to be listened to because, in the final analysis, we would get a decision from on high which would back whatever position we wanted. Very short-sighted.

Q: Well, was there unease on your part and on others about how we were pushing?

CUTTER: It comes down to a personal prejudice on my part. I've never been in favor of us having special privileges. I'm not in favor, in fact, of Embassy commissaries. I think that if you have an international commissary for the Diplomatic Corps, I've always felt that Americans should take advantage of that and not have their special privileges. I think it creates a kind of ghetto mentality in people when they can trot down and do all their shopping in the basement of an Embassy or on a military base. It separates you from the people you're supposed to be learning about. Frankly, I've never had much sympathy with this anyway, so I found myself very uneasy, defending these kinds of privileges. It was my job to do it, and I did it, but I felt very uneasy doing it. I found myself very often sympathizing with my Spanish colleagues from the Foreign Ministry, who told me quite frankly, "Look, you'll win this time on any point you want to take on, but in the long run, you're going to lose, because Spain is not moving in that direction."

Q: Well, then, how did you perceive the political situation? Again, both you- -your instructions from the desk and EUR [Bureau of European Affairs]--how was this falling out at that time?

CUTTER: The career Foreign Service, as represented by the desk and the people at the political level in the Embassy, was definitely looking to the transition. We were looking ahead. We all knew that Franco was not immortal, although he seemed to think he was. A good joke at the time was about Franco in the hospital. His wife was with him, and a big crowd gathered outside. They were saying something outside, and Franco said to his wife, "What is that they're saying?" She answered, "They're saying, 'Adios, Caudillo.'" He said, "But where are they all going?" But everybody knew that the regime was coming to an end and that something was going to replace it. Nobody was clear about what it was, but it would obviously be something to the Left of the situation that existed. Consequently, there was a move on the part of the professionals in the Embassy to get out and get to know the people that might very possibly be part of this change. As I say, we had some luck in

bringing the ambassador around to this position, too. So that our reporting was pretty good, I think, during that period, in terms of reflecting what was going on.

What I think was underappreciated by the Embassy was the influence of the Socialists, because the Socialist Party's base was mainly in the South. Andalusia had a very strong role, a very dominating role, actually, in the Spanish Socialist Party. It was not very well represented in the Madrid area. So what you found was that the Embassy was talking to a lot of the old school socialists who really were not any longer the true spokesmen for socialist thought in Spain. But that was all right, because basically they were echoing a lot of the same views.

There was also, of course, this whole group of people, supporters of the Opus Dei position. They were not Fascists. They were conservatives of a different ilk--Christian conservatives who were looking to change Spain in another way. And to move it ahead in terms of development but development from the top down, and not from the bottom up. And we had very good contacts with those people, of course, too. People represented by Fraga and Suarez-- people of that kind who were going to play a very important role in the transition period.

Q: Well, did you have any trouble from, say, the Franco regime in reaching out and talking to other people? Were there protests?

CUTTER: I remember my first--I had just come from Brazil, as you recall. And in Brazil you were very cautious in contacting anybody from the Left, because the government was violently opposed to it. It would have been looked on as a very, very serious step if you made overt contact with people from the Left. The first business lunch I went to in Madrid with another fellow in the Political Section--we went to a very crowded restaurant near the Embassy, meaning crowded with Spaniards, and met with two people from the Left in Spain.

Q: That would mean, what? The Socialist Party?

CUTTER: The Socialist Party--Tierno Galvan's group from the Socialist Party. We met with them. They were talking in fairly loud voices about when we get rid of Franco, when this country begins to change, and all that kind of thing. I was looking around, kind of wondering when the secret police would...Because, you know, I had the same impression that everybody does of a dictatorship and the secret police were probably everywhere, and these guys were going to be snatched away from our table and carried off right in front of our eyes if they continued talking this way. But I looked around, and nobody was paying any attention. They didn't seem to have any fears at all.

Of course, I learned that Spain really was in transition. Although, at an official level, it wasn't changing, at every other level, it was. Everybody was aware of the fact that soon, things would be quite different. The minute Franco died, there was going to be fairly radical change. The truth of the matter is that the government was not very active in trying to close

down this kind of discussion. The government was quite willing to let this take place, as long as it was at a non official level and didn't directly attack Franco or in writing.

Q: How did you view the Spanish political spectrum? I speak as an absolute non knowledgeable person on this. I remember reading, I guess it was Hugh Thomas' book, "The Spanish Civil War." I've never seen such a fragmented group of people, everybody hating each other and all this. I mean, how did you feel this thing was going to come out? Were they going to work together or were they going to go back to the old mold that caused the Spanish Civil War and actually the rather reluctant appearance of Franco? And, you know, to cut out this nonsense?

CUTTER: That was the big debate. In a sense Spanish politics were frozen in 1936, and the perceptions many people had of Spain in the 1970's were that everything had been forced underground and frozen, so that probably the strongest groups were really the Communists and the Anarchists. The Socialists were probably somewhat less strong, and then you probably had a very strong Nationalist, arch conservative bloc. I think that's basically how Spain had split up during the last democratic elections, which were in the 1930's. So the debate, really, a lot of the debate, focused on post-Franco planning...And when you talked with politicians, military, or almost anyone in Spain about what was going to happen in post-Franco Spain, the debate really would turn around what will the strength of the communists be? You know, if we really had free and open elections, won't the communists be able to take over again? Won't we find ourselves right back in the same situation we were in back in the 1930's? In many respects the whole debate was over what the strength of the far Left was. If you're going to have elections, how are you going to organize those elections either so that the Left can participate or so that the Left, the far Left, can be excluded. What are the merits of the two cases? Should you allow the Left to participate and have more legitimacy in the process but with the possible danger of having a communist or a very far Left government come to power that way? Or should you try and restrict their access and bring about what would be, in effect, a transition government which would allow semi-open elections but would exclude certain elements? Generally, the military favored excluding the Left from the elections. But wiser heads, I think, were saying, look, these people have lost influence over the last 20 or 30 years, and they're not really as much of a force or a threat in this country as the military, or the United States feared. There were many in the U. S. who, I think, would have favored the military's position that the Left should be excluded in the elections. I think that most of us in the Embassy were pretty convinced that open elections would undoubtedly bring a more liberal government to power, but that it would not be a runaway election in the hands of the far Left. And, as a matter of fact, that's the way it turned out.

Q: Did you have any contact with the anarchists, the communists, or...

CUTTER: Santiago Carillo was the old leader of the communist bloc, and he had been slipping in and out of Spain, clandestinely, for years. He was more or less resident in Spain, even in the last years of Franco. Everybody turned their head away. We had contact with those people. We did. We knew younger members especially in the South, when I was in

Seville. I had a lot of contact with people from that element of Spanish politics. There's a Spanish saying that there were "cuatro gatos"--just four cats. You could tell, almost, that they had lost contact with mass thought in Spain.

Q: As we saw at the time, there were two models in Europe. One was the Italian model and one was the French model. The French model was absolute subservience to the Soviets. The Italian model was that they couldn't care less. I mean, they went their own way, and they were much more nationalist--let's get along and, well, respectable communists.

CUTTER: You had two forces at work on the Left in Spain. One grew out of a sense of gratitude that continued into modern Spain for the role of the Soviet Union during the Civil War. The Soviets were the ones who really stepped forward and gave substantial support to the republic. So you had a sense of gratitude by the left towards the Soviet Union for that. On the other hand, Spaniards are never subservient to anybody. There's a strain of independence in Spaniards that doesn't allow them to kowtow. Though Santiago Carillo had always had very active support from the Kremlin, he was very much of a Spaniard first. This was pretty obvious, even when open, free elections started in Spain, that he was not going to be a slavish follower of the Kremlin's line.

Q: Well, were you getting a feeling, while you were at the Embassy, and you might even have carried this over when you went to Seville about the influence, say, of Henry Kissinger, who was, most of the time, national security adviser, and he was in sort of direct conflict with William Rogers, the Secretary of State. Kissinger seemed to be calling the shots. So we had this idea of everything being in an East-West context. Did you have a feel of where Spain was fitting in, or not, or was this just a sideshow?

CUTTER: Well, there's no question, I think, that policymakers in Washington were comfortable with Franco's government in Spain. It wasn't a problem for them. You didn't have to worry as long as Franco was in power in Spain--you didn't have to worry about where Spain was going to go, in this whole East-West conflict. Of course, it made people uneasy to think of what might happen in the post-Franco years. Certainly, in that respect, Spain was looked on, I guess, as a sideshow in many respects, because people weren't worried about it, in the short run.

Q: Well, then, you went to Seville as, what, consul general? You were there, then, from 1972 to 1975? Could you describe sort of where Seville--I'm not giving the Spanish pronunciation but I'll give it the Americanized pronunciation--where it fit into the Spanish context, as a place. And then within the Embassy-Consulate relationship.

CUTTER: Andalusia was the forgotten area of Spain. The South, the poorest area, it's sort of the natural capital of the South, of Andalusia. It's located fairly near the Straits of Gibraltar, about 90 miles North of the Straits of Gibraltar. So, as the Spaniards themselves who live there always say, "We're from the North of Africa" because it's really--in many respects--closer to Africa than it is to Madrid. It had always been the forgotten area. It's primarily an agricultural area, high unemployment, because there wasn't enough

employment on the land, a great exporter of labor during the boom years in Northern Europe.

Q: Even during the colonial period it was the where the conquistadors and...

CUTTER: They all left from there. So it's always been a kind of forgotten part of Spain. It's always been a very radical part of Spain. The communists had very strong influence during the republic in the South, and the socialists are very strong in that area. Under the surface it's a very radical area. On the surface, of course, it was controlled by latifundistas, by a few families that owned enormous extensions of land, a small, upper class which had controlled this life for generations, except during the period of the republic. Although those people were dislodged from their positions of power during the republic, once Franco took power, they quickly reassumed their position in society. You had, on the surface, and at the top in Southern Spain, a very conservative element controlling the situation, but a potential for rather radical change, once the iron hand would be taken off. Very few people were ever chosen from the South to be a part of the government in Madrid. Most of the people who ran Spain during all of the Franco years were from Castilla--the area around Madrid--or from the North or from Cataluna--the area around Barcelona--and the Basque country, around San Sebastian. The South was basically forgotten, both in terms of programs and in terms of personnel. People were just not pulled up to Madrid to represent the South. So it was an area where there were a lot of festering problems to be resolved.

Q: Well, did you have a problem with the Embassy? I speak with some experience. I was consul general in Naples, which is in the Mezzogiorno, the South of Italy. And I found that there was a real prejudice against the South within the Italian community, and it permeated even to the Embassy. You tended to dismiss anything from the South. Did you find yourself having to stand up, within the Embassy for the southerner and southern interests or not?

CUTTER: Oh, very definitely, there was very little concern about what was happening in the South. The major interest of the U. S. Government in the South was that we had two major bases there. We had an Air Force base in Moron de la Frontera and we had a big naval base at Rota. And, looking at the job from the consular point of view, we had over 30,000 Americans retired and living in the South of Spain. There was an enormous, consular burden in the South. The post was looked on by Madrid as a post primarily for servicing American interests there. The Embassy was only marginally interested in our political and economic reporting in the South, because they felt that things were really happening in Madrid and the North. The South, in this view, was a backwater.

Q: Well, again, I'm going back to the Italian context. I found that in Rome they would see the focus on any minute change within a cabinet. You know, the Italian situation is such that nothing really changes, except some personnel. Getting terribly involved in the capital and not having a feeling for the country as a whole. Once you got outside, did you find, did your perspective change?

CUTTER: Well, my perspective certainly changed. I'm not too sure, although we did a lot of reporting from the South, I'm not too sure that the Embassy's perspective necessarily changed. The fact that the government that's now governed Spain for almost all of the last 20 years came from the South was a horrible shock to everybody who, in those days, was operating in Madrid. I talked to my old colleagues who were in Madrid at the time. They paid no attention to the names we were naming as future, possible leaders from the South. This seemed like a fantasy.

Q: That same thing, I think, was replicated in Turkey. Bob Dillon said that he was a fairly junior officer and was the only one who knew these people coming from basically southern and coastal Turkey. It is one of the problems that embassies run into. They become the captive of the capital.

CUTTER: That's right, and they go to all the same cocktail parties, talk to all the same people. You have these political celebrities that move around. And they become the conduit to the country, in many respects. I will say that when Hill left, he was replaced by an Admiral, Horacio Rivero, former vice chief of naval operations of the Navy, a man of Puerto Rican background. Spoke Spanish fluently. Rivero made it his job to visit every one of the provinces of Spain while he was ambassador. So a little bit of the insularity of the Embassy was modified by his approach. He spent a lot more time in the South than any other ambassador had. He came and stayed with me on numerous occasions. He liked it down there. He felt this was the real Spain and made a big effort to get to know the authorities and probably listened to what we had to say, reporting out of Sevilla, more than anybody else had for many years. So, in that respect, my job was a little bit easier.

Q: Well, how about your contacts with the emerging, political leaders that were coming from the South, their interest in America?

CUTTER: I can kind of sum that up. The official establishment in the South really didn't want you to have contact with the Left. So, when I arrived there, I tried to focus on what my job really was. I knew that my primary function there was to take care of American interests. No question about that. I couldn't jeopardize our relations in the South because of the bases and because of all the Americans living there by being too aggressive in reaching out to other sectors in Spanish society. So what I tried to do, during my first six or eight months or even the first year in Sevilla, was to cement my relationships with the authorities--the military, the governor-general, the governors, and all those kinds of people--on whom I had to rely to get my job done. But I asked my staff to begin to start fanning out and building contacts. Fortunately, I had a couple of very bright, young officers working for me, who were not totally satisfied doing just visa work. I organized the work load of the Consulate so that they could have time to go out, make contact with student groups, make contact with labor groups--do that kind of thing, while I kept up the facade of total dependence on the old establishment. But after a while, I felt that I had to start reaching out to other sectors, as well. One of the most interesting, one of the most useful people to us there was the chief of police, a man who was best known as "the butcher of Barcelona," because he had suppressed, very violently suppressed, a couple of radical

movements in the North. He was very important to us in many ways. We had lots of young Americans in prison there, because of drug related activities. And we needed to have good relationships with the police so that we could do our job and help take care of these kids. So he had been a person whom I had cultivated to a certain extent. One night I was having a few young Sevillanos in for dinner, and they asked if they could bring along a friend of theirs, a man by the name of Alejandro Rojas Marcos who was in exile, actually. The Spaniards had a system of exiling people in Spain from their own community.

Q: Oh, yes, internal exile.

CUTTER: Internal exile, quite right. And Rojas Marcos had been in internal exile. He was exiled from Sevilla to Madrid and had just been released from that status and was back in Sevilla for the first time. They asked if they could bring him along for dinner. I said, well, of course, bring him along, forgetting that I was going to take everyone afterwards to the theater. The Lope de Vega Theater was right down the street from the Consulate. I had a box there and I was going to take all of my dinner guests to a theater production there. But, I wasn't going to back away from this. We all went down, and Rojas Marcos, I guess, was sitting right next to me in the box. I looked across the way, and there was my friend, the chief of police. He waved at me, and his hand slowly fell as he looked at who was sitting next to me, and I think we never spoke to each other again as he was so incensed over the fact that I would make a public appearance with a Leftist, a dangerous Leftist, like Rojas Marcos. That was, in a sense, putting the American stamp of approval on this dangerous fellow. This fellow, by the way, has risen to great prominence in politics in the South.

Q: How did you find the attitude of, say, the Spanish Left? I don't mean to exaggerate. I mean, almost anybody was to the Left of, I guess, the Franco Government. But I mean the people who were really going to move into mainstream politics. How did they view the United States at that time? This was obviously under Nixon. We were involved in Vietnam, but we were opening up to China. How did they view us?

CUTTER: Really, across the spectrum you had every kind of view. I think that the oligarchy in Spain looked on us very favorably. They liked having the American presence there. In many ways more moderate people looked on us as having an influence for change as well. They had seen--since we had opened the bases in Spain--that Spain had moved. It wasn't nearly as repressive as it had been before we had come in. Spain had begun to move towards modernization and change. I think that there were people who gave the U. S. presence a certain amount of credit for this. But when you got to the Left of the spectrum, you found all of the same attitudes that you found in Latin America and in other areas, where the U. S. was looked on as an imperialist power, trying to impose its vision on the world in supporting old and reactionary governments. Certainly, there is an argument to be made that, because of our close association with Franco, the kinds of economic and financial support that we'd given Spain, in return for the bases, we had prolonged the Franco period. It might have died a more natural death, in the minds of many people in Spain, if we'd not been there to support that structure. But you had the whole spectrum of views on the U. S. role. The period I was there, of course, was the period when Nixon had

to resign, and the whole Watergate scandal broke out. There was a general lack of comprehension about what was happening in the United States.

Q: I was in Greece. Nobody could understand what it was all about.

CUTTER: You know, this kind of thing was everyday activity in country X, Y, or Z, and that the U. S. could get so exercised about this was a little surprising. Even the Left didn't understand it or sympathize with it too much.

Q: Well, what about the American population, the 30,000 American expatriates living there? Were they a problem or not?

CUTTER: They were a huge logistic problem for us. We had only three American officers, beside myself, in the Consulate. We had a very heavy citizenship load. Most of these people lived along the coast. Seville is inland, as you know, so we had a big problem in how to service them. We tried to attack the problem in several ways. First, we opened an office, a branch office, in Malaga. One of us--we all took turns doing it--would go down. We had a certain day when we were open down there, or a couple of days we were open every month. We would go down, and people could come to that office and get passport and citizenship services. We also had a large prison population of young Americans, whom we would try and visit regularly. So we tried to service it that way, but it was really overwhelming. I came up with what I thought was a pretty good idea. I sent out a letter to about 50 prominent Americans living on the coast, Americans who had some position, either in business or who had some leadership capacity in the various communities along the coast. I asked them all to meet with me at a hotel in Marbella. Americans have this commitment to public service, usually, and they like service organizations. I thought that if I can get the American community somehow organized, we'll be able to use them to handle a lot of our problems. Actually about 80 people showed up for this meeting. We organized something called "The American Club of the Costa del Sol." We organized it in chapters so that there would be an organization up top, and then we would have chapters in each of the cities along the coast. We elected a retired dentist, Paul Costelle, as our first president. I picked him as the logical person to be the leader of this group, a person who would be willing to give time to it. We put together a pretty good organization. I gave them a list of jobs I thought they could do. First of all, I thought they ought to have "Welcome Committees" in every community along the coast, where they would go out to greet new Americans coming in. Don't forget that Spain was then looked on as a cheap place to retire. So lots of retirees were coming in there with Social Security checks. Usually, they didn't speak the language. They were isolated once they arrived. A lot of the beauty of the place seemed to go right over their heads, because they were so worried about their every day life and how to adjust to this new and foreign environment. So the first thing was to organize "Welcome Committees." Then "Prison Visiting Committees." From this grew a whole series of services. It just took off like a rocket. Before long, in every community we had a welcoming committee. It reduced the problems enormously that we were getting in the Consulate. We got them to visit the people in the prisons on a fairly regular basis. At least once a week somebody from the community was coming in to bring little "Care" packages

to our young people there. A lot of the problems we had been having really were being taken care of by this kind of a volunteer organization. We had our own little "thousand points of light" along the coast there. They still looked to us for a lot of guidance.

Then I got the authority to appoint a consular agent who turned out to be Paul Costelle, the president of the organization. He stayed on for a number of years in that capacity. Really, it became a solution to a lot of the citizenship problems. The American Club of the Costa del Sol is still, by the way--going strong.

Q: It sounds like an excellent idea. How were Americans being treated in prisons? This is still the height of the drug business, and the hashish coming over from...

CUTTER: Spain has had very tough drug laws. Anybody who was caught with any amount of narcotics on their person was probably going to be given six years in prison. Bang, just like that. Of course, you know, under the Roman law system, if you have a finding that somebody should be indicted, that's almost being convicted. Either they were released or they were held in prison until the trial, and the outcome of the trial was almost certain, and they were going to be found guilty. There were some miscarriages of justice, I felt. There were some Americans who were kind of "mousetrapped" by the situation, but a lot of them were just plain drug smugglers and deserved to be where they were. They were treated like anybody else in Spanish prisons. They were not given any special privileges, nor were they particularly singled out for abuse in any way. Spanish prisons are not nice places. They are not country clubs. They are cold--especially in the South, where...People think that basically it is a warm climate. They have cold and damp winters down there, but they have no central heating, of course, nothing like that. You probably lived in your overcoat if you were in prison, if you were lucky enough to have an overcoat and prison food is not particularly appetizing. Young Americans found this to be quite a learning experience. I will say that many of them actually took it as that. Many of them learned to speak Spanish quite well. Many of them were quite philosophical about it, once they were trapped there. Others were not, and we had a lot of very serious psychological problems to deal with. I think that, overall, the Spaniards were pretty good about trying to, if they could in any way do it, pass the Americans on to us--get rid of them if they could, and get them out of the system. But, usually, they were in there for two or three years, minimum, before they were able to get out.

Q: Well, is there anything else that we should cover on Seville before we move on?

CUTTER: No, the US military actually behaved themselves quite well in the South.

Q: The military takes care of itself.

CUTTER: They do. My relationships with the military were excellent. They looked on me as kind of the senior American in the area. Whenever any kind of problem of community relations turned up, they usually would turn to us for guidance. I spent a lot of time working with them, actually. I tried to develop good relationships with the base commanders. The

base commander at Rota was a good squash player, and he had the only squash court in the South. I got to know him pretty well. I went down and played with him fairly regularly. So our relationships were good.

Q: Then you left, in, what, 1975.

CUTTER: I left in 1975. I will say, going back to talk a little bit about Sevilla, though, because I think it's kind of an interesting study in how you can make yourself a part of the community. Both my wife, Christiane, and I were very interested in the things of great interest to Andalusians. We both like horses, we were both quite interested at that time in bull fighting and in flamenco guitar. Christiane especially. She had more time than I did and was out in the community a great deal, taking part in a lot of the activities that were considered to be very important by the Spaniards. This was a miraculous door-opener, in many ways. People whom, probably, I would never have gotten to know, in the normal course of events, were far more accessible because they'd gotten to know my wife, in one way or another, and who was interesting herself in these activities. As a consequence, they would include me in things that I think I normally would not have been included in. The point I'm trying to make is that in many ways this kind of a job is a team job. If your wife is willing to get out into the community and speaks the language and is interested in the affairs of the community, she can probably do more, in terms of opening up that community to you than you can yourself. Because you're loaded down with the office job and the routine.

Q: It opens up aspects of relationships in other organizations that you just never would get to.

CUTTER: That's absolutely right. She, for example, introduced me to some people who got me into one of the brotherhoods in Seville. I became a member of a "Cofradia." You've probably seen movies of the people marching during Holy Week, wearing hats and masks. At first I thought this was sort of nonsense, this kind of activity. Because of these contacts which she had developed, the people invited me to become a member, even though I'm a non Catholic. They got permission from the Cardinal to do this, and I actually marched during Holy Week for three years. I went out with a mask and hood and the whole thing, marched through the streets, and learned what it was that motivated people to do this, what it was all about, and how the hold of this ritual was maintained on people's hearts and minds in a fairly modern state. It was fascinating, and by doing this I was given much more acceptance in the community than I would have had normally, because it showed that I was really interested in knowing about it. But I have to give a lot of credit for this to my wife.

Q: It's one of those things that often gets overlooked--the practical importance of the contacts that are made outside the office that the spouse can't get, who is trapped in the office.

Well, then, you left in 1975. Where did you go?

CUTTER: I came back to Washington and I was made deputy director of United Nations Political Affairs [UNP] and was given responsibility for dependent area matters--something I'd worked on before. And the Middle East and disarmament matters, as well.

Q: This is a pretty broad spectrum. Where did you find yourself--this was 1975 to 1977--concentrating. What were your greatest problem areas?

CUTTER: Well, obviously, the Middle East was the big issue. We found ourselves spending our time mostly on the Middle East, although there were a lot of other issues that came up as well. You see, almost everything that comes up in the Security Council comes back through UNP. That means that you're constantly responding--you're like a fire fighter in the Department. While you're not directly responsible for Middle East policy, you're the conduit in the UN and so you're constantly in the middle of coordinating positions at the UN with the desks around the Department and trying to get a position that will "fly" in New York, but yet one that reflects U. S. policy. So you are, in a sense, the intermediary in all this.

Q: Obviously, U. S. policy at that time was driven a great deal by our ties to Israel. How did you view this? Was this sort of frustrating? Did you find this as sort of getting in the way of other things?

CUTTER: Well, you look at this with a sort of split perspective. An issue like whether the Palestinians should have a permanent observer in the UN can become a major crisis at the UN and in Washington as well. I think that UNP tends to reflect more of an internationalist view of world problems. It tends to be the agent in the Department that is looking at things the way the international community is looking at them. So if desks have localitis, certainly IO, in the Department, the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, has localitis, in the sense that it tends to be influenced by what the international perspective is on various problems. So that I think you find that the bureau is frequently at odds with geographic bureaus within the Department in the way it looks at problems. I think that, even in those days, back in the mid-1970's, you had a more balanced view on Middle East problems than you probably have emanating within the Department, from NEA, for example. UNP tried to take a more balanced position on the Arab-Israeli conflict and to try and see things, not only through the eyes of Israel, but also through the eyes of the Arab countries. When reasonable requests were coming down the pike, we would try and come up with a more balanced position, I think.

Q: Well, how did you find the impact of the Jewish, or the Israeli lobby, as far as you were concerned? Were you somewhat removed from it, or...

CUTTER: Oh, no. You always knew that AIPAC [America-Israel Public Affairs Committee] and the other, Jewish organizations were out there. If the Department got too far off base on issues in which they were strongly interested, you were going to hear from them, and you were going to hear from the Hill [Congress] in no uncertain terms. One of

the big issues at the UN, of course, in those days, was the Zionism as racism issue. Of course, our position on that was very clear. We did not equate Zionism with racism and we were opposed to this issue being debated at any length and were very strongly committed to getting that resolution off the books at the UN. At the same time we had our conflicts with Israel because we were supporters of Resolution 242, which is the resolution which has been sort of the umbrella resolution governing the international approach to the Middle East situation since the early 1970's. I'm not sure when Resolution 242 was actually passed.

Q: Well, that was the sort of "land for peace"...

CUTTER: Recognition of Israel in return for eventually giving the Palestinians a homeland.

Q: Well, it's been part of our method of operation where every year a list is sent out to every post saying, be sure to get support for our positions on certain issues in the United Nations. Support for Israel, of course, is one of them, and I imagine that you must have gotten back some rather--either amusing or indignant or annoyed--responses, because these would go to everybody. I recall our charge, or rather the chief of the American Interests Section in Iraq, was supposed to go to Saddam Hussein and tell him to support our resolutions on Israel. Come on, fellows...How did you sort of balance off the responses you'd get?

CUTTER: The Department would go through this exercise every year, especially UNP, of putting together all of our positions for the coming year at the United Nations General Assembly. At that point we would send out a long cable to all of our posts around the world, outlining what our positions were going to be on certain issues during the coming year, and asking them to go to their host government and get support for those positions. A major objective was always the exclusion of mainland China and the maintenance of the Republic of China (Taiwan) as the permanent member of the Security Council. That was No. 1 on the agenda--trying to assure that governments committed themselves well in advance to supporting our position on this. That was almost a touchstone of our attitude toward a country, whether or not they were going to support us on that particular issue. And then, you know, with varying degrees of seriousness, we would attack other problems. Certainly, the Zionism as racism issue was a key issue for us right along. And one we lost on most of the time. The overwhelming majority at the UN supported this particular resolution, and we were fighting a rear guard action to try to get it overturned. Now, by the way, things are swinging back in our direction. It looks as if this resolution will be wiped off the books. But it was, in a sense, an issue that the Third World could rebel against us on. Even though, I think, a good many of them had no idea of what "Zionism as racism" meant, it was something that they thought they could vote against the U. S. on and probably not seriously jeopardize down the line whatever economic support they were getting from us. At the same time they could show some independence and be brother Third Worlders at the UN. So the late 1960's and the early 1970's were a tough period for us at the UN. This was a period when we couldn't get automatic majorities any longer. All the newly emerged countries that had joined the UN in the 1960's and the 1970's had to have issues on which they showed their independence from us.

Q: What was the attitude of the professionals like yourself, who were in the United Nations? You knew that these countries were going to vote against us on certain things, that really this is a way of exerting their independence. Did you get so involved in this that one got indignant, or you went through the motions and said, "OKAY, fellows, this is going to happen, but here are the things that we really care about." Zionism and racism, you know, is not an earthshaking...It's sticking it to us, but it doesn't mean anything.

CUTTER: I think far more important to us, in substantive terms, really, were things like the "New Economic Order," and issues like, I forget what it was called, but this whole movement within UNESCO to limit freedom of inquiry in the Third World, control of the press, and that kind of thing.

Q: UNESCO was way off the path.

CUTTER: That's right. Those kinds of issues and international organizations were more serious because they attacked fundamental beliefs of the United States and of the West in general, and I think we felt somewhat frustrated that our European allies didn't always take the same serious view of these issues that we did. They usually voted with us, but they were not willing to expend much effort to get out and lobby people and to put pressure on them on these particular issues, until it was too late. And then they'd begin to realize that these were fairly serious issues and that the U. S., in fact, was not being just rigidly imperialistic or Right Wing in its views. These were serious problems that faced the world and that the West had an obligation to get out there and make people know what our viewpoint was. Almost too late. You know, we had to withdraw from UNESCO to bring some sanity into that organization in this regard.

But there was a lot of U. S. tilting at windmills, too, at the UN. There were issues which, I think, we took very seriously, or seemed to take very seriously, that we did an enormous amount of lobbying and arm-twisting on, that we probably could have rolled with the punch on. And then concentrated our attention on areas that were of greater importance.

Q: It's interesting to look at. I mean the United Nations was very...Everybody looked upon it right after the war as something we were going to do. Then there was the disillusionment period, and which lasted, really, throughout most of the Cold War. But now, at the beginning of the 1990's, where we are today, all of a sudden the United Nations is back as an important factor, really as a peacekeeping, disputes settling instrument.

CUTTER: Well, obviously, that's the result of not having the veto facing us from the East.

Q: I'm talking about your personal feeling, and maybe that of the others, OKAY, the United Nations isn't perfect, but it's like an emergency brake or something. Maybe we don't want it, despite all the frustrations, or was there a feeling, "Oh, the hell with it. Why do we bother?"

CUTTER: Certainly not...Those of us who worked closely with the UN saw it as a very important safety valve. Here was a place where everybody met on equal ground. Everybody had one vote. Some people's vote was worth more than others, in the Security Council. But in the General Assembly everybody had one vote. Everybody got the same amount of time to stand up and talk about what they thought was important to them. This gave small countries and developing countries from around the world a place where they could put forward their views in a relatively receptive environment. It gave them a chance to blow off steam without really causing any serious, long term problems. It also was a place where you could consider, in a fairly neutral way, some of the serious problems that faced the globe, as a whole. You know, we tend to focus, to an undue extent, on our problems with the Soviet Union. But those problems were really marginal for the people from the Third World. Their problems were problems of existence and survival, and they wanted a lot more attention paid to those problems than we were willing to pay. In the UN they can get our attention. They can get our attention by kicking our shins on the problems that we consider are serious and, in turn, maybe we'll pay attention to the problems they think are serious. I think we saw it as a place where serious activity was taking place. Lots of people see votes on these issues as very marginal and hortatory in nature. In reality these are the problems that are of great interest to these developing countries. It's the one area where they can get our attention.

Q: We had, what, two ambassadors while you were there, Moynihan and Scranton.

CUTTER: Right. Scranton and Young.

Q: So what was your impression at the time, and maybe the impression of UNP, of the effectiveness and the thrust of these particular ambassadors?

CUTTER: Moynihan was not there for much of my stay. But Scranton, I thought, was effective. Scranton was a very balanced man, a vanishing breed of Republican, a moderate Republican man who basically understood the issues, was not doctrinaire about the issues, and had developed good relationships. He was fairly easy to work with.

Andrew Young was a force to deal with. He was fantastic. From my point of view he was the perfect person for the Carter Administration to have sent to New York. First of all, being a black American, he sent a message, a very strong message, that we were going to pay attention to black Americans, that we were willing to give them posts of great importance. He had played a very honored role in the civil rights movement in this country, so he had acceptance among all delegations in New York. When he wanted a hearing from Third World countries, he got it. He was able to work with those countries in a very positive way and, I think, was a brilliant nomination for that job.

Q: Did you have a feeling...I mean, it developed later, but was there concern that he was kind of a loose cannon?

CUTTER: He was never a loose cannon. He may have been left out in the cold, especially on the Palestinian issue, but Andrew Young, I'll just say for the record, was never a loose cannon.

Q: Okay, for the record, so that we can go into this in more detail. Andrew Young got into trouble because he talked to some Palestinian representatives at a time when we said we would never do that. As you say, he was "left out to dry." Were there any other particular issues that surfaced at this time that were particularly difficult?

CUTTER: Well, issues that I had to deal with, of course, were constantly recurring issues of the U. S. administration of its own, dependent areas. That was a problem that was directly in my bailiwick, for which I probably had primary responsibility in the Department. How do we deal with the question of Puerto Rico? How do we deal with the question of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands? As more and more of the colonial dependencies had become independent and joined the UN, the pressure on the U. S. as, really, almost the last colonial administrator, was almost unbearable at times. Of course, we thought that we had solved the problem of Puerto Rico by having a plebiscite there and giving them this special status, Commonwealth status. So our position always was that Puerto Rico was no longer a dependent area. It was a self-governing area, and we were no longer required to report to the United Nations about it. Our friends, the Cubans, of course, had taken this on as a major job to liberate their fellow Caribbean Latinos from the yoke of imperialism. You could count on the Cubans raising, in every forum possible at the UN, the question of Puerto Rican independence. This is one of the issues on which we always circulated people before the General Assembly, that we wanted to make sure that they didn't buy the Cuban line on this issue, that Puerto Rico already was, in fact, self governing. Usually, we could hold the day on this issue. Usually, we could kill it in committee, but the Cubans were very persistent, and there were enough people out there, in the Third World, especially, who were in doubt, really, as to whether we had allowed the Puerto Rican people to make a free and open decision on this matter. This was an issue that we had to deal with at almost every General Assembly.

Q: Did we encourage people to go--maybe not as an official delegation, but go take a look at Puerto Rico?

CUTTER: Well, we definitely did not encourage an official delegation, because that would have been acknowledging the UN's "right" to do this. But we always said that anybody that wants to travel to Puerto Rico is free to do so. As a matter of fact, we almost always had Puerto Ricans on our delegation to the UN, in one capacity or another, so people could go to them and hear at first hand what Puerto Rico is all about. No, we were quite willing to have anybody who wanted to, in their individual capacity, travel to Puerto Rico and take a look at what was going on.

The Trust Territory [of the Pacific Islands] of course, was still under official UN supervision, and regularly, every four years, there would be a visiting mission from the UN, which would go out to the Trust Territory to take a look at what was going on there. Our

goal there, of course, was always to have a visiting mission which we thought would come up with a report favorable to our position. We did our best to keep Soviets off that or people that we thought would echo the Soviet line. But, in the final analysis, Soviets did go on the visiting missions to the Trust Territory, and we did, occasionally, get reports which were not fully satisfactory to us.

Q: Well, how did you feel about this Trust Territory business? Were we at that particular time--we're talking about 1975-1977--looking ahead to try to do something about this? Were we trying to do the right thing, or did you feel that maybe we were putting it on the back burner...

CUTTER: Once again, of course, the Defense Department rears its head, and there were conflicting interests. On the one hand, the general U. S. proclivity to favor independence for colonial dependent areas. That's always been our position. So we always gave a certain amount of lip service to that position. But we had this strong, security interest in the Trust Territory. The military wanted to keep certain bases in the Trust Territory. Testing bases and potentially atomic testing areas. All this, perhaps, as fallback positions in case we were ever bumped out of our bases, say, for example, in the Philippines. You wanted to have fallback positions. So the Defense Department was very protective of our right to keep certain areas in the Trust Territory safe for U. S. military activity. This, of course, was in direct conflict with what many people at the UN wanted to see happen with the Trust Territory. And many people in the U. S. Government as well felt that we had to turn loose this area. It was, of course, a special trust territory, in that it was a strategic trusteeship, which meant that it wasn't supervised by the Trusteeship Council but was supervised by the Security Council, although we regularly reported to the Trusteeship Council on our administration. In the final analysis the status of the Trust Territory of the Pacific could only be changed by the Security Council. That meant that we had the veto, so that any change in its status would have to be approved by the United States. The UN was not a problem for us in that regard. This made certain elements within the U. S. Government fairly rigid about how they saw change coming about there, and what they were willing actually to allow in terms of change in the Trust Territory.

Q: While you were there, did you see any movement towards saying, "Let's get these countries to negotiate independence," which did happen later on, but was this...

CUTTER: Oh, there were negotiations going on all during that period out in the Trust Territory. We were trying to evolve a treaty which protected our security interest, that gave them a modicum of self government which would be accepted by the UN, so we could get this problem off our backs. The problem was that, in many cases, either the price that the local citizens were demanding for a continued U. S. presence there was too high, and we were unwilling to pay that price, and consequently we were not able to reach agreement with them on what their form of self government would be. Or, the areas were so marginal that we were not willing to give them the kind of economic support that they wanted before opting for independence. So it was a very difficult kind of situation for us to work out.

Q: In a way, what I gather at least from the United Nations' point of view, this was more a holding operation. It was not an evolving one.

CUTTER: It was evolving in the sense that we were constantly looking for the formula that would permit us to get out of the trusteeship business, and at the same time to protect our national security interests. In many ways the two objectives were irreconcilable.

Q: Well, you'd left UN relations, and really, for the last year or so you'd gone to Congressional Relations. How long were you with them?

CUTTER: I went there--I was there about two years, at H [Department office abbreviation for the Bureau of Congressional Relations]. I was asked to come over because it was clear that one of the major objectives of the Carter Administration was going to be the Panama Canal Treaty and that the treaties, once they were signed, would require a massive lobbying effort to get them accepted and ratified. Somebody who knew Latin America and felt comfortable dealing with Congress would be useful. You know, dealing with the UN, in many respects, is like dealing with Congress. It's a parliamentary situation, and so Larry Pezzullo was deputy assistant secretary for congressional relations. Part of his watch was Latin America and the Far East. These are two areas where I had worked a lot, and Larry asked me to come over and join him. It looked like it was going to be a lot of fun. So I moved over into the job, first of all as a Congressional Management Officer. The Assistant Secretary [for Congressional Relations] then was Doug Bennet. First of all, there was Bob Beckel who has since gone on to greater glory as a political consultant. You probably see him frequently on CNN now. He took over that job, but for a very short time.

So they asked me to take over the job as deputy assistant secretary for that area. I pointed out to them that I was probably going to leave the service when I turned 50, which was about a year and a half away at that point. So they asked me to take the job as acting deputy assistant secretary. They wouldn't have to go through all the problems of the confirmation process on the Hill, if I was willing to take the job on an acting basis until I left. So for the last year and a half I filled that job as acting deputy assistant secretary. My main job was to build up the coordination effort for the treaty ratification.

Q: How did you find the Carter Administration approach? The treaty was confirmed. It was a lot of effort. It really was almost surprising because it was giving up American territory, which many people felt was ours in perpetuity. What your impression of the Carter Administration in its approach to this...

CUTTER: Well, they did a tremendous job, because it was a very unpopular treaty, in many respects, a treaty that had marginal support around the country. It was a very dangerous vote for many people in the Senate. It meant that, from the President on down, everybody had to make a tremendous effort to get it accepted. I will say that the leadership came right from the President. He was personally involved. He was willing to do whatever was necessary to see to it that the treaties were adopted. Consequently, we could use him in a way, I think, that few presidents have ever been used in American history to be an active

agent for ratification. We realized that we had to go, senator by senator. There are 100 Senators, and we had to make sure of every one of them, one way or the other. We had to do whatever was necessary to bring them on board until we had 66 Senators willing to vote for the treaties. Carter, as I say, put all of the resources necessary, including his own time, at our disposal. First of all, we started what we called our "Capitol Hill Seminars." We would get small groups of senators together. The Senate Majority Leader was then Senator Robert Byrd. He was willing to work with us. He made available to us the Majority Leaders office in the Capitol building. We would take experts up to the Hill, starting with the two ambassadors, Ellsworth Bunker and Sol Linowitz, who had worked on the treaties. We would get small groups of senators together and conduct seminars on the situation in Panama and why it was necessary to ratify the treaty. Then we would tell the senators, "Look, whatever you need from us so that you can vote for this treaty, you let us know." In many cases they would bring in large groups of key citizens from their home states.

We would often take those key people to the White House. We would set up briefing sessions in the East Room. We would bring in experts, and the thing would be topped off by the President himself coming in and standing there and taking the flak and answering people's questions. He was magnificent in that situation. That's where he's really best. He knew the issues as well as any of us and could stand up there and handle these questions in a wonderfully convincing way. We really had a superb team, starting with the President and working around on down. As part of the effort...I guess I took over half of the Senate to Panama and took them through the whole row down there, including introducing them to Omar Torrijos, (who, while not president was the real power in Panama), and taking them on field trips with Torrijos, so that they could see what grass roots opinion was. I traveled all through Latin America with [Senator Howard] Baker, who was then the [Senate] Minority Leader, because it was clear that Baker was going to be a key actor in all this.

Q: This is the senator from...

CUTTER: Howard Baker from Tennessee.

Q: From Tennessee, correct.

CUTTER: It was clear that if Baker would support the treaties, we could probably break away enough Republican support to get them ratified. So I took off on a five-nation trip with Senator Baker. We called on the presidents of Panama, Peru, Brazil, Venezuela, and Barbados. In each of those places we met with the top authorities, so that Baker could get a feel of how Latin Americans were reacting to this situation. Of course, in every country he got very strong support for the treaties.

Perhaps the most dramatic occasion was when we were in Venezuela. President Perez, [Carlos] Andres Perez, invited us--He is now president again--invited us to come for a very small dinner. It was just Senator Baker, the Foreign Minister, our own Ambassador, Pete Vaky myself, and the President who were at this dinner. We all sat in an ante room before dinner. He [President Perez] began to give Senator Baker a lecture on why he had to vote for these treaties and why the Republicans had to support them. He was lecturing him

like a schoolboy. You could see that Baker was getting more and more angry over this, getting redder and redder. Finally, he brought his hand down on the coffee table, bam!, and just shocked everybody. I could see an international incident growing out of this. Both Pete Vaky and I were on the edge of our seats, ready to intervene if there was going to be a real incident. Baker then shook his finger back at President Perez and said: "Mr. President, I just want to ask you one question." The President sat back in his seat, looking a little bit shocked, and he said: "Yes, what is that?" Baker said, "Where is your men's room?" That brought the thing to a halt. It livened up the atmosphere. From then on the conversation got back to more normal channels. We had a lovely dinner. The heat was off. But it was a key note, in a sense. Baker realized how serious the Latins were about this, but he wasn't going to be pushed around.

Q: Well, you ended on a high note, on a successful thing, which, of course, must have given you a great deal of satisfaction.

CUTTER: It was, personally, extremely satisfying. It was a great team. We had Ambler Moss working with us very closely. He then went on to be Ambassador to Panama. During the early implementation stages of the thing we brought in people from all over the country, really, to work on this. All of us made speeches all over the country, numerous speeches. It was an incredible effort.

Q: Just one sort of final question. You retired when you became 50. Why did you choose this? I mean, many people go on until they reach 60. You had a successful career. What sort of...

CUTTER: It was very complicated, I think. First of all, I guess I was restless in some ways. I'd spent a lot of time in the bureaucracy. I had alluded earlier in our conversations to the experience I'd had when I was in Brazil and my dissatisfaction with the way the State Department had handled that. And I was extremely unhappy over the way my career had gone after that--not in terms of my jobs. I liked my jobs. I've always liked my jobs in the Foreign Service. I was not happy about the way the promotion system was working. It seemed to be cranking along slowly. I was offered an opportunity to do something which was very challenging on the outside and gave me a lot of scope. And there were certain, financial reasons as well. I had six children, all of whom I'd assumed were going to go through university. It's almost impossible on a government salary to educate six children without mortgaging everything you own. It came close to that, anyway. I just didn't see how, on a government salary, I was going to be able to see all these kids through college and not end up in very serious financial difficulty. So, the idea of taking early retirement and taking on a job which was challenging and lucrative, at the same time, certainly was attractive.

I didn't do it without a lot of soul searching, because I love the Foreign Service. My wife loved the Foreign Service. She was not a spouse who disliked it. On the contrary, she is a linguist by training. She is a person who loved foreign travel and loved living with other cultures, as I did. So it was a tough decision for both of us to make. I think it was a very

close one because, you know, in effect my career had just gotten a rejuvenation. I was at a take-off point. Certainly, had the Carter Administration stayed on another four years, I would have had a fairly lovely career. I'd performed a good service. I'd had close contact with the White House and all the top levels of government. I was looked on as a valuable member of the team and I agreed with most of the policy objectives of the Carter Administration. I was very comfortable, both in a professional and a political sense, in dealing with them. So it was a tough decision to make. In retrospect, it was absolutely the right one because, when the Reagan years began, as a Latin Americanist, I would have been out on my ear.

Q: You would have been in great trouble. As they say in Korea, you would have been in deep "kim chi."

CUTTER: No doubt about that.

Q: Well, I'd like to thank you. I appreciated this. It was very interesting.

CUTTER: Well, it was a pleasure.

End of interview