The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

HUGH DE SANTIS

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Initial Interview date: January 27, 2006

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INTERVIEW

Q: And you go by Hugh?

DE SANTIS: Yes. It is my name.

Q: Let's start at the beginning. When and where were you born?

DE SANTIS: In Erie, Pennsylvania on the sixteenth of April, 1942.

Q: Let's talk a little about the family. First of all, where does the name De Santis come from?

DE SANTIS: My father was actually born in Rome. On that side of the family the name and the origin is Italian.

Q: What you know about your father's side of the De Santis family?

DE SANTIS: I don't know very much about the background. My father came here as a young boy. He worked in the textile trade in New York and New Jersey and later set up a painting and wall papering business. I've never traced the family tree, so I don't know if I am part of the lineage that produced the 19th century poet and literary critic of the same name.

Q: Do you know how your father came over? Did he come over as a struggling immigrant or did he come over to a family that was already established?

DE SANTIS: Yes, I suppose to an established family. He had a brother here and so he came over to live with him initially. I think the intention was to go back to Italy, but like a lot of people, he decided he was going to stay in the States. He lived in New York City, and I think the circuitous route to Erie, Pennsylvania was related to his marriage.

Q: Then on your mother's side, what's the background of your mother?

DE SANTIS: Italian as well, though with a German admixture. The family on her side had been in this country since the middle of the nineteenth century, so they were pretty Americanized. As a child I was tutored in Italian, beginning at the age of five or six. That meant when I came home from grammar school there was a second set of lessons. Now my father would come home from work and dutifully and sometimes sternly tutor me. If I hadn't done my homework, I was deprived access to social activities. I always felt deprived as a child because I had to go to school twice a day. The point of bringing that up is that on my mother's side of the family there was no facility with languages, and my friends certainly did not have those burdens.

Q: Did your mother go to college?

DE SANTIS: High school.

Q: And I assume your father?

DE SANTIS: High school.

Q: Did you grow up in Erie?

DE SANTIS: I grew up in Erie. I went to a prep school, but it happened to be located in Erie so I was the equivalent of a day hop at Cathedral Preparatory School. I stayed in Erie until I was eighteen and then went off to college.

Q: Was your family, coming out of Italy and all, was it a Catholic family?

DE SANTIS: Yes.

Q: How Catholic was it?

DE SANTIS: Well, he was a Catholic in the way that modern Europeans are Catholics, which is to say nominally. Some of his values have stayed with me for a very long time; for example, he believed that it didn't make much difference where one went to church because, as he said, we all prayed to the same god. He did not… I would not call him an agnostic, I think he was a theist. He just did not… he was not a practitioner. It just wasn't important to him.

In my mother's case she was a practitioner, and I went to church on Sunday. I remember once asking my father when I was a teenager why he didn't do this. He said that it was something that was important to my mother, and when I came of a certain age I could use my own judgment.

Q: Did you have brothers or sisters?

DE SANTIS: A sister, a year-and-a-half younger. She was a beautiful child, and she is a beautiful woman. Generous, decent, intelligent, and sophisticated.

Q: What was Erie like up through elementary school?

DE SANTIS: In the '50s. Well, it was sort of "anytown" USA, I suppose, though I had no other comparison with any other place. As a young boy growing up I thought it was a generally affluent community. There was no dominant industry, but rather diversified small-to-medium manufacturing. We lived a reasonably satisfying middle class life. I didn't find it, not that I would've paid that much attention to it as an eight year old or ten year old, a cultural Mecca by any means. I think its attraction for a child was the Presque Isle peninsula that was a frequent place for visitors, not only in Pennsylvania but from elsewhere in the state, Pittsburgh, in particular.

Q: There was a battle there wasn't there, a naval battle?

DE SANTIS: In 1814, Oliver Hazard Perry. I'm hard pressed to remember the name of the ship, but I remember as a child going down to the public dock in Erie where that battleship, I think it was called the Constitution, I may be wrong about that, but that battleship was still present, though I don't think it is any longer, for all to see. That was for me as a young boy always quite an experience.

Q: Was this the sort of neighborhood where you could walk to school, get on the street, bicycle around and all that?

DE SANTIS: Yes. Precisely that kind of a neighborhood where I had good chums. I had my bicycle, and we played baseball in the street on occasion and at a grammar school sand lot and did the kind of normal things kids did, played hide and seek and the rest of it.

Q: And I would think though the place being knee deep in the snow most of the time.

DE SANTIS: That had both pleasant and unpleasant memories. In those days when, it seems to me, the seasons were somewhat more predictable than they are today we used to get snow very early and sometimes just enormous snowfalls that were always a delight if they kept me away from school. The thing that I remember about that as a child, which stands most vividly in my memory, was on those wonderful snowy nights neighbors and passersby just wishing each other Merry Christmas and saying hello to each other. There was a kind of small town charm and innocence to it all, the exchange of pleasantries that you really almost never see any more.

Q: In your neighborhood what was the composition of your neighborhood?

DE SANTIS: It was mixed. I mean, I don't remember precisely. It wasn't the kind of neighborhood where there was an ethnic identity so I'm certain we were not the only

family of Italian extraction. There were others who I'm sure were Irish or German, I think your normal melting pot kind of thing.

Q: Were you much of a reader?

DE SANTIS: Yes.

Q: Do you recall reading anything that stands out in your mind?

DE SANTIS: I do, indeed. As a very young boy, certainly less than 10, I remember reading The History of the United States' Marines. That was one of the early books. I remember reading the history of General Custer. I mean the kind of things that a boy might be interested in. I must've been around 12 or so when an uncle bought me Sienkiewicz's Quo Vadis, and I remember finding that pretty tough sledding. I read a great deal and usually in the evenings when it was time to go to sleep. Somehow my parents always mysteriously knew if there was a light going on in my bedroom. I would sometimes have a flashlight under the covers to continue my reading.

Q: It was a boon to Eveready.

DE SANTIS: Absolutely. The flashlight ploy and the radio ploy. Listening on the radio to a baseball game and hearing my father in another room telling me to shut the radio off. I would put the volume as low as I possibly could, hoping they wouldn't hear it, but they had these extra sensory powers.

Q: What was elementary school like?

DE SANTIS: I went to a school called Irving Elementary School. It was by and large a pleasant experience. I was a very good student, but I was an impatient student. Later I was told by teachers that I should have been in an advanced class because I was one of these kids who was constantly raising his hand to demonstrate how much I knew and … no, no. Let Johnny speak… I would be reprimanded. I typically received bad deportment grades. In those days the teachers, instead of giving you an A or whatever the equivalent was, would give you a B because of your deportment. My parents and my father, in particular, were assiduous attendees at all the parent teacher nights. My father would remind the teachers that if he's misbehaved by all means discipline him, but please don't detract from his grades … but that's the way they did it in those days.

Grammar school was basically a good experience. I had some pals that I kept company with, one of whom … his dad was the minister at a Methodist church not too far from our home, and I spent a lot of time in the church gymnasium playing with him. A lot of time was spent on the baseball diamond at Irving, where I invited strangers and friends alike to play ball. My most vivid memory was of my failed effort to establish competitive athletics with a neighboring grammar school. Unlike the Catholic schools, the public school system had ceased to participate in inter-school athletics. When my appeals to my fourth-grade teacher were rejected, I took it upon myself to organize a basketball game

with Columbus School. When my teachers learned that we had played basketball at the Columbus gym, they were quite annoyed by my willfulness. I was summoned to the principal's office for a lecture and a beating of my hands with a large ruler the principal kept for such purposes. Today she would be arrested for such behavior.

Q: Did your family fall into any particular political category?

DE SANTIS: Yes. My father was a Democrat, the kind of Democrat that voted for Adlai Stevenson twice and lamented before I could understand it that a man that intelligent couldn't possibly be elected.

On my mother's side, I had uncles who probably, I'm confident, voted for Eisenhower and had somewhat different views, but my father's views, I wouldn't call them doctrinaire but they were pretty … he was a yellow dog Democrat.

Q: During the '50s did the outside world intrude much? You know, news or interests or?

DE SANTIS: I think it didn't in my case through grammar school. I was certainly … I remember in those days the periodic drills in case there was a nuclear attack … to get under the desk and make sure you had this blanket or rug we were asked to bring in that we would put over us so that would supposedly suffice to keep out the radiation. I remember being aware of the communist threat. There was a program on television and I think I must've been eight or nine when it first appeared called I Led Three Lives. I was very taken with that, that we had these infiltrators in the United States who could actually exploit us and take advantage of us. Now I was never cautioned by my parents to be careful of this or that, but I was very much aware of the Soviet Union, and there was always this tangential identification or curiosity about the world beyond our shores because of my father's background.

Q: Now, taking Italian, what was the purpose of this?

DE SANTIS: It wasn't my mother's doing. I think it wasn't relevant one way or the other to her. I think my father wanted me to be exposed to European culture and in particular in learning the Italian language. I don't think I approached this with great enthusiasm between the ages of six and eleven when I was being taught because my preference coming home from school was, of course, to go out and play with my pals. Later on I greatly, greatly appreciated what he had done for me.

Q: For certain events of the world, did you gather around the radio to or TV?

DE SANTIS: No, the things I remember … I was an eight-year old during the start of the Korean War, for example, and my awareness of that was quite superficial. I was quite detached from what was happening. I had a very lively imagination. In grammar school … I suspect kids don't do that anymore … we had to draw and paint, and I would draw active scenes of cowboys and Indians fighting, which mimicked the movies I saw, and I remember being reprimanded. I can't remember what grade I was in, maybe third grade

because the Korean War was raging and I shouldn't be drawing weapons, I was told, because people were being killed over there. It may have been that my third-grade teacher had a relative in Korea. I remember not being terribly sensitive to or aware of the magnitude of what was being communicated. I found it a little oppressive because my creative bent, as I defined it, was being stifled.

Q: After elementary school you went where?

DE SANTIS: I went to junior high school, went to Roosevelt Junior High School … and that Roosevelt being Theodore, not Franklin, as they would always remind us. I was scheduled to go to the public high school, a good public high school, closest to us called Strong Vincent, but I decided … and it literally was me who made the decision … I decided that I wanted to go to the prep school. It was a Catholic prep school. My father, probably reflecting some anticlerical bias, thought that I should go to a public school, but I was so insistent on it he concluded that if this is that important to you, then he said, that's OK, that's what you should do.

Q: Do you know what inspired this? I mean, for a young kid being away from your buddies.

DE SANTIS: Well, I wasn't particularly happy at Roosevelt. At a time when boys and girls were going to dances, dressing fashionably, and dating, I was pretty geeky. I was smart but painfully shy, friendly but not cool, "nice," as the girls used to refer to me in their so-called personality books, but far from an object of adolescent flirtation. I felt different from my peers, and not quite sure where I fit in. What inspired the transfer to Cathedral Prep, I think were relationships that I had developed with a couple of pals in the general environs, a couple of blocks away, both of whom had gone to Catholic schools. I didn't feel I had missed anything not going to a Catholic school, but there was something about this all-boy experience that struck me as something I should be looking into, and they probably had a big influence on the decision that I made.

Q: Your school again was named?

DE SANTIS: Cathedral Preparatory School

Q: Who ran it?

DE SANTIS: I think the order was called Oblate Fathers. You know, it was replete with blazers and headmaster and lots of restrictions and weekly church attendance in the cathedral where, whether we liked it or not, we were part of this huge choir, 1,200 boys when I was there, a big school, raising our voice to sing Latin hymns.

Q: Were the teachers from the order or were they a mixed bag?

DE SANTIS: Most of them were from the order but some of them were probably diocesan priests who had affiliation with the high school, which was by and large a good academic experience, but a socially oppressive one.

Q: What subjects did you gravitate to? Were there any you didn't gravitate to?

DE SANTIS: Yes. There were three basic programs that were offered. One was called the classical program, which was completely Greek and Latin classical studies. Another was at the other extreme a scientific program, which did not really spend any time on classical education but was exclusively geared toward math and the sciences, and then the middle one, which was the one that I followed, a Latin scientific program in which, as far as I was concerned, you had the best of both worlds.

I was a very good Latin and French student and very interested in languages, very interested in history, very interested in geography. We used to have unintended competitions in classes. I remember in the world history class when they would pull the map of Africa down, as Africa was then constituted, and I wonder, the teacher would ask, how many of you looking at this map at some point could set it aside and identify all of the countries of Africa. I would make it a point to get it all down before anyone else could.

I also did reasonably well in math – algebra, trigonometry, solid geometry – and, as I say, got very good grades …though as one priest told my father I didn't work as hard as I could've and probably could have been number one had I really wanted to be instead of number thirteen or nineteen or whatever it was in the ranking of students at graduation.

Q: Did religion intrude much with you or not?

DE SANTIS: Not terribly much. I was certainly a faithful church goer in those days. I don't think that … because it was not, I think, the dominant element in my parents' lives … I mean, my mother was a church goer and insisted that I do the same, but I wouldn't say it intruded on my life in any enormous way. I think that sort of manifested itself when I got to college because certainly by my sophomore year I was so skeptical of lots of things that the Catholic Church advocated that I really stopped attending church at some point on a regular basis, and eventually I did not attend at all.

Q: Did the division that so often happens in the Catholic Church between the Irish, the Italian and maybe the French and Portuguese, anyway, these ethnic divisions often, did you become aware of that at all?

DE SANTIS: Well, I was aware in prep school that virtually all of the faculty was Irish-American. I was certainly aware of that. I was aware of the Irish influence when I went to college. My undergraduate education was at a Jesuit school, and I was aware of it when a priest said to me in my freshman year, "All of the Irish kids want to become priests, and all of the Italian kids want to become doctors. Why do you think that is?" I didn't realize that things were so configured. I was aware of ethnicity, I was aware of ethnic slurs when

I was in prep school. I was aware of stereotypes. I was aware what Poles were supposed to be like, what Irish were supposed to be like, though I had a greater identification with certain ethnic groups than others just because of familiarity with neighborhood families, less with Poles for example, far greater with Italians, Irish, or Germans.

Q: How about girls? You were at that age when girls are usually a great attraction.

DE SANTIS: I was a very shy kid. While I was not unattracted to girls, I would not call myself very adroit or very graceful. I think this was complicated by an automobile accident I had. Because we were so close to the New York state line – only twenty miles away – it was common to zip over the line because you could drink at eighteen in New York. If you were sixteen you might be able to get away with it. I did this one time with some friends in a car I had borrowed. I did not realize that the tires were bald. On the way home, I picked up my sister and a friend of hers at a dance, and as we were driving home we had a blowout. Fortunately, I wasn't speeding, and I had very little to drink. The car ended up smack into a tree. We were all hurt, some of us more than others. Tragically, the young lady who was seated next to me ended up with the imprint of her face in the dashboard. She was taken to the hospital for emergency surgery, and I was so distraught as a consequence of that experience that I retreated ever more into a shell, and I probably didn't come out of it until I was a senior. I didn't have a very active social life. Fortunately, that young girl survived and looked as lovely after the surgery as before. I even took her to my senior prom.

Q: Erie, I remember going through there back in the '80s or so and it was the most depressing place because there seemed to be row after row of industrial type buildings shut down.

DE SANTIS: It wasn't like that when I was a kid growing up. It was an industrial city, and like other cities in the rustbelt, it has clearly deteriorated, but it had an active shopping district. My parents passed away when I was in my thirties, so the amount of times I've been back to Erie you could probably count on one hand. I have sort of lost touch. I do remember the downtown sort of drying up as people moved to the suburbs. This is obviously not peculiar to Erie; it has happened to a lot of cities in this country. The damage that was done to what used to be the commercial center of the city, you know, as establishments left or closed up, producing the depressing kind of environment that you talked about.

Q: You graduated from prep school when?

DE SANTIS: In 1960.

Q: Whither?

DE SANTIS: I left to go to John Carroll University in Cleveland, Ohio.

Q: Why there?

DE SANTIS: I'd like to tell you this was all carefully thought out, but it wasn't. We had a visit, actually many people came my prep school to entice students to submit applications, and I recall this guy did such a wonderful job of selling the institution I thought maybe that's where I should go to school. Now there were other opportunities, I could've gone to Penn State, I could've gone to school in New York City. My father was not particularly insistent on saying you have to go here or there. The only concern he had was that I might go to college in Erie, at Gannon College, as many of my friends did. My father insisted that I leave home.

Q: Obviously a wise fellow.

DE SANTIS: He did not want me to … he said it is time for you to be on your own, and you know, I don't care where you go, but you have to leave home.

Q: During prep school I guess you were so tied up with it, did you have summer jobs or afternoon jobs?

DE SANTIS: Other than when I played football later in the summer and had to go to practice, my father felt strongly that, after I turned sixteen, I couldn't just spend my summers lolling about; I had to be productive in some way. I was a packer, a bagger in a grocery store, in a big supermarket. I remind my wife of the difference today when you go to the local supermarket and have somebody throw things in bags any which way. I remember being trained to do that as a 16-year old and taking great pride in making sure that I could pack the bag properly.

Q: Then John Carroll, you were there from 1960 to '64?

DE SANTIS: Yes.

Q: Talk a little bit about what's the origin of John Carroll and then talk about what it was like when you were there.

DE SANTIS: John Carroll was the first Catholic bishop in the United States. I don't know what the count is today, it may not have changed. If I remember correctly, it is one of 30 Jesuit institutions in the United States. I don't recall the number of students but I'm going to guess in the vicinity of 3,000. It was not large. That was also one of its attractions, this very good student-teacher ratio. That has obviously changed as institutions need to generate greater revenue; it is now co-educational. I went … the priest was probably right … I went to study pre-med because I thought that would please my father.

I was never really all that interested in things like botany or zoology, which you had to take in your freshman year. I was much more drawn to languages, including the English language, and the humanities. On the basis of certain aptitude tests that we were given, I was placed in an advanced English class and in an honorary English fraternity. After my

sophomore year I remember soliciting the advice of faculty members because I wanted to change my major, but I was going to make my father unhappy, which I think it did to some degree when I told him that I was no longer really interested in becoming a medical student … that I wanted to become an English literature major. So I did.

Q: With Jesuits running the school, did you learn sort of the Jesuitical way of learning and of dealing with situations?

DE SANTIS: I like to think that one of the advantages of my undergraduate experience was that I was trained to think logically about things. I minored in philosophy. I think from that perspective it was a plus. On the other hand, discussions about philosophers like Immanuel Kant, for example, were pedestrian because it was a Catholic institution and philosophers sometimes got put into categories … were labeled, you know … he's an atheist or an atheistic existentialist, and that meant that he's not somebody that we should take seriously.

I was pretty intellectually independent, which probably had some influence on my own views of religion, and I so I found this approach a little too oppressive. I recall taking a true-false test in a metaphysics course my sophomore year, which I simply could not fathom. Rather than give yes or no answers, which I simply could not do, I elaborated on each question, answering each on the basis of underlying assumptions and the logic that I thought flowed from those assumptions. I wasn't very successful. I failed the test.

Q: You entered there in 1960. How about the election campaign of 1960 of John Kennedy? Did that engage you?

DE SANTIS: Absolutely. I was certainly caught up with the Kennedy mystique, like lots of people were. I think the fact that he was a Catholic was significant to me because I realized that if he were elected president, this would be a watershed event. No Catholic had ever been elected president of the United States. His youth, his vigor, his charm, all that had a big effect on me as well, but the principal memory of the Kennedy presidency was the Cuban missile crisis.

Q: October, 1962

DE SANTIS: Yes. And I remember being in a dormitory and having a conversation about this with two or three of my college classmates and being all of a sudden seized with the reality that if something draconian happens here I'm going to be packed off. So that was, I think, my first serious awareness of the world beyond our shores and of the consequences of the policies that we were pursuing.

Q: Did the world engage you more at that time in doing international studies or anything of that nature or no?

DE SANTIS: It engaged me more, but I hadn't made up my mind that international affairs was going to be the way I spent my professional life. I was very interested in

writing, very interested in psychology, increasingly interested in the world beyond my shores. I subscribed to things at a relatively early age like The New Republic in addition to Time magazine. Still, I was pretty informed politically, and I don't think that following the day to day events of the 1960s, following events about NATO, for example, like the French decision to leave the military wing of NATO, that was not central to my world.

Q: How about the civil rights movement that was beginning to crank up at that time. You were off in Ohio. Did that have much impact?

DE SANTIS: You know, I don't recall; the civil rights movement began to have an impact on me after I left undergraduate school. It was not a prominent a part of my college experience. We were obviously aware of was going on, but I don't think … I think that in the next couple of years that it became a much more prominent part of my life.

Q: During the time both in Erie and John Carroll, did you run across any Jews?

DE SANTIS: Certainly in grammar school and junior high school I had some experience with Jewish kids. There were a few at my prep school; there were some at John Carroll. I probably … given John Carroll's location in Shaker Heights, I'm sure I dated some Jewish girls. I was not raised with any ethnic or religious prejudices. It wasn't relevant to my family what someone's background was.

I remember in college … but I don't recall what the name of the street was … I think it may have been called Warrensville Heights Road in Shaker Heights … and I remember it was called the Gaza Strip by the students. I do recall on occasion some students from John Carroll making nasty comments, you know …I make a distinction between what I would call malign versus benign anti-Semitism, and I think benign anti-Semitism is in some ways rampant in our society … making caustic comments about Jews, and it was the first time in my life that I saw first-hand the kind of anger that this provoked. I mean, in some cases fist fights would break out. I didn't understand why there was a need on the part of my friends to make these comments. But that was my exposure to what was going on in Israel and the West Bank.

Q: Also looking at this at the time there was still also children coming out of the Irish immigrant experience which is terribly prejudiced. I went to Boston University for a year and coming up against Irish immigrants. I was horrified. It was just a world apart but you know, that's what they came up with.

DE SANTIS: Yes, I think that's right. I could not make that sociological observation then as I can now, but I think that you're absolutely right. It was the imposition of stereotypes on people, not just on Jews but on other people as well, and your point is well taken. In addition to the near war experience in '62, the Arab-Israeli conflict consequently also became a part of my intellectual world, though I was by no means following developments closely.

Q: You mentioned literature. Did you find yourself concentrating in any particular area?

DE SANTIS: Yes, I was very attracted to Shakespeare, I suppose both the Tudor and Stuart periods of literature. I was a very good Shakespeare scholar, and I was very interested in seventeenth century poetry. I was interested … I remember the love poetry of John Donne and Robert Herrick were very interesting to me. I loved the romantics. I was mesmerized by Byron. I also studied the plays of O'Neill, one of my all-time favorites, Chekhov, and Ibsen, among others, and I liked to write satire.

In my senior year – this was not very much appreciated by the dean of students, a dean of men, at John Carroll – I can't remember his name … Morgy Lavin … but he would always refer to the ballgame of life. So when I was asked by the editor of the paper if I would write the class history, I wrote a satirical class history based on the ball game of life, where we … my classmates … were in a game with the university, ahead much of the time but at the end in the ball game of life we didn't come out on. I remember running into a couple of people on the quadrangle who took my aside to say, "I can't believe you would write something like that." But, of course, it was just meant to be a satire, though I suppose it was directed at the school's regimented approach to things. They expected something, I think, more sober and adulatory.

Q: Then in 1964 you're getting out. What were you pointing for at this point?

DE SANTIS: The truth of the matter is that I didn't know. To be perfectly candid, I didn't have terrific direction. I thought I wanted to go to law school, but I didn't do as well as I had expected on the exam. I remember when I took the law school boards there was a component of the test that required you to punctuate sentences. As I mentioned earlier, I mean, I got very good grades in English, and no one ever said I was a bad writer. But I remember I didn't do very well on that part of the test because they had a set way, a set style in mind, so I was sort of turned off to the rigidity of the approach, and I thought law school in the end might be kind of boring. So I was a bit at sea.

The real decisive factor for me – and this is the third foreign policy or, let's say, world event that influenced me – was the Vietnam War because when I left undergraduate school I had a draft notice waiting for me in June of '64. Like a lot of new graduates, I wasn't prepared for this and didn't quite know what to do. I met a friend from high school one day, I even remember the friend's name, Jimmy McGoey. I happened to run into him, and he said you can get in the reserves if you drive up to such and such recruiting station, so I drove up and enlisted in the army reserves. What this meant was that I had bought some time.

In the meantime, a professor at John Carroll who taught clinical psychology, especially a course called theories of personality – and that was my other great interest besides literature – took an interest in a personality theory I wrote, even though it was probably pretty superficial. But he thought it was pretty good for somebody who didn't have any experience or training, and he said you might want to study psychology, and that sounded just fine to me.

So he recommended that I contact the head of the clinical psychology program at Loyola University in Chicago, whose name was Father Herr. I sent a note … he was a very difficult man I subsequently learned. In any event, I sent a letter to him asking what I could do to gain admission and that if I could be enrolled sooner than later I would be grateful because I had the army breathing down my back. He wrote back in red ink across my letter. Clearly, something I said in the letter he didn't like, but he told me to come and see him. I remember packing my belongings and driving off to Chicago. I remember saying to my mother I wasn't sure where I was going to end up, maybe San Francisco, though I was joking. She said nothing would surprise her. I drove away and found my way to 800 North Michigan Avenue, having no idea where the hell I was. I went up to see this priest, Father Herr, who was a very gruff guy. He told me to take two courses. One was a course in statistics without which, he said, you cannot … won't be able to do anything in clinical psychology. The other one was a course in abnormal psychology. He said, "You'll be lucky to get C's in these courses."

That was my introduction to graduate school – and I did not get C's in the courses, by the way. In the course of that experience, as much as I was interested in clinical psychology, I wasn't interested in lab work, playing with rats and that sort of thing, any more than I was interested … I loved physics and I loved chemistry … but wasn't interested in the labs and wasn't very good at doing experiments. One day I came upon somebody, an administrative person, at Loyola in the industrial relations program, basically the study of labor economics, industrial relations, and labor relations. And lo and behold, after a couple of discussions, I was offered a scholarship if I wanted to pursue a master's degree. The courses … because the program was geared to people in the business world … courses were offered at night. So I would work during the day as a graduate assistant in exchange for tuition over two years. I turned that down … I turned the scholarship down … because I wanted to complete this program quickly and get out in the workaday world, and so I finished that master's degree in eleven months. I petitioned to take more than the number of courses one was permitted so I could really accelerate my progress.

Q: What was the point of all that studying?

DE SANTIS: At that point I was … the short term point was to enter the private sector, take a job in labor management relations of some sort and …or personnel, something in that area. I didn't have any grander ambitions beyond that because I still had a military obligation. In those days the basic training camps were filled because by 1965 things really started to escalate in Vietnam, which is when I entered the reserves. I didn't know when I was going to be called up, which was a problem for private sector employers. People were not very willing to … obviously this doesn't happen anymore … if you went for an interview, the first thing … I remember I went for an interview with Ryerson Steel Company, no longer in existence, in Chicago … they wanted to know if is you had completed your military commitment. "Do you have your military service out of the way?" they would ask. And if the answer was no, they weren't going to bring you on board because they knew they would lose you.

Q: At the time you were at the University of Chicago, this was in 1964 to '65, wasn't it?

DE SANTIS: That was at Loyola.

Q: Was there any ant- Vietnam feeling at all?

DE SANTIS: It hadn't really started yet, certainly not there. There was discussion among students, among males about, boy, things are really heating up. It was just a matter of time before we were going to be called up, everyone agreed. I mean, there certainly was an awareness that this was our likely future, at least in the short term. In my case I was prepared for that eventuality. I'm reminded of this because of what a divisive issue Vietnam was in American society; it remains a divisive issue in our society. In those days whether you were a member of the Reserve or the National Guard wasn't relevant. If you were going to be packed off to Vietnam, you were going to be packed off, even though the chances were far less if you were part of the Reserves. I thought that that was going to be my future.

Q: You got your quick master's degree. While you were in college were you doing any work on the side at all?

DE SANTIS: I tutored French. I majored in English literature and minored in French and philosophy. I tutored French, I babysat, I bar tended. I did that because I remember asking my father in my freshman year for money to take this young lady to a dance. My father sent $60 and a letter. He said he was going to do this one time. His job was to pay for my education, not to finance my social life. If those things are important to you, he said, you will have to find some way to make ends meet. So I did. I never asked him again.

Q: On languages, were you picking up languages?

DE SANTIS: Yes. I was very good at languages. The French came very easily.

Q: But when you were taking French how was it taught ? Were you learning to speak it?

DE SANTIS: Well, it's not the way it's taught at FSI. I took French as well as Latin in prep school and that was kind of a mnemonic thing where the teacher would say whatever and then you repeated it. When you minored in a subject, as I did at John Carroll, that meant I took French literature courses, and yes, you had to speak in French. If you had to leave the room because you had to go to the restroom, you had to request permission in French. But this wasn't an immersion course in any way.

Q: Was there any program to study abroad when you were John Carroll?

DE SANTIS: Not to the best of my recollection. That would have interested me very much. In those days, other than fairly frequent trips with my family to Canada to places in Ontario, I had no exposure to the world.

Q: In 1965 you're getting out. What happened?

DE SANTIS: Getting out of graduate school? I met a lady in graduate school who was a Lithuanian by birth. She was born in Kaunas, but ended up to in a DP (displaced person) camp. Her parents were physicians and among the fortunate people who had the kind of education that allowed them to come to the United States and go back to medical school for a year or two, or whatever the period was, so they could practice medicine here. Many of their friends who were lawyers or jurists didn't fare as well and ended up doing janitorial work. She and I hit it off and decided we would get married. It had nothing to do with military service; we just decided to get married. In retrospect, leaving aside the fact that I am no longer married to her – in retrospect the marriage was an impetuous and imprudent decision because I still had military service ahead of me. We were not even married a year and I was packed off to the army.

Q: You went in the army in '66?

DE SANTIS: February 1967. We were married in '66 and I did get a job, incidentally. The one place that would take me was Argonne National Laboratory, an AEC contractor, and that was my first exposure to security clearances and the federal government. I worked on the labor negotiating with the Teamsters, Machinists … I mean, I participated in labor negotiations with those unions and others. I found it quite interesting. They were willing to take a chance on somebody who hadn't completed his military service, and then a year later I was on a bus to Fort Knox, Kentucky.

Q: Did you get any particular feel for the labor movement at that time?

DE SANTIS: I had a great respect for those people; I have to be honest with you, even the ones who were coarse rather than sophisticated. I didn't think all of their demands were so onerous, and while I represented management and did that quite comfortably, there were occasions when I said, well, I don't to know why we can't make the following concession. I was pretty young. No one was going to pay attention to anything I said. But I respected them for what they did, for the contribution they made to the lab.

Q: You went to Fort Knox for basic training, was it?

DE SANTIS: Yes.

Q: What did they do with you?

DE SANTIS: Well, other than those first … what shall we say? … I mean, you talk about a rite of passage, I mean, losing your hair and having to sit in a commode without partitions. They didn't know quite what to do with me. The reason for that was that I had a master's degree. They asked how much education we had … I remember being called to the company commander's office and he said, "Well, try to make the best of this." I mention this because many of the people in my platoon hadn't finished high school.

Being educated had no effect on my relations with my mates. The marvelous thing about being in the army was the cross-section of people you met. I am a believer that all Americans should have this experience in some way, some public service, and it's critical to our democracy. I met people in my unit, my platoon, who probably grew up on dirt floors. The sense of commitment that we had, the sense of community that we had, the commitment to each other was really quite extraordinary. I found it a remarkably maturing experience.

Q: What did they do with you?

DE SANTIS: The Six Day War broke out.

Q: This was between Israel and Egypt and Syria.

DE SANTIS: That's right. This was in the summer of '67. I remember thinking to myself, good Lord, here I thought they were going to send me off to Vietnam. I'm probably going to the Middle East. The fact that I was a reservist, as I say, was not relevant to me because at that point in the Vietnamese war all bets were off. The demands for manpower were so great anything could have happened. We all waited to see where our advanced infantry training was going to be. I was trained to be in the infantry. That meant I might have been sent to Fort Polk or Fort Jackson, and everyone knew what the next ticket was from there. But I was sent to quartermaster school in Fort Lee, Virginia, south of Richmond. That's where I spent the rest of my active duty.

Q: You were doing that until when?

DE SANTIS: Until the end of '67, the fall of '67. I went back to Argonne National Laboratory with my military service out of the way, quite marketable. The International Company … and this is where that part of my life became more and more prominent … the International Company of Amoco made me a job offer and I went to work for them.

Q: I was surprised in '67 they didn't do more with the reservists.

DE SANTIS: I think that they provided for reservists in terms of life skills. Is that what you mean?

Q: In keeping them going, you know, keeping them in.

DE SANTIS: Yes. I can't explain this. When you got your orders and someone said you're going here or there, I didn't know quite what that meant. Certainly quartermaster school didn't mean anything to me. I considered myself having been given an enormous reprieve. When I left active duty, however, and of course still had a reserve obligation, what I learned in quartermaster school was irrelevant. I remember being assigned to a military intelligence unit because they were looking for people who had foreign language skills. But, you know, if you moved your residency, as we did, you got assigned to the available reserve unit. If there was no military intelligence unit in your area, you were

assigned to the unit, whatever its mission, that was closest. It was a little bit like the Foreign Service, where you trained in an area and then sent someplace else where the skill or language you learned isn't particularly useful.

Q: You were only at Argonne a short time?

DE SANTIS: My relationship with Argonne was brief. I was grateful to them for giving me an employment opportunity, which permitted me to get married and for keeping my job open when I got out of the Army. It was never a place that had a long-term future for me. First of all, it was an institution for scientists and so for people who had a different kind of background. There wasn't much headroom. So when the opportunity to work for Amoco, which I considered a real splendid opportunity, came up, and they were very interested in me, I leapt at the offer with alacrity.

Q: Amoco being an oil company but what was their interest in you?

DE SANTIS: Employee relations or what is today human resources. My background … I had done wage and salary studies and labor negotiations … and so I was hired at the very end of '67, December of 1967, just as the International Company was moving from New York to Chicago because John Swearington, then the chairman, had decided to integrate the company's different units. For the first few months my task was to help staff the office, meaning hiring lawyers, believe it or not, as well as administrative people, accountants, secretaries. I was flying back and forth between New York and Chicago on a fairly regular basis. That was their interest in me.

Their long-term interest in me, I suspect, was to find young people with the skills that they thought could be developed to become executives at some point down the road. You know, I was a pretty impatient guy, and this was my first exposure to a large organization that didn't brook really any deviation from corporate proprieties. There was an opportunity for me to move to Pan American Petroleum, which was Amoco's, that is Standard of Indiana, exploration and production company in Tulsa, and I had gone out there for a visit and interview. But I was more interested in professional opportunities at the corporate office. So, I stayed at Amoco International for a couple of years. The striking experience for me at Amoco, of course, was the immersion in an international experience. I met people from Venezuela, I met people from Iran, and I was very much intrigued with international life.

Q: Were you going out to these countries?

DE SANTIS: I was supposed to go to Iran, but for whatever reason that trip was called off. I was scheduled just prior to leaving the company to go off to Egypt. This would not have been glorious duty, being posted in the desert at the site of wells, you know, training Egyptians in site management and working with people on employee relations, that sort of thing. I moved on from there to the financial consulting world. I was hired by a New York based financial relations firm, which was a combination of financial consulting and financial PR (public relations), to join their Chicago office.

Q: You did that from when to when?

DE SANTIS: I did that from ’69 basically to ’71 and then again in ’73. There was a hiatus there. You asked the question about direction and that’s when direction, in my case, began to congeal. I was still in my twenties. I wanted to do something international, I was pretty convinced of that, but I was married and still needed to generate income. I was basically an account executive for this firm. I was responsible for doing research on corporate clients, and I did a fair amount of traveling, not abroad, well, into Canada, but most of the travel was in the U.S.

Q: How did the rather specialized area of the business world appeal to you?

DE SANTIS: I liked the research aspect of it. I liked the opportunity to make assessments, analytical assessments about companies, and try to suggest things they might do to improve what they were doing. I was never offended, and … I mean, my interaction at a relatively young age was with CEOs (chief executive officers) and CFOs (chief financial officers) … and I was never offended when someone said to me, “Well, Hugh, we really appreciate all the work you’ve done here but we think we’re going to do something different.” I never felt proprietary about any of these things. I was paid to offer my advice and it was their prerogative to accept it or to reject it.

What happened was the gentleman who hired me, who was a lawyer and a very fine lawyer and a man I liked a great deal, decided to leave to take a job as an investment banker with then Dean Witter. The gentleman who replaced him was an ex-newspaperman and a very decent man, but the nature of the work had changed and the energy that had been so much a part of the office had started to dissipate. I think this also came at a time when we were starting to enter into a bear market where the opportunities to do things were less available than they once had been. That coincided with the nagging desire on my part to do something internationally, and so I decided to go back to graduate school. I was offered a scholarship by the University of Chicago to study international relations.

Q: So you were at the University of Chicago from when to when?

DE SANTIS: I was at the University of Chicago from ’71 through ’77 with the exception of 1973. I went back to the financial consulting firm in 1973. The gentleman with the newspaper background who ran the office was exceedingly considerate. I needed to generate some income as I moved on. I had completed a master’s and I was now in a Ph.D. program and so I basically took that year off.

Q: International relations at the University of Chicago, was there any thrust at what you were looking at?

DE SANTIS: Yes. My focus was Europe and the Soviet Union. I went to study with Hans Morgenthau and was just thrilled that I was offered a scholarship to do this. But the thrill

was very brief because Hans Morgenthau very soon thereafter left and went to The New School in New York. Morton Kaplan became the head of the committee, a very different person from Morgenthau, fairly doctrinaire in his thinking, I felt. I studied with Aristide Zolberg, who was one of the Europeanists in the Political Science department and also with Nathan Leites, who was a great political scientist, part of the Jewish diaspora from Austria in particular and also Germany that ended up at Chicago. I had the great pleasure to study with a number of those giants, including Bettelheim and Bert Hoselitz, who taught me economics of the developing world.

Ultimately, I gravitated to courses offered in United States diplomatic history, which were taught by Akira Iriye. I took several courses from him – in fact, all of his lecture courses – and was very excited to learn about America's place in the world. I remember writing my MA paper under both Kaplan and Iriye, entirely missing the inherent tensions between a political scientist and a historian who wanted me to take my Ph.D. in their respective programs. Kaplan was pretty directive. He told me upon reading my first draft, "You'll have to change this" because the thrust of my paper … my approach was historical rather than sociological … and what he was saying to me, which I was too inexperienced or naive to pick up was, do you want to take your Ph.D. with me or do you want to work with Iriye? I chose to take my Ph.D. with Iriye. And even though the Ph.D. was conferred in diplomatic history, my focus still was on Europe and the Soviet Union. I managed to … which was one of the wonderful things about Chicago … to create a program in which I was working with political scientists, people in the psychology department and sort of structuring my own international relations course of study.

Q: Were you finding, stating my prejudice, but had the usual preoccupation with numbers hit political scientists at this point?

DE SANTIS: Quantification. It had, it was the beginning. I think the difficulty I ran into, particularly with Kaplan … there was a tendency, I think … there was an overly rationalistic approach to international affairs. I once raised in class the irrational influence on political decisions, and Kaplan simply dismissed me by saying that it was difficult enough to create rational models without complicating things by incorporating idiosyncratic inputs. In fact, if I could have done it … and I would have done it if Harold Lasswell had been at Chicago … I would have studied the psychopathology of politics. That really helps to explain why states do the things they do. And so yes, I have always had a bias against an overly rationalized approach to international politics.

Q: So many universities were infected, again I'm stating my prejudice, but campus Marxism was still going strong. How about Chicago?

DE SANTIS: Chicago dealt with that swiftly and sharply. President Edward Levy … when the Mark Rudds at Columbia presented themselves in Chicago, Levy simply expelled them all. It is a little bit like the way the old Soviet Union used to deal with hooligans, and how China still does address demonstrations, as Tiananmen showed. Chicago simply nipped this in the bud. It liquidated the people that created problems for management and went back to business as usual.

Chicago was and is a very conservative institution. While there was certainly anti-war sentiment on campus, it was nothing like the protests that you saw at Berkeley or Columbia or other places. In my case, I remember wearing my fatigues to school … my work shirt with my name tag sewn on to it and my sergeant's stripes. I was critical of the war, as I was even when I was in the service, and I remember protesting it once in the service. Protesting is too strong a word. I would be asked rhetorical questions, as we enlisted men were by gung-ho officers. How many of you believe you know, we would be asked, sometimes in battalion-sized formations, how many of you sitting here believe that this is a terrific war and we're all doing the right thing to defeat Charlie and save Asia from Chinese communism? I swear to God. How many of you disagree with that? And I remember raising my hand and, by God, I was the only one to do so. But to their credit, the drill sergeants said OK, get that blankety-blank four-eyed so and so to come on up here and tell us why he thinks this war is a mistake, and I would say something to the effect that the Chinese had been fighting the Vietnamese since about the ninth century. I didn't think our concern is with China expanding southward. They would listen to what I said, which I am sure I said in a pretty unsophisticated way, and then ask the battalion: "How many of you agree with this four-eyed so and so?" And of course, no hand would go up. They would tell me to go back to my seat and shut up, or more precisely shut the fuck up.

At Chicago the radicalism of Berkeley simply didn't exist. Protest was done in a more discreet way, I would say, because people knew the University did take kindly to revolutionary rhetoric. Similarly, I recall students in the history department trying to lobby to have an African-American other than the great John Hope Franklin brought on the faculty. The University didn't deal with democracy very well … we were told, in the tradition of great European universities, that the school existed for the scholars assembled there, not for the students, who were there to learn … and so I told my fellow students, who had asked me to participate in their protest, that reason would never work because the faculty had all the answers, and if they were really serious they would have to do something really, really extreme, like kidnap a faculty member and threaten his life if their demands were not met, but no one, including me, was really prepared to go that far, so the protest faded.

Q: How did you find Chicago University, living around there, because it is surrounded by essentially a ghetto?

DE SANTIS: Yes, a very dangerous environment. We lived … when I was working in the private sector, we lived just off Lake Shore Drive in an apartment building that was expensive, especially for students, an extension of my former life that I needed to ease the transition. When I went back to school I still managed to do some consulting … financial public relations, which generated a little bit of income to supplement the scholarship. I took these jobs to avoid taking financial assistance from my in-laws or my uncle. This was complicated by the fact that my wife also went back to Chicago at the time to complete her Ph.D. in sociology, and her family was understandably concerned about her creature comforts. Because we could not afford the rent at our apartment, we

eventually moved to a place, also on the near north side of Chicago, not on Lake Shore Drive any longer, to be sure, but to a place called Sanborn Village. So we never lived in Hyde Park. We commuted to Hyde Park either by train, the Illinois Central Railroad, or in this little Datsun jalopy I managed to buy.

We did have one bad experience a few years later … it was over the Christmas break of 1975 … when visiting friends in Hyde Park for dinner. We were accosted at knife point … I didn't see him, my wife did but never said anything … in the warming hut of the Illinois Central stop on 59th Street with nobody on the platform fairly late at night. But for the whistle of the coming train coming when it did, the situation could've been much worse. The guy forced me to take my boots and coat off, all the while holding a knife to my wife's throat. I thought he was thinking of raping her, in which case I might be able to get the knife from him. Fortunately, it never came to that. We weren't unhappy that we didn't live there.

Q: What were you and your wife planning to do?

DE SANTIS: We were planning to … initially, I think, my thought was I was going to teach international relations. She was going to teach sociology. But at some point reality begins to hit you in the face and you have to ask the question, well, what if you get offered a job on the West Coast and I get offered a job on the East Coast? How do we do this? Not unlike the situation that obtained in the Foreign Service roughly at the same time, or a little bit later, where wives, in an era of gender equality, were no longer simply wives, they had careers too. How do we do this? This was complicated by the fact that as time went by I became less interested in teaching and more interested in practicing what I had been learning. I wanted to become part of the State Department and the Foreign Service.

Q: What was your dissertation?

DE SANTIS: My dissertation was on … the MA paper was a paradigm on how we formed images of the Soviet Union …the dissertation was on the origins of the Foreign Service and its role in the Cold War. And that ultimately led to a book called the Diplomacy of Silence. It was a study of 30 people as they moved from post to post and ultimately served in the period from 1944 to 1946 in one of the countries in Eastern Europe, which ultimately became the battleground of the Cold War. What experiences they took with them … formative experiences, experiences from other posts they took with them, their perception of the world … and I made a distinction in the book between those who were based in Washington and those who were based in the field because they had very different effects on the way people saw the Soviet Union and later the Cold War.

Q: I've gotten the feeling from reading and talking to some people that those who served in the Soviet Union even during the war found they were being treated as enemies. It was not a positive experience.

DE SANTIS: Yes, I mean, in reading Maxwell Hamilton's letters to his wife in '43 … he was very unhappy partly because he didn't have Russian language skills but also very unhappy with the way the Soviets were behaving in such a high-handed way. The people who served in the Soviet Union actually had the most realistic view of the Soviets. Ironically, the sentiments of diplomats such as Hamilton, and even more so real Sovietologists like Kennan or Bohlen, can be juxtaposed with the way we approached the Tehran Summit, with then Secretary of State Cordell Hull still waxing eloquent about Joseph Stalin as a man who could rise to high office in the United States. There were discrepancies between the field and Washington, which goes back to my point about the center and the periphery that I developed in the book. People in Washington in those days, people who were helping to formulate policy, were more inclined to the bet on the come, if you will; the James Clement Dunns and others. People who were watching this firsthand were more inclined to see the Soviet Union for what it was and to say that Washington's expectations were too idealistic. There was a real clash between the center and the periphery, a point that Loy Henderson and Elbridge Durbrow, both of whom served in Moscow, and Walworth Barbour, who was in the Balkans, made to me when I was researching the project.

Q: I can understand that. I interviewed a man who served in Moscow and in Vladivostok during the war and I took some excerpts and entitled that section "Learning to Hate the Soviets."

DE SANTIS: Well, there was another part of this. For people like Elbridge Durbrow, Kennan probably to some point as well, Bohlen, Llewellyn Thompson, people who had the experience of being at that Riga listening post or at least being exposed to the Soviets in other ways in the '20s and early '30s, they carried with them an image of the Soviet Union, through Stalin's show trials and the rest of it that other people who didn't have that experience would not had difficulty comprehending in 1944 and 1945. I'm referring to Dunn and others in the Department.

I tried to factor all of this into the analysis. In fairness, even people like Loy Henderson … during the '42 to '43 period when it looked like the United States and the Soviet Union really might develop some modus revendi after the war … they began to question whether the Soviets really had changed. This is all catalogued in Ambassador Henderson's nine-volume memoir, which is at the Library of Congress but which I saw before anyone else, I am proud to say. For some reason, Ambassador Henderson took a grandfatherly interest in me, telling me at one point, "Young man, you belong in the Foreign Service." In any event, you can see this shift in thinking very clearly in the memoirs. Then as the Soviet Union showed itself for what it ultimately was in the period after 1944, after the summer of '44 particularly, Henderson and others would say later that the Soviets really hadn't changed, and the US was wrong to be duped into believing that they would.

Q: Apparently Henderson got crossways with Eleanor Roosevelt, at least that's the story. He was bounced over to go to Tehran and then to India. In other words, he'd been the man who kept the books on the Soviets, a big card filing system of who was doing what to

whom and this was not Eleanor Roosevelt and her coterie and she was kind of wrong. But it was part of the times. She didn't see the Soviets as Henderson did.

DE SANTIS: Well, I didn't know that. I'm not surprised because his views were pretty consistent on the Soviet Union. He was pretty hard over and somebody like Eleanor Roosevelt, who would have liked to believe that the world was going to be very different, would have had a hard time with him.

I might say parenthetically, many years removed when I was serving on Senator Bingaman's staff, a very fine man, the Senator asked me the question that it was only a matter of time before the Soviet Union would cooperate with us and abandon ideological warfare? I remember telling him that it was probably not going to happen in my lifetime. I was, of course, radically wrong about that, not that the Russians have become like us, but I never thought that the wall would come down quite as quickly as it did. Not unlike something Loy Henderson might have said too. Interestingly, I was brought on board by the Senator's administrative assistant because he wanted Bingaman, a liberal senator from a relatively conservative state, to move closer to the center.

Q: Your Ph.D. was when?

DE SANTIS: The Ph.D… I finished in 1977 and it was conferred in January of '78.

Q: Where do we go from here? We were talking about your getting your Ph.D. and then what?

DE SANTIS: The Ph.D. was conferred in January of '78, and that was a very turbulent time for me because I had spent a good deal of the previous couple of years doing research at various places. I was away from home a lot, including up at Princeton where I guess I met George Kennan for the first time. I met him twice to interview him and to read his papers to which I was given partial access. My wife and I, as it would happen, these things … the timing is always bad … split up in February 1978.

I had been invited up to Clark University in Worcester. Mass, a wonderful institution, as a follow-up to a preliminary interview in New York in December at the annual American Historical Association meeting. It was a bit like a meat market for schools to recruit new historians. I was Clark's choice, so I went up to Worcester in February to make a presentation and do further interviewing, I think the day after my wife said maybe we shouldn't live together any longer. It was not spectacular timing.

Clark was interested in me because of my eclectic background. They were interested in somebody who was trained as an historian but who also had a background in political science, among other things. They asked me if I would put together an M.A. program in international relations that also incorporated some of the psychopathological elements Lasswell studied. One of the professors who attended my lecture, a psychologist, thought I could make a contribution there. I found that quite interesting. When push came to shove and they offered me a contract I realized that and this was not a tenure track thing,

but rather something I would be asked to do for a couple of years and then have to move on and find another job. That's not really what I wanted to do. But the more I thought about it, I realized that I really wanted to be a practitioner, so I respectfully turned it down and made arrangements shortly thereafter – I think I moved in June of '78 – to come to Washington, DC. I had Loy Henderson's comments still ringing in my ears, and it was a question … at that point I was I guess around 35 or so … of am I doing this too late?

I made contacts with people on the Hill particularly with Chuck Percy's staff because of the Chicago and Illinois connection. I thought I would be snapped right up. I had a Ph.D. from Chicago, writing credits, and real-world experience. But I did not have "Hill experience." A professor of mine from Chicago, Barry Karl, a terrific teacher and scholar, who knew that I was professionally trying to get my act together, told me to call the head of the history department at Temple University in Philadelphia. They were looking for someone to fill in for somebody who was on sabbatical. I was grateful for the opportunity because I needed a job, but I was also trying to make contact both in the State Department and on the Hill, which would be hard to do long distance. In any event, I went up to Temple, kept my apartment, my studio apartment on Capitol Hill, and then managed to share an apartment with somebody in Philadelphia. I taught twentieth century political history and a survey course in American diplomatic history the first semester, and then the second semester … I remember, it was quite fascinating … I taught European art history, which was quite a leap for me. That was really quite interesting because the students were all studio artists who were not used to having somebody say, well, artists don't just dream this stuff up. You live in an environment that influences your thinking and your sensibilities. I remember giving my first lecture … I'll never forget it … on mannerist art and the Lutheran Reformation. Much to my surprise and delight, the students as time went by realized that, yes, I guess the culture in which we live does have some effect on how artists actually define themselves and come up with creative ideas. The Temple experience came to an end in June of 1979.

I came back to Washington and immediately got a job, while I was waiting for the State Department to finish its security background review. A gentleman I met who was in the Foreign Service but had left fairly early on and who was regarded as having a first rate mind, Anton De Porte, then on the policy planning staff, took an interest in me. He had been reassigned to run the European Office in INR, and he was very interested in having me come to work there. So while I was waiting for this longish process of the full-field investigation to end, I was offered a job at a small consulting firm, a beltway bandit. The beltway bandit was in Alexandria, Virginia. The name of this place was R.F. Cross and Associates. They had a contract with the Defense Nuclear Agency to look at the history of nuclear weapons testing and the effects on people who may have been infected with radiological poisoning. They were looking for someone who could put the history of this together and assess the consequences of the testing on the health of people who were at the test site.

Q: Where do you find, I mean there's Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where else would you look?

DE SANTIS: Well, these were the tests that we conducted in the 1950s. This was before the test ban treaty of '63, when we were doing atmospheric testing. I forget what the first test was now but I think it was Test Mike in 1953 or perhaps Ivy, and there were written records associated with the tests. I was not asked to do this because I was an expert on biology or nuclear weapon testing or its physiological effects, but I knew how to do research and they were looking for somebody who could do this in a hurry and who wrote well.

Q: So you went only to already existing studies and all.

DE SANTIS: Well, there were no studies at the time; there was a repository of data. We were to piece this together in such a way as to show when the study was conducted, how many shots there were, what the fallout was, how many people were affected, and so on. This was undertaken because claims were now being brought against the Federal government by people who were, as it turned out, not adequately protected from radiological poisoning. I started that job, if I remember correctly, pretty quickly after I came back to DC from Philadelphia, so it must've been July or August. I answered an ad in the Washington Post.

In the interim, and I'm trying to remember, the National Endowment for the Arts – another Post ad to which I responded – contacted me and I went to have an interview. I met a woman, a very sophisticated woman, who was kind of a director of planning. In the course of the interview, she concluded that my eclectic background would be useful to her in doing studies on different issues. I was flattered and very responsive to the challenge. I recall the gentleman who called me to make the formal offer … and I guess recruited me … asked when I would be able to start work. I felt a little uneasy about this because I knew what I wanted to do, and it wasn't making a career in the National Endowment for the Arts. But the State Department was just taking a long time, as it unfortunately invariably does, and the project work at R. F. Cross would eventually be coming to an end.

I asked someone I had befriended … a Harvard Ph.D. who worked as a defense analyst at the Congressional Research Service … for advice. He told me to take the Endowment job and to simply leave when State completed its administrative process. He said people do this all the time. This person, who has done well for himself, has probably behaved this way on multiple occasions, as others have in this town, but the advice didn't sit well with me. If I had known that it might take another year for the Department to make a formal offer, I would have done as he advised. But what if the timing was much shorter? I could not bring myself to take the job, which I felt might have left people in the lurch if I were suddenly to leave. So I called the man who made the offer and honestly explained my predicament over lunch, telling him that it was intention to become part of the State Department once the clearance process was completed. He thanked me for my honesty, pointing out that they were making a commitment to me and that my early departure from the Endowment would have greatly embarrassed him.

I found myself in similar circumstances in a couple of other places that summer, when I was completely candid with people. In one case, I was invited to a board meeting of the Close-Up Foundation, which wanted to hire me for a senior position, but the head of the organization said that he feared my heart was elsewhere, which was true. As it turned out, matters all came to head I guess at the end of '79 or the beginning of '80. I was offered a position … in fact, I began on Saint Patrick's Day in 1980 … in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the office of European Analysis.

Q: As what? Were you a civil servant?

DE SANTIS: Yes, I was a civil servant for two years. I was hired by Anton De Porte as the Special Assistant for Regional European Security Analysis. In other words, I was given the NATO portfolio with an emphasis on France. My job was to sort of look at the region as a whole, particularly the security dimension, but also in those days the EC (European Commission) dimension. I relied on my relationships with the office's country experts to provide data. It was a very good working relationship, and almost all of these people were FSOs with a couple of exceptions. In my second year Anton De Porte retired and, I think, at the beginning of '81 Don Gelber, a Turkish hand, who later became ambassador at an African post, took over the office. I know he was DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission) in Lagos for a while in the 1980s.

Q: I think I have interviewed Don.

DE SANTIS: Yes. I think he lives in New York now. He took over the office, and I continued the same work for him. At some point midway through the year he talked to me about going out to Lagos with him. "You know, you'd have to take the foreign service exam," he told me. I had by then established on the basis of the work I was doing on NATO, and I can be more specific about that if you like, very close relationships with EUR, with the European Bureau, and in particular with George Vest who was Assistant Secretary at the time, and very good relationships with Ron Spiers, who was running INR, and also with Jim Goodby, the deputy START negotiator, because of the work I was doing on arms control issues and NATO.

I took the Foreign Service exam, passed the exam, and went to see each of these gentlemen. George Vest had strongly encouraged me to do this. I was all set to go. I was set up to attend the A-100 class and I assumed … and all three said coming into the Service at my then pay grade, which was a new 2, would be no problem, given my background and things I had done already … that I would be brought in as a 2 or 3. But that's not what the system had in mind. The personnel people said, "Oh, no, no. You have to start as an O6." I said, "Geez, I can't keep taking these huge pay cuts, because I took a pay cut to come into the government to begin with." So things started and ended at the same time. I didn't even join the A-100 class. I didn't feel that I was asking for so much. I had taken the exam. I already had a good reputation in the Department and the field, and I had three distinguished people with the rank of ambassador who had encouraged me and offered their support for my membership as a mid-grade officer. But the system didn't want to do it that way, so I left.

INF was one of three issues I remember most vividly from that period. I also prepared a retrospective analysis for INR on Kissinger's Year of Europe policy, which took several months. This project was important because it helped me to develop a relationship with George Vest, Ron Spiers, and others. What I basically did was to analyze the Year of Europe policy in historical context, but to make it relevant to what was going on in the late 70s … to what was going on in Afghanistan, for example … by drawing some lessons that had policy implications for what the Carter administration was trying to do; and, as part of that message, what I was conveying was that it wasn't clear to me that so much had changed in the way we conducted our diplomacy with our allies. Our relationship with NATO really hadn't improved dramatically. We still were not listening to our allies, and we were not consulting as effectively as I thought we should be doing. The paper was really a monograph. I remember Spiers classified it as Top Secret NODIS. I presume it's been declassified since then.

I remember a year later, when I was out at the mission in Brussels talking to John Hawes, who was our Political Counselor there at the time, and others about this. They were very interested in the paper. It had real relevance to contemporary Alliance politics. That paper was important for me because it helped to establish my reputation with people in EUR, people with whom I developed good professional relationships.

Q: Let's go back to the NATO thing. It was an interesting time that was straddling the Carter and Reagan Administration and you had, I guess … was the SS-20 already up or did that come a little later?

DE SANTIS: No. The SS-20 started to be deployed in the mid-70s. It was in the late 70s, perhaps as late as '79, that Helmut Schmidt, the most impressive statesman of the era, in my opinion, made his representations to the Carter administration, which, you may recall, people in DOD in particular were not especially responsive to this. They didn't see the SS-20 as being a big threat to the US until Schmidt made it increasingly clear that while it might not affect you in the United States it surely does affect those of us living in Central Europe.

Q: And so what was the conclusion?

DE SANTIS: I'd have to refresh my memory on that one. Ultimately … well, the US recognized that we could not allow the Soviets to continue deploying SS-20s. But this decision was not made quickly. The Carter administration was preoccupied with SALT II, MBFR, and the CDE negotiations that grew out of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Meanwhile, the Soviet deployments continued apace. Finally, the Europeans got the Carter administration to agree to the double-track decision, as it was called, in 1979. The idea was for the US to deploy cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles, which were ballistic missiles, and simultaneously negotiate with Moscow to remove all intermediate-range missiles from Europe. The Carter administration acceded to this plan to placate the allies, especially the Germans, though, as I recall, without any enthusiasm. The rationale was laid out by the Brits, at a meeting … I think it was in

Guadeloupe … in January 1979, a meeting of the heads of state of the US, UK, the Federal Republic, and France. The North Atlantic Council of NATO approved it in, I think, December. For the US and the Europeans, in particular, this was about "recoupling" Europe and the US in security terms. The great European fear, and it was really palpable in that period, and even more so when Reagan became president, was that they might be abandoned by us. In the Reagan period, certainly in the first couple of years, European feared they would be entrapped in a new conflict with the Soviet Union. So they felt caught between a rock and a hard place.

The potential decoupling of Europe that Schmidt worried about was magnified by our tendency to do things without consulting our allies. If were to be honest, we would recognize that we and the Soviets both behaved imperiously in our spheres of influence in Europe … I mean, we were the dominant power … though, of course, we exercised our dominion through persuasion and veiled threat rather than coercion, as the Soviets did. I guess part of what I was concluding in the Year of Europe paper was that there was still a tendency on the part of policymakers to make decisions and treat them as *faits accomplis* when to it came to sitting down with people in the Alliance. You may recall, there was a great deal of consternation in NATO over the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan on which Lord Carrington ultimately decided to resign because he disagreed with the way in which Washington was approaching it … I mean, as an East-West crisis rather than an East-South problem. As I recall, NATO also viewed Afghanistan as an East-South problem. There was a tendency for the United States to want to put everything in an East-West dimension. Europe was trying to avoid doing that because they didn't want to go back to the Cold War. What I concluded was that not much in our relations with our allies had changed. We were still behaving in a way that left Europe out of our decision making. And we have persisted in that behavior, as the current Iraq war demonstrates, to this very day. We decide what is in our collective strategic interests and then expect the Europeans to implement our decisions.

I made a similar case in a second paper I produced in 1980, but in a much more policy-relevant way. I had done an analysis of what turned out to be … it wasn't the CDE then … but at the Helsinki Review Conference in Madrid, it became clear to me as I was looking at the cable traffic that the United States was going to be isolated. I wrote a paper … and it came perilously close to being a policy recommendation … suggesting that we had a couple of options: we could insist on having it our way, at the risk of alienating the Europeans even more, or we could go along with the Europeans' desire for a conference on disarmament in Europe as a way of keeping a security dialogue alive with the East. I essentially recommended doing the latter because I thought we'd have a better chance of influencing the outcome and of co-opting the allies if we could do that.

David Aaron, then Brzezinski's number two on the National Security Council, apparently went berserk when he saw this paper. I don't know what I was, a GS-12 at the time perhaps, and he called the front office … he called Spiers' office. Spiers sent Hank Cohen down to see me, Ambassador Cohen. That was my introduction to Hank Cohen, a nice guy with whom I developed a good relationship. He wanted to meet the guy who wrote this paper because they were catching such flak upstairs, and so I remember his

comment to me when he left. I'll never forget it. He said, "You've learned your first lesson in the way Washington conducts foreign affairs. Don't be right before everyone else is." That was the kind of NATO environment we were in as we made the transition to the Reagan administration, and that is the kind of work I was doing … writing papers that people in the building hopefully thought were useful to them and the policies they were promoting.

I think those were the dominant … those are the memories that are most vivid to me. There was a memory also of the Polish crackdown by General Jaruzelski in December of '81, which would've been right at the end of the period when I was making the transition into the Foreign Service. This occurred on a weekend … and I was in Saturday morning to look at the traffic. I don't remember if I was the duty officer; I may have been. Hank Cohen came out of his office as I was getting ready to leave. He said he needed to see me, and there were a couple of other people from INR, the late Bob Baraz, who ran the Soviet office, for one, and he told us he needed us to write something on this building crisis … because Soviet troops had already left their garrisons … what we thought would happen. The expectation at the time … because Soviet exercises were going on, which was the MO they had used before in Czechoslovakia … was that we would see a repeat of 1968. I wrote a paper for Ambassador Cohen suggesting that the more probable outcome was that the Poles would take matters into their own hands because no love was lost between Poles and Russians. The last thing Polish leadership and certainly the Polish military wanted was the Soviet Union in there killing innocent Poles. I remember that vividly because Richard Perle subsequently said then what Condoleezza Rice just said incidentally about the Hamas victory … we have a remarkable way of saying these things … "it was the last thing anyone expected". But obviously some of us expected just that. People who work on these issues in the broader foreign policy community are people who often say insightful things, as I know we did. And as a friend of mine did, who was on the Policy Planning Staff at the time, Steve Grummon, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. The assumption that, boy, no one is thinking critically about foreign affairs crises is wrong; people are. It simply doesn't perk up to the decision maker, who then excuses the failure to respond effectively by saying it was the one thing we hadn't thought of. Or just as likely the decision maker ignores it.

Q: There is the group-think syndrome or conventional wisdom. Everybody thinks something, for those in power, it's almost catching, it's like a disease. And those who maybe really know don't seem to be able to penetrate the upper echelons where people tend to coalesce around a viewpoint.

DE SANTIS: Well, I think, sadly, you're right about that, and even in the job I'm performing now for Ambassador Negroponte, these things don't change. A friend of mine, a retired FSO whom you should probably chat with, this is Glen Cella, whose background is both Europe and NEA … and he would always say that expertise was the enemy of policy. I think one of the problems is groupthink, and I think for younger officers there's always an understandable inhibition, because you rely on the mentoring, on the experience of people who are more senior, and if those people are not in a position to say, yes, I think we should do this or say this, either because they're too timorous or

because they're worried they're not going to be on the next promotion list, those views don't perk up.

Q: INR, how did it come out? Did it come out in any particular way?

DESANTIS: No, I don't recall any reclama from INR that reminded the Secretary or anyone else that we had people here who were thinking along those lines on Poland. I'm just trying to think. That was in my first two years … I mean, bureaucrats everywhere behave predictably. No one wants to be the nail that stands up because it gets pounded down. I think there are analogies to my INR experience today when Condoleezza Rice says we didn't expect this outcome in Palestine regarding the election of Hamas.

Q: You're talking about Hamas winning the election in the Palestinian elections 10 days ago?

DE SANTIS: With a majority. That sort of begs the question, well, why not? Why didn't we anticipate a Hamas victory? One of the questions people should be asking is the "what if" question. What if Hamas wins this election outright, what are the implications for the United States and American interests in the region? I'm hard pressed to believe that somebody in the State Department, whether in NEA or INR or somewhere, was not asking that question. The issue is whether or not someone had the wherewithal to say, yes, let's to go ahead and address it, and that's very difficult to do once you know the policymaker's mind is made up.

Q: Did you notice in that '79 to '81 period a noticeable shift in the State Department attitude? I mean, you were doing these think pieces, basically, and you were moving from the Carter Administration, which was rather idealistic leftist, to idealistic rightists with Reagan.

DE SANTIS: The phrase that I used in the '80s, and I would still use it today, was that America simply went from populism on the left to populism on the right. I think they were both populist presidents. What I remember as a relatively junior officer about the Carter Administration was how much open criticism there was in the corridor. It's not something that typically happens in the State Department. People are a little more circumspect. But FSOs were quite openly critical of Carter and, as I remember, he was certainly not George Vest's favorite president.

I was put on the transition team when we went from Carter to Reagan to deal with European issues. The issue I recall being asked to address was the Polish question. Solidarity had already come into existence, and Charles Z. Wick, you may recall, had became the head of USIA with his Hollywood experience. This was his "Let Poland be Poland" period. I remember writing a paper comparing Poland and Nicaragua, saying that we had to be careful when we criticized the Soviet Union for pressuring Poland through Jaruzelski because we were intervening through surrogates in Latin America … so that we would not be hoisted on our own petard by doing the same thing in Poland. I'm quite sure that no one in the Reagan Administration paid attention to that comparison.

By now I'd decided I wasn't going to be part of the Foreign Service, which by the way was very disappointing to me … because I simply had to be realistic and make a judgment about how long it would take me to get back to my then current rank. I was getting a promotion every year as it was, and I thought how long will it be before I go from 06 and 02? That wasn't going to happen overnight.

At about this time a gentleman from the CIA, a Vernon Walters' protégé by the name of Hugh Montgomery, was appointed Assistant Secretary – then Director – of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). I had met him at the Agency when I was working for Don Gelber because I had basically written an estimate that the CIA paid for. Somehow, I did not write it under the aegis of the intelligence community. Montgomery, who had been station chief in more than one European post, was one of the people who had read this, and we started chatting, and one thing led to another. He decided he would like to have me in the front office of INR. Parenthetically, my colleagues thought I was being reassigned to shut me up. I don't know whether that is true. In any case, what they had asked me to do … I was given a title of Executive Assistant to the Director … but what they really wanted me to do was to edit and help manage the Secretary's Morning Summary, which no longer exists. You may recall these were the short, so-called front of the book breaking news items and then the three 48-line intelligence assessments of some policy issue that would go up to the Secretary early every morning.

So that was my task then, working with a very fine gentleman by the name of Phil Stoddard, who was a Deputy Assistant Secretary, and Hank Cohen, the senior DAS. I guess I sort of would see Hank as maybe the managing editor and Phil … or Hank as the executive editor and Phil as the managing editor, and I was kind of the newsroom editor. It was my job in dealing with office directors to decide whether or not a piece was good enough to be sent up to the Secretary, or relevant enough, and sometimes you got into, you know, issues with people who outranked me surely, but I had the authority in the job to say "Well, I just don't think this one is good enough to send forward."

For example, I remember vividly when somebody asked me if the Pol-Mil office in INR could send a book item up to the Secretary on the strategic implications if the Soviet Union were to somehow send troops into the Kola Peninsula into Finnmark. I simply asked one question: what was the probability that that was going to happen? Well, the guy said it was a pretty low probability, and I said, why on earth would the Secretary be interested in knowing something about that then? So those are the kind of decisions …

Q: Didn't they have troops there?

DE SANTIS: Well, they did have them, I don't remember how many, and plenty of nuclear weapons. But this was to defend the peninsula from invasion, which had happened twice in the 20th century, but not in Finnmark, in that no-man's land between Norway and the Soviet Union. I thought it was one of these academic exercises, but if it didn't have some policy relevance, some probability of occurring, why of all the things we could write about, what would the Secretary care? Office directors got into it

sometimes, not so much with me but … "Well, I'll take it up with Phil Stoddard," they would say. I recall ever being such a wonderful boss. I remember Phil saying more than once, well, I'll take a look at it, but if that's what he said, meaning me, I'll trust his judgment.

That was a very fun time for me in the sense that I had a wonderful relationship with Phil and Hank but I was always itching to be more involved in the doing rather than in just editing somebody else's work. I wanted to be more actively involved. Ambassador Montgomery was reluctant to turn me loose because some of the things I was writing about in those days had to do with the European Peace Movement. I would periodically get packed off to Europe to meet with peace activists in Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, in particular, because if I remember the details then, Germany would only deploy intermediate-range missiles to offset the SS-20s if one other continental power also deployed.

It became clear to us we couldn't … we weren't going to count on the Dutch. We were less certain … maybe we could count on the Belgians, and of course, no one expected the Italians to be steadfast … in those days under Craxi, they were the most resilient, and provided Helmut Schmidt with the justification to do what he needed to do. I would be sent out to engage the peace movement in the hope of bringing them around, and I would write memos about this upon my return. What I would say when I was in The Hague and what I would say when I was in Belgium was quite the opposite of what I might be conveying to my superiors in the Department or in the UK. Still, there was a great deal of concern at State about writing something that might be viewed as a challenge to the administration's position.

I will tell you something, and this will sound tendentious or as selective memory, but I remember vividly during this time when Jim Goodby took me aside in to solicit my assistance on a matter that was important to him. Jim, as you may or may not know, was working for and I'm trying to remember the general who was the head of the START talks then. You may recall this START negotiator better than I do. It will come to me … Ed Rowny. Jim, a smart and very decent guy, was having a hell of a time as his deputy. Jim and I were having a conversation one day, and he said to me, "You know, you ought to try to write something on this. I can't do it (given the sensitivity of his position) but you may have something imaginative to say to get us out of this box we're in."

I wrote a piece that talked about …essentially, without going into the details, it said not precisely, but it effectively said the same thing that Kvitsinsky, the Russian ambassador who led the Soviet INF delegation, and Ambassador Nitze said when they had their so called walk in the woods, namely, that we need to get rid of the Pershing II missiles, and if we can make this tradeoff maybe we can reduce the number of SS-20s. I remember … I was astonished when a couple of weeks later the walk in the woods surfaced which, of course, we thought was going to be the breakthrough that we needed. The Reagan administration resolutely opposed it.

That was a tense time because, going back to the point you made earlier, in this case the head of INR did not want to appear to be challenging administration policy. That certainly wasn't my intention but was instead a way of saying, look here, maybe we should be taking the Nitze-Kvitsinsky agreement more seriously.

Q: Would you talk a bit about your impression of the peace movement and the people in Europe you were talking to? Did you get a feel where these people were coming from? Were they dealable with at all?

DE SANTIS: The answer to the second question is almost always not. In fairness to those who were idealistic but well-intentioned, as opposed to those who had an ideological agenda, it was very difficult for us to get people to look at the situation in a moderate way. This was a period in which the Soviet Union had worked very hard with its public diplomacy to influence the peace movement in Europe. In many quarters they were successful. They were successful because there was a perception among young people that the United States was taking Europe back to the Cold War. The argument that we would make … we didn't start this, we weren't the ones who put the SS-20s in Europe … didn't fly somehow because of the administration's rhetoric or the perception that we were not interested in effecting an arms control outcome. You recall both in INF and START nothing happened for a long time, and in 1984 we simply left the table. As it turned out, it was a stroke of diplomatic luck … or genius, as the Reaganauts would say. The Soviets realized, well, we'll have to change our tune if we want to sit down and talk to those people. It was very difficult to get peace activists to see it from a U.S. perspective, no matter how hard you tried. The same thing was true to in the UK. I had friends there … I would be over at someone's house for dinner … some of whom were academics, and their minds were made up.

At a dinner party in Chelmsford hosted by a British historian, a terrific woman, I had befriended when we were both doing dissertation research in Washington, and her husband, the people invited to join us … fairly left in their views, Labour and Liberals in terms of political affiliation … were quite emotional in expressing their opposition to our deployments in Greenham Common. As you know, when we are abroad there is almost an instinctive tendency to defend one's country, which I did, and pretty vigorously, questioning their suspicions about a country that had twice rescued Europe militarily. The conversation unfortunately got quite heated, which disappointed my hosts. I suspect my friend Fiona concluded that I was an incorrigible right-winger … I was, after all, defending the policies of the administration … because we lost touch with each other.

Q: How about the intelligence and this kind of thing? There's always been this, not dispute, but you get intelligence from essentially secret sources as well as overt. Many of the people I've talked with felt that the overt intelligence was normal diplomatic intercourse and a preponderance of them were not all that impressed by covert. I mean, how did you feel?

DE SANTIS: Yes. I was not one that … if some piece of intelligence crossed my desk that was covert, I didn't automatically dismiss it, but I'd look at it and try to determine

how credible the source was. If I found a piece of information that I thought could have influence on an issue, the way I saw a development or the way I might write about it, I would always try to corroborate it with the traffic that came in from the embassies. If there were a third person in this room from the intelligence community, he or she might say that's kind of biased on your part. The fact of the matter is I knew our people, and I could go out to the field and talk to them about policy issues, and they were people whose judgment I respected, whose intellects I respected, and I was more inclined to take their point of view rather than somebody who would send a piece of information in based on a source which may or may not have been a credible source. I wasn't wowed because something was classified as codeword. I was pretty circumspect about the sensitive stuff and more inclined to be responsive to the diplomatic traffic that I was getting from our people.

In addition to which, I had my own sources, as any political officer in an embassy would, people who were diplomats in Washington at various embassies. I had continuing conversations with them and developed relationships with them as one would in the field, and there were some people I was more inclined to trust, including journalists, foreign journalists, many of whom I thought were well plugged in to people, who would provide information to me.

Q: How did this work? Sometimes people in the intelligence community stay away from foreigners or stay away from newspaper people.

DE SANTIS: Well, that's correct. The short answer to that is people in the CIA are told to avoid having contacts with outsiders, but as I told them when I had to go through the clearance process for my current consulting position, that's not what people in the business of diplomacy are about. The job is to engage others and to communicate with them, and we're not told not to speak with foreigners; that is your job. Partly through mentoring, partly through experience, you learn what to say and not to say and how to say it.

Q: Hugh Montgomery came out of CIA. Did you find that he brought CIA attitudes? Was this a problem or not?

DE SANTIS: Yes, I think it was. You know, at the CIA there is a … you have two cultures there; you have the operational culture and the analytical culture. They don't always see eye to eye or even like each other. I think he came with a distinct set of ideas, as would a Foreign Service Officer going to work for the intelligence community; you get acculturated into a system or into a way of seeing the world. I think there was some suspicion on his part of … I can't trust these people.

I remember that Hank Cohen was a wonderful buffer for me in the front office. I recall one time writing a piece … I should tell you, in those days very often INR would also send up longer pieces, longer pieces meaning three pages, to the Secretary on some subject. There would always be embarrassment in the front office if they didn't have something to send forward to meet the quota for the day, whatever it was, three pieces I

guess. So I might be called by either Phil Stoddard or Hank. Quick, write something for us, put something together, they would say; we can't send this stuff to the 7th floor. And so hurriedly, I would write a piece on some subject such as the peace movement or the INF talks. And then they'd say, well, what how do you want it classified? So we would come up with a classification, even though it was rarely derived from cables. It was done quite back of the envelope, but it was always a respectable analysis, and it saved them from embarrassment. Sometimes this created a problem because Montgomery was very anxious about sending things forward that he thought again might in some way some way be misinterpreted by people in the White House.

In one case … I don't remember what it was he wanted me to change … and I didn't feel in good conscience that I could change it … and I remember Hank Cohen asking me how I felt about that and I said, "He's the boss and it's his call what he wants to send forward." I said, "You can send it forward with his changes, but please take my name off the drafter's line because those aren't my views." Hank was very decent about that. He found some way to finesse the language … he referred to it as being Talmudic … so that the analysis could go forward in a way that satisfied everyone. he could go forward. There were tensions there. I think at the DAS level … you know, these were all Foreign Service officers, and then you had Hugh Montgomery, and I think there were cultural differences. I don't think there were overt spats but it's not that everybody was on the same page, that's for sure.

Q: Did you get involved with any part of the Reagan administration and Central America and all that?

DE SANTIS: No. I did when I was reassigned to the Policy Planning staff. The issue during the INR period that I got involved in that was somewhat problematic was the Siberian gas pipeline issue. I had written … again not unlike the paper that I wrote about the United States being isolated and Europe on CDE in the Carter administration … and I also believed we were going to be isolated on the Siberian gas pipeline because, as I argued, that Europeans were basically interested in commerce. The French, the Germans, the Italians – the main countries the Russians were courting to build that pipeline – they were not going to be deterred. That was a very difficult period because the Reagan administration kept changing its baseline on that issue.

I don't remember the particulars of the administration's revolving logic, but again I'll give you an analogy that it was not unlike the reason for going into Iraq. Well, did we intervene in Iraq because of WMD? Or was it to promote democracy? Or was it to get rid of a bad guy? The Reagan administration employed the same kind of flexible reasoning to justify their opposition to the pipeline. That issue was vivid to me because it was the issue on which Al Haig fell on his sword. I have to tell you, I had this wonderful laudatory comment on my Year of Europe paper from Al Haig, on the executive summary that we sent to him, which I have kept for my files. However frustrating he may have been for people in other bureaus, especially our Latin American people, on European matters he was quite sensible and I thought quite educable.

Q: He had been NATO commander.

DE SANTIS: He knew Europe. Going to the source in Cuba, as he put it, that wasn't my beat. I recall the last memo I did on Europe, which was on the pipeline issue with the Soviets, it was a memo through Ambassador Montgomery to the Secretary making the case that efforts to kill the pipeline weren't going to work. We got a call from the line on the seventh floor (the people working in the Executive Secretariat that served as the conduit for the building's flow of paper) that the Secretary of State had just resigned. I remember Hank Cohen standing in front of my desk and I said, "What do I do with the memo?" And he said, not missing a beat, "Send it to the Acting Secretary."

In the staff meeting the next morning, I remember vividly when everyone went around the room the consensus seemed to be, well, you know, it was just a matter of time before it happened. Haig was not sufficiently circumspect, he was too pugnacious, he was this, he was that, comments that had not been expressed heretofore but were now socially acceptable because they could be made with impunity. I actually respected Haig for standing up to the White House on an issue on which I thought he was right. I thought he was giving them sage advice. I was the only person at the staff meeting to say something positive about him.

Q: The issue being again the pipeline?

DE SANTIS: Yes. The issue being that this is not a good fight to wage with the allies because they could not be budged. They are going to do this anyway; it was a loser for us. You don't want to fight losing battles. You're better off acquiescing in this situation, I argued, and taking the Europeans on in other policy issues.

Again I will make a quick analogy because it is all so vivid in my mind … and this is pure speculation, but I read with interest in yesterday's paper the change of tune of the Bush administration on the current demonstrations in Europe on the part of the Muslim community following the cartoons in the Danish newspaper. And my speculation would be that the administration has changed its tune from being originally sympathetic to the Muslims to now being sympathetic to freedom of the press issues because they want to retain their bona fides with the Europeans, now that our relationship has improved somewhat, just in case we might want to do something else in the Middle East and have to rely on their support. I think Haig was trying to convey that advice to the administration.

Q: What were you doing as we move along?

DE SANTIS: This was a one year assignment and what I was doing, as I said, was to basically perform the task of getting the Secretary's book ready for him every day, but there were other things I was asked to do. I was asked to write memos that analyzed the policy issues on which the intelligence might have a bearing one way or the other. I wasn't particularly happy doing the "book," the morning summary, on a continuing basis because I wanted to be more actively engaged in the policy process. There were always

… this was in many ways a thankless job because friends of mine, not just in the European office but other offices of INR were sometimes put off by the edits and sometimes because we rejected their analysis. Nobody likes someone to say, "Gee I just don't think we can use this piece. Or I think you're going to have to rewrite this." I never shied away from doing what they asked me to do, but it is not a job where you win friends and influence people. At some point … and this was the second pass they made at me … I think a year earlier Phil Kaplan, who was on the Policy Planning staff basically working as the then director's chief of staff had contacted me.

In the first recruitment, Phil told me emphatically that S/P (Policy Planning) was looking for someone to advance Secretary Haig's new policy initiatives. The example he used was Haig's goofy idea of getting the Saudis and other Arab states to join with Israel in forging an anti-communist front in the Middle East. Haig called this "strategic consensus." Phil said this was the real issue, not the Arab-Israeli dispute. He asked me what I thought of this. I said that it sounded like Haig's "going to the source" idea of fighting communism in Latin America, but it was doomed to failure because the Saudis would never line up with Israel. The Palestinian issue was still the central problem in the region, I added. Phil was noticeably put off. The meeting ended abruptly, and I, of course, was not offered a job. A year later Phil came back to me again. By now, I guess, we're in the spring of '83. I needed to find out where I was going to be working next.

Meanwhile, a very nice gentleman by the name of Milt Kovner, a Foreign Service officer who was working at the CIA as the NIO for Europe asked if I would like to come out and interview for the deputy NIO job. I had met Milt when he was DCM in Athens. He's just a very fine man. So I went out and interviewed for the job. There was a big round table discussion of these distinguished people on the National Intelligence Council, including Harry Rowan, and they put me through my paces. There was nothing perfunctory about it. There more than a little riding on it for me as well because Milt had said to me privately that he would be leaving in a year and that I would in all probability, assuming I conducted myself well, succeed him as NIO for Europe. You know, I was about 40 years old at the time and I thought that was a pretty nice assignment. But I wasn't sure if this was the right thing to do because there was still a stigma attached to the CIA. I recall having a chat with Jim Goodby about it. He said, "Well, I would rethink that if I were you." He said, "Don't you ever want to be ambassador?" He said, "I don't think you'd want to have that on your record." I paid attention to Jim's advice, turned the job down, probably unwisely, and continued to look around. Steve Bosworth had taken over the Policy Planning Staff … in that period, I guess, for about two years thereafter, it was called the Policy Planning Council, which was kind of a wise men's group, four wise men with major geographic and functional responsibility, and then the rest of the staff.

Q: And at this time George Shultz was the Secretary?

DE SANTIS: Shultz was the Secretary. I don't remember all the wise men, there were four. Jeremy Azrael was in charge of Soviet and East European affairs; Bob Osgood had strategic arms control, Western Europe, and East-West issues; Peter Rodman was responsible for the Middle East; and then there was a fourth gentleman whose name I'm

not remembering now. I guess this would be the Latin Americanist, but I can't remember who that was at the moment.

So Kaplan interviewed me initially, but I was asked to see Professor Osgood, a professor at SAIS. I did not know Bob Osgood. I actually had been in a roundtable conference on NATO with him a couple of years earlier arranged by INR at which I was asked to be the keynote speaker. He interviewed me and, though he didn't know me very well at all, decided that I would work out. I passed muster with Bosworth as well, and so I was offered a job on the Policy Planning staff.

Q: When you pass muster under these circumstances was this the right attitude or the right knowledge?

DE SANTIS: I think in Osgood's case for sure … I mean … he was an academic … it was the right knowledge. I don't think it was a political litmus test. I mean, I think if he had found me an extremist one way or the other he might have said I don't think I could rely on this guy's judgment. So I went up to the Policy Planning staff in July of '83. It was a curious time because … no, it had to have been earlier than that, it must have been the spring of '83 because Reagan's Star Wars speech, if I remember correctly, was in March of '83.

Q: It was part of the state of the union speech.

DE SANTIS: Actually, it was later, in March. I was given a portfolio working for Osgood. I became known … my secretary … the phone would ring and she would say, "Doctor Osgood would like to see you." I would go to his office and he would close the door and he would sit behind a sheaf of paper on which he had been writing something. Sit down, I want to pick your brain, he would say. I became known as Doctor Osgood's consultant by my colleagues. Whenever he wanted to write a memo or an article for publication, he would invite me down to bounce ideas off, and I would dutifully comply.

I also became Dr. Osgood's administrative assistant in a way because … I remember the day … he did not know how the process worked. He said he was going to go to Brussels. I said when are you leaving? Well, he was leaving in a day or two, and I thought he was going off just to talk to some people. I said, "Does the embassy or the mission know? "No," he said, "I'm just going to go." OK, I said. I quickly wrote a cable because he didn't realize he couldn't just show up without a country clearance. I did such things for him periodically, so I would try to stay abreast of his plans. Well, let me see if I can just talk to the people in EUR first, I would say to him, and make sure they know what you have in mind because they can help you set up the meetings. I never minded doing that for him. I thought he was just a remarkable, distinguished man, an inspiration to me. We grew closer over the years, and I was deeply saddened by his untimely death in 1986..

Q: Tell me, at this time where did the policy planning come in? It often had different roles: Sometimes it's almost a speech writing thing, almost a secretariat, a private

secretariat for the Secretary. It's not very often policy planning. Policy usually consists of two weeks ahead of time or something.

DE SANTIS: Well, I think you're absolutely right, and this was one of those fallow periods in many ways. There was also among the outsiders, among the political appointees who were brought in, Bob Osgood excepted, there was also a suspicion … you raised that issue about the intelligence community and the Foreign Service officers in INR … a suspicion of career people, sort of you've got to be careful about them, they're not going to give you the real scoop. And so while Steve Bosworth was a career officer, I found him very careful and most disinclined to do anything that might suggest we were questioning or deviating from the Reagan administration's policies.

I wrote a number of papers on a variety of subjects … and I'm trying to remember the name … you would know this gentleman … he worked on the Policy Planning Staff, he was ambassador to Sudan, a Greek American, passed away maybe six or eight years ago. Bill Kontos. Bill had just come from IO (International Organizations), and we would get into discussions about how we could do things differently. For example, what we concluded was that in places in Africa, a part of the world Bill knew well, where the United States did not really have much history and certainly precious little understanding, it would be better for us to invite European involvement rather than trying to go it alone. So we thought that in places like Mozambique the Portuguese ought to be involved in some way because they knew things we didn't know about how to deal with their former colonies; and in East Africa we might solicit the help of the Brits or the Italians. I mean … these countries have long histories in Africa. So we wrote a paper for the administration on how European involvement could serve two purposes: make it easier for us to achieve our policy objectives and also mend some fences with the Europeans. I wrote many papers like this, individually or jointly. Steve Bosworth would often send a note on the title page of the draft: an imaginative analysis, Hugh, the White House will never buy it. And there was no point to read further; there was no way he was going to send this forward. It was a period … going back to what you said … in which it was pretty clear that the White House had made up its mind on a number of issues. And even if your intention was, as it was in my case, not to challenge the administration's policy but to suggest ways that we might do things more effectively, anything that deviated from the script, even in terms of process, was simply something that senior State officials weren't going to send forward.

I had a collection of those papers, with one exception. In September of 1983 Bosworth called me into his office and he threw this huge binder, a briefing binder, at me. DABM. I said to him, "What's DABM?" Defense against ballistic missiles (the precursor to SDI.) It was then that he announced to me that the British had delivered a non-paper. Apparently, what had happened when the President made his speech about Star Wars … certainly nobody on the Policy Planning staff and, I dare say, probably this was true throughout the Department, took it seriously and they just thought it was, you know, kind of a pipe dream or maybe a bone he was throwing to Edward Teller that had nothing to do with policy. I later learned that this nonetheless created some anxiety in Europe. When the

Brits and others came back from their European vacations, they decided they needed to put a marker down.

What had happened behind the scenes, which we were not aware of at the time … certainly I wasn't … was that the President was now readying a meeting with all the cabinet members to get their support for what would ultimately become SDI in order to spend $26.5 billion dollars over a period of five-years, as I recall, to go ahead and deploy this shield. On the basis of the British non-paper, basically a polite questioning of what all this was about and its potential implications, Steve Bosworth called me into his office and threw this briefing book at me and said, "You have 72 hours to write a paper on the subject." And by the way, I knew not a damn thing about defending against ballistic missiles. "You have 72 hours to write a paper on the subject and then," he said, "the Secretary will make a decision accordingly."

Well, I remember leaving his office and saying, my God, where do I begin? One night I did not sleep, and I remember spending hours over at ACDA (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) talking to physicists to make sure I understood missile trajectories and how we would do this, whether you could take a missile out on launch, whether you could get it at mid-course, whether you get it in the terminal phase, what the fallout might be, what the security implications would be for the Europeans, what the cost would be, what the political fallout would be. This time I actually solicited Bob Osgood's advice, reversing the usual pattern. Bob was annoyed that the paper had to be drafted so quickly; he thought it deserved more reflection. Candidly, he may also have disagreed with my recommendation. Anyway, seventy-two hours later I produced a paper, the first paper on the subject in the Department, and basically recommended against the $26.5 billion dollars as an aggregated expenditure. I thought we ought to continue to do research on the issue. I thought the fallout, politically and otherwise would be too great to warrant a consolidated missile defense project. We should continue to do research, I argued, but in a disaggregated way. We don't need to call attention to what we have in mind, I maintained, until we actually had a working missile defense. I was pleased to say at the time all the cabinet members voted yes, we want to proceed with this project and spend the money, except the Secretary of State. That was my one major success in S/P.

Q: Could you explain the term a "non-paper"?

DE SANTIS: I always tell people who know nothing about the diplomatic business … this term is when you want to express dissatisfaction or protest against something, but you don't really want to formally affix your name to it. It's a polite way of doing that … of making an unofficial expression of a government's views.

Q: While you were doing this, obviously your great competence is on Europe. Were you picking up in the late '80s the possibility of the Soviet Union was about to dissolve or that the Soviet Union was no longer what it used to be?

DE SANTIS: No. I was not. In fact, I will readily admit later on … but this is too far down the pike … this was the time when the Berlin Wall came down, I remember being

incredulous how many people said they had predicted that development. Well, I surely did not.

Q: I haven't talked to anybody, a professional who knew that it was coming down.

DE SANTIS: Yes, I have said comfortably and quickly from the get go that I did not predict that. Nor did any of my diplomatic colleagues or, for that matter, Soviet analysts working in the think tanks. The closest I recall anyone coming to this possibility was Dmitri Simes, with whom I later worked at Carnegie Endowment and with whom I had coauthored some op-eds. In 1987, on the way back from lunch, Dmitri mused about the prospect, influenced no doubt, as we all were at that point, by Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika. After discussing the pros and cons, we dismissed the idea as too fanciful to write about in an article.

I did have some sense that change was afoot in the Soviet Union, however, while I was serving on the Policy Planning staff. I was invited in the fall of '83 to join a delegation of Soviet experts, led by Ambassador Kennan, for a conference in Kiev. I was thrilled to be in Kennan's company again, and this time not as a student but as a practitioner of diplomacy. Somebody at the Wilson Center whose name I cannot remember extended the invitation to present a paper because I had written on the subject both in my master's paper and dissertation, which later became my first book. The recommendation that I participate, however, came from John Lewis Gaddis. The only stricture was that the paper had to be historical, that is, it had to deal with the period between 1917 and 1933. The Soviet Union was not going to permit you to talk about anything contemporary. I remember writing a paper on Lenin's New Economic Plan of 1921. The planned conference occurred right around the time of the KAL (Korean Airlines) shoot down.

Q: Over the Kamchatka Peninsula.

DE SANTIS: Over the Kamchatka Peninsula. The directive came down from Secretary Eagleburger that there would be no travel to the Soviet Union. I called the people over at the Wilson Center and said that I was sorry but I wouldn't be able to participate. Well, as it turned out, they decided they probably shouldn't be doing this at that time either. The trip was rescheduled for late spring of '84. This was a very tough time in the Soviet Union because the aging leadership was dying off. Chernenko had just died, right on the heels of Andropov, who served as General Secretary of the Communist Party for less than year, as I recall. This was really a gerontocracy, and who was going to succeed Chernenko was anyone's guess. The competition was between Gorbachev and Romanov. Most Sovietologists expected Romanov , who was even harder line than Chernenko, would be chosen, but his drinking problem, as it later came out, and I suspect the desire of most Politburo members to try to revitalize the USSR decided them in favor of Gorbachev.

In the middle of this political ferment we went off to the Soviet Union, which I'll share more about momentarily. The delegation was composed entirely of academics, except myself and Ambassador Kennan, who obviously also had impeccable academic

credentials. Kennan's presence was, of course, a treat for the Russians, as it was for the American delegation, especially in light of the historical focus of the conference and the role Kennan played, first at the listening post in Riga prior to diplomatic recognition, and later in Moscow. Whenever he rose to speak, especially in his closing remarks, you could hear a pin drop on the floor. Everyone was riveted on him, this imposing sage and repository of history, whose message, as it had been for some time, was one of détente and peaceful cooperation. This was quite different from the containment doctrine he advocated after the end of World War II and into the 1960s.

We arrived in Moscow, spent the night, and boarded a train the next morning to Kiev. I shared a sleeping compartment with Professor Hans Rogger, a German by birth who taught history at UCLA. We established a rapport on the train, drinking chai…Russian tea, and talking about the USSR and fascism, which was his specialty, and current international relations. Years later, when I joined the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, I reconnected with Professor Rogger, who was then nearing retirement.

My introduction to Kiev, a very pleasant city with lovely grassy parks that stood out against the drabness of otherwise gray surroundings, was a bit chilling. On the other side of the platform, a Russian immediately greeted me with the words, "We meet again, Dr. De Santis." This gentleman, surely with the KGB, had contacted me sometime in 1982 through the auspices of a psychiatrist by the name of Davidson, who was doing research on psychopathology and politics. I believe I had contacted him when I was working on my doctoral dissertation because of my interest in the same subject. In any event, the psychiatrist, a probably well-intentioned but quite naïve man, invited me to the Russian's hotel room. I demurred and insisted that we meet at the Watergate restaurant. Over lunch, among other things, I was asked to inscribe my book on the Soviet Union and the Cold War to Georgi Arbatov, then head of the USA and Canada Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. I refused all of these overtures, which I suspected were part of a recruitment effort. When I returned to the Department, I was asked to draft a memo detailing the experience. That the Russian greeting me from the train platform in Kiev had not removed me from his radar screen two years later was quite arresting; indeed, quite chilling. As it turned out, I never saw him again. Nor was I ever contacted again by any Russian.

Getting back to the conference, we trooped into the seminar room every day for several days during which both sides presented papers followed by critiques and discussion. Not for the last time in my experience in the USSR, I found the hotel pretty grim by Western standards, with something resembling Xerox paper for toilet tissue and a shower that, probably not accidentally, produced only cold water. Nothing like a bracing cold shower on a cold Russian morning. I believe my turn to present my remarks came on the third day of the conference. I presented my paper to a filled room, explaining in some detail Lenin's attempt to introduce a market mechanism with the 1921 New Economic Plan to jump start an economy that had been blighted by war. The Russians went crazy. "My God, you can't say these things. Lenin would be turning over in his grave if he heard this," they thundered.

I was just stunned by their reaction…that I had created such a furor. What I was subsequently told by somebody from the embassy was in the room, specifically a USIA officer, was that, unbeknownst to me, a debate behind the scenes was going on between Romanov and Gorbachev on how Russia should be responding to the defense challenge posed by the United States and our new, technologically sophisticated warheads and anti-missile system. It was the beginning of the recognition, which can be traced to a speech Brezhnev gave in Tula in 1978, that the USSR could not compete with the United States economically without relaxing its stifling control. I did not realize it, but what was going on behind the scenes was the beginning of the Central Committee debate about the future, clearly using the NEP as a model of modernization, which, after Gorbachev's accession to the position of General Secretary, led to glasnost and perestroika. I was just kind of a twig in that sea of change.

Q: Were there any currents in INR or anywhere [else in the government] you were doing it that the Soviet Union's got real problems and it might not weather them? I mean I saw people coming back and [saying] said God, the place doesn't work. I mean it's terrible but at the same time it's got this mighty military force and you would go among what is now known as the stans and find the people there are completely disaffected. You put all this together and you think, well, the Soviet Union may not be here forever.

DE SANTIS: No. As I recall that period…and if I recall this fuzzily you can correct me… I believe the CIA actually was continuing to project a fair amount of economic growth for the Soviet Union. There was not an expectation that things were coming undone. There was recognition that the Communist Party had a gerontocratic leadership and that it was an impediment to development. Aliyev, Romanov, Gorbachev, those were the new leaders of the younger generation, but they were not seen as moderates in a Western sense, and I don't believe anybody anticipated that Gorbachev was going to make the changes that he did. The intelligence community, like the policymaking community, was inured into a way of thinking about the USSR that rather mirrored the Soviet Union's policy rigidity. I'm sure people were assessing what effect the ascendancy of Romanov or Gorbachev might have on Soviet behavior, and maybe quite presciently, but I don't think anybody expected to see the radical change we ultimately experienced.

To digress for a moment, the Berlin Wall came down while I was living in Los Angeles and working for RAND. Because I had published many times in the Los Angeles Times and knew the opinion page staff, I was asked by the editor of the page if I could write a piece on why American foreign affairs experts failed to predict the Soviet collapse. I wrote an article saying that people in the diplomatic, intelligence, academic, and think tank communities were to greater or lesser degree all participants in group think (we're currently doing the same thing, incidentally, in East Asia). Senior management at RAND, no doubt concerned that such a revelation might tarnish the organization's reputation with DoD, was furious that I was tarring them with the same brush as others in the foreign affairs community. After I challenged their opposition on grounds of freedom of expression, something one would expect an august think tank to champion, I was permitted to publish the article. But Jim Thompson, who is still the president, demanded

that I publish the piece without reference to my affiliation with RAND. I had obviously hit a nerve.

With respect to the argument I made, there was certainly a belief on the part of the Reagan administration that the Star Wars gambit would actually make it hard for the Soviet Union to compete. Hardliners were convinced that we were going to drive them out of business with Star Wars. Liberals challenged this view, but there was some truth to it. There was also a belief that the deployment of the MX missile, the so-called "Peacekeeper," and the SLBMs (sea-launched ballistic missiles) on the new Trident submarines, both of which were fitted with the same warhead, would put the Soviets on the technological defensive. I knew from my business travel in the Soviet Union and from frequent chilly exchanges with senior Soviet officials on the arms race that it was not the MX that they worried about. It was actually the Trident D-5 deployment that most concerned them. The consensus in the US, however, even among the most febrile Soviet-bashers, was that this new phase of competition would be a protracted process, and when the end came, it caught people pretty much off guard.

Q: You were on the policy planning staff during this period. Then what happened?

DE SANTIS: For me it was a frustrating time because S/P was not having any influence on policy. In fact, I formulated a postulate at the time that one's physical proximity to the policy maker was inversely correlated to one's influence. In other words, when I was a relatively junior officer in INR, you know, one could go home at night…I wasn't married at the time…one could go home at night to tell Mildred or whomever that you wrote this wonderful analysis today, and because you were too far removed from the decision making process to know that rational actor models don't mean much, you might conclude that your insights actually influenced the Secretary's decision. Well, you didn't know how many layers separated you from the decision maker. When you're on the policy planning staff, on the other hand, you come to learn pretty quickly that no one is listening because the Secretary's mind is already made up or because a handful of people are covertly making policy, as happened in the Baker State Department, or because no one wants to challenge existing policy. Invariably, Steve Bosworth, who then headed S/P, would send papers I wrote back to me with short, polite notes thanking me, even occasionally telling me that the analysis was imaginative, but almost invariably saying that the White House would never buy it.

In some cases there was no comment. Bob Osgood had asked me at the end of 1983, I believe it was, to apply my imagination to the INF and START talks … to try to get out of the stalemate we were in with the Soviets in both fora. As it turned out, Sandy Vershbow was trying to do the same thing in EUR at the time, probably at Jim Goodby's urging. So I produced a paper advocating the merger of INR and START. The paper was replete with missile trade-offs and a verification regime. Osgood like it because it was similar to Brent Scowcroft's thinking. Bosworth and Kaplan and an Army colonel on the S/P staff who was working strategic issues … though he had no capability of thinking strategically … were appalled because the recommendation was so diametrically opposed to the Reagan administration's approach. In other words, I was actually advocating a way

to resolve the arms control impasse and effect an agreement, which is what Osgood had in mind. The White House and the Pentagon were content to stonewall until the Soviets caved. The paper was suppressed and I was told, probably by Kaplan, not to address the issue again because it would be an embarrassment to EUR, then run by Rick Burt, and to the Department.

As an illustration of the shackles imposed on the Department, when Assistant Secretary Murphy, Dick Murphy, started a working group on Iran-Iraq, I was packed off by Bosworth to be S/P's representative on that team. And I listened to people around the table talk about the effort that we were going to have to make in the United States government to get the French, who were selling Exocets to the Iraqis, for example, and the rest of the Europeans, to stop selling these weapon systems. These were not Europeanists; these were NEA types for the most part, and they didn't fully appreciate Europe's commercial motivation.

I remember going back to my office and writing Bosworth a little memo. I told him that Murphy and his group had completely misjudged the Europeans, who would never let our influence affect their commercial interests. I cited other examples. By the way, that was a period in which we really were convinced that we needed to placate Saddam. There's no question about it. The worst case scenario was that Iran would win that war, so we had to do whatever we could to help the Iraqis. In particular, we wanted to make sure that the Europeans didn't sell the Iranians weapon systems. My recommendation to Ambassador Bosworth, and what I told him I would say at the next meeting of Murphy's group, was that it was in our interest to let Iraq and Iran self-destruct and that we should accordingly steer clear of taking sides in the conflict. I never went to that meeting; Bosworth removed me and sent somebody else in my place. What I wanted to say was not what anyone wanted to hear, and Bosworth didn't need me saying those things to Dick Murphy.

The other episode that comes vividly to mind in that period…another source of frustration…involved a piece on Germany that Phil Kaplan asked me to write. Before doing so, however, he said he wanted to make sure I understood how he and Steve Bosworth wanted the paper to be written. Essentially, the paper was to praise the efforts of the CDU, under the then new Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and to criticize the SPD, which was conflated in the Reagan administration's thinking and in the view of toadies like Kaplan, with our Democratic Party. I was already being told what the conclusion was supposed to be. He said George Shultz can't abide Hans Dietrich Genscher, the then Foreign Minister. Larry Eagleburger, the undersecretary at the time, didn't like Genscher either, I was told. He said "Am I making myself clear where I want this to go?" I was just astonished that a professional colleague would say something like that. I don't want to comment here about Phil Kaplan's managerial style, but I said to him, well, Phil, it's my responsibility to write you a paper based on what the evidence reveals rather than how you think it is supposed to come out, and that is what I intend to do. He was visibly angered.

Phil, who served in the FRG, liked to say that the US had the SPD on the run, but it was a fatuous thing to say, and I thought to myself, one day the Social Democrats would come

back to power, so why would you want to gratuitously alienate people with whom you're going to have to work? I found it just astonishing for a diplomat to be saying something that you would expect a political appointee to say.

Q: Genscher was FDP, wasn't he? He was almost the man in between and he was primarily responsible for all hell breaking loose in Yugoslavia.

DE SANTIS: He was for a while. He was the dealmaker, and he played a large role in Europe's flaccid approach to Yugoslavia after the end of the Cold War. His party was the one that you needed if you wanted to govern because neither the SPD nor the CDU ever got a majority of the vote. This was Genscher's value to the SPD and Helmut Schmidt, and after the Hesse elections in October 1982, he turned around and chose to play the same role for Helmut Kohl.

Q: I don't understand how someone can say I can't stand the guy. You know, this is part of diplomacy.

DE SANTIS: Presumably other people whom you have interviewed will remember Phil. I could give you other anecdotes, but I won't. Perhaps others will.

In any event, I wrote the paper. I don't remember exactly what I said, although I know it was a balanced paper, which maintained it was in America's interest to work with whomever is in power in the FRG. I cautioned against dismissing the SPD as a group of lefties, which the Reagan administration's political appointees were inclined to do, lest we might alienate the party and consequently make our lives more difficult when they returned to power, as they inevitably would. Well, Phil was furious when I finished the paper. He was going to teach me a lesson once and for all, so he sent the paper out for review. He send it to George Vest, he sent it to Hank Cohen, he sent it to Ron Spiers, he sent it to Nelson Ledsky, who was then Minister Counselor in Berlin, he sent it to Ray Caldwell, as I recall, who was deputy director in EUR at the time. He may have sent it to others as well. I had either worked for or with all of these people, and they collectively returned comments saying they didn't have any quarrel with my analysis. They might quibble about this or that, but they generally agreed with the thrust of my recommendations. Phil's ploy didn't work. He was kind of hoping they would all say what a dreadful paper I had written and how can you keep this guy around?

By the end of 1984, it was becoming clear to me that S/P was not the policy environment I had hoped it would be. I remember even being taken to task by Paul Boeker, a good friend of Steve's and a fellow econ officer, who either had been ambassador to Jordan or was about to be. Paul is now retired and working at the University of California at San Diego.

Q: I believe he died a couple of years ago.

DE SANTIS: Oh, no. That's too bad. Well, Paul called me into his office, as Phil had asked him to do, and kind of chided me for writing the paper as I had. I remember saying

to Paul, let me ask you something. What you and I say outside of this building on behalf of this or any administration is one thing. Like you, I have to represent the interests of this administration. What you and I as professionals say behind closed doors, however, is something else. We have to be open and honest with each other, and if we can't do that how can we call ourselves professionals?

That year I vacationed in Jamaica over the Christmas-New Year's holiday during which time I gave a lot of thought to my current assignment. When I returned to DC in January of '84, I immediately invited Bob Osgood to have lunch. I told him that I was probably going to curtail because I wasn't finding S/P very stimulating, and I just needed to be someplace else where I could do some meaningful work. This was not a question of ego on my part, the feeling that no one was paying attention to me; I was disturbed that we were simply implementing the preconceived ideas of the Reagan people without a discussion as to the difficulties we might encounter or any kind of due diligence. In retrospect, I suppose I could have hung on a bit longer, for things changed dramatically in the second Reagan administration with the elevation of the pragmatists – Baker, Shultz, Carlucci – over the ideologues.

Without commenting on the validity of my remarks, Osgood agreed that my skills were not being put to good use. He advised joining a policy think tank. I remember suggesting to him maybe I should see if I could be seconded to someplace like CSIS. He counseled against the idea on grounds that I would have to find financing for the projects on which I worked. He asked me if I knew Tom Hughes, the president of Carnegie Endowment, or his key associate, Larry Fabian. I knew neither. Bob kindly said he would be happy to make some calls on my behalf. One thing led to another, and by the spring of '84 I began to have telephone conversations with Tom Hughes. But they were always inconclusive: I don't know what kind of office space we will have available, Tom would say, or he would express doubts as to whether I would be able to voice my own views. Anyway, after a couple months of this, I decided to cast my net in another direction. I guess I talked to Hank Cohen again…I can't remember if Hank was by then Director General or perhaps Deputy DG of the Foreign Service, but he was helpful. I got a one year Pearson assignment to work on Capitol Hill. I began in July or August of 1984.

Q: Who did you work for?

DE SANTIS: I worked for Senator Jeff Bingaman, a democrat from New Mexico, a first term senator. I believe he was elected in '82. I had actually gone to Senator Arlen Specter's office first, and I had also talked with Lee Hamilton's people, but I preferred the Senate to the House. Being a Pennsylvanian and having lived in Philadelphia, I thought there might be a better connection with Specter, and his people were quite interested. Senator Specter had a reputation of which I was ignorant at the time. I understand that he tended to be pretty demanding when he was traveling abroad, and I know he was not a favorite of Foreign Service officers. To this day, I believe he's a guy who demands a lot of attention. In any event, I remember sitting down with his administrative assistant, who somewhat pretentiously referred to the senator as a "factualist." I didn't know quite what that meant. The AA said he doesn't have time for a

lot of analysis, he just needs to have information quickly. I asked him what he had in mind and he said, well, for example, if you're working on the START talks, Specter would expect you to summarize what happened in the latest round in one sentence. I said to this gentleman that I didn't think I was capable of summarizing an entire round of negotiations in one sentence. I thought, gee, this is probably not the right place. It sounded pretty superficial.

I knocked on Bingaman's door in large part, to be perfectly candid, because I had never been to New Mexico. Everyone said it was such a beautiful place. So out of curiosity I thought I would inquire as to who this new senator was. His AA was also interested in me, but I think the main interest was that I was a political realist. The AA, a very competent lawyer, thought that Bingaman was too far to the left of his New Mexican constituency, and he wanted to bring the senator back to the center so that he could be reelected. I was quizzed on the Soviet Union – and this goes to the heart of your question of anticipating political change in that country – and Bingaman asked me what I thought of the Russians. I told him that I thought conditions would change very slowly in the USSR and that his children and my children would probably face the same threat we faced. That tells you where I was at the time. The senator and his AA were very happy to have me join the staff, which I did around the first of August. Ironically, Tom Hughes called me a week later. He wanted to know what had happened because Carnegie was getting an office ready for me, which came as a big surprise. I said, "Well, I simply had to move on. I needed to get a new assignment." He said, "Well, how quickly can you leave?" "Well," I said, "I can't leave quickly. I have made a commitment to this man. I have to stay here and finish this." And I did.

Q: For how long?

DE SANTIS: A year. It was a one year assignment, which I completed in August 1985.

Q: What were you doing?

DE SANTIS: I was his legislative assistant for foreign affairs and resident Soviet expert, though his defense LA, Ed McGaffigan, was also quite knowledgeable about the Soviet Union and probably resented my presence.

I once told Steve Low at FSI when he was interviewing people to do some work there that I thought…and I still feel strongly about this… that every Foreign Service officer relatively early on should have two assignments: a two-year assignment in INR and a one-year assignment some place on the Hill. The reason I think the latter is important is that there is still this enormous cleavage between the legislative branch and the executive branch – especially the State Department and the Foreign Service. I thought it would be a wonderful way to break down barriers because I think if people in the Department could interact with people on the Hill they would also see that congressional staffers were not all superficial and that some of them actually knew a great deal about foreign affairs. And I think if people on the Hill had a chance to work with people through the Pearson program they would see that State Department officers were not blindly doing the

bidding of a particular country or region of the world to which they happened to be assigned, but that they were just as committed as folks on the Hill were to the promotion of American interests.

Working on a Senate staff was unlike anything I had encountered in the executive branch. I once told a reporter from Le Monde who came to interview me that power in the executive branch was a function of how much information one controlled, in other words, how many organizational units reported to you. Congress operates on a medieval model. The Senator or Congressman is the lord of the manor, and everyone else functions as his vassal. The pace was also much faster than what I was used to in the bureaucracy. I found that quite invigorating, the long hours notwithstanding, because decisions had to be made in response to budgets and other aspects of the authorization-appropriations cycle. As an example, on my first day the senator's press secretary came into my office around noon and said that the famine that had broken out in Ethiopia was becoming more severe and we, that is, Senator Bingaman, would need to have some comment ready for the press when his opinion was solicited. The senator wasn't there that day; he was in Albuquerque or Santa Fe visiting constituents. But he was scheduled to meet with the press in one of those cities at four o'clock and he would need to have talking points on the subject. The press secretary said "I need something from you in a couple of hours." That was my introduction to Capitol Hill. And that is the way it works.

I didn't know a damned thing about what was going on in the Horn of Africa. What they expected you to do and what I did immediately was to start calling the Department -- people in the African Bureau – among other places so that I could get a sense of what was going on. I called AID and talked to various people…what are we doing about this or that, what is our policy in the face of such contingencies, who can quickly get me up to speed on what we were doing, blah, blah, blah – and in two hours I had a one pager ready for Bingaman replete with talking points. So that was my congressional introduction.

Q: During the year you were there were you pretty much dealing with stock things or was the senator in one way or the other getting involved in any particular area?

DE SANTIS: No, there's no such thing as a particular area of interest for a senator, especially for a junior senator, although Bingaman was clearly focused on energy issues, given the R&D constituency in New Mexico, and his defense LA and a science fellow he had on his staff, a physicist from San Diego, during the year I was there provided expertise in that area. In the Congress, you have a nominal portfolio but the business, unlike in the policy community, the business on the Hill is driven by the exigencies of the moment. There may be an issue, not necessarily a policy issue, an issue on which your constituency has taken a strong view one way or the other. You need to respond to it. Or you need to respond to a dear colleague letter that another senator has floated because he or she is interested in introducing a sense of the Senate resolution or actual legislation and you have to make a decision about whether to be associated with it, a decision, I discovered, that is invariably driven first and foremost by the politics of the matter rather than by the substance of the resolution. It took me a little while to get the drift of this, but once I did, I was very responsive to Bingaman's interests because my job was not to try

to…I wasn't there to be his teacher. I was there to help this man's career, to get him up to speed on issues and help him honestly and forthrightly make his case. And I considered Jeff an honest and decent man. He and Pete Domenici, like Senator Lugar and former Congressman Lee Hamilton, are exemplars of public service, in my opinion.

This is not to say that I never expressed a view. In fact, Bingaman's staff was quite suspicious of me. Even though I was a professional rather than a political appointee, they considered me a Reagan plant, a function of their youth and inexperience. I was sensitive to these feelings and to what was probably some uneasiness on the part of Bingaman, and so I was careful not to insinuate my views into legislative matters. One episode comes to mind during the deliberations over the foreign aid bill in 1986, when Senator Levin, ever protective of Michigan car makers and therefore critical of Japan, introduced an amendment to the bill that would have required Japan to have its defense appropriations reviewed by the Senate. Bingaman came bounding up to me on the Senate floor, asking what I thought he should do. I told him that it was congressional arrogance at its worst but that I understood the Democratic Party's position on the matter and thus recommended that he vote for the amendment. Thirty or 45 minutes later, after he caucused with some of his colleagues, I heard "NO" when the roll call came round to Bingaman. When he approached me, I said "Wow! That took some courage." He said that now it would be my responsibility to deal with his critics, which I gladly accepted. To put my role into proper perspective, it was not my comment alone that swayed the senator, and perhaps not at all; it was Bill Bradley's no vote on the issue that was decisive.

Q: The Senator from New Jersey.

DESANTIS: Yes.

Q: One question on foreign affairs; I would imagine New Mexico being where it is Mexico would loom rather large, but it has never been your particular portfolio.

DE SANTIS: No, not at all. The science fellow knew Mexico because of his proximity to the country and so took the lead on this country and on Central American generally. I believe he had prior Peace Corps service in Chile. I did get involved in some of these issues, however, dealing with the amnesty question that states bordering Central America had to confront in those days.

Q: It's a very complicated relationship but do you want to mention some of the other things?

DE SANTIS: That issue, the amnesty issue, the apartheid issue in South Africa, I was actively involved in both areas. I traveled with the senator to Central America to see Danny Ortega in Nicaragua. We also visited Panama and Honduras on that trip. I also traveled with Bingaman to the Soviet Union by way of Paris, which his wife Anne wanted to do. You will find this hard to believe, but this Bingaman's first trip out of the country since he was on his honeymoon.

Q: You were talking about you're working with senator who?.

DE SANTIS: Senator Jeff Bingaman from New Mexico.

Q: Let's talk first about Mexican amnesty and other relationships. And then we'll get to Central America. What sort of issues did you find you were dealing with?

DE SANTIS: The science fellow, as I mentioned, had traveled extensively in the Americas, and he by default became the resident expert on Mexico. His politics were also very close to Bingaman's. I wasn't working Mexico per se, but the amnesty movement involved more than Mexico; it involved people principally from Nicaragua and El Salvador and to some degree from Guatemala. I was caught up in the broad sweep of the Reagan administration's preoccupation with Central America and with the communist-contra clash in the region.

Q: What was the feeling of the senator's office staff about amnesty? We were really facing a big flood because of the war. Nicaraguans, Salvadorians and Guatemalans were coming up and claiming because of war they should be allowed to stay. What was the feeling on that?

DE SANTIS: The staff of the office, which will not surprise you, as is the case on the Hill broadly, was primarily composed of younger people who were enthusiastic supporters of the senator. These were the sort of people who went out and rang doorbells for their political candidates and put fliers in people's mailboxes. From their standpoint, the conservatives in Central America were terrible people – I remember once reading a letter from a liberal constituent who alleged that Somoza had drunk the blood of the people he killed – and we had an obligation to bring folks who were seeking asylum from authoritarian governments into the United States.

My view, and probably that of his administrative assistant and maybe one or two other people on the staff who composed what we'll call the senior cadre, was somewhat more circumspect because it's never quite that simple. There were an awful lot of people I think who were using the asylum issue to try to get into the United States simply because there are economic opportunities here that they wouldn't have in their own country. You needed to make a distinction as to which people were justifiably claiming asylum on political grounds and those people who were primarily seeking economic opportunity.

The way this worked out…there was, as you recall, considerable disagreement on this issue in the States at the time. Senator Bingaman was sympathetic to those who sought asylum but also aware, as was his AA, that as a liberal senator from a conservative state, and as a first-time senator, he would have to be mindful of public opinion if he wanted to get reelected. What I chose to do – with the senator's blessing, of course – was to begin to work with the Republican leadership in New Mexico, that is, state senators, many of whom were of the view that these people actually were coming here for economic reasons rather than to escape political oppression. I took it upon myself to begin this

dialogue because substantively we needed to make a distinction and also I suppose to be politically helpful to Bingaman. Since I was on the senator's staff I was trying to be responsive to his administrative assistant's concerns. Initially, I recall, the republican legislators in the state were just astonished to receive calls from me announcing my intention to solicit their views and to work with them on this delicate issue. "God," they would say to me. "You mean Jeff is OK with this?" And I would reply: "Well, we're just going explore this."

And as it turned out, Jeff was OK with it because he realized… I think by then he trusted me more…that I wasn't trying to do something that was going to tarnish his reputation. I was trying to be responsive both to his needs and to the validity of the asylum situation. This was a very emotional time. I recall being in New Mexico – in the senator's office in Santa Fe in particular, where I was kind of sent off as the point man to meet with constituents who were vitally concerned about border issues and who thought that Jeff should be doing more and that the United States should be doing more. My diplomatic skills came in handy, for it was my job to politely, diplomatically explain to them that the senator was trying to do the right thing but, given the complexity of the issue, it wasn't as easy as it appeared. They always walked away thinking I had told them exactly what they wanted to hear, or perhaps they were too polite to tell me otherwise, even though I'm sure I wasn't doing that. Jeff and the AA were pretty content with the exchanges with the constituents and the Republican state senators for the most part.

Q: Did you run into, this was the time when Ortega was running Nicaragua, the Sandinistas. It was also a time when the left wing of the public opinion used the glitterati, the Hollywood stars, and thought the Sandinistas were great. An awful lot went down there. They were known as the "sandal-istas", wearing sandals and playing the guitar. You say you went down there. How was it?

DE SANTIS: I went with the Senator Bingaman, Senator Levin and Senator Leahy and their staffers. Senator Chaffee was supposed to go, but he backed out at the last minute. We went to Panama, Honduras and Nicaragua. We also met with the cardinal at the time in Nicaragua, whose name I cannot remember, a very decent man and thoughtful man, and then we had a meeting with Ortega. I was barred from attending the meeting because I was traveling on a diplomatic passport and the ground rule was no diplomats could be involved in this meeting.

Q: On the State Department side?

DE SANTIS: Right.

Q: You were there as what?

DE SANTIS: There's a program called the Pearson Fellows, and I was assigned to the senator for one year from the State Department. I was suspect because of my temporary status and because the staff assumed or concluded since this was the Reagan administration and I was working for the State Department, I must therefore be part of the

Reagan Administration. They didn't realize that as professionals we were doing the bidding of whoever was in the White House and so it took a long time for them to warm up to me. Many maintained their reserve because they assumed I had an ulterior purpose, I suppose to poison Bingaman's mind, which was hardly the case.

I assumed when we had the meeting with Ortega that the senators would cave, that they would simply say, well, that's fine, we don't need him in the room anyway, but surprisingly they didn't. The ground rules were such that I was permitted to join the meeting but prohibited from asking a question, as I had with the cardinal. I recall afterwards at the embassy Senator Bingaman was very excited about meeting Ortega, and he confided to me that he thought the Sandinista was a pretty decent guy with his heart in the right place. He asked for my reaction. I told him rather bluntly, and you'll pardon the French, I told him rather bluntly that I thought he was a little shit who was up to no good.

One of the things that was most striking to me about that experience was that in revolutionary societies there are lots of people who are wonderful revolutionaries but they turn out to be poor at governing. That obviously was the case in Nicaragua. I vividly recall upon entering Managua that it reminded me of Moscow … not that the cities look alike, but the drabness, grayness, and lack of animation that one encountered. I remember being struck that there was no soap anywhere. Their Marxist rhetoric aside, Ortega and his comrades did not seem to be doing much to transform the lives of the citizenry. I remember sort of seizing on the obvious lack of governance – as opposed to repression – and telling the delegation that it was only matter of time before the public would grow disenchanted with the Sandinistas. Certain basic essentials had to be met, and it was hard for me to believe that this society would tolerate these deprivations indefinitely.

I think the senator tolerated my views, but I don't think he subscribed to them … he certainly didn't subscribe to my views about the Soviet Union, and they were not by any means doctrinaire views.

Q: Then you also went on a trip to Europe? How did that go?

DE SANTIS: We stopped in Paris, though I'm not quite sure why; it may have been just a regularly scheduled stopover, or perhaps it had sentimental meaning for the Bingamans, who, if I remember correctly, honeymooned there. We had some time on our hands … it was the better part of the day before we had to get on the plane again … and so we went into the city. Jeff's wife Ann, who subsequently became the associate attorney general for anti-trust in the Clinton administration, was particularly excited. She is a lawyer who could have been a successful politician in her own right in New Mexico, Jeff's staff would tell me, and I think accurately, and a very lively lady I liked who was quite content to visit places like Galleries Lafayette and Au Printemps, the great department stores in Paris. Jeff just kind of went through the motions. I mean, this was … you know, he hadn't been there since he got married, and he was pretty blasé about it. I offered to translate for him as he examined various items for sale, but he was not really interested. He had a bemused look about him, as if to say he was simply killing time until we could get to the real purpose of the trip.

The visit to the Soviet Union that was very interesting trip because the senator, being from New Mexico and having a research and development constituency in the state as a consequence of Sandia Laboratories and Los Alamos, was very concerned about what the Soviets were doing scientifically and very eager to find out more about nuclear arms development. So we actually went to Novosibirsk, the biggest city in Siberia and the research and development center of the Soviet Union. I suspect that may have changed to some degree today, but perhaps not much. This was my first time in Siberia, and it reminded me very much of what the American West was probably like in the 1880s, with lots of muddy streets and unpaved roads in many cases, but they had a pretty sophisticated research and development facility there. The gentleman we went with was Roald Sagdeev, who was either the director or the deputy director of the facility, or perhaps he headed the institute that focused on nuclear physics. Roald Sagdeev ultimately defected from the Soviet Union … or maybe he came here when it collapsed … and ultimately married former President Eisenhower's daughter who took over running the Eisenhower Institute.

Q: Susan.

DE SANTIS: Susan Eisenhower.

A very decent guy, a very smart guy … and so that was quite an interesting experience. We also spent some time in the city of Novosibirsk, which was a more interesting experience for me and Ann Bingaman than I think it was for the senator. The other focus for him other than getting a better feel for what was going on with respect to Soviet arms development was meeting with Soviet Jewry, so called refuseniks who were trying to get out of the Soviet Union and largely immigrate to Israel. To meet with Soviet Jewry in those days was no easy matter because of the constant concern that we were going to make life difficult for these people. Typically, the embassy would make arrangements for you to do this stealthily so that the KGB or the local police were not aware that you were doing it. They may have been aware in any event, but I suppose they thought if we did it carefully and discreetly nobody was going to … it wasn't going to be publicized, and that's what they wanted to avoid at all costs.

My vivid recollection of that experience was meeting a group of very nice people in the apartment of a couple …they were … it was easier for me to say then than it is now … they were elderly people who were very gracious, and they provided cakes and tea in honor of the senator's visit. Any American senator who could come over to do their bidding was somebody they wanted to meet.

The senator was very cautious in how he responded to their questions. At one point, the gentleman who was the most loquacious of the group – an American who defected to the USSR in the 1920s or early 1930s, when a lot of people on the left in the US perceived the Soviet Union as the promised land … and these were all, by the way, scientists – mathematicians, physicists, biochemists – who had a self-image of superiority and entitlement. They believed, as the former American made clear, that they deserved to

leave the Soviet Union first because they were, after all, highly educated people who had a contribution to make to science. I remember speaking up, no doubt out of turn and perhaps inappropriately from Jeff's perspective, and I asked them if they felt in purely human terms that they were better than less educated people who were suffering equally. They had a hard time with that.

They then asked the senator if he would take a public stand on the arms control treaties and withhold any support until Soviet Jews were permitted to leave the USSR. The senator said well, Hugh is the to foreign affairs expert in our office, and I'm going to defer to him. So I answered the question diplomatically but honestly. I said as painful as it was for me to hear about their plight, it would be utterly irresponsible, given the gravity of the nuclear arms race, to stand in the way of an arms control agreement if we could get it. Whether the senator would have said that or not, I don't know, but he never criticized me afterwards.

I think on balance he found it an interesting trip, though not culturally enriching. He had absolutely no interest in going to the Hermitage Museum when we were in Leningrad, one of the world's spectacular museums. Even though I had been there twice previously, I was eager to go again. Fortunately, his wife was eager to go, so she and I went off to the museum, and I guess he just bided his time. Both he and his wife were interested in meeting people. For example, we had a Kyrgyz translator with us. And because he was such an engaging guy, they just assumed … you know, Americans are so inclined to do this … what a friendly fellow; he's just like us. I'm sure he was supplied by the KGB. We also spent some time in an open air market in Novosibirsk, which was great fun for Ann, and I think the senator had a good time too. On balance, however, the cultural things that one imbibes that give you a better sense of people and what they're all about were not of particular interest to him. He was all business.

Q: After these trips and you got back did you see any, you might say, growth or understanding? You know, this was a relatively short time.

DE SANTIS: Yes. I think in a general way. I wrote the first op-ed piece over the senator's signature for publication, and I don't remember exactly what I said, but it was on the arms race and on the need for a strategic agreement, which I and the senator both believed was important. It was fairly easy to write because I wasn't forcing myself to say something I felt uncomfortable saying. His press secretary thought it was great that we had managed to get Jeff in print. The fact that he signed off on the article indicated to me that he felt more comfortable asserting himself on certain issues, but also that there was some slight shift in his views, which were becoming a bit more nuanced. I don't attribute that to me as much as I do to Bingaman's willingness and ability to educate himself.

The one shift I remember most vividly in his growth was … I happened to be working for him when the foreign aid bill was on the floor, which I was responsible for, as I have mentioned earlier. Senators, legislators generally, have a way of holding court on issues that really complicate things for people in the foreign affairs business. In this case they wanted a line item in the legislation that specifically took the Japanese to task for failing

to spend enough on defense and declared that until the Japanese spent one per cent of their GDP on defense, which they subsequently did in real terms, then we would take certain steps to sanction them. As I recall, it was not clear just what we would do. In any event, after I protested that the amendment was utterly irresponsible and arrogant and yet another example of our penchant for extraterritorial interference, the senator actually voted against it. I believe he was one of six Democrats to do so. As I think I said earlier, I could flatter myself that it was my influence that decided him to vote the way he did, but he was actually influenced by Bill Bradley, who also voted no on that issue.

Q: You were there working for the senator from when to when?

DE SANTIS: I worked for him from the late summer just about the time that you would be to reassigned, it may have been a month or so later of '84 until '85.

Q: What happened to the senator?

DE SANTIS: He has done very well for himself. I believe he chairs the Energy Committee in the Senate, and I think he is regarded as a serious, sober, thoughtful senator by his colleagues. I actually have a very high regard for him. I have a high regard for both of the senators from New Mexico. I also have thought that Pete Domenici was first rate. They are both very decent people, and the kind of officials that I think we ought to be sending to Congress because they did their jobs assiduously, they were not prima donnas, they didn't try to take advantage of the system and I think that they were honorable people. I think he's done very well. He's been much more active on the various committees in the senate. I haven't followed his career all that closely, but I think he's still highly regarded as a serious and thoughtful senator.

Q: Well then, wither Hugh?

DE SANTIS: Well, my year was up and I still had the option of going to work for Carnegie Endowment. Had Tom Hughes made the offer he ultimately made before I had agreed to do the Pearson, I am certain I would have gone to work at Carnegie rather than on the Hill. It may have taken someone else's interest in me to get Tom to make the offer, and when he did, I rejected it. "What happened here?" Tom said. And I said, that something else came along. Well, he wanted me to leave immediately. I said I couldn't in good conscience do that. I had agreed to come to work here for a year and that's what I would do. My year was up, and I thought it was time to reconnect with Carnegie.

I had one final trip before I left the Senate, however, which was a trip to … and I'm sort of doubling back here a little bit …was a northern flank trip. This was a NATO driven trip to Norway via Brussels that took the CODEL to the Finnmark area where we could look right across the border at the Soviet placements or Soviet guards. That was an interesting trip. I was part of a bipartisan staff delegation from the House and Senate. Those trips were useful to develop relationships with staffers from the other party, which you still could do 20 years ago but no longer can in the polarized political environment of today. I remember establishing a rapport with Jake Garn's AA, whose name I can't quite

remember, Jeff something or other. Michelle Van Cleave, who was then Jeff Kemp's foreign affairs staffer, was also on the trip. On an 8-seater puddle jumper from Oslo to Tromso, just above the Arctic Circle, we were all taking swigs from a bottle of cognac that Peter Lennon, Levin's staffer, had shared with the group. Everyone, that is, but Michelle. So I engaged her in conversation on the apartheid issue, convinced that I could establish some compromise that we could both accept. I failed. Like other ideologues, her world was black and white, right and wrong. We are living with the consequences of that kind of thinking today.

After that trip, I called Tom Hughes, who was eager to have me join Carnegie rather than go back to the Department. So I made another arrangement with the State Department to take an unpaid absence. Tom, however, was still very concerned that I wasn't going to take be able to speak my own mind, and so … perhaps, in retrospect, against the better judgment of other people, if not my own, I chose to resign. At a subsequent luncheon a couple of months later, Nelson Ledsky and Avis Bolen tried to get me to reconsider. They said that I was crazy and that there would still be plenty of good jobs for someone like in the future, including a return to S/P to replace Avis. Given my experience with the bureaucracy – the disappointment, after I had taken the Foreign Service exam, that what people said and did were two different things, Jim Goodby's caveat, which may or may not have been genuine, when I turned down the Deputy NIO job at the CIA in 1983 that I would be jeopardizing my chances to become an ambassador, among other things – I just decided, well, I want to do this the right way at Carnegie and I do want to be able to express myself honestly, which one did at one's peril in the Department, maybe Tom Hughes is right. I actually left the State Department in 1986 and went to work for Tom, recognizing that this was not a permanent job by any means because that wasn't the way he ran Carnegie Endowment. People were there for a couple of years, one or two years, and then he would find someone else to do the same kind of work.

The time at Carnegie was terrific. That was a very rich time for me professionally. I was very active. I was on the op-ed page of The New York Times or the LA Times or The International Herald Tribune or something almost weekly. I did an awful lot of television, both network TV, Good Morning America kinds of shows, and local shows, radio as well. I was abroad a lot giving speeches. And I was actually putting together …I was directing the European security program, which is what they had retained me to do, so I was doing a lot of the arms control work I had done in the State Department as well as European work. It was a very exciting time. Moreover, I didn't feel that I was deprived of information. A colleague in the Department asked me if I missed reading the cable traffic. I replied that I probably got 90 percent of what I needed, and that I was often supplied with inside information from the European embassies, sometimes about matters I wouldn't have otherwise known.

Q: Let's talk a bit about, Carnegie Endowment has been around a long time. How were you getting into sort of the mainstream media stream? You know, op-ed pieces appearing. How did this happen?

DE SANTIS: Well, I suppose there are two components here. One is that in this town, if you're affiliated with an institution like Carnegie Endowment or Brookings or AEI (American Enterprise Institute) or one of those places, I think you have a greater cache than someone would who might have equally, if not more, interesting things to say who doesn't have the proper institutional affiliation.

And the other component, you know, I don't say this to be immodest here, the other component had to be the substance of what you wrote. Obviously, Carnegie Endowment might make it easier to get some editor to read your piece, but whether he published it or not was dependent upon what you had to say. So I think it was a combination of things…and I had …there were certain newspapers that you wanted to make sure you wrote for. Nobody wrote for The New York Times on a monthly basis, but I probably published in The Times two or three times a year, which was a fair amount.

Q: You have these institutions, think-tanks. The Brookings Institution is sort of considered the shadow cabinet of the democrats who lean to the left. The American Enterprise is to the right. Where did the Carnegie Endowment fit into this?

DE SANTIS: Tom Hughes, who has long since retired as president, and he had been very active in democratic politics all of his life, is a Minnesotan who at one time in the Kennedy administration was the head of intelligence and research. I think he had worked in the senate for a while … that may have been for Walter Mondale or for Hubert Humphrey; I think it was for Humphrey. I think if Tom were here and someone were to say, how would you characterize Carnegie? His response … I think I had heard him say this with people from Australia one time, we're center left. I think that is probably accurate. That's broad enough. They weren't far to the left like some of the smaller … there are organizations in this town that really are very much on the left. I wouldn't put Brookings in that category either, but I think it was similar to Brookings in that the sensibilities of the people that Tom brought on board … they were people who subscribed to what would, I think, conventionally be called liberal approaches to issues. There were always some exceptions. Dmitri Simes was part of Carnegie Endowment and had been there a number of years. Dmitri had decidedly conservative views, not reactionary, but conservative. Jeff Kemp, who was on the staff when I was there, also had conservative views, and he had been on the Reagan National Security Council staff. I think Tom was surprised that my views were hard to pigeonhole. I co-authored with Dmitri on several occasions when it seemed that we were on the same page and I could comfortably do that. I don't think that created a big problem for him as long as you could defend what you said. But I would say people of that political orientation were the exception and not the rule.

Q: Where were you during this time?

DE SANTIS: This would be fall of '85 until the beginning of '88.

Q: Things were changing in the Soviet Union particularly and this is the major thing. How would you say you were calling it, the Endowment was calling it? I mean, I'm

looking at this. It was a big question: what was Gorbachev doing, what was happening domestically and wither the Soviet Union?

DE SANTIS: Actually, I'm delighted to field that question. If I were a graduate student again and, as I once was, relying on oral histories, I would like to have had someone say what I'm about to say.

I did not call the collapse of the Soviet Union. There was a spate of people after the fall of the Berlin Wall who subsequently said they had all predicted this, and I found it quite extraordinary. I'll come back to that in a minute. Please remind me. I was not part of that group. I can say I got other things wrong. I happened to be giving a speech in St. Paul, Minnesota just hours before we bombed Libya in 1986. I was asked by someone in the audience at the time what I thought the Administration was going to do.

Q: This is in response to a bombing in Berlin, of the night club where Americans were killed but also it was known as a place where American GIs went.

DE SANTIS: It was that and, as you well know, it was just the continuing terrorist activity on Libya's part, the Pan Am bombing being the most horrific. Well, there were a couple of other episodes; you may be right about that, before '86 that involved the Libyans. I mean, they were certainly on our short list of people who were discredited in every way, and the fact of the matter is when asked the question from the floor, did I think the United States was going to engage in military action, I said no because I thought that the Reagan administration was bluffing and ultimately would not take those steps. I remember going back to my hotel room after the speech and putting the TV on. Henry Kissinger was being interviewed on the bombing that had just taken place. I thought the timing was just great, having told an audience as an expert, no, I don't think this is going to happen.

Just so I don't cover myself completely in embarrassment, in 1981, when I was still in the Department I remember being asked on a Saturday, when I stopped in to read the traffic just before going on leave, to write something on what was likely to happen in Poland. This was just before the crackdown. I remember all of the options that we were looking at, one of which was a Soviet invasion. It was my decided view that Jaruzelski would not let the Soviet Union kill innocent Poles, and that there if there was going to be a crackdown the Poles would administer it themselves. I got no credit for that. Richard Perle subsequently said in response to press queries that, boy, nobody in the government would have thought that the Poles would take matters into their own hands. This was the conventional kind of thing to say, even in the Department. So I didn't always get them wrong, but I certainly got those two wrong.

It was a tremendously different time in terms of our relationships with the Soviet Union. In my past visits to the Soviet Union, my experiences were very different from the visit I had, for example, in 1987. I went over to the Soviet Union right at the time the concepts that the Ministry of Defense was advancing such as "defensive defense" were being bandied about. This concept referred to pulling our forces back, the US and the Russians,

and creating more breathing space so that we don't get to into a conflict? At that point perestroika and glasnost also had become words that were being used in the Soviet Union in the press and one the street, and there was a sense that a transformation was taking place.

I remember it quite vividly because I was invited to be on a panel that David Calleo of SAIS had put together. I was to speak about the Warsaw Pact and NATO and how they were configured and how we might do things differently. My counterpart was a Russian by the name of Sergei Karaganov, who has become a much more visible guy in the Russia since then running a think-tank that discusses international security issues. I was very struck by how relaxed people were. I could actually express myself openly and not have someone jump all over me as they had done in times past. It was clear to me that a thaw had taken place.

Another thing that was quite evident during the Gorbachev period was that there was no more vodka on the table. I mean, it used to be commonplace that people would be drinking through meetings. There was water and soda, but there was no more liquor on the table. I suppose this was not simply a response to the very high alcoholism rates in the country, but a recognition on Gorbachev's part that he was going to take the country in a different direction and he wanted officials, especially in discussions with Americans, to be sober and clear-headed. Under the circumstances, I thought I could push the envelope. I wanted to go to Lithuania and I asked someone whom I knew, someone Dmitri Simes had put me in touch with, who was a fairly senior guy, if he could help. You could make this happen for me, I said. Oh, no, no, no; that would be impossible. So it still wasn't so open that you could simply make your way to another part of what was still the Soviet Union after all. There were certain boundaries. Otherwise, walking around in the Soviet Union was very different from what I had experienced before; the oppressiveness had diminished. That was palpable.

Q: What were you getting from our embassy? Were they seeing obviously there were changes but was this for real or was this a facade? How were they seeing it? Your impression?

DE SANTIS: Well, I think that the embassy saw the changes. I don't think the embassy … my view is that nobody, maybe a few people here and there … but certainly nobody I recall at the time had come out and said that Gorbachev really represents the transformation of the Soviet Union. I think the embassy's view was not very different from my own thinking, as I wrote later when I was at the Rand Corporation and I likened Gorbachev to Franklin Roosevelt in this sense. The New Deal was not intended to socialize the United States, it was intended to preserve capitalism. I think that perestroika as defined by Gorbachev was not intended to democratize or to transform the Soviet Union, it was intended to reform it, to make socialism work more effectively. I think from that point of view nobody who was looking at these issues carefully really thought that … yes, things were changing, but it was not something that was going to happen to any time soon. In other words, I don't think anyone was prepared for the rapid transformation we experienced.

Your question is relevant because things were going on in other countries that clearly suggested change was afoot. In those days, and even before … I would say in the early '80s as well when you traveled outside the Soviet Union into neighboring countries and … Hungary would be a good one because Hungary was always a bit of a maverick and they were liberalizing their economy long before anyone else was in the so-called Eastern Bloc … when you would travel to Hungary in those days it was almost like being in the West. You felt freer to move about. The stores were stocked with more goods and better quality goods. This contrasted with a place like Nicaragua. I knew instantaneously … I felt like I was back in the Soviet Union when I went to Nicaragua. There is a sense of oppression or an oppressiveness that you feel. Hungary was a more relaxed place. You could even use your American Express card at selected places.

It was clear to me that things were changing. Hungarians whom I knew and whom I had met then and subsequently when I was at the Rand Corporation were reminding me how relaxed the political situation was becoming in that country. The two key developments were the round table discussions that took place in Poland in May 1991, during which General Jaruzelski ultimately was trumped by Lech Walesa and Solidarity. In Hungary's case … and Hungary had opened its border with Austria, which preceded the round table talks … you had a relaxation of Communist rule in the sense that there was now a conservative wing and a liberal wing of the Communist Party. What was happening was … even in a society where no other political parties were permitted … you were starting to get almost a de facto creation of political parties within this so-called monolithic structure. I would say just parenthetically that this is something that might serve as a model down the road for what may happen in China. So those changes were quite palpable.

Q: Were you getting any feel for the divergent nationalities? You know, in other words the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, you know, the Stans, but also Georgia and all that while you were dealing with this?

DE SANTIS: Well, even as far back as the trip with Bingaman in '85 I remember the Kyrgyz who were assisting us on the trip. In conversations I had with … while this guy was a loyal member of the Communist Party, he was also ethnic Kyrgyz, and it was clear to me in conversations that he wasn't looking at the Soviet Union solely, he was looking at Kyrgyzstan too. It was more palpable in '87 in Ukraine because there I recall … actually it wasn't '87, that was '84 as well … on a bus trip we had Soviet KGB people, I'm confident, on the bus with us. Some Ukrainian woman had the temerity to speak Ukrainian, and the Russian shouted her down. I recall that the woman continued to speak in spite of the reprimand. I was very taken with this. That's pretty extraordinary. That was even actually before Gorbachev, and I think it reflected the pent-up frustration of enslaved peoples, especially the younger generation.

What was happening, I think, and I wasn't aware of it at the time … and I'm backtracking if I may just for a second here … I got into a little bit of trouble because I had presented some views innocently about Lenin's New Economic Plan in a public

forum without realizing that that was precisely a subject for discussion in the Politburo at the time. They [the KGB officials in the audience] were furious I was discussing this, and I didn't know why at the time. I think for people who were inside the Soviet Union changes were taking place at some level before we in the West, as carefully as we were monitoring the situation, were able to analyze. Embassy reporting certainly would have observed these developments, but I do not believe that even Soviet experts predicted what ultimately transpired.

Q: Did you find that, certainly in the Washington climate, that you were propounding things are changing whereas say, the American Enterprise Institute would say, no, they're not? Was this a battle being fought in the think-tanks or not?

DE SANTIS: I don't think so. I'm pretty confident that the policy community, the intelligence community, the academic community, the think-tank community, I don't think anybody was ahead of the curve. I recall one time in '87 having lunch with Dmitri Simes, and on the way back from lunch Dmitri said, "Hugh, I have to ask you your opinion. Somebody in the Washington Post just called me and asked me … and this was going back to Reagan's repeated admonitions that we have to break down the East-West barriers …"What would happen if the Berlin Wall were to come down?" That was quite extraordinary in 1987. Dimitri and I kicked it around, and we concluded that it would be extraordinary if that were to happen, and we could easily understand what a transformation that would create, but we thought the probability was low. I can't respond to your question, Stuart, in the sense that I had actually done an investigation of how other people were viewing this possibility, although that might be an interesting subject for research, you know, who was actually ahead of the curve on this.

I think at the Rand Corporation … I remember when I was asked about this by the LA Times when the wall actually came down. I had been invited downtown to their editorial office, and a great guy who is no longer with us, Art Seidenbaum, the editor of the Sunday Opinion section of the paper, asked me if I would write a piece on who might have anticipated the end of the East-West divide. I basically wrote an article that said nobody really got it right; and we didn't get it right, I argued, because there was too much group think. You had people in academia or the think-tanks or government, people who were always talking to each other and forming a general consensus that things weren't going to change that quickly, Gorbachev notwithstanding.

Q: I have heard it said that Vernon Walters, who was our ambassador to Germany was questioning. He said, you know, this could happen. He wasn't saying it would happen but was thinking this was in the cards. All the people around him were saying no.

DE SANTIS: I think that Gorbachev represented such an extraordinary change. We all recall Maggie Thatcher's enthusiasm in meeting him and her comment that this was really a different Soviet leader. I think that was clear. We were looking, I think, for a more humane leadership, going back to what was once called socialism with a human face in Czechoslovakia. I think that was our best expectation.

Q: Was there much contact with the State Department at the time?

DE SANTIS: My relationships with people in the Department, people in the regional bureaus, people in the embassies never changed. I used to be asked how much I missed having access to classified information. My honest reply was that I got probably 90 percent of what I needed from public sources and from my continuing contacts with diplomatic colleagues and others in the foreign affairs community. The 10 percent that I would have received from classified sources mainly involved current developments that would have emerged publicly anyway at some point and, in any event, did not materially influence in most cases the policy issues on which I was writing. When you have good relationships with people -- in my case in the embassies, the foreign embassies in Washington -- very often people would proffer information that you might not have otherwise had access to, which I recall in a couple of cases during my time at Carnegie quite vividly. This is a matter of trust. Diplomatic colleagues who trusted my discretion in using the information supplied me with information because they knew that I wasn't going to embarrass them. This was also the case with journalists. I am sure that I supplied information to journalists on background or deep background on those occasions when I was interviewed, both in and out of the Department. Just as it was not in the interest of the good journalist to expose his sources, I too was careful in protecting colleagues who shared things with me. In general, I did not suffer much from leaving the Department because I was fairly well plugged in while I was at Carnegie. That was also true when I was working at RAND in California because I was back in Washington every month and made the rounds in the Department, Congress, and elsewhere.

When you have good relationships with people, in my case in the embassies – the foreign embassies in Washington – very often people would proffer information that you might not otherwise have access to and if you had a good relationship with that person and there was trust they would allow you to have that information because they knew that it wasn't going to embarrass them. On the basis of those contacts, on the basis of being abroad often, on the basis of good contacts with the news media, both in this country and abroad, you know, I think I was fairly well plugged in.

Q: Were you finding a loosening of the Soviet Embassy personnel? Or were they a bit bewildered about what was happening back at home?

DE SANTIS: I think they pretty much drew a line. There was still, as we know, some resistance to Gorbachev. It obviously gradually diminished, but at the end of '85, the beginning of '86, when I got to Carnegie Endowment, that was certainly not the case. It probably had diminished somewhat by 1987, the year Gorbachev's book Perestroika was published to international acclaim. But you still had people toeing the company line. This was true not only of the Soviet Embassy; it was true of the East German Embassy, for example. I would have lunch with somebody from their embassy from time to time, and when I would comment on the probability or the possibility that we could have a thaw take place in East Germany, I was told no, no, that could never happen here. So I think with some exceptions people were very careful about what they said. I think that's even true in embassies where there was recognition that change was taking place. Charter 77

obviously had a big effect on social conditions in then Czechoslovakia, but you know, talking with the embassies … they would acknowledge that these changes were occurring, but that they were limited to a small segment of the community and didn't represent the breadth of public opinion. I think they were pretty much still toeing the ideological line.

Q: In '88 you left Carnegie?

DE SANTIS: I left Carnegie in January of '88. I had been offered a job at Georgetown in the Department of Government to teach bureaucratic politics. I was also doing some consulting on an issue on which I had worked at Carnegie a great deal, as I had in the Department, the INF (intermediate nuclear forces) issue, which had come to fruition in remarkable ways. I might just digress for the moment.

I remember writing lots of op-ed pieces at Carnegie. They were delicious op-ed pieces to write because, I remember one time, I forget where I published it, it may have been in the Chicago Tribune, I remarked that Gorbachev was a remarkable automobile salesman. And he was doing a very effective job of selling himself and his position on arms control. No matter what we said to sweeten the pot, he never said no. Sure, you can have that too. These were days when Richard Perle was clearly being trumped by Mr. Gorbachev. Gorbachev would say on INF he wanted to cut a deal. "Well, we can't cut a deal," the Pentagon would say, "unless there was verification." And Gorbachev said, "Fine, we'll have verification." "Well, there has to be intrusive verification," we would reply, obviously in the hope, at least from Perle's perspective, that Moscow would not comply and thus would demonstrate in so doing that it really was an evil empire. "Absolutely, we'll have intrusive verification," Gorbachev answered. So we threw up another barrier that the Reagan administration believed the Russians would not surmount. "Well, we have to have what was called a zero-zero arrangement," the Pentagon insisted, meaning there could be no missiles in the Asian part of the Soviet Union pointed at Japan." This became a sensitive matter with Tokyo as the talks proceeded because the Japanese feared that we would denuclearize Europe at the expense of Asia's security. "Fine, we'll take them all down," Gorbachev replied. So ultimately … it was a remarkable tour de force on Gorbachev's part and, you know, who could argue with the outcome? I suppose the zealots who saw the world in Manichean terms were perversely put off by the agreement because it undermined their simplistic view. Gorbachev had trumped Richard Perle and the hardliners, who quietly left the political stage, which was left to the moderates, the long-suffering George Shultz, James Baker, Frank Carlucci, and the like. Some years later, I wrote … and I believe Shultz's memoirs bears out … that it was the combination of Mrs. Reagan's concern about her husband's legacy and Shultz's perseverance that led to the INF agreement.

Not only had I done a lot of writing on that subject and done a lot of TV, but at the end of the time at Carnegie … for some reason not the Foreign Relations Committee but Sam Nunn's committee, the Senate Arms Services Committee … asked me … actually, asked the Library of Congress, which, in turn, called me … if I would write an assessment for them of INF: what we achieved with the agreement and what the implications would be

for arms control, NATO, and East-West relations. Just to clarify, these were the missiles … they were not intercontinental, meaning a range of less than 6,000 kilometers, actually 5,500. The INF missiles had a range of 2,500 - 3000 miles, that is, the SS-20, which meant that they could strike Europe or, if the Soviets redeployed them east of the Urals, Asia. The Soviet SS-20 was the missile we were concerned about. We had cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles that we deploying in response.

Q: When you wrote this for the Armed Services Committee how stood the situation because the SS-20 cruise missile balanced with, you know, sort of dominated most of the '80s.

DE SANTIS: Yes, that's what was so extraordinary about this. I don't know if we discussed this before, but during my tenure in the Department, I recall Jim Goodby, who was our deputy negotiator in START (Strategic Arms Talks) for the Reagan administration, took me aside one time and said, "You know, you ought to be thinking about ways to end this negotiating impasse, you know, consider writing some different alternatives." I remember …this is another sort of prediction that turned out to be absolutely true … I wrote a paper in which I argued we might be able to cut a deal with Soviet Union on the SS-20 issue by giving up the Pershing II missiles. The cruise missile is what is known as an air breather, that is to say, it operates on the basis of aerodynamic principles like an airplane rather than a ballistic missile and its flight time is much slower, so therefore the reaction time … if you launched one of those … on the part of the Soviet Union would be much greater, though it flew at a low altitude, which arguably made it harder to target.

The Pershing II missile is a different story. It was a ballistic missile with a relatively short trajectory, which meant the Soviets would have had very little reaction time if we launched one … I don't remember what the time was from launch to target acquisition, but I we are talking minutes rather than hours. This was a weapon that could be used to take out command and control facilities, so it was perceived as a decapitation weapon. At the time I wrote the long memo I was doing a one-year assignment for the then Assistant Secretary of Intelligence and Research, a former CIA officer and a protégé of Ambassador Walters, Hugh Montgomery. He didn't want the memo circulated at all, so he suppressed it. Ironically, only a week or two later we had the famous walk in the woods, where Ambassador Kvitsinsky from the Soviet Union and Ambassador Nitze from the United States proposed just about the same kind of arrangement to give up the Pershing II missiles.

Q: At the time, this would be what '88? Nunn on the Armed Services Committee asked you to examine this issue. And you came out?

DE SANTIS: I came out, I mean, Gorbachev had made it relatively easy to analyze because he really had satisfied all of our concerns. I thought that this was the making of a possible strategic posture that would permit the United States to maybe begin discussing more seriously reductions at the strategic level as well, which, of course, we did

following the end of the Cold War. On balance we had to be very grateful for this outcome and, as far as I was concerned, it had very promising implications for Europe.

Q: So what happened here?

DE SANTIS: At some point, this actually happened at the end of '87, I think … I was teaching at Georgetown, consulting in various places, doing some writing on other subjects, all in the national security area, and the Rand Corporation expressed interest in having me come to work for them. So in March of '88, I believe it was, they flew me out to Santa Monica to make a presentation and to make the rounds and talk with officials there, and they decided to offer me a job. So at the end of the year I went out to the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica.

Q: How long were you at Rand?

DE SANTIS: A little over two years.

Q: What was the interest of Rand? Why did you fit into Rand?

DE SANTIS: Rand was eager to have people come to work for them who were visible to the policy community, people who were sort of recognized experts in their area or specialty, presumably who would also have access to people in the policy community and be able to attract business. I mean, this was kind of a "twofer". Here is somebody who could write things on national security projects already under way or under contract, but we could send this guy out to attract other business in Washington. So I think that was their attraction. My attraction was the opportunity to write. To me, clearly, by 1988 the world was changing. I still hadn't come to the conclusion that the Soviet Union was simply going to go out of business, but I remember trying … I sent a book idea, which was amplified at their request, to the Twentieth Century Fund. I believed that we had to look at the world in a very different way and that there was going to be a gradual relaxation in the tensions of the Cold War over time.

I was looking forward to the opportunity to be writing about some of these things. It's very hard to do this kind of writing in the policy community because projective assessments don't have immediate relevance to current events. So I went out to the Rand Corporation hoping to do that, and discovered that Rand is a curious place. It was at least when I was there. Because it is a consultancy, you have to bill your time. So they paid me a salary, I mean, they paid me a very good salary and brought me out to Santa Monica, but once I got out there, I assumed that since they were paying me this money, someone would say, well, Hugh ought to be involved in X, Y and Z. Well, it didn't work like that. You would have to go and knock on the door of someone who was in charge of a project, and you basically asked that person if there was something you could do for him. The term of art at RAND is "coverage," that is, your time had to be billed to a project in order to pay your salary. As it turned out, the projects that seemed most suitable were either already staffed or the project managers had no interest in including me in their work. I recall in one case, I met with an economist who worked on Soviet issues. He asked me

where I had done my work. I asked him, "What work?" He wanted to know where I studied in graduate school, with whom I studied, what my doctoral thesis was about, and so one. Stupefied, I reminded him that I had been out of graduate school for almost 15 years, but I would be happy to talk about what I had done since then. But he had no project work to offer. Nor did anyone else. I found it a most curious arrangement because I had very little to do for a couple of months. I was being carried as overhead. I found this the strangest environment. I remember going to a senior vice president and saying that I was just astonished. You recruit me, pay me a decent salary to come out here, and I'm very eager to do something, but nobody has any work to do.

Well, that did change gradually. I started casting wider nets to go beyond Europe, Soviet and East-West relations, and arms control. In retrospect, being forced to find other projects on which to work – unbeknownst to me at the time – did me a service. While I was still writing about the Soviet Union, Europe, East-West affairs, and strategic arms control, I was also now getting involved in other kinds of work. A lot of the work that I was doing was a lot more strategic in nature – strategic assessments, long range analysis, futures analysis. A lot of the work at the time … as the Cold War … the Wall came down when I was there obviously, and as the Cold War had come to an end people in the armed forces, in the Army in particular, were very concerned about how they would be able to maintain their defense establishments if you no longer had the same military threat. They were very interested in having people contrive scenarios, plausible and realistic scenarios, in which they might be asked to deploy their military assets in the event of a conflict. I started doing some of this work for the Army, I started doing what is called "black" work, which, as you know, is highly sensitive work for the Pentagon, and I started doing more global analysis. I also started doing more work on Asia, and I was getting involved in work on the Middle East. So in a way it was beneficial for me, because I was forced to learn and make judgments about other parts of the world, particularly in the case of Asia, which is a part of the world in which I have done a lot more work ever since.

I did study Chinese history and politics when I was at the University of Chicago, and so some of the things that I had learned a long time ago "suddenly" I was using for the first time professionally. So it wasn't all bad, but I was disappointed that I couldn't find work in my acknowledged area of expertise, which was the reason I was brought to RAND. Part of the reason for that was the reluctance on Rand's part to deviate too much from what I thought was fairly conventional wisdom, no doubt driven by the need to please the client. Part of it was the attitude of a gentleman, an economist, who was managing most of the project work on NATO issues. I recall being interviewed by this gentleman in March of 1988, and he seemed to be put off for some reason that I had published so many opinion pieces in newspapers, none of which I included in my resume. Once I got to RAND and began to participate in discussions that he had arranged, it became clear, as the Wall came down, that he fully expected, as did people in the Pentagon, that we would have a NATO-centered world now. This is the origin probably of the NATO expansion of the 1990s, which allowed former Warsaw Pact countries as far back as then to imagine that they could become part of NATO someday. The perceived centrality of NATO was synonymous with American centrality, which was also in peoples' minds as the Cold War

ended, whether it was referred to as unipolarity or Madeleine Albright's indispensable actor.

The other model that was being bandied about – almost, it seemed to me, as a straw man – was the CSCE model, the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe. The CSCE model for Europe was the model that was advocated by Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia. Anybody who had spent any time talking to people in Europe or any time really looking at CSCE knew it was not workable. It was simply too idealistic. But Havel and other members of Charter 77 who assumed the foreign policy levers after independence envisioned a world without the power blocs of the Cold War. Havel later changed his tune when CSCE failed to gain traction and bought on to the NATO model. I advocated a different model, which was Eurocentric. I felt that NATO, having fulfilled its purpose in impressive fashion, should and would become less important in the post-Cold War era. If the world was indeed changing strategically then we would also have to think differently about how we addressed security issues in Europe, and Europe would have to play a more active role. The economist and others at RAND were not interested in hearing that at all, and the reason for that was the Pentagon wouldn't buy it. Therefore Hugh De Santis was, sort of … we don't want you working on these issues with us. I did not pass the litmus test. RAND was working on a NATO-centered world, and that was no longer my view. I ended up working instead on a host of other kinds of projects.

I did one that will amuse you perhaps, Stuart. I was packed off during the first Gulf War to the strategic air command in Kansas with another senior guy at Rand. The Air Force had retained Rand to do a "lessons learned," and the two of us comprised the policy team. I give them high marks for this because even before any shooting started or an actual war plan was prepared, the guys who were planning the air war – a three-star and a two-star – wanted RAND to carefully observe how they were doing things for subsequent evaluation. There were various teams. There was a logistical team, a team that dealt with air assets, including basing and maintenance of bombers, and one or two others besides the policy group.

I remember the two-star, after he gave the battle staff briefings early in the morning, would go into his office, and he would start cussing, "We can't get the Spanish to do this, we can't get the Brits to do that." My favorite was, you know, those goddamned Foreign Service officers, who did not seem to be taking things sufficiently seriously, in his opinion. I need beddown forB-52s in Saudi Arabia, he would bellow. Where the hell are the diplomats when we need them? I would have to listen to this, and I'd say, "General, let me explain how this works. Let me explain to you what the ambassador and his deputy and the political counselor are doing with their time. They are addressing a multitude of issues they have to confront that are not all related to the pending war. While it's not as simple for them as it is for the military to say, "I've got a task to perform here, so let me get to it. Everyone get out of the way." The Embassy still had to conduct business with the government in Cairo on a host of other political and economic issues. I remember having to explain to both generals why Maggie Thatcher was having difficulty authorizing American aircraft to refuel in the UK. Do you realize, I reminded him, how many times she has gone to the mat for us on INF and other issues? You have to be

mindful of her political circumstances. Well, that's not the way the military thinks. They were preparing for a military contingency, and all the services were focused on doing their part to make this effort a success. Although our embassies in the Middle East were surely engaged in continuing discussions with their counterparts on what lay ahead, they had other business to conduct. I found the differences in approach between the military and the diplomatic community quite interesting, and hope that some of what I tried to convey got across to them, namely, that it's a much more complicated world out there than they realized.

Q: While you were at Rand did you find that the collapse of the Soviet Union ... was there a movement on our military to say, OK, that's gone, now let's build up China as the big threat?.

DE SANTIS: No. That happened much later. I do think that did happen, of course, and is happening. That did not occur at the time. In fact, if anything … and I remember being astonished as late as 1990 … being invited to meetings at RAND where someone had mathematically worked out how long it would take the Soviets, if they chose to mobilize, to transport forces to the Fulda Gap, and would we be prepared to contest their advance … analysts were still preoccupied with the Soviet Union, and I thought I was in a time warp. I remember saying to the fellow who was responsible for this project and who had it all very intricately worked out, I said, let me ask you a some simple question, "What's the probability, the political probability, that Gorbachev would do this? What would motivate him to do this?" They didn't have an answer for that, so the project on which they were working was sort of like what if? It was a "what if" question, and "what if" questions are perfectly legitimate but there has to be some measure of plausibility to it. At a time when Gorbachev was bending over backwards to be responsive to us to in a variety of ways, the likelihood that he was going to draw us all in … or that he was simply duping us to drop our guard while he mobilized his forces, seemed to me highly improbable.

I think there were probably people in the Pentagon … I don't think this guy just dreamed it up, or maybe he did … but I think there were people in the Pentagon who remained suspicious. The suspicion that the Soviets were playing an intricate game was surely why Richard Perle and Company couldn't seem to take yes for an answer in the arms control talks. There was this kind of laggard effect … yes, this change has taken place, whether it was perestroika or the INF agreement, but I don't believe it.

Q: Was there any concern about what did happen later? You begin to see in Yugoslavia the ethnic break down and then later the religious problems.

DE SANTIS: I think it was too early yet for the religious problems with the Islamic world to seize people's imaginations. There were concerns about Yugoslavia in particular. There were people who looked at Romania and Hungary … who were mindful of the vivisection of Hungary after the First World War and the loss of Transylvania and other parts. There were people who looked at these issues from an ethnic point of view. I don't remember people doing the kinds of studies then that concluded, boy, this

[enthonationalism] is really going to be a problem. We should prepare for. That doesn't mean they weren't being done. I'm just not aware of that.

Q: How did you find the atmosphere in Rand?

DE SANTIS: I thought that there were a lot of very smart people at Rand, but I thought that Rand in Santa Monica, at least … and in those days you had to go to Santa Monica as opposed to work in the Washington office, which changed after the Cold War interestingly ... but I thought that RAND was too removed from the policy pulse. In the national security area, projects were undertaken to satisfy the needs of Pentagon action officers, hardly the cutting edge of policy. There was also a lack of real-world experience at RAND. Most people came to RAND direct from a university campus or perhaps another think tank, where they might have worked as a research assistant. There was much less hands-on experience than I expected. Reports tended to be massive documents, far too large for policymakers or their staffs to read, and the focus of project managers was the briefing of the Pentagon action officer. We used to get RAND studies when I worked on the Policy Planning Staff at State, but no one had time to wade through 300 pages of text.

Q: Santa Monica. I can't think of a worse place to be, located anyway.

DE SANTIS: Actually, it was a very nice place to be located. I had an office basically across the road from the ocean, and I could watch the waves lap the shore. Pretty idyllic, really. I recall one day having lunch with a colleague at a then chic place on Ocean Avenue called I Cugini. As I watched the rays from the sun do their dance on the ocean across the street, I said to my colleague, "Here we are having lunch at 3 in the afternoon looking at the Pacific. How bad can life be?" The other nice part about my LA sojourn was meeting Debbie, a lovely, poised, intelligent, and immensely competent interior designer whom I married in San Francisco in 1994.

On the other hand, there were downsides to living there … the impossible traffic, the distended character of LA, without a real city center, and the lack of interest in anything outside of California. Southern California, and LA in particular, always seemed to me to be removed from goings on in the rest of the country. In many ways, Santa Monica was the center of cultural fads like roller skating that eventually made their way across the country. But there was little interest beyond California. I used to say that LA was sui generis, a place beyond the point where time and space converged. I found RAND similarly out of touch.

Q: I was thinking about being able to get the pulse of what's going on.

DE SANTIS: Yes. I think that's fair. When Rand was set up I think in '46, it was set up out there intentionally so that smart people could go out and think great thoughts and not be affected by the policy environment here in Washington. In those days maybe it worked that way, but Rand over time became more dependent on what the defense establishment wanted – in my opinion, and in the opinion of others at RAND whom I

respected, more like a beltway bandit than an independent institute that was doing cutting edge analysis. The days when Albert Wohlstetter would have said I'm going to write this paper because this is what I think the military needs to know … over time senior researchers who had worked there during the halcyon days told me when I got to Rand that those days had probably come to an end sometime in the '70s.

I found people at Rand, younger people as well as older people, all had Ph.D.s. You could not work at Rand if you did not have a Ph.D. I had a deviant view of that requirement. I don't think that it's absolutely critical for people who bring an enormous amount of expertise and brainpower with them to have a Ph.D. I think because people didn't have real world experience I found a lot of naiveté at RAND on a range of issues. I think here, Stuart, you are probably right. I think younger people today who are working in the Washington office of Rand, which is where most people are now working, are probably better off because even if they haven't been in government, they at least have access to people, and osmotically they can get an idea of what's going on. I found RAND in that sense a little bit too academic, and I don't really mean that as pejoratively as it sounds …but academic in the sense that they were a little too hide-bound … this is how we think reality is configured, you know. I wasn't sure whether a lot of the suggestions were all that practical. That's not true across the board, of course. There are a number of people at RAND besides myself who brought considerable real-world experience to the task. By and large, however, I think they were too removed from the policy environment.

Q: Then you were there what, about two years?

DE SANTIS: A little over two years, yes.

Q: This would bring us up to?

DE SANTIS: '91.

Q: The Gulf War. Was this a time of hurried activity? In the first place, was this whole thing sort of locked in the think-tank establishment? All of a sudden here was a war that came out of the blue in a place we didn't expect it.

DE SANTIS: Well, here's another example where I can … I was asked by the Army in '89 to come up with some plausible scenarios that would enable the Army to introduce heavy divisions. One of the scenarios I laid out was an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. That happened before the war, obviously. Having said that, when the LA Times called me and interviewed me … this is when Saddam was threatening Kuwait … as to whether or not he was going to intervene, shades of my '86 prognostication of going into Libya, I said that I thought he would continue to bluff, that he would mobilize but he wouldn't invade. I thought he was going to be able to get what he wanted simply by threatening us, and he wouldn't have to invade. Well, to be perfectly candid, I think he might have achieved his objectives had he withheld his forces because in those days …and this was true throughout Iraq but not only in Iraq …it was true elsewhere too in the Levant … that the Kuwaitis and others had been delighted to see Iraq fight Iran in their protracted war

because the body bags went back to Iraq. Kuwaitis didn't have to die in that war. Nor did other Arabs. In a way Saddam wanted to be paid for that, for shouldering the burden against Iran. He wanted to be cut into the oil benefits, the windfall that others reaped, and he wanted a bigger piece of the pie. I think there was actually some justification to his argument, and I think had he been a little shrewder diplomatically he might have gotten what he wanted. But I got that wrong.

The war itself, once it happened, I don't think people were stunned. They were more stunned when the Wall came down. There was almost a sense of excitation about that development. Once again I remember smart people at RAND running up to me saying, isn't this great? The Wall has come down and Europe is coming back together, everything is going to be great, everybody's going to live happily ever after. I found it a remarkably naive view. I told them that what would happen now is that all the national tensions that got buried by the Soviet Union would now come to the surface. And of course, that ultimately did happen.

What was most astonishing about the first Gulf War, apart from the role I played as part of the lessons learned project, was the considerable effort on the U.S. government's part, particularly General Powell's part, to keep the Israelis out of the conflict. Few people knew at the time, and maybe it is still not well known, that Powell and Ehud Barak, then the head of the IDF, conducted a lengthy back-channel dialogue. Powell was the administration's point man with the Israeli military to ensure that they stayed out of the fray and did not upset the careful diplomacy we had pursued with the Arab world. The other astonishing aspect of the war was the high tech wizardry. I remember being simply incredulous. I was invited over to a colleague's house, and there we were watching the war on television, in real time. I was simply speechless. Now let's show you again how that bomb hit that building, the reporter would say; I had just never seen anything like it. This was being sent back to American living rooms by CNN. CNN came of age with the first Gulf War. That's really the transformation of communications in many ways in this country. I mean the modern transformation. But getting back to your question, no, I don't think other than the technical wizardry that people were terribly surprised. Obviously, Saddam calculated that the US would not respond to his actions. As people later wrote, and as former colleagues of mine on State's Policy Planning Staff said in advance of the invasion, Saddam reckoned that the US, with Vietnam is the back of his mind, would prefer to avoid a military clash, while Iraq, which had fought Iran for a decade, was battle-hardened and psychologically more prepared. I'm quite sure a considerable amount of work on all of this was done at RAND and elsewhere subsequently, but I can't speak to that directly. In any event, I left RAND shortly thereafter.

Q: Did you get involved in the Israeli factor in the Gulf War?

DE SANTIS: I did not get involved in that. I was privy to the discussions that were taking place, and I was also indirectly privy, though I didn't know it at the time, not precisely, to when the shooting was going to start because I had been back in Washington, as I was every month, just before we intervened. I had set up a meeting with somebody I had known in the State Department, Barry Lowenkron, who was serving on Powell's staff in

the Pentagon. We were to meet for breakfast the next morning. The night before I received a call about eight o'clock from Barry's secretary, and I remember the words vividly. General Powell has asked that you stand down. I think what was being clearly communicated, though I couldn't be sure at the time, was tomorrow was the day the US was going to attack, or it may have been the day after, and there was no need to have any further discussions about this. The timing of the invasion was obviously closely held, and it took people working with the military, as we were, by surprise. I was supposed to be in theater, I was supposed to be in Saudi Arabia working with the Air Force. Things happened a little faster than we anticipated and that didn't come about.

Q: Was there any Israeli element involved in Rand? Our relationships, of course, are so close they sometimes overlap.

DE SANTIS: No. I don't remember that. I mean there were certainly people at RAND who were, as there would be in any organization, sympathetic to Israel's cause.

Q: There wasn't an Israeli office?

DE SANTIS: I don't remember that.

Q: I'm saying this because sometimes at the Pentagon the Israelis got so deeply imbedded in so much of our military, it just suddenly occurred to me but I guess not?

DE SANTIS: I don't think so. I think given the effort that General Powell made, which was considerable, with General Barak at the time, who was then Israeli Chief of Staff, I think I would have probably been aware of that. If there was an Israeli involvement it had to have been very carefully disguised.

Q: You left Rand in '91. Wither?

DE SANTIS: I was asked to come to the National War College, come back to the East Coast, which I didn't want to do. I wanted to stay in California. I would have preferred to be in the Bay area. I chose to take the bird in the hand, though I wasn't particularly interested in teaching at the National War College. I thought I would do that for a year and then find something else more in keeping with my policy interests.

That didn't work out as I had intended. Shortly after I got to the War College the book idea that I had in the late '80s, which I began to conceptualize at Rand, I seriously started researching while I was there, and I thought here's an opportunity to do another book that you are not going to be able to do if you are in a nine-to-five plus job, as I am now. The research and writing took a few years to do because I was obviously working every day, running seminars and that sort of thing.

My work at the National War College entailed presenting lectures and leading seminars to not only military, but primarily military, officers at the rank of colonel and lieutenant colonel and their Foreign Service equivalents and other people from elsewhere in the

national security community. I maintained contacts with the policy community throughout this period as well, not just the State Department. I continued to go to the usual meetings in town, continued to write, continued to go abroad, give talks, stay abreast of what was going on.

A substantive change occurred for me in the course of the research I did for that book. I mean, I was in Central America, I was in Asia, I was in the Middle East, and I found myself gravitating more to … the book was about globalization and its implications for the United States, and I argued that the 21st century would not be an American century. The thesis was not as well received here as it was in Asia. It was subsequently published the next year by the Bungei Shunju in Japan, where it received good notices.

Because of the book, I became much more interested in regional … the book was about regionalization as a unit of analysis … the regional developments taking place in Europe and Asia and Latin America. I spent a lot of time in Argentina, in particular, and Chile but also Brazil, talking to people about Mercosur, which is their attempt to form a Common Market, and spending more time in Asia, particularly in Japan, but then subsequently in Southeast Asia, where I also talked to people about regional economic integration. I'm still very bullish on this idea, and I have just published something on that subject, although it's not Japan that is the focus any longer, it's China.

Q: When you were working on Japan as far as globalization it seems like Japan is practically impervious to it. It seems in some ways to be going in the wrong direction. Its work force is getting older, the cost of maintaining the Japanese way of life is getting more expensive.

DE SANTIS: Yes. You're exactly right. In fact you asked what the big issues were at Rand – the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Gulf War. The other big issue was Japan during my tenure there because of Japan's extraordinary economic muscle at that time, and I think all of this was reified, you know, symbolically by Japan's purchase of Pebble Beach and Rockefeller Plaza. It ultimately had to disgorge those assets later on and sell them when it fell on harder times. In the late '80s and early '90s, I mean, people were writing books about Japan's ascendancy. This was the Japan that could say no, as was written by Ishihara Shintaro and the former CEO of Sony. You know, they argued, we're now in a position to sort of call the shots, and in many ways they were.

Nothing stays the same forever, however, and Japan's bad loans and reckless financial management led to the "lost decade" of the 1990s. That applies to the United States too. When I was doing research on the globalization book, I remember writing – and remember I'm doing this, writing this, in '94 – I believed that the bloom was off the Japanese rose, that for reasons that you already mentioned, Stuart, the aging work force, but not just that. The fact that younger people in Japan … and when you're over there this is most conspicuous … don't have the same work ethic as the older generation, is another problem, and the cost of capital is very high in Japan. There were a number of other factors that suggested to me that this couldn't go on. It surely hasn't. I mean, until recently Japan has been in almost perpetual recession.

In discussions over there … I remember one time with a group from the National War College … I had taken them to Vladivostok in the Asian part of Russia. It was the first time I had been there because until 1993 Vladivostok was a closed city. Then we went from there to Japan and to Korea. I remember at a large roundtable discussion with a counterpart national security organization in Tokyo we got involved in a chat about how the respective institutions prepared their students. How do you do things the National War College, I was asked? "Well, I said we have regional study trips at the end of the year in the spring and we go to about twenty places around the world so students can see first hand for two weeks at a time what is going on and immerse themselves in the countries they have been studying.

"We do the same thing," he said, except the radius was much smaller. Doing the same thing meant going to Southeast Asia, maybe as far afield as Manila or Jakarta. And I said, "That's it?" What it conveyed to me was a certain parochialism. I think that it is in part because of Japan's parochialism that it has been overtaken in East Asia by China. It's not just because of its enormous size and its resourcefulness, but it's the fact that China is much more imaginative about dealing with the region.

Q: We will leave this when you are changing your focus. You're still at the National Defense University. You might talk next time about your impressions of future admirals and generals and ambassadors who are coming through and you were looking at them.

DE SANTIS: Well, I'm happy to do that and I could probably elaborate a little bit on multiple travels to Japan, on some things I'm saying now, which ended up in fairly high-level discussions with people.

Q: And also your sort of impressions as the new boy on the block, dealing with China and also Southeast Asia. You know, Thailand was ready getting ready to go through its problems and Indonesia, you know, and all that.

Future military leaders, what was your impression of them? And also some of our people, the Foreign Service types?

DE SANTIS: You know, when people would ask me about the quality of the military, officers of the rank of lieutenant colonel and colonel, I would generally say that these are folks who have aspirations to become flag and general officers. Some of them do. Fox Fallon, for example, who commands our Pacific forces, was at the War College in 1992, my first full year. More are journeyman officers, however, and others are below average performers. I think there is probably a normal sine curve here. It is probably not dramatically different from what you would find in colleges and universities, where you have a smaller segment of people who are really terrific and would be first-rate in anything they aspire to do. That would certainly apply to the military officers at the War College. There was also a segment whom I was quite surprised to see were permitted access to the National War College because they really weren't prepared for a program of higher learning. There was nothing wrong with them as individuals; it's just that they

lacked the prerequisites to do this sort of thing. The way it works in the military, however, is that some CINC approves the assignment of a handful of officers on the basis of recommendations by his subordinates, and no Commandant of the National War College, or any of the other military schools, is going to challenge it. The bulk of the people, however, were those who were in the middle ranks as far as skills, intelligence, and knowledge are concerned, folks who were going to do a perfectly decent job in whatever they were asked to do but who were not necessarily going to have new ideas or break new ground.

Let me make a few observations. The fact that some students did not belong in a school of higher learning, and I use that term loosely here, did not mean that some would not graduate. At the National War College, at least during my tenure, no one ever washed out. I recall one officer who was caught plagiarizing a paper, an offense that I felt for sure would lead to his dismissal. It appeared that he had been dismissed, in which case I had been proved wrong, but a year later we learned that he had received his degree, a master's in national security strategy, in spite of his transgression. I don't want to suggest that this doesn't happen elsewhere, but the military prides itself on honor. I think it also reflects that education, which is invariably confused by the military with training, is not taken all that seriously. It's really a box-checking exercise. In the case of the fellow who had cheated, it may also have been a question of political correctness. He was an African-American, and during my time at the War College I know the military was eager to have more blacks in senior positions.

Another observation I had … I was struck that they tended to adopt similar positions … I mean, I sat around a table, as I did for many years, with 15 very enthusiastic, type A people and I tried to get them to see the complexities of the world, but it was very difficult to get the military to really deviate from what was really a shared script, at least publicly. Through various ploys and chicanery I managed to do that from time to time so that they might feel free to honestly express themselves, especially when it came to making judgments about national security policy, but it was not easy.

I recall one time an Air Force officer, a smart guy, had expressed a view, and it was clearly a liberal view, and he was roundly criticized by his colleagues. I had to come to his defense. It wouldn't have made any difference to me what his view was, and I don't remember whether I agreed with what he was asserting or not, but I wanted him to feel free to express his view, no matter what. I wanted his colleagues to know that it was okay too. I think this is true in the military broadly, that if you deviate from the norm, the social proprieties, the conventional wisdom, the preordained wisdom of the CO, you are reminded that you are out of step very quickly. The reality is, education is supposed to be liberating. I used to tell my colleagues that the ideal outcome for the 160 students who engaged in a year of national security study would be 160 different views. Training, by contrast, which is what the military confused with education, means that you master some repetitive activity until it is performed very accurately and very efficiently.

There was a period of time, and I think this would have been in the early to mid '90s, when an army officer on the faculty decided to introduce a segment into the curriculum

that he called the changing face of America. The point of this was, and this was a great idea, to introduce people to what was going on in our society, particularly parts of our society with which we may not come into contact. People in the military establishment, less so in the foreign affairs community but I think to some extent there, too, tend to lose sight of the day-to-day affairs in people's lives because you are caught up with the looking at the world beyond our shores generally and with a self-contained and socially predictable environment of the military base, for the most part. Because of the location of the War College at Ft. McNair, we were cheek-by-jowl with inner-city blacks who lived in poverty. I don't know if the Army officer and the former Hill staffer who dreamed this up had a political agenda, but this component of the course on Congress and National Security Policy did not go over well.

On another occasion, I recall a two- or three-part piece in the Washington Post on the closing of a meat packing plant in Kansas City, I believe, the Cudahy Meatpacking Company. It was really kind of a sad story about a couple who had done all the things we expect people to do, pay their taxes, send their kids to school, respect the law, and this guy suddenly is without a job. His wife found work at a five-and-dime as a cash register attendant. I used this episode in seminar as an example of the human consequences of globalization. One of the military officers, a Marine, was quite put off that I found this a heart-rending experience because, as far as he was concerned, it was only natural for these people to be displaced because of globalization; if labor was cheaper in Mexico, so be it. I don't disagree with the macro economic argument that he was making, but I found it quite extraordinary to encounter such remarkable insensitivity to day-to-day problems that affected average Americans, people who presumably had served their country, in this gentleman's case I believe he was a veteran. An Army colleague in the seminar said that people had to learn to pull themselves up by their bootstraps, just as he had done in rising to the rank of colonel. I found that rich, given the fact the military world is one of the last bastions of socialism. But I was mainly stunned that I did not find any sensitivity to the concerns of others in the country.

Still another observation that I'm reminded of is the difference between Foreign Service officers and military officers. The military … in many ways most people don't serve in the military service any longer … you could count the number of civilian students year after year who had served in some branch of the armed forces. As a consequence, there's a growing lack of understanding on the part of FSOs of what goes on in the military. The military, for their part don't know much about what Foreign Service Officers do in the field, so I would typically have someone come before the class who had served in a large embassy like Cairo, let's say, to explain how the embassy operated. It was really an eye opening experience for military officers. They didn't realize that the segments in the embassy that are actually represented by Foreign Service Officers are small and getting smaller every year in very large embassies. There are a lot of law enforcement agencies, for example, that populate these embassies. I would remind the class of the experience I had, when I was at the Rand Corporation, with the generals at the Strategic Air Command who were planning the air war against Iraq in 1991.

Just as the generals felt frustrated with the diplomatic community during the first Gulf war – what the hell is wrong with these guys? – the students at the War College, regardless of their experience, were equally inclined to be dismissive of diplomatic work. It was just patently clear to me that they didn't understand the complexities of what goes on in an embassy, what's on the plate of the political counselor and the kinds of issues he or she has to deal with on a day to day basis. I tried to bring that into the classroom and hopefully did some good in broadening the horizons of people in uniform, but equally in broadening the horizons of diplomats, who might not have had the opportunity to serve, into the complexities of the professional lives of military officers.

Q: You mentioned you were beginning to move your focus over toward East Asia. How did this come about and how did this translate?

DE SANTIS: In 1991 I published an article in the Washington Quarterly called "The Graying of NATO". The thrust of the article was that NATO had served the country very well for half a century but that strategically the world had changed. NATO in the future would have less relevance than it had had in the past, and it was high time, in my view, that Europeans assumed some greater responsibility for their own security. That, I argued, ought to be the focus of our foreign policy vis-à-vis Europe rather than devising new ways to sustain the Alliance.

Friends of mine and people with whom I had served, Sandy Vershbow, as an example, who has been confirmed as ambassador to South Korea, among others, took great umbrage at this. How could anyone be challenging NATO? Increasingly, as I worked that issue in the ensuing years, it became clear to me that the Europeans were unlikely to do much that was different from what they had done in the past. The United States, for our part, didn't seem particularly inclined to want to prod them to do things differently. We seemed content to direct the affairs of Europe, at least in security affairs, because it enhanced our influence and our self-image. Europeans would periodically complain, but they ultimately went along with things in the final analysis, notwithstanding the difficulty that we had, or Rumsfeld had, with so-called old Europe a couple of years ago. So in part I lost interest in Europe because Europe seemed to be losing interest in playing a larger role in the post-Cold War world, the EU aside. I became increasingly attracted to Asia in part because I was doing research for a book on global change and its implications for the United States that also forced me to acknowledge that the international pendulum was shifting from Europe to Asia and that the great challenge, it seemed to me, was how to contain the burgeoning power of China and increasingly, as we have seen, of India.

I began to focus my attention more on regional integration … I was, of course, also looking at Europe in regional terms … but increasingly to focus my attention on regional integration in Latin America and East Asia. The Latin American venture was relatively short-lived because it was very difficult to see how Brazil and Argentina, given their competition, would work together to develop regional cooperation and how they were going to incorporate other countries like Chile, which already had lower tariffs than either Brazil or Argentina.

Asia was different because an embryo of regional cooperation existed with ASEAN and because of China's rise. In China's case, it was clear by the late '90s that a strategy had been put in place to gradually bring the smaller countries in Southeast Asia into an economic relationship with China that ultimately China would influence. And I think I have we have seen that this has played out in the years since. The great policy question for people in this administration and successive administrations will be what China does with its new found power. Does this really represent a threat to America's interests or, as I argued in something I have recently written, does it represent an opportunity if it means that Asia is going to be more integrated socially, economically, perhaps politically more stable? Does it present opportunities for the United States economically? Does it also provide opportunities in terms of reducing the military assets the United States might otherwise have to deploy in that region?

It seemed to me the more interesting questions that were being posed by the change in the international system were being generated by developments in Asia rather than Europe. That was the genesis of my shifting focus.

Q: You were still at NDU at this time?

DE SANTIS: Yes.

Q: Did you find was there a line you were supposed to take regarding, particularly China, but also with Japan and India?

DE SANTIS: I didn't find a line on Asia. There was a line on Europe, interestingly, and everyone was very sensitive to anything that challenged the viability of NATO. I don't think anyone inhibited me from writing things, but I think there was a great deal of concern about anything that questioned NATO enlargement, for example, which I was doing. With respect to China no one said … there wasn't a company line. In those days, and this persisted until 2002 in my case at least, it was very difficult to get funding from research foundations to do work on regional economic integration if you were suggesting that there could be some kind of environment in Asia that would be China-influenced that would be conducive to American interests, and that was simply because policymakers weren't interested in that kind of approach. China was perceived as a threat. The students who sat around the seminar tables perceived China as a threat. Those were the views of their commanding officers, and you know you can sit there and discuss with them alternative futures, but they were inclined to see the region pretty much as a piece.

Q: Do you feel that if you're in the military you have to have a threat?

DE SANTIS: Yes, I really do. The fact is not just the military; I think the intelligence community suffers from that too. As you know nobody wants to have a terrible episode take place on their watch. The last thing you want to do is miss a development if you're an intelligence officer that has great implications for American security, similarly if you're a military officer, so I think there's always a tendency to perceive the world in terms of potential threats rather than potential opportunities.

In the military's case I think this is exacerbated by the fact that potential threats also mean bigger budgets. If one could make the case that China represents an increasing threat to America's interests not just in East Asia that but, given China's great demand for natural resources as we have seen, in Africa as well, then one can make a more plausible case to people on the Hill that the military needs greater resources in order to have greater assets at their disposal, deploy troops more quickly, that sort of thing. I think it is not just a question of needing to see bad guys, it's a question also of its practical implications.

Q: What about, was India sort of coming in under the radar or where people looking at potential problems or opportunities?

DE SANTIS: Yes. At the National War College … this would be true in government bureaucracies and the Executive Branch too … if your window to the world was Southeast Asia, say, and you focused on smaller countries like Malaysia or Singapore or Thailand, you inevitably would see countries like China as a potential threat. You also saw countries like Japan as problematic because Japan was perceived in Southeast Asia and by those who studied Southeast Asia as never doing particularly much to help develop countries in that region. It was more of an exploitative arrangement. I think every expert had his or her pet theme. If you were a sinologist dealing with China, you would be more sympathetic to an argument such as I was advancing that it's too soon, we don't have enough data to conclude that China is going to be a bad actor. If you were somebody who focused on Japanese politics you might have the view of China that the Japanese have, which is a very negative one.

So I think there's a tendency of people to identify … and I think, Stuart, you would agree with this … to identify sometimes – what used to be called "localitis" in the Foreign Service – with the part of the world on which you are focused. I think you have to stand back from such attachments, maintain objectivity, and reduce bias as much as possible.

India was very much under the radar in those days, and it's only a relatively recent development … I think in the last two or three years, particularly under the Manmohan Singh Administration … where we're seeing for the first time a rather consistent approach taken by the Indians to reduce the weight of government to allow the private sector to develop and expand and, even quite recently, we are beginning to see some signs of the Indian budget expanding to free resources to build the infrastructure and develop an educational system, both of which desperately need to happen in that country if it's going to prosper. Increasingly, I think more attention is now being paid by the US to India than China in some ways because of the implications of their relationship not just for stability in East Asia but for American interests as well.

Q: While you were dealing with this how were your ties to the academic world and were they shedding different lights on things than you expected?

DE SANTIS: In the academic community I think there were … on all of these subjects there were different points of view, whether it was India or Europe. There were Europeanists who questioned NATO expansion, but most scholars probably took – with a small C – a more conservative view that NATO expansion is a good idea and that anything that reduces the salience of NATO is not in American interests. I think American academic experts on India generally supported the thaw in relations with the US, but I am sure some Indian academics have expressed concern that such ties would erode India's autonomy. Similarly in East Asia I think that there were those people who if they followed Japan as an academic would be subject to the same potential biases as people who follow Japan in government, which is to say, they would be opposed to policies that weakened the security tie between Tokyo and Washington. It wasn't a situation where people at NDU and people in government had one view and academics had a different view. I think there were sort of parallel perspectives.

Q: You were talking about NATO and the graying of NATO. You were at NDU during the Balkan crisis? How did that play out?

DE SANTIS: The one experience that I remember most vividly, a gentleman I knew in the State Department and in the Foreign Service had taken an academic job either at the University of Kansas or Kansas State in the political science department. I believe this was 1993. I was relatively new at the War College. He was to be a keynote speaker on the Balkans in the spring, I guess, just before commencement, and I was asked if I could substitute. This was Dale Herspring that I'm speaking of. And so I did an options paper addressing the problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I recall the audience, many of whom were retired senior military officers, being a little put off because, in my view, the conflict between Serbia and Bosnia I did not see as being comparable to the holocaust, as it was presented by the Clinton Administration. I didn't think the objective of the Serbs was to kill all the Muslims in former Yugoslavia; I think it was territorial aggrandizement on Serbia's part, and if you were in the way they would take you out. It's very different from what went on in Congo during the latter part of the Clinton Administration or what is probably going on in Sudan today. And they took great issue with my view and stressed that we had to come to Bosnia's defense. General Ed Rowny, the former START negotiator, was particularly outspoken on the matter. Other than that I don't think that the Balkan crisis … it was an issue of discussion, of course, at the War College, as it was in the media – I remember doing some NPR on developments there at the time – but more of the concern was on the damage the continued instability was inflicting on NATO. In my judgment, that was the major reason for our military intervention.

You know, when I was at NDU, members of the faculty aside, there wasn't an administration … the commandant or the president of the National Defense University didn't say this is the stance we're taking on this or that. The one thing they were concerned about was that we were … we not … they were sensitive to the enunciation of positions that would run counter to administration policy. They didn't want the institution to appear that it was challenging the administration. It didn't make any difference whether it was a Democratic or a Republican administration, challenging it frontally on matters of national security policy was to be avoided. I think part of the concern … again this

always comes back to funding issues … part of the concern is that we didn't want to offend legislators who might be in the position to dole out resources for military education. There were no real company positions in those days as I recall.

The only one I do recall where there was some concern … I had been invited by the Cato Institute, the Libertarian institute, to debate … I don't remember the congressman's name now … he was from New York and well-known … Steve Solarz. He had taken the view that we had an obligation to come to Haiti's defense when the Haitian military decided to oust the president, Aristide, who was freely elected. This was at an early point in the Clinton administration, and it came on the heels of the situation in Bosnia and the crisis in Somalia. I published a piece in the Washington Post in which I argued historically that American interventions tended to come to no good in that part of the world and they never really led to any positive outcomes for the most part. That was the view that Cato supported, and they wanted me to debate Solarz. That was frowned upon by the War College establishment, and so I decided not do that.

Q: What about Japan? Did that fit in anywhere or was Japan sort of dropping away from our interest?

DE SANTIS: No, the big issue with Japan from about the late '90s, from about '96 on, was the desire certainly of then Secretary of Defense Perry and the Bush Administration as well, Rich Armitage in particular, to get Japan to assume some greater military responsibility in East Asia. Japan, as we know, is restricted from fielding an offensive … so-called offensive military force because of the strictures imposed by the United States at the end of the Second World War. As time has gone by and as the situation in East Asia has changed, many people in this country felt that Japan ought to be doing more in the region, at least in peacekeeping and in providing assistance to the United States logistically, which it has done in the second Gulf War by refueling American ships.

That was the primary focus, the so-called defense guidelines that were promulgated in Japan during this period did gradually extend the sea lines of communication and did gradually make the case for Japan to assume greater responsibilities for peacekeeping. That to us may seem like a simple affair, but in a country where you still have very substantial pacifist opinion, that was no easy chore. That was one major issue with Japan. The other major issue of course was the prolonged recession in Japan. It was just one perpetual recession, it seemed, after another from about 1993 on. For about a decade, Japan was really in a position where it was self-absorbed with its own difficulties and unable to play a larger role in the region.

Q: We're talking about economic issues?

DE SANTIS: We're talking about economic difficulties largely, and its self-absorption inhibited it, in my judgment, from exercising the kind of imagination that I had referred to earlier, which the Chinese were able to demonstrate in East Asia. Even if Japan hadn't had these economic difficulties, I don't think the situation would have been dramatically different because I don't think it had the vision that the Chinese leadership had about

integrating the region. This was something Japan has been reluctant to advocate in large part because it does not want to sever its security relationship with the United States and, in many respects, to affect its relations with the countries in the region, including … especially the smaller countries don't want to see Japan sever that relationship with the US either because they remember the Second World War. They don't want to see Japan come roaring back as a threat to regional stability.

Those were the kind of issues that bounded the discussion of Japan. I was relatively agnostic; I didn't have a position one way or another on Japan. Friends of mine who looked at Southeast Asia were very critical of Japan, particularly for the impediments that it raised in its trade with the United States, but also because they viewed the small countries in the region as little more than markets for its exports.

I started traveling over there, and I began to have interesting discussions with some people, particularly in the Foreign Ministry, but outside of some people in the Foreign Ministry – certainly not the North American division – and in METI it was very difficult to find Japanese who wanted to do things very differently. Over time I found it very frustrating. Younger people I think were willing to consider different approaches, but by and large Japan is an exceedingly conservative and hierarchical society, and everything involving foreign policy seemed to revolve around the relationship with the United States. It was U.S.-centered rather than Asia-centered, and I thought and still think that in the long term, that it is not in Japan's interest, that Japan one way or the other is going to have to immerse itself in the region because the dominant actor economically ultimately is going to be China, which is bound to change regional relationships. My argument with the Japanese with whom I met with was that you should want to influence the kind of Asia that's going to emerge while you have an opportunity to do that. If you wait too long … once decisions are made, and if you haven't been a party to them … then you're going to have to accept the cards that you are dealt, but that was not then nor today the focus of Japan. They continue to focus their attention on the United States and that special relationship.

Q: How long were you at NDU?

DE SANTIS: Ten years. I left in 2001 to set up my own consultancy.

Q: Did the State Department feel you were there as the State Department representative or quasi-representative?

DE SANTIS: No, not in a formal sense. I think the War College still does this … they had a … I forget what the proper title was, but if there was a deputy commandant, that position went to a diplomat in residence, usually an ambassador.

Like other faculty members, I had to evaluate students after each seminar I conducted or each core course, but at year-end we had to basically write their ERs, and I would end up with Foreign Service officers as people in my charge, if you will. The only time this became an issue was if State Department officers, depending on whom the diplomat in

residence was at the time, came to me and asked if I would please write their evaluation because they were concerned that it be done right. These are evaluations, depending on how they are written, that will have an effect on whether someone gets promoted or not. So I had those kinds of responsibilities. I basically functioned as the rating officer, and the diplomat in residence served as the reviewing officer.

Q: Did you detect that in the military training is considered a stepping stone to higher positions whereas in the State Department training is considered a luxury and real men don't do training?

DE SANTIS: Yes, I have spent the past year working for John Negroponte in the office of DNI dealing in part with some of those issues. The model for the intelligence community now, in response to the events of 9/11 and the legislation that followed, is to sort of emulate the military, how they go about training and education. You're absolutely right, I think, neither the intelligence community nor the diplomatic community does anything remotely close to the military, although the intelligence community, or many of its agencies, have formalized training programs.

I think you have to make a distinction, and I say this all the time, between training and education because they're not the same. Training to me is the mastery of a certain set of clearly defined activities for which the outcome is a relatively clear. As I said earlier, that's not what education is about. In education there is no school solution. The idea is to give you the tools to go out and think your own thoughts and come up with imaginative ways to do things. I think sometimes we get the two confused.

The military, for example, when I was at NDU routinely called what we did training. I never trained anyone. I mean, I was in the army. We didn't train people to see how quickly an amphibious landing can take place or how quickly someone could disassemble and reassemble his rifle, all of which is very important in terms of saving lives, among other things. We sat around a table and got people to think thoughts that might deviate from policy or just reflect on things so that they might maybe … they might have a new perspective. That to me falls under the rubric of education. The military certainly, but not only the military, tends to confuse the two.

Q: Did you get any flak for training officers to think on their own? That you might be leading them down the wrong career path?

DE SANTIS: Inhibiting them from succeeding as military officers? No. In any case, that never crossed my mind at all. I thought I was doing them a favor. At this point these people on average were 44, 45 years of age, so when I started there they weren't much younger than I was. I thought there were more than a few cases where people were quite responsive a Socratic dialogue and wanted to think new thoughts. The number of these people … a young naval officer I remember, Jim Stavridis, who was relatively young, 36 or 37 years old, was a commander, and he became a captain very quickly while he was there and I think he now has two stars. It certainly didn't inhibit his advancement. You know, I think it depends on how you play the game bureaucratically, but I think the

military, like every other organization needs to have people who are imaginative at the top.

Q: Did you get any feel for the problems of the submariners, strategic bombing? I mean in other words the world is broken down into a bunch of little conflicts, and there is no longer the grand battle that they have been preparing for for so long and some elements really have a problem with that.

DE SANTIS: I thought that was what you were getting at. I think all institutions, all organizations, the Foreign Service as well, have pecking orders. So for example if you are an Air Force officer, what you want to be – the crème de la crème – is to be a fighter pilot, a tactical fighter pilot. You can go on down the list in terms of status. I think that's true in the Foreign Service too. I think the political officer remains the one ruling the roost and, unless this has changed, if you were assigned to the European Bureau, you couldn't do any better than that. I think all of these … the Navy was very much the same way, and I don't know that this was especially exacerbated by the changing environment, though I am sure it had to be. I do think that it had an effect on certain services more than others. The phrase that the military likes to use in is putting boots on the ground, and that's what the Army and the Marines do, or given current operational realities, did. The kind of contingencies that I think you are referring to, Stuart, are contingencies that the United States increasingly addresses operationally in what is called a standoff capacity, in which we respond with long-range bombing, either by air or by sea, and we are reluctant to have American forces introduced for a variety of reasons. The problems that we encountered in the Horn of Africa in the Clinton Administration in 1993 reminded American politicians and certainly the public that we didn't want to put American lives at risk in some of these faraway places. That was part of the reason President Clinton remained reluctant for a very long time to send American troops to former Yugoslavia … to Bosnia.

Those kinds of issues were very prominent during the time I was at the National War College. The Army in particular felt that the kind of contingencies that the United States confronted were not conducive to having the Congress say we need heavier divisions. Instead, money was going to be thrown at the Navy and Air Force, so once again it came down to budgetary issues.

Q: How did the withdrawal from Somalia play with the military?

DE SANTIS: That was at the beginning of my tenure, so it's a little bit harder for me to comment. If that had occurred a few months later when I was more immersed in how they did things … I was still trying to get my sea legs, as it were. Obviously, it created a great consternation. People were very unhappy when it happened. I don't remember, to be perfectly candid, whether that that meant the average person meaning student or military faculty member, was more reluctant to be packed off as a result. I rather doubt it. I do know that during the first Gulf War we had a number of people during the time that I was there who participated. They were very happy to participate, and those who didn't have the opportunity were very unhappy they did not serve in that conflict. The military

by and large … they call themselves warriors for good reasons. I think that the average person would have said, if he was permitted to make the decision on whether we should we go back into Somalia, he or she probably would have said, yes, let's go back and clean that nest out. I don't remember it being a continuing issue except insofar as it reinforced criticism of the Clinton Administration on the part of the military. They thought the Administration, to use a phrase that is popular now, had cut and run.

Q: Did Islam raise any questions while you were there?

DE SANTIS: It did particularly after Sam Huntington's article and book came out dealing with the clash of civilizations. This was a subject of discussion for years after in seminars, and I'll bet it still is. I think that the military responded to Huntington's thesis very supportively. I have always thought that we Americans looked at the world in Manichean terms. Leaving the substance aside, I think the success of Fukuyama and Kennedy and Huntington had much to do with the stark and, in my view, overdrawn contrast they made. The military very much saw Islam as a threat to American interests, but not because there was any understanding of it historically or culturally. Virtually none of these people, and I repeat virtually none, had any real experience or exposure to the Middle East.

Q: It's a problem that might end up in fighting, but basically you are looking at China and the problem you might have there.

DE SANTIS: The two scenarios that the military focused on, and that was almost a repetitive thing, were produced by two threats: one was a Korean threat, a second Korean conflict scenario in which China would or would not intervene; and the second one was a Middle East/South Asia scenario, and it could have involved Iraq or Afghanistan, when the Taliban were riding high. Those themes, which were replayed every year as part of the last core course on military operations and resources, simply reinforced the policy line of the military that these were the contingencies we would face in the future.

Q: You left NDU when?

DE SANTIS: In 2001.

Q: What were you doing?

DE SANTIS: When I left? I set up a consultancy, and immediately I was asked by the State Department -- I wasn't sure who the sponsor was at first – I thought it was the policy planning staff but it turned out to be INR – to do an assessment of a study that had just been completed by the State Department, a 2010 study, a futures study. I was asked to look at that critically along with the 2015 study the CIA had done, the three volumes of the Hart-Rudman Report, the Joint Chiefs 2020 study, and the Department of Defense Quadrennial Review. That was my first project for the State Department.

Q: Before 9/11?

DE SANTIS: Absolutely. Although that was before 9/11, I was in the process of editing it when the attacks occurred, and I changed it immediately. Thereafter we looked at the world quite differently. As a consequence of 9/11, and these studies didn't convey that transformation, the focus suddenly was purely on the Middle East and terrorism. In fact, and I will digress here for a second, I think our single-minded focus on terrorism diverted our attention from a lot of other realities in the world that are likely to have a big effect on American interests, including China. I think we've been too single-minded, too preoccupied with one issue.

Q: How did developments in the Middle East and Afghanistan strike you at the time they were developing?

DE SANTIS: After I completed the project for the State Department I did some consulting for USAID. They had asked me to … and this was before the war … to look at some of the non-military aspects of terrorism. In my view, while there are clear radical elements in the Mideast who aspire to the return of the caliphate, which is, of course, an absurd expectation, I think the majority of people … there are an awfully lot of young people in the Middle East, people who have an education but don't have an opportunity because the government doesn't make it possible … simply want to live normal lives. I thought … the argument at the time, as you recall, was that the people who were behind 9/11 were all middle class or upper middle class people … they're all well-educated so don't tell me this has to do with poor people … and I thought that missed the point. The foot soldiers of revolutions, and that was true in Lenin's time as well, the foot soldiers are people who don't really have anything to aspire to and they look for some kind of identity. I think the Osama bin Ladins and Zawahiris provide them with that kind of identity. I thought we had an opportunity to do some good in trying to provide some educational stimulus, trying to find people in the Middle East, and there were examples, clearly not too many, but Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and the kings of Morocco and Jordan. They were examples of people who were reform-minded … that doesn't mean like the United States … but people who wanted to do things differently in their societies. The younger Mubarak, for example, in Egypt set up his own think tank to promote entrepreneurship and he tried to get younger Egyptians to look at the market in a different way. I thought it was in America's interest to try to work with these people. The face of the Middle East should not be the United States demanding change; the change has to be Islamic. While the people I was working with at USAID, many of whom were economists, were pleased to hear that, my recommendations didn't go very far because the people who retained me, political appointees in thrall to the Bush administration, it was not what they wanted to hear.

I had developed a concept for a government-wide conference that would address a range of political, economic, social, cultural, and religious issues in the Middle East and broader Muslim world or *ummah*. The career people at USAID were very pleased. I was extending invitations to Jagdish Bhagwati of Columbia, an international economist whom I studied in graduate school, Bernard Lewis, and other distinguished scholars as well as experts from the Middle East. The so-called Policy and Strategy shop that hired me deep-

sixed my concept paper and conference idea because the administration – there was a troika of Peter Rodman, Richard Haass, and Elliott Abrams… I can't remember his surname – thought it was too soft and wanted to go in a different direction. This was in the late spring and early summer of 2002, so the die was already being cast.

Q: Did you get the feeling of a big disconnect after 9/11in the policy particularly toward Iraq. Was it going in the right direction?

DE SANTIS: My honest opinion then, and I never changed it, was that I no longer had access to classified information so when the administration said that Iraq was preparing to develop this WMD (weapons of mass destruction) capability I had no reason to dispute the contention. When I realized that other governments, Germany for one, were coming to similar conclusions, I thought, you know, we have to be responsive to this. My only concern at the time was that we might be moving too quickly. It wasn't clear to me that Saddam Hussein represented an immediate threat. I thought we ought to continue to contain him rather than overreact. My great concern was that we would not have enough time to do what needed to be done in Afghanistan.

I remember in the summer of 2002 when my wife and I moved to San Diego, I was doing TV for FOX and the TV people would come out to our house with cameras and lights and they would ask about the battle. And I said all of the questions you are asking me have to do with how we're going to fight the military phase of this. Well, yes, they said. You are a strategist. Yes, but the military war is being planned in Washington. I said I'm 3,000 miles away, and I am not a military planner. You should be asking me what happens when the shooting stops because I told them … and I would repeatedly say this to others on the West Coast … that we're failing to see the difficulties that we're going to run into politically afterwards. I felt sure I wasn't the only one who called attention to the post-hostilities environment. I'm quite sure that if you walked the halls of the State Department or talked to some of my friends … any number of them said the same thing. That was my concern – that we were doing this quickly and we weren't preparing for the consequences.

Q: What have you been doing recently?

DE SANTIS: Do you mean, what have you done lately? I did some consulting while I was still in San Diego, but it was set up here, for the Center for Naval Analyses to do a series of alternative futures for China and its role in Asia. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security in the State Department asked me to write a strategic plan in the spring of 2003 for their security operations, which I did when we returned to the East Coast, and I have done some consulting for CENTRA Technology on a range of things. Then a year ago I began working for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Q: Did you find a change in atmosphere when you were out in San Diego, you know, there's such a thing as an inside the beltway syndrome or something where it's hard to find I mean, everybody sees things almost, maybe not alike but within certain parameters.

They're concentrating on it much more. I was wondering what was like out in San Diego?

DE SANTIS: You're absolutely right. In fact, friends of mine didn't try to dissuade me from relocating, but they said, "Boy, this is going to be pretty frustrating for you out there", and in many ways it was, but San Diego is a wonderful community. It's terrific if you're ready to retire, which I was not, and medical care is wonderful. It has spectacular weather, people have a very healthy lifestyle; but you don't have that give and take that we have not just in Washington but on the East Coast generally, the awareness or interest in things in a big world going on around you. I will give you one anecdote.

We lived in Del Mar. When I woke up one day, probably our second day in our new home, I wanted to get a newspaper. When I walked outside and looked in the driveways of our neighbors, there were no newspapers. My wife, being an optimistic and cheerful person, said "Well, they're probably getting the news online." I was astonished there were no newspapers in this upscale neighborhood. I called The New York Times to have my paper delivered and was told that nobody received The New York Times in my area, so they didn't know how to do this because there was no carrier setup. It took a month of constant badgering on my part to get the newspaper delivered.

The folks who would pull over daily to watch the sun set over the Pacific and the chemical salesman I played tennis with, who made a nice living servicing the same four accounts and knocked off at 2 in the afternoon so he could spend time with his family, were equally symptomatic of the lack of interest in much beyond their day-to-day lives. And it wasn't just there. When I was at the Rand Corporation – and though it was much better in LA, more cosmopolitan, there was a sense that California was the part of America that was sui generis. You knew there was something else going on back there east of the Rockies or across the Pacific, but it wasn't really relevant in the lives of these people. You wouldn't be sitting in a cocktail lounge having a drink and have somebody chat with you and say, "Gee, I noticed this happened in Sacramento", for example. "What do you think of that?" as I said to a lawyer at a block party one Sunday afternoon in Del Mar in reference to the dismal state budget. He hadn't given it any thought. That wasn't part of everyday conversation.

Q: I realize that what you're doing right now is obviously sensitive. Do you have anything you can say about your impression of the intelligence operation as it is being set up now?

DE SANTIS: I think that the first year has been a difficult year in many respects because setting up an organization from scratch is always a momentous undertaking, particularly something such as Ambassador Negroponte has been asked to do. I think he's put together a terrific organization. He has a very fine team, a very fine leadership team. I think the tough decisions still lie ahead, and it remains to be seen what will result from the creation of the Office of the DNI. I think this year will be an important year because this is the organization's second year, and in February or March of next year he'll have to answer to the Congress, as he did last year, as to what's been done. I don't think the

Congress will give him a pass two years in a row. Something tangible has to be accomplished. This has great implications I think, for the future of the intelligence community.

Most people in the intelligence business with whom I have spoken believe it was a mistake to create a superagency, which they believe will simply create another layer of bureaucracy without substantively changing anything. I have tried to remain impartial, but I concede that the DNI has had little to show for his effort thus far. Part of the problem, I suspect, is that Negroponte is not a career intelligence officer. He doesn't have the familiarity with the people and institutional processes that a career intelligence person would have. Part of the difficulty, of course, is trying to get fifteen, now sixteen – the Drug Enforcement Agency has become the sixteenth member of the intelligence community in the last couple of months – agencies to work together. I have said to anyone who would listen that the desire for an integrated community, which is what the intelligence reform legislation mandated the DNI to produce, will be a will of the wisp unless the DNI gets 16 directors in a room for three days, whether it's at Airlie House, or Palm Springs, or his back yard, and they collectively agree on two or three things that they are going to do in support of community integration. That hasn't happened unfortunately because no one wants to challenge the prerogatives of independent agencies, who are used to doing things their own way. I can tell you from my involvement in creating a lessons learned center and in setting up a community-wide education program that there is considerable resistance, especially from the CIA, which has been superseded by the DNI. But change of the sort that the Congress has in mind will never come from the bottom up; it has to come from the top down. I think substantively … and the President said this after 9/11, and I think he was right … this is substantively in the interest of the United States, but I think bureaucratically it's also in our interest to do things more efficiently so we don't repeat the mistakes of the past. I'm not Pollyannaish about this. This isn't going to happen overnight. But I guess I'm also not confident that the will exists to make the tough decisions that are required. At this point, we're just moving paper around.

Q: One of the things that has come from my conversations and obviously is coming mainly from State Department sources so it's got that bias but talking about INR versus the CIA. INR seems to be a much smaller sort of agile, quick on its feet organization with you might say boots on the ground. In other words, its people who have either served in the country and are attuned to what do you do about the intelligence? It doesn't have too much of the layering the CIA has. I have an office manager whose husband who was the Jordanian INR officer and he moved to the CIA and he's got five people dealing with Jordan. The problem being the more people you have, the more there's a tendency to homogenize and putting an organization on top of it sounds like another homogenization.

DE SANTIS: That's the potential downside and the critics of the office of the DNI from the inception said we're just creating another bureaucratic layer, as you have suggested. That was also the criticism of the CIA. I think the honest response to that is that the jury is still out on that. There are now a thousand fulltime people working in the office of DNI plus contractors. I don't think they want it to get any larger than this. It's not intended to

replace any of these other agencies; the office of the DNI is not intended to become the new CIA. The whole purpose is a facilitative one. How do we structure this in ways that we work more effectively together?

The comment that you raised about INR is a very pertinent one though because one of the organizations or entities within the office of the DNI that has been created is what is called customer outcomes. And what that really means is, are the customers happy with what they receive from the intelligence community? In the intelligence community, people who are the recipients of intelligence are by definition called customers whether they are diplomatic customers or military customers or whomever. There's a great concern that because of the events of 9/11 and the failure to determine the existence of WMD in Iraq, there's a great deal of concern that the intelligence community isn't being as responsive as it could be or should be to the policy community.

The comment that you made in the case of INR is particularly relevant here. It is not just that INR, as you imply, is small; it's the fact that INR is immersed in policy by definition because it is in the State Department. Historically, the intelligence community, particularly the CIA, was very aloof from the policy community, and they didn't talk to people. You simply did your business; you received the cable traffic and you did your analysis on that basis, whereas the intelligence function, small though it is in the State Department, is performed by people who have served abroad and, even if they haven't, they are people who are sensitive to policy implications of what intelligence is supposed to be doing. I think in many ways INR is a kind of model as for the way intelligence ought to operate in the community as a whole. The more layers you have, the more analysts you have working in the same area, the more bureaucratically removed you become from the policy process. I think the intention on the part of Ambassador Negroponte, who obviously comes out of the State Department tradition, is to do precisely that. That will represent a cultural change in big organizations like the CIA, particularly for younger people who come on board, who must understand that, in doing intelligence work, you are not necessarily being removed from a process, hermetically sealed, as it were, that you have to participate in a process if you want to have intelligence provide the kind of information to policy makers that they need.

Q: How do you feel about that? Are you optimistic?

DE SANTIS: I was more optimistic some months ago than I am now. I think that the bureaucratic inertia that organizations … your comment that the gentleman who went to the CIA now had five other people working with him or for him … I think the bigger the organization, the more difficult it is to change it. It's like trying to move a battleship. That's not an easy thing to do. I would be optimistic if … and let me … I guess the safest thing to say, the most honest thing to say to is, optimism is to a function of leadership. To the extent that we can get the kind of leadership that recognizes that it is not all about you or your organization, it's about the community and about the interests of the nation, then I would be optimistic that change will take place. To the extent that we end up with more parochially minded leadership, then I think very little is likely to happen.

Q: OK, this looks like a good place to stop and I want to thank you very much.

DE SANTIS: Thank you.

End of interview