

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

DAVID DEAN

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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is the 21st of July 1998, and this is an interview with David Dean. This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, and I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy. To begin with, can you tell me when and where you were born?

DEAN: I was born in New York City on August 25, 1925, and lived in New York for some years after that.

Q: Could you tell me a bit about your family?

DEAN: My father's grandfather, Thompson Dean, started out chopping wood on the Ohio River and gradually built up a business owning and running a fleet of Mississippi river boats from Cincinnati along the Ohio river and down to New Orleans carrying grain, cotton and other cargo to the seaport and bringing finished goods, mostly from England, back up the river. Thompson Dean established his headquarters in Cincinnati. Subsequently the family moved to New York City.

Q: What business was your father in?

DEAN: My father started off as a cotton broker with Clayton Bowers and traveled extensively in East Asia to China and other places. Then he became a stockbroker until the crash of 1929. Subsequently, he was a wine merchant in New York City, mostly buying wines from Germany and France and having them imported into the U.S.

Q: I know you have a brother, Jonathan, whom I am also interviewing. Any other family?

DEAN: We had one younger brother, Tony, who has passed away. My mother's family came from Dublin, Ireland. Her father was born in Dublin although I think her mother was born in the U.S. and she was born in New York also. My father had several brothers and sisters, but they have passed away. My wife Mary and I have two sons, Kenneth and Thompson.

Q: How about your schooling?

DEAN: I attended high school at Riverdale, which is on the outskirts of New York City.

Q: Grammar school, too?

DEAN: At first I went to schools in Stamford and Darien, Connecticut, and New York City. Then I went to the middle school and the upper school at Riverdale. It was a boarding school. After I finished, I went to Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut for a year and then went into the Navy's V-12 program. The Navy sent me to Harvard. I stayed there for about a year or so and then opted for flight training. I returned later to graduate from Harvard in 1949. I went into flight training and finished as the war was ending, just as the Japanese surrendered in fact. I later served on the USS Atlanta and the USS Toledo as a naval aviator. Our ships were in the Pacific, based in Qingdao, China, with the Seventh Fleet. We would make port calls to Shanghai, and Hong Kong, then over to Keelung in Taiwan and down to Borneo and Singapore and Penang. From these experiences, I became interested in China and East Asia.

Q: Had you had any opening or interest in the international world from school or your father's trade or anything like that?

DEAN: Yes, from my father's trips to East Asia, there were various artifacts around the house, but most of my schooling at Harvard was in English history and literature. I went to graduate school after the Navy at Columbia and studied in their School of International Affairs in Latin American studies. Before entering the Foreign Service, I never had any formal education on China or Chinese studies.

Q: In grammar school and at Riverdale while you were there, what sort of books interested you? Did you read a lot?

DEAN: Yes, I read a lot, but mostly fiction. I read Sir Walter Scott, Robert Louis Stevenson, Conrad, Alexander Dumas, Kipling and G.A. Henty.

Q: Oh, yes, The Dash to Khartoum, With the Allies to Peking. It is interesting how many of a certain generation were inspired by Henty who was really for the British Empire, but it caught a lot of us, myself included.

DEAN: They were stirring books at the time for that age. I read mostly about American and European history and not a great deal about China.

Q: In the Navy you mentioned these trips. In the first place the ships you mentioned sound like cruisers.

DEAN: They were. I was in the aviation division. Our planes were observation planes.

Q: I was going to say, it sounds like they were catapulted off.

DEAN: They were. First OS-2U Kingfishers, and later on the SC-1, the Seahawks. They were catapulted off, and if the sea wasn't calm enough, the ship would usually turn into the sea and make a slick, and the plane would land on the slick and taxi up to a net that was trailed behind the cruiser, and hook onto it. There was a hook in the bottom of the main pontoon. Then they would lower a block with a cable on it. There was a hook right in front of the cowling. You would hook that on and they would haul you up. Sometimes it was hard to hook on if the weather was rough. You would break the windscreen a few times. Usually, though, it worked all right.

Q: Did you get much shore leave when you were in these places?

DEAN: We were based in Tsingtao, which is in Shantung Province. There is a small seadrome there just between the outer and the inner harbor, and we worked there. That was the first time I met Chiang Kai-shek because the Chinese had one half of the seadrome and we had the other half. He came to inspect the Chinese half and we were introduced to him.

At that time, I was on the USS Atlanta. Coming in to the outer harbor, we had a pilot on board, but we misjudged the speed of the current, and when the pilot ordered the engines stopped and the anchor let go, the momentum of the ship was so great that all the anchor chain ran out and the pentails broke. They are used to hold the chain inboard, but they broke. In cases like that, there is always a buoy with a line attached to it which will bob up and show where the chain and the anchor are. But, some Chinese in a sampan came rowing out, cut the line to the buoy, put the buoy in his boat and rowed away! It took our divers three days to find out where the chain and the anchor were! They are really heavy. We recovered them eventually, but it was a very embarrassing introduction to Qingdao.

Q: Well, did you get much shore leave?

DEAN: Yes. Being based at the seadrome, we stayed at the Edgewater Mansion, which was a hotel and, of course, we observed what was happening in the city. By the time I got there, it was toward the end of '46 and beginning of '47, the communist forces were beginning to encircle the major cities, not only in Shantung but also in the northeast provinces. The Generalissimo's troops controlled the cities but the countryside was controlled by the communists. Of course there was martial law and a curfew every night. If you happened to be in a cafe or a bar or a restaurant, Chinese soldiers would come in at the curfew hour with fixed bayonets and drive everybody out on the streets and home. You may have seen some of these pictures with crowds of people fleeing from a policeman wielding a big bamboo stick. They really had enormous numbers of people inside the city. Qingdao had been ruled by the Japanese, and by the Germans before. They had many white Russians there. There were thousands of people from the countryside who came in to seek refuge, so it was really a crowded place. We weren't affected by the shortages or anything like that, but there were many poor people without food, and without shelter, so the conditions inside many parts of the city were not good. Our cruiser division would only stay for perhaps two or three weeks before we went on another voyage somewhere else, but during those times, I got to know what the city looked like and at least developed a real interest in learning more about the Chinese.

Q: What about the other trips? What were you doing, sort of showing the flag?

DEAN: That's right. We'd just go down to Singapore or to Hong Kong or to Taiwan, the Philippines and Borneo. When we went to Hong Kong, for example, the British Navy would offer every officer on board a guide to take him around from one of their own ships. As I recall, the HMS Theseus was a British aircraft carrier which was in port at that time. It was our host for the USS Atlanta. I remember because I was the officer of the deck and I couldn't go over to the Theseus for a cocktail party they were giving for us until I was relieved. Well, I was relieved later, but there wasn't any boat to take me over, but the captain's gig was still there. The captain was ashore and he wasn't using the gig, so the officer of the deck said I could take it. So I went over in the captain's gig. It was an enclosed boat. We had a fairly new crew on board and as they approached the Theseus, they didn't make any signal. They saw this fellow up on the flight deck waving frantically, so they waved back at him. As a result, the British thought it was an admiral on board because they saw all five fingers. You should have seen the scurrying there. The captain came up from the cocktail party, sideboys came out, the Marines came out, the band came out, and they started to play. When I got out of the gig, they saw I was an ensign. The music stopped; the captain left; the sideboys disappeared. My friend, who was waiting for me up there said, "Quick, we've got to hide." So, we kept out of the way for the rest of the time. He wasn't a very good guide to Hong Kong because he was confined to his ship for exploding a couple of cherry bombs behind the officers decommissioning the RAF airfield.

Q: What was the situation when you went up the Malaysian Peninsula?

DEAN: When we went ashore in Hong Kong, it was virtually a ghost town. Before the war, lots of the inhabitants had fled inland. Those who remained under Japanese control had taken almost every piece of wood out of the big mansions on the peaks and the hills surrounding Hong Kong. They had used the wood for firewood. They had taken out the window frames, the parquet floors, the doors, everything they could use to burn. When I got there, you would go up to the peak, and at certain times of the year, there is a lot of mist and fog. The fog was going in and out of these old houses which were vacant, and it really looked like a ghost town. I guess Hong Kong then had a population of maybe three or four hundred thousand people as compared to more than six million today. Anyway, things were very depressed in an economic sense as well. Further south was Singapore, a crown colony, which had also suffered under Japanese occupation. It was a very old-fashioned place. Raffles Hotel was the only place to go, the economy was flat. The British ruled it like a typical overseas possession. Singapore, Malaya, Borneo, and other places like that, truly had an old-fashioned society, almost like something out of the beginning of the century as described by Somerset Maugham.

Q: Did this pique any interest in you?

DEAN: Yes, indeed it did. After I left the Navy, I finished school at Harvard and then went on to Columbia for a master's degree. I then applied, at my brother's recommendation, for the Foreign Service. I got into the Foreign Service after I passed the examination. I went to the usual training course in late 1951. I guess it was two or three months later that I was assigned to Kuala Lumpur. I hadn't been to Kuala Lumpur in the Navy because it is an inland city, and my ship did not stop at Port Swettenham, which is the closest port. It was too small then. I was very pleased to be assigned to Kuala Lumpur. The Chinese must have been about 40% of the population, with about 50% Malay and 10% Tamil. The Chinese businessmen were running most of the economy.

Q: I'd like to go back for just a minute. When you joined the Foreign Service, you had taken international relations at Columbia. Was there any particular emphasis that you found at Columbia?

DEAN: Oh, yes, I was a student of Frank Tannenbaum. Tannenbaum was a specialist on Latin American history. He had been decorated by the Mexican government. He had floated down the entire length of the Amazon River, from the upper reaches, in a dugout canoe with only two Indian guides. He had done a lot of things, but also he was a remarkably fine human being and a really great teacher. He was originally from Austria. He had come over, I think, around 1919 after WWI. He found many breadlines in New York City, people suffering without enough food to eat. He organized a breadline and took it into St. Patrick's Cathedral and asked the priests to feed the people. They sent him to jail. Besides being a great historian on Latin America affairs, he became an authority on prison reform. He wrote several books about it. He is well remembered, not only by me, but by anyone who ever took any of his courses and by his associates at Columbia for many years.

Q: I assume first you took the written exam for the Foreign Service, and then you took the oral exam.

DEAN: Yes. The written exam included French and Spanish. Then I took the oral examination.

Q: Do you recall how the oral exam was conducted in those days? Do you recall any of the questions?

DEAN: First they wanted to know what I had been doing. I told them that I was a naval aviator, that I had been out on the China coast. They asked what books I had been reading, in American literature particularly. They were interested in what sports I did. They had a big argument among themselves about the virtues of tennis and squash because I happened to play squash at the time. There wasn't a great deal of grilling. It was a very civilized and pleasant meeting. I guess it must have lasted an hour or so. I can't remember. Then they asked me to wait, and a little while later one of their secretaries came and said, "All right, they have accepted you." I think that was in the summer of '51, and I went into the class around October with people who became some of my closest friends.

Q: Who came in with you that you recall?

DEAN: Well, Paul Pople was one of my really close friends. He went off to Vietnam; and I went to Kuala Lumpur, but later we were in Hong Kong together. We lived in the same duplex. He lived upstairs; we lived downstairs. We were either dining at our place or having cocktails at his or vice versa. We became very good friends, with him and his family. He has passed away, but his widow, who lives in Italy, and my wife keep up a correspondence. We see their children whenever they come to the States. There were others, too whom I remember. It was a very short, intensive orientation course. Then I went off to Kuala Lumpur, and everybody went their separate ways.

Q: You were in Kuala Lumpur from what, about '52?

DEAN: Yes, at the turn of the year; it must have been from '52 until about the middle of '54. Just before I got there, the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, had been assassinated in an ambush on the way up to one of the hill stations, Fraziers Hill. He was a very courageous man. He was going up there with his wife and just a driver and a police constable in the car. They had no other type of protection. He saw the road blocked with a tree trunk, and he knew what it was because that is how the communist guerrillas would attack. They would block the road and then fire on the cars when they stopped. So, he got out of his car and let them fire away. They killed him, but his wife was not injured. The British sent Sir Gerald Templar to take his place. Templar, who was later chief of the Imperial general staff, was a livewire and he energized the campaign against the terrorists.

Q: He was a name to conjure with.

DEAN: That's right.

Q: Were you there at that time?

DEAN: Yes, I knew him and his family quite well and saw him frequently, not on official business, but socially. He was very active. His daughter invited a lot of younger people to various functions. She was about my age, so I would go there fairly frequently with a number of friends. He would join these parties and have a very good time. He was really quite a brilliant person too. It was he who organized the home guards around the Malay kampongs. He also instituted resettlement areas to bring the Chinese squatters off the land and guard them in a barbed wire village which would have schools, hospitals, and places for them to work. because the communist guerrillas were pressing the squatters for food and information. Templar was trying to isolate these people from the guerrillas and to deny the guerrillas both food and intelligence. I used to go around occasionally with the patrols into the jungle looking for communist camps. There were several different kinds of troops there besides the home guards which just supported the Malay villages mostly. The police and the army would guard the resettlement areas. Then there would be patrols into the jungle by whatever units of the British Army that happened to be stationed in Malaya, Australian units or Fiji units, and Gurkhas, too. One of my friends, John McKay had been a brigadier general in the Indian army. He had gone to Nepal and recruited three or four police jungle companies from the Gurkhas, most of whom had been retired from the Indian army. Some of them were quite young people; maybe they hadn't even joined the Indian army. He brought them to Malaya and established them around certain key areas in the mountain chain that runs up and down the Malayan highlands. They would try and interdict the movement of the communists going back and forth and sent out patrols to try and find out where they were bivouacked and to kill them. I went out with them a couple of times. One time, it was during the Dashira festival, the new year's festival, during which they stack all the arms of their company in a square, behead various animals and sprinkle them with blood, and then have three days of plays and drinking and everything else you can imagine. It is their major time to let off steam. I was present during one of these rituals and it was quite a sight to see. Anyway, travel through the jungle with these patrols was very difficult. The jungle was so thick, you had to hack your way through if you didn't find any trail. Most people said the British soldiers could only get one or one and a half miles a day whereas the Gurkhas were able to go at least three, sometimes more. They were really good troops. The whole atmosphere of the time, of course, was one of tension because of the emergency situation. The communist guerrillas were trying to disrupt the economy of the country by slashing rubber trees and blowing up the tin mine dredges in an effort to cripple the country and eventually take it over. So, General Templar was really like a breath of fresh air coming in from the outside. The former Sir Henry Gurney and the Malayan civil service had never seen anything like him before. They had more of the old fashioned Somerset Maugham type of attitude.

Q: Sitting on the veranda at night waiting for the sun to go over the yardarm.

DEAN: Indeed there was a lot of that. It was a really fascinating time. A lot of the rubber planters existed in an almost besieged state. They lived on their rubber estates, their bungalows surrounded by barbed wire, with special troops hired to protect them. Inside

their bedrooms, they would have sandbags stacked so that if someone fired or threw grenades from outside, they would be protected. They would drive around their plantations in old Fords that had an armored sheet underneath it. Even the windshield would come down; a piece of metal with just slits in it. The windows would be thick sheet metal. There were many instances when they were ambushed and killed, so if you got an invitation to a rubber plantation, you would usually go out in a convoy and spend the night and come back together the next day. The rubber planters had some fairly intense parties. They lived under siege, so it was a hard life for them. A lot of rubber tappers were killed or their trees were slashed. Depending on where the communists were, it was a dangerous life for them. When they got into town they lived it up a lot at the Dog, a popular sports club, or the Lake Club or the Selangor Golf Club or other places where they congregated late at night, such as Nanto's Milk Bar. I don't think Nanto ever saw a glass of milk in his life! I joined another group there, the Hash House Harriers. The Hash House Harriers in Kuala Lumpur was the original club. They organized a sort of paper chase. The hares would go out with small sacks of paper and would lay a trail, including false trails, and then come back in a gradual circle to where they had started; the hounds are then a half-hour head start and then tried to catch them by following the paper trails. At the end there would be a great big tub of beer and lemonade. One of our members, John Yates, who is still a close friend today, went out with a colleague as hares and at the edge of the jungle they came across a communist guerrilla camp in atap (palm leaf) huts. They saw them with their weapons but my friends were unobserved. The hares came back and warned the rest of us. The police and the army were told and they encircled the guerrillas and captured them. In those days there was a reward on the heads of the leadership of the communist guerrillas. Central committee members were worth so much and so on up the hierarchy. Two of the people captured had \$10,000 rewards on their heads. My friend and his colleague each got \$10,000 for finding them and they gave a succession of rather remarkable parties through every restaurant in Kuala Lumpur for the other members of the Hash House Harriers in 1951.

Q: Other than that, the U.S. presence was a Consul General at the time?

DEAN: No, it was still a Consulate from 1951-1954.

Q: A Consulate. Well, what were you doing?

DEAN: I was the administrative and consular officer. We had a very small staff, a political officer and an economic officer. Hank van Oss was the Consul. Then there was a small USIA group, too. The consulate consisted of seven or eight Americans and four Chinese staff and two Malays.

Q: What were our concerns at that time? What were we doing?

DEAN: We were concerned with the emergency and with the communists, whether or not they would succeed or whether the British would be able to cope and restore political stability and the economy. The U.S. had large commercial interests there. Some of the tin

mines were owned by Americans. We bought a lot of Malaya's rubber. The U.S. had stockpiled lots of rubber and tin, and whenever we sold something from the stockpile, it would affect the prices in Malaysia to the nth degree. I think our unpopularity there grew with the manipulation of these stockpiles. I can't remember how many American citizens lived in Malaya then, but not many, and we didn't have much visa or consular work to tell the truth. Most of my work was on the administrative side, except the Consul asked me to write airgrams and telegrams about my contacts with the military and the jungle companies and others just as a commentary on how the war against the communists was going.

Q: Of course, to put it in perspective, at this time we were still at war in Korea most of that time, so this was not an esoteric exercise.

DEAN: No, no. It was quite important. There was no evidence that the communist Chinese had sent arms or other supplies to the guerrillas. They were using mostly arms that the British had given them during the war against the Japanese. The British had helped organize them and had used them in attacks on the Japanese. But the guerrillas were getting moral support you might say through communist Chinese radio broadcasts, and perhaps training too, although that wasn't too clear at the time. Of course, it was a serious time because of the Korean War, but everyone in Kuala Lumpur was focused inward on their own emergency rather than what was happening elsewhere in the world, so this occupied everyone's attention.

Q: Were you seeing at that time a pretty solid split between the Malays and the Chinese?

DEAN: Oh, yes. There was a big ethnic divide. The British were seen to be coddling the Malays and protecting them against the ravages, economic and otherwise, of the Chinese merchants. The Chinese were fending for themselves. I don't mean the guerrillas, but those Chinese in the business community. There was the Malay Chinese Association which was very powerful. In fact, there was a Chinese, Henry Lee, who was Minister of Finance. In everything economic and financial, including ownership of shops and businesses, just as the Chinese did and do in Indonesia, they controlled most of the commerce. There was a lot of jealousy against the Chinese on the part of the Malaysians. Occasionally a Malay would go amok and slice up a lot of the Chinese. There was a great deal of tension and hatred on the part of the Malays toward the Chinese.

Q: Did you have much contact with the Chinese? I'm not talking about the guerrillas.

DEAN: Oh, yes. I had a lot of contact with the Chinese because they were merchants, including as I said, the Minister of Finance. They were involved in all aspects of the rubber and tin industry.

Q: What about in the Malay group, I was wondering if you saw a political class begin to emerge?

DEAN: No, not then. The British were occupying all of the positions, not just of power but also administrative positions in the civil government, the police, almost every other aspect, including immigration control. Malays were not then a major power. That came later when the various Malay leaders were helped by the British to come to the fore. The British were running everything as far as government went at that time. It wasn't the Malayans and it wasn't the Chinese.

Q: Were the British people you talked to sort of making noises about leaving at some point?

DEAN: No, I don't think they were thinking in those terms. This was early, you see, in 1951-'54. They were not really that much aware of the big forces going on around them in Southeast Asia and China, except by reading the newspapers, but they really weren't thinking in those terms. The Malay civil service was, as I said, a very old-fashioned civil service. The military were there for a very specific job. People weren't thinking of leaving and being replaced.

Q: What about Singapore? That was part of the whole.

DEAN: That was a separate crown colony at that time, also ruled by the British.

Q: Lee Kwan-Yu...

DEAN: No this was before Lee Kuan-Yu's rise to power.

Q: Is it possible that anything went on before Lee Kwan-Yu?

DEAN: I'm sure he was there, but he was a young man. He must be in his 80s now, so he certainly was there. I don't think there were too many people in evidence in the government structure except those nominated and put there by the British.

Q: Was there any effort made on our part to say these people are going to get free at some point and we want to make sure as we started to do later on.

DEAN: At that point, when I was in Kuala Lumpur, there weren't any discussions of that, at least among our staff.

Q: We weren't pushing de-colonization or anything like that?

DEAN: No. We may have been pushing it elsewhere, in London and in Washington, but not in Kuala Lumpur, and certainly there were not any instructions or messages that I saw to that effect.

Q: I was just wondering why you were allowed to go out on these patrols. Was there any thought that...

DEAN: Well, I just did, you see. I was a member of the Hash House Harriers and some of the military officers were members, so we just became very friendly and we'd just go. I was also on the Selangor rugby team then, and we would go off to different capitals in Perak or Penang or to Singapore, and play rugby with the various teams in these places. Some of the members there were also in the military and we'd go off with them, too. But, it was very informal. We didn't go through lots of bureaucratic red tape. In fact, even the books we had in the office to guide us on various consular issues and other guidance were so old that I once remember the widow of an American sea captain coming in. She was, I think, part Malay, and she had married a sea captain in 1905. Her sons wanted her to go to the States as one of them was thinking that would be a better place for his mother. So she applied, and I looked it up in these old books, and there was a provision that before a certain date in 1925, people who married sea captains would gain American citizenship. So, I sent a paper into the State Department, giving them all the citations from our meager supply of manuals. They sent me back an airgram stating that the law I cited had been repealed in 1935 and, "in the future, please send your messages in on the proper forms." I had to tell the lady that she couldn't become an American citizen. Eventually, she got an immigration visa.

Q: You left there in 1954, whither?

DEAN: Yes, I left in the spring of '54, in May I believe, and had some home leave and then went off to the Consulate General in Rotterdam, my only European post.

Q: You were in Rotterdam from when to when?

DEAN: I was in Rotterdam from the summer of 1954 to the end of '56. At that time, there was a special act passed by Congress to give additional immigration visas to Holland. I was in the consular section.

Q: The Refugee Relief Act.

DEAN: Yes, the Refugee Relief Act. They wanted to include Holland because some of the dykes had burst earlier, making many farm families homeless.

Q: I think even more so because the ranking Republican member of the judicial committee was from Holland, Michigan.

DEAN: That's right, so they included Holland, particularly farmers whose lands had been inundated by the sea. Most of those farmers had regained their feet and started working again, and yet they felt that there was more opportunity in the U.S. They really didn't seem to be like the refugees who were coming from different parts of eastern Europe and who were genuinely refugees. We always had somewhat of a tussle with the Department over who was eligible. It was a good job because it was very busy. I don't know how

many immigrant visas we issued, but it was in the thousands, and it was interesting helping people go to the States. I liked that. They were all good people essentially.

Q: Just about the same time I was a refugee relief officer in Frankfurt, Germany, and we would get the same publications from Immigration and the State Department, advisory opinions. We were dealing with people who had escaped from eastern Europe, yet we were reading these things about the Dutch and what the hell did they need, or the Italians. The point was these were both politically important areas.

DEAN: Well, of course we understood this, and we did ask for advisory opinions and we did realize that the Dutch didn't seem to be in the same category as the refugees from eastern Europe. It caused a lot of back and forth traffic and heartburn. Also neither the law nor the way it was administered were clear. If they had cleared up the whole thing from the very beginning, then it would have been easier for everybody administering it. It does seem to me, (I found this later when I was in Taipei,) that a lot of visa officers, the young consular officers, frequently are given a very short time to decide whether the applicant, especially for visitors visas, is going to return to his/her home or if a student is going to return to his/her home. How can you judge in twenty seconds whether that is false or true. It strikes me that is a very serious flaw in administering our consular work.

Q: We have an almost impossible law.

DEAN: It is foolish.

Q: What were your impressions of the Dutch in this period?

DEAN: Well, my wife and I met and married in Holland. She was the secretary to Consul General Paul Reveley. I met Mary when I arrived, and a year or so later, we got married. She had gone to high school in the States at St. Mary's Female Seminary in Maryland with a couple of Dutch girls whose families had sent them over to the U.S. during the war. In Holland, once you become friendly with a Dutch family, you are friendly forever, and they were extremely nice people, so she had entree into many different households. I, of course, tagged along, so I got to know them too, and they are our good friends to this very day. They are people whom we liked and with whom we have shared sadness and joy. I liked the Dutch very much indeed.

Q: Rotterdam was the major port.

DEAN: Yes, with the exception of a few buildings, it had been almost completely destroyed by the Nazis during the war. The Germans deliberately tried to raze the whole city. At that time there wasn't any place to live in Rotterdam. I lived in the Hague above an antique shop on one of the narrow winding streets in the old part of the city. The only problem was that I had the key to the front door, and I had to go through the antique shop to get up to this little garret. I was always afraid that I would jostle against some priceless vase or something else and create a catastrophe. Also the garret wasn't heated; I had to break the ice in the basin in the morning! Anyway, it was unique. We got to know people

who lived in other types of accommodations. We had very good friends, the Van Huey Smiths, who lived in a windmill which they had converted into a really beautiful home with a little moat around it.

Q: Who was the Ambassador then? Do you remember?

DEAN: Matthews I think, Freeman Matthews.

Q: So he was a professional. In those days I take it there weren't any particular problems with the Dutch were there?

DEAN: No, I think Holland is one of the few countries that have always appreciated the Marshall Plan aid they received at the end of WWII and have always been grateful for it, so we didn't have any serious problems of any type of which I was aware. I don't think there were any. We always seemed to coexist in a very amicable way.

Q: I was wondering if the Dutch were in a way a bit resentful of how the United States by this time were beginning to make themselves more friendly and include the Germans in things because of the Cold War and all that. I was wondering if for the Dutch, at least for that generation, it was not forgive and forget.

DEAN: It was not just that. Of course, they felt antagonistic toward the Germans. But they were firm U.S. allies in the Cold War. However, some of my friends had extensive holdings in Indonesia, and the U.S. was pressing very hard for the Dutch to withdraw from Indonesia. One of my friends was the former Dutch Governor General of the Indies. He died shortly thereafter. His widow was always very interested in what was happening there, and so were many others. Many of Mary's schoolgirl friend's families had business interests of one type or another in Indonesia, so they were following developments very carefully. I never found in my personal relations with the Dutch that they were antagonistic to me or Mary or to the U.S.

Q: Well, with your experience in Malaysia, what were you picking up about the situation in Indonesia?

DEAN: Just what we knew at the time, that the Indonesians under Sukarno were trying to drive the Dutch out. They had given the Dutch a really hard time when they had taken over the concentration camps that the Japanese had abandoned. The Indonesian nationalists treated the Dutch harshly to get revenge for earlier Dutch control. That phase had passed over, but there were still a lot of problems. We at that time were beginning to furnish arms to the Indonesian insurgents, who were trying to displace Sukarno. It wasn't until sometime later, I think, that we stopped arms supply, after the Bandung Conference. You see, I wasn't in Holland until after that conference; it was a fait accompli. My friends were bemoaning a sense of the past, their lost lifestyle, their lost empire, their lost businesses. But they seemed to be reasonably prosperous. It wasn't as though they had been driven into bankruptcy or anything like that.

Q: You left Holland in '56.

DEAN: Yes, just at the end of '56. Our son Ken was born in Rotterdam shortly before we left for home leave at Christmas time of '56. I went into Chinese language training. That is why I had to smile when you said our facilities here were so much better; my training was in the basement garage of the Arlington Towers.

Q: You are talking about this interview which is taking place at the new Foreign Service Institute. Why Chinese?

DEAN: Because I had been interested in China through my service in the Navy traveling and staying in Qingdao, traveling along the China coast, meeting the Chinese in Malaysia, getting to be interested in their history and their culture. I had begun to take some Chinese lessons on my own in The Hague from an overseas Chinese who had come from Djakarta. His father had an automobile agency, and every time there was some economic downturn, Indonesians would come by with iron bars or even troops with machine guns and smash the windows of his automobile agency. They are still doing that with the Chinese. Today, with conditions as bad as they are, the Indonesian are still taking it out on the Chinese merchants who own most of the rice mills and most of the shops. Back then my teacher had received a scholarship from the Dutch government to come to Holland to study English. I was giving him English lessons and he was giving me Chinese lessons. So I applied for Chinese language training, went back to Washington at the end of '56, and went to the Foreign Service Institute for six months. It was a marvelous type of training they gave us, not only the language training which was very good, but also area studies. We had Doak Barnett, who became a famous figure among China scholars. He brought all of his friends down to lecture to us, every leading scholar you could think of at the time in the field of Chinese studies except John Fairbank who was ruled out by the Department.

Q: As a Foreign Service officer, what did you feel would be your future taking Chinese since we didn't have relations. The communist Chinese ruled the mainland, so what did you think about as a career?

DEAN: I felt it was inevitable that we were going to have relations with China and that indeed, for our national interests we should have them. I felt that very early on, and I feel it today. It just seemed to me to be common sense. But we also had other Chinese posts. We had our embassy in Taiwan then. I had visited it while on board the USS Atlanta when it was a Consulate General. We had Chinese language officers stationed in Singapore and various other places. We had talks going on with the Chinese in Geneva and then Warsaw. Later I was to be the counselor for those talks and write the instructions for them for four years. It just seemed to me it was an important enough place to have more attention paid to it.

Q: While you were doing this, this is pretty early on in terms of our developing a China corps. Were there any characteristics of the new China hands that you could see at that time?

DEAN: No, it was hard to see. In fact, in my own class, my friend Paul Pople had gone to the Chinese language school in the class before mine, and others who I came to know went there. My own class was a very mixed group. Some were from the agency. One was more interested in consular work rather than political or economic work and went on to specialize as a consular officer. One was an economic officer, but he left the service after awhile; he got fed up with it. Initially there were five of us. Four of them were left-handed. I was the only right-handed person in my class. It was difficult at Chinese dinners because our chopsticks would duel with each other.

Q: You say you were getting outstanding scholars, that Doak Barnett was bringing them in. What was the picture you were getting of China at this point?

DEAN: A pretty clear picture I think. Most people realized that Mao had purged the landlords, that there had been an enormous number of executions and deaths. They realized that he had first given the land back to the peasants and then took it back again from them. They realized that he was ruthless, that our own relationship was very poor, that China had forged a relationship with the Soviet Union, which at that point had not started to crack apart although a lot of people like John Fairbank said it would because they believed the Chinese leadership would eventually reject the Russians. I think they had a pretty clear idea of China. It wasn't a rosy picture by any means. It is just that there wasn't enough information, I think, to give one more than a general picture.

Q: Not too long before there had been the McCarthy attack on the China Hands. At the time you were talking about, was this something that you were all looking over your shoulders or was the topic of conversation or concern?

DEAN: Sure. I wasn't looking over my shoulders. I think all the people I spoke to were indignant about McCarthy and felt that it was really the fault of our own government to allow something like that to happen, one of the weaknesses of our government and the weakness of his colleagues in the Senate. Of course he eventually was discredited. By that time, by '56, he had gone.

Q: But what about with China, this is during the Eisenhower administration, Walter Robinson was in charge.

DEAN: Yes, he was very pro-Taiwan you see. He knew and liked the madam, Madam Chiang Kai-shek, and the Generalissimo. He was a strong defender of the GRC (government of the Republic of China), but there were other strong defenders as well, such as Walter Judd, whom I later came to know and to like very much. We weren't on the same political wavelength, but he was a really nice man. He had been a medical missionary in China. He developed his political point of view from the circumstances in

which he had lived, and he kept the same points of view until he died. Just the same, he was a very fine person and very good friend. I didn't know him at that time, and I didn't know a lot of the other Foreign Service officers who had served in China, some who had come under McCarthy's fire. Even Doak Barnett: the State Department wouldn't give Doak Barnett a permanent clearance. His brother Bob served in the State Department for many years, and both were suspect during the McCarthy period because of their views and contacts. Very unfair.

Q: Again, trying to capture the period when you were taking Chinese at the FSI, what was your impression of the situation on Taiwan, the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek?

DEAN: It is hard to say. We spent much of our time studying very hard. Some of our speakers would talk about what was happening in Taiwan. Some of the people from the Department would tell us about conditions there. It didn't seem to be very gripping to tell the truth. Not a lot was happening in Taiwan at that time. It is true that later on the offshore island crisis occurred, but that was a couple of years later. Our relationship with Taiwan had already been firmed. We all read the White Paper, read all the background documents. We knew that our government had intended to let the chips fall where they may as far as the Generalissimo and his government were concerned when he left the mainland and came over to Taiwan. It wasn't until the outbreak of the Korean War that brought the government of the Republic of China back into the fold again and caused the Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Strait to help protect them. It wasn't until then that a very close relationship began to develop. By 1957, the relationship had become very close. But people in the Department were divided. Most were very positively in favor of Taiwan and very negatively disposed toward the mainland because it was communist and allied with the Soviets. That was the prevailing cold war view. I remember going in to the old East Asia Bureau and saying, "Why don't we start something going with the mainland?" They said, Shhh. Don't let anybody hear you say that."

Q: I know. I came into the Foreign Service in '55 and had nothing to do with that area except having been an enlisted man in Korea during the war, but you know, it just made sense. You have got China sitting over there and that is what diplomacy is all about. Talk to them.

DEAN: We were talking to them you know. At that time talks were continuing in Geneva. We were talking to them, but it wasn't getting anywhere. Both sides were just talking past each other. There was some prospect of getting an agreement on the renunciation of force, but we were afraid to accept it. Now the roles are reversed. We are trying to get them to accept a renunciation of force and they won't. Against Taiwan, I mean. For myself, although I was thinking and hearing and reading about these things, I really wasn't focused on them as I was trying to learn more Chinese and reading more about the background of China and its history in the civil war than on current conditions. I was spending a lot of time focused on that, and not as much, I would say, on policy. Indeed we students weren't involved in policy at all in those days. That was also true later

when we went out to the language school in Taichung where I studied for a couple of years.

Q: You went out to Taichung at the end of '56.

DEAN: No I stayed in Washington at FSI for six months and then went out to Taichung in July of '57, for two years.

Q: You were learning basic mandarin weren't you?

DEAN: That's right.

Q: What was the atmosphere like in '57-'59 in Taichung?

DEAN: Our Embassy had been sacked by the Chinese in early 1957 because a MAAG [Military Army Advisory Group] jury found a U.S. serviceman not guilty of a killing, but better relations were quickly restored.

Q: MAAG is military assistance advisory group.

DEAN: Yes, but our languages school didn't have a great deal to do with our embassy or MAAG. The Chinese were expanding the CCK [Chiang China-kuo] airfield near Taichung with American contractors, so they were there in some numbers. The atmosphere was tense because the communists had bombarded the offshore island of Quemoy and Matsu in 1958 and the U.S. Seventh fleet broke the blockade. The head of the language school, Howard Levy, tried to keep us focused on the Chinese community as much as possible in order to learn more Chinese. He introduced us to many Chinese officials. Some were retired mainland officials who had come over in 1949. Some were scholars; some were local officials. Or, we would go off and spend a week at one of the universities living there and talking to the students and the professors. Levy tried to get us to interact as much as possible with the Chinese society. Then, of course, we had our lessons, and we did what reading we could in addition. We really concentrated on the Chinese language and our studies to the exclusion of contacts with the Americans or the Embassy. Occasionally we would get a visitor from the Embassy, but very rarely. Occasionally we would get an inspection team coming by, but that was our only contact with officialdom. We were left to ourselves and our studies. People worked very hard.

Q: Were your Chinese teachers in a way sort of pushing the Taiwanese line?

DEAN: No. The teachers mostly were from the mainland, mostly from Shantung. The reason we used them is that they were mainlanders who had come over to Taiwan in 1948 and they had the same mandarin accent as people in north China. People in Taiwan speak a Minnan dialect which comes from southern Fujian. Their forefathers came over from southern Fujian two or three hundred years ago. They were fisher-folk who settled down and became farmers and gradually prospered. They are the basic population. There is an aboriginal population which lived in the mountains who were the earliest inhabitants.

There are perhaps only three or four hundred thousand of them left. But, 85% or more of the population of Taiwan are these Taiwanese whose forefathers came over from Fujian. The teachers at the school spoke the Mandarin dialect from northern China, which is the dialect we learned. We didn't have anyone at that time speaking the Taiwanese dialect. This was a great mistake. Even the Chinese officials, the mainland officials who occupied all the jobs in government, local and central, didn't speak Taiwanese. Only one. I met, a vice minister of foreign trade who told me he spoke Taiwanese. He made a point of learning it. He said he was the only official he knew of who spoke Taiwanese. This of course was in the mid-'60s when he said that. But it was true. It is a difficult language in the first place even for mandarin speakers. There were some mainlanders who had come from Fujian who naturally spoke the dialect, but very few.

Q: Were you getting any impression of the KMT government?

DEAN: Sure. There were lots of impressions. We lived in Japanese houses that the Japanese had built for their officials, with tatami floors and with little gardens. They were quite nice houses on the broad unpaved street, with no telephone. There was one telephone at the director's house which was way down at the end of the street. Naturally no television. On the next street down there was a general under house arrest, named General Sun Li-ren. He had been accused of conspiring against the Generalissimo and plotting a coup. This was not true as it later turned out, but he had been sentenced to house arrest. He did stay there most of the time, but they gave him a chance to get out, and occasionally we would see him playing tennis on public tennis courts with his guards. We never met him but we knew about him and we knew the circumstances. We also heard about General Sun from some of our teachers who weren't too sympathetic to the mainland government. There were one or two of them, even though they were from Shantung, who had come to Taiwan earlier and had been protected by the Taiwanese when there was such a wave of hatred against the mainlanders after the incident of February 28, 1947, when there was an uprising. The mainlanders put it down brutally, killing over 20,000 people. Some say as many as 30,000 people were executed. So, there was no love lost between the Taiwanese and the mainlanders. One of our teachers described the circumstances, having been there then. This was ten years earlier, but it burned deeply in his memory. To this day, the incident is a governing force in politics in Taiwan. Anyway, with those undercurrents, we knew that the security forces would come in and break down people's doors and drag people away in the middle of the night, imprison them, execute them for alleged communist sympathies or other acts. So, we knew what kind of a society it was. On the other hand, we had a lot of friends among the local populace, mostly mainlanders, because they were the officials, and they were the educated people. A certain group of Taiwanese had been educated in Japan by the Japanese, mostly doctors and engineers, during their occupation. but they hadn't established universities in Taiwan. The Japanese built up the infrastructure, the agriculture output was designated for Japan. Taiwan was a breadbasket for Japan during the war years and before. We knew what the score was at any rate. There was a Sino-American friendship society, but all the members were mainlanders, mostly generals and officials. We become very close friends with some of them. To this day, one of our

closest friends was then in charge of the armored brigade in the Taichung area. That must have been 45 years ago. He and his wife attended our Taiwan born son Tom's Man Yue Party in 1958. We have been to the Hu children's weddings, and to all sorts of family birthdays, and affairs like that. Even last December, I went to Mrs. Hu's 80th birthday in Taipei, with her whole family present. So we got to know some people very well indeed and became very close.

Q: What about this '57-'59, I'm not sure exactly but I think the great leap forward was underway at that time, were we getting much in the way of information?

DEAN: Later I found out more about developments in China because after two years in Taichung, I went to Hong Kong and was in charge of our economic section analyzing developments on the mainland. In '57 the Hundred Flowers Bloom campaign had been launched by Mao Zedong. But he found the criticism was too intense, so he stopped it and purged all of those who had been rash enough to criticize him. Then he began his commune system, taking agriculture producer cooperatives and forming them into large communes. Then he began the Great Leap Forward program, trying to substitute manpower for capital investment. In other words, he was trying to use labor instead of capital investment, to lift China off its feet and move it into a new economic era. People were melting down all sorts of slag in backyard furnaces, none of it usable, and being drafted for projects elsewhere and leaving the old men and women to work in agriculture. They were told to deep plow. They broke through the fields where you would have your rice growing, usually very thick clay, they would break through the bottom with their deep plowing and all their water would run off. They had a terrible time. But I'm getting a little ahead of myself.

Q: It wasn't overly apparent was it?

DEAN: Not at first, because in Taichung we were really sort of isolated. We weren't in the thick of what was going on. We knew of the offshore crisis, the communist attack on the islands of Quemoy and Matsu had taken place. Tensions rose, and people were concerned that this would be the beginning of an attack on Taiwan itself. But then the Seventh Fleet came in and broke the blockade and Taiwan was able to re-supply its soldiers on Quemoy so that crisis died down. We had earlier signed a mutual security treaty with Taiwan in 1954 after an attack on Little Quemoy. In a sense, under that treaty, we were obligated to help them although there was a big argument, later made famous by Nixon and Kennedy in their 1960 debates for the presidency, about whether our treaty should cover these offshore islands. There was a Formosa Resolution and all sorts of argument about this point. It is really hard to tell you how isolated we were in the language school from matters of policy.

Q: Were alarm bells ringing during the Formosa Strait crisis for you all too? Were you thinking maybe we are going to be in the middle of an invasion?

DEAN: We polished up our evacuation plan to try to decide how to evacuate our families, just as we had in Kuala Lumpur. In Kuala Lumpur we had a great big bag full of gold coins and some machetes we planned to give our people. We were planing to go through some of the jungle paths over to the other side of Malaysia. It was a very foolish plan. You would never be able to get people across. I don't know if you ever read Neville Schute's book A Town Named Alice. Anyway this is about captives of the Japanese going across Malaysia and the travails they went through. We never would have been able to use this plan. Anyway there was a similar plan for Taichung. I think that had us going up the mountains to the silver line trail along the plateau and coming down into Hualin. Of course, that is okay if people are pretty fit. I have gone up that trail two or three times, but it is very steep. If you were thinking about carrying little kids, Mary and I had two by then, and any food supplies, to say nothing of clothing, it would have been an almost hopeless task, but at least we had a plan. So there was some thinking as far as that went about evacuation.

Q: When you were getting out in '59, oh, by the way, besides language studies were you having any of what might be called area studies?

DEAN: No it was almost completely language with good concentration and excellent teachers. People who finished the course had a very good working knowledge, I think, of Chinese, at least a three plus, but of course, you needed more. Anyway we had good teachers, good morale and a good school. I went from there to Hong Kong.

Q: Did you have any choice or where did you want to go?

DEAN: I don't know whether I had any choice or not. I was assigned to Hong Kong and was happy to go there.

Q: Hong Kong was the pre-eminent China watching place wasn't it?

DEAN: That's right and that is the job I got, in the economic section. My friend Paul Popple, it happens, was the head of that section. Later he left and I took his place.

Q: By the way, you were there from '59 to...

DEAN: '62. That was a fascinating time because I did get involved in what was happening on the mainland and saw the results of the Hundred Flowers Bloom campaign. I also saw the results of the commune policy and of the Great Leap Forward, which was an abject failure. Coupled with very bad weather, it created famine conditions in many parts of China. There was a steady stream of refugees coming into Hong Kong. One of our jobs was to study the refugee interviews that the British special branch conducted and to find out about conditions in China. Most of these people were refugees for economic reasons; it wasn't for political reasons. It was because of their livelihood; they had none and they had to find some way of feeding their families. Literally thousands and thousands of refugees came into Hong Kong until it got so bad that in 1962 the British

army and the police put up barbed wire to keep people out as they just couldn't take any more. People were swimming across the bay, trying to avoid the sharks, trying to get smuggled in by so-called snake boats. They were trying everything. Once they touched base in those days, they were home free. The British would not expel them if they landed. That wasn't true later.

Q: Can you talk a bit about how the economic section worked, I mean what you were looking at in China and how you were getting your information?

DEAN: We got our information from a whole series of sources. We produced a translation of the Chinese press. It was quite an elaborate group that translated articles of interest from various papers. We'd get those papers from all sorts of places, even from the market, a fish wrapped in paper. It might be an old provincial newspaper which we could use. We did a big translation service of the Chinese press and distributed it to universities and academicians and others for their research, too. Later we had to charge them for it, but at that time I believe it was free. Then we used the FBIS translations of Chinese radio, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. That was based on Okinawa and we got a lot of their published material. Then we used, as I said, the Special Branch reports of the refugees, and we tried to use whatever other sources of information we could get. I would say that our general overall assessment of what was going on in China was reasonably accurate. It may not have been specifically accurate, but it was reasonably accurate for the economy in the various provinces. We had a very good agricultural officer, Bryce Meeker, who worked with us. He was really expert. He had been in Hungary during the Soviet invasion of Hungary. Later, he was to go on to Russia. He was very capable and hard working, and he added a great deal to our assessment. A lot of the problem really wasn't in the industry but was in the agriculture sector and he followed those developments very carefully. We followed also their foreign trade such as it was at that time. Of course, we had this stricture against Americans buying anything from China so we had a Treasury official in Hong Kong, Charlie DeSevalas, who made sure that everyone at the consulate general or even the public, Americans living in Hong Kong, knew the Treasury Department strictures against buying things from China. I would say it was an exciting period for us because, although a lot of what we did was analytical, we did see enough people who had been in China for one reason or another and we had enough sources of information to put together a pretty good picture of what was happening. Of course we liaised with Australian intelligence and British intelligence, and we had a very large contingent of CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] in our consulate general. The consulate general was huge, with a staff of several hundred Americans and Chinese.

Q: Who was the Consul General at that post?

DEAN: Well, there were different Consul Generals from 1959-63. Marshall Green was Consul General for part of the time and then Julius Holmes was Consul General for part of the time. My wife had worked before we were married in London for Julius Holmes, so she knew him quite well. She was his secretary there. So we became very friendly with

him and with Marshall Green, too. They were interested in what was happening on the mainland, and our section was putting out a great deal of the information.

Q: In many ways what you were putting out, the economic side was the real story wasn't it?

DEAN: Yes it was, but there was a problem here because a lot of people, analysts back in Washington, were believing the Chinese claims about their economic success during the Great Leap Forward. We were debunking these claims, you see, so there was a certain amount of tension between those people who thought China was doing just marvelously and those who knew from talking to people who had seen the situation that it was doing very poorly, in fact tragically. It wasn't until later that the numbers of 30-40 million people dying during this period were confirmed. It was very interesting. There were lots of good newspapermen. Joe Alsop was there hovering around thinking China was going to break up because of the crisis resulting from the failure of the Great Leap Forward. Stan Karnow was there with Time Magazine, Jerry Schecter, Bob Elegant, all of whom later became quite well known, all writing about what was happening in China. The focus of our Consulate General was really on China although we were negotiating with Hong Kong on the first textile agreement limiting the shipment of textiles to the U.S. We negotiated that. Our economic section had two parts. One was the China analysis section, the other dealing with Hong Kong issues. Then, later I became head of both of these sections. We dealt a lot with the British government on textile restraints and a lot of other issues. Of course at that time, our navy was using Hong Kong as an R and R base. Navy ships were always in port and as a result, we had very good relationships with the British military. They were very hospitable to our men and we would always go around to the functions they hosted. It was a very lively scene at that time. I think more and more people were concentrating on China. I remember one of my friends was a British police officer, who later became a civil servant. In '62, the police were busy trying to keep Chinese refugees out of Hong Kong. He was involved in that effort, trying to keep people out and also interrogating people. Later on, in '66, he was abducted by a radical group during the Cultural Revolution, which, in spite of orders from Peking, was spilling over into Hong Kong. The Hong Kong government got him back, I think, with an apology, but it was a tense time for him and for his family and friends.

Q: I wonder right now, I am reading this book by Dr. Lee on the personal life of Chairman Mao. In a way you find it incredible, going to something like the backyard furnaces. They were melting down pots and really not turning it into anything. You have the feeling that nobody was able to ask the question, well, this is all fine but what does this mean? Were you wondering about the thought process of these people who were going so crazy?

DEAN: Yes. You see, Mao Zedong was great for theory but terrible for practice, partially because his theories were so bent. That book will indicate, if you have gotten far into it, that he was like the Chinese emperor. No one would dare approach him with a complaint or criticism. Frankly, they were even reluctant to approach him to ask him for

instructions. Once he laid down the general line, they would go out and scurry and try to do what they thought he meant, and lots of people just didn't know. It is a most amazing book. I would suspect, based on what little I know, it is fairly accurate.

Q: I am told you knew there were some problems, but I was wondering, here is a China watcher, you are looking at these people who are considered the Han race, great merchants and all this - it is as though they have gone nuts.

DEAN: Well, some of the Chinese knew this. For instance, in '62, Peng Dehui, who was one of their most famous marshals, objected to what they were doing. He said the statistics everybody was putting out from the communes and from the factories were just unbelievable. During that time Mao dismissed the whole state statistical bureau because it had also objected, but Peng Dehui was a very important official. However, he was purged in an anti-rightist campaign. Even though he was purged, others of similar view, like Liu Shaoqi, who very soon took over from Mao as the president, also believed that the Great Leap Forward was a terrible mistake. Later on, Liu was purged for his views. A lot of people in China understood, just as we did in Hong Kong, that things were going crazy. It was just a terrible waste and a terrible tragedy. We knew that and reported it. I think gradually people came to understand, even in China, that it was just dreadful. There was a period around '64 when the rightists had come back in after the anti-rightist campaign that had dismissed Peng Dehui, but then they got purged themselves. That is a later story.

Q: Could you talk about the problem back in Washington. I mean, there were talks about how well the Chinese were able to mobilize, in the United States, mobilize all their people and maybe they are on to something, even barefoot doctors.

DEAN: People thought they might be on to something but, you see, I think that it was wholly inaccurate and based on just wishful thinking and not on the facts. People who had consulted any of our reports knew they wouldn't succeed. Of course we couldn't prove that what maybe 1,000 people said in their debriefings was accurate, that they portrayed developments in the rest of China. It is like picking up a handful of sand and counting the grains and wondering if they can count for the whole country. But it was an indicator. Also the provincial newspapers were indicators, as were the reports of visitors.

Q: Did you find some people in the academic world or the political world wondering maybe "This is pretty marvelous?" There is always this love affair between the United States and China.

DEAN: You always get some people who believe that. Sometimes people draw up their opinions without enough facts to substantiate them. You are always getting differences of opinion in the China field. Look at today. So, that has been sort of normal, since 1949. I think that, looking back on that time, our Consulate General people did a very good job of using what information they had to project an analysis of what was going on. And, we had good relations with the Hong Kong government and the intelligence services., so we were able not only to carry out our analysis of the mainland but also our mostly economic work pertaining to Hong Kong.

Q: What about in this '59-'62 period, you did have the election of 1960. One always thinks of Nixon and Kennedy and the Quemoy debates. When one looks back, I can't remember who was doing what or why it was such an issue, but it was one of those things that cropped up. Did that play at all with you?

DEAN: No, it didn't really seem to have too much resonance. Most people felt that Kennedy had won that debate primarily because of the way Nixon looked. I mean he had very poor make up and a dismal look, so it wasn't really the substance that made Kennedy win, it was the PR part. When Kennedy came in, there was some thought that he might be thinking of changing policy toward China, but if he had been thinking of it, nothing came out of it. There wasn't, as far as I know, much going on. The reason for that rumor is that Walter McConaughy was the Assistant Secretary for East Asia Affairs at that time. I worked for him later. He is a fine gentleman, but he was thought of as being a very strong supporter of Taiwan. He was moved from his job. I think Roger Hilsman was put in his place. It was thought that the move was part of a rethinking the China policy. If my recollection is correct, that is what gave some credibility to those rumors.

Q: Someone in one of these oral histories said, and this is of course third hand, that Eisenhower when he talked to Kennedy after Kennedy was elected said, you know in international affairs I am going to support you. If you make a move toward China, I'm not going to. I don't know if there is any truth to that, but Kennedy really won the election by a hair and wasn't really very adventurous on this.

DEAN: I guess he inherited the Bay of Pigs. Of course, it took place on his watch, but I think it was already in train. But, I don't know if you would call Vietnam adventurous or not.

Q: No, it was sort of a reaction.

DEAN: Maybe he inherited that, too.

Q: Yes, Dien Bien Phu was in '54, but I mean things sort of grew, it wasn't as though he...

DEAN: But that is how all these international crises develop. They just don't usually flare up unformed; they take root, and they gradually appear.

Q: Well, you were somewhat removed, but did the enthusiasm for government and all that that came with Kennedy, infuse the Foreign Service where you were or were you just too far away and too...

DEAN: I think it was an uplifting time. People felt hopeful about the future. I'm not talking about just China policy but the future in general. To a lot of youth, it was a breath of fresh air; people felt that this was a good omen for the future, but I don't think it affected our day by day work or changed anything in Hong Kong.

Q: What about Hong Kong and these textile agreements? Hong Kong by this time had reached the stage where textiles seem to be a moveable thing going to poor areas.

DEAN: Before then, you see, when the communists took over on the mainland in 1949, many of the Shanghai textile magnates moved down to Hong Kong. Very fortunately, a lot of the new equipment they had ordered was on the high seas, and they had it diverted to Hong Kong, so they were able to start business right away. They built up an enormous business to a point where our economists were worrying a great deal about the flood of textiles that were coming into the States and driving our own textile industries out of business. So, we focused on Asia, although a lot of the textiles were coming from Italy and other places. We concentrated on Hong Kong and decided on an agreement that would limit the amount of increase of Hong Kong textile exports per year. After a lot of heartburn in Hong Kong, because the textile magnates there didn't want to be limited, the British decided they would sign an agreement for doing this. They gave quotas to each of the textile manufacturers. Those quotas have been bought and sold in subsequent years. It has worked very well except that a lot of these businesses established factories in Thailand or Taiwan or other places, even Africa, and started manufacturing textiles for export to the United States. In a way, we may have cured the Hong Kong problem but then we had to make textile agreements with Korea and Thailand and everybody else. It is like suddenly 1,000 heads were springing up and you have to deal with all of them.

Q: When you were doing this at this time, you were dealing with the British, and how were the British dealing with the magnates who were mostly Chinese?

DEAN: That is right. We were dealing mostly with the British. They usually would have some Chinese staff too. In their legislative counsel or executive council meetings, they would have several Chinese bankers as well as prominent businessmen. They would discuss these things to the nth degree. Gradually the British were able to persuade everybody that there was no alternative, that they had to do this, and in the long run, it wouldn't be bad because they had a guaranteed increase. That has worked quite well for them. So, the industry prospered. They didn't overproduce; they knew what the limits were and they ran up to them. They would negotiate with us frequently on different categories, taking things from one category and putting them into another or expanding the categories; gloves, hats, different sports apparel. So, they did very well with the textile agreements. It seems restrictive and against free trade on the basis of it, but in many ways it benefitted their industry.

Q: Did the dynamics here, the British were doing the negotiating, did you had the feeling that the Hong Kong Chinese merchants were part of the process.

DEAN: Yes, they had to bring them into some of the negotiations. We dealt with the British Director of Commerce and Industry and with the Financial Secretary and with the Chief Secretary. I think that negotiations were pretty hard, but from our point of view, they were successful. John Lacey, my predecessor, did a lot of these negotiations. He was

very even tempered and kept to our position and wore the others down. Eventually they saw the light.

Q: I thought we might stop at this point, and we'll pick it up next time when you are leaving Hong Kong in 1962. Where did you go?

DEAN: I came back to the Department.

Q: You left Hong Kong and you came back to Washington. What job did you have?

DEAN: I was a desk officer in the Office of Asian Communist Affairs in the East Asian Bureau. Asian communist affairs had the responsibility of following developments in China and in North Korea and in North Vietnam, and also Mongolia.

Q: You were doing this at the beginning of each session from 1962 to when?

DEAN: '66.

Q: '66, a good solid time.

DEAN: I started out as one of the desk officers. Later I became the officer in charge of Mainland China affairs. Then I became deputy of the office and then acting head of the office during this four year period.

Q: Did you have a piece of either North Korea or North Vietnam or was it all China?

DEAN: Mostly China, but we had everything. I had China at first, but later took North Vietnam and North Korea. Of course, the focus at that time was both on China and North Vietnam.

Q: Why don't we talk about China first and then move to North Vietnam. We have already talked about it before, but when you came back, how were developments in China seen and what were developments in China?

DEAN: Well, it was a very curious period from '62 to '66. 1962 saw the end of the Great Leap Forward and the beginning of the rightist movement. I should say the anti-rightist movement. People like General Peng Dehui, who had protested about the Great Leap Forward, said it was just a terrible waste. Of course, the country was suffering a great deal because besides taking all the able bodied men from the agriculture sector, leaving old men and women and children to work there, they also suffered from three bad years of weather so there was widespread hunger and serious famine in some places. Later on we learned that between 30 and 40 million people died during this period. So, General Peng Dehui and others felt very strongly that Mao's policies were wrong and they protested. They were able to end the Great Leap Forward, proving that it was a disaster, but they suffered for being correct. Mao was able to purge them, so this was the anti-rightist movement of 1962. But, in spite of the fact that there was an anti-rightist movement and

Peng DeHui was purged, people who had similar views, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and others formed a group in the bureaucracy that also supported Peng Dehui's position, and they gradually gained more influence to the point where Mao Zedong felt more and more threatened. It was then at the end of '65 and beginning of '66 that he launched the Cultural Revolution. We were following these developments, the purging of Peng Dehui and the formation of this coalition around Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, an anti-Maoist coalition, so we used all the information that Hong Kong provided and other sources to try to analyze what was happening in the mainland and to decide what our policy should be.

Q: Now 30 years later we are all over China, lots of books are coming out and all that, but looking back, how well do you think we understood the forces within China and the role of Mao at that time?

DEAN: I think we had a very general idea, not a specific one, but we had a lot of sources: their own broadcasts, their own newspapers, the attacks against individuals, the purges. This gave us a pretty fair idea of what was happening in China. As I say, it wasn't until some time later that we knew the extent of the damage of the Great Leap Forward and the effort to remove ownership of the land from the peasants. They had given them ownership of the land shortly after 1949, but then they took it away and formed these smaller agriculture producer cooperatives, then the larger ones, and then the people's communes. This time and the Great Leap Forward coincided. Both proved to be disastrous ventures.

Q: I'm wondering not just to capture the mindset in Washington but in the academic community. I suspect at the time there is a tendency to say maybe the Chinese are right for the Chinese. Maybe they are on to something. It turned out they weren't.

DEAN: That wasn't our tendency but in European and some academic quarters and some government quarters, there was a tendency to say the Chinese were really substituting labor for capital investment and pushing ahead to industrialize China in a very rapid way. We knew from my experience in Hong Kong seeing the refugees and the reports that had revealed conditions in China, of the utter impossibility of their claims about agricultural production, and we knew from attacks on various members of their own elite in Hong Kong that things were in very bad shape. Granted our analysis was very general, but our views in Washington at the desk were similar. I don't believe we had any false expectations about what was happening in China, in fact, quite the opposite. Nevertheless, we still felt that we had to deal with the Chinese, and one of my jobs was to write the instructions for the Warsaw talks with the Chinese. I wrote them for the first couple of years and then I would go to Warsaw every month to advise, first Ambassador Cabot and then Ambassador Gronouski in the actual talks with the Chinese. We gradually tried to change the tenor of these talks.

Q: Could you explain what the Warsaw talks were?

DEAN: These talks were started initially in Geneva with Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson. They came about through an agreement between Zhou En-lai and John Foster Dulles in 1954. We started talks in Geneva with the objective of trying to get the Chinese to renounce the use of force against Taiwan and to try to get some newspapermen, academicians, and other types of exchanges with the Chinese. They always said in those talks that the subject of Taiwan would have to be resolved before they could advance other aspects of the bilateral relationship. This is very interesting, and there is some new research. Jay Taylor, who has just written a new biography of Chiang Ching-kuo has found that initially the Chinese were willing to renounce the use of force. U. Alexis Johnson sent telegrams to the Department that are now public saying he recommended that this be accepted. It was too all embracing for Washington, so they turned it down. Later on we came back to a more narrow definition of the renunciation of the use of force against Taiwan. It is very interesting to speculate what might have happened had we come to an agreement much earlier with the Chinese about the renunciation of the use of force. But we didn't and we spent a lot of time and effort. The talks become quite sterile. We would say our piece and they would say theirs. They would issue the 272nd serious warning about over flights by American planes of the Chinese mainland and we would pay no attention.

Q: They were actually U-2's piloted by Taiwanese weren't they?

DEAN: Not necessarily. Some were flights by our own planes and some were the Chinese Nationalist patrols that were going up and down the Strait. U-2's were more for intelligence gathering. These others were the normal patrols in the Strait to maintain their air superiority and also to see if anything was developing on the coast. Sometimes they would fly too closely inland and we would get another serious warning. The talks were not getting anywhere. The Chinese wanted to resolve Taiwan first; we wanted to exchange newspapermen and academicians.

Q: What about people in prison. We had at least two. Could you talk about Americans in prison there and what we were trying to do about that?

DEAN: There were many American citizens still in prison, religious leaders, and also some people left there from the Korean War, and others who had been on intelligence missions and who had been imprisoned when their plane had crashed. I went to the border when I was in Hong Kong to greet Bishop Walsh. Bishop Walsh was released from prison after being held since 1949.

Q: This was about when?

DEAN: If my memory serves me correctly, this would have been in 1962. Bishop Walsh was a really remarkable man. He was bedridden but later recovered. He had been in prison for many years, since '49. There were many others like him, who claimed American citizenship. Later on they were to suffer a lot more because of the Cultural Revolution. At the time I was in Warsaw the talks had been moved from Geneva. They

were held in a small Polish palace in a park. We would come in; the Chinese would come in. When I first got there, neither side would acknowledge the other; they would sit down and start their talks. When I got there, after I had spoken to Bill Bundy who was the Assistant Secretary, we tried very hard to change the atmosphere of the talks, to shake hands and begin to change the language. Instead of referring to their “regime,” we referred to their government.” We got rid of a lot of pejorative expressions in an effort to make it a little more civil. I also started to go over to the Chinese Embassy at the end of each talk or on the following day to see if there had been any problems with the translation (each side translated their own Ambassador's talk) to see if there were any questions or anything like that, but it was mostly an ice breaking type of situation. We tried quite hard to get some agreement on newsmen and on academic exchange saying if it was difficult to solve these major problems, why don't we put them to one side and go on with more practical ones in the interim. We didn't stage any breakthroughs, but we did change the atmosphere quite a bit. These talks were electronically bugged. One of our security men had his van a few blocks away, and he picked up the talks on his radio. We knew the Polish government was listening but plainly the Russians wanted to make sure the Poles told them the exact truth, so they had installed their own bugs in the chandeliers, so the talks were actually broadcast at least to a small circle around the palace. I think that things began to get a little better, but then the Cultural Revolution broke out, and that prevented any type of movement at all by the Chinese.

Q: When one looks at this whole thing, the Kissinger breakthrough, in a way it wasn't a matter of initiative on our part, it was really the Chinese just weren't ready for this sort of thing. I mean the thought of Americans having relations with China during the Cultural Revolution during the height of it is almost impossible to envisage.

DEAN: No, I think we were doing our best in the period from '62 to '66, but the Cultural Revolution broke out in 1966. There were too many tensions within the Chinese government. Later on, one of the reasons I think they were receptive was the Soviet action against Czechoslovakia in '67. This caused enormous consternation in China because they, of course, thought they might be another victim of the Soviets. It was at this time, or a little before, that they began digging underground shelters underneath Beijing, Shanghai and other cities. I went down into one later; it was a complete underground city. They were building them with the idea that this would protect their people from Soviet nuclear warfare. They had air purifiers and everything. They had flour mills down there, hospitals, dormitories, workshops, all sorts of things. They were really quite large. Of course, it would not have stood up against nuclear warfare of the kind they had in mind, but it shows you how much labor was involved in all these places. Digging so many underground cities was unbelievable. They did it for fear of the Soviet Union.

Q: Now we are talking about constraints on the Chinese because in '62-'66 they are sort of sorting things out, moving from the Great Leap Forward to their rightist movement and Mao is sort of glowering in his cabana by the swimming pool, and then he came back with the Cultural Revolution.

DEAN: Mao was locked in a power struggle with Liu Shaoqi and with Deng Xiaoping and the party bureaucracy, and in fact he did lose the presidency. He kept the chairmanship but he lost the presidency to Liu Shaoqi during this period. Mao was determined to purge Liu and Deng, also who supported him, as well as anyone else who opposed him.

Q: Did we have a fix on Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping and that sort of thing?

DEAN: Yes, I mean they had been very prominent, it was very clear. The only thing that wasn't clear was Deng Xiaoping's position; whether he was fully in Liu's camp or whether he was staying with Zhou En-lai somewhere in the center or had moved over to the left. We didn't know that; we didn't know the exact manipulations Mao was making. We didn't know for sure, but we knew there was a power struggle going on. Liu had been purged and arrested. We knew that Deng had been purged. We knew that many people at the top felt that the Great Leap Forward was a disaster and it was Mao's fault. It was not clear in 1966 where things were going to go, and we didn't predict the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. I don't think anybody predicted that.

Q: What about constraints on our side because during the Eisenhower period, in a way one has the feeling that the China policy was tossed to the rightists in our Senate and you had Robertson and all who were going to make sure we weren't going to go anywhere with China. It was a pretty rigid China policy I would characterize. Then you came back here in '62 under Kennedy and Johnson. Within the East Asian Bureau, were you picking up a feeling of, well maybe now we can do something?

DEAN: I think when Kennedy was elected and assumed the presidency, the East Asian Bureau thought he was going to make some overtures toward China and to change our policy. I would like to think it is true, that he had been thinking of this, and he changed the leadership of East Asia and the Pacific Bureau. I'm not positive about this, but it was thought that he was interested in going ahead. But then he stopped. There were too many other problems. There was Cuba and there was the burgeoning Vietnam situation, so we didn't move ahead. Then when he was killed in '63, I was back in Washington. I remember when I hear about it. I went to get a hair cut at the barbershop. Elwood Williams, who was a friend of my brother's on the German desk, told me about it. Kennedy's death ended the prospect of any movement. I don't think that Lyndon Johnson (whom I got to know a little better later), was on the verge of doing anything, so things were certainly in abeyance at that time. Vietnam began to take a much more prominent role in the work of the State Department and in our work and in the government's work. I would have to go around, for example to many schools and universities and colleges talking about the administration's position on Vietnam. The students told me that the President was lying and the government's position on Vietnam was wrong, all of which was part of the early stages of campus unrest and opposition to our Vietnam policies, so it was very difficult to talk to people.

Q: Sort of our cultural revolution.

DEAN: Yes. It was a very difficult period. It was almost impossible to explain the government's position particularly since I, myself, felt it was questionable whether we would be able to impose a solution on the Vietnamese people. I felt that quite strongly. In fact, I went over to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and participated in several studies at the time to see what we could do against the North Vietnamese. I was opposed all the time to the use of U.S. armies being sent into North Vietnam because I felt that it would bring the Chinese in with even greater force. The Chinese were already involved; they had already been manning missile, batteries, and other anti-aircraft batteries. They already had battalions of troops on road-making duty in North Vietnam. Later on I found, from a graduate student who was getting his Ph.D. at Peking University, that during the course of the Vietnam War, the Chinese had something like 900,000 troops in North Vietnam, mostly doing road-building and anti-aircraft, not all at one time, but at various times during the course of the war. Anyway, my feeling was that if we sent U.S. ground forces into North Vietnam, the Chinese would respond. And so, of course the studies went further than that. I would repeat that the Chinese would respond and naturally the subject of nuclear weapons would come up. I had to take footnotes protesting some of these reports as I felt that the use of tactical nuclear weapons would not deter the Chinese. Mao said that China had about a billion people and if they lost half of them, they would still have 500 million. Even if we devastated them and used other than tactical nuclear weapons, this would be a festering sore, not just the question of the use of nuclear weapons, but on the Chinese themselves. It would be a festering sore and eventually they would recover their economy and their people, and then they would be an enemy forever. It seemed to me it was wiser not to spread the war. Some, like Ambassador Graham Martin, didn't think the Chinese would come in. Of course, I didn't know, but I was almost positive that they would feel that they would have to. Anyway as you know, instead we bombed North Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

Q: We are talking about U. S. ground troops in North Vietnam because that was one of the options that we could do.

DEAN: That was one of the options, and that is why these JCS studies were being made, to find what the Chinese reaction was, and that is why I was there.

Q: What were you getting from our military about putting ground troops into North Vietnam

DEAN: What I just described, the JCS study on this. Some people wanted to know what the results would be. Tommy Thompson was the one who pushed the JCS study.

Q: I was just wondering when you talked to the military or with the military individually, were they saying "Hell, no?"

DEAN: Some of them. They were divided too. Some were saying they didn't want a wider war. Some were very upset at the constraints put upon them by the conduct of the war, no

troops in the North, initially no bombing of the North, no bombing of the ships bringing goods in, the Russian ships, the Chinese ships. They felt as though their hands were tied behind their back and they couldn't really fight a war like that. Of course, they were right. But, also on the ground in Vietnam things were not settled; things were not proceeding that favorably. People, I think, were giving exaggerated reports of body counts, and all sorts of other misinformation. Then Washington wanted to use Robert Thompson's ideas. Robert Thompson had been in Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia. I had known him at the time. He was trying to suggest that the British experience in Malaysia be transferred to Vietnam which was, however, a completely different situation. I argued at length about that, without too much success. There were lots of arguments going on within the Department about this plan and about policy. I was in charge of the peace initiatives with North Vietnam. There were lots of these peace initiatives, both on the part of other governments and on the part of individuals who would come into see us, and even some feelers on the part of their own government. I was very interested in this and hoped that we would find some way of bringing at least a pause in the war allowing us to reflect and to find a way out. I had earlier served in the White House for Lyndon Johnson. He had been elected in '64 and I was there for about two months working on his inauguration primarily because my friend, Paul Popple was his Chief of Correspondence and had asked me to come over and help him. So I did and I got to meet Johnson frequently. He would come in and pick up his correspondence from the pile on my desk and say this guy is a good friend of mine, you should give him very good treatment. He was a very suspicious type of person. He was suspicious of me until he got used to me. But anyway, he was a very interesting man. I think that if he had better advice, he might not have committed the U.S. so thoroughly to the Vietnam War. At the end of '65, he did declare a bombing halt in Vietnam. This was after the Gulf of Tonkin alleged attack. I say alleged because I talked to Senator Fulbright later about this, and he said that it appeared dubious. Then Johnson started the retaliatory bombing. He declared a pause in December '65. He sent Governor Avril Harriman, myself and Chris Squire to visit several heads of state to see if we couldn't prolong the 1965 bombing pause of North Vietnam into a possible peace negotiation. That is where I got introduced to Air Force One. We traveled with two crews and the three of us to several different countries. They asked me to go because the first stop was to be Warsaw. We were going to try to persuade the Poles to intercede with the Soviet Union. Then we were hoping also at the same time to see the Chinese there. At the time, although I didn't know it, there was an argument within our government between Dean Rusk and McNamara. Rusk was opposed to this initiative. He thought it wouldn't do any good. McNamara was for it. They felt they each had the President's ear. The President was wavering in between. He wasn't sure which one was right and what he should do. At any rate, we did persuade the Polish government, and they sent the director general of the Foreign Ministry off to Moscow to speak to the Russians and then on to Hanoi. This same man, Ambassador Michalowski, I believe, later became the Polish Ambassador to the U.S. But the Department would not give us permission to see the Chinese. That was very unfortunate. Later on, when we got to Vietnam, they didn't allow us to see some of the other players, including the North Vietnamese we had hoped to be able to see in some neutral country.

Q: What was the feeling you were getting about where the constraints were coming from?

DEAN: I didn't know then. We were full of hope. We thought we might be able to take this bombing pause and really do something. So, we went to Poland and got some fairly good results. We didn't see the Chinese. Then, we went off to see Tito. He was the co-chair of the non-aligned conference at the time. When we got there, he was up in the northern part of Yugoslavia. We tried to land, but the airport was fogged, so we had to go back to Belgrade and take a special train. I remember it was New Years Eve at that time.

Q: This was when?

DEAN: This was '65.

Q: Yes, I remember. I was Consul in Belgrade then.

DEAN: Harriman, Ambassador Elbrick and I and someone else from the Embassy went up on this special train to see Tito. We spent the night on the train and got there the next morning and had breakfast with Tito. He insisted everybody have several slugs of brandy. He said he would try to help. We went off to Egypt to see Nasser, who was the other co-chairman of the non-aligned movement. Nasser also had the opinion something should be done. We met at his military encampment outside Cairo. He seemed sincere, saying that he wanted to do something. Then we flew off to Iran to see the Shah, and later to Pakistan to see Ali Khan. We saw Prime Minister Shastri in New Delhi right before he went to Tashkent to meet with Ali Khan, where he died. Anyway it became more like public relations than anything else. Then we went to Australia to see Prime Minister Menzies because the Australians were involved in Vietnam. Next we went to Japan to see Sato, who was Prime Minister, and we went to Saigon and to Laos. But, because we couldn't see the Chinese or the North Vietnamese, we only achieved the result of getting the Soviets interested. At that time the Soviets and the Chinese were pretty much at loggerheads with each other. We thought that the split between them really happened in the late '50s, and by the time things had developed in the early '60s they really were at odds with each other, including over supplying arms and materials to North Vietnam. The Chinese would deliberately hold back the train shipments coming through China carrying Soviet munitions and goods to North Vietnam. They deliberately delayed then for weeks, sometimes even longer. The Soviets had to resort to shipping many of their military supplies through Hanoi. So the Chinese were, in effect, blockading some of the Soviet aid to Vietnam. The Chinese didn't want the Soviets to get a foothold in Vietnam and be on both of their borders. This is why later on they were so annoyed at the Soviets taking over Camh Ran Bay after the U.S. withdrawal. There was really bad blood between the Chinese and the Soviets. We thought that we possibly could play on this antagonism and deep antipathy. So we tried. Harriman and some others wanted to see if we couldn't exploit this rift.

Q: I'm trying to figure out what the game would have been if the Soviets were going to support. In a way we wanted both the Soviets and the Chinese to join together and say let's...

DEAN: We wanted both of them to agree to a bombing pause and influence Hanoi to that effect because they were both supplying Hanoi. Our view was that if they could use their leverage on Hanoi, then it would be valuable. Now, we thought that the Chinese might do it because they didn't want the Soviets to get more influence there. We thought the Soviets might do it because they were angry at the Chinese and concerned about the growing Chinese power there. This was just a wish, but, of course, none of this happened. After the bombing pause in '65 we committed more and more troops to South Vietnam and suffered tragic consequences.

Q: What was your impression of Harriman at this time? He was a very important figure; it was logical that he should have been Secretary of State and yet Harriman was cast in sort of this East Asian role.

DEAN: He had been Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs and then Under Secretary. I think that might have been before they had a Deputy Secretary, and he didn't become Secretary of State. I think people listened to him. When I say people, I mean people in our own government and also foreign governments. He was really respected very highly. You could see that very clearly in all of these meetings, and he was very persuasive and knew all the details and facts. I thought he was a good emissary, and if we had been given permission to see the Chinese and the North Vietnamese, who knows? Of course, it is quite possible that Hanoi might have refused to enter into any negotiations at that point, but it really depends on what they would have gotten out of it. They wouldn't refuse to look at it I think. They might have gotten a lot out of it without the destruction which they themselves suffered. I think of it as one of life's great opportunities lost.

Q: What was your impression on how Harriman was treating these constraints that were put upon him? Where was it coming from?

DEAN: It was really coming from the Secretary and indeed the President, so he was feeling let down. It wasn't a matter of others trying to restrain him. He didn't try to go off on his own; he waited for authorization before he did anything.

Q: Did he sort of talk to you all as he went around? I mean what were you getting from him?

DEAN: Yes, we had several discussions about whether we could manage to talk to the Chinese or the North Vietnamese, if the bombing pause could be extended, what the outcome could be if there was a negotiation. There were always discussions of this type, and of course, what the Chinese motives were, what the Russian motives were, whether the South Vietnamese (at that time they weren't even drafting their own people into their armed forces,) whether they were able or willing to stand up for their own government.

Whether or not the split in the communist camp, which was so obvious by then, although some people still didn't believe in it, whether that was going to make the domino theory less viable. Of course I thought it would. I thought it was rather unlikely that the domino theory, which represented a monolithic communism advance, was sensible. We saw China and the Soviet Union at each other's throats. The North Vietnamese hated the Chinese and had for 1,000 years or more. They had been occupied and ruled by China for many centuries, and they didn't like the Chinese. Later on the border war between them in 1979 was an acute expression of that dislike. The Chinese didn't like the Vietnamese either. But, also Thais didn't like the Vietnamese or the Cambodians. It is very hard for me to see why we did not pay much more attention to these fractures in international communism.

Q: Were these fractures well known and part of sort of the body of your knowledge? I mean yours and the other people who were dealing particularly your dealing with a variety of countries.

DEAN: Sure, anybody who had read any Vietnamese history would know about the relationship with the Chinese and the Vietnamese, documented over the centuries. Anybody who had been following developments since 1958 with China and the Soviet Union would know that they had really come to a parting of the ways as early as 1960. It seemed to me that this knowledge was discussed in papers, but people in the Department really didn't focus on them. Many in Congress, but also some of our own policy makers, didn't really factor the implications into account. It is not hindsight to say that the Sino-Soviet split was so real and that the Vietnamese hated the Chinese.

Q: What were you getting, I mean you had North Vietnam as part of your responsibility, how did we see the North Vietnamese government? What were they, were there factions within it?

DEAN: We were getting very little from North Vietnam. I think we knew much less about North Vietnam than we knew about China, and our knowledge about China as I have described was very general. But, for North Vietnam we had very little really good information about any disagreements within their government or factions. Our information began to develop later, but not at that time. We were groping around, but the major outlines were very clear, particularly with regard to the Vietnamese. The North Vietnamese intention to rule their whole country, and their willingness to suffer incredible losses in order to achieve their objective. All this hadn't just suddenly popped up in 1964. They had defeated the French at Dien Bien Phu in '54, and they had been fighting the French for quite some time before that. It was quite clear that their objectives remained the same. It is very difficult for me to understand that we got into such a morass without foreknowledge of the consequences, without really thinking through what the pro's and con's were, what the odds were, what we were likely to achieve or not to achieve, whether or not we could bomb the North Vietnamese into submission.

Q: Did you have the feeling that Johnson in a way was calling the shots or was this Rusk calling the shots?

DEAN: In the long run it was Johnson. Even when Fulbright and other Congressional leaders came to see him after the Tonkin incident, he told them he was not going to run away like a cur with his tail between its legs, that he was going to stand up for America. I think that what he lacked was more farsighted advisors. Bill Moyers was one of them, but not on foreign policy. Dean Rusk was a strong advocate of our policy in Vietnam. I admire Dean Rusk. I think he was a great man, but when it came to the Chinese, he was staunchly anti-communist, anti-Chinese. He had been Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs before, and he had served in the Burma campaign and his views were deeply affected by the KMT's loss of China.

Q: He had been a planner for the...

DEAN: That's right, so he had some knowledge of this. He was a very knowledgeable man. He was definite in his principles and his views; he was almost unswervable. He was very persuasive, and straightforward person. In many respects a very admirable man. I just happen to think that he was wrong.

Q: Well, in this case, one can be admirable, but this is a pretty horrible thing to be unadmirable.

DEAN: On one of my trips to Vietnam, I came back with Dean Rusk on the same plane. We played bridge most of the way back. He was a good bridge player. We played all the way through. We didn't stop for meals. But, we didn't have much of a conversation about what was going on. Once he made up his mind, that was that.

Q: What did we see in it for the Chinese to support the North Vietnamese, because this doesn't raise itself as being a major policy consideration. Maybe I'm wrong but...

DEAN: Oh, I think so. Vietnam is on their border just as Korea is on their border. I believe very strongly that they were very concerned about security, their national security. There is a book that is out recently. I think it is called The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress. It describes Chinese history in terms of their concern about their border areas and their effort to secure those border areas as a means of protecting their own country and civilization. This book depicts these objectives as primarily defensive in nature and describes the Indian border wars and the border war later with Vietnam and the Russian border wars as being essentially defensive in nature. I think that anything that happened in North Vietnam which involved foreign forces possibly going into North Vietnam would have been of extreme importance to their national security and defensive posture. I still believe to this day that they would have reacted with massive amounts of troops and that we would have embarked on a war with China if we sent troops into North Vietnam.

Q: Looking at China, were we looking at any divisive elements there, warlordism or something like that?

DEAN: There were some people who thought that maybe (they always thought that and still think it today), China might break apart. I don't think that is a likelihood, although, who knows what will happen in the future. It didn't seem a likelihood to us then because the country had been unified quite completely by the communist rulers. If Mao had retired, stepped down in 1950, he would still be revered as a great man. Now for many people, particularly among the intellectuals, he is vilified. A lot of the ordinary people, taxi drivers, farmers, still remember his name and remember the mass movements, so he is still a name to be reckoned with as far as they are concerned. It just seems to me that China is such a huge, vast place and our knowledge about it is so comparatively small. It is like picking up a handful of sand from the beach and counting the grains and from that determining how many grains there are in the rest of the world.

Q: How did we see Zhou En-lai during this '62-'66 period?

DEAN: We saw him as a sort of a mediator, as a person who stood between Mao, between the wrath of god, and the rest. He tried to keep things running on an even keel. Actually he catered a lot to Mao. If he hadn't, he would not have stayed in power. But he was responsible later on for bringing Deng Xiaoping back, and he was responsible, I think, for shielding some of the officials from the Red Guards and the terrors of the Cultural Revolution. Essentially he was a positive image in our minds at that time in the early '60s, and later, too. I think most people felt that Mao was a fanatic and Zhou En-lai was a pragmatist. Most people felt that Liu Shaoqi was pragmatic and Deng Xiaoping, too. It later turned out to be true. Of course, it is easy to say if we had known more in the '60s we would have reacted differently both toward China and toward North Vietnam, but one gets drawn into these things, particularly if you are not very clear-sighted about what our objectives are. One get drawn into them and they become bigger and bigger and then it is hard to extract oneself with any degree of honor. People get committed arguing one side or the other in Congress or in the public, and so this whole Vietnam venture really fragmented our society in many different and disturbing ways.

Q: Did Senator Fulbright play any role during this '62-'66 period particularly regarding our China policy?

DEAN: No, I don't think so. He was focused on Vietnam. Not too many people were talking about changing our China policy at that time. He may have said this in his memoirs or publicly, but I don't recall it in any of his speeches or statements. When I spoke to him later, we were talking mostly about Vietnam.

Q: How about the CIA? I mean this is sort of what you have the CIA for, to find out what is happening in difficult places, in those days North Vietnam and China.

DEAN: They were good analysts, their analytical side on China had very good people. I remember several of them. I thought they did quite a good job of trying to describe what was happening at that time. They were using the same sources which INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research] and the Consulate General in Hong Kong were using. They may have had some human intelligence sources, but basically they had the overt radio broadcasts, the provincial newspapers, the refugee reports from the Special Branch in Hong Kong, and diplomatic dispatches from other countries that were represented in Beijing. So, using those sources, they came to, I think, fairly sensible conclusions about what was happening in government circles. Vietnam was a much more difficult thing because nobody had focused much on it before, and nobody really had nearly as good sources. We were sort of groping around more blindly without intelligence in Vietnam.

Q: In the office for dealing with these affairs, were there any discernible splits about what we should be doing and all that?

DEAN: Because it was a crisis, policy decisions had risen to the top. Decision making was at the Secretary's level and the Presidential level; McGeorge Bundy at the National Security Council. His brother, William Bundy, was the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia. It was at William Bundy request that I was following the peace initiatives. We tried to see if there was some way of getting good channels and developing one of these initiatives into something meaningful. I think we didn't get very far with them because there wasn't a really burning desire to follow them up much from on high, even with the Harriman initiative. Which is not to say that we didn't try.

Q: Well, moving over to sort of the other side, more about difficult places, what about Kim Il Sung and North Korea? What were we getting out of that?

DEAN: Nothing but what you have heard about and known about for some time. Just complete adulation of Kim Il Sung, and the fact that their society was such a closed dictatorial society even after the Sino-Soviet split. Before, both the Chinese and the Soviets had supported North Korea, particularly in its war against the south. Now the split was a big question for the North. Would they be able to obtain military support from Moscow or Beijing? North Korea was playing them both off against the other. It was getting more support from one because it claimed that the other was going to send support, so the Russians would hurry up and do it, or the Chinese. So, as far as Chinese and Soviet support was going at that time, they were doing quite well. The North still harbored designs against South Korea. There were still constant incursions of intelligence groups and tunnels under the demilitarized zone, all sorts of actions abroad and at home to further their aims. They were a true danger. The question is, would they take advantage of what was going on in the South? You know several units from South Korea went to Vietnam.

Q: A whole division

DEAN: A whole division was sent to South Vietnam, and they proved to be very effective. Would the North Koreans take advantage of their absence to try something;

would the war spread? This was a real worry, and we didn't know the answer at that time. We had a morass that was quickly developing in Vietnam. It had been developing for some time already, but it was getting worse. We had the uncertainties about what was happening in China, and we had the danger from North Korea, so it kept us busy.

Q: Well, you left that job. Oh, William Bundy. What was your impression of where he was going?

DEAN: It was hard to tell. I wasn't sure if he really was dedicated to the peace initiatives I mentioned or not, or if he was just doing that to placate a certain element of the establishment. He is a very intelligent man. I just don't know. But for him, you see, after all, it was doubly difficult, because he had the responsibility for all these things and much more, so he had a good deal on his plate. He knew through his brother, of course, and through the Secretary, what the conflicting policy views were at the highest levels of our government, and he had to deal with them. He also had to deal with Congressional views, and they were intense, as well as with public pressures that were highly critical. So, he had a much greater burden to bear then.

Q: Did you feel there was a carryover kind of from both the Kennedy period but also a carryover from WWII, sort of the OSS-type of thing, very active people. We can do anything; don't just stand there, get in there and do something. Was that an element do you think at that time?

DEAN: Probably the CIA had operational units in Southeast Asia. They always had been an activist voice. They always claimed their daily briefings for the President were just intelligence, but obviously when you choose certain bits of intelligence and leave out others, then you are really slanting the picture. I always thought that the INR was a good counter to a lot of their views, and we tried to send over our views from the INR side. I don't know how much of a role they had. I'm sure that the military was divided; I suspect they were too. Certainly the State Department was divided on these issues, as was the country. It was a really bad period.

Q: During this time, looking at mainland China, what was the feeling of its intentions toward Taiwan?

DEAN: Well, judging from the Warsaw talks, Chinese insisted as it had from day one of these talks and even from the day they declared the People's Republic on October 1, 1949, that Taiwan was part of the People's Republic of China. It was a province; it was part of their territory. They were never going to give up this claim, and in my view, they will never do so. It is a territorial imperative that is very strong in China and with other countries too. It seems to me their attitude toward Taiwan was expressed in the Taiwan talks when they refused to renounce the use of force. Their rationale for doing so, of course, is that this would be surrendering their sovereignty and their claim that Taiwan is part of their country. They believe they have a right to quell internal disturbances themselves. Therefore, they weren't going to give up the use of force. Their attitude

toward Taiwan was very tough on that stance. But, I can't think of a time that it hasn't been tough except for a period in the '80s when we had better relationships with Deng Xiaoping, and at the same time, we had good relations with Taiwan, and Taiwan and the mainland were beginning to trade, to invest, to travel. Tensions in the Taiwan Strait at that time, I would say between '82 and '89 when Tiananmen occurred, were the lowest they have been in history. At other times, of course, there have been high threats. In '62-'66 Taiwan was doing a lot of these lightning jabs at China, sponsored in part by the CIA, but also sponsored by some of our far-out military units. They would send rubber boats onto the mainland with a few infiltrators. Usually they would be captured within days. They would send balloons over with messages and with little gifts from the offshore islands. They would do lightning raids here and there. Of course, the CIA helped the Kampa Guerillas in Tibet. This was the time of the Tibetan uprising and the Chinese crackdown in '59. At any rate, there had been a lot of that type of thing which provoked the Chinese and didn't get us anywhere. In fact, it just created more tensions. The over-flights I speak of, not the spy flights but the others, were not a deliberate goading of the Chinese, but they were more from navigational problems. China was so troubled, roiled internally, that I think they didn't have that much focus on doing something about Taiwan. Things were tense but not critical.

Q: You left there in '66 just about the time of our great buildup in Vietnam. Where did you go then?

DEAN: I went to Taipei.

Q: You had been focused almost completely on the mainland and the communist side. Had there been anyone within the East Asian Bureau, who looked after Taiwan?

DEAN: It was the Office of Chinese affairs. Asian Communist Affairs had broken away from the old Office of Chinese affairs. Taiwan, and I think Korea and Japan, were handled by a separate office, so I didn't have much to do with it at that time.

Q: I was wondering you kind of did your own thing; it wasn't as much involving China.

DEAN: No at that time they were separate. We didn't have much to do with what was happening in Taiwan. I recall quite clearly. It had been a very important desk in those days, but it was beginning to enter a decline, partly because of the Vietnam War and partly because of what was happening in China, and partly because there wasn't much happening in Taiwan at that time. My next posting when I left the Department and went to Taipei was as Political Counselor. I think you have already done a session with Arthur Hummel, a talented professional. He was the Chargé at that time. Then Walter McConaughy became our Ambassador, and we didn't have a Chargé after Art left. When Walter went away on leave and for promotion boards and things like that, I became the Chargé, but for most of the time, I was the Political Counselor.

Q: You were there from '66 to...

DEAN: '69.

Q: When you arrived in '66, what was the political situation and the economic situation in Taipei?

DEAN: Taipei was just starting to move into the boom years of their economic development. They already had their land reform, where the land was turned over to the farmers, private ownership of the land. The landowners were compensated by shares in some of the government corporations, sugar, petroleum, etc. That phase of the economy already had gone very well. Agricultural production was up very high. Light industries were beginning to grow very rapidly. In a few years heavy industry also began to grow, the China steel corporation, China Shipbuilding, electric power, things of that type. So, their economy was in pretty good shape, but still the agricultural sector was leading in importance at that time. The Generalissimo was in complete charge. The mainlanders who had come over with him were ruling Taiwan from the top down. A few Taiwanese had been brought in to lower ranking jobs in the government, but essentially the mainlanders were calling the tune and they were disliked by the Taiwanese because, as I mentioned earlier, of the very cruel and arbitrary way in which they had been ruled from 1945 until the Generalissimo came over in '49. In 1945, the Gimo sent General Chen Yi to take over Taiwan. Chen Yi created a crisis between the mainlanders who came over and were grabbing everything like carpetbaggers and the Taiwanese populace, to a point where there was an enormous uprising against the mainlanders by the Taiwanese which was brutally suppressed with as many as 10,000 people killed arbitrarily by General Chen Yi in 1947. The Taiwanese have never forgotten that. The mainlanders were ruling them in every aspect. They didn't have any say in what was going on. So they committed their energies primarily to the manufacturing and economic and industrial sector. When I got there two-thirds of the large companies were owned by the Taiwanese, and of course, they owned the land. The farmers owned their land. They owned most of the small and medium sized companies, so they were a very important economic power even if they weren't a political power. That was the scene when I arrived in Taiwan. The mainlanders made sure that dissent was punished. There was, I remember, a man named Po Yang who was a dissident. He was a mainlander himself. He drew some derogatory cartoons about the Generalissimo, and he was imprisoned for several years for those cartoons. Various others, like Li Ou, had spoken out and had been jailed. There were several other intellectuals who were jailed for their dissident views. Some were mainlanders; not Taiwanese. But the Taiwanese were gradually becoming independent oppositionist politicians. One of them, Henry Kao, won the election as an independent Mayor of Taipei City, and the Generalissimo decided not to intervene. Kao served out his term. There was a-lot of Congressional interest in Taiwan. Many visitors coming in because of the old days. They came to see the Generalissimo or the Madame. They were entertained by the Chiangs, who were very intent on maintaining U.S. support and the U.S. connection. Indeed they offered up the island facilities for the Vietnam war effort. Tankers for the B-52s were based in southern Taiwan. They would fly up and refuel the B-52s that were coming from Guam or Okinawa on their way to bomb the North or South. At that time

there were over 10,000 U.S. service personnel in Taiwan and lots of the dependents of those serving in Vietnam were also there. I forget now what the total number of Americans were. It was a huge U.S. community in terms of the PX and special privileges and everything. We were negotiating a Status of Forces Agreement with the Foreign Ministry. There had been some incidents where our military had insisted on trying the army culprits themselves.

Q: There had even been a sacking of the Embassy.

DEAN: That occurred much earlier as a result of one of these incidents in 1957 before I got to the language school. Anyway, in '66 we were still negotiating, and during the time I was there, we did arrive at a final agreement on status of forces which included an agreement on who would try whom for what type of offense. It was more necessary then because there were so many Americans. I also set up with the general in charge of the Political Warfare Department a bi-weekly meeting on developments in China. They had much better intelligence than we, and for once, it wasn't propagandistic. We met with representatives from their military and from their navy and their intelligence service, and we would meet once every two week with our own team and find out what they thought was happening with Liu Shaoqi or with Deng Xiaoping or Zhou En-lai and what was Mao doing? This was the start of the Cultural Revolution and it was really of considerable interest, so we reported back to the Bureau. I think that time has proved their analysis was pretty accurate on what was happening. They had a much better feel for these things than we did. We kept up these sessions with them, and also at that time with Chiang Ching-kuo who was the Generalissimo's son and who would later become president. At the time he was Defense Minister and Vice Premier. He had not had much to do with the diplomatic community. He had been in the background mostly in the '50s and early '60s as head of the intelligence and security. He was a shadowy and rather negative image to foreigners. We agreed, it would be good if he became better known and met more newspapermen and diplomats and became better known internationally. Once when I was chargé, he came to my office and said, "You know I followed your advice. I had a meeting last night with a newspaperman representing The London Evening Star." It turned out that the newspaperman was a Russian KGB agent, Victor Louis, masquerading as a reporter for this London paper. Louis had come to Taiwan to stir up trouble because the Soviets and the Chinese were at odds with each other. The Russians were trying to fish in troubled waters and Victor Louis came back a few times to see if Taiwan might be willing to have an unofficial relationship with the Soviet Union. Taiwan was so anti-communist at that time that they rejected it, but just the same, it was an interesting type of situation.

Q: What was your impression of Chiang Kai-shek?

DEAN: He was a very charismatic figure. Say what you will about his stubbornness or inability to do what Americans wanted, he was a very charismatic figure. When he entered the room, he really made a difference. I dealt with him a few times, not through informal conversations but to deliver messages or to get messages back for Washington. He had, I think, a very traditional Chinese upbringing and a very conservative, even for a Chinese, traditionalist point of view, and a relatively narrow horizon. His son was much

different. Ching-kuo had a very broad horizon, a much different education and much different outlook. Anyway, I think the Generalissimo really believed in the Confucian ethic. He believed it was the duty of the people to respect the government and the duty of the government to serve the people, but he didn't brook any interference and he was totally opposed to any type of liberalization. I think he was a figure, we would say, of "yesteryear," of the previous decades; whereas, his son, Chiang Ching-kuo was a figure of the present and future. The Madame, of course was very evident in relations with Americans and frankly played a major role with policy towards the U.S. At that time, we had stationed on Taiwan some of our planes with nuclear weapons. Later these were withdrawn. We also were supporting as you mentioned earlier, the Chinese Air Force U-2 planes and a lot of their other intelligence units. We had just come to the end of our aid to Taiwan, but we were still giving them access to a lot of military surplus material from Vietnam. Our MAAG Chief would go to Vietnam and send ships just loaded with all sorts of surplus equipment. The Chinese military did very well during that time by offering to help the Air Force with the refueling of B-52's, with the repair of some of the military equipment that had been broken or destroyed and getting large quantities of material for themselves. As a result, during that period, Washington's relations with Taipei were quite positive. Walter McConaughy, our Ambassador, had very good relations both with the Generalissimo and other top leaders. They had a remarkable group of officials in Taiwan, some of whom are still alive. These were people who had come over with the Generalissimo, who had occupied positions of real power in the bureaucracy in China. Some were very able and capable people. Taiwan got an infusion of upper level very talented people who were responsible for the land reform, for agricultural progress, for light industrialization, for the heavy industrialization, and for the economic progress of the island. They deserve a lot of the credit for it; they handled things well.

Q: One of the great deficits of the Chiang Kai-shek regime prior to that had been the corruption which had initiated many of the attacks on his government and the Kuomintang. Had that been pretty well dissipated by the time you got there?

DEAN: I think they made a definite effort to wipe out corruption from the very moment the Generalissimo came. You see, C. H. Kung and the Soong family didn't come to Taiwan, they just retreated to New York. So a crowd of people like that who had been so involved in corruption on the mainland didn't come to Taiwan with the Gimo, but they took their ill-gotten gains and decamped elsewhere. The Generalissimo came over and really cracked down on top-level official or even mid-level corruption. I'm sure there was some corruption on the street, paying off policemen, customs officers, things like that, but it was really very low-level and not important to the economic development or to the well-being of the society. So, the Gimo kept a very sharp eye on that. People were afraid to transgress. His son was even stricter. His son fired his closest friend and advisor because his advisor's mistress had gotten involved in a banking scandal. Ching-kuo was even more adamant against corruption. During that period the transgressors knew that punishment would follow, so I think that kept corruption down to a bare minimum.

Q: You mention all these visitors. The China lobby had been equivalent to what the Israeli lobby is today. With the China lobby, these were not people of Chinese descent but California conservatives mainly, sort of the conservative wing of the Republican party. I would have thought that they would have in a way gotten in the way of our relations because with the charismatic Madame and the Generalissimo would get them to manipulate our political process so we couldn't deal with them on a level playing field. I think in terms of the Israeli lobby today in the United States. Did you have that problem?

DEAN: The China lobby has a long history. It goes back to "who lost China?" It goes back to the McCarthy period. It goes back to the WWII days where China was an ally and Madame Chiang Kai-shek and the Generalissimo were heroes. The China lobby was not as much in evidence in 1969. But it was still there, and they were still close friends. The Generalissimo and his foreign ministry made a strong effort to invite prominent Americans to visit Taiwan, and there was a steady stream. It seemed to me that from '66 to '69, the China Lobby wasn't as powerful as it had been before, partially because everybody was focused on Vietnam. I think that Taiwan was fairly confident of U.S. support.

Q: Johnson was still in the White House at this point.

DEAN: Yes.

Q: But this would change. Nixon was elected in '68 and the administration started in '69.

DEAN: But Nixon had been to Taiwan during this earlier period when he was not in office, and they felt that in him, they had a very close friend. He had been there earlier on various visits. I remember once he had come to Kuala Lumpur while I was there in '54 while he was Vice President and he had been to Taiwan on that trip also so he was well in favor. There were other people like that who had come to visit the Generalissimo and the Madame. Walter Judd was still a Representative. He was a frequent visitor, and the Madame liked him very much as did the Generalissimo and they welcomed him. So, the China lobby was there, but it wasn't as active. They had been able to keep mainland China out of the United Nations, and by one way or the other had prevented it from taking Taiwan's seat. This went on until 1971 when China did get in and Taiwan was expelled. But, in '66-'69, things were still going along pretty well, and I think the relationship was reasonably smooth. There were, as I say, status of forces negotiations going on. We ironed out other problems, and they were cooperating with us on Vietnam. The Generalissimo was advising not to send American troops there because he knew that a lot of casualties would cause heartburn at home, but to use other troops like the Koreans. Easier said than done. We didn't want to use his troops just as we didn't want to use them in the Korean war for fear of bringing the Chinese in, but he helped in other ways. I think that essentially during that period of time, the relationship was quite friendly.

Q: How did you get on with Walter McConaughy because he was sort of not the old China hand but you might say to the right of the old China hand?

DEAN: Well, that was his reputation, and it was true. I also think that he was one of the finest gentlemen for whom I have ever worked. He was really honest in his opinions and very courteous. I think that he did have strong views, and I would feel somewhat differently. We would talk about our differences. I would write something, and he would say let me think about this for the next day or two. He would take it home with him and then he might come back in a couple of days and say, "I understand what your argument is, but I just can't bring myself to agree." He would say it in a very nice way. We had several discussions of this type. We had a very good relationship, and I liked him very much, even though as I say, our views were different. Our Economic Counselor and I had very different views, too.

Q: Who was economic counselor?

DEAN: Bill Morell. At first it was Bob Brown, then Bill Morell. Bill and I are close friends to this very day. Walter McConaughy is still down in Atlanta. Unfortunately he is almost blind and he is not too well. His wife is looking after him. He had one special attribute which I will never forget. He had a remarkable, phenomenal memory. He would go in to see the Generalissimo and they would have a conversation for an hour and a half. He would come back and dictate it, the whole thing, and he would remember it exactly. Some weeks or months or years later, he would still remember the whole conversation in its entirety. His own experience was with China. He was Consul General in Shanghai when the KMT was defeated. He had a lot of experience in the East Asia Bureau concerning China. So, he had a very good background, and he knew what he was talking about. It wasn't as though he was making up his mind without any grounding in facts. It is odd to say this, but he seemed to be the perfect representative to Taiwan at that particular time, because our policies were meshing; our relationships were good. He had a very positive relationship, not only with the Generalissimo and the Madame, but with other top level officials. I think he was respected and liked. I don't think people were manipulating him. He drew up his own views from his own resources, not from outside pressures.

Q: You mentioned Bill Morell, the economic counselor was coming out of a different view. Was there any sort of different outlook on the economic side?

DEAN: Not really. I was just saying philosophically that our views on China policy and the authoritarian rule on Taiwan and Vietnam were different. On the economic side of things we saw developments quite clearly in the same direction.

Q: Were we making an effort to see on Taiwan that the Taiwanese were going to take over eventually. I mean this is an aging generation of mainland Chinese. We were looking at sort of a new breed that were being sort of, in place. Was this something you were seeing and how were we dealing with it?

DEAN: It was not clear then how things were going to develop because there was a second generation of mainland Chinese like Fred Chen, James Soong and many other

people of their age and even younger who were taking high positions at that time, so it wasn't clear where things were going. It was still an autocracy, but we dealt extensively in our Embassy in the political section with what you would call the independent oppositionists. They weren't allowed to have an opposition party. That was illegal, but they could run as separate individuals independent of any party organization. We had one very good officer, Jerry Fowler, who would go off and talk to some of these people, go to some of their parties and make close friends. Through him we kept up with a large number of oppositionists who are now in positions of power today. Fowler brought our political section in Taipei in close touch with oppositionists like Wu San- Lien, the head of one of the independent newspapers. Wu had to steer a rather clever line to keep his newspaper from being closed down. But, he is a revered name in the opposition movement in Taiwan because he did oppose the KMT. We felt that the Taiwanese were 85% of the public, that inevitably more of them would come into government. Chiang Ching-kuo who was rising into prominence then, was bringing in more Taiwanese into the party at the mid levels and into the government, too. So, it seemed clear that if you were looking forward at their history, the Taiwanese would have a much more important role. We tried our best to establish relations at that time with as many Taiwanese as we could.

Q: Was there any concern with the mainland Chinese making any inroads with the Taiwanese?

DEAN: Yes, there is the General I mentioned, General Wang Sheng, with whom we had these weekly meetings. He was also the head of security and counterintelligence. One of his jobs was to ferret out spies and subversives. After the Korean War about 15,000 Chinese prisoners of war opted to come to Taiwan instead of going back to the mainland. He found out that several communist cells had been planted among those soldiers. He did the same with other infiltration that occurred even with people who came over with the Generalissimo. Taiwan didn't let many other people in after that. Some of those were communist spies who had been planted, and he uncovered them, too. There were quite a number of people that he had arrested who were either executed or imprisoned.

Q: At this time the Cultural Revolution was really cranking up. It was in full swing. This must have been a big turn off for the Taiwanese on both sides. I mean were they getting a pretty good picture of what was going on?

DEAN: I think they got a reasonably good picture. In some cases better than ours. I think the Cultural Revolution was pretty well publicized; at least the more glaring activities of the Red Guards. This made the Taiwanese feel that they didn't want to have anything to do with the mainland. It made the mainlanders on Taiwan wonder if they should take advantage of this, and there was some advice going to the Generalissimo that maybe he should persuade the Americans to do something. Of course the Americans were so deeply involved in Vietnam that they weren't about to get involved in the mainland, too. Caution prevailed in Taiwan among the Chinese mainlanders themselves. They decided to wait

and see how this was going to play out. It was a pretty lively and stimulating time for all concerned.

Q: What about Japan? Was Japan just sort of a big evil that had left them.

DEAN: They hadn't left them yet. They didn't break relations until later. At the time, the Japanese DCM's name was Hara. He had served with my brother in Prague. When I got to Taiwan I met him, and he immediately made the connection, and he became a very good friend, to the point that we were discussing the recognition of Outer Mongolia which our government was planning. I discussed this with him and, the Japanese government, not wanting to be left behind, went ahead and recognized Outer Mongolia. Then, because the Generalissimo had written to President Nixon, we decided not to do it. So, the Japanese were left out there hanging. It was very embarrassing for a while. Anyway, they never wanted to be following in our footsteps. They wanted to be a little bit ahead of us but not so far out ahead that they were dangling. During that time, they still had ambassadorial relations, and in a way, Japan was very popular among the Taiwanese, because unlike in Korea where they were at each other's throats, in Taiwan the Japanese had acted with strictness but with fairness. A glaring contradiction to the mainlanders who originally came over and who acted very unfairly. If there was an offense under the Japanese, it was punishable by a definite penalty and nothing else. The Japanese had occupied Taiwan for some 50 years. They had been there since the Sino-Japanese war of 1895. So the Japanese had rewarded those Taiwanese who spoke only Japanese not only in the workplace but in their homes. They had educated Taiwanese leaders in Japan. These were mostly engineers and doctors. They had built up the roads, the factories, the railroads, what have you. So they were not unpopular. Frankly a great deal of Taiwan's trade is still with the Japanese and the older generation still speak Japanese. So Japan has maintained close ties with Taiwan, and they have been fairly beneficial to Taiwan traders and Japanese entrepreneurs as well.

Q: Were we much involved in economic promotion as far as trade with the United States and all that?

DEAN: The U.S. was Taiwan's major export market, but we really didn't get into serious trade problems until a few years later. We did negotiate textile agreements as we did in Hong Kong, and we got into some other agreements. But, the real problems blossomed in terms of intellectual property rights. This first manifested itself in book pirating. Book publishers would get a best seller, pirate it, and sell it for a pittance, usually locally, but then the Chinese began to send them abroad, books like the Encyclopedia Britannica. You could buy the whole set for \$50. This was true in the late '50s and through the '60s. Finally we were able to clamp down on pirating and copyright infringement by the end of the 1960s and into the 1970s. Still, it was a really big problem, particularly when you get to cassette tapes and music, and then video tapes and CDs and software. The billowing trade surplus became an enormous problem until in the '80s. In 1987, we had a trade deficit with Taiwan, a deficit just in our bilateral trade, of \$19.4 billion in that one year. This was building up. When I was there, it wasn't nearly that way in the '60s, but through

the '70s and into the '80s our trade defect really began to blossom, and it was a serious issue. I can get into that later.

Q: Yes, I was thinking this would be a good place to stop. So in 1969, you left Taiwan; where did you go?

DEAN: I went to the senior seminar at the Foreign Service Institute.

Q: David, you were in the senior seminar from '69 to '70.

DEAN: Right.

Q: Could you tell me what you got out of the senior seminar?

DEAN: I thought it was a great experience. I had been working very hard in Taipei and now I was in a completely different milieu. We were traveling all over the U.S., visiting various governors in different states and also different industrial companies and local government as well. It was such a refreshing change and such a different type of thing that I had never experienced before. I learned a lot about our own country. It was a completely delightful experience. Also my associates in the senior seminar were great people. There was Cleo Noel, who was later killed in Khartoum, and Sam Lewis, who was later Ambassador to Israel, and several other excellent people. I enjoyed myself a lot. My particular friend, Dell Carlson, had been formerly Ambassador in British Guyana, or what was British Guyana before. He and I went off to do a joint project, because a project is required. We chose something completely different from either of our experiences in the past. I guess most people felt it was a little strange, but we were interested in water resources and how certain areas of the U.S. and certain other areas of the world would find enough water as population continued to grow. Southern California is a perfect example. We were looking into all sorts of nuclear driven de-salinization, reverse osmosis, solar systems and things like that, and we went to visit a lot of different plants that were using these techniques in the U.S. He also went to some of the islands in the Caribbean which he knew pretty well. We completed the study and presented our report together. I think it was well before its time. That was 29 years ago and still water problems plague large parts of the world, and they will get more intense as time goes on. Anyway, I had a really good time.

Q: Did this give you a different feeling toward the American people, sort of getting out there?

DEAN: Oh, yes, because formerly my whole experience had been focused on foreign policy and things abroad. This gave me a much different idea of how politics works. One of our classmates was Chuck James who had worked for Ronald Reagan in the Governor's office in California. He told us a lot about domestic politics, and we found for ourselves in many different areas what was happening. We had a chance to talk to many people and both state and federal officials. I remember one in particular from the Bureau

of Indian Affairs. It just struck us all as being so antique and so behind the times, their attitude, and what they were trying to do with the Indian reservations. It opened our eyes to many different types of problems we have at home in agriculture, in industry, the environment, in politics, in poverty.

Q: Did you draw on these experiences later?

DEAN: Yes, I think they stood me in very good stead. when I was giving talks, for example, which I did at great length later on in Hong Kong and in Taiwan, I would draw on these experiences as examples of how the U.S. worked and how problems were solved and how issues were resolved. I thought it was a really worthwhile and rewarding experience. They also gave you time to read a lot, and the library facility they had at the time was terrific. They had a couple of really interested librarians who would find virtually any book or recommend books on particular subjects and produce them in a very short period of time. I was impressed. I read a lot during that year also on subjects I had never read anything about before. It was, all in all, a marvelous experience, and I enjoyed it. I think I benefited from it a great deal.

Q: Well, in 1970, you were back in the world again.

DEAN: That's right. Even before I had gone to the senior seminar the EA Bureau asked me if I would go to Hong Kong as the Deputy Principal Officer, and I agreed to, so I was back in Hong Kong in 1970 and stayed there until 1974, mostly doing my best to help manage a very large office. We must have had several hundred people if you combine the 250 Americans with several hundred Chinese. It was a big operation. A large part of it was concentrated on analyzing what was happening politically and economically and militarily within China. It was at that time, our largest China watching post. I have spoken earlier about some of our sources. Some of them were the same, but we had additional sources by then. There was more travel by American citizens to China. We had opportunity to interview them and to see many other foreign travelers who came through Hong Kong who had been on visits to China, so we had more information. Many of them had spoken both to central and local officials, so we found out quite a bit more about what was happening. It was pretty obvious there was an easing of tensions between the U.S. and China. This was even before Kissinger's visit.

Q: Kissinger's visit was during this period.

DEAN: That is right. It was in 1971. Kissinger had secretly visited China. John Holdridge was with him. Holdridge's book, Crossing the Divide, details that trip. Kissinger had ostensibly been on a trip to Pakistan and allegedly became ill, but actually he was spirited away to the airport and flew to Beijing where he met with Zhou En-lai. Of course, most people in the Department, including Marshall Green who was the Assistant Secretary and ourselves in Hong Kong who were supposed to know what was going on, knew nothing of Kissinger's trip or the results of it. However, one of my friends in Hong Kong was L.P. Sung, a newspaper publisher of a very small paper. He had previously been in the

intelligence service for the Nationalists and then the communists. He could have been working for both of them for all I know. We were having lunch in a small restaurant where we used to meet periodically. He said, "You know, there is going to be a very high level visit from Washington to Beijing." I said, "Oh?" He said, "Yes, the highest level." My friend was well connected with the NCNA people. They were the Chinese communist newspaper and intelligence arm. He said, "Yes, I have got this on very good authority." Of course at this time that was sort of a big shocker. Nobody thought that things would move as quickly as that. We all read President Nixon's article in "Foreign Affairs," but we hadn't realized things were moving that fast. We weren't in the loop on that type of closely held information. So, I went back to the Consulate General. It just so happened we were having our country team meeting, and I told them what I had heard and asked, "Should we report this to Washington?" Then it was decided by David Osborn, who was our Consul General, not to do so." He said, "they probably know about it if it is true." David Osborn was, I think, one of the most brilliant people I have ever met in the Foreign Service or elsewhere. He was a great linguist. He had served in Japan and spoke excellent Japanese and excellent Chinese. He also spoke the Cantonese dialect which he learned in Hong Kong to such a degree that he would go on the radio program and indulge in banter, a humorous dialogue, with the radio station host. Later, when he became Ambassador to Burma, he learned Burmese, too. He always thought that everybody else had the similar type of keen mind as he did. He would send reports or ideas or suggestions back to the Department that would go from one logical point to the other without filling in the valleys or thought processes in between and expect his readers to be equally as intelligent as he was, so that he didn't need to fill in all the argumentation. I kept on telling him that his assumption that everyone would understand wasn't necessarily the case. I got several comments or feedback from the Department saying they didn't understand why he had gone from point A to point B to point C. It was a pleasure to work for him. But, getting back to Kissinger's visit and the aftermath.

Shortly after L. P. Sung had told me that an important top level visitor was coming from Washington to Peking, we received a flash message. It was about three or four days later, telling us to listen to the radio in twenty minutes. That was Nixon's famous radio and television address here in the States, in which he revealed that he was going to go to China to bring about a change in U.S. relations with China. Well, this was exciting news, and pretty soon we were involved in preparations for the visit. Then, after the visit, there was subsequently an agreement that we would set up an official liaison office in Beijing. David Bruce was the first ambassador. He was given the personal rank of Ambassador for his new job. It was a new concept in diplomacy, the Liaison office had all the diplomatic privileges and immunities and what have you, but the U.S. still didn't have diplomatic relations with China. We just had an official liaison office and they had their official liaison office in Washington, both represented by an ambassador. The Consulate General in Hong Kong was involved with getting David Bruce and his wife up to Beijing and provided a lot of administrative backup for them as they were just getting started. We were involved in helping with the establishment of the liaison office. They were rather short staffed, so they called on us for various things. For example, for the first time an American official was to be permitted to go to the annual Canton trade fair, so I went to

represent the U.S. from the Consulate General because the liaison office couldn't spare anybody at that time. The Chinese reluctantly agreed that I could go. It was an eye opener for me because at that time Guangdong (Canton) looked like a very old fashioned city that time had passed by, there was very little traffic. It reminded me of Kuala Lumpur in the '50s in many ways. It certainly was not the bustling industrial center that it has become today with massive traffic jams, huge numbers of people crowding the streets, and fantastic pollution in the air and in the water. It has greatly changed in such a short period of time. I'm talking about the great change from 1973 until today. At any rate, a great deal of our effort was designed to try to help our office in Beijing get settled, but also we continued our reporting because the liaison office was not ready yet to take over a large amount of the China reporting.

Q: Also I would suspect that being in Hong Kong in those days, you were in a better place to report rather than being trapped in the capital.

DEAN: True, and that proved to be the case even later on. John Holdridge went to Beijing as the deputy. He was Kissinger's nominee. Kissinger was the National Security Council advisor to the President. But, Alfred Jenkins went as a second deputy. He was Secretary of State Rogers' appointment. The two, Kissinger and Rogers, couldn't agree on who should be the DCM, so they sent two DCMs. It shows you a little bit about the bureaucratic push-pull between the National Security Council and the State Department. I think the State Department really had not been informed at all about Kissinger's private visit and the President's intention to move ahead. The White House kept that very close and under wraps. No one knew about it except Kissinger and Richard Solomon and Holdridge. I think this shows the beginning of the divide between the National Security Council and the State Department. Later on Kissinger became Secretary of State, but he diverted most of the State Department officials who dealt with China by tasking them to write NIE drafts and other papers while he merrily went his own way with his own policy without waiting for any conclusions from Department desk officers. It was a very interesting way to keep the bureaucracy busy, but rather disheartening.

Q: Let's talk a bit about this period '70-'74. What was happening in China at that time?

DEAN: Beginning around the end of 1965 and into '66 China had embarked on the Cultural Revolution. It was, as I said earlier, Mao's efforts to strike down bureaucratic opponents and his opponents in the party, so he used young high school and even elementary school students, the young Red Guards, to storm the headquarters of the party and the bureaucracy and to drag out the responsible officials, vilify them, and pelt them with mud. In some cases, they were killed. Even in 1970, the Cultural Revolution had up and down, and additional surges of terror. Zhou En-lai was apparently trying to calm things down. Deng Xiaoping had already fallen and so had Liu Shaoqi and many other important officials. Things were in a relatively chaotic state. Dr. Lee, in his book about Mao Zedong, goes into that at some length. We were following developments, trying to find out where the Cultural Revolution would lead. Eventually it went on for 10 years. The universities were closed. The libraries were sealed. Nobody got an education.

Everybody was busy on trains going from one place to another to storm one center of the party or to destroy temples. The slogan was, "Knock down the old and up with the new," so they destroyed a lot of China's most beautiful artifacts. It was really a terrible crime committed against their own civilization. We were seeing the results of this, and we had many reports from relatives and visitors.

Q: This was not a closed society in this regard.

DEAN: No. It was widely publicized. It was in their papers, on their television, and broadcasts on the radio. It was everywhere. Everyone knew. Visitors, relatives would be just distraught at what was happening to the intellectuals who were being purged. The economy was really suffering because the government's attention was focused elsewhere, on the Red Guards and their task to destroy Mao's enemies. It was a very crucial period and we were reporting on all these events. Eventually, when John Holdridge and the others were established in Beijing, we kept reporting Zhou En-lai was under attack because he had advocated once again resuming the examination process to get into the university. The papers were attacking him, not by name, but were saying Confucius was trying to restore the entrance examinations for the universities. Some of the provincial papers up in Liaoning were leading this attack, and we were reporting on all of this. It was very clear from our analysis of what was going on in Beijing that the left wing of the party led by Jiang Qing (Madame Mao), and her cohorts were really trying to oust Zhou En-lai and the recently returned Deng Xiaoping, so that the leftist policies of supporting constant revolution, and constant struggle to prevent backsliding into bourgeois thinking and practices would prevail. They were really vicious in their attacks on Zhou. Zhou En-lai was ill; he was suffering from cancer. A couple of years later, he died. It was so obvious to us in Hong Kong that this infighting was going on. John Holdridge kept sending emissaries down from Beijing to our Consulate General in Hong Kong. He sent Fitzgerald, the Australian Ambassador, and he sent Howland, the New Zealand Ambassador, with messages for us to calm down, not to make such an issue of infighting. He said everything was peaceful on the streets of Beijing, that their people didn't think anything was going on and that we were unnecessarily alarming Washington. Of course it was clear, that at the liaison office everybody wanted the new relationship to work, and it would work much better if everything was stable.

Q: And they had their contacts, and they didn't want to see these contacts knocked down.

DEAN: Well, they thought that we were exaggerating. They didn't have many contacts, which I discovered when I went there later myself, the only contacts our office in Beijing had were the other diplomats. They might get some information from a fellow citizen who happened to be a businessman or someone passing through. Basically they had few, if any, Chinese contacts on whom to base their views. They didn't get the provincial papers that we were getting either. Later on in John Holdridge's book, Crossing the Divide, John said that he knew from the very moment he got there that there was this attack on Zhou En-lai and constant internal strife. This is, I think, memory failing him because he protested so much that when the new Consul General, Chuck Cross, came out

to replace David Osborn, Cross said the Department thought that Hong Kong was wrong in its assessment of what was happening. I think the CIA analysts were the only ones who thought we were right. But in this case the Department, the people on the desk and in the INR thought we were wrong. When I was in Beijing some years later, and the Gang of Four had just been arrested, big wall posters went up all over the city and they explained with excruciating detail all the ins and outs of the attack on Zhou En-lai for restoring the examinations, or doing everything that Chiang Qing and company had criticized him for, so we had a complete, detailed account of that period which I think proved without a slightest doubt that Hong Kong's analysis of the leadership in Beijing was completely accurate. We had a very good staff. We had Bob Drexler, an excellent draftsman, very concise and succinct; Jay Taylor, who was very good on projecting things into the future, and Sherrod McCall, who was excellent on short term projections. It was a terrific group of officers. Jay Taylor is in this area now. He is writing a biography of Chiang Ching-kuo and has sent the final draft to the Harvard University Press. Sherrod McCall is on the west coast, in San Francisco. He is guest lecturer on Chinese ships along the China coast and southeast Asia. Getting back to the point I was making, pretty soon Chuck Cross understood where we were coming from and he didn't try to interfere or change our analysis.

Q: I think it is an important thing to look at because dealing with China and visions of what happened to the old China hands, here you were reporting essentially chaos.

DEAN: Yes, a real serious leadership struggle. It was probably the beginning of the struggle for succession.

Q: By this point halfway through at least, Kissinger became Secretary of State. When you got these pleas from Peking and Washington, did this interfere with your reporting?

DEAN: No, we felt we were right, and we had newspaper evidence and some hearsay, but then radio broadcasts and other things that seemed to indicate our analysis was correct. We didn't change it nor did, Chuck Cross try to get us to change it. We just carried on. This was in '74, and just two years later, history proved that we were right.

Q: I'm trying to capture the attitude of the China hands. Here you have this immense nation which was not our friend which was going through a very chaotic time which meant it was very badly weakened. Was there any shout of almost pleasure at China's chaos because what is bad for this country means that it is essentially less of a threat for us.

DEAN: No, that was not our motive in reporting on the leadership struggle. I think most people who were working in the Consulate General at that time were very much in favor of better relationships between Washington and Beijing. Most people also believed that if China just dissolved into chaos, it could create many more problems for us than if it had a reasonably stable government, even though it was a communist one at that point. So, I think people were positively inclined toward China, at least those with whom I was

working. There was no desire to create problems for the Washington-Beijing relationship. On the other hand, we felt Washington should know what was happening, so that they could base their assessments on facts instead of on hopes.

Q: Well now, as you were doing this reporting, were you seeing any of this encourage a Chinese xenophobia and criticism of the opening to the United States which had been sponsored by Mao? Still, I think this would be a turn that could have happened.

DEAN: Well, it was happening to a certain degree because all Chinese who had had an education in the United States or had some contact with the U.S. were dragged out and criticized. There was one professor named Robert Winter at Peking University. He had been teaching English there since 1926 or '27. He was a very elderly man at that time. They dragged him out and criticized him, imprisoned him in his room. Several other Chinese professors at Peida either committed suicide or were thrown into the pool at the university and drowned. It was a serious attack on the intellectuals and a really tense time for all the people. People were worried about what was going to happen as a result of these clashes in the top leadership. Were they going to spread as the Cultural Revolution had already spread over the country, was Madame Mao's influence going to prevail and would their future be even worse than the past had been?

Q: Was Madam Mao (Chiang Qing) pretty well identified as the leader there?

DEAN: She was well identified as the leader of the extreme left. There is no question there. She and her Shanghai clique really held a lot of power, and she had much influence because of her close connection with Mao Zedong. Mao was rather mercurial, too. At one point he would swing over one way and then swing over the other way. She tried to keep him influenced to the most extreme policy. I think at that time he was beginning to fail mentally, too. So she was a dangerous woman and perceived as such, not just by the leadership but by large numbers of the populace, who knew what was going on. Of course, hundreds of millions did not know, and had no idea, living in the countryside or in far-off places. Others who were in Beijing and the larger cities, such as Shanghai, had a pretty clear idea of the big power struggle.

Q: How were your contacts in Hong Kong? I mean how was Hong Kong responding to this, both the government at the British level and down below?

DEAN: I think they were responding with alarm. They could see a repeat of the 1962 situation where they had to set up barbed wire and have the police and the army push back masses of people who were trying to cross the border into Hong Kong as a result of the failure of the Great Leap Forward. They foresaw that similar things would happen again if the Cultural Revolution did leak over into Hong Kong. It was mostly during the period when I was in Taipei. During that period my friend Trevor Bedford was snatched. He was a high ranking policeman who was kidnapped by the Red Guards and later released. In Hong Kong there were bombs left in certain places and some prominent individuals had live snakes put into their mailboxes in packages. Open them up and there

is a poisonous snake. So, there were all sorts of threats and things like that. The regime in Beijing was trying to prevent the Cultural Revolution from affecting Hong Kong. Hong Kong was still the source of a great deal of China's foreign exchange and their trade, so they wanted to preserve it, but it proved impossible to control everybody. Things just became chaotic. People were worried about the future. Was their future going to be one of disintegration and chaos, or were they going to be able to ride out this period? It was a tense time, I think, and for the intellectuals it was a period of extreme worry.

Many of them were sent down to the countryside to work in pig styes. I remember one woman I met some years later. She had been sent to far-off Inner Mongolia. The local peasants hated the people who came down from the cities. Mostly they were intellectuals; they had no idea how to farm. Their hands weren't ready for hard work nor their health, and they were just extra mouths to feed, so they were really not received very well. They were set to the most menial work. She was cleaning out pig styes and all sorts of the rotten jobs you can find on a farm, but she did it willingly and built herself a reputation. Some years later, they voted to send her back to school teaching. She had been a school teacher in Shanghai. But it was true of everything. Children were betraying their parents, denouncing them as bourgeoisie capitalists or denouncing them for having said this or that, and the parents would be sent down to the countryside to slave away on farms. The whole place was so disrupted.

I don't know if I mentioned earlier, but I went to Jinan, which is the capital of Shandong province. There is a hill, called the 1000 Buddha Mountain outside the city. Over the centuries Buddhist statues, huge ones and small ones, had been carved in the stone. The Red Guards had smashed off the heads of every single one of these statues using dynamite if it was a really big one or axes if it was smaller, so the whole place was destroyed. Many other cultural sites were destroyed as well. In some cases the army came out and protected temples and other buildings on orders from their local commanders. Sometimes army units were fighting against each other. Many temples, many priceless scrolls, and all sorts of artifacts were destroyed during this period. I think that the human destruction, destruction of their history, and the fact that the schools were closed for ten years, made this period one of the darkest times one can think of in Chinese history. It had such a major effect on the future in terms of losing a great pool of educated people, and also the attack on the intellectuals left China without much guidance in that area. It has taken a long time to build back. So, I think China really suffered enormously during the Cultural Revolution. In my view, you have to blame it completely on Mao Zedong and his policies. It is just as you see in Dr. Lee's book, Mao acted like an emperor, aloof and isolated. People were even afraid to approach him. When they did, it took months to get him to focus on any policy that would improve the lot of China's people. In Hong Kong at that time we were just doing the best we could to give an honest assessment of what was happening in the mainland. As for Hong Kong itself, we had very good relations with the British government and with the Chinese members of that government, as well as with Chinese merchants, bankers, lawyers, either professionals and with the media as well. We worked hard on all of these contacts, and one of our major targets was the American Chamber of Commerce. They had good information and we would

exchange ours with them, and we tried to build up really close ties with the Chamber and to help them as much as we could. I feel Hong Kong and Taiwan were two places I have been where the relationship with the American Chamber was very close indeed, and invaluable.

Q: Was the Consulate General feeling the pressure of the people of Hong Kong, particularly those with money, to make sure they had American passports and green cards?

DEAN: Yes. A lot of them tried to do that. They could get E-visas if they were investing in the United States, because Hong Kong was a British crown colony at that time, so they could get treaty trader visas. Many of the wealthy Chinese had children in the United States, and it was easy for them to get permanent residence. For tax reasons, most of them did not, but they all had visitor's visas to go if something happened.

Q: They were all keeping their...

DEAN: That's right. Some of them had their seagoing yachts ready to get on and go. They could reach the Philippines or elsewhere. Most people felt they would have enough warning. Except for the incidents I mentioned when the Cultural Revolution spilled over but was contained by the police and the army, there wasn't that feeling of panic in Hong Kong or the fear that Hong Kong was going to be overwhelmed. The incidents I spoke of happened in '67 and '68. By the time we are talking about in the early '70s, Hong Kong was more worried about its trade and its economy. The stock market had fallen through the floor, having gone up very high, it had come down very low. Many people lost their money. But, things on the mainland seemed to be settling down. Zhou En-lai was back. His influence seemed to be apparent, and the flow of the Red Guards was beginning to recede. The frenetic sending of people off to the countryside was beginning to stop, but people hadn't come back. Things seemed to be calmer, and this is the period when we established our Liaison Office. But, under the surface, as I mentioned, things were seething and bubbling and ready to break open again. It was a fascinating period of time. We were very busy, as you can imagine, in the Consulate General, not only with the visa applicants and the business interests, but with the analysis of what was happening economically as well as politically on the mainland, and with our support of the new Liaison Office in Beijing and our efforts to help as much as we could.

Q: Did the war in Vietnam play any part in what you were doing?

DEAN: Yes, of course. It was a major factor. We had an enormous number of ship visits. Hong Kong was an R&R place for the navy. Ships that had gone down to the Vietnam area had come back, so their crews had R&R. It was an R&R post for lots of people from Vietnam, too. Soldiers and others came from Vietnam for rest and recuperation. That was an important area. I think Hong Kong merchants benefited a lot. They were making equipment for the military in Vietnam. Everything from web belts to buckles and boots, everything you could think of, so in a way they prospered with the Vietnam War. Of

course, behind all of this was the reason for the Nixon-Kissinger opening to China. They not only wanted to use China as a barrier to the Soviet Union's expansionism, but as a way of trying to resolve the Vietnam War. That was one of their primary reasons for the new policy. I think everybody understood that, at least in our office, so Vietnam was tied in to everything that was happening at that time, and Hong Kong did have a role in the ways that I mentioned.

Q: With China hands, of which you were one, Hong Kong was always the greatest concentration, was there a new rise in morale and chomping at the bit because all of a sudden China was opening up?

DEAN: I think most people in Hong Kong were pleased that China was opening up, as was the American public. I think there was a great wave of approval when President Nixon made his announcement about his forthcoming visit, but I think we were sort of realistic because the Chinese are not that easy to deal with. We found that even during Nixon's visit there were hard negotiations going on about the Shanghai Communiqué. Marshal Green by that time had been brought into the net with John Holdridge and others, and the Chinese were really very tough on the question of Taiwan and other specific issues. I think that no one thought it was going to be easy. I had a great deal of experience dealing with the Chinese in Warsaw already. I didn't think it was going to be easy. The Chinese government wasn't settled then. It was impossible to see smooth sailing. The best we could hope for was gradual incremental progress in the relationship, and that is what we did hope for. I think most people in our Embassy in Taipei, as well as Hong Kong and most of the Department, felt these moves were good for the United States, that it was in the U.S. national interest to move in this direction, so I feel there was almost a unanimity. There were a few people, of course, who kept thinking about the past instead of the future, but they were in a very distinct minority at that time. Still, some people were suspicious about China and whether the relationship would work, what China would do in the future, and whether it would be able to recover from the Cultural Revolution. Who knew? There really was a lot of guesswork going on then.

Q: Well, you left there in '74.

DEAN: That's right, I went back to the Department.

Q: Doing what?

DEAN: I went to personnel. I got a job as the chief of the junior officer division in personnel.

Q: You were doing that from '74 to...

DEAN: '76.

Q: This should have been a very interesting...

DEAN: Oh, I had a great time. It was a really delightful interlude in my work because I was responsible for the new junior officers when they came in through the examinations, were brought into the Department and received their initial training and got their first assignments, and also for what we call “Mustang officers,” those who were converting from staff job reserve officers to regular Foreign Service officers. We had frequent interaction among these people. It was a very good selection of young officers, many of them having no idea what the Foreign Service was like or what their futures were going to be. Many have turned out to be excellent Foreign Service officers. I met a couple later on who enjoyed their first assignment very much, even though they were in Africa or some far-off place, and then for other reasons had left the service, but had regretted leaving very much. They were a very positive group, very interested, very hard working and very willing, and I enjoyed the experience, thoroughly. There was a nice group of colleagues in that office. We went to the mat several times on behalf of these young officers to try to get them into positions that in our judgment, we felt they would benefit from and in which they would shine. We made several assignments to different parts of the world, Europe or Africa or Latin America or Asia. Many of the junior officers seemed to have benefited from that first posting.

Q: You were there essentially just after the trauma of Vietnam, so you weren't having to throw young officers into Vietnam which made quite a change.

DEAN: That's right, and that for me was a great relief; although, we sent some of them into far-off places that weren't a bed of roses either. No, it was a totally fine experience. The only thing at that time on personnel policy, was that the Foreign Service kept assigning new officers to personnel and we were all amateurs in a way. We were taken from the field and put there. Then, when it came up to questions of long-term personnel policy, everybody had his own ideas, and things changed all the time. You would have a new Director General; you would get one policy. Get a new Director General; have a new policy, and the Department was changing the rules of the game for personnel as we were going along. I found that unsettling personally because it was hard to explain to the new officers exactly what the system was. If you explain what the system is today, the next question might be explaining a somewhat different system. It might be a matter of the career cones and how to change between the cones, and everything else, so that part of it was not too sensible. I feel that the Department would benefit from professional personnel officers and professional administrative officers instead of bringing in a lot of amateurs. I am not referring to political appointments. I consider myself an amateur; I was not a professional personnel officer. We just did our best for the young people involved.

Q: Was there much emphasis in the '74-'76 period one to recruit women and two, to get them into jobs that would be challenging?

DEAN: There was some emphasis then, but it wasn't as much as it later became. We were delighted to get any woman applicant who would come in through the examination process or who was a mustang, but there weren't very many, very few to tell the truth. I think later there was a bigger push to try to recruit more women, but at that time, there

weren't many at all. I remember trying to help in some cases like Tip O'Neill's daughter who was a reserve Foreign Service officer; she wanted to transfer in. I thought she had a lot of potential and tried to get her assignments that would help her. There were some officers who had been brought in from cultural affairs. The question was whether we could convert them to Foreign Service officers or whether they would have to go back to USIA. One was a really good linguist who had been the director of our Chinese language school out in Taipei, George Beasley. I tried to get him regularized as a Foreign Service officer. In several individual cases like that we tried to find really good people, and he was excellent. He had a good background and excellent capabilities. He could have competed with anybody. We were doing our best, but it was on a really small scale. I think the big push came later. There was a lady Foreign Service officer, Alison Palmer, who would come frequently to our office on behalf of some applicant or other saying the reason we hadn't brought them on board was because of discrimination or she would claim someone hadn't been promoted. She was a very tough person, but I don't think she was right, because we would have been happy to help women officers.

Q: She was talking about somebody who had not come into the Foreign Service?

DEAN: Right.

Q: In a way, that was beyond your capability. That was the Board of Examiners.

DEAN: Indeed, and the promotion boards also. I followed the careers of some of the junior officers; and they really turned out well. Will Itoh became Ambassador in Thailand. Jeff Bader was the Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia before he went off to the National Security Council. These people were first class and later proved to be leading elements in that class.

Q: Did you have any input into junior officer training?

DEAN: Well, some. We worked very closely with the Foreign Service Institute and gave them our ideas and suggestions, some of which I think they incorporated. We provided speakers and tried to tell the new class what was in store for them. So we were definitely interacting with the Foreign Service Institute.

Q: You left this assignment in '76.

DEAN: Yes, I almost left early. Bill Sullivan asked me to go and be his deputy in the Philippines, but I felt that I had made a commitment to the Department to serve the two years I had agreed on in personnel. Also I was interested in what I was doing, and I didn't want to just drop it and go off and leave everything in the lurch, so I courteously declined and stayed there. Later, Bill Gleysteen in EAP came down and asked me when my two years were up if I would go to Beijing to our Liaison Office. I said I would and that is where I went after my stint in personnel

Q: You went, is it called Beijing?

DEAN: Yes, the Chinese call it Beijing.

Q: You were in Beijing from when to when?

DEAN: I was there from '76 to '78 for a two year tour. I was working first with Bill Gates, who had been chairman of the Morgan Guarantee. He also had been Secretary of the Navy and briefly Secretary of Defense. He was a fine man. He had been appointed by Gerald Ford who, as you know, had taken over after Nixon when Nixon resigned. Ford was an old friend of Gates and had appointed him to this job with the idea that we would move forward with formal diplomatic relations with Beijing, and that is what Bill Gates really wanted to do. When I got to Beijing in June 1976, it was still a very difficult post because our people were isolated. There was the diplomatic community with whom we could interact, but not with the Chinese. The Chinese wouldn't have anything to do with the foreigners, not just the U.S. but with other foreigners also. So, one's whole life was with the other foreigners and not with the Chinese. It seemed so odd, so strange to be in such a huge country with so many hundreds of millions of people and to have your circle of both work and social contacts be limited to the other foreigners only. We were also treated in a somewhat different way because we were not part of the diplomatic corps. The Chinese every year, for example, would have a big tour through China for the diplomatic corps. We got our own private tour. It was much better, frankly, with a smaller group. We traveled all over. It was a really interesting opportunity to see the country. Shortly after I got to Beijing, Zhu De, the famous marshall, one of the survivors of the Long March, died, so we all went to his funeral. Earlier in that year, Zhou En-lai had died in the spring. Then there had been a serious riot in Tiananmen in April of that year when lots of people came to pay their respects. The government forbade a funeral for Zhou En-lai. This was very unusual and everyone knew it was Madame Mao (Chiang Ching), his enemy, who was responsible. Deng Xiaoping had been purged just shortly after that for the third time. So, Chiang Qing and her cohorts seemed to be coming to the fore. Anyway, there was trouble in Beijing. Zhou En-lai was now gone; Zhu De was gone. Then the Tangshan earthquake erupted, the most devastating earthquake in recent history.

Q: A quarter of a million people.

DEAN: Yes, hundreds of thousands of people were killed and many more were casualties. The estimates of the dead were even higher than a quarter of a million, they were closer to half a million, 500,000 at one time. The real number is somewhere in between those two figures, but there were literally hundreds of thousands killed. I saw the city of Tangshan later. It had been leveled to the ground, huge cement structures were smashed to the ground, trains had been set on fire. The coal mines nearby had all been flooded; the miners lost their lives. It was a terrible tragedy. The whole effect of the earthquake which was about 8.2 to 8.4 on the Richter scale, spread to Tianjin. The Australian prime minister, Whitlam, was visiting there, and in the hotel in which he was staying, the building separated, there was a big gap; you could see all the way down to the bottom floor.

Lots of buildings in outlying Tianjin were destroyed. Even in Beijing where we were, many the old mud brick houses, high walls with heavy tile roofs, just collapsed because the shock waves were so great. In the apartment I was living in there were great big cracks in the wall right above all the doorways, and in some of the other apartments where our staff were, some of the balconies had fallen off. The authorities made everybody evacuate the hotels and the apartment buildings. The whole population of Beijing moved out to the streets, and people were living in shelters along the streets. Fortunately it was summer, but it was hot. There they were, all these millions of people living out in the streets. The streets were wide and the sidewalks were also wide, so they built their shelters on the sidewalks. We had to evacuate all of our dependents because we didn't have any place to keep them, so we sent all of the women and children off to Japan or Taipei or Hong Kong.

We kept the nucleus of our staff; we lived in the office building and in the Ambassador's residence because they are both low two story buildings. We brought a lot of mattresses down from storage and put them in the dining room and had sort of a dormitory, 10 people there, 12 in the living room, some in the offices and elsewhere. At the time we had a Congressional delegation visiting. It was a problem for them; we had to put them up, too, because they had been kicked out of the hotels which were closed, so we had about 15 or 20 of them take care of and to house and feed. There were severe aftershocks going on all the time. It was an extremely tense period of time. Like all things, gradually order was restored. After people had lived on the streets for something like six weeks, they gradually were able to move back into their buildings, some of which had been repaired or partially rebuilt. Gradually things came back to normal. The significant of this earthquake was identified by some Chinese as Mao Zedong losing the mandate of heaven, a sign that he was going to lose power. Sure enough, very shortly thereafter, he died. This was a very tense period because who was going to replace him? No one knew! Earlier, after Zhou En-lai died, Hua Guofeng had been appointed premier. He was not to last long in that job. I remember James Schlesinger had been invited for a visit. He arrived just as Mao died. The Chinese didn't want to cancel his visit, so they sent him out to the provinces, mostly in the northwest, for a tour, and then he came back a couple of weeks later for talks.

Q: He was what at that point?

DEAN: He had been Secretary of Defense. He was in China in a private capacity, but he had been invited by Mao, so they wanted to honor his visit. This period of time was so crucial because after the earthquake, and Mao's death, Madam Mao and her cohorts tried to seize power. This was the Gang of Four; who had their base in Shanghai. Madam Mao had sent orders to the Nanjing regional military commander, whose area also included Shanghai, ordering him to open up the Shanghai arsenals and arm the militia. The militia was loyal to her. She wanted the militia to be armed and to take over the city while she went to Beijing and negotiated with the other leaders. She wanted to use Shanghai as a major lever. What happened, and we all found this out from the big character wall posters

after she fell, was that the Center heard about her plan and they ordered the Nanjing military commander, General Ding, not to arm the militia. He was wavering so they sent the former military commander, Xu Shiyou, who had been posted to Canton a few months earlier, to come back and assume charge. Most of the top military commanders in the Nanjing region owed their promotions to General Xu. He was really very popular. He came back and ordered General Ding to guard the arsenals and not to arm the militia. The commander refused. Xu Shiyou, according to the big posters, drew his revolver and shot him and then sent regular military troops to guard the arsenals. Chiang Qing (Mrs. Mao) in the meantime was in Beijing thinking her militia was in control or would be shortly, but she was seized and imprisoned by the top leadership. That was the end of Chiang Qing. You should have seen the public reaction when the news broke. I was at a dinner with the British Chargé and the German Ambassador and a few others in the Sichuan Restaurant (one which Deng Xiaoping really liked). Arthur Burns was visiting at that time and it was a dinner for him. I had heard earlier from a young Chinese student, an American who had come to visit his grandfather, who was a member of the National People's Congress. The grandfather had heard, strictly through the grapevine, of the arrest of Chiang Qing and the other members of the Gang of Four, and he told his grandson. The grandson told one of the wives of our officers (That was when our people still stayed at a Beijing hotel) and she told us. So, we had that information, and at the dinner, the British Chargé told me that his driver had told him that Madame Mao (Chiang Qing), had been arrested. So we put these two things together and it seemed just too good to be true. It was a development that I think everybody had hoped for. Two or three days later, this information spread over the whole city. I have never seen such a huge roar of popular approval. Huge numbers of people came to Tiananmen Square and started snake dances all through the whole square, beating drums, setting off firecrackers. It was the biggest spontaneous celebration I have ever seen in my life. Chinese military officers and others who had always shunned foreigners were grabbing people from our staff who were down there observing and were having their pictures taken with them. It was a really complete, absolute turnabout in the attitude of the people. They obviously felt so happy and so pleased that they weren't going to fall under the constantly left-leaning struggle and the revolutionary zeal of Chiang Qing. It was a big boost for the city. Then, gradually Deng Xiaoping came back to power. He had been purged after Zhou En-lai died, but he came back for the third time and gradually began to take over power as vice premier. He had ties all over the country with the military, with the top bureaucracy, with everyone, so it didn't take him long to consolidate his power. We had several meetings with him because various groups of congressmen and senators would come, and he would always give them a big banquet in one of the restaurants near the Forbidden City, which no foreigners had been able to visit before. He was a short feisty man; very interesting, and very practical. He said, "It doesn't matter whether a cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice." "Learn truth from facts." He knew of all of the distortions that happened during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. He was a practical person but still very authoritarian. He was a communist, but he was very sensible.

Q: Were you finding a change, outside of the Tiananmen Square demonstration, for foreigners particularly you and others?

DEAN: Yes, absolutely. After Deng Xiaoping's return there was a great change in the foreign ministry people we dealt with and the academics, intellectuals and government officials. Much different. Before, for example, the only Chinese we could ever invite for a dinner were the head of the Diplomatic Service Bureau and his colleagues. We would invite them to a dinner at my place, ply them with drink and they would have a really good time. Then the next few days, as they were in charge of dispersing apartments or drivers or cooks, and it was like a jackpot. We would get a whole series of these things. But, those were literally the only people we could invite.

Q: That was your connection for survival as opposed to finding out what was going on in the country.

DEAN: That's right and that was done for administrative reasons. We couldn't talk to anybody else. Later we really had much franker conversations with the foreign ministry people and other officials, or the Chinese at the universities began to tell us all the things that had happened to them during the Cultural Revolution. I mentioned the wall posters. They went into great detail about how Zhou En-lai had been attacked by Madame Mao. They revealed all sorts of other things; it was fascinating. Of course we went to Mao Zedong's funeral. They built, in an exceptionally short period of time, a huge mausoleum for him in Tiananmen Square. There he was lying in state. I think history will prove that if he had stepped down in 1950 when he ended the civil war, he would have been thought of as a great man instead of more of a monster. He caused so much damage to China, economic and intellectual and physical damage, it was unbelievable. At that time I was working for Leonard Woodcock.

Q: You were what, the DCM?

DEAN: Yes. Tom Gates had wanted to stay, but the new administration wanted its own man, so Leonard Woodcock came, and I also worked for him. He was very interested in his job, in the Chinese, and in trying to move ahead with diplomatic relations. Tom Gates had been very disappointed that there weren't any moves on his watch about regularizing relationships. He even sent me back to the Department with a letter to the President asking why we weren't moving ahead and making use of his recommendations to do so. I went back and took the letter to Habib and asked him to proceed as he thought best. It was pretty clear that we weren't ready right then to move further ahead. Both Tom Gates and I would have liked to, but I didn't think that Washington was ready. Later on that summer, Secretary of State Vance came to Beijing in late August '77. He proposed to Deng Xiaoping that the U.S. switch its Liaison Office from Beijing to Taipei and its Embassy from Taipei to Beijing. He said either a U.S. Liaison Office in Taipei or a U.S. Consulate General in Taipei would enable us to establish our Embassy in Beijing. Deng Xiaoping characterized this proposal as a step backward in the negotiations with the U.S. because he claimed that both Ford and Nixon-Kissinger had claimed that the U.S. would not have any official relationship with Taiwan, and what Vance was suggesting was an

official government office of one type or another in Taipei. Therefore there was no progress during that visit. Leonard Woodcock and I were both disappointed at the time.

Q: Disappointed in the Washington proposal or the Chinese reaction?

DEAN: Disappointed that the Chinese had turned him down, because it would have saved a lot of heartbreak and problems later on in the relationship with Taiwan. We still had an official relationship. Taiwan would have been happier to have an official liaison office there with an Ambassador rather than the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), which they eventually got. But anyway, Vance was not able to reach any agreement with the Chinese. Later on Brzezinski became very interested in doing something which was anti-Russian in scope, anti-Soviet.

Q: Brzezinski was National Security Advisor and was looking at everything with a certain amount of Polish view.

DEAN: Yes, that's true. He was a bright and engaging person and who knows, perhaps the idea of using the Chinese against the Russian was an attractive one at that time. We are talking about May 1978. By that time the Vietnam War was long lost, but we were still locked with the Soviets in the Cold War, and Brzezinski felt that China would be a really good ally against the Soviets. So, he wanted to move the U.S. forward into formal diplomatic relations with China, and make them a formal ally against Moscow, but at least use them in the game against the Soviet Union. Brzezinski went out to the Great Wall and brandished an AK-47 and said, "This is for the polar bear." He had his discussions with the Chinese and they agreed to start negotiations later on in the summer between Washington and Beijing. These negotiations were kept very secret. They were run by the National Security Council and by the USLO, the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing. They weren't disseminated among other people. At that time, my tour was up, and I left for a job in the Department in INR as head of the East Asia section. My replacement, Stapleton Roy, was the one who did most of the work with Woodcock on the negotiations with the Chinese. I came back leading a group of Congressmen and Senators in the fall, just before Thanksgiving, and Stapleton Roy and Leonard Woodcock gave us a good briefing. But, at that point there had been no breakthrough on the crucial question of continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan to bolster their defense against any mainland attack. The Chinese were adamantly opposed to the U.S. continuing arms sales, even of a defensive nature, and the U.S. side would not move ahead unless there was some agreement that we would continue arms sales. After our visit to Beijing, I traveled all over China with this Congressional group. They were interested and interesting people. Senator Muskie was there, as was Senator Stone, Packwood, and several others. Muskie has died, and the others are no longer in Congress. It was a very good trip. The Chinese made a major effort to accommodate their interests. Stapleton Roy gave us an excellent briefing in Beijing. But as I said, there had been no breakthrough.

The breakthrough came shortly afterwards in early December. The Chinese decided they wanted to go ahead with formal relations. They reserved the right to raise the arms sales

issue at a later date. They were putting it to one side and letting diplomatic relations proceed, and we did establish diplomatic relations. President Carter, on the fifteenth of December, 1978, said that as of the first of January, 1979, two weeks later, the U.S. was to establish formal diplomatic relations with Beijing, that we were to break all relations with Taipei, that we were to withdraw the remainder of our military forces in Taiwan, which at that time were just a few hundred, and that we were to give one year's notice to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty that we had with Taiwan. In 1954 the treaty's revision said that it could be terminated with one year's notice. We were to do all of these things, and of course, not too many people in the State Department or in the whole bureaucracy knew anything about this. Very little preparation had been made. The breakthrough came suddenly; the announcement came shortly after that. The negotiations had been kept secret because the administration did not want Taiwan's friends in the Congress to disrupt them or to hinder them, so here was a *fait accompli*, but what were we going to do with Taiwan? Well, "L's" (Bureau of Legal Affairs) Jim Michel drew up a quick version of the Taiwan Enabling Act, or what later became the Taiwan Relations Act. It didn't deal with arms sales. It didn't deal with protection of economic interests on both sides. It didn't deal with a lot of issues which Congress, when they got the draft, felt were important. So, on a bipartisan basis Senator Frank Church and Senator Jacob Javits got together in the Senate and Zablocki and Lester Wolfe and others in the House, and they worked on a bipartisan plan to bring about a Taiwan Relations Act which did include a large section on arms sales, which included language very similar to the Mutual Defense Treaty, that any attack on Taiwan would be viewed with serious concern by the United States. They stopped short of saying what our response would be. They protected economic assets on both sides; they gave Taiwan, in effect, the status of a foreign country to argue its cases in U.S. Courts. They gave all sorts of protections of immunities, not diplomatic immunity but functional immunity, which later was similar to immunity given to foreign consulates or organizations in the United States. They added many provisions like that. For example, they gave Taiwan 20,000 immigrant visas annually, similar to the quotas of other countries. This was something Taiwan hadn't had before. They treated them in many respects like a foreign country, but they said the relationship would be unofficial and would be conducted by the American Institute in Taiwan, a non-governmental private organization. That is where I came in. I had been in INR just for a few months, and I volunteered to Dick Holbrooke to help build up this new American Institute.

Q: Dick Holbrooke was...

DEAN: Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs. We were concerned that AIT not be politicized, that it become a professional organization subject to the Department's guidance in terms of policy. The American Institute in Taiwan was not established to originate policy; it was to carry it out, and that is what we did. So, the Institute was started in a little basement room where the old FSI used to be. We had a room smaller than this. It was about 12'x12'. We jammed three desks in there and we had one secretary and three officers.

Q: Well, when you started, was there a concern that somehow this might turn out to be one of these things where they would haul some political figure out as a very strong proponent of Taiwan, and this would sort of muddy the waters and set a precedent. Was this a concern?

DEAN: Yes, it was a concern, and that person might go directly to the White House, for example, or might be at odds with the State Department over what policy we would pursue. We emphasized in our negotiations with Beijing that we would have only unofficial relations with Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act added on a lot of things that were apparently official, but they gave the President certain leeway. President Carter, when he signed the Act, said the Congress had given him certain leeway, and he would interpret that in light of the negotiations with Beijing on diplomatic recognition. Of course, AIT was just an idea. We had to borrow the \$15.00 to go down to the District of Columbia and register AIT as a nonprofit organization. We didn't have any money. I got into an argument with the Department administrative people because our people out in Taiwan had been put on administrative leave. Later we were going to turn them into AIT employees. The Taiwan Relations Act said that AIT employees may not be U.S. government employees, so we had to separate them from the Department. In the meantime, they were on administrative leave. Some of the administrators in the Department wouldn't let me send air pouches out there with their letters and credit card bills and everything because the Department didn't have any money for the American Institute in Taiwan. I had to go to a higher authority and say, "Can't you just please pay for them anyway and send them out," and they did. It was that type of little problem that was multiplied a hundred fold in every little thing you could think of. Because the Taiwan Relations Act said we were private, nongovernmental, and our employees were not to be U.S. government employees, we had to deal endlessly with personnel and administration, and not just with the Department, but with other departments and agencies to resolve problems. We wanted everybody in Taiwan to be converted to AIT employees regardless of which agency they had come from; USIA, Agriculture, Commerce or elsewhere. We gave them the same allowances, the same types of leave as Foreign Service Officers.

Every single department had different rules for allowances, shipment of household goods, school allowances and home leave and whether they could ship an automobile and the type of housing they could have. We wanted to treat everybody the same way, and we wanted them all to report through the Director of AIT, and not individually, to their departments. Initially, for the first few years, we were able to hold the line, and everything worked out very well in terms of employee morale. Everybody was being treated the same way and got the same benefits in terms of working together and in terms of our relations with their parent agencies and departments back in Washington and everyone enjoyed a harmonious relationship. Things from that point of view went very smoothly. It was working out the details back here that was really frustrating. Eventually Washington's bureaucracy's insisted on regaining their separate controls. We didn't have any problem with EAP, the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Their policy guidelines were very clear, and we understood them. We followed them, and that pleased Department policy makers. They wanted us to be as unofficial as possible. But the administrative side

complained they had no experience dealing with an unofficial organization that was carrying out U.S. foreign policy abroad. Our director was just a private citizen; he was not an Ambassador. So we continued to have difficulties of different sorts up until the present day with the administrative side of things, although we tried hard to resolve them.

Q: How did you, I mean here you are in this organization; did you have a State Department badge and all of that?

DEAN: Because the State Department lawyers said it would be a conflict of interest if I signed the AIT contract with the State Department, while still being a State Department officer, I retired from the State Department, early in January of '79 in order to take over AIT, to help found AIT, and to manage it and sign the contract with the Department. The contract was important because by means of the contract the State Department was able to funnel funds approved by Congress to us on an annual basis. The contracting officer had never had a contract of this type before. The legal provisions kept defeating him and us. We kept trying to modify and simplify it, but it wasn't easy because nobody had dealt with a situation of this type before, so there was a lot of confusion. Anyway we eventually got things working. Fortunately, we had a terrific administrative officer, Jack Connally. He is still on contract with the Department. He has retired, but the Department calls him back and sends him to different spots to try to solve administrative problems. He was really an experienced, positive thinking officer. We were so lucky to have him because the problems were so enormous and so frustrating. He did a marvelous job. We also had Joe Kyle who had been economic counselor in Taipei and had served in the EA Bureau. He came on board in January as our economic officer. Joe was experienced and a good negotiator with both the U.S. bureaucracy and the Chinese. He negotiated many agreements with Taiwan and kept track of economic developments there. Then we had David Evans from Defense who had been a colonel in the Air Force and later a Pentagon civil servant working with the military unit that supplies foreign military sales. He came over to us and virtually ran our military sales. So, we had the four of us together, but we didn't have any money so we had to work without pay. It was a really good group. They were self confident enough in their own fields to go right ahead and do things and not to worry about getting all sorts of clearances; they just went ahead and did it. Without that type of approach, we never would have set up the Institute.

Q: You say you couldn't pay anybody. Most people who work for the government, and I speak from experience, don't have a back log. I mean we need our monthly check.

DEAN: That's right, but we couldn't do anything about that until President Carter signed the Taiwan Relations Act in April 1979. Once he signed the Act, we signed a contract with the Department, and the Department started to fund us. Fortunately, because our staff in Taipei had been put on administrative leave and had not converted yet to AIT, the Department was able to pay them. So, they got paid. It was just the four of us in Washington who weren't on anybody's payroll. Jack had already retired from the Department. David Evans was on transfer. We couldn't pay anybody then but we were able to recompense them later.

Q: How long did this last?

DEAN: We started in January; February, March, April, and we started to pay them in May.

Q: I'd like to get this in here before I forget, how long were you with AIT?

DEAN: I started with AIT in January 1979. We gave ourselves a title. I was Chairman of the Board and Managing Director, for several years from January 16, 1979, when we registered the Institute, until the very beginning of 1987. I was in Washington for the first eight years. Then I went to Taipei as director of our Taipei office from January 1987 to the end of 1989, and I remained a trustee until 1995.

Q: This is a minor detail, but did you say you dug into your own pocket to bring up the \$15 to register?

DEAN: Oh, sure. We borrowed it from Leonard Marks in L. We got by, but we were working very hard then. There were so many issues we had never visualized, and I don't think the Department had thought of them either. Political issues, personnel issues, all sorts of different things, but gradually things came to order. You see, part of the problem was that a lot of U.S. departments and agencies had direct dealings with Taiwan before. They dealt directly with Taiwan's embassy here or sent people to Taipei. We had lots of travel back and forth and lots of business. Now, they had to funnel everything through AIT, through our office in Washington, and they couldn't deal directly with Taiwan officials. They had to have us there and present, even if it was a negotiation of a new airline agreement, negotiated by the Department's aviation division, but with AIT chairing the meetings. Everything had to be funneled through us. Of course that created resentment and a big backlog, but eventually we got things moving very speedily. Of course some didn't want their people in Taipei to be merged into the AIT structure, but we were able, partially thanks to the people I have already mentioned, to do all these things. For instance, we had to sign all the military sales agreements. For the first year, all military sales were suspended by prior agreement with China. In the second year, military sales began again and new contracts had to be signed. We had to sign every single one of them. I must have signed hundreds, if not thousands of contracts, and all in 10 copies or more. I should have had one of those signature writing machines. But military sales were negotiated with David Evans, our military representatives, and the Taiwan military procurement group, and DSAA, the Pentagon unit that controls military sales. David and the others did all the negotiations and I did all the signing. That went quite smoothly although every time we would sign something and send it up to Congress, Beijing would protest. It was more of a proforma protest in those days. We also signed agreements on everything else. During the years I was in Washington we must have signed between thirty and forty different agreements on everything from safety at sea to fisheries to intellectual property rights.

Q: I am a bit confused. Let's take fisheries. There are fishery people who know fish, and you don't know fish. There are fishery people in Taiwan who know fish.

DEAN: And we would bring them together.

Q: You would act in what would be known in Hollywood parlance as the beard. The man who takes somebody else's mistress to a party so somebody else can get together with her. That was known as the beard.

DEAN: We were the beard plus! What we would do is bring the fishery delegation from Taipei to Washington, not the other way around usually. Then the fisheries experts would meet with each other. If we could spare a person, we would have them there, if not they would meet by themselves in a place that we would arrange at AIT, or a hotel room, or it could be anywhere at that time, but not in the office of our fisheries experts. So they would meet; they would negotiate. When they got to an agreement we would have to sign it. We would sign it, and there was a provision in the Taiwan Relations Act that we had to report all of these agreements to Congress. We were also the repository of all of these agreements. If anyone in the public wanted a copy, they would have to come to us. They were also printed in the federal register. Yes, in a sense we were the beard, but in another sense, we served as the unit that coordinated people and cut through a-lot of red tape. You know if there is to be a meeting of people from the State Department, the Defense Department, Treasury, Commerce, they dance around with all sorts of briefing papers and clearances. We would just pick up the telephone and say we are having a meeting here tomorrow, please send a representative. They always did. We didn't have a lot of paperwork, so we cut through a lot of red tape. We facilitated a lot of agreements; we got things done much faster than the normal process worked. The Taiwan representatives were amazed that things like that were happening. Of course Taiwan didn't like the setup; they wanted an official office, not an unofficial one. They wanted to go to the State Department and the National Security Council and talk to everybody in the various departments and they couldn't do that. They wanted to have high level visitors coming from Taipei, and from Washington to Taipei, and they couldn't have that either. There were lots of things they couldn't have that made them unhappy, but in terms of the substantive work, getting agreements done, cutting through red tape, facilitating real work, then AIT did a pretty good job.

Q: How about the representation of Taiwan in Washington. What was your role in that?

DEAN: We had to make all their official appointments for them. We were the interface for them in Washington. They would come to us if they needed to see someone, and we would meet either in our office or arrange a luncheon or a dinner or a breakfast. We had lots of breakfast meetings, and we would get someone from the Department, maybe the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and a few others to discuss a particular problem. We would discuss it over breakfast and get a solution usually, I mean if a solution could be reached, or at least they would pass their messages back and forth and hope they would reach the proper recipient. So, they had that type of contact, and when visitors came from

Taiwan, legislative groups or others, we would brief them in our office, make their schedule, including calls with the Congress. At that time, the State Department was shy of having these people in the building, but later on legislators could go in, but no Chinese officials, in the State Department or the National Security Council or White House. So things worked out. If I had to do it again, I would have made a memorandum of conversation for every single discussion I had with the Department's administrative people, because we didn't have a good record of what had been agreed upon as the years went by and that was unfortunate. Other than that, under the circumstances, we did the best we could, and we tried to help Taiwan's Coordination Council. Taiwan's office in the U.S. was called the Coordination Council for North American Affairs. Subsequently, in '94, they changed their name to TECRO, which was Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative's Office in the United States because they had to have Taipei or Taiwan in there so people would know where to go to get a visa. In those early days, we did our best. There were lots of embarrassments. In the beginning the State Department was very tentative about dealing with Taiwan at all. They felt that Taipei and their friends in Congress wanted to throw a spanner in the new gears of the relationship with Beijing. Taipei wasn't helping itself at that time because it was always saying that the relationship with the U.S. had some elements of officiality in it, or when we signed the privileges and immunities agreement, Taipei claimed it was diplomatic privileges and immunities. Before you could say Jack Robinson, the PRC Embassy would be in there protesting about a diplomatic agreement, and about the names Taipei used, the Republic of China, and all this type of thing. Washington was really tentative in dealing with Taiwan and worried about Taiwan's attitudes and what they would try to do. They were worried about the new relationship with Beijing. We tried to soothe these feelings both on Taiwan's side and on the Department's side and to build a bridge between the two so they could communicate in a less frenzied, uptight way. I think that helped a little bit. For one thing, I had a very good relationship with President Chiang Ching-kuo. I had served in Taiwan before, so I had met him much earlier. We had become, I would say, good friends. I admired him and respected him, and I think we had a level of confidence in our conversations with each other. I went to Taiwan soon after AIT got started early in '79 and saw him. He had determined he would do everything he could to make the relationship with Washington work. He saw relations with the U.S. as vital to Taiwan's security, although a lot his countrymen and high officials were livid about the break in the relationship and the U.S. diplomatic relations with China. He himself calmed them down and tried to rebuild the relationship. He really did a great service to his country by doing that. Unfortunately, right after the break in relations, on December 27, 1978, Deputy Secretary Christopher and Roger Sullivan, a Deputy Assistant Secretary in EAP and others in EAP had gone to Taipei on a special mission to work out the new relationship. When they got there, the whole cavalcade was met by a mob of students and workers who smashed the windows of the cars, jumped up and down on the roofs, forcing the roofs down on the seat backs with passengers crouching on the floors. Some of the passengers were cut by the flying glass. I think that this riot had a profound impression on the victims. Christopher and the others who came with him became sour about Taiwan and the relationship. It was foolish of us to have sent a mission to Taipei at that particular time because we should have anticipated some public outrage. We should have met in

Guam or Hawaii and worked out things in a calmer atmosphere. Partly it was our own fault and partly it was a demonstration that got out of hand, and partly the fault of the foreign minister and others in Taiwan. Things were pretty tense. Eventually President Chiang sent his ablest negotiator, his vice minister of Foreign Affairs, Yang Hsi-kun, to Washington. He was highly respected here. He was an independent thinker, but really brilliant. He worked very hard with the State Department. He got the agreement we now have with the American Institute in Taiwan, its functions in Taipei, its functions in Washington, and the Coordination Council's functions in Washington. The Chinese set up an office in Taipei too. So the agreement was worked out and both sides began to move ahead with the relationship. I think that it has worked reasonably well. At the very beginning, some people thought this would be a short term solution, that things would change in five or 10 years at the most. The unofficial relationship has been going on for 20 years. The 20 year anniversary will be next April. It looks to me that it will go on for a long time after that, perhaps, another 10 or 20 years. So we have this organization, the American Institute in Taiwan. It has had its ups and downs, but I think it has tried very hard to carry out its responsibility, and it had some very good people. Chuck Cross was our first director in Taipei. We had Jim Lilley and then Harry Thayer, Stan Brooks, and then myself later. I'll get to that.

Q: How did it work? I mean we had our office in Taipei. Somebody would sit down and write the equivalent to a political telegram reporting this. What would they do, send it?

DEAN: Send it to me. The telegram would be addressed to AIT Washington, and our telegrams to Taipei, all telegrams that went out to Taipei were from me. I would sign them; I mean my name would be on them. They would be sent by various organizations. The EAP Bureau would send them to other bureaus, after clearance.

Q: In other words these were basically State Department communications.

DEAN: Yes. We had a circuit to the State Department. I am only telling you what the form was. The form was put that way in case unclassified cables got into the public realm and it would be seen very clearly that they were being sent between AIT Washington and AIT Taipei. But, in the Department, in the communications sector, when AIT/Taipei telegrams came in, they would be distributed to all the departments and agencies according to subject or there even could be a byline on them, pass to so and so. We had the usual protection of our confidential materials. The Sea Bees came from Manila and built up our communications room and everything else with the normal type of equipment that an Embassy would have. We had full scale cooperation from the State Department in those respects. I mean you couldn't ask for better cooperation, in communications and technical support, things of that type. It worked out very well.

I think there was a lot of concern in Congress about Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act said that AIT had to report to Congress annually for the first three years, which we did. We would give Congress a report which would use the Department's resources as well as our own, a mutually agreed upon statement. Then I would speak at an open hearing about

the relationship. I went up to testify several other times for several other reasons, particularly before Congressman Solarz, who was the chairman of the House Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific. He was concerned about several human rights and other cases, some of them just terrible. There was a big riot in Kaohsiung in 1979 at the end of the year. Elections had been postponed the previous year because of the break in relations. It was Human Rights Day so the oppositionists were demonstrating on both of these counts. The demonstration got out of hand. Something like 183 policemen were beaten up. Several rioters suffered some injury too. No one was killed, fortunately but several organizers were arrested. Congress and the Administration were concerned that the Taiwan government was going to give the death penalty to some of these people. Taiwan was still under military rule and martial law, and most of those arrested were going to be tried in a military court. In early January 1980 I was sent to Taipei to speak to President Chiang. This was three weeks after the riot. After we discussed it at length President Chiang assured me that none of the prisoners would get the death penalty, and that most would be tried in civilian court not military courts. In the final analysis, that is what happened. The Taiwan authoritarian government controlled the courts. President Chiang realized the impact on American public opinion if the prisoners were executed. He was a very unusual and farsighted man. He made it clear to me that he wasn't going to do this, and subsequently that proved to be the case. All of the prisoners who were given jail sentences are now out. Their jail sentences were shortened. President Chiang followed through on his promises to us. Some of those who were released from prison are now among the most prominent leaders of the opposition party in Taiwan, and they have played a major role in Taiwan's march toward democracy.

We worked hard, both in trying to restore confidence in our relationship with Taiwan through our military sales which were very important to them, but also through our conversations, negotiations, and other aspects of the relationship to reassure them that the U.S. was not just washing its hands of Taiwan and walking away as we had in 1949-1950 before the Korean War broke out. They had some experience with that. They were afraid we were going to take Taiwan and hand it to the mainland on a silver platter in pursuit of our own national interests. That suspicion was with them then, and I am afraid it is still with them today.

Q: In a way, this early period was helped by the fact that Taiwan was not a democracy and the mainland China was not a democracy so we didn't have an emotional stake of withdrawing our support from a "Democratic" country and pushing them into the jaws of a communist one.

DEAN: You could say that, but on the other hand we had had a long, close, and friendly relationship with the Republic of China, both on the mainland and Taiwan. They had lots of friends in the U.S. and in the Congress, and their economic ties with us were becoming more and more important as well. They had really good links with our military because many had gone to our various military training schools at the highest level. As well as low ones. We had trained their aviators, and had given their navy old destroyers and other ships. It was a very close relationship. We had a joint command, the Taiwan Defense

Command, and joint war planning. There was a lot to the relationship which was suddenly brought to an end. This is the first time I can recall that we just broke diplomatic relations with a friend and ally, though we did have a mutual security treaty, in pursuit of our interests elsewhere. I think there was a feeling of guilt on our part for the way we had managed this relationship.

Q: I have done an interview with Nat Bellocchi who held your position somewhat later. I mentioned that the ROC, the people representing there, had an incredible network of friends. They really knew how to network, I mean they already had it through their mercantile interests and their military interests and all this. We are talking now about the early 1990s, the mid-1990s, the mainland Chinese just didn't have this type of relationship. I was wondering whether you found yourself running into that network.

DEAN: Oh, yes. Even in a lot of my testimony before Congress. There were those in Congress who resented the fact that the U.S. had broken relations with Taiwan and asked really pointed questions about the new relationship which they resented, I remember Derwinski, who was a Congressman from Illinois, while we were in some grain sales conference (Taiwan had sent us a grain purchasing mission that was in Chicago.) seated on the same platform saying to me in an aside, "If I had my way we would send our battleships to Taiwan, restore diplomatic relations, and put the U.S. flag back up on the embassy there." He was speaking from the heart; that is what he really felt, and lots of others felt that way. It was a delicate time in the State Department's relationship with Congress, its relationship with Taiwan, and frankly in Taiwan not everybody was going the same way the president wanted to go. There were those who wanted to embellish the relationship and restore officially, but carefully, so as not to offend the U.S. Administration.

Q: Well now, you must have felt you were the greatest nuancer in the world as far as having to deal with this. I was thinking that the Taiwan representation in the United States, particularly in those early times, were trying every way to almost exacerbate the problem.

DEAN: What they had done was to compensate for the lack of official relations by sending over all sorts of missions, purchasing missions, sports groups, cultural groups, and inviting to Taiwan, congressmen, senators, staffers, governors, educators, mayors, everyone you could think of. There was a constant stream of visitors, and still is.

Q: They paid their way.

DEAN: Yes, of course. This is still going on. They use the alumni association of Tung Hai University to invite people, or Suchow University or other private universities. They did this to compensate for the lack of other types of official contact, and quite successfully. They had very good congressional relations through people in their offices in Washington. They got to know all the staffers, all the congressmen. They were dropping in all the time giving them information about what Taiwan was doing. That has continued, but at the time, it was quite delicate and the new relationship made it even

more so. It was very touchy with Beijing, and Congress was intent on following up to make sure things were run as they saw fit. Everybody had a different agenda and a different perspective. We tried to bring them all together.

Q: What about the mainland Chinese? Were they rattling rockets and doing much during this period?

DEAN: Well, of course, right after the announcement of diplomatic relations they were still very sensitive. I mentioned they flew off the handle when we signed the privileges and immunities agreement, and Taipei characterized them as diplomatic privileges. They were on the lookout for anything like that. On any showing of the Republic of China flag in the U.S., any sign of officiality, anything, they would protest right away. There were lots of protests to the State Department those first couple of years. Things got even more tense when President Reagan campaigned, when he was the candidate, because he said on several occasions that he would restore diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Q: This was in 1980.

DEAN: Yes, that's right, the 1980 election. President Reagan gave several speeches. He said, "We will have an official government office in Taiwan. The relationship with Taiwan has many elements of officiality in it." He was known as a good friend of Taiwan. He had been there several times as Governor of California, and Richard Allen was writing a lot of his speeches for him. Richard Allen later became the National Security Advisor and worked in the word "officiality". I counted it eleven times in one speech. This drove the Chinese on the mainland up the wall because they were afraid Reagan would restore U.S. official relations with Taiwan. A lot of Republican visitors to Taiwan at that time, before the election, were promising Taiwan that relations would be upgraded. So here again we had a really tense and difficult situation.

I recall that various invitations for the inauguration had gone to Taiwan. Anna Chennault was the National Republican's Women's Committee leader. She had gotten the senate organizers of the presidential inauguration swearing-in ceremony to invite a delegation from Taiwan led by Y. S. Tsiang, Secretary General of the KMT, and several officials from Taiwan. The Chinese Ambassador heard about this and said that he would boycott the ceremony if Y.S. Tsiang came to it. So, I had to go along with John Holdridge to tell Y.S. he was disinvited. Fortunately he had checked himself into an Alexandria hospital with a "diplomatic illness." Earlier we urged Taipei to tell him not to come. Then Anna Chennault said, "Don't pay any attention to them. Come anyway." We again urged them not to come, but finally they did arrive. Y.S. was here. He knew that he wasn't going to be able to attend the ceremony. He checked himself into the Jefferson Hospital with the flu, and we went to the hospital to give him our commiserations. Anyway, he didn't go; the Chinese Ambassador did come, and the Reagan administration decided they would not upgrade relations with Taiwan.

Even so, the Chinese were really upset and they pressed the Reagan administration. They pressed us hard on arms sales, on the FX fighter plane, on all sorts of issues. Finally the Reagan administration decided that besides not upgrading the office in Taiwan and leaving things as they were, that they wouldn't sell the FX aircraft to Taiwan. We negotiated an arms sales agreement, signed on August 17, 1982, which said that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan would gradually decrease and that they would not exceed the quality or quantity of earlier arms sales. This agreement was made under the assumption that there would be a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan situation. The domestic repercussions were so severe that they affected Alexander Haig, who was Secretary of State in the early parts of the negotiation, and his pressing for this agreement was partially responsible for his resignation.

The entire conservative establishment in Washington reacted with cries of outrage and horror. Senator Barry Goldwater and Walter Judd, a former head of the Committee for One Million, went in to see President Reagan. Of course, this was orchestrated over several weeks and months, through the months of May, June, and July, really up to the August signing in '82. When Haig had gone to China in June, he had to use these words, "We will not exceed the quantity or quality of arms sales." This was not in his brief but they represented what he thought. They were written into the August '82 agreement. President Reagan was upset by his friends' reaction. He sent a letter to President Chiang Ching-kuo in July with six points in it concerning arms sales. Two of the points are still important in other areas. One is that we would not be a mediator between Taipei and Beijing, and the other is that we would not press Taipei into talks or negotiations with the mainland. He sent the letter as a way of reassuring them. He said we had not discussed Taiwan arms sales in advance with Beijing and would not discuss them, would not agree to a certain time for ending arms sales, would not change the TRA, and would not change our position on Taiwan's sovereignty. So Reagan sent the letter in July and went ahead and authorized the signing of the Communiqué. I think by that time we had been backed into a corner and had no other option other than to sign it. But it has caused a lot of dissension. I think that whenever you have a document like that which one side is being forced into, you really can't expect it to last forever, and I think we have to say not only the spirit of the Communiqué has been violated, but several of its terms have been violated by us.

Q: When you talk about quality, what is quality.

DEAN: We had a rule of thumb. If something is no longer being produced, like a M-48 tank, then we were willing to sell the next higher production model. But that wasn't an agreement with China. Every time we did something like that, they would object strenuously. So we had a lot of trouble with China in the early Reagan period, during the campaign, during his first year in office, up to August of '82.

Q: Did you as an Institute have, I mean I would have thought you would have wanted to brief and really sit down and talk to the Reagan people around him. These were people coming in, there always is a learning curve for a new administration but particularly for

one coming in as the Reagan one did. These were not old government hands who knew their way around. This was a brand new crew.

DEAN: That's right. On the other hand, they had some experienced people, John Holdridge, for example became Assistant Secretary for East Asian Pacific. Jim Lilley, whom I had known for a long time, went to the National Security Council. They knew what the score was, but you see they had two motives. They wanted gradually to improve relations with Beijing for our own national interest, and at the same time, they wanted to improve unofficial relations with Taiwan. And, this is exactly what they did. After the '82 Communique, the Reagan administration began to do both of these things. Relations with the mainland improved markedly. Relations with Taiwan improved markedly. From the summer of '82 until Tiananmen, we had good relationships with both sides. I won't say terrific; there were lots of problems with both countries. But they were solvable, and the trend was a positive trend. We did a lot with Taipei. Washington had a very good policy team. For once the National Security Council, the State Department and the Pentagon worked together. It was a pleasure to see because at other times they were so often at odds with each other, and I have seen that. In this case, there was Jim Lilley and Gaston Sigur, and Rich Armitage over in Defense. They were all friends. They were representing different organizations but could resolve whatever problems they had and present a unified position very well, and they achieved a great deal, both with Beijing and with Taiwan. That is where I had a hope things would continue to improve, but who could foresee Tiananmen.

Q: Tiananmen was in 1989, which we will come to. Before we end this, you left Washington in '87.

DEAN: In early January 1987, I went to Taiwan as Director of AIT's Taipei office. Earlier I was talking about some of the developments which I had taken part in when I set up AIT in '79 until '87.

Q: We'll stop it right now at '87. At that time in '87 when you moved to Taipei just when you were going or during the mid-'80s, were you seeing a change, or foreseeing a change in Taiwan from being a Kuomintang dictatorship, with a centralized government to one where the native Taiwanese would essentially assume power takeover and that democracy would come in. Did you see this?

DEAN: Well, yes. In fact, I would go to Taiwan from 1979-87 at least annually, sometimes twice a year, and have talks with President Chiang. He had already announced in '86 to Katherine Graham, the publisher of the Washington Post, that he was going to abolish martial law, that he was going to allow the formation of opposition parties, that he was going to reform the Legislative Yuan, which meant retiring all the elderly legislators and holding elections for new legislators.

Q: They never had an election did they?

DEAN: Most of these elderly legislators were elected in 1947 on the mainland. But Taiwan had elections for the lower levels, mayors, and magistrates, city councils, village chiefs, etc. The KMT won most of these because there wasn't an opposition party. There were only individuals who might run as independents. So CCK's announcement was a major departure from the past, and Chiang Ching-kuo told me that he would have done this much earlier but there were serious problems at home and abroad. I am sure he had it in mind to move toward a democratic form of government because he realized that the mainlanders who had come over with his father were only 15% of the population. The other 85% were represented by locally born Taiwanese, and they were beginning to push very hard. There had been serious political problems in Korea and problems with Marcos in the Philippines. He knew that in the future, if he wanted to preserve stability and progress on Taiwan, that he would have to move toward representative government. He was already bringing in Taiwanese to the lower ranks of the party and encouraging them to join the lower ranks of the civil service; then into the mid-ranks, and then into the higher ranks. His vice president was Li Teng-hui, who now is president. He had appointed him Mayor of Taipei, and then Governor of the province of Taiwan. He appointed him Vice President. He was grooming him for the future, and many others too, not just Lee. So when President Chiang told me that he had in mind to move toward these political reforms, the break in relations with the U.S. had set back his timetable. He said he had to postpone the elections for the Legislative Yuan.

There were several other very difficult things, like the '82 Communiqué that we just have been discussing, which were a big blow. Then there were the murders in the Lin Yi-hsiung family in the Kaohsiung incident. Lin Yi-hsiung's mother and his twin daughters were murdered in early 1980 by some unknown assailant, but everybody knew it was political. Cheng Wen-jeng, a professor at Carnegie Mellon University, had been thrown off the roof of a library after being interrogated for 13 hours by the garrison command. Henry Liu, a journalist in Daly City, California, had been murdered by a hit squad from Taiwan on the orders of the Ministry of Defense Intelligence Bureau Chief.

These events all caused a big furor in our Congress and in our government. President Chiang was trying to cope with that. He announced shortly after, that no member of his family could succeed him. Although he had succeeded his father, it was quite clear to me that he had not trained any member of his family to succeed him. There was one, the middle son, who wanted to and was trying to manipulate things on the side. It was thought that this son might have been involved in the Henry Liu murder, too.

Q: Well, looking at these murders, it sounds like kind of a rogue operation.

DEAN: Yes. I think they were people within the security apparatus who were very right wing and intent on having their own way. But, President Chiang had to deal with all different opinions within his own country. He was quite a remarkable person to try to do this and yet move forward. He didn't just make a decision to move forward into these reforms. He had gone around and gotten everybody's opinion, if not their agreement. At least he had given them the courtesy of long and repeated discussions of the pluses and

minuses of moving in that direction. So when he did it, it wasn't a big shock to the establishment. They knew he was going to do it. Gradually things were implemented; martial law was lifted. The plans were underway for the new elections, and then he died. If he hadn't put these things in motion, I don't think his successor would have been able to fight the diehards in the KMT Central Standing Committee, and Taiwan would not be where it is today.

Q: Well, I thought we might have one more session, okay? So, we quit in 1987 and you were off to Taiwan to be the director of our office there.

Today is August 17, 1998. David, what about going there? This is the equivalent to being an ambassador, but it is not. I was wondering about the Senate and confirmation. There are a lot of political currents going around, so I wouldn't think anybody would say this is a routine assignment.

DEAN: The Director of AIT was chosen by the Department the same way an Ambassador was, that is the Deputy Secretary's Committee, where the Director General of the Foreign Service and the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and a few others sit in on it, and they would have to get White House clearance as well. So, in the fall of '86, George Vest, who was Director General of the Foreign Service then, came to me and asked if I would be willing to go to Taipei. I hadn't thought of another overseas assignment at that time, so I consulted my wife. My wife has been the mainstay of my entire Foreign Service career. In fact, what little successes I had in the various posts were due in large part to her and the friendships she had made with an astounding variety of people in Hong Kong, Beijing, and Taipei. It seemed to me that I had to ask her first if we were going to go. Sort of reluctantly, we both agreed and things were set in train. Usually the AIT Director had a meeting with the President. Mary and I had a photo opportunity with Ronald Reagan although we weren't official representatives and our appointment did not have to be confirmed by the Senate.

Q: Well, was there any connection with the Senate and the staff? I would have thought there would have been.

DEAN: Normally the Department lets them know, and later on this became a major issue, but at that time it wasn't. I knew most of the people who were interested in Taiwan in the Senate and in the House, too, for that matter and their staffs. There wasn't really much of a problem. They knew that I was fairly well informed about what was going on and had visited there frequently, at least once, maybe twice a year. I met with most of the top officials there, and we had a good relationship. There weren't any voices raised against the appointment of which I am aware.

Q: You were there from '87 to when?

DEAN: I started out in January of '87 and I wound up in December of '89, so that was a three year tour. When we saw Ronald Reagan, he said that he had been to Taiwan several times when he was Governor and was very interested in what was going on there. I told him that I would keep everyone informed. He said that is fine, and that was it. That was in December. and I arrived in Taipei in early January. The first opportunity I had, I met with President Chiang Ching-kuo. I had known him for many years, and he was pleased at the appointment, primarily because someone you know is better than someone you don't. He was very helpful to me. He made sure that some of his senior advisors who really were not too keen on meeting with the Americans would meet with me. For instance, Shen Chang-huan, who was the Secretary General of the President's office, and who had been foreign minister. I tried to invite him for lunch or just to tea, or possibly just a meeting, but he was always busy. I mentioned to the President that I would really like to see Shen and to see a few others. It was very clear that the President spoke to them because very shortly thereafter, they called me up and said, "Let's get together and see each other." I tried to touch base with almost all of the top party and government officials as well as the oppositionists. Then I spent a-lot of time with the American business community because I felt that this is where we could make our biggest contribution, helping them to the best of our ability. I met with various businessmen. There was a new airline to be set up. I met with the chairman of that airline together with McDonnell-Douglas people and Boeing people to introduce them and get them to focus on American aircraft rather than on the airbus which was their original intent. Eventually they did buy mostly McDonnell-Douglas and Boeing aircraft. They didn't buy any airbuses at that time. That is EVA Airlines. Similarly with China Airlines and the Taiwan power company, which intended to build some more nuclear power plants. General Electric, Westinghouse and other American companies were interested in getting the bid on the rapid transit system rather than the French or the Germans. I spent a lot of time opening various exhibits, going to trade shows, doing all sorts of other things, making innumerable speeches. I must have made five or six speeches of one type or another every week. So, I traveled all over the island to universities, to trade fairs that were opening or to various functions of one type or another, environmental meetings, university meetings. I was quite busy doing all that.

Q: Did the reluctance of some of the party people, the foreign minister and others, because we had recognized mainland China and reduced relations so they were sort of saying to hell with you, or had they gotten over this?

DEAN: Some of them had not. Some of them were ultra conservative, traditional in the Chinese sense that they had not gotten over the break in our relations. They also felt that the U.S. was not trustworthy. In the '49-'50 period, we had abandoned them and then the U.S. had broken relations in the beginning of '79, and we had the August 17, 1982 Arms Sales Communiqué with the mainland which gradually reduced the quality and quantity of arms sales to Taipei by the U.S. They didn't trust us. Also we had been trying to work very hard in getting Taiwan to stay in the Asian Development Bank. The Chinese wanted to come in, and the usual scenario was for Taiwan to be voted out. Taiwan was a founding member, and we felt that they should stay. Shen Chang-huan was Foreign Minister then, before he became Secretary General to the President's office. He resisted to

the nth degree any change in Taiwan's name, any change in its status in the Bank. He really fought to the very end. President Chiang overruled him, so he was feeling put out by that experience as well. There were lots of things that he could point to that he didn't like.

Q: While you were there, was this Asian Development Bank issue resolved?

DEAN: It was resolved before I got there in '84. Shen left the Foreign Minister's job and became Secretary General of the President's office. In that capacity, it wasn't necessary for him to meet with any foreigners that he didn't want to. He was a close and influential advisor to the President. I thought that we should have some dialogue and some opportunity to look into these things and see where the problems were and see if we could try to reach a common understanding. I met with Shen a lot later on, and also with John Kwan, who was a very bright and able Deputy Secretary of the KMT. I met with him, and we became good friends I think.

Later on, of course, I met with many of the opposition people. I had gotten to know them during the time I was in Washington and would come out to Taipei. Many of them were wives and relatives of those prisoners who had been arrested after the Kaohsiung riot, and they were trying hard to get their husbands and relatives out of jail. I was trying hard to do that, too. Congress was interested, the administration was interested. We kept trying to urge President Chiang to commute their sentences or to shorten their sentences. I kept arguing, as I said earlier, to Chiang during the time I was posted in Taiwan, urging more and more moves toward democratic reform. That was the best way to bring the American society and the Taiwan society closer together. I think he saw the value of that.

I think I mentioned earlier that he started his reforms or at least announced them in the fall of '86 to Katherine Graham of the Washington Post. He spent '87 gradually implementing them. In July of '87, he announced the lifting of martial law. That was quite a remarkable fact because martial law had been in existence ever since the Generalissimo had brought over his army and the civil servants and the rest fleeing from the communists. So, it had been in effect from '49 to the summer of '87 when Chiang Ching-kuo lifted it. It meant that a lot of cases that would ordinarily be tried in military courts would be tried in civilian courts. It was a great relief to many people. Military law was not accompanied by armed soldiers on every street corner or by tanks rumbling through the streets. I don't want to give that impression. Yet the courts could summarily sentence people who were brought before them, without what we would consider to be due process, for oppositionist activities, for gathering together in groups of more than twenty, for forming a political party or writing articles in magazines that were derogatory or against government policy. All of these things could be tried in military court, but with the lifting of martial law, that was no longer the case.

I think I established a good rapport with President Chiang. He used to send me messages before various actions would be made public. In the case of martial law, he told me when it was going to be lifted, a few months before. As in the case when he decided to allow

old servicemen who hadn't been back to the mainland for something like forty years to go back and see their families. This was a major break in policy. He sent me a message, I think it was in the summer of '87, and he told me through his secretary, Ma Ying-Jeou, that he had decided, for humanitarian reasons, to lift the restriction on people traveling to the mainland so those old soldiers could go and see their families. Of course this was a major breakthrough in the relationship between Taipei and Beijing. He wasn't just telling me out of friendship; he wanted Washington to be informed about this major policy change so they were prepared for it and put it into their own calculations. Well, needless to say, Washington was very pleased about this development. Anything that would voluntarily reduce tensions between both sides was good. They were quite pleased; I told him the reaction I had gotten. He went ahead with this policy, I think in the fall, October or November. Subsequently, literally hundreds of thousands of people started traveling to the mainland. They forgot the distinction that it was supposed to be old soldiers, and everybody went. I think that as of this date something like thirteen million visits have been made from Taiwan to the mainland since 1987.

Q: Was there anything the other way?

DEAN: Very little, because Taiwan is still quite restrictive. They were frightened of a flood of visitors, and their security people are still quite tight. There were just tens of thousands who had come from the other way. I don't have a figure. I would guess it wouldn't be more than 70,000.

Q: How were the two Chinas communicating with each other?

DEAN: They communicated in all sorts of ways. There was a major defection for example. A China Airline pilot flying one of China Airlines planes, (I think it was a cargo plane if I am not mistaken), instead of coming back to Taipei from Southeast Asia, flew to White Cloud Airport in Canton, and he landed there. This was quite unusual because Taipei had been the recipient of many Chinese air force planes with pilots defecting. This was a case of a man who had serious debts and marital problems. There was a negotiation to release the plane. That was carried out between China Airline representatives who went to Hong Kong and the Airline Association in China, CAAC. The two negotiated for the release of the plane, and that went very smoothly. Other negotiations, like fisheries disputes, were just settled informally. Later on, through the Red Cross, if one fishing crew had been seized and taken ashore by one side or the other, or if storms had sent ashore fishing boats, they would help repair the boats, give the crew food and cigarettes and send them on their way. Both sides were doing this, so it wasn't a vicious type of confrontation. There were all sorts of unspoken rules. I think when the air patrols from the Taiwan side mistakenly went over some mainland territory, the mainland always kept their patrols the same distance away so they didn't converge and accidentally have combat between the two sides. They kept pretty careful track of what was going on. There were lots of people who came over on fishing boats from the mainland to get jobs in Taiwan. Tens of thousands of people at one time were working in the construction industry illegally because they could make in Taiwan in one month what it would take them a couple of years to make on the mainland, and they would send money home. Taiwan security was

always picking these people up at construction sites and trying to deport them. That is where the Red Cross came in and tried to help handle the flow.

So, there was a lot of relationship back and forth, and something else that I didn't find out about until later, but about which I was curious. At one time President Chiang told me, I thought it was in the fall of '87, he had received a very courteous message from Deng Xiaoping. I said, "From Deng Xiaoping?" He said, "Yes, he wished us well on the Reversion day holiday, "which was the date the Japanese turned Taiwan back to China. I didn't think too much more of it, but then reflected on it later. It is likely that Lee Kwan Yew had been acting as a conduit back and forth between Chiang Ching-kuo and Deng Xiaoping, not necessarily negotiating but carrying messages back and forth hoping to reduce tensions between both sides and to increase understanding between both sides. That was pretty interesting. I think it will come out in Lee Kwan Yew's memoirs which are going to be published soon. Anyway, Chiang Ching-kuo kept a pretty careful eye on what was happening, on the mainland; on the oppositionists, who were now given permission to form opposition parties; on the military; on his own die-hard stalwarts in the upper ranks of the KMT, and the people. He had a very nice way of going around and consulting people and asking for their opinions, and trying to find out what their views were. Even if people disagreed with him and were unchinese enough to let him know, he still had given them the opportunity to express their views, so when a policy decision was taken, it did not come as a surprise. Instead it came as, " I knew he was going to do that," so they accepted it. The political reforms, the opening to the mainland, all of these major things, at least to Taiwan eyes, proceeded very smoothly and quite successfully. During the time I was there, I had opportunities to talk to him about his plans and these developments. I think our overall relationship was very good. He told me one time that he felt relations with the United States were better than they ever had been. This was interesting because he was referring back to quite a long period of time. Although the U.S. didn't have formal diplomatic relations, we really had quite friendly relations.

So, the U.S. relationship with Taiwan has thrived. Trade, for example, quadrupled. The visa activity at our American Institute in Taiwan had gone up from 40,000 in '78 to something like 130,000 in 1989, so all of our relationships had deepened, had become more meaningful, had become more valuable to both sides. The fact that Taiwan was fast becoming a democracy did make a difference. Before, everybody had admired Taiwan's economic progress, but now they were making a great deal of political progress. I think this gave Taiwan much more public support in the U.S. and Congressional support than if it had remained an autocracy. It changed the equation a great deal.

Q: Had Chiang Ching-kuo understood this?

DEAN: Yes, I think so. This was part of our discussion over the years from '79 onwards, that if they moved toward more political relaxation and more political participation, and in effect more democracy, that it would be the one thing that would really strengthen ties with the United States. I think he understood that very well. I think it was one of his motivations. Preserving stability, providing for the succession, and allowing the

Taiwanese majority gradually to take over was part of his vision of the future. He was a very farsighted and intelligent man, and a very careful man. He wasn't a showy person at all. He wasn't the charismatic figure his father was. His father would come into a room, and everybody would pay attention. Chiang Ching-kuo just had a friendly, homely look. He talked to people in a very equal way. I think he never accumulated any money of his own, unlike Marcos or the Korean leaders or the Indonesians. When he died, the state had to take over paying for his wife's hospitalization and for a place for her to live, because he had left no funds. He wasn't a grasping, accumulating type of person. He was willing to share political power, which was a very interesting thing. Sadly, after I had only been there for a year, I went home for Christmas. It must have been at the end of '87, I went on consultations and took some Christmas leave, and before I got back, President Chiang passed away. He had suffered over some years from very serious diabetes, had a pacemaker, and other things wrong with him. His vision was going because of the diabetic problems. He had trouble standing up, and for the last few months, he had to be in a wheelchair. So he was in quite bad physical shape. He was working even from his bed until the very end.

Q: How did your office, I mean one of the games must have been what is going to happen after he leaves. What were you thinking about in terms of what happens?

DEAN: He had hand-selected Lee Teng-hui, a Taiwanese, as his Vice President. He had brought him up in many different roles: mayor, governor, Vice President. I thought there would be a constitutional succession. And since Chiang Ching-kuo had already gotten the political reforms started, I felt there was no going back on it. Some people in the Department and the INR felt the Taiwan military would not allow Chiang Ching-kuo's successor to have as much power as he had, or give him as much scope, they would circumscribe him. They thought that the stalwart higher ranks in the KMT would also not allow Lee Teng-hui to have as much power. I didn't believe that. I didn't believe that the military would intervene and try to control things. I didn't believe that the elders in the party would be able to do so against the forces of modernization. I was one of those who felt that Lee Teng-hui would inherit the power.

As it turned out, this was correct. I had gone back very hurriedly to Taiwan after President Chiang's death, in early 1988. First I had met with President Reagan and some of his advisors, Colin Powell and others, in the White House. I had a message to give to Chiang Ching-kuo, but Chiang Ching-kuo died, so we changed the message to Lee Teng-hui. I went back quite soon after Chiang Ching-kuo's death, I think in January. I called almost immediately on Lee Teng-hui at his home and gave him President Reagan's message, together with condolences. There was of course, a lot of infighting going on. Lee had been sworn in as president. But, Madame Chiang Kai-shek, who was in residence at Shih Lin, was trying to intervene in the chairmanship of the KMT party. She wanted the party elders to rotate the chairmanship until the July party congress. However, one of the young party functionaries, James Soong, sort of shamed the standing committee into voting for Lee Teng-hui for chairman because James Soong, who had been one of the private secretaries of CCK, said that the president had explicitly said that he wanted Lee Teng-

hui to become chairman of the party as well as President. So, no one dared to intervene, and Lee Teng-hui was appointed chairman of the KMT. This gave him the two reins of power, and it prevented anyone else at that time from trying to usurp part of his authority. This put some of the old guard's noses out of joint, but eventually even they understood. Lee Teng-hui was really effective in promoting CCK's policies of political reform.

Q: CCK is...

DEAN: Chiang Ching-kuo. We always called him CCK. Anyway Lee Teng-hui was going along and the military supported him. There was an incident just at that time. The newspapers all had to treat this rather delicately, but the newspapers said that the Deputy Director of the Institute for Nuclear Research had disappeared, had left his post, and later was seen in the streets of the U.S., in Vienna, Virginia. Gradually the story came out that he had informed the U.S. about what Taiwan was trying to do in the nuclear weapons field. After considerable conversation and pressure from the U.S. side, Lee Teng-hui and his new government stated that they had no intention of producing nuclear weapons even though they had the capability of doing so. That chapter was awkward because the press claimed that the CIA had paid this deputy director for years, and he was a plant there, and he kept them informed of what was happening. Now just at this crucial time when Chiang Ching-kuo had died and Lee Teng-hui became the president, all of this story came out. It was a hot potato for Lee Teng-hui to handle, to say nothing of ourselves. He did very well by it, with dignity. I think he was caught by surprise, just as Truman might have been caught by surprise after Roosevelt's death about how far we had gone in this field. Lee agreed that Taiwan would not embark on this program and made sure that this was the case.

Q: It is obviously our policy not to have this happen, but here you are this private entity. What were you doing? Were you essentially getting instructions to weigh in heavily on this?

DEAN: Of course, oh, yes. This was part of the message I was carrying. There was no question about that. Even earlier we had gotten them to agree to send back to the U.S., and this is public information too, the spent fuel from their Canadian heavy water experimental reactor. One of the AIT agreements signed with Taiwan and reported to Congress was the agreement on the shipping of this spent fuel. Subsequently we shipped the other fuel rods and the whole plant back, the part of it that wasn't made inactive. Anyway, there was a great deal more to the story than this. I have given you a rundown of what appeared in the press, but it did cause a lot of ripples beneath the surface in Taiwan. One has to give credit to President Lee Teng-hui for being very firm against his own military and scientists and others in closing down the program.

Q: What was your responsibility? I mean we have besides the CIA, which we mentioned had rather close ties with Taiwan over the years, but we also had our military. I mean you name it; we have these, and here you are in this peculiar position of being a private corporation. Was your responsibility equivalent to that of being an Ambassador?

DEAN: We never really argued about the AIT director's authority. Everybody worked together. What we did really was the product of our office back in Washington and our office in Taipei. They were working together; they weren't working at cross purposes with each other. They understood our policy and they did their best to help carry it out. So we didn't have any arguments. I was given a lot of latitude on how I would carry out my duties, and I did it to the best of my ability using primarily the contacts which I already had. Some of them were very good indeed. We would have raised this issue with President Chiang Ching-kuo quite readily had he been alive. As it was, I had to raise it with President Lee. But I had known Lee Teng-hui for some time when he was mayor, when he was governor, and vice president, so I had known him for many years. We knew each other very well. When I was in Taipei, I invited him for Thanksgiving dinner along with his wife and some of his close staff. He'd invite me to his house. I had easy access to him anytime I wanted to see him or any time he wanted to see me, I was there. It wasn't that we were standoffish or at odds with each other. It was a period of time when Washington had built up very good relations, even though they were not diplomatic, with Taipei. At the same time, we had very good relations with the mainland. This was the period between, let's say, '82 and '89, before Tiananmen. So, there wasn't as much contention between Taipei and Beijing at that time. In fact, tensions across the Taiwan Strait were at the lowest they had been since 1949 and cross-Strait trade was rapidly growing.

Q: Were things pretty quiet on those offshore islands?

DEAN: Yes, things were quiet on the offshore islands. There was talk of reducing the troops there. As I mentioned to you, Chiang Ching-kuo was using Lee Kwan Yew as a bridge to the mainland. All sorts of people were traveling there, businessmen, investors, visitors. Factories were beginning to move over to Fujian. Before I get ahead of myself, I want to mention one of the things that Lee Teng-hui did. I was discussing with him Washington's concerns about the trade deficit. We had a trade deficit that year, 1987, with Taiwan, of 19.4 billion dollars. Just with a tiny little island, 250 miles long and 90 miles wide. That was a huge trade deficit. Washington was very exercised about it. The Treasury, Commerce, the State Department, all wanted to do something about it. So, I had several talks with President Lee. I was trying to get them to work out some form of timetable where they could bring down their trade surplus gradually. Finally in 1988, Rostenkowski and several other very prominent Congressmen came to visit. In the middle of the visit, President Lee drew out this plan from his coat pocket and said, "I worked this out myself". It was an outline of a trade action plan to reduce the deficit primarily by seeking new markets or expanding existing markets outside the U.S. and by importing more goods from the U.S. Lee said that he was going to give this plan to the various ministers involved and have them flesh it out and in two months time, they were to report back to Lee, concerning the plan's implementation. Well, it worked to a very large extent. Treasury at that time was pressing very hard to get Taiwan to appreciate its new Taiwan dollar. They pressed and pressed, and finally the pressure was so intense that Taiwan did change the value of its dollar and appreciated it from 40 to one to 28 to one. Treasury

itself felt that this would be the best way of reducing our trade deficit. I'm not sure if that in itself did the trick. I personally think that diversifying markets and importing more U.S. goods was equally, if not more important, than forcing up the value of the NT dollar. In any case all of these things did happen and the trade deficit was reduced. In 1995, it was down to about nine billion dollars. However, it has been going up since then. At any rate that is a substantial reduction from the earlier 19.4 billion. So, we were quite active on that front. We were also active on the intellectual property rights front, all the copying of tape cassettes, CDs, and video cassettes, home movies everything.

Q: Computer program software.

DEAN: Everything you can think of.

Q: It exploded in that decade.

DEAN: It was a major problem for us. We had negotiation after negotiation trying to get Taiwan to draw up laws, pass them, and then enforce them against these abuses. They had all sorts of gimmicks. They had Henry Hsu, a businessman and a good friend of mine, who headed the businessman's campaign to stamp out piracy. He'd get a great big steamroller and run it over pirated video cassettes, things like that. The government was very much like the government on the mainland on these same issues. It was very difficult to get them to make any effective moves. They would agree, but then to enforce these decisions was very difficult. They had a lot of little storefront places where people could go and see rented videos for a very small amount of money. They were a bit like social clubs. You could bring in the whole family or a whole group. They were all showing pirated movies. There were thousands of them in every city. It was hard to close them all down. The police weren't willing to get into confrontations all the time with the people about these things. Every block seemed to have one of them. But, eventually they saw the light because they wanted to preserve copyrights for their own software. They were beginning to get into that in a big way, and they were getting into their own CDs and so on, so they wanted to protect their own. Stiffer laws were passed and the problem was brought down to manageable proportions, but it kept everybody busy going back and forth to negotiate. USTR would come out to Taiwan or Taiwan would send a group to Washington. Then we had problems about fisheries. We were trying to save certain species and also to outlaw the use of these huge mile and a half long drift nets that would catch everything in the sea. Taiwan had a large fishing fleet. They really didn't want to limit their efforts at catching fish; it was very lucrative. They would send these ships out. There would be a mother ship. They would put their catch on ice. It was very profitable. They were fishing in waters they weren't supposed to be fishing in and all sorts of things. We wanted an agreement where our Coast Guard and other search vessels could board their vessels and see if they had made any illegal catch. They claimed this was an infringement on their sovereignty. There were demonstrations and arguments on the radio and in the universities about this effort to curtail their sovereignty. We had a lot of speeches, debates, conversations about issues like that, too. It was quite an active period with all these things going on. I think we solved them reasonably. We did persuade the

Chinese about the fisheries issues, and they did pass laws allowing their ships to be boarded. We did persuade them on the intellectual property rights. We did persuade them on the value of the NT Dollar and other trade issues. Sometimes they would complain that they felt behind the eight ball because of our military sales and other things, they relied on us so much that they had to do what we asked in these other areas. I think they protected their own interests as well as anybody could have regardless of this dependency. Certainly when we brought up an issue, they didn't say right away we will go and do it. It took years of argument, negotiation, and persuasion to get them to agree. They were very similar with negotiations we had with the mainland on similar subjects.

Q: Was there much contact between your office and the Peking Embassy?

DEAN: Not a great deal. Most of the things we were dealing with, although they had policy implications, were not explicitly Taipei-Washington-Beijing relations. Things were quite calm during that period on both sides of the Strait. The American Embassy wasn't complaining about what Taiwan was doing, and Beijing wasn't complaining about it either. Things were fairly, I don't like to say harmonious, but without crises such as we had later on. That period which one looks back on with a certain amount of calmness came to an abrupt halt in 1989 on June 4, when the Chinese military used weapons and tanks to drive the protesting students out of Tiananmen.

Q: Were you in Taiwan?

DEAN: Yes, I was in Taiwan then.

Q: We'll come back to that, but before we get to that, what about the military equation? Were military sales, training of troops, some of the issues you would get involved with?

DEAN: Yes, all of them I had very close relations with General Hau Pei-tsun, who was the equivalent to the chairman of our joint chiefs of staff, and all of his top military commanders. I met with them regularly. I had known them for some years. I had not agreed with Washington that General Hau might try to usurp power after President Chiang died. I thought of him as a loyal and good soldier who would obey commands. He later became premier. At any rate, I felt that he was loyal to his government and his constitution. It may well be that he had earlier conversations with President Chiang Ching-kuo, and Chiang Ching-kuo let him know how strongly he felt about the necessity of protecting the government and the constitution. I think the military cooperated with us. There were five points, if I can remember them. They said that they would play everything in low key. They would not have publicity about the arms sales. They would have patience, persistence and preserve the confidentiality of these sales. Of course, we had to report them to Congress, so eventually they all got out, but Taiwan's military weren't blowing them up out of proportion in their press, and they weren't writing press articles about the annual talks we had with them in Washington on military arms sales, where decisions were made about what types of weapons and what quantities of weapons would be sold. They seemed to be willing to work within the confines of the relationship.

We had a small retired military component in our Taipei office. They kept in touch with the Taiwan military quite well, one for each service. We weren't having trouble with the military. The former political oppositionists or dissidents had now become a growing legal political party. There were other parties too. We had very direct interaction with them, carrying on the ones we had before. Things were not going badly at all in terms of U.S.-Taiwan relations. It is true they were unofficial, but you would never know it, except by the fact we didn't fly a flag outside of our office, and they didn't fly a flag outside of their office here. Their representatives here were seeing virtually anybody they wanted to see. They couldn't go into the State Department or the National Security Council, but they saw some of these people outside of these buildings. They saw others, congressmen, senators, State Department people. They seemed to be forging ahead, and we seemed to be doing the same in Taipei, and Beijing was not objecting. We were playing things in low key. We agreed to play things in low key, particularly the military issues, and the government was playing things in low key with us, too. It was only later, some time after I left, that we had problems. We will get into that later.

Q: What about whatever passed for the diplomatic corps? Did they cause problems?

DEAN: The Taiwan government kept on trying to push us in with the diplomatic corps, but I just didn't go to any national days. I didn't go to any diplomatic events. I had a few friends, of course. The Japanese director of their unofficial office established in 1972, the Interchange Association as they called it, had been the former DCM for the Japanese Embassy in Taipei when I was in our Embassy. We were close friends. He had worked with my brother in Prague and we were together in Hong Kong, so we had known each other for a long time. We saw each other frequently. Mostly we would have a private supper or he would come to my office or I would go to his office and we would talk about things. If there was a dinner party, which we had occasionally, too, we couldn't talk as much. The Japanese had very close relations with the Taiwanese businessmen and with the oppositionist businessmen or oppositionist party, but also with the KMT. Mr. Hara was an unusually well informed, well plugged in person, an excellent representative. The others diplomats I didn't cultivate. It was a great relief not going to national days.

Q: I was just going to say it was a load going to diplomatic receptions. It is not exactly a punishment.

DEAN: No, it is not a question of not being allowed. They would have been delighted if we had gone there. The Chinese on Taiwan were trying to encourage the impression that our office was the same as the other embassies. But I didn't go because I didn't have to go and it saved a-lot of time. I didn't have to go to the airport whenever the foreign minister came in or went out. I didn't have to go to all the national day functions. I have been to those in many other places. They are really time consuming. Instead, I could see some American businessmen or invite some Chinese officials whom we really wanted to influence to dinner or to a luncheon. I must have had a luncheon every single day, usually with just one person or possibly two. I would meet at breakfast every single day, normally with groups, and certainly dinner every night, receptions for business leaders and others.

There were a fair number of congressional delegations that came through in spite of our break in diplomatic relations. They were always welcomed by the Chinese and called on the President and everybody else. Usually, we would go along if the delegation wanted us to, and we briefed them all beforehand, business delegations, congressional delegations, other types of visiting delegations, scholarly groups like the Stanford Business School, the Whiffinpoofs, everything you can think of. Anyway, I think we had a very good office with excellent hard-working qualified personnel. We tried to bring the language students from the school we had moved from Taichung up closer to Taipei into some of these events also. All in all it was a very busy time. I was busy; my wife Mary was even busier than I was. It is difficult in the Foreign Service today. Yesteryear everybody sort of rallied around and all the wives helped a lot, but now that is sort of old-fashioned.

Q: How did Tiananmen Square hit you all?

DEAN: Well, it's very interesting. The Chinese on Taiwan were shocked by it like everybody else and dismayed by it like everybody else and they were disappointed by it, but they weren't really taken by surprise like we were. Because they knew through harsh experience that the communists would use force to preserve their power and to knock down dissent. They expected them to use force to do this, so when they did, it wasn't the same as in the U.S. where we thought that Humpty-Dumpty had fallen off the wall and it was the end of the world. There was only a brief pause in Taiwan before they resumed their increasing number of visits to the mainland. Increasing numbers of factories moved over to the mainland to establish themselves there, and increasing investments. There was an enormous amount of that type of activity going on in spite of Tiananmen; whereas, we froze our relationship with the mainland. It was a very different sort of reaction. I think our reaction was vastly overblown, partially because of our own analysts and academicians earlier were acting as though Deng Xiaoping was a reformer and not a communist, you see. They thought reforms were heading toward a bright blue democracy in the future.

Q: I would have thought there would have been a lot of speculation just as an outsider knowing nothing about China, I found myself wondering what the hell is happening in China, not because of the crackdown because that seemed inevitable, but the fact they allowed this thing to fester on and on.

DEAN: Of course. That's because there was serious argument within the high command in China itself, in Beijing. There were arguments on how to cope with it. If they had just dragged the students out of the square and put them on busses and sent them back to the university shortly after the very beginning, that would have ended it. Or if they could have left them in the square to bake in the hot sun of the summer. Believe me, Beijing in the summer is really hot, and if they had forbidden the townspeople to bring them food and water, they would have baked them out. But to use the troops was a crazy demonstration of power. I think they were worried the protest would spread, and it did, to Shanghai and some of the other cities, and they were afraid they'd lose control. That is the worst thing

they could think of, that chaos would spread over the land, so they were really up tight. But in Taiwan, I think the harder heads thought that they would use force.

Q: Among your Chinese friends on Taiwan, was there much debate about what's going to happen, because this did not happen all of a sudden; it was a rather long drawn out affair.

DEAN: It was a matter of a few months you see. The thing is the press and TV revealed these developments to every one because just before Tiananmen, just before the students went in to Tiananmen to protest and to stay, Taiwan's Minister of Finance Shirley Kuo led an Asian Development Bank delegation to Beijing where the annual meeting was being held, along with about 100 TV and newspaper men from Taiwan, because this was the first time a minister from Taiwan had ever gone to the mainland since 1949. It was a big event.

These newspeople stayed on to film what was happening in Tiananmen Square. Then came Gorbachev making the Chinese face fall even more. Then the argument built up within the top leadership. When you have arguments like that in the top leadership, they are not always evident at the time to people who are on the fringes of Tiananmen Square watching what was going on. But it was very clear that Zhao Zeyang, the Chinese premier, tried to get some agreement with the students and was prevented from doing so because Li Peng and other hard-liners felt it was giving in. It is also clear in the final analysis that Deng Xiaoping was responsible for ordering the army in. If Chao Zeyang had been able to get an agreement with the students and had kept his position as premier (at least he wasn't a far right communist, he was more toward the center), then China might have moved much more rapidly and the relationship with the U.S. might have blossomed. They might have avoided Tiananmen and made progress toward a different type of society. Sadly, that didn't happen.

Q: Was there a certain amount of shock on the part of the Taiwanese seeing the United States being so disappointed in what happened?

DEAN: They would say something like this, that the U.S. didn't realize the true nature of the communists and now they are seeing it for themselves. We knew it all along. We weren't taken aback by this. We knew they would do something like this whereas the U.S. foolishly thinks they can get a nice chummy relationship, and they don't take the nature of the communist beast into effect. The leopard never changes its spots, that type of argument. The whole point is Taiwan, after a momentary pause, continued to build up its investments, its trade, its visits to the mainland. It went on until 1995 when President Lee made his well-publicized visit to Cornell. Then the Chinese on the mainland went up like a rocket. It wasn't just the visit.

The visit had been preceded by a series of moves by Taiwan. In the early part of the Clinton administration, the administration was paying much more attention to domestic policies. They really weren't paying any attention to Taiwan although they had set in

motion the Taiwan policy review, which took a year and a half to come out, and it produced very little. The U.S. also wasn't paying attention to the mainland. Washington was busy focusing on domestic affairs or Bosnia, but not on China, so President Lee felt himself deserted by the U.S. or ignored. Therefore, instead of maintaining the low key foreign policy which had been so productive, he decided to embark on a new high visibility policy which he called pragmatic diplomacy. He went down to Southeast Asia to play golf with heads of state. He made more visits abroad to countries that did recognize Taiwan, especially in Central America. Taiwan was pressing very hard to be the host of the Asian Games. President Lee was pressing very hard to be invited as a head of state to the APEC meetings, that President Clinton had elevated to head of state meetings. He wasn't able to do any of these things. He didn't get the Olympic nod, didn't get invited to the APEC meetings, so had to send his economic minister. Then he coopted the oppositionist party's program of rejoining the UN, and he tried to get the 29 countries that had diplomatic relations with Taiwan to raise the issue of Taiwan before the UN rules committee, to get it on the agenda, but he was unsuccessful. Finally, President Lee's 1995 visit to the U.S. was for the same reason, to raise Taiwan's international visibility and persona and to persuade the U.S. and other countries that Taiwan had a right to international representation, as much right as most of the members of the UN. All of this activity just infuriated the mainland and finally the trip to Cornell set them off. We had assured Beijing that Lee Teng-hui would not come to the U.S. Secretary Christopher had told Foreign Minister Chien that, "No, we will not permit Lee Teng-hui to come." Our Embassy in Beijing had told the Foreign Ministry, No, he will not come. We understand your concerns." So at the very last minute Congress voted overwhelmingly to welcome him, I think with only one exception, and President Clinton changed his mind. The Chinese reacted by withdrawing their Ambassador. They embarked on a series of military exercises, surface to surface missile firing and live firing exercises in the Strait. They vilified Lee Teng-hui. They broke off the cross-Strait talks that had been started in 1993 between an unofficial entity from Taiwan and an unofficial entity from the mainland, copying our own model. They broke those talks off, and things were really at a hiatus. They got worse, because they kept on claiming that Lee Teng-hui was a secret sympathizer of Taiwan independence and he really wasn't for unification, even though he said that was the government's policy. Finally in an effort to drive home their opposition to Taiwan independence, the Chinese embarked on another huge scale military exercise in the Taiwan Strait in the early part of March '96, just before Lee Teng-hui's election for president, which he subsequently won, partially because of these exercises. The Chinese fired missiles over Taiwan very close to the port of Keelung and then short of the port, so they were bracketing Taiwan with these missiles fired from the mainland. Then they had huge exercises in the vicinity of the offshore islands of Matsu and Quemoy. Things were very tense. We dispatched two carrier groups to the waters near Taiwan. You might think this was a plus for President Lee, but it didn't turn out to be. Because of this crisis, high level attention was finally given to China policy, and the administration made a deliberate effort to improve relations with China. This resulted in Jiang Zemin's visit in October of '97, and it resulted in President Clinton's visit to China in the end of June this year, '98. I think in retrospect you have to think that President Lee's visit to Cornell and the high visibility foreign policy and the activity in the Strait has been a turning point in improving

U.S.-China relations rather than putting those to one side and improving relations with Taiwan. We don't know where the future is going to lead us, but at any rate, let me get back to '89 and talking about Taiwan's reaction to Tiananmen. We were certainly talking to the Chinese on Taiwan about that. They acted in a much cooler and rational way than we did. Eventually my tour ended in December of that year. I had been in Taipei from early 1987 until the end of 1989. President Lee asked me four different times to stay, but I did not relay his request to the Department. The Department doesn't like personal requests like that and I knew it, so I said I couldn't. I was getting old and had to leave. Of course he is a couple of years older than I am, so he kept on asking me to stay.

Q: You were saying you left.

DEAN: Yes. I stayed on the Board of Directors of AIT as a trustee. I had been on the Board since it was founded on the 16th of January, 1979, and I stayed on it at their request when I left Taipei in December of 1989. I was on the Board up until September of '95. The reason I left, as you may know, was because the administration appointed a man named James Wood to the chairmanship of AIT. When I heard about this I spoke and wrote to Winston Lord, who was Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs. I told him I looked at Wood's record and that he had no experience whatsoever in the field of relations with China or Taiwan. This was in '95 mind you, at the time when all of these things were going on that I just mentioned, President Lee's visit to Cornell, the Straits crisis leading up a little bit later to the second military crisis and our dispatch of carriers. It was a critical time. My worry was that the administration, even with President Lee's visit and the repercussions from it, still wasn't paying enough attention to what was happening in our relationship with Taiwan and our relationship with the mainland. I felt that they really were allowing a crisis to come to a head by not paying enough attention to it early on. That was one of the reasons I had spoken to Winston Lord. James Wood was sort of a secondary reason. It was pretty clear to me that they weren't paying any attention to what was going on if they intended to name someone without any background to the job.

Q: Was he a political appointee?

DEAN: Yes. They didn't use the normal procedure to get him in. Apparently it was some deal between Moose, who was Under Secretary for Administration and the White House Personnel Office. It later turned out that Wood had gone over to the White House for the last couple of years and was camping out in the White House Personnel Office, trying to get them to appoint him to something.

Q: Who was he?

DEAN: I don't know. He was a lawyer from Arkansas or something, but he had worked in the State Department and in FBO and in diplomatic security. His boss in diplomatic security had called me when he heard about this, and said you don't want someone like that because I had to fire him for lying. Furthermore he caused trouble over properties that diplomatic missions might have in Washington DC, more trouble with the DC

officials and with the embassies than you could imagine. All of these things had to be swept up after him. I had this call and a couple of others from employers about him. I didn't want to protest on the basis of his own personal record. I figured the Department should know that, but I based my letters on his lack of background in the area and also on the belief which I had spoken earlier to Holbrooke when we started the operation that it was important to have a Foreign Service officer there who was at least amenable to discipline, knew what the rules were, took orders from the Department and tried to carry them out, and didn't try to create an independent foreign policy. I didn't put all of these things in my letters, unfortunately. Maybe I should have. I sent letters to Winston Lord and Tarnoff, who was the Under Secretary of State then, and to Tony Lake, but the die had been cast. They confirmed the appointment of Wood. Subsequently they fired him about a year later. He kept trying to sue the Department because he felt that AIT should be an independent agency not subject to guidance from the State Department. The State Department lawyers said the whole intent of setting up the American Institute in Taiwan was so that the State Department could use it to carry out policies toward Taiwan. Anyway, I saw the lawyer's letters passing back and forth. It was a very messy thing. Wood also apparently had been trying to steer Chinese businessmen to a consulting firm with which he was associated. According to Nat Bellocchi, he tried to raise funds for the Democratic National Committee in Taiwan and other things. It just proves that for a job of such sensitivity, you have to get someone whom the State Department can rely on to carry out their own requirements. This is what I tried to say, perhaps inexpertly.

Q: Well, you said it expertly. These things are usually decided at a political level. Moose was Under Secretary for Management at that time. He was also from Arkansas and the President was from Arkansas. These things happen.

DEAN: That's right, and I understood that too, but it was unfortunate. I can see things like that happening when you know, you have the case of an Ambassador to London whose only qualifications may be that he speaks English. But you can have a good deputy. But, AIT Washington was a very small office. It has a few people with explicit responsibilities. It doesn't have deputies or DCMs. I'm not talking about Taipei; I'm talking about the Washington office.

Q: Another question back to the time you were in AIT in Taiwan, What was in it for the Taiwanese government to encourage all these investments in Mainland China?

DEAN: It wasn't what was in it for the government; it was because we had forced the value of the NT dollar to rise. Wages in Taiwan went up very rapidly. Formerly they had been a big manufacturer of low wage goods like shoes and textiles and things of that type. Now wages were too high; they couldn't manufacture these things competitively, so it was very easy for them to move to the mainland. The mainland welcomed them. They just took their whole machinery and their managers mostly and sent them over to Fujian. They spoke the same Minnan dialect in Taiwan as they do in southern Fujian province, so they were welcomed with open arms, and the wages were incredibly low in comparison. This was a made in heaven deal for Taiwan's manufacturers of shoes, golf clubs, textiles and a

lot of other things where low wages would help a lot. As a result, Taiwan itself has been propelled into the high tech area. Perhaps not by our design but by the circumstances, propelled into computers, electronics, the high end of manufacturing where their high wages are not that much of a drawback. The wages there for computer professionals are still less than they are in the States. They prospered from their factories on the mainland, and they prospered from their new high tech factories in Taiwan.

Q: Did you have any concern at that time about this development?

DEAN: I don't think any of them foretold it. Later on President Lee became concerned about the huge outflow of investment funds as well as factories to the mainland. He is worried that the mainland would have a lever it could use against Taiwan. Already over 20% of Taiwan's exports go to the mainland. They already have a lever. This is to say nothing about the investments that Taiwan has made, over \$30 billion of investments on the mainland in factories. I think Lee Teng-hui's government is worried and has prevented some very large investments. The Formosa Plastics Group wanted to invest something like \$6-\$9 billion on an island just off Xiamen in a big petrochemical plastics complex. He persuaded them not to do it by offering them more land in Taiwan, some place that they could build there. I think that these big companies will eventually invest heavily in the mainland as time goes on. It is hard to say what is going to happen.

Q: What have you been doing since you left AIT?

DEAN: I thought so highly of President Chiang Ching-kuo that I agreed to become an advisor to a foundation that was set up in his memory. It is an academic foundation that gives grants to colleges and universities to encourage Chinese studies, research and books for publication by university presses, for new faculty positions, for senior scholars and for dissertation grants, things of this type. So, I have been doing that two or three days a week, and I write articles. I have written one recently for a book that is to be published, entitled *Twenty Years After the Taiwan Relations Act*, "a review of U.S. relations with Taiwan." Mine is a chapter in the book and Nat Bellocchi will write a chapter, David Lanx, Jim Lilley, and a few others will also contribute. I have raised funds for a biography of Chiang Ching-kuo. It has been completed by a colleague in the Foreign Service, Jay Taylor, who is putting the finishing touches on the last draft and will send it up to the Harvard University Press shortly. It is a very interesting book; I have read all the different drafts. It is well written, informative, and it goes over many of the things I may have touched on. I hope Harvard will accept it and it will be a popular book.

Q: During this last time you were with AIT what was the role, you mentioned one thing about Madame Chiang Kai-shek, who was a dominant figure for so long. You mentioned the grey ghost.

DEAN: That was the "ghost from Shihlin." That is what the Taiwanese called her when she tried to intervene in the election of the Chairmanship of the KMT after Chiang Ching-kuo died. I don't think the Taiwanese hold her in the same respect as history does, as we do for example or as the mainlanders who live on Taiwan do. Several of my Chinese

friends journeyed to New York City for her one hundred and first birthday, I think in April. She is looked upon as one of the last great figures of this century. Certainly she was very prominent during W.W.II in terms of Sino-American relations and certainly she will have a place in history. Some young newspaper woman just came by and interviewed me because I knew her quite well in the olden days. She is writing a biography of Madame Chiang Kai-shek. It is hard to get people to say anything, even people close to her because there have been some scurrilous biographies, as for example Sterling Seagraves' book on the Soong dynasty. It was a case in point, sort of like yellow journalism. So, people are afraid to say anything or to be quoted or anything because they don't know how the author is going to slant things. I have gotten involved in writing some articles about the future relationship between Taiwan and the mainland. A close friend of mine, the publisher of the *China Times* in Taiwan, Mr. Yu Chi-chung, a remarkable man in his late 80s, wrote an article about the prospects for a confederation or a commonwealth for China and Taiwan. I wrote a similar article at the same time in 1994 for St. Johns University's conference on Taiwan. Mr. Yu gave his opinion in a speech before the Central University in Taiwan. Subsequently even the former chairman of the oppositionist party, the DPP, Democratic Progressive Party, advocated a British Commonwealth solution for Taiwan and the mainland like the British Commonwealth of Nations. Various others have raised this same issue. Even one of the active DPP legislators, who was an academic before he became a legislator, was thinking of a confederation that might even include other Chinese areas. At any rate, it is an idea that probably would be accepted by us and Taiwan and other countries, but not at this time by China. I think in the final analysis this would give Taiwan their independence in everything but name, and a commonwealth name is not a tie that binds too tightly, the only objections probably would come from China. China has promoted their one country two systems that they have used for Hong Kong. But the one country two systems idea they have for Taiwan is much broader than the Hong Kong model. It is not impossible for me to see in some future period, 10 or 20 years from now, when China's definition of one country two systems could expand and because suspiciously like the definition for a commonwealth or a confederation. It would solve the problem for everybody and in a way that would be peaceful and without stress to everybody involved. China is a huge place; Taiwan is a very tiny place. It is true that China can use Taiwan's expertise in trade and everything like that, but essentially China has its own problems. I think they don't want to be forced into a confrontation over Taiwan, but they will if they have to. It is the territorial imperative all over again. It is still an interesting and critical issue. I closed my chapter for the book I mentioned by advocating the same thing, a commonwealth of nations or a confederation.

Q: Well, David, I want to thank you very much.

DEAN: Not at all.

End of interview