The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

WILLIAM J. GALLOWAY

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
Initial interview date: September 28, 1999
Copyright 2001 ADST

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background
- Born and raised in Texas
- Texas A&M
- U.S. Army, WWII - Europe
- Postwar treaties

State Department - Foreign Affairs Officer 1948-1950
- Marshall Plan
- Belgium monarchy
- Atlantic security
- Soviet threat
- North Atlantic Treaty negotiations and signature
- Ted Achilles
- German question
- Eisenhower
- Italy

State Department - Regional Affairs - Special Assistant 1950

London, England - North Atlantic Council Deputies – Special Assistant 1950-1952
- Ambassador Charles Spofford
- North Atlantic Council
- French demands
- MC-48
- Organization
- General Eisenhower
- Regional commands
- NATO
- German role

Paris, France - NATO - Special Assistant 1952-1956
- North Atlantic Council
- Korean conflict

Soviet Union
Douglas MacArthur II
"Macmerbo"
George Kennan
Wahwee MacArthur
Secretary of State Dulles
SEATO
CENTO
Philippines
Pakistan
Germany
Geneva Summit - 1955
Bulgaria
Khrushchev
"Open skies" proposal

State Department - Foreign Service Institute [FSI] – German Language Studies 1956

Vienna, Austria - First Secretary 1956-1959
Political Parties
Neutrality
Vatican relations
South Tyrol
Refugees
U.S.-Austria relations
Hungary
Suez

State Department - Personnel 1959-1961
Grades and titles

State Department - Director General - Special Assistant 1961-1964
Affirmative action
Tandem assignments

National War College 1964-1965

London, England - Political Officer 1965-1974
Conservative Party
Ambassador David Bruce
Parliamentary system
Southern Rhodesia
European Union
Contacts
NATO's moves to Brussels

U.S.-British relations
The French
Economy
Nixon visits
Prime Minister Wilson
Ambassador Annenberg
Prime Minister Heath
Kissinger
Foreign office relations
Muskie visit
Chequers weekend
Elections - 1974
Union disputes
Correspondence with Prime Minister Thatcher
Deputy chief of mission [DCM] problems
Relations with Ambassador Annenberg

State Department - Executive Assistant to Under Secretary for Management 1974-1977
Dean Brown
Ambassadorial appointments
Eagleburger
Acheson auditorium
Loy Henderson Conference Center
Dick Moose

National War College - Deputy Commander 1977-1978

State Department - Executive Assistant to Under Secretary for Management 1978
Personnel issues
Foreign Service Act
John Jacob Rogers award

Comments and evaluations
Awards and commendations

Attachment 1
Valedictory Address - Cadet Lieutenant Colonel William Galloway - January 22, 1943

Attachment 2
Letter from Gibb Gilchrist (copy) - July 24, 1960

Attachment 3
The Origins of NATO: An Insider's View - November 18, 1992

INTERVIEW

Q: Today is the 28th of September, 1999. This is an interview with William J. Galloway. This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. Why don't we start at the beginning? Why don't you tell me where you were born and something about your family?

GALLOWAY: I was born on a farm near a little town named Throckmorton, Texas, in 1922. My father actually was not a farmer by trade, but in those days, employment was such that he tried a bit of everything and ended up on a farm. Very shortly after I was born, the family moved into town which had a population of about 1,000 or 1,100.

Q: Where in Texas is Throckmorton?

GALLOWAY: It is about 150 miles west of Dallas-Fort Worth, about 100 miles south of the Oklahoma border, midway between Abilene and Wichita Falls. It is a sparsely populated county as most of them are in that part of Texas. The main activity was agriculture, growing cotton and grains. In the early days cotton was big. Normally, whenever school was out in summer, you usually were happy, but after I was old enough to start picking cotton, that line of work became boring and wearing very quickly.

Q: You cut your hands, too, can't you?

GALLOWAY: Well, you can, but once you get the hang of it, you can do it very easily. It is just that in the summer time the temperature was anywhere from 90 to 105, and the weather very dry. This was 1928 into the ‘30s. At that time Texas was a poor region. There had been oil play earlier in the century and there was still some around in various areas, but most of the large deposits had been pumped out and there was no boom by this time. This was pre WWII. Agriculture was the thing.

Q: What was your father's background and your mother's background?

GALLOWAY: My father was from a family of five or six children. He went to school until about the sixth grade, and then he had to quit school and go to work.

My mother was born in Georgetown. They met in Throckmorton. My mother spent most of her young life on the farm her father owned east of town about three or four miles. She was able to complete high school going into Throckmorton. At that time the general level of income in all of that part of the country was very low. This was just before the depression, entering into the depression and the years immediately following the depression. Very few people were wealthy -- only those with the luck of having oil found on their land or some families brought up with very large estates, for example, cattle ranches dating back to the frontier days. That part of the country was opened up

gradually. They found that raising cattle and getting it to market was about the best way to increase your status in life. Some of the old cattle trails started around Abilene there in Texas and on up to the...

Q: Chisolm, Goodnight, that sort of thing.

GALLOWAY: Yes. They ended up in St. Louis or the nearest railhead at that time. That part of Texas was sort of on the edge of being good ranch country. It was generally too dry to produce enough natural grazing land to sustain large herds of cattle. I don't know how many per acre it could feed, but anyway, it was necessary to supplement the grass by extra feeding to get cattle ready for market. After cattle drives were over, as railways branched out, getting cattle to market became easier, and in the '30s or so, with truck transportation, you could send them to Fort Worth. Fort Worth became the center of the meat industry in Texas, with stockyards proliferating. They still have an annual show there called the "Fat Stock Show". All of the old boys would gather for a blast every year. That was the kind of atmosphere. My father found difficulty in getting a job, as did others. He tried several things. He worked in a tailor shop, doing pressing, dry cleaning, and altering clothes. He tried selling insurance for awhile. He tried selling cars for awhile. There just weren't enough people with enough money for anyone to be very successful.

Q: Was Throckmorton near the dust bowl or was that...

GALLOWAY: Right at the bottom, right at the edge of it. The dust bowl started up around the Oklahoma panhandle and the border of Texas and then on up into Kansas and the plains. I remember particularly during my high school days, teenage days, those dust storms would gather and would look just as red as fire. The whole land was just drying up. Finally, after several years, they got into terracing and developed various other agricultural engineering means of holding the land. But for my generation and some time before it, Texas was a depressed area.

Q: Well now, how big was your family?

GALLOWAY: I had one brother four and a half years older than I. Both my father and my mother worked at whatever jobs they could get. My mother was a very strong woman. Like a lot of the people down there, she was a throwback to the frontier days, when women were accustomed to running things. She did many things. She used to take school teachers in for boarding during the year. She was a very good seamstress, and she sewed clothes, dresses, coats, whatever, for anybody that wanted them. She had quite a clientele of customers there. She also worked for quite a time as clerk in one of the dry goods stores, just anything during those days which she and my dad could find to do they would do. We scraped through. We were not really poor, but we were just over the line. We had our pride and our standards and ethics and morality and religion. That was the center of the Bible Belt, so religion was...

Q: Were you Baptist?

GALLOWAY: I lived in a divided family. My father was a Baptist and my mother was a Methodist. Since I was the youngest, my older brother went to the Baptist church with my dad, and I went to the Methodist church with my mother.

Q: Well now, what was Throckmorton like when you were growing up as a young boy?

GALLOWAY: A great place. Most small towns are, particularly if you are young enough that the hardships don't really seem to be hardships, they are just a way of life for everybody. You knew everybody in town; you knew what everybody was doing, and you could make friends. I have a lifelong friend. We started playing together when we were about four years old. We still keep in contact. We are both amateur radio operators. He went into the Air Force during the war. He went through WWII, Korea, Vietnam, and then went to work for the NSA and ran stations for them. He closed up several places. He commanded their station at Peshawar and closed it down. Then he was head of the station at Okinawa, and closed it down when that island reverted to Japan. He was stationed for quite some years in Europe, with sort of roving responsibilities, France, Germany, England, so forth. I happened to be assigned over there, and we got together several times. He was and is, I suppose, the closest friend I ever had, or certainly one of them. We still operate our ham radios and talk to each other a couple of times a week. I just talked to him this morning as a matter of fact. His name is “Rocky” Eubank, aka [also known as] Colonel Graydon Knox Eubank, retired.
Q: What about school? What interest did you have, how did you relate? Start with elementary school.

GALLOWAY: Well, we had a good school. The community leaders stressed the need for getting good teachers. At the time when I first started school, there were several smaller schools around in the county of eight or ten students, something like that, and a teacher doing the whole curriculum from first grade to twelfth grade. But Throckmorton itself had a grammar school and a high school. As far as I can remember, I started kindergarten, and it was well conducted. I have no recollection of any unhappiness because of the lack of capacity on the part of the teachers and the school. During the time that I was going through school, things really picked up. The superintendent was a real go-getter, and he managed to get local authorities to agree to try to concentrate outlying schools pretty much in Throckmorton. Busses were available by then so that a substantial number of students around the county were bussed into Throckmorton. By the time I graduated, I think there was probably only one other county school left in the town of Woodson which had a population of about 600-800, something like that, outside Throckmorton.

The superintendent, Mr. Harry Rice, did an awful lot for that school system through consolidation, emphasizing quality in teaching and so forth. A lot of teachers in that place came from what was then sort of a factory for school teachers at Denton, North Texas State it is now called, but then it was called CIA, College for Industrial Application, something like that. It supplied probably the majority of the teachers for the state of Texas. They were good. I remember that the grammar school principal and the high

school principal were two men whose conduct, standards and behavior had a lot of influence on me as well.

Of course, both my father and mother were religious, very actively so, and we all went to Sunday school and church regularly. When I grew up, nothing was left out in my upbringing about what was right and what was wrong in the eyes of God. Happily, I think that has stayed with me, with some modifications, through my life, and I am deeply grateful for the foundation that I experienced in school, social activity and the whole town itself.

Q: By the time you got to high school, were there any particular subjects you were interested in.

GALLOWAY: Math. Math and Science. These were my particular interests then. I just devoured them. I was always good in school. I was valedictorian of my grammar school, valedictorian of my high school, valedictorian in college At Texas A&M. I knew how to study and it was easy for me. Math and physics and chemistry and so forth all came easily. In high school, there were about half a dozen of us who planned to go college to study engineering of some kind. We got the high school to put on a special class in trigonometry for us. There was a lady there, Mrs. Peavey, whom I shall never forget. She knew math frontwards and backwards, and she taught us trigonometry. That was a great help. Fifty years later, when I was given the honor of the first distinguished alumnus of Throckmorton High School, I made a particular point that when we from that high school went to college, we did not find ourselves at any disadvantage vis-a-vis students from other schools. We had as good an education as was offered generally in that part of the world.

Q: What about reading?

GALLOWAY: Oh, yes, well in those days reading was your main hobby, reading and sports. You played all the sports and you read all the books. There were myriads of books in those days about Tom Swift and other teenage heroes. I was always reading a book of some kind or another.

Q: How about at home? Did you have sort of discussions about what was happening at home around the dinner table and that sort of thing?

GALLOWAY: Yes, but mostly relating to social activities in the town rather than the school itself; although, we usually had at our dinner table two or three or four teachers. The discussion centered pretty much on practical day to day events in life that came our way or any big national event. When Roosevelt came into office and various programs were adopted under the New Deal, you could really see the effect of them...

Q: Rural electrification.

GALLOWAY: Rural electrification, and then the CCC.

Q: Civilian Conservation Corps.

GALLOWAY: Yes, and the NYA, National Youth Administration. Under that program many new public buildings were put up, and the high school had a fine gymnasium built under that program. Then, there was a place over near the rodeo arena where facilities were built for taking care of stock. There was CCC work around the place, not much that I remember in the city, but you could see signs of things that were happening, and life was getting better in many ways.

Q: Well, did with your family and the school teachers and all, what was the attitude toward Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal?

GALLOWAY: It was very pro. As a matter of fact, in those days all of Texas was Democratic. They didn't even have a Republican primary. The Democratic primaries were in fact the elections for office, judge or representative, etc. in most county and state offices. It was not until quite a few years later after WWII that the Republican party even found itself a base to organize in Texas. But at the same time, while Texas was wholly Democratic in partisanship, it was probably the most conservative partisanship you could imagine. So, when the Republican party finally did get going down there, a lot of people found a home. The frontier life in the country was almost all conservative, I think. People were accustomed to doing things for themselves. They were not accustomed to much regulation by government. Taxes were very low. Of course, there was no income tax then. Sales tax was unheard of. I think the only taxes that were really levied in those days were some excise taxes on petroleum products, things like that, and property tax which went to the schools almost entirely.

Q: While you were in Throckmorton in high school, did the world at large, things that were happening in Europe, Asia and all, did that have any impact or interest.

GALLOWAY: For me it did, particularly in high school. We had intramural competitions in the county: public speaking, declamation, typing, extemporaneous speaking. I went out for extemporaneous speaking, and that inevitably led me to world events because almost all of the subjects thrown at you to speak on were either national or international. One of the main topics of interest was the war between China and Japan. Apart from the war, China was a source of great interest because of its turmoil and its difficulty in building any institutions, just hundreds of millions of people dependent on rice paddies. Chiang Kai-shek was considered a great leader dedicated to the freedom and independence of China. Then when communism and fascism came along, public wrath rose. The idea of infringing on one's independence and liberty to do what he wants to do, to work where he wanted to work, or in any way to regulate his life, that was anathema to people in that part of the country whose lives had never been restricted, and people naturally fell into opposition. By that time, let's see, the war started in Europe in September, '39, and I started college just about that time, too. I was in ROTC so that meant even more interest. As time went on and patriotism grew throughout the country, Roosevelt's leadership gradually moved the United States more closely into the international situation. By the

time I was on my second year in college, there was little doubt that we would all be going into the army when we graduated. Then Pearl Harbor happened when I was a junior in college, and from that point on it was hard to study because everyone was talking about the war. A. & M. being a military school, there were already many graduates on active duty and some had already seen action.

Q: You are talking about Texas Agriculture and Mechanical.

GALLOWAY: Yes, Texas A&M. It was the place for anybody who didn't have much money to go to college. The tuition was I think $50 a year. I was able to get a job down there so I could pay most of my expenses. I had taken touch typing in high school, and I got a job in the registrar's office typing up records of grades of students. My family sacrificed and helped as much as they could, but they had little extra.

Q: Well had your brother gone to university too?

GALLOWAY: He had not. From the time he was about 12 years old, I suppose, he got the radio bug. From that point on he was building radios, first starting with crystal sets and then going up to one tube super heterodynes, variable oscillating sets and so on until finally he was able to get his license to operate a station. He built on his own a shack out behind our house; my family helped as much as they could, and my uncle helped as well. We had a house which cost, I think, about $7-$8,000 to build, a three bedroom house, then up to four bedrooms. It first started with two bedrooms, and as we got into boarding teachers, they took the bedrooms. My parents, my brother and I moved our beds out under the grape arbor until we could get another room built on the back. My grandmother was living with us because my grandfather had died when I was about two years old. There was that relationship between mother and daughter which frequently happens; each wanted to run things. But my mother was chief of the tribe, and unfortunately for Daddy, there was no steady job that could bring in much money. She was, as I said, a very strong woman, very religious, devout. She didn't mind work. After we were married, on one of her visits to us here in Washington, she was putting up some curtains. At one point, she said, "Oh, gee, my back is hurting, I am going to have to rest a bit." Then she picked up a broom and started sweeping. That was her idea of resting.

Q: A sort of frontier type. When you went to university, were you pointed toward something?

GALLOWAY: Yes, I was pointed toward chemical engineering. Our high school principal taught chemistry, physics and the sciences. I had settled on chemical engineering. When I got to A&M, I learned that all engineering courses for the first year were the same, the basic courses. I had enough of university chemistry in my freshman year to realize that that was not the kind of engineering I really wanted to do. So, I changed my major to mechanical engineering, which just pointed me in a slightly different direction. I was always set on some kind of engineering. An engineering degree offered a good chance of getting on. Texas A&M is a land grant college, known primarily at that time for its work in the field of agriculture and engineering, particularly petroleum

engineering. It's course in petroleum engineering was second to none in the country, and most who came out of that were snapped up right away by oil companies. Its total student body when I was there, I think, numbered around 7,000. With WWII and the growth of technology since then, it is the fastest growing university in the southwest. It has a student body population of about 45,000.

Q: At the time you were there, what was the atmosphere?

GALLOWAY: When I was there, the atmosphere was largely military because we all were in ROTC. Our housing arrangements, for example, were laid out like military barracks. In other words, I was a member of A Battery field artillery, and the field artillery had its own dormitories. Other arms and services had their separate dorms. We had cadet officers (seniors), non-coms [non-commissioned officers] (juniors and sophomores), and enlisted ranks (primarily freshmen). We had courses in military science and tactics. There was a lot of hazing in addition to discipline imposed by upperclassmen because it was a military type organization which inherently enables the guy in the next class up to rule with a little more authority than he might otherwise. It was probably not as intensive as West Point or Annapolis. One's life out of class went according to the social code of a military organization, more or less. The worst thing in the world at that time was being a freshman. You were called "Fish________". You wore a little white ribbon around your sleeve at the wrist. That marked you for everybody to see. For example, one part of the disciplinary act and social, too, if you saw any of the officers, upperclassmen in your outfit, with somebody else on the campus, you had to go right away and introduce yourself to the people he was with. So, I would run up and say I'm Fish Galloway. When you think about it, that created a pretty closely knit group, and the spirit which grew from that was extraordinary. For wartime it seemed to be preeminent with patriotism the over- riding force.

Q: What about both your later years in high school and at university, what about dating?

GALLOWAY: Well, let's see. Dating started later in those years than it does now. I think I had a date or two when I was a junior in high school: go to the skating rink or to a movie or something like that. When I was a senior, more of the same thing. We had a senior banquet and I had a date for that. There wasn't all that much dating in high school. Some people, they were usually a minority, got together in high school and really were suitor and suitee, or whatever, for two or three years. Usually, those liaisons broke up if one or both went off to college. When I went down to Texas A&M, it was not co-ed - all male. Our dating was probably less than in other colleges. What there was of it centered on the school for girls in Denton - TSCW, Texas State College for Women. There was sort of a traditional relationship between the two schools. I met a young lady who was the daughter of one of the professors at A & M and also a student at TSCW. We dated for a couple of years, my junior and senior years. Those were the great times.

Q: Did movies play much of a role in your life? Were movies pretty much the main entertainment?

GALLOWAY: Yes. Movies were, I guess, the number one entertainment for everyone in those days. We had an unusual experience with movies at A&M. In my senior year, Warner Bros. or was it Universal? Universal, I guess, decided to do a war picture based on Texas A&M's military reputation and its graduates going on and fighting the Japanese. They came to College Station and we had a great time. I, particularly. As a result of my position as Executive of the Cadet Corps, I was asked by the studio people to help them in a public relations capacity, which turned out to be, in effect, sort of official escort for one of the young starlets. That was pleasant duty indeed.

Q: What was the name of the movie?

GALLOWAY: The name of the film was "We've Never Been Licked." I don't know how many theaters it got around to, but it was certainly a B film. The star was an actor by the name of Richard Quine, and Noah Berry, Jr., known by everyone as "Pidge" was also in it. He fitted in with the student body at A&M like a natural. The girls, too, with the attention of some 7000 young men, were great favorites. Let's see, the leading lady was Anne Gwynne. Martha O'Driscoll was the young lady I entertained. I really had a great time escorting her around.

Q: My vision of her was looking very Irish with dark hair.

GALLOWAY: No, blonde. I still have some pictures around here somewhere. She was a beauty with a wonderful personality, just effervescent. Everybody liked her. My assignment came about because the studio was calling on us to provide student units for various scenes they were shooting. The Cadet Colonel was the number one, and I was Cadet Lieutenant Colonel and the Executive of the Corps, the number two. Universal decided to put us on their payroll at a very nominal retainer. They called it public relations. I think they paid us five bucks a day for a couple or three months, however long they were on location. That was very useful particularly in taking the young ladies around and being the good host. I had not thought too much about it until after I retired and approached the age of 65. I started looking into social security and found that the work I had done in the Department after I retired was actually enough for me to qualify for minimum social security; but as Social Security went back into the history of my employment records, the first entry was 1942, as an employee of Universal Studios.

Q: Well, the time you were going to graduate when? What year did you graduate?

GALLOWAY: We were supposed to graduate in the summer of '43. Since Pearl Harbor had occurred and war had been declared in '41, the question arose how do we treat these ROTC fellows. By the time I had finished my junior year, they had decided. Part of the procedure for going through the ROTC was that in the summer between the junior and senior years we went to camp -- military camp where we did actual gunnery practice.

Q: Artillery.

GALLOWAY: Yes, I was artillery. So they decided in order to hold on to us and to get us

in as soon as they could, and the college agreed, that they would continue with no summer recess. We got maybe a weekend or something like that off in the early summer of '42 and then went right back and started our senior year. I graduated in January as valedictorian of the class.(See Attachment 1) In any event, I want to show you a letter I have from my old Dean of Engineering at that time who later became President of the university and Chancellor of the Texas A&M university system. He fostered a broad extension of the university system and its academic and professional standards. To a considerable degree, he was responsible for the school becoming what it is today. It is not quite on a par with MIT or Cal Tech, but it is close.

Q: Oh, yes.

GALLOWAY: It is close in terms of science and technology. It is with the best in the country for petroleum engineering, close behind with aeronautical engineering and mechanical engineering, probably, also in civil engineering. It has perhaps done even more in the field of agriculture. It has a medical school in Galveston. Also, it conducts underwater research and instruction. I was amazed the last time I was down there for the 50th reunion of our class, by the progress since I left. Now, President Bush has selected it as the place for his library which opened recently. Friends who have visited it have been very impressed, and I understand that the school is being praised for its excellence.

I have a letter written to me many years ago by my Dean of Engineering, whom I have mentioned previously, after he had retired from his handiwork on the institution. (See Attachment 2) It meant a great deal to me.

Q: Well, you graduated then in December of '42?

GALLOWAY: January of 1943. What happened was that the military ROTC and the university jointly decided on a means of regularizing our status and accelerating the training of officers at A & M. They took all of us who were in ROTC down to Houston and enlisted us as corporals. We were then sent back to school and told that we would be sent to the appropriate Officer Candidate School as soon as we graduated ; meanwhile, the college would begin our senior year without a summer recess and continue to operate on a three semester per year schedule as long as the military situation required.

Q: Officer Candidate School.

GALLOWAY: Yes. So, instead of having the summer camp, we went back to school, got our degrees early and went directly to OCS. I went to Fort Sill to the Field Artillery School. Others scattered to where their OCSs were: infantry to Fort Bragg, chemical to Fort Monmouth, and others all over the country. We spent three months in the OCS and then were commissioned. So we were commissioned somewhat later, no we were commissioned at about the time we would have been anyway, but we were commissioned with better qualifications and training than we would have had if we had just gone to the summer camps. We were then assigned to units already in being. Some went to Europe right away due to intensification of the land war there. I was assigned to remain at Fort

Sill as a gunnery instructor, because of my math and mechanical engineering background. Applied gunnery is just simple trigonometry, so the instruction was not demanding. After I had been teaching gunnery for a couple of classes, one day a young first lieutenant came in and sat down at the back of my class. I didn't know who he was or what he was all about. He came up to talk to me afterward and said he was the Commandant's aide-de-camp. He had been aide for two years and wanted to get out on a different assignment, so he was looking for a successor. The long and the short of it was that in a few weeks he got in touch and I was assigned to succeed him. I stayed with that general, J. D. Balmer, most of the time I remained in the army, either as his aide or working in one of his staff sections. He was very cooperative and very able. He had a patron, General Leslie McNair. McNair had sent him down to the artillery school for command experience with the prospect of commanding a division in the European theater when there was an opening. Unfortunately, McNair was killed in Normandy on a visit there soon after D-Day. Later, Gen. Balmer was assigned as corps artillery commander to a new corps being formed, the XXIII Corps. When he left Fort Sill, he took me with him down to Brownwood where the XXIII Corps was being assembled. We spent several months there. He commanded new artillery units being activated, ran tests on them and oversaw their training. We had several divisions and several different outfits of artillery which were corps artillery. I don't know how familiar you are with military corps artillery.

Q: There is division, and corps.

GALLOWAY: Yes, and corps artillery would be heavy and medium artillery directly under corps command. It was used to support and supplement division artillery wherever needed. It consisted mainly of 155mm howitzers, 8-inch guns and 155mm guns. We had support responsibility for division artillery, pretty much all 105mm howitzers with one battery of 155mm howitzers. We had oversight and training responsibility for about four or five divisions and several groups of corps artillery stationed all over Texas. We were always on the move looking at these units, scheduling combat readiness tests, and the general had to keep an ear on morale. The general finally trusted me enough to send me out on my own. If the military grapevine came up with something going on in a place that disturbed him, he'd ask, "You know anybody in this place?" Usually, I had a friend or two stationed there I'd met either at A&M or Fort Sill. I'd say, "Yes, so and so is a friend of mine." He'd say, "Why don't you pay him a visit." So, I would go out to these outfits and quietly gather impressions about the mood, the general attitude toward the command, and, if there were real morale problems, the reasons for them. It was interesting, and I helped him out on a few of them. In one outfit, an armored division based in Abilene, the artillery commander was an officer who had done most of his service in Washington. He was really an authority on artillery theory. We began getting noises that the artillery there was in bad shape. The general and I paid a visit. I knew a lot of the first and second lieutenants who were ready to identify the problem. Although the unit was relatively new, the commander had them in the field all the time, concentrating on maneuvers and firing. He just jumped over the basics of military activity and tried to make immediate expert gunners out of them. He didn't give them enough time in quarters to police up, get themselves cleaned up and establish the relationships and discipline necessary to build a good unit. The general quickly verified this by his own observations. The decision was

made to relieve the commander. The officers and men responded quickly to the chance to get set up in quarters, clean up, get back to basics and make themselves into an effective unit. So, it was a very interesting experience. The General later took on a junior aide and let me work in staff sections of the corps artillery headquarters, particularly, operations and intelligence, so I got a pretty good grounding.

Q: When did your XXIII corps go overseas?

GALLOWAY: We were over in December of '44, I think it was. We went to England and were billeted in Bournemouth on the southeast coast. There were, at that time, many artillery units still arriving from the United States. The only problem was that the personnel and equipment were shipped separately. We found ourselves in a situation where units were bivouacked in tents with only their personal belongings, but nothing to shoot and nothing to fight with. Our artillery pieces and ancillary equipment were sitting on docks at ports up and down the west coast. So, our first task was to go to the general quartermaster depot up in London. We sent a squad of about four or five officers up there. We'd go through all their manifests of everything in quartermaster or other storage to find out where the equipment was. Then, we'd get in touch with specific units, tell them the location of their equipment and send them to get it. We did that for two or three months. After they got their equipment, we set up readiness tests for them before they could go over to the continent. Although late arrivals, some of them saw some action. By the time our headquarters got over there, we were assigned to the Fifteenth Army, the last army activated in the European theater. The original commander was soon replaced by General Patton, who was sent there after his last episode which had hit the press and caused further embarrassment to the Allies, particularly to the U.S. and General Eisenhower.

Q: I think he had made remarks when he was in Austria about or Munich that after all the Nazis are just like politicians in the United States or something to this nature.

GALLOWAY: Yes, whatever, and General Eisenhower gave him a good dressing down. He sent him to take command of this 15th Army, which really didn't exist; it was just an army headquarters. The “Army” was then given the responsibility of writing an operational history of U.S. operations in WWII in the European theater. So, we gathered there in Bad Nauheim, a former spa. The headquarters consisted mostly of colonels and lieutenant colonels who had been key commanders or operations officers of combat units. They were from all arms and services who had led the campaign to allied victory.

General Balmer was put in charge of the artillery authors. All in all, well over a hundred volumes were produced by that collection of active WWII veterans. The history found its repository in the Pentagon eventually.

Work on that project continued after General Balmer’s departure. He was there until '45. He then received orders to return to the U.S. to assume a command for the invasion of Japan. He took me with him and we went over to Bournemouth to wait for the next sailing of the Queen Mary. Things were happening fast in Japan while we waited for the

Queen Mary for two or three weeks. One of my duties was to go up to London to draw his liquor ration, which I usually made into an overnight stay, returning to Bournemouth the next day with his booty which he always generously shared with me. I would take his car for the trip since he wasn't using it sitting there in Bournemouth with friends. On one such bootlegging episode, I was enjoying myself in Piccadilly Circus in the evening when word came that Japan had surrendered. Oh, what a celebration we had that evening on VJ day. As you will understand, the general and I just sort of relaxed from that point on, and eventually came on back on the Queen Mary. When we returned to Washington, we were given a 45 or 60 day R&R leave. His family were down at Fort Sill, and mine were at Wichita Falls which is about 60-70 miles south of Sill. So, we went down to the southwest and visited our folks on that extended leave.
While this is out of time sync here, I'm skipping over to the point when General Balmer was made Deputy U.S. Commander for the occupation in Austria and took me with him to Vienna. The headquarters was crowded and there were plenty of aides there already, so I asked the general how about letting me work on this Austrian treaty. State had a big delegation there taking part in the four power negotiations on a peace treaty. He said, "Okay, check in." So I talked to the State people who were quite cooperative. They told me to come on over, and I arrived to sit through dozens and dozens of meetings of the Austrian Treaty Commission. I soon found out why the U.S. Delegation welcomed me: they were good enough to let me write the minutes of those protracted talks. So I had a lot of practice.

Q: What was your impression of that, this is with the Soviets and everybody together. What was your impression?

GALLOWAY: It worked very well. The occupation zones were clearly demarked, and Vienna itself was separate with all the four powers alternating their time of command. We had controls and a military court in Vienna itself.

Q: The movie "The Third Man" is a good example of.

GALLOWAY: It was a little Hollywoodish, of course, but what was so clear in Vienna and had not yet been understood by people around the world was that the Russians were enemies, not allies.

Q: While you were there, you were talking about what was it about '45 to '48 or so?

GALLOWAY: Yes.

Q: Was at your level, was it coming home that the Russians weren't the friendly allies?
GALLOWAY: Yes. In many ways. They kept apart. The Soviet government wasn't about to let their people have social contacts with any of the other occupation powers, so they were really sat on. The rest of us, the British and the French and ourselves had high old times. The policies and the antics of the Soviets in the four power Allied Council for the occupation were little short of hostile. When the Treaty Commission got going, the behavior and policy of the Soviet delegations in those two forums made it absolutely

clear that they had drawn a line, and they were not going to back out. They intended to stay. It was at that time highly questionable whether they ever would sign a treaty with Austria.

Q: It wasn't until '54 that a treaty was signed.

GALLOWAY: Yes, and rather out of the dark it came. Until then, Soviet hostility was very apparent across the board. It had hit us earlier in occupation duty in Germany. Immediately after cessation of hostilities, the first mission we had in the XXIII Corps was to set up civil administration oversight for occupation by our forces in the Rhineland. In the areas we'd come into we had found large camps of so-called displaced persons, most of them Ukrainians and from various other nationalities in the Soviet Union. They had been brought in by the Germans as labor for many activities. They were friendly toward us, hated the Germans, and their attitude toward their home government was certainly negative. But, Moscow recognized that and didn't really want these people back; so they were very slow and dragged their feet in any attempts by the western powers to get them to take these displaced persons and put them on a train for Soviet territory. I suppose a lot of those people just ended up in between East and West.

Q: There were forced repatriations. I mean this was a pretty traumatic and horrifying experience. Particularly captured soldiers, Russian soldiers who fought on the side of the Germans, the Vlasov army and so on. They were forced back and all of them were killed.

GALLOWAY: In our area we didn't get involved in any of that, fortunately. The displaced persons in our area of responsibility were all civilian, and pretty much all peasants. They were just able to do menial tasks. That is all the Germans had wanted. But they were certainly anti Soviet in their attitudes and they really had no idea what was going to happen to them. I don't know if any were eventually taken back or if they were just forgotten and allowed to wander out of the camps.

Q: I think most of the people who were displaced persons by the time things were fairly will settled by '48 is when the cold war really kicked in, ended up in camps and we had in the various countries, United States, Canada, Australia and all had rather extensive programs to clean up those camps. Many of them ended up abroad.

GALLOWAY: Yes, I'm sure.

Q: Well, by the time of your return were you making contacts with the State Department people while you were in Europe?

GALLOWAY: That story really began before the time in Austria. Of course, I worked with the State Department people there in the delegation for the Austrian treaty. Those meetings just droned on and on. The Russians gave absolutely no indication that they were prepared to do anything, so the record of those negotiations are of no historical importance whatever. We just thought it was a stalling operation that had to be endured.

Q: Was this in a way a training session for somebody like yourself and others warning

about the Soviets?

GALLOWAY: It was not intended as such, but I guess it was in a way. The State Department people had been picked for their expertise in certain areas so that they could contribute to the treaty negotiations. I got into the real thing earlier in four power negotiations in London being conducted by the Council of Foreign Ministers in '45. General Balmer was assigned as Military Adviser to the U.S. Delegation in those meetings. He took me with him to London. Three or four colonels were also assigned to this duty. The general and one colonel and I ended up in a flat at #45 Park Lane, which is now where the lobby of the Hilton Hotel sits on Park Lane. We had the ground floor flat. That was a great billet.

Q: I am trying to figure this out. You were working in Austria up to '48 was that but you were also in London in '45.

GALLOWAY: Yes, I need to transpose in time. I was involved in the work with the Council of Foreign Ministers which started in '45 and '46. Their deputies had been working on drafting peace treaties for Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Italy. They had been going for some time and had come to the point when the military aspects of the treaties needed to be addressed. General Balmer was assigned as the chief Military Advisor of the U.S. delegation. He took the group I mentioned earlier with him to London. We started meetings with the French, British and Russian delegations there on military clauses for those treaties.

We negotiated the military clauses. At one point, we were instructed to prepare a list of military materiel to be forbidden. Colonel Dick Stilwell and I were doing this job, and we initially wondered where in the heck we were going to find anything which would give us a starting point.

Q: Stilwell is spelled with one "l" isn't it?

GALLOWAY: Yes. He was later in Korea and in Vietnam where he became four star. A very tough cookie. I knew that but he was congenial in our small group.

Q: Oh, he is very nice in Korea.

GALLOWAY: Yes, but he didn't get along with our ambassador.

Q: I am not surprised.

GALLOWAY: Well, Dick came up with an inspiration. He proposed that we get a copy of the Treaty of Versailles and see if it had a list of military materiel that should be forbidden. We did that and we found the list of prohibited military materiel in the Versailles treaty. We just updated it. We didn't tell too many people where we got our start; we just updated it and presented it with straight faces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had instructed us to produce such a list couldn't give us any guidance, so we just put

our list on the table and the four power military delegations began negotiating. As you know, if there is a vacuum in some area of policy and someone puts forward a reasonable proposal, it has a good chance of being accepted. Things just seem to happen that way.

Q: I recall Dean Rusk drawing a line in a National Geographic then at the 38th parallel in Korea. Little did he know that later on that was going to happen.

GALLOWAY: The four power military meetings really had a go at negotiating it, and it was generally accepted, except that we finally got stuck on the number of aircraft that were to be allowed to the Bulgarians and the Rumanians and the Italians. The Soviets wanted more for the Bulgarians and Rumanians and fewer for Italy. We spent a long time arguing over that in London. Then, we moved to New York during the General Assembly meeting so the foreign ministers could decide the yet to be agreed parts of the treaties. The general plan was for them to resolve the main problems in the drafts, then send the delegations back to get it all finished up, and then set up a peace conference for all Allied powers in Paris in 1946. While we were in New York, General Balmer managed to get tickets for the football game between Army and Notre Dame the year Davis and Blanchard were starting for Army.

Q: Oh, yes.

GALLOWAY: We went off to Yankee Stadium with some of the members of the other delegations. It turned out to be a disappointing game, the final score being nothing to nothing. So, we went on to Paris from there to complete the negotiations and set things up for a peace conference. We and the Russians were still at swords points on the numbers of aircraft to be allowed the defeated nations. So, the French decided the best thing to do was to take us away from the negotiating table, let us have a little fun and work out the disagreement in good spirit. They took the military delegations down to Deauville and put us up in a hotel on the beach. We had a great time. Strawberries were just in season, and the fish, my gosh the seafood was fantastic. It was unbelievable. We stayed there for a few days. There was a casino but we couldn't go in with our military uniforms. So we scrounged around and found some other things to wear and went in to the gaming tables. The Russians, a Lieutenant General and a Major, never would make a bet. They would come over and tell us to put it on the number which would correspond with the number of planes they wanted to settle on in the treaties. Back in Paris, we finally got things all wound up. The Conference of Paris was held there in 1946 for the signing of the Peace Treaties between the Allied Powers and Italy and the Balkan countries. I came back to Washington for a short time and then went to Vienna with General Balmer for the occupation and the meetings of the Austrian Treaty Commission. I have already given an account of that assignment. I left occupation duty there in ‘48 and came back to Washington for reassignment. That was a major turning point in my life. I was faced with the decision of whether the army was really for me. The army personnel office would not listen to three assignments which had been open to me in areas of work akin to what I had been doing for some time, but rather insisted that I had enough of moving around in staff positions and must be assigned to troop duty. When I inquired about what troop duty they had in mind, I was informed that I was to be assigned to Fort Sill as a gunnery instructor.

The fact that I had begun my commissioned service in such a job seemed not to be germane. So I decided to get in touch with Ted Achilles at State. He had been assigned to us as liaison officer during the negotiations of those peace treaties with Italy and the Balkan nations. He and I got to be very good friends. He had broached to me in London the possibility of joining the Foreign Service. At the time, I was still caught up in the interests of the assignments I had, as well as enjoying the relationship with General Balmer. Ted urged me to think about it again when I got back to Washington.

So I got back here and found that the prospects for a military career, after what I had been involved in, seemed really dismal. Going to Fort Sill to a job in which I had started out seemed to me to be emblematic of what I could expect in the future. Moreover, I had been made aware during my military service, even though I was a regular officer, that there was a bond among graduates of West Point which had a definite effect on assignments and promotions. Even though I had been given a regular commission as an honor military graduate of Texas A&M, future prospects in a postwar army did not seem so bright. So, I decided to retire. I wrote out my resignation and walked it through four echelons in the Pentagon in one day. Fortunately, I got it through. In retrospect, I have to think that I was lucky because I got out before there was any definite policy in the army to hold on to people. I had been in touch with Ted Achilles who had told me that if I could get out to come on over and he would hire me in the State Department. I got it signed that day by all the necessary echelons in headquarters. I was offered a reserve commission but declined.

Q: Why don't we stop at that point. So we'll pick this up in really 1948 and Ted Achilles has invited you to come over to the State Department.

***

Today is the sixth of October 1999, I'd first like to go back a touch. Could you tell me a bit about your impression of Ted Achilles when you were working with him in Vienna?

GALLOWAY: No, I didn't work with Ted in Vienna. Ted was not in Vienna.

Q: Where did you work with him?

GALLOWAY: The negotiations for the peace treaties were in London where the Council of Foreign Ministers of the four powers were meeting. The preliminary work was done there by their deputies. Then, the Council of Foreign Ministers met to review the results, including at the General Assembly meeting in New York that fall. So, we worked in London for a few months, and then the entire group of delegations and staff boarded the Aquitania which was just about to dry-dock in Britain for scrap. The British Government made arrangements for her to make one last unscheduled crossing to get us all over to New York. It was a relief when they gathered there in New York where the foreign ministers of the four powers reviewed the work already done and gave instructions needed to complete the drafts of the treaties. We were in New York for some weeks, then we headed back not to London but Paris. It had been agreed that the peace conference

would be held in Paris, and we finished the negotiations there. The conference was held there in 1946 with much pomp and ceremony in the best French tradition.

Q: So you came back, what job did you get. When you came in, did you take any exam or just...

GALLOWAY: I was still in uniform then.

Q: Yes, but did you, we had already talked somewhat about this, but what was your impression of when you were still in uniform of how Ted Achilles operated?

GALLOWAY: Ted was not only a highly intelligent Foreign Service Officer, but also knew his way around the bureaucratic aisles of the State Department. When I got in touch with him after I came back here and decided I would make the move, he said, "Come on over and let's talk about it." I went over and he said, "I can hire you right here." He was chief of the Western European Division in the Department. He said, "I can hire you. What sort of salary do you want?" I said, "Well. I'd like to get the equivalent of a captain's salary in the army." He said, "How much would you like to get?" I said, "About $4,000, something like that." He said, "Oh, well, that shouldn't be any problem." So, they were able to hire me in a professional grade in the Civil Service. I went right to work in the Western European division, starting officially as the assistant desk officer on Spain and Portugal. The regular desk officer was Bill Dunham, a congenial fellow with a lot of ability, who readily took me under his wing.

Q: Yes, I know bill. He was in Annapolis.

GALLOWAY: He nursed me along carefully and soon let me have Portugal ostensibly, while he kept an eye on things. We got along great. Fortunately, I took to the business pretty well. On the Portuguese desk, during this time, we were trying to set up renewal of the Azores Treaty. Also, we had pending the Marshall Plan implementation where legislation required negotiations for bilateral agreements for some organizational machinery with the various European countries before they could participate. These activities vis-a-vis Portugal were interesting and seemed important to me. After a few months, the officer who had the Belgian, Swiss and Luxembourg desk became very ill. In fact, he became so ill that he would never return. Ted Achilles, the informal and practical bureaucrat, said, "Hey Bill, how about you taking this on?" I said, "Sure." There I was, I think I was 25 or 26 years old, and I had no formal academic background for that kind of work. I just dug into it and watched the other officers. I got a lot of pointers from them. They were all very helpful. Elim O'Shaughnessey who was the French desk officer sort of adopted me and we became very close and lasting friends. He dubbed me " Junior." I was junior in the Western European division. Woody Wallner was there as deputy of the division. Mac Godley came in a little bit later and had the number two slot for France. So, Ted had hired me into that world just on the basis of our association in London on the treaty negotiations, and I became desk officer for Belgium, Switzerland and Luxembourg. I turned my attention to getting to know and learning to work with the diplomatic representatives of those countries at their missions in Washington. It was a heady wine

for someone just out of a military uniform and a long way from Throckmorton and the farm where I came into the world. After a few years of participating in the post war four power military negotiations, I was working with seasoned diplomats and moving onto much broader international horizons.

Q: I was going to say, in Western Europe at this time, the Marshall Plan was just coming in, there must have been great concern about what was going to happen, because all those countries looked like they could collapse and sort of end up as revolutionary regimes didn't they or not?

GALLOWAY: Well, it varied from one to the other. It so happened that in my particular area, Switzerland would have liked to share in some benefits of the Marshall Plan, but without having to sign anything that might have seemed to infringe on its policy of neutrality. We harangued about that back and forth for a long time and really nothing came of it. Belgium and, of course, Luxembourg were steady as a rock. Belgium still had the politically sensitive question of the monarchy hanging over it. Leopold, you are familiar with that story?

Q: He had surrendered very easily and was not in good odor.

GALLOWAY: No, not at all. Moreover, during the war he had picked up a lady, made her his consort and later wanted to make her queen. Anyway, he had gone into exile with everybody else, and with the end of the war, he didn't enjoy the same welcome as his fellow countrymen who had been working for or fighting with the Allies. He didn't have a lot of support among the Belgian people or the Belgian government. Spock was the head of the socialist party and van Vreeland was head of the conservatives. They alternated in winning post war elections and heading the government. Both of them had a degree of popular support and both were able politicians, Spock particularly. They just sort of let the issue of the king hang without taking any initiatives. Eventually, as you know, his son came back and was accepted by the public at large and both political parties and in due course was crowned.

Q: Baudouin.

GALLOWAY: Baudouin came back, and it was settled in that fashion, which I suppose was a model that served later for Spain. In any event, the Belgian Government itself was quite stable. They had been run over and through during the war, but as far as their economy was concerned, they were ahead of most other Europeans at that time. They got busy after the war. Things were coming back, so they really didn't need a heck of a lot of help except for some priming. They could take it from there themselves which they did. So there was little difficulty in setting up a program for them with an agreement. After that, elections just followed right along. So, relatively speaking, I'd say I probably had an easier time than the fellows who were negotiating with the other Europeans. As I recall, John Leddy was the overseer for most of those bilateral agreements to implement the Marshall Plan. Anyway, we got them done pretty quickly.

Then, the next item which came on the agenda almost simultaneously was the security problem in Europe. This really stemmed from the concern expressed by the British. In an early visit over there, General Marshall and Bevin were together, and Bevin began talking about security for western Europe, thinking out loud about getting together a broad band of free democratic powers from western Europe into the Middle East. Marshall called in Jack Hickerson and, telling him about Bevin's ramblings, asked him to find out what it was all about. Jack went over to the Foreign Office and soon learned that the general idea was to explore the security situation with a view to finding some kind of security arrangement with which the United States could be associated. That had been a foregone conclusion among our people.

Q: Where was this in relation to the two things in '48 that, I think, one was the Berlin blockade and the other was the communist overthrow of the regular government in Czechoslovakia?

GALLOWAY: These didn't have much effect on my particular work right away. After the Berlin airlift had been organized, that was enough of an early warning for us to conclude anyway, okay, let's do what we can. The one other thing with Belgium was that after the war we entered into an arrangement with them about the Congo. By that time, we had verified that there were significant uranium deposits in the Congo. So, we made arrangements with Belgium. They were very cooperative with respect to our access. They got in return some preferential treatment in various matters. That was a pretty solid relationship in the manner it was implemented.

Then came the security concern which was widespread in western Europe. There were no organized indigenous forces there, except for some in France. They were unreliable at that point. The British really took the lead, and what it came down to was that fortunately for them, there were people in high office in the U.S., mainly Harry Truman and General Marshall, and Senator Vandenberg in the Senate who had his eyes opened very much by WWII. These people had come to recognize that European security was no longer just European security. It was Atlantic security. We had experienced two wars because of not accepting that fact of life. So there was an opening here, but those people who were in the high offices of government were, in their thinking and their understanding of the world situation at that time, ahead of the general public. What was needed was some European initiative, something to make people in this country aware that Europeans wanted to do something for themselves and were prepared to do something for themselves. We told the Europeans at the time to go on back and work up some security arrangement among themselves that could show they were determined to take whatever steps and work as hard as necessary to build up forces to defend themselves. Hence, the Brussels treaty was formed in the spring. Vandenberg then sponsored a resolution in the Senate for the United States to aid and assist those countries who had shown their intention of resisting aggression and protecting their people. That was the first plank or the first opening that this country had for the executive to move toward some possible Atlantic security arrangement. We had talks with the Canadians in '48 in the Pentagon and got the ball rolling. A general area of agreement emerged from those early consultations. One had really to look at the Congress and the nation for the broad consensus to support a policy

which would, in effect, tie U.S. security to Europe. Apparently, Truman endorsed it right away and gave Marshall a free hand. Robert Lovett was Undersecretary of State under Marshall, and he undertook exploratory talks with the European ambassadors. That came after we already had the talks with the Canadians in the Pentagon which affirmed the possibility of a collective approach. The Pentagon was understandably reticent about any true test for security commitments that immediately involved troops. During a period of some months, less than a year, some of the younger officers over there on the general staff whose thinking was very advanced managed to convince the doubters that U.S. security interests included Europe.

Now, about the negotiation of the treaty, we got a joint memorandum from the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to the President recommending exploratory talks to consider the possibility for the United States to participate in some kind of security arrangement with the Western European powers. Those talks were initiated here by the Secretary of State with the ambassadors concerned beginning in September. Their result was to form a committee to be chaired by Jack Hickerson to proceed with continuing and detailed substantive discussions. We ended up with three tiers, Ambassadors and the Secretary of State, then the Assistant Secretary level with Ambassadors or DCMs, which was the International Working Group, and another group of less senior officers which was really a drafting group. I have pictures of the working group; also, I have a silver cigarette box, of which there are fifteen in existence, with the engraved names of the members of the working group. We decided to give ourselves these mementos because we realized our anonymity in the whole scheme and wanted to mark the occasion at least for ourselves and our immediate associates and families. There were seven countries involved. We started negotiations in the fall of '48 and continued steadily the rest of the year. We proposed a pretty coherent draft of a treaty to all the governments. Following their reactions, we had the second round of negotiations. Very little difference, few changes, nothing really of substance.

Q: When you were doing this in your own mind and your colleagues around you, I am not talking about the top people. What had priority? To stop the Soviets or to keep or tie France and Britain and all and do something about Germany so Germany wouldn't rise again.

GALLOWAY: At that juncture the Europeans were pretty scared and didn't know what the Soviets were going to do, and I don’t think that the Soviets really knew. But there we were, sitting cheek by jowl in Germany and some change inevitably had to come about in time. It couldn't go on forever. But, in the face of the Soviet threat, we concentrated on security.

The concept was a collective security arrangement, based on Article 51 of the UN Charter, which would be triggered only if the USSR moved against the Western powers. It took us a few months to negotiate the clauses in the treaty, in particular article 5, which opened up the possible use of military force or allowed the use of military force. That was a decision for each government to make. During those negotiations, which were supposedly hush-hush super secret, the top people here in Washington were resolved to

carry through with a firm stand. The Congress was consulted informally with Vandenberg as the main contact, even though Connally became chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Q: Tom Connally of Texas.

GALLOWAY: So, we tried to keep in close touch with and brief everybody in the top levels who would be concerned with the broad policy decisions. In the State Department it was handled by Jack Hickerson directly to the Secretary who, by then, was Dean Acheson. Jack brought Ted Achilles into the circle and Ted brought me in. This became a continuing practice but an informal one. We had some things to work out in the State Department because some of the Secretary's principal advisors had an interest, principally Chip Bohlen and George Kennan.. Chip tended to be doubtful but not actually hostile to the direction we were taking, mainly because he doubted that the Senate would approve it. George Kennan, in his ubiquitous way, came up with some general ideas not sufficiently specific to be of any particular use. Acheson and Marshall had instinctively seemed to want only a few people directly involved in these negotiations to keep them under control. Giving Hickerson direct responsibility accomplished the purpose. Kennan may have sat in on a few sessions. I don't think Chip did. Hickerson acted as chairman. He was solid as a rock, a wonderful fellow to work with and had a marvelous sense of humor. He was very intelligent, had rock like integrity, and knew where we ought to be going. Ted, a superb writer, was the primary draftsman of the treaty. The meetings of the working group evolved into a unique experience hardly resembling normal diplomatic activities. In a short time, a spirit of camaraderie developed to the point that the members were working together as a group, hardly as representatives of governments. The informal and intimate exchanges enabled different points of view to be reconciled with relative ease, so that there was soon a common approach on most major issues. This had the effect of bringing the participating governments closer together and to a successful conclusion.

Q: How about the French? The French always seem in recent history and I guess really in ancient history always seem to go off on a different tangent?

GALLOWAY: Well, they were in a very weird position at this time. They were going through a succession of governments with various politicians being selected in succession as prime ministers with their cabinets changing. DeGaulle was sitting down at his place. He was not back in circulation.

Q: Sulking in his tent.

GALLOWAY: He was sulking. There were two or three fellows in the French foreign office who were very solid and sound. Roland DeMargerie, for example. I think he was political director or director general. He was a very bright and savvy guy. To the extent that they, and their people here in the embassy who met with us, were given pretty wide latitude to handle the negotiations, things went quite well. The Ambassador, Henri Bonnet, was effervescent but pliable and followed along with his staff.

Q: You can fill that in later.

GALLOWAY: His deputy played an active part, and Arnold Wapler, first secretary or counselor was my opposite number. They were with us all along, with little difference in their line of thinking from the rest of the group. The only thing that came up in the "Atlantic area" part of the negotiations that caused some trouble was French insistence on the inclusion of the three Algerian departments of France, which according to the French constitution were considered to be part of France. In any event, we finally got around that with some sort of guile, language that enabled us to carry on. We had such a near consensus in the working group that we'd help each other when needed to bring governments around to the common ground. If some particular initiative would be better received coming from the Europeans, we'd stand by and they would take the initiative. During that period of six months to a year we became close friends and tended to pal around together socially. I was particularly fortunate to be so close to Ted Achilles. A few years ago I was asked to present a paper on the nature of the working group activities to a NATO sponsoring group at Kent State University. (Attachment No. 3) I told them that I thought Ted Achilles played a primary role in the conceptual thinking, drafting and negotiation of the treaty. As a thinker and draftsman, he had few peers. I compared his role in the conception and negotiation of the treaty to that of James Madison in the framing of the Constitution. That is how important Ted's contribution was to the North Atlantic Treaty. Moreover, he happened to be pretty well connected in the Republican party. His family was, I believe, involved in the founding of Eastman Kodak. Ted was valuable not only in terms of treaty language and treaty negotiations, but also in using his political antenna to read the mood of political leaders and the general public.

Q: How about the Robert Taft wing of the Republican party? In '48, at least the house had been taken over by the Republicans and Taft was a Republican leader although in the Senate representing what used to be the isolationist side of the Republicans. Was that a concern?

GALLOWAY: I was not all that close to congressional politics at the time, but it certainly never seemed to be an obstacle or a drawback to Vandenberg and Connally. Connolly went right on chairing his committee and supporting the treaty, and Vandenberg sat by as the greater statesman.

Q: He had been an isolationist.

GALLOWAY: He had, and was like many converts. He was more Catholic than the Pope as far as being an internationalist after WWII. It may be for that reason that Taft and his followers did not seem to give him pause. The only thing that seemed to matter was the nature and extent of the U.S. commitment. That got around again to Article 5 the heart of the treaty. Well, when we were working on that in draft, going back and forth on it, lo and behold the text of it appeared in the New York Times, by Scotty Reston. Official reaction by the U.S. and other governments was duly horrified. For several years after, I kept an ear to the ground trying to find out who had done the deed. Analyzing it

carefully, I was convinced that it must have been a deliberate leak, and I thought it might have been Vandenberg or Acheson. Years later, my wife and I were invited to dinner by the Canadian Ambassador in honor of his departing Minister, Saul Rae, an old friend who had been one of our NATO colleagues in London and Paris. Secretary Acheson, long retired, and Scotty Reston were among the guests. During the course of conversation, I had an opportunity to ask the Secretary if he knew who had given Mr. Reston the text of Article 5 when it was being negotiated. He remembered the incident and in his customary fashion of taking the bull by the horns, he raised his voice to carry across the room and said, "Scotty, Bill Galloway wants to know who gave you the text of Article 5 when we were negotiating the North Atlantic Treaty." After a brief pause, Reston responded, "Yes, I guess he would kind of like to know." That was the end of it.

Q: Well, it had been an article of faith the United States in Washington's farewell address. I am sure the phrase "No entangling alliances" must have been engraved over your workplace, and here was an entangling alliance.

GALLOWAY: Here was an entangling alliance, no question about it, and about as close to a direct military commitment as any such in history. You'd have to go back two or three centuries to find such a closely binding commitment for one country to aid another. The leak stirred up a real hornets nest at the time. Of course, everybody piously denied knowing anything or having talked to anybody. Much later, I learned from a scholar at Kent State doing his dissertation what I now accept as the explanation of the leak. This is borne out in Ted Achilles autobiography -- an admission that he, himself, leaked it, either with or without knowledge of his peers or superiors, I don't know. I surmise that Ted thought it a necessary move to see whether or not the public would support this government in making such a security commitment. As the reaction indicated, there was no strong public opposition. From there on it was smooth sledding. The only remaining question was the membership of the treaty. Italy, of course wanted in very badly.

The French, allowing their duplicity to take hold, sponsored Italian membership by telling the Italians we will do everything we can to get you in the treaty, and then in our working group meeting saying well these people can't really be depended on. Anyway, the U.S. wanted Italy in, believing that the lesson of World War II had been well learned and that Italy was likely to be permanently on the path of democracy.

Q: Well, of course, after by this time was after the very crucial 1948 elections in Italy. We had made a slight investment in, actually, both the Soviets and the United States poured money into that election to put the Christian Democrats in the drivers seat.

GALLOWAY: Which lasted for about 50 years. That of course, was a key element in Italy. As you say, we were generous in our support of Italy.

Q: The specter would have gone that way anyway.

GALLOWAY: I think so. It certainly expressed the true aspirations and goals of the Italians as I remember them.

Q: Yes, but something could have gone wrong. '48 was a very critical year.

GALLOWAY: '48 I suppose of all the post war years was the most critical. When we began to wind down on our treaty work, somebody asked what we were going to do about a preamble? Nobody had thought of a preamble. That really opened up the floor for all kinds of language that became sort of a contest. But, finally, we came up with wording that served the purpose. That was, then, the completion of the initial drafting of the North Atlantic Treaty.

We then began to consult with other countries interested in joining the proposed security arrangement. The Norwegians came in first with whole hearted support for the pact. They had some questions about some of the clauses. Morgansterne was their ambassador and the fellow on his staff who did most of the treaty work was Sivert Neilsen who later became Norwegian ambassador to the United Nations. He was very bright and cooperative, very helpful. Their questions were soon and easily answered, and they lent their full support.

That was an extraordinary group. I have never participated in any other venture that was as pure in the actions of the people involved. There was no backbiting, we had some open arguments about various things, but the general role, the central purpose was always there. We were unified, and our thinking was the same. We became close friends. It was the most important and exhilarating experience in my life. Now, my memories are tinged with personal sadness because I am the only American still living who participated in it.

Q: What about Denmark?

GALLOWAY: Denmark did follow the Norwegians. The Swedes tried to dissuade Norway and Denmark, but the Norwegians who had been fully engaged in World War II had no illusions. Lange, their leader, was a very solid man of great intellect and principle. He knew the past and where the future lay. The Danes seemed to be less assertive. They had the longest relationship with the Swedes, I suppose, and they really didn't like the idea of saying no to Sweden, but they thought the other way was much in their interest. There was an amusing side note in these Baltic consultations. It had to do with the Icelanders. Although they maintained more or less a neutral pose in public, they got to Acheson and told him that the Norwegians and Danes had to come in. Don't you let them fluff you off on this. You hold your noses and come on through. Particularly the Danes. So the Danes came along.

Q: Was there any thought at the time of trying to bring the Swedes in, for example?

GALLOWAY: I can't say there really was. Doc Matthews was ambassador to Sweden at that point. He would have liked to have the Swedes come in. He showered the Department with telegrams on how we should define our policy in Scandinavia more clearly and distinctly. He tried getting this argument around in various ways, but there was no one I can recall, either in the Department or in the Congress, who expressed a

great desire to pressure the Swedes. They had their own military establishment. We knew that Sweden, ideologically and politically, would be maintaining strictly a policy of neutrality. That neutrality would always be in accordance with western ideas and ideals. Sweden was regarded as a friendly neutral. We really didn't need to worry about it for a security arrangement.

Q: During the drafting period, was consideration made that obviously this was one of the major purposes was to present a bulwark against the Soviets, but at the same time were you all careful to try to not sound provocative?

GALLOWAY: I think to an extent we were. Some more than others. The Canadians, for example, were strong in pushing Article 2, known as the economic article. Some other countries, too. There was hope that economic cooperation and assistance could be available through that channel. But apart from that, I don't think there were any governments, individual spokesmen or ministers who were provocative toward the Soviets. Nor were they defensive about what we were doing. I think it was generally assumed that Soviet intelligence was good enough that they probably knew all along how the negotiations were going.

Incidentally, this is getting a bit ahead, but that assumption carried through during the subsequent life of NATO, particularly, within U.S. political and intelligence circles.

Q: Well, you know, on the 50th anniversary of the treaty, the phrase was brought up that was used around your time that NATO was designed to keep the Germans down, the Soviets out and the Americans in. Was there any thought that the Germans might join? We are talking about the West Germans.

GALLOWAY: During these negotiations, the question of the future of Germany played no part. Three of the participating powers were in occupation in Germany, and early during the consideration of a security arrangement between Western Europe and the U.S., it was recognized that it would not get off the ground if it were coupled with German peace negotiations or any hint of German participation. This applied not only in assessing Soviet reaction but also to the political and security interests of the proposed members of the security pact.

Q: Then when this was signed and approved by the Senate, what did you do?

GALLOWAY: After the signature in what was then called the Department of the Interior Auditorium -- I don't know what it is called now.

Q: I think it is called the government auditorium. It is the big auditorium on Constitution Avenue across from the Smithsonian. I think it is called the Federal Government Auditorium.

GALLOWAY: It was then the Department of the Interior Auditorium. It was the largest around at that time so we set it up there. One amusing sideline, we were all over there

sort of acting as ushers, Hickerson, Achilles and I, and one or two of the secretariat who helped us in getting things trimmed up, and Luke Battle, Dean Acheson's special assistant. We were all over there just hovering around waiting for the beginning of the ceremony. All of a sudden a middle aged lady came in the main entrance and started walking down the aisle. She did not evoke much recognition until Ted saw her and in the blink of an eye he got to her side, offered his arm and escorted Mrs. Bess Truman to a seat in the front row.

After the signing was completed, we all just went on back to the State Department. I expect Jack and Ted went over to the Metropolitan Club and had themselves a good martini lunch. Ever been to the Metropolitan Club?

Q: Oh, yes.

GALLOWAY: I don't know if they still serve drinks now as then. If you ordered a martini, you would get it by the carafe - about two regular glasses of martinis. Quite a few in State were members then.

Q: Oh, yes. I think you could almost order automatically if you were a foreign service officer.

GALLOWAY: Yes, be a member. Well, you could get in although it was still expensive in those days and one needed more than just a modest salary. Ted wanted to put me up for membership there and at the Chevy Chase Country Club; I thanked him profusely but couldn't afford it. Most of the assistant secretaries and people like Ted were certainly well fixed to carry the dues. In those days there would always be four or five cars heading over to the Metropolitan Club at lunchtime. Ted or Jack or some other kind soul would invite me from time to time. It was sort of like a continuation of the psychology closely associated with WWII, the occupation and the cold war about the consumption of alcohol. If you were going to have a lunch it wasn't a lunch unless you had a martini. An awful lot of “the creature” was consumed in that era. Dinner, my goodness, started with martinis, wine during the meal, then brandy and cigars before setting up three or four tables of bridge, which also brought on the scotch. I couldn't take that much. I had to drop out early so I could go to sleep that night. But it didn't seem to impair the intellectual functions of the policy makers. The Metropolitan Club was part of the government; it was part of the arena, serving principal people from the White House, the State Department, some, not too many from Defense. It was a little far for them. Besides, they had their own club and didn't want to get tainted. CIA people would be in there, and the princes of the press, Joe Alsop, Scotty Reston, and I was going to say Walter Cronkite, but I think he had already gone to New York and television. He started out as I recall as a UP correspondent, and got an offer to move into TV when it came along. I remember he was at the press club one day when I had been invited over by Bill Lawrence. You remember Bill Lawrence of the New York Times? He and I became good friends when I was in Vienna. He saw Walter on this occasion and said, "You know, Walter, here, is going to be pie in the sky. He is going to take a job in TV, giving up journalism and moving to TV." Cronkite didn’t seem to be too confident about the move himself but said he was

going to give it a try and could always come back if it didn't work out. I thought about that years later. Cronkite, I suppose, became the dean emeritus of TV journalism in this country.

Q: Well, now, were you back after the treaty was signed to Belgium, Luxembourg, and Switzerland?

GALLOWAY: I had that, plus I shared the treaty responsibility in the European division for the period of time that Jack and Ted were there. There was a reorganization of the department about a year or so later. But, before the reorganization, we went back to work with the Europeans who were keen for implementation of the treaty, particularly on the military side. I worked with the Pentagon, and we negotiated with the European representatives on a military arrangement, not a command arrangement, but a military cooperative planning arrangement.

We came up with a committee for military planning in northern Europe, one in central Europe, one for southern Europe and the Mediterranean and one for Canada and the United States and so forth. So we had a succession of these committees which endured for...

Q: Could I, you say you were on the implementation side. Were there any problems?

GALLOWAY: There was an overhanging problem in that the Europeans wanted a more visible military commitment from the United States than just consultation and planning.. We called these things that we set up planning groups.. Planning for northern Europe, planning for Southern Europe and so forth. The Europeans wanted, of course, stronger military commitment than just joint planning. While the political talks were going on, these planning groups gathered and began producing planning papers. The military has a great facility for doing that. All the while, we received gentle and sometimes even more pressure for commitments stronger than military planning. Eventually, at the next North Atlantic Council meeting it was agreed to set up a military command structure.

Q: Yes, well, Eisenhower went out there it had to be before '52 because he came back and ran for President in '52. He was the supreme commander.

GALLOWAY: He was the first supreme commander. That was from, no, we started, I guess, about '49.

Q: Yes '50 and '51 to early '52 I think.

GALLOWAY: Yes. After he got SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) set up and running in Paris, he had a stream of visitors from the U.S. seeking to persuade him to return home and hold himself in readiness to run for the presidency. Cabot Lodge was one of the last to make the pilgrimage. Eisenhower resigned his command and returned to take the appointment as President of Columbia University in late '52 or early '53.

On the actual negotiations for the establishment of the military command structure, the initial step was to set up the “Standing Group,” which was to be the highest military authority with all other NATO commands subordinate to it. It’s membership would be the highest military officers of the United States, the United Kingdom and France. The Supreme Commander would report to it. Naturally, General Eisenhower was the unanimous choice of the NATO governments. General Al Gruenther, with whom we had worked on the negotiation of the treaty in Washington when he was director of the Joint Staff, was named by Eisenhower as his Chief of Staff. In London, he told me about Eisenhower”s acceptance of the appointment. You probably know that Eisenhower was a fanatic about bridge. Gruenther, a world class player and tournament bridge referee, was his favorite partner.

It seems that they were in a bridge game down at Fort McNair when Eisenhower was called to the telephone. He came back to the table and said that he had been told that he was wanted to be “Supreme Commander for this UN thing.” Gruenther said, "That's North Atlantic Treaty." Eisenhower, “Well, I'll tell them that I'll do it, but you have got to come along.” And so he did. They scheduled an early visit to all of the countries in NATO. Politically, that was probably the first really major move under the North Atlantic Treaty to give it substance. He went to all the countries and met with their prime ministers and defense ministers. Gruenther briefed us in London afterwards. The principal problem they met was the proposed “Standing Group” of three countries. They were able to get rather grudging acceptance of the idea everywhere they went until they got to Rome. Gruenther, a small fellow about 5'6," maybe 5'7," had a voice like a bull horn, and he said, "When we got to Rome and talked to the Italians, they were all for the “Standing Group” to be composed of the United States and Italy and any other country we wanted to have. The Italians were dogged in their insistence, and maintained it for quite some time. We finally just had to tell them if they wanted to be a party to the treaty they were going to have to agree. The issue was finally settled at the next meeting of foreign ministers. We had sent instructions to our embassy in Rome to make it absolutely clear to the Italians that they must agree to the “Standing Group,” Count Sforza, their foreign minister, carried it on to the point of making a case in the ministers meeting. Dean Acheson got up and made one of the smoothest, most complimentary and compassionate speeches ever. He said that it pained him deeply to have to disagree with Count Sforza, a man whose record on liberty and justice had been firmly established long before his other colleagues at the meeting were adults. It had been one of the most glorious strains of the efforts by the true Italy to achieve its unity, independence and freedom. It was because of Count Sforza’s integrity, his long involvement in leading Italy to its rightful place and his great international stature that he felt he could ask him to exercise his authority to agree on this crucial issue. Acheson went on in that vein. It was wonderful to watch Sforza as his profile tilted and his eyes fixed just over the heads of those on the other side of the table. There was a pause which the old Count let go on for a minute, and then he signified his agreement. After the meeting, one of the members of the Italian delegation came up to me and asked if Count Sforza could have a copy of the statement made by Secretary Acheson.

Q: He had a little goatee.

GALLOWAY: He had a little goatee. Acheson was always able to rise to an occasion like this with superb oratorical skill which ended with the appeal to Sforza as the power to make the decision himself. And Sforza responded accordingly. He loved that. It was a fitting way to put the matter to rest.

Q: What was the issue with the Italians?

GALLOWAY: Just that they wanted to be regarded as a great power in terms comparable to France. They did not want to be classed as one of the smaller powers. The fact that they had started out on the other side in the war was irrelevant to them. I got to know many Italian diplomats after that and some of them became very close friends. I have a great admiration for the Italians and their ability to live life in a way that perhaps few other people can.

Q: Well, after these standing committees were set up and all, was your job to sort of monitor them or what?

GALLOWAY: That is what we were doing for a few months, but then the push for further implementation of the treaty was such that very soon the idea was posed of a permanent political body at a level to exercise overall control. The North Atlantic Council of foreign ministers was the head of everything, but it was able to meet only from time to time. So, the discussions went back and forth and in due course came up with the mechanism of the North Atlantic Council Deputies, a permanent body to be situated in London, exercise control over NATO, reporting only to the North Atlantic Council. We moved on to get agreement on that fairly easily and quickly. In theory, these Deputies were to be individuals of such standing in their own countries that they would be able to act on their own discretion for the most part without having to refer back to their governments for approval and instructions on every question. That was, of course, wishful thinking, but we set them up in 1949 or 1950 in London. For the first year, we would go and meet for a few sessions in London and then all go back to our capitals. During that time, we crossed and recrossed the Atlantic at least a dozen times.

In the meantime, there was a reorganization in the State Department. Basically, what had been known as geographic offices and UN office, became bureaus, and were headed by assistant secretaries. For the Bureau of European Affairs, we had George Perkins. He was a member of the Merck Company family and had been one of the top executives in the company. He came in during the period between April when the treaty was signed and the moves toward its implementation.

Meanwhile, I built up my working relationships with the Pentagon and made friends over there who were very helpful and cooperative. My wife and I were out at dinner one evening where one of the participants was a colonel on the joint staff of the JCS. It turned out that he was one of the officers in the mainstream of their NATO planning and operations unit. He told me that the staff was in the process of preparing a paper for the

action of the joint chiefs, which they already understood to be the intent of the joint chiefs, assessing the force capabilities and strengths of the United States.

As part of this, they were going to have a clause to the effect that the total force was such that there would be at least two divisions in excess of domestic requirements and would be available for deployment overseas. Of course that was what the Europeans had been wanting all along.

The next morning I was in George Perkins' office quite early. I don't think I had even shaved. When he came in, he said, "Bill, what in the heck are you doing here?" I said, "Well, I have a little news for you." I told him about the information I had learned the previous evening about the JCS working level paper on forces. He got busy with everybody from the Secretary on down calling the Pentagon. The gist of the communications was what in the heck were they doing over there because they were way ahead of us on the policy for overseas force deployment. The responses came back in soothing tones that they were just getting their ducks in order and preparing. This was a little rough. Anyway, the furor died down shortly, and that turned out to be the first real indication that the Pentagon was at long last fully supporting the concept of Atlantic security and prepared to take the major step of putting in troops.

Q: How long did you stay in the Bureau of Western European Affairs?

GALLOWAY: Well, George Perkins called me in. One of the new offices set up was known as the Office of Regional Affairs. I was the first officer assigned to it. It was to have responsibility for political, military, and economic affairs in a regional context. An economic officer was designated as the director and several other economic officers were assigned to staff it. I was the only officer in it who had been through the whole NATO experience. Quite soon, I had found that the economic people were tending to move in a direction which inevitably would end in a split. So, I went to Perkins and asked him if I could speak to him off the record. I told him that the way the officers in the regional office were going could only end in trouble. I suggested that he get a very strong political officer and put him up there as the deputy director of that office. I became instantly a bum and later a hero for what I did. Do you know Wahwee MacArthur?

Q: Yes, Mrs. MacArthur.

GALLOWAY: MacArthur had been director of the Office of Western European Affairs which he had aspired to all his career. When he was told he was going to be made deputy director of the Office of Regional Affairs, he was not overjoyed to say the least. His reaction was pale compared to that of his wife. Anyway, Doug came up there reluctantly but with all his juices flowing as always. I had an office adjacent to his with an inner door. We could sneak back and forth and talk with each other without going out in the hall. He was right on me. I don't know if you know him or not.

Q: Oh, yes, I had a long interview.

GALLOWAY: You did?

Q: Yes. One of my first interviews.

GALLOWAY: Well, Doug was a dear man. He had a very mixed reputation in the foreign service and in the department. He was a fellow with great energy and determination, and when he was directed to go, he went. He would go in, over, through, whatever was standing in his way. His contemporaries more or less got along with him and some of them genuinely liked him, but for most, he was regarded as a guy to stay away from.

Q: Yes. He was difficult to be a subordinate, and then again, particularly in the overseas thing, his wife was very difficult always.

GALLOWAY: Well, Doug and I had a marvelous relationship. I found him to be a very loyal, a very understanding, and supportive boss. I became his special assistant in a later assignment. He was brought back from serving as an advisor to Eisenhower when he was at SHAPE. He was brought back by Dulles and made Counselor of the State Department. He got me back as his special assistant. There were just the two of us. As we go on in this saga, I will tell you much more about him.

Q: Well, let's stick now sort of chronologically for the time. We are talking about when he was deputy.

GALLOWAY: It was called RA, the Office of Regional Affairs. He was deputy and was given de facto responsibility for politico-military affairs. So, we carried on working on the measures and consulting with the Pentagon and the representatives at the NATO embassies which led to the conversion of the North Atlantic alliance from a piece of paper to an actual alliance with real people, real forces and institutions which over a period of time exceeded everyone's expectations. The original steps were very small. Ed Martin was the Director of RA. I had three chiefs. Ed Martin, Ridgeway Knight and MacArthur. If I hadn't been young and enjoying it all, I am not sure I'd still be here, because each of those fellows was in his own right an extraordinary officer, all very able officers, with histories of service and accomplishments which I could only envy. Anyway, I was the only one who knew about NATO and had actually thought much about it. I came up with the idea for the planning groups as a way to get some movement in the military area. The Pentagon bought on to that because they originally hoped that it would be the extent of their involvement. Then they went ahead on their own and moved faster and further than any of us in the department had anticipated. I have already mentioned that an officer on the joint staff told me privately about making two divisions available for overseas deployment. So, military commands were established and the member governments including the U.S. began the process of assigning forces to those commands.

Meanwhile the North Atlantic Council Deputies had been organized and were meeting regularly in London. They moved to create ancillary activities to the military command

and force structure. A military supply board and a defense economic and financial committee were formed, staffed by officers assigned from the member nations, and began working on coordinating the efforts to support NATO. That was hard, slogging work. The Europeans were still in post-war recovery, and budgets were already strained. While fully supporting the collective security treaty, the governments were hard pressed to increase budgets since the normal needs of citizens were still not adequately fulfilled. Defense spending increases were politically difficult. Nevertheless, all persevered and within a few years NATO was a force in being.

But I am getting ahead of events. In late 1949 or early 1950, George Perkins called me into his office and said, "I've just given you to Chuck Spofford. Who may I ask is Chuck Spofford? He is going to be Ambassador Spofford and he is going to be our North Atlantic Council Deputy. He wanted to know what I could do for him, so I said well I'd give you to him." During this time in Washington, I met a very lovely young lady who was attending art classes over near Dupont Circle. She had become friends with another art student who was the wife of Paul Hubert, a Belgian attache who was involved with us in the NATO work. I was invited to their house for dinner one evening. I arrived and walked in, and here was this lovely young thing also invited for dinner. There must have been eight or ten for dinner. After dinner we played liars dice which in those days in most circles replaced bridge. I guess when she looked at me trying to figure out whether I'd lied about my roll of the dice, I knew she needed to be protected. We had sort of a whirlwind courtship which resulted in a project of marriage early in 1950. This was before I had been told that I was going to London with Spofford. So I went to her with my problem, and she was patient. The Spofford delegation then began commuting between Washington and London. We had postponed our wedding twice, I think, for two or three months each time. We were married in June 1950. Anyway, we set up the North Atlantic Council Deputies, with Ambassador Charles Spofford as the U.S. Deputy. He was one of the senior partners of Davis, Polk in New York and had been chairman of the Metropolitan Opera Association among other things. During World War II service, he had risen to the rank of brigadier general. He was with the command that started out in North Africa and came up to Europe.

Q: Moved into Italy.

GALLOWAY: Yes. Alexander was the commander with Montgomery as his deputy. Spofford told a vignette about the beachhead in southern Italy at the height of the fighting. He was at Alexander's headquarters when a report came in that a jeep bearing correspondents from Montgomery's forces had reached the perimeter. Alexander told his signalman to take a message: "Dear Monty, your press has arrived, when can we expect your army?" The British political representative in the headquarters was Harold Macmillan. Spofford and Macmillan became very close. He was one of Spofford's first contacts when we got to London. The Conservative Party was in opposition at the time, and Macmillan became a member of the Churchill government after the elections held some time after we arrived.

Q: I was just thinking, it is a good time to stop here, and I think why don't we put down at

the end here. We'll pick this up, you have talked about being made the assistant to Spofford, but we haven't gone into the issues and what you were doing and something of your personal life.

***

Today is the 15th of October, 1999. Bill, you when was this that you were going to be deputy to Spofford?

GALLOWAY: Not deputy, special assistant.

Q: Who was he and what was the job?

GALLOWAY: I have already briefly recounted Spofford's background, professionally as partner in a prestigious New York law firm and his military service when he attained the rank of brigadier general.. He was appointed our first U.S. Representative to the North Atlantic Council Deputies with the rank of Ambassador. Other countries also designated council deputies. The North Atlantic Council, the highest authority under the Treaty, was composed of the foreign ministers of the member nations. SHAPE was already getting organized. The need for a stronger, permanent political body became evident. Thus, the North Atlantic Council Deputies, who would act as the Council in permanent session, was established in London. There was some French opposition to having it in England, but at that juncture, with the rest of the NATO military being organized forward on the continent, everybody except the French seemed more comfortable having this body in London. There, without other NATO distractions immediately at hand, it could get itself organized and try to establish a broad strategy for NATO as a whole.

Q: I want to get right at the beginning. You did this from what, 1948 to until when ?..

GALLOWAY: This was in either late '49 or early '50 that the North Atlantic Council Deputies was established. I did this until '52 I guess it was.

Q: Could you talk now about how it was put together and what were the council's goals?

GALLOWAY: Well, this political body was supposed to implement and develop the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This was important because the military structure was being established, and member governments wanted political authority in control of NATO. The need and sentiment for establishment of the Council Deputies was a bit slower in its manifestation than other developments under the Treaty. So, its birth was in some haste and its members began congregating in London to address immediately the needs of NATO, how to meet them, and to organize its own institution and staff. From late '49 or early '50, we commuted from Washington to London for several series of meetings, and we moved over there in late '50. We stayed there about a year and a half in offices made available by the UK Government in Belgrave Square in London's west end. In short order the Council Deputies created subsidiary bodies for defense financial and economic matters, and for military production and supply. Their jobs were to try to get

the defense establishments of the member nations to provide the money and the wherewithal to build installations, and provide for equipment that would be needed by NATO forces in Europe.

Meanwhile, progress was being made on the military side. SHAPE was located initially in the Majestic Hotel on the Champs Elysees. Later, the French government made space and facilities available on the outskirts of Paris. It should be noted that these actions came about to some extent because in the North Atlantic Council Deputies which met for several months in 1950, the French mounted a very strong campaign for three things: the stationing of American troops in Europe under the North Atlantic Treaty, the creation of a command structure with an American supreme commander, and for all that to be located in France. Those were their three objectives. They pushed them in the meetings of the North Atlantic Council Deputies all during that period of time - and they came to fruition. Also in the North Atlantic Council Deputies, we were wrestling with how to transform the military organization from the regional planning groups established earlier into military structure under the supreme commander. This was accomplished by the delineation and designation of appropriate subordinate commands by the supreme commander to cover the entire NATO area.

Q: Yes, northern command, southern command, central command.

GALLOWAY: Yes, that transformation came about naturally enough to make it easy for the Council Deputies to approve it and pass it on to the military to implement. It did take the planning groups out of their amorphous state as planners and put them into a military chain of command with echelons of headquarters under a supreme commander. The first requirement was to prepare plans to develop force structures, equipment requirements, communications channels, and overall requirements for the defense of the NATO area. The initial integrated plan to come up through NATO commands to the Military Committee was as I recall MC-48 in its designation. It called for the raising and maintenance of roughly 98 divisions for the defense of the area.

Well, the finances and the wherewithal were not available in the countries for a force of that size. Each of them had its own forces, but not too many of them had contemplated any serious increase of these forces. Their main objective was, and it was achieved, to get the United States to station forces physically in Europe under an American supreme commander, which was accomplished with General Eisenhower.

Q: Well, during this time at the very beginning, what were you and Mr. Spofford doing? I mean what was Mr. Spofford doing and what were you doing to assist him?

GALLOWAY: We had within the U.S. delegation to the Council Deputies, political, economic, and military officers much along the lines of the organization of an embassy staff. Ted Achilles was number two to Spofford and also head of political affairs. Dick Breithut was our chief economist and the representative on the finance and economic committee. A two star general, Dan Callahan, was named as the chief of the military production and supply board. Very quickly a new word came into the language, at least

into the English language,"infrastructure," which was a term that encompassed all of the necessary barracks, living spaces, storage depots, communications, everything that would be needed by the forces. So the Council Deputies established an infrastructure committee, which worked with the other bodies already underway. Initially, agreements were sought and reached on locations for headquarters, communications units, depots for all military equipment, lines of communications, etc. Also, during this period of time, military organization operated under the command and instructions of the supreme commander who reported to the standing group, the three U.S., U.K. and French representatives. The standing group met here in Washington, so there was a lot of back and forth between Washington and Paris in those days. But with Eisenhower as commander, his influence and his stature were such that most of the countries put their cases directly to him on what they wanted, what they needed and how much help they would have to have from other sources in NATO. These countries were still recovering from WWII and they didn't have any extra cash or money to float loans. Also, there was a general opinion that the Germans should bear a substantial share of the financial burden even though they were not going to have any forces. So all of these different issues were worked out one way or another in the North Atlantic Council Deputies.

Q: How did you find having come from this very collegial joint effort in drafting the treaty, did you find sort of national interests began to intrude more when you got to the sort of committee council?

GALLOWAY: Yes. It was, I think, inevitable because the time had come to deal directly with the physical resources and forces that would be needed to implement the treaty's military capacity. Under the Council Deputies, we had a political committee, the financial and economic committee, the supply board and additional ad hoc working groups. The French worked to some extent slower in this context.

We started out in the lower groups to get issues up the ladder for the Council Deputies consideration. Or sometimes we would be given a mandate by the Council Deputies. We had constant meetings. As we got down into the details of the command structure, the communications, the locations, the size of forces, we usually ended in a situation which, in essence, was that the United States was perhaps the only one who had enough resources to make a substantial dent in the whole list of requirements. However, arrangements were negotiated so that the forces in being on the continent and in Europe would be designated as NATO forces, would serve under the regional integrated NATO staffs and commanders, who, in turn, received orders and instructions through the international integrated staff at SHAPE and the supreme commander. In the central area there was a French commander, in the north a British commander. In the south, the command became southern Europe and western Mediterranean which did not go to the Italians but to an American admiral.

Q: It remains that way today.

GALLOWAY: It remains that way. The southern command is primarily the 6th Fleet. So, all of these staffs and commands began to take shape and to produce an international

effort. There was certainly an overall consistent opinion about what they wanted to do. The difficulties came primarily when the combined staff and planning work resulted in 98 divisions as the requirements of NATO.

Q: I don't think the United States during WWII had more than 84 divisions. We had large divisions, but I think we were keeping right around 85 divisions.

GALLOWAY: Yes. Well, this was a figure which obviously was political. It was set high so that it would have its effect on the countries to produce as much as they could in western Europe, and at the same time, it would send a signal to eastern Europe that they would be confronted by substantial force.

By this time in '53, it was apparent that the original hopes for the North Atlantic Council Deputies, in terms of exercising substantial political influence on the member governments, had fallen short. They had been successful in furthering the organizational development under the Treaty, but increasing the defense efforts in forces and other requirements lagged. Moreover, the Council Deputies had never really attained the political status to move governments; they were, in practice, representatives who functioned only as their governments allowed. This weakness in the political arena also had a tangential effect of more political importuning directed at General Eisenhower. Government ministers were not reticent in making the case to him as to why their countries deserved special consideration and should not be expected to shoulder the additional burdens inherent in meeting the defense requirements laid down by the NATO military. It was a turning point for NATO, and the time for reassessment and brainstorming was at hand. You might say that it was time for political thinking and action to explore better ways of staying in step and hopefully getting ahead of the movement on the military side.

Various ways to improve the situation were floated, and these finally came into focus for the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon. It was proposed that the Council Deputies be transformed into the Council in permanent session to be Chaired by a Secretary General of international stature, and that this new structure would move from London to Paris. That would put the top political authority on the continent, give it more direct access to European governments and lend its influence to the military establishment. The foreign ministers reached agreement along these lines at the Lisbon meeting and undertook to anoint a Secretary General of NATO. The first choice of most was Sir Oliver Franks, then British Ambassador in Washington. The Chairman of the Council, Foreign Minister Pearson of Canada, recessed the meeting while he talked to Sir Oliver by telephone. When the meeting resumed and Mr. Pearson recounted the conversation, it was clear that Sir Oliver had been taken by surprise and was not prepared to respond immediately. While Pearson expressed cautious optimism that he would accept, that did not happen; instead, Sir Oliver declined the appointment. Further discussion in the Council failed to produce another name at that time. The Council decided to adjourn without naming a Secretary General, but also to charge the UK Government with the responsibility for proposing to the Council someone of the high international stature wanted for the position. In a relatively short time, Lord Ismay was

proposed and accepted as the first Secretary General of NATO. So, we pulled up stakes in London, moved to Paris and transformed ourselves into members of the U S Delegation to the North Atlantic Council under its new leadership, the Secretary General.

Q: You know, during this, again I am going back to the time you were there, other than trying to locate the council's headquarters in Paris, were the French fully on board?

GALLOWAY: They were fully on board in the sense that what they really wanted to achieve was to have Americans stationed on the continent in such numbers that if anything happened, the United States would immediately have to be involved militarily. As NATO began to grow from its infancy, the cold war, of course, was in flux, and the question of Germany still loomed over everything else. There were different ideas about how the Germans might be integrated into the NATO military forces. As this back and forth continued, the French eventually came up with the proposal to form a European Defense Community with a European Defense Force under it, including West Germany. This possible scenario took quite a lot of time to negotiate and to prove unacceptable in the end.

Q: Was that during this '50-'52 time?
GALLOWAY: That was later on.

Q: I am trying to keep this focused on this time you were there.

GALLOWAY: The time I was there. In Paris I was special assistant to Livy Merchant. Moving from London to Paris, we had a change of scene, change of characters and change of organization. The organizational changes sought to consolidate U.S. regional activities in Europe. The new permanent North Atlantic Council, the continuation of U.S. military aid programs as well as economic aid programs, and U S representation to the European regional economic organization, first the OEEC and later the OECD. Retired general William Draper was designated to head all U.S. elements in those areas. We had our offices in the Hotel Talleyrand. Under Draper was a Deputy, a retired air force general Anderson, and then Livy Merchant. All three had the rank of Ambassador. Draper was the U.S. member of the permanent North Atlantic Council which had been given the Palais de Chaillot for its new headquarters; de facto, Merchant was the working permanent representative.

Lord Ismay arrived on the scene and began the establishment of a permanent staff and secretariat for the Council. In one of his earlier meetings, Ismay noted that he was not yet fluent in French, but rather had a command of the language somewhat like that of his old boss, Prime Minister Churchill, which he described as English words with French endings. He promised to improve his own fluency. I should have mentioned earlier that from the beginning of the establishment of NATO, it had been agreed that all of its meetings and discussions would be carried on in English and French without interpretation; however, documents would be published in both languages. Subordinate committees were formed under the Council, including a Political Committee. This was where I did most of my work, serving as the U.S. member or alternate. By the time I left

in '53, the Council and its staff were well established. Their authority was recognized and accepted in a manner that focused member governments attention more than had the earlier Council Deputies. They gained more influence as time went on, and there was evidently the reality of political authority over the military. Eisenhower had served his term as supreme commander and then was persuaded to come back and accept the presidency of Columbia. That must have been '53. He was succeeded by, who was the airborne commander?

Q: Vandenberg?

GALLOWAY: Vandenberg. No not Hoyt Vandenberg. No it was, he later went out to Korea. He was famous for carrying a grenade.

Q: Oh, yes, Ridgeway.

GALLOWAY: He succeeded Eisenhower. There had been speculation that Gruenther would take over, but I think that in the hierarchy of the army there may have been an inclination to show that there were competent senior officers other than Eisenhower and his followers who had grown up in NATO. Ridgeway was certainly a senior four star general following Eisenhower's five stars.

I have neglected to record that Doug MacArthur II had been Political Adviser to Eisenhower throughout his tour as SACEUR, where he became, along with Gruenther, the third member of the inner cabinet.

It was only natural that he would be named from the State Department to that post. So, both he and I profited in the long run from George Perkins' moves back in 1950. I went with Spofford and MacArthur with Ike. That pretty well blew away the cloud Wahwee had cast over me when I had recommended MacArthur for the assignment as Deputy of Regional Affairs when he was already Director of Western Europe his long held goal.

Q: Now during this time, in June 1950, the Korean War started. You know people you were working with, how much was the Soviet threat perceived to be imminent?

GALLOWAY: I don't think it had much effect on European perception of the imminence of the Soviet threat. Certainly the other NATO governments fully supported the United States in its decision under the UN to help preserve South Korea. I remember the working group meeting following the U.S. decision. The UK representative, Derek Hoyer-Millar, his voice choking with emotion, made a brief but powerful statement complimenting the U.S. for acting the way a great power should. That was warmly received by the others. Indeed, several NATO countries were able to send forces under UN auspices to join with the U.S. They were in fact token forces for the most part, but they did emphasize the policy of their governments. I don't think that event in itself affected to any considerable degree the attitude toward the Soviet Union. Some of my colleagues speculated that the Soviet Union was beginning to learn how to work and act internationally. It was involved in the four power occupation of Germany. It was involved in the four power occupation

of Austria. It had the satellite countries under military occupation. It had its hands full. There were no serious Soviet threats, moves or announcements to raise the threshold in Korea, except for Kruschev's blandishment later on.

Q: That's not now.

GALLOWAY: In this early period, the NATO powers just held to a steady course. The fact that Soviet forces and the Allied forces were cheek to jowl in Germany and Austria was a state of affairs that existed, and it stayed pretty much that way until a later time when the first opportunity suddenly came on the Austrian treaty.

Q: In '54-'55. Was there concern on the part of the people of particularly the French Communist party, the Italian Communist Party?
GALLOWAY: Not after that one election.

Q: The '48 election in Italy.

GALLOWAY: That was the height of concern. I think the way that election came out removed many of the undercurrents that had been running around in western Europe. Moreover, that event had the ancillary effect of encouraging other political parties in the various countries to reinforce themselves and assume more prominent roles in the political swim. In France it worked to such an extent that everybody wanted to organize a party and take part in the government. Of course, they had a succession of prime ministers and new governments during the fourth republic. They were just being French; however, the French civil service is an excellent bureaucratic administrative body. Our experience through NATO contacts with the French at the diplomatic levels was solid and continuous. We had very few disputes per se with the French. Frequently they wanted to add some petty little thing or some *cache* that would make a passage more French in tone.

Q: Use of the language, something of that nature.

GALLOWAY: Yes, but those things were soon understood by everybody, and we were able to deal with them without difficulty.

Q: Well then, in '53 where did you go?

GALLOWAY: In '53 I was there in Paris in the Hotel Talleyrand, our headquarters, and MacArthur had gone back earlier. Let' see. Did he go back or did he stay? I guess he stayed until a little later. When was the election, in '52?

Q: '52. Eisenhower came in January of '53.

GALLOWAY: Well, that's when MacArthur came back, when Dulles was named Secretary of State. One of the first things he did was to position somebody at his elbow who had a very good relationship with Eisenhower and his immediate staff, and that was

MacArthur. He had built that kind of relationship during those years in Paris.

Q: MacArthur had the job of counselor of the Department of State which depended on what the Secretary of State wanted it to be. I mean every administration the job changes, but the title stays the same.

GALLOWAY: Yes. It is sort of like the Lord Privy Seal in the British cabinet. It can be given any responsibility wanted. In fact, when MacArthur was Counselor, it probably wielded more power in the State Department than any of the geographic or functional bureaus. That was because his relationship with the Secretary of State very quickly became close and cordial, and the Secretary fully trusted him and depended on him to help with the White House. General Andy Goodpastor was Eisenhower's main chief of staff, and he and MacArthur had grown up together in SHAPE. Well, anyway, MacArthur sent a message to Livy Merchant asking if he would let me come back to be his special assistant. I was a bit reluctant, although I never told him that. Anyway, we formed a very good working relationship. I had become accustomed to having all kinds of new and unfamiliar things thrown at me that I somehow managed to muddle through, and I got along with people pretty well. I guess being a general's aide for a period of time in the army helped prepare me for this kind of thing because I got to be very comfortable in the position of special assistant or aide or whatever.

Q: Let's get this at the beginning. You were doing that from '53 until when?

GALLOWAY: '53 until '56 or '57 I guess.

Q: All right. Well now, when you were there, how did Douglas MacArthur work? How did he use you? How did he operate with the department from your perspective?

GALLOWAY: It became obvious to the other high level officials in the department soon after Mr. Dulles took over, that MacArthur was going to be one of his primary actors and agents. When I came back to be his special assistant, there were just he and I and three secretaries in the office. It was probably best that there were no more players than that because we could move from one thing to another without trampling on any institutional lines or activities. MacArthur handled himself very well with Dulles and the White House. The other two who came to be the principal advisors on the staff of Dulles were Livy Merchant who had been brought back as Assistant Secretary for European affairs and Bob Bowie who was head of the Policy Planning Staff, fresh from Harvard..

Q: Also part of that is the legal advisor, too.

GALLOWAY: Herman Fleger had a special tie with the Secretary though long friendship and the legal profession. So, whenever anything legal was involved, the secretary would say let's get Herman in and see what he thinks. Herman would join in, and he would usually go along with whatever these other three fellows cooked up. I don't think he was a lawyer of great international renown or experience, but he was a fine man, and he wanted to do anything and everything he could to help. He was not overly active, but

when asked to do something, he was always available to help. These other three, MacArthur, Merchant, and Bowie were the main actors in that period. In fact, somebody, I think it was somebody in the secretariat had coined a name “Macmerbo.” For two or three years when the question arose as to who was handling something for the Secretary, the answer was, “Macmerbo.”

The Secretary had so much trust and respect for these fellows that he would hand them just about anything. When it came time, and this is digressing, for the SEATO treaty to be negotiated, instead of assigning it to Walter Robertson who was Assistant Secretary for the Far East, he asked MacArthur to take it on.

Q: Did you get any feel for Walter Robertson? He was very much a creature of the right wing of the Senate. I have heard that it was explained that you do whatever you want in Europe but don't mess with, particularly don't play around with China, or anything else like that.

GALLOWAY: That was essentially what happened in fact. Walter Robertson, if you cut it to bare bones, was the Congressional protection of Chiang Kai-shek. That's about what it amounted to. He was a Virginia patrician. He was very closely tied to the conservative elements in the Senate and the House. He was a fine gentleman with enough ego to enable him to operate pretty well at that level, but also without unnecessary or undue sensitivity. For example, when the Secretary gave MacArthur the job of negotiating the SEATO treaty, it did not seem to disturb Robertson at all.

Q: Yes. Well, his concern again was Chiang Kai-shek.

GALLOWAY: I was there with MacArthur from '53 until '56, and it was one of the most active jobs I have ever had. It covered as broad a horizon of activities as I have ever been called on to handle. As things worked out, I think the first time he went off on a visit, the Secretary asked MacArthur to pull things together for him which led to or established the precedent that whenever the Secretary was going off for a four power meeting or any other kind of meeting whatever, MacArthur would be the man to get all the preparations done.

Q: Often sitting at his elbow too. I have seen pictures.

GALLOWAY: Yes, that’s right. It did not seem to cause a problem with other senior career foreign service people or other high level officials in the department. Even senior people like Chip Bohlen and George Kennan were somewhat left on the sideline. Kennan was even more left out. With Chip it didn't seem to matter too much because he had his own reputation. He had his own group of people, including me from my desk officer days. He confided with me about his outlook. He said, "Galloway, when you get into a high position in government, once you get in, one quality which will give you considerable help is to be a little lazy." Chip followed that axiom pretty well. He paced himself. He was a brilliant man, and his background and experience had traveled with him. He was about as authoritative on the Soviet Union and what was going on generally

as any person around in those years. He spoke Russian and served as interpreter for the President or the Secretary whenever they were meeting directly with the Russians. He was at Yalta. His credentials were such that he didn't feel threatened by latter day activities.

Q: Kennan felt that he had won the policy planning and I think he felt sort of left out to pasture, didn't he? When the Dulles administration came in he didn't...

GALLOWAY: Well, even before that. I don't know that to be absolutely true, but that was what I picked up in the halls. As I mentioned to you about the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty, Jack Hickerson and Ted Achilles worked directly with the Secretary. If either George or Chip heard about something and asked what it was all about, the Secretary would smooth things over or just ignore it. That was in what is now the old state building. We were up on the sixth floor. The Secretary's office and the office of Kennan had a connecting door. Kennan mentioned that from time to time. I think Acheson had the door locked, but he treated Kennan such that, I think, made Kennan feel that his position and his contributions were appreciated. In fact, Acheson just listened and then did what he, himself, decided. He did not ask Kennan to take on any special role in the department. That was perhaps the thing, I suppose, that irked Kennan in those days. As you know, even under General Marshall, Kennan was there as head of the policy planning staff, and then Dean Acheson became Secretary.. I was titular head of the Swiss desk at that point. Socially, I was on the roster for the Swiss, the Belgians, Luxembourg, and a lot of the NATO people as well, so I was having quite a high old time in my social activities. I remember dinner at the home of the Swiss Minister, who, incidentally, was married to the sister of Henry Wallace. I don't remember all of the guests other than George Kennan and his wife. After dinner the break came for men to have brandy and cigars while the ladies repaired elsewhere. Kennan more or less dominated the conversation. Anything that came up, he had an opinion. He got to talking about the State Department, speaking along these lines, "You know it has been very difficult, very hard." He went on, "You know, it has been very difficult in the State Department for some time now because of the people there, Bob (Lovett was Under Secretary under Marshall) and I are the only two with general competence." From the standpoint of a practitioner of diplomatic activities, one could sense the ego of the speaker and his flawed judgment in making such a remark openly. Talleyrand certainly would not have condoned such a statement in the circumstances; moreover, it was so patently untrue. As the department operated in those days, he did various things but did not exercise any general authority. I remember he conducted a few seminars, got people in from the outside to talk about issues. He made one contribution on the actual wording of one of the articles of the North Atlantic Treaty. Ted gave him credit for that. Otherwise, Ted and Jack bypassed him to work directly with the secretary which suited the secretary. George Kennan was obliged to endure a bruised ego.

Q: Yes. Well, I think it got in his way from a career point of view too. I served with him in Belgrade near the end of his diplomatic career. I felt he took things too personally. I was way down below a chief of the consular section. He saw things in terms of rebuff to George Kennan rather than policy.

GALLOWAY: He was that way with the planning staff, too.

Q: Well, he has been there, in his way, he was probably where he belonged at Princeton...

GALLOWAY: As a historian. I don't know how good a historian he is.

Q: Well, he was a commentator and acting as sort of one of a number of academics who made, I mean not necessarily correct, but strew out the diplomatic plant as far as discussion goes.

GALLOWAY: Something I noted during my period there in the department with MacArthur was that Kennan seemed to enjoy little respect from his contemporaries.

Q: He was not... I mean this comes through very clearly from the interviews. He obviously was a powerful person and he had a distinguished career, but you don't get eyes lighting up. When they talk about MacArthur or when they Bohlen, or George Kennan. Did you have problems? I mean MacArthur was one of the sort of the old line of the foreign service of the imperial ambassadors. Was that a feature while you were dealing with that?

GALLOWAY: Yes. And MacArthur had probably twice as much adrenaline as anybody else. When the Secretary asked him to do something, he didn't hesitate to use whatever means was necessary. He tried to be cooperative and helpful, and generally it went that way for people who worked with him. He never tried to steal other people's ideas. He never tried to put anybody down or anything like that. He wasn't playing politics with his fellow workers, but he was darn well going to get done what the Secretary asked him to get done. I became imbued with sort of the same idea. I was working with him for about four years. He led the way and I followed in his footsteps. I suppose I didn't make or gain a huge host of comrades myself. On the other hand, I tried to make him available to all levels of the department. I tried to make it possible for anybody who had something being blocked or held up by somebody up the line to look to us for help. I tried to help them out and sometimes got MacArthur to take a hand. I did try to keep in touch with all of the echelons.

Q: Did you find yourself trying to smooth things over sometimes?

GALLOWAY: Not very often. Not as much as you might think. Doug's colleagues, particularly those serving in senior positions, could observe in meetings with the Secretary when he, Merchant, Bowie and others were there, how discussions were conducted. It was not very formal. Usually, there were three or four participants doing most of the talking, going back and forth, with the Secretary chiming in from time to time. He, or one of the others would contribute most of the substance of what emerged as the decision, and, more often than not, it was left for MacArthur to carry it out. It was during this stage of implementation that I learned about a strong trait of his character -- I

found him to be very loyal, very loyal indeed. I did not find him to be standoffish to other people in the department. He respected the integrity of the institution and the people working there; he understood generally that they were working institutionally, and not personally. So, he was always willing to help out when a worthy cause came along. I think that because we sometimes moved like a whirlwind and were involved in so many things, the impression was that we were running and stomping over everybody. We did that only rarely, but for the most part our work was carried out and in a manner which bruised few people.

Q: Yes, I haven't picked that up. I think it was just not somebody you could warm up to, very few people would warm up to.

GALLOWAY: He didn't have many truly close friends. He and his wife were very close, their family, he and his wife and his daughter were extremely close. As a family they came first. He had lots of acquaintance friends, had met a lot of people, knew a lot of people, both American and foreign. I suppose during the period I was with him, I became about as close a friend to him as he had, despite the official relationship.

Q: My oral histories are replete with stories about Mrs. MacArthur in her overseas manifestation as the wife of the Ambassador. She was considered a very difficult person by some who dealt with her. How did you find her in Washington when often the contacts are so different?

GALLOWAY: Well, up until he went to Japan as Ambassador, he had always been under an immediate supervisor. Now, Wahwee was a character in her own right, of course. I enjoyed her tremendously. She was great fun, a lusty lady and there was nothing she would hesitate to say or do. Betty and I became almost members of the family. At one point, I remember Wahwee fell and cracked her ribs. She called up Betty and said, "I have some cracked ribs. If you have nothing to do, would you mind let's talk." So Betty went over and they drank martinis all afternoon. Once, when they came out to our place for a charcoal dinner, Wahwee and I got into a “burping contest”. I think she won. In the family circle, almost anything could happen.

I have heard stories about his and her behavior in the ambassadorial role. I don't know. I can see it. He would certainly establish his position. This was just MacArthur, just as his uncle had done. He would certainly establish his position if he was the top man there. But, he had a good sense of humor, not much patience with things that didn't go well. When he wasn't working and could leave officialdom aside, he was ready to have a good time. I don't know how much social life they carried on. I suppose they had to do quite a lot. They had a house over in Georgetown. We were there frequently. Her father, the vice president, would drop in from time to time.

Q: Vice President Barkley.

GALLOWAY: He would drop in from time to time. They had a long background in Washington from their respective families and Doug’s foreign service career, so they

knew just about everybody in the political and diplomatic circles, but basically I don't think they enjoyed being so actively social.

Q: Rather like on the Kennedy social circuit, that sort of thing. In earlier stage they weren't.

GALLOWAY: Not really. I think they enjoyed the life; the work was hard and demanding but very rewarding, and anything which came up in the international scheme of things could draw Doug into the middle of it.

Q: Did you, you probably had left the job if you left in '56 before the Hungarians/Suez crises came. But what about were you involved at all or seen from your own perspective the crisis that led up to the Aswan...

GALLOWAY: Secretary Dulles himself was never a great proponent of the Aswan Dam project. He didn't have the feel for Middle Eastern affairs as he did for European and Asian affairs. He was involved of course, he had to be, but after all, by that time Nasser was taking aid and assistance from the Russians, so he was not viewed by the Secretary as a friendly ally. I know that there was a turn in negotiations at a late stage which led to our deciding not to help build the dam. What the consequences of that really were, I don't know. I was in Vienna by then. Another aspect which came into that equation was that although they did a lot of work together, Eden and Dulles were never very great friends.

Q: No, in fact, there was a mutual dislike, I think.

GALLOWAY: If not dislike, at least distaste. Eden tended to say and do things not the way Dulles saw what should be done, and Dulles, I think, had little respect for his judgment or his statesmanship. When relations with Egypt turned sour, that certainly had an effect on the relationship between those two.

Q: Well, communications stopped with the British Just I mean it was over an iron curtain there. That didn't help. Just before the British, French, Israeli intervention.

GALLOWAY: Yes, and Eisenhower, as I understand it, was four square with Dulles at that point, particularly when the British and French started talks directly with the Israelis. Another thing that made a terrific difference with both Eisenhower and Dulles was the timing of that action in relation to the Russian action in Hungary -- the Hungarian revolution. In the United Nations we had been painting the Russians as diabolical creatures in Hungary with complete disregard for humanity. I was in Vienna at the time, all the refugees were there, so I was up to my ears in that crisis. Betty, too. She was helping run a soup kitchen and a Hungarian handicraft program for the refugees.

Certainly there was some opinion in Europe which was probably circulated to discredit Dulles. He was depicted as having persuaded Eisenhower to go the UN route and to give the British a spanking; Dulles was depicted as a real culprit. My feeling is that his relationship with Eden had an awful lot to do with it. Eden overestimated and thought

that he could sway Nasser and the Arab states much more than was ever possible. I think that the British had deceived themselves on that front for a long time. At least this was my experience with diplomatic contacts from that area whose general attitude was that the British just so overestimated their position in many things.

Q: Was there any concern on the part of the professional diplomats, that group that was surrounding Dulles about sort of almost the legal approach to diplomacy, getting treaties. If you are not with us, you are against us type of thing. There didn't seem to be in a way, particularly in the unraveling colonial world what was former colonial world in the East and all, a feeling on the part of Dulles of understanding these countries, where they were coming from.

GALLOWAY: Well, that could well be a part of his personality. He had great difficulty in accepting the status of neutrality. He did not see how a government could proclaim a policy of neutrality in the face of the moral and ethical conduct of the Soviet Union vis a vis all with whom they came in contact around the world. So, he was no great admirer of the Swiss or the Swedes or anybody else who professed to be neutral.

Q: Well, did you see MacArthur and Merchant and Bowie trying to put a more, I would almost call it a more balanced view?

GALLOWAY: Yes. They did. Their experience, of course, was much more direct and much more immediate with all concerned. They had some flak thrown at them, no question about that. They had some effect on him, but he was a man whose convictions and beliefs, once formed, rarely changed his outlook. He was a devout Presbyterian. On many flights I can remember him standing in the aisle of the plane, opening his briefcase, taking out his pocket edition of the Bible and reading it. He used a special aircraft to travel to meetings, particularly when we did the SEATO treaty, and we went back and forth to Manila and Bangkok. We always stopped over at Honolulu for airplane crew rest. We would have the VIP facilities the army had for visitors at Waikiki Beach. We had wonderful times. The Secretary enjoyed traveling. Mrs. Dulles was always with him. That was his main relationship. Occasionally, he would come up and want to get a bridge game going on those long flights. As a matter of fact, I think I have a little note from him thanking me for work on the Bangkok conferences. “Mrs. Dulles and I enjoyed having you with us, and I enjoyed the bridge.” But, he was a person whose outlook on foreign affairs and on society in general was well formed, and I don't think changed much. He was not a very personable fellow either, but as for his beliefs and his personal convictions, they seemed deep and abiding.

Q: This was the start of one of the preeminent comediennes. The year that had just gone past was done by a young woman called Carol Burnett who did a record called "I Fell in Love with John Foster Dulles." It was about a young girl having a fan's crush on John Foster Dulles. The whole thing was so incredible that it was funny. I don't know if you recall it.

GALLOWAY: I recall that record. It was great. For that period of time when I was with MacArthur, we saw an awful lot of Dulles. We accompanied him on many of his travels,

and always with great loose-leaf books of documents prepared for anything that might come up in meetings. In preparations for meetings held in Washington, we worked almost daily with him in his office or at his house on weekends.

Q: Did you get any feel when the SEATO Treaty was being put together, there was some discussion wondering why Pakistan was included in that? Did you hear any of the discussion about Pakistan?

GALLOWAY: Well, yes. The Secretary addressed the issue of Pakistani participation from the outset and was not unwilling to let it go through. Pakistan at that point was a good friend and ally. They had governments which were certainly in tune with what the United States sought to accomplish in Asia.

SEATO came about because the people in the area, just like the Europeans had earlier in NATO, the governments came to us and pressed for a security treaty. Their attitude was that we need a security relationship, too. Many disturbing things are going on in our part of the world. We don't know what China is going to do, and with Vietnam in conflict, we need security. We need a treaty. The Filipinos were certainly hard on that. The Australians and the New Zealanders thought that we should be involved substantively in the security of the area Thailand also; although, Thailand was not very forceful in its foreign policy one way or another. The people were, I thought, educated, intelligent and knew what was going on, so it was very much in their best interest to have a security relationship with the United States. Here is another instance where the problem with Eden came up. He wanted to include other Asian nations which had long histories and relationships with England.

Q: Sort of the CENTO powers?

GALLOWAY: Yes, all of the Asians. He wanted India, all of the subcontinent to be involved. This issue surfaced earlier in Washington during the initial study on Southeast Asian security with the British. Doug MacArthur was the principal on our side and their minister in their embassy was an old Asian hand. We met with him and his assistants almost daily. We were supposed to draw up the framework for any security relationship in the far east, Southeast Asia. He had been or later became their sort of Ambassador General in Asia.

Q: Secretary General?

GALLOWAY: No. Robert Scott, he was their principal diplomatic representative in Asia with headquarters in Singapore. He exercised something like an Ambassador at Large role over British diplomacy in that part of the world. He was a bright man, and a very nice, decent person. MacArthur and I were meeting almost daily with him and his assistant. We drafted a joint U.S.-UK policy paper concerning security in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Given the choice, I think the President and Dulles would not have taken the initiative to reach a collective security agreement for the area. But governments in the area were sufficiently riled up and apprehensive to want more assurance of their

position vis a vis China, and China, in Dulles' eyes, was possibly as great a threat to peace as the Soviet Union. In any event, MacArthur and I worked with the British to produce a paper which the two governments finally agreed. Then we invited the representatives of the countries concerned to take part in discussions. Pakistan was right in the forefront of those wanting to participate. The real reason they wanted in was to try to influence the language of any agreement or treaty to be written so as to work against India, if the threat ever arose. Most of the other parties pretty well fathomed that and it was one of the reasons that the operative clauses of the SEATO treaty were not quite as binding or as tough as those in NATO.

In any event, we held negotiations here in Washington, MacArthur heading them, with the ambassadors of the countries concerned. In two or three months we roughed out a draft treaty. I had drawn up a draft based on the NATO treaty because I had that negotiating experience earlier, and we worked with that and whittled it into shape for southeast Asia. The countries in the area wanted to reap political rewards from the actual negotiations and proposed that they be completed out there. It was agreed that the foreign ministers would come along when a draft was produced, have a conference, settle any outstanding problems and sign a treaty. So, we went out to Manila. Magsaysay was president at that time. That period saw probably the closest relationship we ever had with the Philippines. Magsaysay had working for him a group of bright, dedicated young people completely loyal to the point of reverence. They were very friendly with us and we had a great time working together. The government made available to us the best place I have ever seen so far as physical security was concerned. It was an open, fairly large building with a great room with all sides screened to the open air. It was out on the grounds of the Malacanang, the presidential palace. So, we set up there and carried through our negotiations. We had several weeks of meetings. Despite the outstanding physical security, items on the negotiations and actual texts of treaty articles appeared with regularity in the Manila press, courtesy of unquoted and unidentified Philippine officials. Confidentiality was not a mark of politics there; however, the vice president was generally thought to be the main source of leaks.

MacArthur was widely hailed because of his uncle's legendary role in the Philippines. It was almost like a marked event in Philippine history. He was always in demand, and the Filipinos never doubted his word on any single thing whatever. That was very interesting to see.
We brought the negotiations to near conclusion, leaving some issues for the foreign ministers to settle. A conference was held amid much pomp and press play, and the foreign ministers held two days of meetings, agreed the final text and signed the Southeast Asia Treaty. It took us about six or eight months to complete that project. Dulles tried to cover Vietnam in the treaty language to the extent we could, but nobody really took it to heart. The French were not at all helpful in that respect. As a matter of fact, they contributed very little to the whole effort. Their position had deteriorated to the extent that they could do little but bluster and make noise, which got them nothing.

MacArthur was always seated to the secretary's left when we were at the negotiating table. He, MacArthur, had pretty much every detail in his own mind.. My position was

right behind him to produce anything else he might need. That made for a close relationship between the three of us on all of the negotiations which the Secretary looked to MacArthur to prepare in advance and assist during the conferences. All in all, we covered a broad range of substantive issues and policies and a large area of the world.

The Manila phase of those events was most memorable. It was almost like a vacation, going out there and meeting in the outdoor "tabernacle" to negotiate a security treaty for that vast area, and then having the foreign ministers descend for the final act and ring down the curtain.

The Filipinos couldn't have been happier or more pleased. They came out for the final ceremonies in all their finery. The men wore those sheer shirts called barong tagalogs, which was their formal dress, and the Filipino ladies, some of the loveliest women I have seen anywhere, appeared in their long ball gowns with butterfly sleeves. It was, indeed, a grand occasion. I now have a supply of barong tagalog shirts.

Some months later, there was an organizational meeting in Bangkok. Again, the hosts really outdid themselves, and the conference generated much publicity. Incidentally, I wrote the draft of the communique and chaired the working group which prepared it for the Council's release.

Opposition forces in Asia, mostly Communist, dubbed SEATO a paper tiger. While it never developed as much militarily as NATO, the meetings out there with their attendant publicity did provide the SEATO governments with the evidence of allies in a security arrangement concerned with the area. It had its political and psychological assets. At least, none of the other "dominos" fell. Occasionally, diplomatic and political activities may create perceptions in the minds of potential opponents, and I think SEATO served that purpose to some extent. The meeting in Bangkok led to informal exchanges about creating a secretary general and a permanent staff; later these moves did occur with the Thai Ambassador in Washington being appointed Secretary General of SEATO with a staff and headquarters in Bangkok.

The next meeting of foreign ministers was held in Karachi. This met the expressed wishes of the Pakistanis; moreover, it was the capital of the only remaining SEATO nation on the mainland of Asia. The prime minister, Mohammad Ali, was not only pro-western but also highly regarded in Washington. He enjoyed strong support within Pakistan and was also respected in the Arab world. Zafrulla Khan was the foreign minister. The meeting did not produce much except organizational developments. The Pakistanis would dearly have liked it to result in something to buttress their stature vis a vis India, but other members were not willing. The fact of the meeting itself did give the Pakistanis some little satisfaction in showing that they had security allies. I had come to have much respect for the officials of that country. I believe they reflected a people who were brave, had undergone deep problems since before the partition of India and were really trying to establish a true democracy. They had not yet been able to build stable institutions and governments since the country's birth. Nevertheless, they had the pride one finds in Asia in their country and in showing great hospitality to official visitors.

After the meeting, they invited delegations to fly up to northwest Pakistan and travel up through the Khyber Pass. I jumped at the idea, and MacArthur said, "Sure, go ahead." The Australian and the New Zealand foreign ministers came along as head of the cortege. We went first to Lahore, the capital of West Pakistan as a state, while the capital of the country of Pakistan was Karachi. Lahore was several hundred miles distant. There were two aircraft, a C-47 and an old Bristol freighter with fixed landing gear and almost no sound insulation. Being one of the junior members of the party, I went in the latter, and I've never had a noisier flight which seemed eternal. In Lahore we were given a traditional state dinner which was as fascinating and good as the building itself was magnificent.

The next day they took us on up to Peshawar and then just a few miles north to Fort Jamrud, where Pakistani police authority was exercised by the indigenous tribes, the Pathans and the Afridis. The Pakistanis had agreements with these tribes to secure the area from there all the way to the Afghan border. We were met by the chiefs and a considerable number of their followers from local tribes. They were a formidable looking lot: bandoliers of ammunition crossed over both shoulders, long curved-blade knives in their belts and most with rifles, which it was alleged, they made themselves. Some of those tribesmen had blond hair and blue eyes. The explanation going around was that they were actually descendants of Alexander's legions when he campaigned through Asia. The tribal chiefs presented the traditional sheep to each of the foreign ministers. Later, the sheep were quietly passed back to the tribes.

Our cavalcade of vehicles was then led by the official Pakistani hosts into the Khyber Pass. As we made our way up through the foothills of the Hindu Kush, the peaks on either side held one or two lookouts who seemed to be passing news of our progress to similar lookouts ahead. We traveled all the way through the pass to the Afghan border. We got out of the vehicles there to have a good look at the scenery all the way around the horizon and then focus on the Afghan sentries across the chasm. They looked back with interest and obviously wondered what was going on. It was a scene, both from the natural wonders of the terrain and the spectacle of our escorts and the Afghans across the border, which brought memories of Hollywood productions many years earlier of some of Kipling's stories. It was the Northwest Frontier of old days of India and the storied conflicts of those times.

From that memorable scene, we drove back to the top of the pass where the regimental headquarters of the Khyber Rifles was situated. At midday we had lunch at the officers mess where they served us a marvelous stout curry washed down with beer, which was preferable to wine because of the nature of the food and the heat. All the while a band of pipers played. There was some comment that the Scots had originally heard bagpipes in India, and then adopted them for their own. Finally, we reluctantly left and returned to Peshawar and then on to Karachi. I shall always remember that tour as one of the most spectacular experiences of my life.

Then, from Karachi back to Washington and the real world. Our next event was the

Geneva summit meeting in '55. MacArthur, again, was tapped as the head man to make all preparations for the President and the Secretary. We had position papers to write and much coordination to carry through.

Q: I heard that trunks, footlockers full of papers.

GALLOWAY: Footlockers, yes. That summit meeting came when there had been little movement in East-West relations for some time. West Germany was doing well economically and psychologically, but East Germany lived through hard times under Soviet occupation. There was no hint of any Soviet give on Germany. There had been little change in attitudes and public postures in disarmament. NATO had come into its own in Europe. Korea was more or less inactive. And there was some uncertainty in Soviet leadership. Bulganin was the titular head of government, but Kruschev was Secretary of the party. The two had been moving around different parts of the world spreading propaganda and trying to create mischief, at the same time conducting themselves almost like a traveling vaudeville show, particularly Kruschev. In fact he was drawing attention and some laughs and cheers by his antics and clownish appearance. There was keen interest in which of the two would eventually emerge as the sole leader.

As is usually the case, the prospect of a summit between the U.S. and USSR led to hopes in the general public. The Secretary recognized that the conference would draw numbers of people from U.S. agencies to Geneva, so he devised a scheme to have a rear echelon in Paris. People like Nelson Rockefeller, Al Gruenther and two or three other senior men in the government with their retinues were asked to remain there on call. The Secretary obviously wanted to minimize efforts to claim the President's attention. Most of us in the supporting cast went on to Geneva ahead of the President and the Secretary. There was quite a lot of work there for us to do before the principals arrived. We began staff meetings which were picked up by the Secretary when he and the President flew in. These meetings were mostly at three levels -- MacArthur, Merchant and Bowie had us together daily, they would then brief the Secretary who with or without some of them would brief the President. Later in the proceedings, the President chaired a meeting of the full staff.

Internationally, there were daily formal meetings with four or five representatives of each government taking up one side of the square table. There was one interesting bit about the principals on the U.S. side. At previous summits, Chip Bohlen, as interpreter, was seated on the President's left. At Geneva, the Secretary arranged that Doug MacArthur sat on the left of the President, and the Secretary sat on his right, with the rest of the advisers and staff spread out behind. Also, there was a noteworthy arrangement on the Soviet side. There were five principals at the table. Before the meeting began, they would be sitting back in their seats; when the President opened proceedings, Bulganin, almost ostentatiously, leaned forward and rested his forearms on the table. In that forum he marked himself as No. 1. After talks in the formal meetings, everyone would adjourn to a buffet with food and drinks set out in a reception room where they mingled informally. The hope was that the principals could really open up with each other in that setting. One of our senior people was supposed to be near the President to make a memorandum of

conversation. One afternoon, Kruschev with his interpreter came up and started talking to the President. I hurriedly looked around for Chip only to see that Anthony Eden had taken him off to the side. My only course was to go back and stand close enough to hear the entire conversation and made a record of it. Kruschev immediately brought up the “open skies” proposal made by the President. Kruschev said, "Sometimes in affairs between countries, one country will make a proposal for purposes of the public which they know will not be accepted by the other side." The President said, "If you are talking about open skies, just try me." They were going back and forth. Then, Bulganin and Molotov and Zhukov saw Kruschev over there with the President. They got him out pretty quickly, obviously not wanting direct talks between an unchaperoned Kruschev and the President.

Actually, the U.S. side had attempted to clear the way for some informal and private talks. It was thought that the President and Zhukov, in view of their relationship as commanders of the victorious forces in WWII, might be able to exchange views candidly. The Soviets agreed to the idea and private talks between the two were carried on, with only Chip Bohlen present as interpreter. Nothing came of it. Zhukov was in no position to negotiate; obviously he was given no special authority at all to speak on behalf of the Soviet Union. Bulganin and Kruschev were at that time the twins running things. So, little came out of the Geneva summit of ‘54 except for all of the fuss and furor of a high level meeting. The President’s “Open Skies” proposal which would have permitted each nation to fly freely over the territory of the others was the only major initiative. It received favorable acceptance publicly.

The President held a meeting of the entire delegation staff on the last day we were in Geneva. He said that he was glad to see all of us there and that it reminded him of Shakespeare's Henry V when King Henry walked and talked with his troops just before the battle of Agincourt. It was St. Crispin’s Day. He quoted that particular passage about we few, we happy few, we band of brothers and how those who were not there would forever bemoan their fate for not being with us on St. Crispin’s Day. It was a tribute to his sense of a historical moment, even though there was no celebration after Geneva. The U.S., UK and France tried to move toward relaxation between East and West, but the Soviets would not budge. Moreover, their position was obviously made more complicated by the rivalry between Bulganin and Kruschev.

So, we consoled ourselves with Swiss cheese fondue and kirsch, and then we packed up the footlockers and trunks of papers, even more numerous with the records of the meetings, and followed the President back to Washington.

Q: You left in '56.

GALLOWAY: I left MacArthur’s office in '56 to take one of the cram courses in German at the Foreign Service Institute. The Department also encouraged my wife Betty to take the course. I think we spent an intensive three months learning the language by the Institute’s immersion methods. We emerged not with a great fluency, but with a working knowledge of the language. We then moved to Vienna where I was assigned as a First

Secretary in the political section of the embassy.

***

Today is the October 22, 1999. Bill, you are off to Vienna in 1956. What were you doing there?

GALLOWAY: This was my first traditional Foreign Service assignment. For the earlier period I had been through the NATO structure either overseas or back here in Washington. I was in the political section in the embassy as a first secretary. Al Puhan was the head of the political section. Tommy Thompson was Ambassador. Austria at that time was in the process of really shedding most of the WWII hangovers. It had recovered fairly well, was still suffering economically, but things were looking up. I could see that it was just a matter of time until it would be well back on its feet. During the post war period, it had been governed for the most part by a coalition of the two major parties. That was still the situation when we arrived.

Q: The parties were I assume the precursor to the Christian party and the socialist,

GALLOWAY: Yes. The Christian party was called the People's Party, and the socialists were the Socialist Party. Both had a number of good and aspiring leaders. At the time I was there, the People's Party was in the majority and Raab was the Chancellor. The Socialist Party was one of the staunchest elements of the whole government. It had come through the experience of really facing off against the Soviets. This was during the occupation when the Soviets attempted to win allegiance from elements in Austria. The Socialist Party didn't fall for that line, on the contrary, they were probably the strongest opponents of the Soviets and the indigenous communist party. The Socialists had some very strong leaders, some from the labor movement and some just intellectual and political adherents. There were and still are a number of strong socialist party leaders in central Europe.

In any event the government was a coalition of those two parties. They apportioned the governmental offices by a system known as “proports.” One party would have the foreign ministry, the other would have defense, etc., filling all of the cabinet posts and the senior subordinate positions in that manner. So, as embassy officers we dealt with members of both parties in the various departments. Representatives of both parties were very friendly toward the United States. Economic considerations probably were a main ingredient of that friendship. They were struggling toward a level of prosperity, and the economic assistance from the United States was one of the main building blocks.

As a member of the political section, I soon learned that there were only two or three main political issues that needed to be watched. Leading in political policy was the determination to establish and pursue a policy of independence and governmental neutrality in relation to other states. Given the Austrian attitude of friendship and cooperation with the United States, we had no major problems with its basic orientation and could support its efforts to rebuild democratic institutions. Our position was to see

that it was left alone to carry on its normal political activity.

Another prominent political consideration was Austria's relationship to the Vatican. The Concordat was being renegotiated. That had some political aspects that bore watching. In fact that gave me an opportunity to form a friendship with Monseigneur Zacci, one of the attachés in the Papal Nuncio's mission. My wife and I were valuable to him in that we were able to meet with him at diplomatic functions and at the opera and to form a sort of human shield behind which he could smoke a cigarette.

The third matter of general interest was their long standing disagreement with Italy over the status of the South Tyrol which both countries had been claiming back and forth for many years and generations. That made their relations with Italy somewhat formal and brittle, but neither side seemed disposed to do much about their claims except to reassert them as occasion warranted.

Q: Did we take any steps on the south Tyrol issue at all?

GALLOWAY: No. We managed to control our initiative in that instance and left it to the two of them to settle if such were ever possible. It never seemed to get close to the point of armed conflict. There were elections and other political moves, and we refrained from any involvement. I think our position generally was the south Tyrol could decide its own future: whether to be part of one country or the other or to remain in its undecided status.

Q: How did we feel about neutrality? I mean other places we were picky under John Foster Dulles. Neutrality was not considered a good word particularly in India, Ghana and other places. What about was this an exception?

GALLOWAY: This was an exception, perhaps because of our role of occupation after WWII when we had the four power occupation pattern there the same as in Germany. Vienna was, of course, its own little enclave with the four powers rotating as chief for a particular period. The rest of the country was divided into four zones. The Russians, particularly, had stripped their zone of pretty much all of its economic goods, key machinery or wealth of any kind. But, we had begun earlier to pay our own occupation costs. At times we were giving aid to all of Austria. We did not object to the move toward neutrality so long as it was accomplished in a democratic institutional format. Our main concern was that the political system worked and that it should work in a democratic way. It did. As a matter of fact, within the party coalition arrangement, it was more democratic than most other countries. So, we never took exception to the government's declared policy, nor did we try to push them in another direction.

Q: Was there any reaching out with the People's party to the EEU or the Socialist Party to the SED in Germany?

GALLOWAY: Not much. They were pretty much occupied by their work at home. Despite the past relations between Germany-Austria and Austria-Italy, at this particular time, and I think still to a considerable degree, the Austrians are a central European

nation with elements of east and west. Neither of the other two countries had that makeup or complexion particularly. I don't think that there was any more than just normal camaraderie with the Christian and the socialist parties in the other European countries. The Austrian socialists, as I say, were a tough outfit. They really held their own. They were very experienced politically and also in their relations with Moscow. They didn't let themselves be wooed or whatever. As far as Germany was concerned, I think Austria was quite willing to sit back and hope first to get its own treaty. I think they were as surprised as others when, in a four power meeting, Molotov said unexpectedly we will agree to have a peace treaty with Austria. The treaty was concluded, and occupation forces were withdrawn. That was the situation when we arrived there right after the Hungarian revolution.

Q: That would have been in November or December '56.

GALLOWAY: Something like that, yes. The Austrians really did make a great effort to help take care of the refugees who had just streamed across the border. Of course, their relationship with Hungary was almost familial. So they set up camps, made housing arrangements and helped to provide food. We and the other western countries put a lot of aid in there. The embassy ladies set up a soup kitchen for the Hungarians who could get themselves at least one good hot meal a day. At the consular building there was always quite a following of Hungarians waiting for some word on what would happen in their particular cases or to be invited to move into the approved exodus or offerings of countries to take Austrian refugees as immigrants. The U.S. took quite a lot, as did other countries, but most of them were hoping to come to America. There were always many waiting around the consulate and that is where the ladies set up a soup kitchen so that they could have a hot meal while they were waiting. I don't know how many of them had actually been involved in fighting in Hungary which was very short lived when the Russian tanks came in. At least these people had gotten out through the gate. Better to get out than get hurt. The embassy ladies also ran a thrift shop, and under its auspices they started a Hungarian handicraft program. The Hungarians joined in with enthusiasm and they made things of all kinds that could be sold either there or elsewhere. That activity was carried on most of the entire time we were there, and my wife Betty took on an active role in it. Mrs. Thompson, the Ambassador's wife, was its principal sponsor. All in all, the Hungarian refugee problem was the principal issue for the Austrian government, the international welfare agencies and the embassy, officially and informally, to deal with at that time.

Q: How did you find relations with the foreign ministry and all and with political figures? I mean was it quite open?

GALLOWAY: Very open. Very open for the American embassy. More so than for the others. In fact, there had developed before I got there, and which I inherited, a relationship with the chancellor's public affairs office. The head of that office was very pro-American. He sat in cabinet meetings. He was a pretty powerful figure in the People's Party and was really a de facto minister. After every cabinet meeting, he would invite one of us to his office and tell us what happened. It was, of course, done very informally. We

found ourselves as an embassy probably more informed about the government's activities than the foreign office itself, and the foreign office, although they were as cooperative as they could be, were able to sense that.. Sometimes they came to us to find out what was going on in their government.

Q: This happens.

GALLOWAY: Nevertheless, we had very good relations with the foreign office people. Figl was foreign minister when we arrived and he stayed in office a long time. Gruber, who had been Ambassador to the U.S., later served as foreign minister. Anyway, the embassy enjoyed the closest relationship with the government without having to work to any great degree to carry it on. The requirements for reporting as such or for formal diplomatic activities vis a vis the government were very minimal. I can recall that most of our reporting was done in the old WEEKA, the old comprehensive format which missions were supposed to follow and send in weekly reports by airgram. That was the main vehicle for our reporting out of Vienna, which gives you an idea of the rather quiescent political status of the country. The Austrians were left to carry on their own affairs and time was in their favor. Eventually the two parties decided to abandon coalition government and began vying with each other for governmental control. That was after my departure. I would have to say we couldn't have wanted for a better, closer relationship with the government during its coalition period as such. We never needed to use it in any serious way as leverage because their policies certainly were not adverse to our interests and we hoped they would be able to prosper and achieve their main goals.

Q: What were the Soviets doing? I mean it was a neutral, but it couldn't have made them very happy.

GALLOWAY: I think the Soviets in the field were somewhat surprised when the Austrian treaty happened. I expect that occupation duty in Austria had been a plum assignment for all ranks of their military. Even in the early post war days, Austria was a country and people of music, song, fun, drinking bad wine and having good times no matter about one’s economic position. Whether one was just getting by or a plutocrat didn’t really dampen their spirits all that much. But the Soviets, well there really wasn't anything they could do. They had delayed the Austrian treaty for as long as they thought it was in their interest. They had not been able to stir things up to the point of creating unrest, they had nothing further to gain and were pretty much on the defensive at that time anyway in Austria. They had learned there was no prospect of their getting a strong communist foothold in Austria, so I suppose they decided they might as well cut their losses. Their later relationships with the government and with the political parties were practically nonexistent. The less the government had to do with them, the better for it. Once they agreed to the peace treaty and removed the occupation forces, the Soviets, when they said goodby, it really was goodby. They were left with a diplomatic presence which gained nothing. As far as I can recall, they really didn't attempt pressure tactics on the Austrians; they were pretty quiet.

Q: Was it a three or a four year tour?

GALLOWAY: It was a two year tour.

Q: During that period of time, the Hungarian revolution had just ended. There had been this massive outpouring of people. Were we monitoring the Hungarian refugees who stayed in Austria. Were we seeing them as perhaps forming a revenge party or something?

GALLOWAY: My own feeling was that they came out because of frustration and disappointment, sadly realizing they were misled in thinking that if they rose up against the repressors, help would be forthcoming from the west, primarily from the United States. After all, our occupation army was just across the border. I think some of the President's and the Secretary's public statements and speeches during that period were probably open to inference by those oppressed people that if they created uprisings on their own, help would be forthcoming. Although our leaders certainly never went so far in their public pronouncements, to wishful thinking people living in dire straits it was not beyond hope. They thought they were being encouraged not to knuckle under, not to give way. In reality, when they came out of Hungary into Austria, they must have realized that there was no real possibility of military action against the Soviet Union for the liberation of Hungary. They probably saw the truth in Hungary when they were waiting for it to come, but it never came. In the West although some public sentiment called for military action, I don't believe there ever was any such intention within Western governments. As an occupying power in Austria, neither we nor the UK nor French made any noises or moves which could be interpreted as militarily threatening.

Q: Did you get the feeling that the CIA was running around doing all sorts of things?
GALLOWAY: Well, they had lots of people around, but actually no, they were realistic. They obviously hoped as did the rest of us that the Soviets would not be as brutal as they were in dealing with the Hungarians, but I don't think there was any dogma, so to speak, in CIA policy at that stage to militarily liberate Hungary. I don't believe their people out in the field were off their thinking on that.

Q: But it was mainly the Soviets the KGB and the CIA were both trying to recruit each other and all.

GALLOWAY: Oh, yes. It was that sort of individual activity, which looking back, was completely unnecessary. I don't think either side gained a whit from it. It was to some extent because of the situation of Austria among east-west nations at that stage. Every other person was looking for an agent or a double, but nothing really worthwhile came out of it for either side. I think reading the newspapers would have been just as effective.

Q: Which usually is the case. How about I mean, we were just moving out of the four power occupation. Was there still a lingering unity between the French embassy, the British embassy and the American embassy?

GALLOWAY: Not so much. As always, the French tended to go their own particular way. It was not aimed toward continuation of a close relationship with the British and ourselves at that stage. Their occupation policy was muted because France didn't have adequate financial resources to help. They did take some refugees. The British were much in the same position, and they were always free to consult and talk. We had no differences with them.

Q: Did you, you came there right after the Hungarian Suez crises of '56. The Suez crisis was noted by a sudden cutting off of all sort of communication between the British and the Americans. It only lasted for a little while. This was really coming from the top. Did you find that put any breach in.

GALLOWAY: It was an anachronism strangely. The British and French had been consulting with the U.S. on the canal, but they suddenly went on their own with the Israelis. They half-heartedly tried to keep up the fiction of cooperation in Washington. We were not really affected very much in Austria. We were too far away. Eisenhower and Dulles were so perturbed that their disenchantment with the action of the British, French and Israelis came out in full force publicly. The U.S. had taken the lead in the United Nations condemning the Russians for their move in Hungary to suppress the budding opposition there with just blunt military force, undue military force. Most of the rest of the UN joined in and the Soviets really had taken it on the chin in the United Nations and world public opinion. The United Nations was the main sounding board and focus of international attention. That the British and French had joined the Israelis to move militarily on Suez at such close time proximity to the Hungarian event seemed so wrong-headed as well as outright aggression that it completely undermined the UN position vis-a-vis the USSR. I think the President and Secretary were particularly unhappy with the British. In all candor, it was not all that surprising that the French should go off on their own because such was more or less habitual, but for the British to do it was surprising. Murphy was in London talking to the British, but they apparently were not completely candid with him, carrying on actively on the side with the French. As the Suez action was continued with British and French forces moving sluggishly and ineffectively, I believe that word was sent through Murphy to Macmillan, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, that if they didn’t stop, there would be no more money from the U.S. Certainly the United States was not financially supportive. The story has it, although I have no firsthand knowledge of this, that when Macmillan informed Eden and also told him the UK did not have the wherewithal to do it without leaving themselves destitute, that brought a halt. You can imagine what influence that had on the relationship between Eden and Dulles.

Q. You were going back. You suffered from this illness and all. What did you do?

GALLOWAY: I came back to the Department and was assigned to a job in personnel which had not much substance to it, but the Department was very good to me because of a nagging illness which had shortened my tour in Vienna.

Q: Well, you were in personnel for four years then or what?

GALLOWAY: I was in personnel for about two or three different jobs. Then I went over as a special assistant to the Director General of the Foreign Service.

Q: Let's go back to Personnel. When you first got there, in '58, what were you doing in personnel?

GALLOWAY: I was assigned to an office responsible for personnel planning. There were about half a dozen of us there, and all kinds of personnel policies or problems or whatever were thrown at us. We were asked to study them and produce ideas, recommendations and so forth.

Q: Can you think of any of the issues that you were particularly were wrestling with?

GALLOWAY: Frankly, it escapes me. They were all rather minor aspects of the personnel process. I don't remember anything of great moment at that time, but we were producing papers.

Q: What about when you were with Tyler Thompson when he was director general; what were the titles and rank? You must have known

GALLOWAY: My second job in personnel was Chief of the Title and Rank branch which was a part of the personnel assignment process. Personnel assignments are the wheel that makes the Foreign Service and the Department of State go. In the title and rank branch we had responsibility for according diplomatic titles and ranks to officers as they were assigned to positions overseas, in embassies and consular posts. The diplomatic and consular titles were decided in accordance with the positions to which our foreign service personnel were assigned and following international diplomatic practices. I have to say that assignment was truly an educational experience. I had not realized just how much importance some people attached to their titles. I learned a lot about my fellow human beings.

Q: Well, I was going to say you must have seen the darker side of nature. Titles and ranks are not an inconsiderate part of the human being.

GALLOWAY: That is certainly true. I had not realized how much a part it was until then and how much it meant to each individual as he went to a new assignment. For one thing I had not myself been in any senior positions where the title and rank of the job meant much. As a matter of fact, having served in the army as long as I did as an aide-de-camp and then having had the experience in the NATO period, titles and ranks meant little in my firmament. As I got into the substance of this particular job and watched the regular stream of assignments and moves, the importance of titles and ranks to the people involved left me with a different perspective. By and large, just common sense dictated what one did in that job. There were always a few cases where someone was bucking for a title which had not previously been accorded to the position or just wanted to upgrade his role in the diplomatic scheme of things. As I recall, the titles of counselor or minister were frequently sought without justification. There were cases where people who were

attached to consulates weren't happy with the title of vice consul. It was a melange of things.

At one point there was actually enough fuss over titles and rank to cause some controversy within personnel. Our little branch did a study of title and rank on the use of the title of counselor. We selected the British, French and various other major governments and got copies of their diplomatic lists in about half a dozen major capitals, Cairo, Tokyo, etc. around the world. We made a chart showing how they used the title of counselor in these various places. We took that over to Loy Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary for Management, and he was absolutely tickled pink. We spent quite a lot of time with him going over that comparison chart. It was an eye opener to say the least, but the lack of conformity in the various diplomatic services was quite notable, and we found that the rules of grade and title did not always go together in assignments, particularly by the other governments. We found that the French had a pretty good system. They had adopted classes or grades in their regular foreign service which were entitled secretary, counselor, and so forth. They actually promoted to those titles and ranks rather than class one, class three, and so forth. That shaped our thinking in later years in revising our own foreign service personnel system. I'd have to say that the title and rank job was a revelation to me. It was not difficult work, but it did entail controversy, as I have mentioned.. It had to do with human beings and their egos, and we had to deal with that. It was from that job that Tyler Thompson arranged for my assignment as his special assistant to the Director General of the Foreign Service.

Q: Well, now, as director general with Tyler Thompson, what were you doing?

GALLOWAY: In those days, the director general's position on the organization chart was a box connected laterally, not vertically, to the Deputy Under Secretary for Management. There was no "position description" for the job. That was much the way it had gone for many years. He was a companion to the head of the management side of the department, and with whatever duties and responsibilities the management chief assigned. It was always filled by one of the most senior officers in the service, and by tradition and practice his door was always open to anyone. His personal prestige usually enabled him to step in and influence issues of personnel and management. What I found when I joined Tyler Thompson was that he was informally evaluating senior foreign officers and making recommendations for appointments to ministerial and ambassadorial posts. It was, in effect, the starting point for careers in chiefs of mission or other senior posts. He would draw up a list of officers for ambassadorships and pass it to the deputy undersecretary for management, where presidential appointments were controlled. So, in that sense he did not have institutional responsibility for personnel, but he had an unspecified responsibility for picking the best performers for assignment to high office. Naturally, he worked very closely with the head of personnel.

Q: Well, did you know, there is something I have seen from time to time was that so many of these appointments to people who are taking away the political appointments, which is a whole different kettle of fish, but within our Foreign Service, was that those were people who were ending up with special assistants to the under secretary, assistant

secretaries, but many often who would have a sponsor which is a high position. They were more likely to, I mean this was the best way to get you started to be let's say ambassador, maybe.

GALLOWAY: It was one way of doing it. It certainly had an influence in the selection process. Mind you, by and large, the people who were picked for those positions were usually outstanding in the areas where they worked. In some cases personal favoritism or political influence played a part. Such were the exception rather than the rule, and most of them were at the very top level where the special assistant rode the coattails of his principal. So that, almost by definition, those officers who were in the special assistant jobs were usually fairly outstanding people. On the other hand, our recommendations were more influenced by the people who came up through the bureaus or progressed up the ladder in the field with outstanding records. Assistant Secretaries, their deputies, office directors, officers in the field who were already chiefs of mission at smaller posts, DCMs, consuls general at important consular posts, and to meet your point, special assistants to some top departmental officials, usually on the seventh floor; that's largely where we looked. Having served in personnel and in the director general's office for some time, I found that the pattern of development of a foreign service officer had become fairly apparent. By the time an officer had reached the class 3 level, he was usually in a position of having established himself as a person destined for further advancement or as a person for whom it would be difficult to find a job from that level. Admittedly, that was not always fair because some officers had not had assignments that offered the opportunity to show what they had, but generally speaking, by the time an officer reached the class 3 level, his reputation was pretty well established. That's where you looked for your DCMs or ambassadorial appointees. If they went on up from class 3 into class 2 and class 1, some officers developed further and others leveled off. Their potential had been realized. Others bypassed them and took on increasing responsibility.

Q: Was there at this time, I am trying to capture the era. I think I know the answer, but, I think I know. Was there any particular attention to trying to get women or blacks into those positions or was this just something that didn't there wasn't a pool.

GALLOWAY: This was before the programs of affirmative action. The attention given to sex or race really came by fiat from above where political considerations were more a part of the daily fare in government. There were some in the foreign service officer ranks, women, African Americans, Hispanics, etc., who had entered in the usual manner and worked their way up, but they were certainly more in the minority than their fellow citizens in the general public. Some of them had made it up to top jobs in the field or the department, but they were few. The most difficult problem lay with the black minority. We made extraordinary efforts to find qualified ones. At one point we invited a group of black leaders to a conference in the department which covered several days. We had university presidents, professors, lawyers, athletes, and others who had made their ways to positions of public importance. The meeting brought out several considerations such as the difficulty of the foreign service exams, the fact that so many of them had to start from economic or cultural handicaps, the general lack of opportunities. One of the most interesting points made by the visitors was that a really able black college graduate could

usually find a more remunerative position in business, law, or other professions than in the government. It was a very useful meeting, and though we did not find an immediate solution, we did get the attention and continuing help of some of the participants.

As for the ladies, we did make special efforts to give them every consideration for good jobs, including chief of mission. Moreover, they began to turn up in greater numbers via the exam route, and I believe they are far more numerous now than in the time frame we have been considering. In those days there were not enough people to choose from, and it wasn't until the later programs that the service began to get more personnel resources in these areas. I can remember at one point while I was in Tyler Thompson's office, he called me in and said the president had just sent down the word that he wanted to appoint, I think it was thirty, lady ambassadors. We were directed to come up with a list within a few days. He said, “Who are we going to find?” I said, “Well, we have some Foreign Service women officers who certainly merit weighing. What is her name, Willis?”

Q: Frances Willis.

GALLOWAY: Frances Willis was one of the first women, of course. She was probably the highest ranking female officer in the service at that time. Tibbetts, Margaret Tibbetts, later on Carole Laise. Generally, these women had begun to come into the Foreign Service. Perhaps in those earlier days, they just had not either had the desire to compete or enough interest in foreign affairs to lead them to follow a curriculum that would qualify them for such a career.

Q: Well, also there was that marriage business.

GALLOWAY: There was the marriage problem.

Q: Which was never a matter of statute but if a woman got married she was expected to resign. If a man got married he was not. This was patently unfair.

GALLOWAY: Yes, Bill and Louise Armstrong are a case in point. The department’s policy was one of those anomalies which presumably had been embedded in the foreign service from its inception. If a woman foreign service officer married, she had to retire. Finally, the unfairness of that policy was recognized and women foreign service officers were permitted to marry male FSO’s without being forced to retire. Even then, the assignments of the two officers had to be worked out carefully by personnel. If they were assigned to the same post, one could not be put in a supervisory position over the other. This could become a problem as they reached senior ranks. In practice, many accepted assignments to different posts.

Going back to the aspect of race, the department experienced the effect of World War II as did most other government departments. Many Afro Americans came up from the south and established themselves in the cities in the north where there were jobs. When I was in the department in those earlier days, they filled most of the lower ranking civil service jobs. There would be an occasional one who had the opportunity to go to college,

pass the foreign service exam and become a foreign service officer. But it wasn't until the action programs came in later that their numbers began to increase.

Q: Starting in the late '70s and then in the '80s and the '90s when it really picked up.

GALLOWAY: Yes, they began to germinate, I think, during the Kennedy period. Then they increased as the minorities themselves pushed their own cases and got into positions where they could be heard and make their cases. My experience was that when the call came to report on numbers of women or racial minorities, we were always looking for people. So much so that from my personal experience, I can remember specifics when people were recommended for positions they really weren't qualified for, but we just had to show a better representation of minorities in our total employment. So, the assignments were made and somehow it worked out more or less.

Q: Well, you left the, after the director general's assistant, what did you do?

GALLOWAY: I had wanted to get into German affairs because the future of Germany seemed to be such an important factor. As I thought further about it, I became more drawn toward our future with Britain. My experience in NATO, both during the negotiation of the treaty and building the NATO institutions, had made it clear that the UK and Canada were going to be the most substantial partners and our most reliable allies. I decided that the old "saw" of the long standing special relationship between Britain and the United States, together with Canada, really did have more to it than just the lip service which had become popular. Moreover, I believed that the U.S. and UK needed to stay very close in the effort to bring Germany back to full citizenship in the West, and that this would also entail a close understanding between us in influencing France to stay on the right track. I anticipated that would be an active and interesting area and I hoped to have a part in it. So I put in an early bid for an assignment to London. Also, I had hoped to go to the National War College before moving to the field again. I was lucky. It turned out that a job at the appropriate level would be opening up in the political section in London in about a year, and in the meantime, I got the bid to go to the war college.

During that period my wife and I had decided to adopt children. Again, we were fortunate. We adopted a son, Jeff, just before I entered the war college and a daughter, Mary, just a few weeks before we departed for London.

Q: What year would this have been?

GALLOWAY: '63, '64. I went to the war college from the director general's office, and our class finished in '65.

Q: I was thinking this might be a good place to stop for now. We'll pick it up the next time in 1964. You go to London. We will pick it up then

GALLOWAY: Yes, although I might have a few thoughts about the war college.

Q: Why don't you put the War College on now, and then we will pick it up?

GALLOWAY: Well, the war college was sort of a credential that would serve very well in the senior ranks. Admittedly, I was in a position in the director general's office to have some influence on my next assignment. The war college seemed to me to be good experience to gain and to have on the record before going out again. I learned a lot in that year down at Fort McNair. I had resigned my regular commission in the army in 1948. Developments in the scope and composition of our defense forces during the intervening period, including Korea, NATO, SEATO and Vietnam almost boggled the mind. We were heavily involved in Vietnam at that time and the cold war was still in full swing. Many of my military colleagues had already served in Vietnam and might be called on to go out there again. Technological advances had changed the character and nature not only of force units but also of strategy and tactics. The helicopter, rockets, lasers, and other weapons guidance systems, as well as avionics and communications capabilities had made far reaching changes in fighting wars.

As for the war college itself, I learned through association with my fellow students the extent to which all elements of the service, army, navy, air force, and marines had made great efforts to educate their senior people. Many of them had gone to universities, earned advanced degrees. All services had these programs. Moreover, they had developed and improved their own training and academic system. So, I found myself among peers who had impressive backgrounds in experience and academics. Studying and working with them was an educational experience in itself for those of us not in uniform. All students were of the rank of Lt. Colonel (or equivalent) or higher. Across the board, I found that the army and navy were the most solid. The air force hadn't yet really established its hierarchy and itself in a way that led to broad horizons in professional terms. We had a lot of air force officers who had spent the last four or five years on call to do the runs in the SAC twenty-four hour bombing presence in the air.

Q: Strategic aircraft.

GALLOWAY: Strategic aircraft. Some found it difficult to stretch their thinking or to accept ideas which might point in directions other than what they had been living with the last forty years of their lives. During the course, I think the air force officers really broadened more than the rest. The navy was perhaps the best in terms of individual officers although the army was a very close second. The army really thought in the broadest terms: increasing our capacity for weaponry, for tactics, for strategy, for political understanding and so forth. The navy sent some of its best people there. They were established and they expected to go back to their navy slots. They were pointed to jobs in the upper echelons of the navy, whereas the army was much broader. They were thinking in political military terms.

Q: The other thing is the army really has to deal with politics. The air force flies above it, and the navy is hopping around the sea. In a way, they aren't, they don't have to even come face to face with other people.

GALLOWAY: Yes, and in fact the army had run WWII very largely from an outfit in the pentagon called OPR, Operations and Plans division in the general staff of the army. It was the most potent outfit there.

Q: That was where Eisenhower was a Lieutenant Colonel in that.
GALLOWAY: He was head of it. During WWII, that outfit called the turn on policy probably more than any other staff unit in the Pentagon. So, the army had a head start in strategic thinking and political thinking. They had had to get into it in WWII days.

I used the year at the war college to prepare myself for an assignment in London. I did a lot of reading on British politics, and I wrote my thesis on British politics and British defense policy. It was very helpful to me as preparation for going to London, and also as I said, in learning about the rest of the government, how they were going, how they were moving and so forth. It was very encouraging.

Q: Well, why don't we pick this up then in 1964 when you are off to London.

GALLOWAY: All right.

Q: Great.

***

Today is the 29th. of October, 1999. It is now 1964 and you are off to London. You were in London from '64 to when on this particular tour?

GALLOWAY: Actually, that should be '65. I was at the national war college in '64. In London from '65 to '74.

Q: Wow! All together. OK well, let's start at the beginning. When you arrived there, what was your job and what was the embassy like at the time?

GALLOWAY: When I arrived, my position was first secretary in the political section, and my assignment was to cover the Conservative Party which was not in power at that time.

Q: What party was in power then?

GALLOWAY: The Labour Party was in power.

Q: Who was the prime minister, Harold Wilson?

GALLOWAY: Harold Wilson. Labour had won the election just the year before, and they were getting things going. They were starting some of the programs they had been hatching for quite a long time. Wilson called another election a year or so later when the

tide was very much in Labour's favor and got an additional five years on to 1970.

When I arrived, David Bruce with his legendary experiences, service, reputation and stature was Ambassador. He presided over the embassy with the charm and ease of a Virginia patrician, and had the full support and admiration of the staff. Bruce was his own political, economic, whatever reporter when he thought something merited his personal attention. Otherwise, he delegated responsibility for running the embassy, both substantively and administratively, to the staff through the Deputy Chief of Mission. He kept himself informed on the work of the staff by informal consultations, weekly staff meetings and reading all incoming and outgoing messages. He liked to read on his feet and had a lectern at the wall to the side of his desk. The DCM at that time was Phil Kaiser who had previously been Ambassador to Morocco. Phil had been a Rhodes scholar at Oxford at a time when many of the current leaders in the parties had been in their university or food line years. He had many friends in both parties and was particularly close to some of the academic dons in the Labour Party. His contacts and insight were significantly beneficial to the embassy. He, as well as Bruce, kept their doors open to all of us and we enjoyed an easy and instructive working relationship.

During that period of time, the political section in London was fairly large compared with most embassies. Two officers were assigned to cover the two main political parties in all aspects, their everyday activities, their performance in the House of Commons, their planning and policy formulation in their party headquarters, their principal ministerial level leaders, and their “backbenchers”, or the rank and file of the parliamentary parties. We also had some “plums” to pass out in the form of grants under the Smith-Mundt program, which financed visits to the U.S. by foreign government leaders for a six week tour and consultations around the country. Many of these grants went to members of parliament of both parties. Al Irving was covering the Labour Party when I arrived. He was an old veteran, and they used to call him “the old colonial” down in the House of Commons where he enjoyed the friendship and respect of a large number of Labour MP’s. He had been in London for a number of years and was truly an expert on British politics. I moved into the position responsible for “covering” the Conservative Party, or Tories as they were popularly known. I was able to get introductions to two or three key people in the party and branched off from there. I found that the best way for me to get a feel for the operation of government and to learn the numbers of the players, their names, who was doing what, whom to pay attention to and whom not to follow was to attend the sessions at the House of Commons. I did so regularly for about a year or two until I really felt that I knew the system and the players in both parties. That blanket pattern of attendance paid off in other ways. The attendants and doorkeepers there are for the most part retired guardsmen, big six foot plus fellows with grey hair, magisterial bearing and the most cooperative and friendly people one could ever want to know. I got to know some of them very well there in the house, the Sergeant at Arms' office, the Speaker's office and most important, the whip's office. The Chief Whip of the party in power is really the person who runs the House of Commons. The importance of the Chief Whip is illustrated by the office assigned to him and his staff outside Commons.

On Downing Street there are three office/residence buildings. No. 10 is the office of the

Prime Minister and his living quarters, No. 11 is the office and housing of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and No. 12 is assigned to the Chief Whip and his staff. I spent quite a lot of time in No. 12 and also had occasions to be in the other two buildings.

Q: Were there two whips, one Tory and one Labour?

GALLOWAY: Yes. They have several subordinate whips appointed according to ability and the geographic area where their constituencies lie. It is generally considered that service as a whip is almost a prerequisite to further advancement to ministerial level appointments. To get to the ministerial plums, one often serves in the whips' office for a year or so. It is there where plans, timing and sponsorship for legislation were put together, not that the whips took the place of party operation as a whole but they largely planned the legislative agenda. Also, the whips were expected to be the locus for two way communication from the backbenchers to the leadership and *vice versa.* Naturally, they carried substantial influence with other MP’s. They were key contacts whom I made special efforts to get to know. I faithfully put in a lot of time with them and it really paid off.

Q: Well just, I am not as familiar, I know the general idea of how the British system worked, but you know in the House of Representatives and the Senate so much work is done in committee or in the corridors or something. You can attend Senate or House sessions all the time and not really get too good an idea of what is going on.

GALLOWAY: The British government, being a parliamentary system, is different. The House of Commons has some standing committees, but they are not used in the same manner or as much as our congressional committees. Nor do they have anything like the influence and power of our congressional committees. During the time I was in London, the government did make some efforts to use committees in more substantial roles. In fact they sent people over here from each party to meet with our members of congress to learn about our committee system and how it operates. They cane back with mixed opinions. In Britain so much of the business is carried on by debate in the house of commons.. For example, every Tuesday, the prime minister is there for half an hour to an hour and subjected to questions which have previously been filed. He gives answers to these questions, and there is always a follow up to the person who put in the question to ask a supplementary. That is when the fun begins. So, they carry out most of their work in the House of Commons really as a committee of the whole. They use the committees to some extent, but they have no control over the business of the house. It is not necessary for legislation to go through committee before being introduced on the floor.. Committee members as such really don't have all that much more influence in the Commons than back bench members.

My personal view is that the nature of a parliamentary system probably rules out the use of committees such as our congressional committees. In the parliamentary system, the executive and the legislative branches are melded together. To set up parliamentary committees of the scope and authority of our congressional committees on legislation would expose the executive to a serious dilution of his authority and power. It would

introduce an institutional change over which the executive could be put in a vulnerable position beyond his control no matter what his parliamentary majority. Few heads of government would willingly make such a concession. To create such an institution of government would necessarily have to be the subject of general popular elections to change the constitution of the government. A prime minister must be able to rely on his cabinet, junior ministers, and whips to control parliament plus the fact that a majority of the members of parliament belong to his party or coalition. Those elements of a parliamentary government comprehend the functions of our congressional committees.

Holding a minority of seats in the House of Commons in 1965, the Conservatives were "Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition". As such they organized their MP's into a "shadow government" comprising the party leader as head of a shadow cabinet with shadow ministers named for each government department and junior shadow ministers assigned specific areas of responsibility. The chief whip and his subordinates operated pretty much as they would had they been in power. Seniority and previous ministerial experience has some influence on the shadow appointments, but by no means rule out advancing younger MPs of promise. A good case in point was Margaret Thatcher. I first met her when she was a back bencher while the Tories were in opposition. Her first assignment was in a shadow junior role on taxation, and after some time there, she went on to education. She was an unusual back bencher. I got to know her and her husband, Denis, quite well. We spent some time together socially. They came to our social functions and Denis invited me to some of the social activities at Burmah Oil where he was established. The point I want to make about her position in politics is that she was then the same woman who later became Prime Minister; in other words she would not hesitate to voice her views to anyone whomever. She was different from other women in the House of Commons. She was not particularly liked by her colleagues because of her personality and her kind of aggressiveness. Nevertheless, she was made a member of the shadow cabinet during that opposition period. It came about because it was traditional to have one woman member, and the lady who was already there became unable to continue because of her health. Largely as a result of persuasion by Jim Prior, parliamentary private secretary to party leader Ted Heath, the latter invited Margaret to join their group.

Heath had become party leader shortly after I got there. Sir Alec Douglas Home had been the prime minister and leader of the party until the election in the fall of '64. That's when Labour won the first time. That's when Wilson came in, in '64. After a few months, Sir Alec resigned as Leader of the Conservative Party when he realized that there was dissatisfaction with his leadership among Tory MPs. There had been a lively contest between Reginald Maudling and Edward Heath for the leadership which Heath won.

Q. You were saying with Margaret Thatcher...

GALLOWAY: Yes. I was very impressed by her despite her reputation and relationship with the rest of the Tory MPs. One who shared my views was Jim Prior, Conservative MP for Lowestoft, a constituency in East Anglia. He was a person of solid substance. After leaving Cambridge, he put together all the credit he could muster and bought a farm. He worked hard, did well and obviously gained the respect and confidence of the

citizens in his community. He was persuaded to stand for parliament and won his seat in a close election. Soon he was a vice chairman of the party with an office in Conservative headquarters on Smith Square. When Heath won the party leadership, one of his first moves was to name Prior as his parliamentary private secretary. I had met Jim shortly before that and to coin a phrase, he took me under his wing. We became such close friends that he used to stay with us frequently, particularly after the Tories assumed power in the next election and he was in the cabinet. As he asked me, "If Ted doesn't have a room for me at 10 Downing Street, can you put me up?" He was, of course, my best and most reliable source in London, which I made sure he knew so that he would not share with me anything he did not want known by us. He quickly became Heath's closest confidant and adviser.

I talked with Jim about Margaret Thatcher and my high regard for her. I told him I was going to recommend her for a Smith-Mundt grant visit to the U.S. She was accepted and spent about six weeks in the states very profitably for her politically. Jim wanted to give her opportunity in the House of Commons, and as I recounted earlier, persuaded Heath, against his will, to take her in the shadow cabinet. According to Jim, she was not shy about joining in the deliberations. She irritated Heath repeatedly, and Jim had to intervene with him frequently to save her neck. By the time of the next general election in 1970, she had established herself as the foremost woman in the party's hierarchy. That did not change the situation, however, that she and Heath could never got along. Unfortunately, that situation persisted even after the Tories gained power, but Heath could not deny her a cabinet post. She became Minister of Education in the Conservative government.

Q: Tell me, as the political officer of the American embassy attending parliamentary sessions, what were you looking for? I mean how did you...

GALLOWAY: I was looking for the way they legislated, for the general lines of policy that emerged. For example, during the first year they were mired in the problem of Southern Rhodesia. That was the main theme, plus their economic situation which was at that point just beginning to look up a bit. The government was more preoccupied with Southern Rhodesia and its fate than just about anything else.

Some of the most heated debates in the House of Commons were over Southern Rhodesia. This was a difficult problem for both parties. One of my recollections, not having to do with the substance of the problem, was that Harold Wilson established himself as a consummate debater and leader during that difficult time, but despite his efforts, a solution eluded the government.

Q: Well, we were very much involved, too, because we had become sort of a party to many of the negotiations.

GALLOWAY: Yes. It was a very difficult thing for all of us because the Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia had long been uncooperative with the British, and it was very reluctant to give up anything because the white population there was such a minority. It

still was fighting against the inevitability of one man one vote. The Labour Party, of course, was all for working out some kind of transitional arrangement which would allow movement toward that goal. The Conservative party was hopelessly split, although Douglas Hurd, Heath's assistant, passed to me personally a message which Heath wanted the President to know, that when the Tories gained power, they would retain a consular presence. I passed it on but doubted it would help in the U.S. decision on that problem. For two or three years the Labour government wrestled with the Southern Rhodesia problem. They tried to negotiate. Wilson went down to Gibraltar for negotiations. At one time they thought they had made some progress but it collapsed. Inexorably the movement in Southern Rhodesia was just putting the government in a position where it tried to use every device it could think of to hang on to power. Eventually it was unable to do so, and power was shared. Now we have the results of that, fortunately without much bloodshed.

Q: Well, now, as you watch these debates, an awful lot of them must have been internal things in which we would have only a peripheral interest. Were you sort of looking for things where the United States has an interest which could be on tariffs or foreign policy or NATO or something of that nature?

GALLOWAY: Yes, the daily routine in Commons, over a period of time, gave us a pretty good feel for what to expect from them on policies and programs of interest to us, NATO, Europe in all aspects, commonwealth and colonial issues, and particularly, economic conditions. The embassy was in the position, I think, to report to Washington and give a fairly good picture of what to expect, what not to expect, and what to get into and when to stay away.

Q: Then were you making book as well as your labor officer counterpart, political officer counterpart on where the various people in the Conservative Party stood on things that were of particular or potential interest to the United States?

GALLOWAY: Yes. Well, for example, the European Union was a classic example. Both parties had their problems with it. Both of them initially opposed full British membership. Then, as time went on, developments in both parties led them to move more toward the European structure and scene rather than to remain the outsider. Mainly, their relations with the Commonwealth and the United States caused them to be very cautious about joining the European Union fully.

At the same time the UK attempted to assume leadership with other countries, Sweden, Norway and those around the periphery who weren't sure about the European Union themselves. As you may remember, at one point they formed a separate economic organization mainly on paper which would cooperate with a Western European Union and be a sort of bridge to the rest of the world. Sitting in the House of Commons gave one a feeling of how things were apt to go, how difficult it was going to be for them to join a European union. Also, in the earlier days how much could we depend on them for their continued presence east of Suez, could they stay out there and help out in that part of the world. The Conservative Party was initially pretty sound on maintaining British

presence there. The Labour Party was not so much. Then the Conservatives wobbled. When the financial situation became so rigidly confining that they had to watch every penny in the budget, there was just no question of being able to maintain any large military presence anywhere that would be meaningful. With what they had left, they still tried to do the best they could, but during the life of that Labour government, they really in effect cut their ties east of Suez. I remember David Bruce coming in after that vote in the House of Commons and writing one of the few telegrams that he would write personally, giving his views that the British government had just made one of the greatest mistakes in its history by abandoning the policy east of Suez and withdrawing its forces and presence from that part of the world. While I was very strongly committed to that view, as was just about everybody else in our camp, I think I probably had more misgivings about their ability to do it because I was closer to their thoughts and feelings, sitting in Commons listening and talking to people.

Through the good graces of people like Jim Prior and Willie Whitelaw, the chief whip of the Conservatives, I was able to meet and get to know many of the Tory MPs and other Conservative Party officials. One who became a fountain of information and a close friend was Sir Michael Fraser, later Lord Fraser of Kilmorack, who was vice chairman of the party. They had a sizeable staff at party headquarters and nearby a research department which had gained some fame in British politics. It had been established by Rab Butler back in earlier days and had been responsible for drawing up most of the strategic policies of the party, political, economic and military. It was headed by Michael Fraser for a long time before he became vice chairman, and he had been largely responsible for its development and reputation. He was not only a source of information, but because he was not in the House of Commons himself, he could talk more freely. We could sit down and sort of brainstorm about what might or might not be possible. He was a great source of guidance and information to me. We have kept in touch since I left London, and he and his wife have visited us here in McLean.

Another MP I got to know quite well after he had served as Prime Minister of the previous Conservative government and later resigned as leader of the party was Sir Alec Douglas Home. Some time after he moved out of 10 Downing Street and resigned his party post (incidentally he held the foreign secretary post in the shadow cabinet under Heath) he gave a reception to which I was invited. After looking around, I realized that I was the only non-British person in the room of about 50 to 100 people. Soon the shadow cabinet had congregated out on the balcony and was working out its plans. One of them invited me to join in, and I listened until the confab broke up. I had a pretty good reporting telegram to send to Washington the next day.

After they won the election in 1970, we received a back channel message from the President asking whether Sir Alec would be Foreign Secretary in the new Conservative government. I put the question informally to Heath's office and received the answer that he would be if he wanted it. In any event, that immersion in the functioning of the political parties and the House of Commons coupled with relationships in the foreign office, the treasury, the ministry of defense and various other departments gave us some idea of just how things were apt to go with the new government. Unfortunately, it didn't

look all that good because the government simply didn't have the means.

Q: Well, what about during this time of the European, it wasn't the Union at that time, it was the EEC, European community. In particularly '65 up to a year or two later, DeGaulle was in power and this was about the time DeGaulle was essentially kicking NATO out of France, How was this received? I mean were we trying to do anything about how we would deal with this. I mean there were two ways of dealing with this. One was if this is the way you want it, we are sorry but we'll just do it nicely which is actually what we did, or the other one was screw you. Do you want us to take our dead from the graves of people who fought for France which was a very tempting thing to do. Was that sort of fought out? How did you see this?

GALLOWAY: If there was any nation with less regard for the French than we, it was the British. As for DeGaulle, they never had any use for him and still had the bad taste in their mouths of his troublesome presence in London during the war. They were in their own way outraged by his actions in NATO and by his decision to withdraw the French military forces from NATO command. That was the device he used so to speak to kick us out. The British, as well as most other NATO members, were united with us when we turned to the French and asked in effect what France proposed to do about all the installations and facilities we had made available to SHAPE forces in France, the lines of communication and all that. There were heated exchanges between our people and French ministers. I recall one of our leaders asking Couve de Murville, De Gaulle's Prime Minister, if he thought the American people would sit still for this enormously costly move in exchange for all the Americans who lay in graves on French soil. Couve couldn't answer. As time passed, we came to realize that the best thing to do for NATO's continued effectiveness was to move its headquarters out of France. Sitting there with the host government acting with such recalcitrance would not enable NATO to operate the way it should. There were constant disputes with the French over many things. Among the French themselves, cleavage between the Gaullists and the non-Gaullists was very apparent during that period of time. Anyway, NATO finally did as you described.

The French wanted to stay in everything except for forces. They were told that they could no longer participate fully if that was the way they wanted to do it. In that situation we decided the best thing was to move headquarters. NATO went to Brussels.

Q: Were we during this time, I mean were you using your connections and all to tell the British to cool it?

GALLOWAY: Didn't have to. They were not out in front. They were pretty much on their own. We were consulting with them very closely. They were very much in the same frame of mind as we were, so that we really didn't have to tell them to cool it. Of course, the familiar old British attitude, which I always enjoyed, let them feel that with all of their experience with the French, they were really guiding us along.

Q: How did the Johnson administration view Harold Wilson's government? How good were relations would you say between these two administrations?

GALLOWAY: Cordial but not very active. For Wilson and the Labour Party this was their first chance to govern since Atlee's immediate post war government. They had all they could handle. They were naturally more interested in domestic policy. It wasn't long before that priority brought them to conclude that they needed to withdraw the resources committed to their east of Suez presence and cut defense spending generally. They knew we hoped they would do neither, but they really had little choice and the course left for them was just to put their forces under NATO command and try to go on from there.

Q: Well, now, when we were looking at the British, I mean, I assume that while it wasn't in a way our business, it was our concern about how the British dealt with their economy. You know, a strong Britain is a stronger ally. Were we concerned during the Wilson time about the power of the unions particularly the more militant ones that seemed to be able to tie things up and to keep Britain from becoming a powerful country?

GALLOWAY: Yes. We were still giving aid to the British. We did have to push them at times on certain aspects because economic policy would be their only means to stay in power. One issue was price controls. We pretty much forced them to put in price controls as a quid pro quo for further money from us. They did. It was a partial success. As such things happen, theoretically, they can be forced, but actually, when you get down to practicalities, it is never perfect. They muddled through it somehow. They pulled in their horns quite a lot. The economy was still very short on many things, and some were still on ration. They didn't have the money to import much. They were short on things like butter, other dairy products, and meat to some extent although Scotland supplied some meat and certain commonwealth countries, New Zealand for example. Lamb was one of the staples in Britain at that time. They were scrimping and they were mindful of their major commitment to go through with the national health service. The capital outlay on that at the beginning wasn't too great, but after a couple of years when the demand for capital to maintain hospitals and other medical equipment became critical, they were strapped. The health program was really stretched to perform as they hoped it would. Fortunately, the medical profession cooperated with them. I spent some time in a hospital while I was there, and I found that the sense of cooperation and service by people in the hospital was very high indeed. The atmosphere in the wards of doctors and nurses was caring and close knit. As time went on they had to make some modifications because the costs became so staggering.

As for their relations with France, they were not as close to the DeGaulle problem as we. During that period, DeGaulle was still pushing his favorite concept of trying to create a "political standing group" so to speak. In other words, U.S., U.K., and France would form a political triumvirate to run the alliance and everything else. We rejected that and so did the British. We had never had close relationships with DeGaulle although the Free French had been an ally and post war France was generally friendly to the United States, but more passively than actively. The French were going through their problems in maintaining stability and had so many changes in government during that time. Then, when the North African situation began to simmer and came to a head, it was beyond the political power of the third or fourth republic to handle. Eventually, the public at large tuned to DeGaulle thinking at least the French right wing could get him in power. Once

he was in power, he moved quickly to consolidate governmental power around himself. We continued to have contact with him mainly through the presence of the American commander of SHAPE, at that time General Norstad.

Q: Laurence Norstad.

GALLOWAY: He was one of our best. He spent quite a lot of time talking to De Gaulle about international control of NATO air defense. Norstad, being an air force general himself, recognized that the key to a really successful defense of western Europe was a coordinated and integrated air defense. He talked with DeGaulle on several occasions about the benefits this would bring France, how it would enable them to improve their own air defense establishment and communications. DeGaulle wanted to do some of those things, but he wanted more. In fact the French military informally did maintain contact, stayed abreast of what was going on and cooperated in a way without being part of the command structure, but DeGaulle was not going to leave French forces committed as long as he was not also in the top political command, back to the old political triumvirate..

Q: Well, the thing I never quite understood was I spent some time in the 50's in Germany, and in a way life was so much better, no rationing or anything like that. You go over to Britain or to France, all of a sudden the Brits were the only ones who seemed to be having to curb themselves.

GALLOWAY: West Germany certainly recovered itself quickly even though it had born the brunt of much devastation. In a way, I suppose, the damage to its basic infrastructure enabled it to rebuild faster. The Germans just had to start over which was easier than repairing and restoring. They built new structures and got on with it. We were certainly not holding them on very close purse strings at that time as I recall because we wanted to see a democratic Germany as soon as it could possibly be. A far as the British and French were concerned, we were always urging and pushing them to try to do more. The fact is that the British and French simply did not have the productivity the Germans have in their labor force. That is the main difference. Britain was also short on capital. They had practically bankrupted themselves during the war as had the French. The Commonwealth had become a relationship in name only. They still had Commonwealth preferences, but it was no longer the source of revenue to them that it had been up to the war.

Q: Well during this period up through the end of '68, you had the Johnson administration in, and you were representing the looking after the Conservative Party. Were there any connections between the Republican Party n the United States and the Conservative Party, or were these...

GALLOWAY: Nixon came over on visits a few times. When he did, he made a point of going and talking with the Conservative leaders and the shadow cabinet, people like Ted Heath, Sir Alec Douglas Home and Harold Macmillan and some others. He touched all the bases there. He, incidentally, was a great admirer of Britain. On one visit he made later on as President, he visited the House of Commons. The only President ever to do so,

and I made all the arrangements through the sergeant at arms and the chief whip's office.

The sergeant at arms box at that time was just behind the Tory side of the house. He made it available to the President. I had, I think, seven people. Let's see, there was the President, Rogers, Henry Kissinger and two or three others. They were met at the door of the house by the Leader of the House, at that time a Labour MP by the name of Fred Peart. He led the President and his party through the public lobby and then into the lobby where only members and the staff of the house were allowed. Peart took Nixon into that lobby where the members were conversing in small groups and going back and forth into the chamber of the house. The members began applauding Nixon in the lobby. He bowed and smiled and was a very happy man. He really enjoyed that. He was then led into the box and we got them all seated. By that time the word had gone around so that everyone knew he was visiting and taking in their proceedings. I think it was the prime minister's day for answering questions. Every MP who got up to ask a question or to make a comment said something to the effect that he would hope that the Prime Minister in his talks with the President of the United States would bring up such and such. They were all laying out their particular hopes. Nixon was sitting back there smiling really enjoying the occasion. One MP came in during the questioning obviously unaware what was happening and sat down in one of the Tory seats very near to the rear. He was just sitting down and happened to look around. He did the most dramatic double take I have ever witnessed as he saw the box filled with the American President and cabinet members just behind him. It was a happy and friendly session which everyone enjoyed.

Q: Was there, the Wilson administration was still in power when Nixon came in in '69, was there any difference in our attitude with the advent of Nixon and his security advisor, Henry Kissinger?

GALLOWAY: They worked well with the Wilson government. The Wilson government was anxious to work closely with their friends. I remember on the occasion of his visit when he and his party were flying in, something came up about the welcoming remarks the Prime Minister was going to make on the President's arrival. They had passed a copy to us and we had sent them to the President's party. We got a telegram asking us to try to get to the Prime Minister and request that he make a change in the wording of the text. I went down to the prime minister's private secretary. This was just some hours before arrival. The Prime Minister looked it over and said he would be glad to accommodate the request. The President was already in the air, so we awaited their arrival. When they got off the plane, Hal Sonnenfeldt, one of Kissinger’s staff, spied me and asked if we got the message. I responded that the Prime Minister had accepted the change. In fact, the British had seemed to imply that they were somewhat in an inferior position in dealing with the President’s staff. They were cognizant of everything they were supposed to do, but I think the class system which had so structured Britain for so many years may have had a little reverse effect in that situation. None or very few of the Wilson people had any direct contacts with people in Nixon's government.

Q: Well, Annenberg came out as ambassador, and he had a very rough time at the beginning, didn't he? What was your impression of this?

GALLOWAY: He had a rough time with the press. It started before he ever left Washington. The foreign relations committee were not all happy about him and made some disparaging, un-called-for remarks during his confirmation hearings. He arrived in England to face the barrage of publicity from Washington surrounding the politics of the appointment and his lack of experience. That was supplemented by his background in Philadelphia which also touched on his family history in Philadelphia and earlier in Chicago.

Q: The father had gone to jail and was involved with Lister.

GALLOWAY: It all came during the Roosevelt administration and was connected to tax evasion. I think his father may have died in prison.

Q: I'm not sure.

GALLOWAY: I think perhaps he died. The action against his father had left a painful wound which Annenberg felt very deeply. He was determined to use the appointment Nixon had given him as a means of restoring his father's good name. He had worshiped his father, and what he had gone through obviously still cast a spell over his life. He had had no diplomatic experience, and even though he was a publisher, he did not have much experience in public relations when he was the target. With the press send off he got from Washington and was taken as a cue by the British, he was certainly in the floodlight from the time he arrived. Then, he did a couple of things early during his London tour which didn't help. Traditionally, the Ambassador's first contact with the British public is a speech at the Pilgrim's Club. Also, traditionally, that speech usually had the theme of Anglo-American unity, kinship, and cooperation - "the special relationship." Well, he decided that he wanted to take the occasion to warn against the drift he saw in young people in America and elsewhere taking stands in irresponsible ways. He thought his listeners would agree that the younger generation should pay attention to history, their parents and forbearers, and have respect for and support government. That was the tone of his speech which made headlines mainly in the sense that it departed from the traditional theme of such speeches at Pilgrims. I don't think there was disagreement with what he said; it was just that he had chosen that particular subject for his speech.

Then he presented his credentials. As you know, he has a speech impediment which he has worked hard all his life to improve, and, indeed it is not so noticeable as to detract from his conversation. But he still had difficulty with it from time to time, particularly when he was in a situation of some stress. When he went to Buckingham Palace to present his credentials, with all the fanfare and ceremony that went with that, he obviously was in a position of some stress. The Queen asked him a question about how he found it in London and how he was situated. He made that famous remark about the embassy residence being in need of some refurbishment. It was sort of a pompous way of saying that it needed to be put in shape before he moved in. This was picked up by the press from the presentation of credentials, and, also, that his wife could not be with him for the ceremony but was nearby in a position to watch. His wife, Lee, was a very

charming lady and a force in her own right. The press did its job on the presentation of credentials which led to some developments in how the Ambassador was to conduct embassy business and eventually to his calling me into his office with Bobby Scott and specifying the role he wanted me to follow. Have I mentioned this previously?

Q: No, I don't know what follows.

GALLOWAY: Well, Annenberg had problems with his Ministers, Deputy Chiefs of Mission, from the outset, not through any fault of his but because there had been some very questionable decisions made in the State Department in advance. Phil Kaiser had been DCM under David Bruce. Phil had a foreign service reserve officer commission with a finite term. Phil thought somehow or other that he could get around that and would be allowed to stay to serve with the new Ambassador. Personally, I thought it would have been a good thing if he could stay because he had close contacts with the Labour government. He was bright and easy to work with, had enjoyed a good relationship with David Bruce and the staff worked well under him. I was aware of the limitation on the term of the foreign service reserve appointment, but since Phil was well acquainted in political circles at home, I would not have been surprised if some arrangement to keep him there evolved. Well, not only did it not happen, but also the State Department had set Ambassador Annenberg up to do the dirty work. His first chore was to tell Phil Kaiser that he would have to leave. That was the first contact they had. Phil had invited the Ambassador and Mrs. Annenberg to dinner the first or second night they were there. At dinner, the Ambassador gave Phil the news. There really was little or no cooperation between them from that point. In this strained atmosphere we did the best we could to carry on the embassy's business.

The ambassador was not sure of himself in this new environment. He was, however, a darned good executive. He knew how to manage an organization and he was accustomed to delegating authority to subordinates. He also understood institutional activity and institutional loyalty as contrasted with personal loyalty. He had brought with him a young assistant, Robert Scott, a scion of one of the Philadelphia mainline families. He was very intelligent, personable, friendly and well established as a member of a Philadelphia law firm. My first contact with him concerned the Pilgrims speech which he was drafting. I gave him the history and asked if he thought he could get the Ambassador to change his mind about the topic. Phil Kaiser also tried to get Annenberg to make a traditional speech. Both to no avail. Within a few weeks Bobby Scott came to me for a private talk. He could not work with Kaiser in the circumstances. He was very candid and told me he would appreciate it if I would help him.

Q: Helped in what?

GALLOWAY: So, I helped him out as much as possible to handle the ambassador; to get him acquainted with what he should do in the embassy and what he should do vis a vis the British government, public, and press. We drew up a memorandum for the Ambassador which recommended that he not try to follow in the footsteps of David Bruce as a United States post war diplomatist, and that in fact the situation did not call for

that. As far as the embassy and Anglo-American relations were concerned, there was no need for a high level of diplomatic activity in London or for a continuing substantive interchange with the prime minister and the cabinet. We recommended instead that he take on a project of visiting several main areas of the country to meet people outside London to express and promote friendship and good will. We picked out Birmingham, Liverpool, Nottingham, Leeds, York, Edinborough, and other main cities. He liked it and told me to set it up. From that point, Bobby and I cooperated informally on the whole range of the Ambassador's activities. He and I formed the closest working relationship in the embassy. For the first few months Annenberg pretty much relied on that as his way of getting things done. Bobby was very open. He didn't know how embassies worked and wanted to learn. Together, we functioned as *pseudo* executive directors *in lieu* of a direct line of authority down through the DCM. Given the Ambassador's executive capabilities, the informal arrangement served his purposes. In fact it was intact most of the time he was there and we managed to operate without any major difficulties except for the fact that almost until the time he left, he had trouble with his DCMs.

Q: I interviewed Tom Hughes recently who was one of his DCM's, and Tom was mentioning you and he said that he hadn't realized it but you were sort of the back channel contact with the Conservative Party to the Nixon administration until they came in. Could you comment on that?

GALLOWAY: During the first couple of years I was there, I spent much time at the House of Commons learning just how business was conducted and, at the same time, learning the players and their numbers in the Conservative party. The Tories were receptive and helpful as they got to know me, and because I was the officer in the embassy assigned to "shadow" them, they more or less took me under their wing as one of their own. Since they were in opposition, they didn't have many secrets to protect, so they were glad to fill me with information on their policies, operations and personalities.

Another valuable source of information is their annual party conferences. All parties have them, alternating between various cities. With the Conservatives when I was there, they gathered annually either in Brighton on the southeast coast or Blackpool on the northwest side. These regular reunions are important to the morale, organization, policies and unity of the parties. Representatives from all constituencies in the country gather, meet with party leaders, participate in policy development through their input to the agenda and substance by speaking from the podium, committee meetings, direct exchanges of views with each other and parliamentary leaders. I found that in a concentrated period of two or three days, I learned as much and met as many of the rank and file as almost the rest of the year. I think I attended almost every Tory party conference during my tour, including one of the Scottish Tories in Perth.

I was also made welcome at Conservative Central Office, the name for party headquarters, and the research department where much policy was conceived. In return, I was able to brief them and share information on general issues. I made it absolutely clear that I would not be passing to them any information which could be used against the Labour government. I briefed Ted Heath regularly, usually at his conference room office

at Commons, which was assigned to the Leader of the Opposition. I covered broad foreign policy events and issues and specific events or issues as they occurred so long as they could not be used against the government. In other words it was international affairs information which they needed and wanted to know but gave them no preferred position to use to attack the Labour government. They were generally well informed and needed no help on Germany, NATO, the EEC, etc. Heath came over to the States a couple of times and visited the White House. He and Nixon hit it off very well, as a matter of fact, so well that Nixon let Heath know that they were going to have a personal relationship that would really work well for both sides. It continued that way until Kissinger went to China. Nixon had not informed Heath about that intention in advance, and Heath never forgot that. Heath was already a Europeanist, but he had recognized the importance of the United States relationship, and he had thought that he was known as having a close relationship with Nixon. But when Nixon did not tell him in advance about China, Heath interpreted that to mean that he would never be able to rely on knowing the true intention of the United States on the most important issues which might well affect the UK. In other words, he regarded the omission as evidence that he could never be sure that he would be taken into top counsel.

Q: Were you called on to kind of smooth feathers on this?

GALLOWAY: Yes to some extent, but there wasn't much to be done about it. Heath is a self made man, one of the few such to become leaders of the Conservative Party. Heath started out a poor boy and I believe one of his parents had died is his early youth. He was not living in poverty, but he was in the poorer class. He got to Oxford by winning an organ scholarship. He played for religious services and was given a scholarship to Balliol College. Heath was a man of very strict ethics. He had high standards in his beliefs of the way people should act and shouldn't act, and he applied them not only to himself but in his own mind set them for others. That was certainly true of his character even though he had come up through the political maelstrom to top leadership. He still held those very strong, high ethical and moral principles on how people should behave. He was a man of rocklike integrity. He tended to be sharp spoken with definitive views, was somewhat afraid of women and could not suffer fools. He never really recovered from Nixon's not informing him on such major policy. From that point on he pretty much steered a course toward the European Union without holding back, which was theoretically what we wanted but we wanted it both ways. We wanted Britain in, but we also wanted to keep the relationship with Britain. Through Jim Prior who was his closest confidante, I hope I was able to influence to some extent the continuation of at least the appearance of cordial relations between Nixon and Heath.

I'm not sure that Nixon ever knew. I had got to know Nixon fairly well when he visited London before he became president. He came over I think three different times. I was assigned to take him around because he always wanted to talk with the Tories. I took him to see some of the Labour ministers in government as well. On his last visit, he had agreed to have lunch or dinner with Cy Sulzberger, chief European correspondent for the New York Time. The affair was set for Claridges and Nixon invited me to join them. He also had former Congressman Bob Ellsworth along as his caretaker arranger and

presumably a putative member of the White House staff if Nixon won the next election. It was an interesting get together, and apart from general assessments by those noted pundits, I was a little surprised by Nixon's seeming deference to Sulzberger. I don't think any great secrets came out, but if Sulzberger had any doubts about Nixon's intentions, they were dispelled that evening. To project ahead a bit, Bob Ellsworth and I did keep in touch, and when he was actually in the White House after Nixon won the election, I was able to pass some things through him for Nixon. To go back to your question, given that the Tories had taken me into their confidence, I think I was able to exercise some influence on at least keeping Heath open to the necessity of good relationships with the United States, although from that point on, I don't think he ever entertained any ideas of trying to separate Britain from full integration in whatever European union came into being.

Q: Tom Hughes was saying that Annenberg sort of kept himself above dealing at the prime minister level and felt that he was the President' representative to the monarchy. Is that a fair estimation or not? It doesn't make much sense.

GALLOWAY: No. it wasn't. Being the social animals they were, the Ambassador and Mrs. Annenberg were perhaps a bit dazzled during their early days in London. They knew the social value of acceptance at the palace. They were soon on informal terms with members of the royal family and included them in their entertainment at Winfield House, the embassy residence. They organized a magnificent ball for Lord Mountbatten. It was close to being the social event of the year on both sides of the Atlantic. Every socialite worth his or her salt in Europe and the United States jockeyed for an invitation, and many succeeded. I remember when Betty and I walked in, the first person we met was Earl Sohm, our DCM, who had been tabbed to stay with the Prince of Wales and introduce him to members of the embassy family and other guests. The first thing Prince Charles asked me was about my job. As we talked he seemed to be really interested and was peppering me with questions. When he was pulled away to meet someone else, he remarked that he envied me. The Annenbergs certainly enjoyed the royal relationship and apparently it was reciprocated.

After Annenberg left London, the Queen visited the United States where her yacht put in at Philadelphia to be officially greeted by the Annenbergs. Mrs. Annenberg had been named by the mayor to organize the welcome and entertainment in Philadelphia. Remembering that Annenberg had never been fully accepted by the main line in that city, I hope he enjoyed that event as much as those of us who had worked for him. Later, the Queen conferred a knighthood on him which was done at the British Embassy in Washington to which I was invited. I was really pleased for this man whose main purpose in life had been to exonerate the name of his father.

As for the Ambassador's relationship with the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and other members of the government, his simple view was that he should not try to take up their time unless he had instructions or information to convey at their level. He included them, of course, in his circle of conducting the business of the embassy and in his social activity, but he felt that such relationships should be based on the immediate interests of

the President or Secretary of State. That aspect of his responsibility was made more complicated by the fact that Kissinger and the British Ambassador in Washington had developed such a close working relationship that the embassy in London and the Department of State were largely bypassed to such extent that business between the two countries was carried out by those two men.

Q: This, of course, was a typical Kissingerian operation.

GALLOWAY: Yes, the way he wanted it. I was put in the position at times of having some of the officers in the foreign office tell me what had been going on in the White House. They also told me that they were tired of receiving telegrams from Ambassador Freeman prefaced by something along the lines of "I had lunch yesterday with Henry Kissinger who made it clear that the following information should not be given to the American Embassy in London or the State Department." Nevertheless, the foreign office officials, being the veterans they were, made life as easy for us as they could. We still had plenty of daily business to do at lower levels and embassy officers could work with the foreign office up to the equivalent of assistant secretary without difficulty. But the fact was that there wasn't all that much for the embassy to carry on with the prime minister and the foreign minister. Recognizing this, we reviewed the scope and substance of our reporting across the board, and we set ourselves to provide Washington with the best and most reliable information and advice possible. We reasoned that Kissinger would profit from reading what we had to say.

Q: We were tied up in foreign affairs particularly with the Soviet Union, with China, and with Vietnam. Did Vietnam and what we were doing there play any role. I mean was this something you had to deal with?

GALLOWAY: Marginally. We played a role in the sense that the British Communist Party made the most of the opportunity to set up demonstrations at the embassy and at Winfield House on every occasion they could. We learned from contacts in the Special Branch at Scotland Yard that substantial numbers of the demonstrators were hired and brought in to do most of the marching and picketing; however, there were enough true believers among the mob to make the right noises. There were obviously enough rogues to stir up trouble when the time seemed right to them, and then the police would go into action sometime on horseback. Those scenes were the nastiest because the bully boys in the crowd would try to go at the horses with cigarettes to their flanks which really did set off some violence and led to arrests. Those demonstrations went on for weeks, and the tail enders were mostly the paid marchers. Finally, they presumably realized that it was a waste of time and money and called them off. As far as the government to government relationship was concerned, there was never any question of the British joining us militarily in the field. Their resources were best situated in NATO. They were very hopeful of our success in Vietnam and some of the Labour Party were even more keenly supportive of our action. I had the unique experience of taking, oh he was Secretary of State, senator from Maine, ran for president.

Q: Oh, yes, secretary of state. Well, we can fill this in. Edmund Muskie.

GALLOWAY: Muskie. He came over on a visit, and I took him down to see the Foreign Secretary who at that time was Michael Stewart. Muskie, although he didn't say so, seemed to have had his doubts about Vietnam, I think. Michael Stewart delivered to him about the strongest argument for the United States to continue its efforts and policies in that part of the world, particularly in Vietnam, of any I heard during that period. He was convinced that the security and welfare of the western world depended on our not letting Vietnam go the wrong way. He thought that part of the world would be severely threatened if we were to pull out. He almost lectured Muskie on it. He was a quiet scholarly fellow, but the dimensions of the reality of his feelings on our stand were very strong indeed.

Q: While you were there, there was a big demonstration and one of the participants was a Rhodes Scholar named William Jefferson Clinton, now our president.

GALLOWAY: Did he really take part in that?

Q: He was in one of them in front of the embassy, yes.

GALLOWAY: I have heard that rumor just in the past few years. I didn't hear about it when I was there.

Q: Well, he was just another American student. Were these demonstration in front of the embassy a bother?

GALLOWAY: Not really. After the first one or two, Scotland Yard set out a prescribed route which came no closer than a block away from the embassy. They tramped around from Oxford Street out on the other side of Grosvenor Square back onto Park Lane, really out of range of the embassy. I think we probably did out part in helping the Special Branch of Scotland Yard. We let them put a photographer inside on the second floor where a large window gave him an excellent view of the front ranks of all the demonstrators. They shot a lot of film there; it would be interesting to know if Mr. Clinton was in any of the photos.

Getting back to the work in the embassy, I started out covering the Conservative Party and moved up to deputy chief of the political section before Annenberg came. After some weeks the Ambassador seemed to be placing special trust in me as deputy in the political section and called on me increasingly for advice and information. Bobby Scott and I worked together informally very closely. This actually began during the time Tom Hughes was there, but it really intensified after Jerry Greene had come in as DCM. It finally became a de facto situation when the Ambassador called me in and said in effect that he wanted me to run the embassy. I responded that he had a deputy chief of mission for that. He responded that I should let him take care of that and that he wanted me to run the embassy. He told me there were three things I should always follow: that he wanted to be sure that the embassy was doing what it should and that he should be kept fully informed, that I should make sure that he was never blind-sided with information from

other sources that he should have known, and that I should make him look good. That put me in a heck of a position.

Q: I was going to say, this is awful because I mean could you tell the DCM?

GALLOWAY: No. This was after Tom Hughes; Jerry Greene had been assigned as DCM.. My own position had also changed. Ron Spiers who had been chief of the political section was wanted in Washington by Alex Johnson to head the politico-military bureau. Annenberg put it to the Department that he would let Spires go if they let him make Galloway chief of the political section. They did. From that point on, he wanted me to run the embassy.

Q: I mean, how would you do that because these people wouldn't be reporting to you. You would have no authority over the FBI or the Naval Attaché or anything else like that.

GALLOWAY: Well, there wasn't much activity in those areas so that the Ambassador could maintain the formal channels which were well established. We had a little trouble with one or two of the military attaches. However, we had an officer in the political section from the Defense Department who was from the office of the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, and his terms of reference were such that he could exercise oversight over all defense affairs.

Q: Yes, ISA.

GALLOWAY: ISA. We had a slot there for him which was very useful to us because in practice, he took care of practically everything with the ministry of defense. The attaches were left to more or less the protocol functions of an attaché. With the defense officer in the political section, I had direct control over him and the politico-military relationship with the UK.

Q: Well, how did you deal with the DCM?

GALLOWAY: Well, we had arguments. Not with Tom Hughes so much. I tried to help Tom as much as I could. He needed it. He was a very bright man with a healthy ego, but his assignment put him in the field into an unfamiliar environment and, unfortunately, he was just out of his element. When he came over, he had been accustomed to the atmosphere of upper level Washington both in the executive branch and on the congressional side. He knew scores of people in high places in Washington. In London he also knew many of the practicing politicians, but he just didn't know what he was supposed to do. I tried to help him as much as I could. Then, he suddenly was faced with a family problem. His wife became ill and it took many months for her to regain her health. As time went on, Tom realized that he should probably get back to Washington where his wife would be better off, and also where he knew all of the rules of the game. He did that. I liked Tom personally. While he was there, one of his sons had an eye problem which called for surgery. Annenberg arranged with an eye specialist he knew to do the surgery on the boy and paid for it all himself. Then this thing with Tom's wife.

Annenberg was very understanding, his personal relationship with Tom was friendly and he tried to help out. I was really surprised when I was told that after he was back in Washington, Tom was speaking at the, what was it, the Yale or Harvard club?

Q: Cosmos Club, Metropolitan...

GALLOWAY: No, it wasn't. It was one of the university gatherings, either Harvard or Yale. Tom was speaking at a luncheon. I was told by someone who was there that Tom really ran down the ambassador, his reputation, his competence, his integrity, and his performance. I was surprised. I knew that Tom had not been very happy about the way his tour in London had gone, but I thought that was largely because the embassy was pretty much cut out by the Kissinger line direct with the British embassy, and secondly because of the problems he had with his family. He certainly owed loyalty to Annenberg.

Q: Well, he, I mean his oral history was straight from himself but I didn't know there was any great animus, just Annenberg saw that his role was not to get down into politics which was quite fair. I mean, that's...

GALLOWAY: That was deliberate. As I told you earlier, we urged him not to do that, but to carry the presence of the embassy around the country. He did that on several trips, half a dozen or a dozen, which I arranged with the town clerks in the cities visited. They were delighted to have the Ambassador come and visit in places where they had never been host to the presence of an American ambassador. They went beyond traditional hospitality and each place tried to show that it was truly special. In each of these places, he would see something or find something where he could donate anonymously to a museum, a library, a cathedral's restoration or some other civic institution. Moreover, in each place there would be a police security escort of several officers. He would make a substantial contribution to the welfare fund of those organizations. He made friends. He made real friends on all of those trips, and later he invited some of them down to London for entertainment at Winfield House. As a result of this broad based approach to promoting good will, one could sense that the British press began to change their attitude toward him.

As for Annenberg's dealings with the government, he didn't shirk anything, but he did not take the initiative unless there was good reason to do so or Washington instructed him to take up something with the Prime Minister or Foreign Secretary. That did not hamper the continued effectiveness of the embassy as the diplomatic agency of the U.S. in England. I have already referred to our special efforts to make ourselves the best reporting post so that Washington would be fully informed. We had no problems in carrying on normal business with the foreign office and other government ministries. Everybody in my political section was able to deal directly with their opposite numbers and, indeed, at higher levels in the foreign office. In all areas, Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, we were able to work closely with the officers in charge of those areas, and we had direct entree to the foreign secretary's office and the prime minister's office. When the U.S. decided to put MIRV missiles in our strategic weapons, bombs and warheads, I think this was the occasion, although there were other times involving cold war activity, we

received a telegram late in the evening instructing the ambassador to see the prime minister immediately, and convey to him our planned moves. The watch officer called me and I called the Ambassador and explained it to him. I told him I had already got to 10 Downing Street and that the Prime Minister would see him whenever he was ready. I told him the documents were being typed and that I would bring them out to Winfield House. When I went out there, he had Ambassador Strausz-Hupé from our embassy in Sri Lanka staying with him. You probably recall that he had been professor for international affairs at the University of Pennsylvania.

Q: Straus-Hupé?

GALLOWAY: Straus-Hupé. They were pals. I got to know Straus-Hupé and enjoyed him. He was an intelligent man. I showed Annenberg the telegram and explained the instructions. He told me that since I knew the Prime Minister well, I could handle the matter with him. I responded that he had to go because the telegram that went out reporting the meeting must say, "I called on the Prime Minister late last night and carry on from there. He agreed but said the driver had gone to bed and the car was garaged for the night. I told him that I had my Volkswagen outside. So, I took him to 10 Downing Street in my Volkswagen without wasting time, which prompted a remark that I drove like a reporter. Ted Heath and one of his people were waiting for us. We made the demarche and explained the ramifications, and after answering a few questions, took our leave. I have told you this in some detail to demonstrate that the Ambassador had no jealousy or personal sensitivity about things relating to his position or the embassy, as long as they were done and done right. He knew that I had spent three or four years covering the Conservative Party before they won the election in 1970 and that I knew their leaders personally. Some of them had spent time at our house. Jim Prior, for example, when he was minister for agriculture and later leader of the house of commons, would come up sometimes on weekends and stay at 10 Downing Street. If Heath had other guests, Jim would stay with us. We were always delighted to have him join us in the large place on Sussex Square which housed the political counselor.

When the Tories won the general election in 1970, The White House wanted us to deliver a message personally to Heath, so the Ambassador dispatched me. I called Conservative Party headquarters where they were all celebrating, explained my mission and was invited to join them. Heath saw me and moved away from his group, and we started walking down the hall when he grinned at me and said, "Well, well." I said, "You're right." Nixon certainly was courting Heath at that point. Just the minute they declared him the winner, Nixon wanted to get his congratulations in, so I was able to convey them even before Heath had faced the press. I was careful not to use my personal entree with Heath unless it was necessary. He showed his appreciation by inviting Betty and me to Chequers for a Sunday lunch at which he promoted me to Minister for the day by having my place card at the table so inscribed.. This was a traditional weekend for prime ministers -- go to Chequers for the weekend and invite some people for Sunday lunch. It was not only a great honor for us but also a most enjoyable affair. One of the guests was Peter Ustinov, not widely thought of as a Tory, who was clad in a pale green plaid jacket which did stand out. He was just as entertaining in person as on the stage and had

everyone laughing with a takeoff on an American from Cleveland in the third row at one of his performances. He was a great, friendly guy. Betty sat next to him and at one point asked him how he came to be there. He responded that he had been trying to figure that out himself. Another guest was Robert Kaiser, Phil's son, who had been in the Soviet Union as Washington Post correspondent. He is now in a high editorial position at the Post. Heath also invited us to dinner at one of the Conservative Party conferences and to receptions in his flat at the Albany. Another favorite of Nixon's and particularly of mine was Sir Alec Douglas Home. As foreign secretary in the Heath government, he hosted a visit by our Secretary of State William Rogers. A country house is provided for the foreign minister but not on the scale of Chequers. The talks with Rogers were held out there with each side gathered informally at a longish table. The subject of the Secretary General of the UN came up. Rogers asserted that the fellow wasn't very quick on the uptake or words to that effect. Sir Alec interjected, "He's dumb, is he?" I don't think Rogers caught the tone for I didn't see him crack a smile. Sir Alec looked down at me, saw me grinning from ear to ear, and returned a puckish smile. Nobody else was laughing. But Home was something. Once he asked me to come to see him down at the House of Commons. This was after he had been prime minister. I went down there and into a cubby hole about half the size of this room, but it had a desk in it and a sofa. He said, "The reason I asked you to come down here was that I wanted you to see my sofa." He laughed mischievously and observed that tradition was followed by furnishing things lavishly for ex prime ministers even in the House of Commons. Space in the House of Commons was very restricted, not enough seats for all of the members in a full session, and most of them worked out of a locker or with others in very small offices.

Q: They are building a big office building now.

GALLOWAY: Are they?

Q: There are a lot of...

GALLOWAY: Where are they building it?

Q: Well, it is down around Whitehall.

GALLOWAY: On Whitehall? I'm trying to figure out...

Q: I'm not sure. I saw it this summer. I don't know. I'm not that good at London.

GALLOWAY: Was it on the river, on the bank there?

Q: I think it is off the river, not on the river, but it is behind. It has got big braces sticking up. It is quite controversial, the usual thing, you know. It is not traditional.

GALLOWAY: It is not over on the Big Ben side?

Q: I am not sure, maybe. Yes, it is very close to Big Ben.

GALLOWAY: Well, of course they need the space very much. They have five or six MP's sharing an office and a telephone if they are lucky.

Q: Well, Bill, what happened in '74 to you?

GALLOWAY: What happened in '74.? The Conservative Party called and lost a general election which surprised me and quite a number of pundits in the press and even, I think, quite a large number of the Labour Party. The results were so close that neither of the major parties won a majority of seats in the house of commons. The Liberal Party, which won some ten seats, could actually have joined in a coalition with either side. There was an interregnum of a few days while the parties explored possibilities. At one point it seemed there might be a possibility of a coalition between the Tories and Liberals; Jeremy Thorpe, the Liberal leader, obviously wanted very much to be in a government but some of the Liberals were really ex-Labourites who couldn't abide an alliance with the Tories.

Finally, Heath conceded and Labour formed a government with a majority of only a few seats over the Conservatives. The calling of the election had been controversial among the Conservative leaders. The fundamental problem lay with the trade unions who had fixed value votes in the Labour Party which enabled them to dominate that party and exercise undue power in the country. Earlier in the winter, the power workers unions had become restive and negotiations to meet their demands made very little progress. They broke down and a strike was called. They were aided by other unions unofficially even though it was outside the law. As time passed, fuel for power stations became low and various coal miner unions were not breaking their necks to replenish the stocks. Heath's government decided to oppose the unions and took measures which had little effect and finally led to rolling brownouts over much of the country. British labour law is such that a government has little power to exercise in union disputes. Ultimately, the only thing the governing party can do is to call elections in the hope that the will of the public will politically exercise sanctions over the unions and oblige them to back down. As the confrontation reached its climax, Tory leaders met with Heath at Chequers over a weekend. I talked with Jim Prior when he returned from there and learned that the decision had been made to call a general election forthwith. At that time he was Leader of the House of Commons and Lord President of the Council (the Privy Council). The election was to take place in six weeks. Jim had been one of the foremost advocates of calling the election, believing that the public had had enough of the unions flouting the general welfare with highly questionable actions and would return the Conservatives to power with an increased majority and a mandate which the unions could not ignore. A couple of days later, when the election had not been called, I saw Jim in his rather splendid Lord President's office in Whitehall. He asked me to sit down and would I listen while he dictated a memorandum to the Prime Minister. The gist was that a grave tactical error had caused them not to call elections at the crucial time, and with expectations so high, they had lost their advantage and should postpone indefinitely. He was obviously very disappointed. As we talked, he surmised that Willie Whitelaw, who had not been with them at Chequers, had subsequently talked with Heath and advised him not to

proceed. Jim implied that Heath had lost his nerve. He had decided originally to take on the unions, but when the time came to act he could not. The election was called somewhat later with the indecisive outcome I described earlier. Heath tried to work out some coalition arrangement with Jeremy Thorpe, but it came to nothing. So, Heath had a short term in office, and the Conservative Party drifted until Margaret Thatcher won the leadership.

As for what happened to me and my family, we were preparing to leave London to return to Washington. I had been there for a long time, about nine years, starting out with three or four years under Ambassador Bruce. Then, Ambassador Annenberg came. I have told you about my unusual experiences. Annenberg had got a commitment that I'd remain as long as he wanted me to stay. So much for the situation in the embassy.

As time passed our children who arrived in London at the ages of one and a half years for Jeff and about two months for Mary were growing up. Our first house there had been at Cresswell Gardens in South Kensington; when I became chief of the political section, we moved across Hyde Park to a large house reserved for the political counselor on Sussex Square in Paddington just a couple of blocks off Bayswater Road which borders Hyde Park. Our neighbor for about a year was Rupert Murdoch who was beginning to make his presence felt both in the publishing world and politics. We enrolled the children in a private school at Marble Arch right across from speakers corner in Hyde Park. It was a fine little school called Connaught House. An old weathered brick house, all its rooms were converted into class rooms except for kitchen and dining room and the living quarters of the head mistress, Mrs. Keane. Its student body was rather small and varied, with other diplomatic corps children as well as English children. I believe the Jordanian Ambassador had a child there, and the actress Joan Collins had a daughter there. Like most private British schools, it had a very good scholastic program. Our children got off to an excellent start academically and they became accustomed to mixed nationalities as fellow students. It was a valuable experience for them, and they enjoyed it. Nevertheless, Betty and I realized that the longer we were abroad, the more difficult it might be for the children to adjust when we did return to the U.S. Also, diplomatic life abroad for an extended period puts strains on the family due to the lack of time they can spend together. The social life is demanding, too, in that it calls for the wife to try to extend herself to be a representative of her country, a leader and frequent hostess of the other wives, a hostess at other diplomatic functions, as well as an attendee -- and to be a good mother. In short, it is rough on wives.

Q: Oh, yes, we all know about that.

GALLOWAY: I had, of course, discussed my situation with Ambassador Annenberg who was understanding and released me from the commitment to remain until he left, which, actually he thought would happen quite soon. Kissinger came over on a visit in early '74 and was accompanied by Larry Eagleburger. I had got to know Larry when he was head of the political section at NATO in Brussels. When he went back to Washington and to Kissinger's staff, we had more contacts, usually in conjunction with visits by Kissinger and then by the President. I discussed my personal situation with him.

He was understanding and asked if I would like to have a mission. I responded that I really did not aspire to an Ambassadorship; I had been so fortunate in my assignments that I had been in the policy mainstream and had been the beneficiary of much job satisfaction and enjoyment. I did not think that the caliber of embassy that might be offered would be as interesting, and I knew that my wife would prefer not to be asked. Returning to Washington would probably be a better use of me than going to an embassy. He accepted my reasoning and said he thought Dean Brown would like to have me in his office. He said he would be in touch and the assignment with Dean worked out, so I came back as executive assistant to the undersecretary for management.

Q: You were there from when to when?

GALLOWAY: I was there from '74, when did I leave?

Q: You said '74 you left.

GALLOWAY: '74 until '80 when I retired, with one brief interval at the war college. I was in the long established deputy commandant slot reserved for the State Department although my title was something like international affairs advisor. What happened was that when Carter won the election, Dick Moose came in as under secretary for management. Before that there had been Dean Brown and then Larry Eagleburger took over himself. We had a lot of fun.

Q: I was just thinking maybe I have got to knock off now. Maybe we'll have one more session, and we can talk about the management side. Can we do that?

GALLOWAY: Yes, that would be fine. I'd like to tell you about that.

Q: Good, well we'll do that then.

***

Today is the fourth of November, 1999. Bill, you were in management in the State Department from when to when?

GALLOWAY: It started in, let's see, I came back in '74.

Before we go to that, two points occurred to me that I wanted to add on to the period in London. One was Annenberg's ambassadorship which went from the shaky start to a very successful tour for him in representation of the United States. That was to a considerable extent because he carried the ambassadorship around the whole country. He met and saw and talked to a lot of people. He continued with his generosity, mostly anonymously, but in a couple of cases it became known publicly. In any event, he succeeded in reaching a broad range of people and in promoting good will. I think more people knew about the American ambassador being there and became aware of our friendship than ever before. He took it to places where an Ambassador never had been. As for those aspects of his job

in representing his government, he was on good terms and was effective with the UK government from the prime minister on down; as an experienced executive he saw that the embassy did its business given the unusual nature of direct diplomatic contact at White House level in Washington. He gained considerable respect from the public and press for his performance. I think Annenberg deserves a high grade for his ambassadorship, and I'm confident that assessment would be supported by the senior and most experienced American correspondent there, Joe Fromm of U.S. News and World Report.

Secondly, I want to elaborate on Margaret Thatcher's role. During my first three or four years when I was working hard on "shadowing" the Conservatives, Margaret Thatcher and her husband Denis were very friendly. He was with Burmah Oil and invited me to one of their directors sessions at week's end when they gathered for sherry and whatever. He and Margaret came to receptions at our house frequently. She worked on back bench ministerial assignments and, as I mentioned, was made a member of the shadow cabinet under Heath. She was not cowed or embarrassed to speak her mind, and her relationships with her colleagues were a bit prickly. Nevertheless, she did establish herself as a person of some standing and authority. I mentioned before that I arranged for her to have a Smith-Mundt exchange program grant to visit the U.S. for about six weeks, and she really made the most of her time over here. She served as minister of education in Heath's government until the Tories lost power. After several months, Heath's continued leadership of the Tory party weakened and led to an election for the leadership. She won that contest against three top cabinet level veterans, perhaps because they split the votes against her, not only to the consternation of the public but also to many in the party, perhaps even herself. I was surprised, but as she was a good friend, I wrote her a letter of congratulations and best wishes. She responded as follows:

THE RT. HON. MRS. MARGARET THATCHER, M. P.
HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON, SW1 0AA
27/2/75

Dear Bill,

Thank you for your kind letter. I still do not know quite how it all happened! Six months ago I should have said it would be impossible.

I just know that I have taken on an enormous task -- more difficult in Opposition than in Government.
But the response has been fantastic.

I met Henry Kissinger the other day when he was over here and have become one of his many fans.

I hope it won't be too long before I visit the United States.

Yours ever,

Margaret
Indeed, she came over here soon. The British Embassy gave a reception for her to which I was invited. As I went through the receiving line, she grabbed me and said, "Oh, Bill, I want to talk to you." I nodded, saw Denis with some guests and went over to him. He took me aside and we had a good talk. He thought that it was just a question of time that she would be in 10 Downing Street. She had the solid support of the right wing in the Conservative Party and a lot in the rest of the party. She had beat out three veteran ministerial MPs for the leadership of the party. About that time Margaret left the receiving line, came over and took me to sit down and talk. She described all that was going on as she saw it. I asked her about her relationship with Ted Heath. She expressed her unhappiness. She had done her best to persuade him, but he still opposed some of her policies. She did not think he would change.

As we talked for some time, the ambassador came over to take her to other people still waiting to meet her. She said that she must go and that was the last opportunity we had for a good private talk. She went to work to unify the Conservative Party. One of her most significant appointments during Opposition was Jim Prior as shadow minister for Labour. That probably did not reflect any personal preference for Jim who had grown to a position of power under Heath, but she rightly sensed that the confrontational relationship between the Heath government and the labour unions had put Jim into probably the best position of anyone in the party to take on the unions for her. Meanwhile, Labour labored in government, with economic conditions still moving along pretty much on a flat line. Wilson resigned the Prime Ministership after a couple of years or so, and Jim Callaghan took office. Finally, he was able to put to rest a canard kept alive by the press that Callaghan was the best prime minister Labour never had. Callaghan kept going for the full term of five years and then called a general election in the spring of 1979. The Conservative party won a good working majority of seats in the house of commons and Margaret Thatcher was the first lady to become Prime Minister of Britain. I quote from my letter to Jim Prior who had been named Minister for Labour in the new government:

May 4, 1979
Dear Jim,

Congratulations.

We have been thinking about you and Jane a lot during the past several months, and particularly in recent weeks. It was a time when I felt most strongly the desire to be in London again. It would have been great fun to be able to talk to you as events unfolded.

The campaign and the election got quite a lot of press coverage here. As a matter of fact, I thought the press reporting was more reliable than when we were there.

I listened on election night to the detailed returns broadcast on the BBC overseas service and had a pretty good idea of how things were likely to go when the returns from

Guilford were announced in the early stages. My recollection is that it has been a fairly accurate barometer of the national swing.

Betty and I spent the 24 hours after the election longing to engage in the old game of cabinet making, but we were in the dark except for a few obvious ones.

As I see it, you may well hold the key. At first glance, the balance of the cabinet seems to be in your favor on the whole, but I wonder whether they have learned as many lessons as you have during the past five years about working with the unions. In any event, you have a testing time ahead, and it will be interesting to watch.

Sincerely,

Bill

Also, I wrote to Denis Thatcher:
May 4, 1979
Dear Denis,

Knowing from personal experience the legendary efficiency of the people at No. 10, I am taking the liberty of using this channel as perhaps the surest and fastest route to you and Margaret.

Please convey to her from my wife and me our sincere congratulations on a magnificent victory. She now has the opportunity to accomplish two significant and enduring benefits -- nationally, to give individuals back their rights and chances to pursue a better life, and, politically, to bring unity to her party such as it has not known for a long time.

I know you are justifiably happy for her and proud of her. I remember clearly about three years or so ago in the British Embassy here when you told me that you were absolutely confident that she would go to No. 10, and that it was only a question of when. Well, that is now, and your unselfish help and support of her will be even more important than in the past.

Incidentally, may I say that I think the two of you have made a contribution which is rarely remarked; your example in today's uncertain social environment has shown that marriage is still the most productive, happiest, and most spiritually rewarding mode of life.

Best wishes for all possible success to you both, and fondest regards.

Yours sincerely,

Bill Galloway

Denis responded:

Denis Thatcher
10 DOWNING STREET
16 May

Dear Bill,

How wonderful to hear from you and thank you for your so kind letter.

It has been a hard road and when I look back over four years to when Heath lost even I am amazed at what Margaret has achieved. We were a demoralized party and not even conservative. At first it was a one woman exercise to persuade the Party that Conservatives were not a brand of “pink” socialism.

Had we took the lurch to the left would have brought us to the brink of Communism; in the next four years with God’s help, determination and belief in our principles we can show the world that freedom is the great gift to all men and women and then we can say in the words of Pitt the Younger, “England has saved their colors by her efforts and Europe by her example.”

Enormous problems lie ahead not only in the domestic field; EEC, Ireland and Southern Africa being but a few. Margaret will certainly not be “the soft touch” but other leaders will learn of her integrity and her abiding faith in the Christian ethic.

With our sincere regards to you both and hopes that we will meet again one day.

Sincerely,
Denis
P. S. Margaret has been much influenced by Bill Simon’s book, “Times for Truth.” All Americans should read it.

She formed a government which began to undo some measures taken by Labour in recent years, e.g. denationalizing key industries and putting the country on a course to more individual entrepreneurship and free capital generation and movement. Britain prospered perhaps more than at any time since the war. Riding on a wave of economic good times, she called a new general election in 1987 and was returned to power by a large majority. I had retired by then, so I wrote freely to both Denis and Margaret. The exchange went as follows:

June 15, 1987

Dear Denis,

I have written to the Prime Minister to congratulate her, and I wanted at the same time to congratulate you. Having had the privilege of knowing both of you and receiving your help and advice when I was at the Embassy in London, I know how you and Margaret

always did things together. Your whole-hearted support and encouragement helped and enabled her in her historic role. She has been most fortunate having you at her side.

I enclose a copy of my letter to her to let you know just how important I believe her tenure in office to be.

Betty and I hope that both of you and your family will enjoy good health and good fortune.
Sincerely,

Bill Galloway

Dear Prime Minister:

Although retired from the American Foreign Service, I hark back to earlier years at our Embassy in London, from 1965 to 1974, when one of my assignments was to “shadow” the Conservative Party. Personally, I would like once again to thank you and Denis for your help and kindness during that time.
I like to think that forming associations with many MPs and arranging for some of them, like yourself, to visit the United States contributed in a small way to the continuing close relationship between our countries.

Now comes the opportunity to congratulate one of those MPs who became Prime Minister in an unprecedented historical achievement.

I believe that your continuation in office in the present situation is supremely important to the stability and security of the Western world. History will record your work as a great contribution. Millions, not just in Britain owe you their thanks.

Betty joins in sending highest regards and best wishes for health and happiness to you, Denis and your family.
Sincerely,

Bill Galloway

She responded:

10 DOWNING STREET
WHITEHALL, S.W. 1.

10th July, 1987

Dear Bill,

A brief note -- belated I fear -- to thank you for your kind letter immediately after the general election.

It was marvelous to hear from you, especially as you masterminded my first visit to the United States.

I have been eternally grateful for the wonderful experience it gave me.

Warm regards from us both.

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

I have to confess, although I liked her very much, I never in the world thought she would become prime minister. Her quick response to the Argentine military move in the Falklands and the subsequent speedy and highly effective British military action went a long way toward reminding the world that, although there was no longer an empire, the UK still held a seat in the top international council. British arms, once more, proved their worth. The Prime Minister's stature was further enhanced. She was perhaps the first to meet with Soviet leader Gorbachev and discern that the time had arrived when the USSR was ready for change. Her close relationship with President Reagan enabled the two of them almost literally to pull the string that held Soviet Communism together and then watch it begin to crumble. She had become a leader in the Western world as Prime Minister of Britain.

Q: And a very powerful one. A very effective one.

GALLOWAY: Very effective. Probably the most effective since WWII, and maybe even more effective than most in the twentieth century with respect to domestic policy.

Q: Oh, yes. Well, she turned England around and got it onto a rational course. It had been too dominated by particularly by unions and all. They had gained inordinate power and not rational power.

GALLOWAY: They were all in cohorts against the government. They had the Labour Party in their pocket because of an earlier party constitution which gave them arbitrary numbers of votes on party policy based on union membership. That was really the main factor leading to their winning the election Heath called in 1974. Harold Wilson came back in as Prime Minister. He gave way to James Callaghan in a couple of years and Labour was able to carry on a full term until 1979. The Conservatives won and Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister. She took on the unions across the board, sending back to the private sector a substantial hunk of the industries Labour had nationalized. She turned the country back to capitalism, implemented firm policies, told the people where she wanted to go, what she wanted to do and was hugely successful. She restored the nation's stature and became a force to be reckoned with in international affairs. It was one of the most striking turnarounds in a nation's affairs ever.

Q: I want to ask another question, and I don't know if you want to answer this or not but while you Annenberg had you sort of run things. Tom Hughes was there and he had sort of a difficult time because of the problem, domestic problem. You had Jerry Greene who was a regular Foreign Service officer who came and that must have been very difficult. Could you talk a bit? You didn't talk about your relationship there.

GALLOWAY: When Tom decided that he should return to Washington, his decision probably was primarily based on his domestic situation, but also the opportunity to head the Carnegie foundation must have exerted a strong pull because it was tailored to his interests, experience and background. I liked Tom and his wife, and I thought they did the right thing.

The Department sent out a list of three or four people as possible replacements. The ambassador consulted me and some of the other senior officers. I think we all agreed that Jerry Greene was the best candidate. We knew that he was also the candidate of Bill Macomber, then Deputy Under Secretary for Management. So, the ambassador selected him from the list. I had never worked directly with Jerry before, but we had been social acquaintances for several years. He came on over by himself, leaving his wife and family to follow later. I invited him to dinner the first night he was there. I gave him a profile, psychological and practical, of Walter Annenberg, the way he worked, what his interests were, how he did things, his likes and dislikes, and anything else I could think of to help Jerry. I offered advice on how he could best get along with the ambassador and also ensure that the embassy functioned as it should.

I don’t know what brief or instructions Jerry may have brought with him from Washington. He must have been aware of the facts of life about the White House-British embassy relationship. In any event, as he settled in, the rhythm of the embassy began to change. His staff meetings were more formal, and he broadened their substantive scope. He may have thought that because the ambassador was not on a day to day practice of personal or telephone consultation with the prime minister and the foreign minister there was a void between the embassy and the government. In fact there wasn't because we had contact, ongoing contact, up through ministerial level in every department we needed. He made his traditional calls on the top career officials, of course, but then he began initiating substantive discussions at that level. It got to the point that it left an impression on the ambassador that Jerry was in effect upstaging him. Jerry also took on some of the work normally done by the embassy staff. That produced some friction with the section chiefs, who came to me to talk it over. At one point when Bobby Scott had done something on behalf of the ambassador, Jerry reacted by telling him that there was room for only one DCM. When the EEC debate and vote was scheduled in the house of commons, Stan Cleveland, the economic Minister came to tell me that Jerry had reserved the tickets regularly allotted to the embassy for himself. Stan was the responsible officer in the embassy for the EEC. At his request I went with him to talk to Jerry about the matter. I had to take the lead because I was the house of commons man, and I urged Jerry to let Stan go to the house for the debate. With ill grace, he eventually did turn the seats over to Stan. My early advice to him seemingly had made little impression.

So, occasions arose when I had to talk to Jerry and try to reason with him to change his approach. Looking back, when Jerry came into the job, he didn't seem to realize that the ambassador had established the relationships and pattern of doing business that were comfortable for him; to the extent that Jerry did not understand that and try to fit in and make his contribution in that context, he caused waves which affected both the ambassador and the staff chiefs of sections.

Q: Was Annenberg coming to you and...

GALLOWAY: Annenberg was just dealing with me. Under the mandate he had given me, he expected me to go ahead. I'm not sure that he gained any confidence in Jerry but he soon lost it if he did. He did not like Jerry's public activity and his way of going about things. Jerry just didn't click. When I tried to persuade him to turn things around, that, as you might expect, didn't seem to have any effect other than to put distance between Jerry and me. I decided that I couldn't disappear into thin air so I'd just have to do the best I could. Jerry was having problems with the other counselors. I remember when the inspectors did their report on the embassy, it included a phrase to the effect that the embassy was doing well, but that it was being run by a "college of Counselors."

Because of my relationship with the ambassador and with Bobby Scott, a lot of this fell on my head. It was a stressful period. Finally, it got to the point that Jerry wrote a memorandum to the ambassador. It said in substance that he had come to the conclusion that there was not the mutual respect between them and with the chiefs of section which was needed for him to do his job. The ambassador called all of his counselors out to Winfield House, showed us the memorandum and then invited comments. The discussion was brief and noted particularly the use of the words "mutual respect." All present agreed that the ambassador was left with little choice.

The ambassador took Bobby and me out to lunch the next day or so. He told us that he obviously could not work with this man around. He was going to tell Washington to move Jerry. He was going to make the top embassy staff the goats. He was going to say that the reason he wanted Jerry out was that he could not get along with and not carry on proper managerial relations with the other members of the staff, basically the counselors in the various sections. He concluded in the vein that Jerry was really a pest, that he had to get him out and was going to make us the fall guys.

Soon after that, Jerry was transferred and Earl Sohm, who had been in the director general's office as head of personnel, was assigned as DCM. Earl and I were old friends and had worked together before. I recommended him to the ambassador very highly because I thought Earl's style would just fit with the ambassador. He was very low key. His management style was to delegate responsibility and then step back and let the staff carry on. He didn't get in anybody's way and was completely responsive to the ambassador's wishes and way of doing things. He did not have any quirks about his own social relationships or his standing in the hierarchy. So I recommended him very highly, and the ambassador got him. The embassy worked like a charm from that point. It was a very pleasant, happy place to be. But, I encountered the ill will of some of the senior

people in the Department. They apparently thought I was personally trying to get rid of Jerry and that I was bucking to be DCM. I was not. I was simply doing what the ambassador had told me to do. That's the way I had to work.

When Earl was there, he and I worked together, and with Bobby. He could work well with all the other chiefs of sections. The ambassador liked him. So, everything went well from that point on except for those in the Department who put me on their "Black List" That really didn't matter too much to me because I had been there a long time. I was there for nine years, and it had been very rewarding. Because of the timing of the political events and because the people were so receptive and really went out of their way to help improve relations, I just had an unusual opportunity there and I felt very lucky. That's the way it went.

It had been one of Annenberg's fondest hopes that President Nixon would visit London during his ambassadorship. In due course the President scheduled a state visit. Pete Skoufis and I were put in charge of the President's visit because I had known the President at least enough that he wouldn't scowl when he saw my face around. Pete was Counselor for Administration and was indeed a very good administrator. One of the main features was to be Nixon's visit to the House of Commons, and I have described this earlier when reporting on his visits to London prior to his winning the Presidency. As I said, he was intensely interested in English history and was fascinated by the House of Commons. In his departure statement, he referred with pride to his visit to the House of Commons as the first American President to do so. The other main event was a meeting and lunch at Chequers with Prime Minister Heath where they were joined by the Queen who broke precedent by visiting Chequers "informally" so that she might meet and talk with Heath and the President together. That she broke precedent was really a feather in the respective caps of Heath and Annenberg. It was a gesture of unprecedented good will.

As for my tour in the embassy, I think it was perhaps the most enjoyable assignment I had in the service. It was all due to luck and circumstances that developed during that time. I happened to be there on the spot. Larry Eagleburger was with Nixon and Kissinger who was by then Secretary of State, and Larry was his number one assistant. Larry talked with me about what I wanted to do, and I have told you about that conversation in one of our earlier sessions. Annenberg had agreed that he would stay as long as the President wanted him to. One reason that he stayed as long as he did was because Mr. Stone, a wealthy Chicago businessman, was trying mightily to get the President to appoint him to the ambassadorship to the Court of St. James. Stone had received some TV exposure extolling "positive mental attitude." At the Republican convention, he had given a huge party. He was apparently a sort of a quirky guy, and the President asked Annenberg to stay longer than a normal tour so he wouldn't have to appoint this fellow. Annenberg ended up staying about five or six years. I came back to work for Dean Brown.

Q: Well, tell me now a little bit about how Dean Brown operated, what was his background.

GALLOWAY: Dean Brown was a brilliant young fellow. He had come up through assignments in the Belgian Congo, Canada, Washington, where he had the Canadian desk, and then special assistant in the front office of EUR. Then he went to Paris. I was in the director general's office by that time, and he originally was assigned to Rome. He really wanted to go to Paris, so I lent a hand. He was assigned to Paris which put him on track to go up. He did extremely well there with Bob McBride who was DCM. Dean came back later as chief of western European affairs, and then to Dakar as Ambassador. From there, to Jordan as ambassador. He had really shown his mettle as a highly capable guy, so he was tabbed by Kissinger for the management job.

The department was in one of those phases when the personnel operation and administration was in flux. Personnel had been put directly under the Director General of the Foreign Service, which made him de facto chief of personnel. I believe that still is the organizational pattern. Frankly, I have never thought that was a good idea because it makes the director general the assignments officer and leaves quality control and training in the service somewhat out of the mainstream of management. I have always thought those responsibilities should belong to the Director General, and, in addition, that he should be the person looked to for recommendations for ambassadorial and other high appointments in the field. I am in a minority in those views because most officers think that the Director General would not have any authority without personnel. Nevertheless, I continue to believe that he should not have to defend personnel assignments nor be the butt for high level interventions on personnel assignments.

Institutional quality control was haphazardly carried out by the sort of sledgehammer way the promotion system works. The selection board process is all right, in itself. The flaw is in the efficiency reports which are submitted to it. Most supervisors, ambassadors and managers succumb to the practice of hyperbole. Superlatives become ordinary in the ratings, and after reading a couple or three ratings on officers who were class three, you would have read them all for the whole class with very few exceptions.

Q: Well, now what was your job?

GALLOWAY: My job was executive assistant to the Undersecretary for Management. At that time he was Deputy Undersecretary. Management involves personnel and money. Dean took care of the finances by working directly with the budget officer in the bureau of administration. I had no job description, but in essence I had an informal watching brief on personnel. The director general reported directly to Dean, so I had informal contacts up and down the line with the working levels in personnel. Also, I was in liaison with the geographic bureaus, pretty much at all levels. I fed in to Dean the information which came my way from those sources and passed down to them anything which would help them in their jobs.

Another part of the job involved ambassadorial appointments. With my rank and position I was pretty well situated to keep in touch with the assistant secretary level in the department regarding ambassadorial assignments in their geographic bureaus, in both directions, to get their ideas and to put up possibilities to get their reactions. There was

another dimension to the job which might be best described as catch all. Unexpected things came up constantly, and one just had to field them and work out something acceptable. It was largely a high level personnel job, but an anonymous one. It had to be carried on behind the scenes.

Q: Did you find nothing is anonymous in the State Department. I mean the people all but trained to ferret out secrets. How about I mean were people coming up, I mean were you getting petitions shoved over the transom or under the door?

GALLOWAY: From time to time. I tried to make it work both ways. I had had the experience under MacArthur of being a special assistant for somebody at a high level in the department, and I had learned how to try to stay on good terms with the guys on the desks and other officers who floated around in positions similar to mine. I tried to let them feel that they could have an entree to the top level through the side door. I continued to operate pretty much that way in management. I found that the assistant secretaries were cooperative and accepted me in that role. One thing I discovered fairly soon in that job was that its effectiveness depended on the undersecretary being there physically. If he went off on a trip or awol, the office might as well close down. Only in some instances was I able to help with people who were willing to continue the relationship that we had established.

When Eagleburger replaced Dean Brown, he asked me to stay on which I was certainly willing to do. His presence there made the management mandate considerably more potent. He was still doing much of his old job for Kissinger, such as handling the Israeli situation and anything else that Kissinger wanted. So, while the management job put him in the institutional line, it obviously was not his favorite line of work. Nevertheless, he devoted all possible time and attention to it, but I sensed that he was not all that happy with his lot. He and I had become pretty close. Going back to when he was the political section chief at NATO and I was the same in London, we had continuing informal good relations and contacts. I decided to share with him my thoughts about the main weakness of the organization. I went to him and said, "I have got something I want to propose to you." He looked at me a little unhappily and said, "You want me to resign don't you." I said, "No." I said, "No it is not that." I went on in the following vein. We have here a huge sprawling outfit with a bunch of barons and their fiefdoms who are individually largely on their own and off in every direction when you are out of town or when you are doing something else. When you are not able to devote enough time to this or if you are just sort of letting it run itself, it doesn't do very well. It doesn't do well particularly when you get to the budgetary process because each bureau is left with sort of a guessing game on how much more it can ask for. The department has no way now of relating position to performance to actual budgeting for personnel or operations. Not only is that done by hook or crook by these guys coming up to you directly, but you are not in a position to make an informed decision off the cuff. I think you need to create a staff with enough oomph to it to continue to operate the system whether you are here or not. Also, make it a much more justifiable budgetary operation which is not just off the cuff or from the seat of the pants. He thought this over for a while and went and talked to Henry. Henry agreed; he thought it was a pretty good idea.

A management operations staff was then established. I recommended to Eagleburger that he try to get Earl Sohm to be director of the new staff. Earl had broad experience, much of it in personnel, was widely known and respected in the Department and the Foreign Service and had proved himself in management. Earl agreed and began to bring in officers whose abilities he knew to staff the operation. The main objective was to craft a system which would allow the requirements of the operating bureaus to be assessed, have them theoretically filled by personnel and then costed by the budget office; such procedure to be an annual exercise which would facilitate preparation of the budget and give top management a justifiable basis for decisions on resources. It took a year or so to plan and establish the system, but in time it did help all concerned to bring personnel and finance into a better balance. I have had no direct experience with it for many years, but I assume that it is probably more refined and helpful now.

There was another important feature in this new organization. I recommended to Larry that he appoint the head of that staff as his deputy to be acting under secretary in his absence and to be in charge when he had to do something else temporarily. He bought that idea and so was the move made to fill the void when the under secretary was not around. For the rest of the time Eagleburger was there, we kept up support to improve it. It was not, of course, a panacea for various reasons. For one, Eagleburger was always an approachable guy and some assistant secretaries would deal only with him because of previous close relationships, and they knew that if they went to him he would try to help them. We had to contend with that for most of the time he was there. He was vastly overworked because Henry, whenever anything important came up no matter what the subject matter, would call for Eagleburger. Eagleburger was in effect always the number two in the department with Kissinger. I think that the management arm of the Department was strengthened by Larry because he was so close to Kissinger and could inject some of his ideas down through the structure. Once having grown more muscle, it was there for Larry's successors and I think had much more value to the department.

There were a couple of things Eagleburger and I did that were truly gratifying. During the time of the serious problems over Berlin, Dean Acheson was asked to come back as a consultant for a couple of months or so. Larry, who was at about the class four or five level at that time was detailed to him as special assistant. So, it was Acheson and Eagleburger. Larry and others who worked with him at that time came to have tremendous respect and admiration for him. I had gained that earlier during my NATO experience when he was Secretary of State, and we were working with him on NATO. He was, certainly in my estimation, the most successful, ablest Secretary of State we have had in our government. Of course, by his appearance he looked like a European foreign minister.

Q: I know he did, yes. He used to drive some of those midwestern Senators wild.

GALLOWAY: With his tailor and his homburg hat, he really looked the part. He really was an extremely able man. He had the full loyalty of Truman. They got along famously and enjoyed each other, different as they were. Eagleburger and I were talking about this

after Acheson had passed away. Larry said he wished we could do something in memory of him. I went back to my office and thought about how almost everyone who had ever worked with him still remembered him as The Secretary. Casting around for ideas, I suddenly had one. I went back into Eagleburger's office and said that I had an idea. I said we have an auditorium here, a State Department auditorium. We could name that the Acheson Auditorium. Well, he grinned at that and said good idea. I will take it up with Henry and see what he says. Henry said it was a fine idea. So, we got in touch with Mrs. Acheson who was pleased, set up a ceremony and officially named it the Acheson Auditorium. There was standing room only for the event. That gave both of us great satisfaction.

Some months later, a similar thing happened. Loy Henderson used to come down to the Department from time to time after he retired and always stopped in the undersecretary's office to say hello. He was still just as interested and as much an elder statesman and friend to the State Department and Foreign Service establishment as ever. After one of his visits, Eagleburger said, "Gee, we should do something for that fellow." We all held that man in the highest regard not only because of his dedication, integrity and loyalty, but also because he had done so much for the Department and the Service. I thought about it for a while, then went to Larry and said I had an idea. I mentioned the conference center downstairs on the ground floor which was well done and in which we took pride as a state of the art meeting facility. I suggested that we could name it the Loy Henderson Conference Center. Larry thought well of the idea so we proceeded to arrange a ceremony with Mr. Henderson and carried through with christening the Loy Henderson Conference Center. The old fellow was so happy and pleased that several of us were close to blinking our eyes more rapidly. Those were just two things we thought of and carried out. I think both of them lend dignity and are worthy historical markers. They leave a certain stamp because both men represented, I think, the finest of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

Q: I agree, yes.

GALLOWAY: We endured some unhappy and sad situations while Larry was there. We had to move some people around in the Middle East when things were very dangerous. One such tragedy was the assassination of Frank Meloy in Beirut soon after he went there as ambassador. It was a cold-blooded, planned execution. He had ben down in a Caribbean post I think.

Q: Yes, it was Central America, I think. I can't remember which one, but he was a great guy.

GALLOWAY: A really great guy, able, and polished and a man who made friends and kept them. It was a personal blow to many in the Service. I certainly enjoyed my friendship with him. I had stayed with him in Rome when he was DCM there. We had a great time. He was sent to Beirut because Henry called Larry in and told him he wanted the best man the Foreign Service could produce to go to that post. Larry came back and we talked it over for a time. We agreed that the man to fit Henry's need was Frank. He

left his post, came to Washington for some heavy and extended briefing and then departed for Beirut. We got Dean Brown to go out and bring him back. Another name was chiseled into the plaque in the Department's lobby of those who had given their lives in the Service.

After Carter won the presidential election, Eagleburger stayed around to help during the transition and then went to Yugoslavia as Ambassador.

Q: In '76.

GALLOWAY: Cy Vance came in as Secretary of State. He had a few people he had worked with before, but by and large, the people who came into the senior offices in the department were politically correct for the White House. Many had been around the Democratic Party for some time, several from various posts on the hill. Dick Moose came in as deputy undersecretary of management. He had been on the hill for years. I stayed there with him for a while. I told him I recognized that the relationship between him and his executive assistant would be close, that I assumed he probably would have a personal friend he would want, that I fully understood and he should go ahead and pick whomever he wanted. Meanwhile, I would help him out as best I could.

One of the problems that bedeviled Dick all the time he was there was the office of personnel. He didn't like the way it was run. We talked about it at great length on many occasions. Finally, the idea solidified of appointing a director of personnel at assistant secretary level who would report directly to the undersecretary for management rather than the director general. Moose went ahead and made his plans to take that action. He was just on the verge of doing so when he was asked to take over as Assistant Secretary for Africa. The *status quo* prevailed.

An assignment had been worked out for me to go down to the National War College as deputy commandant, although the title was changed to international affairs advisor with the second in command rank unchanged. When Dick left, I was already set for that slot and detoured my commute down to Fort McNair. We spent some time working on the curriculum for the course and I got acquainted with the faculty, and then the students as the term began. It had some of the atmosphere of an academic institution but with a military command structure imposed. I had a staff of instructors of some half dozen, some from government departments and others on leave from university posts. They were an impressive and congenial group, each with an area specialty and some of general competence. I had to accustom myself to the role of head of an academic department.

Q: You did this when to when?

GALLOWAY: '77 to '78 at the war college. Meanwhile, Ben Read became deputy undersecretary for management in the Department. He looked around for an executive assistant for some time. Eventually he called me and asked me to come back to the old job. I agreed if he would clear the way at the war college. He did and I went back to my former desk. I had known Ben since his earlier tour in the Department. He was devoted to

public service. A brilliant man of integrity, excellence, high standards of ethics and morals, he was a pleasure to work with. He left it up to me as to how I could best serve him and the Department. His daily staff meetings were productive and often created lines of action. We had two special assistants, Pat Kennedy, perhaps the ablest young officer I had ever encountered, and Dwight Mason, equally competent. By and large I worked along my familiar lines. I continued contacts with the geographic assistant secretaries on ambassadorial appointments and other bureau interests. Most of all I tried to help Ben on personnel. He soon encountered the same problems as had his predecessors. There was always the influence of the White House staff which had legitimate interests up to a point, and these were dealt with either harmoniously or not depending on the attitudes of the people in the White House. But the main problems were inherent in the personnel operation itself. Assignments were the key, and then counseling of foreign service personnel had rough spots. The promotion system worked fairly well, but ran into difficulties, as I have pointed out earlier, due to habitual inflation of efficiency ratings. The most difficult problem was that over the years a group of higher level officers had to be carried as “over complement” because assignments could not be found for them. Then, there was the fact that the civil service people in the department were administered by the Director General of the Foreign Service, a point of some dissatisfaction. All in all, it was an intricate institution and for the most part not supervised or run by professional personnel managers. Carole Laise had become director general during Dean Brown’s tenure and she had some peculiar ideas.

Q: For example?

GALLOWAY: Well, I remember an occasion when Carole came into one of Ben’s staff meetings with a letter in hand from Charlie Whitehouse. He was DCM in Saigon and had run across a guy who was either in AID or something.

Q: CORDS maybe.

GALLOWAY: CORDS. He thought this fellow was great and was the kind we ought to try to get in the Foreign Service. So Carol began her presentation with the letter and started to argue that we need to get such people into the Foreign Service. I decided to be a devil's advocate which probably embarrassed Ben. I spoke up and said that I knew Charlie Whitehouse, and that I wouldn’t give a dime for a recommendation of his. Here he comes in wanting to lateral somebody either into a high position in the service where there is no facility to train people except to assign them so that they can gain experience or to bring them in at a lower level, hand pick their assignments and let them rise to the top of the diplomatic structure of the Foreign Service. We can't do that if we are going to continue to have the support and loyalty of the people in the service and maintain institutional loyalty. You have got to recognize that institutional loyalty and not abridge it if you want a successful organization of the caliber and excellence that we demand in Foreign Service people. Carole was really taken aback. I let it ride for a moment and then told Carole I was sorry, but that I did that just to make a point. I had known Charlie Whitehouse for many years and think very highly of him and that if he recommended this fellow, I was sure he would be a good Foreign Service Officer if you could get him into

the Foreign Service. But I said that is the wrong approach if you are heading up the Foreign Service. We have enough lateral entries from the political process as administrations change. They bring in new people who are assigned to Foreign Service positions and then stick around long enough to get themselves a permanent rating and a permanent position. It is hard enough to deal with that, without having people actively trying to recruit from the outside. Ben was having trouble maintaining his composure. Anyway, I apologized to her for the manner I used to make the point.

Ben soon found himself faced with a situation of a surplus of 60 or 70 officers in the upper grades with no assignments. He asked himself what in the world could be done about this? Obviously, we couldn't continue indefinitely as an organization with such a problem. So, he decided that he would talk to the Secretary and recommend that no promotions to class 1 be made that year. He did so, came back and arranged that the top selection board would make no recommendations for promotion of class 2 officers to class 1. We were seriously concerned and asked Ben if he was sure the Secretary understood the situation and the possible consequences and implications. Was he sure that he had the Secretary's backing? Ben said that he had gone over it with the Secretary and he had approved it. Well after it happened, the clamor was worldwide. Those officers who worked directly with the Secretary and enjoyed his confidence went to him and condemned the action. There was obvious unrest throughout the service. In a few weeks the Secretary called Ben in and told him he was sorry but that he would have to convene another board and direct promotions to class 1.

After that blow, Ben saw the need for some very basic structural reform. We went to work on a deep and broad study. It took us about two years. Ben saw the flaws in the service, in particular, that having to use age for mandatory retirement and time in grade for selection out purposes was a haphazard way of going about it. His recent experience left no doubt that we needed to find ways of eliminating the surplus of officers at senior level. The main problem in those days was that by the time an officer got to class three, his career was either already made or not. He went on from there to more responsible assignments and higher rank, or, if not, he was tucked away in some make-do job where he whiled away time until a lucky assignment turned up or he ran out of time in class. We did some long and hard studying and came up with something like the present system based on two premises: there should be instituted a threshold at the upper level of the service, that is from the intermediate level to the upper level, and to get over or through that threshold should require such a high level of performance that the officer would either make it in two or three years after he became eligible or he would be honorably retired.

Q: Similar to the military system.

GALLOWAY: Yes, of retiring colonels if they don't make a star. The idea was to create a threshold to help control upward movement so as to avoid the congestion in class three and above without assignments. That was one thing. The other was to devise a means of retiring people from the Senior Foreign Service, as it was to be called, if successive onward assignments were not possible. Looking at the class structure and the time in

class limits, we concluded that there should be short time in grade tenure in the Senior Foreign Service. Our premise was that if an officer in the Senior Foreign Service was not promoted to the next grade in a few years, he would be retired or could be retained another year if recommended by a board. Our study concluded that it should be hard to get into the Senior Foreign Service, as it was called, and hard to stay unless an officer continued to produce at a high level. We had been working toward legislation throughout our study, and we surveyed the existing structure and its operation at length and in depth. I think it was the most thorough study done on the Foreign Service since the Wriston program. The purpose of that program was quite different: to open the doors to augment the Foreign Service when it was a much smaller organization and couldn't begin to fill the positions in the department and the field at the same time. It was essentially a lateral entry program to enable the service to meet post war demands.

We recognized that our plan for new legislation was not going to be very well received by many in the service because no matter what their current position, their security could be threatened. We sent officers to the field, all geographic areas, to explain the proposals. We arranged conferences of counselors of mission, DCMs and some ambassadors to whom we explained the whole concept, asked for their feedback and urged them to talk it over with their staffs. That enabled us to get the word around very well, and the feedback was not long in coming and in leading to some changes in the proposed legislation. The next step was hearings before our committee in congress, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Congressman Dante Fascell of Florida chaired the hearings, and Ben Read was our principal spokesman. The committee and its staff were very helpful throughout the extended discussions. I left before the legislation became law. It was inevitable that the new Foreign Service Act would have some rough going in its early years, and I took one step later to try to ensure some support for it.

When Larry Eagleburger was appointed Deputy Secretary, I wrote him a letter to explain what we had done and to ask him to lend his influence to carrying out the new plan:

January 7, 1989

"Dear Eagleburger,

Today's post confirmed what I have been hearing for some weeks -- that you are returning to the charge as Deputy Secretary. Congratulations. With you and Scowcroft in place, foreign policy and national security are anchored. I am encouraged.

Although you are slightly past the entry age proposed by Plato for an administrator of the Republic, I believe your capacity for service in an office of high public trust is now optimal. Exercise it fully, but with some restraint to protect your health.

After more than 40 years of peace in Europe, prospects are still promising. Even though the Western Europeans may be obstreperous in some areas, they are unlikely to threaten fundamental values shared with us. As for the Soviet Union, time is on our side. Communism has emerged not as a utopian social form but rather an oppressive political

system contrary to human nature and dependent upon dictatorial measures to govern. It will continue to lose support and eventually give way around the world. Meanwhile, keep up the pressure.

You will recall that when I worked for you, I occasionally indulged my ego and adopted the mien and tone of the proverbial “Dutch Uncle.” At the risk of casting myself again in that presumptuous role, I have a couple of thoughts for you.

I came away from that period of our association with the impression that you had formed a not too flattering view of the Foreign Service, particularly the operation of its system. I shared that view up to a point and urged your successors to make drastic reforms. Over time, as the ever present surplus of over-complement senior officers grew, top management felt the full frustration of the system's shortcomings. We undertook an exhaustive study and analysis. The ultimate outcome was legislation of the new Foreign Service Act. There were two primary objectives: to make it difficult to get into the senior ranks and stay there (thus reducing the surplus of senior unemployable officers), and to enable the Service to function on the up or out principle without relying on mandatory retirement for age. The result was not perfect, but better than before. It moves out some good people, but it keeps the best. George Vest has been crucial in getting it rooted institutionally (He was then the director general). Keep your management on the same track; don't let them tinker with it because some good people and friends may be passed over.

Finally, you rose in the Service like a shooting star. Naturally, you have particular affinity with young officers on the same trajectory. Don't push them so much that you distort the system; give some of the slower ones like me opportunity to develop into valuable assets, which frequently happens. In the same vein, without detracting from your characteristic of relying on personal loyalty and returning it, give full opportunity to institutional loyalty to respond to leadership. I remember your telling me after your Ambassadorship in Yugoslavia, that you wished you had had that experience before the management job. I think you were reflecting some of the things I have mentioned.

In any event, please excuse the impertinence. Good luck, good health, good fortune, and let me know if I can help.

As ever,

Bill Galloway"

Q: Well, that makes sort of a nice bookend to this, don't you think?

GALLOWAY: I think so. I want to add that when I retired, I did get an award.

Q: It is an award.

GALLOWAY: Yes, the John Jacob Rogers award "For long, dedicated, and devoted

service of extraordinary distinction in the Department of State and the Foreign Service and in special recognition of his crucial role in developing the proposed new Foreign Service Act."

Q: Well done.

GALLOWAY: It did not mention other things that I had enjoyed most and took most pride in during my career. I did receive other Superior Honor Awards which were related to those. They had come about through opportunities rather than by design. If you look back on them, the initial assignment which started as a desk officer, then working on NATO from its inception to its implementation in the field, that was really heady wine for a young fellow of 25 years just out of a military uniform. So, I am eternally grateful to Ted Achilles for making it possible for me to work with him and have that experience, and then on to London and Paris to actually set up the organization in Europe. Then, going back to be MacArthur's special assistant which was very active and a constant source of satisfaction even though it meant a lot of stress at times. When the Wriston program came along, I lateraled into the Foreign Service. I was just extremely lucky in the assignments I had - the Title and Rank job in personnel which gave such insight into human nature, then Special Assistant to the Director General of the Foreign Service, Tyler Thompson, then the National War College for a year, and then the final tour in London which lasted for nine years.

I suppose that assignment was in a way the most rewarding personally of anything that I had done. Luck just seemed to come my way in every aspect of that job.

Q: Yes, you were able to use your talents.

GALLOWAY: Well, it was very interesting and rewarding. Then, coming back and being able to help in management and in trying to improve the Foreign Service structure. That in itself was a source of satisfaction. The relationships with my colleagues in all those jobs and the friendships, both in my own service and in other diplomatic services with whom we came in contact, were personally rewarding. I look on myself has having been a very fortunate and lucky individual. If I had written it all as a dream, I couldn't have asked for anything better.

Ben and Nan Read gave a reception when I retired. It was one of those happy and sad occasions. One of my most cherished keepsakes is a scroll conceived by Ben and the staff, with the help of the graphics office, which goes as follows:

To all to whom these presents come:

Greetings
Know that I, Under Secretary of State for Management and for Other Purposes have absolutely appointed without right of appeal, on the advice and counsel of my Trusty Staff, WILLIAM GALLOWAY, to be the first honorary Member of the Senior Foreign Service with the rank and title of Grand Counselor at Large with the right to select and

change cones at will and not be included in any bargaining units [SEAL]

Done at Washington this eleventh day of January 1980

Benjamin H. Read

Then, finally, the following message from Eagleburger:

Dear Bill,

In my first message from Henry reporting on developments in Washington, I have learned that you will be receiving this week the farewell plaudits you believe you so richly deserve. I could not let such an opportunity pass without telling you what I really think of you -- particularly when safely separated by several thousand miles, with the whole Yugoslav army between us.

When I look back on our time together, I get tears in my eyes and a catch in my throat. I remember the many times you told me -- (sometimes with the patient resignation of a parent, but more often in a tone reminiscent of a fellow with a German accent down the hall) -- what I was doing wrong, what I was not doing at all, and what I should never do again.

I also recall with nostalgia your many proposals for reorganizing the Department or parts thereof. I still think your suggestion that I work John Thomas and his bureau into the Passport Office was a bit extreme, but have often wondered whether I shouldn't have gone along with your proposal to place DG and PER under Ed Misey. The suggestion you so often made about abolishing M, while leaving the Executive Assistant position in place, also began to seem a reasonable one shortly after the middle of last January.

But, so be it. Of such oversights is the stuff of foreign policy made. I promise to do better next time.

Seriously, old friend, I know how much everyone there will miss you -- because I already do. You were a great guy to have around, not only as a father figure, but because of your absolute integrity and considerable courage. There aren't many like you in this business of ours, and I shall always cherish our times together -- both the good and the bad.

The best of luck to you and all the best from someone who will never forget how good it was to work with and for you.

Eagleburger

Q: Well, that has been fun.

Attachments follow

Attachment 1:

Sixty-Seventh Annual Commencement Exercises of the
Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas

Friday, January 22, 1943

Valedictory Address
Cadet Lieutenant Colonel William J. Galloway

Ordinarily the function of a valedictory is to say farewell to the friends we are leaving behind when we graduate. But these are not ordinary days we are living. Instead of scattering all over the world, the friends we now know will soon be united again to fight. To fight for a way of living that allows such institutions as Texas A. and M. to exist. Thousands of Aggies are already engaged in this war, and thousands more will be in it before it is over. So instead of saying goodbye to our friends, we are merely saying goodbye to the relations we have had with them here.

We are facing great responsibilities and an even greater task -- a task that will try to the utmost our strength, courage, initiative, and ability. And most of all it will test our education both liberally and practically. May I call to your attention John Milton's definition of education that appears on the cover of our college catalog, "I call therefore a complete and generous education that which fits a man to perform justly, skillfully, and magnanimously all the offices, both private and public, of peace and war." I think that definition is amply filled by the education that we have had a chance to get here. The price of this education demands that we prove it, and prove it we must if freedom and common decency are still to exist. I'm not so sure that the war is the greatest test of this education, for living in the luxuries and opportunities of a peacetime America is a great task in itself. But if this education does serve to show us what we really are, we shall be amply rewarded.

It is true that winning this war is going to be a tremendous task. But we are not facing this task alone; you - our mothers and fathers and friends at home - you are with us. The war must be won by the fighting men on the fighting front. It cannot be won on the home front, but it can be lost there. So, while we and millions like us are doing our best to win it, we are sure that you are doing your best to see that it is not lost.

If we had not been a war class, we might have waited for several years to assume responsibilities that we must now assume at once. But we would also have waited to find out what our debt to society is. We might have had to wait even longer before we could pay this debt. So we are indeed fortunate in that we can realize that debt now and can also do our best to pay it now. Pasteur, the great French scientist, realized his debt to humanity and used his mind to pay it. We must use our minds also. But we must speak by actions and deeds, too.

Since we are fighting for more than ourselves, there are certain convictions and ideals

that we must hold above all. Each of us probably thinks of these ideals a little differently, but they are all essentially the same -- the inalienable right of our way of life, and that the task of living it completely demands the freedom and opportunity that each individual in America enjoys every day. We must not allow anything to destroy these ideals and we must fight to see that nothing does destroy them.

In our relations with people there are several qualities that we must acquire in order to make these relations pleasant ones. Especially in the army, we must know and acquire self discipline. If we all get to be officers, this is even more important. We must have self discipline in order to deal with the men that will be under us. Because by disciplining ourselves we may make the men under us happy and loyal instead of unhappy and mutinous. The most important thing that goes to make up this self discipline is restraint. The quality of restraint in an individual, an idea, or a work of art has been respected throughout the ages. It characterizes the difference between a masterpiece and just a good job. If our education here has given us that desired restraint, we may be sure that our work is not lost.

The critical times that we are living in present us with both danger and opportunities. We cannot do anything about the dangers that we will be confronted with, but we can try to fit ourselves to make the most of the opportunities that arise. In making the most of these opportunities, however, we must not neglect our responsibilities. We must realize these responsibilities, they must be stamped indelibly in our minds. We must realize all that is desired and expected of us and we must do our best to see that these are filled.

In closing, I will ask the senior class to stand in hand salute in memory of our classmates who have passed on -- Harold Louis Delfraise, Edwin Bridges Patterson, Gerald Eugene Depew, and Richard Downing.

Attachment 2

Letter from Gibb Gilchrist, former Dean of Engineering,
President, and Chancellor of the Texas A. & M. System

July 24, 1966

Dear Bill,

Ty Timm brought me news and a message from you. I always knew that anyone who took Mr. Crawford's ME 101-102 could succeed at anything, but you are the first engineering graduate who landed and is succeeding in the Diplomatic Service, as far as I know.

I have been retired for several years but have a little office on the first floor of the Engineering Building. It happens that in the corridor just outside my door, the pictures of the Student Engineers' Council are hung. Nearly every day I look at them and recall many of the students I had to "advise me." Your picture is one I look at often. I remember you so very well. I am sure you must remember Colonel Willard Chevalier of McGraw-Hill who visited us for a week most of the time. You may or may not recall an incident involving the Colonel and yourself. He came in January, 1943, because, as you will remember, the Class of 1943 graduated in January '43. Colonel Chevalier was considered one of the ten most effective speakers in the U.S. He talked to the Engineering Students. As valedictorian of the '43 class you were due to make an address. You asked the Colonel to give you some advice as to how best to prepare and present an address such as you were to make. I'll never forget his answer. He said the best advice he could give originated with an old Negro preacher who was always preaching to a full house and gave his philosophy in these words:

"Fust, I tells um what I'se gwine to tell um; then I tell um, then I tells um what I done told um"
Remember!

I am proud of you Bill -- but I never had any doubt as to your success in any field you entered.

Let me hear from you some time.

Yours,

Gibb Gilchrist

<u>Attachment 3</u>: The Origins of NATO: an Insider's View

William J. Galloway, Retired United States Foreign Service Officer

A Speech Given to the Lyman L. Lemnitzer Center for NATO and European Community Studies

Wednesday, November 18, 1992

Director Papacosma, Professor Kaplan, ladies and gentlemen. It is an honor to be here at an institution bearing the name of General Lemnitzer, one of the contributors to NATO.

A year and a half ago I received a letter from Mr. Snyder. He explained that he was writing a doctoral dissertation under Professor Kaplan on the role of middle echelon diplomats in the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty. It was his contention that the participants in the International Working Group had been slighted in history as to their contribution. I found it easy to put aside my natural modesty and agree with his thesis. I was obliged to note, however, that my personal claim to share in that contribution was tied to the coattails of Ted Achilles. I had no competition for the role of youngest and lowest ranking officer on the NATO Working Group of 1948-1949. It was very heady wine indeed for one who had just laid aside the uniform of a junior officer in the army.

Before focusing on the International Working Group, which met in Washington from late 1948 to early 1949, we should take note of certain policy landmarks:

The Brussels Treaty, under which Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg banded together to strengthen the security of Western Europe.

The Vandenberg Resolution, passed by the United States Senate, encouraged the association of the United States with regional and collective security arrangements as were based on effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affected its national security.

These public manifestations of security policy came to fruition as a result of months of diplomatic activity among the governments concerned.

Within the United States Government, the formulation of policy, under the aegis of the President, rested largely with the Department of State. The Secretary of State, General Marshall and later Dean Acheson; Under Secretary, Richard Lovett; Director of European Affairs, John D. Hickerson; Chief of the Western European Division, Theodore C. Achilles; and desk officer for Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland, William J. Galloway; constituted the line of policy action. Also, two other officers in the Department -- Counselor Charles E. Bohlen and Director of Policy Planning George F. Kennan -- were tangentially involved in framing policy in the early stages but were not actively involved in the negotiations. Early consultations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense (as well as the British and the Canadians) posed the concept of a security arrangement and the possibility of participation by the United

States. This work benefitted particularly from the participation of the Director of the Joint Staff, Major General Alfred Gruenther. The results were presented to the President who approved the broad policy and its implementation.

This thumbnail sketch gives the impression that the whole venture enjoyed smooth sailing. In fact, it did, but only because such a major change in peacetime foreign policy by the United States had found acceptance by key leaders in Congress. If the thinking of Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg had not evolved during World War II and its aftermath, it might not have been possible to gain the bipartisan political support necessary to create NATO.

Within the State Department, direct responsibility devolved on Hickerson, Director of European Affairs. Achilles, Chief of Western Europe, became the main action officer. In my opinion, Ted Achilles, from the outset, contributed more to policy formulation, liaison with other government departments and the international negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty than any other individual. He coopted me to help him with the paper work, and as events progressed, I hung on to the tail of a comet in diplomatic activity which was high adventure to one of my age and limited experience. Incidentally, when Achilles asked me to join, he gave me, as a first assignment, two books to read on the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. In retrospect, and with due regard to the relative importance of the two instruments of state, I would describe Achilles' role in the drafting and negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty as roughly comparable to that of James Madison in the framing of the Constitution.

Hickerson was a consummate leader. He carried responsibility easily, was quick and intelligent, had a fun loving sense of humor, and had earned the respect of the European diplomatic representatives in Washington. The Working Group prospered under his chairmanship, while his manner and personality encouraged the informal, freewheeling participation of its members. It not only produced much substantive agreement, but it was also just plain fun.

Within the State Department, Hickerson and Achilles managed to handle most policy matters directly with the Secretary of State, whose informal sanctioning of that procedure left some other senior officers somewhat frustrated. Hickerson and Achilles were not apologetic about their success in that continuing bureaucratic finesse; moreover, they considered that it contributed to the confidentiality of the work. We were fortunate in carrying the negotiations to completion with few unintended breaches of security (with the exception that Donald Maclean in the British Embassy was privy to all proceedings).

After my initial immersion in this venture, I felt a natural curiosity about how it got its start. One day when we were working in Hickerson's office, I put the question to him. He looked up with a characteristic grin and leaned back to enlighten a neophyte. According to his account, some months earlier there had been a high level conference in London. After a meeting with Foreign Secretary Bevin, General Marshall had called in Hickerson. He reported that Bevin had been talking about creating a band from the Middle East to Western Europe to counter the Soviet threat. Marshall asked Hickerson if he had any idea

what Bevin was talking about and was told to follow up with the British. Hickerson had done so and learned that the purpose was to put together some form of security arrangement in which the United States would join. From that point, events moved with deliberate pace. Consultations within the U.S. Government took place as I have described. Just who worked to influence Senator Vandenberg, I have never found a fully satisfactory answer. I suspect Hickerson had a hand in it, along with others at a higher level.

After months of diplomatic preparation, it was arranged that meetings would be held in Washington with the ambassadors of the Brussels Treaty powers and Canada, under the Chairmanship of the Secretary of State (as it transpired, however, Lovett acted for General Marshall).

Basic security policy was discussed and a working group with representatives from each government was established for continuing consultation. The purpose was to determine whether the broad security concepts, which seemed to represent a consensus, could be translated into a formal security arrangement. It was generally agreed that such an arrangement would be based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter which recognized the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense of all member nations; moreover it would not fall within the purview of Chapter VIII of the Charter concerning regional arrangements. Meetings of the Ambassadorial group were to have minutes whose texts would be approved by all participants.

The Working Group was left to set its own procedures. The Ambassadorial Group would meet whenever the Working Group had proposals or reports to make. In practice, the Working Group developed into a unique body. It kept no minutes and anyone was free to speak without being identified in any formal record. Hickerson was Chairman, assisted by Achilles, with me bringing up the rear. Most of the embassies involved sent two officers to the group, usually the minister or counselor and a first or second secretary. The one exception was Luxembourg whose ambassador, having no support staff, took tongue-in-cheek pride in being a member of all three groups. The third group was a drafting group, *ad hoc* in nature, which met whenever the Working Group needed a paper produced or when completed drafts needed to be reconciled. Its membership was even more informal and haphazard, with those who had pertinent thoughts, ideas or interest showing up for the inevitable back and forth of drafting sessions.

Negotiations proceeded quickly and rather smoothly, because there existed a broad area of agreement. Putting this into tangible form meant drafting a treaty. The principal questions to resolve were what other countries should be invited to join in a collective security pact and what should be the nature and extent of the commitment undertaken by the governments individually and collectively? A rough draft treaty soon took shape based largely on a draft Achilles had been working on for some time. As this made its way back to the governments, and their views and positions came back to Washington, the Working Group proceeded to reconcile the conflicting views and to supplement the draft with its own suggestions. The Working Group proved an ideal instrument for negotiations. Its members soon came to have a relatively clear understanding of what

would or would not gain acceptance by most parties, and the Group frequently provided its own initiatives for the consideration of the Ambassadorial Group. Positions of individual governments could be tested informally in the Working Group and where indicated, accepted compromises worked out. The group worked together so closely and informally that it took on a character of its own (a "band of brothers" as Achilles dubbed it) rather than being just an international conclave. The degree of cooperation reached during that period by the Working Group was unique in my experience.

As the discussions probed to try to delimit how far a collective security commitment could be extended and still be acceptable, Article 5, the heart of the treaty, went through various changes and nuances. The principal factor was, of course, how far the United States would go. When the words "including the use of armed force" were proposed, the political atmosphere became rarified indeed. Consultations with Congressional leaders were encouraging but not conclusive. Into this uncertain and highly sensitive atmosphere, someone on the United States side deliberately leaked the text of Article 5 to James Reston of the New York Times. Outrage over the leak was vociferous on all sides, with U.S. officials leading the pack. But the public did not seem to be too upset, and the debate calmed down. The trial balloon had worked. Article 5 was set, even though there would be some opposition in Congress.

The other subject prompting much exchange was membership. Norway, Denmark, and Iceland were obviously desirable if they were so inclined. Portugal seemed essential to the United States, even though there was some hesitation on the part of others. Italy actively sought membership and was supported by some, particularly France. Finally, there was the question of the Algerian Departments of France. The Working Group dealt with the membership question at length. The Scandinavian aspect resolved itself largely due to the views of Norway, which was the first additional government invited to join the meetings in Washington. Denmark and Iceland came in a bit later, as did Portugal. Italy and the French territory in Africa were controversial, and those questions were resolved only after extensive debate and ultimately with representations at governmental level.

By the time the other participants joined in the Working Group meetings, the text of the Treaty had been largely agreed. Some new suggestions and modifications were naturally proposed, but very few changes were made in the draft. Then, when the text was complete, it had no preamble. Several members turned to composing suitable texts. There was some levity, such as a proposal for "Dear Joe." Finally, more serious heads prevailed and agreement was reached on a preamble text, ironically, almost the last act of the Working Group.

All of us who worked on those negotiations realized that we had been privileged to take part and that, if successful, the North Atlantic Treaty would stand as a major force in history. The members of the Working Group were proud of their contribution but knew that they would remain largely anonymous as is the nature of such diplomatic activity. They, therefore, decided to give a memento to themselves. Signatures of all were collected and were engraved on identical silver cigarette boxes, along with the dates marking the beginning and end of Working Group activity. There are fifteen such boxes

in existence.

After the signing of the Treaty on April 4, 1949, it went to the member governments for ratification. I accompanied Secretary Acheson to the White House for the formal signature by President Truman of the instrument declaring the entry into force of the Treaty. This was carried out by the President in a manner presumably characteristic of his way of doing business. Those of the press who were interested were present and the President, turning to Charlie Ross, his Press Secretary, asked if he had a release.

The statement which we had labored over for several days and at all levels in the State Department was passed around. The President, who was vigorously smoking a cigar, then turned to those assembled and said that this Treaty was not directed against anyone but was solely for the protection of its members. He then signed the paper declaring the Treaty in force. End of ceremony. His remarks were an abbreviated version of the statement in the press release, but Acheson, who was accustomed to the President's style did not blink an eye. I reflected to myself that the President's words were, after all, much in the spirit of the famous sign on his desk: "The buck stops here."

Even before the Treaty was signed, there was informal discussion among some of us in the Working Group about its implementation. We carried this on without the benefit (or hindrance) of instructions from governments. It was only natural that the Foreign Ministers would meet from time to time, and thus became the North Atlantic Council, which subsequently went through different formats. Most of you are thoroughly familiar with its metamorphosis.

In the early days there was no broad consensus on further organization. In fact, there were those inside the U.S. Government who thought that our adherence to the Treaty, with commitments to a role in Western European security, would suffice to deter Soviet aggression. In my daily work and contacts with officers in the Pentagon, I found several who viewed the U.S. role as going no further than furnishing military assistance to some of the European nations. That, after all, would be following the pattern of the Marshall Plan.

My colleagues in the Working Group did not consider this sort of passive participation enough to reassure the people of Western Europe. After all, they were living in apprehension and fear, with massive formations of Soviet troops in central Europe and frequent threatening blandishments by the Soviet Government. They wanted active U.S. participation and most of all, U.S. forces stationed in Europe as the spearhead of a deterrent.

Behind the scenes, exchanges went on back and forth for several months. Meanwhile, my colleagues on the Joint Staff progressed to the point of agreeing to set up committees on an area basis for military planning. Accordingly, we framed the original organization as military planning groups for the principal areas concerned -- Northern Europe, Western Europe, Southern Europe and the Mediterranean, and Canada-U.S. These groups, comprised of military officers of the region (including the U.S. in some cases) were to

meet regularly to develop plans for the defense of their areas. The plans were then to be submitted to a Military Committee comprising the military chiefs of all the member nations. You may well imagine the plethora of planning papers based on myriad assumptions which appeared at early meetings in 1949 and 1950.

Meanwhile, we had made some progress on the political level by getting agreement on establishment of the North Atlantic Council Deputies on a permanent basis. The hope was that each government would appoint a representative of such stature and rank as to enable the Council Deputies to proceed to implement the treaty without having to consult governments for instructions at each step. A laudable goal, but in practice the Council Deputies did not find it possible to act semi-independently any more than any other international diplomatic body. The U.S. Council Deputy was Charles M. Spofford, a senior partner of the New York firm of Davis, Polk.

Meanwhile, in the State Department there had been personnel and organizational changes. A new office of Regional Affairs was created in the European Bureau. I have the dubious honor of being the first and lowest ranking officer assigned to it. Among other things, it would handle North Atlantic Treaty affairs. Other changes sent Jack Hickerson to Assistant Secretary of the United Nations Bureau, and European Affairs brought in a new Assistant Secretary, George Perkins, an executive from the Merck pharmaceutical company. He was a natural leader who was quickly at ease in the governmental environment and soon enjoyed the respect of the bureau. He took me under his wing because I was handling most of the NATO working level contacts with the Pentagon officers about military planning on the one hand, and on the other, shopping the results around with members of the international Working Group who continued their informal consultations.

I was only mildly surprised, consequently, when Perkins called me down to his office, and, with a grin said, “I have just given you to Chuck Spofford to be his Special Assistant in London at the North Atlantic Council Deputies.” This was exciting and challenging, except that I had another exciting and challenging personal consideration which had been growing strongly in recent months. At dinner with the Belgian Attaché and guests, I had met a lovely hazel eyed brunette who was attending art school in Washington. I experienced a sharp drop in interest in NATO and other State Department responsibilities. She finally accepted my proposal of marriage and we set the date for the early spring of 1950. When I disclosed this unexpected turn of events to my fiancée, involving not only possible interference with wedding plans, but also moving to London in the summer, I found that the lure of living in London led her to cooperate with NATO by postponing our marriage until June. For some months thereafter, I saw her briefly between trips to London, and was able to find a very nice flat at Arlington House for us to move into in the summer.

In London, the Council Deputies moved quickly to the main issue -- the nature and extent of U.S. Military participation. The French Delegation took the lead in advocating three far-reaching moves:

1. The establishment of an international force on the ground in Western Europe under an integrated headquarters and a Supreme Commander.

2. The Supreme Commander to be a high ranking United States officer.

3. Finally, American forces in substantial numbers were to be stationed in Europe.

The U.S. resisted the pressure from the Europeans for some months. The Regional Planning Groups met and produced papers, but since they were working almost in a vacuum, their product reflected the absence of an overall strategic plan and the paucity of forces.

On one of our return visits to Washington, a colonel on the Joint Staff invited us to dinner along with other colleagues currently working on NATO. It was a rousing party, and we were among the last to leave. My host then took me aside and told me about a paper he and others were working on in the Joint Staff, and which in the prevailing atmosphere, the betting was that the Joint Chiefs would approve. Briefly, what he reported was that after assessing total U.S. military forces on duty and planned for the foreseeable future, it was proposed that some two divisions of ground troops would be available for overseas deployment. This was the first indication I had that Pentagon thinking had developed to the point of responding to the European entreaties in NATO.

The next morning, a little bleary eyed, I was waiting for Perkins when he arrived at the State Department. He immediately checked around to determine whether anyone else in the Department had similar information from Defense. Apparently, no one had, and some took exception that the military should even consider such a major change in U.S. security policy without thoroughly exploring it initially with State. Perkins was not yet afflicted with such bureaucratic viruses. He learned from the Pentagon that while the idea was still “in the planning stage,” it was considered to be valid.

From that point, the “O” in NATO soon became a reality. Plans for a military command structure emerged and the concept of the famous “Standing Group” was unveiled. Primarily a French idea, it nevertheless evoked nods of wise approval from British colleagues and consternation and frowns from my other old Working Group colleagues. Also, it soon became known that General Eisenhower would be the Supreme Commander. General Gruenther told me that he and his wife were guests of the Eisenhowers for dinner followed by a period of very important activity which the two couples had enjoyed together for years -- contract bridge. On this particular night, however, a brief interruption in play came with Eisenhower taking an “urgent” telephone call, presumably from the President. He came back to the table and told Gruenther that they wanted him to be Supreme Commander of that command being formed in Europe which he didn’t know much about. He then told Gruenther that he would just have to go with him as Chief of Staff to run the show. The important business of the evening was then resumed as the cards were shuffled.
Generals Eisenhower and Gruenther made an early swing around Europe to visit top defense officials in the NATO capitals and consult about the prospective military

structure. The major question of interest was, of course, the Standing Group with its proposed membership of only three governments. Even though it was not his to negotiate, Eisenhower was able to make it easier for his political superiors by using his great prestige and influence to smooth the way. Despite resentment and suspicion on the part of some of the smaller nations, Eisenhower's persuasion and, more importantly, the fact that he would be the Supreme Commander enabled the concept to proceed, even though suspect. In London, Gruenther briefed us on the results of their talks with the various defense officials; when asked what the Italians thought about the Standing Group, he said that they were all for it -- with Italy and any other two countries as members.

Most of the major organizational developments of NATO were negotiated by the North Atlantic Council Deputies during their rather brief life in London from 1950 to 1952. The military command structure, military supply and production, economic and financial machinery, infrastructure (a relatively new addition to the lexicon), status of forces agreements and other components were initiated or completed.

The status of forces agreement had a bruising history. Earlier experience in the State Department with our Legal Office and various dealings with the Pentagon about forces stationed abroad (the Azores) had given me some exposure to the thorny nature of this issue. In London in 1950, one of the officers with whom I had worked closely in Defense stopped by my office and dropped a document on my desk. Very casually he indicated that it would be helpful if I could get it into and approved by the Council Deputies.

It turned out to be a draft comprehensive status of forces agreement for NATO, and as I glanced through it, I groaned at the virtual "extra-territorial" rights it sought for U.S. forces to be stationed in Europe. I asked if it had State Department clearance, and when he shook his head I handed it back to him. He stalked off in a huff. A year or so later, after much massaging in the U.S. Government and drawn out negotiations in NATO, the status of forces agreement was approved. General Thomas Handy, U.S. Commander in Europe at the time and a crusty veteran of wartime service directly under General Marshall, briefed us in London on the general situation of U.S. troops in Europe. He led off with a statement substantially as follows: "I don't know who the American representative was who negotiated this (bleep) status of forces agreement, but I just have to say that he is a traitor to his country." When I passed this on to my colleague who had carried the negotiations, he grinned broadly and allowed as how that was the greatest commendation he had received for his work.

So, those are some of my recollections, pre-NATO and early NATO. I hope they have been useful to you who have enduring interests in this collective security arrangement. It appears to have served its primary purpose for almost half a century. I'm grateful for the opportunity it gave me personally, and for the great satisfaction of seeing it prove its effectiveness within my lifetime. What of its future? I have given that quite a lot of thought as you certainly have. I'd like to hear what you think.

End of interview