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JOHN P. HARROD

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Afghan fair participation
USIA impact
Communists
Peace Corps
Universities
English teaching program
Ambassador Neumann
Afghan relations with neighbors
Role of women
Islam

Foreign Service Institute - Polish Language Training 1971-1972

Poznan, Poland - Information/Cultural Affairs Officer 1972-1974
Environment
Trade fairs
Polish-American Congress
Philatelic exhibition
Fulbright exchange
Security
Contacts
Catholic Church
Balanchine (New York City Ballet) visit

Moscow, USSR - USIA - Assistant Cultural Attaché/Press Attaché 1975-1978
Exhibits
U.S.-Soviet relations
Baku
Visitors
Security
American student guards
Reporting
Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan
Amerika Magazine
Soviet media
Ansel Adams exhibit
Human rights
Ambassador Malcolm Toon
Secretary of State Vance visit and proposal
President Carter
Ambassador Toon on television
American transmissions interference
Soviet bully tactics
Privacy Act
Press stories
U.S. media

Embassy fire
Views on Soviet Union
Moscow versus the provinces
Soviet nationalism

Washington, DC - USIA - Soviet Union Desk Officer 1978-1979
Soviet exhibit
Exchange program

Berkeley Springs, West Virginia - USIA - Mid-Career training 1979

Washington, DC - USIA - Near East Area Officer 1979-1981
Soviets invade Afghanistan
U.S. Teheran embassy taken
Dealing with hostage families
Hostages released
Afghanistan reporting
Mujahideen
Hodding Carter
Abortive rescue mission

Washington, DC - Voice of America (VOA) - Policy Director 1981-1982
Reagan administration
Taiwan issue
"Human Events" magazine
Charlie Wick
Problems
"Worldnet" television
VOA programming

Washington, DC (Capitol Hill) - Congressional Fellowship 1982-1983
Congressman Jim Leach
Congressman Jeff Bingaman
Program content and duties
Congressional staff
Contras issue
Executive Branch contacts

Washington, DC - USIA - Fulbright Program - Europe 1983-1984
Bilateral agreements
Eastern Europe programs
Courses of study in U.S.
West German talks
Reagan's Ireland visit

Warsaw, Poland - USIA - Public Affairs Officer/Counselor 1984-1987

Political situation
General Jaruzelski
Polish contacts
Solidarity faction
Communists
Dissidents
USIA banned
International Visitor Program
Television reception
VCR tapes
U.S. "Culture Week"
Security
PNGs
Changes since 1974
Gorbachev influence
"Intellectuals"
Views of U.S.
Public attitude towards U.S.
"Polonia"
Chargé John Davis
Human Rights Award
Catholic Church
President Reagan
Popieluszko murder
Media
Ted Kennedy visit
Relations with communist countries
Vice President George Bush visit
Leadership contacts
Virulent nationalism
Multiparty system
Helsinki Accords
Border issues

Brussels, Belgium - USIA - Public Affairs Officer 1987-1992

TDY - Warsaw for Bush visit - 1987
French language program - 1987
NATO
Protocol
Duties and functions
Reference center
Media
Visitors
INF Treaty
Contacts
King Baudouin

Gulf War
Operation "Provide Comfort"
Memorial Day ceremonies
Eisenhower memorial
Luxembourg
U.S. ambassadors to Luxembourg
NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner
Ambassador Mike Glitman
Ambassador Bruce Gelb

Washington, DC - USIA - Western Europe and Canada - Deputy Director 1992-1996
Administration cuts
Refocus for USIA
Comments on USIA directors
Political ambassadors

Retirement - Comments and Observations

INTERVIEW

Q: Today is the first of March, 1999. This is an interview with John P. Harrod. This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, and I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy. Well, you go by Jack?

HARROD: I go by Jack.

Q: Let's start. Can you tell me where and when you were born and something about your family?

HARROD: I was born July 13, 1945, in Chicago, Illinois. My father was a lifelong - that is to say, 40 years - executive with the U.S. Steel Corporation, and my mother was a housewife. I grew up in Chicago, went to high school there.

Q: Did you have brothers, sisters?

HARROD: One sister, three years younger than myself. And I left Chicago basically when I finished high school and went off to college.

Q: Well, let's talk a little bit about the early years. Where in Chicago did you live?

HARROD: The very southwest corner of the city, a neighborhood called Morgan Park. We lived in two different houses while I was growing up, but basically it was in the same neighborhood.

Q: What was Morgan Park like?

HARROD: It was supposed to be as suburban as I suppose you could have in the city itself. It was, as I recall, the only Republican ward in the City of Chicago, and Morgan Park High School, where I went, was considered to be one of the best public high schools in the city.

Q: Grade school?

HARROD: Oh, grade school in that same neighborhood, something called Clissold Grammar School.

Q: And what sort of study, particularly in elementary school? Any areas that you were particularly interested in or teachers you remember?

HARROD: Not too much. It was a general elementary education. I skipped a couple of semesters. I was a year younger than most of my classmates by the time I went into high school, but nothing in particular. It was more high school before I really start to remember a whole lot of individual teachers.

Q: Well, let's talk about high school. Your high school again was-

HARROD: Morgan Park High School.

Q: Morgan Park.

HARROD: Which I know has its own website now.

Q: Oh, my goodness. What about at there? Did you have any particular areas you were concentrating on - sports, entertainment, music, books, courses?

HARROD: Well, there are probably three things that I started doing in high school which kept with me over the years. One was an interest in history. Another was an interest in writing. I was working on the school newspaper and the yearbook, and there was a sports angle to that. I was not much of an athlete myself, but I did work on the sports page of the newspaper and the yearbook. And the third thing was I went into high school studying Latin. I studied two years of Latin and signed up for a third year of Latin, which they couldn't offer because they didn't have enough students signed up so they called me into the principal's office at the beginning of my junior year and said, "You can't take third year Latin. What are you going to take?" This was in the post- Sputnik era, and I thought it sounded exotic that they had started to offer Russian, so I said, "Why don't I take Russian." I'm thinking it was a lark at the time, and in fact it was one of those inadvertent career decisions, so it was an interest in history, an interest in writing and communications, and Russian language, probably, that got me going.

Q: Any books - fiction, non-fiction - that sort of stick out in your mind?

HARROD: I remember at that stage of my life reading every book that Kenneth Roberts ever wrote, from *Northwest Passage* to all the Arundel series.

Q: The Arundel series and Oliver Wiswell *and all that.*

HARROD: Yes, and I remember Benedict Arnold featuring prominently in several of those books.

Q: Yes, as being more a hero than not.

HARROD: That's right, one of the best generals we had, till we lost him. But that was kind of my interest, part of an interest in history. I do remember those books rather vividly.

Q: I do too. That Oliver Wiswell, *for example, I think for me was something I always referred back to as being there was another side to things like the Revolution, Oliver Wiswell being a Royalist, and realizing that history was not one-sided. While you were taking Russian and looking at history, was your family pointing you towards anything, or were they-*

HARROD: No, my family was basically pointing me toward a college education but not telling me what to do with that college education. My father was a metallurgist and had his degree in metallurgy, and I don't think he ever really envisaged me going into that field. So it was more just an assumption that I was on a sort of a college track program from grade school on. I mentioned I skipped two semesters in grade school, and I was in a sort of an accelerated track, and then in high school it was a college prep kind of an honors program. So it was always assumed I'd go to college, but it was never clear what I would be doing with the rest of my life.

Q: What about college? Where were you thinking about?

HARROD: I wanted to go to a small liberal arts school, and just about every place I looked at, East Coast and Midwest, fit that category. I think Princeton University was probably the largest place I looked at, but it was never a serious contender. I was looking at places like Amherst and Bowdoin in the East, Williams College, and then in the Midwest, Grinnell, Knox, Carleton, Colorado College.

Q: Where did you go?

HARROD: I ended up going to Grinnell College in Iowa for two years, and then that career track that sort of began in high school got a hold of me, and at the end of my sophomore year at Grinnell (which is an excellent institution, and I still keep in touch with it, a good loyal alumnus), they were unable to offer Russian area studies as a major because the fellow who headed the department left suddenly at the end of my sophomore year. So they sort of told me I'd have to pick a different major than the one I had been

sort of aiming towards, and instead of doing that I looked at college catalogues and picked another institution that had Russian area studies as a major, and I transferred after my sophomore year at Grinnell to Colgate University in Upstate New York. And that began right with that choice of studying Russian back in high school kind of stuck with me, and when I got to Colgate, the head of the department there interviewed me as a new transfer student. He said, "Why did you leave Grinnell? It's a damned good school." And I explained what had happened with my prospective major, and he said, "Well, that's awful. I helped them design that program." So it led me to believe I'd made the right move in transferring. It was the same identical program that I'd been pointing towards.

Q: In the first place, Grinnell, you were there from when to when?

HARROD: '62 to '64.

Q: And then at Colgate, '64-

HARROD: '64, graduated in '66, with a BA in Russian area studies.

Q: Both at Grinnell and at Colgate, what was sort of the attitude towards the Soviet Union at that time that you were picking up from your professors?

HARROD: Interesting. It was more curiosity. These were academic institutions, and we were studying area studies, meaning history, geography, literature - the whole ball of wax. The person who headed the department at Colgate was a Russian émigré, who had fled after the revolution and personally was quite anti-Soviet, but I don't think any of that ever really rubbed off into my course work. It was just more of a curiosity - what is this beast?

Q: I was wondering, often universities can become sort of the last place of refuge of Marxism, I mean in modified form in one kind or another. Did you find much of that?

HARROD: Didn't find any of that at all. Again part of it may have to do with the fact that if you're studying Russian area studies quite broadly, probably 90 percent of it is going to be pre-Revolutionary history and literature and all of those things that make it Russian rather than Soviet. We could have, obviously, courses in modern Soviet history and economics and geography, but no, there was no Marxist contingent that I recall.

Q: While you were at both Grinnell and at Colgate, did you think of an international career? What were you planning to do with your Soviet studies?

HARROD: Good question. I mean, I was kind of torn between journalism, which I still had an interest in and still worked on yearbooks and newspapers and stuff while I was going to college and doing something in the international affairs realm or politics or whatever, writ large, but I hadn't defined it much beyond that. The question is, did I think about the Foreign Service at this point? I didn't. I thought about doing something that would bring me into contact with the big world out there, but I didn't know exactly what

it would be. In fact, when I left Colgate, I had to make a very serious decision about what to do about graduate school, and it was a very close thing between going on in Russian area studies or going to the Medill School of Journalism at Northwestern, where I'd been accepted. But because I had not majored in journalism as an undergrad, Medill had a requirement that I had to go there for the summer session in 1966, and by that point I had signed on for a summer session in the Soviet Union at Moscow State University, so my department head at Colgate, the old émigré chap, he said, "You can always learn how to write. It's better to know something to write about first."

Q: Absolutely. Well, during the '62 to '66 period - Thai was, of course, after Kennedy was elected - but would you say sort of that spirit of government and going out and doing things with the government - was this still well thought of by the student body?

HARROD: The "ask-not-what-your-country-can-do-for-you-what-you-can-do-for- your-country" sentence?

Q: Yes.

HARROD: I'd say more at Grinnell than at Colgate. Grinnell was more of a - I hate to disparage one or another of my *almae materi*, but Grinnell was more of an intellectual school and Colgate was more beer and fraternities, so there was a bit of a tension at Colgate between the minority of these students who were into this sort of public service or civil rights or whatever it might be and the sort of entrenched fraternity crowd. There was some tension about that.

Q: Was there any sort of attempt to do any recruiting or let you know about foreign affairs and USIA, State, CIA or anything else on the Colgate campus.

HARROD: If there was, I was unaware of it.

Q: I would have thought that Russian area studies would have been a fertile field for them to focus on.

HARROD: Well, I would think so too in retrospect, but at the time, I can't remember anything. There may have been people who came to campus and I just didn't pay attention to it. The only attempt to do anything like that that I can recall actually occurred after I left Colgate and I was already down in graduate school here in Washington and my old department head from Colgate came to town and set up an interview, a three-way session with a friend of his who it later turned out was working for the radios in Munich, and that was his attempt to sort of do a little job hunting for me but it didn't amount to anything. And frankly, I don't know that I even knew there was a USIA before I came to Washington.

Q: Well, what was this Soviet program, the summer program that you got involved in?

HARROD: It was simply one that Colgate University sponsored in that one summer of

’66, and they might have done it one or two times afterwards. They put together about 20 students from Colgate and from quite a number of other universities, and it was a six-week summer program, part of which was an intensive Russian-language program at Moscow State University and part of which was a little travel around the former Soviet Union, including a week at a youth camp down on the Black Sea coast. It was my first overseas trip and it was my first sort of hands-on experience with the Soviet Union. And it was also good for my Russian.

Q: How did you find the program work, and what did you get out of it?

HARROD: The summer program?

Q: Yes, the summer program.

HARROD: Well, I got two things out of it. I obviously came away with a better grasp of everyday Russian because of the instruction at the university in Moscow and the need to use the language for a few weeks. Also my first real, as I said, hands-on experience with the Soviet Union. You know, who are these people? What is this place like? And probably, given the fact that we went down to the Black Sea coast, the very beginnings of an idea that there’s a lot more to this country than just Moscow and then what was called Leningrad.

Q: Were you getting to mix with Soviet students and all that, or how did this go?

HARROD: We got some of that. I mean, the courses we took at the university in Moscow were essentially for foreigners, and there were not Soviet young people in the groups, but we lived at the university in the dormitories, so we bumped into people, and particularly the week at the youth camp down on the Black Sea gave us an opportunity to meet some relatively contemporary Soviets from all over the country because the Black Sea coast is where people come for vacation from all over the place. I mean we met mining people from Siberia. So it was a little bit of that. Just, as I say, the tip of the iceberg, the beginning, but it was at least some direct experience.

Q: What did you bring back from there as far as what was the Soviet system like.

HARROD: At that stage of my life, probably not a whole lot. It was relatively bureaucratic, and I, of course, over time, came to appreciate the fact that it was a whole lot more bureaucratic than I realized in 1966, not any idea that you were basically being surveilled. ’66 was sort of the early part of the Vietnam War controversy, and I remember we had visited the American embassy in Moscow and picked up some U.S. government versions of the Vietnam situation and were trying to distribute them to some of the Soviets we met at the youth camp on the Black Sea, and this was not well looked upon by the people running the youth camp. So it was sort of the beginning of the realization that this place is quite a restricted society.

Q: Did you find that the Soviet people felt free to talk to you at all, or was there a

problem?

HARROD: Some of them did. And I think I, you, begin - it's hard for me to filter out when some of these things began to dawn on me, whether it was that summer or later on, when I spent much more time in the Soviet Union, but I also began to realize sometimes that the people who did talk to you had permission to talk to you and therefore, you know, you kind of divided people into a couple of camps - the ones that weren't allowed to talk to you but were probably the ones you really wanted to talk to, and the ones who were allowed to talk to you who tended to be government-approved.

Q: Were there any problems with this group of students that went over there?

HARROD: Not any that I'm aware of. It was a relatively brief time, and we got to spend a couple of days in Paris and Prague on the way in and Vienna on the way out, so it was a nice summer. And we had, as I say, no problems that I'm aware of, and we all had a good time.

Q: When you came back in the summer of '66, where did you go?

HARROD: My parents had moved during the summer, and from Gary, Indiana, where my father worked at that stage, to Youngstown, Ohio, so I had the interesting experience of getting off the airplane in New York City in the middle of an airlines strike, and I couldn't fly from New York to Pittsburgh, which was what I was supposed to do, so I ended up having to take a bus all the way to Pittsburgh, and my father came in from Youngstown, Ohio, and picked me up there and went to a house that I'd never laid eyes on before and new surroundings. But the longer term picture is I then went off to graduate school. And I had already made up my mind. I mentioned I had the choice of going to journalism school at Medill or one of several Russian area studies programs. The three that I had been fairly serious about were the University of Michigan, American University here in Washington, and Georgetown here in Washington. Michigan had offered me a teaching assistantship and so had American University, but there tended to be, as I read into it, strings attached to both of them; and then Michigan kind of withdrew the offer because of budget problems, and I ended up coming to Georgetown. I basically made a calculation that if I'm going to be studying something that involves the rest of the world, or at least a part of it, the nation's capital was probably a good place to do that, with the Library of Congress and foreign embassies and government here. So I probably would have, on academic merit, picked the University of Michigan, which had a good, solid program. I picked Georgetown essentially because it was here in Washington, and came here in the September of '66, end of August, I guess, to begin two years of graduate study at Georgetown.

Q: Was it part of the School of Foreign Service?

HARROD: No, it was just the regular graduate school. The Russian area studies program at Georgetown in those days was just part of the graduate school, which was in an old red brick building down at 35th and O, I think.

Q: What was the thrust of the Russian area studies program in this period at Georgetown?

HARROD: Very similar to what I had as an undergrad. In fact, my big disappointment was that essentially I was covering the same material I had done as an undergraduate. Very few, if any, of the other people in the program at Georgetown had had an undergraduate concentration in Russian area studies. Most of them had come from history, political science - whatever - so I found the Georgetown program very repetitive and in some ways not as good as what I had been doing as an undergraduate. It did give me an opportunity to take a few courses in philosophy and in other parts of the world. I took one course, I remember, on Asian communist parties, which gave me a chance to take a look at what had been going on in Indonesia and Vietnam, China, which I hadn't as an undergraduate. So there were a few things. But a lot of what I did at Georgetown was just repetitive, and I frankly began to lose interest.

Q: Well, while you were there, was the Vietnam War intruding at all?

HARROD: Oh, yes. Because, again, you were here in Washington, particularly in ’67, when you had things like the march on the Pentagon and other demonstrations going on in town. There were other things to attract one’s attention, and to make a long story a little shorter than it might otherwise be, the combination of me not being terribly enthralled with the Georgetown program and the heating up of the political situation meant that sort of in the middle of my second year at Georgetown, which would have been the winter of ‘67-68, I pretty much stopped working on my thesis - by then I’d done all my course work and I was just working on my thesis - and I started getting involved in the political campaign of ’68 almost to the exclusion of other things, and just coincidentally, this was the same period when I took the Foreign Service Exam and passed it, and so suddenly I could see a career track at the end of the tunnel. And I should say that the only reason I took the Foreign Service Exam - again, you look at the decisions you make over time - I came to Washington because I figured the graduate school was here in the nation’s capital, therefore it’s a good place to be. Between my two years at Georgetown I was looking for something to do, preferably something that paid a little bit of money, and I applied for a couple of summer internship programs in those days before the government was basically bankrupt, and lots of departments had summer internship programs, and I applied to one at the Department of Defense and one at something called the U.S. Information Agency, which sounded interesting to me because I was interested in communication and writing, and I got accepted in the summer program at USIA, and they put me to work for three months in the Office of Soviet and East European Affairs, where I spent the whole summer essentially translating handwritten comments that Soviet visitors to our exhibits in the Soviet Union had scrawled. Every place we had an exhibit, they had a comment book, and people could put in their opinions. And somebody had to sit down and take all this handwritten Russian and turn it into English and analyze what it all meant. That was my summer project. But the people I worked with there in that office said, “Why don’t you take the Foreign Service Exam?” And I had not seriously thought about that at all. I was actually more

looking toward a career in some way, shape, or form in the media, whatever that might mean. But they said, "Hey, you can't lose. If you fail, you fail. If you pass, you've got another option." So I took the Foreign Service Exam in December of '67, and much to my surprise, I passed, and so as I began to drop out of graduate school and get involved in the political campaign, it was always sort of with this knowledge that that MA isn't quite as important as I thought it might be because, by God, I actually have a job here that's waiting for me.

Q: Political campaign - '68, of course, was probably the most heated election year we've had. What were you doing and why?

HARROD: Assuming that the statute of limitations has run out on this, I actually seriously violated the Hatch Act back in those days. I had two part-time jobs while I was in graduate school. The first year I worked at something called the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. The Georgetown graduate school program was at night. All my classes were in the evening, so I had the days to study and do other things. I worked half days at this Settlement Commission the first year. The second year I had a job as a clerk in the Peace Corps personnel office half-time. And as I began to stop working on my thesis and start working in the political campaign, it sort of developed that while registering, I guess, for my second semester, there was a sign-up table in the gym at Georgetown for people who might be interested in working on Gene McCarthy's campaign. And being a naïve idealist, I signed the list, and later they called me at home and said, "Your name's on the list. Would you like to work with us?" And I said, well, I'm trying to work on my thesis and I've got this part-time job and I was basically trying to make excuses why I probably couldn't do it. And they said, well, you can work in the evening if you want, if you have a day job, and I said I know, but my day job's down at the Peace Corps office downtown, and they said, well, our headquarters is right next door to the Peace Corps office. So they sort of shot holes through my excuses, and I started leaving the Peace Corps and walking next door to work on the McCarthy campaign, which I realize now was a violation of the Hatch Act because I was a government employee. But in those days who cared? And I spent more and more time on the McCarthy campaign and finally left the Peace Corps job in the middle of the spring of '68 and spent full time working on the McCarthy campaign. And it is one of those ironies of one's life that just a couple of weeks after the Democratic convention of 1968 in Chicago, which as we all know was a rather colorful event (I was not there; I was still here in Washington with the McCarthy people here), I then joined the Foreign Service, and my commission was signed by Lyndon B. Johnson, whom I had just spent the previous eight months trying to unseat.

Q: What was the spirit of the McCarthy campaign from your perspective?

HARROD: Well, I think it was a noble and idealistic effort to get this country to think seriously about its foreign policy priorities. I think, with all due respect to Gene McCarthy, he's a good poet and probably would have been a lousy President, but he did serve as a sort of rallying cry to get people to take a look at what was going on in Vietnam. I had mentioned in grad school I had taken a course on communist parties in the

Far East, and I had read quite a few books on Vietnam, historically and politically, and I basically had come to the conclusion that we were in the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time, and so that was what got me into the McCarthy thing. And even after I had signed my Foreign Service papers I still felt that way, but one does what one's country...

Q: Did you have a feeling that within the McCarthy thing, did you feel some of the thrust as either isolationism or sympathy towards wars of national liberation or where did you think it was?

HARROD: In the McCarthy campaign, obviously the anti-Vietnam War movement was a large thing that embraced people all the way from outright supporters of Ho Chi Minh to probably some isolationists. I didn't detect any isolationism in the McCarthy campaign at all. I mean, it was more, as I say, idealism. It was this feeling that the U.S. shouldn't get involved in this. Maybe there was some feeling that we were involved in somebody else's war of national liberation a little bit, but it was more a plague on both their houses. We were supporting one group of not particularly savory Vietnamese against another group of not particularly savory Vietnamese, and we had inherited a French colonial problem. But it was idealistic, and it was more a U.S. domestic thing that it was... You know, it was to basically get people to take a look at the President. I remember a great sense of betrayal in the McCarthy campaign when Bobby Kennedy jumped into the race. At one point in my life, and I wish I could find it, but I can't any more, I had a little, small lapel button that was given out to people, and it said "W.M.B.N.H." - just little initials - which meant "With McCarthy Before New Hampshire," and it was given to all the people who had been working on the campaign in the office *before* the New Hampshire primary, because after the New Hampshire primary a lot of people joined in.

Q: But actually what happened was that McCarthy showed that Johnson was vulnerable.

HARROD: And then Bobby jumped in.

Q: And Bobby jumped in.

HARROD: I remember they put up a headline from the old defunct *Washington Daily News* on the wall in the office just before Kennedy announced, and the headline was something like "No Great Demand for Kennedy." I was living in a rooming house in Georgetown at the time, Burleith Glover Park, or whatever they call it now, and one of the other guys in the rooming house was an avid Bobby Kennedy supporter, who was later best man at my wedding and we're lifelong buddies. But we had pretty much agreed by June of '68 that whoever won the California primary, the other guy would kind of give up his allegiance and we'd all work together. And of course he was the one who came in at about five o'clock in the morning on that day and told me that Bobby Kennedy had been shot, and that was the end of our pact. He was Kennedy, I was McCarthy, and we were going to bury the hatchet after the California primary.

Q: Did this campaign and all have any... Were they concerns about working for the

government?

HARROD: No, not in my mind. One of the things that I've carried with me throughout my entire so-called career was this perhaps naïve view that the United States is actually a pretty decent place and stands for some things. And the fact that you can campaign against a seated President and still be a good loyal American was something that I felt then - and still do - and in many ways I think it's also a good experience for somebody who is in the USIA side of things, as I was, because part of our job overseas was to explain the United States to people who didn't necessarily understand us. And having a background like that, I could tell them, look, you know, here I was, I was out trying to unseat the President of the United States, and now I'm a good, loyal government employee.

Q: When did you take the oral exam?

HARROD: It would have been the early part of '68, maybe February. I'm a little fuzzy on that. I passed the written exam in December, and then much to my surprise - you could tell very easily (I hope the Board of Examiners doesn't do it this way any more) after you took the written test if you got a big, fat envelope you had passed; if you got a little, small envelope, you got a rejection letter, but the big, fat one was full of forms you had to fill out for medical and security and everything else. So sometime in the early part of '68, I took the oral exam. There were three people. I remember it as an intimidating experience. I know the exam's changed many times over the years. There was no in-basket test in those days. It was just three people seated at one table and you sitting at another table, and they asked you questions and you responded.

Q: Do you recall any of the questions that were asked?

HARROD: The only thing I recall, and I recall it somewhat vividly because comparing notes with a classmate of mine at Georgetown who took the test about the same time I did, it sounded like we'd gotten pretty much the same kinds of questions, and he and I answered one somewhat differently, and I remember this because it was a role-playing thing. They said, pretend you are the assistant cultural attaché in - I think they said - Ghana, and you're being attacked about Vietnam, and so they were giving me difficult questions, and one guy said, You know, I read in *Time Magazine* that blah-blah-blah-blah. What do you say to that? And I'm supposed to be in front of a large audience of people. And I said to him, I said, "Well, that could very well be. I haven't seen that issue of *Time Magazine*, so I can't really respond. Rather than waste these people's time, why don't you and I get together afterwards and you show me the article, and we can talk about it." And they seemed to like that response. But I passed the oral.

Q: You had indicated at that time, was the exam you took the same one that you would take to go into the Department of State Foreign Service?

HARROD: Yes, when you took the written exam in those days you checked a box at the top of the test that just said "STATE, USIA"; the test was the same. There might have

been one option, if I recall dimly, there might have been one option that if you checked the USIA box you had to do. You know, you didn't take an economic test, or something like that, but otherwise it was the same written test, and as far as I know the oral exam was the same for everybody.

Q: Now I was wondering whether the oral exam was emphasizing America.

HARROD: To some extent. I mean, I think the people who gave me the oral knew I had checked the USIA box, and so they were sort of doing this role-playing thing imagining I was an assistant cultural attaché instead of, let's say, a consular officer somewhere. But as far as I could tell - the classmate of mine who took the oral at roughly the same time, I think, wanted to go into the State Department and they gave him, it sounded like, pretty much the same spiel, so...

Q: So you came in. Did you finish your MA?

HARROD: Never did. All but the thesis. I did all the classwork; I even had the outline of the thesis, which was going to be on Soviet foreign policy in Turkey in the early '20s, when Kemal Atatürk was founding the Turkish Republic. I'd read a lot on this and was looking at it as a case study of how the first sort of "emerging" Third-World country, which in those days would have been republican Turkey, essentially manipulated the Soviet Union and took all of its support and then kissed off the Soviets. When the time came to be a good loyal Soviet ally, Kemal said screw you. But as I got deeper into it, I discovered almost nobody had written on this subject, and it was turning more into a doctors' thesis than a masters' thesis. I still have all my notes and books and things, and one of the ironies of life was that one of the key episodes in this entire history was when the Georgian Republic collapsed (1921, I think it was) and the Red Army under Kirov was moving in from one direction and the Turkish Republican forces were moving in from a different direction to the city of Batumi on the coast of the Black Sea, and the two sides who were supposedly allies almost got into a shooting war as the Georgians evacuated. But it was very hard to find out what really happened. A couple of years later, when I was on a boat in the Black Sea, when I was then in the Soviet Union, I ran into a garrulous old fellow on the boat who, it turned out, had been in Batumi in 1921 and gave me a great oral rendition of what happened, but by then it was too late.

Q: Well, how did it work? You came in, when, in '69, was it?

HARROD: '68, right after Labor Day.

Q: Was there a USIA class or was it a joint class or what, of junior officers?

HARROD: This was the first class that had USIA Foreign Service information officers as commissioned Foreign Service officers. Up to that point they had all come in as reserve officers. This was the first class of FSIOs. We came in jointly with the State Department. Leonard Marks, who was then USIA director, swore us in up on the Eighth Floor of the State Department, and there were about forty people in the combined class, and for one of

the only times in history, I think, the majority were USIA, newly minted FSIO's. I can remember several people in the A-100 course giving us presentations that were clearly State Department oriented, and then when one of the USIA people would ask a question, he would sort of say, well, how many of you are with USIA? And when the majority of the hands went up, it was sort of, oh, well, um... I remember one on the emergency evacuation system, where they were telling us what would happen in a crisis, and somebody asked, well, what about us in the cultural center across town? And the guy looked at all these hands up and he said, "Well, I guess you're on your own." That told me something right there.

Q: What were you getting out of this? All of you are basically coming out of the same pot, but when you got to the taking of the basic officer course, were you finding that there was a real cultural difference between the State and the USIA attitudes?

HARROD: Yes. Yes. Simple answer. We also, many of us, were somewhat confused at the time as to whether we were getting paid far too much money for spending three months sitting around listening to irrelevant lectures or not nearly enough money for putting up with all this stuff. The A-100 course was three months at the time, and very little of it do I remember except for the one episode I just mentioned about emergency evacuation and another fellow who quite seriously stood up in front of us and told us that we should always be candid and express our views but never rock the boat. Those are the two things I remember from the A-100 course, which, as I said, was joint. It was both, all of us together, State and USIA, for three months. The one good thing about that is I must say the, sort of, alumni network from that A-100 course stood me in good stead throughout my career. I think I knew some of my State colleagues better having spent those three months with them. I would be very much against, you know, sort of, segregation, if you will - which is now irrelevant if USIA is merged into the Department. But there were periods when the classes were separate. I think it was very good to have them together. One of my classmates was Jim Leach, who is now a congressman from Iowa, and much later, when I had a congressional fellowship from the American Political Science Association, I ended up spending six months working with Jim Leach up on the Hill because we had been Foreign Service classmates.

Q: Did you get any sort of specialized USIA training at all?

HARROD: After the three months. It was different for some of us. I remember a couple of USIA people in my training class, who had specific language skills and perhaps some overseas Peace Corps experience or something like that, after the three month A-100 course were taken and immediately sent overseas. In my case, I had been slotted into an exhibit going to the Soviet Union in the summer of '69, so I had about six months there after the A-100 course where I was put into an office in USIA in the exhibits division working on getting ready to go overseas the following summer. So I really had more of an orientation to USIA by working at headquarters for six months before I went overseas.

Q: What about Vietnam and your basic officer course? Wasn't this about the period when anyone who was breathing was being grabbed and sent off to Vietnam, or not?

HARROD: Some of my classmates were, in fact, sent off.

Q: What was the feeling about that?

HARROD: It was probably individual. There were probably at least a half a dozen people from my A-100 course, mostly State, who were sent off to work in what was called the CORDs Program in Vietnam. We had a lottery that we had set up at the beginning of the A-100 course to collect money and give it to the person who we thought got the worst assignment, and Vietnam was excluded from the lottery because it was assumed that this was just too far off the pale. I think somebody who went to Tegucigalpa got the money at the end of the time period. But yes, it was controversial, and some of my friends went. I don't recall it being - you know, this is 30 years after the fact - a divisive kind of an issue. There were three of us in the A-100 class who had received our induction physical papers and were ordered up to Fort Holabird in Baltimore for our pre-induction physicals. I remember our struggling to get the Draft Board to recognize that we were now government employees with top-secret security clearances, and we all ultimately managed to do that. So it was more a question of are we going to stay in the Foreign Service or are we going to get drafted, but it wasn't a controversial issue. I think if you've made the decision that you're going to join the Foreign Service and go to work for Uncle Sam, you've already crossed a particular bridge in your life. If you were going to storm the barricades at the Pentagon, which actually I did in '67, you're probably not going to sign on the dotted line to be a government employee.

Q: Were you married at this time?

HARROD: No.

Q: Were you getting pressure or influence from sort of the young grad student types that you'd be normally associated with? What the hell are you doing? Why are you part of this, and all that?

HARROD: No, I wasn't. I didn't associate with a lot of people such as you're describing. In fact, a couple of my roommates from the boarding house in Georgetown were involved in demonstrations and other activities, but it was not nearly as polarizing an experience as people think it might have been. We all managed to get along just fine although we had different views on the subject. I was actually very much against the War. I was at the march on the Pentagon and several other things that took place, and I remember the assassination of Martin Luther King and having the National Guard stationed across the street from my boarding house in Georgetown, at Western High School (now Duke Ellington), and you know, U.S. troops walking down the street in front of my house. It was a difficult experience. I got into trouble with an ambassador many years later in a country where I noticed troops on the street, and I said it reminded me of Washington in 1968, and the ambassador didn't think that was quite the right analogy. It was to me.

Q: How was the civil rights movement playing within your group that you were dealing

with?

HARROD: We were all in the middle of it, and at one time in my life I was a member of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, until it was made clear that they didn't particularly want white people, when Stokely Carmichael took over from John Lewis. And I remember during that period in '68 when there was the march on Washington, and I remember the mule train caravan downtown.

Q: The Poor People's March.

HARROD: The Poor People's March - we were down there for that. All the people that I had pretty much associated with those days were strong supporters of the civil rights movement and involved in it in one way or another. We just felt that that's what the United States was all about.

Q: You came in then, what, about February '68, you say?

HARROD: September, right after Labor Day.

Q: September of '68. How did the election of '68 hit your group?

HARROD: Most of us had been involved in one way or another in the campaign. The election being a three-way one in those days, with George Wallace as the third person in it, was an interesting one. I remember it came up during the A-100 course, when we were getting a talk about political reporting and we were supposed to pretend we were a - I said I didn't remember anything else from the A-100 course; you've now prompted me to remember something - but we were told that we were the junior political officer in some foreign embassy here in Washington, and we were supposed to analyze this campaign and report on the Wallace candidacy. And I remember expressing the view in my telegram back to my home capital that if Wallace actually were to win the election a lot of the career people in the U.S. government service might resign in protest and the grizzled State Department person running this course pooh-poohed the whole thing and said none of these people would quit for anything.

Q: Probably he was more astute than...

HARROD: But I remember in those days, that was my first election when I could vote in a presidential election, and in those days my parents, as I mentioned, had moved to Youngstown, Ohio, so I was registered in the State of Ohio, where I never actually lived, and I remember swallowing my pride and voting for Hubert Humphrey, simply as the lesser of the three evils that were out there running at the time. I actually think that Humphrey was quite a decent chap, but he go himself into a difficult fix there in '68, but I ended up voting for him. I remember often the big surprise - maybe not that big a surprise - when Richard Nixon was elected. That meant that the two signatures on my Foreign Service commission from '68, Lyndon Johnson and Dean Rusk, didn't last terribly long, and Leonard Marks, who swore me in, was gone in a couple of months, too.

Q: You were dealing with a Moscow exhibit both in Washington and in Moscow. This was from when to when?

HARROD: Well, the exhibit was from June of ’69 until maybe July of ’70, and it was not Moscow. Moscow was one of them, but these were the large traveling exhibitions that USIA ran for many, many years, and we were in six different cities of the former Soviet Union, so having spent from roughly September of ’68 to June of ’69 working at the Washington end getting ready for this thing - the exhibit was “Education in the USA,” and my job back in Washington had been to sort of get together some educational technology and other things that we would use as display items in the exhibit. And then in June of ’69, off I went with the advance party to Leningrad, which was the first of our six cities, and then the exhibit opened, I think, in July of ’69, and I spent a year... We were in, if I remember, Leningrad, Moscow, Baku, Tashkent, Novosibirsk, and Kiev, I guess were the six cities, not in that order.

Q: When you were going there with education, one, how were we treating the education problem in the South? Although technically schools were no longer segregated, it was still an uphill battle there. How were we dealing with that?

HARROD: Well, actually, the simple answer is the exhibit itself, in terms of displays, didn’t deal very much with it. I think there were some visual displays about integration, but the exhibit was heavy on technology. Essentially we were trying to show the Soviets new ways of learning, including - this is now thirty years ago - things like computer - assisted learning, where students would push buttons for the correct answers and language learning by tape - all these kinds of things. But the real reason for all of those exhibits, no matter what they were called, whether they were education or hand tools, we’ve had a bunch of them, was simply to give Russians a chance to talk with the young American guides.

Anyway, the Russians would ask guides, well, where do you live in the Unites States and what’s your family like? So it became much more of a give and take about life in the United States than it was the technology. The technology was the introduction, and each of the guides would work on a particular stand in the exhibit and give a little presentation about what it was all about, but usually things shifted gears pretty quickly. I was not a guide. I was given the grandiose title of assistant general services officer, and my job was essentially getting the exhibit put up and taken down and maintained and being interface with the Soviet labor crew and the customs people and stuff like that. Essentially, what USIA had done was ship me off to the Soviet Union for a year to see the country, practice my Russian language and be a sort of resource for the exhibit, and whenever I’d get bored I’d walk out on the floor of the exhibit and pretty quickly people would come over and start asking me questions, and I could do the same guide thing. I must say also I had blinders on in those days, since I had been a summer intern with USIA and had worked in the Office of Soviet and East European Affairs, my assignment was pretty well cooked when I joined the Foreign Service. The people who had encouraged me to take the test knew that I had passed it, and when I was sworn in at USIA, I was already 100 percent

sure that I was going to be going to the Soviet Union. We had a panel interview with personnel officers from USIA where they got us in in threes, I think, and sort of said where would you like to go and what would you like to do? And one of them asked me the question "Is there any part of the world you wouldn't want to go to?" the answer, of course, being, "Oh, no, I'll go anyplace." But I said, well, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. And they sort of looked shocked, and the European personnel officer sort of shuffled his papers and said, "Well, Mr. Harrod's been taken care of." So I already knew that I was going to the Soviet Union, and that was kind of, as I say, an investment in my future, by shipping me out there. The Exhibits Program also, to put in a plug for it since we don't have it any more, an awful lot of those young graduate school guides who went out for six-month stints on exhibits later took the Foreign Service Exam and ended up in quite senior positions in the Foreign Service. It was a great training program for future Foreign Service people.

Q: Were there any security problems that came up while you were on this?

HARROD: On the exhibit? Yes. I worked on two exhibits. I worked on another one later and I was familiar with several others, and on virtually every exhibit there were security problems, generally in the sense of the Soviets attempting to compromise some of our young guides, and generally they did. We had to ship a couple of people home from every exhibit that I can remember for having done something they shouldn't have done, usually of a sexual nature. I finally came to the conclusion that we really should have a ringer in each group of guides, somebody that would come out and we'd ship them home a week later to make an example to everybody else, but we actually didn't have to do that; the Soviets kind of did it for us. So yes, we had security problems.
Q: When there were sexual problems, I mean, what was it, because with these guides, even if they took pictures I can't see that it... They're not government employees - well, in a way they were.

HARROD: In a way they were, yes.

Q: But it wouldn't compromise their career; they'd just ask for extra copies.

HARROD: That's what Sukarno, I guess, did at one point. But no, the idea was they would compromise them and then attempt to get them to report what was going on and, you know, feed any information that they could to the Soviets, and it was all the stuff that the security officers tell you can happen, photography through pinholes - it was all very nasty stuff, I must say, and it helped bring me around to the conclusion that at least some people in the Soviet Union were extremely nasty. And an interesting thing is as the exhibit would go from city to city, some of the cities had obviously a much tougher KGB contingent than others. There were certain cities where we would have almost no security problems at all and some where it was a daily struggle to try to keep the goons out. We had other kinds of security problems, in the sense of people who visited our exhibit and asked particularly provocative questions, who were obvious plants, or some innocent people who asked the wrong kinds of questions who literally would get beat up in the parking lot outside the exhibit. We saw lots of fairly nasty things, which helped shape my

view of the former Soviet Union.

Q: What was your impression of the impression that these young guides got.

HARROD: Most of them, as young graduate student types, would tend, I think, to fall into the sort of liberal to leftist group, and by the time they would finish their six months in the Soviet Union, we tended to put them into two groups - the radical group, which wanted to nuke the place, and the moderates, who simply wanted to build a large wall around it and leave it alone for a hundred years and then look over the top and see what was going on. Yes, it had a big impact on most of them, and as I say, some of them who probably hadn't ever thought about working for the government then took the Foreign Service Exam and ended up being very good Foreign Service officers with the Department or the USIA. So it did have a big impact on them.

It also, I think, had another impact on them, and certainly on me. All my education had been Russian area studies - Russian, Russian, Russian. Being on an exhibit that goes to places like Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan - even the Ukraine - I think really gave me the sense that this is not Russia - this is a country that is made up of lots of different groups, and I think it planted the seed in me way back there in 1970 that the Soviet Union's nationality problems would eventually be its undoing. I thought it would take 50 or 100 years, but I became much more interested in the nationality and ethnic issues in the Soviet Union by virtue of having spent time on that exhibit, where a lot of my Foreign Service colleagues who spent all their time in Moscow were still Russian-centric. They still looked at it through the Russian prism. I began not to. I began to look at it in other ways.

Q: Our educational system - I mean, you'd gone through it, I mean the university at Grinnell and Colgate and Georgetown was very Russian-centered.

HARROD: Very much.

Q: I mean, there just really wasn't any way of doing the Caucasus or Central Asia or something like that.

HARROD: No.

Q: Or the Ukraine, which is as big as France.
HARROD: No, that was something that I think was a big failing of our system. We tended to be just interested in the Russian part of it. Later when I came back to Washington, I found there was a network of academics back here, many of them affiliated with the Woodrow Wilson Center, who did specialize in ethnic issues, and I began to go to some of their sessions. But I think way back in '70 was when I first got this perception that this country is a lot more varied.

I remember going to Estonia. After our first exhibit city we had a week off. Usually between cities we had a week or so off while the stuff was being shipped to the next

place. Some of us went to Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, and this is July or August of '69, and I remember seeing something scrawled on a wall in downtown Tallinn in Estonia, and by some discreet inquiries with Estonians I could figure out what the words meant, and it meant "The Russians have stolen our country." And then I went back a year later to Tallinn, and the same thing was still in faded chalk on the wall because, clearly, the Russians didn't understand what it meant because they never bothered to learn the local language, but there was this anti-Russian sentiment, which I had never appreciated as a graduate student or even as an undergraduate because everything I was getting was the Russian version.

Q: What about as the assistant general services officer, what about dealing with the Soviets on, you know, a working basis, getting things done and all? How did you find that?

HARROD: Depends on who they were. We were escorted everywhere we went, all around the Soviet Union, by a crew of people from the so-called All-Union Chamber of Commerce, which was the outfit that USIA had signed contracts with. They were supposed to be our counterparts and our interface with local authorities wherever we went, and they would pick up some locals from whatever city we were in, but the same crew went with us, and they were all basically goons from Moscow. They could be reasonable if you're working with them. Sometimes the customs people could be extremely difficult. I spent a lot of time working with Soviet laborers because we would hire them to help put up the exhibit, which did a couple of things. I began to see what ordinary Soviets were like, and I learned to swear in Russian, which is a talent that became useful later in life. But it was an interesting experience, I must say.

Q: Did you find the system works, I mean as far as getting laborers to do things, or get things from hither to yon and all that?

HARROD: Well, it's a command system. If we wanted 12 laborers, they would give us 12 laborers. Now whether the laborers could do anything was another question. I remember one case where we were trying to open a large shipping container and there were 12 laborers and 11 of them were standing around watching and one guy was hitting a recalcitrant bolt with a hammer. And one of the Russian laborers said to me, "This is the way we do things here - 11 people watch and one guy beats on it with a hammer." And you know, that's the way the system was. It was a command system. It didn't work. Some of the people were okay, and some of them were nothing but police agents. But it was an eye-opener.

Q: Did you find any interest in the theme itself, education?

HARROD: Among professionals certainly. I mean, what ever city we were in we would get visits from groups of teachers and educators, and we had a library with the exhibit that contained books in English on education, and a lot of people who could speak English would come in an utilize it. Yes, there was some professional interest. With every exhibit there was some of that, and what we always tried to do was have a sort of

semi-professional component and then have a sort of mass appeal side of things, no matter what the exhibit was. The other one that I worked on for more than a year later on was about housing, "Technology and the American Home." Then again, a lot of it was mass appeal. Electronic garage doors. Whoopee. If you're a Russian, you've never seen one, but in every city we went to we'd also try to organize a seminar and bring in an American expert or two or three on a subject like historic preservation or building in seismic areas and get together with Soviet professionals in that area and have a real serious discussion.

Q: How about any of the areas you went to, were there any problems, stories, or anything else that you think of?

HARROD: The first time around, in that '69-70 period on the exhibit, Novosibirsk, out in Siberia, we had some particular security problems that I probably don't want to go into, but I mean it was during Vietnam, and it was a difficult time, and people were out to get us. Same in Tashkent. I remember being in Baku and having a different feel about Baku, and that was partly because there was a new Communist Party boss who had just taken over in Azerbaijan and he was trying to thumb his nose at Moscow, so they were being nicer to us there than they were somewhere else, and I went back to Baku on another exhibit in '75, and it was even more the case then. I mean, it was a very sharp contrast, and that's when you begin to see that this isn't one country; this is a lot of little satrapies connected to Moscow. But there were plenty of security problems. 1970 was, again, the height of the Vietnam situation, and it was a little bit difficult at times, but a fantastic experience. I mean, one thing that the Foreign Service didn't do in those days was get you out of Moscow or Leningrad. There were travel restrictions. If you were assigned to the embassy or the consulate you were pretty much stuck, whereas the program I was on, I got to see a lot of the real Soviet Union.

Q: Were there people who were trying to come to the exhibit to sort of vent their dislike of the system and all that, you know, Soviets who were fed up with things?

HARROD: A few, a few. Some of them, as I said, got beat up in the parking lot outside the exhibit, and some would come and try to make a contact with an American and try to talk to them afterwards, particularly, I remember, in Leningrad, which was sort of an intellectual center of the Soviet Union, there were a number of quasi-dissidents who kind of sidled up to us as the Americans in town and would try to see us after hours and make contacts. There was a bit of that, less so if you were in a place like Tashkent or Baku, where there was less of an intellectual opposition network. There was some of that in Novosibirsk, and I alluded to security problems we had in Novosibirsk, and some of it was connected with the fact that there were possibly dissident-possibly provocateur types out there who were trying to make contact with us.

Q: The exhibit would shut down in the evening, I supposed, at a certain time. Did you have problems? I mean, was it sort of your responsibility or part of your responsibility to make sure that the guides didn't stray too far off the ranch?

HARROD: It wasn't specifically my responsibility. We tried. Some of the guides would make contacts and go out in the evening and go drinking and have social lives with Soviets if they could. A lot of times people were just too pooped. I mean, the exhibit would start at 10 o'clock in the morning and go to seven o'clock at night, and by the time you ate dinner there wasn't a whole lot of that. We had one day off a week, and a lot of times the Soviets would try to organize activities for us on the day off - you know, go visit a collective farm or whatever, largely to keep track of us, I suspect, and keep us busy. But you know, some of the security problems we might have had had to do with people making the wrong kind of contacts after hours, but there wasn't a whole lot of that. I remember one person who had a little too much to drink and fell down in the gutter and broke her arm. That was a medical problem then.

Q: Did you have much to do with the embassy?

HARROD: Some, with the USIA Press and Cultural Section in Moscow. We'd make weekly courier runs up to Moscow to pick up the mail and get a few things from the commissary and then fly back to wherever we were. And for the opening of the exhibit in each city that we were in, somebody from the embassy, whether it's the ambassador or the press and cultural counselor or somebody, would come out and cut the ribbon. So we had sort of contact, but not a lot of it. And when the exhibit was in Moscow, which it was for one of those periods, then we were living at a hotel not too far from the embassy and would go over there and use the snack bar, and I remember having Thanksgiving dinner at somebody's apartment.

Q: What, during this essentially '69-70 period you were with this exhibit, what as you saw it was the state of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States?

HARROD: Not very good at that particular time. '69-70 was a rather tough period because of Vietnam largely. Relations were not good. Being an exhibit we were a little bit exempt from that. People would ask us, you know, difficult questions about relations, but because we were not official representatives of the embassy, *per se*, they probably cut us a little more slack. But it was not a particularly good period, particularly when we would do things like bomb Haiphong Harbor and a Russian ship might sustain a little bit of damage, then people would get on our case. So it was a little bit tense. When I was back on the other exhibit that I worked on in '75, that was a period of the Apollo-Soyuz link-up, and relations were a lot better then.

Q: You came back from this with, I assume, even greater fluency in Russian by this time, didn't you?

HARROD: Well, that depends on whom you ask. I thought I did, but then I came back and took a test at the Foreign Service Institute, and the old émigré instructor who was testing me didn't seem to like the fact that I'd learned a lot of Soviet slang, and the contemporary terms for some things that she was still using the old pre-Revolutionary terms for, so I didn't test out a whole lot better in Russian when I got back, but that was because of who did the testing. I was a lot more fluent than I had been when I left.

Q: What did you come back to?

HARROD: I came back to about three weeks in Washington, and then I was off to Kabul, Afghanistan. I had originally been assigned to Calcutta. While I was sitting in the exhibit in Novosibirsk, I got a telegram telling me that I was going to be sent to Calcutta as an assistant IO or something out there in the branch post, and I did the thing you're never supposed to do in the Foreign Service. I wrote back and explained why I thought this was a lousy assignment. They had couched it in terms of, you know, your knowledge of communism and Marxism and blah-blah-blah will stand you in great stead in West Bengal because it's got a communist-Marxist government, and I went back and pointed out that, you know, this is a very different kettle of fish, I'm a Soviet expert, I'm not a West Bengal expert, and I said I'd just as soon not go. And they came back and said, okay, you're not going to go. A friend of mine got the job, and he was trying to get into the Foreign Service. He was a civil servant. It worked out fine. He went to West Bengal and got in the Foreign Service. I didn't know where I was going to go, and then I got back to Washington and I was told I was going to Kabul, Afghanistan, which I remember telling my then fiancée that I was going to Kabul, and she was on the other end of the telephone line and played dumb and later went and had to look it up in a book and find out where it was. I had three weeks in Washington and I was off to Afghanistan, a part of the world I had never been to, had no knowledge of, and there I went.

Q: Well, you were in Afghanistan from when to when?

HARROD: It was a little more than a year. It was from the summer of '70, July of '70, until August of '71.
Q: What was your job and how did it work out?

HARROD: That was an interesting thing. I was officially sent out there as junior officer trainee. Now they had told me when I went off to the Soviet Union on this exhibit that that was my junior officer trainee assignment, and when I came back somebody said, well, you never really have had a chance to work in an embassy, this exhibit thing has been anomalous. So they sent me off to Kabul ostensibly as a junior officer trainee. When I got there the post did not have an information officer - they had eliminated the position - and so there was PAO, a CAO, and a center director. So I became the *de facto* information officer in Kabul.

Q: What does being an information officer mean, at that time?

HARROD: At that time it meant two things. It meant sort of serving as press attaché for the U.S. mission when there something to comment upon and being in charge of whatever outreach information programs we had - film showings, you name it. It also meant, it being a small post, that the center director, for instance, was on home leave for a couple of months, and I took over as acting center director, so I really had a chance to do other things.

Q: A "center" being what?

HARROD: Cultural center - American library, English-teaching programs. In those days in Kabul we had a fairly large program of English teaching and also a very nice cultural center and library, which was right next to the regular USIS offices, which were in what had once been, I gather, the old American embassy, but by then we had a new embassy, which was the one that is, I guess, still there under somebody's caretakership right now.

Q: What were relations like with Afghanistan 1970-71?
HARROD: Very interesting place to be. As I said, I knew nothing about the place when I went out there. There are two different schools of thought on a training assignment: whether you should be in a big embassy where you can do a million different kinds of things or be in a small embassy. This was a very small embassy; it turned out to be a perfect training assignment because I got to do lots of different things and dealing with Afghan government ministers which, you know, junior third secretaries would never do in Paris or London.

Relations with Afghanistan were modest. Somebody said at the time that Afghanistan was the only country in the world whose foreign policy was both made and executed in the capital city, since none of their embassies - and they had not too many of them - counted for anything. So Kabul was the place to be. It was a neutral country. We and the Soviets had development programs in Afghanistan, but it was officially neutral, and we got along in strange ways. The Soviets sort of developed the northern part of the country, and we were developing the southern part of the country, and we were on neutral turf, so we would fire off our daily news bulletins and give our different versions of Vietnam and things like that, but essentially, us being neutral, we met on neutral ground and had some interesting contacts. I remember getting a New Year's card from the head of the KGB office in Kabul, and there was a captain from the Soviet military intelligence who kept popping up at a lot of places where I went, and again, it being this kind of a country, I remember I introduced the captain to my boss, the PAO, at one cocktail party, and I said, "Peter, this is Captain Khrisanov from the Soviet embassy," and my boss said, "Oh, Captain, what do you do over there" and he said, "I steal your secrets." It being a neutral country you could do this kind of bantering, but the main thing I remember is it was a great place for a junior officer because we would get a visiting American speaker in and we'd say to the foreign minister, would you like to meet him? And the foreign minister would say yes, and you'd go over and see the foreign minister. I dealt with the minister of culture all the time on things. You didn't deal with low-ranking people in a large bureaucracy because they didn't have one. Fascinating place to be.
Q: At that time what kind of government did Afghanistan have?

HARROD: They had a king. This was before everything fell apart. There was a king, there was a prime minister, there was a quasi-parliament, but still officially it was a not-very-constitutional monarchy. I met the king once, I think, met the crown prince once. The day I arrived in the country I was picked up at the airport by the center director, who later became a very good friend, who took me up to the hotel where I was going to be spending the first week or so till I could move into housing, and we went to the restaurant

on the top floor of the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul, and as we went into the restaurant, some guy at a table on the other side said, "Hey, Ed," and Ed said, "Excuse me for a minute," and so Ed's wife and I went over to the table and sat down, and Ed went and chatted this guy up, finally came back and sat down, and I'm jet-lagged and I said, "Who was that?" Ed said, "Oh, that's the crown prince. We play tennis once a week." That was the kind of country it was.

Q: Was there any feeling at that time about Kabul was the government center but its writ didn't go very far beyond the walls of Kabul?

HARROD: Oh, yes. In fact, one wondered whether its writ even went to the city limits. You had this definite feeling that it was Indian Country out there. The military attaché at the time, in giving a briefing for newly arrived Americans, said that as far as he could tell the Afghan military was incapable of protecting the country against any threat, foreign or domestic. It was pretty wild. There were stories of Peace Corps volunteers out in the boonies who had been intimidated by tribal chieftains, and it was clearly not a unified country. And it was very 16th-century. When my then fiancée arrived to join me in Kabul, where we were married shortly thereafter, she landed at the airport, and I was indisposed at the time with a bad case of hepatitis, so she was kind of on her own when she landed at the airport. She walked out the front door of the airport, and here were guys sitting on donkeys and camels walking down the street and people carrying guns and, you know, "What have I gotten myself into?" It was a very wild place.

Q: Was there sort of a small ruling elite with whom one dealt and all that?

HARROD: Pretty much, yes. I mean the small government apparatus, so, as I said, we dealt with ministers. There was a small intellectual group. That was it. It was a pretty small operation.

Q: What were you doing?

HARROD: Doing daily news bulletins, press releases, a lot of work with our AID program there, taking Afghan journalists out to visit AID projects, film showings, as I mentioned before. We had an exhibit. One of the things that they sent me there to do. I hardly walked off the airplane and I was put in charge of a pavilion that the U.S. had for the annual Afghan fair. Every August they had a fair, and we had a moon rock there, and I had had a moon rock on our exhibit in the Soviet Union, so I was the moon rock expert. And I spent my first month in Kabul basically running this pavilion at the fair with this moon rock. And I think the moon rock was less interesting to the Afghans than the turnstile that we installed to control access. They'd never had one in Kabul before, and so people would go through the line to go through the turnstile and then run through the exhibit and go back and get in line again. But it was a fascinating country, and while I was there we did have some issues that popped up from time to time, like impending famine, and we were trying to work to get increased food aid for Afghanistan, and things like that.

Q: Well, did you find yourself on the information side in competition with the Soviets?

HARROD: Yes, in terms of putting out our version of things. I mean, we would get every day, every morning I would come into the office and we would have what we called the Wireless File which had come in from Washington, the teletype service, with speeches and articles about the American policy, and I would go through that and edit it down to a couple of pages of material that we would then put out as an American news bulletin and distribute to all the Afghan government offices and news media and foreign embassies, and the Soviets did the same thing and the Chinese did the same thing and the British did and the French - everybody did it. Once in while we'd get into a feud because you're technically not supposed to take on any third country when you're in a foreign country like that. You're not supposed to say anything bad about the Russians or the Chinese. Once in a while the Russians would say something bad about us, so we'd do the same, and I once in fact said to my Russian counterpart, I said, "Look, I'll lay off if you'll lay off." He said, "You have that discretion?" I guess he had to put out whatever they gave him, and I could edit if I saw fit. Because whatever they sent us was official policy, I could use this or that, but I could select.

Q: Did you find that it made any difference?

HARROD: Made any difference - that's a very broad statement. I mean, given the fact that Afghanistan fell apart and went through several increasingly worse coups and finally civil war and everything else, you could probably say, no, it didn't. I think if Afghanistan had continued on the path that it was going on when I was there, which was a little bit more constitutional democracy being fed into the system, it probably would have made a difference. Most of my Afghan contacts and co-workers from the time are either dead now or in the United States, so ultimately, no, it didn't, I guess, but it was a good effort.

Q: What about during this particular period, were we avoiding the Chinese - we're talking about mainland Chinese?

HARROD: We were avoiding them officially. While I was in Kabul, Kissinger made his first secret visit to Beijing - or Peking, I guess, at the time. I remember that was a big surprise to all of us, but we had no contact with the Chinese. In fact, we would, I think, almost daily send them our news bulletin and they would reject it and send it back, so there was no real... In Afghanistan, at the time, there were essentially two branches of the Communist Party. One was the sort of pro-Chinese wing, and one was the pro-Soviet wing. There would be demonstrations from time to time. I remember at one point there was going to be a demonstration by the pro-Chinese faction, and they were going to come right down the street outside our cultural center, so we sort of battened down the hatches and put on increased security, and they came by with their big red banners, and as they went by they started shouting "Long live America" and went on down the street, and we had no problem whatsoever.

Q: Were there any groups that you were focused on that you felt that you know, given the situation at the time, that you felt these were the people we should get to?

HARROD: I spent a lot of time working with students because I was one of the youngest people in the embassy at the time, and I sort of had the USIA brief for students. So I got to know some of the students at Kabul University, and there was a polytechnic institute in town, and I would do things like when I first got there I remember there was a flag football league. And Kabul University had a team that was mostly Afghans who had studied under American Field Service auspices in the U.S., and so I went out and joined the Kabul University team instead of the embassy team. And there were Peace Corps volunteers and Afghans, and I got to know a lot of the students. A couple of them run a restaurant in suburban Arlington now. I was trying to work with younger groups when I wasn't working with the minister of culture or the foreign minister, whatever.

Q: What was your impression of the university students? I mean, what type of education were they getting, and again, so often universities tend to be hotbeds of Marxism, just sort of a phase young people go through?

HARROD: I supposed they were. There were the university and the Polytechnic Institute in Kabul, and there were a lot of politically active students there, some of them of the Marxist persuasion. The ones that I dealt with pretty much weren't, although I did deal with a few Afghan faculty types out there who spoke Russian. They'd been educated in the Soviet Union. I had that one advantage of speaking Russian, which is what attracted the KGB station chief and the GRU guy to me, because I was the guy in the embassy that spoke Russian. So I could do some work with Afghans who had studied in the Soviet Union because I could speak the language. But most of the students I dealt with weren't of that particular persuasion. I think it's kind of a self-select. If you are a member of, let's say, the pro-Chinese wing of the Communist Party and you are a student at the university, you are probably not going to do a whole lot at the American Cultural Center or with the American embassy's third secretary.

Q: Who was the ambassador while you were there?

HARROD: Robert Gerhard Neumann, who had been born in Vienna and was later ambassador in Morocco, I think.

Q: How was he as an ambassador? What was your impression?

HARROD: I thought he was very good. He was quite an educational experience for a very junior chap like me, to be working for this Viennese professor, and he taught me a few things. I must say, looking back at my career, I've worked for a whole bunch of ambassadors, and I've had good things to say about all of them. They've all been career, except for the last one. Neumann is arguably-
Q: He's one of those mixed ones.

HARROD: Yes, he was a political appointee in the Johnson administration, but because he was head of Republicans for Johnson in California he kind of slopped over, and because he was a professor of political science he was more than a political appointee.

No, I learned a lot from him, including that when he said *bazaar* I had to be careful whether he meant *bazaar* or *bizarre*. I had to do a transcript of one of his speeches, and he said - I thought he said - "bizarre rumors;" he meant "bazaar rumors."

Q: How about English teaching? Was that popular or not?

HARROD: Yes, we had an active English-teaching program because a lot of Afghans, as people all over the world do, saw English as a necessary requirement for higher education. A lot of the people we were teaching English to were targeted for AID training programs, so there was quite a bit of that. It was a big program. There was also the sort of residual English interest there because with Pakistan and India nearby, even if Afghans weren't going to the United States, they felt that English was important because of their neighbors. My wife - first fiancée, then wife - taught in the English-teaching program there in Kabul when she came to join me. Of course this gave her something to do, and she had a degree in linguistics, so it was a very good thing for her. One of her students, I remember, came to the States after we were back in Washington and he brought a nice gift for her because she'd "learned him English so good." But it was a good program.

Now I must also say that Ambassador Neumann taught me that you don't always necessarily have to play by the rules because one time we were there and there was this potential famine we could see over the horizon. If they had a bad winter, they didn't have enough food, and we had been trying to attract Washington's attention to this. And Washington wasn't paying much attention because India was going through a similar but much worse experience, so we couldn't get anybody's attention, so I was told to sort of give the Afghan government some advice on what might attract attention. And I suggested to the foreign minister's people that perhaps a formal Afghan government statement appealing for assistance would attract some attention and we could then send it to the media or whatever. And they thought this was a good idea, and they said would I write it? And I pointed out that we weren't supposed to be doing this for other countries. The ambassador said, "I know that. Now just go ahead and do it." So I did and was then later summoned to the Afghan government news agency to pick up a copy of the statement that I'd written. And I must say, it did get some food aid out of Washington finally.

Q: What was your impression of the role of India and Pakistan in Afghanistan during the '70-71 period?

HARROD: Well, while we were there was when the Bangladesh business happened, and Pakistan basically broke in two. Pakistan and Afghanistan had border disputes for probably a couple of hundred years. Afghans basically didn't have particularly close relations with any of their neighbors, which is why they were neutral. So they had problems with the Pakistanis. India essentially related to Afghanistan as a way to give trouble to Paks, and then the Paks at that point were busy with their own Bangladesh problem. There was a correspondent for a very large news weekly (whose name I won't mention but it sounds very much like "news weekly") who came into Kabul to file his story on the Bangladesh business because he couldn't file it out of Pakistan. They

wouldn't let him file the story, so he flew in, landed, I picked him up at the airport (he'd requested assistance to get him to file his story), and as we were riding into downtown, he said, "Now what kind of a country is this? What kind of government do they have?" Afghanistan was not in everybody's attention then.

Q: Was Iran under the shah doing anything? What was happening?
HARROD: Not a whole lot, because again, the Afghans thought the shah had hegemonistic intentions, and so there wasn't. The shah had ideas of building a railroad and all other kind of things, and the Afghans weren't having any of it, I don't think. They preferred dealing with the Americans or the Russians, I think, to dealing with their more immediate cousins.

Q: Was it sort of unwritten or apparent that the Afghans were allowing both the United States and the Soviet Union to play there and they were balancing both off to get whatever they could get out of it?

HARROD: I think that's a fair statement, yes. That's exactly what they were doing.

Q: You left there in, what, '71?

HARROD: '71.

Q: What was your impression at that time of whither Afghanistan?

HARROD: I thought, incorrectly, that it was going to slowly evolve into a more pluralistic democratic system. I remember being at a wedding where one of the distinguished guests was the king's cousin, Daud. He was retired at the time, a former prime minister, and he was so described and looked like that was what he was. And of course, a couple of years after I left, he had a *coup d'état*, ousted the king, and took over, and then it all went downhill from there. But no, I thought it would evolve in a more reasonable way, and I was quite wrong.

Q: How were we seeing the role of women at that time?

HARROD: Just beginning to emerge. I had a female assistant at the embassy, at the USIS, who was my press assistant, and she was one of the few, I would say, modern, educated, Westernized women in the country at the time. Most ordinary women still wore the, you know, top-to-bottom veil, but there was an emerging women's - it would be wrong to call it "women's liberation," but it was at least a group of educated women who were coming to the fore. Now all of that has been thrown out the window, but it was starting to happen. I really did think that the country would be making strides toward a more reasonable system, but all those various *coups d'état* began to take their toll, and finally the whole place went to hell.

Q: What about Islamic fundamentalism? What sort of role was this playing at that time in our perception?

HARROD: Not much that I can recall. There was more of an issue in Afghanistan about the tensions between the majority Sunni Muslims in the country and the minority Shiites, ethnically different Hazaras from the central part of the country. So there was some attention to the difference between the two Islamic communities. But this was sort of before Islamic fundamentalism became a term that people bandied about. This was the early '70s, and Afghanistan was a very fundamentalist country no matter how you looked at it. It was just a question of... I remember when we had our moon rock at that exhibition. There were some people, very fundamentalist, who claimed it was impossible to have a moon rock because there were seven layers of heaven between the earth and the moon and you could not possibly go to the moon, until one fairly enlightened mullah apparently quoted a chapter or line from the Koran that said he who captures knowledge can unlock the secrets of the universe. He said clearly the Americans have done this, so this is a moon rock. And suddenly it was okay that it was a moon rock. So there were varying shades, but we didn't look at it in those days as Islamic fundamentalism I don't think. When the country is basically still in the 16th century, it's hard to say what is fundamental and what isn't.

Q: What about our strong support of Israel during this time? Was that an issue?

HARROD: I don't recall it being an issue. Again, Afghanistan is not an Arab country, and Iran in those days was a fairly strong closet supporter of Israel itself, as were the Turks, so I don't think it was on their radar screen very much. Among some groups there was a certain Islamic solidarity, I suppose, with the Arabs, but the Afghans aren't Arabs and probably didn't care that much.

Q: You left there in 1971. Whither?

HARROD: Whither? Back to the States for Polish language training. Again, one thinks fate has something to do with this. I was supposed to go - I'm trying to think if they even had an assignment for me, and they didn't. And I was going to be staying in Kabul for another year is what they finally told me. And I got that word on a Thursday, and that night I went to a reception at the Polish embassy, which as I reconstruct probably was for the Polish Communist National Day, July 22, and the next day was Friday, which was the day off, and I came into the embassy on Saturday and found a cable assigning me to Poland. So it was nice timing, but we had three weeks to get out of Afghanistan, to pack out and get back so I could start Polish language training. So it was a very hasty exit from Kabul right after I'd been told I was going to stay there another year.

Q: So you took Polish from what, from '71 to '72?

HARROD: '71 to '72, back here at the Foreign Service Institute, which was again a very nice thing for the Foreign Service to do because my bride, whom I had married in April of '71, her mother had been born in Poland, so by the time I went home for Christmas in '71, I had learned enough Polish that my new mother-in-law and all of her relatives thought that this was just wonderful that the new son-in-law could speak the language.

Q: Just what was the background of your wife, her education, and how did you meet her?

HARROD: She is Dolly Foley of Manchester, New Hampshire, and she had a master's in Slavic linguistics, undergrad from Mount Holyoke, master's from the University of Chicago, and she was one of those young Americans sent over to the Soviet Union to work as an exhibit guide because she spoke fluent Russian. That's where I met her. In fact, we met in Baku in Azerbaijan and became engaged after the exhibit, and I went off to Afghanistan, and she went to work on an exhibit in Poland for a few months because she has basically native Polish from her mother. And while working in Poland on that exhibit, the then public affairs officer in Warsaw, Jock Shirley, got to know her, and she mentioned she was engaged to this Foreign Service officer for USIA who was off in wild Afghanistan, and I gather Jock said something like "Is he any good?" and she said, "Would I be engaged to him if he isn't?" So Jock registered my name, and later there I was sitting in Kabul and I get assigned to Warsaw, Poland. I believe this was Jock Shirley's doing. He was by then still the PAO in Warsaw, but I gather he fed my name into the system and so out it popped, and we scrambled out of Afghanistan, came back to Washington, set up temporary shop in an apartment in Rosslyn, and I began studying Polish seriously for the better part of a year. And during that year, my assignment got changed. I had originally been assigned as ACAO, assistant cultural attaché in Warsaw, and then toward the end of my language training, with only a few months to go, there was a shakeup at USIS in Poland because Jock Shirley was pulled out to become the area director here in Washington, and so other dominoes began to fall, and the fellow who was in the branch post in Poznan was pulled into Warsaw to become the information officer, and I was reassigned to be the branch PAO in Poznan, which at the time I was agnostic about. It was the difference between being in a big embassy in Warsaw or being all by yourself out in Poznan. It was probably harder on my wife, because she would have had more opportunities to do things in Warsaw than in Poznan, but in '72 we went off Poznan, Poland.

Q: And you were in Poznan from '72 to-

HARROD: '74.

Q: What was Poznan like?

HARROD: I guess the city itself was several hundred thousand people, but it was a tiny little consulate. There were four American officers, a principal officer, a consular officer, an admin person, and myself, and so it was really a tight little ship. There was no other American community in Poznan except for a couple of Fulbrighters every year at the university, and so we were pretty much on our own out there. We all three of us lived in the same little building that had been configured into three apartments. The principal officer lived in the consulate in those days, in the same building where the offices were, and it was a very small operation.

Q: Why did we have a consulate in Poznan?

HARROD: As near as I can tell, because in 1956 there had been riots in Poznan which

helped bring down the former communist government and brought in Wladyslaw Gomulka, and I guess the way our government works, if something happens somewhere, you immediately establish a presence, even if nothing then happens in the next 30 years. And Poznan, to be perfectly frank, and I apologize to the Poznaniacy, whom I like, but nothing much happened in Poznan. It was a fairly working-class, solid city. But the consular district, which was the western third of Poland, a large chunk of which had been Germany up until the end of World War II, had some very interesting places in it, so I quickly figured out that my job in Poznan was to spend as little time as possible in the consulate and as much time as I could on the road.

Q: I would have thought Gdansk, for example, would have been a more logical place.
HARROD: Well, in retrospect, sure, because by 1980... In '70, Gdansk was doing things, but I gather you take your consulates where the host government will let you have them.

Q: Wasn't there an annual fair?

HARROD: Yes, big trade fair in Poznan.

Q: And so that probably had-

HARROD: That had something to do with it, certainly. And in fact, when the trade fair would take place, which was June, we pretty much stopped doing everything else and spent all of our time at the trade fair working with the Commerce Department people who were out there for the fair. That became a full-time operation. But what I did was we had six provinces that were part of our consular district, and so I had five other provincial capitals to cover, and I spent a lot of time on the road, most of it in what the Germans once called Breslau and the Poles call Wroclaw, which was more of an intellectual university center in many ways than Poznan was, so I would go down there at least a couple of times a month for a couple of days, ran the circuit.

Q: What were relations like between Poland and the United States at that time, and how did it reflect itself in places where you were dealing with it?

HARROD: Let's see, Gomulka had been essentially unseated in the winter of '70-71. In fact, my wife had been working on that exhibit in Poland when all the problems took place up in Szczecin and Gdansk. Gomulka fell; Edward Gierek came into power, and Gierek was seen as sort of a neo-modernist communist, so it was a period where relations were officially difficult in some areas but we, I think, tended to view the new régime in Poland as a kind of modernist one that was trying to make some positive changes. And so relations were fairly good. Also, you must understand that all of the official communist stuff in Poland means nothing, because there were probably three people in the entire country who believed any of it. Poland was, as I described at the time and I still believe, the most pro-American country I'd ever worked in, including the United States. You could do no wrong. We had exhibits in Poland like we did in the Soviet Union, but you never got questions about Vietnam or race relations or anything else because most people believed the United States was perfect.

Q: Sometimes this is a problem, isn't it?

HARROD: Yes.

Q: I mean you are dealing with people who see us through their sort of rose-colored glasses. How did the American, what is it, Polonia play, as far as your work goes?

HARROD: Well, now that I am officially retired from the government and have no formal responsibilities, I would say that in my view, the Polonia influence was a retardant to better working relations because the émigré community tended to be harder on the Polish government than, frankly, we were, and therefore kept us from doing some things because of the specter of the émigré community in the States getting incensed about it. To be fair, that's not always the case. I mean, we had a number of Polish-Americans who came out to Poland while I was there who didn't share that view at all. But as an organized group, the Polish-American Congress probably tended to be more against "dealing with the Commies," as it were, than we would have been.

Q: This is so traditional. I mean, we're still suffering probably - I'm not sure if it would have made a hell of a lot of difference - today with Cuba the Cuban-American community here.

HARROD: You can take a number of ethnic groups. I mean when I had my congressional fellowship in '82-83, I went to a two-month seminar at Johns Hopkins SAIS (School of Advanced International Studies) here on the influence of Congress on foreign policy. We had to do a term paper, and I did mine on the role of ethnic communities in determining or influencing U.S. foreign policy. I mean you can go through the Greek community, the pro-Israel community. I picked the Polish-American community as one of my examples.

Q: The Irish.

HARROD: The Irish, definitely. Any group that - Armenians, take Armenians - any group that has a sizable component of American society can exert an influence, and some groups that don't have a sizable proportion always feel like they're getting ganged up on. But there were quite a number of Polish-American visitors to Poznan in those days, including every year for the trade fair they'd send out a Polish-American congressman to cut the ribbon, whether it was Ed Derwinski or whomever.

Q: Zablocki?

HARROD: Zablocki didn't come while I was there. Derwinski came one year, and I'm trying to remember who was there. We also had a big philatelic exhibition while I was there, in 1973, I guess it was, the World International Philatelic Exhibition, and we had a Congressman Dulski from Buffalo who came out for that one. It was an interesting experience. It was a Copernican anniversary here, and so there was a big space component, and we shipped out, in addition to all the stamps that we had, we had a stamp

hand-canceled on the moon by the Apollo astronauts and things like that.

Q: Did you find that at the consulate you were having to deal with Polish-American who were coming back and were either shooting their mouths off or trying to play big shot or something like that in the villages?

HARROD: No. We had none of that. The consulate as a whole had quite a few instances of suspect visa things. I was only a backup visa officer because of what I did, but I did have a couple of days where I had to fill in for the consular person when he wasn't around, and the presumption in two-thirds of the cases was that there was something fishy going on about a lot of these visas. I remember we had one fellow come in who had... One of the days that I was acting as the visa officer, I had denied a visa to some fellow who was claiming to go visit close friends or relatives in the States but he had a little difficulty remembering where they lived, and so I turned him down. And a few months later, his American sponsor came in to see me and was giving me holy hell about turning down the visa, and he said he had the right to invite anybody he wanted to. And I said, you're right, and I have the right to turn them down. He was going to write to the Secretary of State, and I said, fine, you go ahead and do that. Do you know where the Secretary is going to send your letter for a response? He said, "To you." I said, "That's right." And it turned out that this guy was, in fact, inviting all of the band members and prostitutes that he had met when he was over visiting to come see him.

Q: How nice.

HARROD: But it was fishy. There was a lot of that.

Q: Did you have any particular issues to deal with during this time?

HARROD: I had very few political issues. The nature of my job being not in the capital city but off in the western part of the country meant that I probably spent three-quarters to 90 percent of my time on cultural and educational issues, didn't have a whole lot of, you know, political issues to address. I was working on Fulbright educational exchange issues, we were doing art exhibits, we staged *Porgy and Bess* at the opera in Wroclaw, which was the first time it had ever been staged in Poland, I believe, brought in an American singer from Vienna to work with them on the production. That's what I was doing, and the trade fair every year, not a lot of heavy political content. In fact, I remember during the *Porgy and Bess* business I made one of my regular trips down to Wroclaw and was in seeing the opera director, who became a very good friend, and he began the meeting by noting his great displeasure with the fact that the Americans had bombed Haiphong and a Polish ship had been damaged and this was a detriment to our relations, and then having made his little set-piece statement, he said, "Okay, now let's get back to talking about the opera." So he made his point. But again, since most Poles were very pro-American in their sentiments and anti-communist, really, there wasn't a lot of political issues to deal with.

Q: Were you finding that the information that was coming out that you were supposed to

distribute was in a way almost overly simplistic for the audience you were dealing with, or really wasn't necessary?

HARROD: Well, for me it wasn't necessary, because most of that was done by the embassy up in Warsaw and I really didn't have to get into it. In fact, I got myself into trouble with the USIA inspectors who came out very soon after my arrival in Poznan in the fall of '72, I guess it would have been, because they were asking me what I did with the Wireless File when it came in. I pointed out to them, because I was in a branch post with no communications, by the time the Wireless File got to me it was at least three or four days old and was totally useless. That wasn't the answer they wanted, but that was true. There wasn't much I could do, and even sending things to the local newspapers - I would only do that if there was a very specific thing that I wanted to get in the newspaper in Poznan or Wroclaw that I thought might work. In other words, I didn't send them a daily compendium of material as I would have done in Kabul, for instance, or in Moscow later on when I was in Moscow. In Poznan, if there was a press release about the upcoming trade fair, we'd send it out, but nothing else.

Q: How did you find the press there?

HARROD: Oh, the provincial press was essentially a waste of my time unless, again, it was some specific issue, like if we had an American exhibit coming to Wroclaw, then, yes, you generate material, and generally they would be happy to use some of it - no political content there. But mostly the press in Poland in those days was essentially in Warsaw and to a lesser degree in Krakow, where we were just opening a consulate in '74, I think, so we didn't have much of a presence there yet.

Q: Who was the principal officer in Poznan when you were there?

HARROD: The first year I was there it was Frances Usenik.

Q: Oh, yes.

HARROD: The second year it was Herb Malin.

Q: Oh, yes. I know both of them. Did Frances adopt her children while you were there, or did she do that previously?

HARROD: She had done that before.

Q: She had done that before. I remember it because I knew her in Yugoslavia, and she'd already had her child.

HARROD: The both of the children were there with her.
Q: They were Polish, weren't they?

HARROD: Right. And then she left after the first year, and Herb came in for the second

year. I must say, I've been in a couple of posts where I've had a change of command, and it's a very good thing, I think, because you tend to get stuck in a rut, and to have somebody new come in, no matter who they are, is a good... Much later in my career in Brussels I had one ambassador for three years and another ambassador for the fourth year, and I always said to myself, That fourth year would have been really wheel-spinning if a new guy hadn't come in and you have to sort of start all over again.

Q: Were there any particular incidents or anything like that while you were in Poznan?

HARROD: We had a couple of incidents of people throwing paint at our window displays and things like that, but nothing serious.

Q: Well, traveling around, did you find the Polish equivalent to the KGB? Were they at the same caliber as the KGB, or were they a little less-

HARROD: They were in evidence from time to time, but they were nowhere in the same league, partly because I don't think they had the same marching orders. They would kind of keep track of you a little bit, but it wasn't the same. I actually noticed them more on my second tour in Poland later on, when I was based in Warsaw and I'd go out to Poznan to visit. I could pretty much guarantee being picked up by one of several cars with license plates whose numbers we had all made note of as soon as you came into the city limits, and the car would sort of stay with you the whole time and escort you on the way out. But the first time, in the first two years, it wasn't very noticeable.

Q: Well, also were there any attempts to compromise or, you know, these incidents and things like that?
HARROD: No, and again, I developed some friendships from that first go-around in Poland that stuck with me into my second tour later in Poland, people I really considered to be good friends, some of whom were officially members of the Polish United Workers' Party.

Q: What about social relationships with you and your wife and the Poles during this '72-74 period?

HARROD: Most of the social relationships started as official relationships. In other words, most of the people we got to know were people we'd met because of the nature of the job, but they could quickly, depending on who the people were, turn into good personal relationships. We made some good friends. When I'd go to whatever city it wasn't an official call any more; we'd be going over for dinner and they'd come up to Poznan and do the same thing. And we assumed our apartment was bugged in Poznan, but that didn't seem to stop anybody.

Q: How about the Church?

HARROD: The Church was very powerful in Poland. It was probably more an issue my second time around, in the '80s, than it was in the '70s because by then the Solidarity

thing had come along and the Church was seen as more of a center of political opposition. I didn't have a whole lot of relations with the Church the first time around. There was a theological academy in Poznan. Poznan was the site of the first bishopric in Poland, back a thousand years ago almost, and there was still a theological academy there, and we gave them some language teaching equipment that we had left over in the consulate. We weren't doing any language teaching any more, so we donated it to them. I had a few meetings with the bishop, you know, on particular things, but it wasn't a big thing.

Q: Well, you left there in '74, and I thought we might sort of stop at this point, and I'll put at the end of the tape where you went so we'll know where to pick it up. Where did you go?

HARROD: After '74, I went to the former Soviet Union again in a clever ploy by the same Jock Shirley whose name I mentioned earlier. I went back on home leave to the States in January of '74, at what was supposed to be the halfway point of a three-year assignment in Poznan, and while I was back in Washington, Jock said to me, "You know, we're thinking about creating a new position in the Soviet Union that would be with these exhibits that you've got experience with, but it would be a diplomatic position rather than a general services job, sort of like a branch PAO who would go around from city to city. Would you be interested in that at some point," he said. And I said, "Sure." I went back to Poznan and found my assignment curtailed to two years and I was going to be sent to the Soviet Union. So my assignment ended in '74 instead of '75. Now if he had said to me, "Would you rather stay in Poland for a year or go to Moscow?" I would have said, "I'd rather stay in Poland for a year," but he doesn't ask the question that way. He got me to bite, and in '74 I came back to Washington for about three months, four months maybe, and then set sail at the very end of '74, beginning of '75, off to the Soviet Union again.

Q: Okay, we'll pick it up then, great.

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Today is the 14th of April, 1999. Jack, you were there from when to when?

HARROD: Well, let me do a footnote first. I was thinking after we finished up with the last one that there was one thing from that earlier tour in Poland that I just wanted to throw in because it's one of the things that make USIA, as long as it still exists for the next few months, a lot more fun than the State Department often is, and that is something that I didn't mention. And while I was in that Poznan assignment from '72 to '74, we had the New York City Ballet come to Poland, George Balanchine and the whole mob. And I had only been there a few months, and my job, being fairly junior, was to be the Polish speaking liaison, dogsbody, helper, you-name-it, for the backstage crew, the stage manager and all the technical people. The CAO was George Balanchine's escort and everything. Well, it absolutely was a wonderful time. They had two performances in the city of Lodz and two performances in the city of Warsaw, and I spent a couple of weeks

with the stage crew. Part of my job seemed to be to get them liberally supplied with duty-free booze from the embassy store and things like that, but it was a marvelous experience which included things like working the spotlights (because it was easier for me to do it than to interpret for a Pole, so they told me what to do). One night the lighting director in Warsaw had too much of the duty-free booze and was out of commission, and I ended up sitting at the lighting console following the stage director's cues for the lights, you know, up and down, all that stuff. Anyway, it was a totally fascinating experience, and all these folks were wonderful. George Balanchine had no ego that I could detect. He insisted on riding on the bus with everybody else. But it was a wonderful kind of hands-on cultural thing that, quite frankly, my friends on the State Department side of the aisle never really got a chance to do. And I also discovered that all these gorgeous ballerinas with the New York City Ballet, who would float across the stage and looked absolutely splendid, as soon as they hit the wings would start panting and huffing and were sweating like crazy up close and personal, and of course the one thing you said, you never wished a dancer "break a leg," for good luck. Their good-luck expression, I discovered, was *merde*, which - anyway, it was a fascinating experience. And after we finished up the last time, I said to myself, You know, you look back on this, and there are lots of memories, but this was a good one, dealing with some very interesting people, having a lot of fun. And the wardrobe director actually had a crush on me. I introduced him to my wife at the time, and I said, "Ducky, this is the woman who got me before you could." And he had a little fit, and my wife looked as if she was totally unaware of all of this, sort of blanched. Anyway, it was a lot of fun, and I just wanted to toss that in-

Q: Excellent!

HARROD: -because one of the things that made USIA different from the State Department was the chance to do some things like this.

Q: I've always felt that this is an absolute plus. Now then, I want to get this. You were in the Soviet Union from '74 to-

HARROD: From the beginning of '75, actually.

Q: Actually '75.

HARROD: It was right after Christmas, I think, we set sail, and I was there from the beginning of '75 until the summer of '78, going through three different jobs during that time period. One of the hallmarks of my early life in the Foreign Service was never being able to hold a job for very long. I mentioned my Poznan job got curtailed from three years to two. In Moscow, I went through a series of three jobs in three and a half years, which was a little more than I'd expected when I got there.

Q: A personnel man would make note of this.

HARROD: Yes, "a rapid progression up through the ranks" is what I would say, but some of it was fortuitous. I mean, my Poznan thing getting curtailed from three to two I

explained, and at least one of the jobs in Moscow was totally unexpected. But I went there in the beginning of ’75, and I spent the first 15 or so months, from the beginning of ’75 through April of ’76 working on another one of these exhibits, and as I explained before, this time it was a different job. This time it was a sort of a roving branch public affairs officer position. I had a diplomatic passport, was accredited as an assistant cultural attaché, and my job, essentially, in every city where the exhibit set up shop (there were six of them - Tashkent, Baku, Moscow, Zaporozh’ye in the Ukraine, Leningrad at the time, and Minsk) and in each one of those cities my job was sort of to set up a branch of the embassy, in a way, and meet as many people as I could, conduct special VIP tours of the exhibit for VIPs, and in three of the cities, well, in every city, we had a couple of American specialists. This exhibit was on “Technology in the American Home,” so in each city we’d have a couple of people who were either professional builders or architects or whatever who would come and spend some time with the exhibit. And in three of the cities we conducted full-dress symposia for like three days, where we’d bring over a panel of American experts in a particular aspect of construction or design or architecture and have a real full-fledged symposium. And my job was to coordinate all of that and also to develop a Rolodex of who’s who in each of these cities, the concept being that we would then have a sort of public presence in cites where we didn’t have consulates and we could go back from time to time and we’d know who the rector of the university was and we’d have met the mayor and the local Party officials. In theory, it was wonderful. I found when I got back to Moscow after the exhibit was over and the PAO had changed (the man who conceived the idea was gone, and a new PAO came in), that the old Moscow-centered view of Russia, or the Soviet Union, sort of predominated, and I really never got a chance to go back to most of these cities and follow up. In fact, at the end in ’78, I had to pay my own way to go back to Baku, which was my favorite place, and see all my old Baku contacts because the embassy wouldn’t even foot the bill for it.

Q: During this first part, ‘75-76, what would you say was the state of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and how was it reflected, you know, out there beyond Moscow?

HARROD: Okay, a two-edged answer to that. First of all, relations, particularly in the early part of that period, the first half, middle of ’75, were officially quite good because that was when we had the Apollo-Soyuz joint space mission, the so-called in Russian *rukopozhat iyev kozmose*. That means ‘handshake in space.’ So while our cosmonauts were getting ready for that flying around up there, the official state of relations was supposed to be good. What I discovered was - and this was something that really shaped my view of the Soviet Union... I’d picked it up on my earlier exhibit. I’d picked it up as early as my ’66 grad-school time there, but this one really confirmed it, which is that each one of these cities really had a different character and a different view of things, depending on who the Party bosses were. In ’75, we were in Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan when this whole handshake in space business was going on, and we were treated exceptionally well. The ambassador came down to open the exhibit-

Q: The ambassador was-

HARROD: -was Walt Stoessel at the time, and he was received by the Communist Party boss in Azerbaijan, Haidar Aliyev, who has since come back to life as the president of an independent Azerbaijan, but at the time he was the Communist Party boss (former KGB official) and had never - I believe his people told us - received a Western ambassador until Stoessel came down in May of '75 to cut the ribbon. And that reflected sort of our general reception in Baku. They were exceptionally nice. I had contacts with a number of party officials. I remember one of my discussions with an *apparatchik.* He asked me how I liked Baku, and I gave him my usual diplomatic bit about how it was a lovely city, and in fact, I had met my wife in Baku on the earlier exhibit, so I said, "I have great fond memories of Baku because it's where I met my wife, and I'd love to come back some day as the first American consul general perhaps." And he looked at me, Communist Party official, and he said, "How about the first American ambassador?" Well, I didn't get a chance to go back as the first American ambassador. Somebody else got that, I think Dick Miles, but to have a Communist Party official drop that little hint was something. Later on in other cities, Minsk being the one I remember particularly, we had some difficulties with the authorities, the security was very tight, but not in Baku. In fact, at one point, one of my Communist Party buddies in Baku asked me if I'd been followed. I said, "I don't know, if they're any good I wouldn't know it, would I?" And he said, "Oh, I guarantee you're not being followed. You know, we consider you guys friends here." He's probably lying through his teeth, but-

Q: You know, I've gotten this from other people, even in the most difficult times, saying that when they got out to particularly the Caucasus and Central Asia, a whole different world.

HARROD: But not always a good one. I mean, we had a lot of security problems in Tashkent in both exhibits that I worked on. The Tashkent KGB branch seemed to be a particularly tough one. But Baku was different. Baku was warm and friendly in those days.

Q: Say you were doing technology, mainly what - building technology?

HARROD: Building. The title of the exhibit was "Technology in the American Home," and while it was a chance to show things like automatic garage door openers and microwave ovens and stuff, it was also a chance to talk about home building materials and the whole idea of single-family homes, which of course was something rather unknown.

Q: Well, in a way, it's all very nice, but this sounds like it's almost showing off, because both the structure and the economy of the Soviet Union wouldn't - it wouldn't have any particular pertinence to it, in a way.

HARROD: Well, yes and no. I mean, construction technology tends to be construction technology, and in Tashkent we had a symposium for three or four days on how you build in an earthquake zone, so we had some people from California out, and it was a

very good seminar, with essentially Uzbek construction people, not Russian. In Leningrad, we had a weeklong seminar on historic preservation, and one of the highlights of that was having Brendan Gill, who died not too long ago, who was a columnist for the New Yorker, and a guy named Jim Fitch, who was a professor at Columbia, and a guy whose name escapes me at the moment, who was head of the preservation society here, National Trust for Historic Preservation. So there was some serious talk going on, but as I mentioned with the earlier exhibit, the real idea here was to get Russians in to have an interaction with these American guides who spoke Russian, so whatever the subject was, it was just really a draw to bring people in and then get into a discussion. And the American home was a good one to get a discussion started because it's a totally different concept of housing, and it would get people into a discussion of, well, how much does a house cost, you know, how do you pay for that, mortgage loans, how much does your father make? So it was a good subject for that, and we had the usual gizmos. It was a bit in a way like the kitchen debate back in '59-

Q: With Richard Nixon and Khrushchev.

HARROD: Right, it was the same. We had a kitchen. We sort of had a replica of each kind of a room in an American house and then some sections on building technology as well. It was a good show.

I mentioned Minsk being a particularly tough place security-wise, and I think part of that was because we had probably half the population of Lithuania come down the road. It was about three hours from Lithuania down to Minsk, and a lot of Lithuanians came to the exhibit. And there being political overtones to that, security was very tight. In fact, after the exhibit, I tried later in my Moscow days, I think on three different occasions, to go to Lithuania on official visits, and each time I got turned down from the Soviet Foreign Ministry for "reasons of a temporary nature." So I think they assumed we had made lots of contacts with Lithuanians, who were almost by definition dissidents, and were a little bit afraid of our presence there.

I mentioned we were also in Zaporozh'ye, which is a fairly small town way down in the Ukraine, and that was probably the most boring two months of the whole exhibit because once you'd seen the famous oak tree under which the Cossacks wrote a nasty letter to the Turkish sultan and once you'd seen the hydroelectric plant, that was it - there was nothing else there.

Q: I always think of that wonderful painting. What was it, Repin or what?

HARROD: Repin, yes.

Q: On what? It was called "Zaporozh'ye."

HARROD: "The Cossacks write a letter to the Turkish sultan," I believe, yes. We saw the oak tree where they wrote the letter.

Q: These Tatar looking people are having a wonderful time.

HARROD: But there wasn't much else in Zaporozh'ye, although in a small town like that we had almost regular access to the mayor and Party officials. The two cities where we had the best access of the six, and my job being access, were Baku, where we got everybody in the whole hierarchy all the way up to Mr. Aliyev, and Zaporozh'ye, but the problem in Zaporozh'ye was there wasn't much of a hierarchy to get up to.

Q: In '66 you'd been doing this yourself.
HARROD: As a student.

Q: As a student. How did you find it? Was there a different student than when you were there, from the American point of view? How did this interaction go?

HARROD: I didn't have much contact with American students when I was off in places like Zaporozh'ye because there weren't any.

Q: Who were the guides?

HARROD: The guides were all American graduate students there, but they were there for six-month tours. The end result, I think I mentioned that the earlier group in '69 and '70 was pretty much of a piece. This was sort of their first long-term exposure to the Soviet Union, and most of them came as fairly liberal and left as fairly convinced conservatives. But I think particularly those who spent... The first half of the guides were in Tashkent, Baku, and Moscow, and I think that group probably had a better appreciation for that multi-ethnic character by being in Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan. The second bunch, which was in Zaporozh'ye, Leningrad, and Minsk, officially was in three different republics, all of different ethnicity - you know, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, but there wasn't a great deal of difference. I do note, though, that all three of those republics had seats in the UN, and when we were in Minsk, Senator Edward Brooke from Massachusetts was chosen to come out and cut the ribbon. He was in Minsk for basically just one day to do that, but the Byelorussian Foreign Ministry had an official lunch for him, and the Byelorussian foreign minister, who had been their ambassador to the UN - I think that's probably one of their only diplomatic postings - was there to host the lunch. So they still their little trappings of being quasi-republics, even if they were part of the Soviet Union at the time.

Q: Were there any major problems - student or guides getting into trouble?
HARROD: Oh, yes. There always are, Tashkent, again, being the location. Tashkent was the first city of this exhibit, and I think we sent one or two people home from Tashkent for having gotten into trouble, or having *been gotten* into trouble is probably a better way to put it because both of them were sandbagged, which led me, as I mentioned earlier, to this idea that we ought to have one stalking-horse amongst the guides who came over specifically to be thrown out so we could make the point. After that, things kind of settled down, although Minsk was the last city, and Minsk was also quite tough. The toughness sometimes had a positive side. We used to get one day a week off, and on that particular day the Byelorussians went out of their way to be hospitable and would bus us off to their

national cross-country skiing training facility (this was in February, I think), and we'd have a day of cross-country skiing, and they'd host us to lunch. And all of it was a nice way to keep tabs on us and get us out of town on the one day we had time to go do things.

But it was pretty much of a piece, and I worked with subsequent exhibits from my Moscow vantage point, and things are fairly across-the-board. As you noted earlier, when you're in the Caucasus and places like that, it tends to be a little more interesting because you get into this ethnic identity issue.

Q: Did you find yourself being used, debriefed? Or any interest from the embassy - and I include both the CIA and as well as our political officers and all that?

HARROD: Well, in each city where I was, I would go out and meet as many people as I could, I said, and try to get to know who was who in this particular town, and I would from time to time write essentially scene-setters that I would send back to Moscow. We had a courier service that would go back and forth, and so I'd sort of do a mood piece or a biographic sketch on somebody, send them back to Moscow. What happened when they got back to Moscow was sort of up to the embassy. In some cases, they were turned into - if you remember - the old airgrams we used to have and would be sent back to Washington, and in one particular case I got a letter from someone in the intelligence community back in Washington later on who commended me for my profiles of Mr. Aliyev down in Baku. I had seen him on, I think, three different occasions, once with the ambassador and twice at other kinds of events, and had done sort of a little, you know, "impressions of Haidar Aliyev," and I got a little specific note thanking me for that because they said they really didn't get very many reports on what they called "provincial Party officials." As I say, Mr. Aliyev is now the president of Azerbaijan, and he came here last year, I think, on an official visit, and my wife, who works at the Commerce Department, was invited to a dinner with the U.S.-Azerbaijani Business Council and took (with her) a picture that had been taken of me with Aliyev and showed it to him at the dinner, and he apparently waxed ecstatic and autographed the picture for her and went on to Houston and then in his speech in Houston mentioned this picture as evidence of how, you know, long the relations between the U.S. and Azerbaijan had been friendly. I take some small credit for having... I spotted Aliyev back in '75 as a very atypical politician for the Soviet Union. He was not dour and at death's door like most of them and was rather lively. He reminded me of a ward-heeler in Chicago.

Q: I was born in Chicago.

HARROD: So was I.

Q: I'm sure I haven't been back there in years, but I'm sure I'm still voting there.

HARROD: Well, Mr. Aliyev would, I'm sure, have you voting in Azerbaijan. But he was quite a colorful character, and I spotted him early on. At one point he became deputy prime minister, when Andropov, I think, was Party boss in the Soviet Union, and at the time I opined that if they really started bringing some of these non-Russian ethnic groups

into the central leadership, it would be a real change for the Soviet Union. Well, Mr. Aliyev didn't last very long in that role.
Q: Yes, well, then towards the end of '76 you moved to another job?

HARROD: End of April in '76 I came back. The exhibit ended. I came back to Moscow, and for the next year and three or four months, until the summer of '77, I was officially assistant information officer, which was a double-headed job. I sort of backed up the information officer on some of the press work, and I also was in charge of the exhibits program, if you will, from the Moscow end. I helped negotiate two agreements with the Soviets on subsequent exhibits, including a bicentennial one that we had, and that was essentially what I did until the summer of '77.

Q: Who was the information officer there?

HARROD: It was Gil Callaway, who is still a good friend. I just talked to him on the phone the other day.

Q: Where is he now?

HARROD: He's up in Chevy Chase, somebody you might want to talk to: Gilbert Callaway.

Q: How did you find, at the heart of it, our information program ran, looking at it from the embassy point of view?

HARROD: Well, looking at it from the embassy point of view, at that stage, our information program was *Amerika Magazine*, the Voice of America, and press releases and the daily news bulletin. Because of the nature of the beast at the time, there wasn't a whole lot you could do outside of Moscow, which was one of the things I'd been trying to do on this exhibit, take our presence to places where we hadn't been. What I discovered in practice, both as AIO and later when I succeeded Gil as the press attaché/information officer, was that so much of the information work in Moscow was taken up essentially with press reaction to the Western press on crisis situations, of which there was a steady stream. So you really got tied up in working what Jamie Rubin's doing over here at the State Department these days, responding to whatever the issue of the day was. It was great training for somebody to be a press officer, quite frankly, but in terms of a coordinated information program, that was really the people back in Washington doing the *Amerika Illustrated* and Voice of America and stuff like that. We didn't have much chance to do a lot of that in Moscow.

Q: Were you able to have contact with sort of the cultural world or the media world? You know, you do in other places.

HARROD: Some. There was some contact with the Soviet media, quote-unquote, because that was part of the job. I got to know, meet - I wouldn't say *know* but I got to meet - the editors of most of the major newspapers, and I had some contact with cultural

people, depending on the issue we were working. But at the time security was pretty tight in Moscow, and you kind of reached the conclusion that the people who were free to deal with you were not necessarily the people that you wanted to deal with. And a couple of times I had to curtail developing relationships with people that I actually liked because I was afraid I'd get them into trouble. We lived, as everybody else did, in guarded compounds, where there were police all around the compound, and in fact, unless I miss my guess, Anatoly Sharansky was arrested leaving the apartment of one of the embassy officers who lived in the same building that I was in. So it was kind of difficult to have any normal relationship with people. I had some contact with them, particularly later on when I was information officer and we put on an exhibit of Ansel Adams' photographs from Moscow, which was the first time Ansel Adams' work had ever been exhibited in Moscow. And we were essentially trying to make the point that photography is something more than photojournalism, which is what the Russians tended to view it as, and working with a Soviet TV personality who was also an author and a naturalist. He was sort of their version of Marlon Perkins (if you remember Marlon Perkins, the zoo guy from the old television show). He cosponsored the exhibit with us, and we put it on, and we couldn't get Ansel Adams to come out because his health wouldn't do it, but he taped a message for us. It was a good experience, and I met a lot of artists (quote) through that exhibit, but again, under carefully controlled circumstances. You didn't necessarily invite them over to your house or go out drinking with them because it might get them into trouble.

Q: How would you describe the mood of the embassy and how it looked at the Soviet Union in this, what, '76-77 period?

HARROD: Well, it was an interesting period. We had one administration, the Ford administration, going out. We had a new administration coming in at the beginning of '77. Stoessel, who was a very good ambassador whom I greatly respected, left. He was replaced by Mac Toon, who was also a very good ambassador whom I also respected and had a lot of fun with. It was a time of human rights. The Carter administration brought in the human rights issue, which upset the Soviets greatly. There were a number of these sort of crises, whether they were local Moscow crises or had broader implications, that came up consistently throughout this period. So we were always reacting to something. In fact, at the time we had a policy that the embassy spokesman, which was me, would not be identified by name, because they were afraid if somebody's name was associated with all these critical remarks about the Soviet Union, that person might find his windshield smashed or his tires slashed, so at one point when Hodding Carter and Cy Vance were out there, we delivered an official protest to the Soviet Foreign Ministry about interfering with Western news transmissions, and I did a briefing with Hodding. And the traveling press wanted to use my name, and I said, "I'm sorry, but our practice out here is we don't do this." I think it was Dick Valeriani from NBC who said, "So we can't use your name in the interests of press freedom here, right?" But that was our policy.
But as I was sort of thinking to myself about what went on during that time, it was kind of a steady stream of these little crises. When Toon came out, at the end of '76, on a recess appointment from the Ford administration, nobody was really sure how long he would stay as ambassador - new President gets elected, what? But we had a visit by Secretary Vance in '77. The new administration had hardly got its feet wet and Vance

and Hodding Carter came out, and I guess Toon kind of predicted to them how the Soviets would react to the Carter administration's new proposals to radically reduce nuclear weapons, and I guess Toon was right, and they kept him on. Toon was a marvelous ambassador to work for as press attaché, because his first reaction was to comment. Stoessel, being a good career diplomat, his first reaction was to not comment, whereas Toon led with his mouth.

I hope I'm not telling tales out of school here, but when Toon arrived as ambassador, I don't even think he'd been officially accredited yet, and he did the first of the traditional weekly background briefings. The American ambassador every week would meet with the Western press on Friday on no attribution, "senior Western official" or something, and I think Toon's first briefing one of the correspondents, David Willis from *The Christian Science Monitor*, asked him what he thought his role was as the new American ambassador, and I believe, if I'm not misquoting Ambassador Toon, he said something like, well, he thought his role was to teach the Russians how to act like a great power, and not like some two-bit banana republic, which got people to sit up and take notice. And Mac tended to react that way, and he was a pleasure to be the press spokesman for, I must say.

Q: How did the embassy - I assume you're talking to your colleagues - view the Carter administration? In a way, you were watching what they were saying on the campaign trail, and this is all a new, unknown thing, and campaign promises and statement come out, and these things sort of dissipate after the election, when they have responsibility, but can you give a feel for how you all kind of felt about it?
HARROD: Well, I remember how I felt, and I think I'm not stretching it to say that at least some of my colleagues felt the same way. There were two things that struck us immediately with the new administration. One was the emphasis on human rights, which I think we - while we felt deep in our hearts that this was the right thing to do - also felt that it was going to piss off the Soviets no end and would lead to all sorts of tensions in the relationship. The other, interestingly enough, was the amazing contrast between Cy Vance and Hodding Carter, with whom I worked quite closely, and their predecessors, namely Henry Kissinger. Kissinger was known for being imperious - brilliant, but imperious. When Vance came out on his very first visit to Moscow in that beginning of '77 - I believe he arrived on a Sunday, and we, of course, were all at work in the embassy on Sunday getting ready for the Secretary, and the Secretary of State actually came around through the embassy in his cardigan sweater saying hello to everybody, patting them on the back, and thanking them and apologizing for the fact that they had to be in working on Sunday. And we all sort of looked at ourselves and said, my God, he's a nice guy! And we all wanted to work hard for a nice guy. I think we all had a feeling that we were willing to go the extra mile for this guy because he was treating us like human beings rather than bossing us around. I remember one of the visits that Vance made to Moscow - I don't think it was the first one; it might have been a later one - where I was waiting with Hodding Carter at the ambassador's residence to go back to the hotel where there was to be a press briefing. We were waiting for Vance to get back from a meeting he was having with Gromyko or somebody, and then we were going to go to the hotel and brief. And Vance came back and went in with the ambassador and Hodding to

another room to have a drink and talk about what they were going to say, and I'm waiting out in the hall, and the ambassador came out and said, "Why don't you come on in and join us." And I said, "Oh, no, no, no. I'm just waiting. When Hodding comes out, we're off to the hotel." The ambassador went back in and said something, and the Secretary of State got out of his chair, came out in the hall and said, "Jack, come on in and sit down with us." And you say "Yes, Sir," and you do. That was another reaction that we had, that these were decent folks. That doesn't always make a good administration, but at least they were nice people.

Q: Well, I'm not sure if this first visit was the one, but as I recall, Vance came out very early on with a-

HARROD: It was a radical new proposal.

Q: -radical new proposal where there really hadn't been much homework or preparation for, and frankly came back with a pie in his face.

HARROD: And that's, as I said earlier, I think Ambassador Toon, who was the Ford administration recess appointee, I think - I'm fairly sure that what Ambassador Toon did was look at the proposals they brought out with them and said the Russians are going to laugh you right out of the room, which, in fact, is exactly what the Russians did, and sent them scurrying back to Washington with a sort of "Are you guys crazy? You know, we've spent how many years working on one track, and all of a sudden you come out and switch signals on us." So that was an educational experience, I think, for Vance and his people.

Q: One does have the feeling that the Carter administration had, you know, good ideas but not necessarily well thought-out ideas, and there was a very long learning curve, you might say, in this.

HARROD: Possibly, although my experience, perhaps like yours, is that each new administration that comes in tends to follow - even if it's the same party - but each new administration comes in with the basic bureaucratic premise that first prove your predecessors were idiots. So they come in, they don't want to listen to anything anybody has to say, and they learn, slowly but surely, that you can do some things, you can't do others. The Carter people may have had a more radical change with the preceding administration in some ways. I don't think their learning curve was any longer than anybody else's, frankly.

Q: Did you have any concern about, I think, Carter - and I'm not trying to pick on Carter, I'm just trying to get your reaction - that Carter came in with a basic, almost Christian, idea that if you're good to your neighbor and all that they'll be good to you, and let's not be confrontational and let's try to work this out.

HARROD: For a guy who didn't want to be confrontational, his human rights policy was a thumb right in the Soviets' eye.

Q: I was over in Korea at the time, and this human rights policy did not sit very well with Park Chung Hee.

HARROD: Oh, I can imagine. It didn't sit very well with the Soviets, either, quite frankly. And one instance I remember is each ambassador in the Soviet Union, or at least the major ones, usually got about three minutes on Soviet television on the national holiday of that particular country to deliver a little homily to the Soviet people. And July 4 of '77 it was Toon's turn, and I was one of two people in the embassy who wrote his speech. One of the political officers and I co-authored his remarks, and we felt compelled to mention human rights. And so we wrote the speech, and we went to the TV station, and they were going to put it on the teleprompter, so they took the text and copied it onto the teleprompter, and then they decided that they wouldn't let him say these things on Soviet television, and so Mr. Toon didn't deliver his Fourth of July address in '77. And of course, we went back to the Fourth of July reception at the American residence after the quote taping unquote that never really took place, and everybody was asking him about his speech that night, and his only answer was, turn on your TVs at nine o'clock. And that's what I told the press, and about three minutes after nine I remember one of the wire services calling me up and said, well you told us to watch but there wasn't anything there. I said, "Well, there's your message." They wouldn't let him mention human rights on Soviet TV. But to give the Carter administration some credit, those of us on the USIA side of things, who are supposed to reflect American values and society and not just the politics of the moment, should give Mr. Carter some credit - and I don't think he was a particularly good president, personally, but you have to give him some credit - for at least getting back to basics. I mean, you know, the United States is supposed to stand for certain values, and he reminded us that yes, we are, and just getting along with the Park Chung Hees and the Leonid Brezhnevs of this world is not the only consideration.

Q: Well, if I sound like I'm down on it, I'm not.

HARROD: No.

Q: Actually, I think there was an earth change in our policy because of - maybe rather inept at the beginning and all, but the human rights thing has changed the way the world looks at things, things that no longer would be tolerated. I sometimes felt that the Henry Kissingers and also particularly the Europeans, you know, tended to get so bloody sophisticated that they couldn't move.

HARROD: You know, another advantage that we had in the Soviet Union in those days was the Soviets were, of course, their own worst enemies and would often do things that fed precisely into this line. I mentioned that we had delivered a protest about their interference with American or Western transmissions. I had the wonderful experience of being sent to the Soviet Foreign Ministry to deliver a protest where they didn't know why I was coming, I just requested a meeting. And I sat down, and I said to my interlocutor, I said, "the first thing I want to do," I said, "personally, is thank you very, very much," and I said, "because I'm a fairly mid-level official in the embassy and I normally don't deal

with the Secretary of State directly," I said, "but because of your total screw-up here with the Western correspondents, the Secretary of State himself, personally, told me to come here and..." and then I read my protest. And you know, they played right into this. While I was there, while I was press attaché, we had several outrageous violations of the human rights of people, including American citizens. We had the Pentecostalists, who came into the embassy and set up housekeeping. We had the shoot-down of the *first* Korean airliner, not the one where-

Q: This is the one that didn't get shot completely down.

HARROD: Well, it went down. Only a couple of people got killed. It landed in Karelia. It was a precursor of things to come. A good friend of mine who was an International Harvester representative in Moscow was dragged out of his car at a stoplight and thrown into the Lefortovo Prison as a bargaining chip for two people we'd picked up in the States for espionage. There were a lot of not particularly pleasant things which, quite frankly, taught me how to be a press attaché. I learned all sorts of tricks which I later would tell new generations of USIA officers, about how to circumvent such things as the Privacy Act.

Q: Well, how would you?

HARROD: Well, the International Harvester chap who was dragged out. He and his wife - not wife at the time - his girlfriend at the time (we were later at their wedding here in the States) were on their way to our house, actually, for dessert after they'd been somewhere else for dinner, and he stopped at a red light, a car pulls up behind him, they force open the doors, drag him out of the car while his girlfriend is screaming, and they throw him in prison - allegedly for currency speculation, in fact, as a bargaining chip. So once the word was out that this guy had been thrown in prison, all the correspondents in Moscow wanted to know, What did he do? What is he guilty of? Well, first off, we weren't sure he was guilty of anything, and so the American consul, head of the consular section, went over to visit him at the prison at the first opportunity, came back and said, "The guy says he didn't do anything. He's totally innocent." And I said, "Good, I'm going to go tell the press." And the officer said, "No, you can't do that - Privacy Act. He didn't sign a release. You can't tell anybody anything." And so I called the bureau chief of *The New York Times*, who had been the first one to enquire about this, and I said, "Dave, I'm real sorry. The Privacy Act won't let me tell you anything. If it wasn't for the Privacy Act, I could give you a very firm declaration of his innocence, but I can't do that." He said, "I understand." And after that, we got his girlfriend to sign the release for him and then we could officially put out the word. But the hypothetical "I'm not allowed to do this, if I were, I could tell you" is something I learned. And later on in another case involving an American citizen who had been "detained" in the Soviet Union, I called the UPI bureau chief at the time, and I said, "You know, you have wide distribution, wire service all over the U.S.," I said, "How does a human interest story about an American citizen who's being forcibly detained in the Soviet Union and can't get out sound to you?" He said, "Sounds real good to me." And I just was quiet. And about 30 seconds go by, and the light bulb goes on, and he says, "Jack, do you know anything about an

American citizen who is being forcibly detained here in the Soviet Union?" I said, "Joe, I'm glad you asked me that question." And we got the story out.

That's one of the things about Ambassador Toon. He was not reluctant to use the media. There were a couple of occasions where in the embassy we would have debates about how we should handle a particular issue, with most of my State colleagues, and even some of my USIA colleagues, tending towards, you know, "Let's not do anything." And on a couple of these occasions, after the group dispersed, Ambassador Toon would pull me back in and say, "You know, " he would say, "I really don't mind if the story gets out." And so a couple of times we got the story out before the Soviet version could be put out, and it helped. We actually got this one particular detained fellow out of the Soviet Union because it became a press issue in the States.

Q: I think this points out one of the things that the normal sort of Foreign Service establishment has been so chary. It's been burned so many times by the press. There are some who are so terribly sensitive to it that they don't understand how to use it when you want it. I mean, why don't you use it for attack instead of always being defensive?

HARROD: Well, in one of these cases the director of USIA was out visiting at the time, along with my boss, the area director from Washington, and one of these stories blew up in the press, and the area director said to Ambassador Toon, she said, "Someone told me that Jack had leaked this story," and Toon looked at her and looked at me and said, "Oh, Jack would never do anything like that," and then he winked at me because, in fact, we had deliberately put this story out.

Toon's first reaction was always to react. When he would leave, the embassy under other leadership would revert back to its no-comment mode, and one thing I think that State Department officers, if I may enter this into the record, don't understand, is that "no comment" is a red flag to the journalists. That means "I know something, but I'm not going to tell you." I told one of the bureau chiefs when I first took over as press attaché that if I ever told him I didn't know, that meant I didn't know. If I ever had to tell him "no comment," that meant I knew but I couldn't tell him. And he said, "As long as we play by those rules, we'll be fine." I have some lasting relationships with the media from those days in Moscow. I trust them; they would trust me. And I don't think... I was on a panel discussion in London, at something the University of London sponsored back in '96, with Maggie Thatcher's former press spokesman and a couple of journalists. And I was the only one on that panel who was taking the position that government officials and the media could work together. Everybody else had this adversarial view, whether from the government or the media, that the other guy's lying and you can't trust him. My experience, I think partly because I was in difficult outposts like Moscow, or later when I was handling media for the Iran Hostage Task Force, these were difficult situations and the media people understood, and you could have a good relationship with them and trust them. They fed me some material that was useful to me, and I fed them some things. So I don't have that view at all, as long as you know who they are. There are some media people who've burned me that I didn't know.

Q: I think this can be quite... It depends. In Moscow, you're ending up with the cream. I mean the people have had to learn the language. In a way, they're all living in difficult conditions, and-

HARROD: Not all of them.

Q: Okay.

HARROD: We had a few who were not quite so...

Q: I've been in places - I was in Saigon at one point, and you had some pretty scruffy characters there too. There were some responsible, and there were some who were just absolutely unreliable.

HARROD: If I got to know the person and trust him, or her, you have to base this on some track record. Where I got burned were people that I didn't know well enough to trust. There was a new bureau chief who came in once whom Ambassador Toon almost declared war on. I mean, he had just arrived, and Toon had one of these Friday press backgrounders that I mentioned. And the issue was always whether Brezhnev was dying or not. And the Chief Justice, Warren Burger, had been in Moscow on a visit, and Toon had gone with him to pay a courtesy call on Brezhnev. So the question at the backgrounder on Friday was how did Brezhnev look? And Toon said, "Well," he said, "I don't want this to get back to me in any way, but he looked..." I don't know whether he was better or worse that week, but this bureau chief then did a story that said "According to a senior Western official who was present at a meeting between the U.S. Chief Justice and Brezhnev..." And Toon went right through the roof because the attribution was perfectly clear. We gave that guy one more chance, and he basically shaped up. But if you know your people, you can trust them. If you don't know them, you can't trust them.

Q: Well, now, just on a case like this, how would one handle it? Would you call in that person and tell them what they'd done?

HARROD: Yes. That was my job as press attaché, basically was to tell him, "You screwed up. The rules of the background briefing are there is no attribution that comes back to the briefer, and that's so obvious, there's only one other person in the room, he's it. You can't do that." We had another case where Toon gave an interview to a Western periodical, and we sent the transcript of the interview to Washington, and somebody in Washington didn't like something that Mr. Toon said, and my job was to contact the media outlet in question and get them to take back something the ambassador actually had said that we had on a tape recorder. And they didn't really like doing that, but they figured, I guess, that it was in their long-term interest to keep Mr. Toon as a happy camper. And he said it. I mean, he admitted he said it, and he believed what he said, but somebody in Washington didn't like him saying it, so we had to get them to kind of edit that out of their final version - which they did. They could have very easily said, no, we're not going to do it, and they would have been well within their rights. I said I learned a lot about being a press attaché, which I think stood me in some stead later on in

my life, but it was a tough time in Moscow because each one of these things would kind of pop up.

We also, in the middle of this, in the summer of '77, had a fire. The embassy burned up. I had just moved into my new office. Gil Callaway had left, and I had cleaned out his office and put up my posters and decorations on the walls, and the embassy burned up. That was probably, in a way, the biggest story of the whole time I was there.

Q: I'm in the middle of a set of interviews with Bill Brown, and-

HARROD: Yes, Bill was there.

Q: -and I'm talking about the fire, and he said one of the things he really learned about this was that the ambassador was there sort of trying to direct and do things, and he should be at one remove because things were happening too fast, and it would have been much better if he had moved back a little.

HARROD: Well, the ambassador, I remember also, was in his tuxedo because he had been at the Romanian embassy or at a farewell for the Romanian ambassador or something, and then there he was in his tux directing the firemen.

Q: And he was saying that the firemen were pouring into the place with brand-new firemen's uniforms on.

HARROD: Well, not the first crew. The first crew were real firemen, and then when the fire was sort of under control, a whole new shift of firemen suddenly appeared. But for me it was an interesting experience because we had a houseguest who had just arrived, one of our old exhibit guides from the '75 exhibit had come, and he was staying with us in our little apartment. He'd just come that afternoon, and we'd just had dinner, and we're sitting around reminiscing, and the phone rang, and I picked it up, and it was the sort of junior guy I think from the AP bureau who had the night shift, and he called and he said, "What can you tell me about the fire at your embassy?" And I said, "Huh [What]?" and I said, "Let me get back to you." I put the phone down and called the embassy and got no answer, and you never got no answer, so I immediately put my shoes on, said farewell to my wife and my houseguest, and sped down the road. And you could see the glow in the sky. And I got there, spent all night out on the street with the media folks as we watched the place burn up.

Q: Well, you say you had three jobs there. What was the third?

HARROD: The third was press attaché. I segued from assistant information officer in the summer of '77 directly in to the information officer/press attaché job because Gil Callaway left after two years. I think everyone assumed he would stay for a third year, and I guess Gil decided he would - I think he ended up going to Rome, which was far better than Moscow. And so suddenly, the fellow who'd been in the pipeline to replace Gil was at Garmisch for year of Russian, and so I got boosted up into the press attaché job, which was for me wonderful because I had direct access to the ambassador. I think it

was the first job I'd ever had in the Foreign Service, except my trainee time in Afghanistan, where I actually had a direct relationship with the ambassador. I was one of about a half a dozen people in the embassy who could see him just about whenever we needed to.

Q: With this direct access, how did Toon view - I mean this is the dying time of Brezhnev - how did he view the Soviet leadership and whither the Soviet Union, from what you can gather?

HARROD: Well, I don't want to put words in his mouth, but I think the question here is how do you spell "*whither."* I mean, I think Mac had a very realistic and jaundiced view of the whole aged, crumbling leadership of the Soviet Union, trying to teach them, as he said, how to act not like a banana republic. So I think he had a very realistic view of them, and I think one of the critiques of him back in Washington in the Carter administration was that he was too much of a quote hard-liner unquote. His version of that was, he said, "If by that you mean that I am a realist and look at these people the way they really are, then I guess I am a hard-liner." I guess I tended to be a hard-liner that way, too. But I think he was a good counterpoint to the Carter administration tendencies. In fact, I think he once said that there was nothing that couldn't be cured by having him and Marshall Shulman change jobs for a couple of months, so Shulman could actually-
Q: Marshall Shulman being the-

HARROD: Head of the - he had a higher loftier title, but he was essentially in charge of Soviet policy back here, whether he was at the NSC or the Department. But the idea was, you know, if Mac went back to Washington he'd see what you had to put up with in Washington, and if Shulman could come out to Moscow for a few months he'd see what the place really was like.

Q: During this time, was the USIA or the embassy looking at the Soviet Union... I mean, this was still the Cold War; things had settled down so the Cold War was luke-cold. To try to say, why don't we start messing around with the republics? I mean, you've got all these nationalities, and why don't we sort of encourage them to show separatist tendencies, because if this weakens the Soviet Union, this is a plus for us.

HARROD: Well, there may have been something like that going on, but I was utterly unaware of it, and in fact, everything that I noticed in Moscow was the complete reverse. I had spent 15 months of my life traveling around the boondocks essentially to develop some appreciation of what was going on out there, and when I got back to Moscow I found out everybody in the embassy seemed to think that the Soviet Union began and ended in Moscow. No, I did not see anything like that. Once in a while, some issue would perk up onto the radar screen that involved one of the other republics, but it was always seen as sort of a slight variant of the basic. The Politburo was in Moscow. Mac Toon once said there are only 15 guys in this country who know what's going on and none of them are talking. And essentially all of them were based in Moscow. A few commuted in from the provinces, from the republics. But no, I did not detect that. I would have been one who would have been strongly in favor not of trying to foment any nationalist

attitudes but certainly paying a lot more attention. My view at the time was that nationalism would some day be the undoing of the Soviet Union; it's just that I thought it would be 50 or 100 years down the road. I never thought it would happen this fast. But no, I did not see anybody deliberately playing that card. Maybe there were people in Grandma's House across the river who were thinking about it, but I never saw it.

Q: Well, then, in '78 you left. Whither?

HARROD: Back to Washington. Again, the way the Foreign Service tends to work, I was due out in '78. I told my people back in Washington I would do anything except one particular job. They wanted me to be the Soviet Desk officer back at USIA, and I frankly, at this point, was rather fed up with my three and a half years of watching people get beat up on the streets outside the embassy, and I said I need a change, I don't want to be the Soviet Desk officer. So guess what they made me do.

Q: Foregone conclusion.

HARROD: Right. I even tried to bid on information officer-Cairo as a way not to go back to Washington and do this, but they made me come back, and the only deal I could cut was that they insisted that I would only have to do it for one year while they groomed somebody else to replace me. And so I came back to Washington in 1978, and I was Desk officer for the Soviet Union - and I formally changed the title - and the Baltic States for a year.

Q: So this is '78 to '79.

HARROD: To '79.

Q: How is the view back '78-79, how is the view that you were getting at USIA? Was it sort of in accord with the field?

HARROD: Pretty much, yes. I mean, most of the people that I was working with back in Washington had some experience in the field. The PAO in Moscow was the same guy that I had worked for for the previous two years. We knew each other well, we worked well together, and so it was kind of an extension, in a way, of my earlier job - which was precisely why I didn't want it. But the fact that it was only a year and for half of that year I doubled as assistant policy officer in the USIA European Area Office, so that's other things to do. There was a Soviet exhibit that came to the States that year, so I went off to Knoxville, Tennessee, and was there for the opening of the exhibit, also to Baltimore, which is another of their cities, so I had a few things, and it was not a horrible year - it's just that I wanted a change of pace, and this wasn't really quite a change of pace. I had a lot of meetings with the State Department at the time because we were trying to set up some sort of reasonable reciprocity between the numbers and the way people were treated in the media both in Washington and Moscow, so we spent some time working on that issue. I don't know that it was ever really resolved. Nothing particularly sticks out in that year, except...

Q: I was wondering, did you get involved at all in looking at the exchange program? Was it still a thing where the Soviets would send over 35-year-old rocket scientists, and we would be sending students who were looking at Byzantine culture?

HARROD: I didn't get too deeply into it because in the Area Office was Yale Richmond, who was Mr. Everything on exchanges, but I must say that that's a dissimilarity in the exchange program that exists not just with the Soviet Union or with Russia. When I was PAO in Belgium many years later, you know, the American Fulbrighters came to Brussels were always into art history and things like that, and the Belgians who would go to the States were always in chemistry and law and business administration, so yes, the Soviets I'm sure manipulated the program, but...

Q: -but basically this is what we've got to offer, and it's so attractive that it would be hard for people not to-

HARROD: Well, there are two things. The United States is the Mecca for all these hard sciences, basically, and if you come from a country that has a centrally directed set of priorities, that's what the priorities are going to be; whereas on the American side, you know, basically people who are going into the exchange program do it for their own personal reasons, and in most cases those are humanities. You're not going to go to Brussels, let's say, to study nuclear physics, but you would from Brussels to Cal Tech to study nuclear physics, so I mean that's the way it works.

Q: Well, then, in '79, when and where?

HARROD: In '79, my one year being up, I had been angling to try to get out of things Soviet and find something else to do, and two things happened. One, I got sent off to Berkeley Springs, West Virginia, for a couple of weeks for USIA's what they called "mid-career training program," which was a wonderful couple of weeks.

Q: What did you get out of these mid-career programs? I've always been interested in mid-career programs.

HARROD: Well, it was interesting because it gave you some idea of how to work with people from... We had, I think, six Foreign Service and six civil service people who were off there for two weeks. It just was a useful experience for me to see how different people approach issues differently, made some fairly good friendships there, but it got me to think about management, which was something I hadn't really thought about - how you deal with people and issues. And then the real big change in '79 was that in angling around for something else to do, I discovered that the guy who had been my public affairs officer on my initial assignment in Afghanistan was now the deputy area director for USIA's office for North African, Near East, and South Asian affairs - NEA, for short - and I asked him if he had any jobs. He had a deputy policy officer job coming open. Each USIA area office, which is analogous to a geographic bureau at State, had a policy officer, and I think most of them had a deputy policy officer, who were in charge of

relations with the USIA media, with the Department of State, on the policy issues, making sure that USIA's policy-oriented material was in line with what the policy was. And NEA had this opening as a deputy policy officer, so I bid on it and I got it, and in the end of the summer of '79 I moved down the hall or upstairs, I forget what it was, from the European Area Office to the Near Eastern Area Office.

Q: And you were there doing this from '79 until-

HARROD: I stayed there in that office - again, I went from deputy policy officer later to policy officer - until the end of '81.

Q: That was a quiet time in the Middle East.

HARROD: Well, yes.

Q: Iran, Afghanistan.

HARROD: Well, one of the ironies was I'd hardly been in my new job more than three or four months when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Now, I had served in Afghanistan and I had served in the Soviet Union, so almost overnight, I became USIA's specialist on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. So I worked with our media people putting together brochures and pamphlets about this issue, and I sort of became the point man in USIA on this issue.

Q: This is such an important thing, because in many ways, if one has to point to anything - I mean, at least for me; I don't know about others - I could almost point to this as being the beginning of the end for the Soviet Union. I'd like you to comment on that, but also what was our reaction of why the hell they did this?

HARROD: Well, why they hell they did it is I think they got themselves deeper and deeper and deeper into a mess, not unlike certain other countries that have gotten themselves into messes over the years, maybe at the present time, even.

Q: Yes, we're talking about-

HARROD: Kosovo.

Q: Kosovo, in Yugoslavia.

HARROD: But basically, starting with the first coup in Afghanistan in '73, when the king got ousted by his brother-in-law, it all started going downhill, and then finally in '78, I guess it was, the brother-in-law got ousted by the communists and then one branch of the party got to devouring the next and they went through several communist leaders who killed each other off, and the Soviets kept getting deeper into it until they finally got to the point that they figured we've got to do this ourselves. If you remember, they invaded over the Christmas break in '79, thereby the Americans were all lulled in their Christmas

vacation mode, and in went the Soviets, December 27th or 26th, if I remember correctly. So suddenly I became the point man, and I said some things - the sound you hear now is me patting myself on the back - but as early as January of '80 I was invited to address a business conference. They tried to get somebody important but couldn't because everybody else was busy, so I got sent, and I talked to something called the World Business Council, and I was supposed to be talking about this new international crisis in Afghanistan, and they had had Arnaud de Borchgrave talk to them-
Q: Of Newsweek?

HARROD: *Newsweek* at the time, yes. He's a Belgian, and I've later met him in other versions, but at the time he was talking about the Soviets slicing into Afghanistan and, you know, warm waters of the Persian Gulf and all this sort of stuff, and I told this group, as I told other people at the time, I said, "My experience in Afghanistan and in the Soviet Union tells me that..." I think De Borchgrave had said, "He who controls the cities and roads in Afghanistan controls the country," and I said my experience was that he who controls the cities and roads in Afghanistan gets his head cut off if he sets foot off the roads or out of the cities. I said my sense is that the Soviets are in this very deeply, and it's going to be very, very difficult and it's not going to be this crescent of crisis pushed to the Persian Gulf that even people like Zbig Brzezinski were kind of talking about at the time. The Afghans are nasty guys, and the Soviets were rotten at the core, and so as early as January of '80, I said this is going to be a tough one, the Russians are in for a big problem here. And I like to think I was right. And it was the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union. I think there's no question about that. Getting involved in Afghanistan was really the beginning of the downfall of the system.

So I spent my time doing that, and then - I don't know if you've interviewed Marilyn McAfee, former ambassador to Guatemala, now retired.

Q: No. Where is she, do you know?

HARROD: Somebody told me that when she retired she and her husband moved south, I think, so I don't know where she is. Marilyn and I were junior officer classmates in USIA. We came in in '68 together. And in this period, when I was in the Near East office, Marilyn was also in the Near East office, and she was the Desk officer for Iran, Afghanistan, and I think Pakistan, if I'm not mistaken, and in November of '79, Marilyn was the Desk officer and she was on a promotion panel. And I was filling in for her on her desk when I got a call from the Department of State on a Sunday saying that some crazy students had taken over our embassy in Teheran, and so I told my wife, well, they had done this before in February. The embassy had been taken over for a day or so. And I said, "Aw, they did it again, I've got to go down to the Department and I'll see you in a few hours." Well, that was the beginning of four hundred and what was it, 444 days, and when I went down to the Department on that very first day, I was put onto two tasks, which I then continued off and on throughout the whole rest of the crisis. One was liaison with the families of the four USIA people who were held hostage, and on the first day or two a couple of them weren't even held hostage yet. They were still in the American Cultural Center, and we were on the phone with them. The other was handling press calls,

since I had some experience at this. And so I became *a* press spokesman. We rotated, so I was not *the* press spokesman, but I was a press spokesman for the Iran Hostage Task Force, at the beginning, for the first few weeks, almost the first month. And then when the crisis kind of settled down, I went back to USIA to my other job, and then I would go back to the Department when the crisis flared up again, when we had the unsuccessful rescue attempt, and then at the end, as the thing began to come to a head, I was back there full time working some crazy hours, because we staffed that office, particularly that first month, on a 24-hour basis. There were a few of us who handled that office around the clock for the first month. Again, I think my press experience in Moscow helped me. I have a picture on my wall at home of me sitting in the working group area up there on the top floor of the Department of State in the Secretariat, and Cy Vance is sitting next to me. The subtext of this is I'm on the telephone and I'm talking away. I was talking with a radio reporter from Dayton, Ohio, who had called the American embassy on Day Two or Three and had actually gotten through to the quote students unquote who were holding our people hostage, and he was giving me a debrief of everything they had told him, and I was scribbling this down, knowing that the Secretary, who had come up to say hi to the troops, was right next to me and I would be able to turn and fill him in. And by the time I got off the phone, the Secretary had gotten up and left, so it makes for a great picture, but when I got off the phone he wasn't there any more. He later inscribed the picture for me, so at least I have it on the wall and it looks like we were working together.

Q: How did you deal with the families?

HARROD: Well, at the beginning we just tried to give them - first make contact with them. I mean, the very first day or two it was pretty chaotic, and it was just finding who to talk to. And then it was keeping them apprised of whatever we could keep them apprised of. Later, as the thing became less of an immediate crisis and more of a long haul operation, you may recall the families were all brought to Washington on three occasions for briefings, and at least one case I remember we were up on the top floor of the State Department and President Carter and Rosalyn came over to meet with them and shake hands, and I developed some, to this day, sort of lasting relationships. One of our hostages at the time was a guy named Bill Royer, who was an English teaching officer whom I don't think I'd - I might have met him, but I don't think I had. I got to know his mother, an indomitable woman who was probably in her late 70s or 80s at the time, who came to Washington, and we had her over to dinner and went out with her. And when Bill finally came back at the end of the crisis, he arrives at the Marriott Hotel over there in Crystal City, and his mother was hugging this guy that he had no idea who I was, but there were some good relationships there. Because we only had four people among the hostages, I think, you know, one got a little closer relationship maybe there with the families than if we were dealing with 50. But perhaps the single best moment in my Foreign Service career was on Inauguration Day in 1981, when I picked up the telephone and I called Mrs. Royer in Houston, Texas, and I said, "Mrs. Royer, your boy is in the air, and he's on his way home." And that's one of those things, that being inauguration day, they had downtown Washington fairly well cordoned off, and I had been working out of my home all that morning on this issue, and finally I went down to the Department and got off the Rock Creek Parkway about two blocks from the Department and swung up to

try to get there, and the National Guard had sawhorses across the street to block everybody off, and I remember I stopped my car, and some big sergeant came over, and I rolled down the window, and he said, "Are they gettin' [getting] out?" And I said, "I think they are." And he said, "Men, get those sawhorses out of the way." And I got into the Department. It was a moving experience.

Q: In the Afghan situation, were you sort of giving good, solid background information about Afghanistan to the press corps, because I would have thought that they would - you know, it's not a place that they would be particularly knowledgeable about?

HARROD: Some, yes. Another thing we were doing, in USIA at least, was looking for good credible accounts from inside Afghanistan. There were a couple of correspondents who snuck in, basically, from Pakistan and spent some time with the mujahideen, and we would then try to get the rights. There was one guy, Ed Girardet, I believe, with *The Christian Science Monitor*, who had a very good series, and we would then try to get the rights to those articles so the U.S. government could get them reprinted abroad, figuring that their credibility, quite frankly, was supposedly better than the U.S. government's credibility. And we did some briefing of people.

One of my losing battles in the bureaucracy was to try to keep the U.S. government referring to the Afghans not as "rebels" but as, you know, *mujahideen*, or-

Q: "Freedom fighters"?

HARROD: I didn't care what you called them, but I didn't like the term *rebels* because I didn't think they were rebelling against anything that was legitimate. But it was a busy time, but it wasn't what I expected. I had hoped to move over to the Near East office and do some think-pieces on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and I was a little leery when I started my new job because I'd only had one tour in Afghanistan, and that was it, and I didn't know much about the rest of this (Middle East issues). Somebody told me, "Don't worry about that. All you've got to do is master the nuances of the current policy, and that's all you really need to know." Well, it turned out having a little direct experience in Afghanistan and Russia was a help. On the Iran Hostage thing it was my press experience that was a help. One of the things that I don't think was widely known, and I used when I mentioned I was at the symposium in London back in '96, I mentioned it there: there were quite a number of U.S. media outlets, national and local, that knew as early as maybe Day Three or Four of the Iran Hostage situation that some people were <u>not</u> held hostage. You remember the ones that the Canadians took in ultimately and smuggled out. There were some media people who knew that there were people still at liberty and said nothing about it until they were out. This is again one of my things that you can trust people sometimes when common sense dictates - one of the first things the media wanted to know was how many people are being held hostage. We said, "Well, we're not sure," obviously, because if you're not sure, you're not sure they've got everybody, right? And they didn't get everybody, and we knew that. And some of the media knew that, and they didn't say, you know, "About seven or eight Americans are believed to be still at large in Teheran." That would have tipped off the Iranians, and they would have gone house-to-

house practically, looking for them.

I also did some live talk show stuff at the time and learned one little trick about live talk shows, which is when you're on the line and they tell you, you know, this is the Joe Blow Show from Peoria, Illinois, and they're calling to talk to somebody, you always pretend you know Joe Blow extremely well. "Oh, Joe, it's good to hear you," you know.

Q: Was the impression on the hostage thing that this was going to be solved in a while, I mean shortly, or did it change?

HARROD: I think the first couple of days, particularly the first day, there was the initial feeling that this was a repeat of what had happened the previous February, and it'll be over quickly. After the first couple of days, I then think the mood shifted, and we don't know how long this is going to last. And then once it settled down, there was no clear idea when it was going to end, right up until almost the very last day. You know, we didn't know they were actually getting out until they got out. The plane was sitting on the runway, but nobody knew it was really going to take off. And back here in Washington, of course, that was Inauguration Day, and it was clear that the Iranians were kind of waiting for the Carter administration to be out and the new administration to be in before they'd let the plane take off.

Q: Was there in USIA an effort to keep our criticism, at least official criticism, of the Iranians down to a certain extent that we didn't want to get them too riled up because of hostages? Did this have an effect on it?

HARROD: I am unaware that there was ever such a view, no. The one thing that I do know was a conscious effort on our part, at least on the spokesman side of the task force, was to keep emphasizing that our goal was to get all of these people back alive and well, because there was a sort of instant reaction around the country of, you know, well, they're all dead anyway, so let's just go in and nuke the Iranians or something like that. So we had to keep saying, you know, we understand why people have feelings like that, but basically, our task is to get these people out alive. However long it takes, we'll get them out. And ultimately, we did.

I remember when they did get out, when the wheels went up and the planes left, one of the networks - I don't know which one it was - sent a huge platter of cold cuts and bread and cheese and everything else up to the task force up on the seventh floor, just as a sort of a for-a-job-well-done kind of thing. I also remember at one point during the crisis, the embassy in Islamabad was attacked and set afire, severe, and Hodding Carter came up to the task force - it was about seven in the morning - and he was trying to get the latest briefing on what was going on in Islamabad. We had phone contact with them, and then as he was leaving, I was walking out with him, and we went out into the outer lobby up there on the Eighth Floor, and there was this fellow with red hair sitting there who jumped up, and he said, "Hodding, can I talk to you for two seconds?" And I turned to Hodding, and I said, "Who's that guy?" And Hodding said, "Oh, he's the sort of weekend guy for ABC here. His name's Koppel."

Q: Ted Koppel.

HARROD: It's the first time I'd ever seen Ted Koppel, who was starting his, you know, "America Held Hostage" thing and went on to many greater things.

Q: How did you view Hodding Carter in a professional sense?

HARROD: Well, I have to hedge my opinion here a tad because... Well, let me just say that I think he's the best State Department spokesperson we've ever had. That's my hedging. He was a marvelous guy to work with. He managed to convey the official information while appearing to be casual, humorous. Nothing conveys information better than appearing to do it in that manner, I think. You get your points across, but you don't seem as though you're reading from a prepared statement. So Hodding is the A-list in my book. He also was a lot of fun to work with. I had him in Moscow a couple of times and then dealt with him back here in Washington. He was witty, approachable, and a lot of fun.

Q: Were people working on the Task Force at all concerned about how the Carter administration was responding to this crisis in that Jimmy Carter was so concentrated on the hostage crisis that it seemed to inhibit him? I mean, he was limited to sort of the Rose Garden strategy and all. Was this considered a problem at the time?

HARROD: It might have been by some people, but I don't think by us dealing with the Task Force. I thought the President was obviously concerned by this issue. One personally might think, as you suggested there, perhaps more than he might otherwise have been, but I think particularly when the families came to Washington and the President came over and met with them it was a boost for them to know that the fate of their relatives was of concern at the highest level, because I said there was a feeling in this country, you know, like who cares about these people, anyway, and let's, you know, go beat up on the Iranians? I've seen the same thing with these three unfortunate soldiers who are being held right now over in Serbia. You know, well, they're dead anyway, so who cares? Well, they're not, and one of the things about this country is we do tend to care about our people, and we cared about the hostages.

I remember one of the times I was quoted in *The Washington Post*, but not by name, unfortunately, was when the people came back and I was handling the media over at the Marriott in Crystal City and one of the correspondents - everybody was trying to get access to these people. They were being given basically the run of the Marriott, but we would not let them meet directly with the media unless the media would put in a specific request and the person would have a chance to okay it and then come down and meet. Well, one of the *Washington Post* reporters at the end of her story said that somebody had asked about the hostages and a spokesman said, "They're not hostages anymore. They're free to do whatever they want." And they weren't hostages; they were out.

Q: There was this abortive attempt to rescue the hostages using helicopters, which fell

afoul in the Iranian-

HARROD: -desert.

Q: -desert, and not too long thereafter, Cyrus Vance resigned. How were both these events viewed?

HARROD: Well, I heard about the abortive rescue mission the way most people in Washington probably did. My radio alarm went off that morning, and I remember snapping to as I heard, you know, "Somebody reported killed" in this abortive mission in the Iranian desert. And when I got into the office that morning, I actually had to look at a map to try to figure out where this might have taken place, so we had no knowledge of it, nor should we have had. I think the feeling was, once we had learned about it, that Vance had opposed it; he had refused to say anything until it happened, and then he resigned on principle. And Hodding Carter did the same thing, being the loyal spokesman for his boss. Hodding had a great deal of affection for Vance and I think felt that if Vance was leaving, the only thing he could do was leave. I respect the principle. I think it might have been a little too high-minded for the circumstances, but, well, I think we all respected it.

Q: Well, then, you'd left in '81, really, with the advent of the... Was it your time, or was it the change of administration?

HARROD: No, it was neither. It was again one of these things where I've learned that mostly my career was subject to the whims of others. Toward the end of '81, I was back to my role in the office of Near Eastern Affairs as the policy officer, and my boss, at the time, Ted Curran-

Q: -whom I've just finished interviewing-

HARROD: -tipped me that higher-ups in USIA had suggested to him that I be moved over to the Voice of America, which was in some disarray at the time, to take over as policy officer of the Voice of America. I had no inkling of this. No one had said a word to me, and Ted tipped me that I might be getting a call about this. And so it was over the Christmas holidays, I think, and I had time to listen to the phone ring and not answer it a few times while I thought about what I wanted to do, because I knew that the Voice of America has the reputation of being sort of a hotbed of intrigue and high political drama. So when I finally got the call from the counselor of USIA, whose name was Jock Shirley, the same guy who had plucked me out of Poland, and he said, "We want you to go over to VOA, starting now" - like right then. The only answer I could say was "yes." And so I did get him to lay off, I think, until Christmas was over, and about two days after Christmas I reported to the Voice of America, where I believe the poor fellow I was replacing didn't know he was leaving yet. And I went in as policy director for the Voice of America at a time, as I said, of some disarray. The Reagan administration was trying to put its imprint on VOA. The director was a fellow named James Conkling, who was a California buddy of Reagan's but, quite frankly, was not really well suited to that job, and they were putting in a new management team, basically, at the next level down. Terry

Catherman was the deputy director of VOA, Sam Courtney became sort of the director for policy and programs, and I moved in as the policy office head. I didn't last all that long. In about eight months, Charlie Wick fired me, but it was probably the most politically charged eight months of my life.

Q: Okay, well, let's talk about the politics of the Voice of America.

HARROD: Oh, yes. The view at VOA, you had your career journalist types, who hated any kind of government interference, even though it was a government radio station. You had the Reagan administration attempting to imprint its own political views on the Voice of America, and then you had the career Foreign Service people, who were kind of in the middle. There are hardly any Foreign Service people, if any, left at VOA these days, but in those days there was a sort of middle-upper echelon of Foreign Service people there.

And it was quite an experience. I remember my very first staff meeting, when I was being introduced as the new policy director, and one of my old friends at VOA, since I had a number of them, largely in the Russian Service, came over to me after the meeting and she said to me, "Well, which faction are you with?" And I said, "I'm not with any faction. I'm just here trying to do my job." And she said, "Well, the mere fact that people see you talking with me is going to put you in one faction." Anyway, it was a very Balkan kind of a place. One thing I neglected to mention is that one of the reasons I think I was pulled down there to be the policy director was just a few weeks earlier martial law had been proclaimed in Poland, and I was, of course, formerly in Poland, spoke the language - and I think one of the reasons they wanted me down there was to try to make sure the nuances of our policy with respect to Poland were carried forward. I used to keep a box called a "Strojer," with which you could dial up any of the broadcasts on VOA and a lot of other things as well, and a lot of times I would keep it on the Polish Service and listen to what the Polish service was saying, which I don't think the Polish Service liked very much.

Anyway, it was a very difficult assignment. I felt like I was caught in the middle, and I remember there was somebody down there who was supposed to be sort of the editorial writer, if you will, for VOA, who was a Reagan administration appointee named Phil Nicoliades. Phil came from Houston and was a very conservative chap whose job it was to reflect the new administration's view in editorials. His office adjoined mine, and we actually had a door that connected, and when I arrived and took over my new job, I found a locksmith changing the lock on that door. And I stuck my head around and said, "Thanks for the vote of confidence, Phil." And Phil ultimately was squeezed out because he never wrote an editorial that they could possibly put on the air because it was all this rabid stuff about, you know, Brezhnev and his trained barking seals. You know, the kind of thing that you would expect TASS to do, and not us.

Anyway, it was a tough job, and I found my name being bandied about in publications like *Human Rights*, this time by name. I could never get quoted when I was a spokesman, but when I was no longer a spokesman, my name kept popping up on either one of two extremes: either I was a wishy-washy Foreign Service type who was not a true

"Reaganaut" for the conservatives, or I was part of the policy *aparat* that was in to squelch the independent journalism types. I think at the beginning I was viewed by the career people at VOA as somebody who was coming in to try to force them to say things they didn't want to say in policy terms, and by the time I left, I was one of the few remaining defenders of journalistic integrity. One of the issues I remember fighting was the White House was extremely upset once when VOA referred to Taiwan, and not as the Republic of China. And I pointed out that that was the official policy of the United States, that we had recognized the People's Republic of China and we didn't call Taiwan that any more. And in fact, the State Department said that, but there were some people in the National Security Council at the White House who didn't like the fact that that was our official policy. So you got caught in the middle of all of this, and finally I was squeezed out. Mr. Conkling left and was replaced by John Hughes, who had been USIA's director of policy and programs. And he came down and took over VOA, a very fine guy. I wish he'd stayed longer, but about the time Conkling was leaving was when I knew my days were numbered. There was an issue of a very conservative congressman from Long Island who took on VOA in *Human Events* and criticized it for a whole bill of goods.

Q: Human Events *being-*

HARROD: -a very conservative publication which was read widely in the Reagan administration. Anyway, the congressman was named Labouteliere, I think, and he took on VOA and had a bill of about a dozen particulars that he thought VOA was doing wrong, on the front page of *Human Events*, one of them being muzzling Alexander Solzhenitsyn. What in fact happened was Solzhenitsyn had done an interview and he had strongly criticized our Western European allies about something - the French and the British and the Germans - in rather intemperate language, and when the Russian Service had done his interview they had paraphrased that part of it. They hadn't used his exact language, and this was "muzzling Alexander Solzhenitsyn." And so the head of the Russian Service was in the dock, and we had a big meeting down in Conkling's office with Charlie Wick, the director of VOA, a number of other people, including the congressman and his staff, about this issue, and they were pillorying the head of the Russian Service. And I rose to her defense and said that basically she was using editorial judgment. This was not censorship; this was what any journalist would do. And Charlie Wick then went after me, and I learned one thing at the time, which is you never disagree with Charlie Wick. And he said, "Well, you're saying" x, y, and z, and I said, "No, that's not what I'm saying; what I'm saying is - " Well, you never disagree with Charlie, so I was told after that meeting that my days as policy director at VOA were numbered. I actually hung on for the rest of John Hughes's brief - four-month, I think - tenure as director before Hughes was importuned by George Shultz to become his official spokesman at the State Department. So I left on the same day John Hughes actually did, and we walked down to our last staff meeting together, and I remember telling him how much people were going to miss him because he was a very good, if brief, director of VOA. When you have a Pulitzer Prize, it's hard for the career journalists there to look at you as a political hack. And I said, "People are going to miss you." And he said to me, "Well, people are going to miss you, too, but we're both making the right move here." So my tenure at VOA lasted about eight months and then I left there. But it is something to,

you know... I remember coming home from work one day, and a friend of mine from USIA called. The phone rang as I walked in the front door, and I picked it up, and he said, "Turn on WRC radio right now." And I did, and it was Phil Nicoliades, the editorial writer who had been canned from VOA, on the Braden-Buchanan show or something, talking about, you know, the people who had been out to get him at VOA, including that "striped-pants cookie-pusher Jack Harrod." It was nice for the notoriety, but on the other hand... I still keep my press clipping from those days, where I was mentioned here and there.

So I left in August of '82, and my *eminence grise*, Mr. Shirley, said, "I realize we put you on the hot seat over there at VOA and got you right in the middle of a very difficult issue. What would you like to do?" And I had put in my name for the Congressional Fellowship Program some months earlier but had thought this was not going to happen because I assumed my tenure at VOA was going to be longer than it turned out to be. And so I said to Jock, well, I am an applicant for the Congressional Fellowship, and lo and behold, bingo, I got the Congressional Fellowship and left VOA, took a month off, and then went up to Capitol Hill, which as someone pointed out to me at the time, was a perfect elevation from which to piss on the administration. And that was a totally different experience, and it was a very good one because I had just gone through the ringer for eight months of being right in the middle of a lot of difficult stuff and having your name in the public prints. It was sort of like honorable exile for a year and a half up on the Hill, where I could get away from a lot of this. I also managed, quite inadvertently, to also be away from USIA when it physically moved from Pennsylvania Avenue down to Southwest DC, so I managed to avoid all of the dislocation of the move by being on Capitol Hill at the time.

Q: While you were at the Voice of America, under the beginning of the Reagan administration - you've already made some reference to it - but what was the impression of Charles Wick and how he operated, initially?

HARROD: Well, I mean, there are many people who look back at Charlie Wick as having been the leader at the glory years of USIA because he got us lots of money and played the piano at the White House. You know, Mary Anne Wick and Nancy Reagan were bosom buddies, and that Charlie was well connected. I cannot disagree with any of that. I mean, Charlie was the best connected director, probably, that USIA has ever had, Ed Murrow included. The fact that he was a temperamental, difficult guy who had only the vaguest understanding of what was going on is another issue. I found him an effective director in some respects. I found him as a human being somebody I would like to be a long ways away from. He fired me from my VOA job. He later commended me in a couple of notes I've got from him. One thing is he would fire you one day, and the next day he didn't even remember who you were. So it was not a long-term personal thing at all; it's just that he was a very volcanic difficult human being, I guess perhaps coming from the background that he came from out there in the business world, maybe that was the way he thought things were done. I personally did not care for him very much, but he was well connected and got the agency lots of money.

Q: But what was the feeling, he was very strong on the idea of having - what was it? - "Telenet" or whatever?

HARROD: "Worldnet" television. Not a bad idea, except that the question is what do you do with it? When later (this moves us a couple of years down the road but it's appropriate here), later when Worldnet finally did get up and running I was at a conference in Brussels, and the head of Worldnet was there, and he was saying, "Starting next week we're going on two hours a day every day." Up to that point it had been used on a spot occasion to do a specific thing. He said, "We're going to be on the air every day for two hours." And he was just delighted with this. And I said, "What are you going to put on?" He said, "We haven't worked that out yet." I mean, in some respects, the technology was the issue and not the substance, and I would approach it from the other direction: what are you going to say, before you try to say it? But Charlie had some good ideas; it's just that I found him a difficult human being. One of the things in VOA that we tried to do during my brief tenure - I had come into the job, and I think part of the reason they had put me in the job was that in traveling around the Middle East in my job in the Near East area office, I would come back and write reports about what people told me about a number of things, including VOA, and people out there in the outside world looked at VOA as the official radio station of the U.S. government, and they thought that whatever VOA said was policy. Well, of course, if you know VOA, you know that's not the case at all. They say pretty much whatever they want to say, and they had something called "commentaries" at the time, which were done by the VOA commentators without any policy clearance. So when I came into the VOA job, my first goal had been to try to delineate what is policy from what is news, and make it clear to the listener. And so I had an idea, and then when Gene Pell, who had been a correspondent I knew from my Moscow days, came in as the head of the news division at VOA, he and I worked together on a policy which was analogous to a newspaper. We set up editorials, something later that people at VOA and USIA hated, because they didn't understand why we did it. But basically we were trying to separate editorial opinion from the news, so it would be clear to a listener: you know, "The following is the official view of the U.S. government," and you get your editorial - like a newspaper. You've got op-ed pieces, where you have other people's views, you have your editorials, and you have news. Editorials don't slop over into the news, and vice versa. So we set up this policy during my brief eight months, and it obtained at VOA for quite a number of years. I don't know if they still - they were trying to get rid of it back in '95 and '96. I don't know if they ever did. But as I say, people didn't understand why we did it. What we did was to try to lock the policy in to two or three minutes of the hour and have the rest of it untouchable by the policy hacks like me, but it was not entirely clear. Anyway, Charlie Wick didn't understand a lot of this either, quite frankly. He signed off on the policy and promulgated it, but I'm not sure he understood that the news was then supposed to be inviolate, rather than having his friends at the White House dictate what news would be broadcast and what wouldn't be.

Q: In Congress, you were doing this Congressional thing from when to when, and which congressman?

HARROD: The program, which is a marvelous program, and I keep my membership in the American Political Science Association up to this day, the Program officially ran from September to ’82 until the following year, August of ’83. I got an extension which took me all the way through to the end of 1983, so I was there for almost a year and a half. The program has some academic preparation at Johns Hopkins, at SAIS, and then you basically are supposed to spend the rest of the time working for a congressman and/or a senator. They actually prefer if you do one and one, half the time with a congressman and half the time with a senator. And it’s disturbingly like having to go out and find a real job because you have to go around from office to office with your résumé, trying to get people to take you on, even though it doesn’t cost them anything. I had one slight advantage when I got to the point where I was job-hunting on the hill, I called an old junior officer trainee classmate of mine, Jim Leach, who is now a congressman from Iowa, and I went up to see him, and I said, “Can you give me some advice about people that might want somebody with my background, and can I use you as a reference?” And all this other stuff. And he said, let me think about it, and he called me at home that night and he said, “Why not me?” So I spent my first five months working for Jim Leach, and then in May of ’83, I moved over to the office of Senator Jeff Bingaman from New Mexico. Leach and Bingaman are still on the Hill, and I still keep in contact with them. Great experience, I highly recommend it. Anybody who’s coming up through the ranks and has an opportunity to do a Congressional Fellowship should. You learn an awful lot about how our system works by being up on the Hill. There’s a tendency in the Executive Branch, in the foreign affairs side of it in particular, to look at it as sort of your own personal bailiwick - you know, “We do foreign policy, so we know what we’re doing.” And when you’re up on the Hill and you’re getting 2,000 letters a week from your constituents about a particular foreign policy issue, and you read the Constitution, you realize that the Congress does, in fact, have a role in foreign policy, of which some of them are reminding us now as we’re into this Kosovo business.

So I spent the first five months with Leach and then the rest of the time with Bingaman, and during the time I was up there, Central America was the big issue - Contras, Ollie North, all of that stuff was going on; Lebanon - the Marine barracks got blown up. So there were quite a number of foreign policy issues to keep me busy. That was my thing. I went to work for Leach sort of as an extra body.

Q: Leach was from what district?

HARROD: Republican from Iowa, Davenport, and he and I had known each other, as I said, as Foreign Service JOTs together - tremendously nice guy, and the fact that I had known him gave me a certain access that I probably wouldn’t have had if I’d just come in as a regular Foreign Service officer. Jim thinks highly of the Foreign Service, and he thinks very highly of Foreign Service officers’ writing abilities, so I spent most of my time with Leach writing things for him, whether it be floor statements or columns (he did a weekly column for local newspapers) or speeches or press releases, whatever. I did a lot of writing, mostly foreign policy issues, but that was it. And in fact, he wanted me to stay on with him and perhaps even work on a book, and what I opted for was the idea of the program, which was you were supposed to get a broader experience, and I went over and

interviewed with Bingaman's people, and he'd just been elected, really didn't have a staff put together yet, and he didn't have anybody doing foreign policy as a full-time thing. So he took me on, and I spent my time over there doing less writing and more issue work on foreign policy. I did some writing; I mean, he introduced legislation on Central America which I drafted, and I wrote some speeches for him. But that was more issue-oriented, going to more meetings. I remember I met a lot of the Central American types, Comandante Zero and Rubén Zamora, and some of these other people who were big in the Nicaragua issue at the time, on both sides of it. It was part of the world I didn't know much of anything about. And it's humbling at times. When I went to work for Bingaman, one of my jobs clearly spelled out was, since Bingaman did not have a big background in foreign affairs (he was attorney general of New Mexico) and Central America was the big issue, he sort of wanted me to set up a kind of a seminar for him, you know, meetings with people who could brief him. And I got ahold of Sol Linowitz and we arranged to have lunch at the Monocle Restaurant, and so Bingaman and I and Linowitz and, I think, Bingaman's chief of staff all went for lunch at the Monocle, and Bingaman's a very sharp guy, and he was attorney general, he's a lawyer, he's organized, and he was asking all the right questions about the Panama Canal Treaty and the relationships with the countries in Central America, and Linowitz was impressed, and Linowitz was giving this professorial background on everything, I mean, it was a tremendous exchange, exactly what we wanted, and as we came out after lunch, you know, Linowitz looks up at Bingaman and says, "Well, Senator," he says, "is foreign affairs going to be one of your real interests here on the Hill" and Bingaman said, "Not really." But it was a good experience. I highly recommend it because the Congress is an important part of our system, and Foreign Service officers, frankly, don't pay much attention to it.

Q: How did you find the role of the staff in Congress, because often one gets the impression - this is probably the Foreign Service point of view - that often unelected members of Congressional staff can often direct their principal off on odd ways, or just regular ways, and often they almost get the bit in the teeth themselves rather than their principals, often on foreign affairs? Did you find this?

HARROD: Yes, it's certainly a possibility. It didn't happen in the two offices I worked in. I would also point out that nobody elected Foreign Service officers to do anything, either, and they've been known to get the bit in their teeth if their boss tells them to, too. So really, the responsibility comes back to the member of Congress. If the member of Congress lets his or her staff people run amok, then it's the responsibility of that member of Congress. I worked for two thoughtful, intelligent guys who never would have let me run anywhere, much less amok, but on the other hand, the advantage of being up on the Hill is you need one clearance. If I saw something that I thought was of interest to Leach or Bingaman, then I went in and said I think we ought to cosponsor this bill or I think we ought to do this, and they said "yes" or checked the right box on the memo - that's all you need, you don't need anything else, that's it, it's a go.

Q: Did you have the feeling, particularly on this Latin American business where politics were really very strong and there was a lot of pressure that you were up against very strong proponents and opponents of what we were doing in Central America? Did you

feel you were being tugged? How did you react to this?
HARROD: Some of that was there. I said afterwards - I wrote a paper for USIA - it was interestingly very, very much like the Foreign Service officer stationed overseas. When I would go back to, particularly Bingaman's, home state in New Mexico, which I did on a couple of occasions and made weeklong tours of the state, I would be meeting with concerned groups of constituents in universities, with newspaper editors, the exact kinds of people that if I were a USIA officer stationed in country X, I'd be meeting in country X. The difference was I was not reflecting the national policy; I was trying to communicate to them what the senator felt about things and listen to their views. I must say, there was more anti-administration sentiment out there at the time than there was... It wasn't go in and kill the Commies in Nicaragua; it was more why is the U.S. supporting the Contras? While I was on the Hill the Boland Amendment passed, I think, something like 407 to nothing, which said that the U.S. government shouldn't give any money to the Contras, which Ollie North was violating left, right, and center at the time. So there was a lot of this, but I never felt pressured, I never felt that it was an uncivil dialogue. People had different views, and they were expressing them, but in many ways it was a lot more of a rational discussion than I've had in the executive Branch on issues, and that you were free to engage in a discussion. There was no central command decision that this is the policy. Both Leach and Bingaman were open to other views.

Q: Bingaman was what party?

HARROD: Democrat. He was the quintessential moderate Democrat, and Leach is the quintessential moderate Republican, so I was dealing with two guys who were basically very easy to deal with and open to discussion. It was an interesting experience. In no way was it typical. One way in which it was definitely atypical, was some of the other members of the fellowship program that were there the same year I was and worked for bigger names, and they might see Senator X, you know, twice a month and refer to them always as "Senator X," whereas with both Leach and Bingaman we were on first-name terms and I saw them all day every day, and it was a much more of a give and take. So I think I got a lot out of the program, and as I say, I recommend it to anybody.

Q: In getting your information, how did you find that USIA and the Department of State responded to what you were trying to do?

HARROD: I used two tactics, and I never was sure which one would work best. In some cases, particularly when I was with Leach and we were trying to do some things for constituents - there were a couple of visa cases where, you know, there were humanitarian concerns - I never could tell whether calling somebody in the State Department that I knew and pulling the old-boy kind of, you know, "Hi, this is Jack, you know we worked together at so-and-so, can you help me out on this one" was better than simply calling up and saying, "This is Congressman Leach's office." I think you got a better response the second way than the first way sometimes because there was this, every time you introduced yourself as somebody from a senator or a congressman's office when you're calling the Department of State, there tended to be this momentary gasp at the other end. They produced pretty well. I had very few reasons to deal with

USIA, though, from that vantage point.

Q: I wouldn't think so.

HARROD: Nor did I particularly want to, since I described my departure from VOA and my chance to sort of sit it out for a year and a half.

Q: Did you run across the actions of the NSC at all? I was just thinking on the Iran-Contra business and all that. You were there fairly early on, but did the NSC, did you have any contact with them?

HARROD: No, very little. I had an advantage and a disadvantage. Working with Leach, Leach was a maverick within the Republican Party and was not considered to be following the party line at all, so he did not necessarily have the best connections to the White House at all, except to Vice President Bush. And with Bingaman I was dealing with the Democrats, so again, there was not much connection to the White House there. He had nothing to contribute there, really.

Q: Well, I thought we might quit at this point, and we'll pick it up the next time in 1983. You left the Congressional Fellowship, and whither?

HARROD: At the end of '83 I left the Congressional Fellowship, went back to USIA briefly, for six months, to running Fulbright program for Europe. That was, again, something I was kind of forced into because I had six months to gap before I left, and in the summer of '84 I went off to Poland as public affairs officer.

Q: Okay, so we'll touch on the Fulbright in the end of '83, and then we'll move to Poland. That's great.

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Today is April the 22nd, 1999.

HARROD: Earth Day.

Q: Is it Earth Day?

HARROD: Lenin's Birthday - 129 today-

Q: Yes, well, Hitler-
HARROD: -and my 28th wedding anniversary.

Q: Oh, very good. And two days ago was Hitler's 110th birthday.

HARROD: We got married on April 22nd in Afghanistan in 1971. To answer the question, we had gotten a million times on exhibits in the Soviet Union, what do you do

on Lenin's birthday? Well, we'd say, we always have a glass of champagne.

Q: Okay, Jack, let's start. First we want to talk a bit about the Fulbright.

HARROD: That was a very brief assignment, and just another example of being shoehorned into something I hadn't intended to do because of people higher up in the pecking order, which ultimately turned out to be a valuable thing. I mean, I came out of my Congressional Fellowship at the end of '83; I knew I was going to Poland in the summer of '84, and I was basically hoping I could spend six months sort of sitting in the European bureau reading the files and working myself in, but another one of my sometime mentors, Jodie Lewinsohn, who was the senior career person in USIA's Cultural and Educational Exchange Bureau at the time, had just had a long-time civil servant retire who had been in charge of the Fulbright Program for Europe, and so she needed to plug somebody into that gap, and she plugged me into it. I didn't particularly want it. It turned out to be an interesting six or seven months because I figured out how the educational exchange programs worked, how they budgeted, and frankly it stood me in good stead when I got overseas and was a PAO and needed money for an educational exchange program.

Q: I just thought I'd make sort of obvious comments, but for somebody who's thinking about a career, if you try to plan things out too much, you usually miss opportunities you don't know are there.

HARROD: My experience up until the end of my career, probably, but for at least the first 20 years of my career, my assumption was anything that I was trying to do wouldn't work, and it was better simply not to plan too far ahead and go with the flow. I've told you how I got put in to Poznan, how I got put into the first Soviet job, the exhibit job, where I was sort of a branch PAO. The Congressional Fellowship thing kind of fell into my lap. The job at VOA was something I had not anticipated till the day they called me. And this Fulbright job was something somewhat similar. It was a pleasant six or seven months, and as I said, I was in charge of budgeting the program for the whole of Europe, West and East, which was a lot of money, and I had never done any budgeting much before, and this was good experience. And as I said, when I became a PAO, I knew how to find the money back in Washington when I needed to.

Q: Tell me about the Fulbright and how it was worked in Europe, although you were working the money, that's where to look. Did you see any patterns? This would be in the early '80s.

HARROD: Yes, the pattern at the time, quite frankly, which was something that evolved later, but given the nature of the governments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in those days, the Fulbright Program was always administered on a government-to-government basis. There were no Fulbright Commissions. And so when you were budgeting, you sort of had to start with what the bilateral treaties with the Russians or the Poles or the Hungarians mandated. In a way, it was preferential treatment for the East because they were always guaranteed of X number of dollars, or at least X number of

grants, which translated into dollars, because there was a state-to-state agreement. For Western Europeans, and I later discovered this as a PAO in Western Europe, had to kind of take whatever money was left over, and it was then apportioned on some basis or another, and it sort of changed from year to year. But the advantage was, of course, to have a bilateral agreement in Eastern Europe, and you knew exactly what you were going to get. When I later became vice chairman of a Fulbright Commission in Western Europe, it was a little bit of a dicey thing because you never really knew from year to year where your money was going to be or how much you'd have. That's kind of what I learned. I also learned where the reserves were built into the system back in Washington, which is what you later, you know, when I was in Warsaw, to jump ahead just a little bit, and we needed to come up with a Fulbright grant to get a Solidarity journalist to the States for the year and it wasn't in my budget, I knew whom to call in Washington and tell him which drawer to look in where the files were kept where the money was. So I knew how to get the money. So never turn down a job that involves controlling money in Washington because it will serve you in good stead overseas.

Q: Did you see any pattern of where the students of Eastern Europe were going and types of work or anything of this nature?

HARROD: We talked a little bit about this earlier. The disparity always was that the Americans who were going were studying history or culture or literature, and the East Europeans coming to the States were studying physics and computer sciences or whatever was big at the time. But as I said earlier, I don't know how you really get around that because-

Q: -that's what we teach.

HARROD: -that's what we're good at, and our students generally want to go to Europe to study things that they can't study in the United States. So-

Q: If both can serve national interests, at that time for the Soviet empire, but it also exposed people to the United States-

HARROD: Sure.

Q: -and served us well after everything fell apart.

HARROD: Sure, and I think one of the problems that we've always faced - USIA always faced as an agency - was that it oscillated between concerns for short-term policy-oriented stuff, which was the Reagan administration and Charlie Wick, and the long-term bridge-building aspect of its work, which was something that John Reinhardt and the Carter administration had emphasized. I never understood why you couldn't do both, and I still don't understand why you can't do both, but at various periods in its history, USIA kind of oscillated between the two. My version on this is you're not going to succeed in making your short-term message and solving your short-term policy problems if you haven't invested the time and effort in building the long-term relationships. The Fulbright

Program is one of the best ways to do that. There is simply nothing better than having someone come and live here for a year or two and learn about the United States. The same goes the other way, with Americans living abroad. I applied for a Fulbright when I was in graduate school to go to Yugoslavia to study Marxist legal theory. I didn't get it. I'm probably happy I didn't get it, but it would have been certainly a unique and useful experience.

Q: Did the Wick administration at the USIA pay much attention to what you were doing, or were you kind of under the Radar?

HARROD: Under the radar most of the time. There were times when he would suddenly pop up high on the radar screen. I mentioned that Charlie Wick essentially fired me from my VOA job. During my six months in working in the Fulbright Program I received two commendations from him, one when we had I think it was biannual, cultural talks with the Germans. The Germans were very big on having formal talks every couple of years, and we hosted them in '84.

Q: You say Germans.
HARROD: West Germany, in those days, Federal Republic. And we hosted the talks in '84. One of the disparities in the Fulbright Program had always been that the Germans put more money into it than we did for the bilateral program. I did some rejiggering of how we calculated the costs, because we had never really captured the costs that we paid to the contracting agencies who, basically, administered the program. So when we captured those costs and calculated them out per exchangee, our support of the program looked a lot better, and when the Germans came to town, Charlie put those numbers on the table, and the Germans were impressed that the American support was more than they had thought it was. And then Reagan went to Ireland in '84, and they wanted him to announce something. I think he was visiting the university in Cork or somewhere, and they wanted something. And so I reached into the drawer and came up with another hundred thousand dollars or something for our Fulbright Program with Ireland, which was totally anomalous. There wasn't even a Fulbright Commission in Ireland, but it was an easy one to suddenly triple the number of grants or whatever it was, and I got a nice little note from Charlie Wick thanking me for my contribution to the success of the President's visit to Ireland. You pop up on the radar screen when the front office needs something, basically.

Q: Okay, you went to Poland from when to when?

HARROD: Poland was the summer of '84 until the summer '87, three years as public affairs officer.

Q: Now could you explain what the public affairs officer was at that time and sort of the general duties, and then we'll talk about the embassy and then what you did?

HARROD: Well, public affairs officer, or as we called it in Warsaw, because it was Eastern Europe, we called it the "counselor for press and cultural affairs," and we didn't

use the title PAO, public affairs officer, except in intra-USIA parlance. The fiction always had been in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union that there was no separate U.S. information service, that it was part of the embassy and therefore we used the diplomatic titles and not the functional ones. But basically I was in charge of the embassy's cultural exchange programs, educational exchange programs, information - meaning daily information to the media - and long-term information programs to sort of make information about the United States available to the Polish public.

I should note that fires tended to follow me around. I got burned out in Moscow, and about four months before I arrived in Warsaw, the embassy there was hit by a big fire and all of the USIS press and cultural section (P & C, as we called it) offices were burned out, so I spent my first six months in Warsaw in provisional quarters in the basement while they rebuilt the place. I worry about fires. I have been burned out of two embassies.

But the thing about Poland that even people in Washington I don't think quite appreciated was that this was a very, very interesting time. Poland had just come out of martial law. Obviously, we don't want to go through a whole lot of history here, because I wasn't there, but martial law was imposed, Solidarity was cracked down on, people were imprisoned, finally martial law was lifted, and I arrived not too long after. And it was a period that was sort of a murky one in U.S.-Polish relations. Officially, our relations were still quite bad. Caspar Weinberger, the Secretary of Defense, had called General Jaruzelski a Russian general in a Polish uniform, which apparently really pissed off Jaruzelski. I mean he took it as a personal affront, and for the whole three years I was there the one thing that the Poles said would get relations back on track was if Weinberger apologized for his remark, which, of course, he was never about to do. But it was one guarantee that General Jaruzelski was <u>not</u> a Russian general in a Polish uniform because he took personal umbrage at being called one.

Anyway, a very interesting period. When we arrived in '84, shortly after we arrived, the dissident priest Father Popieluszko was murdered, and his body was fished out of a reservoir not too far from Warsaw on a night when my wife was the duty officer and we were at the chargé's residence for a film showing, and we got the call that they'd found the body. That sent us rushing to the embassy to get a cable out to Washington. A couple of months after I left, as PAO, I was called back on temporary duty to Warsaw to help work on the visit of Vice President Bush. So we went from the murder of Solidarity priests to the Vice President of the United States making the first high-level official visit to Warsaw in years. And that was sort of the way it was for those years. It was a very interesting assignment because, unlike Moscow, where your ability to deal with the quote opposition unquote was very, very limited because of security, in Poland officially things were difficult, but in private they weren't nearly as difficult as they were on the official level, and we did an awful lot of things in Poland that we couldn't quite take public credit for. But one of the things that makes Poland a fascinating place was one of my last days in '87 before I left I was doing some farewell calls, and I think I was the only American embassy official in at least half a dozen years who went to the Communist Party, the Polish United Workers Party (excuse me), headquarters in downtown Warsaw to pay a farewell visit on an old friend of mine from my first tour in Poland back in the '70s who

had risen to become a department head in the Party Central Committee, and I was even greeted at the door by a secretary who called me "comrade," which I thought was amusing. And then I went from there, having just visited the party headquarters, to have lunch with another good friend, who was a Catholic opposition member of the Polish Parliament, and we had a very ostentatious lunch in the Parliament dining room so that he could show off the fact that he was seeing somebody from the American embassy. So the fact that you could work both sides of the street made Poland an interesting place.

Q: When you arrived there, you'd been there before, and the martial law was declared after you'd left before.

HARROD: Oh, yes.

Q: As you met with people who'd been around, and you knew the area, did you talk to people about why the martial law, the situation, and how would it work? Was this felt to be almost a necessary action, or-

HARROD: It depended on who you talked to, obviously; there were different views on the subject. I think some of the more rabid opposition people never really forgave General Jaruzelski for having done what he did. The Jaruzelski line was essentially that they had to do it or the Russians would have done it for them. It's hard to tell, but I think again the interesting thing about Poland is, after all the bitterness and the martial law (and there were, in fact, some people killed), you now have situations where both the Solidarity people and General Jaruzelski are on talking terms again, and they've made a pretty good job of patching it all together. One of the things that was not appreciated by a lot of people, including in the policy-making circles in Washington, is that you probably could find three committed communists in the whole country.

Anyway, I found a quote from Stalin that I wrote into our country plan and mentioned to a few people like Richard Reeves, the columnist for the LA Times Syndicate. Stalin once said putting communism in Poland was like putting a saddle on a cow. It really didn't fit, and the Poles didn't use the term *comrade* except if they were Party officials. They were still very formal, polite. Everybody is "Sir" or "Madam." Private agriculture. So there was a veneer of ideology, but not much of a one, unlike Moscow again, in great distinction to the former Soviet Union. So as I said, we worked both sides of the street, and while I was there as PAO, we were dealing with the Catholic Church opposition, with the Solidarity labor people, with dissident journalists, and at the same time we had some contacts with government officialdom, even party people. Not as much in the beginning, but toward the end of that period, you were having more and more of that. And there were things that we were doing which we thought we were doing sort of creatively to avoid government retaliation, and in fact the government probably knew what we were doing all along and just basically let us do it. They had banned USIA, essentially, before I got there, during my VOA assignment, so that would have been early '82, I guess. The Reagan crowd and Charlie Wick had put this extravaganza on television and radio called "Let Poland Be Poland," which mightily honked off the Jaruzelski people, and at that point they then banned USIA and all of its works, and officially we

didn't exist in Poland. They wouldn't let anybody from USIA/Washington come in on a temporary visa to visit us, which was kind of a blessing, in a way, and I once asked them how come people like me got visas, because we were from USIA, and the Foreign Ministry guy said, "Oh, whoop, that must have been a mistake." So they basically let us in and let us do some things as long as we didn't put the USIA banner on it and make a big deal. We would send people to the States on the International Visitor Program, by giving them tourist visas. Our Consular Section was quite creative and helpful in this way, because essentially they'd go off to visit Uncle Stas in Milwaukee as a tourist, and when they'd arrive in the States, their visa would be changed to a J-1 and they would be given their three-week USIA-sponsored International Visitor Program, and one of my grantees, who was a stage designer with some very loose ties to kind of the creative artistic opposition, came back from his visit and had to turn his passport in to the local police station (which was what you did in those days), and when he did, the official asked him how his trip to the States had been. He sort of hemmed and hawed a bit, said oh, he'd had a real nice time, and the official said, "Oh, we know what you've been doing," he said, "but was it a useful trip?" And the guy said, "Sure." And the policeman said, "Fine." So as long as we didn't make a big deal out of it, lots of things took place.

There are some things that emerged in my subliminal consciousness while we were there. One was the importance of television and video material. At the beginning, what we did was we invested a lot of money in multi-system VCR equipment, meaning it could play both European and American tapes. And then we loaned these VCRs out to various institutions on long-term loan from the U.S. embassy. Most of these institutions happened to be Church- or Solidarity-related cultural groups, and then we could funnel American videotapes to them, and they could use their equipment. We essentially had a wide distribution network around Poland using video, which is something that I hadn't done in previous assignments. Toward the end of my time there, my press attaché, Paul Smith, found that one of his neighbors had a satellite dish and was pulling in CNN and Worldnet and these other things directly into his house, and so we invested in a satellite dish - Paul bought it personally, but we reimbursed him for it - and he set it up out at his house, and we started pulling in Worldnet and bringing the tapes to the embassy and showing them in the Cultural Center in the theater every day. And the Poles shortly thereafter tried to put in a law about controlling satellite dishes, even though there was a Polish entrepreneur, I think, up on the Baltic Coast who was making satellite dishes and selling them. The Poles finally put a hold on their law and said they were going to study it for a year or so, by which time there were so many satellite dishes around Poland there was nothing they could do about it, which I think was their intent all along. We can't regulate this. But both of these things struck me with the power of direct communication, which is something I hadn't been able to do in Moscow, where people listening to the Voice of America in crackly, bad reception in the middle of the night was about as close as you could really get. With the videos and particularly with direct satellite broadcasting, you could reach people almost instantaneously and directly and bypass government control. It was quite an impression.

Q: What type of things were you distributing on your VCR tape net?

HARROD: A lot of things that USIA would be distributing to us, some of them commercially available products in the States about U.S. culture, American films, but also when USIA would send out tapes about specific policy kinds of issues, whatever they might be, we could loan those out as well.

Q: Were they put into Polish, dubbed, or were they-

HARROD: Most of it was in English. But there was a wide knowledge of English in Poland, and in some cases we could get them translated if we needed to. We also were doing things, one of the indelible memories I have which kind of illustrates this strange situation in Poland at the time, there was a higher educational institution called, let's see, the Higher School for Planning and Statistics - SGPiS, in Polish - which was sort of their Wharton School, the highest level of economic and foreign trade education they had, and it was right in Warsaw. One day a couple of students from there came to see me at the embassy. We didn't get a whole lot of callers, but they came in and they said that there was a week of Soviet culture that had been organized out at SGPiS by the officials - a week of, you know, Soviet film, dance, song, whatever - and they thought it would be fair to have a week of American culture to balance it out. And this was probably '86, when things were still a bit dicey, and we had some people PNGed from our embassy, so it was still a little iffy. And I said to them, "Do you really think you can do this?" And they said, "Yes, we think we've got enough support to do this." And so we entered into an arrangement, and we began to work with them, and we put together a week-long program that involved lectures, films, the whole week of American culture. And they got the support of their institution to do this. The one sticking point is we needed a fairly large hall for the opening session. We were going to have some talks, and we had a visiting speaker. We needed a fairly large room. And it was exam week at the school, and so most of the large halls were being used, so the students went to the head of the ROTC program, a colonel in the Polish army, and asked if they could use the ROTC hall. And he said "Sure." So to open the week of American culture at this institution, I was up on the podium along with the colonel in his full military rig and other officials from the school, and we had our week of American culture. Strange.

I mentioned PNGs, too. We had three people thrown out of the embassy while I was there, one of them a USIA officer. I almost got thrown out of the embassy. What you had was a sense of various forces kind of struggling within Poland at the time, from the opposition to the more moderate folks in the régime to the real hard-liners maybe on one extreme.

Q: Did you feel that it was the equivalent to the internal security apparatus that was the tough one, or was it more the ideological political people?

HARROD: I think it was probably the internal security apparatus. I mean, part of it was just circumstance. I mean there were three of us in the embassy - at least three of us, maybe four of us - who had dark hair, glasses, and moustaches, and sometimes I think the security folks got us confused. One of the three people who was PNGed was one of us, one of the folks with the glasses and the moustache, but when they started putting out all

the evidence of why they threw him out of the country, at least a couple of the tidbits they had involved others of us in the embassy. They thought he was at a certain place at a certain time, and he wasn't. But I had the misfortune of almost getting bounced out, and my 15 minutes of fame probably was the Polish government spokesman at the time accusing me of things on national television. My cultural attaché was leaving, and I organized a big farewell party for him, and because he was the cultural attaché he had a lot of contacts with the artistic dissident sort of community, and we sent out about 90 invitations for his farewell party, and one of them went to a couple who were translators, who in fact were out of the country when we sent the invitation, and one of the underground Solidarity leaders, who was of some notoriety - he was sort of hiding out since martial law had been proclaimed - was using their apartment while they were away. And the police broke in, caught him, and found the invitation to my house sitting on the table. So the government spokesman was waving it around on television trying to prove that this meant that there were clandestine contacts between the American embassy - and me in particular - with this Solidarity underground leader, whom I of course had never even met - although I met him later. But I thought my number was up. When the farewell party actually took place, 87 of the 90 people came in a pouring rainstorm, and there were two carloads of security police in front of my house. One of the visitors who had never even been to my house before knocked on the window of the security car and said, "Which house is it?" and they pointed at my house. It was a massive turnout, and again, it was to make a point: we're not afraid of you.

Q: You'd been away. When was the last time you were in Poland?

HARROD: I left in '74.

Q: When you came back, basically ten years, could you do a little compare and contrast between the two times?

HARROD: Well, basically, I think the seeds of everything had been there the first time around. I mean you had your reformers, your moderates, your quasi-opposition, and you had your harder-line folk, who were in dog-step with Moscow to the extent that they felt they had to be. Now what had happened is in the meantime, the Solidarity movement, while I was gone, had come to the fore, had been squashed by martial law, and it had pushed everybody out more into the open on the extremes. I don't think anything fundamentally actually had changed. The more I think about it, it had all been there. I think back in the '70s our hope would have been that the more sort of moderate reformist wing of the ruling party would have continued along that path and that Poland would have become more like the Czechs were in '68. In fact, Poles being Poles, things had come to a head. One saying is that if you put two Poles in a room, you get three opinions. And so things had come to a head, but the forces were still there. There were very few radical extremists on either wing. Solidarity itself was a very unstable coalition, if you want to put it that way. I mean I think there was a tendency in Washington to view Solidarity, with Lech Walesa at its head, as a monolithic group. In fact, it was an umbrella that sheltered everybody from right-wing nationalists to left-wing labor folks to the Catholic Church. Everybody sort of fit under that umbrella, and as I think you saw,

after communism officially collapsed in Poland, Solidarity split into its various wings. They had nothing much in common except opposition to the existing régime.

Q: Everybody - both our embassy and all the Poles, who are a particularly politically astute people - must have been watching developments in the Soviet Union. I'm not sure of my exact dates when Gorbachev came to power, but you had a series of dying - Brezhnev, Andropov, then Chernenko - and then Gorbachev, who seemed like an... I mean, was there a feeling that this presence to the east is beginning to become less difficult?

HARROD: Yes, very definitely. And one could sense with Gorbachev's arrival that in some ways the pressure was off the Jaruzelski régime to be hard-line. Jaruzelski's justification for having imposed martial law essentially was that the Russians made him do it. And when the heat was off from the Russians, things changed. I remember Gorbachev came to Warsaw not too long before I left - I can't put a finger on the specific time - but one of the things that struck us was by this point Jaruzelski had reintroduced the pre-World War II Polish military uniforms for the honor guard at the airport, which are four-cornered hats and high boots and all this stuff, so when Gorbachev did arrive, he was met at the airport by this honor guard in the uniforms of the Polish forces that had fought against the Soviet Union in 1921, and then he was taken to the main square of town to lay a wreath at the unknown soldier's grave, the unknown soldier being a soldier who was killed fighting the Soviet Union in 1921. So there was this sense of Polish national spirit already beginning to burble up under the quasi-communist régime of General Jaruzelski. So yes, there was a definite feeling that with the heat off, with reformists beginning to come in the Soviet Union, the Polish régime no longer had the excuse or the justification - whichever one you want to use - for maintaining a hard line internally. And that's when things began to change with Washington. I mean, the first two years I was in Warsaw, we had virtually no visitors from Washington at all. Things were tight, and relations were bad. The last year that I was there, probably about halfway through it, which would have been maybe the end of '86, Deputy Secretary of State Whitehead came in for a visit-

Q: John Whitehead.

HARROD: -John Whitehead - who was the first senior-level U.S. government official, I believe, to have been out there since martial law. Senator Kennedy and most of the Kennedy family came out on Memorial Day Weekend in '87, and Vice President Bush came out in, I think, September of '87, when I came back on TDY. So things began to suddenly thaw, if you will, and in a way, I had had the opportunity to stay in Poland for four years. I had a three-year assignment with an option for a fourth year, and two years into it, when things were pretty bad and people were being PNGed, I elected not to go for the fourth year because I figured it would just be another year of the same thing. And by the time I left in '87 that fourth year looked like it would have been a pretty interesting one because by the end of that fourth year things had really gotten back to full speed. So again, you don't know in this business; when you start looking ahead, you never can predict what's going to happen.

Q: What was your wife doing?

HARROD: She was the senior commercial officer, and the commercial center was separate from the embassy, and it was about three blocks away. So when we arrived in '84, I remember the chargé, John Davis, came to the airport with his number two, Dave Swartz, to meet us. We were quite surprised. There was no ambassador at the time because of the bad state of relations. The whole three years we were there, there was no ambassador. John was what we called "*chargé d'affaires ad infinitum*" because he was there permanently, and he lived in the ambassador's residence, and for all intents and purposes, he was the ambassador. But he came to the airport to meet us, and we were quite surprised, but he said, "Hey, I don't get to meet 25 percent of my country team all at once very often. So my wife had her section of the embassy and I had mine. It was a tandem assignment, but as near as I can tell, neither the Commerce Department nor USIA talked to each other in Washington. It was just the fact that we'd both been there before, we both spoke Polish, and our bureaucracies came to the same conclusion.

Q: Being in Warsaw, can you talk about your impression of the importance of what, I guess, one can term "intellectuals" or intellectual class or whatever it is. What does it comprise of, and how important was it at this period of time?

HARROD: Well, the whole term *intellectual* or *intellectuals*, as a group, is something that in the European context may make some sense. I'm always leery of it in the United States, particularly people who call themselves intellectuals.

Q: We just don't use it.

HARROD: We don't use it, but in a place like Poland, it has a particular significance, because of course Poland didn't exist for 125 year or so - 1795 to 1918 - and it was the intellectuals, it was the cultural elite who maintained that sense of being Poland - let Poland be Poland, to use the Charlie Wick phrase. So in the Polish context, intellectuals have always had a particular meaning, because they preserve sort of the national culture, and if you have a general Jaruzelski who has imposed a rigid régime from the top, then the intellectuals are sort of defining themselves as the real spirit of the country.

In Poland there are lots of them. I mean, we had lots of contacts with artistic people, meaning both the visual arts and drama, theater, opera. One of my good friends from my first tour in Poland had become the deputy director of the Warsaw Opera by the time we came back in '84, which meant I spent a lot more time at the Warsaw Opera than I probably would have wanted to. But there were some good contacts, a lot of writers. I did some things with these folks. I also found that particularly the older generation of writers and cultural people in Poland were people that my chargé, John Davis, had known. He'd been in Poland, I think, for three previous assignments, and he used to have lots of soirées at the residence with these folks, so I didn't attempt to duplicate what he was doing. I tried to work with more of the younger folk, sent a lot of them on International Visitor trips to the States. But essentially these were all people who felt that they were

preserving the spirit of Poland, the "Polishness" of the country. And one thing you have to also know, and it's become obvious, I think, in the last few years, is that Poland always saw itself as a Western European country. Back in the 16/1700s, they called themselves, what was it, *antemuralis orientalis*, or something, which meant 'the eastern bulwark' against the hordes. So Poland always saw itself as Western, and the cultural elite wanted to maintain ties with the West. The U.S. was seen as sort of, in some ways, a cultural Mecca. I said in a report to Washington that one of the difficulties of working in Poland was it the most pro-American country I'd ever been in, including the United States. They had an almost unrealistic view of how good the United States was.

Q: One always gets into one of these things where you find yourself, you know, exposing the warts.

HARROD: There was one private university in the country, the Catholic University in Lublin, and every year they would open their academic year with pomp and circumstance, and they would always invite all the Western ambassadors to come for the formal ceremony. And John Davis, our chargé, used to love to go down there, because every time they would introduce the chargé of the United States of America, he'd get a standing ovation. And I saw that once - it would have been in '87 - when the Pope came for a visit, and I was chargé for one of the days of the Pope's visit, and he was going to Catholic University at Lublin on that particular day and he invited the Western ambassadors and chargés to come. So I went down with the flag flying, and the ceremonies were out in the courtyard, and they had built a big stage, and the Pope's throne was up on the stage, and the seats for the diplomatic corps were up on the stage. They introduced the ambassadors one by one as we all arrived, and I and the Australian chargé were at the tail end of the line because, of course, we were not ambassadors. And they would introduce them, and they'd walk up the steps to the stage, and the head of the foreign relations department of the Catholic University would greet them at the top and take them to their seats. When they'd finally gotten around to the *chargé d'affaires* of the United States of America, second to the end, we got the usual applause, which weren't for me, they were for the United States of America, and as I walked up the steps, the foreign relations guy, who was a priest, instead of shaking my hand and walking me over to my seat, gave me a big *abrazo*, and I embraced him back, and the crowd cheered. And all of this is just making a political point.

Q: Did you find with the intelligentsia that you had connection with writers, academic world, in the United States? I mean, was there a lot of back and forth?

HARROD: Oh, there was a lot of back and forth, and it was not by any means confined to what you'd call the intelligentsia or the opposition. Since we worked both sides of the street, I mean, I would have lots of contacts particularly with journalists, some of whom had turned in their Party cards when martial law had been imposed and now were in the opposition, and some were writing editorials for the main Party newspapers. And virtually all of them had either studied in the States at one time or another or their kids were studying in the States. I remember one of the editors of the communist newspaper *Polityka*, one of his kids, I think, was at Harvard, and he was going for a tennis

tournament in the States. There was a lot of this back and forth, and it was not, as I say, just the opposition.

Q: Did you find a certain amount of either unease or annoyance with the political types in Poland, the communist people, and watching whatever their position was essentially eroding? I would think they would become less and less effective.
HARROD: Yes, they were less and less effective, but two things. One, as I said, you probably had three convinced communists in the whole country. Most of these people had simply made career choices. The thing that I found - sad is the wrong word, but - a little bit affecting, and it's something I encountered later on when I visited what had once been East Germany and was now absorbed into the Federal Republic, were people who were say in their 50s. I had a good friend - the fellow I mentioned earlier, who had become head of a department in the Party Central Committee - I had known in my first tour in Poland, when he had been a vice-rector of a university, and we'd done lots of things together, and he was a member of the Party, and he went up the ranks. I saw him when I was back the second time. I went down to Wroclaw, where he still was at that time, and we had dinner together in his apartment, and then he came to Warsaw and became a department head, and I didn't see him till I made my farewell call. You got the sense that people back in the '70s who had seen the country under the Soviet thumb and had made a career choice that, well, I'm going to work within the system and try to, if you will, change the system from within by being a quote good Commie - again, the kind of Dubcek analogy, if you will - those people, I think, were kind of sad and depressed. At least my friend seemed that way. You know, they made a choice. History proved that their choice was suddenly inoperative, and then they were thrown out with the old system, and there was a little bit of sadness there. But that happens.

Q: Did you have much to do, at least did you find much influence with the activities in the second largest Polish city? Of course, I'm referring to Chicago. And what was going on there?

HARROD: There was. *Polonia* is the term used for the Polish émigré community, wherever it may be, whether it's in the United States or Canada or Australia. And particularly the first couple of years that I was there, there was a sense that the Polish-American community, *Polonia*, in the States, was resisting any attempt to sort of cobble together a little bit better relationship, again, because of martial law, and it's all understandable. But I think that feeling was there, that the émigré community was resistant and influenced Washington, and Washington therefore was not looking for great opportunities to put together a better relationship. By the third year, I think with Gorbachev in Moscow, the feeling was that the old rules didn't necessarily apply, and things began to creep forward. But again, it's an illustration of the effect of perceptions on policy. I don't think things had changed all that much within the Polish system. It was the outside effects: it was Moscow and it was Washington opening up a little bit. Poland had always been this kind of complicated mix in the country, and there were some people who were looking for a better relationship and some who weren't, but essentially for the first couple of years, Washington really wasn't interested in exploring the options. They just sort of were keeping at arm's length.

Q: Well, was there attempt by John Davis and by you, working on your two various organizations, to have the Department of State and to have Charlie Wick and Congress now understand things really were changing?

HARROD: I can't speak for John Davis, but he's a very skilled and subtle fellow, and I'm sure he was doing his best to tell people that Poland was not the black and white situation that some people seemed to think it was. There were times when I probably was a little harder-line than he was. At one point, one of the new members of my staff had his visa denied in Washington under this pretext that we don't give visas to USIA people, even though they had, up until that point, always given visas to people being assigned to the embassy (it's just they wouldn't do it for TDY), and I was, you know, rather incensed about this and felt we needed to retaliate by denying a visa to some Pole going to Washington and tit for tat, because that's the way I dealt in Moscow. That was our assumption: when they do something, you do it right back at them. And John was always looking for ways to not overreact, because he saw the subtleties in the Polish system and didn't want to play into the hands of the hard-liners. And ultimately, the guy finally did get a visa. I think we waited six months, and I'm sure John was lobbying in various corners, and the guy finally did get a visa. And if we'd retaliated, I'm not sure-

Q: -he wouldn't have.

HARROD: Probably not. I mean, I still believe that retaliation is a useful thing, but-

Q: It really does depend. It sounds great, and certain types... The Soviet system was such that you had to deal with it. Other systems...

HARROD: Yes, each thing is unique unto itself, I guess.

Q: But sometimes, you know, the hard-liners can play into the hands of the hard-liners, and they're both quite happy to keep things bad.

HARROD: And again, Poland was a fluid enough situation, with many competing interests there, that I think John was trying to avoid these overreactions so that we could wait for the more moderate folks to finally come into the fore. But a fascinating place. I mentioned the fellow who had been arrested in the apartment, Solidarity, Zbigniew Bujak. And by a year later, basically, in May of '87, when Ted Kennedy and the whole Kennedy clan came to Warsaw, it was to present the Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Award to Mr. Bujak and Adam Michnik, who was another Solidarity leader, and they had it at the ambassador's residence, which was John Davis's residence, and Mr. Bujak, who had been dragged out of this apartment and thrown in jail a year before, was there to receive the Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Award, and all the police outside the ambassador's residence, nobody stopped him. Interesting country. That's one of the nice things about Poland, that it's an interesting country.

Q: What about the Church at that time, I mean, dealing with the Church?

HARROD: We dealt with the Church for several reasons. One was that 95 percent of the Poles are officially Catholic; therefore, the Church represents a certain majority of the population. Two, certain parts of the Church were very active in being a counterweight to the régime, and a lot of churches had set up cultural centers. They were the places we'd loan our video equipment to, and they'd become kind of semi-legal rallying points for the opposition because the government really wasn't interested in cracking down on the Church. That would have been a little too much. However, at least in my perspective - I'm not sure everybody would have agreed with me on this - one always had to keep in mind that the Church also had wings that represented the more - what's a good word here? - nationalistic and obscurantist, perhaps, wing of the Solidarity movement, and so you had to be a little bit careful - at least I thought we had to. The Church was not a monolithic organization in Poland by any definition, but it was a very important part of society, and so we did work with it. When Tom Simons, who was deputy assistant secretary, came out to Warsaw, I had a lunch for him, and one of the people there was a priest who was active in the sort of "cultural movement," in opposition to the government. He was invited not because, essentially, he was a Catholic priest but because he was a member of that part of the opposition. But by definition the Church was important. When Father Popieluszko was murdered, you know ("Who will rid me of this troublesome priest" I believe is the English example.), the fact that he was a confessor to many of the Solidarity opposition people and active in the opposition was important, but the fact that a priest was murdered was just as important, and his grave became something of a shrine. When Ted Kennedy came in '87, he made the pilgrimage to Father Popieluszko's grave, and I'm not sure he fully understood the cheering crowd as he left the church, hundreds, perhaps thousands of Poles all there gathered around, all shouting "*Kochamy Reagana, Kochamy Reagana*," which means 'We love Reagan.' I'm not sure Ted Kennedy understood that! But they basically loved Reagan because Reagan was anti-Soviet.

Q: What was your reading of the embassy? You'd just arrived, and the priest, Popieluszko, was murdered? What was the reading on why it was done, because this really was sort of out of line?

HARROD: It was very much out of line, and I'm not sure anybody really knows what happened. I sort of cavalierly used that "Will no one rid me of this troublesome Priest?" line, but I think there was something to that.

Q: Well, I mean, this happens.

HARROD: It happens. I think some fairly mid-level to junior people in the security service thought they had the green light. Their superiors probably never really imagined that somebody would do away with this priest, but they did. I remember when they fished the body out, and it became apparent he had disappeared some time before, the minister of the interior, General Kiszczak, made a national television appearance in which he used a famous phrase that we all began to repeat, where he said that *Polska nie jest dzungla*, and he had a certain accent, he said, "Poland is not a jungle." You know, this is not some Third World country where priests are murdered, because the analogy, back in the mid-

‘80s, there were priests being murdered in Central America, and the Poles didn’t particularly like that comparison. So I think it was probably some folks who exceeded their authority and went too far, but Popieluszko then became the martyr and the rallying point for the opposition. And I said, his grave was a shrine and probably still is.

Q: One of your main jobs was dealing with the media. Do you want to talk about the Polish media during this time?

HARROD: Well, the official media were the official media, and we had to deal with them to the extent that we dealt with the official media. Sometimes they could be quite interesting. There were a couple of newspapers that, while official and while connected to the Party, were more quote reformist unquote, and in fact, the editor of one of them became prime minister of the country at one point when Jaruzelski was trying to find a quote reformist unquote, Mieczyslaw Rakowski was the guy’s name. So keeping ties to the official media had some purpose. There are also, even in the darkest times in Poland, was an official opposition media, if you will. There were newspapers put out and magazines by the Catholic Church, by various other groups that were not part of the régime down in Krakow, there was a major - *opposition* is the wrong word, but a sort of alternative Catholic publication, *Tygodnik Powszechny*, meaning sort of ‘General Weekly,’ ‘Universal Weekly.’ The people who ran that... Jerzy Turowicz was the editor. He just died a few months ago. He was one of John Davis’s old friends from earlier incarnations. I met him a few times, usually dealt with his number two or others, so I wasn’t working John’s contacts. But there was an opposition or alternative set of publications in Poland, and we kept in touch with them, met with them, dealt with them. There wasn’t a lot of information worked, in the sense of putting out a lot of news releases, or anything like that, but then on the premise that most people aren’t going to publish them anyway. But keeping in touch with the media was particularly useful when we would have visits by either a Whitehead, a deputy secretary - or Congressman Steve Solarz came out for a visit there - or Ted Kennedy, because you could then set up meeting for them for the visitors with people that you had contact with who would give them a pretty good fill in, either from one perspective or another, that was useful for these visitors to have. And that’s what I found particularly useful in working with the media, this ability to bring them to bear, to make their points to visitors from Washington. Visitors from Washington will believe it if they hear it directly from the horse’s mouth. If they hear it from a political officer in the embassy, or even from John Davis, they probably aren’t going to believe it.

Q: Did you ever find yourself with issues, where you were acting as a spokesman for the embassy, where it was more than just a pro forma *release and all that - crises or anything?*

HARROD: We had a few of those. I mean, much less of that than in Moscow, where I had been dealing with that almost on a daily, weekly basis. In Warsaw it happened a few times. Now in Warsaw, again, I had a press attaché, who was the normal first line contact with the media. A couple of times when he was not in the country, and I remember two cases of the people being declared *persona non grata* happened while he was out of the

country, and I had to be, perforce, the embassy spokesman and got cited in a couple of versions. But a PNG story is very easy, because essentially the embassy never comments on allegations of intelligence activities, and if someone's been thrown out of the country for quote "activities unconnected with their diplomatic status," our only reaction is we don't officially react. So those were pretty easy - not a whole lot of official on-the-record comments.

Q: What about Poland's connection to its communist colleagues in Nicaragua, Cuba, I mean, was there much in the way of-

HARROD: The only Cuban connection we tumbled on while I was there, was one that actually was very beneficial to us, meaning the embassy had a softball team, and we found some Poles who actually played baseball. It turned out there were eight baseball teams in Poland, and one of them, in the town of Kutno, was coached by a Cuban, who had come to Poland on some sort of an exchange program and married a Pole and stayed there. So we went out to Kutno, had a softball tournament with the local team. They came to Warsaw. And later, when Vice President Bush came, in September of '87 (I was no longer the PAO by this point - I was just back on a visit), people in the embassy had organized a visit by Stan Musial and Moe Drabowski, two former Major-Leaguers with Polish connections who were there, and they had a reception, and I believe this coach of the Kutno team was probably the only Cuban to be in the ambassador's residence in Warsaw in recorded history. So that was our Cuban connection. But the Poles were not the most active in maintaining ties to their alleged friends.

Q: At one time, the Poles had been fairly active in setting up rather nasty police activities in friendly countries.

HARROD: I'm not aware of...

Q: I mean, acting as advisors and all, but Poland at this point, from your perspective, was not very active in the non-aligned of friendly communist world.

HARROD: Well, probably the best thing for me to say is that it was not something I came into contact with.

Q: Well, it probably speaks for itself, in a way. What about West Germany and East Germany at this time? Poland had been moved lock, stock, and barrel, what, a hundred and fifty miles - I don't know how many miles, but we're talking about 100 or more miles - to the west, which in many ways is probably looked upon with a certain amount of pleasure. I mean, they're as close to the West as they can be.

HARROD: They lost more territory in the East than they got in the West, but no, Poland has had rather portable borders, and I remember a joke that a Pole told me back in those days. I said, "What if World War II broke out again and you were attacked by both the Russians and the Germans at the same time. What would you do" and the guy thought a minute, and he said, "Well, we'd probably shoot the Germans first." "Why is that?"

"Well, business before pleasure."

One of the things from my first tour in Poland back in the '70s that struck me, and I think while this is very anecdotal it says something about the region, at the Poznan Trade Fair back then there was an official delegation that came in from the Federal Republic of Germany, and you must understand that this was early '70s and Poland and the Federal Republic had only recently even recognized each other, and so it was the beginning of a new era. And I remember that the German minister, who came in to represent West Germany at the trade fair, had a Polish last name, and the Polish minister who was welcoming him had a German last name. So that part of Europe, the borders have moved frequently, and anybody who sort of maintains a nationalistic ethnic purist approach is way off base, because back in the '70s there were a lot of Poles who claimed German ancestry and wanted to emigrate to West Germany. In most cases, these were all the results of long-term mixed relationships, and they called them "*Volkswagen Deutsch.*" It was an economic emigration if anything. But you know, Poland has had a difficult history. It's in a difficult location. One of my Polish friends once said - I said, "What would you do to change Polish history, if you could? What's a major thing?" And he said, "It's very simple." He said, "Put us where Canada is."

Q: You came back on TDY. Could you talk about the visit of George Bush, because this is rather significant, wasn't it, the fact that we had the Vice President go there?

HARROD: Yes, it was the beginning of the change in the Polish-American relationship. As I said before, for about the previous eight months, nine months, signs of it had been coming up. I think the Whitehead visit was the first. And then we had Congressman Solarz and Senator Kennedy, and there were other officials coming out from Washington. But the Bush visit was a big thing. It was a demonstration, I think, from the Washington end that, you know, we can let bygones be bygones. And while I was working at the press center at the hotel, and so my viewpoint of these things is somewhat circumscribed, because that's where I was stuck during the course of that visit, Vice President Bush announced during the visit that John Davis was going to become ambassador to Poland, which was something everybody cheered. But there was a lunch at his residence, and General Jaruzelski attended, and actually Jaruzelski lived about two blocks from the residence. We used to know where he lived and saw his motorcade going back and forth, and sometimes we'd even kind of wave. And Jaruzelski, I believe, raised a toast to Helen Davis at this lunch, as the woman who had brought him together with - I believe Lech Walesa was there at the lunch, but if Walesa wasn't, other leaders of Solidarity were, like the current foreign minister, Professor Geremek and others. And so here sitting at John Davis's tables (plural) on the patio, were General Jaruzelski representing the alleged horrible régime, the Russian general in the Polish uniform, and leaders of Solidarity, all together, quite a historic moment, when you think about it. And Bush, being already running for president in '88 (he had a film crew along that was essentially doing filming for the campaign), so he saw an advantage to this. But it was the beginning of a new relationship.

Q: What about Solidarnosc *and the embassy during the time you were there?*

HARROD: There were lots of contacts. Mine were pretty much limited to the cultural and, to some extent, the press side of it, not with the political leadership. Others in the embassy dealt with Lech Walesa. I did not deal with Lech Walesa. I want to make no claim to that. I'm not one of those who has the picture of me with Lech on his piano at home. But I did meet some of the other leaders of the movement and dealt with their media people. But as I said, to me the thing that was never appreciated in Washington is that Solidarity was not solid; it was a coalition of different groups. In talking with a Professor Geremek, let's say, who's now the foreign minister, here you have a quote intellectual, a pipe-smoking professor, and that's very different from dealing with an electrician from Gdansk or with some more rabid right-wingers or with Jacek Kuron, for instance, who became minister of labor, who was really sort of an old-school labor union left-wing organizer - very different bunches of people, so you really had to know who you were dealing with.

Q: Go ahead. Did you run across any problem with sort of virulent nationalism that we had to be careful about in Poland or anti-Semitism or that sort of thing?

HARROD: Yes, yes. There are virulent nationalists in Poland. There were when I was there. And Poland has always been a strange country. There is an anti-Semitic streak, and there are virtually no Jews in the country, so how do people become anti-Semitic without Semites? Some of my very good Polish friends, you know, when you finally get to some point after a few vodkas, you would hope you had finally met somebody who didn't have this strain, but often they did. I don't know. I can't explain it. History, I guess, says something for it. But it's a weird strain, and it's indefensible. I mean, the Poles, one of the endearing qualities of the Poles is that they're great underdogs. One has the feeling that if they were overdogs they could be just as nasty to their neighbors, and have been in the past, as their neighbors have been to them, but that's a strain that fortunately is a minority one in the country, and the real rabid right-wingers, at least when I was there, and I think even today, are a very tiny portion of the population. You find it in other countries. It's tough to figure out, but it's-

Q: Serbia today, where we're bombing in a war with Serbia, I spent five years there, and they are also great underdogs and playing this to the hilt internally. I mean, they can be nasty.

HARROD: Polish history, I mean, between the two wars, when Poland became independent again, it tried to and, in fact, did snatch up portions of Lithuania and even a little tiny part of Czechoslovakia. One of the strains that has never been resolved in Poland, and we saw it within the Solidarity movement and even on the other side, in General Jaruzelski's camp, is the rabid Polish nationalism *versus* the tendency to try to form a soft of confederation with their neighbors. The dictator Marshal Pilsudski, back in the interwar years, had started with a grandiose idea of sort of a confederation of Lithuania, the Ukraine, Poland, Belarus, which was much like 16th-century Poland, basically, if you took a look at it. I mean, that's the borders of what was 16th-century Poland. That is not consistent with a rabid Polish exclusionary kind of nationalism. And

these two tendencies have always kind of fought within Poland, whether you build a broader confederation - in which case the term *Poland* or *Polish* becomes something like *American*, in a way: it doesn't mean what language you speak or what your ethnic background is; it becomes a political term - or whether Polish just means "I'm Catholic; I speak Polish; I am culturally Polish, and you're not - tough." But they will resolve that. I was not popular at one point, when I can't remember, which visiting delegation it was that came to Warsaw in '87; I briefed a lot of visitors. Someone said, "What would happen if communism was removed from Poland, tomorrow?" You know, how would the country evolve? And I said probably like it did in the early 1920s, where you would have a plethora of political parties who would all take different and exclusionary positions, and within about five or six years, I said, somebody like General Jaruzelski would probably come in and impose order, which is what Marshal Pilsudski did in 1926. Fortunately, the Poles have proved me wrong, and so far they're making a very good go of it as a good Western democratic country, and I think they will make a go of it. But the tendency in Poland had always been to fissiparate into small parties. Then you would have a multiparty system that could never form a true majority, and ultimately you get some man on horseback who wants to end the crisis.

Q: It is interesting that in places where I didn't think the South Koreans could get it together to have a real government. You know, they were called the Irish of Asia and all. And they've done a reasonable job of having a democratic government. I think there's a tendency on the part of the Foreign Service to kind of look at these countries and think, well, they really can't get it together, you know.

HARROD: Well, they can, and I think, at least in Europe, we've had the experience of the fifty-plus years since the Second World War, and a country like Poland can look at its Western neighbors as examples of how you get over this unfortunate tendency and you become a regular, stable democratic country.

Q: I'm not sure how it was put at that time, but what about the OSCE, the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Helsinki Accords - were they playing any role, as we saw it, at this time when you were there?

HARROD: Not for me, they weren't. In fact, it was not till several years later when John Kornblum was ambassador to OSCE that I really focused on it. Now obviously, in Moscow, the Helsinki Accords and their human rights guarantees were something we focused on a lot in Moscow. But I don't recall in Warsaw it ever having been that much of a factor in the relationship.

Q: Maybe, I don't know if it steadied things down, but the fact was that it did recognize existing borders as being only open to change through peaceful means and all that.

HARROD: Everybody agrees with that until somebody decides they want to start changing it. That's wonderful guarantee, but look what happened to former Yugoslavia. When push comes to shove, I don't know what it's really worth. I think the thing that cemented the borders for Poland was essentially their agreement with Germany in the

early ‘70s, because when they made an agreement with West Germany, West Germany took the unique position of sort of recognizing the western Polish border, even though it wasn’t a border with West Germany - it was a border with East Germany. But I think that was a good guarantee of stability. The other border, on the eastern side of Poland, is a little more negotiable right now. You’ve got this enclave of Russia up there in Kaliningrad. It’s a strange geographic anomaly, and I don’t know what’s going to happen to it. Anyhow, that’s Poland.

Q: Well, then, you left Poland in-

HARROD: ’87.

Q: ’87. Whither?

HARROD: Whither? Whither was one of those issues that comes to all of us tandem people in the Foreign Service, tandem assignments being more and more common these days. My wife and I ended up in Poland in ’84, as I said, because our two bureaucracies essentially came to the same conclusion independently. Leaving Poland was a more complicated thing because there was not such a natural tug, and so we looked into several options where we could both go. By this point, by ’87, we had a two-year-old son. We wanted to go someplace together. Our bureaucracies were looking at things. USIA was suggesting places like the Philippines and Pakistan, and even Australia was one we looked at, but in all these cases, because of the difference between Commerce and USIA, we would have been in different cities (except for Manila, we would have been together). But in Pakistan, it would have been Islamabad and Karachi, and in Australia it would have been Canberra and Sydney. And finally we explored Brussels, at least partly because Commerce had at least I think one, and they were thinking about opening a second, office in Brussels, and USIA had three different offices in Brussels, and two of them came open at the right time for me. So we started looking at Brussels. And ultimately, to make a long story short, we were both assigned to Brussels, the difference being that my wife’s job began in 1987, and my job was to begin in 1988. So I had a year to gap between the time we left Poland and the time my job started in Brussels. My wife was assigned as the number two person in the Commercial Section of the embassy, and I had originally looked at a job at the U.S. mission to the European Community, as it was at the time, but USIA in its infinite wisdom decided to assign me to the embassy to Belgium, essentially, they said, because of my administrative experience. The EC job had no staff, really, and it was more of an advisor. The embassy job was the administrative infrastructure for all three USIS posts in Brussels. It even had some wider implications. So I got assigned the embassy, but I had a year to gap. So we go to Brussels in 1987, in the summer, and my first five months or so I was an unemployed father of a two-year-old with no pay. I was off the books. That’s when they sent me back to Warsaw for a week or two to work on the Bush visit, and while I was there, my wife, God bless her, decided that I needed something to do, and so she paid for me to have, I think it was, twice-a-week Dutch language lessons. So I studied some Dutch, took care of the kid, and then in January of ’88, I went back on the payroll and went into an intensive five-hour-a-day French language program. French was required for the assignment - I didn’t have French

- and they agreed to teach me the language at post. Dutch was not required, even though 57 percent of the population of Belgium speaks Dutch, not French, so I had studied Dutch on my own with my wife's financial support, and so I studied French for six months and took over my job at the embassy in the summer of '88 as public affairs officer.

Q: And you were in Brussels from, essentially then, say, '88 to when?

HARROD: '92.

Q: '92.

HARROD: Four-year assignment, five years total because of the one year off. My wife, in the meantime, after two years at the embassy, was assigned to open the Commerce office at the U.S. mission to the EC, and so she actually had five years of gainful employment in Brussels in two different jobs, and I had my four years as PAO.

Q: Can you describe your role and the embassy? I mean, Brussels is a complicated place because you're tripping over various missions and all that.

HARROD: Yes, there were three ambassadors, three missions, and it was a complicated thing. It was also a very unique assignment for me, something new. Because I had never worked in a Western European country, there were several things I found odd and difficult at the beginning. Belgium is a monarchy, so you had people who walked around with titles like Count and Viscount and this sort of thing, which I couldn't take seriously, coming from the East, where everybody was allegedly the same.

Q: Comrades.

HARROD: Yes, "Comrade" this and that. I found *comrade* hard to take, but also dealing with your counts and your viscounts and that stuff was equally difficult. There were some pleasant surprises. I remember very shortly after I took over my job, I had a lunch - my press attaché, Jim Findley set me up - with the press spokesman with the defense minister because we were working on a complicated idea. We had something called NATO tours, where each USIA post - each embassy, I should say - in Europe would put together a group of people in a particular area, whether they're journalists or academics or whatever, and fund half the program (and the U.S. mission to NATO would fund the other half), and these people would go off and, you know, peer across the Fulda Gap at Soviet tanks and go to Berlin and see the Wall and do other things to sort of impress upon them the importance of NATO. And we did this both for countries that were in NATO and countries that weren't. Anyway, we had this idea of sending some Belgian labor leaders on a NATO tour, and we had this strange idea that while they were there, why didn't they look at the Belgian troops in Germany, because Belgium was one of the occupying forces. So we had this lunch with the defense minister's press spokesman to float the idea - you know, what would he think of us sending some Belgian people on the U.S. taxpayers' account, and they would actually deal with Belgians in Germany? We started our lunch, and we finally broached the idea, and he scratched his head, and he

said, “Sure.” And I remember sort of momentarily stopping, and I said, Wow, I said, I’ve never worked with allies before. It’s easy. We did it.

It was an interesting time when I took over. I mentioned the administrative part of this job. I’m going to interrupt myself to - whatever I was starting there, I’m going to mention something else that was different for me in Brussels.

Having served all of my previous assignments either in the former Eastern Europe or in places like Afghanistan, Brussels was a quote “normal” unquote Western European post, and there was an awful lot of protocol - what some people would call public affairs - which to me was more the cocktail circuit kind of things than I had ever experienced before. I mean, we had an American Chamber of Commerce, I was being requested to appear at... There was an American Businessman’s Club - all these kinds of things that I had not been used to, and there was a lot more of that than I expected. I had to wear my tuxedo more than I had ever worn it in the past, and these kinds of things. It was something that was new to me, not always a lot of fun. It just seemed like you had to do these things as part of the - and I did a lot of speech-writing, which was not something I had done a *whole* lot of before. My job in Brussels also encompassed Luxembourg, where we didn’t have an American officer, and so one had to support the ambassador in Luxembourg, and sometimes I was writing speeches for two ambassadors at the same time. And there was a big administrative component. As I mentioned, we had three USIS posts in Brussels, but only one of them had an administrative infrastructure - the FSNs, the local employees - to do the budgeting, and I got contracting authority while I was out there to act as a contracting officer for all three posts and Luxembourg, and we also, because I had an extremely good staff of Belgian employees, who were very knowledgeable and into computers before a lot of the rest of the agency was into computers, we actually provided administrative support for posts as far away as The Hague, or even we had a method of printing out the Wireless File electronically (back in 1988) that was fairly new, and in Bonn, the U.S. mission in Germany, which is the biggest one in Europe, adopted our way of doing it. So we were sort of an administrative infrastructure for a broader area. We had a very nice cultural center with a very modern, computerized what we used to call library (and then we changed the name to sort of “reference center” because it wasn’t a library in the old sense), and a lot of the things that the staff did in the library, the reference center, became models for other posts in Western Europe. So we were conscious of being a country post for a fairly small country but at the same time an administrative resource for the whole region, which was something I hadn't properly appreciated.

Q: How were relations, ’88 to ’92 period, with Belgium?

HARROD: Quite good. I mean, the Belgians were an ally. They had a coalition government, which made it rather difficult for them to do bold things because they were always afraid about the coalition. This came to the fore in the Gulf War, but at the beginning, when I took over in ’88, the big issue for us was the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) withdrawal. My ambassador, who arrived, took over about the same time I did, was Mike Glitman, and Mike had negotiated the INF treaty in Geneva, and so he

was the expert on the treaty, and the treaty went into force literally as I took over my job. I remember my predecessor left in July, and I was on leave and was coming back at the beginning of August to take over as PAO, and I figured August was a great time. It's quiet. Belgium's on vacation. I'll have time to read in. The day I took over as PAO, the Soviets notified us of an inspection of the two U.S. facilities in Belgium where cruise missiles were stored, and so literally my first day on the job, I was in the car on the way to Florennes Air Base to be the point person for an inspection with attendant media hoopla. We had about 50 or 60 media people there because it was one of the first - I think it was *the* first - Soviet inspection on Belgian territory. Television cameras, whatever. And so for the first six months or so of my assignment, INF was the issue - we had repeated inspections - which in one way was great because I was immediately working with the press spokesman for the Foreign Ministry. And then we also had a visit by President Bush. Let's see, when would that have been? It was not till '89. We had Reagan in '88; we had Bush in '89. But the Bush visit cemented my relationship with the press spokesman for His Majesty the King of the Belgians. We also had - by my count, and I may be imprecise on this - but during my time in Belgium I think we had somewhere between 19 and 23 visits by the Secretary of State, or Secretaries of State. My first one was George Shultz at the end of '88, and then we had Jim Baker up the wazoo for the remainder of my time. We had three presidential visits, and I was also pulled out of Belgium for two presidential visits to Moscow and the Madrid-Middle East Peace Conference. So I did lots of visits. My staff was superb at Secretary of State visits. When the first one happened on my watch, I was concerned. The Secretary of State is coming, his entourage. My staff was not concerned. And after the 15th or 20th such visit, I began to see why. We just simply said, oh yes, another secretary of State visit.

Q: Of course, they're NATO-scheduled visits and all that, isn't that right?

HARROD: They're NATO-scheduled visits, but we were the administrative infrastructure for the USIS post at NATO.

Q: Yes, but I mean the point was, this had been going on for a long time.

HARROD: Not like we had them. Not like we had them, because at first the new administration, the Bush administration, Jim Baker came out for several early visits. Then the Gulf War began to heat up and it seemed like we got the Secretary of State every few weeks. It was quite something. The staff was good at it, but every time the Secretary would come, we'd have to set up the press center at the hotel downtown and handle all the movements of all the people. And the presidential visits, of course, one Reagan and two Bush, were major undertakings, which involved dealings. Even though the President is ostensibly coming to meet with NATO, he's in Belgium, and we had a lot of work, and the king would always insist on some meeting with the President. It was fun working with the Royal Palace. At one point we had an advance party of 30-some people out there walking through the king's palace. The king's press guy made a point of the fact that he was doing an advance for the king's state visit to Switzerland next week. He said, "Just me."

Q: Were there any problems with these INF (Intermediate Nuclear Forces) inspections? Did you find these things worked fairly well?

HARROD: They worked fairly well. The two problems were, from our perspective, short notice - because under the terms of the treaty they only had to give you 48 hours notice-

Q: Well, that's the whole idea of it.

HARROD: That's the whole idea, but what it meant was ginning up to handle it was a sort of drop-everything. That's when the Foreign Ministry press guy and I exchanged our home telephone numbers so we could call each other at two o'clock in the morning if the notification came in. And then the gaggle of press people. But I must admit, there was a certain sense of accomplishment with Mike Glitman as the ambassador, having negotiated this treaty, when the final inspection came of the last shipment of cruise missiles out of Florennes Air Base. And we were down there with the Belgian defense minister and a lot of media to watch the last missiles be loaded onto the last C-5, or C-141, I forget which, and off they went into the distance, off the end of the runway, and I was thinking, Gee, you know, there are not too many people in the diplomatic service who actually get to see the results of their work, and for a guy like Glitman to have negotiated the treaty and then see it physically going into effect must have been quite something. So that took care of the first part, the INF issue. It was just a lot of scrambling around, but it was good.

And the presidential visits were fun and, as I said, cemented one's relationships. I got to see how the Royal Palace worked and developed some good contacts. Western Europe is very different from Eastern Europe, but when I started working with the people at the Palace - the king's role in Belgium is a very unique one, partly because Baudouin I had been king for 40 years and had established a role as sort of father figure to the country, and he dealt with politicians on a one-to-one basis. I took several visitors to see him, and I got some appreciation for how he worked and how his style worked, and then when there was almost a constitutional crisis in the country when the Parliament passed an abortion bill and the King had threatened not to sign it. And the whole embassy was reporting to Washington the opinion that the king, as a constitutional monarch, had no choice - he would have to sign it, there was no issue here. And my contacts in the Palace - it's sort of like Kremlinology in the East; I think that's one of the reasons I picked up on this, because I had been in the East and you get used to these little signs - all my friends in the Palace said, you know, the king is serious about this, and so I said he's not going to sign the bill, everything I know says he's not going to sign the bill, but that would be a constitutional crisis, blah-blah. Well, it turned out he didn't sign the bill. He essentially abdicated for one day, and then the bill was promulgated without the king, which you could do if His Majesty was indisposed or not there, and then the Parliament implored him to take back his throne, which he did, but it made a very short, small, gefuffle, but I took some credit. I was given some credit also, I must say, as being the only person in the embassy who believed that this would happen. That's what you have when you have two presidential visits and you get to walk through the palace and talk to a lot of people and meet people that you can later chat with and find things out, because frankly the embassy

didn't pay much attention to the Palace except when the new ambassador would present his credentials. The king was seen as not a direct player in the political process, but in fact he was.

Q: How about the Gulf War? We're talking about the '89-90 period. How did that play out?

HARROD: Well, it preoccupied us almost exclusively, partly because it was Brussels and the headquarters of NATO; and because of this administrative role we had in my post as the sort of support for the other posts. Not too long after Saddam invaded Kuwait, there was established a Brussels Security Working Group, which was eight people representing the military community and the three embassies in town, and I was the public affairs person of the working group, and as the war built up, we spent more and more time meeting as this working group, which was chaired by a brigadier general who was on the U.S. military delegation out at NATO. But we had to basically develop public affairs plans, policies for what would happen when the shooting war finally started. We did some dry-run exercises. Anyway, it was very time-consuming, and when the shooting war did start, we went into full-time meeting mode and did many of the things that we had staffed out ahead of time. I must say, when one is in the Foreign Service, one ends up in the course of one's career doing lots of these emergency drills. They even send out teams to embassies to run you through them. We did several of them while I was in Brussels, and the only one that was of any use to me whatsoever was the one we did ourselves as part of this working group. We ginned up our own exercise to test ourselves for what would happen if the war really does break out, in the sense of U.S. direct bombing of Iraq. And so we ran our own little exercise, and it pointed out to us several things that we hadn't really thought of yet, which we then incorporated into our planning, and when the war did break out, we were ready for it. It's the only one of these that I've ever actually had to put to use, and it was one that was not imposed on us by a team coming out from Washington to test our readiness; it was one we did ourselves.

Q: How did the Belgians respond to the Gulf War?

HARROD: Well, initially - and this is another example of where public diplomacy can sometimes play a role - I can think of two instances in the Gulf War from my point of view, but one of them was that initially we were trying to get support from our allies for a common response to Saddam, and that included contributing military forces to the Gulf. The Belgians do not have a large military, but they had some things that were of use. They had C-130 transport aircraft, and they had minesweepers. And so we had tried to put the persuasive arm on the Belgians to contribute some of these assets to the common good, and at least the way I remember it, the initial response on the political level had been "we'd love to, we're allies, but it's very delicate situation here, coalition government, divided public opinion, you know, we don't want to be out in front," blah-blah-blah. I had a good friend who was a security affairs correspondent for one of the major Belgian newspapers. Her newspaper ran a public opinion poll, which pointed out, finally, and this was not accidental, but something like, I don't know, 80 or 90 percent of the Belgian public felt that Saddam should be hung from a lamppost, and so the

newspaper publishes these polls and findings, which we then immediately take over to the Belgian government and say, "What's controversial here?" And the Belgians ultimately contributed minesweepers and C-130s, once they were convinced that they had the public support from their people to do it.

The other example of where public diplomacy played some role, I remember, was really when the Gulf War had ended, and we had created the impression that we thought the Kurds and Shiites should rise up and rid themselves of Saddam Hussein, which the Kurds did. And then the Kurds took a terrible pounding from Saddam, and the public opinion and the press in Belgium and in some other Western European countries was immediately rushing to the conclusion that the Americans had left the Kurds hung out to dry. And I got on the telephone in this case to Washington and told them that we were going to take a terrible beating on this issue if we didn't do something, and I was later given some credit by my superiors for having been the first one to tip them to this, which at least was one of the things that got that Operation Provide Comfort going so that we were air-dropping supplies to the Kurds and it looked like we were attempting to follow-up on the consequences of our earlier encouragement. So public diplomacy does take a role.

But during the Gulf War, I mean, aside from these couple of issues, the main focus for us was on the internal situation within Belgium, and the Belgians picked up a couple of suspected Iraqi terrorists in Brussels who might have been sent there. The general who was the commander of our little eight-member working group, in fact, when he was out of his house, his house had been broken into and his - I don't know what he was - aide-de-camp or something had been drugged. So there were some signs that there were nasty things that could have gone afoot in Brussels, and that was the preoccupation there, was security. And I must admit, I had not spent a lot of time working with the military, given where my assignments were, but it was a good experience in Brussels working with this little group. Of our eight members, I think three were uniformed military, and a couple of others were American civilians working at NATO. But it was a good experience.

Another thing that Belgium drove into my consciousness on the military side was that in Belgium we had three U.S. military cemeteries, one from the First World War and two from the Second World War. Every Memorial Day weekend, the American ambassador or chargé would visit all three cemeteries for elaborate ceremonies, wreath-laying, flyovers. This was a big deal, and it was the first time I had had to participate in anything quite like that, and the first time you see the ten thousand crosses and *Mogen David* stretched out across the green field, it makes an impression on you, and it still makes an impression. I mean I took my son to see *Saving Private Ryan*, and the movie opens and closes in the Normandy cemetery, but it looks very much like the cemeteries in Belgium, and it gets to you. You know, there are some shared experiences. I was touched the first time I did this, which would have been, I guess, '89, when the Belgian interior minister, I guess, at the time, who was representing the king at one of these ceremonies - the ceremony had officially ended and everybody was getting in their limos and leaving, and some relatives of some Americans, who had relatives buried in the cemetery had come over to talk to Ambassador Glitman and wondered if he would come with them while they went to look for their relatives, and the interior minister was getting into his car (and

he'd been educated at Harvard or something) got out, came over, and joined them and walked around with them and, you know, found Uncle Joe buried over here, and the Belgian took the little Belgian flag off the grave and handed it to the family member and said, "Please take this as a symbol of our remembrance of your loved ones." And I thought, Gee, you know, this is a nice touch. Unfortunately, just about every Belgian politician, including this guy, I think, has been implicated in some sort of corruption and scandal over the years, but I was impressed by him and thought he would be a good comer, but I think he's been tainted along with everybody else. But these were aspects - I mean, for somebody who had spent his or her career in France, Italy, the UK, or whatever, it wouldn't have probably been a big deal, but for me, coming from the East, these are the things I remember from Belgium because they were new to me. I mean, we went down to Luxembourg for Patton Day - General Patton liberated Luxembourg, not once but twice, once in September of '44 and then after the Battle of the Bulge they had to go back through again - and so people have long memories. While I was in Brussels the Eisenhower Centennial was taking place, 100 years since Ike's birth, and we were trying to drum up support for a commemoration of some sort, and of course the Belgians remembered Ike not as the President of the United States necessarily, but as the commander-in-chief in the war. That's really the role that he's remembered for. And we were having some trouble - and again at the political level - getting people to do anything. There had been some approaches made to the Belgian Parliament about some little commemorative thing, and they weren't getting too far. And some of us remembered that the king, who had been on the throne, of course, for 40 years, had in fact paid a state visit to the United States in the late '50s when Ike was the President. And so I called one of my friends at the Palace and told him how much trouble we were having getting something ginned up here, and wasn't it unfortunate because His Majesty was one of the few leaders who actually remembered Ike. I believe the next day the speaker of the Belgian Parliament got a call from the Palace that said you really ought to do something. And they had a commemoration, and Ambassador Glitman and I were invited to sit in the gallery while they said nice things about Ike, and it went into the record. We did it.

Q: Who was our ambassador or ambassadors in Luxembourg while you were there?

HARROD: The first one was Jean Gerard, who was the Reagan administration ambassador, I believe. She'd been at UNESCO in Paris, I believe, before we got out of UNESCO, and moved over to Luxembourg. She was followed by a person who has a cubicle just down the hall here, Ed Rowell. Luxembourg is a fine little place, and being up in Brussels and having responsibility for Luxembourg, I found it a pleasant experience. It was two hours down the road, and as Daniel Webster said about Dartmouth College, it is small, but there are those who love it. And Luxembourg has the advantage, as I believe Ed Rowell once said, of "doability." You have not resources there, but you can do just about anything if you have the resources because you know everybody in the country. When Jean Gerard was leaving and had a farewell reception at her residence, I went down for that, and I was standing there holding a drink talking to somebody who I think was a Paris friend of hers, and this gray-haired gentleman walks over and sticks out his hand, and he says, "Hi, I'm Jacques Santer." He's the prime minister, of course, now

the head of the EU.

But it's that kind of a country. You knew everybody. I went down with Ambassador Glitman. He was invited by Ambassador Gerard to talk about the INF treaty at one point, and so we went down and had a lunch. That tells you something about Mike Glitman. He's ambassador in Brussels, and I found out from down in Luxembourg that he was being invited down to talk at a lunch. He didn't tell me. So I went to him and said, "Ambassador Glitman, I understand you're going to Luxembourg. Can I help you with the speech or anything." And he said, "No, I think I can handle it." And so I went down as an aide-de-camp, but he knew what he was doing. He didn't need somebody to write his speeches for him - on that subject. If it's INF, Mike knew it backwards and forwards. But I remember going down there for the lunch and being amazed. Even in Brussels it was hard to get the real high government officials to attend much of anything. And down in Luxembourg, for Ambassador Glitman's presentation, they had the prime minister, the foreign minister, the defense minister (such as he is, the commandant of Luxembourg's tiny little armed forces), the Soviet, British, French and German ambassadors, I believe. It was quite an assemblage of the power elite in Luxembourg City. I was impressed. That was the doability quotient: you can get them.

Q: You were in Brussels during probably the momentous period of change - Germany united, the Soviet Union was at least beginning - I'm not sure if it had changed by that or whether it turned into Russia or not, but it was damned close to it. How did this play out in Brussels?

HARROD: Well, it left several indelible images. My colleague, who was the public affairs advisor out at NATO, one of his duties every year was a large academic conference that the U.S. mission to NATO co-sponsored, and one year I remember attending that conference, and sitting next to Manfred Woerner at the head table was the Russian ambassador, and this was quite an image. And then later a delegation of Eastern-

Q: Woerner being the head of NATO.

HARROD: Secretary general of NATO at the time. And to have the Soviet ambassador sitting there with him - and as a featured speaker at this conference - was quite something. And then my colleague out at NATO sponsored a visit by a bunch of Eastern journalist types who came, and Manfred Woerner was there, you know, hobnobbing and shaking hands, and the alliance is changing. And in fact, I was there, we had a press meeting when Russia emerged from the ashes of the Soviet Union. The foreign minister arrived as the foreign minister of the Soviet Union for a meeting at NATO - again, the Soviet foreign minister being included in a meeting at NATO was something in and of itself - but he arrived as the Soviet foreign Minster, and he left as the Russian foreign minister, and while he was there, there was a one-on-one between him and Secretary Baker, and it was the Russians' turn to host it, so they were going to do it at the Soviet ambassador's residence in Brussels, but they didn't have the foggiest idea how you handle a large press corps, and so the Russian/Soviet press attaché asked us for our help. And we went over to the Soviet embassy compound - Russian embassy compound (it's

hard to tell which one it was at this point) - and got the run of the ambassador's residence, helped them set up a public address system, you know, figured out where the holding area for the press would be, went through this whole elaborate rigmarole and essentially did all their press work for them. And when Secretary Baker arrived, the meeting went much longer than anticipated. We were sitting there in the holding room with all these journalists, and it was a unique experience. I mean, here we were on Russian embassy premises, which in my experience are always top secret, and in this case, the Russian press attaché - you know we'd done everything - I said, "Is there anything else we can do for you, Aleksei" (or whatever his name was), and he says, "Yes, Jack, would you introduce me to Ralph Begleiter" of CNN, because they watch CNN. So I called Ralph over and introduced him, and Ralph wanted to do a stand-up right out in front of the Russian embassy, on their property, and Aleksei said, "Sure, Ralph," and they went out and set up their cameras, and all these things that in my experience the Russians would have said, "*Nyet!*" There we were. It was new.

Q: Was there anything else we could cover?

HARROD: I think as far as Brussels goes, the one other thing I would say, I had three years of Mike Glitman, who was a superb ambassador, and Mike was better than he even thought he was because during the Gulf War he tended to shy away - sorry, Mike - he tended to shy away from a lot of public things. He did not like to cut ribbons and make a lot of speeches and things like that. When the Gulf War broke out, there was an edict from Washington that ambassadors should be more public in articulating our message, and Mike, whose French was quite good, was invited to appear on two of the Sunday talk shows in Brussels, the French ones (there were two Dutch ones and two French ones), and so he appeared on both of them, turned out he was very, very good at it, and here I, as his public affairs guy, you know, had been trying for two and a half years to get him to do more of this kind of thing, and he was very good at it, and about five months later, he was gone, end of his term. But he was really very good, and he even had a great sense of humor, and his French was good, and it all worked out superbly. But in retrospect, my fourth year in Brussels - which would have been more of the same, four years with the same ambassador - my fourth year was made much more interesting by the fact that Glitman left and the new ambassador to Brussels was one Bruce S. Gelb, who had been the director of the U.S. Information Agency and had left that job under some controversial circumstances, I guess, and so suddenly the guy who had been my big, big boss in Washington, but with whom I had never really dealt except on one trip when he passed through Brussels and I just was out at the airport to get him from one plane to another, suddenly came out as my ambassador. So my fourth year was a lot more interesting because I had a new ambassador to adjust to, and Bruce was much more into the public aspect of things than Mike Glitman. Mike was a career diplomat who negotiated the INF treaty, whose credentials are impeccable. Ambassador Gelb came from a different background in business, and so he was much more interested in making his maiden speech to the Belgian-American Association, which was a huge hit, and then he took his role as the honorary co-chairman of the Fulbright Commission seriously and came to Fulbright Commission meetings, which Ambassador Glitman had never done because he didn't know much about educational exchange and didn't think he was

qualified to do this. So Ambassador Gelb became much more of a public figure, and I became his public affairs advisor in the full sense of the term. I mean, we used to meet regularly, and it was quite a pleasure. And I must say (and again, sorry, Bruce), I had some fear and trepidation when he arrived as ambassador, because of the track record at USIA and his perceptions of me, and we had a closed-door meeting shortly after his arrival, which ran into the evening hours, and we ended up shaking hands, and I think we made a very good team, and I learned a lot from him. And it made that fourth year, I think, a lot more interesting than if I had simply gone through a fourth year of the same stuff I had been doing.

Q: Well, then, in '92, whither?

HARROD: Whither? Back to Washington.

Q: To what?

HARROD: Well, I came back. USIA had an office of European affairs, writ large. It was all of Europe, from Vancouver to Vladivostok. I came back as the deputy director of that office in charge of the Western European and Canadian side of it. There had been some attempt to get me to switch to the other side of the shop and do the East European and Soviet side, but I resisted that. It was not much of an attempt, but the idea was floated, why don't we switch you and the other deputy around? And I said, "Not really," because I had come to the conclusion during my time in Belgium that the Bush administration was shortchanging Western Europe as it poured huge resources into eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. And I said when I came back in '92 that I was afraid we would build democracy in Kyrgyzstan and in the process ignore our long-time friends and allies. So I wanted the Western European side. In retrospect, the period from '92 until my retirement in '96 was a very depressing one, because after spending a year and a half as the deputy for Western Europe and Canada, they then split the office in two, and I became the director (not deputy) of an office specifically for Western Europe and Canada, which was supposed to enhance it in the bureaucratic firmament, but in fact, I spent four years of doing nothing but fighting rear-guard actions against budget cuts, personnel reductions, and a diminution of U.S. attention, in public diplomacy at least, to Western Europe and Canada.

Q: Was this a continuation of the sort of how public attention was being focused, or was it a new administration? I have the feeling that they didn't change that much in how they approached the matter.

HARROD: No, they didn't. And it's not just the administration. This was a congressional problem; it was a public perception problem in the United States. Some of it, though, stems from very back at the beginning in the Bush administration, when the Soviet Union ceased to exist and democracy broke out in the East. The Bush administration, Secretary Baker in person, I believe, had decided that the new resources that had to be poured into the new countries of the former Soviet Union would come from within the European budget. In fact, Mike Glitman I believe at one point told the Secretary, "You should be

looking at a globe, and not a map of Europe," but it was a conscious decision to sort of tilt the map of Europe and let the resources slide from the West to the East, which meant it was all coming out of Western Europe's hide. But it was not just the administration because Congress consistently for a number of years, either in subcommittee or in committee or even the full House or Senate, would attach language about how USIA should cut its facilities in Western Europe and Canada because, ostensibly, those people already new everything about the U.S.

Every time you would get a budget cut, which meant personnel cuts, you knew another one was coming down the road. There was no sense that you were ever going to stem this constant pressure, and during my four years, we probably cut - I don't have precise figures here - but we probably cut our USIS presence in Western Europe by a third.

Q: Weren't their concerns at the time about the growing Green movement, which had a certain anti-American, sort of leftist thrust to it?

HARROD: Yes, there was a concern among some people, but I must say it was not a concern that translated into anybody's broader concern about the issue, about resources. Essentially, what we were doing was closing posts, closing branch cultural centers or even country cultural centers, laying off people, including a large number of our Foreign Service Nationals, and cutting American positions; and it was consistent, throughout the four years. It started when I came back in '92. I mean it predates my return, I suppose, in '92, because the real budget shifts began about fiscal '91, probably, when the Soviet Union collapsed, but by the time I came back in '92, the big issue was Congressman Pete Stark from California, who had focused on the fact that we had quote libraries unquote in Western Europe, and I believe because of budget cuts, some of his public libraries in California had to reduce their hours open to the public, so he couldn't understand why the U.S. government was putting money into libraries in Western Europe for these fat cat Europeans when he didn't have enough resources out in California. So he started a campaign to get rid of all quote libraries unquote in Western Europe. Well, you know, sweet reason had a difficult time prevailing because these were not just libraries, they were not just for the benefit of the West Europeans. They were facilities designed to get an American point of view across to people that we wanted reached. And they were increasingly electronic, working through the Internet and fax machines and things like that. They were not a place where a student came in and read a book. But we had trouble getting this message across. Ironically, a couple of years later we seemed to have convinced Congressman Stark, but by then the issue had grown by leaps and bounds. But we tried to stay ahead of it by, essentially, transforming whatever quote libraries unquote were left into these more sophisticated electronic resource centers, because really what we were doing was responding to requests for information from people like staffers for parliamentarians, from cabinet-level offices in host governments and hooking them up with relevant sources of information, either locally or electronically from Washington or other parts of the United States. So they were valuable, they were important, but we had a very difficult time getting across this view to people who thought all we were doing was providing a nice, air-conditioned library for local folks to come and read books. But it was much more than that, and part of the problem in Western Europe is that it's a high-

cost part of the world. Salaries are high. Facilities' rent is high. So when we would get a budget cut, it was usually unequally focused on Western Europe, even within USIA, because that's where the money was. You could close a post in Africa for the amount of money you would save by firing two German employees of our mission in Bonn. So they always came to Western Europe for money, and your program budget, actually, is fairly small. I mean, probably only about a quarter of the money in Western Europe was discretionary money for programs. Most of it was locked into people and facilities. The only way to save money when they tell you to take a budget cut is to let people go. I remember our PAO in Bonn, Germany, said once, rather impassioned, when he was Washington (he was having a meeting with a "senior official in USIA" who was in charge of a huge bureau with hundreds of people, and this official was lamenting that he was having a budget cut and he was going to have to get rid of 35 positions in his bureau, but fortunately only 17 of them were actually encumbered by bodies at the moment), the guy from Bonn said, "I just had to fire 25 people face to face, so I'm not sympathetic to your situation at all." There is also a tendency here in Washington, consistent with any administration, any director of USIA: it's much easier to fire people overseas than to fire people in Washington who ride up in the elevator with you in the morning. And so again, they would come to us and say, you've got to cut your budget by 20 percent or 15 percent or whatever, and that meant me telling PAOs in Western European countries that they were going to have to bite the bullet and close things. And it was not a pleasant four years, I must say.

Q: How did you find the administration of USIA at the top and how it was run under the Clinton time?

HARROD: Let's see, that takes us back to '93. I must say, even predating that, there had been a little bit of instability at the top. I mean, Charlie Wick, as I had said earlier, was not my favorite human being. He had had eight years of running agency. When he left, Bruce Gelb was there for maybe two or three years. He left. Henry Catto ran it for a short time. Then the Clinton administration comes in, and Joe Duffey is named to the job. So there was a sense, I think, after Wick, that there was a bit of inconsistency and there was no sense of a real firm hand at the throttle for any extended period of time. And Dr. Duffey took over in '93, and my personal experience is that Dr. Duffey had some sympathies to Western Europe, given his background and the things he had done, but it didn't translate into any effective defense of our presence there. I think Dr. Duffey, without trying to ascribe motives to him, was more interested in domestic U.S. issues. He's a very committed and experienced guy in the civil rights movement and he had a personal interest in Northern Ireland, where he'd been an observer in the past, but he didn't have the sort of visceral connection to the kinds of things that I was doing and trying to preserve. So frankly, from my perspective, we had a rough few years.

Q: You were also in the State Department where Warren Christopher did not take a strong stand when State Department resources were cut. I think without hesitation that it was a mistake that we did this because obviously our role is very important, and as we're doing today, we're fighting a war in Yugoslavia-

HARROD: -who are our allies-

Q: -who are our allies, and everything you can do to make them better allies is to your credit. And you don't cut off your means of doing that.

HARROD: And as I say, public diplomacy is a combination of short-term persuasion and long-term bridge building. And if the crunch comes and you need your friends, you're not going to have them there unless you've invested the time and effort to work with them over the long haul. I used to say, and I still say, no matter where the crisis is in the world, whether it's in Yugoslavia or even Korea, or in Haiti or Somalia, the people we turn to for financial and military and political support are the Europeans. So you can't simply ignore them, which is essentially what we were doing.

And another aspect of the job that was sometimes fun, sometimes not so much fun, but it was something Dr. Duffey also had to put up with, is that, as someone once told me when I took over my job in '92, oh, you've got all the nice countries and the difficult ambassadors. I had 24 countries, I believe, that I had to deal with, and virtually all of the ambassadors were high-profile political appointees like Pamela Harriman and Jean Kennedy Smith and Larry Lawrence in Switzerland. Even the career people - I had Reg Bartholomew in Rome, and Reg is hardly a shrinking violet. So here you are, trying to put out the word that you've got to cut your resources and lay people off, and then what you do is you rankle political ambassadors who believe that their turf is inviolable, who raise holy hell. Sometimes when they raised holy hell with Joe Duffey, he might back off a little bit on one or two small issues; sometimes no, because we simply didn't have the resources. But certainly one aspect of the job was dealing with a lot of ambassadors whose... I mean, when you think about it, I've mentioned those. Dick Holbrooke was in Bonn for part of that time. Jim Blanchard, who was one of my favorites, was up in Canada. But these are all people with strong views who believe their views are correct, and they want you to do what they want.

Q: And they do have their ties in Washington, too.

HARROD: And they do.

Q: They're not disciplined.

HARROD: In fact, Reg Bartholomew, to his credit, being a career guy, he would sometimes come in and lobby Joe Duffey about how we couldn't cut Italy, and as I would walk him out the door, I would say, "Now, Reg, you know that I'm going to have to send you a telegram in a couple of weeks that says you're going to have to lay off six people." And he says, "I know, and that's when I'm going to send you the telegram back that says 'over my dead body.'" And we'd argue it out. But money is money, and if they only give you a certain amount, that's what you've got.

Q: Towards the end, there had been proposals put out that USIA amalgamate back into the State Department. How was this sitting with you and your colleagues at that time?

How did you feel about this?

HARROD: Not well. I try to be objective about this, and frankly, it is not the organizational structure that makes the difference. It is the attention that the administration or any administration puts on public diplomacy. But essentially, I think, certainly I and most of my colleagues felt that the bureaucratic structure also was an indication of how much attention people at the top paid. And President Eisenhower had created USIA to make it a distinct organization outside the State Department for reasons that made sense back in the '50s, and I frankly didn't see any reason to change that. You know, one could argue, and I would still hope, that within the Department of State public diplomacy would get high level attention, but it wouldn't have the same bureaucratic separateness, and also, because USIA has a long-term role and well as a short-term one, being a separate bureaucracy gave it an ability to carry out that long-term role at some isolation or insulation from the Department. My fear is that putting it all into the Department means that the resources will go to the short-term crises and not the long-term bridge building. So on an abstract level, bureaucracy and organization isn't the key issue, but on the practical level, I'm afraid it probably is, and if I may critique the USIA management over the last few years, my feeling is, because I didn't sense any visceral connection to the kind of work that USIA was doing, there was also not a visceral defense of the agency's existence, unlike, say, what Brian Atwood was doing at USAID, which may or may not in the long run be more effective. I don't know. I can't argue that. But there wasn't the sense that there was a defense being made of USIA's identity, role, mission - whatever you want to call it - which was not the most morale-enhancing-

Q: I would have thought, when you retired in '96, that it was with a certain amount of willingness to get out from under this.

HARROD: Willingness may be not the word I would choose, but it was certainly with a certain degree of relief. First, because I wouldn't have to fight the budget battles any more; secondly because the consolidation issue, while not resolved before I left, was still hanging out there. If I had not retired in '96, I would certainly be retiring now because I would not be part of the consolidation. It's too late in my career to shift over to a new bureaucracy. There are others who will do that, I am sure, very effectively, but it wouldn't have been me. When I put my check mark in the box on the Foreign Service Exam back in 1967 and checked USIA and not the Department of State, it was because I wanted to do a certain kind of work, and my fear now is that that kind of work will not be what it was. So yes, there was some relief about getting out in '96, although at the same time you hate to leave an organization that you put a lot of time and effort into. And as I told people in '96, the good side - my retirement was essentially occasioned by yet another round of budget cuts at USIA, where they had to reduce the number of Foreign Service officers by a hundred, I think - and Dr. Duffey made a very rational decision that anybody who had qualified for early retirement would be early retired so that the more junior people would not have to be let go. And that's a very good decision, so there were no limited career extensions. My number was up, and I left. I said to my wife, I said to others, "The good thing is, this was nothing directed at me personally; it was just a broad-brush thing. The bad side is, it had nothing to do with me personally; it's simply a broad-

brush exercise."

Q: When you retired in '96, what have you been up to since then?

HARROD: I've been working for three different non-profit foundations, so non-profit that I don't get paid for what I do, one of them being the Public Diplomacy Foundation, which is trying to carry on support for the kind of work USIA did and hopefully the Department will do. I did a few public speaking engagements for remuneration, had one major job as a free-lance writer, which was not a particularly pleasant experience, but it brought money into the bank. And the fact that my wife is now deputy assistant secretary of Commerce has given me a certain ability to do Boy Scout work and play with the 13-year-old that I wouldn't have had to do if I were scrabbling for the next buck.

Q: Well, all right, then we'll stop at this point.

HARROD: Okay, it's been a pleasure.

End of interview