

Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training  
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

**AMBASSADOR MAX M. KAMPELMAN**

*Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy*  
*Initial interview date: June 24, 2003*  
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## INTERVIEW

*Q: Today is June 24<sup>th</sup>, 2003. This is an interview with Max M. Kampelman. This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, and I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy.*

*To begin with, when and where were you born?*

KAMPELMAN: I was born in New York on November 7, 1920; so I'm 82 years old.

*Q: So you were born in the city?*

KAMPELMAN: In the city.

*Q: Can you tell me a bit about your parents, first on your father's side and then on your mother's side?*

KAMPELMAN: Well, both of my parents came from a portion of Europe, which was then considered a part of Romania, although it's gone through different transitions over the years. They met here in the United States. Though they both came from the same community they didn't know each other in Europe, but they met in the United States. They married in New York. I was the only child.

*Q: What was sort of the background of your family? It was a Jewish family?*

KAMPELMAN: A Jewish family.

*Q: Is there a family trade or something like that?*

KAMPELMAN: I don't know as much as I would like to know and frequently criticize myself for not asking more questions when I was younger. My mother's father was relatively well to do and was involved in agriculture in Romania. I don't know very much at all about my father's father. I knew my father's mother, my grandmother, because she came over with her children to the United States - and with her husband, but her husband died before I was born. She was a grand dame and kept the family together, the brothers, and lived with one of my uncles, always adjacent to us, so we were very close. So I grew up really in a kind of intimate relationship with my father's family. My parents met actually at one of the ethnic groups that were created in New York, where people from the same European community, particularly among the Jews, would form their own burial society.

*Q: Yes. The burial society was a very important factor.*

KAMPELMAN: There were not only burial societies, but there were places where one could borrow money without interest and pay it back. It was a cooperative kind of arrangement. And that's where they met.

It was at the outset, by no means, a financially comfortable arrangement. We lived in the Bronx in an area that was - I wouldn't call it a slum, but a low-income area of the Bronx - and that's where I was born. My father was first in the silk remnant business. This was before my time. When I began growing up, he, for some reason, opened up a butcher shop; so he was a butcher and my mother would work in the shop. Things got better after a while and through one of his associates born in the same area he did some investing in real estate and therefore until the Depression went up a little bit and we moved into better homes - better apartments actually.

*Q: These were apartments then?*

KAMPELMAN: All apartments.

*Q: Were they walk-up apartments?*

KAMPELMAN: Walk-up apartments, yes.

When things turned bad again he left the butcher business and they decided - because again, one of their friends was in the ladies' hat business, so they opened up a retail establishment selling ladies hats, after the butcher shop closed. My father died when he was fifty-four, a relatively young man, but by then we were living in a relatively comfortable private home. But he left no money really and we ended up living in what I

would then call a slum. It was an apartment in which my mother's sister was living. She was a religious person so we had that orientation.

*Q: I was wondering, as a child, when you were growing up, where did your family fall in the Jewish religious spectrum?*

KAMPELMAN: Orthodox, which was the typical reaction. The reform was really mostly German Jews. My parents were not observant, but my mother kept a kosher home. We were not particularly observant, but my parents and I went to High Holiday services in the orthodox synagogue wherever we lived. I guess that's the way it went. I received a rather intensive Jewish education. They felt, even though they were not themselves observant in an orthodox sense, they wanted me to have training in this.

*Q: Well, the only child and a male child, at that.*

KAMPELMAN: Yes, a male child. And therefore, beginning with kindergarten I attended Jewish Hebrew schools. They were called yeshivas. That was kindergarten, first grade through eighth grade, and then to a high school with the same orientation. All male, half a day traditional public school classes taught by teachers who were teaching in the public school system; in the afternoons we had them, in the mornings there were Jewish studies. Bible language

*Q: So essentially your schools were not public schools.*

KAMPELMAN: Not public schools.

*Q: It sounds like you were in what amounted to a rather constrained enclave in a way.*

KAMPELMAN: Well, I wouldn't call it constrained as much as relatively isolated, were it not for the fact that there were many of us, that we were friends with one another.

*Q: How about being out on the streets? What did you do for fun?*

KAMPELMAN: Let me give you an example. Beginning with the first grade, our classes would begin at nine o'clock in the morning and ended at five o'clock at night because you had two kinds of classes. And that was my schedule through high school. Nine o'clock in the morning until five o'clock at night, which didn't give you a great deal of time with respect to the streets after school. Public school, for example, the elementary school - we were right across the street from a public school - they were rather rough, threw rocks at us and that kind of thing you'd expect in that kind of a neighborhood. On the other hand, among my fellow students Babe Ruth was a hero; we knew what the Yankees were doing, like ordinary kids.

*Q: Yes.*

KAMPELMAN: At some time I got a job even selling scorecards at Yankee Stadium for a short period during the summers. So that was the schedule then. The exposure to non-Jewish kids of our age was minimal. People working for my parents in the stores were, in all cases I can remember, none Jews. They were friends. Our familiarity with the non-Jewish communities as kids was that they would throw rocks at us.

*Q: Of course this was New York and the Catholic kids were going to Catholic schools and they were probably having rocks thrown at them. They were kind of no-go areas.*

KAMPELMAN: Exactly. That was my growing up. We had very good education, I felt, through high school.

*Q: You were eight by the time the Depression started to develop and all. Was this sort of a continual presence, the economy, in your family? As a kid, did you realize...*

KAMPELMAN: I was shielded from the pressure. I knew my parents both worked, but they shielded me from the negatives, except where we lived, but where we lived I didn't know any better. I mean this was home.

*Q: Yes, home is home. They're all the same digs. Really, as a kid you don't notice this sort of thing.*

KAMPELMAN: Yes.

*Q: What about the family regarding politics and all? I mean this is a time of great torment. Particularly in the Jewish community you had the Socialists.*

KAMPELMAN: My father was a democrat, not a socialist. I'm aware of the fact that during that period the vast number of Jewish immigrants working in factories and joining unions was socialists. My father was a Democrat. He somehow had met the boss of the Democratic Party in New York, Flynn.

*Q: Ah yes, Edward Flynn.*

KAMPELMAN: He may have made a political contribution and was given a golden badge, which he was very proud of, to show he was a democrat. So he was a democrat. I remember as a kid, in the 1928 election of Al Smith, my father was strongly for Al Smith.

*Q: As we move up to '32, was Roosevelt sort of a god in the neighborhood, or not?*

KAMPELMAN: Yes. He had been governor of New York and the people in New York were all very proud of Roosevelt, were very accepting of Roosevelt. He was going to get us out of the Depression. My father, as a democrat, was strong in this.

*Q: Well, to carry this a little farther on the political side, how did La Guardia fit in here?*

*He was a liberal republican.*

KAMPELMAN: I have no recollection of my father's relationship to La Guardia, or impressions of La Guardia. Mine was very favorable because I took a keen interest also in politics as a child. So my impression of La Guardia was a high plus.

*Q: And he read the comics too.*

KAMPELMAN: He read the comics. That's right. He heard that.

*Q: In your school what subjects particularly interested you?*

KAMPELMAN: For me, in the earlier classes it was civics. Public affairs matters. In high school it was also civics and politics and government, American government mostly. I was a good student. I was not the best in the class. As a matter of fact, the best in the class happens to remain a friend. We lunched about a year ago in New York. I've kept in touch with him over the years. His last name began with a K, and mine with a K, so we would sit next to each other frequently. I was a good student. I was not top of the class, but really a very good student. I went through the learning of the Bible, but I would not say that that was as interesting to me as my classes in civics.

*Q: How about history? Did history interest you?*

KAMPELMAN: History interested me very much. The social sciences also did. At the end of high school my mother would've wanted me - my father was then dead - and said so, to continue with the yeshiva college and university in New York, and maybe become a rabbi. But I knew even from the days that I was in elementary school that that was not for me. I got the education and I enjoyed it, but I really, as a child, began to think of myself as somebody who would be a lawyer.

*Q: Did Zionism raise its head at all at the yeshiva, or not?*

KAMPELMAN: Not in a political sense, but very much in a religious and a philanthropic sense. As a child, for example, we had a collection box in our kitchen - even in the slums - where we were all taught to put in pennies; and periodically a man with a beard or a rabbi would come by and collect it. A lot of this was collecting for Israel, an orphan's home or something else. This was of course long before Israel was a state but there was a commitment.

*Q: By the time Hitler came on the scene you were twelve. How much were you all following the news, not just in Germany, but all over?*

KAMPELMAN: Not as closely as my later years taught me I should have. The family and the family's friends that clique knew what was happening, but really did not know the intensity of what was happening and equated it with their own experiences in Europe

constantly running into anti-Semitism. This was not new for them. It was kind of an assumption that European non-Jews would be anti-Jews.

*Q: Yes, but no idea of the immensity.*

KAMPELMAN: Yes.

*Q: Were you and your family following the news on the radio in those days much?*

KAMPELMAN: I did, but not as seriously as in later years I thought I should have.

*Q: Yes, I think most of us felt that way. It was a time I think people weren't distracted by the amusement factors of television and all that.*

*Did you go to movies? Were you allowed to go to movies?*

KAMPELMAN: Yes, I was allowed to go to movies and went to movies. As a matter of fact, when the family had the butcher shop, they were not Sabbath observers but they kept a kosher home; and the butcher shop was not a kosher butcher shop. It was just a butcher shop within the area and neighborhood, which was not Jewish primarily. But I would go to the movies every Saturday afternoon because my mother and father were working in the shop; and what could I do? There was a boy named Buster who worked as an errand boy in the butcher shop. They would have him take me to the movies. He'd drop me off and pick me up so I wouldn't have to cross the streets. I also recall the policeman on the corner of the butcher shop - his name was Mr. O'Mara - who became a dear friend of mine, and a hero. It just comes to mind now as I talk to you.

*Q: Well, as one thinks about...These were real neighborhoods.*

KAMPELMAN: It was a real neighborhood.

*Q: What about your teachers? Were there any teachers that particularly inspired you or maybe disinspired you?*

KAMPELMAN: My impression is that I got along well with all the teachers in the elementary school and I recall, as a matter of fact, the name of one lady who taught first grade, Miss Pickelmy. I don't know why I think of her and her name comes to mind. She obviously made a deep impression on me, a favorable impression on me. The Jewish subjects were taught generally by rabbis; and the English subjects and non-Jewish subjects were taught by teachers who were teaching elsewhere. I recall high school teachers much more than I do the elementary school, particularly the French teacher, because you know, you had to study languages. Every high school student in the state of New York had to pass the regents' examination.

*Q: And these were tough.*



KAMPELMAN: These were tough and we worked very hard to prepare for those regents examinations.

*Q: I went to a New England prep school and they made us take the New York regents exams. They were rough.*

KAMPELMAN: They were rough. They were determined to have us do well.

I remember the high school French teacher. I can't think of his name at the moment, though I have his picture in my head. He began the first week by saying, "I want you to write slowly an essay about Paris," and we would write the essay about Paris and he would correct it. And the next week the same essay about Paris would be corrected and we'd go on and then we'd translate the simple paragraphs into French from English, and then toward the end in preparation for the regents; he said, "All right, now you're about to perform the regents. Let's assume they ask you to write a paragraph about museums or about the movies. What you say is, 'I saw a movie and it was in Paris. Paris is a beautiful city,' and then go on with your thing." 'I went to a museum; I saw something French. Paris is a...'"

*Q: [laughs]*

KAMPELMAN: I remember that technique led us to do well in the exams.

*Q: By the time you got to high school where did you feel you were all pointed towards?*

KAMPELMAN: Most of the class felt they were pointed toward the rabbinate. All of the class knew that they were pointing toward college and whatever other careers they might want, teaching or whatnot, because not everybody in class ended up going to the same college, the yeshiva college. But practically all did. I chose not to. As I say, my mother regretted that, but I chose not to. I wanted to be a lawyer and there was a college very near where we were then living, about four or five blocks. So I enrolled in that college at New York University and they called it the University Heights campus. It's now closed.

*Q: It was an extension of New York University?*

KAMPELMAN: It was part of it. It was a campus of New York University, but it was in the Bronx, not downtown. It was the university. It was really, I thought, the Tiffany of the NYU, but nevertheless that's where I went. We had no money.

*Q: This would've been '36.*

KAMPELMAN: No. I graduated high school in February of '37. So I enrolled there. As I said, I had no money; I think I received a partial scholarship. But I asked whether I could work and they said I could. And I would say that in the three-and-a-half years that I was

on that campus, because with getting out in February I had to make up some courses, I earned more money than I did for a number of years after I left college.

*Q: While you were in high school though, did you get involved with the family butcher shop? By this time your father was in the business?*

KAMPELMAN: By that time we were in the ladies millinery business and I was actively involved, particularly on weekends because my classes were nine to five. Sometimes evenings. It was a retail shop. I would either serve as cashier in the shop, and I was cashier in the butcher shop too, even though I was much younger. I would either serve as cashier or, after my father died particularly, my mother would send me downtown. We were in the Bronx not far from the subway; the elevator became a subway. I would buy ladies' hats. The center of the industry was at Thirty-Eighth Street in Manhattan. It was the center of the hat trade.

*Q: This was Dubinsky's, right?*

KAMPELMAN: That's right. It was the center of the military trade. This was hats, not garments.

My mother would say, "I need three brown Milan straw." So I would go to wherever I was supposed to go and I'd say, "I want to buy three Milan straw," and if I had to make a choice, I made the choice. It was usually a good choice. Or she'd say, "Bring home a dozen mixed," because we would run out. Or special order; she would call in a special order and I would go and pick it up.

*Q: This, of course, was the height of women and hats and New York was the center...*

KAMPELMAN: They all wore hats.

*Q: Yes, they all did. There is a wonderful song by Danny Kaye talking about Louis Dache and all of this about women's hats, which he ends in "I hate women."*

KAMPELMAN: My mother had help. There was a saleslady, I remember. Nelly McCarthy. She was a member of the family, virtually.

*Q: I assume that in the hat shop there was a certain taste and a certain cost that you fit the shop to your clientele.*

KAMPELMAN: That's right. The clientele was medium; it wasn't impoverished. It was not a slum.

*Q: Did you find yourself as a young lad with these women coming up and saying, "How do I look in this hat," and all that?*

KAMPELMAN: Well, that was Nelly McCarthy's job, but I watched all these and would sit watching all of this. I would sometimes sit when it was quiet doing homework. This was every Saturday.

*Q: What about at New York University; what type of jobs did you have?*

KAMPELMAN: You mean at the university?

*Q: Yes.*

KAMPELMAN: I got a job as a clerk in the bookstore and that lasted for my whole period. I was able to get the concession for the checkroom for the weekly dances. Every Saturday night there was a dance at one of the campus houses and I persuaded the director and I was the check person. I never learned how to dance at that point because I was never dancing, I was checking. But that provided tips. I also had the concession for formal tuxedos at the end of each year for the proms. I had the concession for The New York Times subscription. The New York Times gave me cards and I'd distribute them out and if you want to subscribe to The New York Times, see Max Kampelman at this telephone number; he'll be at the bookstore. And then summers I worked as a busboy in the Catskills, but I also...

*Q: What are some of the major ones that one hears about?*

KAMPELMAN: Grossinger's. I never got into the majors, but I got into the good resorts where there were tips.

*Q: Did you get to hear the entertainers?*

KAMPELMAN: Yes.

*Q: Because so much of American humor came out of...*

KAMPELMAN: That area and those people. And I did get to hear the entertainers. I was not very good as a busboy. I confess to that. I was not very good. And I only really did it for one period. I got fired from one place because I didn't know how to make salads - or at least the boss didn't think I knew how to make salads. I was not very good at that. As a result, other summers I worked in the steel factory in Brooklyn, New York, and I sold Fuller brushes in the summer, which was a difficult, hot job. And I remember we'd meet in the morning with the regional director and in order to combat the disappointment of not making as many sales the previous day as you would have liked, he would say, "Just remember, the next person is spending a hundred dollars." I sold magazines in the summer. A variety of things. But I did earn money.

*Q: I would think, in reflection, later on in your public career, that sort of thing would give you something to go back to. I mean selling, working in a factory.*

KAMPELMAN: I suppose.

Now, I graduated and did well. As senior I became president of the John Marshall Law Society. As a junior in college I became the president of the Menorah Society, which was the Jewish students group. And my qualifications for being president as a junior were that I had been at the yeshiva as a high school student and I was interested in this. And as a matter of fact, as president of the NYU chapter - and we had a good chapter - we would have speakers come in on occasion; and there was an inter-university Menorah Society which was centered at Columbia University, and I was invited to be a part of that inter-university group, which broadened the scope. I met people then from the other universities in New York. The director was a Reform Rabbi by the name of Isador Hoffman, who became a very dear friend of mine. He was the director of Columbia and he guided all of us because we did not have a Jewish chaplain on our campus; there was one on the downtown NYU campus, but not on our campus. So I used him as a kind of chaplain - I had him come up and speak at NYU - and we became friends until he died, as a matter of fact. Many years ago, indeed, he performed the marriage ceremony for my wife and me.

*Q: How wonderful.*

KAMPELMAN: Many years later.

*Q: Again, you were at New York University from February of '37 until?*

KAMPELMAN: Until June of '40.

*Q: A very important date.*

KAMPELMAN: A very important date, that's right.

I also became chairman of the John Marshall Law Society. I always had that in mind. I became a member and they elected me chairman when I was a senior.

*Q: All hell was breaking loose in Europe during your time. Were you reading The New York Times?*

KAMPELMAN: Yes. I was quite interested and I had extraordinarily good professors on that campus and they totally broadened my horizons. We talked a lot. I chose political science as a major. I had extraordinarily good teachers; I read a lot; I wrote papers; I spent time at the New York Public Library when I had an important paper to do; I did a lot of reading; and I was a good student. Not an excellent student, but a very good student.

*Q: Did you have any feeling, during this time, about discrimination against Jews and so on?*

KAMPELMAN: We were all very much aware, particularly our Jewish group, of Hitler and of the anti-Semitism in Europe. But it was far from us.

*Q: Anti-Semitism was pretty strong in the United States at this time.*

KAMPELMAN: We did not experience it on that campus. I was fortunate in that regard. I will say this: the Jewish students managed to keep to themselves; the non-Jewish students managed to keep to themselves. There were a lot of them in the engineering school, which was on the same campus. But at the John Marshall Law Society we had it mixed and maybe I was insensitive, but I was not conscious of a problem on campus.

*Q: Also, New York was different.*

KAMPELMAN: We had a lot of Jews on campus. New York University had a lot of Jews on all of its campuses. It wasn't City College which had more Jews; we had a lot of Jews on campus. And my professors were all non-Jewish, interestingly enough. But they became good teachers and good friends.

*Q: Where were you pointed towards?*

KAMPELMAN: I was pointed toward the law.

*Q: Any particular school?*

KAMPELMAN: No, but when I graduated in June and decided to go to law school, I knew I had to go to night law school and work during the day. There was no other way that I could do that. And the best night law school in the city was at New York University. So I enrolled there. But I do want to add one thing... when I was on the college campus I became an anti-Stalinist, an anti-communist, and specialized in studies on democracy. I had a professor, Arnold Zurcher, who taught political science and we studied Marxism and political theory. My total instinct was against dictatorship and against the communists. There was a communist clique on campus and I found myself actively engaged in an anti-communist clique on campus.

*Q: Emotions ran pretty high.*

KAMPELMAN: Very high.

*Q: It's hard to imagine, but communism had a great deal of attraction, particularly in New York and often coming out of the Jewish social democratic strain that came out of Germany, I guess.*

KAMPELMAN: It fit in.

I also had a professor who taught social legislation and remained my friend until he died, Jack McConnell; we kept in close touch with each other. And that too strengthened my identity with the New Deal. But he also did one other thing; he recommended that I spend a month, my last summer in college, with a Quaker work camp. He felt that it would be good for me to do that; that they were socially oriented. This was a work camp in Reading, Pennsylvania, working with the American Federation of Hosiery Workers - a trade union - and a Quaker work camp in a slum. I was able to get a scholarship for that, which meant that I didn't work for that month, but I took his advice and enrolled and spent the month there.

*Q: What were you doing?*

KAMPELMAN: We were fixing up slum buildings. Some of these homes were for trade union workers; others were not - slum homes. It was mostly a black area, but not solely black. We did, in a sense, what Habitat (Habitat for Humanity) does now. I made lasting friendships in that Quaker work camp. The director of the camp recently wrote me; he's close to a hundred years old, still alive; he's in Quaker retirement, David Richey. He and his wife became dear friends. One of our campers is the wife of a minister who just died last month here in Chevy Chase. We keep in touch with each other. She married a Methodist minister.

*Q: Do you find that the Quaker approach to no war and all...*

KAMPELMAN: It influenced me. It influenced me a great deal. The power of love. I read Tolstoy; I read the Quakers; and I really became a conscientious objector. But I became an anti-communist conscientious objector, if you know what I mean.

*Q: Yes.*

KAMPELMAN: It didn't blind me. It also didn't blind me to the existence of evils.

I kept in touch with the Quakers all during my law school days and the essence of what persuaded me to be a CO at the time was that wars and violence don't solve the problem. The elimination of evil requires something different from killing people.

We read Gandhi about his success with the British and his non-violent approaches. So I became a conscientious objector. I joined the pacifist organizations. I joined the Fellowship for Reconciliation. I joined the War Resisters League. That's how I met Norman Thomas, Evan Thomas' brother, who was the grandfather of the columnist here. I identified myself.

*Q: The draft started in 1940, didn't it?*

KAMPELMAN: Yes.

*Q: And you were eligible as all hell at that point.*

KAMPELMAN: I was and I registered under the Selective Service Act as a conscientious objector.

*Q: And what happened then?*

KAMPELMAN: I was granted status as a conscientious objector. They called it IV-E. The draft board - I came in; I had letters of my activities - and they had no problem assigning me. As I said to you, this was all while I was going to law school at night. I was a busy man. During the day I worked as a steamer in a sweater factory and joined the International Garment Workers Union. Now, that's interesting. Among the people I met at NYU (New York University), besides Jack McConnell, was the Christian protestant chaplain - a man by the name of Frank Olmsted, who became a very good friend of mine. I was chairman of the Menorah Society, he wanted to get acquainted with me, and I found a friend. And he was a friend in every way. He also urged me to go to the Quaker work camp. When I left college and enrolled in night law school, he knew I had to work, and arranged for me to meet with some leader of the Garment Workers Union enabling me to get the job as a steamer.

*Q: This was David Dubinsky's outfit.*

KAMPELMAN: Yes. This was David Dubinsky's outfit. I was very, very interested in unions and social things so that while I was working as a steamer in a factory I joined that union - it was Local 155, the knit goods workers union. The president was a man by the name of Louis Nelson. I did that for about a year, in the factory, during which I occasionally, when I had time, would get active and then Louis Nelson would ask me to leave the shop and do education work in his Local, which I did. So I worked for the union for about a year.

*Q: Tell me about this union because, for somebody who doesn't know the history of unions, it sounds like a rather hum-drum thing. But this was a power house.*

KAMPELMAN: It was a power house and it was a life that became a member's life. You had a social life. They had a resort in upstate New York for members of the union. You had a social life, you made friends, and they produced improved conditions for their workers. There was no question about it.

*Q: Well, I mean we're talking about sweatshops.*

KAMPELMAN: These were a lot of sweatshops and they were getting rid of sweatshops. I did not work in a sweatshop; I worked in a regular factory but belonged to the union.

And then Nelson introduced me to the lawyer for the Garment Workers Union - the big union, overall - a man by the name of Elias Lieberman. Lieberman enrolled me to help

him and together we went to Washington and had a hearing before the Wage and Hour Board and abolished industrial homework. I did a lot of that work, going to law school at night and during the day I would interview working women at home. They would have sewing machines and they would get paid piece work. And I studied many, many of them and analyzed their piece work and the number of hours they were working. By definition the employee was not paying the minimum wage, but much less than the minimum wage.

*Q: Yes, that was the whole idea of this.*

KAMPELMAN: And we demonstrated that to the Wage and Hour Board and the Wage and Hour Board issued a ruling making it illegal in that trade to do that. Again, Elias Lieberman and I became friends until his death, and as a matter of fact, his niece and I had lunch about six months ago. She came to Washington and she wanted to talk to me. She had seen my name mentioned.

*Q: Did you get involved in clashes with the communists?*

KAMPELMAN: Yes. Let me tell you where I got involved. Not with the union so much because this union had already defeated the communists. But in law school I got involved. In law school, I joined the first year I was there something called the American Law Students Association. They saw that I was working in unions so they invited me in to become a leader. That organization was being captured by the communists nationally, and we were not. We were on the other side. Columbia University had a chapter that was also mostly on the other side, but mixed. I met students from Columbia University as well as New York University and we organized a fight against the communist control.

Interestingly enough, the head of our Columbia group lives here in Washington and was a member of the Atomic Energy Commission. He's regrettably now with Alzheimer's and I'm going to be visiting him this weekend. His wife, who entertained us and fed us Saturday nights before they were married, was then dating him. She was a professor at Queens College and she was the first woman professor at Georgetown University's College of Medicine. But be that as it may, we worked and I went to Washington on the weekend with our group for a convention where we met Abe Fortas, who helped us, and Felix Cohen, who helped us, and I got acquainted with them during that time. Yes, we had that fight. We won it while we were there, but after we left law school the communists took over the organization and their organization doesn't exist anymore.

*Q: I think this is a good place to stop. And I'll put here that we've talked about your time with the garment workers, at law school, the fight with the communists. I don't know. Is there anything else we should cover at the law school or things that were going on then?*

KAMPELMAN: No. The only other thing was that toward the last year in law school one of my professors arranged for me to have a clerkship with one of the leading law firms in New York - Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin and Krim. Louis Nizer was a giant of a lawyer.



*Q: I read his book.*

KAMPELMAN: That was an important move. I learned a lot, it permitted me to take the bar examination before I received a law degree because the Court of Appeals permitted people who were conscripted to take the exam, but they couldn't be lawyers until after they got their degree, but it permitted them to take it before they got their degree. Louis Nizer offered me a job after the war and we became good friends.

*Q: Well we'll talk about the Nizer period and all that.*

*Q: You say Louis Nizer, who was really a name to be reckoned with, even I, without a legal background, knew Louis Nizer was one of the top people. He wrote a book. What was the name of his book?*

KAMPELMAN: He had a number of books. One book that you may be thinking of is called Thinking on Your Feet. His books dealt with reprints of speeches he had made as well as some lessons he had learned.

*Q: I think there was a story of his life or something.*

KAMPELMAN: There is a life story book.

*Q: You said you learned a lot from him. Could we talk about what you were picking up, because this was influential in your later life?*

KAMPELMAN: When you're a clerk you're the low person down on the totem pole. I was going to night school. It was a very active law firm, and most mornings I went straight from my home to the courthouse, having picked up the previous day papers to be filed. So I'd go straight to the courthouse, do my job, then come back to 1501 Broadway, which is where they had their offices, and I would do some research, do some errands - make myself useful to the many lawyers in that firm. I was the only clerk and being surrounded by the lawyers, all of whom were very nice and helpful - talking to me about my studies, I learned much of the law.

On a rare occasion, when I would get down to the courthouse and a motion would have to be argued - I can't think of this happening more than two or three times, if that - if the lawyer was late and the judge was calling the motion up for argument, I just stood up and made the argument. I never said I wasn't a lawyer; I'm sure he assumed I was a lawyer. There's nothing illegal about it. But since I knew what was involved...But that was rare. Normally what I would do is if this was a proceeding I would try to sit through as much of it as I can to learn how it's done.

I remember one case involving a terrible accident and Louis Nizer was handling the litigation in court. He was really the chief litigator of the firm, an eloquent man. Here I knew the particulars of this case - it had been in the firm for many, many months - I

studied it and I knew the business, and yet as I heard him arguing the case tears came to my eyes. He was that good. So this was what I meant when I said that I learned many things about the law which permitted me to be a bit more comfortable.

*Q: Did you ever find yourself morally tested about picking up cases that really stunk, in taking the wrong side of a stinking case?*

KAMPELMAN: No, I never did. It's a good question, but I never did. The nature of that firm's practice was hardly any rich versus poor or right versus wrong. It was primarily rich versus rich. The firm emphasized motion pictures, theater, art world.

*Q: I think this is where Louis Nizer came into the public eye, in the entertainment business. He became a part of show biz.*

KAMPELMAN: Right, and when you're in that kind of atmosphere Columbia Pictures is fighting MGM - it isn't quite in that category.

I also did one of the things that I should not ignore because it was an important part. Louis Nizer did a great deal of research when he made a speech. He was not flippant about the responsibility. I learned that. I am not flippant about my speeches. I take care. But he had me do a lot of research for his speeches. Now that's not legal research particularly, but it's research. And I learned the importance of preparation - preparation for a law case, preparation for a speech appearance - and it's been with me for the rest of my life, the preparation.

*Q: And diplomacy too. Diplomacy in many ways has a lot.*

KAMPELMAN: In many ways it's involved in the process.

There were also interesting sidelights. Bob Benjamin, Benjamin and Krim, was dating an actress, Susan Hayward. At one point he was having lunch with her and he was late and he said, "Max, do me a favor and take Ms. Hayward to lunch."

*Q: She was a real beauty.*

KAMPELMAN: She was a beautiful lady and I did take her to lunch. He joined us later but we had interesting conversation.

*Q: How old were you then?*

KAMPELMAN: Well, I was going to law school. It would've been 1940; I would've been twenty years old.

*Q: Pretty heavy stuff.*

KAMPELMAN: That's right. Pretty heavy stuff.

*Q: Well all of a sudden you got caught up in the war.*

KAMPELMAN: I did.

*Q: Let's talk about that.*

KAMPELMAN: Alright. I registered as a conscientious objector. The law says that a conscientious objector whose claim is recognized by his draft board should be conscripted to do work of national importance under civilian direction. That was what the law said under Section IV-E of the Selective Service Act. A number of conscientious objectors objected to that. They objected to the concept of conscription. I did not. I then, having majored in political science, believed a society has a right to defend itself; a society has a right to conscript if its national interest requires it. So I never had any problems with that. It permitted me to do work of national importance; I said that's what I would do. I could not envisage myself killing anybody. But there was another factor, which was my mother. My mother had a dear, dear brother who was killed in the First World War in Europe. When I as a kid at one point decided I wanted to be a Boy Scout - and I did, even as a yeshiva student - I talked to my mother about it and indeed - I don't remember now what I showed her - she started to cry. I was named after her brother and I therefore never joined the Boy Scouts because she didn't want me to.

*Q: Because it was too militaristic? Was that it? The uniform...*

KAMPELMAN: The uniform was militaristic. So I had that influence on my life also and I don't deny that.

*Q: What about the draft board? This was a draft board where? Because all these were basically local citizens.*

KAMPELMAN: All people from the Bronx, New York.

*Q: Did they have problems with you? Because there were people who were part of the society, friends and all that, and it's fairly simple to say, "I've always grown up in this climate". A young lad could come up and say this without...*

KAMPELMAN: Well, I had to present a written statement, which I did. I also submitted myself for an interview - a long interview - and I had no problems with them. They asked intelligent questions. They wanted to see consistency and I showed them consistency with the Quakers and my activity in the pacifist movement, and they gave me no trouble. Many draft boards did cause difficulty and as a result an appeals board was established so that somebody could go above whatever local prejudices might exist on the draft board to an appeal board. But I never had to. My draft board just said fine.

Now my first assignment...

*Q: Excuse me. When was this?*

KAMPELMAN: Sometime at the end of 1941.

*Q: Forty-one, okay. This was prior to our entry into the war. We didn't go to war until December of '41.*

KAMPELMAN: This would have been prior.

*Q: But the draft was still there.*

KAMPELMAN: The draft was there.

*Q: Very closely; it almost died by one vote.*

KAMPELMAN: I'm a little uncertain in my head now about exactly when that was, but it was around 1941. It might've been early '42. One or the other; I can't vouch for that.

My assignment was to go to a conservation camp - soil conservation - run by the Department of Agriculture in Big Flats, New York, which was near Elmira, New York. This old CCC (Civilian Conservation Corps) camp was still run by the Department of Agriculture and our task was to clean out the forests, cut trees where the experts said they should be cut and clean them out, and then also in other areas plant trees. I arrived at this camp and I think there were approximately forty of us there in the camp. We lived in camp facilities. It was very hard physical work, but it was also work that was good for my health. It was good, hard work. And I worked at it. Most of the campers were church-going people - Quakers, Quaker sympathizers, some Mennonites, and some Church of the Brethren - and some what one might call intellectual pacifists like me. As a matter of fact, I made good friendships there. They were wonderful people to be with. All different educational levels.

*Q: How did being Jewish fit into this particular brand of Christianity?*

KAMPELMAN: I was the only Jew in the camp and I talked about it. They were curious about it and I knew something about it. I never experienced the slightest bit of discrimination or prejudice in all of the years I was in civilian public service. They respected it, they were curious about it, and we talked about it.

*Q: I was going to say this particular brand of Christianity, just looking at it and knowing a little about them, is not what you would call the redneck type, fundamentalist.*

KAMPELMAN: They were fundamentalist in some ways, but not intellectually. A number of farm boys from the Mennonite or Brethren activity were there. They worked

very hard. They were all conscientious. I guess I was there close to a year.

*Q: How about the leadership - the Department of Agriculture people?*

KAMPELMAN: It was a technical leadership. It was a camp run by the American Friend Service Committee, the Quakers. The camp director was a Quaker assigned by the Society of Friend Service Committee to direct us. He and his wife were there. If I remember, she was the cook and he was the director. A very, very nice man named Osgood. He was the director; that is, he made sure that things were running well. On occasion we were permitted, if we wanted to, to go to Elmira on a Sunday or a certain Saturday. If any of these people wanted to go to church, they could go. We were free to move around once we did our work. But the camp was an isolated camp. It was not within a larger community.

*Q: Did you have any problem with the local townsfolk?*

KAMPELMAN: No. We were not exposed that much to the local townsfolk, but we had no problems with them. Those who went to church would certainly not have any problems and the church was not just Brethren or Mennonite or Quaker. There were also, I would say, three or four of them who would go to a normal Christian church. They might be Methodists, for example, or Catholics.

*Q: You did this for about a year.*

KAMPELMAN: For about a year. Then a notice was distributed - frequently notices were distributed - and this was a notice asking for volunteers who would be willing to work in an institution for feeble-minded children in Pownal, Maine. I decided to apply. I wanted to do something with human beings and this was an opportunity to do it, and I was accepted. So I shifted from Big Flats, New York to Pownal, Maine, which was not too far from Portland. And there I was assigned as a nurse in a hospital for feeble-minded children.

My first assignment was quite a shocker because it was really with human vegetables, but humans. And I served as a nurse.

*Q: Were you given any training?*

KAMPELMAN: While I was there the director trained me. And I was not the only one; there were four or five of us there.

*Q: How did you deal with these people that were in such a condition that they were...*

KAMPELMAN: They were human beings. They couldn't talk. There were an awful lot of those children. It is the ones I was assigned to care for. All you could do was care. Wash, clean. You communicated; you talked, hoping they would understand something. It was

difficult. It was a very difficult period. And after a few months the director came to me and asked me how I would feel if he transferred me to the farm. The spring was coming - growth season - and apparently they had patients who were working on the farm. Would I be willing to do that? He could have assigned me to that, but he asked me and I said yes. So I moved from the hospital to the farm where I learned how to drive. I never had driven an automobile.

*Q: You were a real city boy.*

KAMPELMAN: A real city boy. I had never driven automobiles. I learned how to drive a tractor, as well as an automobile. And here were older feeble-minded human beings with whom you could converse. All of them had been there a long, long time - years and years. Really, I have to say, lovely human beings. I don't know a better word to say.

*Q: I've heard that they're very gentle souls.*

KAMPELMAN: Gentle souls. Lovely, lovely people. And I got attached to them. As a matter of fact, the institution at Pownal was not too far from a railroad track. I don't think it was an active railroad track, but periodically the trains would come. Well some of these people I was working with had never been out of the camp in twenty years, thirty years; they had been there a long time, and as I said, we became very good friends. So I went to the director and I asked him how he would feel if I took two or three of them every Saturday night to town and I bought them hamburgers and walk around. And he agreed. He was a very nice man, a broad minded man, and so I did that. And of course for them it was heaven. That added some spice to their lives.

*Q: You know, one hears about, after time, almost the brutality of the people who are perpetually taking care of people who can't take care of themselves. One, it's hard to hire people, and two, it's a numbing experience. Did you see that in the staff there?*

KAMPELMAN: Not a bit. Not a bit. Our unit's staff director - there were four or five of us and one of them was our director who later became a clergyman. He was absolutely terrific. And as a matter of fact, he ended up marrying the cook - a young lady, a lovely lady - and I kept in touch with them for years. But I want to say there weren't many of the CPS (Civilian Public Service) people like me in feeble-minded institutions. More went in mental institutions, I'm guessing we had people in maybe a dozen mental institutions.

*Q: That would be quite difficult, I would think.*

KAMPELMAN: And that was quite difficult.

*Q: Because these were people who had different manifestations.*

KAMPELMAN: And that was difficult. I never was there, but in talking to them later over the years they injected humanity - and this has been written up - in the treatment

wherever they were. They found brutality in many instances. Articles were written about how they injected a new approach into treatments and it worked apparently.

Then a notice went around again - another notice - saying that the Church of the Brethren Service Committee, not the Friends Service Committee, was looking for volunteers among our group to be human guinea pigs in a starvation experiment. I thought about it and I volunteered to do that. I was interviewed in Boston by, I remember, three physicians who would be part of that experiment - Henry Taylor, who was a cardiologist, and August Henchel, I remember, who was a physiologist. They interviewed me and gave me an examination. Of course I had been in good health as a result of the conservation camp and now working on the farm. So they accepted me.

*Q: So this would be about '43 or so?*

KAMPELMAN: Roughly.

*Q: What was this about?*

KAMPELMAN: Okay, so I reported to the University of Minnesota, which is where the experiment was being held. The director of the experiment was a man by the name of Dr. Ansel Keyes. You know the K-ration?

*Q: Yes.*

KAMPELMAN: The "K" stands for Keyes. He developed the K-ration.

*Q: This was the standard ration for our military. I knew of it, but I came in the era of the C-ration, which was a little better.*

KAMPELMAN: A little better, but this was the K-ration.

I found that we were headquartered in the basement of their large football field. There was room in the basement. I guess it was originally for dressing rooms. There were about forty of us from different parts of the country who had volunteered and been accepted. I learned many more volunteered than were accepted. It was explained to us that there had been no studies available on human starvation, which surprised me. Their purpose would be to first put us all on an equal standard of health and diet and that would take a number of weeks - I think six weeks; I don't remember now - where we would eat the same food, every one of us, the same amount, the same everything. Secondly, we would then be put on starvation regiment for six, eight months, something like that. We would be divided, without our knowing where we are, into different groups and each group would have a different rehabilitation treatment with different vitamins, calories, minerals - whatever the experts decided. Let me say to you the result of it was two volumes, which I have in my library, the only authoritative work. I am still receiving visits from physiologists - not many now. Six months ago or so somebody from Canada called and came to visit. Again,

these two volumes are the only authoritative work that today exists in the field.

*Q: Could you give a bit of a background on why we'd be doing this?*

KAMPELMAN: Why as a country?

*Q: Yes.*

KAMPELMAN: Oh yes, it was explained. A) Concentration camp victims and prisoners of war. That's why the Defense Department financed this. The responsibility was civilian but the money came from the Defense Department. Ansel Keyes had persuaded the Defense Department to put up the money. As a matter of fact, they became so eager for this that they would be pressing Keyes for reports even before he was ready to make any final reports. I got down to about 100 pounds. Now, we were told that we could eat nothing other than what they gave us. We would live there underneath the football field in cots, which was fine; we would be examined physically every day; there was to be a treadmill every single day and a blood test every single day. We were also to do exercise outside of the exercise they had. My recollection is we were to walk forty-five miles a week. Now, don't hold me to that, but I think I'm correct.

*Q: But in that area anyway.*

KAMPELMAN: Forty-five miles a week. The university was right along the Mississippi River. They designated how many miles from one point to the other so that we knew if we went from point A to point B it was three miles, if we'd go to point C it was five miles and we would do this every day when we could.

*Q: Were you doing this in the winter? I think you'd be going through knee-deep snow.*

KAMPELMAN: We were. There was no question about it. We did it. As a matter of fact, we were written up in the Minneapolis newspapers, always in a constructive way. I never felt that it was negative. As I said earlier, I took the bar exam in New York without getting a law degree, but I couldn't practice law without getting that degree. Shortly after I got there I went to the dean of the Minnesota law school - Dean Frazier, I remember...

*Q: This was the law school of Minnesota?*

KAMPELMAN: Of Minnesota. You see our laboratory was right on campus. So I went to the dean at the law school and I identified myself. He knew by then about the experiment because it was around and we all wore the same kind of uniform anyhow - it wasn't a uniform, but it was civilian sweatshirt- and I asked him if he thought I could take courses if NYU law school would agree to accept the credits of Minnesota. Would he permit me to take courses that I needed and I would ask NYU to tell me what courses I needed. His son later became a congressman, Don Frazier...



*Q: Oh yes, very well-known.*

KAMPELMAN: ...and then he became mayor of Minneapolis. And I saw Don Frazier about a year ago. We're good friends.

*Q: He's very liberal.*

KAMPELMAN: He's kind of a democratic liberal, on the left side of the Democratic Party. A lovely, lovely man. His father was really an unusual and gifted man. Anyhow, he said, "Yes, by all means." So I wrote to the dean of NYU and he said yes. So I took, I think, the two or three courses I was missing by going to the Minnesota law school.

*Q: This, of course, was during war time, but all the bets were off later. All the universities got very possessive about their thing.*

KAMPELMAN: I had no problem. Within one term I got it all done and then I decided to take other courses. By then I'd met some people around campus. I majored in political science in college, so I took political science courses. Let me say that the two volume work, which did not mention names but numbers - I recognized myself and was told what number I am when the book came out - I came out of that experiment with the least psychological damage of any of the forty. Ansel had a staff psychologist full-time - Josef Brozek, who is still in Minnesota - they're convinced it was the courses that led to least psychological damage.

*Q: I was wondering why you were doing this. From what I gather this was more a physical test to see how you could rehabilitate people. But were you getting psychological tests?*

KAMPELMAN: Constantly. We had a full-time psychologist. We had to keep a diary every single day of dreams and anything else that we did. As I said, the psychologists worked with us constantly, as well as the physical sciences, because they were looking for psychological damage also.

*Q: Was there at a certain point when people's minds started going to food and away from sex and all this?*

KAMPELMAN: Let me say, the sex drive disappeared with starvation.

*Q: It goes very quickly.*

KAMPELMAN: It goes very quickly.

I'm about to make a statement that I can't prove, but I believe that every single one of the campers except me began collecting cookbooks and recipes. An interesting development. Their minds were so preoccupied with food. It did not hit me as something that I would

want to do and it's probably because I was taking courses. (End of tape)

*Q: I was just saying I finished reading recently a book called The Ghost Soldiers about American prisoners of the Japanese. Much of the time they would sit around and create mental meals in loving detail.*

KAMPELMAN: That's what happened here. Brozek, the psychologist, was a Czech, originally born in Czechoslovakia. He was dating a girl whom he later married. We became good friends and he introduced me to his lady friend's good friend. So I had a lady friend soon after I got there. She'd walk with me sometimes - a lovely lady who lives here in Washington today - she married a very nice fellow. But I wanted to say to you, right after this initial period not only did the sex drive disappear, but I really wasn't as friendly as I should have been to a friend.

*Q: Well when people get more and more isolated...*

KAMPELMAN: More and more isolated, I felt. And yet I want to say that the faculty and the students were fine to us and I made a point very early on, particularly during the first phase — of going to the synagogues in Minneapolis. I wanted them to know I was there and I just wanted to develop relationships. Again, I made lasting friendships there. The rabbi at one of the synagogues later became a rabbi here in Washington. My wife and I visited him and his wife last Sunday. So it's a long relationship. But I met him at the synagogue in Minneapolis.

*Q: While you were doing this, from the chronology it sounds like around '43, '44.*

KAMPELMAN: Forty-three, '44, '45.

*Q: I was wondering whether the enormity of what happened in Germany and the concentration camps - and for American soldiers too - and just the deprivation of food in Italy and other places, was this something that you all were aware of?*

KAMPELMAN: Yes. Not as much. The concentration camp existence didn't really come in until later.

*Q: Yes, it was really almost after the war.*

KAMPELMAN: But my colleagues were intelligent people, the forty of us. Incidentally, one of them left the experiment after an accident which chopped off a finger. The psychologist was convinced that this was a psychological act. He was a deeply religious Quaker — and I'm sure he never voluntarily would have left that experiment. It was stressful. I mean no sense kidding about this. It was stressful.

*Q: Oh yes.*

KAMPELMAN: But I met a lot of people also and they were very nice to me. I had no problems. And I was taking courses.

Let me say to you that I began to question my pacifism with Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

*Q: We're talking about the nuclear bombs that went off in those two places at the end of the war with Japan. This was August of 1945 about.*

KAMPELMAN: You know I had been taking courses in political science. The faculty was a young faculty and they became friends of mine as well as teachers. My commitment to pacifism had, I'm sure, without even my knowing it, all different categories - one of which was a reading in Tolstoy and Gandhi and the power of love instead of killing. The Indians did it. With the dropping of the atom bomb I remember thinking to myself this doesn't work. These guys flying up there never see the damage they're inflicting down below. How do you reach people who are attacking? This is not going to work. You either accept evil or you resist it, and the power of love is not capable of resisting it. That had a very profound effect on me and I began to talk to the political scientists about it and I began to think too. By then the war was coming to an end.

The authorities asked me to stay on after the experiment and the war in order to close up the unit. 1946 came and the war was over. My faculty friends told me I had earned a master's degree in Political Science and was working toward a doctorate degree. It appeared as if I was practically all through with the coursework for the doctorate degree. They asked whether I would like to be an instructor of political science. They said they would make me an instructor if I agreed to finish my doctorate. I had to make a career decision. They knew I was a lawyer. So I thought about it and since I thoroughly enjoyed the intellectual challenge in teaching political science, I thought I would stay at Minnesota. I wrote to Louis Nizer. He had offered me a job for after the war. I explained that I was offered this teaching position and that I wanted to try it and he wrote me back saying that he wanted me to know that if after a couple years I decided that I wanted to go back to law I should not hesitate. So I became a member of the faculty, got a master's degree, and finished my course work for the doctorate and a new world opened up for me.

*Q: Could you talk a bit about political science in the latish '40s and how it was taught? Because to my mind political science today is a whole different...which I consider - I mean I have to state my prejudice - crazy. Starting at that period, how was political science taught and what was the outlook?*

KAMPELMAN: Our department, which was a great department, I've got to say...

*Q: Yes. Minnesota is one of the major universities...*

KAMPELMAN: We resisted turning political science into sociology with equations and predictions and the effort to make it a science. Our emphasis in that department in the courses I took and the courses I taught - for example, I taught one course which was

called Humanities in the Modern World where we went into Freud, Lenin, Karl Marx, D.H. Lawrence. The political science department and sociology joined up. I taught a section of that. I taught a course in a seminar called "Problems of Democracy," which was a tremendous course. I think the students and I liked it. We did not go into the formula business, which is where political science has drifted.

*Q: Which strikes me as a bunch of alchemists looking for the philosopher's stone.*

KAMPELMAN: Exactly.

*Q: You know, the right equation and you've solved it.*

KAMPELMAN: Exactly, and we can then make a prediction.

*Q: You must have found the student body, particularly I think probably the greatest set of student body that we've ever had, and that was the veterans coming back.*

KAMPELMAN: Yes. It couldn't be better. It was stimulating. We had serious young men and women, mostly men but also some women. It was a pleasure to teach and I was a good teacher and a good member of the faculty.

I liked to teach freshman, the introductory course - preference - because you get more of the kids there than you do later on. I'm still in touch with some of my students. So that opened up a new life for me.

*Q: Well how were you looking at some of the aspects, for example, as you were doing this; I mean the enormity of what was the Third Reich, of Hitler, and also the battles that were going on still of the intellectuals sort of having this love affair with communism and excusing the enormities of Stalin's Soviet Union and all this? Did you find yourself having battles or dealing with this?*

KAMPELMAN: No and yes. That's a good question. I think I mentioned that when I was in college we were battling communists. Fortunately the political science faculty at the University of Minnesota shared my anti-Stalinist, anti-communist perspectives, without a doubt. My faculty adviser was a man by the name of Evron Kirkpatrick, later the husband of Jeane Kirkpatrick.

*Q: Oh, yes.*

KAMPELMAN: He was a political scientist of distinction at that time and he was my faculty advisor on my doctorate work. You ask about the politics and the Stalinist business. The students knew the point of view of our department and my point of view, because I never hid it; we talked about it. And you know they always liked a good fight and so they would arrange debates for speeches and I always responded affirmatively and was active on campus. Frequently my opponent would be a man by the name of

Papandreou, who was an instructor of economics at the University of Minnesota.

*Q: Oh my god. I was consul general in Athens for four years when the colonels were there and Papandreou came up a great deal.*

KAMPELMAN: Okay.

*Q: It was Dimitri, wasn't it?*

KAMPELMAN: Yes, Dimitri or Andrei, I don't remember. I had breakfast with his son some weeks ago here in Washington. His son is now the Greek Foreign Minister. Frequently, his father who became the Greek Prime Minister, and I would debate on campus. After Reykjavik, when I was in Reykjavik with Reagan...

*Q: This was during the latter part of the Reagan administration.*

KAMPELMAN: After Reykjavik Reagan assigned an Air Force airplane to me and they took me to various capitols in Europe to explain Reykjavik from our point of view. One of those was Greece and I was to meet with the heads of state. It may have been the year you may have been there.

*Q: No, I wasn't there at that time. This was during the mid-'80s.*

KAMPELMAN: Well, I land at the airport and I don't remember who the ambassador was but he met me there and said, "Mr. Papandreou invited you to have dinner with him tonight," - and I haven't seen him since Minnesota - "at his home in the country," wherever that was. I said, "Fine. What time are you going to pick me up?" He said, "I'm not invited." So I said, "You call the people in his office and you say that I don't go to a meeting with the prime minister without my ambassador being there." Just as firm as that. He called me back a little bit later at the hotel and he says, "It worked. I'll pick you up. I'm going there." So we go there and he greets me warmly. I hadn't seen him in years and he embraced me and greeted me warmly; we talked about old times. I don't remember how it came about but the occasion arose where I said to him, "My friend, at that time I thought that if you were not a member of the Communist Party you were cheating the party out of dues." The ambassador's face got white. Blood is draining down. Papandreou laughs and says, "Well, what do you think now?" I said, "Well that's why I'm here. I want to find out if you wised up!" We had a wonderful evening.

*Q: Was there a core - because this was an interesting period in our society; we were beginning to move into McCarthyism. I know one of my professors when I was in college was Frederick Schumann, who was one of the people pointed to early on by McCarthy. We were beginning to feel that.*

KAMPELMAN: On our campus there was always a left-wing unit, as there was on every campus. Frankly it was concentrated in physics and chemistry and not in either economics

or political science.

*Q: That's interesting.*

KAMPELMAN: In our campus. I should say that I had earlier referred to my dealings in the trade union role, and of my friends. A friend of mine showed up in Minneapolis working with the Textile Workers Union. We had communists in the trade union movement in Minnesota. As a matter of fact, they controlled the CIO. "Max, would you be willing to advise our local chapter people, because we want to fight this element?" So I became an adviser - got a little money for it - for the Textile Workers Union. We had a chapter of the American Federation of Teachers. I joined the union. I was assigned, or volunteered - I don't remember - to be on the executive committee of the citywide AFL; it was not then the CIO. Again, we had to struggle there and I was active in both of these issues.

Next, the political science department at the University of Minnesota - young people mostly - most every Saturday night we met socially at the home of Herb McCloskey or Evron Kirkpatrick; he was then married to another lady. Who would show up frequently at eleven, ten o'clock at night? The newly elected mayor of Minneapolis, Hubert Humphrey. We would have great evenings talking.

In 1944, when I was not knowledgeable at that point about the CIO, Humphrey merged the Farmer Labor Party with the Democratic Party so as to help Roosevelt win in '44. They became the Democratic Farmer Labor Party. And Roosevelt won in '44. In 1946 at the state convention Humphrey invited me to the convention. I went to the convention - not as a delegate, but as an observer - the Communists took over the DFL, a combined Democratic Former Labor Party. I can use the term "communists" very easily because the following two or three years the CIO had hearings and kicked out these people from the labor movement and I wrote my doctoral dissertation on this question. So I was active, you see, politically at the same time as I was teaching and writing a dissertation.

*Q: Did the issue of communism as we move on - and McCarthyism was getting strong; it started in, I guess, '49.*

KAMPELMAN: It started afterwards.

*Q: How long were you at Minnesota?*

KAMPELMAN: I left Minnesota in '48 and that in itself is interesting because it fits in a little bit with what you're talking about. As I said, I was a good teacher. The chairman of the department was a distinguished political scientist, William Andersen. I had finished all of my coursework; my thesis subject was the CIO versus the Communist Party, a Study in Power Politics. He came to me and he said, "Max, you're doing well here, but we have a rule against giving permanent faculty appointments to our students." So he said, "I've got a suggestion to make to you. We've talked it over in the department. Why

don't you go someplace else for two years, three years, and then come back to us?" I said, "Fine." But he said, "You've got to finish your dissertation."

*Q: I want to say you weren't married at this time.*

KAMPELMAN: No, I was not married at this time.

So I said, "Fine." He says, "I know just where you should go and I've arranged if you want to, to go there," and I said, "Where's that?" He said, "The London School of Economics. It would be great for you to go there. They've got a vacancy. You can stay there for two years and then you'll come back. Plus we'll be getting you from the London School instead of from Minnesota." So I wrote a letter to London and they wrote a lovely letter back telling me where I was going to be living and all the rest - the salary and living arrangements - and then they said, "You know, one of our faculty people is in Chicago. Maybe you ought to get acquainted with him. It's Harold Laski." Well, I got the letter - and is presented a problem. I had just published an article in the Journal of Politics on Harold Laski, which was critical of his friendship with the Soviets.

*Q: He was a name to conjure with...He was very close to Eleanor Roosevelt, wasn't he?*

KAMPELMAN: Yes. He was a distinguished political scientist but he had this tilt and I wrote about the tilt.

How to handle this? So I wrote him a letter. I said, "I've just heard from [so-and-so] that we're going to be colleagues next year and it might be a good idea if we got acquainted. I'd be very pleased to come down on a Saturday to Chicago and we can have a cup of tea together and get acquainted." A nice letter. "P.S. If you haven't yet read: Harold J. Laski, A Current Analysis by Max M. Kampelman, which appears in the current issue of the Journal of Politics, I suggest you not read it until after we meet." I figured that's a way to handle it. He got back to me and I went to Chicago on a Saturday and met with him and his wife. He never raised the article and I didn't because I've already mentioned it in the letter. About two weeks later I received a letter from the London School of Economics saying they made a terrible mistake; they really don't have a vacancy. So that took care of that.

*Q: Yes.*

KAMPELMAN: So instead Bill Andersen tells me there's a vacancy in a college in Vermont known as Bennington College. "Why don't you apply and I'll apply for you." So I got a letter back from the president in which he offered me a job and a very nice letter in which he says I might object to some of the conditions and one of these conditions is that we've got a two-and-a-half month vacation in the summer and a two-and-a-half month vacation in the winter, and you may find that to be too onerous; I was to teach two seminars. So, I got married that summer and we went to Bennington College.

*Q: Did you tell me that you got married that summer?*

KAMPELMAN: Yes.

*Q: Where did you meet and what's the background of your wife?*

KAMPELMAN: I met Maggie during the war while attending a meeting of conscientious objectors in New York. It was a meeting from different places and they were meeting because some of the COs were not doing work that they thought was of sufficient national importance and they wanted to do more of that kind of work. A meeting was called for some of us to talk about what we were doing. I think I was then in Maine and we had a meeting and one of the people who was there was from a Philadelphia mental hospital; Ben Segal was his name. He is now dead. His wife is today in a Quaker retirement home. He had a date with a friend, a former classmate, and he introduced me to her, and it was Maggie. We became friends and she kept in touch with me and indeed visited me in Minnesota. We finally decided after a few years of knowing each other that we wanted to get married.

*Q: What was her background?*

KAMPELMAN: She was born in Chicago of a working class family, although her father became a foreman at General Electric. She was a socialist. I don't know whether she was a member of the Socialist Party or not, but she was a democratic socialist and after college she got a job...

*Q: She went where to college?*

KAMPELMAN: She went to Chicago Roosevelt University. Have you heard of the school?

*Q: Yes, I've been there.*

KAMPELMAN: It used to be the central YMCA (Young Men's Christian Association).

*Q: Well now it's located in the auditorium building, but then it was in the YMCA.*

KAMPELMAN: She was a good student, apparently an "A" student. In the beginning she worked for the CIO war relief committee during the war and then got a job with the Garment Workers Union, which was the union I also had worked for; and she became an educational worker in Louisville, Kentucky, and then was transferred to Wisconsin where she was the educational director of the union in Wisconsin. She was able to come to Minnesota and it worked out very well. So we got married and we went to Bennington College.

*Q: You were at Bennington from when to when?*



KAMPELMAN: It began September of '48.

*Q: And how long were you there?*

KAMPELMAN: Okay, that's a story now in and of itself which I have to give you.

*Q: Alright.*

KAMPELMAN: It was a great job. My weekends began on Thursday night and ended on Tuesday morning. Two seminars on Tuesdays and Thursdays, but I had to finish my doctoral dissertation.

Humphrey in Minnesota was running for the Senate in November; I was in Vermont, not voting in Minnesota, but he and I had become friends from these Saturday night meetings and I helped out. As was mayor he asked me to do a few things on the new city charter. We became friends. He called me on the phone after he won the election. He said, "Max, Muriel and I are going to be in New York at a meeting of the League for Industrial Democracy where I've been asked to make a speech. Why don't you and Maggie meet us and spend the weekend with us?" So Maggie and I drove down. I heard the speech and I met a lot of old friends there; and then together we interviewed somebody for the job of running his legislative program in Washington - a very capable man, I thought. I told Humphrey afterwards, "You ought to take Stewart. He's really very, very good." I thought he did and I went back up to Vermont.

Christmas came and I received another call from him. "I'm going to save you from sin." He had a real Protestant work ethic and five months vacation was for him sinful. So he was going to save me from sin. He said, "Instead of playing around waiting for two-and-a-half months I want you to help me open up my office and get it together. Bill Simms is going to be there handling Minnesota problems; he's not policy." So, instead of finishing my dissertation, which I had time to do, Maggie and I went to Washington. Frankly, I hired myself. I had a question in my head, "How do you work for a friend?" But I quickly saw this was not a problem. We were partners. I was his junior partner.

So I got a hold of Fred Burkhardt, the president of Bennington, and I told him. "Look," he responded, "Max, come on up. Fly up for the opening of classes because there are kids who have signed up for your classes already," - two seminars - "and meet with them. See what they want. See how you can work something out maybe." So I met with both classes and we worked out a deal. I would come up I think it was every other weekend and have a three hour seminar Friday night with one class and a three hour seminar Saturday morning with another class. I don't think I did it every weekend, but I may have. Maybe it was every other weekend. I gave the kids an opportunity to transfer to another class, but they all wanted to continue with the class so this is what I did for the rest of that term. As a matter of fact, as I talk to you now, Bennington was then an all-girl school. I broke that mold because I told the girls, "Look, I know I'm interfering with your weekend, but if you

have dates and you want to bring your date to the class, bring your date to the class.” And quite a few of them would bring their dates to the class. So I then took a year’s leave of absence, thinking I would spend another year in Washington, and I stayed for six-and-a-half years.

*Q: By the way, for that time that you were going up to Bennington we were about twenty miles apart. I was a junior at Williams.*

KAMPELMAN: The girls used to date the boys at Williams.

*Q: Unfortunately I kept trying to find a girlfriend up at Bennington and I never really did, which you could’ve helped me if I had only known.*

KAMPELMAN: Well Maggie and I used to sometimes have dinner at the inn.

*Q: Williams Inn, yes.*

KAMPELMAN: Williams Inn, which was a beautiful place.

*Q: It was a Treadway Inn.*

*Bennington had a reputation of being very avant garde all the time. How did you find the students there?*

KAMPELMAN: Really very good. Serious kids. A lot of dance and art, which I had nothing to do with. But those who took political science courses were really intelligent, bright kids. I’m trying to think; there’s a school for slow learners here in Washington run by Sally Smith. Do you know it? It’s a great school.

*Q: Oh yes. Is it something like Experiment School?*

KAMPELMAN: I can’t remember the name.

*Q: It has a name like that. It’s located on Canal Road.*

KAMPELMAN: She was one of my students. She’s now running this school. A highly motivated girl.

So it was fine. What I found also, which was different from Minnesota and impressed me - at Minnesota most of the talking was done by the boys; very few girls said anything. They might come to you after class and talk to you. These kids, with no boys around, they were talking. They participated. And that’s why, frankly, I recommended to two of my children that they go to an all-girl school, Mt. Vernon College, and they loved it.

*Q: This continues to be the case. There’s a strong rationale for having all-women*

*colleges. It draws women to get out there and assert leadership.*

KAMPELMAN: Yes.

*Q: Then we're moving back really to about '49, are we? We moved to Washington. And it is for six years?*

KAMPELMAN: Let me also add that during the '46 to '48 period with Humphrey we lost—the right wing of the Democratic Party lost to the left wing Farmer Labor Party at the convention in '46. Between '46 and '48 Humphrey went around the state with his friends to bring the party back from the left wing, which was mostly the labor left wing, whereas right wing labor was on our side. And I helped out - not much, but I did. He traveled all over the state. My classes might finish, let's say, at three o'clock and he'd pick me up at three o'clock. There would be a car full of people and we would drive someplace in the state and meet with people who were on our side and tell them to organize. So I was active in that. And, of course, without my being present in '48 he did take the party.

*Q: Was it sort of what I call the traditional left wing, particularly the communist thing of hanging on meetings until everybody went home and then they would take over and that sort of thing?*

KAMPELMAN: And this meant out organizing them. And they could organize well because I remember the Electrical Workers Union and the Longshoremen's Union in Duluth put a lot of money into that left wing and they hired organizers.

*Q: These are the very left wing, yes.*

KAMPELMAN: But Humphrey was the popular political figure and he won the convention. The only thing he got out of '46 is he got an agreement out of '46 to make his friend, Orville Freeman, as secretary of the party, which helped as Orville Freeman later became secretary of agriculture and the governor of Minnesota. He just died a few months ago.

*Q: Harold Stassen - was he in Minnesota?*

KAMPELMAN: He was Minnesotan. A very active governor.

*Q: He was Republican though, wasn't he?*

KAMPELMAN: Yes.

*Q: Was he a figure that sort of...*

KAMPELMAN: He got involved in his politics and he was a major figure in the state.

Anyhow, I didn't want to get into that part of it.

Now we're back to Washington.

*Q: We're in '49 to '55 about, which was a very interesting time. In the first place, tell me a little bit about Humphrey. I have a great deal of admiration for Hubert Humphrey. He had a reputation that he talked so much that it was hard to get a conversation going with him. How did you find this? I mean he was just full of ideas.*

KAMPELMAN: Full of ideas. And he did talk too long. I mean it is said, and I believe it, whether it came from here or from somebody else, Hubert's speech need not be eternal to be immortal.

*Q: [laughs]*

KAMPELMAN: But his speeches were eternal. But you know, he was a great listener as well as a great teacher. Believe me.

I once talked to him about that. We became very close friends. I became his lawyer. Until he died really we were intimate friends. But I once said to him, "You know, everybody criticizes you for talking too goddamn long." I said, "Why do you talk so goddamn long?" This was early on. He says, "Max, you and I are teachers." He says, "When you really want to be a good teacher you've got to tell them what you're going to tell them, and then you tell them, and then you've got to tell them what you told them," and that was his philosophy. And he did look upon his politics as an educational teaching job. He was never superficial.

As a matter of fact, do you have a card?

*Q: Yes, I'll give you one.*

KAMPELMAN: Do you want some reading material on this period?

*Q: Yes.*

KAMPELMAN: Do you have my book?

*Q: No, I don't have it.*

KAMPELMAN: Would you like a copy of my book?

*Q: Yes.*

KAMPELMAN: I just got some books from the Internet because it is out of print. I'll send you one and I'll send you some reading material about Humphrey. They just had the

twenty-fifth anniversary of the Humphrey public affairs center at the University of Minnesota. It was a reunion and they asked me to make the banquet speech, which I did. I'll send it to you.

*Q: You arrive in Washington in 1949.*

KAMPELMAN: January of '49.

*Q: Truman had surprisingly been reelected.*

KAMPELMAN: Yes.

*Q: This was your first time in Washington. What was the flavor of the political situation and the things you were dealing with?*

KAMPELMAN: Let me say first of all that I did not attend that great '48 convention where Humphrey made the civil rights speech because I was at Bennington. I'm sorry I didn't go to Philadelphia for it, but I didn't. It would've been a tremendous thing. But I've written up this period which I am going to send you.

The Southerners looked upon Humphrey as some terrible outsider, forcing the Democratic Party to split.

*Q: This was when Strom Thurmond and the Dixiecrats moved in.*

KAMPELMAN: Right. As you know, they left the Democratic Convention, walked out of the convention. The Southerners looked upon Humphrey as some goddamn upstart. (End of tape)

Secondly, Time magazine had his picture on the cover as he came to Washington. It was a picture of this whirlwind blowing into Washington like a tornado. If you're a freshman senator you don't get that kind of recognition and as far as Senators were concerned that was evil. Times were very, very tough and I describe it in my speech and this article that I'll send you. It'll also describe to you what we did, including what I did.

*Q: Well this is for the record here, so I think it's a good idea to talk about some of the things that...*

KAMPELMAN: Okay. He's an enemy; they treat him like an enemy. There's no question about it. And I think the word cruel is an accurate description of the treatment. So what do you do?

*Q: You say "how they treated him." How did this manifest itself?*

KAMPELMAN: Ignoring him; if he says anything they walk out of the chamber.

*Q: Sort of in Coventry in a way.*

KAMPELMAN: Yes. Now all these things hurt, particularly for a gregarious fellow who never looks upon himself as having any enemies. He was a gregarious, friendly human being. So what do we do about it? And I know this hurt him badly. We would talk about it.

He was offered the national chairmanship of Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). ADA was an organization created between '46 and '48 to challenge the Wallace movement within the Democratic Party. It was left wing. ADA was created mostly by liberals. Eleanor Roosevelt was an active ingredient in that creation. Humphrey was invited to be one of the leaders. Governor Chester Bowles of Connecticut, Paul Douglas of Illinois, Ronald Reagan of California, president of the Screen Actors Guild, were among the creators. And this was an organization that was grabbing hold, with chapters in many states. And they asked Humphrey to be the national chairman and I urged him to accept and he accepted it. I don't think he even doubted it and he accepted it.

He would get invitations to speak all over the country; he would accept those invitations and he would build support all over the country. And slowly it began to dawn mostly on the Democrats in the Senate, the non-Southern Democrats because the Southern Democrats were a breed of their own; but the non-Southern Democrats began to see he's carrying some politician weight. He's got support. So it began to move them away from 'how do you get along in the Senate' to 'I better think about my domestic constituency.' This began to evolve. This developed friendships. Secondly, he worked like hell as a senator. Time was no issue, day or night. He learned legislation. If an issue came up he knew what the issue was. He was very bright. So he became knowledgeable about the issues that were before the Senate and chose to speak about them, in spite of the fact that the Southerners might walk out when he stood and spoke about them.

We did one other thing. Let's assume that he'd make a speech on the Missouri Valley Authority or soil conservation or labor legislation or poll tax or getting rid of the civil rights discrimination. We learned - as a matter of fact, I learned this - that that speech could be reprinted by the government printing office and we could order as many copies as you want as long as you paid for them, and it was relatively cheap. So since I had a lot of friends in the trade union movement who became Humphrey friends and I was also in charge of legislation in that office, Bill Simms, who was his assistant from there, was in charge of Minnesota politics and I was in charge of legislation; I was in charge of the press. Today my equivalent might be five, six, seven staff people. I was the only one. I would persuade the labor unions or the education organizations to order thousands of copies of these reprints and to distribute them around the country.

Many of the unions had educational meetings. I would frequently go and speak at those educational meetings. The University of Wisconsin, for example, had a School for Workers. All summer long unions would come for a week or ten days with people from

their staffs and from their members and we would be there with literature and in person permeating ideas, sending out ideas - education for the teachers, and the farmers, a lot of stuff like that and expect that they may be informed, because these were thoughtful presentations and argumentative; they weren't rhetoric as much as they were substance. And they gained support and friends, and slowly Humphrey became the leader of the liberals in the Senate. He was really acknowledged. Paul Douglas helped.

*Q: He was from Illinois.*

KAMPELMAN: Paul worshiped him. Paul became a dear friend. He helped him; he guided him; he supported him. Even politicians who had played their political life with the southern Democrats suddenly found they had to develop in other directions as well. So we slowly began to overcome that negative.

As far as the southerners were concerned, he was the enemy, with one exception: Lyndon Johnson. He and Lyndon came to the Senate at the same time, but Lyndon came from the House; but somehow, after about a year or two, they became increasingly friendly. Humphrey wrote his master's thesis on Roosevelt's New Deal. Johnson felt that his career was due to Roosevelt's help. Both were very serious people. I don't mean to be negative about anybody, but if you were looking for where Jack Kennedy was later on you'd have to look at the golf course.

*Q: Yes.*

KAMPELMAN: Humphrey and Johnson worked day and night. They were serious people, both of them. Johnson outworked everybody and Hubert had a good head and knew his stuff; and that leads me to the following, which was crucial: Joe Pechman, at the Brookings Institution, and I became very good friends. Joe was a tax expert at the Brookings and he would always be filled with the inequities of tax legislation and tax loopholes. And it occurred to me, and I went to Joe one day and I said, "Joe, how would you like to help us out on these tax loopholes?" He said yes. So I arranged a meeting with Humphrey. Pechman brought to the meeting two or three other experts, one of whom I saw recently - Lou Oberdorfer - became a federal judge here and had been a tax expert with one of the leading law firms. Lou Oberdorfer, Joe Pechman, a fellow Charlie Davis, who was secretly there because he was working for the House Ways and Means Committee, but he was a tax expert. Joe used to say, "It's too technical." So we talked and Humphrey said, "You know, I'd like to do something about this in the Senate. Can you guys help me?" and they said, "Yes, we'll help you."

He persuaded them to help him, whereupon we began study sessions. At the end of a workday they'd come to the office and they would make up a list of all the tax loopholes that they thought we ought to try to close, knowing we couldn't do it, but making a case for them. Each night we would discuss a different loophole. We'd spend hours at it and it was complicated, but Humphrey was smart as hell and he would catch it and then they would work and come up with papers. And we finally came up, I think, with ten or eleven

loopholes. Then I remember we had a couple of evenings where they would shoot embarrassing technical questions at Humphrey, the kind of questions you might get on the floor of the Senate. At the end of it everybody was satisfied and we were ready to go because the tax bill was coming up and that's what we were timing this for, the tax legislation.

We arranged that one or two of them would - because they had jobs - be in the gallery; I would sit next to Humphrey, which I mostly did when he was speaking; and if things got tough I'd signal; they'd come down, I would go out, and they'd give me the answer. Let me say to you that this rarely happened in a full week of debate. Humphrey would begin introducing one amendment at a time. Opposition: Walter George of Georgia, Dean of the Senate, and McKenna of Colorado, Senior Republican - both aged, grey-haired people. And they knew the subject from A to Z; they had been working on it for many years. As usual, a lot of the southerners would move out of the chamber when Humphrey began. We began to see a turn. He knew his stuff. Monday goes by, Tuesday goes by; Senators began to come back in. It was a fascinating debate, lasting for hours each day. I can tell you it was a wonderful thing to behold. I've never before or since seen it in the Senate. The liberals were present - and they surround Humphrey as a way of demonstrating support. Three or four or five of them became eight or nine, or ten or twelve of them or fifteen of them were surrounding him. I remember instance Bob Kerr of Oklahoma oil...

*Q: A big oil man.*

KAMPELMAN: A big oil man, very conservative. An expert.

The pending amendment is related to the depletion tax advantages for the oil people get and we wanted to get rid of it. Herbert Lehman, an old man now, wanted to help. So he had a brief statement to make, to let Humphrey catch his breath, and he mispronounced "depreciation" to "depletiation." Bob Kerr, a mean man, stood up and ridiculed Lehman, a former lieutenant governor of his state, a United States senator, a distinguished international banker. Humphrey heard this and he gets up and he whiplashed Kerr as Humphrey can do with that tongue, and he really brutalized Kerr, to the point of embarrassment; and then talked about Lehman's public service career.

*Q: Herbert Lehman was governor of New York and a very distinguished guy.*

KAMPELMAN: A very distinguished man. And I'll tell you Humphrey just really wiped the floor with Bob Kerr, as he has the capacity to do, which, let me tell you, made him friends; made a lot of friends with Humphrey.

Anyhow, the senators began coming back for this debate. Now we lost every single amendment, as we expected to. At the end of the debate, it's over and Walter George and Eugene Milliken come over to Humphrey - you've got to remember, he had been ostracized by the Conservatives - shook his hand and embraced him for the job he did. And that broke the dam. Humphrey began to cry. There were tears coming out of his eyes.



They respected him that day. That broke it. And I had the interesting experience weeks later I had access to the Democratic cloakroom; one staff person in each Senate office had access to use the telephone if we needed to. The cloakroom was a place where Senators would lounge around; and I heard Walter George, in his gruff voice, talking and it occurred to me they're talking about Humphrey. And George was saying (they didn't know I was there), "You know, that fellow Humphrey, he really means what he says about civil rights." Suddenly it occurred to me. These fellows couldn't believe that the liberals believed in civil liberties. To them it was politics, getting the black vote. They couldn't believe it. And let me tell you this had an impact on me. Both sides had convictions. And that I saw in this event. The tax debate broke the dam. Johnson also helped break the dam.

One of the things I helped with early on was create a caucus of legislative assistance, administrative assistants, among the liberals. A liberal caucus. There never had been any such thing. But we figured these conservatives were meeting together all the time...

*Q: Soon you were out having branch water and bourbon, I guess.*

KAMPELMAN: Exactly. So we met together with the assistants. Fortunately - I say fortunately - Herbert Lehman was now in the Senate and whereas I was the only legislative person in Humphrey's office, professionally, Lehman had a half a dozen because he was using his own money.

*Q: Yes.*

KAMPELMAN: And New York was a bigger state, which meant it got more money. He had an administrative assistant by the name of Julius Edelstein, Commander Julius Edelstein. He's still alive, still in New York, and I'm still in touch with him regularly. He's now about ninety. So we used Julius' staff to do our work at the caucus and we would work and get plans together so that we were becoming increasingly effective in the Senate. We were increasingly effective. When Johnson wanted to become the leader, he wanted to get it unanimously. He and Humphrey used to spend time together because they were both serious people; neither were society people; and their wives liked each other because their wives were not society people. As a matter of fact, I was the liaison between Humphrey and Johnson and when I left the Senate in 1955 the Washington Post had a lead story in its political column by Albright, who was their political reporter, saying, "What's going to happen to the Humphrey-Johnson alliance now that Kampelman has left Humphrey?"

I got along with Johnson quite well, and his staff. Johnson wanted unanimous support as leader. The Democratic liberals couldn't do that because he was tied in totally with his votes with the southern group. I knew he had relationships with Franklin Roosevelt, and Humphrey saw a different side of him; we knew that he was really a crass politician, but he had Texas to worry about. Anyhow, we worked out a deal and the deal was that the liberals would choose James Murray of Montana, an old man who by no means could be

a leader, and they would nominate Murray at the Democratic caucus. There would, therefore, be two nominees, Murray and Johnson, and just before the vote Murray would stand up and move to make it unanimous. So it was a unanimous vote for Johnson and yet a way for us to express our independence.

*Q: You were there '49 to '55. McCarthy was going full blast. How did this impact on the Humphrey operation and you?*

KAMPELMAN: I'll be glad to repeat my thoughts because this is a very important aspect.

*Q: We'll stop here and we'll pick this up next time. We've done much of the '45 to '55 time in the Senate, but we do want to talk about the McCarthy period, which we haven't covered at all, and the impact of this; and also about Eisenhower and what, if anything, was happening civil rights wise because this became a light motif later on. But this was early days. So we'll pick that up next time.*

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*McCarthy. How did this hit you? I would think that you yourself might be vulnerable coming out of the New York area and having been a conscientious objector and all. It's the sort of thing that I would think the McCarthyites might zero in on. Did they give you any trouble?*

KAMPELMAN: I did not experience that problem in any way. Actually, McCarthy came from Wisconsin, next door neighbor to Minnesota. I had the occasion when he first came to the Senate to talk to him and I never found him hostile, personally. I found him forthcoming. In McCarthy's early days he made a great effort to work with the press. He had good rapport with the press. As a matter of fact, there was a man by the name of Lee Nichols who was the United Press correspondent in Washington at the time, who had worked at the C.O. Journal with me during the war. Lee Nichols was a friend of McCarthy, at least socially. That said, McCarthy spent time socially with Lee Nichols. So I did not personally experience any difficulty. Of course, he became really such an irresponsible public servant with his mindless attacks. He was considered in my mind and in the mind of Humphrey and others, to be an irresponsible opportunist with an evil streak in him.

*Q: How did Humphrey relate during this time to McCarthy?*

KAMPELMAN: They had a working relationship but not a friendship.

*Q: Was there a point where McCarthy had gone too far and he was getting shunned? I mean early attacks and all of this.*

KAMPELMAN: Well, Humphrey was never attacked, if that's your question. Oh yes,

McCarthy became an opportunist and he decided this was his future and he became totally irresponsible.

*Q: But was there any concern about a McCarthy movement as far as the political process?*

KAMPELMAN: We did not find a problem, to the best of my recollection, in Minnesota, but Humphrey's goal was to disassociate his anti-communist convictions from McCarthy, who he believe to be a real danger to our democratic society. Bill Benton, the Senator from Connecticut, a Democrat, a very, very wealthy man took on.

*Q: Benton, Malcolm and Bowles, wasn't it? Public relations.*

KAMPELMAN: Bill Benton was an ADA member - Americans for Democratic Action - and we would talk about this McCarthy problem in the caucus that we had begun to formulate in the Senate, a liberal caucus. Benton announced that he would take on the anti-McCarthy effort. He would urge Humphrey and others not to get involved deeply. I remember him vividly saying, "If we're going to get tarred, I can handle it. I'll just go after him. I'm not afraid of what he can do to me in Connecticut." So he took the lead in the Senate when it was called the anti-McCarthy movement in the Senate. In the meantime there was tremendous irritation growing around the country and among the Democrats in general. Humphrey particularly was terribly troubled by McCarthy. He had, after all, come into national politics by being the anti-communist liberal. He understood the communists and their totalitarian ideology give his experience with the Democratic Labor Party in Minnesota. Americans for Democratic Action was created for the anti-communist labor movement; he felt McCarthy was a phony. One night Humphrey had dinner with an old professor of his and of mine, a man by the name of Benjamin Lippincott, a political science professor at the University of Minnesota. I knew they were having dinner that night. The next morning Humphrey said, "You know, I had dinner with Ben last night." I said, "I know." And he said, "We came up with a damn good idea, that we introduce some legislation," basing it on a judicial opinion by Judge Learned Hand of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York, one of the country's outstanding judges who should have been on the Supreme Court. There were two brothers, if you remember, at the same time serving on the same court. They would say one of them was the Learned Judges August Hand and the other was the August Judge Learned Hand.

The decision by Judge Hand had to do with communist activity. In his opinion, he did not look upon the Communist Party as a political party. He looked upon them as an arm of the Soviet Union and that, therefore, it should not be treated like a political party seeking to win public office. We both looked upon Lippincott as a professor. So Humphrey said to me, "Let's file a bill consisted with the Judge Hand opinion. We know how to deal with communists. I'd like you to come up with something. Think about it." So I did.

I got in touch with a man who was then the general counsel of the AFL-CIO. His name

was Arthur Goldberg who later became a Supreme Court Justice. The CIO had taken upon itself to have trials against unions considered to be communist unions. They brought charges against the leadership of those unions - the electrical workers, the longshoremen, and others. There were a few of those unions, as a matter of fact, within the CIO. They didn't have a lot of members but they had a lot of activity. Arthur was the lawyer who brought Philip Murray, the head of the CIO, and Walter Reuther, of the automobile workers together cleansed the labor movement of communist influence. I talked to Arthur about legislation and Arthur assigned one of his deputies, a man by the name of Harris, to work with me. We developed a piece of legislation which in effect said that the communist party was not a political party, but an arm of the Soviet Union and that it should be treated as such. If you call a person a communist you are accusing him of a crime. If the accusation cannot be proven, you're subject to a lawsuit for unjustifiably accusing somebody of being a criminal.

*Q: So people would almost have to register because they were...*

KAMPELMAN: That's right. So we wrote up a piece of legislation, gave it to Humphrey, and he liked it; we shared it with Senator Wayne Morse, a senator from Oregon and a leading legal scholar.

*Q: Was he a Republican or a Democrat at that time?*

KAMPELMAN: A republican who was drifting from the Republican Party to be an independent.

*Q: But he at that time was a republican.*

KAMPELMAN: At that time he was in the course of the shift. But he shifted from the Republicans to be independent. He had been a professor of constitutional law, a very learned lawyer, and he looked at the legislation and he liked it; he made a few changes in it and he said, "I'll be glad to introduce it at the Senate." So we got together with Paul Douglas, Herbert Lehman, and introduced the legislation. If we really wanted to challenge the communists, you just don't go and change liberals while being communists. If you called somebody a communist who was not a communist he could sue you for defamation of character based on the decision by Judge Hand and the legislation. The legislation did not become law.

*Q: This straddles the two periods, but let's talk about 1950 when Truman was president and Humphrey was a senator and you were assistant, about the Korean War. This was June 25, 1950. How did Humphrey react to this?*

KAMPELMAN: Let me say - and I've written about this - that when Humphrey came to the Senate he was cruelly treated. I don't know if I went into that with you.

*Q: You did.*

KAMPELMAN: Truman was among those who thought negatively about Humphrey. The reason for that was that the south walked out of the democratic convention because of what Humphrey did on the civil rights program, and Truman at the time thought that it might've assured his defeat, but he won and in the next year he began seeing Humphrey moving in as a leader and supporting Truman's policies. With time, by the second year - I would say by 1950 - they were pretty close. I think it was in 1951. We were always looking ahead to the next election in 1954. We looked at the state and there was a very popular Republican governor by the name of Luther Youngdahl, who was a good public servant and a nice decent man. As a matter of fact, I had voted for him when I was in Minnesota, even though I was a Democrat. Humphrey and I talked about him as an effective policing opponent in 1954. We knew he was a lawyer.

One morning we saw in the newspaper, in the Washington Post, that a federal judge here in Washington resigned. I called Humphrey on the phone early before I got to the office and he said, "You thinking what I'm thinking?" and I said, "Yes." So Humphrey arranged to see Truman and explain to Truman that Youngdahl was a fine and capable public servant, would be a great judge, and his appointment to the new vacancy would be politically desirable. Truman's reaction was, "No. He defended me when it came to MacArthur." He agreed. We then had to tell the governor what we had in mind. Another friend did that. He became an outstanding judge. This was an indication of Truman's friendship with Humphrey. They were both the same kind of Democrats: strong defense, military stability and very liberal on domestic policy.

*Q: Lately war has become divisive things in our political action. How did you see the Korean War and how did the Senate and Humphrey react during 1950?*

KAMPELMAN: At that time, the Korean War was by no means explosive and a divisive force like the Vietnam War. This war was to protect against an invasion by North Koreans. My recollection is that it was simply not very divisive. The divisiveness developed later when Truman fired MacArthur because MacArthur in effect challenged his judgment and went further than Truman wanted him to go, toward the Yellow River, if I recall correctly.

*Q: He wanted to go beyond the Yellow River.*

KAMPELMAN: Until China entered the picture more rapidly.

*Q: Yes.*

KAMPELMAN: I did not look upon that, and I do not recall that being a liberal - conservative divisive factor within the Democratic Party.

*Q: I recall the phrase "Mr. Truman's War." I'm not quite sure where that came from.*

KAMPELMAN: I don't either, but you remind me that there was some of that. But I'm

not conscious of it as being at all divisive for our politics.

*Q: I don't think the saying "Mr. Truman's War" ever took. I ended up in Korea as an enlisted man and it wasn't as though everybody was for you; you kind of wondered why did you get stuck with that.*

KAMPELMAN: It wasn't a great patriotic war.

*Q: No.*

KAMPELMAN: I also don't recall it as being divisive.

*Q: Civil rights. Humphrey in '48 raised this subject really for the first time.*

KAMPELMAN: And in '49 we introduced detailed legislation and every one of our proposals suffered. The fair unemployment effort, the poll tax, anti-lynching - making it a federal crime; we put it in legislation and all of that was defeated.

*Q: These were the great southern barons, weren't they, who headed the committees?*

KAMPELMAN: The Senate of the United States was controlled by the Southerners. They were the Democrats with seniority and they had an alliance with the conservative Republicans. All the committee chairs were from the South. They had seniority. They were there like fixtures. They were heavy with seniority and they had power.

*Q: As you were drawing up these things what was your feeling? Was this like spitting into a hurricane or were you looking to the future?*

KAMPELMAN: Again, I've written on this. Humphrey was ostracized. It hurt him. By that I mean he felt personally hurt because he was a gregarious fellow. Some of his best personal friends had been opponents. That never was a factor with him and he was gracious. But we talked about this and I knew he was deeply hurt. He was offered the ADA national chairmanship and he accepted it. We worked out a strategy under which, as national chairman he would travel around the country with a good staff of ADA people. The national office was in Washington; the man in charge of ADA was Jim Loeb, a good organizer, and we arranged for Humphrey to speak all over the country for ADA, which meant for liberals and for labor because the AFL-CIO leaders associated themselves with ADA. He had large audiences - I don't know if you've ever heard him speak, but the man was an eloquent speaker, one of the best speakers in the country and he could get a group excited. Normally the purpose was to build up ADA and Humphrey support in the states and that support could pressure Washington. Slowly during the course of that year and the second year and that time democrats out of the South, not in the South, were beginning to recognize that Humphrey had a constituency in their state. For example, I remember that the Senators from Pennsylvania were not friendly at all; Scott Lucas of Illinois was not friendly at all. But within Pennsylvania the unions were there and our liberals were there;

within Illinois the same thing. So they began to pay attention to Humphrey and he was by the second year being recognized as being the liberal leader in the Senate.

*Q: Had there been anybody playing that role before?*

KAMPELMAN: The liberals were not organized before. I helped organize, for example, the legislative assistants of the liberals and we met regularly. We met once a week back then. I guess by 1952 we were meeting once a week or more often if necessary. Herbert Lehman joined and helped.

*Q: Of New York.*

KAMPELMAN: Of New York. A very, very wealthy man who hired staff above what the Senate budget provided. We were limited by the Senate budget. We had no money. I was the only one in our whole office that dealt with legislation and the press. I think Lehman perhaps had eighteen people. So our caucus used the Lehman office really to do a lot of the paperwork. We had one other device, that I came up with, and it worked out beautifully. I learned early on that a Senator or a House member could order reprints of sections of the Congressional Record. They had to pay for it but the cost was not that great because it was the government printing office. So in introducing anti-lynching legislation he didn't just introduce the legislation; he made a statement speech why the legislation was essential. He would go into history of lynching and news events. We would widely distribute the reprint,

A proposal to create a Missouri Valley Authority, a movement to move the principles of the Tennessee Valley Authority to the Missouri Valley was a goal. Legislation was not just introduced, support for it, a statement, of course, followed. We persuaded our friends, to order the reprints. And we reprinted thousands of them - it was in the many thousands; I no longer remember the numbers - and we sent them to every chapter of ADA in the country. I had taught worker's education at the University of Wisconsin. There was a school for working students at the University of Wisconsin - it still is there - and for two summers I taught there. Unions were developing educational programs all over the country. Again, we loaded them with literature. So our job was to educate at the same time as we put in legislation. And let me tell you, that began to be useful and crucial and produce results. So we countered the isolation we experienced in the second year by developing friends around the country.

*Q: Well, in a way the stoppage of these civilized things in the Senate committees didn't produce anything. I mean it was just a matter of sitting on it so that all the talk and explanation was coming out of your side.*

KAMPELMAN: That's right. A crucial ingredient later developed with Lyndon Johnson. Johnson came from the House to the Senate in the same year as Humphrey joined. Somehow Johnson was the first of the Southerners to begin responding to Humphrey. Humphrey wrote his master's thesis on Roosevelt and the New Deal. Johnson felt that his

political career was advanced by Roosevelt. So they had that in common. Neither of them would ever dream of taking an afternoon off to play golf. These were two serious legislators. Their wives were not social butterflies. Their wives were down to earth ladies and they liked each other.

*Q: This is Muriel and Lady Bird.*

KAMPELMAN: Muriel and Lady Bird. Not that they spent a lot of time with each other, began to see Humphrey as a possible contributor to his advancement. That may have been his motives.

Humphrey's motives were that he saw talent and he saw an opportunity to break the Southern alienation.

*Q: Was Humphrey bitten at all, during the time you were there, by the presidential bug?*

KAMPELMAN: I think so, but I have to tell you so were his friends while he was mayor. I was there when he was mayor. In 1952, before Stevenson was selected Senator, Brian McMahon of Connecticut made an appointment to bring in John Bailey, the political boss of Connecticut, to see Humphrey. I was present. Why did they want to see Humphrey? They don't like Stevenson; they don't think Harriman knows how to campaign, and Bailey has decided he would like to have Humphrey be the candidate for president in 1952.

*Q: Bailey, of course, was like Farley. He was one of the national bosses. He was a very powerful figure.*

KAMPELMAN: His point was, "Hubert, we can get you the nomination." I remember this. Humphrey's response was that he had already committed himself to Stevenson. He said he was not ready for the presidency and that they should go and support Stevenson. He knew that Truman was for Stevenson. We publicly read that Truman would prefer Stevenson over Harriman. So the presidential bug was somehow in the wind even in 1952.

*Q: You say part of your responsibility was the press. Can you talk about the press during that period of time? It was the fourth arm of government or something like that.*

KAMPELMAN: Humphrey was extremely popular with members of the press. He was always available and helpful. They began to accept the fact that he was moving. Their job was to stay in the Senate gallery and hear speeches. Well, what they heard were educational performances. As I explained to you, because our objective was not the immediate vote alone. Our objective was to come up with some educational materials that we could distribute around the country.

*Q: Prepare the ground.*



KAMPELMAN: Prepare the groundwork and begin educating the public, and we did a lot of that with speakers. The reactions of the press were very good and that, of course, further irritated the South because he was then getting very good press around the country.

*Q: In '55 you left. This was after Humphrey ran again in '54 and was reelected. Why did you leave?*

KAMPELMAN: Because I never intended to stay that long. This was not to be my career. It was very clear that I had a teaching job waiting for me in Vermont and now Minnesota was beginning to say, "Come back to us." So this was never my life and I never intended to be here for the rest of my life. As a matter of fact, the night of the '54 election victory I told Humphrey that it was getting to be time for me to leave, I congratulated him, and I said, "Hubert, I really should leave now." He said, "What are you going to do?" I said, "Frankly, I don't know. I haven't had time even to plan what I was going to do." I had the whole legislative burden on my shoulders; it was a hard, tough job. And we wanted a family. Well, he says, "Who's going to take your place?" I said, "I don't know. We're going to have to find somebody." And he said, "Look, stay for the next session. It's now November, the next session is January. Stay for the next session. Find a replacement for yourself during the next session. Begin making some plans for yourself. Just don't go off leaving without knowing what you're going to do." So I agreed and I waited until the end, which was September, October of '55, and I got a replacement.

Tom Hughes was from Mankato, Minnesota. He was a graduate of the Yale Law School. I had met him when Humphrey became chairman of a subcommittee and I asked Tom Hughes if he wanted to come down and serve as the counsel for that session. I liked and respected him and Humphrey got to know him. I had my replacement. Tom Hughes after a year left Humphrey because somebody he felt closer to, Chester Bowles, had gone to the House and Chester asked him to be his top man, so he went with Chester Bowles. But that didn't matter.

*Q: I've had a nice long interview with Tom Hughes.*

KAMPELMAN: So you know Tom.

*Q: Yes.*

KAMPELMAN: He did the job very well. As a matter of fact, I had lunch with Tom the other day. In the meantime Maggie and I made a decision not to leave Washington. We had friends now and frankly I wanted to help Humphrey become President. I did not see how I could do that from Vermont, or even Minnesota. I decided, since I had always intended and indeed was a lawyer, that I would open a law office. I found some space at 17<sup>th</sup> and K, a brand-new building. I hoped to get business from law firms in New York and Minnesota who knew me.

Humphrey was also chairman of a subcommittee on security. This was a subcommittee of the governmental affairs committee and involved government security, loyalty tests and all of that. They needed a special counsel for that and friends of mine recommended a man by the name of Harold Green, who was working for the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). I met Green, I was impressed with him, I introduced him to Humphrey and for about a year he did a hell of a good job. He came out with good studies and good recommendations which were well-received and were fully consistent with civil liberties. Hal was a good lawyer. Hal said to me, "I hear you're leaving to practice law." I said, "Yes." And he said, "Well, I don't want to go back to the Atomic Energy Commission. I want to open up my law office and work in the security field. What if we do it together?" I said, "Well, I don't want a partner," but I said, "we can share space." So that's what happened and we shared space.

*Q: So how long were you...*

KAMPELMAN: Well, while we're on that theme, let me go earlier. Early in my Senate career in 1949 and '50, I met a lawyer by the name of Felix Cohen. He had been the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior under Harold Ickes. He was the son of a great American philosopher, Morris Raphael Cohen, who was an associate of John Dewey. Felix was a philosopher in his own right, as well as a superb lawyer. He had created a new Interior Department, the Indian Claims Settlement Commission. There had been tremendous grievances, correct grievances, about how the American Indians had been treated and Harold Ickes had wanted to respond. He needed Felix to draw up a piece of legislation under which this commission would be established. Indian tribes who felt or believed land had been taken from them, either without compensation or without adequate compensation, could come to this commission and present their claims. If their claims were upheld then another hearing took place where a dollar amount for compensation would be established. By the time I met him, Felix was practicing law. Among his clients was the American Association of Indian Affairs. He was an expert advisor to Indian tribes in Minnesota and all over the country.

We had once briefly met in Washington during my law school days when he helped some of us in the law schools, in the anti-communist group at a convention here in Washington. Felix became a friend of mine with my move to Washington; I admired him. Let me say to you his wife is still alive. I think my wife saw her last month. I think she's in her nineties. She's in bad shape, but her mind is still lucid. We became friends. This leads to our subject.

Felix had two associates working for him. It was a small firm. One was a young man by the name of Arthur Lazarus, from Yale law school. It turned out that when I had been much younger I had dated his sister. Another young lawyer with Felix was Richard Schifter who also came to me with a letter from Chester Bowles to Humphrey and another from a mutual friend to me. We became friends. So I not only knew Felix but also two people working for him.

When I announced that I was leaving the Senate, incidentally, Robert Albright of the Washington Post, a political reporter, wrote a story on what's going to happen to the Humphrey-Johnson alliance now that Kampelman is leaving. I played a crucial role in that relationship.

Anyhow, with my decision to leave the Senate, Richard Schifter and Arthur Lazarus came to me. Felix Cohen had died about six months earlier. He smoked like a chimney. They wanted me to come to join them. They and Felix in Washington were part of a large firm in New York, which was looking for a partner to replace Felix. The firm was dealing with Mr. "X," who was a retired diplomat and a very successful society lawyer; and they didn't like Mr. "X." Would I consider joining the firm? I said, "No. I don't want to join people I don't even know in New York."

We were invited one night for dinner at the Schifter's, which was not unusual; present was one of the partners from the New York office, and a man by the name of Frank - he died last year - we got into a warm argument. I can't even remember why we had an argument, but he was an argumentative fellow. It was on some public issue and we were on opposite sides. As soon as I left that I remember telling my wife, "There goes the Schifter dream." But they offered me the partnership. I hesitated. So we worked out a middle deal. They would move their offices, which were on 18th Street, to my new office building on K Street where there was space on the same floor; they would have an entrance to their office and I would have an entrance to mine. There would be an in between partition with a door in it; and we'd try this out for a year and see how we felt about it. Well I can tell you that in the course of the first week I needed them because I couldn't have been in two places at the same time. It became clear to me I needed help, so we became one.

*Q: What type of law were you getting into?*

KAMPELMAN: Anything that would come my way, except lobbying. I had made up my mind that I would never lobby. The reason I had made up my mind on lobbying was because I had seen distinguished lawyers come to me on behalf of a client. They were supplicants, you know, and I did not want that. I just felt it was not dignified. As I explained, we made one exception, Arthur and Dick would continue to lobby for Indian tribes. I explained that when I walk down the Senate halls I wanted a senator or congressman to say, "Max, where have you been? I haven't seen you in a long time," rather than think, "What does he want this time?"

*Q: But did you find yourself called upon to, say, rather than representing a client they say, "Max, we're working on some legislation to promote [this or that]."?"*

KAMPELMAN: I had two or three early opportunities. The Senate Secretary was a man by the name of Leslie Biffle, who really ran the Senate machinery. A Southerner, he respected me and tried to help me. He called soon after I opened my office and said, "I've

asked Mr. [So-and-so] to come to see you. I think this could be a good thing.” The new opportunity represented the National Tax Equality Association. It was an association designed to eliminate the privileges that farmer cooperatives have in the tax codes, special tax breaks.” He explained to me what he wanted. So I said to him, “Look, we’ve got a lot of cooperatives in the Senate.” I want to help them. He wanted me to go to Humphrey because I had access to Humphrey, in order to do something that was against his principles and against his politics. So I said no. I got another call from Leslie Biffle, “I’ve asked [so-and-so] to come to see you for help.” This man wanted me to represent the government of the Dominican Republic, headed by Mr. Trujillo a dictator. I refused.

*Q: He was one of the most corrupt, brutal dictators.*

KAMPELMAN: So I said I can’t represent Trujillo. I said that goes against everything I believe in. He’s a dictator. I called Leslie Biffle and thanked him. In a few days, I had a lawyer in Minneapolis ask me to do something at the Securities and Exchange Commission. I had another matter coming up with a lady, who was recommended to me by a friend, who wanted a divorce. It happened quickly that I needed Arthur Lazarus to cover for me. I couldn’t be in two places at the same time. Arthur and Dick were superb lawyers. We continued to handle any business that came in: Real estate; a divorce; the Securities and Exchange Commission; we did it. I will say this to you: we did it well in the sense that I had two great Yale law school lawyers, both of whom at been at the top of their class, and we received referrals.

The divorce, for example, was in behalf of a young lady who was married to the son of one of the very wealthy families in Washington. He had been violent. His mother had four law firms representing the husband at different times and I was the only one representing the wife. The company lawyer - the mother helped the son, the father was dead; the mother, with her husband, brought in the company lawyer, brought in her personal lawyer, brought in the head of the D.C. Bar Association because she thought he would have influence with the judges. I told my secretary, “You keep time records, but I want you to have another column called ‘aggravation time’ because they’re going to pay for this aggravation time.” And they did. I won the divorce for our and I got a hell of a fee from the mother. I ended up introducing my client to her next husband who was a professor of political science.

I created the first new bank in Washington in forty years. One of my clients was in the real estate business, a dentist; he was my dentist and developed an expertise in real estate. I learned, working with him and representing him and seeing things, to work with the banks. In the older banks in Washington - there were a few of them only - not a single black was on the board of directors; not a single woman was on the board of directors; not a single Jew was on the board of directors. I remember talking to my client about this; I said, “This is ridiculous. When Kennedy got elected in 1960 I knew he’d come in with a new administration. So I said to my dentist - client, “How would you like to join me in creating a bank?” They’ll be a new control of the currency. I did some research on it. There’s been no new bank in forty years. Can we get enough wealthy people together so

that we have financial substance here? Well, my client was an entrepreneur and he liked the idea. So we got the group of investors together.

I asked the President of the Howard University, whom I had known, Jim Nabrit, if he would be willing to serve on the board; and he said yes. I then asked Patricia Roberts Harris, the dean of the law school who later became our ambassador to Luxembourg, if she would join the board of that company, and she agreed.

*Q: She's an African-American.*

KAMPELMAN: An African-American woman. I then asked a man whom I met when I was in the Senate; he was a Marine Corps colonel by the name of Don Hittle, and he became a good friend of mine. As a matter of fact, when I used to lecture around the classes I would say, "The most effective lobbyist I've met in my experience happens to be a Marine Corps colonel. He represents the Marine Corps." And it's true. He was very effective. Smart. I liked him and we became good friends. He was now retired and I asked him if he wanted to be on the board. We really put together a good composite. The comptroller was impressed and he gave us the new bank charter.

*Q: What was the name of the bank?*

KAMPELMAN: It was then called the District of Columbia National Bank. I became chairman of the executive committee and our Firm served as counsel. But I'm not a banker and I knew I wasn't a banker and after a couple of years, a businessman in Washington came to see me - he owned Savings and Loan Association ; I remember that - and he said, "I'd like to buy your bank. You'll all make a lot of money. I'll pay you a great deal." So I talked it over with my dentist friend and the board and they all said if the price is good, sure, we'll sell; we're not bankers. We sold and we all made good money. I'll go on to say that today it is the owned by the Bank of America.

*Q: Ah-ha.*

KAMPELMAN: The Bank of America was the last purchaser of the bank.

*Q: Is there any relation to American Security and Trust?*

KAMPELMAN: No. American Security and Trust - a man by the name of Baker was the president of it - helped us in our getting the charter, which was strange. Riggs was the largest bank in town and tried hard to stop us.

*Q: In '55 you left the Senate step. How long were you a lawyer before you got back sort of into government work?*

KAMPELMAN: Well, I practiced law beginning with 1955 until 1980. During that time I never sought a government job. I really never expected I'd want to go back to working for

the government again. I'd seen the government closely from the Senate. As you know, Humphrey was active; I knew the government agencies; I knew the White House; I knew people there. I did have two career opportunities to be a federal judge. The first was a call from the White House - Mike Feldman was then counsel for Kennedy. He said, "Hubert just left the president and he was recommending somebody for a judgeship... After you left the President asked, 'Why doesn't Hubert ever come over here with Max's name?' So I said, "He never comes in with my name because I've never asked him to come in with my name. That's not what I want." So he says, "Just keep in mind, Max, the president likes you... If you ever want something or a judgeship, just don't hesitate to ask."

The next opportunity was a call from Humphrey at about 10:30 in the morning. He had just left President Johnson who intended to appoint me to be a judge in the United States Court Claims. In a year, there is going to be a vacancy in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and I would be moved from the Court of Claims to the Court of Appeals. "The rest is up to you. Do you want it? I've got to know by two o'clock." So I said I would think about it for an hour and I'll call him back. I thought about it for an hour and I called him back and said no. And that was a definitive no.

There was one other event that I shouldn't forget because it was a job offer. On the day of Kennedy's funeral in Washington, Humphrey called me in the afternoon, "Can you and Maggie come out and have dinner with Muriel and me tonight?" and I said, "Yes." I knew he was terribly crushed by Kennedy's assassination. He and Kennedy had become very close friends in contrast with their 1960 race when they were political rivalries. I knew the assassination was troubling him terribly. And I thought that's what he wanted to talk about.

Adlai Stevenson was also at the dinner, but he left for the airport. We were washing the dishes when Humphrey said: "I was with the president this afternoon," He wants you to be his counsel. He does not want Sorenson. He wants you in there." My wife, hearing this, exclaimed: "Hubert, you can't do this to Max." I talked to Humphrey. I explained to him why I had no interest in it at all. I had spent a lot of time with Johnson in the Senate; he knew no restraint; I knew his weaknesses; nothing in the Cato book surprised me. I found that he enslaved his staff. George Reedy, who was a good friend of mine who worked for the United Press before Johnson hired him, was a neighbor who lived right across the street from us, and I knew how badly he treated George.

*Q: He was his press spokesman, I guess.*

KAMPELMAN: Yes. Lillian, who was George's wife, would complain to Maggie frequently about Johnson's treatment of his staff. Respect for me would go out the window. One Sunday, Reedy woke up and found a brand-new Lincoln in front of his house, a gift from the president. Obviously the president felt guilty about some event and gave him a Lincoln. Humphrey understood this. I also explained to him; "Look Hubert, we have a President; we don't have a Vice President. Under the Constitution we need a

vice president and he's going to have to run for president in November with a vice president. Now I think what I ought to be doing is looking to make certain that you run the vice presidential candidate." And I said to him, and this was, of course, only two days after the assassination; "I can't back you and work for Johnson. Johnson wouldn't want me. Secondly, if I worked for him and didn't help you to become vice president, he wouldn't believe me. He'd think I was anyhow." So I said, "Just try to get it out of consideration. Say no." I saw Johnson about two weeks later at a bill signing and. And Johnson said to me, "I've got to talk to you." I said, "Yes, Mr. President?" and left it at that and he didn't call.

There was one other sad and awful experience for me. Johnson was President and I received a phone call: "The president would like to see you." No reason given. I was taken to a crowded room. The President was going to announce the appointment of a new Mayor for the District of Columbia.

*Q: Walter Washington.*

KAMPELMAN: Yes. Walter Washington was to replace the old commission form of government and I was apparently to be appointed the chairman of the city counsel.

*Q: No consultation.*

KAMPELMAN: No consultation in the slightest. Ramsey Clark is there, the attorney general at the time. I said to him, "This can't be. I'm not going to leave my law office." "Max, we checked the law on this. You don't have to worry about conflict of interest, nothing." Well, I said, "Okay." If I don't have to break the law, it's a public service and I'd be glad to do it. The president came out and made the public announcement. I went back to the office, I called my partners together, and told them exactly what happened. And I remember turning to Harold Greene saying, "Hal, please, let's get the conflict issue resolved. Call the attorney general's office and see what they have on the question and do the research yourself." About four or five days later he said, "Max, you can't do both jobs. Unless you work for the Government less than 129 days a year. That's the law." I said, "you can't be chairman of the City Council for 129 instead of 365 days."

Meanwhile, and this is where the bitterness comes in for me, Clark Mohlenoff, a reporter for the Minneapolis and the Des Moines newspapers, is close to a Congressman from Ohio, or from another state, a right-wing extremist, Clark was very hostile to Humphrey, as was this congressman. Humphrey was not yet vice president; it was barely an idea.

He was investigating a client of mine who helped put up a truck factory in India with government aid help. I had developed and helped persuade my client to do so. He was a good client, a close client, a Minneapolis client. His company bought a Detroit motor truck company and they were looking what to do with it overseas; and I had a theory, which I've had for a long time before. With the technical developments in the United States, a great deal of very good equipment would be destroyed as they were replacing it.

Why not just give that equipment to underdeveloped countries and help them develop. My client liked the idea and he proposed a deal with business interests in India. AID (Agency for International Development) was to provide assistance. Clark Mohlenoff and his Iowa Congressman began describing the project as corrupt - saying that Humphrey is making deals under which a supporter of his was getting money from AID to send junk overseas. This was the theme. And I was representing that client, although I never approached AID; the company did that on its own. The client was well-equipped; he didn't need me to do that. Nor was Humphrey involved even though it would have been proper for either or both of us to be involved in the AID decision to support.

In the meantime I'm being told by my office that I can't take the city job. Dilemma: what do I do? I went to the attorney general. I gave him our legal memorandum. The law was clear. I can't be in the firm if I gave more than 129 days for the city. I discussed this with Allen Bible who was then the chairman of the Senate District Committee from Nevada, and a good friend of mine; I'd worked with him; and I needed it all out in the open. I said, "Allen, I'm looking at withdrawing my name from consideration as Chairman of the City Counsel." I was the largest producer in the firm. I did. He came back with an idea. He said, "Give me a thoroughly detailed statement and I'll put it in the Congressional Record." Which I did.

The Washington Post then picked up the Mohlenoff story on page one. The assumption was that I'd done something illegal. It was humiliating and it hurt.

*Q: Of course.*

KAMPELMAN: I'll tell you what I did. I called Ben Bradley.

*Q: He was the top editor of the Washington Post.*

KAMPELMAN: I said, "Ben, that story is miserable and untrue and you had no business writing it. He said, "Do you want to talk to me about it?" and I said, "Yes. I'll lay it all out for you." So I came up to the Washington Post and he called the editors together along with Katherine Graham, the Publisher. I came with all the data on my role, and the philosophy behind the transaction; and I laid it all out - why it was a good deal. Actually, it turned out to be a good economic deal because the deal went through. That would be helpful. I don't know what's happening today, but I believe the Indians' project was successful after a difficult birth.

I laid the whole thing out for the newspaper and that was the end, except for a postscript. Some years later I was in Geneva on government business and a reporter from the Washington Post came to cover it; he told me that the reporter who wrote the story for the Washington Post was reprimanded for writing that story. As a matter of fact, some of my press friends became indignant and were of assistance to me. One of them was Neil McNeil from Time magazine; Marianne Means of the Hearst newspapers; another was John King from The New York Times. The result was that Clark Mohlenoff, who was



then the vice president of the Press Club and was scheduled to be the next president, was never moved to the presidency. It was the first time, I was told, that a vice president of the club did not become the president of the club.

*Q: Well, we'll stop here. We talked about your unhappy experience with the District of Columbia Council and all; and we're covering the period 1955 to 1980. Is there anything else you think we should talk about in that time before we move on?*

KAMPELMAN: The only other thing that I've not covered is of course Humphrey politics.

*Q: Alright, well let's talk about Humphrey politics.*

KAMPELMAN: Which I was deeply involved in, of course, when I...

*Q: Alright. Well, we'll talk about that and then we'll move on.*

KAMPELMAN: And also Channel 26, educational television.

*Q: Okay, we'll talk about Channel 26.*

KAMPELMAN: I was chairman of the board. I created "Washington Week in Review."

*Q: Alright, we'll pick that up.*

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*Let's talk about Humphrey's politics now. During the time you were with Senator Humphrey, which was when to when?*

KAMPELMAN: From January 1949 when he first took the oath of office as a senator until October 1955 when I decided - actually I decided a year earlier - that it was time to leave. So that was six-and-a-half years. It was his first term plus the first congressional session after his reelection.

*Q: During that time what do you feel were his major accomplishments?*

KAMPELMAN: Well, I believe that he became the leader of the liberals of the Senate, which was in itself a very important accomplishment. I think he certainly made a major accomplishment in freeing the Democratic Party from the shackles of very narrow minded conservative and bigoted Southern influence; and I think that may have ended up, historically, to be his most important contribution. But fundamentally, for me, he was the voice of responsible American liberalism. In the Senate he mobilized senators, was the sponsor of important legislation, and introduced into the liberal movement a sense of "real politick," a practical real politick as a politician.

*Q: How did you find the trade unions during this time? How did he get along with the trade unions and all of that?*

KAMPELMAN: When he was mayor, and as a political activist in Minneapolis before his election, he was faced with the fact that a large element of the trade union movement in Minnesota was communist controlled. The Democratic Farmer Labor Party which he helped create in 1944 was significant; up until 1944 there was a Republican Party, a Democratic Party, and a Farmer Labor Party. He, working with the National Democratic Party, was able to merge the Democratic Party and the Farmer Labor Party in 1944 so that Roosevelt could get the electoral votes from Minnesota during Roosevelt's 1944 election period. In 1946, the communist trade unions were able to work hard in the state and attract what I would consider extreme left-wingers, and others who were not, and they took over control of the Democratic Farmer Labor Party in 1946. On the other hand, they recognized that he was really the leader of the party, not in title, but he had been elected mayor in 1945; there weren't that many Democrats in public office; there was in St. Paul and Duluth. He spoke at the 1946 Convention, but they outvoted him and the only thing he really was able to do was to get a deal made under which the Secretary of the Democratic Farmer Labor Party was his choice and he chose Orville Freeman, his friend, who later became the Secretary of Agriculture, and also the Governor of Minnesota.

But losing in 1946, the party, he determined with his friends and associates to take the party back in 1948. That meant undermining quite a few of the labor unions and strengthening the forces within the labor movement, like the steel workers and the auto workers, who were not part of the communist movement. Fortunately for him, and maybe for all of us, Philip Murray, who was then the head of the steel workers union, and the head of the CIO, decided that something had to be done about the communists and the labor movement; and so he and Arthur Goldberg, who was a lawyer in Chicago for the labor movement and for the Steel Workers Union, and then he appointed Goldberg also to be the attorney for the CIO; and they, with the help of other trade union leaders, began a drive to defeat communist control. This included the Electrical Workers Union, the Longshoremens Union - quite a few of the unions - the Fur Workers of New York; and the leadership helped him in Minnesota.

He met with Philip Murray and they sent people in to politically stimulate the unions, and it involved me as well because I had been, I think I indicated, associated with the Garment Workers Union and with the Textile Workers Union as a youngster. The Textile Workers Union people whom I knew came to me and asked me if I would serve as a paid consultant to the Textile Workers Union while I was teaching and advise their Minnesota unions, which I agreed to do. The faculty had organized not a large but an effective branch of the American Federation of Teachers which was tied in with the American Federation of University Professors, and I was elected as delegate to the AF of L Central Labor Party in Minneapolis. So I was able, with friends, to help Humphrey.

By 1948 I was not at the Democratic Chicago Convention because by then I had just left

the University of Minnesota. I left at the end of the semester in June of 1948 to take a job in Vermont at Bennington College teaching political science. That summer I spent at the University of Wisconsin School for Workers where I was a faculty member. I had been there for a previous summer as well. But in 1948 at the convention of the Democratic Farmer Labor Party Orville Freeman and Hubert Humphrey and their group were able to take control of the Minnesota party. A number of the former communists had changed. You have to understand that Minnesota itself had a history of violence in the labor movement years back. It was very, very much, not Russian, but left-wing radicals who were traditionally in that central part of the United States. So the tradition is there and the communists built on that tradition. But Humphrey was very much supported by the labor movement as mayor and they were very effective in helping him win the state when he ran for the Senate in 1948.

*Q: In '48 to '55 did Humphrey continue to be close to the unions during this time?*

KAMPELMAN: He was close to the unions continually. He was sympathetic even though he was from South Dakota where there were no unions and they were extremely supportive of him, as he was supportive of them. One of the first pieces of legislation he introduced was to abolish the Taft-Hartley law. It was a very, very close relationship both with the CIO and the AFL. Philip Murray and Walter Reuther became good friends; and David Dubinsky of the Garment Workers Union, and Alex Rose of the Hat Cap Millinery Workers Union were all very close. And the teachers unions were all very close to him. They had access to me and to the office and we had access to them when we needed their help.

*Q: Did they act as a positive force or were they a special interest group?*

KAMPELMAN: The AF of L was more special interest than the CIO was. But the AF of L went along. The CIO, for example, was very much interested in health legislation and the Missouri Valley Authority, which is the extension of the TVA principle for the Missouri Valley, and civil rights; both the AFL and CIO were very active. He worked for all kinds of legislation, a lot of it like minimum wages which dealt with working, but also beyond that; also international relations, particularly the CIO was interested in international relations.

*Q: Well you mentioned that during this period you got involved with Channel 26. If you can explain what...*

KAMPELMAN: I got involved with Channel 26 and other public activities after I left Humphrey.

*Q: Alright. Well then this would be after '55.*

KAMPELMAN: After 1955.

*Q: You had several clients but you didn't want to be a lobbyist.*

KAMPELMAN: I don't want to repeat that. I went into that, but time brings the unexpected.

We sold our house to a couple. I was then in Wilmington, Delaware on behalf of a client in a stockholder's meeting. We put up our house for sale in Chevy Chase and we bought a house here. My wife called me on the telephone and said that there was a buyer right there on the scene and that one of them wanted to talk to me. So I got on the phone and it turned out to be Mitch Miller, the talented musician.

*Q: Oh yes. He was very...*

KAMPELMAN: Mitch Miller was the in-law of the couple that was buying our house and so he and I negotiated the deal. He was a businessman on the telephone and we came to an agreement on price and all the rest. The man of the couple we sold it to, was the new associate director of the National Zoo and we became very good friends. As a matter of fact, our kids would go to the zoo and he would give them special tours. At one point there was a baby tiger born and he took the baby tiger home and invited our kids over so that they could see the baby tigers. We were really family friends.

One day he called me and said he'd like to come over to visit with the director of the zoo; and he did. They had a problem: a group of neighbors and citizens were forming a "Friends of the National Zoo" organization and they were worried about it, these two, because the New York zoological park was apparently run by the citizens' group, much to the discomfort of the professionals in the New York zoo. This is what I was told; I don't know if that's true. They had wanted my advice on how to handle this. So I advised the director and the associate director to cooperate with the citizens. I didn't know much about the zoo other than taking my kids there. I said, "Get them on your side. They can be helpful to you. Just don't be an obstructionist." They took my advice.

I'm again in Delaware, in Wilmington, at another client's business, when my wife called me on the telephone and she said, "I didn't know you agreed to be the president of the Friends of the National Zoo." I said, "What are you talking about?" Well, she says, "I've just heard from Lear Grimer that they had a meeting tonight and they elected you first president of the Friends of the National Zoo." So that was my first citywide responsibility here. What I found as president of the Friends of the National Zoo is that tuberculosis was rampant among the animals, that one little girl had stuck her hand in a cage and an animal had clawed it seriously and that the zoo was in terrible shape. So one of the things I did was to persuade a number of agencies that instead of the zoo's budget counting as part of the D.C. budget, since this was a national zoo it ought to get national funds from the Congress via the Smithsonian, and it is now that. Anyhow, that was one community activity I got involved in.

I got a phone call one day - it was the first year of Kennedy's presidency; that would have

been 1961. I got a telephone call in 1961 from Newton Minow, who had just been selected chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). I had met Newton in 1956 when Stevenson ran for the presidency. He was associated with Stevenson; he was a lawyer in Chicago. He called me in 1960 to say he was coming to Washington as Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission and would I represent him on a real estate transaction - I did - and then he called me on the phone after he was in Washington and in effect what he said was that he wanted me to become Chairman of the public television station in Washington, Channel 26. I remember saying to him, "Newt, I've never watched the station. I know it exists, but it's UHF (Ultrahigh Frequency) and we don't get UHF on our television, and in our neighborhood." Well, he arranged for me to have lunch with him and Willard Kiplinger, who was the founder of the Kiplinger Newsletter and who was one of the founders of Channel 26, and they persuaded me to become chairman of Channel 26. I couldn't say no to Newt.

I found a mess. I found a wonderful, wonderful lady who was running it and sponsoring it; a lady by the name of Elizabeth Campbell. I think she's 100 years old this year. She was interested in having television in the Virginia schools as part of the classroom operations. They had a studio in Virginia; they had been in a high school and they had been informed they had to move. They had no place to go; they had no money; they didn't have proper management. They had a superb engineer. I had to throw myself into this challenge. It took a lot of my time. I familiarized myself with the organization. There was an eastern educational network consisting of New York, Washington, Pittsburgh, Boston. I hired somebody that they recommended to me. I had fired the fellow who was in charge and I got the new fellow in who really knew his business. I persuaded Jim Narrit, who was the president of Howard University and who was a friend of mine, to make room on campus for our television station to be using that campus and for us to run a course for any of their students who wanted to know about communications. We worked a deal out. We did that and I persuaded every college president in this area to join the board. I felt it was an educational station. I wanted them on the board.

So we built up the board very nicely and now we needed some money. So I went to see John Kluge, who was then the head of Channel 5. I talked to him and I explained to him who I was and what I was; and I said I thought that the commercial stations had a duty to support this educational - we called it educational television - we didn't call it public television at that time. I had heard that he was having difficulties with the Federal Communications Commission. I also remember saying to him that if our station went out of business the channel would probably be taken by some commercial station, which would be competition for him. To make a long story short, he gave us \$250,000. I went with that to NBC in New York, who had a station here at Channel 4, and they gave us \$100,000. I received nothing out of Channel 9, which was owned by The Washington Post. But Kiplinger helped raise money so we got enough money to be able to handle our job. John Kluge recently received an award from the Library of Congress. He just gave them a few million dollars and there was a big story about him. I've seen John Kluge on occasion since, always thanking him again for that initial contribution.

Now, on this scene of building our station, the head of the Boston station, a man by the name of Hartford Gunn, a very capable man, called me on the telephone and said, "Max, our Boston audience;" - he had a good, successful station tied in with the universities; we were secondhand - "we can not function without servicing more public service political work," and, "I'm going to have to send somebody down to Washington and open up a Washington office." And I said, "I don't want you to. I can't permit that to happen." Well, he says, "I've got no choice." So I said, "Give me a few months and I'll put something together because I want one in our area as well." And I had in mind doing a program.

I had a friend by the name of Neil McNeal who was the chief congressional correspondent of Time-Life. When I was teaching I saw his book, which I considered to be the most authoritative book on the House of Representatives and I used it when I was teaching political science. So when I came to Washington in 1949 I wanted to meet him, so I did meet him and we became friends. I asked him if he would be willing to do a weekly fifteen minute show on the Congress. I pointed out to him that very little educational effort entered any of the stations, radio or television, about how the Congress worked; and I wanted him to tell us the important things happening in the Congress that week. He liked the idea and he started doing that, and it took off very nicely.

I then talked to Neil about building this up and we got a hold of enough people; I had a former student, whose name escapes me, who was then the military correspondent of the Washington Evening Star, the Pentagon correspondent. He was bright; I had him as a student in Minnesota. I persuaded him to join this group and to talk about the Pentagon. I was introduced to a man by the name of David Willis from the Christian Science Monitor and I persuaded him to come on board. And that's what got started with the *Washington Week in Review*. Willis was then assigned by the Christian Science Monitor elsewhere and I got a hold of Pete Lisigor of the Chicago Daily News, whom I had met and was considered the dean of Washington journalists; and nothing like this existed any place, on any station.

I had Bill McCarter, our new station manager, find a moderator. I wanted a moderator who was not a reporter; I wanted a moderator and an academic who could challenge the reporters. I recommended my professor, Evron Kirkpatrick, who was Jeane's husband - they were not married then - but somehow McCarter said he didn't do well on the air. I mentioned Richard Scammon who later became Head of the census bureau. Anyhow, they started with somebody from NBC. McCarter came to me a couple of weeks after that and he said, "Max, this isn't working. This isn't what you want," and I knew it wasn't what I wanted. I wanted it to be educational. And McCarter said, "I would like you to try. You know what you want." So I became moderator. I received an Emmy for my moderating role which is now in my office. *Washington Week in Review* was adopted by the whole Eastern Education Network. Boston was satisfied, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia; and it made the rounds in Chicago. It began to spread! I had people stop me in airports; it got to be a very popular program. And that's how I got involved in television. I left as moderator in 1967 or 1968 when it became clear to me that Humphrey was going to be running for president and I wanted to help him.

*Q: We're talking about '68.*

KAMPELMAN: Yes.

*Q: You said Kennedy. You started with Newt Minow when Kennedy came...*

KAMPELMAN: That's right. In 1968 I knew Humphrey wanted to run. So I gave it up in '68 because I felt that if I was going to be associated with Humphrey and his campaign I did not want to be in a position of being a moderator on a public television program. That's when I gave it up. It was interesting and I enjoyed it.

*Q: You're talking about essentially the government process and the political process. And just by picking issues it has political clout. Was this a problem?*

KAMPELMAN: Let me be more specific about this, and why I was a good moderator, if I say so myself. My political science training helped. We were then broadcasting on Thursday nights and I called each one of these fellows Thursday afternoon: "What are you going to talk about tonight?" I found that each of them was going to talk about the story he was writing for his newspaper that day. That didn't satisfy me. I didn't want that. What I kept saying to them is, "Think about what happened this week that the history books might refer to, or that if you were writing history five years from now, you would refer to it. I want to know that story. I'm not interested in the newspapers. Assume every one of your viewers reads the daily newspapers." And that was my theme constantly with them; it was a constant struggle. It took a while but they came to understand what it was I was looking for. For example, I can remember this vividly; they were calling up some troops for something - I don't remember what - by then my student was no longer at the Evening Star, they'd sent him elsewhere, and I enlisted Charles Cowdry of the Baltimore Sun - a military expert; I remember saying to Charlie, "Charlie, what were the options that the Defense Department had that day when they made that decision? What were the alternatives? What was the opposition to it?" and that's the way we were. The program exists today; that is, one reporter talks, the others ask questions - they take turns, but they are not as analytical as I would like.

I must confess to you that I don't watch the program that much these days because I don't find it's as analytical. But I know it's a popular program; I know it's good. To give you an example of my philosophy: my philosophy was that we must not emulate the commercial stations. We must supplement the commercial stations. For example, when the State of the Union message is broadcasted over every network. I at that time said we will not broadcast it because it duplicated the commercial stations. What about those people who don't want to watch the State of the Union? The alternative programs: music when there is talk on the commercials. That's why we exist, to provide an option for the minority. At one point we broadcast - what was the name of the conservative who runs the national review?

*Q: Buckley?*

KAMPELMAN: Bill Buckley. He had his television program on the air. Nobody else in Washington had it; it was just beginning that program. We ran it for a time. Staff called me on the telephone: "Bad news." I said, "What's the matter?" "Channel 5 has offered him time on their station and though he likes us he's going to get paid for that and there's a bigger audience." So they were down in the dumps. I said, "Exclaim in joy! Don't be worried. That's great. Come up with more programs that the commercials will take over from us. That's our job." So that was my philosophy in this approach. Anyhow, I thoroughly enjoyed it. Some months ago I was invited to a board meeting at Channel 26; I hadn't been there in many, many, many years, but they had an anniversary and Sharon Rockefeller is now the chairman and they had a little function at their home and she wanted me to come and talk about the old times.

*Q: Did you run into any problems from Congress saying, "What are you doing messing around with this political issue?"*

KAMPELMAN: Never. None at all. Of course, first of all, we were responsible and we had the cream of the crop. I mean our people were good. And also, you've got to understand, we only slowly became a national audience. We began as an eastern audience, and then became national.

But you could say that I got active in community affairs.

*Q: Well what were you doing while with the zoo and the national media? Were you continuing as a lawyer?*

KAMPELMAN: Oh sure. That's how I earned my living. As a matter of fact, when I started as a lawyer there were just three of us. I can only tell you today there about 140. The firm has done very well. The firm did very well when I was there and even better since I left. I always continued; this was my livelihood, the law. I've always felt a sense of responsibility to find time to do other things and I found the time to do things in the community.

*Q: How did you find the administration within national radio while you were doing this? I would think that these would be rather contentious people, you know. Full of ideas and...*

KAMPELMAN: It didn't interfere. I'm not conscious of a single act of interference by any administration, Democratic or Republican. I think we were respected. We got an Emmy for public service broadcasting. We were well-known, but no interference at all. Never. I think, had any of the people - Pete Lisigor, Charlie Cordry, Neil McNeal - gotten any flack I would've heard about it. They would have talked to me. But there was no flack, no interference; we did our job. We did our job rather well. And I thoroughly enjoyed it and I frankly enjoyed the prominence. You know, it's an ego boom when



people stop you. People still remember. I still have people talk to me about the *Washington Week in Review*.

*Q: You mentioned that Channel 9, the Washington Post Channel, that you didn't get any money from them. How were relations with The Washington Post?*

KAMPELMAN: We had none. There was no need to. We had none. We did our job. I don't think any of them looked upon us as competitors. First of all, it was a UHF station before UHF became stylish as a result of Newt Minnows passing regulations under the Federal Communications Commission Act. I found no difficulties and I don't think our people did. The other stations accepted us. As I said, I remember one night the engineers came to me and said that one of the commercials was prepared to let us use their equipment if we wanted to broadcast the State of the Union. I simply said no. It was not an alternative from my point of view. I watched the State of the Union. No, no problems that I saw. I've been active in many areas, as you can tell; people call on me and if I can do it and I have the time to do it I respond. And I have responded over the years. It's always been enriching and not troublesome.

*Q: Your law practice continued. Were you doing the zoo at the same time as public radio?*

KAMPELMAN: Yes, but that ended. In each case when it was time for me to end it ended and I would become chairman emeritus. When people ask me today I say my profession is that of being a chairman emeritus. I'm chairman emeritus of the station; I'm chairman emeritus of the Friends of the National Zoo; I'm on the stationary as chairman emeritus of the Georgetown University Institute of the Study of Diplomacy; of the American Academy of Diplomacy, and of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. I'm chairman emeritus United Nations Association. I'm chairman emeritus of the American Friends of the Hebrew University. I'm chairman emeritus of the Jerusalem Foundation. Teddy Kollek, the mayor, asked me to become chairman; I became chairman. When the time came for me to leave, I left. So that's my career, chairman emeritus.

*Q: Let's talk about as you moved into the international fields. When did that happen? Well first let's talk about the '68 campaign with Humphrey.*

KAMPELMAN: Well, of course, Humphrey was vice president. Did I talk about the '64 campaign?

*Q: I don't think so. No.*

KAMPELMAN: I think we ought to start, really, with the '64 campaign.

*Q: Okay.*

KAMPELMAN: In 1960 Humphrey wanted to be the Democratic candidate for president.

His opponent was Jack Kennedy. We lost the key primaries. I don't have to go into detail on those unless you ever want to at some point. I'm happy to do it, but not now. Our labor friends, after the West Virginia primary was won by Kennedy, disappointed Humphrey. We found that the Catholic labor people were very proud of having a Catholic as president of the United States and didn't give us the support which we thought was warranted, that Humphrey thought was warranted. Also we were outspent; but for whatever reasons we lost.

The labor people then came to see me and asked me if I would arrange an appointment with Humphrey, which I did. Now who's "they?" They were Arthur Goldberg, who was general counsel, there was David Dubinsky of the Garment Workers Union, Walter Reuther of the Auto Workers, and Alex Rose of the Millinery Workers Union. Goldberg was very close to Kennedy. The four of them said that they wanted Humphrey to be selected as the vice presidential candidate with Kennedy in 1968. They also said they had discussed this with Kennedy; that Kennedy said that Humphrey had not said a word to him since the primaries even though they were both on the Senate floor frequently, which was probably true. He was very unhappy, particularly with Bobby Kennedy, because we had been getting reports of rather scurrilous material coming out of Bobby Kennedy. They said they wanted us to know their plan. They weren't asking for anything other than for Humphrey and Kennedy to say hello to each other on the Senate floor and to meet and chat. Humphrey agreed, but neither he nor I took seriously the vice presidential talk. Humphrey told me that Kennedy did come over to him and they chatted. He liked Jack - he always did like Jack - but so be it.

Goldberg kept reporting to me the progress being made and finally he told me it's done. We have a commitment; it's going to happen. Again, I was skeptical but they told Humphrey, and I think Humphrey was skeptical, but I don't know. I flew to Los Angeles before the convention. I got a call from Humphrey in Minneapolis saying that he and Muriel were arriving by plane on a certain hour and would I meet them at the airport. So I went to the airport and I met the plane and he took me inside and he said, "Tell our friends that all bets are off." I sat down and said, "I've seen them since I've been here. They're convinced that something is going to happen that you will be the Vice Presidential candidate." He said, "I am not interested. Muriel doesn't want it. Mostly she doesn't want to be part of anything to do with that Kennedy family. Just tell them no. And I don't want to see them in Los Angeles." So I went back and I told them no and it ended up with Lyndon Johnson.

*Q: Bobby Kennedy was really hard for a lot of people to digest, wasn't he?*

KAMPELMAN: Really hard, yes. I never knew the man, really. I've met him but I never knew him. From the reports we were getting, particularly in Wisconsin and West Virginia, they were really horrible reports.

*Q: Well apparently Kennedy money went in personal money and Bobby Kennedy, of course, then was heavily tainted with McCarthy.*

KAMPELMAN: He was. Anyhow, that was that. Johnson was vice president; Johnson becomes president. I want to say to you that Humphrey and Kennedy became very close when Kennedy was president. Not Bobby, but Jack. Very close. Larry O'Brien and Kenny O'Donnell, whom I knew, said to me, "He's the most loyal fellow we've got in the Congress. Jack loves him." And I know he spent a lot of time with Jack. I may have mentioned at some point - I don't really remember what we talked about - but at one point Kennedy's man, Mike Feldman, called me on the telephone. Did I talk about that?

*Q: No.*

KAMPELMAN: He called me on the telephone and said, "Hubert was just here pushing a judgeship for somebody and the president wants to know why he doesn't come in with your name." I said, "Well, tell the president Hubert has never come in with my name because I've never asked him to come in with my name." But it gives you an idea of the closeness there.

Humphrey called me the day of the funeral and he said, "Can you and Maggie join Muriel and me for dinner tonight?" and I said, "Yes, we'll come out." I knew he was crushed by the death. One other person there, Adlai Stevenson. We had dinner. Adlai Stevenson had to leave to make a plane. Hubert starts cleaning the carpets, which is what he always did; and went to wash the dishes. He motioned for me to come along and help him wash the dishes. And he said, "Max, I saw the president this afternoon," - this was after the funeral - "and he wants you to be his counsel. He doesn't trust Ted Sorensen; he doesn't trust Mike Feldman. He wants you to be his counsel." My wife heard this and exclaims, "Hubert, you can't do this to Max!" and I sat down with Hubert and I explained to him why I couldn't do it, and wouldn't do it. One of the reasons I gave, and I gave a number of reasons, one of which was that I knew Johnson very well and knew how brilliant he was; but I also knew how cruel he was - never to me, always respectful to me, but I knew if I began working for him it would certainly no longer be respectful because I knew how he treated people who worked for him. But I also said to Humphrey, "Hubert, I've given some thought since the assassination; he's going to need a vice president in 1964. You're the guy for that. And what I want to do now is I want to use my time to see to it you become the vice president. I can't do that if I work for Johnson because even if I don't help you and I'm working for him, he'll think I am."

*Q: Yes.*

KAMPELMAN: So I ended up working for him for vice president and we worked very hard. We met right here in the living room. I got a group of five or six of us together and we planned it. We went around the country. And by 1964 we felt that it was inevitable.

*Q: Were there any other candidates?*

KAMPELMAN: There were, and a lot of people had talked about it. I knew that Gene

McCarthy thought he was going to be because Gene told me. I told Gene, "Be careful, Gene. Don't get hurt by this," because Johnson was playing with it. One of the reasons I knew we would get it is because I knew the relationship between these two people. They were good friends. They yelled at each other frequently, but they were good friends. Also, one of our small group planning the campaign was Jim Rowe, who lived across the street. He was the first administrative assistant of the president of the United States under Franklin Roosevelt, and was an intimate of Lyndon Johnson's. When Jim accepted my invitation to be a part of our group, saying to me, "I'll have to check," and I said, "I know you have to check." He came back and said, "I can help you." I knew that Johnson wouldn't have said, "You can do it," if there was a negative. So we worked this thing. I spent from that day in '63 and all of '64 I put a great deal of time into this political effort, and by the convention in Atlantic City Humphrey was selected.

I will go on to say that the night of the election the president called Humphrey - I was in the suite at the Nicollet Hotel in Minneapolis - and the president said, "Hubert, fly down tomorrow morning to the ranch. We've got to talk." They'd won the election. And Hubert asked me if I would fly with him to the ranch - we had a private plane, of course, the campaign plane - and I did. We had a larger meeting; Johnson had his staff there and Humphrey's administrative assistant was also there, a very capable fellow. Johnson embarrassed me, frankly, by saying that he didn't think Humphrey had a good staff, and the staff director there; and he was wrong; Humphrey had a good staff. But he didn't think Humphrey had a good staff and he expected me to take over the vice president's staff. And I said, "Mr. President, that's not going to be. I'm not going to get into the government," and he put me aside and talked some more about it and I just persuaded him I was not going to get into the government service at that point.

The two went off talking privately by themselves and then we had the meeting together and Johnson says to me in a group, "Well, you're being unpatriotic and refuse to serve your government and your president, but at least you can do one thing for me," and I said, "What's that Mr. President?". He said, "The vice president does not have a vice presidential home in our government and I think the vice president ought to have a home. I should have had a home when I was vice president. The vice president of the United States should have a home of his own," which made sense. "I want you to find it for me," he says to me. And then he told his staff, "Give Max a pass to the White House. Let him come in when ever he wants to come in," which was very nice; the task was useful.

And I narrowed it down to two places. I narrowed it down to the Tydings' home; Senator Tydings' father-in-law was Joseph Davies, who had been the ambassador to Moscow, and the Davies' estate is right here on Macomb Street; it's a massive estate. I went to Joe Tydings, the senator, and said, "You know, that would be perfect for a vice presidential residence," and I told him I had an assignment to try to find it. I said, "Or it would be better for Joseph Davies' estate to become the vice presidential residence." He said, "I'd love it, but my sisters would want the money." I said, "You mean they'd only want to sell it?" He said, "Yes, they'd only want to sell it; they wouldn't want to give it." So I said, "Well, I'll report that to the president." And then I saw another piece right where the vice

president's home is on Massachusetts Avenue which was home of the chief of naval operations. The admiral had that house. I was pushing the Tydings' house so I gave my report to Johnson pushing the Tydings' house. He heard and then he said, "No. I'm not going to spend a dime." He said, "I want that place where the chief of naval operations is staying." "He ought to move where the other chiefs are living anyhow," he said. And he said, "That'll make me popular with the other chiefs." And I said, "Well, but it's going to make you unpopular with the chief of naval operations." But that's what he decided.

*Q: During the time from '65 to '68 while Humphrey was vice president did you have much work with him?*

KAMPELMAN: Yes, but not too much. He would periodically want to get together and we would talk. Let me also say - it's for history, so I don't mind saying - that when his wife thought that I should come by, either because his morale was down or he had a problem, she'd call me on the telephone and she'd say, "Max, it's time for you to come and have breakfast with us." By then he didn't have that house. He had an apartment overlooking the Potomac. So I'd go over there for breakfast and he and I would walk and he would talk about what's on his mind. But that wasn't frequently. That was occasionally. Recently there was a twenty-fifth anniversary of the Humphrey School at the University of Minnesota. I think I mentioned this to you. I sent you my speech, I think. I don't know if you got it or not.

*Q: Yes, I have the speech and the book.*

KAMPELMAN: When I was introduced to be the banquet speaker the fellow who introduced me was the fellow who helped Humphrey write his book, who had also been a student of mine and was a very capable writer. He introduced me to the group by saying that when he was helping Humphrey with Humphrey's book he had the occasion to look at the Secret Service documents, - "The name Kampelman appears in the Secret Service files more often than any other single person except the president." He turned to me and said, "I didn't realize you spent so much time with him." So obviously I spent enough time with him that it made the imprint. But it really wasn't that much.

*Q: As you said, anybody that is around Lyndon Johnson, particularly in sort of a amorphous position like the vice president, I would think that Lyndon Johnson would get to be so overpowering that Humphrey would need solace or something like that.*

KAMPELMAN: That's true. It was a difficult relationship. It was a particularly difficult relationship because Humphrey was persuaded that one of the staff members of Johnson was undermining him with Johnson. I had no evidence of that myself; Humphrey was fully persuaded and so was his staff, and they were referring to Joe Califano. I don't know why that would have been the case, but it was. Apparently, from what they told me, Johnson was capable of pettiness and cruelty. I don't know if you've ever had the chance to read the Cato book?

*Q: No, I read the first one but I haven't read the second yet.*

KAMPELMAN: This book on the Senate years is fantastic. It deserves all the prizes it can get. But the pettiness also shows the behavior there and that aggravated Humphrey. To give you an example that now hits my mind: when Humphrey was selected as the presidential candidate in 1968 the big debatable issue was Vietnam. The rioting in Chicago was centered around Vietnam and that was serious rioting. I saw a report from the Secret Service at that time which said that there was a plot to kidnap Mrs. Humphrey, and they took it seriously. It was an unpleasant period. The date for that convention was selected to coincide with Johnson's birthday and Johnson was advised not to show up at the convention by the Secret Service and by all of his friends who were at the convention; he didn't show up. So you can imagine how bitter he felt about all of this.

*Q: Well what about Humphrey during this time that you were seeing him? The Vietnam war was cranking up more and more and he was a good supporter of the president, he was a good soldier. What was he talking to you about as far as Vietnam was concerned?*

KAMPELMAN: We didn't talk that much about Vietnam, except during the campaign. We did not, before the convention, talk much about Vietnam. Humphrey was a supporter. He also knew things that were not generally public. For example, he knew from what he told me, that Johnson did not share Kennedy's desire to proceed with the Vietnam War. At least so he told me; I'm only telling you what he told me. Johnson and Dick Russell - Russell influenced Johnson - felt that we should not pursue it and should try to close the book on it. Johnson was persuaded - McNamara helped persuade him, and others - that he should finish the job. That's what I got from Humphrey. Johnson had asked Cy Vance and Averil Harriman to try to come up with a solution to the Vietnam problem and the talks with North Vietnam began before and during the campaign. I think, it's my recollection, that they took place in Paris.

*Q: Talks were going on between Harriman and Vance in Paris.*

KAMPELMAN: There was a great deal of effort under way before the talks would even begin. People who were pushing for Humphrey to be president wanted Humphrey to disassociate himself from Johnson's policy on Vietnam. Humphrey couldn't do that. He wouldn't do it; he couldn't do it. One, it was not loyal; two, he was aware of Johnson's efforts to try to get the talks under way, which were not public. So he was not in that position. So he gave me an assignment which was to review his speeches that were being prepared here in Washington. Most of his speeches were ad-lib. This was a fellow who didn't need the text.

*Q: I was going to say he was renowned for talking.*

KAMPELMAN: But there were some times when we needed a prepared statement because that's what would get into the newspapers - policy. And he wanted me to review every foreign policy reference to make sure that it did not put him in any dishonest

position with respect to the president. He knew that his campaign staff wanted him to separate from the president, and he didn't want to separate from the president. I was aware of this problem.

Let me say that during the convention, I had two serious proposals for Humphrey at the convention. One of those proposals was that he resign as the vice president at the convention, that he do it in the midst of a very favorable speech about Johnson and his presidency and his role in the Senate and the strengthening of our democracy and his support of the president. But that he should end by saying that there's now an amendment that the constitution provides that the president can replace an absent vice president by submitting a name to the Senate for ratification. This was a constitutional amendment that had just been adopted. The country would not be hurt by this, but he, Humphrey, felt that he had to give every ounce of his energy to defeat Nixon for president; and that that he found this was much more important than his serving as a vice president for the remaining few months when somebody else could fill it. I laid it all out front for him and he didn't want to do it. He said he took a pledge; he took an oath of office and he wasn't going to leave it.

One of my jobs was to find a vice president for Humphrey. I was given that assignment. When he was selected as vice president Lyndon Johnson had Jim Rowe spend hours with him - finances, weaknesses, everything, because Johnson didn't want to have anything not open; and Humphrey wanted me to do the same thing with potential vice presidential candidates. I talked to Jim Rowe and Jim told me the kind of questions he had asked when he had that job. Now I had the job and I interviewed a number. First off, for example, I was looking for an Italian. I had talked to Dick Scammon in the Census Bureau, a good friend, who told me that the key swing votes in many of the industrial states were the Italian-Americans, that they felt discriminated against because of the mafia; that they were self-conscious; that they would be very proud to have an Italian; that they were also moving toward the Republican Party increasingly and that this would bring them back in. But it had to be a qualified person. So I met with the mayor of San Francisco, Joe Alioto. He was a capable man, liked Humphrey; Humphrey liked him. And Joe said, "Max, you don't want me. I was a lawyer before I was mayor. My clients were not the most desirable elements in society. You don't want me because I'll be attacked." I went to speak to Johnny Pastori, the Senator from Rhode Island; capable, a very fine man. He wouldn't consider it. And I interviewed a number of other people. It was clear to me that Humphrey tilted toward Muskie; from the beginning he tilted toward Muskie, but he wanted other names and I reviewed names for him.

I explored Sarge Shriver and Teddy Kennedy. Although Humphrey was not for that, he liked Teddy; he didn't feel Teddy was qualified and he thought it would look to gimmicky. But I never talked to Kennedy. Humphrey respected and liked Sarge Shriver. Larry O'Brien and Kenny O'Donnell came back with the "family" doesn't want anybody from the family; and I said, "Does that include Sarge Shriver?" I was told that includes Sarge Shriver. Sarge didn't know that. I later told him.

*Q: When you say "the family," who spoke for the Kennedys?*

KAMPELMAN: I don't know. I spoke to O'Brien and O'Donnell. I don't know. Was it the father? Was it Jack? Jack was dead. Was it Teddy? I don't know who "the family" was.

*Q: Well they were probably still in shock from the death of Bobby.*

KAMPELMAN: They were probably in shock from the death, that's exactly right. Whatever reasons, and it may not have been personal toward Sarge, I just don't know. I know that Humphrey liked Sarge.

So anyhow, I came up with another idea for vice president. We were at the convention. I thought of Nelson Rockefeller and I spoke to Humphrey about it at length. I did not know Nelson Rockefeller, but I knew he'd been defeated by Nixon in California. I knew that he was a liberal-minded fellow, had mutual friends. I thought the country was wounded and needed to be reunited and I thought that if he could get a Republican in there who was somebody with whom we had compatible interests, that the country would welcome it. After lots of discussion and soul searching on Humphrey's part I got the green light. One of Humphrey's closest friends was a man by the name of Dwayne Andreas, who was the chairman of Archer, Daniels, Midland - at one point a Minnesota company, but moved to Iowa - and who was very close to the Rockefeller family. Former governor Peabody of Massachusetts was a cousin of Nelson Rockefeller. We talked to both of them; I did, Humphrey did not. We got word that Andreas had talked to David Rockefeller and that David Rockefeller would take it up with Nelson Rockefeller, which was encouraging. I was told that Peabody talked directly with Nelson Rockefeller. We needed to know quickly, within a day, and the answer finally came back no; and so he went with Humphrey's original choice, Muskie.

The following January or February, I don't recall which now - maybe March - I received an invitation from a mutual friend to join Nelson Rockefeller and his wife for dinner at Pocantico and I did. I went up with a mutual friend and there was only two other persons there and they were his older brother and wife. Mrs. Rockefeller was there, a small dinner group, Nelson Rockefeller thanked me. Apparently he knew I had something to do with the exploration. I was sitting next to Mrs. Rockefeller who "sotto voce," but out loud, said, "I don't know who my husband voted for, but I voted for Hubert Humphrey." And she let me know so did Nelson, but Nelson never told me that he did and I don't know that he did; I just have reason to believe he did, but I don't know that he did.

Anyhow, Rockefeller was creating a commission on critical choices in America and he invited me to be a part of it, and I became a part of it. I've got the volumes here in my library. That's how I met Henry Kissinger, through the commission, and I met Henry's wife, Nancy, through the commission. As a matter of fact, I had dinner with both of them a few months ago here in Washington.



*Q: The election was really so close and it...*

KAMPELMAN: Let me give you another story about the election being so close, if I may. On the Saturday before the election I received a telephone call at home from Lou Harris, the pollster. He said, "Max, I can't find Hubert; I can't reach him. Can you get him a message?" I said, "Lou, he's in California campaigning today. I can get him a message," because I had access through the Secret Service; any time I wanted Humphrey I called the Secret Service number and they plugged me in. I said, "I can reach him." He said, "Well you tell him that he's won the election as of this afternoon." This was Saturday afternoon. I said, "You better explain that to me." He said, "I've been talking to Hubert every day this week. Our polls show him steadily and speedily getting up and as of our poll this morning he has passed Nixon, and with this trend continuing he'll be comfortable by Tuesday." That was quite a report. So I called Hubert and I talked to him, but what I did not know was that later that day Johnson called Humphrey. This is in Clark Clifford's book and in another book critical of Kissinger.

*Q: Oh, yes. Seymour Hirsh.*

KAMPELMAN: It's also in Seymour Hirsh's book.

Johnson called Humphrey on Sunday to say that they had a tape that told them that Mrs. Chenault had called General Thieu from the Watergate Hotel where she had an apartment, to Thieu in South Vietnam - let me start by saying that the newspapers on Friday indicated something about the Harriman-Vance talks in Paris - and urged Thieu to disown those talks even though he had accepted the agreement and she knew that; and she said to General Thieu, according to these stories - and this is what Johnson told Humphrey - that he would do better under Nixon as president than he would under Humphrey as president; and General Thieu that day, Sunday, was going to renounce the agreement and the Republicans were going to say that this was just a political ploy by Johnson to get Humphrey elected, all of which they said on Sunday and was in the Monday newspapers.

Johnson told this to Humphrey and he wanted to know what Humphrey advised him to do. And Humphrey said to him, "Does Dick know about this?" Johnson said, "I don't know but I have a call into him; but I wanted to talk to you first." He talked to Nixon, he called Humphrey back - this I get from Humphrey now - and says that Nixon claims he knew nothing about it and that it must have been a Mitchell operation. And Johnson said, "What do you want me to do?" And Humphrey said, "What do you think I should do about this?" And I don't know more of the details of the conversation other than the decision made not to disclose the Chenault-Thieu talk. Lou Harris later told me that if the election were held on Saturday Humphrey would have won; if the election were held the following Saturday Humphrey would have won. But the timing of this led to defeat.

I had the occasion some years later, after Nixon resigned as president, when he was recouping - you may remember he was again getting active in foreign affairs - Brzezinski

called me and asked me if I would join him for dinner with Nixon who wanted to have a conversation on foreign policy with a few people. I don't know whether Brzezinski came up with my name or whether Nixon came up with my name, but I would say there were four or five or six of us sitting around the table with Nixon. It was lovely weather and we were sitting outside on his lawn before we went in to dinner and I sat next to Nixon on the lawn chatting. He wanted to know how Muriel was and I told him. I had known Nixon in the Senate and I had known him as president. He said, "Hubert was a great patriot," and I said, "Are you referring to election eve of 1968?" He said, "I'm referring to election eve of 1968 and Hubert was a great patriot." And then he added, himself, "You know," he says, "I had a dilemma when I ran for president," and I knew what he was talking about and I said, "I think I know what you're talking about, Mr. President." And he said, "My people told me that we could prove that Illinois and Texas went to me and not to Kennedy, if it weren't for fraud. They wanted me to protest and get a recount in Illinois and in Texas and I wouldn't do it. I don't think we ought to be having these kind of problems in this democracy of ours. The president is selected; there it is. Accidents happen." Which was interesting.

*Q: That was very foggy, particularly Illinois.*

KAMPELMAN: I don't know what happened. All I know is what Nixon told me about it. I can't vouch for that. I don't know. It may be Nixon was making it up to make him feel good, but I don't think he was lying to me when he said people were asking him to challenge the vote. Anyhow, that was the Humphrey thing and of course Humphrey ran again for the Senate and got elected.

*Q: Did you get involved in that?*

KAMPELMAN: No, but there's a Minnesota thing.

*Q: Well I think this might be a good place to stop here and we'll pick this up after the loss of Hubert Humphrey and the presidential election of 1968 and what you did. But we've talked about Channel 26; we've talked about the zoo; but let's talk about what you did after as a diplomat.*

*Q: Well let's start on your diplomatic career. What happened?*

KAMPELMAN: Well, my diplomatic career didn't really start until 1980. My activities from '68 were increasingly foreign affairs, defense policy, on top of an active law practice. Nixon got elected in 1968 and I knew him but not well. I was just trying to focus and get my head together a little bit. What I did actually, politically, for a moment is I persuaded Humphrey to come back to Washington from Minnesota. He decided just to go back home to Minnesota once a month and I organized a lunch once a month. He was pleased to be back; he had friends here and he wanted to keep in touch with politics. I arranged the monthly luncheon at the Madison Hotel, to which I brought journalists, political figures and public officials. It was not a large lunch; we might have a dozen

people, just to keep him alive and to keep his prospects alive. Other than that I would say that most of my activity was professional.

In the early 1970s, at the end of the Nixon administration, Paul Nitze and...

*Q: Wait a minute. The Nixon administration came in in '69.*

KAMPELMAN: In '69 and they had until 1972. I ought to say maybe a word about the '72 election where George McGovern was the candidate. Humphrey thought he should be the candidate and wanted to be the candidate. I don't recall whether I went into the '68 election year, but let me just say that I think I did discuss with you, but I don't want to repeat any, the telephone call I received from the pollster.

*Q: Yes, you did.*

KAMPELMAN: So Humphrey felt that he had a good shot at beating Nixon in 1972. I felt that; many of his people felt that, and we began organizing to that end. The Vietnam issue became the focus around which the left-wing of the Democratic Party concentrated. The younger people seemed influenced by that and we understood that. We began organizing and we found it was difficult to raise money in 1972. The Democratic National Party arrived at a decision that since the primaries were very important, the primary vote in a state would not go to a hundred percent of the winner. If it were fifty-one/forty-nine that's the way the vote should be apportioned. And the National Committee of the Democratic Party adopted that as a state policy, which we had no problem with. McGovern meanwhile had a lot of money and spent it effectively.

It was a strange competition because McGovern really owed his political career and beginning to Humphrey. Furthermore, they lived practically next door to each other here in Washington for a long time. McGovern, nevertheless, had ambitions and he was being pushed forward. We did fairly well in the competition. California was a crucial state. Our leader in California was a lawyer by the name of Eugene Wyman and his wife. He was a successful lawyer, and a good loyal friend of Hubert's. He had a budget for California, which he raised. We needed more money. I didn't get involved in the finances but those who did know they were inadequately supplied with funds. Wyman called me one day and he said, "Max, I'm being pressed to give some of my money to the campaign outside of California. I don't really want to do that; I need that." I said, "Eugene, I don't really have a judgment on that because I don't know who asked you, I don't know what is involved," because I didn't get involved in that part of the campaign. He called me on the phone and said that Humphrey called him and he decided to do it, but that it was going to damage us.

He asked me to come out to California and I did come out to California to look around the state with him. At one point he called me on the telephone and he said he lost the black vote in San Francisco. I said that's ridiculous. Humphrey was the leader of the civil rights movement. I remember he said yes, but the black vote in San Francisco was

controlled by the name of the congressman whose name is out of my mind at the moment; although his brother, I notice in the press, is one of the leaders now of the California legislature. But he said it requires a lot of “walking around” money to win. I remember the term “walking around money.”

*Q: I just read a definition of this in Tom Wolf's book The Man in Full.*

KAMPELMAN: And he continued, “We’ve lost San Francisco.” This was even before the primary election.

*Q: “Walking around money,” as I understand it essentially you pay somebody to get out the vote who does god knows what. Usually there’s a payoff.*

KAMPELMAN: Regrettably it was an important part of the black vote. Anyhow, the result of California was - don’t hold me to it - the figures may be fifty-one/forty-nine or something like that. Maybe it was fifty-two/forty-eight. The national convention was in Miami. Humphrey asked me to watch over the procedures in Miami. We had a campaign organization, but I, as Hubert knew, never really got deeply involved in the campaign business, just as an adviser to him. Forty-nine states had their votes divided between the candidates, including the primary states. There’s a dispute on California. The California party refuses to split the convention delegation and comes in with a 100% McGovern delegation. I counted; that would put them over the top. It was the only state including the minority vote.

The chairman of the convention was Larry O’Brien, a Kennedy man and a good friend of Humphrey’s. He had indeed been our campaign manager in ’68. The convention started; there was going to be a discussion and a debate at the convention of the California delegation. I went to see Larry and I said, “Larry, there shouldn’t even be a debate about this. The Democratic National Committee has ordered a division. It’s a clear statement and you know if we split the vote, Humphrey gets the convention majority,” which was indeed the case. He listened attentively, didn’t say anything, but he had to make a ruling as chairman; and he made a ruling against us. I was appalled. I went to Larry and I said, “Larry, I’m appalled. There must be something...” He takes me aside and he says, “Look Max, our chances of defeating Nixon are not good. I think Hubert has a shot at it; McGovern has no shot at it; but I don’t think Hubert could win against an existing president like Nixon.” This was before the scandal. “Now, if I rule for Humphrey the lefties in the party are going to walk out of the convention; if I rule for McGovern the Humphrey people will not walk out of the convention and we’ll have a united party.” He says, “I don’t feel I had a choice.” As you know it was a fiasco. First McGovern chooses a Senate with a history of mental problems. Sarge Shriver, who was a partner of our law firm is then chosen and we lost. So there you go.

Paul Nitze and Eugene Rostow later came to see me.

*Q: This was after the election?*

KAMPELMAN: This was after the election. Concerned about detente, which Nixon was pushing; concerned about the deterioration, they said, of our national defenses. I was not an expert. I had a point of view; I wanted a strong national defense, but I was not an expert. But they said they would like to create an organization of Democrats and Republicans to watch and prepare for a stronger defense for the United States. Would I help them, legally, to organize it, be counsel and join them? I said yes, I would be glad to do that. Meanwhile within the Democratic Party, the Humphrey wing saw the McGovern wing taking over and we decided to organize against them. Pat Moynihan and Ben Wattenberg took the lead with us to try and help us do it, and we had a lot of support.

My partner, Richard Schifter, who retired with me from our law firm and later became Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights under George Schultz, helped organizing with Ben Wattenberg. Ben Wattenberg is now with the American Enterprise Institute. They created an organization called Coalition for the Democratic Majority and I associated myself with them. Similarly, Dick Shifter organized a group within the Jewish community called the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, which I joined, whose purpose was to emphasize the importance of America's national defense system with adequate military force; and was a counter against a great many in the Jewish community who identified with the McGovern wing of the party.

*Q: Were the traditional Jewish coming out of the German socialist background?*

KAMPELMAN: We had three defense groups organized and I belonged to all three, but spent more time with the Committee on the Present Danger, which was Nitze's creation.

*Q: A couple of questions before we move on. I want to talk about this, but just on the political side; at the time, when Watergate first arose did these ring any bells or was this just considered a minor, little...*

KAMPELMAN: To me it was a reflection of Nixon. I had identified Nixon as a kind of extreme right-winger with whom I did not sympathize. I had, for example, been an admirer of Helen Gahagan-Douglas, whom he defeated for the Senate.

*Q: Oh yes, that was a nasty election.*

KAMPELMAN: That was a nasty election, but I had rooted personally for her, although I didn't know her. I may have met her once but I didn't really know her. So the Watergate Scandal didn't shock me, but I saw that as an important element which strengthened my loyalty to the Democratic Party, if it was to be the correct kind of a Democratic Party; and we were working to make it a correct version of the Democratic Party.

*Q: What were you seeing as wrong about, at that time, the left wing of the Democratic Party?*

KAMPELMAN: You have to recall that my experience in politics began with Humphrey in Minnesota when we were fighting the Communists who were the left wing of the Democratic Farmer-Labor Party. Up until then I was not a Democrat active in politics at all. I also have to say to you that when I learned during the '68 convention of the behavior of these anti-Vietnam activists, it repelled me. When I read Secret Service reports of an effort to kidnap Muriel Humphrey I was outraged. I did not look upon them as a part of the mainstream of American life. I also felt that a great many of the left wing that I had been fighting I thought of as Soviet principals. So I looked upon them as taking advantage of this Vietnam crisis, exaggerating it. I knew, for example, that Johnson had worked quietly, without publicity, with Harriman and Vance to try to get us out of there. I knew that his instincts were not for it, but he felt that he had to carry it out when McNamara said you have to carry out the Kennedy policy, so I did not sympathize or identify with that group in the '60s. Now I was also not a Nixon person and it did not surprise me, frankly, to find Nixon coming up with a solution to Vietnam which was worse, from my point of view, much worse than the deal that Johnson, Vance, Humphrey and Harriman had been working out which would have saved the South Vietnam regime and made it more democratic, as I learned about it. I'm not an expert in that field.

I also believed in a strong national defense, which they were not. They were trying to cut down on national defense. So I could not identify with that left group, although I want to say to you, I lost some friends as a result of this, much to my chagrin and my wife's disappointment. I never put political loyalty as a condition for friendship.

*Q: No.*

KAMPELMAN: But there I found it to be the case. Nevertheless, this is where we found ourselves. So the Committee on the Present Danger was organized. We decided not to announce our existence until after the 1976 election because we did not want our group to get involved in the 1976 election. Carter was running; from what I could see, I didn't particularly like the man, but I had no concerns about his foreign policy as he campaigned. We decided not to be a part of the '76 election. But in December, after the election, we announced our existence and our objectives.

*Q: How do you keep an organization quiet in Washington?*

KAMPELMAN: Well, we didn't. We didn't announce it, that's all. We didn't announce that it existed. We were not trying to be secret about it. We were not trying to be a secret organization. I think the accurate way to say it is we decided not to announce our presence as a way of not getting involved in the '76 election. Individually, people did what they wanted to do.

*Q: Basically it was a discussion group?*

KAMPELMAN: Sure, and we developed policy. I was not an expert, but I tell you, I found it an educational experience to sit at executive committee meetings and getting

briefings from experts - Paul Nitze, Ed Rowny, scholars we brought in to help us formulate a policy. I learned as much as I could about that, but never really memorized it or absorbed it totally. But I was exposed and I think I absorbed myself in that climate.

I have not said anything about the 1976 election and let me just say a word about that, if I may.

*Q: Certainly.*

KAMPELMAN: Humphrey made up his mind he was not going to run in 1976. He was in the Senate again. I can tell you people came to him and asked him to run, but Henry Jackson decided to run.

*Q: This is Scoop Jackson?*

KAMPELMAN: Scoop Jackson, Henry Jackson, of Washington. Humphrey's close people, like me, identified with Jackson. I knew Jackson a long time; I had liked him. I was a friend. And I told him if there is anything I can do I'd contribute it to his campaign. Jackson lost in Pennsylvania, which he expected to win because of the labor movement.

*Q: This was in the primaries.*

KAMPELMAN: The primaries in 1976. I get a call from Jackson. "We've got to get Hubert to enter the New Jersey primary and to run." The New Jersey primary was the remaining big primary. I said, "Have you talked to Hubert?" He says, "I have and he refuses to even consider it. But we have to get him to do that." He didn't like Carter because they fought. Jackson really didn't like Carter.

*Q: And Carter wasn't really part of the establishment at all, was he?*

KAMPELMAN: No, nobody knew much about him. That's right. Here is this newcomer from Georgia with a group of people nobody ever heard of is running around and winning. I called a few people and Scoop called a few people and I talked to Hubert about it, and finally Humphrey agreed to consider it. I said, "Look, Hubert, the least you can do is talk to your friends, the ones who are urging you. Let's come over to your office and let's have a meeting and let them be able to try to persuade you." And he said, "Well, I'll be glad to do that. I owe it to them." So we all got together on an evening. The next day was the closing date for filing in the New Jersey primary. We talked. Senator Harrison Williams of New Jersey was present, saying, "Hubert, you can win. We've seen the primary." Jackson's people were showing him polls. And Jackson was ahead of Carter, and certainly Humphrey was ahead of Carter, in New Jersey. And we spent a few hours talking about it.

Humphrey at one point said to me, "Call Muriel." So I went into another room and I called his wife. And I said, "Hubert asked me to call you," and she said, "Max, the

children and I have talked about this. We told Hubert if he wants to run, we'll back him; we'll support him. We will not be unhappy about it. We're sick and tired of politics." She said, "Let him decide what to do when you tell him that again." I told him and Humphrey finally says, "Okay, press conference tomorrow morning at ten o'clock." Robert Barry, who was working for Senator Williams of New Jersey, agreed to have filing papers signed and to be at the airport at ten o'clock - National airport - and to fly to Trenton once he gets the green light from the press announcement. We wrote up announcement plans to make and gave it to him; I showed up the next morning at the press conference. Humphrey got up and announced he's not running, which astounded me and others because I thought we had gotten to him.

I later asked him what happened and he said, "Max, in spite of what the doctors told me, I knew I had cancer and I did not want to die in office as president of the United States." And he said, "My doctors were telling me I could do it." He did die and his instincts were correct. But that was his decision. What bothered the hell out of me was that after Humphrey's announcement the newspapers reported a statement by Carter saying, "I would've licked the son-of-a-bitch in New Jersey." You can see that turned me off.

*Q: Oh yes.*

KAMPELMAN: That turned me off. Now I'm back to the Committee on Present Danger. Carter was elected President of the United States and all of a sudden we don't see the Carter who was in the Navy and who campaigned supporting defense. We suddenly see him pursuing detente with the Soviet Union and being very soft on defense, from our point of view. So, over the next year or more we issued statements - learned, scholarly statements - putting our point of view and our criticism; the Coalition for a Democratic Majority does that and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs does less of that because they're not political, but it's studied reports were similarly based.

The Vice President is now Walter Mondale. Walter Mondale and Hubert had been friends since we were both youngsters in Minneapolis. I received a call before the convention from Stuart Eisenstein, who was a friend of mine - he helped Humphrey in 1968 and now was part of the Carter team - and he said, "Max, what would Hubert really think about Mondale for the vice presidency and I want your personal judgment as to whether he is adequate for the job." Well I said, "Stu, Hubert would be delighted and it would go very far toward reducing the tensions that exist between the two. Secondly, I think it would be a splendid political move for Humphrey people around the country, and they are many, in the labor movement. They don't know Carter, but they know Mondale; they know Humphrey. This would be very good. And thirdly, I think he's highly qualified and a very capable man." And he was selected. Now, whether my conversation was instrumental, I have no idea. It may have simply supported what they knew, because I wasn't giving them something new. It was common sense.

So Mondale kept in touch with me, as I said, and he knew that I had a different point of view on foreign policy. His record in the Senate was not something I admired in foreign



policy. I didn't like what he did with the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), for example. And he knew that. We were friends. We had one period of great tension between us but that got resolved. Then Afghanistan happened.

*Q: Are you talking about the Soviets moving into Afghanistan at Christmas of 1978 or '79?*

KAMPELMAN: Yes. Carter changed his foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. It was '79 and I'll tell you why I know this. Mondale called me and in effect said, "Max, we're now on a similar wavelength; would you be willing to bring in, to meet the President, some of our Democratic friends who have been critical? Brzezinski and I have talked about it and we think it would be useful." So I said, "Well, I think it would be useful too." Right away I got a call from Brzezinski with the same message. So I got a small group of people together and we met with Carter at the White House. These were the Democrats, not the Committee on the Present Danger. I found my Democratic colleagues asking really hostile questions to Carter about the last two years and I could see Carter getting hot under the collar. I was disappointed. So I stopped the discussion and I said, "Mr. President, would you excuse me for a moment while I, in your presence, talk to my colleagues?" And out loud I said, "What are we doing here criticizing the President of the United States who invited us to meet with him because he would like our advice on foreign policy questions, and who is pursuing a policy that we agree with now? Let's stop this." We had a short meeting thereafter which was in a better tone. Carter left and we then continued talking with Mondale and Brzezinski.

A few months later, on a Friday morning...

*Q: Afghanistan was Christmas so it almost had to be in 1980.*

KAMPELMAN: Maybe it was March.

I got a call from Mondale, "Max, I'd like to see you." This was not unusual. He would sometimes want to talk over things with me. I said fine. It was a Friday. I said, "I'll be in all next week. Just tell me when you want to meet." But he said, "I'd like to see you today." So I said, "I'll walk over." Our office was then at the Watergate so I walked over to the White House and then to his office. He said, "Max, we had our Friday morning breakfast on foreign policy this morning." The press had indicated that every Friday morning Carter met with Vance and Defense and the CIA and the Chiefs. And he said, "Your name was proposed, not by me," he says, "to head up our delegation in Madrid and the President has asked me to talk to you about that." I've got to first say to you, I did not know what the hell was happening in Madrid or what it meant to go to Madrid and head up a delegation in Madrid. But for the moment that was secondary because I said, "Fritz, you know I can not and do not want a government job." Mondale said, "I told the president that at the breakfast." Fritz knew I had turned down all government job opportunities. He then said that "It would only be three months and you don't have to leave your law firm." So I said, "Look, if it's three months of service that doesn't require

me to leave my law firm, then I'd be delighted to do whatever is required of me to do."

As we talked a little bit I recognized the Madrid Conference as being a follow up to a conference attended by Arthur Goldberg three years earlier in Belgrade. And I remembered that Goldberg considered it a miserable experience, but that didn't trouble me. Anyhow, after I said yes, Mondale said there's a catch. So I said, "What's the catch?" He said, "Cy Vance offered the job to Bill Scranton, the former governor of Pennsylvania. So I said, "So why do you need me?" and he said, "He offered it to him a couple of months ago and Scranton has not responded; and the president feels we're getting close and he probably won't respond, and he doesn't want to wait. And Vance feels the same way." Mondale, in the course of this, said, "Cy Vance offers all kinds of jobs to Bill Scranton. They were classmates at Harvard and they're both on the board of Harvard." It was something like that as I remember. So I said, "Fritz, I came here without a government job, I'm delighted to leave without a government job; if something happens let me know," and that's how we left it. Weeks went by and I heard nothing, absolutely nothing, which was fine. I didn't tell people about it because there was no job. I don't even think I told my wife about it. I may have told my wife about it; I don't remember now. But it was out of my mind.

After many weeks Fritz called me on the telephone, "Do you remember our conversation?" and I said, "Sure I do." Well, he said, "Scranton told us yesterday that he would accept the decision." So I said, "I assumed he did, not having heard from you, so I'm not surprised." But he said, "The president still wants you to be a co-chairman, to have the both of you, a Democrat and a Republican." So I said, "Alright. Does Scranton know about this?" He said, "I don't know." He said to me, "Why don't you go over and talk to Cy Vance about the whole thing." I knew Cy Vance so I went over and I talked to him and he said, "No, I have not mentioned it to Scranton," but he said, "the President wants you in there." It was later explained to me that because of what I did at that earlier meeting with him. He liked what I said and did. It's interesting how the world comes together. But Vance said to me, "Don't worry. Scranton will have no problem with that. He's a lovely person, he's a dear friend, and he'd be delighted to have you as co-chairman." And then I said, "But, Cy, I've got another problem: this three months business. I can't leave the Firm." He said, "I know that." He explained the short three month job and made me a "special" employee. So they arranged to get me a piece of paper which referred to the regulation. So Bill Scranton and I become partners.

*Q: What about Scranton?*

KAMPELMAN: Scranton and I worked together beautifully. I liked him. I had never met him before. He was easy to work with. The State Department recommended Warren Zimmerman to be our deputy. I never met Warren Zimmerman. Scranton and I were both impressed with him so we took him in as our deputy.

*Q: Warren and I were both Serbian specialists and we served in Belgrade together. He was a young officer and I was a mid-grade officer.*

KAMPELMAN: Okay.

Scranton and I learned from the State Department that we had problems on the Hill (Capitol Hill). There was a Commission on the Helsinki Final Act and there was tension between the Commission and the State Department, and had been for a few years. Dante Fascell was the chairman of the commission; I knew Dante well. The staff director was Spencer Oliver. His father was a lobbyist at the AF of L, a friend of mine, and indeed; I remember his father asking me if he could use my name with Dante Fascell because he was applying for the job. He could use Humphrey's name, too. So I went to see him and Dante Fascell. Both did not trust the State Department.

Anyhow, I worked out a deal with Fascell. He wanted Spencer to be our deputy. I said: "Dante, the State Department recommended Warren Zimmerman. I think our deputy ought to be somebody in the State Department to help with cables and all the rest, but I'll be glad to make him a kind of staff director. I could do this because Scranton authorized me to figure out any way to do it. So I worked out a deal. I then said to him, "I want you to be honorary vice chairman and I want Senator Pell," who was the head of the Senate group, "to be honorary vice chairman." They would be honored; they agreed.

Two weeks later, on a Friday, Scranton called me on the phone and said, "Max, I just want you to know that I went in to see the President this morning and I withdrew from Madrid." I said, "Bill, that's crazy. Why did you do that?" and he said, "because of my health." He said, "It's getting bad and I shouldn't be doing this." I don't know if he had lung problems or what. So I said, "Bill, you're co-chairman. One of the advantages of co-chairman is that if you're not well and you want to stay in Washington, I will be there; and it's only three months." He said, "I knew you would say that, which is why I didn't talk to you first," which was a complimentary thing to say. Then I heard from Mondale and Vance and Brzezinski that they didn't want to have another co-chairman; I would be the chairman. I said fine. Then as we got close to the preparatory meetings beginning in September of 1980 I got a call from Brzezinski: "Max, much to our surprise, the President has just appointed Griffin Bell as co-chairman with you." This was the former attorney general who had just a few months earlier resigned. He said, "I'm sorry." I said, "Look, I'd be honored to serve with Griffin Bell." I never met him, but he was the attorney general of the United States. So I said, "That's not a problem." Brzezinski said to me, "I think maybe you ought to call Clinton Bell and talk to him about what you're doing and what his job is." So I called Bell, who very gruffly on the phone said, "Yeah, what the hell is this thing that the President wants me to take?" - he didn't say he took it. So I said, "Well, I'll come down to Atlanta, judge, and we'll talk about it."

So I went down to Atlanta and spent a few hours with him, most of which he told me was that he didn't want the job; he didn't like the job. He had no interest in going overseas. He has no time; he's too busy with his law practice etc...; I kept hearing these same speeches. So I finally said to him, "Judge, I'll be there for the preparatory meetings. Why don't you come for the opening day? You don't have to be at the preparatory meetings at

all. The opening day is in November. Why don't you come for the opening day? If you want to come for the preparatory meeting or any part of it, come, and then get a feel of the meeting and whatever you want to do is fine, as far as I'm concerned." I then said, "We had to go up to the Senate for hearings because we both were to have ambassadorial titles." He said, "I won't take the job" after we got it all worked out. And I said, "Why not?" "I will never appear before a congressional committee again."

*Q: He had been...*

KAMPELMAN: Embarrassed because of a club he belonged to.

*Q: Oh. And his wife owned the club, coming out of Georgia at that time.*

KAMPELMAN: And he said, "My wife won't let me. I won't do it." So I figured something out under which he did not have to appear before a committee.

Meanwhile, I read the Helsinki Final Act to prepare for the meeting.

*Q: This is a good place, I think, to explain what was the issue in that.*

KAMPELMAN: Okay. The Soviet Union, in the 1950s, had proposed a European security conference. As I think about it, their purpose at the time was twofold. One, there were no boundaries in Europe, and no peace treaty - after the Second World War. So they wanted an agency that would legitimize those boundaries. Secondly, they wanted an all European conference as a way of subtly undermining NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). The United States was not a part of Europe. The European West resisted that proposal by the Soviets in the 1950s because they saw that it meant separating and undermining NATO and they would have no part of it. Then Nixon became President with his detente. The West in Europe saw the United States getting closer to the Soviet Union and said to themselves, 'well, we maybe have a green light to get closer as well.' The United States agreed somehow to this and discussions began, I think in 1972 or '71, about how to organize this conference. Fortunately, and since I was not a part of this I do not know whether the idea of introducing human rights and broader relationships into what was to be a security conference, whether that came from the West in Europe or whether it came from the United States. I did not know that. I've heard both stories, so I'm assuming they both agreed that this is what had to be.

In any event, by 1975 they had an agreement, which was called the Helsinki Final Act because it was signed in Helsinki, Finland. It was an agreement that had in effect three fundamental sections or baskets, one of which was a security basket which provided for military, confidence-building measures among the thirty-five members. Apparently there were thirty-three European countries. I never knew there were, but if you count Luxembourg and Monaco...

*Q: And Lichtenstein and San Marino, I guess.*

KAMPELMAN: It comes to thirty-three, plus the United States and Canada. So the Russians accepted those modifications. The one basket was security oriented; the second was an economic basket among the thirty-five so as to help produce cooperation; and thirdly was the humanitarian - freedom of religion, freedom of human rights, freedom of travel, all broadly stated and without specifics.

I also learned that when Gerald Ford signed that agreement in Helsinki he did so against the advice of his secretary of state. I make that statement because I have reason to believe that's probably correct, but I'm not sure. I'll tell you why I'm not sure in a moment. But it certainly was against the advice of his party and many Republican members in the Congress. But he decided to sign it and he signed it. That agreement also provided that this should be a process, which meant that the thirty-five countries should meet periodically to review matters. The first such review meeting took place in 1977 in Belgrade and Arthur Goldberg was chosen to head up the American delegation for that. If you're interested, I will later tell you how that happened because I know how it happened.

*Q: Well why don't you talk about that?*

KAMPELMAN: Right now?

*Q: Yes.*

KAMPELMAN: Humphrey, after a meeting with Carter called me on the telephone.

He had developed a good relationship with Carter. He called me on the telephone in my law office and he says, "I've just left the president" - that was Carter - "and I told the president that if he's going to involve himself so deeply into the Israeli-Middle East question" - this was UN Security Council Resolution 242 - "he ought to talk to Arthur Goldberg," who was our ambassador at the United Nations at that time and who was instrumental in the passage of Security Council Resolution 242. Carter liked the idea. Humphrey to me: "Would you call Arthur and warn Arthur that he is going to get a call from President Carter? I found him at his farm. I told him, "You're going to get a call from the President." He got a call from the President; he went to see the President. The President was impressed. The President said, "I want you to be my mid-East negotiator." Arthur agreed to be the mid-East negotiator. Arthur left the president's office and looked for Brzezinski. When he saw Brzezinski he said, "I've just been made the mid-East negotiator. You and I should talk." Brzezinski was appalled; he had no knowledge of this. They talked about it. Goldberg left; Brzezinski called Cy Vance, "What do you know about it?" Cy Vance was appalled. He knew nothing about it. They both agreed quietly they've got to derail this. It took them a few weeks to figure out how to derail it.

*Q: What was their problem?*

KAMPELMAN: I'm not sure I know what their problem was. I think their problem was

the fact that Arthur, as UN ambassador, was an independent soul and would take no instructions from anybody other than the President of the United States. This was Goldberg; I knew him well and this is the way he is. In an event, Zbig and Vance felt they had to derail the Carter action. They apparently persuaded Carter and agreed to tell Goldberg that the East-West problem needed his legislation and was now more urgent than the Middle-East.

The problem with it was that the State Department had already selected somebody, a career officer, to head up our delegation in Belgrade, a very capable career fellow whose name escapes me for the moment. And his name had been sent up to the Senate already for the Belgrade meeting. So they had to get themselves out of that mess. Be that as it may, Arthur's experience in Belgrade was terrible. I'm surprised, but for whatever reason Arthur told me that, it was the most miserable political experience of his life.

In any event, I read the Helsinki Final Act and I was rather impressed with it; and I think I should say here what went through my mind. I used to teach. Did I talk to you about the Myrdahl book?

*Q: Yes, you did.*

KAMPELMAN: That's what I thought. What went through my mind was the Myrdahl book and statements, that in America what impresses him is our virtual national agreement on what "ought" to be and we were moving the 'is' to the 'ought' steadily. I looked upon the Helsinki Final Act as the 'ought' of relationships signed by all of Europe. Now, the Russians didn't think anybody would hold them accountable and secondly, they wanted to have security and their boundaries recognized. But to me it was an 'ought' and if all of Europe agreed to an 'ought.' We had a right to judge the 'is' and to help move the 'is' to the 'ought.'

*Q: Henry Kissinger denigrated this accord. I've interviewed George Vest, who was working on this.*

KAMPELMAN: George was superb at this.

*Q: But he was saying that he would hear from the Swedes, who heard from the East Germans, who were hearing from the Soviets, that this whole negotiation was a bunch of nonsense because Henry was off on arms control; and this was nothing.*

KAMPELMAN: Let me say to you that George Vest is the fellow who put it together for the United States and he helped me because he was still in the State Department...

*Q: He was head of European Affairs, one or the other. Head of European Affairs.*

KAMPELMAN: I did not come into this job in any way hostile, on the contrary. I came in generally trying to get along and George Vest was a tremendous help to me in giving me

the background and the history. I'm jumping a little bit, but Bill Clinton gave me the Presidential Medal of Freedom for this work.

*Q: I'm looking at it here. It's very impressive.*

KAMPELMAN: There was a little get-together before the ceremony. I was there with my family. President Gerald Ford was getting it the same day. Gerald Ford came into the room before the ceremony. He saw me, he came over to me and he said, "Max, I'm glad you're here. I want to thank you." I said, "Mr. President, what are you thanking me for?" He says, "When I signed the Helsinki Final Act my party opposed me, my secretary of state opposed me; you have now made me look good in history," which was an interesting comment, but which is why I could say earlier that the Secretary of State was not in favor of the signing. I got that from the president, from Gerald Ford.

Incidentally, I guess I should say this because it's...after it was clear that I had been chosen to head up the Madrid meeting, my secretary received a phone call from Henry Kissinger's secretary; he was then at CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies). His secretary said to my secretary, "Dr. Kissinger thinks it's time for him and Mr. Kampelman to have breakfast again." She said to me and she says, "I never knew you had breakfast with the secretary of state." I know him of course, but I said, "I don't think we have had breakfast ever." But that was his way of arranging a meeting. Henry was a friend of mine - he said, "Max, don't take the job. It's awful. It's all a Soviet plot. You know better than that. Don't take it." I took it, but I'm just telling you here that I went in, therefore, and I knew Arthur had problems with our allies, as well as with the other side. So I told the State Department that I would like to make a tour to some of our allies in Europe before the meeting, and I did.

One of the great problems that Goldberg faced was the fact that he mentioned the names - and I think it was six victims of Soviet repression - at the Belgrade meeting, asking for their release. This was a source of controversy. I do not know why it was a source of controversy, but it was even among our allies. I was convinced that there was no way I was going to go to Madrid without mentioning the names, and without being actively anti-Soviet because their 'is' was very far from the 'ought.' And I told this to the State Department and George Vest agreed with me. I had no problems. Brzezinski agreed with me. I had no problems.

I went to Germany and met with Genscher. I explained to him that I want to have good relations; I want there to be a NATO caucus; we want to be part of it, and we wanted to have a united western front. And I said I know this is a controversy, naming names, but there's no way I'm not going to mention names. I'm going to be mentioning names. He said to me, "We received 50,000 Germans out of the Soviet Union last year, quietly and without any noise or embarrassment to the Soviets-" (End of tape)

He said that time he come to the United States. He sees these signs: 'Save Soviet Jews,' That was not his way of doing things. So I said, "Minister, I respect it. I want you to know

at the outset that I know you received 50,000 Germans quietly last year; it so happens that last year 50,000 Jews were released also from the Soviet Union and we were not quiet.” “But,” I said, “I do not want to be part of anything that will keep one single German in the Soviet Union.”

*Q: Are we talking about Germans? We're not talking about Germans, are we?*

KAMPELMAN: Germans apparently from the Soviet Union.

*Q: There was a German group that lived in Ukraine back in...*

KAMPELMAN: Well, whatever. He just said, “We got 50,000 Germans out of the Soviet Union.”

But I said, “You know, let’s think of ourselves and the NATO caucus as an orchestra. In an orchestra you have a flute that plays softly, you’ve got a saxophone that blares out at times, sometimes the piano is soft; sometimes the piano is loud.” I said, “But we play music together. Let’s look upon our Madrid experience as an orchestra. We’re going to blow the horn. If you don’t want to blow the horn, you do it your way. But let’s make music together, but we must have a caucus.” Why do I mention this? Because later, after Shultz became Secretary of State and the Madrid meeting was still going on, Shultz said to me, “Genscher keeps talking to me about you and the orchestra. What is that all about?” And I told him. Genscher liked our approach and we became friends. We also visited during the Madrid meetings.

*Q: He was the long-term head of the Free German Party.*

KAMPELMAN: He was the foreign minister for many years.

*Q: He was the foreign minister for many years under various regimes.*

KAMPELMAN: The German ambassador to Madrid, whose name was Jorge Kastl, became a close friend of mine. It started with Genscher telling him to work closely with me, but it ended with our developing a close friendship and I’m still in touch with him and his wife. In our planning I always involved the Germans, and Kastl, who had been an experienced ambassador was very helpful to me during the whole Madrid meetings.

*Q: You named your delegation; it started out with you and Scranton - a Democrat and a Republican and all. Your delegation became sort of a Democratic delegation. You know, the people would orientation that way. Was this a problem?*

KAMPELMAN: No, let me just say as far as our delegation was concerned the staff included people from State, as well as the Congressional staff. I assumed the Congressional staff was democratic because they were working for Dante Fascell. I had no idea what the politics of the State Department group was. But Warren was my deputy.



I never asked his politics. He was a professional diplomat, and the Secretary of our delegation was also a professional diplomat. I had no knowledge of what his politics were. But I was a Democrat, openly known.

When the Madrid meeting temporarily adjourned before Christmas, Carter had been defeated that previous month. So I submitted my resignation, as every ambassador would do. Indeed, the NATO ministers who were now friends of mine, because from September until Christmas we worked as a team, and I made a lot of friends; gave me a farewell party. I submitted my resignation and in early January I received a telephone call from Al Haig, who was the new Secretary of State, not yet in office, saying, "Max, I talked to the President. The President would like to have you continue." I said, "I'm a Democrat, Al." He said, "He knows and I know that. We want you to continue. I know what you're doing in Madrid; I'd like you to continue to do it in Madrid." I received a similar call from Jeane Kirkpatrick, whose husband was my faculty advisor and who was a good friend of mine, and she said, "Max, the president has asked me to go to the United Nations and I happened to be at a meeting where your name came up in connection with the Madrid [meetings], and I put my two cents in that I'd like to see you..."

I don't know if I ever went into how I first met Reagan, but at some point we should.

*Q: Well why don't we talk about it?*

KAMPELMAN: At some point we should but let me just finish up this theme here. I agreed to continue in the job. I said it's more than three months and I have a problem. I wanted another letter. I wanted to know whether I'm still a special government employee. So I received another letter saying the job has been designated as such and therefore anybody who holds the job can enjoy its benefits. I think they stretched the point. But the fact of the matter is I needed a letter to protect myself on the process; and I got the letter, even though they stretched the point. So we had a good laugh about the politics. Reagan knew I was a Democrat, and I'll go into my relationship with him in a few moments, but that was never a problem. I should also add here that I had decided not to receive a salary other than expenses. During Madrid's three months, other than expenses, I continued without salary again.

*Q: As you went into these negotiations in Madrid, had this become a political matter? I mean sort of the right wing of the Republican Party saying this was a sell out to the Soviet Union and that sort of thing.*

KAMPELMAN: No.

*Q: That's interesting.*

KAMPELMAN: No, it was not. First of all, because immediately as Reagan was sworn into office they appointed me to continue in the job.

*Q: But was there any talk anywhere within...*

KAMPELMAN: No. I had no political problems and no problems with the career folk. Our country ambassador was Terence Todman. I had reason to know that Goldberg and Eagleburger, who was the ambassador in Belgrade, were at loggerheads. So what I did is I went to see Terry Todman the first day I was there because our officers were initially at the embassy - and I went to see Terry. I said, "I understand that at the previous meeting Goldberg and Eagleburger had their problems. I'd like you to become a vice chairman of my delegation. You're always welcome to attend any or all of the sessions, and I'll keep you fully informed," and he was delighted. Terry and I continue to be friends.

I also said to Fascell that every Congressional member of his Commission should consider themselves to be honorary members of our delegation, and any time they wanted to come out to Madrid I would have them sitting in at the meetings. These were Democrats and Republicans. Even though everybody knew I was a Democrat, the meetings were not partisan meetings. We had a good relationship.

I talked earlier about a NATO caucus. Warren Zimmerman knew the fellow - this was now the preparatory meeting, which began in September; the main meeting began in November - who was heading up the British delegation, so I met him before we began. Warren and I said to him, "Look, we want to do something about the NATO caucus." He said, "I don't think there's going to be a NATO caucus." He explained, "That sour taste in Belgrade led the Ten European Community to move in. We're going to have regular meetings for the Ten. We're going to have loyalty problems." But he said, "If you want a NATO Caucus let's see what we can do." He wanted to cooperate with us. He said, "Let me call a meeting of all of the NATO group at the United Kingdom embassy and we'll talk about it." So he called a meeting and he explained right after UK comes U.S., so you may want to call a meeting after the UK meeting, although I don't know if the French will attend or how it will be." Anyhow, we met at the UK. I notified the NATO members that I was scheduled to meet the Soviet delegation head the next day at lunch. I would cancel the lunch if they wanted me to cancel. If not, I proposed a second NATO caucus meeting the next evening at the U.S. Embassy at which I would report on my meeting with the Soviets. They agreed unanimously. The French also showed up.

Now a word about that meeting with the Soviets; the Romanian ambassador to our meeting was Dactu, a professor. He had come to Washington before the meeting. I didn't have an office in the State Department; I kept my law office. The State Department thought I ought to meet him, so I met him. Jean Dactu apparently had been a teacher and then was a diplomat. I found he spoke English when we met. It was a pleasant session. On the eve of Madrid, I told our State Department to tell our ambassador in Spain that when Dactu comes to Madrid I'd like to meet him on the first day for lunch, since I didn't think I would know anybody else there. He agreed and asked could he bring his delegation of two more, and I said yes. So the three of them came and Warren and I met with them. We chatted, during the course of which he said, "Would you be willing to speak on Romanian television?" I said I'd be delighted. At the end of the lunch he said to

me, "You know, I'm going to have to tell uncle about this lunch." So I said, "Mr. Ambassador, I had every expectation that you would discuss this with the Soviets and you should. Everything I've said to you I'd be delighted to say to anybody."

He called me that afternoon and I knew by then that the man who was going to head up the Madrid preparatory meeting was their country ambassador, a man who later their U.S. ambassador, Dubinin. Dactu said, "I reported to Ambassador Dubinin and he says that he would very much like to meet with you." After Afghanistan, the President had issued a policy that no American would officially meet with a Soviet official. Before I went to Madrid I said to Brzezinski, and to the President, and to Vance - we were in a meeting - that I didn't see how I could possibly attend a meeting without talking to every delegation. There were two political issues of sensitivity - this Afghanistan reason was one and the other was a military suggestion that the French were pushing. We talked about both and the President said, "We have to leave that up to your judgment."

So I said to Dactu, "Well, I'd be delighted to meet with Ambassador Dubinin." He was pleased. He said, "You know, no American has met with a Russian." But I said I'd be delighted to meet with him. I also said, "Tell me where he wants me to meet him." He called me back a half hour later and he said, "Ambassador Dubinin would like you to tell him where to meet for lunch." I thought a minute and I said, "This is a game he's playing...this is my first day in Madrid. You take me two blocks away and I'll get lost. I don't know Madrid. I've never been in Madrid. He's the ambassador in Madrid. He should be deciding where we're going to eat. He doesn't want to do that because he wants me to issue the invitation and he wants everybody to know that." I continued, "That's fine. Let's have it in my hotel suite and let everybody know that I invited him to have lunch," which is exactly what happened. I had the authority to meet with him at my discretion, but I didn't give a damn and it served my purposes at the NATO caucus; although I hadn't planned it, a lot of these things just happened.

He came with his number two, who I learned from Warren, he was a KGB general and was running the delegation. Warren and I met with the two of them in my suite at the hotel. It lasted until nearly four o'clock and I offered him a deal. I said, "Look, this is a preparatory meeting. You and I are going to fight at the meeting constantly and I'd like to level with you." I said, "You know what I think of your government," and I said, "I have no use for your system and I'm going to say so." But, I said, "We have a preparatory meeting now; we had Belgrade. We don't think those rules were great; you may not think those rules were great. Let's agree to continue with Belgrade, whatever those rules are. Rules are not important. Let's just get through with it in three or four days and get it done and prepare ammunition for the main meeting where we can fight each other." He said he wanted to think about it. He never agreed to that, with the result that the preparatory meeting where they took a licking began in September and lasted to the opening day of the session in November. We couldn't agree, but he took a licking. In any event, that was that and then I reported to NATO.

The next day Warren called me. The general had telephoned him - Sergei Kondrashev

was the name - and he said they had a good luncheon and they would now like to reciprocate by inviting us to dinner, or for lunch; I don't remember. I said, "Warren, you tell them that the next days are Jewish high holidays and I intend to go to the synagogue, and so if he wants to talk to me he's got to wait until after the Jewish high holidays." And then I said to Warren, "And, Warren, I don't mind letting our allies know that I've said no and why I've said no." So Warren passed it along, which stood me in good stead anyhow, and delivered a message. So that's the NATO caucus. We met regularly and frequently. Before the opening day in November I went to the Swedish ambassador - they were part of a neutral and unaligned caucus - and said: "I don't want to embarrass you in any way but I'm going to mention Carl Wallenberg." I said, "He's been made an honorary citizen by the Congress and I don't want to embarrass you, he was a Swedish citizen, but I want you to know I'm going to do it and I think you may want to tell your government that I'm going to mention him as a victim of Soviet repression." He said thank you and then on the opening day he came to me and said, "I'd like you to listen attentively to what my minister is saying," and the minister mentioned Raoul Wallenberg. In Belgrade they fought naming names, but he mentioned Wallenberg in Madrid, as did many other countries.

At the preparatory meetings the staff of the Commission was superb. They were very helpful to me. It was a great staff. They had the Belgrade experience. I used to carry a briefcase with data with me that I could always pull up. I recall one exchange between us and NATO with the Soviet Bloc. I recall beginning to compare what the Soviet Bloc said in Belgrade (date given to me by the Commission staff) and the contrary position they were now taking.

The Hungarian was sitting across from me. I had a quotation of the Hungarian who was in Belgrade and he knew it. I looked at him and took out a piece of paper. He was getting nervous; and I made a decision right on the moment that I was not going to read his statement, but I will talk about the Warsaw Pact and embarrass them as a whole, which I did, and they were embarrassed. I arrived at my hotel that night to find a case of Hungarian wine, no note. The next morning I came into the meeting and went straight to the Hungarian, and with a sober, somber face I said, "You've caused me great difficulty, Mr. Ambassador." I said, "We have a rule in the State Department that we can not accept any gifts that we can not consume within twelve hours. It was a very difficult night for me." And he brightened. Obviously we became friends.

*Q: It shows too that for a minor point you don't try to humiliate people, if you want to keep working with them, to make a little point or something, which really...*

KAMPELMAN: Let me finish that story. The Romanian asked me to be on television. Warren worked out a time for me to be on television that day or a few days later, I don't remember. I was interviewed on Romanian television and I said how pleased I was to be speaking to the people of Romania because both of my parents were born in Romania. He was very excited!. "Where?" So I told him and I said, "Of course. It was part of Romania when they were born, it's now, unfortunately, a part of the Soviet Union." And then we

had a good interview about the meeting. Two days later Dactu came to me and asked, "What did you say on Romanian television?" I said, "I don't know. I just tried to be polite." "Well, he said, "my President is all excited about what you said. He wants you to come to Romania to meet with him." I said, "Look, I know why he wants to talk to me." One of the items Dactu and I talked about at our meeting, on the opening was that he had instructions to get the next follow up meeting in Bucharest, and I said to him, "We will oppose it. You haven't earned it." And I said, "I have no problem meeting a neutral country or a western country, but we will not go to a Warsaw Pact country. My department will not agree." So I said to Dactu, "He wants to see me because he wants to push me to change my mind about the next follow up meeting." He said, "Well I don't know why he wants to see you." I did not respond to the invitation.

I received another visit a few days later: "My President wants to see you." Finally, about a month later the State Department called me, "Max, can you go to Romania?" I said, "Why?" "Well," they said, "because Dactu wants to talk to you." I said, "Do you want me to go to Romania?" They said, "Yes, we want you to go to Romania." So I took a plane at government expense and I went to Romania. We spent three hours together. He never once raised the question of the next meeting of the CSCE. I was wrong. We talked about the place where my parents were born and during the course of it he talked about the Soviet Union. I told him what we were going to do in Madrid; I told him I was going to criticize his government also. He brought me to a map on the wall and he pointed to the boundary between Romania and the Soviet Union and he said, "There are 100,000 Soviet troops on the Soviet side of that boundary. Washington has to realize what I face," which was an interesting comment and I passed it, of course, on to Washington.

*Q: That's very oppressive government...*

KAMPELMAN: Well, I found him impressive.

*Q: Oppressive.*

KAMPELMAN: Oh! But he was impressive...but it was an oppressive regime and I said so. But I want to say to you two things: he made it possible for me and my wife to visit that area where my parents were born and that was to fly me from Bucharest to the boundary with the Soviet Ukraine and I made arrangements with the KGB general to be met there and to have somebody take me into the city. Let me add here that after three years, as we're ending the CSCE meeting in Madrid, we still have a small but significant difference of opinion on the final statement. I persuaded the neutrals to come in with a proposal we could accept. The neutrals agreed to put it in as their compromise. The Russians said they don't accept it. Dactu stood up and said, "At the instructions of my president, my government's position is in favor of the neutral and non-aligned proposal." People in the State Department told me they didn't know of any other instance where Rumanians deviated from the Moscow line.

*Q: Well, Ceausescu was a very personable person. I mean not personally a nice guy,*

*but...*

KAMPELMAN: No. He was a butcher.

*Q: He was a butcher, but I mean he was a person who made up his own mind.*

*Q: You thought you might mention how you met Ronald Reagan.*

KAMPELMAN: Did I not do that yet?

*Q: You haven't done that yet.*

KAMPELMAN: Okay.

I mentioned, I believe, that I was active in the organization of the Committee on the Present Danger. This was a group of no more than 100 and I was on the executive committee. One of the 100 was Ronald Reagan. I had never met the man; I don't even know if I ever saw any of the movies that he was in. One of his friends was on our executive committee - a man who later became the first national security adviser under his administration, Dick Allen. Allen indicated at our executive committee meetings - he was always talking about Reagan - that he was going to help Reagan move to the presidency.

I was in private life, of course, and I was chairman of the American Friends of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, as well as a board member of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This involved me in life in Israel and education. Carter was president. You may remember a time was reached when Carter and Vance decided to bring Russia into the Middle East. I thought that was terrible. The Soviet Union was not qualified to do it and would not be impartial. A thought occurred to me and I went to Dick Allen after one of our executive committee meetings and I explained that I did not like what Carter was doing about the Middle East in bringing the Soviet Union in, and that I wanted somehow to communicate the fact that Carter should not believe that the Jewish vote is always in his pocket. I explained my University connection and that we have an annual fundraiser in Palm Beach, Florida, where wealthy people go for the winter.

*Q: The Kennedys go there.*

KAMPELMAN: Sure. The Kennedys go there. And I was frank with him. I said, "What do you think if I invite Ronald Reagan to be the speaker at that annual fundraising dinner?" I said, "There will be a lot of Republican Jews there, too" - Max Fischer was a big Republican fundraiser and active in the Jewish community - and I told Allen why I wanted Reagan there. He said, "I'll have to talk to the governor about it." A few days later he called me and said, "I talked to the governor; he said yes, he'll be pleased to do that," - He knew it couldn't be a political speech because I made that clear to Allen, that we didn't want to get involved in the politics of it; and he said that Reagan said yes on

condition that a fellow committee member will be there and sit next to him on the dais and brief him so that he knows who the people are. I said, "Well, I intended to be there," as the chairman and I'll be glad to sit next to him. I reaffirmed the fact that of course it won't be a political speech; and he said, "No, as a matter of fact, the governor told me that every year he buys Israeli bonds," which I did not know.

At the dinner, I sat next to the man and we chatted. He wanted to know about me; We'd never met. He wanted to have somebody, even though he didn't know me, that he could talk to. When he found out my relationship with Hubert Humphrey, his eyes lit up and said, "Hubert is one of my best friends," which I had no idea. And he said, "As a matter of fact, when he comes to northern California I always insist that he stay at the executive mansion with Nancy and me." This is new to me. Then he said to me, "When I was president of the Screen Actors Guild Hubert was very helpful to me and we've been friends ever since." So we spent the evening talking about Humphrey, when we could talk, because of speeches; he told me a lot about the Screen Actors Guild and his activities there. He also said he spoke in Minneapolis for Humphrey as Senator in 1948. So we got along quite well with each other. He made a splendid speech, as a matter of fact. That's how I met him. I never saw him before.

This becomes relevant. I was in Madrid appointed by Carter. Carter was defeated and I submitted my resignation as every political ambassador did. I received a call from the new Secretary of State, Al Haig, whom I knew when he was with Nixon as chief of staff, and then he was around. As a matter of fact, I met with him once when he was the head of NATO in Europe. Haig said, "The President and I would like you to continue in Madrid." I received a call from Jeane Kirkpatrick: "The president wants you to continue in Madrid." So I said, "I'll be glad to continue in Madrid." I have a feeling that our exchange in Florida may have contributed to this appointment.

*Q: I'm sure it did.*

KAMPELMAN: I'm sure it did, although I knew Al Haig - as a matter of fact, I introduced Al Haig at a meeting in Europe; Jeane Kirkpatrick and I were friends; her husband was my faculty advisor at the University of Minnesota. She was a strong Humphrey supporter when Humphrey ran for president. So that's how I ended up continuing into the Republican administration. I developed a splendid relationship with the President. He wanted to talk to me and we chatted, and, for example, to give you an illustration of this - it's never been publicized - I really had the Soviets on the run in Madrid; there's no question about that, and I had it without any polemics because I'm not a polemical fellow. So we had really quite an anti-Soviet, anti-repression movement going that was quite effective, and it was all over the European press because I was on radio a lot. Reagan liked this.

At one point George Shultz became Secretary of State.

*Q: Finish this because we want to go back to the Madrid conference.*

KAMPELMAN: I had not known Shultz when he was in the cabinet in Washington. He was very active, but I never knew him. I was not a Republican and I was not active in the government. He called me when he became secretary of state. I congratulated him on his new appointment and I said to him, "Is there anything I can do to be helpful?" and he said he wanted me to come by and chat when I'm in Washington.

*Q: You were back in your law office by this time.*

KAMPELMAN: No, I was in Madrid still.

Why did he call me? Carter became President in January of '77. In December of '76 I got a phone call from Walter Wriston, the president and chairman of the board of Citibank; he was a very distinguished businessman. I had met him as a lawyer; I was negotiating with him at one point. We had not become friends, but we had become acquaintances. He called me on the telephone and he said he'd like to see me.

Our business relationship was brief, but pleasant, and he felt free to call me. He said, "Look, one of our clients is ARAMCO (Arabian-American Oil Company), which is the Saudi Arabian oil company; and he said, "The president of ARAMCO has asked me to see if I can bring him together with the new Carter people." And he said, "You're a Democrat and I'm wondering if you have any thoughts about this." I said I had met Carter, but I didn't know him - "do you know why ARAMCO wants to..." and he says, "I don't know; he didn't tell me." Well, I said, "I think I know why, and that has to do with the legislation that was the subject of a debate between Carter and Ford." That was the legislation before Congress that no American company could participate in the Arab boycott of Israel. There was a proposal in Congress which failed after a sharp debate, saying that any company that cooperated with that boycott was itself guilty of violating American law, and Carter had said in the debate that he was in favor of that legislation. So I said, "I think that's what they're concerned about." So I said, "Look, the new national security adviser is going to be Brzezinski. I know Brzezinski." He was, in fact, a friend of mine and a strong supporter of Humphrey. So I said, "If you'd like, I'll make arrangements for Brzezinski to meet with your client," because I wanted to be helpful there. He called me up and he says they'd like to do that. Anyhow, the meeting took place.

I wasn't there; I didn't hear anything further about it, but Wriston called me on the telephone and he said, "You were right. That's what they wanted to talk about." And he said, "You know, I wasn't that familiar with this piece of legislation. Can we do anything to help here?" I said, "Well, what do you have in mind?" "Well," he says, "it seems to me, and it seems to ARAMCO, that we shouldn't have this struggle next year and that we ought to come up with something." So he and I agreed that I would bring together the leaders of the Anti-Defamation League who were active in this fight. He would bring together the Business Roundtable, which ARAMCO was a part of.



So we had a meeting in the boardroom of Chase Manhattan. As I went into that boardroom meeting I kept thinking - I looked around and saw who was there, and was. Here was the power of American business - the president of General Motors; the president of General Electric; the president of ARAMCO; the president of the Federated Stores; the president of EXXON; the head of Dupont. There were five of us from the Anti-Defamation League. We had a wonderful few hours of discussion where the Anti-Defamation League people presented their arguments, which were presented well. And George Shultz was there as the president of Bechtel. That's why I'm telling you the story. Out of this came an agreement that they would appoint a couple of people and we would appoint a few people - lawyers - and try to see if we could come up with a compromise. And I was part of that process. They both asked me if I would chair the process. We did, and we came up with a solution which was practically unanimous supporters in both the House and the Senate. It solved the problem, but the negotiations were tough.

*Q: Do you recall more or less how it fell out?*

KAMPELMAN: Well, it really carried out the purposes with reasonable protection for the businesses. It called for proper procedures. It's still the law. It's still being observed.

Obviously we got in touch with the White House and the Congress - Stu Eisenstadt, a friend of mine, was in charge of domestic affairs for the Carter White House - and I told Stu what was happening, I kept him informed. Meanwhile, occasionally we would come to insoluble problems in negotiations. As a matter of fact, at one point I was on vacation - I had been to all the meetings, but we had a little place in the Virgin Islands and my wife and I and our five kids were there. I recall receiving a call from the head of Dupont saying, "You've got to come back," and I said, "Why do I have to come back?" "Well," he says, "it's broken up again." I said, "It'll wait until I come back." And when I came back it was resolved.

Shultz at that time developed the impression, that I had saved and pushed the agreement. Now he's secretary of state. The only time we met was at that one New York meeting. So he obviously had a plus attitude toward me. When he flew out to Madrid on one of his European trips, I called the NATO caucus so that Shultz could meet with the NATO caucus, and my friends in the NATO caucus, trying to help me, I'm sure, told him what a good job I was doing and how happy they were that the NATO caucus is together. So he felt very good and he and I developed a very close, really good relationship.

Whenever I came back to Washington - because we met at meetings for about six, seven weeks and then break for a couple of weeks and then come back for six, seven weeks and break again, and at every break I had to go see Shultz - and Haig - when they were there, and I would brief them on what's happening. I said to Shultz that I thought the Russians were going to give us everything we ask for - this is now after about two years - and he said, "Why do you say that?" and I said, "Well, because it's clear to me from my discussions with the Soviets." By then I was pretty close to the KGB general who was the number two man and he spoke English. I think I mentioned that they had three different

heads of delegation, all of whom were deputy foreign ministers, but that the KGB general was the consistent number two man who ran the delegation and was very effective and skilled.

I said, "Well, you know they've been terribly hurt by the Madrid meeting and they know it. Their business of trying to stop the deployment of cruise missiles is going down the drain; they can't stop it, and I think they just want to end the meeting, as far as they were concerned, and I think they know that they've got to give us what we want." He said, "Well, that's great." But I said, "I've got to tell you I'm no longer satisfied with what we've asked for." So he looked at me and he said, "What do you mean?" I said, "Well, let's assume that we get everything we ask for and I appear before a congressional committee and somebody says to me, 'Well, what have you asked for?' and I said, 'Well, we asked for this statement, that statement, the other statement, and the concluding document.'" I continued, "If I were a member of Congress I'd say, 'Statements again? What good do statements do? They don't live up to what they undertake anyhow.'" Shultz was nodding his head, so I said, "I can not be satisfied unless I get people out of there. If I can get people out of jail, if I can get human beings to be able to migrate out then at least I feel I've done something in the three years, and not just getting some paper; and I can defend myself with the Congress." I had not planned to say this.

He said, "You want to change the rules in the middle of the game?" I said, "I guess I do." Well, he said, "I can't authorize that. It's above my pay grade." Within a half hour we were at the White House. I had certainly not expected this. Schultz said, "Max has got something to say." By then I had a good relationship with the President. Reagan turned to Shultz and said, "George, this makes a lot of sense to me. How do you feel about this?" Shultz replied, "Mr. President, it certainly does makes sense, but" he said, "you know our allies won't like it. The Russians certainly won't like it. We're changing the rules." I then said, "Mr. President, that's right. They won't like it. The Germans won't like it." I said, "But I don't know that I have to tell them," which is what I added in my discussions. Reagan, just like this, says, "George, I like it. I think this is what we ought to do," and he said, "If Genscher calls, you handle him; if the chancellor calls, I'll handle him." Just like that. Then he said to me, "How are you going to decide which people?" which of course is a good question. I did not know. And he said, "What I'd like to do is include the Pentecostals who are now in the embassy."

*Q: Yes.*

KAMPELMAN: You may remember. I think there were seven or eight Pentecostals.

*Q: They had been there for a long, long time.*

KAMPELMAN: They had been there for a long, long time.

And then Reagan said to me, "You know, when I first became President, I met with Dobrynin. I talked to Dobrynin; I told Dobrynin if they want to have a good relationship

with me the first thing they ought to do is clear the decks and let the Pentecostals out.” And he said, “I haven’t heard a word about that since. I’d like you to do what you can about the Pentecostals.” So I said, “Well, I will.” And then I said, “I don’t have any idea which people...I don’t know. I’ll have to play it by ear.” I didn’t have a number in mind; nor a plan. I just had a principle in mind.

Upon my return to Moscow and to Madrid, I got a hold of Kondrashev, the KGB general, and I said, “Sergei, I have instructions from my President. I am not to permit this meeting to end, or agree to anything, unless we can get people out.” He blew up, because he was pushing to end the meeting. I said, “Look, I’m not speaking just for myself, Sergei. I’m speaking for the President of the United States and the Secretary of State. I have that authority and instructions from them. I think what you should do is get in touch with your chief in Moscow and you just better tell them what the story is.” This was Andropov at the KGB. About a week later he came to me - less than a week - and said, “I’ve got instructions to talk to you and to negotiate with you.”

I left out one item. As Shultz and I are leaving the President’s office at that meeting, we’re standing up and getting ready to go and the President said, “Wait a minute, Max,” and he went to his desk and he opens up his desk and he picks out a piece of paper - and he said, “See what you can do about these people.” So I went outside - Shultz and I had not seen the piece of paper - we both look at the paper, and there are the names of Jewish refuseniks who were in jail in Russia. Now how long he had that piece of paper in his desk, I’ll be damned if I know. He may have had a meeting that morning and somebody may have given him a list. I just haven’t got the slightest idea. But I had a list, at least to begin with, of people, and I of course used that list. I then had gotten a list from Dante Fascell, who headed the commission...

Oh, there was another condition. The Soviet condition from the negotiation was that nobody must know about it except the President, the Secretary of State, and me. So I said, “What about Dobrynin?” who was then the ambassador. He said, “Above all, Dobrynin. He must not know. He sticks his nose into everything,” I remember him saying that to me.

*Q: This was the president saying this?*

KAMPELMAN: No, this was the KGB man saying to me, “Nobody must know about this except Shultz, Reagan and Kampelman.” I asked, “What about Dobrynin?” and he said, “No, he sticks his nose into everything and we shouldn’t be dealing with...” He didn’t want anybody else to know, and I couldn’t tell allies. I’ve got that list, people of all religions. We began negotiating. We agree on the Pentecostals, but with one difference. I get a hold of Warren Zimmerman, who had been my early deputy in Madrid and was now in Moscow as DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission). I said to Warren - without telling him why - “Warren, you have the names of the seven Pentecostals at the embassy. Can you get me the names of every member of their family?” and he sent me more than eighty names from Siberia, or wherever they were.

*Q: I think they were from Siberia.*

KAMPELMAN: Siberia, yes.

So I didn't give Kondrashev seven names, I gave him eighty-some odd names from these two Siberian families. At one point he says, "Okay, we're all set on that. We'll let them go." That's part of our deal. The reason I'm saying this is that at one point he said to me, "We've got problems with the Siberians." I said, "What's the problem?" He said, "They have to go to Israel." I said, "They're not Jews." He said, "They have to go to Israel." I said, "They don't want to go to Israel, they want to go to Germany." I said, "They don't want to go to Israel." He said, "No, they must go to Israel." I said to him, "Sergei, if they go to Israel they'll land in Israel and take the next plane out to Germany." He said, "I don't care what they do after they land in Israel." So, I made arrangements with our American embassy to fly to Israel and then to Germany.

I had a lady on the list who Dante Fascell had given me. Again, I can't quite remember her name, but I think it was Katz. She had relatives in Florida. I explained to Sergei, "Look, Fascell is the chairman of the congressional commission," which he was - the commission on the CSCE. I said, "He's very important. He may even be at some point chairman of the foreign relations committee." So I said, "I think it will do your government some good to make a friend here." He came to me again later. "We can not let Katz go." I said, "Why can't you let Katz go?" Then he said Mrs. Katz shot Lenin. I said, "Sergei, the Katz you're talking about shot at Lenin in 1923." I knew the event, of course. It was at an opera and a lady by the name of Katz, if that was her name, took a shot at Lenin. She missed, but she took a shot at Lenin. But he said she shot Lenin. I explained, "Katz is a common name."

We also had Natan Sharansky. I do want to say that with all names I mentioned, I cleared those names with Sakharov, and I want to say why I cleared names.

*Q: Now Sakharov was in Russia.*

KAMPELMAN: Sakharov was in Russia and I had been in touch with him for a long time. From the beginning, before we had a deal - of people without Sakharov saying okay. The names mentioned by me in the early days might put those people at risk; and I didn't want to do that unless he could assure me that either they or their families approved of my using their name. So Sakharov and I, through the American embassy, were in touch with each other during those long Madrid days. I had Sharansky's name on this list and Mrs. Sharansky, who was very energetic had been to see me three or four times. So I had Sharansky on the list. Kondrashev said yes, finally. We ended up with a few hundred people getting out. On Sharansky, I said to Sergei: "You're telling me that Sharansky can go doesn't help. How do we tell Sharansky? If you go tell him we have a deal, he isn't going to believe any of you fellows. It's an empty promise." Well, he says, "What should we do?" So I said, "You have not let his mother see him for more than a

year,” which was true. Ida Milgram was her name. I said, “You haven’t let her see him for more than a year. You have to let her go to see him and she will explain this to him.” So he agreed.

I received a cable from the American embassy saying Ida Milgram came in to see them, and said much to her surprise the KGB police were very pleasant with her and asked her to come to the KGB office. She came to the KGB office and they very politely gave her permission to go with her son. She wanted to know what was happening, so they explained to her what was happening. In the meantime I let his wife know what was happening. His wife came back to me and said that she doesn’t want him to leave. She didn’t think he ought to ask to leave. She was accompanied this time by some Hasidic Jews, with the long beards and the fancy black hats. I said, “Why?” and she says, “Well, it’s acknowledging the right of the Soviet Union to have him there,” which I understood as a problem. As the question came up, how does he get out, the Russians say to me, “He’s got to ask.” I said, “Well, he’s got to be careful about the letter because if the letter acknowledges anything or if it asks pardon, it really means ‘I was sentenced properly and I’m asking...’” So I came up with a one sentence letter which the KGB agreed to. Anyhow, Ida Milgram went to visit her son and said to her son that his wife did not think he should do this. Sakharov, however, was urging him to accept this and to go to Israel; and he decided that he doesn’t want to write. He writes about this in his book. I saw him about a month ago at Charlie Krauthammer’s house. He’s now a member of the Cabinet in Israel. Anyhow, we ended up by getting a few hundred people out of jail and out of the Soviet Union.

*Q: I wonder if you could go back now and talk about sort of the nuts and bolts of this Madrid meeting. What you did talk about was sort of the end game there, but at the beginning, what were we asking for and why were the Soviets in such a bind?*

KAMPELMAN: The earlier meeting in Belgrade had been a fiasco. You were there in Belgrade. You knew the problems, I gather. There were serious problems. There was no effective NATO caucus. There were, in fact, divisions within the NATO caucus. I think I mentioned here how we got the NATO caucus started again in Madrid.

*Q: Yes.*

KAMPELMAN: So we had a caucus that was going and it was an effective caucus going for the preparatory meeting.

*Q: Yes.*

KAMPELMAN: With all of this the Soviets were on the run. NATO had decided to put Pershings and cruise missiles into Europe to balance the Soviet weapons. This was their great objective. You remember they produced hundreds of thousands of people in demonstrations.

*Q: It was the hurrah of the...*

KAMPELMAN: It was the last hurrah of the Soviet Union in Europe. And they were losing that battle. Genscher and a number of Europeans felt that what we did in Madrid helped them because of the publicity we were getting in Europe - publicity which we were not getting in the United States, but that we were getting in Europe. I was on radio practically every day talking about the Soviet Union. So that was their position and they wanted to get rid of that problem and move away. Their request was for a disarmament conference to take place in Europe. They finally agreed that that disarmament conference should include the Americans and the Canadians.

*Q: At first they had been trying to exclude the Americans.*

KAMPELMAN: At first they were trying to exclude us, in order to undermine NATO, but then they saw that was not feasible so the United States was to come in. During the course of the Madrid meeting as they saw they weren't getting any place. Though they continued to call it a disarmament conference, what they were really talking about was a conference on military confidence building measures. NATO had a counter to that, which was a French proposal, for military confidence building measures. That too was interesting because by the time I went to Madrid in September of 1980, the United States had not agreed to the French proposal and I was not authorized to sign on to the French proposal. But the French proposal was on the table. There was a dispute in the administration between Brzezinski and Vance. Vance wanted us to support the French proposal; Brzezinski, and the Defense Department, did not want us to support the French proposal.

After the preparatory meeting, and the beginning of the main meeting, at a meeting at the White House, I asked for permission to support the French proposal at a time when I thought it would be helpful to us in the negotiation. I did not wish to give a blanket endorsement, but in back of my head I was always aware of the fact I could have a problem with the French, and I wanted to have a bargaining tool. The recommendation I made was finally accepted by Brzezinski and the Defense Department. It was a way to bring the administration together, but it was also a way to give me a negotiating tool. I did feel, during the course of the meeting - I thought it was a good proposal - and at an appropriate time I signed on to that proposal for military confidence building measures. Toward the very end of the meeting, the Turks raised some questions about that. They, of course, are the next door neighbors and they were concerned about it. What I did at that point is I asked for a meeting with the Joint Chiefs and I flew back to Washington and I met with the Chiefs. I explained the French proposal thoroughly to them and what I thought we were getting out of it. I also had authority to send their representative on my delegation, who was an air force colonel, to Turkey. So he went to Turkey and we ironed out that problem with the Turks and the Turks were pleased about it. This was the military component of Madrid.

Jim Goodby, whose name may be familiar to you; you may know him...

*Q: Yes, he's been in.*

KAMPELMAN: Jim Goodby later headed up our delegation at that military meeting dealing with confidence security building measures.

The mechanics in Madrid were moving nicely; we were getting support from the neutrals. Now, at the very end of the meeting the Maltese began to act Malta-like.

*Q: Was this with Mintov still there?*

KAMPELMAN: He was still there as their leader, a strange man.

*Q: He was a pain in the ass, from a NATO point of view.*

KAMPELMAN: A pain, and he was still there. His foreign minister, whose name escapes me, became friendly with me. He would fly from Malta to Madrid. He had met Walter Reuther, the UAW (Automobiles Union Workers) leader, and he looked upon himself as a bosom pal of Walter Reuther. He had asked Walter about me and Walter said he and I were friends, which we were. So he felt he was, therefore, my bosom friend and that he could manipulate me. Toward the end, as expected, Malta began making new demands. They would not end the meeting unless their demands were met - which was their technique. We were finally all agreed now, except for the Maltese. Saliba was their Madrid representative, is now their ambassador in Paris, who wrote me a letter recently. I told Saliba, "You tell your minister that I am leaving Madrid tomorrow on the plane and I'm going back to my family and to my private life," - you remember I was not a Foreign Service officer - "and that I'm asking my delegation to leave with me, but we will have a representative from the American embassy sitting in and instructed to say no every time the Maltese delegation proposal comes up." And I said, "When you're ready to deal intelligently and responsibly I'll be glad to fly back for the final meeting." And I left. And I took the whole delegation with me. I had Terry Todman, our country ambassador somebody to always be there to go through the form. Larry Eagleburger, when I came back, said, "What are you doing here?" I told him exactly what I was doing and he thought that was a great idea. Finally the Maltese gave in and it ended the meeting.

There was one other problem at the very end. For reasons of high principle, the Russians kept one issue open that they would not agree to, and that was - we agreed to many conferences; we agreed to have a conference on human rights once a year instead of waiting three or four years, on democracy and human rights, and I wanted to have a meeting on family unification to take place a year from then, but they wouldn't have that. I wouldn't agree to the end of the meeting. Neither would NATO, unless we got that one. I persuaded NATO to stick with us on this. This went on for about ten days. I was stubborn.

The Germans and the Spanish were great; all of NATO were great. I have to say we were unified...I came up with an idea which I discussed privately with my Spanish colleague,

and that was for the Spanish prime minister - he was the Social Democrat who became prime minister for a number of years; a capable man; I said, "You're the host country. Why don't you have your prime minister call all thirty-five delegations to a reception - call it a farewell reception - and let him say that this impasse must end, and, therefore, he is proposing the final compromise to end the meeting." And I said, "The Soviets will have to accept that. There's no way they can not accept it." So we drafted a final item which included what we wanted on family reunification. He called the meeting together; he made a talk, distributed the paper to everybody, and then said, "I'm assuming that everybody here is agreeing to this final proposal." The Soviets looked at me and they knew exactly what I had done. There was no doubt in that. And that's how we ended the meeting.

*Q: Was there the feeling that basically the whole Helsinki thing, as far as the Soviets were concerned, was to get the borders set? And the rest of it was considered kind of minor stuff, which all of a sudden they found themselves stuck with. This was their tar-baby. They grabbed that border issue and all of a sudden all these other things came at them.*

KAMPELMAN: Exactly. You saw the award on my desk from Genscher, NATO was strong, and of course my relationship with Shultz strengthened during this whole period, and with Reagan, because Reagan was informed.

As a matter of fact, I have another story about Reagan that I think is relevant here. It was during Madrid. I think Chernenko was the new prime minister of Russia.

*Q: It didn't last very long.*

KAMPELMAN: Yes, it didn't last very long. But it doesn't matter who was there. In any event, my discussions with Sergei Kondrashev, the general, led me to have an idea, not related to the Madrid meeting, as to what the United States might do vis-à-vis the Soviet Union; and it had to do with the forthcoming meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. So on one of my trips to Washington I took it up with Larry Eagleburger. Larry listened and he said, "Max, I gave the opposite advice to George yesterday." Just like that. Well, I thought to myself, I made a try. I wasn't pushing it, I was just discussing it. It wasn't part of my Madrid meeting. So I figured okay, that was it. Then Larry went on to say, "But I think George ought to hear what you have to say." Within ten minutes we're in Shultz's office. Larry asked me to explain, I explained. Shultz turns to Larry and he says, "You gave me the opposite advice yesterday." Larry says, "Yes, but I thought you ought to hear Max." Shultz says, "Well I then gave this advice to the President yesterday." So I figured I might as well drop the idea. Shultz continued, "The President ought to hear what you have to say." He called the President's secretary, and said to me, "You have a nine o'clock appointment to see the President tomorrow morning. And, Max, I can't be there," Shultz said to me, "because I've got a breakfast on the Hill and I've got to go to that breakfast on the Hill."



So at nine o'clock the next morning I showed up at the White House, the secretary said, "You can go in," and I go in, obviously interrupting a staff meeting because they're all there - Baker, Meese, the whole bunch of them, including the vice president. They're all around the room. And the President said, "George says I ought to hear something that Max has to say." He explained to them and I made my statement. I knew I was interrupting so I made it brief. When I made the suggestion to Eagleburger, I never thought I would reach this moment. Baker spoke up against it and said, "You know George gave us the opposite advice yesterday. I think George was right." Meese agreed with Baker. Two or three others speak up; they all agree with Baker. I think, 'what am I doing here?' First of all, it wasn't that important. The President must see something in my face of disappointment, although I did not feel disappointed. The President looked at me and said, "Max, don't pay any attention to any of these fellows. Not a single one of them was ever a Democrat." And that ended it.

*Q: Of course he had been. He had been a real New Deal-er.*

KAMPELMAN: Everybody laughed, of course. Not a single one of them was ever a democrat.

I mention this because it's clear from what I've been saying that the President that I knew in Madrid and in Geneva was not the President I read about in the newspapers.

*Q: You do get this feeling - people I've talked to - that there was a president with very firm convictions and who focused on things. Not everything; he went about sort of the routine of business.*

KAMPELMAN: He had views.

*Q: He had strong views.*

*You left the Madrid conference, I take it, with great pleasure.*

KAMPELMAN: Oh sure. I want to say to you I was not getting a salary at all for this. Three years without a salary, but I was getting income from my law firm. I was getting my expenses paid, but I was theoretically just doing this for three months.

*Q: Just to get an idea on sort of the Washington scene, which I think many people don't understand; men and women are pulled in from time to time, like yourself, from law firms or something to do something. I would think their business would suffer. Is there a benefit by this? I mean the fact that you've got a partner of a law firm who is out accomplishing something other than helping AT&T (American Telephone & Telegraph Company) make some more money.*

KAMPELMAN: Well, first of all, I was lucky I could do that. The reason I could do it is we had a successful law firm. I was still getting an income from the law firm, and not

only that, for example, during those three years we had about three or four months when we weren't meeting at one point because of the Polish problem - the Soviets in effect installed a general as Poland's dictator.

We objected and the meeting adjourned for three or four months. I was back in my law firm during that period of time. Our firm did not engage in any government business, only private law.

I talked about Romania, I talked about Hungary; now Poland. The number two person in the Polish delegation was a man by the name of Jerry Novak... You know I made a point of developing relationships with most of the delegations, including some from eastern Europe. As a matter of fact, I am still in touch with some of them. Did I tell you that a book by KGB General Kondrashev is in my library autographed by him?

*Q: No, I don't think so.*

KAMPELMAN: Well, Sergei Kondrashev, a KGB general, wrote a book a few years ago in which he wrote about his experiences before Madrid. He was in charge of the KGB in Germany. The co-author of that book was the fellow who was in charge of the CIA in Germany during the same time, and they both wrote a book together. Sergei sent me a copy of the book, which is published by Yale University Press, "To my friend, Max Kampelman, who taught me the importance of democracy and human rights," or something like it.

*Q: Oh, how wonderful.*

KAMPELMAN: Anyhow, Novak, the Polish fellow, came to me at one point ; he knew he could trust me - and he had a serious problem. His wife has joined the Women's Committee of Solidarity and his son has joined the Youth Committee of Solidarity, obviously hostile to the government he was working for. So I said, in effect, "Look, let them do what they feel like doing. You can't stop them; they've already done it, but if you get in trouble, you come to me and I'll arrange for you to go to the United States," which was all I could do for him. It so happened that after Madrid, I arranged for him to go to the United States. He is now, I think, their ambassador to the democratic Poland and a senior official in their Foreign Service. I wrote a letter in his behalf when Solidarity took over control.

The number three person at the Polish delegation was Adam Rotfeld, who also a senior official in Poland. He told me an interesting story. He said that he was born in a part of Poland that was near Russia and that his father was the mayor of that small community. His parents were Jewish. When he was a baby the nuns in that community went to his father and said, "Look, you're in trouble. We know what's coming. We'd be glad to take your baby and bring him up." So they took the baby and during the war his parents were killed. At the end of the war the nuns called him and explained to him that he was Jewish, that they took care of him and his parents were now dead, and they gave him a choice. If

he wanted to continue in Poland, they would continue to support him through all of his schooling. If he wanted to go to Israel, they had a branch in Israel and they would send him to that branch and the nuns there would take care of him and he would get his education in Israel. He knew nothing about Israel - he was a child - and he elected to stay in Poland.

He was a student of the number one man in the Polish delegation, who had been his professor in courses. Novak had also been a student of the delegation. This number one man, who was a professor, also brought these two former students to work with him. Rotfeld was told that as a Jew, he could never have a career in the Foreign Service. He had been number one in his class. We chatted about that and he kept me informed about what was happening. I never asked either of them to do anything that was unpatriotic or dangerous. But curiously, Rotfeld, is today a very senior Foreign Service official. I received an e-mail from him last week. I keep in close touch with these people because I've got a separate proposal that I'm now working on involving CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) and OSCE (Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe).

*Q: This brings up a question. You've got this international convention of the Soviet bloc and the Western bloc getting together. Did you have a problem with the CIA sniffing around or trying to develop agents and all that? I mean this is what the CIA does.*

KAMPELMAN: I assumed that the CIA may have been there, but I had absolutely no problems and no identification, as distinguished from my experience in Geneva. You have to understand that the United States government, up until Madrid, had pretty much dismissed the CSCE as an institution.

*Q: To me it's a Cinderella story.*

KAMPELMAN: They pretty much dismissed it. But had I known the CIA was there I would not have been troubled. Nobody identified himself to me as being a CIA agent.

*Q: Because I was just wondering whether sometimes an over eager CIA person can screw things up.*

KAMPELMAN: I will say when we I got to Geneva the CIA was there, very actively.

So this is now '83. I'm back into private life and I find myself being called on again, every once in a while. For example, Shultz called me one day and said: "The President would like to see you." The president wanted to discuss the Soviet-Jewish question. The United States embassy was the only embassy represents outside of the Jewish synagogue on Friday night in order to protect the people from the KGB. He did not understand why our allies are not helping us there. He wrote a letter to a few European heads of state asking for their cooperation. He gave me the use of an airplane; asked me to hand deliver and dismiss the letter. He wanted me to talk to them about having people at the

synagogue. I did. It was a great experience. It was great for me. I had not met a lot of these heads of government. On another occasion Shultz wanted me to go El Salvador. It was a mess. I went down and spent three days. Then I went for the election of Duarte.

*Q: Duarte is in El Salvador.*

KAMPELMAN: I went down and I saw Duarte first, then there was an election - the first presidential election in El Salvador. Shultz asked me to serve as an observer. Tom Pickering was our ambassador during that time. We flew to various places on the day of the election. Tom Pickering and I were on the same helicopter. The helicopter was behaving strangely, but nevertheless we landed and we went to see the different places. There were very long lines for their first election. The people were filled with tremendous enthusiasm. As we landed back in the capitol, Tom motioned for me to come ahead and he showed me bullet holes in the helicopter; he explained, "That's why we were behaving strangely. They were shooting at us." Tom and I are very good friends now and we see each other socially.

*Q: I'm interviewing Tom right now.*

KAMPELMAN: For the inauguration of Duarte, Shultz was chairman of the delegation and asked me to serve as a member of the delegation. On the plane I sat next to Jesse Helms on the airplane. Helms and I were talking; he remembered me from the days I was in the Senate and we talked about Humphrey, and again Helms said to me how much he admired Humphrey. You know, I have found uniformly that this was a man respected by Democrats and Republicans. Helms was telling me stories about him and Humphrey and then somebody came up and asked me to go up front to talk to Shultz.

Shultz in effect said, "Max, we got some news that there will be an assassination attempt at the swearing in, and I think you ought to know about it." I said, "I think Helms can help," because Helms, we knew, was close to the extreme right-wing. "Well," he says, "what do you think? Should I call him up?" and I said yes. So I brought Helms up front and Shultz told him. Helms was troubled and said, "George, can I have a car when we land?" and Shultz said, "We'll arrange for you to have a car." He said, "Give me a car and I'll do what I can do." There was no assassination attempt. Now, whether Helms talked to people when he got there, I don't know. But it was interesting for me to have these occasional breaks in between my diplomatic assignment.

*Q: How did you feel about the whole El Salvador thing at the time?*

KAMPELMAN: Well I supported the democratic elements and I supported the administration. You have to understand that my experience with the communists in Minnesota, Europe, and elsewhere, led me to believe that they had tentacles out all over the world. I have always had a consistent view that democracy and extremism just are incompatible, right or left. So I had no problems with that. As a matter of fact, when I was Counselor to the Department, I did quite a bit of work in Central America, working

with our friends.

*Q: This brings up a philosophical point. One of the things that disturbs me - I was born in 1928 many people, somewhat on the left, that you call liberals, sort of join wholeheartedly into believing that communism is so great. You know, when you had the horrible example of Stalin and everything else. Did you find yourself at odds with some of your colleagues?*

KAMPELMAN: Constantly, including my college days. I've been associated with groups, resisting their influence within the liberal community because it's not liberal. And the party is going through much of the same thing today again. There is a kind of mentality which I don't understand; I'm not a psychologist. It's a mentality which looks upon the right as an enemy. Well, some on the right are fascists, but most are loyal believers in democracy.

I think I told you the story of Humphrey and Joe Raugh where Humphrey said, "I don't know about you, Joe, but I only have one President today," - and his president was Dwight Eisenhower - "and if he asks me to help, I'll help if it's within my conscience." Look, I personally know that my working with Reagan has damaged me in the eyes of a number of liberals and Democrats. So be it. I also know the Democratic President gave me the Medal of Freedom.

*Q: You mean a Republican president?*

KAMPELMAN: No, Clinton. He gave me the Presidential Medal of Freedom. You know, it's puzzling and it's troublesome. It's a mixture of things, of what I don't claim to know.

*Q: Well you still see this battle fought out on the Internet between, you might say, the Marxist point of view. I mean almost the last stand of this. The philosophy, basically - you know, share the wealth and all - is fine, but the practicality has been so horrendous.*

KAMPELMAN: Well, I for one, strongly support the President's foreign policy. Frankly, I oppose his domestic policy. I really do not understand, and can not support, what he's doing [domestically]. And the White House staff know; and I don't keep my views secret. I know a lot of people and I tell them what I think. I just don't understand it. I look upon the theologians in both parties as those I disassociate from, whether it's the theologian of the left or the theologian of the right. The theologian of the right these days is a theologian who believes somehow that the way to help the economy is to let it trickle down - it's been a traditional view; help the people on the top and some water will come to the bottom. I just don't accept that. And the theologians on the left think that everybody who disagrees with them is dangerous. They are not sufficient believers in democracy and liberty in my book.

*Q: I think it's true of both sides with the theologians: do it my way or...*

KAMPELMAN: Anyhow, the period between my two diplomatic assignments is where we are at. Now at one point I read in *The New York Times* that I was going to replace Jeane Kirkpatrick as ambassador to the United Nations. I looked at the newspaper and there's an item which nobody spoke to me about. People called me on the telephone and I told them that I didn't know. I did know my friend Jeane Kirkpatrick was leaving because she told me so. But I had no idea that there was talk about me being her replacement. Jeane ended up agreeing to stay another year.

Soon thereafter I received a call from journalist Joe Kraft. He asked, "Max, when are you going to the Middle East?" I replied that "I'm now in my law firm. I'm not going to the Middle East, Joe." Well, he says, "Max, I know it's not public, but I know you're going to the Middle East." So I said, "Joe, tell me what you know." He said that "You're going to be the Mideast negotiator." "Oh," I said, "then you know something I don't know." He said, "I got it from the Saudis and I've now confirmed it with people at the State Department." I finally persuaded him to believe that nobody ever spoke to be about it, which was true. Nobody *ever* officially talked to me about it, and as far as I knew, it was not true. Maybe they forgot to call me or maybe they changed their minds.

Then, at five o'clock one morning, I received a telephone call at home from a lady - five o'clock in the morning - who identified herself as a lady from CBS (Columbia Broadcasting System) radio. She said, "You know, Mr. Ambassador, there's a conference now in Geneva between Shultz and Gromyko," which I was aware of because the newspapers had reported it. They were trying to put together the arms negotiation again because the Russians walked out of the arms talks. "Well," she said, "we just got a cable from Dan Rather saying you're going to the U.S. negotiator." So I said, "I really don't think that's so. I haven't heard anything about this." I persuaded her that I had never heard anything about this; I was not lying to her. And after a long conversation she said, "Well, I have to tell you that we're running with it at six o'clock and I have to tell you that you'll be getting phone calls, so you ought to be prepared for it." So I said, "Why are you running with it if you know that I haven't been asked to do this?" She said, "Because Dan Rather says that you have the assignment." Just as simple as that.

*Q: Well obviously we know who has the power. You might explain who Dan Rather is.*

KAMPELMAN: So I turned off the phone. I left my home at about nine o'clock to go to my law office and there were television reporters right in front of our house here. I arrived at my law office to find television cameras in the office. All I could say was that I didn't know anything about this, and that's all that I said. "I know nothing about this" - because I didn't. Days went by, with the press stories etc. I did not want the assignment. My wife did not want me to go. She didn't want to live in Geneva. And I didn't want to go for two reasons: one, I didn't want to go to Geneva; two, I didn't really feel qualified. It's a complicated task. Although, I learned a lot from the Committee on Present Danger, it was really complicated and I did not want to go to Geneva. Furthermore, I did not believe I was going because nobody had asked me to go. I figured it was *The New York Times* story and Joe Kraft all over again. So my wife said, "Max, you've got to do something about

this,” because we were being pestered. She suggested that I call Shultz. I responded “Well, I’ve thought of calling Shultz but I’m a little concerned about calling,” because, you know, the Dutchman was likely to say to me, “Who the hell asked you?”

I called Larry Eagleburger who had just left the State Department and was working with Kissinger. Once on the phone with Larry, I could not get a word in edgewise. Typically, he was calling me stupid and dumb etc..., as Larry Eagleburger has the capacity of doing. And I said, “Larry, why?” and he in effect said, “You have no business taking this goddamn job. You can’t win on this job. It’s an impossible job, It’s a lost job. You don’t know enough. You have no business doing this.” And I said, “Larry, that’s why I’m calling you. I want you to tell George Shultz...” - and I explained to him that nobody had asked me to take the job. I asked Larry to “Tell George, please, that I don’t want the job, I really don’t want the job. I strongly don’t want the job.” So he asked me, “What if he says, ‘Will Max take the UN job?’” So I said, “What UN job, Larry?” Well, he says, “The one I talked to you about.” I said, “Larry, you never talked to me about the UN job.” So there was some truth in the UN report, but he never did talk to me about; he thought he had talked to me about it. “Well,” he said, “I meant to talk to you about it but then Jeane decided to stay another year.” So I said, “If he offers me the UN job, that I will take, because I would like to serve the country. I don’t mind working at that job, but if Jeane leaves, sure, it’s New York. I wouldn’t say no to that job, but I don’t want the Geneva job.” He called me back an hour or two later and said, “Mission Accomplished.”

I was scheduled to speak in Sun Valley, Idaho, at a Young Presidents Organization. My wife and I thought we’d follow it with a few days of vacation at the same time. I was about to be introduced and a lady ran up to the dais, “There’s a call for you from the White House.” So obviously I stopped. It was Shultz and Cap Weinberger both on the phone. “Max, you’ll be getting a phone call in five minutes from the President and we don’t want you to say no.” Shultz and Weinberger knew I did not want the job. And I said, “You know, I can’t take this job. I really can’t take this job. I’m not qualified.” They said in effect, “We’ll get you a top-notch deputy.” The President called me in five minutes. He knew that I was reluctant - he had been told - and he said, “You’re going to go to Geneva, Max” and, “I’m asking you to go.” And, “Where are you?” I told him where I was and he said, “Can you be in Washington tomorrow?” I said, “Yes. I’ll leave tonight.” Meanwhile, the audience was nervous and excited about the fact because they were told about the call. So my wife and I left and I went to see the President in Washington. He made it clear to me that he couldn’t find anybody else who satisfies both Weinberger and Shultz.

*Q. Oh yes. These two are at loggerheads, although they were friends.*

KAMPELMAN: That’s right. They were at loggerheads here. President Reagan said both of them were prepared to accept me. He said I would always have access to him. When I was in town and there’s a meeting of the National Security Council, he wanted me to be at,” which was kind of a nice thing - and he lived up to that. And with that said, I found myself going to Geneva.

I learned in the process that I had three negotiations occurring simultaneously and I was the head of all three, but my specific job was on ballistic missile defense (SDI). John Tower was to head start; Mike Glitman was experienced with the INF. John Tower spent twenty years in the Senate and was chairman of the Armed Services Committee. When Shultz told me this, I said, "George, John Tower, twenty years in the Senate; how is he going to feel about me being the overall chairman?" Shultz told me "He's going to have to accept it." I said, "He knows more about this subject than I do." He said that I would be supported as chairman" I thought to myself that Mike Glitman had a career in the Foreign Service and worked with Paul Nitze. I asked, "Why isn't Paul Nitze doing this?" I was told he was too old; and would serve in Washington working with Shultz and the President. I said, "What about Ed Rowny?" The die was cast.

I will say that the President gave us a grand sendoff; he arranged a breakfast of Congressional leaders for the day that we were leaving. Cap Weinberger gave us an airplane. Since I don't like to fly all night, I persuaded the Defense Department that we leave at noontime so we can consult. When I was traveling to Europe as a lawyer I always took a morning flight out of Kennedy, because I didn't want to fly all night. The a breakfast at the White House was with the leaders of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the House Foreign Relations, and the House Armed Services. It was a good-bye, farewell meeting and they gave us a great sendoff. Reagan was wonderful in what he said; they were all cooperative.

But before that, there was another interesting incident. I was able to attend the National Security meetings. For one of the first meetings that took place I received an invitation from the White House: 'The President wants you at the meeting.' So I went to the meeting. Geneva hadn't started yet. Cap Weinberger said, "Mr. President, I have learned of some disturbing news. I have learned that Bob Byrd," Senator from West Virginia and the leader of the Senate at the time, "is introducing a resolution, putting the Senate right into our negotiations in Geneva by getting a special committee involved to do this. This is interfering with your constitutional responsibilities and we've got to stop it. You've got to do something about this." The President - and I found this was a pattern for him; went around the table; he did not respond; he just went around the table having other people comment on what was said. Everybody agreed this is a terrible idea, that it's an interference. He then said, "Well, Max, what do you think?" I said, "Mr. President, I hadn't heard about it before." But I continued, "When I was in Madrid, you remember, I found the Congress to be very helpful to me," which they were. I had worked very closely with the Congress. So he says, "Max, why don't you go see Bob Byrd and tell him that I asked you to see him?"

So I went to see Bob Byrd. When I met with Bob Byrd, he told me that he was putting together a committee - Democrats and Republicans - across the appropriate top committees and he wanted his committee to be right on top of the negotiations. So we talked and I told him about my Madrid experiences with Congress. We negotiated a deal. It was going to be an observer committee. I said, "We can't have any of you sitting in on



the negotiations. You just can't do that. I want you out there frequently and I will make arrangements for you to meet the Soviet delegates every time any of the congressional people come out. If you were a Russian and you knew that there were some Senators there sitting, you'd be talking to the senators, not to the U.S. negotiators. You will downgrade the status of the U.S. negotiators, so I can't permit you to do that. I will brief you fully. There will be no secrets from you." So we negotiated that deal and then I also said to him, "I want you there on the opening day. I want to show we're there with the consent and approval of the American government, President and Congress." He agreed; he understood everything - and we worked out a good deal. And then as we finished he said, "You know, Max, I'm a little puzzled," because I told him about Cap Weinberger. He said, "I'm a little puzzled about this. I didn't make this proposal without first calling the President and talking to him about it. The President thought it was a damn good idea." Isn't that interesting?

*Q: Oh, yes.*

KAMPELMAN: The President never let on at that meeting that he even knew about it. So we worked out a deal where they came out frequently. There were two or three people in the House who would come out as well and I would always brief them fully, but the Senators came out regularly, steadily. Al Gore was constantly coming out. Ted Stevens, Al Gore, and Claiborne Pell were frequently together and they were helpful to us. I'd arrange press conferences, with photographs, so that they could send pictures back to their constituents about their involvement in Geneva. They knew everything that was happening because I told them. We discussed matters. And when I came back to Washington the observer committee always had a meeting that I attended where I would brief them. I'd bring Mike Glitman and John Tower around for the meetings. John, of course, would love it when the Senators would come out because they were his old colleagues.

Now, interestingly enough, this is not of national importance but one such event comes to mind now. Claiborne Pell, who was Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, was on this observer group and one day he called me on the phone and said, "Max, I can't help it; I'm going to be absent on one of our visiting days." I said, "Claiborne, what's up?" and he said, "Well, I'm going to go to Zurich. A friend of mine is going to be there." I said, "Why don't you have him come meet you in Geneva so you don't have to leave?" It turns out the friend happened to be Yuri Geller, who was on the stage as a magician or as a mind reader and did what are considered tricks through his mind - paranormal. Claiborne Pell was a believer in the paranormal. He arranged for Geller to come to Geneva instead of Zurich. I then said, "Why don't you go back to him and say that since we're going to have a reception for the Senators with the Russians - let him take the stage." Claiborne thought that was a great idea so he called Yuri Geller and Geller said he'd be delighted to do that.

So we had a large reception with the Russians and the Americans; all the delegates from both groups - and Geller took the platform. In the meantime he called my secretary and

asked her to bring a tea spoon to the meeting. Well, what does he do with the tea spoon? He took that tea spoon, which my secretary brought, so it couldn't have been his, and with his mind he bends the goddamn thing. And I saw him do it. I was on the platform. He bent it. He proceeded by taking my watch. He moved it backwards without touching it, by two minutes. Everybody was saying it was really a fantastic kind of performance. Of course, afterwards the Russian head of delegation said to me, "You know, we have people like that in Russia, too." Anyhow, the rapport between us and the Senators was good and we had a pretty good personal rapport with the Soviets as well.

Now on this connection, before I forget I want to put one other incident in.

*Q: Yes.*

KAMPELMAN: I got to know, of course, General Abramson, who was the head of U.S. missile defense. As part of my job I was briefed by him. Part of his people were on my delegation since my delegation consisted of people from Defense, the Joint Chiefs, State, CIA - you know, the whole works. We had a large delegation! At one point I saw Abramson in Washington and said, "Abe, when you're next in Europe, why don't you come to Geneva and I'll introduce you to the Russian generals who are there. As a matter of fact, I'll invite them to a session with you, if you'd like." I thought that would be a good idea. So he replied, "I'd like to do that." He informed me that he was going to be in Europe at [this and this time]." There were three chief Russian negotiators, just as there were three Americans. I told my Russian counterpart in the space and defense area, my counterpart, Kvitziusky, that I've invited General Abramson to Geneva. I didn't know if he'll come, but I hoped when Abramson came that he and his group would be willing to meet with Abramson. I remember Kvitziusky said to me very formally, "If the American delegation asks the Soviet delegation to attend a meeting, the Soviet delegation will always comply." Just very formal. I figured the Russians didn't want to go on record with anything, which was fine. Then Abe called me and said, "I'll be with you at [this and this date]." So I told my Russian counterpart, "General Abramson will be here on [this and this date]. I'd like to invite your Space and Defense delegation to a meeting to meet him and have him talk with you." And he said, "When the American delegation invites the Soviet delegation, then we will attend."

I then received a call from Abramson saying he couldn't attend the meeting. I said, "Why can't you come?" He replied, "Cap doesn't want me to go." I said, "I want you to come. You've got to come." Well, he said, "Cap Weinberger has rejected the trip." I called the White House and said, "You shouldn't be interfering with the negotiations this way." I don't know who made things work out, but Abramson came out and the meeting was fascinating. Abe was a thin, tall, and athletic man. It seemed to me, as I looked at the delegation of Soviet generals, not a one of them was under two hundred pounds. Abramson told the Russians not only about the U.S. program, but he told them about the Russian program too, and it was clear to me that he knew more about the Russian program than they did. And they were furiously taking copious notes. Really. Furiously taking notes. This proved very helpful to us in the talks.

Interestingly enough, regarding my relationships with the Soviets in Geneva Kvitizinsky was a very capable diplomat who earlier walked in the woods with Paul Nitze. At one point, he spoke English fluently. I was having lunch with Yuri; I found luncheons were far better forums because there are no interpreters present and with no interpreters they spoke freely; it's not reported; I remember saying to him, "Yuri, what the hell are you still doing in Geneva? You were with Paul Nitze. You are better than that. You know your decisions are being made in Moscow. Get out of this. This is not going to help your career." And I said it genuinely because by then I knew his wife was a teacher and I knew his family situation. He said, "What should I do?" I said, "You know people. Get yourself the ambassadorial post to Germany. You speak German fluently. That's what you should do. Because here you're nothing. You're just reporting back and you're doing the same thing you did years ago. It's not challenging your mind." And he knew I was right. Curiously enough, a few months later I received a note from him: 'Dear Max, I took your advice.' - nothing else - he was appointed the ambassador to Germany. Isn't that interesting?

Now Victor Karpov, who was with me the overall head of the delegation and specifically negotiated START was a real professional diplomat, but unfortunately he was an alcoholic...As a matter of fact, at one point the Swiss police came to me, (I had good relationships with the Swiss) and said they found him in the gutter, and what should they do? I said, "Take him back to the mission. Don't say a goddamn thing to anybody, and keep it away from the press," which they did. Karpov knew that. Early on the negotiators under John Tower (I had two roles - I was the chairman of the whole thing, but I was also responsible for Space and Defense) very proudly told me they had Victor Karpov over for cocktails the previous evening, they got him drunk and they had an inside track now. I got a hold of John Tower and I said; "John, that'll never happen again. That's not the way the United States is negotiating. You are not to get him drunk again. And if I hear that you're going to get him drunk again, I'm simply going to report it to the White House, and I don't want to have to do that." To the best of my knowledge that was not done again. But I got a hold of Karpov and I said, "Victor, this is what I learned. Stop that. Don't do that. Drink in your apartment if you must. The KBG will get you." Victor Karpov has passed on since then so I feel I can talk about him more openly. But you can see that for me this was all an interesting kind of never before experience, so I could make my own rules of operation.

Do you want to continue? I have a few other things to say, but that's up to you.

*Q: Let's continue.*

KAMPELMAN: At one point now I received a call from the White House at one point saying, "Max, we'd like you to go to India. The president met with Indira Gandhi," who was then the president of India. Gandhi was very pro-Soviet and the President said to Gandhi that he was going to send you out there to talk about the American position. They of course would provide me an airplane. I was busy; I was deeply involved in the Geneva

negotiations, but I went. I remember flying out on Friday morning to India and meeting with Gandhi and then meeting with the foreign and defense ministers.

*Q: Her. Oh, it was Rajiv Gandhi at that time.*

KAMPELMAN: The defense minister impressed me. And I remember saying to the defense minister, "You know, you've got a lot of superb scientists in your country." A lot of them had been trained in the United States. "You've got a problem of Chinese nuclear capacity. You ought to be putting up your own defenses. You ought to be talking to our Defense Department about how you can have missile defenses, instead of attacking our missile defense program." Sunday I was back in Geneva. It was a quick trip.

Anyhow, another call came from the White House. "The President wants you to go to Australia." Well you just don't make a weekend trip to Australia. So I said, "Well, can I do that during the summer break?" and they said, "Yes." The President had met with the Australian prime minister, Hawke, who was also apparently partial toward the Soviet position, and he wanted me to deal with that. My wife and I decided to turn it into a vacation. State worked out the arrangements to go to Australia. We had a date certain and Maggie and I decided we would stop first in New Zealand, then go on to Australia, and we'd take our youngest daughter with us and make a family trip. I was saying goodbye to Shultz the previous day - I was supposed to leave the next morning - and he wanted to know a little bit more of what my plans were and I said, "Well, we're first stopping for a few days in New Zealand," and he said, "You're not going to New Zealand?" and I said, "Yes." He said, "You can't go to New Zealand." I said, "Why can't I go to New Zealand?" and he replied, "We're not sending any diplomats to New Zealand." You may remember we had a struggle with New Zealand over nuclear ships.

*Q: Yes.*

KAMPELMAN: He said, "Look, why don't you let Maggie go to New Zealand with your daughter and you go to Australia, and then let her join you in Australia?" So I obviously didn't go to New Zealand. I went to Australia. Hawke was the prime minister at the time. He is somebody who became my friend later on. I spent time and we vacationed in Australia; it was a good session.

Then on the way back Shultz suggested that since it was summer he would be in Palo Alto at his home and he said, "When you come back, why don't you stop by Palo Alto and we'll visit?" Our ambassador was a man by the name of Lane, who was a good friend of Shultz's. The ambassador was very helpful to me and we had a good time in Australia. My talks with Hawke went well. I then flew to San Francisco and then Palo Alto while Maggie saw some friends of hers. We were sitting around the swimming pool in Palo Alto and Shultz said, "I need somebody in Washington. My counselor is leaving." - he was the fellow who later became postmaster general - and he said, "I've got to find a replacement." I said, "What are you looking for?" I was thinking he wanted suggestions. Schultz wanted somebody that could be in Washington if he and the deputy secretary

were out of Washington. He wanted somebody who could take some of his speaking engagements outside of the country or in country. He wanted somebody who can help him with the relationships with Congress. And I came up with a few names of good people. And then he said that he knew he really wanted me there. So I said, "Well, Mr. Secretary, I'll be pleased to come if you want me to come there, but then we have the job of finding somebody to take my place." So, we discussed about who could take my place.

He didn't want me to talk about this to anybody. So I did not. We came up with Paul Wolfowitz, who was our ambassador to Indonesia, and he said to me, "I don't think Paul will take it. Paul is great, but I don't think Paul will take it because he wife loves it out there and he loves it out there. Will you call him?" When we got back to Washington I called Paul on the phone and Paul said he wanted to think about it. He called back the next day and said no, that they wanted to stay in Indonesia. Shultz then called me and said he had talked to the President and the President did not want me to leave Geneva. So I figured, well, okay, that's it. "So the President suggested, why don't you do both jobs." So I said, "Do you think it's feasible for me to do both?" and he noted we completed one treaty. The other one was well on its way. I could fly back and forth; I was not any longer needed to be there every day. I ended up with both jobs, but I stayed more in Washington. In any event, as a result of this I saw a lot of the Russian foreign minister, Shevardnadze.

Shultz came to me one day in Washington and said, "I just heard from Shevardnadze. He's going to be in Geneva on [this and this day] and he wants to know whether you will be there." So I said, "If he's going to be there, I'll be there, if he wants to see me." So I made arrangements to be there. I set up a meeting for nine o'clock that morning at the Russian mission. I flew in the previous day to Geneva and my press man told me that "The meeting will be over at ten o'clock." I said, "How do you know it will be over at ten o'clock?" Well, he told me, they called a press conference for 10:15. The meeting lasted until about 12:30, incidentally, and I did not invite Tower or Glitman to join me, for two reasons - one, they were not invited; two, Shultz wanted me to be there alone, without the other two. I found that what he really wanted to do is to find out why the U.S. was taking the positions we took and he didn't trust the word he was getting from his negotiators. Based at least on our meetings together, he felt I'd be frank with him. This was after the Reykjavik, Iceland summit.

*Q: Yes, the Reykjavik meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan.*

KAMPELMAN: I had a chance to spend a little time with Shevardnadze. Anyhow, the meeting lasted until 12:30 and we went through the whole protocol. I was very straight with him. For example, on one item I remember, which involved a military matter. I said to him, "Look, I don't understand this position by the U.S. I don't know why we have this position," but I said, "This position is strongly held by the navy." And I said that I could not believe that the President would act against the navy on this question, and it does not in any way adversely affect Russia. In spite of what your people may tell you, I said, I don't see how you're hurt by this. "Furthermore," I continued, "our navy has responsibilities your navy does not have. We have a navy all over the world. Your navy is

not all over the world.” He understood. It was a candid exchange. I said, “I can ask for an explanation if you want it. I may not understand it because I’m not an expert in this field.”

Kvitzinsky went to Germany to be their ambassador. Shevardnadze replaced Karpov as the head of the delegation. He kept Karpov as the START negotiator, and since I was Counselor, he replaced Karpov as head with a man who later became their ambassador here in Washington, one of their senior diplomats, who spoke English fluently. We ended up, as you know, with two treaties.

*Q: I'd like to stop at this point. I want to ask some questions about while you were dealing with this about changes in the Soviet Union, because the arrival of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. And then of course there was the meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan, and then the Reykjavik meeting in Iceland where almost all reference was...*

KAMPELMAN: I do have something to say about the Geneva meeting, but I can say it next time.

*Q: Max, while you were doing the Madrid talks and all of this, were changes in the Soviet Union having a major effect?*

KAMPELMAN: The Madrid talks did not come at about the time of changes in the Soviet Union. The change was during the Geneva talks.

*Q: You went back to private life and you were involved...*

KAMPELMAN: I went back to private life after Madrid and I kept getting called on periodically to do occasional chores, which I was delighted to do.

*Q: As we moved in toward the end of the Reagan Administration things were really beginning to pop in the Soviet Union. Did you get involved in this at all?*

KAMPELMAN: Oh sure. I have no doubt in my mind that Reagan and Shultz had a great deal to do with the changes. We, of course, had nothing to do with the fact that Gorbachev was selected to head up the Soviet Union, but I will say that the inter-relationship between both Gorbachev with both Reagan and Shultz, as well as the inter-relationship of Shevardnadze with Shultz, played, I think, a significant role in the transformation of the Soviet Union. I also believed, with others, that the Madrid meeting had a great impact on the leadership of the Soviet Union. Whether it had any impact on the selection of Gorbachev I haven't the slightest idea, but I do know that they took a licking and knew it; and from what we later learned, it was a setback, because we talked to many of the Soviets afterwards.

As far as the inter-relationship between Gorbachev and Reagan is concerned, that began really with the first summit in Geneva between the two of them. I did not attend that

summit. We called a break in our Geneva negotiations during the period. I asked Shultz whether he expected me to be there because if he did I would've gone there, but he said no, he wanted me to be in Washington and that if he needs to call me he could. He did not think that the negotiations would deal with arms control because the arms control negotiations had just recently begun. Interestingly, if I could drop a footnote here, John Tower, who was living in Geneva –decided, with his wife, to actually live in Geneva during the talks. So he was in Geneva. I had my family here in Washington. John wanted to go to the summit talks; he wanted to be in on the talks. I told him that I did not think that he would be welcome at the talks, but that I had no problem if he could arrange it. He tried to arrange it and he was turned back.

At the end of those talks - it was close to Christmas and we had a Christmas break in Geneva - I came back to Geneva in early January. Two things happened. One, before I went back there was a meeting of the National Security Council, and as you remember I said that I was invited to the meetings of the National Security Council. Reagan made the case and felt very positive about his meeting with Gorbachev. He said, "I think Maggie was right. I think we might be able to deal with him," which was interesting. We didn't go into a great deal about that at the National Security Council meeting, but he discussed a little bit his feelings about the meeting. When I got back to Geneva Victor Karpov took me aside. "Max, I just want you to know that I have instructions from my highest authority not to attack your President." He didn't say who it was; I assumed it was Gorbachev.

*Q: Had the President been attacked before?*

KAMPELMAN: Well the Russians were always attacking the President. Whoever the President was, the Soviets were attacking the President. But he said, and then I had to laugh as we broke up to go into the formal meeting, he said, "That doesn't cover your Secretary of Defense," which I laughed at. I'll jump now a few years, if I may.

*Q: Had you, though, sensed on our side somewhat the same thing or had we been pretty careful in our language?*

KAMPELMAN: We've always been careful with the language. I think we were most careful with our language.

*Q: Were you picking up any instructions or something, "Let's proceed a little differently"?*

KAMPELMAN: There was absolutely no change in our approach. Nobody ever said to me that we should make a change, nor did we in any way alter our position with respect to SDI. But what I did hear, personally, is the President saying I think we can do business with this fellow.

The reason I'm jumping now is that after the Reagan presidency I received a call or a

letter, maybe both, from Mrs. Reagan saying that the Reagan Foundation was going to have a commemoration meeting about Reykjavik, and she asked if would I attend and speak at the meeting. This was after I was out of government, and I said of course I'd be delighted to do that. They had the interpreter for Gorbachev there. Gorbachev was not there but the interpreter of Gorbachev was there who was at all of the sessions. The Geneva meeting came up. The man who was our chief of staff of Reagan who recently died - the Wall Street broker whose name escapes me, was also there.

*Q: Regan.*

KAMPELMAN: Regan, that's right. He was also there.

We had a very interesting day chatting about the talks. On the Geneva meeting, the interpreter impressed me with the fact...

*Q: This was sort of a bald man with a big mustache.*

KAMPELMAN: He was the Russian.

*Q: Yes, the Russian. You'd see him all the pictures.*

KAMPELMAN: Yes, you'd see him in all the various places and he knew his stuff.

He said that they had been briefed before the meeting about Reagan and what they expected to find was a doddering old man with pretensions, a cowboy, an old movie actor, and not a serious person. They drove up - it's freezing cold, he said, and Gorbachev was bundled in one of these Russian fur coats and hats; I know Geneva can be cold. He said, "We drove up to this place, opened the door, and there is this fellow. Ronald Reagan without a coat, a big smile, rushing out of the door to greet us." And he said, "It shocked all of us." Regan interrupted and said, "I just want you to know we had a heavy fur coat on Reagan's shoulders, expecting him to go out in his fur coat, and as your car driver drove up the president said, 'Who the hell needs this?' and threw the coat away and came out," which was an interesting little sidebar, and I thought it relevant for this phase.

In any event, shortly after the Geneva meeting got under way, the interpreter said, "We were further surprised by Reagan saying to Gorbachev, 'Let's just go walk and talk,'" and he pulled Gorbachev into a small lake house closer to them. I remember it; I've seen it. It was a glorified hut. And, from what the interpreter said, and from what I later saw in the notes that the interpreter had made of the meeting, Reagan was quite open about the fact of what are we going to do about this relationship between our two countries. The issue of whether or not we were going to war? Are we going to go to peace? What are we going to do? How are we going to handle this? It's up to us to make the decisions. Do we need nuclear weapons? They found it to be a very constructive meeting and a constructive opening, though they never did get to arms control or any other detail.



*Q: I'm trying to get a little bit of how you worked this; you were both the Counselor of the State Department and our negotiator chairman?*

KAMPELMAN: At that time I was not yet Counselor to the State Department. Our Geneva negotiations had just started. I didn't become Counselor to the State Department until we had practically finished the INF (Intermediate Nuclear Forces) Treaty - practically finished it - and had most of the START treaty understood between us, with details to be worked out. It was at that time, even though the negotiations continued for another year-and-a-half, I was full-time negotiator, not Counselor. But when Shultz and the President asked me to take on the additional job, the heavy work was really done in Geneva. We needed technicians to come together, which took a lot of time, but the really serious policy questions were coming to a close.

*Q: At the Geneva thing while sort of the heavy work was done, how did these talks start? Was it saying we really have to do something here? Do you think on both sides or not?*

KAMPELMAN: The talks started with formal statements that were really formal presentations by each side. The Soviets attacked us for wanting to undermine the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty with our missile defense program. I spoke for the United States and my point was that what we were doing was not in violation of the ABM Treaty, but that what we really needed to do was begin to modernize our systems. We knew they had their defenses and we were going to proceed with our defenses. It was very formal and the formal presentations continued practically until the very end. The informal discussions didn't begin until Gorbachev moved in and Shevardnadze moved in and then the coldness began to break down.

I will, in that connection, say that the first meeting between Shevardnadze and Shultz took place in Finland at a conference that I also attended. The two of them had some private time together. We had a meeting between the two delegations. This was not arms negotiations, but the delegations at the Helsinki meeting, and then Shultz took Shevardnadze aside and the two of them were together about thirty or forty minutes. This was after the Geneva summit. Shultz felt very comfortable about Shevardnadze and the relationship between the two became extremely close; family close. Shultz learned about Shevardnadze's grandchild who was ill. Shultz made great efforts to find where in the United States the medical facilities were appropriate to what he understood the illness of the grandchild to be, and he made efforts in that direction. The relationship was a good relationship between them, to the point where after I became counselor - Shultz came into my office, which was next to his because I had the counselor's office, and he said Shevardnadze was going to be in Geneva. Did I mention this?

*Q: I can't recall.*

KAMPELMAN: Shevardnadze was going to be in Geneva on this and this date and he wanted to know whether I would be there and I said to Shultz, "If Shevardnadze will be there, I'll be there," because I was flexible. I was going back and forth, dividing my time.

There were still some outstanding issues and if it was serious I would fly back to Geneva to see what was happening. I got to Geneva and made an appointment through the embassy for a nine o'clock meeting at the Soviet mission in and my publicity man for USIA (United States Information Agency) said to me, "Your meeting will be over at ten o'clock," and I said, "How do you know?" and he said, "He's got a press conference at 10:15." So I went at nine o'clock thinking I'd have an hour there. Actually I did not ask John Tower or Mike Glitman to join me. I asked Shultz whether I should and Shultz said, "No, you were invited. He didn't ask them." So I went alone and I can tell you we didn't break up until 12:15." At ten o'clock I looked at my watch and I said to him, "You know you've got a press conference scheduled," and he said, "They've got nothing to do except to wait for me," and we continued talking.

It was clear to me that he was concerned about on the remaining issues between us and he didn't understand why we were taking the positions we were taking. I did my best to discuss these with him; he didn't obviously believe he was getting our story from his delegation. I gave him the story and there was no doubt in my mind he accepted what I was saying. I was not bluff; I was straight with him. As a matter of fact, I remember at one time during the discussion getting to some naval issues and I said to him, "Mr. Minister, I have to tell you I don't really myself understand the U.S. position on this particular issue. It's highly technical; I don't understand it." But, I continued, "I know our navy feels very strongly about this and it's inconceivable to me that President Reagan would overrule the navy on something like this, and I don't see how your navy is hurt in the slightest by what we're doing." I explained to him, "We have international obligations and we have a different kind of a navy than you have," and he listened.

At one point, for example, on the ABM Treaty I mentioned something to him about the ABM treaty's Agreed Statement D; he had never heard of Agreed Statement D. I had an interpreter with me and he had an interpreter with him, so I had our interpreter read agreed statement D to him in English and in Russian and he had never heard of it. He asked his interpreter to go in and get the Russian version of the ABM Treaty, which was interesting because I learned - I don't know how to say this, but I learned in Madrid that I had to see what the Russian translations were.

I don't know if I ever mentioned to you that I had a linguist from the State Department come out to Geneva, at the end - after we thought we had the whole agreement ready - and I had him read the Russian version. He came up with about fifty areas where he would differ with the Russian translation from the American translation. I remember saying to Kondrashev, "We can't accept this. We won't go along with this." He said, "You have no right to judge our language," and I said, "I have every right to see whether there is consistency between your language and my language," and I said, "You better work with my translator and get something settled." So I learned about this.

Shevardnadze got the Russian version and he looked at it and it was what I was saying it was. He said, "I don't think Gorbachev knows about this." This statement, if I can just take a minute of your time, provided, in my opinion, the basis for an agreement. I

explained to Shevardnadze that Nixon was the one who proposed the ABM Treaty to the Soviets who You didn't want it and resisted it. Now, I said, "The reason you resisted it is because you were working on this problem. So a compromise was worked out. After the ABM Treaty there was to be a series of agreed statements-" (end of tape)

One of those agreed statements was Agreed Statement D. What does Agreed Statement D say? I don't have the specific text in front of me, but Statement D says that the ABM Treaty is applicable only to the technology of the moment and not to new technologies. We agreed to Agreed Statement D. Our ABM program is not the technology of the moment, it's new technologies. We were not violating the ABM Treaty. This was then and remains now my personal position. I could never get the Department of Defense to agree with this, even though this was a way to support. The Defense Department wanted to get out of the ABM Treaty and I didn't think it was necessary to get out of the ABM Treaty to pursue our missile defense program. This gives you an idea of the relationship with Shevardnadze.

In Reykjavik, for example, I think we were there for three days. On the last day things were at loggerheads and Gorbachev and Reagan recessed for lunch. Shultz and Shevardnadze remained and called together our delegation, including Akromayev, who was the head of the Joint Chiefs of Russia. We were trying to come up with something that might salvage the situation and I remember Shevardnadze turning to me, and after long discussions that we had, and trying here and there to make them shift saying, "You're a creative person. Why don't you come up with something here that'll solve this problem?" Curiously, we did come up with something. It was not my idea, but Richard Perle's. He came up with something very creative, which both Shultz and Shevardnadze thought had some merit. As a matter of fact, all of us around the table thought it had some merit. It was creative.

Just then the President was driving up from Reykjavik back to our meeting and we all ran down to the room where Reagan was and the Secretary said, "Richard has something to propose to you to consider, Mr. President, that we [in the U.S.] agreed to, and it makes sense for you to consider." And Reagan said, "Now, You all think that what I'm about to hear I ought to take seriously?" and everybody said yes. Richard Pearl began the process of explaining when the door opened and Gorbachev waltzed in as if he owned the room. He walked right in and we couldn't continue talking, so we went out and two hours later the meeting broke up. I frequently thought to myself, 'what if we'd had another fifteen minutes? Maybe it could have been different.'

*Q: When you were doing these things in Geneva, what was your reaction initially, and then as it progressed to the Strategic Defense Initiative known as Star Wars? A lot of people in the United States were saying this is pie in the sky. The science was extremely complicated. What was your preparation?*

KAMPELMAN: Well, you have to understand that before I went out to Geneva I had a deputy who was an expert - he really was, Hank Cooper; a difficult personality, but really

an engineer who knew his stuff. So not only was I briefed in Washington by the Defense Department, Arms Control Agency, and Cooper, but also I flew out to our labs and was briefed where fundamental research was taking place.

*Q: Livermore probably. Well, anyway, in California.*

KAMPELMAN: I went to both of them and I got briefed by their experts. I want to say that I didn't have the slightest doubt in my mind that this was serious and feasible. Also Abramson persuaded me that the Russians had a similar program. As I told you earlier, Abramson told the Russian generals where they were doing their work on missile defenses, and they obviously thought that it was a good program. Interestingly enough, the Russians made a proposal at the United Nations during the course of these negotiations that there be an international defense system developed. They didn't follow through on it. To answer your question, I have no doubt in my mind that this was not pie in the sky, and that it was necessary. Otherwise I would not have participated.

*Q: How did the whole Geneva process proceed?*

KAMPELMAN: It proceeded. We met formally, I recall, three times a week. We met informally whenever we could. But the fact of the matter is that the deal was not made in Geneva. The deal was made in private conferences between Shultz and Shevardnadze, with their technical assistants present at each time. They're the ones who ironed out the differences which were then reflected in Geneva, but the fundamental work was done between the two and the experts the two brought along. For example, Shevardnadze depended a great deal on General Akromayev, who was the Chief of Staff, and who, interestingly enough, later committed suicide, and Shultz depended a great deal on Paul Nitze. I placed my two cents in it, not because I was a technician, but because I am a realist in the negotiating approach. I was present at all of these sessions - Shultz wanted me at all of these sessions - and together we'd come up with ideas, test them and come up with the agreement.

Of the fundamental questions, the first one that broke was down the agreement to go down to zero on INF. Now that was, interestingly enough, Dick Perle's idea. Dick submitted it to the President and the President bought it. I have to say to you that the one thing that was clear to me from the beginning of Geneva, as far as I was concerned, was that Ronald Reagan wanted to go down to zero for everything and nobody else agreed with him in the administration. Shultz didn't agree with him, Weinberger didn't agree with him, Ken Adelman didn't; nobody wanted to go down to zero. The Congressional leadership didn't agree with him. As a matter of fact, after Reykjavik Sam Nunn got a hold of me and asked, "Is it true that they came close to going down to zero?" I said, "It's true. He called it a close call, because he didn't think we should go down to zero. Al Gore didn't think we should go down to zero. They were all part of the Senatorial observer group that I worked with. But Reagan wanted to go down to zero. As a matter of fact, I remember Al Gore saying to me that zero was impossible; the Russians would never accept it, and that Perle had recommended it only as a way of killing the deal. I differed

with that because I knew Perle quite well and I knew when he was bluffing and I knew when he was serious. We pushed for zero and we meant zero, out of the INF.

*Q: "INF," this is?*

KAMPELMAN: Intermediate Nuclear Forces.

*Q: Basically this was the SS-20 and that whole thing.*

KAMPELMAN: Fundamentally that's what gave rise to the SS-20 that gave rise to our response with Pershings and cruise missiles.

*Q: Which was the last real crises between the two superpowers.*

KAMPELMAN: Reagan was firm about it and we got down to zero, in spite of the skeptics who said this was just a negotiating device by him to kill the deal. This was an important step for us. We ended up, in START, the longer range missiles, with approximately fifty percent reductions, which is the first time we've ever had any kind of a deal reducing rather than putting restrictions on nuclear weapons. I felt very good to be a part of that process.

Relationships developed very well. Bill Crowe, who was then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, developed a very good relationship with Akromayev and I remember he invited Akromayev to visit the United States. Crowe was the host and took him around the country and also took him on a battleship. After he finished his tour a few of us met with him and Crowe. It really seemed to me that he was impressed with what he saw. He had no knowledge of how overwhelming our power was, particularly our navy. I remember a statement he made: "I used to be critical of our navy for wanting more money all the time." He says, "Now I understand." What impressed him, interestingly enough, was not only the modernity of what we had, but in the navy the fact that we had women sailors and he saw women soldiers. This really impressed him.

*Q: I've interviewed Admiral Crowe and he was saying that Akromayev was very impressed when he went to an air force base and met women mechanics. He thought maybe these were trotted out to make him look good and he was talking to pilots and the pilots would say, "No, this is for real. My life depends on the ability of these [women]." So I think he put his finger on where the real power anybody - I speak as a former enlisted man - knows in any military is that is our real strength is in the non-commissioned officer corps, and the Soviet system does not produce a very good non-commissioned officer. It's still sort of a brutish type of thing. They've got a lot more officers and not many non-commissioned. Our real strength is the expertise and the ability of the non-commissioned officers.*

KAMPELMAN: Well he learned that. In any event, those are the things that are in my mind.

Now, in time, therefore, the Geneva negotiations turned into formalities. The real substantive negotiations were outside of the Geneva talks. Now, when it came to the detailed drafting of the treaties that's when Geneva again was vital, because there is where we had the experts, on both sides, and we weren't going to be misled on technicalities. And this took a lot of time.

Now in that connection, I think I mentioned the early problem of the Senate and Senator Byrd and the observer group. I want to say that the observer group was extremely helpful to us when it came time to ratify INF and START. They felt they were in on everything because we briefed them fully, and therefore that procedure worked.

*Q: Well, in a way the lesson learned from the League of Nations and Wilson's refusal to allow Lodge and other Republican senators to get involved was well learned by this point.*

KAMPELMAN: Reagan understood this and some of the others did not. As a matter of fact, another illustration occurs to me. I told you we had a tremendous sendoff at a big breakfast at the White House and that Reagan had the top people in the House and Senate there etc. I got to Geneva and a week or so later I got a call from the deputy secretary of state, Ken Dam, who said, "Max, George wanted me to alert you that you may be called back to Washington by the President, for a couple of days." I said, "Why?" and he then said, "Well, we're in trouble on the M-X (Missile-X) missiles. There's a piece of legislation; twenty-six M-X missiles that are coming up and there is strong opposition." Max Friedersdorf, the legislative man at the White House, persuaded Reagan that we need help and he's thinking of you." I said, "It's bad. I just got shipped off with a bi-partisan consensus and all of a sudden you're bringing me back to do some partisan lobbying." I said, "That's not good." He said, "George agrees with you and George expressed himself to that effect, but I don't know. I want to alert you."

On Friday night, Geneva time, I got a call from Max Friedersdorf: "The President would like to see you on Monday morning." I said, "It's on this M-X?" and he said, "Yeah, it's on the M-X." I said, "Well, okay; if the President wants to see me, I'll be there," and I remember saying to him, "It's Friday night. If you want me to be there, I've got to fly the Concorde." He said, "You've got authority to fly the Concorde from London." So I took the Concorde. On Monday morning I went to the White House. I was given a list of Congressmen I was to see in the Capitol. I looked and I didn't see Tip O'Neil, who was the speaker of the house, and I said, "Where's Tip O'Neil?" The response was, "Oh no. He's leading the opposition." So I said, "You know, I'm not going to set foot into that House of Representatives without first talking to Tip O'Neil." That got him all nervous, and I was firm. So they located Tip O'Neil. It was about eight o'clock in the morning. I knew Tip O'Neil. I had been active in the Democratic Party and he knew Humphrey. I didn't know Tip O'Neil well, but I knew him, and I knew as a matter of courtesy I wasn't going to walk into the House of Representatives.

My first appointment was with Tip O'Neil. I explained my presence and we talked. He said, "How many votes are you short?" and I responded. He opened up his desk and took out a piece of paper. He said: "You're shorter than that. It's worse than that." And then we talked as friends - not intimate friends, but we talked. Mostly what was concerning him was the deterioration in American politics - the hostilities that were growing, the tensions, and the fact that every member of the Congress wanted to be President of the United States - the way he put it - instead of understanding the virtue of being in service as a member of Congress. And then he said, "Are you going to see Michael today?" - the Republican leader - and I said, "Yes, I have an appointment to see Michael, too." "Well, he says, "you talk to him. He agrees with me fully that this crew is just terrible." I had been told earlier that he had a sister who was a nun, a sister, at one of the church organizations for peace - a church organization or something like that.

I made my rounds - Democrats and Republicans - and I smelled, during my rounds, more favorable reactions from the Democrats. Tip O'Neil seemed to be quietly helping. I had said to him: "You know, Tip, this kind of politics of trying to kill the system is not the function of the Congress." And I said, "The Democratic Party, to the best of my knowledge, has never tried to kill the system. We may think too much money or too little money is being spent on something, but we don't want to kill the system." And he listened. Anyhow, I began to smell a little bit better atmosphere. My theme was that we should not unilaterally give up a weapon system without getting the Soviets to reciprocate.

At the end of the day I went to see the President and said, "Mr. President, I have very little doubt in my mind that Tip helped me with Democrats today." I said, "I just have a smell that he helped me." He picked up the phone and said, "Get me Tip O'Neil." I only heard one part of the conversation, filled with "You dumb Irishman" - to Tip O'Neil. "What in the hell got into you? I hear you were polite to my man, Max." Two Irish friends cussing each other out. These were obviously two friends.

*Q: Well that was part of the Irish mafia there.*

KAMPELMAN: That's right. It was part of the Irish mafia. Again, we never heard of this Reagan in the newspapers. But I'm only telling you what I heard.

My schedule showed a Reagan press conference on his agenda. We finished talking and we walked outside toward, I believe, the East Room. I walked in with the President and encountered endless numbers of Members of Congress, and the press. The room was filled with Democrats and Republicans - and journalists. And on the platform were George Shultz and Cap Weinberger and the Vice President. We walked up and there's a chair for me on that platform, - a full press with cameras.

The President went to the microphone and said, "I guess there's no need for me to introduce Max to you. Max, why don't you come here and talk?" Just like that. "Can you come and tell them what you were doing today," or something like that. I can tell you I

was not prepared. I didn't have the slightest idea. And I now remember saying, "Mr. President, I'm pleased to have the chance to say what I was doing today," but I said, "I see friends in the audience here, I didn't expect to be here. I am in Washington to discuss the MX missile and I see some people in the audience who, I think, are opposed to it. Your position and my position, Mr. President, are the same, but Mr. President, I want you to know that every one of these people, whether they're for the MX or against the MX, is an American patriot who wants to do what's right for the United States." And I said, "If we have any differences, these are not differences that are fundamental for the safety of this country," which of course was what I should say, and this is what I talked about. It's one really outstanding experience of my life. And then I went back to Geneva. The MX passed the House by a narrow margin, and it's there.

*Q: You might explain MX for somebody who doesn't know.*

KAMPELMAN: I'm not technical. It was an intercontinental weapon. The point I was making at my speech was, and with everybody I talked to, that I thought we ought to get rid of the MX, but only as part of a treaty with the Soviet Union, and not unilaterally. That was the thrust of my talk with Tip O'Neil; that was the thrust of my talk wherever I went to, and that was the thrust of my talk to the Congressmen and to the press. I didn't want to give up anything without getting something in return, and that's why, as a negotiator, I had agreed to come down. I'm glad you asked me that because that was the thrust of my report.

*Q: You were sensing real movement in this because we had been going for maybe twenty or more years on various talks, which was sort of an exercise in - well, it wasn't in futility completely because an awful lot of the aspects were turned over and over to so many people. It was a training exercise, almost. But nothing was happening. But it took the combination of Gorbachev and Reagan to get this moving.*

KAMPELMAN: Yes, it did. And, I want to say, Shultz and Shevardnadze. There's no question about it. They were together and they greatly respected each other. They liked each other. To the best of my knowledge, I have reason to believe they're still in touch with each other.

If I could drop a footnote about Shultz. There was a meeting scheduled in Moscow between Shultz and Shevardnadze. I was scheduled to go to Moscow with them; as a matter of fact, a number of us were going. I was Counselor then also. It happened to coincide with the Jewish holiday of Passover, and Richard Shifter, who was then the Assistant Secretary of State in human rights - with whom I'm having dinner tonight - talked to me about an idea he had. He was going to Moscow also, the visit coincided with a Passover Seder in the Moscow embassy that night, that Hartman was organizing.

*Q: Mr. Hartman, our ambassador.*

KAMPELMAN: Yes. Many Jewish Refuseniks who were not in jail were invited. Dick



had the idea and discussed it with me, and I took it up with Shultz - that Shultz should come to the Seder since he was going to be in Moscow. I talked to Shultz about that and Shultz said, "That's a great idea," and he told Ros Ridgway, who was our Assistant Secretary, to arrange the schedule so that he could be at the American embassy for dinner that night. Ros said he was scheduled to have dinner with Shevardnadze. Shultz said, "Explain to Shevardnadze that I can't have dinner with him, but I'll see him after that; that I want to go to the Jewish Passover Seder," which he did. Shultz went. I did not go because I had a heart attack two or three days before this. I had an unexpected, sudden heart attack. Before going to Moscow, Shultz stopped by my house - I had just gotten out of the hospital - to see if I had any last minute requests of him, which was thoughtful. That was a great event, that Seder, from what everybody tells me. As a matter of fact, one of the people who Shultz met that night, whose name escapes me, continues, to this day, to communicate with him and correspond with Shultz. I believe it is Eva Nudel. She is now in Israel and she had a great impact on him. She talked at the Seder. At any rate, you can see symbolically what it did in Moscow. The Secretary of State of the United States was there. And it was good for Gorbachev and Shevardnadze to know that he had gone to the Seder.

*Q: What were you doing at the end?*

KAMPELMAN: Well, at the end I was doing two jobs, mostly Counselor work, because the treaty principles were worked out. When tensions arose, I'd go back. And there were such times. As a matter of fact, there was one occasion toward the end when we were not far apart. We had a meeting scheduled between Shultz and Shevardnadze in Geneva. They met periodically, not only about these talks, but about other things as well.

I went to bed that night and I thought we had had a deal; everybody was agreed to it and the technicians were writing the words on that issue. It was an INF issue, if I remember correctly. I was tired. I always tried to fly during the day, but this time I flew out there with Shultz and we flew all night; so I was tired. For the first time in my life, I took a sleeping pill and went to sleep. At about three or four o'clock in the morning Charlie Hill called me and woke me at my apartment. My wife and I kept the apartment, even though I was also now Counselor as well. Charlie said, "The talks are breaking up. They've broken up in order to go back and talk to the principals and George says he'd like you to go down there and settle it if you can. I'm sending a car for you." So I woke up and went back and I settled it. We got it done so that by the morning meeting, which was supposed to be the final meeting, we had an agreement. But it did occasionally require me to go back and forth and try to be a bit creative about some of these issues. But I was then Counselor, so I was doing, in effect, all things; and as Counselor I was doing anything that came up. I was making occasional public talks as well.

I met with Shultz at least twice a day when he was in town. We met together in the morning with him and John Whitehead, and other senior officials. We met every morning and every evening. The rule was that at least one of us had to be in Washington at a time. We all agreed that we would want our schedules coordinated. Even though I was low man

on the totem pole - I think I was number three on the totem pole by the statute, but realistically I think I looked upon myself as number four and not number three. But I remember even as number three there were a couple of days when all the cables went out from Washington, to all the world, signed Kampelman instead of Shultz. We'd talk about whatever came up. We met with Members of Congress when necessary. He asked me to go down to Central America on three occasions, which I did. I think I've reported that here. I had a fascinating experience. John Whitehead and I became lasting friends; we're still in touch with each other. Shultz and I became lasting friends. It was a pleasant and satisfying experience.

One issue came up that was important and involved the current crisis, the Middle East. Shultz came to me one day - he may have come to my office or I may have gone to his office; I don't remember now; I think I went to his office - and he said, "You've seen the American embassy in Israel in Tel Aviv?" and I said, "Yes, I have." He continued, "It's a security risk. It's a safety risk. It's a disgrace for us to have an embassy in an office building with a public garage down below, facing an ocean where we're vulnerable. The ambassador's office is vulnerable to shots from the sea that might come from some ship..." He continued: "We need a new embassy and I'm told Jesse Helms won't go along with a new embassy. Will you go talk to him?" This was after the Latin American matter that I described in an earlier tape where Jesse Helms, and I were sitting next to each other on an airplane. Do you remember that?

*Q: Yes, I do.*

KAMPELMAN: Shultz felt I had a relationship with Jesse Helms. So I went to see Jesse Helms and discussed it with him. He said he was fully aware. He had been to Israel, he had seen it, and he thought the embassy was a disgrace. He said, "You tell George that if he tells me how much money he needs, I'll support it. I won't ask any questions. I'll arrange to see that he gets every dime he wants in the building of a new embassy, but it's got to be in Jerusalem and not in Tel Aviv. I will not agree to a new embassy in Tel Aviv." I said, "Look, Senator, I also think the embassy should be in Jerusalem. In every country where we do business in the world our embassy is at the seat of government. The seat of government is in Jerusalem and I'm for having our embassy in Jerusalem." "But," I said, "that's not the administration's position." He said, "Well, an overwhelming number in the Congress would support the embassy being moved to Jerusalem." I said, "I know and I am against what the administration's position is, personally, on it, but the administration's position is until there is a peace agreement, they aren't going to build the embassy in Jerusalem." Anyhow, within a half hour we had a deal, subject to Shultz's approval. It required that we would be asking for new buildings in Tel Aviv and in Jerusalem. Both buildings would be adequate to be an embassy. Tel Aviv had the army and the business community and Jerusalem had the seat of government. So we were to build two buildings and they wouldn't be wasted because we needed to build them. Actually, there was no proper building in Jerusalem for the consulate. That was the deal.

I went back to Shultz and Shultz said he thought it made sense, but he was going to check

it out with Dick Murphy, the assistant secretary for Near Eastern affairs. Well, the bureau opposed it. I was for it. Shultz decided to support my position and he said to me, "Murphy tells me that the Arab world is going to be terribly unhappy about this and that we're going to get a flow of protests from the ambassadors. You're going to talk to those ambassadors, not me." Let me say here that only one ambassador came. The plan passed the Congress and only one ambassador came, the Egyptian, who said to me he wasn't opposing it; he wanted an explanation - which was interesting, and I reported that.

We then set out to work. We had a real estate expert, Nick Salgo, who owned the Watergate, a dollar a year man for the government temporarily. He was a big contributor to Reagan. I arranged for him to go out to find locations in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and he did. Regrettably, the place he found in Tel Aviv was a place that was vetoed by the Israeli government because it was near the Israeli intelligence operation north of Tel Aviv. To this day we haven't built anything in Jerusalem even though he found a splendid location. The legislation, at White House direction after we left the government, permitted the President to declare a temporary waiver.

*Q: What sort of groups would you be talking to as Counselor?*

KAMPELMAN: I didn't do that much, but I did some. I did some talking overseas, for example, in London, in Paris, when they wanted somebody to speak about the negotiations. I could do that; I did that in my role as Counselor. In the United States I met with many delegations that were coming into Washington to see the Secretary. If the Secretary wouldn't see them, I frequently saw them. I spoke around the country on foreign policy in universities. That was not a major effort, but I was there to do some of that when the Secretary was invited and could or should not accept.

*Q: Well with the arms control at the final Geneva accords, were the French on board?*

KAMPELMAN: They were on board. Let me just say about that what I indicated in Madrid where we had a very effective NATO caucus. Let me tell you that for the Geneva talks I went to Brussels before every single session and I went to Brussels at the end of every single session. I briefed NATO on those talks. On one or two occasions where the sessions might last a long time, I would arrange to go to the NATO in between; in the middle of a session. I kept NATO fully informed and, therefore, we didn't have the slightest problem, and that included the French. No problems. As a matter of fact, I made some very good friendships among the NATO's secretariat. Renaldo Petrinani was the number two man in Brussels under that old long-time head, the Dutchman. Renaldo Petrinani later became the Italian ambassador to Washington. We remain friends to this day. We're both on the board at Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. I kept NATO fully informed. I would not only keep them informed, but if they had any ideas I wanted to hear them. They generally did not get involved, but they wanted to be informed.

*Q: During this time that you were working with the Reagan Administration, what were*

*your relations with the vice president, George Bush?*

KAMPELMAN: Excellent. Frequently - as a matter of fact, it became a pattern, I think - I would come in and brief the president. The vice president would occasionally be there. When he was not, I moved. The vice president would also ask me to come in and brief him privately. Our relationships were excellent. I think I mentioned to you, but maybe I didn't, how kind he was to me on a rainy day at the first Gorbachev meeting in Washington.

*Q: Yes, you mentioned that.*

KAMPELMAN: He looked upon me as a friend, so the relationships were good. When he became president I supported him in the Iraq Crisis. There weren't many Democrats who supported him in the Gulf. Al Gore was one. I supported him and I tried to help him, and he appreciated it. Curiously, I remember the first time I saw him as President he took me on a tour of the residence of the White House. I had not seen previously seen the residences until Bush took me through there. Incidentally, out of one of the rooms Reverend Billy Graham, who was obviously a guest at the White House for that day, came to greet us. He had slept over night there. What interested me was a side comment he made to me, which was, "You know, Barbara and I were never up here before." That was interesting.

*Q: Ronald Reagan was a great sort of friend but nobody he was close to, not even his kids.*

KAMPELMAN: That's right. The fact that the Vice President was never invited to the residence was telling to me. Now I have not seen much of George Bush since he left the presidency, although once I visited him and his wife in Maine, just for a few hours.

Let me also say that during the Bush presidency I was called on four times, I think, to spend a month for Jim Baker on CSCE meetings that were going to take place based on agreements that I had made in Madrid. One was on nationalities, one was on family reunification, one was on immigration and human rights. I think I've talked about that at one point here, including the one in Moscow dealing with McDonald's restaurant.

The Copenhagen meeting, which I think was one of the great historic meetings in international relations, we came out with a document which three international law professors whom I know called the most important international human rights document since the Magna Carta. That Copenhagen document is superb. In order to solidify the Copenhagen meeting, I helped push a recommendation that there be a meeting of the heads of states to ratify, and it's called the Agreement of Paris, and the meeting took place in Paris. Baker invited me to the Paris meeting; he thought I ought to be at the meeting. I did not sit in on decisions, but I was in at the meeting. And they did ratify it. At the end of the last session there were a lot of people around from different countries - you know, thirty-five countries - and Barbara Bush saw me and called out, "Max," and asked

me to come over. We embraced and then the President came by. I had not seen him at all during this two or three days, and she shouted, "George, here's Max." He came over and she said, "He's responsible for this meeting," which I didn't know she knew, but it was interesting. He said, "I know, I know." It was very nice. Not that I've seen them much, but they were very nice.

*Q: I'm looking at this and what I suggest we do...I assume you left the Counselor job at the end of the Reagan Administration.*

KAMPELMAN: Oh, yes. I told Baker that I was leaving.

*Q: So what I thought we would do is maybe stop at this point. We'll have another session which we'll be talking about your time after leaving the Reagan presidency, and we'll talk about NGOs.*

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*Max, let's talk about your time afterward. What sort of NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) have you been involved with?*

KAMPELMAN: Well, before my diplomatic service I was involved with a few Jewish-Israeli organizations; the Anti-Defamation League was one. I think I became a vice chairman of that, or something like that. Mostly, as far as Israel is concerned, I kept out of its politics, but I joined the board of the American Friends of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and became its chairman, and I also joined the Board of Trustees of the university itself. I became quite active in the university. Indeed, they have a chair in my name, which they created, which was good. And then I also became Chairman of the Jerusalem Foundation, Mayor Teddy Kollek of Jerusalem enlisted me for that assignment.

*Q: Oh, yes. Longtime mayor of...*

KAMPELMAN: He was a longtime mayor of Jerusalem.

*Q: He was a very, very influential figure.*

KAMPELMAN: He asked me if I would assume the chairmanship of the Jerusalem Foundation in the United States, and I did.

After Madrid, Freedom House asked me to join the board, which I agreed to do, and then to serve as chairman, which I agreed to do.

*Q: Would you explain what Freedom House is?*

KAMPELMAN: Freedom House was an organization created at the beginning of the Second World War. It was an organization created by Eleanor Roosevelt and Wendell

Wilke to advance the cause of freedom in the world, including in the United States. It was a bipartisan effort. We just recently celebrated our sixtieth anniversary. I think this organization was extremely helpful in strengthening the democratic elements, mostly in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. It did so with some minor funds, but mostly with encouragement and training and vision. Apparently the then leadership, which consisted of Leo Cherne, who was a very distinguished American during my day there, and Leonard Sussman, who was the executive director; they asked me to serve on the board and then to serve as chairman. They liked the Madrid meeting and felt that it was helpful to them. I'm now chairman emeritus and still very active in the organization.

*Q: What type of things is it getting involved with now, since the whole terrain has changed so much?*

KAMPELMAN: At the moment Freedom House has adopted an op-ed piece that I wrote in the Washington Times somewhat more than a year ago. And now I am putting in a great deal of time, along with Mark Palmer, in pushing the concept that the Helsinki Final Act, as we worked it out in Madrid, should expand itself into the Mediterranean area. When I was in Madrid it consisted of only thirty-five countries, which was thirty-three European countries plus the United States and Canada. Today it's fifty-five because with the breakup of the Soviet Union, new Central Asian countries asked to be a part of it, were invited into and ended up joining. Now our project is to move south, as well as to strengthen what they now call the OSCE, rather than the CSCE, in the areas of Central Asia.

I don't know if I ever went into this philosophy of the Madrid meeting that I had with you. Stop me if I have. I don't want to repeat myself. But when I was given the invitation to head up our delegation in Madrid, I was advised by a number of people not to take it because it was nothing but a Soviet front, they said to me. But when I was teaching at the University of Minnesota a book came out - Gunnar Myrdahl. Did I discuss that?

*Q: I think you did.*

KAMPELMAN: Well, let's put that aside. What I learned in Madrid was that it's very important to take advantage of an "ought." The Helsinki Final Act asserted the ways countries ought to behave. We then would have a right to say, "Move your 'is' to the 'ought'." Now there is no ought in the North African Mediterranean area and our concept is to get the 'ought' broadened into the Mediterranean; Mark Palmer and I have now met on the plan with about a dozen ambassadors; we had lunch with all of the Scandinavian ambassadors. We were pleased when the prime minister of Denmark supported the plan at a speech here in Washington. So that's the kind of thing Freedom House does. Regrettably, our White House is killing the opportunity to spread democracy south of Europe.

*Q: I'm wondering, talking about the Mediterranean and all, one looks at the Islamic world, and with the quasi exception of Indonesia, in this whole place there's no real*

*democracy in that.*

KAMPELMAN: Well Turkey is a Muslim state. India has more Muslims in it than the Middle East has and India is a democracy.

*Q: Well then let's be exclusive. Let's look at Syria, Egypt, Algeria...*

KAMPELMAN: That's the seat now of anti-democratic activity. Freedom House is now helping me to wake up the White House to the opportunity we have. They seems tied in knots on this question.

*Q: Yes. You know in a way your work on democracy and all with Eastern Europe was already prepared for you. I mean these were people who had, at a certain point, sort of democratic roots, with the exception of Russia.*

KAMPELMAN: But that's a big exception.

*Q: Well, a huge exception, but the point being that it was almost like speaking to like, but when you start moving into the Islamic world, with the exception of Turkey, which of course had Ataturk which broke away from the rule of Islam, which is still a problem there. You know, these other countries aren't going anywhere.*

KAMPELMAN: I can tell you that's what they said to me and to others about Russia. "What are you trying to do there? You can't change it." Yet Russia has changed. We're living in a world where there's a larger percentage of the human race today governed by democracies or near democracies than ever before in known history. And I talk about percentage because obviously a population is a certainty. There are democratic sources that exist even within countries like Saudi Arabia. Egypt goes through a form of election now because they feel under pressure to do so; they're not a democracy. Jordan is closer to a democracy, but even Jordan doesn't quite reach it there. Morocco is moving closer in that area. And we do not minimize at all the fact that the largest number of Muslims in the world live in Indonesia and in India where there is democracy, or relative democracy certainly in India. So we can not accept, and do not accept, the notion that democracy is antithetical to Islam.

*Q: No.*

KAMPELMAN: And our job, which is not an easy one, and I don't mean to indicate to you that it's an easy one, is to expend the concept, certainly now into the Mediterranean and maybe into the Gulf states, although that's a slow process. But Qatar today is moving toward democracy. Bahrain is moving toward democracy. These are Gulf states. Anyhow, that's what Freedom House is pushing and I don't mind telling you that in the last two months I have met with three under secretaries of state now in office, two assistant secretaries of state now in office, and have received green lights from all five to continue with our efforts. I have discussed the project with one of the leading members of the

National Security Council, who seems attracted to it. The task now is to get the State Department to come in with a recommendation, but that requires imagination.

*Q: In practical terms, what are you doing?*

KAMPELMAN: We're meeting with them. We've written a paper, Mark and I, a rather long paper, justifying and setting out how the plan ought to be put into effect.

*Q: But how does this impact say in Egypt?*

KAMPELMAN: Well, we've talked to the Egyptians and they seem agreeable. There are six non-participating Mediterranean states that are part of the Helsinki process. They were present toward the end of the European negotiations. Spain and Malta wanted them to sign in addition to the thirty-five countries, and they were prepared to sign, six of them. Europe, however, since every decision had to be unanimous, said they don't want to add to the East-West task. The East-West problem was what they were creating and they didn't want to bring in a Mediterranean complexity. But all six are listed in the Helsinki Final Act. That includes Egypt, it includes Israel, it includes Morocco, it includes Jordan, it includes Algeria. We now are suggesting that they become full members, if they wish. They want to be invited in and that's what we're asking. And then when they can accept the 'ought' we've moved another step forward towards what may be a long effort.

*Q: As you wrestle with the problem with democracy, what happens if elections are held and a religious group gets the majority, which in turn, itself, does not believe in democracy? In other words, once it gets in power then it says Allah has told us to do this and forget about having other elections because we're...*

KAMPELMAN: Well then they can be expelled from the process. The essence of democracy is that a democracy may decide not to be a democracy, through a vote. But for us democracy is not just an election; it's a whole concept of a rule of law. And that's what we're processing. As a matter of fact, what the Helsinki process produced - for example, in Copenhagen where I was asked by Jim Baker to go back for a month and represent the United States even though I was out of the government and finished my Counselor job. He asked me to go back to Copenhagen, to Geneva, to Madrid, to Moscow - one a year, for a month, to help them to strengthen up the Helsinki process. The Copenhagen document has been called by a number of professors of international law - I can think now of three, but there are more than three - the most important international human rights document since the Magna Carta, and it spells out what a democracy means. If anybody was to come and join this process, they would be joining what is apparent, a series of 'oughts;' and that's our task. Once the oughts are there, we have a leg up toward the 'is.' That is also an economic ingredient in the Helsinki process which is attractive.

A professor of international law at the University of Illinois is this summer preparing for us - he wrote me the other day that he'll have it ready in September - a whole pamphlet setting forth what all the documents of the Helsinki process are saying, so that when



country X says, "Well, we're invited to come in. What are our obligations?" it'll all be down in writing what the obligations are. Now, a country can assume obligations and not live up to them, but we're not looking for a magic wand. We're saying if you can get this "ought" in there, we've got a leg up. It strengthens the democratic elements within the country and hopefully is achieved down the road. Anyhow, that's what Freedom House is, one of its activities. I don't know if you've heard of the Community of Democracies.

*Q: No, I haven't.*

KAMPELMAN: That's Freedom House again. This was as a result of a recommendation made by Professor John Norton Moore of the University of Virginia, who used to be a legal adviser in the State Department. He and Mark Palmer came up with an idea to Freedom House's board under which the foreign ministers of the democracies of the world should meet together periodically, discuss their problems, and see about moving forward the whole concept of democracy. I presented this idea to the White House during the Clinton Administration, during the last week, as a matter of fact, of Tony Lake's White House service. I discussed it with him for about an hour and he said, "Max, you've given me the only reason I have to regret leaving this job. I'd like to work on this project." Tony is now on our board. Sandy Berger adopted it and liked it. Madeleine Albright accepted it and there was a meeting in Warsaw sponsored by the United States, Chile, and Poland, of about 100 foreign ministers who agreed to create a Community of Democracies.

Interestingly enough, a number of non-democratic foreign ministers showed up, which we, Freedom House, did not like. But they showed up wanting to be part of it. The Community agreed to meet again in Seoul, Korea, which they did last November. This administration thought of it at first as a Madeleine Albright proposal and were not interested in pursuing it, but we persuaded them that this was not a Madeleine Albright proposal - it was a Freedom House proposal - Colin Powell was not able to be there, but he sent Paula Dobriansky, Under Secretary. They've agreed to have another meeting in Chile. Now, I'm not against saying none of these are magic wands, but they're movements, and Freedom House engages in those movements. We now have offices in Eastern Europe and in Central Asia. Anyhow, that was one of my non-governmental organizations that I've spent a lot of time with and still am spending time.

Now another activity: Freedom House was after Madrid, now I move to after Geneva. There is an organization called the American Academy of Diplomacy. It consists of no more than 100 members. They're supposed to be distinguished Foreign Service officers, mostly of a higher level - I was invited - and I was elected to membership. My name was proposed, there was a mail ballot, and I was elected. I was then asked to serve on the board. I served on the board. Larry Eagleburger was chairman of the board. I attend a board meeting late and Larry was in his as I walked in and Larry said, "Congratulations, Max." I said, "Congratulations on what?" He said, "We've just elected you my successor." So I became chairman of the American Academy of Diplomacy. Bruce Laingan, who was our diplomat in charge in Iran during the terrible problems there, was

and is the President. I think he's called president. I served in that job until my serious illness and then I got out, but I'm on the board. I do a lot of work with them, meet with them regularly.

Next, Georgetown University has an Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. Ed Muskie, the former senator, was the chairman. The board came to me and asked me if I would succeed Ed Muskie as chairman. I agreed. I served as chairman until last year - I'm still on the board - when I was replaced by Tom Pickering.

*Q: Tom Pickering?*

KAMPELMAN: Tom Pickering. Tom is a good friend of mine and a champion diplomat and leader.

Tom is now the chairman. I've been quite active. We've had meetings, we've studied, we've been active.

*Q: Doing what? I mean what is the thrust of what you're up to?*

KAMPELMAN: We at Georgetown do a number of things. One of the things is that we take in, every year, people from the State Department, the Defense Department, the CIA - they apply for it - and give them advanced training at Georgetown University. We, at the same time, do studies. We have a staff and we do different studies. We've done studies on the intelligence operation in the U.S., we're now working on that again to modernize it and make some changes in it. We're not revolutionizing the world, but it's important. We teach classes at the university and it works out quite well.

Now, I was also chosen by the President to serve on the board of the United States Institute of Peace. I was then asked by the White House and by Sam Lewis, who was then the president, if I would become chairman. I said no, I could not take that; it was just too much for me. They then came back to me afterwards and said would I be willing to serve as vice chairman if Chester Crocker assumed the chairmanship, and I said yes. Chester and I are good friends, and up until last year I was vice chairman. My term expired and under the statute, I had my two terms. But I'm still close to them. Richard Solomon is now its president. Although I'm not on the board I constantly meet with Chester and Dick because we're good friends. So you can see my non-governmental organizations have occupied my time and have been very useful.

*Q: Looking at this overall, for somebody trying to understand Washington, where do these organizations fit into the projection of American or world foreign policy? How do they work, do you feel?*

KAMPELMAN: Well, they each have their own unique niche to cover. Freedom House, for example, is much broader non-governmental; although Freedom House has been asked by the State Department, under contract, to engage in a number of democratic

activities in the world, and we're doing that. We also become a kind of a pressure group on government, and that's one function of non-governmental organizations. The American Academy of Diplomacy is not academic, but they primarily are designed to strengthen the State Department. They try to help with appropriations; they make themselves available to be helpful. Their experts are available and on call, and frequently are called upon by the State Department to do different chores. The Georgetown project and the U.S. Institute of Peace write papers, do studies, stimulate.

I left out one very important non-governmental organization, but it's semi-governmental. President Carter - and this was before I went to Madrid - asked me to become chairman of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Now the Woodrow Wilson Center was designed to be the tribute to President Wilson. It was established under the Johnson Administration, toward its very end. Hubert Humphrey was its first chairman. I was its third chairman. The chairman is appointed by the President. The executive director when I was chairman is now the Librarian of Congress, James Billington. The Woodrow Wilson Center is government funded. We brought in scholars from the United States and around the world to discuss questions of war and peace and they spend a year - some less than a year - as fellows. Some of our retired State Department people also move to the Woodrow Wilson Center.

I thoroughly enjoyed that work; I thought it was important work. And as a practical matter let me say that Madrid came on its heels, while I was chairman. I made a point of returning to Washington for every board meeting, which was four times a year, to work with Jim Billington on these issues. One of our scholars was a Polish scholar, by the Polish, actually, a scholar of ancient Europe, but a scholar in the best sense of that word. He was arrested during Madrid. He associated himself with the Polish solidarity movement, as a liberal scholar. Jim Billington called me on the telephone to tell me that he'd been arrested. I got on the floor of the Madrid meeting and I reported that this outstanding scholar had been arrested, and I publicly said to the Polish delegate that I wanted the government of Poland to know that as far as I was concerned, I could not consider the Polish government to be a civilized government so long as this gentleman and others were in jail. This was when Jaruzelski became the dictator of Poland. And we got him out. As a matter of fact, he became the foreign minister of Poland about five years ago. These are some of the things that we've done. As a matter of fact, when he came to Washington as foreign minister he asked to see me. I met him and he thanked me. I met his wife previously. These are things that one can do with outside activities.

*Q: What about the articles - the op-ed piece in the Washington Times, something on foreign affairs? There's a great deal of emphasis on this, but by looking at this over time, do these penetrate the power circle - the NSC (National Security Council), the State Department, the Defense Department?*

KAMPELMAN: It's a good question. I think it varies. Some articles do penetrate. Some annoy and sometimes have an influence, even with their annoyance. I would say that a columnist who is published throughout the country has greater influence than the

occasional op-ed piece that I might write, for example, and as you know, I write quite a few of those. I would think an outstanding column or a television personality who has greater influence because it might produce greater political influence. But I do feel some take it seriously. I use this illustration now: the Community of Democracies which became government policy, and is today government policy, the next meeting will be in El Salvador. I talked about what I'm doing with extending the Helsinki Final Act. As I say, I know the upper levels of the State Department are now considering it seriously and giving it serious thought, because I've met with them. Sometimes it just goes by the board. But, you know, I have found that practically everything I have written - and I have written quite a bit - brings some response.

Now, for example, let me turn to the ABM treaty: I, in Geneva, came up with certain ideas about the ABM treaty and missile defenses. I left the government and a new president came in now, Bush. I wrote a piece about it, giving my version of what ought to be done, based on my experience. Ken Adelman, close to this new administration and former head of ACTA, called me on the telephone and said, "Good article, Max," - he knew what my view was - and he said, "The new counsel at the Defense Department is a friend of mine. Would you be willing to have lunch with him?" I said, "Of course." So the three of us had lunch and I talked about it. They did not follow my recommendation, and I think they would have been better off had they done so. I had lunch at the White House with a friend who knew my views, who saw my piece, who commented on my piece, and at lunch said, "Did you read the president's statement on missile defense?" and I said, "I did," and he said to me, "Did anything sound familiar to you?" with a smile; and I said, "Yes, I recognized some of it." But I said, "As a matter of fact, he left out some of it, too," which he laughed at.

*Q: Of course. Your experience over many years in working in the Washington foreign affairs thing, you can penetrate at certain points by these organizations, by contacts, by writing, and all that.*

KAMPELMAN: You can. For example, I made a speech a couple of months ago before a group of rather significant influential people at a meeting called by David Abshire, who was a former ambassador of NATO and a former head of the CSIS. If I must say so myself, I worked on the speech and it was a damn good speech. David, I think, arranged for it to be published in a magazine called Vital Speeches of the Day. I've now had four or five speeches of mine published by them and that gets wide distribution. Every library in the country uses it and every library in every university uses it because it's a research source. I can tell you from the mail I've gotten, that it has an impact. Now that deals with the question you were raising earlier about the Muslims and democracy and how realistic is it to make the 21<sup>st</sup> Century the century of democracy, which is what the Secretary of State today and the President have said is the purpose of American foreign policy today. It's had its impact. I think you have greater impact if you're working at the White House, but the fact of the matter is it comes together and you can get groups organized and it has an impact. This is part of the strength of democracy - views have an impact when you reach a political year, as we're now reaching, because they get picked up...

*Q: You're talking about the election year of 2004.*

KAMPELMAN: That's right. The election of 2004 is coming up. It gets picked up. Now I don't mean to exaggerate its influence. You'll have much greater influence if you're in the government at the higher echelons of the government. I'm not saying you necessarily have the influence at the lower echelons, but you do have influence even at the lower echelons of government. If you're a responsible citizen and you have views, I think you have a duty and an obligation to share those views - if you have them. In my case the practice of law is no longer my serious interest.

*Q: We're talking about August 27, 2003. Just to take a snapshot, how do you feel about American foreign policy and where it's going today? This is very controversial. There are many people who are quite unhappy. I wonder if you could just, for somebody in the future, take a look and talk just a bit about that.*

KAMPELMAN: Let me say that I believe, and indeed I perhaps have had some voice in contributing the thought, that I would like American foreign policy to be directed toward the aim of turning the 21<sup>st</sup> century into the Century of Democracy. This is my prevailing philosophy. I made a talk on the Hill before the U.S. Institute of Peace during the very beginning of the Bush Administration, in which I urged that democracy be America's foreign policy. That's a talk that was also reprinted in Vital Speeches of the Day. So that's where I come from. I do not believe that somehow those of us who were born in the western hemisphere have a unique gene which permits us to enjoy democracy while the rest of the human race doesn't want it, or can't experience it, or wouldn't appreciate it. That's not my view of the human race, nor is it my view of religion. So that I believe those of us who have, have a duty to share to help. I give to charity. This is a giving idea. That's my philosophy.

I did not vote for George Bush Jr., the president. I did not vote for him for President, mostly because I considered myself to be a Democrat. I was not an enthusiast of Al Gore, with whom I worked very closely. I didn't see Bush's job as governor of Texas to be a qualification, so I didn't vote for him. But I will say that I was impressed with the people around him, even during the campaign; and whereas friends of mine felt that they couldn't possibly tolerate the idea of Bush, I was not in that camp because I knew that Condoleezza Rice was advising him on foreign policy. I had met Condoleezza Rice when she worked for the elder Bush. I had worked with her because she was a specialist on Russia. I was impressed with her. When she was provost at Stanford I spent time with her because George Shultz set up a group of advisers; she was one of them and I was one of them. We met once a year. I knew George Shultz supported Bush and George Shultz told me I should not underestimate him. I had the occasion at George Shultz's eightieth birthday party in San Francisco, which was a two-fold affair - a big affair Saturday night which his wife ran, and a good private brunch Sunday morning. But that Saturday night in San Francisco I found myself assigned by Shultz to a table sitting next to Condi Rice on one side and Don Rumsfeld on the other side. I knew Don Rumsfeld from his earlier

experience in Washington. I had invited Don Rumsfeld, when he left government, to join the board of Freedom House. He joined the board of Freedom House and indeed contributed money to the Freedom House. The three of us decided, in effect, to ignore the music; we'll talk international policy. This was after the election, but before we knew who was President. Condi knew that if Bush was President she would go down as the national security adviser, and we even talked about where she should live. Rumsfeld, I am certain, had no idea - had no desire to get into the government, but he ended up being in the government. Well, I had known him, so I felt comfortable with him; I felt comfortable with Condi Rice. I had worked closely with Colin Powell when he was at the White House and when he was Joint Chiefs. So I felt very good about the team that Bush brought in, and then when Bush began to verbalize this business of democracy I was pleased, and remain pleased at that objective.

In general, therefore I will say I support the President's policies. I can not say 100 percent because I don't even agree 100 percent with my wife on all things, but in the main thrust I'm a supporter. Now, I do think two serious mistakes were made in connection with Iraq. I've written a piece on this for the Washington Post, which they published. I do not believe that a president who assumes the oath of office, and who believes that national safety and security call for a specific policy - policy X - I do not believe that a President who took the oath of office should say I believe in policy X, but, of course, if I'm vetoed at the U.N. Security Council, I won't pursue it. That is not his oath of office. And as I look at the United Nations, I see Libya in charge of its human rights, I see Syria replacing the United States in the human rights conference, I see Libya as chairman of the security council, I see a General Assembly which is controlled by non-democratic societies and states. I don't believe they are equipped to substitute for the President of the United States, elected by the American people, on foreign policy issues.

Now, two mistakes I think that the Bush Administration made is first - and you have to say the administration's error; you can blame it on Defense, you can blame it on State - whatever it is, it's the administration. They were unprepared for the looting that would take place and did not send in military police. We should have had thousands of military police trained to police the streets, so when Saddam Hussein, who has obviously demonstrated over the years canniness and intelligence and tactical control, opens up all the jails, sends out thousands of criminals into the streets, we should be prepared. So what do the criminals do? They loot. We're not prepared to stop it. So that had a bad effect on many people within Iraq. The second mistake I think we made - and this shocked the hell out of me because I was certain they would understand this beforehand - with our high technology and communication we should have had radio outlets, and indeed radios and television outlets, throughout Iraq. On the first day the President should have spoken not to the American people, but to the people of Iraq and said, "Our troops are now within Iraq. We'll get out as soon as we can. This is our purpose." A number of friends of mine have now been in Iraq for the last few months. One of them worked with me in Madrid and in Geneva and is now on the staff of the U.S. Institute of Peace. He came back last week and came to my office to brief me. He says the people of Iraq are overwhelmingly for the United States; I don't get that from our press, but the Terrorists

gained by their radio broadcasts and we lost.

*Q: Well this, I think, is always a major problem, in that the press focuses on the hole and not on the doughnut. They almost have to have a mob to have a picture. You get no feel for the progress that's going on there.*

KAMPELMAN: Now, for example, I was listening last night to the Jim Lehrer show - I try to listen to it; it's a good show. The lady who was broadcasting the news said two more U.S. soldiers were killed today, bringing the total to 140 since May when President Bush announced that we had won the war. Now, let me say the last part of this is editorializing, just as editorializing would be "One hundred and forty troops were killed, which is compared to 600 who were killed in automobile accidents in the same period." Either one is a kind of news editorializing. So that is part of the problem. But you asked for my view. My view is that we're going in the right direction. We've made some mistakes. I don't think we're doing the right thing yet in Afghanistan. I do not think we should have made deals with the feudal tribal leaders, which is what we have done. I think we need more troops in Iraq; I think we need more troops in Afghanistan. This is my view.

*Q: I think the problem probably rests with the Pentagon right now.*

*Moving on to another subject, you mentioned that you had been involved with Israel and the Hebrew university and all, but avoided the politics. How does one avoid the politics, and what are the politics of being a prominent Jewish leader in Washington and you've got Israel which is a political minefield?*

KAMPELMAN: I can only give you my view. I have always acted on the assumption that I would help the democratically elected government in Israel, whatever the party. If the Prime Minister needs my help, I'll help him. The Likud prime minister, if he needs my help and he was elected, I'll help him. That's been my approach toward this. Nor have I ever tried to mix internally in their elections. I've kept away from that as far as I could. My philosophy has always been that, they're a democracy, and there but for the grace of G-d go I, which is exactly my philosophy as I think about, for example, the Holocaust. There but for the grace of G-d go I. I think this permeates the view of many Jews. I am convinced in my own head that if Israel were not a democracy I would not be with that view. But the fact they are a democracy makes me of that view.

Now I know Palestinians. As a matter of fact, I met with the Palestinian negotiating group a number of years ago, during the Carter Administration, on two occasions. On one occasion a friend of mine who is a Palestinian here and works at the World Bank asked me if I would meet with their negotiating group. I said of course. I met with them at one of the hotels downtown. We talked about how one negotiates; we also talked about their objectives and my perception of Israel's position, which has not changed. They're lovely, educated people. I appreciated being with them, and on another occasion I was asked by the United States to go to Athens - actually we didn't meet in Athens, it was outside of

Athens - where I met some Israelis and some Palestinians who were there, military people, and we talked about these issues. But, regrettably, it's a mess out there. Now, there are many other Jews in the United States who take part in their politics, who contribute to their political campaigns for one party or the other party.

*Q: Is it difficult to duck the political side of the thing? You know, you have a very strong, what one could only call an Israeli lobby, in the United States, which has tremendous political clout.*

KAMPELMAN: It does, and I want to say that I contribute every year to that group. It's AIPAC, American-Israel Public Affairs Committee. They don't mix in Israeli politics. What they do is try to advance the interests of Israel as a country, no matter who the leader is. They'll push resolutions, they try to get money in appropriations for aid, but they don't get involved in Israeli politics.

Let me say one other thing. You talk about extra-curricular work. I have not discussed this. I have known every Israeli ambassador since I came to Washington in 1949. That includes their early ambassador, Aubrey (Abba) Eban. A good friend of mine was Israel's ambassador, Abraham Harmon, had got me involved with the Hebrew University. My recollection is that their next ambassador was a man by the name of Dinitz. Dinitz was very close to Henry Kissinger and during that administration the oil problem came up with Saudi Arabia. He discussed it with me, and I said to him, "You know, you're not equipped to deal with this technical stuff, but there are people in Washington who know oil. Let me bring them together for you." So I did and they all were great - technically helpful.

That began a process which exists today. The composition of the people helping him depends on the issue. At first, oil became the problem. Every single one of those ambassadors has agreed - because they pass it one from one ambassador to the next - to meet with expert Americans. The group changes. These are experienced Washington people. They are all Jewish and friends of Israel. We give advice when it's asked for. Mostly I think it's intelligent, responsible advice. We do it with the current ambassador. We don't ever advertise it. None of it is self-dealing. Every one of these people has no personal financial interest with any of these issues. My wife and I had dinner last night with one of the former ambassadors and his wife, who were visiting here. They just got a new grandson in New York and they were visiting Washington. He's at the university. We talked about the danger to Jewish and Arab civilians arising out of the combat.

*Q: Of course this has been the name of the game for years on both sides.*

KAMPELMAN: I know.

*Q: The innocents far outnumber what you would call combat related deaths.*

KAMPELMAN: That's right. But his answer to me was he agrees. Bt he said to me, "You



know what? What the Palestinians have learned is that they get surrounded by people; they invite children to come around them.” This is what he said to me. I don’t know if that’s so or not. But it’s part of the game. That is said. It should end. Wars should end!

*Q: It’s part of the game on both sides, yes.*

*End of interview*