

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

STEPHANIE SMITH KINNEY

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy

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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is 25 March 2010. This is an interview with Stephanie Smith Kinney. Stephanie and I are old friends. And this is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies, and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. Stephanie, let's start at the beginning. When and where were you born?

KINNEY: In Orlando, Florida, because Mother didn't like the doctors and the hospital in Winter Haven, which is where I really had my roots and grew up.

Q: When?

KINNEY: June 24, 1944.

Q: You sound like a war baby.

KINNEY: Very much so. June 24 was a big day for the Smith family, but my father was not there because he was in Belgium (Battle of the Bulge) and later Cologne, Germany in World War II. At least that's what his letters suggest. The story is that my mother caused problems at the hospital by not filling out a name because she was suppose to name me - - as she was-- after my great-grandfather William F. Eger, known to all as Billie. Thank Heavens, she opted for Carole Stephanie Smith. My father's name was Charles Carroll Smith, so there would have been a feminized Carole Smith, in case he didn't come back. Fortunately, he returned and I was allowed to become C. Stephanie Smith.

Q: All right, well let's take the family. Let's go on your father's side first, the Smith side. Where do they come from? What do you know about them?

KINNEY: They are of primarily French and English origins and are what give me the right to say I am a 13th generation American, depending on how you count it. Having started out in the Mid-Atlantic region well before the American Revolution, they came down from the area around Columbia, South Carolina, to Jefferson County and a little

little town in North Florida called Madison, where my Great-grandfather Columbus Benjamin Smith ran a newspaper and served as county judge for over 30 years.

My family has been in Florida for more than six generations. My father's father, Charles Carroll Smith, Sr., moved from Madison in the 20's (during the Florida Boom) down to central Florida, which is where Winter Haven is located. I was the first grandchild and the third generation of Smiths in Winter Haven.

Q: What were the Smiths up to in Madison County and elsewhere?

KINNEY: Madison was timber and tobacco growing county, but what Jefferson County was best known for, according to some relatives, was having more stills per square mile than any place in the country during prohibition. As I said, my great-grandfather became the judge of Madison County. My grandfather, who died before I was born, and my father were both hardware men and had their own businesses. I'm told my grandfather came down to central Florida during the Florida Boom days, when he acquired substantial property, which was subsequently lost during the Great Depression. To this day, real estate booms and crashes are as native to Florida as mosquitoes.

Q: On your mother's side, where do they come from?

KINNEY: She is of German-Irish stock from Fort Worth, Texas, via German settlement in Indiana in the Mid-19th century. The German side of her family was from around Muncie and Huntington, Indiana. My impression -- since one of my great-aunts invented a church called the Church of the Brethren-- is that the Shoemakers were deeply religious. On the Eger side, I think they were more deeply committed to advancing themselves by pursuing the American Dream in business.

My Great-grandfather, William (Billie) Franklin Eger, ended up in Bartow, Florida, which is fifteen miles from Winter Haven, after a very successful stint with Armour and Company, the meatpacking company out of Chicago. It is thanks to his move to Florida that my Texan mother and Floridian father eventually met.

My grandmother, Ruth Eger Mullins, was born at the turn of the century and seems to have developed a contrarian streak. She ran off from her overly strict Indiana family with a peanut farmer and then eventually married an Irish oil wildcatter from Forth Worth, Texas, named James Newburn (J.N.) Mullins. Mom's parents were divorced when J.N. ran off with someone in their Baptist Church choir.

The shame and scandal of the divorce unhinged my grandmother, who was not that much fun to be around anyway. My mother sought refuge and an escape through music as she developed her considerable talent as a pianist, winning classical piano competitions throughout Texas. Her first year in college, she ran off with a boy purported to be "from the wrong side of the tracks" and was summarily whisked off to Florida by her wealthy maternal grandparents, the Egers, who by that time were living a very good life growing citrus in Central Florida.

Papa Eger offered the young man a large sum of money to “disappear,” telling him this is what Mother wanted. The young man refused the money but did “disappear.” Papa told Mother that the young man had taken the money, thus proving his unworthiness, and arranged with his good Bartow buddy, Spessard Holland-- soon to be Governor of Florida -- to have the marriage annulled. Only through coincidence, did my mother encounter her first husband after my father’s death in 1969, and only then did the two of them discover the truth of my grandfather’s manipulation. This was yet another lesson to me about the games people can play with themselves and others.

Q: And her grandparents were doing what in Bartow?

KINNEY: Papa Eger had opened up and run the Armour operation in Montevideo. I don’t know when he came to Bartow, but I do know that in 1936, he was an avid businessman and fisherman living in a big house in Bartow and got a patent for an artificial fishing lure that caught three fish at one time, a feat trumpeted in Ripley’s Believe It or Not some years later. This fishing lure and others he invented were so successful that he formed the Dillinger Bait Company as a sideline to his orange grove interests and residual relations with Armour.

Papa Eger was purportedly in Montevideo when it came time for me to be born. The story is that he came back for my birth, thinking I would be his namesake, his first grandchild, whom he would endow with a trust for life. I guess Mother inherited some of her mother’s contrarian streak because she opted to name me after Daddy instead, and so “Good-by trust baby.” As the story goes, my great-grandfather got in a huff and went back to Montevideo and was not seen again for some time. Presumably, he left Mother Magda (Magdaline) in the big house in Bartow. I don’t really know. It’s all Southern family folklore, which, as any good Southerner knows, is based on the importance of never sticking too strictly to the truth!

Q: Your mother and father met when?

KINNEY: I think they met around 1941, the same year my grandfather Smith died. The Billie Egers lived in Bartow and Uncle Orville Eger and Aunt Patsy lived in Auburndale, and the Smiths lived in Winter Haven, which was in-between. Daddy was a fisherman and knew my grandfather. He used to joke that he had bought twice as many fishing lures as he could ever hope to sell in the hardware store just to cultivate the relationship once he met Billie’s grand-daughter, my mother. Mom was a pianist and gorgeous, and my father was the most handsome man in two counties and was known for his charm and beautiful baritone voice. I suppose the pairing was inevitable in some way. He sang, and the chemistry was apparently -- from all the stories-- instantaneous, palpable, and fierce.

Q: What sort of education did your parents have?

KINNEY: Daddy went to Clemson, when it was a well regarded Southern Military College, to get a two year business degree, followed by a year or so of specialized

training in the hardware business. This was timely because his father died in 1941, leaving Daddy in charge of the Carroll Smith Hardware store, as well as his three younger siblings and his mother. As I said, Mom started college, I think, at SMU in Texas.

Q: That is Southern Methodist University in Texas.

KINNEY: Yes. She was from Fort Worth. You'll recall, she left school to run off and get married.

So, where I am concerned, just think "Southern Gothic": My mother's name is Billye, my father's name is Carroll. My brother is Charles Carroll Smith, III, known as "Squire;" he is married to Barbara Clare Simpson, better known as "Punkin." Her father Terrell is known to all as "Bubba." Her mother is known as "Big Barbara" to distinguish her from little Barbara. And Big Barbara, after Bubba ran off with his secretary, is now married to my Uncle Joel Collins Smith, who was her first and only high school sweetheart. It is central Florida at its Southern best. And this is now what makes up a sizable part of the politically famous and sensitive Interstate 4 corridor, which tipped the vote in Florida in favor of Obama in the last election. My family was not among those voters, I regret to say.

Q: Do you ever go back there?

KINNEY: Oh Lord, yes. At least once or twice a year. My mother still lives in the same house I was raised in at 110 Tenth Street, S.E. in Winter Haven. My brother is still there. He is in real estate now, but he cultivated and managed groves up until his 60's. All grove people eventually go into real estate development. Winter Haven is my touchstone with America because since the 50's, it is unailing in revealing early on how the country is going to vote and why. I still live in legend in the British Foreign Office for calling the Bill Clinton election before anyone in London had even heard of the man from Hope.

Q: I assume you can walk down the street and know everyone who is related to anyone.

KINNEY: Well not any more. But there was a time. It was 13,000 people when I grew up. Today, because of Disney World to the north, it is probably closer to 50,000, in the area at least.

Q: How did the depression hit your family?

KINNEY: Badly. As I said, the Carroll Smiths had moved down to central Florida in the Boom.

Q: The big Florida land boom.

KINNEY: Yes, the land boom, and they lost everything except the store. I never really have heard the details, never even knew the story until about eight years ago when my Uncle Joel told me. There was great bitterness between my mother and my father when

they divorced, so I have to be very careful about what I consider to be factual, as opposed to story telling.

Q: One thing, my mother and father separated; they never got divorced, but I mean it was a full separation, really because of the depression. It put a tremendous strain.

KINNEY: The same in my family, only I'd say it was due more to the impact of Grandfather Smith's early death and World War II. First, Daddy inherited responsibility for his three siblings when his father died, plus a spendthrift mother who had no concept of money whatever, and they all bankrupted the business twice. And he had a gorgeous new wife, who was basically an energetic city girl still very ambitious to fulfill her musical talents, and live beyond the confines of Winter Haven. Her lifelong lament was that her parents and grandparents had forced her to give up a scholarship to Julliard. Who knows?

Daddy received battlefield promotions during the Bulge and then returned from Europe in '46 after some time in occupied Germany. He returned to massive domestic responsibilities and a fragile business in Central Florida, and my brother was born in 1947. I think Daddy probably would have preferred to stay in the Army, where things were more structured and under control.

By the 50's, Daddy started suffering a kind of spiritual and sexual malaise (probably stress induced), and Mother's family on her grandfather's side, the Egers, could see what was happening and provided for her substantially in Papa Eger's will. When Papa Eger died, she decided to create a music school, which was not something Winter Haven really needed. And then, the story goes, Daddy threatened her with divorce if she did not put all the money under him, and she bucked. According to her, she feared that this threatened college education for my brother and me. I suspect there was a lot more do it. However, this incident was one of the things that triggered the divorce. Certainly, the only thing I ever heard them argue about was money. The passion remained to the end. Daddy remarried a year before he died but Mother never did. No more entangling alliances for her!

I think I have always been very conscious of the cost of war on young men when they return home, especially if they cannot talk about what we in the Foreign Service call "re-entry shock." I now look at vets, standing like a rock, through the lens of the stories of the consequences of World War II service that I remember hearing about from my parents' generation. PTSD is the least of it.

Q: What sort of war did you father have?

KINNEY: The Bulge.

Q: He was in the infantry then.

KINNEY: Yes. There were a lot of difficult times in Winter Haven before he enlisted. He was accused of being a draft dodger because he had stayed to take care of the business and the other three children and his mother and new bride when his father died unexpectedly. I think it was a stroke; I never knew him. But Daddy eventually enlisted. He received a battlefield promotion to sergeant or something. I know he and his war buddy from Indiana would get together at our home in Florida at Christmas time every year. Some of my primal memories were of "Uncle" Bill Groves and Daddy sitting down and telling the Christmas stories of the Bulge. Bill was an infamous Catch 22-type "scrounger" and managed to produce a carton of Lucky Strikes and some toffee for Daddy that Christmas. As a result, a carton of Luckies and a big box of toffee were always a part of the Groves' presents when they made their annual Christmas trip from Hartford City, Indiana, to Winter Haven in the years thereafter.

Q: All right, just a little more. Where did your family fit politically?

KINNEY: In those days, Florida was solidly Democratic; there was no real alternative. It was just a given. There was no Republican party, for all intents and purposes. Florida was part of the "Solid South." You didn't think of being a Democrat as a meaningful affiliation or choice; that was just the way life was, just like life was segregated.

My parents were "moderates," and great believers in the New South. Leroy Collins was a family relative on the Smith side. The Collins were from Tallahassee and he eventually became governor of Florida in the 50's. He was one of the leaders of the New South Governors' Conference. So the family was associated with that branch of the Democratic party; they were progressive or moderate on the subject of race.

My first Presidential election memories were of everyone voting for Eisenhower and then for Nixon. I remember "I like Ike" buttons vividly. I liked him a lot but did not really know why, except that he had a good smile and everyone else liked Ike. Florida has a long tradition of voting Republican in Presidential elections when it was suppose to be Democratic, just as it voted Democratic for Obama, when it was suppose to be Republican, which is now the state's overwhelming party affiliation and political instinct. A complete turn-around from when I was growing up.

Q: "I like Ike," that would be '52. What about religion?

KINNEY: Presbyterian. My father's family--especially my grandmother-- was Episcopalian, but Mother didn't like Father Stirrup, whom she thought boring. She was very attracted to the sermons of Reverend Hamilton at the Presbyterian Church, and so we became members of First Presbyterian.

Q: Was religion an important raising factor?

KINNEY: Well again, it was just a part of life. We were upstanding members of the church. You went to church every Sunday; you had social relationships within and among churches. I remember when I got to be a teenager, I was curious about other churches,

and I really liked this boy who was a Baptist, so I visited First Baptist, along with Beymer Methodist, where another boyfriend was a member. I was kind of horrified at the Baptist Church, the way they called people to testify and come down and be saved and all. I had no idea that was the way some people worshiped. I like the Methodist Church because it was the first to have air conditioning! Then there were the black churches that we all heard stories about. But churches were just institutions that were part of the social fabric and life of the town. They served rather as an organizing principle for social relationships, predictors of background and education and, if one had thought to think about it, social hierarchy as well.

Q: Were you sort of almost the end of the prohibition but basically don't date Catholic boys, that sort of thing?

KINNEY: We didn't have any Catholics to speak of and there were no Jews. There was a small, poor looking, Catholic church, I think, but basically Winter Haven was black or white and all Protestant. There was a man by the name of Berkowitz, who came along when I was in high school, who was Jewish. He built this outlandish, sort of over-the-top house that caused a great deal of comment, but there were no Jews that I knew of in my high school.

My only association with Jews was through the horrible photos of Life Magazine, which I had seen in their coverage of the opening of the concentration camps at the end of World War II. That really stuck with me, and I did a research paper junior year in high school focused on the causes of anti-semitism, which was something I just could not understand. I was reminded of this some years later when people, who had no knowledge of the South and had never even been there, would damn me and everyone else in the region as "racists." The politics, fear and the human need for scapegoats that lie behind such things are complicated, and they usually take blood and time to change.

Q: Weren't there even Jewish traders? Usually department stores or something like that were owned by Jews.

KINNEY: There were not any that had children my age who identified themselves as Jews. The May family, who owned the May's General Store, may have been, but they didn't have children my age. I literally didn't know anybody who identified as Jewish. Barbara Livingston turned out later on to go back to her Jewish roots. But no one identified as anything but Protestant, and within the Protestants, there was the hierarchy among the churches with the Episcopalians and the Presbyterians near the top and the Nazarenes and the Pentecostals on the other end and the Catholics hardly visible. The Methodists came up in status at a certain point because they built a big, new church and got air conditioning before anybody else. A lot of people became Methodist in the early 50's until the other churches began getting air conditioning as well.

Q: I have interviewed a couple of retired Foreign Service Officers who grew up in Brooklyn and never met anyone who wasn't Jewish. I mean these neighborhoods were homogeneous; there was no design, it is just where you settled.

KINNEY: Exactly. Today it is referred to as “sorting.” But this was the old South. This was Florida before Disney World. I am something of an informal expert on the impact of Disney World because it was so close by, and it happened when I was in late high school, early college. The area of Florida where I grew up was also pre-Cuba. The state today is nothing like the world in which I came of age.

Q: Well, I want to talk about the world in which you grew up, pre Disney and all that. But during sort of the 50’s, what was life like? We will talk about school in a minute. But were you turned loose on the streets out playing with the kids?

KINNEY: My brother and I had free run of the neighborhood because it was utterly safe. Everybody knew everybody. We were between two freshwater lakes. The town claimed there were 100 lakes in the area. The boys played together and the girls played together. Sometimes we had orange wars between the boys and the girls.

Q: I grew up in California. Oranges are great to throw.

KINNEY: Oh yeah, and they are dangerous too. Some of my most vivid memories are the adrenalin and the excitement and sometimes terror. I remember being treed in an avocado tree at one point, and fortunately the avocados were just coming on line. Unripe avocados are also very good missiles, and can do heavy damage. We had great fun. We spent a lot of time down at Lake Elbert. Everyone had boats and water skied. Winter Haven was the home of Beautiful Cypress Gardens, which was one of Florida’s first and biggest tourist attractions, a combination of swamps, flowers, and water ski shows.

Q: And beautiful girls in bathing suits. I would see the newsreels all the time.

KINNEY: And in Southern Belle dresses, which had nothing to do with real Southern Belle dresses, except that they had hoop skirts. My mother worked closely with Julie Pope, the wife of Dick Pope, the man who created the attraction. When Dick was called up to war, Julie and Mother kept the Gardens open by creating USO shows to attract all the airmen training at near-by the Bartow Air Base. Mother figured out that they had gasoline and nothing to do except work, so she and Julie created the first water ski shows complete with music and a female trio of singers and some dancers. The Pope kids, whose father had taught them to ski, put on the first ski show. The Gardens show was the only thing to do in central Florida, and the guys from Bartow air base loved it and wrote home about it. Dick was a masterful promoter, and quickly advised Julie from Europe to provide free Cypress Gardens post cards to all the service men, who would in turn advertise the Gardens wonders across the country for free.

Q: During the war, Florida was a major air training center. My brother was a naval pilot training pilots, including John Glenn, in Florida.

KINNEY: Probably at Pensacola. The weather was so fine, and that was what attracted the military to Bartow, along with local Democratic power brokers like Spessard Holland.

That base is now a commercial private airport. My brother has his plane there. But in those days, it was a strategic air force training center. Well, I should not say air force because the Air Force had not yet been invented.

Q: Yeah, it was army air corps.

KINNEY: Army Air Corps training base.

Q: Well how did segregation play in your elementary school?

KINNEY: Well, I graduated from a segregated school system. I graduated from Winter Haven Senior High in 1962, so my life experience was that of the segregated South. It wasn't until I went off to college that I realized that there was anything wrong with that. At home, we were always threatened with our lives if we used epithets or the word "nigger." You got your mouth washed out with soap. So we always thought we were pretty progressive and kind and moderate. The realities were that I grew up with "colored maids" as nannies, and we had full time "colored" help, just like in the current best seller and movie, The Help.

When I was in late high school, when we no longer had full time help, I remember asking Mother how much people had been paid when I was little and being shocked at the answer. As children, my brother and I had had two full time nannies--Old Lee Lee and Lula. Old Lee Lee got \$25 a week. She was also the person who named my brother "Squire." She and Daisy, the maid next door, would argue over who had the finer baby. Mother came in the living room one day and found Old Lee Lee in the bookshelves holding a dictionary. When asked, she told mother that she was naming her baby "Squire" because, according to the dictionary, "Squire" means the outstanding man of the district.

That story suggests an intimacy and an integral relationship that was quite real and quite filled with positive feelings on both sides. However, looking back from today's world, it was not a relationship of equals, and it was certainly always defined by the white person involved--for better or often for worse. It was literally, now, another century and another life ago. Seems hard to believe.

Q: Was there the town and then the big town?

KINNEY: Well, there was Winter Haven, and then there was Florence Villa. Florence Villa was where the colored people lived, where the negroes lived, as we were taught to respectfully call them, negroes. The negroes lived in Florence Villa. I remember at a certain point when I was in primary school, we took laundry to be done, and I went with Momma one day to pick it up in Florence Villa. I remember looking and thinking, "What is the matter with these people? How sad. Why are these people living in these shacks?"

The Villa was full of unpainted wood shacks on concrete blocks. I never went inside of one. I just went with Mother when she delivered the laundry to be done, or we would pick it up. But the whole town was nothing but wooden shacks and ramshackle wooden buildings, and I am sure many had neither water nor electricity at that point in time.

I didn't understand why it was that way; that was just the way it was. I assumed everyone who was living like that was poor and uneducated, but I did not know why. It was a heavy incentive not to be poor or uneducated. I had a good concept of whether someone was educated or not by that time related to how they spoke English, whether they were black or white. Poor whites and poor black people spoke the same way, so I figured there was a relationship. More than I knew!

I remember being shocked and pleasantly surprised one vacation when I returned during college or graduate school when I deliberately drove through "the Villa" to see how it had changed. There were still a few unpainted wooden buildings tucked in here and there, but for the most part, the wood had been replaced with concrete and on a couple of streets, where clearly more successful individuals lived, there were single story, concrete houses with car ports and gardens and even the occasional swimming pool, just like in Winter Haven. The thing that really surprised and impressed me was how the borders of the Villa and Winter Haven had actually come together in a seamless, if sparse, mixing of white and "colored" houses. Progress was clearly possible and seemed to be evolving more in the South at that time than in the ethnic ghettos of Boston where everyone considered themselves so superior!

Q: Were facilities in town like the water fountains and movie theaters and all segregated?

KINNEY: Well, not in any way that made you--or at least me-- conscious back then. Colored people had their place, and it never occurred to me to ask why there were never any colored people in the movie theater or McCrory's Five and Dime or the Rexall Drug store, where we would go after a movie. That was just the way it was.

I don't remember, for example, labels like "Whites only" or something like that, because in Winter Haven, at least, life was very traditional and very set by convention. It was all self re-enforcing, at least when I was a child. I don't really remember even any debate on the subject; that was just the way it was. It wouldn't have occurred to colored folks to shop and entertain themselves in Winter Haven, any more than it would have occurred to white folks to do the same in Florence Villa, although I suspect -- in retrospect--there were more relations between high school white boys and colored girls than anyone ever let on.

Q: Ok, school. In the first place were you much of a reader as a kid?

KINNEY: I was a fanatic reader. My father loved poetry, and I must have gotten the reading bug from him. My mother wasn't much of a reader, although she was a great believer in education. But I discovered books early on, and I was good at it. I was voracious. I fell in love with Romans and Greeks in elementary school. I fell in love with history in elementary school. I went through a period of reading everything I could about Florida history. I was so excited in the fourth grade because we actually got to study Florida history. It was all about those Spanish conquistadores and how Florida got to be a

state. It was so fascinating. I remember a book called The Flamingo Feather, about the defeat of the French Huguenot community by the Spanish near what is now St. Augustine. That was, I guess, early on, a perspective on a world that was somewhere else in another time.

Q: Were there any particular books that you hit kind of early on that stuck with you...

KINNEY: Lost Worlds, a book my Grandmother gave me when I was 10 about signal archeological expeditions and finds and Richard Halliburton's Book of Marvels.

Q: You know Halliburton often comes up in the Foreign Service.

KINNEY: I am not surprised.

Q: Lost Worlds, that is Doyle isn't it?

KINNEY: No, you are thinking of Conan Doyle's reference to the "tepuis" in Venezuela, where we later lived. But I am talking about a book that was focused on archaeology. It was the stories of the discovery of Knossos and a lot of Carter's work on King Tut, obviously, and Schliemann's work at Mycenae, looking for Troy. My grandmother gave it to me when I was in fifth grade. I just couldn't believe it. I couldn't read it enough. I would read it and re-read it. I checked out Richard Halliburton's Book of Marvels from the Winter Haven Library more than any other person in town. If you looked at the book card, it was Stephanie Smith, Stephanie Smith, Stephanie Smith -- all the way down.

Q: How did you work in the school system? Were you a good student?

KINNEY: Oh, I was every teacher's dream--Miss Perfect in everything and an over achiever.

Q: I suppose you were one of these girls that was very good at spelling.

KINNEY: No, I was never very good at spelling and still am not to this very day. But I loved school. I was too studious and too goody-goody to be truly popular by high school standards, but I was always in the "in-crowd."

I was always highly respected. All sorts of boys came around when we graduated professing their love and telling how they never dared ask me out because they didn't think they were good enough. Everybody always said that they knew I wasn't going to stay in Winter Haven. I was going to do something else. They didn't know what, but they knew that I wasn't going to be like most of my class. I guess I wasn't, although a fair number of geeky girls ended up having pretty respectable careers, several in science.

Q: Did you get a solid training in "Southern Belleness?"

KINNEY: As part of the Foreign Service entry process in 1971, you had to write a biography explaining how and why you had chosen the Foreign Service. I remember writing that I had already had a life-time of training in diplomacy, in getting your way indirectly, because I had been a very smart and irregular thinker raised as a good southern daughter. There was a tension between the idea of being a proper Southern Belle and the idea of “doing something else.” This tension came from my mother, who never got over having to turn down the scholarship to Julliard because it wasn’t proper for her to go off to New York alone. That is where I got the curiosity and adventuresome spirit from, I’m sure.

Q: I grew up as a teenager in Annapolis.

KINNEY: That is where my husband grew up.

Q: My brother was ten years older, and so we used to take dates called “drags” into the house. I was about 12 years old. I would get these young beauties from all of the southern colleges. If there was no other male around, they started on me. My god it was great. I don’t know if it still exists, but it is something to see.

KINNEY: Well, one was made to understand that you had to be a “good girl.” There were “good girls” and “bad girls.” “Bad girls” probably had more fun, but they also got “knocked up” and rarely married a respectable man, so there was no question but that I would always be a “good girl.” So my experience was limited in some areas, but charm was not one of them. You were taught, not explicitly but implicitly, how to charm the pennies off a dead man’s eyes.

Q: Oh yes, and it worked.

KINNEY: You knew honey always served you much better than vinegar. There was not an option for vinegar. Life was privileged, but only within certain limits and constraints, unless one could cleverly find a way around them.

Q: Did you find by the time you hit high school or maybe even before as a girl just sort of hide the fact that you are smart?

KINNEY: Oh yes. Some of my primal memories are learning to ask dumb questions to make boys laugh. Being smart, I felt I had to be dumb about some things, so I chose to be dumb about math and mechanics. I could stand in front of those car motors and just ask the dumbest questions and just be absolutely mystified. “Well isn’t that amazing. I never understood that in my life. Well, it is just sort of like-- an egg beater.” Everyone laughs indulgently. “Oh, did I say something silly? (Bat, bat with the lashes.) But you really did help me better understand how it works.” (Smile!)

Q: There was a musical called “Wonderful Town” with Roslyn Russell, and she sings a song, “Ten Ways to Lose a Man.”

KINNEY: I excelled in all of them. I was too scared to be bad, and too good at being smart and “good” to be of interest to any boy for very long.

Q: What was high school like?

KINNEY: High school was wonderful. We had fabulous, high quality teachers. I had a geometry teacher, Miss Smith, who put me in the first experimental, all-girls geometry class. She had a theory that girls and boys had really different orientations and grasps of geometry. She was going to teach us girls geometry in a way to which we could relate.

Miss Smith just loved math, and she was going to teach us geometry willy-nilly, but not with male techniques. She was absolutely right. I had a sociology teacher who was amazing, and really made you think. Wonderful history teachers, wonderful English teachers. On the other hand, foreign language class, Spanish, was a joke. Mrs. Connor just taught us English rules about Spanish grammar because she couldn't speak two words herself. But most of the other subjects were very well taught by highly educated people, mostly women, except for chemistry and sociology.

In my view, the destruction of American public education can be traced back to the opening up to women of jobs other than “teacher, secretary and nurse.” Up until the Seventies, America benefited from the largest cadre of underpaid, highly educated public school teachers the world has ever known. Since then, unfortunately, we have gotten what we pay for, and the overall product has been increasingly poor, especially in urban centers. Same thing with nursing, for which we now depend on developing country immigrants.

Q: Was it still the days of sort of the unmarried schoolmarm?

KINNEY: A combination. Miss Smith, the geometry teacher was the only unmarried teacher I had. In retrospect, she was probably a lesbian, but I did not even know there was a term for women in those days. I did know about male homosexuals because of all of Mother's connections with the fine arts.

But back to teachers. Winter Haven was called that because it had been a haven from the winter, particularly in the 20's for a lot of northern people of wealth. At one time it was reputed to have more millionaires per square mile than any place else in the country. So you had an interesting combination of, I would say, better educated, more sophisticated, more experienced families from other places, along with the old Southern landed families. Some were military; some were business. Some had just ended up there. Then you had the Old Guard locals, who were no slouches because they worked hard and made a hell of a lot of money, which bought them social and political access around the state.

My Winter Haven was a world of the “Protestant Ethic.” There was no escaping it. Honesty and integrity came first, then education, then hard work, and then deferred gratification. These were generally shared -- if sometimes honored in the breach- values pretty much across the board. Whether black or white, you worked your ass off so you

could have something better. For the whites, the Protestant Ethic value set was helped by the fact that there was also money in the area. There was investment. Dick Pope and Cyprus Gardens brought it to the area, along with the citrus industry and a vibrant culture of independent, small businesses, many of which became very large and lucrative over the years.

Life, as I knew it in Winter Haven in the 50's, was quite wonderful. I used to think that my childhood, which was filled with movie stars and classical musicians, was perfectly normal. I grew up with opera singers and nationally known pianists and vocalists in my house at the breakfast table. Some would dedicate songs to me in their encores.

My mother was a pianist, who saw herself as marooned in Winter Haven, so she figured, "Well if Mohammed can't go to the mountain (New York City), I'll just bring the mountain to Mohammed." She organized the Winter Haven Community Concert Series, which lasted for almost twenty-five years. As a result, Jerome Hines and Walter Castle and Lilly Pons and Rise Stevens and Whittmore and Lowe very often ended up staying at our house when they were giving concerts in Winter Haven or nearby. So that was the music side.

On the other side, we had Dick Pope's connection with Hollywood. They filmed several movies at Cypress Gardens in the late '40's, and then in the 50's they filmed "Easy to Love" with Esther Williams and Van Johnson. There were all these wonderful parties and filming events and special activities to which my parents, and sometimes I, were invited. Mike Todd also featured Cypress Gardens in Cinerama. It was a strange, wonderful childhood in which I also got very well and broadly educated in a number of surprising ways for such a little town.

Q: Did the outside world, I am thinking about the international world, intrude very much?

KINNEY: Heavens no. Not at all. There was no question. This was America. It was all about America. There was no question about what America was and who Americans were and weren't and that Americans were God's gift to a backwards world. There was no question but that America was the finest, most honest, decent country in the world. As I said, I learned about the Holocaust at one point through Life Magazine, but Life Magazine was the extent of my knowledge of the world beyond Florida. When I first saw those horrific pictures of the Holocaust, I became very interested in WWII, but nobody liked to talk about it. They would sort of encourage you to think about something else. That was then; that was over there. We were now living in the 50's.

I do remember one incident involving the Korean War. A whole bunch of family adults had gathered for lunch at our home, after which they all repaired to the living room. There was a lot of intense conversation about something called the 38th parallel. They were so involved in conversation about this that they were totally ignoring me. I crawled under one of the sofas and listened. But I also had somehow found a pretty pink and white pill, which for some reason I stuck up my nose and could then not get out. Between

their worried conversation and the pill in my nose, I guess I must have begun to cry. The next thing I knew I was being whisked to the hospital and there was no more talk of the 38th parallel. I must have been about seven at the time. It took a while for history classes to get up to the 1950's and clarify for me what all that 38th parallel worry was about.

I was a quintessential product of that era. My father used to come home for a served lunch, and we would all sit around after lunch on the screened porch, drinking tea, chomping ice and talking about the events of the day. I would always try to have something interesting to share because people would listen. I guess the real difference, looking back over the longer term, was that unlike all but the school teachers, my mother worked--teaching piano at home and then going off to New York City for six weeks at a time for "Master Lessons" with a man named Edwin Hughes. Again, to me that was "normal," if also special because most people had never been to New York City, nor could they afford to go nor, more importantly, would they have any interest in going to such a scary place "up North."

Q: What about a newspaper or TV?

KINNEY: Well, there was the Tampa Tribune, and there was the Winter Haven Daily News Chief, both of which still exist. For reasons I never really understood, we would not think of subscribing to the Orlando Sentinel, even after the advent of Disney World. In those days, somehow Tampa seemed closer and more of a reference point, although it could take up to three or four hours to drive there vs. two and a half to drive to Orlando. (Today with the Interstate it takes 45 minutes to Tampa and about 35 minutes to Orlando.)

I didn't see a television until Queen Elizabeth was crowned in 1953, I think it was. The family across the street got a television set, but there were no nearby TV stations yet. The TV screen was just full of snow. But I went across the street, and I badgered the Race family within every inch of their life to get the best reception possible because I wanted to see that coronation.

I knew everything there was to know about the coronation ceremony from beginning to end, thanks again to Life magazine. I was determined to see the actual event. The broadcast was, I think, from Jacksonville, and by the time it got to Winter Haven you could hardly see the images, but I saw what I could. I saw the Princess Elizabeth going down the aisle at Westminster Abby, and I saw her with the orb and scepter, and I saw the canopy and I knew what was going on behind it when they dropped it to cover her.

That was the first time I had ever seen a real TV set. Our family didn't get one until Disneyland opened in California. I think that might have been in '56 or so, a couple of years after the coronation. Daddy brought home a Phillips television so we could see the opening of Disneyland in Anaheim, California. My brother and I were ecstatic!

Q: Well how about movies? Were you at the Saturday night movies?

KINNEY: Movies were wonderful, but you only went to the Ritz Theater, never the Grand. Only the boys went to the Grand on Saturday afternoons. That is where the serial cowboy movies were, like Hopalong Cassidy. I loved Flash Gordon. That was the only time I was ever allowed to go to the Grand because proper people went to the Ritz.

The wonderful thing about the Ritz was that it was among the first businesses to get air conditioning. Also, it had the great musicals almost as soon as they came out. For example, “Seven Brides for Seven Brothers,” “Singing in the Rain.”

Q: This was the jewel of Hollywood during the 50’s.

KINNEY: Yes. From “Seven Brides for Seven Brothers” and “An American in Paris” to all the Fred Astaire movies and later on “The King and I” and “West Side Story.” That was by the time I was in high school. I adored dance and I adored musical theater. Mother went to New York to do some master classes in the early 50’s and brought back a copy of “South Pacific” and “Finian’s Rainbow” and later “The King and I.” I discovered Broadway, and I never got over it. I listened to those records over and over until I memorized all the songs and their lyrics.

Q: Decca Records was turning out a series of original music.

KINNEY: Yes. Mother and Daddy had seen Ezio Pinza and Mary Martin in South Pacific, so I fell in love with Rogers and Hammerstein. In retrospect, I learned a lot through the lyrics, which I didn’t always understand but later recognized the words. For example, I remember learning about “Trochaic” (meter) “onomatopoeias” from listening to Kismet and hearing Howard Keel singing the song “Rhymes.” I’d wonder, “What is he singing about?” and I would ...

Q: “I have rhymes, sweet rhymes..”

KINNEY: Yes, and just such cleverness in the use of the English language, especially Cole Porter’s Kiss Me Kate. So, listening to those records taught me a lot; I learned so many things from them besides stories and melodies. And I loved dance: Singing in the Rain was just my idea of heaven, although I preferred Fred Astaire to Gene Kelly. I must have seen Singing in the Rain 16 times.

Q: I still see it.

KINNEY: The other movies that I really loved were the toga movies, the movies from either Biblical or Roman times.

Q: Samson and Delilah.

KINNEY: The Ten Commandments. I couldn’t stand in line long enough, to be there early enough, to see The Ten Commandments when it came out.

Q: Did it grab you because of the religious content or because of the spectacle. You have a very firm shake of the head when I...

KINNEY: No, it had nothing to do with religion. It had to do with history. I had discovered ancient history, and I just found it fascinating. I could hardly wait to see how they would visualize it. The movies were the only thing that I had besides books, so to me, it was real. Looking back on it, they are pretty tawdry products, but I was mesmerized. I was enamored of it. I was just fascinated.

Q: You and I are both, although there is a considerable age gap, children of the movie era.

KINNEY: Oh, my yes. Europe was a great fascination of mine because of history. All that (Western) history took place in Europe, so I wanted to go to there and see it. When they started filming movies in Europe like Three Coins in the Fountain and To Catch a Thief and An American in Paris, these were magical. These were all in the 50's, and they were the first glimpses that Americans, who lived in small towns in the Deep South like me, ever had of Europe. They were also the first images of what post-war Europe looked like. By that time, I had seen enough pictures from the War. I knew about the destruction; I knew about the holocaust. It was all unfathomable to me, but that wasn't the way it looked in the movies.

Plus, anyone who had enough money to go to Europe in the late 50's was a big deal. I remember one fabulous party Mamma and Daddy went to was because Dick and Julie Pope (the owners of Cypress Gardens) were going to EUROPE! Wow!! How times change.

Q: I would imagine you didn't have the opportunity during that period some of the rather gritty say Italian movies, Bicycle Thief?

KINNEY: Foreign movies? No, I never saw a foreign movie until I went to Cambridge (Mass.), to attend Harvard. I didn't see foreign films at Vassar. I don't remember going to movies in Madrid. I went to the Zarzuela, Spain's light opera, like Gilbert and Sullivan in England.

Q: Well, you graduated from high school when?

KINNEY: 1962.

Q: Extra curricular stuff?

KINNEY: I was the president of several clubs or an officer in them. I ran for student government, but I wasn't popular enough to be elected. I was taking piano all this time so I gave annual piano recitals, as they were called. So I had the piano and glee club. I had drama club, which was my real passion and love. I won the Oratorical Contest two years

running, I was a Future Farmers of America Princess, and starred in both the junior and senior plays,

Q: What was the play?

KINNEY: The one that I loved the most that I did senior year was “Our Hearts were Young and Gay.”

Q: Yes, Cornelia Otis Skinner.

KINNEY: Yes. And I had been picked out by the English Department well in advance for that part.

Q: How did they work out the reticule business? This is a purse that hung down in the front.

KINNEY: I remember that. I had a pink chemise and I remember something about the purse, but, I can't conjure it. But I loved theater and was wonderful at it. It was probably my most natural talent. I remember that they gave us a vocational preference test senior year that made all the teachers shake their heads. I really didn't fit in any of the standard categories, and so finally someone decided that it probably meant that I should be an actress or in theatre or some such. They were actually probably right in terms of natural bent and talent, but “nice girls” didn't become actresses, so that was not really an option. Besides, how would anyone from Winter Haven ever end up in some place like New York or Hollywood?

And speaking of Winter Haven Senior High, there is another high school story that bears on my Foreign Service career. At Winter Haven Senior High, in our junior year, they taught us how to do research papers, complete with footnotes and bibliography, by giving us a really dumb topic to research. This way, we could focus on mechanics and form before having to focus on substance, The topic was “The Vocation Of My Choice.” So as a junior in high school-- for reasons that I do not recall-- the vocation I chose to investigate was the Foreign Service because I learned somewhere that this was how one got involved in diplomacy, something I felt I'd been practicing all my life.

What I most remember about that paper is the creative and elegant cover I made for it, and the conclusion I reached. My conclusion at the end of the paper went something like this: “So, if you are a girl and want to have both a Foreign Service career and a family, this is not a good choice for you. It is very clear from State Department literature that the only way that women can really rise in the Foreign Service is to marry a successful officer.” (I quoted this back to the men on the Board of Examiners during my Orals examination in 1971.)

The point of this story is simply to note that this routine, public high school research paper in 1961 is where another seed was planted for wanting to work outside the environment I already knew. I didn't really think about it again until 1970, when the

Macomber reforms that enabled married women to become Foreign Service Officers were announced, but maybe that research paper also had something to do with my wanting to see and experience Europe, where, in my view, Western history really took place. During my college years we were at the height of the Cold War and living a very Euro-centric world; junior year abroad (JYA) meant that one could spend a year in Europe and still get a US college degree.

Q: You say you ran for Student Council office but weren't popular enough. Looking back on it cold and calculating, what didn't you do or what was there or was it just you were up against.

KINNEY: Well, I was up against some guys, and I also was a bit of a goody two shoes and suffered from "My God, she has done everything else; we are not going to vote for her to be Class VP as well."

Q: Oh yeah, I probably would have wanted to put you in your place too.

KINNEY: I just loved doing things, and I was encouraged in that. Plus, I was everybody's little darling and teacher's pet, and I felt like there was nothing I couldn't do.

Q: But didn't you all feel, didn't you pick up in high school, that this is all fine, but I am going to end up as a wife and a mother and there is never any career?

KINNEY: That really never occurred to me, because my mother worked. She just taught piano, but she had aspirations, and she was very vocal. There was never any question that I was going to college. By my own volition, I was not going to college in Florida. I was going North to school-- as in North Carolina. (Laugh.) I ended up at Vassar, which changed my life.

Q: OK, well you graduated from high school when?

KINNEY: 1962.

Q: While you were in Florida in high school did you get involved either emotionally or any other way with the Kennedy-Nixon election?

KINNEY: Not really. I think we were Nixon people. I didn't really understand why. I thought Kennedy was cute. I thought he was really very handsome and looked better than Nixon. But politics were just irrelevant. The center of the world was Winter Haven-- Winter Haven with all these people and all these wonderful things. Who needed anything more? Except that I wasn't content to go to college in Florida for reasons....

Q: Why Vassar?

KINNEY: Because some of our oldest family friends were originally from New York and they had a niece, Jeannie Dilge, who attended Vassar and came down for spring vacation.

And our family friend, Mary Louise Dilge, took it into her head early on that I should go to Vassar. She said, “You would love it. It would be great.” I sort of said, “Huh?”

I had all these stereotypes. I had heard of Vassar, of course, but thought “You are kidding.” Anyway, Jeannie came down to Winter Haven and we were introduced. She convinced me that I ought to apply, or at least I ought to come to Vassar for a visit. Then at cotillion the following September, during the Grand March, they passed out college pennants to everybody as you marched by. Would you believe? I was given a grey and pink pennant with Vassar written on, which I took it as a sign! (Little did I know that Vassar’s colors and one of my favorite color combinations were cattily referred to in that era as “The rosy dawn of knowledge on the grey of a woman’s mind.”)

That was junior year of high school, so when Jeannie came down again for spring vacation and kept working on me. I said, “Well I am happy to, when can I come up for a visit?” So I got on the Silver Meteor train, which stopped in Winter Haven, and made a solo visit in the fall of my senior year to Vassar College in Poughkeepsie, New York. It was in the fall, and I had never seen leaves turn colors before although I had seen snow. (We went to Indiana in the late fall when I was seven.) The Catskills were beautiful, all sorts of autumnal hues.

Mostly, everybody at Vassar was so nice and made me feel at home. They spent a lot of their time talking about ideas and books! And, there was a girl in Jeannie’s group named Carole Smith. So I took that as another sign!! Vassar was very encouraging. I told them that I didn’t think I could afford it. They said to apply for a scholarship and that I might also want to consider “early decision.”

On the theory of “What the hell, why not?” that is what I did. So in late November of my senior year of high school, I got a very thick envelope post marked Poughkeepsie, which I was afraid to open. (I later realized it is thin envelopes you should fear!) This fat one informed me that I had been selected for early decision, and I would get a full scholarship, if I would just fill out the enclosed forms.

Q: All right, then you went to Vassar from '62 to '66.

KINNEY: Yes, except for junior year, which I spent abroad. The fall of 1962, when I arrived in Poughkeepsie, was the fall that Mary McCarthy’s (Vassar ‘33) book, The Group, came out.

Q: The Daisy Chain.

KINNEY: Well, it was a novel based on her days at Vassar, but it caused an uproar because of her description of sex and the loss of virginity at Vassar. The New York Times had a front page story based on a current survey of how many currently did and didn’t “do it,” which made Vassar notorious for awhile. Let’s say the trend of the 30’s became more pronounced in the early 60’s. The question everybody wanted to know

when you got off the bus at Hamilton College for our first glee club concert was, “To which percentage do you belong?”

Because there had been all sorts of coverage that fall, we became all known as The Group Class, and we were followed as a sociological case study thereafter. What we were, without question, was a good example of the transition going on in America regarding women’s roles and rights. When we graduated, Newsweek did a cover story on us. And people are still doing studies and writing us up. What really distinguished us, by the time we graduated in 1966, was the fact that for the first time in the history of the school (and this was indicative of the other Seven Sisters as well), only half of our class married. The other half went to graduate school. Virtually all of us ended up with careers of one sort or another, in addition to whatever other paths we may or may not have chosen.

Q: Well let’s talk about Vassar as a freshman. What were your impressions of it?

KINNEY: It was beautiful. It was strange. There were all these people from all over the country, indeed from all over the world. And they all played piano and danced or had a special talent, and they were all literate and sophisticated and had been around much more than I, so that for the first time in my life, I just felt like an average or lower than average type. Instead of being the top of the heap, I was a little fish in a big pond, rather than a big fish in a little pond. And it was scary. And at the end of second semester, I was going to get a B for the first time in my life, something that caused me to call home in tears.

The source of the tears was the fact that I had to take a foreign language, and they put me in Spanish 210 because I had four years of Spanish in high school. Unfortunately, it was four years of rules about Spanish grammar with a teacher who did not really speak the language herself or certainly did not speak it fluently or well. In Spanish 210, the professor didn’t speak anything but Spanish in the class, and we were expected to read real books in Spanish. I was clueless. I couldn’t get my mouth open. I couldn’t say two words. But I managed to get through the first year and did ok, all things considered. I did get that “B”, but also got mostly “A-’s” and “B+’s” in my other classes. I figured, “Well, maybe I can do this after all.”

I remember sitting in my room in the Spring of freshman year, looking out onto the gardens of tulips and other flowers, and thinking, “My God, how in the world did I ever do this? I am so glad I did!” So, I just kept working at it.

Q: Well ’62, were there any sort of political movements? This was a little early for Vietnam.

KINNEY: No. I had an interruption in those four years because I decided that the only way I was ever going to get to Europe was to major in Spanish, my *bête noir*. I succeeded with the delightful conspiracy of Pilar de Madariaga, who was the sister of Salvador de Madariaga, a well-known intellectual of Republican Spain, who later sought refuge at Oxford after the Civil War. Pilar’s co-conspirator was another Civil War refugee, Sophia

Navoa, who was from Vigo, Galicia, not far from Franco's birth place in La Coruna, but she was his cultural and intellectual opposite. When these two dear ladies found out that I wanted to do junior year in Spain, they just bent all the rules to help me do it. They totally lied and misrepresented my command of Spanish to make sure I would spend junior year in Spain. That is what happened. So my political coming of age was not in the United States. It was in the University of Madrid in 1964-65, when the first student riots in more modern times broke out against Franco's regime.

Q: This was still high Franco.

KINNEY: Oh yes! He didn't die until 1976, I think it was. Anyway, when I got back to the United States and everybody was getting excited about protests at Berkley, I was not terribly impressed because I had already "been there and done that" and seen what it could and could not accomplish. I was ready to move on and do something else more serious.

Q: Before we move on to Spain, let's talk about classes.

At Vassar, I changed my American history major to my minor, and I became a Spanish literature major, so that I could go JYA (junior year abroad). At that time, only language majors were allowed to take off junior year to study elsewhere. In 1964, with Vassar's approval, I flew to Spain and joined New York University's year-long JYA program in the Facultad de Filosofia y Letras at the University of Madrid, which was the only program at the time that was conducted entirely in Spanish with University of Madrid full professors as faculty.

Q: Were you getting a dose of international studies in whatever course like history?

KINNEY: Well, at Vassar I discovered the study of history through primary sources. They had reams of reading but no textbooks. Everything was done from primary and secondary sources, analysis and essay. With some difficulty, I went from a world of multiple choice exams to which there was only one answer, to an approach to learning that was a good deal more confusing and complex, at least initially.

I remember a professor in one of my sophomore American history courses saying that he wanted me to do a paper on how the use of rhetoric in Congress had changed between 1840 and 1850, and I didn't know what the hell he was talking about, much less how to address the issue. Studying history at Vassar was wonderful, especially--strangely enough-- studying Southern history. Carl Degler was there, and I did Southern history with him obviously. I also did world history, and American history, and some of the sub sets in both of those. I discovered Art history at Vassar. If I had taken Art History 101 my freshman year, I probably would have been an art history major rather than a...

Q: How did you find the view of Southern history from Vassar, or did you get much of that?

KINNEY: Well, Degler had researched and written extensively on the South, and was also close to C. Van Woodward, who was at Yale, I think. I was impressed by the fact that the South was considered different enough to warrant its own history. It rang absolutely true to me in retrospect.

I remember going with one of my roommates to a football game in Redmont, New Jersey, and realizing for the first time in my life what the ongoing North-South divide and what the segregation issue was really about. I found myself sitting in a crowd of people who were predominantly black and unknown to me, and just absolutely shivering in my skin and stomach. I had enough presence of mind to realize that this was happening because I had never experienced anything like that. I could tell myself these are nice people and they are not going to hurt me, but it was such an alien and such a strange experience, it frightened me; it really shook me. An intimate black-white relationship within the family was one thing; being a minority white in a sea of blacks was another!

All of my intellectual and rational sort of principled approach aside, that was my first recognition that there was an emotional and a cultural content that presented a human conundrum and reality (on both sides!), way beyond the abstract and principled theory of civil rights. And if that emotional reality was in me, it was a lot more strong and profound a reality for those who had not had the education, experience and the background that I had.

I was fascinated. I delved deeply into Southern history and its issues because I began to see where I came from at a distance and with a perspective that hadn't been possible growing up in it. Some of it was shocking. Some of it was confounding. Some of it was also infuriating, such as having to put up with some of the ignorance and arrogance of the haughty S.O.B.s declaiming and defining "truths" and "judgments" that were just too simple and un-nuanced to be tolerable for anyone who had actually lived in the South. Humans are varied and complex, as are their stories and their history, especially as they evolve over time.

Q: Well, you had the civil rights movement cranking up then. Did you find yourself conflicted there? Because there is an awful lot of just plain snobbery or whatever you want to call it, just looking down on the South.

KINNEY: That is what I am referring to. The self-righteous dismissal with simple prescriptions and answers for anything South of the Mason Dixon would really infuriate me. But I never really knew how "Southern" I was until I came to Vassar. At home they always told me that I talked like and thought like a Yankee, so it was a good thing I was going to one of those Yankee schools.

I never understood how Southern I was until welcoming a bunch of guys from Williams and Amherst and Union to one of the first mixers in our house at Vassar, maybe a month or so after I arrived. I was in front greeting them and telling them to come on in and I said, "You all can put your coats over there." And some snappy little guy snidely said, "An' where yu from honey chil'?" I turned around and said, "What do you mean? Back

home they tell me I talk just like a Yankee.” Well, I never said “Ya-ankee” in less than three syllables, and as soon as I replied, everybody just cracked up. That was my beginning of the realization of my Southernness and that I was something different compared to most people at Vassar. And it was impressed upon me in many ways over the next six or seven years in Poughkeepsie and then at Harvard. You don’t know until you get to see yourself from another perspective who you really are and what matters and doesn’t. It’s like you’re never being more “American” than when you first go overseas.

Q: I can recall being in Mississippi and talking to a girl, and she said she just loved my accent. I didn’t realize I had an accent.

KINNEY: Well, although all my theatre and oratorical work in high school helped “normalize” my speech, there IS s a Florida accent, and I obviously still had it when I went to college. I could hear it in the guys from Gainesville and other places in Florida when I met them at Yale and Harvard. It is not as pronounced and not as defined as Georgia or Alabama. But it is there. Because I had always done so much speech work and so much theater, I didn’t have an accent as strong as everyone else at home. But my husband to this day-- I think you hear it now just talking about it-- when I talk to the family or when I go to a Southern topic or a Florida topic, says he hears it, that it comes back. It comes ‘round the corner.

Q: Well this won’t be picked up in the transcript, but as we moved into the subject your Southern accent has gotten stronger.

KINNEY: Absolutely, it is just part of who I am. And proudly so!

Q: OK, Spain. You were there from...

KINNEY: ’64-’65, and then I went back every summer until 1970.

Q: Where did you go to University?

KINNEY: I went to the University of Madrid, the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters. I lived with a Spanish family on Serrano Street in the Barrio Salamanca, which was one of the best in the city. For \$100 a month at that time, you could live like a princess because of the exchange with the Peseta: 99 to the dollar. It was without a doubt, the most difficult and emotionally challenging year I had ever experienced, and I thought freshman year at Vassar was a challenge. But the first four months in Spain were four times harder.

Q: Well, what was it the language or the culture or what?

KINNEY: No one had told me about culture shock, so I went totally unprepared. I could hardly speak Spanish, and I really knew nothing about the country. I knew they had had a civil war, and that was about it. I knew a little about Spanish history. I had read some excerpts from a couple of their great authors, but I really had no clue what I was doing. AND, I had never lived in a city before. So, for example, part of my great frustration and

fury, which I attributed to Spanish incompetence, were busses that didn't show up on time. I would just get up into an absolute fury having to waste time waiting for them, not realizing that late or non-appearing busses are just a part of any urban environment, Spanish or otherwise. So, it was culture shock times two due to both city life and Spanish culture. When you don't know what to expect and that what you are going through (culture shock) is "normal," it can be pretty difficult.

The family I lived with--Jose and Paloma de Ramos-- were not able to have children, which also put a particular dynamic on things in my living situation. In retrospect, it was sad, especially for the Spain of that era. Paloma's father had been Franco's best friend in the Spanish military in Morocco, and they were Franquistas of the first order. (You'll recall that Franco's revolt was started from North Africa.) She and Jose quickly decided that I was some sort of "sin verquenza," a person without shame, because I would insist that young men come to the door to pick me up for a date, which is what a good Southern girl insists on. If she did otherwise, she would be considered a trollop. The differences to be navigated between the Southern girl and the Vassar girl in the Franquist environment were quite stunning and quite difficult to deal with. By the following Spring, however, I ended up loving Spain, its culture and people and language, but it was a tempestuous relationship to finally reach that point. And, it was another life changer.

Q: Did you get any feel of the aftermath of the civil war? Was it was still around at that time?

KINNEY: Oh absolutely, and this was crystallized during my Christmas vacation that year. I spent the Christmas of 1964 with the family of the first foreigner I ever knew. This was an American Field Service exchange student who came to Winter Haven my junior year from Aarhus, Denmark, Finn Brobecher. He lived with the family of my boyfriend at the time. The minute I knew I was going to Spain, I wrote to Finn, and he invited me to come and join him and his family for Christmas. So having had this initial traumatic three months in Madrid, I then went to spend Christmas with the Brobechers in Aarhus.

After Christmas in Denmark, I met an American friend in Frankfurt, Germany, and we drove to Munich and Vienna and then down the Rhone Valley and back over the Pyrenees into Barcelona and then back to Madrid. So what I appreciated right away during that vacation were two things: 1) how much more Northern Europe/Germany had developed since the end of WWII in 1945 and 2) how much less Spain had accomplished since the end of its Civil War in 1939.

I also began to realize that were "Spanish Spaniards" and there were "European Spaniards." I got along very well with the "European Spaniards" and liked them a lot, but I could not say the same for the "Spanish Spaniards." "Spanish Spaniards" tended to be Franquist, tended to be uber Catholic, uber conservative, uber small-minded from my perspective and utterly ruled by the doctrinaire and the traditional in their thinking, which included seeing me as an unaccompanied, single American Protestant as some sort of monster or freak. As I got to learn more about Spain's Islamic past, I also realized that this group impressively still embodied many aspects of Arab culture than I had not

appreciated earlier. Castilian Spanish, as a language, was not the only place remnants of 700 years of Islamic culture had left its mark.

Finding out about Spain's Muslim past was no easy matter though. Books on the subject were banned. History started in 1492 after the Christian reconquest of the peninsula and the infidel Moors. Sanchez Albornoz's groundbreaking study of Moorish Spain was published while I was there and banned from sale in Spain. So, of course, it was the one book all self-respecting university students had to obtain a copy of!

Q: Sounds like your Spanish-Spaniards would fit right in with the red neck south.

KINNEY: Well, I will come to that later. In short, they would. As far as I was concerned, the European Spaniards--particularly the men-- were real educated, modern human beings. So there was that distinction. And there was also the political distinction between Republicans and Franquists, something I came to appreciate because my best friend was living with the Azcarate family, and Gumer Azcarate had been Vice President of the Republic before the Civil War broke out. As a result of "my family's" Franquist affiliation, I quickly learned never to mention when I was going to see the Azcarates.

Thanks to Gumer and Guillermina Azcarate, I not only had an insight into Republicans vs. Franquists, but I also had an insight into that other interesting dichotomy drawn by Europeans, which was Spain versus the rest of Europe. Twenty-five years after the Spanish Civil War, Spain was still poverty stricken, crumbling and ancient--still Moorish or medieval in many aspects. When I went to Munich and saw what the Germans had done in the same period of time, it was like being on another planet, not to mention the differences of culture and people, and Denmark was even more remarkable, needless to say. But Germany is what really brought the contrast of the North/South divide home to me.

Having seen that divide in my own country, it resonated. In fact, I eventually rolled my observations and thinking into a set piece I often used communicating with Spanish Speakers in Latin America in particular. Because another thing I became aware of living in Madrid-- even though it was a period of intense anti-Americanism in Latin America-- was that the Latin American students in Madrid and I had a lot more in common and felt more at home with each other by virtue of being New Worlders than Latin American students did with the Spaniards with whom they shared a common language and to some degree a culture but a very different mindset and set of emotions. The Latin American students in Madrid remained ideological, anti-American, leftist revolutionaries in theory, but in reality they found that they were much more at home with the gringos at the university than they were with the mainstream Espanoles.

So the dynamics of the North/South cultural complexities and realities and the affinities between the Southern US and South America were something I took great delight in trying to make sense of by the end of the year. And it really stayed with me.

I ended up drawing on those insights and using them in an often requested speech in Venezuela when we were posted there in the mid-80's. I would do a play on the word "Yankee" and speak from the standpoint of the U.S. Southerner who also had the same view of Yankees as the Latin Americans, someone who had had to confront the same problems as an underdeveloped region and agrarian culture that pretty well matched my Venezuelan interlocutors' own experience. So it allowed us to get past the ideological rhetoric and down to more specific and problem solving conversation, especially where development economics was concerned.

Q: Did you run across the U.S. Embassy while you were in Madrid?

KINNEY: I didn't know it existed.

Q: Were you a new girl when you came back to Vassar? Had you seen the light?

KINNEY: No, but I was different. I had had an experience that very few people had had at that time. Most people went to France and Germany. Back then everybody-- especially in Europe and also on the East coast of the United States -- thought that Africa began on the South side of the Pyrenees. Although some Scandinavians and Germans were beginning to discover the charm of Spain's inexpensive, sunny beaches, Spain was not cool in either Europe or in the United States. Most regarded it as a retrograde backwater of Black Legend catholic conservatives and maybe bull fights.

A year after I came back home, however, that changed. Spain suddenly became cool and I found myself regarded as cutting edge because of my junior year in Madrid. The 1966 World's Fair introduced the "New Spain" to the United States. The Spanish Pavilion was one of the hits of the Fair, and it received more awards and commentary than almost anything else. It also introduced Spanish design, style and cuisine, especially sangria and paella, to Americans.

New York had no Spanish restaurants before the Worlds' Fair, but shortly after the Fair closed down, it had three or four, and for a while these restaurants were among the best and most chic places to be seen in the City. So things Spanish that had been unknown or politically incorrect -- at least in New York circles-- suddenly had a certain cache and were considered more interesting than news from Paris or Berlin because modern Spain was so unknown and still so exotic. "Tierra de color y contrastes" (Land of color and contrasts) was what the Spanish tourist posters advertised and it was.

What I loved about Spain, this small peninsula, was its intense and richly diverse regional variety, with eight layers of conquest and history piled one on top of the other, all of which you had to understand, you had to come to terms with if you wanted to understand the culture and the people. This was a stunning richness for an American with only 200 years of national history, even one from the South, which sees itself much more deeply rooted and penetrated with a sense of the burden of history.

The experience of junior year abroad was so intense and so awakening that I didn't want to give it up. I fell in love with my requisite Spaniard. That lasted for a couple of years, and then I got real. They say that Foreign Service Officers have rich fantasy lives; I guess I was a very good candidate after that year in Spain.

Q: No, I can understand. You mention your Spaniard. How do they, I mean...

KINNEY: He was a European Spaniard, not a Spanish Spaniard. He was love waiting to happen.

Q: ...treating the American girls. I used to find this a consular problem from time to time. You know I mean not really understanding American girls.

KINNEY: Mixed signals. One of the biggest problems for me at that time was the fact that there were few Americans in Spain, and so I kept being taken for Swedish. Apparently the Swedes were unlike any female Spanish men had ever encountered. Most American girls at that time were not Swedes, when it came to sex.

At least in my program, most American girls/women were used to being open and trusting and confident and thinking we knew what is going on and how to control our environment. With some notable exceptions, most of us in Madrid resisted acting too far out of line with how we behaved at home. Unfortunately, most of us also had little or no understanding of class systems, culture systems, the Moorish influence, the role of the Catholic Church, an understanding of Spanish cultural signals and tacit decision making and the creative use of Spanish hypocrisy, if you will.

There was a wide cultural gulf between America of that era and where Spain was at the time in general, but this was even more true when it came to gender. You could get angry or frustrated about it, or you could seek to understand it, and I benefited greatly from eventually having a pretty profound and useful understanding of most things Spanish--even the "piropos" and harassing, urban "ligones," who felt anything with skirts was theirs to try and conquer.

Q: Well you graduated in '66, the Daisy Chain and all that. When you got back to the campus...

KINNEY: All the Junior Year Abroaders (JYA) stuck together. Having left old rooming groups at the end of Sophomore year, the college tended to pair us up in Main Hall, which is the building where our class all lived together senior year. I ended up with another refugee from Junior Year Abroad, Betsy Messeca. She had been in France, and we both suffered from the same angst, nostalgia, and not fitting in and became wonderful, dear friends to this day. JYA's were just different. You weren't thinking about the same things. You weren't talking about the same things. You weren't doing the same things as everybody else. Betsy went on to become one of the first female VP's at Chase and infamously brought the women's class action suit against the bank and won. I went on to become one of the first married women accepted into the Foreign Service.

Q: I mentioned the Daisy Chain. Was there a special Vassar spirit that permeated the place or was it just school?

KINNEY: Vassar has always seen itself as special, and at the risk of being partisan, what captured it for me was a photo layout in Esquire Magazine about the time The Group, came out.

Q: The book.

KINNEY: Yes, the book by Mary McCarthy that I mentioned that caused such a storm. There were a lot of articles in the '62-'63 period on the "Seven Sisters," as the women's equivalent to the Ivy League was then called. The coverage was prescient because ten years later, most of the women's colleges had gone co-ed. So it was a swan song era, of sorts, although people didn't realize it in 1962.

What captured Vassar for me was this Esquire layout of stereotypical images conveyed by models dressed and posed appropriately for each of the "Seven Sisters." Under each model was the respective college motto. Vassar was the only one that didn't have a motto. Vassar was the only one whose colors were irregular-- pink and grey. Remember the wag version of that was "the rosy dawn of knowledge on the grey of a woman's mind."

The fact is that Vassar had always held a leadership position in the education of women since its founding in 1865. It was one of the earliest and finest liberal arts colleges for women and produced a number of women scholars, such as Maria Mitchell, the first female astronomer and many others, including Jane Fonda and Meryl Streep and Lisa Kudrow more recently. (The list of scholarly and business leaders is much longer, but they are less well known, except for the guy who created Pixar.) We still have Maria Mitchell's observatory on campus. It is a national historic landmark now. That sense of leadership, to some degree the sense of entitlement, but mostly obligation, for women to go out and show what they could do permeated the campus, and that was ever more true as the 60's progressed and feminism became a public topic rather than a private discussion.

Q: Did the Kennedy inaugural, "Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country," did that, was that considered aimed at women too or was that pretty much a man's thing?

KINNEY: I think that was not something that women saw as directed at them. Women had always been serving in the support role, but I don't think that was interpreted as go out and seek a leadership role as much as go out and make a difference and do something significant.

Q: How about the Peace Corps? Was this something that was striking?

KINNEY: The Peace Corps was an exciting concept, and its people did make a difference. A couple of people in my class joined it. I considered it, but having spent the time that I did in Spain, I frankly, wasn't prepared to subject myself to two years of male harassment and God knows what else out in less developed areas of South America. I knew too much.

With my Spanish, I would have been sent to Latin America because the fear of creeping communism in that region was a big concern in those days. It was a priority to counter the intellectual left, the communist infiltration and, of course, Cuba, which by that time was being recognized as a destabilizing force in the region.

Q: Was the women's movement, Betty Freidan and Gloria Steinem, was that...

KINNEY: I read The Feminine Mystique. It was a source of much discussion. But by that time, at least for myself and for most of my classmates, Freidan's was a "Duh?" proposition. I think I mentioned this earlier, but my class was the first class at Vassar where half of the graduates went on to graduate school instead of running for the diamond and getting married. So we were interesting in that respect. We were a turning-point. I think a fair number of us retained a certain amount of self-consciousness about being that turning-point class. Two years later, the first few men were admitted to Vassar, and that started the shift to co-education, or as Vassar puts it, co-equal education. So it was both the end of an era and the beginning of a new one.

Q: Did you burn your bra or was that sort of thing going on?

KINNEY: No. I looked down on people that behaved like that. I was a Southern girl. And that was no way to behave.

Q: You graduated in '66. What did you do?

KINNEY: Well, I didn't have a lot of money. I had to earn a living. What was I going to do fresh out of Vassar, a perfectly minted "water lily floating on a sea of culture?" Harvard was offering MAT's, a one-year teaching Masters, so I thought, "Ah, that will get grad school out of the way, and I actually will be able to do something with that degree." Influenced by the best seller of the same name, I saw myself "charging up the down staircase" with Miss Barrett; I was passionate about education because it had been so important to me and my ticket out of the confines of Winter Haven.

I ultimately applied to the Harvard Graduate School of Education (HGSE) because everybody else had these impossibly long application forms, and Harvard's was only four pages long. I was lucky; I got in. I got an NEA scholarship, and went through the program, which was pretty useless, except that I got a teaching certificate out of it. What it did was cement my lifelong antipathy to a public school system that makes the possession of an "education" degree more important than one's substantive mastery (history, math, science, etc.) of what one teaches.

Being familiar with Harvard's style and teaching methods as a result of Vassar, I was a good deal more confident than many of my fellow students. I remember, in the case of one required course, I just flatly refused to spend my time on it. I explained to the professor why the course was a waste of time and he allowed me to write two research papers on topics of interest to me in return for the A in the course. The other part of the deal was that I was not to share with anyone our conversation and what had been agreed to. An important lesson learned in knowing how to ask for what you want.

The most interesting part of the MAT degree were the courses I got to take in Harvard College, things such as linguistics and some of Chomsky's early work on grammar. Although I was deeply committed to improving the teaching of foreign languages in the public school system -- especially given my own public school experience -- I had to revise my priorities. During my Harvard internship in Waltham Senior High School and the following year that I spent employed there, I learned that I really could not justify trying to teach Spanish to people whose greatest need was to first learn to speak and write decent English.

Q: I am just looking at time, I have got to take off. I know you have got something else. Why don't we talk a bit about...

KINNEY: I am surprised that all of this is about pre-Foreign Service. I thought this interview was supposed to be about my Foreign Service experience.

Q: Well, I will explain it on tape. When we started this program, we did ask a bit about where you come from. The whole idea was to dispel the idea that all Foreign Service people were born on Harvard Square with a silver spoon in their mouth. It is an extremely diverse group. As I started going, one is my natural inquisitiveness, but the other one is I realized we have now done over 1600 of these transcripts, and for the last good number of years we have been going into depth on the early things. As a result, we have got a unique collection of Americana with people growing up in the 60's and all, because this happened to be the generation where we picked this up. There is nothing like this anywhere else. So I have the feeling, really the conviction, that the upbringing and early youth and all of the Foreign Service will become as important from the sociological point of view as the diplomatic history. It will take years for it to become really well-known, but it is there. You can pick up all sorts of things.

Q: Today is the first of April, April Fool's Day, 2010. It is also Census Day, with Stephanie Kinney. So how was Harvard and what happened after that?

KINNEY: After Harvard, there was never any question but that I would work, in large part because my mother had always worked and run the house and had the family. My parents got divorced while I was in college, and that was pretty...

Q: How did that hit you?

KINNEY: Like a thunderbolt. But I was 18, and I was determined that this was their problem and not my problem and that I was not going to let it distract me. I understood survival from early on. I don't know whether this was a Southern thing or a family thing, but I had a much more finely honed sense of life as survival than a lot of my classmates did. The Scarlet O'Hara thing is real, or it was.

It was very clear to me that I was on my own, and my life would be what I made it, that it was up to me. There wasn't time for a lot of playing around, so I was fairly pragmatic. I was passionate about public education. I believed in education back then, and Vassar had re-enforced that ten-fold. As I mentioned earlier, I saw myself charging up the down staircase with Miss Barrett. I looked around, and I had a Vassar degree, but nobody would let me teach because I didn't have an education degree.

Q: Up the Down Staircase was a book about a teacher's experience in the New York system at the time. It is both hilarious and tragic.

KINNEY: And tragic, yeah. It inspired me to decide that was a worthy calling. As mentioned, Harvard was offering a one year Master's in Teaching (MAT). I looked at other schools and their application forms were multiple pages, and some of them had the temerity to want two years for a degree. So I thought better an easy, one-year Masters. I got an NEA grant and filled out Harvard's four page form and was off to Cambridge for a year. I did my public school internship and stayed on at the school's request for a year, but decided the biggest problem for these children was not learning Spanish. They needed to learn English first.

Q: Where did you do your intern and year's teaching?

KINNEY: I knew you were going to ask that question: Waltham Senior High School, in a suburb outside of Boston.

Q: What was Waltham like as far as a source of...

KINNEY: Working class., and an increasing number of minorities and immigrants-- African Americans, Portuguese, Hispanic, and Puerto Ricans, if you distinguish Ricans from Hispanics, which one should.

Q: Well, was bilingualism part of the code of that day?

KINNEY: Oh yes. Well no, it was becoming part of the code or political correctness. Title V, I think it was, in federal legislation. My experience turned me into a raving opponent of Title V and the whole concept of bilingualism. When I was at the Commonwealth School, I set up an internship for my Spanish students with a couple of Boston elementary schools that were going down the bilingualism path. I was horrified at what I observed. It was great for my students, but it was essentially an excuse for adults who should have been more responsible, to keep a next generation of young people

effectively barefoot and pregnant and locked in a lower class in need of “Latino politicians.” What I observed were schools being turned into a Hispanic cultural setting in which students easily opted into Spanish and did not effectively learn standard English. The children were the sacrificial lambs in the hands of rising “Latino politicians.” Fooley!

Q: You might just explain what bilingualism meant at that time.

KINNEY: In theory, it was devised to “save” non-English speaking immigrant children the pain earlier immigrant cohorts faced with unrelenting and unforgiving immersion into English, live or die. The theory was that you would have a bilingual curriculum in which certain classes would be taught in their native language, in this case Spanish. That way young students would be getting the content such as math in their native language without having to learn both math and English at the same time. They would be moved ahead into increasingly English-only classes as their English improved. In reality, it didn’t work.

In reality, bilingualism was a jobs program for Spanish speakers in Latino political networks. The kids spoke Spanish at home, and they came to school and they had very indulgent teachers who worked with them more in Spanish rather than trying to teach them English. It prolonged the amount of time the children stayed in their native language and native cultural setting. For me, it raised serious questions about whether they were ever going to gain a real command of standard English and middle class American culture.

What I observed was a recipe for condemning these children to a ghettoized, Spanish-speaking existence in the United States. This may have been more comfortable in the short run, especially for their adults, but in the longer run, bilingualism as implemented by Hispanic politicians was not going to benefit the children or the country. The main beneficiaries would be the politicians with patronage to distribute. So I became pretty adamant and outspoken in my views on that.

Q: I agree completely. My wife also has her masters in English as a second language and taught. It is pretty obvious the major thing about it is it gave jobs to Spanish speaking people.

KINNEY: It was a jobs program for adults and a political program for Hispanic politicians as opposed to American politicians. It was a spoils program or a patronage program at the expense of the children. It was just like in the District of Columbia.

Q: How did you find the school administration in the city school you were teaching in?

KINNEY: As depicted in Up the Down Staircase. Large classes (30-35 for a foreign language class) and pretty bureaucratized and run according to the book by older white men intent on basically keeping the lid on and controlling the lack of socialized and cultivated behavior that children were no longer getting at home. A unionized jobs program for adults.

Q. So what happened?

By chance, I was introduced to Charles Merrill, a son of the Merrill Lynch fortune and the Headmaster of the Commonwealth School in Boston. Created by Charles when he returned from occupied Europe in the 50's, Commonwealth became well known in education circles for its many breaks with tradition. John Holt, who wrote Why Children Fail, worked at Commonwealth. Charles himself often referred to the school as "his snake pit for young radicals," since the students were largely drawn from the cream of the Harvard and Boston academic and professional elites.

The interesting thing about Commonwealth was how deeply rooted in tradition it really was--a place of Socratic questioning and investigation, required Bible classes, the illusion of freedom managed with pretty iron clad control by one man and one only, the Headmaster. The school had only one rule: "No roller skating in the corridors." This was the perfect setting for a benign and often whimsical dictatorship.

It is a long story, but Charles ended up hiring me to be his Spanish Language and Literature Department, as well as his co-lecturer in American History for three years.

Q: What made Commonwealth what it was?

KINNEY: Its headmaster. Charles Merrill was the son of the founder of Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith. Charles was forever the younger son engaged in liberal rebellion against his capitalist father. Charles was my most significant and meaningful encounter with the true New England liberal political cultural tradition, at its best and worst.

The interesting thing about Charles was his inability to be at ease with good fortune, but that is a whole other story, which we don't need to go into. Charles had seen his father lose his first fortune in the depression and then rebuild it into Merrill Lynch. Charles was a small, slight, driven man, who, by the way, achieved a great deal more than the public generally knew or understood. His great sadness in life was that he was too young to join the Lincoln Brigade in the Spanish Civil War, but he made it into the American Army and ended up on a Fulbright in occupied Germany and France right after World War II. He fancied himself being the author of the great American novel, and then had to accept that this was not to be, nor was it where his real talent lay. He was a provocative teacher at heart.

Q: He had this feeling that after WWII there was going to be another Hemmingway and he might be it?

KINNEY: Exactly. As he told the story, he realized that he wasn't going to make it as a novelist, but also realized that what he really loved was teaching. He had the means to come back and buy two Boston townhouses on Commonwealth Avenue, renovate them,

and create the Commonwealth School, which, as I mentioned, became a haven and laboratory for educational progressives such as John Holt and others.

Some years later, looking at schools for my daughter, I learned that the first Head Mistress of Georgetown Day School in Washington, D.C. had a link to Commonwealth and to some degree modeled Georgetown Day on it. I learned this because I mentioned that its atmosphere reminded me of a small private school I used to teach at in Boston.

Charles was a doctrinaire New England liberal, but he had actually been raised in both Florida and Mississippi, a fact that gave us more in common than many people realized. Through a curious set of circumstances, he had first hand experience south of the Mason-Dixon and unlike most of his New England colleagues, knew the region and its culture quite well. He also had a jaundiced view of the Cambridge Square set, particularly Harvard, MIT and the whole Boston area academic and professional elite because he saw what was happening to their children. He saw what “having no boundaries” led to.

His “No roller skating in the hallways,” seemed ultra liberal and cool. However, this was a two story townhouse with stairs, so in reality the rule meant he ran things as he saw fit, in accordance with individual needs as he perceived them. He used that approach for basically trying to teach the children -- and between teaching freshman year Bible class and junior year American History class, he did personally teach them all-- that life requires boundaries. Life requires structure and disciplined thought, and that when there are no rules, it is an invitation to dictatorship. He was the dictator, the Headmaster. He also believed that it was important for children to learn that adults can be dangerous.

Charles was a deeply religious man, but in a somewhat unorthodox way. He taught the Bible classes that were required for freshmen because he believed that the Bible conveys great literature, great moral quandaries and culture. There were a large number of Jewish students in the school. 15% of the students were disadvantaged minorities, mostly from Boston, attending on scholarships personally provided by Charles. The rest were the children of the Boston/Cambridge liberal establishment. Peter Galbraith was one of my students.

Q: Whom I have interviewed.

KINNEY: Yes, I could tell you some stories about him.

The late 60's and early 70's was a period of a lot of drug use, and we had serious drug problems in the school, along with a lot of civil rights conflict and activism. And we had social class problems because Commonwealth was the first private school in New England to make a commitment to having a student body with 15% minority students, primarily African Americans from the black neighborhoods in Boston. (They were called “black” in those days.)

Charles led the way to pressure the other private schools in New England to do the same, through his ABC (A Better Chance) program. He believed in the power of education and

was very committed to using it to help break down segregation in the South and to promote a better quality of “integration,” as it was then called in the North. He knew and understood in a way that the New England liberal establishment did not, or at least at that time did not appreciate, how deeply segregated the North really was as well.

This lack of Northern self-awareness got me into quite a bit of trouble at one point. Charles and I team taught American history together, and the second year I was there, we agreed that it might be fun to shake up the students a bit and teach it from the Southern point of view as the War of Northern Aggression, something I could do quite well, complete with accent and attitude. In the discussion class following the lecture, one of the things we wanted to address coming forward was the fact that where segregation in the South was de jure, there was actually a good deal more integration of lives and realities across race lines that in many areas of the North, where de facto segregation produced lifestyles where neither race really knew or had much experience with the other for good or ill.

With malice of forethought, Charles and I laid out my perspective on the hypocrisy of the North vis a vis the South, especially where the elite, liberal establishment was concerned. Several parents called and demanded that I be fired, not knowing that Charles had collaborated in putting this issue on the table. We both felt the kids needed to learn something they did not know: they were the self-righteous products of an insulated and extremely precious, homogeneous world. That world might have been intellectually adventurous in theory but could be quite closed and re-enforcing and narrow in reality. In my experience, some of the most self-satisfied provincialism I ever encountered could be found in and around Harvard Square.

Q: Well, in Boston at that period, racism was rife. I mean busing.

KINNEY: No, that wasn't until after I left in 1971, but I had predicted it. In fact, as the story began to unfold, I told Charles in a letter that the results could be worse, because due to class and ethnicity, the communities involved not only did not like each other but literally also did not know each other.

Charles sent a personal annual newsletter to all current and past Commonwealth families, and he ended up quoting at length what I had written him on this subject, as well as a remembrance of the demands of certain families for my dismissal because I had dared put my finger on the problem in class a few years before. It was his way of chastening the Harvard Square set when the conflict broke out between South End and Roxbury. It was indeed virulent and violent, and people were shocked, shocked.

Q: Well in your opinion, how did this 15% minorities work at your school?

KINNEY: Like any strategic change effort, with difficulty and mixed results. You had class, ethnicity and color at work. Charles also brought in one or two white students, who were poor and disadvantaged but whom he considered deserving. Ideology only goes so far, however, and then there is the human reality. I don't know what the actual statistics

were, but there were those who were cold-eyed and saw the white man's school as the opportunity it was and regarded the Commonwealth scholarship for what it was, an overdue down payment for a better life. Others suffered hurt and confusion and got chewed up in the process of a noble experiment.

Alice Walker, the author of The Color Purple, was one of Charles' protégés, although I've never seen her acknowledge it, nor were many around him aware of the fact. I knew this because Charles gave me a copy of her first book, the publication of which he basically paid for. She was not a student, but she was a Merrill protégé. He had picked her up through another channel. He quietly used the Merrill money for lots of good things. For example, he funded a lot of work on free education in Poland and in Krakow, in particular. It is not by accident that things transpired there as they did. People like Charles had been working on it for a long time, identifying potential leaders and providing scholarships to off-the-grid private schools, which he created in one case, endowed and bought books for in others.

But you asked about the scholarship students in Boston. Some of them saw it in a very cold-eyed, street-wise, opportunistic way, and they made the most of it. They were even grateful for the opportunity. Others had terrible difficulties and were crushed because they didn't really understand enough about the opportunity they had been given and the costs that were going to be attached to it. They paid heavy prices trying to keep up with the Galbraiths, or be cool with the druggies or compete academically with kids who were born knowing more than they could ever learn in a couple of years.

There was also the big problem of having to go back to their own homes and neighborhoods each night, where no one else was "being given a free ride," and square that reality with their daily life at Commonwealth. Many in our students' neighborhoods viewed them as attending Commonwealth because of their perceived potential to go to a Whitey school at Whitey's expense to make Whitey feel good. This was how their neighbors often characterized what our students were doing.

Some of our minority students would end up "acting out" at school so they could go home and brag about what trouble they had caused for Whitey that day. Many of these kids felt like they had to lead double lives, and it was a terrible burden for them. Some of them managed it cleverly and well; others had very sad and distressed lives because they ended up not belonging anywhere. Such is the real cost of real change.

Q: You were there at the height of the protests against Vietnam. In the first place, how did you feel about our engagement in Vietnam, and then how did it play out, sort of in your life then at that particular time?

KINNEY: Well, I didn't pay too much attention to it. Charles' reference to Commonwealth as his "snake pit for young radicals" was because revolution was very chic at the time; it was the time of "radical chic," to use Tom Wolfe's phrase. The school was a block off the Boston Commons and Charles Street, which is where marijuana was easy to buy and all of the big demonstrations in Boston took place.

I found the whole thing puzzling. I found ideology puzzling. I found Nixon versus Stevenson puzzling. I mean this was when people still had posters and small memoriams to Adlai Stevenson in their garages. I didn't understand these people. I learned about New England liberalism and New England liberals and the whole Liberal thing more by osmosis or by accident. I could play their game, but they had no clue, much less curiosity about mine. Nobody ever had spelled any of this out for me. They all assumed they knew me and that everybody knew what they knew and agreed that they represented "Godly truth."

I came from an era and a region such that I didn't even know Liberals existed. I mean life was defined by what I had known and grown up with in the South and discovered at Vassar and in Spain. So the South to North thing was still a challenge for me. When you added the international dimension to this-- like Vietnam-- how could I know where truth lay? Based on experience to date, including Spain, where and what was "truth?" The only thing I knew was that truth was complex and it was different things to different people.

I still believed in it the concept of empirical truth, but I sure did not know what it was in the case of Vietnam. All I knew was that what I was observing was driven more by passion and conviction than any real experience or knowledge of those involved in the war itself, whether civilian or military.

That time in Boston was a real education in politics and power and ideological differences. I guess Boston was an intellectual coming of age for me that I valued tremendously. But I couldn't understand how one could-- as a country-- have treaties and both moral and legal obligations and walk away from them. I couldn't understand how one could go in and tear up some place and not have some responsibility for finishing the job and fixing it. I couldn't understand how people could regard the North Vietnamese, who were puppets of Mao's China, as "benign" and morally superior.

I never basically came down one way or another because I never was basically able to find what I thought was some irrevocable touchstone of truth. So I didn't approve of violence and radicalism to make your point, and I certainly didn't think that carrying posters and raging through the streets was very constructive. That was mostly hormones at work, as I had seen in Madrid. That gets you nowhere and doesn't influence anybody with serious power, except to convince them that your side must be wrong or they would behave in a more constructive way.

I remember that McGeorge Bundy was a friend whom Charles asked to speak to the school. Bundy made what I thought was a very powerful case from his perspective. History has judged him to be wrong and at best ill informed. In retrospect, his performance was that of a polished spokesperson for policy, everything that years later I would see again in Washington at high levels, where decisions eventually have to be made--right or wrong. Only time really reveals their consequence--for better or worse.

Q: He was National Security Advisor?

KINNEY: Yes. It was just all very confusing from my perspective.

Q: Well then after 1970, whither?

KINNEY: In early 1969, I decided that I was fed up with Harvard Square. I felt like I had gotten into a bit of a rut, and I was going back South. I was maybe going to move to Atlanta. I had never been to Atlanta, didn't know a thing about Atlanta, but it seemed like a good idea at the time. The thing that really ticked me off was a Commonwealth grading session.

Commonwealth gave grades twice a year through handwritten comments and collective teacher discussion of each individual student. This one student -- I don't know how he had gotten in. -- was the dumbest thing that ever walked through the door, some arrangement between the family and Charles, no doubt. God knows. He was a nice kid, good white boy, but just dumb. And the faculty decided he should go to Duke or Rice. That was just the final cultural insult, as far as I was concerned. If this kid had gotten into Podunk U, it would have been a miracle, and they thought Duke or Rice were so stupid and unselective that they might take him. It just ticked me off. I slammed down my books on the table, made an intemperate statement and got up and left the grading session.

Charles came running after me, making apologies and assuring me that he would discipline the miscreants on his teaching staff, who were the source of this folly. I finally agreed to come back in. There were acknowledgements and apologies. I just felt that if they were so damned smart and so right and so righteous, how could they be so bloody ignorant and so hypocritical and so narrow? If I had learned enough to play their game and operate in their culture, I did not see why they should remain so willfully ignorant and smugly dismissive of the complexities of mine? It just got to the point of bugging me. So I was going to go back South.

I had been dating a couple of different people, so I let them know that I was leaving, and that it was the end of the relationships. ("Relationship" didn't mean in those days what it does today.) I agreed to go to one more party with the older, real estate developer I was seeing, who was the person who really helped me understand this whole little elite insular world of the New England liberal establishment. It was at that party that I was introduced to Douglas Sheldon Kinney, a recent Peace Corps returnee starting an MPA at the newly renamed Kennedy School of Government. We were married in June of 1970, and I stayed in Boston for another year at Commonwealth. When Douglas finished his degree, we moved to Washington to begin his Foreign Service career.

I want to backtrack just a bit because you said to remind you about going home from Boston and from New York.

In that period, what stunned and irritated me were the attitudes and ignorance that I found in New England vis a vis the South. It grated on me that anybody from South of the

Mason Dixon Line was immediately dismissed as being from “Nixon Land” or a member of Nixon’s “Silent Majority” or otherwise denigrated as generally benighted, if not evil.

My touchstone has always been Winter Haven, Florida, a place I continued to visit at least once or twice a year. And what I saw happening there surprised and shocked me, starting, I think, maybe around my junior or senior year in college. That would have been about ’65 or ’66. Such that I started deliberately tracking what I observed on trips thereafter.

I’ve already described how I discovered the blending of color lines between Florence Villa and Winter Haven, starting when I was in college, Integration had happened. Nobody planned or forced it; it just started happening. The two communities just sort of crept closer and closer, and on the edges, the edges began to blur. You couldn’t tell where one began and the other ended anymore. In “colored town,” people had two car garages and nice simple concrete houses, just like a lot of the less wealthy members of the white community. The shacks and the wooden buildings were not totally disappeared, but they were withering. They were going away and being replaced by something better.

The physical manifestation of change and the economic manifestation of change were stunning to me. I couldn’t believe it. There was a real middle class black neighborhood in Winter Haven. Such had never been evident or observable before. I kept trying to figure out how or why this seemed to be happening --more or less-- on its own. This is not to say that it would have happened without the national movement, but in Winter Haven, the integration was much more apparent and real than anyone at Commonwealth seemed to be able to conceive of. I was seeing a much more integrated reality in Winter Haven than I did in Boston. I just found that really interesting.

Q: So what is Doug’s background?

KINNEY: Douglas was the son of Sheldon H. Kinney. Sheldon was a man who ran off to sea at 14 because there was not enough to eat at home in Pasadena during the Depression. Doug’s father lied about his age to become a sailor in the Navy a year or so later, and was then selected from the ranks to attend the Naval Academy. He was in the class commissioned early in order to fight in World War II and he still holds the record for the number of submarine “kills” in twenty-four hours (Battle of the Atlantic). He rose to Rear Admiral before retiring to take the Presidency of the Maritime College of the State University of New York for ten years. After that he salvaged the new United Nations World Maritime University (WMO) in Malmo, Sweden, from its corrupt first Rector. Doug’s mother, Elizabeth (Lea) Mercier Douglas Kinney, was from a well-to-do New York family that had married into that of Boss Tweed’s at the turn of the century and then lost all its money during the Crash of ’29. This meant she had to withdraw from college and earn a living, which she did in the fashion industry with her roommate Betty Bacall, later better known as Lauren. The Depression left its mark, and she and Dad Kinney married as soon as his class of ’41 graduated.

Dad Kinney was quite a hero and an amazing man. He loved the Naval Academy and served several tours there, including one as Commandant of Midshipmen. The family spent enough time in Annapolis in their permanent home on Lake Ogleton, which Douglas considered “home,” despite having had ten addresses in fourteen years by the age of 14. At 14, Douglas was given a full scholarship to Milton Academy by one of Dad’s admirer’s, Bernard Baruch, who saw that Douglas was suffering from all of the changes of schools. (They would think he was a genius at one place and a retard at the next.) Barney gave a full scholarship to his alma mater, Milton Academy, with the understanding that it was to go to a deserving Navy junior, which is how Douglas became the first child of a serving military officer to ever attend Milton.

Q: You mean Milton Academy.

KINNEY: Yes. Milton Academy. And then to Harvard, which is what you did in those days, if you went to Milton; 38 members of his small class went to Harvard. Douglas was also a scholarship student at Harvard. He lived off-campus at the Co-op House, and knew from the day he arrived that he was schooling for a diplomatic career in the Foreign Service; he studied government and international law with Kissinger, Jo Nye and Marty Perez and other Harvard names. He did two years in the Peace Corps building wells in what was then Upper Volta but later became Burkina-Faso. (It was those wells that enabled people to survive the first Sahel drought.) He came back from Africa in 1969 and was getting an MPA at the new J.F. Kennedy School of Government, which is what the old Littauer Center for the Graduate School of Public Administration became in 1966, after Kennedy’s death.

Q: So you stayed on at Commonwealth until when?

KINNEY: We were married in June 1970 and upon Douglas’ graduation moved to Washington in 1971.

Q: And Doug went into the Foreign Service?

KINNEY: Yes.

Q: Did you have any interest in the Foreign Service?

KINNEY: Well, when I was introduced to him for the first time, he said he was getting an MPA with the goal of going into the Foreign Service. I laughed and said, “Yeah, that is what I thought I wanted to do until I found out that the only way for women to rise in the Service was to marry a successful male officer, that married women couldn’t be officers.”

As fate would have it, the rules changed in 1970. As graduation approached, he was looking at AID, because he had become very interested in development economics as a result of his Peace Corps experience. Also, he had done a lot of work at the Business School as part of his MPA. His other option was Citibank because Citi was hiring in

those days, still sending Americans abroad to do their banking work, rather than hiring local nationals with Harvard degrees as they came to do a decade later. They offered Douglas Beirut, which is the job my Headmaster thought he should take. Douglas's other option was the Foreign Service.

I knew Douglas had always wanted to be a Foreign Service Officer, so I told him that he should pursue that because they had just changed the rules for married women, and I would take the exam, and we could just both go around the world being Foreign Service Officers together. It didn't occur to me that I might not pass the written exam or then might not pass the oral exam and not be put on "the list." Little did I know.

Q: Well, then, so Doug went into the basic officer course, A-100.

KINNEY: Yes, he went to A-100, and I went to the "Wives Seminar."

Q: What was some of you might say the spirit and attitude of the wives that you were with?

KINNEY: Well, we were questioning more than I think had been the case five years before. I only know my class. Bonnie Miller was in it, Ambassador Tom Miller's wife. There was a lot of expectation that times were changing. The "Declaration on Spouses" edict had been published, so it was clear that wives no longer had to do "representation," but it was still expected. It was still seen as something important. There was still an emphasis on the importance of the wife's role. After all, we were all taking the "Wives Seminar."

Dorothy Stansbury was the head of the Wives Seminar, and she really stressed the diplomatic value and importance of getting out and networking. We were to bring people to the table, into American homes and thereby facilitate relationships. Doing so would facilitate the business relationships of the male officers and thus the work of the U.S. Embassy. It all made great good sense. Most people just thought that anyone who wanted to be paid for work or have a career of her own was a little crazy or a troublemaker.

I remember upsetting the chair of the etiquette class. We were talking about table settings for a formal dinner, and Joan Wilson was insisting that only fine china and silver could be used. I volunteered that that might not always be the case. "I agree with the silver," I said, "but I don't see why I couldn't achieve a more dramatic effect using my very modern, black fluted Dansk firestone ware." I had china, but what I had found was that the Dansk made a more stylish esthetic statement, and one could use all sorts of wonderful colors with it; it was just not a 19th century, flowery china esthetic." I was told in no uncertain terms that I was not allowed to use anything but fine china or it wouldn't be a formal dinner and blah, blah, blah. I just listened to that and then went to Mexico and gave the most gang-buster, wonderful black tie parties, leaving my china in the closet and using my black and white fluted firestone ware instead. It worked just fine, even for the older folks.

It was this kind of generational shift for people in my generation; we were questioning the details but accepting that we were in a new era, which for the first time prohibited any comment or review of our activities in our husband's Officer Evaluation Report (OER). Nonetheless, we were not so naïve that we thought we could go out and burn bras and not harm our husband's career in the process. So there was a respect for both the privilege and the responsibility of being married to an officer; however, many of us no longer saw ourselves as an extension of him, rather it was a responsibility taken on by a couple made up of two individuals.

Q: Where did you go? What was your first post?

KINNEY: Well, I really wanted to go to Latin America; I didn't care where. I lobbied hard for a Spanish speaking post because I spoke Spanish and was passionate about all things Spanish, including Latin America and Mesoamerican archaeology. (In those days, they did not give language training for wives.) I had created a course in Mexican history for Commonwealth because Mexican history was a good way to study "revolution" and get our students at Commonwealth to have a better understanding of what "revolution" really entails than they did.

Douglas was told we were headed for Chile, but for some reason that fell through, and we ended up going to Mexico City. Ambassador Robert McBride needed a new Special Assistant. He and his wife, Jackie, were some of the best of the "Old Foreign Service." It was a very important post. It was a very interesting time to be in Mexico because of all the guerilla movements and political ferment at the time: we had several kidnappings. It was also a fascinating cultural setting. There was just no place on earth you would rather be on the weekends when you could go out and explore unkempt archaeology zones, which I really loved. So, I was thrilled with that assignment. Plus, I had taken the Foreign Service exam and passed, and also passed the orals. I was told that I was the second married woman to have ever been put on "the list" and was just waiting for my name to be called up.

Q: Do you recall any of the questions asked in the orals?

KINNEY: Yes, I recall one in particular that just knocked me out. I was planning to come in as a USIA officer because I figured I really was "a water lily floating on a sea of culture," and that cultural diplomacy would make sense for me. Also, by being in USIA, Douglas and I could avoid the nepotism issues. I also really believed in (and still do) the importance of education and culture and cultural exchange as a key to building long term relationships and influence. And so I opted for being an FSO in the United States Information Agency (USIA).

The oral exam question that floored me was the assertion that the Spanish zarzuela provided the foundation and origins for American musical comedy and what was my view? I was impressed that any of these guys had ever heard of the zarzuela. I thought that was fabulous! However, that they would make such a preposterous proposition just

dumbfounded me. So I proceeded to tell them six ways from Sunday why that was an absolutely silly hypothesis.

Q: I have a vague idea but what the does the term mean?

KINNEY: Well, the zarzuela is, in fact, what we would most easily characterize as a Spanish operetta or light opera. Think of Kern if you will, or think of Gilbert and Sullivan. Actually, it is more contemporaneous with Gilbert and Sullivan but without the really clever lyrics and biting political satire. Frankly, it is not as interesting either musically or in terms of its lyrics, but call it a popular light opera. To suggest that there was any serious musical or literary or cultural threads between that and the east coast of the united States of America at the time that you saw the emergence of Kern and Rogers and Hammerstein and others, I found just ridiculous.

Q: I have always loved musical comedy.

KINNEY: Well, I happen to think it is one of America's great contributions to the world. I grieve what has happened to it. But the zarzuela proposition was a stretch too far. If they had said Gilbert and Sullivan, I could have said, "Well you know there is a reasonable argument and here are the threads." But the zarzuela? That dog didn't hunt. That was not where Kern got his ideas and began evolving, nor Hart, nor Rodgers. I thought it was just a wonderful question though. I had great fun knocking it out of the ball park, and it just convinced me that the Foreign Service was going to be damn fun.

Q: So what happened?

KINNEY: With Douglas? We went to Mexico City, and Nixon put a freeze on hiring USIA officers because he didn't want the "young radicals and Bohemian types" coming into USIA and dissenting from his foreign policy on Viet Nam. He was more comfortable hiring his older and more mature, reliable journalist friends. So he put a freeze on hiring Junior USIA Officers from '72 until later '73.

I knew that I was not going to be called back to Washington to start training, so what was I going to do? I had been a teacher, and I wanted very much to work. I had never not worked. I had never been "the wife of." I mean it was fun, all the archaeology and nice parties and so forth, but I was really upset about having no work and no income of my own.

One evening there was some reception for the American Legion and Douglas persuaded me to go. By that time, the novelty of such events was wearing thin, as was constantly being "the wife of." However, that night was when I developed my theory of "When in doubt, go!" I went to the reception and met a history teacher, Louise Honey, from the Colegio Americano, who told me that she desperately needed another history teacher and latched on to me as a solution to her problem. A quick review of my credentials convinced her that I was to teach US history, World History and the History of China and India.

To make a tortured story short, with the help of the Embassy's Admin Counselor, Vic Deikos, I ended up actually working full time as a teacher at the Colegio Americano with the blessings of Douglas' boss, the Ambassador. It didn't really earn me very much money-- \$5,000 a year-- but some job was better than no job for both my sanity and our bank account.

As a junior officer, Douglas was getting paid \$14,000 a year. Our budget was tight; we were living in the city. We had a big house within walking distance of the Embassy, which was great, and we gave good parties there, including the first one to include members of the Soviet Embassy. But the vision of a future being "the wife of" for the rest of my life was less than comforting.

The teaching job solved everyone's problem, except that such had never been permitted before. The CIA took care of one or two of its wives in-house and under the table, but no wife of the diplomatic corps had ever legally worked on the local economy before. It was Vic Deikos, God rest his soul, who got all parties to agree that I could do this as long as I left the country on my diplomatic passport but came back in on my civilian passport. The assumption was that the Ministry of Hacienda would never cross-check with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and no one would be the wiser. Once back inside the country, I would still be a diplomatic spouse with a full claim to immunity as far as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was concerned. Step 2 was that I was never to acknowledge that I was anything but a diplomat's wife because I would always carry my black diplomatic passport with me, and hopefully the bureaucracy would never notice that I didn't have a re-entry stamp on it, if I ever had to present it. Step 3 was that in the event of an accident going to or from work (not farfetched given Mexico City traffic), I would say I was going to the grocery store and immediately claim diplomatic immunity, thereby setting no precedent nor threat to the international diplomatic system of respect and reciprocity for members of the diplomatic corps.

Q: What was the school?

KINNEY: It was the American school in Mexico City, the Colegio Americano.

Q: How did you find the student body?

KINNEY: "Acomodado," as they say in Spanish, "privileged." The students were children of American and Mexican elites from the worlds of government, diplomacy, business and the learned professions. They were good students. They were all planning on going to college in the States. They were a diverse bunch. I loved having the job and teaching them. I started the Model U.N. program, which is still operating today.

Q: How did you teach the Mexican War?

KINNEY: From a fairly American perspective. One, that was the way the textbook was written. Two, the Mexican students didn't complain. Three, that is what was expected because it was an American school, and I was teaching American history, so I was

teaching it from the American perspective, not from the Mexican perspective. This is not to say, however, that Mexican students did not raise different perspectives on their own in class!

Q: Well, while you were in Mexico, did you get complaints about the colossus to the North and that sort of thing?

KINNEY: Well, as I said, we had two kidnappings of Americans while we were there, so such attitudes were rife. There was a junior Foreign Service officer who was killed in Matamoros. I was asked to stand in for his wife in one of the ransom delivery run-arounds. The kidnappers didn't show, but the FBI thought I looked enough like the victim's wife (Andrea Patterson) that they asked me to substitute for her when the kidnappers suddenly switched plans and demanded she meet them in Mexico City, instead of up north near Manzanillo, where the kidnapping took place. Then our Consul General, Terry Leonhardy, was kidnapped in Guadalajara.

Luis Echeverria was President of Mexico at the time. The intellectual left was in full bloom. While we were in Mexico, the assassination of Allende took place in Chile and sparked massive demonstrations in Mexico City. I was a free agent and curious, so I went out to the streets and the big demonstrations in order to get a feel for what people believed and why. Of course, we had been told one story in the Embassy, but that was not at all what I was hearing on the street. It was a very interesting time. Anti-Americanism and the intellectual left were driven more by the middle classes and the university students than the truly poor and disenfranchised people of the South.

There was also a guerilla movement in Southern Mexico. Luis Cabañas was the guerilla leader down in the state of Guerrero, near Oaxaca and Acapulco, where kidnappings were a tactic and Douglas served as the once a month resident consul before he became the Ambassador's Special Assistant. We had to spend a weekend each month in Acapulco providing citizen services because the U.S. didn't have a consulate there. Our biggest problems were both real drug cases and a significant number of Americans who were framed with drugs and ended up in jail with little or no recourse. There was little the embassy could do for anyone but make sure prison conditions were acceptable, give them the names of lawyers and/or doctors they could call for professional services and make sure their families knew what had happened. Families, of course, were distressed and often tried to get their Congressman involved.

The most Douglas could do was to try and point our AmCits in trouble to lawyers who knew how to pull levers and make things work. But as you well know, the Embassy could not get them out, could not be responsible for them, etc. And this was in '71-'72. There was a forward leaning stance at the time as people put pressure on Congress, and Congress insisted this that and the other. But in those days, the lines of what a consular officer could do were drawn fairly strictly. Douglas conducted the jail visits and tried to bring magazines and small sundries to make life a little more tolerable. There were some very sad cases, total miscarriages of justice. And there were others who, frankly, belonged to be in jail and yet would expect the American government to get them into

American jails. Douglas would have to explain, "Sorry, but you have committed a crime here, and this is the legal system you are subject to," which always came as a shock.

Q: The Olympics, was it '68? You mentioned Echeverria, I can't pronounce it.

KINNEY: Luis Echeverria. He was elected President of Mexico in 1970, after having served as the Interior Minister for Diaz Ordaz, under whose rule the famous Tlatelolco Massacre took place in 1968. This was a bloody and lethal attack on student and other civilian protesters ten days before the opening of the Olympics. For years, the number of dead has been disputed, but suffice it to say that the Interior Ministry was complicit and that the modus operandi of violence and cover-ups continued during Echeverria's administration, most notably with the 1971 Corpus Christi Massacre in Monterrey.

Interestingly, the only time Douglas and I were ever actually in the presence of Echeverria was when we bumped into one of his campaign rallies in Merida in 1970, when we were on our honeymoon. What struck me about his speech was his demagogic populism. I remember his was on the stand pointing proudly to his family of eight children declaiming that Mexico did not have an over-population problem with its 4.5% population growth rate at the time; rather, Mexico's problem was underproduction. Wow!

But that kind of thinking, combined with brutal suppression of dissent of any kind, was the Partido Revolucionario Institucionalizado (PRI) in a nutshell in those days. First of all the concept of an "institutionalized revolution" boggles the mind and begs consideration. The reality was that the PRI was one of the most authoritarian, no-holds-barred, tough, corrupt regime of insiders for the benefit of themselves that ever walked the face of the earth, and all of this was very evident. Any time the PRI was threatened, the use of force was a given. That is what the students forgot in '68. The Tlatelolco case -- the numbers killed and the conditions surrounding it -- was still a subject of outrage at a lot of dinner parties, particularly when you talked to student leaders, which we spent a lot of time doing. But nobody could do anything about holding anyone accountable because there was no public record. That facts didn't come out until after the PRI was unelected years later.

Q: What was your impression of the Foreign Service from a brand new wife's point of view?

KINNEY: I thought it was a fantastic, wonderful adventure and opportunity, and I hoped to be able to work in it myself, now that the rules had changed -- the non-existent rules. I took great pride in being American and representing my country and an American perspective. I was as well versed as my husband. I thought that was important. I was very proud of him and all that he was handling. He was first class proof that the consular tour is a good training ground and a good talent identification process. He was picked up first by the Ambassador to be his Special Assistant and then by somebody from State's Secretariat, who was helping staff Kissinger's trip to Mexico for the Tlatelolco Nuclear Disarmament Treaty Conference, which was aimed at ensuring a denuclearized Southern Hemisphere. That was the event that drove Kissinger to invent GLOP, the policy of

busting up the old regional bureau clubs in an effort to ensure that, for example, Latin Americanists knew something about more than just Latin America. He saw the need for a more global perspective before such was popular.

Q: In Mexico, Kissinger discovered that...

KINNEY: The Latin American Club didn't know about anything except Latin America, and he was horrified. And he was right.

Q: Oh, he was right, but he was also the man who used to say 'Latin America is a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica.' I used ask candidates to explain what he meant by this when I would use this quote on the Foreign Service oral exam.

KINNEY: Well, he was very much the Europeanist, a Eurocentric. From his perspective, those in the Southern Hemisphere were just corrupt, dumb, no-accounts with no real power. I didn't agree with that. My thought then and history has vindicated me, I guess, is that whoever is on your back step matters, and whoever is in your backyard matters--for better or worse.

Q: How did the Allende episode in Chile play out at your embassy?

KINNEY: Well, the Embassy was told definitively that we had nothing to do with the assassination. The uprising was carried out by the Chilean officers. We were not directly involved, and that was the position to put out on the street. I believed my government and that was our position and we stuck to it. However, nobody else believed us.

Q: Well then, what happened to you as a Foreign Service wife?

KINNEY: What do you mean?

Q: Well, in other words, did you come into the Foreign Service?

KINNEY: Yes, but not until 1975. We went back to Washington. I turned 31, found out I was pregnant, was unemployed again, and in a new city again, although I was at least familiar with Washington. We had stayed there briefly before going to Mexico. We had to buy a house, and it was a huge moment of personal transition and transformation for me.

The Family Liaison Office(FLO) was really born from this period of my personal angst and distress about what I had gotten myself into by marrying a Foreign Service Officer. I realized that this was my life, and I didn't like it. Either Douglas was going to have to give up his career so I could work and have a career or I was going to have to give up having a career for his, or something was going to have to change. At the time, it seemed the best and easiest path was to change the Foreign Service.

I was furious at the prospect of what life as a Foreign Service wife would mean--no identity of my own, no job or professional identity of my own, no income of my own, no

economic security and a life of constant moves and upheavals that I was expected to take care of while Douglas went happily off to an office designed to function the same, whether in Abidjan or Washington. Passionate hardly described my conflicted state and feelings!

I managed to find a job researching outer-continental shelf oil issues at Common Cause while fighting off morning sickness, but the turmoil of that first re-entry back into Washington was what led me to start thinking about the full implications of Foreign Service spousehood and what was needed to help solve my own dilemma--some sort of liaison office in the Department, where family members could go for information and help and understanding. I started reaching out and complaining and looking for people who felt the same way I did and who might be able to help.

Q: Was there anything institutional available?

KINNEY: There was nothing. When “dependent wives” were taken out of the efficiency reports and were made “free” and “independent persons,” they were effectively turned into “non- persons.” Previously, they had at least been recognized as “dependents” for whom the Department had some responsibility, e.g. the Wives course, but the Department of State as an institution had no obligation to them at all once they were “independent persons.” But the catch was that a wife was still subject to her husband’s career constraints, i.e. constant moves and no employment of her own. You had no rights, and mostly the system had no responsibility to you or even recognized that you existed or mattered.

Indeed, the stripping away of the required but uncompensated role of the “traditional wife” caused as much angst among older wives as the expectations of the traditional role caused among younger, more career-oriented wives. Many of the older wives just reaching the senior ranks, felt displaced, discarded and aggrieved about having been deprived of both role and status after many years of dedicated service. It was very sad and upsetting for everyone.

From my perspective, the Department’s attitude was that if the wives wouldn’t play ball, the Department would take its marbles and move on to a new game without them. If the wives were going to complain, then they were simply out of the game and left to their own devices. My device was to look around for advice and allies, and I found Dorothy Stansbury, who sent me to Hope Meyers.

Q: Who was Dorothy Stansbury?

KINNEY: Dorothy Stansbury, you’ll remember, was the head of the Wives’ Seminar. Dorothy sent me to Hope Meyers, who was married to Howard Meyers. She lived on P Street in Georgetown. Hope was very sympathetic to my perspective. She knew another woman who was. That woman, Anne Relph, had been an actress and a writer. She eventually divorced her Foreign Service husband, but not before doing yeoman service

on behalf of working for the creation of what eventually became known as the Family Liaison Office (FLO).

Hope, Anne and I and two other working women married to Foreign Service Officers posted to Washington, and another woman who was herself a State Department Civil Servant but married to an FSO, formed what we called the Research Committee on Spouses. We decided that the way to start changing things was to start gathering evidence and information. We would meet every Thursday at the Department in a room arranged by one of the husbands. It was during this process that we found out that there was no statutory requirement for married female Foreign Service Officers to resign from the Foreign Service. It has just been the practice. I remember the day Molly came in and said, "Did you know there is no rule, there is no law a woman has to resign when she gets married? We don't have to do this. Women officers don't have to do this."

Not everyone in the group aspired to become part of the Foreign Service, but all of them wanted to work and have financial security of their own. The evaluation of wives in Officers' evaluation reports had resulted in a lower than national average divorce rate in the Service, and when the Declaration on Spouses was issued in 1971, the number of divorces began to increase dramatically, some with tragic results as Officers ran off with younger women and left wives who had worked for free for twenty or thirty years in penury. Not all Officers were gentlemen, it turned out. And the plight of divorced wives and their right to a portion of their husbands' annuities became a cause celebre once the Family Liaison Office was established.

I worked at Common Cause as a volunteer and on what was becoming known as the "spouse revolution" until the birth of my daughter, Mercier, on July 4, 1975. By that time, the work of the Research Committee and our ideas were beginning to spread and at a certain point Hope said, "Stephanie, we are not going to be able to do this with just the six of us," and she was right.

The Research Committee had worked out the key questions and answers and theory and rationale for framing the issue. We had sent out this five question survey, which we managed to deliver to officers in the Department. I don't remember how we did it, but we managed to get it to most of the FSOs in the Department.

My view was that if we can't prove that this is a management problem, we will get nowhere. As long as it was feminism or ideology or a bunch of whining women issue, nobody was going to pay attention to us. We had to prove that it was a management issue, i.e. that it was an institutional management concern because of the changing role and expectations of women. Somehow we had to prove that the Foreign Service was not going to be able to do its business if it did not make allowances for working spouses. "The Foreign Service could not stay in the 19th century forever."

In our view, people were going to stop going overseas if wives could not work or if they had to give up good salaries. OR, this issue could change the character and the background of the people who come into the Foreign Service: smart people are married to

smart people. So, if things didn't change, we would start getting dumb people married to dumb people who are happy to go around being "the wife of."

The key survey question we finally developed was "Will the working status of your wife influence your preferences for your next assignment?" I think we just used the word "influence." I don't think we went further than that. I don't remember exactly. What I do remember is that we got a stunning 38% response on the Survey and 33% of these responding indicated that the working status of their spouse would influence their next assignment, and many people wrote additional comments. So that is what we took to the Director General, Carol Laise, pointing out that spouse employment was a coming systemic issue due to changing younger generation needs and expectations related to changing economic circumstances.

This was about the time that the Jimmy Carter presidential campaign was pushing "family issues" and making a big deal out of family. We all agree that it made sense to frame our issue in terms of family, the Foreign Service as a family and Foreign Service family members. Then, when I went to AAFSW...

Q: AAFSW means...

KINNEY: American Association of Foreign Service Women, which is what it was at that time. Its name has since changed to the Association Associates of the Foreign Service Worldwide, to accommodate male spouses. However, in 1976 AAFSW was the old line wives club. I remember Hope said, "Stephanie, you have got to go do this. You need to meet Leslie Dorman, the new president of AAFSW, and you need to get these women behind you because if they are not, you are wasting your time. You don't have any chance of accomplishing anything." So I said, "OK, fine."

I remember the first meeting I attended was in Georgetown, in a beautiful Georgetown home, complete with fine drawing room, major silver service and porcelain tea cups. It was just classic. But Leslie Dorman was not classic, at least not in the old Lady Bountiful sense of the word. She was a Brit, and she had been in the Army during WWII, and very intentional. She was taking over the Presidency and sizing me up. I think she probably thought, "Well, the young woman has an issue. She makes sense, but she needs seasoning. She needs smoothing; she needs rounding. She needs us! She's got energy, and we know how to get things done."

It turned out to be a felicitous partnership, and we are still friends to this day. When we left the meeting, Hope asked, "How do you think you did?" I had never used the subjunctive so much in my life. The whole presentation was very gentle: "there seem to be these concerns and these younger women and there might be a problem and you, perhaps, could consider the possibility of looking into it." That day we essentially planted the idea and the concept -- as well as the Forum process -- for creating the investigative report that eventually gave Secretary Cyrus the broadly supported recommendations he needed to respond to.

The AAFSW Forum produced the 1976 “ Report on the Concerns of Foreign Service Spouses and Families.” We wanted to make the family aspect central in order to soften the feminist aspect. I wrote Chapter Two, on “The New Foreign Service Wife,” which was essentially the philosophical and the intellectual framework for the report. It described the generational change, the changing role of women, the requirements for work, the expectations for work, and pointed to the impact that this would have on the Foreign Service as an institution over time.

The 1972 Declaration of Spouses represented a dramatic policy shift but with no thought as to consequences or impact. The shift in model to the “New Foreign Service Wife” from the “Old Foreign Service Wife” was disruptive and difficult for everyone. What we tried to show was that if there were anything worse than being a “dependent wife” it was being a “non-person.” That really spoke to people because-whether old or new- they all had experienced what that suddenly meant. Older women were bitter, hurt and distressed, and the younger women were just uncomprehending of all of this. So did our best to bring the two together.

The AAFSW remains justly proud of its significant role in this process because it was AAFSW that gave its imprimatur to the next survey, which was done worldwide. Cynthia Chard, who was crazier than I was, and I formulated the worldwide survey and got it out. And then we began to receive reams and reams of responses, all of which had to be tabulated, collated and analyzed, which we also did. Because it was done under the auspices of the AAFSW Forum, the organization got some of its members to head up different issue groups or committees, which then wrote what became different chapters of the 56 page report.

The different committees would meet, and they would have discussions. Looking back, it was really a good example of how to bring about strategic change, only then there were no books on the subject. We had to figure it out each step of the way. It wasn't like we had a play book for it. But the issue was timely, and we were inclusive, and our process was very clear and purposeful. In the final analysis, we also had the help of the Senior Wives of the Department, i.e. the wives of the seventh floor principals, including Mrs. Vance.

David Newsome was the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the position traditionally encumbered by the most senior career officer. David and my husband's father were old friends, and David had kept a mentor's eye on Douglas from the time he was 14. Jean Newsome, David's wife, called me at a certain point after Cy Vance had been confirmed as Secretary of State and asked if I could use her help and that of the Senior Wives. My surprised and grateful answer was “Yes.”

And just to put all this in context, I should note that Nixon lifted the freeze on USIA hiring three months after my eligibility on “the list” ran out, so in the fall of 1975, I took the Foreign Service Exam for the second time. Fortunately, I passed and was put on “the list” --again. This time I had learned enough to figure out that I was not risking the USIA option again and that if I wanted in fast, I had best be one of the 38 admin officers that

State was expecting to hire that year--as opposed to one of 6 political officers. Besides, I couldn't be a political officer anyway because my husband Douglas was a political officer. I wasn't schooled to do economics and really was not interested in consular work.

My real interest lay in a set of issues that were highly policy sensitive and politically charged, but no one at State yet really cared about or associated them with diplomatic service. These were the "global issues" such as environment, oceans, and science and technology issues, including energy. In the short run, all my involvement with management issues and senior officers as a result of my little spouse revolution made me a plausible candidate for being what was then called a Foreign Service Administrative Officer, a group known today as Management Officers.

Q: One question. As you are going through this, there is a big elephant that you haven't mentioned. What was happening to military wives at this time?

KINNEY: Military wives were not yet really raising issues yet. However, a few military officers aware of what was going on at State did figure out that their family members would probably soon be raising many of the same concerns. I remember that I got the telephone call from the Pentagon asking for a briefing when I was working in the Director General's (Carol Laise) Policy Coordination Office, where I was charged with "solving the spouse problem" and then setting up the Family Liaison Office (FLO). I also got calls from Foreign Ministries all around the developed world wanting to know what in the world the State Department was doing? They wanted to know whether what they had heard was true, what State was up to and why were we causing such trouble? There was great concern that spouse discontent might be contagious.

Q: OK, so we will come to that. First I am going to have to cut this off fairly soon.

KINNEY: But we still haven't gotten to my Foreign Service career.

Q: In fact, we are hitting at the heart of something really important right now. As a matter of fact, I think this might be a good place to stop, and we can pick this up the next time and consider the development of the Family Liaison Office. Did you come into the Foreign Service and then start militating or vice versa?

KINNEY: I started asking questions and "rabble rousing" in '74, after we had returned from Mexico and had gotten settled. I was struggling with personal angst about what I had gotten myself into by marrying an FSO. By then I knew it wasn't automatic that I was going to get into the Foreign Service, and if I did not, what was I looking at as a life? I was horrified. So I started looking for my own salvation, seeking information and ideas from other wives whom I respected and who understood our generational differences. And I also started diagnosing what I thought was wrong with the Foreign Service with regards to family members.

My daughter, Mercier, was born on July 4, 1975 and a number of my Research Committee on Spouses friends brought gifts and advice. I took the Foreign Service exam

again in the fall of 1975 and was inducted into the Foreign Service in September of 1976, as a member of what came to be known as the Fighting 127th (Foreign Service Class). A third of us were in our 30's and were either minorities, single women or married women (2), and none of us would probably have been accepted a decade before.

1976 was America's Bicentennial. I remember photographs taken of me and Mercier in her "Snuggly" (an unorthodox, carrying device to keep her close to my chest) in the Department of State lobby with other members of the Research Committee on Spouses. We were standing on either side of the yellow "Don't Tread on Me" flag, which we thought perfectly represented our sentiments.

I focused on advancing the spouse revolution for about a year, by which time it was safely lodged under the auspices of the AAFSW. When I was invited to become a member of the Foreign Service's 127th Class, I received the news with mixed emotions. I was very conflicted about leaving my daughter for full time work, and I was very concerned not to undermine the progress made on the spouse issue. But there was no alternative to my longer-term salvation than to say "yes" and report to A-100, the FS initial orientation and training program.

I was terribly conflicted but also joyful to be back at work and with a career before me that I already knew I loved and was dedicated to. And as far as worrying about the spouse issue, I just made it part of my persona and continued to spread the word and work ideas wherever I went, including in A-100, the mandatory orientation class for Foreign Service Junior Officer candidates.

A-100 is where I met Bill Backus, a Princeton foreign affairs graduate who had not passed the FS exam but had become an expert on State Department management and personnel conundrums while working for the Murphy Commission, which led to the Macomber Reforms. Bill was recently hired by the Director General Carol Laise to advise her from her Policy Coordination shop. When Bill came to brief us on FS personnel matters, I introduced myself and told him that if the Director General was ever interested in solving the spouse problem, which I had helped create, I had a few ideas and would be pleased and proud to serve her. It took a while, but I was eventually asked to join Bill and Charles Hill and Torrey Whitman as part of the DG's Policy Coordination team. My job was to "solve the spouse problem" and work on other issues related to an increasingly questioning and troublesome younger generation of officers.

When I completed A-100, I resisted going overseas because I really wanted to bring the spouse movement to fruition. Having already learned more than any Junior Officer should know about the FS personnel system, I managed to pursue my interest in cultural diplomacy by getting an assignment in the Bureau of Cultural Affairs (CU) for West Africa as a Fulbright officer, working for James Relph, the husband of Anne Relph, one of the original six wives in the Research Committee on Spouses. The job was not very demanding, which was good, and within six months Carol Laise called me up and asked me to please solve the problem I had created.

It was a relief when my Foreign Service job, which was my vocation, came together with my avocation, which was creating some sort of institutional support for spouses and families. Now we could make real progress.

Q: All right, well let's pick it up then. Today is 14 April 2010 with Stephanie Kinney. So Stephanie we were talking about the creation of the Family Liaison Office (FLO).

KINNEY: The creation of what came to be called FLO was a function of my being invited to go to work for the Director General (DG) of the Foreign Service, Carol Laise. Out of the blue, the DG's Senior Advisor, Charles Hill, invited Margaret Sullivan, another activist, and me to lunch with him across the street at the Foreign Service Club. When we came out of the Club after lunch, Margaret asked me, "What was that all about?" I remember telling her that I thought that one of us had just been interviewed for a job, but we'd have to wait to find out which one. It turned out to be me.

Having assured himself that I was not as radical and as intemperate as some people had warned him, Charlie decided that I would be safe to present to the new Director General, which he eventually did. I was hired by Ambassador Laise, in her words, "To solve the problem you've created." It was a wonderful opportunity. It also taught me a lot about the Foreign Service. I was an FSO-07, and I was miraculously assigned to an FSO-02 (senior) job slot in the DG's front office. I learned early on everything is negotiable, and there are no firm rules or standards in the Foreign Service.

This situation certainly favored me at the time, but its longer-term costs to the Department and the institution of the Foreign Service have been high. Once FLO was up and running, I also had reason to read just about every study that had been done on the Department and the Foreign Service until then, and, as a result, I learned more about both institutions than most incoming officers.

I had a clear vision of what we needed to do on family issues, and I saw myself as the link between the people who had the power and the influence to decide and make things happen and the people who needed and very much wanted to see things change. The sound bite of the day was, "The only thing worse than being a dependent (which is what people had been officially named before the 1971 Declaration on Spouses) is being a non-person." Even senior wives could relate to that.

FLO was designed with two functions in mind. The first was to provide easily accessible, needed information to family members so that they could make informed and sound personal decisions and solve problems that resulted from or were conditioned by the realities of Foreign Service life and State Department bureaucracy. The second function was to provide a link to management such that when policy decisions that had a direct or indirect impact on families were being made, there would be a voice for families at the table. This voice would be the Director of FLO, drawing on the information that FLO

would in turn be able to collect from and about family concerns. Miraculously, this is eventually what came to pass.

Q: You mentioned before we got on mike that they checked you out to make sure you weren't a "bomb thrower" or a "bra burner."

KINNEY: "Bra burner." The language of the day often used to refer to activist feminists.

Q: But I remember one time running across Cynthia Thomas, who had been brought into the Foreign Service after her husband committed suicide when he was selected out due to a confusion of evaluation reports.

KINNEY: Oh, I remember that case very well. There were two Charlie Thomasses, and the files got mixed up, and Cynthia's husband was selected out on the basis of the other Charlie Thomas' file. It was that case that changed the policy on officer access to evaluation reports. That was another part of the Macomber Reforms. Cynthia's husband insisted that there was a problem, but -- in keeping with the policy of the day -- he was not allowed to see his evaluation report and so could not defend himself. He became something of a cause celebre with some and a pariah for many. He tried, but was never able, to find a real job after he was selected out, and so exercised the most serious form of protest--suicide. The mistake was eventually recognized but too late, but the Department did take it upon itself to take care of Cynthia by offering her employment since he life as a Foreign Service wife had left her with no record of paid employment.

Q: My thing was I remember sitting down at a table with a couple of people I knew and Cynthia Thomas and realized this was sort of the group that was the equivalent of a Marxist cell, well not Marxist, but they were against the State Department and they were hired by the State Department. I could see where really there wasn't any talk of compromise there. They were really out to destroy the system from within. I was wondering as you got into this whether you ran across people of the same ilk. I mean some are so bitter that you really couldn't work with them.

KINNEY: Yeah. It affected both men and women. Remember the FSO who was selected out that went to work for Jesse Helms and spent twenty years punishing the FS in every way he could, always in the name of making it "less elite." There were many women who also felt discriminated against and blamed the "old boys" and "the system."

The Women's Action Organization (WAO) (I think I've got the name right) was a focal point for feminist activism at State. Allison Palmer, an FSO who aspired to service in the Middle East, was one of the leaders, along with Marguerite Cooper King and others. Allison was famous because she also took on the Episcopal Church and became its first female priest, after she made life miserable for the State Department for almost twenty years as a result of the class action suite she filed on behalf of women.

Interestingly, Allison used the 1975 exam (the second one I took) as evidence of exam discrimination, a charge I always had trouble with. In my view, the exam tested for

knowledge relevant to a diplomatic career and aptitude; the problem is that most women at that time did not have backgrounds or degrees or experience in economics, management, political science, and exotic cultures. I would not have done as well as I did had I not been indirectly associated with the Foreign Service. If preparation matters at all, then at that time, women as a group were not as well prepared academically or experientially to pass the exam as men. But was this purposeful “sexual discrimination?” I never thought so. And those of us who did it the hard way paid a heavy price in male resentment and ridicule for years afterward because of all those women who “got in for free” or got “free promotions.” But serious and dramatic social change is never easy nor fast. Allison’s was a good cause, but she was never known for her temperance.

I knew of Cynthia’s case. I never spent any time with her, but we tried very carefully in the Research Committee on Spouses to stay away from WAO, first because they were an employees’ organization and second because of their style. We did not think their tactics and their rhetoric would advance our interests. As I mentioned, Marguerite Cooper King was one of them. Marguerite and I became friends, but there was wariness and a very deliberate distinction between the two groups because the WAO was so bitter and fierce in its rhetoric that it did not win friends and influence people within the Department.

Form and style were and have always been important in the Department. I remember a Deputy Assistant Secretary dressing me down for framing an argument in terms of substance over form. “Form” he said, “matters and don’t ever forget it! It often communicates much more than ‘substance.’ ” Maybe it was my southern background; maybe it was just common sense, or maybe it was because I needed all the wives to feel comfortable with what we were proposing, but I instinctively recognized the need to act in a way that was seen as reasonable and with the Department’s interest at heart.

There were lots of wives who looked quite askance at this younger generation. I had to prove myself to them before I had to prove myself to Charlie Hill, the DG’s rep. The old “honey gets more flies than vinegar” just seemed to me an obvious rule of thumb in a place as hidebound as the Department of State. This was an essentially 19th century British model and organization coming to terms with some pretty dramatic demographic, social and economic change within the U.S., whose increasingly educated younger generation of women was spreading a strong feminist perspective and series of complaints.

As you pointed out, in 1974 or thereabouts, it became increasingly evident that you could no longer maintain a middle class lifestyle on one salary, or that it was going to be increasingly difficult to do this over time. By then, we also had the first really large generation of college-educated women who had not gone to school to get married but rather to acquire capabilities and skills for which they wanted to be paid. They didn’t want to give it away for free.

In society at large, you also had the reality of one marriage in two ending in divorce, which particularly if you were tied to the Foreign Service, meant that you were putting yourself in financial and personal jeopardy. This became more apparent as the ‘71

Declaration on Spouses freed male officers to divorce, something that earlier might have adversely affected their careers. All of the sudden, the below average FS divorce rate became average, and it was clear that assuming your husband would be true forever was foolhardy. This was especially true when it was very evident that there were lots of bad marriages in the Foreign Service and lots of “foreign affairs.” I mean I saw it on Douglas’ junior tour in Mexico; our DCM was a drunk and a philanderer. There were a number of very sad cases of FSOs who left their wives and left them high, dry and impecunious. A friend of yours, Jane Dubs, Spike’s wife, became the poster child for this situation.

Q: He was our ambassador to Afghanistan who was assassinated there in 1979. Two years before, he had remarried a younger woman who refused to accompany him there least she lose her job in Washington, and she got his total pension and benefits while his long serving and suffering FS wife of thirty years was left without any means of support.

KINNEY: But Jane wasn’t the only one. There were many like her, and entitlement to a pro-rated share of the husband’s annuity became one of the FLO and AAFSW agenda items for which there was eventually a legislative remedy.

Q: We’ll talk a little bit about trying to capture the spirit of the time. What about the ambassador’s wives who came up through the Foreign Service.

KINNEY: As mentioned earlier, they were displaced by the 1971 Declaration on Spouses, and they were not happy. Many of them looked quite askance at the younger generation as being traitors and uncivilized and disrespectful to them and to their country. They saw themselves as playing very important roles, which indeed they did. They saw themselves as having paid the price as a junior wife, and they wanted the benefits of being senior wives. They had made a respectable -- if unpaid -- career of the Foreign Service and had a strong sense pride and identity as Foreign Service wives and all of the sudden this was taken from them. It was emotionally and psychologically devastating for some; for others it was liberation. As generations shift and economics shifts, profound social change goes with it. Not everybody was happy. At the point at which I went to the AAFSW...

Q: Which was what?

KINNEY: American Association of Foreign Service Women (AAFSW) as it was called then. It was the wives organization. It became the base and the alliance for legitimizing the concerns of spouses. Had the AAFSW not been willing to embrace the spouse question and had it not been behind the proposed solution, FLO never would have happened. To this day AAFSW remains very highly identified and purposefully engaged in the office and keeps an eye out to ensure that it does not go astray, i.e. become too bureaucratized.

AAFSW effectively swung into action a number of times in the 1980’s, when the Director General function of the Foreign Service was demoted and there was a threat that the Director of the Family Liaison Office would no longer sit at the table with the

Undersecretary for Management (M) and again when the FLO budget was threatened. It was AAFSW who charged up to Capitol Hill and rang the bells and raised the flag, and all of those ill-considered 7th floor moves were walked back. At one time, there was a solidarity and an unbreakable link between the Hill and AAFSW wives. None of that happened by accident. The wives were often better politicians and relationship builders than their officer husbands.

Q: Well, you were brand new to the system. Did you find the ranks of the senior male officers pretty solidly opposed to what you were trying to do? Many of them, of course, had wives too.

KINNEY: The most positive example is one I alluded to earlier, when Jean Newsome, the wife of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs David Newsome, reached out to offer the support of the wives of the political appointees, including Gay Vance, the wife of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. The Democratic agenda had placed an emphasis on family, and it was not by accident that we had framed our issues in terms of family and that the “solution” was to be a “family liaison office.”

Jean Newsome said that the “senior wives” needed a project, and asked if I could I use them? Could they be of use? I asked what she had in mind, and she responded saying, “Well I was thinking that we could have a group; we could meet together over lunch or bring bag lunches, and you could brief Gay Vance on what has been going on, and maybe we could figure out how to be helpful.” That was just manna from heaven. I said “Yes!” of course.

That was the beginning of a life-long network and friendship group that, with the addition of a few women not involved in the 70’s, came to be known as The Lunch Bunch. (See addendum.)

The Lunch Bunch continued until Gay died two years ago. Jean always organized it. Gay always presided, and the format always involved going around the table bringing each other up to date on recent developments of interest, the same as when we started in early 1977 when we were focused exclusively on FLO and family concerns. Besides Jean and myself and Gay, the wives involved were Nan Reed (U/S M Ben), Betty Atherton (Amb. Roy), Susie Bennet (A/S H Doug), Nancy Hamilton (Cong. Lee), Barbara Hoganson (OBC and FSO Jerry), Lesley Dorman (Pres AAFSW), Joan Wilson (OBC and FSO Jim). Fabulous women all!

We would gather every Tuesday in the Secretary’s conference room with our bag lunches, and we would brief Gay on what was happening, sharing information and letting people know where there were problems and what needed to be done. It is a wonderful story that has been captured in Jewel Fenzi’s book, Married to the Foreign Service.

The best part of the story though was when the DG had asked me to write the memo to the Secretary recommending the creation of the Family Liaison Office. The memo got held up by the Executive Directors, who opposed the idea and would not clear the draft

memo. So in response to your question about men: there were men who were very sympathetic and favored the creation of FLO, and there were others who thought this was an outrageous abomination and interference in the Department's work by people who didn't belong to the Department. This was particularly the view of the Executive Directors, who saw themselves as being stuck having to deal with "these people"--wives-- and "this thing"--a wife office--, and were not just about to approve it.

Q: The Executive Directors were people who had a seat on the staffing and running of the various geographic bureaus and their overseas missions. All of a sudden, they have got to figure out, well what are some of the problems with the overseas family members that affect our work at that time?

KINNEY: Well, the loudest issue was spouse employment, and they didn't want to have to be strapped with that monkey. The issue of providing needed information to families remained, but the establishment of the FLO was going to solve that. However, the issue of spousal employment per se was going to be a huge headache and remains so to this day, notwithstanding the numerous facilitative and policy and cultural changes that have expanded opportunities.

It was not evident, and it was not one of our recommendations right out of the box that there be counterpart offices to FLO at each of our embassies overseas. (What later became known as CLOs or Community Liaison Offices.) I remember vividly the day that Ben Reed called me to come see him. The Secretary by that time had already approved the memo because Gay had taken him an "out of channel" copy of it via a Lunch Bunch meeting. The next day I came in and it was signed, waiting for the DG on her desk. Secretary Vance had signed it, and, in effect, said "Make it happen."

So then there was a question of how do you implement the concept? That was where I had a very significant role because implementation couldn't be done by outside forces; it had to be done within the Department. However, once again there was an inside force to work with those outside, and we did it exceedingly well, if I do say so myself.

But to return to how the CLOs came into being: We had to find a location for the FLO, and I was adamant that it had to be on the first floor near the C Street entrance, and that it had to be in an area where family members could go without having ID cards to get in, because they weren't given any kind of ID in those days. There was a coat check room that was used for special events, which was just to the left as you walked into the C Street entrance lobby. We figured that and a little more space was all we needed, if they would just remodel it. Ben called me up at a certain point, and I remember sort of slouching down in my seat. He said, "Stephanie, this is going to happen. You are going to get your coat closet, but I don't want any more requests. This is it, right? You have got what you want." I said, "Oh, yes sir."

What I did not tell him at that moment was that this was all I was going to ask for, knowing full well that Marilyn Holmes was in Embassy Lisbon and Molly Whiteside was in Jakarta, and they were going to come in with very creative, urgent proposals and ask

for the creation of Community Liaison Offices (CLOs) in their embassies for the following list of reasons, which their Ambassador husbands strongly supported. That was how the CLO counterparts came to be. The Family Liaison Office was already well on its way to an inauguration to be presided over by the Secretary -- as soon as the renovation work was done!

Q: This is a little bit nuts and bolts-ish, but I think it is important. When you are talking about the Family Liaison Office, are you speaking strictly of the State Department in Washington, as opposed to creating a family liaison office counterpart in Rome for example?.

KINNEY: Yes. The name was changed to Community Liaison Office (CLO) overseas in order to better accommodate singles in the Embassies, who were adamant about not feeling included by the term "family." Today "family" is more broadly defined, but back then it was mom, dad and the kids! However, "family" was what worked politically in Washington, which was a first priority for administration and congressional support, headquarters recognition, legitimacy, and authority. Headquarters--the Department of State-- was what everyone had in common because that is where you departed from and where you came back to, irrespective of Embassy or Consulate conditions.

My/Our objective was to build something that would grow organically of its own accord, once the basics were in place. And that is what happened. Within five years, almost all posts either had or were in the process of establishing CLOs. I know for the FLO Tenth Anniversary Celebration, I was invited to come back and participate, and I think by that time there were 180 branches overseas. So given the concept and the permission to pursue it, there was an organic growth of the network, depending on specific needs at posts abroad.

Importantly, there was a central organizing unit to coordinate policy, help with stateside re-entry issues and develop new functions as needed, such as when the rash of evacuations took place in 1979 and 1980. The articulation and definition of family-related concerns and managing them constructively was what we set out to do from the beginning and by God, it's still working today.

Q: Well, did you see or go to or look at two other entities, in the first place the American military.

KINNEY: In the Seventies, they came to us. They were very concerned. As I said, I got the DOD phone call while I was working in the DG's office: "We are interested in what you are doing. We are quite concerned. What is going on over there?" So I invited them to come over and see.

The military mindset was lagging way behind us. Eventually, because they had such resources and when the problem hit, it hit them with numbers so much larger than ours, they eventually became much more institutionally engaged and committed and resourced for families. But I got the first phone call from DOD when we started on FLO, and

eventually FLO served as their original model for redefining how and why families matter to service readiness and institutional effectiveness.

DOD could see that the changing role of women would have an impact on the armed services, but they didn't really know what to do about it. I guess they thought, "If the State Department is doing X, then it must be OK, and it seems to be pretty sensible. It is small scale, not a big investment. We will see what we can learn from them."

Q: What about other diplomatic services? Were we the forerunner?

KINNEY: I remember inquiries from the Brits, the Canadians, the UN (stimulated by the Brits) and the Australians. I remember Penny Winsley visited us from the Australian Foreign Service. She and I met again years later when we were both doing climate negotiations in Geneva. In 1976 Penny was something of my counterpart in the Australian service. She too had married into her Service and eventually became an FSO. It was strange that we both ended up involved in climate change negotiations 20 years later. But I remember that she called from Sidney and came to visit when her husband had to come to Washington for something.

Q: This, of course, is one of the things. There is really a sort of Anglo-American conspiracy. It is being done right now. The British have a flourishing British diplomatic oral history program. My colleague there, we have consulted for years. We have gotten no rise out of the French or Germans.

KINNEY: Well, I think it has to do with culture; it has to do with mindset. It has to do with the cultural currency that underpins the frankly most important post-WWII international institutions. Of course there are national differences among the Anglo countries, but there is more that binds us together, at least up until now. It is not clear that the glue of WWII will survive much longer with ever more distant and increasingly diverse youth demographics. Continental Europe with its North/South and East/West divides and its different religious, political and cultural traditions is quite different and frankly more complex and full of complexes.

Q: Well for one thing, so many Foreign Services in other countries are still very much the way we had it in the 19th century. It was a class system. The class system is that if you are a diplomat you come from a family with money. When you get right down to it, our whole problem was money.

KINNEY: Increasingly after World War II, most FSOs were no longer independently wealthy, although quite a number of FSOs during the 50's and 60's seemed to marry women who were. Interesting.

Q: So we couldn't, I mean this is almost the crux of it.

KINNEY: I think class, much more than race, is the huge elephant that has been sitting in the middle of the FS living room for the last 30 years. I think, to a significant degree, it is

the inability to talk about this and be honest about it that is very much related to the deterioration of the institution. If you can't be honest, you can't name the issues and take the actions that are needed.

You can teach "class" and real class-- in the small c sense of the word -- is not exclusive. It requires a certain *noblesse oblige*, whether there is money involved or not. It can be taught, the trappings of it can be taught. Real class is the ability to talk and be comfortable and make others feel comfortable and respected up or down the social scale. Unfortunately, the people who don't come to it naturally, or have not been taught what class is and is not, tend to be terminally insecure. We have a lot of these types in the Department today, in part because we have trained for narrow skills but not taught them the values and attitudes, ethics and behaviors that really matter to effective diplomacy. The insecurity has produced a lot of the cynicism and a lot of the nastiness, and a lot of the bureaucratization of the Foreign Service and the Department of State.

If we could have just acknowledged and talked about real, but politically incorrect, issues and offered guidance on dealing with the various issues, we would all be much better for it. "Power" is another word we are not allowed to really examine, understand and accept as a daily reality to be managed rather than resented. I cannot believe we never address the concept and its consequences and ramifications in A-100. How is someone who has never really thought about and examined and considered "power" with a cold eye to survive in this profession? How can a country have a serious diplomatic service if "power" is a forbidden or dirty word? If one has never really thought about power and influence and does not feel comfortable purposefully and deftly wielding them, how can they flourish in diplomatic service?

The unwillingness to acknowledge either "class" or "power" because some have it and others don't and because neither will ever be equally distributed works to the disadvantage of all and produces dysfunctional behaviors. However, if one acknowledges it and teaches everyone how to have it and use it constructively, this creates a more even playing field and cuts down on bad behavior. There's nothing worse than the autocrat who is not to the manner born and doesn't know better and lives in fear of being "discovered." It's the Peter Principle all over again.

Q: I remember running across this when I came in around in the mid 50's. That was when you went to a post your pay card was sent to the post by sea mail which meant it arrived much later. Like people of my generation, we couldn't skip a pay check but the Department assumed that you could. We were running around, we had to borrow money in order to go, this is a class issue. These were assumptions that just aren't valid anymore.

KINNEY: But if you can't talk about it and you can't be honest about it, you can't fix it.

Q: Well OK, how long were you working on the Family Liaison Office?

KINNEY: I came in the Foreign Service in September of 1976, the year the Forum on the Concerns of Spouses and Families was published. I think FLO was opened in 1977, so I would have gone up to the DG's office in the first half of 1977 sometime. I think then it was maybe opened in October or November.

I remember I deliberately absented myself from the inauguration in order to start the turnover to others. I had been invited to brief a number of UN mission ambassadors and a couple of UN officials about what the State Department was doing to adapt to new realities involving what people referred to as "the new foreign service wife." I took the invitation very deliberately so that I would not be present at the FLO inauguration. I knew what I had done, and I knew that it was absolutely essential that the only people to get credit for it were AAFSW and the new FLO director, Janet Lloyd. So I wasn't there when they cut the ribbon.

I remember the Washington Post article about the inauguration written by Donne Radcliffe. It said that "it is rare in government that something goes from idea to execution in one year." That is how she started out the article about the ribbon cutting because it was one year to the day from when we had turned in the AAFSW Forum "Report on the Concerns of Foreign Service Spouses and Families" to the DG, which was the channel through which it had been delivered.

Q: Ok, Stephanie, let's talk about at the time when opened, what did FLO do?

KINNEY: Well, as I said, it had two primary functions: one was to help people help themselves by providing them needed and useful information, and the other was to sit at the table with Management and provide a voice for families for any policies or discussions that could directly or indirectly affect family members.

What did "help you help yourself mean?" What that meant and the kinds of information that were crucial when FLO opened included such things as education options overseas and in Washington, especially where special education needs were concerned. It also included how to find your way around the Department, including all the good information that was available over at the Overseas Briefing Center (OBC), the allowances office and through the transportation office, since wives frankly had to do most of the logistics for moving and finding housing. Health issues and navigating medical services and especially mental health issues were big, as was the issue of employment options for spouses. This last issue became the long-term challenge and remains one today.

The best idea at the time was to create something called a "Skills Bank." There were a number of people at different times involved with that project. The concept was you would gather information from posts abroad about employment options and opportunities (if any). There would be a data base back in Washington that people could consult and then they would have to follow up on their own. It was the beginning of the idea of deliberately gathering information about employment opportunities, whether it was at the Embassy or in the private sector or where ever. It later expanded to list spouse skills at post in hopes that employers would come to consult it. FLO also spent a lot of time

briefing new recruits and spreading the word about what FLO could and could not do. It took the lead in telling new families coming in and advising them before the fact that employment opportunities overseas for spouses were very limited, and so if you were a young man and you were married and you had a wife who was expecting to work, you really needed to think this thing through because this might not be the right career for the two of you.

For a couple of years, there was actually a quite impressive honesty about the limitations on spousal employment because people did begin to understand that ignoring the issue was only making matters worse. If you brought people in with unrealistic expectations, they only became a canker sore on the system that made things worse, not better, as time went on. Those were the main issues initially. Demand for FLO assistance and services was strong from the beginning, and it tried mostly to track and respond systemically to needs and priorities as they emerged. Spouses turned out to be excellent organizers, unlike some of the FSO husbands.

The initial AAFSW Forum Report had ten recommendations, the first of which was to establish FLO. All of the recommendations eventually turned out to be pressing enough that they required action, and they were all eventually implemented. One recommendation that became pressing in short order was the need for an evacuations focal point for family members, who often got separated from and sent home without the FSO. The Embassy takeover in Tehran was the first of many crises of that nature. We had envisioned the need in 1977 but did not press it as a priority within the new FLO until the need for an evacuation coordination officer became more clear. The events of 1979 and 1980 highlighted the need, with Iran and then the Beirut bombing.

Support for foreign born spouses also emerged as an issue. We could see the numbers changing. Americans were not as uniformly married when they came in, and so they were marrying more and more foreign-born wives, and those foreign-born wives were totally at a loss once they left their own country. In many cases, they did come from much more 19th century settings as you described, and 20th century America was a shock. They also didn't speak English that well and were not culturally American. That was very often challenging.

I understood that if I were going to be an FSO, I could not be a "Founding Mother" of the FLO forever. It had to stand on its own, and so did I. Even while in the DG's office, I started to associate with other issues, especially the early work under DG Ambassador Harry Barnes to write the Foreign Service Act of 1980, another major reform effort, which today is now woefully in need of updating. Think how the world and diplomacy and the American public has changed since 1980.

I remember a day in the early 80's, when I was the Uruguay-Paraguay Desk Officer in the ARA Bureau. I was visited by an inspection team assessing the work of the FLO for the first time. I was delighted because when we were setting it up, I remember saying to Janet Lloyd, the future first Director of FLO, "If this is valid, it has to prove itself and we need to build in some sort of assessment at the five year mark to do this." I didn't have

much worry about what that assessment would show, but the fact that the FLO was willing and eager to submit to such a review was important to show that it was not a charity case. I was pretty sure any assessment would show that it was a strong management asset, and it did. I remember the person from the assessment team coming around to me and saying, “I didn’t know you had anything to do with this.” I smiled because that is exactly the way it was supposed to be.

Q: Was the office amalgamated, you know, when the inspectors come around and inspected. Were they part of the inspections?

KINNEY: I don’t remember, I think they did, but to be honest, all I remember is the person coming in. I was just so delighted that FLO had really taken off on its own and proved itself beyond the generation of its founders. It had become institutionalized, just as we had hoped.

Today of course, the FLO is a sizable operation. I don’t know what the total staff is now, but I took the British DCM’s wife to meet its Director last year. I was just delighted and impressed as can be at how it has grown and how professional it is, how rigorous they remained. But that willingness to speak out and that truth telling function, it is one of the few places in the Department where it has survived and flourishes. That part of it was evident and is very satisfying.

Q: OK, lets go to whither Stephanie after you have done FLO. I would have thought that in a way it needed to be done, but you have caused problems for the administrative apparatus and you were an admin officer.

KINNEY: My time in DG/PC taught me more than it was possible for most junior officers (JOs) to know about how the Service and how it operated, starting with the fact that I was still an 07 JO with only six months in the Service when I was officially assigned to an 02 senior position in the DG’s policy shop. Any time I heard the response “No, it cannot be done,” after that, I knew it really meant “No, we don’t want to.”

The fact that I was a newly minted Admin Officer who had lost her Southern accent provided insight into another Foreign Service reality at the time, the tension between admin and political officers and number of factions within the Service itself. For example, Joe Mersman, a fairly senior Admin Officer with aspirations to become a “godfather” within the Cone stopped by to introduce himself to me one day, no doubt curious to meet this by then somewhat infamous new officer. We had a nice, long chat during which he deftly let me know he was someone I should appreciate and respect, which, of course, I did. But as my questions and charm no doubt emboldened him, he eventually came out and told me quite bluntly that the “problem with the Service is the overabundance of Southern Gentlemen, who are too refined and genteel to be effective political officers and are even worse when strapped with managerial responsibilities.”

Being careful not to give myself away, I started probing what he meant and what he was really getting at. His take was different from the standard accusation that the problem was

New England, Ivy League elitists. What I was given to understand from Joe was that 1) poor management was State's biggest problem; 2) the New Yorkers (which I came to realize was code for Jewish) in the Admin Cone were not respected but were here to fix things; and 3) the Admin brotherhood looks after its own and was out to do in the Southern Gentlemen. Interesting---for a Southern woman classified admin but really desirous of doing "global issues." Joe was right about poor management!

My first boss in DG/PC, Charles Hill, was my FS ideal, as he was statistically for others, according to a survey recently conducted by McBer and Company, a Cambridge management firm charged with developing a new efficiency report for the Foreign Service, in the wake of the Charlie Thomas debacle. Working for and with Charlie, who was merely doing time in DG on his way to greater things, was a stroke of fortune not to be repeated professionally, but it was also a jarring experience personally. Like all great men, he had his feet of clay--women being one of them. (See The Man On Whom Nothing Was Lost by Molly Worthen, Yale '03) Fortunately, we (I) ensured that our mutual attraction remained purely professional, and when Molly's book came out, I had no regrets. However, working with him as a bracing introduction to the intricacies of gender relations in the Foreign Service of the late Seventies.

Another example of this was the phrase that had to be extracted from Charlie's otherwise glowing, guaranteed to get me promoted (which it did) Officer Evaluation Report (OER). With the best of intentions, he described me as gracious and praised my "perky personality," or some such. I thanked him for the substantive elements of the report and pointed out that "perky" was not acceptable, a point I then had to explain to him as both prejudicial and without equal when describing male personalities. He took the point and changed it but was still surprised and mystified. All I could think of was George Goebel's (a 50's late night show comic) constant references to "Pretty, Perky Peggy King," a young singer he favored on his show, an image I did not want circulating on the Review Board.

Before departing DG/PC, Charlie took pains to involve me and a new Asian FSO, Rock Wong, in what turned out to be the last Young Turk movement within the Foreign Service and the Department of State it still dominated at that time. Ken Quinn was the leader and called us The Group of 44; Rock and I provided useful "diversity," as the movement was basically driven by the upcoming senior officers still stuck with mid-level pay rates 20% below the national average. The pressure of the Group, plus Jimmy Carter's Civil Service Reform agenda and other factors, eventually led to the creation of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, which was effectively divided the Foreign Service into a Junior and a Senior Service, and thereby set the stage for its eventual decline and thorough bureaucratization, especially as appointments to senior positions became more and more politicized and filled by non-FSOs.

The Foreign Service trade-off at the time was a 20% rise in salary for mid-level officers for a new Senior Threshold, which was promised to reward "excellence" and ensure a steady flow upward of only the best officers leadership. What know one realized was how quickly the serving Senior Officers could/would corrupt the system by using a last

minute “emergency” mechanism called a Limited Contract Extension to extend tenure to their friends and themselves in such a way that it soon created a Senior Glut and stopped promotion flow-through from the bottom.

Another factor most officers did not know about or ignored was something a Civil Service colleague in DG/PC warned me about when he heard us discussing the importance of excellence and the desire for a truly outstanding diplomatic service: “Stephanie, you have to understand. Jimmy Carter has decided to use the federal government as a jobs program for the disadvantaged, so don’t stress excellence too much.”

Telling this story in 2010, it remains to be seen whether the United States will have a diplomatic service worthy of the name in another decade. It certainly will not unless members of the Foreign Service itself can find the will and the means to organize and challenge that diplomatic service is not something that just anyone can come in and do for a few years when they feel like it. The trend towards equivalency between the Civil Service and the Foreign Service personnel systems, despite their considerable differences, remains challenging.

Anyway, when Charlie left the DG’s Policy Coordination shop, he was replaced by Bob Gershenson, an old tough, admin mafia type and good friend of Jo Mersman. Bob had risen from Executive Director for ARA to the highest position he would ever have in the Department proper. He couldn’t quite figure me out and didn’t really approve of me. He was bothered by my V-neck Diane Van Furstenberg wrap-around dresses, which I considered to be his problem, not mine.

Exercising textbook management guidelines for dealing with women in the workplace, Bob proudly called me in one day and asked my opinion on a “hypothetical” office dress problem, as though it had nothing to do with me. He then asked how I would handle such? I’m afraid I let him have it between the eyes, counseling “very carefully and with witnesses,” least his problem with the most popular and elegant dress design in the country at that time be mistaken for gender discrimination or harassment. We never heard another word about it.

Bob knew I thought Charlie Hill was God and did not hold him in the same esteem. I remember Bob saying to me, “Stephanie I have rarely seen a junior officer who uses brute power so fearlessly and effectively, but it is not enough.” That was true, wise and insightful, but I was not really ready to come to terms with Bob’s administrative bureaucracy just yet. I guess I never really did.

I should note for the record that it was also Bob Gershenson who tied the Department to Wang Word Processing Systems, a progressive move at the time that proved to expensive to give up easily and thwarted any adoption of the internet at State until the turn of the 21st century. Bob sent me to a technology fair with instructions to identify the best. I did and it synched with his views, and a few weeks later Mr. Wang was invited in to discuss the possibility of a contract with the Department of State. I was thrilled at the prospect,

because I loved the new technology which was so much easier than legal pad drafting. (I did not have a secretary of my own to whom to give dictation like all the guys did.)

As mentioned, The new DG Harry Barnes started me working on the FS Act of 1980, and then the Old Boy Network saved the day. Only it was my husband's Old Boys. Douglas was asked to be the Executive Assistant for Ambassador Richard Gardner in Rome. Gardner called three different people, and three different people said "Douglas Kinney is your man." To the DCM Allen Holmes they said, "the only officer we know of that could stop the firings." So Douglas and I were sent out to Rome on a "Directed Assignment."

A "directed assignment" meant that it was done out of normal channels at the request of the DG. This actually caused Douglas some serious problems longer term, but we were blissfully unaware of them at the time, just thinking that it was great to be filling the "needs of the Service." Unfortunately, other people apparently assumed they had the job, and they were very unhappy when they did not get it and then waited two years to take their revenge. But that comes later.

Douglas was asked to take the Rome job, and recognizing that I was part of the tandem, the DG said that there is also a good job for Stephanie as well. Fortunately Allen Holmes, my good friend Marilyn Holmes' husband, was the DCM in Rome at the time. So we were all kindred spirits, and there were no problems in the short term. There were feelings to be assuaged in the longer term, but we went excitedly off to Rome.

Q: You were in Rome from when to when?

KINNEY: We went to Rome from August of 1979, right after Aldo Moro had been killed, to July 4 of 1981

Q: This is where we came into contact because we took Italian together. I was going to Naples as Consul General. All right, let's talk about Ambassador Richard Gardner. What had you heard before you went out there about him, and what was your impression of the Gardner ménage or whatever you want to call it?

KINNEY: Well, I hadn't heard anything. I was just thrilled to be going to Rome. I could not believe our good fortune. But be careful what you ask for! I had never made an international move before. Douglas had grown up in the Navy and was used to moving around, but I wasn't. That move for me was just sheer torture, agony, pain and misery for the first year.

Embassy Rome screwed up our housing request for an apartment large enough to house us, our four year old and our au pair. They had never heard of a working mother who was an FSO with a small child and did not take us seriously. So we found ourselves in a one bedroom efficiency in which Douglas and I had to sleep on the pull-out couch for four months while we searched for a place to live. No one would rent to the American Embassy because it had announced to the world that it would not pay key money. I went from paradise to a nightmare.

Suffice it to say, we did manage to find a lovely home in Trastevere just in time for Christmas, the date I had set to return to Washington if we still did not have a home. I knew the transition to the real Foreign Service would be difficult, but I had no idea how hard it would be for me and what a burden my poor husband was going to carry for two years in the form of his Ambassador.

We had been in Rome maybe two weeks when I got a call from Marilyn Holmes, the wife of the DCM, to come for tea, which didn't surprise me. We knew each other from FLO activities. Marilyn was very progressive, but also wonderfully very old school. She wanted to try and help me understand what we had gotten ourselves into and that we would need to manage with some finesse.

Marilyn and Danielle Gardner had gone to school together, so Marilyn was very loyal to Danielle and very understanding. She delicately described the Gardner's personal situation as a European-style marriage. She told a poignant story about how after the war and an escape from the Venice ghetto, Danielle's parents had prohibited her taking the position she had won through audition at the Comedie Francaise in favor of an effectively arranged marriage to an up and coming New York lawyer name Richard Gardner.

Danielle's ambition and theatrical bent was not easily satisfied in the role as wife of RNG and mother of Tony and Nina. Taking over as the American Ambassadrice at Villa Taverna offered her the canvas she had long dreamed of, and she exploited it to the hilt, while Richard occupied himself with Carter administration diplomacy. Danielle Luzzatto Gardner played high stakes cultural politics and information gathering, relying on all her worldly charms, which were considerable. She was in her element and did not care who knew it or what they thought.

So I just accepted that was the way things were and that the Ambassador was a difficult man with complexes. He suffered from a certain insecurity and confirmed my belief that insecure people are the most dangerous in the world. Working for him was a learning experience, but also a very challenging one. But that was mostly my husband's problem, not so much mine.

My problem was my very smart, self-important and ambitious but very short and slight and insecure, Schedule C (political) appointee boss, Daniel Sewer, a failed chemist who then worked for the UN, where he got to know Gardner, whom he convinced to take him to Rome as the Science Attaché. In Rome, the matter of the Iraqi nuclear program immediately came to the fore.

However, once the Israelis took care of the Iraq problem, it was Iran than really colored much of our tour. Our Embassy in Tehran was overrun a second time, and Embassy Rome changed almost overnight from a style that was very flamboyant, classy and socially prominent with constant entertainment scheduled at Villa Taverna to one that was austere and under the radar because it was considered inappropriate to be partying too much while the hostages were being held. Dinners continued but on a quieter and

lower profile of social networking and activity. Nonetheless, stories about Danielle and her style and flirtations remained legion.

In my view, where Danielle was concerned, a lot of people were both small minded and jealous or both. She was a pretty amazing woman, God rest her soul now. She died a few years ago in the middle of a New York City social gala. Despite the challenges both Ambassador Gardner and his wife presented, at least one was rarely embarrassed to be a member of that Embassy team, in contrast to that under the previous Ambassador, John Volpe.

The Gardners were sophisticated. Danielle was from an old Venetian Jewish family and they both spoke Italian beautifully. They knew what they were doing, and pursued Carter administration goals with energy and purpose, a chronicle Dick kept -- or rather Douglas kept for him--in his Diplomatic Record, an asset no doubt when it came time to write his book Mission Italy many years later. Ambassador Volpe was viewed as a poorly educated, poor immigrant to the US who made good but spoke substandard peasant Italian with a terrible Abruzzazi (backwoods) accent and carried a large social chip on his shoulder. I never met the man myself, but we heard lots of unflattering comparisons. Local elites always prefer to deal with someone they can consider their equal. Volpe, and others we have sent to Italy, did not fit the bill.

My husband was a party to the opening to the Communist party and the strategy for Italian approval of the SS-20's; I wasn't. I was just a struggling Junior Officer on her first rotational tour, tortured by a nasty, insecure, anti-FSO, schedule C who seemed to enjoy putting others down to make himself grander. For example, my professional and legal name and signature was Stephanie Smith Kinney, and he informed me that he didn't do three names for women so I could be Stephanie Smith or Stephanie Kinney, which did I want?

Besides trying to figure out how to work with this person, I also had to worry about the discovery of terrorist drawings of our apartment, and the black scribbly drawings my daughter would bring home from school every day for our first six months in Rome. You cannot imagine my relief when FINALLY colors, and flowers and singing birds and sunshine began to appear in her work.

Douglas, who had been a golden boy from his entrance into the Service, saw his career damaged by Gardner with a mediocre evaluation report in return for what all regarded as a miraculous tour de force of "stopping the firings." Dick only cared about Dick, not the many people who killed themselves making him look better than he was. As his Executive Assistant, Douglas was privy to just about everything but could tell me very little since I did not have an SCI clearance. The larger point was that there was clearly very serious work being done in Rome at a very substantive moment in Cold War history. And for all their ego, tics and foibles, the Gardners were a very serious and purposeful ambassadorial couple, who were there to accomplish something and arguably did.

Q: I think one of the things to put in perspective is the fact that Italy was and still is an important piece of patronage for Italo-American political appointees. Usually they come from provincial families, and I am talking about basically lower class, provincial families because they are first or second generation immigrants who have made good in America, but may not be well-regarded in Italian society. In other words real Italians look down on them. They speak a dialect, which is like going in and speaking, you might say, high hillbilly in the United States. It really doesn't work, but we keep doing it.

KINNEY: I ran into two examples that make your point. I did not appreciate the Italian perspective when we arrived, or the Italo-American perspective--WASP that I was-- for that matter. The first example was when the Ambassador had a big Villa Taverna reception for a group of Italo-American business people to which I was also invited.

Q: Villa Taverna is the ambassador's residence.

KINNEY: I was there as part of the staff that evening, and found myself listening to the most swaggering, foul mouthed, "guess this will show them" commentary on the part of this group of Italo-American men because they were very conscious of the way Italians looked down on them, and by God they weren't going to take it any more. I was just stunned. I had no idea about this dynamic at work within the Italian-American community. It was quite an eye opener.

On another occasion, I had to deliver a speech in Ascoli Piceno, a town near Pesaro on the Adriatic. My job as the Assistant Environment, Science and Technology (EST) Attaché meant that I became the Embassy's point person for what turned out to be Italy's first heroin epidemic, hence my speech in Ascoli Piceno on US Drug Prevention Policy. I gave the speech to an assembled group of regional dignitaries and became good friends with the woman who was my host, a fervent drug treatment activist. I was given a queen's welcome by all. And all wanted me to understand one thing above all--that Ascoli Piceno was a town without emigrants, people who had left to go to America. This showed how solidly accomplished and prosperous the city and its citizens were in contrast to those towns which had sent large numbers to America, such as the many towns in Abruzzo. Again, I was quite shocked by the way my host and others looked down on other towns and regions with which I knew former Ambassador Volpe was closely identified.

So your point is very well taken, and our tendency to place more value on domestic patronage than effective representation can be very counterproductive.

I experienced the same thing in Latin America, in Uruguay, where we had a Chicano, political appointee ambassador during Uruguay's transition back to democracy from military rule. I found myself in very uncomfortable circumstances more than once when, speaking Castilian Spanish, I would visit from Washington and dignitaries, who considered the Ambassador an uncultured and ill-spoken man, would ignore him in favor of the "real American representative."

Q: Of course, when I was Consul General in Naples, anybody from Rome North looked down upon the Mezzogiorno. I remember at one time having a dinner and the prefect and his wife and couple of other people were just dissing all over the local people. There it is. Italy is really a very divided society between North and South. What was your job?

KINNEY: When Douglas was called out to Rome, I was told that there had been a position created for me. It was known that I was interested in global issues. There was an Environment, Science and Technology office in Rome, whose only officer needed help, so I would be the Assistant EST Attaché working for Daniel Serwer. I was thrilled, until I had to start dealing with Danny. But it was a learning experience. It taught me to be forever wary of short men, which I managed to do until service in Denmark some years later.

As I explained earlier, except for a few demarches at the Environment Ministry, what my new title really meant was that I was to be in charge of the demand reduction side of U.S. engagement on Italy's new narcotics problem. Shortly after we arrived, there were lots of animated public rallies near the Embassy. I remember going by one, thinking my Italian must still not be very good; maybe I just was not understanding things correctly. Well, I was understanding just perfectly. It was a Communist Party rally, and the message was that there was no heroin problem in Rome, no drug problem in Italy. The only drug addicts were foreigners, especially American tourists. Rumors of Italian addicts were the work of the CIA.

In fact, there was a very serious heroin epidemic in progress, especially in Rome, which you could see by going outside of my Palazzo on Via Garibaldi street in Trastevere. On a daily basis, I had to pick up syringes so my daughter didn't end up stepping on them or picking them up herself, as she did one day asking "Mommy, what is this?"

Rome and Florence were particularly difficult centers of drug abuse, and it related to your comments about the division between North and South in Italy. As my DEA colleagues, who had just come off working the French Connection explained, "It's *deja vu* all over again."

Just as the American Mafia had reluctantly gone into drugs some years earlier, so the Mafia in Italy had held off dealing narcotics in Italy at all. However, when the old ethic ("Don't foul you own nest.") came under pressure and the financial competition with a less ethical, younger generation got too much to ignore, the industrialized North was declared fair game. What the Dons did not think through was that the factories of the North were filled with workers from the South. When these workers in Turin and Milan and other Northern urban centers returned to their home villages in the Mezzogiorno for vacation time with the family, they brought their addiction and drug habits with them. So in 1979, Italy was hit from North to South with a major heroin epidemic. Its first!

Q: The emigration to the United States was over. I mean Naples had been a great center and it faded out.

KINNEY: Yes, one emigrated not to the States anymore but to Germany or to northern Europe or to some extent to Denmark, where there is a good sized Italian immigrant population in Copenhagen. However, mostly poor people from the South in search of work went to Northern Italy to the manufacturing centers, where the jobs were. I suspect you saw the same thing in Naples.

Q: And it was a major generational change. We say the Mafia. There is also the Comora and the Cosa Nostra, so these clannish criminal groups in Southern Italy developed very strong roots in the North. Before, if you had a battle over leadership within the gangs, you maybe would kill the leaders. But now the new kids on the block were killing the family members. It sounds bizarre, but by the 1980's they were amoral in this criminal behavior, which in the past had at least had its standards.

KINNEY: Well, Italy and the study of Italy was the source of the sociological concept of “amoral familism.” Having come from a country that took pride in and had always, at least in my experience, made a point of institutions and institutionalization of power, living in a culture that was still solidly “personalist” and “tribal” (family defined) was very different. I could relate to it because I had seen the same thing in Spain and Latin America, where anybody outside of the family is fair game. In Italy, this was especially true the further South one went. It was just as “personalist” as any third world country.

Rome is a very Southern city in that sense as well, along with the heavy burden of a very long and not always easy to survive history, which every Roman carries in his bones. Survivalism trumps idealism in Italy. And the history is so layered; they've seen so much come and go; Americans can't help but be amusing to them.

I, and many others, found and find Rome a very difficult city to come to love. It's the only Middle Eastern city without a European section. To live there happily is to profoundly understand the meaning of the phrase “When in Rome, do as the Romans.” Unfortunately, the US Government and its systems will never find a good way to come to terms with this truth. To love Rome, one must become a little Roman.

Q: Well I think a lot of us, you know, realized very quickly that your education counted for little in Italy. It was your family connections, which got you your job. So you would have people graduating at the top you their class in electrical engineering and no job.

KINNEY: Yes, that was very sad, and is still true today. We used to get people coming to us--junior officers but identified with the Ambassador-- asking for “recommendations” or if we could “arrange” something for someone in their family. I love Italy and the Italiani, but theirs is a very particular world and way of life.

But my job in 1979 was drugs, which was great because 1) I learned a lot about the issue and immunized my daughter for life and 2) I got to travel all over Italy accompanying experts from our National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA) or giving speeches myself, which was great for my Italian, if -- I am sure -- it was sometimes hard on the ears of my audience.

It also turned out that the only person in Rome who had any empirical data and idea about the number of heroin overdose deaths was a die-hard Communist, Ustik Avico. The Lord works in wondrous ways: Ustik and I became best friends and tight allies, and all the sudden the Communist Party changed its tune. It stopped blaming the CIA and even became partners with me and the Embassy and my Vatican contact--Don Mario Picci--in advancing the cause of Therapeutic Communities, a model pioneered in the States by a Monsignor O'Brien in upstate New York. And it was later Don Mario, whom Douglas called, when the Pope was shot, who got Douglas through to the Pope's personal physician right after he had finished operating on him. What a time.

After serving under Sewer less than a year, I knew I had to do something and got myself detailed to serve as a "control officer" for the state visit of Jimmy Carter, which was another unbelievable experience. This one involved fishing Ham Jordan and Jody Powell's friends on the Advance Team out of the Trevi Fountain, one step ahead of the police. But every FSO has these kinds of stories to tell.

When the State visit was over, I then did six months on the visa line, which was fascinating. I will contest anybody who thinks they are above consular work and that they shouldn't have to do it, which is a big problem now with a lot of incoming entry level officers. First, you are never going to get away from consular issues--especially visas -- in a Foreign Service career, never mind that you are not a consular officer. You have got to learn that law and learn the basics, and the only way to do it is to take the courses and man "The Line." It is also so instructive. We had Russian Jews and Armenian Baha'i and Jewish Iranians coming in by the boatloads through Rome.

Q: Because we are talking about the Iranian revolution.

KINNEY: Yes, the Iranian revolution in '79.

Q: Applicants from both Iran and the Soviet Union were essentially those regarded as religiously subversive.

KINNEY: Yes, and we also had lots of Filipinos. It is very instructive for young officers to confront people who absolutely lie to your face. You have the evidence in front of you that says they are lying. You remind them that it is a permanent offense to lie to a U.S. Consular Officer and that this alone will bar them from ever getting a visa, and they will still look you straight in the eye and lie.

For certain kinds of Americans -- people like me -- that kind of lying was a real shock. Lying to try and get away with something I could understand, distasteful as it was, but to continue to lie when caught red handed and confronted with evidence to the contrary was just stupid, and that I really had trouble understanding it. It was a mark of both habit and desperation.

Q: Well, this is something I have found being a Consular Officer. Young people like yourself, coming out of the American system, you really don't expect to be lied to blatantly. Of course these were people who came from societies who had to lie a lot.

KINNEY: I don't think they thought of it as lying. They had no conception of "truth."

Q: Actually, you, as the Visa Officer, just represent authority. And the point is how do you get past this authority; what do they want to hear? They will tell them what they think you want to hear because you are just an obstacle getting in the way of what they want. I mean it is not a matter of morality or anything else.

KINNEY: Yeah, they are not lying; they are surviving.

Q: They are surviving, and it is very hard for middle class Americans to accept this. It is really one of the hardest jobs; it is important that the young Visa Officers doesn't get so bitter that they begin to take it out and see things that are not there. It is a good learning experience.

KINNEY: It is a tough experience for building and assessing judgment -- for forging good judgment about others outside your culture, and for assessing new officers for their judgment, for their temperament and aptitude for duty. There is work that has to be done. Who is going to do it? It is your job. We are not being paid to like it. You are being paid to do it well and do it professionally. I hope that we don't do something foolish like decide junior officers no longer have to go through that crucible.

Q: Did you get any feel for our stance on the Communist Party in Italy? This is Euro-Communism and Antonio Gramsci and Dylan Boyer and the gentlemanly face to the thing, and we have to deal with it.

KINNEY: As I mentioned earlier, I ran into it right away, because the only person who seemed to have any accurate information on overdose deaths in Rome was a Communist. Ustik had never met anyone like me, and I had never met a real live communist before, and I just thought he was an absolute gold mine. He was honest; he was rational; he carefully collected and used empirical data. His was the only data base in the country. I had to get special permission to continue my relationship with him, which became quite close. It included being invited over to their family home for dinner. I remember him very fondly and affectionately. I think he learned a lot of insights he would never gain otherwise about America and capitalists. That was my introduction to "The Party."

I'll give you my take on Communism in Italy. Ambassador Gardner had secretly been sent over to open relations with the Party, with which the USG had never had formal relations before. Italian Communists were not by and large Stalinists. In my view, Communism in Italy was almost a default option for the lack of other alternatives to the Catholic Church, among other things. A lot of the values and instincts were rather similar, but if you were anti-clerical, you tended to feel rather more comfortable in the Communist Party (PC) than inside the Church.

Italy's was a cultural communism. It was the home of Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci had understood this, in ways that most of our academics and scholars, and certainly our national security types, did not. Euro Communism in this context was an alternative to the Catholic Church. It was not the same as Leninist Soviet Communism. It was preaching a gospel of communitarian progress and goodness and, in fact, at the municipal level, the PC was usually a good deal less corrupt than its Christian Democratic counterpart. Communists were also more inclined to use reason and technical fixes than faith and temporary political fixes, in my experience.

That's a huge generalization and certainly when push came to shove, the PC would line up on the left every time, but why not? They were never going to have real power beyond the municipal level and they knew it. The high water mark was 34% in national elections. Admittedly, that scared the pants off of everyone, but it was the high water mark nationally.

You really had to see the distinctions between the Soviet agenda and the Italian way and work them accordingly. To my mind, the funniest thing in the world would have been for the PC to win and be responsible for Italy. That would have been like the "Ransom of Red Chief," the O Henry short story about the kidnapers who finally begged to give the little boy back.

Communism wasn't monolithic, much as our "systems" and "gaming" boys at the Pentagon wanted to make it out to be. Each country had its own conditions and story and reasons for being attracted to socialism, democratic or not. One of the best ways and most effective ways to engage was to draw on what is now called "soft power" and be very pragmatic. This is why, as a JO, I believed and continue to believe today, that Environment, Science and Technology (EST), at their best, are relatively non-ideological tools with which to build relationships and solve problems, the same as cultural exchange. They are all crucial tools for modern diplomacy.

One must take care not to corrupt the content of any particular issue, but, for example, we were able to make common cause with communists in Rome, thanks to Ustik and the fact that we were working on a problem that could be defined and reduced to a certain amount of data and empirical information. There were necessary and reasonable prevention and treatment responses Italians could consider, based on the experience of other countries that had already grappled with drug epidemics. On the supply side, good police work could both identify sources and corruption points, which were often just as important.

My message was always that the U.S. had experience but no real answers because we were Americans and this was an Italian problem now. The Italians had to come to grips with what had happened in their own country and what had caused this epidemic to break out in the first place. It was not some subversive plot that could be ascribed to others. To the extent that they wanted help, we and others could share our experience.

Q: I must say having served four years in Greece, it was a delight to be in Italy because in Greece anything that happened was the American's fault. The Greeks always blamed somebody else. In Italy, they say we have got a problem; we have got to deal with it.

KINNEY: Well, they didn't at first, but we brought over a couple of people from NIDA and started working the issue with them. It was a real evidence of diplomacy at work, and it worked, and it mattered and they did take ownership, and a lot of Communists learned a lot about the issue and, more importantly, about working with Americans and America itself because we eventually sent a number of them to the States to link up with professional counterparts there. Many would retain their ideological frames rhetorically, but even the head of the Communist Party soon became a regular and enthusiastic visitor to the USA. In 1979, the dollar was very strong and most Italian communists had never been to America or had any idea what it was like. In 1980 the dollar suddenly softened, and Italians in large numbers could visit the U.S. for the first time, and they were knocked out. Just loved it, especially New York!

Q: And also the Communist Party, it depends on your perspective. In Naples, the mayor of Naples was a communist poet, a very nice man. I mean we were having a series as you remember, of bombings and awful things happening, including an earthquake, so there were all sorts of masses for the victims of such and such. I would appear and the head of the Communist Party of whatever area would appear and others of the various parties. We were all part of the authority, and we would just appear. I guess to a certain point, I am a good atheist, but after my time in Naples, I can practically do the Roman Catholic - - I mean the Italian-- mass because I went to so many of them.

KINNEY: And the same was true of the Communists. I didn't meet any PC [Catholic] "believers," much less practitioners, but they were all comfortable in their skin in a Catholic setting because that is who they and their family had been for centuries. To me it seemed that it was mostly their anti-clericalism or lack of faith in the Roman church clergy and hierarchy that led them someplace else, not the values per se. Communism was just a secular faith.

Q: How did you find, did you get much of a feel for Italian society? How did you feel about the people you were dealing with?

KINNEY: In what sense?

Q: Well I am just trying to...

KINNEY: In those days, American diplomacy was stretched thin, as it always has been. It was very purposefully aimed at the power and intellectual elites, who had influence and decision making power and authority. One met ordinary people and got to know them through the tasks of daily life and living in Rome. For Douglas and me, getting outside the Embassy orbit was a real challenge because Gardner was so demanding. One planned vacation after another, one promise of taking on some regional responsibility (like

Sardinia) after another got scuttled. On the other hand, we enjoyed a privileged position for people so young in Rome.

When we arrived in Rome, the deal was for Douglas to serve two years in purgatory, and then he would get a real job, a two year tour of duty as number two in the Political Section following the Socialist Party, which was key to the INF agreement. That was the promise to my husband, “if only he could/would stop the firings.” Well, Ronald Reagan won the next election, and that was the end of that deal, so we only had two years in Rome instead of the promised four.

As I said, we didn’t have that much time to spend with ordinary people, so of the world that we saw, several things impressed me. I was 33 at the time, and I thought I was fairly mature, but the Italian establishment was a testimony to longevity and seniority. I remember becoming aware of people looking straight through me because I was just too young to be interesting. If you did not have grey hair or no hair at all, you simply didn’t count. It was irritating but understandable, once you understood how things worked. The men were not all that evolved, but they could be gallant and charming. The importance to Italians of “bella figura” surprised and intrigued me. I liked their awareness and sense of style and proper form, but style without substance also grows old.

Q: The Southern genes came out.

KINNEY: Oh yes. I love southern places. I love the Mediterranean. It is fun. Life is infinitely circles within circles within circles. I came to appreciate the meaning of the word “Byzantine” in Italy in a way that I never had before. The concept of constant change in government representing stability and no one getting too much control over anything was jarring, especially when instability was how it is perceived and understood from afar.

At a certain point, Douglas created a dictionary in which he started listing all of the classic sort of inside political phrases like a *governo balneario*, a summer seaside government, meaning it is only there so everybody can go on vacation. Another great one was a *crisi pilotato*, a guided crisis, meaning that it had been created deliberately for a certain purpose. The most dangerous crisis was the *crisi al buio--the crisis in the dark no one had planned or understood*. The weight of history from the peasant to the President was so heavy. As an American, it was hard to feel anything but still wet behind the ears. These people knew that they had already seen it all for thousands of years, so who were we with only 200 years of history behind us?

Q: But at the same time, there were significant developments.

KINNEY: Oh yes. Italy was key to getting the Russian SS-20s pulled back. Learning about the science establishment was an eye opener. I had no appreciation before going there about how evolved and sophisticated and capable their science community is. I remember someone saying, “Well do you remember who Fermi was?” “Yes, I know.” But I had no idea about the Italian NIH connection, the medical exchange in research

between our two countries, the energy connections both conventional and nuclear and in alternatives. It was just always one discovery after another.

I was a culture vulture, so I also loved the ancient history and the art and all of that. That was just a given, but I guess it was coming to appreciate -- apart from Italy's chaotic surface -- something that an Italian once said to me that really sums things up: "*Siamo un popolo molto en gamba.*" We are a people very clever, very adaptable, very quick to understand. They are.

Q: I always think of the verb "arrangiarsi," to work around a problem.

KINNEY: Yeah. To arrange things, but often with great subtlety. If one is going to be a diplomat, I think having a first tour in Italy has to be one of the greatest blessings and one of the greatest instructive experiences one can have. Rome is not called the Eternal City for nothing. It is one of those cities that changes your life.

Q: How would you describe, this first time as an officer in an embassy? How would you describe -- morale is the wrong term -- but the outlook of the Junior Officers there? A demanding ambassador but at least a productive one would stay at work most of the time.

KINNEY: I have concluded over the years, that Class A embassies are permanently unhappy. In part, I think this is due to their size; in part because of the demands; in part because that nasty word "class" imposes itself much more obviously and unavoidably than in smaller places, where everyone is in the foxhole together.

In the case of Rome, in addition to all that, and an ambassador who had become notorious for firing people, you had an expectation that I experienced, and I know others did much more painfully: you think you are coming to one of the grand capitals of Europe, and you don't know you are being sent to one of the smaller capitals of the Middle East. As one wag said, "Rome is the only middle eastern city without a European sector."

Rome is very special and unto itself. At the Embassy, we had to have a special bulletin board on which to post news about labor strikes, "*scioperos.*" Otherwise, you never knew what was not going to be open or working or functioning on a given day, or you might not know which streets to avoid. As I mentioned, life could be complicated when you needed to "live like the Romans" but were expected to operate like an American. Didn't work very well. You had to know what days the flower sellers weren't there and buy ahead, or be embarrassed to arrive some place empty handed.

While we were there, they started shutting down the historic center so transport and logistics were a nightmare until one could "make an arrangement" with the proper papers and permits. It was hard learning that Romans are very discerning people, who don't have a lot of time to spend on people who aren't useful to them. It was not easy to break through and develop real relationships when somebody always wants something, and you are expected to provide something or you are of no use. Looking back, this is really how much, perhaps most of the world, really operates, but it was not the environment from

which I had come, and the learning curve was painful. But also richly rewarding---Rome is still my favorite city in the world.

Q: Well Stephanie, this is probably a good place to stop. Where did you go after?

KINNEY: Reagan won, and Gardner was out. The people unhappy with us back in the Bureau of Personnel in Washington immediately began to threaten us with Lagos. Max Rabb, Reagan's chief New York finance man was being sent out as Ambassador, and he wanted us to stay on because everyone else was leaving. However, his nomination was held up interminably, and PER wanted its pound of flesh.

We got word that Jeane Kirkpatrick was interested in Douglas, and she wanted him to fly someplace to meet with her. He couldn't do it. Couldn't afford it, so she eventually came to him in Northern Italy or some place. I forget how they met up. Anyway, she decided he was the one she wanted for her Latin American officer at the US Mission to the United Nations, where she would serve as Ambassador.

When Max Rabb finally got approved, he went to Jeane and asked for Douglas in order to maintain some continuity in the Embassy since the entire political section was changing over, but her response was, "Sorry, Max. You may want him, but I've have got him. So, too bad." Douglas's and my preferences were of no interest to anyone. We wanted to stay in Rome for the promised "real tour," but by that time, our main objective was to avoid Lagos, so we went to USUN with Jean.

Doug's assignment had the lead, so I did the best I could and found an unfilled slot at the New York City USIA Information Center, whose staff was responsible for programming the activities of official USG visitors to New York under the International Visitors (IV) Program. This program identified emerging leaders in many fields and brought them to the United States for three weeks to meet with their professional counterparts all over the country and to get to know America's complex and diverse culture.

Q: OK, this was when?

KINNEY: This would have been in '81 to '83.

Q: OK, today is 26 April 2010 with Stephanie Kinney. Stephanie, where were we?

KINNEY: New York City, where we arrived on July 4, Mercier's birthday, after one week's notice that we would indeed not be staying in Rome. Foreign Service life can be trying. I spent the next two years worrying about raising a six and seven year old in New York City, worrying about how we were going to pay the next bill because we had no allowances and had to pay for both a New York Apartment and a private school, and how I was going to get back in the Department's good graces career wise, after having taken this bizarre, off-track assignment. What a curious life this was that I ended up leading!

Q: Well first, I think we covered it somewhat, but one last question about Rome. What was your impression of how, particularly the younger people who came to the Embassy and all, big cities are aren't always the best assignments. The Romes, the Parises, they are not always the greatest place because everybody is occupied doing things, and nobody has the chance to take care of the people who are just learning the trade and how to live abroad. Was Rome a problem?

KINNEY: For the first year, Rome was sheer torture and anguish, for me particularly. "When in Rome, do as the Romans," was the opposite of how the U.S. government or the U.S. embassy was inclined to do things, which made life complicated. For example, from day one, we had housing problems. I was the only female officer in the embassy who was a mother and my daughter was four years old. I knew because of Doug's job of the terrorist threats against the busses and the school (Merry Mount) that she was going to. Nothing ever came of it, but I was aware that there was more going on than a lot of people were aware of.

Class A posts are traditionally places that have JORPs (Junior Officer Rotation Positions), which is what I was formally assigned into. A JORP is ideally something that every JO should aspire to, but particularly in those days, there was no real mentoring or cultivating of JOs. You were just supposed to have sprung from the head of Zeus knowing everything. Married women officers were certainly an oddity. Married women officers with children were even more of an oddity. I was the only one in a staff of over 600 people. So there were a lot of problems I had to work out all on my own. I didn't have any role models. And all the sudden I went from having power and control and influence to really having none, and I did not like it.

I remember writing Betty Atherton, Ambassador Roy Atherton's wife, and some friends back in Washington very long, emotionally pained letters. Betty, in particular, acted as my mentor and my mother and guide in not giving up on my marriage and the Foreign Service and my own ability to manage things over time. She was a great lady, God rest her soul. Lord knows, I got no help from the officer corps.

Q: OK, New York. You were in New York. Was it U.S. UN?

KINNEY: Well, Doug was assigned to U.S. UN; I was assigned to the USIA International Visitors Programming Office. The good news was that we were in the same city and that we had obtained a second "tandem assignment." The bad news was that Douglas had a great job, and I felt like mine was career suicide. But we were together. Tandem careers are common place today, but when I came in they were unheard of, and it took a lot of time and practice for the institution (mostly the Bureau of Personnel) to come to terms with the concept, much less its implementation. PER leadership varied in its progressiveness, at times being outright hostile, especially as the number of tandems in the Service began to grow. There was also a growing perception that tandems served in Class A posts more than single officers, a canard which circulated for years and had to be periodically statistically disproved.

Q: The USIA office was separate from U.S. UN.?

KINNEY: Yes. USIA was the United States Information Agency, which was a separate agency from State in those days. It was responsible for, among other things, running all of our Cultural Exchange programs, including the International Visitor program. Every quarter, embassies would select grantees who would be given a three week, professionally oriented visit to the United States for the purpose of getting to know the United States through meeting with their professional counterparts across the country. Of course, almost everybody came to New York.

I was the only State Foreign Service Officer there. The office was basically a Civil Service operation, run by a women by the name of Elaine Heifetz, who was very good, very dedicated, very New York, and her coterie of mostly very Brooklyn female staff. I take that back; there was another FSO, an African American USIA officer, who was her deputy. His name was David, and I remember him with great affection because he improbably actually got me promoted due to the help he gave me in writing my section of my OER and the assessment he made of me.

I was very frustrated there with this assignment. I knew it was not “promotable.” First, I was working for USIA, not State, and second the job was a nothing-burger, highly administrative in nature and not very demanding. During my first six months, I read 35 books on the job because the job just didn’t demand that much. On the other hand, it did turn out to be very interesting because of the people I got to meet and squire around town, something that other program officers did not make a habit of.

I made the most I could of the job because I got to deal with some really interesting people and professional interests. I decided that these people were going to see what I thought they needed to, not necessarily always what they thought they wanted to. So I ended up making myself sort of indispensable to their programs.

I remember I spent several days with David Hockney, the British artist, including attending his soirees down in the Village. When General Jaruzelski, the last Communist leader of Poland took over in 1981, he started tightening up control to please his Soviet overlords, and we got a man by the name of Karpinski out on the IV program just in the nick of time. He was one of the last Polish intellectuals to get out after Jaruzelski brought down the gates. We not only programmed Karpinski, but managed to get him asylum status and eventually a position at Yale, from which he operated until things got better a decade later.

There were just lots of people like that. I remember going for a ride in a New York City police car with a visitor and learning a lot about the underside of New York City and the NYPD, which was just fascinating. It turned out to be a wonderful learning experience for me and the visitors I handled got very high quality programming and access to things they might not have otherwise. I realized that the one thing I could do was call up

anybody I wanted to, invoke the name of the U.S. Government and make it happen. It was great fun.

Q: You did it from when to when?

KINNEY: I did it from '81 to '83.

Q: OK. Well let's take while you are doing that, what happens. Were you, the basic trip would be outlined both by the post and by Washington. So you were in charge...

KINNEY: I was in charge of what they were going to do and whom they would meet in New York City. What they saw, whom they met and what they did was my little bailiwick. I very quickly learned to pick out the interesting ones from the less than interesting ones, the ones who, in my view, were diplomatically, politically, economically significant or intellectually or artistically significant. I was not shy about speaking out and grabbing what I considered to be the best of the bunch. Unlike everybody else in the office, this was not going to be my full time work for the rest of my life, so I decided to make the most of it for our visitors and for myself.

Q: OK, lets say you get somebody like an African rising politician. I mean this would be tricky because the parts of the black area of New York are not exactly the safest place to go to.

KINNEY: Well, not really. One of the things that David, the USIA Deputy, helped me with, which I remember to this day was the concept of my "more settled roots." What I came up against in New York City was all these people with "less settled roots," which is, of course, the heart of New York. Everyone going there wants to become someone or something they are not. It was and remains a boiling cauldron of ethnicities and minorities and immigrants coming from backgrounds very different from my own.

I had been going in and out of New York City since I was in college at Vassar two hours up the river in Poughkeepsie. But I had never lived Manhattan and the boroughs in the way that I did during this tour. In this job, I really had to delve deeply into the City and that was really fun.

No, Harlem was not a big deal. Yes, you had crime and ne'er do wells, and the city was not going through one of its better periods while we were there. There were all sorts of social problems and tensions, but at heart, New York is just a bunch of neighborhoods, and it was just like going into a foreign country: if you acted the right way and you called the right people and made the right arrangements in Harlem, it was not different from getting special treatment in Brussels or Rome or any place else. Particularly, if you had the U.S. government behind you, there was very little to be denied.

Q: OK, well let's take a few types that you would get.

KINNEY: I would get world class artists, like David Hockney, the British pop art leader and critic. I didn't know who the hell David Hockney was, but London had sent him to us, so I figured I'd better find out why, which was harder in those pre-Internet days. I figured, "Well, first of all you ask him whom he wants to see, who his friends are, whom he wants to connect with, what interests him about the U.S. art world, and then you add some things he might not otherwise get to know about the US. He had a lot of connections on his own. He didn't need USIA or the U.S. government or me really, but I just made myself indispensable, and we became temporary best friends. I squired him around the City because he was, after all, our responsibility. We made sure that he got to talk to galleries and gallery owners like Castelli, whom he had not yet had an opportunity to meet. We made sure that he got to go to artist soirees, which were a little bizarre and definitely into the Oscar Wilde world, but that was interesting too. We got him to all the major modern art museums with the curators and the right people. He was as interested in the Metropolitan Museum of Art and some aspects of its collection and the El Barrio Museum, as he was in MOMA and the Whitney and the places that were predictably of interest to him and interested in his art. We got him around New York because he was interested in politics and society. I don't remember the details of the program, but it was an effort to give him a memorable opportunity to see aspects of New York that he probably wouldn't have seen on his own. We also did newspaper interviews. I remember we did get him a New York Times feature article in the Arts Section because he was there, and the State Department got a little credit for it as well.

Very often we had journalists, and journalists, of course, were very political and often interested in the problems of the United States, especially the seamy side. One of my favorite options for these guys was the NYPD drive around. The first time I did it knocked me out, so I assumed it would our guests as well, especially because crime was such a problem at the time. I do remember one guest who couldn't believe the humor and culture of the Irish cops. We had real incidents during the course of the day in which we were doing the ride-about, so we saw how the police responded and the procedures they used. I remember both of us were impressed how well the police knew their neighborhoods and the individuals --including the bad guys--in it. We were cruising the upper west side, lower Harlem, and the cops would talk about the guys on the street, obviously familiar with them. They would pull over and chat them up just to let them know they were being watched and had best keep it cool.

Homelessness was a big deal then, and the Europeans, of course, didn't have homelessness, and they thought we were terrible because we did. Well, there was a lot to learn. One of the main problems in New York was the correlation between addiction and or mental problems and homelessness. It was rather touching to see how the police protectively regarded their "coo-coo birds," who could not be institutionalized beyond their will and so were on the streets. It was extremely educational and informative and a powerful work experience visitors rarely forgot. More often than not, police rides always figured large in news or TV articles generated by visitors when they returned home. The Embassies would send us copies for our effectiveness files. This was a good way of seeing what visitors understood and how they reflected on it once back home.

Most of the people that I remember were Europeans. This was '81 to '83. The intellectual left was still our toughest challenge around the world but especially in Europe, given Euro-communism and all the political dynamics surrounding that. So getting America's story out in ways that were honest and credible was very important. This little office and program deserved no small credit in helping accomplish that in a thousand ways a year, a real unsung hero of the Cold War.

Q: What were the politics of New York City and New York State at the time?

KINNEY: I am trying to remember if that is when Dinkins was mayor. I just honestly don't remember. I remember there was lots of crime, lots of homelessness, lots of social problems and tensions. The fact that we would put people together with fierce critics of both the New York power structure and the U.S. administration was always very important to visitors and was very impressive to them. We would also make sure that they understood that New York was not America and that they could contrast it with others cities and regions of the country.

Our aim was for them to have a better grasp of the regional, the economic, the cultural and social differences and the variety of this enormous sprawling country and this inevitably shook them up because most Europeans came from their own capitals, and they came to Washington and New York thinking they knew all about the United States of America. One of the things that I always tried to do was find ways to surprise them about New York City as a city of small neighborhoods. Many of them had been to New York before and thought they knew all about it, so to help them put New York in a context vis a vis the rest of the country was also really important.

Q: Well the normal person who goes to New York City gets off at the airport, goes to a hotel, goes to a play or two, goes to a couple of good restaurants, walks around downtown and then leaves, and that is New York.

KINNEY: Exactly, which is why I made them go to the various boroughs, ride the Staten Island Ferry, see South Seaport, visit a Brooklyn Museum and see the Cloisters and the world's largest gothic cathedral still building up in Harlem. We did a lot of African American stuff because race and race relations was still big news in Europe, along with drugs, crime, homelessness and addiction. I drew very heavily on my New York experience in my next assignment, when I had to do a State Visit to New York City for Uruguayan President Sanguinetti and his wife.

I had to put together their New York program and serve as her official escort. They were both very confirmed, Sorbonne-bred, socialists and anti-clerics. She was a well known art historian and conservator, who had never been to the US but did not like us just the same. She left singing a different tune. I took her up to Harlem to St. John the Devine and showed her what was going on up there with local youth, once the cathedral started rebuilding with its neighborhood stone cutting programs and apprenticeships and its textile design and fabric manufacturing programs for neighborhood youth. The cathedral was using the building process to create small businesses and teach skills that locals

could really use and products they could sell. They were hiring kids from Harlem to learn the crafts that were both medieval and modern and do finish the building.

Q: You are talking about the Episcopal.

KINNEY: The Episcopal cathedral of St. John the Devine up on Amsterdam Avenue at the edge of Harlem. Mrs. Sanguinetti was blown away. It was a total disconnect and unexpected shock for any definition or vision that she had ever had about religion in general and the church in America in particular. She had no notion of Protestants. Their whole experience had been Catholic; I guess one of the reasons they hated it was because they had no alternative.

Mrs. Sanguinetti was very impressed by the social activism and social work versus the charity model. What she saw was white people actually constructing programs that gave poor black people a life line to a different kind of life, in contrast to the ideological stereotypes she had absorbed and thought represented truth about America. From her perspective, before her visit, Harlem was proof the US was evil and uniformly mistreated black people. Having opportunities to really jolt people out of their stereotypes and notions and miss-information in times like that was really fun.

After that visit, I got a nice little note from somebody at the White House saying it was the most thoughtful and effective programming in New York that she had ever seen. It didn't go into my OER or anything, but it made me feel really good. Because of her interest in art and history, I also took her to Southside Seaport, which was a reminder of the Dutch history and the sailing and the port and the commerce, elements shared with her home city of Montevideo. She was impressed how the old port area had been revived and important history saved not as a museum but as a self- sustaining economic proposition that both conserved history, presented something beautiful, redeveloped a totally raunchy neighborhood and also provided a new life, a new kind of renewal in that part of the city. She didn't associate those sorts of things with her ideas of America.

Q: This was the early Reagan period, and...

KINNEY: And that made the intellectual left even more challenging....

Q: And suspicious, a right wing movie star sort of a boob with nuclear weapons. I mean that was sort of the impression all of us had to deal with. How did you find working in that office?

KINNEY: The USIA office?

Q: Yeah.

KINNEY: Well, I was very unhappy when I arrived because I had obviously compromised. All tandems had to and have to work out their own salvation. There has never been a promise or assumption of equality or equity for each member of the couple.

Doug had sacrificed for me significantly when he stayed in Washington an extra year so that I could finish up work on the FLO, so USIA was my turn to do the same.

The minute Reagan won the election, and we got messages that we were being sent to Lagos, we knew we needed a Plan B and Lagos would not be in it! Douglas had served in the Peace Corps, and he was not taking his family to Lagos, thank you very much. So as long as he was happy and he had a good job at U.S. UN with Jeane Kirkpatrick, it was my turn to make do. He would have a responsible job, if not a stellar one, because Latin America wasn't the biggest deal in the world. However, as it turned out, he ended up doing the Falklands War for U.S. UN and ended up writing a book about it some years later and appeared on the cover of the NY Times Magazine in the process.

I was just happy to have a job in the same city at USIA. The office itself was not a Foreign Service environment. It was not a diplomatic environment. It was basically a bunch of New York ladies with entitlements for life to run this program. The director, Elaine Heifetz was very good, very responsible, very cultivated, had some vision, but it had been being recycled for a long time and wasn't what I would call dynamic. As I said, I read 35 books on the job the first six months.

Once I got a better attitude and started seeing the possibilities, things changed. I figured it is not about them; it is about what I make of it, and I ended having a great time. I think I may have even ended up getting promoted after the USIA assignment because of the powerful case David and I made in the OER for cultural diplomacy, and that was neat!

Q: Well then, you left New York in '83. Whither?

KINNEY: To DC and back to the Department. I became the Uruguay-Paraguay desk officer, which again was not a high power job, but it was a desk job and it was Latin America, a region for which I spoke the language. I felt confident, although I had no idea what Desk Officers do. There was no training or preparation for the job, nothing.

I remember walking in the first day and being told to do a certain memo on a subject about which I knew absolutely nothing. Well, that was when I learned the virtue of plagiarizing. My solution was to go to the file, take whatever the latest memo was and recast it into my own. The object was to look smart and feel no shame, notwithstanding my training in college and all strictures against plagiarizing.

So I became the Doyenne of the "guays," Ura and Para. That job turned out to be really fun and really important to me because Uruguay was in the throes of trying to transition from a military government back to democracy. I had an opportunity to help the U.S. get our role in the process right.

What I learned is that, if they are any good, lowly Desk Officers really control their ambassadors. The Ambassadors may think they are in charge, but they are not. Desk officers, even junior whipper-snappers, can have tremendous power and influence if they

know what they are doing and take advantage of it. My ambassadors never did anything without me, and they didn't get to do some things they wanted to if I didn't agree.

We had an ill-prepared, Chicano political appointee in Montevideo until Rich Brown, a diplomatic adult, was finally sent down to be his DCM. Ambassador Aranda was a very nice person, very proud and all the rest, but he was not well received by the Uruguayan elite because he was Chicano, and he didn't speak good Spanish. He also didn't really know his way around State, much less Washington. He was very embarrassing. I remember when I got off the plane the first time people started coming up to me almost within earshot of him complimenting me on my Castellano because I spoke with a "ceceo" (the th sound so characteristic of Castellano) and because I had been educated in Spain. The Uruguayans were not subtle about their disdain.

Q: Well, we are speaking about the same thing we talked about in Italy, where somebody coming with sort of a Mexican peasant's Spanish I mean it is very apparent even as far down as Uruguay that this isn't cultivated Spanish.

KINNEY: Uruguayans were first very Euro-centric. They had very high opinion of themselves, and they were more Paris-oriented than New York, the same as in Buenos Aires. They were insulted that we would not send people whom they considered to be their cultural equals. So that was a difficult thing. He was very nice, and there were no problems.

Q: Did he understand about all this?

KINNEY: I think he was probably oblivious, except when it was really driven home to him. I remember a reception in which I looked over, and there were more people around me than around him in part because they knew I was career and he was political, and in part because they liked my style and they were making no bones about it. They were not nice in this regard. I had to sort of break things up and bring people around and do the proper thing. It was just part of the job.

Q: What were the dynamics, we will do Uruguay first. Were the Tupamaros out of the...

KINNEY: The Tupamaros were out. The military was in, and the issue was whether Uruguay could be moved back to democracy. Could the United States, without telling the Uruguayans how to suck eggs and without giving any hint that we had a strong role or influence in moving them back into the democratic column, get them to embrace and successfully implement a return to democracy? It was clear there was going to be a transition of some sort. The concern was how radical a turn to the left it might be.

The question was transition to what and how and would U.S. involvement be productive or counter-productive? Would we be subtle and deferential and invisible, making sure that it was their transition and their agenda and that it was they who got full credit for it? Or would we be ham-handed and ill-advised and unsubtle in our efforts? Aranda was a Reagan Republican. He was more inclined to be a little more entitled "Speaking for the

President of the United States,” than was really wise. Rich Brown a senior Foreign Service Officer was eventually sent down to be his DCM, and some years later became ambassador to Montevideo himself.

Rich and I had good chemistry from the start and worked well together. He was fearless and encouraged me to be the same, especially when it came time to take advantage of the good Congressional contacts I had cultivated. In particular, he encouraged me to ignore the Seventh Floor and take advantage of a staffer’s invitation to write my own earmark legislation, and thus ensure there would be a reward if we needed it for a return to democracy.

The U.S. did not have much to offer Uruguay, but I managed to get them a State Visit and once with that in hand, we then had to have “deliverables” such as a cheese quota and an expanded textile quota. That’s where the legislation came in handy and proved both timely and indispensable, so I was forgiven.

Bob Gelbard was my DAS in ARA, and along with Rich was also very supportive. Basically I think he decided that he was going to let me run until I got myself in trouble. But it was Rich who actually held my hand when the going got scary, and went up to the Hill with me to write the legislation that eventually gave Uruguay the trade concessions and some ESF assistance money. I had found out that Representative Bereuter of Nebraska had been a Peace Corps volunteer in Uruguay and was interested in the country. Everybody was happy to let me go hang myself, as long as they could blame it on me and it would be all my fault if something went wrong. We got the legislation done. I back engineered the thing, literally writing the legislation with Rich’s help and then passing it to the right staffer. When the State visit took place everyone was delighted that we could announce the trade concessions and \$30 million in ESF.

Q: What is ESF?

KINNEY: Economic support funds. That \$30 million in ESF was a gift that was going to keep on giving the way we drafted it, so it wasn’t gong to be just a one year thing. They were going to have it for a couple of years. It made the Uruguayans take us very seriously, but we never demanded credit for it, and we never demanded anything in return except that there would be an election and hopefully a return to democracy. It could be on their terms.

It was pretty clear to me that Sanguinetti and the Colorado Party were going to win, but we had some very difficult moments. The Frente Amplio was a well entrenched and established far left party, fierce in its opposition to the United States and fierce in its criticism and opposition to the more traditional and moderate Colorados and Blancos. It would not have been good for U.S. interests, although the Frente did eventually over time become moderated, and I think today they are running the country. They have had the Presidency a couple of times. But there has been a real alternation among parties there, and that is good. But 1984 was the first democratic, free and fair election since the de facto take over by the military a decade before.

Q: What was your role, the State Department's role during the Malvinas/Falklands War. Did that happen while you were on?

KINNEY: No, that happened when we were in New York, and that was really Doug's bailiwick. The war was all over and done with by the time I arrived back in Washington. Britain had gone in and taken it back and it would be a new century before Argentina could even think about reasserting its claims, so badly had it played its hand.

Q: How did Uruguay fit with Brazil and Argentina?

KINNEY: Tenuously, the way it always has as a little buffer state between the two giants. Very conscious, very proud, and very much more British than people appreciate, which was one of their saving graces. But they only had three million people. Uruguay's biggest problem was the world had stopped having Northern wars. Uruguay had experienced great growth and wealth and privilege and prosperity thanks to having to ship meat (from my great-grandfather's Armour facilities) and wool to Northern armies. Vietnam was not a northern war, and there had not been major conflicts since then. The Uruguayans kept saying, "I don't understand; what has happened? We used to be so wealthy." From my perspective, Uruguay wasn't so much an economic or socialist basket case as a 1930's intellectual basket case. Their elites all dated from that time. Because Northern wars and local neutrality produced lots of money then, no one felt the need to change anything until it was too late. They were nice people, well intended, but just sort of out of it.

Q: Uruguay is basically a city isn't it?

KINNEY: It is two cities. It is Montevideo and Punta del Este. Punta del Este is not unimportant because it is where the ruling elites of the Southern Cone go in the summertime.

Q: We had a conference there at one point.

KINNEY: Yes. One of the things I did as a result of the state visit was tee up Uruguay to become the site of the new GATT round, called the Uruguay round. That was thanks to me. I was very proud of that. Enrique Iglesias was one of the very few recognized serious people the country had ever produced in recent times, a big U.N. operator and later Foreign Minister of Uruguay. He made a name for himself in ECLA, the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America. He had been hanging out in Chile, and when democracy returned, he began positioning himself for Foreign Minister. He was enough centrist and only lightly left of center. We had confidence in him. Holding the GATT round in Uruguay was his idea, but I was the one who got it to the White House and locked down so that it actually happened. It was another "deliverable" for the state visit.

Q: Were there any repercussions from sort of the collapse of the junta in Argentina after the fiasco of the Malvinas. Was Argentina imploding at the time, or did it make any difference?

KINNEY: I went through Argentina. I got to know it a little bit, but that was somebody else's bailiwick. It didn't really affect Uruguay. However, there was a general shift away from terrorism and youthful radicalism in Latin America. The young people everywhere were sobered by its consequences.

I remember the group of young leaders sent to the States by Argentina's Rio de la Plata organization, which struck me as indicative of what was going on generationally across the Southern Cone, with the exception of Paraguay, which was a different case. Having lived through the terror, having lived through the disappearances, the extremes of both the military and the radicals, people wanted "normalcy." They wanted moderation, centrism. They wanted rational problem solving. They wanted responsible government, not the utopianists on either side that just wreaked havoc with the economy and the politics and everything else.

Q: Hadn't Uruguay gone in for disappearances and that sort of thing?

KINNEY: Yes, but not to the extent as in Argentina. It wasn't as massive; they were only three million people. They were a little country compared to Argentina. But the modus operandi of the terrorists of the day was the same, and the modus operandi of the military and its response was the same in Argentina, Uruguay and Chile. They were all military folk and they knew how to break things and kill people; the scope and the character of their regimes varied.

Uruguay's military dictatorship was a bit softer, a *dicta-blanda* rather than the *dicta-duura* we saw in Argentina and Chile. But the Uruguayan regime was tough, especially early on. By the time I came on the scene, things were beginning to loosen. It was pretty clear there was going to be some sort of transition. While some could excuse the dictatorship after the terror, it was no longer sustainable.

Q: Well, let's turn to Paraguay.

KINNEY: Oh, Paraguay was a hoot. Paraguay was like some bad novel. I didn't spend as much time on Paraguay because it was so exotic, quixotic and quirky, but I did go there a couple of times. I had two different ambassadors, one political and one State Department. The first was Art Davis, fine and intelligent, but hardly a man prepared for the job. He was a retired Coors Beer protégé from Denver, a dedicated Republican pushed forth by one of Reagan's most important fundraiser, Coors. Art was really a wonderful man. He loved birds and acquired a pet Emu while he was there.

Art's wife was tragically killed when her plane crashed into a mountain in Bolivia. Helping head up (along with the Bolivian Desk Officer, Barbro Owen) the ARA Bureau's task force to deal with the crash (on which many other Americans were also killed) took

on a special personal urgency for me. The location where the plane crashed was impossible and yet we had to do everything possible to attempt a serious search and rescue effort without endangering even more lives.

The crash was an inter-agency nightmare (especially trying to get resources out of DOD) and took about two weeks before we had to declare an end to the search and rescue efforts. I was sorely depressed by the number of “can’t do” people I encountered because “Well, frankly Bolivia and Paraguay just don’t matter that much.” It was not an incorrect political calculation and perhaps even a resource calculation, but it still made me both angry and sad. Mrs. Davis was also an adventurous, lovely and kind lady.

Davis himself was a well intended, good hearted, true blue American. Why he ever took Paraguay -- what he ever thought he was doing there, I have no idea. But he was a good soul. He sought advice and took it, and nothing ever happened during his tour that was not thoroughly vetted with his Desk Officer--me.

Q: Was Stroessner gone by then?

KINNEY: Stroessner was still there. The big question in Paraguay was when and if we would finally have a transition--hopefully a democratic one-- in Paraguay. During my tenure on the Desk, however, the really big issue in Paraguay was Josef Mengele. Everybody just knew that Josef Mengele was secretly hiding in Paraguay. There was no doubt. Every human rights NGO and whacko group in Washington would end up in my office, because nobody else wanted to deal with them. “Let’s let Stephanie take care of them.” was the general attitude, whether they were sent from on high, or the Congress or just felt self-entitled and informed and determined to make a name for themselves on their on.

Q: You might explain who Josef Mengele was.

KINNEY: Dr. Josef Mengele was a notorious Nazi war criminal, best known for his medical experiments on twins in the concentration camps. The movie, “Boys from Brazil,” which had come out a year or two before, was total fiction but nonetheless a pointed reference to the nature of his activities during the war. The movie told the story of how someone like Mengele escaped to Brazil as part of an effort to resuscitate the return of Nazism after the war by cloning little Hitlers. Truly bizarre but a pretty good movie with Gregory Peck, if I remember correctly.

There was very good, documented evidence that Mengele, like a lot of Nazi war criminals, had fled to Latin America after WWII, and that he indeed had lived in Asunción, Paraguay, something the Paraguayans were perfectly open about it. You could accuse Stroessner of lots of things, but harboring Josef Mengele in 1983 was not among them. He was far too crafty for that. However, if there was one thing you really wanted to do to get Stroessner on his high horse and causing problems, it was promote and abet the unjust assumption and accusation that he was currently giving aid and comfort to Dr. Mengele.

Well, both Stroessner and Mengele stayed with us during my tour, although a few years later investigators were able to put the stories of Dr. Mengele to rest. He was found in Brazil, where he had died and was buried on a beach somewhere.

However, this discovery only came out after COHA and all of the really left wing Latin American NGOs and human rights organizations had mounted an expensive and intense effort to prove that the Reagan administration and the United States of America were guilty of a heinous cover-up and protection of Mengele's hiding place. And they all ended up in my office at one time or another, many several times.

The investigative TV show, 60 Minutes, even got into the act. Mike Wallace decided to focus on the story and went down to Paraguay, asking questions and shooting video footage designed to "prove" Mengele was probably there. They call me for assistance and comment, which led to some very difficult moments because I was not about to be manipulated into having anything to do with them or talking with them in any way, least it show up in what I was pretty sure would be a dramatic hatchet job aimed the Reagan administration--which proved to be the case. Wallace's attempts at "balance and truth" were highly overstated. But later, when evidence that Mengele had indeed left Paraguay and gone to Brazil surfaced, I could not resist an "I told you so," with some satisfaction. The things one gets involved in working for the State Department!

Q: By the way I have an interview scheduled with, and I can't think of his name, but he was born in Romania. But he came to the United States, got a Ph.D. in dental pathology and eventually joined USIA and became consul general in Sao Paulo, which is an extremely weird thing. But when they found Josef Mengele they were having trouble identifying him, and he did the teeth. By the way, I have a Ph.D. in dental pathology.

KINNEY: I don't think they found Mengele while I was the desk officer. I think it was several years later. But I just remember chortling and thinking, "I told you so!" because I was always getting accused of all sorts of heinous things as a State Department operative.

Q: How did we view Stroessner at the time?

KINNEY: Well, every ambassador went down there with the hope that Stroessner would die on his watch. Clyde Taylor was my second ambassador to Asuncion, and that was certainly Clyde's fondest hope, unrealized unfortunately. Stroessner was just one of those old authoritarian, Somoza-like dictators. He had mellowed with age, and things were getting better, but that could never really excuse some of his crimes. The stories about what he and his friends did to women were particularly chilling to me.

We spent a lot of time with the opposition. I knew all of the younger generation, and basically everybody was pretty much resigned to waiting for Stroessner to die. It was also pretty clear that the majority of Paraguayans themselves would not have voted to get rid of him. In the final analysis, by the 1980's he was seen as having done a lot for the country, rather in the same way that Franco was viewed by many in Spain.

But this story line was not what people wanted to hear. It did not fit the ideological narrative, and it didn't fit the self-righteous moral narrative many people insisted on. As I said, some of the stuff he did early on, I think about to this day and it makes my skin crawl. But by the time I got there, Paraguay was a backwater with some hope for a better future. Its biggest problem was probably limited education and corruption.

Paraguay and Paraguayans at that time made their money off of contraband. It was and probably still is a smugglers' paradise. Of course today, it is also very important because of the triangle where all of the Hamas and the Middle East Operatives are. So Paraguay is just Paraguay. There are good people there. It is a quirky place. Guarani, the indigenous language, is spoken by a lot more people than you realize, and is one of the country's two official language, together with Spanish.

When I came back from Mexico, I had the good fortune to be hired for one assignment as an Escort Interpreter for the USIA International Visitor (IV) program. My IV person was somebody from Paraguay. Her name was Kati Decoe, and she was the only deaf educator in Paraguay. We spent three weeks together visiting all the major deaf education centers and intellectuals in the U.S. in 1974. It was a great pleasure to look her up and reconnect with her when I became the Paraguay Desk Officer and had to make a number of trips to Asuncion. Her insights and stories were invaluable, and I also introduced her to both Ambassadors. In every country there are always lots of wonderful and wise people if you take time to find them and listen to what they have to say.

Paraguay was not unlike Mexico in the degree to which its population today is a mixture of indigenous Indian and European/North American intermarriage. A Paraguayan, like a Mexican, is almost by definition a Mestizo, although there are gradations of that. The European component may not always have been the most savory of backgrounds, but in general the Paraguayan populace was like any other, lots of nice, serious people who wanted to make as much as they could of their somewhat limited circumstances.

Paraguay was not blessed with any significant natural resources. It became a huge crossroads for another problem we had: Korean illegal immigration started routing itself through Paraguay because Stroessner was very open and favorable to anyone who offered money, especially under the guise of business. So you had all sorts of Korean businesses popping up, and they all had to do with travel and airplanes. And guess where they all went -- straight to the U.S. So we had problems on that front, as well as on the human rights front.

Q: OK, let's talk a little about the embassies. Take the Uruguayan embassy. How did it deal with you? All embassies have characters of their own.

KINNEY: You mean the Uruguayan embassy here in Washington?

Q: Yes.

KINNEY: Well, initially they had a Chargé d' Affairs. He was the DCM Fabini. I had just gotten back from Italy, so my Spanish was a little rusty. Fabini fortunately was Italian. I remember after our first meeting, which I insisted on doing in Spanish, he said, "You seem to confuse Spanish and Italian." I said, "Well, I have just gotten back from a couple of years in Rome. It may take some time." He and I became fast friends as it became more and more apparent that Uruguay was likely to get the State Visit I had proposed to the White and the Uruguayan government had then asked for in the wake of near certainty that there would be elections and a return to democracy. Fabini had a very small staff and was not used to attention from anyone in Washington, so he was a little insecure about anything as momentous as a State Visit. Basically, I reassured him and said as long as we worked hand in glove, this state visit thing was going to work out just fine. We were going to do this thing together.

Well, we started working like two peas in a pod-- young peas in a pod-- and some older Uruguayan authorities in town took note and decided that they did not want to be left on the sidelines. There was a much older Uruguayan ambassador by the name of Hector Luisi, who had retired to Washington in the wake of the military take-over in Montevideo a decade before. He was very old school and did not like what he saw with this young Fabini character running things at his old Embassy. It was unseemly. Fabini was too young; he couldn't possibly know what he was doing. He wasn't old and wise enough. And there was this young female Foreign Service Officer, who was just far too much involved and knowledgeable.

So the first thing I knew, poor Fabini had been moved to the side and Hector Luisi was remade Uruguayan ambassador to Washington. Hector called me in. I was kind of shocked and hurt and didn't think it was nice what they had done to poor Fabini, but to make a long story short, Hector WAS a very wise, extremely smooth and practiced diplomat of the first order in a 19th c sort of way. He understood my assets and value, as well as my youthful liabilities, tolerated the latter and built up the former.

Hector and I formed a tight team and made it all happen. And it did all happen perfectly. It was an exquisite ballet between the two of us. He was an old style diplomat. Fabini and I would eat in the cafeteria or some sandwich joint. Hector always took me to Jean Louis, which was the most elegant restaurant in Washington at that time, one of the most expensive, and just exquisite. I had more meals there, thanks to Hector, than any impecunious FSO-3 ever dreamed of. But that was how we conducted business. When Hector had a problem, he could bring it to me. When I had a question or problem, I would take it to him. So basically we just formed an iron-clad partnership, and it worked beautifully because we both wanted the same thing--a spectacular and successful visit.

Q: How about the Paraguayan embassy?

KINNEY: Paraguay, well I can't even remember. Oh yes, I do remember him. The Embassy was in a large, tasteless house on Connecticut Avenue just over the line in Chevy Chase, and the Ambassador lived on a street in Northwest I had never heard of until then. He was a relatively youngish, sweet man with his wife and two kids but totally

clueless. They had a big house. They did have me over for dinner a couple of times because I went to all the requisite receptions. I did the proper things with them, and we had them to our home. They were very nice people, but they were not players. I basically did everything through Asuncion and our ambassadors there. I basically did the minimal with the ambassador here because he was not serious player in Paraguay or the United States. They were basically here for the children to learn English because they did not speak it well.

Q: OK, how about you Bureau at the State Department, ARA? How did it strike you at the time, its interest and its two hubs of the universe?

KINNEY: Well, they were happy to have an energetic young person who took her job seriously and basically didn't cause them any trouble and got things done. Bob Gelbard was the principal DAS, and he was wonderful. I became one of "Bob's girls," nothing illicit, but it was noticed that -- unlike most of his peers--a number of his prodigies were women. He was married to a very accomplished professional in her own right, a leading demographer.

Bob was among the first male officers who had a genuine appreciation and affection for professional women, and just didn't have any problem with it. All Bob was interested in was, "Could you deliver? Did you do good work and make him look good?" He was young, up and coming and competitive. He understood the shifting demographics and sociology at State and the problem of having a lot of men still fighting and jockeying for what would become divided and fractured power. From Bob's perspective, I suspect, as the number of women increased, and you had all of them thinking you were the greatest, that might help and it couldn't hurt.

Elliot Abrams was the Reagan administration's Assistant Secretary for American Republics (ARA). Elliot was a Norman Podhoretz and Midge Decter protégée, i.e. Jewish intellectuals who would normally have been Democrats but became Reagan republicans based on his conservative foreign policy proclivities. Elliot could be a little tedious. Extremely rigid and ideological and not very...

Q: Well, he was tied to Central America too.

KINNEY: Yeah, he was totally focused on Central America, wrapped up in the Contras and in the Communist threat in Nicaragua especially, so he didn't care about me and my little 'guays." He would sign awards and go through the requisite formalities when it was required, but nobody really cared about the 'guays, as long as they stayed on track and were good, positive stories, which I made sure they were!

Q: You refer to the 'Guays as...

KINNEY: Uruguay and Paraguay.

Q: What does Guay mean? It is obviously Indian.

KINNEY: I don't know, but in Italian it means "troubles" or "messes." a mess. *Un guaio, due guai*. That was the sense in which I always affectionately and tongue in cheek referred to my two charges because Uruguay and Paraguay were always messes.

Q: So we will yank you out of that and whither?

KINNEY: Then from there oh, we had this problem. We had to go back overseas. We were tandem. Things were getting tough. The Republicans did not look on tandems with as much possibility as the Democrats had, and we were going through a bit of a retrenchment and return to the "tough guy" thing in Personnel. I had come in as an Admin Officer and had not yet served an admin tour. I thought I had served an admin tour in DG/PC, doing the Family Liaison Office, but nobody would give me credit for that. It was a 7th floor policy job; I had not served in the admin trenches. So we had two problems: 1) Douglas and I had to do a hardship tour because people looked at our résumé, and there was no hardship there (they never knew Richard Gardner!), and 2) I had to do an admin tour, or I was not going to get promoted, no matter how good everyone thought I was.

So, we eventually worked out a very good situation. Doug would take the number two job in the Political Section in Caracas, which at the time was considered hardship for length of stay, or some such. It did not have a hardship differential but there was some other angle-- I don't remember, maybe because the exchange rate was so awful and Caracas was so dangerous.

Douglas should have been head of a political section somewhere but Caracas was the best we could do and we knew 1) it had a great school for Mercier and 2) the country mattered because of oil and politics and 3) how bad could any Latin American capital be? If it got us off the hardship list, fine. We would also add to our hardship credentials by having Douglas depart in March to fill a much needed Embassy position and leave the pack-out and move for me and Mercier to do by ourselves that summer, after the Uruguayan state visit in June and the Deputy Secretary's big trip to Latin America a few weeks later, which included "the 'guays."

So Douglas's assignment was set, and mine remained in dispute. I essentially did not want to do admin work but understood it was required if I wanted to get promoted, so we worked out a deal by which I would serve as an Admin Officer for the first year and then become the Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer (ACAO). I was happy with this because I believed in cultural diplomacy, it was substantive and interesting and involved interesting people at post. I can't say that I was too thrilled about the prospect of being in charge of the motor pool or General Services.

At the time, I was also thinking about jumping from State to USIA. Barry Fulton, an old friend and boss from the Information Section in Rome, was going to be the head of personnel at USIA, and he was saying come on over there because they would treat me right.

I finished up the State visit for Uruguayan President Sanguinetti, did the prep for the Deputy Secretary's tour, put in a new central air conditioning system at home and moved my daughter and the cat and I to Venezuela in August.

Oh, during the State visit, I got one emergency phone call. The emergency was from my nanny, panicked after getting through all the security hurdles: "Help, the cat has had kittens on the oriental rug. What do I do?" So we didn't have one cat to move to Caracas, but rather one cat with six kittens. It turned out that we had to have special permissions and all sorts of bureaucratic foolishness and paper for this, which I had obtained in advance for the cat, but not for the kittens.

We arrived in Caracas in August, and Benny Segura, the Admin Counselor for whom I would work--bless his heart -- had quickly figured out there was one way to greater greatness, and that was make sure that everything his new admin officer wanted, she got. (Douglas had won Benny over and done his part in all of this before I arrived!) So the Kinneys had a wonderful apartment to move into and Benny personally took care of the cat and the permissions and whisked us through customs without anyone knowing about the additional six baby kittens.

Benny turned out to be just terrific and a character of the first order. He sized me up right away, and put me on the "Ambassadorial Care and Feeding" detail. In this capacity I redecorated his offices and curated his newly arriving American paintings collection, including writing the catalogue for it. Next stop was to redecorate the cafeteria, which was a black hole and horrible, and help the ambassador spruce up his new residence. Otto Reich was the ambassador, another Reagan political appointee who had also been associated with Central American policy.

We had a sizable earthquake the first six months we were there, which scared everyone because Caracas had been leveled by a major quake twenty years before. The Embassy itself had survived more or less in tact more by luck than design due to the quake's particular rhythm and the way it had interacted with the soil on which the Embassy was built.

Our almost 6 point quake and several strong tremors thereafter made everyone nervous, especially Benny. He was responsible for the Embassy's Emergency Action Plan, which, it turned out, had not been updated for years. So, another special project for Stephanie! This was actually very good training and interesting as well. I had to learn all about the past quake and meet all the seismologists in town and eventually make a trip to Panama City, where OFDA (AID's Office of Disaster Assistance) had a big regional emergency response center and where my old friend Art Davis was then Ambassador. So I got to do business, see the Canal and the Zone and Art all at the same time. Great learning experience! And then, of course, there were no more earthquakes in Caracas. Oh well. Better to be prepared than not. I performed very well for my year in Admin, which did soon get me promoted.

And then I moved on to become the USIA Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer (ACAO), a function I held for two years as we extended our tour of duty there. I knew what I wanted to do as ACAO, which was sink my teeth into the intellectual left in Caracas, the last bastion of Communist group think and a major problem in the universities. But first I had to focus on the USIA agenda, a pretty set piece with little flexibility and less imagination. For example, it took me a year and a half to manage to insert anything about the environment into it because “that had never been done.”

As Americans got into Presidential campaign mode for the 1986 election, I developed an approach of talking about it and indirectly pushing a democracy agenda by taking clips of the campaign adds from both parties and using them as a vehicle to invite audiences to draw conclusions for themselves about what differentiated the two candidates and what they had in common, political styles and key messages. It worked wonderfully because I became a facilitator for helping Venezuelans debate and draw conclusions for themselves rather than an administration spokesman or propagandist, a change everyone admired and appreciated.

In an effort to kill two birds with one stone, I brought American fund raising know-how and techniques to Venezuela. This was important because government cut-backs were beginning to seriously undermine what had been vast government investments in cultural institutions of all sorts, from fine arts, to universities to children’s programs, including their nationwide youth symphony movement, known as *el sistema*, an amazing program that made learning classical music available to thousands of very poor and disadvantaged children.

Aside from the fact that the wealthy elites were going to have to step up and pitch in to compensate for the government subsidy cut-backs, I also knew that transferring fund raising know-how would be a perfect vehicle with which to bring the social and cultural elites and the communists together in the same room to address something they both cared about. The communists were interested in fund raising because they were sort of Trotsky intellectual communists. They appreciated art and controlled many of the artistic cultural organs of the country, like in Italy. Our seminars and workshops brought many strange bedfellows together for the first time and more often than not, people discovered “their opposition” could be useful and was not so bad after all.

In the same vein and with the help of Robert Redford, we bought the Sundance Film Institute to Caracas for workshops and a film festival, the first time Sundance had ever gone outside the U.S. We brought people together and began to cultivate relationships with people the embassy had never really talked to or been in touch with, which was terrific. Douglas did the standard political work, focusing on the opposition COPEI party and its new young leader, El Tigre. Unfortunately, El Tigre could not overcome the deep corruption and dysfunctionality of Venezuela’s politics as usual. Instead, we witnessed the election of Carlos Andres Perez for the second time, not a hopeful sign for the future of Venezuela.

We also had a Vice Presidential visit from Dan Quayle, his first international foray after his election. He turned out to be a much better diplomat and thoughtful person than he ever got credit for. He came well prepared and worked hard and made a good impression on the new Venezuelan administration as well.

Q: He got no credit for that trip at all. But in the first place you were in Venezuela from when to when?

KINNEY: From '86 until '89.

Q: What was Douglas doing?

Douglas was the number two in the political section under Donna Hrinak.

Q: When you arrived in Venezuela, what was sort of the political economic situation?

KINNEY: Corrupt, corrupt, corrupt.

Q: When you say corrupt...

KINNEY: The parties, the whole political system. The Accion Democratica (AD) and COPE (Christian Democrats) were the two traditional parties. The right of center Christian Democrats and the left of center AD were entrenched and powerful and in control, but you couldn't move, you couldn't do anything in the country without bribes and paying people off. The exchange rate was artificially pegged at eight Bolivares to the dollar, which was a joke but sure made Johnny Walker and Buicks nice and cheap. The exchange rate later went up to I think 18 Bolivares to the dollar, and then maybe it was 38 by 1989.

What you were looking at and what we saw coming was virtually the end of a very stable era that had simply run its course because of generational changes and demographic changes in the country. There was a weight of corruption that even the corrupt could no longer sustain. It was a country in which at the time there were 17 million people, but only 500 really counted. We probably knew 350 of the 500. They all got together once a year at a lavish dinner. Life was sweet for the basically European and Cuban elites; there had been a growing middle class, but what we watched was the utter destruction and pauperization of that middle class. That was both tragic and sad. Venezuela was a very important country because of the oil, and it suffered from its curse.

The ties between Venezuela and Miami were very tight because of the glory years, when Carlos Andres Perez created OPEC and instigated the oil embargos and subsequent financial boom in Venezuela, thanks to the doubling of oil prices. In the late 80's, the Venezuelans reminded me of the Uruguayans in their inability to grasp why the good life had changed. Why did no one consider that maybe it was time to do things differently? They just complained and couldn't understand why they couldn't go to Miami to buy

their groceries anymore! What had happened to the good ol' days of "*Dame dos*," (Give me two.), the phrase emblematic of days when people had more money than sense.

The *Dame Dos* era had ended rather precipitously with the decline of oil prices. Venezuela was trying to adjust, but it really hadn't, the fact that it kept up preferential exchange rates for cars and Johnny Walker Black Label for all those with the right friends in government was proof of that. It was a fascinating tour. We loved it. We loved Venezuelans. We had a great time. But it was a political tragedy in the writing. You could see it. When Chavez came on the scene, none of us who were there were surprised.

Q: Was Chavez a figure while you were there?

KINNEY: No, he was a no-count in the military. But he must have been listening to the same siren songs we would hear from time to time in Caracas--"what we really need is a dictator to return order and get this country in shape."

Q: What was your impression of the society that you met?

KINNEY: I was going to write a book, and it was going to be called "Gold Shoes at Noon." When I shifted over to the cultural affairs job, for some reason one of my first duties was to go to some seminar that took place mid-day. It was on nuclear waste management. Venezuela didn't have nuclear power, but in case it might someday...?? Don't ask me. I walked into the room at 11:00 in the morning, and encountered the most amazing sight: several tall, gorgeous women in super short skirts, very high heels and tight fitting, low cut sweaters decorated in gold or silver lame appliqués. And they were wearing official conference name tags with professional designations. They were amazing, as were Venezuelan women in general.

The Venezuelan women were almost like Italians. They always reminded me of Danielle Gardner in some ways: what you saw was what you got. They dressed to the nines, very flamboyantly and never wanted to downplay any of their feminine assets. The nuclear waste management seminar was full of these gorgeous creatures, at least half of whom turned out to be extremely knowledgeable and capable of sharp questioning. The gold shoes at noon and the sequined parrot tee shirts always summed up Venezuelan society for me. The women were the most amazing, flamboyant birds of paradise you ever laid eyes on, and the men were quiet dark little operators behind the scene. Nothing was ever what it appeared.

Q: You are talking about the ruling society.

KINNEY: Yes. The 500. And then there was the rest. A statistic that stuck in my head was seventy-five percent of the children being born in the country were illegitimate. One of the biggest issues in the society was the encroachment of Protestant evangelicals proselytizing and winning away the Catholic flock. It was so pronounced that after we had been there about a year and a half, the Catholic bishop actually wrote a very nasty piece in the local newspaper complaining about this. Public education was a disaster, but

the government supported a fabulous symphony music education program aimed at producing a National Youth Symphony, which continues today and has gotten rave reviews in Washington, along with its youthful conductor Maestro Dudamel, who is now conductor of the Los Angeles symphony, I believe.

The religion factor was interesting. We are Episcopalians, and we went to the Episcopal Pro-Cathedral of St. Mary, which was presided over by a wonderful, old fashioned WASP rector when we arrived. But he was soon replaced by a very energetic Cuban, who was the least spiritual man I have ever met in my life. But his job was to go out and build flock, and he was doing it with a vengeance. The Episcopalians, the Pentecostals, and the Mormons were the basic three evangelical forces in Venezuela.

Q: And basically the evangelical forces were of American origin?

KINNEY: Yes. The really sad thing about all of this was the number of people who came to me over time to complain, "Oh, if only we had been colonized by the English, it would be so different." They blamed the Catholics, they blamed the Spanish and the Catholics for Venezuela's cultural faults, including corruption. So a lot of people were becoming Mormon or Episcopalian or some brand of Protestant because they perceived a correlation between people who were doing well and making it up the class ladder and those organizations. We saw the same thing happened in Mexico in the early 70's with the Mormons.

As I said, the saddest thing to me was to watch the pauperization of the Venezuelan middle class. At the same time they had a vision of possibility of upward mobility, in fact the economic management of the country was going from bad to worse. Between international commodity prices (when the price of oil fell) and the total mismanagement, miss-investment of the country, people who had been able to get pretty good educations and were ready to start being productive ran into road blocks at every turn.

Carlos Andres Perez in his first term sent 40,000 Ayacucho Fellowship holders abroad each year for fully paid college educations, mostly in the States but also in Europe and the Soviet Union and a few to Cuba. These kids were coming back to Venezuela educated and inspired--in many cases--to make Venezuela as good as the United States. And what they came back to was the realization that if they didn't enter into the corrupt game with one political party or the other, they had no future. If they told the truth about mismanagement and wrong policies, they had no future. If they tried to start a business on their own but did not pay for patronage and protection, they had no future.

Q: Did you have a feeling that you were on the lip of a volcano?

KINNEY: Oh yeah, you could see it. It was just a question of how long it was going to take. We were ten years off from Chavez at that point, but people were already talking about bringing back a dictatorship. They were waxing nostalgic about Peres Jimenez. And particularly among the elites. They were beginning to discern that there was this indigenous cauldron of people who were uneducated, untended to, and increasingly

empowered by information and technology and transportation seething underneath them. They really didn't know what to do with it, and so they mostly ignored it, hoping they could get their money out in time if things blew up.

They just wanted to keep partying and living the nice European style veneer that was the upper echelons of Caracas. The elites were mostly either old European stock like the Germans who came over in the 19th century to run or to build Cacao chocolate fortunes, or the Catalans and Spaniards who came from the Civil War era in Spain or the more recent Cubans who had fled Castro. There was a large Jewish community there and that was very powerful and they had their own club, but they were well integrated and very important, of course, to the business side of the house. There were the Phelps, the Pacanins, the Zuloagas, the Mendozas, the Cisneros and so on--all of these families who were building a European-style veneer, but it was just a veneer.

Q: What was our policy there? I mean sort of or did we have a real policy? Did we feel this was of concern to us?

KINNEY: Well, we pretty much took Venezuela for granted because it appeared to have elections and appeared to be democratic and was increasingly friendly toward US oil interests desirous of coming back to Venezuela.. It certainly was very friendly to the United States then. Oil was our main interest obviously, and at that time Venezuela wasn't really a problem. Better to look the other way.

I just had my little bailiwick in the cultural section, so I just did what made sense to me. If I were going to work the cultural side, it was going to be the intellectual left that was putatively our problem, and I did what I could there, mostly by confronting people with experiences at odds with their ideology. There were a lot of ways you could approach that and do it.

"Telling America's story to the world" in the USIA lingo of the day was easy. I brought down a couple of art exhibits and curated both of them, one with a broken ankle. I had had to get a wheel chair and fly to Maracaibo to mount the Edward Westin photography exhibition. We had painting exhibit at the Modern Art Museum where Sofia Rangel was the curator. The collection we brought was actually a Vassar College collection of Hudson River Valley painters, so it was sweet for me because Vassar had originally put it together. We brought down lots of economists, lots of rule of law and judicial administration experts and name brands, which were more substantive in nature. We were quietly working away at trying to help them improve their judicial system, which was European Napoleonic Code based, and we were trying to give them a window on some of the advantages of bottom up rather than top down of U.S. style standards and process and due process and all that sort of thing.

Q: did you go to the universities?

KINNEY: Oh yes.

Q: Because sometimes universities are no go areas

KINNEY: There were two main universities, one public and one Catholic private, Andres Bello. There was an active leftist group at the public university, but nothing dangerous or anything. It was always fun. I enjoyed going and engaging with young radicals. I could play the game just as well as they could, and more often than not had actual experience and knowledge from which to make my arguments and observations. We spent more time and resources at the private Catholic university because that is where the serious economists and the serious modernizers were. They were frankly a better investment.

Q: Was the problem of Colombia reflected much or was that another world?

KINNEY: It was another world, but I first became aware of the enmity between the two countries at a personal level. I had a Colombian national woman working for me because her family had to flee to Venezuela at some point earlier. Really bright, really sophisticated, terrific young woman. The national employees were fabulous especially the ones in the cultural section. She gave me an insight in both directions. I started asking questions. Venezuelans do not like Colombians. They consider them snobby, arrogant, overbearing, and dangerous. Colombians look down on Venezuelans because they are half breeds. It is the difference between the viceroyalty and the Captaincy.

Q: Who was the ambassador in Venezuela?

KINNEY: Otto Reich.

Q: How was he because he was a controversial figure.

KINNEY: He was a card carrying, Cuban-born Republican, so that stamped him in a lot of ways. Good man, well intended and not all that bright. He tried hard, really wanted to do well, really made an effort, did what he thought was right.

Q: Ok, after Venezuela, whither the Kinneys?

KINNEY: We came back to Washington. While I was in Venezuela I was diagnosed diabetic. And that was the shock of my life, totally unanticipated. We came back in 1989 because it was time to reintroduce our daughter to America. She was becoming a little Venezuelan, and that was not a good thing. So we came back and managed to get her into the National Cathedral School and promised her to stay home for four years, which we did.

At this juncture I finally got to work on what I had always wanted to do -- global issues. I heard about something called "climate change," and figured there is always opportunity when no one else is interested or takes it seriously. So, I got myself an appointment in the Bureau of Oceans, Environment and Science (OES) and arrived just as the International

Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was being set up. I ended up having the opportunity to work not only the preparatory process for the negotiations for the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) but also participated as one of State's three negotiators for the actual negotiation of the Framework agreement over a period of three years.

Q: Okay, today is 12 May, 2010 with Stephanie Kinney. Stephanie we will pick this up, when did you leave Venezuela?

KINNEY: We left in 1989.

Q: And where did you go?

KINNEY: We came back to the Department. The opportunity that I came back to was one not much regarded by anybody else in the Service and highly irregular. From the beginning, I had expressed an interest in what were then called "global issues." They were really transnational issues, which in the essentially bilateral corporate culture of the Foreign Service of that era was not a highly incentivized career path to pursue. But I had always seen global issues as emerging and important and something I wanted to do; however, Service rules of time precluded working on such issues until you reached a certain grade.

You couldn't serve in an environment science and technology (EST) job, for example, until you were at least an FSO-2 or 1. So this was my first opportunity to do that. I also knew that something called "climate change" was emerging as a big issue. My perverse interest made me the only FSO involved (until the very end) in what turned out to be one of the biggest issues and negotiations of the decade. To the discredit of our diplomatic service, I was the only FSO able to participate in the Framework Convention on Climate Change negotiations from the preparatory phase to the signing of the treaty in Rio in 1992. So it was a very formative and interesting experience. It was also a pretty serious indictment of how inward, backward and unimaginative FS leadership was growing that it could have a diplomatic service with only one person engaged on this issue. All the rest were civil servant with more narrow technical know-how and special interest pleaders. Our senior FS leaders remained doggedly stuck in the 1980's and convinced that climate change was a "technical issue." Ha! Far from it.

Q: Well let's talk about the background of what you were getting into and how your job fitted into that.

KINNEY: The job that I applied for didn't exist and was not allowed to be discussed. The Department was neither prepared nor structured for this issue. It did not quite know what it wanted to do. The Bush administration was of very mixed mind about the issue. This would have been late '88-'89.

Q: So this would have been early Bush I.

KINNEY: Yes. The environment was embraced by the Bush administration as a signature issue. He was going to be “the environmental President.” People forget that. There was a geo-strategic reason for this. It was related to the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the environmental and ecological disaster the Soviets had left in their wake.

Q: A terrible environmental impact. I mean communism had not paid the slightest bit of attention to the environment. They were a messy group.

KINNEY: Yeah, they were pigs, in a word. All you had to do was to go to any of the eastern states towards the end of the regime to see this. For those who had not been deeply schooled (as I had not) in the Soviet empire, it remained shocking to see how undeveloped and how brutalizing and brutish the physical manifestations of the regime were, not to mention human rights, as well as the economic disaster they had sown.

The environment is one of those issues in the international context with which the West was very associated, but which nobody took seriously. In the international arena, environmentalism was more a scientific or technical issue, not particularly a political one. The United Nations had created UNEP (the UN Environment Program under the Egyptian Mustafa Tolba) and pushed by the Scandinavians, especially Sweden, convoked the World Environment Conference in 1988. This followed in the wake of a number of years in the mid-80's of record high summer temperatures, which triggered a new focus on global warming and climate change.

My own personal view was that there were many other contributing factors producing this focus. One was the fact that in the wake of Reagan's Star Wars, research money for the physical sciences had declined dramatically, and the global warming issue was an opportunity to redress the funding imbalance. I used to do a speech citing eight reasons why climate had “suddenly” become so important, pointing out all the various interests and interest groups that found common cause in making climate change an urgent issue. The interests ranged from the nuclear energy lobby to the science lobby to the Greenies to the alternative energy interests, to those of the European Union, which was trying to enlarge Brussels' authority over issues heretofore left to the sovereign states.

Based on the process that had preceded the successful negotiation of the Vienna Framework Convention on Ozone Depleting Substances and its related Montreal Protocol, the UN had created the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Given the success of the ozone negotiations, everyone assumed the process for climate should be the same, a fatal mistake in the longer term. The two issues were nothing alike: ozone depleting substances were all man-made (mostly by DuPont), well defined and in time easily substituted with non-ozone depleting substances. CO₂, the designated “enemy” in climate change is essential for life and central to the source of modernity and national economic interests, i.e. fossil fuels. In addition, the science on ozone was fairly straight-forward and eventually uncontested; the opposite was true for climate change.

Geo-politically the interest in the environment was a useful policy tool as the Soviet Union broke up because it highlighted Communism's many failures and provided a fairly benign and not ostensibly "political issue" around which to organize partnerships and other cooperative activities, especially in Eastern Europe. It was also an ideal vehicle for encouraging grass roots networks and organization around local issues, knowing that these same networks would eventually morph into more democratic political organizations and alignments.

As grants and financial aid begin to flow, environmental NGOs proliferated and prospered. Whether it was a dirty river or a waste heap, there was an unending number of good works for NGOs to apply their expertise and enthusiasm to in Eastern Europe. The people in Eastern Europe who came together to clean up or remediate environmental problems were people of background, conviction and a certain commitment to activism and taking control of their own lives in whatever limited way they could. So it was neither accidental nor surprising that under the guise of environmental local community meetings to solve local environmental problems, more issues than the environment got addressed.

In the United Nations context, the climate change issue was being formulated in terms of the next big negotiation and the next big global issue after ozone. It was going to be much more comprehensive, much more public, and much more brokered than the Montreal protocol had ever been. One might argue that one of the reasons that Montreal was so rapidly negotiated and effective was because it had been done by a relatively small group of primarily diplomatic professionals. Dick Benedict was, of course, our leader and chief advocate for that negotiation.

Q: Who did you say?

KINNEY: Richard Benedict. He wrote the book on the negotiating process, "Ozone Diplomacy." It is unfortunate that Robert Reinstein, our chief negotiator for the FCCC has not done the same. Climate was and remains a more complex and less understood issue and negotiating process.

Unfortunately, I say all of this with hindsight because at the time I had no idea of what I was getting into and the Department certainly did nothing to train or prepare me for this assignment. In fact, I was officially assigned to a non-existent job that we were not allowed to talk about in a no-name office for the better part of the first year. We were not allowed to talk about it because of forces on Capitol Hill that were very opposed to the State Department getting at all involved in this issue.

As a result, what I came into was an office essentially headed up by an Assistant Secretary, Bill Nitze (Paul Nitze's son, who came from Chevron and later went to EPA). He was passionate about the issue and saw it as a personal opportunity to make a difference. He had rounded up a civil servant by the name of Dan Reifsnyder, who had worked in two other parts of OES and was bored with his current job, and me, an unexpected FS asset, to start working the issue. Since, neither Bill nor Dan had

diplomatic experience, Bill thought I might be useful. Nobody on the Hill, in the White House or in the Department really knew what they were doing or what they wanted to do on this issue. So we spent the first year, 1989, being driven by the international UN calendar of events and the schedule of the IPCC. The UN process was roaring ahead willy-nilly, and a confused U.S. would only complicate, not stop its process. We dove in to at least know what everyone else was pre-positioning for.

Q: Well 1989 was of course a pivotal year because at the end all hell broke loose. Environmentally was all hell breaking loose?

KINNEY: No, it was more a very confident and empowered UN process driving everyone's agenda under the leadership of two powerful figures, Mustafa Tolba, the Director of UNEP, and Maurice Strong, an independently wealthy Canadian businessman who had dedicated the latter part of his life to creating what came to be known as the 1992 Rio Conference or more formally, the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED).

UNCED as a process that was moving forward in which not just developed countries but also in the underdeveloped countries of the G-77, as their representative bloc at the UN was called. The G-77 saw an opportunity in UNCED to advance what was an ancient agenda dating back to the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) from the early 70's. The agenda from that period was still a demand for free access to Western markets and free access to Western technology on the theory that it was owed (due to colonialism) and the lack of it was what made the under-developed world poor.

The IPCC involved both developing and developed countries. Its premise-- similar to the process that had preceded the Vienna Framework Convention -- was that you lay down a body of scientific evidence as proof there is a problem and then you begin to tease out the major negotiable issues and terms of reference for any subsequent negotiating process. By introducing key concepts and working them in a multilateral arena, such a process begins forming a cadre of people who will then go on and become the negotiators of the issue at the proper moment.

The proper moment -- in the case of climate -- was an intergovernmental negotiation process designed to produce a major international treaty open for signature by the leaders of UN member states in June, 1992m at Maurice Strong's UNCED or Rio Conference. All of this was little known, little understood, and little recognized outside of the networks that happened to be involved in 1989, but a few years later, it captured the attention of the world and brought together one of the largest meetings of world leaders up to that time, including the President of the United States.

As envisioned, President Bush went to Rio in June of 1992 and signed the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), which our negotiating team had just initialed for the United States the month before. However, none of the people who negotiated the treaty for the US were present at Rio.

The 1992 Climate Treaty was well crafted enough so that the United States was the third country in the world and the first major power to ratify it, six months after the President signed it. How one got from nothing in 1989 to such a big something in 1992--or if you were a cynic or critic such a big nothing in that short a period of time-- is really a story that needs to be researched and written by people who actually participated and were present because it was quite a fascinating experience, little understood by those outside of it.

Q: Well, what were you doing?

KINNEY: When I arrived into OES in 1989, there was to be a meeting of the IPCC RSWG, the Response Strategies Working Group, which the U.S. was to host in two months in Geneva. Nothing--zip-- had been done to organize this meeting we were to host. Nor did anyone in the office really know how to do such, e.g. they had no idea how to communicate with our Mission to the UN in Geneva and its well practiced conference services section to seek advice and help in preparing for the USG's responsibility as host, to acquire a venue, arrange hospitality, ensure everything from welcome packets to pencils and note pads were available for each participant, issue press credentials and coverage, and all the other details involved--in addition to developing in Washington the instructions and substantive preparations for the US delegation to this meeting!

I was thrown into a situation of having to start going to international preparatory meetings for the RSWG and simultaneously trying to organize the RSWG meeting itself so the United States would not be embarrassed as host of this very important upcoming meeting. Fortunately, I had gained a vicarious knowledge of the UN and USG assets in that regard through my husband's work at U.S.UN in New York in the early 80's. But never having actually worked the UN environment and institutions and processes myself, it was like being fed with a fire hose to get up to speed on both the substantive issues, the U.N. and multilateral processes, learn something about the U.S. domestic governmental players and dynamic (I had been overseas for four years and was coming back to a new administration and a new cast of characters in Washington.), as well as learn the interagency and non-governmental networks and interests at play where climate change was concerned.

I had never had any exposure before to the climate change and environment, science, and technology area, nor had I any experience with international conference diplomacy and negotiations. I'm smart and the proverbial quick study, but in retrospect, I was appalled that the Department of State took such a cavalier and unsophisticated and uncaring approach to how it manages international negotiation processes. Why in the world does not the greatest power in the world have a diplomatic service purposely prepared for such, at least in the basics, all of which are both predictable and teachable, whether on the strategic planning and substantive side or on the organization side?

The situation still boggles my mind and looms as either major arrogance or massive incompetence and irresponsibility on the part of Departmental/USG leadership. But as our political culture has become more chaotic and full of self-interested amateurs, our more professional infrastructure and resources have suffered.

This situation is both wrong and dangerous! From time to time, when I would be in the Chair speaking for the United States of America, I would realize that I was engaged in this very complex international process involving the negotiation of a legally binding instrument on my country with no experience or preparation except what I had been able to quickly pick up and obtain on my own. Fortunately, we eventually acquired a master negotiator from the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) under whom I worked, Bob Reinstein. He saved the day and gets credit as the chief negotiator who really made it possible for all of us to get to “yes.”

At the beginning there was no one in OES who had ever been engaged with the UN or any meaningful multilateral negotiation. (The only Montreal Protocol leftovers seemed to be at EPA, which was also part of the climate problem.) Within the Foreign Service there was no one interested or involved because working in OES “wasn’t promotable.” Plus, OES held the key to no onward assignment overseas like the bilateral regional bureaus did. The result was that you had a bunch of young people thrown into the issue who knew nothing about it and less about how it might affect real US interests, which at that stage were still undefined. Since several of those involved were basically transfers from EPA or the National Science Foundation (NSF), their grasp of the issue was either ideological greenery or narrowly and wonkily scientific, neither of which was appropriate given the real financial and strategic interests at stake.

One of the problems was the lack of anyone versed in “UN Speak.” Because of our experience in New York, I knew enough to know that the UN speaks its own language, and that UN English is not always as benign as it seems. For example, “new and additional” is a phrase one of our inexperienced members agreed to in a meeting in New York without realizing that this was a long standing, underdeveloped country construct in UN Speak that referred to their right to 1% of each developed country’s GDP as an assistance transfer. With great embarrassment and chagrin, the US had to walk back from what this officer agreed to because she did not realize what she was doing.

The young woman was attending some early Rio Conference preparatory meeting. The faux pas was walked back but at the cost of the US looking could not be trusted to negotiate in good faith, and that its word was trustworthy. This was very bad in a process in which mutual trust and reliability are crucial. It wasn’t this young woman’s fault. She had no clue. To her credit, she did call back to OES for instructions. I know this because I had been in the office about three days at the time, and I remember warning “the authorities” that this didn’t sound right to me and that we best be careful to make sure that it did not mean something special in UN speak. Well, the Office Director had never had any experience with the UN and felt it sounded fine (of course we would need to provide some additional resources to help developing countries deal with climate change), so he approved the language. Oops!

In my view, this was a prime example of State’s unwillingness to or inability to provide the professional diplomatic formation and service the country deserves. The world was rapidly becoming more multilateral than bilateral but we have stayed doggedly dedicated

to the bilateral as a corporate culture and still do not purposefully develop our diplomats for regional and multilateral diplomacy and the negotiation of the global issues that characterize this level. In the 1990's, most of the people in OES were narrow gage, domestic civil servants with domestic ideological perspectives, especially those who had come from EPA.

I had an abiding habit of “never thinking right,” or “never being on the right side of righteousness and God” where most of my other colleagues were concerned. But I just never saw this issue in the same terms as the green lobby, and as we discuss it, you will see that my take on climate is not what you read in the newspaper and not politically correct and standard analysis.

Q: Also, you might talk here a bit about how you saw the political environment because you had a significant number of people who represented a significant political bloc too.

KINNEY: Well, I guess where you come from in DC determines where you stand and how you see the issues. Most of our government institutions are narrowly focused to reflect domestic concerns and constituencies. State is different in that regard. It has no natural, focused domestic constituency because it operates internationally. It must broker conflicting domestic interests before it goes into the international arena to define what the US interest and objective is at that level. Peoria we ain't.

In 1989, the energetic forces behind climate change were largely environmental and to a lesser degree scientific, neither notable power houses in US politics or in the rest of the world, for that matter. This, notwithstanding the fact that Green Parties and politics were beginning to emerge in Europe. What very few people in OES seemed to grasp or want to come to terms with was that, although it may have been framed as an environmental issue focused on CO₂, the climate change issue was really all about energy and economics, at least as far as national interests and international politics were concerned. The consequences and economics of energy constitute a much more weighty and consequential factor in the short term than do the more speculative, longer-term, environmental concerns. No country can transform its energy production and consumption habits over night or with the stroke of a pen.

So you had the environmentalists and EPA, the science community, the Department of Energy, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense and a Republican administration beholdng to heavy industrial and corporate interests, which was nonetheless advertising Bush as “the environmental President” for geo-strategic reasons, among other things. The politics within the US were complex and still new to the issue. Our domestic situation made the politics abroad look simple, by comparison, although no issue involving 180 sovereign countries plus the European Community in Brussels is simple. My personal view is that the fact that climate change got framed as an “environmental issue ” rather than an “energy issue” would be an abiding and to this day debilitating and serious problem.

The fact that climate was essentially a UN driven issue also complicated matters, You had people who hated the UN and didn't like the United States being subject to what they considered to be a bunch of overpaid international bureaucrats who were over practiced in picking other people's pockets. You had not a few scientists even then, who were real scientists rather than politicians in scientist drag, who said, "Wait a minute, there is no proof here. Science is about evidence. Show me the evidence." At that time, what we mostly had beyond the basic global warming theory was three very hot summers, which, with the help of the media, the NGOs, scientists and other interested parties had managed to convert into a crisis.

Few people do or did dispute the reality that the earth is wrapped in a warm blanket and that in the presence of increased CO2 there can be warming, but many also remembered that in the mid-70's the impending crisis had been "global cooling." I remembered that panic because my husband had brought one of its foremost exponents to speak at State in the Open Forum. Hence, one of the first things the Bush administration successfully insisted on was the use of the term "climate change," because no one could dispute that climate does, in fact, change. And what you really saw over the next couple of years was a taste of the world to come: an increasingly mediagenic issue driven by NGOs and other interest groups with no responsibility -- or accountability -- outpacing the older, more measured and informed governmental modes of dealing with such issues. From a handful of NGOs involved in the Montreal Protocol, we were suddenly talking about hundreds and then thousands -- of all political persuasions--spewing their views to an equally unaccountable media that was just "reporting the news" and trying to sell their product.

Q: Which meant exaggeration basically.

KINNEY: Scientists who either had failed at or were tired of the lab, the classroom or the bench had discovered going to meetings around the world and promoting their point of view was really a lot more fun than the anonymity of the lab and the scrutiny of peer reviews.

Europeans had another set of interests, which were well wrapped in green, for political reasons of their own. The evolution of the EU was a process of gathering strength in and for Brussels. Brussels needed to integrate and diminish sovereign authorities within their Union and saw environment as a perfect integrating issue through which to reach for taxing authority, energy authority and other "competencies" to use EU language. If enough Europeans were led to be concerned about the environment, Brussels could get the right to tax and regulate through the back door, authorities that otherwise remained with its sovereign state members.

Also, the European Community (later Union) had an advantage because of Western Europe's use of nuclear and later the less developed and carbon intensive countries of Eastern Europe. Both factors gave a growing Union overall energy consumption patterns very different from those of the US, Australia and Canada, for example. This made climate an excellent issue for grand-standing and invidious comparison where the US was concerned, something that warmed younger Euros' hearts.

You had the G-77, the bloc of under-developed countries, as they were called in those days. The G-77 very quickly figured out its role, which was basically to deny a global solution unless the West paid them to behave better.

None of this was understood by the broader public at large or by most in the U.S. government, to be honest. Within the USG, agency representatives tended to see only their more focused and narrow interest and did not really care about anything else.

Given Bush's desire to be "the environmental President," the energy with which Mostafa Tolba and Maurice Strong were driving the UN processes, the European Union interests and our own media and environmentalists at home, there was no question but that the United States would be front and center and that the position that we took would be globally public, globally significant, and globally subject to fierce commentary and often criticism.

So my little role in all of this was initially to learn as fast as I could and start going to meetings and pulling together operationally what was needed for the USG to successfully host a meeting in Geneva. Then it was to be the Deputy Director in something called the Office of Global Change (OES/OGC), which emerged maybe a year later. No, I wasn't the Deputy right away. Frances somebody from the National Science Foundation was brought over, but she threw up her hands not able to deal with the issue or the process frankly. She was really a scientist and a science type, and she was appalled.

The work was both demanding and hard and dangerous! Booby traps lay everywhere, and Frances didn't want any part of it, so I was able to replace her when she moved on. OES long-timer Dan Reifsnyder became the head of the office, and for the next three years Dan and I and Robert Reinstein, the master negotiator brought in to replace Bill Nitze, became the triumvirate from State that basically ran the show from start to finish.

Q: What was, I mean did say like the geographic bureaus, did they pay any attention to what you were doing?

KINNEY: No.

Q: How about OES means....

KINNEY: Oceans, Environment and Science. Fred Bernthal was the Assistant Secretary at the time. He had been brought over from the National Science Foundation, where he had been involved for many years in its international division, not a research powerhouse. He was a Republican political appointee from the Bush administration. He was somebody who was considered scientifically reliable, not a crazy who would run off and do nutty things like the White House feared EPA would do. Fred was there throughout the IPPC preparatory process, and I am trying to remember once negotiations got underway, I guess he was still there as well. Once the actual negotiations got underway, my life became Bob Reinstein, Dan Reifsnyder and a 40 some odd person inter agency process,

all of us being driven by the unrelenting pace of international meetings, international negotiation sessions and two major events in that context hosted by the United States with Presidential participation, always a complicating factor.

The first Presidential meeting was the January 1990 meeting of the IPPC, at which Bush announced the United States would participate in a political negotiation. In fact we would end up hosting the first negotiating session, unbeknownst to any of us at the time. With his IPCC announcement, the Bush administration laid claim to the climate process and ostensibly its leadership.

Six months later, in June, we learned through a press release from the White House that the United States would host the first negotiating session of the Framework Convention starting in January 1991. We -- meaning OES and the State Department -- had no money for this commitment, no mandate and no real authority. We kept waiting for some direction from the White House because that was who was calling the shots apparently, mostly through the office of John Sununu.

By this time, the White House had unveiled Bob Reinstein as its choice for Chief Negotiator and this told us a lot. Bill Nitze was effectively fired. As was his style, Bill made some cocky, unacceptable comment in public and was practically gone the next day. Whooose!

Reinstein had been a lifelong DOE and then USTR civil servant, a highly skilled negotiator in both contexts. Bob had several negotiations, especially the U.S.-Canada nuclear agreement to his credit. He was brought over because he understood the climate issue was really about energy. He understood economics. He understood the science and was able to hold his own scientifically, having started out as a science writer. He was someone that Boyden Gray, the White House Counsel, fingered as reliable because there was no one else at State that the White House trusted on this issue. (Probably with good reason, in my view.)

The fact that Reinstein became the lead negotiator for the United States meant that from day one we never viewed climate change as an environmental negotiation; we viewed it as an energy negotiation. I remember the first thing Bob did was to ask the CIA to make us up a chart of the top eight or ten energy consumers in the world, the size of their economies, their energy mix and the own energy resources. One look at this chart, and it became clear who and what mattered and for what reasons and whom we would really have to have in our camp to get a treaty--the dirty dozen!

We looked first and foremost at the energy issues and the energy equations, and then everything else was secondary. Others will tell different stories, but in my view that pretty much sums up why the negotiations were successful, why the United States signed, and why the United States was the third to ratify this massive agreement negotiated in a record time of two years. This was the equivalent in terms of complexity and breadth and craziness of the Law of the Sea negotiations, which had at that time still not been

successfully concluded after a decade. We were able to do this in two years, and it is a pretty amazing story.

Q: OK, so you focused on energy. Usually with negotiating any problem and participants are people of good will, you figure out what the solution is almost right from the beginning and then how do you get there? What do you see as...

KINNEY: First of all, we knew it would be a framework agreement, so there would be very little that was binding and biting in specific terms, which is what all the environmentalists wanted. We knew that there were several important principles that needed to be established first. One was the principle of national differences or national differentiation. Based on our chart alone, we knew that one size could never fit all because energy production and consumption and economic development and industrial plant amortization varied so much among countries. (The fundamental problem of Kyoto, which was tailor-made for the European Union, was that what worked brilliantly for them did not work for us or many other countries.)

We knew that targets and timetables were a non-starter for the U.S. with its division of powers and requirement for Senate advice and consent, as well as an assiduous approach to legal commitments, i.e. if we sign we must already have implementing legislation in place, least we promise and then not be able to deliver and have the government sued for breach of law. Because of how things were developing within Europe, we knew that we were going to ultimately be at odds the EC (now the EU) for a whole variety of reasons, and so our allies were not going to be European. They were going to be other major continental, diverse economies like our own, such as Australia, Canada, Russia, and Japan and within the G-77; we knew that China, India and Brazil would be counting on us to control things and would therefore be approachable at certain moments.

For example, there is a great intellectual property rights (IPR) story that I was a party to as negotiations progressed. It was beginning to dawn on Brazil, India and China that notwithstanding their standing in the G-77, they were not like most less developed countries. By the early 90's, they were already beginning to discern today's world (2011), even if we could not, and with it their need to be able to grow to their full potential, which was enormous. They could see that anybody who has to produce energy for robust economic development could not afford to engage in fantasy and the hope for swift, simple alternatives to fossil fuel.

Q: China and India, and Brazil too.

KINNEY: Yes. Well, the story with Brazil is that one of the three or four major issues in the negotiation was the insistent G-77 demand for "free, guaranteed access" to the transfer of technology. As you know, in the U.S., the government does not own the technology but rather the private sector does, along with individual patent holders, hence it is considered a form of "intellectual property." Benefits from the holder's intellectual property rights or IPR or "technology" was not something the U.S. could agree to give away because we did not own it.

Instead, I developed the concept of “technology cooperation” and, as a result, ended up having this in my little basket, which was eventually reflected in Article 4-b. But back to the story: At the 1991 winter session in Geneva, we invited the Brazilian delegation to lunch. We still needed their cooperation with us and needed to assess how disposed they might be to turn their backs on the G-77. We met for lunch and had the requisite amount of pleasantries and small talk and then it came time for each of the pairs to address concerns and/or exchange information with their counterparts in more private conversations, although still at the table. And as my counterpart, Mr. Vargas -- a very tough and expert Brazilian trade negotiator-- could see that I was about to go after him again on the technology issue, and he leaned over politely with a smile to say, “Stephanie, don’t worry. We don’t have to talk business today.” I asked “Why not? That is what we are here for, no?.” He said, “That is all right. I just discovered something--we have IPR of our own. We understand now.” And Brazil was the first to jump ship. Well, they didn’t exactly jump clear of the G-77 ship, but they began shifting and nuancing how they operated and with whom on which particular issues. They still wanted money, so they held tough on “new and additional resources.”

Q: What were you talking about?

KINNEY: What less developed countries are still at the table for--money. You saw this in Copenhagen last December (2009 COP). The third world is obsessed. I use the term “third world” because that was the lingo of the era. The underdeveloped and less developed, non-Western nations were convinced that they were underdeveloped because the West in general and the US in particular were selfish, ungenerous imperialist powers intent on keeping technology from them in order to keep them poor and under control. Balderdash. They could not have effectively and efficiently--much less honestly--used unlimited free technology any more than they could have absorbed the 1% of US GDP they were aiming for when demanding “new and additional resources.” Oh, and did I say that the USG did not own the “technology” they thought they wanted and needed?

This was 1990 remember, and we were dealing with very “statist” third world regimes, most of whom did not have serious “free markets.” Many of their representatives, poorly educated on Marxist ideology seemed to believe that states possessed technology rather than private entrepreneurs and companies. I would spend hours and hours trying to explain to people that the United States could not promise technology it did not own. Some understood the concept of IPR and others simply refused to acknowledge it, much less agree with it.

My ultimate understanding of “negotiations” is the result of my experience over the three years I was involved in the Framework process: negotiations are all about mutual education and bonding. It is not that complicated, unless we want it to be. Without a common language and agreed upon frame of reference and definitions, and without a common understanding of the interests at play and without trust in each other’s word (that is where the bonding comes in), you can’t get to “yes.” It is simple as that.

The complexity of the process, the issues and the fragmented interests of the parties at the table, plus the emergence of the media and NGOs and information technology soon began to bear down on the climate issue and greatly complicated things--especially after the Framework Convention was ratified. It might be of interest for people to know that our little office was the first in the State Department to acquire a capability that resembled E-mail.

One of the reasons the Soviet Union ultimately fell was that we had realized early on the importance of soft power, had identified the scientific community as an opportunity for disseminating information about life outside the Soviet Union, and had developed and been refining information exchange networks between our scientific communities and theirs for a long time. Thanks to DARPA and the National Science Foundation (NSF), which had invented and pioneered the early use of a neat technology that later came to be called the Internet, we had a unique machine in OES, where getting the latest documents by mail from the U.N. Secretariat was a terrible problem. Our solution was a very loud, clanky automatic typing device, which could provide reams of texts from distant sources almost in real time. Because Fred Bernthal, who was Assistant Secretary, had come from the NSF, we were able to do a deal with Robert Correll, who was the head of NSF and a key player on behalf of science in our inter-agency group. He was also our first representative to the IPCC Science Committee.

Once we got this “miracle machine” in OES, we started using it to exchange documents in real time with Geneva, and with the secretariat for the climate change negotiations. So we would get UN documentation almost as soon as it came out and provide quick turn-around for US views, comments, critique and complaints. We didn’t have to wait for the mail or even cables. This became a huge advantage because we became known as the center of real time information.

This is just a little side story that I have always cherished. You’ll recall my reference to helping Bob Gershenson choose Wang Word Processing when I was a junior officer. Well, State was still using them in 1991 when the rest of the world was moving to computers. At State we had no computers at our desk, only a “word processor,” one step up from the IBM Selectric typewriter.

Q: A Wang being a very early...

KINNEY: Word processor. Wang had developed a proprietary word processing system for the Department of State, the only system at the time capable of processing highly classified information electronically.

Q: There is always an evil opponent or something, I mean usually within one’s own government. Or did anybody care about climate? Was this sort of going on without...

KINNEY: Think about what else was going on at the same time--the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the Soviet Union and its communist ideology, on which State had

been focused for more than thirty or forty years. Nobody really cared about climate, except John Sununu, who cared deeply and profoundly.

Sununu was the Chief of Staff for Bush, an engineering by training I think, and he had been given the portfolio for this issue. And no, I spoke too quickly. DOE cared because they understood the energy implications. EPA cared passionately, but about the environmental implications. The USTR, U.S. Trade Representative, cared because of the problem of protectionism masquerading as holier than thou greenery, an emerging issue in what was then GATT and is now the WTO. The DOD was not much involved until the end, when they woke up to the energy implications for the armed forces.

The Department of Commerce thought this issue was a Trojan horse designed to advance “watermelons” or people who were green on the outside but red on the inside. The DOC representative was a true blue, Reagan free marketer complete with suspenders with elephants on them. No threat or risk was too small to send their representative out in full battle armor. Socialism would be stopped in its tracks! J.R. Spradley, God rest his devilish soul! He was our most talented debater and defender of doctrinaire Reagan Republicanism. We were never going to be snookered as long as JR was around. He was also a hell of a negotiator and often used as our secret weapon--“You better be careful or we will sic JR on you!”

And finally there was the Science community (NSF, NOAA, NASA, and OSTP at the White House), which was deeply interested and engaged because of the implications for more money and resources for the natural sciences.

Q: NOAA being...

KINNEY: The National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, a part of the Interior Department. Interior, writ large, was only somewhat interested in climate because of an issue that has only more recently emerged crucial, and that is forests, which serve as a sink for CO-2. So if you are going to put lots of CO-2 in the air, one way to compensate for it is to reduce deforestation, reforest or maintain existing forests, especially more fragile environments like rain forests and ancient forests. The more forests you create or maintain, the more CO-2 you can take up or “sink,” if you will. Developing countries have forests, and so there was obviously a potential deal to be worked out in that area.

So there was hardly anybody who wasn't interested, except at State. And there was hardly anybody who didn't have a very narrow perspective and set of special interests. So, if State hadn't existed, we would have had to be invented. There was no alternative to our chairing the inter-agency process and leading the negotiations because we were the only ones who did not have a narrow constituency driving us instead of a global, geo-strategic perspective tightly linked to US interests both short and longer term, Hence, we had to find a way to integrate and broker and find a single national position, which wasn't (never is) easy. You can appreciate that our roughest negotiations were not at the UN, but rather at home in the inter-agency process.

We were essentially running two parallel sets of negotiations, one domestic and one international. The cacophony, cantankerous, Quixotic nature of the domestic negotiations and politics rarely enabled us to be prepared in time or in a way that we could actually work our position in advance, the way we should have. But then in those days, we really had no serious competitors; we were the US, so we could often be less diplomatic and professional than we should have been. On more than one occasion we left home for a negotiating session without instructions and received them only after we arrived. It was maddening.

Q: Well, who were the major international countries, players both for and against us?

KINNEY: Well our major adversary and biggest challenge was the EC (now the EU), whose own complicated process in Brussels would bind England, France, Germany and Italy to a hide-bound position. They were statist; we were not; they were Code countries and we were Common Law; they believed in top-down command and control and we wanted a bottoms-up approach that recognized national differences. They wanted targets and timetables and that was a redline for us. They relished the environmental frame because of the opportunities it presented for Brussels to expand its competency, and we were not about to turn our energy policy and economy over to a bunch of idealistic greenies. They felt self-righteous, and we developed a thick skin about being the opposite but protecting US interests; what we wanted was a treaty we could actually sign and ratify. In the end the Europe had to cave, but vowed to rise again and did at Kyoto.

Other tough adversaries were the G-77, particularly India at the first negotiating session. Their chief negotiator, Ambassador Dasgupta, provided a tough, week-long drama duking it out with our chief negotiator before folding, but the theatre and drama went right up to the last moment. Reinstein prevailed, and everyone usefully observed what he and we were made of : we got the terms of reference we needed; the EC was shown to be irrelevant as it came to a struggle between the US and India, and India yielded just enough that everybody was able to move forward.

Q: Well, what was in your time the final outcome?

KINNEY: Both private sector and public sector oil producers such as Exxon and Saudi Arabia suddenly realized about half way through the process, the huge stake they had in this issue, which threatened to make CO₂ a “pollutant” whether it was a natural part of the climate system or not. The final outcome of all this was that in May of '92, in a very deft, greased lightning moment, the negotiation was concluded: “That is yes? I hear no objections.” Chairman Ripert slammed down the gavel, and it was done. We initialed it in New York and then in the following month of June, President Bush actually signed the Convention for the United States in Rio.

In addition to the treaty itself, what I think was most significant about it was the changes it stimulated and triggered in the developing world. When we began in 1989, most of the emerging/developing/ less developed world didn't have environment ministries; as far as they were concerned, environment was just another imperialist plot to keep them poor

and underdeveloped. By the time negotiations ended, there was beginning to be an emerging awareness of the risks posed by climate change and continued disregard for the environment, as well as the opportunities. Some less developed countries actually began to see the logic of what we had been telling them, which was that the West had made a lot of mistakes in its development model, not because we were bad or unrighteous or nefarious but because we just didn't know any better. In some fundamental sense, cheap oil had been the driver for modernity, for modern life as we know and love it. Now, developing countries had/have an opportunity to improve on that Western model and make their development smarter and more sustainable. Why waste money and resources on remediation if you can prevent environmental damage in the first place? One of the important concepts embedded in the treaty, along with national plans and reviews, was our "technology cooperation," which was based on mutual interest and partnership rather than legitimized new entitlements.

For almost 20 years now, building on the Country Studies program the Convention established, climate technology cooperation has grown from one or two demonstration projects to an important dimension of international relations, carried out usually at the bilateral level between states with mutual interests. The Country Studies were another important direct product of the negotiations: countries had to establish greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) baselines in order to be able to judge progress in reducing GHG levels thereafter.

Such studies helped bring a modicum of reality to bear as well. Take coal, for example. As much as everyone complains about coal, it is now clear that nobody like the US or China or Australia is going to be giving it up any time soon, given how plentiful, secure and cheap it is. China is not and we are not; we simply don't have and cannot afford a substitute right now. But there are things we could and are doing technologically to mitigate the use of coal, although I am personally not convinced that sequestration, for example, is among the best alternatives. The important thing is the Framework Convention has helped spur innovative energy R&D, the first step to doing something different.

Also, especially in emerging economies, which don't have such heavy sunk costs in relatively modern industrial plants, there are opportunities to start developing a more diverse and decentralized mix of energy sources and to make them as clean as technologically and economically feasible. This was a new concept for many in 1990. However, we are going to have to do a lot more to educate people about production life cycles and full cost accounting. For example, just because corn is not a fossil fuel does not mean that the biofuel ethanol is a carbon cost free answer 1) because of the fossil based energy required to produce the ethanol, and 2) because of the adverse impact ethanol production has had on food security. There are no simple, cost free solutions, except maybe turning off lights and other energy efficiency measures, but they won't get you where everyone wants to go--back to 1990 CO2 levels. Not by a long shot!

I think full cost accounting is one of the really important spin-offs of the Framework Convention, though it is not addressed explicitly within it. It's embedded in the Country

Study methodology. You can't know what something costs until you count all of the costs, including previously unrecognized externalities such as environmental destruction and other liabilities.

The whole problem of "The Commons," which in this case is the cost of overloading the free and unowned atmosphere with man made GHG emissions, was one of the concepts that came out in 1988 World Environment Conference. That was also the conference that gave us the term "sustainable development." You will remember the Framework Convention on Climate Change was a separate, self-contained and segregated negotiation to be delivered to the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) only AFTER the FCCC was negotiated. "Sustainable development", as defined by Gro Brundtland, the Chair of the 1988 World Environment Conference, was the key phrase or concept that UNCED really enshrined in the international lexicon in 1992. Smarter and less GHG intensive energy production is a crucial part of sustainable development for developed and developing countries alike.

So important FCCC outcomes included the concept of smart and sustainable energy production, the impact on economic accounting, the introduction globally of the concept of environment ministries and the necessary role of the state in looking after and regulating those things which nobody else cared about: water, air, land and forests and other natural resources that had heretofore been taken as a free good. And then the treaty itself, which enshrined a lot of this in its terms of reference, definitions and its ongoing commitments and processes. In this respect, it both helped create and in some cases reinforced an agreed upon language and set of concepts with which the global community could and would address a range of transnational environmental concerns, in addition to the one of climate change.

As I mentioned, the idea was to establish an ongoing process that would pull countries in the right direction. The heart of the Framework Convention was a baseline reporting system combined with action plans to bend the business as usual trend lines on GHG emissions. And these action plans were linked to partnership options and projects, where developing countries were concerned. The Convention helped educate and catalyze a vast range of new policies and activities that today seem like the norm but, of course, back then were new and highly controversial, especially in the developing world.

Q. I mean you are talking about a really sensible negotiation. Was anybody aware of this? The reason I ask...

KINNEY: Not much outside of those who were caught in the middle of it.

Q: I am thinking of the reporting that has been developed over the years on the Arab Israeli negotiations, which essentially have just gotten worse in the last 50 years. One would hope there would be even more reporting on a success story, but I assume there was hardly anything.

KINNEY: Right. I have begged Reinstein for years to make a record of it but to no avail. Maybe we can get him into the Oral History program at least. (Mission accomplished!) Our diplomatic service (the Foreign Service) didn't care and wasn't really involved in this negotiation, except for me and then maybe a handful of officers subsequently, which begs all sorts of questions.

The FS thought this negotiation -- like the rest of OES work -- was "technical," which shows how uninformed and lame our personnel and FS leadership has been. The FS corporate culture shied away from anything that was not solidly bilateral and tightly linked to regional bureaus, which could organize ongoing assignments abroad with a minimum of interference from the Bureau of Personnel (PER), or now Human Resources (HR). If I sound a little jaundiced, I am. It still bewilders me why the corporate culture resists adapting to the 21st century, where a broad range of global policy issues and programs from human trafficking to drugs to AIDs to aviation agreements are much more important than reporting on the doings of the President of Surinam, But that is just my view.

The climate negotiations were not ultimately about science, or technical expertise; it was about political and economic interests. To the extent that we ever needed technical expertise, we had Bob Correll or any other scientist we wanted from the bureaucracy. The reality was that they were largely window dressing. This was politics. This was reframing old fault lines. This was all about either national or regional interests, just the way diplomacy has been for the last two millennia. Nothing has changed in that regard. If you were so naïve as to think this were not the case, you were going to end up in a heap of trouble. The United States does not put its signature -- at least until Mr. Gore--to agreements with which it cannot or does not intend to comply. Our reputation and our courts see to that.

Q: You are speaking about the Osaka agreement?

KINNEY: Yes, I am referring to the Kyoto Protocol. Gore signed it, knowing full well that it would never be ratified by the US Congress, although he held out the hope publicly that it would. In so doing, he frankly made us look like disingenuous fools. The U.S. Senate sent a very clear message-- 99 to 1 -- that it would not ratify, and yet Gore went to Kyoto and signed the Protocol on behalf of the United States, which was a disgrace. But that is part of the story of how and why I left OES. I was purged by one of his appointees because I was suspect for having worked on the Framework Convention and was skeptical about what I knew the EU was already pre-positioning to become the first protocol under the FCCC, i.e. Kyoto.

Q: What happened to you after this? This would be '92?

KINNEY: Rio was in June of '92. The negotiating team had a wonderful celebration at Reinstein's house in Chevy Chase. I wrote a funny little musical that we all participated in and presented to him in his basement, which was called "The Climate Follies." New

words to old Broadway tunes, ending with Kermit the Frog's song, "It Isn't Easy Being Green." And then, as happens, we had to break up and go our different ways.

My first job was to lead the USG preparatory process for the newly mandated UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD). This was a validation of all I had learned in the climate negotiations, which was satisfying because I also headed the US delegation to the first CSD meeting, which was held in New York in July or August, with a follow-up workshop in Bogotá, Columbia a few months later.

Having spent almost three years on climate, however, I really wanted to do something different. However, I had invested a lot and remained concerned that by late 1992, the number of FSOs working in OES was smaller every year. We were able to hang on to a number of office directorships, but ex-EPA staff was rapidly taking over the bureau, along with other civil servants, none of whom would ever move on once they captured their jobs.

There was a Deputy Director position opening up working with Andy Simms in the Environmental Policy Office (OES/ENV). ENV was fondly known as the "Sludge and Drudge office" (in contrast to the "Fur and Feathers Office" that worked on species issues); it was responsible for a long list of international treaties essentially aimed at checking industrial and chemical wastes and pollutants or prepping for future negotiations aimed at better integrating environment and trade: the Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) and its Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) Protocol, the Vienna Convention on Ozone Depleting Substances and its Montreal Protocol, the environmental components of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the trade and environment committee negotiations under the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the similar committee under what was then the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) were some of the most important issues for which ENV was responsible. I had my pick of poisons and pollutants if I wanted to get into other issues. And because of my early work on the CSD, that new negotiating process also got lodged in ENV as part of my portfolio.

I had been working in ENV about five or six months when Clinton and Gore were elected President and Vice President. Not to long after the inauguration, I was purged for my sins in the climate change negotiations by Eileen Claussen, an EPA operative who had hoped to do for climate what she did for ozone but got shut out of the climate process because she apparently did not understand the difference between the two issues. Eileen was a very effective bureaucrat, cultivated Al Gore assiduously and subsequently became one of his key environmental policy advisers, all the while patiently working her way toward becoming the OES Assistant Secretary at State, just in time to preside over the Kyoto Protocol negotiations. Suffice it to say, she made sure she would not be second guessed by anyone key to the Framework negotiations.

Q: This was the Clinton Administration.

KINNEY: Yeah, this was the Clinton Administration; Senator Al Gore was our new Vice President. I have a story about Al Gore, which I'll recount because I'd like to have it on the record somewhere.

I was Al Gore's "nanny" -- better known as his "control officer" in State Department lingo-- throughout the climate negotiations. Al Gore was a senator obsessed with the climate change issue, and he attended all of our negotiating sessions as a member of the U.S. delegation because of his intense personal interest. He was as fervent and as passionate then-- or perhaps even more so -- than he is now on the subject of climate. And he was a handful. But he was a U.S. senator, and you treat U.S. senators with all respect due and also with all the respect they think they are due, which is not always the same thing.

He was not the only Congressional tag-along, God knows. Every time we left town, we had fights with the Department because we never left with a U.S. delegation of fewer than 45 accredited members, and there were always four or five last minute ones from the Hill who were either elected officials or their staff surrogates--usually intent on keeping an eye on us until they realized what really long hours and tedious work was involved. But Al Gore and his assistant, Katy McGinty, very early on became part of the negotiating session woodwork. I was detailed to be his "Control Officer," which is a FS State Department term. It does not suggest that I had any real control over Senator Gore, except that I usually did know where he was and what he was up to at any given time.

I had great affection for Mr. Gore as a personal matter because our two daughters were very good friends, and he had personally displayed a gallantry and a defense of me in an acrimonious encounter with a European Parliamentarian group to which I was served up by the Department as the designated sacrificial lamb. Interestingly, my attacker that day was none other than Mr. Barroso of Portugal, who is today the head of the EU, and back then was absolutely the shortest and nastiest and most ill-mannered member of his group. Since Mr. Gore had organized this event in the first place, it was to his great credit and my relief at a certain point, that he stood up and stopped the proceedings and said, "I am sorry, Ms. Kinney is not the enemy." Pregnant pause. We all knew who the enemy was -- the Republican administration. "She is a Foreign Service Officer, and she is doing her duty and does not deserve such treatment." And he then proceeded to give quite an appreciation and spirited defense of the US Foreign Service in general. He came by the house later that night to pick up his daughter and to give me a copy of his new book, Earth in the Balance, which he had personally inscribed with a message of thanks for my service. I will never forget this and always appreciate it.

But neither will I ever forget what I watched him do in New York at the UN at our next to the last negotiating session in January of 1992. As I watched Al in the negotiation process, I realized that he and I would never see eye-to-eye on climate, but I kept my mouth shut, especially after a meeting with him and Bob Reinstein and myself in Geneva in December of 1991. Bob and I just walked out of that one shaking our heads and asking what in the world had he been smoking and what has made him so irrational on this subject that causes him to fly in the face of reality?

But the story on the record is the following: In late January/early February 1992, we were in New York at the UN in the next to the last negotiating session. Senator Gore was with us once more. In my nanny role, I had cultivated a good relation with Katie, who did a pretty good job of keeping informed on not only the Senator's wants and needs but also his movements. On this particular day, as we were a couple of days short of the end of the session, Katie came to me and said, "We have all these appointments set up." So I had to drop everything else and accompany him and Katy on a round of calls. They met with the head of every single major delegation -- British, German, French, EC, China, and India.

The US was very close to closing the deal. We knew the deal wouldn't be done until May, but we were this close to it, and it was beginning to dawn on everybody that 1) the agreement was going to happen in time for Rio and 2) it was going to be the U.S. approach, essentially a U.S.-led deal. It was at this point, that Senator Gore took it upon himself to make this round of calls and give each head of delegation an impassioned plea not to be snookered, not to go along, not to be taken in by the U.S. and agree to "its treaty."

Q: What was his difference?

KINNEY: He wanted biting commitments and targets and timetables among other things, basically the European formula. After the first of these meetings, I excused myself to go to the restroom and high-tailed it back to our chief negotiator to report what had just happened, running all the way so that I could report and still get to the next meeting with the Senator at the appointed time. Bob asked, "What did you do?" "I couldn't do anything." was all I could reply. But the good news was that I was in the meeting, and I had verbatim notes. The bad news was that Gore was a U.S. Senator indulging personal prerogative.

The Senator obviously did not feel bound by being an official member of the U.S. delegation but rather used that status to send a counterproductive message. I was dumbfounded. But we were too close to a deal to be able to make an issue of his behavior, so we just kept quiet. I continued on the round of calls, taking verbatim notes and duly reporting back to our chief negotiator which delegation heads he should call or bump into next into to neutralize Mr. Gore's behavior. And in his quiet, laconic way, Bob would start in: "I understand Al was by...." Bob took it in stride, but I was just stunned and appalled that a U.S. Senator, member of the U.S. delegation at the crucial juncture of a major international, legally binding negotiation would behave like that. As you can tell, I have never really gotten over it. To my mind, it presaged what followed when he went to Kyoto and put the name of the United States on that flawed Protocol, knowing we would never ratify it. Shameful.

Q: Well, there we are.

KINNEY: Yup. There we are. What a privilege it was to be involved and to have learned and gained the perspective I have on this issue and this little piece of history, which will

not be long remembered nor recalled again, I dare say. One of the privileges of being a Foreign Service Officer.

Q: Well, speaking of being a Foreign Service Officer. You mentioned that OES at your time was turning into a civil service dominated bureau.

KINNEY: Yes, not yet at the Office Director level, but at every other level. The Assistant Secretary and DAS positions had been “politicized” some time ago, Tom Pickering and John Negroponte being the last two FSOs to serve as the A/S.

Q: Looking at it from outside the profession, what difference does it make whether it is Civil Service or Foreign Service?

KINNEY: Well, the two cultures and formation and perspectives are quite different and when the Civil Service takes over, it is for life, so this means that our Foreign Service has ever less experience, interest in, and capability to deal with EST issues (and other “transnational issues”), which will only get more and more important and relevant over time. I think that is ill advised and foolish and frankly not in the country’s interest.

Q: So does this translate in negotiations...

KINNEY: It means that FSOs today do not know any more about climate than what they read in the press, which is hardly an informed source at the geo-strategic level. That is a little bit of an overstatement, but not by much.

Q: Which means the press is done frankly by amateurs.

KINNEY: Worse. Most often, tendentious amateurs, whether from the left or the right. That is true for all the global issues now handled by the “functional bureaus” such as human rights, political military affairs, the econ bureau, etc. The term “functional” dates from the late Seventies and is designed to be dismissive. What they ought to be called are “policy bureaus,” because that is what they do across an astounding array of global issues. Today these bureaus are overwhelmingly Civil Service, which means tenure for life but little movement and broad experience beyond a narrow bureaucratic job function. Because Civil Servants are notoriously poor writers of FS evaluations, that is yet another perverse incentive (along with reduced numbers) keeping FSOs uninformed and out of some of the most important and interesting issues of the day. It is dysfunctional and has produced, in my view, very unfortunate results to the detriment of everybody, especially the State Department as an institution.

Q: NO, but it is an important point to make. Stephanie where did you go after this? When did you leave this job?

KINNEY: Well, my last act in OES, was getting purged just after the successful Bogotá CSD meeting in the summer of ‘93. Shortly after returning from Bogotá, I was called over to the White House to meet with Katie McGinty and Eileen Claussen, who as I

mentioned, would become the OES Assistant Secretary '95 during the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, having moved Eleanor Constable (the incoming A/S in '93) out of her way.

As I said, anybody who had negotiated the Framework Convention was in Eileen's crosshairs, and I made a terrible mistake in a conversation at the White House with her and Katie McGinty. In response to something outlandish Katie said, without thinking I responded "Oh Katie Sweetheart, who do you think..." and I don't remember the rest. It was a misplaced "Southernism;" Katie was a good ol' girl from Tenn. Unfortunately, Eileen was from New York and now worked for the VP. I could feel Eileen bristle like a cat when I spoke to Katie as I did, so I apologized for the use of the "Southernism," which it was. Katie recognized it as a Southernism and dismissed it, but within a week I could feel the knives at my back. Within two weeks, I had confirmed with knowledgeable colleagues that I had best starting looking for an exit. No sense sticking around to get hung.

Fortunately, Jacques Kline was the head of training at the time, and had been pursuing me to go to the War College, which I had wiggled out of when Clyde Taylor had his job. Much as I liked Clyde and school, I felt like I had already done War College after Douglas went there because they are such a damn social and groupie bunch, and God forbid there be any event Douglas and spouse did not show up for!

Well, I was walking the halls and contemplating my uncertain future when I bumped into Jacques. I looked him straight in the eye and said, "Jacques, I am eating crow. I need your help. I've got to find a place to land because I am in the process of being purged by the Administration." He said, "What are you talking about?" I said, "I am sorry I didn't go to the War College like you all wanted. You are right; I should have, but I need to go there now." He said, "Well, I can't send you to the War College now because all the slots have been filled, but I have got X number of new slots for ICAF, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, which is also at Ft. McNair. Would that be of interest?" "Definitely!"

Actually, I liked the ICAF option better because, unlike the War College, which does the geopolitical, ICAF is more focused on economics and political economy, something I knew less about and I knew would only get more important. He said, "OK, come by and see me in about a week." I departed OES and went off to become a member of the ICAF class of '94, a Distinguished Graduate at that.

Q: OK, so we will pick this up next time. This will be '93-'94?

KINNEY: Yes. '93-'94.

Q: We will talk about ICAF. But I am still not quite sure why the "Oh Katy" was such a problem. I mean could you go into it?

KINNEY: It was an excuse. Eileen Claussen picked up the phone and told Eleanor Constable, who was angling to be the next OES A/S, that "the White House" wanted me out. Eleanor was the most senior female Foreign Service Officer in the Department at the

time but asked no questions. (So much for FS Sisterhood!) Eleanor agreed because Eleanor, who was legally blind and deaf by the way but would not admit it to anyone except under duress, wanted to be Assistant Secretary of OES and was well aware of Eileen's power in things environmental. I later became aware of Eleanor's disabilities because of the stories of her last assignment in Nairobi and because she told me about her condition, when I was trying to advise her in a meeting: she explained that she could not hear me nor see the notes I was passing to her. She was not a nice person, but she was a senior female officer who felt entitled and could really cause trouble. Why the Department did not retire her, I will never know, but the men were probably scared of her, plus she was married to a revered older FSO, Peter Constable.

Anyway, I began to sense that someone wanted me gone. I started asking questions and eventually got the full story and background from Buff Bolen, who knew his days were numbered as the current OES A/S (Fred Bernthal's replacement) as soon as the Democrats came in. He had not yet departed, which was why Eleanor was waiting in the wings like some vampire bat. The fact that she was rumored to be replacing Buff, was not reassuring. Buff asked if I knew her? "Well enough, I replied." And he opined that it would be wise for me to move on." I said, "That is what I thought." That was the day I ran into Jacques in the hall and did the deal on ICAF.

Q: Was this an outlook thing because you have said....

KINNEY: Well, there were a number of things. The encounter with Katy was just the excuse that Eileen had been looking for. Reinstein had been purged. They couldn't get rid of Dan Reifsnnyder because he was Civil Service, and I was the next one on the hit list. When I misspoke, it just confirmed all of Eileen's worst image, idea and feelings about me, plus I was pretty and seemed to operate with impunity under Bob --her arch nemesis--and she was frankly an unattractive little Yankee dumpling. Where I'm concerned, that combination has never been good news. If one wanted to find reasons to be upset with me on technicalities and style, it has never been that hard.

What was interesting is that Eleanor actually came to regret that she had been a party to this action to get rid of me. She soon came on as OES Assistant Secretary and seemed to realize that she needed me, especially for the CSD process. Sorry. She actually had some nice words for me at the end and actually said, "I am sorry. I didn't realize you are really quite good." It was too late.

Q: OK, so we will pick it up the next time.

Today is 19 May 2010 with Stephanie Kinney, and where do we go?

KINNEY: I was at a Brookings conference yesterday, which was the most intelligent and heartening conference focused on climate that I have been to.

Q: You are talking about the great Brookings Institution.

KINNEY: Yes, in Washington. I went because I am now teach a graduate seminar on Sustainability and Public Policy. Anyway, the conference suggested that there is serious adult thinking beginning to go on, and there could be a serious shift toward thinking about the issue more in terms of practical matters like energy. It led me to think about “lessons learned” from the UN FCCC. The new U.S. position articulated by Todd Stern, Obama’s new chief negotiator for climate, was entitled “Back to the Future.” One of the things they are going back to in order to go forward is the UN FCCC. Oh my God. Maybe we did something right after all!

.....
Q.: We are talking about what you were doing on climate in this session. What years were you involved in this?

KINNEY: 1989-1993. It is a shame that there is no purposeful “lessons learned” or record and archival process associated with this negotiation or almost any other within the State Department. In my view, it is one of the real failures in leadership and management and intellect. Just another mark of the Department’s decline, among many, I guess. But for a negotiation as far reaching as climate and a process that has gone so horrendously astray, I think it is very important that at some time the “lessons learned” be recorded and the realities of the negotiation -- as opposed to the media’s or the NGO propaganda’s version -- be laid out to clarify the record.

Q: Pick up a little of the spirit of the time. We may have covered it before, but had the lines been drawn so that somehow energy or climate change is connected with big government? If you were on the right part of the political spectrum, who said climate was a bad word, or had it gotten in that far?

KINNEY: No, it hadn’t. One of the serious lessons to be learned is to not be misled by false analogies. The false analogy in the case of climate was the assumption that this issue could/should be framed as an environmental hazard and negotiated the same way as the Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depletion, which was concluded in 1988. The Protocol had been preceded by an intergovernmental preparatory process and the negotiation of a framework agreement -- the Vienna Convention -- and together the two treaties were seen as astoundingly successful in their promise to actually eliminate CFCs and other man-made ozone depleting substances and thereby, over time, reduce the hole in the ozone layer.

The problem with seeking to replicate the Montreal Protocol, however, was that the ozone depleting substances were entirely man made, unlike CO2 and other GHGs most of which have natural as well as man made sources. As a result, the aerosols and other products using ozone depleting substances were definable in quantity and source and were undisputed in the effect they were having on the ozone layer, at least where science was concerned. The problem stemmed from a man-made substance called

chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) (and others), which had been invented in the United States by Dow and DuPont, basically to power aerosols.

Q: This was known as Freon in those days.

KINNEY: Well, Freon is another form of an ozone depleting substance, that is actually an HCFC. You don't want to go there, but forms of fluorocarbons like Freon are used to power air conditioning. Bromide, Bromine, Methyl Bromide are other substances used for preserving vegetables and plants when they are shipped and exported. So there are a number of chemicals and varied uses, but the widest use and the most problematic in the early to mid-80's was aerosols, and the United States became a leader in calling attention to their risks and the health risks associated with a thinning ozone layer.

If you looked at ozone depleting substances as the man-made polluting products they were disturbing Mother Nature, then it is fairly easy to conclude that we should ban the production and get everyone to go along and the problem will go away. The reason we were actually able to this, however, was because DuPont had recognized the problem and come up with viable and affordable CFC substitute. Nonetheless, from the time the danger posed by aerosols and their CFC propellants was identified and their production was stopped was about an eight or ten year process, although the negotiations themselves only lasted a couple of years toward the end of the 80's. EPA played an very important role in the process. Richard Benedict was the lead negotiator for State. The international treaty to ban CFCs was the first agreement of its kind negotiated globally under the auspices of the United Nations, and it was very successful.

U.S. leadership persuaded the rest of the world that CFCs constituted a serious global risk, and we could/should get rid of them in an orderly international way in order to save the global environment. If we did not and continued to deplete the ozone layer, all sorts of bad things would occur, especially a rise in skin cancer, not to mention the continued expansion of the large hole opening over the Antarctic that was observable and measurable. Proof of the need for action.

Successful international problem solving on ozone inspired international coverage and interest in this rather arcane issue. When the negotiations of the Montreal Protocol finished, a lot of the same people who had been involved in the ozone process thought they had the answer to the next big issue--"global warming!" There had been three terrifically hot summers in the middle of the '80s, indeed the hottest recorded to date. It seemed logical, I suppose, to leap to the conclusion that if greenhouse gases were the culprit, especially CO₂, countries just needed to eliminate or reduce GHG emissions, the same as they had CFCs.

I've already commented on the various interests that converged to promote climate change as an urgent global issue. At the UN both Mostafa Tolba as President of UNEP and Maurice Strong behind the scenes had been intimately involved in the Montreal Process. Both were men of tremendous energy, great vision, confidence, assertion, and determination to go on to bigger and better things. And in the wake of Montreal,

believing it utterly possible and appropriate for the UN to take on the next big challenge “global warming” became the next target, never mind that 15 years earlier the urgent issue had been “global cooling.” But that got lost because memories are short and bureaucrats and leaders come and go.

Tiny little Malta, like all small countries looking for a way to distinguish itself, was probably the country most responsible for putting global warming on the UN agenda. Why might you ask? God Knows. All sorts of weird things have come out of Malta. This was the latest little country looking for a big profile. Among other things, it was an island, and it had looked at the basic science and said, “Ooops, not good for islands.” Malta had some very talented, long-standing UN operatives and ambassadors. Unlike the US, the rest of the world sends their very best and most practiced to the United Nations, and they generally encourage them to stay and cultivate relationships and thereby a power base.

Taking a page from the Montreal playbook, the UN initiated a preparatory process by establishing the IPCC under the auspices of WMO (World Meteorological Organization) and UNEP. The IPCC was composed of three different committees, including climate science and response strategies. I think the third was adaptation but don’t really remember now. The idea was to use the IPCC to build the case and prepare for the negotiation. Through the IPCC process you would also form a group of people who are already familiar with the issue and the lingo and each other and would, therefore, be better equipped to negotiate successfully.

There was just one or two problems everyone seemed to overlook, at least from my perspective. One, although the environment could benefit from addressing climate change, to really address it you had to focus not on environment but on energy. Two, greenhouse gasses are nothing like CFCs, which are only man-made and utterly accountable chlorofluorocarbons. GHGs are both natural and man made. They are a collection of gases, which are very different in character, weight and lag time in the atmosphere. And in general, they are very much harder to monitor and account for. (Witness there is still no agreement in 2010!)

The science on ozone depletion was clearer and more advanced than was climate science when the FCCC negotiations began. Global warming was a long standing theory, which nobody has ever really disputed. The paleontological record clearly demonstrates that periods of intense warming have come and gone. The conceptual leap and the crux of the debate was whether the man-made (as opposed to natural) emissions of CO₂ and other GHGs were now causing warming and, if so, how could you tell what was due to Mother Nature and her geological cycles and what was attributable to anthropogenic GHG emissions since essentially the 1950’s when fossil fuel based industrialization expanded and intensified in earnest.

Before anyone knew it, the UN process was driving both the issue and the negotiation, complete with a clear action-forcing deadline of June 1992 for delivery to the UNCED in Rio of a “global warming treaty.” Once things get a head of steam up and create concern

and a sense of urgency, and negotiators and NGOs from over 140 countries start traveling and getting regular shots of adrenalin-filled negotiating sessions, the process is very hard to stop. Whoever says process doesn't matter, has never seen good process at work.

Q: You say "process driven;" what do you mean by that?

KINNEY: Process is how you accomplish something rather than what you accomplish. I distinguish between process and product. I am a great believer in process. If you get the process right, you have a better than even chance of getting the right product. For example, if you have a negotiation that is very complex with multiple interests, but you have as negotiators at the table a representative of only one of those interests, the chance is pretty small that the other seven interests in the negotiation will be properly represented and balanced in the final agreement. If, however you have a process whereby all of those interests or stake holders are represented and appropriately engaged, you probably have a much better product coming out of this negotiation process, one that has engaged on the necessary realities and interests involved. You probably have a much better solution to whatever the problem is. So, how you do things can be as important as what you do, because the former determines the latter.

When how you do things (your process) becomes so complex that it begins to overwhelm the issue or the product itself, however, you have problems. This is essentially what has happened, in my view, in climate, and the inevitable fatigue has begun setting in. We saw the numbers of people and committees and meetings and task forces and hangers on (mostly NGOs) begin to really expand in the early 90's, and it has only gotten worse over the last 20 years. In the early 90's, the issue was still esoteric, a matter of limited representatives from states to address in the traditional multilateral conference diplomacy mode. There were officially recognized, UN-certified NGOs, both from the private sector and the environmental sector. We affectionately referred to them as "tree huggers" and "smoke stackers," but in 1990, they could all fit in a small break-out meeting room. Five years later, you had to have a conference room to hold them.

Among my many duties, in addition to Mr. Gore, I was in charge of managing NGOs, which in those days could actually be managed by one person. We tried at one point to bring them together for efficiency's sake, but they would not sit in the same room with each other, so we had to have separate briefings for the greens and the private sector business types. The latter included oil, nuclear, renewables, Chamber of Commerce, small business, and professional association groups, all of the people, who after they really focused on the issue, said, "Yikes, you are talking about making a major, dramatic transformation of the U.S. economy. Nobody knows about this negotiation, and you all are diplomats and politicians, not economists or energy experts and what the hell do you think you are doing? We are not going to let this happen in the dark!"

On the NGO side, you had every green true believer from the most radical and whacked out beyond Greenpeace, to the more responsible like Sierra Club, World Wildlife, Audubon, Resources for the Future, the Environmental Defense Fund, Natural Resources Defense Council and the Union of Concerned Scientists. This last group was a totally

sold out by a bunch of left of center scientific propagandists headed up by Alden Myers, who is still talking to the press and pushing his climate product twenty years later. Climate has become a “jobs program” for many of these organizations and characters.

We had to manage these people because all of a sudden everyone wanted a piece of the action. This was new work, new fund raising, and an interesting activity that gave them the excuse to travel all over the world to all these meetings. In the early 90's, we only had to deal with maybe somewhere around 25 to 40 business types and maybe 50 to 75 environmental organizations. How many were there in Copenhagen? 40,000. Unfortunately, climate NGOs have become an industry.

Q: Well as you started this, two questions. One, with this thing you were there sort of at the beginning. Did you and your small circle have a big villain, I mean the smoke stackers.” Did you see a problem?

KINNEY: No.

Q: I am talking about that, and the other one is did you realize what this thing was going to cost as far as the way it is going on?

KINNEY: We were aware that we had been asked to take on an issue that, if it had an analog, would not be ozone but more like the Law of the Sea Treaty because of its breadth, depth and multifaceted dimensions. George Bush surprised and outraged many on the business side of the republican Party when he suddenly legitimized global warming and climate change as a negotiable issue, a move really necessitated by his desire to be “the Environmental President.” It was also a way to keep the environmental issue front and center within Eastern Europe, where local pollution issues provided a perfect cover for grass roots organizing without ostensible political implications for a failing Soviet Union.

I think last week we talked about the EC/EU factor and how the issue served its interests, so I won't repeat that.

If you think about it, environmental policy of any kind necessarily requires a more integrative/cross boundary approach to more narrow policy and power sectors as defined by our essentially 1940s-1960's institutional infrastructure. Remember, the U.S. had no EPA until 1972, and most environmental ministries in the developed world were younger than that. Most “third world” countries still did not have them or had them in name only by 1990, witness that most sent Foreign Ministry staff to the negotiations. Significantly, the EC was represented by its Environment Commissioner and most member states sent both Foreign Ministry and Environment Ministry members as their heads of delegation or some combination thereof.

Q: It was a bureaucratic dream.

KINNEY: Yes. And the physical science interests were aching for their day in the sun, after the Star Wars emphasis of the Reagan years. And, unlike today, with the Republican administration of that time, science and studying the problem was both a constructive and an acceptable path for taking action without upsetting the business sector of the Republican Party too much. It was also a useful way of “signaling” that people had better start paying attention because this was not going to be an issue easily wished away, no matter how much specific uncertainty remained about the science, the impacts, the economics, the climate computer models and all the rest.

The money started flowing back into the natural sciences via the universities and government related agencies. Agriculture was also a beneficiary, one because of its sensitivity to climate change and two because of Republican political constituencies. And what most people did not observe or have any reason to grasp or understand is that while “the environment” was the public face of the issue and the focus of propaganda and rhetoric, the real issue at the heart of all this was not the environment. It was energy.

What the issue really demanded and was pointing to was a fundamental shift from a high carbon intensity to a low carbon intensity economy. And that, in 1990, was pretty radical, wild stuff. And 20 years ago, this was little understood, less grasped and certainly not articulated in those terms because “saving the environment” was the frame of the day. As a result, one of the things the Republican administration did was to go out and look for the most experienced trade and energy negotiator it could find in the U.S. government. They found him in Robert Reinstein, who had done numerous trade and energy, particularly nuclear with Canada, negotiations.

Q: Is he any relation to John Reinstein?

KINNEY: Yes, he is John Reinstein’s son.

Q: John Reinstein for years was the head of our economic bureau. We have an interview with him.

KINNEY: You should track down his son and force him to do his oral history because it exists no place else. I was a junior member of a triad. Bob was the chief negotiator. Dan Reifsnnyder was a civil servant who had been long-serving in OES and just happened to be pulled over to the “no name office.” I was this FSO who had never been engaged in an international negotiation and knew nothing about climate change, but I knew it was a big and coming issue and that it would be interesting. I always wanted to do “global issues,” and boy this was a global issue of the first order. Why not start at the top? But I was the least experienced of what turned out to be the three State negotiators.

Climate was an amazing learning experience for me. But, in retrospect, I was also able to play something of a Madame Defarge (Tale of Two Cities) because I started out doing essentially an Executive Officer (EO) function, which was more operational than substantive, given the unending number of meetings and events in which we were involved. This sheer operational burden soon required us to start bringing on more staff

so that we had to juggle both substantive policy challenges and organizational management challenges at the same time, and God knows Reinstein wanted nothing to do with the latter, so that pretty much fell to Dan and me.

After the US hosted IPCC meeting in Jan. of 1990 and the first FCCC negotiating session, which the US hosted in Chantilly, Va. at the brand new Westfields Conference Center, we had a pretty experienced and humming organizational infrastructure. At that point, the real attention shifted more to the substantive negotiating process, both within the USG and with the other 180 countries eventually involved. By that time, our team had a pretty clear list of which countries really mattered and how we would need to prioritize our efforts, resources and time.

About this time, I came up with concept that Bob latched on to and wanted to use for the heart of our position on the technology transfer issue. So this became my little baby over time and ended up in Article 4.1 b and c of the treaty commitments on action plans and cooperation on technology transfer. In short, the USG position called for Technology Cooperation based on action plans and voluntary partnerships of mutual benefit or something close to that. The point was to move as far away as possible from the developing country call for “guaranteed and free technology transfer.”

The fact that we had somebody who knew something about science (Bob’s background was in physics), numbers (math), energy and multilateral trade agreements and issues made all the difference in the world. He had also participated in the Montreal Protocol to some degree and clearly understood the difference with climate, something the EPA types in that agreement did not, especially Eileen Claussen, whose undying enmity he eventually won, as she was edged out of the process. Under Reinstein’s guidance, as I said, from the beginning we did not approach this as an environmental negotiation because you can’t really negotiate Mother Nature; you can’t really negotiate “the environment.” There is no real there, there. At that level, what you can negotiate are realistic national energy interests. And that is essentially how we approached it and what we did.

Q: You know you are saying this, but here you are talking about a small group within the State department. You have got all this. The European Union is trying to get going. I mean, could you get them to go along?

KINNEY: No, we never made it. In private talks, we would try our best to make people aware of the fact that fundamentally you had to look to people’s energy interests and patterns of production and consumption and national politics. Countries are different. They have different resources, different history, different geography etc. But national differentiation was not something Brussels was interested in at that time, au contraire. What Brussels needed was further subjugation of member state national sovereignty, not the reverse.

You’ll recall the CIA’s Energy Economics, Production and Consumption Patterns chart we started out with. We knew who the Dirty Dozen were and why and the economics

behind it, and that pretty much told you what the game would be. I remember the afternoon Bob and Dan and I first studied it and Bob said, in effect, “OK, this is going to tell us what the negotiation is really about and what we are going to have to do. Don’t take your eyes off of it.” It turned out to be really about eight countries that were absolutely required, but it gave one a very different sense of what was at stake here than did the hysterical environmental perspective, which tended to be “Help! The world is coming to an end if we don’t stop global warming tomorrow!!” It also showed the business sector message for what it was-- resistance to government regulation and any change in current comfortable status quo. Strategic messages aimed at future problems are rarely welcomed in the short term. Over time, the really smart money started doing their own analysis and studies and started moving on their own rather than waiting for the U.S. government to get its act together and provide clear, strategic and purposeful policy leadership.

Q: Including China and India.

KINNEY: Yeah, I think we went over that last week, so let’s don’t do that again. Suffice it to say, China is now beating us at what should have been our game, alternative and cleaner energy technology and market development.

Knowing I was coming back today for another round on climate, yesterday. I made a list of ten lessons I learned from the FCCC negotiations:

- 1) Be conscious of the historical moment. In this case, the bust up of the USSR, the further integration and deepening of the EU and the U.S. interests in both of those events and how climate happened along in that moment.
- 2) Get the frame right. The frame should have been energy in my view, not environment, but that is not the way the larger context played out.
- 3) Be careful of false analogies. Montreal Protocol was simple, persuasive, and has nothing to do with climate. For one reason in addition to the multiple gasses, what is the largest greenhouse CO-2 component? It is water vapor. We can only model about 3% of the climate dynamic on all these computer models (maybe more now) that have come to be “Gods truth” as promoted by the modelers and the scientists behind them, but still they can’t model clouds.
- 4) Don’t dismiss outlyers-- people who don’t think like the herd-- out of hand. Listen to them--whether they are right or wrong, they are telling you something about the politics of the process.
- 5) Beware of klieg-light science. Science, I learned, is not always about the search for truth. I always thought it was. I was horrified to see what scientists do when confronted with klieg lights, television cameras, international travel and first class hotels and what was for them celebrity status. They are as corruptible as the rest of us, and there were one or two on the IPCC science committee

Q: On what science committee?

KINNEY: The Science Committee of the International Panel on Climate Change.

Q: Well did you find at a certain point as you looked around the negotiating table you were able to see people with all the science on them and say, "Well, this is a coal lobbyist?"

KINNEY: Yes. We are all human beings, and in the final analysis, there are very few people at the table who do not have a rather narrow, vested interest, which is another reason and another "lesson."

6) With a complicated negotiation, that necessarily involves both international and domestic interests and contests, the State Department has to be in charge, because it is the only agency without, if you will, a special domestic interest at stake unlike DOE or DOC or EPA or Agriculture.

Q: They can always be labeled as "selling out."

KINNEY: Yes, and I guess that is why State is so often stuck with that charge. We are really the only ones who could look at the whole picture and say OK, out of this whole mess, where does the greatest U.S. interest lie and why?

Q: Well, you could come up with something, but basically State Department people aren't trained to figure out scientifically where do interests lie.

KINNEY: In the final analysis, this is not really a scientific issue. It is not science that is being negotiated, it is national interests as currently (and note I say currently) understood and perceived. Science has nothing to do with the negotiations per se. Science is foreplay. Science is a predicate. Science gives you the legitimacy you are seeking to redraw the power equation. That is why it is so dangerous to get scientists involved in political processes: in the end, it will always be about politics (power) and that which is feasible, at least in my view.

It is very hard to stay virginal in this business. That is why you need to use negotiators with international history and experience, not NGOs to do your negotiating. I would argue that one of the reasons we got into trouble in Kyoto was we had two former NGOs (at the DAS level) or EPA types (A/S) taking over the reins of the negotiations. Not good. Lost sight of the fact it was about energy, and that is a very different kind of power equation with very different short and longer term interests.

To continue with my lessons learned list:

7) When dealing with the UN make sure that everyone in the delegation and responsible for decision making speaks UN English (UN Speak) and history. If you are not deeply steeped in UN English and history you don't understand the code. We had some egregious examples of that.

Q: Well, can you give an example of that?

KINNEY: I referred to this earlier. An example of that was Debra O'Dell, the young officer who was expediently sent to New York and told it was ok to agree to "new and additional resources." The phrase is used in the FCCC but note how carefully it is conditioned. The G-77 needed it to save face, so we gave it to them, but made very clear the conditions required to qualify for any of it.

8) Be clear about the sequence and the links among your parallel negotiations at the international and domestic levels. Remember that this is not just an international negotiation with international sub groups of interests, but it was also a domestic negotiation with a totally different set of interest sub-groups and politics both within the USG and also, of course, the private sector body politic.

There is never a clear, single U.S. interest domestically. For example, each government agency and bureaucratic fiefdom fought for its constituency and interest as they were perceived. You also had the media, always looking for a leak and a story to sell their product. Then you had the NGOs, on the left and the right, tree-huggers and smoke stackers, "free and unaccountable" American citizens, and they both had to be managed. And they were not as out of control in those days as they have become with the information revolution. The FCCC was really pre-IT revolution. It has only gotten worse and more complicated.

Q: Stephanie, it just occurred to me you were mentioning the various interest groups, as I recall one of the contributors to greenhouse gasses and all were cows letting methane.

KINNEY: Bovine flatulence.

Q: Was there anyone representing the cow fartiers or not?

KINNEY: That was one of the many reasons we had the US Department of Agriculture well represented on the delegation. In fact, their guy Gary was one of the best--smart, thoughtful, constructive, happy to cough up resources when needed and genuinely concerned about finding the best path forward for the interest of farmers and the environment and the economics at play. He was from the research arm of USDA, and he had lots of money. State had no money for this process. I think I mentioned last week how on very short notice and no budgetary planning, Dan and I had to raise a million and a half dollars in order to finance the first FCCC negotiating session out in Chantilly which was going to be...

Q: Chantilly, Virginia.

KINNEY: Yes. The session the USG hosted. (In negotiations, since the UN rarely has funds for such, it turns to member states to pick up the tab for major negotiating sessions that are not held at USUN or Geneva or in Nairobi.) In this case, President Bush was asserting U.S. leadership by making the first negotiating session here. Let me finish my "lessons learned."

9) The process of negotiating itself slowly changes things, and it also starts changing the facts on the ground. This is very important, more important than it seems for long-term negotiations. Let me give you some examples. The negotiators and the interests very quickly get entrenched and institutionalized, particularly regarding certain personalities. Ten years later they can still be negotiating the world as it was ten years before. But the issue, the knowledge, the personalities, the political conditions, indeed the economics themselves very often move on.

Q: Well, you are really talking about particularly something of this nature where change was the name of the game anyway.

KINNEY: Exactly. When we started out, there was hardly a developing country in the world that had an Environmental Ministry. All of these countries had negotiators from their Foreign Ministries. As I said, they thought “environment” was a Western plot to keep them barefoot and pregnant and deprive them of the right to develop.

By the mid-to late 90’s they may have been weak and clearly still not major power brokers within their own governments, but you started seeing that almost every major developing country was establishing and beginning to build up Environmental Ministry. This means that they had a Minister and his/her people were usually technocrats. Technocrats are usually a lot easier to deal with than politicians in negotiations. They are educated in a different way. These Environment Ministries may be weak and some notoriously corrupt where enforcement is concerned (India, for example), but they can only grow and get better over time, at least one hopes so. The same thing with science and technology. I think I mentioned last week one of the little quirky factoids of this early experience was that OES had the first in effect international E-Mail in the State Department in our office, thanks to the National Science Foundation.

So be aware of how much things are changing and why they are changing, even as the negotiating process remains comfortably the same. People who have made this their life’s work have sort of forgotten that this is not the same world as it was in 1990 or 1995 or indeed in 2000 or 2005. It is a hazard.

10) Beware of institutionalizing passé interests to everyone’s detriment. That is a reference to the degree to which “climate” has now become an industry and people’s careers, people’s jobs, organizations fund raising ability depend on it, so they don’t really want it to be solved. They don’t want it to go away. Avoid creating a business or an industry based on the issue. I think that is one of the worst things we have done with the climate issue, to the detriment of the issue. Anybody who looked at the images coming out of Copenhagen in 2009 could not possibly take this issue seriously.

Q: You might just tell about Copenhagen.

KINNEY: I am sorry. My reference is to the most recent Conference of the Parties, which was held in Copenhagen in December, the end of 2009. It was a disaster. It was a very

embarrassing public failure and both the Secretary of State and the President of the United States were involved.

Actually, as a personal matter, I happen to think there is quite a lot of value in that very short Copenhagen Accord that President Obama negotiated. There are three concepts in it that have never been put on the table before, which in the climate context are “revolutionary.” One is the concept of an objective of a low carbon intensive economy. That is a new phrase, and agreed to by multiple parties. The second is verification and monitoring, in other words it is about verifiable and accountable deeds, including in development countries. That has never been in there before. Transparency has never been in Climate-speak there before. Developing countries didn’t want to have it because they want to have the money and do what they want with it, mostly send it to Swiss Banks.

The climate process, which now started 20 years ago, has become unmanageable. Dan Reifsnnyder, my erstwhile OES Civil Servant colleague from 1990, has recently become the Chairman of the COP, the Jean Ripert of twenty years ago. Some may say that he offers continuity and experience, all of which is true, but that can also be a liability. The head of the Union of Concerned Scientists, Alden Myers, is still doing the same globe trotting, irrelevant and unhelpful and frankly unimaginative left of center complaining to the press he was doing in 1992. Because these are entrenched personal and business interests-- whether they are non-profit NGOs or not -- they have a vested interest in the status quo. In my view, we need to get NGO’s of all ilks under control and keep them away from the serious business. We need to avoid corrupting our scientists with self interest, and frankly avoid deluding ourselves about the sanctity of the issue and the process.

Q: Well in the first place, how is this thing. You are in a small, often neglected bureau running these negotiations which have momentous possible consequences. But how did the State Department from the Secretary of State on down treat you all?

KINNEY: In the early 90’s, climate change was for all intents and purposes an unknown, unrecognized and by most accounts irrelevant issue. One of the tragic things that has happened, among many in the State Department, in my view, are the perverse incentives, lack of leadership, imagination, and vision that caused the Foreign Service to restrict and focus itself ever more on just bilateral relations and the geographic bureaus. The result has been that the so-called functional bureaus, which are actually more appropriately named policy bureaus because that is what they do, have been turned over to Civil Servants, who were narrow gauged “technical experts” supposedly, but really just long-term-in-the-job domestic bureaucrats.

This is not to say that there aren’t some brilliant ones. Dan Reifsnnyder is an example of a brilliant, dedicated, accomplished, magnificent public Civil Servant. But he is more the exception than the rule. OES in the mid 80’s, when Tom Pickering and Negroponte were Assistant Secretaries, was 60% Foreign Service. Today it is less than 20% Foreign Service. As I mentioned, I was the only FSO, the only U.S. diplomatic service officer, in the entire negotiation until way late in the game when we found a young officer, Jeff

Miotke, who we brought on board. To my knowledge Jeff and Melinda Kimble are the only other FSO's with experience in climate, which is criminal and inexcusable for our diplomatic service, And Melinda has been retired for some years. There have probably been some JOs brought in as the FS has gained more positions in recent years, but it is by accident, not purposeful, I'm sure.

This situation is an uncaring, DOS perverse incentive management problem, not a climate problem. The reason FSOs don't serve in OES--and thereby do not acquire expertise in its array of compelling and fascinating global issues, is because they don't want civil servants writing their OERs and OES does not control the overseas EST positions, the regional bureaus do. Most FSOs relish the thought of working on serious policy issues, which is all the global policy bureaus (the so-called functional bureaus) do now. However, because State's leadership and lingo and the FS Act of 1980 are all so out of date or unknowledgeable and caring about the institution vs. the foreign policy, the institution has become an increasingly domestic Civil Service bureaucracy at home.

Q: Well OK, but if you are saying foreign service officers were more sort of going after the sexy career enhancing things.

KINNEY: The incentives were and have remained such that they favor the bilateral, not the multilateral issues and diplomacy.

Q: OK, so what difference does it make whether you have Civil Servants or at least don't have those particular, they learn their multi lateral job and stay on the job.

KINNEY: What distinguishes the FS and CS cultures is not only the way by which they join the Department and get practically (if randomly) trained by the Department but also the breadth of their know-how and experience--broad and interlinked field and Headquarters versus deep but narrow domestic functions. Both systems are woefully out of synch with modern reality and requirements in my view, but that is another topic all together.

Practically what happens, if you take OES as an example, is the following: CS staff is brought on board on the theory that a given position requires "technical expertise" something that a "generalist" FSO might not have. This was a canard when it was promoted in the DOS culture back in the 80's and remains so today. The reality is that "deep technical expertise" is rarely needed in State's work, and if it is, there is the whole USG on which to draw for a given meeting, issue or what have you.

However, when the FS is starved for positions (such as in the early 1990's when Sec. Baker decided that we would staff the 20+ new embassies created in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union with "no new resources"), there are always hundreds of people who want to work in a given office in the State Department, get to travel the world but live safely at home and work only 9-5 like good bureaucrats. And the more positions that are allowed to be designated "technical" because it is some issue some fossilized FSO doesn't understand and would himself be afraid to tackle, the more positions were

and continue to be turned over to the CS. Also involved in this dance is the increasing politicization of the Department and its leadership, now even to the Office Director level, and ALL of these people (and their “friends”) are Civil Servants.

Anyway, once one has obtained a Civil Service designation at State, one pretty much has it for life and people tend to stay in one job forever rather than gather the experience one does by moving around and through cultural regions and substantive issues, usually with some linkages and logic among them. This sort of experience always helps one see and exploit connecting the dots much better than experience based on long-term, narrow technical expertise.

State’s job is basically about power politics, not technical expertise. A more useful officer for State would be someone with experience in several Latin American countries and their linguistic counterparts in Europe and Africa doing energy, economics, and a range of environment issues as opposed to someone who is a singular expert on forest management. State just really doesn’t need many “tree people” to negotiate biodiversity and endangered species issues. Once on board, however, the narrow expert does not want to leave and certainly does not want to go back to the Department of the Interior or EPA. So the CS accretes over time, at the expense of the FS, and the FS becomes less broadly well-versed and knowledgeable about 21st century issues than it is about 20th century modes and priorities. Thoughtless and sad.

Q: Well how long were you in OES?

KINNEY: From ’89 to ’93, the first time. I didn’t do climate exclusively. I did climate exclusively until we negotiated the treaty, and then I got into the Copenhagen amendment to the Montreal protocol and several other treaty processes or international organizations involving long-range pollution, persistent organic pollutants(POPs), GATT and OECD, plus the U.N. Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD)

Q: For example, obviously the vice president, during the four years you were doing, what was Al Gore’s role, and how did you feel.

KINNEY: I think I covered that last week, and I probably don’t need to go over it again. His role was as an interested U.S. Senator. My view of him was that he is someone with whom we had to have respect, but we had to keep him under control because he was nutty on the subject, and dangerous.

Q: What about the bureaucratic battles? Could State hold its own?

KINNEY: We did very well, actually, not to toot our own horn too much. Maybe we should do that more often. We ran an honest process, and we were noted, and I think highly respected, for it because we really didn’t have any objective but to get to the right kind of “Yes.”

Q: Was there any dispute about the right kind of “Yes?”

KINNEY: To some degree. If you were on the far right side of the business community, you didn't want any "yes." If you were on the left side of the environmental community, the idea of having a Framework Convention rather than "specific targets and timetables" constituted a moral failure. So in a sense, the right "yes" for us was a "yes" with which nobody was entirely happy but one that would pull us forward in a desirable direction, which in our mind, was ever greater commitment to a lower-carbon economy and the innovative technologies that would necessarily undergird it. If anybody was too happy with us, we were probably overlooking a balance point. We were probably not asking ourselves the right questions or thinking something through carefully enough.

"Beware of the law of unintended consequences" should probably be another item on the lessons learned list. When people get wrapped up in power games of the moment and their solutions, one of the biggest problems is the unintended consequences of their solutions. They don't think down the line. They don't think it through. There is nothing in the system that forces them to do that. We happened to have a group of people at State who forced that issue, and so we were able to shade and shape compromises by running a very honest, reason based, and where we could, logical process.

Q: When you say "honest", what do you mean by that in the context?

KINNEY: By "honest" I mean giving all interests an fair hearing and 2) whether in the domestic or international arena, getting down in private to those things that could not be said in public for whatever series of reasons, e.g. so and so is a sold-out, corrupt idiot, or this demand is absolutely beyond our "redline." Your public statements are one thing, but what is really your bottom line? That sort of thing.

Q: During this time the Secretary of State was...

KINNEY: The Secretary of State when we started was Jim Baker, and when Clinton came in it was Warren Christopher. But during the FCCC, it was basically Jim Baker. Jim Baker could not have cared less about climate change because he was trying to close out the Soviet Union and re-unify Germany, which to his credit he did, and in his spare time he was also trying to make progress on the Israel-Palestine peace front. He had his hands full with other things. The person that he delegated climate to is now the President of the World Bank, Bob Zoellick He was C, the Counselor for the department. He was the head of Fannie Mae after he left the State Department. Brilliant trade negotiator and economist. Really knows his stuff. Cold as a fish. Hard, scary businessman. Zoellick was our "7th Floor Minder" in the Department, but the real minder was John Sununu, in the White House. When he left, the job went to Clayton Yeutter, who was brought back. He and Bob knew each other from previous work, which was helpful, and Yeutter was in charge when we got down to the "end game."

Q: Well, I think maybe this is the time to come up to how did the final deal come out?

KINNEY: The final deal was the Framework Convention which means you had agreed on terms of reference, definitions, the objective of the Treaty, commitments and follow-

up in pursuit of that goal, future organization (an annual Conference of the Parties) and process, financing, dispute resolution, etc. You had agreed on how you were going to deal with the issue going forward, and it was designed to make clear that you WOULD go forward. Anyone interested can Google the treaty itself.

Because the Europeans and all the environmentalists wanted specific and legally binding “CO2 targets and timetables,” we settled on non-binding goals and objectives. Oh, there was another very important principle in play put on the table by the EC and that was the “precautionary principle.” Under this principle, which within their legal system had no bite, if there was any chance of disaster happening, you were obliged to take precautionary action before the fact, not in the fact.

Europe’s Napoleonic code tradition operates on very lofty principles highly subject to interpretation in a given instance, rather than the more well defined precedents so important in our more common law legal system. They have magistrates, for example, rather than juries as we do.

This difference between Code and Common Law legal traditions can really cause problems for the US in treaty making processes because our system of check and balances and evidence is sooooo different and sooo much more accountable, generally speaking. Anyway, it took almost three years, but the solution to Europe’s demand to enshrine the “Precautionary Principle” into U.S. law was to embrace a non-binding “precautionary approach.” Again, one size does not fit all, especially with a bunch of U.S. lawyers either in the room or waiting for us outside.

This is probably something I need to my “lessons learned” list. Anybody who is going into a global negotiation needs to be given a cram course on the fundamentals of international law and then the differences between Napoleonic Code law, which most of Europe and Latin America and many other countries practice, and the British-derived “common law” tradition.

Another item would be the importance of keeping in mind the difference between our federalist system with its separation of powers and everyone else’s parliamentary-based systems, which do not have such. Europeans can make bad laws, ignore them, sweep them under the carpet and no one cares. In the United States if we make ourselves subject to a law and then don’t follow it, we can get our ass sued by the first upstart NGO who wants to take us to court and force the issue or the first state that feels the federal government has overstepped its bounds. Europeans did not and continue to not understand this. I spent more time explaining these differences and realities to them.

Our own NGOs very often would get wrapped up in the gauzy European vision of targets and timetables. Some of them were quite intentional about it because it would make court cases over interpretation easier to bring forward. Many would welcome the opportunity to make the country do the right thing through the courts. Others were just poorly educated about their own country and clueless.

This stuff is important, and we don't prepare our diplomats or FSOs in any way shape or form to do it. As an institution, State is not intentional about the professional formation of its diplomatic service. At best, it offers, random short-term training, unlike many other benchmark services.

Q: Is a better way? Could the Foreign Service Institute have any way to pass these things on?

KINNEY: Yes but the Institute is not interested nor inclined. Not their priority. It too has become essentially a Civil Service training institute and remediation center for employees who do not really know how to write and conduct themselves properly, whether at the support level or the management level.

Do you know how they teach negotiations? Right now it is in the hands of a sweet 20-something with a new degree in "conflict management," practically straight out of college. She means well but has never served the first minute in the fox hole. And up until a year or so ago, they were still teaching negotiations the same way I was taught in the now abolished Mid-Level course in 1981. I wasn't really taught; I was given three days or something of role playing under a man named Tom Colossi from the labor union arbitration board and all the "negotiations" were labor-management, factory floor based!!! What a bunch of pathetic inattention and adult irresponsibility toward the next generation. Criminal absolutely criminal. You guys (speaking to two interns in the room) ought to be screaming for your own special Masters in Diplomatic Studies paid for by the State Department as part of your required formation in the first five to seven years designed to get you prepared for the world you have to go into. I am speaking as a FSO right now.

Q: We have two interns taking conflict resolution courses in college _____

KINNEY: But negotiating legal traditions is part and parcel of negotiating global treaties. I need to go back and add five more lessons learned now that I think about it, to my list. I have lost my train of thought now.

Q: Well we were talking about the final result.

KINNEY: Oh the final result, yeah. Best to just read the Treaty than have me rehash it. We had required Country Studies to establish a GHG emissions inventory or baseline and then follow up action plans and annual reports which were due in order to get each party actively engaged on the issue. This was to initially only apply to the Annex A, developed countries. We were expected to first show good faith and set an example for others hopefully to follow at some point in the future.

The Bush administration actually took the Country Study process very much to heart. They put Bob Grady in charge of it. Bob called me maybe a month before we even ratified to start work on it. We were the second or third country to ratify, but we didn't ratify, I think, until September or so. I got a call from the White house in July. Bob says,

“I understand you are the person behind this Country Study stuff. Can you come over and brief me on it? I did and then he took it up from there. State didn’t have the money or the resources and our office certainly didn’t have the authority to make people do this in other agencies, so it was a White House led activity.

Our U.S. report was really beautiful, really good, and we set a good example for everyone else to follow. The idea was that you would first raise people’s consciousness, get them to develop a strategy for reducing emissions within their national conditions. But because it would be public and all of the work behind it would be transparent, there would be a certain honor to be defended in making your actions match your words.

Notwithstanding the agreed language in the Treaty, technology transfer remained a huge issue. This was another one of those secret code phrases that as I explained earlier, really dated back to the UNCTAD negotiations of the 1970’s, and damn if you didn’t hear it again in Copenhagen last December. Developing countries continue to believe that if you just give them the technology, they would be developed. Balderdash then; balderdash now. But it is what happens when you get into a political arena where rhetoric takes over.

Basically, the FCCC tried to lay down a process into which was built a modicum of accountability as a condition for either cooperation on technology or finance. Developing countries hate conditionality because they want you to just give it to them. If you just gave them money and just gave them technology, viola they would be developed tomorrow. From their perspective, the fact that you won’t give them either for free is what has left them in the situation they are in. Pathetic but that ideological strain is still out there and will still take time to lay to rest. Compared to twenty years ago? It is not as strong and broadly evident as it used to be. Countries and cultures ARE maturing.

Dispute resolution was a very dicey thing. Lurking behind this issue that we haven’t talked about were the implications for free international trade versus “green protectionism.” The GATT was still in effect while we were doing the FCCC, but GATT consistency was something that both the Euro and the developing countries paid light attention to. The US was constantly on patrol for inconsistencies with GATT.

Q: GATT being...

KINNEY: General Agreement on Tariff and Trade. Today it is the WTO, the World Trade Organization. Again there were multiple interests that saw environment as a way to either change GATT or get around GATT or undermine GATT because GATT is a rules-based agreement, as the WTO is. If you don’t play by the rules and everybody doesn’t play by the rules, it doesn’t work. Hence, everybody is always angling for new benefits in one setting that can then be taken as precedent in another, e.g. climate and GATT.

The international trade regime (GATT) was another issue thread running through the climate process. Environmental issues were relatively new to the trade regime set up after

World War II. This regime had not until very recently had to deal with any of these issues coming out of the environment sector.

As a parenthesis here, central to climate, is whole concept of the Tragedy of the Commons. The Commons are those resources such as air and water that nobody owns. The oceans, the sky, the rivers, the waters, the wetlands, large swaths of forest or wildlands not effectively “owned” by anyone are therefore resources or assets not taken care of by anybody. In this case, the climate is one of those “unowned” and ungoverned or unregulated assets. There were no rules for climate, so it could be exploited with impunity, just like the oceans, until fish stocks started collapsing, for example. Then countries dependent on those stocks began to figure out that it might be better to try and manage them rather than destroy them for everyone.

Property rights usually carry rules and responsibilities with them in the form of law. When you start trying to make rules that are going to govern or condition an asset like “climate,” which has never been subject to such, you end up running into the rules-based institutions that are already out there but had never dreamed in a hundred years of having to deal with something like climate change. Another one of the delicious complexities of the issue.

Dispute resolution works very well in GATT because the issues involved are very concrete and accountable--steel, textiles, shoes, etc. People were very reluctant to go too far and get themselves too far ahead on dispute resolution in this climate treaty because of the implications it could have for free trade and vice versa. So the dispute resolution section in the FCCC was very carefully drawn and artfully made.

Back to the analog with Montreal Protocol. Another reason that this was a Framework Agreement was based on the ozone model, which started with a Framework and then ratcheted up commitment with the Montreal Protocol and then subsequent amendments to that document. So the FCCC was envisioned as a framework agreement that would eventually be supported by numerous subsidiary protocols, as appropriate. That was why when the Europeans didn't get what they wanted in the FCCC treaty negotiation, they were already out of the gate working on what became the Kyoto Protocol the day the FCCC was agreed to.

The United States wanted to see how this Framework would sit, how it would evolve, before rushing into something else. We really didn't want to do a Protocol so fast. We weren't against it longer term, but there was no reason to rush to judgment in a Montreal style protocol when the two issues were --in our view-- so different.

But the Democrats came in and the “enviros” (environmentalists) were just all over this because they were as unhappy as the Euros (for different reasons) with the Framework Convention. They and the Euros were hell bent for leather because they had been outflanked, and they were going to get us in the Protocol, and that is exactly what happened.

Q: When the Democrats came in, was your negotiating team tainted? I mean...

KINNEY: Oh yes. Reinstein was dismissed. I was purged. Dan was a civil servant and he lived to fight another day.

Q: Who took over?

KINNEY: Dan carried things because he was the only one who had the continuity and the knowledge. Reinstein's replacement was poor Rafe Pomerantz, a political appointee from the environmental NGO, World Resources Institute; he was an independently wealthy trust baby, who had started on the far left in the 60's, but moderated somewhat with age and ended up at WRI, a fairly responsible NGO allied with the Democratic Party.

I first met Rafe at a preparatory climate meeting in Noordwijk (the Netherlands) in 1989. He was one of my preferred NGO reps, because he was honest and capable of reason. I used to call him "my favorite badger," which upset him the first time I used the moniker. He thought I was saying something bad about him, when my intent was entirely the contrary.

The NGOs were all badgers, but Rafe was my "favorite badger" because he was a pretty honest and reasonable one. He moved increasingly into responsibility and moderation over the course of his career. By the time he was appointed OES Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Environment under Eleanor Constable and then Eileen Claussen, of whom I spoke earlier, he was among the best NGO political appointee options we could have had. However, that State was consenting to an NGO political appointee for such an internationally and diplomatically sensitive function was/is another issue unto itself. You know there is a problem when a good and honest man comes to you to ask, "Why don't they have training courses or something for DAS's, Stephanie?" We were good enough friends that I could respond to Rafe honestly: "Up until relatively recently, it has been assumed that DAS's would have had at least 15-20 years of diplomatic service experience and would therefore not need training."

Q: Well then, concentrating on Stephanie and whither. When did you leave this?

KINNEY: I went to the ICAF, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces from 1993-94 to escape a purge.

Q: I saw something similar, when I was in the Senior Seminar (State's equivalent to the Military war colleges, which has since been eliminated). Tom Boyatt, an admirable FSO in his day, all of a sudden appeared in our midst because he had gotten into a conflict with Henry Kissinger. He was a Junior Officer and he stood up to Henry Kissinger, so he was all of a sudden...

KINNEY: Yes. Well I was spirited over to ICAF, which was a delight for me because economics was my weak point, and I had learned a lot. I had gotten into both trade and

economics doing climate, thanks to Reinstein, but this was an opportunity to really dig in and study geo-economics (as opposed to geo-politics) for a year.

In the second semester, the ICAF curriculum breaks everybody up into Industry Groups, and the year that I went there, for the first time, they created an Environment Industry Group, so I signed up for that. To my horror, I discovered that the person who was in charge of it was some military guy who thought that it was all about nuclear waste and remediation. I went, “HUH?” Joe Rolf, or something close to that was his name. So I decided there would only be one solution, which was that I should help him teach the Seminar, which is what the “Groups” were, and so that is what I effectively did.

The “Groups” were supposed to study a broad industry with the aim of also exploring it first hand through a domestic trip followed by an international one designed to, in effect, study the competition and/or learn from others. I immediately volunteered to help with the international trip on the basis that I had embassy connections and some sense of both the issues and where to study them and suggested that, of course the domestic and international trips should complement and link to each other, thereby acquiring broader control over what we (I) would be spending time on. And poor Joe, who was clueless, acquiesced and eventually became grateful.

We had a fabulous, informative, fun and interesting set of trips! The first went to the West Coast and visited the old Hanford Nuclear in Washington state (out of deference to Joe, check that one off the list!) and a number of places in California, where they were either grappling with interesting issues or doing innovative things, and then we turned to the international dimension.

I knew what I had always wanted to see and set about to kill two birds with one on ICAF trip. I had been trying to get to Budapest since the Hungarian revolution and I had never really been to Eastern Europe. So, we were going to look at the problems left by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe (particularly in and around Krakow (about which I had heard so much from Charles Merrill) and Budapest and the Black Triangle, and then we would go to London and Germany to talk finance, business opportunities, new technologies, etc. And while in the area of the Black Triangle, we would also pay our respects at Auschwitz. It was a fabulous trip. Everybody loved it. No one could believe how interesting and full of potential “the environment” was since their understanding was about on the level of Joe’s, and I also learned lots and lots that was very useful, and ultimately graduated with distinction.

When my ICAF year was over, Douglas and I were faced with both another hardship requirement and the need to pay for Sarah Lawrence College, so we got ourselves a tandem assignment to Chad, where he would be DCM and I would be the Pol/Econ section but report to the Ambassador, so as not to run afoul of nepotism concerns.

Unfortunately, MED pulled my medical clearance because of my diabetes. It was bullshit, because there was already someone there with the condition, but they were tightening up because of the expense of all the unplanned medevacs (medical

evacuations). The fall-back for me, offered by PER, was that I was supremely qualified for either of two new FS positions that had just emerged, one in London and the other in Copenhagen; I could take my pick.

I chose Copenhagen because I knew less about oceans and fish than I thought I should, which was the focus of the London job. But I also knew that both of these jobs had been held back by OES until that late in the game so that there would be no FSOs available and they could give them to two of their Civil Servants interested in cushy jobs in Europe.

To its credit, PER and others were shocked and outraged when I told them this and also gave them the names of the people expecting to encumber them. I was glad to see Ray Arnaudo go to London because he did know a lot about oceans and fish and his wife had just won a scholarship to Oxford; however, knowing who had been promised Copenhagen, I was concerned whether it was a real job or not. What I knew was that since Fred Bernthal had been OES Assistant Secretary, he had been angling to create a Regional Environment, Science and Technology function in Scandinavia, preferably in Sweden, where his family came from. Funniest thing. Same concept but in Copenhagen, and the other civil servant slated for it had been a favorite of Fred's.

It took some sharp elbows and a call from AFSA (American Foreign Service Association) to PER warning them that AFSA would be following this assignment with great interest to make sure that the new FS position went to an FSO. Not surprisingly, I again ran into the duplicitous fingers of Eleanor Constable in the pot, who, when confronted, again apologized and said she had no idea or would NEVER have backed a civil servant for the job.

I have no idea how the Department's resistance to ANYTHING regional was overcome (probably some unexpected surplus in the OES budget that year) but never underestimate the bureaucratic skills of the Civil Service. The position was supposed to be a regional function based in Copenhagen that would be accredited to various countries in the region. A friend of mine was the GAO in Copenhagen, so I called Meg to see if this job was for real. Does it actually have a position number, job description, etc? Yes, it did and the incoming Ambassador Edward Elson was quite excited about it. (Political ambassadors to small countries when they expected something bigger are ALWAYS excited by new positions!)

Unfortunately, I didn't know enough to ask the real question: does it have its own budget for regional activities and travel? The answer to that would have been, "Oh, no one has thought about that." I also did not ask about what kind of new authorities had been provided to validate this REGIONAL function in State's bilateral world and corporate culture. Live and learn, but it was painful.

First, I was separated from my husband, who was also none too happy to be going off to N'Djamena alone. Second, think about it: in a bilateral world, what authority would a regional function have? Zip, Zero, Nula. And function thinking and planning and

coordinating regionally would only be a damn pain in the backside of any purely bilateral authority and an unwelcome interference in their otherwise placid, personal, bilateral turf and territory. And where career ambassadors might be persuaded to think beyond the confines of their small country for geo-strategic or budgetary reasons, political appointee ambassadors would see little or no short-term value in such.

My DCM described the situation as he saw it in my first OER from Copenhagen. He likened me to the lead character in the movie “Dances With Wolves,” who was a soldier sent to an outpost in the West totally alone to negotiate and establish a U.S. presence among the Indians. The DCM said that this was essentially the assignment that I had been given, and he was not far from wrong. But ever foolish, ever dauntless, I fell back on institution building -- which seems to be the theme of my career -- and decided “OK. The joke is on them. I am going to make this real.”

Q: Before we get there, I do want to go back to your ICAF trip because I think it would be interesting to capture this trip with the Industrial College to East Germany. You know militaries are messy. Right now we are in the Foreign Service Institute which is located on a place, which between 1942 and 1990, was a military base. When this section was turned over to the State Department, they just thought we will knock down some buildings and rebuild. They discovered, for example, oil seepage all over the place because all militaries have motor pools. This is in America, and we try to keep things clean. You had the Soviets, who didn't try. What I gather is that Eastern Europe was one big motor pool residue.

KINNEY: That and worse! It was unbelievable when I first saw what they had left in Eastern Europe in 1994. I had never been behind the Iron Curtain up until then. I had friends who had served in Moscow, and their whole analysis of the U.S.-Soviet contest was that the US was clueless and so fixated on the nuclear issue that it did not understand that the Soviet Union was basically an enormous, backward and seriously underdeveloped country. Pretty accurate actually, except that the U.S.S.R. did have nukes. Given the performance of some of their other weapons, however, one should have wondered early on about their reliability and their precision.

The Soviet legacy in Eastern Europe underscored this underdevelopment issue in ways that were hard for me to understand, given the Soviets statistically high education rates and their sophisticated science and technology establishment. But it was, I guess, a question of priorities. The Soviets were insecure peasants for the most part, still marked by World War II and a history of invasions from the West. So they focused on security and bombs. Nobody in the USG spent much time on assessing the quality and accuracy of their weaponry until rather late in the game, but that was another issue.

Basically, in my view, the Soviets (as distinct perhaps from all Russians) were ideological peasants and aesthetic and environmental pigs. That was the only way to describe it. They were peasants who ended up with way too much power, given their fear and insecurity, so that they bristled at any threat to loss of power and relied on brute totalitarian authority and control to defend themselves. Absolute control was key.

What struck me most in 1994 was the physical and aesthetic consequences of Soviet rule. In Eastern Europe, where large swaths of culture and historical development had not been utterly destroyed by the war as in Dresden or Stalingrad, brutalist architecture and living conditions were the best the Soviets could offer. The former Soviet airfields that we visited outside of Budapest left even the military asking how we could ever have taken this adversary seriously? The antiquated technology and lack of order and maintenance was worthy of Africa. Aesthetically, mechanically, environmentally, the former bases were a disaster area. The apartment buildings that the Soviets housed people in were reason enough to condemn them all to the circle of Hell in Dante's Inferno. Shoddy, poor workmanship and just trash and toxic dumps and industrial waste everywhere you turned. It was unbelievable. The same patterns were repeated in the Baltic States, which I came to know well as part of my regional responsibilities based in Embassy Copenhagen.

Even military officers with some exposure to the Soviet military were amazed at what they found beyond the few "show military installations" they had heretofore been allowed to see. They kept shaking their heads and saying, "Why didn't someone tell us?" We wouldn't have had to spend all this money worrying about these guys. These people couldn't fight their way out of a paper bag." (I could not resist noting that some Foreign Service Officers had tried!) But the U.S.S. R. did have the nuclear bomb and the hydrogen one, and they did have a nuclear establishment, and they had ICBMs for delivery devices targeted at us, so, I suppose, the politics and economics of national security meant that such threats could not be taken lightly.

Q: Also, a lot of tanks which pointed in one direction.

KINNEY: One direction--to the Fulda Gap. But it really was quite sobering to see behind the Potemkin Villages in 1994. And our ICAF group went to the so-called Black Triangle, an environmental disaster area which was part of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Q: Why is it called the Black Triangle?

KINNEY: The Black Triangle, where Poland, Czechoslovakia and Germany come together, was one of the most heavily industrialized areas in the region and one of the most intensely polluted in the world. I can't remember the names of all of the little towns that were there. Katowice, Poland was the one I remember the most. However, the whole triangle was an area of industrial waste due to Soviet manufacturing practices. Environmental destruction had literally turned small towns black, and the earth itself was black and rocky and uninhabitable because of the industrial waste. It was basically a toxic waste dump half the size of West Virginia.

Q: Did the people, the Czechs, the Poles, the Hungarians and all realize what had happened? Were the Soviets or communists in charge, or was it basically under local rule.

KINNEY: It depended but all authority was basically loyal to the Soviet Union and apparatchiks of the communist regime. This is why environment in these days -- the late

80's forward -- was so subversive. By the late 80's, the fax machine was one of the most revolutionary technologies around and was connecting people behind the Iron Curtain with a more modern world. The fax machine was enabling the samizdats and the world of underground publishing.

Q: Samizdat means self- publication.

KINNEY: Yes, self-publication and the underground presses. The people who got out to the West, people who could compare and contrast, people who could get real information as opposed to the fake information the Soviets were feeding this information back through the education system. This is why the science community within the Soviet Union was so important. They were the only people, outside of the KGB, who really knew what was going on in the rest of the world and how far behind the Soviet Union was and how primitive and backward it was compared to the West by this time.

For one thing, especially in Eastern Europe, people by the late 80's were suffering from all sorts of medically documented environmental illnesses and maladies. Children were suffering massively from asthma and all sorts of cancers. So people knew that this was coming from their surroundings. It was ugly. It was unbearably ugly. The few places like Warsaw, whose historic center had been restored to pre-World War, traditional architecture -- stood in stark contrast to a Soviet landscape, so a contrary cultural memory and nationalist pride survived.

Q. Was this also true in the Baltic States?

Oh, yes! Only there, the original, vernacular architecture and city centers had not been restored but rather left to decay while Soviet housing blocks were constructed on the edges of the cities.

One of the really good things the international division of EPA did during the Eighties was carried out by Region 5 in Chicago by its Director, Val (Voldemaras) Adamkus, a naturalized American of Lithuanian decent. Val (or Valdas) eventually returned to Lithuania to become its President in 1998. But I met him when he was still in Chicago, using "the environment" as a subversive tool. Starting in the early 80's he would travel to the Baltics with suitcases full of books on the environment and started developing networks of people with a common interest in environmental issues.

When it became possible, as a government, we would also use the USIA International Visitor(IV) program to bring people over to the State and put them in touch with environmentalists here. The EPA could/would also send (non-political) technical experts out to advise and help on addressing local environmental issues, such as improving water quality or cleaning up a toxic waste dump, of which there were many. This was a way of stimulating grass roots, citizen networks and cooperative interests. We introduced IV grantees to NGOs in the States, who in turn helped them develop NGOs of their own in the Baltic states. The younger generation in the Baltics was more restive and more technically educated. They could actually study environmental issues in their universities,

and the Soviets just never put two and two together. They never paid serious attention to “environmentalism” because they were focused on economic development and national security and did not connect the dots, any more than they did when “human rights” were first introduced as an international concern.

Q: Did your military colleagues and the others in your class come away with the same insights? I would have thought this was a real eye opener.

KINNEY: It was a real eye opener. They were very appreciative. Because of their military culture and experience, it had just never occurred to them that there was an international dimension to the environment. And to be honest, they really did not know that much about the domestic environmental dimension, which from their generally conservative perspective was, at best, highly suspicious. Today, DOD and the U.S. military are some of the most environmentally progressive forces around because they have come to see the economic efficiencies involved, but back then, they really just saw the environment as some NGO driven, regulatory regime trying to force clean-up on U.S. bases and nuclear waste sites.

The Eastern European trip was a real eye opener for everyone. Since I was in charge of organizing our trip, I deliberately tried to structure it so we could see the problems, and then we would focus on solutions and market opportunities for environmental technologies. In that context, I thought it was important for the American military to start seeing itself as having a vested interest in the environment. I felt this broader perspective was crucial because DOD has also been one of the biggest technological and research and technology forcing organizations in the world. Witness the internet.

Q: I was just wondering. I went on the nuclear tour back in 1955. I never understood why you can't take all this nuclear waste, but it in a cement mixer, grind it all up and use it again or something. Was there any such discussion?

KINNEY: Well you can't really use it again, but you can certainly store it away, and the Europeans have been doing that with untarnished success ever since the 50's. I'm afraid the problem in the U.S. is called Three Mile Island and an under-educated public in the presence of over-active, fear-mongering NGOs. The interesting thing now is apparently people are scared enough of global warming that they are about ready to re-legitimize nuclear. It seems unthinking to me that we have continued to hitch our fate solely to fossil fuel production controlled by the Middle East. But it is a problem in a democracy where all opinions are increasingly treated by the media and the Internet as though they are equal and worthy of equal attention. Our political culture has not really begun to deal with the democratizing effects of the digital revolution.

Q: We are getting to a period where the information revolution is really allowing the screwballs to seize control.

KINNEY: Well, the screwballs and the proselytizers, whether they are religious or secular.

Q: Today is 25 May 2010 with Stephanie Kinney, and Stephanie, where are we?

KINNEY: I think we are in the process of pioneering State's first Regional Environmental Hub-- in Copenhagen, Denmark. There are, I believe, 12 Hubs today, maybe more, I don't know. In 1994, the Foreign Service did not have enough EST officers and did not take the EST function very seriously because FSOs did not generally come from a science background. Well, neither did I, but neither was that really necessary to do good EST diplomacy. As I saw in a number of cases, it is much easier to make a good EST officer out of a diplomat than the good diplomat out of a scientist.

Q: EST?

KINNEY: Environment, Science and Technology. In the early 1990's, there was still an EST cone in our Foreign Service, but you could not get into it until you were well into the mid-level. Then you had to jump over all sorts of hoops in order to qualify. I ultimately did that.

Q: You say hoops, what were the hoops?

KINNEY: The hoops were the need to have X number of assignments in EST Cone, which, of course, meant that you would be putting yourself "out of cone" for your own promotion purposes. You'll remember that I had been coned Admin back in 1975, although I never served more than one year in the function. In order to "switch cones" you had to have served X amount of time doing work in the cone to which you aspired to change. With my work on the climate negotiations and some additional pressure on my part, I was permitted to switch into the EST cone, notwithstanding its limited promotion numbers, i.e. the relatively limited number of slots EST offered for promotion each year compared to those offered by other cones. However, the EST policy issues were varied and fascinating; I also realized that there were no EST positions abroad in countries you would not want to live in. Only serious countries had serious EST capabilities and interests.

I don't think I was able to make the switch into the EST cone until around 1995 or such, but the main point is that you are talking to the last Foreign Service Officer ever promoted into the Senior Foreign Service on the basis of an EST background. About that same time, the cone was abolished by Tim Worth and Eileen Claussen-- short term political appointees with no concept of what they were doing institutionally. There were a few of us left who were grandfathered to still compete for promotion into the Senior Service as EST officers, and I was the last one to be promoted in 1998. There is no EST cone or purposefully cultivated function in our diplomatic service today. A little strange, it seems to me, for the 21st century, especially considering our international competition.

Q: Let's go back to 1994. But let's remember that we want to talk about why this EST cone is abolished, but let's do it when we get up to that point.

KINNEY: I briefly referred last week to the vicissitudes of ending up in what became the Regional EST Counselor position located in Copenhagen. The function was responsible for and accredited to the three EU members in the region (Denmark, Sweden, Finland) and the three Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. I thought because there was a Personnel Bureau (PER) job description and because the function had been technically defined in the PER system, this meant that it was a real job. What I discovered was that I had made a terrible mistake because I did not know enough to also ask about how this function was going to do its work operationally in terms of regional planning authorities, budgetary resources and staffing. So I ended up, in essence, pioneering/building from scratch what later became the model for what is now State's Environmental Hub System.

Q: In other words, here was sort of a non-job. Nobody was paying any attention to it. Which meant it was a disaster or your unsupported sandbox to do with what you saw fit.

KINNEY: I suppose that is the upside of the decline of Foreign Service professionalism and discipline -- the Service still enabled entrepreneurial officers to live by the wits and see what they could do. The Copenhagen Regional EST Counselor function was a theoretical construct in a very bilateral corporate culture, so it was not until I arrived that I realized the reality was that I really had neither authority nor resources to call my own; everything had to be cajoled or taken from some purely bilateral pot or turf.

However, my arrival in Copenhagen coincided at a moment that was crucial in the evolution of the Baltics and also Scandinavia's posture within the EU. As I arrived, Soviet troops had just pulled out of Latvia after a string of uprisings and protests in which people were killed for rejecting Soviet control. The same was true for Lithuania. The Soviets were still in Estonia, which had been the headquarters of their nuclear Navy. I decided that one thing I could do would be to assure a U.S. presence and at least limited leadership in the shut-down of the nuclear reactor in Paldiski, Estonia, and the dignified exit of the Soviet nuclear naval forces from the country.

Q: What kind of nuclear reactor was it?

KINNEY: It was the Soviet Union's nuclear naval training reactor, which was located on a little peninsula about half an hour from Tallinn in a place called Paldiski. Paldiski was where the Russian nuclear submarine navy was headquartered and where their nuclear submarine officers were trained. They had a full nuclear reactor operating on land for training purposes. Closing that facility down was important because the Russians were leaving Estonia, and the Estonians certainly couldn't handle a nuclear navy or nuclear facility on their own. Closing down the reactor facility was also important because of the considerable concern at that time about non-proliferation. What happens to the loose nukes and loose nuclear material if they are not carefully controlled?

One had to see the physical and operational reality on the former naval base at Paldiski to really appreciate the full scope of the problem. As the Russian navy pulled out of Paldiski -- and that had already been accomplished when I arrived -- they left absolute and total physical ruin and devastation in their wake. The old base quickly became an environmental wasteland left to be picked over and pilfered by poor Estonians looking for anything of value that they could possibly scavenge -- including any nuclear leftovers such as the reactor.

Q: To put it into context, and please correct me if I am wrong, the pull out was not one of the "Screw you, we are going to tear everything down." It was more just a case of "take our marbles and leave" on the part of the Soviets.

KINNEY: Based on what I observed, especially in the military bases throughout the Baltics, I think there was a large "screw you" element, but it was limited to what the Soviets could actually take with them." So the result was to leave the emerging, independent Baltic states with the all their mistakes and physical detritus. In Paldiski, the Soviets had vandalized everything and left very little of value, except their nuclear reactor and storage facilities. If they could have carried the buildings off, they would have, but they could not.

As a result, the buildings were being systematically picked apart for steel, copper, window frames, doors, electrical wiring and any other marketable commodity. My first visit to Estonia, which was essentially an inspection trip facilitated with the help of our small, local Embassy staff, produced some unforgettable moments. I will never forget being taken on a guided tour of the former Soviet Naval Headquarters in the port of Tallinn, which by then had been vacated and left deserted. As I was escorted through the old facilities, the most common artifacts, other than maps, left in almost every room were abacuses. Some of these abacuses were beautiful and finely made of ebony and rosewood and other finely polished woods. But they were abacuses, obviously a widely used tool up until about six months before I arrived in late 1993!

Q: For somebody coming across this, you might explain what an abacus is.

KINNEY: An abacus is an ancient, medieval instrument for counting and doing calculations and accounting. There are people who are good at it, who can really accomplish a lot, but the West left these behind in the 19th century, at the latest. In a sense, I suppose, they were the early computer of the Middle Ages, but to be faced with the challenge of working with the Scandinavian states and the Russians and the Estonians to insure the orderly and peaceful closedown of the nuclear reactor at Paldiski, and to encounter the most frequently found evidence of the Soviet presence to be filth and abacuses was just a mind blower.

This was not the first, nor would it be the last time that I found these, to be sure. Because I was one of the highest ranked American officials present in Estonia for this particular purpose, and because we were being shown around by the Russian Admirals, and I was the only woman, I took full advantage of the situation to exclaim about the beauty of the

abacuses and their beautifully crafted woods, and how sad that they were being thrown away. I immediately became the center of attention and gifted with several with great ceremony. I took them back to the Embassy and then to Copenhagen as evidence of what I had seen. I may still have one or two in my attic at home, as a memory of those days.

Q: I have to ask, did you turn on southern charm, complete with fluttering eyelashes?

KINNEY: Oh definitely, it works on Sovs like a charm, especially senior Soviet military officials. I have been shameless all my life in drawing on that when I need to.

Q: Use what you got.

KINNEY: Use what you got, and in traditional, conservative cultures, you have a decided advantage as a woman to play what I call “the woman’s card.”

Q: I used to find as a Consular Officer in the Balkans, I often would send women vice consuls out into a difficult situation because I knew they would calm things down and didn’t need the testosterone boiling on both sides.

KINNEY: Exactly. Most particularly with trained military officers or people who consider themselves to be part of the elite. If they are male and come from a traditional culture, they tend to revert to a different mode in the presence of a woman, particularly if the woman is gracious and charming but also has high expectations of them. I have always found that communicating high expectations in a kind and thoughtful way usually brings out the best in people, but it especially brings out the best in otherwise thuggish officials.

Q: You were an international group, right? What was the attitude of the Soviets here, taking this group around?

KINNEY: I’m not sure what you are driving at. This project was actually initiated by the United States and Sweden because Sweden is a significant nuclear energy producer with impressive waste storage experience and technology. (Unlike the U.S.!) And of course, Sweden sits on the Baltic Sea. Sweden was also a member of an organization called the Helsinki Commission, which included the Russians as well as the Scans and other countries located on the Baltic Sea. The organization had long focused on environmental concerns vis a vis the Baltic Sea, and it was also being used by the Scandinavians to deal with one of their major concerns, which was potential nuclear pollution, proliferation and production of nuclear energy produced from old, unsafe facilities located in the Baltic states.

Here again you can see the leitmotif: Environmental concerns are “technical issues,” not political ones. Hence, they can be used to confront otherwise deadly serious political issues, such as nuclear proliferation and the lack of deteriorating security all around the old Soviet nuclear establishments, whether military or civilian in nature.

Q: What was the attitude of the Soviet military who were taking you around as you uncovered, you know abacuses, nuclear stuff bubbling on the surface? Were they embarrassed or obliviousness or what?

KINNEY: Well, for the most part, the admirals, generals and the colonels with whom I worked were first and foremost professionals. They were very proud people, but they had no illusions, in part because they had been in the Baltic states. The Baltics were the Caribbean of the Soviet Union; they were the “fleshpot” of the old empire-- the most advanced and most pleasant countries to which to be assigned or given vacations, as a reward. The Baltic states were where Soviet officials met over their summer holidays. And because they were so close to the other states of the Western world (Finland, Denmark, Sweden and Germany) around the Baltic Sea, the military officials with whom I met were not unaware of what had transpired between the West and the Soviet Union over the last 15 years and how far behind the Soviet Union was.

We always took great pains to never put them in a position of embarrassment or losing face, which they appreciated. They were very much in the perestroika, Gorbachevian vein -- it is time to move on. Their attitude was that Russia too was very concerned about the “environmental” (nuclear) problems, and they welcomed an opportunity to work together with us. Of course, what they wanted out of the “cooperation” was to save face.

They were negotiating in other venues to get the Soviet military men taken care of. One of the problems about pulling their military out of the Baltics and Eastern Europe was that their soldiers had no homes to return to in Russia, no housing, no jobs, nothing. Also, our cooperation was important because it was it was these officers that had the information and technical know-how we needed vis a vis their legacy facilities in the Baltics and elsewhere, especially their nuclear facilities.

So there was a sense of everybody having something positive to contribute; if we worked together, we could all make progress on these difficult issues. I realized early on, however, that the real lead on these issues would be the Scandinavian states, not the U.S. I knew that the U.S. simply had bigger fish to fry, as important as a smooth transition in the Baltics might be. My job was to make sure the Baltics did not become a headline making problem. No news would be good news. Unfortunately, Jim Baker had decided that the State Department could open relations with all the new countries of the former Soviet Union with no new resources! As a result, the Department was trying to cut its losses and had little or no resources to dedicate to the Baltics and less for its new Regional EST Counselor to draw on. The Scandinavian States, which were panicked about nuclear proliferation, and our Department of Energy (DOE), which had real interests, authorities and resources through the nuclear programs under its national laboratories, were the most likely pockets to pick from my perspective.

So, I very quickly learned and was thrown into an intensely and delightfully complex inter-agency, well before the concept of “whole of government approach” became the watchword. Once again, I found myself in the a situation not unlike the opening session of the climate negotiations-- the USG makes a public statement (announces a new

Regional EST function) but does not provide the resources beyond personnel to carry it out. State had no money beyond my salary and housing allowance and had no clue what it wanted me to accomplish--if anything! AID had money, but would only spend it if they owned the project, and State was trying to save money by pulling them out of Estonia, although they maintained a skeleton AID operation in Lithuania. However, as a corporate culture, AID personnel hated the State Department, which it considered “immoral” and “threatening” to its mission, so its man in Lithuania had no interest in facilitating anything not already on his personal agenda. \$250,000-or \$300,000 worth of studies done by American contractors did not foreseen nor include the work of a new EST Regional Counselor.

Q: This seems so much the pattern.

KINNEY: AID is a whole other story. We can go there on a different day. The Department of Energy had both money, know-how, and a sense of responsibility. They had an international program. They were using it. They had long technical exchange tendrils and tentacles out all over the world, but particularly in Lithuania because of the nuclear reactor there at Ignalina and in Estonia at Paldiski. Then the other USG player with more sympathy was our Environmental Protection Agency, especially Valdas (Val) Adamkus, the leader of EPA Region 5, of whom I spoke of earlier.

Val, was/is a man driven by vision, history, passion and a personal conviction born of life experience. You’ll recall he was a Lithuanian-American, and he met his Latvian wife in a concentration camp in Riga. They fled to the United States, where he ended up being the Russian translator for Brezhnev and Nixon, and parlayed that through a series of interesting life events into a career of environmental work as Head of EPA’s Region 5. Region 5 is headquartered in Chicago and reaches as far as Pittsburgh and has the largest concentration of people from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the United States. Interestingly, a huge proportion of these immigrants are engineers and chemists.

As Val related it, in the 70’s after translating for Nixon and Brezhnev, at a given moment, Brezhnev turns to him and asks if there is anything that he can do for him? Not missing a beat, Val said, “Yes, allow me to visit my family in Lithuania.” There starts in the mid-70’s a process created, largely by Val himself, of going back and establishing contacts in Vilnius, and then a couple of years later because he has this privileged status, traveling pretty much as will and taking in books every time he goes to Lithuania. Because by then he is working for the EPA, Val’s books are about the environment because he has become a confirmed environmentalist. Val also understands the environment into which he is going in Lithuania, and he understands the subversive potential of environmental protection. He starts bringing in these books and giving them to people and telling them to read them and building his own little network and cadre. So by the time I arrive, I actually make a major VIP tour of the Baltics with the Assistant Administrator for EPA, who is none other than my old friend and former OES Assistant Secretary in 1989, when I report for climate duty, Bill Nitze. In 1994, Val Adamkus, is still a U.S. citizen and still living in Chicago running EPA Region 5. BUT, there are also huge rumors that he will soon be drafted to run for President of Lithuania, a rumor that turns out to be utterly true. In fact, Val subsequently serves two terms as President of Lithuania.

Val and Bill and I, at Val's invitation and on his Region 5 dollar, do a VIP tour of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Val wants to make sure that we know and understand everything he wants us and needs us to know about Lithuania, so we spend more time there. It is quite an insight-producing visit, and a lot was accomplished in a very short time. Talk about the importance of strategic vision and the difference a single individual can make when he is driven and focused and determined, you saw all of that come together in Val Adamkus. When he started out, he was not the most astute politician or greatest president the world has ever seen, but he was certainly one of the most passionate and personally committed. In fact, he got into quite a bit of trouble in his first term because he was probably too naïve for the really dirty, sewer-level politics of the Baltics in general and Lithuania in particular. But he persisted and got reelected some years later.

From my perspective, Lithuania was more Catholic than Lutheran (unlike the other two Baltics) and, therefore, it aligned very comfortably with Soviet socialism for many years. Moving it out of that mold was a lot harder than anybody realized. It was not the same as Estonia, which was basically German Lutheran, and Latvia which is very complicated because of the demographics. It was only 20% Latvian by the time the Soviets left. Each of the Baltic states is different, but at that time, Lithuania culturally was the most Soviet in instinct and mentality because the Catholic culture of its era and the Soviet culture actually shared an authoritarian tradition. So retuning to a "democratic tradition" was more challenging for Lithuania than it was for Estonia.

But we've digressed from Paldiski and the nuclear reactor there.

My problem was that the person who had purged me from OES was now Assistant Secretary for OES. Also, I was marooned in a regional function no one understood nor cared about with not even a travel budget to my name. What to do?

I started documenting the case for the political opportunities I saw and the need for State resources. In the meantime, I started trying to make friends with the people who had resources, namely the Scans and EPA and the Department of Energy. If diplomacy is the art of working through others and letting them think they thought it all up, then I certainly qualified as a diplomat.

The problem with trying to extract resources from other agencies was that it often had to come on their terms, and those terms were not always in the U.S. interest or in regional interests. The guys from the national labs at DOE were my biggest problem.

Q: Why?

KINNEY: First of all, they traveled in packs of 20 to 30 because they had unlimited travel funds and they loved to travel first class -- anywhere would do. They were magicians at doing only what they wanted to, especially when dealing with a highly technical issue involving nuclear waste management or later the case of an infamous

toxic lake in a Estonian town called Sillamae, on which I also managed to get people engaged. The lab guys had the advantage of being able to thwart questions by non-technicians with technical mumbo jumbo, which scares everybody else so they don't dare ask questions. They would then send small armies out to answer the questions that the other people were too afraid to ask, like "Is this really necessary or wise or timely?"

I would ask for one or two experts at most, which is all the Scans ever had, and I would get a Cub Scout pack in return. So we would have these huge, guy delegations to manage. Their manner was arrogant and offensive. It is not that they didn't want to be helpful, they were just crusty and old and ill-bred and ill-prepared to deal with any vaguely political or cross cultural situation. The DOE nuclear division in those days was something out of the 1950's, out of Hanford. These guys had a 1050's perspective of national security, and they loved the perks it gave them. They hide behind their Q clearance! Well, I had a Q clearance as well, much to their chagrin, which I had taken care of before I arrived because I knew the DOE Q culture from my work on climate. So, when the Q clearance mumbo jumbo would not work, I would say, "OK. What is your next excuse?" Managing that cast of characters was a test of fortitude. And then you had the Bleeding Heart, Kum Ba Yah, let's all sit down and make the world safe and clean for the environment chorus from EPA Washington.

Val and his EPA Region 5 team were a different breed. They were people with a purpose. There were only three or four of them, and they were wonderful to work with. They knew what they were doing; they were extraordinarily well connected and coordinate, they knew the local cultures and terrain, and they played the game exquisitely.

But I found it embarrassing to always be in the position of not really having anything to bring to the table except pretty words, when all of the Scandinavian states were not only contributing well beyond their lifting weight financially, but also with boots on the ground action and execution. They were not taken with USAID studies. They would find a problem and fix it. Need a new sewer plant here? Of course you do; the water is polluted and killing the kids. Let's get a new sewer plant in, and in three to six months a little town X would have a new sewer plant, with Swedish or Danish or Finnish contractors, trainers and parts. And guess who made friends and got the ongoing contracts? Not us!

Q: In a way, I would assume that you would sort of appear and then back pedal.

KINNEY: No, I did the best I could with smoke and mirrors. At least in those days, the fact that the U.S. would show up at all still meant something. And I did eventually find a way to eek out some resources from State.

There was another major UN Conference coming up in Denmark, something called the Social Summit. I went over in mid-to late '94, so the Conference must have been scheduled for the spring of 1995. I knew there would be a high-level delegation for the Conference and that there was a better than even chance that the President wasn't going to do it but that he would probably send Hillary because a Social Summit was sort of

“ladies work” and a good fit for her interests and skills. I also knew that my old friend Al Gore might be a candidate for participation, especially if we got to him the right way.

To make a long story short, one of my little coups-- and this was thanks to my nemesis Eileen Claussen-- who in late '94 was still at the White House as Gore's environmental policy adviser. Since my exit from OES had been without recrimination on my part, I simply acted as though nothing exceptional had happened and wrote her about the important and exceptional opportunity the Vice President had to score one for the United States in the Baltics, by “officially closing down the nuclear reactor in Paldiski,” which would also allow him to drop in on the Social Summit, should that also prove politically useful.

Gore indeed came to the last day of the Social Summit -- mostly to do Bosnia-related things with my old student Peter Galbraith, who was then Ambassador to Croatia. And then we got Gore to fly over to Tallinn, where we had a much-celebrated signing ceremony for a new Bilateral Science and Technology Agreement between Estonia and the United States, drafted up by yours' truly out of thin air. The EST Agreement was a lot of words with no real meat underneath them ---- YET. Think of it as another framework. When you don't have anything real to deliver, deliver a framework for future cooperation, and then threaten the appropriate technical agencies with being seen to not support the President's (or Vice President's) agenda unless they provide the meat. That was essentially my strategy.

The one thing that we did have to put on the table was \$20 million we managed to get DOE to put towards the Paldiski nuclear waste management shutdown initiative and the clean-up of this toxic lake, located not too far from Paldiski in a town called Sillamae. So with the President of Estonia and the Vice President of the United States, and all of the attendant Baltic Presidents, we had a big ceremony and it was a big deal. The Vice President signed, and I stood there and did the little blotting thing, and we carried the nicely gold embossed dual agreements offstage and put them I don't know where. I don't know where they go. The disappeared. I think one went back on one the Vice President's plane. God knows what the Estonians did with theirs, but it was a very successful public event and a fantastic photo op. It bought me a lot of mileage for very little for the next 12 months. The problem was, what was I going to do for the last 12 months? It got to be old retuning to Baltic capitals and representing “our interests” but not having a lot to represent except good intentions.

Q: What was happening. You had one initiative you were able to do. But then the rest of the time...

KINNEY: Well, there was the Paldiski decommissioning, and the first serious survey at Sillamae in Estonia and a number of encouraging visits and meetings on my part. I wrangled US observer status for the Helsinki Commission, although I did not have many resources to bring to bear on any of the problems they were addressing. I at least reminded Washington of the Commission's work and got EPA to start interacting with it a bit more.

I did the best I could to get some funds for a small clean up job in Latvia and then there was the huge, Chernobyl-like nuclear facility in Lithuania called Ignalina. This scared people to death because it was the same model and suffered from the same management as Chernobyl. It was Chernobyl waiting to happen. We put a lot of DOE and AID focus on shoring up the large facility's security and trying to remediate and strengthen this really very technologically outmoded reactor. Another thing I got into was the Arctic Council, which today is all of the sudden very important and proving its political value because of all of the potential for oil in the fragile Arctic environment. It is also turning out to be a hotbed of "indigenous rights" activism because of the large indigenous populations strewn throughout Greenland, Russia, Alaska, Canada, Norway and Finland. But again, at the time, the Council was something that nobody could have cared less about.

In retrospect, I learned a lot about Arctic science and environmental issues and politics, all of which have turned out to be useful from time to time. The Arctic Council work took me north of the Arctic Circle on several occasions. I was the first American to cross the border between Finland and the Murmansk Archangel region of the then Soviet Union. We had a border crossing ceremony for which the Soviet and Finnish guards had been alerted we were coming. Since I was the first American and that was a big deal, we were met with great honor and I was given a little bouquet of flowers and expressions of friendship, bear hugs and pictures. I was again looking at Soviet environmental disaster areas, this time around Nikel.

Q: I have seen pictures. I grew up in Annapolis and my brother is a Naval Academy graduate. I have always had a great interest and fondness for the navy. And to see pictures that were taken in Murmansk and Archangel and Vladivostok and all of these ships just decaying. You could almost see the submarines bubbling up. Were you seeing that?

KINNEY: Yep. And that was what was going on in the sea. There is a place called Nikel that was one of the most horrifying experiences. It is not too far over the Finnish border into what was then still the Soviet Union. 25% of the population, as I recall, was dying of some sort of cancer that was directly related to the manufacturing process of the factory there. The conditions in which people were living and had been living were so primitive and so careless and so un-modern compared to the world that I came from. Again, it was almost beyond believing that we could have been as frightened as we were of this sprawling imperium called the Soviet Union.

Q: Well did you, I mean you were with a bunch of American, and not just American but the Scandinavian as well.

KINNEY: Usually I was the only American. It was mostly Scandinavians because this was the Scandinavian neighborhood. They knew it. They took it seriously. They were really working to make change. They were fabulous in every regard. They were seized of the historical moment, seized of the opportunity it presented, and seized of their own self-

interest in ensuring that the Baltic didn't become a nuclear contest point or a nuclear waste or proliferation disaster.

Q: Well, after you left your Russian hosts, by that time, the question must have come up as to why things were so bad in what had been the Soviet Union in terms of development and environmental protection. I mean was it the system? Was it the Russian soul that couldn't grasp the implications?

KINNEY: I am not a Sovietologist, and that was not ever my discipline or experience, but my observation would be that this was basically something very close to a serf state when the Bolshevik revolution occurred. Utopian idealists and peasants took over, very frightened, insecure peasants who had never known anything but an authoritarian, imperial regime. Stalin, a Georgian with a complex to put it mildly, a very Hitlerian figure, was not substantially different. Same song, other side of the political spectrum to Hitler's fascism. He knows brutality and violence works, and that is about all he knows of the modern world; he knows just enough to be dangerous. He tries to industrialize and force march this peasant, traditional, landed culture into the 21st century at any cost, without regard to blood or treasure.

Russia is huge. It is larger than the United States, and we know how difficult and how long and how challenging our economic and political development history has been, with the very best and most favorable of circumstances. So when the only thing you are really good at is authoritarian/ totalitarian control, that is what you focus on. That means it all goes into the army, and that means you have got a lot of people -- because none has have access to the modernizing world -- who are very smart but are being held back by all of the constraints. The last thing in the world you really care about is the trash and the consequences of this kind of production. So it just wasn't in their mindset.

Remember when we started the Framework Convention negotiations in 1990, I think the Soviet Union did actually have an Environment Minister, but his function was so new and such a curiosity that he did not count for much more than window dressing. The Foreign Ministry ran the show, and the KGB, of course. But then most of the world outside of the West did not have environmental ministries either in 1990.

Russia has learned a lot since then. The developing world has learned a lot. I mean if there is one thing to be said for the mis-framing of an energy issue into an environmental issue, it is that at least it raised awareness of the concept and the issue of environmental protection and environmental externalities. At least, where we are going with that now is toward a more sustainable economic development model. One hopes!

Sustainability is going to be the next big challenge. It already is. But, as I said earlier, I really believe it would have been better had we been able to frame the climate issue as the problem it is, which is an energy problem. Cheap energy is what made the modern world possible, basically cheap fossil fuel. That is the nub of the problem. All the rest is a consequence. So you have to go back and really grapple with the nut of the problem, which is the energy equation.

In many parts of the Soviet Union, like in Murmansk, the state was controlling but not productive or progressive. I mean these towns existed for whatever manufacturing plant had been put there because there was a deposit of a needed mineral deposit, for example, never mind that the mineral is highly toxic. But beyond that, the state had no interest and had no purpose and didn't care, so the people who were forced to live there were just surviving and doing the best they could as things were imposed on them. And in many cases, they were still not that far removed from the 19th century, early 20th century origins of their great-great grandparents.

Q: I was interviewing one man who was assigned to the Soviet Union. He was driving, and he got off the beaten track. In fact, he was where he shouldn't have been, but it was just a little village. He was listening to the radio, and they were talking about the space program. He was sitting listening in the car, and there was the village and a little lady with a babushka pulling this thing up with a yoke and filling it with water to take home. I was just thinking of the contrast; it just struck everybody.

KINNEY: Yeah, and if you were not privileged to experience it first hand, you could not imagine it. And most of the American public did not have any knowledge other than what it had gotten through movies and the media, and the movies and the media had never been there either.

Q: Also there was the problem that our intelligence apparatus and actually our analytic apparatus was very Washington-centric.

KINNEY: Very Washington-centric.

Q: You know your enemy had to be so powerful in order for you to keep the budget flowing or keep your prestige. Anyway, so how did you find the embassy in Copenhagen?

KINNEY: Embassy Copenhagen was a trip. It was presided over during my entire time there by a short little man by the name of Edward Elson. He was a (Clinton) political appointee. Ambassadors to Denmark always are, and the Danes resent it. And he was a self-made millionaire, a Southern, Jewish businessman with a wife from Tennessee and a large number of impressive Board memberships and good works. He made a fortune in books, W.A. Smith, I believe. He discovered the niche market early on and had gotten a monopoly early on in airports for the book concession. He had then parlayed that with a good deal of acumen into a sizable fortune.

One of the most famous "Eddie stories" when I arrived was the evening he had attended one of his first, high-toned social events, as an invited guest. Danes pride themselves on brutal honesty, to a fault very often. Many possess a smug satisfaction and sense of moral superiority to almost everyone, especially the U.S. Well, one of this type leaned across the table and said to the Ambassador, "I understand that ambassadorships in the United States are bought and paid for now. How much did you have to pay?" To which Elson

replied, “Obviously not enough, Madame, or I wouldn’t have to be here listening to you.” Eddie could have a very sharp tongue. As I said, he was a very short man and was disinclined to take guff from anyone, male or female.

Quite by accident, I first met the Ambassador at the airport when I was arriving. The person meeting me introduced us; I was shocked because I learned very early in my career to be very wary of short men, and Ambassador Elson was very short. But, we got along. All human beings have good points and bad points. He exemplified that. He was married to a very social, very sweet Tennessee girl who, it turned out, was the aunt of two of my very best friends at Vassar. Susie’s passion was American crafts, and she facilitated a splendid show of the same while I was there, His passion was contemporary painting, of which he was a collector, He turned his 19th century residence into a very stunning display of American contemporary art in the photo realist vein, which I found a little strange, but it was his taste. I had two wonderful DCMs, Greg Mattson and Jimmy Coker. The embassy was very host country-centric, as bilateral embassies are. I, unfortunately, had six countries for which I was responsible. There was nothing in the Embassy budget for my new function, so I was always begging, borrowing, stealing, conniving and cajoling to try to make something of this amorphous responsibility I acquired when the Office of Medical Services decided that I was not fit to serve in N’Djamena.

Because of my state visit and UN climate experience, I became invaluable to the DCM and the Embassy when the Social Summit came to Copenhagen in early 1995. This was Ambassador Elson’s first big event, and it was, of course, White House-centric. And like all political ambassadors, he assumed an entitled position but knew little or nothing about how these things worked, much less how to manage or control them. He soon wisely delegated the serious work to his DCM. I was asked to be the Control Officer for Hillary Clinton, which was quite an experience. Her Advance Team was the best and the most professional I ever worked with in 25 years. I commented to the Lead Advance at one point on their courtesy and their ability to listen, which is unusual in these circumstances. His response was, “It is a reflection of our boss. She would have it no other way.” She also was quite a bit more attractive (actually quite beautiful) than any of the media ever allowed and very warm and engaging.

Q: I was watching her, shots of her in public relating to children or to people, not the top people but the face of life. I was very impressed. People I have talked to basically speak very well of her. This is not because she is now Secretary of State, but as the First Lady.

KINNEY: I developed a very high regard for her. The Big Issue for this visit, the proverbial one in these kinds of events, was the difference between what some clueless White House staffer in Washington had dreamed up for her and what the reality on the ground dictated. In this case, the White House was adamant that she go to a huge NGO conclave on a little island in Copenhagen harbor called Christiana. What they had no idea of was that Christiana was and had been forever a scurvy hot bed of Bohemian drug and very far left radical politics, including a quite active squatters’ rights agenda. It was a security nightmare and no place for the First Lady to go near.

Q: One has to say there is something about northern European far left that is so far removed from the American far left.

KINNEY: It is another world. But just because it had NGO on it, some staffer decided this was the right thing to do politically without having a clue. So I spent the better part of the first week or so trying to get the White House to understand how dangerously wrong their recommendation was. Not only was this a disastrous media story in the making but more importantly an unspeakable security concern.

I had done enough of these kinds of events to know how to box the White House--make allies with the Secret Service, who always hold the trump cards in these sorts of situations. Once they understood that the Embassy was savvy, we were able to quietly, without anybody ever recognizing it or getting upset, maneuver this issue to where it needed to be--deep sixed. The First Lady ended up giving her speech where she should have been scheduled to give it in the first place, which means in the right conditions with the right people and the right security etc.

Q: She didn't go to the island.

KINNEY: No, but it took 2 ½ weeks to walk that mangy dog back.

Q: How did you find working with the Secret Service on this. They must have been horrified too.

KINNEY: They were, once I took them on a little tour of the place, but part of the problem was that the Ambassador was about as green as the White House staffers at this point but and he was only obsessed with making them happy. And the poor DCM was having to coordinate the whole circus, which had a thousand moving pieces. And, did I note that the U.S. was the only country out of 140 that was NOT participating at the Ministerial or Head of State level?

Hillary was only coming in for three days of what was a week and a half long mega conference. Maybe it was two days. But one of the virtues of experience, is that you know what questions to ask, what the likely issues will be and how the process works and where you go for needed leverage and good decisions. The latter rarely comes from the Advance Team. The secret is to very quickly establish relationships and bona fides and form inter-agency alliances, so that in spite of the mis-information and the political misguidedness in Washington, everyone gets the right results. The Secret Service is very tough, very good, very professional, and if you approach them in the right way in the right moment on the right issues, there is very little that can trump them. And that is what you have to aim for. The other thing is never look like you are trying to do something because of the Embassy or because of your personal role or because of anything other than what the Principal wants and needs.

Q: Well, what was the conference all about?

KINNEY: The conference was called the Social Summit, and damned if I can remember. It was one of these mega conferences that the UN was doing in those days, but aimed at things like human rights and women's rights and poverty. Who knows, I wasn't involved in the substance of it.

Q: Like motherhood and apple pie.

KINNEY: Yeah. And it had a declaration at the end of it that everybody agreed to, and then, of course, those declarations become the frame of reference and the terms of reference for the next negotiation or the next event. I think it had an action plan. These things always have action plans, and the action plan serve as a point of reference to go back to five years later and say OK, what have you done? Did you do what you promised?

The action plan always suits somebody's agenda and provides a good rationale for doing what needed to be done anyway, but is given international imprimatur, or whatever. This was sort of a stepping stone to what eventually became the follow up Sustainable Development conference in, I think it, Johannesburg. I get very foggy on all of this because it was essentially a one off event for me, all of a set piece for a few hectic days and the hook by which I was able to get the Vice President to go to Estonia, which was only an hour's flight away.

Q: How did three days with the President's wife...

KINNEY: Well, Al Gore came too. Al Gore showed up, and he was "my old friend," so I took care of him too. We went on the plane together to Tallinn to do the signing on the S&T Agreement. I am sorry I interrupted.

Q: NO, I was just wondering how Mrs. Clinton dealt with various groups and all.

KINNEY: Always very well prepared, very articulate. She speaks real English, unlike many State Department types at that time. Hers was accessible and understandable. She was unfailingly gracious. She had very high expectations. She suffered no fools and no foolishness, but as you know, that is never an issue when it comes down to the moment. Even when things fail, there is no such thing -- there cannot be such a thing-- as failure in the final moments. There never is, or at least in my experience, there never has been. And it is one of the things again that you learn with experience.

Q: Then, when Al Gore arrived, what did you do with him?

KINNEY: He was really there to make public statements about Bosnia. He and Ambassador Peter Galbraith (my old student from Commonwealth) announced a major initiative involving Croatia. What I remember is that at the last moment, I had to run out like a madwoman to track down some suitably sized Croatian flag, which we finally had to take from the Croatian Embassy. At midnight, I was calling up the Croatian

Ambassador, so we could borrow his flag, which was the only one the same size our ours, for the photo op.

But Gore was not in Copenhagen for the Social Summit; that was Hillary's show. However, he was making a nod on the environmental side to the Danes because he was still very much the environmental poobah. The Europeans were already organizing for the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, and he was helping them push their agenda for that.

Denmark was also owed because it was playing a significant role in NATO by creating the Baltic Battalion. The Battalion was their baby, and it was the first efforts to get the Balts into the Western military mold. The Partnership for Peace was very big. The VP was mostly concerned with those kinds of issues in Denmark and in rewarding the Danes for the leadership that they were exhibiting in Bosnia and in NATO. He then did a jump over to Tallinn to do the nuclear S&T Agreement signing the next day. But it was quite a full plate, a very exciting two weeks. And then things simmered down and life went back to normal.

We also had a big Biodiversity Conference while I was there, which was hosted by the Environment Minister Svend Auken, a wild-eyed, self-promoting environmentalist still hoping against hope to become the Socialist Party's Prime Minister some day. My old "favorite badger", Rafe Pomerance, who was the Environment DAS in OES, came out for that event. Rafe was relieved to see me because he had no clue what he was doing; he was a climate man and he hated the UN processes. Any kind of negotiation or meeting with the media made him very uncomfortable. He had been an NGO all of his life, and all of the sudden he was in a situation where every word mattered and landmines you never even knew about could blow up in your face at any time. We did our very best to try to prep that event and educate him about the Danish game and the Danish Scandinavian role in all the environmental stuff, but it was really more than he wanted or could take in and retain on short order. I was ready when he asked me to please come with him and do most of the talking at the meeting.

Probably the most important action I initiated at the end of the first year was a ten page memo to Washington, laying out all of the problems I could identify institutionally and structurally that were designed to undermine and ensure failure of the Regional EST function if they were not addressed. I never got a response to it. It never got acknowledged, but the reality is, over the next couple of years, almost everything that I had identified did start being addressed one way or another: a person in OES was designated to be responsible for hubs. When the next hub was set up, they tried to make sure that it didn't suffer from the same debilities that the one in Copenhagen had encountered: budgets were developed and fenced off; travel budgets were provided; coordination with the regional bureau desks improved and the bilateral posts were instructed to give due consideration to the Regional Counselor's leadership and advice.

My successor was wonderfully successful, got huge budgets and programs and real projects. David Molinaux did a fabulous job. So my satisfaction was that I pioneered it; I found out a lot of what was wrong and recommended the fixes. Notwithstanding all this,

we were able to accomplish quite a number of useful things. However, I discovered my very low tolerance for “smoke and mirrors” after a certain time. I mean “smoke and mirrors” always has its utility, but three years of “smoke and mirrors”...

Q: You are talking about “smoke and mirrors” meaning creating something out of nothing.

KINNEY: Creating something out of nothing. I was really exhausted and tired, and I just could not bear to make another trip to another capital with just talk. It was embarrassing.

Q: Where was Douglas during all of this?

KINNEY: He was in Chad. He was the DCM there under Larry Pope in N’Djamena. They had problems of their own. You could see back then the seeds of what you are seeing on television in Chad and Sudan today. But that is another whole story you have to get him to tell you.

My daughter and I went down for Christmas for 13 days the first year. The excruciating bureaucratic torture we went through to establish her right to a flight to see her father aside, our Christmas in N’Djamena in 1995 was one of the most wonderful Christmases I have ever spent in my life. But I will let Doug tell that one. Came back

I think the fact that there came to be 12 environmental hubs-- maybe there are more now-- and that they had real programs, and real program resources, real purpose and focus was an important outcome of those three challenging years in Copenhagen.

Q: I realize this was not your thing, but you were at an embassy. How did the Danes from your observation view the mess in the Balkans at the time, the split up of Yugoslavia?

KINNEY: The Danes got it. A very interesting phenomena emerged while I was there. Scandinavia, as you know, is noted for its pacifism, its peaceism. They are rather like the Dutch in their disapproval of American intervention in places like Vietnam and self-righteous about their welfare model (Never mind that they have had to start dismantling it because they can’t afford it.). While we were there, the Baltic Battalion was something that the Danes helped pioneer. They were able to channel all of that negative energy into something very positive, which is called peace keeping and peace keeping troops. They are very good at it. It fit their moral frame, and they have developed a great deal of skill in terms of techniques and know-how in this sort of thing. They have certainly punched way above their weight in influencing European thinking on these topics. The interesting phenomenon to which I referred was the fact that an increasing number of Danish males started going into the military and coming out either wanting to continue in the military or lauding its value, which in the post WWII, Cold War environment in Scandinavia was a real surprise and turnaround.

The amateur psychologist part of me says this was a Viking culture that had been seriously defanged and feminized with men were being turned into housewives, and all of

a sudden young men started to find their inner Viking and liked it. It was a validation both in terms of valor and honor and courage, discipline. Things that guys like and that they flourish under. I have not been able to follow it since, but there were a number of research and media stories on this, which I just found fascinating. The Scans, in general, really took up the cudgels on peacekeeping, and that has been their standing contribution in all of these quasi-conflict or conflicted reconstruction environments since then. They are really good at it. They are good strong NATO partners and allies, do wonderful training.

Q: Well, you left there when?

KINNEY: In '97.

Q: Whither?

KINNEY: Back to Washington. I came back to take the Latin American brief in S/P, the Office of Policy Planning. I was hired by Jim Steinberg -- had an interview with him and everything -- and, happened to me three or four times in my career, by the time I got into the job, the person who hired me had left. The new political appointee was Greg Craig, who has most recently made the newspapers because he was Obama's Counsel and was fired not too long ago. A very well known lawyer of the Democratic stripe in Washington, DC. Interesting guy. Passionate about Latin America, but he was clueless when it comes to accomplishing something at State--or probably in any other government setting. He's more suited to being a high powered, independent lawyer.

Q: He is now Deputy Secretary.

KINNEY: Not Craig, but yes, Steinberg is now one of two Deputy Secretaries and purported to not be happy with having to share his function with Jack Lew. Steinberg left S/P before I arrived and went to the NSC and then to the think tanks when the Republicans took over. Now, it is a Democratic administration, so he is back in. When Greg Craig took over S/P, Luigi Einaudi was still there, and Luigi is one of those icons and mythical figures dating back to the Kissinger days. Luigi and I have known each other for years--since the days he "held court" in ARA as head of its Policy Office. He had an octagonal coffee table in his S/P office, which Secretary Rodgers had given him. When Luigi left S/P about three months after I arrived, he willed it to me and it sits in my attic office now, a fond reminder of that wonderful and amazing man.

I only stayed six months in S/P because it was evident that it was a joke and there was nothing that I could usefully do regarding Latin America, and I definitely wasn't going to get promoted out of there.

I let it be known in the halls that I was discontented and available, and Melinda Kimball, called to offer me a surprising and somewhat worrisome opportunity. She wanted me to be the new Executive Director for OES, which was a double portfolio that also included being ExDir for the Bureau of Democracy, Labor, and Human Rights (DRL).

My mouth dropped. She said, "I am firing John Macgruder and I want you to do this." I said, "Well, I have to think about it. You know I have zero experience. I haven't even been in an admin function since 1985. This is not just one needy bureau but two! In fact, they are one of the two weakest and most problematic bureaus in the Department." She said, "Well, I need your help. John Campbell is my PDAS (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary), and he will be your contact, and he will be there if you need him." So I asked around for a couple of days. I knew the Deputy in that office, a long-suffering civil servant, and I knew that he assumed he would become the Executive Director when John Macgruder died. I was worried about that. I knew it was an all Civil Service operation. I knew what EX's were like sociologically and culturally-- just huge problems.

Q: One problem being different attitudes and different outlooks or different experience.

KINNEY: All of the above, plus for OES and DRL, under resourced. There was a particular challenge in this case because although the lower levels were products of the DC schools, the Division Chiefs were all leftovers from the Department's old, "black" Continuity of Government program. This program used to be blacker than the ace of spades, but like the tunnels at the Greenbrier, it had emerged in light and had become more and more public knowledge and then eventually abolished. When they abolished it, the person who administered that program became the Executive Director for OES, and he brought all of his people with him. Their perspective was that they ran the bureau, which, of course, they didn't, and that "those people across the hall"-- meaning the policy offices and the substantive policy officers -- were the problem. And because all the ExDir staff was civil service, they really didn't like the Foreign Service.

I knew they were especially not going to like an FSO in as EX, especially one who had not come up through the ranks of budget and fiscal, human resource, general services and IT side of the ledger. But I figured at least it was real job, and it was something that really needed to be done. S/P and its Director were jokes. It did neither policy nor planning, especially under Greg. With all due respect, he was a nice guy, really sweet, thoughtful, respectful, but didn't belong where he had been put. One of the big problems with S/P over the years is that it lives on the legend of George Kennan, but it has no real rule or purpose.

Q: George Kennan the originator of S/P. But it has been used as speech writers or dumping ground.

KINNEY: Exactly, and increasingly politicized with lower-level political payoffs as civil servant appointments. Lee Feinstein was the other Latin American portfolio person besides Luigi, who left. Lee was an endless source of silly to ridiculous ideas about how to control illegal arms trafficking in Latin America and how to encourage an enhanced Latin American security arrangement. Lee was also a Vassar graduate, and a lower level schedule C type. I don't know how he got in there, but he stayed on forever, for a really long time. He was going through a nasty divorce. But, thanks to Hilary, about six months

ago he was made ambassador to Poland. So he parlayed his first political appointment under Albright into a better one for himself.

There was another guy there, a public diplomacy person, who was in exile because he had gotten in some serious trouble with the neo-cons. Well, he was a neo-con himself and they were hiding out and laying low during the Clinton administration. When they reemerged with Bush II, I had a pretty good preview of what was going to happen because I had known this guy and watched him operate out of S/P, particularly on the Iran opposition legislation, which he was not supposed to be doing but was mucking around in his spare time with his U.S. and Israeli allies. Really interesting. Nothing is ever lost, although it may seem so at the time. You never know what you are going to learn that proves to be useful later on. But back to OES and EX.

Q: OES?

KINNEY: Yes. OES/EX, the Oceans, Environment and Science Executive Directorship. I went back to Melinda after three days and said I would take the job. I had talked with the disappointed Deputy Director. It was evident that if he didn't get the directorship, he was moving on. God rest his soul, he died about two years later. Young guy, really sad for his family. But I became the Executive Director and spent two of the toughest years of my life, although I learned a lot that has served me well thereafter because I spent all of that time mastering the strategic planning process. I was able to double or triple --I can't remember-- both the number of people and the budget for each of my bureaus, OES and DRL.

I learned a lot about the institutional infrastructure problems at State, and developed a lot of the convictions I hold today about the institutional issues that are dysfunctional and are hampering our efforts to have a 21st century Diplomatic Service of the United States. The fights were spirited and they were waged with a whole bunch of new friends, a network to which I had not been exposed since FLO days, all the EX directors.

One of my little campaigns was to try to shift the language. There has been a long standing divide in the Department between "substantive bureaus" (the geographic bureaus), and "functional bureaus." Functional bureaus are mostly Civil Service; geographic bureaus are mostly Foreign Service. Geographic bureaus are what they suggest. They are regionally defined and focused and they "own" the embassies and consulates and all resources dedicated to them within their geographic regions abroad. Functional bureaus are not at all well described by their name. Half of them are management support functions, and should be known as the management bureaus or the support bureaus or the management family bureaus such as A(Administration), RM(Resource Management), HR(Human Resources), IRM(Information Resources Management), NFATC(National Foreign Affairs Training Center, including FSI, the Foreign Service Institute), etc. The other half of the so-called functional bureaus are really policy bureaus. They are the global issues policy bureaus. Since I was in charge of two of these bureaus, I decided to start referring to them as global policy bureaus, which got noticed and started being copied by other functional EX's. I don't know that it stuck,

but for a couple of years thereafter, I kept getting reports that the geographic bureaus were upset because the “so-called policy bureaus” were taking over at headquarters. The 19th century mindscape and antiquated structure that is today the Department of State is something I think still needs to be dealt with.

Q: You mentioned something that I never had to really deal with it, but we hire for civil service basically locally. In Washington, D.C., you have one of the country’s poorest educational systems as your primary talent pool.

KINNEY: The Department of State is now representative of the DC school system at the staff support level, a wasteful crime in my book. You’ll recall, as I do, what Torrey Whitman cautioned me back in 1979 when I was working in the DG’s office: “Stephanie, you have to understand. Jimmy Carter has decided to use the federal government as a jobs program for the disadvantaged, so don’t stress excellence too much. His decisions will affect government service for the next 20 years or so.”

Q: I keep trying to do something about it, but you have the prejudice issue because the D.C. talent pool is mainly African American.

KINNEY: This would be my suggestion: This is a national institution. The Foreign Service Act of 1980 requires that it be representative of the United States. Personally, I think it should be representative of the best of the United States. The Foreign Service is already required to recruit nationally. I don’t know why the Department of State as a whole should not be required to recruit nationally through the same selection process and subject to the same evaluation and subject to the same mobility requirements. In other words, the needs of the Department are inconsistent with the 1950’s Civil Service personnel system, which is simply dangerously out of date and inadequate to today’s requirements.

Q: I know over the years I was an FSO. Of course, my experience is now dated, but if you made a call to get something done and you had sort of what Washington called at that time a “black accent,” you’d think, Oh God, am I talking to somebody who has the experience and practically the smarts to do what needs doing?. Usually your suspicions were correct. Very definitely second rate performance capabilities.

KINNEY: When Torrey Whitman warned me about his sense of what Carter was doing with the federal work force in the late 70’s, he was spot on. He warned that the standards were going to be brokered at every level in the name of equal opportunity, and to just get used to it. We were going to have to start remediating once people get in, he said, and he was absolutely correct. The problem is we have never remediated or been honest about the consequences of that decision.

The way the Civil Service is structured and the way it operates is dysfunctional. But the FS is not much better now. There are very few FSOs who have ever been interested, willing, or able to operate outside of their own narrow environment. Few have any care

whatsoever for the larger institution and for State as an institutional base. Like it or not, you cannot fix the Foreign Service without first fixing the Department of State.

Q: I might tell you to qualify that even more that I would say I used to say 10% maybe 20% of the Foreign Service people that one is exposed to are really interested in the Foreign Service per se as a profession. I mean it is how to get promoted and how to move up. I mean it is a bunch of hard charging people who only measure success by that ambassadorial title, which is pursued at all costs.

KINNEY: Your comment is interesting. As we speak, I am doing a tabulation and analysis of two surveys that AFSA has sent out and has gotten stunning responses to. The question that I just finished tabulating last week was question number six for the entry level officers. Question number six was, "What attracted you to the Foreign Service?" We had 394 written comments and responses. Only 12 used any form of the word diplomacy, diplomat or diplomatic in their answer. You want to know what the other reasons were? Adventure, excitement, living abroad, secure job and benefits, travel, travel, travel, and service.

On the core values question: The reason we asked about core values is because we had a 2000 sample to compare it to. At that time, when you asked if the Foreign Service had core values and, if so, what were they. The seniors almost universally said "yes." They named high minded values like loyalty, intellectual integrity, service, those kinds of things. I have the list. It is all on the web. The mid-level people were doubtful whether the Foreign Service had core values and when asked to name them overwhelmingly named negative values such as kiss up kick down, don't rock the boat, things like that. When asked, the entry level people, who were six weeks out of A-100, said that they weren't sure, they didn't think so, but they guessed that if they did, they were in this order 1)hard work, 2)EEO diversity and 3) teamwork. Stark differences.

Now those Junior Officers in 2000 are now the mid-level cadre that we are surveying in 2010. The first question is "Does the Foreign Service have core values? If so what are they?" The second question is "Does the Department of State have core values? If so what are they?" We asked this because the Foreign Service is an institution within a larger institution. In the 2000 sample, no one believed the Department of State had core values. There was a range of opinion as to whether the Foreign Service did and what they were. We asked the same question of the mi-level group today and interestingly, hard work is still one of the things being named. Service is named, loyalty is named and then the answers are all over the place. (See Addendum II: Question Response Summary.)

In fact, technically speaking, the Department of State does have core values, but no one has ever heard of them. Do you know where they are and what they are? There are five of them. Way too many for any practical purpose or use. There should never be more than two or three so that they can be remembered and integrated into the corporate language and culture. Well, State's core values are published in the State Department strategic plan, but few have ever read that either. Only one out of 500 of the junior officers knew about them and named them. The interesting thing now is that the JOs are saying that the

State Department has core values, although they remain foggy about what they are; however, none of them believes that the FS has core values. In other words, it is a total reverse from almost ten years ago.

Q: Well, are you looking at a comparable examination of civil servants who reached officer rank?

KINNEY: No, because this is an AFSA survey, and AFSA doesn't have a reach to the Civil Service. I agree completely that it needs to be done. I think people would be shocked.

I know that one of the things that my tour as Executive Director brought home to me full force was the vehemence and antipathy of the Civil Service towards the Foreign Service, which was embodied most particularly in my long-term personnel officer, Pat Miller. And similarly my B&F officer. They felt persecuted. They hated what they thought to be the FS dilettantism. They regarded the "policy people" as the problem. And in fairness, I know many FSOs, who think the reverse, that the CS system at State is the problem.

My first week on the job I had a number of things that I needed to know and learn about, and I discovered there was no bureau Service Request Form for either OES or DRL. So if somebody had a problem or a support need, they had no way of communicating it to EX, except through private personal channels. I was outraged. So I quickly drew up my own little form, checked with my IT guy and announced we were going to link it to a data base to keep track of action requested and completed. Several of my staff got irate at the idea that they would be at the beckon call of all those officers "across the hall." I was dumbfounded and bluntly told them that the officers across the hall were the reason they had a job, and if they had a problem with that, they could look for work elsewhere, starting now. That was the end of that discussion.

Q: IT is?

KINNEY: Information technology. When I came into the EX job in 1997, virtually no one in the Department had internet at their desk, for security reasons. We were still on the old proprietary WANG word processing system I had first reviewed in 1978! We had two word processing systems -- a classified and an unclassified system-- and never the twain should meet. In EX, I had three systems. I had the unclassified system on which most administrative support work was done; I had classified system for substantive classified material, and then there was a third system in which most B&F and HR data base and systems operated.

Bonnie Cohen, the Under Secretary for Management, was appalled at this situation and got something that came to be known as "the black box." This was about the time I came into EX. When I heard about what she had done, I thought "OK. There is no reason that everybody in the Department, including myself, cannot have access to three systems with a black box that could switch among the systems." If M has it, there is no security problem. I also knew that back in the days when Rio was being negotiated, my IT guy

had somehow or other managed to get a T-1 line, without anybody realizing the implications of what he was doing. This was a very important line. It was essentially a broadband line that would enable us to carry a lot more data and do a lot more than standard wiring. So, we had actually had the needed wiring in OES -- unlike any other bureau in the Department -- only no one knew it except Mike and I.

Long story short: OES became the first bureau to have black boxes. I got the money and I got the installation because of Michael Bishton, bless his heart. Michael was the one who put in the T-1 and knew all about it and knew how to engineer it. We got it done with the blessing of Diplomatic Security and with IRM. We also had the Department's first video conference room and capability. I remember inviting Wendy Sherman, who was Albright's surrogate at the time. We had champagne and strawberries and a really nice time. Pat Kennedy and all the other Management poobahs were there with their jaws dropping about such an advanced capability in the Department.

I wanted OES to become known as a happening, cutting edge bureau. We had cutting edge issues and technology to match. And people began to sit up and take notice. Compared to the video conferencing technology available today our little demo project was pathetic, but at least it was striving and showed people what could be done. It took the geographic bureaus another ten years to get with the video conference program, but Glen Johnson latched onto it, bought a much more sophisticated system and started using it in the Bureau of Verification and Compliance. And he eventually became one of the drivers behind the new Smart messaging system.

Learning IT lingo and capabilities and how to work with wireheads like Mike and Glen was very timely and important. Also the USIA integration got under way, and I was on one of those task forces. I discovered that one of the things the EX directors in OES in those days did was negotiate international fish agreements. Don't ask me why the fish people didn't; probably because MacGruder wanted to keep control of the money involved. Anyway, I had to go to Lisbon and do the North Atlantic Fishery Agreement, as well as the Great Lakes agreements because we were responsible for administering a lot of money that got passed to State for that purpose.

And then there was my other responsibility, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. I had to get its new Assistant Secretary read in and broken in and prepared to function within the Department for strategic planning, budget and other resources, none of which he was really interested in but nonetheless came to see as important. That was Harold Coe, an international human rights professor at Yale, who is now back at the White House working for Obama. (He subsequently became the head of the Legal Affairs Bureau (L) at State in the Obama administration.)

I was responsible for the DRL budgets, personnel resources, the IT infrastructure and the budget planning, strategic planning. When Coe came in he was wonderful. He was an action can-do guy. One of the significant things about DRL was that in two years we watched its budget go from practically nothing to \$20 million for democracy and human rights projects. It is now \$200 million. In just two years, I watched "unfunded mandates"

micromanaged from Congress in the form of earmarks but with no money behind them go from 72 to 192. It tells you a lot about the Congressional-State dysfunctionality, and unreality.

Q: IN other words these were things to do...

KINNEY: Things that we had to do for which nobody provided resources.

Q: So what happened? Did they just get filed away?

KINNEY: Well pretty much. The Department just ignores it because you have to rob Peter to pay Paul. Unfortunately, we never say, “no” or get rid of anything old. We just let the new mandates pile up and say yassuh, yassuh, hit me again. It is utterly dysfunctional, utterly dishonest, utterly disingenuous and a testament to needing to tear down and start all over again in my view. Because I started making a big deal of these unfunded mandates, when I saw Charlie Brown a couple of years later, he laughed and said, “You want to guess how many mandates we are up to now?”

I was trying to get the Department to stand up and say, “We are happy to do this, but we can’t do it without resources,” but they wouldn’t. The Congressional perspective was that we’ll tell you what to do and that means you will have to get rid of something else, but that never happened. You know that once you make resources available to people and set up a bureaucracy to do something, it is very difficult to fire it and make it go away. That is not an excuse.

Q: I would think there would be all sorts of collisions. Senator So and so’s earmark to push hog bellies into Patagonia or something like that, the State Department isn’t taking it seriously.

KINNEY: Oh, it happens. But again Senator So and So can go to his constituents and say, “Well, I legislated it. Look at this. It is the nasty State Department that is not following through.” It is a vicious circle. It has been around a long time. There is nothing that is going to change it. But God Bless Robert Gates. Because of the disasters in Iraq and Gates’ own analysis of where the national security is at risk, he has made an issue of the deterioration of our State’s infrastructure and the Foreign Service over the last five years or so.

Q: Gates is presently Secretary of Defense.

KINNEY: Yes he is presently Secretary of Defense. We will just have to see whether this holds. I read in Sunday’s paper an article on Obama’s speech to the West Point graduating cadets this year entitled, “A Visions For Diplomacy.” I so very much wanted to write the post and say that this is all well and good, but it is meaningless if there is not an infrastructure or a resource base and properly educated and trained people to make it happen operationally.

Q: How long were you in ...

KINNEY: In the Executive Director office? I was there for two years. I was absolutely totally exhausted beyond belief after that. We accomplished a lot. I was very proud of it, but I was also tending to be in a state of permanent anger over what I was seeing all around me. The tour got me promoted and also, at some point, got me an offer of an Ambassadorship to Surinam. The D Committee was given my name and decided to offer me the Embassy in Paramaribo, but I thanked them kindly and said, "NO, my family situation did not permit it now, maybe later." But, of course, it is unusual for there to be a second offer at the golden ring. I was frankly not interested in spending two years of my life in Surinam and I was conflicted about the thought of asking Douglas to accompany me as a spouse.

I didn't know what I wanted to do next because Douglas had not made it into the Senior Service and had had to retire. I was promoted as a result of my work in OES-DRL/EX, but I was also coming up on the six year rule, which would require me to go overseas again, and I did not want to do that to Douglas, who was devastated by having his career cut short.

I looked into Senior Seminar and they told me "no." Then I got this call from Rea Brazil saying, "Now we want you to come to the Senior Seminar. The Senior Seminar, which has since been discontinued, was at that time was the Department's highest level executive development experience. It was a nine month program for 15 FSOs from State and 15 from agencies around Washington, particularly the Defense Department. CIA, National Security Agency, AID, USIA, and the civilian side of DOD at the Department of Defense. I think we also had an energy person and maybe one from Treasury. Ours was the 42nd class. The next to the last class.

The concept behind the Seminar was that you had spent your career overseas, and it was time to get to know your own country again. So the heart of the nine month experience was a series of domestic trips organized and focused by the members of the Seminar to different regions of the United States, basically Boston and New York (finance and education and technology), the Midwest(Agriculture), the South (immigration, drugs, aging, African American issues, the Blues and the port of New Orleans), Alaska and Washington State (Hanford again, Silicon Valley, and the crazy Alaskan frontier), the Southwest (Native American culture and thugs and drugs and the national labs of Sandia and Los Alamos) and then California and Hawaii because we had a submariner, who had just come out from Hawaii and was hell bent for leather to get us out to the submarine base in Honolulu. Bless him! I actually got to "drive" a nuclear submarine, an awesome experience. I cannot tell you to this day how valuable those trips were and how much I learned on them. They were stunning.

If I were in charge of the world, I would make that the beginning of formation for diplomatic service officers in the 21st century. If you don't first know your own country and have a real feel for its people and diverse economies and cultures, you don't belong to be an American diplomat. And yet this is done at the end of your career. And today it

is no longer done at all! The Seminar was abolished two years later in order to provide a two week management training course to everyone.

The other part of the Seminar was bringing in the best, biggest names in all sorts of areas on all sorts of issues, across the board from education to religion to demographics to technology. Another component was little training sessions with the media, each giving congressional testimony and stuff like. Then you had a month-long period dedicated to your research project. You were not supposed to do anything related to the State Department, but I chose to ignore that dumb guideline.

Why have all this brainpower and all this investment in these people, and focus them on exploring exotic religions or herb growing? It made no sense to me. The only thing I was really interested in was to see if my anger and my perspective on things was singular. Was I the person who was out of step or did other people have the same concerns? I ended up doing a project that was called "Developing Diplomats for 2010." It had four questions that I addressed to 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 to very senior, mid-level and junior FSOs and wrote up the results. It became something of a Samizdat itself, transmitted around the globe by people who got copies and e-mailed it to friends. I also managed to get it on the web by publishing it on the American Diplomacy website, hosted by the University of North Carolina. I knew we were coming into an election. I knew the Secretary of State, didn't know who it would be and didn't really care. I just hoped he would care more about the institution than Albright had.

For starters, I learned through the research process that I was not the only one who was upset, angry and disturbed by the institutional deterioration of this Department and the Foreign Service. The survey elicited a lot of really good ideas, which were feasible to implement. I came up with 30 recommendations. Many of them were, in fact, eventually implemented under Powell, who was one of the people to whom a copy was sent by our Ambassador in Beijing.

The moment for the Report was right, and it set off another group, five guys who came to me and asked if would I like to join them. We became known as SOS for DOS, the SOS being a distress signal; DOS was the Department of State. They were just talking; I proposed actually doing something. I wrote the first draft of a letter that they played with and eventually settled on and published. We got it signed by 1600 people from ambassadors to civil service secretaries. The letter and another set of ideas and recommendations were then presented to the next Secretary of State, who turned out to be Colin Powell. The letter and the SOS group was one of the reasons when Powell came in his first day at State he announced that he was not only going to be a CEO, but that he was also going to be the Department's COO, Chief Operating officer. As a military man, he understood the importance of taking care of your troops and your institution.

In fact, Powell actually delegated the COO role to Rich Armitage, but for the next four years he and his team did work very hard to make tactical -- if not strategic-- improvements. Unfortunately, 9/11 happened and refocused everyone on the challenges it presented.

The biggest thing Powell was able to accomplish was the first step in transforming the Department's IT infrastructure so by the time he left, everybody had Internet at the desk. Marc Grossman became the DG for a year and changed Personnel (PER) to Human Resources (HR), but Marc only stayed six to eight months and then he became Undersecretary for Political Affairs. Again, the proverbial problem of no long-term, visionary operational leadership at State. I think we need a permanent Undersecretary for Operations, with a tenure of six years to bridge political administrations, who is responsible for the institution. The Secretary of State will never be interested enough or stay long enough to really care for the institution.

Institutional infrastructure and corporate culture are everything. If you don't keep them vibrant and updated, you have no hope of turning your talk into walk. You have no hope of turning strategic vision into operational reality, and that is the great challenge. Powell made a small difference, but then 9/11 happened and that changed everything, and now we are in the 21st century still operating with a 20th century organizational approach.

Q: Well, I am looking at the time and it is probably a pretty good place to stop.

KINNEY: Well, I'd like to wrap this up. In the Spring of 2000, I went from the Senior Seminar to a secret assignment for six month's in which I was the Department's liaison to the Hart-Rudman Commission, where I managed to get some strong recommendations included aimed at increasing diplomatic readiness through adequate staffing and other resources, plus the blasphemous thought that it was time to let the 19th century British Foreign Service model go and create a 21st century Diplomatic Service of the United States. Unfortunately, the initiative, which produced the finest analysis and foundational text ever done by the US government, got ignored because it had largely been a Republican backed initiative. Only 9/11 brought it back to light because the Commission had correctly identified Homeland Security as the greatest risk and had laid out a series of ideas how to deal with it, hence DHS.

With Powell's help, State got commitment to a 15% training float and the first increase of Foreign Service resources in 25 years. But that was all quickly eaten up in Iraq and in Afghanistan, so we are going through exactly the same exercise again under Secretary Clinton. But having spent six months working sort of surreptitiously, I wanted to do something I really believed in because of its institutional implications, which was the creation and establishment of something to be called the United States Diplomacy Center. It was to be an interactive museum and educational conference center located at the 21st street entrance of State. I worked on that for about six months, writing Powell's statement of support, benchmarking similar scale projects and developing a business plan for the project. However, when 9/11 happened, I knew the project wasn't going anywhere. More to the point, the Civil Servant who was in charge of it, Betsy Murphy in public affairs, hated the Foreign Service, did not tell the truth, and I just simply could not work under those circumstances, so I left.

Dick Shinnick in M asked for my help in “reinventing” the GAO Liaison function at State. Somebody who had been there for 15 years had finally left, and the function needed a serious renovation. So I reinvented the GAO Liaison Office function for the new Bureau of Resource Management (RM), which was headed up by Chris Bernham, a political appointee with modern financial experience who did fantastic things. He was a Wall Street man and really knew what he was doing and started the process of turning the outmoded old FMP into what is now RM. The RM Bureau is now the strategic planning center for State that Sid Kaplan still heads up. Armitage started aligning and integrating the strategic planning process and its bureau performance and mission performance plans.

But I had to get a real job, and in the post 9/11 world, the real job was obviously counter-terrorism. They needed a deputy for the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT). I applied and was hired by the current Coordinator, a retired General Taylor. However, once again, by the time I came on board, his successor, Cofer Black, a retired CIA covert operations officer notorious for hunting Ben Laden, was the new Coordinator.

Cofer had been chased in Africa by Osama bin Laden. He is the one who promised George Bush to bring Bin Laden’s head back in a box. He was a remarkable man with remarkable stories in many ways, but perhaps we should make that the subject of my last session --my experience in S/CT. S stands for Secretary’s Office, CT is coordinator for counter terrorism, and why I left the foreign service in 2003.

Q: Today is 6 June 2010 with Stephanie Kinney. Stephanie, we left you in the Department working on management type things, and then you moved over to be a Deputy in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT). This would be when?

KINNEY: Let’s see, I was OES/DRL Executive Director from early 1998 to late 1999 and then the senior seminar. I came into S/CT right after 9/11, so it would have been in the spring of 2002.

Q: Let’s talk about the organization. It has been around.

KINNEY: S/CT had been created in the late 1980’s, essentially to combat Euro-terrorism. Jerry Bremer and probably Tom Mille, who was his junior member, get a lot of credit for the way the office was stood up. At the time, terrorism used as a tool of the left in the developed world was our biggest problem. Notable examples were the Red Brigades in Italy, the Bader Meinhof in Germany, the Red Army in Japan. The West was undergoing a siege from its own homegrown, leftist radicals, who thought they were going to reform the world through armed revolution, using terrorism as a tactic, as a technique. It was part of, in my view, the hubris of the ‘68 Generation and a logical outgrowth of the leftist “revolutionary tradition,” starting really with the French Revolution, the Bolsheviks and all those who were inspired by them thereafter, including the left in Latin America. The use of terror as a (self) justifiable tactic was more prevalent outside of the United States than here although some off-shoots of the SDS and the Civil Rights movement embraced

it at different times. The other organizations that reached out and touched developed world interests with terrorism was the Abu Nidal Fatah element of the Palestine Liberation Organization and Black September in their struggles against Israel.

Q: When you say the '68 generation you are talking about the May, June of '68 en Europe, particularly in France.

KINNEY: Yes. The student uprisings in France, which were echoed throughout Europe, and the hubris of youth that followed when the students did not get their way. In both the U.S. and Europe, "the establishment" was feeling the impact of the post-war baby boom children coming of age in a very different world, especially within the university setting, where freedom and theory reigned supreme. Demographically what had happened was that the ratio between adults to children shifted from 4:1 to 2:1. The number of "civilizers" decreased, while the number of young, hormonal, "barbarians" increased. That is a recipe for social instability in any country at any time.

The massive Youth Bulge in the Islamic world should be what we are focusing on today. This bulge promises to make the 1960's in the West look peaceful, especially when contrasted with the constriction of youth and the increase of the aging and aged in the Western world today. The Islamic youth bulge, especially in the Middle East, means we will not see stability in that region any time soon, especially when combined with the lack of strong, modern institutions in any dimension in that region.

Technology and social norms were changing dramatically in the West and Japan by the late 1970's, and terrorism had become a political problem for the U.S. because of the number of Americans deployed overseas, who became easy terrorist targets. You had the aftermath of Vietnam and the upsurge of enthusiasm for all things leftist or radical, and the rise of the intellectual left in Europe was in its heyday, and people like Abu Nidal saw terrorism as more effective than negotiations for countering Israel. There were lots of people inspired to action, thanks increasingly to the media, particularly young men between the ages of 16 and 38, by definition the most dangerous force on the face of the earth at any time, especially if left without jobs and family ties.

State organized S/CT with the idea of establishing links with other intelligence services, and having a more focused way to track terrorist activity and think about it as a phenomenon to be managed politically, as well as a risk to be managed operationally. As youthful rebellion died down in Europe, peace initiatives emerged in the Basque country in Spain and in Ireland, and Iran shifted support to Hezbollah in a bid for Shia support in Lebanon, attacks on Americans diminished throughout most of the 90's, so S/CT was just another plumb for patronage and not somewhere FSO's wanted to spend much time.

When 9/11 hit, S/CT was not a bureau but rather a small functional office, most often headed by a political appointee (The Counterterrorism Coordinator) responsible for reporting to the Secretary. Hence, the office symbol S/CT; CT stood for counterterrorism. S/CT had become largely a longer-term civil service staff operation under the direct of a string of short-term political appointees. Relevant desks and geographic bureaus actually stood up and ran the task forces and managed any immediate crisis produced by a

terrorist act. S/CT's job was to send its airplane and FEST "response team" when requested, if the plane functioned. This same plane was also the one used for "renditions," perhaps one of S/CT's most important functions to approve and coordinate, but again an "operational" task.

As such, S/CT was the rather narrowly defined optic through which State addressed terrorism. Its most important product was an annual Terrorism Report required by Congress, the content of which was actually basically produced by the CIA but whose roll-out, oversight and delivery to Congress was the responsibility of State. This is to say, State's optic and counter-terrorism response mechanisms were defined more by tactical operational response requirements rather than strategic understanding and initiative taking. At least when I arrived in S/CT, there was absolutely no evidence nor interest in looking at sociological, demographic, ideological or other dimensions, which were triggering this phenomena in new and startling ways within the Muslim world. Nor was there anyone in the office who spoke Arabic, certainly not the long-term, domestic civil servants who formed the majority of the staff.

Q: Where did the PLO and their efforts fit into things?

KINNEY: Part of the same shtick. By the late 90's Abu Nidal, who had long-ago split with Arafat, was still using terrorism in the form of suicide bombers against Israel while living under the protection of Saddam Hussein, who served as a front line state of protection for anyone interested in attacking Israel. Saddam was also providing the money, roughly \$25K a hit, to the families of the suicide bombers, although he came to distrust Nidal's loyalty and probably had him killed shortly after 9/11. That was the Iraqi terrorist connection, not Al Qaeda, which was another phenomenon all together, although one not as "unknown" as Americans seemed to think on September 11, 2001.

Q: Islamic terrorism was really a different kettle of fish.

KINNEY: A different kettle of fish but the same radical socio-psychological stew. Abu Nidal and Black September were the early demonstration and use of terrorism in the context of the Israel-Palestine dynamic. Carlos the Jackal, a Venezuelan bourgeois youth who was associated with Abu Nidal, eventually found his fame in terrorism and became a bit of a plague on the whole European universe. You'll remember the daughter of our best friends in Rome was killed in the attack on Fiumicino Airport in late 1985. That attack was led by Abu Nidal and Black September. She bled out in her father's arms. Her brother was wounded but survived. (Nidal's blood thirst also touched us in another way: the assassination of Israel's Ambassador Argov in the UK, a man whom we knew and whose family we got to know well in Mexico many years before.) The concept of maiming and killing innocents to make a political point was amply defined and demonstrated in those years. It is not at all surprising there has been a return to it in the 21st century, especially in the Muslim world, where the tradition dates back to the Assassins.

Other practitioners in the West were the IRA, the Basque resistance in France and Spain and the FARC in Colombia. Until there was push back in the West in the mid-80's, the intellectual left essentially excused and justified it. Interestingly, the tactic has now been pretty much de-legitimized for use by Westerners in the West. It remains to be seen whether the same will happen within Islamic cultures. Given the number of innocent Muslims killed, one would hope so.

Q: Well also we had a political problem in the States with the IRA. Senator Kennedy....

KINNEY: Ah yes, all those Irish votes. The IRA was largely financed out of New York. It was not something that the majority of America understood or recognized, but it was certainly an open secret on the East Coast. Boston and New York were the largest source of finance and support, "passing the hat for the women and children" in the bars. Bullshit.

Q: Well, no it is _____

KINNEY: Everybody was afraid to alienate votes, to besmirch an entire ethnic group with the behavior of the miscreants and the malfasants, and there was also the Kennedy power base in Boston. Let's speak plainly. And in fairness, there were ultimately some good things to come out of that connection. He was involved in a lot of back channel stuff during the "Irish troubles." Gerry Adams eventually emerged and shifted from one side to the other, over a period of ten to fifteen years of very tedious, largely quiet, behind-the-scenes work. But we had a fair amount of experience with this tactic and especially with the financing thereof. But it was Euro-centric terrorism. It was largely not aimed as massive killing. It was largely aimed at political symbols, at individuals rather than large groups.

I think that was a shocking difference that emerged in 2001-- the magnitude of the vision and the terror. I happened to be in New York in 1993 on a climate negotiating session when the first attack on the World Trade Center took place. And it was understood; Osama Bin Laden was not an unknown name nor unknown threat within the foreign affairs community. However, it was not until 9/11 that he became a household word.

Q: You arrived in S/CT right after 9/11.

KINNEY: I arrived in March or April of 2002. What I observed was that the office was virtually the same as it had been created in the late 1980's. There was nobody in it who spoke Arabic. It had become heavily civil service. There was a group over on Navy Hill of military reservists who were responsible for the FEST, which was the airplane and the unit that handled renditions, something that had been going on for years. It was no surprise, and it was no secret when it suddenly became a big media splash a few years ago. The S/CT budget was very limited. It was just an office, another place where you put political appointees with a sort of a national security, military-type of background.

I was actually hired by General Taylor, who was Colin Powell's man. But by the time I arrived in the office, Taylor had departed to take over Diplomatic Security, and Cofer

Black was pending confirmation. Cofer was never confirmed. They fast tracked him without a hearing. He was Bush's and Rich Armitage's choice. He had been in Afghanistan and just retired from the CIA. He was one of the Agency's star operatives, had indeed been fighting with and being actively pursued and targeted by Osama Bin Laden for quite some years -- first in Africa and then most immediately in Afghanistan. He made a lot of media when he promised the President Bin Laden's head in a box. He was a rather flamboyant character in that sense, and what I would call a classic, old style CIA operative. However, my time with him was not a tour that inspired me nor assured me that we were on the right track.

Q: Right after 9/11, I would have thought there would have been a tremendous beefing up of the counter terrorism function, or did that go somewhere else?

KINNEY: Well, it largely went to the intelligence services and to the military. S/CT had been a backwater in State. It was a 9-5, civil service operation.

Q: Would you explain the connotation to us.

KINNEY: For me, the connotation is that these are people who have stayed in the job since the 80's or 90's. They are very comfortable. They go home at 5:00. They are good people, but their Civil Service culture, evaluation system, etc. has never met what I considered to be a proper standard for the Department. I am a fairly tough critic of the Civil Service as a system and corporate culture, which I believe is totally misplaced at State, especially in the 21st century!

I do not mean to besmirch the people at all. They can't help the system they are caught in. It is the opposite of agile, innovative, and risk taking. As I said, I think it is totally inappropriate to the State Department for the 21st century, but I am known for my tough views on this.

Q: Did you feel that the State Department was almost bypassing, was deliberately being bypassed, or allowed it to bypass or was somebody else in the State Department picking up the ball?

KINNEY: Here is my perspective on that. When 9/11 happened, there was only one institution in Washington with the resources, the agility and the ability to respond, and there was only one service culture that was a "can-do" culture: this was the military. Their downfall was that they were so "can-do" that they didn't know what they didn't know and couldn't do. Not insignificantly, at that time, there was also a broad disdain for the State Department as a "do nothing" organization at DOD and in Washington in general, largely because State could not explain itself to others and not surprisingly, no one really understood diplomacy or what diplomats actually do and how they do it. Interestingly, it was Secretary of Defense Robert Gates who did understand this best and significantly changed perceptions about State in at least some quarters. But it was too late. We'll have to see what happens in 2012.

Back to immediate-post 9/11. There was an NEA (Middle East) cadre at State, and State did eventually get its act together and do a very fine report on the consequences and the requirements for going into Iraq. But it was in State Department fashion at the time -- a day late, dollar short and no real "marketing" behind it. Similarly, the only intelligence unit that got it right about WMD's in Iraq was State's INR bureau. They called the issue absolutely correctly-- the only organization of the 26 member intelligence community to get it right -- but they were outvoted 25 to 1. Quality is everything but it is increasingly regarded as elitist or exclusivist and the untutored wisdom of democracy is preferred.

It was evident to me that almost as soon as they decided to go into Afghanistan, the train was being provisioned and readied to leave for Iraq. I don't ascribe any special prescience to myself, but it was my impression that lots of other people didn't take it as seriously. The civilian side of the government was lumbering and slow; it was frankly confused because we were all emotionally traumatized and panicked by 9/11. I think that has to be said.

When history looks at our response and reactions, what it will see is panic and emotion and false analogies prevailing over cold, hard, deliberate rational information gathering and thinking through of our response processes. History might also record what I had seen when I was in S/P in 1997-'98, which was the consequence of having developed a cadre and a network of people, who under Bill Clinton had advanced the Iraqi Opposition Act and had essentially been aiming for the destruction of Saddam Hussein since that time, but through non-military means. That network, which was largely right of center neo-conservatives (the Neo-Cons), combined with the politics of the era and combined with the shock and really emotionally destabilizing effect of 9/11 led us to respond as though we were still in the 20th century. Our response was a Western, conventional warfare response with Pearl Harbor as the historical reference point rather than something that, in my view, was not quite as straightforward and a good deal more complicated.

My take on Iraq, which occurred while I was in S/CT, was that among a variety of other reasons, State's feeble condition and deteriorated capabilities ensured that the DOD/military perspective and approach became unavoidable. We also had a Secretary, who for all of his many fine qualities, did not choose to resign, but rather stayed loyal. If he had been George Schultz, he would have tendered his resignation, but he didn't. I think that made further inevitable the story that then unfolded. And it unfolded pretty much as people in NEA at State had predicted it would. But that is all past history.

Q: You were in the office of counter terrorism from when to when?

KINNEY: From the spring of '02 until July of '03, at which time I retired.

Q: What were you doing?

KINNEY: I discovered the reason that they were so interested in bringing me in was they had a hidden scandal on their hands. The consequence of 9/11 had been a quadrupling overnight of money flowing into the S/CT budget, the same as happened throughout so

much of the government. But S/CT had neither the staff nor an office structure nor a culture capable of dealing with that reality. Everybody was acting expediently in those days. People were throwing money in the belief that would accomplish something, and that is always dangerous.

S/CT could not spend the money fast enough, and it had hired on contract an ex- Marine, Sam Brinkley, a one person contract to be their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) expert. Sam, having come from the Department of Defense, was an expert in handling large sums of money. So, Sam being very helpful, knew exactly what to do with that money that could not be obligated or executed on time. He created what was in essence a slush fund over at DOE, where the money could be obligated but then turned into “no year” money for purposes of execution, i.e. it could sit there until S/CT could think of a good way to use it. SOO, the money just started piling up. And then Sam started thinking of ways to use it--mostly by hiring contractors to come in and help S/CT meet its new and expanding load of work.

Lo and behold by the time I had got there, Sam had become a Vice President of Wackenhut, because guess from whom Sam was getting all those contract bodies? Wackenhut, Sam was not immoral or malfeasant or anything. This was all expediency. But this was also a disaster waiting to happen. If the Washington Post or the Inspector General had ever gotten word of this, it would have not been a pretty sight. So I was told that my job, among other things, was to fix this. And that was quite a challenge.

What I ended up doing was creating a new division of SCT. It was called P-4 because I was absurdly given responsibility for four Ps--policy, program (that meant money), planning (the strategic plan and the budgeting process), and public diplomacy, which meant preparing the annual counter terrorism report to Congress. You might remember a year later, in the late spring of 2004, the report turned into a major scandal because people questioned its contents, etc. It was very poorly done, and Cofer Black departed S/CT shortly thereafter. None of this surprised me when I read about in Rome, where I had vacationed in retirement. All I could think with a mirthful smile was, “Thank God, I had sense enough to leave!”

The annual report in question had been required by Congress since the 80’s. It was being used, in effect, as a text book for most universities that had any coursework on counter terrorism. The year before I came in, the day that it was supposed to be unveiled, they didn’t have books ready. That had been a major embarrassment for Secretary Powell, who was involved in the roll-out and had egg all over his face because S/CT made the public announcement on the roll-out and the Secretary’s presentation of the report and then he did not have any product to distribute. One of my many jobs was to deliver a quality report on time in 2003. We succeeded very well. But what I discovered was that there was no data base; there was no plan; there was no marketing and that my boss, Cofer Black, the Coordinator for Counter Terrorism, refused to either review it or take it seriously. It considered the report a joke -- a tedious, boring joke at that!

Q: What were people doing?

KINNEY: I don't know. The same thing they had been doing for twenty years, I guess. The agency did all the substantive work, but S/CT was on the hook for it, the responsible party and the public face. So I brought all the parties together. I got them organized; we set a calendar. We had benchmarks. I had deliverables by the month. If you didn't deliver, you got really nasty messages from me. I had no problem picking up the phone and calling your boss and letting him know that things were behind, so we delivered on time. For the first time, we also delivered a shorter summary report, which we made available in a number of foreign languages for broader distribution and we did it in color. It was fabulous, if I do say so myself. I was very proud of it. It was the best report by all accounts that had ever been produced. And it was produced on time. It was marketed, and by the time the report was unveiled, we also had a new data base of people who wanted this and who relied on it, an initial list of somewhere between 1000 and 2000 names and growing.

Q: OK, but what was this particular product?

KINNEY: The product was the Report to Congress. It was a book about an inch thick, on the state of terrorism in the world. It included everything from description of the incidents during the past year to graphs comparing those with the incidents in previous years. It had both a snapshot for the year and a comparative trend line vis a vis the past. It was a list of all the actions that the U.S. government, particularly the State Department and DOD and NCIA, were taking to counteract these kinds of activities. In other words, it was a report on all the programs, and how the money Congress had given us was being used. We included also terrorist finance. That issue was among my responsibilities as well because my new unit was also responsible for identifying and legally designating terrorist organizations for anti-terrorist finance measures. First we had to identify you as an active terrorist organization throwing bombs, etc. Then, we had to identify you as involved in fund-raising and as a terrorism financier. Both activities were illegal and required a legal finding of culpability and S/CT was responsible for doing this.

Q: Well, this terrorist finance later became quite a target didn't it? Or was it seen as...

KINNEY: Well, State essentially lost its role in the game. Juan Zarate, whose name you still hear on the television, was a hungry young man at Treasury, and basically the President just shifted the nod to Treasury and said "You guys take care of this." So State attended inter-agency meetings, but that was about all. S/CT was at the table. We went to the national security meetings and the strategy meetings. Treasury had the lead, but State still had the responsibility for the legal designation that would enable Treasury to take actions against the guilty parties or organizations. The civilian side of the USG has always worked "inter-agency."

Contrary to the many DOD-oriented pundits who emerged after 9/11, the civilian side of the USG has always worked big issues, e.g. climate, through an interagency process. It was just DOD, the intel community and the FBI who tended to live in their own stove-piped worlds that resisted coordination with others. The 20th century, national security

mindset was suddenly given a new lease on life after 9/11 and started calling for a “whole of government” approach as though the rest of us on the civilian side had not been working that way for the last thirty years! Where terrorism was/is concerned, the need is for better integration and balancing of military, national security, and civilian functions such as diplomacy, development, finance, and media awareness, mining, exploitation and messaging. For example, there was no one responsible for so-called “public diplomacy” and handling the media after 9/11. The PD people at State, who spoke Arabic and knew the region culturally, were screaming furiously. They realized first and most urgently, along with the strategic communication people at DOD, the crucial role of the Internet and the media in all of this; they above all understood how it was being used by Al Qaeda and other extremist groups and how flat footed the West was in that regard.

Our government just wasn't prepared institutionally or culturally or technologically or mentally to deal with Islamic extremism. The only thing the leadership knew was World War II and Viet Nam. On the civilian side of the ledger, and certainly at State, there was no well-defined chain of command, flow of resources, strategic plan or anything. There was no clearly defined authority for anything. DOD had the numbers, the resources, the men itching for revenge and steeped in conventional thinking and warfare and with Rummy at the helm, and the Neo-cons in the background, everything suddenly became a nail the over-investment in our military hammer could handle. Washington became military, “hard power” obsessed, and no one thought that “soft power” was relevant or worth spending two dimes or two minutes on. It was a moment in history in which the military grabbed the baton and ran with it, until it was too late and we were mired in two long wars of choice with very uncertain outcomes.

Q: Were you running across the problem that you are referring to that nobody was sort of thinking this thing out.

KINNEY: I will offer as evidence the first thing I did after Cofer Black came on board in November. Having assessed S/CT up close for about two months, I proposed an off site, strategic review for S/CT leadership and was told it wasn't needed. Later on, Cofer told me that my problem was “big think,” and that CT was all about “ops.” What can I say? He said it. I found the memo the other day in my files. I should put somewhere so that history knows somebody, an FSO, was concerned about this. The memo made the case in very specific terms and examples that S/CT was still essentially the office that Jerry Bremer and Tom had set up in 1989 and that it needed a strategic review of its functions, priorities and the skill sets and knowledge now required, a strategic re-thinking and restructuring if you will to manage the issues at hand.

Basically, having worked in the shadows all his life, Cofer wanted an ambassadorial title he could then parley into money, which is what happened. When he told me that my problem was “big think,” I begged to differ, explaining why this was important at the Department of State and for US diplomacy, and we had problems from that time on. About six months later, my Deputy came to me and said that, based on meetings that he had been in but Cofer had cut me out of, he would like to testify on my behalf if I would charge Cofer with sexism in a grievance case. I said I knew what was going on but

grievances were not my style. By the following July, I decided I was tired of being angry, and it was a waste of my time, and it was time to retire.

Q: When you say Ops?

KINNEY: Operations.

Q: I know but what was...

KINNEY: Cofer was not a bad person. He was just what he was-- a CIA operative. He had no tolerance for nor interest in diplomacy. He had no tolerance for the bureaucratic processes of the State Department. He wanted that Ambassadorial title because (as he had the bad taste to explain to me at one point), he was going to show his brother and his sister, both of whom had gone to Ivy League colleges (like me) how far he had come on his little degree from Santa Barbara. He used to complain about having to go out and give speeches for free when everybody else was getting paid. I said, "But Cofer, that is what we do; we are the taxpayer's dollar at work." He was not persuaded.

My other keelhauling with him was over public diplomacy, which was one of my four major responsibilities. Remember the four P's. It hardly seems worth describing now. Suffice it to say that he felt it was inappropriate for S/CT to instigate with other bureaus any effort to begin educating key DOS personnel about Islam, Muslims, the Middle East, etc. He rejected the idea that we needed more and better personnel in S/CT qualified in Arabic and Dari and Farsi. And, as mentioned, the one unavoidable, "public diplomacy" product for which S/CT was officially responsible, the annual terrorism report to Congress, he refused to even look at.

Oh, I just remembered a fifth big responsibility, which was to serve as President of the Organization of American States (OAS) Counter Terrorism Committee (CICTE). It happened that the President's chair fell to the United States during my time in S/CT and there was no one else in the office who spoke Spanish and had diplomatic experience. So, I ended up presiding as President of the CICTE for a year and chaired all the preparatory work for CICTE's Annual Ministerial Meeting, which was held in San Salvador. There I turned the Presidency of the Committee over to my El Salvadoran counterpart, who soon became Foreign Minister. The Committee involved intense hemispheric interaction and diplomacy. We were very intent on keeping South America and Central America solidly with us on our Counter Terrorism posture and measures, and we wanted to see them invoke the Rio Treaty.

Q: An attack on one country is an attack on all.

KINNEY: An attack on one is an attack on all, exactly. The OAS, which has never had a reputation of being the world's most efficient and valuable and productive organization, really stood up and did this right. They put money into it. It was a great honor, and I had a tremendous time. Cofer and S/CT had no idea what I was doing, but what I was doing was holding the southern flank, encouraging them and helping them to organize and

begin to get programs going that would train people throughout the Hemisphere in port security, money laundering investigation techniques, and other kinds of technical training initiatives, which we encouraged but they actually paid for and carried out.

Q: I would think this would go sort of counter to your boss' idea of "ops" means people getting out and...

KINNEY: He didn't have a clue and didn't care. He talked to his CIA friends around the world and that was about all. The one thing I will give him credit for is he was very well connected to the Middle Eastern intelligence community, and he did start going on trips to raise hell over terrorist finance activities, particularly out of Saudi Arabia, where some of the princes were major funders of Al Qaeda. Nobody wanted to admit this; nobody wanted to deal with it. You can't just go in saying, 'I am the United States and if you don't handle your prince, we are just going to pick up our embassy and go home.' You can't do that as much as the American public would like to. So we spent a number of years working on the royal family and the good guys within the family to try to close down the bad ones.

We eventually succeeded. It took about three or four years. But money is fungible, and if you close down one channel, it simply squishes out through someplace else. But you do what you can. S/CT was growing but still quite small, and when I left, it still had no one in it who spoke Arabic.

Another diplomatic initiative I undertook, one that I actually read about in the paper a few days ago, was the Pan-Sahel Initiative across the top of Africa. Bob Perry, who was the principal DAS in the African Affairs Bureau (AF) and I introduced this initiative to Northern Africa. EUCOM, which was DOD's European combatant command, had correctly identified a problem in Africa, the growing presence of Pakistani operatives all across the Sahel and increased money flows and free schools for Arabic. All that empty dessert was proving to be a magnet for jihadist activity. The bottom part of Algeria, the bottom part of Libya, all of Niger, all of Chad and Mauritania and the top part of Mali. So we were sent out to introduce the Pan Sahel initiative because the DOD was about to unilaterally militarize the whole of northern Africa if State did not do something about it.

With no resources and little to offer but warnings about our concerns, Bob and I were sent out to express U.S. concerns, show the State Department flag and ensure that any further DOD initiatives came through that channel or were at least coordinated with it.

We met with the President or the Premier of all the countries just named. I was amused to be actually making "a return visit" to N'djamena, Chad, much to everyone's surprise. Douglas was still well remembered for his tour there, and I was able to pick up some relationships from when I had been down there visiting him on Christmas in the 90's. The German ambassador had returned, and he was a very good source of information. It was fun to see him and his wife again after all those years. In each country, we met with the key leaders and were given warm welcomes as the highest ranking USG officials from Washington most of the countries had had for some time. We explained that what was

envisioned was a “cooperative partnership,” which, among other things, would involve strengthening some elements of each country’s military. I won’t bore with the details.

The one thing we heard consistently from each President was a plea to stop closing down our English language program, from which the USG was withdrawing support at the time. Someone in Washington had decided everybody now speaks English, and we didn’t have to spend U.S. government money on teaching it. We would just let the free market do it; if people wanted to learn English, they could jolly well pay for it. It took several years to get that Washington-centric mindscape reversed!

I remember the president of Niger was particularly troubled because his son was going to be affected, and he wanted his son to learn English. Why were we doing this? He couldn’t understand, and why didn’t we understand what the Pakistanis were doing? Why didn’t we understand what Saudi Arabia was doing? As I had seen in the mid-90’s in Chad, Saudi Arabia had been building mosques and setting up Arabic teaching programs for free all over the Sahel region. And no one had told us before the visit that the USG had decided to kill all its West Africa English teaching programs.

Bob and I came back to the States, and spent two weeks making people absolutely furious with us for raising flags and alarms about closing down our English teaching programs in an area where Islam was on the march and had demographic momentum as well. We got no where. “Sorry, not a priority. Go away!” So the USG killed all the English teaching programs, which we then had to subsequently re-start, which is always more expensive. We are now back in the English teaching game in the Sahel countries.

I have come to look on this period shortly after 9/11 as a very, very important historical moment to be studied. There are good lessons to be learned about what happen when a super power panics and the people in control have no point of reference but another era because they cannot/ do not want to see the new emerging realities on the ground. The people with the most knowledge and insight rarely get brought to the table at moments like this.

Q: I am looking on the table, where we have this book called “The Legacy of Ashes” about the CIA over the last 40 years or so. Many of them seem to be a carryover from WWII.

KINNEY: Exactly, we always seem to be fighting the last war.

Q: Anything goes, and if it doesn’t work out, we will try again. Whereas in a long term thing, if something doesn’t work, it may be counterproductive to the extreme. We seem to be driven by that great American thing “Don’t just stand there, do something.”

KINNEY: Yeah, and that is part of the problem with the imbalance between the military and the diplomatic or civilian institutions and strengths. The U.S. military is optimistic and “can-do” to a fault. I love them dearly, but....

And now (2010) actually, they have begun to realize the limits of bullets against big ideas. Who is the biggest advocate of diplomacy in this town right now? Secretary of Defense Bob Gates, who is encouraging his troops to learn and study diplomacy and the diplomatic method more than is the State Department. The State Department doesn't study it at all, doesn't teach it and prepares no one. We take junior officers in, give them five weeks of A-100, a language if they are lucky, and send them out and wonder why there are so many problems at post and in the Department. It is inexcusable.

Our military officers, in contrast, are now getting online Masters degrees in diplomatic studies. I don't know if you heard one of the news reports the other evening. It featured a 27 year old army captain in Afghanistan; his conclusion was that he was actually a provincial ambassador for the United States. He probably has had more training, learned more, and actually now understands better than a lot of people on the civilian side of our government.

Q: People on the civilian side don't come in with anything unless they picked it up at a previous post.

KINNEY: Exactly.

Q: During this post-9/11 period, at the top of the State Department we had Colin Powell, who was the general of all generals, and Rich Armitage, who also came from a military background. Did you find was there any sort of attempt at State to look at this phenomenon of Islamic terrorism, the root causes and how to go about dealing with it?

KINNEY: Yes and No. Prior to the invasion of Iraq, State had a well-known and regarded Iraq Study Group, which produced a report that warned about the need for a post-invasion plan and the political fractures present in Iraqi culture. But the report was published late and its findings were "inconvenient." Rumsfeld famously later found comfort in excusing certain actions as a result of "the unknown (as opposed to known) unknowns." In the case of Iraq, I am afraid there were too many people with power who were not really interested in ideas contrary to their own, and, of course, one's ideas tend most often to be based on based on what one knows. It is the rare person who stops to ask, "What do I not know? What do I not understand?"

There is something I may have mentioned it earlier but that bears repeating in this context. From the mid-90's going forward, I observed on many occasions the growing disdain within the military--especially at the colonel level -- for the Department of State.

Q: Why so?

KINNEY: I have not studied it, nor can I give you any kind of definitive answer, but this is the impression I got from climate issues and others. The military is trained to the hilt to respect civilian control. They are operators. They are executors. They are mission driven. The only thing they want to know is "What is it you want me to do?" What that means is "What is the policy under which I am operating?" Ambiguity gives the military a case of

the hives, and yet often in diplomacy it represents an important value and can be used to good effect. The military lives in a world of black and white; diplomats are more accustomed to a range of grays.

An example that comes to mind involved the Arctic Council. The military was very concerned about the potential constraints and precedents that could be set vis a vis the Arctic, because of what was going on in the climate negotiations and other fora. There were all sorts of inter-agency meetings, and DOD sent their people. State chaired the meetings, and finally one day there was an explosion at the table from the two military reps: "Look, we just want to know what the policy is, and State will not be clear on this. State refuses to make a decision."

That frustration was repeated around town 14 times a day, seven days a week. By the late 90's/early 2000, they also viewed Bosnia as "Madeline's War," and they were angry about the fact that State had sent them to war in Bosnia, once again with their hands tied behind their backs; they wanted to fight WWII--they wanted the Battle of the Bulge. They didn't want this weird kind of internecine, civil conflict with ethnic cleansing and failed state stuff. They--particularly at the colonel level-- loathed the State Department. They disdained it. They thought that it was useless, thought that it was stupid, because it wasn't their culture. And there were so many of them, who was to tell them they were wrong?

At State, few people had any military experience and interface, because you only got it if you worked NATO or Pol-Mil or you had gone to the war college. People who had gone to the war college understood the military and respected them. We got along just fine. But in the working environment, the State people were as bad and disdainful of the military as they were of us, again because they had no understanding of nor appreciation of the military culture.

So you just had two cocks in a barnyard constantly fighting each other; only the source of cocks from DOD were a lot better cared for and resourced than those from the Department of State. So guess whose knives were sharper and who generally won those battles?

If you keep that 2000-2001 environment in mind and then 9/11 happens, there is a strong impetus for believing that the military is the only and sharpest knife in the drawer to look to for a response. Plus, there are a million people in this town who are national security, military types and have not had a good war for a long time, and they know what to do because they have been studying for it, and planning for it all this time. Unfortunately, their point of reference is the 20th century. You are now looking at what you get when that happens.

To the extent that it was originally tightly focused on taking out Al Qaeda, Afghanistan was a proper response initially. Only once again, everybody forgot the lesson of Charlie Wilson's War--Afghanistan has a dangerously ill-literate and backwards looking, war lords culture in which bad guys tend to win because they are meaner and have more patience than Westerners.

Iraq was a lot more complicated from the beginning and seriously undermined our focus in Afghanistan. If there was some rationale for our duty to go and try to decimate Al-Qaeda, Iraq was fully a war of choice, but there were a variety of reasons circulating since the late 90's to take our Saddam, some of which have been forgotten.

First, Iraq was a front line state in the Israel-Palestine conflict, and Israel was never going to participate seriously in the peace process as long as there were front line states like Iraq giving aid and comfort to the Palestinians. Abu Nidal lived in Baghdad under Saddam's protection. All of the suicide bombers and their families were paid off by Iraq. Anybody who was attacking Israel through terrorism and other means could retreat to Iraq in absolute safety. Until this stopped, there was never going to be any chance of Israel agreeing to anything involving peace with Palestine. This was a reason -- especially beloved of the Neo-Cons-- to get rid of Saddam. This was one of the reasons Congress started funding the Iraqi opposition in 1998.

Another benefit of getting rid of Saddam was related to terrorist finance. Iraq had the second largest amount of oil in the world, next to Saudi Arabia. If you freed that oil up, it would be a direct threat to Saudi Arabia. If the United States were perceived to be headed in that direction, you might finally get Saudi attention for closing down the money flow to Al Qaeda.

Some people considered the despicable, Hitlerian nature of not just Saddam, but also the psychopathic sons who would succeed him, as reason enough for regime change. More illusory, but credible when sold to DOD and the Neo-cons by Ahmed Chalabi, was the idea that Iraq had the most secular, highly educated, capable, sophisticated and modernized population in the region. Unfortunately, no one thought to ask what happens to such a population after 30 years of life under Saddam. The result was a country of survivalists focused on waking up and being alive the next day. Destroying the old order without leaving anything in its place would be a recipe for chaos.

So there were a number of factors out there pointing to invasion, in addition to the fear of WMDs. And on that point, Saddam had had and used WMDs on his own people; why wouldn't he use them again? Even the WMD inspector Douglas had lunch with in the fall of 2002 was personally persuaded that they were there. So there were a lot of elements at play to justify moving ahead with the Iraq invasion. Basically, they all fed a military machine that was poised and ready to go anyway, especially after the perception of initial success in Afghanistan.

What we didn't do was listen to the people who really knew something about Afghanistan and Iraq and history and Islamic extremism and what was driving it. What we failed to take into account is our own impatience and sense of history and short attention span. If you have seen the movie, Charlie Wilson's War, the most important piece of the script is the quote at the very end, which notes that after winning "Charlie's war" against the Soviets in Afghanistan, Congress couldn't be persuaded to put up a million dollars to rebuild schools, and we walked away from the country.

So, as I constantly tell my graduate students now, make sure you know what you don't know, and make sure you are asking the right questions, because if you are not asking the right questions, you will never get the right answer.

Q: When you left in what 200...

KINNEY: In the summer of 2003, I gave myself a retirement party to thank everybody and immediately flew to our place on Eagle Island in Maine. Then I cried. I've wondered if I should not have stayed and fought, but I also believed that part of what was wrong was that the older generation was staying comfortable with itself and staying on too long and thereby not giving a younger generation the opportunity to bring needed change. So I decided to practice what I preached.

Q: I was wondering whether when you left, did you feel anything was going right or was it...

KINNEY: I felt that Cofer was clueless. He was the wrong man in the wrong job at the wrong time. He was more interested in himself than anything at State. He was the one who fingered Blackwater and got the contract for Blackwater from State and then, as you know, left to become the Vice President for Intelligence for Blackwater. The company's fall from grace was a just reward.

Cofer was not a bad man; he was just a swaggering opportunist by that time, which probably also meant he was a fish out of water at State. We spent time together. He was a bit of a misogynist. He didn't like the fact that I had graduated from Vassar and Harvard; he made that clear. He didn't like the fact that my office looked more like a living room aimed at inviting talk. (I didn't have a big manly desk because I had taken to using small, narrow credenzas because I hated those big desks, remnants of another era which were disproportionate to the chopped up space that we were given at the Department.) He seemed to me to have chips on his shoulder, but mostly he was in a job for which he was ill suited.

I was spending way too much time grinding my teeth and staying angry about all the things that made no sense and the lack of people who wanted to do something about them, so I decided to do something about this situation.

Q" Well Stephanie we are coming to the end of this. We will talk about what you are doing after retirement, but first I wonder if you could comment on a couple of things. You have always had an eye on management in the State Department. When did you come in?

KINNEY: I came in as an FSO in 1976. I had been associated with the Department by marriage it since 1971.

Q: What has been your impression about management development?

KINNEY: About how management has been viewed at State and changed over the years? In the Seventies, the narrative about the Department was that “it did foreign policy.” This was a conceit, but it was truer then perhaps than twenty years later. Management is becoming a little bit more acknowledged and recognized as a necessity now, especially as the Department has become more of a program agency and perhaps less of a policy center. When I came I think it is fair to say that the Foreign Service still ran the Department of State, including at the Assistant Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secretary levels. Department personnel were more homogeneous with regard to education and background and therefore more cohesive. When I came in the Admin Cone in the FS was pretty seriously disdained, especially by Political Cone officers who really still ran the show. None of this is true today. Significantly, the Admin Cone is now called the Management Cone, which is attracting more MBAs and Business Management graduates than former Civil Service administrative types. So there is more modern management knowledge and experience in the Foreign Service today but less cohesion and less FS leadership at the top of the Department.

Q: You were drawing yourself up in a haughty pose when you said “do foreign policy.”

KINNEY: Yes. As I said, it was a reassuring conceit back then among the old guy political officers, especially. But the problem at the State Department, I believe, is its lack of institutional leadership and its lack of a single, unified and vibrant corporate cultures. Its culture is still fundamentally 20th century and divided between Foreign Service and Civil Service and the growing overlay of short-term, schedule C leadership. There are people, pockets of people, working to change that, but it is an uphill battle. In large part because in my lifetime, as I recounted, the Foreign Service was split into two services -- junior and senior -- by the Foreign Service Act of 1980 in an effort to make us equivalent to the Civil service and vice versa.

It was a pact with the devil. It meant a 20% salary increase for mid-level FSOs and should have been called the Mid-level Officer’s Financial Relief Act because that is what it was. That salary increase was what got everyone to support it, but as soon as they knew they were going to get the money, they turned it over to the “personnelists” and the Civil Servants, who then actually drafted the Act. The drafters of the 1980 Act did not believe in a generalist Foreign Service officer corps. Bill Backus and I argued about “generalists” versus “specialists” ad nauseam; he wanted to create a Foreign Service more like the Civil Service, of which he was a part. He and the other drafters wanted to tie the Foreign Service to the Civil Service and create an equivalency that has never existed because the two personnel systems and cultures are so different. They also created something called LCEs, Limited Career Extensions, which seriously corrupted the Senior Foreign Service through their abuse, and then created an infamous senior surplus, the cost of which was the gutting of a generation of largely O-1, political officers in the mid 1990’s.

So today what do we have at the State Department? The vast majority of our FSOs have less than five years experience. You have officers expecting to be promoted to O-1 who have done only their obligatory consular tour, maybe a tour in their cone, and one or two others. Another pattern is that many entry level officers now have to do two consular

tours, then return to the Department for a desk job and then go to Iraq or Afghanistan where they do ops with the military. They have never done the first lick of what you would call mainstream diplomacy. One wonders what the impact of this will be on the system?

Now this is not to say that what they have been doing is not a kind of diplomacy; it is and it is utterly essential to the 21st century. But their experience to date is not a kind of work that has prepared them to come back into the civilized world and maintain proper relations and perform with long standing successful states and cultures. These more established states--be they developed or “emerging” like the BRICS, all value tradition and diplomatic *savoir faire* more than we, and they far outstrip the value and importance of either Iraq or Afghanistan.

I worry that we are not professionally forming and preparing the younger generation for mainstream diplomacy, which is still being practiced in all the serious countries of the world. The array of truly shocking attire and behavior (compared to other Foreign Ministries) one can see at the Department of State today begs questions about the standards and health of the organization. The new officers are wonderfully diverse candidates, but we are not properly educating and mentoring them; we are not giving them the know-how and training that they deserve at every level. We are just taking them in and sending them out and hoping that they don’t make that many serious mistakes. There is little adult supervision because the “adults” are rapidly departing.

The people who are coming up are assuming now that they are entitled to run things. They are bright. They are willing. They are creative. We need to listen to them. We need to transform the culture of the institution, and we can’t do it without the help of those of the younger generation, who has been out there on the front lines. But neither can they be allowed to be uneducated, and to assume that they can just go out and be themselves and be ‘mericans and tell everybody what to do because I am American, which is what has been happening in lots of places. I just had lunch yesterday with an inspector and someone who has been minister counselor in Paris and is up-coming to Berlin. Their tales are enough to make your hair stand on end as to what they have encountered. People are now saying we just don’t know how to cope.

Q: We have had problems that are endemic to the system. There are a certain set of officers who are very smart, very bright and there are others who have gone basically the staff route and supporting the great man, and as a reward quite early in their career are handed plum assignment management.

KINNEY: Still happening.

Q: ...assignments and they really don’t bring much to the table outside of the fact that they were able to serve somebody really well.

KINNEY: Yeah, the president of AFSA made a very interesting point in a meeting I was in.

Q: This is...

KINNEY: American Foreign Service Association. Her name is Susan Johnson. She was taking exception to the term “career development.” She does not like the term “career development” vice “professional development” because she feels that the term “career development” exacerbates all of the problems current in the present culture, which is careerist, individual, increasingly exempt of idealism and any sense of duty and service. I thought it was a very interesting point.

The people to whom you have referred as the high flying “staffers,” have taken no interest in their own institution, which is the base of their power and their work. It is the nature of a profession that it is involved in its own institutions. Other wise, it is not a profession. I could not sustain the assertion today that diplomacy is a profession at the Department of State. I think it can be. I think it should be. I am working to move it in that direction, but there is no evidence that the current culture and conditions and leadership are encouraging and helping the younger generation assume the responsibilities and take the measures needed to improve the situation.

Q: In a way, what we are doing right here, this oral history and the whole program, is designed to a great degree to help; whether it will work or not is completely a different matter. But to pass on sort of the knowledge and history of what has gone on before to the next generation is what we want to do. How this works, that is sort of above my pay grade. I am not sure how to get there. But we do have the cumulative wisdom.

KINNEY: And we have the cumulative goodness and know-how and power and influence, if we use it. But minus strong leadership that seeks to instill common ethics and standards and professional pride, there seems to be growing concern that what we are getting is a group of people for whom little matters beyond one’s own interests. If the Foreign Service culture is all about stepping on someone else to get to the next rung, it is not going to work. You are going to hang separately, because, in my view, that is how it has gotten us where we are.

If the conceit continues that the only point of one’s work is “policy” and everyone does not grasp that quality corporate culture and purposefully managed resources are just as crucial, the institutional strength of State will continue to deteriorate. Why don’t we ensure that every single officer is as fluent in team building, personnel management, project and program management, and budget and finance as they are in their policy know-how and their foreign languages? Why don’t we plan for synergy by more purposefully engaging officers in clusters of different but related policy categories and issues, such as economics, trade, energy and environment? Or political military, NATO, POLAD, Peace Keeping and reconstruction and stabilization? Or reconstruction and stabilization and human rights and migration, rule of law and civil society?

Q: Ok, let me ask another question because it is still pertinent. I don’t know whether in time it may no longer be of things that are changing so rapidly that it probably will be no

longer as pertinent, but in your experience, what has been your experience during your career time in the role of women in the foreign service?

KINNEY: The role has grown. The numbers of women has increased. Their role in the Service has been validated. Some of the best officers today are the woman. Classy women can still get away with being classy women but the same is less true for the men. And, of course, the work/family balance issues affect both groups and necessitate choices. So one question might be, "Are the right people staying?" "Do we dare define 'the right people'?" Probably not. But I do think we need all officers to have a certain level of profound education, a certain command of culture at all levels, plus capability, and also a comfort with wielding power and taking charge or command, which means taking responsibility, not just ordering people around. But balance and quality are always key issues in my mind.

The demonization of intellect I think is one of our serious problems. You asked earlier on about some of the reasons for the lack of management. The military has maintained a cohesive and coherent culture because it is unbrokred. Nobody sticks a Schedule C political appointee in as major or a brigadier general, much less as a four star general. That is no longer true where our diplomatic service is concerned. When I came to State, there was no such thing as a schedule C Assistant Secretary. Jimmy Carter took eight FSOs -- well they were almost all FSOs under the age of 38 who had resigned over Vietnam such as Dick Holbrook and Tony Lake-- and he made them Assistant Secretaries. They were known as the Baby Eight. So when Ronald Reagan came in he said, "Oh, I will pocket those eight, and I also want a DAS in every bureau," and so the Deputy Assistant Secretaries became politicized. Today it goes down to the Office Director level. S/P, the policy planning unit? It a jobs program for Administration friends. Everybody who doesn't know any better thinks this is the center of power. They have no clue what a useless organization it is. It has no real function.

Q: It is a speechwriting...

KINNEY: Yes, that is a small unit and it does a wonderful job, and everybody else there just scratches their head and tries to figure out how to fit in because there is no logic to it in the Department. It is connected to nothing. If not kept busy, they get overly involved in operational matters which then pisses off the bureaus, and then the bureaus eventually work to do them in and cut them off. I, myself, did that on numerous occasions. Or they get involved in these extra curricular big idea initiatives, which never go anyplace because they have no budget, they have no authority, they have no sustaining power, and as soon as the Secretary leaves, they are toast, so it is a problematic unit. Marie Slaughter actually understands this, and from what I understand is actually trying to do something better and more intelligent with it. I don't know how well she is succeeding although I heard yesterday she is probably going to resign. It makes me wonder if she has seen the emperor's clothes. She is going back to Princeton. We will see. That is just a rumor.

The politicization, along with Secretaries of State who also have no sense of responsibility for or interest in the Department as an institution, continues to sap the

institution of vitality. That in my view is one of the primary reasons that the institution has fallen on such hard times. What every single person in that building lauds Colin Powell for is that he understood taking care of the troops. He, along with George Schultz 20 years before, are the only two secretaries who have ever done anything to address the requirements of maintaining and developing and modernizing our institutional infrastructure.

Our problem today is that our institutional infrastructure is 50 years out of date, and there is nobody who cares. There is nobody who is home There is nobody to call. In my best of all possible worlds, I would love to see the development of a Permanent Under Secretary for Operations. This would be a Foreign Service Officer with both management and policy experience, who would serve six years, a full administration and a half of the next, and this person's sole responsibility would be the modernization first and then the care and feeding and nurturing of the institutional infrastructure for our diplomatic service. I would also like to see the "Foreign Service" recognized for what it is, which is a personnel system, like but different from the Civil Service. I think it is the right personnel system for the Department of State and I think now, in the 21st century, it ought to be the ONLY personnel system at State. I do not think the Civil Service is the right personnel system for the Department of State in the 21st century because of its lack of a serious evaluation system, it's lack of requirement to go overseas, it's antiquated (1950's) occupational categories, and its 9-5 corporate culture, that leaves everyone else to do the after hours work.

I would like to see a unified Diplomatic Service of the United States of America emerge. That means that anybody hired by the Department of State would be subject to the same entry and selection procedures, the same evaluation procedures. I fail to see why anybody working in the Department today should not have at least two or three tours overseas in the course of a twenty or twenty-five year career. I fail to see why anyone working in the Department should be working in the same job for more than six years. If you are going to be primarily domestic, you are going to have to move around within the institution (and perhaps the government), the same as the worldwide available people who move around the world. Otherwise, you develop stovepipes and lose the ability to connect the dots. You develop disdain for anything other than your own little narrow vision of the world, and you become less useful for 21st century purposes.

As far as I am concerned, if everyone is subject to the same standards of entry and evaluation and minimum overseas service and foreign language requirements, there could be more permeability between the primarily domestic and primarily worldwide available people. But those who are worldwide available would have better financial advantages and benefits because it is a tough world out there. It is very tough on families. But if everybody were in the same game and the same system, playing by the same educational standards and rules, whether you are staff or officer (and I think there should be a more clear and insightful distinction between those two things) I think this would help cohesion. I think this generalist/specialist thing is just a way of denigrating generalists, because they can be dismissed as dilettantes and that is wrong. We need people with broad knowledge and experience and adaptability and the ability to see opportunities and

connect the dots. “Specialists” are not known for these characteristics. If you had everybody in the Department under the same fundamental system, there would be less cultural conflict between the two personnel systems. There would be a greater feeling of we-ness and responsibility to each other rather than invidiousness.

To their credit, I think the younger generation is much more sensitive to seeking balance between work and family. The Foreign Service is very hard on families, especially children. Not all family members thrive overseas. If you turn out to be one of those families who doesn't, why shouldn't you be able to come back and serve in other ways?

People who think they want to be primarily domestic and then get the wanderlust and the spirit of adventure and really want to go out and do diplomacy should be able to do so with proper formation and training. If after five years of working at State and if they are good and they are qualified, if they are prepared, why shouldn't they be able to go out and do that? In other words, if entry and evaluation processes are the same, we have a much more flexible system from the standpoint that people's needs change from when you are in your 20's to your 30's to your 40's to your 50's to your 60's and your 70's and there is no reason the system should not recognize and accommodate that.

We have frankly a 1950's personnel system and structure that could without major crisis be much improved on and create an institution that would be much more appropriate to the realities of the 21st century. To his credit, Colin Powell, in addition to taking care of the troops, got us Internet at our desks. But the State Department did not have internet at the desk and accessible until 2004! Only Colin Powell was strong enough and determined enough that he overcame the people in Diplomatic Security, who thought that security was everything. Life in the world is not secure. If you want a guaranteed security, you shouldn't work at the State Department.

Q: Go to a monastery.

KINNEY: But even there watch out for the leadership.

Q: I am going to call this off at this point. Stephanie I want to thank you very much.

KINNEY: Thank you for allowing me to tell my story. I hope it proves of interest to someone someday, if only my grandchildren.

LUNCH BUNCH MEMORIES

By Maggie Moose

Gay Vance's Lunch Bunch, (appropriately capitalized) had to be the most relaxed and inclusive of all State Department groups that met during the Carter administration. It

is true that Jean Newsom was the formidable organizer--and still is!--But Gay's warmth and willingness to listen and create opportunities for families within the State Department and Foreign Service ranks were extraordinary. As was her effort to reach out to diplomatic wives of foreign embassies and Congressional spouses.

I have a keen memory of one of the briefings for State Department and Congressional wives organized by Gay and Jean. My husband, Richard Moose, was speaking about the Administration's Africa policy. I was seated next to Teresa Heinz (now Teresa Kerry) who obviously didn't agree with his presentation on Mozambique, Teresa's place of birth. We had met her on Nantucket...she was young and gorgeous and charming...and I squirmed as she muttered (under her breath) about how stupid the policy was. I, of course, thought he was absolutely correct. However...we all talked about it(cautiously) later and ...after thirty years or so... I think she has forgiven him!

Those lucky few who comprised the original Lunch Bunch and participated in the fabulous machinations of the Vance\Newsome Twosome were inspired by their energy and willingness to listen, and then ACT. And now behold!...thirty years later we still gather to celebrate Gay and her mighty influence on all of us. Thanks for the memories, Gay Vance! With much love.

ADDENDUM
By Stephanie Kinney

Gay Vance and Jean Newsom played crucial, catalyzing roles in creating the Lunch Bunch, but it has been the combination of all the wonderful women and their gift for enduring friendship that has sustained it over the years. In that sense, I hope each member of this remarkable group appreciates the special gift of goodness, grace and grit that she embodies, as well as the strength of character and courage she has shown moving not only from one place to another, but also from one phase of life to another.

As the youngest member of the group, I feel I owe a special debt for the privilege of having been able to come to know such a wonderful group of women. In many different ways, each member of the Lunch Bunch has helped bridge the generation gap and quietly opened new possibilities and options for all members of younger families in the Department of State and elsewhere. The development and creation of the FLO marked me personally and professionally. I learned from that experience the importance of networking and building institutionally. I learned that amazing things can be accomplished if pursued in the proper way for the right reasons. As the years have passed, I treasure the life lessons and role models the Lunch Bunch has exposed me to, not to mention the wisdom of so women I love and admire. Thanks for the friendship and many memories!

ADDENDUM II

MID-LEVEL PROFESSIONALISM SURVEY ANALYSIS

QUESTION 11: Does the Foreign Service have core values? If yes, what are they and how have they been communicated to you?

QUESTION 12: Does the Department of State/your agency have core values? If yes, what are they and how have they been communicated to you?

Background:

According to the State Department's current Performance Report and its Strategic Plan, the Department's core values are as follows: loyalty, character, service, accountability, community and diversity. If these are taken seriously, taught, exemplified and play a meaningful role in the corporate culture, most officers should be able to name them. We thought asking about "core values" would provide important insights about our corporate/institutional culture.

Another reason to ask about core values is to compare and contrast answers with a Senior Seminar research project conducted ten year ago, which also asked these questions of three different groups of Senior, Mid-level and Junior Foreign Service Officers. The JO's in 2000, who had just completed A-100, should now be represented in the survey's mid-level cohort. The three groups showed dramatic differences in 2000, and we were curious to see how participants in this survey would respond. A full copy of the 2000 findings is attached, but key points follow:

Core Values Matter: Senior officers uniformly asserted the importance of core values as the qualities and attributes that define a corps or a corporation and the way each conducts its business. They cited the Marines (Honor, Courage and Commitment), West Point (Duty, Honor, Country) and Motorola (The Motorola Way) as values-based organizations.

Mid-level and junior officers ...agreed about their importance for a number of reasons:

- "Meaningful core values build cohesion."
- Core values infuse work with "meaning that transcends the mundane."
- Core values "attract recruits who already embody them."
- In large and/or mobile organizations, "core values increase efficiency" because employees within the organization who do not know each other "can make certain assumptions about one another" based on shared values.
- Core values "infuse and reflect the spirit of an organization."

No Agreement on What the Values Are

FSOs did not agree on whether their institution has core values or if it does, what they are; there were pronounced differences among senior, mid-level, and junior officers on this issue. All but two senior officers interviewed believe the Foreign Service has "core values;" however, this group was split fifty-fifty on whether the

Department of State has them. Close to half of mid-level and junior officers were unsure whether State or the Foreign Service has core values. One person thought our evaluation system reflected core values, suggesting that perhaps they were embodied in the precepts.

Appendix I contains a consolidated list of the “core values” identified by respondents. Agreement on values declines as seniority declines. Of those who believe core values exist, all agreed that they are not articulated but rather that they are “absorbed by osmosis” or “by example.” Senior and junior officers identified values that are positive; a substantial number of mid-level officers identified values that are negative.

The list of ascribed values betrays confusion about the definition of the word “value.” Whatever the definition, however, twenty out of forty-eight of mid-level officers interviewed believe neither State nor the Foreign Service has core values. Among those who believe core values exist, many of the “core values” cited are negative:

“CYA;” “Look out for yourself, no one else will;” “Don’t rock the boat;” “Rank has privilege but not accountability.”

The core values most cited by Junior Officers were “hard work,” “equal opportunity employment (EEO) or fairness,” and “teamwork” in that order.

A single mid-level officer pointed out that in fact the Department of State does have formal core values; they have been published on page seven of the Department of State Strategic Plan (See Appendix II). Compare this list with the list in Appendix I and draw your own conclusions....

Today’s sample displays confusion about the meaning of “core value,” in even greater numbers than in 2000. A substantial number in all cones describe their work or work related functions, e.g. represent and defend USG interests, rather than naming values such as integrity or loyalty. Although wide margins in all cones claim the Foreign Service and the Department have “core values” (a closed question), close to 50% of consular, management and Public Diplomacy coned officers then cannot name them or express uncertainty about their existence or give negative comments and values in their comments. Interestingly, economic and political cone officers respond less negatively. The only values frequently mentioned by all cones, however, are “*honesty/integrity*” and “*service*.” “*Professionalism*” is mentioned in both categories of positive responses, but given the confused responses to Questions 6 and 7, one can have no confidence that the word means the same thing to different people. It is interesting that the current survey’s mid-level cohort, many of whom would have been entry level officers (junior officers) in 2000, continue to frequently cite “*hard work*” as a core value (the same as ten years ago), perhaps more suggestive of a drone culture than one that is inspired and inspiring.

COLLECTIVE IMPRESSION:

A disclaimer: this is not a scientific, professional survey; it is better described as a “sounding out” of AFSA members on twenty questions addressed to Foreign Service Officers and Specialists in ranks 3-2 and 1. This analysis is focused exclusively on the mid-level FSO responses to the two questions identified above. Because of the open-ended nature of the second parts of Questions 11 and 12, tabulation is necessarily notional rather than statistically precise.

One third to almost half of all the cones either do not think there are core values, are unsure/unclear about whether there are, think maybe there are but cannot name any, or name negative values, e.g. “Cover your backside;” “kick down, kiss up;” stifle enthusiasm and reward political hacks.” “They have neither been articulated nor communicated well.” “This sounds negative, but the core values I see are 1. Take care of yourself because no one else will; 2. Watch your back; 3. Don’t help anyone, but yourself; 4. Don’t trust anyone, especially your own colleagues; and 5. Expend as much energy and resources as necessary to fight other USG agencies for they are the enemy. As negative as this sounds, I have seen each point demonstrated time and again at different posts.” Such responses suggest that neither the FS nor the Department of State has core values, which by definition are deeply inculcated in the corporate culture and all employees. Six or less in each cone know about and name the values cited in the Strategic Plan, thus indicating that there is no intentional or purposeful link between this Plan and the corporate culture. Conal differences suggest that officers do not hold common core values, and values serve no purpose for building cohesion in the officer cadre. Several people in each cone mention a “laminated Biz Card” with the Department’s values and strategic goals, “which is older but still relevant,” at least to them.

Note the differences in responses to Question 11 (Foreign Service core values) and Question 12 (Department of State core values) from the five cones, an analysis of which follows:

CONSULAR CONE SAMPLE: Of 111 (65 male) self-identified as “consular cone,” **105 responded to Question 11**, of which 80 (76%) said YES, the FS has core values and 84 provided comments. Of these comments, 39 were negative; 24 referenced the Consular Bureau’s Leadership Principles*; 28 described work-related activities perceived to be valued by the Department, and 19 named “core values.” 3 named the core values cited in the Strategic Plan.

***CA Leadership Tenets/Principles:** Inspire, model integrity, practice 360 degree diplomacy, lead by example, develop the next generation, communicate, build great teams, delegate authority not responsibility, learn constantly, follow courageously.

Foreign Service Core Values Job-related core values

Integrity/honesty 11 EER Precepts 11

Service/serve others 4 Represent/promote USG interests 6

Professionalism 3 Service 6

Leadership 3 Hard work 3

Equality/fairness 2 Help public/Amcits 2
Intellectual rigor 2 Communicate effectively 2
Diligence, objectivity, patriotism, Professionalism, excellence, support
dedication, cooperation, idealism current administration, open debate,
learning 1 each FS mission statement, follow instructions 1 each

103 responded to Question 12, of which 82 (80%) said YES, the DOS has core values and 88 provided comments. Of these comments, 26 were negative, 15 referenced the Consular Bureau’s Leadership Tenets*; and 40 referenced their FS answers (positive and negative) as valid for the Department, with some being more explicit than others that “the FS is the Department;” others disagreed. 2 cited values named in the Strategic Plan. 6 offered personal statements.

Department of State Core Values Job-related core values

Integrity/honesty 3 Service/serve the public 3
Belief in diplomacy 3 Promote USG interests/value 3
Values in the Strategic Plan 2 Integrity, professionalism, mission
Service to others, mentoring, Statement, diplomacy, protect
Discipline, Honor 1 each Americans, “depends on the Sec” 1 each

COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS:

“I’d like to say yes [the FS has core values], but I’m not sure I can define them. There are certain things we as an organization aspire to, but which are too often honored in the breach. I think most of us would like to think the Service has a certain ‘esprit de corps,’ a feeling that we’re all in this together, facing the same hardships and the (sic) reaching the same goals. But, then I see too many individuals operating for themselves and think that, while my view is only a hope, an ideal, rancor all around has become a core value—I may be a cog in this vast machine, and the machine would undoubtedly continue to run without me, but if I can keep the squeaks and creaks out of at least the part of that machine, something has been achieved.”

“Flexibility to the point of having no moral compass or spine. This has been communicated via socialization.”

“You are AFSA and you know that CA has core values. Why are you asking this question?”

“DOS is too diverse to have or communicate core values.”

“Loyalty, Character, Service, Accountability, Community and Diversity. [named in the Strategic Plan]As a consular officer I strive to act in accordance with the Bureau’s leadership tenets: inspire, model integrity, practice 360 degree diplomacy, lead by example, develop the next generation, communicate, build great teams, delegate authority not responsibility, learn constantly and follow courageously. I have a print out of the consular tenets and hear/read them regularly. I have a laminated biz card with the Department’s values and strategic goals (older copy-still relevant).”

ECONOMIC CONE SAMPLE: Of 103 (59 male) self-identified as “economic cone,” **101 responded to Question 11**, of which 69 (71%) said YES, the FS has core values, and 82 provided comments. Of these comments, 39 were negative; 38 described work-related activities perceived to be valued by the Department, and 25 named “core values.” 9 made personal statements about the FS without answering the question.

Foreign Service Core Values Job-related core values

Integrity/honesty 10 Promote USG interests/values 10

Service/serve others 8 Service in the job 8

Dedication/duty/idealism 8 Hard work 5

Teamwork 5 World wide availability/FS needs 5

Excellence/intelligence 4 Professionalism 5

Professionalism 3 Mission first/responsive 5

Learning 3 Objective/truth to power 4

Objective/non-partisan 3 Precepts, sacrifice 3 Flexibility, respect, leadership Sacrifice 3

Sacrifice, “the mission” 2 each Loyalty to Secretary/President 2

Discipline, patience, country, Competence, flexibility, diversity,

Independence, community 1 each Best of the US, training, discipline 1 each

99 responded to Question 12, of which 54 (57%) said YES, the DOS has core values and 68 provided comments. Of these comments, 26 were negative; 24 referenced their FS answers (positive and negative) as valid for the Department, with some being more explicit than others that “the FS is the Department,” (without regard to its numerical minority in Washington); others disagreed; no one acknowledged the Civil Service as part of the Department. 28 named core values listed below; 1 named the Constitution; 5 cited “*support for the administration’s foreign policy*,” 2 cited values named in the Strategic Plan, and 3 offered personal statements.

Department of State Core Values Job-related core values

Integrity/honesty 4 Promote USG policies/values 8

Service 4 FS Precepts 2

Support the Secretary, loyalty, Mission, hard work, leadership,

Community 2 each Non-partisanship, competing

Duty, diversity, mission, respect points of view 1 each

Powell’s card 1 each

COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS

“They [State] have too many core values to know which ones are really core.”

“I’m not sure what “core values” mean—sounds very touchy feely.”

“I’ve asked this question for 10 years, and still don’t know the answer.”

“The phrase “core values,” which has swept American institutions in the last ten years, is trendy and therapeutic. I would prefer to talk of our common oath, to defend the Constitution

of the United States against all enemies. Picking five happy sounding buzzwords for a hallway poster does not assist our shared commitment to common goals.”

“I have not heard of any nor seen any promoted as part of professional development at FSI or at any embassy. Core values are notably missing from FSI A-100 “training.””

“Up until five years ago, I would have said that we believe that US security depends on an open handed and rule- based approach to addressing global threats such as poverty. I think that these values are diminished by diplomats serving in war effort(s).”

MANAGEMENT CONE SAMPLE: Of 112 (76 male) self-identified as “management cone,” **110 responded to Question 11**, of which 79 (72%) said YES, the FS has core values, and 89 provided comments. Of these comments, 42 were negative; 24 named “core values.” and 22 named job related activities or characteristics. 4 referenced Sec. Powell’s cards, 2 referenced the Strategic Plan and 3 said we used to have values in the past. 5 made personal statements about the FS without answering the question.

Foreign Service Core Values Job-related core values

Integrity/honesty 15 Promote USG interests/values 8
Service/serve others 12 FS Precepts 5
Professionalism 6 Support each other 4
Loyalty 4 Hard work, job skills 4 each
Dedication/commitment 3 Service, speak truth to power,
Sacrifice, diversity, flexibility, Support foreign policy agenda 2 each
Leadership 2 each Promote dialogue, Pride in US,
Innovation, teamwork, diplomacy, Protect AmCits, get more for less 1 each
Patriotism, intellectual integrity,
Fairness, FS Journal inserts 1 each

106 responded to Question 12, of which 70 (69%) said YES, the DOS has core values and 73 provided comments. Of these comments, 26 were negative; 32 referenced their FS answers (positive and negative) as valid for the Department, with some being more explicit than others that “the FS is the Department,” (without regard to its numerical minority in Washington); others disagreed. 21 named core values listed below; 1 named the Constitution; 5 cited “*support for the administration’s foreign policy;*” 6 cited values named in the Strategic Plan; 2 cited Consular Leadership Principles, and 3 said “core values” changed according to the Administration.

Department of State Core Values Job-related core values

Integrity/honesty 9 Promote USG policies/values 3
Service 5 MPP’s 2
Loyalty, diversity, 2 each Bureaucratics, good relations,
Patriotism, diplomacy, pride, Fairness, support for each other 1 each
Professionalism 1 each

“When I joined the Foreign Service in 1982 I was told that this was a quasi-military organization, with world-wide availability requirements. I was also told that it was a rank-ordered service where seniority was respected. I left the FS in 1997 and returned as an officer in 2003. In my A-100 class few of those previous FS values were emphasized.”

“Pixie dust and manipulation. A-100 explained the promotion process as “pixie dust” i.e. not transparent. Witnessing the manipulation of the awards process. Officers spending weeks grooming their EER’s at the expense of the job requirements.”

“I think we just absorb them. Sec. Powell took the trouble to define them and we all had little cards—remember? One is the responsibility to speak the truth and guide our political masters with good advice, even if they don’t want to hear it.”

POLITICAL CONE SAMPLE: Of 137 (89 male) self-identified as “political cone,” **136 responded to Question 11**, of which 100 (76%) said YES, the FS has core values, and 106 provided comments. Of these comments, 29 were negative; 49 described work-related activities perceived to be valued by the Department, and 34 named “core values.” 10 made personal statements without answering the question; 2 referenced the past; 1 referenced the Strategic Plan: *“State and USAID have core values enumerated in the Strategic Plan. FS values are implicitly derived from those values but not explicitly communicated: loyalty, character, service, accountability, community and diversity.”*

Foreign Service Core Values Job-related core values

Integrity/honesty 23 Hard work 10

Service 10 Loyalty to Pres/Administration 10

Loyalty 7 Professionalism 9

Dedication 6 EER precepts, service, mission,

Excellence/intelligence 5 Promote USG interests/values 6 each

Professionalism, patriotism 4 each WW availability, rep best of US 5 each

Teamwork, flexibility Inquisitiveness, discipline 4 each

Objectivity/Non Partisan 3 each Democracy, competence, adaptability 3 each

Discipline/deference, diversity 2 each Rigor, leadership, fairness, diversity 2 each

Courage 1 Oath, humor, up or out, selfless,

Teamwork, integrity, caution 1 each

134 responded to Question 12, of which 87 (69%) said YES, the DOS has core values and 91 provided comments. Of these comments, 22 were negative; 46 referenced their FS answers (positive and negative) as valid for the Department, with some being more explicit than others that “the FS is the Department;” others disagreed. 32 named core values listed below; 1 cited the Strategic Plan, and 5 felt the core value was to obey and support the Secretary and/or the hierarchy. 1 cited the FAM and the FS precepts and 1 only stated, *“If core values equated to core precepts that would be sad.”* 18 made personal statements that did not answer the question.

Department of State Core Values Job-related core values

Loyalty 5 Promote USG policies/values 7

Intelligence/intellect 1 honesty 3 WW availability 2
Service 2 Professionalism, collegiality, hard
Patriotism, diplomacy, pride, work, advocacy, service,
Fairness, diversity, duty, courage, consultation, incrementalism,
Excellence, honesty, caution 1 each mission, comity 1 each

COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS

"I don't like the term "values," as I don't see the way we do our job as built around a particular ethical construct, although ethics are a motivator and a limit on our actions. However, the Foreign Service has expectations which we should adhere to: Duty to country-Placing the team/organization ahead of the individual-Transparency and honesty in how we operate inside the USG (sic) These tend to be learned in the first few years of service, or not at all."

"It's all in the oath we take: We serve the country (the Constitution), and by extension the people of the United States. That is really the only meaningful way it has been communicated to me. We also serve the government, but that's only a subset. At the point we feel the latter conflicts the former, it is our job to speak out within the system to correct the problem. If that doesn't work, conscience and ethics dictate that we leave the system-though not all of us have the courage to do that-and try to fix it from outside."

I'm not sure what the official Department's answer would be to this, but I associate our core values with the promotion precepts: Leadership, management ability, interpersonal skills, etc. These are distributed and explained in detail every year at EER time."

"I'd like to think that there is among the better practitioners in our Service a shared sense of commitment to the mission and a willingness to endure hardship and, when necessary, separation from family to accomplish it. That esprit de corps that I sensed as an ELO has abated—I find less of it the longer I'm in, and more concern about promotions and lining up career-enhancing assignments."

"Self-sacrifice in the sense of working for the accomplishment of broader national interests; a strong, underlying belief in America's core democratic values; and the sense of mission mentioned above. [Questions 9 and 10] My Army service instilled these values in me, though I suspect that most of us in the Foreign Service believe in the same general value system."

"There are a few sets [of core values] floating around but they are non-standard and largely ignored. Nothing codified like the military uses. Some Ambassadors and bureaus just make up their own."

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY CONE SAMPLE: Of 98 (56 male) self-identified as "PD cone," **97 responded to Question 11**, of which 69 (72%) said YES, the FS has core values, and 77 provided comments. Of these comments, 40 were negative; 34 described work-related activities perceived to be valued by the Department, and 19 named "core values." 9 made personal statements without answering the question, and 1 referenced the Strategic Plan.

Foreign Service Core Values Job-related core values

Integrity/honesty 14 Promote UGS interests/values 10

Service 6 Service 7

Loyalty 5 Hard work 9

Dedication/duty 4 Collegiality/support each other 5

Patriotism 4 Keep US image strong 5

Professionalism, diversity, Teamwork 4

Sacrifice, diplomacy, serious 2 each EER Precepts 3

Truth to power, excellence, MPP 3

Competence, intelligence, valor 1 each Integrity, leadership, professionalism,

Policies, support for administration 2 each

Fairness, mission, respect, more

with less, results 1 each

96 responded to Question 12, of which 60 (64%) said YES, the DOS has core values and 69 provided comments. Of these comments, 36 were negative; 32 referenced their FS answers (positive and negative) as valid for the Department. 30 named “core values” listed below; 1 referenced the Consular Leadership Principles. 1 named the values in the Strategic Plan, and added “*Not often communicated outside of A-100 and the Diplopedia. Core values are not to be confused with “core precepts,” which form the criteria for tenure and promotion and evaluate such skills as leadership, management, interpersonal, intellectual, communication and substantive knowledge. There are reinforced every year through the EER process.*” This analysis shows that many people do not understand the difference between evaluation criteria and “core values.”

Department of State Core Values Job-related core values

Service 3 Hard work 2

Loyalty, integrity, excellence 1 each Precepts 2

Leadership & Management 2

Flexibility, mission, diversity,

Excellence, mutual understanding,

Defend US foreign policy,

Democracy & human rights 1 each

COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS

“We all stab each other in the back and try to climb over each other’s carcasses to the top.”

“I believe so but they are not as ingrained in the newbees as I would like to see.”

“I wish it still did. It’s become a bureaucracy without a solid foundation. We’ve lost our sense of direction, daring and personal and professional responsibility.”

“Foreign Service institutional culture is strong, begins in A-100 and continues throughout career.(sic) The core values are integrity, sacrifice, truth-seeking.”

“I’ve heard of them. I’m sure they’re very educational to whatever FS-05 & -04 are coming in and sound great on paper. I could not tell you what they actually are but I’m quite sure I could fake it if I had to. I probably read them via cable whenever they first came out.”

“I think so, but would be hard pressed to list them. I think that Consular Affairs has gotten this part right...and that their approach should be replicated at least as far as applicable to PD.

“We used to. They got lost somewhere.”; “i (sic) once saw them on a poster in Seoul. No where else.”

Again, the values have not been explicitly communicated, but I would agree that State has basic, core values.”

“Core values at the individual level are winner take all self-promotion in pursuit of assignment and promotions; at institutional level, State is all about maintaining “dialogue,” which is code for helping the host country promote its interests in Washington.”

End of interview