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AMBASSADOR CHARLES WILLIAM MAYNES

*Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background

Born in South Dakota, Raised in South Dakota and Utah
Harvard University; Oxford University
Entered the Foreign Service in 1962

State Department; International Organization Bureau	1962-1965
Personnel	
Arms Control paper	
Article 19, Non Proliferation Treaty	
UN's United for Peace Resolution	
Vientiane, Laos; Economic Officer	1965-1967
Souvanna Phouma	
Environment	
Currency support	
Foreign influence	
Government	
Ambassador Sullivan	
Local Loyalties	
Culture	
Gold trade	
Communist movement	
State Department; FSI; Russian language study	1967-1968
Moscow, Soviet Union; Economic-Commercial Officer	1968-1970
Environment	
Contacts	
Reforms	
Shchokino Experiment	
KGB	

Relations	
Henry Ford visit	
Government	
Changes in Soviet Union	
Kissinger	
Foreign embassies	
US Ambassadors	
Resignation	1970
Congressional Fellowship (American Political Association)	1970-1972
Office of Senator Brad Morse	
McGovern 1972 Presidential campaign (on loan)	
Secretary, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace	1972-1976
Director for International Organizations	
Study group of US Ambassadors	
Relevance of UN	
Moynihan	
Middle East	
Transition Team for Carter Administration	1976-1977
Team members	
President Carter's appointments	
Loyalty issues	
Administration views of UN	
Major Personalities in Administration	
US Manipulation of UN	
Jews and Blacks in Administration	
State Department; Assistant Secretary, International Organizations 1977-1980	
Personnel	
US funding for UN	
Regional Southern Africa issues	
Namibia	
Arab-Israel issues	
Personalities	
Jewish political influence	
Arab-Israel Peace Process	
Extent of US domination of UN	
Effect of <i>Intifada</i>	
American press	
The Shah of Iran	
US problems with International Organizations	
World Disarmament Conference at General Assembly	

Nuclear weapons issues	
French Satellite Monitoring Proposal	
“nuclear priests”	
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty	
Influence of scientists on nuclear issues	
Non-Proliferation Treaty problems	
South Africa issue	
Andy Young	
French and British support	
Zimbabwe	
Latin American view on Puerto Rican statehood	
Resignation	1980
Observations	

INTERVIEW

[Note: This interview has not been edited by Ambassador Maynes]

Q: Today is the 14th of August, 1998. This is an interview with Charles William Maynes, known as Bill.

MAYNES: That's right.

Q: This is done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, and I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy. Well, can we start kind of at the beginning? Could you tell me when and where you were born?

MAYNES: In Huron, South Dakota in 1938.

Q: That sounds like an ideal place for a diplomat to be born.

MAYNES: Well, actually, my mother and father lived right across the street from the Hubert Humphrey Drug Store, so it's more cosmopolitan than you might think. It's a small town.

Q: Could you tell me about your family?

MAYNES: My mother was the daughter of a minister who was the Protestant minister in a small village in northern North Dakota. He died young and left my grandmother with four children, whom she raised by taking in laundry and having boarders. All four of them went away to college, and there she met my father, who came from a small farm community in South Dakota. He was one of four boys, and his father had not gone past

the seventh or eighth grade, but he had married a woman who had gone to Northwestern. She followed him out to the farm but then insisted that he send all four boys away for schooling for high school and that they all go to college. So that's sort of the background of the family.

Q: Well, what was your father? Was he a farmer at the time you were born?

MAYNES: Well, my father, after college, joined Firestone and was on the manager training track. He became a manger and did that for probably 20 years and then went into business on his own in Salt Lake City. And so I went to High School in Salt Lake City. I'm sort of a corporate brat in the sense that, at least at that time, an up-and-coming person in the corporate world moved every three years. So every three years we went to a new community, and these were mostly in the Midwest - South Dakota, North Dakota, Kansas. And then he quit and went into business for himself.

Q: As a corporate brat, moving around, what type of education were you getting?

MAYNES: Ordinary but good. I think most people don't realize that the highest educational standards in the country are in the Dakotas. More people finish high school, more people go on to college, so the education there was actually excellent. And then in high school I went to a public high school in Salt Lake City, which was, I guess, the better high school, but it was just a public high school.

Q: Did you feel the influence of the Mormon Church in the high school?

MAYNES: Oh, yes. I was the gentile, as they call non-Mormons, and I think that is one of the reasons I went away to college. It's not that I had anything against the Mormons at all - in fact, it was as lovely place to grow up. After I graduated from high school, the pressure to convert became much greater, because Mormons believe in marriage for eternity. You have to be married in the temple, and all the girls I was dating were Mormons. So suddenly the pressure from the father to convert or to go to Fireside became much greater. I think that's one of the reasons I applied to go away to college.

Q: While you were in high school, what were your interests?

MAYNES: Well, in part because we moved all the time, I was kind of a loner in most schools, because I was the new person who didn't know anyone. So I tended to study more and my grades were very good, which is one of the reasons I got into good colleges when I applied. But I did try as hard as I could to major in girls.

Q: What about reading? Did anything grab you?

MAYNES: I guess probably the most important thing that happened to me in terms of reading was when I was about seven, my mother and father got an encyclopedia. I proceeded to read it from A to Z, and I remember one of the things that happened to me

when I was in grade school. The teachers had a strike and they all left the schools. Catholic nuns were brought in to run the schools for a while, and in the fifth grade I had gotten to the letter V by that time. My teacher looked out at this sea of Protestants and asked if anybody knew what the Vatican was. And mine was the only hand that went up. I told her, and she kissed me. So I started early reading, and it worked out fine.

Q: Well, did the international bug burrow in at all while you were in school?

MAYNES: Not in high school. A little bit at Harvard, where I took Western European History, but mostly when I got the Rhodes Scholarship to England. First of all, I realized, as I suppose aristocrats did two centuries earlier, that travel is educational and makes you more tolerant and understanding when you find out that other people in fact know some things you don't know, live in some ways better than you live; and I decided that I wanted to do that. Until I got the Rhodes, I was hell-bent on being a lawyer, and after I got over there I decided that the only reason I wanted to be a lawyer would be so I could go into government, and somehow get into international affairs. So I applied to Yale Law School and actually got accepted with a big fat scholarship. But I decided that I was really using that as a detour to try to get into international affairs, so I applied for the Foreign Service.

Q: I want to go back just a touch. In high school, did you study foreign languages?

MAYNES: I took no foreign languages in high school.

Q: At this high school, Mormons send their boys away?

MAYNES: As missionaries.

Q: I've often wondered about that. I've seen two young men with shirts and ties on in many peculiar countries.

MAYNES: That's right. They learn the language and try to convert. And I suppose you can argue in that sense that Mormon education is more cosmopolitan than one might think, but in fact, it's still very parochial. My biggest memory of the missionaries was my astonishment when people I knew would come back and tell me that they'd been on missions and they had suddenly been gifted with the gift of tongues. That's not quite the right phrase, but the idea is that you suddenly can speak the 10 languages and understand anyone. And my reaction to this was one of astonishment and suspicion.

Q: I've often felt that there didn't seem to be much carryover between this experience abroad and when it comes back.

MAYNES: I'm told by people who should know, that Mormons are basically taking over the CIA these days because of US government requirements on background checks. If you've ever slept with a girl or smoked a joint or had anything in your character, you're out. The Mormons, however, have these exotic languages and usually a spotless personal

record. Yet, apparently there is great concern in the CIA these days; it's not that they're against the Mormon recruits. Somebody told me that John Deutch made a statement privately that they were turning down 90 percent of the applicants they wanted because of these background checks. It's basically the drug issue.

Q: I think it's an interesting thing for the times. Well, anyway, why Harvard?

MAYNES: Because I am a member of the bell curve generation. Harvard decided in the mid-'60's to make an even greater effort to become a national university, and so they launched a vigorous effort to recruit across the country. And in my high school, three schools showed up to recruit: Harvard, Stanford - and I applied to both of them - and the University of Pennsylvania. And nobody else showed up. So I applied to those two and got in, and chose Harvard mainly because everybody from my high school who had good grades went to Stanford, and I was the odd man out as the Protestant, and so I went the other way. I could have just as easily gone there.

Q: So you were at Harvard from when to when?

MAYNES: From '56 to '60.

Q: Can you describe the atmosphere that you found it as coming out of where you did and coming to Harvard?

MAYNES: Well, of course, at first I was tremendously intimidated. Harvard admitted me, but they didn't give me a scholarship, and I didn't have enough money to go, and so I was working two jobs that summer and I arranged when I arrived at Harvard to work two jobs. And they sent me a letter saying that this was highly inadvisable and that I should not come. They actually called me up and suggested that I go to the University of Utah and then apply for graduate training. Well, I didn't want to go to the University of Utah, so I went, but I was obviously very, very worried. But I did extremely well, and so the first tests, after six weeks, I did so well they gave me a fellowship, and at Christmas they'd given me a full fellowship so I didn't have to work any more. But I think I ran scared all through Harvard that my grades would fall and I would lose that fellowship and have to go back to Salt Lake City. And in fact, I can remember taking the Greyhound bus from Salt Lake City to Boston and particularly as we crossed the Mississippi, then we would stop and someone would get on, and I was sitting next to a wiseacre of a traveling salesman, and some pimple-faced kid would get on, and he'd say, "He's going to Harvard." Of course, he always was. And some of them had to go back at Christmas and didn't stay. So that left a big impression on me. Most of it was for finances. They couldn't make it financially.

Q: What type of course were you taking, and what interested you?

MAYNES: History, history. Well, Harvard was a wonderful place to go, I think more for the students than for the instruction. If I were to go back to college again, I would not go

to Harvard. I would go to a smaller school like the ones my children went to. I'd try to go to Oberlin or Swarthmore.

Q: You just get a lot more attention.

MAYNES: But the student body is so electrically alive. That's so in probably a lot of schools, but it certainly was at Harvard at that time. The only thing that was a little bad about it - this was during the Sputnik period, and the newspapers were filled full of stories about how bad American education was, and there'd always be a last paragraph that said, "At least, we have Harvard." And so it began to be a rather high arrogance figure among the students after a while. But I remember one incident where we were brought down to earth. A bunch of us were sitting around talking about Sputnik and American education, and at the table suddenly Dean Bender sat down. He was the director of admissions. And he listened to this for a while, and then he said, "You don't all think you got in here on merit, do you?" And we said, "Well, that's what Time Magazine says." He said, "Well, I know how you got in here." He said, "I'm the one who admitted you." We said, "How did we get in?" He says, "Well, as a matter of fact, most of you at the table did get in on merit, but your lot in life is you're going to work for the people who got in who didn't get in on merit." He said, "We admit about 25 per cent of the class because they're going to run the country, and you're going to work for them. Your lot in life is to work for Michael Rockefeller." And he turned out largely to be correct.

But anyway, I had some excellent teachers there, a couple of whom remain friends to this day. I remember taking Stanley Hoffmann's class. That probably was one of the first examples of an intellectual experience - he taught a wonderful class on France that I think made me a Francophile from then on. It was a class that combined history and literature and politics in an absolutely brilliant blend. It's the only time in four years at Harvard that I saw a professor cheered at the end of each lecture because it was such an intellectual *tour-de-force*. And I got an A in that course, which I was very proud of. And that probably is the first impulse. But then I had Stephen Graubard, who is now the editor of Daedalus, who was my thesis advisor and pushed me, I thought, to the breaking point, but I see now how valuable it was, to write better. So it was a valuable intellectual experience.

Q: Why had you sort of pointed yourself towards law while you were there?

MAYNES: I had an uncle who was a lawyer, and he lived with us when I was a small boy, and I had always admired him, so that was it. There was no desire to make big money or help the poor - nothing other than follow Uncle Joe. Then when you get to Harvard, also, like many colleges, so many of your classmates are either aspiring to be doctors or lawyers, so I was sort of . . . you go with the flow, you know.

Q: How did the Rhodes Scholarship work out?

MAYNES: Well, that was probably the best intellectually. That was better than Harvard because there was so much freedom at Oxford.

Q: First of all, how did you get into the program?

MAYNES: Well, I read about it and just applied and got it. I also won the Marshall. I got a Marshall as well and turned that down for the Rhodes. I knew I had very high grades. I was in junior Phi Beta Kappa, in the Junior Eight at Harvard, so I had among the highest grade points in the class. And I was from Utah, so I knew my chances, if not great, were at least reasonable. I certainly wasn't going to be laughed out of the competition, so I applied. And I can't recall, but I wouldn't be surprised. . . . Oh, yes. The senior tutor from Adams House urged me to apply because I think he thought I could win. And I did. You've got to remember, at that time most people thought that they would never leave this country. I mean, it's hard to imagine that, but in my class at Harvard, like three or four had been abroad - maybe more had and didn't admit it, because at that time at Harvard, everybody wanted to be on scholarship because that showed that you were intellectually strong. As a matter of fact, there was a big campaign by the people who were rich to get "honorary scholarships," you know, and they finally gave them - \$100 scholarships - but some people didn't run around saying how rich they were, so there were probably more that went abroad. The fact is that few of us had been abroad. Now, while I was editor of Foreign Policy for 15 years and used to run an intern program there, everybody who was applying had been to three or four countries by their senior year in high school, so it's just a totally different. But Harvard in the mid-50's, late 50's, you know, looking at sort of what was going to happen to you in life, you said, Gee, what if I don't. Something like the Rhodes was like a miracle. It would let you go abroad, which otherwise, I thought, I would have to work 40 years or 30 years to get the money that finally would permit it.

Q: -allow your widow to do it.

MAYNES: -yes, allow my widow to go. I mean, my father married my mother and promised her if she married him he would take her to Europe. He never could do it until he was 65, and he had quite a successful career, but it just was out of the question.

So I wanted the Rhodes to go abroad, and I had a wonderful time there, and I'm not sure I actually valued the Oxford experience more than Harvard, but that may be my time of life. I might not have been ready for Oxford at 18.

Q: I think this often happens.

MAYNES: Because they turn you loose, whereas Harvard puts the harness on you and says, "This is the direction you're going to go." And they simply, every week my professor would give me a list of 30 books and say, "Read in these and give me a paper." It was the first time I'd sort of been liberated intellectually.

Q: Was there any sort of oral exam, screening exam?

MAYNES: Oh, yes.

Q: Do you recall how that went?

MAYNES: Yes, I got in a fight with the president of Stanford, who thought I was too liberal, but it probably got me the fellowship, too. You know what they try to do in these interviews is trap you, as they did in the Foreign Service interview. Get you into a logical trap and see how you cope with trying to get out of it. Or to confront you; you offer a conservative view and I offer a liberal view, and because I'm more experienced I begin to overpower you, and how you react to that. It's that sort of a form. So the president of Stanford was trying to beat me down intellectually with conservative arguments. I guess I answered persuasively enough that I got the fellowship - when they announced the four of us who got it, they singled me out as someone who had confronted the committee.

Q: Well, you were at Oxford from 1960?

MAYNES: '60 to '62.

Q: You mentioned the intellectual freedom there. Was there sort of an international mingling while you were there, either with the Brits or others?

MAYNES: Well, ultimately there was, although unfortunately I never got as close as I was hoping I would. I did develop Anglophilic from the experience. I didn't have very many English friends. I had international friends. But it was sort of a hotbed. I became the secretary of the American community, mainly because I wrote the letter that protested Kennedy's actions, the way he was handling the Cuban Missile Crisis. We sent a petition, which made The Times. I was always afraid that was going to keep me out of the Foreign Service. It shows the extent of our file system because it was never brought up.

Q: When I was with the Board of Examiners we had some people come up who had been in the SDS, the Students for a Democratic Society, which was the far left.

MAYNES: The petition was never brought up. Our argument was that literally to threaten the destruction of civilization, this was not acceptable. We were challenging the whole deterrence concept.

Q: I'm just curious about various movements there.

MAYNES: Well, the main movement was against nuclear weapons at the time. It was CND - Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. It was very strong in Britain at that time, and Americans were often under attack at Oxford for being part of a bellicose, destructive nation. Actually, the purpose of the statement that I wrote on Cuba was to prevent it from going too far, because the original statement had gone way over the top.

Q: Did you find inherent in movements of this sort and others a basic distaste for the former colonials on the part of the Brits?

MAYNES: Oh, yes. The British then had the problem that I suppose the Russians do now of how do you adjust to a downsizing? That is going back to the 80th anniversary of Rhodes Scholars, and that view has totally disappeared. They now see America, I think excessively, as everything is over there and we're just a poor little provincial station. The Cold War had its grip on our class. I told you I was secretary. The president of our class had been the president of Notre Dame, and it was revealed later that he was being flown over to Washington to meet with Robert Kennedy on a regular basis. This was part of a covert operation to try to undermine left-wing or Communist-influenced elements in the international student movement, and he then went on to become president of the National Student Association and was destroyed politically in the late 1960's, early 1970's when he was trying to run for political office. Well, he became mayor of Akron, but then he was trying to go higher, and suddenly it came out that he had been on the CIA -- I'm not sure he was on the payroll, but he certainly was an agent of influence.

Q: Well, Robert Kennedy was taking almost an inordinate interest in youth. I mean this was a period it's hard to recapture.

MAYNES: Of course, these rumors go right on up through Clinton's class. There are rumors that Clinton was working for "intelligence," and those rumors have been out there. And whether or not they're true, what is true is that the Agency was reaching into the American student body there and did have some people in its network.

Q: '60-62 - there was another movement afoot besides, in the United States anyway, and this was the Kennedy election, which galvanized an awful lot of people in the United States-

MAYNES: It's what caused me to go into the Foreign Service.

Q: -and others. I was wondering whether you could talk about that impact on your particular class, because here it seems like a certain conflict.

MAYNES: We were all great admirers of Kennedy, notwithstanding this critical letter that we sent. And the New Frontier was a great attraction to many of us. I think I was the only one who was directly lured into government, but others in other ways were influenced by it. Dick Celeste is now our ambassador in India. He went into politics in Ohio, became governor of the state. Matt Nimitz was in the State Department as a counselor and under secretary for security assistance. Lester Thurow was on the Council of Economic Advisors. Robert Montgomery was in the Nixon Administration. So a lot of us went into public life, I think, and one of the early impulses was... It's amazing how different those days are from now, when government service is right at the bottom of the

heap. But in those days, everybody, whether they could do it initially or later, wanted to go into government service.

Q: While you were in England, did you as an American pick up any of the class problems in England?

MAYNES: Oh, yes. I had a scout, who came in every morning to wake me up and provide me with shaving water. That's all been abandoned now. The class problem was a tremendous albatross on British development. I think it's disappeared to a significant degree, but it's still there. A lot of it's court-related; it's connected with the monarchy. I mean, when you get right down to it, there's a whole system, and it filters out through the society. But it was very pronounced at Oxford. People who went to state schools were thought inferior beings. We never felt that at Harvard. We felt sometimes under-prepared, but it was made clear to us from the first day we arrived at Harvard that the historical record at Harvard was that the people from private schools did better the first two years, and the class leaders intellectually were people from the public schools at the end of four years. So people tended to catch up and surpass. But that certainly wasn't the belief, and I doubt that it was the record at Oxford. I think the people who went to the so-called public schools, privately funded, did much better.

Q: Well, the system fostered this, and also they were much better prepared.

MAYNES: Well, they are. I remember one Christmas I didn't have enough money to go away for a vacation, so I stayed at college, and up to the college were coming people taking their entrance exams, to try to get into Merton, which was my college at Oxford. So I had lunch with them day after day, and I soon realized that these kids, who were then 16, 17, had read all the books already that I was reading at Oxford to get my degree, and so they have a degree of specialization which is totally unknown in American universities, and for that reason, somebody from Oxford... You know, if you get a BA at Oxford, if you wait two years, you pay a little money, you get an MA. And in fact, it was deserved, because you take physics there, all you take is physics. I mean, you really do know more physics than a physics major here, who is required to take 40 percent, or whatever it is, of his classes in other areas. Now whether that's a better system, I don't know, but you do end up with people graduating from Oxford who really do know their field much better than ours do.

Q: Did you get off and travel around while you were there?

MAYNES: I did. At Oxford you get six weeks at Christmas and six weeks at Easter, and then the summer, so every time that happened, I headed for the continent, and it's amazing what the overvalued dollar can do for an American tourist. I got a scholarship of \$2,100 a year on my Rhodes, and with that I paid room, board, and tuition at Oxford and I traveled all over the continent. I stayed in hotels, not in youth hostels - third-class hotels, but hotels, with clean sheets and a bath usually in the room. And at the end of two years I owed my father \$200. It's amazing. And my Australian colleagues were telling me all the

time the dollar was overvalued, and I kept denying it, and of course they were right. I realized this when I was in the Carter Administration and then I was an assistant secretary. And I went up to a hotel in New York that I never had been able to afford to stay at before, but with government rates and everything... I'm lining up to check in, and there in front of me are a bunch of French and German kids with knapsacks checking into the same hotel. I realized that it was just that the situation had flipped.

Q: Well, did any particular countries grab you when you went there and looking at them?

MAYNES: Well, France. I had a French girlfriend, and so I traveled all over France. Italy, of course, was wonderful, and I spent a lot of time in Greece. But maybe because of the Latin background, I was more attracted to the Mediterranean countries than the Teutonic ones. I did travel in Germany, and I didn't like it that much then. I like it better now, but then I didn't like it very much.

Q: Well, by this time was the Foreign Service - the travel, the Oxford thing, and the Kennedy experience-

MAYNES: But also I read Kennan's memoirs. Like many people of my age group who entered the Foreign Service, you know, we read Kennan in college, and he was such a wonderful writer. I decided I wanted a career that combined action with an intellectual dimension to it. By that time, my choices were less law, and I was actually thinking at Oxford of becoming a Don in philosophy. I was doing quite well in philosophy. I studied the politics of philosophy and economics. Most people don't do very well in philosophy, but I was one of the better students in that, and so I was even thinking of doing that. But I decided I really wouldn't want such a sedentary career. I did want an intellectual career; I didn't want to be a businessman; I didn't want to be a lawyer; I wanted something more intellectual but something also that had some action. And that was what put me in the Foreign Service.

Q: You took the Foreign Service Exam when?

MAYNES: It would have been 1960.

Q: Do you recall anything of how the oral exam went?

MAYNES: I think I knew I was going to pass it when they asked me an obscure question about some commission that had been set up in Brussels. It was clear they did not expect me to know. I knew it because already I had foreseen the day that I might be the editor of a major intellectual journal. I used to love sitting for two or three hours in the junior common room reading all the magazines. And so I was extremely well informed for a student. And so when they hit me with this question - they didn't actually ask me to name the head of the commission, but they put this question out to me, and I said, "Well, you must have meant the commission headed by . . ." and I've forgotten the name now. I mispronounced it, but I could see the shoulders straighten, and I knew I was going to get

it. But it was not combative at all. That's the only thing I remember, because I knew that was the key moment, that I had surprised them and I knew that.

Then the other thing is I was still thinking about going on for a graduate degree, and I'm not sure I got good advice, but the examination committee then, as a team, sort of pressured me to come in the Foreign Service right away and not go on for a fuller education, that I should come in right now, "You're ready to come in right now." So we had about a half-hour discussion of the pros and cons of coming in right away or waiting. I think they thought if I didn't come in, I wouldn't come. If I went on, I wouldn't come in.

Q: Well, I think that's often the pattern.

MAYNES: So they were very anxious to get me to commit right then, which I didn't resist very much, because. . . .

Q: Well, you'd already had the equivalent of another degree anyway.

MAYNES: Yes, I had. The question was just whether I'd get my Ph.D. That was one of the big turning points in my life, and I don't regret it. But I recognize it as a turning point.

Q: When you came into the Foreign Service in '62-

MAYNES: '62. I had also a very unusual security interview. I got notice that Agent Brown was going to meet me in the middle of the Salt Lake City airport and give my security interview in order to clear the way for me to enter the Foreign Service, so I meet this guy in the middle of people, you know, and, "Look," he says, "I haven't got much time. I've got about 20 minutes before the next flight out. I just want to ask you, look, you're not some kind of queer, are you?" And I said, "I don't think so." And he said, "All right, okay." So there. That showed the priorities. I could have been a spy, just as long as I wasn't a homosexual.

Q: Well, of course, the whole theory was that homosexuals were. . . . Well, one, you might say, there was the institutional repugnance towards this activity. As I sit here looking over Dupont Circle from your office, which is sort of the center of the American movement-

MAYNES: Absolutely. The president of the movement is probably sitting right out there.

Q: Nobody's accused him of that!

MAYNES: No, no, no.

Q: But also the feeling was that it left people susceptible to blackmail - which, in fact, it did at that time.

MAYNES: It did, because we allowed it, just as we allowed adultery to become a blackmailable-

Q: But anyway, you came in in '62. Can you describe your class, known as A-100 or basic orientation?

MAYNES: Yes. Let's see. We had five women, all of whom left because the State Department still had that rule that if you married, the two of you couldn't be in at the same time, and so all five of them left. Ed Djerejian was in my class and went on to great distinction in the Foreign Service. He and I were really the only two who sort of stayed for something. I left after ten years and came back, but the rest kind of disappeared. I mean a couple had distinguished careers in USIA, but the State Department people. I mean Djerejian was clearly a star. You know, it was not as strong a class as it could have been.

Q: Well, when you were in there, where did you want to go? I mean, not you but sort of the thrust of the class? What did they want to do?

MAYNES: Well, of course, they all wanted to go abroad, and they all wanted to go to Europe because, again, you've got to remember the period. This was a period when it was hard to travel, expensive, and kids had joined the Foreign Service largely because they wanted to see Europe. A few were interested in Latin America because they had language or something, but there was not much interest in Asia and none in Africa, a little in the Middle East. I stayed in Washington because they basically asked some of us in the class to volunteer to stay in Washington. And since I had just come from abroad, I decided I would volunteer. In fact, those of us who stayed in Washington, I think, had better careers. I realize in retrospect. Djerejian stayed, and I stayed, and Kathleen McDonough stayed, and that was about it. And all three of us got better ongoing assignments because we were able to scope the system out, you know, and I went into UN affairs because I had the Wilsonian impulse coming from the part of the country that I did. My first two assignments in the Foreign Service were just extraordinary in terms of the amount of authority I was given. I mean, really, exceptional. I wrote, as a junior officer, one of the key provisions in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I and another fellow took the initiative to challenge what was then the prevailing orthodoxy, which was we were going to offer security guarantees to India, and we produced a paper trying to prove that, one, we wouldn't do it, two, they wouldn't accept it and, three, that this was just going to lead us into trouble. That was very heavy, to have a paper go to the president and actually have a provision in a treaty. And then I went to Laos, and through a series of accidents, the economist for the AID mission had quit, and so I was sent over there to sort of keep the papers in order until his replacement came, and they were satisfied with the performance, so I became the non-project economist for the AID mission.

Q: You were in IO, or UN Affairs.

MAYNES: That's right, a rotational officer.

Q: From when to when?

MAYNES: '62-64.

Q: Who was running it at that point?

MAYNES: Harlan Cleveland.

Q: Were you able to see how he operated and where he was coming from, or where you too far removed?

MAYNES: Well, he was sort of cold and aloof and, in fact, white talented, quite a brilliant man, in fact. They had a special interest in me because Cleveland had been a Rhodes Scholar, and his deputy, Richard Gardner, had been a Rhodes Scholar, so I did see a lot of them because I was used as note-taker, and so I saw them in action a lot. Cleveland's just not a very warm man, but very able.

Q: How about Richard Gardner?

MAYNES: Well, I saw a lot of him because I was reporting to him. Actually, seeing him for the first time probably set the scene in my mind that I ought to leave the Foreign Service as soon as I was in it, because I was looking at him, and I thought, My God, here he is, he's deputy assistant secretary, and he's got exactly the same background I do, and he's only six years older. What's the likelihood that I will be a deputy assistant secretary if I stay in the Foreign Service? Not high. But he was very innovative, and IO was a major powerhouse thing. I mean, Joe Sisco was the head of UNP and a major force in the Department. We had a lot of good young officers: Don McHenry was sort of my cellmate and obviously headed for distinction. His colleague became the president, is now the president of Bowdoin. We had Robert Oakley. There was a lot of talent, you know, at the lower levels, and then the upper levels were Cleveland, who many people thought was going to become a Secretary of State - and in fact probably should have been. I think he had the intellectual qualities to be Secretary - better than many of the people who did get it. But anyway, he had sort of a star over his head, because when he left Oxford he went out at, I think, 27, and ran UNRA in China and had done apparently a brilliant job, and then he'd gone on to become the Dean of the Maxwell School at Syracuse, and then IO at a very young age, and sort of had an aura. So it was a powerful bureau, probably the most powerful it's ever been.

Q: Did you have a feeling when you came in there - and often the new boy on the block gets a good feeling for it until you become part of it - that there was sort of a UN mafia within the State Department, I mean, true believers - because the UN has always. . . . you know, the bilateral versus the United Nations.

MAYNES: Yes, well, it quickly became clear to you that although we had a very talented staff, we had to run twice as fast as anybody else in the building because the natural locus for power is regional bureaus. So IO itself was staffed by people . . . I suppose I qualify not as a true believer, but certainly I thought it was important, so the people who were in there tend to think it's important. The core of the bureau, though, consisted of women.

Q: I've noticed that over a period of time there are women who stayed there much longer.

MAYNES: Because many of them were women who had come to Washington in 1945, gotten a job at the State Department, and couldn't go abroad because they were married and that sort of thing, and in those days, the Department allowed these women to stay in the same job year after year. When I became assistant secretary of IO, one of the criticisms I got from OMB was that the quality of the bureau was no longer as high as it had been in the past. And the reason for it was that the Department had changed the rules, and you couldn't stay in a job like that. They rotated all those women out, and it was true that they had a degree of expertise that a Foreign Service officer coming in would never get, no matter eager he was. And so that was a problem. But they were the pillars. Kathleen Bell in the Economic Section and Virginia Hartley in the Political Section and Virginia Householder in the Administrative Section. They ran the place. They didn't have the highest jobs, but whenever it came to a crunch, they were the ones who produced the papers; they were the ones who provided the critical edge. And when the Department lost those people it lost a lot.

Q: You said you had a hand in a Non-Proliferation Treaty clause. What was the clause, and what was the issue?

MAYNES: It was the assurances clause. Well, we were hung up in the Department of State. We couldn't break the treaty out of our own bureaucracy, and the big issue was what are we going to do on the assurances issue? And the prevailing wisdom was - but they couldn't get any consensus for it - that the United States was going to offer security assurances to everybody who signed the treaty. And that was just patently not going to happen. It couldn't get through the Senate, and it's not going to happen. We're not going to go to war to defend every member who signs that treaty. So I and another junior officer were in the arms control section of IO, and we sat down one night and wrote a paper analyzing the weaknesses of the then prevailing position - still not endorsed by any authoritative level, but the one that everybody had been chewing on for months - and outlining an alternative, which we then presented to Cleveland. He immediately saw the power of the argument and sent it on up, and then the next day the security people came to see us and said that we had to give them all the copies of everything that we had produced, and we couldn't read our own memorandum any more. And then a few days later I looked at the New York Times, and there on the front page, prime column, was my memo, saying that the U.S. government was considering this. And then I went to work the next day, and Bill Buffum, who was then the head of UNP called me in and said, "I want you to go home." There's going to be a security investigation. The President's furious at this leak. I know you didn't do it. It has been leaked by somebody who opposes this

position." Anyway, at the end of the day, the principals met and adopted our position. Unfortunately, it's the weakest provision in the treaty, because what it says is that if - it basically buries the issue - it says that if somebody violates the treaty, that the Security Council at the UN is supposed to come to grips with this issue and deal with it appropriately. I mean the language is more flowery and reads better than that, but that's the essence of it. So basically it buried the issue and allowed the treaty to go forward. Of course I'd been fascinated to see the Indian position these days, which of course hasn't changed since 1965, and of course we buried the issue and then did nothing about it. That wasn't the intention.

Q: India has just within the last few months had a nuclear test.

MAYNES: Yes, and their reasons for it are exactly the reasons that they gave in 1965, and we've done little to address those concerns. But, anyway, that was the role that we played, and it's one of the few cases where at the very bottom of the bureaucracy a paper's produced that just *shoots* right up to the top.

Q: A question I'd like to ask - I mean, obviously, you did very well at Harvard, you got a Rhodes Scholarship, so you're not dumb - you know what I'm saying - in other words, you are somebody who's coming out, very bright, coming into the Foreign Service - how did you feel about this? It's sometimes very difficult to come in with this background into a bureaucracy. It sounds like you had some what you call wiggle room or something.

MAYNES: Well, you see, I never was forced to wear the beanie cap. I think it was a series of accidents, now that I look back on it, but they set out to make me wear it, but-

Q: We're talking about freshmen in colleges who had to wear a beanie cap to show that they were insignificant.

MAYNES: Hazing. To show your insignificance. You know, the work on the Non-Proliferation issue sort of transformed my role in the bureau, and immediately I was seen as a substantive force in the bureau by that action alone. So then I was given the primary responsibility for managing our campaign on Article 19 against the Russians. So I always felt I was doing something very significant. I went off to Laos, where I suppose my intended fate was to report on nonexistent commercial opportunities in Laos. In fact, once I got there, within days, as I mentioned earlier, the economist for the AID mission quit in a huff because he hadn't been promoted, so the AID director called me in and said, "Would you just sit at his desk and make sure that key action documents are called to my attention and that sort of thing." So I got these, and I started answering them, and he cleared what I wrote, and Washington liked it, and so I got that job. And so that's probably the most responsible job I ever had in the Foreign Service, even maybe including when I was assistant secretary. I mean, we were supporting the Lao currency, and I was writing the papers that basically told the Lao how much they could spend. And I and the ambassador would go in and tell the minister of finance, no, you can't do this and, yes, you can do that, and of course the ambassador didn't know much about this, and so that was a very

heady, I would even say corrupting experience. It's a colonial experience, where you're the outsider running the country.

Q: Well, come to Laos, but I want to take you back. You mentioned Article 19.

MAYNES: Well, this was only in passing, to answer this question of how did I feel-

Q: Yes, but you were on, you might say just by definition, the fast track.

MAYNES: I was on the fast track.

Q: I mean, you were getting assignments and you were doing well in them, and so there was room within this hierarchy.

MAYNES: I never felt really hemmed in until I got to Moscow. Then I did begin to feel that. But in IO and in Laos, I had lots of opportunity and felt I was doing something significant. Some of that came from the leadership of the two organizations, Cleveland in IO and Bill Sullivan in Laos, both of whom didn't have much respect for. . . . You know, if the third secretary was more able than the first secretary, they reached right down. Both of them were like that.

Q: Article 19 - you were dealing with that. What was Article 19?

MAYNES: Well, it's ironic now, because the Russians had a position then which is our position now. Then we believed that the General Assembly, under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, could impose mandatory peacekeeping expenses on member states, and so we used the United for Peace Resolution to impose on the Russians financial obligations to pay for peacekeeping in the Middle East and in the Congo, and they refused to pay, saying it was unconstitutional. We took it to the World Court, got a decision that it was constitutional, and so we had a stand-off with the Russians in 1963 about payment, because they were more than two years behind and were going to lose their vote. You may recall that that year the General Assembly had no votes, in order to avoid the confrontation. What's ironic is that we're now approaching the same position, and we have adopted the Russian position, that the General Assembly does not have the right to impose these expenses on member states. Anyway, I managed that campaign, which in the end was, I suppose, unsuccessful, because as Rusk said about something else: we looked each other in the eye, and the other guy blinked. Well, we blinked, because, as Virginia Hartley predicted we would, we would not be able to tear down the organization for that purpose. But that had brought me in contact with the Secretary and lots of other people in the management of that campaign, because it was a worldwide campaign.

Q: And what other one did you mention? With India. Could you explain the issue dealing with India.

MAYNES: Well, under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, China is grandfathered in as a nuclear power, and India, which is a country of equal potential and almost the same population, and which regards China as a rival or even an enemy, is denied the right to become a nuclear power. So if you get India to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, what are you going to do to reassure India that it will not be attacked by China? That was the issue. How do you get India to sign unless you give them this assurance, and can we give them this assurance? And that was the debate. There was no resolution because to give India that assurance is a gigantic, gigantic step, and yet not to give it to them, under the framework of the argument which we were advancing, was to prevent any forward movement, because they wouldn't sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty - why should they? So it's basically the argument you see today. It's the same argument, and what we did was basically put that argument in a side box for 20 years so that we could actually bring the treaty forward and get other states to sign it. We still had the India problem, but tucked down here, which has now come out of the box.

Q: Well, then, you went out in '64 to Laos?

MAYNES: Let's see, '64, that's right.

Q: You were there from when to when?

MAYNES: I came in the Foreign Service November, '62. I took four months of French, so April of '63 to probably April of '65 I was in the Department of State in IO, and then I went up to Laos for the next two years, and then I took a year of Russian.

Q: Then we're talking about '65-67, approximately.

MAYNES: Yes.

Q: What was the situation? Laos early on in the Kennedy Administration had been front and center, and one always thinks of Kennedy on TV explaining Laos. The only time that Laos has ever been there.

MAYNES: And it didn't belong there then.

Q: Where did Laos-

MAYNES: I arrived, I guess, when Laos was in the eye of the storm. There had been Kong Li. He had been decently written up in the Washington Post as a little major. I think he was only about four-feet-nine or something like that. He basically pulled a *coup d'état* and established a neutralist government under Souvanna Phouma, which we initially were violently opposed to but then realized, of course, that he's the best thing that we had going because it basically calmed the region for a while. So I arrived just after that had happened, and Laos was the eye of the storm. In fact, the AID director and I took the first car trip down the spine of the country from Vientiane to Paksay to try to prove to

merchants that you could take that road and not get shot. But I think if we'd taken it six times, we would have been shot. I don't know. But the point was that it was calm enough in the heart of the country that actually to begin to see life restored, and we were then to convert our AID program in that period from simply supporting the currency to trying to do some development and trying to encourage some cross-border commercial activity, etc. The Cold War was there. Of course, I realized subsequently that we were doing some extremely rough things beyond the point that I could see, a lot of covert activity, a lot of bombing out of Thailand, the "Secret War." The Secret War was going on.

Q: They even had Thai troops.

MAYNES: Everything.

Q: But here you are, Vientiane, you must have been aware of the CIA presence.

MAYNES: Oh, God, I was the only non-Agency. . . . I mean, everybody assumes I was in the Agency, because I was in AID, and everybody around me was CIA, and the director there was the "White Ghost" - what's his name? He's an infamous character in CIA. Stockwell.

Q: Later he was a major figure down towards the end in Saigon.

MAYNES: That's right, and also connected with the Bay of Pigs and Jim Lilly, who went on to become ambassador in Taiwan and South Korea and China. That was a long, long CIA background, including his wife's father was a major figure in the Agency. So I know all those people.

Q: Did they sort of do their thing and you do your thing?

MAYNES: Yes, I mean, first of all, if you crossed the line, it was quickly made clear. For instance, I once did a report on opium smuggling. Of course, it's now known that the Agency was allowing some of these shipments to come out on their planes, and I began to poke around a little, and immediately, you know, it was made clear to me that I should not do any more reporting in that field.

Q: Who made it clear?

MAYNES: Somebody who came from the embassy. He was the "administrative officer," but I think he was in the chain.

Q: Well, it was a period when if it seems to work you can do anything you want.

MAYNES: That's right. Which, I think, ultimately led to things like the secret bombing of Cambodia that brought us down. I mean, they were breaking the rules; we have to break the rules. It looked gentler where I was sitting, but I realize now that. . . . I had friends

who worked in the head office, and they would talk about "the killers," you know, in the mission, because we had people who . . . that was their job.

Q: Just to capture the spirit of the time, was this something that in a way one said, I guess I'd better not know about that and go about my own business?

MAYNES: Well, it wasn't that easy to find out. It was very compartmentalized. Every once in a while, the veil would be broken. For example, there was once when it was clear that the embassy in Vientiane was helping pick targets, but somehow the codes got broken or the messages got rerouted some way and this got out. You weren't supposed to know, and "What's this?" and people very upset higher up that these messages had gotten out. It was all over our heads and beyond the horizon with people at the top in the agency and the embassy helping direct it, but it was over our heads, and as I said, over the horizon. The center part of the country was an island of relative stability, and it was the best moment. Then it began to deteriorate.

Q: Did you, sort of collectively, feel concerned about what the North Vietnamese military might do there?

MAYNES: Oh, sure. We had people killed. I had friends killed because they'd be flying out to these remote areas and their planes would be shot down and that sort of thing. You know, we didn't have a sense of the true dimension of the terror that lay ahead, both the terror that we were inflicting by the bombing and the terror that was on the ground. In part, this was because Souvanna Phouma had miraculously - because of his unique role in Lao history - achieved a situation where all the contesting parties accepted him as prime minister. It was a period of relative calm there for a while. But no, we're talking about the period before we had introduced 250,000 troops into South Vietnam. This was '64, and we introduced them in '65, as I recall. Is that right?

Q: Yes.

MAYNES: Anyway, we hadn't done it yet, and so there was still a kind of calm. You certainly got a sense of the vulnerability of Lao society because Laos is basically a country that should not exist. It would not exist but for the protection of outside powers. The Thai and the Vietnamese were in the process of dividing the country when a French postal official, Pavie, took a canoe up the Mekong and arrived at the royal court about the time that the division was about to be consummated, and without any authority from Paris, he proclaimed a French Protectorate. I mean, this was totally self-initiated - no authority from Paris - and the Lao were saved as a kingdom as a result and a ward of France. And while I was there, they became a ward of the United States. And then they tried to become the ward of Russia and then the ward of China - anybody from the outside who can protect them against the Thai and the Vietnamese, who otherwise would simply divide the country according to the balance of power or ethnic lines or whatever. So when I was there, Souvanna Phouma was accepted by everyone, even though everyone also took advantage of the situation, but not excessively at that point. And the Lao were

very grateful to us and dependent on us because we'd replaced the French as their protector against these immediate outside forces.

Q: How did you find dealing with the Lao government?

MAYNES: Fascinating and frustrating. Fascinating because your Lao counterparts were often as well educated as you were and very smart and, of course, knew the culture better and yet couldn't get anything done. And it was only after I'd been there a year that I realized the difference between and country like the United States and Laos was not just their size and wealth, but in the United States, if somebody at the top says get something done, there are 20 people below who are capable of actually turning out the order. In Laos, these people were like the Wizard of Oz. I mean, they'd issue these orders. . . . I mean, one day I was sitting in AID and into my office came our director of highways, somebody who certainly didn't go past high school, but he'd been building roads in the United States for 25 years. He knew how to build roads. If you called Tom in and said, "Build a road," he could do it. And I looked at him and I thought to myself and said to him, "You know, the difference between Laos and the United States is we have Tom. We have people who aren't at the top who actually can *do* these things, and they don't have any of that." Of course, they have other things, but they don't have that. So it was very frustrating, because we had an action-oriented agenda. You know, Washington wanted progress on all of these things. And we'd go see the Lao, and they'd promise, and then nothing would happen - because they couldn't.

Q: I was consul general in Saigon '69-70, and I found that you were up against the bureaucracy, where in our bureaucracy you say do something, and somebody will do it. But in the Vietnamese bureaucracy, a person on top might give the order, but they might not just do it. Like you'd usually find some way, but there wasn't a feeling of either urgency or really did they want to do it.

MAYNES: Exactly. And then we had this colonial relationship, which was a real problem. I sat in on a meeting once where we had a VIP from Washington and we had our minister-advisor right next to the minister, and the minister gave what the advisor thought was an inadequate answer to this VIP from Washington, so the advisor reached over and grabbed the minister by his necktie and said, "What kind of chickenshit answer is that to give to an important person from Washington, huh?" And we got him out of there the next day, but I thought about that for weeks afterwards - you know, what that really said about the American presence there and the colonial nature of it, which was not as raw in virtually every other aspect, but the reality was the same. The guy with the clout was the little guy from America, not the big guy from Laos. And that's a very . . . It's a corrupting relationship. A friend of mine who was in Japan and is the Department's foremost Japanologist said he had not realized this until he took his first tour in Okinawa, and he saw for the first time, for the first time realized what this was doing to us as well as to the Japanese.

Q: No, it does. How about Bill Sullivan? How did he operate and your impression of his influence there?

MAYNES: Well, he totally dominated the mission. I thought he was a brilliant ambassador. Of course, the young people in the mission loved him because he had no sense of hierarchy. I turned out my first airgram, and a note came over to my boss saying, "The man seems to show some analytical talent. I think you ought to give him xyz to do." So already, the doors open with one little note from the ambassador. And he did that all the time with others, so there was a real sense of ferment, and everybody admired him. He wrote better than anybody else in the mission, had ties to Washington, was feared in Washington because of his sharp tongue and sharp pen and the fact that he had Harriman's support.

Q: Harriman was assistant secretary.

MAYNES: Yes.

Q: And really much more - I mean, Harriman was sort of the sub-secretary of state.

MAYNES: Exactly, for Asia, and so he was exciting to work for, and I'm very high on him. I guess the only thing I would say in retrospect is that none of us, including him, saw far enough ahead. We were so absorbed in doing the job that we, I don't think, saw just how futile this exercise was. It was only at the end of my tour that I began to realize that we were fighting nationalism more than we were fighting Communism and we were going to lose for that reason. But the Communists had captured the nationalist flag. That is the way I would put it. We were continually trying to convince ourselves that the majority were really with us if we could only prevent them from being intimidated. And in fact, and this was a debatable assertion, but in fact I think in retrospect it's clear, that once Ho Chi Minh captured the nationalist flag, that to resist it took such overwhelming force that it would be almost unconscionable to apply - and that they were going to win, maybe disastrously for their own future. It's kind of like the Israelis trying to deny the relevance of Arafat.

Q: You're talking about the Palestinian cause?

MAYNES: Yes. He had captured the nationalist flag, and to defeat him when he's got that flag, maybe to help somebody else get it - but, of course, the people there who would get it would be Hamas. But it was the same kind of situation, and I don't think Sullivan saw that. I certainly didn't see it until it was too late, and I think in that sense, I suppose, he failed and we all failed.

Q: But it seems, too-

MAYNES: But he was an excellent, excellent ambassador who stood up for his people, who wasn't afraid of Washington. I find if I have a criticism of people in the State

Department it is that too many of them are almost like military officers in the sense that they don't challenge a bad order. They just "Yes, Sir," and "Can do," and that's good in some cases, but I'm not sure in diplomacy that that's always the best approach.

Q: But it seems as though some of the thrust of what we were doing - we put such emphasis on these small countries that we were putting people like Sullivan and others in, who were great activists, and they were the wrong people for the countries.

MAYNES: They were larger than life.

Q: And this is exactly what you shouldn't, because the Lao are a pretty passive people, and they sort of brush them aside. I mean, you have a feeling that-

MAYNES: I agree with that too. I remember going in as the notetaker for one VIP from Washington, and I accompanied him in every place we went. He would make Washington's spiel, he would advance Washington's demands, and the Lao would say, "I understand, I understand you," and so he goes back, and I see a cable that goes from the plane to the White House saying, "All objectives achieved." And of course, I knew that not one of them had been achieved. Not one time did the Lao say they would actually *do* what he said. They said they understood him, you know, that they understood it and they weren't going to do it.

Q: Well, this is one of the great stories of the clash of cultures.

MAYNES: Of course, in Laos you also have a culture that regards any show of excessive emotion or anger as totally unacceptable socially. And it's almost in the American character that a good manager or something - well, maybe the word *anger* isn't quite right - but energy, edge - but it doesn't work in that culture. They find it almost an example of barbarism.

Q: Well, on the economic side, how were things going as far as the AID program is concerned?

MAYNES: Well, we had a relative success. When I was there the Lao currency was declared the strongest currency in the world by a survey out of Wall Street. We supported it at 5500 to 1. We had a little organization called FEOF (Foreign Exchange Operations Fund, or something like that), and we had five countries run it. America dominated it because we put the most money in, and we stabilized the currency. This was in reaction to an earlier AID program where we'd subsidized the import of commodities, and then it had been grossly abused and had led to many congressional investigations and condemnations of the Department for its poor management. This was the alternative, which was to stabilize the currency and basically create a free market. And it worked. The trouble was it was expensive. We were spending - not the United States alone, but with FEOF - something like \$60 million a year to subsidize the Lao economy, and when you do something like that, of course, the reason we got so involved in the budget was that the

higher their budget, the higher FEOF had to be. So if you only had \$60 million or only had \$50 million, you had to go in there and tell them which they had to cut in order to make it. Every year I had to do the mathematical analysis of what the imports were and what the outputs and what the FEOF amount was going to be. And then we would present it to the IMF, and they would ratify it and they would go and raise the money. But it was considered a great success at the time and was the reason that the DCM in Laos, who was slotted to be DCM in Moscow, took me along, because he wanted to get some new blood in the economic field in Soviet studies. So I had a very successful tour there. It ultimately began to collapse because we began to have gold outflow problems in the United States, and the treasury began getting upset that Laos in particular became the center, in Indochina, for the gold trade. Massive amounts of gold - because we were a free market - were moving through Vientiane to Saigon, where every housewife in Saigon was wearing a gold bracelet that was hammered out in Vientiane as an inflation protection device.

Q: Yes, like they even buy little bars of gold. They're for sale along the-

MAYNES: Yes. I was providing the financial underpinning to make this, because you could buy and sell money. So we had some very serious visits from the Treasury while I was there. I spent time with senior officials of the Treasury, and they wanted us to stop this gold trade. We couldn't stop the gold trade without stopping the free market in the currency, so while I was there it lasted, but I think in the end they had to take some steps because it was true we were headed off the gold standard. We were not going to make people pull more and more tons of gold out of Fort Knox.

Q: What was the impression that people had of Souvanna Phouma, from the embassy, that you were getting?

MAYNES: I think high because of Sullivan. I mean, Sullivan dominated the embassy, and if he was high on him, then others were. There were some Cold Warriors who were close to some of the right-wingers in the military and thought that we should get a government with a harder edge, and some were there to work up *coups*, one of which is an interesting story in itself. But whenever that happened, we came down foursquare for Souvanna Phouma because anybody who did his numbers back in Washington knew that this was the best situation for us.

But Souvanna was a transitional figure. I realize that while I was there. I followed him out in the countryside once. I used to watch him all the time in Vientiane, but there was a period after decolonialization where there was a window for a certain kind of leader, and that was someone who was comfortable in both worlds. Souvanna Phouma could show up at a diplomatic dinner party and be a charming Frenchman, and a Westerner, if you will.

Souvanna Phouma was a transition figure because after decolonialization there was a window where people were absolutely needed by their country in order to reassure the domestic population that an authentic figure was in charge of the country and reassure the outside donors that someone like them was in charge of the country, and so Souvanna

Phouma was an ideal transition figure. He was a French member of the *haute bourgeoisie* in Vientiane, charming the wives of ambassadors, and out in the countryside he was a Lao prince. But even while I was there, you began to see the transition to the new order. A bill went through the Lao parliament which required all documents in Laos to be in Lao, and that was passed by a parliament which was dominated by military people who'd been elected to the parliament. Many of them were sergeants and majors, and they took over the parliament, and they represented the future of Laos, which was more indigenous, with no or very light French patina. And they were demanding that Laos be Laos, and so the more that they succeeded in passing regulations like that, the less relevant people like Souvanna Phouma became, because basically the parliament was saying, "We don't want a transitional doubt. We don't want a translator between the two cultures. We want one culture. We want Laos." And so he had to pass from the scene at some point. But for a while I think he was, even in the Lao context, a great man. I mean I think he spared his country. . . . He tried to play the role that Sihanouk has also tried to play, and I think maybe in some ways with more success, because Sihanouk finally got overwhelmed. That may not be Sihanouk's fault, but they both were trying in their way to keep the Communists at bay and keep us at bay and save their country, and I think they, in their own ways, bought a lot of time for their countries. In the end they were overwhelmed.

Q: Did you have any feel, while you were there - I'm talking about you as one of the members of the embassy - for the Communist movement there, because we're looking down at Cambodia, where you had the Khmer Rouge, which was-

MAYNES: Of course, Khmer Rouge we hadn't even heard of.

Q: I know, but I'm still saying, in that country there developed probably the most vicious and virulent form. Were you seeing anything of that nature?

MAYNES: Nothing. As a matter of fact, the Communists were in Vientiane. They had a little compound there - at least that's my memory of it. One didn't know. First of all, Souvanna Phouma's brother was the head of the Communist movement.

Q: Half brother.

MAYNES: Half brother - so one didn't know what kind of movement it was or what would happen if they ever took over. I mean, we saw them more as agents of the Vietnamese than as any serious domestic movement. Maybe we were wrong, but I'm saying that's the way we saw it. And no one really knew what a Lao Communist was, other than an ally of the Vietnamese, who were trying to take over South Vietnam. The politics in the period that I was there, the neutralist mantra was dominant, and the right-wingers and the Communists were pushed to the side because there was an international agreement and you had Souvanna Phouma as a unique legitimator in charge of the government. So we didn't have debates like that. The Communist problem was over there, and it was being contained by the fighting in the mountains, on the one hand, and the agreement of '62 on the other.

Q: Well, why don't we leave at this point, and we'll pick this up the next time, when you left Laos, and we'll pick up going into Russian training.

MAYNES: Okay.

Q: This is the 31st of August, 1998. Bill, what got you off to - well, in those days we called it Soviet studies?

MAYNES: I think I had understood, as I looked at the Department of State, that it seemed to me there were three areas in the Department of State where, if you were a professional, you had some chance of rising to a position of some influence. One was Arabic studies, one was Russian studies, and one was Chinese studies. And I'd always been more interested in Europe than the Far East or the Middle East, so I chose Russian studies. In addition, the DCM in Laos was posted as the DCM in Moscow.

Q: That was who?

MAYNES: That was Toby Swank, and he liked me a lot and offered basically to take me along, and in fact, favored me so much that when I got there, I did not, like the other beginning officers, have to work in administration. He took me right into the substantive section of the embassy. So it was the opportunity which I had with him to sort of jump a rank.

Q: When you took Russian studies, you were here in Washington first? From when to when?

MAYNES: That's right, it would have been 1968 - because I remember sitting and studying Russian and watching Washington burn after the Martin Luther King assassination and wondering if I was crazy to be studying an exotic language and going abroad when my own country was falling apart.

Q: Well, just about that time, too, the Soviets had moved into Czechoslovakia.

MAYNES: Well, I arrived in Russia the day that they moved.

Q: Okay, then we're really talking about . . . you took Russian from when to when?

MAYNES: Well, I can't remember exactly. It would have been ten months prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Q: So really '67 to '68.

MAYNES: I would have left Laos in the summer of '67, so I would have started about the fall of '67.

Q: While you were taking Russian, sometimes one picks up quite a bit about the culture from one's teachers. Did you feel you got anything from them, or was it-

MAYNES: Oh, yes, absolutely. We had three Russian teachers, and they were of very different backgrounds. One was from the aristocracy and sort of 1917 aristocracy, lovely, beautiful woman. Another was from the Russian intelligentsia and had been through the Siege of Leningrad, and she and her husband were virulently anti-Soviet but passionately pro-Russian - of the kind who will immediately side with the Soviet Union if someone was trying for example, to take the Baltic States away from Russia, etc. Then we had a lower-middle-class woman who had grown up in Harbin, so we got three sectors of Russian society.

Q: You got to Russia, then, I suppose around August of '68?

MAYNES: That's right. That's when.

Q: You were there from when to when?

MAYNES: From August of '68 till August or July of 1970.

Q: Before we get to the reaction to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, what was your impression of the Soviet Union when you got there, compared to what you'd been thinking about it?

MAYNES: I think it was pretty much what I expected, except that I didn't . . . I mean, I knew it was certainly a very highly authoritarian place with lots of repression and official anti-American ideology. What I wasn't prepared for was the warmth of the Russian people toward Americans, which was very genuine at the time. And that's probably changed, but it certainly was very strong then. I also wasn't prepared for our own isolation and self-imposed isolation, our fear of contact and our own paranoia, which was much greater than I would have expected.

Q: How did this translate itself, this paranoia?

MAYNES: Well, fear of contact with Russians. Part of this stems from our foolish reaction - in terms of policy response - to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Since we didn't want to do anything that was substantive, we were all ordered not to talk to Russians. So having spent 10 months learning Russian, I was ordered by the security officer at the embassy - not ordered but strongly encouraged - to avoid all contact with Russians. In fact, we were under an official prohibition from talking to them officially for several months, which of course simply cut us off from information and any modest influence that we could have.

What I also realized very quickly after I arrived - and I had not understood this - that Soviet studies was a radioactive field. I remember encountering a professor a couple of months after I was there, a distinguished professor here in the United States, and he told me he had been the first professor in the Cold War period to be permitted to spend a year at the Russian Institute, studying there. And I said, "Well, you must have written an interesting account of that." He said, "Oh, no, I couldn't possibly." And I said, "Why?" He said, "Well, if I said anything favorable, I would have been ostracized in the United States, and if I said anything unfavorable, I would have been denied a visa to return." So that was a big shock to me, and then I began to realize and noticed that - we quickly noticed - that the best analysis of Soviet reality was coming out of the CIA and not out of the State Department. And since I knew the people in the State Department and to my mind they were just as gifted and in some ways, I thought, maybe even more than their CIA colleagues - and I think certainly on the whole a more elite group - there had to be a reason for it. And the reason was that the CIA had anonymity, and we didn't, and people were scared to death to say anything that deviated even slightly from the party line, whatever that might be at the moment. So it was not as radioactive, I suppose, as Chinese studies, for which people were actually thrown out of the Service and that sort of thing. But people learned their lesson, and there was an orthodoxy that you had to follow, and you were only permitted to deviate from it if you got to a very, very high level and were very much trusted by the people in power back in Washington.

Q: Well, your job is what at that embassy?

MAYNES: I was number two in the economic section.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

MAYNES: For one year, Thompson, and he did have the reputation where he could talk truth to power. And then Jake Beam, who was a very distinguished ambassador but did not have that confidence back in Washington.

Q: I'd like to try to get the feeling of the atmosphere there. When you say that the reporting, particularly let's say on the political side, which you would have access to now, did you find that. . . . This is the early Brezhnev period, I guess, wasn't it?

MAYNES: In retrospect, I think you can see that the Soviet Union was fitfully trying to reform itself really from 1956 on, and the big chance came when Khrushchev finally had supreme power, and while we were there, he was thrown out, but they knew that they were in trouble, because basically the model for growth that they had was running out of power. The model was, take surplus labor with the status quo technology, marry them - in other words, take peasants off the *kolkhoz*, put them in a factory, and you get a one-time immediate shot-in-the-arm increase in GNP and growth. By the time I arrived, they were facing a labor shortage, and the technical journals were filled with articles about this, and it was clear that they knew that they had to do something about this. This, of course,

ultimately brought them down. Actually, I personally wrote some airgrams at the time predicting that this couldn't last. What I didn't understand was how long they could hold on, but it wasn't that I was so prescient; it was that they were saying it themselves. You just had to read the journals. And they were floundering around trying to figure out how they could solve this dilemma. And they talked about putting the handicapped to work. Of course, that wouldn't solve the problem. Or making students go three years to university instead of four. All these were one-shot, small solutions to the problem. There are only two solutions, and both were dangerous for them. One was reform, to increase entrepreneurial activity, and also the implementation of new scientific discoveries into the economy. And they tried that. They created a scientific - I've forgotten - state committee for science and technology. They tried to develop technology to take the existing labor force and make it more productive. And the trouble was that they needed to open up the system, really, to do that. And then they tried entrepreneurial reform, and they had something called the Shchokino Experiment while I was there, and they were going on and on about this. And it did give them big gains where they allowed the director more authority. But they were afraid of replicating it, so it was just like a little hothouse plant out there in the middle of Russia. And then they tried importing foreign technology, and that's, of course, when we were slapping sanctions on them trying to stop them from doing it. But they were getting a lot of technology from Western Europe and Japan, but there again, they'd buy these plants, they would be state-of-the-art plants, turnkey projects, and they were so afraid of infection from the outside that they would dismiss the foreign specialists as soon as the plant was completed, and then they never could bring it up to full capacity. So you'd walk into these modern plants, and they'd be working at 50 per cent capacity. So they were trying everything they could to change the system and not lose control. And then came the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and that really closed the reforms down. The reforms sort of stumbled on for a while, but it's clear now that the invasion of Czechoslovakia basically closed a chapter that had begun with Khrushchev's speech before the 20th Congress. Then it greatly intensified when he became head of the Politburo, then began to lose momentum but still was continuing in the early days of Brezhnev and Kosygin and got virtually shut down with the invasion.

Q: How did the invasion of Czechoslovakia. . . . You're the new boy on the block, and often your antennae are more alert to things. How did you find our embassy reacted to this, particularly the political section?

MAYNES: Well, the embassy had predicted the invasion, but in a bureaucratic manner that didn't help very much. In other words, they said the chances were 51-49 that the invasion would take place. Thompson was gone, and we had no access to Soviet leadership, so we basically had a reasonably professional response to it, but I don't think we showed any great insight because we were really denied anything. . . . We were ordered by Washington not to talk to Russian officials; Thompson was gone; we couldn't fight that prohibition; and we were followed every place we went. From the minute that the invasion took place, the KGB put agents on us wherever we went. So we were reduced to reading the newspapers, you know - and actually, we were very skilled at that. People in Moscow developed, particularly after they'd been there about six months or a

year, a very fine sense of what words meant, and so we did a good job of that, but I don't think we brought any great. . . . we didn't perform the normal task of diplomacy, which is to somehow get into the mind of the leadership of the other country and be able to inform your own country of what's really motivating them and what some of the pressures are. It wasn't until Thompson came back that we began to articulate a reasonable version of what might have taken place inside the Russian leadership, because he had that finger-feel for it. He also had contacts like no one else in the embassy.

Q: Well, you're pointing to one of the things, too - the bureaucratic response. When we have a crisis with a country, we often withdraw our ambassador, we tell people "Don't have contact," which always has struck me as being just the wrong thing.

MAYNES: It is the wrong thing.

Q: You don't go into a pet or a pout. I mean, what the hell. This is when you want a full-court press.

MAYNES: I agree. When you have one of these crises, for a US Government or for the Administration in power, the domestic public relations are more important than the diplomatic considerations. So it's more important for them to have a headline in the post saying we ain't talking to these nasty Russians because of what they've done, rather than sitting down and trying to figure out whether there's any opportunity really to influence this decision.

Q: In your observation, is this an American way of responding to these things, or is it a diplomatic-

MAYNES: Yes, primarily, and it basically comes down to the fact that Congress has such a role in foreign policy. In other words, you can have a democratic system and have a very important parliament and a traditional form of diplomacy, but you can't have it with the American system, because the Congress has an independent power base totally separate from the Administration, and Congress may not only have different views, which it often does, but it has different political interests often and will manipulate the crisis - as will the Administration - for domestic political gain in a way that I don't think takes place to the same degree in any other democratic country.

Q: In the economic side, did you find yourself, again, reduced pretty much to reading journals and all?

MAYNES: Yes.

Q: As opposed to getting out and looking around?

MAYNES: Well, I traveled quite a bit, and we would visit Russian factories. But of course none of us were technically expert, so it was more of a political mission than a

diplomatic mission. At the end of my tour, there was a burst of commercial activity, which was held in check by Kissinger, who was trying to follow his "linkage" theory and get the Russians to help us in Vietnam.

Q: We're talking about Kissinger at the time was the national security advisor.

MAYNES: That's right, and founded this theory of linkage. The Russians were building a major truck plant, and Henry Ford came over and a number of very prominent American business came through the embassy interested in trade with Russia.

Q: How about when Henry Ford came through? This would be Henry Ford II, I guess.

MAYNES: That's right.

Q: Did you get any impression from him of what his impression was of the factories?

MAYNES: Well, it was interesting. First of all, he had Christina with him, who stunned the Russians by showing up at an embassy reception in a see-through topless blouse, which also mesmerized the embassy officers; also they'd never seen anything like that, and she was gorgeous - at least that's my memory. It was very sheer - let's put it this way. I'd never seen anything like it before. Ford said something that I had never realized before. First of all, he said, "You know, the Russians are interested in having me participate in this, and I can't quite understand why, because I assemble trucks and automobiles, I don't manufacture them." And he said, "Only the Italians manufacture automobiles." In other words, they start with the ingot at one end and an automobile at the other. It's a totally integrated production. Fiat, for that reason, has won many of the contracts in Eastern Europe - in Poland and other places - because you had no automobile industry, no suppliers, and you'd walk in to an empty wheat field and build a plant that goes from the ingot to the-

Q: When I was in Yugoslavia around this time, a little earlier, they produced what became the Yugo, which was a Fiat, called the Zastava.

MAYNES: Okay, so he said, you know, he couldn't understand why they wanted him and that if he got the contract he would have to strip his empire of all of its most talented people and send them to Russia to put this damn thing together. So that was an interesting kind of insight, but then we saw why the Russians were interested. It turned out that the minister of the automobile industry had been a young worker in Dearborn in 1932 or something like that, when we had these exchanges.

Q: Actually there was a Ford plant put up in the Soviet Union at one time.

MAYNES: That's right.

Q: In the 20's or '30's.

MAYNES: That's right, and that was when Walter Reuther also came over and worked there. So this guy had made his career, you could realize - I mean, I'd seen this phenomenon: someone's educated in a particular country, and of course it's the reason we all want them to be educated in our countries, they learn our specifications, they learn our way of doing things, and they make their career by saying the American or the French or the German way is the best - "It's the best," you know. So he was very anxious to have Ford bid for it.

But those were my two dominant impressions of that period. I also remember Bill Miller, who later became secretary of the Treasury, showing up in my office and telling me how smart he was. That was when we were in merger mania, you know, and the sign of a great businessman was to assemble as many diverse factories, regardless of what they produced, as possible in one gigantic trust, and he had outdone everybody else. So he, of course, showed our ignorance. I knew the name and the name of the company, but I wasn't as familiar as he thought I should be, so he spent an hour telling me how he was the smartest businessman in America and at that time, I guess, was. Shortly after he left, the company collapsed.

But we had several people like that come through at that time, scouting out the landscape, but basically restricted by US policy.

Q: What about agriculture? Was the agricultural attaché part of your section?

MAYNES: Yes.

Q: Because agriculture and the Soviet Union have always been two really key ingredients.

MAYNES: We had a very active agricultural attaché, who, of course was reporting regularly to Washington on what the harvest was going to be because that would influence how much grain the United States might be able to sell. And then we had a science attaché who maintained contact - he probably had the most interesting job in the embassy, because it's just the reverse of here. Here scientists tend to be conservative, and English and history professors tend to be liberal; and in Russia it was just the opposite. The language and history professors were ideologues, and the chemists and the physicists - as we can see now, many of them have become leading reformers - and that was because those were the fields where you could express yourself with fewest restraints. So the more liberally minded tended to go in those professions.

Q: Do you remember the science attaché's name.

MAYNES: Yes, Chris Spire was his name. He's dead.

Q: It turned out - obviously it was a combination of political and economic factors, but the economic factor seems to be the major cause of the Soviet Union.

MAYNES: I think it was. I think the Soviet Union basically began to disappear the day that Stalin died, because the day Stalin died, they stopped shooting people. Before that, if you were a dissenter in the Soviet Union, the threat to you would not only be that you'd lose your freedom but you'd lose your life, and not only your life but your wife's and your friends' and your children's lives would be threatened maybe with extinction. After Stalin died, they stopped shooting. They still were harshly repressive, but decreasingly so and erratically so. And so more and more people - and you have them in every culture - who don't conform, won't conform, want to raise questions began to raise questions, and the Soviets didn't know quite how to handle them. You know, they tried intimidating them, and of course they succeeded in most cases, but then there were some people, like Sakharov, who wouldn't be intimidated, just would not be intimidated. And while I was there, you had the first protests in Red Square, and I think, in retrospect, it was a clear process that was going on. And then you had a change in *pokalenniya*, a generation change. The Soviet Union after the great purges was basically run by a group of people who were almost all the same age. You've got to remember that Gromyko became ambassador to the United States in the midst of World War II, I think, when he was 32 or 33.

Q: And he'd been DCM before that.

MAYNES: And Kosygin - he was jumped up to a major position in '39. In other words, it would be as if all of us are starting out in our careers and suddenly some great catastrophe eliminates all the people who are 40, 50, and 60. And so suddenly these jobs are open. So it isn't that everybody who got the job was talented, but they were all sort of the same generation, and they were all ready to leave the scene. So that's one of the reasons that I think when Gorbachev came in, the change was even greater than might otherwise have been the case if you'd had, as most societies do, sort of mixed generations in power. You have somebody 60 working next to somebody 40, and they both have jobs of equal . . . because of the accident of promotions and that sort of thing. But in Russia, everybody was about the same age, all getting old together, all holding on as long as possible, and suddenly, at some point, you had to make a break with the past. So they tried two old guys after Brezhnev died - Andropov and Chernenko. They were the same age.

Q: And they died.

MAYNES: They died right like that. So finally at some point, you have to make a break. You have to say, "We have to reach out to a new generation." Well, this new generation was the generation that had grown up at the time of the 20th Party Congress and had a totally different point of view. And not only that - all the jobs suddenly began to open up because all these people were dying. So I think it was the combination of the fact that they stopped shooting people. Well, it was three things: they stopped shooting people; the system, which did work in the 30's of taking standing state technology and moving people

off the farm, ran out of steam and they couldn't find anything else to replace it; and then you have this generation change. You put those three together, and it was explosive.

Q: While you were there - again we're talking about the '68-70 period - did you have any feel - I realize you were cut off, but I was wondering whether you were able to have the kitchen table conversations with any of the intelligentsia or others - about how the ideology was going, because in many of the countries, the Marxist ideology was taught in the schools and seemed to be sterile as hell and didn't have any real-

MAYNES: When I was there, of course, Kosygin and Brezhnev were still in the full use of their powers. I guess my view is that the system, there was great cynicism about the system, but less about the ideology - that people did believe in it, because they didn't know anything else - but who knows; there were no public opinion polls, that sort of thing - but I had the impression that what they wanted was socialism with a human face. That's why the Czech experiment had a big impact on the intelligentsia. That's what they wanted. They didn't want our system, but they wanted their system with a human face. They did not want Stalinism. They wanted more freedom. They wanted more experimentation. There is a collectivist ethos in Russian history, not just in Bolshevik history. There is in Russian history. They are suspicious of dog-eat-dog capitalism. They still are. They're going to be even more so after this last currency crisis there. So you didn't run into many people - maybe they were afraid to say so - who were sort of Milton Friedman libertarians - of the sort you run into now. You run into quite a few of those people now, who are pro-capitalism à l'outrance (to extremes). But then, I think the more adventurous spirits - I mean really adventurous - would say we'd like to be like Sweden. The sort of more normal adventurous spirit would say we like what the Czechs were doing and we made a mistake. That is the way we want to go. And I think that's basically where Gorbachev thought he was taking it, and it wouldn't work. I mean the system couldn't stand that kind of reform, I don't think, because in the end, the truth is, and that was the unpleasant truth, the system really did depend upon repression. In other words, it wasn't an aberration of the leadership. The system would collapse without the repression.

Q: Well, in my interviews and from other readings, I came away with the impression that you're moving into the Nixon-Kissinger period, but particularly with Kissinger, who seemed to of the opinion, which is really sort of a European one, that maybe the Soviets were going to come out ahead in power, politics or whatever it is, and the best thing was to try to cut a deal and work with these people because of what was happening in Vietnam and we were beginning to lose our will.

MAYNES: I think that's true.

Q: And I was wondering - this would be very early on - but I was wondering whether there was any of that feeling among your colleagues.

MAYNES: Well, I told you that we wrote a couple of messages to Washington suggesting that Russia could not sustain the arms race, that it was, for all the reasons that

I've mentioned - labor shortages, inability to use new technology, or develop it on its own, etc. - that it was on a course where it could not compete. That was not an accepted view, and I think there was a fear that the Soviet Union would exist for 200 years and we were losing our will. But I've got to remember also that this was the period when we landed somebody on the moon, and so that was, I remember being at the embassy, and the head of the Internal Section for Political Affairs came by and he said, "We're just too good, aren't we? We're just too good." I'm not sure everybody had Kissinger's pessimism about America.

Q: And also, this was early on. I mean, a little later we were talking about things going bad in Vietnam and protests were going on.

MAYNES: I think Kissinger clearly saw his mission was managing a soft landing for America's decline and trying to consolidate some kind of structure of stability before we no longer had the influence that we had at the time. And I think he did see the Soviet Union as stronger than in fact it was. But I'm just saying that you could see at the time, and it was reported at the time, and this isn't because we were so far-seeing. It was in the God damned literature, and all you had to do was read the literature, and they were saying it themselves.

Q: Did you get any feel - it's always very difficult for somebody there because of the limited contact - I sometimes have the feeling that our people in the Political and Economic Sections knew far more of what was going on in the Soviet Union than even a well-informed Soviet did, because you had the time and leisure to read all the literature, where the normal engineer or others didn't

MAYNES: That's true, but of course that's the privilege of being a diplomat. When I subsequently became an editor, at one point I found myself appearing quite often on television on morning news programs when crisis would break, and it wasn't that I was the most informed person in the United States on any particular issue, but because I was paid to read, basically. They suddenly discovered that I knew a lot about everything going on in foreign affairs. Well, a diplomat sitting in Moscow is in the same position. I mean you're paid to observe and read and study, and after a while, yes, you do get to be better informed than almost anybody, except maybe some academic specialist. Unfortunately diplomats still have a lot of unnecessary bureaucratic make-work.

Q: What about other diplomats? Did you find that we were using them, they were using us?

MAYNES: Well, there were only a couple of what I would call serious embassies in Moscow, as is probably true here in Washington also. Now by serious I mean who are engaged in more than visa facilitation and trade promotion, people who are studying the high politics and economic strategy of the country. And those countries were preeminently Britain, which has sort of imperial inertia driving its foreign service, and they invested heavily in the training and recruitment of this kind of person. So if you went

to the British embassy, you ran into people like yourself who had been given language training and who saw as their job to try to do more than just facilitate the businessman or congressional visitor but to understand the country and to try to interpret it for their government. The French did that. The Germans less so, but they had a couple of people, one of whom ended up as the German ambassador here. And the Japanese also invested heavily. And then the Yugoslavs, for obvious reasons. The other East Europeans tended to run that kind of almost intelligence activity, which is really what. . . . I mean, diplomats are involved in legal intelligence, and the East European countries would run that activity through the part of the Party relationship rather than through their embassies, so their embassies were not as well informed. But the Yugoslav embassy was very well informed. The Italians had at least one person who was of this sort, and that was about it. And then everybody else was in trade promotion and visa facilitation.

Q: And did you find them sort of leeching off us when they had to do a report?

MAYNES: Yes, they descended upon the Americans to find out. But you see, we leeched off them too, because the Soviet system was closed, but it wasn't completely closed - couldn't be - it had some outside contact. By the way, I forgot to include the Finns in that group. The Finns had an outstanding embassy, outstanding, probably the best in the country, better than ours in terms of quality of people - of course for obvious reasons. This was very important to them. But all these other countries would have contact with the leadership, which we didn't have very often. It's a two-way exchange, because many of them had more contacts. Now the Finns were especially valuable because they not only had the analytical capability; they also had the contact. And so that's why they were so valuable. And their current ambassador, Otto Maasselaa, was a third secretary when I was there, and he was already seeing his prime minister on a regular basis to report on Russian affairs. And he would accompany the prime minister to see Kosygin.

Q: What about our CIA reporting? Were you privy to much of it?

MAYNES: I wasn't privy to the reporting from the field. That went through a separate channel. Of course, I got all the reports coming back, and I must say I had a much higher regard for their analytical capability than their spy recruitment and all that stuff. The kinds of people they have in Washington and Moscow, I didn't think they were the top people, but their analytical staff back here was terrific.

Q: Did you see Thompson in operation much?

MAYNES: Yes, I did, and he was like a swan among the ugly ducklings. I mean, to the degree the Foreign Service has deteriorated, I think one of the reasons it's deteriorated is that the system no longer invests in people the way it used to. If you look at that sort of great generation of Kennan and Bohlen and Thompson and Henderson, they received the equivalent of a Ph.D. in Russian studies. Kennan was sent for three years to study at the University of Berlin; Bohlen, three years at the University of Paris. I don't know where Thompson was sent. And then they were given almost nothing but Russian studies and

Russian assignments, Russian-related assignments from then on, and the result was that they got a deep grounding. My generation got eight months in FSI, and it showed. Maybe they were much better than we were - I'm perfectly willing to concede that. They weren't that much better, though. And yet they did better, and I think that we do not invest in our people the way we used to, and Thompson was one of the last who had come up through the system and had developed a deep historical appreciation of Soviet behavior, was able to put things in context in a way that the rest of us weren't. I mean, when airgrams would be sent up to him, he could point out that this had happened a few times earlier, and this kind of thing. And so he just had a depth, and he also had a character that made him different.

Q: One can say that in October of '62 Thompson was probably the key figure who might have prevented World War III, by being the Soviet expert sitting with the Kennedy Administration dealing with the Cuban Missile Crisis. He was the one who gave the guidance that seemed to steer us clear of a complete confrontation.

MAYNES: He was a very wise man, very good ambassador, very wise man.

Q: How about Jake Beam, who was also ambassador to Poland and had been around for a while?

MAYNES: He didn't have the depth in Russian studies that was necessary. He couldn't speak Russian. He was a very fine ambassador, but there is a difference between the kind of knowledge that I'm talking about and simply diplomatic experience, which he had in spades. He was a very distinguished diplomat and a lovely man to work for. He was more dependent on us than Thompson was.

Q: Did you have any feeling at that time about the beginning of the Kissinger-Dobrynin sort of channel?

MAYNES: No, except that we were getting complaints from our Desk back in State Department that they didn't know what was going on, being cut out. But we didn't know the extent of it, and I had left when Kissinger committed the unforgivable mistake of showing up in Moscow and not even telling the ambassador until he'd left that he'd been in town. One thing I did notice, by the way, during my career in Moscow is that paradoxically, Soviet diplomats knew more about these exchanges than American diplomats. Quite low-ranking Soviet diplomats would know about exchanges in Washington that we were not informed of.

Q: It's one of the aberrations, and actually, I think, many would say it was a real weakness of the whole Kissinger time, that brilliant as he may have been you almost had the feeling he was playing games with the American bureaucracy-

MAYNES: He made some big mistakes.

Q: -and he enjoyed this. I mean, you know, it wasn't just tactics - there was a certain amount of pleasure.

MAYNES: That's right, he did. And he made big mistakes as a result. I mean Jerry (Gerard) Smith's book, Doubletalk, documents in a devastating way mistakes that Kissinger made in SALT I because he did not consult his own staff, and they were the kinds of mistakes that led to problems in the Senate ratification and the subsequent attacks on what he had done. Many of those could have been avoided if he'd just had the common sense or humility to talk to some of his own people.

Q: In '70 you left. Were you beginning to have doubts about the Foreign Service as a career? I mean you had already expressed that you were seeing some of your colleagues like Dick Gardner and others...

MAYNES: I actually was quite happy until I got ready to leave Moscow and something very extraordinary happened. Jake Beam and the DCM, Boris Klossen, both called me into their office to thank me for my service. I'd gotten a very nice airgram from Washington from the Department. The CIA had actually initiated it, but the CIA, the Department, and several of the user agencies praising my work for the two years that I'd been there. It was kind of a surprise, just came across the. . . all cleared out and everything. So I was summoned up by the ambassador and the DCM.

Since Washington seemed to like my work, I guess they thought they ought to thank me for it. So I was summoned up, and after they said how much they appreciated what I had tried to do, each of them - *each* of them - asked me if I would do him a favor when I went back to Washington, and that was to talk to their son and try to dissuade him from joining the Foreign Service because of how much it had changed. And I looked at them, and I thought to myself, My God, you know, I'm supposed to want to stay in the Foreign Service so I can get your jobs some day, and you're asking me to go home and tell your son not to join. I didn't say anything. I said I'd be happy to talk to them about what the Foreign Service was like. Anyway, that made an impression on me, but it wasn't the reason I resigned.

I went to work on the Hill, and one of the people I was working for - Fred Harris, who was then chairman of the Democratic Party and was one of the 13 or 16 who knew they wanted to run for President, and I knew I probably should have worked in his campaign, but he asked me to manage his Senate office while he ran. And I thought that was such an unusual opportunity that I asked for a year's leave of absence, and the Department denied me that. It was caught up in a frenzy of paranoia over the Congress because of the Vietnam issue, and unbeknownst to me, two thirds of FE signed a confidential letter of protest to the President over the invasion of Cambodia, and we had a new director general, and he'd been on the job about three days. His first request for action was my request for a year's leave of absence that he'd just received. I'm trying to piece this together. I think he had just received-

Q: Who was this?

MAYNES: I've forgotten.

Q: John Burns, maybe?

MAYNES: Yes. He was a former ambassador in Africa, and he was an old Princetonian type and sort of white shoes and . . . and I guess Nixon had told Kissinger-

Q: We're talking about . . . Well, the Cambodian invasion was the spring of '70.

MAYNES: He told Kissinger that the Department was out of control and we had to bring these people under control, and so my request was denied. And so he asked me to come over and told me that this was a terrible mistake, that the Foreign Service was almost like a religious order, and if you left it you wouldn't be any good to the Service any more, and that you'd be polluted if you went out did what I was proposing to do, and then he marched me up to see Macomber, who was undersecretary for management, and he started in on the same lecture. And I had looked up Macomber's background before I went in there, and so he was going in the same vein and I said, "Mr. Macomber, I'm only proposing to do at my age what you did at yours." And he said, "This interview is over." I went home and wrote out my resignation.

Q: Just to work it back, you left in '70 and came to-

MAYNES: I was awarded a Congressional fellowship of the American Political Association. At that time there were just one or two from the Department. It subsequently got greatly extended. The Department changed its position after my case. The next year they did allow someone to take a leave of absence, and they greatly expanded the program, because they realized that they needed to understand the Congress better. But they were very suspicious of the Congress, and I don't think liked this program, even though they had nominated for it rather good officers. I mean Dick Moose was a Congressional fellow, and subsequently became undersecretary for management. Bill Shinn, who was at the time the outstanding Soviet specialist, had been a Congressional fellow. Then they named me. So they had solid people, but they didn't like the program.

Q: One of the things that I've heard again and again is the Department of State has the least understanding of almost any department of Congress.

MAYNES: That's true.

Q: And it has all the apparatus to deal with it, but it doesn't work.

MAYNES: That's right. It's true.

Q: When you went to Congress in '70, were you assigned to Fred Harris?

MAYNES: No, what you do is you go around and you interview at various offices, and then they put in their bids, and you put in yours. And I interviewed at the Muskie office, and he was then running for President and was like 70 per cent in the polls, and they told me I was their first choice. But at the same time he said, "We've decided to pick you instead of someone else because you're not an academic." And I said, "Well, why would that be a problem?" He said, "Well, we've had academics in here before, and there's a lot of tension in this office, and a lot of the women cry all the time, and these academics spend all the time going over and asking them why they're upset." And I thought this was the famous Muskie temper. So I decided that I would go with Harris. And then-

Q: Harris was what?

MAYNES: Well, he was a Democrat from Oklahoma. He was then chairman of the Democratic Party and decided to run for President because, as he told his staff at the time, notwithstanding Muskie being 70 per cent in the polls and McGovern one per cent, he said, "There are only two people in this race who can get this nomination. One is George McGovern, now one per cent, and the other's me." And we said, "Why?" He said, "Because the rules have been rewritten. I appointed McGovern. He wrote the rules. I know what the rules are. And this time around the activists in the Democratic Party are going to play a much bigger role in the nomination than ever before, and there are only two people who can get it." Because he didn't get it, Harris had to leave the Senate. So then I went to work for Carl Marcy, who is the head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's staff. He saw me and asked me what I was going to do on the House side, and I gave him some suggestions. "Oh, you ought to work for Brad Morse, Republican from Massachusetts. He's by far the best guy in the House in international affairs." So I took his advice, and he was right. Brad was the best on the committee at that time.

Q: You worked for Morse from when to when?

MAYNES: It would be six months.

Q: Six months.

MAYNES: I'd have to get out my bio to know the exact dates.

Q: But we're talking about the early '70's.

MAYNES: It would be '70-71.

Q: By this time you were an ex-FSO, or still-

MAYNES: Well, I quit after Morse to go to work for Harris full-time. Then I did join the campaign because, of course, there was no bar. I wasn't working for the Department. So then I worked up through '72, and then Harris basically closed down his Senate office and

loaned us all to the McGovern campaign. So I became in charge of issues for Sarge Shriver in the 1972 convention.

Q: First with Morse. Morse is, I assume, a fairly liberal Republican.

MAYNES: He was a liberal Republican. He was an internationalist, a liberal Republican, and a big optimist, you know. Everybody loved him. He was a "bridge" player in the Congress and somebody who got things done and Democrats like to work with. Democrats then controlled the Congress, so Brad was somebody who could bring along some Republicans.

Q: What were you doing with him?

MAYNES: Same thing I did for Harris. I was doing foreign relations, and he was terrific. He treated me like his top aide in foreign relations at the time, and actually it was my relationship with Brad, I suppose Brad and Fred, that really changed my life. Well, Fred in the sense that through him I probably got ultimately the assistant secretaryship, I would guess, because he had a tie with Mondale. And Brad, because after Harris left in '72, I was without a job. I had the right to reapply for the Foreign Service. I called up someone high up in the Personnel Office and said I was thinking about it. He said, "Oh, don't do it. It's just a mess here now. Don't apply. Yes, you'll probably get in again, but it's not worth it. You're going to have better things to do." That said a lot. When I get two ambassadors and somebody who's supposed to be recruiting - and I had a very good record in the Department. So anyway, I was looking for a job, and the University of Minnesota offered me an associate professorship at the new, well, then it was the School of Public Administration, now the Hubert Humphrey Institute. And I had actually accepted the job. I had gone out. I'd been interviewed, and they had accepted me. And Brad Morse called me up one day when McGovern lost or when Fred resigned - I can't remember - when Fred resigned, I guess, from the Senate, and said, "What are you going to do?" And I told him. He said, "Oh, that's not good enough. You really belong here in foreign policy stuff. You shouldn't do that." And I said, "Well, that's what's on the plate." He said, "Let me place a few telephone calls." So he called McGeorge Bundy at the Ford Foundation and Tom Hughes at the Carnegie Endowment and said, "You guys gotta interview this guy." And so I was interviewed both places and both offered me a job, and I took the job with Hughes and begged Minnesota to let me go, which they did.

Q: Going back, you were with the McGovern campaign-

MAYNES: Working in charge of issues for Sarge Shriver. He was the vice-presidential candidate.

Q: How did you feel both about Vietnam and how was that issue with Shriver at that time?

MAYNES: I had a very conflicted view on Vietnam. On the one hand, I'd been out there and I knew that the people who were likely to win were not very attractive.

Q: You're talking about the Communists.

MAYNES: I didn't know; none of us knew what kind of régime the Lao would impose, and in fact it's been softer than the others, but we knew enough about what had happened in North Vietnam after the French left to know that this was not going to be pleasant. So I was not wild about a Communist victory. On the other hand, many of us in the embassy in Laos felt that it was a terrible mistake to introduce American troops there, that we'd lost the moment we'd entered, that we could not win this if we were, in effect, the bright white man - well, there were a lot of black troops, too - but anyway, non-Asians trying to impose a system on the people of Indochina, when, as I said earlier in this interview, it was also clear that the Communists had captured the nationalist flag. Nationalism was identified with them, not with the people we were supporting. So I felt we were going to lose, and the best thing to do was the most graceful exit that could protect our interests, so I probably was less committed to the pure Democratic Party platform. I mean, I had some sympathy of the Vietnamization policy of Kissinger and Nixon, if it had been honest, which I don't think it was.

Q: Did you have any feel - I imagine you did - about the people around McGovern and obviously Shriver too on foreign affairs?

MAYNES: Well, there were a lot of smart people. Actually the most important person was John Holum, who was head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and is now undersecretary, I guess, for - I don't know what they call it.

Q: Arms Control and International Security Affairs.

MAYNES: He was McGovern's top foreign policy advisor, and he was very smart. And there was sort of a standoffishness of what you might call the Jackson wing of the party.

Q: The conservative Democrats.

MAYNES: Yes, the conservative Democrats. They either sat it out or they... but they were anti-Communist to the point that they were willing to fight the war to the last Vietnamese, and we weren't. So you had sort of a coalition of the . . . the driving force was the left wing of the party allied with an uneasy center. We lost the right of the Democratic Party and therefore lost the election.

Q: One always thinks during this period on McGovern's side of the young college students chanting "Ho, Ho, Ho Chi-Minh is going to win," people who were sort of idealistic almost or naïve.

MAYNES: I think they were the ones probably pounding on doors, but they weren't in the campaign. I do remember an argument with Mark Shields, who was advising Shriver, when Kissinger announced that he had an agreement on Vietnam. Shields was trying to find some way to disparage it, and I said, "Look, you know, we've got to support it." He said, "We'll lose the election." I said, "Well, then we'll lose the election." I mean, you know, if they've taken our issue away from us by adopting our position, we can't undermine it. Maybe it's bogus, but we don't know that it's bogus. But you didn't hear this "Ho, ho, ho" stuff. As I say, those people might have been knocking on doors.

Q: They weren't at the center.

MAYNES: They weren't at the center, not on the foreign policy side of things. Basically the foreign policy was sort of the left of the Democratic Party, but not the fringe. People believed in and had for years believed that the Pentagon budget was bloated, that there'd been excesses in the Cold War, that we shouldn't be supporting some of the right-wing dictatorships. You know, all that we see ever day in the debates on the Hill. It's a perfectly credible position. There's a great deal to be said for it, I would say, in even most cases, but the only problem was it divided the Democratic Party, and we lost the election.

Q: Well, then, you went over to Tom Hughes, is that right?

MAYNES: That's right, yes.

Q: And he was the head of the Carnegie-

MAYNES: -Endowment for International Peace.

Q: And you were doing that when, '72-ish?

MAYNES: '72 to '76.

Q: What were you doing there?

MAYNES: I was in charge of the New York office of the Carnegie Endowment. Tom had moved. The office had been up there from '47 to sometime in the '80's. The headquarters were there from '47-48 until Tom took over in '71. He moved the headquarters down to Washington, but we had this big infrastructure up there and the program and the bulk of our people were up there, and he was basically involved in a very clever effort to pull the foundation down here against the will of the trustees, many of whom were paragons of New York Society and, of course, wanted the institution to stay there. So I was brought up basically as an earnest to them that he was not going to shut down the program. I did background work on UN affairs, and the reason the endowment had moved from Washington to New York in '47 was to devote its entire program to this New Institution called the UN.

Q: I think one of my professors at Williams was Joe Johnson.

MAYNES: Oh, yes. He was the previous president.

Q: During the '72 to '76 period, was the UN your basic focus?

MAYNES: That's right, and then I created some other programs, too, but I was first director for international organizations there, i.e., for the UN, but it was made clear by Tom that I was in charge of the office, and then he made me secretary of the Endowment, which is the number two job in the Endowment.

Q: Well, what were you doing? We're talking about dealing with the United Nations.

MAYNES: Well, I ran a study group of UN ambassadors, a study group of younger people who have since risen to considerable prominence - the number two in the German Foreign Office was a little German diplomat at the time that was in my group. I created something called the International Fact-finding Center that hired prominent journalists from around the world that did investigative reports on emerging issues around the world and published those reports. I did quite a bit of writing at the time, which was what established my position and actually got me the job of assistant secretary with Carter. I did a lot of writing on the UN and became known as sort of the next generation's person on the subject. And I administered, and I advised Tom Hughes. I was his top advisor.

Q: How comfortable were you in looking closely at the United Nations? This was '72-76, what one might term as the "high Kissinger period." How did-

MAYNES: Well, I was there when the infamous Zionism>equals=racism was an issue that was pushed. As a matter of fact, I had my first appearance on that issue. Well, the thing is, it's probably in your genes when you're born - I tend to be center-left. I tend to be idealistic, internationalist, and I have always seen the UN as important to American foreign policy because it is a symbol of our commitment to the internationalist approach to international affairs. I think I'm quite realistic in terms of what the UN can do and, in fact, at the beginning of this Administration tried to warn them against some of the things that turned out to be mistakes. So I've never been a world federalist, I've never believed that the UN can replace states, but I have thought that for the United States, the UN was a very important institution because it appealed to indigenous American idealism and it's an important rallying center for those in the society who believe in an internationalist approach. So I have never given up on the institutions, and even in the bad days when Moynihan was denouncing it with all of his eloquence, I was very supporting of it.

Q: Moynihan, was he there during the '72-'76 period? Did you get a feeling what was motivating him?

MAYNES: Yes, politics. He wanted to run for Senate, and he galvanized the Jewish community of New York with that performance.

Q: Well, the Zionism>equals=racism - what was the genesis of that?

MAYNES: First of all, there are a couple of things going on in here. One is foolish tactics and extremism by some Arab participants. We can't ignore that. But also, the reason they got support is that - and this is an increasingly controversial issue in Israel itself - Israel is a Jewish democratic state with a very large minority, which has second-class citizenship, and a democratic state that says it is Jewish. Now what does that say about the people who are not Jewish? And there are, as you know, all sorts of privileges for the Jewish members of the international community who have automatic right of return, but not for the Arab side - restrictions on what land they can buy, etc. So this was the reality that these demagogues on the Arab side were putting their finger on to inflame tensions within Israel and put pressure on Israel. The problem with the resolution was several-fold, but foremost was the fact that the Israelis saw - and I think correctly - whatever the substance behind the charge, if the charge stuck, to label a state racist is to delegitimatize it, because "racist" in the UN context meant apartheid, and apartheid meant an illegitimate state. So if this resolution stood, Israel was delegitimatized. So they were right to see it as the danger it is. But this issue - and it's not just an issue for Israel - God knows, it's all over the world now - I mean, this is the problem in Bosnia and Croatia and Serbia. Serbia is for the Serbs; it's not for the other minorities. Croatia is for the Croats, and as Tudjman says, the others are guests. Well, this is the ethnic concept of citizenship.

Q: Well, it's true in South Korea, where the Chinese are a tolerated minority, but they don't serve in the military, etc.

MAYNES: And Arab Israelis can't serve in the military, etc. So it's a problem for any ethnically based state, and Israel's problem is that it's one of the few ethnically based states whose existence was internationalized from the beginning, because it came into being because it was recognized by the UN, so the UN has constantly had the existence of Israel as a standing brief on the agenda. And this was a very mischievous resolution designed basically to delegitimatize Israel.

Q: You were up in New York in an American organization. Did you find that being in New York, which is sort of the American Jewish center, that this played at all in how the Carnegie Endowment operated?

MAYNES: Oh, absolutely. And something very fundamental is involved here. When I had just arrived in New York, I met Dick Gardner, and he was telling me at the time of the '67 War he was with a prominent member of the Jewish community who was watching the television debate at the UN, and he said, "Dick, I'm going to have to make a choice between my UNA card and my UJA card, and I know which one I'm going to choose." Alright, what has happened, I think if you look back, you would have to say that the Jewish community after World War II was absolutely central in the leadership and funding of what I would call the internationalist lobby in the United States. They were behind all of the human rights groups and sort of good-government groups and ponying

up for it. They were instrumental in the selling of the UN, American international commitments abroad. They haven't totally abandoned that leadership role, but they have significantly stepped back from it, and no other group has stepped forward to take their place. The hope was for a while that the international business community would do it, but their interests are too narrow. They come down to just trade or something like that. They aren't willing to step forward and say we need an AID program for Africa or we need to do X in the Middle East. They just don't do that. And the Jewish community had done it. So this debate over UJA card, UNA card had implications far beyond support for the UN. It has to do with the whole character of America's approach to international issues. So it's a fundamental issue, and winning that community back is very important for the American approach to the outside world.

Q: Did you find it influential in the thrust of the Carnegie Endowment?

MAYNES: Well, it set certain limits to what people could say and do, because the Middle East issue was sort of the "third rail" of American politics.

Q: Well, why don't we pick this up the next time and put here: we've talked about your work in New York from '72-'76 - is there anything else we should cover?

MAYNES: No, I think that's it.

Q: And then we'll pick it up in '76-77 next time.

MAYNES: Okay, thanks.

Q: Today is the 29th of October, 1998. Bill, we've gone to 1976. Where did you go?

MAYNES: '76 I was still at Carnegie as the secretary of the Carnegie Endowment, but after the election in November of Jimmy Carter, I was asked to join the transition team, and that was probably because I had worked with Tony Lake at Carnegie but also I had been the principal author of a report that Cyrus Vance released on the relationship between elite opinion and public opinion. About December, I joined the transition team for the new administration.

Q: Could you give me a little feel for the transition team, because each transition team, particularly when you have a rather major swing between Republican and Democrats as this one did, how would you characterize the group of people who were on the transition team?

MAYNES: Well, I think with the exception of myself it was an inside group that had basically bonded in Vietnam. So you had Tony Lake and Richard Holbrooke and Peter Tarnoff and Les Gelb and Richard Moose. And all of them had known each other from

Vietnam, maintained contact. It was the first time I'd realized that in a country as large as ours there are these sort of generational inner circles. You and I meet in grade school and somehow maintain the bond until we're 70. I thought the country was so big that that didn't happen, but it does happen.

Q: It does happen

MAYNES: And this group is the one that has basically resurfaced in the Clinton Administration.

Q: It's been around for a long time, and I'm doing Dick Moose now and Tony Lake, and they're both-

MAYNES: They've been linked together. And I was not part of this group, but I was on the fringes of it because I had served in Laos rather than Vietnam.

Q: That counts.

MAYNES: Well, it counted, but I was sort of half in. It was clear from the beginning that there was an inner circle, and I was not part of it. And it was an inner circle that was basically developed 15 years earlier in Vietnam.

Q: Well, I would have thought that there would have been a certain disconnect between Jimmy Carter and particularly his political domestic advisors and this group you're talking about, because although they were in the Vietnamese War, they at least had seen that the world is not a simple one and that Communist is not a benign as Carter seemed to imply.

MAYNES: Well, of course, I think that statement of Carter has been misinterpreted. But anyway, to get back to your earlier assertion, Andy Young once told me that Jimmy Carter's main introduction into international affairs was an important occasional lecture at UNA in Atlanta or the World Affairs Council, and I think that was probably true. And he came in with a sense - it seemed to me - of inadequacy in the field, a self-knowing inadequacy, and as a result did something that is not very often done in administrations. He basically told Vance and Brzezinski that they could pick their own team. So there was very, very little political maneuvering in terms of the appointments. Hodding Carter and Patt Derian were picked for political reasons, although they both turned out to be very good. But it certainly had a big influence. But they were the only ones. I'm trying to think back, but we were, for good or ill, basically picked because it was this inner group and whether or not we were the best is a very debatable question, but we certainly had had a lot of experience, were qualified in general for the jobs. And Vance was permitted to do that. By the way, when we got to Clinton, that memory was still strong, that that had, quote, been a mistake, that the White House should have played a much bigger role in the selection of people in order to guarantee loyalty to the White House.

Q: Was there any question on this that there wouldn't be loyalty to the White House?

MAYNES: No, but most White Houses want more than what you and I would think of as loyalty. They want . . . cult of personality is a little too strong, but it comes close - in every Administration. They want you sitting out there in Naples to be constantly mouthing the praises of the President, and no American in your earshot is ever to hear anything other than how he's the most brilliant, the most accomplished; and I guess we didn't always have that degree of deference. I think we were certainly loyal to him, but in a way, it wasn't Carter so much; it's the handlers.

Q: Well, the handlers often set the tone.

MAYNES: Yes, that's right.

Q: What about something that's happened with some other administrations, where in foreign policy you end up by having to take care of Congress or a senator's staff aides and the like?

MAYNES: Do you mean appointments?

Q: Appointments.

MAYNES: You know, we didn't have much of that. Vance really was given a *carte blanche*. You can ask Tony. Tony would know better than I would, but that's certainly my impression. When I became the head of IO (International Organization Affairs), I was under no pressure - amazing - under no pressure to appoint anybody with strong political background. I was under pressure to appoint minorities and quickly found people I thought were qualified for the job. So that was when I recruited Joan Spero to be the ECOSOC ambassador, and I recruited George Dally to be one of my deputies. But I was under pressure to do that; there's no question about that. But pressure not to appoint a person - you know, it was not a case of "Senator Jones has called up, Bill, and by God, you'd better appoint him."

Now, as we approach 1980, that began to shift, and I was under tremendous pressure to appoint a Hispanic from Florida as my deputy, and I resisted and resisted, and it was made clear that it was going to happen. About that time, I left, but he was 29 years old, had been in the car business and did have a degree in international affairs from Columbia, but the whole purpose of it was to try to swing the vote in 1980 in Florida, which was seen as a key state. So it changed, but I'm saying at the beginning there was absolutely no pressure whatsoever.

Q: Well, when you were putting this together, you eventually went to International Organizations. Was that sort of made implicit?

MAYNES: Well, I was brought on the transition team to handle the UN because I had more experience in that field than anybody else, and so it was. And that led to my appointment as assistant secretary, which I think, in retrospect, was sort of a fluke because I literally did not make one single telephone call in my behalf. I never tried to organize any lobbying campaign, anything. And it was just simply that Andy Young, after having had me brief him several times, said, "I want him." And then of course I knew Vance. But I was told that I wasn't going to get anything.

Q: Well, initially, how would you describe the Carter-Vance-Brzezinski attitude towards the United Nations?

MAYNES: Well, Vance, it was very strong. And he'd played a leading role in UNA (United Nations Association) before, and he continues to play it. I just saw him this week, and he's still very active there and, I think, comes out of this Stimson tradition, sort of Eastern Establishment tradition of realistic support of international law and international institutions - in other words, knowing the inherent problems but hoping that this is a force that should be built up. I think people like Vance and Whitehead - I've heard both of them talk-

Q: John Whitehead.

MAYNES: John Whitehead. You know, Whitehead's now the chairman of the UNA. Vance was the chair. I've heard both of them talk, and for them the formative experience - and of course it's disappearing now - was World War II, and they have seen the consequences of fanatical nationalism, and they don't like it. And to the day they die, they are going to resist it because they've seen what price people pay when those forces get out of hand. So they have a special commitment. Whitehead's a Republican, worked for Reagan, who in fact was hostile to these views, but Whitehead feels it very strongly, because I've heard him personally say it, in private, and I've heard Vance say it.

Q: Well, I think one of the lessons of people of a certain age, and I'm close to that - I was born in 1928 - was that it was a terrible mistake not to have gotten into the League of Nations.

MAYNES: That's right.

Q: I mean this is the thing that's drummed into you in that generation; I don't think it's as much now.

MAYNES: But there's also a sense, you see, that this country now has almost, in terms of who can resist us, almost unlimited power. And these people believe that we should show some restraint in using it, that it is healthy for the country, healthy for others, if we as well as others are bound by some kind of rule of law, some norm of acceptable behavior, that it is, "I'm stronger than you - I shouldn't have the right just to push you around doing whatever I want" - but also recognizing that not everybody follows the rules. But they

think it's important to strengthen these laws. I'm speaking for them, but this is the message I get from it.

Q: Yes, and I think it's a very valid message.

MAYNES: Now Brzezinski - you asked me about Brzezinski. Brzezinski, I think, saw all of this. He saw the UN as important. As a matter of fact, he'd written a very critical article of Ford when Moynihan was up there. And Moynihan, as you know, was throwing rhetorical firebombs up there, creating an enormous controversy up there. Brzezinski thought that he was doing great damage to the United States and was urging that the President appoint someone like Elliot Richardson or somebody like that. He saw it as an important place, but more from the standpoint of public diplomacy, standing up to the Russians, more of an instrument of foreign policy, useful at some times, less useful at others, but not as a goal in itself. I think people like Vance and Whitehead see the UN as a goal in itself, and again, I think it comes from their personal experience in combat, which Brzezinski's never had.

Q: Yes, and it was a generation, and I picked up some of it only by osmosis, but it was there.

MAYNES: Yes, and I'm very sorry we're losing it.

Q: Well, know, I agree. I think you have to go all through the whole process again.

MAYNES: Absolutely, we should learn from what you guys did.

Q: Well, one of the things that I'm trying to do with this oral history program is to capture these experiences and hopefully get it into the mainstream.

MAYNES: That's a worthy goal in itself.

Q: Now, when you were on the transition team, were you told fairly soon on that you would take IO?

MAYNES: I'll tell you what happened. I think I was one of the last picked, and they tried to get me to accept a deputy assistant secretary slot, which I turned down, because I'd been offered Foreign Policy in the mean time by Carnegie. Anyway, I realized that I might become assistant secretary when Carter - again reflecting his uncertainty in this field - decided that what he would do is ask the transition team to call up ten numbers of what you might call the foreign policy establishment - but really establishment, people in their 80's, you know, quote, wise men - and ask them who ought to get these jobs. So we reported what Harriman said and Rusk and people like this. So I had written an article for Foreign Affairs about six months earlier called "A New UN Policy for the United States," or something like that, and I looked at these lists when they came back. We all were making the calls, but I looked at the lists that came back, and on the list for IO were two

ex-secretaries of state, who were unlikely to take a position lower than the one they'd just left; three people who'd been out of the country so long you had a question of whether they were still citizens; and anyway, way down at the bottom of the list was my name, and they say, "He wrote an article for Foreign Affairs." And this was a fascinating example of how that magazine credentials people. And so I looked at the list, and I thought, My God, I'm the only viable candidate. I mean, there were other viable candidates. There was Sam Lewis, who was in the job and who wanted to stay, but in terms of outsiders, I was the most. . . . I mean, I was young and alive, still *compos mentis*, and so I thought, My God, I might get this job. But then, again, these insiders, like Tony and Dick and Tarnoff, you know, they were sort of nailing down for one another all these jobs - and the one that was left open was IO, and I was meanwhile briefing Andy Young, and Andy finally said he'd like me. So that's how it happened.

Incidentally, you know, these generational cliques, what's fascinating about them is that you and I meet when we're young and we support one another up to a certain point, but then you get up to a very high point, and there are only one or two jobs left, and that's when they break up, which is what has happened now. Holbrooke and Lake are at one another's throats because there's only one place at the top.

Q: Yes. I'm interviewing Winston Lord, too, on this business. Could you tell me about-

MAYNES: Fascinating institutional dynamics.

Q: I know it. But as they were going around putting in jobs, you did have the feeling that if you belonged to-

MAYNES: It was clear.

Q: You were not only friends, but it proved your competence. I mean, I think of-

MAYNES: These people were - let's be honest about it - these people were the stars of a whole generation of Foreign Service officers who had gone to Vietnam - whether they were the very best is an open question, but they certainly had proven their competence and, more important, they had shown their ability to serve compliantly and competently important people. In other words, many of them had also gone and worked on the peace process in Paris, so they had further competence. Also, many of them were seen in the Foreign Service as "Phil Habib's boys" - that was another important issue, because Vance loved Habib. I never quite understood it because I liked Phil in some ways, but I thought he was - for somebody so high up - the least intellectually gifted Foreign Service officer I've ever run into. I mean, astonishing areas of ignorance. But he had this animal energy.

Q: I've often looked at somebody like Larry Eagleburger, whom I know from early on quite well, and there is a positiveness. I think sometimes if somebody has a positive line, rather than too intellectual-

MAYNES: Well, I've often looked at the people who have risen up in the Service to positions of real power - like Sisco, Habib, and Larry Eagleburger - and they have one characteristic, which is that they are can-do guys. They are not the most gifted intellectually. I think anybody would look at those three and say they are not at their peers, but they are, as one former Foreign Service officer told me, he once ended up in Dulles's office with Sisco, and they had jointly drafted a memo trying to propose a solution, and so Dulles finally looked at them and said, "Well, Gentlemen, this is a very interesting memo, but," he said, "in terms of your recommendations, what do you think the facts tell us we ought to do?" At which point Sisco immediately leaned over and said, "Mr. Secretary, what do you want the facts to tell us to do?" Now there is the attitude that these three brought to the job. I don't like it, because I think it gets us in a lot of trouble, but I understand why they are preferred.

Q: One always thinks of Adlai Stevenson, who seemed to come down on several sides of the question.

MAYNES: Well, now we know from the records that, of course, it was his proposal that actually solved the Cuban Missile Crisis. It was the decision to pull the missiles out of Turkey.

Q: The birth of your appointment was the briefing of Andy Young, and Andy Young was, again, an activist. He came out of the civil rights movement. How did you find him? What was your initial impression?

MAYNES: I think Andy's a national treasure. I mean, I think he's an unbelievably gifted, wonderful man, and the country's very lucky that he established the relationship he did with King. King used him as the negotiator.

Q: You're speaking of Martin Luther King, Jr.

MAYNES: He used him as the negotiator with the Southern sheriffs because even though he was only in his 20's, he just had no chip on his shoulder and was able to sort of wear them down. I'll just give you one anecdote that will show you what kind of person he is. When Martin Luther King was incarcerated in the jail in Birmingham, Andy used to go visit him. This is where he wrote the famous letter from Birmingham, one of the great documents of American history now, and when Andy walked in the first time, the sheriff there picked up the phone and he said, "Jake, the little nigger's come to see the big nigger." And Andy walked back, and he said, I am going to turn him around. And so every day he'd say hello, and the guy would turn his back, but he just kept at it, and after several weeks, it was "Hi, Andy, how are you?" I mean, this is the kind of person he is. He didn't take that first incredible insult and let it destroy him. He is just simply a wonderful person, and we can talk about this later, but the response of this country to him is very disturbing. It says a lot not very good about the United States.

Q: I'd like to capture your impression and your working with him, when you first were sort of briefing him or prepping him for this job, because the United Nations is obviously its own world, and here is somebody coming without any particular background in this. What were his interests, how did he approach this, and what was your impression of this?

MAYNES: Well, the first thing we tried to do, of course, we recognized his lack of knowledge, and so we persuaded him to get as his deputy James Leonard, who had been our ambassador for the negotiations on, I think it was, chemical weapons at the time, but he was a senior official in ACTA and then had been the president of the United Nations Association, so he knew all of the players up in New York and also was deeply trusted by Vance. Andy came to the job seeing it as a legislative job, which to some degree it is. I think he overestimated the degree to which you can persuade other people in an environment where many of them are under instructions. They may think your arguments are terrific, but they're still going to vote the other way. On the other hand, he had a tremendous impact on Third World delegations, but he also because he was from the legislature, he did not take kindly to detailed instructions, which the United States, as you know, is prone to attempt to tie people in the field down with. So he was kind of a loose . . . a loose cannon is too strong, but he was blithe spirit. I remember we sent him down to South Africa, and we worked weeks on a speech, and for once we really actually had a good speech, and he looked at, and he stood up and said, "This is a good speech, and I stand by it, but it's not the speech I'm going to deliver." And then he proceeded to give, I think, the most brilliant speech I've ever heard in my life extemporaneously. So you can argue that someone like that. . . . I don't know whether they should or shouldn't be appointed to those jobs. It's an open question. I think he did a great deal of good for the United States. I think occasionally he did some harm because he was a "blithe spirit," and often that helped, sometimes it hurt.

Q: Well, he was following Pat Moynihan, wasn't he?

MAYNES: Well, no, he was following Scranton. Scranton sort of calmed the waters.

Q: The legacy of Pat Moynihan, you were saying, was pretty negative.

MAYNES: It was very negative. Actually, I like Moynihan. I think he's one of the more gifted men in American life, but his performance there was very destructive.

Q: It's interesting. I've just finished a series of interviews with Judge Laurence Silberman about Moynihan.

MAYNES: Oh, sure.

Q: You know, I mean, it's part of the-

MAYNES: It's like what's going on in New York now. I don't know if you read Mary McCrory's column to day, but Schumer and D'Amato have yesterday both vehemently

denounced the Wye Agreement as "selling out to Arafat" and thoroughly trashed it over television. And of course, Moynihan was playing the same cards.

Q: It's the Jewish vote.

MAYNES: Yes, he's playing the same cards. He was headed for the Senate, and as a matter of fact, it's well known that he could have avoided the Zionist vote. He wanted the vote. I mean, the Indian ambassador went over and said, "Here's the way to avoid it," and he said, "I want my vote."

Q: On the "Zionism is racism."

MAYNES: Yes.

Q: This, of course, is one of the problems of somebody, particularly who comes out of the New York world, or it could be the Miami or California world, where the Jewish vote is so important that on a major issue you have people who, you might say, have already stated where they are because of their politics.

MAYNES: Also their ambitions. Madeleine Albright, in a different way, played a very similar role. I met with her two hours after her nomination was made to brief her, at her request, and as I got about halfway through the briefing I suddenly looked at her and said, "Madeleine, you *are* going to repudiate the Jeane Kirkpatrick approach to the UN." And she sort of took the Fifth Amendment, so I knew what was going to happen. The conflict with Boutros Ghali was preordained. She was going up there to make her stand and hope that it would push her up, which it did. It's very destructive of the organization, this kind of manipulation of it for political reasons. And it's one reason why occasionally I think maybe the UN should be moved to Geneva. You know, because it's too close to us, it's too big a temptation to use it as a xenophobic whipping boy. Anyway...

Q: Well, did you find Andy Young particularly interested in sort of a lot of the nitty-gritty issues like Cyprus and-

MAYNES: No, he was only interested, really, in one issue, and that was. . . . He was very interested in the Middle East, but knew how radioactive that question was, particularly for a black man. One thing that people don't realize is that the hate mail that came in the minute he got the job - and much of it from Jewish sources - reflected this black-Jewish rift that had developed. Hate mail's too strong: fear.

Q: Could you explain, just to understand the time, the Jews had for years been sort of the mainstay of the civil rights movement in the white world, intellectually and in the way they led their lives even.

MAYNES: Yes, it's true, but what happened was - and I'm not fully competent to explain entirely what happened - that sort of the center of Jewish life and the center of black life

in the United States unfortunately is found in the same city, and it is that there is a struggle for power there, and a lot of it started with the Ford Foundation's efforts to reform the school system there. The school system was dominated by Jewish teachers who had seen the civil service as a way to climb out of the lower classes, so they'd become sort of barely middle class with a pension and tenure and that sort of thing. And in the black schools, only 15 per cent of the graduates were competent. That's literally the figure - I mean admitted by everybody. And the Ford Foundation came along and said now this has got to be reformed, and they proposed local parent control. So the parents got control of these schools and immediately started firing some of these teachers for incompetence. And that led to just an absolute explosive relationship. And then you've got the affirmative action issue, where Jews felt that this was going to be used against them, or not used against them, but that they would suffer if places were reserved for minority people. And then you got a growing number of blacks not in leadership positions, but the Jewish community movie attitude was there, that it was very hard for a black person to look at what was happening to the Palestinians and not see a parallel with what was happening to blacks in South Africa. And there was sort of a campaign to keep the lid on that actual attitude. So you put all this together, and I remember when I joined the Carnegie Endowment in '72, I proposed to a black friend of mine to put together a session between black leaders and Jewish leaders, and he said, "Don't do it." He said, "There will be fistfights." This is absolutely an explosive question. Well, that was sort of below the surface.

Q: But it was still sort of boiling hot.

MAYNES: But at the surface it was comradeship together, you know, to fight the common fight. But below, the feelings. So you put someone like Andy in that position, and from below come letters - you know, "You Third World f - ." You know, the theory was that he was going to adopt the Third World agenda, which would be pro-Palestinian, anti-Israeli, and in fact, he was so pro-Israeli in his original approach to the question of his position there that we had protests from Arab governments about his pro-Israeli pronouncements - which came out of his experience in the civil rights movement. He honestly felt, and he spent an enormous amount of time speaking to synagogues, because he saw this as central. And one of the things that few people know is that when he had to resign, his proposal to the President was that he appoint Sol Linowitz as his replacement, because he felt that a Jew had to replace a black, that the relationship was so terrible that the only thing you could do was. . . . And of course they appointed another black - who was very competent.

Q: Don McHenry.

MAYNES: Yes, Don McHenry, very competent, and certainly deserving the job and I think did splendidly, but the fact is the deck was stacked. I mean there were only two ways you could go. You had Sol Linowitz or you had another black, or some Jewish figure.

Q: Well, when you took over this IO, was there the equivalent to a pact between Andy Young and you, because it's a very peculiar thing. It's in and out. Was Andy Young a Cabinet member?

MAYNES: Yes, he was.

Q: So who does he report to, and where are you in this?

MAYNES: Well, there is no answer to that question. The assistant secretary on a day-to-day basis approves all of the instructions, including those that are supposed to bind him. But it's kind of like trying to rope in an elephant. Yes, you throw the line over his ear and he'll march the way you want, but if he decides he's going another way, you just can't stop him. So this has happened often in the past. The guy picks up the telephone and calls the Secretary, calls the President. Andy Young was the one who turned President Carter around on the neutron bomb. There was a meeting over there, and Carter changed his position. I never felt squeezed between them, because both the Secretary and Andy Young were so nice to me, but I could have been. And in fact, the record, before I had the job, I think there had been eight assistant secretaries in seven years during this tumultuous Moynihan period. They were just chewing him up because nobody could meet Pat's expectations.

Q: You took over from Sam Lewis.

MAYNES: He brought a lot of sanity and stability back to the whole process. He was there about a year, I guess.

Q: What words of advice did Sam Lewis give you when you took over?

MAYNES: Not many. I mean he was angry that he couldn't keep the job, so he was not about to stay around and offer much advice. I think he thought I maneuvered him out of the job, and I suppose that on the surface I did. But there was no campaign or anything. This was Vance's decision, and I never even asked Vance to assure me I had the job. I mean this was a decision that came down from on high. Everybody knew I wanted it, but I had not gone and said, "Please give me the job." So I didn't know. I didn't do anything Sam should have been upset about, but I understand, he was upset. We had nothing against him. We quickly spun around and got him Israel, for Christ's sake.

Q: Where he, in a way, for a small country, played a much bigger role. I mean, he was practically the proconsul.

MAYNES: Yes, he was second man in the country.

Q: For in diplomatic terms a very long time.

MAYNES: Oh, yes.

Q: When you arrived in IO, could you talk a little bit about the team you assembled?

MAYNES: Yes, I put together a team of four people, and I had been a Foreign Service officer, so I reached back for people I knew who were competent. So I got Jerry Carmen, who went on to be our ambassador in Geneva and had worked with me in IO as a young officer and was the most brilliant young officer we had then, so I got him back. He went on to become Eagleburger's special assistant after he left the Geneva job. He came back as one of Eagleburger's top assistants. He was my first deputy, and then I got George Dowley, who had worked for Congressman Rangel, a very lovely, gifted lawyer. And then I got Bob Barry, Ambassador Barry, who was subsequently our ambassador to Bulgaria and Indonesia.

Q: And is now in Sarajevo as head of the OECD.

MAYNES: And I recruited him because when I was in Moscow he was by far the best person in the embassy, I thought the most gifted in our embassy. So I basically recruited people that I had known. I mean, it's the old school tie idea.

Q: I mean, you know them.

MAYNES: I'd seen them perform. So we had a very strong bureau, and I got Tom Niles as head of UNP, and Tom quickly took over the Namibia negotiations. So we had a very strong team of officers. We also had some very, very good young officers - John Tefft, who is now DCM in Moscow, Dan Kurtzer, who is now US ambassador in Egypt, and Stan Escudero, who is now US ambassador in Baku. They were all young officers in IO.

Q: The interesting thing is you name these names for a very long time, and I don't want to be pejorative, but we'd had a cadre of women who had been in IO for a long time, mainly because this is a place where they could shine and were sort of allowed to rise, as opposed to going out during time of discrimination against women.

MAYNES: That's right.

Q: Was that cadre still around?

MAYNES: No, they had left, and one of the criticisms I used to get from OMB by people who'd known that group was that . . . although I think the people I've mentioned are strong and have proven it by their subsequent career. I mean, Kurtzer was just an extraordinary officer, really extraordinary, and I strongly recommended to NEA and they agreed with me that he be our first Jewish officer ever sent out to the Middle East. I helped bring that about. But I was criticized by OMB for not having a strong enough bureau *substantively*, and what they meant by that, and they made it quite explicit, is "You used to have these women in there who knew what happened in 1949 and what happened in . . ." And we didn't have those people. We had people like Kurtzer, who

were very able but still learning. And that has led to a great. . . Well, those people were not allowed to stay. They rose up because of the reasons you cited: they were married, many of them to professionals here in town. They couldn't go abroad, and so this was one way for them to have an interesting job in international affairs. But now the new rules don't permit that kind of implantation of expertise which remains fixed in one spot and grows in its sophistication. So it's a problem. I mean, the institution is not as good in this field as it used to be in terms of substantive knowledge. I don't know what one does about that, because you're fighting a whole personnel system, and they don't want people to exist like this.

Q: Which is a peculiar thing that we've been unable to reach a balance between longevity, which means substantive knowledge, and-

MAYNES: Well, the thing is we used to offer it. When I joined the Foreign Service, if you performed well, you had a job for life. And while it didn't mean that you rose necessarily up to be ambassador, you might be just the person who everybody recognized as the most skilled Burmese expert in the Department, and everybody valued that. But now they don't, and it's up and out. I have this friend, Mark Crabbe, who never made ambassador, probably never should have made ambassador, but is universally acknowledged by all the China scholars as the most brilliant of all the group. He was number one in his class, in the entrance class. He's brilliant with languages, just brilliant, and he's a remarkable sort of intelligence source. But he doesn't have the personality to be an ambassador. And fortunately he joined as a Marine in Beijing when that was still possible and made it all the way to the end, but if he came in today he'd be out in eight years or whatever it is. No, he'd probably make it to about 38, and then he'd be bounced, which is ridiculous.

Q: What were the issues when you arrived in January of '77? Did you have any problem getting confirmed?

MAYNES: No, as a matter of fact, I walked into the room and sat down at the witness table, and just at that moment the person who was chairing the session got up and left, and Senator Percy walked in and someone handed him an envelope. And he opens up the envelope and says, "Mr. Maynes, I'd like to ask you a few questions. Are you for fixed exchange rates or floating exchange rates?" And I said, "Well, that isn't my area of expertise, but I think probably in the current international situation we have to have floating rates. We don't have reserves to support a fixed rate." So he says, "Do you think we ought to have more coordinated policy or our economy with the OECD countries or less?" I said, "Well, it's not really my area of responsibility, but I think that if we have these floating rates, we really do need a greater effort of coordination to prevent wild swings." He said, "Well, Mr. Maynes, do you favor reform of the IMF." And I said, "It's not my area. . . ." "Why do you keep saying it's not your area of responsibility? Aren't you the nominee for. . . ." The thing is, you see, he actually knew me. I had testified before his committee. Maybe without his glasses he can't see very well. Anyway, it was hilarious.

Q: Did you set forth a policy that-

MAYNES: I never got a chance. I had three questions.

Q: Well, I was wondering whether you set forth an economic policy.

MAYNES: I did, I did - which I actually don't think was so bad, but I don't think anybody paid any attention.

Q: It makes one wonder. When you arrived, how did you see your agenda for IO?

MAYNES: Well, I saw my agenda as first of all to restore funding, because we'd cut off funding for UNESCO. We were threatening to cut off funding for the UN. So I saw my job mainly as trying to restore US support for the UN, which meant explaining it better, defending it more effectively, and trying to silence some of the more vocal constituencies, namely the Jewish community (almost exclusively the Jewish community), and the way you did that was by trying to address some of their concerns. So we worked very hard to sort of calm the system down on the Israeli-Arab issue and had some success, and actually we did get the funding restored. That took a lot of time. But I saw that as my main priority. Then the other issue that dominated the bureau was the Namibian negotiation, because we were the action . . . There was a division of responsibility. AF took Zimbabwe, and we took Namibia. And Jerry Helman was the principal draughtsman, and he and McHenry worked brilliantly together, but Niles was very active in this, and they did a terrific job. I mean, contrary to all expectations, they actually got a framework agreement which provided a basis for the ultimate settlement. We actually thought that if Carter had won, I think we would have gotten it out several years earlier.

Q: Don McHenry said, I think, we lost something like eight years before it. . . It was almost a done deal.

MAYNES: Yes, it was a done deal. It was a done deal, and Don deserves enormous credit for it.

Q: I think when one looks at the map and thinks about places, and here we are, the greatest country in the world, spending a great deal of effort - on the part of the State Department and this apparatus - on a place called Namibia. Why, in the mid-'70's, late '70's, was Namibia so important?

MAYNES: The UN has established as a norm, if you will, and I think it's probably the UN's greatest contribution since '45 - it's probably not peacekeeping or the human rights developments or even some of the more spectacular developmental effects of achievements like sharp reduction of child death from dread diseases - but a norm that states cannot acquire a territory by force. And when you look at the record, it's always charged in this country that only Israel is attacked on this issue, but in fact, Turkey's got

the monkey on its back because of Cyprus, the Indonesians because of East Timor, the Argentineans because of the Falklands. In other words, if you take territory by force, you break a norm that the UN has helped to establish. And South Africa was trying to hold onto that territory, against popular will. Now the legal situation is a little more confused, but it was seen in that light, that they have broken the norm, and it's very important to try to establish that. Then in terms of our UN strategy the Africans have 50 votes. They have 50 votes, and this was an issue that looked as though it was solvable, looked as though actually, if you put your shoulder to the wheel, you could solve this damn thing, and it would have tremendous resonance with Africa in an administration which wanted to pay Africa a great deal of attention.

A lot of that came back to Andy, who was interested in this, but also Tony Lake. All of his writing up to that point had been on Africa. He was an Africanist. I've always thought the American interest in the racial issue in southern Africa is directly related to our own racial problem here. We have a national interest in trying to settle peacefully or with a reasonable margin of peace these racial conflicts, because if we don't they are going to ricochet dramatically back into our own society. We cannot just sit and watch soldiers machine-gun down black crowds - or *vice versa*. I mean, if South Africa. . . Right now, you know, there's a lot of random killing of white farmers. If it were ever shown that the government was behind this sort of thing, it would be inflammatory in this country. We've got too much at stake, and Namibia was part of this puzzle, along with Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe is the bigger prize, much bigger.

Q: They were working with the British and Americans.

MAYNES: But the British wanted us as active partners. They had realized that they didn't have the power to carry it alone, so they asked that Andy join Owen. It was much like what's happened in Ireland. The Brits just don't have the muscle any more, so they asked us to join. But when I raise this domestic racial issue, this is my view. I never heard it expressed by anybody, but I think that's the reality, that there is a special intensity, a special sensitivity on this questions, and we're fools if we don't recognize it.

Q: Did you find that the White House - Jimmy Carter coming from the South, and his background would be particularly sensitive to this sort of thing

MAYNES: He was. He began to take an interest in it - not as much as the Middle East, but he took a big interest in it, and then it sort of took on a life of its own. The thing is that the administration at one point was in a lot of trouble, and the one thing that seemed to be working was Namibia. And then it got built up as a, quote, success story, see. I mean, we thought we were really going to get an agreement, and we came very close. And I remember being ordered once by Dave Newsom to go give a press briefing, and give all the credit to Vance, because he was under so much assault in the struggle with Brzezinski and stuff like that. He had helped, because he had authorized it, but the person who really deserved the credit was McHenry - I mean, if you were going to actually say who did this, it was McHenry. He was the one who was important.

Q: But in the world of Washington-

MAYNES: I was ordered, told, you go down, and I want you to go down and give a press briefing - this is a big suspect story; it's the only thing we've got sort of really that's working out - and I want you to go down and tell the press that Cy Vance did this. Well, I didn't mind doing it, because, in fact, by giving this a head of steam and by supporting us at key junctures - he had done this, but in fact, if you're really going to say, "All right, yes he did this, but who was the real hero?" Well, the real hero was Don McHenry - who is not mentioned in this framework.

Q: I've just finished last week interviewing Don McHenry on this. He was talking about how well this contact group worked.

MAYNES: And that was sort of a collective idea of all of ours. I don't know where it quite came from, but it sort of emerged by osmosis. We were trying to sit and figure out how do we bring maximum pressure on them, and so we began putting together the list of which countries really had interests there. And well, there were five of them. The one that didn't quite fit was Canada, but they were on the Security Council. And so perfect.

And so we put this together, and as the French minister said, never in the history of France has anything like this been done. He was a big champion of it. But it did work, and it's been adopted subsequently, sometimes with success, sometimes not - in Bosnia. . . The contact group is the same; it's the same idea. What you need for this to work is every state has to be interested but no state has such a supreme interest in it that they're willing to go in and shoulder all the burden or willing also to offend all the others by pushing them aside. So it's an uneasy balance, and if it gets out of hand - in other words, if one state suddenly decides, well, we do have this interest - and we're close to that in Bosnia. But it does work, and it does have an impact on countries to have five big fellows take a common position on this.

Q: I refer readers to my interview, which eventually will show up, with Don McHenry on how this thing developed and the dynamics of it.

MAYNES: All the drafting was done in IO. We did all the drafting and all the instructions for it. And McHenry was on the phone with us all the time, and the US provided the dominant intellectual leadership, I think, and it took a tremendous amount. . . But it did work, and they made tremendous progress, way beyond what anybody expected.

Q: I think this is probably a good place to cut it off now. I wanted to put down some things. We're into the time when you were in IO, and we've talked about your early relations, how you got the job, and how early relations were with Andy Young, and also about Namibia and how that worked. And some of the things I'd like to bring up are, we haven't talked about the Middle East.

MAYNES: No, it's a big issue.

Q: We haven't talked about the Panama Canal business. I mean, I don't know how that reflected, but Latin America, Chinese recognition, whether that had any. . . . China was already in there, but talk about relations with China. Obviously about dealing with the Soviet Union.

MAYNES: And we had the World Disarmament Conference.

Q: And World Disarmament Conference.

MAYNES: That was a big issue.

Q: And then Camp David, which was part of the Middle East. And UNESCO.

MAYNES: Sure.

Q: Okay?

MAYNES: Okay .

Q: Today is February 1st, 1999, Bill, let's start first, let's talk about the Middle East, which includes Camp David and all. Where did IO stand on the Middle East problem, which is essentially at that point the Israeli-Palestinian problem; and then we'll move over to Iran.

MAYNES: Well, we didn't stand anyplace as a bureau that was in opposition to US policy, but we did have a special role that we played, because the Middle East issue was one of the few issues on the international agenda that was internationalized from the beginning. And initially it was internationalized to help Israel, to get recognition for it, and to provide legitimacy for basically the establishment of a Jewish state in the Arab World. Once it was internationalized, of course, as the years went on and there was no settlement, the Arabs used this internationalization of the issue to bring pressure on Israel. So Israel was being held to the standards of the Geneva Convention, which it was violating in the West Bank. It disputes that, but an occupier cannot move people off the land. There are all sorts of regulations. So regularly Israel was being brought to task, not just in the Carter Administration, but ever since, for not adhering to these codes of behavior, which it was a party to. In addition, of course, there was the problem of Arab excess, treating Israel in a totally unfair way. So one of the problems in managing the issue was that the Arabs had some legitimate complaints, and they also advanced some outrageous or illegitimate positions.

Q: What would those be, for example?

MAYNES: Well, trying to delegitimize Israel as a state, charging Israel with human rights violations which the Arabs themselves were committing and blocking any effort to raise the issue on the other side. Those would be two important questions. So when we started, Andy Young is now seen as somebody who is very pro-Palestinian and pro-Arab and even anti-Israeli, and in fact that is not how he came into the office of US ambassador to the UN. He came into the office out of the civil rights movement, where the support of Jewish Americans for Martin Luther King had been very important, and in fact, he had as an informal advisor a man who had played a major role in the civil rights movement, and his name unfortunately escapes me at the time, but he is very controversial because he had had a Communist background.

Q: Stanley Levinson?

MAYNES: Yes, Levinson. Now he was not a close advisor, but he had access to Andy. When Andy first came into the office, he was making statements so pro-Israeli that we had formal protests from the Arab delegations because he was not following the State Department line on the Middle East. He was spending lot of time in synagogues talking to Jewish audiences, making statements there and elsewhere that aroused concern in the Arab world. But at the same time, one of the interesting things - and it shows the raw nature of ethnic politics in this country - the minute that he got in there there started to be a large flow of hostile mail from Jewish Americans. This was way before he'd said anything, done anything, and this gets to the relationship between blacks and Jews in the United States after the early '70's, after the '67 War, when a number of black leaders began to speak sympathetically about the Palestinian cause and equated their own plight here with the Palestinians' plight there. Andy was not part of that, but just the mere fact that he was black brought this wave of mail, and I saw some, and it was quite distressing. That was one of the reasons he was speaking in all of these synagogues, trying to calm that audience down, but they were just convinced. And I suppose they would argue that given subsequent history they were right, that there was no way that a black American could serve in that job and then not become pro-Third World, pro-Palestinian, etc. I don't know, I strongly doubt there was any predestination in this, because in fact he did start out on the other side, but he was buffeted so much that I think it did begin to influence some of his thinking. I think the other thing that influenced his thinking was Andy had grown up in the civil rights tradition where you talk to anybody who would talk to you, and the idea that we wouldn't talk to the PLO seemed to him preposterous.

Q: I think it seemed preposterous to most people. This is something that Kissinger had let the Israelis essentially put over on him in order to get some small point somewhere.

MAYNES: That's right. Anyway, that's the background of that. Once Begin came into power we had trouble, because while it is true that the settlements started under the Labor Government, and you could really argue that the Labor Government laid the basis for all the trouble we're having on the West Bank now, we at least went through the pretense of

arguing that these were security settlements. When the Likud won in June of '77, immediately Egypt rallied worldwide support - I mean they got more than a hundred signatories - for a resolution that basically consisted, almost entirely, like 99 per cent, of US statements on the settlements issue and tabled the damn thing. And Vance looked at this and looked at the origins of this and said that we would support it, because it was US policy. And as you probably know, we in the end voted against it, and the reason is that the Israeli lobby put pressure on the White House, and notwithstanding the fact that virtually every word in the resolution conformed to our position - we didn't vote against it, we abstained.

And actually there's a history there that's worth recording. I was summoned over to see Hamilton Jordan, who was the President's special assistant and his most important advisor, and Jordan wanted to know about this resolution. And I had a flow chart which traced every word back to some US statement, some UN resolution that the United States had voted for, and the only word that was different, as I recall, was that it said that the settlements should be "rescinded." We had never used that word. So anyway, Jordan looked at this and said, "Well, now I understand it, but we're not voting for this resolution." And I said, "Why is that?" And he says, "Before Jimmy Carter went to the UN in March of '77, he had 85 per cent of the Jewish community in the United States, and after he shook hands with the PLO representative, it's down around 18 per cent. We're not voting for it." So in the end we abstained, and then the next year we held our breath-

Q: This was in-

MAYNES: '77.

Q: '77 we didn't vote for it.

MAYNES: In '78 we voted for it. People forget that we did vote for it. I mean, it was our position, and we sort of sneaked it in. We had been having lots of problems with Begin, and so we voted for it. You've got to remember that he'd also invaded Lebanon in '78. In '79, you had the settlements in Hebron, and so the Egyptians took this resolution, which we'd voted for in the General Assembly, to the Security Council and tabled it there. And that is what led to Andy Young's downfall, because he was under orders to try to delay a vote on that, and the Arabs told him that if he met with these people he could get the delay, and he did it. And then it was revealed, and we ended up actually voting for the resolution and then repudiating our vote, because, again, the curious thing is that our embassy in Israel came back. . . . We had originally agreed to abstain, and I left town at that time to go give a speech in Minneapolis, and while I was gone a cable came in from the embassy in Israel and said that the Israelis knew this, knew they deserved it, and were expecting the US to vote for it. So Vance went to Carter and turned it around, and the decision was to vote for it, which we did. And then the Israelis basically rolled us. They got to Mondale and contended that there was all kinds of language in there about Jerusalem which had never been used before. Of course it had been used before. This is another one of these issues where the United States has a position from one

administration to another which it is not willing to utter, although it never votes against it, and that position is that the final status of Jerusalem has not been decided, that it has to be the result of a negotiation. We do take the view it should be a united city, but we don't spell out what that means and whether it means an Israeli city. And so then Carter repudiated his vote, which of course you can't do. It's still in the record. And then subsequently Senator Moynihan wrote a cover article for Commentary in which he said that I and Andy Young had lost the 1980 election for the Democrats because of this vote, that it had alienated Jews in New York and that that was what caused Kennedy to win the New York primary, which then weakened Carter in the '80 election and caused Reagan to win. In fact, analyses of the vote show that it had very little to do with the vote in the primary, but anyway, there's a long history to this.

Q: One of the things that I think seems to repeat itself, including with the Clinton Administration, is that at the beginning of an administration they tend to be very, very concerned about Israel, that they don't want to upset the Jewish vote. But it sounds almost like a repeat at the very beginning of the Administration, and then after dealing with the Israelis for a while, it tends to stiffen their backs.

MAYNES: Well, I think that's true. What's going on here is an electoral logic. If you look at the demography of the United States ethnically, the Jews are concentrated in New York, Florida, and California, with a big concentration in Illinois as well. The Democrats cannot win the White House without one of those big three. Forget Illinois. But they have to take New York or California or they don't win. And the Republicans, therefore, you can argue, then, why do Republicans pay so much attention to the Jewish vote, since they don't get it Jews vote 85 per cent for Democrats. What's going on here is that the Republican ploy is to persuade Jews not to be enthusiastic and to sit home, and the Democrats' ploy, or strategy, is to energize them to come out, and as the campaigns began to unfold, the Democrats and the Republicans made more and more extreme statements about how far they will go to support Israel. Coming out of an election, the last thing an administration wants to do, the first month in office, is to repudiate its promises, even if they've been made ill-advisedly. So they are committed, as you suggested. Then as they begin to look at the reality of the Middle East, and they realize that there is no way that you can adopt this position that you have said you would adopt in the campaign and protect US interests in the area. They begin to walk the position back. And that happens in the second and third year, and by the fourth, they're getting geared up again for the next election. So you really only have sort of an 18-month window there where you can actually work the problem. And it's very hard. The governor on it that prevents too much excess by an administration is that no Israeli government, no matter how enthusiastic a US administration is to show its loyalty to the Israeli cause, no Israeli government wants the Peace Process totally snuffed. So in our enthusiasm, sometimes it's the Israelis who rein us in a little bit because if it looks as though it's going to really snap, they don't want that. But you're quite right in your characterization of the positions of most administrations. At least that's my explanation as to why.

Q: There's a cadre of essentially civil servants who work in IO, and did they tell you about the rhythms of how this worked?

MAYNES: No, most of them have no concept of it, because they're so divorced from politics, but those of us who've worked on the Hill and inside the State Department can see the rhythm quite clearly. I mean there is this rhythm. You have to understand it if you want to work the problem, move it forward. I think this is one of these problems that unfortunately there is no Hail Mary pass that is going to resolve the game. In football terms, this is a ground war. Each administration sort of moves the ball ten yards forward and then hands it off to the next one, and then they move it tens yards forward - or sometimes, unfortunately, a little bit back, but never too far back - and then it resumes. But there's going to be no master breakthrough, or at least I doubt it, no master breakthrough that resolves this once and for all; it's going to have to be push forward slowly. And in that case, the UN becomes involved usually against US will. The basic position is that the UN ought to butt out because they don't like the pressure, and we want total domination of this issue, and the rest of the world largely gives it to us, but won't give it to us entirely, so every once in a while the UN, predictably - there's almost a rhythm to that, too - becomes involved because the damn thing is slowing down too much, something outrageous has happened on one side or the other; and it gets internationalized again. The foundation is permanently internationalized, but it flares up anew and becomes an international issue and becomes difficult to deal with.

Q: In IO did you feel the heat of politics coming at your office, or was this something that the Desk was getting?

MAYNES: When Sol Linowitz was appointed the negotiator, the first thing he did was summon me up to his office and tell me that he wanted me to basically keep the UN out of all issues involving the Middle East. And I said, "Sol, look, the United States position formally is, if you take 20 issues, it's with Israel on about 19 or 18; on a couple, like the settlements, it's not. At least rhetorically it's not and publicly it's not. And when these issues flare up at the UN, all I can do is look at this from the standpoint of international law, of public pronouncements, and make a recommendation to the Secretary. And then you make your recommendation, and they have to resolve it up there. But I can't, as an assistant secretary, basically close down on IO and not have a view on these things. That doesn't make any sense." And he then accepted that position, and actually we got along extremely well.

Q: How did the Camp David process-

MAYNES: Well, my deputy, Jerry Helman, I assigned him to participate in the process. He went up to Camp David, and he did basically all of the negotiating for the peacekeeping arrangements. And then I got involved with it directly when we went to implement those because the original Camp David accord called for a UN force in the Sinai or, if necessary, a US force. And it was quickly clear that the Israelis wanted that US force, and they didn't want a UN force. They wanted to get us in there, and we didn't

want to go. And so I remember we sent out something like 18 cables to Jerusalem to get a date. UNEF renewal was coming due six months from then.

Q: UNEF being?

MAYNES: United Nations Emergency Force, isn't it UNEF? It's the emergency force in the Middle East, but I've forgotten these. . . . It's now been 20 years. But there was a UN force in place, and we would have preferred to see that strengthened and have a more international effort. And the Israelis signed onto that at Camp David, but then when we went to implement that, they would never answer any of our cables. We gave them our thinking; they'd never comment. So finally I was sent out to meet Begin and Dayan.

Q: Moshe Dayan.

MAYNES: -yes - to flush out their position. They handled it masterfully. First of all, Dayan - they claimed he was out of the country. I'm sure he was in the country. But when we get out there, "He's out of the country." So I can't see him. I see Begin finally, and I had taken with me Mel Levitsky, who was the head of UNP for me, and the first we walk through the door, and Begin looks at Levitsky, and he said, "Is this your first time in Israel?" And he said, "It is." And he said, "Shame on you, Mr. Levitsky," and goes on to a long - basically it was a filibuster - you know, an hour on what an outrage it was for a Jewish American not to have been in Israel before. And Sam Lewis and I kept trying to bring him back to the . . . you know, "Mr. Maynes has come out here 5,000 miles to talk about . . ." We never could get him on it. And then when I left, they leaked an outrageous version of what I'd said to Bill Safire, and I was denounced in a Safire column.

Then months later - *months* later - the Israelis were mad at us about something, and they claimed that Sam had said something in this meeting. By the way, the Israelis take verbatim notes of everything we say. We take . . . you know, the ambassador on the back of a pad. We never take any stenographer. But they have verbatim notes. So Sam said he didn't say this, or something, and it turned out he had. And they produced the verbatim record, which then, at the embassy in Israel, came back to Washington and said, "Unfortunately, Sam said this, but it also shows that the statement to Safire is totally wrong. These things were never said."

So anyway, I was very badly savaged there, and when we then had a subsequent meeting with Weizmann and Dayan in Washington to follow up on the proposal to put Americans in there, Weizmann took me aside and said, "We treated you very badly, I know," but it didn't do any good. They still got their way. They got the US force in there, which was what they wanted, you know.

Q: One of the things that run through these oral histories I do is the frustration with the professionals of the Foreign Service, not just the professionals, but people who've dealt with the Middle East, who are finding that no matter what they do, the Israelis are able to

call up their contacts within the Congress or within the media to work it around so that they get both the story and whatever they want.

MAYNES: There is a wonderful story told by John Bushnell when he was in the White House and was on the NSC, and the Israeli ambassador - I think it was Dinitz at the time - came in to see him and said, "What's your recommendation for aid to Israel?" and he made the mistake of telling him. And Dinitz said, quote, "We're going to beat the shit out of you." He said, "We're going to roll you." And they did it.

Q: I interviewed somebody who was our economic counselor in Tel Aviv who said how frustrating it was to screen any proposal and to come up with reasonable recommendations because they had nothing to do with anything, because Congress would immediately double it.

MAYNES: What can you say? It's true. I just chaired a Council on Foreign Relations meeting last week that discussed the question of "Does the Democratic Party have a foreign policy" and then there's going to be one, "Does the Republican Party..." And I was the chair of it, and Marty Peretz, who is the editor of The New Republic and a ferocious defender of Israel, the issue of aid came up, and he says, "Well, all that happens in aid is the black caucus blackmails the Congress into giving money for Africa." There's sort of a silence in the audience.

Q: You might put it in today's context about how much aid goes to Israel as compared to going to-

MAYNES: I mean it was such an outrageous statement, and people just sat there as though they'd had a custard pie thrown in their faces.

Q: Did Camp David make any difference in our Middle East policy? Did you see a change after it? You were there until when?

MAYNES: Yes, I did. It did totally reorient our policy, because we had been going for a global settlement, and our policy then became to try to get support internationally for the Camp David Accord. And I think we had an outside chance of getting that until Begin resumed the settlements within a week of returning to Israel. And that really doomed it. I want to make clear, you know, I am very sympathetic to some of the Israeli positions. I mean, now that there is a state there, they have legitimate security concerns, and we should be sympathetic to them. But what is frustrating is the fact that we have no independent policy of our own. And many of the positions taken are very detrimental to American interests in the area - and I would argue, over the long run, to Israeli interests. And I would say that about 40 per cent of the Israelis would agree with that position.

Q: I've heard this before, too. Did the Andy Young talking to the PLO representatives cause any particular problem for your office?

MAYNES: Oh, God. Well, there was a Congressional investigation of my role. I was charged in a front-page article in Peretz's journal, The New Republic, with being the one, along with Hal Saunders, who had cooked this all up. We were anti-Israeli and this was a secret plot inside the State Department, he was acting under . . . all nonsense. And this is where I learned what friendship is in Washington. I had gone to school with Les Aspen. Well, he was the one who launched the investigation, never called me, never. Anyway, they found that it was absolutely untrue. I mean, there just was no evidence for this whatsoever. This was an initiative of Andy's, but they went through all of - what shall we say - the "special" sources of information to find out whether there was anything to the argument that this was a sort of a State Department plot. And this was Wolf Blitzer, now on CNN, who wrote this, and who I think was very close to Israeli intelligence then.

Q: Did you find that often the American Jewish people who were in important areas in the media and politics and all tended to take more extreme positions than-

MAYNES: I think that my experience with this, which goes beyond my time in IO, is that of course it is a fact that there are a very large number of Jewish Americans who work as journalists, particularly for our better newspapers. And I think it's also true that almost all of them were Zionists and very pro-Israeli, almost blindly pro-Israeli, for many years. Beginning with Begin's victory in June of '77, there began to be a change because Israel existed as a reality and as a myth for American Jews, and the myth was a Labor Party myth of a social democracy in the Middle East, exemplifying all the values that most Jews - and I wish more Americans - held, of democratic development, social solidarity, etc. Begin came in, and he had a theocratic vision, which was of the "Greater Israel," which could only exist if either you ethnically cleansed all of the Palestinians or held them in semi-apartheid. And you remember that during that period there were all sorts of outrageous statements that were being made by Israeli officials, comparing Palestinians to cockroaches. The American Jewish community is very wonderfully tolerant on the whole - I mean the majority are - and these statements began to rest uneasily with a growing number of them. Then you had in the Reagan Administration, an invasion of Lebanon, and you had something that had never taken place before, where people like John Chancellor stated over "NBC News," this is not the country we thought we were supporting if they're bombing helpless Beirut. And then the *Intifada* developed, and I think there has been an important change in the attitude of Jewish Americans who are working as journalists, and you see it reflected in people like Tom Friedman. The Basic commitment to Israel is unalterable, but they see the Palestinians as human beings, not as ants or cockroaches or vermin to be exterminated or to be managed by some kind of control agent. And I think it was the fact that the really raw racism that was expressed by some prominent Likud leaders played back very badly here. And then the *Intifada*. So for the first time, for a growing number - and I would say a majority - of American Jewish journalists, the Middle East now has two human faces instead of just one, and that is a big change. And that has created a dynamic that has permitted Oslo and the progress that we've made. Otherwise, we wouldn't have made that progress, I'm convinced.

Q: In IO, how did you find relations with the various Arab delegations?

MAYNES: Except for the Egyptians, they foolishly never really paid any attention. The Egyptians and the Iraqis. Was Hamdoun ambassador after I became. . . . I guess he came after I was in Foreign Policy. I think while I was in IO, the only Arab delegation that paid any attention at all was Egypt. Most of them don't play the game here. I mean, they don't understand it at all; they just are totally out of it. That's true, by the way, of most ambassadors from Europe, too. I mean they just have no idea what to do here.

Q: Which means it's the press and Congress probably more than the State Department.

MAYNES: Oh, absolutely. Cultivate Fred Hyatt, not-

Q: Fred Hyatt being?

MAYNES: Well, he's the main foreign policy editorial writer of the Post right now, along with Steve Rosener. They're much more important than any assistant secretary. So they just have no idea.

Q: What about developments in Iran, because this was the time when the Shah was overthrown, and our embassy was hit?

MAYNES: Well, of course, IO played - if not *the* - certainly a major role in our very unsuccessful management of that crisis. I mean we were successful to a surprising extent in rounding up international support for our position and getting the sanctions established and all those things. I mean those were all run out of my bureau, but of course it didn't solve the problem. But no, we were very active, and I had one of the few Farsi speakers in the Department on my staff.

Q: Who was that?

MAYNES: Stan Escudero. He's now in Azerbaijan as ambassador. We had almost no one in the State Department who could speak Farsi - Persian - and, I mean, it's an incredible statement, but true. I was giving a talk the other day, and someone asked me about Iran, and I said, "You've got to realize that if you tried to list the most important countries in the world, I think Iran would be on the list of about the top 10 or 15." First of all, it's a large country. It's got oil. It's geographically placed. But when you look at the radiance of its culture, which goes from India all the way up to the Chinese border in Central Asia, this is a very, very important country, and the State Department, for some reason, never invested the kind of resources in it that it did in, say, the Arabic training or Russian training. Those are more important, but not toweringly different in importance. We should have had 30 Farsi speakers, instead of two or one or whatever it was.

Q: At IO, were we trying to find out ways of making contact with people in Iran?

MAYNES: We were, and a lot of them came through our bureau. These were third parties trying to establish contact. The trouble is it was very hard. . . . It's an interesting case: when Banisadr made his first big statement. I remember, and I've admired this ever since. Bill Van den Heuvel, our deputy ambassador in New York, was the only one who looked at this and said, "This is a plea for a dialogue," which of course it was. And it was interpreted, you know, as hostile. Of course, it's a recitation of all of their grievances from the past, but it was. . . . It's kind of like Arafat in '74 going before the UN and saying, you know, "I'm holding out an olive branch and a gun."

But of course the fact is this is the first time he was ever saying he was holding out an olive branch. And it was greeted with an incredibly negative reaction. And Banisadr and all the statements coming out of Iran . . . I mean, one of our troubles was that we had made ourselves *persona non grata* with the very elements of Iranian society that were inherently and structurally our friends, the social democrats. The conservative democrats were all thrown out, but the social democrats, around Bazargan - was that right? Let's see, I'm trying to think. He was the only person who had been in the Mossadegh cabinet, and he surfaced as the leader of the social democratic opposition, and of course spent most of his time fighting for his rights and in jail, but he didn't dare talk to us because we were poison. We had overthrown his government.

But when you looked at the array of forces in Iran, that was the one we wanted to have surface, and we couldn't talk to them. We couldn't reach out to them. And we're still in that dilemma to day, I think. And also, people were uncomprehending. I remember when Vance and Carter went to Iran, and Carter made that infamous statement that Iran was an island of stability in a sea of disorder, or something like that, Dan Spiegel, who was then one of the Secretary's aides, found himself one afternoon floating in a pool with Vance and the undersecretary for political affairs at the time Phil Habib, and the President was meeting with the Shah. As you know, the only time that the big shots get some time off is occasionally when the President meets alone. So they're all out there floating in the pool drinking gin gimlets at three in the afternoon, and Spiegel, who had worked for Hubert Humphrey and had actually drafted the legislation that tried to limit US arms supplies to the Shah, looked up after his second or third gin gimlet, screws up his courage, and says, "You know what? I'll bet you the Shah's son never sits on the throne."

And Vance and Habib told him that showed he was not really suited for service in the Department if he was that blind. I mean, we had invested everything in the Shah, and he had very cleverly exploited us. I remember before I came in the Carter Administration, you have the famous or infamous meeting of Persepolis, where he rounded up all the leading intellectuals of the United States and basically bribed them - bought them off - by giving this fabulous trip. He created an Aspen Institute there, and Charlie Yost was the head of it. I mean, it was like a campaign. He learns that Stuart is on the left, and Bill's on the right, and they write columns, and they were both invited. You know, he coopted the entire-

Q: He knew how to play the system.

MAYNES: He knew how to play the system. They coopted the "chattering class" and the movers and shakers, the press, the think tanks, the Department. I was never on this list, but you know, the caviar arrived as a present at Christmas, and all this stuff. And it worked. It worked. So when this struck, people were dumbfounded. This is the Shah who's carrying out the "white revolution," who is... you know, how can this be? So it was very hard to get people to... I remember I sent Vance a couple of articles. I remember sending him Oriana Fallaci's interview with the Shah, trying to show him that the Shah was not the kind of man he thought he was. I don't know if you ever read her, but she-

Q: Yes, I got tangled up with her because I was in Greece at one time, and she was supporting Panagoulis, who was getting Americans in trouble. She's a very able Italian journalist, but personalized her interviews.

MAYNES: She was a genius at getting people to reveal things they didn't want to reveal, and that's what she did with the Shah. She did it with Kissinger.

Q: Kissinger was going to be a cowboy, I think, or something like that.

MAYNES: Well, that's right. She obviously gets these men to sort of assert their manhood with her, and she manipulates it. And the Shah clearly thought he was going to best her, and she just made mincemeat out of him. But out of this came - if you read this, you began to see this large imperial vision that he had, his contempt for democratic forms of government, his contempt for the West. It was all there. It was all in this article. Anyway, it was very hard to get people to look at that because of the way he had systematically sort of seduced the leadership of our country with a very careful campaign.

Q: Well, we've got to stop now, so next time we'll pick this up. We've covered the Middle East, more or less, so this leaves us with China coming in, Disarmament Conference-

MAYNES: Africa, too.

Q: And Africa, and we'll pick that up. This is in IO. Okay?

Today is the 8th of April, 1999. Bill, you were assistant secretary for UN affairs from when to when, just to get back to it?

MAYNES: From March or April of '77 until April of 1980.

Q: We've talked about the Middle East, what about China?

MAYNES: Well, while I was assistant secretary, we had our first bilateral discussion with the Chinese on international organizations. The Chinese were trying to decide whether it

was, quote, worthwhile to join these institutions, so I was sent out to China for the first bilaterals to try to introduce them to the world of the UN and other international institutions, and I got a very good reception there. I'm not sure there's much more to say about it except that the Chinese were asking me questions about concrete benefits of joining *versus* the cost of paying the dues, and they obviously were probing to try to figure out which institutions they ought to join.

Q: It sounds like almost in a peculiar way we were acting as somewhat of a mentor at this point, which is, you know. . . .

MAYNES: We were. And I was a prelude to Mondale's trip out there. He showed up a few weeks later. But they were going down sort of organization by organization, and what's the ILO do, and what's the World Food Program, and etc, and trying to figure out whether they should participate. Of course, what happened is that, because China has incipient aspirations to be a world power, once they got in, of course, they had to join them all.

Q: What about something like the ILO? I mean at that time, did you see that this could pose a problem for the Chinese?

MAYNES: Of course it could, and I'm not sure they ever raised the ILO. But I must say, to this day, I should know but I don't know whether they ever became members. I presume they are members, but the ILO is a problematic organization for any system that cracks down on labor. And the ILO was one of the battlegrounds during the Cold War between the West and the Soviet Union, for precisely that reason.

Q: Were there any organizations you felt at the time were sort of not on your good books, that you weren't pushing too hard?

MAYNES: Do you mean for them to join?

Q: For them or just-

MAYNES: While I was assistant secretary we had trouble with UNESCO and we had trouble with FAO and we got out of the ILO basically because President Ford had made a promise to George Meany. I've forgotten now what Meany gave Ford, but in return Ford gave Meany sort of a card where he could fill in what he wanted, and what he wanted was to get out of the ILO. And it was because of the "Communist influence." And so we got out of the ILO, and then came back in it after a year, sort of having issued our demonstration lesson. But we had lots of trouble with M'bow in UNESCO, who was a charismatic but corrupt leader, and we had trouble with Salma, who was an autocratic Lebanese who probably was better than we allowed, but we didn't like him because he was so impervious to our influence and advice.

Q: What about disarmament?

MAYNES: Well, while I was assistant secretary, we had the largest disarmament gathering since the inter-war period in the World Disarmament Conference at the General Assembly, and we had heading it Averell Harriman, and that was actually a very important meeting because at that meeting the United States and several other countries - the nuclear countries - issued what are called "negative security assurances." This is something that had been hanging around in the bureaucracy for years, and we'd never found any way to sort of get it out. The negative security assurances basically tell a non-nuclear state that the United States will not attack it with nuclear weapons under any circumstances if it is not a nuclear power *or* - and then we added a provision, which is still haunting us, and it was mainly connected to our problem in Korea - *allied to a nuclear power.*

So this allowed us to maintain our first-use doctrine. Most Americans, of course, don't realize we have a first-use doctrine. We, above all others, have contended that we have the right to use nuclear weapons first, and we didn't want to give that up in Europe, and we didn't want to give it up in Korea, so we put in this special provision. This is of importance because it's decreasingly clear that North Korea has an alliance with a nuclear power. It no longer has one with Russia. It may have one with China. I suppose our excuse would be that *it* has become a nuclear power. But anyway, this also was important in the Gulf War because, in fact, the order did go out to US generals to try to figure out how many nuclear weapons it would take to subdue Saddam Hussein, and it was then pointed out that we would not use them.

I think also dissuading us from doing it was not only the obloquy that would come from using them but the fact that our internal studies showed (I was told later by a general who carried them out) that we'd have to use over 40 nuclear weapons to subdue Iraq, assuming that we weren't bombing the civilian populations but trying to use nuclear weapons against the troops. So actually, that general, after he left the service, went on to declare publicly that nuclear weapons were useless and that we should come out for radical reductions in our nuclear weapons and a no-first-use policy.

Anyway, at this meeting, though, we did get out of the bureaucracy for the first time in 20 years a commitment by the United States not to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state that was not allied to a nuclear state.

Q: In this, were you involved in the formulating of this, and if so, was there a-

MAYNES: Oh, I was very central to it.

Q: Where was the opposition coming from?

MAYNES: The "nuclear priests" - you know, the people in the Administration, in every administration and outside administrations who were in love with nuclear weapons,

almost in a caricature of *Dr. Strangelove*. I mean, it is the inner sanctum of the defense establishment, nuclear weapons are.

Q: I find this now, but even for a long time, it's like poison gas. I mean, this stuff doesn't work, as far as-

MAYNES: Exactly, which is probably the main reason it's not used - not the Geneva Convention. It blows back on your own troops. The radiation hits your own troops. I mean it was pointed out to me by an admiral that one of the reasons - there may be others - that the North Koreans hug the 38th parallel so closely, with so many troops, is that it makes it impossible for us to use nuclear weapons against them first. We would kill our own troops. And so we have this counterintuitive result of the first-use policy, which is that it causes foreign armies to come closer to us, in order to. . . . "hug your enemy" is your only strategy.

Q: Well, did you find that you were getting into almost theological arguments?

MAYNES: Oh, yes. For example, the French put in a proposal - which actually I still think is a good proposal - to create a UN satellite system that would be able to document accurately the disposition of forces and monitor agreements, etc. Well, the hysteria within the US Government over that proposal! I've never run into anything like that. And this was at a period when we denied that we had any such capability, even though everybody knew we did, and it was common knowledge in the newspapers and everything, but we never officially acknowledged that we did. So the idea that the French would dare to stand up and admit that such capabilities existed and that nations had these things was considered a form of *lèse majesté* that was totally intolerable, and out of the woodwork came these impassioned bureaucrats who were denouncing the French and denouncing us for even reading their speech, much less agreeing to it. We never agreed to it; we just read it. And that was enough. We should have immediately shredded every copy. So those were two very, very sensitive issues.

Q: Were these people, bureaucrats, concentrated in the Pentagon, or were they-

MAYNES: Pentagon and CIA.

Q: CIA.

MAYNES: And NSA.

Q: But there must have been people within all of this, the professionals, who looked upon these things with real concern and questioning their ability. I mean, you're making your plans, you realize you can't use the things.

MAYNES: Well, you and I know that or believe we know it. I have come to conclude, after many years of experience, that much of what goes on in government resembles

I mean, bureaucrats are in the same position as Unite Automobile Workers who suddenly face an import threat. A new idea is an import threat, and they are bitterly resistant to it because it means their jobs, or if not their jobs - since they even may have tenure - it means their importance. And they fight it vigorously. There's another aspect of arms control, and I would say, of economic issues. I think those are the two issues that are the most difficult for the US Government to deal with, and the reason is that there are so many agencies that have a legitimate claim to a voice at the table that it becomes almost impossible to get any decision unless the President really knows what he wants to do. There are many areas of the government, if you're the President or the Secretary of State, you can wait for good ideas to bubble up from the bureaucracy. If the bureaucracy knows that Bill Maynes is an open-minded person, ideas will come, because there are all kinds of creative people down there who will throw up ideas if they think they're not going to be immediately, automatically batted down. But that is not true in the economic and the arms-control field, because the mine fields are incredible. I remember in the case of the World Disarmament Conference, early in the Carter Administration, Carter gave a speech at the UN, and I slipped one sentence in the speech which miraculously made it through the bureaucracy. I was sure it was going to be blue-penciled out. And it was just one sentence that said, "We are going to take the World Disarmament Conference seriously." That's all it said, right? The World Disarmament Conference was two years away, but I got that sentence in.

Well, I thought I knew what would happen, and it did. Immediately, people at the White House suddenly read this, people in the Pentagon read it too, and said, "Who the hell got that damn thing in? How'd that get in there?" And they set up task forces. The President has promised; now he's got to have something to say at the World Disarmament Conference. We can't just let him go up there nude.

So Adam Yarmolinsky was put in charge of this. He was the number three in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and we had numerous strategy meetings, and the bureaucracy came up with, I think, 52 initiatives. And I remember going to the climactic meeting, and Adam, almost tears in his eyes, said, "This is just terrible. I am ashamed of us. We've worked a year and a half and we've come up with 52 initiatives, every one of which has been vetoed by one or more of you except one."

And so we said, "What's that?" He says, "Well, I'm almost embarrassed to say. It isn't even really our initiative, but somebody has proposed that we agree with the Japanese that every country should declare at least one day of the year 'Disarmament Day,' and there would be a pledge by every government that at least a cabinet-level member of their government would give a major speech - once a year - on arms control and disarmament. And nobody has objected to that, so we're going to be able to tell the President that he can support that."

And a hand goes up, and he says, "Wait a minute. There's no consensus on that." He says, "Who are you?" He says, "I'm Admiral So-and-so from the Joint Chiefs." He says, "Well, I've got it down here that the Joint Chiefs have signed off on this." He says, "The Navy

wasn't at the meeting. We object to this." He says, "Well, why do you object to this?" He says, "Because, just think about this. If there is a speech that has to be given by a cabinet-level official, he's not going to give it here in Washington. He's going to go off someplace in the country to give this speech, and that's going to involve expenditure of money. This is a God-damned waste of money." And so they ended up with nothing.

So we had to go back to the President and say, "We spent a year and a half and we've come up with not a single initiative that the bureaucracy can agree with." And of course the President didn't know what he wanted to do, and nobody else of any real responsibility would take the handle on this, because it was bureaucratic suicide, and so we went into the meeting, and just as we knew would happen, the United States got cornered, and we came up to a point where to save the meeting we had to offer up an initiative. Well, one of the 52 initiatives was this negative security assurances question. And so that's how the thing got in. We looked in the bag of tricks, and the French had given a statement, and the Russians had given a statement, and the Chinese had given a statement, and the British had given a statement, and so we gave a statement; and then you had for the first time the five nuclear powers making some kind of statement.

Unfortunately, they weren't all exactly the same statement, but the thrust was that nuclear weapons states pledge that they will not *ever* attack a non-nuclear state with a nuclear weapon, and they had not made that statement before. If we'd been willing to actually have the President go up and make a statement on that, we could have used it as some kind of negotiating leverage.

But that is typical of the US Government in arms control issues. It's typical of the US Government on international economic issues. I was this morning listening to reporters talk about Chinese negotiating style, and they say on these international economic negotiations they always wait till the last minute and have some high-level official cut the deal. Of course, that's exactly what we do. It's not Chinese at all.

Q: Did you find that there were these "nuclear priests" within, say, the Soviet or the French bureaucracy, too?

MAYNES: Oh, sure there are. Absolutely. There are careers made in it. Another revelation that really struck home to me - I can't remember whether I was out of government by this time; I probably was, but it was shortly after I left government - I went out to Livermore for an arms control conference, and they had - oh, God, what was his name? We made him our negotiator for the Comprehensive Test Ban. . . . Herb York.

He was for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and he had also been the head of Livermore. And I realized, it's like in this field, I guess the equivalent would be: you can't be president of a university unless you've been a professor with a Ph.D., not because professors with Ph.D.'s necessarily have the best training to be president of the college, but because the troops won't follow you unless they think you have that credential. Well, in this case, anybody except Herb York who called for the Comprehensive Test Ban

Treaty was almost shouted down in the room. And the guy in front of my - he was a physicist - got so angry that he stood up and said, "You're trying to take my job. That's what you're trying to do. You're trying to *take my job*." And then York got up, and he endorsed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and they still hated it, but they said, "Well, Herb, at least you understand the problem. You're on the wrong side, but you at least understand the problem."

But yes, these physicists saw the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as basically denying them their livelihood, and in the Carter Administration, they systematically sabotaged the effort. They had one of their own in the Energy Department in a key position, and we know for a fact that he went over and stirred up the British scientists to get the British to oppose the agreement. I mean it was an inside conspiracy of the nuclear priests on both sides of the Atlantic getting together to pressure their governments to stop this thing. And I even have heard some of these scientists laugh about the way that they pulled the wool over the eyes of the civilians on the issue of deteriorating shelf-life of the nuclear weapons and whether this was a . . . Of course there is this problem with tritium. We know about that. But the fact is that they trot these things out in order to stop progress, because they know the civilians are defenseless to argue about. And they do it very cynically, and it all revolves not around national security; it's job protection. I'm going to lose my job.

Q: I think as we worked on these oral histories, we're hoping to get more inside the system, to understand that things as they're portrayed in the press and in the-

MAYNES: Well, this is one of those issues that have never been portrayed correctly because it is clearly a case of job protection and, you know, very inventive people basically blackmailing the leadership who do not have adequate scientific credentials to challenge them. And so it becomes "my scientist against your scientist." And because the federal government represents such a huge investor in job opportunities for physicists and nuclear technicians, it's very hard to get a counterweight because all these people have their livelihood basically resting on programs that you want to curb, and they are not going to agree to this. And the only way we've really diffused it is golden handshakes-

Q: Which means high discharge parachutes.

MAYNES: Very high discharge salaries. During the Bush reduction in the defense budget, there were some very, very high golden handshakes given to some of these people as they reached retirement. So that's one thing you can do. And then the other thing they can do is, you know, they've tried to find them alternative employment. And actually this issue has come up recently in the Chinese spy scandal. We've got two issues that have been conflated. One is whether there is a classic case of traditional espionage taking place in the labs, with the Chinese having been able to insert a spy inside our system. Another issue is whether the labs have some role in international scientific diplomacy, which they have assumed as part of this effort to find them new things to do. And they have been receiving large numbers of Russian and Chinese and other physicists, and no one has ever

alleged that anything really has ever been compromised in these programs. But part of what is going on here is trying to find another role for the labs, so that they will calm down.

Q: Out of this disarmament conference, then, you ended up with the negative promise. Is that about it?

MAYNES: That was the main achievement, as I recall. Well, no, there were a couple of main achievements. Every administration has as a priority trying to maintain international support for cohesion around the Non-Proliferation Treaty, so any time you have a major discussion of disarmament, the flagrant violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by the five nuclear powers - in the sense that they have not taken steps to disarm themselves - becomes a major issue that has to be managed. So from the standpoint of strict American security interests, you'd have to say the main achievement of the conference was that we shored up again support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In subsequent years we've tried to argue that some of the reductions in Europe with the zero-option on the medium-range nuclear missiles and START II are earnests in the direction of fulfilling our obligations under the NNPT, but at the time we had very little to show for it. And so trying to keep people on the reservation on that was the main. . . . And negative security assurances fitted into that strategy.

Q: Well, then moving over to Africa, what as happening in Africa?

MAYNES: Well, I've got five minutes, and that's going to take a long time.

Q: All right, well, maybe we might stop. Did you find - back to the disarmament things - after all, President Carter was trained as a nuclear engineer, albeit as a submarine commander, but still: did you find that he had a greater interest in this issue than, say, other presidents?

MAYNES: I don't think so. I think Carter started out not all that experienced in international affairs and finding it more to his satisfaction than domestic policy, as many presidents do because they have more authority there. They can do more things without getting support from the Congress. So he began playing more and more of a role, and they begin thinking of their legacy, and very few presidents want to be known as the "War President." They want to be known as the "Peace President." And so he did play a helpful role, particularly in his last couple of years.

Q: All right. Well, we'll pick this up again in Africa.

Q: Today is the 31st of August, 1999. Bill, the last time we had this, we covered up to Africa. I think we've covered the Far East, Middle East, a lot on disarmament and all, but

now we're coming to Africa, and you said let's save that for another time because you've got quite a bit to do. You were at IO from when to when?

MAYNES: Well, originally as a rotation officer in '62 to '64, and then I returned as assistant secretary in early '77 to early '80.

Q: Well, then, let's take a look at what were our concerns with Africa from the IO point of view.

MAYNES: Well, the concerns were two-fold. First, substantively, there were three neuralgic issues in the UN system. One was South Africa, one was the Middle East, and the other was the new international economic order. Those were all three issues on which the United States was on the defensive and in a very, very small minority.

Of the three, the one that it seemed to me there was at least some prospect of altering the US position enough so that we would have some support was on the South Africa issue. So for substantive reasons the bureau put a great deal of emphasis on that subject while I was there. Every previous assistant secretary had, too, but I thought we had the opportunity to actually make some changes in US policy in the Carter Administration because of Carter's relationship with Andy Young, that we could change our position enough so that we actually might not be so isolated on that position. And I think we had some success on that. And then the other reason we were active in it was that the Namibia issue was moving up in salience. It had a position where it either had to be lost to South Africa, which was about ready to gobble it up, or it was going to be lost in a UDI (unilateral declaration of independence) or it was going to be solved diplomatically, but we had come to a point where this had to be engaged. So we took a great deal of initiative on that.

I suppose there is a third reason that we were so involved in Africa, and that's simply Andy Young, who was our first black ambassador to the UN, who was highly visible, cared a lot about it, had tremendous contacts in Africa. I traveled around with him in Africa, and he seemed to know every second cabinet minister wherever we went. And I thought it was because he'd been in Congress, but when I asked him about it - I found this interesting - he said, "No, it's not because of Congress. It's because of church camp." I said, "What do you mean, church camp?" He said, "Well, I was a Congregationalist, and my mom and dad sent me off every summer to church camp." And he said, "Bill, what do you think happens when you get 500 boys in a church camp and you have your first meeting and you look out at the 500 and 35 are black? Guess what we found among the 35." I said, "I don't know." He says, "Well, about ten of them were Africans who had been sent to the church camp by missionaries." And he said, "Those people went back to Africa and rose up to be cabinet ministers." And he said, "Every summer I'd meet another ten." And so he says, "I met some of them in Congress while I was a congressman, but I met a lot of them when I was a young boy going to church camp." So those were the three reasons that we were actively involved.

Q: In Africa we'd had a sort of a policy that was not particularly forthcoming on South Africa and all up to then. What were the pressure groups? Who cared about Africa within the policy establishment of either administration, and why was this an opportunity?

MAYNES: Well, I think there are certain neuralgic issues for each party. For the Democrats, increasingly, the South African issue was becoming neuralgic. I mean there were lots of pressures against us around the country, lots of groups that felt that we were pushing South Africa too hard, too far, but I think it's kind of in a way - this may sound far-fetched to you - but almost like Clinton's commitment to the women's issue or to the gay issue, certainly the last one was not a prudent political decision. But among activists in the party this was part of the sort of liberation agenda - I mean liberation of groups that had been oppressed or mistreated - so that if Clinton did not live up to his pledges to the gay community (which, of course, he didn't fully), if he totally ignored them, paid no attention to them, he not only would have lost credibility with gay groups, he would have lost credibility with the liberal activists in the party, most of whom were not gay but who would see this as a signal. And I think the South African issue at that point was acquiring that kind of salience in the Democratic Party.

You can almost track - I did at one point in an article. If you looked at the platforms of the Democratic Party you start seeing - I think it started in the late '60's, middle '60's - for the first time you see the South African issue introduced into the platform, and then the references get more and more and more insistent. And this reflected, I think, partly the dependence of the party on the black vote, but then outsiders would point out that blacks - the rank and file - weren't all that interested in South Africa, but the leaders were.

This was a leadership issue, and black leaders were interested. And then liberals were interested because, I think - and I agree with this - I think that the interest of the United States in South Africa's, I shouldn't say success, but avoidance of failure or collapse - America's interest in that was mainly domestic here, a signal that it would send if South Africa turned in a direction where basically what is happening in Kosovo happened in South Africa, that all of one group left because they either were driven out or felt that there was no future for them - that would be a very, very bad signal for the United States, with its racial problems. So I think the pressure was more elite, self-generated, central to the Democratic Party, but also sort of American conscience about race in general.

Q: Well, in your position, were you sort of given marching orders by Secretary Vance or anything, or did you just sort of know.

MAYNES: It was just in the wind. I never had Vance call me in and say, "We're going to give priority to South Africa." It was just in the wind. Everybody knew once Carter was elected, particularly with Andy Young up in New York, that there was going to be a much greater emphasis given to African issues. I think the arrival of Dick Moose as the assistant secretary as also a signal. He'd been undersecretary for management. They moved him down to this job. Part of the reason was, I think, that although he subsequently got that same job again, people didn't feel that he was that terrific at the

management issue, but he was an important figure in the building. I mean, he was not an insignificant figure; he was a major figure, and he was moved into that job. So I think it was in the air.

Then the other thing we'd have to remember is, you know, no one would have predicted, going into the late Bush, early Clinton Administration, that Kosovo and Bosnia were going to be the major foreign policy issues. That would have been inconceivable, and no one would have staffed up his department in order to put in positions of power people who actually knew something about these subjects because no one would have anticipated that. Well, it's a little less the case in southern Africa, but all of those issues were moving toward a resolution point. The war in Rhodesia was moving to the point where decisions had to be made. We had Sharpsville take place.

Q: This was a riot?

MAYNES: It was a police riot.

Q: A police riot in an African shanty town?

MAYNES: And that was the year when Steve Biko was beaten to death, I mean in that period. And then in Namibia you had UDI looming up as a possibility, so the agenda was partly set by local actors. They were doing things that caught attention of people. And then the British had decided that they finally had to do something about Rhodesia, and they confessed that they couldn't handle it alone. This was another case almost on a much less significant strategic scale, but it's like the British in Greece and Turkey saying we can't handle the load any more.

Q: This is '48 or something like that.

MAYNES: But the British came to us in the Carter Administration and say, "We need your power. We can't handle this by ourselves. We need the United States there beside us in order to push this through." So Andy Young became the partner of David Owen in trying to negotiate the Zimbabwe settlement, and we worked closely with the British as well on the Namibian settlement. They were after us for help on the Zimbabwe issue.

Q: Well, what was the role of your bureau in these African affairs?

MAYNES: Well, we played the lead role on the Namibian issue. There was a division of responsibility, and AF (African Bureau) took the lead on Zimbabwe, and we (IO) took the lead on Namibia. And then they took the lead on South Africa. But we had the lead on Namibia, but we were the lead bureau on Namibia and the second most bureau in the Department on the other two issues, although, to be fair, Tony Lake played an extremely important role on the Zimbabwe issue.

Q: Tony Lake was the-

MAYNES: Head of Policy Planning.

Q: Well, now, what about when you say you took the lead?

MAYNES: Well, we had the drafting responsibility.

Q: Was this sort of handed out? Did you-

MAYNES: I'm trying to think of how it really developed. I think the reason that it really developed that way - and AF tried a couple of times to get the responsibility back - and when Chet Crocker took over as assistant secretary for AF in the Reagan Administration, that was the first thing he did, was seize the Namibia issue back from IO. It got started because Namibia, like the Middle East and Cyprus, had been internationalized. They had not been regionalized; they had been internationalized. They had been taken to the UN, and there was a body of legislation governing its future. So the UN had established a legitimacy in dealing with the issues.

Q: Well, it went back to the League of Nations.

MAYNES: That's right. So that was one reason. And the second reason was that because of this mandate that the league had and that the UN was supposed to carry on and the fact that South Africa was defying it, many nations got involved in trying to prevent UDI. And the third reason that IO ended up with the responsibility is we came up with a strategy of the contact group, which essentially was the first case in history, I think, of this kind of intense, coordinated diplomacy. It has since been repeated in a number of other crisis areas, and it basically reflects the fact that several countries may have a partial interest in a settlement but not the kind of compelling interest that would cause them to decide to put major resources into solving a problem, and so you basically pool your interests and come up with a common position.

So we decided to do that with France, Britain, the United States, Germany, and Canada because it was on the Security Council then and the others because they were the major trading partners and either had deep interests in Africa, like France and Britain, or had a sort of overall stewardship role, like the United States, or in the case of German, the reason Germany was brought in was, as you probably know, the main streets in Windhoek are named for people like Goebbels and there is a very deep, sometimes unfortunate, German influence there. So we had to bring the Germans into this as well. So the idea was that if you brought all these parties together and you could get a common position, you could bring unmatched diplomatic leverage on the problem. And it basically worked.

The French foreign minister said at the time that in all France's history they had never engaged in a diplomatic exercise like this, where it basically not only coordinated but adopted the same foreign policy as four other countries, and the five of them, once they

reached agreement, made common *démarches*, worked together on this problem. And it built a considerable *esprit de corps*. It revealed that Don McHenry had unusual diplomatic talents, which were far above average - far above average - and those were revealed in this exercise. He was our chief negotiator. And the result was that they ended up with Resolution (I think it's) 485, which was the basis on which the settlement finally was achieved subsequently in the Reagan Administration.

Q: I'm interested in a number of facets, but one of them was bureaucratically here you are working with the French, the British, the Germans, the Canadians, and all - was the European Bureau ready to sort of say, have it, it's your problem? Were they-

MAYNES: We had to clear everything with them, but there was no question we were in charge, and that reflected the fact that when we first got the responsibility we had a couple of very capable people managing it - Jerry Helman and Tom Niles, who later became assistant secretary for EUR. And then we wrote most of the instructions, and most of the basic paperwork, I think it's fair to say, for the whole exercise came out of the US Government. I mean, this is just a national characteristic. We just love to be in charge. It wasn't unique to the two people I mentioned. It's unique to the United States. I mean we love to be in charge.

Most of the original drafting came out of IO, and all of the presentations were made in New York. And McHenry played a major role in shaping what we wrote. So we were making lots of progress, and it was hard for EU or AF to say anything at that point because we did make a lot of progress. We actually got a damn agreement, and I think, had Reagan not won, we would have had the Namibian settlement three years earlier. We were ready to go to Geneva for a final settlement, and the South Africans at the last minute pulled out because they thought Reagan was going to win, and they were right.

Q: At that point, to continue with that, were you making any effort to get in touch with the Reagan Administration to say, "Fellas-"

MAYNES: No, because their position on this was so clear. Chet Crocker was in print denouncing what we were. . . . He, of course, picked it all up. This is part of the game of politics, but he was like a rat terrier, you know, chewing our ankles all the time and helping Reagan get elected. And so he was very critical, although I think he'd be the first to admit that the final settlement was . . . he just picked up what we'd done, and then to his great credit, he brought it into port. We had it sitting, like, 20 miles offshore, and then after the election it went about 200 miles offshore, and then he brought it right back into port. It took him about two and a half years, but he did it.

Q: Did the departure of Andy Young because of his talking to the PLO have any effect, or did Don McHenry just sort of pick up the ball on this particular issue?

MAYNES: No, on this issue it had no effect at all. Don was totally in charge of it. It did have an effect on the bureau's morale and power and everything, because Andy Young

was a . . . Don McHenry is a highly competent professional, and indeed, he's been a close friend for nearly 30 years, but he's not a political power of the land. And Andy was. And so that made a difference.

Q: While this was going on, did you feel the hand of Jimmy Carter at all?

MAYNES: He supported us in all this. He never hesitated to. . . . Yes, we felt, not a directive hand but a supportive hand. The initiative was coming out of the Department, not out of the White House, but he certainly was supportive.

Q: How about the rules, from your perspective, of the other powers, the French, British?

MAYNES: They were all extremely active and at very high levels, partly because of the novelty of this. This had never happened before, where you had five foreign ministers who had a common project - and a negotiating project, not just call up and say, "Stu, will you support me on this one." This was, "You and I have to reach agreement on exactly what we are going to say to the South Africans next Tuesday, word by word. It has to be the same instruction." And that had never happened before, and rather than being irritated by it or saying, no, hell, I'm going to make my own, they got fascinated by it because it was sort of a historical first. It had never happened before, and so they developed considerable closeness. I think that's one reason that Vance and Owen reappeared in Bosnia, because they'd established this excellent relationship in this case.

Q: In a way it was helped that there were no really vital divergent interests.

MAYNES: No, there was nobody in France or the United States or Germany saying stop this, because we care more about *X*. The closest we came to that was with the Germans, and that's because of this German right-wing presence in Namibia, which they were frightened to death of, like bringing the plague back home. I mean, it was made clear that they would never send troops there for any kind of peacekeeping, not for the reasons you might think, but contagion. No contagion, you know. But they were helpful. But they were the only ones who had this. . . . They had a couple of issues that could have ricocheted into their domestic politics.

Q: When you left, did you see this all going for naught or did you see-

MAYNES: Well, initially I did, because I saw Chet trashing publicly everything we'd done and making statements like, "We'd left him with nothing." I thought, Oh, God, this is three years down a rat hole. But first of all, I guess I've gotten more tolerant in my old age, and I realized that this is just part of the game, and his game was to establish his credibility, and in the end he built on everything that had been achieved before and, as I say, brought the ship home and, I think, deserves credit for it. I give him credit for having actually been the one who was present when the flag was lowered.

Q: At one time when I was in INR back in the '60s-

MAYNES: My friend McHenry is not quite so charitable. He's still irritated.

Q: Well, of course.

MAYNES: And he's not given the credit he rightly deserves. I mean, actually, Chet in private gives the credit, but I think he wants more in public.

Q: I have a solid interview with Don, so we can-

MAYNES: You might flush this out. I think you'll find that he's a little sensitive on the subject.

Q: At one time, I was in African INR, dealing with the Horn of Africa. This was in the early '60's, and one of the feelings around was that South Africa was going to end up with a night of long knives when the blacks would get it together, and I was wondering what was the feeling. Was there any feeling that this thing might work out, I mean, in South Africa itself, the black-white problem?

MAYNES: You know, there was the hope it would work out. I don't think any of us had any idea that Mandela would turn out to be the kind of person he was. The most we hoped for was the kind of much, much less satisfactory situation which we have in Zimbabwe, where the whites, you would have. . . . We started this, I guess, before the interview, when you and I were talking of the concept of "entrenched cantonization," or entrenched privilege for a certain period, which is what you've got in Zimbabwe - entrenched provisions in the constitution that make it difficult for the majority to take precipitous steps that penalize the white minority. I think that was the most we hoped for, and that's good, because it avoids a blood bath, but it doesn't save the country. And you probably know in Zimbabwe the big problem is there is a white community that stays there and farms, but all the children are moving away. And that could happen in South Africa, too. So it isn't a night of long knives, and it certainly wouldn't have the impact on our domestic politics that the night of long knives would have. But it's also not a very happy sign for multi-racial communities.

Q: Is there anything else on Africa we should cover, or is this pretty much the major focus during this time?

MAYNES: That was the major focus. I mean there were obviously developments concerning Angola and the Horn of Africa, but we played a significant but not vital role in development policy. We tried. We supported AF. I think during my time in State we made three appeals to the White House trying to reverse our Angola policy and lost every time. Three strikes, you're out, right? Then you have to wait for the next administration.

Q: Turning from Africa, the one area that we haven't touched on was Latin America and the Caribbean. Did that play much of a role during your time?

MAYNES: No, not really. Well, the Nonaligned Conference took place when I was in IO, and IO managed the relations with the Nonaligned Conference, and that was basically a disaster, certainly from the standpoint of issues that IO cared about, because although I never thought any of these Nonaligned conferences were a disaster but others in the Department thought they were. And Castro, of course, exploited it, as you'd expect.

Q: I suppose the Puerto Rican resolution came up.

MAYNES: Yes.

Q: Did we just sort of have a Puerto Rican desk person?

MAYNES: Well, I was the Puerto Rican desk officer. I'm glad you brought that up. It was during that period that for the first time all three groups in Puerto Rico resolved to work together to have Puerto Rico established as a colonial holding by the United States, as accepted by the UN. And of course, the White House was vehemently opposed to that, and we made some changes in our policy while I was there. The United States had never, since Eisenhower, reiterated to the Puerto Rican people that the choice was theirs, and any effort to raise that in the Department of State encountered immediate hostility, because in fact, we were treating them like a colony - within the Department, I mean, not publicly - but then you could not get a reiteration of Eisenhower's pledge or 1958, I think, that the choice was up to the Puerto Ricans. No, what if they make the wrong choice? So after a great deal of bureaucratic struggle, we got a statement to go out with our ambassadors going and saying that it was the Puerto Ricans' choice, which is now the US position.

Incidentally, when we did that, we got a remarkable reaction from, I think it was, Colombia. It might have been Venezuela, but I think it was Colombia. The foreign minister said, "Well, that's wonderful that you've made this statement, but tell me, what are you going to do if Puerto Rico makes the wrong choice?" And the ambassador said, "Do you mean independence?" He said, "No, I mean statehood." He said, "All of Latin America would never accept it. This would be a totally unacceptable option to every state in Latin America." And I thought about that statement for a while, and I realized what it is, and it relates to the subject you and I were discussing before about places like Bosnia and others. The reason that the Latins take that position is that Puerto Rico is part of the Hispanic world and cannot be severed from it - from their standpoint - just as Quebec sees itself as part of the French-speaking world, and if Canadian policy doesn't keep it in the French-speaking part of the world, they are opposed to it. The majority of Canadian people may feel otherwise, but it's that kind of position. And it's held very strongly in Latin America because after the Spanish were thrown out of Latin America, the sort of cultural, governmental, intellectual elite of Latin America all migrated to Cuba and Puerto Rico, so you sort of got a supercharged essence of Hispanic character in these two islands, and they're seen in a special way by the other Latins. And the idea that one of

them would not just be owned by the United States but would *disappear* inside the United States is an anathema, culturally.

Q: That's fascinating.

MAYNES: It was fascinating to me, and I didn't expect it.

Q: Also I would imagine that in a way, if it served as a designated target or something, they could say that the United States is keeping this place.

MAYNES: Yes, there were a lot of games played, but there are also some important issues here, and they're fascinating ones because it's possible at some point that from the standpoint of the Latins the Puerto Ricans would make, quote, the wrong choice. And then what would we do? We'd presumably make them a state, but then we'd have an issue, you know, sort of on the agenda for the next . . .

Q: Yes. Well, let's move to the election of 1980. Carter lost.

MAYNES: I left in April of 1980. I resigned.

Q: What was your feeling about. . . . Reagan hadn't been elected, but did you see this in the offing?

MAYNES: Well, I'll tell you what I told Vance.

Q: Was it Vance at that time?

MAYNES: He was still Secretary, and I actually submitted my resignation in February and agreed to stay through the budget presentation, and then I formally left the Department the day of the raid on Iran. And I told Vance at the time when I went up and asked for permission to leave because we'd all signed statements saying that we would stay four years. That was in response to a criticism of the Kissinger period, where there was just a merry-go-round of appointments in the Department of State, and very few people were lasting in jobs more than a year, and you'd barely learn your job and go off to another one-

Q: A Kissingerian strategy.

MAYNES: -or be fired. So when Vance took over he made a statement that we were all going to pledge to stay four years. So I went to him and said, "I will stay four years if you ask me to, but honestly, the way this administration is headed, there isn't really a role for me in it. Most of the things that I care about, they have decided they are not going to do anything about, not only this year but if they're elected, it's pretty clear they're not going to do anything about them for the next four years. And there's a conservative wave in the country, and I would be much better off running a magazine, where I'd have my own little

pea-shooter, than I would being inside the Department, basically shut down on issues that were of interest to me." When I first said I was going to resign, he said, "You can't do that, I need you." When I finished saying that, he smiled, and he said, "Well, you have to make your own decision."

Q: He was getting ready himself.

MAYNES: Well, he wasn't, but I got an aspect of that, too. So then he said that he wanted to have a farewell party for me, and so I was negotiating with his office as to when this party was going to take place, and so I get a call saying that he wants to have it - I've forgotten - whatever the day was that the raid took place on Iran. And so I said yes, and that Friday morning I got up to get the newspaper, 6:30 in the morning, got up, the headline is, "Eight Dead Americans in Iran." So I walked right into the house, called up the Operations Center, and said, "Please tell the Secretary that I understand why the Luncheon has to be canceled, and I wish him well." And they said, "Oh, he's already called in. He wants this luncheon to take place." I said, "Really?" So I go to the luncheon, and Vance shows up, and he has all the assistant secretaries there - Christopher, I mean the leadership of the Department. And he spends all of his time saying wonderful, nice, excessive things about me. He's also in terrible pain because he's got an attack of gout. And it was only two days later that I realized that this was his resignation lunch. He had told the President that he would resign after the raid. The raid took place. He'd resigned. But he hadn't told me. And so I see it as kind of the quintessence of sort of establishment class. He was probably our last Secretary of what you and I knew as the Eastern Establishment.

Q: Yes, he went to the same prep school I did.

MAYNES: Which is that, by the way?

Q: Kent. He was some years ahead of me, but anyway.

MAYNES: Okay, but he's the last of that. Certainly Madeleine isn't, and Baker wasn't, but he was. And I look back on that, and I think there are very few men who wouldn't have - even if they hadn't started off to do it - in the middle of the luncheon blurted it out, or turned it to himself. I mean, even if he didn't reveal he'd resigned, started talking basically about himself. Instead, the whole thing is organized around me, when the more important, far more important, man in the room has resigned, too. I was an admirer before, but since that-

Q: I know, that's class.

MAYNES: That is class.

Q: You mentioned that you saw the Administration, even if reelected, dropping some things. What were the basic issues that you saw them not pursuing?

MAYNES: Well, I thought they were going to have a much harsher position on UN issues, on all aspects. . . . Basically, geopolitics were taking over the Administration - the East-West struggle. Brzezinski had fundamentally won the argument. I was operating in a world where you had to establish reasonable relations with people from developing countries, and after the Iran Hostage Crisis, anybody - this is an exaggeration, but - who didn't have a white skin was seen as on the other side. I mean, not *literally*, but there was a tremendous chilling - let's put it this way-

Q: It was us and them.

MAYNES: Us and them. And not just us in the north against them in the south - us in the United States against the rest of the world, you know, which prepared the way for Reagan because America alone and defiant was the mood, and no predisposition to fight that attitude, rather a survival strategy of "how do we get in the raft and make it down the river?" And I just couldn't see that I could accomplish very much there. We were basically giving in to the right wing on arms control and development, and on every issue which you could think of the trimming was one-way. What role would there be for me in that? You know, I am center-left, not center-right. This wasn't center right; this was right-wing. Basically, you saw premonitions of what has since become Clinton's strategy of triangularization, trying to get over with the winners. And so what role would I have?

Q: Well, then, I'd like to talk a little about when you left, because you were still very much part of the foreign policy establishment outside the government.

MAYNES: As a matter of fact, I probably became more of one after that position than before.

Q: I wonder if you could talk about what you were doing and how you see the role during this period - you might mention what you were doing - and see the role of these organizations on American foreign policy.

MAYNES: Well, it's going to take, I think, longer than the time we have.

Q: Well, we can do another one.

MAYNES: Yes, but I'm going to have to finish in a few minutes. But I think let me just say this - that the role of the think tank here in this society is one primarily of agenda-setting and legitimization, not determination of policy, and from the position of editor of foreign policy or from the position of head of the foreign policy section of Brookings or any of these jobs like that, at least as I see it, the main thing that you can do is help establish - along with other, obviously, not alone - the parameters of the debate. We don't determine the debate, but we do establish that certain issues belong on the agenda. You force people to address them. And that is both a more important and a less significant role. More important because I think it does have real impact over time. Less significant

because if you're someone who demands immediate gratification, you cannot pretend that you're in charge of Africa policy or whatever that might be, but what you can do is greatly circumscribe the amount of space that the person who runs that policy will actually have to walk around in. And that's the reason that administrations and foreign governments ought to pay more attention to what these folks are doing. There's no question that the Heritage Foundation has changed the parameters.

Q: This is a conservative think tank.

MAYNES: They have changed the parameters of the debate on a number of issues, from our position towards international organizations to the welfare question. But they're answers weren't always accepted. We haven't left the UN, but we have greatly changed our position toward it. We haven't thrown every welfare recipient immediately on the street, but we have taken a much tougher line towards it. And you know, every think tank has its areas where it has had some impact, managed to put issues on the agenda that weren't there before. The answers they get aren't always the ones they hope for, but the fact is that that is the main role that they would have. Now I think I would characterize what I was doing at Foreign Policy as defending a concept of foreign policy that I still think belongs at the core of our foreign policy. I think it accords more with the inclinations of our people but was not all that popular with the Washington elite in recent years, and that is a continuation of the liberal internationalist foreign policy that has fundamentally guided us since '45 but is under attack. And so I was trying to defend that concept, but I also was trying to maintain a journal in which left-right would talk about it. I wanted people on the right to mediate and to write in it too, even though the bulk of the articles would be progressive center-left. But I also published a number of conservatives as well, because I think they were keeping the dialogue open among the elite, which paradoxically, as the stakes have gotten less, the animosity seems to have increased.

Q: Sounds like academia.

MAYNES: Well, that's right. It's Kissinger's definition of academia, the arguments are so fierce because the stakes are so small. It's true that in the early '50's we had comments about people on the right and the left that were as extreme as they are now. We were talking about people being "traitors," you know. But then we went through a long period when we didn't use that kind of language. Now we're back again, or close to it, with character... Unless you follow the public line on, say, Kosovo, you're in favor of genocide. So the margin for discourse has gotten smaller.

Q: Do you think, Bill, that we could leave it at that?

MAYNES: Okay.

End of interview