

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

DANIEL OLIVER NEWBERRY

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
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INTERVIEW

[This interview was not completed due to the death of Mr. Newberry.]

Q: This is an interview with Daniel O. Newberry. It is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. Dan and I are old friends. This is the second interview that is being done with Dan. The first interview was one of our early efforts and was rather short, so we're going to do a more thorough interview this time.

Dan, could we start off by giving me when and where you were born and something about your parents and your family.

NEWBERRY: That's very kind of you. Everybody likes to talk about himself and his family. I was born in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1922. I was one of four sons eventually born to my mother and father who, shall we say, had been Southerners for from four to six generations on both sides of my family, going back to colonial times.

I grew up in Atlanta, Georgia, went through college at Emory University, and never left my birth place until I went into the U.S. Army in 1943.

Q: Let's go back a bit. What did your father do?

NEWBERRY: My father was a CPA, a certified public accountant.

Q: What was your mother's occupation?

NEWBERRY: She had her hands full, raising four little boys.

Q: Can you talk about your school experience? Where did you go to grammar school?

NEWBERRY: Without going into my family's history, I might say that I went to several grammar schools. We moved around in the Atlanta area several times, so I went to two or three elementary schools. I went all the way through the same junior and senior high school in Atlanta. So it was just the first part, the elementary part, of my schooling which involved some change, all in the Atlanta area.

Q: What about Atlanta and the South as they were in the period prior to World War II? What do you recall from this experience? In those days the South was really a distinctive section of the country. The South no longer is so distinctive today.

NEWBERRY: No, Atlanta has been transformed, in some ways in a splendid way and in some ways it has involved all of the "blight" of big, urban sprawl. Atlanta was quite a different place when I was growing up there in the 1930s. Those were my chief memories of my early childhood. I don't remember much about the 1920s, because I was too young then.

You were asking about the South and the "Southernness" of it. During my early years Atlanta was indeed very Southern. One of my chief recollections and, in some ways, one

of my regrets, is that I was so saturated with the history of the Civil War and the "glorious Confederate dead" that, when I left home, I said to myself that I was never going to read another book about the Civil War!

Since you've asked me and given me time before the microphone, I would like to mention my junior high school. It was called Hoake Smith Junior High School. Mr. Hoake Smith was prominent as a Senator or Member of Congress, I don't remember which. Our Junior High School happened to be the closest school to the Confederate Memorial Cemetery. Every year, for three years running, we were all transported out on school buses to the Confederate Cemetery. We listened to oratory like that on the Fourth of July elsewhere in the United States. Except that July 4 is or was considered a "Yankee" holiday down there.

Confederate Memorial Day [on April 25 each year] was the time when all of us would go to the Confederate Cemetery. My chief memory of that time was an awareness, after going to one of these events, that there were a lot of veterans still living who had fought in the Civil War. A lot of them were brought to the cemetery in wheelchairs, while others walked with canes. Many of them had long, white hair. I remember saying to my little brother: "No wonder we lost the war! There was just a bunch of old men on our side!"

I tell that story because it brought home to me how much we were absorbed in the Confederate cause, which we considered "our" cause when we were children.

Q: What was the impression that you received as a young boy about Franklin Delano Roosevelt, because this was the time when he was President?

NEWBERRY: I remember very vividly that my father was not an admirer of Franklin D. Roosevelt. He was very conservative, politically. He was an adept or follower of the great Georgia agrarian politician, Tom Watson. Watson's statue was on the grounds of the State Capitol in Atlanta. So that was where my father's politics came from. However, other members of my family and some of our neighbors attended political rallies in honor of "Governor Roosevelt," as they called him during the 1932 campaign, when he came to Atlanta. All of us kids, and many of the grownups, went out to see him, because everybody said that he was going to be the next President. Everyone expected that to happen, even those who didn't want him to be President. In Atlanta, GA, in 1932, we knew that we were looking at the next President of the United States.

Q: Was there any particular regard for Roosevelt because of his identification with Warm Springs, GA? [Warm Springs had a naturally heated pool for the treatment of people who suffered from what was then called "infantile paralysis" or poliomyelitis.]

NEWBERRY: We were all pretty much aware of the fact that he often came to Warm Springs and to Georgia when he was President. However, this Presidential election campaign all happened when I was 10 years old, so I don't have much of a memory of it. My recollection of it came from listening to the radio when he was nominated as Democratic candidate for President. I was that much interested in it, even at age 10.

Our reaction, that in my family circle, and among the people that we talked to was not so much that Roosevelt was an "honorary Georgian." At the time the country was desperately in need of something. We were going through the depths of the Depression, and people felt that we could not go on indefinitely with Herbert Hoover as President. Even children understood that the Depression had to be dealt with.

Q: How about race relations from your perspective as a young boy at that time?

NEWBERRY: I have to respond to that with a heavy heart because, like all "proper," well-mannered Southern children, we were taught to address all grown black men as "Uncle" and black women as "Auntie." I thought, until I was already out of high school, that I was paying respect to them in this way. More generally, we called Blacks "Negroes" in those days, unless we were one of those Neanderthals who had worse names for them. Then, one day, to get the attention of a young Negro man, I addressed him as "Uncle." He said: "I'm not your uncle. I'm no relation to you." That was a revelation to me that Black people, Negroes, African Americans, or whatever you want to call them, did not like to have little white children call them "Uncle" and "Auntie." I tell you this as a vignette of how little we understood what the Black people were thinking about.

Q: While you were in high school, did you develop any interest in the world beyond the United States?

NEWBERRY: To the extent that any reasonably stimulated, alert student had such an interest, we had an established curriculum. I studied history, geography, and all of those things. I was very much interested in journalism. I thought that I would pursue a career in journalism. So maybe, when I was a high school kid, I read more about the world than my classmates did, simply because I was very much aware of what was being carried in the newspapers. I imagined myself, some day, writing articles for the newspapers.

Q: How about diplomacy and the Foreign Service? Did you have any knowledge of that?

NEWBERRY: No. However, I have to tell you, since you mentioned diplomacy, that one of my forebears, and I think that it was my great grandfather's first cousin, was a "political appointee" of a South Carolina politician. My forebear was named Francis Pickens. He was sent to St. Petersburg as United States Minister to Russia. Apparently, through Picken's third wife, who was much younger than her husband, he was on very good terms with the Czar of Russia. When their next baby was born, the Czar was godfather to this South Carolina baby, who was born in St. Petersburg. I remember hearing of this very dimly. I never made any particular point of it. It is interesting to note the family connection, although it had no influence on my view of the world. I don't think that any member of my family ever met Minister Pickens. This was the only link that my family had with diplomacy.

Q: So you graduated from high school in 1940?

NEWBERRY: I'm sorry to say that I graduated from high school far earlier than I should have. I graduated in 1938 at age 16. I'm sorry about this. I think that everybody concerned with my early graduation used very bad judgment in letting me move ahead in school that fast. I think that children should stick to their own age group. At least, that is my own, personal view.

Q: So where did you go then?

NEWBERRY: I went to Emory University.

Q: Which is in Atlanta.

NEWBERRY: Yes. I used to take the streetcar to go to class. That was during the Depression, and I really didn't have the alternative of going away to college, although I did win a scholarship when I graduated from high school. However, in view of the conditions of the scholarship, my father said: "That's hardly enough money to pay the train fare back and forth!" So I never really considered going away to college.

Q: What courses did you take? Were you still thinking of being a journalist, or what were you studying in college?

NEWBERRY: First of all, I had to work my way through college. I had to earn enough money to pay my tuition. So a lot of my college curriculum depended on when the courses were being offered and how to fit them into getting downtown and doing my "moonlighting" job. Fortunately, Emory University, even in the 1930s, was very insistent on a broad, liberal education. Every undergraduate freshman and sophomore had to take social studies, "hard" sciences, and philosophy.

So it was a great and wonderful way to study, especially for a young kid like me who didn't know what he was going to concentrate on. I was really interested in almost everything, and they offered a lot of everything. It was only in my third year at Emory University, and for very practical reasons, that I opted to study chemistry. So I studied organic chemistry.

Q: You said that you were "moonlighting." What were you "moonlighting" at?

NEWBERRY: During my freshman year there were jobs available under what was called the National Youth Administration. People in my circumstances were offered jobs, usually on campus, so that they could make enough money to pay their tuition. However, you had to put in about 20 hours or more per week. That's what I did during my first year. Then I stumbled onto a job with the Rekordak Corporation, a microfilm subsidiary of the Eastman Kodak Corporation. So during the next three years, usually on my bicycle, I rode into downtown Atlanta and put in my seven-hour day, processing tanks of Rekordak film. I'm not telling this because I'm trying to "brag" about myself. I don't recommend doing this to anybody. It was a very strenuous job. The biggest cost to me is that I didn't have many friends at college. It's a tough way to go to college.

Q: It's a very lonely way to go through college. However, the Depression was probably the biggest influence on young people, certainly for several generations, much more than wars and everything else.

Regarding organic chemistry, what did you think that you were going to do after you graduated from Emory College?

NEWBERRY: I didn't really know. At a certain point at Emory University, usually at some point during your sophomore year, you had to choose a major course of study. I didn't know what I wanted to do, so I began asking older people for their views. This is beginning to sound like President Jimmy Carter and his question: "Why not the best?" I asked people what department at Emory University had the best reputation. Everybody said: "Chemistry." I said to myself: "Since you don't know, you might as well sign up for the department that has the best reputation." So that's what I did. However, I never worked in the field of chemistry.

Q: You were at Emory University in 1941, when the United States entered the war.

NEWBERRY: Yes. I tried to get into things like the Navy's V-7 [officers' training] program. In fact, at one point I had won an appointment to the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis. However, they wouldn't let me into any of those things because my eyesight was not strong enough, as was then required. Even to this date, when I see a naval officer or someone in the Navy, wearing glasses, I say to myself: "It's not fair! They wouldn't let me into the Navy!"

Q: I remember that, during the early 1940s, I lived in Annapolis, Maryland, and my father was a naval officer. I also had "weak" eyes. Eyesight was the determining factor as to who was and who was not eligible to be a naval officer.

NEWBERRY: Well, in response to your earlier question, Stu, this was 1941 and we were all "gripped by the war." However, because of my defective eyesight, I couldn't get into any of these military services. So I continued my program at Emory University. Finally, at the beginning of 1943, I received one of these notices from my Draft Board. I decided that I wasn't going to try to avoid military service. I felt that if they wanted me now, I was going to serve. So I entered the service just before the beginning of my last semester at Emory.

Well, there were a lot of guys in my position. It was an all men's school, and that's why I used the word, "guys." A lot of us were in the same situation, so the powers that be at Emory decided that anybody at Emory University who was drafted during his last semester would receive his degree anyway. So I got my bachelor's degree from Emory University "shy" one semester's credit. However, they gave me a degree, anyway.

Q: What was your military experience?

NEWBERRY: I'm ready for that question because those of us who had anything to do with the military services know how "haphazard" these things can be.

Let me hark back for a moment. When I reported to the proper place at Ft. McPherson, outside of Atlanta, GA, I took a streetcar. The Sergeant who interviewed me looked at my CV [Curriculum Vitae] which I had filled out, although they didn't call it that in those days. He said: "'Rekordak.' What is that?" I said: "It's the microfilm subsidiary of the Eastman Kodak Corporation." He said: "Fine, you're a skilled photographer," and he put me down as that. Just like that! A skilled photographer. So, as of that moment, as far as the United States Army was concerned, I was a skilled photographer.

Q: But essentially you had been processing film.

NEWBERRY: Yes. This was a process of continuously stripping film, running it through tanks, and mixing chemicals. I had nothing to do with taking pictures. I was just developing the film. Anyway, that is an example of the "haphazard" part of Army service.

However, as I was listed with this "Military Occupation Specialty"...

Q: MOS.

NEWBERRY: I put this altogether afterwards. But with a bunch of other guys who were brought into the Army at the Atlanta Induction Center, we were picked and "packed together" and put on a train going up to Fort Custer, Michigan. We only found out on the train that we were going to something called a "Prisoner of War Processing Company." As events slowly unfolded, and I really have a point in going through all of this, our "mission," once we got through basic training, was to go overseas and do all of this bureaucratic work of getting information out of German and Italian Prisoners of War, in addition to providing the proper information to the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC]. You would think that, for a skilled photographer, this would provide him with something to do.

However, what the Army assigned me to do, under the Table of Organization, was to run all of these ID [Identification Card] cameras and always with the same focus. All we had to do was to put up names on these "mug shots" of the POWs. That was the exacting demand put by the U.S. Army on this "skilled photographer."

This really is leading to a point, because indirectly it led me to thinking about the Foreign Service. As it happened, in the same year [1943] we were supposed to be prepared to deal with Italian or German prisoners of war. We had Italian-Americans in our unit who spoke fluent Italian.

We also had Germans, mostly Jewish young men who somehow had been spirited out or had escaped from Germany. They came over to the United States, just when they were of draft age. They were inducted into the American Army. These guys were in the barracks with me. I heard them all speaking German, and I decided that this was my opportunity. I

had studied German for one year at Emory University, because in those days an organic chemistry student had to know enough German to look up the references in a book.

Q: Yes, he would have to be able to do that.

NEWBERRY: So that was the beginning of my developing some fluency in German. Again, in the United States Army they had a little "squeeze" [a reclassification] just before we went to the Port of Embarkation [POE]. They were filling out the TOE [Table of Organization and Equipment]. They needed to have another interpreter. So they just arbitrarily informed me: "Newberry, you're now an interpreter."

Q: Oh, yes.

NEWBERRY: That's the way, or used to be the way, that things were done in the Army. I hope that it's better organized now, although I really don't know how it is done. I had a particular story to tell you...

Q: No, I'd like to "capture" your military experience, because I think that it's very important for anyone to understand who these people are who have played a role in the formulation and implementation of American foreign policy. How did this work out? Where did you go overseas, and what were you doing?

NEWBERRY: We had several "false starts." This is interesting in terms of the way the war unfolded. We went through basic training and then were waiting for the call to go to our Port of Embarkation. Suddenly, the bulk of the German Afrika Korps collapsed in North Africa [in May, 1943], and shiploads of German POWs were being sent to the United States from Tunisia and other places where they had surrendered or been captured. So we had to deal with them, get them distributed, and quickly organize POW camps in the United States. We did that for several months before we could even think about going overseas.

Q: How did it work for you as an interpreter? Were you interpreting at that point?

NEWBERRY: Actually, I was "translating," because that's what I was doing with the POWs who came in my "queue" [waiting line], as in a visa office. I had several questions that I could ask these German POWs. By then I knew enough German to understand their answers to questions such as: "Where were you captured? Who captured you?" Then there were the standard questions such as: "Who is your next of kin?" and so on. It was a pretty standard series of questions.

We had been briefed enough to know that there were certain kinds of prisoners whom we should turn over to S-2 or G-2 [basic unit or higher unit intelligence entity]. Presumably, these prisoners had been "screened" on the battlefield. However, some of them were still of intelligence interest, and we would alert other people to deal with them. We were not ourselves intelligence personnel. Actually, we served under the Corps of Military Police.

Unfortunately, most of us were ashamed that we had to wear the "crossed pistols" [insignia of the Military Police] on our uniforms. Everybody thought that we were MPs. We weren't, in fact.

Q: When did you go overseas?

NEWBERRY: We went overseas in April, 1944. The Army was still setting up various POW enclosures in places in England, in anticipation of the invasion of Normandy. So we spent a lot of time moving around England in April-June, 1944. Eventually, we went across to France on something like D+15, early in July, 1944, I guess.

Q: What were you doing there? The same thing?

NEWBERRY: We spent an awful lot of time in a kind of "holding pattern" because we didn't have any prisoners of war to process, of course, until after we arrived in France after D-Day [June 6, 1944]. We were limited to working with the local British Military Police, who had control of prisoners of war. The British Military Police tended to assign us to preparations to set up enclosures for POWs who would be captured by the American Army. It was going to be our responsibility to put these German POWs into these enclosures, then get them out, and, presumably, moved to the United States. However, this latter duty was not part of our mission. We were simply organizing to receive German POWs and "disposing of them," that is, moving them on.

In fact, the American Army started sending German POWs over to England before we crossed the English Channel on our way to France. So we were slightly delayed in setting up POW enclosures in France.

Q: How did the war progress for you, after you crossed over to France?

NEWBERRY: It was really not as dramatic as it may sound. It may sound rather "thrilling" in retrospect, but my unit was on the first plane to land at the airstrip in Cherbourg which had been reconditioned following the invasion and the subsequent capture of Cherbourg. By that time the "front" had already moved perhaps 30 or 40 miles South of Cherbourg, so we were not in any particular danger. However, we were required to dig "foxholes" [individual trenches]. This gave me my first experience of sleeping in a foxhole. I missed out on the only air raid that I ever went through, because I was asleep in the foxhole and couldn't hear what was going on. So that was the only kind of real war experience that I ever had.

We were never actually in the combat zone. We were in what they called an "advance sector" or "adsec," as the Army called it. We were never in the front line, except that during the "Battle of the Bulge" [December, 1944, to January, 1945] the front line came fairly close to where we were bivouacked. We didn't know quite how close we were to the front line. We weren't supposed to be in the actual combat zone.

Q: What happened when German resistance collapsed at the end of April, 1945?

NEWBERRY: In terms of our own experience, the most immediate consequence was that, when the Wehrmacht [German Army] collapsed, there were still pockets of resistance in Western France, such as St. Nazaire, Lorient, and Brest, where German submarine pens were located. We had to go and process all of those people after the surrender. They had been "holed up" in those positions for some months. We had to "dispose of them," too.

Then, at that point, the Army began breaking up our unit. I was assigned to another unit in Brussels, working on "redeployment." Then, at a sort of "magical moment," after V-E Day [May 7, 1945] I was assigned to a much more interesting job in a Military Government unit in Bavaria. At this point we're getting away from the story of my Prisoner of War unit, which I want to return to, because there is one particular incident that I wish to discuss. My last six months in the Army, up to late 1945 or early 1946, was in a specialized unit.

We were supposed to find "non-Nazi" German newspapermen to get "democratic" newspapers started up. They were not very easy to find, because of the nature of the Nazi regime. Anybody who wanted to get a job on a newspaper had to belong to the "Deutsche Presse Kammer," a subsidiary organization of the Nazi Party. So anybody who had a "Presse Kammer" card was automatically ineligible to be the editor of a newspaper, because he was considered a former Nazi. This was sort of a "Catch 22" situation, but eventually we found some newspapermen. Some of the newspapers that we worked with, such as the "Neue Deutsche Zeitung," the "Regensberger Neue Presse," and so forth.

Anyway, there were three or four papers for which I helped to find working journalists and which were still being published at the end of the war. They are still being published some 40 years later. I am proud of my "tiny" role in getting a democratic press started in Germany, back in 1945 and 1946. A very minor role, I must say. Remember, at that time I was a Sergeant, so I didn't have much authority.

Q: You mentioned that there was something which you wanted to mention, when you were with the Prisoner of War Processing Group.

NEWBERRY: In a certain sense, it's a little repetitious, because a little vignette from this experience appeared in a magazine article on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, which appeared in the fall of 1995. There were lots of little "memoirs," including comments by Foreign Service officers, in that article. Unfortunately, my contribution to this article was considerably reduced in length when it was published. The proper citation for this article, I think, is the September, 1995, issue of the "Foreign Service Journal." Everything in this issue looked back on the events of World War II.

However, what I am about to mention was even more limited than that. As I mentioned, we started to get German POWs in England in 1944 before we crossed the English Channel into France. The very first batch of German POWs assigned to us just appeared

in the middle of the night and without any warning.

We were billeted in a disused cotton mill somewhere in Lancashire. It was a "wretched" place if there ever was one, in terms of the physical facilities. I say "disused." It had not been abandoned. During World War II the British used every available space, so this facility was not "abandoned." It was simply a "disused" cotton mill.

For some reason or another some of our officers, including my own platoon commander, was away, maybe on leave, or something like that. All of a sudden we received a trainload of what we were told were "prisoners of war." However, they were not really "prisoners of war." They were "slave laborers" who had been liberated from Nazi control. These were people who had been sent out to Western France to build the so-called "Atlantic Wall" fortifications on the Atlantic coast of France. As it turned out, they included Russians and people from Central Asia from all sorts and conditions of wretched humanity who had been piled into railroad boxcars and sent to build the Atlantic Wall in France.

It turned out that they were the first people to come to us for processing. We didn't have a commissioned officer around. So as the senior non-commissioned officer, I looked out at this "sea" of people in front of me. They had been trained by the Germans to march in formations 24 people abreast. They came into this huge, empty space in the disused cotton mill to which we had been assigned.

Nobody was in charge of them. I mention this to give you a sense of the trauma involved. I was wondering what in the world we were going to do with them. Something told me to get out there in the middle of the room and shout: "Abteilung, Halt!" [Detachment, halt!]. They understood this much German and they all stopped. Then I gave the command "At ease" in German. When we finished counting them, we wondered what we were going to do with these people.

However, we found among these people a Russian, a Captain in the Red Army, who could speak German. We organized a "relay" of interpreters. I spoke German to this Russian officer. This Captain would speak in Russian to various people in this group, which included Tatars, Uzbeks, and people from Soviet Georgia. We had to go through a questionnaire prepared by the ICRC, the International Committee of the Red Cross [in Switzerland]. I reached the point where I could hear the questions moving along this "relay" from one language to another, even though I didn't understand the languages involved. Then, I had to wait for this "relay" until I could hear the answer in German. After this I would then type the answer in English on the ICRC form.

Of course, I had never seen people that even remotely looked like these people out of Central Asia. I'll mention two of them in particular. This was when my mind "opened up" to the possibility of making a career out of dealing with people whose background was different from mine. This was a cloud no bigger than my finger, but I think that, after this experience, I became aware of an interest in making a career outside of the United States.

I would like to mention two particular episodes in this chain of "relays." One episode, and I described it in this little article in the "Foreign Service Journal," involved a very young-looking prisoner or, perhaps more properly, a liberated slave laborer. In this "relay" of questions I found that this boy was 17 years old. He was a shepherd from the northwestern part of Uzbekistan. More precisely, he was from the "Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan." He had been taking care of a herd of his uncle's Karakul sheep up in the northwestern part of Uzbekistan.

One day he had the bad luck to walk down to the local village on a trip he made semi-annually into the village to buy supplies. After buying the supplies he intended to return to his herd. It turned out that a Red Army conscription team was in the town on the day when he had the misfortune to go into it to buy supplies. Of course, they conscripted him into the Red Army. They put him on a train and sent him to the front, with no training. He was almost immediately captured by the Germans and sent out to work on the construction of the Atlantic Wall in France. I figured that from the time he turned his sheep over to his uncle to go into town, until I was sitting there, asking him these questions, a total of six weeks had elapsed!

Even today I try to imagine what was in that poor boy's mind. In six weeks he went through this experience, ending up talking to Americans in this funny ex-cotton mill in Lancashire! You can imagine what this did to my imagination.

A word about the physical setting for this contact with the slave laborers. There were several "aisles," because those of my colleagues who spoke German were doing the same sort of thing. Our company clerk, who really didn't know much German, was curious about this process. He came up to me and said: "Sergeant Newberry, do you see that man over there in the corner?" The man had a bandanna tied up around his head. He looked swarthy and appeared to be something like a gypsy fortune-teller. The company clerk, who was an American Jew from the Bronx [borough of New York], said: "Newberry, I think that that man is a Jew." I said: "No way! How could a Jew survive all of this?"

We arranged to have this man taken aside and decided to pursue this matter. When we had caught up with our other work, a couple of us took him to the side of the office. My friend, the company clerk, came out with a question in Yiddish: "Are you a Jew?" The man looked startled. You could tell, from his manner, that he had some sense of what was being asked, because this was something that Oriental Jews had probably heard. After patient questioning we found out that he was indeed a Jewish silversmith from Tbilisi [also known as Tiflis]. He had been caught up in all of this, and his fellow Georgians never let on to the Germans that they had a Jew in that group. This was one of the most marvelous stories I can recall!

Anyway, those are two incidents that stand out in my mind from that middle of the night experience in the cotton mill in Lancashire. This experience opened my mind, and I realize now, in retrospect, that that's what got me to thinking about the Foreign Service.

Q: I think that, for so many of us, the military experience of our generation was often the

catalyst that led us into deciding to enter the Foreign Service.

NEWBERRY: Stu, I have another comment, though it is not directly related to what I have just mentioned. This was another one of those "incidental" benefits of being in a military unit that did not have to spend all of its time trying to stay alive and keeping body and soul together.

A lot of the time I spent in my unit was the classical, military practice of "hurry up and wait." However, this is one of the things that I wish that somebody would look into. This is sort of an intellectual "GI Bill" [U.S. government benefits for veterans of World War II military service] in advance. During World War II there was the USO [United Services Organization]. The USO people, in collaboration with experts, set up a shelf list of titles of good books for soldiers, sailors, and airmen to read. Every military unit was supposed to have a complete collection of these paperback books.

Q: They were small and long.

NEWBERRY: Yes. They were all the same, standard size. I remember that in my unit we had a guy who could make anything. He made a special case for these books so that we could bring them along with us. We brought the books with us. In our collection I think that there were about 200 books. I think that I read every one of them. I've often thought of the many guys in my circumstances who had considerable, intellectual curiosity. However, if we hadn't had those books, we would have been bored to death. I will pay tribute to the opportunity that those books gave me. When I took the Foreign Service exam, in the section on general information, I even startled myself at the high grade that I received. I attribute this to the fact that I had the opportunity, as a soldier, to read about everything in this collection of books. That was one of the curious, unintended benefits of being in an essentially "non-combat" unit, with time on my hands but with books to read.

Q: This is one of the things about military service. I discovered, when I was in the Army, that I read a lot of things which I never would have read if I'd had a more complete selection of books. However, we had only a limited selection of reading material, so we were reading much better than we would have done if we had been allowed to read books that are the equivalent of "chewing gum for the mind."

NEWBERRY: Or the equivalent of airport, "newsstand" books.

Q: Yes. Well, then, you mentioned that in 1946 you were discharged from the Army.

NEWBERRY: Yes. I was "re-deployed," which was the word used, back to the U.S. on a troopship. As soon as I got back to the U.S., in this case to Fort Dix, New Jersey, I was discharged from the service.

Q: So this was in 1946. What happened then?

NEWBERRY: I had a perhaps naive notion that I knew that I had a somewhat "discounted" degree from Emory University. I had a bachelor's degree but I hadn't had a

full, four years of academic credits. So I used my time under the GI Bill to go back to college and take some courses at the undergraduate level, just so that I could face the world and say: "Yes, I have an undergraduate degree from Emory University and I have all of the credits that go with it." This was really a period when I was deciding what to do.

Q: What were you "kicking around" in your mind while you were deciding this?

NEWBERRY: I knew that I wanted to see more of the world. I didn't quite know how to go about doing this. There were all sorts of circumstances that applied to this process. I didn't have many adult "mentors" [persons from whom to seek advice]. I won't go into that in detail but I was sort of groping.

One day I happened to meet a man who had been about two or three years ahead of me at Emory University. He had just passed the Foreign Service exam. He explained how difficult he thought it had been. On an impulse I said: "I'll bet I can pass it!" He told me how to write off and get a copy of a sample Foreign Service examination and so forth. When I received a copy of the sample examination and saw what the exam was about, I realized that passing this exam was not going to be a "breeze."

Either somebody had told me or I realized this from the literature I had on hand that to pass the exam, there was no escaping having a good background in American history. Simply speaking, the exam was designed in such a way that you could not "sneak past" American history. So during the next several months I must have read at least 20 or so books on American history. First of all, it was a matter of pride. I wanted to pass the Foreign Service exam. Also, I became interested in what I was reading. In the end, the answer obviously is that I succeeded in passing this exam.

I took the Foreign Service exam in 1947 and passed it. The examination may be even worse now, but in 1947-1949 the Department of State was only appointing a couple of dozen new FSOs [Foreign Service officers] every year. So there was a big backlog of people who had passed the written and oral exam and were awaiting appointment. The personnel people in the State Department told me in 1948, when I passed the oral exam, that it was going to be a long wait before I could expect appointment as an FSO. They told me: "Mr. Newberry, congratulations on your having passed the written and oral exams. However, you'd better think about doing something else for a year or two because there are a lot of people in the queue ahead of you."

This was the one time when I had parlayed my education in chemistry into getting a job. I got a job as a "detail salesman" for E. R. Squibb, the pharmaceutical company. That's what I was doing when my invitation to join the Foreign Service finally came through.

Q: Could we talk a bit about what you can remember of the oral examination? Do you remember any questions or how it was conducted?

NEWBERRY: When you asked that question, it reminded me of... I don't know who it

was who said that there is nothing like being sentenced to execution to concentrate your mind. Naturally, I was very much concentrated on the prospect of appearing before an oral, examination panel. I have a fairly good memory of it, although it took place about 50 years ago, in 1948.

The oral panel consisted of a rather disparate group of people. I think that there were five members. Anybody who has done research on the history of the Foreign Service during this period will have run across the name of Joseph Green, a career Foreign Service officer. At the time of which I speak, he presided over all of the oral examination panels. Another member of my oral examination panel was a retired Westinghouse Corporation executive. There were also a couple of "public" members. Former Ambassador Jack Jernegan, whom I later worked for, was also on the panel. He was an old NEA [Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs] type. He was eventually ambassador to a North African country, perhaps Algeria, [and later to Israel].

I was much struck by how different their approaches to me were. I thought that the Chairman, Joseph Green, was very "difficult." For example, he said: "How is it that with all of the experience you had you only barely passed the German language examination?" I said: "I only had a year of formal, German language instruction in college. Most of my experience with German was sort of 'picked up.' I was satisfied with my grade." Then one of the other examiners picked up on this point and said: "Mr. Newberry, why is it that you don't have more of a 'Southern' accent?" That surprised me, but I dealt with that. They were very much interested in my Georgia accent, and very rightly so. I sense that what they were after was to make sure that this candidate, in this case me, really had his roots in the United States. That was the approach that they took, and it was not a bad one.

They asked me a number of questions. Since you give me the opportunity, I'll mention one of them. The examiners were all people who "kept up" with the news. There was one unusual episode in Georgia history. If you will think back, you may remember it. At one time we had three Governors of Georgia at the same time.

Q: Was this Eugene Talmadge and...

NEWBERRY: Talmadge and Carmichael, and I don't remember the name of the other Governor. However, it was a very complicated situation, and I explained it. They said: "Imagine that you're explaining this to a foreigner how this could happen." So I said that my family was on the Gene Talmadge side of the controversy and that I had followed all of this, although from some distance.

This situation involved three claimants to the office of Governor of Georgia. Gene Talmadge was a veteran politician in Georgia who had previously been elected Governor of the state. He was making a "comeback" at this time. Unbeknownst to the general public, even when he was running for reelection, he was suffering from cancer. His family knew that he was not going to live much longer. They hoped that he would last long enough to win the election and be inaugurated for another term as Governor. However, and for the first time in the history of Georgia, a candidate for Lieutenant

Governor was also on the ballot and was running for reelection. This man, who had been the first, elected Lieutenant Governor, was not from Talmadge's political party. The Talmadge supporters in the Georgia State Legislature had quietly arranged to have Herman Talmadge, Eugene Talmadge's son, nominated to run for the office of Lieutenant Governor. Therefore, if the election was close enough to be referred to the State House of Representatives, the Gene Talmadge supporters could pick Herman Talmadge and not Carmichael, the serving and other candidate for Lieutenant Governor. Normally, someone looking at this situation from the outside might assume that the elected Lieutenant Governor would succeed Governor Talmadge after he died.

Meanwhile, the third man in this controversy was the sitting Governor of Georgia, who refused to give up his office because no qualified successor had been elected to succeed him. The outcome of the election "hung fire" for two or three weeks. The outgoing Governor continued to sit in the Governor's office. I was able to explain this complicated situation to the Oral Board.

Q: So you took the oral exam in late 1948.

NEWBERRY: Yes.

Q: What did you do between the time you took the oral exam and you entered the Foreign Service?

NEWBERRY: I was working as a "detail" salesman for E. R. Squibb, the pharmaceuticals firm.

Q: What is a "detail" salesman?

NEWBERRY: It has a very specific meaning in the pharmaceuticals business. What a "detail" salesman does, or did in those days, and presumably still does, is to receive a briefing on new products. He becomes familiar with what they are for and how they can be used. Then he goes around and calls on physicians and medical people, hospital pharmacists, and what not. He tries to draw their attention to the new product. In my case, this was what I tried to do for new products being marketed by E. R. Squibb and Sons.

Then one day I got a message from the State Department. They offered me, not a commission as a Foreign Service officer, but as a Foreign Service Staff officer, with the understanding that I would later and more or less "automatically" convert to being a Foreign Service officer. The Department needed people but, for some reason, couldn't appoint them.

So I took a deep breath and said to myself that I had taken the Foreign Service exam, more or less on a "dare." If I didn't accept this offer, I would wonder all of my life whether I did the right thing or not. Even though the salary I was being offered as a Foreign Service Staff officer, or an FSS officer, compared to what I was receiving as a "detail salesman" for E. R. Squibb, involved a huge reduction in income, I decided that

this was the time to do it. I decided that if I turned down this offer from the Department and continued to work for E. R. Squibb, where I was doing very well, from the salary point of view, it would be a great mistake. I realized that this was the time to try out a diplomatic career in the Department of State, and I never looked back.

Q: So when did you actually enter the Foreign Service?

NEWBERRY: May 1, 1949.

Q: You entered the Foreign Service as a Foreign Service Staff officer. What were you going to do?

NEWBERRY: It actually turned out that I was appointed to be a Foreign Service "clerk," as an FSS-13 [specific grade under the Foreign Service Act of 1946]. I thought that I would be sent out to my post in this status. However, the Department caught up with me in about three months. They gave me a "double promotion" from FSS-13 to FSS-11. This only slightly discommoded me in terms of my salary. However, even with this "double promotion" my salary was still less than \$3,000 a year.

Q: When you entered the Foreign Service, did you have any choice as to where you would be sent or what you were going to do?

NEWBERRY: Stuart, to tell you the truth, I reported on the first working day in May, 1949. I've forgotten whether it was May 1 or 2. My time was initially spent in filling in forms and whatnot. I had been in the Department for two or three days, when I got a call to go and see such and such a person in Personnel.

This person turned out to be a lady, who said: "How would you like to go to Jerusalem?" I said: "Well, I understood that when you join the Foreign Service, you are supposed to go anywhere. If you want me to go to Jerusalem, that's fine. I'll go to Jerusalem." She said: "Fine. We want you to go to Jerusalem right away to replace a man who has just been shot!" So that's how I was assigned to my first post in the Foreign Service. Mercifully for my predecessor, he was medically evacuated and survived the gunshot wound.

So I didn't have any initial training course or any other preparation. When this woman from Personnel said: "We want you to go right away," I replied: "I don't even have a passport!" She said: "Oh, we'll take care of that." So I was just whisked out to Jerusalem without really knowing very much about the Foreign Service.

Q: Let's take this process step by step. How did you get to Jerusalem?

NEWBERRY: That was a drama in itself. Back in 1949, even as it is today, the State Department was very short of money. So the lady in the State Department Travel Office bought me an airline ticket to get me as far as Athens, Greece. That was as close as I was going to get by commercial airline. She said: "Now, Mr. Newberry, when you get to

Athens, you go into the Joint Mission," or whatever it was called, which handled travel arrangements for all American government civilian and military personnel. She said: "They will arrange for you to go on a United Nations plane from Athens to Jerusalem."

Well, the people who were doing this administrative work in the embassy in Athens didn't know as much as they should have. They took my passport, which had finally been issued, and wrote a very formal, "Third Person" note, and sent it to what they thought was the legation of Palestine. Of course, there was no such thing. The helpful messenger from the American embassy in Athens took my passport to the Israeli embassy in Athens. The Israelis, smugly I think, were delighted to put an Israeli visa in my diplomatic passport. I didn't know that all of this was going on!

Then I went to pick up my passport and went out to board the United Nations plane. I found out that it was a C-47, "bucket seat" aircraft which was transporting UN people from the UN Mission in Greece to Jerusalem. What was the UN office called? I think that it was UNSCOP, the UN Special Commission on Palestine. You see, the Greek Civil War was still going on. Anyway, that's why they had this sort of "shuttle aircraft" going around the Middle East. I boarded this UN plane and then became aware that I had an Israeli visa in my passport! I felt vaguely uncomfortable about it, because I had read something in what was then called the "Paris Edition" of the "New York Herald-Tribune" about the problems for American citizens traveling in Arab countries with Israeli visas in their passports.

Well, there I was. Still, I thought that I was going to land in Israel, since the embassy in Athens had gotten an Israeli visa for me. As we were preparing to land at this airstrip called "Columbia," outside of Jerusalem, I looked out the window and saw all of these people with what looked like "tablecloths" on their heads. I thought: "My God, we're landing at an Arab airport." So that's how I got to my first Foreign Service post.

Q: How did you get into Jerusalem?

NEWBERRY: With difficulty! [Laughter] It was really rather a gripping experience for somebody like me who really didn't know very much about how to conduct himself as a Foreign Service officer. The airstrip at "Columbia" was literally just a landing strip. The paved, asphalt road from Ramallah to Jerusalem ran across the landing strip. There was vehicular traffic going across the landing strip! It was that kind of situation.

It was getting rather late in the afternoon, and the pilot had to fly on to Beirut that same day. He had to get to Beirut before dark because in 1949 they didn't have any landing lights at Beirut airport. So the pilot and the crew of the airplane were eager to get out of "Columbia" airstrip. While they were getting all of the cargo unloaded, which was destined for delivery to the UN Mission up there at Government House in Jerusalem, I was talking to an obviously European soldier in the uniform of the Arab Legion. He turned out to be an ex "Afrika Korps" German who had somehow escaped becoming a prisoner of war. He had enlisted with the Arab Legion. So there I was, chatting away with him in German, never realizing that I was closing the "trap" around myself by being seen

and heard speaking German.

The point I'm leading up to is that a woman Major in the Arab Legion, and remember that this was in 1949, was in charge of the arrivals and departures of all persons at this airstrip. She was the only officer in the Arab Legion who could speak four foreign languages. Her name was Major Asia Halaby. She held a commission in the Arab Legion. We eventually got on fairly cordial terms, but not that day! She took one look at my passport and said: "Mr. Newberry, you cannot land here!" I said: "Where can I land? I don't have an assignment to Beirut. At least, I'm assigned as a vice consul in Jerusalem. It says so in my passport." She repeated: "You can't land here!"

I realized that I was in trouble. So I talked to one of the American Sergeants who had been a passenger on my plane from Athens. I said: "When you get up to the UN Mission at Government House, pass the word back to the American consul over on the Israeli side that the new American vice consul is out at the 'Columbia' airstrip and is in trouble." This Major Halaby had said: "Okay, you can stay, but you're a prisoner of war!" That's when I said to this American sergeant: "For Heaven's sake, get the word to the American consul and tell him what my situation is."

Well, as it turned out, this Sergeant went to a cocktail party and forgot all about me. However, another one of the UN military people was staying at the same "Bed and Breakfast" place where I was under "house arrest." Three days later, he saw the American consul, Bill Burdett, on the street in Jerusalem and said: "What are you doing about Newberry?" Bill is now dead, God rest his soul. He said: "Newberry? He's still in Washington." I found out about this conversation later on. Anyway, once the consulate knew that I was out at "Columbia" airstrip, another vice consul came out and "bailed me out." That was my arrival at my first post. I had literally been declared to be a "prisoner of war."

Q: Dan, could you explain, both for me and for the historical record, what the situation was in Jerusalem in 1949 when you arrived there? How did it appear to you?

NEWBERRY: I'll be glad to do so. First, let me say what the "technical" situation was. What was referred to as the "Old City," that is, the entire walled city of Jerusalem, plus the eastern side of the city, including Mt. Scopus and all of the area adjoining it to the East, was controlled by Jordan. This was the situation left over from the first Arab-Israeli War of 1948. The Jordanian Army, made up principally of the Arab Legion, held what is now the West Bank of the Jordan River. That is, the "Old City" of Jerusalem, plus the West Bank of the Jordan River. Israel controlled what was called the "New City" of Jerusalem and everything West to the Mediterranean. So, in effect, we had to deal with two governments in Jerusalem.

We dealt with the Jordanian "Mutusyarif," as they called him, the Governor of the "Old City." On the Israeli side, the Israelis still had a "Military Governor" of Jerusalem. So that was technically the political division of authority.

As it turned out, we had a little difficulty in getting me started on my assigned duties. Bill Burdett, the American consul in Jerusalem, had already decided that I would have one of the most irksome jobs in the American consulate, because that's what they always do to the most junior officer. [Laughter] That was arranging "clearances" for American travelers to get through what was called the "Mandlebaum Gate." That is, from the Israeli to the Jordanian occupied sections of Jerusalem. Mandlebaum Gate was actually a square, or a "Platz," as they say in German.

Since the "cease-fire lines" happened to be laid in place, Mandlebaum Square was "no man's land" between the Jordanian held sector and the Israeli held sector. There weren't very many American travelers whom either side would allow to cross to the other side. In particular, the Jordanians didn't like people to come first to Israel and then to Jordan. It was my job to arrange for all of these "clearances," to go and meet these people, and to walk them through "no man's land" and help them with their baggage, since no vehicles could go through this area. That is, unless I happened to have a consulate jeep, which couldn't carry much luggage in any case.

The only kind of vehicle allowed to go through the Mandlebaum Gate was a foreign, consular vehicle. Everything else was stopped. It was like being on the bank of a river where there was no ferry boat. People literally walked across the demarcation line.

So this was one of my first, assigned duties. However, our old friend, Major Asia Halaby, of the Arab Legion, was also the person who handled the clearances for the Jordanians. During the first two or three weeks that I was doing this job, I had some other duties to handle on the Jordanian side, but my name was not on the Jordanian "clearance list." Finally, the American consul took the matter up with the Jordanians. Major Asia Halaby said: "We suggest that you assign somebody other than Mr. Newberg" [sic] to that duty.

Of course, Bill Burdett stood on principle. He got his friend, Wells Stabler, who was the American Charge d'Affaires in Amman, Jordan, to go to the Jordanian Foreign Ministry. Major Halaby was then ordered to let me perform my duties in clearing people to go from the Israeli to the Jordanian side of the line.

Q: I think that she must have thought that you were Jewish, because she heard you speaking German.

NEWBERRY: That's why I mentioned the fact that I was heard speaking German. Eventually, she told me this. She said: "Your name is Daniel, and I heard you speaking German. What else was I to think but that the State Department had committed the great effrontery of assigning a Jewish vice consul here?" As I found out later, that was what was bothering her, although I didn't know it at the time. Actually, I think that the State Department would have had every right to assign a Jewish vice consul to this position. It might have been a little hard on the incumbent, but there was nothing wrong with the principle of assigning a Jewish consular officer to the American consulate in Jerusalem. We had Jewish FSOs and have had them assigned to Jerusalem, but not in 1949. When I thought about what might have happened if the Jordanians had had an American

"prisoner of war" in those circumstances, it did not leave me with a very cozy feeling.

Q: What was the military situation there? Was there a cease-fire at that time?

NEWBERRY: There was a cease-fire. As I recall it, the truce talks at Rhodes were still going on, although I will have to check the dates. They already had in place the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), or had it on hand very soon after that. There were multinational contingents monitoring the borders between Syria and Israel, Jordan and Israel, and Egypt and Israel. They had these UN "Truce Supervision Units" based around there. It was a pretty "hairy" [dangerous] business. Some of the personnel assigned to these units came close to great, personal peril in handling this job. It was a very tense time, indeed.

It was also particularly dangerous. I remember, from the time when I was still under "house arrest" at this "Bed and Breakfast" place which was called the "American Colony Hotel" [North of the walled city of Jerusalem]. Actually, it's more than a bed and breakfast place, but I was a newcomer and didn't know the difference.

I wanted to go to the Anglican Cathedral to attend religious services. They told me at the American Colony Hotel to stick to the main road because there were still land mines that had not been "defused." It was still a combat situation in May, 1949, even though there was a truce in effect.

Q: What was the American consulate general in Jerusalem doing in those days in its relationship with the Arabs and the Israelis?

NEWBERRY: It was more a case of what the consulate general was trying to do. It was really an anomalous situation in terms of our relations with our own colleagues. The American ambassador in Tel Aviv insisted that the consulate general in Jerusalem was a "constituent post" of the American mission in Israel. He tried to give orders to the consul general in Jerusalem, but the consul general would have none of it. In consular terms, the consulate general in Jerusalem reported directly to the State Department and not to the embassy in Tel Aviv and not to the Legation in Amman, Jordan. This was about the time when they stopped referring to the country as "Transjordan," calling it simply, "Jordan." That was sort of the bureaucratic situation that we had.

In traditional, Foreign Service practice we all got to know and to cultivate the Military Commander of the Jerusalem Garrison on the Israeli side. He was a colonel named Moshe Dayan [later Israeli Defense Minister and a major Israeli political figure]. He was very approachable. He and his wife were obviously very ambitious. They had what the Europeans used to term a "calling day," a certain day when new arrivals could go to Dayan's house and meet all sorts of interesting people.

That's what I did, even though I had no reason to meet higher ranking officials. So I got to know Moshe Dayan and his sister, who was being "courted" by one of our officers. I won't say which one. Moshe Dayan's sister-in-law married a young Israeli Air Force

Lieutenant. I was lucky enough to be invited to the wedding. That young Lieutenant was named Ezer Weizman, who is now President of Israel. [Laughter]

It was an unusual situation where a young, low-ranking Foreign Service officer, in fact, the most junior FSO, had regular access to these Israeli "movers and shakers." Just as during a later part of my experience in Jerusalem, toward the end of my tour there, I just "happened" to be on the Arab side of Jerusalem one day in August, 1952, when something terribly dramatic happened inside the Old City. I found out that King Abdullah of Jordan had been assassinated in a mosque! I was the only officer in our consulate general who knew this. I was trying to alert the other side of the line, while still doing my job as a reporting officer.

So for the next several days all of us in the consulate general were trying to piece together what had happened. Obviously, the Jordanian Police moved in and arrested people right and left. However, it was just my luck that I happened to be in a place where nobody in the American consulate general would have known about what had happened for hours until the BBC [British Broadcasting Commission] reported what had happened. I was able to contribute to the reporting on this event.

Q: You mentioned that you had contacts, even as a young officer, among the "movers and shakers" on the Israeli side. What about on the Jordanian side?

NEWBERRY: I was just going to say that, in the context of this quick "round up" of people who were arrested by the Jordanians, was what I thought was one of my best contacts. He was explaining a lot of things to me. I guess that he was a nephew of the famous Mufti Hajamin al-Husseini, who was very prominent among Palestinians. My friend was arrested and eventually hanged for alleged involvement in the conspiracy to kill King Abdullah! I began to think that acquaintanceship with my friends, the people whom I was cultivating, was potentially dangerous.

This reminds me of the fable of La Fontaine about the two donkeys in the caravan train. One of them was carrying a load of hay and one of them was carrying a load of gold coins. I'm sure you know the story. During the night thieves ripped open the bags of the donkey carrying the gold coins. Of course, the donkey was stabbed to death. However, the donkey carrying the hay was undisturbed. The moral of this story was: "It's not always a good thing to have an important job!" That's what I was beginning to think, as this has happened to many Foreign Service people, including people you knew and drank coffee with, who wound up on the "wrong side" of the political spectrum and came to grief. You know, this came as quite a revelation to me and to my outlook on life when I was a "young boy," as I thought of myself, only 27 years old.

Q: What was your impression of Jordan when you first arrived in that country, including how it was run, where it was going, and all of that?

NEWBERRY: Well, Stu, I can only give a very circumscribed response to that very good question. As a "new kid on the block," I was so concentrated on getting my work done,

and it was a very busy job, that I didn't really have the leisure to go out and sort of "explore" things.

We didn't have "professional" diplomatic couriers. We took it in turn to drive our diplomatic pouches over to Amman, Jordan. I would chat with the people in our Legation there, which consisted of two rooms in the Philadelphia Hotel. So I picked up impressions regarding the situation. However, my recollection of those years is very limited. The British were still very much "running the show." That impression has lingered with me, especially after King Abdullah was assassinated. Abdullah's successor, King Khalal, was mentally so limited. Then, it was some further time before the "Brave, Young King," Hussein, really began to take control of the situation. But during all of this time, from 1950 to about 1960, it seemed to me that the British were still very much "calling the shots."

Q: What about Israel? What was your impression and the reaction of our people in Jerusalem toward the Israelis?

NEWBERRY: I have to say, quite candidly, that I was personally shocked, when I arrived at the consulate general in Jerusalem, to find that, to a man, our people were all very "anti-Israeli." I was shocked at this because, first of all, as I told you, some of my best friends and closest "buddies" in the U.S. Army during World War II had been Jewish refugees from Nazism. I was prepared to be "open minded" about Israel. However, as I learned more about some of the more terrible things that the "Hagganah," the most prominent of the Jewish organizations, did during the first Arab-Jewish War [in 1948], I began to appreciate that there really were two sides to the Arab-Jewish conflict.

Then, at a certain point, the line from "Romeo and Juliet," about "a plague on both your houses" appeared more reasonable to me. "A plague on both your houses" was pretty much my attitude during the rest of my time in Jerusalem, because such outrageous things were done on both sides. I think that I was honestly "neutral" by the time I finished my tour of duty in Jerusalem.

Q: Either then, or not too long afterwards, our consul general was killed, and nobody, even to this day, knows who killed him.

NEWBERRY: I heard many, almost eyewitness stories. I think that it is beyond debate that our consul general, Tom Watson, was killed by a sniper. They still had his "bulletproof vest" hanging up in the consulate general which was supposed to protect him. However, the bullet entered right under his armpit and went right past the "bulletproof vest." So, despite taking precautions, he was killed in that way. I haven't made a detailed study of this matter, but on the basis of circumstantial evidence I believe that the sniper could only have been on the Israeli side. Well, I don't really know. However, the point is that, when he was killed, Consul General Watson was either going to or coming back from a meeting of the Special Consular Commission which was trying to implement the truce. He was on an errand of peace, either coming or going, when he was shot by this sniper.

Q: Do you think that that contributed to the bitterness of the people in the consulate general toward the Israelis?

NEWBERRY: It may have, because the man that I replaced was also shot, presumably from the same direction. However, he survived. So that's part of it. I think that the natural, sort of "social" contacts of the Americans in the consulate general, especially those who couldn't speak any other language but English, was with the military and civilian people in Government House. I would have to say that they were pretty much anti-Israeli.

Q: What about the relations between the consulate general and I guess that by now it was our embassy in Tel Aviv?

NEWBERRY: We had an embassy in Tel Aviv. The ambassador was a "political" appointee.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

NEWBERRY: His name was James McDonald. He was a prominent and perhaps the leading, Gentile "Zionist" in the United States. He was "rushed out" to Tel Aviv shortly after the United States recognized Israel in 1948. He didn't know much about the State Department, but he thought that he had access to the White House, [then under President Truman]. He attempted, without success, to persuade the consulate general in Jerusalem to consider itself a "constituent post" of the embassy.

Ambassador McDonald's performance in Tel Aviv is interesting, in retrospect. I liked him personally but I thought that he was not a good choice to be ambassador in Israel at that time. He didn't serve in Tel Aviv until toward the end of the Truman administration. We had a career FSO as the second American ambassador to Israel, Lynette Davis.

I was assigned to temporary duty in the embassy in Tel Aviv for the last few months of my tour in Israel. This was during the interim period when we were waiting to know who the new ambassador to Israel would be. I remember hearing a youngish Israeli Foreign Ministry official telling me: "Well, we hope that the new American ambassador will be a career officer, because we know that in the State Department they discounted everything that Ambassador McDonald said. We want an American ambassador who will report accurately what we say to him." Of course, since Ambassador McDonald was such a partisan of Israel, he was interpreting what the Israelis said to him, and the Israelis didn't want that. The Israelis just wanted an accurate report of what they told him.

I had not been in Israel since that first tour, but the Israelis had obviously learned how to "operate" in Washington. However, at that time, which was just a year after Israel became independent, they were still "feeling their way" as to how best to influence the development of U.S.-Israeli relations. Having an all-out, pro-Zionist American ambassador in Tel Aviv was not their idea of the ideal situation.

Q: It still isn't. Just recently our ambassador to Israel was actually an Australian citizen who had also been a lobbyist for the Israeli government. Then he was naturalized as an American citizen and is now the Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.

NEWBERRY: Well, you said it, Stu. I didn't, but I'm not disputing any of the irony in your remark.

Q: This is a very "dubious" situation, to say the least.

NEWBERRY: I think that, as an aside, that applies to sending, how should I say it, "hyphenated" Americans as ambassador to any country where they are closely associated with either the culture or the politics of the country in which they are supposed to represent the United States.

Q: I know that recently we had a Greek-American ambassador to Greece. I heard that his views on Greek-American relations were completely discounted in Washington, because his reporting was so "biased."

NEWBERRY: There's another side to such a situation, too. I am talking now, not so much of the ambassador, but of American Jews who may be assigned to the embassy in Tel Aviv. When I was in Jerusalem and then, briefly and for several months at the embassy in Tel Aviv, the labor attache at the American embassy was a very sharp guy. His name was Milton Fried. He was the only identifiable, Jewish-American officer in the American embassy.

The reason he was chosen for the position of Labor Attache, and he told me this himself, was that he was the son-in-law of Sidney Hillsman, a very prominent American labor leader. However, he said privately to me: "This is not a place for an American Jew to be assigned. All of the Israelis think that, because I'm a Jew, they can 'use me.' In fact, I'm an American, and I resent this attitude." Those were pretty much his words. It's awkward to be in such a situation.

Q: We've run across this in a number of countries. Well, during the time that you were in Jerusalem, were there any incidents or events which particularly come to your mind which you or the consulate general had to deal with?

NEWBERRY: I can tell you of some "colorful things" that I had to deal with.

Q: Let's hear them.

NEWBERRY: In the Table of Organization of the consulate general in Jerusalem, I was called the "citizenship officer." We did not issue visas, thank God. I think that most Foreign Service officers who haven't done visa work consider themselves very lucky not to have had that kind of assignment. I have great respect for visa officers, and some of my best friends are visa officers, and all of that. However, I consider that my assignment

to the consulate general in Jerusalem was very interesting, and I learned a lot about consular work, but very little about visas.

Let me get on to citizenship matters. This had a particular angle because I was assigned to Jerusalem. In 1949 one of the things that the citizenship officer in Jerusalem had to do was to keep track of all of the American veterans in our consular district who were entitled to receive benefits under the "GI Bill" [legislation enacted in 1945 to help veterans attend college or other training courses]. There were lots of veterans in Jerusalem at the time, and they all wanted their checks delivered on time. I had to make sure, if they were attending Hebrew University, for example, that they received their money on time. This involved a big, administrative problem.

There were other aspects of this citizenship job. There were many naturalized American citizens in the Jerusalem consular district who were probably very close to the "point" of automatically expatriating themselves. Under the Nationality Act of 1949, a naturalized, American citizen could not remain overseas indefinitely. So I found myself having to prepare certificates of expatriation for American citizens. When I learned the job, I anticipated this situation and I would call them in and tell them that if they didn't go back to the U.S., they would lose their American nationality.

Most of these people didn't speak any English. They spoke Yiddish. So there I was with my college German. I spoke German to them, and they would answer in Yiddish. So that's the way we communicated.

I think that most people who are acquainted with that part of the world are aware of those extreme, Orthodox Jews who have been sort of caricatures. These Jews, many of them from Poland, wore big, black hats, had side curls in their hair, and big, black gabardine coats. There was a community of these Orthodox Jews in a certain quarter of Jerusalem who were American citizens. I had them as "customers," too.

Of course, I didn't have any political objection to them, but I had to keep on good terms with them. First of all, because they were American citizens and, secondly, because we had to pass through their community, even on the Sabbath, to get to the Mandlebaum Gate. Several times I had stones thrown at me in this area, the Mea Sharim quarter of Jerusalem, because they considered that I was "desecrating" the Sabbath. In fact, I was like a postman, doing my appointed rounds, but they didn't like it when I passed through their quarter on the Sabbath.

What I'm leading up to is that these people were a very important, colorful, and even "pungent" part of my recollection of Jerusalem. These people took their ritual baths before they came in to meet me, but they never washed their clothes! You can imagine, in a warm climate like that of Jerusalem, what they smelled like when they came into my office! I'm not kidding you. I reached the point where I would have to stand by the window and keep them all the way across the room, just to be able to talk to them. It was that bad! Sorry to go into this aspect in such detail, but if you want to talk about "color," that's one of the more "colorful" sides of doing citizenship work in Jerusalem!

Then, over on the Jordan side of the consular district, I had more "colorful" experiences. Of course, when I first got to Jerusalem, we didn't have any sort of office over on the Jordan, or Arab, side of the city, because, as it turned out, the office building of the consulate general was on Ramallah Road in the "New City" of Jerusalem.

As it turned out, we were eventually able to use a couple of rooms in the building housing the American School of Oriental Research in the Old City of Jerusalem. The citizenship officer (that is, me) held office hours there, one day a week. Anybody who had claims to Social Security checks or who needed to register the birth of one of their children who had claims to being American citizens (for many Arabs were American citizens), could meet with the citizenship officer at the American School of Oriental Research.

On another day in the week I went up to Ramallah, which was perhaps half an hour's drive from Jerusalem. I had office hours at the Quaker School in Ramallah one morning a week for Arab Americans who came in to discuss citizenship problems. I can give you an example. It is curious to note that some of these people were actually shepherds. Their parents, or some of the older members of this community, somehow had gotten jobs in war industries in the U.S. during World War II. They stayed on in the U.S. long enough to acquire rights to a Social Security pension. Then they came back to Palestine and were re-absorbed into their own culture. When their children were born, they may or may not have been eligible to be registered as American citizens. So I really had to know U.S. citizenship law, inside and out. Otherwise, I would have been "zapped" [disavowed] by the Passport Office back in Washington.

Q: Did you get into any difficulties with Jordanian or Israeli authorities as you went along your appointed rounds? I mean, after you got over the initial problems you had with the Jordanians.

NEWBERRY: Not really. I can't recall that either side treated me discourteously, once they understood what I was doing. My greatest fear was that, because of the sort of "front line" atmosphere, I might wind up taking the wrong road. I remember once on a beautiful, spring day some friends of mine and I went out with a picnic basket. We took the wrong road and wound up in the middle of "No Man's Land." We tried to sneak back as quietly as we could, because in that atmosphere any frontier guard might have just shot us, if he'd seen us out there. My main concern was inadvertently making the "wrong move." As far as courtesy or discourtesy, helpfulness or unhelpfulness, I never encountered any of that. Granted, I was doing things which were politically pretty much "neutral." If you asked my superiors for their views, such as the consul general, if he were still alive, you might get an entirely different answer.

Q: Who was the consul general?

NEWBERRY: The first one was Raleigh Gibson. He had not yet arrived, and Bill Burdett was acting consul general. Gibson had been consul general in Salonika, Greece. I remember his telling stories about the famous "Wood and Pulp Case." I think that he was

consul general in Salonika at that time. He finished his tour of duty as consul general in Jerusalem. Younger officers who don't know their way around Washington and don't have a "network" of friends and supporters back in Washington may have trouble finding out what's going on. After Gibson left Jerusalem, we had another long period of time when there was no consul general assigned. Roger Tyler then became acting consul general and served in that capacity for quite a long time. He replaced Bill Burdett. We didn't have Raleigh Gibson's successor as consul general until I had left Jerusalem. I was out in Jerusalem for two and one-half years. We had a fully accredited consul general there for a little less than a year during that period of time.

Q: You mentioned that the officers in the consulate general in Jerusalem were basically "anti-Israeli." What would you say was the root cause of this attitude?

NEWBERRY: I mentioned their association with the UN people, and there were still a lot of British officials around. The British in Jerusalem had particularly bitter memories of what the Hagganah [Jewish Agency] and what the Irgun Zvai Leumi [IZL] did to the British troops in Jerusalem. My colleagues in the consulate general, who had been in Jerusalem longer than I, would talk about "horror stories" dating back to this period. Well, that's about the best answer that I can give.

I had so much on my mind about learning how to do my job that I can't say that I spent a lot of time analyzing the views of my own colleagues. That's just my recollection of the situation, and I can't help you much more than that.

Q: Did you have many visitors to the consulate general in Jerusalem?

NEWBERRY: Yes, in spite of everything. You asked for color. I'll give you some color. I was assigned to make all of the arrangements for official Americans crossing through the Mandlebaum Gate, both from Israel to Jordan and from Jordan to Israel. I think that this particular incident happened during the second Christmas time that I spent in Jerusalem.

A strange, shall I say, "coincidence," or whatever the word is, occurred. Former Governor of Minnesota Harold Stassen, a famous name in American politics of that era, came to visit Jerusalem. I've forgotten what his position was at that time, but he was a perennial [and unsuccessful] Republican candidate for President. I can't recall precisely when this happened. Maybe he was still Governor of Minnesota. Anyway, we learned that he was coming to Jerusalem by way of Tel Aviv. I was asked to arrange for him to go across into Jordan through the Mandlebaum Gate at night. He wanted to go to Bethlehem to attend a Christmas Eve ceremony of some kind.

Meanwhile, we got word that old Senator Theodore Green (Democrat, Rhode Island) was coming to Jerusalem for a visit. However, Senator Green was coming to Jerusalem by way of Jordan. Senator Green was just about as durable in his own way as Senator Strom Thurmond (Democrat and later Republican, South Carolina). They both wanted to go to the Christmas Eve celebration, including Midnight Mass, in Bethlehem. So the consul general arranged to get over there, at the Mandlebaum Gate, and meet the car that

brought Senator Green from Amman, Jordan. They were waiting in the car on the eastern side of Mandlebaum Gate at about 11:00 PM on Christmas Eve. I was coming from Israel and making my way to Mandlebaum Gate with Governor Stassen. We got over in the car, a large car. So I got Governor Stassen, the consul general, and Senator Green into this large car. However, I had the impression that Senator Green wouldn't speak to me!

What I discovered as we moved along was that this was one of the "tricks" of old Senator Green. He could fall asleep with his eyes open! In fact, he used to do that on the floor of the Senate in Washington. So that was why he apparently wouldn't speak to me. He was asleep!

Q: This is the second interview done with Daniel O. Newberry. This is in 1997. I guess that we are just about the end of your tour in Jerusalem. One thing you might discuss. Did you feel, in Jerusalem, the "heavy hand" of the pro-Israeli press and politics in the United States? Or did this really come later?

NEWBERRY: Stu, my impression was that the pro-Israeli press had already won, hands down. There was no contest, from our perspective. There wasn't any pro-Arab press in the U.S., from our perspective. All of the American news media, including radio and what there was of television [TV] at the time, were pro-Israel. At least, that is the impression that we had out there.

Q: Was there any concern on our part about the Arabs who, for one reason or another, had been forced out of their traditional homes in Greater Palestine, which is now part of Israel, as refugees? Were we reporting or thinking about that at all?

NEWBERRY: We were reporting on it, insofar as the small staff at the American consulate general had the leisure to report these things. The embassy in Tel Aviv was not particularly interested in that aspect of the subject. The legation in Amman did some reporting because they had huge camps of Palestinian refugees on the East bank of the Jordan River.

Yes, we were concerned about this. We were talking previously about the "well springs" of anti-Israel feeling. I could see this with my own eyes. This is a technique that the Israelis still use. You create refugees when you want to, quite simply by bulldozing their houses. That is still a standard technique.

When I first went to Jaffa, which is a suburb of Tel Aviv, it looked like one of these old European cities destroyed during World War II. Jaffa, as a city, goes back to the time of the Crusades and before that, even to Biblical times. Jaffa looked like one of these old, European cities which were absolutely devastated during World War II. I asked people: "Where was all of the fighting? Nobody said anything about pitched battles here." I was told: "Oh, no, the Israelis demolished the town after the fighting was over." The Israelis had just about flattened the entire, old city of Jaffa, just to make sure that the Arabs didn't

have any place to come back to. That is just an example of their attitudes.

Q: When you came back to Jaffa, did this type of thing cause feelings of revulsion among your colleagues, and maybe you? At this point the American public was sort of cheering for the "plucky Jews" to beat back the Arabs and all of that.

NEWBERRY: People tended to speak of "brave, little Israel." However, Stu, I have to say that in the "culture" of the Foreign Service in those days nobody was particularly interested in "debriefing" junior officers freshly back from their posts.

Q: They still don't. They don't "debrief" the senior officers, either. The closest thing we have to debriefing is the process that's going on here, 50 years after the fact.

NEWBERRY: Anyway, inexperienced officers like me were wondering what was going to happen to them next. I have no memory or any impression of anybody wanting to "pick my brains."

However, when I got to Atlanta for home leave, somehow "the word" got around that a local, home town boy had returned from being a vice consul in Jerusalem. The Hadassah Business Women's Club [Jewish community group] invited me to be a speaker at one of their meetings. I wondered how many businesswomen there were in Atlanta, and Jewish businesswomen at that. Atlanta was still not a very big city in 1949. This program was held at a Jewish country club in Atlanta. I was graciously received and then taken into the room where I was going to make my little speech. There were about 800 women in the room! They all wanted to hear everything that they could possibly hear about Jerusalem.

I would have to contrast this reception with the attitude of officers in the State Department toward one of their professional colleagues in talking about his experiences in Jerusalem. They might even have learned something from my talk! These Jewish businesswomen in Atlanta wanted to get everything out of me that they could. They were a very good, sharp audience.

Q: You were there in Jerusalem from 1949 until when?

NEWBERRY: From the first part of May, 1949, until some time in October, 1951. As I said before, during the last few months of that period I was on temporary duty at the embassy in Tel Aviv, although still technically assigned to Jerusalem.

Q: Let's talk a little about your reaction to being in Tel Aviv. I am speaking now of the atmosphere in our embassy there, as opposed to the consulate general in Jerusalem. Was there a difference in how things were regarded and dealt with there?

NEWBERRY: There was a definite difference in the atmosphere, because the people in our embassy in Tel Aviv had no contact, to speak of, with Arabs at all. That led to a built-in difference in outlook. It was a "different window on the world."

Of course, I had never been in an embassy before. I didn't even know how to work in an

embassy. I was assigned to temporary duty in the Economic Section of the embassy. I had a certain set of subjects that I worked on. Talk about "color"? I'll give you another bit of "color." In those days we had "despatches," as you may remember. This was the only time that I ever wrote a despatch. The State Department was very proud of spelling the word "despatch" with an "e," rather than with an "i."

One of the things that I got interested in, and this was one of the ironies of the Foreign Service, was the "vanity" of my superiors. They wanted their sections to be fully staffed and to show that they were "overworked." In fact, the embassy was not "overstaffed." Nevertheless, they insisted on getting this young officer, me, who had been assigned to Jerusalem, moved up to the embassy.

There really wasn't enough work for me to do. There wasn't enough office space, either. There were four officers in a room half as big as this room. You know the dimensions of it. It was like the "City Room" of an old newspaper. We almost literally had to "climb over" each other to get in and out of the office. However, there I was in the embassy, even though I wasn't really "needed."

I thought of subjects to write reports on. I decided to write a report on the Israeli fishing industry. It was very poorly developed in those days. I realized that one of the keys to the fishing industry was the dietary laws and the "Kosher" rules about what kind of fish could be eaten. That is, whether the fish were scaled or unscaled, skinned or unskinned, and so forth. I had a Biblical quotation at the beginning of my despatch. In my experience this was the only time that I dared start off a despatch to the Department of State, quoting the Bible. This may still be rare.

However, I had a lot of fun and learned a lot about why the Israelis, at that point, hadn't done anything with their fishing industry. This despatch had to do with that. In Turkey, in the olden times, it had been the Greeks who did all of the fishing. The Turks had to learn how to catch fish, and the Israelis also had to learn how to be fishermen.

Q: I thought that we might stop at this point and pick up the thread of your story the next time. In 1951 you were transferred from Jerusalem. Where did you go?

NEWBERRY: After home leave and about a 10-week training course at the Department of Commerce, I was assigned to the consulate general in Istanbul. The course at the Department of Commerce dealt with how Foreign Service officers should do economic and commercial work. Perhaps we can go into that next time, because how I got this assignment is also a commentary on how the personnel system worked in the Department of State.

Q: All right, good. We'll pick it up then.

Today is December 9, 1997. We are continuing with an interview of Dan Newberry. Dan,

perhaps you can go into how you were assigned to this commercial course. When did you take this course?

NEWBERRY: It began at the end of 1951. During the last five months of my assignment to the consulate general in Jerusalem, I had been on temporary duty at the embassy in Tel Aviv, doing economic reporting. I received my "Home Leave" orders in September, 1951, with no "onward assignment" mentioned. However, I learned that I was being assigned to take a training course at the Department of Commerce after taking home leave in Atlanta. This training course was designed to teach younger Foreign Service officers how to do economic and commercial reporting.

So I reported to the Department of Commerce before I went on home leave. I learned some very instructive things about how the Foreign Service training system really worked, if you'll bear with me.

Q: Yes!

NEWBERRY: My supervisor at the embassy in Tel Aviv, Owen Jones, who, praise the Lord, is still living, told me: "I know the man who is in charge of that course at the Department of Commerce. His name is Herb Cummings. I'll write and let him know that you're going to be taking that course. When you get to Washington, look in on him."

When I arrived in Washington and reported in at the Department of Commerce, a secretary there said: "Mr. Cummings is on a field trip, but I'll make a note of your name. When he comes back from this trip, we'll arrange for you to come in and call on him."

Well, a couple of weeks went by, and I was well into the training course. Then I received word that I should come in to see Mr. Cummings. It turned out that Mr. Cummings had just come back from a trip to Turkey. I was very much interested in what was going on there. While Cumming was on this trip to Turkey, the chief of the Economic Section in Istanbul called his attention to the fact that a woman officer who was assigned to the Economic Section was about to leave on transfer to another post. The Department had not assigned her replacement. The chief of the Economic Section told Cummings: "What I really need is a bright-eyed and bushy-tailed, young Foreign Service officer, because there is a lot that can be made out of this job."

So, as it turned out, I was the first FSO who walked into Mr. Cummings' office, and he said: "How would you like to go to Istanbul?" If some other guy had walked into Cummings' office, he would probably have asked the same question, but it happened to be me. This was a very important event in my professional career. In fact, as we'll get around to talking about later, I did three tours of duty in Turkey and became something of a Turkish "specialist." This all got started because I happened to walk into Cumming's office at the right moment, and he asked me if I would like to go to Istanbul. I said: "Yes," but it was not as easily arranged as well this.

Q: What about the training course itself? What was the attitude in the Department of

State toward the Department of Commerce at that time? Attitudes toward assignments to Commerce have varied over the years. I was wondering what attitudes were at that time.

NEWBERRY: My impression was that the attitude of State Department officers toward the Department of Commerce was very "cooperative." There was no particular resentment or disdain on the part of the younger Foreign Service officers attending this course toward an assignment to do economic or commercial work. Granted that my colleagues and I were fairly low down on the totem pole. I think that the guy who served the longest in our group taking the Department of Commerce course had been in the Foreign Service for about eight years. Of course, I had been in the Foreign Service for less than three years. We had not developed the tradition of disdain that you may have seen in other people.

Q: What was the emphasis in the training program?

NEWBERRY: A lot of it had to do with statistical analysis and how to gather and make use of statistical data. There was a lot of emphasis on what international trade agreements required the U.S. to do and what trade preferences were. It was sort of an undergraduate course in foreign trade. It was more or less "Foreign Trade 101."

Q: What was your impression when you completed the course? Did you feel a little more ready to tackle the problems of being an economic and commercial officer?

NEWBERRY: It might have been an illusion, but I did feel that I was better prepared to do economic and commercial work than I had been before I took the course.

Q: Then how did your assignment process work out?

NEWBERRY: That's what I wanted to add a footnote to, because everybody concerned seemed to be delighted that Dan Newberry was being assigned to Istanbul. I wrote all of the usual letters to the consul general and the ambassador. I began making my travel preparations and made a reservation on a ship, because we had to travel by ship in those days. I went on home leave. When that was over, I still had not yet received my travel orders to proceed up to New York to take the ship to Istanbul. By this time it was early in the New Year [1952]. I still didn't have any travel orders, and the Department didn't answer my letters.

So I came back to Washington. While I was waiting in the Office of Personnel, I overheard a conversation between two people. They had these "modular" walls [about five feet high and fairly thin] in those days. I heard a lady saying to her colleague: "We can't let Newberry go to Istanbul and replace a woman. There are very few places in NEA [Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs] where it is established that a woman can work effectively. I want to put a woman in that job." However, I was not to be deterred. So I got in touch with my "new friend," Mr. Cummings, over in the Department of Commerce and told him: "There are people over here in the State Department who are trying to 'thwart' you. They don't want me to go to Istanbul." He said: "I'll take care of that."

That was the last I heard of this problem. Within 48 hours I had my travel orders. I went up to New York and put my car on the ship I was traveling on, which was one of the group of ships known as the "Four Aces." That was the way we traveled in those days if our posts were on a sea lane. So that's how I went to Istanbul in early March, 1952.

Q: So by your fortuitous overhearing this conversation, you were able to resolve the problem. This is an example of a "low level, bureaucratic block."

NEWBERRY: It was, indeed, a "low level, bureaucratic block." It was simply a matter of the Office of Personnel trying to preserve a "slot" which they had earmarked for a woman. You might call it "reverse discrimination" in these days. Fortunately, I was lucky enough to be able to outmaneuver them. I got to Istanbul, and this was the beginning of a long and happy association with Turkey.

Q: This time you were in Istanbul from when to when?

NEWBERRY: From March, 1952, to August, 1956. This was rather a long time for a lower-ranking officer.

Q: Istanbul was a consulate general.

NEWBERRY: Right.

Q: What was your job at the consulate general in Istanbul? What was the official job title?

NEWBERRY: My assignment was to the Economic-Commercial Section in the consulate general. I had certain, specific reporting responsibilities. The most "picturesque" job was to prepare the quarterly report on "Filberts," or "Hazelnuts." This was in the days before we had an agricultural attache in the embassy in Ankara. In the division of labor the embassy in Ankara had assigned the preparation of the "Filbert" report to the consulate general in Istanbul because most of the Turkish "Filbert" exporters had their offices in Istanbul [or "Stamboul" in French; the two names for the city were used interchangeably]. If you'll pardon my expression, I really "sank my teeth" into those hazelnuts and had a ball with them.

Also, I did a lot of the reporting on Turkish customs practices. I spent a lot of time studying and getting acquainted with the great, bureaucratic "maze" of Turkish import customs, because we had so many American business firms which were registering complaints of the difficulties and delays they were experiencing. Of course, as a junior officer, I fell heir to the most irksome duties to handle, but I found this quite an education.

Q: Could you talk about any of the problems created by the Turkish bureaucracy for American firms which were trying to work in Turkey in those days?

NEWBERRY: As I look back on this period, it seems to me that the Turkish restrictions were not particularly aimed at Americans, Europeans, or anyone else engaged in exporting goods to Turkey. Everyone faced the same, bureaucratic hurdles. Even to this day the Turks have not entirely shaken off the heritage of the Ottoman bureaucracy. Although by the 1980s the system had been relatively simplified, in the 1950s the old, Ottoman bureaucratic procedures and regulations were still very much in play. It was just impossible to get things done expeditiously, even by "passing money under the table," as some of the foreign businessmen did. The Turkish system was very old-fashioned. It was designed, not to encourage imports, but to protect what the Turkish bureaucracy thought was a budding, Turkish industry. In some cases there was no Turkish industry in a given field at all, but the Turkish bureaucracy was still "protecting" home industry, just in case it emerged.

Q: What did you do as a junior officer in the consulate general in Istanbul in dealing with these problems?

NEWBERRY: I set about systematically getting acquainted, mainly with the English-speaking officials in the Turkish Customs Office and in Turkish banking institutions. I was also picking up economic data along the way. In the whole Economic-Commercial Section of the consulate general we had three officers, plus the Section Chief, so there were four of us. We had a certain list of economic "indicators" which we had to collect data on.

We systematically made the rounds of our contacts in the market. In my case I could speak French. In those days most of the Turkish Jews spoke French, rather than English, so it was very useful for me to talk to Jewish businessmen in French. However, it took me a long while before I learned enough Turkish to conduct business in that language. So during the first two or three years that I was in Turkey I did not use Turkish as a working language.

Q: From your perspective, what was your impression of the Turkish economy during the period 1952-1956?

NEWBERRY: My impression was that it was really stagnant. All of the industry in Turkey of any size at all was owned by the Turkish state. This was Kemal Ataturk's principle, which they called "etatism," or state ownership. Ataturk had decreed that at that stage of Turkey's development all industries should be owned by the state. In effect, state enterprises constituted perhaps 90 percent of the Turkish industrial base, with all that that entailed. There was the usual lack of vision that you get when so much of the economy is dominated by state-owned enterprises.

So this situation was very frustrating for American businessmen to deal with. Although the Turkish National Assembly passed a law to encourage foreign capital investment, it did not yield any results to speak of. Certainly, as far as traditional American exports like Coca-Cola or Pepsi-Cola were concerned, these were not available in the Turkish market. No foreign soft drinks could come into Turkey in the 1950s, for example. The same thing

was true of textiles. The Turks had their own textile industry, and they certainly were not going to allow foreign competition for that industry. The import duties on textiles were very high. For example, if a Turkish lady went abroad and bought three meters of silk cloth in Paris to have a dress made out of it, she would probably have to pay three times the price of what she had paid for it, in Turkish customs duty. This is an example of how prohibitive it was for the average Turk in the 1950s to import anything into Turkey.

So it was rather a bleak scene, and the city of Istanbul looked that way. I had the impression, when I first arrived in Istanbul, that nothing had been done to "freshen up" the city since 1914!

Q: What was the Turkish government like? Obviously, Ankara was where the American ambassador was stationed. From what you gathered from your own observations and from comments of your colleagues, what kind of government did Turkey have when you arrived there in 1952? Did any changes take place during your first tour in Turkey?

NEWBERRY: It was something "new" for Turkey. The 1950 general elections in Turkey had been the first, really free and unfettered, democratic elections. The party of Ismet Inonu and his colleagues who had inherited the traditions of Kemal Ataturk was voted out of power. A new party, called the Democrat Party, led by Adnan Menderes, came into power in 1950. When I arrived in Turkey, this new government was still very much in the "bloom" of its success and riding high. Of course, the American government was smiling broadly on this phenomenon of a freely and democratically elected government in the Middle East. The only other such government that the American government could point to was Israel.

This situation had its pitfalls. Adnan Menderes was very shrewd and quick to exploit this situation. He spread the notion that he was the "chosen instrument" of Washington. We played this game, consciously or unconsciously. The first thing we knew was that Adnan Menderes and his Democratic Party began to abuse their power. The American government was also "tarred with the same brush." We were regarded as not only condoning but encouraging Menderes to abuse his power. It was that kind of atmosphere.

Q: You say that Menderes was "abusing his power." We're talking about the situation during your first tour of duty in Turkey. What did we see as constituting an abuse of power?

NEWBERRY: There were very strong restrictions on the role of the other parliamentary parties and what they could do. There was a misuse of police power. Tax breaks were accorded to important members of the governing party, the Democrat Party. I can't give you a catalog of these abuses, since I was not assigned to the embassy. Therefore, I was not in the "direct line" of reporting.

However, since I was assigned to Istanbul, and Istanbul is really the capital of Turkey in every sense except politically, we would encounter Turkish national, political leaders and other leaders, whose "home base" was Istanbul. They might have been in Parliament or even in the government, and we had a chance to talk to them. Although I was a fairly

junior vice consul, I managed to talk to some of these Turkish political figures. Certainly, I heard from our consul general and more senior officers what they were picking up and reporting.

The whole atmosphere was very difficult from the point of view of a "constituent post" under the embassy in Ankara. I'm sure that other people, recalling those years, observed a common phenomenon that the American ambassador and the embassy, in the capital, felt that they had the best vantage point for looking at the government that they were accredited to. They tended to the view that "all of those people out in the provinces" just didn't understand the situation. That was very much a part of the attitude of the American embassy in Ankara toward American officials stationed at the consulate general in Istanbul. For our part we thought that we were living among the "movers and shakers" and that we had a special point of view.

Q: Who was our ambassador at that time? Were there several ambassadors who served during the time you were in Istanbul?

NEWBERRY: There were several. Let's see. When I first came to Turkey, George McGhee was still ambassador. He was a political appointee of the Democratic Party in the U.S. Despite the fact that Dwight Eisenhower won the presidential election of 1952, the Republicans didn't get around to replacing Ambassador McGhee until the late spring of 1953.

I wouldn't fault Ambassador McGhee for the relatively narrow view taken by the embassy in Ankara, because he used to come to Istanbul often. He kept an apartment in the building of the consulate general, which used to be a combined residence and office when the American embassy was in Constantinople, as Istanbul used to be called. Ambassador McGhee balanced the outlook of the Istanbul metropolis with the views of the relatively "provincial" capital in Ankara. He did this very neatly by often visiting Istanbul himself. He was gracious enough to talk even to the junior officers in the consulate general. He learned their points of view himself. He got to know what our people in the consulate general in Istanbul were hearing and thinking about.

I would have to say that his successors as ambassador, and the comparison is rather invidious, took a different point of view. His immediate replacement was Averill Warren, God rest his soul, and then Fletcher Warren, and God rest his soul, too. I think that Fletcher Warren was American Ambassador to Turkey for a longer period of time. Fletcher Warren was really a "Latin America" hand. He had been Ambassador to several Latin American countries. He was a very distinguished gentleman. However, I think that he was really "out of his element" in the Middle East. His idea of being an effective ambassador was to give Prime Minister Menderes whatever he wanted, if it was in the power of the United States government. Ambassador Fletcher Warren did not want his "constituent posts" reporting things that reflected against Prime Minister Adnan Menderes.

Well, we've heard that before. I'm sure that you've interviewed people who served in Iran

and who were discouraged from sending in reports which reflected adversely on the Shah.

Q: Oh, yes! Did you feel, even in your position, that you were getting from other reporting officers in Istanbul sort of a feeling that they couldn't report the kinds of things that they wanted to report?

NEWBERRY: I certainly felt this myself. I'll give you a very specific instance. I'll have to "jump ahead" a little.

Q: Could you stick to the 1952-1956 time period?

NEWBERRY: All right. I'm now jumping ahead to 1955. There had been the so-called "Cyprus riots," and we can come back to that. However, just to make this point. I had become acquainted with a person whom I considered a rather "elderly" American citizen. He was a naturalized American citizen who lived in Istanbul. He doesn't seem so "elderly" in retrospect. [Laughter] He must have been at least 65 at this time I am speaking of.

Q: My God, that's old!

NEWBERRY: He was married to a granddaughter of Sultan Abdul Hamid. He and the granddaughter lived in sort of "seedy splendor" across the Bosphorus Straits in one of those great estates that the Ottoman Princes and Princesses and wives of the Sultans had. He lived right next to one of these estates, which had no heating at all, I must add. It was very uncomfortable to go and visit him and have tea in the wintertime. However, I went, because I was fascinated. Actually, this American citizen's mother-in-law was the last surviving widow of Sultan Abdul Hamid, [the last Turkish Sultan, dead by this time]. He was living in the same building with her son-in-law. However, she never emerged, so I never met this old lady, who really was well on in years. She must have been in her 90s at this time.

What I'm leading up to is this. One day, in the middle of a snowstorm, at the end of 1955, I guess it was, I had received a telephone call from this Turkish-American. He said that he had something "terribly important" to tell me and that he had to see me right away. He said that he couldn't come to see me at the consulate general because his wife was "indisposed." He said: "Dan, you've got to come over here. I've got something terribly urgent to tell you."

So I went out to see him. From his point of view what he had to tell me WAS terribly urgent, because what he had picked up from the Turkish military garrison right next door to his wife's estate was an open discussion of the beginnings of a plot by the military to overthrow the Adnan Menderes government. I listened to him very carefully. As soon as I got back to the consulate general, I made my notes and drafted a report about what I'd been told and what questions I'd asked my friend. I didn't talk to any of the military attaches assigned to the consulate general. I felt that my Turkish-American friend was pretty astute, and he took this report very seriously, as I did.

I showed this report to the consul general. The consul general looked absolutely terrified. He said: "Well, I think that we'd better send this to the embassy in Ankara. Don't send it to Washington." So that's what I did. I sent it in the CONFIDENTIAL diplomatic pouch to Ankara, and that's as far as it went. It was never reported to the Department. Then, lo and behold, the Turkish military overthrew the Menderes government. Washington might have had a good two years of lead time to collect additional intelligence on this event, because the report was in such detail. According to my friend, the military officers involved in this coup d'etat talked about their contacts throughout the Turkish military structure. At least this report could have assisted our intelligence people, if no one else, in tracking down what was going on. However, our embassy in Ankara decided to "bury" Dan Newberry's report.

I was in a position to check out what, if anything, had happened to this report. A few years later I was assigned to the Turkish desk in Washington in NEA [Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs]. I went through the files, and there was no sign that my report had ever reached Washington. That's how I knew that the embassy in Ankara had simply "buried" this report.

Q: Who was our consul general at this time?

NEWBERRY: At the time I wrote that report the consul general was Robert McAtee.

Q: Were reports normally sent directly to Washington from the Consulate General in Istanbul, rather than through the embassy in Ankara?

NEWBERRY: Yes. Our consuls general, for the most part, exercised their discretion. If I may say so, Mr. McAtee was "retired in place." He knew that Istanbul was his last post in the Foreign Service and, by his body language and other behavior, he let everybody know that he really didn't want to "trouble the waters." However, the other consuls general in Istanbul, and I guess that I served under four of them during my four and one-half years in Istanbul, included Burt Matthews, Arthur Richardson, and Bob Miner, who was the last of them.

These consuls general were all quite insistent on their "right" to report directly to Washington. They "got away" with it, although they had to be somewhat circumspect about this. There was really a "running battle" between the consuls general and the embassy in Ankara. Naturally, the ambassador didn't like such "independent minded" consuls general. Most of the consuls general were very distinguished, senior Foreign Service officers who weren't about to be mere "flunkies." If they learned something that Washington might not know about, they reported it.

I'm coming up to a specific case. I mentioned the "Cyprus riots." This is another case which I will tell you about.

Q: Before we come to the "Cyprus riots," how did you handle daily business there in

Istanbul, just to give us a "feel" for the atmosphere? You were sent out there to be a "bright-eyed, bushy-tailed" young officer. How did you behave under the circumstances?

NEWBERRY: All right, if I can "brag" about myself.

Q: Sure! It's your microphone.

NEWBERRY: One of the first things I did, while I was still "getting my bearings" in Istanbul, was that I talked to the chief of the Economic/Commercial Section about this quarterly "Filbert" or "Hazelnut" report. I said: "I can't very well write reports on 'Hazelnuts.' I've never seen a hazelnut bush or tree. I've studied the map, and all of the hazelnuts grow out on the Black Sea [northern] coast of Turkey. I would like to go out there and look at them." Apparently, nobody had ever bothered to do that before.

It turned out that there was what they called the "Friday Mail." This was a coastal boat which left from Istanbul and touched at all of the ports along the Black Sea coast of Turkey. I took along an interpreter from the consulate general, and he and I went on this ship. It was a very picturesque experience. It was my very first time out of Istanbul. I was really getting to see some of the heart of Anatolia.

For me this trip was just a "ball," even before I started to report on hazelnuts! So we got off at the port farthest from Istanbul, Trabzon. We went to a local hotel. I think that we paid the equivalent of about \$0.50 for our beds. Then we took cross country "jitney taxis" from one place to another. I visited a number of little, hazelnut exporting places along the Black Sea. Of course, hazelnut plants are not just shrubs. They sometimes grow into full size trees. I saw tens of thousands of them and learned a lot about hazelnut cultivation. I talked to the local owners and growers of hazelnuts. In addition to having a wonderful time getting to see part of Turkey, I had a basis for understanding what hazelnut production was all about.

The reason that all of this was of such interest to the United States government was that the hazelnut or filbert producers in Northern California and Oregon were determined to keep Turkish hazelnuts out of the U.S. market. The U.S. Department of Agriculture constantly wanted updated information on Turkish hazelnut production. There was an elaborate procedure for deciding what the tariffs should be on imported, Turkish hazelnuts. Anyway, I learned about Turkey, and the information which I obtained played right into my hands.

I remember that one of the "by-words" around the consulate general in Istanbul, because I had so much fun with this, was that people called me the "Attache aux Noisettes." This was French for calling me the "Hazelnut Attache." On one occasion someone was visiting my office and said: "Oh, where is Mr. Newberry?" The reply was: "Oh, he's probably gone out to count the hazelnut trees!" [Laughter] Anyway, that was more picturesque, and it did not occupy all that much of my time.

Q: No, but it helped you to get out and see the situation. You can talk much better about it. In fact it represents one of the "dangers" that officers, and particularly economic

officers, can get involved in. That is, they may tend to rely on reports that come into the office.

NEWBERRY: That's right. That's one of the pitfalls you face, and I learned to remind myself to avoid it. The Turks had a superb, research institution in Istanbul called the "Turkish Development Bank." This bank had some of the best analysts, statisticians, market researchers, and so forth. I could just have gone down to the Turkish Development Bank, obtained a copy of their "handouts," and written my reports without going anywhere out of Istanbul. This bank turned out really first-rate reports, but that was not what I wanted to do.

Like many people in the Foreign Service, I very early developed the feeling that I don't like to write about things that I don't understand. This was one of the impelling things about my reporting responsibilities. Before I wrote anything, I wanted to understand it. My way of understanding it was on a "hands on" basis.

Q: Something that you just mentioned strikes a chord with me. I never served in Turkey, but I've observed it from other places. In particular I have spent about nine years in the Balkans. One thing about Turkey, even in those days, is that it sounds as if the Turks still had this almost "Byzantine" bureaucracy. At the same time they were developing some very bright people. The Turks seem to have gone very well into banking and statistics and were very modern people in this sense. They had a cadre of well-trained people, which is still true today. Did you notice this "dichotomy" between a "Byzantine" bureaucracy and very bright and capable people?

NEWBERRY: Oh, very much so. Even as an experienced, older officer, I was struck by the irony between the clever way that officials in the Turkish government often behaved and all of these "idiotic" customs regulations which they had adopted. Actually, the Turks had been very far-sighted in sending their bright, young men, and sometimes their bright, young women, off to Europe and the United States for graduate studies and so forth. They had set up, even during Kemal Ataturk's time, and he died in 1938, a program to train people in up to date techniques. So the Turkish government had the resources in terms of personnel and brainpower to do a lot more than their policies allowed them to do.

When the time came, when it was politically possible to break out of these antiquated and restrictive practices, the trained cadre were in place. So at a certain point in modern Turkish history this process sort of exploded, because the people were ready and willing to do more and, in fact, were even "raring" to do so.

Q: I know that when I was in Athens, in the 1970s, my wife was teaching at a private school. There were several Turkish students in her classes. I think that they were all young women of high school age. My wife was particularly impressed by both the willingness to study and hard work displayed by these Turkish students, as well as their "patriotism." They wanted to do something for their country. Did you find that this was a very prevalent attitude among the educated classes in Turkey?

NEWBERRY: Yes, I can say "Amen" to that. Patriotism is something that you find among most Turks. Of course, Kemal Ataturk and the so-called "children of Ataturk" of that generation were raised in that way. The whole "liturgy" of public life really "drove home" the message of Turkish patriotism. However, I found this attitude particularly among the educated women. Over the years of my exposure to Turkish society, I came to understand that modern Turkish women understood that Ataturk's "revolution" is what made it possible for women in Turkey to be something other than bearers of children. Therefore, the Ataturk "revolution" was something to cherish and work for. That was the wellspring of Turkish women's patriotism, which they passed on to their sons and daughters.

Q: What about social contacts, in particular? How did you find social contacts with the Turks, as a young officer?

NEWBERRY: Actually, it was a great blessing to be the lowest ranking officer in the consulate general because I was often not included in the usual, representational functions. I was "free as a bird" most of the time. So I could go out, make new Turkish friends, and spend time with people who had nothing to do with my assigned reporting responsibilities.

As a consequence, by the time I finished my first tour in Istanbul, I had a very broad range of acquaintances, especially in the cultural field. We'll come to that part of it in a minute. As a consequence, during my last year in Istanbul, I was seconded to USIS [United States Information Service] to be the cultural affairs officer. This assignment was given to me because I had exploited the opportunities available to me. Nobody had been paying attention to what this young vice-consul was doing socially. I hope I didn't use this opportunity inappropriately.

Q: Did you find that the official, social life was almost a form of "entrapment?" This is often a problem at an embassy.

NEWBERRY: I found what I saw of the official, social life to be tedious in the extreme. It seemed to me that at the senior level social life consisted of most of those 25 or 30 foreign consuls general in Istanbul entertaining one another. I remember reading an economics textbook in college with a chapter called, "Taking in One Another's Washing." I saw that among the consuls general. I swore that if I ever got to be a Consul General, I would not indulge in that kind of activity. It was very much a "way of life" for people at that level. An awful lot of their time and meager, representational resources were spent entertaining other consuls general.

Q: Well, how did this business of "taking in each other's washing" work out, as far as the work was concerned?

NEWBERRY: I think that one of the most easily detectable effects of it was that senior officers picked up traditional prejudices from one another. Most of the consulates in Istanbul in those days, in the 1950s, still had non-Muslim, local employees. They were

often ethnic Greeks, ethnic Armenians, and ethnic Jews who, for various reasons, tended to look down on the Muslim Turks. That attitude had a whole historic and cultural side to it. In this way the consuls general and the foreign staff in the various consulates picked up, and this applied to the American consulate general, too, most of their understanding of what Turks were like, as filtered to them through the eyes and ears of a minority group of non-Turkish employees who worked for them.

Q: Could you characterize the prevailing attitude of the upper echelon of the officers in the American consulate general and perhaps even of our embassy toward the Turks at this particular time?

NEWBERRY: I wouldn't want to do an injustice to anybody. I think that the attitude of particularly senior officers varied from person to person. I know, for example, that Bob Miner, who was the last consul general in Istanbul that I served under, really had a great fondness for the Turks. He had taken the trouble, over the years, to learn to speak enough Turkish so that he had a real "feel" for Turkish culture and attitudes. I really don't know about the attitude of the other consuls general in Istanbul. Some of the middle grade officers in the consulate general simply regarded Istanbul as another post in the Foreign Service. Some of us, like myself, found Turkey a very "special" place and the Turkish people a very "special" people. This was just my own prejudice, but I felt that there were all too few Americans who realized what an opportunity it was to be in Turkey and what a remarkable people they were living among.

Q: Could you talk about the "Cyprus riots," what they were and what led up to them?

NEWBERRY: This may be a little bit out of sequence, but in the mid 1950s the British were indicating to us, as they had done in Palestine, that they wanted to reduce their responsibilities in the Middle East. In Greece they had turned over their responsibilities to us in the late 1940s. They indicated to us in the mid 1950s that they were going to give up Cyprus. So there was a lot of political maneuvering going on. As I look back on the situation in Istanbul, it strikes me that up until 1955, by which time I had been in Turkey for three years, I never heard anything about the subject of Cyprus. Cyprus did not appear to be something that was part of the "liturgy" of Turkish patriotism, and so forth.

This may only be "hearsay" on my part, and I suppose that the historians have dug into this. There are a lot of Turks today who feel that the British government deliberately aroused the interest of the Turkish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister on the subject of Cyprus to "mitigate" Greek influence on that island. The British have often used the tactic of "divide and conquer." At least, that is often the Middle Eastern view of British statecraft. These Turks, of whom I speak, think that the reason why the Turks were so stirred up about Cyprus is that the British put them up to it. Of course, by 1955 Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and his Foreign Minister, Fatim Rustu Zorlu, were desperately looking for "distractions" because the Turkish economy wasn't doing as well as it should. There were pretty good indications that in the next elections they might not even be the majority political party. So the Cyprus issue came to them as an invitation to "stir up the Turkish people," and that is precisely what they did.

Q: Could you explain what the situation was in Cyprus?

NEWBERRY: In 1955? Well, the British were still exercising sovereignty over Cyprus. What they were doing was to look for a way to sort out, not only the Greek and Turkish Cypriot interest on the island but, more importantly, what the governments in Ankara and Athens would have to say about Cyprus.

While all of this maneuvering was going on, someone set off a bomb in early September, 1955, in the house in Salonika, Greece, where Kemal Ataturk was born. When Ataturk was born there in 1881, Salonika was still part of the Ottoman Empire. In spite of all of the difficulties between Greece and Turkey, the house he was born in had until then been preserved as a kind of "shrine." Immediately after this incident was reported in Turkey, and the first thing anyone knew, there were anti-Greek mobs in the streets of Istanbul and Izmir. The mobs were protesting against this "outrage." Then it later turned out that the Turkish government had arranged for the bomb to be thrown against Ataturk's birthplace.

Q: Good God!

NEWBERRY: It really was an outrageous, worthless thing for the Turkish government to do. Of course, I was there in Istanbul and I saw the riots developing in Istanbul on September 6, 1955. I saw Turkish government trucks bringing in people from the outlying slums of Istanbul to demonstrate against the Greeks. This could only have been done with the connivance of the Turkish government. The mobs in Istanbul simply went wild, destroying all of the shops in the central part of Istanbul which they imagined to be owned by foreigners. Since most of the foreign shops were owned by non-Muslims, that meant pretty much all of the shops in downtown Istanbul.

As it turned out, at this time Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and his retinue were on a train, going back to Ankara. It was hours before they could get the news to him that the whole riot in Istanbul and Izmir had gotten out of hand. So it was not until about midnight, as I recall, before the word got back from Prime Minister Menderes. He "blew the whistle" and stopped the riot. The Turkish government sent in the Army with tanks to get the rioters off the streets. So this riot went on from late afternoon on September 6 for six or seven hours. However, the strange thing about all of this was that there was no loss of life! Apparently, the rioters had instructions to destroy only property but not to hurt anybody.

Now I'm coming up to a point about this business of reporting. Naturally, as soon as the riots were over and we had to pick our way over all of the broken glass around Istanbul, Consul General Arthur Richards deployed all of us to get as much circumstantial, eyewitness material as we could get. He conferred, first of all, with the Greek consul general who naturally had heard many of the "horror stories" about the riots. The Greek consul general assured him that nobody was killed.

The point I'm leading up to is that as soon as we could get a reporting cable on the riots

back to Washington, Consul General Arthur Richards sent it into Washington, with a copy to the embassy in Ankara and a copy to our other Consulates in Turkey. Well, the ambassador in Ankara was furious that the consul general in Istanbul had sent this report directly to Washington. However, Consul General Arthur Richards stood his ground and continued to report directly to Washington. What happened was that, from the ambassador's point of view, about three or four days later he sent one of his second secretaries, a Turkish speaking embassy officer, down to Istanbul to do an "independent" report. The consul general saw what was happening. He called us in and said: "Be courteous to this embassy officer. He's going to cover the same ground that we have, but don't interfere with his reporting. But don't get into any 'who struck John' conversations with him. Let him do his work." This is what the embassy officer did, but we never saw a copy of his report.

Q: Were you reporting that these riots had occurred with the connivance of the Turkish government and that trucks were bringing in the rioters from the countryside?

NEWBERRY: I asserted, without really researching the matter, that I had personally seen trucks with the markings of Turkish state enterprises, bringing these people into Istanbul. Although, in the strictest sense, I wasn't taking pictures of the trucks, as it turned out, everybody in Turkey has now acknowledged that the riots were "contrived" and organized by the Turkish government. We reported this, and that's what upset the ambassador in Ankara so much.

Q: When did it become apparent that the Menderes government had actually arranged to have the bomb set off at Ataturk's birthplace in Salonika?

NEWBERRY: That became clear much later, although suspicion that this was the case was widely reported. I think that it was several years later before somebody sort of "spilled the beans" and provided circumstantial evidence that the bomb was planted by agents of the Turkish government. That little bit of "clandestine information" took a long time to surface.

Q: Why were these called the "Cyprus riots"?

NEWBERRY: Because Cyprus was in the atmosphere. Negotiations on Cyprus were going on, and the slogans being "flung about" on the airwaves and newspapers all had to do with Cyprus. The explosion of the bomb that went off at Ataturk's birthplace in Salonika was associated with some sort of slogan having to do with Cyprus, although I would have to research this further. Anyway, everybody understood that the Turks were rioting over Cyprus, and these disturbances have always been referred to as the "Cyprus riots." On a smaller scale riots were going on in Izmir, too. However, since I wasn't in Izmir, I won't go into that.

Q: During and prior to these riots in 1955, had there been much in the press about the plight of the poor Turks in Cyprus who were a minority, what the Greeks were allegedly doing to them, and all of that?

NEWBERRY: No, there was very little material of that kind in the Turkish press. It all just seemed to surface during 1955. Certainly, during my first year in Istanbul [1952], the situation facing the Turks in Cyprus was not something that you heard about. Now, the Turkish minority in Greece was another matter. The Turks were always complaining about them. That's a complicated story, because the Turkish minority in Greece, in Western Thrace, was supposed to be assured of having certain rights by the Treaty of Lausanne, just as the Greek minorities in Turkey were assured of certain rights under the same treaty. Those were the issues that we read about in the press. However, the condition of the Turkish community in Cyprus was just something that never came up in the press.

Q: Did you have much contact with the Greek community in Istanbul?

NEWBERRY: Very much so. In our Economic-Commercial Section in the consulate general in Istanbul three of our five Foreign Service nationals were ethnic Greeks. Through them I got to meet a lot of people in that community. At that time I made friends with some Americans, art restorers, who were cleaning the mosaics and frescoes at the church of Kariye Camii St. Saviour in Chora, that little jewel of a Byzantine church in Istanbul. Through them I met a lot of other Greek Orthodox people. So I had lots of contacts with the Greeks.

In those days before the "Cyprus riots" the Greek neighborhoods of Istanbul were among the most interesting places that you could go in the evening. There were Greek "tavernas" where everybody, Greeks and Turks alike, were singing and getting drunk together. There was a wonderful atmosphere there. However, all of that came to an end after the "Cyprus riots."

Q: How did that manifest itself?

NEWBERRY: First of all, the Turks just stopped patronizing the Greek restaurants, tavernas, and so forth. The ethnic Greeks in Istanbul were obviously beginning to think that maybe they ought to "get out" of Turkey. So Greeks and Turks kept their distance from one another after that, and a lot of Greeks emigrated from Turkey.

Q: While you were in Istanbul, as this Greek-Turkish distrust became more evident, did you have any "feel" about the political pressure coming from the United States? There is no particular Turkish vote in the U.S., but there sure as hell is a Greek vote in our country. Did you feel any of that at this time?

NEWBERRY: Not at this time, Stu. I think this whole issue of Greek-American pressure on the U.S. government was a little slow in developing. After all, the British were still the sovereign power in Cyprus, and the status of Cyprus was considered a British, not an American problem. It was only after the British, Greeks, and Turks worked out what were called the "London-Zurich Accords" in 1959 or 1960 that there was an occasion or vantage point from which the United States could legitimately be expected to exercise

pressure on the Turks. And the pressure came, for sure.

Q: When did Turkey become a member of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]?

NEWBERRY: I believe that Turkey was actually voted into NATO at the end of 1951. It may have been December, 1951, or something like that.

Q: So you arrived in Istanbul...

NEWBERRY: In March, 1952.

Q: So Turkey was already a member of NATO.

NEWBERRY: It was a brand new member, and so was Greece. They were the two, new members of NATO.

Q: From your perspective and from what you were hearing at the consulate general in Istanbul, did Turkish entry into NATO make much of a difference?

NEWBERRY: Oh, very much so. This development certainly got everybody thinking about our relations with Turkey and why Turkey was important. Turkey was now being integrated into the whole scheme of Western defense in the stand against Soviet aggression and so forth. Oh, yes. This made Turkey definitely important. Of course, Turkey had already gained some repute from the behavior of the Turkish Brigade in South Korea during the Korean War. The fact was that the Turks had already shown what they could do on the battlefield in South Korea, where they performed marvelously, of course.

Everybody seemed to think that the entry of Greece and Turkey into NATO was "great." The Europeans clearly felt the same way. There were no misgivings, except back in the political capitals of Europe where there were people who didn't want either Greece or Turkey in NATO. However, the admission of Greece and Turkey was due to U.S. pressure. We "twisted arms" to accomplish this. In 1951 George McGhee was the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. He was generally credited for "masterminding" the whole strategy of bringing Greece and Turkey into NATO. Naturally, when he came out to Turkey to be the American ambassador, he was a "super hero" and is still so regarded by the Turks. Ambassador McGhee, thank God, was still going strong at the time. He went back to Turkey and is still regarded as one of Turkey's favorite Americans!

Q: How did you view the threat from the Soviet Union against Turkey at that time?

NEWBERRY: I don't think that the fact that we were in Turkey made so much difference as the fact that most Foreign Service officers were convinced that the Soviet Union had "aggressive designs" and that international communism was something that prepared us to take the whole danger of Soviet aggression very seriously. And, of course, the fact that

Turkey was geographically that much closer to the Soviet Union only reinforced that view in Turkey.

However, I knew that most Foreign Service officers in the 1950s had no doubt that the path of wisdom was to stop Soviet aggression before it went any further.

Q: When you were talking to your Turkish friends, was the Soviet Union a subject of concern to them?

NEWBERRY: It was, in some instances. I should say that it was more on the mind of the Turks than in our minds. The Turkish attitude toward dealing with the Soviet Union was epitomized, in my mind by what a young Turkish diplomat said to me back in the 1950s. This came up in regard to some outrage which the Soviet government had committed, and the American government had given a rather lukewarm response to, in the minds of the Turks. This Turkish diplomat said: "I know that you don't want to use the atom bomb, but give us a bomb, and we'll drop it on the Soviets." That sort of epitomizes the Turkish attitude in those years.

Q: Were there any other developments in Turkey during this 1952 to 1956 period that come to mind?

NEWBERRY: Regarding the period from 1952 to 1956 I can tell you some things that were NOT going on. The Turks were sublimely, if I can misuse this word, oblivious to the rest of the Middle East. The Turks have traditionally disdained the Arabs. They feel that the Arabs "stabbed them in the back" during World War I. They were not particularly interested in their Arab neighbors, except for Iraq. They took great care to stay on speaking terms with Iraq. Apart from that and in retrospect, considering what was going on in the Middle East, the fact that the Turks were so little involved is the reverse of something that happened. It was a "non happening." Furthermore, at the end of 1956, when the British, French, and Israelis attacked Egypt, this came as a big "thunderbolt" to the Turks. This reminded the Turks that the Middle East was right there, South of Turkey.

Q: You're referring to the "Suez Crisis."

NEWBERRY: Yes, the Suez Crisis.

Q: One last question on this. What about the visits to Turkey of ships of the Sixth Fleet of the U.S. Navy? Did you have any such visits to Istanbul, and how did they go?

NEWBERRY: We had many visits by ships of the Sixth Fleet. Of course, the Turks were delighted to have these visits. One of the great things that I have often pointed out is that the most important, single event in the history of U.S.-Turkish relations happened before I arrived in Turkey. It happened in 1946 when the battleship, USS MISSOURI, arrived in the port of Istanbul, bearing the remains of the Turkish ambassador to the United States who had died in Washington during World War II. This was the first opportunity to return his remains for burial in his native soil. President Harry Truman saw this as an

opportunity to drive a point home to the Soviets, so he chose the most famous battleship in the U.S. Navy and sent the remains of the Turkish ambassador back to Turkey. The Turks understood this symbol very clearly.

To this day, in 1997, Turks continue to remember just exactly where they were standing when they caught sight of the USS MISSOURI coming into the port of Istanbul. It was like Americans who can remember where they were when they heard about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 or when they heard about the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963. Many Turks remember that event in 1946. This is a rather long-winded response to your question. However, that was the first ship visit to Turkey. Then, when Turkey became a member of NATO, it became a matter of routine for ships of the Sixth Fleet to visit Istanbul. There were never any problems, nobody demonstrated against these visits, there were no "Yankee, Go Home" meetings, or any of that. The USO [United Services Organization] came out, and the American community rallied around. The Sixth Fleet ship visits were always a great occasion for members of the American community to show their pride.

Q: Did the problems of the Kurds or the Armenians arise at all, or was that more or less in the bailiwick of the embassy in Ankara?

NEWBERRY: Both of those subjects were pretty much "suppressed" in those days. As a matter of fact, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the 1950s, and for many years thereafter, would never acknowledge that there were such people as Kurds in the Republic of Turkey.

Q: They were referred to as "Mountain Turks."

NEWBERRY: They were called "Mountain Turks" or simply non Turkish speaking Turks. It was that bad. You simply could not have a discussion with any Turkish government official about the Kurds.

As far as the Armenians were concerned, this was all about a fairly hideous memory of what had happened to the Armenians in 1915 and previously. However, the Armenian community that was left in Turkey was mainly in Istanbul. Of course, the Istanbul Armenians were never subjected to all of that persecution. They may have had relatives who lived in other parts of Turkey and who were driven out of their homes, perished on the road, and so forth. However, I believe that, whether the Turkish government inspired these anti-Armenian actions in eastern Turkey, they never did anything like that in Istanbul. So there was only the memory of the horror and not the direct impressions of it on the part of Armenians living in Istanbul.

Q: What about the cultivation of hashish, opium poppies, and all of that. Was that an issue at this time?

NEWBERRY: It was not an issue. We were aware that there was some illegal trafficking, on a localized basis, in opium and opium derivatives. However, now that you ask me

about it in this context, I think that the whole issue of the world-wide trafficking in opium and opium derivatives had not developed to such an extent by the early 1950s that Turkey was brought into the controversy. However, the traffic was definitely going on. Of course, the Turkish government had a stake in this traffic because it was getting revenue from the legitimate or licit cultivation of opium for use in legitimate medicines. The opium went into the Turkish government's own factories which were producing authorized "alkaloids."

However, the traffic in hashish and opium was not a big, political issue and was not something that the American embassy and consulates had to worry about in the 1950s.

Q: You left Turkey in 1956. Where did you go next?

NEWBERRY: I was transferred to New York. Now that you open up that subject, it gives me a chance to digress again about the personnel assignment system in the Department of State and how different it was in those days. I'll repeat what I may have said before. There was no such thing as "bidding" on positions in Foreign Service posts, as there is now. Since I had spent no time in the Department, I had no idea about how to go about even inquiring about what my next assignment would be.

However, lo and behold, in the late summer of 1956, I received a letter from a man who had been my supervisory officer in the consulate general in Jerusalem. He had been to a dinner party in Washington where he talked to another Foreign Service officer, Jim Barteau, who had served on the Palestine Conciliation Commission [PCC] and who knew me slightly. Barteau was later the "Number Two" at the U.S. Permanent Mission to the UN [USUN]. Barteau told my former supervisor that they had just established a new position for a second press officer in USUN in New York. Barteau asked my friend and former supervisor if he had any idea of who might be available to fill that slot. So my friend mentioned my name. Barteau said that if I was interested in this position, I should write a letter right away to him at USUN.

And it all happened just like that. Barteau had a favorable impression toward me from a few encounters we had had, back in Jerusalem, some four or five years earlier. So that's the way the assignment came about. I was assigned to USUN as the junior or second-ranking press officer. This was not a USIS [United States Information Service] slot. It was a State Department slot.

Q: You were there at USUN from when to when?

NEWBERRY: I arrived at USUN around the end of August, or early September, 1956. I remember that I reported for duty at USUN on the day that the Suez Canal issue was inscribed on the UN agenda. This was before the British, French, and Israeli invasion of the Suez Canal area.

Q: Who was the Permanent Representative of the American Delegation to the UN at that time?

NEWBERRY: It was Henry Cabot Lodge. His Deputy was Jerry Wadsworth, who had been a Congressman and who was a member of the prominent, Wadsworth family in New York state. His family was very active, politically.

Q: Let's talk about Henry Cabot Lodge first. He was quite a political figure. He ran for the office of Vice President with Richard Nixon in 1960 and was very much involved in South Vietnam at a later stage. What was your impression of him?

NEWBERRY: I'll have to qualify my answer by saying that Cabot Lodge was something of a "remote figure" to people on his staff at USUN. We didn't really have occasion to sit down and chat with him, and he was not disposed to chat with us. However, we watched him and supported him. We saw, of course, how he was using his very prominent position. You can imagine that in the very early days of television and television news coverage, with the combination of the Suez Canal crisis and the revolution in Hungary, Henry Cabot Lodge was on television almost every night for weeks and months on end. If he had not been a national figure before that, he certainly was that after the extended "double crisis" of Suez and Hungary in late 1956 and early 1957.

I was referring to the television side of this "double crisis." In those days the whole technology of TV was so under-developed that, when Cabot Lodge was being interviewed on TV, he had to go to the TV studio. The stations didn't have all of these mobile vans and "link-up's" from remote locations. At this time the regular press officer was out of town, so Ambassador Lodge asked me to go with him to the TV studio. I went with him and was just sitting on the sidelines, watching the interview. After it was over, he gave me a ride back to where I lived. He lived in an apartment at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel.

I said to him: "Mr. Ambassador, you didn't really answer the question they asked you" about this or that subject. He said: "Dan, there's one thing you have to remember about going on TV or being interviewed on TV. You decide ahead of time what YOU want to talk about. You talk about it, no matter what the questions are." I've never forgotten that. I've seen that, and that's exactly what other, prominent people do. It was good advice, and I learned it early, not that I've done all of that much on TV.

Q: What was your job at USUN?

NEWBERRY: Actually, it was not all press work. The way the U.S. mission was organized, press and public affairs matters were all managed in the same office. I did a lot of what they considered "public appearances" work. In those years we dealt a lot with NGO's, or non-governmental organizations, some of which had permanent, observer missions at the UN. Other groups consisted of public-spirited organizations which would bring visitors to New York, and a visit to the UN was part of their program. A lot of my work involved appearing before these visiting groups and trying to describe how the U.S. mission to the UN was organized and how it represented United States interests. Some of our work involved how we had to "shift gears" during sessions of the UN General Assembly.

So I had these dual jobs of a public affairs officer, working with public groups, and then assisting the press officer. We had a daily press briefing at noon, every day, during the annual session of the General Assembly in the fall of each year. When other crises were on, we sometimes had daily press briefings.

At this point I have to mention, as an aside, that there was a very attractive young lady, who was in the UN Bureau of the daily newspaper, The Christian Science Monitor. She used to come to these press briefings and sat in the first row. She used to ask questions. Finally, one day, I asked her a question, and she said: "Yes!" [Laughter] She became my wife.

Q: You arrived at USUN at quite a hot time.

NEWBERRY: Indeed.

Q: We're talking about the impact of the double crisis of the Suez Canal issue and the Hungarian revolt in October-November, 1956. What was your impression of what we were doing and what were some of the issues that we had to deal with?

NEWBERRY: As far as the Suez crisis was concerned, I think that everybody in USUN supported President Eisenhower. It was a "bitter pill" for our British and French allies to follow the lead of U.S. policy on this matter. I think that in this regard there was very little dissent among the Americans on our mission staff. They felt that Eisenhower did absolutely the right thing to "blow the whistle" on the British, the French, and the Israelis. It was very difficult to restore what had been very cordial working relations with the British, the French, and some of the other European and NATO allies and delegations at the UN. So a "chill" developed between us on this matter. However, eventually, this all settled down, and the British decided, and the British body politic in particular probably decided, that Eisenhower was right, and Sir Anthony Eden [British Prime Minister at the time] was wrong.

Q: What about the Hungarian revolt? Were you involved at all in that?

NEWBERRY: Oh, yes. Everybody in our mission was involved, especially the two press officers, because we had hours-long sessions, sometimes with both issues being debated back and forth. I remember that, on one occasion, I was in the UN building continuously for about 38 hours, without getting out of there. It was that kind of intense, prolonged, protracted work pressure. But it was fascinating, and we were all gripped by it. Fortunately, there were snack bars at the UN where we could get something to eat, both day and night. So we didn't die of hunger!

On Hungary, first of all, there was the "trauma" of it. Even then, some of us had a sneaking suspicion, and we used to mumble this to ourselves, that maybe we had "misled" the Hungarians to expect too much from the U.S. That was one element. However, we were so busy that we didn't really spell it all out.

When I mention the trauma, I remember one particular moment, when the Soviet Army moved into Budapest. At a certain point the Associated Press ticker at the United Nations was "hooked into" the Associated Press Bureau in Budapest. Then I discovered what was going on. I was looking at the "Telex" machine as this material was coming in, with "blow by blow" descriptions from the AP office in Budapest, reporting what was happening. One report said that Soviet soldiers were downstairs in the AP building and were coming up the stairs. And then, all of a sudden, this report stopped. It still gives me the "creeps" to recall this. We had been that close to the event. It was almost as if we were talking to the AP staff. So it was a very dramatic time.

Q: You were assistant press officer of the mission from 1956 to when?

NEWBERRY: I was there from 1956 to 1958.

Q: What was your impression of the journalists in the press corps with whom you were working?

NEWBERRY: It was a very large press corps. There were some very good journalists and some who were not so good. Most of the wire services had first rate people covering the UN. One of the reporters whom I felt privileged to have known was a real "pioneer" in journalism, Pauline Frederick. She was the first, really prominent woman television reporter. She was covering the UN full time. I had many occasions to have really "in depth" conversations with her. I probably learned more from her than she learned from me.

There were a lot of journalists of that caliber. I think that some of the major U.S. newspapers like the bureau of The New York Times at the UN had at least four, full time people covering the UN. The "Herald-Tribune" had two or three full time people at the UN. Even The New York Daily News had three, full time reporters, even though they didn't carry much material on the UN in that paper.

Q: The New York Daily News is a tabloid.

NEWBERRY: A tabloid, and I used to wonder how in the world they could justify having three people assigned to the UN. You check the clippings of articles in the "News" on the UN, and there probably wouldn't be more than four or five column inches per day. But the "News" maintained a fairly large staff at the UN.

Anyway, there were a lot of first rate reporters assigned to the UN and a lot of attention paid to everything that was going on there. If you'll pardon the expression, some of the "provincial" newspapers, like The St. Louis Post-Dispatch and The Chicago Sun-Times both had full time reporters covering the UN. They covered nothing but the UN. So it was a very stimulating environment for me to work in, apart from being the press officer for the U.S. Mission to the UN.

Q: Did an "anti-UN" lobby develop in the United States at that time which you had to deal with?

NEWBERRY: We at the mission had little occasion to deal with it. We were aware of some of the sentiments, but I'll tell you that, in our perspective, and my own perspective as well, we were not particularly concerned about it. Mind you, we were working under a Republican administration. Some of what I might call the more ardent conservatives in the mission referred somewhat cynically to what they called, the "cult of the UN." This term about the "cult of the UN" referred to people who often made the point that the United Nations is our "one, last hope for peace" and that we have to support everything that the UN is trying to do.

Some of us felt that this attitude was going too far, because we saw the limitations of the UN and appreciated at first hand what the UN could and could not do. However, we didn't feel any direct impact from what the "anti-UN people" were saying and doing. In a way, I used to blame what we used to call the "cult of the UN" for raising the expectations of the American public regarding what the UN could do.

Q: Was Henry Cabot Lodge our UN ambassador during the whole time you were there in USUN?

NEWBERRY: Yes. Actually, I only served in USUN for two years. I think that Lodge was there until he resigned to run for Vice President in 1960.

Q: What was your impression of some of the other delegations at the UN?

NEWBERRY: Well, mine was a very narrow perspective. In spite of the rather chilly relations we had with the British mission to the UN after the Suez Crisis in 1956, I felt that they were very well equipped and represented. Some of the smaller countries had very good people there. For example, the Danes, although they had a very small mission, really paid a lot of attention to what was going on. The same thing was true of the Swedes. Of course, Dag Hammarskjold of Sweden was the Secretary General of the UN, and it was not surprising that the Swedes would pay a lot of attention to the organization.

I didn't have that much contact with the other delegations, except for the Turkish delegation, since I had served so much time in Turkey. I was "befriended" by the Turkish mission and was very glad to be so treated. I learned something about the Turkish perspective, but I can't say that the Turkish Delegation to the UN was all that influential. This was just a personal interest of mine.

Q: What were relations like between the U.S. and Israel within the UN context at that time?

NEWBERRY: Once we got past the Suez crisis of 1956-57 and things "settled down," the "status quo ante" in our relations was restored, and the importance of Israel in the American foreign policy process came very much to the fore. We had very close contacts

with the Israeli UN Mission. In those days the Israelis sent some of their top diplomats to head their mission at the UN. I think that any of us in the Foreign Service who had been "saturated" with the influence of Zionist and other friends of Israel on the formulation and conduct of American foreign policy did not need to be reminded of it. The evidence of it was there, every day.

Q: What about the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Soviet bloc? Was there much contact with them at this point?

NEWBERRY: I would say, in general, that it was sort of an "operational contact." We would be in touch with the Soviets in getting co-sponsors for resolutions in the General Assembly or in the Security Council. There was a certain amount of "collegial contact" with the Soviet delegation. However, our objectives and purposes were so much opposed to one another that there was not all that much contact. That is, unless our "clandestine people" were making contact with the Soviets, and we didn't know about it.

Q: How did you work with the press? Did you go out to them with an agenda, and they would come in with an agenda? How did this work out?

NEWBERRY: In general, the way that my boss, Frank Carpenter, and I operated, once we were briefed on the situation and read the morning "take" of telegrams, which the mission to the UN circulated to us, we would contact other delegations and the UN Secretariat to find out what was going on. Other delegations certainly didn't hesitate to ask us what we thought about given issues. I remember one particularly aggressive guy who would call me at home on the weekends and even on Sunday morning, because he was "on duty." In general, the press did not let us escape knowing what questions they were interested in. So when it came time for the formal and principal briefings, we had a pretty good idea of what the press people were going to ask.

Q: Was there any difference between the questions asked by TV and press representatives in those days, as far as approach and that sort of thing?

NEWBERRY: I don't think so. Most of the TV reporters, like John McVane and Pauline Fredericks had come to their jobs after working for the "print media." It seemed to me that their style of operating was very much like that of the other journalists who worked for the "wire services" and the major, metropolitan newspapers. They also had "deadlines" to meet. The Baltimore Sun had a full-time reporter at the UN.

Q: What about your "backstopping" from the State Department? I mean from the Bureau of International Organizations Affairs [the IO Bureau]? Did you feel the "heavy hand" of the IO Bureau or not?

NEWBERRY: Not as much as IO would like to have been able to do. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge saw to that! Cabot Lodge was a member of the President's cabinet, and he reminded the people in IO that they were dealing with a cabinet officer. That sort of kept the IO people "at bay." However, on the operational level we found ways, without

affronting Ambassador Lodge or anybody else, of keeping in touch with IO.

As I was about to say, we at the working level had our own telephone lines to the State Department, and particularly to the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. We found ways of coordinating our views in the manner that we needed, without getting into a "turf battle" between the Assistant Secretary for IO and Ambassador Lodge at the UN.

Q: You were there at USUN until 1958. That was after the Suez and the Hungarian crises were over. Was there anything else that particularly occupied your time at the UN?

NEWBERRY: Toward the end of my time in USUN and in the summer of 1958 "all hell broke loose" in Baghdad, Iraq. Nuri Said, the Prime Minister; Crown Prince Illah, the Prince Regent; and King Faisal were all hanged after a coup d'etat, which overthrew the Iraqi government.

Q: We're talking about the coup which occurred on July 14, 1958.

NEWBERRY: That was a very dramatic event which attracted our attention at the UN. That kept all of us at USUN "chasing around," during my closing weeks in New York. I was transferred to Washington at the end of that summer.

Q: What was the general reaction in the Department to the coup? Did we do anything? Were there any elements of concern about this event in Baghdad?

NEWBERRY: First of all, there was astonishment that it had happened. As with most of these events in the Middle East, the Soviets were always "rattling" their missiles and so forth. This was always a backdrop to the event. Whoever was in charge in the Soviet Union would say: "If you don't do this, that, or the other, we'll fire missiles which will rain down on you." That was always part of the problem which made everybody, shall we say, more "uptight" than would otherwise have been the case.

Q: What about President Eisenhower sending our troops into Lebanon because of this whole crisis in the Middle East? Did that cause any flurry in the UN?

NEWBERRY: I think it only caused a flurry among people who had served in the Middle East. Some of us thought that this deployment of U.S. troops was unnecessary. However, I wouldn't say that there were extended discussions on the matter. I personally thought that the situation in Lebanon was such that we didn't have to send troops there. You may recall that when the U.S. troops landed, they were welcomed by the Lebanese people. However, that's another story for somebody else's book.

Q: Then in the late summer of 1958 you went back to Washington.

NEWBERRY: To serve on the Turkish desk.

Q: Today is December 16, 1997. Dan, we have you coming back to the Turkish desk in the late summer of 1958. You were on the Turkish desk from when to when?

NEWBERRY: I don't remember the exact dates, but it was from the late summer of 1958 until November, 1959.

Q: How did the Turkish desk fit into the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at that time?

NEWBERRY: Turkey was one of three countries in an organization called the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, also known by the acronym of "GTI." Although Cyprus was beginning to be treated as a separate entity, I recall that Archer Blood was working in GTI. He later went on to greater glory. Cleo Noel was working on Cyprus, and Grad Mawser was working on Iran. The Turkish desk was larger in those days, so I had an officer senior to me as the officer in charge of Turkish Affairs, Guy Hope. I was the number two officer on the Turkish desk. We worked under the general direction of the office director for Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Owen Jones.

Q: During the 1958-1959 period what were the major issues that you found yourself dealing with on the Turkish desk?

NEWBERRY: The major subject that I recall, and I'm sure that I dealt with many others, was the whole set of problems associated with the growing, American military presence in Turkey. The Pentagon, the State Department, and other U.S. government agencies found that it was very convenient for us to have an "open door" in Turkey. The Prime Minister of Turkey was very glad to have his country seen as a "chosen instrument" of the United States.

I remember vividly, I must say, and on my own initiative, since I had seen the signs of this tendency before I left Turkey in 1956, that I prepared a paper pointing to the dangers of the growing American military presence in Turkey. The number of American military personnel in Turkey was approaching 10,000. I thought that a presence of this size was full of potential trouble and was already beginning to reflect such trouble. This was in terms of the inevitable collisions of American servicemen with Turkish traditions, institutions, and traffic. The American presence in Turkey was beginning to be a big, big problem.

This was a time when the NATO "Status of Forces" agreement was being negotiated with Turkey. The application of a "Status of Forces" agreement standard allowed the American military to "declare" an incident involving an infraction of Turkish law as being committed while the American serviceman involved was "on duty," in which case it was beyond the reach of the Turkish courts. This was already giving us a lot of problems and was going to create even bigger problems later on.

I recall that this was the main problem that I worked on. Of course, I worked on other subjects. There was the growing, political dissension and the exasperation of the Turkish

body politic with the regime of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. It became more and more repressive, putting restrictions on opposition parties, which I alluded to in an earlier part of this oral history. There were signs that the Turkish military was plotting to get rid of the Adnan Menderes regime. Lo and behold, the Turkish military did just that, shortly after I left the Turkish desk early in 1960.

Q: Going back to the American presence in Turkey, did you have any contact with people at the Pentagon on this matter, or did you have any discussion with your superiors on this issue?

NEWBERRY: No. There were discussions on this subject, but I was not directly involved in them. My immediate superior, Guy Hope, and his superiors had their own liaison arrangements with the Pentagon. That was just not one of the things that they assigned to me to handle.

A great deal of this liaison was handled in the field between the American embassy and the MAG [Military Advisory Group] or, as they called it in Turkey, the JUSMAT [Joint United States Military Advisory Group in Turkey], as well as the U.S. Air Force in Turkey. This was a very "stormy" relationship. At one point, in 1959, I found myself on a visit to Turkey, right in the middle of a big investigation of a currency scandal, involving a full colonel in the U.S. Air Force and a lot of people on his staff. The American military in Izmir were caught "red handed" in large scale, black marketing of American currency. In short, we had a huge array of problems, on which the American military was not very sympathetic with the State Department.

Q: Was it part of your job to monitor the problem of the American presence in Turkey?

NEWBERRY: Very much so. We were in contact, either by telegram or by letter transmitted by pouch. The embassy and the consulates knew very well that the Turkish desk back in Washington was very much aware of these problems and welcomed more alert and detailed reporting on this matter. We always commended the embassy and the consulates for what they were doing in this respect. One of the "stranger" duties of the junior officer on the Turkish desk was to write evaluations of reports from the field. These evaluations, by the way, were signed by my superior officers, but everybody knew that Dan Newberry was writing them. I'm proud to say that, despite the fact that I "chided" some of the drafting officers for "overlooking" some things, they are still my friends today.

Q: What about the political situation in Turkey? You say that the coup d'etat which overthrew the Menderes government happened...

NEWBERRY: On May 19, 1960. I left the Turkish desk in December, 1959.

Q: Were you getting reports on the situation within the Turkish Army, and were you on the "alert" that this coup d'etat was brewing? You mentioned before that in the embassy in Ankara there was a tendency to "pooh-pooh" such reports.

NEWBERRY: Well, the indications of a possible coup got worse.

Q: Did you talk about the situation and how you saw it?

NEWBERRY: Yes. How I saw it and how my colleagues saw it, because we used to wring our hands and mutter about it among ourselves. Although there were plenty of signs of unrest in the Turkish Army, even reports to this effect in the Turkish press, insofar as the newspapers would dare to print such material and risk having the papers closed down. The level of discontent was rising. There were even demonstrations here and there against what the press considered repression by the Adnan Menderes party, even before I left the Turkish desk.

However, Ambassador Fletcher Warren in Ankara was a very capable Foreign Service officer. He is now dead. He lived to a great age, well into his 90s, in Texas. Fletcher Warren considered that America's interest in Turkey would be best served by preserving Adnan Menderes in power as Prime Minister. He simply did not encourage any adverse or, shall I say, disparaging reports on the state of Adnan Menderes' government. Some of these disparaging reports managed to be sent to the Department of State, one way or another, but basically his approach to Washington was to protect the reputation of Adnan Menderes. I would say that, although I'm jumping ahead of this story, people who have studied modern Turkish history know that eventually the military, revolutionary government which overthrew Menderes sent him to the gallows. He was hanged.

Fletcher Warren still tried his best, right up until the end of the whole drama, to save Adnan Menderes, because he considered that Menderes had been such a good friend of the United States.

Q: What view was taken of the reports coming into the Department from Ambassador Warren and from other parts of our embassy, as well as the analysis that we were getting? Was it apparent in Washington that there was a real, "split view" of how things were going in Turkey?

NEWBERRY: It was evident to me, mainly from talking to people senior to me. I was not privy to a lot of the highly classified traffic, so I don't know actually what went on. I have forgotten what my rank was at the time. Even though I had been in the Foreign Service for nine or 10 years, I looked much younger than that. People tended to treat me as a junior officer, even though I had nearly 10 years of experience. However, I wasn't "cut in" on a lot of the reporting.

Q: When you talk about highly classified telegrams, I was thinking that this usually means at the ambassadorial level, or something like that.

NEWBERRY: I'm only guessing, Stu. Since I didn't see these cables to which I refer, maybe they didn't really exist.

Q: Who was the Director of the Office of GTI Affairs, and who was the Assistant Secretary for the Near East?

NEWBERRY: In charge of GTI was Owen Jones, whom I referred to before. Owen Jones had an excellent background. He had served in Ankara as the Economic Counselor in the fairly recent past. He knew the situation and knew Ambassador Warren, who was out there in Ankara. So Owen Jones was about as good a choice as we could have to be the Director of GTI in that situation. His deputy was Millau Williams, who had previously served in Greece. Williams went on to be an ambassador in Central America. He, too, is now dead.

Above the Office of GTI the Assistant Secretary was William Rountree. The Deputy Assistant Secretary with whom I dealt most was "Pete" Hart, or Parker T. Hart, who is very well known and well considered in the Foreign Service.

Q: Do you feel that Owen Jones shared your concerns about Menderes and company?

NEWBERRY: I think so. At least that's my recollection. However, given the way that the State Department was organized in those days, an FSO-1 [high rank] didn't spend all that much time talking to an FSO-5 [more junior officer]. Owen Jones was a busy man, and he had Greece, Iran, and Cyprus to deal with, as well as a lot of other people to talk to. I don't begrudge him that. I admired him, and he's still a great friend of mine but I didn't spend all that much time talking with him.

Q: Dan, while you were on the Turkish desk, did you run across the "Greek Lobby" at all, during this 1958-1959 period?

NEWBERRY: I knew that it was there but I think that they had not "geared up" as well as they obviously did later on. It had not yet become a major feature of the Washington scene, but it was very much there.

Let me remind you that the British were still governing Cyprus at this time. There was a time when I was on the Turkish desk when the Turks had that horrible, airplane crash. Adnan Menderes and his whole retinue were on the plane, and several people were killed. They were on their way to discuss the Cyprus problem with the Greeks and the British. So that is another reason why I think, in retrospect, that the Greek Lobby in American politics had not yet become a major factor. Cyprus was still a British possession.

Q: What about the Turkish attitude toward NATO and, more particularly, toward the Soviet Union? Were we at all concerned that the Turks might try to do business with the Soviets or not?

NEWBERRY: Absolutely not. On the contrary, the Turks have the reputation of being our "staunchest ally." Regarding NATO, the Turks wanted more NATO infrastructure projects, and they got a lot of them. The defense of Turkey's eastern border with the Soviet Union was consciously strengthened by the Turks and by NATO. Our relations

with Turkey, in the NATO context, were very productive during the years I served in Turkey. After the coup d'etat of 1960 a lot of questions began to be asked, but this is jumping ahead of the story, and I was off the Turkish desk by that time.

Q: Did you have the feeling that Turkey still played a secondary role in American policy in the Near East at that time?

NEWBERRY: Yes, very definitely. We felt in many ways that whenever Turkish cabinet ministers came to Washington, it was always a struggle to make sure that they got in to see the "right people." Of course, the Turkish desk was not the only desk that had that problem.

Q: Did you also find that within the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Turkey was a country of "secondary interest," as compared to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia?

NEWBERRY: Oh, not at all. Turkey was one of the leading countries in NEA [Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs] which, in those days, included South Asia and Africa. It was a big bureau, but Turkey was regarded as at least as important as Egypt, but not as important as Israel. Israel has always had a very special place in the American foreign policy scheme of things. Nobody had any illusions about what was the "number one" country in NEA.

Q: You left the Turkish desk in 1959. Then where did you go?

NEWBERRY: It turned out to be quite an adventure, for all sorts of reasons. With respect to my own, professional future, as I mentioned a while ago, I was concerned about still being treated as a "junior officer." By now I had been in the Foreign Service for 10 years. I was looking for a way of getting a more substantial position. Instead, I got something quite different from what I had bargained for. I had let it be known that I was looking for another job.

I had just taken time out to attend Pratt Summer School at McGill University [in Canada] to study French. So I was newly certified as being fairly fluent in French. Somebody in Personnel had heard about this. He had a "desperate vacancy" in Vientiane, Laos. The ambassador there had been sending "NIACT" [Night Action] telegrams about this vacancy. Before I knew it and before I could even "check out" the situation, I was "in the pipeline" to go to Laos.

Meanwhile, my courtship with the lady up in New York had been proceeding. The assignment to Laos precipitated a decision for us to get married right away. So our wedding date was set for December 3, 1959. After our wedding we took a 15,000 mile wedding trip from Asheville, North Carolina, to Vientiane, Laos!

This next assignment to the embassy in Vientiane was an adventure in many ways.

Q: You were in Laos from 1960 until when?

NEWBERRY: From December, 1959, until December, 1961. For reasons which we can review, I got out of Vientiane precisely on the second anniversary of my arrival there. I was plenty ready to leave.

Q: Who was ambassador when you went to Vientiane?

NEWBERRY: The ambassador who had been there for some time and who was so insistent about getting another French-speaking officer out there was Horace Harrison Smith. He was a "Far East hand" and was fairly well known in the Foreign Service in those days. About six months after I arrived in Vientiane, Ambassador Smith was replaced by Ambassador Winthrop Brown, who arrived in Laos in early summer, 1960. He was still ambassador when I left Laos in 1961. Then Ambassador Brown went on to be ambassador to the Republic of Korea and, I think, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs.

I don't want to distract the reader or the transcriber of this memoir with too many personal reminiscences.

Q: Well, let's see what you have to say.

NEWBERRY: It will become evident, if it is not already so, that I admired Ambassador Winthrop Brown and that I did not admire Ambassador Horace Smith.

Q: Let's talk about the situation in Laos when you arrived there in December, 1959. This was a time when the situation in Laos was beginning to "heat up," and Laos became a significant center of public attention.

NEWBERRY: Well, not quite. The whole of the former Indochina was receiving attention, but Laos was still a little known corner of Indochina. In fact, many people at our wedding had to ask me where Laos was on the map and what was this place called "Vientiane." They would ask: "Don't you mean 'Vietnam?'" This was a fairly sophisticated community in Asheville, North Carolina. However, a lot of the people we met didn't even know where Vientiane, Laos, was!

Anyway, what I intended to say was that, when I arrived in Vientiane, after all of those "NIACT" telegrams the ambassador had sent to the Department about filling my position, I found that the ambassador was going to put me to work doing something other than what he had been screaming about in those telegrams. In fact, the embassy initially didn't even have a desk for me! Anyhow, I figured that I "lucked out," because these telegrams precipitated the lady's decision to marry me and to go with me to Indochina. I was happy, no matter what the job was.

As far as the political situation was and the place of Laos in the world, these were still a puzzle to me and to most of the Americans in our embassy there, who were not "in the know." There was a "huge" CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] component there. They far outnumbered the State Department people, and I was about to say the AID [Agency for

International Development] mission. It was the most blatantly open, "clandestine" operation I have ever seen. Everybody in Laos knew who many of the CIA operatives were, and the CIA people didn't make any attempt to disguise their affiliation.

As a matter of fact, there was a very colorful, picturesque CIA man in Vientiane whose name was Campbell James. He was famous among CIA veterans of those days. The way the newly arrived CIA people identified themselves to the Lao was by asking the question: "Do you know my friend, Campbell James?" That was a way of announcing that they worked for the CIA and that the Lao could deal with them accordingly.

Then we had a "disguised," military aid mission. Under the terms of the 1954 Geneva Accords, there was not supposed to be anything like a military aid mission in Laos. We had something called the "PEO," or the "Program Evaluation Organization." Every one of the men assigned to the PEO dressed alike in sort of British-looking, white tropical shirts, shorts, knee length stockings, and white shoes. They all stood to attention when they talked to one another. There was a Major General, Johnny Heintges (John Arnold Heintges), who was in charge of this group. Instead of calling him "General," everybody called him "Chief." Again, this was a very thinly disguised MAAG [Military Assistance and Advisory Group] mission in Laos. It was a very bizarre situation that my wife and I moved into when we arrived in Vientiane at the end of 1959.

Q: Well, what was happening in Laos? Why was all of this there?

NEWBERRY: There was a communist-inspired insurgency, called the "Pathet Lao," which controlled a good bit of the country. They were very aggressive. As far as we understood it, the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union were giving the Pathet Lao aid and comfort. Meanwhile, the country was still ostensibly governed by the King of Laos, whose residence was in Luang Prabang [some 120 miles North of Vientiane] and who was a remote figure. However, the real leaders were other Princes from the royal family.

Prince Souvanna Phouma was the Prime Minister. His half brother, another member of the royal family, was Prince Souphannouvong, who had associated himself with the communists years before. He was a communist protégé. Prince Souvanna Phouma and Prince Souphannouvong were openly contesting with each other for power, supported by their sponsors: the French and the Americans, in the case of Souvanna Phouma, and the North Vietnamese, the Chinese Communists, and the Soviet Union, in the case of Souphannouvong.

I'm not sure that anybody understood what we were trying to do in Laos. It was certainly never conveyed to us by the ambassador and the "Country Team" [ambassador's senior advisers]. In addition, there were hundreds and even thousands of American officials, milling around and "doing their own thing," without very much coordination.

Q: What was your job in the embassy in Vientiane?

NEWBERRY: I was assigned there to be a liaison officer between the embassy and the thinly-disguised MAAG mission, but the ambassador realized that it was a waste of effort to have a French-speaking officer dealing with Americans. The embassy replaced me with a Thai-speaking officer, who did liaison work with the American military! I became the second-ranking officer in the Political Section. My assigned duty was to cover the Lao National Assembly, which passed for a Parliament. However, I found that there were three or four CIA officers who were doing the same thing I was doing, and with more resources at their disposal than I had. So it was an uphill struggle.

Q: When you say this, in the first place, was the Lao National Assembly an effective, political organ, or was this just a sort of "show piece"?

NEWBERRY: It was more of a "show piece" than otherwise. Just to give you an example of how well-equipped the members of the National Assembly, the deputies, were, all of the legislation introduced into the Lao National Assembly was drafted in French by French bureaucrats seconded to the Lao government and ultimately translated into Lao. The debates in the National Assembly were in French, and then they were translated into Lao before they were published. This gives you a pretty good idea of who was doing the "technical work" of the National Assembly.

I hesitate to say that French advisers were "calling the shots," because there were real shots being fired before long. However, French officials were still very much in control of the situation and also in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We in the American embassy dealt openly with French bureaucrats, who were telling Lao officials how to conduct the foreign affairs of Laos.

Q: Then, in a way, your most effective work involved dealing with French officials who were working for the Lao?

NEWBERRY: Yes. That was certainly the most satisfying aspect of my work to me because I had very intelligent conversations with these French officials.

I would like to get back to this other point, about the competition with CIA officers. A very vivid episode comes to mind. When the situation was much "tenser," later on, I had a conversation with Chao Somsanith, who was the President of the Lao National Assembly. In other words, he was the Speaker of the National Assembly. This was at a time when it looked as if the Pathet Lao were going to take over the coalition government, or some such thing. I thought that Somsanith, the President of the National Assembly, expressed some very interesting views, contrary to what his own colleagues had been telling our ambassador. So I reported all of this, and the ambassador sent this report to the Department of State. He said that he had no idea that Prince Somsanith was an "independent thinker."

The next day one of these CIA officers went around and had another talk with the same man, Chao Somsanith, and sent out a completely contradictory telegram through his own channels to Washington. I didn't find out about this, and neither did the ambassador, until

several days later. What the people in Washington made out of the President of the National Assembly talking out of both sides of his mouth to different American officials and why he did so, I leave it to you and to our readers to conjecture.

Q: Were you sort of "tripping over" the CIA people? Laos is a small country, and if the CIA had three people covering the same ground that you were covering, I would have thought that there would have been a "traffic control problem."

NEWBERRY: Well, they had their own communications system.

Q: I was thinking of "traffic" in the sense of going in and out of these offices.

NEWBERRY: Or the embassy parking lot. Sometimes this was a problem in itself. To say that we had problems is another way of saying that we were just trying to make our way through the congestion. There were several conspicuous and, shall I say, ubiquitous figures involved. I sometimes had this figure of speech in my mind. We in the State Department, Foreign Service officers, were like the "gigolos" at a tremendous house party. We were keeping the guests entertained, while the "second story men" were upstairs doing our work. That is the feeling I had as an embassy officer in the midst of all of this so-called "clandestine activity," which was so much more extensive than our own, official activity.

Q: What was your impression of the communist threat where you were in Laos?

NEWBERRY: The communist-supported "threat" was very evident. For example, when I made one of my fairly rare trips to Luang Prabang, the "Royal Capital" [as distinguished from the "National Capital" in Vientiane], we flew on small airplanes which were just able to fly above the anti-aircraft fire of the Pathet Lao stationed between Vientiane and Luang Prabang. The Pathet Lao had "infested" a great deal of Laos, practically to the outskirts of Vientiane. That was the situation in northern Laos. When the Lao government forces moved a little farther South toward Savannakhet [in central Laos, on the Mekong River], the Pathet Lao anti-aircraft did not reach that far, of course.

A metaphor which often came to my mind when I traveled in the countryside, and every Foreign Service officer wants to get out and see the countryside, was that so much of the country was "infested" by the Pathet Lao, Vientiane was sort of an island. Other places, like Luang Prabang, and Sam Neua, in northern Laos, were other islands. All around us and between these "islands" were shark-infested seas, and the sharks were called "Pathet Lao." The situation was that bad.

This was the situation in northern Laos. Southern Laos was where the anti-communists retreated to when the civil war broke out in August, 1960.

Q: What was happening before August, 1960? It sounds as if a war was going on, anyway.

NEWBERRY: Yes. There was a guerrilla war going on in the countryside. The royal government controlled all of the major towns in the country. However, as I just indicated, it could not reach many of these towns by road. That was the beginning of the operation in support of the "Montagnard" [mountain people], whom we called the "Meo" or "Hmong." Supporting the Meo was a particular responsibility of the CIA people. There was a particularly "heroic" CIA officer who, every couple of weeks, would go up to Sam Neua, which was way up in northern Laos. He was the source of many stories about the "beleaguered" Meo contingent up there, surrounded by Pathet Lao and eventually overwhelmed by them. So traveling around and working in the provinces in Laos in 1960 and 1961 was a dangerous and sometimes fatal business. We lost a few of our colleagues there, some of them in air accidents.

Q: What was your impression of the Lao politicians and the other Lao people you were dealing with?

NEWBERRY: It's hard to answer that. The Lao, as people, are very lovable and charming. However, their culture and their whole way of thinking is so different from ours. I began to look on them as people who were just trying to survive and to provide as best they could for their families and other people close to them. They were just trying to figure out, day by day, which way to jump. That was the theory that I had.

The Lao were not terribly sophisticated. When my wife and I arrived in Laos and, for all I know, this may still be true, there was only one high school in Laos. One "lycée" in the whole country! The lycée, of course, was a school with a French curriculum, located in Vientiane. You can imagine the level of sophistication of the people below the high-ranking government officials. Even in Vientiane, below a certain level, you couldn't find people who could speak even "pigeon French" [or "Français Negrillon" or "Français Petit Nègre," as the French used to call it].

Q: You had come from the Turkish desk in the State Department. You were concerned about having "too many Americans" with NATO and so forth, with the subsequent impact on Turkish culture. Did this type of concern carry over to Laos, when you talk about the number of CIA and U.S. military people?

NEWBERRY: It was a very different kind of concern. My dismay at what my wife and I found in Laos brought me very close to giving up my career as a Foreign Service officer. I had the feeling that "we Americans," that is, United States government officials, had no idea of what we were doing. We were just floundering around in Laos, misleading these poor, simple, unsophisticated people and expecting more than we were going to get. I felt that in that particular, little corner of the world that we were in, we didn't know what we were doing, we didn't know where we were going, and we had no "vision" of the future.

Then it became evident from Washington that President John Kennedy had decided to make a "stand" in Vietnam and to cut our losses and whatever strings we had in Laos. I don't know that anybody said it this way, so many words, but we in the embassy in Vientiane said this to each other. Governor Averill Harriman was appointed to negotiate

some kind of "arrangement" in Laos. By the way, later on, when our efforts in Vietnam turned sour, many people referred to the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" [supply line from North Vietnam to South Vietnam, through Laos] as the "Averill Harriman Memorial Highway." However, I later worked closely with Averill Harriman. I want to make the point that he was a very loyal member of the Kennedy administration. If he made a bargain that way, at the Conference on Laos in Geneva in 1962, it's because President Kennedy told him to do so. So if you want to call the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" something else, you could call it the "John F. Kennedy Memorial Highway." Why? Because it was Kennedy's policy that Harriman was carrying out during the Laos negotiations in 1961-1962.

Q: How did you follow these negotiations at Geneva? In the first place, they started under the Eisenhower administration and then moved to the Kennedy administration.

NEWBERRY: Right.

Q: What was the feeling on how the negotiations started and how they ended?

NEWBERRY: In retrospect, we all sort of cheered over the whole history of our involvement in Indochina. I can't really put myself back, after all that's happened, into what I thought in 1958 about Indochina. I thought that we had sort of come to a general agreement. Being a Foreign Service officer working somewhere else in the world, I tried to keep up with these things. However, I'm just trying to project myself back in time. My view was that Indochina was an area that we had sort of agreed to neutralize. After all, we had the Accords from the Conference in Geneva in 1954 and we thought that this had all been settled. However, then other things happened. I had the feeling that Washington had "changed its mind" and that we had decided to be more aggressive in Indochina but had not really thought the matter through. I still have many questions in my own mind. We were in Vietnam but we didn't know where we were going. I certainly had that feeling about Laos.

Q: At some point wasn't there a military plan to insert a lot of American troops into Laos? Were you aware of this?

NEWBERRY: I just heard talk of this. It was all on a "need to know" basis, and since I didn't need to know, I wasn't told very much about it.

Q: In the long run our common sense came back, and since there was no airport in Laos, what were we going to do with these troops?

NEWBERRY: The infrastructure of Laos was all wrong. Our military people there, the men in the white shorts and stockings, knew this, too. However, they were disciplined people, and if somebody gave them an order, they would say, "Yes, sir," salute, and go off to do what they were ordered to do.

Q: You mentioned that you were not on the best of terms or didn't care for Ambassador Horace Smith. Could you talk about him as an ambassador and so forth?

NEWBERRY: Ambassador Horace Smith was a remote figure to almost everybody at the embassy in Vientiane. He chose to conduct much of his telegraphic traffic with Washington on what we later called a "NODIS," or "No Distribution" basis. So most of his reports on his conversations and his instructions from Washington were simply not distributed to anybody else in the embassy. If the DCM [deputy chief of mission], who was John Holt, ever saw any of this cable traffic, he never told any of us about it. I was on very congenial terms with John Holt, who was a very nice person.

The way that Ambassador Horace Smith managed the embassy, he had a French-American FSO, a lady who had joined the Foreign Service as a "Wristonee" ["lateralized" into the Foreign Service under a program set up in the mid-1950s by Henry Wriston, a former Dean of Brown College]. She had been a teacher of French, I believe, at one of the colleges near Baltimore. I believe that it was Hood or Goucher College. She was bilingual in French and English. Ambassador Smith took her everywhere, and she was in on everything. However, she never told any of us anything. So the conduct of our official relations with Laos was being carried on by Ambassador Horace Smith and this very brilliant but "close-mouthed" lady, named Francoise Queneau. She has long since retired from the Foreign Service.

All of this was going on, and the rest of the embassy and the mission were only told, selectively, of what was going on between the Lao Prime Minister and Ambassador Smith, and the ambassador and Washington. So we were all, literally, "floundering."

However, when Winthrop Brown arrived as ambassador to Laos, the whole situation changed. We had "Country Team" meetings [staff meetings]. I was assigned to do what old-time Foreign Service officers remember as the "WEEKA" [originally the acronym for the "Weekly Airgram" but later meant a weekly summary sent in by cable]. Things changed, almost from "night to day," in the sense that we knew what Ambassador Brown was thinking about doing.

Q: What happened to Ambassador Horace Smith?

NEWBERRY: I think that he retired soon after leaving Laos. He was assigned for a while as a "Diplomat in Residence" at Sarah Lawrence College. Then he retired and stayed on at Sarah Lawrence as a member of the faculty. I think that's where he was serving when he died, several years after he retired.

Q: Did you get any "feel" about how Ambassador Winthrop Brown was assigned to Laos? He was an "East Asian hand." What was his impression in Laos when he came and took a look at the situation there? What were you and other officers in the embassy getting from him about the situation in Laos?

NEWBERRY: Unfortunately for Ambassador Brown, he didn't have much time because, I think that in a matter of two weeks after he arrived, we had the so-called "coup d'état" when a young, Pathet Lao Captain ["Commandant" in French], named Kong Le, under really bizarre circumstances and not knowing really how far he would be able to continue

with this effort, in effect, "took over the Lao government." I later had a conversation with him. His French was about as good as my French. He told me that he had planned this whole "coup" on the basis of a training course that the French military had given him on how to defend against this kind of coup. He decided to turn it around. So the French taught him how to carry out a coup d'état.

Q: What was Kong Le after?

NEWBERRY: Of course, all of the Pathet Lao military people wanted to win control of the country. However, the strange thing about it is that he was such a low-ranking officer, only a "Commandant." Then, of course, his superior officers quickly reacted to what he had done, and Prince Souphannouvong, the head of the Pathet Lao, in addition to his supporters, quickly made use of the coup. However, for a long time we were dealing in Vientiane with Captain Kong Le.

Meanwhile, Vientiane had been occupied by Pathet Lao troops, and we couldn't do anything, even function, without checking with Kong Le and the group of uneducated people around him. Then the "educated" cadre of the Pathet Lao came into Vientiane and set up an improvised "coalition government." This didn't last long, by the way.

Q: These Pathet Lao had been shooting at you previously. All of a sudden, they were in Vientiane.

NEWBERRY: I should say that this was a "bloodless coup d'etat." The Royal Lao Army didn't put up any fight against the coup. The big fight came later on. In retrospect, although I was not privy to the planning, it soon became evident that Washington, including the Pentagon and the royal Thai government in Bangkok, were organizing to "roll back" the Pathet Lao. The first thing we knew, there was an all-out civil war.

General Phoumi Nosavan, the chief of staff of the Royal Lao Army, was our "chosen instrument" in the campaign to re-take Vientiane. That's where we got into the highest drama of all, with the "Battle of Vientiane," which took place, I believe, in December, 1960.

Q: Well, before we get to the "Battle of Vientiane," how did you operate? What had been the "enemy" was now inside the gates and controlling Vientiane. How did you work during this particular time?

NEWBERRY: In fairly short order the "Princes," namely Prince Souphannouvong and Prince Souvanna Phouma, cobbled together a sort of "coalition" in which there were Pathet Lao ministers as well as ministers who supported Souvanna Phouma in the government. Souvanna Phouma was the Prime Minister, but, as I say, there were Pathet Lao ministers in the government, too.

I must say that we weren't accomplishing very much at this time. My role was just trying to figure out who the "players" were every day. That is, who was in which post. My job, from day to day, was sort of to identify who the "personalities" were.

Q: Were you "constrained" or could you go out and "knock on doors?"

NEWBERRY: We could travel around the city. We were not "constrained," except that we learned to be cautious because there were so many Americans at large. We learned to be careful to make sure that we did not find ourselves in the same office, at the same time, and on the same errand as another American. There might be representatives of two or three different agencies doing the same thing I was doing. We had a large AID [Agency for International Development] mission in Vientiane, too.

A lot of our time and effort was spent in trying to coordinate with other American officials and agencies, rather than with the Lao government. That's my recollection of this period.

Q: What about the CIA? They'd been running a sort of "active campaign" in other places. I would have thought that the Pathet Lao would want to expel the CIA people, or something like that.

NEWBERRY: The Pathet Lao were there, but they had a pretty tenuous hold on Vientiane. They knew that the Royal Lao Army and the royal Thai government were organizing to push the Pathet Lao out of power. So the Pathet Lao was not in a position to do an awful lot of detailed targeting of people. My impression was that Captain Kong Le did not expect to take over Vientiane. The Pathet Lao were sort of surprised at their success. They really didn't have a "scheme," in the sense of a classical, communist scheme, to go in and get rid of the intellectuals. There was none of that. Everything was very improvised.

Q: How did this all play out?

NEWBERRY: With massive support, both financial and material, from the United States government, and working through the royal Lao government, General Phoumi Nosavan, the chief of staff of the Royal Lao Army, organized a military "push" against the Pathet Lao occupation of Vientiane. He was operating from his headquarters in Savannakhet [central Laos, on the Mekong River]. Toward the end of November, 1960, he was getting close to Vientiane. I'm sorry, but we'll have to check all of these dates. In December, 1960, there was a pitched battle for the city of Vientiane, insofar as the Pathet Lao Army and the Royal Lao Army could undertake a pitched battle.

The battle of Vientiane went on for four or five days. We had the odd circumstance that, at one point, General Phoumi, who was our "chosen instrument," was lobbing shells into downtown Vientiane, and they were hitting the American embassy chancery. The Vientiane "Fire Brigade" was trying to put out the fire at one end of the chancery. We knew that we were going to have to get out of there. Therefore, at the other end of the chancery in the code room we were trying to burn all of the classified documents. So at the same moment we were putting out a fire at one end of the building and setting a fire at the other end! I mention that to epitomize the absurdity of the situation. Eventually, we

closed the chancery for a day or two.

Q: What about you and your wife at this time?

NEWBERRY: Very early on in the process the powers that be in the embassy knew about this military assault against the Pathet Lao in Vientiane. They ordered the evacuation of all of the wives and children, the so-called "dependents." They were all evacuated to Thailand. My wife, who was several months pregnant, was evacuated to Bangkok and lived in virtual "exile" there for the next year and a half. Our first child was born in Bangkok. This evacuation situation continued for the rest of my tour in Laos. The families had not been allowed to return by the time I left Laos. I went to Bangkok and got my wife and child in December, 1961, prior to going on to my next post.

Q: So you had the "Battle of Vientiane." Then what happened?

NEWBERRY: Then General Phoumi's forces, the Royal Lao Army, retook control of Vientiane. The Pathet Lao left the capital, and the situation returned to the "status quo ante." The Pathet Lao was still the net gainer in all of this. On a parallel track Averill Harriman and the Pathet Lao side were negotiating in Geneva about setting up a so-called "Conference on Laos." They tried to work out a "modus vivendi" between the communists and "our side" in Laos.

Q: What was the attitude toward these negotiations in Geneva? Was there a feeling that "our side" was going to be "sold out" or not?

NEWBERRY: That was the general feeling. We thought that we would make the best deal that we could. We had the perception that we were going to make our stand in Vietnam and cut our losses in Laos. That was the general view. Because we didn't have the same level of virtually "instantaneous communications" that we have now, we didn't get daily summaries of what was going on at the Conference on Laos. From time to time we would hear what was going on.

Q: Once you got to the "status quo ante bellum," did you go back to knocking on doors and doing what you'd been doing previously?

NEWBERRY: Yes, pretty much the same thing. However, we did this with a good deal more sophistication and a much better sense of direction. We had Ambassador Brown, and the man who succeeded John Holt as DCM was much more in the Foreign Service tradition. He made it a point to...

Q: Who was the new DCM?

NEWBERRY: His name was Bob Keel, who has died since then. We had a much better sense of a traditional, Foreign Service "team," working together, than we had under Ambassador Horace Smith. Of course, since our wives and children were still "living in exile" in Bangkok, we had a great deal more time to spend together. We had lots more

poker and "Scrabble" games in the evenings, because there was little or no social life.

Q: Did you ever feel, at times, that perhaps you and the other members of the embassy staff were learning far too much about this rather "improvised" Lao government, or not?

NEWBERRY: I did. I wouldn't want to put words in the mouths of other members of the staff, when we were all living in Vientiane as "unwilling bachelors." We had an awful lot of time to talk to one another. I think that my own, personal reaction to all of this went deeper. I was very troubled about our sense of national purpose. We seemed able to spend so much of our national treasure and effort on such an inconsequential corner of the world. I had some serious doubts about whether I wanted to stay in the diplomatic service. However, my own vision of it was very much complicated by the fact that I'd persuaded this lady to marry me and come out to Laos and live. And then look what I got her into! So I said to myself that it would not be fair for me to leave the Foreign Service without letting her have a "normal" Foreign Service experience. So I stayed in the Foreign Service and had a different experience later on.

In my view it was a very personal matter for me to spend, what, six or seven months with my bride in Vientiane and then have her sent off, well advanced in pregnancy. She used to say that, apart from the one weekend a month I was given to go and visit her and the baby in Bangkok, she used to feel like Madame Butterfly, pacing up and down with the baby, wondering whether the father of her child would come back! That's a joke, of course. However, that was the kind of life in exile that SHE was leading.

My own recollection of the situation in Laos and my personal involvement in it are all tied up with what happened to my bride and my first born child.

Q: Absolutely! What about Ambassador Winthrop Brown? He got "hit" with this whole situation, rather early in his time in Vientiane. Did he express any concerns about what we were doing in Laos or was he just being a "good soldier?"

NEWBERRY: I think that he was being a "good soldier," a very earnest and reflective one. Since the embassy Marine guards were in on this situation, too, I would say that I did the same thing for Ambassador Brown for years before he ever came to Vientiane. I kept a daily, UNCLASSIFIED journal. When I was embassy duty officer and was checking around the office, I read some of his journal from the time he was DCM [deputy chief of mission] in New Delhi, India. The Marine guards told me that they had found some of his journals since he had come to Vientiane. This was all UNCLASSIFIED. I said: "Well, that's indecent! What were you doing?" But some of these journals were later published. His UNCLASSIFIED account of the "Battle of Vientiane" appears in "The Foreign Service Reader," which was published by the American Foreign Service Association [AFSA].

I mention this because Ambassador Brown was a very thoughtful man who had a sense of history and the place of things. However, as far as his view of Laos was concerned, I would say that he was very much like Secretary of State Dean Rusk. You know, during

the Vietnam crisis Dean Rusk was often one of the "true believers," God rest his soul. That was the impression that I had of Winthrop Brown. He was a very disciplined, competent, capable Foreign Service officer, and he believed in what we were doing. How, I don't know, but I give him credit for it, and I admire him for having been a man of such integrity. I have to believe that he really believed.

Q: Dan, we've talked about Ambassador Winthrop Brown being a "true believer" in what we were doing in Laos. Do you feel that some of the other embassy officers in Vientiane held the same view? You said that you were sitting around, talking to each other in the evenings. You had plenty of time to spend in "bull sessions." Was there much concern about "what the hell are we doing here in Laos" and all that?

NEWBERRY: Oh, very much so. Some of my contemporaries and some others who were younger than I was had lots of questions about what we were doing. However, instead of making a really, extensive analysis, I must recall that we were in a really remote corner of the world. We didn't get the "Herald Tribune." If we got a copy of the USIA [United States Information Agency] "Wireless File" three or four days later, we were lucky. We were pretty isolated from the world out there in Laos.

Q: Did you meet with any journalists?

NEWBERRY: Yes, some very competent reporters were assigned to Vientiane. They especially began to come to Vientiane after the Kong Le "coup d'etat," in 1960. Some of them regularly made the rounds. Stanley Karnow of "Time" used to come down from Hong Kong, Takashi Oka from the "Christian Science Monitor" came there about once every three months, as well as other reporters who went on to be very distinguished foreign correspondents. They were on that "Southeast Asian beat." They were checking us out. Some of us had, what shall I call them, "no holds barred conversations" with them. I must say, in my candid conversations with journalists that none of them ever "betrayed" me. I was very careful, of course, which ones I chose to be candid with. I went to Vientiane very early on in my career. My wife had some experience as a press officer. I found that some of the most interesting and enlightening conversations about the involvement of the United States in Indochina came from talking to visiting newspapermen, and not from my own colleagues.

Q: When did you leave Vientiane?

NEWBERRY: I left there in December, 1961.

Q: What was your feeling about where Laos was going?

NEWBERRY: I thought that there was going to be more fighting. I couldn't say what kind of fighting but I just had a feeling that this was just a pause and that there was going to be more fighting. We could see what our own people were doing in Vietnam. We were just building up for something bigger, but I couldn't make it more specific than that.

Q: Did you have the feeling that the North Vietnamese, Chinese Communists, and Soviets were involved in what was happening in Laos?

NEWBERRY: I had to rely on our intelligence reports. We didn't have any direct evidence on the ground in Vientiane, except that, when the Pathet Lao was included in the coalition government, they were following a very obvious pro-Chinese or pro-Soviet line. However, we didn't have any direct evidence of that. Of course, the Soviet Union opened an embassy in Vientiane after the coalition government was established. We, at the second secretary or first secretary level, whatever I was at the time, didn't have any contact with these communist representatives.

Q: Where did you go next?

NEWBERRY: My next post was Tehran, Iran. This meant going back into the GTI [Greek, Turkish, and Iranian] area. In a sense, this was my "home base," and that's how I looked at it. We were talking earlier about the changes in the way personnel assignments were made. I just took it upon myself to write to the director of GTI, who had succeeded Owen Jones. This was Robert Miner, my last consul general in Istanbul, who was now in charge of GTI Affairs. I asked him if there was a spot for me and, lo and behold, I was assigned as deputy political counselor in the embassy in Tehran. That was my next post.

Q: You were there from 1962 until when?

NEWBERRY: I was there from 1962 until 1964.

Q: At that time what was the situation in Iran?

NEWBERRY: Let me just add one thing more. In between Vientiane and Tehran I was assigned to something called the "Mid Career Course" in the FSI [Foreign Service Institute]. That was one of the programs that the FSI organizes. I was a little shocked to be told that I was in "mid career." So far I had only been in the Foreign Service for 12 years. Here I was already in "mid career," but that's what they called it. So I spent three months in Washington at this course, and it was very nice to be able to do that. I actually didn't get to Tehran until July 5, 1962. I was very careful not to arrive before July 4, as otherwise I might have been involved in preparations for the July 4 reception!

Q: What was the situation in Tehran when you arrived there?

NEWBERRY: By 1962 the situation was that we had many years of a cozy relationship between the United States government and the "Shah-in-shah." It was sort of a fixed, "mind set" for people in Washington that one of our principal objectives in Iran was to keep the Shah favorably disposed toward us, so that we could maintain all of the "listening stations" and so forth that we had and that we would have uninterrupted access to the oil supplies of the Persian Gulf. The fact that the Shah of Iran had pervasive intelligence organizations around the country and was a dictator did not seem to daunt us.

I'm not complaining, because we had an interesting and treasured experience during our

two years in Tehran. However, as a political officer, it was a very strange situation to be in. There was a Parliament, but every candidate for Parliament was "hand picked" by the Shah. So there was no real Parliamentary or political activity that was worth reporting on. But we found other things to write about.

Q: Later on, and this became renowned in the Foreign Service, political officers assigned to Iran in the 1970s were told not to report anything "bad" about the Shah or the Shah's government. Were there any indications of this in the early 1960s?

NEWBERRY: That was pretty much the atmosphere, but it depended on the ambassador or the political counselor as to how much "candid" political reporting was allowed to go out. There was a lot of sort of "back channel" traffic. When someone would write a Memorandum of Conversation, although it might not go into a telegram or an airgram, a "courtesy copy" of the memorandum would find its way through the pouch to some guy we knew on the Iranian desk. He would share this copy of the memorandum around the Department, but it was never stated to be an official communication.

During my time in Iran there was a very talented and, I would say, "brilliant" young Foreign Service officer named Bill Miller, William Graham Miller, who is today the ambassador to the Ukraine. Bill Miller cultivated members of the National Front who were the supporters of Mossadeq. They were very much involved in maneuvering to try to persuade the Shah to have a more enlightened government or, who knows, maybe take over the government. Ambassador Julius Holmes and Harry Schwartz, the Political Counselor, as well as Schwartz's successor as Political Counselor, Martin Herz, allowed Bill Miller to keep up these contacts with the National Front.

Although we had a sort of channel to the National Front, in the end it was not the National Front that overthrew the Shah. It was the Muslim fundamentalists. In the end the National Front came to grief, along with the Shah. At least, this was one mitigating circumstance, during my time in Iran, that the leadership of the embassy had the good sense to keep some kind of channel open to the National Front, in opposition to the Shah.

It fell to my duty, when President Kennedy was assassinated, to get in touch with the two, leading National Front figures, each one of whom had been Iranian ambassador to Washington. I persuaded them to come to Washington to the memorial service for President Kennedy which was organized. It was the only time since the Shah returned to Iran, or later fell from power, that the only official, open contact between them and the American embassy was at the memorial service for President John F. Kennedy.

Q: How did you go about your business as a political officer in Tehran? What would be a typical day in going about your business in Tehran?

NEWBERRY: I should explain that my role as the "number two" officer in the Political Section varied. My first political counselor was Harry Schwartz, who was a pretty "laid back" guy and easy to work with. He let me get out and "do my own thing." When I figured that there was no political reporting to do, I did some airgrams and despatches on

institutions in Iran. In addition, I spent part of my time, and this turned out to be a rather time-consuming aspect of my job, keeping in touch with our consulates. We had four constituent posts or consulates in Iran: in Tabriz, in Meshed, in Khorramshahr, and the other in Isfahan.

It had been decided, before I got there, that the consulates needed a "friend in court," somebody who would watch out for their concerns and interests and would show recognition of what the consulates were doing. So I was known as the "consulate coordinator." I spent a lot of time doing that. I made frequent trips to the consulates and talked to the people in the consulates to maintain personal contact with them. A lot of my time in the embassy was spent in "following through" to see that, not only political or economic reporting from the consulates was properly evaluated, but also that the administrative and personal problems of people in the consulates were taken care of.

I found this liaison work with the consulates a very rewarding side of my work in Iran, although it was not what you might expect a political officer to be doing. However, in retrospect, it equipped me later on to function more effectively as the principal officer of a consulate. I think that I was much better prepared and more effective as a principal officer because I had had this experience of being a "friend in court" for the consuls.

Q: We had a very extensive reporting program in Iran.

NEWBERRY: Indeed, we did. However, a great deal of it was managed by another U.S. government agency.

Q: You're talking about the CIA.

NEWBERRY: Yes.

Q: Was there any difficulty, as far as you were concerned, about having two organizations reporting? Were the CIA people reporting one thing and you were reporting another?

NEWBERRY: I don't think that that was necessarily true, because a great deal of the CIA activity in Iran was "operational," rather than gathering information. I can only guess what it was and I wouldn't want to go on record, because it would be on the basis of my impressions only. However, my view was that a great deal of the CIA resources and staff were, as I say, "operational."

Let me make a side remark, Stu, about CIA activity in general in Iran. You will recall that in our conversation on Laos I made such a point about the CIA being all over the place. They were all over the place, but in a different way, in Iran. For example, the CIA chief of station had been in Iran for years and stayed there for a time after I left.

Q: Are you referring to Kermit Roosevelt?

NEWBERRY: No. This was Gratian Yatsevich, who came after Kermit Roosevelt. Yatsevich was a very colorful man who died in 1997. He saw and had more extensive conversations with the Shah-in-Shah of Iran than the ambassador did. That gives you, in a nutshell, what the situation was.

I want to hark back to my remarks about the situation in Laos. I would like to mention another of these "absurdities" for which I blame the State Department. Somebody before my time, and before Harry Schwartz's time, was very upset because, in the embassy in Vientiane we had two political sections. This situation was not unique to Tehran. There was the CIA "Political Section" as a distinct entity within the chancery building, apart from the State Department Political Section.

One of Harry Schwartz's predecessor's as Political Counselor had persuaded the State Department, and they were slow to act on this proposal, that we should have just as many political officers on the Diplomatic List [published by the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs] as the CIA people did. So we could keep a "balance" in this way. In Tehran the traditional, State Department organization had something like five or six political officers in a country like Iran which had no political parties to speak of. So we had a lot of frustrated, junior officers without real jobs to do. My function in Tehran as a deputy political counselor was to manage this situation and find useful things for these junior officers to do. The only reason that we had so many FSOs was just to "counterbalance" in terms of numbers the CIA officers down the hall.

This situation was carried to an even more absurd degree. I hadn't been in Tehran long when I found out that in the embassy mail room, where they were sorting out the incoming mail, distribution was made to one of two categories, "Political 1" and "Political 2." When a new political counselor arrived, he said that that is not acceptable. He said that there should be one political section, as far as he was concerned. So he included all of the CIA people in the Political Section. Of course, what the employees in the mail room did was to sort out the mail in two categories anyway and just go through a show of combining the two political sections. The mail was delivered upstairs in one package but in two, separate bundles. That's how the Iranians understood the distinction between the two aspects of the Political Section. This gives you an insight on some of the traditional, "silly" things that we have done in the Foreign Service over the years.

Q: Was any attempt made on the part of Political Section 1, if you can call it that...

NEWBERRY: That's what they called it: "POL-1" and "POL-2."

Q: Okay.

NEWBERRY: We in the State Department were "POL-1," of course, because the State Department is older than the CIA.

Q: Were you able or interested in reporting on the workings of "SAVAK," the internal police service of the Shah?

NEWBERRY: Only sort of "inferentially." It was such a big organization and so pervasive that the journalists who came to Tehran reported on everybody. Everybody reported on it. Of course, when I said that the CIA people were "operational," a great deal of their operations were done through SAVAK, the internal police agency of the Shah's government. So there was not much that the State Department people could tell Washington about SAVAK that wasn't already in the newspapers or in other agency reporting. We didn't spend a lot of our own, State Department resources analyzing it.

Q: What about two elements of Iranian society which, I am told, are very important. One of them is the "Bazari" class, the merchants at a lower level than the merchant bankers, or whatever you want to call them.

NEWBERRY: We were very much aware that they were important, but somehow or other, for whatever reason, and probably anyone who has studied this subject could guess what it was, we did not have any good contacts with the "Bazari" class, except in the provinces. The consulates were much better at getting close to the "Bazari" class. They were much closer to the feeling of antipathy which the "Bazari" merchants had toward the Shah's regime and were much closer to the religious situation that led up to the overthrow of the Shah.

Back in 1963, the Shah was trying to demonstrate that he was a modern-minded monarch. He had his own reasons for trying to get control of the religious foundations, the so-called "Waq" or "Waqif" groups, which held tremendous stretches of agricultural land. The Shah wanted to get control of this land, and he called this an "agricultural revolution." He tried to confiscate this land and sell it to the tenants. But that's not the way it worked out, and the "Imams" and the "Mullahs" [two classes of religious functionaries] knew what was going to happen. So there was a struggle for power.

In 1963 that struggle was one of the two issues, on the basis of which the Ayatollah Khomeini first rose to national prominence. He was trying to head off the Shah's "land grab" which was going to take away the lands which the Imams and the Mullahs controlled, through the "Waq" and "Waqif" foundations. The other issue was votes for women.

Q: This was what was called the "White Revolution?"

NEWBERRY: Yes, the "White Revolution." That was in 1963. That's the first time that any of us in the embassy, except a few people who were real specialists in Iran, had even heard of Ayatollah Khomeini. However, Khomeini was very much the power behind that demonstration of the "Sixth of Bahman," the Iranian month, against the "White Revolution."

Q: With the "White Revolution" taking place, this was just the sort of thing that...

NEWBERRY: There were several aspects of the "White Revolution." The Shah had

assigned the educated military officers to teach literacy to the ignorant peasants, and so on. There were lots of very respectable parts of the "White Revolution." However, the pious, religious people, the "Bazaris," saw it as a power grab by the Shah to eliminate the influence of the religious foundations and the Ayatollah's [religious officials].

Q: Did these so-called reforms, known collectively as the "White Revolution," touch a responsive chord in the embassy? I suppose that this was the sort of thing that we had been pressing the Shah to do.

NEWBERRY: We reported all of this with a straight face, as though we admired the Shah for it. Except when things began to turn "sour," I don't recall that we ever asked why the religious people were against these reforms. The initial reporting reflected all-out admiration for the Shah as the far-seeing leader of Iran.

Q: Were you able to see that the "White Revolution" was more of a power grab on the part of the Shah? What was the feeling in the embassy about whether this land would be actually distributed? How did you think that this process was going to end up?

NEWBERRY: Of course, there were many debates about this. Most of our contacts were educated people whose sense of fair play in the scheme of things was very much opposed to letting the peasants get control of the land. One of their favorite refrains was: "Who's going to take care of the 'Qanats?'" The "Qanats" were underground irrigation channels. This was the sort of slogan which the anti-land reform people had. They said that if you let the peasants own the land, nobody would maintain the irrigation system. So you have to leave the "Qanats" in the hands of affluent people who know how to manage them.

Of course, this was regarded as a terribly reactionary attitude. Most of us who had the time and leisure to analyze the situation never believed that the Shah would actually let the peasants own the land. All of the thousands of years of Iranian history argued against that. Sure enough, the money that he did manage to get went into the Vaqf loan in which the imperial family and a lot of privileged people invested a lot of their money. The reform never, in effect, really happened.

Q: Were you able to report this situation as it developed?

NEWBERRY: Not me. I don't know what anybody else did but there was no "audience" for that kind of reporting in the State Department, and nobody encouraged it.

Q: I think that it's very interesting to get a "feel" for the situation within the embassy. That is, things of this nature were happening. Were you encouraged to report "positively?" Was this a pervasive feeling within the embassy?

NEWBERRY: I have the feeling that what we were doing was what, in Foreign Service parlance during my time, was called writing "sitreps." We were writing "situation reports" or factual, short items without any significant analysis. There was very little, long term analysis being done.

Q: What were you getting from the consulates? Was that getting through?

NEWBERRY: It was getting through to us in the Political Section of the embassy. I made sure that copies of the consulate reports were "pouched" back to Washington. I don't recall that an awful lot of it was incorporated into the ongoing reporting. Of course, this all happened 35 years ago.

Q: I understand.

NEWBERRY: My recollection may be "dim," but my general impression was that the embassy leadership did not hit the Department over the head with these reflections. We talked about them and even wrote notes to one another about them. However, I don't recall that we really said to Washington: "You have to think about this and think about it seriously." We did not make any campaign out of it.

Q: What was your impression of Ambassador Julius Holmes?

NEWBERRY: I admired him enormously. Since you've brought up the subject of Ambassador Holmes, I really want to put this exchange I had with him into the oral history because it was such a wonderful bit of advice to me as a Foreign Service officer.

Ambassador Holmes was a very busy man. He never looked very busy and he was always very gracious. His residence was right there in the embassy compound. It's still there, although I don't know who's living in it. Anyhow, his way of more or less "catching up with things" was to save material for later reflection in his "in box." He would come into the chancery on Saturday morning and sit on the sofa in his office and read this material. Then he would ask the duty officer to come into his office and sit down with him. This was one of his techniques for keeping up with the more junior staff.

Then the ambassador and the duty officer would chat for a while. It was a great privilege for me. On one particular Saturday morning I had gone through the incoming and outgoing traffic. I knew that the ambassador had an audience with the Shah the day before. I found out then that the ambassador had been at the Imperial Palace for over three hours. I saw the reporting telegram which the ambassador had sent in on his conversation with the Shah. It was only about three paragraphs long!

By that time I had gotten used to these little "chats" with Ambassador Holmes, and I was bold enough to say: "Mr. Ambassador, you spent over three hours with the Shah, but all that I saw in the reporting telegram was three paragraphs." Ambassador Holmes pulled down his pince nez glasses, looked at me, and said: "Dan, always remember this. Report extensively on what the other guy said but say as little as possible about what you said." That was a wonderful lesson to a Foreign Service reporting officer, and I never forgot that.

Ambassador Holmes knew what his mission was. He knew, if you'll pardon the

expression, what his parameters were and he conducted himself magnificently.

Q: What was the feeling in the Embassy about the Soviet "threat" to Iran and Soviet influence in Iran while you were there?

NEWBERRY: Of course, we always realized that Soviet troops were up in the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic, just across the border to the North. If things went badly in Iran, these troops could just move in. This threat was never more on our minds than during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Q: That was in October, 1962.

NEWBERRY: Again, it fell to my lot to be embassy duty officer on the weekend of the Cuban Missile Crisis. I described this experience in the book put out by AFSA [American Foreign Service Association] called, "Inside a U.S. Embassy." AFSA had asked me to write something about the experiences of an embassy duty officer. We learned of the final decision about what President Kennedy was going to do. I had to sort out this long message from Washington, which came in to the embassy in Tehran in "reverse order." The message came to us in the middle of the night. I decided to wait until we got the actual instruction part of it to wake up Ambassador Holmes.

When we received the actual instruction part of this message, I brought it to Ambassador Holmes, who said: "You need to do everything you can to make sure that the Shah reads this message before he goes to work in the morning, because it will be all over the radio and all over the world by tomorrow morning." So the code clerk and I were trying to put this message together. I drafted a "Third Person" note from the ambassador to the Shah, conveying this message ostensibly from President Kennedy, confiding in the Shah that he was about to announce establishment of a "quarantine" around Cuba.

I couldn't get anybody on the phone at the Imperial Palace, of course. I went over to the gate of the Palace and talked to the Captain of the Guard, with the request that he please see to it that His Majesty sees this message before he has his breakfast. The Captain's answer was: "That depends on His Majesty." However, the Shah must have seen this note, because Ambassador Holmes told me that the Shah never complained about not being informed about what the U.S. planned to do.

However, you asked me about the Soviet threat to Iran. One of the things that was very much on our minds and in our reporting was that the Shah was concerned about those Soviet troops which had threatened Iran in 1946, when they occupied the Tabriz area. They were still there and "in spades" in 1962, just North of the border. It would just take half an hour for Soviet tanks to start rolling into Iran from Soviet Azerbaijan, as well as set off demonstrations by the "Tudeh" Party [Masses Party] in Tehran. So in that situation the Shah of Iran was following every aspect of the Cuban Missile Crisis. He was thinking about how this crisis was going to affect him, of course.

Q: Dan, is there anything else that we should talk about regarding Iran at this time, or

any other developments?

NEWBERRY: I think that we have pretty well covered Iran. I apologize to you and to anybody who reads this that I haven't had the leisure to go back and sort out my notes. These are my impressions of Iran at that time.

Q: That's good. I thought that we might stop at this point. We are now up to 1964 at the end of your tour in Iran. Then where did you go?

NEWBERRY: I went back to Washington then. I might talk a little bit more about my experiences in Iran, particularly about personnel matters. I like to make sure that these personnel questions are made clear, so that anybody analyzing the Foreign Service personnel system would occasionally read this oral history.

Harry Schwartz's successor as political counselor was a brilliant but difficult man named Martin Herz. This was a very difficult relationship for me because, to use an analogy from the German Army, he treated me as if he were a First Sergeant. I found myself having to "protect" the junior officers serving under me from a very temperamental and demanding Political Counselor. So I thought of myself as a "Feldwebel" [corporal] serving under a First Sergeant.

I was getting toward the end of my first tour of duty there in Tehran and I was supposed to go on Home Leave and then come back to Iran. As it happened, the officer in charge of personnel in NEA [Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs] was Archer Blood. He came through Tehran. I "let my hair down" to him. He was one of my great heroes in the Foreign Service, not because he had helped me out of a bad situation but because he was a really outstanding, Foreign Service officer. We can talk about him when we get to Bangladesh, too.

Archer Blood said: "Dan, just keep quiet. I'm going back to Washington. The only way we can get you out of here is by assigning you to Washington. Are you ready for that?" I said: "Of course I am." So Archer Blood quietly arranged for me to be assigned to the Department as the officer in charge of CENTO [Central Treaty Organization] Affairs. However, this assignment was not revealed until my wife and children were safely on home leave with me. This was one of those maneuvers which people used to be able to arrange for. I was able to do this to get out of a very difficult and unpleasant situation.

This was a good time for us to return to Washington because, during the course of our home leave, it was revealed that another child was on the way. It was much more convenient to have the child born in Washington.

Q: Dan, one final question about Iran. Martin Herz was a major figure in the Foreign Service.

NEWBERRY: Oh, very much so. I admired a lot of his accomplishments. However, as a leader of men, he left an awful lot to be desired. I should say, men and women, although

we didn't have any women officers in Tehran at the time. He would have led them, too.

Q: Did he have a different view on the Shah and what was happening there than Harry Schwartz did?

NEWBERRY: Oh, yes. He probed much more deeply into the situation than Schwartz did. I personally liked Schwartz a lot more than Herz. However, I have to hand it to Martin Herz, who was a brilliant officer. As people who knew him or have read about him, he had been a court reporter before he joined the Foreign Service. He took short hand and typed at 200 words a minute! The Marine guards in Tehran used to tell me that he would come into the embassy at 5:00 AM. By the time we arrived, at 8:00 AM, all of us had what we called "Herzograms," instructions written out to us. So what was the deputy political counselor going to do? Herz had already done the deputy's work for him for the whole day, before we even had our breakfast. That was the kind of virtuoso performance that Martin Herz turned in.

Q: With Martin Herz as Political Counselor, was there a change toward looking more closely at the "White Revolution" and other things that were happening in Iran?

NEWBERRY: Yes. As a matter of fact, Bill Miller, a brilliant young officer who was still in Tehran when I left, spent many hours talking to Martin Herz. I'm sure that Herz was encouraging Bill Miller to probe more deeply into the National Front. Bill Miller did not have any contacts that I knew among religious people in Iran, but he did with the National Front and did a good job on it.

Q: I take it that the religious leaders were almost beyond reach for us.

NEWBERRY: Pretty much so. We were aware of them, because other people told us about them. We had some "third hand" information but we didn't have any important, direct contacts among the religious community at all.

Q: Okay, Dan, let's stop at this point. We'll pick it up again in 1964 when you were taking over the CENTO [Central Treaty Organization] desk in the Department.

Today is January 5, 1998. Dan, we had you going to Washington to be in charge of the CENTO desk. You were there from when to when?

NEWBERRY: Let's see. I came home in the summer of 1964. I was on the CENTO desk for two years from the fall of 1964 to the fall of 1966, after which I moved up to the Iranian desk.

Q: Okay, let's stick to CENTO for the time being. CENTO was always sort of a "cobbled together" organization, particularly after Iraq was rather violently moved out of what had been called the "Baghdad Pact" in 1958. That was when Brigadier Kaseem

overthrew...

NEWBERRY: King Faisal, Crown Prince Illah, and Prime Minister Nuri Said.

Q: How was CENTO actually viewed by the powers that be in the State Department when you arrived on that desk?

NEWBERRY: To the extent that people thought about it at all, they didn't think much about CENTO. In the mind of most people, of course, CENTO was still the Baghdad Pact. Since the Baghdad Pact had gone out of existence, many professional diplomats were not aware that there was a surviving organization, which changed its name to the Central Treaty Organization.

I remember that I had been working on the Turkish desk back in 1958, at the time of the revolution in Baghdad. After this they moved the headquarters of the Baghdad Pact to Ankara. Of course, they had to change the name of the body. We had great sport of it, trying to figure out a name. I remember that one of them which we had some fun with was the "Greater West Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." [Laughter] That was drawn from the old, World War II Japanese concept of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."

However, by 1964 the Central Treaty Organization was still alive but did not have much prestige. I keep referring in these interviews to my career experiences. When I had my assignment to Iran "broken" and came back to the Department to work on the CENTO desk, one of my friends came to me and said: "Dan, you must have been desperate, because, professionally, CENTO has got to be a 'dead end.'" Well, for reasons that I will explain, it was not a dead end at all, although it sure looked that way.

Q: What countries belonged to CENTO at that time?

NEWBERRY: The members of CENTO were Britain, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. The three, regional members were Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, in addition to the United Kingdom. The United States was never a member as such, but we fully participated in all of its activities and paid our share of the annual budget. The Secretary of State went to all of the meetings of the CENTO Council of Ministers. We were members of CENTO in everything except name.

Q: Well, in your estimate what did "de facto" membership of CENTO mean for the United States?

NEWBERRY: Of course, most historians agree that the whole notion of the Baghdad Pact was something in the mind of the late Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. He adopted a concept which was actually developed by a British diplomat, Sir Owen Carrew, of "the Northern Tier" of countries. He thought of the "Northern Tier" as consisting of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and even Afghanistan, although they never pursued bringing Afghanistan into the organization. The "Northern Tier" of countries was to serve as a barrier to Soviet intrusion into the Middle East. That was the basic purpose that the

architects of the Baghdad Pact and the supporters of CENTO held onto. This was a way of solidifying the northern approaches to the Middle East against further Soviet incursion.

Q: When you arrived on the CENTO desk, what was your perception of the Soviet threat to the Middle East?

NEWBERRY: My own view was that the Soviets had "outflanked us" because they had great influence in Egypt, Syria, and other parts of the Middle East. Although Turkey and Iran, and Turkey especially, stood in the way of a Soviet land invasion of the Middle East, there was not much else, except symbolic value, in having these three countries lined up. Of course, Pakistan, by extension, was also a member of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization [SEATO]. Pakistan had the unique position of belonging to two alliances which were important to the West.

Q: Turkey did, also.

NEWBERRY: Turkey also belonged to NATO, yes.

Q: So CENTO was something like a "link to a link to a link."

NEWBERRY: Yes. From the Turkish point of view they participated in, and even hosted, the Baghdad Pact when it moved to Ankara, but it was always a peripheral or "add on" to Turkish membership in NATO. In Turkish eyes, they agreed to participate in CENTO because this was something that they believed that the Americans wanted them to do.

Q: What were your concerns, on the CENTO desk, during this 1964 to 1966 period?

NEWBERRY: On a plane of "doing it with mirrors," I would say. CENTO had such low prestige among most U.S. government agencies in Washington that I had to find "artful ways" to "shore up" American participation in CENTO. CENTO didn't really show up in anybody's budget anywhere in the U.S. government. Since the U.S. was not a member of CENTO, when the Secretary General of CENTO came to Washington or we were asked to host the 10th anniversary meeting of the Council of Ministers, the Office of Protocol initially declined to let us have any money. U.S. non-membership in CENTO was always an anomaly.

However, professionally, I found my service on the CENTO desk a very interesting experience, since I was the only person in the whole State Department who understood what the mechanics of CENTO were. I found that, when I was getting clearances for various things, I often had to deal at the Assistant Secretary of State level because they were curious about what they were being asked to clear. So I learned a lot about the Washington bureaucracy, since nobody else wanted to bother to clear all of these CENTO messages. That was my fate and, although it was inconsequential, in terms of advancing the national interest, to me it was an education in how to maneuver and find my way around the State Department and Pentagon bureaucracies.

Q: Did you pick up any "nuggets of wisdom" about how things worked in those days? In other words, how to get around, how to get things cleared, and how to get things done?

NEWBERRY: First of all, it took an awful lot of patience, and I suppose this still goes on in the State Department. State Department officials are busy people who pay attention to their own work, first. The poor guy who has to get a CENTO message cleared usually had to hang around until 6:30 or 7:30 PM, hoping to catch the signatory, the "clearance guy" before he went home. So it was a time-consuming process, but, like any other Foreign Service officer, I extended my contacts and got to know an awful lot of high-ranking secretaries to Assistant Secretaries. Once again, it was a way of learning my way through the bureaucracy.

However, I would say that, in those days, when the United States was "symbolically" participating in CENTO and actually putting as much money into it as anybody else in the organization, it was not a "high budget" operation. The people who were most interested in it were the U.S. military. There was a Military Committee, and they always liked to extend their contacts. The CIA, the DIA, and INR [the State Department Bureau of Intelligence Research] were interested in the Counter-Subversion Committee. We met with other CENTO colleagues periodically, and they found it very useful. However, all of the other committee meetings were very "pro forma."

I had to organize American participation in them and finally get somebody to attend an Economic Committee meeting. Usually, I had to figure out a reason why they would want to go to Ankara or Tehran in the first place. I would tell them that this was a convenient way of getting your business done and also representing the United States. I thought of all of this as "doing it with mirrors."

Q: Who was your boss?

NEWBERRY: I was called the officer in charge of CENTO Affairs. My office was part of the Office of Regional Affairs in the Bureau of Near East/South Asian Affairs. The Office of Regional Affairs took care of anything which sort of crossed country lines, such as United Nations affairs and so on. In other words, multilateral organizations of any sort where more than one NEA office took part came under the Office of Regional Affairs. I also did UN work, so I was not entirely preoccupied with CENTO Affairs. Since I was working in NEA Regional Affairs, I also handled UN matters.

Q: Looking back at what we know historically of the three nations of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, one of the main purposes during the Cold War was intelligence collection, mainly through using listening posts. In Pakistan, in the earlier period, there was a base for U-2 [reconnaissance] flights. I would have thought that you would have had a strong, intelligence factor in everything that you did there.

NEWBERRY: Actually, you would expect that, and I expected that. However, the intelligence services of those countries met routinely with one another, bilaterally, and the meetings of the CENTO Counter-Subversion Committee were just another gathering

of the same people who were seeing one another from time to time, anyway. However, regarding the three regional countries, as was often the case until the fall of the Shah, the Bureau of NEA Affairs in the State Department was "transfixed" by the Shah-in-shah of Iran. That was the first thing that we thought about. Our first question would be: "How do we square this with the Shah," or, "Is this what the Shah would expect?" This was very much the atmosphere that we all dealt with in NEA. Of course, the assumption was that our intelligence from our listening posts, satellites, and whatever else we had out there was particularly important. Only the Shah could guarantee the continued collection of this intelligence. At least, that was the assumption.

Q: During the 1964-1966 period were you looking at any Soviet military threats to the Middle East or did we think that there was any probability of anything happening there during this time?

NEWBERRY: Not in CENTO as such, but the NEA Bureau was very mindful of Soviet propaganda and political games in places like Egypt, Syria, and so forth, as well as the propaganda war. One of the ways that all of this came home to me on the CENTO desk was that, earlier on, at one time the Soviets had made a big thing out of the Baghdad Pact and CENTO and what this all signified. Then it all began to drop off. When the Soviet propaganda machine stopped maligning CENTO, we knew that the organization had outlived its usefulness. [Laughter]

Q: Were there any particular crises during this time that you had to deal with?

NEWBERRY: That I personally had to deal with? I wouldn't say so. CENTO was so far off center stage that I never felt that I had to deal with a crisis. The only crisis that I had to deal with was when I was deployed up to the United Nations, for two years running, to be the NEA representative on our Delegation to the UN General Assembly.

While we're on that subject and are talking about Pakistan, I have to tell you about a very amusing experience I had. During the second time I was assigned to be the NEA representative on our UN Delegation to the General Assembly, I was spared from having to be away from my family for the entire period of the General Assembly. I just went up during the first two weeks, when the Secretary of State goes up to meet with the Foreign Ministers. I was assigned to arrange the meetings between the NEA Foreign Ministers and Secretary of State Rusk. I would take notes and prepare the reporting cables.

On this particular occasion it was just after the Rann of Kutch war between India and Pakistan [in 1965]. I had been following the reporting cables in Washington and also when I was at the UN. When Pakistani Foreign Minister Bhutto met with Secretary Rusk, at the United States Mission to the UN, I knew what Bhutto was going to say and I knew what Secretary Rusk was going to say back to him. So I just sat there and listened and didn't take any notes. When the meeting was over, I prepared the MemCon [memorandum of conversation] and the reporting cable blindfolded, because the two sides just restated their positions.

Well, a funny thing happened, when I finished my stint at the UN and came back to the Department in Washington. Bruce Laingen, who was then the officer in charge of Pakistan Affairs, said to me: "Dan, I had a curious question from somebody at the Pakistani embassy who had been up at the UN. He wanted to know if we had 'taped' the Secretary's office so that we could record the conversation." I think that Bruce told him: "Of course we don't 'tape' the Secretary's office." The Pakistani said: "We noticed that your note taker didn't take any notes." [Laughter] The simple explanation was that I didn't need to take any notes because both sides' positions were so familiar to me. Sure enough, we did send a reporting telegram on the Bhutto-Rusk meeting, and I'm sure that anybody who read it might say: "I'm sure I've read this before, somewhere." However, I swear that we did not tape the meetings between the Secretary of State and Foreign Ministers at the U.S. Mission to the UN.

Q: Did you find yourself at all concerned, as the NEA representative at the General Assembly, about the anti-Israeli attitude displayed by many of the members of the UN?

NEWBERRY: That was a constant concern. It was not really unique in my experience. Over the years there have been so many situations where the entire United Nations General Assembly would vote one way, and the United States and Israel would vote the other way. It's just sort of a "given" in the United Nations arena that that's the way that United States foreign policy is conducted.

Q: Did you find that this was so much of a constant factor that the way that everybody dealt with this was almost a "pro forma" situation?

NEWBERRY: A lot of the speeches were expected. As often happened at the United Nations, in those days, the speeches were not directed to the other Delegations in the General Assembly but to audiences back home. That's what the name of the game was so often at the UN, and this frequently remains the case to this day. The speakers are "grandstanding" to audiences back home.

Q: It's been said that Secretary Rusk was particularly interested in Asia and more or less turned European matters over to Deputy Secretary of State George Ball or somebody else. He also didn't spend a lot of time on Near Eastern questions. Was it evident to you that the Near East wasn't an area of prime interest to Secretary Rusk, from your perspective?

NEWBERRY: Yes. That was very much my impression. When I had assignments in NEA, involving Turkey and CENTO, Dean Rusk did everything that he did, conscientiously. When he had to talk to an NEA Foreign Minister or go to an NEA post, he did his "home work" and turned in a conscientious job. But NEA was not an abiding concern of his.

Let me just make an aside here. Since we were talking about dealing with CENTO with "mirrors," this reminds me of a trip I made with Dean Rusk to Ankara for one of those CENTO Council of Ministers' meetings. Incidentally, although we were not a member of

CENTO, Dean Rusk was the only Foreign Minister who attended all five meetings of the Council of Ministers. On this particular occasion, this was the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the Baghdad Pact, which, of course, later became CENTO.

Again playing this with "mirrors," the various delegations had all agreed that there would be CENTO "Fellowships." I had somehow contrived to get out of the Washington bureaucracy three such Fellowships for the respective nominees to come to the United States. One Fellowship was awarded to Pakistan, one to Turkey, and one to Iran. On the plane going to Ankara, at a certain point Dean Rusk got out his "Briefing Book" and was going over it with me. When he got to the page about the CENTO Fellowships, he said: "The Atlanta Rotary Club could do better than that!" [Laughter] He was saying how trivial and what a pittance we were putting into the organization.

Of course he had headed the Ford Foundation for years and knew what grants were. The cost of these Fellowships was probably worth less than a total of \$50,000.

Q: So you moved over to the Iranian desk in 1966, is that right?

NEWBERRY: Yes.

Q: Then you served on the Iranian desk from 1966 to 1967.

NEWBERRY: Just one year. I worked under Ted Elliott. I was his deputy. We had another officer working on economic affairs. I was working on political affairs.

Q: What was your impression of how we treated Iran at that time? You already alluded to it before, but now you were back and sort of in "the heart of the beast" in the State Department. What were you getting, from the perspective of the Iranian desk, as far as looking at the Shah, Iran, where things were, and all of that were concerned?

NEWBERRY: My general impression is that it confirmed many of my surmises about how little thought was given to the details of Iranian policy. On reflection, we were just "transfixed" by dealing with the person of the Shah. Much of my work, as the deputy on the Iranian desk, was simply making sure that the ambassador's recommendations were followed. The ambassador was at the other end of the cable traffic, and that was what the desk had to do.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

NEWBERRY: Armin Meyer. He reminded us daily that we needed to support his relationship with the Shah. That was a major preoccupation. Whenever an Iranian cabinet minister visited the United States, we made a major effort to accommodate him. At one point the Minister at the Court of the Shah, who was probably the Shah's closest, personal friend, decided to visit the U.S. We pulled out all the stops and organized a whole program for him. Then, without giving any warning, he decided that he had something else that he would rather do than follow this program. So for about three days I had to make apologetic phone calls to all of the people who had agreed to see this Iranian

cabinet minister. It was an awful lot of non-substantive but important "stagecraft." That's the kind of thing I thought I was working on when I was on the Iranian desk.

When the Shah came on one of his many state visits, my chief occupation was dealing with the White House staff, with their endless, "picky" arrangements about the guest list at the big, black tie state banquet. In the end, after working for weeks, getting together the most respectable guest list, in the end, most of the people who were invited to the state dinner were political friends of the President. They had nothing to do with Iran or foreign policy or anything else. I didn't consider my time on the Iranian desk as a very substantive year.

Q: It also sounds as if you were between two, very "imperious" people: President Lyndon Johnson and the Shah of Iran. Those two personalities sort of dominated your work.

NEWBERRY: Of course, volumes could be written about the "imperious" President Johnson. I won't go into that except to give you one vignette. When I was preparing for this state visit of the Shah, who, of course, had been to the U.S. on several, previous state visits. The White House staff had decided that President and Mrs. Johnson were tired of the usual "gifts" which the State Department recommended. So I was to come up with an original, imaginative gift list. I was pleased that they liked the suggestions I made.

One of the things that particularly intrigued them was that we had a report that the Shah had installed his own "bowling alley" at the Imperial Palace in Tehran. It turned out that he and the Empress were both avid bowlers. So I did some research and got the Brunswick bowling ball company to make some special bowling balls and put the imperial crest on them. These special bowling balls were finally delivered to the White House the day before the Shah and the Empress were to arrive. Mrs. Johnson took a look at this gift and said: "That bowling ball is just too big for the Empress!" A member of the White House staff called us and said: "Why did you send such a heavy bowling ball?"

Then I had to "level" with them. I said: "We researched this and had somebody quietly go into the Imperial Palace in Tehran and take the number off the ball. We have our sources of information." I assured Mrs. Johnson's assistant that this ball was, in fact, the same weight as the Empress of Iran usually plays with. To this day the Empress is a strong, robust woman. She could lift that bowling ball and did. So, with all the last minute tensions before the state visit, I was on the phone to the White House, explaining about the bowling balls to Mrs. Johnson's office. By this time I had spent 15 years in the Foreign Service, and that was what I spent my time doing!

Q: While you were on the Iranian desk, was there any "disquiet" about policy toward the Shah or toward the Shah's policies?

NEWBERRY: There was concern but no disposition to pursue the consequences of our misgivings.

Q: Could you talk a little about what you were getting from people?

NEWBERRY: These concerns were mostly expressed by people returning from serving in Iran or people who made trips to Iran who were aware of the level of discontent and also the abuses of the Shah's regime.

One of my favorite, and sort of telling reminiscences, concerned an American-educated Iranian. He returned to Iran and did some traveling around. This must have been in the mid-1960s. He later returned to the U.S. and told us: "I was in many places in rural Iran, where there are no doctors or dispensaries. However, there are all of these SAVAK [secret police] agents." To me that just spoke volumes about what were the priorities of the Shah's regime in terms of taking care of the Iranian people. There were no doctors, dispensaries, or nurses. However, every village had its quota of SAVAK agents.

Q: Was there any effort made, on our part, to try to pump more assistance, such as the delivery of medical care, out into the countryside? I imagine that one of the real problems was that, as is typical in many countries, including our own, it's very hard to get doctors to work in rural areas.

NEWBERRY: I'm sure that that's true, right here. If you go 50 or 100 miles from Washington, it's not all that easy to get doctors to go and set up medical practice there. It's worse in countries like Iran and Turkey. I know from personal experience how difficult it is to get professional people to go outside of the big cities.

Q: It is very difficult to do.

NEWBERRY: It is, indeed. Available, medical care there is very primitive. In Iran medical care was not being delivered in the rural areas. As a matter of fact, schools were among the things that the Shah had managed to do something about. He made it a requirement that young Iranian men who were drafted into the military and who were university educated had to spend a certain amount of time working in the literacy program, teaching villagers how to read and write. We have to give him credit for that. He did some good things.

Q: During this 1966-1967 period, were there any great crises and problems which occurred, other than with bowling balls?

NEWBERRY: They don't spring to mind. There was always this continuing concern about the foreign relations of Iran with Iraq. The Kurdish question was something on which I maintained a watching brief. However, most of my work involved the reading of daily intelligence intercepts. I knew more details about the Kurdish question than I could do anything about, anyway. However, somebody had to read those reports, and that was one of my jobs.

Q: What about the Kurdish problem, as it pertained to Iran? Did we have any particular policy for dealing with it, or anything like that?

NEWBERRY: Yes. We had our own, clandestine operations going among the Kurds. However, we blew "hot and cold" on what to do about this problem. As long as the Shah was around, we tried to gear our Kurdish policy, how shall I say it, to accord with the policy of the Shah. And the Shah played "games" with the Kurds. This involved making counter-moves against the Kurds who were operating from Iraq. Turkish activities against the Kurds appeared much later on, long years afterwards.

Q: How was Iraq perceived by the Iranian desk in Washington, from your point of view? Was Iraq regarded as a threat? What was the feeling?

NEWBERRY: At that time my recollection is that we were more interested in how Baath Party politics were going to work out. The Baath regime in Baghdad was sort of a rival of the Baath regime in Damascus. There was always some fascination with manifestations of the same political doctrine. However, at that time Iraq was not regarded as a threat.

Q: Regarding reporting from Iran, did you feel that there were "constraints" on it?

NEWBERRY: They were the same constraints that I described in our earlier talk. Those constraints were still very much there.

Q: Was there a feeling that Ambassador Armin Meyer was sort of "captured" by the Iranian Court?

NEWBERRY: No, I think that Ambassador Armin Meyer was a very astute diplomat. He knew what Washington wanted and he conducted himself accordingly. The inspiration for our "coddling" of the Shah came from Washington and not from individual ambassadors.

Q: You left the Iranian desk in 1967. Where did you go after that?

NEWBERRY: I went to replace Monteagle Stearns as Special Assistant to ambassador at large Averill Harriman.

Q: So you did that from 1967 to 1968.

NEWBERRY: Yes, just for one year.

Q: What were the responsibilities of Averill Harriman as ambassador at large from 1967 to 1968? He had had so many positions in the government, dealing with foreign affairs. What was his particular function at this time?

NEWBERRY: Governor Harriman always liked to be called, "Governor," because he used to say that this was the only public office that he was ever elected to. So we always called him, "Governor." Governor Harriman, of course, had supported the election campaign of President John F. Kennedy in 1960. When Kennedy became President, Governor Harriman was appointed Undersecretary of State, I think. Anyway, he had a

succession of jobs in the State Department. By the time I went to work for him, President Kennedy had been killed, and Lyndon Johnson was President. Averill Harriman, to whom the Democratic Party owed a great deal, financial and otherwise, was kept on in office.

By this time he was 75 years old, which is my own age. I think that I could function as well as Governor Harriman did, if I had his resources. However, the general attitude toward Harriman among people around Washington was that he was just being "tolerated" and was just an old "leftover" from the earlier days. He had been Secretary of Commerce, ambassador to the Soviet Union, ambassador to Britain, and so forth, under earlier administrations. By 1966 he was 75 years old and had been given the position of ambassador at large. Governor Harriman could be interested in anything that you wanted him to do. However, he had a "special portfolio" to pursue the question of American prisoners of war who had been captured during the Vietnam War.

My particular function for him was to read the cables and "screen" reporting from Vietnam so that he could be "up to date" and participate in higher level councils of the government with the latest, telegraphic traffic. The wives of prisoners of war were encouraged to keep in touch with Governor Harriman, although there wasn't very much that we could tell them. I became a sort of "listening box" with these wives. I had many interesting conversations with them. I came to "take the measure" of the remarkable wife of Admiral Stockdale. Sybil Stockdale sort of "organized" all of the West Coast POW wives. She would call me up from time to time, just to get as much information as she could, which was very little, in fact.

It stands out in my memory that her husband was Captain Stockdale, when he was captured by the North Vietnamese. He was later promoted to rear admiral before he retired and became a candidate for Vice President with Ross Perot in the elections of 1992. However, at the time of which we are speaking, the Stockdales were much younger. Mrs. Stockdale was an extraordinarily talented organizer and, how shall I say it, sensitive listener. I regarded the discussions with her as among the most interesting experiences that I had when I was working for Governor Harriman, staying in touch with the wives of the POWs through Mrs. Stockdale.

Q: The relatives of the Vietnam prisoners of war are still a potent, political organization, even today. My perception is that this group of people has become a sort of "Right Wing" organization which holds the view that, "The government doesn't do anything for us." We still see "missing in action" flags and banners, and all of that. Was there anything of that nature at this time, or was this a practical organization devoted to the question of what we are going to do about the status of the POWs?

NEWBERRY: The question was, indeed, what we are going to do about their status. At the height of the Vietnam War, we had very little information. We didn't even know where the prisoners were being held, in most cases, except in the case of prisoners held in Cambodia, and we'll come to that. I have a very important message to convey on that subject.

We really didn't know very much about the status of the POWs. My job really was to give the wives of the POWs some feeling that the U.S. government really "cared" about their husbands. There just wasn't much information available, but I have to say that I have not kept up with that subject. My career took me on to other matters. I have not been in recent touch with any of these prisoner of war organizations.

Q: How much attention did you feel that both the U.S. military and the CIA and other intelligence organizations paid to this issue during this time?

NEWBERRY: Of course, at this time I was in the frustrating position of trying to get answers for these wives of the POWs and was unable to get any. I had the feeling that we weren't doing as much as we could have, but the Vietnam War effort was so enormous and so vast that I would not want to be in the position of saying that we could have done more. I knew also that we had so many other things that our resources were being devoted to. I would not want to make an individual judgment on that matter.

Q: At this particular time what was your impression of how Governor Harriman operated, as you saw it?

NEWBERRY: I remember that Joseph Kraft, the columnist, wrote a profile of Governor Harriman at that time. It struck me that it made a very good evaluation of Harriman. Kraft said that, "Averill Harriman is the only ambitious, 75 year old" that he had ever met. Harriman was still trying to "get into the act," still looking for a role to play. In fact, he had a symbolic role to play because he went off to Paris when the long-enduring peace talks with North Vietnam began. Harriman went as the ostensible chairman of our Delegation to the talks. However, he was "backed up" by Cyrus Vance, who was the real negotiator. Harriman had enough "clout" in Washington that he was able to go to Paris, open the peace talks, and participate in them. Nobody expected him to be the real negotiator. People spoke of "Harriman and Vance."

That was a mess because so much of what he was doing was trying to find a role to play. After all of the honors that he had gained, he was still looking for more. As his Special Assistant, I found that I also had to look out for social opportunities for him. Get him on the White House guest list for things that you wouldn't expect Harriman to be interested in. He wanted to be "seen" in these circles. That was very important to him.

Q: Did Pamela Harriman play any role in your work at all?

NEWBERRY: At that time Marie Harriman was still alive. She was Governor Harriman's wife and she died back in the 1970s. Pamela Harriman married the Governor much later after I had left his service. I never met her until after Governor Harriman had died. So I did not know Pamela Harriman well but I knew Marie Harriman. She was a very distinguished lady and a gracious hostess, as well as an art connoisseur. She had been running her own art gallery in New York when Governor Harriman met and courted her. They had a very gracious home in the Georgetown district of Washington. That was

where Jacqueline Kennedy, President John F. Kennedy's widow, lived after the President was assassinated.

This brings me to something that I would like to put into this Oral History because I don't think that it's ever been recorded before. When I was working for Governor Harriman, Mrs. John F. Kennedy was still Mrs. John F. Kennedy. She got a lot of attention from the news media. Every time she went out to dinner with any man, he was the focus of considerable speculation. At this point in my story, when I was working for Governor Harriman, Lord Harlech, the former British ambassador to the United States, was regarded as the principal suitor of the widow of President Kennedy in all the tabloid magazines.

Well, all of this is related, as I mentioned some time ago, to Cambodia. We had no diplomatic relations with Cambodia at that time. We had broken relations with Cambodia, and the Australian government "protected the interests" of the United States in Cambodia. I've forgotten who protected Cambodian interests in Washington but I never had anything to do with them. However, the Australian embassy used to bring messages to the State Department, since Australia protected "U.S. interests" in Cambodia. On this occasion the Australian first secretary brought me an envelope.

This was one of the most stupid "blunders" that I ever made in my career. He had a message from the Australian High Commission in London, addressed to Mrs. Kennedy. I received this envelope automatically and, without thinking, opened it up. Well, much to my astonishment, as I had not known that all of this was going on, Jackie Kennedy had decided that she wanted to visit Angkor Wat, in Cambodia. Some famous French scholar had told her that she should see it. So never mind that the U.S. had no relations with Cambodia and that the Viet Cong had captured some of our people and taken them into Cambodia. They were holding American "prisoners of war" inside Cambodia. Jackie Kennedy just decided that she wanted to go to Angkor Wat and that she wanted to go NOW.

I really caught "hell" from Governor Harriman for having opened the letter addressed to her. Well, I was the Special Assistant to Governor Harriman and I opened mail addressed to the Governor. The letter turned out to be an invitation to Mrs. Kennedy from Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia. The letter had been forwarded to Governor Harriman who, I guess, knew Mrs. Kennedy pretty well. Governor Harriman said to me: "I don't know what possessed you to open that letter!" However, I could tell from his tone of voice that he was very glad to know what was in the letter, because it alerted him to what problems he had to face. Of course, Mrs. Kennedy's first reaction was one of surprise that a Special Assistant could listen to phone calls for Governor Harriman. As a matter of fact, like all Special Assistants in the State Department, I was expected to listen in on the Governor's phone calls. When I did so, Governor Harriman was very proper. He told me: "You're a Foreign Service officer, and when I'm talking about Democratic Party politics, you are not to listen." He wanted to keep me absolutely clear of such matters.

Anyway, Mrs. Kennedy's reaction when she found that the letter addressed to her had

been opened was to say to Governor Harriman: "Averill, suppose that that letter had been a 'tender' avowal from Prince Sihanouk." Of course, Prince Sihanouk was married and so forth. So this was the beginning of my, how shall I say, disillusionment with the "Camelot" image of the widow Kennedy.

However, to compress this story, one of the things I had to consider was how to get Mrs. Kennedy to Cambodia. Of course, it was a simple enough thing to arrange for commercial transportation for her and Lord Harlech as far as Bangkok. But there was no way to get them from Bangkok to Phnom Penh and thence to Siem Reap, where Angkor Wat is located.

So Averill Harriman and Bob McNamara, who was the Secretary of Defense at that time, spoke on the phone to each other, and I listened in. It was very revealing. Neither one of them wanted to pick up the phone and call Mrs. Kennedy. McNamara said: "Averill, you call her." Governor Harriman said: "No, Bob, I think that on this one you should call her." [Laughter] It was obvious that they dreaded having to talk to Mrs. Kennedy.

However, in the end what was arranged was that, to justify using a U.S. military aircraft to fly Mrs. Kennedy and her entourage from Bangkok to Phnom Penh, they had to "cook up" a mission for her. So it was agreed by Mrs. Kennedy with Secretary of Defense McNamara that, while she was in Cambodia, she would intervene personally with Prince Sihanouk to do something about getting our prisoners of war released from Cambodia to somewhere and somehow do something for the American prisoners of war held by the Viet Cong in Cambodia.

So the whole visit of Mrs. Kennedy to Cambodia unrolled, and it got to be a big "hullabaloo." At one, "horrible" moment I thought that I was going to have to go with her. Governor Harriman said: "We can't just let her go alone with Lord Harlech. That would cause a lot of gossip. We've got to find another man." I protested: "But Governor, I'm married." Harriman said: "But you speak French." I kept saying: "But I'm married." So, in the end they got Michael Forrestal, the son of the late James V. Forrestal [the first Secretary of Defense], who was a very eligible bachelor and who had escorted Mrs. Kennedy on social occasions. Mike Forrestal, who had served in the government, went along on this trip. It was fortunate, from our point of view in the State Department that Mike Forrestal did go along, because he was a "trained observer" and he was the only source of information as to what actually went on during Mrs. Kennedy's "state visit" to Cambodia, a country with which we had no diplomatic relations.

Well, the visit took place, and Prince Sihanouk pulled out all of the "stops." As the visit was coming to an end, Mike Forrestal reminded Mrs. Kennedy about her commitment to ask Prince Sihanouk for help in arranging the release of American prisoners of war. At this point Mrs. Kennedy had still not brought up the subject, in spite of repeated reminders. In the end Mike Forrestal himself had to bring up the subject with Prince Sihanouk. Of course, the whole "magic" of her proposed intervention was gone.

I tell this story because I think that it reveals something about Mrs. Kennedy and her

single-mindedness that she couldn't be bothered to mention the American prisoners of war during all of that "glamorous" experience, in spite of her, how shall I say it, her "chef de cabinet" [principal aide, in this case Mike Forrestal] reminding her of the prisoners of war at every step during the visit to Cambodia.

Somehow or other, I've never been able to shake this impression from my mind. I don't think that it's ever been recorded anywhere. That's why I've gone to so much trouble to tell this story in this interview. I am an "ear witness" to all of this.

Q: It's very interesting that Mike Forrestal, in what is known in social terms as "going as the beard," was the "other person" when there was a romantic liaison going on. This term is used when you bring another party into the proceedings to dissipate the appearances of any "impropriety."

NEWBERRY: Well, that's a story all unto itself.

Q: What was the reaction, particularly within the White House staff, to your efforts to have Governor Harriman included on guest lists for state functions? Did you find a sympathetic reaction there? Did they say: "Oh, my God! We've got to do something for him."

NEWBERRY: They usually "rolled with the punch." I must say that it wasn't regarded as a terribly small scale matter and that I had raised it too late. They would try to include him. I would say that Governor Harriman was "tolerated" at the White House, rather than really "treasured." However, there came a time, when I was still working for Governor Harriman, and the whole national sentiment was beginning to change about the Vietnam War, and President Lyndon Johnson was finally persuaded to bring together a group of senior statesmen, known as the "wise men," including Clark Clifford and...

Q: This was after the "Tet" offensive, which began in January, 1968.

NEWBERRY: Governor Harriman, who was always very sensitive to these things, of course took part in this group. I could sense the "shift" in his views, although I was not present. I knew that something had happened. Harriman, McNamara, and company were all beginning to look for ways to shift their positions on the Vietnam War, because it was obvious that President Johnson had been persuaded that he had to change the whole approach. That's when we began talking about the Paris Peace Talks, and so forth. In my perception of it, the experience with the group of "Wise Men" was decisive. I think that Dean Acheson also took part in these discussions. They persuaded President Johnson that he had to change his position on the war.

Q: Then you left Governor Harriman's staff in 1968.

NEWBERRY: Yes. At this point Governor Harriman was going to Paris to participate in the peace talks. He didn't need me and, as luck would have it, I got an assignment to attend the Army War College for a year as a student in the class of 1969. So it was just a

perfect "parting of the ways" with Governor Harriman. The Governor went to Paris, and I went to Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, for a year.

Q: Could you talk a bit about your time at the Army War College? You were there from September, 1968 to June, 1969. Could you give us your impressions of the War College and what you got out of that year? What was your impression of the U.S. military? This was really at the height of the Vietnam War and all that. What was the atmosphere?

NEWBERRY: It certainly was the "height" or the "depth" of the Vietnam War. First, let me say that the year I spent at the Army War College, living on the post with my family, was a surprisingly agreeable experience, personally. My wife and I found that we had far more in common with the colonels and "honorary colonels" in the class than we expected. Most of my classmates were Army colonels. We found that we had much more in common than what separated us. This was a great revelation to me. Some of my War College classmates are close friends of ours to this day. Other State Department colleagues who have been to one of the war colleges have told me the same thing.

From the personal point of view, it's a great revelation to have this intimate, day to day sense of a common mission, shall we say, and a common commitment with our military colleagues. That was an important, personal experience.

As far as Vietnam is concerned, as it happened, in 1968 General Westmoreland, the famous General "Westy," had just been pulled out of Vietnam to become the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. The tradition at the Army War College is that the first lecture of the student year, in the fall, is given by the Army Chief of Staff. So General Westmoreland gave the first lecture. This has a very important bearing on my experience at the war college, which I will explain now.

You may remember that during the Vietnam War, General Westmoreland had a "running battle" with the press. He had lots of complaints about the "malign influence" of press reporting on the Vietnam War. So in his inaugural lecture at the Army War College General Westmoreland expressed the hope that several of the officers in the class would devote their student thesis time to analyzing the impact of press reporting on the conduct of military operations.

When the time came to propose our thesis topic, I proposed something else. I was called in by the Director of Instruction, who said: "Dan, we know that you've been a press officer. You heard what General Westmoreland said. What are you going to write about the Vietnam War?" I said: "Well, the general just made this as a suggestion." The director of instruction said: "You should understand this, Mr. Newberry, that Army officers have been court-martialed for not carrying out the suggestion of a general officer."

So what was I to do? I did not want to write about the Vietnam War. I came up with a proposal to do my research and write my Army War College thesis on the relationship between the Department of Defense Public Affairs Bureau at the Pentagon and the Pentagon press corps, right here in Washington. I knew that most of the press reporting

was "decentralized" and written out in Saigon. The Army War College approved this thesis as meeting the "requirement."

This turned out to be a fascinating experience during my [year] at the Army War College. All of the members of the class were allowed every Wednesday off, for a period of about 10 weeks, to do research. They provided me with a car and driver to take me down to Washington once a week to do my research. I spent a lot of time in the Pentagon, and also in the State Department, doing an analysis on how the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs was organized to handle public affairs. In fact, it was abysmally organized. There were the worst relations, marked by constant "bickering," between OASD/Public Affairs and the Pentagon press corps.

I found that the irony of it, as I pursued my research, was that the regular members of the Pentagon press corps, including some of the most respected "by-lines," were amongst the most critical of the "control mechanism" that had been put into place during the Secretary of Defense McNamara regime. They felt that this mechanism, in effect, amounted to "censorship." I brought out in my dissertation that in many respects McNamara's regime and the people that he had in public affairs represented the "triumph" of civilian control over the military. However, the people who could be counted on to carry out the instructions were all of the military people from the Army, Navy, and Air Force who were "seconded" to this Bureau of Public Affairs; they were making this regime work. They carried out orders. Here we were, with the apparent triumph of civilian control over the military. In fact, this was an example of the most thoroughgoing censorship and dissembling. The Pentagon correspondents hated this system. I assembled a whole catalogue of complaints to this effect.

To mitigate this view, in my thesis I did a comparison with the way the State Department handled public affairs during the Vietnam War. Although we, both then and even now, have our "hangups" about dealing with the press, we did fairly well. This was during the time Bob McCloskey was Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. He has since died, but we remember him as being an exceptionally effective spokesman for the State Department.

In my thesis I made a comparison between the two, public affairs operations in the Pentagon and in the Department of State. I also made an analysis of what the hangups of the State Department people were and how they affected the situation. If anybody wants to do some research on my paper, it is available through the Army War College. The title of it is: "The Defense Department and Relations with the Pentagon Press Corps," published in 1968 at the Army War College.

I won't dwell on that any more, except that, to go back to the Vietnam War, in the course of my final, roundup interviews, I couldn't see the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs at the Defense Department, but I saw his Deputy who was handling public affairs. This Deputy was himself a former newspaperman. I regarded him almost as a "renegade," because he was part of what I regarded as a "censorship" operation, too.

At this point I was developing the conclusions to my research. I said to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs: "I have been impressed with what a splendid organization and how well equipped the Pentagon and the Department of Defense are in supplying all of this information. Why is it that the Department of Defense did not try to explain to the American public what we were doing in Vietnam?" The reply of this Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs was: "If we did that, Newberry, the American people might get to 'like' the Vietnam War, and that would close off the President's options." I can tell you that this remark almost made me sick to my stomach. That's all I have to say on this subject.

Q: Did you sense within the Army officer corps any "disquiet" about Vietnam and what we were doing? You are really talking about the people who were fighting the war.

NEWBERRY: Absolutely. We had many, free-ranging discussions among the members of the class, who were mostly colonels. Many of them were terribly disturbed about the whole concept of the war, the way it was being waged, and the professional mistakes that were being made. Incidentally, in retrospect one of the most revealing things that came to my attention was that toward the end of the year at the Army War College several officers from the National Guard spent several days with us. We met with them and had discussions with them.

One of these officers was the General who commanded the Ohio National Guard. He was "terrified" that many of the members of the class appeared to be such "free thinkers." Many of our classmates commented after the "bull sessions" with him were over: "That man is 'dangerous.'" In fact, he was the officer who later conducted the operation to restore order at Kent State University in 1970.

Q: This conversation with the commander of the Ohio National Guard was in the spring of 1968. It was the Ohio National Guard that fired on students at Kent State University in 1970. This really "tipped the balance" in the U.S. anti-war movement.

NEWBERRY: My reason for mentioning this is that the Army officers in my class who heard this general recognized him as "dangerous" and commented to this effect among ourselves. Sure enough, he was. The Kent State University clash between university students and National Guardsmen was a very important event in the whole drama of the Vietnam War.

Q: Absolutely. In 1969 you left the Army War College. Where did you go?

NEWBERRY: I would like to refer back to the personnel assignment process in the State Department. I might add and take advantage of this opportunity to "brag" about myself a bit. Members of the war college faculty told me that my thesis on Defense Department relations with the Pentagon press corps received the highest grade of the various theses prepared by my class. In fact, they said that they had never given such a high grade to a thesis by one of the students. They incorporated my paper in the war college curriculum for the next several years as "required reading" for the ensuing classes. I felt that I came

out of my war college year with a great deal of prestige.

However, the State Department paid no attention to this. When it came time to inquire about my onward assignment, the personnel people gave me two choices: one was to be principal officer in the consulate in Peshawar, Pakistan; the other was to go back to Turkey as the principal officer in Adana, Turkey. I didn't have much trouble making a choice between these two possibilities. I found that in Peshawar, Pakistan, the only place where my children could go to school in English was the Pakistani Air Force School for Dependents. They would be the only non-Pakistani children in the school. So it didn't take me long to decide to go back to Turkey as principal officer at the American consulate in Adana.

Q: So you went to Adana, Turkey. You were there from when to when?

NEWBERRY: From August, 1969, to August, 1971.

Q: You were, what, consul general?

NEWBERRY: I was consul.

Q: What was the situation in Adana? How do you pronounce it?

NEWBERRY: Actually, most people who speak English call it Adana, with the stress on the second "a."

Q: Could you describe the consulate there at that time? That is, its responsibilities and the principal matters that you were dealing with there?

NEWBERRY: I got the clear impression, and I knew this from my previous time on the Turkish desk in the 1950s, that a decision had been made to move the American consulate from Iskenderun [also called "Alexandretta"], where it had been for many years, down near the Syrian border, to Adana. Near Adana was a Turkish Air Force Base, which was to be jointly operated by the Turkish and the U.S. Air Forces. The base was being developed at Incirlik. In fact, the U.S. Air Force "ran" the base, with the participation of the Turkish Air Force. All concerned had decided that the American consulate in that area should be close to Incirlik, since there were very good, relations between the U.S. Air Force and the local, Turkish community.

So the principal function for the American consulate in Adana was to ensure good, community relations between the U.S. Air Force people and the Turkish community. However, of course, we had other, traditional consular responsibilities. The consular district covered 18 provinces in southeastern Turkey. We had relatively meager, personnel resources. We had myself as consul, vice consul Mike Austrian, an American secretary, and four or five Turkish employees [Foreign Service Nationals].

We did a pretty thorough job of getting around a relatively large, consular district but we

couldn't do all of that much "in depth" reporting. By that time, although I was reasonably good in conversational Turkish, my vice consul, Mike Austrian, spoke Turkish better than I did. When we made field trips, although we took interpreters with us, I think that we did a reasonably good job of reporting on political and economic matters.

However, we were basically concerned about the Air Base at Incirlik. We tried to ensure that the U.S. Air Force personnel at Incirlik understood what the problems were. One of the biggest of these problems, which Mike Austrian and I had to deal with, involved the trade union situation at the air base, which constituted one of the anomalies in the Turkish political situation. This is still an anomaly, to a certain extent.

The irony is that, back in the 1950s, I was involved in trade union problems during my first tour of duty in Turkey. The American Federation of Labor had a "missionary" out in Turkey. In fact, he was a trade union organizer. He was not particularly welcome in Turkey as he was teaching the Turks how to organize labor unions. So this whole phenomenon of Turkish labor unions and their militancy was something which the American labor movement had introduced into Turkey.

When I got to Adana in 1969, a strike was going on at the air force base at Incirlik. There was a nationwide union in Turkey which organized the military base workers, called the "Defense Workers' Union." The union members were on strike and demonstrating outside Incirlik Air Force Base at this time.

The strike didn't extend to the air base itself, but the union had pickets outside the main gates. There was an astonishing atmosphere inside the base about the attitude toward the Turkish strikers, who were carrying placards and so forth outside the base. It came home to me that an awful lot of American adults had grown up without any understanding of the history of the trade union movement in the United States, as well as the contributions of the trade unions to the life and prosperity of America. The U.S. Air Force people at the base in Incirlik had the attitude that those Turkish workers were like the "Viet Cong" out there, waiting to do "mischief." These Air Force personnel had absolutely no understanding of the rights of labor to organize and to make their grievances heard.

So I found myself, as the American consul, trying gently to persuade my own countrymen in the U.S. Air Force to understand what trade union rights were. It was as basic as that.

Q: How did you go about persuading the U.S. Air Force base commander and his officers to understand the role of trade unions and, particularly, the attitude of the Turkish strikers?

NEWBERRY: Well, we only had partial success because, as at most military installations, and particularly at our base facilities, there is a constant turnover of people. I found during my time at Incirlik that I was constantly having to go over the same ground with newly-arrived colonels, majors, and so forth, coming in from God knows where. I should add that this strike was eventually resolved. However, these Air Force

officers really didn't want to deal with the trade unions.

I found that, in general, one of the biggest problems that we had was psychological. One of my colleagues told me that in the U.S. Air Force, when you go from one base to another around the world, everything is provided for you, including the PX, the Commissary, the movie theaters, and so forth. So an air base is an air base is an air base. A lot of the U.S. Air Force people were really not interested in community relations with the Turks. They could walk down the road, outside the base, to a little, makeshift colony of souvenir stalls and buy anything Turkish that they wanted, without even going into the city of Adana. In fact, many of the U.S. Air Force people didn't go into Adana at all.

We had an uphill struggle. We made some progress and we kept trying. There was a very lively Turkish-American binational association. Some of the more purposeful U.S. Air Force people would come into town and take part in the activities of the binational association. However, they were a small minority out of the couple of thousand U.S. Air Force personnel assigned to the base. There was a very large, American community living inside the base. Some of them were actually quartered in the city of Adana, by choice, especially those who had "unaccompanied tours of duty." Some of them brought their families to Turkey at their own expense and rented quarters in Adana. I don't want to paint an absolutely bleak picture, because there were some purposeful people among the U.S. Air Force personnel assigned to the air base at Incirlik who went out and learned and saw something of Turkey. However, for the most part, U.S. Air Force personnel would just as soon have had nothing to do with the Turks.

In some ways, if there were little or no contact with the Turks, this would facilitate our community relations problem. However, on the other hand, it was a challenge to "juggle" these considerations.

Q: Did you have the problem of automobile accidents, drinking, people going into mosques, and that sort of thing?

NEWBERRY: I think that as far as the issue of Americans going into mosques was concerned, they had pretty good briefings. We never had any problem with that. Automobile accidents were another matter. Since Incirlik air base was in a rural, agricultural community, a lot of really terrible traffic accidents occurred with farm carts which circulated at night or in the late dusk, with no markings or lights on them. We had lots of really serious problems with Air Force drivers who, in spite of briefings, unfortunately had some fatal accidents. The driving habits of Americans and the village folkways of Turks and their tractors and tractor-trailers were a constant problem. This was one of our biggest community difficulties.

Of course, we had the "Status of Forces" agreement, under which the American military could simply declare that, in the event of an accident involving an Air Force vehicle, the Air Force driver was on duty, in which case he could not be touched by a Turkish court. Still, this created a dreadful, community relations problem. This was one which the U.S. Air Force worked on all the time and made a very serious effort to deal with. However,

with that many people, many of the airmen had their own cars which were brought out to Turkey or were flown out from the United States, there was lots of driving around. There were beautiful, excursion places for picnics in the mountains around Adana. There was a lot of traffic on the roads, and eventually we had lots of problems on that score.

Q: Well, how did you interrelate with the Turkish authorities in the area?

NEWBERRY: The Governor of the Province and the Mayor of the city of Adana were my principal contacts. I took great pains to stay on good terms with the Turkish military in the VI Corps of the Turkish Army, which was based there. We were very mindful that there were lots of Turkish military in that part of Turkey. We used to say that they were rehearsing for the invasion of Cyprus. It was very obvious to us what they were doing. However, by that time I knew a good bit about the Turkish military. I knew that if I asked too many questions, they would just tell me to mind my own business. So vice consul Mike Austrian and I just took note of these things and recorded them. However, we did not get into any operational discussions with the Turkish military.

As it turned out, preparing for the invasion of Cyprus was exactly what the VI Corps of the Turkish Army was doing, when we were there. There was always a lot of military activity on the roads. I just kept up "correct relations" and very cordial relations with the Turkish military. I've always found the Turkish military to be courteous and polite, even when they had a stern message to deliver.

On one occasion, a Peace Corps alumnus who was employed as the director of the Turkish-American Association Center, had gone out of his way to be hospitable to young, "drifting Americans" who came through the area. On numerous occasions he allowed them to stay in his apartment. Some of these "drifters" were stashing drugs in his apartment. This came to the attention of the Turkish police, and the former Peace Corps volunteer was arrested. By this time Turkey was under martial law. I went down to see the martial law commander, who was responsible for dealing with this matter. I went down to see what I could do to make sure that this young American was not unduly punished for allowing some of these "drifters" to use his house to store drugs.

I'll never forget the very stern but friendly lecture that the commanding officer of the VI Turkish Army Corps, a three-star Turkish general gave to me. He said: "Mr. Consul, the job of being director of the Turkish-American Association is a serious job, and it should have a serious person in that job." That's all he had to say. On the other hand, he did the necessary. He got the message from me. They preferred no charges against the young man. However, the young man had been thoroughly sobered by this experience. He never let anybody else stay in his apartment, "drifters" or otherwise.

I mention this story because it shows the care which the Turkish military exercised in their relations with us. They were firm but courteous and friendly.

Q: Speaking of these American "drifters," during part of this time, from 1970 to 1974, I was consul general in Athens. This was a period when an awful lot of young Americans

were going into Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and so forth, picking up hashish, and trying to smuggle it out. I'm not talking about "big time" drug dealers. Mostly, it was young people doing this. Did you have a problem with this kind of thing?

NEWBERRY: Not a big problem. Of course, in Istanbul it was a huge problem. Most of the "drifters" got no farther than Istanbul because it was an easy, open scene in those days. There were stories written and even a movie shot about them. However, very few of these "drifters" strayed as far South and East in Turkey as Adana. So we just got an occasional one.

Q: I think that we may have talked about this before. I am referring to some young, American women who were arrested for having a van full of hashish. Were they still in jail when you were in Adana, or did that happen later?

NEWBERRY: That did not happen when I was in Adana. It happened during the time Bill Hallman was consul in Adana. Actually, when I was principal officer in Adana, we only had one American citizen, a civilian, in jail. Of course, the U.S. military took care of their people. Bill Hallman, my successor, had a different experience.

Q: Part of my responsibility as consul general in Athens during this time was that I had a representative to handle federal benefits in Turkey and other things. We used to send our people out to investigate in Turkey, and they would come back with great stories. I wonder if you could explain what Federal benefits in Turkey were and your impression of what was happening in your consular district.

NEWBERRY: This was a very specialized, localized situation. To explain how this came about, you have to go back to World War I. We used to call this man the "Social Security Attaché in Athens." He would come over once a year to inspect the situation. Thanks to the missionaries in that part of Turkey, a lot of their protégés got jobs in war production plants in the United States, especially in Michigan. Many of them stayed on in the United States after World War I was over, long enough to build up eligibility for Social Security pensions. Then they came back to their villages out in eastern Turkey, especially in the province of Elaziğ.

Q: Elaziğ was in your...

NEWBERRY: It was in the Adana consular district. Actually, it took about an eight hours' drive to get out there. I'll try to shorten this story, but what happened was that these people came back to their villages and had children, who were entitled to Social Security Survivors' benefits. Even in my time in Adana, in 1969-1971, there was still a substantial number of monthly Social Security checks that had to be disbursed. However, there was an enterprising villager out there in Elaziğ who had contrived to adopt a number of these people legally. He was siphoning off the Social Security checks for himself. This had all happened before my time in Adana.

It was such a scandal that the Social Security Administration had decided that the

American consul in Adana had to distribute these survivors' checks personally every month. We had a position in the Consulate which had been funded by the Social Security Administration. One of our local employees went out to Elaziğ Province to distribute these Social Security checks. I went with him a couple of times because I wanted to see the situation in person, and so did vice consul Mike Austrian. The Social Security attaché in Athens would come out and inspect this situation once a year because of the extensive "fraud" that had gone on. There were still attempts being made to continue the fraud.

We had set up special accounts in the local bank in Elaziğ for these people, so that "shysters" couldn't get hold of their money. However, we had to check up constantly to make sure that the people eligible for these checks were still alive. This was a very time-consuming process and, for all I know, it still goes on. I don't know any other place in the world where such an elaborate system has been set up. This was because of the extensive fraud that was perpetrated, years before.

Q: Did you find that the Turkish authorities were helpful in trying to end this fraud?

NEWBERRY: Yes. Once the fraud was discovered, they cooperated completely. They didn't like anybody engaging in such activity. We set up special accounts in a government bank which, I think, is now being "privatized." In those days it was a government bank. We had full cooperation from the bank.

Q: What about the cultivation of opium poppies and that sort of thing? Was this much of a problem in your area?

NEWBERRY: Not in my area. The principal province for the cultivation of opium poppies was in the consular district of the consulate in Izmir. This problem was very much on the agenda during that period. I think that I once remarked that when Bill Handley was our ambassador in Ankara from 1969 to 1972, I don't think that there was a single day during his mission to Turkey that he didn't have to deal with the subject of opium. This was not a problem in my consular district. I was very much aware of the problem because, of course, I read all of the cable traffic that was repeated to me from the embassy in Ankara. I knew how much the U.S. government was concerned about opium.

This was a period when President Nixon had placed great emphasis on stamping out the opium and narcotics traffic. There was a lot of illicit cultivation of opium poppies in Turkey during this time. In the end we obtained the cooperation of the Turkish government, to the point that there was virtually no "illicit" cultivation of opium poppies. There is "licensed" cultivation of opium poppies, because the Turkish government produces its own narcotics for medicinal purposes. This is very much under control, mainly because of our pressure and our willingness to assist the Turkish authorities to find crop replacements and so forth. So this is one of the triumphs of American-Turkish cooperation.

This is not a significant problem any more. However, the illicit traffic in heroin from the Middle East, from Pakistan and farther East, through Turkey and to the Mediterranean, is

still a problem on which our Drug Enforcement Agency and the Turkish drug enforcement people work together very closely. However, there no longer is a problem of the illicit cultivation of opium poppies in Turkey.

Q: Obviously, you reported on political developments in your consular district. Were there any particularly interesting political developments taking place in your consular district?

NEWBERRY: Of course, there were reverberations from national political developments. These were developments which we occasionally felt in rather unexpected ways. Most of eastern Turkey includes what we now call freely the "Kurdish areas." Political developments were very much under the control of what we called the "Agha," who were local leaders. They decided whom their people were going to vote for. There was always a lot of competition between the major political parties to get the support of this or that "Agha" and sway his people's vote this way or the other.

The year that Turkey had a general election when I was consul in Adana, there was a very interesting phenomenon. The "Agha" decided that they didn't like the terms that were being offered by the major political parties. So they supported "independent" candidates. It was the first time that any significant number of independent members of Parliament were elected. This was because the "Agha" were fed up with the two largest political parties in Ankara and put up their own candidates. I don't know that that has ever been repeated in Turkish politics, but it happened that year.

Of course, we felt the repercussions of that, although there was very little terrorism and kidnapping going on in my consular district. However, there was one, very celebrated case in my district, where terrorists captured, I think, four American sergeants. This led to a big drama, which I watched from afar.

I had some rather strong differences of opinion with the embassy on the way it was handling the public relations side of this problem. I remember commenting on a particular telegram from the embassy in Ankara. I said that the way the Embassy was "building up" this terrorist, Deniz Gezmiş, it was turning him into something like "Robin Hood." The embassy's answer was that in these circumstances you have to use television and radio to negotiate with this terrorist. I've never been convinced that that was wise. This terrorist, Deniz Gezmiş, in fact avoided capture and actually "holed up" in my consular district for a time, although we didn't know it then. He was eventually captured and paraded again before the television cameras.

The Turkish Minister of the Interior had a sort of press conference. It was the beginning of what I considered "depraving" the public media by politicians. This terrorist was a villain. He not only had kidnapped the four Sergeants, but he had terrorized a lot of other people. He was eventually executed. However, because of the way that we conducted negotiations with this terrorist, he was built up, as I said, into a great, "Robin Hood" type of figure. He is still referred to in Turkish politics, and it is said that the Turkish state committed a "terrible crime" in executing this "noble, young man." That's just one of my

pet peeves.

Let me make one more remark on this subject, which shows one aspect of Turkish personality. We returned to Turkey once again before I retired. While all of this drama was going on, and, of course, the whole nation knew about it, Turkish people would stop me on the streets and apologize for what was happening. They would say: "You know, those kidnapers are not 'real' Turks." This is a standard Turkish comment, that "no real Turk" would do such a thing.

I remember swallowing hard, taking a breath, and saying: "I have to disagree with you. Just as in America there are 'good Americans' and then some 'bad Americans,' you've got some 'bad Turks.' I think that these people are 'real Turks' who have gone 'bad.'" The instinctive reaction of the Turks was to disassociate themselves and say that "these people can't be real Turks." We'll come to that subject again, in another interview.

Q: Did Israel enter at all in the Palestinian conflict from your perspective? Was there any interest in that in Turkey?

NEWBERRY: We had a very particular interest, because we were monitoring what was going on at the Incirlik Air Force Base. We suspected, and then found out that, in spite of the Turkish government's admonition that Incirlik Air Force Base was not to be used in that crisis in Amman, Jordan, when was it, in 1970 or 1971, when the Palestinians...

Q: This was the "Black September" incident.

NEWBERRY: In spite of all of the admonitions to the contrary, Vice Consul Mike Austrian discovered that the U.S. Air Force, in fact, was using Incirlik Air Force Base for forwarding supplies to Israel. The U.S. Air Force was transporting them down to Israel. One of the most difficult times that I had with the Air Force was when we "blew the whistle" with the embassy and let the embassy know that the Air Force was "breaking the rules." If the Turks had ever found out about it, this could have spoiled all of our privileges at Incirlik forever more.

Q: Dan, you were talking about the involvement of the U.S. Air Force in assisting the Israelis with the movement of supplies during the "Black September" crisis of 1970. What was the U.S. Air Force doing and what did you do as far as informing the embassy was concerned? How was this matter handled?

NEWBERRY: I can't tell you too many of the details. Vice consul Mike Austrian, who was a very observant, alert guy, had a very distinguished career. In fact, he followed my footsteps and was assigned as political counselor at the embassy in Ankara. He had a very important role to play in connection with "Operation Comfort" in Iraq.

Q: Is he still in the Foreign Service?

NEWBERRY: I think that he has just retired. However, his wife, Sheila Austrian, is a

senior officer in USIA [United States Information Agency]. We were together in Adana in those days. Mike Austrian discovered this information that the U.S. Air Force was shipping supplies for Israel through the base. I don't think that we ever saw a cargo manifest, but we knew what the destination of this equipment was.

We had to protect the source of the information. The alternatives were to send a communication through the Air Force or to use our "One Time Pad" cipher system. So I sent Mike Austrian up to the embassy in Ankara to report this in person to the embassy, rather than take all the time to use the "One Time Pad." The embassy took up the matter from there. The next thing we heard was a "string of oaths" from the colonel at the U.S. Air Force base for our "snitching" on him. I don't know what the cargo was or what the Air Force had told the colonel to say. However, this misuse of Incirlik stopped. That's as much as I know.

Q: This sounds like one of those political arrangements made in Washington, and the Air Force went along with it.

NEWBERRY: In another respect, this is not too surprising because the U.S. Air Force ran Incirlik as if it were a U.S. installation. They sent planes all over Africa and here, there, and yonder. Some of the U.S. Air Force transports used to go to Israel to buy eggs for the base commissary. So it was a common enough thing for planes to go to Israel. I guess that the Air Force figured that they had a cargo plane available to move these military supplies to Israel. I don't fault anybody on the ground there in the U.S. Air Force detachment at Incirlik. The fault was with whoever in Washington had directed the plane from Incirlik to transport military cargo to Israel. They should have known better. Every time this kind of situation would come up, the Turkish General Staff would remind us that Incirlik was not to be used for this kind of thing. So Washington knew better or should have known better.

Q: Did you find that the U.S. military commanders there at Incirlik were politically "sensitive," or was this something that you had to handle yourself?

NEWBERRY: Some of the U.S. Air Force people were politically sensitive, and some were not. It was a mixed picture. Some of them were excellent and sensitive. Some of them were utterly insensitive. Some of them were downright "hostile" to the State Department.

Q: You left Adana in 1971. Where did you go then?

NEWBERRY: I left there in 1971. I was assigned to Tangier, Morocco, as consul general.

Q: You were there from 1971 until...

NEWBERRY: I was there for only one year, for reasons which I will explain. First of all, to give you a tip-off as to what's coming up, when I arrived in Tangier to take over as

consul general, the Foreign Service inspectors were there. Joe Mendenhall, who was the Senior Inspector, called me in and said: "Dan, you've just arrived here and are not part of this inspection. However, I have to tell you that our first recommendation is to close the post." So that's a back drop to what I'm going to tell you about Tangier.

Q: I thought that we might cover Tangier and then stop. Or should we wait?

NEWBERRY: I would rather wait.

Q: Alright. Next time we'll pick it up with your arrival in Tangier in 1971.

[Note: This interview was not completed due to the death of Mr. Newberry.]

End of interview