

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

NUEL L. PAZDRAL

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
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INTERVIEW

[Note: This transcript was not edited by Mr. Pazdral.]

SUMMARY: *Nuel Pazdral started off in administrative work in the AF Bureau, then went on to a consular assignment in Denmark. From 1968 to 1974 he did science work in Germany and then Poland. The Polish experience is particularly interesting for the light it sheds on U.S.- Polish relations during that period of the Cold War and on the scientific expertise that Poland was able to maintain. Mr. Pazdral returned to Poland (Krakow) in the late 1970s and witnessed the start of Solidarity. From 1979 to 1981 Pazdral was in Suriname. He gives a detailed eye-witness account of some aspects of a military coup that just sort of happened -- more than it was planned.*

Q: Today is August 3, 1992. This is an interview with Nuel L. Pazdral on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies. I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. Nuel, I wonder if you would give me a little about your background...where and when you were born, grew up, were educated, etc.?

PAZDRAL: I was born in Missouri in 1934 and spent only about ten days in that state because my father was in the military and my mother went there because that was the nearest military hospital. I lived as a child in the Philippines, California and all over the United States. I graduated from high school in Alaska.

Q: What branch was your father in?

PAZDRAL: He was a military surgeon and started out in the Army and then somehow got switched over to the Army Air Corps, and ended up in the Air Force when that was founded after the war. In fact, he was one of the founding members of the College of Aeromedical Surgeons which then became a specialty. He retired after something like 37 years in the Service. He had intended only to stay in long enough to pay off his college debts because he graduated during the height of the depression. By the time that was done the Second World War had come along and he really couldn't get out. And by the time the Second World War was over he had too much time to throw it away. So he stayed in. He is still alive and active out in California.

He was sent various places. During the Second World War he was in Australia and we were in Washington with my grandparents, which was a very interesting time. He came back and we went to Alabama where I was in the middle years of my schooling and then on to California and up to Alaska where I graduated from high school. I was accepted at Stanford University so I went there in 1952 and graduated in 1956 with a degree in political science.

I had originally started out in pre-med but decided I didn't want that. At the time I had been working for a newspaper. I started out writing a sports column for a newspaper in Anchorage, Alaska and kept on doing that while in college so I was a stringer for the Palo Alto Times and broke in on the San Francisco Examiner because I was also a photographer and sold them some photographs and then they said wouldn't I like to go out and cover various college sporting events, etc.

So when I graduated from college I actually ended up working for a few months for a San Francisco newspaper before I went into the Army, which everyone did in those days, it was obligatory. I spent not quite two years in the Army, 21 months, 13 of which were in Korea. This was after the war. It was a very interesting time because the war had just ended a couple of years before and the country was still in a great state of turmoil.

In fact that is one reason why I ended up joining the Foreign Service. I had such an interesting time in Korea and the times I was able to get away from there I went to Japan, took a trip to Okinawa, and a couple of business trips for the Army. I was an infantryman but had some special things to do. I was working on a contract for some printing that the Army wanted done and that got me to Japan a couple of times. Anyway I was enchanted with the Far East. I had taken the Foreign Service written exam before graduating from university and just sort of let it slide. I really had no thought at that time of going into the Foreign Service having taken the exam because a professor of mine was very keen on the Foreign Service.

But then I came back to the United States thinking to go back into the journalism business and looked all over for. I was married at that point and had one child, so it was necessary to get a job right away. I looked all over for a job visiting I think every managing editor of

every newspaper in a 70 mile radius of San Francisco, including the Watsonville Times, I still remember. I found that I hadn't worked long enough to have re-employment rights under the newspaper guild, so I would have to start again at the bottom. That being the case I looked elsewhere and found a pretty good job with a television station, selling advertising. The idea being that when something came along in the newsroom I would move over to their news operation. By the time that happened, two years later, I was making so much money selling television I couldn't afford to make the switch.

Then I decided selling as a way of making a living really wasn't all that much fun, although it was quite lucrative. At that point the State Department wrote to me and said, "Look, we have been deferring your oral examination for all these many years now since you were in the Army, but it is time for you to either fish or cut bait. Would you like to take the oral exam?" I said, "Why not." I took it and didn't pass. But in those days they had something they called "being deferred." They would defer you saying that you were a little weak in an area, but come back and try again next year.

They literally told me to get a subscription to the New York Times and read up more on current events, which I did and went back the next year and passed it.

I came into the Service in 1961. This was before the cone system had started and I was essentially hired as a management analyst because a lot of my college training had been in public administration. They sent me off first to German language training which got me off probation right away.

I had asked for a job in Washington because I thought it would be a useful thing to do, to find out how the Department worked and who to write to when you are overseas, etc., before going out. I got put into the Post Management Office of the Bureau of African Affairs, AF/EX as it is called. I started out as a junior post management officer which I did for a year. Then I got sort of put into doing special project work. This was right about the time of the Cuban missile crisis...

Q: 1962.

PAZDRAL: ...and President Kennedy had apparently been under the misapprehension that he had instantaneous, secure communications with all of his ambassadors around the world and he had tried to tell them all before announcing the blockade of Cuba that he was about to do that. Well, it didn't work. Some posts you couldn't get a cable to under 72 hours and telephones just didn't work at all. As a result of which the White House mandated a very large scale augmentation of our communications worldwide.

But most of the emphasis was on Africa because we had opened up so many new posts there...something like 16 posts in 1960...and for the most part they were still using PPT and one time pads for encryption and that sort of thing. One time I can remember a study which said that to send a cable from Zanzibar to Dar es Salaam, which is just across the water, you had to go all the way up to London and come back and if either of the cable

offices were closed that day, this didn't happen. So the average transmission time for the most urgent cable in those days between those two posts was 72 hours.

Well, new encrypting gear was budgeted. The Central Intelligence Agency took over a large part of this because they had these machines. It was called a KW26 in those days. I don't know what they are using now. But this was a fancy machine which worked in pairs and the machine at this end was constantly talking to the machine at the other end and they would decide if they had any garbles or not. It all worked out automatically. It was pretty much space age gear for its day and the Central Intelligence Agency was the only agency that had many of these machines. So they then moved into our communication picture in the State Department for the first time. And ever since then we have had the system which we had then, which is basically that we sort of massage the data and then pass it along to Agency folks who send it onward. I don't think I am revealing anything deeply classified by saying that.

In any case, to put this gear into an Embassy requires a very large parcel of administrative support. To take one example, you have to have a lot of air conditioning because the equipment has to be maintained at a certain temperature and humidity. In those days you had to have Marine guards. Most of our Embassies in the smaller posts in Africa were not air conditioned. So it wasn't just a matter of getting the communicators and communications gear and radio transmitters, but also of putting in the air conditioning, and finding a room in which the floor was strong enough to bear the weight, etc.

This involved millions and millions of dollars. So I got involved in that for almost a year and worked very closely with the Office of Communications in the Department in planning for the orderly installation of this sort of equipment.

That sort of got my name on the books because after that I was asked to go up and be the staff assistant for the Bureau. In those days it was a one man job. Almost all the Bureaus now have at least two, if not three, staff assistants working in shifts. But in those days, at least in the Bureau of African Affairs, you were all by yourself. I remember the fellow that I replaced...I was still a FSO-8 at that time, as I recall...

Q: The lowest rank.

PAZDRAL: The lowest rank, yes. He went on to be the Desk Officer for Ghana, which was a much more elevated position and I envied him greatly. He later went on to be our ambassador in three of the little southern African countries, David Bolen and then was ambassador to East Berlin. I think he is now working for DuPont.

Q: DuPont up in Delaware, yes.

PAZDRAL: In any case I did that for a while and then was sent to Polish language training, planning to go out to Warsaw. I had been very interested in working in the East Bloc and had in fact applied for Russian language training, but had been told they were

too full and would I take Polish instead. I agreed and they sent me to Polish language training. That was then broken because my wife lost her medical clearance and I was pulled from the language course and went back to AF as staff assistant for some time longer.

Q: Who were you working for?

PAZDRAL: It was G. Mennen Williams, former Governor from Michigan, who had campaigned actively with John F. Kennedy. According to G. Mennen Williams' personal assistant, he was the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs because he had asked for the job. He was very high up in the Kennedy hierarchy apparently, and was offered essentially whatever he wanted in the administration short of a top Cabinet post. He said he would explicitly like to be Assistant Secretary for African Affairs because the challenges and opportunities in Africa were so great.

Indeed, Soapy Williams was that sort of a person, a very liberal Democrat, who was a politician par excellence, could make friends with people like Kwame Nkrumah, so that Nkrumah sent him birthday cards and gave him little gifts every time he visited, more than you would expect. Williams, did, I think, quite well by his lights in the African area. I can't really trace the history of his progress because I was only seeing the paper flow basically. My job was simply to keep the vast stream of paper moving as quickly as possible and to the right places. It is interesting to me now looking back on it, I didn't pay too much attention to what was going on. My interest was simply in making sure that it continued to do so.

Q: The African Bureau was brand new. Africa was on the front pages and was considered to be one of the places to get if you were a bright, ambitious, middle level Foreign Service officer because you could make a name for yourself because you didn't have to deal with the old and crusted people, say in European Affairs. What was the feeling towards Williams by some of the people?

PAZDRAL: He was such an activist and so liberal in his views that I think most of the rank and file enthusiastically went along with him, because they were younger people like Dave Bolen, for example. Dave got into the Foreign Service by virtue of having been an Olympic Gold Medal winner. He was black and one of the first blacks in the Foreign Service, as far as I know. The Deputy Assistant Secretaries at that time were...there were two and then later three...one was Henry Tasca, a career Foreign Service officer who was a brilliant man and very adept at sort of Machiavellian administrative ploys that got the Bureau what it needed. The other was J. Wayne Fredericks. I don't know his background that well, but he was an Africanist from years before, I think he had worked for oil companies there and then had some connection with the Central Intelligence Agency, but I am not clear on that. But I think for the most part the substantive officers in the Bureau were behind Soapy all the way.

Q: Well, he had clout too.

PAZDRAL: Yes, sure, he could get what he wanted. How far he got I don't know. My impression, and I certainly am not an expert, is that the deterioration began fairly quickly after independence. It might have been possible had we had perfect foresight to do something to impede that process a bit, to buttress those democracies, but we didn't do it and so you got very quickly people like Kwame Nkrumah, sort of a denigration of the process of democratic development which is only now beginning to turn around. I must say that I became quite disillusioned with Africa having served there, and decided that although there was great potential, it was unlikely to be realized any time soon, and events have proven that to be the case.

In any case, I did my service in the Bureau of African Affairs and then went on to Polish language training and then came back to the Bureau of African Affairs. Then I was curiously sent back again to finish the Polish language training, which I thought was a rather inefficient way to do it, but never mind I was anxious to go to Poland. At that time, just as I was finishing my language training finally, they changed the new visa law.

Q: 1967 wasn't it?

PAZDRAL: No, it had to be a little earlier. In any case they eliminated the national origins quota system. The reason they rushed me back into Polish language training was because they anticipated a need for several more visa officers in Warsaw with a change in the law which would remove the quota restrictions on Polish applicants. We had lines there a mile long and expected to be deluged with applicants. In fact it didn't happen. I well remember that just two days before my language test I got a call from the Bureau of Personnel, asking me to get in touch. I did, of course...one responds rather immediately to something like that. The first words were, "Well, I guess you have heard the bad news." And I said, "No." He said, "Well, you are not going to Poland." I said, "Really?" And he said, "Yeah, you are going to Copenhagen."

I told my wife this bad news and we packed our bags. A few days later I passed my Polish test and we went off to do consular work in Copenhagen.

That was my first overseas assignment. We got there in January 1966. Driving north across the north German plains to take a ferry was like driving across the Russian steppe. The wind was howling and it was freezing cold. You expected the wolves to come around the corner. We got to Copenhagen and spent a delightful two years there.

I did consular work of all varieties because the consular section typically was 50 percent short staffed. It was unusual in those days, but I guess the post was reserved to a certain extent for those who had health problems or something like that. For various reason some of those assigned just never got there. So for almost all the two years I was there we were working fairly shorthanded, which gave me a chance to do the whole scope of consular work. I did welfare and protection.

When we did get some people we started traveling and made several trips around the country picking up consular work that was just not getting done because we hadn't had the time, money or just, perhaps, the inclination to get out into the Danish countryside. I guess the Department's attitude was sort characterized by their attitude towards the language training. When I heard I was going to Denmark, I said, "Well, could I get the language textbooks from FSI so that I could at least study it a little bit? I speak German and could probably pick it up very quickly." "Well, we don't teach Danish." I said, "Really, why not?" "Well," they said, "because everyone there speaks sufficient English so you don't need the language and we just don't bother to teach it." Well, they teach it now. I found when I got there that it was useful if for no other reason than to be able to read the newspapers.

That was an interesting revelation for a new officer. By virtue of having to read the newspapers I learned the language and it wasn't too hard because of the German. But then when I went out on these trips a year later and would try to speak Danish to the people I was talking with, particularly municipal officials with whom I was dealing, who were quite senior, seemed really very impressed that someone would try to speak their language. And even though I was stumbling and making mistakes and not communicating nearly as well as we could have done in English, because they spoke perfect English, they responded to that in ways that made it worthwhile to continue to try to learn Danish. I ended up getting out of there with a pretty good score in Danish.

I would go out to places like Arborg [ph] which hadn't seen an American Consul in years and do an investigation for a pension, issue passports to elderly Americans who really couldn't get down to Copenhagen to get their passports without great difficulty. I don't think we were issuing them by mail.

I remember a curious story which might be useful for your record. I went to visit a very elderly woman who had been born in Iowa, to give her back her American passport. She and her husband were pensioners then and must have been in their eighties. I remember when I got there they had a huge American flag draped across one wall of their tiny living room. The flag was big and the room so small that the flag had to be bent around one corner. The other wall was covered by photographs taken from American magazines. She had obviously maintained her connection with the United States and had fond memories of it.

The reason I was giving her back her passport was that she had been expatriated. She was born in Iowa or Indiana and had married a dentist. The dentist died leaving his young widow with one child and no money or assets except his dentistry tools. She met then the third son of a Danish nobleman, who being the youngest son had no inheritance and was sort of seeing the world. He married her essentially for the dentist tools and set up a sort of traveling medicine show cum dentist parlor on a wagon.

Well, even in those days the Immigration Service was around and he was arrested by the state authorities for conducting dentistry without a license which is a crime. Having

committed a crime in the United States he was therefore turned over to the Immigration Service and deported. She was deported with him because in those days under the Immigration and Nationality Act, if you were a woman and married a foreigner you lost your American citizenship. So she lost her American citizenship. Here is this poor girl from Iowa, widowed with a child and married to this Danish young man. They were deported back to Denmark.

Well, of course, the law changed not too many years after that and women who had been expatriated were then considered to regain their citizenship. Well by that time the Second World War had come along and they were stuck in Denmark. I guess at that point they had gotten so old that there was no point in going back to the United States. In fact, they probably weren't even aware that she had regained her citizenship. But the Embassy got wind of her somehow, I have forgotten how, and checked the records and found that she was one of those who should have an American passport. I was sent out to give it to her. It was really quite an occasion.

Well, I could go on quite a long time about consular work. You know, everybody says "Well, I could write a book about it."

Q: Let me ask a question. You had an ambassador there, Katherine White from New Jersey, a political appointee. What was she like as an ambassador?

PAZDRAL: Super. She was my first ambassador, of course, and, as you say, a political appointee. Her chief disability was that she had a husband who had been a stock broker and apparently made quite a bit of money and retired. He didn't have too much to do in Denmark so he would, for example, go off on Sahara expeditions, or be gone half the time. But when he was there he was a terrible nuisance, I must say, to some of us. He used to pinch the girls, by the way, so nobody really liked him.

But she was a very nice person, very competent too. She had been the public utilities commissioner in New Jersey and, I think, had something to do with the building of the New Jersey Turnpike, which, of course, was high up in the Party and therefore got her an appointment. But she was probably one of the better ambassadors that I ever had. I still remember her with a great deal of fondness. She would spend time with junior officers, for example. She was one of the few ambassadors I know who was able gracefully to tell you what she wanted you to do when she invited you over without making you feel like a servant or somebody who was invited just to fill a chair. She made people think that they were useful and told them exactly what she wanted to accomplish and why she was inviting them and did it in a very nice way. So my indoctrination to Foreign Service representation was actually given me by Katherine Elkus White and I thought stood me in good stead for years after that. I don't remember who the DCM was, as a matter of fact. But I certainly remember Ambassador White.

Q: Well then you left Copenhagen in 1968.

PAZDRAL: Yes, that is right. And I was scheduled to go to NATO SHAPE Headquarters in Belgium. Because of having been in the Army for two years and having a military background, I was kind of interested in the political/military side. The Department in those days was a little more flexible than I think they are now and assigned me as the junior man in the Political Advisors Office, the POLAD, at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe, which was in Casteau, Belgium at that time. So I went on home leave and actually stopped off in Casteau and met my prospective boss and even picked out a house, and the furniture was on its way down.

We went on to a six week home leave and when we got back to Washington on consultation they said, "Sorry, your job has been eliminated for budgetary reasons. Why don't you see if you can find something?" I said, "Well, what have you got for me?" They essentially said, "Well, nothing. This has happened so quickly and you are kind of on your own. Why don't you go look around and see what you can find?"

Well, having spent at that point only two years overseas and almost seven years in Washington. I think I held the record for a junior officer spending time in Washington at that point. I was really keen in getting overseas again. So I looked around and the only overseas job that I could find that looked any good at all was deputy science attaché in Bonn.

In those days we had a fairly active science program and particularly with the Germans, but also with a number of other European countries. The program was not terribly old at that point and my recollection is that it was staffed with well qualified scientists from outside. For example, my boss, whose name was William Wilson Williams, had been the research director for a company here in the United States. He had something like 50 or 60 organic chemical patents to his own name and was a millionaire as a result. He was the fellow who invented the chemical that makes your shirts white and that is apparently still used and did him very well.

The science attaché in Paris, Dr. Ed Peree, [ph] was also very wealthy. Peree was a physicist and invented the little glass beads that they now use to coat reflective surfaces with. These were somehow arranged so that when light shines in it is reflected directly back at the source which makes it seem very bright. Before that the light had been scattered. Anyway, Peree was very well off, also.

And there was a fellow named, I think, Rambert [ph], down in Italy. I don't know what his science was, but he drove a large Rolls Royce. His hobby was cars. The fellow in London, I think, was a Nobel Prize winner. I don't know his name but he had an electron microscope in the basement of the Embassy because he considered that if you were a scientist you had to keep on doing a little science to keep your hand in. It was a fascinating cast of characters.

The job in Germany was fascinating. We got there in March or April of 1968 and right away I was thrown into the winding up of the process of renegotiating all of our nuclear

reactor fuel supply agreements with the German government. We were providing the enriched uranium for a variety of German nuclear reactors at that time. I think there was something like 43 separate nuclear fuel supply agreements. And, of course, in those days we had the Atomic Energy Commission and they were both very active and very influential. The Chairman of the Commission was Glen Seaborg, a Nobel Prize winning physicist, whom I met as a result of the job. In fact I spent a lot of time with him on his various trips to Germany.

We also had a very, very large space science program going with the Germans. They were mounting experiments on US rockets. They were trying to develop their own launch vehicle and they were also taking a part of the NASA Space Program. At that time they were going to take the near solar environment so whereas NASA and others were flying experiments outward in the solar system, the Germans more or less asked to take over the part flying experiments inward towards the sun. How far they got I don't know, but that was the thrust of it.

And, of course, there was a great deal of cooperation in other areas too. I used to pay a visit every week or two over at the German research institute for air and space flight near Cologne. There would be somebody doing aeronautics, somebody doing rockets, or something like that. This was fascinating for somebody who had never been in the science business before. I think I saw at one time or another almost every nuclear test reactor that the Germans had, including one up at Ulich [ph] which was quite advanced and well thought of where instead of using fuel rods they had fuel in balls about the size of croquet balls and this has certain advantages. And they had fast reactors and fast breeder reactors. They had the Otto Hang [ph] which was the world's first nuclear powered merchant vessel. My boss, Bill Williams, being a scientist himself, was well into this and knew just about everybody there was to know in German science, right up to the top, on a first name basis. He had made his contacts in Europe before that because he had worked seven years in Switzerland before coming to the State Department.

I remember on one tour going to a research reactor up near Hamburg some place and I saw for the first time...I have forgotten what it is called, the Chejenko [ph] factor or something like that. If you put a radiating nuclear source down in a pool of water certain sources will create a kind of eery blue glow and you see that all the time in the photographs.

Q: I saw that at Brookhaven once.

PAZDRAL: Did you. Well there you are.

Anyway, that was a lot of fun. My predecessor in that job had been a man named Dr. Norman Neuwritter, who was a scientist himself. He and Bill Williams had gotten along famously. So much that Bill, when a new science attaché job was created in Poland, recommend Norm for that job. And Norm, who is now working for Texas Instruments, as far as I know, was a genius. He taught himself Polish while bicycling back and forth

between the Embassy and the Embassy's Compound in Plittersdorf, which is about a three mile ride. He had a little tape recorder, which was unusual in those days before the Walkman. The story was that Norm had listened assiduously to Polish as he was bicycling back and forth every day to the point that when he finally got to Poland four or five months later he spoke the language fairly well.

Well, Norm got called in 1970 to come back and work in the office of the Science Advisor in the White House. So he left Poland very abruptly and knowing that I spoke Polish and was well recommended by Bill Williams, Norm called me and asked if I would like to go to Poland and be the science attaché there. Well, I had not had any thoughts of staying in the science program because I was trying to get out and be a regular Foreign Service officer. But it was so attractive and the thought of going to Poland was so attractive that I said, "Sure, I would be happy to come." I did so and spent three and a half years in Poland. We got there in 1970 and were there until 1973.

Q: In Bonn, how did the science side fit in with the Embassy? Did you feel you were doing your own thing and there wasn't much contact with the rest of the Embassy?

PAZDRAL: The science program I thought was a very useful one. I am not speaking only of Bonn now, I think less so in Bonn. We got a request from the Air Force to give them a rundown on the state of German jet turbine manufacture technology. How good were the Germans at making jet turbines? Dr. Williams scathing comment was, "How the hell should I know? General Electric has got 37 graduate engineers out here trying to find out the same thing. Why don't they ask GE?" And it was true basically. We didn't need the kind of contacts in the science program in Germany that were so useful elsewhere, for example, in Poland or Czechoslovakia or Hungary.

That having been said, the job was a fascinating one and very necessary because we had so many scientific contacts with the Germans. For example, in the last year I was there the environmental issue became very important in the United States and EPA's forerunner was created. We started getting groups of American scientists coming to Germany to look at what the Germans had done in a variety of environmental protection areas.

So I would say that in those days and for that Embassy, everybody knew that there was a lot of work going on in science and so everybody else in the Embassy sort of gave us our own niche, if you will. And to the extent that there was any impact on either political or economic affairs...for example in technology issues, let us say dealing with air navigation technology which might affect the Berlin corridors and therefore have a political spinoff, we would consult very closely with the political section. I remember on that score going in one day on a Saturday and working in my office. I was called over to the political section by the then head of the section, Jock Dean, who was a tiger. He just ate people up.

Q: John Gunther Dean.

PAZDRAL: We discussed some complex issue on which there was a science aspect. He had three or four of his own people there and said something about getting the desired product, namely a report, out the next day, which was Sunday. I said, "Jock, I have something planned with my family. I can't get out of it." He looked at me as if he was about to bite my head off and said, "Oh, that is okay. You are in the science section. You are not one of my Indians." And he let me go.

But the point was that if you were in the political section there you were obviously expected to be on call seven days a week. But we had very cordial relations to the extent that he was willing to let me off the hook. We were organizationally in the economic section. The chief of the economic section when I left was Leonard Weiss, who was a very dynamic guy. Jerry Goldsteen was the number two there. It was a big section because they had, for example, the legal attaché who was attached to CFBI and had a three man office there attached to the economic section. The Treasury had some people there...financial attachés...that was when Treasury was just establishing or getting its hands on the financial attaché programs.

And that is perhaps an interesting story too because I, by virtue of working occasionally as Embassy staff assistant, since I had been a Bureau staff assistant...every time they had a vacancy in the front office and I wasn't terribly busy I would run up and be staff assistant for the Ambassador, so I got to see a little more of the internal workings of the Embassy than I might of otherwise as just deputy science attaché.

The Treasury had agreed with State Department on the establishment of a system of financial attachés around the world in which we were suppose to share equally. But I remember Jerry Goldsteen, who was a sweet fellow, never got mad at anybody, would grouse about this because he said, "You know, we have financial attachés in 45 posts (or something like that) and guess who is staffing Paris, London, Rome, Bonn, Ottawa and all those other good places? And guess who is staffing Abidjan, Kinshasa and places like that?" This was apparently true. I mention that because to the extent that you get into other agency cooperation with State in providing some service around the world that same phenomenon tends to occur. That is very natural.

Q: There were two ambassadors in Bonn while you were there. One was Henry Cabot Lodge and the other was Kenneth Rush. As staff assistant did you work with either of those?

PAZDRAL: Well, I didn't really work with either ambassador, so to speak because again it was sort of a paper work job and you worked through the senior people in the Embassy. I later in EB, for example, was special assistant to Tom Enders and that was a job where you were very much more closely related with the boss. But my staff assistant days...this may have changed, but in those days it was more making sure the paper was actually accounted for and got to the right place fast. And calling up the drafting officer and saying, "Look, you have four typographical errors in one paragraph and we really need to have this re-plated before the ambassador signs it and sends it to the Chancellor." That kind of thing. I really didn't have too much contact with the ambassador. The secretary

took care of his personal schedule. I would occasionally run errands and, sure, talk to him, but I really don't have any impression at all of Henry Cabot Lodge and Ken Rush only very dimly. I actually did the staff assistant job about three times. Peter Tarnoff was Rush's staff aide and he was gone several times and that was when I went up and did this. I don't really remember the dates or more than that because Peter went on to much bigger and better things in the Department in later years. But I don't really have any impression of either man as ambassador.

Q: So then you went to Warsaw where you served from 1970-74.

PAZDRAL: That's right. My first ambassador there was Walter Stoessel, who was another principled man. Probably the second best Foreign Service officer I have ever met. He was a delight to work for too. He had his peculiarities, let me say.

The science program in Warsaw was very, very active...I will come back to Stoessel in a minute but as long as I am on the subject of the science program...We had the so-called PL 480 funds there which were funds which the US government accrued by selling surplus wheat and other agricultural products to countries which couldn't afford to buy them for hard currency. So PL 480, Title One, allowed us to sell these surplus agricultural commodities and thereby get rid of our surplus stock which was very desirable politically in the United States. Years before that there had been pictures of grain falling out of silos or just being dumped on the ground for storage because we had so much of it under the government's price support programs.

Well that is how we got rid of it all. We sold it to the Poles, the Yugoslavs and the Indians and took payment in their currency with the understanding that we could only spend it in their country. And as I recall we could spend it for any Embassy operation that had to be paid for in the local currency. That was often carefully delineated by a subsidiary agreement that you could pay the utility bills but not buy gasoline with it and things like that. We had all sorts of complex accounts for the use of these funds. But one of the things that was blessed by both sides was scientific exchange. Well, when I got to Poland as science attaché, we really didn't have much scientific exchange except through the Department of Agriculture and that was not my bag because we had an agricultural attaché there who administered that program. But the Department of the Interior was developing an interest in Poland because Polish scientists had done some very good work in coal mine research...coal mine safety, construction methods, etc. I remember particularly that the Poles had developed some effective blast barriers against dust explosions in coal mines. Those are now being used in the United States.

Another one I remember is that Polish scientists did some very good work which is incorporated into the US interstate highway system when that got started in the Eisenhower years. They had big problems with their bridge building. They were just beginning to build bridges using pre-stressed concrete which means basically you take a steel rod and pull it very hard on both ends and keep it under tension while you pour concrete around it. This rod has plates on it so that when the tension is relieved after the

concrete has dried, the tension remains. It is that tension on the steel in the dried hard concrete that gives it a great deal of extra strength.

Well a lot of interstate highway bridges were built using pre-stressed concrete beams and they started to go bad in four or five years apparently and the highway administration at first couldn't figure it out. What was happening was that they were getting corrosion in the rods. The Poles had figured this out. They had looked at what we were doing and started doing a research program of their own and decided to build these same sorts of bridges in their country and quickly figured out, because they use very corrosive salt on their roads, that this wouldn't work. If the integrity of the stressed steel was at all affected then the whole bridge became too weak to really be used and had to be replaced. In fact a great many bridges in our original interstate system were replaced. They were replaced using the technology that the Poles had developed. Quite frankly I don't remember what the answer was, but it was a good answer. So there was a lot of stuff like that.

The main interest, of course, was from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. We did a great many medical studies with the Poles. Some of those have been going on for years. For example, it was very good to do epidemiological studies in Poland because the Polish records were so good. In the United States, if you treated a child for scoliosis, curvature of the spine, and the parents moved to Tempe, Arizona, the chances were pretty good that the health care system that was trying to follow that child for statistical purposes would lose him. Well, that was never true in Poland. You never lost anybody regardless where they moved within the country. You would still be statistically in the system. So US researchers gleefully fell upon the place. It was not that the Poles were guinea pigs, quite the contrary. You couldn't do anything to a Pole that you couldn't do to an American, that was one of the research principles. But the enhanced records keeping regime was very useful for research.

When I got there we were basically doing about \$900,000 a year in scientific research, almost all of it in agriculture. There was a little book translating going also, but not very much of that. By the time I left the program had gotten up to something like \$26.4 million exclusive of agriculture because everybody was coming in.

We were trying very hard and it was one of the most interesting and challenging things to do to develop relationships with US universities. For example, I went down to the technical university of Wroclaw and they had some very good chemistry going on there. Some people in Oregon had expressed an interest in this. I went on home leave and took the trouble to go to Oregon and talk with the folks up there and got a program going where a US professor on sabbatical would go to Poland and his expenses would be picked up by the Polish university. And at the same time a Polish researcher on sabbatical, still getting his salary from the technical university of Wroclaw, would go to Eugene and the university there would give him a house and some spending money and fix him up with a car and a laboratory. The transportation both ways was paid out of the PL 480 program. But that was a very efficient use of the funds because you weren't paying for the research itself, or for the man's salary, only to expedite and bring about the cooperative arrangement.

Q: We are still talking about the time of the height of the cold war and Poland was well entrenched in the Warsaw Pact, etc. Military security problems must have been a major concern every time you turned around.

PAZDRAL: Well, they were and they weren't. Science, particularly in Poland, less so in the other East European countries that I had contact with...Polish scientists were pretty much on their own. They could call the shots. The Polish Academy of Sciences managed to maintain its independence in the face of strong government efforts to get a handle on it almost up until the time I left. The Poles, like the Russians, had created something called the Committee for Science and Technology...not a ministry but a committee. The Committee's purpose was to capture the Polish Academy of Sciences and thereby to run the entire Polish scientific establishment according to good Marxist-Leninist principles. Well it didn't happen. Although the Academy of Sciences was infiltrated with good Party types, people who were genuinely committed to the Party and felt that they really should gain control over the scientific establishment and begin to install Lysenkoism among biologists, for example...

Q: Could you explain what Lysenkoism was?

PAZDRAL: Yes. A Russian researcher, Lysenko, in affect argued that if you kept cutting the tails off rats generation after generation, sooner or later you would end up with tailless rats. You could influence genetics by influencing the environment, which, of course, wasn't so, but Stalin liked Lysenko's experiments very much and made him supreme in the Russian Academy of Sciences in the twenties.

Q: It fit in very much with the Communist philosophy that the proper political environment will influence the workings of nature.

PAZDRAL: Exactly and that was a very attractive theory. But Polish scientists managed to maintain their scientific independence and objectivity and therefore were able to do some excellent science. For example, every year the National Bureau of Standards, which I guess now no longer exists as such, used to run a worldwide chemical competition. They would send out samples in little glass vials of extremely complicated chemicals and ask anybody who was interested to analyze these and tell them how much and what was there. The Poles consistently came in first or second in that competition year after year. As a result of which the National Bureau of Standards, when this PL 480 money became available to other agencies, quickly established a very big program with Poland.

So it was a very active time. And on the political side it was also very interesting because the people who were doing science were very important in Poland. Many of them were senior Party members themselves, not, if you will, knee jerk Communists. I remember talking with one man who was a very good friend of mine, now dead...he was a dedicated Communist. He was a blood chemistry man, I think. His name was Janusz. I knew him because he was the man who had been appointed by the Poles to run their side of the joint US-Polish Scientific Cooperation Program. He was the man with whom I dealt on a day

to day basis and we got to be very good friends. He died of a heart attack in 1976, I think it was.

But he said to me once, and he was quite serious about it, that the United States and the Western democracies achieved at least the potential for a perfect political system. It wasn't working, in fact very well, as far as he could see. There were a lot of anomalies and inequities in our political system, but at least the potential was there for a functional democratic system that would come as close to being perfect as you could possibly get. His argument was that Marxist- Leninist economics provided the same sort of potential on the economic side. If they could simply be perfected and developed we would have political perfection from Western democracy and economic perfection from Marxism. And he really believed that. He was a very practical man and got a lot done because he realized the main thing was to just keep the country going and to keep trying to improve it. But his idea would have been to work towards the improvement of true Marxist- Leninist economics, which just proves that he was not a very good economist.

Q: This was a time when you were dabbling in science, which is always considered a matter of concern, particularly from the security people. Scientists generally want a fairly open system. This has been true throughout the whole Cold War period on both sides. But you have the security types on both sides very nervous. Did you have any problems with either side?

PAZDRAL: No. Where you got into areas that had been already captured, for example, one of the big problems in that area was computers. The Smithsonian Institution, for example, and an astronomer there by the name of Owen Gingerich [ph] who later went on to do the history of science and do it very well...I think he is one of the leading authorities on the history of science, or was... he was an astronomer in those days and the Poles again were doing some very good work in radio astronomy...what is called long based interferometry where you make an antenna that is actually several thousand miles long by having part of the antenna in Poland and part of the antenna in New Jersey, or some place. You can then some how connect these so they think they are one antenna.

But they had some very good visual astronomers and also some very good radio astronomers and Dr. Gingerich had offered them a surplus computer from the Smithsonian. There was an elderly generation X computer and the Smithsonian had now gone on to generations Y and Z, as had everyone else. So he said, "Hey, if you guys would like it, we will give it to you. All you need do is pay for the crating and shipment." And we could pay for some of that under the PL 480 program, said I. And then we ran smack into export controls. To make a long story short, in three years of trying, that computer didn't budge from Washington. It never got there and it was particularly ironic because it was an elderly machine which wasn't nearly as fast as things available in the West. The technical university of Missouri had four of these computers. I forget what they were called now, but I was struck by that fact. The Poles couldn't really understand.

Well, I found out later, after I was back in Washington, and with the Bureau of Political Military Affairs, that one of the reasons that that particular model computer had been under such strong restriction was that it had been one of those that the Strategic Air Command used in its very early days for targeting. And I guess that the military types thought that if the Russians or their allies could get their hands on this type of machine, some how it might help them to figure out what it was we were doing in missile targeting.

In any case, that was the big problem. You need computers to do any kind of advanced science and the Poles didn't have them. The East Bloc tried to set up a cooperative computer production program where one country would make the central processors and one country would make the disk drives and somebody else would make something else, and it didn't work. First of all nobody made any good equipment. The equipment itself was faulty. And second, apparently you can't build computers in pieces like that. You have to integrate the operation.

In fact, on that subject, the Poles apparently were very good in computing theory. For example, most of the early Texas Instrument computers, computed in something called "reverse Polish notations." This means something to mathematicians but nothing to me. But it is how computers worked most effectively in those days and perhaps still do. But that mathematical notation scheme and method of approaching the computation problem was actually invented by a man at Warsaw University who went on to build some very fancy computers.

Again one of the problems that a non-scientist has in trying to be a science attaché is you sort of have to translate what the scientists are telling you into language that is understandable to your boss, the ambassador. So I would come up with these little shortcuts and paraphrases. When I would try to explain this Polish computer effort to the ambassador I said in effect, "He has come up with something that is very clever mathematically and makes the computer think that it is about four times as large as it is in the center of its operation." Now if he had asked me how it does that, I would have had to say that I didn't know. But by their mathematical computational methods the Poles were able to actually take Western parts that they could get their hands on and build some minicomputers that were as effective as some of the larger Western computers.

But getting back to your question about the security aspects of it, that was our big problem. In other areas there wasn't much. We didn't do too much nuclear research with them, although more than I would have expected in fairly sensitive areas, fast breeder reactors and things like that. The Poles had research reactors from the Russians and were dealing very actively with the Russian nuclear establishment so the Polish nuclear scientists would go frequently to work in the Soviet Union for a month or a year or something like that and come back to Poland. Less frequently would they go to the United States. I have the impression that when they were here they were only allowed to go to certain places and see certain things.

But it is kind of interesting that in those areas which the Defense Department hadn't yet realized were sensitive, we went pretty far. I will give you two examples. In laser research, which even in those days was being looked at by the military for targeting and things like that. That was a very sensitive technology also to the Poles. In fact the restriction was on their part. We sent some people to Poland for a laser conference, I remember this, and they really worked for DOD, but they came as civilian scientists. They didn't have full access to the Polish laser research establishment because much of the good laser research in Poland at that time was done in a military research institute and they were sort of locked up. I remember one of them talking to me over lunch and describing his frustration. He had actually sat down with his colleague, who was also a Colonel in the Polish Army. They were both top notch laser physicists and they could talk all they wanted over lunch or dinner at night but neither could get into the other's laboratory when they visited each other in their respective country.

On the other hand there was a new technology which the Poles went pretty far with what is called magneto hydrodynamics. This basically generates large amounts of electricity by using a gas as a conductor. If you pass a conductor through a magnetic field that is how you generate electricity. Well, if you make the conductor a gas that is constantly moving through the field you can generate fantastic amounts of electricity as long as you don't burn up your magnets. And basically that was the problem.

You could burn anything in a magneto hydrodynamic generator...garbage even, which they did actually at one point...and get very, very high efficiencies of electrical generation, but the problem was that nobody ever beat the difficulty of the gas getting so hot that it would burn up the magnets so the generators would fail right away. The United States put millions of dollars into that research, and so did Poland, and the Russians, as a matter of fact. If it had actually been realized it would have been like nuclear fusion. The shining goal in the future.

Well, it didn't work, but there was a lot of money spent on it. There was a great deal of free access on both sides to the very most advanced research being done on the other side. For example, the Poles were trying to keep their magnets cool by super cooling them with liquid nitrogen. That was a very complex technology and took a lot of work.

We had everything that the Poles were doing on this. In time we were looking at the problem by trying to build ceramic magnets much like the stuff that goes on the front of the space shuttle these days to keep it from burning up. Of course, that is extremely sensitive technology nowadays because you use that type of material on the front of nose cones of nuclear weapons. But, as far as I know, because it hadn't really been focused on as a sensitive technology in those days, the Poles were coming back and telling me about how they had seen something out in Boulder, Colorado, or down in Pomona, California and now they were going to try to use ceramic tiles in their generator throats, etc.

So, to the extent that nobody looked at it and said, "Oops this is sensitive," we didn't have any problem. And because science is so important to any country, the whole science

program gave us tremendous access to certain parts of the Polish power structure that were very useful and to which we probably wouldn't have had access had we not done that.

I will give you one example. As science attaché in Poland, I was also regional science attaché for Hungary and Czechoslovakia where we didn't have science attachés in place. There wasn't much going on. The Hungarians were still reeling from the Russian takeover and were very sensitive. I remember I went down to Budapest only twice in my three and a half years in Warsaw and once was upon the signing of an agreement between the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the US Academy of Sciences, which did a lot of implementation of a small scientific exchange program. The second time was to go down and look at what that program was doing. Both times it was very rigid and formal. We sat around and had some meetings at which I took a few notes and then went home.

In Czechoslovakia...I got to Poland in 1970 and was there 1971, '72 and '73 and was supposed to be also the science attaché for Czechoslovakia. When I proposed the first time to go down there the Embassy came back saying, "Please don't come. Things have been so tough here since the 1968 Russian invasion that we have just been totally frozen out. The only person at our Embassy who has any important contacts working is a science liaison officer. He has something to talk to them about that they want to talk about."

Apparently they were very concerned that my appearance on the scene might jeopardize his ability to talk to these people in the future. They needed him enough that they said, "Look, we really prefer that you not come." So I never did get to Prague on that tour.

So it was important I think. And just one other little vignette, I went back to Poland years later as principal officer in Krakow and while I was there we had a really terrible automobile accident. An American family was there on vacation and driving around the country and their rented van got hit by a truck. There were four teenage children, as I recall. One of them got killed outright and the father and mother were so seriously injured that they were both in intensive care, which you wouldn't want to do in Poland if you could avoid it. The other kids had various broken bones, serious injuries, but were a little bit better off.

The point is that the father was in a rural hospital some place south of Katowice in Poland. I went to visit him as soon as we found out about this and found him lying on a bed. His blanket had slipped on the floor and was soaked in blood. His wounds had started bleeding and nobody had come to do anything about it. The man was literally dying.

He was quite wealthy and we quickly arranged to have a small ambulance jet fly in doctors and blood, etc.; arranged to rent an ambulance and have it driven up from Vienna to southern Poland to take the man from the hospital to the nearest airstrip.

But this all ran afoul of the cumbersome Polish bureaucracy...Why are small jets flying into this airport from the West? We never had this happen before. Maybe there are

cameras on board, or something like that. I think the Polish security establishment was quite worried about that.

We got the guy out but we did it because from my earlier service in Warsaw I knew the Health Minister personally. When it became apparent that we were not going to be able to get this man out and save his life without some extraordinary measures I called my friend the Health Minister, Dr. Rudolfsky [ph] and explained the problem to him saying that the man was going to die if we don't get this airplane in here right away. Can you help us?

About six hours later he called back and said that it was all right. So the science program had certain advantages to it.

Q: Did you get any feel for the Polish scientists' view of the Russians?

PAZDRAL: Well, this may be just a vignette and it is humorous but all the Poles, of course, studied Russian in school, they had to. They were all fluent in it. They could read and write the Russian language as well as you and I can read and write English. But if you asked the Polish scientist...I remember one had gone to a conference in Russia and I said, "Well, how did things go?" He said, "Well, it was okay. They spoke in Russian most of the time and I didn't understand it too well." And I said, "Well, you studied Russian in high school." He said, "Yes, but I don't understand it anymore."

And that was typical, if you asked a Polish scientist, except those that were working in the Academy of Sciences and who had come from the Party apparatus, they spoke Russian and liked to deal in Russian. You would go into their office and see scientific publications on their table in Russian. But for the most part, Polish scientists took the attitude "Well, I had to learn it but have forgotten it all now."

They respected the Russian scientific establishment for what it had achieved, but otherwise it was painted with the same brush with which they painted all of Russia...very inefficient system and one with which we would just as soon be without. We are saddled with it but we wished we weren't. To the extent that we have to work with it we will. We will take advantage of what is good that they have to offer.

Q: Did the Polish security service ever try to coopt you? They were fairly aggressive.

PAZDRAL: No. But they were quite aggressive. I know for a fact that they did get a couple of people there. I was never bothered. I had a problem for a while because my car looked just like the car that the military attachés drove. They had two white Mercedes and I had a white Mercedes that was exactly the same model. The Polish police around Warsaw and the places that I would go to in my car didn't bother me because they knew the license numbers. But when I would get down into the far provinces I would often be stopped and there would be a long and inquisitive examination of my documents because they thought I was a military type. When they found out that I wasn't there was much

radioing back and forth, but other than that I never detected any attempt to coopt me personally or any member of my family.

We had a maid whom we had in effect hired privately. You actually couldn't do that but we had located her ourselves through the efforts of an American family who was there on the economy, not part of the government establishment. She was a village girl. She had gone to work for the Belgian Embassy with the blessing of the Polish establishment, which had to vet you for that sort of job and had quit because she said the Belgian head cook had made a couple of very aggressive passes at her. So she walked away and that had put a black mark on her record and now the Polish establishment which found domestics for you wasn't willing to list her. But our friend told us about her and we were looking for a maid, having had poor success with those offered by the regime. We talked to her and hired her. She became a good personal friend. So much so that when we went back to Poland several years later, she left her husband and family in Warsaw and came down to stay and work with us. That is not to imply that she abandoned her husband but the two of them decided that she would like to come and work for us.

But they tried very hard to get her. She told us later that usually they would pick her up on a Wednesday afternoon as she was walking home. They would take her in and grill her for hours. Keep her there until midnight. Then she would have to walk home after that which was about six miles. Her husband was a butcher, which was a great advantage because a) it wasn't a state job from which they could fire him and b) it gave him more access to food than he might otherwise have had. So threats which they made to make sure that her ration card didn't come through, to see that her husband had trouble on the job, just didn't work. They did get her young son kicked out of grade school though, on the pretext that he had been a trouble maker. So he was not allowed to go back to school for a while. The couple had their own house. It was actually half a house as the other half had been destroyed in the war and they had just built a sort of wall, so that they didn't have any problem with their housing.

But they worked her over very badly. This was a simple, honest village woman. We went out and visited her family in a village about three miles outside of Warsaw that she originally came from. Just the sweetest, salt of the earth people that you could imagine. Her father was an old man with flowing whiskers who was sort of the village elder. You could see why his daughter was such a staunch and honest character.

Of course the security police had told her not to tell us that they were interviewing her, but she told us all about it. At one point she burst out that she had told them, "Look, I am a Polish citizen and I love my country and you don't have to do this. You don't have to try to make me spy on these people." I offered to give her copies of unclassified documents that I would frequently bring home from the office if it would do any good. But she wouldn't do that. She wouldn't play their game at all. But they tried very hard to coerce her and as far as I know they never succeeded. And, of course, there wasn't anything much that she could have told about us anyway, except the kind of personal information that they like to gather to see if they can find any quirks that they might exploit.

I know of at least one person who got into trouble. He was an administrative employee. He got into trouble because his wife was German and she used to travel frequently out to the West to visit her family. You couldn't make the trip in one day usually, unless you drove very fast, so she would often stop some place on route in Poland. The story that I heard years later was that apparently they detected this pattern and set her up. They put somebody out to gradually worm their way into her confidences and seduce her and that is apparently what happened.

He left Warsaw very abruptly about a year after we did. I saw him back here in the cafeteria at State a couple of months after that and I said, "What are you doing here?" He told me that he had to leave and he told me that there had been a security problem. He told me part of the story and I got the rest of it later on from somebody else.

I remember one humorous event. We had a TDY, temporary duty security officer, there once. They put him in an apartment out where I was living so we had frequent contact going back and forth. He told me this story. He had tried to get a taxi one day just after he got there, and he didn't really speak any Polish. Just as he got into the taxi a rather good looking young blonde jumped into the other side of the taxi. She spoke broken but quite adequate English. She gave some plausible story that she really had to get some place and would he mind if they shared the taxi. So they did. She was very friendly and warm, etc. But he didn't really pursue it. But the reason it was amusing was that she showed up twice in other places. Once again in another taxi, which drove up and she happened to be in it when he was standing in front of the taxi rank. And another time in a restaurant, or something, she came up and tried to put the arm on him. He felt, at least, that they were working on him. Nothing like that ever happened to me.

Because I had a series of jobs after that I always felt that if you are going to do good political reporting you had to have an economic dimension which I felt I lacked because I hadn't had very much economic training in college. So I asked the Department to send me to the FSI six month economics course. I had been asking for that for four or five years and they were reluctant to do that, but finally did. So I spent six months in economics.

Then I had to take an economics job and ended up in the Bureau of Aviation Negotiations, which at that time was negotiating all of the air traffic agreements the United States had with various countries around the world. That was what governed the amount and quality of service. So if the British let us fly six times a day to London, we would let the British fly six times a day to New York.

Of course, everybody in South America, the Panamanians, the Ecuadorians, etc. wanted access to the US markets and since those markets were not as important to US airlines the Civil Aeronautics Board, which decided these matters in those days, wasn't about to give the Panamanians or Ecuadorians landing rights to Miami or New York if they could avoid it. They might give them Cincinnati or St. Louis or Waco, Texas, but not New York.

It was an amazing experience. I only did it for about six months, but the office was staffed with people who had been negotiating these things for years. I was just a junior paper carrier. We would go sit in...just to pick one...the Panamanian delegation would come up to Washington to try to renegotiate a series of air rights perhaps for a new airline that had been founded by the President's brother. To watch our people work was a real eye opener. They would not only not give the Panamanians a thing, but usually pick their pockets and send them away happy, which is the true test of a real negotiator.

I don't think we ever worked anybody to a disadvantage but certainly were able to hold the line and often to make gains for American air carriers simply through the process of negotiation and knowing how to talk to, for example, Hispanics if you were dealing with them.

Anyway, I did that for only six months because Tom Enders, who was the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs and the Department's senior economic official in those days, because we didn't have an Under Secretary at that time, desperately needed somebody to come up and run his office for him. He was a hyperactive individual and the person who had been up there was rather slow moving and really hadn't pulled things together and had gotten himself fired and the job had been vacant for a while. I was asked if I would come up and do it and I said, "Well, I really don't want to." I had done that once full time and once part time in Bonn and thought that much more of that on my record wouldn't look too good, which in retrospect wasn't the right answer because those jobs often allow you to pick something very good further on down the line. But I wasn't allowed to decline and was told that I had to go.

So I went up. It was about a 15 or 16 hour a day job at least six days a week and sometimes seven. I was married and had two children at that time. One of the things that I considered to be a great success on my part was to gradually persuade the establishment to give me a couple of assistants. I had one when I started but even so the hours were terribly long. By the time I got out of there that office had three officers in it and a fourth coming.

Anyway, you came in in the morning and got everything ready for the boss before he got there, which in the case of Tom Enders was usually about 7 o'clock in the morning because he had to go to the Secretary's staff meeting at 7:30. And that meant reading through anywhere from 300-500 cables before he got in and giving him the ones that were important; making sure that the action items that you knew he was going to have to take to the Secretary were properly prepared and on his desk; and reading into the problems of the subjects of interest to all the other Bureaus that you could find out that morning and then briefing him on what was likely to come up.

I can remember, he was taller than I am and I am six foot three, striding down the hall on the seventh floor with him trying to keep up with him as he was headed for the Secretary's staff meeting trying to tuck little bits of information into his ear as he went down the hall to make the staff meeting.

I enjoyed that job too, but didn't stay in it very long and did not even try to go with him when he left to go up to Canada, because I was sort of a burned out case at that point. I then went off to work on the Board of Examiners for a while.

But Enders, as I say, was hyperactive and it was a very busy time. In those days the International Energy Agency, IEA, was founded, mostly through his efforts. He and a guy named Steve Bosworth...Bosworth was a fascinating guy who later ended up being our ambassador to the Philippines and before that some place else. But Bosworth, when I knew him had been a junior officer and had actually resigned from the Foreign Service. But he had come to Enders attention somewhere...he was off in Minneapolis or some place doing a civilian job...and when Enders got the Assistant Secretary job in Washington he pulled in a number of people including Steve Bosworth, who headed up his energy division for him. Bosworth was literally in a plane going to Europe about every three weeks and would negotiate with various people about setting up the emergency oil facility that we created when the first Arab oil embargo struck and setting up the International Energy Agency, which has since provided sort of a pad for the Western democracies in the face of possible oil shortages.

But, what Tom wanted was really somebody who was much more in to economics than I was. For example, he later pulled in Bob Hormats from the Brookings Institute. Bob is a Ph.D. economist and I think is teaching some place now. But he wanted somebody as his special assistant, which was the title that I had, not only to run the office, that was sort of a side issue, but somebody who was as good an economist as he, Tom Enders, was who could go and represent him, let's say, in dealings with the Atomic Energy Commission or the EPA, etc.

Somebody with the qualifications of a Bob Hormats could do that, but I couldn't. That quickly became clear. Enders was the sort of guy that if you couldn't do the job he wanted he would leave you to do the job you could do if he wanted that job done and find somebody else. That is why he was so successful. He brought in several other people. For example, he brought in to be the director of the Department's International Financial Affairs Division a fellow by the name of Paul Boeker. Boeker had been just before that the number three or four in the economic section in the Embassy in Bonn, which is where Tom had known him. He was a whiz kid too, an extremely bright guy. Enders brought him back and gave him about a six step promotion. As you know you don't actually get promoted but he got a job that would normally be handed to an officer several grades higher and he did very well at it and ended up with an ambassadorship also. I think his last job in the Foreign Service was as Director of the Foreign Service Institute and now he is with industry.

But Enders would do that, bring in bright people and work them as hard as he could. He certainly worked me as hard as I could work.

Anyway, we got a new Under Secretary for Economic Affairs and he and Enders didn't get along too well, I guess. Enders decided to move on and did as Ambassador to Canada. I didn't even try to go along with him and I think if he had asked me I would have tried to get out of it. I went over for sort of an R&R and worked for almost a year on the Board of Examiners.

Q: That is where we met.

PAZDRAL: That's right. Then I went back and was the Cyprus Desk Officer for a while. I did that for about a year. I had been looking to working for two years in that job but a friend with whom I had served in Eastern Europe ended up in Poland and called me if I would like to go out to Krakow to be principal officer. So I did. I went to Krakow in 1977. Had a wonderful time. That was when Pope John II was Cardinal in Krakow. In fact he was elected to the Papacy during my tenure there. If we do get a chance to come back I will tell you a few war stories about that because it is a fascinating subject.

From Krakow...I had the usual chance to stay there another year, but as the then DCM in Warsaw told me when I asked him for his advise on this he said, "Well, you have been in Poland twice and you certainly have gotten your Polish ticket punched. Probably from a career point of view you ought to go some place else." So I declined the third year there and it was one of the biggest career mistakes I ever made. My successor there came with a three-year assignment nailed down and managed to get two extensions. He stayed there five years and I wish I had. Krakow was a delightful place to live. The Poles are wonderful people, at least the ones down there were when I knew them.

It was an interesting and challenging time. That was when KOR and KSS, Committee for the Defense of the Workers which eventually turned into Solidarity was developing. We had all sorts of things going on. One of my neighbors around the corner was a professor at the university and his daughter was a university student and quite an activist. I remember coming home one night and finding her sitting on our doorstep because it was pouring down rain. She was sitting under the doorstep to keep dry. I said in effect, "Marieska, what are you doing here?" And she said, "I have lost my house key and I can't get in. My father is not home yet. I have just come back from Katowice." I said, "What were you doing over there?" She said, "We went over there and we distributed literature." She described this scheme that the students from the university had worked out. There were about 20 students in five cars with piles of inflammatory leaflets supporting the workers movement. It was all arranged that these cars all got to certain places in Katowice at a certain moment and these kids all jumped out and started stuffing the leaflets in people's hands as quickly as they could and then jumped back into the cars and roared away, thinking that this clever way of doing it would keep them from being arrested.

Well, they were very lucky, is what happened. Normally such an amateurish stunt wouldn't have worked. If they had been arrested they probably would have been rubber hosed and all that kind of stuff.

But that was the kind of thing that was going on in Krakow during my two years there. So again, I left it with much regret and even now wish that I hadn't left it.

But I was offered the job in Suriname as the DCM and that was a very attractive prospect from a career point of view. Well, when I got there...actually it was a DCM job but before that it had been a political/economic reporting officer job and they had just upgraded it because the Ambassador, Nancy Ostrander, felt she really needed the dignity of having a DCM down there. It was the smallest Embassy in South America at that time. So I was really the economic/political reporting officer.

Fortunately, or unfortunately, there was a revolution there while I was there. I got there in 1977 and I think the revolution occurred in early 1978. It was really a non-revolution. As a result of that the Embassy grew spectacularly even in my time. By the time I left we had a defense attaché's office, a couple of political reporting officers. We didn't have a CIA station yet but they kept somebody there continually on TDY and later on opened up a station. Communications was augmented and we even moved into a new Embassy building. That is all simply an indicator of how much emphasis was focused on that country.

The situation was that when I got there the military, like everything Dutch, had a very strong union. When the country became independent the civilian government had offered the military certain pay and other concessions which had never been implemented. I remember one of the chief grievances of the military was that one of the things that the new Surinamese government had offered them was to extend health care benefits to their families. This hadn't been the case before. This was very natural and was done as a matter of course in Holland and in almost all countries. But although it had been promised to the Surinamese military the government had never implemented it; so if your wife got sick, you paid. And of course it made them very unhappy.

So just about the time I got there the military had threatened to go out on strike, which was illegal. I remember somebody describing to me the first attempt of the military to strike and according to this description the military had formed up outside their barracks and said that they were now on strike. They had been surrounded by a police cordon.

The police chief, whom I knew well enough to call him up and ask him to do something for me, had put his police all around these...the Surinamese military were only a couple of thousand strong and less than half of those were in the city of Paramaribo, so you are not talking about large numbers ...but the police had surrounded these striking soldiers who weren't doing anything but standing in formation at that point.

The police chief was trying to coerce them into giving up their strike and they refused to do it. He ordered them to disperse and they wouldn't do that. The soldiers were armed, they had their weapons with them but I don't know if they were loaded. Failing to disperse the soldiers and becoming more frantic about it, this police chief allegedly began dancing and shouting at his troops to get rid of these soldiers, to shoot them if they have to. Then actually saying to one of his policeman, "Shoot them, why don't you shoot?"

So that was kind of the situation when I got there. One of the first things that I remember was that several of the leaders of the soldiers union were put on trial because striking was illegal and unfortunately the government had the very bad sense to try them on a very serious crime. If I recall correctly they were saying in effect that the soldiers by violating their no strike contract had committed treason, the punishment for which could be death. I remember that there was some possibility that these people could actually be executed if found guilty. Well they were found guilty. Again I remember going down to watch this happening. The military were formed up outside the court house in Paramaribo, just standing there. They stood there all day while their leaders were being sentenced.

I think there had been three or four men who had been on trial. The rest of the army...I don't think they defied their officers I think the officers were just smart enough to not get in the way...they just marched down and stood in orderly ranks outside the court house all morning while these people were being sentenced. I have forgotten what the sentences were. They weren't nearly as hard as they could have been, but the military was unhappy that they had been found guilty at all. It amounted to a political trial.

So the soldiers decided to take over their barracks. If I remember there was a cantonment in the center or near the center of Paramaribo. The soldiers union leadership decided that they would take over, in effect have a sit-down strike within that compound. They originally had planned to do it before the verdict itself had been delivered by the trial court, but typically, they had tried to get into the compound and the soldiers on guard, who were also members of the union, had refused them entry. You know, "You have no business coming into the compound this late at night. We can't let you in." So the potential sit-down strikers had just turned around and gone home. That was the way things worked in Suriname those days.

But then they decided to try it again several days later after the sentences were actually passed. I don't recall clearly although I know we were able to discovered what had actually happened. This time instead of trying to get through the gate they climbed over the fence. They were seen doing this by the guards, as I recall, but they at this point were in on it and let them do it. They got into the compound...there must have been 300-400 of these guys and they in effect went on a sit-down strike. Somebody said, "Well, if we are really going to do this we should have arms and ammunition just in case the police try something on us again." They said, "Okay, let us go and take over the ammunition bunker," which was a few blocks away over by the small airfield down town.

So they went to the ammunition bunker and the guard on duty there, who was an old sergeant who had served in the Dutch armed forces, refused to let them in. So they shot him. That was a big mistake. Certainly they had no intention of doing that, I know that for a fact. It was just that one of the soldiers, a kid got trigger happy and happened to have a loaded shotgun. He shot the sergeant and killed him. Right there is were everything started to unravel because at that point they had committed a capital crime and it was no longer a matter of a peaceful strike or something like that.

They took over the ammunition magazine and distributed the ammunition and later weapons, which they hadn't done, to the troops that were on the sit-down strike. You now have an armed group within this camp which knows it has done something bad and is very sensitive to whatever may happen to it.

The next thing that happened was that they decided they had better take over the navy, which consisted at that point of two 55 foot gunboats. There was some scandal attached to them...they didn't perform as they should. Somebody made a lot of money on them. Anyway they had small caliber guns on them, nothing substantial but enough to cause a lot of damage. I remember my first inkling of the fact that revolution was going on was to see one of these gunboats out on the river. The Embassy was on the eighth floor of the tallest building in town and had all glass walls so you couldn't help but see what was going on around you. I noticed one of the gunboats out there making figure eights in the river, and occasionally I would see a puff of smoke. I didn't pay any attention to it for a moment or two but then I heard explosions in the town.

What was happening was that the gunboat was shelling the police station. That was the beginning of the revolution for us. And the rounds were going into the telephone exchange so telephone communications within the city and with the outside world were very quickly disrupted.

The next thing, and this really frightened me because I had been in the army and knew what heavy weapons were like...one of the things that the Surinamese army had was track vehicles with four 50 caliber machine guns mounted on them, quad-50s as they are called. They were anti-aircraft weapons. But they were very impressive. One round from a 50 caliber machine gun, if it hit you in the stomach would blow you apart, or would punch holes in the side of a destroyer big enough to stick your head through. They are very impressive weapons. Well, they were having some looting going on so the soldiers decided that since they had now effectively taken charge of things they had better stop these looters. So they rolled out one of these quad-50s and fired it down the main street.

If you have ever heard one of these things firing it scares the daylights out of you and I could see the rounds. They had the standard load and one out of every five rounds is a tracer. First of all I was afraid they were going to start a terrible fire because the whole town was made out of wood. The Ambassador was in the building...my first thought was for safety...I was kind of interested sitting up there and watching it all happen, but coincidentally we had two Air Force planes which were on the ground in Suriname.

In those days every time NASA launched a satellite they would send down two Air Force EC-135s, basically a 707 packed with electronic gear, because there was a place over the south Atlantic where there was a hole in their radio coverage. They couldn't track the satellites unless they had at least one airplane out over the south Atlantic. So every time they were about to launch a satellite they would send two of these airplanes down there just in case one broke down. This plane would fly out over the Atlantic. I think they had

to fly out for something like six hours and then orbit for several hours while the satellite was going up and then fly back to land in Suriname.

The reason they came down to us was that the US military had built a ten thousand foot runway near the city of Paramaribo during the Second World War and that was now the international airport.

Q: One of the major ferrying points over to Dakar and off that way.

PAZDRAL: Exactly. The runway was still in good shape. These planes had fairly large crews. I think there was something like 13 men on each airplane. These men normally would land their airplanes, come into town 25 miles to spend the night. Since we were all good friends and everybody knew what they were about they would be wearing their military uniforms.

Now we had some 26 Americans in battle dress in downtown Suriname and two extremely expensive airplanes out at the airport. They were supposed to be taking off that morning to go fly this mission. Our communications were still open and we were getting messages from somewhere telling us to get the airplanes off. They didn't know about the revolution because we hadn't been able to do any reporting yet. But they wanted to know where the hell were the airplanes. They hadn't gotten any reports that they were off the ground yet.

I remember one of our chief preoccupations was to get those guys back out to the airport. We got one car load of people out there but the Surinamese military had also taken over the airport and threatened to shoot up the airplanes if we tried to move them. We managed to get the rest of the crew onto a bus and we were going to send them out to the airport and the bus got hung up. We were trying to use radios and they didn't work and all that sort of thing. Then I finally managed to get through by telephone to somebody who I knew at the military headquarters and explained the problem. I said, "Who could I talk to? We have to get these airplanes off the ground if we possibly can." Finally they said, "All right. If you will go to point X we will have somebody meet you there who will escort you."

So I drove to this point, which was four or five blocks from there and a little Surinamese of Javanese extraction, he was all of about 4 feet high and wearing a huge steel helmet and crossed bandoleer on his chest with fragment grenades hanging off it, popped out of the bushes when he saw my car stop and ran over and jumped into my car. He divested himself of his bandoleer and dropped it on the floor...I remember that because I had all these fragment grenades rolling around on the floor of the car.

We drove very carefully up to the barricades with me holding an American flag out the window. We got in and I ended up talking to the guy who is now still the military ruler of Suriname, Desi Bouterse. He was an extremely intelligent guy and he had been union leader. But when they started all this striking for their rights, he had backed out. He said,

"I agree with what your purposes are, but this is not the way to do it, I resign from the union leadership." So he was sort of out of the loop and was not one of those who was arrested. But when all this trouble started occurring they very quickly identified him as one of the few people who had his head screwed on right and could maybe bring it off for them. So they grabbed Bouterse and told him that he had to be their commander. So that is what he did. He personally, then, gave me his assurances that we would be able to move the crews out to the airport and get them on the planes. And the planes would be able to leave.

As it happened, if I recall correctly, by the time we got all that done, it was too late. They had to postpone the satellite launch and they just flew the planes out of there.

The point was that that was my reason for going down there right in the middle of this revolution. The gunboats were still out in the river shooting the police station, and the police chief had fled and was in hiding. I remember they were interrogating people there and as I walked passed one of the barracks, I remember a door opened...and there were several people lying on the grass spread eagle, obviously under guard and being told to lie face down with their arms and legs out stretched and not move. They were all either naked or wearing shorts. Some of them showed evidence of being pretty heavily beaten. As I walked passed this barracks this door opened and another body came flying out, horizontal, face down, as if he was on a stretcher, which he wasn't. Somebody had just picked him up and thrown him out the door. He flew in front of me, hit the grass and bounced a couple of times and quickly stretched out his arms and lay there very rigidly, obviously having been worked over pretty well.

The military at the time of the revolution were a fairly civilized sort. After I left there, the bad element apparently gained ascendancy because later on the union leaders and others...there were something like 17 civic leaders who were just brutally slaughtered. That was after I had gone.

While I was there, and I was there until 1981, so the revolution occurred in 1980. Let's see. I got there in 1979, the revolution occurred, as I recall, in February 1980 and I was there for about a year after that.

One of my contacts was a man who was on the so-called military council. I knew him quite well because my hobby is teaching flying and I had become one of the flight instructors for the Aero Club Suriname. I had actually gotten a Dutch instructor's license from them. He was one of my flying students. I would go over to his house and he would tell me what was going on and sort of hold his head in his hands about the way the revolution was going. This was several months later.

But the point of all this was that they really hadn't intended at all to take over the country. This was not a conscious revolution. They were simply a bunch of soldiers who wanted what had been promised to them. The political establishment was so ham-handed as to force them further and further into a corner. This unfortunate accident occurred from

which then evolved the fact that they had a revolution. Once they had killed a few people, if they had simply laid down their arms as the President of the country asked them to do, they would have been treated as criminals, and they knew that. They went to him...he was a very highly respected figure. His family was old Suriname and he had good connections in Holland as well. The military went to him on the second day and said in effect, "We really didn't mean to do this and we would like to give the country back." He said, "Well, legally the only way you can do that is if you give yourselves up and I will try to see that you are treated humanely, but I cannot promise you anything." They said that that was not good enough.

The situation that then developed was that they governed the country but kept turning to him for advice. It was he that was a moderating influence. His threat was to resign. They wanted him there because they knew that he was their link with respectability and they did respect him. He was a very effective politician. He was elderly, and as I recall, he had always planned to retire anyway in a few years. He had a health problem, I think. But in any case, he finally resigned just before I left. He finally told them, "Look, boys, you can't do that or I will resign." At that point they had been getting some advice from some very radical politicians and they in effect said to go ahead, he wasn't needed any more. A big mistake on their part.

Suriname was fraught with radical politics. In fact, one of the more interesting things before the revolution was to figure out who was the most extreme left wing. I think any person who goes to a Dutch university, in those days at least, became a flaming communist. They brought that back to Suriname with them. Whereas the flaming communists of Holland graduated from university and moved on into the establishment and moderated their views, in that fervent tropic environment down in Suriname that didn't happen and you had some people who were ready to call forth the revolution today. You almost had some shining path types down there, really.

So some of these people had access to these military fellows who were trying to set up a government that could run the country and gave some very bad advice as to which way to go...collectivizing, expropriating and nationalizing all property, and things like that. These things didn't actually happen, as far as I know, but the military were told they were the things to do. And they didn't know any better.

The Dutch military attaché got himself into a lot of trouble because he had maintained his contacts with the military throughout. He had, of course, very good contacts with the Surinamese military and the boys, as he called them, would come to him for advice. After the revolution they would come to his back gate and knock. He would come out and let them in and they would sit on his back porch and drink beer. They would ask him what to do and he would give his personal advice about how to run the country. As I understand it, some Dutch politician found out about these continuing contacts and made it into something very bad. As if this Dutch military attaché had somehow helped to bring about the revolution or fomented it and was then encouraging these radical military types. None of this was true. He was trying to ameliorate the problems that the country was facing and

to help guide them in ways that would bring the country back to stability. But he got fired as a result of the bad publicity he got in the Netherlands.

I left there before things really got bad. But, as I say, after that a friend of mine who was an American and a pilot down there was killed. He was a helicopter pilot and the military council used him frequently. He was flying for a mining company but they would just sort of take over his helicopter and have him fly them around various places they wanted to go. The story was that his helicopter went down in a rain storm, but I never believed that because he wasn't the sort who would have gotten himself into a situation like that. I am reasonably certain that he was done in because they got one of the senior members of the military council in the same airplane accident. He was one of the more moderate ones.

Bouterse, Desi, this Dutch soldier who took over the leadership of the military group had at first, for example, said that he did not want any rank or title or anything like that. And for quite some time he refused to be addressed as anything other than Sgt. Bouterse, which had been his rank in the Suriname army. He later became a Colonel, but he first, I think, became a Lieutenant. I guess people convinced him that he couldn't run a government and an army if he didn't have some rank, so he let himself be called Lieutenant and finally Colonel. He was a man of extreme intelligence. He had served with the Dutch forces and had been in...he did two years in the Netherlands and was involved with NATO troops by virtue of his service in the Dutch army. In that very brief contact he learned to speak very good German, for example. I could talk to him in German better than I could talk to him in Dutch, because my Dutch wasn't that good. He was a very practical guy, but also a guy who had come from very primitive background. One of the things that would immediately occur to him as a solution was, "Well, let's kill our enemies." A fairly primitive, brutal approach to life.

Q: What were our concerns as an Embassy and American policy there?

PAZDRAL: Well, I would say our main concern was that the revolution not be radicalized, as happened, in fact. We had Guyana to the north of us with some very radical politicians. The Cubans in those days were extremely active and trying to gain footholds wherever they could on the continent, and in fact did. Before I left we had some pretty good evidence that the Cubans were actively supplying arms by secret flights coming into the big airport at Zanderij, because they had shut the airport down and I, as a pilot had some ins in the civil aviation establishment and knew there was something funny going on there. There were flights coming in that flight controllers were telling me about but they didn't know what they were and the military were meeting them. I am reasonably sure that that was Cuban arms coming into the country. That connection then became overt and much stronger. That fell apart of its own weight as it had done in other countries, notably, again, in Guyana.

But that was one of our fears, that they would become another base for a revolution in that part of the world. Northern Brazil, I guess, was ripe country for that sort of thing and having a base in Suriname would have been very convenient.

And we were also concerned about the economic development of the country because the Surinamese civilian government, as well as the military types when they took over, couldn't really be convinced that their former basis for prosperity, namely the bauxite industry, wasn't as strong as it had always been. As you perhaps know, Suriname was the principal, if not the only for a while, source for bauxite during the Second World War. It was so important that we had two squadrons of P-40 fighter planes down in Suriname protecting the bauxite mines. How you protect a mine with a Curtiss P-40, I don't know, but that was what we were doing. And of course during and after the war it provided a significant flow of foreign exchange to Suriname so the country was relatively prosperous. Then the Dutch, as everyone said, had left the country with a golden handshake. I have forgotten the numbers now but I think the amount of Dutch aid promised over a five year period immediately after independence was such that it amount to \$50 a head for each Surinamer, which was a great deal of money.

The Dutch were surprisingly forthcoming with their foreign aid as I found out then and later on when I was working in Romania. The Dutch were well-known for their philanthropy.

But any case, corrupt politicians had quickly done a number on the economy, such that the country was really foundering. The civil service was grossly bloated. With the exception of the bauxite industry, which is basically an American run operation...it was just being bleed to death. They made some very unwise choices. For example, they took a lot of Dutch aid and built a railroad over in north Suriname which was supposed to tap into another big source of bauxite. Well, the point was that first of all the world market was dropping rapidly because there were many other sources of bauxite by then and secondly, this place they built the railroad to at a cost of dozens of millions of dollars really only had low grade ore and not much of it. It wasn't like discovering a new Golconda at all. In effect, I think it is fair to say that the money spent on that railroad was wasted. I don't know if they ever started mining anything after they finished the railroad.

The contractor was an American firm, Morrison-Knudsen and one of the things that the military did when it took over was to try to investigate corruption in the government. There had been an awful lot of corruption in the MK project, not with the Americans at all. They were as clean as a hounds tooth. They could see this coming and took great pains to see that everything they did was well documented and that they accounted for every penny they got and that they got no more than they were supposed to.

But, for example, a couple of months after the revolution, the Surinamese military insisted on having some senior officials from Morrison-Knudsen come down to Suriname to discuss the project with them. What they did was in effect arrest them and interrogate them. They had gone through the records of the Surinamese organization that had implemented this project and had simply put a blanket on the floor and taken all the files of this organization and dumped them into the blanket and picked up the whole thing and taken it off to military headquarters to sort out. Well, obviously there wasn't any evidence

in the file anyway. Nobody would have been dumb enough to leave it there and even if they had these military guys couldn't have found it after they had stirred up and totally disorganized the files.

But I remember we were fortunate enough to be able to bring in a Surinamese attorney who was very well known and very well respected to sit in with the three guys from Morrison-Knudsen and myself at the meeting. He was later made to leave the meeting.

The Surinamese military, who, I say, were fairly straightforward, primitive, brutal types, if you will, were threatening to take these guys out and string them up by their thumbs until they told the truth. I was sitting there saying, "You can't do that. These are American citizens." Reason prevailed because the Morrison-Knudsen fellows suspected what they were getting into and had come very well prepared to demonstrate on all of the charges against them that it just wasn't so. They obviously knew that so and so had been taking money out of the project and had very well documented their contacts with so and so, and what they had been paid and what they had paid him, etc. They were able to convince these military fellows and get off the hook. Whatever happened to that project, I don't know. I doubt very much that it had any success.

I had probably better stop.

Q: Why don't we leave it this way. I will go ahead and in the due course of time you will get a transcript of what we have now. However, if you come on back, please come on by because we would like to cover more of Krakow, Nigeria, Romania and Human Rights.

End of interview