The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

DR. WARREN H. REYNOLDS

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
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Office of External Research

INTERVIEW

[Note: This interview has not been edited by Dr. Reynolds]

Q: To begin with, could you tell me when and where you were born and a bit about your family, your parents and all that.

REYNOLDS: I was born in Poughkeepsie, New York, on the 3rd of August 1923. I was born the day after Warren Gamaliel Harding died, and so my Republican parents named me after him.

Q: That's the Warren.

REYNOLDS: The Harding is also there. My name is Warren Harding Reynolds.

Q: I was listening to a listing of presidents' rank and order of their worth. Everyone agreed that Warren Harding ranked last.

REYNOLDS: That's right, that's right, exactly. And so it is a bit distressing. And, of course, my friends in the Historian's Office made one hell of a row over this and had a lot of fun with it and gave me a wonderful photo of his inauguration.

I went to W. W. Smith Grade School. I managed to flunk at least two or three times in grade school. Then went to Poughkeepsie High School, which I loved. Graduated in January of 1943 and waited a month before I went into the service.

Q: I'd like to go back just a touch. Could you tell me what was the occupation of your mother and father?

REYNOLDS: Sure. My father worked for an organization called Reynolds Reliance Produce, Reynolds Reliance coffee and so forth. It was named after a rich relative of ours. Their headquarters was right on the banks of the Hudson. And my father worked in that concern up until about 1912. He loved that work. And he was quite a sportsman.

He was very much in politics and had been an alderman in Poughkeepsie. My uncle, Stan Reynolds, was the district attorney in Duchess County for several years, a dear man. My mother was a very active person in the Republican Party, and everybody, <u>every</u>body loved my mother, including me.

I walked with my father frequently from 37 Inness Avenue, where I was born, in a house that was designed in 1911 by my mother and father. It was a bungalow, not a big house. We didn't have a lot of money, but we had enough to do reasonably well. My father later

went into real estate and worked with Bartelow Barone, who had a grocery store, an insurance business, and all kinds of things in Poughkeepsie, and made a great deal of money off the immigrants who came to America from Italy. My father worked with him, got properties for these people, and sold property all up and down the Hudson, in the Poughkeepsie area, and loved it. We all love the Hudson. We all love places like Asophas, where I have a son now living. It's a great part of the world; it's heaven.

Q: I'm sure, as a young boy and up through high school, you learned to despise that man in the White House?

REYNOLDS: Yes, oh, yes, oh, yes. Even though, by 1934 or '35, we were taking relief checks every month and were getting a quarter of a ton of coal in the wintertime to keep us warm, I learned that my father thought of Roosevelt as Rosenfelt the Jew. There was a lot of anti-Semitism, not just in my family, on my father's part, not my mother. But there was a lot of anti-Semitism in Poughkeepsie.

Q: Also, that he betrayed his class.

REYNOLDS: Oh, yes, oh, yes, oh, yes. It was not until many years later that I literally fought with my father about that, and struck him once, because he said something derogatory about the Jews. I was so unhappy that I hit him, and spent the evening out, felt very guilty, but nevertheless felt that I'd done the right thing. Came back. We never discussed race again, and our relationship was better.

Q: I think, for the record, it must be said that actually Roosevelt came from a Dutch background. But for those who were anti-Semitic and anti-New Deal, they sort of combined the two. It was really virulent. It's hard to recapture. The feeling against Roosevelt in his home territory, Duchess County, where Hyde Park - Roosevelt's home - was located, was particularly strong from those who were of a Republican persuasion.

REYNOLDS: Oh, it was. Right. And then also among the Democrats, because the local Democrats didn't get much of a payoff, as they obviously did in the current administration when their man went to the White House. But Eleanor was an absolute gem. And after listening to Hoover speak, as I did at Vassar College where my mother went to school, I remember holding my father's hand and walking down the street, I was about eight or ten years old, I remember saying to my father, "Dad, that was a dull speech." And we met, almost prophetically, walking down Grand Avenue toward Inness Avenue where we lived, Judge Mack, a great, tall, slender man, a local character, who would introduce Roosevelt to be nominated for the presidency of the United States. And my father introduced me to Judge Mack. Of course, my father didn't think much of him.

Q: You graduated high school in '43. What happened to you then?

REYNOLDS: I got out, and in February I went to Albany. My father, as I hope I've implied before, was very well politically connected with the local Republican Party, especially with somebody whom Roosevelt absolutely hated, Ham Fish.

Q: Oh, yes, Hamilton Fish, the...

REYNOLDS: Martin Fish, do you remember that?

Q: Oh, yes.

REYNOLDS: Well, the old Hamilton Fish was a remarkable, remarkable man. He led, I'm told, the first black regiment to fight in World War I.

Q: Oh, yes, very much so.

REYNOLDS: Is that true?

Q: Absolutely, yes.

REYNOLDS: And his father or grandfather had been secretary of state. The Ham Fish I knew, I tried to go to work for him after the war. He was at least 6 foot 7 inches. He was a huge man. I went into his office, and he had this beautiful wastepaper basket of sculpted wire. It was a beautiful wastepaper basket; I've just always been fascinated. And all around the wastepaper basket, in spite of this man's prowess, because he went to Harvard and played football, in spite of his former prowess, he would throw pieces of paper and miss. He had paper all around the basket. He was an absolutely fantastic politician. He believed totally in his great worth. And he said, "They want me back. They want me back." I went in to see him in '47 or '48, and I said, "Mr. Fish, my family knew you and knew you very well. I will work for you if you go back. I'll go into politics."

There was another very dear person in Poughkeepsie, and that was Judge Flannery, who was close friends with my family and bailed my brother out when he got into a scrape once.

When I came out of the war [in late 1945], I went with Marie Malloy and with Ruth Houstis and with Emil Spahn, Emil, with whom I'd had arguments before the war about how good Hitler was. He was a real Kraut before the war. After the war, he was totally all right. We went out on a double date. Ruth Houstis was a very dear friend, and her mother was, but I went out with Marie, whose father had a pharmacy in Poughkeepsie. We went up the Hudson, the other side, up toward Kingston. And big old ego Reynolds was going to have a good drink. So we went into what used to be called in those days a stand, a bar in the country along the road.

Q: The used to call them roadhouses.

REYNOLDS: Roadhouse is what I mean. Went into the road house, and I said, "I'll have a glass of stout." I drank that glass of stout, from top to bottom, in one shot. And that was really the end of any kind of an entertaining evening. I absolutely went haywire. I was very angry. I was very contemptuous of everybody. I wondered why we'd been in the

war. I wondered why all these people back home didn't know a goddamned thing about what we were doing. I felt very sorry for myself, and very sorry for all the rest of it. We drove back toward Poughkeepsie, and I screamed and ranted and raved in that car, and I was hysterical. We hadn't even gotten to the Mid-Hudson Bridge, and Emil was so upset, because he'd been in combat just as I had, that he drove the car off the road. We swerved to get back on, and as we swerved, I looked out the window and I could see the fir trees were going by in a blur. It was all fogged, an absolute blur. And that set me off even more, just absolutely upset me. I said, "This is unreal. Everything is unreal. There's nothing real about being home. There's nothing real about anything."

Got home, which was the Houstis's home, where I lived, because my parents were both dead by that time, came in the door, and I just used every profanity you could imagine. It went on for about three-quarters of an hour, and finally they said, "There's only one thing to do, we have to call Conga," who was the coroner. Now why would you call the coroner? They called the coroner because the coroner apparently is also the guy who can give you a shot and it may calm you down. So they did that. The shot didn't do anything. Didn't do anything. And I knew from that moment what was happening, where we were going, what was going to happen. They took me to Hudson River State Hospital, and I had to stay there one full night. I think I would have had to spend a second night, were it not for Judge Flannery.

But, curiously enough, going into G-2, intelligence, where I went after I got through a lot of my college training, the security people didn't pick up anything. Nobody in Poughkeepsie apparently said anything to them about it. I told people to. Nobody in the State Department clearance every wrote about it. Nothing. So it was curious.

Q: I want to go back to your military experience. You went in in '43. What did you go into?

REYNOLDS: First of all, I got to Albany. I stood in the middle of a room. (This happened to me a couple of times in my career in the Army.) I stood there, absolutely stark naked. These doctors stood around me and said, without, it seemed to me, any kind of physical examination, "He has the flattest feet we have ever seen." And they immediately declared me limited service. It took me a year to figure out what probably happened, but I [didn’t suspect anything at the time].

But I'll go on with my career first. I was inducted in Albany, in February. My first camp was Camp Dix, where I stayed a few weeks and reported for roll call at five o'clock every morning to have them yell out names. Then I went on down to Camp Croft, where I received limited-service basic training, which lasted five weeks.

All the way through school, I had played the trumpet. I'm pretty good at that. I'm not a great musician, but I can play in a pickup band pretty well. I wanted as comfortable an existence in the Army as I could have, so I said that I could do that. And they said, "Well, then you'll have to take care of taps from now on for this whole section of Camp Croft." I loved doing it, and every time I played tattoo, I played every song you could imagine.

Before I left Camp Croft, I went in and had a complete physical and got myself declared 1-A, without any limited service. So what I surmise happened, but who knows, is that my father had set it up in such a way that I would not go overseas. The perfect thing for a father to do, who'd had one son who was accidentally murdered. You know, you don't want to lose another one. He had five, but I was the youngest and kind of close to him.

Then, in June of 1943, I was shipped to Ft. Meade. I was in a training program where guys got a little bit of training, and I did a lot of close-order drill stuff. That was fun. Then, one day, I went to a movie, and I saw this movie on Norway. It showed Quisling, and it showed him selling out to the Germans, and it showed the Germans marching away. I went in the next morning. You know, you salute the First Sergeant, nobody else, no non-com but him. I saluted the First Sergeant, and I said, "Sir, I request immediate overseas duty. I want to go to combat."

He said, "You're crazy."

I said, "That's all right. I'd like that."

That was arranged, and I went overseas. I was in Yeauville, which was a marshalling area where they had a repo-depot. Then I went from there to the Ninth Division. I lucked out. I was in a marvelous division. It had a great history. It had a great World War I history and [participated in the great campaigns of] World War II. It had been in Djibouti, it had been in the whole Kasserine Pass business, North Africa, the Sicily Campaign. The guys, a lot of them, were in pretty bad shape when we got to England. I was assigned to the 60th Regiment in the Ninth Division, and I was in D Company, and I was in the machine guns. Captain Waugh had me transferred to the mortars. I don't know why, but he did. In any case, I protested to him. And he said, "Warren, that's where I want you." He was the best West Point non-military wonderful man I ever knew. I went into mortars, and I went through five campaigns in Europe. I got a Gold Star for shooting a 120-millimeter mortar, which we captured from the Germans, and we had the shells and everything else. The colonel said, when I shot it over Kansan in Germany, he said, "What a bucket of shit that throws." It was a great gun. It was a much better gun than our 81-millimeter mortar. There are loads of war stories, but I'm sure you don't want me to get those down. But I loved my service. I'm awfully glad I did it.

Q: Where'd you end up the war?

REYNOLDS: I was in the invasion, first of all, D-Day plus 4 [i.e., June 10, 1944]. When we landed, we went to St.-Mère Eglise. Captain Waugh didn't speak any French, and for some inexplicable reason, he knew I spoke some French. So I asked a Frenchman, "Où est? [French: Where is]" And he told me not only the way, but he also told me that the Germans were in the woods and so forth. So we went on up to St.-Mère Èglise, and it was very unpleasant, but not heavy fire, by any means. We didn't experience anything miserable until St.-Lô, the breakout. That's where we began to get hurt. And then we were in the [Battle of the Bulge, December 1944]. I was in Remagen. I was in the

bridgehead across the Rhine.

Q: Was it the Ninth Division that seized the bridge over the Rhine at Remagen?

REYNOLDS: Well, I don't know that we seized it. I don't know.

Q: But you were in the...

REYNOLDS: Oh, yes. I remember going across the bridge. Something went wrong with the blowup mechanism, and the German officer who was supposed to blow the fuse ended up blowing himself away. And we got across the river. Got shot at by our people, because they couldn't shoot at the German jets, mind you. The first time we ever saw a jet. They tried to bomb the bridge out. They couldn't.

Anyway, there are loads of war stories, but I don't think you want those.

Q: No.

REYNOLDS: And I was hurt, of course, in...

Q: Oh, you were wounded?

REYNOLDS: Yes. Not badly.

Q: When the war was over, did you...

REYNOLDS: When the war was over, I was in the Harz Mountains, where I lost most of my friends, because a Schutzstaffel (SS) unit got through and just absolutely massacred, just absolutely was a horrible... But I was lucky, I was on the ground, and I stayed on the ground. I was reading Charles Beard's *Democracy*. And when I came back, I told him. I said he might have saved my life, because I was reading his book on the ground. Went to Stassenhoffen, which was the home of Franz Joseph's future wife. Went there and then went to München (Munich), and went to the Englischer Gardens, which, of course, are of great fame for our wonderful Thomas Mann.

Q: They were also laid out by an American.

REYNOLDS: No, I didn't know that. How interesting. Laid out by an American. Another Olmstead. Good, isn't that interesting. I loved Munich, but it was a pile of rocks when I was there. Engel-Stadt was an interesting town. Stuttgart was a miracle, because a train could ride on a bridge that was only a shell, but still you could get across. Belgium, the people were wonderful. But the Germans were the real... For some reason that I cannot understand I much more admired the Germans than I did the French or the Italians, maybe because they did fight. They did fight. And they worked. And they built. And they rebuilt. They didn't wait to get... So, anyway, it was a preoccupation that came out of it. I guess it's also a product of my Anglophilia. I love the British, and I've spent a lot of time

in England. I would live there if I could.

Q: When did you get discharged from the Army?

REYNOLDS: I got discharged in October of 1945.

Q: Of course, you hadn't had any college. So what happened?

REYNOLDS: I came back, and I went into Christ Church in Poughkeepsie. I'll never forget it. I sat down, and the rector came out and saw me, and I shook hands with him. He brought me back to his study, and he asked me all kinds of questions about my decorations. I answered all his questions. I went back, and he had completely scrapped his sermon and gave a sermon, "The Soldier Comes Home." I can't talk about it now, it was so moving. I regard it as a very high point.

Q: Were you lined up to go to college at that point?

REYNOLDS: Before I was 19, I was determined I'd go to college. But it was only a question of where. Dr. Cummings had gone to Trinity, I guess. He was a very, very well known, but a very conservative Episcopalian, Anglican. Had his own club in London. He was very close to the British. Hated the Catholics. You know, there's bigotry everywhere. But after I'd had the experience with Hudson River State Hospital, I was very happy not only to get started in my life and get my life going again, but I was admitted to Trinity College in January of 1946.

Q: This is Trinity in...

REYNOLDS: In Hartford, Connecticut. Everybody thinks I mean Dublin or Trinity College connected with Oxford (or is it Cambridge?). But, in any case, I went to college. I studied history. I met a fellow who had been a pilot in the war and had been terribly wounded, who became a very close friend. He wanted to go through school fast, just as I did, because we had no patience with the kids. They didn't know us; we didn't know them. They were a whole other generation, it seemed.

Q: I was part of that.

REYNOLDS: Oh, were you?

Q: Oh, yes. I came in in '46. I went to Williams. Very soon, we developed veterans' attitudes. Of course, later, I spent my four years in the Korean War. But I was already mentally a veteran by the time I got out, because the veterans of that time basically took over the whole Zeitgeist of the...

REYNOLDS: Of the college.

Q: Yes, oh, yes.

REYNOLDS: They took over the newsletter and everything else?

Q: Oh, sure.

REYNOLDS: Really.

Q: Oh, yes.

REYNOLDS: Interesting. That's interesting. I don't think that happened in Trinity. [During the war] they had had a Navy program. What do you call that?

Q: V-12.

REYNOLDS: Yes, they had had a V-12 program at Trinity, but I don't remember that the veterans became overridingly influential. That's interesting.

Q: Well, I don't know, 70 percent were veterans.

REYNOLDS: Oh, well. I don't think we had anything like that. I don't know, though. But I do know that the GI Bill was wonderful.

Q: What pushed you toward history?

REYNOLDS: I certainly had no idea when I went to college in January that I would study history, that that would be my field. But I had two professors, Humphrey, [whose classes I took and who I knew but didn't take his classes], George Cooper. Cooper was very pro-British, the former had been at Columbia and had been thrown out of Columbia, but he was brilliant, wonderful, very exciting, introduced us to Charles Beard, again, his economic interpretation.

I think that I pretty well had decided I'd go to graduate school and study history. But I think what really did it was three things. One, I met Sir Alfred Zimmert, who had held the first chair of political science at Cambridge, I think, and had taught in the United States over the years quite a bit, and he was a guest professor at Trinity when I was there. He had a seminar, which I took, on comparative colonial history. And that did it. That was very exciting. The second thing, of course, was Humphrey. He was good.

But the third thing that did it was Jack Globry, the pilot I talked about. He said, "Warren, you don't think or talk or act like other people. You've got to get a lot more training. You must go to... You have some things that... You can do some things." That was really. And he gave me such a feeling for myself that I'd never had before. I'd never had this feeling that, well, maybe I am a little bit gifted. Not a lot, but a little bit gifted. I'd never had that feeling before, but I sure in hell got it from him. So that pushed me right to graduate school [after I graduated from Trinity in 1948].

Q: Where did you go to graduate school?

REYNOLDS: Humphrey suggested (God only knows why this happened; these things are so weird) that the man I should study under would be Ross Opfen at Fordham University, a Catholic school. I became there what they called the resident prod [Protestant]. It was funny. There was also a resident Jew. So, you see, it goes on, this attitude. But there I think it was a little more benevolent. Anyway, I was told in Poughkeepsie, "Don't you dare go to Fordham, because they'll convert you to Catholicism. You're through. You know that they'll get you." I never had even a hint that anybody was trying to convert me. I don't think they wanted me. In any case, one of the most charming things about it was the nuns. They were so marvelous. They were just perfect women. They were the perfect woman to know, not to go to bed with, the perfect woman to know. They were just lovely. The second thing was Hoffman gave lectures in the Concert of Europe, the Congress of Vienna, and the whole idea, everything, everything ultimately pushing toward World War I. But the effort to bring Europe together in 1815, the failure of that, look where we are now. Of course, Sir Alfred Zimmert had always said that will never work, never, you can't do that. Well, we'll see whether we will or not. Remember, in the State Department, we've had our Europeanists. And we went through a whole era of Joe Zerring, who was at CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], and Fena, who was in CIA and State, these people all...

Q: There was a Tom Fena, an Italian hand. He's been interviewed.

REYNOLDS: His wife once told me, it was the most marvelous... I told her this at a funeral the other day, about a month ago, I said, "Do you know what you told me back in the ’50s?"

She said, "What did I say?"

I said, "You said, `Well, Warren, really Tom and I feel, after all the years we've spent in Europe and spent with Jean Monnet and how brilliant he was, and of all the years of unification talk that lead to all the rest of it, economic, political, social, military unification, NATO's [North American Treaty Organization] no damn good. What we need is...'" I thought this was unbelievable, because she's told me, one, "We really feel," said Mrs. Fena, "we really feel that we're more European than American."

I said, "Is that so?" Coming from the Hudson Valley, that was a little tough to take. Of course, I wouldn't say anything to her, because she obviously believed it.

Q: What did you get your degree in?

REYNOLDS: That gets me right to the other professor at Fordham, Dr. Oscar Halesky, who was brought out of Poland by my father-in-law, who had founded the Kosciuszko Foundation for the exchange of students between the United States and Poland. He had founded that, and he brought Halesky to America in about 1941 from wherever he was. And Halesky was much more a European historian than he was an American historian.

But he was a very devout Catholic. Ross Hoffman, by the way, a comical thing about him was that he wrote a book in 1924, I think it was, very, very favorable to Mussolini. This was when he was already a convert to Catholicism. I couldn't believe it. But, anyway, he had gotten his way; he had gotten sober from that. And so I studied especially with Halesky, and I took everything I could on Slavonic history. And I did my dissertation on Britain's relations with Poland 1919-1939. It would hardly be a work of art nowadays. I couldn't even stand to look at it after I'd finished it, and after I'd been examined on it and gotten my Ph.D. [in modern European history]. But that took the better part of 10 years, from '48 to '59. I went through Trinity in two and a half years.

Q: Well, then you got your degree in '59?

REYNOLDS: I finished school in '58. I had worked briefly, between the time I got my Master's [from Fordham in 1950] and my Ph.D. in 1959. I worked for the Pinkerton Detective Agency. Had great experiences with them.

Q: Then what did you do?

REYNOLDS: When I was in training, I'd been teaching at a very, very progressive school in Greenwich, Connecticut, called the Edgewood School. It was just my cup of tea, because it was John Dewey and all the progressivism. So I taught there for one year, 1950-51.

And then, as a result of having made an application earlier, just to be put in the data bank, suddenly I was interviewed [by the Army]. I think they actually offered me, with just seeing the research and stuff I'd been working on, they offered me a job in G-2, working on Poland.

Q: G-2 being intelligence.

REYNOLDS: Intelligence for the Army. Colonel Smith, I think, was in charge in those days.

Q: This interview is going to concentrate mainly on Antarctica. How did you get into Antarctica?

REYNOLDS: Oh, that happened after I worked on these volumes, which you have over here.

Q: We're now looking at the...

REYNOLDS: [Your collection here of the Foreign Relations of the United States volumes. I'm looking for the European [volumes].

Q: We're looking for a part of the Foreign Relations series. I'm not sure if we have everything here. How did you get involved with the...

REYNOLDS: [Anyway], I was working at G-2. I worked there for five years, 1951-56. I worked on the Soviet Army. Before that, I had worked on Poland first. And then I shifted over and I was working on the table of organization, the table of equipment of the Soviet Army. And it was absolutely, really... This was [during] the transition to nuclear energy, nuclear warfare. Working on that was absolutely like a new kind of sex, it was so interesting. I worked on that for five years. I worked on Poland for maybe a year and a half. I worked on Finland first when I came in, because they discovered that my father-in-law was from Poland, so therefore they didn't want me to work on Poland. This was the period when McCarthy was [riding high]. Absolutely unbelievable. Informing was going on. Actually, I'm afraid I ultimately resulted in a woman who had been in G-2 since about 1917, I think I got her fired because of an argument she and I had about whether papers should be turned over to the McCarthy Committee that had a bearing on Secretary of Army Stevens's career, and whether he was a Communist or whatever. It was a very raw area, but we [can] talk about that 50 years [later].

Q: How did you get involved in the Foreign Relations?

REYNOLDS: I [left] G-2, after five years, as a result of my father-in-law's knowing Henry Cabot Lodge. Henry Cabot Lodge was ambassador to the United Nations, and he wrote a letter recommending me to the State Department. And the State Department interviewed me and put me in the Historian's Office, which is where I wanted to go. [At that time, it was called the Historical Division of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. Today, the office is called the Office of the Historian in the Bureau of Public Affairs].

Q: What about the connection to Antarctica?

REYNOLDS: I worked on the Foreign Relations volumes for the first year and a half. I worked on Sweden, Finland, France, and a few other issues. Then I shifted from the Foreign Relations volumes, which is a documentary kind of art, research, to policy-related research. And that meant I worked in a group of about eight other guys and women, and our business was to do research that was requested by various bureaus of the Department. After I had done one or two studies, they said, "We have this study that was started by one of our historians but had to be put down. We'd like you to pick it up, Warren. It's on ice."

I said, "What's that?"

They said, "It's the history of diplomatic relations between the United States and the other claimants and non-claimants who are interested in the Antarctic."

And that's how I got involved. I spent the bulk, really, the bulk of my career, from 1958 until about 1968, on the Antarctic.

Q: Could you describe what, in '58, was the situation with the Antarctic at that time?

REYNOLDS: By the time I went to work on the Antarctic, they had concluded the preparatory talks. I can't give you the dates of those, but it was about a year, a year and a half, leading up to the conference that was held in 1959. The preparatory talks were between four countries: the United States, Britain, Chile, and Argentina. In really a lot of those preparatory meetings, Britain was not involved. We were just involved in it with the Latins, because it was Paul C. Daniels, former ambassador to Honduras, to the OAS, and to Ecuador, a classic diplomatist whose greatest idol was Dunn...

Q: James Dunn.

REYNOLDS: James Dunn, oh, he was absolutely super.

Q: Daniels became...

REYNOLDS: Daniels was Mr. Antarctica. He had a small staff of himself, George Owen, Wayne Fisher, myself, and a secretary. That was the staff of the Antarctic [issue]. We [had an office] on the 6th floor, and we were always under IO when I was there.

Q: IO being the Bureau of International Organizations. In 1958, things are getting ready to do the conference and all. What was the American interest in Antarctica at that point?

REYNOLDS: Well, there were two interests. We were in the middle of the IGY (International Geophysical Year), and that had an Antarctic aspect, which meant that teams from a great variety of countries were going to the Antarctic, and we wanted to be sure nothing got done down there that would either undermine our claim or enhance somebody else's. And so we wanted a [positive] spirit to be created as quickly as we could, because there had been shots fired in anger in the Antarctic in the ’40s, between the Argentineans and the Chileans. And I'm not so sure that the British didn't get involved in it, too. So we wanted the area demilitarized. We knew that virtually from the start.

One of the things that Ambassador Daniels never really wanted to face, and I tried to make him face it, but being a very junior person and not knowing the area nearly as well as he did, I never attempted to push it too hard, when I was writing my narrative on the diplomatic history...

Q: This was the narrative that you were writing as it went.

REYNOLDS: Oh, yes, as it went, and also parts of it had been written for the NIS [National Intelligence Survey] before. And so when I was writing it, I came across a fairly large, maybe 30-page, maybe 40-page, draft convention prepared by the British, on British paper. British paper, legal size, was always longer than American legal size, and it was sort of yellow, not because of age, that was just the color [of their paper]. You love that, probably.

Q: I do.

REYNOLDS: They had drafted a convention on the Antarctic that was so detailed that it would have been [unmanageable] to have negotiated it. It would have been a total impossibility. But what it contained was a lot of [thoughtful] material. So I'd always said to Daniels, "You were influenced by the British convention."

He said, "Nothing of the kind. I wasn't at all influenced."

He was a perfectly wonderful, marvelous friend, but a great denialist. You could be hitting him over the head with a hammer, and he'd say, oh, I don't feel anything at all. He had lost a son at a very early age. He had been in the diplomatic service since, I'd say, 1923 or '24. He had an incredible way with the Latinos, which was very important. That's why these preparatory talks... before.

Q: The Latinos were the major figure.

REYNOLDS: They were claimants.

Q: And Chile.

REYNOLDS: Chile and Argentina. We want to keep them from getting into, as you say, any kind of a land grab. And you know the frontier between Chile and Argentina has never been settled, by any means. They're always having border disputes. Their claim that the Antarctic was a triangulation... that goes directly to the Pole from the width of our countries. So they claimed that piece of the pie. Well, the British claim overlapped both of them, which made it real nice.

Q: Which was the British...

REYNOLDS: That's why the British were in on some of those preparatory talks.

Q: Why did the British have a claim?

REYNOLDS: Because they made one. They made one of the basis of exploration and on the basis, I guess...

Q: Scott and all.

REYNOLDS: Yes, yes, yes, oh, my God, yes, Scott and Shackleton and all the rest. And then, of course, the Norwegians made their claim on the basis of the man who first got to the Pole, and it's never been disputed, Amundsen. It was one of the wonderful ironies of history, they asked Amundsen, "What would you really like to have been remembered for?"

He said, "I would have liked to have been the person who discovered the North Pole." Because, you see, that's their pole. That's their region.

Q: Yes, Norway.

REYNOLDS: It ought to be ours, too, I suppose. But, in any case, there are seven claimants. I won't remember all of them, I know.

Q: Well, then, what were we doing down there?

REYNOLDS: Well, we had a man named Richard Evelyn Byrd. And Richard Evelyn Byrd was a jealous guy. He claimed that that was his continent, and that belonged to the United States. It was American soil. And when the treaty was even under the first preliminary kinds of negotiation...

Q: This was when?

REYNOLDS: In '57 and '58. As soon as it was common knowledge that there were talks going on, they said, "You're giving away America," `they' being people in Congress, especially Byrd's brother, Senator Byrd. I think it was his brother.

Q: I think it was his brother, yes. He was a very powerful senator from Virginia.

REYNOLDS: Oh, yes. Oh, he was no weakling, that's right. You'd never find the international lawyers saying that, of which George Owen was one who was on the staff. He was an international lawyer, and a very, very bright one. You'd never find those people saying that Antarctica belonged to us, or that it belonged to anybody. But that was [a congressional attitude we had to deal with]. Then Belgium made a claim. France made a claim, a very slight claim. The Russians had said, "If ever you get to the point where you want to sit down and talk about a treaty, just remember we have a right to be there, because of our work on the IGY." That was the reason for including the Russians.

Q: Where were you coming from, Daniels and all, as we moved toward the preliminary one? Where did he lead his team? Where did you want to come out?

REYNOLDS: Let me help a little a bit and answer an earlier question you gave me - strategic interests. The strategic interests of the United States in the Antarctic, the first thing you come up with is Drake Passage. Drake Passage gives you that...

Q: Going around the Horn.

REYNOLDS: Yes, you go around the Horn or you don't go around the Horn, it's a big goddamned space. I don't know what it is.

Q: It's right here.

REYNOLDS: Right, right. It's pretty huge. But, in any case, you see that's how you get your triangulation... And the British, of course, were in the Falklands, which they claimed

and still claim. And they claim their claim was... And they did it on the basis of exploration, absolutely. We claimed that Palmer was one of the first to be in the Antarctic, and they claimed that Cook was there, and that was in the 18th century.

Q: Let's go back to the strategic interests.

REYNOLDS: Yes, strategic interests. You get this Drake Passage. We don't want any unfriendly situation to develop that could deny us access to the Passage. That's one thing.

The second thing is the continent itself. What valuable minerals and things might we find there, especially the talk in those days was gold and oil.

And the third thing was the scientific exploration, which we thought was a matter of considerable national interest. It turned out to be not only national interest, but international interest, because it's in the Antarctic that they discovered the Black Hole.

Q: How familiar was Daniels, by the time you got there, with the Antarctic?

REYNOLDS: Oh, he knew it like a book, by the time I got there. Oh, yes. And he wanted to know more. He wanted to know everything I could find out. As soon as I discovered that Matthew Fontaine Maury, who was in the Hydrographic Office...

Q: Of the U.S. Navy.

REYNOLDS: You remember everything. You are smart!

Q: Oh, no, I've been around.

REYNOLDS: You're damn right. I'm impressed. Maury spent 20 years, whatever it was, in the Hydrographic Service before the Civil War. Maury was extremely interested in currents, winds and all the rest, and he developed a set of charts, which you probably know better than I do, that would be of interest to people in the Navy, because they'd help in navigation throughout the world. He would sent any ship that he knew, or anybody, he would send blank charts out with them wherever they were going, and they were to put the fathoms and the weather and the wind and the meteorological information they could, per day, and they were to crank down all that stuff back to Matthew Fontaine Maury. Well, Maury finally decided, I think it's in the winter of 1859-60, Maury decided that what we're going to do here is we're going to have an international expedition to the Antarctic. And this intrigued Daniels, because it was the story of France, Britain, the Netherlands, other claimants. I don't think the Latinos were involved in this. They wouldn't have been, they weren't existing yet.

Q: They were counties. About 1820-21 is sort of the operative year for most of the independence. But they were pretty weak.

REYNOLDS: I see, okay. But they wouldn't have enough muscle yet so that they

would... Well, in any case, the conversations between our people and the British and others, the scientific and the sort of pseudo-government activities of people, international conferences of all sorts, people were talking about, well, what do we want to do with that area? And so there was a lot of talk about exploration down there. Plans were afoot. I don't know whether money was appropriated or not. But ultimately this man, who had had a horse-riding accident, did you know that he had fallen off a horse and had injured his leg, [In 1839, he was lamed in a stagecoach accident.] it would deny him a commission in the Confederate services, to which he defected in 1860 or '61, whatever. [He returned to his home state of Virginia to become head of coast, harbor, and river defenses for the Confederate Navy.] So what he did was, he became their procurement officer and went to England and got, because the South didn't have these kinds of instruments, all kinds of instruments that they would need for navigation and so forth, and guns, supposedly.

Q: A purchasing group.

REYNOLDS: Yes, he became the head of this. He sort of disappears off the screen, as far as I'm concerned, because he's no longer part of Antarctica and doesn't get back into it. His interest in it was because of his career; it wasn't that he was interested in the continent so much.

Charles Wilkes is another great important figure. Wilkes came down here. I think he landed.

Q: I think there's a Wilkes Bay and all this.

REYNOLDS: Yes. So those are some of the strategic considerations.

Q: So we have that. When you got on Daniels's team, where did he want to come out as this thing came? Did he have a goal of what he wanted to come out of this?

REYNOLDS: Oh, yes, sure.

Q: What was that?

REYNOLDS: He wanted to ensure the area, tested the treaty, he said now we want to make sure the area would be used only for peaceful purposes. And he wanted it to be demilitarized. He didn't want any weaponry in the Antarctic. He wanted anything that had to do with nuclear energy. We even have a fairly delicate provision that anything in the way of nuclear waste will be disposed in lead casts and taken beyond 70 degrees north of the Antarctic, which is the zone of application of the treaty.

Q: So to keep nuclear-free of all the things.

REYNOLDS: That's right, yes.

Q: Were you aware at the time that this was pretty much the U.S. government's plan or goal? I would have thought the American military would say, well, but you know this would be a great place, one, to set off nuclear explosions, and, two, to have bases and all this. Was there a problem with the Pentagon that you were aware of at that time?

REYNOLDS: Oh, no. There was a problem with the Defense Department. I say "a problem." There was much less of a problem because of Daniels, because Daniels simply involved them in every, every inch of the planning. But he was so much more deft, so much more careful than the liaison people from Defense that the nuances of his policies would not have been particularly clear to them, anymore than they would have been to the IGY people from the National Science Foundation. So that would complicate things. Congress would complicate things. At the time when the treaty was finally up for ratification, we were told by the congressional [office in] something...

Q: H is the Bureau of Congressional Relations of the Department of State.

REYNOLDS: Right, right, right, right, so-called H. And they predicted the treaty would go down, would not be ratified, because there would be enough people who would vote against it, on the grounds that they would believe the fiction that it was American territory.

Q: How did the negotiations proceed when you were there?

REYNOLDS: My firsthand knowledge of the negotiations really starts with the last preparatory meeting, and really gets into high gear when we meet at 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, in the big conference room upstairs. That's when it gets big for me. I had been writing much of the history that had not been written but which had happened since the earlier drafter of the first chapters had gone. I had done that, and now I was involved as a part of the international secretariat at the conference. And that was very handy.

Q: Were the Soviets, by that time, a participant?

REYNOLDS: Oh, yes. But before we went to the conference, Daniels went up through Murphy...

Q: This is Robert Murphy, who was number-two man in the Department of State.

REYNOLDS: Right. He sent, according to what he thought was straight Department format, an instruction that the secretary was asked to sign, directing him to negotiate the treaty. This was, let's say, in the summer of 1959. And then Daniels went off on leave. And he came back to discover that the paper had not moved out of Murphy's basket. So, since he knew Robert Murphy, he went up and he said, "What the hell is wrong? What's going on here?"

And Murphy gave him the awful response, "It does not meet with secretariat format and standards."

And so he said, "Why weren't we told?" And weeks were lost...

So he went back and did whatever recasting had to be done. I'm not even sure of that. I think he literally took the draft to the secretary. I think that's what happened.

Q: This would have been Christian Herter, by that time.

REYNOLDS: No, no, this was Dulles. [Herter entered duty 4/22/59.] It was Dulles definitely, because Dulles had drafted, which I found in the files and which intrigued Daniels, I found a copy of a short, one-page draft of a convention for the..., which the secretary had written. He was a very bright man, Dulles.

Q: Oh, he was a great lawyer.

REYNOLDS: Oh, yes. Here's a man who never went to a conference anywhere without two things in his hand: a copy of the Peace Treaty with Japan and a Bible. Never went to a meeting without that. A very dear friend of mine always loaded the trunks for Washington. He was a black man, wonderful man. That's a whole story all by itself.

Q: Anyway.

REYNOLDS: Where Daniels was coming from. He said, "I want, Mr. Secretary, for you to sign this instruction to me to negotiate. We may want to think in terms of excluding the Russians, but I doubt that that will be possible."

Q: I think the term we should say is Soviets, because that's what they were called in those days.

REYNOLDS: The Soviets, yes. But he said, "I don't think that's going to be possible, because they've already declared they want a seat. And I think, since the Soviets have been so involved in the International Geophysical Year, we would not want to deny that." And I think Daniels was probably, although this is conjecture on my part, looking back at the Austrian State Peace Treaty of '55, which was the only other treaty we had including the Soviets. Why not include the Soviets, you see? If we're going to meet our objective, which is to have the area pacified, we should have the... passage open, not mined. That's what we've got to do.

So his words to the secretary were something like this, I'm not altogether sure what's going to happen with respect to the Russians. My recollection is that he said something like, We're doubtful we can exclude them. We don't think we can exclude them. And I think the NSC [National Security Council] papers all said we couldn't, probably. They set out in some detail some of the strategic interests that we have in the area. I used all those in my studies. Awful language, Jesus. But, anyway, he said to the secretary (and mind you, Daniels knew the secretary well enough to do this), "I want you to sign this, Mr. Secretary." And then he said, "Underneath, I want you to write the word `tentatively'."

And I think the reason he did that was the issue of the Russians, [admitting that we would negotiate with the Russians]. The reason I think he did it that way also was to protect the secretary. This was still the McCarthy era. We're not over it yet, you know, but we're pretty well over it. But a secretary saying in those days, as much as I am a Democrat, Dulles was saying, "Russia's going to break up." It took another 40 years, but it did. But, anyway, he has to be given some credit for that.

So that's sort of what Daniels had picked up off the table as his instructions to negotiate.

What's going to happen to Daniels later is going to be that he himself is going to get broken down on Article X. Article X meaning the accession clause, because the only Article X that the Soviets would agree to, and that some of the other parties would agree to was, "Any other country that wishes to accede to this treaty may do so." That hit FE, known as Far Eastern Affairs in those days. That stuck in their craw. And Ruth Bacon screamed and ranted and raved.

Q: Why? What was the problem?

REYNOLDS: Because you're going to have Chinese mainland junks coming to the Antarctic. And then they're going to start making claims. And then, as a result of doing that, they're going to indicate, "We are a world power."

Q: Ah, so it was a fear of China.

REYNOLDS: Sure. Oh, yes. Oh, they were terribly concerned.

Q: And this, of course, was the height of our, you might say, keep the Chinese out of everything.

REYNOLDS: Yes, yes. And I don't know if Quemoy and Matsu were happening around then or somewhere.

Q: About that time. That was an issue raised during the 1960 election campaign. Two offshore island groups between mainland China and Taiwan. Where were the British coming from on this?

REYNOLDS: Oh, the British were one of the countries that were well disposed, as I recollect now, I don't know this, but this is my recollection. The British were well disposed to having the Russians involved. Now we're in '59. What's the administration in England? Churchill was in. Came back in in '50 or '51.

Q: Harold MacMillan was a little later. I'm just not sure who.

REYNOLDS: MacMillan, I think you're right. Ah, it's Eisenhower and MacMillan, because I remember I looked at a lot of the letters between the presidents.

Q: Who was the principal British negotiator?

REYNOLDS: Oh, God, Denning his name was. He kept pretty much to himself. He was a pretty reserved sort of fellow. You couldn't read him too well, but he was not a man without opinions, and he was being very direct. I wouldn't say that he carried all that much influence, but Brian would probably disagree with me on that.

Q: You're talking about Brian Roberts.

REYNOLDS: Yes, Brian Roberts. But Brian wasn't at the conference.

Q: I was going to ask you about the British team. Did they have a comparable team to ours?

REYNOLDS: Yes, well they had about three or four people here. The treaty negotiations themselves were important, but also what helped to form the treaty were the first couple of consultative meetings, the one held in Australia in '61 and the one held in Argentina in '62. I went to both of those with George.

Q: While we're still setting the stage here, could you talk a little about the Argentineans and Chileans and what their thrust was at that time.

REYNOLDS: The Argentinean interest was, of course, they... just as much without saying it all the time, but it was just as much as the French - sovereignty, we have sovereignty in the Antarctic. And the same attitude was taken by the Chileans. But more so by the Argentines. Sclingo, I think it is, who was an admiral, I think, and had been a Peronist, I think, and was a pretty tough little short guy, a little short fellow. And then the Chileans had a three-headed delegation, three heads. Mora was one; I can't remember the others. But they were much more acquiescent. They were much more at ease with us. The Argentineans were not.

Q: It sounds like the Argentineans, in a way, were at direct loggerheads with what the treaty really wanted them to do, which was to internationalize the place.

REYNOLDS: Oh, ye. All of them knew what was going to happen, under Article IV, was that no claims that are made are, by this instrument, in any way disturbed, and no claims that people have not made are enhanced, and the people who have not made any claims hereby, by signing this agreement, do not in any way recognize the claims of claimants.

Q: Which is silly. I mean, it's all things to all men.

REYNOLDS: Sure, sure, yes. But you see you've got a greater good: you've got the demilitarization, you've got the scientific cooperation, you've got the instrument for consultation, annual meetings, you've got conservation talked about, you've got accession talked about. And something like 25 or 30 countries now have acceded to the treaty. And

another thing that one wants to remember is that the treaty is written in such a way, there shall be no nuclear explosions in the Antarctic. The Antarctic shall be used solely for peaceful purposes. Everything is written in the passive voice so that it includes not just those who are active parties in the Antarctic and active parties to the treaty, but that it also applies to non-signatories, even if they never sign it. So it becomes a law. Do you understand?

Q: This meeting at 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue took place what year?

REYNOLDS: This took place between October 15-December 1, 1959. It lasted six weeks.

Q: Were the Soviets involved in that one?

REYNOLDS: Oh, yes, oh, yes. They were right there. They were invited to the first of these.

Q: When the Soviets came in, what were their goals as we saw it in the fall of '59?

REYNOLDS: Well, they pretty well lined up with the idea that the claims issue should be set aside. You don't say about a claim, well, let's abolish all claims. No. But you set the issue aside by having an article in which people who believe in their claims could continue to believe in them, and people who don't believe in them could continue not to believe in them. So that's how they felt about claims. About military things, my recollection is that that's not something that overly preoccupied them. They had a man who was head of the delegation who was an absolutely remarkable person. His name was Vasily Kuznetzov. He would later show his teeth for the Soviets in Finland in '61 or '62 and in Prague in '68, and he'd be quite unpleasant.

Q: These were during the same negotiations?

REYNOLDS: No, no, no. The negotiations were all over now. We're talking about a man who was given instruction when he came to America, be nice to the Americans, work with them, get a treaty. That was the sense of that.

Q: It would strike me that the Soviets probably were saying, we're not going to get anything down there, and it's best to make sure nobody else messes around down there in military things, so let's keep this as nice as...

REYNOLDS: That's right. Sure, sure.

Q: Was the attitude of your core team, by coming up with the idea, all right, we're not going to preclude anybody from their claims, was the same way as if we lock everybody up into this internationalization and neutralization, and they have conflicting claims... In other words, it's not worth fighting about, because, in a way, we've already precluded them from really establishing claims because so many people are in there you're just not

going to get anywhere.

REYNOLDS: That's right. That's right. No.

Q: Was that what happened?

REYNOLDS: Oh, I think so. I think that what happened was the scientific exploration defused the issue of claims. But, you see, you have to think about that in terms of, never mind what's happening in Antarctica, you have to think about what popular opinion would be in Chile and what it would be in Argentina and what it would especially be in France, which had one of the smallest claims.

We had an absolutely unprecedented activity, in that Ambassador Charpentier, who was head of the French delegation, asked the permission of the conference and flew over from Paris, Mr. Gros. Daniels wrote a couple of ditties about him, him and everybody else, all the characters in the treaty.

Q: What were the French doing?

REYNOLDS: The French wanted to protect their claim.

Q: Oh, I see.

REYNOLDS: And they wanted to be very clear on what Article IV would involve. So they wanted Mr. Gros to come over, and he was going to lecture the entire conference. It was typical French, well, wonderful goddamned, you know, these were the wonderful days. These were the days when De Gaulle was in power. He had come to power in '58, I guess. So what Gros was to do was to lecture this entire, huge conference. There were 12 delegations, no observers from other countries, but 12 countries, seven of them claimants and five of them not, I think. The conference indulged him for a full morning, to discourse, from the point of view of a Frenchman, on what sovereignty is. It was wonderful. It was just absolutely incredible. But we just sat there and listened. And who knows who was influenced to give what speech in what direction or in any other? Fine. But to me it seemed almost... I would never say, as a historian, that anything is unprecedented. I mean, who the hell knows what happened at the Conference of Vienna or anyplace else? Who knows, they didn't have a tape recorder. But, in any case, he did that.

And the other totally amusing thing that the Frenchman did. He said, in the closing days of the conference, this would be about November 25, 26, or 27, he said, "I'm not authorized by my president to sign the treaty right now. I must await his instructions." So we sat on our asses there and waited. Of course, there were things to talk about, housekeeping and things.

And then one morning in came the French ambassador, Charpentier. (A lovely name. I like the composer, and I like the ambassador.) He had a piece of paper that had to have

been a foot and a half wide, and it had to be about two feet, maybe even a yard long. And he held this piece of paper in front of him, and he read whatever he said. He said, "I now have the instructions of my president that I may initial the treaty." Or did they sign it? Whether they signed it or initialed it, I've forgotten. I think you initial it, and then it has to go to governments, and then governments ratify, and then you sign. So he said, "I now have permission to initial the treaty." Well, he holds up this scroll, and he's reading from it, you see. I thought it was the goddamned 18th century. And down at the bottom, in letters, I am not kidding, that looked to me to be that high.

Q: We're talking about an inch and a half.

REYNOLDS: That's right. "General De Gaulle," signed and with his signature, I guess, above it, although I didn't see his signature. Unbelievable. So that's how we concluded the treaty.

Q: I thought this might be a good point to stop right here. And I want to put at the end, we have talked about the initial meet in October-December '59. The treaty has been initialed, and the next time we'll discuss developments thereafter. I also want to mention that I'll ask the question the next time about the initial treaty. Where did the initiative come from for: This treaty will not preclude claims of other people? Or maybe you can answer that right now. Generally, had that been sort of set up prior to the negotiations?

REYNOLDS: I'm almost certain that that language was agreed before, or tentatively, at least, before Herman Phleger arrived on the scene. But Herman Phleger will arrive on the scene. Which country is responsible for that language, I cannot be sure.

Q: We'll pick Herman Phleger, who was the legal counsel to the Department of State. Okay, so we're going to start from what happens after the treaty has been signed.

REYNOLDS: I think we want to say a few things about the conference itself.

Q: Okay, and we'll talk also about this period up to the signing, the role of Congress's participation and all that, and also any military representation as we get into that.

REYNOLDS: Excellent.

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Q: Today is the 5th of March 1997. Warren, could you tell me a little bit about Herman Phleger, your impression of him. He was an important figure in the Dulles circle in the State Department at the time.

REYNOLDS: Herman Phleger was Dulles's counterpart on the West Coast, in that he was either head of or a member of the Sullivan and Cromwell law firm on the West Coast, whatever its name was. He was not an easy man to know. He was kind of tough. He was abrasive at times, kind of abrupt. One time, without turning around, he said to

me, "Get me Kuznetzov's opening speech. I'll need it as quickly as I can get it." He did the same thing regarding statements to be made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the time when the Senate gave its advice and consent to the signing. Mind you, we'd only initialed on the 1st of December. Phleger, of course, came in before and was selected chairman of the conference. I guess that's kind of traditional for the host country. He became chairman of the conference and had as his conference manager the head of the conference office in IO, whose name was Henry Allen, a very, very effective, sound guy, who had around him people like myself who were his secretariat, and we did all the records of meetings, records of decisions, they were called. Now Herman Phleger was called in very urgently by Dulles when nobody could break the knot, to which I referred in our first meeting, having to do with the accession clause, Article X of the treaty.

Q: And there we were concerned about Communist China.

REYNOLDS: Right, right. FE in particular. And Ruth Bacon and Walter Robinson.

Q: Walter Robinson, who was Mr. Far East and a right-winger of the Republican Party.

REYNOLDS: I didn't know that.

Q: Supposedly a very courteous Southern gentleman, but you didn't mess with him or with any softness toward Communist China.

REYNOLDS: Right. And I told you the story about how the fear was that a junk would end up in Antarctic waters, which I suppose there was one chance in a thousand that would happen. So Phleger was brought in, and it showed the completely marvelous character of Paul C. Daniels, who had been the leader of all the negotiations during the preparatory talks and up to preparing the position papers and even the instructions to the conference. In fact, although I think my memory fails me, I thought that Daniels had the role that Phleger had at the conference, for a short time. But I don't think I'm right, because FE very quickly brought to the attention of the American delegation, during the preparation of the final instructions to Daniels, that we would not have an accession clause, which would make us vulnerable to a Chinese Nationalist...

Q: Chinese Communist.

REYNOLDS: Chinese Communist, I mean, Chinese Communist guard. Daniels took this exactly the way a real soldier would. I mean, he simply said, "Fine, I'm second in command. I'm the alternate delegate." He took on that role, and he managed a lot of the negotiation that went on in the committee of the whole, I think it was called. And Phleger also took a role, but I was not in those meetings. There was a joke that I was called Mercurio, because I was constantly bringing papers from the style committee up to the committee of the whole for their review, after things had been put in proper treaty language, that they were anxious to have in the treaty. I think Daniels was very bitter, but he was a soldier and knew how to keep it to himself.

Q: Daniels was bitter, yes.

REYNOLDS: Oh, yes. Never mentioned it, never talked about it. We saw it in him. We saw it in his manner and so forth. In his office, there were two alternates, and the other one was the person you have on your list there, George Owen, the international lawyer who had been working on Latin American matters for many years before he came to work on Antarctica, and then he was our delegate to the first and second consultative meetings, held in Canberra and in Buenos Aires.

Q: What was the outcome of this debate over the accession clause?

REYNOLDS: The outcome was that it was made broad enough... I'll look at the text here and see if it jogs my memory at all. It's not a long treaty, so it's easy enough to read. It is simply one sentence, "Each of the contracting parties undertakes to exert appropriate efforts, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no one engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the principles or purposes of the present treaty." The way that was intended to be construed was that people could accede to the treaty, but with the understanding that the contracting parties would see to it that they did not violate the provisions of the treaty.

Q: But now what about the problem of anybody being able to join? Was that a draw?

REYNOLDS: Ultimately, that's left sufficiently murky so that by now, and I'm way behind the times, but as long ago as five or 10 years ago, there were already, I think, 23 countries that had acceded to this treaty, and the signatories had been 12. [Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States.]

Q: So every country wasn't jumping in on this.

REYNOLDS: No. No. No. China was in such turmoil, anyway, '59 would have been a perfect year for China to throw up its hands and say who gives a goddamn. In '59, China was having cultural changes and all that sort of thing.

Q: Well, we're moving on now. In the first place, was the treaty sufficiently tight so that our military concerns about the Drake Passage and other elements in Antarctica were covered?

REYNOLDS: Well, it is my understanding, and there are no documents that I know of in the files, it's my understanding that, especially the Navy, they did what Daniels would call an end run.

Q: What did the Navy do?

REYNOLDS: They had plenty of access to people, especially in the Congress, who were

of a mind, and had been ever since the preparatory talks were going on, that what we were doing was giving away a piece of America, a piece of the United States, even though we'd never made a claim and even though we'd never recognized anybody else's claim. So they were very anxious to see whether they could get a sufficiently large number of people in the Senate who would not vote or who would vote against the treaty. The power of their lobbying was strong enough so that H, the congressional [bureau] in the Department, [was] absolutely convinced that the treaty was going down to defeat, and they advised Daniels and the rest of us to that effect.

Q: At what time?

REYNOLDS: We're talking about in 1961, I think.

Q: Ok, so we're now into...

REYNOLDS: Into the ratification [by Congress].

Q: So we're now into the ratification side, and we now have the Kennedy administration, which came in in January 1961. So it's a whole different team. Before we get to that thing, since '61 is a crucial year and a new administration...

REYNOLDS: I'm a little fuzzy on the date of the ratification discussions. They may have been in '60. [Treaty signed 12/1/59; enacted 6/23/61.]

Q: Let me ask this, because it's rather critical. Do you recall having to convince a new administration to go ahead with the treaty?

REYNOLDS: I don't recall that, no.

Q: Ok, so I think we're probably talking about 1960, because Phleger was still a player during the ratification.

REYNOLDS: Well, Phleger would come to Washington on occasion. But Daniels would oversee things, and he would also come to Washington on occasion. But the store was being maintained by Owen, and I was in the store with Owen.

Q: Ok, somebody will have to look at this, but I think we're talking about still within the Eisenhower administration.

REYNOLDS: That's what I think. That's my recollection.

Q: Did you do any...

REYNOLDS: What I was asked to do by Daniels (I think maybe I'm anticipating your question), even before the conference was convened, was to go to the Library of Congress and go through every law journal I could find and go all the way back to, oh,

the 1880s and 1890s to determine whether there had ever been any learned treatises written on the issue of the validity of U.S. sovereignty, the prospect that the area might get internationalized, and what would be the opinion of the American people about that. My research came up with precious little on the Antarctic area. It was a fascinating subject, because it was like Spitzbergen, and it was also even a little bit like the North Pole. I mean, who knows who owns what.

Q: The treaty had been initialed. Did the team you were on immediately turn toward Congress?

REYNOLDS: It's becoming clearer now that it must have been '60, because in July of '61 we were already holding the first consultative meeting. So I'm almost certain it must have been '60, the spring. Oh, I remember, Kennedy was in the Senate. Kennedy was in the Senate, because he came down the stairs and I spoke to him. And I also spoke to Nixon, who was on the stairs. I never met anybody, including Eisenhower or anybody else, I never heard any of those people ever talk negatively about the treaty. Not that I ever talked to Eisenhower...

Q: Did you find you were put not in a lobbying position, but talking to the Senate?

REYNOLDS: No, no, absolutely not. No. I was never asked to go anywhere near them, although I did go, of course, to the Senate Foreign Relations hearings preparatory to the ratification. I think Green was in the chair.

Q: Senator Green of Rhode Island.

REYNOLDS: Right. He was in the chair, and we had to keep him awake.

Q: I know. Well, he was getting close to 100, wasn't he?

REYNOLDS: Right. But the questions were good. The commentaries were good. Phleger was certainly good. I think Daniels was with Phleger, but I don't think that Daniels made a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I don't remember that.

Q: Well, Phleger was really brought in as a high-priced lawyer to make a case, rather than being an authority on the subject itself.

REYNOLDS: Exactly. Exactly.

Q: As often happens at a certain point. You get your high-grade talent to make your case.

REYNOLDS: Sure, oh, yes. As you pointed out, he had an unusual relationship with Dulles. They knew each other and were international lawyers.

Q: Dulles, of course, by this time was dead, but still he had that position. What about the opposition to the treaty that the Navy was trying to drum up? Did it come out as a potent

factor or not?

REYNOLDS: It counted as a sort of scare factor. It worried us that they might be able to subvert enough senators.

Q: Just one more than one-third of the Senate.

REYNOLDS: Right, right.

Q: But it didn't happen.

REYNOLDS: No, it didn't. I think we got something like 80 votes for the treaty. And, of course, we were very, very happy about that.

From then on, the Defense Department, the Navy and what they called Operation Deep Freeze, which had been in operation since the IGY opened in '58, those folks became exceedingly cooperative. I worked more on the history of the Antarctic, for the next three or four years. And the Navy even sent me to Antarctica, so I got a chance to see the Pole. Later on, Henry Dater, who was their Washington-based person for Operation Deep Freeze, even had a ridge named after me. And George Owen had a series of hills named after him. I don't know whether Daniels or Phleger had anything named after them. I don't have any recollection that they did.

Oh, you had one question for me last time that bothered me, and I've thought about it and thought about it, and that was, you were asked by Brian Roberts to query me about a conversation I had with him in Canberra.

Q: We have an inquiry from a Philip Hope of the Stockholder Research Institute at Cambridge, and he asks about Dr. Reynolds's meeting with Brian Roberts at the start of the 1961 consultative meeting in Canberra. In the first place, before we get to that, the treaty now is in effect. Had the other countries acceded?

REYNOLDS: Yes, yes, the ratifications trickled in. There seemed to be no mass opposition to it, except, I think, with respect to Argentina and Chile. We had something of a feeling that things were not all that steady there. I don't remember the political situations in either country then, but those were the two countries we were worried about.

Q: But did they come in?

REYNOLDS: Yes, oh, yes, they ratified the treaty.

Q: So the treaty is ratified by the powers that started the process. We're talking about the end of 1960.

REYNOLDS: Right.

Q: Then what happens?

REYNOLDS: We then activate Article VII of the treaty, whereby we call the first consultative meeting under the treaty. While it's interesting to note that in some of the published materials it was envisioned that that meeting would take place in Washington, D.C., that meeting didn't take place in Washington, that meeting took place in Canberra. And Canberra had, I think, envisioned that it would become the headquarters for all treaty matters. One didn't absolutely know that, one just felt that. And there were some very eager people in Canberra who were preoccupied with the Antarctic, a little bit the way Norway is preoccupied with the North Pole. More so than the South Africans, for instance, who were interested in the treaty, who wanted to be involved in it, but who were certainly not as preoccupied with it as they were.

Q: So now we're talking about the consultative meeting. In this first one, in '61, what were you up to?

REYNOLDS: That first consultative meeting was a great lesson for all of us in sort of Russian diplomatic fundamentalism. When the Russians conclude a treaty, they want to be sure that, in every recommendation that passes at a consultative meeting, we use "treaty language." They don't want any deviation from what it is they've agreed to. After all, as I think I mentioned to you last time, the man who was the deputy foreign minister, Vasily Kuznetzov, was and remained for some years after this quite a power in foreign affairs in the Soviet Union. But they were never overriding; they were never unpleasant. We always thought that the Antarctic treaty had provided a vehicle for the Russians, during the Cold War, to exercise the be-nice-to-America side of their nature. We had Filipov and others in the embassy who were always very cooperative.

This was also the time, 1959, when you sign a treaty, when you negotiate with the Russians, you're doing something that a very large number of Americans are already against. You cannot trust the Russians, so say they. So we had a great deal of quiet selling to do in that connection. But we found that, for instance, one member of their delegation, whose name was Mumchak, he was a Ukrainian, and Mumchak was absolutely very fond of George Gilbert. George Gilbert was a great lawyer. This fellow was a lawyer. This fellow was a human-rights lawyer. Now human rights for us American Cold Warriors in 1959 and '60, to hear about the Russians having a human-rights lawyer, we regarded it then as kind of ludicrous, except that this guy was very serious, very bright, and we all enjoyed him. So there was a great deal of exchange of views and all the rest of it.

But at that first consultative meeting, I do remember it, at some stage, when we got there, we were there for four weeks, I remember talking to Brian. And I remember Brian talking to me about, my recollection now, but this sort of what I remember, that he said, "Warren, we want this treaty to become, at least in part, an instrument for conservation in the Antarctic." It fit all of our views. None of us were objecting to that. We wanted to save the seals, the penguins, the area, the ice shelf, the plankton, and everything else. After all, we sealed off an area, the zone of application, as I told you the last time, was 70 degrees north or whatever it is from the Pole, seventy degrees out, a great circle. That

was the zone of application of the treaty. All the treaty provisions applied to that great circle.

Q: The environment has really come into its own, as far as a major concern of certainly the more advanced countries in the '90s, and it started coming in really probably in the '60s and '70s. This built up, and we found more and more concern about what's happening in the world. This was pretty early on. Were there real environmental concerns, and were there the equivalent to what we would call today non-governmental organizations that were working with you or pushing you at all in those days?

REYNOLDS: To my recollection, no. The closest thing we had was a science advisor on the delegation, whose name was Jones. He was one of the sub-directors of the National Science Foundation. He was very highly thought of, very learned in his field. He would be the person with whom Daniels or Phleger or any of the rest of them might have consulted, had they had some concern about an environmental issue or an environmental position taken by another government. But there was very little time consumed with that, except concern to preserve the area for peaceful uses. That's already doing that without using those terms.

Q: Were there studies that were being done that you could refer to about, you know, if you do this to the plankton, the whales and seals will go, and that type of thing?

REYNOLDS: I don't recollect anything like that.

Q: I suspect that there wasn't much then.

REYNOLDS: No. Except that, you see, we did have the IGY, which started, as I remember now, in the summer of '57, and went through the whole of '58. I think it was an 18-month operation. That's my recollection.

Q: And so this was still quite fresh in everybody's mind.

REYNOLDS: Sure. Oh, sure. And everybody was aware that all kinds of research was going on. There was this wonderful business about one American scientist who would creep out on the ice shelf, and would creep in the direction of one of the female seals, and he'd have kind of a suction pump that women use to take the excess milk out of their breasts, and he would reach out to the seal and put this on one of the seal's nipples, and hope that he wouldn't get bitten or something. There's apparently an incredible high-fat content to seal milk, which makes sense. Seals are trying to stay alive in these waters. Seals are known for being very gentle. That's all I ever remembered. But when I got to the Antarctic and leaned down to try to pet a seal, the seal just whirled on me and growled. I remember thinking, well, we won't do that again. The reason they got the reputation for being so docile was that, in the 19th century, seal hunters went to the Antarctica and beat thousands of these things to death, and then took the pelts and sold them.

Q: Well, this is happening, of course, up in Canada, even until now. Were there lobbies of seal hunters, fishermen, commercial interests, not just American but general ones, who were living off fishing in the area or anything who were opposed to the treaty because they felt it would inhibit them?

REYNOLDS: No, we were never approached, to my knowledge. Mind you, you see, I had a hole-in-the-wall office in the Antarctic staff area, which was not a large area, and I certainly wouldn't see people who would come in to see Paul Daniels and want to talk to him. After a meeting with the Russians, a separate meeting with the Russians, because he had all kinds of meetings going on, and he was a very deft diplomat, he would say to me, "I want you to take some notes. I'm dictating this to my secretary," he said. Then he'd say to his secretary, "Now don't put this down on paper. Reynolds, I want to tell you this orally. This also happened at the meeting, that also happened at the meeting." But he said, "I don't want it part of the record." He was bright enough to know that someday somebody might solicit the papers, and he wanted to be free to say to me what he was feeling about the Russians. He was quite a conservative Republican; he was a Goldwater Republican, and we used to hassle him about all that, because George and I were Democrats.

But, in any case, there were no pressure groups that I can think of, except the military. And that was all very sub rosa, very quietly done. We had a coordinating organization within the government. We had a National Science Foundation representative; we had a CIA representative, part of the time; we had a DOD [Department of Defense] representative from the Navy; and people from the bureaus. I don't think each of the bureaus came. You could argue that AF [Bureau of African Affairs] should have been there, because of South Africa. ARA [Bureau of Inter-American Affairs] should have been there, because of Chile and Argentina. EUR [Bureau of European Affairs] should have been there, because of Norway, the United Kingdom, Belgium, France...

Q: And the Soviet Union.

REYNOLDS: The Soviet Union, absolutely. There were some consultations that went on, but I think the most important talks that went on, to which I was not privy at all, were the talks between Walmsley, in IO, who was an old friend of Daniels, and Daniels. They had worked together and come up through the Foreign Service, since the '20s, and they talked the same language.

Q: Walmsley was a European man.

REYNOLDS: Exactly. And Daniels greatly admired Clemenceau. He was the ambassadors' ambassador, as far as he was concerned. But I don't recall any adversarial situations other than, well, there might be drafting tension at times between DOD and the National Science Foundation. I think the Science Foundation would rather have liked it if the whole Deep Freeze thing had been moved over to the Science Foundation. It was a turf thing. But, of course, the Navy wasn't about to get out.

Q: At the consultative meetings, George Owen was the lead man for the Americans?

REYNOLDS: Yes, yes.

Q: One of the questions says, "What were his objectives and what did he hope to achieve in the long term?

REYNOLDS: In very, very general terms, George always thought of his job as a diplomat as standing up in front of this huge engine, and all he had to do was take various size wrenches and twist this bolt a little tighter, loosen this one, tighten this one, loosen that one. He thought you had to just keep things in balance. That was your job. You don't do anything sensational. The dream had already been fulfilled; Daniels had done that. Now the question was, a very much more modern spirit, George Owen, would now be the caretaker.

He would last through two consultative meetings. And then Robert McClintock, who was in Argentina when we went to Argentina for the second consultative meeting, sent a telegram to Harlan Cleveland, who became secretary for IO, saying that the Antarctic Treaty second consultative meeting had ended, and it was almost as though they were holding a meeting on ice. Which, of course, was an interesting turn of phrase. He was saying it was dull, there wasn't much going on, and so forth. And that hurt George Owen's career. It hurt it because I think Harlan Cleveland always liked to make a little bit of a splash, anyway (well, that's a subjective view of mine). And George was moved from Antarctica to the visa office.

Of course, that's the second story of vocational heroism, whatever, because he proceeded to work out a plan for the reorganization of the visa office, and then ultimately ended up as head of the visa office. And he was Mr. Visa for several years.

Q: Oh, yes.

REYNOLDS: You remember that?

Q: I remember that, very much so.

REYNOLDS: He died of cancer in the late '60s.

Q: So you were concerned with this Antarctic Treaty, putting together the papers, the history of it and all that, until about when?

REYNOLDS: When George's role in the office ended, they put it into the hands of a couple of IO people who had not worked on Antarctica, but who had worked on a number of special committees of the United Nations. Kochnick was put in charge of it. He was a singularly young man. And, of course, the one thing that I think would have distressed Daniels was that it looked as though the administration of the treaty and all the rest of it was going to get captured somehow by IO, and it would fall victim to the UN

[United Nations] ethic; namely, you multilateralize everything, instead of its being a treaty among the parties who are interested in the future of Antarctica. It's not for Ghana, it's not for Ceylon, it's not for Sierra Leone, it's for the countries that want to be involved there.

Q: As far as your knowledge, what happened to it?

REYNOLDS: It shifted out of IO and became part of S/CI, the Office of Science. As far as I was concerned, that would have been a very unfortunate moment. But also the treaty negotiations and everything to do with recommendations and the conservation convention was evolved at that time. So we went in the direction that the British would have had us go, anyway.

Q: That direction being?

REYNOLDS: Being more toward Torgay, greater emphasis on conservation. We were already imbued with that sense ourselves, but when you get scientists whose main concern this is, then things change. Also, my interests and involvement thinned out very quickly.

Q: This set of interviews is concentrated on the Antarctic side, so one last question on that, and then we'll do a little follow through. How did you feel about the treaty by the time you stepped away from it?

REYNOLDS: Oh, I felt just the reverse I felt when my bosses asked me to work on research on the Antarctic. Then, I felt, my God, I'm going to do a study, again, on ice with... But when I got involved with Daniels, and when I got involved with an international lawyer like George Owen, I got a taste of just what the Foreign Service was like. The more that I got [involved], the more I loved it. And that was the reason why. When I left [government] after 30 years in the Department and after six years in intelligence before that, I immediately went abroad and went to South Africa, because I thought it would be a fascinating place to live for a while. And I stayed four years. And I might go back there.

Q: So how did you feel?

REYNOLDS: I felt very good about the treaty, very good about what we had been involved in. George and I talk Antarctica, not nearly as often as people might imagine we did, because we talked it all day long. But we go to lunch a couple of days a week. I think that was probably one of the high points of my government career.

Q: Just to go through it briefly, just to give a feel, after you left the Antarctic team, what did you do?

REYNOLDS: I went back to HO [Historian's Office], the historical [record], and I worked on chronologies on Vietnam. I did a study on Cyprus. I did a study on Prague, on

the 1968...

Q: Crushing of the Prague Spring.

REYNOLDS: That's right. And that study attracted so much attention that, in the early '70s, it went right to President Carter, who read it. Zbiggy Brzezinski read it before him. But the president read it and put notations in the margins. And no one, to my knowledge, in the Historian's Office, ever had a policy study that had that kind of treatment. Of course, my colleagues were thrilled and called me and told me, because I was already in the office of external research by then. I think I can say without too much distress nowadays, I had been passed over to become head of a division, because they needed somebody that they thought would be more competent than I would be. [Around the spring of 1971] I went to [the Office of] External Research, where I spent the last of the years of my career.

Q: External research being part of the INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research].

REYNOLDS: Right, INR, right. [The Director of External Research when I started was Ray Platig.] My role started off as being the economic's officer. I would bring working groups together from several agencies, we would design projects, put them out for bids, and then we would monitor the studies. And it was fun; I enjoyed it immensely. I was much more in the driver's seat myself. [By 1981, we were renamed the Office of Long Range Assessment and Research - INR/CAR. I retired in the late 1980s.]

Q: But this is what we're after, sort of the fly on the wall, the briefcase carrier. The view there is often much more interesting, as we do these oral histories. There's often a certain objectivity, and, with maturity later on, you take a look back and see how it was done. I think it makes much more of a mark on history than somebody saying, "And I carried out my policies, and I did so and so and so and so."

REYNOLDS: I was never in a position, never felt that, but always felt that I was given an opportunity to do some exciting things.

I always remember, when we were negotiating the Antarctic Treaty at 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, I had to go into the room ahead of the secretary when he went to chair the conference. I can't tell you quite how this happened, but a whole crowd of press people pressed in on me and the secretary in back of me.

Q: This would have been Herter, probably.

REYNOLDS: It was Herter, yes. There's a picture of him here. Herter was on these crutches.

Q: Yes, he had very bad arthritis.

REYNOLDS: That's right. At some stage after this melee, his crutches actually fell to the

ground. He had a hell of a time. But he was the spirit of mildness, of gentleness, very much of a gentleman, and he didn't upbraid the press or anything else. But they were clearly pushing.

The only other incident like that was when I spoke to Henry Kissinger coming out of an elevator one day, on the first floor, toward the flags in the lobby. There was a photographer in front of him, and he was saying, "Hold it, Mr. Secretary! Hold it! Hold it!" The photographer was backing up and backing up, taking pictures of the secretary. And the guy literally fell on his ass. And I talked about it, and he said, "Well, maybe that's all right."

But, no, no, it was a good feeling. It was a great time.

Q: Well, I want to thank you very much. I really appreciate this.

REYNOLDS: A pleasure, my friend.

End of interview