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GUNTHER K. ROSINUS

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INTERVIEW

Q: This is Lew Schmidt interviewing Gunther Rosinus in his home in Potomac, Maryland on March 21, 1989.

Gunther, I would like to have you start off by indicating a little bit about your background, your education -- I know you were born in Germany, your arrival in the states -- how you got into your educational area and finally, what it was that brought you into the information program.

So, if you will just take it from there. I will stop you occasionally if I have a question.

Bio-Sketch

ROSINUS: I was born in Germany in 1928 of a Catholic father and a Jewish mother. Very shortly thereafter, of course, came the rise of Nazism. My father died when I was three and my mother had farmed me out to a variety of guardians because she had to go to work to support herself and me.

With the rise of the Nazis, my mother became increasingly concerned and, through an incredible confluence of events, a prominent Cincinnati family that had just lost a son my age, and was looking to replace him with another son of that age, happened to meet a mutual friend aboard a ship cruising between the United States and Europe, where my foster mother-to-be was aboard, as it was her custom to go to Europe every summer on vacation.

We met and arrangements were made and in 1938, I came over by myself to join them in Cincinnati, Ohio.

Q: And your mother stayed in Germany.

ROSINUS: My mother stayed in Germany until 1941 when my guardian family, the Fischer family of Cincinnati, helped to bring her over as well. So, there I was in Cincinnati and, as I say, with a civically prominent family, and I ended up then going to high school in Cincinnati and then going on to Harvard University where I studied political science as an undergraduate within, of course, the liberal arts, and then again graduate school in international relations.

Now, the reason all this fits in so well with my subsequent career was because I was already determined to head for a government service as a young man. The reason for that was twofold: one, the civic involvement and political interest of the family with which I was living, the international interest being further supported by the fact that my foster father was Austro-Hungarian and had spent his youth in the Hapsburg days in Vienna and Budapest, and, secondly, the fact that the family was a great booster of Franklin Roosevelt and, of course, this was the great age of Roosevelt, an age in which young talent was enlisted and an age in which we fought the last good war, an age in which the imagination, the political imagination, was certainly easily stirred by national events.

1951: Entrance into Government Service at Department of State

So, I think those two factors combined to lead me very early toward a public career. I moved then directly into government after graduate school by virtue of recruitment, by someone whom you may have run across by name already, Mel Ruggles, who was a partner with Lou Olom at that time in the Department of State.

They recruited me for the State Department and that is where I went in 1951 and then I spent the next two years before there was a USIA in the Office of Intelligence Research as a political analyst for Southeast Asian Affairs.

Q: This was in the State Department?

ROSINUS: This was in the Department of State, in support of our Southeast Asia policies at that time. This was the era of burgeoning independence in Indonesia, for example, where I was working -- on which I was working at that time.

It was also, interestingly enough, a time in which I was working very closely with Paul Kattenburg, who became subsequently an interesting case of a very prescient objector to our Vietnam drift and who, as a result, had to leave the Foreign Service, and is now happily ensconced as a professor at the University of South Carolina.

It was also a time, I believe, when Jeane Kirkpatrick was working in the same office along with some others who subsequently went on to interesting careers.

1953: USIA Comes Into Existence, Rosinus Transfers to USIA

Now, in 1953, the Agency, of course, was born and so, we in State, had the choice of moving over with it or remaining in State and at that time, I took the route into USIA and within a year of that, was on my way to Japan, the first assignment where you and I, of course, first met, what, thirty-four years ago, my god!
Where do we go from there?

1954: Japan -- Initial Assignment: Niigata

Q: Why don't you -- now, I think you went to Niigata first.

ROSINUS: I did, correct.

Q: So, why don't you tell me not only what you did in Niigata, but what you felt your particular efforts and objectives were directed towards accomplishing; give me some ideas as to how you went about this or some of your experiences, any anecdotes you may have and whether or not you think you were successful, moderately, quite a bit, or otherwise.

ROSINUS: Okay, perhaps we can put it even in a framework of Japan as a whole, since as you recall, subsequently we went down to Kyushu to take over the regional public affairs job in Fukuoka. In Niigata, I served under your embassy leadership as Cultural Center Director.

Perhaps, I should really say at the beginning of this interview that my actions in USIA have always been based upon a keen interest in what I have defined as the overall mission and purpose of public diplomacy, or public affairs, which I can go into perhaps a little more at length as we proceed with this interview.

Basically, I have always felt that the mission of public affairs was an integral mission, involving all the elements that have now come together. Long ago, I was preaching very hard and working with people like Lionel Mosley and others and then writing periodically on the subject of public affairs as a direct dimension of American diplomacy, of public affairs as requiring the integration of all elements, both cultural and informational, and of the public affairs officer as a substantive officer, not just as a manager or an impresario.

The mission of such an integrated effort was to be, as I saw it, the projection of our open society and of the policies that flow from it. Simple enough. That is it. Therefore, I have always put a strong political aura or context on whatever we were doing and using the cultural side of the house in support of a given defined political objective in whatever country I served.

Targeting Labor and Intellectual Circles in Niigata

So, in Japan, for example, and in Niigata, what we were facing in 1954, as you will recall, was the growth of a lot of left-wing agitation, particularly in the labor movement and within intellectual circles.

So, we set up programs directed toward labor and toward intellectual circles, university circles. In Niigata, for example, it took the form, among many other activities, of a regular seminar that I led in international relations with a group of labor leaders from various unions in the Niigata prefectural area.

Q: Had you had any Japanese language training before you went to Japan? If not, were you dealing through interpreters when you were chairing these seminars and how did you operate?

ROSINUS: I had not had language training prior to going to Japan. I took some Japanese within Japan and was able eventually, within half a year or so, to use written texts for speech purposes, which I did, but in seminar settings, I would always use interpretation. The purpose was to try to clarify through seminar techniques and discussion groups of this nature, U.S. policies and intentions and their origins in American society.

We were, of course, also concerned, as you will recall, with expanding knowledge of the United States as a whole among the Japanese who were emerging from the relatively isolated and poverty period of the post-war years.

That effort, I think, was at least on a national scale pretty successful and I recall a specific incident in Niigata that showed the kind of goodwill that had been built through these efforts. In 1955, I believe, a typhoon fire burned down our Cultural Center and, you will recall, immediately the prefectural government offered us room in its own limited space, because of unlimited offices, which had also been partly destroyed by this fire, and we continued to operate out of there. Of course, we had many expressions of sympathy and all that sort of thing coming out of practically every segment of the populace at that time.

I think the widespread use of cultural centers providing access to libraries, lectures, films, exhibits and cultural events, serving as the "window to America," as we called them at that time, was an extremely effective method for projecting our open society at that moment in Japanese history. The *Saturday Evening Post* praised our efforts, with specific examples from Niigata, Tokyo and Yokohama, in a major article in the September 1955 issue.

Q: You mentioned that you were doing this largely targeting the labor. ...

ROSINUS: The labor and university audiences.

Q: University. I know, of course, because in Tokyo, we were also having a clear demonstration of a very leftward driven labor movement. I wonder if you felt that you had

any substantial impact in diverting them away from this more or less left-leaning attitude or could you measure that at all?

ROSINUS: It is tough to measure. There was one funny incident that might have been -- that, again, shows some of these dichotomies in politics. On May Day, as you recall, the Japanese left was in the habit of snaking down the road in large demonstrations with white headbands and flags denouncing various things including certain U.S. policies.

Well, they were doing the same thing in Niigata on this particular day and they happened to come snaking by our Niigata Cultural Center; and as these labor leaders came running by, a number of them broke ranks, came over to where I was standing watching them and exchanged bows and greetings, turned around and jumped back into the demonstration line and kept on going.

I do not know if that is evidence of anything, but I have sort of a fundamental faith that the injection of rationality into any hot, emotional issue does help somewhat when the crunch comes, yes.

Q: Did you have any evidence in Niigata of the Soviet Union trying to place its cultural emissaries or its agents into any part of the programs that the labor union was involved in or in which anybody else was involved in your area?

ROSINUS: I do not recall any specific incidents. Niigata, of course, faced the Sea of Japan and across the sea was Vladivostok, so they somehow had a keen sense of Soviet presence, but as you know, the Soviets have had a pretty tough row to hoe in Japan also, given the fact of the Kuril Island occupation and the prisoners that they held at that time still and were returning gradually to Japan.

There were, as I recall, a couple of warnings about Soviet ships coming in and leaving books and materials and that sort of thing, but heavens, I do not think that they were of any major concern to us.

Q: The reason I asked that question was because at that time, I believe it was at that time, Paul Bethel was our person in Nagoya and at that point, in late '54 or early '55, there was a cultural festival of some sorts in Kanazawa.

According to Paul, the Soviets had decided to make a point of this and they had people, whether they were agents or whether they were using Japanese for this purpose, up there in force and were presenting cases which were pretty -- not too subtly -- a denigration of the U.S. position.

He called on Glenn Shaw, the Cultural Attaché who, of course, had lived almost a lifetime in Japan, to come up and according to Paul, and I was not present, Glenn got up and gave about a two-hour speech in which he virtually demolished the arguments that had been presented by. ...

ROSINUS: Whoever they were.

Q: Whoever they were, and he thought that was a great successful enterprise in the use of the cultural officer in political terms. So, I wondered if you had had any such experience, but evidently, you had not.

ROSINUS: No, not directly, but you mentioned one thing, of course, and that was the great advantage during this particular period when there really was an ideological Cold War going on in the Stalinist years, the advantage of the Soviets in having indigenous agents.

Much of this took place within the labor movement through infiltration by the communist party of Japan at that time, so obviously, yes, they did have their spokesmen around and that was what I was trying to combat with my seminars in international relations with the labor leaders and university people up there. But how does one measure it -- except that over the long run, of course, look at Japan today!

I guess you might say we all succeeded maybe too well.

1957: Transfer to Kyushu, Where the USIS Target Was the Marxist-Influenced Economic and Political Science Faculties at Kyushu University

Which brings me to the point in Kyushu, because in Kyushu there is Kyudai University, one of the great imperial universities of Japan, and my concern there was that Marxism, theoretical Marxism, had such a hold on the economics faculty particularly and in part on the political faculty, in large measure because they were simply out of touch with what was going on around them and Marxist theory was a very appealing construct and concept. It provided the intellectual with what he needs, a "weltanschauung" that hangs together.

So we thought that in Kyushu, it might be a good idea if we could cooperate with another element of our government, namely the productivity program of AID, which was at that time seeking to develop Japan's economic productivity and which resulted in the creation of regional productivity councils, as you recall, composed primarily of businessmen, some union leaders and local entrepreneurs.

Our aim was to encourage that council, the Kyushu Productivity Council, to pay much closer attention to the integration in its programs of both labor and university elements, so that they in turn would become exposed to the realities of Japan's economic future and economic problems and in that process wean them away a bit more from their theoretical and unrealistic Marxist predispositions.

Q: Now, this productivity program was one of the principle thrusts as I recall of the AID or whatever it was then called.

ROSINUS: Right.

Q: Of the AID program under Chief Meyer. ...

ROSINUS: That is right, and I think we did have some success in that. I remember still the name of the chairman of the productivity council, Mr. Chikami, and we worked very closely with him and I think the council did try to reach out into university and labor circles, and, therefore, to try to set up a kind of labor-business-university cooperation that was at that time so typical of the United States and which was one of the reasons, of course, for our economic success up to that period.

Beyond that, we ran the usual program in Kyushu, again with a heavy policy thrust in terms of the explication of American policies and with a broad cultural credibility-building base, if you will, including many cultural performances that were particularly popular in Japan at that time, as examples of the American culture in which they had such an intense interest still in those early years. It was the place of our first meeting with Eugene Istomin and with Rise Stevens and with Jan Pierce, for example, the beginning of a long line of contact with such luminaries as Leonard Bernstein, Andre Watts, Zubin Mehta and the like.

Q: Of course we also had going in Tokyo our radio program which was placing a lot of programs in the radio stations around Japan and Leon Picon was in the midst of producing his. ...

ROSINUS: That is right.

Q: ... .book translation program. To what extent did you have contact with them, in assistance to them and. ...

ROSINUS: Very direct, of course. I traveled a lot throughout Kyushu and every time that we took off, we would visit the radio stations, the editors, you know, the usual USIS route, and the universities and labor centers and so forth and leave materials and pay attention to the book translation and presentation program in particular.

Presentation was a large measure of our activity at that time, including presentations within the university and, of course, there was a regular placement of the radio programs as well.

On this Marxist aspect, I do recall one particular contact with a delightful gentlemen who himself was a professor of economics at Kyushu University, a highly recognized and respected one, by the name of Masao Takahashi. Naturally Mr. Takahashi had very close contacts with Sohyo, the Japanese labor federation, as an advisor as well as with the Japanese Socialist Party. I paid particular attention to working with him on a very personal level, having many interesting discussions about the nature of Marxist

economics and politics as against our own perceptions and he, I was under the impression also, modified his views over time on some of these issues. We also sent him on a very successful leader grant visit to the U.S.

So, again, my faith in rational discourse was somewhat sustained by this experience.

Q: And by personal contact.

ROSINUS: And by personal contact. This was illustrated very vigorously much later in my career when I went to the Philippines, but we will get to that soon.

Q: So do you have any further comments that you want to make with reference to your tour either in Niigata or in Fukuoka?

ROSINUS: Only that they were wonderful years to be in Japan.

Q: Precisely, what were the years that you were in Fukuoka?

ROSINUS: Fifty-seven to fifty-nine; fifty-four to fifty-seven in Niigata. These were years when Japan was still Japan, as you well remember; when such things as Japanese inns were still available to us all as we traveled throughout the country and they simply invoked an intense interest in Japanese history and culture, which is in itself so extremely colorful and marvelous. It was a great experience.

Q: It was a wonderful period, all right, before Japan became so superficially, at least, western. ...

ROSINUS: Correct.

Q: But a lot of that has gone by the board.

ROSINUS: Correct. I went back again a couple of times since then, and I was struck, of course, with this in 1980 when I did a series of talks for CINCPAC in seven Japanese cities.

Q: When you were there, were you able to get up to the North Coast of Japan along the Japan Sea?

ROSINUS: Yes, Niigata, of course, was on the Japan Sea. I went off across to Sado Island, also, which is a famous old cultural island with its old dance forms and so forth.

Q: It has the Sado drums.

ROSINUS: And the Sado okesa, that famous dance. Also up to Akita. I did not get to Hokkaido on that tour, but I did then in 1980 when I spoke in Sapporo on U.S. security policies, but that is another chapter.

Q: What prompted my question was that I think if anywhere, the old Japan is probably still partially represented on the North Coast and on up through the northern part of Kyushu where much of Japan today still looks a bit like I remember it fifty years ago when I first went there; and I have one more comment. ...

ROSINUS: The northern part of Kyushu, you mean, Kyushu or Honshu?

Q: I mean Honshu.

ROSINUS: Because Kyushu is a wonderful island with all of the hot springs and, you know, Nagasaki, fantastic.

Q: Just one comment about your talk regarding the orientation of the faculties of many of the universities toward Marxism. That was interestingly enough a great feature in prewar Japan, when I was there in '38 just for the summer with the Japan-American Student Conference.

I found that there were many students of Marxist persuasion and they were of Marxist persuasion because there was a very strong element in the faculties of the universities at that time. ...

ROSINUS: Exactly.

Q: Having been isolated even then from the. ...

ROSINUS: West, right.

Q: Marxism simply fermented within the universities and I think it took practically a decade or more after the war. ...

ROSINUS: To wear down.

Q: It gradually wore out.

ROSINUS: Yes, that is right, and, of course, I spoke of the productivity council, but obviously, we did much more broad scale work within the universities as a whole, you know, through the American participant's programs, getting in speakers, economists, and discussion leaders, through book presentation, through the use of the Cultural Center libraries doing whatever we could to expose these faculties, particularly the younger faculties, to non-Marxist economic thought and political thought, but it was again a political focus that I brought with me through my own inclinations and my own

deliberations on what the role of public diplomacy should be as an essential element of American diplomacy as a whole.

Q: Well, if you have no further comments at this point on the Japanese, why don't we go on to your next. ...

1959: Transfer to Germany -- Koblenz first, then Bonn

ROSINUS: Then we went to Germany. We went to Koblenz first.

Q: This was in 1959.

ROSINUS: 1959. Again this time to direct the America House, as it was called, an information cultural center in the city of Koblenz and subsequently, in 1962, to assume as Cultural Affairs officer in Bonn at the Embassy to assume responsibility for the program content and direction of all the America Houses in Germany at that time.

Once again, I would say I carried this political thrust with me into Germany to fit that particular situation. Germany, at that time, in 1959 was moving toward NATO-was into NATO involvement and NATO membership, moving out of its post-war occupation period and, of course, trying to find its psychological way out of the morass of World War II and Nazism.

Special Work at Koblenz with German Military Leadership School

In Koblenz, it so happened, we had a unique opportunity to work with the German military because Koblenz had what was called the School for Inner Leadership for want of a better translation. This really meant a school for the psychological preparation of officers who were going to lead the new German military which was to be a part, of course, of the NATO alliance.

That school was very much concerned with matters democratic and historical and political/psychological, so it was a very natural wedding. By establishing relationships with their commanding general, who was General DeMaiziere, who subsequently became the number one officer in the German armed forces and the Inspector General of those forces and who himself was a splendid and very untainted individual, we were able to do a lot of work again with our resources, be it books or films or speakers and personal contact and discussions with the future officer corps of the German military, of the German forces.

That was satisfying work. Again, the unions were important, German unions had always been important. They were, of course, social democrats by tradition. Communism was not an issue, but social democrats tended to look a little more askance at times at the growing alliance with the United States, with the capitalist United States, than others, so we continued to work with union groups there as well.

In effect, I guess you might say in Germany and, again, particularly later, I will demonstrate this in the Philippines, USIS public affairs officers have a particular contribution to make to American diplomacy in their ability to work effectively very often with important opposition groups within a country, more difficult for other embassy representatives to achieve for obvious reasons.

Work With Social Democratic Party

This was particularly important, as I say, subsequently in the Philippines, but again, in Germany by working with people like the labor people, the Social Democratic Party at a time that Adenauer seemed to be the eternal leader of the country, but subsequently gave way to Social Democratic leadership.

I think that helped prepare, again, on a modest scale, a generation of future leaders to look with more tempered mien at the United States and its intentions and its policies.

Working on the principle that a good public affairs officer must be a substantive exponent on American society in policies, I also became personally very active as a speaker on NATO topics, on the whole concept of integration of forces and of the raison d'etre for the Atlantic Alliance and traveled a good deal around the country, particularly once I was in Bonn, as a participant in seminars and so forth, which subsequently led to publication of such talks, so I hope that perhaps there was some personal contribution there on these political issues.

Speaking Before College Audiences on NATO Issues in Tandem with Embassy Economics Officer

I often worked in tandem with an economic officer at the embassy, Emmerson Brown. I would give the political side of the NATO integration aspects and he would give the economics side of the Atlantic relationship and that made for an interesting dual presentation to a variety of seminars, particularly this time to teachers and younger intellectuals in Germany.

They, too, were an important audience group because they, of course, were the ones who had to struggle most with the sins of their fathers and how they were going to present this to their students over time. This whole aspect, therefore, which links to my view of USIS' role in projecting the virtues of the open society and of democratic societies, became an important aspect, an important political aspect in the development of programs in Germany.

Q: Some of the things you said prompt two or three questions. This seems to be a good point to bring them up. First is a rather trivial one, but, of course, German was your native language.

ROSINUS: Yes.

Q: When you went back to Germany, did you find that you had a little difficulty in bringing it up to date?

ROSINUS: I would say that within six months, I was on my way with fair fluency and by the time I returned for my first home leave, which was after my first two years in Germany, I tested bilingual and have ever since been on a bilingual level.

Q: So, you had the advantage of being able to deliver your talks in German?

ROSINUS: Absolutely, everything, and to discuss -- more important, to discuss in German.

Q: Another rather trivial question, but since you were again oriented toward the labor movement to some extent, did you ever come in contact. ...

ROSINUS: And military, as I mentioned, which was very important.

Q: Did you ever come in contact with a gentleman who apparently was fairly prominent in the labor movement by the name of Stephen Thomas?

ROSINUS: For some reason, I think I did and I cannot remember where that might have been. How did you remember him?

Q: The reason is that I was supposed to have gone to Germany in 1964, got sidetracked because the ambassador at the last minute after I finished my German language training decided that he wanted to have Al Hemsing.

ROSINUS: Hemsing came down from Berlin, yes, right. This was Ambassador McGhee?

Q: Yes, this was McGhee. So, I didn't go, but in the expectation that I was going, Stephen Thomas for some reason or another came to the United States on some kind of international labor conference. He had been tipped off to look me up because I was supposed to be the next PAO.

ROSINUS: Right.

Q: We established quite a. ...

ROSINUS: Good relationship.

Q: Probably a good relationship and he was subsequently in the states two other times, both of them just before I discovered that I was not going to Germany. When I didn't go, we lost our contact and I never followed it up. He was a delightful person. He was a

strong labor man and I had looked forward to cultivating him as one of my beginning contacts to help me out in Germany.

ROSINUS: Now I do remember the name and, of course, one other thing is to be said about the German labor movement. As Social Democrats, they were, of course, in the vanguard of anti-communism, you know, because they had had direct experience combating the communists within their own ranks for so many years in the pre-Nazi era.

So, it was not the same problem of communist infiltration or influence that we might have found early on in Japan.

Q*: On the other hand, I think you can find that the labor movement was more oriented toward the Social Democrats than towards the more conservative*.

ROSINUS: Oh, absolutely, yes, always. They were Social Democrats.

Q: I think he was an officer in. ...

ROSINUS: I am sure he was -- SDP, I am sure he was, Social Democratic Party, right.

Q: Another question that is raised by your comments, you said that you were able to deal quite extensively with officers -- I won't call it indoctrination, but. ...

ROSINUS: That's basically what it was, yes, right.

Q: But it's training. Did you feel-let me back up a minute. I am afraid that many of us discover or at least feel that in the American military we don't have as a general rule a large number of officers at the really intellectual level where you find, say, college professors or that sort of. ...

ROSINUS: Right.

Q: They are not oriented that way. They are a little more oriented toward the direct military. ...

ROSINUS: Sure.

Q: Consequently, they are more difficult to deal with at that level. Did you find that among the German military officers there was a higher degree of what I will call intellectualism or intellectual awareness, perhaps, than you would find among a similar group of officers in the American army or military in general?

ROSINUS: Not a lot more, I would say, Lew, if at all. DeMaiziere was himself an exception. He was a fine pianist. He had come from an unusually gifted family and so forth. As I recall looking back on discussions with the officer group and talks to the

group, I think the response was pretty much at the levels that I experienced subsequently in many other military commands around the world, particularly when I was working with Commander-in-Chief Pacific and I was going to say, within the National War College, which I attended, of course, in '68.

Although, I think these being a group of chosen individuals, they tended to be maybe a notch above the norm. So, I would say the level of interest, the level of comprehension was not significantly different in the German officer corps, but they had -- they were much more focused because they had to be.

They were starting out, they were under the gun, so to speak. They had to prove themselves, as divorcing themselves completely from the Nazi tradition while retaining the best elements of the Wehrmacht tradition and fitting into a democratic society that they had never known before, so that was a fascinating era in terms of German development and one that was fun to work with.

Attitude of Germans Much More Pro-American in Early 1960s Than Today

Q: One final question that was raised in connection with your work among the student groups and presumably with the. ...

ROSINUS: Students and teachers and intellectuals.

Q: Did you find any tendency at all toward a Marxist viewpoint at that time and secondly, did you find anything of the attitude, which is unfortunately now apparently growing substantially in Germany, of a suspicion of an anti-American attitude among the intelligentsia and among the student population?

ROSINUS: No. At that time, I think Germans were predisposed to like America and, basically, its leadership. Kennedy, for example, was a magical figure in Germany as well among the young people. I still recall the night of his death, we were in Bonn, I spoke to a number of groups who subsequently commemorated the Kennedy death.

It was as if we were in the United States. They were burning candles and, you know, that sort of thing, and I represented the embassy at some of these events. So no, I did not find that predisposition. That is a predisposition that in part is natural through long relationships, the one that has grown today and, in part, I fear has been caused by some very dubious international behavior and policies on the part of the United States which I will come to at some other point of our discussion because it bothers me to have had to speak to and defend such things, not defend them, but at least to explain them.

Q: Never having served in Germany, I only visited there sporadically, but I read a good deal about it and I get the impression that perhaps the font of a great deal of this anti-Americanism that has arisen in the last decade and a half was in West Berlin and seems to have first been manifested in open form in that area.

Is that a misimpression on my part, do you think?

ROSINUS: No, it is not entirely. It started in West Berlin in a sense that it came into West Berlin by virtue of convenience, and I will tell you why. West Berlin-anyone who lives in West Berlin is exempt from German military service, therefore, by definition, those youthful elements that oppose the established order went to Berlin and then in Berlin, they began to cause problems of sorts and then expanded outward from Berlin again, like the Greens, for example.

Berlin, in a sense, did not generate the problem. They received it and then passed it back again because, as I will mention when we get to Berlin or as we might emphasize when we get to Berlin, the Berliners are very closely tied to the United States by virtue of post-war history and even in emotion still today. I think the last thing they would wish to see in the great majority, and that includes both the SPD and the Christian Democrats, would be a disappearance of the American presence from Berlin. But these youthful elements, yes, they gathered there and then from there were able to propagate their faith as well to other places.

Q: One final question, were you in Germany at the time of the erection of the Berlin Wall or did that come shortly before your arrival?

ROSINUS: Let me see.

Q: That was in '61.

ROSINUS: Sixty-one, was it not August 13th? Yes, I was there; yes, I was there. I was in Bonn, however, and then subsequently, as a matter of fact, I recall visiting Berlin in, I think, it was '63, well after the wall had been established, visiting East Berlin as well at that time.
Yes, I do remember that very well.

Q: You were in Bonn, not in. ...

ROSINUS: I was in Bonn and not in Berlin at that time, exactly.

Attempt to Refute Growing German Tendency to Blame Roosevelt and Yalta Agreement for Division of Germany

Q: Is there anything further that you would like to comment on now with reference to your period both in the America House and then also in Bonn?

ROSINUS: There was one more interesting thematic pursuit in which I engaged during that time in a substantive way because I was concerned by something. I was concerned by a tendency at that time of some German segments to look back at the Yalta Agreement

and to think of it in terms of a betrayal, somehow, or as a cause, let's say, of the division of Germany.

That reminded me all too uncomfortably of what you may recall was called the "Stab in the Back," a legend that Mr. Hitler attributed to events after World War I and so, I sort of set out on a one-man crusade for a time to try to put Yalta into the perspective in which it deserves to be put, namely that it had nothing to do with the division of Europe in any ultimate sense. As a matter of fact, it was an attempt to save what could have been saved through some supervised elections in an Eastern Europe that had already been overrun by Soviet armies in the wake of Hitler's aggression against the Soviet Union. So this is where the problem lay, not in some agreements made after the fact in Yalta at that time, or in Potsdam thereafter. Stalin, of course, subverted the Yalta Agreements.

So, I sort of set out to try to kill this potential "Stab in the Back" legend for World War II. I worked very closely, for example, with some scholars in Germany who were writing on international affairs at that time and publishing books on international affairs and I think, perhaps, a little bit of that -- I know that some of that content went into their works.

Interim in Agency's European Area and Inspection Corps

Q: Well, let's leave Germany for the time being and move on. Your next assignment was. ...

ROSINUS: Then we came back to the United States and for a year or so, I was in the European area working on about ten different countries, as was our wont at that time: United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Malta, of all places.

It gave me a chance to do a little additional traveling to some of these places. Then, I joined the inspection corps and spent about six weeks in Brazil, which was a fascinating exposure to Latin America and, thereafter, went to the National War College which was, of course, a truly fascinating year.

Rosinus' Attempt Both at National War College and in Other Assignments to Promote Public Affairs as Integral Part of Diplomacy

Q: Then, from the National War College, you went to the Philippines.

ROSINUS: Correct. Now, the National War College was an interesting year because, as I have said before, I was always involved in conceptualizing USIA and its role and the role of its officers and what makes a good PAO, how should the agency be organized in terms of the functions available to it, always pulling very hard to get CU out of State, for example, and make it an integral part of this dimension of diplomacy.

At the National War College, I did my paper on the subject of "Public Affairs: A Dimension of Diplomacy." That was the research paper that we all did at the college and it was subsequently published in the college magazine and, perhaps, helped a little bit to sensitize others to USIA's standing problem of finding itself and its role and its definition.

We have wasted a tremendous amount of time and energy, as you know, debating such silly questions as to whether we should be hard or soft, whether we should be informational or cultural or whether the Voice of America can be objective while being an arm of the U.S. Government, whether we should be in the Department of State, you know, all of these things.

I find it dreadful that we have wasted so much energy on it, but having had the questions arise so frequently, I was always ready to jump in with my own views of them and I spent a great deal of time putting on paper these kinds of thoughts.

Q: Unfortunately, they are no less debated today.

ROSINUS: I know. We were talking about my interest in defining the role and mission and purposes of USIA. I have pulled out for this exercise of ours a series of papers that I had prepared over the years, that I had sent to senators and congressmen and God knows who else to try to support the concept of public affairs as an integral part of diplomacy and public affairs as of necessity integrating a variety of functions.

It might be interesting just to go over some of the commentaries in part as they evolved over the years. For example, here in 1974, a critique I sent to Congress of what was in the Stanton Commission's recommendations for, as I recall, sort of chopping up USIA even more than it was at that time.

At the time, we still did not have CU in our quiver. I was trying to make the point that the separation of what some call hard political programming from soft programs concerning American society is ultimately a self-defeating idea: "The essential point is that neither fast media information, nor direct political or foreign policy projections by a government agency will carry the desired credibility unless the ground for their acceptance has been prepared through concurrent exposure of the intended audiences to American culture and civilization.

"The exchange program is thus an integral part of the total public affairs impact and it is, of course, administered as such overseas by USIS officers and always has been."

The other concept, that USIA is engaged in propaganda, has always struck me as a dangerously false way of putting things. "We are not engaged in propaganda or even, as too many of our people, say in communication. We are engaged in and use the facilities of communication to engage in foreign affairs, and, therefore, must be an integral part of the Foreign Service of the United States, which by its very name does not restrict membership to those who come from the Department of State."

Public affairs -- I saw it in early years and still do today as being as much an "integral dimension of diplomacy as the political, military, and economic categories; and quite often, the public affairs presence can be the most strategic in terms of a given U.S. foreign policy position. For example, in Berlin, RIAS, the Radio in the American Sector, is considered by the Berliners to be as important a presence in terms of the political and psychological security of the city as the men of the U.S. Berlin Brigade.

"Also, our element of diplomacy deals not only with the government to which we are accredited, but equally important, it deals with sectors often more important ultimately to our foreign policy goals than an administration that may be currently in power.

"I speak, of course, of the political opposition in the widest sense, of the media in an age of incredible communications impact, of the universities where the future, after all, does lie and of the creative and intellectual communities that set so much the tone and agenda of society.

"So, if we are operating as we should be, that is, in honest dialogue with our critics as well as with our friends, we hope to hold open the channels of communication that can bridge radical changes of government. In our cultural and information centers, we offer a presence that is often of great political and psychological moment to both our friends and opponents.

"Such an institutional presence, representing in microcosm a free society is surely important to our own ultimate national security which lies, it seems to me, above all in helping to preserve a pluralistic world where the open societies well outnumber or at least outdistance the closed.

"We can also, through a medium such as the Voice of America and through field officer contacts build credibilities and channels of communication that in a moment of crisis, bilateral or multilateral, can help to prevent the ascent of irrationality.

"In brief, we smooth the ways of international relations and if that is not the essence of diplomacy, then I should like to ask what is."

Again, in a later presentation in the Foreign Service Journal in 1977, I came to grips with a few other of what I call fallacies that were being propagated about USIA and its purposes, even by our own people, unfortunately:

"I will begin by recapitulating my thesis that the ultimate national security of the United States is dependent on a pluralistic world with as many non-ideology driven open societies as possible; that the furtherance of this kind of world is, therefore, an essential requirement of American diplomacy; and that this public affairs dimension of our diplomacy must thus be dedicated to the projection of our open society, the policies that

flow from it and the maintenance and development of all possible international channels of communication, public and private.

"Finally, the effective pursuit of these objectives requires a fully integrated use of all public affairs tools and elements available to the government in a mutually reinforcing way." Particularly, of course, at that point, we were still wishing to include CU in what was then USIA. Fortunately, it has now been included.

Again, I challenged the claim that we were a communication agency and we even took the name for a time, as you remember, USICA. In fact, we are a foreign affairs agency that utilizes cross-cultural communication in the service of American diplomacy, Even more mischievous is the description of USIA as "a propaganda arm of the U.S. Government," reinforced recently by a book that carried the title of USIA and American Propaganda Abroad."

If propaganda still carried the pristine sense of advocacy through information that it once carried, then, perhaps, that word could be used. But I fear that our century has completely destroyed the meaning of that word and has put it into the service of falsification, usually for nefarious ends; and we simply cannot be capable of propaganda in that accepted sense because we are the most observed and dissected society on earth.

At every overseas post, the very interaction of the major public affairs components properly utilized under PAO management demands truthfulness and enhance credibility. The media services present a picture of a policy, the cultural and information centers offer a chance for diverse readings and dialogue, the exchanges program allows direct observation. That mix can never stray long from as objective a presentation as we are capable of giving. This mutual reinforcement of accuracy and integrity is precisely why none of the elements should stand alone.

Journalism -- and Journalists -- Are Not Trained or Designed to Project American Society and Policies to Foreign Audiences

Another fallacy we have too readily accepted is that journalism or journalists, the media people, are our most natural source of personnel and ideas. I would suggest that American journalists are not trained and the domestic media are not designed to project American society and policies in cross-cultural settings. Quite the opposite, they report from abroad or within what is going on and are thus more fit perhaps to be political reporting officers than public affairs officers.

So, my feeling has always been that the requirement for an effective PAO is not a background in journalism or media experience, but rather, basically, a broad liberal arts education, an interest in the social sciences, literature and the arts, a sense of history, a sense of human limitations, a personal sense -- perhaps a tested personal sense -- of the meaning of America and, of course, communicative personality skills that go with both personal contact and effective management and so forth.

Information and Cultural Programs Are Inseparable Parts of a Total Public Diplomacy Effort

Another aspect that has been unhappily and all too often thrown about by our own people, as we said before, is that information and cultural programs are either separate or separable. Again, they cannot be. That takes me back to something that we did in the Philippines, to which I'll come back a little later, that showed the integration of these elements in a way, and with a political aim, that I think illustrates why one should never separate the informational and cultural arms in any real way.

Argument Against Separation of VOA from USIA

Another periodic proposal from within and without our agency, that VOA should somehow be taken out of USIA in order to give it some kind of pristine purity, I think is barking up the wrong tree. I think we require a steady international voice that is directly related to our diplomacy, a radio and now a television voice, and that is the function that VOA should fulfill -- to say nothing of its vital role as the American government's voice in a time of crisis.

In a society as reported on as ours and as observed as ours, we most surely do not need an officially sponsored radio that simply adds to the unofficial babble of voices. I think we need a meaningful effort, as an integral part of our diplomacy, to keep in perspective the openness of our society, its policies, the rationale behind them and, yes, the discussion and critique that surrounds them. That should not test anyone's moral principles, nor cause anyone to be ashamed, it seems to me, to be a member of the Voice as a journalist. There is no compunction to defend, I think, or even less to sell U.S. policies to all comers but, rather, a need to present them clearly, to provide, as necessary, the historical or contemporary setting from which they flow, to illustrate that they derive from a variety of considerations, are often tempered by the contest of interests within a democracy but do not emerge from willfulness or evil intent (at least not most of the time!).

Credibility does not lie, therefore, in a disassociation from the U.S. Government. It does lie in the steady application of standards of accuracy and balance by all the interacting tools of public diplomacy.

These were some of the things that I was particularly concerned with during the War College years, as I say, and then again in the '70s as some of these suggestions for splitting the agency apart in one way or another and the arguments -- what I felt to be silly arguments -- within our own group about emphasis on soft or hard, cultural or informational, came to the fore.

1968-'73: The Philippine Experience:
1968: Melding Cultural and Informational Efforts

That brings me or brings us, I should say, to the Philippine experience, in the sense that I earlier referred to a major program we launched in the Philippines as having shown the soundness, I think, of the integration of all the elements of public diplomacy. But let me back up a minute before going to that to mention the major thrust in the Philippines and the setting in the Philippines when we got there. I went first as CAO and then ended as Deputy Country PAO.

We encountered a Philippines in 1968 that was increasingly and stridently anti-American, particularly among the university students, the younger university professors -- the intelligentsia, if you will. The barricades were going up, the street demonstrations were taking place, the media also, of course, was affected. A lot of misinformation about the American presence, about the economic history of the Laurel-Langley agreement, about foreign investment, about military jurisdiction, a lot of feeding of emotional fires.

We sat down and asked ourselves what might be the best approach. Again, we came to the idea that we were going to try to speak directly to the issues through a cultural program, a cultural/informational program. We created what was called the National Student Leaders Seminar.

A: The Tagaytai Seminar

In brief, it was called the Tagaytai Seminar because it took place in a very lovely, scenic setting above a volcanic lake so named. What we did was to go around the Philippines and gather from all of the leading universities key student leaders, particularly student leaders who had been in the vanguard of some of the anti-Americanism, and asked them to come up for five days to Tagaytai. For five days, we had a live-in seminar, from morn to night -- and often well into the night!

We asked them to come up and spend five days with us. We thought the best thing to do would be to try to inject elements of fact and rationality into what had become an extremely emotional, anti-American setting.

We called upon both American and Philippine resources to lead discussions, mornings and afternoons, with fun in the evenings, on a wide variety of political, economic and sociological subjects grouped under such topics as "The Complexities of Change", "Agenda for the '70s", "Youth and National Progress", "Reflections on the Realities of Change", "Development in the '70s".

These young people were interested in the development of their own country and the development of their own identity. We tried to expose them to the fact that these things were not being blocked by the United States, that there was a history of relationships that had certain facts and legacies, and that there was a history of military bases that had certain facts involved in it and that had certain tradeoffs if they were going to try to get rid of them, if they were going to get rid of them.

There were tradeoffs in foreign investment, if they were going to try to shut it out and what the penalties would be; that there were internal problems in the process of development, in the process of policy formulation that could not simply be ignored by shouting slogans on the barricades.

We tried to expose them, in other words, to the aspects that these titles indicate, to the realities of foreign affairs, of U.S.-Philippine history and relations and of national developmental problems. Yes?

Q: Now, these four booklets that you have here, these paperbacks, are they a reportage on the conference subject matter or are they booklets that were prepared as preparation for or as a result of those conferences?

ROSINUS: These are booklets that contain all the presentations by the speakers at these conferences as well as student questions and discussions. We were able to enlist in the Philippines, because we had superb contact at all levels of Philippine society, from President Marcos on down-in retrospect, a name that raises other problems, but nonetheless, he was the head of the country.

Q: He was somewhat of a different character in the earlier years, too.

ROSINUS: Exactly. He was, up until martial law and the subsequent years following that.

We were able to gather all kinds of interesting people from the universities and from government, ministers of government, leading professors, political and civic leaders, developmental specialists, the leading population specialist in the Philippines, for example -- incidentally, Marshall Greene, then Assistant Secretary for Asia, I believe, used to get a great kick out of her name, her name was Mercedes Concepcion. Marshall used to get a kick out of the fact that here was the leading Planned Parenthood expert in the Philippines who was addressed as "Miss Concepcion".

Q: We had a specialist on family control and planned parenthood whose name was Philander Claxton.

ROSINUS: I'll be damned. There you go. The two of them could have easily gotten together, right?!

At any rate, these seminars became really high-powered things to which, year after year, the student leaders were eager to come. They started suspiciously in the first year. As a matter of fact, we were told after the first seminar that one student had brought a disassembled rifle in his bag because he was convinced that the CIA, which was one of the bugaboos of Philippine nationalism, that the CIA was going to swoop down on these poor students and do something dreadful to them.

Well, this turned out to be a really fascinating series. The booklets you are talking about contained the presentations by both Filipino and American speakers, and there is a great variety -- the whole political spectrum is represented here, from nationalists to internationalists, from leftists to conservatives, all exposed to discussions with these students.

They were assembled in these booklets. These booklets became a very important part of this totality of public affairs approaches that I mentioned to you before in terms of the total impact of this project. There were, during my time, five of these seminars and booklets, from '69 to '73.

The program was continued after martial law, but it soon shifted its focus because, for obvious reasons, the student disquiet and intellectual disquiet had been severely dampened by the imposition of martial law, so there was no way of really gathering that force again for further discussions.

B: The Lasting and Wide-Spread Influence of This Seminar

Q: Let me ask you, once these books were compiled and published, what kind of a distribution system did you have to get these out, and how widely were they bought and used in the Philippines?

ROSINUS: These books were issued in 25,000 copies each year. They went, of course, to all of the participants in multi-copies to enable them to provide them to their friends. It became a matter of honor to have been chosen for the Tagaytai Seminar as time went by because this recognized their student leadership.

They went out to all the students, to all those who had participated, to all the speakers, to all libraries, all universities and media in the country because we had an extensive list, of course, for our magazine distribution. We had the *Free World* magazine in the Philippines, we culled that list. We know, for example, that the booklets achieved wide classroom use throughout the Philippines.

It went to all the developmental institutions because the subject dealt so much with the political and economic development of the Philippines and the historic and potential U.S. role in it.

It went also overseas. I recall in 1980, during a speaking tour for CINCPAC in Southeast Asia, going through the Southeast Asia Studies Institute of the University of Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur. The director took me through the library and as I was ambling through the library what should strike my eye but five copies of the Tagaytai Seminar booklets sitting up there on the shelf and having been pretty thoroughly thumbed through apparently by non-Filipinos.

Q: Did it also have a bookstore distribution?

ROSINUS: It had a free bookstore distribution. We were not able to go into the selling business, although we had requests from the leading publisher in the Philippines, could he please publish it and sell it. At that point, for some reason, we were unable to do so. I don't recall what the legal problem was.

Q: Turned down by the headquarters in Washington, I presume.

ROSINUS: I think it was, as I recall, for some legal copyright or god knows what reason this was done, but at any rate, they got a very extensive distribution. These seminars were wonderful for those of us who stayed with the young people and their intellectual compatriots during those five years because it certainly steeped us in Philippine thought and Philippine problems.

All you have to do is look through the Table of Contents of these booklets and you see the sort of stuff that is dealt with, everything from U.S.-Philippine military relations through constitutional convention problems and social forces and reform population problems, foreign policies for the '70s in the Philippines and just the whole -- across the board.

Q: Who initially was the instigator of this -- whose idea was it?

ROSINUS: That was my -- my instigation was to set up such a seminar and, of course, my staff at that time particularly Jack Crockett, who was in the Philippines for many years, was extremely helpful in helping to formulate some of the thoughts.

Q: You were the one that organized this thing and established it in the first instance?

ROSINUS: Yes, in this fashion. There had been a student leader seminar a couple years before that had dealt with building democracy or something of that sort -- a more theoretical, somewhat more cultural concept.

Q: Was that the citizen's education project?

ROSINUS: I don't know whether it was part of that.

Q: I have the feeling it was because that was something that was instigated by Earl Wilson and it had sort of an up and down ride. Finally, he was unable to persuade enough people of its value so that after one very excellent trial in Korea, it sort of fell by the wayside.

ROSINUS: I see. Well, this was a project that Ed Mattos had put together as cultural officer in the Philippines a few years before I came and, as I say, it had brought students together to deal with such questions as democratic growth and development and things of that sort.

So, we took the idea of putting student leaders together and then we determined how these students could best be selected and put together in a much longer seminar setting and then we reformulated the whole approach in terms of what the subject matter should be and the nature of the speakers and so forth and moved on into this seminar series.

It did demonstrate the unity of public affairs approaches, I thought very well, and here is where I quote again from this point I made earlier about the fallacy that information and cultural programs are separate and separable. I wrote at that time that an actual field example could perhaps best illuminate this fallacy:

"The recent (1977) Leonard Marx Foundation Award for creative communication in public diplomacy was given for a project toward Philippine student leaders during a time of rising anti-American sentiment and challenge to the American presence.

"It was a project that ultimately had impact far wider than the students involved and reached even onto the floor of the Philippine constitutional convention. [We can talk about that a little after I finish this little quote.]

"Essentially the project was a five-day seminar, that is, a cultural/academic framework. Within the seminar, the discussions centered on developmental policies and on U.S.-Philippine relations, which was an informational exercise. After the seminar, selected student attendees were chosen for the Pacific Student Leader project, which was an exchange program activity. From the seminar came a series of publications distributed throughout the Philippine Islands and other places, which was a book and publications project.

"None of these elements in themselves could have had nearly the effect that the totality of the package did have, a fact that supports in microcosm the contention and experience of every good PAO for the last twenty years, that the sum of all public affairs tools applied in a meaningful fashion is greater than its parts; and that goes double for all the elements of USIA and State/CU, including the Voice of America."

So, that was a point I made subsequent to those seminars in a later writing. But to get back to the seminar, what were some of the impacts? Well, for one thing, there were clear and identifiable changes of mind among a significant number of the student leaders away from emotional radicalism and, interestingly enough, many of them ended up in important positions within their own society, dealing with some of the realities and complexities they had come to appreciate during the seminars.

Many went into opposition during martial law and remained in opposition, came out again with the new government. So, in a sense, our contacts in those days helped bridge the transference from the martial law regime with which we had been dealing to contact with the new government of Mrs. Aquino.

One of the guys, for example, who attended the seminar is now a senior advisor to the Foreign Minister. A number of the resource people whom we used at that time are now in government with Mrs. Aquino.

Others of the former students are involved in international affairs of various kinds; others are in banking and in economic institutions and in universities at high levels. Interestingly enough, they formed their own alumni group, having some pride in being Tagaytai graduates, which continued to bring them together and provided contact with the embassy.

When I went back in 1980 to the Philippines, some, eight years after the last seminar that I had led, some thirty or forty gathered for a special party again, as graduates of the seminar. All of it is to me a confirmation that there was some real intellectual and emotional impact through this integrated approach to public diplomacy.

The books, I am sure, have been well used throughout the Islands and beyond.

Q: They were all in English?

ROSINUS: These are almost all in English, some Tagalog, but of course, the Filipinos use English -- that is no problem at all -- in their university structure.

C: The Tagaytai Seminar Materials Widely Used in 1971-72 Effort to Draft a Philippine Constitution

I mentioned the constitutional convention. That was an important political evolution on which we had also focused at that time.

It was literally some "founding fathers" getting together in the Philippines to evolve a new constitution for the Republic. It was, of course, cut short by the imposition of martial law, but while it was going on in 1971, parts of '72, my office was very quietly but very much involved both by virtue of the fact that many of the delegates to the convention had also been resource people for us at the seminars and by virtue of the booklets having been in their hands, and by virtue of contacts made with them in other ways, particularly the American Studies Seminars, which we had also given a political direction that had relevance to their constitutional concerns.

We became very much involved in providing information of both a policy nature and a political nature in terms of constitutional language and experience in America, how was this framed and how was that framed and feeding facts in on the U.S.-Philippine relationship that, I think, visibly helped in the framing of their own language, proposed language for constitutional changes, to avoid some of the more extreme language that might have been inserted had we not been in such close touch with each other about, you know, nationalism, the thrust of nationalism, lets say, on military base relations or

military base sovereignty or military base jurisdiction, language about foreign investment; that sort of thing.

There could have been, I think, probably much more radical formulations had we not been in such close contact with one another. Our political section of the embassy realized this and was very complimentary about it and utilized our contacts extensively for their own purposes.

Q: Who was ambassador at that time?

ROSINUS: Henry Byroade was there at that time, just before William Sullivan came. Sullivan came after martial law and just before I left. G. Mennen Williams had been my first ambassador, former governor of Michigan, great guy to work with, very pleasant person.

Q: Who was the PAO?

ROSINUS: Hank Miller was originally the PAO and let's see, Les Squires, with whom I worked as deputy. So, those were interesting years, but they were brought to a screaming halt by the martial law imposition. But I think the legacy lingered and, as I say, those people who worked with us in those days from the radical spectrum of the student movement are now, under this new regime, once again politically and economically active in much more responsible ways.

Q*: I think that is one of the best illustrations of the joint contribution of cultural activities, intellectual activities and the informational activities into a single integrated program.*

ROSINUS: You just cannot separate them.

Q: I agree that too often it has been thought the posts should be separate. I don't agree with it myself, but anyway, we have talked enough, I guess, on that particular front. Do you have anything else that you wanted to say now about your years in the Philippines, any significance?

ROSINUS: In the Philippines, we had, of course, one great advantage as Americans. We could talk with almost anyone, even the most anti-American public exponents, because of the historic relationship, which they deemed to be special also, of course, and which was special even as they were trying to break away from it, and because of the great Philippine proclivity for personal contact.

They are a wonderfully gregarious people and put personal relationships above all else, I think, so that we were able to stay in touch with these most radical people, to get them to attend such seminars and, therefore, to provide some facts and some reason to dampen some of the emotional excesses of that time.

Q*: You said that you felt that these conferences did in a number of instances really change the attitude and mind of. ...*

ROSINUS: No question, yes, no question. We heard that from them. We saw it in their continued contact with us after they left the seminar and we heard it from the presidents of the universities who had sent them, who were thankful.

Q: It is very heartwarming.

ROSINUS: Yes.

Q: One of the cases in which you do see some result of your efforts.

ROSINUS: That exactly.

Q: Not all is invisible.

ROSINUS: Very invisible most of the time, but effective over the long run, which is why I think the concept of USIA's function as I previously described it, namely to project our open society and all its ways and then the policies that flow from it, is the only kind of permanent setting in which you can have faith that something over time will be promoted, namely openness and dialogue and information and rationality.

1973-77: Back to Germany -- This Time as PAO in West Berlin

Q: So, where do we go from here?

ROSINUS: From the Philippines, we went, of course, to fascinating experiences in West Berlin where I became PAO and Director of USIS in the U.S. Mission there-just shortly after what might be considered the formal end of the Cold War, namely the signing of the Berlin Agreement.

I say formal end of the Cold War in the sense that the Cold War really was about Germany and Berlin in the immediate post-war years. I think the talk about Cold War today is largely self-serving for our military-industrial-political complex, which all too often needs a threat of some kind to sustain its mutually profitable existence.

What we are engaged in today, I think, is normal state rivalry with the Soviet Union. So, in a historic sense, I think, perhaps, the Cold War began to end with that agreement if you define it as the competition in Central Europe and Germany particularly.

We arrived there just after that agreement had been signed. …

Berliners' Concern that Signing of Berlin Agreement (1973) Might Result in Diminishing U.S. Protection of the City

Q*: For the record, what date was that?*

ROSINUS: We arrived in late '73 and stayed till '77. The agreement had been concluded in '72, so what we found was a West Berlin which was a bit uneasy because they felt that now that the agreement had been signed, perhaps that protective American presence and that great American interest in Berlin as the very epitome of the confrontation between the closed and open societies, which it remains, of course, today, that somehow this American interest would wane; and that gave them fears and that gave us our public affairs cue that the important thing was to preserve in the Berliners' mind and to assure the Berliners that American interest had not waned, that American presence would not draw down significantly and that our interest in the city and its preservation as a bastian of freedom and openness certainly remained.

Main USIS Theme (1973-1977): To Convince Berliners of Continuing U.S. Resolve to Protect Berlin

So, we did spend our time for those four years in our naturally very extensive contacts throughout the city, from Governing Mayor on down and particularly in the press field, but also through a very active Cultural Center and seminars with students and teachers, particularly teachers again, kept this American commitment and presence as active as we could. So it was again a very strong policy and politically oriented kind of program that assured them in a great variety of ways that American policy and political interest remained high in Berlin's future and safety.

Q: That was the thrust of your public affairs. ...

ROSINUS: That was the main aim, right, that was the main aim. In addition, the Berlin PAO also had responsibility for supervising RIAS, the Radio in the American Sector. That, of course, as I mentioned before, was an integral part of the American presence, and, therefore, important to the West Berliners who listened to it a lot.

It was a damn good radio station, but we also, of course, broadcast to East Berlin and the GDR and so, in a sense, we had to reach from West Berlin, the open society, also into the closed society of East Germany, an activity that was also a part of our portfolio at that time.

The Green Week Fair

Another element of our presence, strangely enough, also had a political importance, although it would not seem to have on the face of it -- again, an illustration of the peculiar nature of public affairs activities in this singular city. This was Green Week, an agriculture fair, a wonderful fair, you know, where forty or fifty countries from around the

world participated and exhibited their edible products and some half a million people ate their way through this fair for about ten days, a wonderful international smorgasbord, but the important thing was to have a U.S. presence.

It did not matter whether we were pushing hamburgers or bourbon or corn on the cob or whatever, what the commercial side of it was -- the important thing for the Berliners was that Americans were still there, along with all of the Europeans, some of the Latins, and some of the Middle Eastern countries.

So, even a fair had a political context in Berlin.

Q: You mentioned at the time of your presence there, USIS-Berlin had their own officers supervising RIAS.

ROSINUS: Right.

Q: Now, that corresponded with a time when we had moved fairly extensively from a almost hundred percent American financing operation into a point where probably --

ROSINUS: Ninety-six percent.

Q: Was actually German.

ROSINUS: German, right.

Q: With that, went a considerable amount of, really, a policy control because you have --

ROSINUS: Correct.

Q: This radio in German hands, in effect.

ROSINUS: Absolutely.

Q: You only had a couple of Americans there at that time.

Shift in RIAS Control from U.S. to Germany Produced Some Difficulties; Washington HQ Did Not Always Recognize Differences

ROSINUS: Two Americans there, right.

Q: At that time that you were running into difficulties because of differences of opinion as to what kind of program should be sponsored or should be run out of RIAS. To what extent did you feel that Washington, perhaps, did not fully understand why you had this degree of movement off to a more Germanized approach to programming than we had had before?

ROSINUS: You are absolutely right. When I say I supervised RIAS, I meant, of course, the American officers in RIAS, who in turn were there as policy advisors, really. We did have the ultimate control of RIAS, that is, we owned the transmitters. In the peculiar theology of Berlin, the U.S. military and the U.S. Mission exercised ultimate governance over the city, even though we had, of course, given it in fact to the Berlin Sehat and the Governing Mayor. But still, we retained the right to any final decisions if we had to impose them on the Berliners should that have been necessary.

By the same token, with RIAS, we could have, for example, turned the transmitters off, you see. Now, obviously, the political cost would have been great, and all that sort of stuff, and nobody even thought of doing such a thing.

Your question is one that engaged us at that time because there was some tendency for RIAS staff to reflect in the '70s the same kind of attitudes of moving more leftward, you might say, political attitudes that had been reflected from the United States in the '60s and there was some concern among some of our people that RIAS might become almost counterproductive to its purposes.

It never was counterproductive to its purposes. It was Germanized. It did have some personnel problems at times with some radicalized journalists, but it was nothing that I felt was ever -- that ever escaped really the control of either the German manager, who was basically reasonable if not shoutingly pro-American, and who the hell needs that, and of our own RIAS director and his deputy.

I had the feeling that our two people had adequate policy input and adequate power of review of programs and adequate power of persuasion within the management of RIAS to keep the station basically quite sound. Besides which, I think there was too much alarm on the U.S. side. If we are to project the open society, then we obviously project the conflicts and critiques within that society on any given policy situation.

I had absolutely no qualms about doing that as long as we also had the provision of American policy positions through VOA feeds, which we did have and which were broadcast. Absolutely no problem with that, quite the contrary. I liked it and I liked it even more when I was in East Berlin, looking at this thing from the other side as counselor there for public affairs, because the very exercise of self-criticism, the very exercise of varied opinions, the very exercise of not following a propaganda or governmental line made a helluva lot bigger impression on behalf of this American-owned station, in the eyes of the East, on the other side, than any content we could have given them in the radio broadcasts, because they did not give that much of a damn about content.

They knew about content. What they liked was this exercise by a free people of their free rights. That's what really made the impression and there again, I think, some of the U.S. crowd misjudged the impact of just that kind of thing. As a matter of fact, I remember

telling -- my God, don't tell me he is already forgotten! Who is our most recent leader? The most recent director -- our eight years of -- good God, Charlie Wick! -- telling Charlie Wick, when he came through, as we sat down and talked East Berlin and East Germany with him, that if RIAS didn't exist, we would have to invent it; that we would want to invent it in its then form, as a very excellent example of the open society at work.

Q: This leads me to another question-I know Charlie Wick. For all of the things that he often did, people had tagged him initially as a very wild ideologue. I have come to the conclusion after watching some of his gyrations that he really is not an ideologue, he simply was a sounding board of what he thought the president wanted and he wasn't the kind of ideologue that a lot of people on the far-right in the administration were at all.

If Reagan had wanted to go to the left, Charlie Wick would have gone to the left.

ROSINUS: I quite agree.

Q: He was sort of a weathervane rather than an ideologue.

ROSINUS: I quite agree. There was an interesting example that I can cite on that, to go back to that visit that he made with us in East Berlin. He came to East Berlin, I guess, it must have been about -- I went there in '81. I think he must have come maybe in '82, let's say, and it was his first exposure to a communist country.

The ambassador and I got together at luncheon at the Residence for him with some of our key contacts in the East German government's policy advisory councils, councils that advise both the Politburo and the Foreign Ministry, and we had a hell of a good discussion all afternoon about The Wall and why it was up and what they thought and what we thought, and it was a lot of give and take on this thing.

Q: This was in East Berlin?

ROSINUS: This was in East Berlin, right, a lot of give and take on this. This was Charlie Wick's first exposure, as I say, to real communists, and, of course, the Germans are perhaps the most sophisticated of the lot.

He had never sat with any apparently, so he left that afternoon and went back West and Len Baldyga, who was Area Director at that time, Len subsequently told me that in talking about this experience, Mr. Wick had expressed some amazement to him.

"You know," he said, "talking this afternoon with these fellows, they really believe what they are saying." Well, that was a lesson well learned, wasn't it? You know, this tendency to dismiss communists, to feel that they must know that they talk nonsense -- this faded that afternoon and gave him a much more solid picture of the kind of thing that we were confronting in the ideological conflicts of the time.

Q: Well, why don't you go on from here now. I think we have covered your West Berlin experience pretty well.

ROSINUS: Right.

1977: Back to the Agency as Senior Inspector

Q: What was your next assignment?

ROSINUS: From West Berlin in 1977 back to the States and assignment as Senior Inspector. That was something we can pass over rather quickly, since it is obvious what it was all about.

It was fascinating in career terms, because it gave me my first exposure to two continents on which I had not previously served in any capacity, four countries of Latin America and all of the countries of the Indian subcontinent, and then also at the same time to engage in the totality of program review in those areas, the relationship of USIS to other embassy elements, and the relationship of USIS to the total diplomatic dimension in each country was a very, very worthwhile experience for about a year and a half.

1978: Honolulu: Information Advisor to CINCPAC

After that and after all those travels, we went on to a delightful posting in Honolulu as Advisor to the Commander in Chief, Pacific.

Q: Now, what year was that?

ROSINUS: That was in late 1978.

Q: So Earl Wilson had been there just a couple of. ...

ROSINUS: He had been there a couple of guys before me. It was Jim Pettus who had been my immediate predecessor.

That was a fascinating assignment because it was so totally different and because the way I tried to recreate the job gave me an opportunity to prove quite thoroughly the substantive role of a USIS officer that we have talked about before.

It seemed to me that the days of psychological warfare and, you know, Vietnam and all that business from which this position had originally arisen were long gone; so, it was a position in search of a definition again.

What I tried to do with it was two-fold; first of all, to make it -- and it became so officially for my time there -- an associate political advisor's position. I worked very closely with the State Department political advisor in that capacity.

Rosinus Defines New Role for CINCPAC Information Advisor: Viz, as Communicator to U.S. Allies in CINCPAC Theater Assuring Them of U.S. Continuing Determination To Preserve Area Security

At the same time, and based upon the marvelous access to national security policy information that you received at the highest levels of CINCPAC with daily briefings and cable traffic from some thirty-three countries in the region that were part of the CINCPAC responsibility, based on the information gathered from that, to create myself as a communicator -- explicator, if you will -- of security policies throughout the Pacific/Indian Ocean area at a time when the Afghan invasion took place, at a time when the Iranian situation became ever more difficult and at a time, therefore, when America's security concerns in the Pacific suddenly took a quantum jump.

We had the forward positioning to the Indian Ocean, the build-up of Diego Garcia, the search for ports of call en route to the Indian Ocean and a series of allies in the region who were troubled by what they perceived as new Soviet aggression in the face of what they also perceived as a weakening of American resolve and American strength-partly allies, like the Australians and New Zealanders, but also our neutral friends like the Malaysians, Indonesians, Singaporeans, the Sri Lanka people, et cetera. They were all concerned with this issue.

So it was an ideal time to become a substantive spokesman for security policies in the region. As a result, I traveled during those years very extensively to seven cities of Japan, altogether to about twenty-two cities in nine countries of the Pacific/Indian Ocean area, and held about sixty-six different sessions on U.S. security policy and posture in the wake of these developments.

These were arranged largely through our USIS posts in the region, but essentially with security-concerned audiences -- staff and command schools, general staff groupings in different countries, advisors to prime ministers, foreign ministry and defense ministry officials, politicians, civic groups, media specialists and university people.

In Australia, for example, the parliamentary committee for defense policy -- of which the head, incidentally, subsequently became defense minister. In Bangladesh, the top military command. In Sri Lanka, where we were trying at that time to increase our use of Trincomalee as a port of call en route to the Indian Ocean for our advance positioning, with leading national security officials -- all to me a proof that the role of a public affairs officer, public diplomatist, as a substantive spokesman for American policy concerns really could pay dividends.

I mentioned the defense ministry, the subsequent defense minister under the Australian labor government with whom we sat for a long time and who asked many questions and who was keenly interested in our positions in the far east at that time. Another session in Australia was with a group of general officers and with the chairman of Australia's

Institute for Strategic Studies. I also answered listener questions over a national radio talk show.

I could also mention the fact that the advisor to then President Jayawardene of Sri Lanka was one of the guests at my discussions in Sri Lanka at the time that we were looking toward increasing our presence there at their naval facilities, and we did subsequently increase our presence.

In Malaysia, for example, I had a background information luncheon with the favorite reporter, so to speak, of the Prime Minister of Malaysia. The result was extremely heavy coverage in this neutral country of the U.S. position in the Pacific. …

Q: Is this the article. ...

ROSINUS: Yes, here is an article, for example, that developed from that in which, interestingly enough, because it was on background, I am now described as a ranking U.S. strategist, after which designation I asked CINCPAC for more money!

Malaysia visibly turned pro-U.S. neutral, if you will, if that is the right description, shortly after this kind of exposure and visits of some of our naval people from CINCPAC. Obviously, I was not the cause of this, but I think I helped move it along.

In Hong Kong, I believe I was the first person to speak with Hsin Hua, with the Chinese representatives in Hong Kong, who happened to be their journalists -- but you know what journalists are in communist countries -- again, about the power relationships under this new situation in Afghanistan and the potential problems in Pakistan and Baluchistan, subversion possibilities, Iran, the Gulf and all of those things, which I am sure were duly reported onward to Beijing as current CINCPAC moves and assessments.

So one had the feeling that you were really playing a policy involved role as a USIS officer, which is really what we ought to be doing. That was unfortunately -- once I left, the agency (USIA) never picked up on this.

USIA Tends to Discard Advantageous Activities That Seem to Fall Outside What Area Officers Feel Are "Normal" Agency Problems

We have a tendency in the Agency, I have found over the years, to disregard officer experiences that don't have much relationship to what is considered by the area directors, whoever may be in power at that point, part of the "normal" procedures of USIS operations, i.e., managing programs and people, serving as impresarios to other carriers of substance.

This was so unique and sort of "far out" in the views of some of them, I suppose -- Alan Carter happened to be there for some of the time -- that it never found resonance within those councils.

I continue to feel that this is exactly the position that it ought to be for any future USIS advisor to the command, and indeed for any USIS advisor to any military command-and one way in which we could really strengthen our policy involvement all around the world would be to assign senior officers, who could sit with flag officers by virtue of their civilian rank equivalence, to all of the commands-the Southern Command, the Atlantic Commands, SOUTHLANT, you name it, as well as CINCPAC, functioning as associate political advisors because of their own experience in traveling through the region and their own past professional experiences around the world, strengthening that advisory capacity by serving as communicators with all these security-interested parties in other countries, coming back and reporting, as I tried to do to the commander-in-chief, some of the perceptions that I received in these discussions about the U.S. and its presence and future and so forth, this would be, it seems to me, a marvelous way of utilizing Agency officers in a very policy-substantive way.

Instead, after I left they downgraded the position by one notch, which means that the USIA advisor is now at the level of colonels, which means he has absolutely no clout in a setting characterized by general officers running the whole damned show for all four commands -- for all four military services-and apparently dropped the whole concept of associate advisory and communicative functions. So I was sorry to see that happen.

1981: Return to Europe -- East Germany -- As PAO and Later DCM

Then, after the CINCPAC experience and, again, this marvelous travel exposure to Australia and New Zealand, the Indian subcontinent, southeast Asia and so forth, we turned around and went back to Europe, this time to what might be considered the third tranche of my German experience, having first been in Bonn, West Germany, then West Berlin, which is a separate entity of sorts, and now as public affairs counselor and ultimately as deputy chief of mission in East Berlin and the German Democratic Republic.

That was our first experience in a communist country and my first experience in dealing with communist officialdom. It gave me another perspective, again strengthening the view that one must be a substantive exponent of U.S. society and policy -- and I say "exponent," I don't say constantly enthusiastic defender or proponent. I think the important thing is to make it clear and to put it in its context.

For example, Vietnam: I was always -- not always, I am sorry to say, I was not one of those precious few -- but by about 1968 and 1969 I became uneasy about our position in Vietnam. I began to see that it was based on a lag in perception that took us back to Munich. I began to see that it had not a damned thing to do with our national security interest and that it came out of an exaggerated view of a communist monolith and all that sort of stuff. In other words, I began to share some of many critical views about our presence there.

Thereafter, I was not really, in my discussions with people, a defender of our position in Vietnam. I was an explainer of it. I explained the political -- the perceptions that led to it. I explained the political reasons behind its continuation and so forth, and at the same time I gave voice, of course, to those who were criticizing it and why. I think that is a much more effective way of presenting American policy and American society than simply to sound like a propagandist or enthusiast for any existing administration's policies.

The Special (and Differing) Role a PAO Must Take in a Communist Country

Now, in East Berlin, the role of PAO in the explication of U.S. policies was reinforced, because the real key objective for a public affairs program in a communist country is to keep constantly before the government the factual and perceptual bases of American foreign policy -- in East Berlin particularly to inform the Central Committee and the Foreign Ministry through their advisory bodies, with whom we worked very closely and on a very personal basis, and who were very interested about American policies toward the Soviet Union, obviously those toward eastern Europe, which were differentiated in terms of the countries of eastern Europe, toward German and central European problems and toward arms control, and then, more peripherally, toward the rest of the world and so forth.

So the results were fascinating discussions with these people, both direct and in conjunction with many American participants whom we brought in. You know, Helmut Sonnenfeldt came through and a great number of specialists, Stanley Hoffman of Harvard, Foreign Policy magazine specialists like Robert Hunter and William Maynes, Soviet specialists, arms control specialists, et cetera.

One after another we trotted through people who could talk intelligently on arms control, eastern Europe, on the imperatives of U.S. policy, on the perceptual basis for U.S. policies, on the political rationale, on the political pressures at work at home to do this or that.

Q: What years were these?

ROSINUS: This was 1981 to 1984. That was, for example, the time when the great Solidarity problems began in neighboring Poland. It was the time when in East Berlin itself and East Germany itself a visible opposition appeared to the regime among the young people and the clergy.

USIS Assisted East German Young People and Clergy (Who Were Dissidents) by Providing Information About U.S.

That was the second part of our operation, to help in overt ways through our libraries, through our information programs, through providing them with information as best we could, to provide the clergy and the church people and the dissident young people who

had organized under the umbrella of the church with as much information, again, as we could about the United States.

Q: Did you find that there were any efforts on the part of the East German government to interfere with the access to your libraries and to your. ...

ROSINUS: Oh, yes, sure, definitely. They blocked our libraries pretty effectively for quite some time.

Q: To your knowledge did any of the students or young people who were involved in their contacts with you and the clergy run into trouble with the East German government by virtue of that fact?

ROSINUS: They were all being watched and often warned. As a result, we did not make a big production of contact with the dissident elements ourselves. We left that to particularly one or two officers in the political section who were young people themselves and who mixed well with these young people and who therefore took it upon their shoulders to serve as the embassy contact.

We fed them with our materials, as well as making available what we could by way of film programs in the embassy and the library, which was unfortunately very limited.

So it was really more through the outreach through our embassy officers that we were able to provide information of relevance to the growing dissenting groups who were concerned with things like, you know, alternative cultures.

Just like in the 1960s in the United States, they were concerned with such things as conscientious objection and treatment of homosexuals and environmental questions, as well, of course, as the overriding question for all of these Germans, greater freedom of thought and expression and why doesn't that damned wall come down -- or, at least, if it doesn't come down, why can't we have lots of holes in it that let us go in and out.

East Berlin, of course, together with West Berlin, as I have said before, is the supreme embodiment of my view that public diplomacy must engage in the projection of the open society. Nowhere else can you find the contrasts more alive between open and closed, free and totalitarian societies than in that particular city.

Cultural Programming -- American Performing Arts Brought to East Berlin -- Become a Telling Political Demonstration of an Open Society at Work

Another interesting aspect of East Berlin, which again confirmed the view we have discussed before about the political importance of cultural programming and cultural events-I mean, specifically cultural events, not cultural in the anthropological sense but in the fine arts sense -- is that many of the musical events or dance events, for example, that we were able to bring in to the East Germans were themselves demonstrations, again, of

an open society at work and resulted in what were really political demonstrations on the part of the East Germans, who received these groups so well.

They were saying something to their own government when, for example, Lars Lubovich and his dance group were up there, able to express themselves, you know, through dance in whatever way they wished, loose and free and open in ways that were not permitted in their own society.

So when they got up and applauded a group that was not the most brilliant in the world but certainly a good one, they were applauding just as much for this exhibition of freedom which they themselves wanted for their own artists and themselves as they were for the performance.

Again, another interesting illustration was when the New York Chamber Orchestra came through. We put them on in various cities. In each city they got a tremendous reception, I am convinced one of the reasons for it being that this was an orchestra without a director. It was twelve people running themselves in a perfectly disciplined way -- again, what better demonstration in a totalitarian society of the validity of freedom than to have twelve excellent musicians working in unison without anyone dictating to them.

So I am really quite sure that the political demonstration of societal openness that cultural programs represent, including, of course, academic exchanges, remain and are a very integral part of an effective public diplomacy.

Rosinus Becomes DCM in East Germany

Then, as I mentioned, we ended our stay in East Berlin by serving at the end as Deputy Chief of Mission to then Ambassador Roz Ridgway, who, as you know, has been our Assistant Secretary for European Affairs in State since 1985.

That, too, was a wonderful opportunity and gave me a taste of things that, unfortunately, most of us in the Agency were never able to reach and reminded me of another long fight: trying to reach some sense of equality in consideration for potential DCM and ambassadorships which has never happened, of course, between ourselves and our State Department colleagues.

It reminded me of the Herter report recommendations (1967?) which were very trenchant, I thought, and my own feeling being that what we really need is separate agencies, yes, but to have the officers of the two agencies and particularly the political, economic and public affairs cones, if you wish to describe them as such, interchange periodically through each officer's career and from this interchanged experience to build the kind of broad-based individuals who can then run an embassy as deputies or as chiefs of mission and give public affairs the due it should have, along with political and economic and other elements of our diplomacy.

Q: How long were you there as DCM?

ROSINUS: Altogether, I had about six months as DCM during our last year in East Berlin. During the last four months in particular I was fully occupied with those duties. So that was, again, a very nice way to close our overseas career.

1984: Return to U.S. Chief Negotiator Seeking VOA Relay Station Agreements Abroad

We then came back to the United States and again, fortuitously, ended up in a position that in career terms was also a kind of apogee to a Foreign Service career in the sense that the position was that of chief negotiator for the United States, if you will, and more specifically for the Voice of America, in about eight different countries during three-and-a-half years that I was there, to attain new relay sites and all the related legal, taxation, security, customs and personnel rights for the modernization of the Voice's medium wave and short wave rebroadcasts from overseas sites.

So what that in effect meant to me personally in a career sense, was that I had finally reached the top rungs of what diplomacy is really all about and what ambassadors do, or should be doing, which is country-to-country negotiations at the most senior levels with foreign governments.

So it was a very satisfying way to close out a very long Foreign Service career.

Q: You continued, didn't you, even after you retired, to work on that on a contract basis?

ROSINUS: Yes. It was not contract, but it was simply as a re-employed annuitant under Civil Service status rather than under Foreign Service status after my retirement.

Q: This didn't interfere with your retirement annuity?

ROSINUS: No. That became immediate in mid-'86 and then I put it in abeyance for a couple of years, because I was earning much the same as I had earned previously in this same position.

It was a fascinating experience. It took me to negotiations in Botswana, in southern Africa, where I had never been, and throughout the Caribbean, to the windward and leeward islands, St. Vincent, Grenada, Antigua, Barbados, to Puerto Rico, to Haiti, Central America, Honduras and back again to the Federal Republic of Germany.

We concluded a great number of negotiations. This was in conjunction with another Agency colleague, Foreign Service colleague, Mort Smith.

Q: Oh, yes, Mort.

ROSINUS: Mort first had the job that I took, and then went on to become deputy director of the Voice for the modernization program. I became the international negotiator. He, Mort, continued several negotiations also as chief negotiator and I led these other ones.

Between the two of us we were involved in some fourteen negotiations and concluded ten, but what happened was that the modernization program fell heavily apart because of the Gramm-Rudman budget crunch situation on the one hand, and on the other hand the unwillingness of the top administration of USIA to fight the efforts of the OMB, the Office of Management and Budget, to, in effect, micromanage our program.

Disaster: VOA Relay Base Program Falls Apart Because OMB, Acting on Basis of Gramm-Rudman Budget Imperatives, Micro-managed Voice Relay Program

As a result, it was OMB that was saying not "here is the money you have got, spend it as you would on modernization." It was OMB that said, "no, you will spend it in Thailand and Morocco. You will not spend it in Sri Lanka. You will not spend it in Grenada. You will not spend it in Botswana."

The result was a U.S. government with egg on its face. We had just concluded agreements with these countries, often at considerable political expense to them, political capital. Botswana, for example, was a tough one. It came out successfully only after we got Vernon Walters himself involved in persuading President Masire to have his people finally sign the agreement that we had negotiated with them.

There were similar very difficult negotiations in other countries -- Sri Lanka was certainly not easy, as you might imagine. Now the U.S. government suddenly backs out, or fails to deliver on the expected benefits of construction, local employment, et cetera.

In Grenada we had spent lives, for God's sake, in an invasion. We went down to conclude an agreement with Grenada for a medium wave station. I dealt personally with the prime minister to make the agreement. He was personally involved because he realized that other U.S. elements were drawing down and that he wanted an American presence of duration there, which this would have given him, and the State Department was very strongly in support of this precisely for those reasons. So now OMB puts that on hold and nothing is going on in Grenada.

What I am saying is that you have got a bunch of G.S. elevens or twelves or thirteens or fourteens or whatever, without absolutely any sense for foreign affairs, micromanaging what is very much a foreign affairs operation and our top leadership allowing that to happen.

I think that is a prescription for disaster, not perhaps to our national security, but certainly to our reputation in many parts of the world.

Questions About Validity of Continuing to Construct Short Wave Relay Stations

Q: There is a lot of feeling -- I don't know how much of it is in the agency itself now, but on the part of a lot of people who have held this position for the last ten or fifteen years and are now retired -- that we are perhaps wasting our money on trying to put up too many more transmitters on the short wave operation -- they are not as effective as they were in the days when communications were much more primitive than they are -- and that perhaps we haven't explored the satellite alternative adequately enough, and general arguments along those lines.

ROSINUS: Yes.

Q: What is your own feeling? Based on what you saw in connection with the negotiations for new transmitters, how do you feel about those arguments?

ROSINUS: I went in with the same basic view in a way. At least, I questioned, you know, why are we engaged in a modernization program for short wave transmitters in an age of television and direct broadcasting capabilities and so forth?

Well, I soon found out, through working closely with engineers as well as the lawyers, both of whom I had to take on these negotiations with me that, first of all, direct

broadcasting is way down the pike, and politically a potential can of worms that may take decades to resolve since it would be obvious interference in each others' countries simply to drop broadcasts down from the skies and, B, that in many parts of the world and in particular reaching into the more closed societies -- at that time still the Soviet Union, now of course changing, at that time still the Chinese mainland, now also rapidly changing -- but also into any large-scale territories-the interior of Brazil, of Africa, of Asia and so forth-that short wave was still very much a requirement for such purposes.

We were also, of course, at the same time going into medium wave where that was possible, so that in the Caribbean it was all medium wave. In Central America it was all medium wave relay stations. In Botswana it was in part medium wave in order to develop the capability to broadcast to South Africa, with very strategic reasons for that, obviously.

So I did become convinced that the death of short wave broadcasting was prematurely announced, indeed. Furthermore, when you rely on VOA feeds into medium wave capacities within a country -- let's say for the Argentine medium wave stations to pick up the Voice of America and to rebroadcast, which is also obviously very effective and one thing we were doing -- you need a strong short wave feed to get clear messages.

The only way you are going to get a strong feed into Latin America, for example, is to have a powerful short wave transmitting system in Puerto Rico, which is what had been planned. That is another one that fell by the wayside after the government of Puerto Rico,

through its secretary state and governor, had gone way out on a political limb against strong political opposition to initial an agreement that we had worked out down there.

I am sure they were just as happy to see it all go away, but it is exactly the kind of casual irresponsibility on the part of OMB and the U.S. government that I was talking about before.

In addition, another thing, of course, that is bad about all this was that we had spent not only considerable funds in terms of our own personnel in planning and negotiating and preparing for all of these negotiations and in all the travels involved, but in buying transmitters for the new sites and in providing compensation to a number of these countries, which were paid up front, so that you now have an inactive site under a twenty-five year lease that has already been paid for, for example, that sort of thing.

So millions of dollars are at stake and are being wasted by this kind of false frugality and micromanagement that I mentioned before. It shows the incapacity of the U.S. government to plan over any length of time in budgetary terms. You just run against these ups and downs in budget availabilities.

You know that perfectly well. As a result, far more important policy considerations go right down the damned drain.

Q: It is all tangled up in nickels and dimes.

ROSINUS: Right.

Q: I know. It is terribly discouraging. Sometimes I wonder if we shouldn't go to a two-year budget cycle. There are a lot of reasons for doing that.

On the other hand, if you get shut down one year and you have an annual budget cycle you at least can go back the next year. If you get shut down on a two-year cycle you are stuck except for supplementals for two whole years.

ROSINUS: You are so right. You wonder why it cannot be done in some fashion that you could say that there will be a five-year modernization program.

Q: Right.

ROSINUS: You will have X monies to accomplish that purpose. You will be allowed to carry those over from year to year if you do not spend them. If for some reason you cannot finish this process in five years, you will still have access to those monies that you have not been able to spend, you know, in terms of the stretch-out of the program.

That is partly what happened on the modernization, for example. One of the things that was not taken into account is that when you negotiate with fourteen countries you are not

the one setting the agenda for the speed of those negotiations, and while we accomplished most agreements within a period of about five years, 1982 to 1988, five or six years, a number of them took longer than expected and therefore the purchase of equipment was delayed.

The worst thing, of course, was the contractual process of the U.S. government, which made it dreadfully difficult for the engineers to get their ducks in a row for equipment and so forth for the modernization.

At any rate, what happened was that you couldn't achieve it in exactly five years. When it wasn't being achieved in exactly five years, this modernization process, then the sniping began and then the pulling away of funds began, and that is again how things came to such a poor ending.

Q: Well, you know, in the budgetary process ten or fifteen years ago, so-called "no year" appropriations were much more common than they have become more recently. As the budgetary situation has become tighter and tighter, Congress has been far less willing to -- and even the Office of Budget and Finance has been far less willing to grant no year funds.

If they do, they usually do it only for an inadequate period of time, like two or three years. It used to be possible in the early days of the Voice transmitter program to get five-year no year funds, but it is no longer that way.

I think some of the blame for that goes to various organizations in the U.S. government that misused the availability of those funds in that period and then came back before the five-year period or whatever and said, "we are out of money now, we need a supplemental," and so the Congress has reached the point or OMB has reached the point of saying, "if these guys cannot manage the legitimate and judicious utilization of the funds over that period of time, we are not going to give it to them all at one time."

ROSINUS: Right.

Q: It has been unfortunate.

ROSINUS: Another aspect on the question you had raised before about short wave broadcasting that has crossed my mind was that another reason for the modernization was that the equipment simply was dreadfully old, and therefore, if there was going to be any continuation of the Voice of America in this modern age of communication, we had better come up to snuff technologically.

I remember negotiating in Munich in the Federal Republic for our modernization and talking about transmitters on the site in Munich that had been used in World War II by the German government, you know, and we were using them still in 1984 and 1985, so that was another imperative.

Q: Yes. Well, I guess this pretty well concludes your career.

ROSINUS: That brings us up to retirement, doesn't it?

Retrospective on USIA Career

Q: In retrospect, do you have any general comments about your career in the Agency, what it meant to you, or about whatever you think of USIA activities in general over the period of time that you were engaged in the operation.

If you don't have any, okay. If you have any thoughts you would like to put on tape before we conclude, why don't you go ahead.

ROSINUS: One can never resist that, I guess.

Q: Right.

ROSINUS: The recapitulation and summation of one's career.

Well, the career has been a very happy one. I am not certain that, had I to do it over again with what I know now, I might not have chosen a State Department path rather than a USIA path.

The taste of DCM was very sweet. I really enjoyed the functions of it, not the status of it as much as the functions of it, and I would have perhaps enjoyed moving along those paths over the years. The same goes for my years as political advisor and as international negotiator.

Having said that, it is very clear that USIA was altogether a much more exciting kind of foreign service career than a State Department one would have been, except for the ultimate top positions, of course.

It was eminently exciting and very satisfying. I think one learns over time that the shortcomings that you see in your own career are not blamable on the system. I have come to agree very much with, was it Marc Antony's observation that "the fault, Dear Brutus, lies not in our stars but in ourselves."

I think wherever glitches might have occurred in the career progression, as I look back, they are largely attributable to whatever psychological baggage I may have brought into this career from childhood and young adulthood, and exercised in some fashion throughout.

So it is nice to learn, even if a little late, some of these wisdoms which I would pass on to others -- about wasting one's energies on certain things that don't need energy to be wasted on them, and so forth.

Speaking of wasted energy, I do think that the thing we have said before, that we as an Agency have wasted a lot of energy on trying to define our role and fighting State for existence and coming to grips with a mission and an organization and so forth -- we should have put that to bed long, long ago and, I would have thought, somewhat in the terms that I have tried to elucidate as being my own guidelines, or guiding lights, or guidance points, as I tried to implement public affairs programs in various parts of the world.

One other thing in looking back has troubled me a bit. That is that, as you look back upon American foreign policy in the post-war period, you begin to see some dubious areas that make you reflect on how you handled them at the time as a spokesman and defender, if you will, of policies that are pretty indefensible historically speaking, in retrospect.

I am looking back toward things like the Arbenz toppling in Guatemala by the Dulles brothers. I am looking back to Mossadegh in Iran, to the covert actions of the CIA in a number of instances, to lying to our own people for undefined "national security" reasons, more recently to waging economic warfare through the guerrillas in Nicaragua in an already dreadfully impoverished country, to mining Nicaraguan harbors, to the Iran Contra business, of course, to saying nothing of the senselessness of Vietnam -- to the whole militarization of the cold war, to the reluctance of those who benefit from it to let go of it, to the frequent exaggeration of the Soviet threat, to the whole mirror image that we and the Soviets were engaged in in terms of windows of vulnerability, one side or the other claiming vulnerabilities, often nonexistent, and ending in a dreadful arms race.

Discussion of Problems of USIA Officers Commanding Enough Prestige to be Effective in High-Level Advisory Roles -- and Whether, if Agency Officers Had Been Integrated with Department of State, They Would Have Developed the Independence and Perspectives They Gained Outside the Department

I think what I am coming to is that it is a good thing that we put our emphasis, if we did, not on a senseless defense of everything we had done but on an explication or an explanation of what we were doing, what we were trying to do, and where all these things came from historically and politically. Even then we at times gave voice to lies from our leadership that came to be known as lies only much later.

Perhaps the fact that we as an Agency have never been very effectively seated in the councils of policy is another aspect of this. Maybe, if we were to be so seated, then our own concern with the projection of our society as an open one and as one based essentially on some pretty sound ethical values and positions -- which, after all, are the only things that differentiate us from our antagonists in the world, the totalitarians of right or left -- perhaps if we were to focus on that projection of American values and were

sitting in the councils, we might indeed serve as kind of a conscience or goad on some of these issues as they arose, on some of the steps that would be proposed and at which we could perhaps interject ourselves and say, "hey, guys, what the hell are you projecting here? This is all going to hit the fan. How is it going to look? To what degree is this contributing to the sense of moral equivalence between ourselves and the Soviet Union among those caught between in these situations? To what degree are we going down the path of Israel today, for example, and look what this means to Israel's support around the world."

These are very real foreign affairs factors. Perhaps we as an Agency involved more in policy could play a conscience role -- at least I would like to think so ideally, although I am not sure, because there is a very strong tendency in committees for those who are sitting somewhat tangential to the policy process, even if they are involved in it, to keep silent when the so-called realists are at work, telling you how they are going to pull this and that covert operation for the great sake of democracy.

It is a tough. …

Q: Another problem, too, is that when you get enfolded as a full participant --

ROSINUS: Right.

Q: … .in the process, are you sure that you are going to be as observant as to the pitfalls as you would be sitting somewhat on the sidelines and looking at it from a different angle.

This goes back to my thoughts about your comments earlier, when you said, "I sometimes wondered whether I should have taken the State Department track in order to get to the higher levels," because I, too, had that situation.

ROSINUS: I suspect most of us did.

Q: Well, I was twice given the opportunity to go into the State Department as an FSO and on both occasions, for different reasons, I turned it down.

ROSINUS: Right, yes.

Q: My thought is that, had we been in it all the way up, I am not sure that I would have been as well qualified to be a DCM or an ambassador as I think I was after having had a lot of the USIA experience.

ROSINUS: You are right -- but that path did not often lead to the top.

Q: I think a lot of ambassadors -- not the best of them, but a lot of them -- have blank spots because they have not had that outside experience in a different field and do not

contemplate and understand the public opinion aspects and the problems dealing with the public rather than just dealing with a few people in the foreign ministry.

So it works both ways. We might have been more intelligent and more effective had we been in at those councils, but on the other hand we might not have been. We might have gone with the tide anyhow, and if we had had our experience in the State line we would have been more circumscribed and perhaps not as broadly developed to the bigger picture as we were by going through the USIA structure.

ROSINUS: As individuals, yes. Certainly, as Agencies I would keep State and USIA separate because, as we have often said, the whole thrust and mentality, if you will, of the two agencies are quite different.

State, you know, is cautious. State does reporting, assessing, clearing. While it is operational, it is not as quickly operational as we are and must be. Their tendency is to avoid controversy. Ours may often be to invite it.

I think in the larger bureaucracy of State these necessary impulses on the part of public affairs would have been subdued to a point of serious dilution of public affairs initiatives.

It is true. I was thinking back on my CINCPAC advisory experience as a USIA officer who was involved daily with exactly the same stuff that a political officer and the top command was; in other words, for a brief time there you might say I was running the State Department track.

I think my USIA experience did indeed stand me in good stead in terms of my perceptions at that time, but not in terms of the receptivity of my perceptions by the command, which was so used to getting its marching orders and its interpretations from the State Department side of the house that they paid much more scant attention to the memos that I was sending out.

Going back over the stuff the other night, for example, I pulled out a memo that I had sent to Admiral Long at the time right after the Afghan invasion by the Soviets, and I concluded that they were going to be mired in a Vietnam kind of situation for the first time in their existence, but the command was really not prepared to believe that. They were convinced that the Soviets would, unlike us, pull out all stops and throw in every element of power required to subdue these people.

It was interesting to look back, therefore, on my visit to Auckland for CINCPAC and to recall this headline here in the Auckland Herald in 1980: "Russian Pull-Out No Idle Dream, Says Advisor Gunther K. Rosinus." The article also mentions my view that the Vietnamese would eventually have to pull out of Kampuchea as a prediction, another one of the few predictions that I got right in my life, I guess -- but at least two for two on this occasion!

At any rate, that kind of perception was simply not welcome among a number of my CINCPAC colleagues because of their perception of the Soviets, which was also quite wrong, I thought, in many ways and because there was a tendency to discount political advice coming from USIA rather than State.

One of the things that I tried to do at the command, when they were preparing their briefings to the Congress in particular and to others, in which they were always pointing to the new Soviet presence in the Pacific, was to try to say, "Look, fellows, that is all well and good. The Soviets are at Cam Ranh Bay, yes. The Backfire bombers can come out of Vladivostok and the Badgers can come out and the Soviet subs are around, but, look, so are ours and they have absolutely no carrier capacity while we have tremendous carrier capacity, you know perfectly well" -- and they did, they admitted it, that we are overwhelmingly strong in military terms in the Pacific as against the Soviets.

They didn't like to hear that sort of thing because it was important for them to present the "Soviet threat" constantly. The role, therefore, as USIA advisor in that sense simply didn't go over too well -- or foreign affairs advisor, if you will -- with the command, particularly the commander-in-chief and his chief of staff.

Therefore, perhaps if we were a more integral part and a more recognized part of the policy pantheon, such advice might indeed be taken a little more seriously in the future.

Q: Yes, it might be. I think that one of the troubles we are running into now, of course, is that unfortunately every new administration that comes in seems to look upon USIA as a fairly high-level place to dump somebody who they don't think is good enough to take over one of the big cabinet jobs, and consequently we get demeaned as an Agency because we get some second-hand operator who was put in to satisfy a political plum arrangement.

ROSINUS: Yes.

Q: It worked out better than we could have expected in the case of. ...

ROSINUS: Charlie Wick.

Q: ... . because of the close personal relationship. ...

ROSINUS: Very much so. It was a very great plus for USIA.

Q: That is not going to be the case with the present director. It is going to be unfortunate.

ROSINUS: We have recommended, you know, over the years ways in which this process could at least be enhanced, and one would be a permanent representation in the National Security Council. We do have an officer in there, but again I would have it at a higher level. I would have the director sitting in the Security Council deliberations.

Then, again, the idea that we ought to have the equivalent of POLADs from the USIA side in all of the major military commands and in the roles I earlier advocated-that could create new feedback both into the Agency and into policy deliberations on security policy matters.

Then this interchange of personnel between the various cones of State and USIA would create a similar impulse, so there are these ways, but, my God, it has been thirty years and we still haven't really advanced along those lines, so I am not sure we ever will.

Q: I am not sure we will, but not only that -- if you got that position on the National Security Council and then had the second level people, you know. ...

ROSINUS: That's right -- how would you look.

Q: This would, again, dampen USIA's role. We might be better off not to have him than to have it like that. I don't mean to demean the mental capacity of the present director, but he has absolutely no experience either in foreign affairs or in information work, public diplomacy, so again you have somebody who, even given the position, would not be quite able to maintain it and make the most of it, I think.

Well, Gunther, thank you very much for the interview. I think this has been one of the most substantive interviews we have had. I appreciate your comments and the ability to meet with you this afternoon.

ROSINUS: It was a pleasure.

Q: Thank you very much.

ROSINUS: It was my pleasure. I have relieved myself of an awful lot of thoughts here, probably in jumbled fashion and I am sure in repetitive fashion, but we can edit that out when the time comes.

Maybe we can find some universal leitmotif that goes throughout this career. At least we can say that we have had the pleasure and privilege of walking with history and perhaps even of contributing a useful footnote or two to its pages.

End of interview