

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

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INTERVIEW

Foreign Service Security Program
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This report on the origins and early years of the US Department of State Foreign Service Security Program is based on recollections of Norman V. Schute, a member of the original group of officers recruited for the program. For background purposes and of possible interest, I am a Stanford University graduate, class of 1938, majoring in political science and international relations with minors in history and economics, and studied under Professor Graham H. Stuart who also served as a consultant and a mediator in the Tacna Arica dispute between Peru and Chile and authored many articles and an excellent textbook on American Diplomatic and Consular Practice. With the rise of Hitler and Naziism events in Europe, I was convinced that war was inevitable. In February 1940 I qualified for flight training and reported to US Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Florida, for training as an aviation cadet. Later, owing to visual problems, for example, depth perception, which meant, in my case, that attempting to land 25 or 30 feet above the deck was not conducive to one's longevity.

I served as an operational intelligence officer on the staff of Commander South Pacific or COMSOPAC as we say, under Admiral William "Bull" Halsey and carried out duties at Commander Naval Bases forward area Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands in the early days of the war. After that short tour, I was transferred to the Joint Intelligence Center at Commander-in-Chief Pacific under Admiral Chester Nimitz at Pearl Harbor. Upon release from the Navy I was employed as a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and assigned to one of the two criminal divisions of the New York City field office for several months until beginning my career with the US State Department Foreign Service. Owing to my background, I was recruited as a Foreign Service Security Officer in the newly established Foreign Service Security Program in March 1947. It took me some 15 years to finally reach my original goal of serving as a Consul General at the American Embassy Paris. I never really wanted to be an Ambassador, which was heresy, but my staff was larger than those of most embassies and I was deeply involved in Embassy operations in all areas.

Now, on with the Program.

Names of the various offices will be followed initially with their acronym in capital letters.

During the end of World War II and immediately thereafter, it was quite apparent that the Germans had penetrated our missions and posts abroad. Not only in Europe but in Latin America and Africa as well. During earlier times and immediately after the war it was evident also that security of our establishment was virtually non-existent and while some officers in the Department of State vigorously supported establishment of a foreign service security program, notably led by Ambassador Frederick B. Lyon as Director of the Office of Controls, other old guard traditional diplomatic officers were strongly opposed.

The idea was repugnant to them. Appropriations for the program were diverted twice to other departmental areas. Finally, I was informed, President Harry Truman ordered the Department to proceed at once in establishing this new program. In March 1947, 18 new personnel recruited by Robert Bannerman, the Department's Chief of Security Personnel, reported for training and assignment to major posts in Europe, the Middle East and the Philippines as attachés and assistant attachés. Along with general lectures, part of the training included a week at Camp Holabird near Baltimore, MD, at the US Army Counter-Intelligence School which, for the most part, was redundant as all of us had served in the intelligence during the war. One candidate, Alex Prengel, had been a cryptographer stationed in England. The head of the Office of Controls was Donald L. Nicholson, to whom we were ordered to report directly. Later, he was followed by Jack Minor, Dennis Flynn, John Ford and E. Tomlin Bailey as Directors of the Office.

In the beginning there was very little direction. We investigated leads concerning a few local employees' political orientation thought to have been under the influence of Russian, communist or German influence. After a number of months a format was sent out from the newly established Office of Security (SY) providing an outline for conducting surveys of posts in our area of responsibility covering physical, procedural, personnel and technical aspects of security.

In August 1947 I was posted to our legation in Stockholm and Helsinki. Not long after, both were raised to Embassy status. From the beginning, I and most of my colleagues at other posts were somewhat handicapped by administrative officers who attempted to supervise our work, much of which was sensitive and none of their concern. Our investigations consisted mainly of file checks through the CIA Chief of Station who had liaison with local intelligence and political authorities, and, interviews in background checks. Since I was on good terms with my Ambassador, H. Freeman Matthews, and Deputy Chief of Mission, Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., and most of the staff was being replaced with new officers, I could pretty well cope with the situation, but from time to time I was given initial assignments such as conducting a Cost of Living survey and preparing an emergency and evacuation plan, a newly established requirement of foreign service posts due to the Soviet Russian deteriorating relations with the United States.

The lowering of the Iron Curtain, a term coined by British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill in a speech delivered in Missouri, and start of the Cold War in 1948 gave urgency to this new program. Meanwhile I managed to improve procedures in document handling. Instead of routing classified documents via non-US citizen messengers from one office to the next or file room, I managed to get American secretaries to deliver these classified documents, telegrams and memoranda themselves - much to their chagrin and irritation. During the period of my two year tour, the Embassy was located in a large old stone building on Strandvagen 7A opposite the Royal Palace, across a small bay. The code room shared a wall with the rest of the building which was a pension. Although I could detect no listening devices with my elementary scanner, I had carpet installed to dampen the sound of our antiquated code machine. A one-time pad code book was used for highly sensitive messages. It was not possible to move this nerve center to a secure

area. The telephone system, too, was antiquated. It wasn't until early 1949 the Communications Supervisor for Europe, William P. Richmond working in close contact with the Chief of State Department Communications, an ex-RCA executive, that a new telephone switchboard system was installed which at least assured some degree of internal privacy and security. Most classified documents were stored in simple key lock steel file cabinets and a few combination lock safes which could easily be manipulated by a professional. There were no overnight guards. Except in Helsinki, the guard was a local employee, a Finn, of course, had access to everything in the building. Only at larger missions were American civilian guards on off-hours duty.

Another problem was that many of our recommendations required support of the various State Department Regional Bureaus. For example, the Bureau of European Affairs (EUR), of American Republics (ARA), of Far Eastern Affairs (FE), Near East and African Affairs (NEA). Africa became a separate bureau in about 1958, and so forth.

And support usually meant an allotment of funds and that very little, if any were available. This state of affairs finally came to a head in mid-1948 and a conference was held at our embassy in Paris the end of June or early July in 1948 for one week under the Chairmanship of Admiral Will D. Wright, US Navy (Ret.). It was generally agreed that security was rather repugnant to many members of the Service who felt we were snooping on their work and their person which was totally untrue. Many cooperated, but many did not. The result was to regionalize the program and establish the regional security headquarters for Europe at American Embassy, London, under the chairmanship of William B. Hussey as Regional Security Supervisor (RSS) and five RSO officers who were Paul Green, Felix Verity, Laurence Gruza, Gerry Rothlein, myself and two American secretaries. Resident Security Officers were stationed at London, Frankfurt, Rome and Cairo. Our mission was to visit all consular and embassies to conduct surveys and write reports with recommendations for improving security. These were forwarded to the post with copies to the Regional Bureaus and the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, our bureau.

A full blown detailed outline covering the four basic areas of procedural, physical, technical and personnel security had been prepared in the Office of the Controls, now named the Office of Security (SY), an office in the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, and we were now on our way. SCA could now bring pressure to bear on regional bureaus to support our recommendations.

I conducted surveys of the constituent post in England and of the I.G. Farben building in Frankfurt, headquarters of the High Commissioner, and embassies in Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Vienna and Bern. During this period, arrangements were made by the Department with the US Marine Corps to staff embassies and large consular posts, e.g. the Consulate General in Naples in Italy, with Marine Security Guards. In mid-1950 I was transferred to the Rome Embassy as resident or Regional Security Officer with responsibilities also for covering our posts of Milan, Genoa, Florence, Naples, Bari and Palermo. Work went more smoothly here and I reported to the Deputy Chief of Mission

Llewellyn E. Thompson, later Ambassador to Moscow, and prudently kept the administrative officer, Gaze Lucas, generally informed of my work, always bearing in mind the principle of "need to know," the fundamental tenet of basic security.

In late 1952, I was transferred to Mexico City and carried on pretty much the same as I had in Rome as Regional Security Supervisor until transferred to Washington in the Department's Office of Security in the Physical Security Section (SY/P as we called it). In addition to basic four areas of security, there were also a technical laboratory, a protection unit for official visitors and a highly specialized office staffed by two officers, Fred Traband and Paul Clarke, dealing with personnel cases. During this tour, I was assigned to provide protection services in cooperation with the Office of Protocol during the visits of Queen Elizabeth and King Saud of which more later.

Finally, in March 1958 after much bureaucratic maneuvering, good timing and good luck I was able to obtain reassignment to the Bureau of Near Eastern and African Affairs as a Supervisory Administrative Officer of the near eastern desk. Now I was in the real Foreign Service. In simple terms I was in charge of the logistical support of our foreign service establishments in the Near East. It was an interesting, rewarding, learning experience but exceedingly difficult in the beginning. The preparation of budget spreads, administering personnel support and general services support is an exceedingly complex matter in the State Department. Very soon, we were all in the NEA Bureau began to have problems. Emergencies were popping up in Beirut, Lebanon, and Baghdad, Iraq.

Owing to my earlier experience in E & E, emergency and evacuation planning, I was spending more time in the main State building in the Office of the Executive Director for the Bureau, preparing summaries of the communications traffic and liaising with the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs on emergency planning. This led to the latter office requesting my reassignment to them to which I happily concurred.

The subject of emergency and evacuation planning, its origins and development from 1948 to 1962 is contained in a separate report, but for now the following are some nitty gritty highlights of the early Foreign Service Security Program.

With regard to the physical and technical security, we found on opening our embassies in Europe, temporary quarters were usually leased until we could obtain more adequate quarters or build our own. In Warsaw we occupied a former convent undamaged by bombing near the heart of the old city. When I surveyed the quarters in 1950, a number of pock marks in the walls the size of a soft baseball could readily be noted. Each hole was the location of a microphone our technical people had discovered and removed. In the 1950s after repeated visits, much research and refinement of equipment of technical security officers Bob Anderson and Joe Bezjian, two unusually gifted people, finally discovered the location of a Russian microphone in our Ambassador John Cabot Lodge's office. The Soviet Russian government had thoughtfully presented the Ambassador for his office, a replica of the United States Seal, beautifully carved in wood approximately two feet in diameter. It was skillfully constructed of two pieces, front and back, in the

center of which a small two-three inch opening contained a what is known as a resonant cavity microphone equipped with a short six-eight inch antenna. The Ambassador's voice could be picked up several floors above his in the building attic where Anderson and Bezjian first heard him talking.

The moral here is that one should always look a gift horse in the mouth.

The whole building was later found to be riddled with microphones. Plans were quickly developed for a new building to be constructed under US supervision. Visitor control, too, was a problem. Consular operations obviously require the public's access and most embassies had these activities on the ground floor. Separating visa applicants and others seeking consular services from other areas of the embassy required installing extra doors and blocked passageways. As for procedural or document control, higher classifications of documents were registered and numbered. American staff members were impressed with their obligations to properly handle and store classified materials in safes equipped with manipulation proof combination locks. During non-business hours the Marine guards conducted a security check of each office. If any classified material was left out or in desk drawers, they would pick up the material and leave a security violation notice to be filed in the offender's personnel file. This procedure markedly improved procedural security awareness in the Service.

Finally we come to the personnel aspects of foreign service security. One does not have to be a world famous psychoanalyst to understand that two driving forces in human nature are sex and greed but mostly sex. Polish intelligence was most adept at personnel penetrations. One of our married officers became enamored of a Polish female intelligence operative. After investigation he confessed and was sent to prison. The wife of another officer became the target of the amorous attention of a male intelligence officer. On learning that his real intentions and real interest was not love but information she could provide, before becoming entrapped, she informed her husband and they were transferred to another post.

In Budapest an attaché met one of the famous "Duna" girls who were very attractive, intellectually and physically, at an official reception. When invited to her home for the night, he eagerly accepted. Several days later he received a Hungarian visitor at his office in the embassy who displayed to him a number of pictures at various angles of his activities with the young lady in bed and suggested that he cooperate. The attaché, being no fool, informed his chief and was transferred back to the U.S. within a few days.

In the trade it is called a double penetration but it didn't work.

Homosexuality in the Service has always been a problem. I voice no personal opinion on this. Basically, officially it is believed that homosexuality can lead to the compromise of U.S. Government security. Both German and Soviet intelligence use homosexuals to establish a close relationship with homosexuals in other countries' services including our own. Those who cohabited on the outside were developed into informants by their lovers.

Others were or were likely to become targets for blackmail and thence informants. Traitor is another term used for it. Back in 1946 as I recall, it was the aforementioned Ed Thomas who had to inform Secretary of State Cordell Hull that a very senior officer had been arrested for pederasty in Lafayette Park. In Rome, two of my colleagues after interviews confessed and were released from the Service. Three members of the original Foreign Service Security group were reported to be deviants and on interview were promptly released. And in 1947 before our conference, Foreign Service Chief Inspector Merle Cochran, later an Ambassador, sent home seven communications personnel, a veritable "daisy and chain" as it is known. And that's the way it is, or at least was, in my day.

On a happier note, I mentioned earlier about being assigned protection protocol duties for the visit of Queen Elizabeth and of King Saud, both of which occurred in 1957. The Queen's visit to the United States was to lay the corner stone for the new addition to the British Embassy in Washington, DC, and I was assigned two or three events that took place at the British Embassy. One was a garden party held outside with large canopies to protect from the sun and then a State dinner attended by the President of the United States and of course, Secretary of State. It was a fascinating exercise and then following these activities the next day I escorted up Massachusetts Avenue, Her Majesty and Prince Philip to the corner and around and back to the building site where the corner stone was and she of course with the trowel tapped on some cement, thereby making it officially laid. During those days and for those duties we all carried weapons. Having been with the FBI I had some skill in handling a weapon and was an instructor for some of the other fellows. I can't say that they were marksmen, but in any event, as I say it was an interesting and a wonderful honor for me.

The King Saud thing was really an Arabian Knights affair. I was assigned to escort the little Prince, the Royal Protector and the Royal Nurse. I met them at the ship and took them to their hotel. I'd get them up in the morning and put them to bed at night. Later on, from New York we went to Washington and Blair House which is the official residence for official visitors, was completely occupied by King Saud and his entourage. As I recall, in addition to the little Prince, King Saud had so many wives and of course, many children. I believe he brought over four or five adult Princes and each night one of my colleagues would carry a large packet of money and one of them particularly would go to Baltimore and visit the ladies of the evening. They seemed to prefer blondes, brunettes and red heads. My assignment was, I believe, much more interesting and fascinating. The little Prince apparently had a muscular ailment in his left or right ankle so we made a number of visits to Walter Reed hospital where he was given hydrotherapy and then, of course, visits to the zoo and I have a few pictures of it which are nice memories tucked away. Finally things were drawing to a close. My colleagues and I, individually, were directed to report to a room where assistants of the King gave presents of money and watches. At that point they had run out of the official watches which were gold Longines watches with the King Saud's crest, crossed swords and a palm, in a presentation box. So they went downtown and picked up a lot of Gruens and Hamiltons. I showed the little Prince my watch and he sort of shook his head and ran back into the bedroom. On return he gave me one of the Longines. I also received four \$100 bills. Well, of course, no

government employee is supposed to accept any gifts so I promptly prepared a memo and turned in the four \$100 bills and I listed them by serial number. My Chief, then Tomlin Bailey, wasn't too happy that I'd put this all in writing, but it was a matter of personal protection, I felt, and it just would hold the next person accountable for receiving it. Of course, I turned in the watch but sometime later the Chief of Protocol, Wiley Buchanan, said that these "mickey mouse" watches, as he called them, should be returned and that's how I've got this very nice watch.

In closing I would add finally that anyone wishing detail or elaboration may feel free to contact our leader of this project, Director Charles Stuart Kennedy, who can supply my home phone number, but don't wait too long. I am getting long in the tooth and one never knows, does one?

Sincerely yours, [signed] Norman V. Schute
(N.B. Very special thanks go to Mrs. Sue Wilson whose assistance made this report possible.)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EMERGENCY & EVACUATION PROGRAM
(E & E Program)

This report was prepared by Norman V. Schute,
Foreign Service Officer, Retired

With the onset of the Cold War in 1947-1948, U.S. State Department officials were concerned for the safety of U.S. citizens in Europe in case relations between the Soviet Union and the western powers deteriorated.

In 1948, the Washington Liaison Group (WLG), a Committee of State, Joint Chief of Staff, Army, Navy and Air Force representatives, chaired by the State Department representative, was formed to develop plans for the protection of U.S. citizens and the nationals of certain other friendly countries in an emergency and, if necessary, their evacuation to a safe haven or the United States. Welfare and Protection has always been a Consular function, but this was on a much grander scale.

The first Chairman, Edwin J. Madill, Special Assistant to the Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs (SCA) (the administrator had the same rank as an Assistant Secretary of State) and he immediately set out to introduce and explain the requirements of the Program to all of the Chiefs of Mission in Europe in the Spring of 1948.

The Ambassador to Sweden, H. Freeman Matthews, was most supportive of this planning and I was directed by my Chief, Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., then Counselor of Embassy (and later an Ambassador), to take on this planning as an additional duty while I was stationed in Stockholm.

Generally speaking, E&E planning was not considered a "main stream" activity in the Foreign Service, meaning you don't make "brownie points" toward your career, i.e., promotions (the same held true for Security Officer) in carrying out such responsibilities...but...I believed in it wholeheartedly and immediately plunged into drawing up plans which then were relatively simple owing to our geographic position and Sweden's policy of neutrality in any major conflict.

An emergency could be either a local one which involved danger to American citizens in the event of civil war, a revolt against the government in power, a natural disaster, or political/military strife, or, a general emergency which involved the movement of Russian Soviet armed forces into western Europe.

Meanwhile the Department established liaison groups, staffed by a Chairman and Assistant Chairman to assist posts in their area in drawing up plans and assuring coordination with other posts in their area in the event of an emergency.

These liaison groups were established at London (LLG), Paris (PLG), Rome (RLG), Dhahran (DLG) and Manila (MLG).

Mr. Madill deserves more than kudos for his outstanding work in getting the program established.

In 1950 after a one-year assignment in London as a Regional Security Officer, I was assigned to Rome in the same capacity but again with the additional duty of Chairman of the Rome Liaison Group (RLG) covering Italy, Spain, Greece and our North African post. There was little support for the program and action consisted mainly of handling correspondence with posts in my area to assure coordination of any possible movement to safe havens or the United States.

Then, in mid-1952 I was transferred to our Embassy in Mexico City as Regional Security Supervisor and while I was not responsible, it was quite clear that given our proximity to the United States, very little interest, much less action, was directed to E&E Planning.

After my assignment to the Department in 1955 and later taking up duties as Supervisory Administrative Officer in the Near East and African Bureau (NEA), local emergencies in Bolivia, Paraguay, Lebanon, Baghdad and Cuba finally attracted the serious interest of the Department in E&E Planning. During the Cuban crisis, Charles E. Higdon, Executive Director of Latin American Republics (ARA) and myself, were directed to prepare a new format for the steps, or actions, to be taken by posts in an emergency.

Basically, the format consisted of four (4) phases which are summarized in the following:

With the outbreak of serious unrest locally, Phase 1, after consultation with the Department, could be declared and government dependents (i.e., spouses and children)

could be sent to a safe haven (e.g., from Lebanon to Greece or Rome). Other American citizens (i.e., businessmen and tourists) would be urged to leave through individual notices and committees formed in the local American community. Post activities would be reviewed and where possible, reduced; Phase 2 required a review of post's activities, which ones to discontinue, and transfer non-essential personnel to a safe haven. Also, warn American citizens and assist them as necessary to leave the country; Phase 3, reduce staff further and burn all sensitive documents; Phase 4, reduce staff to Chief of Mission, Deputy Chief of Mission and one or two assistants, complete burning of classified documents and close the post. Under international law, all diplomatic personnel are required to be provided safe conduct departure by the host country, a requirement not always observed e.g. the violation of our Embassy and personnel in Tehran.

About this time, Scott McLeod, Administrator of SCA and his Deputy, Harris Huston (both political appointees), took an active interest in the Program. The political situation in Cuba was heating up with Castro's advance from Santiago in the south on up toward Havana and eventual overthrow of the Batista government.

In late 1957 a new Chairman of WLG, Walter H. Mueller, immediately plunged into his duties. Owing to my background in E&E planning, he asked me to be his Deputy. Walter made a tremendous contribution in formalizing procedures for the Program and in gaining proper respect and support for it. Walter visited all of the LGS and a large number of posts in Europe, Africa, Middle and Far East reviewing plans while I held the fort, so to speak, in the Department.

Shortly after Mueller's appointment as Chairman, the government in Baghdad was overthrown, the royal family slaughtered and mobs over-ran the city. A number of Americans were killed, hundreds of Americans sought refuge in hotels, their homes and any other shelters they could find. Hundreds of these people were tourists who had arrived on charter flights, and, the airport was closed. But even if it were open, airlines would not fly into the city without guarantee of safety by the government in power.

Walter and his assistant made an unauthorized command decision and guaranteed Pan-American Airways their costs to provide transportation for all those Americans wishing to leave.

An important lesson was learned here. No one, or airplane, enters or leaves a country unless the controlling governmental forces of that country permits it.

Pan-American provided three planes, as I recall, which landed in Ankara, Turkey to await authorization by authorities in Baghdad which, while not entirely stabilized, had some semblance of control.

At first they said only one plane per week could enter, pick up our citizens, and safely fly out! Our Embassy officers worked very, very hard in persuading the Baghdadis to permit

more flights and after extending it to three flights a week, Monday, Wednesday and Friday, finally agreed to permit one daily flight until all who wished to leave could do so.

A side light here is of interest. If the charter flights were unable to carry out their contracts, the passengers were out of luck. The State Department does not, or did not then, have funds to provide emergency transportation for American citizens in such cases. So...all passengers agreed to re-pay the U.S. Government for return transportation. Years later, I learned that a large number of those evacuees never did pay for this obligation totaling many thousands of dollars.

Toward the middle of 1959, Castro took over the government of Cuba. In Havana, crowds of over 100,000 people raptly listened to him speak for hours on end. We in the Department were deeply concerned that the mobs, with feelings at fever pitch, would attack our citizens. Fortunately, Castro had strong control, but we were still worried.

A top-level emergency conference was initiated by the Department to discuss the situation. This meeting was attended by Secretary of State Christian Herter, the Admiral who was Chief of the Joint Chief of Staff, armed force representatives and myself as acting Chief of WLG, in the absence of Walter Mueller who was in Africa.

We each presented our views of the situation. Mr. Herter then asked if we could pinpoint the location of our people, American citizens that is, and I replied in the affirmative. He then asked the Admiral if we had pinpoint plans to rescue our people.

The silence was deafening! After a moment or two of recovery, the Admiral responded in the negative, but that he would develop them at once.

Fortunately it was not necessary to implement such plans.

Baghdad and Havana taught us another lesson. There was an overwhelming need for shortwave communications equipment at many of our Foreign Service posts.

In October 1959, a State-Army conference on E&E planning was held in Frankfurt attended by top ranking military officials of the U.S. European command, Deputy Administrator Harris Huston, Walter Mueller, Chairman of WLG and myself. The military had thousands of dependent personnel and, as always, budgeted for funds and developed plans for their evacuation via convoy west through France to the Iberian peninsula. Logistic support, e.g. gasoline, food etc., was stored at specified places along the way.

We, too, had plans but no funds for logistic support, although we had established safe havens at Camp Kagnev in Ethiopia and in Portugal equipped with folding beds and other necessary facilities.

The military took extremely strong objection to Huston's statement that our people, the non-military U.S. citizens, would join their caravans. The conference ended on a rather sour note.

On leaving Frankfurt, Harris Huston, Mueller and myself traveled to London to discuss planning with British Foreign Office officials.

The result was to mark a turning point in State Department E&E planning.

The British informed us they would, of could, not discuss General Emergency planning with us because there would be no movement of civilians, that they would stand fast and make no attempt to leave their cities and homes.

We readily adopted Stand Fast in our planning for a General Emergency.

One big asset to our program was obtaining an allotment of confidential funds to purchase emergency communications equipment: Collins single sideband short wave transmitters. They were small and portable and were shipped to all potential hot spots in Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere.

A new Administrator, John Hanes, a no-nonsense practical leader gave strong support to our work which was important to us vis-a-vis the other bureaus.

We also proceeded to revise and update the E&E Manual and prepare a new one of action for the Department to take in support. They were simple and concise consisting of only 20 or so pages in outline form. Both were cleared by the various Bureaus and other interested areas.

In mid-1960 I was transferred to Paris as Chairman of PLG just as the Belgian Congo blew up. It was rough in the back country.

American missionaries and medical personnel were being hacked to death and in some cases eaten! Time magazine reports were true. There were about 200 of these people, and others registered in the Embassy's Consular Section. Actually, we found there were about 2,000 in the bush! Fortunately, the radio equipment we had sent enabled Ambassador Clare Timberlake to transmit messages to the Embassy in Brazzaville, across the Congo River, where Consul Alan W. Lukens (later Ambassador) could relay Timberlake's report to us at PLG in Paris and we would inform the Department by telephone.

U.S. Air Force planes were ferrying equipment and supplies to Leopoldville in support of the local government. As always, our military gave massive support by carrying our refugees back to safety, landing at Evreux, France, a NATO U.S. Air Force base. There, they were provided overnight accommodations and food and in the morning transport to a nearby French railway station for onward movement by train to Paris.

Since almost all of these people had to be approved and processed in Belgium before going to the Congo to carry out their missionary and medical duties, arrangements were made with Belgian Red Cross representatives to provide the railway transportation without charge.

My assistant and I would meet these people at Gare San Lazare and ask if they wished to return to Belgium or return to the United States.

Many preferred to go to Belgium hoping to wait out the storm and return to the Congo. But many wanted to return to the U.S.

I persuaded many of the latter to loan money to their friends for lodgings in little hotels near the station. I had far less luck in requesting an allotment of funds from the Department for loans to those wishing to go home. Finally, we persuaded U.S. Airlines to accept promissory notes. This unfortunately was a source of embarrassment since many refused to repay these loans later on the grounds that the Ambassador, Timberlake, "had ordered them to leave the country!"

After this, I visited all of our posts in western and eastern Europe, except Moscow, Bucharest and Dublin, as also our post in North Africa, reviewing plans, and consulting on improvements.

In mid-1961 PLG headquarters in Paris was moved to Frankfurt. A new Chairman, Merrill Hammond, a political appointee, was appointed and I reverted to Deputy.

Unfortunately he knew nothing of the program. I briefed him each morning and in the afternoon he would send me memoranda directing me to carry out the suggestions I had given him in the morning.

Ever since the meeting with our British opposites, I finally arrived at the conclusion that the E&E program could be centered in the Department. It had gone full circle.

In June 1962, while on consultation in the Department, I recommended that the General Emergency safe havens be abolished, that my position be abolished, that PLG be abolished and the whole program be centered in the Department of State's Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs.

This was favorably acted upon. After home leave, I was assigned to Oslo as Chief of Consular Services, after which I was assigned to Paris as Consul General.

Walter Mueller was assigned to St. John, New Brunswick, Canada, as Consul General and his duties as Chairman PLG were taken over by James MacDonald, an excellent administrator.

I retired in 1973. Since then I've been engaged in a spate of community activities and occasionally give talks on the Foreign Service and Emergency Planning. In the latter I stress the fact that no funds are provided by the U.S. government for the travel of U.S. citizens abroad in an emergency and they should be made aware of that.

Yours truly, [signed] Norman V. Schute.

N.B. Ambassador Lukens returned to the Department after retirement to serve as a consultant on E&E matters, visiting Middle East and Southeast Asia posts. The current E&E manual is now the size of a telephone book!

End of interview