The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project
Marshall Plan Series

MELBOURNE L. SPECTOR

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
Initial interview date: December 20, 1988

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTERVIEW

Q: Mel, I wonder if you could explain how you became involved with the Marshall Plan.

SPECTOR: I'd be happy to, Stu. I was working for the State Department, the Office of Foreign Service Personnel, which was a part of the Director General's office. In those days, the Director General had more than just personnel.

Q: What years are we talking about?

SPECTOR: I went to work there in '47. I went to work there as a position classification analyst, because the Foreign Service Act of 1946 had been passed the previous year, but the Foreign Service did not really know in detail the kinds of positions it had overseas in its consulates, consulates general, and diplomatic missions. So a rather large staff was set up to describe all of the positions in the Foreign Service, and I was a part of that group.

In early 1948, the Marshall Plan came into existence, and the administrator of the Marshall Plan, more aptly called the Economic Cooperation Administration, the administrator, by law, was given the choice of how he wanted to run the overseas part of the Marshall Plan. He either could use the State Department's Foreign Service or he could set up his own overseas service.

Q: Do you know what the background was to that? It sounds like this was a handcrafted law designed with a certain person in mind who knew people in Congress, to give him a free hand.

SPECTOR: Probably. I don't know. I do think that a lot of work had gone into crafting the law. The Bureau of the Budget worked on it, and I think they got advice from the Foreign Service. But this did give Paul Hoffman, the administrator, quite a bit of leeway. He had other leeways, too. For example, he could hire people as retirees and pay their full consultant fee without having anything being deducted from their retirement. I think that was unlimited. He had another 400 jobs that he could fill; this he used only at home domestically, without any regard to the Civil Service, so he could hire people at any rate up to whatever was a supergrade, without regard to any other law. This has been whittled away over the years and that law still exists, but only for a few positions.

Back to overseas. Mr. Hoffman quite wisely decided to use the State Department's Foreign Service, and in addition to the Foreign Service, he used its communication system, its procurement system, its finance system. What was done was that they called on the State Department to provide a team of people to come over for a short period to the Marshall Plan headquarters and advise them on these various aspects. The man that went over to advise on setting up the personnel system, a man named Everett Bellows, a man whom I'd known working next door to him at the Foreign Service, he asked me to go along to work on the classification of the positions of the new Marshall Plan missions overseas. This was probably March of 1948.

We went to work in this new building, where people were putting up partitions all around us, telephones were just being installed.

Q: What building was this?

SPECTOR: It's called the Miatico Building, at the corner of Connecticut and H. It is now known as the Peace Corps headquarters. The Peace Corps took over many years later. My job was to describe the positions of the new Marshall Plan missions. I did not have anything to do with the organization of the missions; that was done for me. They would merely present me with the organization, and then I'd break it down into the Chief of Industry, Assistant Chief of Industry, the Chief of Agriculture, the secretarial staff, the administrative staff, describe the positions and their functions, and put a rate to them.

Q: What do you mean by rate?

SPECTOR: A salary rate. What we used was the Foreign Service Reserve and Foreign Service staff of the Foreign Service Act. We didn't use the commissioned officers. I don't know if we could have or not. I think we could have, as a matter of fact; the law was very broad. But nobody had any idea of commissioning officers to work for the Marshall Plan.

Q: Since there had never been a Chief of Industry, how did you know how to describe a job that had never existed before?

SPECTOR: We talked it over with the people in the program office. We talked it over with the organization people. A lot of us were just pulling it out of thin air. But I also compared them, in my mind, with the positions we already had in the Foreign Service, the Chief of Commercial and Economic Sections. I used that as kind of a level. It was kind of hit and guess and by-gosh, frankly. We could write them only generally. I think that we probably graded them a little higher than a comparable position in the Foreign Service, because we were trying to get people to come from industry and from private life into these jobs. They were only supposed to be temporary. The Foreign Service Reserve is a temporary appointment for five years and can be renewed for five years. But we only felt the Marshall Plan was going to be in existence for four years, so we didn't care about that kind of thing.

We used the Foreign Service lead system, but we could not use the Foreign Service retirement system.

Q: On the assumption that they wouldn't be around long enough to make any difference?

SPECTOR: That's right. We either left people in Social Security or put them into the Civil Service retirement system. So you had, in comparison with the regular Foreign Service, the regular Foreign Service had careers. Of course, their promotion was selection out, but they were more or less not temporary, not limited. The Foreign Service had a much better retirement, and if they thought about retirement at all, they could retire at a much earlier age, at age 50, whereas in the Civil Service, it was then, I think, 65.

But leave was the same. We used the same leave system, which was very good, because in those days, the late forties, the Foreign Service had a much better leave system then than the rest of the government. You could accumulate up to six months' annual leave, 180 days annual leave, which you could not do in the regular government. Later, that was changed, and the Foreign Service was brought in line with the rest of the government.

Q: Much of this was predicated on people working abroad, and when they came back to the United States, usually by ship in those days, it was quite a move, and they felt that rather than moving them around, they'd let them save their leave and use it all in one long vacation, as it were.

SPECTOR: Yes, that's right. I think it was certainly the best system to use. They could hit the ground running. It was designed for the Foreign Service. If you used the Civil Service overseas, and you must remember there are many people overseas, many more than the State Department, that are under Civil Service overseas. The Department for Defense, for example.

Q: Civilians.

SPECTOR: The civilians. But the Foreign Service is a much more flexible service and it's more attuned to dealing with foreign governments, whereas the Civil Service is more in the service to the defense establishments that are overseas, and not as much attuned to dealing with the foreign governments.

Because the State Department was technically doing the appointing of the people, no one in the Marshall Plan had the authority to appoint anyone to any position overseas. I did, though, and I was about a GS-12. And here I was appointing mission directors at the equivalent of an ambassador's salary!

Q: A GS-12 in military terms is what, a captain?

SPECTOR: About a captain. But it was really pro forma. I never questioned, unless I saw some big blooper of some kind.

Q: Where were these appointments coming from?

SPECTOR: They were coming from all over. The Marshall Plan was wonderful in the sense that it was something that the United States was behind thoroughly. The public was behind it, academia was behind it, industry was behind it. It was like going into a war and having the country behind you as distinct from going into a war, say, like Vietnam, where you didn't have the country behind you. So we were able to attract the crème de la crème of academia and of industry. Let me give you a few examples. We were able to recruit guys out of academia like the man that just died, the head of Yale; I'll think of his name in a minute.

Q: Kingman Brewster?

SPECTOR: Kingman Brewster, who was a young lawyer with us. John McNaughton, later Secretary of the Navy under Kennedy, was a young lawyer with us. We were able to get bright young men and women out of industry and out of government. Everybody wanted to work for the Marshall Plan. As consultants, we were able to bring in retirees because we could pay them their full consultant fees and not have anything deducted from their retirement.

You had a man like Paul Hoffman heading up the agency. Hoffman was, in those days, very well known. He was a Lee Iacocca of those days. He'd taken Studebaker Motor Company and turned it around and was very famous and well known. He was able to attract top men out of industry. You had top economists like Lincoln Gordon coming in. Lincoln Gordon was able to attract other young, bright economists. You had Milton Katz come in from Harvard, who was able to bring in people like Kingman Brewster and John McNaughton and so on. So we were doing very, very well in people recruited.

Q: This was in 1948. Another factor was that most of the people you are talking about either had had developed under the pressure of wartime, either in the military, often with considerable responsibility, or in industry back at home under the hot house of wartime pressures, which for a more disciplined but also more driven person than might be the case at another longer period of peacetime.

SPECTOR: Yes, that is true. We had people from the military who had done very well in the military and had them as mission directors or deputy mission directors, and they did very, very well.

The other thing we tried to do, we had to speed up appointments. Europe was in a crisis, and we had to get people over there, get things going, get things started. I was only a small part of this, but what we did in the Miatico Building is that we had a one-stop service. You could walk in the door, be hired, processed. We had a Public Health Service person there to give you a medical exam. We could give you an almost instantaneous security clearance--which I'd like to come back to in a minute--and we could issue you a passport, all in the building, get you your ticket, and you walked out the door, caught a taxi for the airport, and went off to your post. We could do that literally in 24 to 48 hours.

The most difficult part of that process was getting Mrs. Ruth Shipley, the famous, wonderful Ruth Shipley, to give us that authority to issue passports over in our building.

Q: She presided over the Passport Office for over 30 years.

SPECTOR: Right. As you know, back in those days, Stu, to get a passport, I believe you had to either apply in person at the Passport Office and be seen and interviewed by someone there, or I think you could go to a U.S. court. But that was the only way. But we wanted this one-stop service, so Everett Bellows, the man I was working for, and I went

over to see Mrs. Shipley. She knew why we were coming, and she kept us waiting about 45 minutes, then came to the door, leaned on the door, looked at us, and said, "You're about as welcome as the flu," which kind of dates everybody. (Laughs)

We chatted with her for quite a long time, and she said, "Do you really know how important a diplomatic passport is?" Because we were issuing diplomatic passports automatically to anyone of FSR-3 or above, Foreign Service Reserve-3 or above, and official passports under that.

We said, "Oh, Mrs. Shipley, we know how important a passport is." I said, "You know, Mrs. Shipley, I've just been reading Rebecca West's The Meaning of Treason, and I know that the way that the British were able to prosecute Lord Hawhaw as a traitor was that even though he was broadcasting from Germany, he held a British passport." Well, that got Mrs. Shipley where she lived, and she understood that I knew the importance of a passport. Then she was also reassured that our Chief of Security wouldn't allow any communists, and we got the authority. Later, she and I became very good friends over the years.

The other important thing we had to do was that we were setting up a large regional office in Paris, and the regional office in Paris wanted their own personnel authority. They wanted to be able to hire people there, not send everything back to Washington to be processed. You could hire people over there. You had a lot of people in Europe studying, or who were in the military, and who could be hired on the spot.

Q: Getting a discharge?

SPECTOR: Getting a discharge.

Q: They were people on the G.I. Bill, getting college benefits to study abroad.

SPECTOR: Yes, we got some of our very best people that way. In order to delegate that personnel authority, we had to have a personnel manual with all the rules and regulations. So I was put in charge of getting, as quickly as I could, a manual out. I had two very good people working for me, two ladies, and we got a manual out in about 60 days. Then with that, authorized the ambassador to Paris, the head of the office of the special representative, to have personnel authority.

I went back to the State Department towards the end of the year, because I did not intend to make my career with the Marshall Plan at that point. I was really not invited to make myself through the Marshall Plan. I was married in November of '48, working happily in the Office of Personnel at State, and now in recruitment and handling our work on the logistics for the selection boards.

Then early in 1949, I got a letter from the Director of Personnel in Paris, whom I knew and had worked for previously in the War Relocation Administration during the war,

asking me if I'd like to come to Paris as the Deputy Director of Personnel of the Marshall Plan in Europe. Needless to say, I jumped at the chance, and my wife and I went to Paris in April of 1948.

Paris was a wonderful place to be in those days because of, one, it being Paris, but two, the whole ferment around the Marshall Plan, and we all thought we were doing an important job for an important cause. Everybody was new. I like to quote Charles Mee in his book, The Marshall Plan. He says, "To be young, to be American were wonderful things in the late forties. To be one of Averell Harriman's aides or an aide to one of his aides was transcendental." Well, I was an aide to an aide to an aide, but I can tell you, it was transcendental. I think we did some very, very good things in the Marshall Plan.

In the personnel office, our problem there was really to, again, speed up actions and not take an interminable time to process things. After I'd been there two or three months, the Director of Personnel asked me to do a study in the personnel office. We had about 40 employees. The Marshall Plan in Paris had about 800 employees, and as you know, we had missions in all of the European countries of Western Europe, Greece, and Turkey. So I did what was an organization and management study of the personnel office, and I did it knowing all the people, and I did it with them. I didn't come in as an outsider. Being new, I knew them and they knew me. Instead of really coming out with a study that I laid on the desk and said, "Do this," we worked out the procedures and processes as we went along, which is the best way to do an organization study.

As a part of the administrative office in Paris, there was an Office of Organization and Management. The head of that was a man named Jack Kubisch, who left the Marshall Plan to make his way in the private sector, with a plan, he said, to come back at a higher level, which he did much later.

Q: When he was Ambassador to Greece.

SPECTOR: To Greece, that's right. He came back in as a deputy AID director. So they assigned me to the Organization and Management section, where I tried to put into effect what I considered to be a kind of sensitive way of doing management reform.

At the end of 1950, I came down with a bad case of hepatitis. I was out for about six weeks, and somebody gave me a book to read by Stewart Chase called The Proper Study of Mankind. That's a part of a quote from Alexander Pope, "The proper study of mankind is man." It turned me on to the whole subject of really a personal psychology as the basis of personnel, as the basis of organization. I resolved then to learn a lot more about psychology and about people in organizations if I were going to be a better personnel person or organization person. I actually went into some kind of psychotherapy with an American psychiatrist who was with the U.S. Public Health Service in Paris named Mottram Torre.

I had Dr. Torre meet with our whole organization and method staff in a kind of sensitivity-training session, although we weren't calling it that in those days. What I was really trying to get them to do, and myself to do, was to be aware of the problems that the other people had in their organization. So when you went in, you weren't just coming in with all your brilliance and brains and finding brave new wonderful ways of doing things, but you were working with the people in the offices to find a better and more efficient way of doing it. I think we were partially successful in that. That's a philosophy I've carried down to this present day.

Q: What sort of direction were you getting when you were in Paris? Averell Harriman was in charge of the mission at that time, is that correct?

SPECTOR: Yes.

Q: What were the manifestations of his direction that you yourself were getting?

SPECTOR: To tell you the truth, Harriman did not care very much about organization or administration. I think he took it as kind of a necessity; it was there. He didn't care much about it. So we didn't get much direction from Harriman. Harriman was concerned, and I think he had to be, really, with the relationships with the Marshall Plan countries, the way they were organizing themselves to deal with the problem, which I think was his greatest contribution.

As Lincoln Gordon has said in his oral history interview, Harriman, General Marshall, and Paul Hoffman said, "You European countries decide what you want to do and how you want to go about it, and you organize yourselves into a group. We'll deal with that group, and that group will help everyone decide how the resources should be allocated to each country." Harriman worked out things like that.

Down at my level, I really did not get much from Mr. Harriman, although I had the greatest admiration for him. I think when I was working in Organization and Management, where I really worked more closely with the program was with Lincoln Gordon, who was then the head of program for the ambassador. By that time, Harriman had gone back to Washington to be the Coordinator of Mutual Security, and I think William Foster was the head of the Marshall Plan in Europe. Lincoln Gordon had just come from a trip to most of the missions, and he said, "I don't understand why every mission should be organized like every other mission and have more or less the same administrative resources to do their job. Why does every mission have to have an industry officer? Why does every mission have to have a tourism officer?" I'll never forget, he said, "That's like saying that a size 38 coat will fit every man."

So under the direction of my new boss, a man named Harry Fite, he brought over from the Bureau of the Budget in Washington a couple of budget persons, and the three of us tried to work out a new kind of budgeting of administrative resources to be more in line with our policies and goals that we had in consort with each country. This, I really think, was

the predecessor to much later in the State Department, you may have heard about the comprehensive country program system that was tried in the early sixties, and went on even later in the PARA, Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation, which was run by Policy Planning and Coordination staff of the Department in the late sixties and early seventies.

We didn't get too far with it. Then the Korean War came along. The Korean War just changed all of our objectives in Europe. I'm not sure quite when NATO was being set up, but NATO was a big thing. Eisenhower was made the head of the military part of NATO. We gave some help to the NATO people in setting up their offices in Paris. Especially I remember meeting with General Gruenther on General Eisenhower's staff to help him set up a system for hiring of Foreign Service nationals, and giving him a general briefing on the salaries and so on that he could expect to pay for Foreign Service nationals.

But in 1951, I was asked to come back to Washington to become the Deputy Director of the Economic Cooperation Administration's personnel office in Washington.

Q: Before we move there, as you were hiring people, was there a concern that organizations like to get bigger? Particularly when you're hiring in a hurry and trying to put something together, I would think this would be a wonderful playground for people who wanted to build up empires and really have a lot more people or even tasks that maybe were inappropriate for what you were doing. Was there some control over this?

SPECTOR: Yes, we tried. For example, you couldn't set up a new position without having to go through at least two controls. One was the budget control, and we had a very good budget office run by a lady named Gladys Parlson, who much later became a Foreign Service officer and started a women's program in the Department of State many years later. She was a very tough budget officer.

Then they had to pass muster of my organization section which we had to set up the job, and we had to satisfy ourselves that that job was really needed. So we did have some kind of a control. It wasn't the firmest control in the world, because, frankly, we had a lot of money. As compared with the poor Department of State, we had all the money in the world, and we could do, so money was really not an object. It was just whether or not you had good management. Luckily, we did.

At the top of administration was Leland Barrows, who later became a Foreign Service officer and ambassador. He was a career public servant who had run many other organizations, and his deputy was Everett Bellows, another career administrative man. None of us were in there to build up big bureaucracies, frankly. But it could have happened.

Q: How did you deal with the various AID directors in different countries? Did they become their own little dukedoms?

SPECTOR: Yes, they were little dukes. One of the things that made them little dukes was that by law, they ranked second to the ambassador--by law--which, by the way, didn't make the deputy chiefs of missions very happy around the circuit. These were powerful men, men like David Bruce, Tom Finletter, former Secretary of the Navy, Zellerbach, of Zellerbach Paper, who was our mission director in Italy. So these were men who had run big organizations and thought they knew what they were doing.

I would like to get on this money question for just a second, because there built up a kind of envy, I think, on the part of the regular Foreign Service to the people who were in the Marshall Plan, and I think, probably, for good reason. I think our jobs were probably graded a little higher, whereas the rank in the Foreign Service was in the person. They had to wait for their promotion by the selection boards, and State Department was perennially underfunded and probably cut down the number of promotions based on the funds available. In that Marshall Plan people could also travel. I'm talking now about traveling for business purposes. But there was lots of money for travel. We had the counterpart funds to be used for that, whereas the State--then and now--and I'm talking in 1988, probably still doesn't have the necessary funds for the travel it ought to be allowing its officers to use.

Q: You might explain counterpart funds.

SPECTOR: When grants were made to these Marshall Plan nations, they were supposed to match the grants with their own local currencies, which then were to be put into a fund and to be used jointly under the command of the Marshall Plan people and the country itself. Ten percent of those funds, I believe was the amount, was set aside to be used for administrative purposes by the Marshall Plan people. That was a great deal of money, and the first few months was used pretty wildly. We were always having meetings in Paris of the industry officers or the agriculture officers or the labor officers. The champagne flowed very freely.

A man who showed up at every one of those parties was Art Buchwald, who was the local food editor for the Paris edition of the New York Herald Tribune. That's how we all got to know Art Buchwald. He had a very small salary of $200 or $300 a month that came out of the Army Stars and Stripes, and Art used to come and freeload.

On the other hand, I think the Marshall Plan was good for the Foreign Service in that because it had this kind of money, it was able to take a more liberal interpretation of the rules and regulations of the Foreign Service. For example, in 1948, when you were accumulating time toward your home leave, if for any reason when you were at post you had to return to the United States for compassionate leave, say a death in the family or whatever, the Foreign Service made you start your home leave all over again from the time you got back to post. You could be 18 months toward your 24 months of home leave, and if you came back with the approval of the Department, your home leave began all over again. That was strictly because of trying to save money. The Department then was badly, badly managed of what financial funds that it did have.

We said, "This is ridiculous. If somebody returns from compassionate leave or any leave approved by his or her superiors, there's no reason to begin again." So we got them to change the regulations. State didn't want to do it because of their "lack of funds," but we did it, and they had to do it because of equity. I think from that standpoint, we were a good influence on the Department, because then the Department budget people could go to the Congress the next year and say, "Look, we just have to have more funds because we can't allow our people not to have the same things that the people in the Marshall Plan have." So we were always a step ahead, and the State Department came up behind us. I think from that standpoint, we did good things.

We used to use the Marshall Plan Act to amend the Foreign Service Act. Later we were able to get through much better medical care for dependents and medical travel, using the Foreign Assistance Act, and therefore amend the Foreign Service Act.

Q: When you were in Europe and working on personnel, were you getting suggestions or examples that came from the various missions that you had then put into practice? Was this a constantly evolving situation as far as personnel management?

SPECTOR: I think we got ideas about better recruitment. I don't remember getting any real ideas, frankly. maybe we were just numb to them; I'm not sure.

I would like to talk about one thing, Stu, that I did in my job in organization. There were two foreign information programs going on in Europe. The Marshall Plan had its own large information program. Of course, as I told you, having all this money, both dollars and counterpart, they were able to issue magazines, able to have fairs of all kinds of information, able to start scholarships sending people back to the United States for training, and you also had the Department of State's cultural information program as part of the Department of State. So you had, really, two information programs going in all of your diplomatic missions. You had the Marshall Plan's information program, and you had the State Department's cultural and information program.

I was sent on a trip to Turkey and worked out with the ambassador there a trial run at combining those two information operations into one and under one head, staffed both by Marshall Plan and State Department people. I think this was really a forerunner to the United States Information Agency's operation, because it was fairly clear that you didn't need two or three different information programs going.

I think that's about all I can say about my sojourns in Europe.

Q: You were going to talk about the problem of communists in personnel. We are talking about the beginning of the Cold War and the start of the McCarthy era and all that.

SPECTOR: Yes. You're talking about early 1948, late '47, when they were talking about the Marshall Plan Act. One of the ways that I believe the administration felt that it could

get the Marshall Plan Act through was to impose a very, very severe security clearance test for anyone that was hired by the Marshall Plan. It was probably the most severe of any in government at that time. No one could work for the Marshall Plan who had ever been a member of an organization that advocated the overthrow of the government, and that meant that the Attorney General had a list of such organizations, and some of them were pretty far-fetched.

Q: The Black Dragon Society was one of them.

SPECTOR: Right. There was the famous Washington bookshop which caught an awful lot of people.

Q: It was a cooperative, really, on the liberal left.

SPECTOR: Right. But it was on the Attorney General's list. Actually, I had been a member of that shop, so you can make exceptions. I joined it because it was in the building where I worked, and I went in there to buy books. By signing a card, you'd get ten percent off on buying a book.

But what we did, though, which was very interesting, is that we hired people on a very quick security clearance. There were already files being built up by the House Un-American Activities Committee. There were also files by the FBI. We did what was called a quick name check, and if those people did not show up on those name checks, we hired them and sent them overseas. Later was the full FBI check. These were by the FBI, not by anyone else. As you know, a security clearance can be made by many other than the FBI. The Civil Service Commission and many departments had their own, but ours were done by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. They could take three or four months to come over. I think we had a fraction, a tenth of one percent, maybe less than that, that ever were turned out by the full security clearance.

Only much later, in 1964, did AID put in the idea that they had to get a full security clearance before anybody was hired by the AID agency, which has held up an awful lot of people.

I would like to speak to that for just a moment. I think one of the bad things that have happened in the last 30 or 40 years is that we have confused a security clearance with a qualifications check. In the old days, probably before World War II, personnel officers had personnel investigators. These were people that weren't checking security; they were checking on your references, checking on your qualifications for the position. They weren't checking on your honesty, about whether or not you had filled out your forms correctly. But later that became a security check, on whether or not you were a security risk, whether or not you were going to harm the federal government. So you had this job taken over by investigators, rather than by personnel officers. I think that's still a mistake that we make. When you're looking to a background today of a John Tower, to be Secretary of Defense, they're concentrating on whether or not he was a womanizer or

whether he drank too much, but I think it would be more apt to concentrate on what kind of philosophy he brings to his position of Secretary of Defense. What are the requirements of the job of Secretary of Defense? That's how you begin this thing. Then what kind of qualifications and experience should he have?

Q: Before we go back to Washington, were you involved in the recruitment of foreign nationals, too?

SPECTOR: Oh, yes. We recruited quite a number.

Q: Where were they coming from? What type of people were they?

SPECTOR: I must say, in those days, it was mostly secretaries, messengers, because we did consider our work classified. I don't think we used very much the higher qualified people. We did use them in the information program. There we could use artists, performers, writers, and you weren't dealing with classified information. They were recruited out of the usual places, out of academia, out of newspapers, magazines, motion picture studios, and so on. So we had Foreign Service nationals working for the Marshall Plan. Probably some are still working around the world that started back then.

Q: What were the people that you were hiring doing for the most part? You said that the Marshall Plan was essentially getting the Europeans together to figure out how to help themselves, and we would supply the wherewithal. So what were we doing?

SPECTOR: In a country such as Turkey, we would help them with their agriculture, even though all of the wherewithal came through the Marshall Plan. But we based it on recommendations from the European group itself. But you helped them in agriculture, gave them ideas on industry, on labor relations. You tried to influence them as best you could. You couldn't tell them what to do, obviously, but you'd influence them. Of course, if you had a little bit of leverage behind you of the money, because you had something to say about how much money they got, you could make some influence on them.

Q: You say you couldn't tell them what to do, but if we were in a position to say, "Okay, we'll give you the money if you do this, but we won't give you the money to do that," that's telling them what to do, isn't it?

SPECTOR: Yes, yes. It was a little bit of both. You tried to work back through the European community, too. You'd try to speak with the same voice. They were probably getting the same advice out of Paris from the overall European group as the mission director or his people were getting in Ankara. That's why you needed coordination back in Paris. The people in Paris coordinated in two different ways. One, they were coordinating the work of their missions, but they were also working with the European Economic Community.

Actually, dealing with the Marshall Plan countries, the advanced countries, you have to make a distinction between the United Kingdom, France, Germany on the one side, and dealing with Greece and Turkey or Ireland on the other side. Even today, Greece, Turkey, and Ireland are developing countries, whereas the other countries didn't need an awful lot of advice. They already had institutions and they had the human resources, and all they needed really was the capital, some coordination, and some help with directing resources, timbers for coal mines, as Lincoln Gordon said. But really, to some of those countries, maybe the biggest thing was just the financial resources. But Greece and Turkey were something else, and Southern Italy, as distinct from Northern Italy.

Q: Did our staffing reflect this?

SPECTOR: Yes.

Q: Because sometimes the largest staffs tend to end up in London and Paris, and not in Ankara and Athens.

SPECTOR: See, that was the point about the thing with Lincoln Gordon. We began to cut staff in places where there was really no need for that. I remember we cut Belgium badly, we cut France, but we did not cut Greece, we did not cut Turkey, because they needed the people. Now, whether we did it as well as we could have done it, that is something else. It depends an awful lot on the mission director, as it still does.

To jump to 1973 when I was working for the State Department on staffing the whole world, that was my job working under Bill Macomber, I found out that Italy had 15 officers in its economic and commercial section, whereas Germany had about six. You compare our relations with Italy and Germany. The difference was that in Italy, you had an ambassador named Graham Martin, and Graham knew how to get people, and he liked to build up big staffs. (Laughs)

Q: So we'll talk about going back to Washington. When did this happen?

SPECTOR: It happened in April of 1951. I came back to be the Deputy Director of Personnel. What we called the Marshall Plan was different things. It was Economic Cooperation, and then it became the Mutual Security Agency, later became the Foreign Operations Administration, and so on. But whatever it was, I came back to be the Deputy Director of Personnel. Of course, people don't realize the Marshall Plan had programs that were really run by the Marshall Plan in Korea and in the Philippines, and something going on in India, in China, and later in Formosa. So we had programs all over the world.

About that same time, Averell Harriman was made Coordinator of Mutual Security in the White House, and he coordinated not only what we call the Marshall Plan, the Mutual Security Agency, but what was the Technical Cooperation Administration, or Point Four, and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs in Latin America. I was assigned to be personnel advisor to that group, as well.

Our main job in the personnel office was to try to get several things. One was to get people that could operate overseas. A person who could operate very well in the United States, could operate well in Washington or Omaha or Denver, may find it a much different job of operating well in Manila or in Saigon, where we had a mission. So how could you find this out? How did you know before that person left? You were investing an awful lot of money. You weren't just hiring a person; you were sending him and his family over at a big expense and a lot of time. You sent a person over to be a Chief of Agriculture in Manila, and if he didn't work out because he couldn't work in a foreign environment, you had wasted an awful lot of money and were way back in your implementation. So we tried.

We put money into a program with the Civil Service Commission, we, the foreign aid agency, the Air Force, and the U.S. Public Health Service. We put in $50,000 back in 1951, which was a lot of money back then. We didn't come out with very much. I mean, the Commission tried to devise a test, an examination. They used sociologists and anthropologists. But we really couldn't come out with any clear-cut, easy way to determine whether a person was going to work well. It's not like the Foreign Service.

The Foreign Service went in as FSO-8, you either made it or you didn't. By the time a person came to a position where he was going to be a chief of a political section or chief of an economic section, you knew that he or she could operate overseas. But when you're hiring just out of the general populace to go in at an equivalent grade of an FSR-3 or FSO-2, you just don't know.

About the only thing I ever came up with was, "Does this person have a sense of humor?" If a person is kind of at peace with himself and the world and can take things in stride, he or she will probably do well overseas. That's about all I ever came up with.

Q: It's a fairly standard test. I think from my experience in the Foreign Service. But how could you test this out when you were trying to hire somebody?

SPECTOR: We couldn't.

Q: What was going on in hiring? Interviews?

SPECTOR: Yes. For the very top job, there was an executive recruiter, which that agency had had, and still has to this day, who hires the mission directors and deputy mission directors and office chiefs. Everyone else was hired by the personnel office, which was the bulk of the people.

The first thing you had to do was be pretty sure that you were describing the kind of position that was going to be filled. This was another thing. You couldn't just take a position and say, "We need a chief of industry or chief of forestry for the Philippines." One of the things I instituted when I was there was a detailed job description with a

qualifications statement to spell out the kinds of relationships that that position had with other positions and with the country in which that position was located. So when people say, "We just can't give you that much information," we sent a long letter. It took several weeks for it to get to Washington. Couldn't use the cable system because that was too expensive. So we instituted what was called the AirPAR. It was an airgram position analysis request. You know the system of airgrams within the State Department. At least we used to have them. So at least we did it by air mail, and they were pretty detailed position descriptions.

Q: The airgram system is essentially writing a telegram with telegraph ease, putting it in the mail.

SPECTOR: Sending it by air mail, rather than surface. Then the other thing you tried to do is in your interviews, you tried to sensitize your recruiters to the jobs overseas, and in their conversations with the people, try to ascertain how flexible they were, whether they not only knew their specialty, what they were being recruited for, but what kind of people were they. What they did much later, after I left, that was much letter, they would send recruiters out to interview these candidates in their homes. They would say, "I'm going to be in Denver and I'd like to talk to you about this position of agriculture officer in Saigon. I'd like to come over some time and have a cup of coffee with you and your wife." That, I think, is a great improvement.

The best way, of course, is testing in a work-like situation, which the OSS [Office of Strategic Services] did during World War II, but we didn't have that kind of money or that much time. The agency that's doing it today is the Peace Corps. The Peace Corps did that, and does it to this day. People are hired into the Peace Corps on what is really a temporary basis, and put through what's called training, but it's very rigorous training. If they make that training, then they go on and become Peace Corps volunteers. That's what we should have tried to do in the Marshall Plan, but we didn't have that kind of money or time to do it.

The other thing we tried to do was at least sensitize our people to dealing in foreign situations. What had happened was, about that time, President Eisenhower became President, and Secretary Dulles became Secretary of State, and brought in people like Scotty McLeod to be the Assistant Secretary for Administration, and cut staffs.

One of the places they cut severely was the Foreign Service Institute. The Foreign Service Institute had been hiring anthropologists on their staff to do training in this whole area of dealing in foreign cultures. But with Dulles, those people were fired. What they fired, we hired. We used them in the Marshall Plan to orient our people, to give training to our people. We also used people from the Department of Agriculture's Foreign Security Administration, because in the Department of Agriculture, you have county agents going out and dealing with farms, and they have to learn how to relate to the farmers' problems and to his situation. We felt that people like that could be helpful to our people dealing in a foreign environment.

One of the things that happened which has never been taken full advantage of by the federal government was that about every year we'd get something called the Ribicoff Amendment. Ribicoff was then a congressman, later a senator and later Secretary of HEW. Ribicoff always felt that we had too many people in the Foreign Aid Agency, so every year he would add an amendment to our authorization act, or the appropriations act, I'm not sure which, that said, "The ECA has 90 days after the enactment of this Act to reduce its personnel paid from administrative funds." That meant most of the funds in Washington, by a certain amount, ten or fifteen percent. "Within this time, all other laws are suspended." That means the Veterans Preference Act, the Civil Service Act, everything, which meant we had authority just to fire--BOOM!--without any notice, nothing, without giving any cause. It was a great way to cut people. We didn't like to do it, of course, but we did it.

The way we did it was very interesting. What we did, we first reorganized. If you're going to cut 10%, you say, "Where can we cut back on functions or activities or make things more efficient so we can do with less people?" So what you first do is go through your organization and see where you can eliminate positions. Then you let the ordinary Civil Service reductions-in-force apply. That seems very simple, but we let them apply until it hurt. In other words, if the reduction-in-force was going to get a very good person that was just an excellent person that really we needed badly, the supervisor of that person would appeal and say, "I don't want this person to be cut." That would go to a board of three top officials in the agency. On the other hand, if the personnel cut, the RIF, did not get a real loser, someone who brought Collier's to work every day and leafed through it for eight hours . . .

Q: Collier's being a popular magazine at that time.

SPECTOR: I was trying to date this. Then that could be appealed, too, and that's what we did. We had a group at the top, and you could make these appeals. We didn't have very strong unions in those days, so this went through pretty well with very, very little kickback. The Ribicoff Amendment was in effect about two years, and we did it twice. As a matter of fact, we got calls from the House Post Office Committee and others to say, "How did you do it? We'd like to see if we can't apply that same system to the rest of the government."

But then along came Harold Stassen. Harold Stassen was made the head of the foreign assistance agencies by President Eisenhower. He gave Stassen the authority to amalgamate all of the foreign aid agencies, getting to one. That was the Technical Cooperation Administration, Inter-American Affairs, and the Mutual Security Agency, into one. It was set up as the Foreign Operations Administration, as distinct from policy being set by State, because Governor Stassen and Secretary Dulles, between them, had made the deal that Secretary Dulles would set the policy and Governor Stassen would operate. That's why we got that horrible name of the Foreign Operations Administration.

The missions were called the United States operations missions, which is another horrible name, almost as horrible as the present day AID, which I do not like either.

So I was then the Acting Director of Personnel, and I am the top administrative man under Governor Stassen. He was given the same law. He had to cut his people by 28% within 90 days, without any regard. He could suspend any Act of Congress, any law, and so on. We told him how we had done it before, and we recommended he do it that way again. I think the way he put it, he said, "Well, if that's the way Harry Truman did it, then I don't want to do it that way." He said, "Why can't we give everyone a test, an examination, a written test? Based on the test scores, decide who is going to stay or who is going to go."

Well, I was appalled at this. I went to the Civil Service Commission, got the very top testing man, the chief of their examinations, who devised all the testing for the U.S. civilian government. His name is Milton Mandell. We both went to see Governor Stassen, and he said, "Governor, you give examinations when you hire people if you don't know anything about them, but once they're working for you, you should know how well they're doing through other means without giving them a test. I don't think a test will do much for you."

The Governor said, "I'm sorry. I want a test." So Mandell devised two different tests. One was a general intelligence test, dealing with everybody, and then the other test was an administrative test of how well you were as a manager or administrator, given to people of higher grades. You figured that people of a higher grade, say a GS-9 or GS-11, had to supervise other people. And everybody had to take the test, except Governor Stassen and myself. We were exempt by his orders. However, I decided to take the test. I decided it wouldn't look good if I didn't take it, and he decided to take it. You're probably wondering how well we did. We both did very well. I don't remember quite where he or I ranked out of the total ranking.

Then the Governor took these tests, their scores, and through some arcane arithmetic, mathematics, he took the test scores, plus he looked at every person's personnel file who worked in Washington.

Q: He did this himself?

SPECTOR: Personally, including their raw data of their security examinations. You understand these are raw data, have not been evaluated. All of these people had passed their security. I carried those over to him every day. I would carry it in personally. He was over in the Executive Office Building, which is now the Old Executive Office Building, and the office is now occupied by the Vice President. We had a big chart room set him for him there, and he had a pot of coffee going all day long. He had learned how to drink coffee working for Admiral Halsey, a Navy man. The Chief of Security would bring over these security files, and he would take those two files, read them both, look at their test scores, and then make a decision who was to go, who was to stay.

We never quite figured out how he put all this together. I know that he personally read every file of every person, because he would have details. He had a wonderful mind, a wonderful memory. When he'd come to a case like ten economists, GS-14, he said to me, "Mel, if I find that they all come out about the same with their experience and on their test scores, and I find one that has a little problem in their security file, then that's the one I'm going to fire." And that's what he did. Of course, it made for some real hardships, because out of ten people, two had to be fired.

This is an actual case. It turned out in one man's security file that he didn't pay his debts very well on time. I mean, he was a fine officer, a brilliant man, but didn't pay his debts. He was always a little bit in debt. That turned up in his security file. Stassen fired him.

Another man was fired, the only thing against him, it turned out in the file, was that he had been a friend of Alger Hiss. Nothing else, just knew him, worked with him, and that was enough.

So that was a very tough period for me, because I saw lots of injustice. My name was in every letter, because every letter said, "You will see Mr. Spector, and he will help you find a new job, and he will tell you what your rights are." Of course, I was running personnel, supposedly, and I'd go home every night, have a couple of martinis and tell my wife I was quitting. Then my wife and all my friends would tell me, "Look, quitting doesn't help. If you stay, you can mitigate the situation perhaps." But I had to fire some very good friends of mine. Some were being fired just because he had too many. When he put these agencies together, he had maybe four comptrollers and only wanted to keep one. He fired the other three. He had to put together a big legal office. Each of the agencies had legal officers. He fired one of my best friends out of Inter-American Affairs. So it was a tough time for me.

Later, that authority evaporated. The 90 days was up, and his top administrative man, General Riley, the top Marine under Halsey in the Pacific, Stassen hired him to be the top administrative man under him, he came to me one day with a list of 38 names and he said, "The Governor wants you to fire these people."

I said, "The Governor doesn't have that authority anymore. I'll fire them if there's a reason to fire them under law."

The general blew up and stomped out of my office, fuming. He was that kind of guy, a real Marine Corps prototype. I don't mean to be doing the Marine Corps any injustice, but he was the stereotype of a blustery, red-faced, cigar-chewing general. I said, "I'm sorry, General, he doesn't have the authority. I'll look into all these cases."

Well, I decided then to go home. This was February. I just walked out of the office, went home, and painted the basement. I just would not carry out those orders. A lot of those 38 people called me. By the way, not a single one of them was ever fired. There wasn't

enough on any of them, all this junk about being a friend of a friend of Alger Hiss or knew William Remington at the Department of Commerce.

In the meantime, I'd gotten to know a man named Henry Du Flon. Henry Du Flon had gone to work in the White House under President Eisenhower. President Eisenhower set up in the White House an Office of Personnel to look over the entire personnel system of the federal government--everything--Foreign Service, Civil Service, and so on, under Phillip Young. Phillip Young had been president of General Electric, but also under Eisenhower he was the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission. So Phillip Young had two hats. One was a White House hat, and the other was a Civil Service hat. In the White House hat, he had two men working for him. One was a man named Joe Winslow, handling Civil Service, but he hired Henry Du Flon, who came out of private industry, to look at all foreign civilians overseas, not the military--the Department of Defense, Department of State, Mutual Security, Public Health Service, Agriculture, you name it.

Du Flon came had come to see me as one of the people involved in personnel, and liked my ideas on personnel. He had visited people in the State Department, USIA. So about my second week at home, I got a call one day from Henry Du Flon, saying, "What are you doing?"

I said, "I'm reading the newspaper," whatever I was doing.

He said, "I need some help down here at the White House. I'm going to ask for a new personnel system for foreign affairs. How about coming down and working for me?"

I said, "Great!" Well, here I showed up working in the White House, and everyone in Washington thought I was on the White House blacklist and kind of under a black cloud at the Marshall Plan. Really, friends on the street turned the other way and wouldn't speak to me. But suddenly I show up in the White House. Then suddenly, they're all friends of mine again.

What we were trying to do at the White House was very interesting. What Du Flon had come up with was that we needed a foreign affairs system for the true foreign affairs agencies. Those were the Department of State, the aid agency, generic aid, USIA. But the real problem, Stu, was that the Civil Service had always wanted to take over the Foreign Service. They did not understand why the Civil Service that worked so well for the Department of Defense and for grades registration, wasn't just absolutely the thing to do for the Department of State. So really, what Du Flon was doing was fending off. There was great pressure. The Air Force, for some reason or other, I remember, said, "Why should there be a separate Foreign Service? Those officers ought to be just like our civilians, exactly the same thing."

So what Du Flon came up with, and I was helping him, was one Foreign Service system that would envelop both State, AID, and USIA, information, economic development, political counselor. People would all come in at the same level on kind of a temporary

appointment, and then when they proved themselves, would be commissioned officers. If that sounds like the Foreign Service Act of 1980, you're quite right. It finally came through later.

Du Flon had this approved with charts and an outline by the Chief of Staff of the White House, Sherman Adams, by the President. He had gone to Congress and had briefed the Senate and the House. They both agreed that this was what we were going to do. I was hard at work, working for Hank Du Flon. I was being processed out of the White House staff to help carry this thing out, when one morning, a Saturday morning, I got a call from Du Flon, saying, "Can you come down to the office? There's something happening."

I went down to the office at the Old Executive Office Building. He'd had a call from one of the congressmen, saying, "Hey, you told us that you were going to put in a whole new personnel system. We've been just briefed by Beetle Smith at the State Department saying that they're getting a man in named Wriston to examine what ought to be done about the Foreign Service. We thought you had all this done."

What happened, as you know, as history tells us, Wriston did come in and proposed the Wriston plan of "Wristonization" of the State Department, and our plan got off the ground. I eventually left personnel and went on to Mexico to become the program officer there, the deputy chief of the mission in Mexico.

The State Department knew what Du Flon was up to, and you had an unholy alliance of the career Foreign Service officers and Scotty McLeod, who had been the former deputy to J. Edgar Hoover at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who was the new Assistant Secretary for Administration, who wanted to weed out of the State Department all of these homosexuals and security risks. He saw "Wristonization" as a way to get rid of a lot of people, which was done. I think "Wristonization," by and large, was not good for the State Department.

Q: "Wristonization" essentially was the amalgamation of most of the Civil Service into the Foreign Service, which also meant that those who were, under the State Department terms, "Wristonized," many who were Washington-based, found themselves having to go abroad, which they didn't want to do.

SPECTOR: Right.

Q: There was considerable attrition by this. In fact, the old Foreign Service made out very well, because any attrition in the Foreign Service corps came out of the ranks of the newly arrived "Wristonees."

SPECTOR: Right. There's one more thing I do want to say about "Wristonization." There was good and bad out of the "Wristonization." I'm looking at it from the policy basis of the State Department. You had many entrenched desk officers or country directors who hadn't left those posts. I know of one case where a woman had started out as a clerk, as a

typist, and ended up as the office director after 28 years. Our policy toward country X had remained the same over 28 years as long as she was there. Getting her out was a wonderful thing, to get some fresh air. But what happened was, because the State Department in those days did not have an institutional memory--and probably still doesn't, I hate to say.

Q: We're trying in these oral histories to create one.

SPECTOR: By these very people that left, you lost your institutional memory, and we never made up for that.

Q: One last question. In the hiring and firing, both abroad and in Washington, during the period of time when you were having to move fast under the Marshall Plan type programs, what sort of role did political pressure play on you? I'm talking about patronage, really, from Congress, from presidential?

SPECTOR: I always fought it vigorously, and probably to my own career's detriment. Frankly, I can say that I never let it play a part. At the higher levels, it's certainly true that you want both parties to be represented. Remember the Marshall Plan was conceived and directed at the very end of Truman's first term, and he very wisely appointed a Republican to head up the Marshall Plan, Paul Hoffman. In Europe, he had a Democrat heading up the Office of Special Representative, Averell Harriman. But in a lot of the hiring of the mission directors, Republicans came to be hired. I don't know if it's because they were Republicans, but because Hoffman was a Republican. He looked for industry people mostly. They were Republicans.

I remember one day I was having breakfast at the old All States' Cafeteria. David Niles, who was an assistant to President Truman, whom I knew, came in and sat with me. He said, "You know, I wish you'd get over to those people that we don't like what's happening in the Marshall Plan. You're hiring all Republicans."

Well, I don't think it was true. I really felt very little pressure.

Q: It was also a period of a pretty much bipartisan approach. The problem was so overwhelming, wasn't it? This was looked upon somewhat differently than maybe later on.

SPECTOR: I do want to give you a couple of anecdotes which, of course, are going to be very self-serving. You understand that, Mr. Kennedy.

I late became Director of the Agency for International Development, personnel director. I got a call one day from a congressman from New Mexico, where I'm originally from. His name was Joe Montoya. He's now passed away, so I can tell this story. Joe Montoya was then a congressman, and I'd been on a trip with him to Mexico. He said, "Mel, I have a friend, someone who hangs around the courthouse around these New Mexico counties."

You know the minute he says "courthouse," he's a local politico. "I'd like you to give him a job overseas. I'm sure he could do one of your administrative jobs, your servicios in Latin America."

I said, "Joe, I'd be very happy to meet the gentleman personally, give him a courtesy." I was director of personnel, but I was going to meet him personally. "I'll interview him. If we have a position that's appropriate and if he qualifies, of course we will consider him."

He said, "Mel, you don't understand. You owe me 12 jobs."

I said, "I what?"

He said, "You know that I'm on the House Subcommittee on Appropriations. I helped you get another $100 million. You owe me 12 jobs."

I said, "Joe, I just don't understand that at all. Thank you very much." Of course, I didn't do it.

But I have a much better story that I want to tell you quickly. This is back during the Marshall Plan days of 1951 or '52. I got a call one day from Senator McKellar of Tennessee. Senator McKellar was the chairman of our committee that approved the billions of dollars that went into the Marshall Plan. He said [in a thick Southern twang], "Mr. Spector, I sure would appreciate it if you would do me a favor. I have a young congressmen from Tennessee who's got a problem, and I wondered if you and he and I could have lunch together." Well, you know, if any senator asks you to lunch and also when he is the senator who controls your appropriations, you go to lunch.

I said, "Yes, Senator." So I went up to the Hill.

He said, "You meet me in Congressman So-and-so's office," who was a young congressman.

I went to the congressman's office. He said, "Come in." He was being fitted for a new $200 suit, which was a lot of money in those days. He had a tailor in there fitting him. He said, "The senator just called. He can't make lunch with us, but he said maybe would you mind just having lunch with me alone?"

I said, "Mr. Congressman, of course not. I'd be delighted."

So as we're going out the door, we walk into the House Dining Room, and there's a lovely young lady standing by the door. He says, "Well, look who's standing here?" He said, "Mr. Spector, I'd like you to meet Miss So-and-so."

I said, "How do you do?" She was very attractive.

He said, "Do you mind if she joins us for lunch?"

I said, "Of course not, Mr. Congressman." So she joined us for lunch.

It turns out this young lady had been a secretary to a congressman who had been defeated, and now she was a Capitol Hill guide. This young lady, according to the congressman, was a very good secretary and wanted to go to Paris, and we had jobs in Paris. He said, "I'm sure you can arrange that."

I said I'd be very happy to give her an examination, which we did. We could give secretaries shorthand and typing exams. So I put her through all the process, and she did beautifully. She took dictation at 120 words a minute, typed at 120 words a minute, her reference checks were marvelous from all the previous congressmen. But I would not send her to Paris. I said, "We do not send people to Paris. We hire them to go wherever they are needed." This went on for several weeks. We'd have drinks together and dinner together, and I would not give in. He was playing the same game with Art Weatherbee at the Department of State and guys at USIA. We'd all gotten together and we'd said to each other, "Look, none of us are going to give in on this one," because you can't.

So finally, I got a call one day from Senator McKellar. He said, "I don't know. Let's just talk facts here, Mr. Spector. I've got to get that young lady out of the country. If she just wanted a trip to Paris, I'd just send a group over to Paris and send her over there. But she wants to live in Paris. Now, I can just tell you this is worth $500 million to you."

Well, luckily, I had my secretary on the phone. She took all this down. In those days, your secretary would listen in on your telephone conversations. I said, "Well, Senator, let me look into it." At that point, I thought, "$500 million is a lot of money. Maybe I wouldn't sell out for $1 million in appropriations, but $500 million?"

So I went over to see a wonderful man, Ty Wood. He was the acting head of the agency and also our liaison to Congress, a wonderful man, a good friend of President Eisenhower, by the way. He saved my neck later. I told him the story, and I said, "Ty, this is it. Senator McKellar says it's going to cost $500 million."

He was doodling. He was a big doodler. He looked up and said, "Mel, if you hire that young lady, she's going to go back to the Hill and tell everybody that she's going to Paris. There's lots of young ladies on the Hill who want to go to Paris. There will be 95 others." In those days, we only had 48 states. I remember the 95. "There will be 95 other senators calling you, saying they want their young ladies to go to Paris. No, no, don't give in." And we didn't. So that's one answer to the political pressure. (Laughs)

I want to tell you the end of the story. I got a call from the congressman about a month later. I was "Mel" by then. He said, "Mel, I want you to know that Miss So-and-so is going to Paris."

I said, "Well, isn't that great." I thought, "Which one of these SOBs has let me down in State or USIA?" I said, "Where is she going to work in Paris?"

"She's going to work for General Eisenhower."

Q: The Department of Defense got it's extra half a billion dollars.

SPECTOR: He went directly to Eisenhower. That's how I knew Eisenhower was going to get into politics.

Q: Thank you very much.

End of interview