The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

DONALD C. TICE

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Bulgarian-external relations
Vietnam War
Foreign students
"April Conspiracy"
Russian connection

American Political Science Association - Fellowship 1967-1968
Congressional operations
Politics
Senator Percy
"The March on Washington"
Jesse Jackson
Congressman Don Rumsfeld
Speech writing
Committee staffers

State Department - Special Assistant to Director General and Chief of Personnel 1967-1970
Foreign Service officer "rights" emerge
CORDS/Vietnam pressures
Cambodian "incursion" protest
"Open Forum"
Minority recruitment

State Department - Yugoslav Desk Officer 1970-1972
USIS in federation capitals
Artukovic "mass murderer"
Yugoslavs in U.S.
"Ustachi day"

Belgrade, Yugoslavia - Political Counselor 1972-1975
Consulate reporting
Political problems
Tito
Soviet influence
Mikhailovic statue controversy
Kosovo Republic (Albanians)
Bulgaria relationship
Belgrade "Eight"
Political officers
U.S. press
Nixon resignation

National War College 1975-1976
Vietnam influence

State Department - Assistant to Deputy Secretary of State 1976-1977
- Deputy Secretary of State Chuck Robinson
- Arms control and nuclear proliferation
- French activities
- Henry Kissinger

State Department - Executive Assistant to Under Secretary for Political Affairs 1977-1979
- Phil Habib
- Patt Derian
- Tony Lake
- Brzezinski
- Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
- State vs. National Security Council
- Terry Todman
- Human rights
- Speaking engagements

State Department - Inspection Corps 1979-1981
- Procedures
- Moscow embassy
- Narcotics issues (Colombia)

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) 1981-1984
- Executive Secretary to START delegation
- General Edward Rowny
- SALT II Treaty
- Soviets
- Stealth Aircraft
- Duties and procedures
- Congressional participation
- Soviet objectives
- "FROD" issues
- Missile types
- Paul Nitze
- Richard Perle
- Yuri Kvitzinski

World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC) 1984-1985
- Geostationary Satellite Orbit (GSO)
- Senior Foreign Policy Advisor
- Dean Burch
- Third World interests
- Soviet tactics

"Space WARC"
Burdis tough talk tactics
U.S. military interests
Lower Earth Orbit (LEO)
Satellite clearance procedures
ITU

State Department - Bureau of Diplomatic Security 1985-1986
Embassy security

State Department - Special Assistant to Ron Spiers 1987
Export licensing policy
Technology transfer
Richard Perle (ISA - Pentagon)
Bob Dean

White House Staff 1987-1989
"ISO" account
Telecommunications policy issue
Foreign affairs budgets
Refugees from USSR
Moscow visa problems

Retirement 1989
Booz-Allen

INTERVIEW

Q: Today is February 10, 1997. This is an interview with Donald C. Tice, a retired Foreign Service Officer. I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. Don, could you tell me where and when you were born?

TICE: Yes, I was born in Summerfield, Kansas, on March 27, 1932.

Q: Could you give me a little bit about your family: who you father and mother were and what they were doing, and a little bit about your early education?

TICE: Yes, When I was born, Summerfield, Kansas, was a little town of about 300 people. Now it's less than that. It "died on the vine" when the railroad, which had caused its establishment, went bankrupt in 1928. So, when I was growing up in the 1930's, the town that was already dying. However, it was a wonderful, "Norman Rockwell" [20th century American painter and illustrator for the "Saturday Evening Post"] kind of place to grow up.

My father was the pharmacist in town. My mother was a housewife, although with the onset of World War II, my mother started working in the drugstore when most of the young men in the town and surrounding area went into military service or went to larger towns to work in defense industries. Many other women similarly took paid jobs during World War II. She continued to work in the drugstore until she was quite well on in years.

Q: What about school? Could a town of less than 300 people support a school?

TICE: Oh, yes, because the rural areas surrounded it. At that time, prior to World War II, nearly every 80 acres of land had a farmstead and farm family living on it. That meant up to four farmsteads on many section of land. Now, if you go out into the rural areas in that part of Kansas, you'll find, maybe, one working farmstead for every couple of square miles. So there were a lot more people in the area when I was growing up.

At that time there still were many one-room country school houses where students in the first eight grades were taught. The high school I went to had, I would guess, about 100 kids in it. I graduated in a class of only eight people, the smallest for a long time. Keep in mind, however, that I was born in 1932 in the depths of the "Great Depression," and very few people were having children. You could hardly support a family under the circumstances. Another phenomenon came into play regarding the size of classes. I think that there were something like 28 students in my freshman class at high school. There was a big "fallout" in the immediate post-war period, with people moving away. In addition, in that day and age, a girl couldn't stay in high school she got pregnant, and if the boy in the equation was in school, he usually had to quit to assume his family responsibilities.

Q: At least up through high school, it doesn't sound like a very promising preparation to be a diplomat, out there in the middle of Kansas.

TICE: Well, I had two things going for me. Neither of my parents attended university. My father got his license as a pharmacist by apprenticeship. They were determined that both my brother and I would get degrees, and there was never any question about my going to a university.

The other circumstance was that I was the object of an educational conspiracy in high school. When I was beginning my freshman year, my father was Chairman of the School Board. He served in that position for something like 18 years. The Principal of the High School came to him and said that he wanted to informally move me into 2nd year classes with a group of more advanced students who were college bound because I already had a mastery of the first-year work and would simply be marking time. My father agreed, with the result that I had finished the regular curriculum by the end of the third year. In my senior year I took a few courses I had skipped before, and also was assigned some special projects which had me doing some research writing.

I was supported in all of this by some exceptionally good teacher who held my feet to the fire. I was never "cut any slack" [i.e., they never "let up" on me]. When I would do something that was probably superior to what the others in the class were doing, the teachers hold me to a standard based on what I was capable of, not what I had done. So I got a little "special education" there. [Laughter]

Q: When did you graduate from high school?

TICE: In 1950.

Q: So the Korean War had started. What happened then?

TICE: I went on to the University of Kansas, where I was enrolled in the ROTC [Reserve Officers Training Corps]. I originally had the intention of going to Medical School, because that was what my father told me I should do, and I thought that he probably knew best.

However, during my freshman year I had the experience of cutting up a frog in biology class, and I decided that this wasn't for me. I transferred to the journalism program. Ultimately, I graduated with the degree of Bachelor of Science in Journalism.

Q: What was the situation in the 1950's? The Cold War had started, and the Korean War was "going strong" during almost the entire period that you were at the University of Kansas. Did the subject of foreign affairs intrude on your consciousness? Were you looking at foreign affairs at all at this point?

TICE: I became aware of foreign affairs and interested in them through my classes in journalism. There

I had some excellent professors who tried to guide us on what we took in the College of Liberal Arts, in terms of history and political science. They virtually "forced us to read newspapers." That meant that you had to have read the daily newspaper every day before you went to your first class, or you were "dead meat" [likely to be "marked down" by the professor].

Q: In Kansas in the 1950's how did you find international news coverage?

TICE: We read the “Kansas City Star" and "Topeka Daily Capital." Neither of them was particularly good on foreign affairs, so I also read "Time" and "Newsweek." I would say that I depended more on the news magazines than on the daily newspapers for international news.

Q: Then you graduated from the University of Kansas in 1954?

TICE: Yes.

Q: Then what?

TICE: I went right into the U. S. Air Force. The Korean War was over by that time, but the draft was alive and well I had been in the Air Force ROTC [Reserve Officers Training Corps], but because they were reducing the size of the armed forces, commissions were not being given to Air Force ROTC graduates unless they could go to pilot training. I couldn't pass they eye test, so my choice was to be drafted or accept a two-year enlistment in the Air Force, entering as Airman Third Class via an abbreviated basic training course. I decided to go ahead and do that.

I was assigned to San Antonio, TX. I never left there. I was there for two years.

Q: Was this at Brooks or Lackland Air Force Base?

TICE: I was at Lackland Air Force Base.

Q: I did my Air Force basic training at Lackland in the summer of 1950.

TICE: I was assigned to what they called "Permanent Party" at Lackland Air Force Base there. As an enlisted man I ended up as the "Non Commissioned Officer in Charge" of a unit which was set up with a bunch of other ROTC NCO's to write correspondence textbooks which were to parallel the academic curriculum of the Officer Candidate School (OCS). My unit was co-located with the OCS at Lackland.

My first discovery was that the Officer Candidate School didn't have anything recognizable as an academic curriculum, so we wrote one. [Laughter] It was really great fun. We had this group of people, all college graduates, living in a barracks. We had our own barracks and set our own pace. What we did was create an academic curriculum. It was a very interesting 14 month assignment.

Then, unfortunately, I was commissioned a Second Lieutenant and wound up running a "billeting office," which was probably the least challenging thing that I've ever done.

Q: So when did you get out of the Air Force?

TICE: In 1956.

Q: Had you set out any "fishing lines" for other jobs?

TICE: I had worked as a newspaper "stringer" for United Press while I was at the University of Kansas. I got to do quite a lot of work for them, particularly in sports area. The University of Kansas was a big sports school, and I was the UP "stringer" for sports. At one time my roommate in the fraternity was Wes Santee, who was the guy most famous for saying: "Sure, I'll run the forum on my own" in a 'Life' Magazine in which he

was featured on the cover. However, Santee got at cross-purposes with Avery Brundage [Chairman of the American Athletic Union] and was disqualified from amateur athletics before he could do so. The four-minute barrier was broken by England's Roger Banister in the spring of 1954. Santee did break Pavo Nurmi's Olympic mark and held the world record for about a year at 4.0.4

I also interviewed for a job with the "Topeka Daily Capital." the principal newspaper in Kansas. I decided to go with them when I left the Air Force because they were prepared to pay me about 25 percent more than United Press, which, in any case, had no idea of where they would send me. So I decided to take "the devil that I knew" and went to work for the "Topeka Daily Capital." I stayed there for a year.

Meanwhile, I had taken the Foreign Service written exam twice, failed t the first time, and passed the second. When I didn't pass it the first time, I got a bunch of "College Outline" pamphlets on economics, politics, world and U.S. history, and government, and memorized a crib list my wife created on art, architecture, music, painting, and literature. I took the written exam for the second time in the spring, before I left the Air Force. This time I passed it.

Q: How did you hear about the Foreign Service and what inspired you to try for it?

TICE: My wife was interested in it, but, of course, married women were not permitted to join the Foreign Service. One of my colleagues in this Air Force textbook writing outfit said that he was applying to take the Foreign Service written exam, and he suggested that I go along with him. So I put in an application to take the exam. This was in the aftermath of the "McCarthy era" [reference to Senator Joseph McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin] when the State Department was trying very hard to recruit people for the Foreign Service, which had been decimated in the earlier part of that decade by the good Senator's charges of communist infiltration.

Q: Before you entered the Foreign Service, were you able to talk to anybody about what the Foreign Service did or anything like that?

TICE: I had never met a Foreign Service Officer until I showed up in Washington, DC, to enter the State Department. In retrospect, by the way, this was the point when Senator Fulbright [Democrat, Arkansas] was a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Fulbright wasn't Chairman of the Committee. Senator Theodore Francis Green [Democrat, Rhode Island] was the Chairman at that time. Senator Green was an elderly gentleman who was sort of "half awake" most of the time, and Senator Fulbright, in effect, pretty much ran the Committee. Fulbright was making a big "push" at that time for broadening the "base of recruitment" for the Foreign Service.

I've always felt that I was one of the early "affirmative action" candidates for the Foreign Service. I had not gone to Princeton, Yale, Harvard, or Dartmouth and I was born West of the Mississippi. In any case, I got in.

Q: I entered the Foreign Service in 1955. I remember that at that time there was talk about a "massive infusion of Main Street" into the Foreign Service. Where did you take your oral examination?

TICE: In St. Louis, MO.

Q: Do you recall how the oral examination that you took was conducted or any of the questions asked?

TICE: Yes, I do. There were three people on the board. It was all very "stiff and formal." I don't remember the names of any of the members of the board. One of them later was head of BEX [Board of Examiners of the Foreign Service], but his name escapes me now.

The most embarrassing question that they asked me was to name the original 13 colonies which later made up the United States. I learned later that that was considered a good, "trick" question. In any case, I could only name 12 of the original 13 colonies.

Q: That's like trying to name the "Seven Dwarfs" in the "Snow White" story.

TICE: They asked me some questions on economics. I'd been "boning up" on that subject and was forewarned on that kind of thing.

They asked me to name three successes and three failures in American foreign policy. I don't remember all of my answers now, but I said that one of the successes was the "Open Door" policy on China. We got into quite a debate on that, because one of the board members was a China expert. After this discussion had gone on for some time, the fellow who was debating this with me said: "Well, do I take it that you have changed your mind and have decided that the 'Open Door' policy wasn't a 'success?'" I said: "Oh, no, if that's what you think, I very badly expressed myself, so let's start all over again." [Laughter] He said: "Oh, no." However, when I finished the interview and left the room, I was very quickly called back in by the chairman of the oral board, who told me that I had passed, but "just barely." He said: "Let me tell you. You're probably one of the least qualified candidates that we've ever examined." He really ripped me up one side and down the other about all of the things that I didn't know. I went away very happy but chastened.

Q: When did you get married, by the way?

TICE: I was married in 1955, while I was in the Air Force.

Q: When did you start your basic officer's course at the State Department?

TICE: In August, 1957.

Q: Could you give me a little feel of the type of people who were in that course at that time and, perhaps, how the training program struck you?

TICE: Yes. There were, I think, 33 people in the course. As a whole, it was one of the oldest groups to enter the Foreign Service. There was quite a range of ages. I think that the oldest person in the course was Peter Sebastian. Peter was delayed in being accepted because he was not American born. He had to be a citizen for 10 years before he could come into the Foreign Service. The youngest member of the class was Dick Dwyer, now dead, who was then 22.

I would say that the majority were from the traditional schools that you would think of for people entering the Foreign Service. In addition to the "traditional schools," some of them had gone to the Georgetown School of Foreign Service. They were the ones who did all the talking. I recall that I was quite intimidated when I showed up for the "A-100" course [the entering FSO course]. They all came in carrying copies of "The New York Times" and were talking about foreign policy issues. I had never read "The New York Times" and did not talk about foreign policy issues. [Laughter] However, I quickly "cottoned onto" the fact that there was a bunch of other people like me who weren't doing all the talking but who, as it became clear, were just as smart as the others but not quite as articulate or as sure of themselves.

Q: And there was a certain amount of "posturing," too. When you came into the Foreign Service, it was a time when one dressed fairly impeccably. Speaking for myself, I felt almost as if I had gotten into the wrong "Club" when I entered the Foreign Service. I felt that my classmates in the A-100 course were all fancy dudes...

TICE: Oh, very much so. As a matter of fact, I owned only two suits at the time. One of them was "fawn colored." I quickly "ditched" that one and went into "hock" to get another suit.

Q: You must have gone to S. S. Schwartz in Baltimore.

TICE: Yes.

Q: Well, how about minority or women members of the class?

TICE: There were two women in our class: Phyllis Spaulding, I think, who later married Bob Oakley. Eventually, when they dropped the ridiculous rule that a married woman couldn’t be a Foreign Service Officer, she was able to return to the Foreign Service and is now an Assistant Secretary of State. There was another woman in the class whose name I forget right now. There were no "minority" members of the class.

Q: In your training was there much about American foreign policy or the background of the Foreign Service?

TICE: Yes, there was. We had some "area" lecturers and that kind of thing, but I don't remember that their lectures were particularly "deep." At that time I heard very little about the Foreign Service at all. However, I remember the language training courses much more vividly because they were so much more difficult.

Q: When you entered the Foreign Service, were your interested in some special area or function?

TICE: I was interested in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and in political analysis and reporting. I was initially assigned to an administrative job in one of the old, temporary buildings down by the Reflecting Pool between the Washington Monument and the Lincoln Memorial. Not the Navy Annex buildings on Constitution Ave. but the little, two story temporary buildings along the Reflecting Pool. I was in the "A" [Administrative] Area, working on regulations and procedures. It was something less than inspiring work.

Q: This was after you finished the A-100 course.

TICE: Yes, it was after I finished the A-100 class. That assignment to the "A" area lasted for a little less than a couple of years [1957-1959]. Then I was assigned to French language training at the Foreign Service Institute and was sent to the Consulate General in Antwerp, Belgium, where, of course, the Belgians were going through the French-Flemish "standoff." If you spoke French to the Flemish, they wouldn't even answer you.

Q: Well, let's talk a little bit about your first job, in the "A" area. It sounds like such an uninspiring area to assign a young officer with potential. Normally, the Department makes an effort to make the first assignment interesting by sending you overseas, or something like that.

TICE: Not then. The Department was having trouble finding places to "park" incoming junior officers." The Department was bringing in classes of new Foreign Service Officers every couple of months. This was done in an attempt to "repopulate" the Foreign Service because it had expanding responsibilities, new posts, and that kind of thing. However, the Foreign Service was still suffering from the McCarthy era, when many people had left the service.

Q: I think that I mentioned that I came into the Foreign Service in July, 1955. We were called "Class 1." Obviously, there had been A-100 classes before us, but there had been a long hiatus. This was just the beginning, and everybody was looking at us. All of a sudden it seemed like a "rebirth" of the Foreign Service.

TICE: By the time I entered the Foreign Service in August, 1957, I think that the Department had sort of hit "flood tide" on people coming into the Service. They were assigning us to just about any place available. Out of my class of 33 people only about

half a dozen went right out to an overseas post. The effort was to send a new officer overseas after one tour of duty in the Department, which is what happened to me.

Q: How did you find this business of writing rules and regulations? I would have thought that this would have been sort of a duplicate of your Air Force experience.

TICE: Yes, it was pretty dull, but there was an interesting bunch of characters doing it. They were all officers from the middle grades on up. They were "parked" there in the "A" area for some reason. Some of them had alcohol problems and some were "cantankerous" and difficult to assign, but it was an interesting bunch of people. It was great fun to be with them. My principal project was rewriting and updating the Emergency and Evacuation Manual for the State Department, drawing on the experiences of the Suez war in, I believe, 1956. An interesting aside on that work, when the draft was completed and approved, I sent it forward for printing recommending a red cover. I was told in no uncertain terms that was impossible, because red and pink were colors that could not be used because of the communist witch hunt pushed by the McCarthyites.

Q: Did you pick up anything about the administrative function that you later carried with you later on?

TICE: Oh, yes, quite a lot. Since we were working on the Foreign Service Regulations, I found even years later that I knew more about the Foreign Service Regulations than most other people did. Not that that really counted for much, unless you're an Administrative Officer, but that's what they made me next.

Q: Regarding this time you were in the Administrative area in the Department of State, from 1957 to 1959?

TICE: Right. In the fall of 1959 I was assigned to French language training.

Q: How long did that last?

TICE: Three months.

Q: So then you went to Antwerp in 1960?

TICE: I left Washington in November, 1959, on the SS UNITED STATES, bound for Le Havre, France. Nobody had ever told us that you should avoid crossing the North Atlantic Ocean in November of the year. [Laughter]

Q: You were in Antwerp from 1959 to 1961. What was your assignment?

TICE: I was first assigned as a Consular Officer, but they did a little shuffle at the post and I wound up as Administrative Officer for the first year [1960]. Then I was assigned as the Passport Officer in the Consular Section for the second year. That really was

fascinating for me, because this was a time when our passport and citizenship laws were such that they provided that a naturalized citizen lost American nationality if he or she didn't lived in the United States for "x" number of years after naturalization before going overseas, and all that kind of thing. Along with Haifa, Israel, Antwerp had been the center in Europe of the diamond trade. There were many, many Jews living in Antwerp. When the Nazi-directed "holocaust" was descending on Europe, they decamped to a third center of the diamond industry in the New World, in New York. Many of them stayed in New York for five years, or long enough to be naturalized as American citizens. Then they came back to Antwerp. There was an effort made to try to "catch" people who had come back to Europe on a permanent basis at that time, after naturalization in the United States. We called them "passport citizens." I always had a very uneasy feeling about that period because our instructions were to pick up the United States passports of anybody who had lived abroad for "x" number of years if they were presented at the Consulate. Then the case would be adjudicated by the Department. I felt a great sense of relief, years later, when that whole set of laws was "wiped out" by the Supreme Court. People whose passports I had taken up could then get them back. [Laughter]

Q: That was very difficult. I assume that the people in Antwerp who were involved in this kind of situation would present certificates from doctors that they couldn't leave, and that sort of thing.

TICE: Oh, yes. They would try to prove that they had been back to the U. S. and this kind of thing, but there was no notation to this effect in their passports. You remember, in the old days the immigration officials used to stamp entries into the U. S. in your passports.

Q: Could you talk a little about the Consulate General in Antwerp?

TICE: Yes. It had been one of our major Consulates in Europe because of the events of World War II. When the invasion of Normandy took place [in June, 1944], there were two ports which were candidates for the huge movements of incoming materials for the rest of the campaign in Europe. One was Rotterdam, and the other one was Antwerp. The Allies didn't have enough anti-aircraft defenses to cover both ports against the low level, "buzz bombs" fired by the Germans. These were called "V-1" bombs [or "Vengeance weapons," as the Germans called them]. So the Allies concentrated anti-aircraft guns around Antwerp, the more modern of the two ports, and it suffered only minor damage during the V-1 campaign. Lightly-defended Rotterdam was heavily damaged as a result. The result of that decision was that Antwerp and Brussels were two of the "best defended" cities in all of Europe. Even as late as late 1959 and 1960 Europe was still pretty much in a recovery phase. However, Belgium, with less recovering to do and the revenues created by having the only fully-functioning port in Northern Europe, had the highest cost of living in Europe at that time. Although it was a nice place to live, the "down side" was that a junior Foreign Service Officer like myself found it hard to make ends meet. By that time I was making, I think, about $4800 a year.

Q: Who was the Consul General when you were there?

TICE: That's another story. George Falconer Wilson had been Administrative Assistant to Senator William Knowland [Republican, California], who was Chairman, I think, of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a Republican-controlled Congress. Wilson was one of the "triumvirate" who came into the State Department to "clean out the communists." They included Scott e, who "found" the “communists” as head of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs; George Wilson, who was then Chief of Personnel and "fired" them, and Frances Knight, Chief of the Passport Office, who kept them from traveling..

Wilson had finally been "exiled" to Antwerp as Consul General. He was basically not a "mean" person. He was just ideologically so far off to the Right that he was a little "weird." However, his wife was really "mean." [Laughter] I remember one time sitting in their house, drinking too much, and listening to them talk about how Dean Rusk [then Secretary of State] was a communist. This was a "disturbing" experience for a junior Foreign Service Officer.

We survived two years at the Consulate General in Antwerp [1959-1962]. However, the Department was still having trouble getting people assigned onward. I left Antwerp with no onward assignment. I was told by the Department: "Well, go on home leave, and we'll have an assignment for you at that time." I repeated a request that I had made before. I said that I came into the Foreign Service with the idea of concentrating on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. I made it clear that that was what I wanted. I had a telephone call while I was on home leave in Kansas in which the person who talked to me said: "Well, we have an assignment for you. It's to the Consulate General in Montreal [Canada]." I was again assigned as Administrative Officer. I said: "Well, all right, I'll go to Montreal but if I don't get Eastern European or Russian language training in an onward assignment following that, I'm going to resign."

What effect that had on anybody I had no idea. My comment probably went into the personnel record. However, 18 months later I was sitting, fat, dumb, and happy and having fun in Montreal, because it's a marvelous place to live. I got a telephone call saying: "You have four weeks to finish up in Montreal and get down to Washington for Bulgarian language training." [Laughter]

Q: I'd like to go quickly back to Antwerp before we leave it. Could you describe the political situation in Belgium from your perspective and how you dealt with the Belgians?

TICE: This assignment was during the early days of the Flemish and French cultural and particularly linguistic difficulties in Antwerp. I suppose that Antwerp was about 80 percent Flemish, although I don't have at my fingertips the statistics on the matter. Certainly, Antwerp was heavily Flemish, and there was a lot of tension. The situation wasn't "nasty," though there were occasional demonstrations. You would hear a lot of snide remarks among the French about the Flemish, who worked in most of the shops,

stores, and that kind of thing. If you spoke to them in French, they wouldn't respond or would respond in Flemish or English, because they seemed always to be able to figure out that we were Americans. They would rather speak English with us than French. I learned a little Flemish, but not much. I had trouble practicing my French there. There was a hidebound, holdout group of French speakers, composed of Walloons [French speaking Belgians] and Francophiles.

There was an organization called the American-Belgian Association which was sort of the social center for many of the diplomats assigned to Antwerp. Not surprisingly, it was very anti-Flemish and very much run by the Walloons. This was quite an experience for my wife and myself because it was supposedly a "high society pick-up joint." [Laughter]
Q: Did you have the feeling that the Consul General and other senior officers were caught up in dealing with the "high society" in Antwerp, which sort of absorbed the consular officers there? This often happens when you get into one of these things.

TICE: Yes. That was very much the case with the senior officers in the Consulate General, who were part of the "elite" in the town. No question about that. To a lesser degree, young couples in our Consulate General got invited to social events in "high society" in Antwerp. It was a pleasant existence.

We did have something called the Vice-Consular Corps, which, in effect, was another club. Its members were all pretty hard-working consular officers who were busily involved with the port and that kind of thing. That was where the "real fun" was, because most of us were under 30. We had a lot of fun at the monthly "bashes" at the Vice-Consular Corps.

Q: What about problems with seamen and all of that? Did you get involved with seamen's problems?

TICE: Very much so, signing them on and off and disciplinary problems on the ships. There were also problems with indigent Americans coming through, looking for "handouts" and that kind of thing. That was a good part of my activity.

Q: How did you deal with seamen? Could you get the Belgian authorities to help you do things?

TICE: Oh, yes. Handling these matters was actually fairly simple because, if you had a "beached" seaman on your hands, you didn't give him any money. We arranged with the Scandinavian Seamen's Home, where it cost $0.75 a day for a seaman to live until he got another ship. They had very strict rules. A seaman had to be out of the Home at 8:00 AM and couldn't come back until 6:00 PM. He had to be in by 9:00 PM. We had been able to set up a fund to cover this. I ponied up the $0.75 a day to keep a seaman there but never gave them any money, because they would just drink it up or take off on a spree. It was interesting work.

Q: Were there any "protection and welfare" cases that particularly come to mind?

TICE: No really "wild" ones. During a fair part of my time doing consular work in Antwerp, I was responsible for somebody in jail. The only "protection and welfare" case that really gave me fits involved a prominent judge from Hawaii and his wife, who were visiting Antwerp. He died unexpectedly. In his will he had said that he wanted to be cremated, and his widow wanted to follow through on that. However, there were no facilities for cremation in Belgium at the time.. I had to make all the arrangements to send the body to Germany to be cremated. We had the judge's widow on our hands for the several days that took. She sort of became part of my family. We had lunch or dinner with her nearly every day and persuaded others in the American community to give us a hand in keeping her occupied and as content as could reasonably be expected. This was sort of "what you did." [Laughter]

Q: Let's move on to Montreal. When were you in Montreal?
TICE: About 18 months, from January, 1961, to the summer of 1963.

Q: What were you doing there?

TICE: Again, I started out as Administrative Officer. I couldn't seem to "shake" assignments like that because I knew something about the administration of the Foreign Service. I did that kind of work for about nine months. Then, during the remainder of my stay in Montreal, I again had the citizenship job. However, at that time the Consulate General in Montreal was one of the biggest "visa mills" in the Foreign Service. Everybody assigned there issued visas at one time or another. While I had my own Citizenship Unit and that kind of thing, on rotation I would go over and spend two hours a day working in the "visa mill."

Q: Who was the Consul General in Montreal when you were there?

TICE: It was Jerome T. Gaspard. He had worked in the "Point Four" program in Europe and then came into the regular Foreign Service under the "Wriston Program" [lateral entry of civil servants into the Foreign Service in the mid-1950's]. He was in Montreal as Consul General, I think, for three or four years. Then he moved up to Quebec as Consul General, which was his "retirement post." He was Consul General in Quebec for a couple of more years.

Q: During this period, 1961-1963, what was the political situation in Canada?

TICE: That's where I really got into political work for the first time. While I was assigned as a consular officer, I had the great, good fortune to live in an apartment house which was a short way down the hill from the Consulate General. It was an easy, five-minute walk from my home to the office. It was on the main street which goes over the top of Mount Royal.

One day I was admiring a Ford Thunderbird which was parked next to my car in the parking garage under the apartment building. I struck up a conversation with the man who owned it. It turned out that he was the Member of Parliament for the Mount Royal Riding [electoral district]. His name was Allan McNaughton. We became good friends, although he was quite a lot older than I.. At that time he a key figure in the election campaign of Lester [Jim] Pearson, the leader of the Liberal Party, who was running against incumbent Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker, the leader of the Conservative Party.

I got involved in that campaign because Allan McNaughton started using me as a channel to get information down to Washington. U. S. policy at the time of the election was "neutral," but fairly clearly the Department wanted Jim Pearson to win. However, the Department kept saying "dumb things" which made it more difficult. McNaughton was using me as a channel to "pass the word" to the Department. When he first asked me if I could serve in that capacity, I went to Consul General Gaspard and asked him what I should do. He said: "Write up what he tells you and send it down to the Department. I'll try to get somebody down in Washington to pay attention to what you write up." This process worked.

During the final weeks of the campaign I remember an incident that at that that related to the "DEW Line" [Distant Early Warning Line], a radar defense for the United States, which was being built in Canada, with Canadian Government permission. There was a supposedly "classified" Senate Committee hearing in Washington on this subject. I seem to recall that a prominent figure in the U. S. Government, I think that it was an Assistant Secretary of State, or somebody like that, was testifying in favor of the construction of the DEW Line. This person said to a critical Senator: "Do you want Soviet bombs to drop on us or do you want Soviet bombers to be shot down and the bombs dropped in Canada? You have a choice."

This comment was "leaked" to the press. Allan McNaughton called me up about this. He was "howling mad." He said: "What's the matter with those people [in Washington]? They just can't seem to get it straight." Nevertheless, I was able to keep up this relationship with McNaughton during the whole time that we were in Montreal.

When Pearson won the election, McNaughton became Speaker of the Canadian House of Commons. On a couple of occasions he invited us up, once when my mother-in-law was visiting Montreal, to have dinner in his chambers, which was a very "royal" kind of place. Before dinner we had drinks with him, and Allan had invited a bunch of Canadian political types to dinner, too. I remember that Allan showed my mother-in-law, who was then in her 60's, the dining room. She said: "Oh, my goodness. Look at all of that cutlery! How will I know what to use first?" He said: "You're going to sit by me. Watch me, and whatever I pick up, you pick up. Don't worry about it." [Laughter] He was really a very wonderful guy.

Q: While you were there in Montreal, although only as a consular officer, did you sense any dislike of John Diefenbaker by official Americans? Certainly, President Kennedy had

an intense dislike of Diefenbaker. Did you feel that dislike through the consular and diplomatic establishment we had in Canada?

TICE: Yes. The Quebecers [residents of the Province of Quebec, in which Montreal is located] tended to be Liberals and not Conservatives at that time and were very much anti-Diefenbaker. The other political current was the beginning of the Quebec separatist movement. Advocates of separatism for the Province of Quebec were blowing up mailboxes in Montreal. There was an upper middle class, English speaking enclave in Montreal, and one of the separatists' tactics was to drop bombs in the mailboxes, causing shrapnel to spray the immediate area. So that was going on.

It was interesting that one of the people who was in our younger, social "set" who circulated in the university circles and the Consular Corps was a man who always dressed very dramatically and wore a cape. He was Pierre Elliot Trudeau [a future Canadian Prime Minister]. He would always show up at these functions accompanied by a beautiful young woman.

Q: Were you in Montreal during President Kennedy's visit to Canada? One of the more or less obligatory first visits of a U. S. President is to Canada and another one is to Mexico.

TICE: I don't recall it. If I was there at the time, it was not something that affected us in Montreal.

What did touch us, of course, was the Cuban Missile Crisis [October, 1962]. That was the first time that I felt hostility toward the U. S. on the part of the Canadians. Even then, the Canadians had this affinity for the Caribbean Sea and Cuba. God knows, if I lived in Canada, I'd want to get to the Caribbean too, as often as I could.

Q: Did you find yourself getting into arguments about Fidel Castro and U. S. policy toward Cuba?

TICE: Oh, yes. In social settings you would get into that kind of thing. At times it was really "nasty." The opposition of many Canadians to U. S. policy toward Cuba was very heartfelt on their part. During the Cuban Missile Crisis there were big demonstrations in front of the Consulate General in Montreal.

Q: Was there any appreciation in Canada that this really was not a confrontation between Cuba and the United States but between the United States and the Soviet Union as part of the Cold War?

TICE: Oh, yes, it was very much understood that this was a confrontation with the Soviets. That was when I really focused in on the whole nuclear question for the first time.

Q: If the Canadians were demonstrating against us, what did they want us to do?

TICE: They wanted us to avoid a confrontation with the Soviets. They felt that we were endangering the whole world by confronting the Russians over the Soviet missiles in Cuba.

Q: Really, the Canadians were somewhat "out of step" with the rest of Europe and other places on this issue, weren't they?

TICE: Yes, but this was not unusual.

Q: Let me just change the tape.

Q: This is Side B of Tape 1 of an interview with Donald Tice. Don, when you left Montreal, you went to study Bulgarian. When you asked for Eastern European or Soviet language training, did you expect to be sent to study Bulgarian? After all, Bulgaria is not only down South physically and geographically but kind of "at the end of the line."

TICE: Having applied for Eastern European language training, when I hung up the telephone after learning of my assignment to Bulgarian language training, the first thing I did was to hunt up an atlas to see where Bulgaria was! [Laughter] I guess that I had been thinking of Prague, Warsaw, or places like that. Anyhow, both my wife and I did 10 months of Bulgarian language training.

Q: Tell me. You studied Bulgarian. I studied Serbo-Croatian at almost the same time, in 1961-1962.
TICE: You must have had Father Milosevic [an Orthodox priest working as a language instructor] as one of your teachers.

Q: I was wondering whether you got much from your teachers. Actually, my teachers were Jankovic and Popovic. Larry Eagleburger [later Ambassador to Yugoslavia and Secretary of State] was also in the class. If we got nothing else out of that class, it was a feeling for the Serb mind and mentality. How did you feel about it? Did you get something about the Bulgarian outlook on the world?

TICE: Oh, yes. We had only one teacher because studying Bulgarian involved a really "small country syndrome." Our teacher was a lady named Vera Graff. She was a very bright, bubbly little lady. She was pleasant, well read, and knew Bulgarian literature and that kind of thing. We got a feel from her for things Bulgarian and Bulgarian ways of looking at things.

There were only four of us in the class, one of whom was my wife. That was my first wife, by the way. She died in 1989. She stuck out the whole 10 months with me. The

other students in the class included a USIA [United States Information Agency] officer named Timothy Pfeiffer and another young Foreign Service Officer named Bob Smith.

When we got to Bulgaria, members of our Bulgarian class at the FSI [Foreign Service Institute] made up about three-fifths of the staff of the Embassy in Sofia. Actually, it was not an Embassy; it was a Legation, one of the last in the Foreign Service. Anyhow, in the Legation Bob Smith was Political Officer, I was Economic Officer, and Tim Pfeiffer was Public Affairs Officer. I still have my Third Secretary of Legation identity card. The U. S. Mission in Sofia was the last Legation we had. It was sort of a point of pride that I served in the last U. S. Legation. In fact, I don't think the U.S. has Third Secretaries any more.

Q: So you were in Sofia, Bulgaria, from...

TICE: We got there in the summer of 1964 and left in the summer of 1967. We took home leave after 18 months in Sofia.

Q: What was the state of our relations with Bulgaria when you went there in 1964, both in terms of what you learned in whatever area studies you had and what you learned when you got there?

TICE: U. S. relations with Bulgaria were formal and cold. At that time Bulgaria was used by the Soviets as a kind of "trial balloon" agent. The Soviet Ambassador in Sofia was referred to jokingly in the Diplomatic Corps as the "Pro-Consul." He was the "big man" in Sofia. Todor Zhivkov and all of his lackeys obviously looked to the Kremlin to learn what they should do. So dealing with the Bulgarians was cold and formal.

The Bulgarian Minister of the Interior had been very well trained by the KGB [Soviet secret police]. Ministry of the Interior agents were omnipresent. Our houses and apartments, and most of us lived in apartments, were "bugged" to a fare-thee-well. We had to assume that everything in the Legation was bugged.

Our Mission was and still is located in a little, store-front building in downtown Sofia. Living and working there was tough. Supplies were hard to get. You couldn't travel outside of Sofia without obtaining prior permission for the trip. You had to give notice if you were going outside the city limits. Food, even in the government run, Diplomatic Store, was not particularly what you wanted. The variety of food was very limited.

Q: Did you have turnip salad?

TICE: Yes, yogurt was big, turnips were big. Potatoes and onions generally were unavailable near the end of the winter, and you really never saw green vegetables, even in the summer, when they were producing loads of it in Bulgaria. Much of their best produce, and meat, went to the Soviet Union. Green vegetables and fruit also were being exported to the West for hard currency. They came on the market in Bulgaria just enough ahead of the produce of the Po Valley [in Italy] that the Bulgarians could sell them

handily, send them out to Western European markets out in big 18-wheelers marked "Bulgarplod," which means "Bulgarian fruit". The best vegetables and fruits were always shipped to Moscow, the rest went to Western Europe, and the Bulgarian public could buy them only at peak production periods when the volume of the crops exceeded their ability to ship them out.

Q: Who was the Minister while you were there?

TICE: Eugenie Anderson was. She was the first woman to be appointed a Chief of Mission in a communist country. She was appointed by President John Kennedy. She left Bulgaria in the spring of 1965, about six to eight months after I got there.

The next Minister was Nathaniel Davis, a career Foreign Service Officer who had just come out of an assignment to the White House staff. Nat was in Sofia only a year because he had a very unfortunate accident. He and his two small daughters had gone out on a cold, winter, Sunday afternoon. to a hill in Sofia which kids used to slide down. When his kids got cold he headed back for his residence with them in his van. As he was going down a steep hill with an ice slick on it, the van went out of control, went through an intersection, and smashed into a bus stop. One person was killed, and a second, a child, was badly injured.

The Bulgarians, of course, in their "kindly" way, saw this as an opportunity to "extort" the Americans. So the Department pulled Nat out real fast. His DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission], Tom Tuck, was an "experiment," a USIA officer serving as a DCM. This was back when USIA officers were considered by he Department not as qualified as ”real” FSOs. Tom Tuch of course was and is a highly accomplished diplomat, and went on to be one of the eminent "gray beards" of USIA.

We were very lucky when we lost Nat Davis that we had Tom Tuck as Chargé d'Affaires, because it was nearly a year before a successor to Nat was named.

Q: He was a Soviet hand at that time, wasn't he?

TICE: Yes, he had had experience in both the Soviet Union and in Germany. About the time Tom Tuck was leaving, we finally had an Ambassador accredited to Bulgaria, John [Jack] McSweeney. Jack was initially assigned to Bulgaria as Minister, but he had been lobbying to have the position raised to the level of Ambassador, and the Department accepted his recommendation. I think that he had been Political Counselor and then DCM in the Embassy in Moscow. He was assigned as DCM in Belgium at the time he was appointed Minister in Bulgaria. Then the Department raised the office to the level of an Embassy. This had already been done in Hungary, which had the only other American Legation in the world.

That was one of the first times that I really got in a "swivet" with my Ambassador, although this was certainly not the last time.. When Minister McSweeney arrived in

Sofia, he got us all together and said that he wanted to have all of our opinions on whether or not the Legation should be made an Embassy. When he came to me, I gave him rather a long and stern lecture on all of the concessions that we should get from the Bulgarians, because they considered it very important to have an American Embassy in Sofia at that point. I listed all of the things which, in my view, we should first demand before our Mission in Sofia was raised to be an Embassy.

I realized that I was in trouble because Jack McSweeney is a big, florid Irishman. The color on his face began to get redder and redder. He let me say my piece, and when I finished, he rasped out a "Thank you very much," and adjourned the meeting. Then they announced a week later that the Department was raising the Legation in Sofia to Embassy status. He had already known that.

Q: He wanted to be an Ambassador, that's all. You have to take that into consideration.

TICE: Yes, he wanted to be an Ambassador. McSweeney and I laughed about this incident later, once we got to know each other better.

Q: How was Eugenie Anderson as Minister?

TICE: She was quite good. She was very professional and very solicitous of the Legation staff. She honestly wanted to try to take care of us. She lived in a rather grand house (by comparison to most of our apartments), but at the same comfort level as the rest of us in terms of the difficulty of getting supplies. She had official functions there, and members of the staff were invited over to her residence or were invited to dinner, for example, more or less as "family" members. So we got to see some "civilization" that way.

She was very "political." She had always been, and that was why she was appointed.

Q: Hadn't she been Chairman or something like that of the Democratic National Committee?

TICE: I think that she had been. I liked her. She was a very interesting person. Her husband, John Anderson, had a family connection with the Kellogg breakfast cereal company and was quite a wealthy person. This was how she had had the money to get into the Hubert Humphrey [former Senator from Minnesota and Vice President of the United States] circle and climb up in the Democratic Party. Anderson lived in Sofia most of the time. He was a photographer. That was his hobby and his avocation. He was a very pleasant man, always sort of in the background.

At one point there were several, anti-American riots in Sofia, and he went out to take pictures of them. These took place near the Legation. Eugenie was absolutely furious with him for putting himself in what was potentially "harm's way." I felt very uncomfortable being present when at the residence she was really "dressing him down" for having taken those pictures. This was the Ambassador talking to him. [Laughter].

Q: During the time that you were in Bulgaria, how did you report on the economy?

TICE: I dealt with this in two ways. One way was to read the newspapers. We read all seven newspapers published every day. I can still rattle off their names. We read "Politika" first. This was the Communist Party newspaper. What we read there was repeated in all of the other newspapers. "Politika" material accounted for about three-fourths of the contents of the other newspapers, although the other papers also carried other material. There were papers for agricultural, youth, labor, sports, arts, and the so-called Fatherland Front, which was the organization designed to involve the general populace who were not members of the communist party in social and political activities..

I used the material in the press as the basis for my reporting. Generally, we couldn't get appointments with officials in the economic ministries. They just wouldn't talk to you. So I collected information by word of mouth, on the cocktail circuit. There weren't very many Bulgarians at any of the social functions we attended. I talked to everybody I could and, of course, got a lot of "disinformation," bad information, and that kind of thing in the process.

My wife and I found ourselves in an interesting situation because we both were fluent in Bulgarian and spoke fairly fluent French. We were invited to a lot of functions that other diplomats, primarily accredited Ambassadors, were giving because by and large these diplomats didn't speak Bulgarian. If they invited Bulgarians, they would invite us because they would use us as language bridges, speaking three languages [English, French, and Bulgarian]. This got us into a lot of things that we wouldn't have been into otherwise. Most of the dinners hosted by Ambassadors were black tie. I attended more black tie functions in Sofia than did in the rest of my career put together The "downside" of this was that we had something going on almost every night. You've been at small posts like that. It can be pretty deadly.

In fact, about the time that we got there, the Diplomatic Corps in Sofia made an agreement that there would be no official functions on Friday evenings, Saturdays, or Sundays, unless there were a visiting dignitary, a national holiday, or something like that involved or there was a date that couldn't be avoided. However, in general and even so, people would avoid ordinary, "social entertaining" on Friday evening, Saturday, or Sunday. That was a godsend, because we had three nights "off" the social round.

The best information could not be collected in Sofia. You got it outside of Sofia, but you had to have a travel permit to leave Sofia. We traveled to some extent on the basis of consular work. A lot of Bulgarians had emigrated to the United States during the period between World War I and World War II. Many of these people had retired, were elderly, and wanted to spend their final years in their land or origin.. During both world wars, and particularly World War I, there had been a lot of Bulgarians who had gone to the U. S. in the immigration wave in the early part of the 20th century and had served in the U. S.

Army and were still alive when I was in Bulgaria. They had veterans' pensions, social security rights, and that kind of thing.

There was a Treasury embargo on U.S. dollars going into Bulgaria, with a few exceptions. Some of those exceptions concerned pensions for elderly people. These recipients couldn't get these pensions, however, unless a Consular Officer went out and certified the "bona fides" of the person who was the claimant, and could give some kind of assurance that the recipient would actually have the benefit of the money received.. That practice got us into all sorts of places and all sorts of mischief. I spent as much time as I could traveling around Bulgaria and confirming eligibility for pension checks. I generally traveled with a Consular Officer. If the Consular Officer was not be able to go, I would go in his stead since I was experienced in consular work. We had such a small staff at the Legation that more than two people from the core substantive staff (economic, political, consular) couldn't travel at one time. The language officer at the British Embassy was fluent in Bulgarian, and he frequently accompanied me and perhaps one other Legation officer on week-long trips to visit places which we had arranged to visit.

We had to filed our travel plans in advance with the Bulgarian authorities, and it often took some while to receive approval of the itinerary. Once we got outside of Sofia, it was a different world. I was talking one night to a drunken young worker in a bar in a Danube River Valley town. I said to him: "Aren't you afraid to be seen with us? You just pointed out to me that those guys over at the next table are from the Secret Police." He replied: "Well, about the worst thing that they can do to you here is exile you from Sofia, and I don't live in Sofia anyway." [Laughter] We traveled and pretty well covered everything but the specifically "denied" areas in that country, during one trip or another. We would go into our hotel, go down to the front desk, and then ask the equivalent of: "Where's the action?" They would always just tell us, right out, where the cafes, restaurants, and other places were which students and young workers patronized and where they got drunk every night. That was the way they lived, like the Russians.

When we would go to one of these places, we'd always have our "security tail" with us. However, these security people were all local residents, and the people just weren't afraid of them, as they would have been if the security people, "the heavies," had come from Sofia. We would set ourselves up at a table, order some wine, and make conversation. We would end up feeding and providing drinks to a whole bunch of youngsters. They were surprisingly well informed on what was going on in terms of the internal politics of Bulgaria, and they'd tell you about it.

One of the oddest experiences I had in that regard was in a town called Vidin [northwestern Bulgaria], on the Danube River.. On this particular trip we had to look up birth records in a church. When we got to Vidin, we found the church and church offices locked, and n inquiry were told that the Orthodox priest had been "exiled" from the church for a long time, and could be found in the provincial capital of Tirnovo. We sought him out, and he obtained permission to go with us because we were going to verify a birth record, and, therefore, money would come into the country later on. When

we got into the car with him, he said: "Have you heard about the attempted coup d'etat?" We said: "What are you talking about?" He said: "This happened in Sofia. The Todorov Gorunya faction tried to throw Zhivkov out of power." He added: "One man was killed when he jumped off the top of a building, in downtown Sofia." I quickly got on the telephone and called the Embassy. This was just becoming known in Sofia, when I telephoned. The "word" travels quickly in a country like that.

That was an experience, too, because I think that the church we visited with the priest was built in the 12th century, part of it underground. There was a beautiful "ikonostasis" [a grouping of ikons on a screen which separates the alter area from the rest of the church] but some of the ikons were missing. The priest said: "Oh, they've been in here again. If you boys want any ikons, why don't you take them because the communists are just going to take all of the rest of them away." I thanked him but I said: "Father, but I couldn't and wouldn't do that to your church. Also, that would get me thrown out of this country in a flash." [Laughter] He laughed. I thought it over, and decided that we didn't know whether he was working for the communists. He had obviously been "briefed" before talking to us. You had to assume that anybody you talked to might be working for the communists. This partly underground church was really eerie, going back so far into history. We had a lot of experiences like that.

We had another experience in Varna, a beach resort town [on the Black Sea]. At that time the Bulgarians were offering very low cost tours to Varna. They were ready to do anything to get "hard currency." The main customers at the time were Germans and Scandinavians staying at these lovely looking hotels, with a view over these beautiful beaches. However, nothing worked at the hotels. Anyway, our Defense Attaché had come down to Varna separately and brought his wife and the wife of one of the guys I was traveling with. We decided that we would all go out to dinner together. We had two cars, both of them big, black Ford station wagons which were about twice as big as anything but the "Chaikas" [Soviet built automobiles used for high-level officials] you normally saw there. When the Defense Attaché pulled away from the hotel, he entered a traffic circle, which was in the center of Varna. As he started around that circle his "tail" car filled in behind him, I fell in behind that, and my "tail" car filled in behind me. The Defense Attaché saw what was happening. He rolled down his window and let out a "Texas Yell." We just kept driving around and around the circle. There were four "goons" [secret police] in each of the "tail" cars. We were all laughing like hell. The people on the sidewalks were standing and applauding as we went around and around. We could have gotten into trouble with that kind of silliness.

Q: Sometimes it just "bubbles" out. I take it that local security operations were not as sophisticated as in the Soviet Union. When you went out in the evening in the Soviet Union, you really had to be worried about being "compromised," and so forth.

TICE: It was that way. We had a firm rule that we never traveled alone, for example. I was involved in two incidents. In one case two other guys from the Embassy and I were up on the Danube River, near the "Iron Gates," the Zhelesny Vrati, a big, hydroelectric

project which involved Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria. . We checked into our hotel and then went to an outdoor restaurant right on the banks of the Danube River. We "collected" our usual crew of young people who joined our table. Midway in the evening a guy joined us who insisted on buying the wine for the table. We weren't paying much attention and didn't look to see whether the wine came corked or not. It probably wouldn't have made any difference. Anyway, it had been drugged. Fortunately, in this case at least, I have a very "sensitive" stomach. I began to feel "queasy" and said to my two companions: "They put something in the wine. Let's get up and get out of here." We paid up and started back to the hotel, which was a couple of hundred yards away. I went over to the seawall along the Danube River and threw up. It hadn't hit the other guys yet. We got down to the hotel, and then it got to the other two. Because I had gotten rid of whatever it was early enough, I never passed out. The other two did. We were vomiting and suffering from diarrhea. It was obvious that, whatever they gave us, they did not want us to continue doing what we were doing. By about 3:00 a.m. we were over the worst effects of the drug and decided to "fix their wagon." We quietly packed up our stuff, went downstairs, out the front door, and took off, which left our "tail" cars trying their damnedest to catch up with us. They were driving Soviet-made "Volgas," which are not good cars to drive over rough roads. We took a non-surfaced road from the Iron Gates to the "Friendship Bridge" at Ruse, downriver on the Bulgarian [southern] side of the Danube River. We "fed them dirt" all the way on these non-surfaced roads. That kind of thing could also have gotten us into trouble. We probably should have behaved a little better, but you get "bored" under all of this pressure. [Laughter]

Q: That's interesting. Exactly at the same time, I was in Yugoslavia, just across the border and in another communist country. I was there from 1962 to 1967. One of my great joys was taking off, by myself, to deliver Social Security checks. I did this again and again. By contrast with your experience, I didn't have any trouble at all. The Yugoslavs just weren't playing that "game."

TICE: American aid to Yugoslavia was flooding in at that time, and they weren't going to do anything to halt it.

Q: I always checked with the local police. If I were traveling, for example, up in the hills of Bosnia, I would always go to a police station and say: "I'm the American Consul. I'm looking for such and such," so they knew exactly what I was doing and they could report back in to their superiors. I made quite sure that I wasn't surprising them.

TICE: It was a very different atmosphere. I was there in Yugoslavia from 1972 to 1975. However, the Bulgarians officials were mean and nasty. There were all sorts of sexual compromise attempts on us. As a matter of fact, occasionally I would be warned to be particularly careful about what I was doing and where I was, and to have somebody with me all the time for a while. I would say: "What's this about?" The person warning me would say: "I can't tell you in detail, but just be alert."

The only other, nasty incident while I was in Bulgaria was at a trade fair in 1964. We had a U.S. pavilion there.

Q: Was this at Plovdiv?

TICE: Yes, the Plovdiv trade fair. We used to joke that we could have put the American flag over the front end of the pavilion and put one of our USIA [United States Information Agency] employees, who was originally Russian, outside to greet the people, and we would have gotten the biggest crowd at the fair, just by being there. The Bulgarian people were very quiescent and subdued, politically. However, they loved America. They would turn out for anything American.

The incident I mentioned happened one evening when I had to go back to my hotel to get something. It was toward evening closing time, and when I came back in though the main gate, a couple of the "goons" jumped me. I didn't fight back. I just "took the fall" [i.e., let them beat me up]. They whacked me a few times and then ran off. I went into the pavilion and told Minister Anderson, who happened to be visiting at the time, what had happened. She immediately began to raise all sorts of hell with the authorities.

They were evidently looking for some American to precipitate an incident. Following along behind me was a Serbian-American named Nick Lalic. He was with the U. S. Department of Commerce trade fair organization. When Nick came through the gate, the "goons" jumped him. Nick was about 6'4" and weighed about 280 pounds, or something like that. He just turned around and splattered one of the "goons" against a wall and slugged the other one. Then they put the regular cops on him and arrested him on a charge of precipitating an "incident." They had apparently hoped to try that with me. I hadn't been there very long and would have been a good "catch" because I was a language officer. They could have PNGed [declaring him "Persona Non Grata"] me early on in my tour. We had to get Nick out of the country fast.

The Bulgarians did that kind of thing. You just had to be careful. The listening "bugs" in our apartment were obvious. On occasion, when it was quiet in the apartment, the surveillance folks would turn up the gain on their microphones so that they would be sure of not missing anything. When they did this, our French poodle would bark and point at the nearest listening device. We knew from this where they were -- under the living room couch, under the dining room table, in the den by the telephone, and under the bed in the master bedroom. [Laughter]

Q: How were your relations with the Bulgarian ministries? Did you go to the ministries?

TICE: Only rarely. You would have to request an appointment, and it might take a week for them to agree to the meeting, if they agreed at all. Except for Minister Anderson. She could generally get an appointment whenever she wanted one. By and large, in the case of more junior people in our Embassy, the Bulgarians just didn't want the top level of their

ministries to be dealing with Westerners. So it was very difficult to arrange an appointment.

The only contact I had, which I was able to maintain over a period of time, was with Academician Dashkelov, who was the head of the Bulgarian Academy of Agricultural Sciences. I got to know him because I had asked for an appointment to call on him about something or other. He apparently took a liking to me and felt that he was pretty well insulated from communist "retaliation" for anything, because he was a very eminent man. He was known as the “tomato professor” because he had developed a strain of tomatoes which both tasted good and were hearty enough to be transported over long distances.

We had no agricultural attaché at the Legation, so I filled that function, and any time I could find an excuse I called Academician Dashkelov at the Bulgarian Academy. This relationship took a sad turn, however, when we had a visiting agricultural attaché who was posted to Moscow. I was able to organize a buffet dinner at my apartment, and I invited Dashkelov, the Academy’s Chief of Protocol (with whom arranged the event) and a couple of other Bulgarian officials. It was the only time that I had Bulgarian officials in my apartment during the three years that I was in Bulgaria. They just wouldn't accept my invitations. The sad turn of events involved the Chief of Protocol, a lovely man and an opera buff. I had a new German "Grundig" stereo set and a recent record of Boris Kristoff, a renowned Bulgarian basso, singing excerpts from the great Russian operas. The Chief of Protocol sat with tears running down his face he was so moved by the beauty of the singing and so proud that it was a Bulgarian singing it. When he left at the end of the evening he thanked me profusely giving him the opportunity to hear the beautiful record. I never saw him again after that party. He just disappeared. He was no longer Chief of Protocol. I've always felt very sad about that because I'm very sure that his involvement in getting a bunch of people from the Bulgarian Academy to attend this reception at my house was responsible for whatever happened to him.

Q: Well, as Economic/Agricultural Officer did you ever get involved in "attar of roses" in Bulgaria?
TICE: Oh, yes. High-level visitors always wanted to visit the "Rose Valley.” The main thing that I would do, on the agricultural side, was crop reporting, particularly on the bean crop. When beans were in short supply in other places, there were "export opportunities" for USDA [U. S. Department of Agriculture] sales of agricultural surpluses. The USDA wanted at one point to know what the bean crop looked like in the Danube River Valley, on the Bulgarian side of the Danube. So I called up the Agricultural Attaché in Belgrade, and would and asked how I could predict the green bean crop. He said: "Look, don't even try. Go ask a peasant how the crop is, how it compares to last year and the year before. and how he thinks the bean crop is going to be this year. Take any information that he gives you, and give it to me. Then I can predict the crop." I said: "OKAY." And I had fun doing that.

This led to one of the more amusing conversations that I had in Bulgaria. I had parked my car by the side of the road when I saw a peasant working in a bean field. I walked up to

him, greeted him, and we chatted for a little bit. He said: "Where did you get your funny Bulgarian accent?" I said: "Well, I'm not a Bulgarian, I'm an American." He just laughed and laughed, then said: "Well, your parents must be Bulgarian." I said: "No, I'm just an American. I learned Bulgarian before coming here so that I could talk to people like you." He thought that was just amazing. Then I glanced up and saw that the "tail car" [secret police] was parked about a quarter of a mile back. They weren't very subtle. The "goons" were out of the car, walking around. I said to the peasant: "Do you see that car? That's my secret police 'tail.' Are you going to get into trouble for talking to me?" He said: "Oh, no. Those are local boys, and I know them. They won't do anything to me." So I got the information for green bean production. That was the kind of encounters I had.

Q: Green beans were the life of that whole area.

TICE: Yes. Another time we were on a trip and stopped in a little village whose name was Krulina Voda, which means clear water. right near the Danube River. We needed to contact a man who had served in an Ammunition Wagon Company of the Pennsylvania National Guard during World War I. Sure enough, he rolled out this long picture of the whole unit which he still had from the Great War. He pointed out who he was and gave the names of a number of the others. He was quite elderly.

When we had pulled into this little village, we noticed that it had rutted streets. You had to drive carefully or you would take off the undercarriage of your car. There were chickens and livestock wandering around. There were few signs of electrification. It was colder than hell. We stopped and asked somebody where Gatzo so-and-so lived. He told us. Everybody knew everybody. So we went up and spent some time interviewing this one-time soldier in the U. S. Army. While we were talking to this man and looking at his documents, there was a knock on the door. A man came in to join the conversation. The lady of the house whispered to me: "It's the head of the communist party." The communist leader was very jovial and said: "It's an honor for us to have you Americans visiting us. Why don't you come over to the town council building? We'd like to invite you to have a drink and a cup of coffee with us."

We said: "Sure." So, after we had completed the interview with the old man, we went over to the town council building. The communist leader had a half dozen men gathered there, including one old peasant in traditional peasant dress, with the little fur hat and that kind of thing. He had been an original "Partizan" fighting against one thing or another for years and years. Most of the other men had also been "partisans." We sat there in our overcoats for about two hours, drinking coffee and "mastika," the Bulgarian version of absinthe. As they say: "Absinthe makes the heart grow fonder." It was getting dark. They had the windows open in this room, and it was colder than hell. The Legation officer I was with, Bud Williams, and I agreed later that people had come in looking dour. A young lady was serving the absinthe and coffee. She was unremarkable when we walked in, but by the time we left two hours later, as we discussed the matter later, she had begun to look rather pretty.

When we got up to go, the communist leader, who was getting well into his cups," said: "Well, listen, boys." He called us "boys," because we were both in our early ‘30s and looked awfully young to them, I guess. He said: "Look, you don't want to go all the way back to Vratza (one of the provincial capitals.) He said: "It's a cold night. Why don't you just stay here? We'll slaughter a pig and have a pig roast and a really good time. You can sleep in one of the houses here. We don't have a hotel." We were well aware of the Bulgarian peasant custom, which allegedly was still maintained in some of the villages, that when an honored guest came into town, the visitor not only got a bed but also got the services of the lady of the house, who slept with him. We did not figure that that would look good on our records, particularly as we were dealing with the local communist leader. We gave them many thanks, and begged off the invitation, staggered to our car and drove off into the night.

I probably had more fun during that tour in Bulgaria than I had in any other.

Q: I'm sure that that was true. I always look back on Yugoslavia as being the "high point" of my career. Speaking of Yugoslavia, could you say something about what you were gathering from your side of the Yugoslav border about Yugoslavia in general and how it looked? Also, how about the situation in Macedonia?

TICE: Well, that was a big issue while I was in the Legation in Sofia. If you just mentioned Macedonia or said anything about Macedonia, they would declare "Macedonia is Bulgarian." They said that there was no difference between Macedonia and Bulgaria. Well, we would say: "What about the language difference?" They would say: "No, there is no difference in the language." So there was real tension between Bulgarians and Yugoslavs on that issue.

The tensions this historical issue were heightened over a religious issue, Bulgarians considered the Patriarch of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, with his seat at Alexander Nevsky Cathedral in Sofia, to be the leader of the church in Yugoslav Macedonia as well. There was a big fuss, therefore, when the Macedonian Orthodox bishop of Skopje, the capital of the Macedonian Province in Yugoslavia, was declared "autocephalous", and therefore independent of the church in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian communist government joined the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in condemning what both saw as a Yugoslav attempt to further tighten their complete control of Macedonia as well as weaken the Bulgarian claim that “Macedonia is Bulgarian” Any Bulgar that you met resented what had happened.

An amusing side note, which was true I believe in much of the Balkans, was the continuing strong reaction to anything having to do with Turkey, harking back to the Ottoman Turk 500-year occupation of the Balkans, until near the end of the 19th century. For example, when you talked to Bulgarians, you would often find reason to say, regarding one thing or another: "Why do you do it this way?" The Bulgarian to whom you were talking would look at you very sadly and say “Pet stotine godini Turskoto Robstvo,” which translates as “500 years of the Turkish yoke." [Laughter]

Q: I remember that they said the same thing in Yugoslavia. They said that the only reason that things didn't work was that they had spent 500 years under the Turkish yoke!

TICE: That's right.

Q: They used to say the same thing in Serbia. If nothing worked, they would always say that.

TICE:

In terms of Yugoslavia in general, since Yugoslavia under Tito was not a member of the "COMINFORM" [Communist Information Association, the successor to the "COMINTERN," the Communist International Organization of the 1930's], the Bulgarians did not look on Yugoslavia as a friend, because the Yugoslavs had broken off communist party relations with the Soviet Union.

Q: Did you have any information about how the Bulgarian Army was deployed?
TICE: Yes, as a part of the overall Warsaw Pact defense strategy, it was pointed at the Greek and Turkish borders. The area near those borders was a "denied area" to foreigners. The Rhodopa Mountains run all the way across the southern part of Bulgaria. You could go up into the foothills of the Rhodopas on the northern side, but the rest of the mountains, the southern slope down to the Greek and Turkish borders, were considered a "defense territory" by the Bulgarians and were closed. You even had to request permission, at least a week ahead of time, to take a road which went from Sofia down through that area into northern Greece and Salonika. The Bulgarian authorities did not want any foreigners in that area.

Q: Let me stop here to change the tape.

Q: This is Side A of Tape 2 of the interview with Don Tice. The Soviets had no troops in Bulgaria. Is that correct?

TICE: They had military advisers with the Bulgarian armed forces, but there were no Soviet troops, in terms of operational units, in Bulgaria.

Q: While you were in Bulgaria, what was the feeling about what the role of Bulgaria would be in a general, East-West war, because war was on many people's minds?

TICE: Bulgaria would receive any "thrust" from the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] southern front.

Q: So it was basically defensive?

TICE: It was basically defensive. They were given "niche" roles in the Warsaw Pact plans. For example, Bulgaria was given a significant role in producing electronics for Soviet as well as Bulgarian and other Warsaw Pact weaponry. Bulgaria was among the more prosperous of the Eastern European countries because the Soviets favored them in many ways, giving them roles and missions, both militarily and otherwise. For example, they had Soviet help in building steel mills. It was crazy for Bulgaria to have a steel mill, as Bulgarian iron ore had a very high, sulfur content.

Q: In the Soviet system, you just "had" to have a steel mill.

TICE: Bulgaria also had these very bad, "Chernobyl" type or even older nuclear power facilities for generating electricity.

Q: How about Bulgarian relations with Turkey?

TICE: Relations with Turkey were bad. About 10 percent of the population of Bulgaria at that time was of Turkish descent. Bulgaria had gone through a process of making all people of Turkish descent change their names to Bulgarian names. For example, you couldn't be "Ali Mohammed" any more. Your name had to be something like "Petrovitch". The Bulgarians treated their Turkish minority very badly.

An educated Bulgarian, part of the ruling “establishment” once said to me: "We understand the problem that you have with the blacks in the United States, because we have our Turks," thus illustrating both his prejudice and misunderstanding of American society It was really the worst kind of racial prejudice. Of course, this feeling against the Turks would crop up even after the communists were thrown out of power in Bulgaria. That's anther sad story that we should be able to get in the oral history program by talking with people who served there when the communists fell, like Ken Hill who was the Ambassador there at that time.

Q: Some of the conditions that you are talking about in Bulgaria, in fact quite a few of the conditions, did not exist in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavs could travel around the country, and even abroad, relatively freely. If the crops were bad, particularly during the winter, you did not eat very well, but that was because of the crops. It wasn't because of government officials "confiscating" the crops. I would have thought that there would be a certain amount of jealousy or a certain "longing" to be able to live like the Yugoslavs. Did you find any of that, or was there much information about the Yugoslavs?

TICE: There wasn't a lot of information. However, the trouble was that the general populace nobody could not get a permit to go to Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was just "there," and was a "semi-enemy" because it had broken communist party relations with Moscow. At the time we arrived in Bulgaria, some people from our Embassy went to Nis, in Serbia, to buy meat. This practice had tapered off a little, but we went there a couple of times

ourselves. Where they shopped in Nis was just an open air meat market, but it was worthwhile going there because frequently you couldn't find any meat in Bulgaria.

Q: I remember that when you went from Belgrade to Nis, you were going down to the "lower depths." We in the Embassy in Belgrade heard of people from our Embassy in Sofia going to Nis, for heaven's sake, to do their shopping! This was almost unbelievable!

TICE: I used to make people mad in the Embassy in Belgrade when I would go There. They would ask the reason for my visit, and I would say: "I'm on R&R" [Rest and Recreation]. [Laughter] There was some unhappiness because we would buy things in the Belgrade Commissary and run their supplies down. Of course, for my sins, years later I got to be President of the Commissary in the Embassy in Belgrade and I was trying to get supplies from the U. S. military bases up in Italy. They didn't like us because we'd go into the commissaries in Italy like a bunch of "thieving magpies" and clean out their best stocks. Then they'd be short of supplies.

Q: What about Bulgarian relations with Romania?

TICE: There was the usual, feigned, communist "friendship," but that's about all it was. They didn't have much to do with each other. Of course, under what I believe was the Treaty of Berlin, part of the Dobrudja area, the estuary of the Danube into the Black Sea, had been taken away from the Bulgarians and given to the Romanians, so there was a natural "tension" between the two countries built in there.

However, there was a little suspicion about them, because Georghiu Dej, the Romanian party and state leader at that time, began to liberalize Romanian foreign policy, and this became a minor irritation to Moscow-oriented Bulgaria. The Romanians lived better than the Bulgarians. We would go up to Bucharest, which even had a little, six-hole golf course at the Diplomatic Club.

By the way, to go back to relations between Bulgaria and Greece, I don't think that I talked about this aspect of it. The Bulgarians also felt that everything in Thracian Greece, down to and including Salonika, all a part of ancient Macedonia, was really Bulgarian territory. At the time I was in Bulgaria, Macedonian was still spoken fairly commonly in northern Greece, once you went outside of Salonika to the East. We would go to the island of Thasos in the Greek islands for a vacation. On the waterfront in Thasos, the northern-most of the Greek Aegean island, I could speak Bulgarian to the people, and they would understand me perfectly and reply in Macedonian, which I could understand. I doubt that’s the case now, however, in a subsequent generation

Q: If I recall correctly, and now I'm speaking from the Yugoslav perspective, every once in a while linguistic conferences would be held, which practically started a Third Balkan War. The argument would be over Macedonian and whether it is a separate language or not.

TICE: The Bulgarians would show up at any international conference, particularly on linguistics, with "red eyes and fangs bared." They would defend the view that Macedonian was not a separate language. It was Bulgarian!

Q: I remember once talking to the Greek Consul in Belgrade. I mentioned that I spoke some Macedonian, because I used to go down there all the time. I was told that I was crazy. The Greek Consul said that there was no such thing as a Macedonian language. If you really wanted to get tempers going in the Balkans, the definition of what constitutes a language is sure to cause problems.
Back to your elderly, Bulgarian veterans of the U. S. Army during World War I, were they doing as my Montenegrin World War I veterans did? They all seemed to end up with very, very young wives, by whom they had children. I don't know whether they really were the fathers or what. We were paying out children's benefits based on their service during World War I. This was back in the 1960's.

TICE: I think that this practice was probably less prevalent in Bulgaria. I know of a couple of cases where there were young children from such unions but I don't recall that this was very prevalent.

Q: Before we leave your tour in Bulgaria, did the Vietnam War intrude at all?

TICE: Absolutely, both in Sofia and in Yugoslavia in the 1970's.

Q: Let's stick to Bulgaria.

TICE: In Sofia, very much so. There were at least two, destructive demonstrations against our Embassy which had to do with Vietnam. We "boycotted" a lot of Bulgarian national day events and speeches by Zhivkov and this kind of thing because of the anti-American rhetoric. Ambassador McSweeney was particular avid in his desire to make our displeasure known. He sometimes puzzled over whether it was a greater insult not to go at all to such an event, or to go and walk out when they started ranting and raving about the "imperialist United States." A third option was to send a Third Secretary, which was why I got to go to some of those events! [Laughter]

On one occasion when Khrushchev visited Bulgaria, he made "unfavorable comments" about the United States and Vietnam in his speech and McSweeney walked out. So when Khrushchev was leaving Bulgaria the next day and all Chiefs of Mission were invited to see him off at the airport, Ambassador McSweeney sent me instead of going himself for the "send off" from the Diplomatic Corps. Of course, as a Third Secretary of Legation, I wound up at the very tail end of the Diplomatic Corps at the airport, right next to a wire fence. Within the wire fence enclosure was a whole bunch of workers and peasants who had been rolled out to say good-bye to Khrushchev. He came down the line, shaking hands with the various ambassadors and barely nodded to the man at the end, in this case, me. The peasant next to me, behind the wire fence, embraced Khrushchev, who kissed him on the mouth!

Q: If it weren't for the honor, you were just as glad...

TICE: I was happy that he hadn't mistaken me for the first peasant.

Q: What about foreign students in Bulgaria while you were there? Did they play any role?

TICE: Yes. There were many black African students there. There were some Arabs, but more from the sub-Saharan African countries. I think that this was an example of how racial prejudice worked in the communist world. Since Bulgaria was at the bottom of the European communist "pecking order," they got the black African students. It was really very sad. These youngsters would come to Sofia to go to the university without having even the equivalent of a fourth grade education. The "lucky ones" had been to missionary schools and might have had the equivalent of an eighth grade education. The Bulgarians packed the African students into quarters where, they told us, the living conditions were poor. On the other hand, they were given more money than the Bulgarian students who, therefore, resented the Africans. There were displays of open, racist prejudice by the Bulgarian kids toward the black Africans.

This situation led me to send in an airgram to the Department of State one time, when we still had airgrams as a reporting vehicle. I proposed that we should take some of our money and pay for more African students to go to Bulgarian schools because this would turn them sharply against communism. There actually was a program, which was very "hush hush" at the time, of encouraging these African kids to come in to see us. They could use our USIS [United States Information Service] library. The USIS Library was on the ground floor of the Legation, and it generally had more African students in it than anybody else. While there, they could talk to our Consular or USIA Officers. If they looked like reasonable candidates, we would pass their names along to USIA in Washington. If they could get out of Bulgaria and go to Western Europe, there was a whole operation run out of Munich to divert these students to schools in the West -- some to U. S., schools but also to schools in Western Europe.

Q: At one point, and all of a sudden, I had a tremendous "rush" of students applying for student visas to go to the U. S. There was an exodus of black African students from Bulgaria, who wanted to go to the U. S. Did that happen before you arrived in Sofia?

TICE: What year would that have been?

Q: I'm not sure what year that would have been.

TICE: It may have been during the period I was there, because they were living under really bad conditions. The discrimination against them by Bulgarian students in general was vicious.

Q: These black African students told me that they were called the equivalent in Bulgarian of "black monkeys."

TICE: Yes, "Mai mouna" was a term used by Bulgarian students for the African students.

Q: Were there demonstrations against the Legation regarding our African policies?

TICE: No, I think that they were principally directed against our Vietnam policies. There had been, before I arrived in Sofia, a very destructive demonstration at the Legation related to accusations that a former Bulgarian diplomat, named Assen Geogiev was a U.S. spy. Georgiev had been assigned to the UN in New York. When he came back to Bulgaria, the Bulgarian security authorities arrested him and accused him of being a spy for the U. S. When he was being tried in a classic "show trial" popular in that era they implicated a Legation staff member, who they photographed in what they claimed was a compromising situation having to do with Georgiev. That riot took place while I was nearing the end of Bulgarian language training. Georgiev was executed, as was, years later, a medical doctor whose services were frequently employed by members of the Diplomatic Corps. After I had left Bulgaria, he was arrested and executed. Too much contact with Westerners was not a good thing for anybody in Bulgaria at that time.

Q: What impression did you have of Zhivkov and the people around him?

TICE: They were rather unimaginative, "hard line" communist types. You didn't see anything like imagination. There was no "flair," or anything like that. That was why Georghiu Dej was such an odd character. He was...

Q: He was a Romanian, wasn't he?

TICE: Yes, he seemed actually to think for himself, whereas the Bulgarians all just "hewed" to the Soviet line. I could read the opening paragraphs of a speech by Todor Zhivkov, put the newspaper aside and write the rest of it, because they were all the same.

Q: Did you play the game of "Kremlinology"? Who was standing where, in the lineup of Bulgarian leaders at a public ceremony?

TICE: Oh, yes, we did that all the time, which was pretty futile in a place like Bulgaria. But what else are you going to do when you're there? [Laughter] The only really interesting and different event while I was there was the "April conspiracy", which I mentioned earlier, which we learned about in Tirnovo. It was the first and only occasion, up until recent times, when there was an attempted, military overthrow of a ruling communist regime.

It wasn't that Todorov-Gorunya was a raging liberal. It's just that he was the other, main guerrilla leader, a rival of Zhivkov's. He had been relegated to living a quiet life in Vratza on the other side of the mountains. He and his supporters tried to take over Bulgaria.

They had a part of the Bulgarian Army with them, and that sort of thing. It was more of a musical comedy sort of event than anything else, but it was significant.

Q: What happened to them?

TICE: I think that Todorov-Gorunya was executed. Several other people, including a couple of Army commanders, were sacked from their positions and jailed. One guy reportedly threw himself off the top of a building about two blocks from the American Legation. That was it.

Q: When did you leave Bulgaria?

TICE: In the summer of 1967.

Q: Did the coup d'etat in Greece in April, 1967, have any effect in Bulgaria? This was when the Greek Army "colonels" took over.
TICE: There was some "saber rattling" and that kind of thing, and some ranting about the "fascist Greeks," but nothing serious. We traveled down to Greece shortly after that and had no problem crossing the border.

Q: It was a good time to go, in fact. The tourists had been pretty well "flushed out" of Greece. I went down there right after that. What about the Soviets? Did you get any feel from the people you talked to about the attitude of the Bulgarians toward the Russians?

TICE: Yes. This attitude is historic in origin. Sofia was the only Eastern European capital under communism where they still had a statue of a Russian czar. I think that it was of Nicholas I, "the Czar Liberator." In 1878 Russian troops came into Bulgaria and ran the Turks out. Even when I was in Bulgaria, the Bulgarians still had very warm feelings toward the Russians because they had liberated Bulgaria from the “Turkish Yoke”. They were considered "our Russian big brothers." Now, the Bulgarian youth were beginning to say that a little snidely. However, if you talked to anybody over 40 years old, it was clear that they felt this attachment to the Russians deeply. So the Russians weren't "resented" in the same way that they were in other Eastern European countries.

Q: Let's stop at this point. We'll pick up the interview in the summer of 1967, when you left Bulgaria. Where did you go? We'll put this at the end of the tape.

TICE: In the summer of 1967 I went back to Washington. I had applied for and been awarded an American Political Science Association Fellowship in Congressional Operations. So, in effect, I was detached from duty at the Department of State, although I continued to be paid by the Department, and was placed went to the Hill under the auspices of the American Political Science Association. During my year there I working for Senator Chuck Percy [Republican, Illinois] and Congressman Don Rumsfeld [Republican, Illinois].

Q: Great.

Q: Today is March 11, 1997. Don, it was in 1967 that you went to Capitol Hill.

TICE: It was in the late summer of 1967.

Q: What did this "fellowship" or detail involve?

TICE: The American Political Science Association had had this arrangement for a number of years. It was primarily intended for people from the private sector, academicians, and journalists. However, they then started adding a few government people. The State Department was a late entrant in this program because, as I can remember the climate at that time, Capitol Hill was not considered a place that was "friendly" toward the State Department. Not that that's changed a whole lot since then.

Q: It was the time of the Vietnam War.
TICE: I think that I was the third person who went up to Capitol Hill under this program. Dick Moose was one of my predecessors, as was Hume Horan. I may have been the third Department officer under this program. When we were briefed at the beginning of the program, we were told by representatives of the Civil Service Commission (the CSC was a joint sponsor of the program for the Federal fellows)
we were supposed to remain "non political" but work half a year in the House of Representatives and half a year in the Senate.

Well, 1967 was a very "political" year. That was the year that Richard M. Nixon was headed for the Republican presidential nomination. Nelson Rockefeller was "on and off" about whether he was going to run. Senator Chuck Percy had made a lot of noise as the junior Senator from Illinois, with the highest profile and a deep voice. He also had presidential aspirations. On the Democratic side Hubert Humphrey was Vice President of the United States and looking to run for President. So it was a big year on Capitol Hill. I decided that if I really wanted to enjoy this, I wanted to be attached to somebody who was going to be in the middle of the "political game."

What people under this program did was to interview at various Congressional offices. You had to find your own place. So I went to several Senators' offices, but Senator Percy was the one I really wanted to work for. I ended up "landing" a slot there. I worked for a while as an assistant to the Legislative Assistant on Senator Percy's staff, and on to work Percy’s speech writer, a young man named Cal Fentress.

Q: How did Senator Percy operate, from your point of view?

TICE: He was accessible to all of his staff. Many of the people on his staff were from Illinois and had come to Washington with him. So they all had known each other for a

long time. For example, Fentress, had been a boy friend of the Percy daughter who was murdered.

Q: Senator Percy had twin daughters, one of whom was murdered.

TICE: Yes. The other daughter is now married to Senator Jay Rockefeller [Democrat, West Virginia]. Cal was the son of the heir to the General Motors Acceptance Corporation, so I guess that he didn't exactly have to work to earn money. As we got into the presidential campaign of 1968, I would go along with Senator Percy on activities which had anything to do with foreign policy. Then I began to get into domestic policy, too. I remember that I began to be active during the "encampment" up on the Mall that year connected with and the so-called "March on Washington."

Q: This was in conjunction with what?

TICE: Let me start with Senator Percy's committee assignments in the Senate.

Q: No, I meant the "encampment."

TICE: Oh, I'm trying to remember. The "March on Washington" and the "encampment" on the Mall were a combination of activities in connection with promoting "Civil Rights" and welfare legislation. I remember that we went to a rally being held by one of the "March" leaders in a church on Capitol Hill. Fentress, Senator Percy, and I went to that because the person who had organized this rally was a then little-known Chicagoans named Jesse Jackson. When riots took place in the cities earlier that summer of 1968, Senator Percy had gone back to Chicago and hooked up with Jesse Jackson, trying to do something to quell the riots there at the time of the Democratic Party convention and to establish some kind of "dialogue." So Percy knew Jackson already. This was an interesting thing for a Foreign Service Officer who had just come out of an overseas assignment really to be "thrown into the maw" of American domestic politics, and I really liked this experience.

Q: I think that this "March on Washington" was also known as "The Poor People's March."

TICE: Yes, I think you're right. And, the encampment was called "Resurrection Village".

Q: Did you get involved in writing foreign policy speeches, or what were you doing?

TICE: Senator Percy was a fairly junior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I worked on pretty general stuff.

It was not until the second half of the year, when I left Senator Percy's office to go over to the House of Representatives that I really got into the "guts" of writing political speeches. It was kind of an interesting thing. I went over to the House of Representatives for the

second half of the Fellowship year, interviewed with the Republican Congressman from my district, the First District in Kansas, named Robert Dole. Then I also interviewed with Congressman Don Rumsfeld [Republican, Illinois], as well as other members of the House. However, Rumsfeld was the one I was really interested in because he was very highly regarded as a young Congressman. Rumsfeld is almost exactly the same age as I am. I think that he's two months younger than I. "Rummy" was very highly regarded as a political strategist and tactician. He had friends on "both sides of the aisle" [i.e., in both Republican and Democratic Parties]. He was one of the planners behind the Nixon campaign. So I figured that all of this couldn't be bad.

So Rumsfeld "hired" me to join his staff, primarily to work on foreign policy issues. Then, Congressman Dole went to see him and said: "Don, I wanted Tice to write speeches for my Senate campaign. You 'stole' him." So Rumsfeld said: "Well, for as much time as you need him, I'll loan him back to you."

So, without my having any "say" in it, Don Rumsfeld called me in and said: "Bob Dole wants you to write some speeches for him." Dole's office was just down the hall from Rumsfeld's office. I knew Congressman Dole somewhat. My parents were active in his campaigns. My brother was his finance manager on one occasion in one of the northern counties of Kansas.

Dole tossed me a lot of material which his "hired gun" speechwriter had prepared for him. He said: "Look at these and see what you think of them." I read it all through and went to Dole's "Public Relations" woman, Trudie Messerve. I said: "Trudie, this stuff is no good." She said: "That's what I've been telling him. You go and tell him that." So Dole said to me: "What do you think of it?" I said: "It's crap." He said: "Can you do any better?" I said: "Yes. Let's sit down and talk about what the issues are that you're running on." He said: "There are really only three issues. There's foreign policy, the economy, and the riots in the cities. Those are the three 'buzz words.'"

So I sat down with Senator Percy's speeches and the resource material I had used to prepare them. Cal Fentress and I had done speeches for Senator Percy on all three of these issues. I basically wrote three speeches: one on the cities and social welfare, one on foreign policy, and one on the economy. Then, since I grew up in Kansas and knew the state and the kind of audience Dole would have, I did a "matrix," both geographically and in terms of the kinds of audiences he would be addressing. That is, large cities as opposed to county seats and rural area; audiences he would be speaking to - businessmen, Kiwanis Club members, church groups, youth organizations, labor unions, etc. I numbered paragraphs on the three separate speeches I had prepared on the three different issues. Then I prepared a guide. That is, for this kind of audience, use paragraph such and such from speech one, paragraph such and such from speech two, and paragraph such and such from speech three. So, for a given occasion, he had a basic speech. He always, of course, delivered these speeches pretty much on an "ad lib" basis. He would remember them and most of the details but he spoke extemporaneously most of the time. What I wrote gave him a guide on the things he should address. I then went back working for Congressman

Rumsfeld. Dole used that approach pretty well through most of the campaign. My only recompense for that was seeing in the magazine "Congressional Quarterly" after Dole had been elected to the Senate, a reference to "Robert Dole, former arch-conservative, now turned moderate and even liberal in some instances." [Laughter] That was the impact of the speeches I had written for him. However, I think that what I was writing probably hit closer to Bob Dole's real philosophy than did the perception of him as a "Right Winger" and I think that that is probably still true despite allegations during the 1996 presidential campaign and all of that kind of thing.

Q: What about Congressman Rumsfeld? Dole ultimately became Senate Majority Leader and Republican candidate for President in 1996. But what about Rumsfeld? He was Chief of Staff at the White House, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary General of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] at one time or another. How did he operate?

TICE: He was a real "kick." Rumsfeld was first elected to Congress in the Thirteenth District in Illinois, which covered Winnetka, a northern suburb of Chicago, The lady incumbent of that seat had represented the Thirteenth District for some 20 years, and had decided to retire. or something like that. Rumsfeld decided run for the Republican nomination, knowing full well that he would be running for the Republican nomination against entrenched interests -- the Republican establishment already had designated their candidate.. Rumsfeld had been a staffer in Congress and, before that, he was a Navy pilot so he was not well known politically in the district.

Don organized his New Trier High School classmates. I don't know if you're familiar with New Trier.

Q: My brothers went to New Trier.

TICE: It was one of the best high schools in the United States at that time and probably still is. My wife went there, as a matter of fact. Anyway, Rumsfeld organized his classmates and all of his friends from New Trier High School. With a nearly zero budget, they set up "kaffeeklatsch" in all of their homes, and their parents' homes, and the homes of their friends and their parents' friends, throughout the Thirteenth District. That was basically his campaign, and he won. Once he'd won the primary, he was a "shu in." Then he had money behind him and could put on a real campaign. He had strong support in his district and he kept this going. As a matter of fact, on a couple of occasions I went back to his district with him. His mother was still driving her "getting around" car, a very beat up Volkswagen "Beetle," which Don Rumsfeld had used during his campaign. It was his trademark. We would hop into that "Beetle" and charge around. Every 30 minutes there would be another "kaffeeklatsch," and there would be a full house of people to meet and talk with him. There were more women than men at these events, but a lot of men would also show up too. He'd talk for 15 or 20 minutes, answer questions, and have a cup of coffee. Then we'd scoot out to the car and go around the corner to the next place.

Q: Did you get involved in foreign affairs questions at this time?

TICE: Yes. He was on the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations. This was a key committee for the funding of foreign affairs activities. He had me do quite a lot of research on that, and prepare floor statements, and that kind of thing. Any House or Senate staffer should be the "invisible person," and the convention was that it was always the Representative or Senator who did things. That's changed a lot by now. I did a lot on foreign affairs in that context. I also did some bits and pieces on domestic policy, too.

My "payoff" on the whole year came in 1968, near the end of my Fellowship year. Senator Percy had told me before I left his staff: "If I decide to make a run for President at the Republican Convention in Miami, I'd like you to go along on my staff". I said: "Well, OKAY, but I have to clear my skirts on that, first with Don Rumsfeld." Percy said: "I'll talk to Don." So I said: "I also have to talk with the State Department." I went down to the State Department with the intention of talking to Idar Rimestad, who was the Under Secretary for Management at the time. I didn't get to see him, but I saw his Special Assistant, whose name I can't remember. I explained the situation and said: "You know, if I let the Senator pay my way down to Miami, it could be against the law for me, as a Foreign Service Officer, to have somebody pay my way to work on a political campaign." Rimestad's Special Assistant said: "Okay, we'll cut orders for you. We'll pay your per diem and your transportation down there." I said: "Well, I'm going to be in the middle of politics." He said: "Just stay 'off camera' and keep your head down. This is good experience for you, and we need people who know how to deal with this kind of thing. As long as you are not caught out there visibly, it will be all right."

So I did it and had a ball. Percy's strategy at the convention was to work for Rockefeller's nomination, but at the same time position himself as a alternative candidate if Rockefeller and Nixon deadlocked. However, Richard Nixon had a steamroller going, and was nominated on the first ballot.. At that point, the people on the Percy campaign worked with the Rockefeller forces trying to get Percy nominated for vice president. When Nixon chose Maryland Governor Spiro Agnew, some of the younger people on Percy's staff, most of whom were from Chicago, and I got hooked up with the John Lindsay forces, trying to get a band-wagon behind Lindsay to block the choice of Agnew..

Q: You mean John Lindsay, the former Republican Mayor of New York.

TICE: Yes. Lindsay, instead of Spiro Agnew, the Governor of Maryland. We lost in both cases. However, I've always had a satisfying feeling that I was on the "right side" of the issue, both in terms of Nixon, as presidential candidate, and Agnew, as vice presidential candidate.

Q: Tell me, Don, things have changed so much that one has the feeling today that often much of foreign policy is dictated by Congress. This is called "micromanagement," in the sense that the Administration in office is required by resolution or legislation to do this or that. Often these dictations come more from Congressional staffs, who often have their

own, particular points of view, rather than from their principals, the Congressmen or the Senators. Could you comment on your impression of Congressional staffs during this period, 1967 to 1968?

TICE: Yes, the Congressional staffs during that period were supposed to be neither seen nor heard. The Staffs at that time were much smaller than they are now. There were exceptions, the three most prominent ones being those of Senators Percy, Bobby Kennedy [Democrat, New York] and of Ed Brooke [Republican, Massachusetts]. Some of these staffers, particularly for Kennedy and Brooke, became known personalities in their own right. Of course, on the Committee staffs there were people who were well known, like Carl Marcy, but they were virtual "institutions." Otherwise, Congressional staffers kept a pretty "low profile." Senator Percy tried to keep his staff profile low, although he had a big staff.

However, there wasn't this abomination then which is now called the "Staff Del" [Congressional staff delegation] where you have Congressional staffers who go on taxpayer-funded fact-finding trips acting as if they were Members or Senators, and demanding all the same perks as if they were. I encountered plenty of those later when I was an arms control negotiator.

Q: You left this Congressional detail in 1968. Where did you go next?

TICE: I was assigned as Special Assistant to the Director General of the Foreign Service and to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Personnel, in the State Department. At that time the Director General was John Steeves, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Personnel was Howard Mace.

Q: You held this position from 1968 until...

TICE: 1970.

Q: Could you talk a little about the two people you mentioned, John Steeves and Howard Mace? Could you talk about each one of those at that time, what the Director General and the Chief of Personnel did? Then we can talk about your duties.

TICE: OKAY. At that time the Director General of the Foreign Service, while seen by many as almost a "ceremonial" figure, had a significant amount of say over what happened in the career service. He directly supervised the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Personnel, Howard Mace, who managed the day-by day operations of the personnel system.. However, John Steeves got into operational matters only to a small extent.

As Director General, Steeves interviewed all of the Ambassadors who passed through the Department or were going out to their posts, and so forth. He represented the State Department as a former Ambassador and as the Director General on many occasions.

However, where Steeves had real influence was in the selection of Ambassadors and other high-level personnel in the Department and Foreign Service. These selections, or at least the people put forward by the career service for positions, were made by a small group of senior officers, former Ambassadors generally, under Director General Steeves' chairmanship. It was sort of an old-boys' club, and was so viewed by many.

However, winds of change were already blowing in the Department, in good measure generated by the events in Vietnam

For example, Steeves chaired a group which considered any disciplinary measures that came up. It consisted at the time Howard Mace, Ed Lyerly - the Deputy Legal Adviser for Administration, the Director of the Office of Medical Services, and the Assistant Secretary in charge of Security. I used to sit in on meetings of this group as the note taker and reporter and I observed the interaction of these people and how things were going. This was an interesting period in that regard because this was when Foreign Service Officers, you might say, began to realize that they actually had "rights." The way the Foreign Service had worked up until that time was that if someone, he or she, and most of the time, he, didn't want to go to a particular post, he would be offered a last chance to go to that post or resign from the Foreign Service. And he would resign, if he really didn't want to go to that post.

And, when a Foreign Service Officer wanted to get married...

Q: To a foreign national.

TICE: To a foreign national, he submitted the required application for permission to marry, along with his resignation. One or the other was then approved. I said "he", because there were few women in the Foreign Service, a married woman could not be appointed a Foreign Service Officer, and a single female FSO who married had to resign her commission.

Those rules began to be challenged during the period I was there, and the frustration on the part of the Board of the Foreign Service, members of which were from the "old Foreign Service," over the changes were very obvious. And, of course, this was the time of the Vietnam War. This was the time when President Lyndon Johnson made the decision to "force" Foreign Service Officers to accept assignment to the CORDS [Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support] office in Vietnam. The Department had asked for volunteers for such assignments and had run through all of them. The Department had looked for volunteers in the other, civilian agencies of the U. S. Government, but that well had run dry. The Department was running out of people to be assigned to CORDS/Vietnam. At that point, by direction from the White House, a successful candidate for appointment to the Foreign Service could not be appointed unless he agreed to spend his first tour of duty in Vietnamese language training and then a year or more in CORDS/Vietnam.

This ruling was eventually overturned, but not before a significant percentage of the junior foreign service had served in CORDS. It was a pretty "defining" in the Foreign Service. What it did, and I think that a lot of people may not even realize this, is that this practice built a kind of "Mafia" of people who served in CORDS, both voluntarily and involuntarily (if they wanted to get into the Foreign Service) These officers, with their common experience "hung together" and have been sitting on these...

Q: This is Side B of Tape 2 of the interview with Donald Tice. Don, you were saying that the group of officers who served in Vietnam was a tight-knit club.

TICE: It was a tight-knit club. The members "stood up" for each other. It turned out that this was not good for the Foreign Service in the sense that many people, who would have come into the Foreign Service, declined to go to Vietnam, and we "lost" them. Many others came into the Foreign Service and went on to Vietnam. Then, as they saw it, a year or 18 months later, other people came into the Foreign Service but did not have to go to Vietnam. These people then "turned on the Department" and caused a lot of turmoil.

Q: Did you actually see the "forced assignment" of people to Vietnam at that time? I'm not talking about people who were just coming into the Foreign Service but who were at a more senior or "mid career" level. Was this really an issue?

TICE: I wouldn't say that they were "forced" to serve in Vietnam. They were "pressured" to do so. Depending on the level, say, below the level of FSO-3, which is now FSO-1 in the newer system, there was a lot of resistance on the part of people who had small children, and this kind of thing. They were being asked or "pressured" to go into a war zone. At the FSO-3 level it was a little different because this was an opportunity to go to Vietnam and serve as a Province Senior Adviser, have your own helicopter, your own platoon guarding you, and that kind of thing. This could be "fun stuff" at the command level. There was a difference there, depending on what level you were at.

Q: Did you notice any extensive opposition to service in Vietnam on the part of other Foreign Service Officers? Well, there was the "open letter" to the President signed by some 50 Foreign Service Officers protesting the Cambodian "incursion" in 1970. Were you aware of that?

TICE: Yes, I was just leaving that job in the Director General's office at the time.

Q: In the spring of 1970 there was the "incursion" into Cambodia by American and South Vietnamese forces.

TICE: That is precisely what I was thinking of.

Q: Could you describe what you saw and how that played out, from your perspective?

TICE: From my perspective there appeared to be a lot of officers opposed to that action in the Foreign Service, including some people that I knew. In fact, at the time, I was "Co-Chairman," along with David Bilchik, of the organization of younger Foreign Service Officers called the Open Forum Panel (OFP), which had been formed in the latter part of the Johnson Administration and then flourished under the tutelage of Elliot Richardson, who came in as Deputy Secretary.

The OFP was the organization set up to try to get policy thinking and ideas to the top of the State Department, without their being "beaten to death" along the way. In this day of dissent channels and all that, which were outgrowths, by the way, of the OFP, it is hard to remember the degree to which policy ideas created down in the bureaus by more junior officers rarely saw the light of day. Bill Luers was one of the key people who started that. David Bilchik and I were the Co-Chairmen of it at the time of the Cambodian "incursion" in the spring of 1970. At that time I was on a week's trip as a member of a BEX [Board of Examiners of the Foreign Service] Oral Board out in Denver, CO.

When I returned to Washington, the "Open Forum" panel was basically split. One faction, led by David Bilchik, said that we should oppose the Cambodian "incursion" as a matter of principle and oppose the Secretary of State. I was the leader of the other faction. My feeling was that we could be more effective if we didn't break with the Secretary of State and worked within the system. Bilchik "won," and I went off to be Yugoslav Desk Officer and backed out of the controversy at that point. Yes, the Vietnam War was a very tendentious issue.

Q: Howard Mace was the Director of Personnel? Was he under the Director General, John Steeves?

TICE: Yes. In fact, he reported to Steeves, but he reported to Idar Rimestad, the Deputy Under Secretary for Management. Basically, Idar tried to "ignore" John Steeves, which created a rather tense situation at the top of the Administrative pyramid

Q: From your perspective, could you talk a bit about Rimestad? He was one of those figures about whom people have rather strong opinions. How did you see him?

TICE: It depends on what you want from an Under Secretary for Management. If you want an Under Secretary for Management who was "totally wired into" the Congress and who could go up to Capitol Hill and "cut a deal" with Committee chairmen, Rimestad was your man. If the deal which he cut with the Committee chairmen and the ranking minority figures on those committees was the deal which you got, I would say that Rimestad was a superb Under Secretary for Management. True, he may have cut some deals that we didn't want. However, we didn't then have the kinds of "raids" on State Department funding and the kind of "free lancing" activities that you now have on the part of individual Senators and Congressmen who "screw up" the State Department

because they can willfully do things. He displayed solid leadership before his time, and there were a lot of people who thought that he was very good.

Yes, I know that there were a lot of people who didn't like Rimestad. He had a kind of rough and gruff manner, but with Idar Rimestad you got what you paid for. With him in office you got the Department fully funded and Congress off our backs.

Q: In Personnel, did you see any reflection of a desire to see more women and more minorities in the Foreign Service at that time?

TICE: There was some "push" on this, but not a lot. It wasn't a big issue. At that time the Department started to go out and recruit and get people from minority groups to take the Foreign Service written exam. However, at the time the Foreign Service hadn't yet been altered in ways which took societal experience into account in terms of how you judge people. The Foreign Service was still pretty much a male, Caucasian group.

Q: Back to Vietnam, were we getting very many resignations from the Foreign Service from officers who declined to accept assignments there?

TICE: There were some resignations, but there was no "wave" of them. However, there were individual resignations.

Q: Back to the Cambodian "incursion" in 1970 a group of essentially junior officers signed an letter to Secretary of State Rusk which was "leaked" to the press, protesting our military operations in Cambodia. According to some accounts, President Nixon was "livid" about this and said: "Fire all of them." Secretary of State Rusk sort of "hid them away." Did you get involved in any of that?

TICE: No.

Q: In Personnel, how about issues of "justice"? I put it this way because, when somebody is accused of something, often in the government there is a tendency to believe the accusation. It almost seems to be easier for the government to avoid looking at all of the facts and simply "ease" the person out of the Foreign Service and so get rid of the problem. Did you see any of that?

TICE: No, not really. My recollection is that both John Steeves and Howard Mace, who were at the top of the Foreign Service, were "honorable men." In fact, if I recall anything, it is some instances of quite the opposite. For example, when someone was "unfairly treated," they would try to get them out of the post where they weren't getting a "fair shake" or their job was taken away. John Steeves and Howard Mace tried to "get them away" from the source of the problem and give them another chance in a different context. That was the way that kind of thing seemed to be treated.

Q: Then in 1970 where did you move?

TICE: I was moved to the Yugoslav Desk.

Q: You were on the Yugoslav Desk from 1970 to...

TICE: 1972.

Q: What was the situation in Yugoslavia during the period 1970-1972?

TICE: Tito was still riding high. Of course in the late 1940's he had made his break with Stalin. There had been a decade of U. S. aid to Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav economy was good and improving. Yugoslavia had a sort of "semi-convertible" currency. Most Yugoslavs could get passports and travel to the West without any problems. So Yugoslavia acted in many ways like a Western country. At the time the interest of the Nixon administration was to try to see what they could do to "bolster" the arrangements which Tito had put in place so that Titoism would survive Tito. For example, that was one of the things that I got involved in when I was on the Yugoslav Desk. A request had come down from the NSC [National Security Council] for recommendations on what the United States Government could do to improve the chances for stability in the Balkans after Tito passed from the scene.

I had made several trips out to Yugoslavia and was monitoring all the reporting traffic, so I was fairly conversant with what was happening there. We knew that there was real resentment in Yugoslavia on the part of the Bosnians and Slovenes because we had closed Consulates in Sarajevo and in Ljubljana. So the Yugoslav desk officer in USIA [United States Information Agency], Bruce Jackson, another middle grade officer, and I sat down and discussed this issue. We came up with the idea of putting USIS [United States Information Service] offices in each of the capitals of the Federation of Yugoslavia. This would include offices in Skopje in Macedonia, Titograd in Montenegro, Sarajevo in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ljubljana in Slovenia, and Novi Sad in the Voivodina, and Pristina in the Kosovo. We already had a good, separately housed (from the Embassy Chancery) USIS center in the heart of the university area in Belgrade, and co-located with our Consulate General in Zagreb.

So we wrote up a recommendation to this effect. It really was a case of the "man with a memo" theory making policy. That memo went whistling right through the bureaucratic layers in State and on to the NSC. The first thing I knew was that I had USIA "mad" at me because suddenly, by White House "fiat," their budget was being drawn on to fund the opening of additional USIS centers in Yugoslavia. This happened during the first year I was on the Yugoslav desk. By the time I left there at the end of two years, we had already opened the first additional USIS center in Sarajevo. I left the desk and went to Belgrade as Political Counselor. During my tour there, we installed Centers in Ljubljana and Skopje, and plans were progressing for Titograd. The centers in Pristina and Novi Sad were put on hold because of questions raised about their somewhat different status as “semi autonomous” parts of the Republic of Serbia.

The whole thrust of U. S. policy was how could we make sure that Yugoslavia would not fall apart when Tito died.

Q: I have to say that at one point George Kennan, while he was Ambassador to Yugoslavia, asked me, as the chief of the Consular Section in Belgrade, for my views on whether we should close the Consulate in Sarajevo. I said: "Well, from the purely consular point of view, why not?" So he closed the Consulate in Sarajevo.

TICE: So you "undid" my work! [Laughter] Well, my comment would be: "So, now we've got Embassies in other countries, all over the place.

Q: During the time that you were on the Yugoslav desk, this was still fairly early on during Nixon's first term as President. Nixon was certainly a creature of California politics. What about the Artukovic case? Did that case come up at all while you were on the Yugoslav desk?

TICE: No. That came later, although of course there was ongoing agitation on the part of émigré groups, especially Serbians, to have him extradited to Yugoslavia for prosecution
Q: Explain who he was...

TICE: Artukovic had been the Minister of the Interior of the fascist, Ustashi regime, a Nazi, "puppet" dictatorship in Croatia during World War II. Pavelic...

Q: I think that Pavelic was the "Prime Minister" of the Ustashi regime. Artukovic was the "Heinrich Himmler" [head of the Gestapo in Germany during World War II] of Croatia.

TICE: Artukovic was a "mass murderer." There's no question about that. He learned from the Nazis the techniques that enabled him to kill more people, more quickly. It wasn't just Jews, either. There weren't enough of them in Croatia to make it worthwhile. Mainly, it was Serbs that Artukovic arranged to have killed. The Pavelic regime was a Croatian, anti-Serb dictatorship, which is something which a lot of American people who look at this period do not understand. These Americans tend to say: "Oh, well, aren't the Croatians the 'good guys' and the Serbs the 'bad guys?'" It just ain't that simple.

Now what was the thrust of your question?

Q: Efforts had been made, from time to time, to send Artukovic back to Yugoslavia to be tried. Artukovic was "protected" because he was the brother of a wealthy, Republican contractor in California. This has always been a point of contention in Yugoslav-American relations.

TICE: Artukovic wasn't extradited to Yugoslavia until a number of years later. However, this issue wasn't really "ticking over" during my time on the Yugoslav desk.

The problems which I got into and which were "ticking over" involved two groups in the United States which were always making "demarches" on the Yugoslav desk officer in the State Department. One of them, obviously, was the old "Ustashi" faction centered primarily around Cincinnati, OH.

Q: There were a lot of Croatians in Cincinnati. Was Senator Frank Lausche [Republican, OH] still around? He had a Croatian or Slovenian background, I'm not sure which.

TICE: I think that Senator Lausche was of Croatian ancestry.

The other Yugoslav group consisted of the old "Chetnik" faction of Right Wing Serbs, which was centered mainly in Chicago. For the Yugoslav desk officer, it was a "damned if you do" and "damned if you don't" situation. For example, for years many of the mayors of cities all over the United States had been persuaded by Croatians living in the U. S. to issue declarations in favor of Croatia and flying the Croatian flag over city halls or governor's mansions on May 10, which was "Ustashi Day," Tito's Government and Embassy in Washington was giving the State Department "fits" about that.

I had a list of all of the mayors and governors who had agreed to Croatian requests to honor the May 10 holiday. I wrote a letter to them, as Yugoslav desk officer, cleared it through the Office of the Legal Adviser in the State Department, and also had it cleared by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. The letter said, more or less:

"Dear Mr. Mayor: Far be it from me to tell you what you should do and whom you should honor in your city. However, you might want to consider whether taking part in celebrations which have the appearance, at least, of celebrating a fascist dictatorship which was involved in genocide during World War II. You may not want to do that."

Well, I had stunning success. The Mayors of Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, and Los Angeles, to name the "big ones," all declined to take part in the following year's celebration of "Ustashi Day." I had some gun-carrying Ustashi in front of my desk within a matter of days after I sent that letter out. The letter made the papers, and there was a big hullabaloo. Everybody was running for cover, and Congressmen were pontificating on the matter. To the Department's credit, they protected me on the letter and didn't give an inch on it. The Department could have "fed me to the wolves" on this issue, if they'd wanted to. [Laughter]

Q: Who was the American Ambassador to Yugoslavia when you were on the Yugoslav desk?

TICE: When I was on the Yugoslav desk, Bill Leonhart was the Ambassador. I saw him, of course, during my trips to Yugoslavia and when he was in the Department for consultations. Then he left Belgrade and Mack Toon, who had been Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, was named to replace him in Yugoslavia. Mack went out as Ambassador to Yugoslavia about six months after I went on the Yugoslav desk, I think. I don't

remember exactly. He had been Ambassador to Yugoslavia for nearly two years when I went to Belgrade as Political Counselor in July, 1972.

Q: Did you get involved at all in the controversy between Ambassador Leonhart and Tom Enders [then DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission]?

TICE: No, but I was aware of it. After the "blow up," following which Tom Enders left Belgrade, I was on a visit to Yugoslavia, and Ambassador Leonhart seemed to have the air of being "embattled." He left Belgrade not long after that.

Q: What was your impression of how the Embassy in Belgrade and the Consulate General in Zagreb kept you informed through their reporting and so forth?

TICE: The reporting was good. Both offices were very active. The Consulate General in Zagreb at one point had "gotten a little bit out in front of the Embassy," not from my point of view but from the point of view of Ambassador Toon. In 1971, I guess it was, there was a political "upheaval" in Zagreb, a belated sort of "Prague Spring" kind of thing. [A reference to the uprising in Prague, Czechoslovakia, in May, 1968, which the Soviets ultimately put down by force.] The Croatians were not really badly off, but politically Yugoslavia was still a communist country, even though it was relatively "free." We had some young Political Officers who got very much involved in reporting, based on what the "anti-Tito types" were doing in Croatia. This caused some unhappiness in Belgrade because the interpretation of these events was somewhat different from the two posts.

I remember that when Ambassador Toon was getting read into the situation in Belgrade, he was "livid" because this reporting was going directly to the Department from the Consulate General in Zagreb, without first going through the Embassy in Belgrade. The Embassy was just getting information copies of this reporting. When Toon went out to Belgrade, one of the first things that he did was to order all reporting from the Consulate General in Zagreb to go through the Embassy in Belgrade before going to the Department. However, I think that, by and large, the Political Officers in Zagreb were doing a good job. My predecessor as Political Counselor in Belgrade was Clayton Mudd. Clayton had been in Yugoslavia as an OSS [Office of Strategic Services, a foreign intelligence agency during World War II] officer during World War II. At the end of World War II he was up in Trieste, Italy. He apparently had a few "flies" on him which bothered some people but he knew Serbo-Croat and he knew people...

Q: He had been Yugoslav desk officer for a long time, too.

TICE: Yes.

Q: What was the political situation in Yugoslavia when you arrived in Belgrade in 1972? By the way, you were in Belgrade from 1972 to...

TICE: 1975. In 1975 I was assigned to the National War College.

Regarding the political situation in Yugoslavia in 1972, it seemed "stable." Even in retrospect, it would be hard to say that we should have spotted what was to come, although I would have to say in hind-sight that we should have anticipated it. Tensions were beginning to be apparent over the transfer of wealth from the North to the South of Yugoslavia. That is, Croatia and Slovenia were the two "wealthiest" of the Yugoslav republics. Serbia was somewhere in between. Voivodina was as wealthy as Slovenia but always a little bit "off on its own." Then when you went South and got into southern Serbia and Kosovo, the Albanian area, the poverty level declined very fast, as did the development level. Macedonia was little better than Kosovo, and Montenegro was sort of a "privileged appendage" of Serbia. When Serbia did all right, Montenegro was OKAY.

Tito was trying to arrange a major, incremental "wealth transfer" from the northern to the southern part of Yugoslavia, for development purposes. This was causing unhappiness among the Croatians and Slovenes, in particular. We saw that. Tito was handling this situation at that time. He was still a vital, vigorous man. Every time there were rumors that Tito was ill, not doing well, or ailing, the next thing you would see was a picture of Tito with a big, fat grin on his face, looking down at a boar he had just shot. It was something like that. It was real theater.

Tito was very much in charge. He had set up collective, rotating Presidencies, both of the country and of the Communist Party. They worked as long as he was around. In fact, it took a number of years for these collective Presidencies to deteriorate and finally break down. following his death in 1980. However, the underlying tensions at the time and the underlying causes for what happened later were economic in nature.

That situation accelerated when things finally fell apart as a result of an economic downturn in Western Europe. The main source of hard currency for Yugoslavia came from Yugoslav "guest workers" up in Western Europe. Principally Germany, but also in the Low Countries, some in France, and a lot of them in Switzerland and Scandinavia. A sort of "normal" family in Yugoslavia had the father working in a Western European country, making money and driving back to Yugoslavia every six months in a car which he would sell back home and make money on the sale.

Q: I'm not sure of the timing, but at one point Tito apparently felt that things were getting out of control on the nationalistic side, particularly in Croatia. I think that this was when Franjo Tudjman was put in jail. Did this happen around that time?

TICE: I think that this happened after I left Yugoslavia in 1975. That action marked the beginning of deeper problems in Yugoslavia. However, as long as he was alive, Tito kept these problems pretty much "under the surface." I must say that when I was in Yugoslavia, we were going almost every night during the week to one kind of social function or another. That was how you got information. You could go down to the Writers' Club or the Cultural Workers' Club at 11:00 PM, have dinner, drink slivovitz until 2:00 AM, and pick up information that way. Politicians, members of Parliament,

members of the Tito administration, and students and intellectuals were all at one of those places. It was a wonderful time to be a political reporting officer. It was hard on the liver but it was lots of fun.

For example, you would be sitting at a table with a mixture of Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians. They treated each other with civility. There were always jokes back and forth and that kind of thing. You didn't have a sense of deeply felt animosity and hostility. I guess that hostilities were lurking there, under the surface. However, it took a different political climate for them to come out.

Q: At least my impression is that it took "really nasty," political leadership to bring Yugoslavia down the way it came down.

TICE: I think that that's a very accurate way of putting it. I think that you had "really nasty" political leadership on the part of two people: Franjo Tudjman [of Croatia] and Slobodan Milosevic [of Serbia].
Q: Absolutely. How did we look at Yugoslavia from 1970 to 1975, both from Belgrade and when you were on the Yugoslav desk? This was a time of slowly rising tensions. The "Cold War" was still on. Where did we see Yugoslavia?

TICE: We saw Yugoslavia as an asset and not a problem. During the 1950's we were providing Yugoslavs with most of its military supplies, their training, and all of this kind of thing.

Then, in the 1960's that began to "tail off." The Soviets began to cultivate the Yugoslavs more intensively and began to provide them with some of their military supplies and develop closer ties with them. I think that Tito felt that things had gone too far in one direction. So there began to be some real questions in the U. S. Government over what Tito really was. That is, whether he was a "stalking horse" for the Soviets or whether he was really trying to stay in the middle. Of course, Tito was one of the leaders of the "Non Aligned Movement" [NAM], which was creating public relations problems for the Yugoslavs in the U.S. as politicians leapt on Yugoslav activities in the NAM to make points.

During the period I was in Yugoslavia and dealing intensively with that country for more than five years, both in Washington and then in Belgrade, I don't think that anybody in a position to know in detail what was going on there, ever really thought that the Yugoslavs were working for the Soviets. I think that our impression was that the Yugoslavs were honestly trying to "balance" relations between both sides. Sometimes, to reach that "balance," they would shift the other way for a time, and this would irritate people. However, I don't think that the Yugoslavs were ever seen as anything but a potential ally.

Among other things, if you looked at the various war games and land scenarios that we played back in those days, we always knew that if the Russians ever set foot in Yugoslavia, Tito had his "arms caches" and his Yugoslav National Army. They would go

back into the hills, and the Russians would meet the same fate that the Germans did during World War II. However, they would be facing a better trained and better armed adversary.

Q: What about the Vietnam issue? It "played out" during the time that you were in the Balkans.

TICE: Yes. It began when I was in Bulgaria and continued while I was in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Government officially played the "sanctimonious" game of referring to their "great Vietnamese allies," meaning the Vietnamese communists, and all of that stuff. It irritated the hell out of all of us that way. However, when you got into a private conversation with the Yugoslavs, the issue never came up. If it did, they would say: "We understand your problem and are glad it's yours and not ours." [Laughter]

Q: But you didn't have to deal with the Vietnam War as an issue in Yugoslav-U. S. relations. Perhaps it was an "irritant," but it was not a real issue.

TICE: No, we weren't dealing with it as a real issue, except insofar as Yugoslav public statements irritated politicians back in Washington who didn't understand what was going on.

Q: Did you have a problem, particularly with the Right Wing Republicans, back in Congress? You had known Congress. I remember that when I was in Yugoslavia, we used to get all sorts of things, including proclamations issued by the Governor of Pennsylvania and that sort of thing.

TICE: Well, Congressman Ed Derwinski [Republican, Illinois] was one of the greatest proponents of putting a statue of Draja Mikhailovic, the former Serbian Chetnik leader, on the grounds of the U. S. Capitol. Every damned year he introduced a bill authorizing putting up this statue, and all hell broke loose every year because, as you know, both personally as well as politically, Mikhailovic and Tito were rabid adversaries.

Q: Congressman Derwinski is from Chicago and is of Polish descent.

TICE: He was a Chicago "ethnic politician." I guess that I got to know "Big Ed" Derwinski pretty well when I was on the Yugoslav desk in the State Department. He also came out to Yugoslavia several times when I was in Belgrade. Derwinski was a member of the U. S. Delegation to the Inter- Parliamentary Union (IPU, came to with the U.S. IPU Delegation when they were having their world meeting in Belgrade. He had asked us in advance: "Do you think that I'll have a problem?" Ambassador Toon said: "Of course not. Just come out here." Well, when Derwinski arrived in Belgrade, he was being "hit up" from every side by Yugoslavs, giving him "fits" about his bill to erect a statue to Mikhailovic. He finally came to me and said basically: "Look, would you tell the Yugoslavs to call these guys off? I have to put in that bill every year because that is what I need to do for my constituency. If this bill ever came to the floor of the House of

Representatives for a vote, I'd probably have to vote against it. But get these guys off my back so I can return to my IPU work." [Laughter]

Q: We're talking about an era when there was a huge statue just North of the corner of 23rd and P Sts., N. W., not far from Sheridan Circle in Washington, to honor some obscure Ukrainian poet. The statue is of massive proportions. It's still there.

TICE: Yes, it is.

Q: How did you find relations between Zagreb [Croatia] and Belgrade? I'm talking in particularly about the relations between our Consulate General in Zagreb and the Embassy in Belgrade, during your time in Yugoslavia.

TICE: They were generally pretty good because the Consul General in Zagreb was Orme Wilson. He had been my predecessor as Yugoslav desk officer in the Department of State. He was an "old Yugoslav hand" and belonged to an old American diplomatic family. He was a traditionalist.

Q: He recently died.

TICE: Yes, he just died. Orme was not a "wave maker" [i.e., trouble maker]. He knew a lot about Yugoslavia. He'd previously served in Belgrade and Zagreb and then returned to Zagreb as Consul General when he left the Yugoslav desk in Washington. He was there for five years, so he was there during the better part of the time that I was in Belgrade as Political Counselor.

Previously, when the reporting from Zagreb got a little "out of hand," the Consul General was someone else. That Consul General and the people assigned to the Consulate General at that time apparently tended to think of themselves as the U.S. representatives to Croatia.

Q: Were you able to travel around Yugoslavia much?

TICE: Yes. I did as much traveling as I could. The problem there was that I had a Political Section of six officers, as I recall, and somebody had to stay in Belgrade and attend the meetings. So I didn't travel as much as I liked. I traveled to all of the Yugoslav republics many times and was always pressing Ambassador Toon to get out and travel more.

I think that one of the funniest trips that we had was the first trip (for Ambassador Toon) to the Republic of Kosovo, in southern Yugoslavia. There wasn't any "easy living" in Kosovo. The best hotel there was pretty "seedy." [Laughter] You were lucky if you got a shower, never mind whether it had hot or cold running water!

Q: Did we see a problem in Kosovo at that time? Were you able to talk to members of the Albanian ethnic group there?

TICE: Yes. The problem there was literally growing rapidly, because the people of Kosovo had the highest birth rate of any area on the European continent. This was a problem that the Serbs were anguishing over. One of the last rulers of Serbia had died fighting the Turks, but "the holy fields of Kosovo," as this period of Serbia was recalled, were becoming an enclave of Albanians, whom the Serbs considered were an "inferior people." The prejudice of the Serbs against the Albanians is difficult to believe, even compared to feelings which both you and I have observed expressed, right here in the United States. This Serb feeling expressed the most "vicious" discrimination against a minority group which I have ever seen. The Serbs considered the Albanians "animals." At that time, of course, the Serb working man was often up in Germany making money in German factories, while a good part of the unskilled work in the Republic of Serbia, certainly in Belgrade, was done by people of Albanian ancestry from Kosovo.

Q: The Albanians from Kosovo wore distinctive, white skull caps. Any time there was any hauling to be done, it was done by people wearing white skull caps.

TICE: That's right. It was a festering problem. Everyone knew that it was a problem and that it wasn't going to go away, though the Serbs were trying to ignore it. Tito was trying to assuage or diminish the problem by encouraging development in Kosovo, but he was meeting with resistance from the Serbs and the northern republics, none of whom wanted to see wealth they were creating go to the Albanians in the Kosovo.

Q: At that time were we "cultivating" the Albanian minority, if that is the right term?

TICE: Well, we opened a USIS Information Center in Skopje in Macedonia, the republic adjoining Kosovo, which had a large Albanian minority. While I was in Yugoslavia, there was a marvelous American named George Forner, George had been a Presbyterian minister, then joined the Peace Corps, and then worked for USIA. He was one of those people whom you would call on if you needed some kind of missionary in the wilds of Brazil. He just thrived on going into a place like Kosovo.. When they rebuilt the part of Skopje which had been hardest hit by the 1963 earthquake, what they called the "gradski zid," the "city wall," which enclosed the old city, had completely fallen down. On the old foundations they built the new "city wall," consisting of buildings about seven or eight stories high. There were residences on the upper floors, with shops and offices on the lower floors.

So we put our USIS Information Center in one of the ground floor areas of the new city wall. Well, the building was going along very slowly. Forner, virtually single-handed, "ramroded" getting the construction done, ordering material, and getting workers to keep working instead of going off to drink "slivovitz" [plum brandy, a popular alcoholic drink in Yugoslavia]. While everything else was sort of a "shell," the USIS Information Center

was a "bright spot of light" in this desolate area. Forner was known as "the American" in Macedonia, and he traveled a lot into the "Shiptar" area of Kosovo, too.

Q: "Shiptar" is the Serb word for the Albanians. How were relations, as we saw them, between Greece and Yugoslavia in those days?

TICE: They were "proper" and "correct" and presented no big problems because, while the Greeks have always considered Macedonia to be Greek, there was no attempt to mount "incursions" into Yugoslav Macedonia or that kind of thing. If there were any problems with Greece, they were referred to as "problems with Greece and Bulgaria."

Q: How about Yugoslav problems with Bulgaria, your old "stamping ground"?
TICE: Well, they were sort of like a "fly on the butt." The Bulgarians would "bite" at Yugoslavia occasionally, and Tito would "swat" at them. That was all. There were never any military actions. A couple of times a year there would be eruptions or exchanges of accusations, and that kind of thing. As far as Tito's Yugoslavia was concerned, Macedonia was an integral part of Yugoslavia. The Bulgarians always said that Macedonia is Bulgarian.

Q: In the Balkans the Western Embassies are much closer to each other than, say, Western Embassies in London and Paris. You really felt that you were "together." Was there any particular "differences of view" between, say, the French, the British, the Germans, and the Americans? Or were we all pretty much on the same wavelength during this time?

TICE: I think that we were pretty much on the same wavelength. There were NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] groups in Belgrade which met regularly, There was a NATO Ambassadors' group which, I think, met once a month, and a NATO Defense Attachés group which met once a month. Of course, the Defense Attachés group was pretty much on the intelligence side.

The military attachés, I think, were more subject to Yugoslav harassment than we were. This was because the attachés were out, looking at various military installations. They traveled to collect intelligence on and in Yugoslavia. Travel by Embassy officers was to get to know people and that kind of thing. This also involved gathering intelligence, but it was of a different kind.

Certainly, I don't recall any major differences among the NATO allies while we were in Yugoslavia.

Q: You mentioned that you had six officers in the Political Section, beside yourself. I'm speaking now as a non-political officer, but Yugoslavia is not that big a country. When I was in Yugoslavia, I often thought that we were reporting on developments at the equivalent of the county level. I wondered if we were getting our money's worth by reporting in that much detail. Now, Yugoslavia is a great country to work in. However,

couldn't we have done as good reporting with fewer people? What did you feel about this, at that time?

TICE: Looking at the matter in retrospect, I suppose that we could have gotten along with fewer people. One of the Political Officers was a young guy named Chuck Smith. Chuck sort of "went to ground" in the university community. His girl friend was a Yugoslav Serb. They later married and had a family.

Q: This is Side A of Tape 3 of the interview with Don Tice.

TICE: I used to think that it was fine that Chuck didn't show up at the Embassy, wearing a tie and looking like most Foreign Service Officers, most of the time. That was at a time when there was a low-level dissident group, called the "Belgrade 8," consisting of eight professors at the university who were having philosophical differences with Tito. This was causing quite a lot of furor among the equivalent of "Kremlinologists" or "Yugoslav watchers" and that kind of thing. If I remember correctly, one of the "Belgrade 8" was the elder brother of Chuck Smith's girl friend. So he had total access to this group. By that time his Serbian was so good that he was virtually "one of the gang." He did great reporting from that vantage point.

You had a question. What was that worth? Well, at the time it seemed to be worth quite a lot. In the long sweep of history it probably wasn't worth a "hill of beans." However, you never know.

Another junior Political Officer was Dick Miles. Dick was Ambassador to Azerbaijan, and then DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission] in Moscow. He left that position and is now Chief of Mission in Belgrade. He is not called Ambassador, because we don't have formal relations with Serbia at the ambassadorial level. When I was political counselor, Dick sat half a level down from me in that crumby old office building we had in Belgrade. His office, in fact, was sort of an overgrown broom closet. He literally read every newspaper and other publication put out in Yugoslavia. He would come up with absolutely amazing information from the provincial press that you would never find sitting in Belgrade or even making trips to these areas. We did, of course, go out and make visits and calls throughout Yugoslavia, and we got good insights into what attitudes were like through this travel. But we were very lucky to have a guy like Dick on the Embassy staff, who garnered a lot of excellent insights simply by reading all the provincial press..

Q: Did you find that the Political Section, and the Embassy as a whole, served as a "resource" for other, friendly Embassies and for foreign correspondents in Belgrade?

TICE: Oh, yes. We were very close to the press and were constantly being asked questions by friendly Embassies. A significant part of our job involved providing information to friendly Embassies. This also, of course, gave us a certain leverage. The

symbiotic relationship with the resident foreign also was useful in instances when we might want to know something about this or that but didn't want to go and ask the question directly of some government official. We could put a friendly reporter up to asking the question. We were Dusko Dodor was there for the “Washington Post”, as was Strobe Talbott [formerly “Time Magazine” correspondent and now Deputy Secretary of State]. He apparently was based in Belgrade while he was editing "Khrushchev Remembers" [Khrushchev's memoirs], but on sight strategically should Tito die. Another excellent reporter was Roy Gutman, who then worked for Reuters, but subsequently moved to “Newsday”, where he subsequently won a Pulitzer Prize for his early reporting on genocide in Bosnia

Q: When you say that you would "use" the foreign journalists or had a "symbiotic relationship" with them, what do you mean?

TICE: Well, you might know through intelligence sources that something or other had probably happened. A foreign journalist might come to you and say: "Have you heard anything about this or that?" If you wanted to warn him off the subject you could say: "No, never heard of it." However, if you wanted a matter to come to public notice or thought the journalist might be able to smoke something out, you could stimulate your journalist colleague to look into it further. This was, of course, a two-way street, because it provided the Journalist had the benefit of being tipped off or guided in the right direction to get a story. This is a classic journalist-diplomat relationship worldwide.

Q: The journalists could ask about such a subject without "ruffling feathers," which might be the case if an Embassy officer did it.

TICE: Oh, yes. The journalists sometimes came up with information which we hadn't come across. We could then check out this information through our intelligence sources. Occasionally, the result of the check would be that the information was accurate and might provide some further details regarding a development. Then you could get some guidance on what you could and couldn't say about the subject. That was the other side of this relationship.

I'll never forget that there were rumors about a Right Wing, communist "cell" down on the Dalmatian coast of Yugoslavia, led by a guy that Tito had thrown out of the Communist Party years before. One of the reporters came to me and said: "I've got very good and detailed information on this. I don't want to look like a fool. I don't know whether to report this or not." I said: "Well, if I were you, I would run it." He said: "Thank you." [Laughter] We wanted this story to get out. Once it was out in public, we could collect more information on it. So that was a useful relationship.

Q: You were there during the "Watergate Affair." What impact did that have in Yugoslavia?

TICE: The Yugoslavs weren't terribly interested. They regarded President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger as "friends" and supporters of theirs. This was because Nixon was the first President to invite Marshal Tito to enter the front door of the White House. He had made a previous visit to the White House but was "smuggled in" by dark of night during the administration of President Kennedy.

Q: That was in 1963.

TICE: Yes. However, this was the first time that Tito came into the White House in his full regalia. I was on the Yugoslav desk then and was involved in all of that.

When the Watergate affair began to unravel, I think that the Yugoslavs basically didn't understand it. I happened to be having a reception at my house the day that President Nixon resigned.

Q: This would have been in the summer of 1974.

TICE: Right. I had an old, black and white, Sears television set, which I had rewired to receive the local Belgrade stations. When something big was happening in world news, the local Belgrade stations would pick up international coverage, and the stations were carrying the resignation story direct from Washington. So, I set the TV on a central pedestal in the entry hall of my residence and I turned it on so this reception featured coverage of the story that the President of the United States had resigned.

A number of Yugoslavs came up to me and said: "You Americans are the strangest people! Why would you show this to us?" My answer was simple: "Because that's what democracy is all about. That's how we change our leadership. You people should know that." However, in the larger sense, the Yugoslav public wasn't terribly interested in the Watergate Affair. They didn't consider it a "big deal." They felt that our leaders changed all the time, so what was the "big fuss"?

Q: Then in 1975 you left Yugoslavia. Where did you go then?

TICE: In 1975 I came back to the United States to attend the National War College.

Q: That was from 1975 to 1976.

TICE: Right.

Q: This must have been a rather traumatic time, because of the collapse of the Republic of Vietnam. Can you give us a feel for the attitude of our military leaders and where they felt they were going at that time?

TICE: I can give you something of a feel for that. You're quite right. Most of my classmates at the National War College were lieutenant colonels, colonels, and their Navy

equivalents, commanders and captains. They were almost all products of the Vietnam era. They had served one, two, and three tours of duty in Vietnam. Many of them were combat veterans. They had done well, which is why they were sent to the most senior of the war colleges. Some of them had a very broad perspective. Some of them had obtained advanced degrees and had done things like assignments in the State Department working on political-military affairs. However, I would say that the majority of my classmates tended to be pretty narrowly focused military officers. It was as if they were coming up out of the water to take a deep breath, and here they were in the National War College.

I'll never forget one guy, a Navy Commander, who, during about the second week of the course, was visibly frustrated when we left a meeting. He was snarling. I said: "John, what's wrong?" He said: "Why am I listening to this stuff? What does this have to do with people? I'm trained to kill efficiently. Why do I need to know this stuff?" So we went off and talked about that for a while. It was interesting to watch John and several others of my classmates, who had been pretty narrowly focused on the technical aspects of how best to defeat the enemy, sort of "blossom" as they began to see what they had been doing in the context of the larger world situation.

We were the Class of 1976 at the National War College. We had a goodly number of "war heroes" in that class, including then Colonel Colin Powell [later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff], of course. I saw my Navy classmate, Commander John, at our tenth anniversary party in 1986. He was still on active duty and, by now, was wearing three stars on his shoulders [Vice Admiral]. I walked up to him, grinned, and said: "Vice Admiral, eh?" We laughed. He said: "I know what you're thinking, Don." [Laughter]

It was a very interesting class. When the course started, I didn't know whether I would enjoy it very much, but I certainly did. Prior to this assignment, my experience with the military had been very limited. I only served in the military for two years, but that involved writing textbooks at Lackland Air Force Base, so I didn't have much experience. I found that my classmates were every bit the intellectual equivalents of my Foreign Service colleagues. They had just had a different life experience and training. There were some really fine people in that class. Every five years we have an anniversary "get together." We had one this year [1997]. Most of the class showed up, those of us who are still alive.

I came away from this experience very impressed with our military colleagues, and I looked at military officers very differently after that. For me it was a very different exposure to people who had led a different kind of life and who had had a different professional life experience than I had had.

Q: What was the feeling of your classmates about the state of our military forces during this period, 1975-1976? South Vietnam had fallen to the communists in 1975. Although our forces were out of there at the time, I don't know what the feeling was among our military.

TICE: A lot of the focus of what we did during that year was away from Southeast Asia. These guys had had their bellies full of Southeast Asia. In fact, each National War College class at that time, and I suppose they still do, what was called a “class trip.” That meant that groups of would go to one or another of the regions of the world. You could take a trip to Europe, Russia, East Asia, Latin America, or Africa, plus a domestic trip. Only five of us took the East Asia trip. Everybody else had enough of Southeast Asia, and preferred to go elsewhere.

The focus of our studies at the National War College was on the Soviet Union, which, of course, was then very much alive. In some ways, perhaps, it was at the zenith of its power. The question was what was going to happen there, how would we guard against that, and all of that kind of thing. The feeling seemed to be that the "diversion" of Vietnam was now behind us. It was now time to look at the larger conflict with the Soviet Union.

Q: Then where did you go in 1976?

TICE: In 1976 I went to work for Chuck Robinson, who was Deputy Secretary of State - Henry Kissinger's deputy, as it were. This was the last year of the administration of President Ford.

Q: So you worked there from 1976 until...

TICE: Until January, 1977. I was the senior political adviser for Chuck Robinson. A guy named Rud Poats was his senior economic adviser. Previously, Chuck Robinson had been Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, before he became Deputy Secretary of the Department of State.

Q: What was Robinson's basic background?

TICE: He was a businessman, a marine engineer. He had designed and built cargo containers and extraction equipment for taking ores of various kinds out of countries around the "Pacific Rim," from Chile all the way around to the "black sands" of New Zealand.

Q: Sounds like an "odd" appointment for someone to work in conjunction with Henry Kissinger, who was a sort of political creature "par excellence."

TICE: Well, Henry Kissinger had neither an interest nor, I would say, a deep background on the economic side of things, and he wanted somebody to run this for him. Then he also wanted someone who would handle the "ceremonial aspect" of being Secretary of State and not squawk about it. So Chuck Robinson had to see every foreign Ambassador who wanted to come into the State Department and make a "demarche" about something. Secretary Kissinger would almost never see foreign Ambassadors, unless the

Ambassadors were from Israel, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and countries like that. Nobody else got in to see Kissinger.

Q: So Chuck Robinson, in a way, was the "flak catcher"?

TICE: He was the "flak catcher." He was also a very interesting guy. He had made I don't know how many millions of dollars. He was a very wealthy man. They were an odd couple, but the generally go on well. However, Kissinger on one occasion had asked him to take charge of a particular issue, and then without telling Robinson took an action and "under cut" him. Now, this wasn't unusual for Kissinger.

Q: What did Robinson and you, as his political adviser, do?

TICE: Well, what I spent most of my time doing was following arms control and nuclear proliferation issues. This was the point when the French and the Germans, respectively, were trying to export sensitive, nuclear weapons materials and "know how" to Pakistan and Brazil. We were trying to work, behind the scenes, without irritating either the Pakistani or Brazilian Governments, or, for that matter, the French and German Governments, to put a stop to that effort. We were trying to get interim agreements on that subject.

Winston Lord was then the head of Kissinger's Policy Planning Staff. Reginald Bartholomew was in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. Chuck Robinson was charged with taking action on that matter, and I was his "action officer." So basically I worked with Lord and Bartholomew and their staffs on persuading the French and the Germans not to transfer nuclear technology to Pakistan and Brazil. I was the day-by-day action guy keeping Robinson involved and informed. It was an interesting area which I hadn't been into before.

Q: What were the French and German attitudes on this issue? What were we up against? Was this a strictly commercial matter or something more?

TICE: I think that it was probably a little of both. I think that this was a case of "outreach" on the part of the French in particular. They like to have influence in other countries, as we know. I think that was one of the main points. However, there was also money in it for the French, as they saw it. The question of making money was probably the principal consideration for the French. The Germans have an historical interest in Latin America, and I am sure their objective was to tighten relations with the American hemisphere colossus of the south

Q: What happened at the time?

TICE: Well, I think that nothing much happened at the time. The result of our efforts was to slow down what the French and Germans wanted to do. In the case of Brazil, I think that the Brazilians, earlier on than the Pakistanis, finally decided that it wasn't in their

interest to become a "nuclear nation." The issue sort of "withered away" in the case of Brazil. Nuclear development in Pakistan obviously is still an issue. As you will recall, the French were successful in transferring enough nuclear technology to Iraq so that the Israelis ultimately went in and blew up the Iraqi nuclear facilities. I think that it is now conceded that the Pakistanis have the potential capability of exploding a nuclear weapon, though it may not be clear whether they do have this ability. I suppose that the efforts we made slowed down the process of the transfer of nuclear technology to Pakistan.

Q: What was your impression of the use of the Policy Planning Staff and Winston Lord's management of it during the latter part of Kissinger's service as Secretary of State?

TICE: This was probably the period when the Policy Planning Staff had its greatest influence since the days of George Kennan [original director of Policy Planning]. I wasn't in the Department during the Kennan days, but this conclusion is based on what I read of it. Lord was very close to Kissinger. He was in and out of Kissinger's office all the time. So the Policy Planning Staff had a real impact. U. S. foreign policy was very much "run" by Kissinger when he was Secretary of State. The NSC [National Security Council] had nowhere near the power he had. When Kissinger moved over from being Director of the National Security Council staff to being Secretary of State, he brought that power with him.

Q: Were there any other issues that you were involved in, particularly with Chuck Robinson, during this year?

TICE: Not really. However, one event that I was able to "sit in" on illustrates something that is not well known. That is, much as Henry Kissinger tended to belittled U. S. diplomats and the Foreign Service in his public statements, in fact, I think that he used the Foreign Service to greater advantage in terms of U. S. foreign policy than any other Secretary of State that I am aware of.

After the 1976 presidential elections were held, and President Ford had been defeated, Secretary Kissinger was a "lame duck." He held a meeting with all of the Assistant Secretaries in the Department of State. However, as Chuck Robinson used to say: "There are the Assistant Secretaries, and then there are the 'real' Assistant Secretaries." That is, the people who didn't just have the title of Assistant Secretary because they were appointed for political reasons, but rather because they really "ran" something. He was referring to all of the "real policy types."

Anyway, Kissinger met with all of the "real policy types." The meeting was held in Chuck Robinson's conference room, a little chamber behind his office. Kissinger came in and said: "I want you to look around. You will notice that there aren't any political appointees here. You are all 'career people.' You are the people who run the Foreign Service and the State Department. You all are going to lose your jobs. That's a foregone conclusion. However, you're going to have to run American foreign policy until they actually bring in successors for you. That may take a long time." Then Kissinger gave them a very

straightforward "pep talk" on doing what was in the interests of the nation, not trying to "put down" the new leaders but trying to work with them, and trying to make the "transition" function as well as possible. To paraphrase, as closely as I can recall, he said: "Basically, this is in your hands. The incoming administration is going to have people who will be learning their jobs. Until they complete this process, it's up to you, meanwhile, to run American foreign policy. It's no accident that you are all career people." This was a very interesting series of comments.

Q: What happened to you? You lost your job, obviously...

TICE: Well, when the election of 1976 was over, when Jimmy Carter was elected President, we were all looking around for something to do. At that time Phil Habib was the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Phil had been appointed to this position at the same time that Chuck Robinson was appointed Deputy Secretary of State. Phil Habib knew Robinson from the time when Phil was Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, from which position he was appointed Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

Dan O'Donohue was Executive Assistant to Phil Habib. Dan said that Phil had watched me work with Chuck Robinson, liked what he saw, and knew that I was a specialist on communist affairs. O'Donohue said that one of the first people who would be "booted out the door" of the State Department at the end of the Ford administration was the person who really ran Soviet policy for Kissinger. That was Hal Sonnenfeldt [who had the position of Counselor of the Department]. Phil had told O'Donohue that he needed to have someone who was knowledgeable about Soviet affairs and that Phil needed to reestablish his contacts with Eastern Europe. Art Hartman was the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs at that time. Art was a very experienced officer but, at that time, he didn't have a deep background in Soviet affairs.

So on January 20. 1977, I moved 50 yards down the hall and set up shop in Phil Habib's office to be his adviser on arms control, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe. Phil had an East Asian specialist, an African specialist, and a Middle East specialist on his staff, but he didn't have a specialist on Eastern Europe and Latin America. Phil asked me if I knew anything about Latin America. I said: "Not really." Phil said: "Well, I know something about that, so why don't you be my specialist on Latin America, too?" So I picked up the portfolios on Latin America and Eastern Europe.

Then, when Dan O'Donohue left Habib's office some six months later [summer of 1977], I moved up to be Phil's Executive Assistant.

Q: So you served under Phil Habib as Under Secretary for Political Affairs from 1977 until...

TICE: From 1977 until Phil Habib left that job early in 1979. Phil had a heart attack, I think, in 1978. I was in Phil's office for a little less than two years. It was a fascinating job

because, when the Carter administration came into office, there were a lot of former junior Foreign Service Officers who had gone out to make their way in the big political world and came back to the Department as Assistant Secretaries.

Q: They included Dick Holbrooke, Dick Moose, Tony Lake, and Pat Derian, in the human rights field, as well as others. These were essentially people who had resigned from the Department over the issue of Vietnam policy. So these were the "outs" coming back "in."

TICE: Right. And there were a lot of other diversions and attractions at the Assistant Secretary level. I won't start naming names, because many of these people are still around. Pat Derian, Assistant Secretary for Human Rights, was a real force in the Department.
Q: I'm interviewing her now.

TICE: Good. She'll have a very interesting perspective on events.

Q: She really does. How she got into the State Department is very interesting. At least according to her version, she was picked to be "Miss Human Rights" and to go and "kick some butts" around there. She says that the job grew with time. She was offered Protocol or Human Rights. She sort of defined her own job.

TICE: She was a "power" in the Department. So this was a very interesting time.

However, as I observed from seeing administrations come into office, and I seemed to be in Washington during those periods, Republican administrations bring in "managers." They want to make things "run right." Democratic administrations tend to bring in people who are policy-oriented and have "objectives." This is the same in both domestic and foreign policy.

In foreign policy many of these new Assistant Secretaries had their own personal agendas and objectives. They started running off to do it. Phil Habib was the senior foreign policy official in office at the time that Secretary of State Cyrus Vance came into office. Vance had a lot of "getting up to speed" to do. Vance's Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, did not get appointed and confirmed for some weeks, and he had not previously been in a foreign policy position like this at all. So there was a real "learning curve" to be followed and a time lag involved. To all intents and purposes, Phil Habib was Secretary of State, at least for the first couple of months of the Carter administration.

Q: Can you describe how Phil Habib operated during this time?

TICE: What Phil Habib wanted to know was who was holding meetings and who was going to attend. He wanted to know of, and be able to influence decisions. There were seven of us on his staff. One of our duties was to get that information. Then, at Phil's 7:00 AM meeting, before he went to the Secretary of State's staff meeting, he wanted to know what meetings were being held in the Department at the Assistant Secretary level and in

the NSC [National Security Council]. He would either pick up the phone and call an Assistant Secretary and say: "Look, you're having this meeting on thus and so, and I think you had better have so and so there. I've called them and asked them to attend." Then he'd have us take care of making the arrangements. His frequent remark on who was going to be at this meeting was: "Oh, there isn't anybody there who could find that country on the map!"

Phil also had a direct line to the Secretary of State. He would pick up the phone and say: "Cy, so and so is having this meeting on such and such. There isn't anybody scheduled to be there who really understands this issue. I think that you should have so and so and so and so there." It was a subtle approach to the problem, but...

Q: It was not just pushing a particular policy. It was aimed at making sure that the people at these meetings didn't get "off the reservation" [i.e., changed established policy without full consideration of the consequences]. There were many new people at these meetings, they were very eager, and they could go charging off in all directions. So it was up to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs to make sure that there was some coherence in our policies.

TICE: And some of these issues, such as on foreign assistance policy, involved Tony Lake, who was the Director of Policy Planning. He was the "point man" on foreign assistance. Phil Habib had very basic disagreements with Tony Lake on this issue. Tony was a firm proponent of the idea that foreign aid should only go to those countries defined under the United Nations rules as the "most needy." Phil's view was that we have to give some aid above that level because, if you don't, they may go "down the drain." His case in point was the Caribbean, where the British had just pulled out their budget support for all of the newly independent governments of the Leeward and Windward Islands, Jamaica, and all the way around to Belize [in Central America]. Phil wanted to continue our aid and budget assistance programs there during the transition to independence. Tony Lake didn't want to do this. I remember Phil saying: "Tony, if we leave them to their own devices, in a few years you're going to be having communist or leftist governments there. They'll be below the poverty level, all right, under your formula, but it will cost us a lot more." Tony won on that issue, and it wound up costing us a lot more.

Q: From your perspective, how did Secretary of State Cyrus Vance use the Policy Planning Staff? Was it any different from the way Secretary Kissinger used it?

TICE: Very frankly, I think that Tony Lake was acting more like a functional Assistant Secretary of State in certain areas. In effect, he "ran" policy in those areas, rather than providing advice to the Secretary and the regional Assistant Secretary of State concerned. I say that, although I have never sat in on any of Tony Lake's meetings or anything like that. I don't want to be unkind or unfair to him. The Policy Planning Staff has played different roles in different Administrations, sometimes looking at broad policy issues and sometimes directly focusing on specific issues. I don't think that Tony himself had the "standing" which Win Lord had when he was Director of Policy Planning under Secretary Kissinger, for example.

Q: On disarmament matters and Eastern Europe, for example, wasn't there an ill-fated trip by Secretary Cyrus Vance to Moscow? He was allegedly going to try to persuade the Soviets to accede to some form of disarmament or something like that?

TICE: I was not involved in that matter, so I don't know anything about it. Also, that happened after Phil Habib left his position as Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Then we had the "Desert One" debacle [abortive attempt at rescuing the American hostages in Tehran]. But that was also after I left that office.

One other thing that was clear, however, was that Zbigniew Brzezinski [then National Security Adviser to President Carter] was very influential and tended to "go around" the Secretary of State. This is one of the classic "clashes" within an administration. If you have to speak of "winners" and "losers," I think that you would have to say that Brzezinski "won." He was in favor of the attempted rescue of the Embassy Tehran hostages. The failure of this attempt resulted in Cyrus Vance's resignation as Secretary of State.

Q: We're talking about an attempted rescue of American Embassy personnel in Tehran after the seizure of our Embassy in November, 1979. So we're talking about events in 1980 when you were no longer in that office.

TICE: Right. Phil had his heart attack, I think that was either December 1977 or January 1978, and he stayed on until it became clear his health would not allow him to work under such pressure, at which time he was replaced by David Newsom, in April 1978. I stayed on another year with Newsom as his Exec, until June of 1979. However, I continued to stay in close touch for some time with the staff I had worked with, which included some real stars, among them George Moose, Phyllis Oakley, Dick Jackson, and Tom Miller

There was quite a lot of "bad feeling" between the Department of State and the NSC during that period. Brzezinski declined to include Department representatives in meetings at the NSC of which, in earlier times, they would have been an integral part.

Q: What was your impression of how Cyrus Vance dealt with issues when he was Secretary of State, from your perspective?

TICE: He was very gentlemanly and very quiet. He ran a fairly "tight" meeting and wanted to hear from all concerned. I didn't attend a lot of his staff meetings. I always found him to be the ultimate in courtesy, acting like a gentleman with me and with other people.

Q: Was Phil Habib involved at all in events in Lebanon during this time?

TICE: As Under Secretary for Political Affairs he was involved to the degree that any Under Secretary would be in such matters. However, the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs at that time was Roy Atherton. Then Atherton went out as Ambassador to Egypt, and the officer who had been Director of INR [Bureau of Intelligence Research], Hal Saunders, became Assistant Secretary for NEA. Phil was kept informed of developments, but they were both strong personalities, and Phil was not nearly as deeply into Lebanese affairs as he was to be later on.

Q: Regarding your hand in Latin American affairs, did you keep that for very long?

TICE: Yes, I kept it for as long as I was in that job. Terry Todman came in as Assistant Secretary for American Republics Affairs [ARA] at the beginning of the Carter Administration. He was distracted a lot, however, because of the White House interest in, and involvement in policies toward Latin America. Todman traveled a lot to Latin America with Mrs. Rosalynn Carter [President Carter's wife]. He was gone from his office a good part of the time, and didn't seem to get around to appointing his Deputy Assistant Secretaries. So Bill Luers, who was appointed in the Ford administration as a Deputy Assistant Secretary, wound up as the principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for more than seven months. Bill is a good officer, but he was not seen as a member of Todman's team, and rather than building that team Todman was off traveling and was not getting replacements for the other Deputy Assistant Secretaries. The Deputy Assistant Secretaries left over from the Ford administration were sort of "lame ducks." My principal contact in ARA was a Special Assistant to Terry Todman, Charley Jacobini.

One day, about two months into the Carter administration, I went in to see Phil Habib and said: "Phil, do you know who's running Latin American policy?" Phil said: "Who?" I said: "Me and Charley Jacobini." Phil said: "But you don't know a damned thing about it!" I said: "That's why I'm telling you!" So Phil put pressure on Terry Todman to arrange for the appointment of his Deputy Assistant Secretaries.

Q: Did you have any contact with the problems that were beginning to develop over the overthrow of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua? Or did that happen "on your watch"?

TICE: No, that pretty much happened afterwards. There were some developments going on, but this was pretty early in this connection. I wasn't involved in and had no knowledge of most of that.

Q: With further reference to Latin American affairs, the Nixon administration was credited, probably given too much credit, with the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile and all of that. Did you feel that there was an effort on the part of the Carter administration to show that it really wasn't like those "Nixon types" who were ready to overthrow any "Left Wing" government?

TICE: I think that in Latin America Carter administration policy was primarily expressed in the human rights area. Pat Derian was very much involved in that, and she was very effective in that respect.

Q: Try to capture the mood of the times. What were the attitudes of both Phil Habib and David Newsom toward Pat Derian?

TICE: That's hard to characterize. They understood what her "agenda" was. At times they would be concerned about how this "agenda" would affect policy. On the other hand, neither one of them ever sought "to put Pat down." Not in the least. They would bring her into various issues, when others might have tried to keep her out. They both understood that human rights were an important issue. At times they had to sit down fairly heavily on other Department officers who didn't agree with Pat Derian and who felt that she was primarily a "destructive" element.

Q: This, of course, was a classic conflict between Pat Derian, trying to "push through" her human rights agenda, and the geographic bureaus which said: "Of course, human rights are important, but..." And there's always a reason why there's a "but." For example, we might have a treaty with a given country, a "tricky" relationship with that country, or something like that. However, at the top of the Department of State there was essentially support for human rights.

TICE: That's right.

Q: Did you find yourself in the position of going down to the next rung below the Secretary of State and saying: "Don't try to undercut this policy of concern for human rights." Did you get involved in doing something like that?

TICE: In a very limited way. When you are in one of these Special Assistant positions, you have to be careful about getting between an Assistant Secretary of State and an Under Secretary of State. But informally you could do things such as saying to an Assistant Secretary: "You know, you should be aware that Pat Derian will probably 'win' on this issue." You could start from this point of view.

Q: This is Side B of Tape 3 of the interview with Don Tice. Was there any progress made in U. S. relations with the Soviet Union during this time?

TICE: Relations between the two countries were pretty much on an "even keel." This was a period when we reached agreement on SALT II [the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty].

As a sideline, while I was working for Phil Habib and David Newsom, I became involved as a "SALT seller." I was one of a group of people in the government who were trained

and then went out on the "rubber chicken" circuit [gave talks on the subject to a variety of community groups in various parts of the U. S.]. I also appeared on morning TV "talk shows" in Keokuk, Iowa, for example. I did that because I was interested in it. I also did the same kind of thing on Panama Canal treaty issues. I told the people in Public Affairs who were planning these appearances that I would give them two days a month to go out and give speeches.

Q: That was what we might call a "full court press" effort.

TICE: Yes, it was a major effort. I enjoyed doing it because I went all over the United States, visiting places that I had never visited before and have never visited since. I spoke to Kiwanis and other, civic clubs, university groups, and all that kind of stuff. That was "fun," as far as I was concerned. However, this was a "full court press" on ratification of the SALT II treaty. Of course, the Senate did not agree to ratification of this treaty. This was part of the background which later got me into arms negotiations.

When I finished my tour in the office of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, I was fairly exhausted. I had spent more than two years in that job. The job had involved long hours in the office, and I wanted something else. I was offered one of the top jobs in Personnel but decided that I wanted something that was a little less "taxing" for a while. I went off to be a Foreign Service Inspector for two and a half years.

Q: We'll pick this up the next time with your experience as a Foreign Service Inspector. Oh, one last thing before we move to that, were you still working in the Deputy Secretary's office when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan [in December, 1979]?

TICE: No, I was not.

Q: Then we'll pick this up to cover the period from 1980-1982.

TICE: Yes, that's about right. I was a Foreign Service Inspector from 1979-1981.

Q: Then we'll talk the next time about your experience as a Foreign Service Inspector.
TICE: Yes.

Q: Today is April 4, 1997. Don, could you talk about the role of the Foreign Service Inspectors during the period from 1979 to 1981? This was a period of change in the role of the inspectors, wasn't it?

TICE: I guess so, yes. We were moving away from the "old time inspection," which was almost totally policy oriented. The Department began to bring in people who had "auditing training" from the GAO [General Accounting Office] and from other parts of the government, but primarily from the GAO. These people "knew the books," knew the

technical side of management, and that kind of thing. So there was some "tension" about this. However, I think that that is a trend which has continued since my time as an inspector.

There was still the traditional function of doing a basic, management audit of an Embassy or Consulate or a Bureau in the State Department, for that matter.

Q: Who was the Inspector General when you were there?

TICE: Bob Brewster was the Inspector General for most of the time. He was replaced by Bob (Robert L.) Brown, a former Administrative Officer.

Q: What role did you play as a Foreign Service Inspector?

TICE: I dealt with the political aspect of the inspections. On all of the inspection teams that I went out on, I was the deputy chief of the team. I generally inspected the Political Section and relationships with other U. S. Government agencies, particularly in large Embassies, where there are numerous agencies represented. I reviewed relationships with the DAO [Defense Attaché Office] in particular. Sometimes I got into an inspection of the relationship with the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] unit. However, that generally was handled personally by the Ambassador who headed the inspection team.

Q: Could you give us an idea of some of the inspections which you participated in, perhaps by geographic areas?

TICE: Yes. I was probably very fortunate in terms of "creature comforts" in connection with the inspections I participated in, because I inspected our posts in the United Kingdom, Italy, Switzerland, the Soviet Union, Japan, and Panama, plus brief review of the narcotics function in Colombia and the Passport Office in the Department of State,

Q: Let's pick out a couple of those which you have named. What was your impression of the situation affecting our Embassy in the Soviet Union while you were there? It had some problems, didn't it?

TICE: Yes. Mac Toon was the Ambassador. The Embassy was constantly under a lot of pressure. They had had one very bad fire which had disrupted the place. The new Chancery and associated housing complex was in the beginning phase of construction. They had completed the excavation and were beginning to pour concrete. That construction job had brought in a large number of administrative and management people, overloading the Embassy’s ability to maintain its focus and equilibrium. It had more people than the facilities community could easily support.

The Embassy was tightly run. Mac Toon was a good but tough Ambassador. He pushed his staff continuously. I knew him very well because I was his Political Counselor in Belgrade. On the whole, the Embassy in Moscow was a pretty "up tight" place.

Q: What were the Soviets doing? Were the pressures on the Embassy coming mainly from the Soviets?

TICE: Yes, the pressures on the Embassy came from the Soviets. This was not an "easy" period in the Cold War. The nuclear threat continued to grow. The Soviets maintained very close "control" over the Embassy. For example, one of our Foreign Service Inspectors was working on the ground floor of the Embassy office building. There were Soviet guards stationed just outside the gate of the property.

One day this inspector was inspecting the B&F [Budget and Fiscal] office when he heard a woman screaming. He dashed out into one of the underpasses which led from the street under the Embassy office building and internal courtyard. He found a couple of the big "Militia Guards" [Soviet police], beating the heck out of a middle-aged woman. She was screaming, as I said. My inspector went charging in to do something about this. Someone grabbed him by the coattails and hauled him back, just as he was about to throw a "haymaker" at one of the militiamen administering the beating to the woman. But that kind of thing happened all the time. It's a good thing that somebody caught Tom by the coattails because otherwise we would probably have had to "fish him out of jail."

Q: At that point had the cases of Sergeant Lonetree and all of that happened?

TICE: No. Those cases came up after that point.

Q: What about the narcotics situation? You were on the team inspecting the narcotics situation as it affected the Embassy in Colombia.

TICE: This special inspection took place early on in the escalation of our anti-narcotics in Colombia. The narcotics "cartels" had not really taken over the country at that point. We were under close protection and had armed guards wherever we went. It wasn't as it was later on, when I was there during another period. The situation was a little tense, but we felt free in the evening, when we weren't in an official car. We could walk around because there were plenty of "Norteamericanos" down in Colombia.

The anti-narcotics program was encountering some problems already. There had been some complaints about the DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency] unit in the Embassy not cooperating fully with the Ambassador. There were also complaints from some of the Embassy officers who felt that they should be kept informed about what the DEA unit was doing. We did a "work out" of the DEA unit itself and then of the narcotics liaison unit in the Embassy.

I remember that the inspector traveling with me was not long on "mincing words." When we met with the Ambassador during the first week we were there, the Ambassador was very proud of the cooperation which he had worked out with the Colombian Government and all of that. What we found was that US military equipment was coming in under the

military cooperation program and going to airfields on the Caribbean coast of Colombia, where they didn't allow our DEA people to go. The Colombian military was generally helping with the anti-drug program, but we wanted to make sure that this equipment was going into the narcotics interdiction effort. The problem was that this equipment would never be seen again after it arrived in Colombia. We had fairly strong suspicions that it was going to the "wrong side." The problem was that there was no verification of what was happening with a large amount of equipment.

When my colleague Tom and I went in to see the Ambassador, and he rather expansively asked us what we thought of how the anti-narcotics effort was going, Tom said: "Well, Mr. Ambassador, it's going along, but unless some controls are put in, you and some other people are probably going to go to jail!" [Laughter] This got the Ambassador's attention.

Q: Were you in the Inspection Corps when the new Foreign Service Act [of 1980] came in?

TICE: No, I was not. That came after my time.

Q: That changed some aspects of the situation. How did you feel about the effectiveness of the Inspection Corps when you left?

TICE: Well, I felt that it was quite good, in general. It depended pretty much on the quality of the Foreign Service Inspectors themselves. We had "team leaders" who were good and we had some who were only "So-so." However, I think that, in general, the inspections were quite effective. The approach that I always took was that a successful inspection was one where you would identify problems and then identify solutions with the people who had the problems. The inspection report referred to problems that were on the way to solution, rather than mere cases of "gotcha. We went in with the intent of trying to "fix" what you see that can be fixed or helped. I would say that most of the real complaints or findings that we made that involved serious problems resulted from Department itself not holding up its end of the situation in supporting the post. That was a thread that ran through every inspection that I was involved in.

Q: Then in 1981 you went into what? The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency? Where did you go?

TICE: I had already been nearly two and a half years in the Inspection business when Personnel called me in and asked if I would consider a detail to ACDA to be Executive Secretary to the newly forming Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) delegation, headed by retired Army Lt. Gen. Edward Rowny. It should be remembered that Gen. Rowny had been the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] on the U.S. Delegation for the SALT II negotiations. After that treaty was concluded and signed by President Carter in Vienna, Gen. Rowny resigned from the U.S. Delegation to the SALT II negotiations, retired from the U.S. Army, and came out publicly against the SALT II Treaty. He said that this agreement was not verifiable, allowed too much "throw weight"

on large missiles, and a whole raft of other things. He joined the conservative wing of the arms control community as one of the chief opponents of the SALT II Treaty.

Then, when President Reagan was elected [in November, 1980], Gen. Rowny was brought in to handle the job of further arms reduction negotiations with the Soviet Union. It was a rather messy situation, because Gen. Rowny believed that he had been offered the job of ACDA Director by President-elect Ronald Reagan. However, that post went to Eugene Rostow, and General Rowny then was to be the chief negotiator with the Soviets on disarmament issues. However, it was agreed with the Soviets that the arms negotiations would be divided into two parts -- strategic and intermediate -- and the Rostow, with White House backing, brought in Paul Nitze to handled the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations. The end result was that Rowny got only the Strategic portion of the negotiations, which did not leave him a very happy camper. I mention all of this because the tensions within ACDA, and most especially between Rowny and Nitze, had an effect on the politics of both negotiations.

As I mentioned earlier, I was asked by the State Department to go to work for Gen. Rowny. I said that I thought that this would be an interesting job, but that they should be aware that when I was working for Phil I was one of the "SALT Sellers," one of the people who went out on the "rubber chicken" circuit and got on early morning talk shows with local comedians and cows, trying to convince the public that SALT II I mentioned this previously. I said that I didn't know whether Gen. Rowny would want to touch me with a "10-foot pole" because he was on the other side of the argument over SALT II. They told me: "Go try." So I went to see Gen. Rowny. I introduced myself and said: "There is something that you should know about me," and I explained what I had done with regard to SALT II. He said: "Well, do you have any problem being 'tough' on the Soviets?" I said: "No, because I served for six years in communist countries, particularly Bulgaria, which was pretty tightly controlled by the Soviets. The Bulgarians abused me in one way or another, including drugging me once and beating me up once." I said that I didn't think that I would have any trouble in being hard on the Soviets. He said: "You'll do for this assignment." [Laughter]

Q: So the Reagan administration came into office on January 20, 1981. You had this START negotiation. What was the genesis of the name, START and how did it stand at the time you joined our delegation to START?

TICE: The purpose of START was to pick up after the signed but unratified SALT II treaty. The objective was to move ahead on trying to control what the U. S. saw as a dangerous asymmetry in the weapons systems of the U. S. and the Soviet Union. The Soviets had a large number of very large and very powerful missiles, specifically the SS-18 missile, which could carry up to something like 15 warheads.

The whole business of independently targeting these separate warheads had just begun to emerge and was theoretically possible. At the time we had a missile on the drawing board but actually had no deployed missile that could do this. This subject was debated

endlessly in the newspapers and magazines, in Congress, in the bars, and that kind of thing. Our missile which can do this is now called the "Peacekeeper." Our "Peacekeeper" was still on the drawing board, and we hadn't fired a single one. The Soviets already had the SS-18 produced and deployed. We had more warheads than the Soviets did by a substantial margin. However, we didn't have the ability of getting the "bang for the buck" which they did with these huge missiles. That was seen as a danger to the U.S., and we wanted to get some kind of agreement which would start getting rid of what we called "these asymmetries."

On the other hand the Soviets felt that our cruise missiles were a great danger to them because we had all of these long range airplanes which they didn't have. We had a much larger strategic air force than they had. With our cruise missiles, we could do "stand off" deliveries of nuclear warheads without endangering our flight crews and that sort of thing. These cruise missiles would be much harder to track than aircraft. Then, when the whole issue of "stealth" aircraft leaked out, the Soviets went "berserk".

Q: Can you explain what "stealth" aircraft are?

TICE: “Stealth" technology uses both materials and configurations of aircraft to reduce or even, in some cases, eliminate the radar "image" of an airplane or cruise missile, The Soviets probably feared this technology more than they needed to, but we "pumped this up" [publicized it] more than it really amounted to, just to "scare" them. Once reports of this technology leaked out, the Soviet view was that "stealth" technology could make an aircraft or missile invisible to their radar. That was when we caught them building a huge, "phased array" radar near Krasnoyarsk [in Siberia]. They were trying to "catch up" on the possibilities of "stealth" technology so that they could "see" these "stealth" aircraft. It was a very "combative" period. Of course, President Reagan had referred to the Soviet Union as the "Evil Empire," and the Secretary of Defense referred to President Jaruzelski of Poland as nothing but a Russian in a Polish uniform.

There were very bad feelings between the U.S. and the Soviet Union at the time, so the negotiations that I went into in the spring of 1981 were far from affable.

Q: How did these negotiations go, and what were you doing?

TICE: I was the Executive Secretary of the U. S. Delegation and one of the seven “Members” on the Delegation made up of Gen. Rowny, as the Chairman, five Members representing each of the entities involved in the negotiation (State Department, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Department, and CIA), and a seventh Member who was the Executive Secretary and day-to-day manager of the delegation.

As Executive Secretary, I played a rather strange role in all of this. I acted in most senses as A Deputy to General Rowny. The State Department representative was Ambassador Jim Goodby, who was the titular "deputy” to Rowny" on the delegation. However, Rowny

apparently felt Jim was a "liberal" and was willing to negotiate away too much to the Soviets. So I was both the "manager" of the delegation and “acted” as deputy to Rowny in many instances. I had a lieutenant colonel and a couple of other people working for me. In effect, I was the chief management officer of the Delegation to the START talks. Rowny turned to me in this role, rather than to Goodby, except on formal occasions. For example, when Rowny was not present for some reason, Goodby chaired delegation meetings. My other principal responsibility, a traditional role of the Executive Secretary, was to chair of the policy working groups which we convened. These consisted of the professional staffs of each of the other Members: civilians at the GS-15 [a CSC, or Civil Service Commission rank] level, and military/naval officers at the colonel or lieutenant colonel level. These delegation “Advisors,” as they were called, wrote the drafts of issue papers, plenary statements, and delegation reports, and other documents which were then discussed and, if possible, agreed upon by the Advisors group under my chairmanship. Agreement was by no means assured, however, because each of the Advisors represented his or her own Agency views, and the uniformed Advisors often pushed their individual Service positions. In addition, there was a tendency on the part of the Advisors to re-open issues which had been resolved or fought to a stalemate in the interagency arena in Washington. This happened at the Members’ level also.

We had at least one Advisors meeting virtually every morning, except when we were having a "plenary meeting" with the Soviets. Plenaries were on Tuesdays and Thursdays I'll get to the "plenaries" in a minute. So three days a week we would have at least one meeting of the policy group, and sometimes two..

The problem was that this was the period when the “two "Richard's" were fighting it out on arms control policy in Washington. That is, Richard Perle, Department of Defense] and Richard Burt [Department of State]. Richard Perle was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Richard Burt started out as Director of Political-Military Affairs in the State Department, but later moved over as Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. The two "Richard's" were at each other all the time. It wasn't that they were that far apart on policy, but it was a question of how to go at it and who was going to be "first." It was a "bloody" struggle. Another twist was that the professionals in State and ACDA by and large tended to be more liberal or flexible than General Rowny and the Defense Department professionals. That situation, of course, "rolled off" on us at the Delegation meetings, particularly in the policy meetings.

Q: This is Side A of Tape 4 of the interview with Don Tice. You were saying that policy meetings within the U. S. Delegation, in preparation for plenary meetings with the Soviets, became very "bloody."

TICE: Yes, these were the meetings of the policy advisory committee. At first the meetings would go on endlessly because we couldn’t get agreement. Finally I imposed a rule that no meeting would last more than one hour, and we wouldn't have more than two

of these meetings a day. If they did not come to a consensus on language and issues to be forwarded to Delegation Principals by the end of the hour, then I, as Executive Secretary, would take the issues forward to the Principals meeting where I would explain the various positions and disagreements, and then the fight could take place among the Principals.. However, Gen. Rowny knew that the Principals themselves did not like to have decisions handed back to them. They wanted something that had already been worked out at a lower level.
That tactic worked, and I got the experts group into the mode of either agreeing or agreeing to disagree, and then moving the issue on to the "principals." It was the only way to avoid sitting in that room for I don't know how many hours a day. A side note: we were then still in the "naive" days of what one knew about electronic surveillance. We met in a supposedly "secure" room. In retrospect, have my doubts about the room's "security", but that was a long time ago.

It was a very "tense" time. We had secure phones s our Members and Advisors could contact their Agencies back in Washington. I think we originally had two secure phones and then we got a third one, because it was impossible to operate with only two secure phones. The State and Defense Departments always had to get back in contact with their bosses for guidance. Rowny also wanted a secure phone to talk to ACDA or to Richard Perle in Defense, with whom he had a long-standing relationship dating back to SALT negotiations.. The JCS representative also wanted to use a secure phone to contact the Joint Staff Service to clear positions and get research done. There just weren't enough secure telephones. So whenever the Members' meeting ended, they would all head for the secure telephones.

Q: Where was this meeting taking place?

TICE: This was in Geneva in a building located on Rue de Lausanne, on the waterfront of Lake Geneva.. It was a pleasant place. This building that had been constructed by Berney Kornfeld, the owner of IOS, Investors' Overseas Services. He had built the building and planned the top floor as his "bunny pad" [place for assignations with women] or something like that. He got in trouble with the law before he finished the building. At some point ACDA picked up the building on a lease. We had our plenary meetings on the top floor [that is, the "bunny pad"] of what had been the IOS building.

Q: Did Congress play a sort of "over the horizon" role in this negotiation with the Soviets? I'm thinking in particular of some Members of Congress and Senators who felt very strongly about it.

TICE: Some of them weren't just "over the horizon." They were right in our knickers. They came to Geneva and wanted to "sit in" on the negotiations. That presented a problem, because a Senator or Congressman coming to Geneva to "attend the negotiations" would insist on sitting in on Plenary Sessions. Rowny held his ground on this, even when it involved his good friends on Capitol Hill. He said: "We cannot do that, because if we do, we'll have demands from the Soviets to do the same kind of thing, and

things will get out of hand. So we just can't break that line. Members of Congress can sit in on our delegation meetings and on the meetings of our advisers. We'll arrange for Members of Congress to have conversations with Viktor Karpov, the Chairman of the Soviet Delegation. However, they can't sit in on plenary meetings with the Soviets." Once the Members of Congress learned that they couldn't sit in on the negotiations, making it possible for them to say: "As I was sitting in on the negotiations in Geneva..." that paled for most of them.

There were a few Members of Congress who still would come over to Geneva and spend several days with us. We always made it clear to them that we didn't run an Embassy in Geneva and didn't have people to take care of them. We said that we would make hotel reservations for them and would get them passes to our building. However, we told them that that was it, and they were on their own from that point on. The Congressmen and Senators who did come to Geneva, unless they brought their own infrastructure, would have to depend on the American Embassy farther up the hill from our office. This Embassy was headed by an Ambassador and was known as our Mission to the United Nations Offices in Geneva. This Ambassador would receive them, but the Members of Congress and Senators had come to Geneva to talk about the arms control negotiations, which the Ambassador had nothing to do with. We tried to have as little to do with these Congressional visitors as we could. And for very good reasons.

What really irritated us was that this was the genesis or the early period of the so-called "Staffdels" [Congressional Staff Delegation]. This has come to plague everybody in the Foreign Service. That is, senior or even some junior staff members of individual Congressmen, Senators, or committees travel as if they were members of Congress, using Congressional appropriations. They would insist on getting into everything. That was a pain in the neck. We had people from "Staffdels" around our necks a lot of the time.

Q: What was your impression of the Soviets? How did they negotiate and what were they after?

TICE: Well, they were trying to limit our technology. They wanted limits on cruise missiles, on bombers, and on our development of certain other technologies in the missile field. They wanted limits on certain types of testing because they knew that we could do a lot more than they could do. Our whole nuclear and rocket program was a lot more sophisticated than theirs was. They tried to keep up with us by employing "brute force and size." We kept up our end much more by employing advanced technology and finesse.

This was their objective. They sort of had a "mirror image" of our delegation, although they had a lot more military and KGB [Soviet secret police] members in it. Of course, we could never be sure "who was what." They knew who our CIA guy was, because he was not from the clandestine side of CIA. He was a civil servant in Washington who had been working in this area for years. So they knew who he was. We suspected and, in some areas, knew who their KGB people were, but that wasn't general knowledge, even among

the U. S. Delegation. The Soviets varied a lot in quality but, by and large, they had high quality people. Indeed, they had very, very bright and dedicated people.

Viktor Karpov, the Chairman of the Soviet Delegation, was a rather "rambunctious, hard-nosed bully of a man." He and Rowny were well matched. Rowny would not take any guff from him, and they would occasionally exchange "sharp words. However, the negotiations themselves were "choreographed" in advance. I use this word on purpose. They were arranged in a very interesting way. We had two "plenary sessions" a week, one on Tuesday and one on Thursday. These plenary sessions were very carefully "scripted." One would be at our facility and the next one would be at the Soviet facility. We alternated on days. These sessions would normally start at 11:00 AM. The host delegation for that day, Members and Advisors, would line up, and would shake hands with every Member and Advisor of the visiting delegation as they came in. The Soviets would sit on one side of a long table, with their Ambassador in the middle. Then we would sit on the opposite side of the table, with our Ambassador opposite the Soviet Ambassador. The host Ambassador for the day would welcome the "visiting Delegation" and offer the visiting Ambassador the courtesy of making the first statement in the plenary session. At this point the visiting Ambassador would read the plenary statement, which would be simultaneously interpreted into the other language. Each side brought their own interpreter.

After the statements by the two Ambassadors were finished, the host Ambassador would ask the visiting Ambassador if he and his Delegation could join the host Delegation for refreshments. All present would have a stretch, pick up whatever was being served that day to eat along with a non-alcoholic beverage, and that was when the negotiating began. We would split up into six, different groups, that is, the Delegation Chiefs, Defense Group, Military Group, the Diplomatic Group, Arms Control Group, and Executive Secretaries.. One of the curious things about this arrangement was that, by tradition, all of these groups had interpreters except for the Executive Secretaries, who sat "one on one." It was always arranged so that the Executive Secretaries had a language in common. In my case, while I spoke Bulgarian and Serbian, I didn't speak Russian. So they always had an English-speaking person opposite me. I only dealt with two different Soviets during the entire, three years that I was there. Note that there was not an “intelligence” group, since nobody could admit to being intelligence. Therefore, our CIA Member and Advisor sat with other groups, depending on the topics of the day and their interests.

In the Executive Secretaries group, we always first talk about any arrangements which need agreement, and then would get into substance, which could cover matters clear across the board. The interesting thing for me in that arrangement was that this was in response to a desire expressed by the Soviets. Since there were always multiple people and interpreters in the other groups, you didn't have "deniability" for anything you said in them. The only group in which you could raise a "what if" question and have deniability was that of the Executive Secretaries. In addition, we suspected that the Soviets wanted this so that the Soviet delegation chairman would have a place he could float ideas or make inquiries where his own KGB would not be a party to the exchange.

So I was used by my Ambassador and my opposite number on the Soviet side was used by his Ambassador to raise issues that we absolutely wanted to be able to deny had ever been discussed, if it came to that. It was a kind of curious arrangement. These talks and "post plenary bilaterals," as they were called, would generally start at about 11:45 AM. Sometimes they would run until 5:00 PM. It was really "brutal," because you ran out of things to say and you just "chewed" on each other. This was particularly the case at this time. We were really so far apart on most issues that we would just sit and "growl" at each other. It was particularly painful for me and my Soviet counterpart. we'd just start talking about anything, including literature, books, travel, and whatever.

Q: You began these sessions during this 1981-1983 period, when the Reagan administration was just entering office. As with many administrations, particularly with an "ideological" President like Ronald Reagan, I would assume that it would take most of the first term for him to appreciate that negotiations on these issues, particularly with the Soviets, had to get practical and not remain ideological, if we were going to deal with them effectively. Did you have the feeling that all of you on the Delegation were just "holding the line" and keeping the lines of communication open?

TICE: That's very much what one of the military members of the Delegation said. He put it very well when he said: "This is primarily an underbrush clearing operation." There were so many questions to be resolved about the definitions of things. For example, there were the characteristics that did or didn't have an impact on a particular definition, in terms of weaponry and so forth. I loved some of the terminology. For example, there was a "FROD," which was a Functionally Related Observable Detail.. A "FROD" was not just an irrelevant detail. It related to some function that gave the aircraft a specific capability. There was even agreement that on some aircraft the functions that provided its capabilities had to be "observable," so that you knew that a given aircraft had a given capability.
We got into a lot of that. What this meant was that, in terms of identifying this kind of thing, a lot of the work that was done was useful. When the time came for real negotiations, this kind of detail had already been taken care of, and we didn't have to hold everything up while all of this was done. After the initial "shock" of sitting down and "chewing on" each other, we all began to realize this. This was the way things went for the better part of three years.

Now you will probably remember what was referred to as "the walk in the woods."

Q: Yes.

TICE: That was in the summer of 1983. Paul Nitze thought that he had agreement with the interagency group and President Reagan to try to make a "breakthrough" on the intermediate range negotiations. We very much wanted to get the Soviet intermediate range, nuclear weapons "off the board."

Q: Those were the SS-20 missiles, which were targeted on Western Europe from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

TICE: That's right. It was the SS-20 missiles that we wanted to get "off the board." The Soviets also saw us coming up with our own missiles, which we hadn't yet deployed.

Q: The Pershing II rocket and the Ground Launched Cruise Missiles.

TICE: Yes. The cruise missile, also known as GLCM [Ground Launched Cruise Missile], was always there in the background. The Soviets considered the cruise missiles "strategic" and insisted that they should be handled in the strategic missile, or START, negotiations, instead of the INF, or Intermediate Nuclear Force negotiations, in which Paul Nitze headed the U. S. Delegation.

In an attempt to "break through," and he thought that he had interagency agreement to do this, Nitze basically went off "blind" with Yuri Kvitzinski. Nitze and Kvitzinski just told the two delegations to continue to sit and talk, while they literally went off mountain climbing and for a "walk in the woods." They talked about "what if's" and "how could we's," and They came up with a draft agreement between them which cut through the major issues and would have led to a fairly rapid conclusion of the INF negotiations.

That draft agreement was brought back to Washington at the end of our summer session in 1983. Its existence was "very closely held." I remember that even my boss, Rowny, wasn't privy to it. He knew that something was going on, but he couldn't put his finger on it. He was calling up and "pumping" Richard Perle in the Defense Department to try to find out what was going on. I'm not sure that Perle was fully aware of what was involved in this draft agreement. The two delegations [that is, for the START talks and the INF negotiations] were simultaneously in Geneva and came back to Washington at the same time, because the two sets of negotiations were interrelated. Washington wanted to make sure that they were kept synchronized.

When the two U.S. Delegation came back to Washington, the opposition to this agreement was centered around people like Richard Perle and people that he represented in the more conservative side of the arms control community. As I understand it, Perle went straight to President Reagan. I don't know this from my own, first hand knowledge, but this is what I have been told. Perle was the instrument in getting the draft INF agreement "killed."

When we returned to Geneva in the fall of 1983, the Soviets did not want to negotiate any further on the INF side. They had gotten "fed up" on the strategic side as well. So when we came up to the end of the negotiating session, in late November or early in December, 1983, we wanted an agreement on a starting date for the next session. However, the Soviets declined to set a date. That was it. Basically, they walked out on the negotiations. That ended that phase of the negotiations on START and a possible INF agreement.

The ironic thing is that more than two years later, after many more negotiating sessions and a significant change on the part of the Reagan administration in how it viewed this process, basically the draft agreement which Paul Nitze and Yuri Kvitzinski had negotiated in the walk in the woods was what we got. That is, the INF treaty. You asked whether there was ever any time when we saw some progress. That was the only time in that whole, three-year period that we saw any progress.

Q: I think of this as an "intense" type of negotiations. This may be the wrong term, but this sounds almost like the "Stockholm Hostage Syndrome," with all of you together with your Soviet counterparts working on this issue. Did you begin to think that you were all part of something and that everybody else was against you, or something like that?

TICE: Well, no, we didn't see all that much of our Soviet counterparts outside of the formal negotiating sessions. We had sort of "set piece" receptions and that kind of thing. However, at that time they were not all of that much ready to go out with us socially. They could never go "one on one." There always had to be at least two of them. Many of the Soviets didn't bring their wives. We tended to have our wives there. As a result, there wasn't a lot of social inter-action between the delegations. I probably saw as much of them socially when I went out jogging in the early mornings along the shores of Lake Geneva, as I did at evening events.

What we in the American Delegation got tired of was each other. We were jammed into tiny offices. There were about 45 official Americans on the START Delegation and a like number on the INF Delegation. We had two floors in this IOS building. All of us tended to live at the same hotels and all of that. We got pretty bored, frankly. After the first START session, actually at the beginning of the second session, I went to Gen. Rowny and said: "Look, General, right now we're holding everybody to five day work weeks. Let's set up a Duty Officer system. We have plenary sessions with the Soviets on Tuesdays and Thursdays. We prepare for them on Mondays and Wednesdays, and we use Fridays for a 'wrap up' session. We don't need to have everybody hanging around to wrap up the week's activity. Let's set up a rotation system so that most people can get a three-day weekend now and then. We work very long hours and very intensively. Let's let people get out of town."

Rowny agreed. He said: "Okay, set it up, but I have to be sure that I have the principal or the deputy of each agency on hand. You or your deputy, Colonel Chernay has to be available. I must be sure of that." I said: "We'll work it out." So we did that, and I think that the INF Delegation had already begun to move toward that kind of arrangement. They were a little more "laid back" than the START Delegation. That arrangement helped take the tension off. As a "principal" on the START Delegation, I had a car and driver assigned to me. When the driver left at 6:00 PM, he dropped the keys to the car on my desk, so I had a car available which I could drive in the evenings and on weekends. It was a rental car with no mileage limitations, so my wife and I would go out of Geneva on most weekends.

Q: Then at the end of 1983 you left that assignment. The START negotiations were not continued. So what happened then?

TICE: That was when I went to the "satellite negotiations." These covered much of 1984 and 1985. We had a preparatory conference in the summer of 1984 for the 1985 administrative radio conference. The Soviets had "walked out" of the START negotiations in December, 1983, so it was January or February, 1984, when I joined our delegation to the WARC [World Administrative Radio Conference] negotiations.

I could have stayed around with the START delegation, but when we were in Washington, Rowny got very restive. He was sometimes a difficult man to work for, although I've got a lot of respect for him. When he didn't have enough to do, he could drive his staff "nuts." I really didn't want to sit around on detail to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA] for a long period of time. So I moved on to the WARC negotiations.

As I said, we held the preparatory conference in 1984 and then the space WARC itself in the summer of 1985. I then stayed around in the fall of 1985, "writing up" and polishing the final report and getting interagency clearances on it,

Q: So it is now 1985, and you are leaving the START delegation. What happened next?

TICE: About the time I had decided to look for another assignment, an old friend of mine from my inspecting days called and said "Hey, how would you like to go into international telecommunications?" I said: "I don't know anything about international telecommunications." He said: "Never mind, we need somebody at the senior level to be the chief policy person on a delegation a year from now." At this point preparations were already under way for our participation in the conference of the International Telecommunications Union [ITU]. This was a World Administrative Radio Conference, better known as a WARC, at which and issues regarding the use of the, geostationary satellite orbit and the radio frequencies associated with it were sorted out.

The Geostationary Satellite Orbit or “GSO” is a band about 10 miles wide circling the globe some 2,300 miles above the equator. These satellites basically stay in one place in relation to the earth if they are inserted into orbit the correct speed and positioning. That is why these satellites are called "geostationary."

Q: Let's get the dates when you were dealing with this matter, and then we'll go into the particular issues. You were in that office from when to when?

TICE: I was there from March of 1984 until the late fall of 1985.

Q: What was your impression of the team working on this, when you were preparing for this conference?

TICE: The interagency team was just in the process of being formed. The person who had been brought in to be the overall and technical leader for this negotiating effort was Harold Kimball, an aerospace and frequency engineer from NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration]. Hal Kimball was one of the top frequency and satellite "gurus" [experts] in the U. S. Government. I joined him as the senior foreign policy adviser to the effort.

Interestingly enough, the person who was made Chairman of the U.S. Delegation was Dean Burch, who may be remembered as former Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), appointed by President Nixon. A one-time Congressional staffer, Burch was Barry Goldwater's campaign manger when Goldwater ran for President. Under Nixon, in addition to being FCC Chairman, he served on two occasions on the Nixon White House staff as one of the "Counselors," one of the cabinet level people. The first such assignment was very early in the Nixon administration. Then he was brought back in as a "trouble shooter" during the Watergate Affair. An amusing sidelight, when person of Cabinet rank leaves that office, he or she traditionally is given the chair which he or she used at formal cabinet meetings. Since he was Counselor twice, Burch received two such chairs, which he had sitting in his office. When he was appointed Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to this international conference, he was a senior partner in Pearson, Ball, and Dowd, one of the big law firms in Washington, D. C., which deals in communications matters, among other things.

Burch, who died of cancer in the early 1990s, was a "legend in his own time. He grew up in Texas and on Alcatraz [prison on an island in San Francisco Bay], where his father was a guard. So, as he said, "I learned my English sort of backing into being polite." [Laughter] He was very much a "no nonsense" kind of guy. For the WARC delegation, Burch picked an "inner group" (from the larger, formal inter-agency group), which included representatives from the Department of Commerce (represented by the NTIA [National Telecommunications Information Administration, one of the major Commerce Bureaus]); the FCC, the Department of State, and from the U. S. military, a huge user of radio frequencies. Also included were a couple of representatives of industry, who were chosen not so much for the companies they represented as for their personal, broad knowledge of the technologies involved, the international telecom negotiating arena, and the views of the telecommunications industry. This group, which was Burch called his "cabinet," did most of the skull work on planning for this international conference. Hal Kimball and I were both key members, and we generally met privately with Burch to map strategy in dealing with the "cabinet." We also did quite a lot of traveling around the world, visiting the governments of various countries that we wanted to line up on our side in the battle over radio frequencies that was shaping up.

The principal issue, briefly, was that some Third World nations had decided the geostationary satellite orbit was a "resource" for all mankind, just like the floor of the oceans. They were pushing a system which would give the Third World in general, and equatorial countries in particular, a large measure of control over the assignment of orbital slots on the GSO, and allocation of frequencies associated with them. This, of

course, was absolutely ridiculous, because it would have been the perfect way to stop "dead in its tracks" the development of this resource. That was the battle which was joined at this international conference which took place in Geneva [Switzerland] in the summer of 1985. It was officially called, common term of reference for the conference was “Space WARC”.

The conference ran for nine weeks, and it was nine long, hard weeks of work because we were constantly trying to influence other countries to amend their positions and to keep some cohesion in the Western bloc. Of course, the Soviet bloc was just that, at that time. Curiously, though, while the Soviets always wanted to figure out ways of making life difficult for us, fundamentally their interests were exactly the same as ours. They didn't want a bunch of Third World countries telling them how to use radio frequencies. So this was an interesting experience in that regard.

Q: How did you find dealing with Third World countries? Were they gratuitously "difficult"? They had no satellites to put up and they had no real control over satellites. In effect, they were laying claim to a piece of space.

TICE: Their position was ridiculous from the start. Even some of the Third World countries recognized this, but they didn't want to break "Third World solidarity," although we finally managed to lever in and begin to break that up. One of the leading Third World countries in this was Algeria, which appeared "hell bent" on causing as many problems as possible for the Western European countries and the United States. At times this involved very "tense" discussions and sometimes considerable "tacking" in terms of the tactics that were used.

However, WARC conference finally came out to a basic "stand off" with results which could be interpreted by either side in the way it wanted. The U. S. and the developed countries were left free to go right ahead and pretty much do what they wanted to do. However, it was a real fight. If we hadn't had that outcome, it could have been disastrous, either raising the price of, or limiting access to one of the primary resources available at that time for international non-wired communications

This conference made it possible for me to see the U.S., with the right kind of leadership, could take decisive action taken in a difficult situation. It became clear as the conference neared its end that the then Secretary General was not prepared to force the kind of votes that he could lead to an outcome even minimally acceptable to the developed countries. Just three days before the conference was to end, Dean Burch called him up and said: "I have to come and see you." He went to see him and said: "Dick, this is the position that we're taking. You'd better see that we prevail in it, or we're going to walk out, and this conference is going to fail. Responsibility for this outcome is going to be right on your doorstep. You've got one choice. Either you go with us, the British, the French, and the Germans or the conference fails, and it will be on your shoulders." We received a report later on that when Burch walked out of the Secretary General's office, the Secretary General burst into tears! However, this tactic worked.

Q: Where was the chairman of the conference from?

TICE: From Australia. I haven't used his name because he is a nice guy and is still active in the satellite business world. His mistake was not understanding that the developed nations, with many billions of dollars invested in satellite communications, would have to walk away from the treaty and the ITU if the compromise he was heading for prevailed. It was one of those instances where, if we had had a non political type as Chairman of our delegation, we wouldn't have had that outcome. Burch simply had the authority, and the confidence in his own authority, to do something like that. He just did it and reported back to Washington. There wasn't any question of "asking" Washington for guidance. He also did not seek consensus of the other major Western players. He just told them what he had done after the fact. They, in the main, were quite relieved to have had their chestnuts pulled from the fire without having had to be exposed to the heat. Before he went to see the ITU head, Burch had meeting with the ranking person from all of the U.S. Government agencies represented on the delegation. He told them what he was going to do, said that he didn't want any of them reporting back or telling their agencies in Washington until after he had done it and had the results in his hand; and he would do the reporting. He told them that they would be "off the delegation" if they did not follow his instructions. [Laughter] This was effective.

Q: Otherwise, somebody could start "crossing" you and...

TICE: Yes. We had one instance of a person with one of the U. S. Government agencies going back and "pumping up" his agency head about a position that Burch was taking. That agency head went to the White House. The White House called Burch, who explained to the White House "where they could go" or get themselves a new Ambassador. They had hired him and were stuck with him. Then Burch backed that agency representative into a corner and told him that that was the only mistake that he would be allowed. He would be immediately sent home if he did anything like that again. A report of that got around, and we didn't have any more problems like that.

Q: What about the U. S. military? I speak with a great deal of confidence, having heard something about frequencies on National Public Radio yesterday afternoon while driving home. So I speak with a great deal of expertise! However, apparently, the American military has "staked out" a certain spectrum of frequencies which is particularly good for "digital" transmissions.

TICE: That's right.

Q: Apparently, the spectrum which we have left for digital transmissions in the United States doesn't go around buildings, or something like that. However, apparently the Europeans have taken what we call a "military spectrum" and given it to civilians. Was this a problem?

TICE: It is a problem. I think that it's one which is on the way to being solved. It was more of a problem, say, five to 10 years ago than I think it is now. The U. S. military is now beginning to give up some of the spectrum down at the lower end of the scale, down in the 360 to 500 megahertz range. They are more accommodating, both because they are under pressure and because they are basically "trading up" to reserved chunks of the spectrum in the higher frequency ranges.

The U. S. military will be all right. One of the key issues involving the use of the radio spectrum is that our ability to find ways to "reuse" or "compress" all of those military frequencies and to make greater use of the spectrum available has always moved up and out ahead faster than the requirements for it. It isn't as if anybody is being deprived of spectrum. Now, it is true that in the lower ranges, where you are now getting requirements for digital telephone use, and all that kind of thing, this is creating a limit on the number of people, companies, or entities that you can allow to put up a satellite and go into the telephone business.

The currently-emerging "Lower Earth Orbit" or LEO technology, for satellite also is easing the pressure on frequencies. These are "little guys" which are in elliptical orbits much closer to Earth. Their area of coverage is smaller. However, if you put up a bunch of them, you can ensure relatively full coverage. I believe that Motorola's initial system, called the "Iridium System," is planned for something like 80 satellites, which will overlap coverage on various orbits around the world. As a result, when this system is in place and up and running, you will be able to pull out your "hand held" receiver any place in the world, hit the "transmit button," and, with a little "whip antenna," be within reach of a satellite that can pick you up and connect you with anyplace in the world That's what will eventually lead to having a telephone number like a Social Security Number which you'll use wherever you go and have for the rest of your life.

Q: During this period, was there an organization that everyone, including other countries, reported to when you were putting up a satellite? Do you say that you want this satellite up in "X" sector or something like that? Do you have to get clearance for sending up a satellite in this way? Otherwise, I think that you'd have a "space problem."

TICE: Permission to launch a communications satellite on the GSO is coordinated by the ITU. It has become one of its more important functions. Before you put up a satellite, you have to describe to the ITU its various characteristics in terms of power, the frequencies used, the intended service area, all of the things that it would be doing, and what they call "antenna rolloff." In other words, when you are focusing your antenna for a particular service area, you are required to state how much of the transmissions using the satellite "creep out" to one side or another or "leaks off" in a way that would interfere with something else. When you put in the request to the ITU to register that satellite, the ITU circulates it to all other countries and satellite operators and asks: "Will this proposed satellite, using this much power and in these frequencies harm your existing interests?"

As a result of this kind of coordination it sometimes happens that somebody will say: "Yes, it will harm us." Then you have to define what the service areas are, how to change the antenna characteristics, and all of those things which need to be worked out to ensure that there is no interference. Sometimes, you are told by the ITU: "You simply can't have that orbital 'slot' because it is incompatible with other things there. You will have to move down from that point." Your answer might be: "Well, when you look at that spot along the horizon of our service area, it will require greater power," and all of that. So it is "too bad" or "too sad" for the proposed satellite. The ITU will conclude: "If you want to service that area, this is the spectrum that you can have." So that's a very complex and high intensity issue.

Q: What was your impression of the people in the ITU who run this? I assume that they belong to a sort of international civil service.

TICE: Yes, they do. Its reputation as a specialized agency in the United Nations system is that it's probably the best managed and organized entity in this system. You simply cannot have people in the ITU who don't know what they're doing. So the ITU is mainly managed and staffed by people from countries all over the world who are knowledgeable in the telecommunications area. They are pretty good.

However, later on, after I had retired from the Foreign Service, I went to work for Booz-Allen, and Hamilton. I sort of led the way on a proposal to do a management review of the ITU. Booz-Allen won a competitive bid to conduct this management review. I spent most of a year, part of the time in Geneva and part of the time back in Washington, working on that project. We recommended some fundamental changes in how the ITU was organized. What the ITU did first was to appoint a high-level commission of the representatives of 20 countries to hire a consultant. They were the ones who hired Booz-Allen, and Hamilton. We worked with the high-level commission and not with the ITU itself, although it eventually turned out that we worked very closely with Dr. Pekka Tarjanne, the man who was just coming in and is now the Secretary General of the organization.

As I said, we worked in cooperation with the high-level commission, which had a lot of its own ideas, too. We were able to put substance to many of the ideas and how to proceed in doing this in the context of a comprehensive management audit. Then we dealt with the "business process re-engineering" phase. We were doing this before "re-engineering" had become a popular term. This study resulted in some fundamental changes and reorganizations in the ITU.

Q: Then what happened in 1985?

TICE: Just at the point when I was wrapping up the final draft of the U.S. Delegation report on the Space WARC, I believe it was in November of 1995, I was standing by an elevator one day in the State Department and Bob Lamb, who'd just been named Assistant Secretary for the newly created Bureau of Diplomatic Security, walked by. He was an old

friend of mine. He said: "What are you doing?" I said: "Oh, well, I'm going to start looking for a job." He said: "I've got a job for you." I said: "Doing what?" He said: "Come to see me, and we'll talk about it."

Bob was trying to put together this broadened entity called the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, pulling in disparate elements from around the State Department. However, the core of it was the old Office of Security. He wanted to change the whole nature of that. Up till then many of the people assigned, and it's always unfair to generalize, had been Security Officers. They were very police-oriented and very direct. Culturally, many of them didn't "fit" changing the Foreign Service very well.

When I went to see Bob, he said: "Tice, I want you for my 'cultural interface' with the rest of the Department." [Laughter]

Q: What was this called, the Office of Diplomatic Security?

TICE: It was called the Bureau of Diplomatic Security.

Q: You were with them from when to when?

TICE: A little less than a year. In the fall of 1986 I undertook a special assignment for Ron Spiers [Under Secretary of State for Management] having to do with technology transfer, that continued until I went to the National Security Council early in 1987.

Q: At this point, while you had lots of responsibility in these last two jobs, they were sort of "out of the mainstream of the career Foreign Service." Therefore, you weren't developing the connections with a geographic bureau and all of that.

TICE: In part, this was by design. When I took the job as a Foreign Service Inspector, I knew that this was going to be the first of this kind of special assignment. My wife was ill, could not be assigned overseas, and would probably not be so assignable again. So I really couldn't look to take an overseas assignment. I could take temporary assignments and, in fact, she traveled with me a good part of the time in the Inspection Corps and when I went to Geneva, as her health allowed. However, she had periodic relapses and couldn't be cleared for assigned overseas. Taking a posting unaccompanied was not an option so, basically, my career in the traditional Foreign Service was over, and I was merely "riding it out" till I decided to retire, or until I reached Time-in-Class. That was the reason why I took a series of assignments like this.

Q: Then in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, how did you work as "cultural interface" with the rest of the Department, as Bob Lamb described the job?

TICE: I was put in charge of the Intelligence Unit. Bob used me as a "trouble shooter" and as an "interface" with the rest of the Department. I was the guy whose name he gave to people who would call up and say to him: "Do you know what those security people

have done now?" Then he would say: "See Don Tice." [Laughter] So I was the "flak catcher." It was a rather interesting job and at an interesting time.

I left the Bureau of Diplomatic Security just as the "big problem" erupted. That was when the Department found out that our new Embassy Chancery in Moscow had become, in effect, a "tuning fork" for the KGB. Its very structure was turned into a "radio receiver" and, therefore, was inherently insecure. That issue blew up just about the time that I was leaving there..

I also "worked Capitol Hill" for Lamb. I went up to committee hearings with him, befriended Congressional staffers, and that kind of stuff.

Q: Did you find that problems concerning the new construction of our embassies were sort of turning them into "fortresses" because of the fear of terrorism? There were other consequences. Our embassies no longer were "user friendly."

TICE: That was a big issue. DS [the Bureau of Diplomatic Security] was pushed very hard to turn out embassies into fortresses. Others were pushing very hard to avoid making embassies into fortresses. There was a constant "pull and haul" between those in the traditional Foreign Service and those, with a lot of Congressional backing and pressure, who said: "You have to take care of our people serving abroad." For a lot of reasons, not the least of which was the bombing of our Embassy in Beirut, it was not a happy time. As I said, we were being pulled and hauled on this issue. We were designing some "pretty awful" embassy buildings but we were being forced to do that, because Congress appropriated $500 million to improve the security of our diplomatic offices overseas. A number of Congressmen said: "By God, you're going to spend that money, not on people, but on buildings."

Fortunately, a it turned out, much of that money was never spent. But that wasn't something that we could tell Congress. By the time I had been in DS for about a year, I felt that I had probably outlived my usefulness there.

Then an interesting thing came along that caused a transition for me. This was during the second Reagan term. The Reagan administration had a lot of businessmen serving it, and business interests were one of our primary concerns. We had an export control policy which had been devised back in the 1950's. It had bureaucratic mechanisms in it, set up in the 1940's and 1950's, when the Cold War began.

The Secretary of State received an "Eyes Only" telegram from our Ambassador to Belgium, and which was also signed by our Ambassadors to the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy. The thrust of this telegram was: "Why doesn't the State Department start running this export licensing procedure? Export licensing policy is supposed to be in the State Department, but in fact it is being run by the Defense Department. The Defense Department 'browbeats' the Commerce Department, which has the other 'say' in it. Therefore, there's no rationality in it, and American business interests are suffering."

I got a phone call from Ron Spiers, whom I had known for years and who was then the Under Secretary for Management. He said: "Don, can you come down to my office and look at something?" So I went down and read through this telegram, which was really vitriolic. We had lost some big business deals which were under consideration. This particularly affected Belgium, which was why our Ambassador to Belgium wrote this cable. The Ambassadors who signed this cable were all "high powered," politically appointed Ambassadors.

Ron Spiers said: "What do you think? Is there anything to this?" I said: "Oh, yes, there is." He said: "How long would it take you and how much money would you need to get to the bottom of it and come up with some recommendations?" This was in November, 1985. I said: "Well, half of December is about all that you can work, because Europe 'dies' for the Christmas and New Year holidays. Give me till mid-February, [1986]." Ron said: "How much money do you need?" I said: "Well, I need one professional staffer and a secretary. I need to make at least one if not two trips to talk to these Ambassadors and members of their staffs in these Western European Embassies." And Spiers said: "You've got the job! Go ahead and take care of it." [Laughter]

That job was great fun. I got all tangled up with Richard Perle again. He was Assistant Secretary of Defense, there was a Perle sympathizer in the Department of Commerce, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Economics and Business (EB) was a Perle protégé. They had this whole issue all tangled up. You simply could not export something from the United States if Perle and his friends did not want it exported. They, and the people around them, took the most restrictive approach, particularly when it came to the export of electronics equipment. The U.S. electronics industry was being totally "hamstrung. It could not export its products. Yet the Japanese were "cloning" [copying] our technology, and we had no control over them. That was just one of the reasons that they were just "burying" us in the trade field. This problem involved a lot of other, technical matters, but the primary area of concern was communications, electronics, computers, and so forth.

So I worked with Capitol Hill, worked with other U. S. Government agencies, talked with people in EB, and then the people EB's Export Control Unit, headed by the Perle acolyte mentioned previously. So Perle had the whole thing "sewn up," just like that.

Q: Richard Perle was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs at the Pentagon.

TICE: Yes.

Q: He was also a protégé of the late Senator "Scoop" Jackson [Democrat, State of Washington].

TICE: Yes, he had been a staffer for Senator Jackson, when Jackson was the "big man" in the arms control area. In effect, Richard Perle was Senator Jackson's "think tank." Perle is a man of great intellect who is very skilled at persuading and reasoning with people, as well as manipulating them. He made his own "agenda" the U. S. "agenda" in the arms control area, to a very large degree. He was an amazingly successful person. I always admired him, even though I disagreed with him a lot.

At the end of this inquiry I came up with a report. I took it to Ron Spiers and asked him: "Do you want me to 'pull any punches'?" He said: "No, let it all hang out." So I did this and made recommendations on the reorganization of the Export Control Unit in EB. I proposed the unit be separated completely from EB and be headed by a person with the rank of Ambassador and an appropriate staff, who would report directly to the Deputy Secretary. He had to have ambassadorial or assistant secretary rank to be able to deal with the people like Perle and others, across interagency lines. I documented this recommendation with all of the interviews which I had had in this connection. It was really a lot of fun. The report is about two inches thick. It is an interesting document and bureaucratic study.

After I dropped this study on Ron Spiers' desk, he went direct to John Whitehead, then Deputy Secretary of State. The routing of this report, sort of the "Tinker to Evers to Chance" [reference to Chicago Cubs infield which recorded numerous "double plays" in baseball] route, was Secretary Shultz to John Whitehead to Ron Spiers. Then Secretary Shultz said: "Whitehead, you take care of this." So Whitehead took care of it. I briefed him on it and then he read the report. He said: "Okay, I want you to head up a committee to put these recommendations into effect." So I worked with John Whitehead and with Ron Spiers, the Assistant Secretaries of EB. and EUR [Bureau of European Affairs], as well as the security people, setting up a system for implementing the recommendations I had made. I set up the Ambassador level position and all that kind of stuff. I think that this report resulted in some change in how we got "rolled," at least.

Q: What Ambassador was appointed to that job?

TICE: Bob Dean, then a Deputy Director of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, was given the rank of Ambassador and assigned to the slot. He later moved over to the White House, and I worked for him there. He was a political appointee. I think that he did a pretty effective job. That position has probably been long-since abolished. This was a transition arrangement to "clean out" the problems in that I identified.

At that point I had decided that I was going to retire from the State Department. I think that I had a couple of more years before I would have reached the limit of my time in class as a Foreign Service Officer. One of the things that I had tried to do was to focus the things that I did on matters such as arms control, the world of satellites, the Office of Diplomatic Security, and then this export control program. Experience with these matters would provide good background for later employment. By my lights I would still be a

relatively "young man" by the time I left the Foreign Service. I wanted to have something else to do, and that process of preparation "paid off."

As I say, I was planning to retire, and was filling out the various papers involved and applying for job search seminar, when the Iran-Contra Affair reached its zenith and Admiral Poindexter and the majority of the professionals on the NSC staff, including Ollie North, were sacked. Frank Carlucci was named to replace Poindexter as National Security Advisor, and he persuaded Colin Powell to return from his three-star job in Europe and become Deputy National Security Advisor. I think something like 50 professionals on the staff were either immediately let go or eventually sent on to other work. Some of them were "escorted out of their offices." It may have taken a little longer. Carlucci and Powell looking madly for senior Foreign Service, Military, and CIA officers, with known track records to replace them and help put the whole operation together again.

Q: You were on the White House staff with the NSC from when to when?

TICE: I went over to the White House staff in February, 1987, and I left there in January, 1989, when the Bush administration came into office.

Q: What were you doing on the NSC staff?

TICE: I went there nominally to be the deputy, under Bob Dean, in the area handling technology transfer. I did do some of that, but also was asked to handle monitoring and actions with regard to overall foreign affairs funding, also known as the "150 Account." That was the Office of Management and Budget number for foreign affairs activity. I was asked to handle the "150 Account" in the sense of being the action officer on the NSC staff who would handle problems of conflict among the foreign affairs agencies, or "staff them," at least, over the allocation of budget funds in the "150 Account."

Since I had recently been working in the interagency arena on international telecommunications policy, I was well aware that, following abolishment of the White House Office of Telecommunications Policy, there was a three-way, interagency battle going on among the Departments of State and Commerce and the FCC [Federal Communications Commission over who would determined telecommunications policy. That was an issue which hadn't been resolved, even with the appointment of an Ambassador to head a bureau to determine telecommunications policy in the State Department.

Q: Let me stop here to turnover the tape.

Q: This is Side B of Tape 4 of the interview with Donald Tice. Please continue, Don.

TICE: I had observed this conflict first hand during my Space WARC experience, and knew that it was still going on and was destructive t our policy process in the telecommunications area.

So, I will agreed to handle the '150 Account' but said I would also like to handle International Telecommunications Policy." They said: "Fine. You're it!" [Laughter] I had a staff of three people, including one military officer. That is, I had a staff of two civilians and a couple of secretaries, plus one military officer. One of the civilians with me was a senior USIA [United States Information Agency] officer. During the earlier Reagan years there had been a USIA, or information policy person, who had gotten tangled up in the "Iran Contra" controversy. I think that, in effect, he became a "Disinformation Policy" person. I won't name the incumbent in that job, whose office I took. In effect, he had more CIA than USIA in his background. By that time he had become a problem. So they moved him out (literally -- he declined to give up his office and had to have his pass lifted and be escorted from the building). His replacement, also a USIA officer, was placed under me under me. And then I also had a couple of Army officers. One of them, then a Major, was extremely bright. I expect that he is general by now.

We had a good unit there, and I enjoyed that two years. I was, however, glad to give up the "beeper" and the White House pass when the two years were up. We did a lot of interesting stuff, much of it in the budget area. At that time the whole foreign affairs budget was something in the range of $15-19 billion. It was going up from one year to the next. By the time you applied all of the "earmarks to this budget, there wasn't much left. You started out with applying "earmarks" for the Israeli-Egyptian aid programs. However much you gave the Israelis, you had to give the Egyptians a percentage of that figure. The Israeli earmark kept going up each year, and we were advised that this was non-negotiable. Then you had the Greek and Turkish "earmarks." These were all so highly political that, as I learned once after I got my fingers "burned," you didn't go into them. Then there were all of the Congressional "earmarks." It seemed that each Congressman and Senator who was on a committee where he could have any "say" on it, would get his particular, pet "cow" taken care of. It got so bad that you really didn't have any leeway. If you needed $200,000 to take care of a flash fire or emergency of some kind, it simply wasn't available. You had to "break it out of some place."

The Defense Department was always the "cash cow" in that connection. They were very tired of that role. So it was a little "hair raising" and fast-paced because, when you start talking about money, it quickly escalates to the cabinet rank, and so I had to be damned careful about what I did.

I think that one of the funniest things that happened to me was that, at one point, we were really "low" on usable cash and needed some money for something in Africa, I think. The Major in my office and I sat down with one of our colleagues over in the OMB [Office of Management and Budget]. We figured that if we could get a 1% reduction in all of the "earmarks," that would "free up" a lot of money and would give us some real "elbow room."

We were talking about this, and I think that we actually had some language on paper. We had sworn that nobody would talk outside of the three of us until we were ready to take it to Colin Powell. Then, one day, I had a phone call from Colin. He said: "Don, come over and see me." So I trotted across West Executive Avenue and went into the White House to his office. Powell said: "Don, do you know anything about a proposal to cut the 'earmarks' by 1%?" I said to myself: "Oh, [four letter word]." Colin was laughing at that point. He said: "Good try, but no cigar. I just got a call from Tom Dine." Dine was then the head of the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC. I guess that I had turned pretty red in the face. I said: "Colin, there were only supposed to be three of us who were even thinking about it, and you would be the fourth to know." He said: "Well, I guess you included one too many because there it is." He added: "Good try, but that's finished." I said: "Okay. We'll go back to the drawing board."

Another time that I had an interesting experience involved one of the most contentious issues in the U. S. Government, refugee policy. Everybody has an ox that can be gored in that connection. There is a whole panoply of organizations, including NGO's or non governmental organizations, which support or are involved with refugees. There was a point at which we were having a problem finding money for processing refugees coming out of the Soviet Union. These were primarily Jews and Armenians. The Soviets had opened up the floodgates, and these refugees were coming out. They all had to go through this tortuous path of going to the American Embassy in Moscow and getting a "false visa" so that they could exit the Soviet Union. The Soviets knew exactly what we were doing. These people, with their "false American visa" could exit the Soviet Union and fly to Vienna, where they were then transferred. Some went directly to the U. S., some went to Israel, some went to other places, and there were whole camps set up in various places which were receiving these people. All in all, it was a huge industry.

This "pipeline" of Soviet refugees was chugging along. Then our Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Jack Matlock, stuck a big stick in the spokes. For a number of complex reasons the flow of refugees could not continue at that rate, and nobody in Washington was coming to grips with the problem. So, Ambassador Matlock precipitated a crisis by cut off the flow:
the Embassy in Moscow stopped issuing visas to these refugees. In the Soviet Union at that time, when somebody applied to the Soviet authorities to get an exit permit, one of three things happened. Either they were immediately sent to jail, they were told "No," or they were told: "All right, you can have the permit. Now, here's the date when you will go to Moscow. By that time you must give up all of your worldly possessions, except what you can carry with you, you forego everything you own, go to Moscow, get your visa, and leave the Soviet Union." This arrangement applied to both Armenians and Jews.

Because these people had divested themselves of all of their worldly goods and were moving in the direction of Moscow or were in the process of doing that, When we stopped issuing visas, the refugees began to "stack up" on the sidewalk in front of the

Embassy in Moscow. Of course, television news coverage was already with us, and that was what was showing up in the evening and morning news on Soviet TV.

Unfortunately, the guy who handled refugees was out of the country at the time. And, the problem was one of money. I got a call from Colin Powell, who had just come back from his 9:00 AM meeting with President Reagan. He said: "Don, have you heard the news about people stacking up in Moscow outside the Embassy?" I said: "Yep!" He said: "Generally, I'd be calling So-and-So but he's off on a trip to Southeast Asia on Vietnamese matters. You're my '150 man' so I guess that this is your baby." Powell continued: "The President said to me this morning, 'Colin, I want to know what we're going to do about those people on the sidewalk in Moscow. Please let me know by about 4:00 PM this afternoon.'" Colin continued: "Don, please let me know what we're going to do about it by about 3:00 PM this afternoon." [Laughter] I immediately headed back to my office and sat down with the Bob Dean, the Special Assistant to the President that I reported to. I said: "Look, the only thing to do in a short time like this is to get all of the 'miscreants' in the same room." So we set up a meeting for 11:00 AM and just decreed that the Assistant Secretaries in charge of this matter from the Departments of Justice and State, INS [Immigration and Naturalization Service], and at least three additional Assistant Secretaries would attend.

Q: From HEW [Department of Health, Education, and Welfare]...

TICE: From HEW; Treasury, of course, because money was involved; OMB [Office of Management and Budget] was involved; and every other department which had a stake in this. Of course the man who then headed European affairs in the NSC was a zealot in taking certain positions on this issue. He was there. Representatives of the intelligence agencies were there, and it was a "madhouse." We used the big conference room and got them all in there. I had sort of scripted for Dean how we wanted to try to lead them through the problem. It wound up with a shouting match. One Assistant Secretary was shouting four-letter words at another Assistant Secretary from another agency and that kind of thing.

I had been sitting there beside Dean making notes, as I knew the going-in positions of the various agencies. After about an hour and a half of acrimonious confusion, I wrote out a list of nine "points of agreement". I put a note at the end of it which said: "Bob, at 1:00 PM sharp you had better 'shut them up,' declare a consensus on these points, and adjourn the meeting." Well, that's what he did. They all screamed "bloody murder," but we went back to Colin Powell with this and said that this is what we "agreed on" and suggested that he tell the President that this is what we're going to do. He made a few calls to cabinet members, "stuffed some people back into their holes," as it were, and then we got this process moving again. [Laughter] It was one of the longest days that I've ever spent.

Q: You left the NSC...

TICE: Yes, I left the NSC in early February, 1989. The out- placement, or job search seminar in the State Department started in mid-February, 1989.

Q: But basically you were using your experience in telecommunications management, and all of that. So you went into a management consulting firm.

TICE: Yes. I had talked with Booz-Allen, and Hamilton, which had been in touch with me when I was working in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Ralph Shrader, now the President of Booz-Allen's World Technology Business, had been one of the people on the delegation to the ITU. He had been a youngish-looking engineer at Booz-Allen. I got to know Ralph during that period. Somebody else from Booz-Allen had contacted me, and we had chatted and had lunch occasionally. They were just keeping an eye on me, so that when I left the White House staff, they'd have a chance at me. As a matter of fact, while I was still in the White House I signed a contingency, employment offer. It concerned a very large contract which would have built a world-wide ISDN, an integrated services digital network, for U. S. Government international communications, under the aegis of the State Department. Booz-Allen wanted me, and I signed a contingency contract to work for Booz-Allen and to head the international access negotiations part of that, if we won the contract. That never happened because it was too ambitious.

So when I left the White House staff, I went into the "job search" seminar at the State Department and made a real job out of it. I kept office hours. I went to the offices which, fortunately, were in the old Iranian Embassy [on Massachusetts Avenue] at that time. I lived in American University Park, so it was easy to commute. I went there at about 9:30 AM every morning, got my telephone calls, and worked the job search very assiduously. At the end of this period I came up with the job which I'd sort of had "in the wings" all along. This was offered to me, so I went with Booz-Allen, and Hamilton.

At the time I knew that I was retiring, I called up Ralph Shrader and said that I was leaving. I said that he and his people had been interested in me. This other, ISDN project wasn't maturing. I asked if there was anything else that they wanted to do with me. He set up an appointment, and I went up and met with him. He was by this time a senior Vice President of Booz-Allen and was accompanied at this meeting by Luke Capone and two other people. Capone was another Booz-Allen guy who moved up to be a senior Vice President of the firm. We talked for about an hour, and I was given an offer to work for them as a consultant on several, specific matters.

So for the first year at Booz-Allen I worked on a consulting basis. However, I was charging enough, on an hourly basis, that when I began to get into the business building mode, and I was working for them on about a three-fourths time basis, it was costing them more money than to pay me on a full-time basis. I kind of liked this arrangement. I was bringing in a lot of money. However, Booz-Allen then made me a full-time job offer.

Q: Well, why don't we stop at this point? It's been great.

End of interview