The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR GEORGE F. WARD, JR.

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is April 23, 2001. This is an interview with George F. Ward, Jr. This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training and I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy. Do you go by George?

WARD: Yes.

Q: Let's start at the beginning. Tell me when and where you were born and something about your family.

WARD: I was born on April 9, 1945 in Jamaica, in the borough of Queens in New York City. My father was an accountant and my mother was a homemaker and also employed as a church secretary for most of my childhood. We lived in a neighborhood of duplex houses, which in New York City were called "semi-attached."

Q: What is the background of your father? Where did they come from?

WARD: My dad, George F. Ward, was born in Birmingham, England, on May 20, 1907. He completed his schooling in England, graduating from the Aston Commercial School, which gave him the equivalent of high school. His father, Frank Ward, had served in the British army in World War I and after demobilization could not find work in his trade as a silver and goldsmith. His father emigrated in 1921 to seek better fortune in the U.S., and the rest of the family, including my dad, followed the next year. Several members of my father's extended family, i.e., aunts, uncles, etc., also emigrated to the U.S. during the same period.

Q: What did your grandfather do when he came?

WARD: Initially, he worked as a silver and goldsmith in the jewelry trade in New York City. Family legend – I have no idea if it is true – has it that he made the medal presented to Charles Lindbergh after the latter's transatlantic flight. He did not earn very much, however, and his children, including my father, all worked from a very young age. The family situation became worse when my grandfather decided, exactly when I am not sure, that he would stop working and let the other members of the family support him. When that support did not materialize, he left New York City and moved upstate to a rural area across the Hudson River from Bear Mountain, where he built himself a cabin, lived off the land and occasionally worked odd jobs.

Q: Was there a Grandmother Ward, too?

WARD: There was a Grandmother Ward, and she had much more good sense than my grandfather. My grandmother, Mary Ward, got a legal separation from my grandfather and stayed in New York City with her two spinster daughters. Grandma Ward lived to the ripe age of 96. Her two daughters are still living. They are in Putnam Valley, New York, where they tutor schoolchildren, volunteer for their church, and bowl in a league, all at over 90 years of age.

Q: Did your father stay in New York?

WARD: My dad worked virtually from the time he immigrated until a late retirement. Early on, he worked as a bookkeeper. He trained on the job as an accountant, but could never afford to take the low-paying jobs that would have qualified him to become a C.P.A. For a long while, he was the accountant for the interior-decorating firm utilized by Marjorie Merriweather Post. For a while, the china in our home consisted of the rejects from the sets made for the Sea Cloud, the three-masted sailing yacht that belonged to Mrs. Post. That ship is still in service as a luxury cruise ship in the Mediterranean. Dad later became the trust accountant for the estate of Walter B. Chrysler, the automobile manufacturer. My dad loved camping and the outdoors and eventually built a weekend house in Putnam Valley, New York. In the late '60s, he left New York City, moved up to Putnam Valley, and worked as an administrator for the county. My dad was extremely proud that he worked for his entire life, and especially that he managed to stay employed throughout the Great Depression.

Q: What was your mother's background?

WARD: My mother, Hildegard Ward, had an interesting background. She was born on May 19, 1906 in New York City. Her mother, Lina Laerm, emigrated from a small farming town near Halle, Germany in 1902. (I had the opportunity to visit that town, Koesseln, when the Berlin Wall came down.) She was the youngest of 13 children. She came to New York and fell in love with a Japanese immigrant, Teddo Shimizu, who apparently had run away from his very prominent family in Japan. They got married and stayed together for around 10 years. Both worked as household domestics. Around 1914 or 1915, it seems that my grandfather's family located him and persuaded him to return to Japan. He was never heard of again. My grandmother later married a Scotsman, John Evans, whom I knew as my grandfather. In fact, I did not know the story of my mother's birth father until I became an adult. My mother never spoke of her Japanese heritage. I think I can understand that in view of the stress she must have felt during those times, when children of mixed race were regarded very differently than today, and especially as an American of German-Japanese ancestry during World War II. Her lot was not an easy one. She spoke German until World War I, when the other children in school picked on those who spoke German. She never spoke German again.
Q: My mother had the same problem in World War I. She would say, "What clock is it" and things like that. Unfortunately, then the language did not pass on, so I had to learn it on my own.

WARD: I did the same thing. I had to learn German on my own.

Q: She grew up where?

WARD: My mother had a very hard childhood, since her father left the family. They were very poor, way below what we think of as poor today. They had virtually nothing. She left regular school after the eighth grade and finished her high school at night while working as a bookkeeper during the day. She did well in her jobs and worked for quite a while, probably from 1920 or 1921 until after she married in 1930. She worked for various small businesses in New York. She lived initially on the Lower East Side of Manhattan and then in Brooklyn. Her mother eventually became the governess for the children of Colonel Jacob Rupert, who owned the New York Yankees and a large brewery. Rupert was a very good to my grandmother and gave her a house in Forest Hills in Queens. She moved out there and tended her rose garden. I remember that house, which later was torn down to make way for the construction of a large apartment house complex. My grandmother then moved further out in Queens, close to where my family then lived.

Q: How did your mother and father meet?

WARD: My mother caught my father's eye while they were in the subway. In terms of temperament, they were almost polar opposites. My father was an extrovert and my mother an introvert. At first, she didn't want to have anything to do with this red-haired

guy from England - my father had flaming red hair when he was young - and tried to avoid him, but he persisted, and they were married in 1930.
Q: You had brothers and sisters?

WARD: I had two sisters, Barbara and Eleanor; they were ten and twelve years older than me.

Q: You were a really late child, weren't you?

WARD: My mother was 39 when I was born in 1945. My eldest sister, Eleanor, died in 1985. My other sister, Barbara, lives in Florida.

Q: You were born in 1945 in New York. You were born just about the time the war in Germany ended. Where did you start going to elementary school?

WARD: For the first six grades, I went to Public School 131 in Jamaica, New York. It was a good public school. Most of the children in that school came from a relatively upscale area known as Jamaica Estates. Later, I became part of the first class in a new junior high school, Van Wyck Junior High School, #217. We didn't have junior high schools in New York City until the '50s. I was part of an experimental program that compressed grades seven through nine into two years.

Q: Do you recall in junior high any teachers that particularly stick in your mind?

WARD: My French teacher, Mr. Greenberg, and my science teacher, Mr. Littman, stand out. After junior high school, I went to the Bronx High School of Science, which was a long commute.

Q: That's a major high school.

WARD: Yes.
Q: You must have been quite good in your studies.

WARD: I did well, but the Bronx High School of Science was probably the most academically competitive place I have ever experienced. It was extremely rigorous.

Q: Did you find yourself up against the Jewish mafia? In the New York area, there is a large group of Jewish people who really emphasize education. The equivalent now is the Chinese mafia at the University of California.

WARD: People joke that the Bronx High School of Science was founded by a group of Jewish mothers who lived in the Grand Concourse area of the Bronx and wanted their sons to be doctors. I was the only non-Jewish pupil in my homeroom class at Bronx Science, which made it interesting on Jewish holidays. It was an intensely competitive academic experience. I had to commute three hours a day by bus and subway to get there. I had grown up in Jamaica, which despite the fact that it's part of New York City, was

actually a relatively small community. I went to school with the same group of kids right through ninth grade and then was suddenly thrust into a different world. I had to commute through three boroughs to get to school. I realized after the first day that I might have made a big mistake, but I was too stubborn to quit.

Q: What inspired you to apply there?

WARD: In 1956, the Russians put Sputnik up. I was very interested in science. I always did science projects and got good grades in science and read a lot about scientific subjects. So, the Sputnik caused teachers and school administrators to try to orient anyone who had the least aptitude in science towards science. Since I had some aptitude and was interested, I ended up on that track. I had a number of very talented science teachers in junior high school and in high school.

Q: Did you specialize in any particular field?

WARD: At Bronx Science, one had to. You could choose among biology, physics, or chemistry. I chose biology. That meant that by the time my senior year rolled around, I was taking college level courses in biology.

Q: Was this pretty much people who were looking to be doctors?

WARD: Yes, to some extent. We're about to have the 40th reunion of my high school class. There are a number of doctors, but not an overwhelming number. We turned out to be a pretty diverse group; the common factor seems to be a large number of advanced degrees.

Q: At that time, what would a biology major be looking towards doing?

WARD: Most of the biology majors at Bronx High School of Science were looking to become doctors. I was not because four years of undergraduate college was a large enough financial challenge for my family. I didn't have the slightest idea of how I could possibly afford eight years of university education after high school, so medicine was never a serious consideration for me. It was just economically impossible. Even to become a research biologist one needed a Ph.D. Again, that was financially impossible.

Q: Did you have summer jobs? I imagine commuting would take care of you during high school.

WARD: I didn't have any jobs during the school year, but during the summer, I did. A neighbor of mine in Queens had a stationery business in Manhattan and I worked as a delivery boy for him, running things around the subways and bus lines and walking around lower Manhattan. I got to know Manhattan very well. I also worked as an office boy in a law firm for one summer before I went to college.

Q: Just to pick up on the theme of history, while you were on the science track, what sort

of reading were you doing in history?

WARD: I read an awful lot when I was a kid. I read American history extensively. When I was about eight or nine, my mother gave me a subscription to *American Heritage* magazine.

Q: I've read every issue since 1955.

WARD: I never got the first issue, but I still have the second one. Actually, although it's written in a popular style, it is an excellent survey of American history. If all the issues were indexed on CD-ROM, that would be useful.

Q: It really is first rate. I've religiously read every issue.

WARD: I stopped years ago just because of lack of time, but when I was a kid, I read it religiously. American history was my favorite, but I was also interested in European history. At the same time, I was also attracted to science. Aside from biology, I had thought of aerospace engineering. When I applied to college, I did so as a biology major.

Q: You graduated at 16. What year was that? What did you do about college?

WARD: I graduated high school in 1961. One of my sisters had gone to college, but that was years before, and I had very little guidance on where to go. I understand that today high school students apply to eight or 10 colleges. At Bronx Science, we were limited to three applications. The teachers would only write three recommendations. I applied to Harvard and the University of Rochester. At the time, one of my sisters lived in Rochester, and I went up there and visited the school and liked it a lot. I also applied to a small school in Ohio as a backup. Harvard had a quota for the Bronx High School of Science - they would only accept four. The average SAT score of the 80 or so who applied to Harvard from Bronx Science was about 1450. I was not one of those accepted at Harvard, so I chose Rochester.

Q: You went there for four years?

WARD: I did, '61-'65. It turned out to be a very happy choice. That sometimes happens when you fall into things. I had it in the back of my mind that I wanted to get a Navy ROTC scholarship. Although my parents were quite willing to pay the cost of a private education, it would have been through very significant financial sacrifice for them. My mother probably would have had to take a second job. As a freshman, however, I was too young for a Navy ROTC scholarship. You had to be 17, and I was only 16. So, I sort of sat out a year as what is known as a "contract NROTC student" and then competed for an appointment to a regular NROTC scholarship, which covered all of my tuition and books and paid $50 a month. That relieved a great deal of the financial pressure on my family. I didn't have to take out huge student loans.

Q: What was the University of Rochester like in that time?

WARD: The University of Rochester was, and still is as far as I can tell, an institution with a real commitment to undergraduate education. For example, we had a program called the Honors Program that was an option for juniors and seniors. In the Honors Program, the course load was limited to two per semester, but these were seminars with no more than eight people in them, taught often in the professors' homes. There were no tests during the semester. We were required to read extensively and to write one paper a week for each seminar. At the end of the year, the university would bring in outside examiners for written and oral examinations. I participated in seminars on American intellectual history, Marxism, the Renaissance, the American legislative system, 18th century Europe, and others. Each was a unique and interesting experience. The constant writing was excellent career preparation. By the way, I had changed my major from biology to political science before matriculation. Then I changed it again in my freshman year to history. I just liked history more. I decided I would study what I was really interested in.

Q: What brought about this earth change?

WARD: It was somewhat a matter of faith, the feeling that my calling was not in the field of biology. I was doing well in biology, but that's not where I felt called to spend my life. I was fascinated by politics and history - how political systems worked, how they didn't work, how leaders lead, how great decisions got made. So, I made the change.

Q: You were there from '61-'65. The arrival of John F. Kennedy caused quite a change. It was a call of people working for the country. Did that hit Rochester or you?

WARD: I think it did. Kennedy was such a powerful influence on the whole generation. I think many young people took to heart his call to service.

Q: In political science and history, were there any areas that you were specializing in?

WARD: It was interesting. I didn't specialize in anything that had to do with international relations. I never took a course with "international" in its title until I got to graduate school many years later. I focused on American history. That was a field I loved. I read both American literature and American history voraciously, soaked it up. It was wonderful training for the mind and was terribly impractical in terms of career.

Q: How about the times? You were there. The Cold War was going. Vietnam was beginning to heat up. Did this impact much on where you were?

WARD: It began to. Rochester was a school that sent freedom riders to the South in 1964. It was a school where by the time I was graduating, anti-war protests were beginning. It was a school where the appeal of the NROTC faded over time and almost everyone in NROTC who was not on a scholarship dropped out, taking the size of our unit down from around 150 to 85 or so. However, politics were less a part of daily life at Rochester than they had been at Bronx Science, where there was an active radical left

fringe - communists and Trotskyites. The antics of the left at Bronx Science made me into a conservative. At Rochester, however, I wasn't active politically. I studied hard and made Phi Beta Kappa. I started running track, the mile and half mile. Commuting three hours a day in high school had left no time for organized sports, and I really disliked that. I managed to letter in track, but I think the coach gave more credit to my enthusiasm than my ability. I was active in the NROTC, and that took a great deal of time, because the required naval science courses had to be taken as overloads.

Q: Intellectual ferment in the Jewish community of New York tended to be European socialist and Trotskyite and very committed.

WARD: Oh, yes. The fathers and mothers of these kids were active politically and had come out of a Central or Eastern European environment. It seemed as if everyone I knew came from families that had immigrated relatively recently.

Q: Rochester is a community. One thinks of the Eastman School and Kodak. Did you get any chance to taste Rochester as a community?

WARD: I did. Thirty to forty percent of the students were from the Rochester area, so you got to know their families and the town. It was a nice town. Immediately after I left, they had some real difficulties - race riots and such. But it was a very hospitable community during the time I was there. We now think of Rochester as not quite the rust belt, but not on the leading edge of technology either. But at the time, Rochester was a high-tech place. It was where Kodak and Xerox were based. There were a lot of German and other European immigrant families there, and they gave Rochester a significant base of skilled labor. Apart from Kodak and Xerox, there were places like the Gleason Works and Bausch and Lomb that depended upon skilled artisans.

Q: Also, Rochester must have been nice because it's noted for its mild winters, too.

WARD: Right. The winters were really cold and snowy. There were tunnels under the campus to help you get around. Strangely enough, however, I can't remember that the weather was ever a real inconvenience. After a Rochester winter, though, spring was quite wonderful.

Q: As an ROTC person, you knew what you were going to be doing when you graduated.

WARD: Yes. I chose the Marine option in NROTC early on, so I was headed toward the Marine Corps.

Q: Why the Marines?

WARD: There were two reasons. The most important was that the Marine officer-instructor at the NROTC unit was an outstanding man whom I came to look upon as my second father. His name was Victor Ohanesian. He was an outstanding leader and a person of high intellect. He had completed all the coursework for a Ph.D. in Chinese

studies; he was a former semi-pro football player; he had been an enlisted Marine in World War II and a junior infantry officer in Korea. Unfortunately, he was later killed in Vietnam as a battalion commander. His command group was ambushed near the DMZ, and he insisted that his people get on the medevac chopper first. He bled to death. He died a hero, and those of us who knew him will never forget him. The second reason for choosing the Marines was that I could not imagine spending a career at sea. As part of the NROTC program, we were required as midshipmen to go on summer "cruises." The first summer was 10 weeks at sea, which I spent on an aircraft carrier and a destroyer. Being on an aircraft city was like living in a floating city. I decided that the Marines offered much greater adventure, and that I was in it for adventure and not for driving a boat.

Q: So you graduated in '65. You were in the Marine Corps for how long?

WARD: I was on active duty for four years, '65-'69.

Q: What did you do when you first came out?

WARD: The first thing I did was get married - six days after I graduated.

Q: Where did you meet your wife?

WARD: I met my future wife at church in Jamaica, New York. I grew up in a close-knit community that was based around a little Methodist church in Jamaica. Once we were in college, members of our youth group would get together at Christmas break. In December 1963, we went as a group to sing Christmas carols at an old-age home in Brooklyn. Now my wife had not been part of that group of friends. Her father had spent a career in the Air Force. She had been born in Jamaica, New York, but her parents moved away when she was an infant and came back only when she was 18. She came Christmas caroling with us, and we fell in love on first sight. We were married in June 1965, when we were both 20. I needed my parents' permission to get married.

Q: Then what?

WARD: Then, as every Marine officer does, I went to the Marine Officers Basic School. I spent six months at Quantico, Virginia learning how to lead an infantry platoon. I was there from June to December 1965. After Basic School, where I did well, I was headed toward the infantry when I decided that I would rather specialize in the control of close air support. That specialty turned out to be a disappointment, because it was not the sort of frontline type job that it had been advertised as.

This intersects with my interest in the Foreign Service. I hadn't heard about the Foreign Service until my senior year in college when a friend of mine, Dick English - who has disappeared into the mists of time - told me that he was going to take the Foreign Service exam. I said, "What's that?" He said, "Well, you get to work in embassies overseas." I said, "That sounds like fun." So, I registered for the Foreign Service exam. While I was a second lieutenant at Basic School, I came up to Washington to one of the high schools to

take the Foreign Service exam. The building was packed with people, all of whom seemed to know a lot more about the Foreign Service than I did because they had attended Georgetown or similar programs. I had no clue about the Foreign Service. I had never taken a course on international relations. In a political science seminar, I had done a paper on the Foreign Assistance Act, but that was the extent of my knowledge of the foreign affairs community. In any case, I passed the written exam and took the oral in early 1966. When I took the oral, the examiners did an unusual thing. I was by then stationed in North Carolina. I drove up to Washington with my wife. They invited my wife into the exam room and quizzed her. It wasn't just "Hello, how are you?" They asked her about all sorts of aspects of Foreign Service life. She probably knew less about the Foreign Service than I did, but she did a great job with their questions. Then she sat outside while I took the exam. In the exam, they asked what I was going to do in the Marine Corps. I told them about my assignment in close air support. They said, "It would be great if you could get into intelligence. That would be relevant to the Foreign Service."

Q: Do you recall any of the questions?

WARD: Oh, yes. I realized before the exam that I knew nothing about the Foreign Service. I tried to read periodicals like *Foreign Affairs*, but they were hard to come by on my Marine Corps base. The only relevant book in the Post Library at the Marine Corps Air Station at Cherry Point, North Carolina was about the British Foreign Service, so I checked that out and read it. I couldn't find anything on the American Foreign Service. I came up to Washington for the exam. It was the old style exam that was supposed to put pressure on the applicant, with the examiners sitting some distance away and the applicant alone behind a table. There was a large map of the world off on the left-hand side of the room. One question was, "Starting at the left side of the map and proceeding toward the right, where do you think there will be troubles in the world over the next 15 years?" That was a very open-ended question, and an easy one because you could sort of pick whatever topic you wanted. There were plenty of potential trouble spots. They asked a lot of questions about the Foreign Service, which I really knew nothing about. There were also questions like, "Do you really want to live overseas? Do you really want this kind of life" and that sort of thing. I thought the questions were so hard that, by the end of the exam, I knew I had failed. So, I was very surprised when I didn't. As I left, they congratulated me on knowing so much about the Foreign Service. That little book on the British Foreign Service had served me well.

Q: You learned to fake it then, which I'm sure served you well later on. What happened when you came back?

WARD: I passed all the medical and security clearances by the summer of 1966. At the time, the Department would hold an appointment offer open for three years if you were a military officer. Candidates who were enlisted did not have that advantage. That was discrimination. In the meantime, I did get into intelligence by being selected to attend the Army counterintelligence officer course. At the time, intelligence in the Marine Corps had a secondary status. Regular officers could hold an intelligence qualification only as a

secondary specialty. Only warrant officers, reserve officers, and limited-duty officers could be primary intelligence specialists. I became the first regular Marine officer to attend the counterintelligence course. Today, the intelligence field is much more important in the Marine Corps.

Q: And they can get the intelligence officers out of the universities as they come out.

WARD: So I did get an intelligence specialty. I went to the Army Counterintelligence Course at Fort Holabird in Baltimore and learned how to follow spies around Germany. My wife was then pregnant with our first and only child. I then went back to North Carolina. Our daughter, Pamela Elizabeth, was born on September 13th, and in November 1967 I shipped out for Vietnam, where the techniques I had learned to uncover spies in Germany were not all that helpful. After a short time doing close air support in Vietnam, I was transferred from the First Marine Aircraft Wing to the First Marine Division in order to do counterintelligence work.

Q: About Vietnam, you were there…

WARD: I got there in November 1967 and left in December 1968. I was first based in Chu Lai, where we had a direct air support center that later deployed to Khe Sanh. Chu Lai is in a beautiful location, and life there was pretty good until Tet 1968.

Q: Chu Lai is located where?

WARD: South of Da Nang on the coast. The First Marine Division was there until mid-1967. One of the early large engagements in the war was fought on a peninsula near Chu Lai. Later, the First Marine Division moved north and was replaced by the Army's Americal Division, which, in my opinion, did not do well.

Q: They were involved in My Lai?

WARD: My Lai was not far from Chu Lai. I did not have great regard for the military performance of the Americal Division. They did not do enough patrolling and spent too much time hunkered down behind barbed wire. As a Marine unit, we maintained our own perimeter. Even before Tet, we had begun to get mortared and rocketed a couple of nights each week. Then during Tet we actually had ground action against our perimeter. That became fairly chaotic because an Army unit began firing through our positions. After Tet, I was able to get reassigned to the First Marine Division, which is where I wanted to be.

Q: How did you find… At your level-

WARD: I was a captain. Promotions were very quick. I got promoted to captain with less than two years service.

Q: Were you ready for the Tet offensive? Was it a shock?

WARD: It was a shock, although we expected that the cease-fire would be violated. All holiday cease-fires were violated. I don't think anyone expected that we were going to see the scale of action that took place. The dominant impression of Tet as an American military defeat is totally incorrect. There were some places, such as Hue, where we did retreat at the beginning. But by March 1968, it was clear that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong had suffered an overwhelming military defeat. We ceased to see any activity in the I Corps area by South Vietnamese guerrilla forces. The North Vietnamese took over all of the fighting.
Before Tet, my Marine air support unit had detachments spread out all the way from the North Vietnamese border south to Chu Lai. Getting back and forth between these detachments and especially up to Khe Sanh became problematical. Our people up in Khe Sanh were really cut off. They were isolated for about two months. Marines there lived a bunker life. Our unit was controlling close air support right outside the wire of the base.

Q: I think of the recapture of old Hue as being a big Marine thing.

WARD: It was. The recapture of Hue was completed by the end of February: I joined the Division in May 1968. The Fifth Marine regiment was the primary ground force in the battle for Hue. When the Tet offensive began, Warrant Officer Godwin, a Marine counterintelligence officer, was stationed in the city of Hue. When the communists took over Hue, Godwin was surrounded and finally ran out of water and had to make a run for it. He was wounded and captured. Recently, I learned that he survived his wounds and was imprisoned in a brutal jungle POW camp, where he died. The communists assassinated thousands of civilians just south of Hue. The victims included aid workers such as a German civilian nurse.

During the recapture of Hue, a Marine counterintelligence detachment fought its way back in along with a unit of Nung irregulars. These were Vietnamese of Chinese ethnic heritage. The unit was basically an extended family, brothers and fathers and sons and so forth, with their wives and children. I got to know them pretty well once I joined the division. They were very loyal to us. We treated them well. They were our security force. They managed to get back into Hue even before the Fifth Marines. I was not involved in the fighting there. I heard stories about the Hue Citadel and how difficult it had been to retake it. I went back up to look at it. The Citadel had walls anywhere from six to 16 feet thick. They finally had to be breached by using naval gunfire from the destroyers offshore.

Q: You went to the First Marine headquarters. They were located where?

WARD: Headquarters was located in Da Nang, on Hill 327. I divided my time between field operations and division headquarters.

Q: In a Marine Corps environment, what were you as an intelligence officer doing?

WARD: We tried to accomplish two distinctly different objectives. Officially, we were part of the "Phoenix Program," which was aimed at "neutralizing" the Viet Cong

infrastructure, which meant killing or capturing them. So, we recruited human intelligence sources, developed them, and gained information on leaders of the Viet Cong infrastructure. We did this with some success. The competing demand came from the division commander, who was under pressure to stop the shelling of the Da Nang airbase with 122 mm rockets. If a rocket hit an F-4 aircraft, it was millions of dollars down the drain. The generals wanted that stopped. In counterintelligence, we found ourselves also trying to develop information about where those rockets were coming from. This was almost an impossible task, because the rockets were basically supported on logs and fired one at a time from clearings in the bush.

Q: Two guys carrying it.

WARD: Our effort was not very productive, but we did succeed in uncovering some of the caches of 122 mm rockets. One of the tools that we used was a "Rewards Program." The United Nations peacekeeping force in Haiti later copied this program. We paid for any and all munitions that Vietnamese people brought to us, no questions asked. We paid very sizable sums for 122 mm rockets.

Q: Was this part of the Chieu Hoi program?

WARD: Yes. The First Marine Division also pioneered an offshoot of the Chieu Hoi (which means "rally") program that we called the Kit Carson Scout Program. Early in the First Marine Division's time in Vietnam, Marines began to use Vietnamese who had defected from the Viet Cong to provide area knowledge and warning of mines and booby traps. This worked very well. It got harder, however, because after Tet, there were almost no local force Viet Cong left in I Corps (the northernmost sector of South Vietnam). They had been wiped out. Almost all of the enemy forces in I Corps were North Vietnamese. They didn't have the area knowledge that South Vietnamese guerrillas would have had. They were as foreign to the local area as we were. But otherwise the program was very successful. We'd go out each month and recruit defectors from the enemy forces. Then we ran our recruits through a version of Marine Corps boot camp. We trained them in Marine infantry techniques. We familiarized them with our weapons. They were then paired each one up with a Marine and they went out on patrol on the point. They saved a large number of Marine lives. Many of them fought quite heroically. A couple of them, had they been Americans, would have won decorations such as the Silver Star. They were very effective at what they did. The Marines initially were very skeptical that anyone who used to be an enemy could be trusted. To solve that problem, we would bring the scouts' prospective Marine "buddies" up to our camp for the graduation. We had a trip wire course set up on some trails nearby with firecrackers instead of land mines. We had the Marines first go through the course alone. Normally, they would trip at least one wire. Then we had the Scouts go through with the Marines. The scouts picked up trail signs and the location of the mines, and they proved to the Marines that they were useful people to have around. I ran that program with a couple of great Marine sergeants. I also ran the counterintelligence effort for the division. Our biggest operation was Operative Meade River. In November 1968, just before I was due to come home, we received intelligence that there were a large number of Viet Cong civilian leaders in an area called

the "Arizona Area" south of Da Nang. Because of the quality of the information, we were able to persuade the commanding general to put nine battalions, the equivalent of a Marine division into a cordon and search operation. Most of the battalions were from the First Marine Division, but the Third Marine Division also sent some troops in. We cordoned off an area of three kilometers by 10 kilometers. We knew that the Viet Cong infrastructure members would go underground into tunnels and caves, and that they would have enough food and water for a week to two weeks. The idea was that if we stayed there longer than two weeks, they would have to come out. What we didn't know was that just before we put the cordon in, the Republic of Korea Marine brigade that was stationed at an area of responsibility adjacent to our prospective operational area would fight an engagement with a North Vietnamese regiment, which would retreat into the area we were about to cordon. As a result, the operation began with a large conventional engagement in which about 1,000 North Vietnamese soldiers were killed. Then we evacuated the entire population from the area. Contrary to some of the things one reads about Vietnam, the evacuation was done in a very civilized way. We had a tent camp set up complete with entertainment, food, and medical care. But we did screen the population. Between that screening and people who came out of the caves and tunnels afterwards, we captured about 72 civilian officials of the Viet Cong. That was Operation Meade River.

Q: What happened to the civilian officials?

WARD: They went to jail. For all I know, they are prominent senior leaders now.

Q: Here you were, running intelligence. CIA is up to its neck in this thing, particularly the Phoenix Program. The Army must have been doing this. Weren't you sort of tripping over each other?

WARD: Definitely. In fact, one of the big problems in Vietnam was self-confirming intelligence. Normally, before acting, we liked to have two sources with the same information. But what would happen is that entrepreneurial Vietnamese were selling their information to multiple agencies. In Da Nang city, there was a large Air Force Office of Special Investigations detachment that had a lot of money and bought a lot of information. That was a problem. We tended to operate, as Marines usually do, more at the grassroots level. So we tended to have our own sources of information.

Q: You have these small teams.

WARD: Yes, we often worked closely with Marine Civic Action Groups (CAGs) and with Vietnamese police field forces.

Q: I was there a little later as consul general in Saigon. I would go to Army briefings and these things just struck me as "We've cleared out this. We've done this." They were delivered with great aplomb and all this and I found myself very dubious about what they were saying. This was a problem often at least with the Army. If you're told that you've got to clear out a place, if nothing else, you're going to say you cleared it out. Was trying

to find out what really happened a problem?

WARD: Certainly getting an accurate picture of what was happening in an environment where almost none of us had language skills was a big problem. In terms of the security, I'd have to say that Tet was a watershed. After Tet, security dramatically improved. Between Da Nang and Hue, there was a pass called the Hai Van Pass. Before Tet and during Tet, no one drove over that pass except in a convoy. It was just too dangerous. After Tet, you could drive from Da Nang to Hue without being in a convoy. You could just set out and go. They even restored railroad service between Hue and Da Nang.

Q: I went with a British vice consul. I think we had a driver. We just drove up.

WARD: It was a nice drive. By the time I left, we were driving around extensively. I had teams of two people with each battalion. We were spread out. My job was to sort of run this. So, I'd be driving all the time. You'd always worry a little bit about land mines. You had sand bags on the floors of our jeeps. But we could drive almost anywhere. The only place I could not drive to was An Hoa, in the southwest sector of the area of responsibility. It was not a good idea to drive there except in a convoy. I drove, for example, down to Hoi An, which is a provincial capital south of Da Nang and north of Chu Lai. It was a delightful place where you could get good seafood. I drove up to Hue.

Q: What was your impression of the Marine Corps leadership?

WARD: I'm an unabashed fan of the Marine Corps. I think the leadership was excellent. The Marine Corps, along with the rest of the defense establishment, went through a very difficult time in the latter stages of the Vietnam War. There was a point beginning in 1968 at which we had to take draftees. The Marine Corps expanded from 190,000 to over 300,000 during Vietnam. In order to achieve those numbers, we had to take draftees. That was a problem. You don't want people in the Marines who don't want to be there. We had some serious disciplinary problems. We had serious racial problems in the division. Traditionally, one of the garrison duties of counterintelligence is to investigate threats against the command from within. So, we had a subsidiary mission of keeping track of the racial unrest, which was significant. My clerk was a young African-American corporal. He was very loyal to us and did his job. I found out that some African-American Marines who were just out of control threatened his life. We ran anti-drug operations and seized large quantities of narcotics. At one point, we cordoned off an area where there were a large number of Army and Marine deserters, 500 or so. It was a big problem.

Q: Saigon was just loaded.

WARD: An area near Red Beach in Da Nang tended to be where deserters would gravitate. We swept through and gathered up all these people. That was a low time for the Marine Corps. I left active duty not just because I wanted to come into the Foreign Service, but also because I was depressed by the state of the Marine Corps. We never lost a fight in Vietnam, but the climate of the times hurt the Corps. I stayed in the Reserves

until 1978 and was promoted to major. At that point, I found that my work in the Foreign Service left no time for the Reserves, and I resigned my commission.

Q: While you were in Da Nang, we had a consular representative up there. Here you had this Foreign Service commission in your back pocket. Did you get any chance to take a look at the foreign affairs side?

WARD: No, the closest I got to that was visits with the Marine counterintelligence chief at Headquarters, III Marine Amphibious Force in Da Nang. John Gunther, who later became the intelligence chief of the Marine Corps, was in charge of counterintelligence for III MAF. Trips to III MAF were a big thrill - they had toilets that flushed.

Q: Some of the CORDS people were Foreign Service officers.

WARD: I met a lot of CORDS people, but I do not recall any FSOs.

Q: But you were pretty well tied up.

WARD: Yes. I had plenty to do.

Q: You left there in late '68.

WARD: Yes. I was a regular officer, and at the time the Marine Corps was not accepting resignations of regulars. They had assigned me to train reservists in Illinois. The freeze on resignations was lifted while I still was in Vietnam, and I put in a request to be assigned to the Washington area, since I planned to come into the Foreign Service, my wife and baby daughter were in the Washington area, and it didn't make sense to move me to Chicago. As often happens in the military, I heard nothing back from my request. My wife, however, was living in an apartment complex where my map-reading instructor from Basic School also lived. He was a major and had been seriously wounded, given the last rites three times. He was working at headquarters Marine Corps. My wife told him how silly it was that we were going to have to go to Chicago for my final six months in the Corps, only then to have to move back to Washington. Our friend was at least able to get someone to read my request. Consequently, I was assigned for my last six months to the counterintelligence branch of Headquarters Marine Corps. This was a time of great social unrest, and the Marine Corps leadership was trying to come to grips with things that were happening in American society and that were very foreign to them. General Lou Walt, who was a crusty combat Marine, was at that point the assistant commandant of the Marine Corps. I was assigned to write a paper to explain what was going on in the protest movement. As counterintelligence, we were supposed to know about such things. I remember writing a paper in which I used the phrase "Third World." I was later summoned to go up to explain to General Walt what the Third World was. He said, "If there is a Third World, what are the First and Second Worlds?"

Q: What is the Second World?

WARD: Communist-dominated countries composed the Second World.

Q: You were in Washington for about six months. Did you get any chance to check in with the State Department?

WARD: Yes. I received an offer to join the A-100 course that began on June 19, 1969.

Q: So many come out of the academic world, but here you were, a captain.

WARD: It was different. I also took a big cut in pay.
Q: Not only a big cut in pay, but also responsibility completely something different. You had been around the block. How did you find the adjustment?

WARD: There were others in my class who had just come back from Vietnam. I think of Dave Papst, who had been an Army officer and aide to one of the generals in Saigon, and Carl Jonietz, who had been an Air Force intelligence specialist in Vietnam. Others in the class such as Ralph Johnson and David Pitts were also veterans. I remember being a bit irked by some of the people who were just out of college and maybe had a year of work experience. Some of them seemed to project an air of superiority. They also got higher salaries because of the stupid way in which the Bureau of Personnel evaluated military experience.

Q: Did your class have minorities, women, in it?

WARD: Our class included a couple of African-Americans, a Hispanic, and a Hawaiian native. We had about five women. Most of the minorities dropped out during training or shortly afterward. No one else dropped out during training. I felt this happened because, with a couple of exceptions, the minority entrants were placed in a situation that they were not prepared for in anything but an academic sense. They left because they did not feel at home.

Q: '69 was the height of the protests. Did you feel the bloom had gone off the rose for government work? Was this a problem?

WARD: The atmosphere in society at large was certainly not conducive to government service. However, inside the Department, I sensed a commitment to the Service that was solid. Personally, I saw the struggle in Southeast Asia as part of a larger worldwide struggle with a totalitarian system that needed to be won. I consciously thought that although we were not winning in Vietnam the struggle could continue on other fronts. I saw the Foreign Service as a place where I could continue to continue to make a contribution to defeating an inimical force in the world - communism.

Q: When you got in, did you have any idea of what sort of specialty you might want?

WARD: I did. I knew I wanted to be a political officer, and on the basis of little knowledge I was convinced that I wanted to go to Eastern Europe. That aspiration ran up

against the State Department's policy of not assigning first-tour officers to Eastern Europe. Charlie Thomas was the assistant director of my entering class. I think it may have been Charlie who said, "Well, we're going to get you as close to Eastern Europe as we can." They sent me to Hamburg, which was 30 kilometers from the inner-German border.

Q: You were in Hamburg from when to when?

WARD: 1970-1972.

Q: What was it like going to Germany?

WARD: It was great. My family loved Hamburg, and I loved my job. I feel for the officers these days who have to go to visa mills and sit on a stool behind a window for eight hours a day and make decisions every 30 seconds. I'm not sure what I would have done in a situation like that. In Hamburg, we had 20-odd Americans. We had enough work to keep us busy, but not so much that there was no time for other things. I did consular work, but I also had time for political work. We had a youth program in Germany at the time, which I thought was a wonderful program. It encouraged the junior officers to get out and meet young German politicians and other young leaders. The embassy had a youth committee that met every year. One year we hosted the youth committee in Hamburg. Dick Miles, who at the time was in Belgrade, came up because he was interested in doing something similar in Yugoslavia. Dick's path and mine were to cross again and again.

Q: Hamburg was part of Hanover?

WARD: No, Hamburg was a *Land* on its own, one of the ten *Laender* of the Federal Republic. Politics in Hamburg were dominated by the Social Democrats. I think the Christian Democrats won an election in the mid-'50s or maybe early '60s and after a few months everyone agreed that they were not capable of governing the city. The next election restored Social Democratic control. Later, when I was posted in Bonn, the Christian Democrats had another shot at running Hamburg, but again, after a couple of years, the Social Democrats took over again.

In a way, Hamburg was almost the ideal first post. It would have been still better had it been an embassy, but the Hamburgers took the consulate very seriously, and we got involved in a lot of things. It was fun. As a family, we used the time to see Europe. It was a great place to learn German. It wasn't Bonn, where you could speak English and get by. You had to use German.

Q: There were a lot of protests about Vietnam. How did that impact on you all?

WARD: It really did. In 1970, when we went into Cambodia, there was a large and violent demonstration outside the *Amerika Haus*. We knew it was going to happen. I happened to be duty officer and they thought, "Well, this guy is a former Marine. He

knows how to do this stuff." So, they sent me down to the *Amerika Haus* to witness a pitched battle between the German police and protesters with a lot of force being used, a lot of injured policemen. I don't know how many injured protesters there were. There were probably 30 policemen injured fairly seriously and a lot of tear gas. I stood on the roof of the *Amerika Haus* watching it. The week before, a smaller group had actually gotten into *Amerika Haus* and did some damage. Yes, there was that undertone, but not so much that I felt the average German disliked America. I took courses at the University of Hamburg to help my German. I went to class and never felt hostility directed against Americans.

Q: It's always struck me that the Europeans, particularly in France and Germany, seem to take protests much more seriously than… They dress up for it and there seems to be more of an ideology behind it.

WARD: That was true then and it also appears to be the case now. The people protesting against what they called "globalization" or the Free Trade Agreement are taking things pretty seriously also. But back in the 1970s in Germany there was a very live and strong underground movement of political extremists. It was the time of the Bader-Meinhoff group, when the stage was being set for the assassinations that became endemic in Germany. There were a lot of extremists around, and they were willing to use violence. That night at *Amerika Haus*, force was what we saw, a lot of it on both sides - on the police side, water cannons and tear gas and on the demonstrators' side, rocks and sticks. They were fighting.

Q: In your youth work or making contact with politicians, what was your impression of the German political class that had emerged?

WARD: I have to say that I had then and still have with some exceptions fairly high regard for German politicians. They tend to be serious people. They tend to be well informed on the issues. Their system is very different from ours and sometimes that causes a lack of understanding on both sides. One understands the freedom that Americans have only when you live in another society, which although constitutionally free is still so much more structured and where form and tradition limit individuals much more. That was certainly true in Germany in 1970, and I think continues to be true in Germany today. When I covered the Greens in 1984-1985, I attended a Green party convention in one of the small cities in the Ruhr district in North Rhine Westphalia. The Greens were a very colorful group. At a Greens convention, you would find men and women knitting, dogs running around, kids running around, people of all shapes and sizes. It was very raucous. But when I looked outside my window that night at a pedestrian crossing - it was pouring rain and there was no traffic - there were probably 30 Greens waiting for the light to change so they could cross a deserted street. I think it was Lenin who said that when the German railroad workers launch a revolution, they would pay for the tickets needed to get on the platform at the railroad station.

You have a society that combines a tradition of obedience to rules with the tendency to act out according to ideological commitment. When ideological commitment bumps up

against German society's rules, the outcome can be surprisingly violent. I do not believe that German extremist groups have lost their potential for violence.

Q: Did you have any particular consular problems?

WARD: I remember a 12-passenger freighter full of American senior citizens that was sold in mid-Atlantic to a company that no longer wanted to transport passengers. When they came into port, we had a situation where the captain and the passengers were not even speaking to each other. The passengers refused to leave. The captain was desperate to get them off because a ship in port costs a lot of money. This gave me my first experience in mediation, shuttle diplomacy. I shuttled between the captain's stateroom and the passengers' dining room trying to cut a deal for the passengers. They got a very sweet deal. The shipping line was desperate to have them off that ship. They finally left with money and free plane tickets and all sorts of things. I also remember dealing with some American deserters who had returned from Scandinavia. Once, an American deserter turned himself in to me. I think he figured that he would fare better if he turned himself in at a consulate than to the Army. While I was talking with him, he looked at my shoes, which were shined, a habit I picked up in the Marine Corps. He said, "Were you ever in the military?" I said, "Actually, I just left the military." I think I ruined his game plan. He had hoped for a more sympathetic ear. I remember testifying at his general court martial later that year. He was convicted of desertion, which is a fairly hard charge to prove in the military, as opposed to simple absence without leave.

Q: Who was your consul general?

WARD: Alexander Johnpoll.

Q: He was political counselor in Belgrade when I was there in the '60s.

WARD: And he had been Deputy Director of German Affairs and had had a significant hand in negotiating the Austrian state treaty. For me, he'll always been the symbol of the old Foreign Service. He was extremely formal. I remember that he made the Fourth of July celebration an affair for which wives - there were no spouses then - were expected to make *hors d'oeuvres*, but were not invited to attend. He was very competent, and the consulate was well run. We passed inspections and so forth. But he was a man of the old school.

Q: I think this is a good place to stop here. This would be 1972. Where did you go?

WARD: I was assigned to the Operations Center.

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Q: Today is May 3, 2001. 1972, the Ops Center. Did that assignment come out of the blue or did you have anything to do with it?

WARD: As they do every year, the Executive Secretariat had sent a telegram out to posts asking ambassadors and principal officers to recommend people for the Ops Center. I think the consul general recommended me. So, the assignment came through that way. I left Hamburg in February 1972 and arrived in March at the Ops Center.

Q: The Ops Center has gone through various transformations. In 1972, how did it fit into the scheme of things?

WARD: Basically we were the 911 center for the foreign affairs community. The center had been recently re-organized and overhauled because of perceptions that the system had broken down when a sailor from a Soviet ship fled to a Coast Guard vessel and then was returned to Soviet custody. The whole episode occurred without proper consideration by high-level people here in Washington and several people ended up with egg on their faces. So they modernized the Ops Center and increased its ability to communicate with other operations centers around town - the White House Situation Room, the Pentagon's National Military Command Center, and the CIA.

Q: What were you doing?

WARD: I was initially a junior watch officer and then editor for the morning and afternoon brief that we put together for the Secretary and other principals.

Q: What does a watch officer do? Were there any memorable incidents that you got involved in?

WARD: The duties of the junior watch officer were to receive all incoming phone calls, to monitor the news tickers and the printers that reproduced all incoming substantive cables that were immediate precedence or higher, and to take action to ensure that the relevant officers in the Department were alerted to important situations. In terms of memorable incidents, I recall most of all some terrorist incidents, especially the one during the Munich Olympic Games, when Arab terrorists struck against the Israeli team. We were involved in attempting to coordinate U.S. actions with regard to that.

Q: This was a time when the Nixon administration was well in place. Did you have any sense that the center of foreign policy was over at the NSC rather than the State Department?

WARD: Yes, and that perception grew stronger when, later in 1972, I was assigned to the Secretariat staff when William Rogers was Secretary. At that time, it was quite clear that the State Department was not the center of activity on several aspects of policy, most importantly on Vietnam and on the then secret openings towards China. Nick Platt, who was the director of the Secretariat staff, was personally involved in the opening toward China. In fact, he accompanied Kissinger on the first trip to China.

Q: Were there any intimations about the opening to China until the official announcement came out?

WARD: One knew a little bit more than was in the press because Nick Platt was involved, but it was kept pretty much under wraps. I did not personally know much other than that something was going on.

Q: When the Secretary goes up to the United Nations, he's up there for a week or so?

WARD: It varies. He usually stays one week.

Q: What sort of things are going on that his staff is supporting?

WARD: Normally, the President will go up to the United Nations for a couple of days. The President gives a speech at the opening of the General Assembly and has meetings with the United Nations Secretary General, the president of the General Assembly, and with a few other foreign leaders. The Secretary usually then stays up at the UN for several days and continues a pattern of meetings with foreign counterparts, basically a long series of bilateral meetings. There are also typically group receptions for regional leaders. Sometimes the President does those. He will sometimes do an event for Latin American or African heads of government. But the division of labor varies according to how much the President and the Secretary want to do.

Q: What were you doing?

WARD: The Secretariat's function was to arrange the Secretary's schedule of bilateral meetings, to act as control officers for the meetings, to make sure that the Memoranda of Conversation got done, and to do some of the reporting of the meetings.

Q: Did you get involved in any trips while you were with the Ops Center?

WARD: New York was my only trip during my assignment to the Ops Center, but when I worked with the Secretariat staff, I did travel overseas. I went on three long trips, one with the Deputy Secretary, Kenneth Rush. We went to Hawaii, Hong Kong, Dacca, Kathmandu, Islamabad, where we dedicated the new chancery, which years later was burned down by a mob, Kabul, New Delhi, Tehran, and Geneva. We were supposed to go to Sri Lanka but did not because their former prime minister had died and the country was in mourning. We went on to Tehran for an NEA chiefs of mission conference and then back through Geneva. It was a long trip that had several purposes. Then in the fall of 1973, I accompanied Secretary Kissinger on a couple of trips in the immediate aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. It was a period of epic shuttle diplomacy. The Secretary would use several teams of staff people to support those trips. Typically, one team would go ahead to a destination, do the advance work, work during the visit, and then join the Secretary on the plane. The team that had been on the plane would get a rest and go on to another stop. For example, on one of those trips, I advanced the Secretary's visit to Riyadh, which happened to be the first time he went to Riyadh. From there, I traveled separately to Tokyo to advance that stop. On another trip, we went to Jerusalem and then to Madrid. It was a very intense time and the issues were very important. It was a

fascinating experience.

Q: You were working on memos?

WARD: On trips, the Secretariat staff makes sure that the Secretary's schedule is arranged efficiently and that needed briefing papers are available. The advance officer is responsible for ensuring that the program gets set up, that all the physical arrangements are right. That was a challenge in Riyadh because the phone system was very balky and we had to set up satellite phones, which was a harder task then than it is now. The internal phone system in the Saudi guest palace was basically non-functional, and we had people laying wire inside the palace at midnight. Surprises and complications were the norm during trip advances.

Q: Did you pick up any feel for how things were going?

WARD: Oh, yes. At that time, there were many opportunities to interact with the senior staff, sometimes to take notes at meeting, to write up a lot of the memoranda of conversation, and to read all the papers. So I had a chance to see basically everything that was coming out of those meetings. It was extremely interesting to watch Kissinger, albeit at a distance, operate. I sometimes felt he was trying to build a house of cards with the hope that if he built it fast enough, some parts would always be standing even if other parts collapsed. I think that's what happened. He was also able to modulate his approach in a way that was really masterful, taking a very different tack with Israeli PM Golda Meier than with Egyptian President Sadat.

Q: Did you have any contact with Saudi or Israeli officials?

WARD: Yes. In advancing the visit to Riyadh, I remember working with the Saudis. I would not say they were difficult to work with, but they were reluctant to expose the inadequacies in their facilities. I remember, for example, that every room in the guest palace had a telephone in it, but every time I picked up a telephone, there was never a dial tone. I kept pressing them on the question of whether the phone system worked, and they assured me it did. The day before the visit was going to occur, the system still didn't work. I said, "Could I see the switchboard?" It turned out there wasn't one. In fact, the phones weren't connected to anything. The phone system had never been finished and that is why we ended up laying wire between rooms to make sure the phones worked. Also at the last minute, we had to get a satellite hookup to assure communications with the U.S. The Saudis were very hospitable and helpful, but at the same time they did not want to expose the failings in their system.

Q: How about in Israel? How did you find operating there?

WARD: The trip to Jerusalem was a very intense period. The Israelis were extremely cooperative on logistics, but I had the sense that negotiations were difficult. I came in on the Secretary's plane, so I didn't do the advance in Jerusalem. We landed in Tel Aviv and were picked up by Israeli helicopters. If this had been in the U.S., the helicopters would definitely have been VIP models. I think the Israelis wanted to make a point that they had

just come through a war, so they provided ordinary troop-transport helos. The aircraft had canvas seats along the wall and were crewed by people who looked as if they had just been on a combat mission. We flew at less than treetop level from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The weather was pretty bad both going in and coming out. I can remember Marvin Kalb, one of the reporters on the plane, sitting across from me on one of the helicopters. He had very long legs and was hunched over, tapping out his report on a very small portable typewriter, working very intensely on a very bumpy helicopter flight to Jerusalem. The Israelis were efficient. They were helpful in making arrangements. Security was very tight both at the King David Hotel, but also within the delegation. A lot of information was tightly compartmentalized, and as a member of the Secretary's staff I was complicit in his efforts to cut the consulate in Jerusalem out of distribution on reporting on some meetings.

Q: Did you get to sit in as a note taker in any meetings?

WARD: I did not get to sit in as a note taker in any of the meetings with the Israelis in either Jerusalem or Tel Aviv, but I spoke extensively with people like Joseph Sisco and Hal Saunders, and got to process all the raw Memoranda of Conversation, turn them into cables and so forth. I had a pretty good understanding of what was going on.

Q: Did you get a difference between the Memoranda with the Israelis and with the Saudis?

WARD: Yes. There was a very distinctly different tone. With the Israelis, Kissinger really could talk with the frankness that one can use only with an ally. Some of the conversations were pretty heated. Sometimes the tone of voice was louder than the conversational. That came through very clearly in the MemCons. With the Egyptians and the Saudis, there was a lot more formality, a lot more use of polite cordialities. Kissinger wanted to make sure that he observed all of the customs. For example, on arrival in Riyadh, literally at the foot of the steps of the plane, the scenario said that someone would serve coffee and that they would continue to pour additional cups until the recipient turned his cup over and poured some coffee onto the runway, indicating he didn't want any more. Kissinger wanted to observe all the formalities to make clear that he was respectful of their culture.

Q: When you were in Washington, what were you doing?
WARD: Typically - and I think it's still true today - the Secretariat Staff divides the department into groups of bureaus, and a team of staff officers is assigned to serve as liaison between each group of bureaus and the offices of the Secretary and other principal officers. At the time, all of the papers for the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, and all of the Under Secretaries, went through the Secretariat staff and staff officers looked through every action memo, briefing memo, and information memo, to make sure that they were ready for consideration by the principals of the Department. That's how we spent our days. In addition to that, when we were back in Washington, some of us were preparing for the next trip. It was a combination of staffing of everyday work and preparing for the next trip. It was a very interesting time on the Secretariat because it was a time of

transition from Rogers to Kissinger. There was a very distinct change of pace and focus in the Department once Kissinger took over.

Q: Was this when you became aware of where the power lay?

WARD: Yes. I think that awareness increased after the change took place and you could see the difference in the way the Department operated once Kissinger got there. People were working very hard. They even tended to move physically more quickly. Everyone was in a rush. Kissinger had to learn how to use the Department. He was not particularly rapid in changing his style from that of a White House staffer and solitary operator. When he came over to the Department, he wanted to retain his Secret Service detail and had to be convinced that SY, Security, had the capabilities to protect him adequately. He was concerned about his physical safety. I was assigned help SY convince the Secretary. Marvin Gentile was the Assistant Secretary for SY and he was very anxious to take over protection for the Secretary. I put together a briefing book to give the Secretary all the information he needed to make a decision on whether State Department security could take over his detail. The White House was ready to allow him to retain a Secret Service detail. In fact, he did for quite some time. I accompanied the then Executive Secretary of the Department, Tom Pickering, to brief the Secretary. Kissinger asked additional questions, and I had to do yet an additional briefing book on security. It was quite a while after he arrived at State that he agreed to dispense with his Secret Service detail.

But on substance, he did increasingly rely on the Department. He made an effort to – and I think this is contrary to the image that Kissinger had outside, that he worked only with a very small number of people - work with a larger number of people in the Department. He made an effort to visit various bureaus and to be briefed.

Q: I've talked to somebody who was staff assistant to Warren Christopher when he was Deputy Secretary and he kept telling him to go eat in the cafeteria, go visit some bureaus, but he never could get him out.

WARD: It's hard for the principals. They have so many obligations outside the building and on the seventh floor. They have to make a distinct effort to get out. I know Kissinger had the goal of visiting every bureau in the Department. Every bureau had to write a memorandum, prepare a briefing, which we had to preview. I know that he didn't complete that round of visits.

Q: What did this intensity do to the home life?

WARD: My long hours at work and absences on trips caused me to miss a lot of time with my family. My wife was very understanding. During one of my Washington assignments, my daughter asked my wife if Daddy was on a trip. I wasn't, but I left for work in the morning before my daughter got up and got home after she went to bed. I'm very glad that I had an understanding wife. I think that my daughter looks back on the Foreign Service in a positive way, but certainly the long working hours were a high price to pay for an interesting job.

Q: You left this Ops/Secretariat thing when?
WARD: I left the Operations Center in ’72 and then I was on the Secretariat Staff until early 1974.

Q: Where did you go then?

WARD: I then went to language training to go to Genoa, Italy, which was not my original assignment. I had been assigned to Rome as staff assistant to the ambassador, but the incumbent staff assistant extended, so I ended up going to Genoa as political/economic officer. I did not want to go back to another consulate, but I was already in language training and Italy was a very attractive place to go.

Q: Back to when you were in Ops/Secretariat work, did you have the feeling that you were a selective group? Was this a hothouse for training people who later moved up?

WARD: I think that was true of both places. First, there was no better way to gain understanding of how the Department worked and to get to know the personalities within the Department than working in the Ops Center and the Secretariat. Secondly, the Department made an effort to select people who could do an excellent job. Thinking back, a large number of the people with whom I worked there ended up playing key roles. I think of Ray Seitz, who was with me on “the line” in the Secretariat Staff at the time.

Q: He was later ambassador in London, first and only Foreign Service officer…

WARD: Ray stood out above everyone. Bob Blackwill was another. In fact, Ray and Bob were partners on one team, which was a very formidable one. Bob Blackwill is now going out as ambassador to New Delhi; he was also a senior director on the National Security Council staff and ambassador to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, now the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Lange Schermerhorn, Gib Lanpher, and April Glaspie were also there. I’m probably forgetting others. A large number of colleagues in the Secretariat later became chiefs of mission.

Q: Lange Schermerhorn just retired. She had been working for me in Vietnam. I think it was Bob Miller who was administrator.

WARD: Yes. We had two Bob Millers in the Secretariat; one was deputy executive secretary and the other the executive director.

Q: This one had been with me at Belgrade. I had suggested that Lange was a very good officer.

WARD: You’re thinking of the Bob Miller who had been deputy executive secretary.

Q: All of us were pointing out young officers under us who were people with potential.

WARD: It was probably the best place to go for a first Washington assignment.

Q: You were in Genoa from when to when?

WARD: From the summer of 1974 until the summer of 1976. It was a two-year assignment. That was the pattern at the time; junior officer assignments were two years. The cone system was just beginning. There was no such thing as a cone when I came in. I didn't know for a long time what my specialty was. It wasn't like it is today where everyone is focused on one specialty from the first day.

Q: Things sort of fell out before they had cones. You kind of ended up where you wanted to be. I was a consular officer. I just drifted into it.

WARD: Right. I think most people ended up where they wanted to be, but it was a very mysterious process.

Q: It probably worked a little better. Who was your consul general in Genoa?

WARD: My consul general was Gori Bruno. Even the name is interesting because no Italian would believe that was really his name because "Gori" is not a given name in Italian. It's a surname. So, they wanted to call him Bruno Gori. But the Gori was the family name of his father's best friend. When his father came to the United States, he named his son Gori.

Q: So he was of Italian extraction.

WARD: He was of Italian descent. He was a consular officer, had come up, as many did, through the Foreign Service Staff ranks and had become a Foreign Service officer. Being consul general in Genoa was his last tour. He was a darned good consul general. He took it very seriously.

Q: Genoa, '74-'76. Where did it fall in the political spectrum of Italy and how did it fit in?

WARD: This was a fascinating time to be in Italy. Genoa had always been a city with a large union-dominated communist party. A socialist-communist majority ruled the city with a socialist mayor. Despite all that, Genoa was and is a very moderate city. The Genoese are commercial people. They are seafaring people. They are businesspeople. They are extremely serious. It's also a very insular place. The key relationships among the important families of Genoa were established in the 12th through the 14th centuries, when Genoa was a great power. It was a very proud place. It was also a city that to my mind had been on a slightly declining since about the 14th century. But it was a great place to learn Italian politics because politicians were everywhere, and they were accessible. There was a lot going on. The Red Brigades were just getting started as a terrorist organization. They kidnaped one of the prosecuting judges in Genoa, Mario Sossi. Another judge made a deal with the Red Brigades to get Sossi out. Then when

Sossi was released, the other judge went back on the deal and some of the Red Brigades were killed. The Red Brigades marked this judge for assassination. While I was there, he was assassinated, despite the fact that he had 24-hour security protection. Several of my close political contacts were "kneecapped." One was assassinated while I was there.

Q: Kneecapped meaning…

WARD: Shot in the knee. It was a technique that the Red Brigade used. It was a time also when among the left and certainly among the extreme left, there was extreme anti-Americanism. Kissinger was a negative symbol of America for them, and when he traveled to Europe at one point, there was a generalized threat against American officials. We had Italian police living outside our apartment for several weeks, which impressed my daughter and my neighbors. My neighbors were very upset because Genoese are known to pinch the penny and they were concerned that the *carabinieri* were keeping the lights on in the apartment house. But it was a fascinating time. It was also the time when the Italian socialists were beginning to re-construct their party as a moderate force under the leadership of Bettino Craxi. In 1976, I was transferred from Genoa to the political section in Rome. After home leave, I began covering the non-communist left.

Q: Let's stick to Genoa first. What were you getting from the socialists? Somehow they were a party in the rest of Europe, but the socialists in Italy had lost out to the communists as a left-wing movement.

WARD: Yes. The reasons that they lost to the communists were many, some of which are shrouded in the history of the party in the 1920s. Basically, the socialists were at a disadvantage at the end of the war because the communists had been much more effective in the partisan battle against the Germans. The communists were able, in my view, to inflate their accomplishments and set themselves up as the people who saved Italy, which in the larger historical picture is nonsense. The socialists therefore were disadvantaged. The communists also were better organized than the socialists. The socialists seemed also to be more blatantly out for personal political gain than the communists, although there was a good bit of that going on in the Communist Party also. The joke at the time was that PSI did not stand for *Partito Socialisti Italiano* (Italian Socialist Party); it stood for *Partito Sindaci Italiani*, the Party of Italian Mayors. The socialists were content to be the balance of power party. In a center-left coalition, with the Christian Democrats, they would provide the mayor. In a center-left coalition with the communists, they would also provide the major. They had 11-12% of the electorate, but they held the balance of power in many key cities.

Q: At that time, when you were in Genoa, could you talk to the communists?

WARD: No. At the consulate level, we did not work with the communists, talk with the communists, or have meetings with them except to the extent that they were government officials. Later, in Rome, we had one person in the political section who opened relations with the Communist Party and began under Richard Gardner, the ambassador, to very carefully widen relations with people within the Communist Party. Initially, the

relationship was limited to this particular officer, Marty Wenick. He was able to speak with literally one person within the PCI, the Italian Communist Party. That later was widened a little bit. The ambassador did not meet with communists, although the communists attempted to create the impression that the Carter administration was opening to them. The backdrop to everything was growing terrorism. It was a time when former PM Aldo Mora was kidnaped and eventually murdered.

Q: Which was not really connected to the Communist Party.

WARD: No.

Q: They weren't the good guys, but they weren't the bad guys.

WARD: The only connection was that both the Communist Party and the terrorists were getting assistance from the Warsaw Pact.

Q: In Genoa, what about the Christian Democrats? Were they much of a power there?

WARD: The Christian Democrats had a fairly large contingent on the city council. In the province of Genoa, which included the suburbs, I think the Christian Democrats had a majority. They also were fairly strong in the Ligurian regional government until the elections of 1975, when the left did very well.

Q: Did you have any feel about the problem that later broke the whole political system down a couple of decades later, corruption?

WARD: The great enigma is the personality of Bettino Craxi. He emerged in the mid-seventies as a moderate, reform-minded socialist. He became prime minister, but was forced from office in disgrace. He lived out his last years in exile in Tunisia under threat of arrest for corruption if he ever set foot in Italy. In working with Craxi and his people, I had the sense that there was a great deal going on underneath the table. Craxi's senior aides always seemed to wear Rolex watches and snazzy suits that they should not have been able to afford. In the 1970s, the embassy assessed Craxi as a much more effective leader than the old guard among the socialists, and as someone who could help keep the communists out of power. Giulio Andreotti, the Christian Democratic prime minister, seemed, after all, intent upon creating an opening for the communists to enter the government. If Craxi were corrupt, as certainly seems to have been the case, he was no more corrupt that many other Italian politicians.
Q: Within Italian society, did you find that government employees seemed to have two jobs, one they went to in the morning and then all of a sudden they would disappear and they were doing something else, a private business?

WARD: There were a lot of people with two jobs. When I was in Rome, it turned out that one of the Italian employees in the embassy ran a watch repair business in the embassy on U.S. government time. One of our employees in Genoa had a real estate business as a sideline while he was working at the consulate. These things were difficult to control. I

had the impression, however, that officials in the Italian foreign ministry, which was the only part of the Italian central government that I had any real contact with, were pretty hardworking. They would come in late in the morning, work until lunch, take a long break, and then start to work again at 4:00 or 5:00 pm and stay until late. It made dealing with the foreign ministry an interesting proposition. The focus of the embassy political section was on Italian internal politics. We had one officer assigned to the Christian Democratic Party, one assigned to the Communist Party, another officer (me) assigned to the rest of the non-communist left. Then we had one officer who did the foreign office and two who did political-military affairs.

Q: Let's move over to Rome. You were dealing with which party again?

WARD: I dealt with the Italian Socialist Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, and the Republican Party.

Q: You went there when?

WARD: It was a direct transfer from Genoa. I got there in the summer of 1976.

Q: You were there until when?

WARD: Until summer of 1979, but I spent less than a year in the political section. The new ambassador, Richard Gardner, asked me to be his executive assistant. I agreed to do the job as a temporary assignment, and he later asked me to stay for an extended tour.

Q: Who had been the ambassador prior?

WARD: John Volpe.

Q: What was your impression of how he operated?

WARD: Ambassador Volpe visited Genoa while I was there in 1976. I was political, economic, and commercial officer. We had put together a large economic conference in commemoration of the bicentennial, and the ambassador came up to open it. Ambassador Volpe was an intensely proud man. He was proud of the fact that he had come from extremely humble origins. He told a story of his father and mother. After his father had emigrated to the United States, he would write to his mother back in their village in Abruzzo. She, however, could not read. The local priest would read the father's letters to her. Volpe was very proud of having made a fortune in the construction industry and risen to become Governor of Massachusetts. He was also proud that he spoke Italian. However, his Italian was heavily accented and dialectical. It was an American-Abruzzese dialect that Italians sometimes had a difficult time understanding.

Bob Beaudry, who was the DCM, ran the embassy very capably. Ambassador Volpe had brought along an executive assistant, Tom Trimarco, who had been a business and political associate in Massachusetts. Tom also had an important role within the embassy,

especially on some of the internal political questions. He was a fairly controversial figure within the embassy because it was an unusual situation to have both a DCM and a senior, substantive advisor to the ambassador.

Q: I would imagine that… Who did you go to?

WARD: Yes. I never had a problem dealing with Tom, but Bob Beaudry was the boss. Like Volpe, Bob was from New England. He had been the executive assistant to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson during the time I was in the Ops Center. Johnson had had a stroke. Bob did a fantastic job filling in for the Under Secretary. After serving as DCM in Rome, he did not retire. He did not become an ambassador, but he came back director of the office of western European affairs.

Q: How did you find the core of the political-economic section in Rome? My impression was that you had an awful lot of people who were back for the third or fourth time and almost an insular approach.

WARD: At that time, most of us were on our first or second tours in Italy. A few, like Jim Creagan, Ted Russell, and Dan Serwer, subsequently spent a lot of time in Italy.

Q: Creagan was political officer in Naples.

WARD: Exactly. But at the time, the political section was made up of Ted Russell, who covered the Christian Democratic Party and later became ambassador in Slovakia; Roland Kuchel, who replaced Ted and became ambassador to Zambia; Marty Wenick who covered the Communist Party and became Deputy Assistant Secretary in INR and retired to a second career; Kathy Shirley, who covered the foreign office and became ambassador in Senegal; and a few others. Kathy's husband, Jock Shirley, was outstanding as the public affairs counselor. It was an extraordinary group of people, man of whom went on to some pretty important responsibilities elsewhere in the world.

Q: Let's talk about Dick Gardner. How did he operate?

WARD: Dick Gardner is a good friend who treated me very well when I worked for him. He was a very interesting man to work for, extremely cerebral and goal oriented. In a sense, he was the ideal political appointee because he was well versed in international affairs, he knew the issues, and he knew the people of Italy. He was intensely focused on making a difference. He understood that Italy was at a political crossroads, that the attitude the U.S. took toward the Communist Party would be key, and that there were some people within the Italian political system, including within the Christian Democratic party, such as PM Giulio Andreotti, who were ready to open to the communists. He also understood that while it was in the U.S. interest to have a better dialogue with the communists, it was not in our interest to promote communist participation in the government. In fact, on January 12, 1978, he had himself recalled to Washington over the issue of communist participation in the government and organized a series of meetings that resulted in a policy statement against such participation. The new

policy said basically, "The Italians need to make their own political decisions. It's also up to us to choose our own friends. We prefer to choose friends who have governments led by parties that accept democratic pluralism." In other words, not the PCI. That was a landmark event in U.S.- Italian relations. Dick Gardner got that done. He was an extremely active ambassador. He made speeches in Italian throughout the country. His speeches were not the average ambassadorial speech. Each speech had a theme. Each speech made a point. He was a perfectionist. Speeches would go through many drafts. This got under the skin of some people, which I can understand that. No one wants to be the drafter of a speech that goes through 10 drafts. So, that did affect the attitude of some people within the embassy, although all of the key officers recognized that Dick Gardner was a very smart man and was dedicated to doing a good job. I always found him to be thoughtful of my family and me and interested in my career.

Q: He seemed to have rather enjoyed dealing with the university students.

WARD: He was a university professor. He loved substance. He is a man of ideas. He would have dinners that were unusual. After dinner he would lead a substantive discussion on a pre-determined theme. He'd ask everybody to sit down in a circle, and there would be a topic and a speaker and guests were expected to discuss the topic. This was not something that Italians were used to doing. So, you had to be careful whom you invited and had to manage the program carefully. We also had an open forum within the embassy that served as a form of internal dissent channel on substantive issues. It was the Ambassador's way of reaching out. He reached on the basis of ideas. He was a man of little small talk and not a glad-hander. In that sense, he was different from many non-career ambassadors. It was an interesting approach. I thought it was in many respects quite a productive one.

Q: One of the things that struck me about Italian politics – I was consul general in Naples from '79-'81 – was the extensive reporting and detail that was spent on Italian politics, which seemed to be a minuet that was being played up in Rome. We would get questions about "What is the effect of the latest change in the Italian government up in Rome?" You'd go to Naples and get a shrug of the shoulders. Ah, they're doing it again. It was a different world there. How many people were covering the internal affairs? I was an outsider. What was your impression? Did we get too involved in the ins and outs of this switching of jobs in Rome?

WARD: I think that we did spend an awful lot of time covering Italian internal politics. It was a pattern that we fell into at the end of World War II, when we poured tremendous resources into the country. We for decades opposed the Communist Party and supported the forces that were against the communists. So, internal political reporting became an industry that perpetuated itself. Looked at from today's point of view, one wonders how we kept busy? But in the context of the time, with a communist revolution in Portugal, with Kissinger very concerned that there was a new wave of communism about to spread over Western Europe, internal politics in Italy seemed extremely important. The non-communist left was seen as a potential bulwark. If we could strengthen the non-communist left, then the communists might not continue to surge toward power. So, I

think we were correct at the time in devoting most of our political effort to the internal political scene. Frankly, Italy was not playing an important role in terms of general foreign affairs within the NATO alliance. Italy's geopolitical position is extremely important. But Italian diplomacy on the NATO stage or on the world stage was not very important.

Q: Kissinger said in his book that when he would fly to Rome, he would say landing at the airport was probably the most significant thing he would do. There was nobody to talk to in a way.

WARD: Over the years, I tried to stay in touch with our relations with Italy, especially during the time when I was involved in NATO affairs. I would get to sit in on the Secretary's bilateral meetings with the foreign minister. They contrasted very sharply with many of the other bilateral meetings because they were focused basically on parochial questions, either Italian internal matters or Italian ethnic status in the U.S. The relationship was very different than our discourse with the other major European countries.

Q: How did we view Euro communism and Berlinguer? This was considered maybe the wave of the future.

WARD: There was a sense in 1975-1977 that the communists were the wave of the future. Berlinguer projected a moderate image, and he did bring several important moderates to places of power within the Party. Our analysis was that although there were moderates within the Party, there were also quite a few hardliners, and that the net balance was negative. Therefore, the Italian Communist Party was not one that we could have a normal dialogue with or support.

Q: How did you find the various parties, like the Republicans and the Socialists? Was this more a group of people looking at it as politicians or patriots or were there real ideological goals?

WARD: The Socialist Party at the time was being "reformed" by Bettino Craxi. Despite his later image, he did renew the Party. Bettino Craxi and the people around him at that time seemed to represent a vision similar to that projected today by leaders like Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroeder, a sort of "third way." Craxi had a vision of the Socialists as a non-totalitarian alternative to a communist future for Italy. All of that later got lost in a wave of corruption that destroyed the Socialist Party.

The Social Democrats were probably most corrupt on the spectrum. They were a breakaway from the Socialist Party that never really found a role. They didn't stand for much significant.

The other two small parties, the Liberals and the Republicans, the PLI and the PRI, actually did stand for something - the liberal and republican philosophies that were very important in the 19th century, in the Resorgimento. They harked back to that era and they

were basically true to it. With some exceptions, their leaders were not corrupt. They were idealists. They also had almost no political clout. These were parties supported by less than five percent of voters.

Q: My impression of Italy, which granted was a Neopolitan view, was that the name of the game more than anything else was not ideology but jobs. I remember the mayor of Naples, who was a communist, wanting to keep the Sixth Fleet coming in, get more military in. It was jobs. This was the driving force behind so much, at least in that part of the world.

WARD: Yes. All over the world, all politics are local. In every part of Italy, business and politics were much too closely intertwined. I remember a friend of mine who was one of the young reformers in the Christian Democratic Party in the Ligurian region around Genoa. He was an attractive candidate who increased his party's percentage of the vote at a time when the communists were picking up a lot of support. A couple of years later, without a university degree, without any real professional experience, he ended up in Rome as the chief of public relations for Alitalia, earning a very large salary, enough to keep his children in private school in New York City. He really had no professional qualifications. This was the kind of system that it was. It allowed people through their political connections to move over into the world of the state-controlled businesses. For me, the history of state-owned enterprises in Italy are a warning to leaders in developing countries who think that they can transition from socialism to a free market via a period of so-called "commercialization" of state-run enterprises in which the government continues to hold the stock but runs them on a business basis. It doesn't work because it combines the worst features of socialism and capitalism. It didn't work in Italy. It ruined the country.

Q: Did you get much of a feeling of the sectionalism in Italy?

WARD: Yes. Our transfer from Genoa to Rome itself was striking. There wasn't much difference between Genoa and Germany in terms of the way people abided by the law, and lived their lives. (Although the Italian Riviera had a lot more jetsetters than did Hamburg.) In Rome, I was startled by the disregard for the traffic code. There were certain traffic lights that no one ever obeyed. Then when you got to Naples, of course, it was total chaos on the road.

Q: It was like getting on the bus in Rome. I found that nobody paid the fare.

WARD: There was a tremendous sense of regional identity. I think we forget that regional languages in Italy are still very important. People speak dialect every day. Of course, I haven't been back to Italy in many years. At the embassy, we realized that we were neglecting politics in the regions of the Rome consular district so we assigned a reporting officer to each region. I took Sardinia because I wanted to learn more about it. Talk about regional identity? Sardinia was one of the most insular places I've ever been in my life. The Sardinian people were intensely inbred, perhaps to their detriment.

Q: Berlinguer was from Sardinia.

WARD: Yes. He was from a very prominent and rich Sardinian family.

Q: Did you run into the hand of the CIA? It had this tradition going back to wartime and right after the war, the '48 election. Here was a government that was basically corruptible and we were in a Cold War situation. Did this trip you up?

WARD: I don't think it tripped me up. There was a strong CIA station in Rome with capable staff. There were a couple of incidents that ruffled feathers between the political section and the Station. I never had a problem. In those mid-1970s, Kissinger initiated a program of U.S. support for non-communist political reformers, including funding. Remember that this was at a time when the Communists had successfully engineered a revolution in Portugal. The program would have involved State and the Agency, but at least on the State side, it was canceled before it got off the ground. I think some of this has been in the press since then.

Q: Yes. There was also the concern, which went way back, that there were secret societies within the military.

WARD: Yes. Also, the Free Masons played a role that was hard to figure out. I don't know much about the Masons, but I did have one experience with them when I was in Genoa. One of the things I had to do was host a U.S. trade mission. I needed to recruit businesspeople to meet with the mission. I ran across this fellow who was a Mason. He was a very mysterious person. In the U.S., one thinks of the Masons as a social lodge. There, the organization was mysterious and ideological. This person offered to help me make the trade show a success. He invited me to his house one night. I remember driving along the Ligurian coast, along winding roads, in a heavy rainstorm. Visibility was terrible and it was not a particularly pleasant drive because the roads weren't very good. I got to his house, which seemed to be protected by large dogs, and we talked for hours. He spoke in semi-conspiratorial tones, and I did not grasp a lot of what he said. But the bottom line is that he said he wanted to help me with the trade mission. The next day, 100 businessmen called to ask for appointments with members of the Mission. The people running the mission thought that was fantastic. It happened through this Masonic connection. I never did a thing for that fellow, but I think he thought I was helping him.

Q: You probably made a commitment.

WARD: Of course, eventually, the behind-the-scenes role in Italian politics and business of the so-called P-2 Masonic lodge emerged. I later thought, was that fellow part of P-2? It was one of the stranger experiences that I had.

Q: Did Vatican or Church affairs impact on you?

WARD: At the time, we had a special envoy to the Vatican who had a separate office; it wasn't yet Embassy Vatican. We had a succession of representatives. Until the end of the

Ford administration, it was Henry Cabot Lodge, and then former-mayor Wagner of New York took over. The career person at the Vatican was Peter Sarros. He worked fairly closely with the embassy. Under Carter, the envoy became an ambassador. There was some controversy about that. Because the ambassador to the Vatican wasn't regularly in Rome, Peter relied heavily on Ambassador Gardner to host distinguished visitors. In turn, Peter helped us with requests by VIPs for Papal audiences.
Q: Did you see the Church as a major political player?

WARD: No, although individual Christian Democratic Party leaders were devout Catholics. Aldo Moro was kidnaped at a church. He went to Mass every morning. Aldo Moro was the leader of the largest faction on the left in the Christian Democratic Party.

Q: I know down in Naples in the Mezzogiorno, I would go to church services, usually commemorations of this or that, and I would often find myself standing next to the representatives of the Communist Party. We all showed up and heard the Mass.

WARD: One of my memories of Italian churches on Sunday were the women going into the church and the men standing outside talking about soccer and smoking cigarettes. It's curious. The church played a significant social role, but a limited religious one.

Q: You left there in '79. Whither?

WARD: I went to Harvard for a year. I had always been interested in systems analysis. The Department at the time had a mid-career university training program in systems analysis, which had up to then been used to train administrative officers. I wanted to look at applications of analytical techniques and computers on the political side. I became the first political officer to be designated for this program. The Department wanted me to go to MIT's Center for Advanced Engineering Studies. I remember trying to convince the Department that since I had never been through basic engineering, the Center for Advanced Engineering Studies was the wrong place for me. I argued that I could really accomplish what I wanted to do much better at Harvard's Kennedy School, which had a very liberal policy of allowing cross-registration with MIT and other area universities. Dick Gardner helped me convince the Department that I should go to the Kennedy School. There was not an official concentration system within the master's of public administration program at the Kennedy School, but most of my courses were related to quantitative analysis. I also took systems analysis courses at MIT. I took a lot of statistics, microeconomics, and operations research at Harvard.

Q: This was pretty early on in the computer age. The State Department had moved from the quill pen to the manual typewriter to maybe the electric typewriter by this time.

WARD: When I was in the Secretariat, we had one typewriter that worked with punch cards. There was only one secretary who could operate it. On those Kissinger trips we did have an early model laptop computer. It was basically a very clumsy word processor.

Q: When I was in Korea, we were playing with the Magcard, but we were also playing

with the Wang. I was working with a team – this was '76-'79 – sent out from the State Department to see if we could automate the visa system, but it was with one screen. It was very early on. How did you see the systems analysis fitting in to the political side of things at that time?

WARD: This was a time before personal computers and before we had huge computing power on every desk. At the most basic level, it seemed to me, we could use computers for biographic reporting, keeping biographic files, and for analyzing personalities and trends more efficiently. I also did a project that used a computer-based simulation to model a national security issue.

Q: It was more a retrieval system.

WARD: It was not just retrieval. Looking at elections, you might use statistical techniques to look at election outcomes. I think political sections have by and large stopped predicting elections. But this was a time when political sections, at least the one in Rome, were still expected to have a view on what would happen in the election.

Q: And you got marks back in Washington.

WARD: And it struck me at the time that we probably could do a better job of using some statistical methods than simply saying, "Well, I think the Christian Democrats are going to get 37.5%." That was one side of it.

The other side was interest in using techniques of statistical analysis and operations research to understand political-military subjects better, specifically arms control issues and strategic issues. So those were the main things that I concentrated on during my year at Harvard, which was a fantastic year. I even had time to train for and complete three marathons during the year.

Q: Also, this was a period where even historians were getting into the computer business. They were going down and looking at the county vote in Frederick County in 1830. It was very much on the way. Somehow or another, if you've got enough data and it could be analyzed, you could discover how to make gold.

WARD: Right. For one of my projects at Harvard, I did a so-called Monte Carlo simulation. It was called Monte Carlo because it used random number concepts. At the time, the Committee on the Present Danger, whose most visible spokesman was Paul Nitze, was warning that the Russians with their SS-18 missiles were widening the so-called missile gap, which may not have existed under Kennedy but probably did under Carter, and that they were dangerously close to reaching a first-strike capability against our missiles. Nitze contended that in a first strike, the SS-18 missiles might be able to destroy all of our land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. My project was to test the probability of that assertion using a Monte Carlo simulation. The project used a standard equation for assessing the so-called kill probability of a ballistic missile against a hard missile silo. It involved various factors, including the yield of a warhead, the hardness of

the shelter, something called the circular error probable of the missile system and other variables. My professor, Richard Zeckhauser, suggested that, since all of the factors that were plugged into the equation were actually estimates, that I should undertake a simulation in which all of those factors would vary on a random basis. I could then run through one thousand simulated missile strikes and see where we came out. I thought that was an elegant design. Fortunately or unfortunately, it turned out that the simulation actually validated what Nitze was saying, that there was a high probability that the Russians, in fact, probably could have destroyed our missiles in a first strike. We did that simulation with punch cards. Today, it probably wouldn't be a worthwhile project because you could do it on a personal computer in hours. Then, it took a tremendous amount of work and learning about programming languages.

Q: What was your impression of the - you had been out in the real world of diplomacy – of the academic world from the Kennedy School perspective?

WARD: I really enjoyed my year there and I thought there were some people at the Kennedy School who were connected with the real world. One of the things I do now at the Institute of Peace is teach negotiation skills. The best lessons I've ever learned about negotiation were with Howard Raiffa, a business school professor who also taught at the Kennedy School, a man of tremendous academic and real-world experience.

Q: Did you have the feeling that the Kennedy School was different from the groves of academia?

WARD: Oh, yes. The rest of Harvard looked down and still looks down on the Kennedy School.

Q: They're not part of the groves of academia mafia.

WARD: People at the Kennedy School tend to get their hands dirty in the real world. Perhaps they do not publish as widely as some of those on the arts and sciences faculty.

Q: On negotiation, what techniques did you pick up?

WARD: There were really two strains of negotiation theory at Harvard at the time. Roger Fisher and his younger colleague, William Ury, who has since become quite famous for his books about the practice of negotiations, represented one. Fisher and Ury represented the interest-based approach to negotiation. The object of a negotiation is to discover the underlying interest of your negotiating partner and then work to find a win-win situation in which although the opening positions of each side might not be realized, the underlying interests can be accommodated. Then there is the Howard Raiffa approach. Raiffa would not reject the interest-based approach of Roger Fisher, but he primarily looks upon negotiation through the lens of game theory. It's a more quantitative approach, more of a game-theory approach, but also looking for the possibilities of finding win-win solutions.

Q: You left there in '80. Where to?

WARD: The State Department personnel system said that I had to use my degree. Before I went to Harvard, people from the European Bureau's NATO office (EUR/RPM) - Charlie Thomas and Steve Ledogar contacted me. They wanted me to come and work there. The central system did not want me to do that. They wanted me to take a job that would show I was using systems analysis. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs had organized a new office. Assistant Secretary Les Gelb wanted help in understanding the foreign affairs implications of DOD's defense planning process. He started an office called the Office of Systems Analysis. I went to work there. By the time I arrived, Reg Bartholomew had replaced Gelb as assistant secretary.

Q: You did this from when to when?
WARD: I was there for a year from 1980-1981 when, with the Reagan administration, Rick Burt took over the PM bureau and reorganized it. The Systems Analysis Office was a very interesting place. There were only a couple of FSOs in that office, the rest were Schedule B experts, a number of whom have made important contributions in and outside government. Richard Clarke, for example, had been at the NSC for years and is now in charge of the effort to protect our infrastructure. David Ochmanek, who at the time was a Foreign Service officer, became a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and is now at the Rand Corporation. Arnold Kanter, later Under Secretary for Political Affairs, was the deputy director of the office.

Q: I would think that this would be a rather crucial area. If somebody can put things in quantitative terms, particularly when up against State Department people, who don't think in these terms, you can say, "This is what the formula says."

WARD: You're correct. Les Gelb wanted to have a group of people who could understand DOD's quantitative techniques and, in a sense, help defend State's interests. It was a defensive mechanism for the State Department. It worked to some extent. This was a time when cruise missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles were being developed. One of the issues was stationing of cruise missiles in Italy. Having a group of people who understood what the military was saying about these issues was very helpful to the State Department. But after a year, I had to choose between being a deputy director in one of the reorganized offices in the PM Bureau and going to work for Assistant Secretary Eagleburger as his special assistant for policy in the European Bureau. After some arm wrestling between the two bureaus, I went to the European Bureau via a short assignment as Rick Burt's special assistant in the PM front office.

Q: We'll do Eagleburger next time. The Reagan administration came in January 20, 1981. How did that hit the PM Bureau? Was there a house cleaning?

WARD: As I mentioned, the office that I was in, the Office of Systems Analysis, was staffed mainly by Schedule B employees. They were non-career experts. With the new administration, they all were faced with the need to find other jobs. Some of them stayed, but most of them went elsewhere. The Political-Military Bureau gained clout in the

Reagan administration. Rick Burt came in with Bob Blackwill as his deputy. Jim Dobbins was an office director; Richard Haass was another. They were a very strong team.

Q: The short time you were working for Rick Burt, how did he operate? What was his background? How did he come into the bureau as far as his attitude towards the State Department?

WARD: Rick was a former journalist. He was about my age. He had gone to Cornell and then the Fletcher School. Then he spent some time in England at Oxford or Cambridge before beginning work as an analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. He later became a reporter for the *New York Times*. In PM, the joke was that the *New York Times* owned the assistant secretary-ship. Les Gelb had also come from the Times to PM. Rick was a young, brash guy with a lot of ideas, a lot of intellectual candlepower. As a bureau, PM didn't always have tremendous bureaucratic clout. Its influence depended upon its leadership. Gelb and Bartholomew did accumulate a lot of clout, and Burt wanted to maintain that and, if possible, increase it. He was very active. However, he was not particularly well organized.

Q: That was your job?

WARD: That was my job for a while. A year later, when Larry Eagleburger left the European Bureau, who showed up as Assistant Secretary for European Affairs but Rick Burt. Having deserted Burt's bureau a year earlier, this made me slightly uneasy. Luckily, it was never held against me. When Rick came to the European Bureau, he asked me to again spend some time as his executive assistant to organize things. So I did that both in the Political-Military Bureau and in the European Bureau. In the European Bureau, I traveled with Rick and got to know him pretty well.

Q: The Political-Military Bureau was focused at the time on arms control?

WARD: It was heavily focused on arms control. During the time I was there, the office of Systems Analysis was focused on both arms control and on the Persian Gulf. I spent most of my time working on something called the Rapid Deployment Force, the so-called RDF. That was 1980. The Carter Administration had an eight-year plan that would have resulted by 1988 in a very sizeable military capability for reinforcing the Persian Gulf. It was a fairly well thought-out plan that later had to be speeded up.

Q: The reason for it was-

WARD: Iran. We focused on how to fight a campaign in Iran. How would you get inland from the coastline of Iran if Iranian armor forces blocked the passes in the Zagros Mountains? That was the military problem. The development of the RDF was aimed at that problem. There were a lot of innovative things that began at the time, for example, the idea of maritime pre-positioning ships and basing at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. A lot of work went into detailed planning, for example, on how to utilize aircraft carriers in the shallow Persian Gulf.

Q: Did you find your quantitative analysis helped?

WARD: It helped a bit. We sometimes used analytical tools such as decision trees and matrix analysis. We did not undertake heavy mathematical analyses.

Q: Did you find the Political-Military Bureau one where there was a lot of thought? So much of our work in the State Department is responding to crises. You can almost pick up the New York Times and Washington Post and know what you're going to be doing that day.

WARD: To a limited extent. It was also a place where there were a lot of tight deadlines; a lot of papers that needed to be written for the Secretary. Both Reg Bartholemew and Rick Burt were very action oriented.

Q: Why don't we stop at this point? We'll pick this up in 1981 when you're moving over to the European Bureau and working for Larry Eagleburger.

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Today is May 22, 2001. You were in the EUR Bureau from when to when?

WARD: From the summer of 1981 until the summer of 1984.

Q: What was your job?

WARD: For the first year, I was a special assistant for policy to Assistant Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger. I worked for Mark Palmer, who had the title of deputy for policy within the Bureau. Eagleburger had set up a small Policy Office within his front office.

Q: 1981. What were the matters of interest in European affairs and what were you doing?

WARD: In 1981, we were focused on the relationship with the Soviet Union and in preparing the ground for the deployment of intermediate range nuclear forces.

Q: This was in response to the SS-20, wasn't it?

WARD: Yes, we were also concerned to some extent with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and tried to ensure a unified NATO position within that conference. My role for that year, in addition to helping Mark Palmer write policy papers, was as action officer for the Quadripartite Talks. This was a very quiet forum for coordination among the principal members of the North Atlantic Alliance – the United States, Britain, France, and Germany. The "Quad" talks began as a means to coordinate policy on Berlin, since Germany was directly involved and Britain, France, and the United States were the occupying Western Powers. But over the years, they expanded to

include a much wider agenda.

Q: This was '81-'84. How were relations with the Soviet Union? This was after the invasion of Afghanistan.

WARD: It was a period of difficult relations with the Soviet Union. Not only were we at odds over nuclear weapons and the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe, but also we had the situation in Afghanistan and Soviet support of surrogate nations in Africa and Latin America. There was also the problem of Soviet mistreatment of minorities, especially Soviet Jews.

Q: Did we feel that the Soviet Union was on the move, was being aggressive?

WARD: There was a sense that the Soviet Union was dynamic and on the move in a pretty hard-nosed way. In the same period, we saw tensions increase when Polish PM Jaruzelski cracked down on the democratic labor movement in Poland, Solidarity. There was also the question of the proffered supply of natural gas by the Soviet Union to Western Europe and consideration of the Western Europeans of building a natural gas pipeline from the Soviet Union. We were opposed to that.
Q: This was the beginning of the Reagan Administration. What was your impression? Every time a new administration comes in, we take its temperature. What was your feeling in European Affairs?

WARD: I thought that in European affairs President Reagan appointed a very capable team, with Larry Eagleburger at the helm. He only stayed for a fairly short period of time as Assistant Secretary. He left in 1982 during a bout of ill health. Eagleburger knew Europe very well and had the confidence of all the major players in Washington.

Q: What were you picking up about old things like the pipeline and how much the Europeans were with us on things? Was there any disquiet about Reagan? He came in talking a very hard-line policy that later changed.

WARD: At the beginning of the Reagan Administration, there was palpable concern on the part of our major European allies about the policies that the administration would follow. I think that Larry Eagleburger played a very important role in both allaying fears and at the same time promoting a much more active European agenda than we had had in the previous administration. He traveled almost constantly within Europe. I would often travel with him. I remember once asking him why he felt he needed to travel so much in Europe, shuttling literally from capital to capital. His answer was to the effect that the Europeans needed him as a sort of baby pacifier, someone who could explain policy clearly and provide reassurance. He did that at great personal sacrifice because it was exhausting and he had various health concerns.

Q: Often when there is a certain amount of tension, the French seem to distance themselves. Were the French a little hard to keep on the team?

WARD: Certainly within the Quadripartite group and also in conversations over issues such as the Soviet natural gas pipeline, the French were often the last to come on board and sometimes never came on board. Their positions in the area of arms control were very interesting. On the one hand, the French at a very key moment stood up for the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe. At the same time, in the field of conventional arms control, they had stood aside from the MBFR talks, and they resisted proposals for a new forum for conventional arms control in Europe.

Q: Was it obvious that the conjunction of Ronald Reagan in Washington and Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain was bringing the British and the Americans closer together?

WARD: Certainly there was excellent coordination of policy with London. This was a very busy time in many ways. There were a lot of issues on the table and a lot going on in the world, including the war in the Falklands. The British government was a bit taken aback by the initial stance taken by Secretary Haig, who I think was in Cairo when the war started. He made a statement that sounded to the British a lot like "equidistance" between Britain and Argentina. That changed rather rapidly. But in all, the conflict brought us even closer together.

Q: How were we viewing the CSCE at that time? Later, it turned into quite a powerful instrument for bringing about changes in the Soviet Bloc.

WARD: Initially, America had been skeptical of it and agreed to CSCE only as a way to launch MBFR. But I think we discovered early on in the process during the 1970s that, in fact, CSCE offered an excellent opportunity to hold the Soviet Union accountable to its human rights commitments under the Helsinki Final Act. In 1981, I moved on from the job as special assistant for policy to the Assistant Secretary to become head of the political section in the Office of European Security and Political Affairs, which is basically the NATO and CSCE office. My responsibility included CSCE, so I backstopped Ambassador Max Kampelman, who was our negotiator. In my opinion, Max was a superb negotiator. He masterfully held together the NATO coalition, forged excellent ties within the Neutral and Non-Aligned [NNA] group, and used the instrument of the Helsinki Final Act to hold the Soviet Union accountable. Over time we made a lot of progress on human rights issues in the Soviet Union by coordinating what Max was doing at the table in Madrid, where the CSCE talks were, with our bilateral demarches in Moscow and conversations that the President and the Secretary of State had with their counterparts.

Q: How was Alexander Haig as Secretary of State perceived? Later, he got into outs with the court around Ronald Reagan.

WARD: Secretary Haig was in office for a fairly brief period. It was a year or so. He saw himself as a man of action. He surrounded himself with some very talented people. Because he was there so briefly and I was so junior, I really didn't see him in action that much. My memory of the '80s is dominated by the figure of George Shultz, who took over from Secretary Haig. Shultz was a giant among secretaries.

Q: Did Yugoslavia come up during this time?

WARD: It did. It came up in several ways, very unlike the ways in which Yugoslavia comes up these days. At the time, we were quietly within the Quadripartite group consulting over means of supporting the Yugoslav government *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union. There were some very sensitive long-term commitments by the United States and other major allies on the military security of Yugoslavia. There were programs of assistance.

Q: The concern was that with an aggressive Soviet Union, with the demise of Tito and a weakened government, this might bring about the Soviets messing around in Yugoslavia.

WARD: That's right. Of course, Eagleburger, having recently been ambassador in Belgrade, was very interested in Yugoslavia.

Q: What were some of the other issues that you had to deal with.

WARD: In addition to arms control and CSCE and the crackdown on Poland and the Soviet pipeline, I worked on the day-to-day NATO issues, things like organizing ministerial meetings, which happened twice a year, and backstopping NATO political committee meetings. But the major issues were arms control, the deployment of intermediate range nuclear weapons, and CSCE.

Q: What was your feeling of where arms control was going?

WARD: Arms control was in a very active period. I was less involved with strategic arms control than with our theater nuclear and conventional arms control work. It was a period in which, on the intermediate range issues, the stage was being set for what became a successful negotiation eventually. The deployment, which provided essential leverage for the negotiation, was also being carried forward in a very difficult atmosphere. There were very large protests in Germany and elsewhere over the deployment of these missiles – also in Britain and Italy.

Q: How did you find Germany as a major ally?

WARD: The Germans were extremely important and felt extremely exposed. They felt themselves on the frontlines. They were at the time very concerned that the increase in tensions would result in a conflict on their soil. More than any other ally, they had to deal day-to-day with the reality that a conflict would end with the extinction of their country. So, more than any ally, they were sensitive to every security issue. They needed a good deal of handholding, a good deal of reassurance, constant consultations, and above all they had a great thirst for information about what we were doing. One of the reasons Eagleburger was so successful was that he was able to provide that.

Q: When Burt came in, was he able to continue the networking?

WARD: Rick Burt continued in that tradition. He had a different style – sometimes more abrasive and confrontational, but he continued very constant consultations. That was a formula for success in the European Bureau throughout the 1980s. We had a succession of people at the helm that did rather well in that job with very different styles. I'm thinking of Larry Eagleburger and then Rick Burt and Roz Ridgway, who did a superb job in both managing the bureau and managing the relationship with Europe.

Q: How did the Soviet side fit with the Western European side in the bureau? Were these two distinct cultures?

WARD: There was rivalry between the NATO office and the Soviet Affairs office. It was almost always a friendly rivalry, perhaps not 100% of the time because both offices were fast moving places and frictions did arise. There was a lot of talent in both offices.

Q: Were there ever any clashes?

WARD: There were clashes of view especially in the area of strategic arms control, which was not an area that I worked on. There, the Soviet Affairs office had the lead for the bureau, and yet we in the NATO office felt that we also had a voice. We felt they were inclined to lobby for excessive accommodation of the Soviet position. They probably believed that we wanted to spend excessive time on Alliance coordination. There were other difficulties – the clearance process, papers for NATO, and so forth. Sometimes, as always in the State Department bureaucracy, one had the feeling that more than one office was being tasked with responsibility for the same issue, and coordination was a bit difficult.

Q: Did the NSC play much of a role at your level?

WARD: The NSC played a very important role. I can never remember significant difficulties with the NSC on NATO issues. There were great divergences with the Department of Defense and Richard Perle's team, especially on intermediate range nuclear arms control. A number of quite hard-line individuals on Perle's staff did not seem to want the INF talks to succeed. We tended to see deployment as a means of achieving the so-called "zero option," or elimination of all INF weapons. DoD treated deployment as an end in itself.

Q: Was there any feeling at this point that the Soviets might be stretching themselves too thin and might not be able to sustain a competition with the United States?

WARD: That came later. After a brief period in Bonn, I had a second tour in the NATO office, this time as Deputy Director. The fault lines in the USSR began to appear then, when it became clear that they were paying a very high price in Afghanistan. Of course, that price was raised by some of the activities we undertook in support of the Afghan opposition.

Q: You were doing this job until '84?

WARD: Yes. Then I went to Bonn as the chief of the Internal Political Unit. We had a very large political section in Bonn that was divided up into a number of small pieces. One was the Internal Affairs Unit. We did exactly what that connotes. We followed German internal politics. I watched over the Social Democrats and the Greens. My colleague, J.D. Bindenagel, looked after the Christian Democrats and the Liberals.

Q: You were there from when to when?

WARD: I was only there for a little more than a year. Our ambassador was Arthur Burns, a grand old man who became one of the most recognized and influential men in Germany. He was devoted to his job. He worked very long hours because he really loved, almost more than anyone I've ever observed, the intellectual stimulus of work. He was a very effective ambassador and was really loved by the embassy staff. We had a capable political section. Richard Barkley was the political counselor. Tom Weston was the deputy political counselor.

Q: What party was in power in this period, '84-'85?

WARD: Chancellor Kohl and the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union were in power in coalition with the Liberals. Kohl had been elected in 1982. When he was first elected, it was very much similar to the kind of thing we recently went through with President George W. Bush and also some of the early thoughts about President Reagan. Was this man intellectually capable to hold the office? In all three cases, they proved their detractors wrong pretty early. Kohl jokes were rampant in Germany. You could buy joke books about the Chancellor, which was unusual in a country that respected authority. Later, during Unification, Kohl proved himself to be the single politician in Germany who understood at a deep level what was happening.

Q: You were looking at the Social Democrats, the Liberals, and the Greens. What was our reading on the Social Democrats?

WARD: They were terribly divided between Atlanticists and more left-wing figures in the party. Slowly, over time, the Atlanticists were gaining ground, but they were bedeviled by the tendency of some in the SPD to turn leftward in order to counter the growing Green Party. To the extent that the Social Democrats moved toward the center, the Greens would occupy the left. The Greens were a chaotic party, a party that was fun to cover because they were so chaotic. The party was composed of many factions. When you'd go to a Greens convention, you'd find dogs running around, kids running around, women sitting on the floor and knitting, agendas disregarded, etc.

Q: Sounds like a student movement.

WARD: It was very much a young people's movement. The Greens began an environmental protest party. A much harder line, truly Marxist element, people who had come out of Marxist splinter parties, later infiltrated them. There was tension between

those two wings within the Party. Eventually, over a long period of time, the more moderate wing prevailed. Said another way, radical figures became over time more moderate. I remember that Joshka Fischer, now foreign minister, was photographed during the '70s beating a policeman during a demonstration. When I knew Fischer in the '84-'85 period, it was already clear that he was very realistic about the place of Germany in Europe, about Germany's need for security. He was one of those Greens who in a quiet moment, perhaps after a couple of beers, would admit that Germany had a role in NATO despite the fact that the platform of the Greens party was very definitely for German withdrawal from the Alliance.

Q: Was there a concern that agents of the Soviet Union, of East Germany, had pretty well infiltrated the Green Party?

WARD: There certainly were within the Green Party people who had been influenced by Marxist ideology. I don't recall a special concern about agents within the Green Party, although later it emerged that there were East German agents just about everywhere, including in the American mission.

Q: Were we concerned at the time that at some point, the Soviets and East Germans might come up with a deal, saying, "Maybe you can unite if you, West Germany, and you, East Germany, get out of NATO?"
WARD: That sort of idea was present in the background, enough to be of some concern to us. During the unification saga, it turned out that there were some German leaders, perhaps even Foreign Minister Genscher, who might have been willing to compromise on the question of a unified Germany's position in NATO.

Q: How did the Liberals fit into the scheme of things?

WARD: The Liberals were the Free Democratic Party (FDP). Hans Dieterich Genscher, who was the most popular politician in Germany, headed the FDP. The Liberals were always threatened by the possibility that they could fall below the five percent minimum of the popular vote needed for representation in the Bundestag. The Liberals were also split between a left and a right wing. More or less traditional 19th century liberals dominated the party, but others were further to the left. Genscher became the longest serving foreign minister in German history and was the absolute master of the foreign office. He ran the ministry quite autocratically. He knew everybody because he had been minister for so long. He made even small decisions himself. His stewardship produced a generation of German diplomats who were very cautious because they knew that their chief wanted to call all the shots. They were quite cautious and operated within much narrower limits than the British or French that I observed in the Quadripartite Talks.

Q: At a later date, Genscher has had the finger pointed at him for speeding the dissolution of Yugoslavia, more on his own…

WARD: When we come to that, there is a very interesting incident that I can relate.

Q: We'll eventually come to that. How come you left Bonn after only one year?

WARD: Chuck Redman, who became Deputy Director of the Office of European Security and Political Affairs in the Department in 1984, was moved up in 1985 to become deputy spokesman of the Department. Chuck of course went on to much greater things, but his departure left the office without a Deputy Director in a very busy period. Charlie Thomas and Ray Caldwell asked me to come back to be the Deputy Director. Because I was so interested in the substance of what that office did and in the larger issues, I agreed to do that. I received a "directed assignment," cutting short my time in Bonn.

Q: What was your title?

WARD: Deputy Director of the Office of European Security and Political Affairs, the NATO office.

Q: You did that from '85 to when?

WARD: From '85-'88.

Q: When you came back, what were the issues?

WARD: The issues were those of security and arms control. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe had moved into a new phase in which it was considering mandates for new negotiations on both human rights and arms control. The mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations (MBFR) after years and years had gone basically nowhere. We were discussing with our NATO allies a new arms control forum that would eventually emerge from CSCE and become known as the Conventional Forces in Europe negotiation, CFE. It would consider all NATO and Warsaw Pact forces from the Atlantic to the Urals. One of the defects of MBFR was that the zone of negotiation was much too small. France did not participate in MBFR. So, we wanted as a counterpart to the INF talks to have a Conventional Forces negotiation that included everything from the Atlantic to the Urals. That we felt was the proper unit for negotiation. The main problem would be to negotiate a mandate with the Soviet Union, but even before we could begin that task, we needed to bring the French on board. Much of my time during my first year back in Washington was taken up with working with Steve Ledogar, who then was the deputy chief of mission at U.S. NATO, and with Deputy Assistant Secretary Charlie Thomas in moving toward a mandate for those talks. I remained responsible for the Quadripartite Talks during much of that period, and we used that forum to negotiate a mandate for CFE.

Q: Why would the French be so concerned?

WARD: Initially, the French rejected any limitations on their forces. They were quite happy to see U.S., German, and UK forces included in an arms control arrangement. Another factor was the fact that the French were not part of the integrated military

structure of NATO, so they felt that since they were not in NATO, they shouldn't be counted within NATO military limits vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact. In fact, one of the difficulties in working out the terms of the negotiation with the French was how we would go about accounting for French forces.

Q: It wasn't as though the French had that overwhelming a force.

WARD: They didn't have an overwhelming force, but they had a substantial force. The French military budget stayed pretty robust during a period in which there was always a lot of pressure on the German budget and also on the British budget. This was a time when arms budgets were not declining; they were expanding, in part because of U.S. pressure to maintain three percent annual real growth in defense expenditures. We pushed in a determined way for real growth in defense budgets throughout the alliance. It was a period when our expenditures as a percentage of GNP at times approached five percent. The Germans were hugging three. The French and British were a little above three.
Q: How about the Italians?

WARD: One of the sensitivities of the Quadripartite Talks, the Berlin Talks as we called them, was that the Italians were excluded, and they resented that fact. It sometimes seemed to me that it meant more to the Italians to be there than to do much in terms of policy contributions. It reminded me of the Woody Allen movie, *Being There*. On the other hand, Italy was a staunch ally in terms of deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces, and certainly occupied a strategic position on the Mediterranean. They were sometimes excluded because they failed to exploit politically their material contributions to the Alliance. Britain consistently "punched above its weight" in the Alliance. If anything, the Italians punched below theirs. Italy's contribution to the alliance at the time was substantial. They were providing many bases. They were supporting the INF deployment. And yet influence eluded them.

Q: It's always very difficult to deal with the Italian government. Wasn't this part of the problem?

WARD: When I was in Italy, we used to say that despite the fact that Italy had had 40 or so governments since World War II, it was the most politically stable country in Europe. In 1979, Giulio Andreotti was Prime Minister. He had been a junior minister in the second Gaspari government after World War II in 1948. So, he had been in the government then for 30 years and eventually stayed much longer. The same party, the Christian Democrats, led every government. But the focus was so often inward and not outward. Because of that, their influence within the alliance was often diminished. At NATO ministerial meetings, we would divide up responsibilities for taking notes for the Secretary during his bilateral conversations with other foreign ministers. My memory of many of those conversations with other major leaders of the alliance is that they focused on the large issues. In contrast, the conversations with the Italians were often about minutiae, and sometimes basically about the Italians' sense of inferiority, of being left out. One extreme example was a conversation between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Andreotti. Andreotti began by alleging that there had not been a large enough

Italian-American representation at the ceremony marking the 100th anniversary of the Statue of Liberty. Remember, this took place at a time when some pretty big issues were on the table in the Alliance. The Soviet threat seemed very real. Despite this, Andreotti spent a great deal of time dwelling on a tiny issue. It was one of the iciest diplomatic conversations I have ever witnessed. At one point after Andreotti finished his lengthy presentation, Secretary Shultz said, "Do you have anything else to talk about today?" I and other people in the room thought that Shultz was on the point of walking out. He made no attempt to conceal his exasperation with his Italian colleague.

Q: What about Spain and Portugal? Did they play much of a role?

WARD: This was the period in which Spain was entering the Alliance. Spain played a very important role from the beginning. They quite clearly took the Alliance very seriously. In contrast to France, which did not visibly make an effort to find ways to integrate itself militarily and instead obliged the alliance to put together jury-built secretive military relationships, the Spanish government, although it did not enter the military structure right off, made clear it wanted to do that eventually, that it wanted as close a military relationship as the political traffic within Spain would bear. From the start, they made a very concrete and effective contribution to the Alliance, a striking effort by the Spanish socialists, who only a few years before had been stridently anti-NATO. Portugal played a relatively small role in NATO political negotiations.

Q: Belgium? The Netherlands?

WARD: The Dutch were very solid, often providing a measure of calm and good sense. Belgium and Holland were deployment countries for the intermediate range nuclear forces. They handled it well.
Q: This is quite a political challenge to these countries.

WARD: It was a heavy challenge in all the deployment countries. It was the dominant issue. At the end of the day, the Europeans came through. NATO follow-through on the INF deployment track gave our negotiators a great deal of leverage. NATO had a decent alternative to a negotiated agreement.

Q: All this deployment business was a result of the Soviets moving their SS-20 missiles there and telling the Europeans, "Get away from the Americans because you're under threat now and the Americans can back off while we blast you." It was basically a political move on the part of the Soviets.

WARD: It was a political-military move meant to drive a wedge within the Alliance.

Q: What was the feeling about the Soviets? Things were really moving on security measures, human rights, and arms control. Were we feeling changes?

WARD: Very definitely. In contrast to the early 1980s, when East-West relationships were so difficult, by 1986 things had begun to move, even though progress was uneven.

We moved in 1986 toward a mandate for conventional arms control. Those talks began. They moved quite swiftly. There was progress on human rights within the CSCE forum. Emigration of Soviet Jews increased. The Soviets responded sometimes to the lists of human rights problems that we presented to them. The shoot-down of Korean Airlines flight 007 was a big setback, but at least there were no subsequent, similar incidents. Liberalization began in Poland, and there were palpable changes in most of the Eastern Bloc countries. There were many factors at work, but two were particularly important. First, the Soviets began to realize that they could not keep pace with the West economically and therefore would eventually fall behind militarily. Secondly, Soviet difficulties in Afghanistan were growing. And of course there were some fairly rapid-fire changes in Soviet leadership. One began to hear that the Soviets had been burned so badly by their experience in Afghanistan that they would be less ready to use military force in supporting other members of the Warsaw Pact in the future. That proved to be true in Germany.

I left the European Bureau in 1988 because I was assigned to the Senior Seminar, which was a wonderful year. At the conclusion of my seminar year, Ambassador Vernon (Dick) Walters asked me to be his DCM in Bonn. I met with him for the first time as DCM-designate on April 7, 1989. He had called me and said, "Come on over and let's talk about Germany." I went over from FSI to his office in the Department. He was then leaving the job as ambassador to the United Nations, so he was still in a suite of offices on the sixth floor. He sat me down and said, "George, we're going to go to Germany at a very interesting time. The Berlin Wall's going to come down." In April 1989, that was an astounding statement. No one was saying that sort of thing. The conventional wisdom within the Foreign Service "German club," of which I was not really a member, was that German reunification would take place, but only over a long period of time in which there would be convergence of systems. Walters didn't subscribe to that. He said, "It's almost over." He believed that in withdrawing from Afghanistan Gorbachev was also deciding that the Soviet Union would no longer provide military support to its allies within the Warsaw Pact if those governments ran into domestic unrest. Sure enough, Walters was right and the Wall did come down.

Q: Back to the time you were still within European Affairs, 1985-1988, what readings were you getting about the crackdown in Poland? Was this seen as a new toughening or a sign of weakness?

WARD: Lech Walesa and the Solidarity movement continued to gather strength in Poland throughout the second half of the 1980s. Elections in 1989 left General Jaruzelski no choice but to appoint Walesa's choice as prime minister.
Q: If nothing else, the fact that Poland sits on top of all the lines of communication for the Soviets, unless they're willing to go all out to hold onto Poland, they don't have a credible threat to the West.

WARD: I wouldn't go that far. The Soviets had so much military strength based in East Germany that they did have a credible conventional threat. We saw that later when the Wall came down, and we had access to both records and installations within East

Germany. They might not have achieved all their campaign objectives in quite the time they intended, but they had a very large military force ready to go on very short notice. Key units were ready to go into the field within hours or even minutes. What the effective loss of Poland did do was to deny the Soviet Union the reinforcement capability that they would have needed to get all the way to the Atlantic in a week or so as they planned. But they could have devastated West Germany. Their war plans for West Germany were such that they had stationmasters appointed for every railroad station in West Germany. They had sandbox reconstructions of German cities. They had plans for occupation that were well worked out. They had many divisions in which the equipment was better maintained than the people. In at least one armored division, their tanks were kept uploaded with both weapons and fuel, which is a very dangerous practice. The tanks were kept in heated warehouses. They would have been able to deploy very quickly. The men were housed in unheated barracks and had the opportunity for one cold shower once a week. In the workers' paradise, machines were treated better than people.

Q: You went to Bonn in 1989. This was the year of miracles. You went there when?

WARD: I got there on July 3, 1989.

Q: Walters had said the Wall was coming down. What was your gut feeling?

WARD: My gut feeling, to be quite honest, was that he was wrong. I didn't see change happening that fast. Germans of my generation were expressing great doubts about speedy unification. They saw financial problems, economic problems. They were, as Germans often are, very self-absorbed. They were absorbed with their own problems. They were reluctant to see West Germany taking on the responsibility for uniting the country. Plus, early on, there were few indications that much was happening inside East Germany, although that changed very quickly as the old order in Hungary and Czechoslovakia began to come apart. Then you saw in the summer and early fall of 1989 peaceful protests. You saw East Germans fleeing the country to get to Hungary, to get to Czechoslovakia. You saw East Germans flooding into West German embassies in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the East German government finally relenting and allowing those people to have passage through to the West. The pace of change accelerated. In August 1989, Ambassador Walters was interviewed by one of the German radio networks and was asked if he could foresee unification of Germany within five years. He gave a very short answer, saying basically, "Yes, I can foresee that because the Gorbachev government is no longer willing to support its allies in other Warsaw Pact countries." Washington perceived that statement as too forward leaning. Secretary James Baker was reportedly unhappy with Walters, and Walters did not get much support in the front office of the European Bureau.

Q: When you got to Bonn, were developments in Eastern Europe engulfing the whole operation of the embassy?

WARD: It's a big embassy. The mission included many hundreds of Americans in several locations throughout Germany. Lots of things were happening. But certainly on

the political side, developments that had to do with the so-called "German question" soon became dominant. It was a very exciting time. It was a great time to be in Germany, a great time to be DCM in Bonn. Things just accelerated beginning almost from the time I got there through 1989.

Q: As East Germans were fleeing out of the country and going to Czechoslovakia and Hungary, was there concern that this is all great, but all of a sudden, the East German government may come down very hard and no matter what the Soviet Union does and we might have real fighting in the streets in Berlin and it would be hard to restrain West Germans from going to help? This had been the scenario since 1953.

WARD: There was such a concern. In fact, the East Germans did use repressive force against demonstrations in some instances. But at a deeper level, events were making the possibility of a Soviet intervention less and less likely. Gorbachev's major priority was to reform the Soviet system at least to the extent necessary for economic survival. By the time Gorbachev visited East Berlin for an anniversary day in 1989, the tide had turned. Gorbachev told Honecker that the Soviet Union would not intervene to settle East German problems. Looking back, that policy statement has to be seen as a key one. At that point, East Germany was alone. They knew better than we did just how weak they were. The East German economy was a shell.

Q: Yes. Everybody thought it was much better than it really was, maybe because they were doing well in contrast to the rest of the Warsaw Pact.

WARD: At one point, East Germany was rated as the seventh largest industrial power in the world. When the Wall came down, and we could see what East Germany was really like, there was very little within East Germany that was economically useful. We cooperated with the Germans in a very large-scale program aimed at privatizing and selling off industrial resources in East Germany to those who were willing to buy them and modernize them. The embassy's commercial and economic sections did a tremendous job in publicizing these opportunities, and there were some American firms that stepped in and bought at bargain basement prices various facilities. But there were few real going concerns, companies that could be productive from day one. There were a couple of exceptions – the Zeitz optical works at Jena in Thuringia thrived almost from the beginning. But the automobile plants, the large steel plants, and other large industrial installations were worth only their scrap value. It turned out that I was able in this period to begin to visit relatives that I had in East Germany, where my grandmother had been born. It seemed to me that many of the horror stories that we had heard about what life had been like under a communist system were true. Industrial pollution was incredible. One relative, a second cousin, in East Germany was basically disabled because of industrial pollution. Environmental and safety problems in East German plants were the rule. The Bonneville Company was looking at buying some East German power plants. I talked with an engineer who went through these plants. He said, "From a safety point of view, any U.S. utility would have had to have closed those power plants. At one point, there was a hole in the floor without a fence around it, where you would have fallen into an open furnace." There was no effective environmental protection. The environmental

hazards and workers' safety hazards were criminal.

Q: When you think about the disaster that that whole system was… As things were developing in the Eastern Bloc, were we on high alert? Was there a point where we said, "Hey, this is it?"

WARD: Not in a military sense. I don't recall at any point our being seriously alarmed about the possibility of conflict. There was a tense moment a couple of days after the opening of the Wall, when the Soviet Union approached us through the Berlin Group and asked for a meeting of the four powers in the Kommandatura building in Berlin. There had not been a four-power meeting in that building over forty years, so great symbolism was involved, memories of the occupation. The Soviets stated to us that they were concerned that unrest in Eastern Germany would threaten the security of their stationed forces. Walters, after consulting with the Department and after a great deal of thought, made the decision to go forward with the meeting. The four allied ambassadors met in Berlin. The German government was very angry about this. They felt that at a time when Germany was being liberated, when Germany was pointing toward unification, when the sovereignty of Germany was emerging for the first time in almost 50 years, this meeting symbolized the past. There was a photo taken of the four ambassadors on the steps of the Kommandatura building. It was published on the front page of many newspapers. One German foreign office type said to me, "Look at these four old men. They symbolize the past. They're as tired as the past." It was a judgment call on our part. At the time, we were the only one of the four powers to have doubts about the wisdom of the meeting. Even the British and French valued that gathering as an assertion of the allied role in Germany.

Q: What was the purpose of the meeting?

WARD: The Soviets were making noises that they were afraid things were going to get out of hand. Harry Gilmore, our very capable minister in Berlin, told us that his Soviet contacts there were very nervous. In Germany as a whole, our forces did not feel the threat had increased.

Q: You had these Russian troops, a major army, sitting there.

WARD: You had a major army with a lot of modern weapons manned by young and increasingly disaffected Soviet soldiers. It was an unstable situation. So we agreed to have the meeting, which was aimed at ensuring that the situation would remain calm, that security would be maintained, and that the agreements among allies would be carried out. It was the only meeting that took place. We didn't agree to another. I think that Walters agreed to the meeting because he felt the moment was particularly delicate and demanded a degree of support for Soviet morale. Their world was, after all, coming apart. In the immediate aftermath of the meeting, I thought that perhaps we had made a mistake. Later, I realized that given the role the Soviets would have to play in German unification, it was the right thing to do.

Q: From the way it's described, it sounds like it made sense. It's not much fun to have a major army sitting there with a population revolting against what you stand for and to keep your troops in line and not somehow or other get involved.

WARD: And the western allies were able to say, "Look, we don't have any military designs in this situation. We want the situation to unfold peacefully, democratically, and we don't have any intention of using our forces for anything other than to protect the security of Berlin," which was their traditional role.

Q: I think this is a good point to stop.

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Today is September 27, 2001. Why don't we talk a bit about November 1989. There had been a meeting in the Kommandatura.

WARD: Four Power meetings at the ambassadorial level had been suspended long ago. The meeting in the *Kommandatura* went on for a couple of hours, and no concrete agreements were reached. Everyone agreed that it was important to maintain peace in and around Berlin and that military action should not be taken. But the Soviets also used the meeting as a platform to reassert their role in Berlin. The German officials interpreted the photograph of the Four-Power ambassadors that was taken on the steps of the *Kommandatura* as a statement that change was not welcome. In the case of the United States, nothing could have been further from the truth. The United States and Ambassador Walters had made clear from the start that we very much supported unification of Germany. That was not the case for the other three powers. The reaction of the British and French at first was that things were moving fast, perhaps too fact, that the implications of a united Germany for Europe needed to be carefully considered, and that the process should move fairly slowly. I don't think we disagreed with the analysis that all of these questions needed to be considered very carefully, but we also recognized that you can't slow history or people down, nor was that in our interest. The British, despite what I understand to have been Margaret Thatcher's quite marked hesitancy at the beginning, fairly rapidly came over more toward our view of the situation. The French lagged considerably. Their attitudes needed to be taken into account. Of course, the Soviet Union, especially at the outset, was very interested in preserving East Germany as a country that would somehow play a sovereign role.

Q: You say there were some incidents when the Wall was opening.

WARD: There was no significant violence. However, the western side of the Berlin Wall was technically in East Germany. That is, when the East Germans built the Wall, they built it on East German territory. So both sides of the Wall in a technical sense were in the East. You had on the night of November 9-10 this great flow across the Wall. Most of the East Berliners went back home that night. People almost immediately began literally chipping away at the wall. The next day and for a couple of days afterwards, we heard reports that perhaps the East Germans would try to roll the opening back. The opening

appears to have occurred because of a misinterpretation of a district police official of a decision by the East German leadership to liberalize foreign travel. The district commander decided that the decision meant that anyone who wanted to leave could do so immediately. The world should be grateful for this apparent accident. In the days after November 10, the representatives of the western powers in Berlin did take steps to try to avoid any incidents that might have served as a pretext to roll back the opening. For example, at one point, the western powers made an effort that turned out to be very half-hearted to stop people from chipping away at the Wall because it was technically East German property. It didn't have any real impact except perhaps on those officials and their dependents who might otherwise have personally taken a sledgehammer to the Wall. You can't stand against the tide of history.

Q: What were people in our mission doing? What were you doing?

WARD: We were having the Marine birthday ball on November 9th and I learned about the opening while we were at the Ball. Walters immediately wanted to go to Berlin. It was his first instinct. In his memoir of his tenure as ambassador, which was published in Germany but not in the United States, he relates that his first thought was to go to Berlin. He decided to remain in Bonn on November 10th. I thought that was the right decision. At such a key moment, it was important to have the ambassador available in Bonn. We didn't know exactly what was happening. From Bonn, he could communicate with Washington, stay in contact with the German Chancellor and Foreign Minister, provide advice, and be in constant touch with our very capable team in West Berlin. By November 11th, Walters could no longer resist the urge to be part of history, and left Bonn for Berlin. By then, the situation was a little clearer. He was moved by what he saw happening in Berlin. He tells a story that is quite interesting and evocative of the mood of the times. Apparently, he got to Berlin and went to the Friederichstrasse bridge, which is where many of the spy exchanges had taken place, a bridge between East Berlin and West Berlin. There, he found a man from Hamburg who had come to Berlin with a truckload of flowers. The man gave a flower to every single person who crossed from the East to the West.

I can't stress enough the excellent job done by our Mission in West Berlin in reporting on the situation and also in recommending steps necessary to prevent any violence or misunderstandings between the East and West. Harry Gilmore deserves a lot of credit for that. The embassy after the opening of the Wall basically went into high gear and stayed there, not that we were on slow gear before then, in order to support the negotiations that came to be known as the "two-plus-four process." That expression meant the four allied powers plus the two Germanies. What evolved was a multi-tiered series of negotiations. Secretary Baker did not seem to share at the outset Ambassador Walters's view that we should do everything in our power to promote rapid German unification. Secretary Baker clearly favored a more cautious approach. In retrospect, his approach was wise in that the British, French, and, most especially, the Russians needed to buy into a resolution of the situation. In addition to the major question of German unity, you had a history of allied agreements over almost half a century that needed to be revised or renegotiated. As I mentioned, the negotiations included several tiers: heads of government, foreign

ministers, then people like Robert Zoellick, who was then the counselor of the State Department, and his counterparts. Zoellick coordinated the policy effort in Washington and the negotiations in the two-plus-four format. Bob Blackwill, who was senior director at the NSC, also played an important role. Condoleeza Rice, who at the time worked for Blackwill, was part of the team, as was Ray Seitz, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. Phil Zelikow, who teaches at a university, was the junior member of the Washington-based two-plus-four team and later became the historian of the process. At the time, he was a Foreign Service Officer assigned to the NSC staff.

The role of the embassy during this time was to take the lead where it was appropriate and to support the two-plus-four team otherwise. We took the lead on issues such as status of forces. It quickly became clear that upon unification Germany, it would be necessary to have a new Status of Forces agreement that recognized German sovereignty. We also had the lead on some of the issues that involved allied rights and practices in Berlin. We unilaterally suspended our exercise of some allied rights almost immediately. The four-power rights in Berlin were in theory very extensive, but in practice had diminished over the decades. But even as late as 1989, they included various privileges that seemed even then anachronistic, like free passes on the Berlin transportation system, free shoe repair, fresh flowers in senior officer residences provided by the Germans, etc. The Berlin police reported daily on police activities to the public safety advisor at the United States mission and the other missions. The German budget for allied expenses in Berlin was quite large. Walters immediately saw that many of these practices were no longer appropriate and took immediate steps to cut away many perquisites. On the more substantive side, there were issues like control of civil aviation. As the situation began to evolve, it was clear that airspace control procedures needed revision. For decades, flights into and out of Berlin had been handled through an institution called the BASC [Berlin Air Safety Center], which was a sort of paper-based air control center. It consisted of four teams of military officers who sat around a table and passed strips of paper between themselves to inform each other about flights into and out of Berlin air space. It worked satisfactorily for many years, but it was based on the system of four power rights. The western allies had come to accept over the years a limitation not to fly above 10,000 feet. This was a mistake that made for uncomfortable and inefficient air service once jets came into use. We in the embassy took the lead on negotiations on civil aviation, stationing and on some other subjects. I was the senior U.S. negotiator for the initial status of forces talks and for civil aviation. Simultaneously, there were negotiations going in capitals on the modalities for German unification. The latter process was been well documented in books by Horst Teltschik, Chancellor Kohl's national security adviser, and by Phil Zelikow and Condoleeza Rice.

Q: What were you getting from your German colleagues? Were they seeing a united Germany? Were they concerned that this might cause greater problems? One of the big concerns for us always has been that somehow or another the Soviets might cut a deal where Germany would say, "Okay, we'll be united, but we'll be out of NATO."

WARD: First of all, when rumblings of the crumbling of East Germany began to be felt in West Germany – beginning in the spring and summer of 1989 you had streams of

refugees getting out of East Germany and going into Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and from there into Western Germany – I found among West Germans both in and out of government widespread reluctance about and even opposition to the idea of unification. Middle-class Germany was pretty comfortable and self satisfied. Germans had grown used to the status quo. They felt that long-term processes were headed in the right direction, and there was no reason to rush. Very few people sensed the need for urgency. Fortunately, one of those who did was Helmut Kohl. So, right after the fall of the Wall, you began to see within the German government a division of opinion. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the brilliant and politically adept chief of the Free Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, had led the German foreign ministry for many years. Polls often showed him to be the most popular politician in Germany. More than anyone else in the German government, he was identified with the incremental policy, *Ostpolitik*, that aimed at making the inner-German border meaningless over time in the context of a united Europe. He saw the CSCE process as crucial. CSCE, which was basically unknown in the U.S., was front-page news in Germany. At the outset, the foreign ministry very much reflected Genscher's views and wanted to go slow. People at the Foreign Ministry were also much more willing than the Chancellor was to contemplate Germany changing its role in NATO or even leaving NATO. There were a couple of indications in late 1989 that Genscher may have favored or at least contemplated a neutral status for Germany. I don't think that Chancellor Kohl ever considered such a position. Kohl's chief advisers, Horst Teltschik and Peter Hartmann, were very solid.

Q: Were we pressing and saying, "For God's sakes, fellows, stay in NATO?" Were we pushing all the buttons we could within the German government to show that we thought that a neutral Germany would be a disaster?

WARD: Absolutely. Certainly the embassy represented that view and so did the State Department. President Bush endorsed Ambassador Walters's approach in a couple of hand-written letters. These letters were written, I believe, to bolster Walters's morale at a time when the Ambassador was seriously considering resigning because he felt that Secretary Baker had no confidence in him and was cutting him out of the action. In those communications, Bush made it very clear that he favored German unification only within the context of the western alliance.

Q: German unification within the context of the Western alliance was something out of Oz. It came about. When you think about it, it certainly didn't look particularly assured.
WARD: That's right. And there probably were some on the U.S. team who thought that it wouldn't happen that cleanly. Certainly our embassy in East Berlin didn't. The analysis of our embassy in East Berlin, led by Ambassador Dick Barkley, was that East Germany was a viable country that should democratize, and that it would be in the interest of the West at least for a while to preserve a functioning and democratic East Germany.

On the German side, let me give you one example of the way some Germans looked at this process. Fairly early on, we started informal conversations between the western troop stationing powers and the West German government on a new Status of Forces agreement. The German principal representative in these conversations, which were

initially not formal negotiations, was the deputy legal advisor of the German government, a man named Eitel, who was a good friend. Deputy chiefs of mission and military representatives represented the eight Western troop stationing states. In the first session of those talks, the German side indicated that in the future when Germany became unified, members of western forces would need visas to visit the five eastern states of Germany. This was a position that horrified us. In fact, I could hardly believe what I was hearing. I think a couple of things were at work in this very short-lived position. One was that it was very difficult for people in the German foreign ministry, led by Genscher, to believe that Germany really could be unified and not change its status somehow within NATO. They were constantly thinking, "What price would we pay to the Soviet Union?" Secondly, Germany expected some sort of concrete acknowledgment by the troop stationing countries that Germany was really going to be fully sovereign and that there would be no longer anything such as four power rights and responsibilities. The direct demand for visas fell away very quickly when: a) we reacted sharply to it, and b) we made very clear that we understood Germany was going to be fully sovereign. The other part of it, Germany's consciousness of the price that the Soviets would demand, was a theme that lasted throughout these negotiations and in fact was reflected in the final agreements. Indeed, in the final agreements, the western powers agreed that they would not move their forces into the new *Laender* as military units; there would be no stationing of NATO forces in the new states. Secondly, even official visits by forces would need to be approved on a case-by-case basis. This approval process became an inconvenience. Once Germany was unified, the first thing every East German town wanted was a concert by a U.S. Army band. But the U.S. Army band was not allowed to go to the five new *Laender* except on an exceptional basis. We eventually worked out a special, streamlined approval process for trips by Army bands to the former East Germany. Over time, approval became semi-automatic. I have no idea what the status is today. I'm sure many of these arrangements have changed. But the point of substance was that the German foreign ministry was way behind others in one sense and ahead of others in another sense – behind in recognizing that Germany was going to be unified, in understanding where history was taking this country, but ahead of it in understanding that you would have to pay a price to the Soviet Union. The price paid to the Soviet Union turned out to be actually much lower than one might have thought. The deal was arrived at through some very adroit diplomacy on the part of Washington, Paris, and London, but also through the efforts of Kohl. The Chancellor more than any other German understood that he was in an historical sweet spot, that the external and internal factors were at the moment right for unification. However, he knew that circumstances might change abruptly. So he was willing both to pay a relatively high monetary price for unification. He also made statements that were clearly overoptimistic but that perhaps needed to be made at that time. I remember when he said, "In five years, there will be a blooming economic landscape in eastern Germany." It's been a lot more than five years, and it's not quite blooming yet. But he created this sense of optimism. He is a huge man physically. He created this dynamic image of optimism and positive movement that permeated the country. Germany's left loved to denigrate Kohl as a country bumpkin in much the same way that the American way criticized President Reagan as a dim wit. The left was wrong in both cases.

Kohl moved prospects of unification forward considerably during his meetings with Gorbachev in February 1990. They met in a *dacha* away from Moscow. Kohl and Gorbachev had very long conversations in which Kohl indicated that he was willing to provide very significant economic aid to the Soviet Union, and Gorbachev ended by giving a green light to German unification within NATO. That was a very important element of the deal that was closed in May or June, when the Two-plus-Four agreements were signed. They were ratified sometime later. The United States was the first country to ratify the Two-plus-Four Agreements. I had the pleasure to go with Walters to hand Genscher the U.S. instrument of ratification. It was an instance in which our Senate worked with remarkable speed. Our ratification arrangements were more complicated than anyone else's, and we got it done first. But the deal that Kohl and Gorbachev struck was essential to the overall Two-plus-Four Agreements that produced German unity.

Q: When it was just getting together, what were the roles of the British and the French?

WARD: The British and French weren't quite where we were at the beginning certainly. Maggie Thatcher was reported as expressing deep reservations about German unity. Clearly the French were reluctant. The British relatively quickly understood that the United States was going to be a strong backer of unity, and they also analyzed realistically where events were taking the situation. Within a couple of months after the Wall came down, they were playing a very constructive role. As often happens, the French had their particular concerns. I'm sure that imbedded historical memories of the wars they had fought with Germany were lurking in the background. With unification, France would lose its position as the largest country in Europe. A united Germany would have over 80 million people compared to France's 56 million. Therefore, the French dragged their feet.

Q: Were you all working with the various delegations? What were people doing when it wasn't just the foreign ministers?

WARD: There were constant talks between members of the two-plus-four teams. Zoellick, Seitz, Blackwill, Rice, and Zelikow often visited Bonn and Berlin. We spent a lot of time supporting their efforts. Personally, I spent quite a bit of time touching base with the principal German negotiators in Bonn and reporting these conversations to our two-plus-four team. We were called upon to make many demarches in connection with the negotiations. The political and economic reporting workload increased considerably. In that period, I saw Horst Teltschik, who had not always been accessible previously, quite often. We kept me abreast of the Germans' conversations with Soviet leaders. It was a very active time.

Q: Were actions on the ground beginning to move events, the movement of people and the opening of borders?

WARD: People started to vote with their feet on November 9th and continued thereafter. West Germans also began to move into East Germany. I would travel into East Germany whenever possible, so I had a snapshot every few weeks of the way the situation was

changing. The first indications of capitalism seemed to be the import of western cigarettes, alcohol, used cars (mostly "lemons"), and bananas, things the East Germans had been denied and things they didn't know enough about. They didn't have real automobiles. The automobiles they had were the miserable Trabants that had two-stroke engines. They didn't know how to judge a used car, so every lemon in Europe headed to East Germany and was promptly sold. The East Germans had some money because they were permitted to exchange a limited number of East Marks for West Marks on a one-to-one basis. You'd see little signs stuck in the dirt by the road for cigarettes or used cars. Then you began to see computer software signs. It was interesting to see capitalism beginning to grow. Then Home Depot-type stores started to proliferate. There were huge traffic jams around the latter as the East Germans began to buy materials to fix up their houses. The gray streets of Dresden, Leipzig, and East Berlin began to bloom with color. Unfortunately, quite a few home improvement companies from West Germany that weren't very scrupulous sold new kitchens and new heating systems and new bathrooms to East Germans for vastly more than they were worth. You began to hear stories of sophisticated, sharp, and dishonest West Germans taking advantage of hardworking, simple East Germans. This theme carried through to the present.

In March 1990, there were the first free elections in East Germany; the first and last. Our embassy in East Berlin followed the electoral campaign very closely, as did we. The states that made up East Germany were known even back in the day of the Weimar Republic as socialist leaning, especially Saxony. So, the embassy in East Berlin reported that the Social Democrats and Socialists were going to do really well, and you would probably have a government in East Germany that would be unlike the government in West Germany. It would be a government of the non-communist left. Most of us in the embassy in Bonn agreed with that election analysis. We had an election pool within the embassy betting on what the percentages of the various parties would be. Walters at the beginning said, "It's not going to happen that way. Any party that has 'social' or 'socialist' in its name is going to get creamed in this election. People don't want that. They've had it for 50 years." Unfortunately for Walters, we persuaded him that he was wrong, and he changed his wager very late in the campaign. Had he not, he would have won the pool hands down. Every party that had "social" or "socialist" in its name did very poorly. A Christian Democratic-dominated government emerged in East Berlin. That made doing business between East and West Germany much easier and was another nail in the coffin of East Germany. If they were voting for Christian Democrats in East Germany, then why do you need a separate government there?

Q: It also would have allayed the fears of the CDU-dominated Bundestag of "Hell, we don't want all these socialists coming in." These were their brethren coming in, although I assume they really weren't the same, were they?

WARD: They were an odd collection of people. The communist government, the SED-dominated government in East Germany, basically maintained puppet opposition parties, one of which was named the CDU. So some of the people who went into the CDU in East Germany were the old CDUers; they were puppet CDUers. Then there were a lot of new people. It was an odd collection of people. Walters was a man of great wisdom, and his

point was on target. The East Germans weren't voting for people. They were voting against the communists. The first elected prime minister of East Germany, Demaziere, tended to look lost and out of place in photographs. He was a modest man, a well-meaning man, and not an ex-stooge for the communists. But he had very little impact in the two-plus-four negotiations. It was clear from the outset that he wasn't going to represent an East Germany that had any object other than unification. When unification happened in October, the members of the East German parliament that were elected in March became members of the *Bundestag* in Bonn. There was not a new election for the *Bundestag* right away. The Easterners moved into the *Bundestag* as members on the basis of their election in March

Q: Was everybody looking at Czechoslovakia and Poland, figuring out what this was going to mean? Also, you had Soviet troops on the ground there.

WARD: That was a very important part of the diplomacy. One point that our team made clear to Kohl, although I think Kohl already knew this, was that Germany could not be united unless its relationships with Poland were placed on a better footing.

Q: What were the relations?

WARD: There was great historical enmity, Germany having invaded Poland. There needed to be a German-Polish agreement on the border. You had millions of West Germans who were refugees from the former German lands in Russia and in Poland. Every year, they'd get together in big rallies and talk about going home. So, one of the very tough domestic issues that the Kohl government had to confront was how to keep these tendencies within bounds. Although it was evident to any dispassionate observer that Germany could not be unified within the borders of 1939, the irredentist leaders who had supported the CDU and CSU over the years wanted more. So, Kohl had to do a very adroit dance. Genscher also played an important role. They succeeded in negotiating an agreement with Poland that recognized Poland within its borders, recognized the Oder-Neisse line as the border between Germany and Poland. That was one of the keys that unlocked the way to unification. The entire saga was the most interesting diplomatic situation I was ever involved in. There were so many boxes to be checked, agreements to be reached. In essence, we were completing the peace process for World War II.

Q: Were we concerned about the Soviet troops there? Did we feel the Soviet army was with Gorbachev?

WARD: There was intense concern at the beginning that some Soviet commander might do something rash out of a sense of humiliation. This was pretty quickly dispelled when Gorbachev made clear that he was committed to a peaceful resolution of the situation. I remember that once it became possible for us to travel freely in East Germany, the Russian army that had seemed like such a giant suddenly seemed pitiful. You would see young soldiers clothed in the middle of the summer with their heavy woolen uniforms standing around shiftlessly. They didn't know what to do. They didn't have a mission anymore. I remember visiting Leipzig. There was still a Soviet garrison in the town. I

talked with the commander of the German forces. He said the Russians had basically walled themselves off. There was no longer any communication with the outside. They weren't threatening, but they weren't communicating either. One of the prices that Germany paid for unification was tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars spent in building housing for the Soviet forces that had to return to Russia. The Germans basically paid for unification.

Q: You've got East German sensitivities and Soviet sensitivities, as well as Polish and Czech. I can see where we wanted to keep particularly American politicians and also commentators and so on from going in and crowing and talking about how great we were and "Look what we've done for you poor benighted people." This wouldn't have been helpful.

WARD: It wouldn't have been, but I can't recall anyone trying to do that. I recall just the opposite. There is one evening that I remember that occurred at my residence when we had as dinner guests a visiting delegation of U.S. congressmen and former members of Congress. It was just after unification, when the former members of the East German legislature had just joined the Bundestag. We included a number of former East German legislators in the dinner. It was fascinating. The East Germans were clearly watching the relationship between the Americans and the West Germans. One later told me that they thought that it would be like the relationship between the East Germans and the Russians, in which there was a "friendship," an institutional relationship, but not real closeness. They saw just the opposite. My wife was instrumental in this. One of the congressmen told her that he liked to sing. Then she found out that the wife of another former member of Congress was a talented pianist. So, she asked the congressman to sing. He said, "Only if someone plays the piano." The wife volunteered to play the piano. What ensued was sort of an impromptu musical evening with Americans singing some of our songs and teaching the Germans. Then the Germans all got together, East and West. They all knew the same words to the same songs. They could also sing, something I cannot say for the Americans. It was striking. The Germans had been apart for 45 years, but had not forgotten their shared music. Afterwards, one of the East Germans said to me that the informal interaction between Americans and West Germans had been a revelation that helped him realize that there really was a friendship between the United States and the Federal Republic, one that had been built up over decades.

Q: Was there anyone on the American side who was not with the program?

WARD: There certainly were differences of opinion between our embassy and the embassy in East Berlin and differences of approach. I think they were in error in asserting that there was much in East Germany worthy of emulation in the West. They probably think that our analysis was flawed. But I can't recall anybody who actively sought to obstruct the process. This was a story without any real villains. There were difficult personalities. I think it was to the credit of President Bush, who gave the right direction.

Q: There was talk, people saying, "Oh, you've got to get out to West Berlin and dance on the Wall."

WARD: You need to talk to Harry Gilmore about this. Harry was concerned about the possibility of such displays. He was concerned about excess jubilation. He did take steps to curb that among official Americans and troops. Dick Barkley had another concern that started before the fall of the Wall. Because East German goods could be bought cheaply with hard currencies, there were great bargains to be found in East Berlin. The U.S. Army had been running for years shopping expeditions into East Berlin. On the basis of our four-power rights, soldiers and dependents would come in busloads and buy out all the shops. Dick, I think rightly, viewed that as not conducive to good relationships and worked to curtail the shopping tours. The Army did not stop them, but they may have reduced the frequency at some point.

Q: You were mentioning that Dick Barkley and his embassy in East Germany were not always on the same wavelength. What was your experience?

WARD: I think it was very much a case of where you sit determining where you stand. Dick had trouble shifting gears once the unification train began to move. Prior to the fall of the Wall, he was very actively seeking to open up a new relationship between East Germany and the United States that would promote democratization. His embassy did a superb job of covering the East German opposition. His team included J.D. Bindenagel as DCM and Jon Greenwald as political counselor. They got permission to open a consulate in Leipzig, the center of protest. Once the Wall came down, it was evident to us in Bonn that events were outpacing our policy of promoting gradual change in the East. I can remember a principal officers conference in Garmisch to which we had invited a representative of the embassy in East Berlin. During the discussions, that representative asserted that it was important not to lose the positive social advances that the East Germans had made. Walters, who rarely showed his emotions in his facial expressions, sort of sat back and said in a matter of fact manner, "Could you tell me what those were?" Our friend from East Berlin appeared never to have considered that question before and said, "Well, they have a wonderful system of kindergartens." Everybody sort of looked around. That's one vignette that illustrates the contrast between the two missions.

The difference of approach between the embassies in Bonn and East Berlin was evident in an incident that occurred at a higher level – you'll find it in both Walters's book in German and in the book by Zelikow and Rice on the subject – when Secretary Baker came to Berlin after the opening of the Wall and before the March 1990 free election in East Germany. A communist figurehead named Modrow was still prime minister in East Germany. The question of whether Baker should pay a call on Modrow arose. Walters said basically, "Modrow has been a communist apparatchik all his life; he is there temporarily. He will be swept away. No one will remember who he was. He doesn't matter. Visiting him would give him a stature that he doesn't deserve. We're going to have free elections. You shouldn't be visiting the communist leader." Dick Barkley represented the opposite view that East Germany was a fragile flower moving in a democratic direction. Modrow was the leader; you needed to show that you recognize him; you needed to go to visit him. Baker gave Walters the impression that he wouldn't

visit Modrow and sent both ambassadors away. Later, Dick Barkley somehow got to see Baker again and persuaded the Secretary to see Modrow. When Baker and Barkley made that decision behind Walters's back, Walters almost resigned on the spot. He felt that Baker had not respected his views.

Q: Did you find yourself trying to calm things down?

WARD: Yes, that happened repeatedly, and I was ultimately unsuccessful. Walters first told me we was going to resign in August 1989, when he felt rebuked by Baker after the radio interview in which Walters said that he could foresee a Germany united within five years – not three months, but five years. The press spokesman at the State Department made a statement to the effect that Ambassador Walters's words did necessarily represent the policy of the United States. In several instances, he felt rebuked by Baker, not supported by Baker, and cut off from accurate information about deliberations in Washington and in the two-plus-four talks. I can remember one awkward moment in the Ambassador's residence in Bonn when Bob Zoellick basically refused to brief Walters on the status of the two-plus-four talks. On a couple of occasions, Walters got notes from the President in which Bush expressed support.

Q: Baker had the reputation of having a small coterie around him – Zoellick, Margaret Tutwiler, and others who were around him and in a way were more protective of Baker than of American policy. It made for a rather frosty relationship with others. Of course, Walters was such a powerful figure in himself.

WARD: Walters and Baker were opposite personality types. Baker was extremely controlled, the ultimate lawyer, very careful with words, a person of not many words. And here is Walters, this gregarious, huge man of great wisdom and many, many words and stories and languages. Baker was a linear thinker who did business on a micro level. He looked at all the factors in the equation. Walters was a non-linear thinker who looked at the big picture. Of course, he read the current news, but what kept him up at night was reading history. For example, he sought to learn about Russia by reading accounts like that of the Marquis de Custine, who traveled through Russia in the early nineteenth century. He was passionate about history, about what the events of 200-300 years ago could tell us about contemporary problems. That was a very different approach from the Baker team approach. You needed both, but unfortunately they didn't get along. In the spring of 1991, after the Gulf War, Walters told the President that he would like to leave his post as soon as a successor could be named. He left in July.

You asked about relations between East and West Germany in terms of the U.S. diplomatic missions. There was one other aspect to this. You had the problem of staffing in Berlin. We had in Berlin a very large mission and a growing embassy. It was clear when we decided to open a unified office in Berlin that would be subordinate to the embassy in Bonn that we would need to cut staff. The view from the West was that most of the German employees in the East were reporting to the East German secret police. Many of them may have been secret police agents. Therefore, they should not be retained. The embassy in East Berlin had a different view. To resolve the problem of both

American and German staffing, I met with the DCM from East Berlin and our Minister in West Berlin. We basically went position by position and defined our personnel needs for the new office in Berlin. Dick Barkley was not happy with the result. He, in fact, basically advocated retaining two ambassadors and two missions even in a unified Germany. That idea seemed to me then just as bizarre as it does today. Unfortunately, some people in the State Department thought it deserved consideration. I had a phone call from Jim Dobbins, who was the principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the European Bureau, who asked why the idea was so bad. After all, maybe there could be an ambassador in Berlin who was in charge of unification problems and another one in Bonn who would be the ambassador in Germany. I said that I didn't think that you needed two ambassadors, and that I thought Ambassador Walters would take the same position. The idea went away.

Q: We were adjusting.
WARD: Yes. Sometimes minds lag behind events. This was a case when history was moving faster than people's minds.

Q: What was your impression of Kohl? Was he the man of the hour?

WARD: Definitely. Kohl understood where this was heading. He was willing to make the political and financial investments to make it happen, and he realized that it had to happen quickly before something else intervened. In fact, had he waited, we would have had the Gulf War and then the breakup of Yugoslavia as additional problems.

Q: How did Kohl and Walters get along?

WARD: Famously. They're similar types, both large, gregarious people. They got along very well. Walters had access to him.

Q: How did Walters and Genscher get along?

WARD: They got along okay. They probably didn't relate as well instinctively to each other as Walters did with Kohl.

Q: What were our economic people saying as Kohl agreed to exchange marks on a one to one basis?

WARD: Our economists in both East and West were telling us how disastrous this was. In an economic sense, it was pretty expensive if not downright disastrous. But Kohl believed that it had to be done for political reasons. Sometimes you do things that are not economically wise out of political necessity, and then you pay a price. Germany has paid a price economically for this. Kohl and the CDU were eventually overcome, in part because of the economic cost of unification.
Q: You were there until when?

WARD: Until July 1992.

Q: Did you almost have to rein in our intelligence people, the station chief and so on? All of a sudden, you're going to have East Germany opening up. It was a treasure trove, but did you try to keep people from being overly greedy?

WARD: To say that we had to rein them in would imply that they were formerly under our control. Fortunately, however, our intelligence services played a constructive role. Given Walters' background, he had a very good relationship with the station chief, and so did I. I had confidence in the other representatives of intelligence and law enforcement who made up the country team. The station played a significant role, most of which is still classified. But there is one aspect that has been in the press and is worth noting. That is the fact that copies of the records of the East German secret police, the *Stasi*, were acquired by the CIA. These records quickly became very important from both an intelligence and a law enforcement point of view.

Q: Like the Berlin Document Center, which housed the Nazi files.

WARD: Exactly. We seem at the end of wars, hot or cold, to be lucky in terms of records. The records of the Berlin Document Center are fascinating in themselves, but the Stasi records were even more important during the unification saga. One of the things that we soon discovered was that we had spies among our non-American employees in the embassy.

Q: Didn't you kind of know it?

WARD: We of course assumed that the Stasi had penetrated our staff, but did not have suspects. It turned out that a German woman employed by one of the Defense Department offices in the embassy had been an agent for 15-20 years, and was responsible for taking thousands of classified documents. Unfortunately, she had an American security clearance. There were a couple of other cases. There was a controversy between the FBI and the CIA over the records. The FBI wanted to gain access to the files for criminal investigative purposes, while the CIA wanted to keep them closely held for intelligence purposes.

Q: In turning people.

WARD: Right. The ambassador and I sought to mediate these disputes from time to time.

Q: Germany was unified on your watch?

WARD: Yes, in October 1990.

Q: How did this play out? Were we watching to make sure that we didn't take too much center stage?

WARD: That wasn't a problem. The Germans understood from the very start that the

United States supported unification. By the time October came along, the hard work of the two-plus-four had been done. All the necessary agreements that replaced the post-World War II four-power agreements within Germany were in place. In some cases such as on troop stationing, these were temporary arrangements that had to be turned into treaties later. But I don't recall anyone needing to be reined in or crowing about our role. It was a German show. It was orchestrated as a German show.

Q: We had had a very significant presence in West Germany since 1945, particularly the Amerika Hauser. I would think that we would want to do somewhat the equivalent in East Germany to bring them up to the same knowledge of the United States and its role with the rest of Germany.

WARD: Remember that East Germany had a smaller population than the largest West German state - 17 million people in a pretty small area. Dick Barkley had put in place a program to open a consulate in Leipzig and also a cultural center. Of course, once unification happened, the large cultural facilities of the mission in Berlin became available to everybody. One touching incident occurred - I remember it from a cable Harry Gilmore sent. When the Wall opened, an East Berlin woman went back and returned library books to the American library in West Berlin that she had taken out before the Wall went up and had been unable to return. There were things like that. People remembered.

In the summer of 1990, before unification, and before the decision was made to move the capital to Berlin, we in Bonn understood where things were headed. Dick Imus, the minister for economic affairs, Harry Geisel, the minister-counselor for administration, and I got together and wrote a report called "Mission 2000." The report was a guide to restructuring the mission after unification. We posited, first of all, that the capital would move to Berlin, and that the embassy would have to follow. Then we recommended restructuring the mission, downsizing it severely, keeping the consulate in Leipzig open, closing some of the facilities in West Germany but keeping a large cultural presence in the country.

Q: This is not quite a propos but is something I've talked to a few people about. Did you notice there was a problem with Germany in the United States in that when Americans go to visit Europe, they go to England, France, Italy, and Spain, but Germany has a reputation as being a bit cold and expensive? Were we monitoring American tourism to Germany?

WARD: We didn't count tourists. We never felt alone there. We had a couple of hundred thousand soldiers and dependents there. So, Germany always felt like a place with a lot of Americans. I always had the impression that because so many Americans had served in Germany in the forces, that created a flow of tourists, both relatives visiting people in the forces and also people who had been in the forces coming back to visit. I never thought Germany was as expensive as France.

Q: Right afterwards, after the unification of Germany, was there a letdown about what to

do next? You have this army sitting there. We knew where everything was, what we were after, and who the enemy was. It's all over now.

WARD: That started, but was quickly interrupted. Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990, even before Germany was unified. Then you had the Balkans begin to come apart. But there was a period in which we had a Foreign Service inspection and the inspectors were emphasizing to us that we really needed to transition to an embassy based on our economic relationship, that politics didn't matter anymore. Nothing could have been further from the truth in terms of what has mattered since. The German-American relationship was very important for shaping the NATO approach to the Balkans, and political relationships were the key to assembling the Gulf War coalition. It was a war for which we received so much financial assistance that we eventually had to prove to the Germans that we didn't make a profit. Frankly, I think that the Defense Department rolled into the cost of the Gulf War a lot of marginally related improvements to our bases in Germany. We certainly repaved a few runways on American airbases in Germany with German money during that time.

Q: What about when the Gulf War came? You were there when Saddam Hussein made his move. How did we react right away? Did you work to get up support? Did the Germans jump right on board as far as condemning this?

WARD: Official Germany jumped right on board right away. Of course, the left didn't. As soon as we began to move forces into the Gulf area, we started to get protests. There was a peace camp set up next to the embassy, a fairly large group of people who sat outside our gates and demonstrated every day. Then the Red Army faction, the RAF, launched an attack against the embassy with automatic weapons. The embassy sits along the Rhine. They pulled up a car on the other side of the Rhine, and like good Germans put out warning triangles to stop traffic. They took a couple of sandbags that they had brought with them and put them on a wall, and then used them as supports for two automatic rifles, with which they fired about 270 rounds at the embassy at about 7:00 pm. Luckily, there were only 75 people in the building. At about 6:45, the ambassador had gone home. At about 6:50, I had followed him out the door. I got home at about 7:00. My wife was on the phone with a good friend, the wife of my Canadian colleague, who lived near the embassy, who was saying, "Peggy, your embassy is being attacked." Peggy looked at me coming in the door and said, "Oh, no, that can't be true because George is here." I said, "Thanks for the faith in me, but maybe I'd better call the embassy." I called Post 1, the Marine guard. Because I didn't want to appear alarmist, I asked only if anything unusual was happening. The guard said something like, "Yes, Sir, we're getting shot at." It was very interesting. The incident started and ended within about two minutes. From both U.S. sources and German police sources, we had reports, later proven false, of people in the woods shooting at us for hours afterwards, so people were down on the floor in the embassy for hours. The attack caused a siege mentality among the American community in Bonn. People felt really threatened. We did everything we could to beef up security, especially at the school. People were fearful for their kids' lives. Of course, once you put police with weapons in the open at a school, the fear gets even higher. We had a lot of town meetings, a lot of sessions with people to try to allay concerns. Even so, we

had some people who really did some fairly irrational things – hoarding groceries, sending their families home.

Q: On the Gulf War, what was the task of the embassy?
WARD: The task of the embassy was to: a) work with the Germans to ensure that we could flow forces out of Germany to the Gulf without difficulty, and b) to gain German financial and material support for the war. For example, Germany placed its railways and barge services at our disposal, gave us the highest priority. They allowed us to load our tanks and armored personnel carriers [APCs] on barges, on trains, with ammunition and fuel uploaded, which is normally not done. It was unusual, but needed to happen because these were vehicles going directly to war. They needed to be ready when they rolled off the ship. So, you saw a constant flow of barges loaded with U.S. military equipment going along the Rhine toward the North Sea and the ports. That was a big job.

The Germans made a large financial contribution to the war. They did not contribute combat forces, but they did provide chemical and biological weapons detection units. They had an excellent vehicle, called the *Fuchs* (Fox), which was designed for that purpose. We arranged to get some of those quickly into our inventory.

Q: Chemical warfare was a very distinct possibility.

WARD: Yes. So those capabilities were very important.

Q: What was Genscher's role in this? How did you find him?

WARD: He was during the Gulf episode very supportive. I can't recall any special difficulties. The Germans did virtually everything we asked. They made exceptions that they never would have contemplated in a normal situation for our forces; they did everything they could.

Q: Did the war play on CNN?

WARD: Yes.
Q: This was the first really televised war.

WARD: Yes. Everybody watched it.

Q: How about the peace movement? Did that dissipate after a while?

WARD: They stayed around. We had demonstrations throughout the time. The German peace movement tends to be persistent.

Q: I think it gives people a chance to put on costumes.

WARD: It didn't represent a major German point of view at the time.

Q: Did Yugoslavia start to come apart when you were there?

WARD: Yes.

Q: This is very important. As a Yugoslav hand, I've interviewed Warren Zimmermann and spent a lot of time in Yugoslavia. Genscher does not come across as the number one hero.

WARD: And neither do the Germans, but neither were we. It was an episode worth thinking about. As Yugoslavia started to fall apart, we in the embassy got very little either in terms of information or instructions to present demarches. I assumed that this was because someone else was staying in touch with the Germans at a high level. In the major European embassies, you have "cabinet lines," direct hookups between the NSC and the National Security Advisors on the European side, and between the heads of government and the President. So, I figured, if we're not discussing these important matters where we clearly have differences of view with the Germans, then this must be being done at a very high level. That illusion was swept away one day in early December 1991, when with the EU, led by the Germans, was on the verge of recognizing Croatia and Slovenia. Kohl's coalition partner, the Bavarian CSU, was pushing particularly hard for this. We received an instruction from the Department to go and tell the Germans in no uncertain terms not to go forward with recognition, to stop doing what they were doing. I was absolutely dismayed. I felt, here we were, not having had the kind of discussions you need to prepare the ground, and we were being asked to present an ultimatum. I delivered that demarche to Jurgen Chrobog, who was political director then and later ambassador to Washington. Chrobog, who became a good friend, later told me, "George, I almost gave you that paper back and told you to leave my office." He was so angry, and I think justly so, because he felt that, here are these Americans, who have not involved us in a dialogue about the future of Yugoslavia in the way they should have, coming in to tell me the day before an important EU meeting is going to happen not to execute the policy that we have carefully planned. The next day, the Germans did exactly what they had planned. They led the EU in the decision to recognize Croatia and Slovenia. We followed suit by recognizing Bosnia.

Q: Often, Genscher has been played as the bad guy, saying this was his thing, but this thing came out of the CSU and not the FDP.

WARD: Yes. Croatia, being a Catholic country, had a lot of influence in the CSU. I know that the CSU pushed hard. Genscher may also have for other reasons.

Q: You never know on these things.

WARD: I'll never forget how strongly Chrobog made his points with me. The ministry always reflected Genscher's views very carefully. But it wasn't simply a Genscher thing.

Q: For somebody who is reading this, CSU stood for what?
WARD: The Christian Social Union, the Bavarian wing of the Christian Democrats.

They're a separate party.

Q: In other words, the subject of Yugoslavia had not been raised.

WARD: The subject had come up, but at the level of first secretary, maybe political counselor. We never had received instructions sufficient to discuss policy in any depth. I think Washington was distracted and hoped the problem would go away. You had the unification of Germany that was still being completed. You had the Soviet Union beginning to fall apart. And you had a war.

Q: Of course, James Baker one day said, "We don't have a dog in that fight."

WARD: Then you had Jacques Poos, the Luxembourg prime minister and President of the European Union. He said something like, "Now is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the United States." Baker must have thought, "Wonderful. I don't want this to be the hour of the United States either. Let's forget about it."

Q: I can remember talking to Larry Eagleburger, another Yugoslav hand. We were saying, "Well, let the Europeans take care of this. It's none of our business."

WARD: The lesson still to this day is that nothing gets done on the security side in Europe unless the U.S. takes the lead. Two administrations tried to evade that truth.

Q: With disastrous results.

WARD: For a lot of people.

Q: This is a good time to stop. We'll pick this up when you left Germany in 1992. Where did you go?

WARD: I became principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs [IO].

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Q: Today is October 10, 2001. You left Germany in 1992. This would have been still within the Bush administration.

WARD: That's right. John Bolton was Assistant Secretary in IO. James Baker was Secretary of State.

Q: What was your job?

WARD: My primary job was to be the alter ego of the Assistant Secretary and to manage the bureau. I also was in charge of United Nations political affairs and peacekeeping.

Q: This was a little outside your purview. How would you put the attitude within the State Department and within the White House toward international organizations, particularly peacekeeping?

WARD: Actually, it was a time at least initially when the administration saw the United Nations and to some extent peacekeeping in a very positive context because we were still coming out of the Gulf War, in which the United Nations had provided very valuable support and legal backing for Desert Storm. The administration had been very active in building a coalition within the United Nations. The Perm Five, the five permanent members of the Security Council, were acting more or less in concert on most issues. Some of the peacekeeping operations, notably ones in Namibia, had been successful in 1990-1991, and the operation in Cambodia seemed to be going relatively well. Somalia had not yet begun.

Q: What was John Bolton's background and how did he operate?

WARD: He is by training an attorney. He was an Assistant Attorney General before he came to the State Department. John was close to the Secretary and was part of the core team that managed the UN during the Gulf War and was very instrumental in the outcomes that we got from UN resolutions. At the end of the Gulf War, he was also one of the principal architects of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 687 and 688 among others, which ended the war. Resolution 688 later became very controversial because different parties interpreted it very differently on the extent to which the United States and others could intervene within Iraq. But John was in many ways skeptical of further, deeper engagement in peacekeeping and certainly skeptical about enlarging the mandate of the United Nations, especially those non-Security Council parts of the UN where we could not play as decisive a role.

Q: Secretary of State James Baker had the reputation of having a rather tight knit core group around him on the seventh floor. How did Bolton fit? Did he have clout within that group?

WARD: I thought John Bolton had considerable clout with James Baker and with his core group up to a certain point. I didn't see anything to disabuse the popular notion that Secretary Baker did operate from within a pretty closed circle of trusted advisors, but I think Bolton had a good deal of credibility with those people.

Q: You were with IO from '92 to when?

WARD: '96.
Q: You really saw all sorts of things.

WARD: Yes. Of course, Secretary Baker resigned during the campaign. Eagleburger first became Acting Secretary and then later Secretary. There was a real watershed on U.S. attitudes towards peacekeeping that's often forgotten. President Bush asked his team to look at the subject of peacekeeping, and they published an NSDD on the subject, maybe

Number 13. Following on from that policy, President Bush gave a speech to the UN General Assembly in September 1992 in which he outlined a fairly ambitious approach to peacekeeping, making clear that the United States was willing under certain circumstances to contribute troops to peacekeeping operations, something that had not in the past been the case. He also tightly limited the circumstances in which we would participate. But the same address also contained proposals for increasing the efficiency of the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations. It was a step forward in peacekeeping that was later picked up by the Clinton administration. Later, after that speech, the emergency in Somalia became front-page news. Actually, the worst of the famine was over by the time CNN focused on the situation. There had been a small United Nations peacekeeping operation of about 500 Pakistani soldiers in Somalia prior to the major intervention around November 1992, but those soldiers were basically stuck at the Mogadishu airport and couldn't be effective in their role, which was to protect the food convoys. The food convoys weren't getting through. The warlords were looting them. This became a major story on television. Pictures of starving children and suffering motivated the U.S. and others to do something. So, we in November 1992 formed a coalition and sponsored a Security Council resolution that authorized the coalition to intervene under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, that is, with the right to use force. That coalition force landed in Somalia during the Bush administration.

Q: What was your feeling and the feeling of the people around you as this developed? Was it that this was a diversion or the wrong place to do it?

WARD: John Bolton seemed to me very skeptical of the idea of intervening. He was in a minority at the level of Assistant Secretary and on the seventh floor of the State Department at the time. He was skeptical that we would be able to get in, do the job, and get out cleanly. Some would say that subsequent history has proven him correct in that respect. He also was skeptical of the concept of intervening on solely humanitarian grounds, of using massive force for humanitarian purposes.

Q: What was your involvement in this?

WARD: I represented the Bureau in most of the meetings in the run-up to the Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force and in planning coalition strategy

Q: Were there people, say, from the African Bureau who were familiar with Somalia saying, "This isn't going to be that easy?"

WARD: There may have been, but I don't recall any people within the African Bureau opposing the intervention. I do recall a cable from our Ambassador in Nairobi, Smith Hempstone that predicted Somalia would become a tar baby for us.

Q: Also the phrase came, "If you liked Beirut, you'll love Mogadishu," Beirut being a real mess.

WARD: Yes. John Bolton was not very active in expressing his doubts. He understood

that the President and the Secretary really wished to intervene.

Q: What about the Department of Defense representatives?

WARD: I recall that once it became clear that the intervention would initially be by a force commanded by the United States, much of their initial hesitancy melted away. We did go in with pretty overwhelming force and actually established an admirable degree of order throughout much of the country, including down to the provincial level. That was a level of security that was not replicated later when the coalition force was replaced by a United Nations peacekeeping force.

Q: Looking at it at the time, how did this develop? The phrase came in, particularly during this operation of "Mission Creep."

WARD: Mission creep and nation building.

Q: Could you talk about what those both mean and also how you saw that and your role?

WARD: I believe that the charge of mission creep is justified in the case of Somalia. We went there with a mission to deliver humanitarian supplies. That later, during the Clinton Administration, turned into a mission to effect a change in the political dynamics by hunting down the leader of one of the principal clans there, Mohammed Aideed. It seems to me that there was an incrementalism that could be thought of as mission creep, one mission sliding into another.

Now, the question of nation building is more or less a canard. In any peacekeeping situation, what you are doing is trying to build a capable state. If you're going to call that nation building, so be it. But, in fact, peacekeeping is about putting things back together, taking states that are failed or divided or in conflict and helping end the conflict and then putting a society back on its feet. Unfortunately because of Somalia, nation building has become a very negative term. Even today, I find that when people want to say it in meetings, they'll call it by another word or apologize for using the term. But in fact we are doing nation building in Kosovo and in Bosnia.

Q: That's what you do. You've got to have something to put it together again.

WARD: I later became ambassador in a nation that was built in large part by the United Nations and a peace operation.

Somalia ran off the tracks early in the Clinton Administration, when the operation came under UN control. In June 1993, Pakistani soldiers attempted to seize a radio station that was being used by Aideed as a propaganda mechanism. They took some fairly serious casualties. That led to a couple of things. First, we reinforced the UN presence in Somalia. This included the insertion of both Ranger forces and the so-called Delta force. It also started a debate over whether there should be heavy armor in the UN force. It led to a *de facto* war against Aideed, which became the driving spirit of the UN operation.

All of this was playing out in the context of a Clinton administration review of peacekeeping policy that started out as a PRD [Presidential Review Directive] and then turned eventually in 1994 into Presidential Decision Directive 25 on Multilateral Peacekeeping. I was involved in the process of writing that policy. Our experience in peacekeeping operations and especially the Somalia operation played very heavily in the shaping the PDD. At the beginning of the Clinton administration, Madeleine Albright, who at that time was ambassador to the United Nations, supported the idea of "assertive multilateralism," which included a heavy commitment to peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. Her people were open to the idea of creating a United Nations Standing Force. At least one staff person at the NSC advocated a debate on that issue in the context of the PRD. Defense and the JCS rejected the idea. I also opposed it.

Q: The Standing Force being the United Nations army.

WARD: That's too strong, but it would have been a force at the disposal of the United Nations, whether based centrally or on call. That particular idea did not get very far anyway given the opposition in other parts of the State Department and in the Defense Department. The Somalia operation began to get more complicated and more violent. We started to take more casualties, and in October 1993 we lost 18 U.S. soldiers in a pitched battle on the streets of Mogadishu. It was an ill-conceived operation that became a watershed for U.S. policy on peacekeeping.

Q: At one point, there was a debate of sending armor in or not. The Clinton administration seemed to be reluctant to get too far into this.

WARD: We did not send our own armor in, but we did ask the United Nations to find other armored forces. We ended up with Malaysian tanks and armored personnel carriers, not as capable as the ones we would have brought. We had part of the 10th Mountain Division there. They were light infantry. On that day in October 1993, the plan was for the Rangers and Delta Force to be inserted by helicopter and to capture certain people who were reported to be meeting in a house in Mogadishu and then to be convoyed out by in trucks and Humvees. The plan went awry when one of the helicopters was downed and the force split itself in order to guard the site of the downed helicopter. They were then attacked. Crowds of thousands gathered. It was hard to distinguish between the crowds and combatants. There was very heavy fire. The force took heavy casualties. Of 90-100 U.S. soldiers, 18 were killed. There were even heavier casualties on the Somali side. The operation lasted one day. An armored force finally extracted the Rangers. Our losses really knocked the wind out of our peacekeeping sails. From that moment forward, the strategy for Somalia as far as I could see was to get out as fast as possible.

Q: In Serbia, when Serbia was being very nasty under Milosevic and we were saying we were going to do something, the Serbs would taunt us with the number 18.

WARD: You're correct. As the drama in Bosnia was playing out, we seemed to be intent upon finding ways not to intervene, not to use force there. Oddly enough, the resolution that authorized the UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia actually was a Chapter 7

resolution. For me, it was an interesting study in human psychology that very often both U.S. officials and UN officials referred to the mandate as a Chapter 6 mandate and literally refused to recognize that Chapter 7 authority was there for them to pick up if they wanted.

Q: The difference between Chapter 6 and Chapter 7…

WARD: Sorry for the jargon. Chapter Six is the part of the United Nations charter that pertains to peaceful settlement of disputes. Historically, Chapter Six has been the justification for peacekeeping operations, operations in which the only force authorized is self-protection. Peacekeeping forces may not use force to impose their will on the contending sides. Chapter Seven deals with threats to international peace and security, and has been used as the authorizing authority for peace enforcement operations such as, for example, the November 1993 operation in Somalia and Desert Storm.

Q: Did you find that as the Somali situation developed, your responsibility for peacekeeping began to have a bad name?

WARD: Oh, sure.

Q: Did they kind of wish you'd go away?

WARD: In some ways, it was that way. In other ways, it was just the opposite. Every geographic bureau in the State Department wanted peacekeeping forces in their own area. The number of peacekeeping operations was going up exponentially. I don't have the compilation of figures here, but there were something like 10-15 UN peacekeeping operations in total before the end of the Cold War and many times more than that afterwards. At one point, there were 80,000 peacekeepers in operations worldwide. There were about 20 operations going on simultaneously. The peacekeeping budget was on the order of two billion dollars a year.

Q: When you say this, it's hard to remember where these were.

WARD: Tajikistan, Georgia, the operations in Western Sahara, in various places in Africa, in the Middle East, a changing array of operations. At one point, there were two operations in Rwanda at the same time. The casualties in Somalia created a chilling effect on the willingness of the Congress to appropriate the funds necessary for peacekeeping. This was at a time also when people in Congress wanted to reduce our level of assessments to the United Nations, and we were starting to get way behind in paying our dues. The United Nations assessed us at over 31% for peacekeeping. At first during my tenure, we were paying at a level of about 28%. Later Congress forced us to go down to the level of 25%, which was the level of our assessment for regular UN dues. There are two UN budgets, one for regular expenses and the other for peacekeeping. We had a larger assessment for peacekeeping than for the regular budget. The differential between our assessment and what we were paying quickly added up to real money. Our arrears to the UN began to grow truly large. That affected the ability of the UN to carry out

peacekeeping and also reimburse those nations that contributed to peacekeeping.

Q: For a lot of countries, Fiji and other places, this was a principal source of income.

WARD: Fiji, Bangladesh, and some African countries needed the money the UN paid for the use of their soldiers. For those countries, the UN rate of reimbursement of $988 per soldier per month was a lot more than their costs.

During this period the Congress also passed some very restrictive legislation on peacekeeping, requiring that before the U.S. voted on a peacekeeping resolution, we had to send the text up to the Hill and give them 15 days notice. We had to manage a difficult process in the United Nations where we weren't able to vote on a resolution overnight; it had to go up to the Hill for consideration. The administration was required to brief Congress once a month on every operation that existed. I did the briefings. Offices in IO and at the Department of Defense put a great deal of effort into assembling these monthly reports. We did full-scale briefings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the House International Relations Committee, and the House Appropriations Subcommittee for State and Commerce. That took a great deal of time.

Q: Where would you be getting good information on peacekeeping in Georgia and Tajikistan?

WARD: From our embassys' reporting and also from the United Nations. The UN operations filed frequent reports. In many cases, we had observers in these operations even if we didn't have troops. There was not a lack of information. The problem was filtering all the information. We would put together a thick briefing book and go up there and deliver it. It was made a matter of record. They were rough briefings because peace operations did not have much support on the Hill.

Q: Were you noticing an increasing spirit of isolationism within Congress?

WARD: There was certainly increasing partisanship. I'm not sure I would call it isolationism. There was intense partisanship, and certainly once the Republicans took control of the House in '95, the attitude toward peacekeeping became yet more difficult. The issues of peacekeeping and UN dues can't really be separated. It was the peacekeeping issue that built the arrears and also built the negative sentiment on Capitol Hill. So, we had working groups within the State Department and interagency on this question. Wendy Sherman was Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations. Secretary Christopher was very involved in this. We devised the concept of what came to be known, unfortunately, as the "grand bargain." It would have been a deal between the Congress and the Executive on both paying our UN dues and imposing restrictions on peacekeeping. The deal would have required the Executive Branch to impose some pretty tight restrictions on peacekeeping and also to reduce the UN budget and keep it under control. I was one of those who negotiated with some of Speaker Gingrich's people on those questions. We actually got pretty far. The problem was that this issue, although

allegedly important to President Clinton, was never important enough for him to engage Gingrich personally. We needed the element of presidential leadership to seal the deal. That never happened. We did end up applying stringent fiscal restraints on the United Nations. For years we had insisted on a no real growth budget. We started to require a no-nominal-growth budget, which in effect meant a reduced budget. We succeeded in that. In fact, one year I had to play the bad guy and withheld instructions from our delegation to agree to the UN budget until it was reduced. They had to stop the clock at midnight on December 31, but we finally got the budget reductions.

Q: How did you find Madeleine Albright as our ambassador to the United Nations? What was her role?

WARD: From the very start, she made clear that she wanted to play a full role as a member of the Cabinet as well as Permanent Representative to the United Nations. The Cabinet role of the United Nations ambassador has shifted over time. In fact, in the latter stages of the Bush administration, Ed Perkins was not a member of the Cabinet. He was the last UN ambassador under Bush. John Bolton told me when I took the job in the IO Bureau that the U.S. mission to the United Nations was an "instructed" mission, that is, a mission that acted on the basis of clear direction from Washington. During the Bush administration, I often played the role of the person who would give very detailed instructions to our Permanent Representative and Deputy Permanent Representative on the content of resolutions. They had very restricted freedom of negotiation. Madeleine Albright, having been brought on as a member of the Cabinet with a more expansive role as PermRep, did not fit that mold. Her mission to the United Nations was an "instructed" mission in name only. It did receive telegrams of instructions from the IO bureau, but more often than not those telegrams followed exactly the line that Madeleine had worked out with the Secretary or with Tony Lake or later Sandy Berger or sometimes with the President himself. I maintained cordial relations with Madeleine Albright. She swore me in as ambassador. I respected her energy and intelligence. But if she didn't like the instructions that were coming out of the bureaucracy, she would get new ones. So, that changed the role of the bureau very considerably. She strengthened the Washington office of the United Nations ambassador. There had always been a Washington office of USUN staffed by a couple of people, but her Washington office grew in size and also in its participation in interagency meetings and in meetings at the White House and National Security Council. Madeleine cut a broad swath on the Washington scene and was very influential. She attended every Cabinet meeting and every so-called Principals Committee meeting. That was also a new thing for the United Nations ambassador.

Q: Were you seeing any tension between Madeleine Albright and Warren Christopher, different thrusts?

WARD: They had different styles. Madeleine was more of an activist, especially at the beginning. She talked about assertive multilateralism, and I had the sense that she believed in it. She – and I think she was on the right wavelength – promoted whenever she could more vigorous U.S. involvement in the Balkans. She saw Milosevic very early on for what he was and wanted to bring him to justice. Christopher was much more

careful. He is a lawyer, he was very careful and circumspect. But the two seemed to share good interpersonal relations. I'm sure they had their differences, but they were never in the open.

Q: Did you all dread CNN? One had the feeling, particularly in things like peacekeeping, thinking about our intervention with the Kurds in Iraq and in Somalia, it was very much driven – and not just in the United States but within Europe, too, by the more starving children you can see, the more pressure there is to get involved.

WARD: Yes. That was certainly true in the case of Somalia – less true, however, in the case of the Balkans and certainly of Rwanda in April 1994. Of course, Rwanda, coming in the wake of Mogadishu, happened at precisely the wrong time. It's a subject that deserves discussion. Here is a situation in which we knew exactly what was happening and decided to take no effective military action.

Q: Could you explain what was happening?

WARD: Yes. Let me start in January 1994. Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott took a trip to Africa, including Rwanda. Doug Bennett, who was the Clinton administration's first Assistant Secretary for International Organizations, a wonderful man who is now the president of Wesleyan University, went on the trip with Talbott. Doug came back and said to me, "This place is going to blow up." He had been in the Kigali market where you could buy an AK- 47 or a hand grenade for almost nothing. Weapons were just all over the place. It was clear to him that tensions were such that things were going to blow up. Later, probably in the very last days of March or very early days of April, in a mysterious incident that's never been fully clarified, the presidents of both Rwanda and Burundi were killed in a plane crash near the Kigali airport. They were returning together from an OAU meeting. The plane crash turned out to be the trigger for a very well orchestrated plot by Hutu extremists to slaughter Tutsis. That needs some explanation. The Hutus are about 85% of the population of Rwanda. The Tutsis are about 15%. There was a civil war in which the Tutsis, organized militarily in the Rwandan Patriotic Front, had fled Rwanda to Uganda and then had reentered Rwanda to fight the Hutu-led government. The United Nations had put in place two peacekeeping operations, one within Kigali to separate the two sides that were talking to each other, and the other between the forces in the field. In that context, with the United Nations already in Rwanda, the plane crashes, the presidents are killed, the Hutu extremists begin to take action using information broadcast by so-called hate radios, one of which was called Radio *Milles Collines* [French: Thousand Hills], which broadcast not only hate vitriol but also instructions on what to do. The plan was to kill not only Tutsis, buy also Hutu moderates. It began very quickly with large-scale slaughter in Kigali, and then spread through much of the country. The reporting from the embassy in Kigali was superb, even heroic. It was a very violent situation. Hundreds of thousands of people were being killed. We had real-time information, not exact numbers, but it was very clear that genocidal-type violence was going on. In the wake of the outcome in Somalia - and by the way, by then we had pulled out of Somalia with our tail between our legs - there was no effective voice raised with a plan for effective United States action in Rwanda. Another factor in the equation was that

Belgium was a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council during this episode. Belgium was the ex-colonial power in Rwanda and participated in the peacekeeping force that was in Kigali. Several Belgian peacekeepers tried to give shelter to the prime minister, who was a moderate. They were taken captive. The prime minister, a woman, was killed. The Belgian peacekeepers were first tortured and then killed.

The government in Belgium insisted frantically on a new Security Council resolution that would authorize the withdrawal of the existing UN peacekeeping forces in Rwanda. So, at a time when we might have been thinking about what to do about the violence, the Belgian pressure was causing us to concentrate on getting the force out. That was certainly the personal focus of Madeleine Albright. The Belgians got their resolution, which officially left the United Nations in a position of having no peacekeeping forces in Rwanda except those who wished to stay. The Ghanaians agreed to stay. The Canadian general stayed. But the Belgians left. No one within our government advocated an effective plan for intervention. Under Secretary Tim Wirth, who Christopher had placed in charge of the crisis, convened meeting after meeting searching for a way to intervene. He got nowhere, in part because the Defense Department offered no options. I don't know whether that might have changed had there been more effective intervention at the presidential level or perhaps at the level of Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Advisor. The fact is that this crisis was handled mostly at the Under Secretary/Assistant Secretary level. There was very little discussion of effective intervention. The course of action that was decided upon, upon the urging of National Security Council senior director Richard Clarke, was the so-called "adopt-a-battalion" plan. This was an effort in which the U.S. and various European countries would help train and equip African peacekeeping battalions for Rwanda. Our role was to provide the Ghanaians with M-113 armored personnel carriers. Even though the order to procure the M-113s was supposed to be an emergency one, it took months to get the APCs to Africa. By the time the Ghanaians got them, the genocide was over. A lot of people have apologized, including President Clinton, for what happened in Rwanda. Some leaders have implied that they did not know what was going on there. That is not true. We knew exactly what was going on and took no effective action

Q: Didn't it happen so quickly that, to be realistic, even if everybody had been on board, it would have been pretty hard to get anything in place?

WARD: That's a factor. The violence started fast and spread fast, but it did take a couple of weeks to engulf the whole country. I don't agree with Canadian General Romeo Dallaire, the commander of the UN peacekeeping force, who said if he had had an effective brigade, he could have stopped the genocide. I'm not sure that that would have been possible. But I do tend to think that a force with heavy firepower – that would connote something like at least APCs and attack helicopters – had been inserted quickly, some of the violence could have been stopped. Only the U.S. could have provided such a force on short notice. We chose not to do so basically because we had not recovered from the debacle in Mogadishu. The genocide in Rwanda ended only when the Rwandan Patriotic Front succeeded militarily. They came in and won the civil war. Then all the Hutu extremists and their people became refugees in Eastern Zaire around Goma. This

produced a large humanitarian emergency.
Q: There were reports of hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees out in a rather barren area of the Eastern Congo and scattered around and inside that were genocidal Hutu troops. It made a very complicated situation.

WARD: It led to a very complicated situation. The way we intervened showed just how complicated it was. When the extent of the humanitarian disaster around Goma became clear, we realized that the UN High Commissioner for Refugees wouldn't be able to deal logistically with the situation effectively on her own. The only agency able to deliver food fast enough to relieve the starvation was the United States Air Force. So, our forces went in to Goma with a huge relief effort that lasted for a few weeks. They were pulled out without interagency consultation just as rapidly as they had gone in. I was at an interagency meeting in which most people around the table thought they were there to extend the U.S. military mission in Goma. When we woke up the next morning, our forces were gone from Goma. Granted, it was a very tenuous situation. You did have the potential for violence with the Hutu militias. You also had the moral dilemma of feeding people who had a lot of blood on their hands from the slaughter of the Tutsis. The new government of Rwanda, which was Tutsi-led, put together a program to allow refugees to return and many did return. Many of them returned under international supervision without excessive violence.

Q: It went quite well?

WARD: Compared to what had preceded. Compared to the fact that hundreds of thousands of Tutsis had been killed, it worked very well. But the militias remained in the eastern Congo and sowed the seeds for the war that later began in the Congo and continues today.

Q: How could the Air Force or the Army just plain pull out? It's a governmental thing.

WARD: That's a good question. I'm sure there is a story there, but they just left, and some very high level folks were surprised. They left UNHCR with a first-class security problem.

Q: What was your impression of the various NGOs that were involved in that? Did you have anything to do with them?

WARD: I didn't really. My colleague in the Bureau, Melinda Kimble, who was Deputy Assistant Secretary for the social and economic side of the United Nations, did more with the NGOs. I think at the time it was clear that the NGOs were the principal implementers of the relief policy and they were pretty courageous and doing it as best they could.

Q: Are there any other areas? There had been peacekeeping in Cambodia and the Middle East, the Kurds…

WARD: The Kurdish operation was not a United Nations peacekeeping operation. It was

a U.S. coalition operation that was maintained under that controversial resolution, UN Security Council Resolution 688. This was the resolution that we used in the immediate aftermath of the war to belatedly protect the Shiites. It was used to set up both the northern and the southern no-fly zones in Iraq. It also became the justification for the Provide Comfort operation, which provided aid and protection to the Kurds. It was a continuation of the coalition's wartime authority. At least the British and the United States interpreted it that way. The Russians, the Chinese, and to some extent the French disagreed with that interpretation and felt that 688 had lapsed. Those differences on the interpretation of UNSCR 688 lie at the root of the contention over Iraq policy.

There were many other peacekeeping operations. I don't think it would be worthwhile to go through each one. The ones that dominated were Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda.

Q: What was your impression of the United Nations as an organization in your bailiwick, peacekeeping?

WARD: At the time, there were 185 members. There are now 190. The United Nations often acts exactly as you would think a committee made up of 185 members would act. It is not efficient, and it never will be in a strict sense because it is a coalition of many sovereign voices. The Secretariat is a melting pot of nationalities. Under Secretary General Kofi Annan, who was the head of peacekeeping operations in that era, always impressed me. Boutros Boutros-Ghali was Secretary General. He was our choice, albeit a compromise, as Secretary General, but soon proved very disappointing from the American point of view, especially to Madeleine Albright. In 1992, he published a booklet called the *Agenda for Peace*, which was revised in 1995. The *Agenda for P*eace still stands as a very important document because it defines what we mean by peace operations. So, that was a positive contribution made by Boutros-Ghali. He later proved to be an obstacle in many ways for United States policy. Madeleine Albright in particular did not get along with him. In the case of Somalia, it is fair to say that he pursued Egyptian interests at the expense of international ones.

Even though the UN peacekeeping operation remained problematic, it came a long way under the direction of Kofi Annan. I remember that during the Cambodian peacekeeping operation in 1992, the UN Special Representative for Cambodia, Akashi, came to Washington for a talk. He commented that when he called up UN headquarters from Cambodia, there was no one to answer the phone because of the time difference. That predated the establishment of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. There was no operations center or watch officer system. To get action, the Special Representative would have to contact Under Secretary General for Political Affairs Goulding. God forbid that Goulding might be out for the evening. If he was, there was no way to get instructions. There were no secure communications. One of the initiatives taken by the Bush administration and continued by the Clinton administration was to set up the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and then to equip it with a 24-hour operations center. During the time I was involved, one of the positive things that happened was that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO, became more and more capable. They set up secure communications. They set up rudimentary methods of information

exchange. The UN doesn't deal with intelligence, but they will take information. So, things like that were done. Things started to get better. The U.S. and other developed countries seconded at their own expense about 100 military officers to DPKO. That really started to tighten things up. Unfortunately, the powerful non-aligned bloc (G-77) in the General Assembly took umbrage at the dominance of developed-world personnel in DPKO. After I left the IO bureau, the G-77 succeeded in forcing DPKO to get rid of all those people who were seconded. DPKO basically deflated almost overnight, and lost a great deal of capability. A year ago, I heard that two people in New York were supervising something like 8,000 United Nations police worldwide.

Q: I'd like to turn to the Balkans now.

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Today is October 25, 2001. George, you were in IO from when to when?

WARD: I was in IO from July 1992 until July 1996.

Q: The Balkans were beginning to come apart just about the time you came on.

WARD: That's correct.

Q: There has been a lot of talk about Jim Baker, our Secretary of State, saying, "We don't have a dog in that fight." Many of us, myself included, my visceral reaction was, "God, let's stay out of this thing." The Europeans were making statements about how, "We're big boys now. We can take care of this." From the IO perspective, were you seeing the Balkans as a place where you all were going to get involved?

WARD: We were involved certainly politically and diplomatically, but you're correct in saying that both in the Bush administration and early in the Clinton administration, there was a tendency to not get involved militarily. That meant leaving the UN in the lead. That meant that we had to be content with an operation that was carried forward at a low level of effectiveness and with insufficient force to even fulfill the limited mandate that existed.

Q: On either side, we had a couple of young officers who eventually resigned. Interestingly enough, they hadn't served in Yugoslavia, but they felt very strongly that we should do something. What was happening in IO? Were you getting any of this? Or was it still trying to prod the United Nations to do more?

WARD: We were doing both. We were prodding the United Nations to do more, but I certainly felt myself and dealt within the Bureau with people who felt that we weren't doing enough. I can remember at one point sending a memo forward recommending that we take a much more forceful stance in the UN, insisting on fulfillment of the Chapter Seven mandate. One of the key United Nations Security Council Resolutions for Yugoslavia actually gave UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia a Chapter Seven

mandate, but it was interpreted in a way that the mandate was never used. I remember a conversation with the general in charge of United Nations forces in which I commented, "Well, you had a Chapter Seven mandate to exercise if you wished." He disputed that, saying there was no Chapter Seven mandate, and that they only had Chapter Six authority.

Q: Could you explain the difference?

WARD: Chapter Six is the part of the United Nations charter that deals with the peaceful settlement of disputes. Chapter Six had been the traditional justification for pure peacekeeping operations, ones in which the mission of the peacekeeping force is simply to separate and perhaps to disarm and demobilize the combatants, but not to use force except to protect itself, self-defense. Chapter Seven of the UN charter deals with challenges to peace and security. It has been used as the legal basis for peace enforcement operations. The UN could have been doing peace enforcement in the Balkans, but limited itself to peacekeeping in part because the United Nations commanders and the United Nations special representatives to the Secretary General felt that they did not have the military strength to do more than that.

Q: There was horrendous example after horrendous example of what were warlords, particularly on the Serbian side, around Sarajevo, who were pushing the United Nations aside. It seemed like the United Nations' main object was to keep out of the line of fire and maybe even prolong the situation.

WARD: The historical record will show that Milosevic managed the actions of the Bosnia Serbs pretty skillfully from Belgrade. They did shove the UN around from time to time. Milosevic successfully modulated his bullying so as never to create a situation in which the UN would have been forced to act against him in a definitive way. He managed on the one hand to wage what some have called genocide while at the same time maintaining decent diplomatic relations with all the players in this game.

Q: Was there a concurrent, besides the United Nations, European Union operation going on?

WARD: The European Union discussed the matter extensively in its political fora. They basically operated through the United Nations. No decisive actions were agreed until the situation degenerated to a point at which the plight of the Bosnian Muslims trapped in Sarajevo became truly dramatic. The pace of Serb ethnic cleansing picked up and Serb forces used force to attempt to cow the UN peacekeeping force into acquiescence. When the Serbs took UN peacekeepers hostage, NATO finally intervened, at first with air strikes, which caused the Serbs to become more entrenched and take more hostages and put them at sites that they felt likely to be bombed, and finally with the Rapid Reaction Force, which for the first time placed NATO combatant forces on the ground with the mission of breaking the siege around Sarajevo, which was done successfully. Then concurrently, there was a major effort underway to strengthen the Croatian army using private U.S. resources, companies basically made up of retired American and other

military personnel who trained the Croatian army to the point where the Croatians were able to launch an offensive against Serb forces in the Knin area, causing the Serb population to flee and for the first time introducing into Milosevic's calculation the possibility that he might be militarily defeated. All of these factors drove the situation toward the Dayton negotiation.

Q: What was your role until major force went in?

WARD: The role of IO before the operation became a NATO operation was to manage Security Council business and U.S. participation and support for peacekeeping operations. We were involved in writing an interminable series of Security Council resolutions. That business was a fairly disheartening endeavor because we made a lot of empty threats. The Security Council was forever instructing the Secretary General to take steps in peacekeeping without providing the resources. For example, there was a resolution passed in late 1994 to protect so-called safe areas within Bosnia. Certain towns that were under extreme military pressure from the Serbs were designated as safe areas, among them Srebrenica. Tragically, some of these towns became the opposite of safe areas. An expansion of UNPROFOR for the purpose of protecting the safe areas was authorized. The Security Council instructed the Secretary General to get the job done. The fact is that hardly any country volunteered to provide the extra forces needed for the operation. So, the UN, even when it had the will, did not have the wherewithal. There were few profiles in courage during this period.

Q: What was this doing to you and your coworkers? You've got a situation which, if nothing else, was seen on TV with snipers, particularly Serbian snipers, happily shooting at women running across the street. Then you had things like the marketplace explosion and then Srebrenica, which killed about 5,000 and was a real genocide, where Dutch troops were too few and didn't act very well. Whatever it was, it didn't work out well. But here you have what appears to be a Congress that's not giving you much support. In fact, Congress is spending most of its time going after the UN, going after government workers. They were pretty nasty people. This was the Newt Gingrich revolution. This had to have some effect on you.

WARD: I stayed in IO for four years. I find multilateral diplomacy interesting, a fascinating multi-tiered game. In my view, the U.S. government did not lead in the way we should have early in the Yugoslav episode. A lot of people should share in the blame. We were driven by events rather than driving them. We had the wherewithal, especially early in the game, to militarily dominate the situation. We failed to do it. The kind of military force that was later used, if used earlier, would have saved many lives. The Serb forces in Bosnia were never large, nor were they very effective militarily.

Q: As an old Yugoslav hand, it seemed like the Serbs spent an awful lot of their time sitting on top of hills shooting at artillery in a haphazard way like a bunch of mountaineer rednecks.

WARD: You can think of them as mountaineer rednecks or simply thugs who were

bound together in a cause. Had they encountered serious military force, I just have to believe the situation would have been very different. At one point, having read an analysis that showed something like 30,000 Serb troops on the ground in Bosnia, I asked the three-star general who was the J-3 at the Joint Staff, "What would it take to defeat this force?" He said, "About 100,000 people." I said, "That would be possible for NATO." He said, "Yes." The reason it didn't happen is political.

Q: At this point, the Soviet military threat… The Soviet Union was over.

WARD: The war in the Gulf was over. We had the military capability, but there was no political consensus.

Q: You had a major military contingent in Europe.

WARD: That's right. The drawdown had not yet progressed to the point where it is today. Another problem was the rocky beginning to the relationship between the new Clinton administration and our military leaders. We've all read about the general who was confronted by a young Clinton administration staffer who said, "Around here, we don't like the military" or something like that. I don't know for a fact that that was true, but I did see instances in which political appointees demonstrated a profound lack of understanding for the military, its culture and its capabilities. Once the military stiffened and made it clear that they didn't like to be treated that way, the civilians began to run scared. A great deal of deference was shown to the military. Of course, the generals were not interested in getting involved in another war.

Q: Vietnam and then particularly the Somalia episode had seared the military commanders.

WARD: They were worried and with some justification that unless they made the case for not intervening, they would be sent in everywhere. I heard in interagency meetings beyond Yugoslavia all sorts of proposals for the U.S. military to do this and that – "While you're not busy elsewhere, could you go down to this country and fix this situation?" So, there was a lack of good communication. There was a lot of misunderstanding and distrust.

Q: Who was the head of IO?

WARD: The Assistant Secretary at the beginning of the Clinton administration was Doug Bennett. I was acting from January through May 1993. Doug came on in May 1993. He left in May 1995. Then I was acting from May 1995 to the time I left in 1996. Doug was offered the presidency of Wesleyan University, and, as an alumnus, jumped at it. He is a wonderful man and a real idealist who believed in the United Nations. He was chagrined at the refusal of the Congress, but also of the Clinton administration, to exercise the political will needed to support the United Nations and to support multilateral peacekeeping.

Q: You were in an interesting position. I somehow have the feeling that IO has been staffed by people with just regular assignments such as you, but also a cadre of true believers in the UN within the State Department complex. Did you find that they were oriented towards military intervention? Was it a hard group to deal with?

WARD: The IO Bureau is about 50% Civil Service and 50% Foreign Service. There are more civil servants than in many other policy bureaus. Most of the Civil Service people dealt with the economic, social, and developmental aspects of the United Nations. They were committed to the UN. I didn't necessarily go to IO as an advocate of the United Nations, but I believed it could be a useful instrument of U.S. foreign policy. I do remember being interested in the UN even as a child. My aunt and mother took me to hear Dwight Eisenhower address the General Assembly. I thought that was a pretty neat thing. I didn't find difficulty in working with the group in IO. We had a good group of people. Because peacekeeping was seen as an important endeavor, we attracted to the offices that dealt with UN political issues, specifically the Office of UN Political Affairs (IO/UNP) and the Office of Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations (IO/PHO), a new office that I was able to start, some very good people.

Q: I assume you had American military seconded to the United Nations.

WARD: Yes.

Q: This must have been a frustration for them, too.

WARD: There were some grounds for optimism and inspiration. During this time, we made an effort to upgrade and professionalize the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the United Nations Secretariat, and we seconded dozens of American officers to the UN, where they had the great challenge of setting up a real military headquarters. They put together a situation center, for example. We gave the UN communications equipment that it didn't have before, and put the United Nations in a position at least to begin to control forces over distances of thousands of miles. American officers who had been assigned to the United Nations as observers in peacekeeping operations, for example in the Middle East, became quite committed to the role of military observers in keeping the peace. We should also not forget that even in the Balkan context, there was one very successful operation, and that was UNPREDEP in Macedonia. That was the first and up to now only force dispatched by the UN to prevent a conflict, in this case a Serbian invasion of Macedonia. We had an American infantry unit in UNPREDEP. It worked quietly and very well. Congress was happy with it. The presence of the Americans in that force was a key factor in preventing Serb aggression.

Q: Was there concern on the military and also the civilian side about the political people calling too many shots? Once you insert military, then you start having the lawyers and the politicians, which is usually a negative factor.

WARD: There was always a lot of debate about objectives and end states. Naturally, the military wants to know its objective. Civilians sometimes have a hard time understanding

that if you give a military force a mission, you have to be very clear about the objective and state exactly what it is you want them to achieve. That is the way they operate. Because the civilian side was so indistinct and difficult to read, the military began to be very fearful of undertaking new missions. When I say "military," I mean Joint Chiefs of Staff. They began to ask questions about things like desired end states and exit strategies. That debate became fairly counterproductive. In any military situation, whether it's peacekeeping or war, the exact timing and circumstances of the conclusion cannot be predicted. You can define objectives, but you can't define in advance the end state. The debates on the subject often became very time consuming and resulted in inaction.

Q: You say the military was getting more and more demanding. How were we reacting to this? What role were you all playing?

WARD: It depended upon the peacekeeping operation. In the Balkans, the IO role diminished very sharply when NATO assumed operational control from the UN. The European Bureau managed the Dayton negotiations. It was not a United Nations show in any way, shape, or form. The UN was asked to pass certain resolutions at the end. In other peacekeeping operations, we maintained a very active role. We often found ourselves paradoxically asking the tough questions that we felt the regional bureaus didn't ask when they demanded peacekeeping operations. There were some operations that we felt ought to have been curtailed or shut down. We were under pressure from the Congress to close down some operations. One particularly unpopular operation on Capitol Hill at the time was the one in the Western Sahara, which had gone nowhere for years. The dispute was between Morocco and the Polisario Liberation Front, which wanted to create a Saharawi Republic. Both sides sought to manipulate the UN, and neither was interested in serious negotiations. From the IO point of view, we felt that the Near East Bureau should have been more willing to put pressure on the government of Morocco to create a real peace process. Likewise, we felt that some of the Middle East observer operations should have been downsized to save some money. In some of the African operations, we were very conscious of the costs over the duration of the operation.

Q: Did you get involved peripherally in our Sinai force, which was not under the United Nations for pretty obvious reasons. Going back to the '67 War, the Israelis had no faith in the United Nations, but yet in a way it was all part and parcel of the same thing.

WARD: You're correct. That was not a UN operation, so it didn't fall under the United Nations budget. We were not involved in the Sinai force.

Q: Going back to the Balkans, what happened on the ground in the Balkans that got NATO into it?

WARD: It was a progressive process driven by events. After the atrocity in the market in Sarajevo and with the constant sniping at innocents in the streets of that city, the U.S. and our closest allies decided that NATO military intervention was necessary. NATO indicated to the United Nations that it was willing to put together the Rapid Reaction

Force, which consisted in large part of British artillery and U.S. airpower. There were some British troops on the ground also. That force was authorized by the UN to break the siege of Sarajevo. Even then, it was very tough to get money through the Congress. I remember the day when we had a call from the Secretary's office saying that Richard Holbrooke and I had to go up to the Senate to testify about the proposed appropriation to fund the Rapid Reaction Force. It was an interesting experience to go up to the Hill with Richard Holbrooke, who was of course the center of attention at the hearing. He succeeded in freeing up the money for the Force, but the Congress eventually placed stringent limitations on our ability to spend money for peacekeeping. Perhaps influenced to some degree by opinions they heard from U.S. military sources, Senators grilled us about objectives, end states, and exit strategies. They wanted us to predict the future in some detail.

After the Rapid Reaction Force was deployed, the situation in Sarajevo improved, but there was another setback yet to come – the massacre in Srebrenica. The Dutch UNPROFOR battalion in Srebrenica was nervous. They felt isolated and knew that other peacekeepers had been held hostage. They had been deployed to Srebrenica in fulfillment of the Secretary General's pledge to create and protect "safe areas" for Bosniacs (Bosnian Muslims). However, they did not have the strength necessary to fulfill their mission. A much larger force of Serbs surrounded them. To make matters worse, Bosniac militants used the safe areas as bases from which to launch attacks against Serbs. The Serbs succeeded in surrounding Srebrenica and demanded that the Dutch leave. The Dutch finally complied, leaving vulnerable the people they had been protecting. As we all know, thousands of men and boys were killed either on the spot or as they attempted to make their way back to Bosniac lines. That massacre was an action-forcing event that led to increased NATO and U.S. willingness to use force and also helped convince us to use our diplomatic clout in order to put together a real peace negotiation.

Q: With Congress, particularly after the '94 election, was this a new isolationism? What was driving them?

WARD: Some of the newly elected Republicans probably could be described as isolationist, but I don't think that characterized the Republican leadership in Congress. In fact, we worked constructively at a staff level with Gingrich's people on the so-called "grand bargain" that would have tied payment by the U.S. of our arrears in the UN budget to the administration's acceptance of more stringent rules for making decisions on peacekeeping operations and efforts to reduce the UN's budget. We made a great deal of progress with the Gingrich staff on that issue. At the State Department, this was an effort that was backed by Secretary Christopher. Every time we got back from a meeting with Gingrich's staff, we did a report for Christopher. He looked at the materials that we were presenting. We put together a dog and pony show of facts and figures about the UN for Gingrich's people. At one point, in 1995, we were awfully close an agreement in principle, but the President needed to make a phone call to the Republican leadership. That phone call just never happened. It seemed to me at the time that the political air was so poisonous that both sides preferred maintaining their dispute to resolving it. In fact, the agreement on paying our UN dues that happened years later was very close to what we

had come up with. Perhaps partisanship receded a bit.

Q: How about the role of Jesse Helms in this?

WARD: Certainly at the time he was no friend of the UN, although I guess he and Madeleine Albright later got on pretty well. Every month, I had to go up to the Hill and testify to the staff on UN peacekeeping. At some point, the Republican staff on the Senate side got the idea that they needed to hold us to exactly what we said. They began using a court reporter at the briefings. We were not required to testify under oath, but they created a transcript of each of these meetings. They gave us an opportunity to review and change the record. I say that to illustrate that there was a certain amount of mistrust. I always had good personal relations with everyone on Senator Helms' staff. I felt that we were all basically interested in the good of the nation, but they certainly were distrustful of the administration's intentions.

Q: In '96, you left IO. What happened?

WARD: I had been in IO for four years and decided that either I was going to stay there forever, or I'd have to find another assignment. The system seemed quite willing to leave me there forever. It was, however, a pretty strenuous job, and you only have so much energy.

I began to look around for a chief of mission assignment. In 1996, there were no attractive opportunities in Europe. I thought, well, I'd really like to go to a place that had been the site of a successful UN peacekeeping operation. After having sometimes felt like I was banging my head up against a wall on the subject of peacekeeping, I wanted to see where it had been successful. There was an opportunity to do that in Namibia. I expressed a preference to be assigned as chief of mission in Namibia, and luckily I was appointed after the usual lengthy process. I think the process started in October 1995. I didn't go out to post until July 1996.

Q: You were there from '96 until when?

WARD: '99.

Q: Could you just give a brief summary of the UN peacekeeping experience in Namibia?

WARD: Yes. Namibia was for several decades a German colony. It was placed under South African control by a League of Nations mandate after World War I, having been occupied by a British/South African force during World War I. The League of Nations mandate was taken over by the UN when the UN was created, but South Africa violated the terms of the mandate and the UN's relationship with South Africa deteriorated from 1945. It reached a point at which the UN declared South Africa's role in Namibia to be illegal. That didn't change anything right away, but over time it meant that the UN began to support at least politically the liberation forces in Namibia, the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO), which started as the Ovambo People's Liberation

Organization. By the late 1970s, with Cuban forces in Angola, SWAPO began to use Angola as a safe haven. They began to wage a guerrilla war against the South Africans, who turned Namibia into a military bastion for operations in Angola. All along Namibia's northern border, you find these airfields with 10,000 runways, which you usually don't find around Africa. In the early '80s, at the beginning of the Reagan administration, a young Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs named Chester Crocker was appointed. Crocker saw ending the war as his primary task. Chet became a power broker, a mediator, and a protagonist in the Southern African conflict. He negotiated with the South Africans, the Russians, the Cubans, the Angolans, and others in search of an agreement. He worked through a so-called Contact Group of Western nations and succeeded in bringing the conflict to a conclusion. As a result, Namibia became independent on March 21, 1990. By then, the leader of SWAPO, Sam Nujoma, was already head of the Namibian constituent assembly. When the assembly approved the new constitution, Nujoma became president. Parliament was elected through free and fair elections. Namibia was launched. When I got there, Namibia was six years old.

Q: Namibia doesn't rank very high in terms of American interests. What was the state of relations?

WARD: Namibia was an interesting place. Many of Namibia's leaders had been educated in the U.S. because they were sent to American universities under UN scholarships. For example, the Namibian foreign minister is married to an American. He has a degree from an American university. The Namibian prime minister has a degree from an American university. That was also the case with several others. There was degree of acquaintance and familiarity with the U.S. that was unusual in Africa. At the same time, in the back of their minds, they remembered that we had not supported their liberation cause through much of their struggle. In fact, the U.S. had pursued a policy called "constructive engagement" with South Africa. The Namibians felt that constructive engagement with South Africa meant destructive engagement for them. So, there was both warmth and a little bit of distance. You're correct in saying that the U.S. interests in the area were limited. Our interest was in stability, in keeping Namibia in the democratic column in Africa, where they were not many countries on that side. When I went there, Namibia was one of the two or three democracies on the continent of Africa. Namibia was a place where there was a free press, a free judiciary, where the government regularly lost cases in court and accepted defeat, where the press criticized the government and was not shut down. Over time, unfortunately, the trends in Namibia did not develop in a positive way in any of those areas. I saw increasing attempts to intimidate the press, attempts by the executive to stretch the constitution. But all in all, Namibia remained a democracy, a place where people lived without fear of the government.

Q: What was our embassy like as a mission?

WARD: The mission was quite small. There were about 25 Americans, including 12 from State and a USAID mission. The USAID mission had quite a number of FSN employees. There were around 100 employees total in the Mission. We also had a large Peace Corps contingent. At one time, it was as high as 140 volunteers, one of the largest

programs in Africa. The USAID program focused on education, environment, and the development of civil society. Because the Windhoek embassy was organized when our foreign affairs budget was on a shoestring, we had a limited FSN staff and few resources. The theory was that the embassy would contract out for services. That turned out to be one of the more frustrating parts of running the mission. Possibilities of contracting out in an effective manner, even in a place as well developed as Windhoek, were limited. So, you had to live from day to day.

Q: What was Namibia like? I think of it as being the great western desert.

WARD: There are two deserts in Namibia, which is twice the size of California. The Kalahari Desert is shared with Botswana and South Africa. The Kalahari Desert is a scrub desert. There is the occasional tree and grass. Then there is the Namib Desert, which is a typical sand desert. It is one of the most stable geological formations in the world. It hasn't changed in millions of years. That desert runs right down to the sea. Windhoek, the capital, is located on the large central plain, which is 5,000-6,000 feet high. The plain is a dry savanna, which also looks a lot like a desert to the uninitiated. It's a country with quite a few resources. There are diamonds, natural gas, and uranium. They have a large fishing industry. They have a coastline with a couple of interesting German-flavored towns on it. The population is under two million. If the Namibians can keep their act together on the economic side and maintain a free political system, they could have a bright future.

Q: How did you find dealing with the government?

WARD: It really depended on which issue. I was told when I got there, "Don't deal with the Namibian military. They're hopeless." I soon discovered that one of the highest priority issues for the country was getting rid of land mines and unexploded ordnance left over from the war. This was an area in which the U.S. military could help. In fact, my predecessor had asked the U.S. European Command to send Special Forces advisers and instructors to train the Namibian army in de-mining techniques. I continued and intensified the program, and persuaded the State Department and the U.S. European Command to sign on to a common goal that Namibia should be made mine-safe. If we were successful, Namibia would be the first African country to complete a de-mining program. By the way, we avoided the use of the term "mine free," because that would imply that we could be successful in removing every one of the hundreds of thousands of land mines that were present in the country. We used instead the term "mine safe," which was a UN standard. With the help of the U.S. Army, especially the Special Forces, and funding from the Department of State, we pulled together enough resources for a comprehensive de-mining program that was accompanied by a thorough public affairs effort on the dangers of land mines and unexploded ordnance. We worked closely with the Namibian Defense Ministry and the Namibian Defense Force. In both cases, I was surprised and pleased by their effectiveness and professionalism. I found working with them to be quite easy. They delivered on promises.

For example, the year before I arrived in Namibia, a Special Forces team taught a de-

mining course for Namibian military engineers. Just before September 30, 1995, the team got an emergency call from Washington with orders to pull out immediately because funding would run out at the end of the fiscal year. The team left forthwith. Subsequently, the Namibians used the training and the equipment that they had been given and went out on their own and cleared about half the minefields in the country. When I got there, we brought a team back and did some more training. The Namibians then completed the de-mining of 10 large minefields. Then we went on to the next phase, which was clearing the mines around 500 electrical pylons along a 250-kilometer electric power line that stretched through a remote area of the country. Again, the Namibian Defense Force performed very, very well.

Dealing with the Namibian foreign ministry was a different story. I remembered the other day in the wake of these terrorist attacks that every year we were asked by the State Department to urge the Namibian government to ratify ten terrorism covenants that had been agreed on internationally. Every year, I would go in to see the Foreign Minister along with allied ambassadors and make a strong case on the importance of ratifying the agreements forthwith. He would promise that they would do it right away. The next year, we would go and do the same thing again because nothing had been done. I checked just the other day with my successor and found that they never got around to ratifying the covenants. So, other parts of the government were less efficient than the Defense Ministry.

Q: Were they able to deliver services?

WARD: They did in most cases. When you visit Windhoek, you see a First World city. In fact, Windhoek is amazingly clean. There is hardly any litter. They have a tradition of good mayors and officials who care about the city. They have events like Citizens Cleanup Day. Even the shantytown areas of Katatura, which was the "township" for Blacks during the days of Apartheid - are supplied with basic services. Potable water was available not only in Windhoek, but in most towns throughout the country. There were reasonable standards of healthcare. Services were delivered. Unfortunately, the healthcare system is breaking down under the pressure of the AIDS epidemic, which is just overwhelming the country. The school system needs work because standards of education for the Black majority under Apartheid were disgraceful. Mathematics, for example, was intentionally taught poorly if at all to Blacks. We had major assistance programs for elementary and secondary education. We were trying to help the Namibians transition from a system based on rote learning to more modern standards. Progress was slow, but there was a great hunger for learning throughout the population.

Q: What was the relation with South Africa? By the time you were there, it had cast off apartheid. Mandela was the president.

WARD: One of Mandela's first acts that earned him a lot of gratitude in Namibia was to give Walvis Bay to Namibia without asking any payment in return. Walvis Bay was a South African enclave on the Namibian coast. It was a port and home to a significant fishing fleet. Walvis Bay had never been Namibian. It had been historically an offshoot

of the Cape colony. So, in giving it to Namibia, Mandela was really extending the hand of friendship. And giving it debt-free was quite extraordinary. In the background, however, there was a love-hate relationship between Namibia and South Africa. Namibia was dependent upon South Africa in many ways – it was in a customs union with South Africa, the Namibian dollar was kept at par with the South African Rand, and South African farms supplied Namibia with foodstuffs. Namibia was self-sufficient only in meat. Because of the linkage with the Rand, Namibia can't exercise its own monetary policy except to a very limited extent. A lot of Namibians go to university in South Africa. President Nujoma of Namibia was not particularly close to Nelson Mandela, although he respected him. Mandela was not his type. Unfortunately, President Nujoma in recent years has decided to emulate Robert Mugabe rather than Mandela, a bad choice in several ways.

Q: You mentioned the AIDS epidemic. Please explain how and why it affected the country.

WARD: HIV/AIDS is a retrovirus that destroys the immune system. At this point, there is no vaccine for it and no cure. There are palliatives that will extend the life of AIDS patients, but they are very expensive. When I got to Namibia, the disease was just beginning to make significant inroads. Because of the way USAID works, it is very difficult for an ambassador to access foreign assistance funds rapidly for emergency purposes. The amounts of money available for contingency purposes were ridiculously small. We had a few large USAID programs, but they were all programmed on a long-term basis. Making changes, even small ones, was like turning a super-tanker. I was lucky enough to have a very creative political officer named Louis Mazel, who had begun a program aimed at curbing gender violence and raising AIDS awareness. We funded the program with our allocation of human rights funds. The program cost surprisingly little money, on the order of $100,000 per year, but had far-reaching results. The problems of violence against women and children and the HIV/AIDS epidemic were closely linked. We convinced the State Department to let us use our human rights fund to launch a multimedia campaign on violence against women and children. In fact, Lou Mazel won the State Department's first Human Rights Award for that program. I supported and continued it after Lou left. The Namibian government was inactive, virtually inert, on the HIV/AIDS issue, and HIV/AIDS sufferers were being ostracized. The Namibians were in denial with regard to HIV/AIDS. The newspapers carried many obituaries of young and middle-aged people each week, but no one was reported as dying of AIDS. They either died "suddenly" or "after a long illness." HIV/AIDS was sometimes referred to as the "wasting disease." HIV/AIDS sufferers were shunned by their neighbors in Windhoek and would return to their home villages. There, they would again find rejection and isolation. People were dying of AIDS under trees out in the bush.
Amidst all this, one young woman had the courage to admit that she was HIV positive. She was a very articulate young woman. Her name was Emma. As part of our human rights campaign, we launched an effort against the ostracism of HIV/AIDS sufferers. We made a film called "Emma's Story," which made the point that HIV/AIDS positive people were still alive and that they could contribute to society. That film was quite a success. It was placed in every Namibian school. It helped improve the quality of life for

at least some HIV/AIDS sufferers. Despite our urging, however, the government still basically did nothing. The president's son, according to well-founded rumors, died of AIDS. The president never spoke out on the issue. He never talked about the need to use condoms. Until very late in the game, he never talked about even the desirability of abstinence. By then, upwards of 25 percent of the sexually active population was HIV-positive.

Q: Why this denial? This was also happening in South Africa and elsewhere?

WARD: That's a very good question. You probably need a psychiatrist to answer it. I have a theory based on my short but intense experience in Africa. African leaders feel the need to fulfill the role of the "big man," the equivalent of the tribal chief, a man (and it is always a man) who can solve every problem brought to him. That's not true with HIV/AIDS. It's a problem they can't solve, can't even promise to solve. Because they cannot solve it, they deny its existence or attribute AIDS to outside causes. Nujoma, who is not instinctively a friend of the U.S., on a couple of occasions gave speeches outside the country in which he stated that HIV/AIDS was a product of the American biological weapons program, aimed specifically at Africa. That sort of attitude is a way of deflecting responsibility, a way of deflecting attention away from that fact that even though he is the leader of the country, he really is not able to do anything effectively to alleviate the suffering that AIDS has brought. Of course, there is no excuse for failing to accept help from any quarter to help AIDS victims, and Nujoma and other African leaders have fallen woefully short of the mark. I was also disappointed with American performance on HIV/AIDS. USAID had only a very small HIV/AIDS program in Namibia. It didn't seem to be interested in a larger one. The UN had a more effective program. USAID's excuse seemed to be that the Namibian government wasn't demanding help.

Q: How about the health authorities? Were they taking their cue from the president?

WARD: Yes. The health authorities first of all had limited means. The best hospitals in Namibia are private hospitals, but few Black AIDS victims have the means to pay. The public hospitals were overwhelmed. The health minister told me in late 1998 that all the resources she had for important purposes such as malaria control and polio vaccination were being used for care of HIV/AIDS patients. Namibia had a very difficult malaria problem in the north, with over 400,000 cases annually. People were dying of malaria even though effective treatment was readily available at relatively low cost. The government just did not have the money.

Q: I understand it to be fairly common in Africa for AIDS to be carried by truck drivers and by rather loose relationships and particularly men going to younger girls because they hope they'll be less likely to have AIDS.

WARD: Yes, that's basically the case. HIV/AIDS in Africa is a heterosexual disease. Transmission by dirty needles wasn't significant in Namibia. It may be in other parts of Africa, but I am not aware of that. In Namibia truck drivers and other travelers spread it. The Caprivi Strip (the part of northern Namibia that is shaped like an arrow going from

west to east) is serviced by a hard-surfaced road that has become an important international transportation artery. In large part because of the presence of so many truckers and other travelers, the Caprivi Strip region has the highest incidence of HIV/AIDS in the country. Traditional customs and practices have also played a role in the spread of the disease. For example, men often refuse to use condoms, believing that the latter detract from their manhood. Traditional healers have been known to share HIV-tainted blood. In other cases, traditional healers have allegedly told HIV-positive men that if they had sex with young virgins they would be cured. Such advice resulted in a wave of rapes of very young girls and even infants, increasing the problem of violence against women and children. We picked that up as one of the themes in our campaign against violence.

Q: Were there any issues between the United States? Were there commercial or political reasons?

WARD: The three U.S. interests that I thought paramount were, first, preserving Namibia as a democracy, second, promoting economic development and trade with the U.S., and, third, helping Namibia make a positive contribution to regional security.
There were some significant opportunities for American business. These included contracts for offshore oil and natural gas exploration and production. The Namibian government was also very interested in American water desalination technology, and concluded a deal with one U.S. company. We were also active in helping Boeing sell a 747 aircraft to the Namibian national airline, which had a decent business flying passengers and freight to and from Europe. There were some power projects in the northern and southern parts of the country that were of interest to companies such as General Electric, Raytheon, and Fluor. In addition, there was the prospect of American participation in the Namibian fishing industry. Americans were also very influential in the diamond trade in Namibia, and the country's large uranium mine, controlled by Rio Tinto, had long-term supply contracts with U.S. power utilities. Thus, even though the absolute amount of trade with the U.S. was small, it had several components and was growing.

In the area of regional security, we focused on peacekeeping and de-mining. One of our purposes in training Namibians in de-mining was to put together an indigenous African military de-mining capability that could be used on peacekeeping missions. The Namibian President and Defense Minister were enthusiastic about this project and supported it wholeheartedly. We even talked about establishing a Southern African de-mining academy in Namibia. We were also successful in gaining Namibian participation in a few U.S.-sponsored regional peacekeeping exercises. In one instance, Namibia hosted units from all over Southern Africa for a training course on combat medical care. Between de-mining missions and peacekeeping training, we had an in-country presence of U.S. Special Forces for more than half of my time in Namibia.

The high degree of interest shown by the U.S. military and especially the U.S. European Command in Namibia contrasted sharply with a rather low degree of interest on the civilian side. Although we had one short visit by Vice President Gore, neither the

Secretary nor any Under Secretary nor the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ever visited Namibia. We did succeed in interesting the State Department Inspector General in a program to help the Namibians avoid the growth of corruption, and the IG visited twice (happily, neither time in an inspection mode). The four-star Deputy Commander of the European Command visited three times, the Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command came once, and several other general officers stopped by.

I should not leave out mention of one tragedy. On September 13, 1997, a C-141 cargo aircraft of the U.S. Air Force delivered a team of Special Forces and several tons of de-mining equipment to Windhoek. The aircraft took off for the return flight to the U.S. on that same day. Tragically, the plane collided at 39,000 feet off the coast of Namibia with a German *Luftwaffe* aircraft that was en route to Cape Town. Despite a large-scale search and rescue effort involving many aircraft from the U.S. and other countries and as many as 200 USAF personnel, no survivors were found from either aircraft.

A couple of months later, a U.S. trade mission sponsored by the Corporate Council on Africa visited Namibia. I spoke with some of the members about how to commemorate the tragic loss of life. One of the executives, a former career Army officer, offered to take the lead in collecting a fund for the placement of a memorial at the Embassy. With this funding (approved in record time by State Department ethics lawyers) and the cooperation of the Namibian government and the U.S. Air Force, we designed and constructed a monument composed of Namibian granite and a bronze plaque forged in New Jersey (the aircraft had been based at McGuire AFB). President Sam Nujoma dedicated the memorial in the embassy courtyard on March 19, 1998. Representatives of the families of all the deceased American Air Force personnel attended along with a representative of the German government. A Namibian army bugler played taps. It was a sad and emotional moment, paying tribute to military men who had died for a peaceful, humanitarian cause. The next day, my wife Peggy and I joined the family members on a flight in a C-141 out over the Atlantic to the exact location of the crash. The aircraft dropped a memory box and a wreath. Moments like that can never be forgotten.

Two problems that arose later in my tour were of a different nature. First, Namibia joined with Angola and Zimbabwe in sending military forces into the Democratic Republic of the Congo in support of President Kabila. Second, a small, armed rebellion began in the Caprivi Strip. This rebellion was apparently supported by UNITA, the Angolan government's military opponent and, according to rumors, by Botswana.

Q: Why in God's name did Namibia get involved in the Congo?

WARD: I do not think there were any good reasons, but there were some bad ones. President Nujoma insisted he had good reasons, and his logic went something like the following. Namibia has a permanent water shortage. Eventually, it will be necessary to acquire more water either through desalination or other means. Desalination is very expensive and involves reliance on western technologies. Nujoma saw the Congo as a possible source of water. His grand plans for diverting rivers in Angola and the Congo had only a loose connection with real possibilities. Nujoma also saw the Congo as a

source of mineral wealth and as a market for goods that could be imported through Namibia and transported along Namibia's excellent road system. Like so many others, Nujoma was fascinated with the idea of getting a piece of the action from mines in the Congo. In the latter dream, Zimbabwean President Mugabe, who acquired extensive personal interests in the Congo, influenced him. At first, this exploitation of natural resources was done very quietly. One only heard rumors, which sounded increasingly credible.

We counseled Nujoma and any other Namibian official who would listen against military involvement. The single person who seemed to have doubts was the civilian Minister of Defense. His views were overridden by officials in Nujoma's State House and by the uniformed military. By the time I left, however, the Namibians had begun to suffer military deaths from combat and accidents. To his credit, Nujoma did not attempt, unlike Mugabe, to cover up the losses. When the first Zimbabweans were lost in the Congo, their deaths were kept secret, they were buried in the Congo, and their families were simply informed that their loved ones were dead. Namibia is too small a place, too tightly knit, and too democratic for that to happen. The Namibians brought the bodies of their soldiers back and held a state funeral. It was quite a moving event. A UN helicopter had crashed with Namibians on it, a Namibian helicopter had crashed, and they also lost some infantry soldiers. There were about ten dead in all. The state funeral seemed to turn public and official opinion against the war. The government realized that it had made a big mistake by getting involved, but it also wanted to save face. They didn't want to just run away. So, even though they realized they had made a mistake, they stayed in the Congo for more than a year afterwards, albeit avoiding combat to the extent possible. Their dialogue with us about ending the war became much more productive. Howard Wolpe, our special envoy for the African Great Lakes conflict, made a couple of productive visits to Namibia. I enjoyed very much working with Howard.

Another rough spot was connected with Namibia's election in 1998 as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. We supported Namibia's candidacy because we generally support the nominee of the Organization of African Unity for Africa's seats on the Council. Namibia was elected in the fall of 1998 for a term beginning in January 1999. When the State Department asked me, drawing on my UN experience, how I thought Namibia would vote, I said I thought we had trouble ahead. They had a very close friendship with Cuba, close relations with Libya, although there was no Libyan embassy, and a strong historical friendship with Russia as a successor to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union and Cuba had given them a lot of aid during the liberation struggle. So, on issues that mattered to us – terrorism, Iraq, and others – I thought they would be a thorn in our side. In fact, that's exactly what happened. My last months there were spent trying to persuade the Namibian government to consider some of these issues a little more objectively and not to vote by knee jerk.

Unfortunately, just after I returned from post, they took a position against the Security Council Resolution authorizing NATO intervention in Kosovo. They did that for a truly strange reason, basing their position on their experience with the mini-rebellion in the Caprivi Strip. I predicted they would do that, and it turned out to be the case. They saw

Kosovo as a breakaway province from Yugoslavia, and therefore a negative example for those in the Caprivi Strip who wanted to break away from Namibia. Talk about all politics being local! Their behavior on the Security Council was really erratic, motivated by idiosyncratic factors and their historical friendships. I was gone for most of their tenure on the Security Council, but the U.S.-Namibian relationship on the Council was not a happy one, despite a later visit to the country by Richard Holbrooke.

Q: What was this Caprivi Strip rebellion?

WARD: The rebellion, which was truly a tempest in a teapot, was interesting. The people in the Caprivi Strip are ethnically different from the other ethnic groups in northern Namibia. They are probably more closely related to some of the tribes in Zimbabwe and Zambia than they are to most Namibians. In addition, the people in the Caprivi Strip have been historically friendly to UNITA, the Angolan rebels. Although I don't think the history of this will necessarily ever be written, it looks the rebels were assisted by UNITA and perhaps by some people in Botswana. Namibia's relations with Botswana were not always very friendly. Of course, the idea of an independent Caprivi Strip is ludicrous. The Strip is totally landlocked, and was created by colonial edict at the Conference of Berlin in 1884 because the Germans wanted to have a channel of communication between their colonies on the western coast of Africa and those on the eastern coast. According to an account that may be apocryphal, the British said, "Okay, we'll give you a strip along the Zambezi River, which flows from west to east." They neglected to mention that Victoria Falls was in the middle, making riverine transportation practically impossible. I don't know if that specific story is true or not, but the Caprivi Strip was created to give the Germans a corridor, and there is no African ethnic reason for its existence as a separate entity.

The rebellion itself was small-time stuff. A unit of insurgents established an encampment and ended up killing some Namibians whom they had forcibly recruited. The Namibian police and army got involved, martial law was declared, and 16 people were killed. A very promising tourism industry in the north was wiped out. Tourism is very important to Namibia's future, but few tourists are willing to expose themselves to armed conflict.

Also around this time the Namibian government agreed to allow the Angolan army, which has its bases on the coast in the west of the country, to use roads in Namibia in order to attack UNITA bases in the central part of Angola. The road system in Angola had basically been destroyed in decades of conflict. That resulted in UNITA soldiers coming into Namibia to mine the roads. So, just about the time that we were hoping to declare Namibia land mine-safe, new mines were being laid. Fortunately, the number of new mines was rather small. Just as I was leaving post, we pulled the Peace Corps out of the northern part of Namibia because of the danger. Thus, Namibia's democratic and economic prospects began to fade a bit, almost solely because of poor leadership and decision-making. One of Nujoma's responses to his new difficulties was a half-hearted attempt to stifle Namibia's free press. Unfortunately, I have heard more recently that he is going after the press with more conviction.

Q: Did you have a problem with your American staff with this AIDS epidemic? I would think they would be very nervous.

WARD: In going to post, I was convinced that would be a major issue. However, that did not turn out to be the case, in part because the Namibians insisted that their blood supply was safe. I can hardly believe that today, but they convinced us then. Also, we established a "living blood bank" within the embassy community. Barring a catastrophe, we could generate a large enough pool of blood donors. Also, medical evacuation, which was necessary in more than one case while I was there, was available quickly. There were good facilities in South Africa. One embassy officer had a close call because of complications caused by poor Namibian treatment of appendicitis. The poor treatment turned a rather routine problem into one that required operations and more than three months of hospitalization. Luckily, the officer survived. The standards of medical treatment in Namibia looked better than they were. Health care was good by African standards, but poor by U.S. ones.

We had a large Peace Corps contingent. Many volunteers were teacher-trainers in basic education. USAID and the Peace Corps had signed an agreement under which USAID would finance a new curriculum for grades one through six in the Namibian school system and the Peace Corps would field trainers to help Namibian teachers use the curriculum. The contribution of each agency was necessary for the project to work. By the time I arrived in Namibia, even though the agreement was less than a year old, Peace Corps was already making noises about pulling out. They decided the agreement did not fit in with the spirit of the Peace Corps mission. USAID, which formulates its plans over the long term, had programmed a significant amount of money for this effort and was quite chagrined. Relations between the two chiefs of agency were all right on the personal level, but terrible professionally. On my first trip back to the U.S., I went to see the director of the Peace Corps to try to work problem out. The agreement I reached worked for about 18 months. In my final year, Peace Corps simply pulled the plug on their part of the program, making USAID's job more difficult.

Q: What was the reason?

WARD: The Peace Corps is an interesting organization. They made the decision for their own reasons, which USAID and I did not agree with. Somehow, the Peace Corps came to believe that working as trainers of teachers did not give their volunteers the "full Peace Corps experience" of living in a village as part of a family and interacting directly with people. I saw in the Peace Corps a tremendous aversion to even appearing to be agents of the U.S. government. One example: we had financed through our de-mining campaign a series of mine and unexploded ordnance awareness posters meant for kids. The posters basically told them in all the languages of the country: "If you see things that look like this, don't pick them up." Kids were getting wounded and killed every month throughout northern Namibia by picking up grenades or mortar shells, which exploded. We had a meeting on how to disseminate these posters throughout the country. One suggestion was to give them to the many Peace Corps volunteers who were teachers. They could give out the posters in their classes. I thought, well, that's a good idea, and I took it to the Peace

Corps director, who refused to have anything to do with it. Absolutely. "That's politics," he said. I said, "It's not politics. It's humanitarianism. It's protecting kids." They wouldn't do it. Part of that may have been the personality involved. That was the kind of thinking that drove their decision to pull out of the USAID program, and led them to take other actions that detracted from our ability to represent American interests. In my opinion, Peace Corps staff members often forget that although Peace Corps Volunteers are not U.S. official representatives, staff personnel are.

Q: You left there in 1999. Then what?

WARD: I left Namibia to take the job I have now at the United States Institute of Peace. I had always thought that I'd like to do something after the Foreign Service. My wife and I had decided that we wanted to live closer to our daughter, son-in-law, and our grandchildren. We made the decision that Namibia would be our final overseas post. I could have stayed in the service until at least 2002, but thought that it might be easier to start a second career at age 54 than later. So, I was thinking about coming back to Washington in a position that would allow me time for a job search. In the middle of that sort of thinking, I got a letter from a headhunter. I had been getting similar letters for years, saying basically, "We have this opening available. I wonder if you know anyone who might be qualified for it." In the past, I had always taken the letters at face value. Sometimes I would write recommending a person. This letter concerned an opening as director of the Professional Training Program at the United States Institute for Peace. I read through the requirements. It talked about training for peace operations and conflict prevention. Those were all things that I was interested in and had some experience in. I thought that I could do the job, and decided to recommend myself. I later discovered that such letters are meant at least in part to gauge the recipient's interest in the job.

I interviewed with Dick Solomon and others at the Institute of Peace. They had a lot of applicants, and did not make up their mind until after I had returned to Namibia from a chiefs of mission conference in January 1999. Then they said, "We'd really like you to come on, but we're under tremendous pressure from Congress to reinvigorate the program and expand it. We really can't wait until you leave Namibia in July. We negotiated my arrival at the Institute in April, and I left post in March. I left a little early, and I was quite grateful that the African Bureau did not create any obstacles. I enjoyed working with Assistant Secretary Susan Rice and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Johnny Carson. By the time I left, I had done everything that I could in Namibia. It was an interesting and satisfying tour.

Q: Could you explain what you're doing now?

WARD: The United States Institute for Peace is a non-partisan, congressionally funded entity. It is not part of the government, and it does not represent U.S. official policy. We work toward the peaceful settlement of violent or potentially violent conflicts outside the United States. We do that through various programs, including research, education, fellowships, and grants. We also have a professional training program through which we try to help practitioners acquire and improve skills in conflict prevention, management, and resolution. That means teaching conflict analysis, communication, negotiation,

mediation, and other third party skills to audiences of government officials, diplomats, military personnel, police assigned to international missions, civic activists, NGO workers, and international organization officials. In the two and one-half years that I have been at the Institute, we have grown the program to the point that we reach about 1,500-2,000 people a year. We are moving into computer-based, distance learning programs.

Q: Do you find the hand of Congress heavy or not on you as an institute?

WARD: We are totally dependent on the Congress. Within the Executive Branch, our budget is formulated as part of the Foreign Affairs Account, the 150 Account, but our congressional authorizing and appropriating committees are the education committees, not the foreign affairs ones. Sometimes we take a two-tracked approach on funding, working with OMB, but also appealing directly to Congress. Quite frankly, it's quite probable that if there just a few members of Congress viscerally disliked the United States Institute of Peace, we would be on the road to extinction. Therefore, congressional relations are very important to us. A more present danger, however, is that of simply being overlooked. We are a small institution, 65 employees plus fellows and a budget of about $15 million a year. That kind of sum can become a rounding error in the budgets of the education committees. We pay close attention to the views of Congress.

Q: Okay. I think we'll call it quits.

End of interview