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**ROBERT MARK WARD**

*Interviewed by: W. Haven North  
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**INTERVIEW**

*Q: Today is May 27, 1998. The interview is with Robert Mark Ward, known as Mark. Mark, how long were you with the Foreign Assistance Program?*

WARD: I was with AID for 28 years.

*Q: When did you start?*

WARD: I came to Washington from the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard, where I spent two years on a Master's program 1959-1961. I came to Washington in August 1961, while the International Cooperation Administration and the Development Loan Fund were in the process of turning into the Agency for International Development.

*Q: We'll come back to that later. Give us a thumbnail sketch of your career.*

### **Overview of career**

WARD: I spent my first few years with AID (1961 to 1965) in what was then the Far East Bureau. I was an Assistant Desk Officer assigned to the Burma, Thailand, Indonesia area. The Office Director was David Burgess. The Burma Desk Officer was Ed Felder, who had come from the DLF. He was replaced by Bill Small, who later went out to Rangoon as the AID Affairs Officer.

My first foreign assignment was in Egypt, where I went in the fall of 1965. We stayed until June 1967 when, during the Six Day War between Egypt and Israel, Gamal Abdul Nasser broke diplomatic relations with the United States and the Americans were kicked out. My wife and I then went to Pakistan for four years from 1967 to 1971. We returned to the United States to spend a year in Princeton, where AID sent me on a sabbatical to the Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs. In 1972 I returned to AID/Washington, where I worked in the Office of Program Development and Project Review and the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination for a couple of years. From 1974 to 1977 I was in the Office of Near East and North African Affairs in the Near East Bureau. Tony Schwarzwald was the Office Director there. I was the OIC of Portugal, Cyprus, Turkey, and Special Programs. From 1977 to 1981 I spent four years in Morocco as Program Officer. When I arrived the Mission Director was Al Disdier, who was replaced by Harold Fleming.

I returned to Washington in 1981. For a year I was the Energy Advisor in the Bureau for Africa applying some of the things I had learned in putting together an energy program in Morocco. From 1982 to 1984, I replaced John Blumgart as the Chief of the Special Projects Division in the Office of Technical Resources in the Bureau for Africa. We worked on renewable energy, but increasingly on environmental and forestry concerns.

I went back to the Bureau for Policy Program Coordination, the Office of Donor Coordination, where I was the Chief of the United Nations Division for three years

dealing with AID's relations with the various UN development organizations (UNDP, FAO, WHO, UNICEF, the UN Environment Program and others.

I went to Egypt for a second time in 1987, staying for two years until I retired from AID on the Fourth of July 1989. There I was a Capital Development Officer for the Directorate of Trade and Investment, led at the time by Gregory Huger, who is now somewhere in the wilds of Central Asia as an AID Representative, I believe. After leaving AID, I've done a bit of consulting during the last few years. I've stayed marginally in touch with AID, so I know a little bit about what's developed since I left. However, I expect I've now outlived my usefulness, because more recent AID retirees are perhaps more familiar with, and more interested in, AID's current development vocabulary and concepts.

### **Early years and education**

*Q: Good. Where are you from? Where did you grow up? What about your education? Discuss anything in that that would explain why you got into this business rather than something else.*

WARD: Careers are often accidental. I was born in Buffalo, New York, September 24, 1927. I served in the Army in the German occupation in 1946-47. I went to Wesleyan University, in Middletown, Connecticut, where, in addition to receiving a wonderful liberal arts education, I remember playing soccer a couple of times with Haven North, my interviewer. He was pretty good, actually. I graduated in 1949 and went out West with a couple of friends of mine. We were planning to work in the wheat harvest, but the wheat crop that year wasn't very good, so I got to San Francisco. In order to get back, I signed on board as a deckboy on a Norwegian merchant ship and went around the world. It was 1950. We stopped in the Philippines, Indonesia, India, then independent only since 1947, went up the Persian Gulf, through the Suez Canal, saw the famous statue of Ferdinand de Lesseps in Port Said (this was before the 1952 revolution which brought Nasser to power), stopped in Genoa, Christopher Columbus' hometown, and got back to New York in June 1950. So I suppose that, having seen Europe immediately after World War II, I was exposed to the colonies just after independence.

*Q: What was your major in college?*

WARD: History and Modern Literature. Not your obvious preparation for economic development work.

*Q: Well, there wasn't much on development in those days anyway.*

WARD: That's true. But I had gotten a certain perspective by living in Europe after the war in 1946. I was interested in international affairs. I had studied French in high school and German in college. The first time I had had any contact with other societies was in my cruise with the Norwegians. I spent a month on the beach in Bombay, living at the

Prince of Wales Seamen's Club and wandering around the city on a bicycle. A different world, indeed.

*Q: Why were you staying on the beach in Bombay?*

WARD: Actually, being "on the beach" is a seamen's term for waiting between ships. In Bombay our ship's captain got orders to go down to Australia instead of continuing toward the Persian Gulf, Europe and New York. I didn't want to go to Australia, so I tried to figure out some way of getting off the ship. I pretended that I had an appendicitis. I got as far as the Queen Elizabeth Hospital where they were about to operate, but miraculously the pain disappeared. The doctor realized what had happened, of course, and the Norwegian Shipping Agent said "Okay, we'll just put you on our next ship headed for Europe." The next ship arrived a month later and by June I was back in New York.

*Q: What was your position on the ship?*

WARD: I was a deck boy. I was paid \$35 a month plus board and room. It was a veritable United Nations on this ship. We had people from England, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Australia. I was the only American actually. It was very interesting.

By the time I got back my parents had bought a farm near Lake George, New York and retired to the Adirondack Mountains. I went up to the Adirondacks and stayed with them and helped get their farm in shape. Before I knew it, I was involved in the logging business and housing construction, where I stayed for five years. That was enough. Finally, in 1956, I went to Europe for a student work camp - in fact, for three student work camps. One was in Berlin. One was outside of Tivoli in Italy. The third was in Hof on the border between East Germany and West Germany. We did things of the kind Peace Corps does, but the Peace Corps didn't exist then. The program was run by the Quakers - the American Friends Service Committee, which is active today in a variety of domestic and international activities to help the poor.

*Q: How do you account for this wanderlust, always wanting to travel all around?*

WARD: I guess it was perhaps inherited. My father used to tell wonderful stories about his period in France during and after the First World War. After seeing combat during the First World War, he worked with the Hoover Food Relief Administration, delivering humanitarian relief to feed people in France and Germany. At one point, his letters report, there was even some talk of actually providing food aid to Eastern Europe and Russia. This was in 1918 and 1919. My mother was for five years in the 1920s an English teacher in South China, and she had a lot of stories to tell about that.

*Q: Right. That explains it.*

WARD: After the student work camps in 1956, I came back to the Quaker Center in Paris, which at that time was at 110 Avenue Mozart in the 16th Arrondissement. It no

longer exists. I wanted to stay in Paris a bit longer. I found it very romantic. I wanted to go to school there. I got a job as a night clerk in a hotel and inscribed in the Sorbonne for a year. A number of interesting things were going on at that point. There was the Algerian War, which France was conducting, and Algerians from both the French side and the revolutionary side were in Paris. There was a lot of tension. One time some agents of the FLN - the Front de la Liberation Nationale - shot a young Algerian in a cafe just under my apartment because he had not paid his contribution.

I got a part time job as a filing clerk at the American embassy, which was rather interesting. It wound up that I stayed for two years. My wife and I were married there. Our son was born there. But about the time General De Gaulle took power, we came back to the United States. I inscribed in the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard in 1959 for a two year program in Middle Eastern studies.

*Q: Why Middle Eastern studies?*

WARD: Well, I guess I wasn't smart enough to get into the Russian Research Center. I would have loved to have become a Kremlinologist. In retrospect, it was probably a fairly good idea. I rather imagine that there are a lot of unemployed Kremlinologists around. But I had gotten interested in what was happening in North Africa because of my exposure to the Algerians. The Middle East was interesting. So, I spent a couple of years there. Like various of my fellow students, we were wondering what to do to get employment afterwards.

*Q: Did you write a thesis?*

WARD: No, only various course papers - government, politics, economics, religion.

### **Joined USAID in 1961**

WARD: Many of the people at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies intended to continue to be academics and do research of one kind or another relating to the Middle East. One of them was Carl Brown, a former State Department officer who went on to become director of the Princeton Middle East Institute. A number of others thought that they might be able to sell their Middle Eastern skills to the oil companies. The oil companies' general response was, "All you need to know about the Middle East we can teach you in two or three months. What we want is somebody who knows about oil." That was a disappointment for many of us. As it turned out, one of my friends came to me one day and said, "Look, let's go down and take the Federal Government Management Intern examination." This was a program to encourage people to go into all branches of the federal government. I hadn't thought about that. I said, "I don't want to be a manager. I don't really like that idea." But I went down anyway because I couldn't think of any reason to say "No." As it turned out, I passed it. My friend didn't. He went on to become a wealthy banker. But what the Management Intern Examination yielded was two choices. First, I could become a statistician in the Bureau of Labor Statistics analyzing statistics

about the Middle East. Or I could go down to ICA and join this newly formed foreign aid organization called "AID." I chose the latter because it sounded more interesting. The Personnel officer who interviewed me said, "You know, it's nice that you have a Master's degree. As far as we're concerned, its main value is that it shows you can read and write." By thus assuring the foreign aid program that I was not illiterate, I joined the Agency for International Development.

*Q: What year was this?*

WARD: I joined the foreign aid program in August 1961.

*Q: Did you get any kind of orientation when you joined?*

WARD: I don't think so. I don't think there was anybody who knew enough to be able to tell what it was all about. This was a period in the summer of 1961 when ICA, which had been organized functionally - into offices like "O/FOOD," for example, which dealt with agriculture and food matters - was being reorganized along regional lines, with regional bureaus. There was a lot of informal recruitment of people. People would be going around the corridors trying to hijack the better people they knew from different bureaus so that they could take them into their bureau. There was a lot of disorder and corridor politicking to try to get a critical mass of good people for the bureau that you happened to be in. That didn't last very long, naturally. By the fall of 1961, AID was pretty well in place.

*Q: Where were you assigned?*

### **Assigned to Southeast Asia division - 1961**

WARD: I was assigned to the office dealing with Burma, Thailand, and Indonesia. The Office Director was a charming gentleman named David Burgess, whose background was rather interesting. He had been a Peace Corps director in Indonesia. He was an ordained minister who had been very actively involved in social service. In fact, he had been active in the south in the 1950s in union organizing in textile mills, which was quite dangerous. He was a marvelous Office Director. His deputy was Leonard Durso, a person who stayed around and whom I met repeatedly in various other assignments. Edward Felder, and later, F. William Small were the Burma Desk Officers. Bill Small later became the AID director in Burma.

*Q: What was your function?*

WARD: I was Assistant Desk Officer for Burma.

*Q: What was the situation in Burma at that time?*

WARD: We had a small AID program - too small to warrant a full-fledged USAID mission. We had an AID Representative. The most dramatic thing was the Rangoon to Mandalay Highway. We had contracted with the Army Corps of Engineers to build a highway from Rangoon to Mandalay. For a period of several years, there were arguments between AID and the Burmese Government about where the alignment was supposed to go, what kind of highway it was supposed to be. The American side didn't want to just say, "Well, let's just forget the whole thing." AID would have liked to have done that, but the United States had made a political commitment to build the highway.

*Q: Why did we want to build this highway? What was the point of that?*

WARD: I can't remember the origin-

*Q: Rudyard Kipling's song, "On the Road to Mandalay?"*

WARD: I'm not sure where the idea came from. But that had been picked as a good project for the Americans to do. In the end, it was the Burmese who said, "Let's forget the whole thing."

*Q: Why was that?*

WARD: Just because there didn't seem to be a basis for agreeing on how wide the highway should be and precisely where it should go and what the cost should be. Somebody had made a political commitment of \$25 or 30 million to do something in Burma. We all were trying to work out something, but in the end it turned out not to be possible. A typical situation where each side is nickel and diming the other. In the end, the Burmese had the good grace to say, "You're very kind, but no thanks."

*Q: Unusual. Were there other activities?*

WARD: There was new structure at the University of Rangoon, designed by an architectural firm called Brown and Daltas - Ben Brown and Spiro Daltas - who were outstanding architects. I think they're both still alive, although they've split up. Ben Brown is in Cambridge, Massachusetts now, I think. He must be quite old. But it was rather interesting. They had done work in Iran before. Ben Brown, who was a very gracious southern gentleman, had married a lovely Iranian woman. They had designed and built a little palace for an Iranian princess. The point that was driven home to them by the Iranians (This was, of course, during the time of the Shah, the late 1950s.) was that they had done a very good job of architectural research and drawn on the extremely rich Iranian architectural tradition to produce this new structure with modern materials, but a lot of traditional design themes. The Iranian clients loved it. They said, "Our problem is that so many of these young Iranian architects either take their training in Europe and are trying to imitate European architects and it's not Iranian." You foreigners have given us really good modern Iranian architecture.

*Q: Interesting.*

WARD: Too many artists and architects in developing countries try to imitate European themes and become derivative imitators rather than drawing on their own traditions.

*Q: But he was involved in this University of Rangoon? What were they building there?*

WARD: They were building some portion of the University, some new buildings, which got built actually.

*Q: Were we involved with any technical assistance with the University?*

WARD: No, we were not. The Burmese did not consider it appropriate for foreigners to be involved in content and what was taught. We did not provide that. We were just doing a bricks and mortar job. Actually, it would be interesting to see the structure now. Often in Asia you find stucco covered structures which typically after five years are covered with covered with mildew and mold because of the humidity and the climate. Brown and Daltas' design used enameled bricks, which were far more weather-proof than stucco. They would be hard colored surfaces which would not be destroyed or discolored by mildew and mold. So, they're probably in great shape even now.

*Q: Any other programs in Burma?*

WARD: One part of this University construction program was the matter of producing the enameled bricks. For that, they used local materials. They hired an American named Sergio dello Strologo, who had studied ceramics at Alfred College in New York State, and was teamed up with a partner in New York. Their focus was to try to match up handicraft skills in Third World countries with sophisticated markets in Europe and the United States. For example, one of our projects that they were quite proud of was discovering some basket weavers in some African country - I can't remember where - who were able to produce on order lampshades, which went over just beautifully in some of the really posh boutiques in New York, London, and Paris. They did this repeatedly. Local materials and local skills adapted and used and reworked for upscale export. In the long run, there were some problems with this. Very often, the popularity of certain things like the native African lampshades didn't last all that long. So, the markets tended to be somewhat volatile, but nevertheless, they had quite a number of good successes. In Burma they had gone up country someplace near Mandalay, and they had discovered some deposits of the right kind of colored clays which had been used for generations to make local bricks. They had made the bricks for the University locally and they had made the enamel locally and they put them all together. It worked fine.

*Q: Good. This was AID financed?*

WARD: That was totally AID financed.



*Q: Did we have a mission there then?*

WARD: There was an AID Representative, not a full-fledged mission. The engineer who oversaw both the highway and the university projects was Lou Cohen, who later replaced Bill Small as AID Rep and then went on to higher things - Mission Director in Botswana, I believe, among other assignments.

*Q: And Somalia.*

WARD: The American Ambassador in Burma then was Henry Byroade, who among his other claims to fame, happened to be the ambassador in Cairo when John Foster Dulles pulled the Aswan Dam commitment away from Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1955.

*Q: But why were we in Burma? Why were we interested in Burma?*

WARD: I'm sorry to say that I don't remember our strategic rationale for an AID presence in Burma, although I had a hand in writing the National Policy Paper on the country. A political commitment had been made during the Eisenhower administration. The United States did not care all that much about Burmese economic development. In those days, you must recall, the American rationale for economic assistance had not evolved to its present level of sophistication. Monuments showing American presence and interest were important. So, there were these two rather visible things, the highway, and the university. I believe there was also a malaria eradication program, but it was fairly modest if I recall.. In the end, there was a military coup, President U Nu was deposed and General Ne Win took over. One of the first things he did was to ask the Americans to leave.

*Q: We closed the mission?*

WARD: Yes.

*Q: Did anybody see that coming?*

WARD: I don't know.

*Q: There wasn't any talk about political unrest or anything?*

WARD: No, I don't remember very much about that.

*Q: Were you working in any other countries in AID on that assignment?*

WARD: There was Thailand and Indonesia. We were busy saving the economy of Indonesia with economic assistance at that point. But I didn't get directly involved in that. I remember in my capacity as a junior officer on the Burma and miscellaneous desk, I was assigned to try to put together a package of a birthday present for Western Samoa. This was under the Kennedy Administration. The future of the trust territories of the Pacific

was uncertain at that point. The general thought in the Department of State was that the United States ought to exercise its influence and expand its control in that area if that was at all possible. One thing we wanted to do as gracious gesture was recognize the independence of Western Samoa. As it turned out, we gave two things. We gave some school buses and we gave some books for schools. There was a purchase order - a PIO/C - for the list of these various books that we picked out with help from the Library of Congress and the National Education Association. We put together this wonderful list of books and got them all procured and sent them out to Western Samoa to their school system. About six months later, we got a letter of thanks back, saying, "Thanks very much, but we were wondering what you expected us to do with the 1,000 dictionaries." It turned out that one little item which had escaped us all was that there was a slight typographical error opposite the Webster's Dictionary on this list of books. Instead of 10, it said 1,000. There were supposed to be 10 because there weren't all that many schools in Western Samoa. As it turned out, they somehow found a way of using the 1,000 dictionaries. I guess each little school in each little village got more than its share and they gave a few away to some of the students. But it was all because various of us, including the Assistant Burma Desk Officer, had somehow failed to catch the one or two extra zeros in the PIO/C. My first major lesson in AID - always read the fine print.

*Q: Is that about all we did in Western Samoa at that time?*

WARD: Yes.

*Q: Any of the other countries during that time or that assignment?*

### **First USAID assignment overseas in Cairo - 1965**

WARD: No, the next thing that happened was that the Egypt Desk Officer, John Kean, recruited me to be Assistant Program Officer in Cairo. My wife and I went out there in the fall of 1965.

*Q: What was the situation in Egypt at that time?*

WARD: That was rather interesting. By that time, it was the Johnson Administration. The relations between the American and the Egyptian governments were not particularly good. We were not ardent supporters of Nasser's Arab Socialism. President Johnson had made the decision that he would try to put pressure on Egypt by withholding PL 480 wheat. Egypt was highly dependent on PL 480 wheat to make bread for its population. I'm not sure if the idea came from the White House or from the Department of State, but the thought was that by withholding PL 480 wheat, one could bring Gamal Abdel Nasser to his knees. In retrospect, that doesn't seem very sensible. It did not work. Gamal Abdel Nasser was able to get all the wheat he needed from Spain, Australia and Argentina. It just soured relations a little bit more. When Nasser broke diplomatic relations with the United States in June 1967, we left under duress.

We had a very small AID presence there. The AID program was run out of the Economic Section of the Embassy. The Economic Counselor, a State FSO, was also the AID Representative, and an AID person was the Program Officer and Assistant AID Rep. When I arrived it was Ken Levick, who went on to fill a prominent role in the Office of Science and Technology. He was later replaced by P. Victor Morgan, Jr., a charming and very colorful person who is now living retired in his hometown of San Diego, California.

*Q: What was the program then? What were you doing?*

WARD: We had a very small program: agriculture, irrigation. In education, there was a bricks and mortar school building operation. In rural health, we were building rural health centers. There was quite a bit of participant training of Egyptians in the United States.

*Q: Was this the beginning of the program then? Had it been going on for some time before that?*

WARD: I don't know when the program started. It must have been sometime after the 1952 Nasser revolution. But I don't know what year it started. It was of minor interest to the Egyptian government. It was, as I said, quite a small program. At the same time, the Ford Foundation was in Egypt in force. We cooperated with them on an AID population program. There was an effort to sensitize the Egyptian government as much as possible and the Egyptian population to dangers of overpopulation. One of the key people on the Ford Foundation side was Lenny Kangas, who later went to AID and is now, I believe, with a Washington consulting firm.

*Q: How did you go about the beginning of the population program?*

WARD: Well, it was information and education at that point. I remember, they used to have little trucks that would go around to villages with movie projectors and show films on walls. I never saw any of the films actually, but they were supposed to indicate the dangers of having too many children and how you can avoid that. I have no idea whether they worked.

*Q: Was the government supporting it?*

WARD: Yes, it was. The government was supporting it. It gradually made some progress, I think. However, things were pretty well stopped at the time of the June war in 1967 when we and the Ford Foundation both left so early. The reason that Gamal Abdel Nasser broke diplomatic relations with the United States at that point was that during the Six Day War, the United States had an intelligence gathering ship anchored off Alexandria and we were feeding various kinds of military intelligence to the Israelis, which assisted them in military operations against Egypt. As soon as the Egyptians found that out, naturally, all hell broke loose.

Storm clouds had been building for some time, though. Gamal Abdel Nasser was tightening screws on Israel when he closed the Gulf of Aqaba, which goes up the east side of Sinai to the port of Aqaba in Jordan and, a few kilometers away, the port of Elat in Israel. There was a United Nations force between the Egyptian army and the Israel army which was removed and that placed the Egyptian troops and Israeli troops in direct contact. So things were clearly headed for confrontation. A decision had to be made in late May as to whether the embassy would evacuate women and children or not. The ambassador was Richard Nolte, who was not a career diplomat. He was a Middle Eastern expert, an academic. I remember, at one country team meeting, he went around the table about the third week in May to ask his senior staff whether or not they should evacuate the dependents. There was the military attaché, the naval attaché, the economic counselor, the CIA station chief. They all said, "Oh, things are okay. You don't want to offend the government by doing this prematurely." He got around to the political counselor, who was Dick Parker, one of the State Department's outstanding Arabists in the last few decades. He said, "Well, I don't know about you guys, but I'm scared to death." Dick told me this afterwards. He went on to explain all of the reasons why he thought that it would be foolhardy not to evacuate the dependents, one of which would be, by the time you were certain that it was necessary, you wouldn't be able to reach the airport. So, his judgment ruled and everybody else changed their minds. The dependents were flown out to Athens. As it turned out, I think it was not more than two weeks later, the non-essential people at the embassy (This would have been early June.) were taken down to Alexandria by train at night. I was on the train. We could see the Israel bombs going off to the east, lighting up the sky. We were wondering if they were going to hit the railway or not. As it turned out, they did not. We got to Alexandria and were put under house arrest for four days in the Palestine Hotel at the east end of Alexandria, which happened to be the same hotel at which Henry Kissinger would stay with his entourage when he was carrying out his famous shuttle diplomacy years later.

*Q: Why were you under house arrest?*

WARD: We were detained until transport could be arranged to evacuate us up to Greece. It was the correct performance of the Egyptian police which protected the Americans from being attacked by a mob. Hysteria was high. Demonstrators invaded the American Consulate in Alexandria and the Consular staff took refuge in the vault upstairs. They were informed by radio that the mob was beginning to set fire to the Consulate downstairs. One of the more courageous officials went downstairs to try to defuse the situation. The leader of the Egyptians politely asked to borrow the American's cigarette lighter so he could burn the American flag which he had just taken down. The American gave it to him, naturally, but was not harmed. It must have been much more exciting for the Consular people than it was for us out at the Palestine Hotel.

*Q: The Egyptians were protecting you?*

WARD: Yes, they were behaving quite correctly. We were confined to the grounds of the Palestine Hotel, which was very close, a few hundred yards, to one of King Farouk's palaces at the east end of Alexandria.

Meanwhile our naval attaché was desperately trying to make arrangements to get us transportation up to Athens. It turned out, after four days, he was able to organize a Greek passenger ship escorted by an American destroyer. So they came down and we went through customs examination. The Egyptian police behaved very correctly. By that time, the Spanish embassy had agreed to be our representatives in Cairo since direct diplomatic relations no longer existed.

*Q: This was all of the embassy staff?*

WARD: No, there were still some essential people who finally came down from Cairo the fourth day. This was my colleague and supervisor, Vic Morgan, who had been working away with the AID controller, Bernie Riedel, following the handbook and methodically doing what you're supposed to do in the handbook to close down an AID mission. By the book. It was a little program. So, they managed to do that. Unfortunately, we had one casualty. There was one young man who was on the controller's staff who had a bleeding ulcer. He had been prevented by the Egyptians from getting medical treatment and he died in the last day after he got to Alexandria. After we all, including the essential staff, had gotten on the Greek ship and gotten ourselves up to Athens, one of the saddest duties of the Acting AID Director, Vic Morgan, was to meet the wife of this young man, who was pregnant at the time, and say, "Unfortunately, your husband has died." It was a very painful thing to do. In any case, with that one exception, everybody got out.

We spent a very pleasant month in Athens. One thing Vic Morgan and I did was write a nice long airgram. There were such things as airgrams in those days, carried to Washington by plane and reproduced on mimeograph machines. Precomputer technology. We wrote an airgram giving a summary of what the program had done and what our recommendations would be about how you ought to open up a program if you ever want to do that in Egypt again. We were quite proud of that. We thought it was a good job, showing very perceptive knowledge of the terrain. Of course, I never in my entire AID career afterwards, after we opened up the current massive AID program, I never once found anybody who had ever read it.

*Q: Well, they may have. Was there any special message you were trying to convey? What was the content of this message?*

WARD: I've forgotten. I don't remember what we said. I know it was brilliant, but I don't remember what we said. It may very well have been irrelevant to the massive program with which we went back under Anwar Sadat. I mentioned earlier that we were collaborating with the Ford Foundation on a population program. The Ford Foundation was doing other things. One thing that they were doing was a regional development program in upper Egypt, centered on Luxor and Aswan. This was an ambitious program

which involved education, school building, health, public administration, agriculture, irrigation, the works. I don't know how much money was put into it, but it was a lot more than the American aid program. When I went back to Egypt in my last assignment, I never found anybody who had heard about that. But Ford had been there several years during the early to mid-60s. They had accomplished something. There certainly was a tremendous amount of planning. It would be interesting for someone to dig back into the Ford Foundation files and find out whatever happened to that and how much, if any, was actually used by successor aid groups, the Americans or others, or indeed the Egyptian government, during the '70s and '80s.

*Q: Well, there must have been some elements like the population program and education that may have picked up again.*

WARD: Yes, I think that's true.

*Q: Was there any particular role that you had in this, any program aspects? Were you working on any particular projects? What was your function?*

WARD: As the Assistant Program Officer, I worked with the various technical divisions to try to help them package their products and fit them into one seamless whole.

*Q: How big a staff was it?*

WARD: It couldn't have been more than 15 Americans plus some Egyptians.

*Q: You had some major contracts? Who was doing the population work, for example?*

WARD: I honestly don't remember.

*Q: You were there for two years?*

WARD: Almost two years, from the September 1965 to June 1967.

*Q: When you were evacuated.*

WARD: Yes.

*Q: You didn't go back?*

WARD: No, I did not. In summer 1967, after our month in Athens, I was assigned to Pakistan and in a few weeks we were in Lahore.

In Egypt I had come to have great admiration for my supervisor and colleague, Vic Morgan. He negotiated an assignment as the Deputy Director in Indonesia at that point. He was an interesting person. He was one of a generation of people who had joined the

foreign aid program in Europe somewhat after the Second World War. There were others who had done this - Walter Furst was one. He was the Assistant Director for Program in Pakistan at the time that I was there. He had been in the American Military Government in Berlin after the Second World War. He had then joined USRO in Paris. That must have been at the time of the Point IV program which began under President Truman. They had an office in Paris. You had this generation of people who had, for one reason or another, been in Europe and decided that they were going to get a job in what sounded like an interesting part of American government efforts. So, Walter showed up there. Vic Morgan was in Paris going to the Sorbonne and was in the process of writing a biography of Gertrude Stein. He never finished it. There was Gordon Ramsey, who was studying classical music at that time with Nadia Boulanger and Madame Claude Delius, widow of one of France's major modern composers. He too went down and got a job at USRO. You had this whole group of people. They're now either dead or very old. But these people were among the first of the foreign aid group who for a long time left their stamp on ICA and AID.

*Q: This was in 1967?*

#### **Transfer to USAID/Pakistan - 1967**

WARD: That was in mid-1967. The Pakistan AID group at that time had just moved from Karachi to Lahore. Lahore was not the capital. We had a Consulate there. The capital at that point was Rawalpindi. Just up the road a couple of miles from Rawalpindi, the present capital of Islamabad was being built. So, for the first couple of years, we stayed in Lahore and then we moved up to Islamabad.

*Q: What was the situation in the country then?*

WARD: Oh, very good. We had excellent relations with the Pakistan government. Our AID Mission Director was Bill Kontos, who later became an ambassador. His Deputy was Ernie Stern, who was one of the group of people who resigned from AID in protest in 1971 over the rather brutal treatment by the West Pakistanis of the East Pakistanis when they invaded what is now Bangladesh. But there were some very talented people there. The Harvard Advisory Group was in force there. They were working very closely with the Pakistan Government Planning Commission, headed by a gentleman named Mabub ul-Haq, a notable in the development community. The Harvard Group were working with the Pakistan government on policy questions, import stabilization, and irrigation.

One of the most interesting aspects of the program just about the time that Bill Kontos and Ernie Stern left in 1969 was that they were replaced by Joe Wheeler, who came as the Director, and Vincent Brown, his Deputy Director. The Green Revolution was taking place, just beginning at that point, with the new high yielding varieties of wheat being introduced into West Pakistan. I remember very clearly the first harvest. Our agriculture advisor was a Texan named Curry Brookshire. He was great. He had a friend down in Mexico named Norman Borlaug at CYMMT - the Rockefeller Foundation-funded wheat

research institute. That was the place where the new high yielding varieties of wheat were being researched and produced in Mexico. Somehow or other, Curry worked it out so that 10 tons of seed were brought in by plane to West Pakistan and there were a handful of rather wealthy landowners in West Pakistan who had agreed to cooperate with the agricultural practices which the Americans were suggesting (fertilizer, high yielding varieties, and irrigation). The first year, we were all very lucky because the rains were good. If the rains hadn't been good, the first year's harvest wouldn't have been anywhere near as good as it was. But naturally, we said, "The reason the harvest is good is because of the high yielding variety." Everybody believed it. At least, a lot of people believed it. It was partly true. But that helped to encourage more farmers the following year to plant the high yielding variety. That was where it took off. It was a highly informal arrangement, just that 10 tons and a few enterprising Americans and a few of the Pakistani landowners who were willing to take some risks.

*Q: Did this go down to the small farmers then?*

WARD: Yes, it did. It worked fine. It was very interesting to watch that. Then, with the relative beginning success for the Green Revolution in wheat, Joe Wheeler, ever ambitious and optimistic, thought he would try the same thing in East Pakistan with rice from the International Rice Research Institute in Los Banos in the Philippines. The progress with better varieties of rice was not as good or as far advanced as the progress at that time with the wheat. But nevertheless, a combination of proper farming methods and good rice and fertilizer has since then made a big difference in rice production all through Asia.

*Q: We provided the fertilizer?*

WARD: Yes. That certainly helped. It didn't move as fast as the Green Revolution in West Pakistani wheat, but I remember hearing Joe Wheeler say one time, "I think the most practical, the most concrete contribution that people like us can make is to set goals, to set objectives, so as to focus the energy of a lot of people on getting some things done." Well, it worked. In the last couple of decades, there has, in fact, been a lot of progress in Bangladesh with massive inputs of fertilizer, better rice. A few years ago, I happened to go out to Bangladesh and they had a rice surplus that year. It was very good. That was one of the things that, I suppose, started back in the late 1960s.

*Q: Was there any institutional work going along with this in terms of developing the Agricultural Extension Service or the research program or any of that?*

WARD: Yes, absolutely. Also, there was major attention to the development of tube wells for getting water.

*Q: Explain what we were doing.*



WARD: The importance of water in the Punjab, of course, cannot be overestimated. During early 60s, the World Bank had put a great deal of money into the mobilization or directing or damming of the five rivers which irrigate the Punjab. There was a major political problem when India and Pakistan broke up: India controlled the waters of the Punjab. To be able to avoid having the Pakistani Punjab go up in smoke during the summer, it was necessary to perform some surgery on some of the rivers. So, there was this great international agreement which was reached. With the help of World Bank funding, the waters were so controlled that the Indians and the Pakistanis were able to agree on how the waters would be distributed. So, that was one thing that brought water to their otherwise relatively fertile Punjab. In addition to that, to help expand the area in which the wheat and other things could be grown, the idea of bringing up subterranean water with tube wells, electrically or motor-driven tube wells, was used. That caused some problems because the water would come up, but there were minerals in the water. After a few seasons, you would begin to see around the outer edges of the cultivated areas, white mineral deposits which made the land uncultivable. So, at the time I left Pakistan in 1971, there was serious concern about how to deal with desalinization. I honestly don't remember whether that problem was solved. I remember, by 1971, there was almost as much land being lost to cultivation each year as there was being put under new cultivation, thanks to the tube wells. So, that was a problem. Our engineers didn't really know how to deal with that. There was talk about trying to figure out ways of flushing it. It would be interesting to go back and just find out in retrospect what was, in fact, done, and whether that was really the right thing.

The thing which, however, was looming ahead of us was, in 1970 and '71, had nothing to do with high yielding wheat or rice or tube wells. It was the breakup of Pakistan. In 1970, there was a very bad cyclone disaster, a tidal wave on the Bay of Bengal. Lots of people were killed. Crops were ruined. It was not unique. This had happened, I'm sure, hundreds of times before, but this was a particularly bad one. It seemed to bring other discontents to a head. Up until then, for example, the Bengalis had generally felt that they were being badly treated by the Punjabis. They were both Muslims. That was why they were both part of Pakistan. But these two places were separated by a very large expanse of India. They were quite different. Various expert foreign advisors such as those on the Harvard Advisory Group, were telling the Pakistan government that what they should do is take all of the foreign exchange, or a large portion of the foreign exchange which was earned by the export sale of Bengali jute, and invest it in West Pakistan. The money, the resources, would be more efficiently used. That was fine from the point of view of the Punjabis, but from the point of view of the Bengalis, it looked like imperialist exploitation. So, there was a lot of discontent about the relatively heavy-handed way in which the Punjabis were running the country. That was just one example of a number of ways in which the people from Islamabad were throwing their weight around in Dacca. At that point, we had a provincial mission in Dacca. We had a provincial mission in Lahore. We did not have, as I believe there is now, a provincial mission in Peshawar. The Director of the provincial mission in Dacca was none other than Eric Griffel, now retired from AID. He later served as Assistant Director in USAID/Morocco while I was there as Program Officer. When he retired he spent several years as proprietor of the Apple Tree Bookshop in Concord, New

Hampshire. I understand he has now moved back to Washington (T: (301) 656 1895). In Pakistan Eric would come to meetings in Islamabad and repeatedly say, "We have the same problem inside the mission that the Pakistan government does. You people aren't paying attention enough to our problems in Bengal." He did it in such a charming and puckish way that he never got people angry at him. But his point was quite serious. There was insufficient priority being given to the far poorer population of Bengal by the Pakistan government in Islamabad.

*Q: And it's also true for the AID program?*

WARD: I think so. We tried to do better, but the allocation of funds was not balanced. In Eric's view, more talent and resources on the American side should have been poured into Bengal. I don't know. I was prepared to believe it. In any case, there were a variety of discontents and political opposition seemed to be strengthening. There was a mixture of fundamentalist Islam, resentment against West Pakistani exploitation - not terrorism - but an articulate political opposition. The cyclone disaster was perhaps the straw that just drove everybody over the edge. There was a question as to what role India was going to play. If I try to make a statement now about the nuances of what happened there, it's going to be wrong. In any case, there was a lot of discontent.

*Q: How did you see it?*

WARD: In the end, the Pakistani army felt that it was necessary to invade Bengal, which they did. They shot the opposition leaders. There is to this day a monument just outside of Dacca to these martyrs. That led very directly to the breakup of Pakistan. I left before that happened.

*Q: Were there other programs that were going on at that time?*

WARD: Actually, one of the things that I appreciated very much was the intellectual inspiration provided by Joe Wheeler. About once a year, we would have a retreat up in Nathiagali, a former British hill station about an hour's drive north from Islamabad. The Ford Foundation had a compound up there which they were kind enough to let us use. Joe would usually bring various people, thinkers in the development community. There was Jim Grant, one of U.S. foreign aid's pioneers who by that time was running the Overseas Development Council in Washington. There was John Lewis, director of the AID mission in New Delhi. There were various other people who would come in and talk to us. Basically, it was like college seminars. They would be just wonderful. We would all contribute our papers and take part in discussions. We would have some of the Harvard Advisory Group, irrigation experts, talking about their researches on what really would hold promise for Pakistan and India on the irrigation front. Wally Falcon and Carl Gotsch were the two people in the world, I think, who had collected the most data and knew the most about the dynamics of irrigation in Pakistan. So, there was a lot of attraction in just being encouraged to think about how you ought to deal with this business.

*Q: Do you remember any of the substantive lines of thinking that were being presented or discussed, the issues?*

WARD: We were just taking a good look at how we could try to replicate the lessons of the great Green Revolution for one, and what role there might be for how you would try to move a population program ahead, for example. This was just at the beginning of the period when Jim Grant was preaching about barefoot doctors and how to apply basic medical practices affordably out there at the grass roots, how you could get people to train up a group of people who wouldn't be doctors who would always go to the capital, but paramedicals, midwives and nurse-midwives, who could go out there and actually make a difference at the grass roots. So, we were trying to figure out whether there was something we could do to add our little extra push to something which the local government might be interested in or encouraged to be interested enough to do. Mabub ul-Haq was in the Pakistani Planning Commission then. But he was clearly one of the movers and shakers. It was a time during which John Lewis in New Delhi and Joe Wheeler in Pakistan were trying to work out some realistic approaches to economic development.

*Q: Was there a discussion of policy reform at that point, or was that to come later?*

WARD: I think that came later. It was perhaps taking shape in the discussions our senior people - including our Chief Economist, Evelyn Ripps - had with the Harvard Advisory Group and the Planning Commission and the Finance Ministry. I was concerned more with seeing that the technical assistance projects worked, and I wasn't involved in policy discussions for the most part.

*Q: Were there other topics that you remember discussing?*

WARD: No. I remember, however, that after leaving Pakistan to spend a year at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton, the dean there was the same John Lewis who had led the American aid program in India - seen then as the free world's answer to Mao's forced march into development. While he was running the AID mission in New Delhi he had reared a group of young disciples among his junior officers. Later, some of them said, "Well, working with John was like having a never ending seminar on development. It was just wonderful, all of the things that we learned." Once in a while, one or another of his disciples would show up in Islamabad. In fact, when Walter Furst, the Assistant Director for Program left, he was replaced by David Mathiasen, who had spent time working for John Lewis in New Delhi. And Evelyn Ripps, who guided the economic policy dialogue. She had a team of two or three bright young economists who were working very closely with the Harvard Advisory Group people to try to develop policy oriented suggestions for the Pakistanis or rather with the Pakistanis. This was very much a dialogue of equals. There were some very sophisticated people. I mean, Mabub ul-Haq was only one of them. So, there was a very collegial atmosphere among the development community, both Pakistani and American. Something of the same, John Lewis brought to Princeton. Those

who were interested in any aspect of international economic development had a wonderful time in his discussions at the Woodrow Wilson School.

*Q: That was sort of a high point of AID's role in development in Pakistan. What do you think was the real impact of all the work that was being done? Was it really making a difference at that time?*

WARD: I think so, yes. Probably on the grain production front more than anything else. The policy level aspects, I didn't deal with that directly, but I have the impression that this collaborative way of analyzing problems and trying to figure out how to deal with them in which you had the Pakistanis in the Planning Commission and the Americans in the Harvard Advisory Group and the AID Mission working together basically as a team, I think that worked pretty well.

*Q: Was the Harvard Advisory Group funded by AID at the time?*

WARD: I don't think so. I think we had funded them at a certain point. But by the time I arrived there, I think they were pretty much funded by the World Bank.

*Q: I see. Were there other dimensions of the program that you recall? That was a very significant period.*

WARD: I think I've pretty much touched on everything that I can say about that.

*Q: You talked about irrigation. What other sectors were we in? Were we working in other areas? We had a commodity import program, I suppose, or not?*

WARD: That's right, we certainly did. Under the Commodity Import Program, we brought in a lot of the fertilizer. There was a lot of discussion about domestic pricing of fertilizer to make sure that it got distributed as widely as possible. You would get all kinds of interesting arguments about whether or not you ought to do things to discourage smuggling and black marketeering. Most of the economists would say "No, let it go. The market is telling you where this stuff should go." A person that really would have some useful things to say about this whole aspect of things, I expect, in the absence of the late Evelyn Ripps, would be Walter Furst (T: (202) 244 0672). Perhaps you have done that.

*Q: Not yet.*

WARD: It would be good to ask him what he remembers about the days in Pakistan.

*Q: If you want to add more later, you can do that. But you were there four years. That was a very important period. What was your job? What were you doing?*

WARD: I was the Program Officer.

*Q: What was the size of the program?*

WARD: By current standards, probably not all that great. The Commodity Import Program was loan-financed, but we had a substantial grant program for the time. At that point, we were quite deeply involved in local currency programming, which has always had its detractors and its disciples. What can you possibly accomplish with local currency programming that actually has an influence on resource allocation? There have been books written about that. But we would have our little discussions about local currency programming. I don't think it made much difference in resource allocation, but it allowed us to associate the AID program with successful development expenditures in the Pakistani budget.

*Q: Were there any institutional development projects at all?*

WARD: I guess I can't remember clearly enough about what we did there. Somebody ought to look it up in the country program book.

*Q: All right. Let's move on and do that later. After four years, what did you do?*

WARD: After four years there, I spent a year at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton.

### **A sabbatical at Princeton - 1971-1972**

*Q: Let's talk about that a minute. This was a year off, a sabbatical for you.*

WARD: That's right. I think that that's something which AID should never lose sight of. It's important and useful to send people off so that they can spend a certain amount of time stepping back and reexamining their experience and looking at what they can learn from not only what they've been through, but from talking with other people with similar interests.

*Q: What did you do during that time?*

WARD: Being a Princeton fellow gives you complete freedom to do whatever you want. I remember David Korn, a political officer from the Department of State who had just come back from an assignment in Israel. He spent the year writing a book about Middle Eastern politics. I just took courses. I took a great course with James Billington, who is now with the Library of Congress, who was a well-known Russian historian and Kremlinologist. He gave a course on revolution and politics, not only in Russia, but elsewhere. I took a seminar with John Lewis in which we dealt with various development questions. One of my colleagues up there was a person named Richard Arndt, who had been with USIA in Iran during the time of the Shah. We wrote a paper, I remember, on the cultural dimensions of economic development, or how economic development and culture did or did not work together. I note that these days, culture and development have

now become a fad. I was watching a tape the other day of a speech by Ismail Serageldin of the World Bank on culture and development. During the period that I was in AID, I think the attitude of AID regarding culture and development was very much like the attitude of Hermann Goering, who said, "When I hear the word 'culture,' I reach for my gun." I remember, Larry Harrison, who spent his AID career in the Latin America Bureau, wrote a book a number of years ago on this theme which was roundly criticized by many of the economists, who believe that culture has very little to do with economic development. You can't measure it. It's not quantifiable. So, to hell with it.

*Q: What were you thinking about it at that time? You say that the AID didn't have much sensitivity to it.*

WARD: During this period, Dick Arndt and I pretty much agreed that, if you could ever figure out how to deal with the cultural assumptions and the ways of thinking, the ways of behaving, that anything society puts into the minds of its people can have an important effect on how they will behave economically. Although we certainly didn't come out of our discussions with any formulas or very many operational suggestions, we certainly thought that ways needed to be found to bring this dimension into development thinking. I'm glad to see that in recent years there has been some effort to do that. Maybe someday we'll get there.

*Q: What was your view of AID's development policy or strategy at that time? What was defining AID's program?*

WARD: AID was going through several different evolutions. About the time that I appeared in 1961, AID believed in resource transfer. We were putting lots of money into economies for major infrastructure projects. We were not very much concerned with dealing with basic human needs directly. We thought that somehow by pouring the resources into the economy, that would lead indirectly to dealing with basic human needs. After a while, as AID budgets went down and as different theories of what would work in AID came to the fore we did shift to basic human needs. Each approach had some element of realism and at least one Achilles heel. I'm sure that a far more theoretically sophisticated analysis and critique can be made of every single one of AID's stages.

*Q: Why don't we come to that towards the end? Did you write a paper at Woodrow Wilson?*

WARD: Yes.

*Q: What did you write about?*

WARD: Dick and I collaborated on this culture and AID business. It was a relatively brief paper. It was not a major thesis. It was just in one of the courses. But I found it a very helpful and fruitful period simply to be allowed the time to do some broader thinking not only about development, but about a variety of other things which I found helped me very

much in my later work in thinking in more general policy oriented terms. So, that was a good year.

*Q: What happened after the end of the year?*

### **Return to USAID/Washington in the Program and Policy Coordination Bureau - 1972**

WARD: In the summer of 1972 I went back to Washington for a few years. I went to work with the late John Kaufmann and his deputy Art Handley in an office which was just being created called the Office of Program Development and Project Review in PPC. This was an effort to try to use the project evaluation and approval process to transfer lessons from one part of the agency to another. One of the things that was given a certain amount of attention was the Latin America Bureau's experience with sector lending, which none of the other bureaus really knew very much about. So, we were all looking to the Latin America Bureau to teach us how to do sector lending correctly. As it turned out, the more you probed, the more you realized that there were a number of different kinds of sector lending, some of which worked and some of which did not. Depending on a number of other factors like the personalities of the people you were dealing with, you could convince them to make certain policy changes if you gave them enough money to put enough resources in. Sometimes, you could and sometimes you couldn't. Sometimes sector lending was not so different from local currency programming, of which I had had a taste in Pakistan.

*Q: Did you have a sense of what were the principal features of what worked and didn't work?*

WARD: I'm afraid not. But I know that this matter of looking at specific projects in one region and then trying to distill a few lessons which can be then applied in other regions, was a good thing to do. It's not clear, it's probably impossible to tell just how far the actual transfer went, but at least various things were flagged. People's attention was directed at the desirability of paying attention to what was going on in one regional bureau and trying to see whether or not you might be able to apply that in other regional bureaus. I have no idea in the end how much actually happened. A lot of the time, we had a sense in that little office that we were kind of spinning our wheels because some of the regional bureau people, generally speaking, considered it arrogance on the part of these Policy and Program Coordination people to try to tell them what to do. After all, the only people who really know the realities of what will work in Region X are the people in that regional bureau, period. I think that view may have moderated a bit.

*Q: Did any of the lessons stand out in your mind?*

### **And then transferred to the NENA Bureau and programs in Europe - 1974**

WARD: Nothing that I remember. I went on to something else at that point. I went on to rather more operational things. In 1974, I spent three years in the Office of Near East and North African Affairs. I was not dealing with Morocco or Tunisia, where we still had a program, but I was dealing with Portugal, Cyprus, Turkey and Malta. Portugal was interesting. Portugal was a lesson in how to invent an AID program and set up a mission almost overnight. This was during the period when, if you remember, Eurocommunism was perceived as a danger. It was particularly perceived as a danger by Henry Kissinger. He looked at the map and said, "The communists are in a position of serious power in Spain. The Communist Party in Portugal is large. What would happen if the communists took over in Portugal?" There was a Portuguese revolution in 1974. It was truly amazing. There were about three political parties to the left of the Stalinists. There was some Maoist group and there was some other independent little communist group. Then there were the Socialists who were comparatively middle of the road. Mario Soares, was the leader of the Socialists. I suppose the geopolitical nightmare that occurred to Dr. Kissinger was the possibility that pro-Soviet governments could control the Straits of Gibraltar. In any case, the decision was made to start a program in Portugal. This was a time when large numbers of Portuguese were coming back from the two Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola, the *retornados*. The number of people who were coming back from the colonies into that little country of Portugal were a larger a percentage of the population than all of the influx of people from Eastern Europe into Central Europe at the end of the Second World War. So there appeared to be the potential for a lot of social dislocation which could have turned into political problems. In any case, we set up a program composed of PL 480 and housing investment guarantees and grants and loans. We sent a couple of people over. I remember, Eric Griffel was one of them. The Program Officer in the Near East Bureau at that time was Glen Patterson, who just happened to have gone to the University of Coimbra in Portugal, and spoke fluent Portuguese. Various people were asked to put together the program. So, the program was invented. Glen was asked to go over and set up a mission. This was at a time when Frank Carlucci was the ambassador. He had a very talented group of young handpicked Portuguese-speaking political officers, many of whom had worked with him during his assignment as a political officer in Brazil. They all spoke Portuguese and they would go out and hang around the various all night meetings that the various revolutionary groups would hold in military camps and stadiums in and around Lisbon. They would come back in the early hours of the morning and write their dispatches back to Washington. That revolution was analyzed with far more sophistication than many things of equal importance before or since.

The AID program was interesting. The people we were dealing with were often very well trained, serious professional people. I was commuting fairly often between Washington and Lisbon. We would go into some discussion with some of these really left wing, anti-American communists with their cigarettes and black leather jackets. The first part of the meeting would be vehement attacks on the evils of capitalism in general and American imperialism in particular. We would then start to talk about the specifics of, say, a housing project for Portuguese workers. Immediately, the atmosphere became more friendly. They had gotten their ideological pitch out of the way and we got down to work.



It was surprising to see, when we got down to practical operational things, how much we could really agree.

*Q: Why was housing picked?*

WARD: Because they wanted to do something visible for the workers. It was stated to be very important. There was a problem about that. Some of the more politically and less economically inclined Portuguese said, "We don't care what it costs. We want to do well by the Portuguese working man." Peter Kimm was the Director of the Housing Office in AID/Washington at that point. Peter Kimm and various of his colleagues would try to explain that cost is something you need to pay attention to or you're going to go broke in the long run. It was very difficult for them to accept this. In the end, they didn't ever completely accept it. They were willing to agree on some realistically conceived housing projects, but they disagreed on others. They simply didn't want to accept what the AID people insisted on as financially viable, like sites and services. Sites and services isn't good enough, they said. You've got to have higher quality low cost housing for Portuguese workers. But it was refreshing to deal with people of the professional seriousness that we found there. Although there is no longer a Portuguese program, there is something called the Luso-American Institute. I think Glen Patterson may very well have something to do with that even now. At least, he did for a time.

*Q: What were some of the other programs we were pushing at that time?*

WARD: We were doing something in agriculture. PL 480 food. Regional planning. I discovered during that period that there were regional planning institutions in the United States. There was the Appalachian Regional Planning Commission. There were regional planning commissions for New England. So, we got various people who were regional planners or community planners, city planners, to come to Portugal and talk with their counterparts or try to establish such regional planning institutions. I don't know what finally happened, but that was an effort to make contact. One of the most useful things the aid program did, I think, was to help the Portuguese establish contact with American and European experts whose talents they could use and learn from, and send Portuguese students to relevant kinds of training in the United States.

*Q: Were there any regional planning organizations that we helped set up? Was that part of it?*

WARD: We tried to help strengthen the planning capacity of provincial governments.

*Q: On the PL 480 program, was this Title I or was this Title II?*

WARD: It was both.

*Q: What was the Title II program for?*

WARD: Title II was food relief for people, the *retornados*, who were coming back from the colonies. It was rather interesting to see the attitudes within Portuguese society. Apparently, the people who had tended to go off to the colonies were people who felt constricted by that little country and wanted to go off the way Americans on the East Coast would go out West in the 19th century. These people went to the colonies. Very often, they were very enterprising people. Some of them really wanted to stay. Some I talked to said, "We got along just fine with our African counterparts. We would have dearly loved to stay and work closely with our African counterparts, but politics didn't permit it." These people came back and they were among the most enterprising and the least hidebound and the most open to new ideas and new approaches of all the Portuguese.

*Q: How well were they assimilated?*

WARD: Pretty well. There were no major political problems or outbursts or discontent caused by these people. The conservative Portuguese institution of the family and the community tended to absorb them pretty well. Portugal even to this day is a relatively conservative society. They feel like a family. You go into a railroad station and some little child is crying and some totally strange woman will walk up to him and say, "Now, stop this. Tell me where your mother is. You know you're not supposed to behave like this." They're one big family. But the one kind of interesting insight about Portugal is the great difference between the north and the south, north from Lisbon and south from Lisbon, purely because of geography. North from Lisbon, it's small farms. The atmosphere is one of the independence of small farmers. South from Lisbon, it's the feudal atmosphere of large estates. It is no accident that the strongest area of the communists in Portugal is the south, the downtrodden peasants being exploited in their view by the large estate owners. So, the farmers to the north were able to bring pressure to bear on the decision making of the central government very neatly by simply blockading the one major highway just north of Lisbon through which all of the food and produce for the Lisbon markets would come from the farms. It took about three days before the revolutionary government said, "Maybe we'd better just keep our hands off the people in the north." It was very neatly done.

*Q: Were we involved at all in assisting with the assimilation? You mentioned Title II.*

WARD: We were, I think. At the same time that I was on the Portugal Desk in the Near East Bureau, I worked very closely with Bob Chamberlain in the Africa Bureau, the desk officer for Angola and Mozambique. I'm not sure what we were doing there, but I know that we certainly kept in very close touch on what the *retornados* were doing, what kinds of things we ought to do, at least on the Portuguese end, to help them. I'm not sure what was happening at the other end. I think we did help with some of the actual repatriation. I think there was some shipping that we arranged.

*Q: The Title II food, was that distributed through the government or through NGOs? How was it handled?*

WARD: The government and some NGOs. I think the Portuguese Red Cross was involved. I'm not sure which others.

*Q: But that was available to the people while they got settled, was that the idea?*

WARD: Yes. That was a totally un-AID-like program.

*Q: Do you remember how large the program was at the beginning?*

WARD: No, I do not. I know Robert Nooter, who was the Assistant Administrator for the Near East Bureau at the time, found that he wanted to make the program appear as large as possible for purposes of impressing the Portuguese government and also the United States Congress. So, we managed to add up the amount that we would be giving for the next five years, including housing investment guarantees - not just the fact that there would be investments, but actually the amounts that would be guaranteed, which, of course, are not United States Government expenditures. Nevertheless, we added them in anyway. It sounded pretty good. I don't remember what the total was. We got it all on one sheet of paper.

*Q: But the investment guarantees were private capital, I guess, by and large through private contractors and so on.*

WARD: Yes.

*Q: Did you get involved in other countries during that time while you were in that position? Your position was what?*

WARD: I got involved briefly in Cyprus, Turkey, and Malta. AID had provided Malta with some Army surplus ships which we had to follow up and monitor. Cyprus was another rather strange phenomenon. The same year, 1974, the Portuguese revolution took place, the Turks invaded Cyprus and took over the northern part of the island. Most of the Turks went up there and most of the Greek Cypriots who had lived in the north were evacuated to the south. So, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) were both in there trying to help refugees locate each other, trying to help refugees resettle. There had been a major movement of people, the Turks to the north and the Greeks to the south. The Greek Cypriots were still housed in large warehouses with little screens or pieces of plywood set up between where each little family group was. In areas perhaps four meters square there would be sometimes four or five people taking turns sleeping.

*Q: Were we involved in that?*

WARD: We were providing food relief. We were trying to encourage employment for the refugees. I remember in one little project we were trying to encourage handicraft

development to create jobs, trying to encourage exports of Cypriot handicrafts such as lace, which apparently is a big seller in Europe and England. We had one AID person there: Bruno Kosheleff, who worked very closely with the ambassador. That was the entire AID staff - just one person.

*Q: How much money were we providing?*

WARD: Not very much. It was more symbolic than anything else. Turkey was different. While we were gradually phasing down our Turkey program, there had been a major program there for a number of years. We had one effort to encourage farmers to grow crops other than opium poppies.

*Q: What were we trying to promote?*

WARD: We were suggesting fruits and vegetables. So far as I know, program like that haven't worked all that well because you can make so much more money growing opium poppies. There may be some places where they work, but I don't think Turkey was one of them.

*Q: You were closing the mission then?*

WARD: The mission still had probably 20 or 25 people. I think during the next couple of years, they were closing down. It was not a major program.

*Q: While you were on the desk. I see. Any other aspect of that job? How did you find working in that bureau?*

WARD: I reported to Tony Schwarzwaldler during that period. Tony was an energetic and resourceful manager. He had been in the Pakistan mission - one of Joe Wheeler's disciples. The small world of the development community.

### **New overseas assignment in Morocco - 1977**

So after three years there, I went off to Morocco for four years, where I was the Program Officer, first under Al Disdier as the AID Mission Director, his first and last overseas post. He was then succeeded by Hal Fleming, whose Deputy Director was first Eric Griffel, then Harry Petrequin.

*Q: What was the situation in Morocco at that time?*

WARD: In Morocco, we had a fairly limited program which involved heavy emphasis on dry land agriculture. I'm not sure if this was at the beginning, the middle, or the end of the basic human needs period.

*Q: This was what year?*

WARD: 1977/78.

*Q: It was sort of mid-way.*

WARD: We were very much concerned that 80% of the peasants in Morocco lived in dry land agriculture areas and that was where we wanted to place our emphasis. We had a major long term contract with the University of Minnesota for developing an agricultural training institute.

*Q: What was it called?*

WARD: The Institut Agronomique Hassan II, the Hassan II Agronomic Institute. This was to train agricultural extension people and trainers of agricultural extension people and create an agricultural extension service. This program went on for a long time before I arrived and after I left. That part of the program was very good and appealed to the Moroccan government. The heavy emphasis on dry land agriculture did not appeal to the Moroccan government so much. They were much more interested in fruits and vegetables. Morocco produces a lot of oranges and dates and grapes. They wanted to improve the cultivation of these products rather than dry land wheat. Part of the reason was because larger, wealthier members of society owned farms and plantations which produced these products. In due course, we agreed to do what the Moroccans wanted. It was probably a good decision. It was increasing one kind of agricultural production for the Moroccans. In the end, I think, dry land agriculture came along okay anyway.

*Q: What were we doing in the fruits and vegetables area with our program?*

WARD: Toward the end of the period that I was there (1980-1981), we began to do something in horticulture, to establish a horticultural institute not so far from Agadir down the coast in southern Morocco. I understand that's going along pretty well. We got involved in a variety of things.

We had a major population program there, which seemed to be working pretty well. The Moroccan government supported it.

*Q: They were fairly receptive to a population program?*

WARD: Yes.

*Q: What was the feature of the program?*

WARD: We were able to distribute contraceptives rather widely in local health centers. We had a mother and child health program, which encouraged women or showed women how to take good care of their small children, and also incidentally how to use contraceptives. It was slow, but it was making progress.

*Q: And it was run through the government.*

WARD: Yes, it was run through the government. During 1979, if you remember, there was an energy crisis. Gas prices went up in the United States and in Europe. There were big lines at gas stations. Renewable energy became popular. We decided that we were going to have a renewable energy program in Morocco. The only problem was, nobody knew anything about renewable energy. However we had the assistance of Alan Jacobs' Office of Energy in the Bureau for Science and Technology. Alan Jacobs was extremely helpful. He corralled experts of various kinds: wind, energy, small hydroelectric facilities, solar energy. He would send these people out to help design projects. So, we managed to put together a multifaceted energy project. In the end it faded as the fad of renewable energy faded. It lasted three or four years. Morocco is particularly rich in wind facilities. You drive down the road from Rabat to Casablanca and you can see the remains or, in those days, you could see the remains of old, broken windmills which had been put up by the French, but had never been repaired since Moroccan independence in 1956 and therefore didn't work anymore. But the wind was there and they would use it for things like pumping water.

*Q: What was our program?*

WARD: We established a renewable energy institute in Marrakech, which is about four hours drive south of Casablanca. It's a nice, warm place. That renewable energy center was intended to demonstrate energy efficient methods of construction as well as carry out pilot projects in wind energy, small hydroelectric installations, and solar energy, both flat plate collectors to warm water, and photovoltaic cells. We did that. In the end, the project wasn't continued by AID because it could not be demonstrated convincingly enough that the different projects were economically sound or replicable. The most promising of the renewable energy forms were small hydro. We worked very closely with a remarkable Frenchman, who was at that time the chief engineer of the National Electric Office, the Office Nationale de l'Électricité (ONE), a gentleman named Andre Fougerolles. He's still alive, living in southern France. He had lived in Morocco since 1934. He knew that country like the palm of his hand. This man was an historical monument to that country. Moroccans loved him. He trained a cadre of Moroccan engineers in the National Electric Office who went on to lead in a variety of engineering areas in the country. He was the design engineer and supervising engineer for the construction of a very large earth-filled dam which exists today at Bin El Ouidane in the Atlas Mountains in south central Morocco, east of Marrakech. It produces electricity and irrigation. So, he was a major figure in Morocco. Well, he took us under his wing and helped us discover some places where it would be quite appropriate to put in a small hydroelectric installation, a couple of kilowatts maybe (one to five kilowatts). Although we picked three as pilot projects, in the end one was built.

*Q: Why only one?*

WARD: Because AID economists did not consider that there was a sufficient guarantee of economic viability and replicability. At that time, that was probably true. I would say that it was the risk-averse nature to which AID has increasingly succumbed, wanting guarantees before the fact that Project X will succeed when you know that you don't know whether it will or not. But in this particular case, this one installation did succeed when it was installed. It was used and it is still being used in large part by a program financed by the French foreign aid program to train Berbers in some of the fertile valleys of the High Atlas mountains east of Marrakech to be actors in ecotourism - how to guide tourists, how to run bed-and-breakfasts. This was an area off the beaten track, beautiful areas where people liked to go with rucksacks and hike on trails. It's become pretty popular, more for Europeans than for Americans.

*Q: How does this connect to the hydro?*

WARD: The facilities, this little hydro installation, supplies electric light and electric power for a little training institution and also for other farms in the valley to do things like pump water, grind grain, and various other things.

*Q: Did it prove to be economic in that situation?*

WARD: I don't know whether anybody has recently done a rigorous study of this, but it still operates. I guess, if it wasn't worthwhile to maintain the thing, it would probably fall into disuse. The National Electric Office always took the position that they are not a charity organization and, therefore, in order to have something be worth their attention, it's got to pay for itself. Since they have kept an eye on this, apparently, it must have paid for itself.

*Q: The wind energy didn't work?*

WARD: Things actually got installed after I left on the wind energy front. I remember, I went to a wind area on the Atlantic coast northwest from Marrakech, southwest from Casablanca, with one of Alan Jacobs' renewable energy experts, John Kadiszewski, who the last I hear was with the Winrock Institute in Rosslyn. We were scouting out some possible sites. There seemed to be considerable promise that at least a few of these windmills would be installed, but I have no idea whether AID actually went that far.

*Q: What about solar cells?*

WARD: Flatplate collectors are apparently commercially available in Morocco at this point. There are local manufacturers and people install them. For solar cells, the main use has been in the military for remote transmitters and repeating stations.

*Q: Were there any other dimensions of the program? You talked about the population and so on. Were you involved in any of that work?*

WARD: There was one notable success which Eric Griffel and I managed to get a little project begrudgingly approved by our principals in AID/Washington. It provided research grants to Moroccan graduate students for work on development issues. We got into a conversation one time with a marvelous woman whom I met while we were out there, a woman named Dr. Fatima Mernissi, one of the Arab world's leading feminists, who at that time was a social scientist teaching at Mohammad V University in Rabat. She said, "Look, here you have all these consultants. You foreign aid people want to do something useful and you bring in your consultants and ask them to help you design a project and what do they do? The first thing they do is come to me or people like me. They don't know anything about Morocco, the foreign consultants. They may know their field, but they feel that it's necessary (quite rightly) to talk to people who live in this country and who hopefully have some insights into what some of the problems are and how one might realistically deal with them. Then they don't pay me any money. They come back, they write their papers for you and you pay them. Then they go back home. What you need to do is mobilize the local people more and draw on the talent of the local people and the knowledge and experience of the local people. How can you manage to do that?" Well, after a while, and after a number of conversations, we put together a proposal for this little research grant project, something which fitted into none of AID's priorities, could not be demonstrated to produce success. Nevertheless, because it didn't involve very much money, AID/Washington said, "Oh, well, this is just some of your spare change. Go ahead. But let's look at it after a year." AID/Washington grudgingly approved it.

Well, it was controversial in Morocco because we placed the responsibility of the project in a research institute whose director was politically extremely prudent and did not wish to use any of the funds to support research which could conceivably criticize social or economic conditions in the Kingdom of Morocco. As it happened, there were lots of things that one could usefully criticize in the Kingdom of Morocco and perhaps find solutions to. But at that point, the palace and the government were not interested in that sort of thing. So, nothing happened. Almost a year passed. Despite all of our entreaties, the director of the research institute did nothing. Fortunately, it was possible to transfer responsibility for the project to another institute, Institut National de Recherche Scientifique, whose leader had a bit more courage. Finally, they managed to get a few research projects off the ground in areas relating to agriculture, health, social development, population, things which would seem politically innocuous and perhaps interesting. The research was done by graduate students under the direction of various faculty members. They produced monographs which, in fact, were quite good. The level of expertise at Mohammed V University in the areas that we were concerned with was excellent.

*Q: Was there any effect? What were the results of this?*

WARD: I think the effect of what the Americans did was to get this thing started. Once a few of the papers had been written and it became increasingly evident to various decision makers in the government, in the various ministries, that perhaps this wouldn't hurt them. Some of this information might actually be useful. AID lost interest. The project was not



a high priority. I think it lasted for two years. We didn't renew it. This was after I had left. So, we dropped out. Thanks in part to Fatima Mernissi's efforts the Germans decided to finance the project. After all, the European aid programs, generally speaking, tend to be somewhat less structured and a little bit less meticulously organized and prioritized than the American activities. For that reason, sometimes they are more successful. In any case, the Germans picked it up and kept it going. One of the results is that a number of the beneficiaries of the research grants are now skilled, successful, well-known Moroccan social scientists who have made solid contributions to development. Some of them are running consulting firms. At this moment, VITA is running a micro enterprise financing project in Morocco, which from all reports seems to be doing rather well. That project was designed with the active and very useful participation of a young social scientist at Mohammed V University who was one of the beneficiaries of these grants and who is now a faculty member and is highly reputed. So, little things like this, even though you cannot tell what is going to happen, very often, yield very positive results.

*Q: That can be of considerable significance over time.*

WARD: That's right. It's like investing in small stocks. You never know whether you've invested in the right one, but sometimes it's worth taking a chance.

*Q: Did we have PL 480 programs?*

WARD: Yes. PL 480 Title II, in which food was distributed by Catholic Relief Service. I guess that's the main one.

*Q: For school feedings mainly or for other things?*

WARD: For small community level public works.

*Q: Food for Work type programs?*

WARD: Food for Work programs, that's right. They were fairly modest, but it worked pretty well.

*Q: You thought they worked all right?*

WARD: Yes. We had some housing investment guarantees at a certain point. They were not particularly terrific.

*Q: Why were they not terrific?*

WARD: There were differences of view between the Moroccan government and the Americans as to what an appropriate housing investment guarantee program might be. For example, there was a large industrial slum on the northern edge of Casablanca called Ben M'sik. The Moroccan government wanted to put a superhighway right through the

middle of it and bulldoze a lot of the houses out of the way. The American planners thought that was a bad idea for an AID-sponsored sites and services program. Unfortunately, we were never able to agree on the correct way of handling this. I believe the World Bank finally did agree with the Moroccan government on a rather modest sites and services program, but that was after the Moroccan government had decided to suspend their discussions with the Americans.

There was a health program.

*Q: What was that focused on?*

WARD: The purpose of that was to strengthen and establish rural health centers all around the country. I can't remember if we had a component for training paramedical people. I know there was a mother and child health program. I guess our involvement was partly construction and partly mother and child health. I think we've mentioned the other ones: agriculture, energy, population. We never got very far in education. I have been to Morocco a few times in the last few years and the program understandably has changed a lot. One of the emphases is on assisting private training institutions (particularly trades training institutions) to train a larger number of people in professions and in trades which will get them jobs. This is playing a very useful role in the context of the ten-year structural adjustment program which the Moroccan government has been pursuing together with the World Bank.

*Q: That was not going on when you were there?*

WARD: No, that began in the 1980s.

*Q: You mentioned that the Hassan II agricultural college was particularly successful. Why did it stand out as a successful project?*

WARD: There was a lot of competition among foreign advisors for the hearts and minds of the students and faculty at the Hassan II Agronomic Institute. The Belgians were there. The French were there. The Americans were there. Each one of them wanted to make sure that they called as many shots as possible. Because of the long duration of the University of Minnesota contract, which carried out this project, the Americans pretty well won. There were long-term relationships forged between the graduate students and faculty members at Hassan II and the University of Minnesota or other universities to which Moroccans were sent under the University of Minnesota contract. So, this institutional linkage which was created was an important aspect.

*Q: Do you remember what the scale of the program was roughly? I'm talking about the total AID program.*

WARD: It was pretty small during the period that I was there. I think we were under \$10 million for the technical assistance program most of the time.

*Q: What was our interest in having a program in Morocco?*

WARD: Again, fundamentally political. There were questions about whether Morocco was perhaps too advanced for an AID program. It was not one of your poverty stricken sub-Saharan countries. Morocco is a great place to live. The restaurants are excellent. The climate is terrific. The people are charming.

*Q: But you mentioned that 80% of the people were in rural areas.*

WARD: Correct. King Hassan II had over the years played a facilitative role in Arab-Israeli politics in the Eastern Mediterranean. He has encouraged back channel dialogues at the encouragement of the United States government. He has performed rather useful services. I guess that this program was part of a symbolic recognition.

*Q: Did we have the bases there at that time?*

WARD: We did, that's correct. There were U.S. bases, a couple of them. There was one in Kenitra, which was north from Rabat in the direction of Tangier. It was phasing out about the time I arrived in the late 1970s. It was turned over to the Moroccan government. By the time I left, there were no longer any bases there. But surely the economic assistance program was part of a total aid package.

*Q: Did you feel in any way that the development program was influenced by our political security interests in terms of being oriented in any particular way?*

WARD: Not the content of the program. In fact, it was quite the reverse. We tend to have, as I mentioned earlier on, in Burma, we have this tendency to make a commitment to provide some form of economic assistance because of some political reason. Then we tend to argue about the kind of economic assistance. We want to do it our way and the local government wants to do it their way. Arguments go on forever. In this particular case, in 1977, the economic aid program by and large, because of its relatively small size and the fact that certain parts of it were not particularly popular with the Moroccan government (for example, the dry land agriculture aspect), was a program which we wanted more than the Moroccans did. The Moroccans accepted the program, but without much enthusiasm on the implementation level. They thought there were some marginally useful things in the dry land farming program, but it was not something that they really thought was high priority. They had a possibility of getting a lot more money from the World Bank.

*Q: That didn't interfere with the political rationale for having a program because you were somewhat at odds on the contents?*

WARD: The people who were concerned with the political basis for the program, generally speaking, were different people from those concerned with operating the

program. This is a tension that I'm sure you've seen in many countries. The AID people want to run a program which they honestly believe is going to yield some economic development results. The State Department political officers don't really care very much about that, but are more interested in a program which will make the local government feel good. Sometimes there is a contradiction.

*Q: How did you find that evolving in Morocco?*

### **Energy advisor to the USAID Africa Bureau - 1981**

WARD: At one point, I wrote a paper about a year after I got there outlining three or four possibilities for the program, one of which was to phase it out. The paper rejected the idea of just phasing out the program. First, it pointed out that the Moroccans don't really care all that much about the program as a whole. There are some parts that they think are okay, but they don't give it very much priority. Therefore, it's not really serving our political interests, so why not phase it out? Well, if you phase it out, it would give an unintended political signal, so you shouldn't do that. Don't increase it unless you want to carry out a program which the Moroccans want, but that wouldn't really work very well because what they want isn't by and large the same as what AID will buy. Therefore, straight-line it. Just let inflation gradually reduce its real value. This paper didn't please anybody in AID. I thought it would be helpful to clarify people's thinking. In the end, I think, what we did was to increase the program slightly. AID happened to get a little bit more money that year. So, we did increase the program. But it just kind of floated.

*Q: It was sort of tolerated by the government, but not particularly...*

WARD: Yes, there were certain elements about which the Moroccan government was quite enthusiastic. They were very enthusiastic about the renewable energy, for example. In the meantime, however, the Moroccan government found it rather more useful to deal with the World Bank, which had larger loans to provide. Generally speaking, their interlocutors, the people who spoke for the World Bank in discussions with the Moroccan government, were considerably more sophisticated than the people who spoke for AID. Quite a few of them were French. One of their key people was a former functionary in the French ministry of France. He knew all the policy level finance officials in the Moroccan Government. The Moroccans felt more at ease dealing with the World Bank people. They could get more money for it, for their efforts. So, AID was kind of a back burner operation with the exception of Hassan II Institute. That was a part that they liked. As I said briefly, the renewable energy, population was okay. Agriculture was not. That is, the dry land agriculture. So, it was a mixed bag. I don't have much of a sense about how it is now. There are some lessons to be learned about how you should handle aid programs so as to ensure that they work and perform whatever political objectives they're supposed to perform. It's sometimes very difficult to do.

*Q: How do you find working with the Moroccans in such a situation?*

WARD: Very good actually. I had very collegial relations with the people that I was dealing with on the renewable energy front since, in the absence of an actual energy expert, I became the resident energy expert in the AID mission. I got on very well with the people in the Ministry of Finance. I liked Morocco and they understood that. I spoke good French. So, we got along just fine.

*Q: How about the relations with the embassy? Did you have any particular interaction with the embassy?*

WARD: Oh, yes, particularly with the economic counselors as they came and went; naturally, the agricultural attaché, who was always involved in negotiating the PL 480 agreements. Then, one day, after Ambassador Robert Anderson left, Ambassador Richard Parker appeared, our old political counselor from Cairo. In the meantime, Dick Parker had been the DCM during the 1970s in Morocco. He had then gone on to be ambassador in Algeria. Now he came back under the Carter administration to be ambassador in Morocco. As one of the State Department's leading Arabists, and a man of wonderful wit and humor, he was very attractive to Morocco and attractive to Moroccans. He also was a very perceptive analyst of the inner workings of the Moroccan government. The relation between the palace and other political forces, the Makhzen, which is the Arabic word for the palace authority. Dick Parker wrote a classic dispatch outlining the dynamics of the palace, very much like some of George Kennan's essays written from his period in Moscow as the American ambassador there before he was PNGed. Parker compared King Hassan II with François I in Renaissance France, who maintained his power by a kind of balance of power operation in which he played off the various other political regional forces and individuals against each other and maintained himself as the primary authority. The King of Morocco still does that today. In any case, it became very clear when Dick Parker came back as ambassador in 1979 that he knew too much. King Hassan II and the palace didn't want to have an American ambassador who could see through them quite so easily. So, the White House was persuaded to remove Ambassador Parker. He was replaced by somebody else. But Dick Parker was very interested in economic development. He came over to the AID mission a couple of times and expressed considerable interest in what we were up to. If he had stayed, I'm sure that he would have been very interested in seeing that there was a good AID program there.

*Q: Anything more on your Morocco time?*

WARD: I think that's about all. I had one amazing experience in our probing around for the small hydro sites. In my acquaintance with André Fougerolles, the former chief engineer of the National Electric Company, I went on a few skiing trips with him, this person who knew the high Atlas mountains like the palm of his hand. We went up into the mountains south from a place called Beni Mellal, south of the Bin el Ouidane dam, which Fougerolles had helped construct, south from a place called Asilal, up into a high mountain valley, which is totally inaccessible from December until May because the mountain passes are closed with snow. This is where we put the one site for the small hydro. On one trip we went even further up into the mountains to go skiing. It was an

absolutely superb area for mountain skiing, probably the most remote part of the High Atlas mountains. We stopped to visit some of the village head men. Some of these village head men in that area, had been troops - *goums berbères* - in the French army during World War II under Fougères when this engineer was a young lieutenant. They had fought the battle up through Italy. They had been at Monte Casino and had sustained a 20 percent casualty rate. They had come up through Northern Italy. In the final days of the war, they liberated Stuttgart, my wife's hometown. My wife and André spent one evening in conversation comparing his memories and my wife's memories of that period. André remembered exactly coming down the hill on which my wife's family's house was located.

When we went up skiing we were warmly received by these village head men. We took donkeys to carry our skis and our packs up to the top of the mountain and then we skied down. I got about half way down to the bottom of the snow area and I hit some ice. My ski binding refused to release, my foot turned around 180 degrees and I broke my left leg just about four inches above the ankle. It didn't hurt. I grabbed it and I twisted it back around in place and it still didn't hurt, amazingly. Two Berber guides were behind us. We found a place to stay, a refuge of stones that some sheep herders had put up there in the summer. We built a fire and stayed until about two o'clock in the morning. Somebody had gone down and told the people down in the valley, where we were, and a mule driver came up with his mules in the middle of the night. I was tied on a mule and wrapped in blankets. My leg still didn't hurt. We got down to our base in about two hours. With a few shots of Valium, I was trundled into the back of somebody's station wagon and taken back to a hospital in Rabat, where there was a wonderful Norwegian doctor who was practicing there. He said, "Norway promises that you will ski again." He fixed my leg up and it was all right. I had to pay money to this mule driver - \$50 or something like that - for transportation. I got a signed receipt and sent all my bills and everything into my Blue Cross/Blue Shield coverage for reimbursement. Some weeks later a note came back saying, "We reimburse for ambulances or other normal transportation. This is not normal transportation." So much for the bureaucratic inflexibility of modern society. That's an experience that André Fougères and I have thought about a number of times. Since he retired (he is now 85 years old), he has kept his finger on the pulse of ecotourism French training program. He has gone back to Morocco as kind of counselor emeritus to advise the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Electricity, and he is always welcomed back there as a big brother and local hero. He is still very vigorous, living in the mountains west of Nîmes in Provence.

WARD: During my period in Morocco, I managed to learn enough about energy so I could come back to AID/Washington and be the Energy Advisor for the Africa Bureau. I worked very closely again in Washington with Alan Jacobs in the Energy Office. I was working in the office of John Blumgart, who retired from AID in 1982. I replaced him as chief of the Special Projects Division in the Office of Technical Resources in the Africa Bureau. That was a rather interesting period because we were looking at our renewable energy activities, but getting more involved in environmental activities and forestry activities. The fad of renewable energy was waning. We no longer had the oil crisis. We

thought it would be a good idea to examine the various renewable energy activities which existed, many of which AID had put in place in Africa. W signed a contract with hired Associates in Rural Development of Burlington, Vermont. Together with Molly Hageboeck, then AID's guru of evaluation, now with the Management Systems International consulting firm, we concocted a rather well designed scheme for fanning out teams to various countries in Africa and examining - in the manner of the impact evaluations which Doug Bennet's started when he was AID Administrator - some of the renewable energy projects. The result was a report on what appeared to be working and what appeared not to be working.

*Q: What were the conclusions of the report?*

WARD: Some of the conclusions were that there was a lot that didn't seem to be working. There was a major French presence in the former French colonies of West Africa, and French firms had received French government financing to install flat plate collectors and other renewable energy devices. Unfortunately in many cases not much thought had been given to maintenance so a lot of these things were falling apart. We found some of the projects for getting gas from organic waste seemed to be working, but only under very special conditions where you had lots of pigs around to produce organic waste, for example. There was considerable enthusiasm in the AID/Africa Bureau for more efficient wood stoves. We found that a whole range of foreign donors (European, Canadian, American) were pushing various kinds of wood stoves in different countries, but the programs didn't seem to be working all that well because there were the perennial problems of marketing. How do you convince people that they ought to use these things? Sometimes, the wood stoves didn't work all that well anyway.

*Q: What were the characteristics of the wood stove?*

WARD: There were wood stoves which you could make out of metal and then there were other wood stoves which you could make out of clay. The idea was simply that they were supposed to be an improvement over the open fires that many people were using and that they would burn wood more efficiently and you could concentrate the heat on your pots better so that you would reduce the amount of waste. That was fine as far as it went. But there were a whole range of educational and marketing problems which really weren't being addressed. They never really were effectively dealt with. So, we were rushing about with various experimental pilot projects to try to do things in the renewable energy area. It was a distinctly mixed bag. So much depended on the kind of institution that was trying to run things. For example, in Rwanda, the Swiss were running a very good project for drying fish so that you wouldn't have the fish rot. You could sell them and market them and, in some cases, even export them. That worked pretty well. Some of the wood stove projects were okay. But the more we looked at the wood stove business, we began to see that it was intimately related to forestry problems. How do you encourage people not to cut down trees prematurely? I remember one of the roads out of Ouagadougou in Upper Volta, Burkina Faso. We were told that three years before all the trees had been cut for a perimeter of 30 miles outside of Ouagadougou. "This year," we were told, "it's 50 miles

outside of Ouagadougou. Next year, it's going to be 70 miles." So, there was a shift of focus to forestry. Social forestry- We had a great forester in the Africa Bureau Office of Technical Resources who is still practicing - Tom Catterson. He is an independent consultant now. He had an excellent network of fellow foresters, European and African. He helped to focus our attention on social forestry, how you encourage people to live with forests without destroying them, or live with trees without destroying them. For example, growing certain crops and trees in the same field can help each other in a symbiotic relationship. We became more interested in forestry and, to some degree, also in environmental affairs. It would be interesting to ask someone like Tom Catterson (T: (315) 853 1537) what his perception of how the foreign aid approach of the Europeans and the North Americans has changed, what lessons have been learned in the past 10 years or more.

*Q: At that time you were working there, did you develop some sort of a policy paper or a strategy paper?*

WARD: Yes. The energy advisor for the AID mission in Kenya had up until that time been Weston (Wes) Fisher, who came to work in my office in Washington as the energy advisor when I stopped being the energy advisor. He worked on an energy policy paper, which tried to apply some of the lessons that we thought we had learned from our evaluation and to make some suggestions about other things to do.

*Q: What was it broadly, do you think?*

WARD: Pay more attention to replicability and to the economics of things, the exact opposite of what I would argue for Moroccan small hydro; try to think more about the marketing aspects and the education information aspects of things; try to involve the private sector more in production and marketing. I'm sure there were some other useful lessons.

*Q: What about social forestry, was that part of it? That came later?*

WARD: That came a little bit later. But there was an energy strategy statement which exists and can be found, I'm sure, in the CDIE library.

In our Africa/Technical Resources office we had three foresters, three energy people, and three environmentalists. Tom worked closely with the late Fran Gulick, a wonderful woman, who had spent time with her husband, Clarence Gulick, also now dead, in India at the time John Lewis was leading the AID Mission there. One of Tom Catterson's notable accomplishments, in any case, was organizing a conference in Abidjan of foresters who were quite familiar with the Africa scene. There were a couple of volumes which were published when you were running the evaluation operation in AID/Washington, a couple of big, yellow volumes on African forestry. It would be interesting using those studies and recommendations as kind of a baseline just to see what, if anything, has happened or been learned since then in the same area.



Tom Catterson was an Adjunct Professor at Syracuse University. In our office, we had three people at one time or another who were brought in under the Intergovernmental Exchange Act, which permitted people who were at state universities or state level governments to spend some time on detached service in a federal government agency. Tom had gone to Syracuse University College of Forestry. He had served several years with the Food and Agriculture Organization. He then spent some time in AID/Washington, after which he went to work for the Burlington, Vermont consulting firm of Associates in Rural Development, run by George Burrill. Tom was his chief natural resources advisor for several years but has since become an independent consultant. He has lately been doing work in Haiti, certainly a place that needs help with forests.

*Q: How did you find working in the Africa Bureau? What was the situation in the Africa Bureau at that time?*

WARD: We had the good fortune in the Office of Technical Resources of being led by Lane Holdcroft, who was a very good, very wise, strategically astute, technical person.

*Q: Did you find that the mission was receptive to what you were promoting?*

WARD: Sometimes. What we found rather interesting was, when Tom and I began to realize that it was important to try to encourage a better relationship between growing crops and growing trees, that they were not necessarily competitive, we had trouble with our own agricultural people. Agricultural people say "Trees are the enemy. Get rid of them so we can grow crops." The foresters, naturally, take a different view. So, I would be interested to know what state of play that is in now. You read more and more and more about the mutually supportive relation that must exist between food crops and other crops, but I don't know how that has played itself out in the AID world.

*Q: Did you have special funding for your activities?*

WARD: Not much. We had to depend pretty much on what was built into individual country programs. This was the beginning of the period where you could have buy-ins to centrally funded activities of one kind or another. There was some of that. But that was mainly like venture capital to get things off the ground. But to continue anything, you needed to have something in the country program. So, that took care of the period up until 1984, at which point I left the Africa Bureau to join the United Nations Division of the Office of Donor Coordination in the Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination. There I reported to Joan Dudick Gayoso.

### **New assignment as UN donor coordination - 1984-1987**

*Q: That was quite a shift.*

WARD: That's correct.

*Q: What was your function there?*

WARD: I was the head of the UN division. There was one division that dealt with the World Bank and OPIC and the other lending agencies. There was a division for DAC and OECD affairs headed by Jerome Sherry. There was my UN division.

*Q: What were you supposed to be trying to accomplish with that position?*

WARD: With all of the various UN development agencies, we tried to arrange for AID to speak with one voice. There would be meetings and liaison with the different development organizations like FAO, the World Health Organization, UNICEF, the UN Environment Program, UNDP, and others. When issues were discussed, we made sure that whoever represented the United States at these meetings would say the right thing as far as AID was concerned. We worked very closely with the development office in the Bureau for International Organizations in the Department of State, run by Joan's husband, Tony Gayoso, formerly of AID. We worked very closely with them in formulating the various papers and positions and talking points and things like that. We would go to some of these meetings. I used to go to the UNDP meetings in New York and FAO meetings in Rome. At that point, we had people like Jim Kelly, who was one of the people representing AID at the United States Mission to the United Nations in New York. The second person was my former Mission Director in Morocco, Harold Fleming. We wanted to make sure that they had the correct ammunition in their hands to make representations and state the correct United States position, properly cleared through the various regional bureaus. At various points along the way, when there would be crises like the Sahel drought, the Ethiopian famine, various other major disasters in Africa, at that point, you would find a very close combination of collaboration and competitiveness between AID, led by Peter McPherson, and UNICEF, led by Jim Grant. It was just wonderful to see. In some ways, we were collaborating very much. In other ways, clearly, we were competing with each other. The two organizations inspired each other to do better. In due course, Harold Fleming went to join Jim Grant in UNICEF as his senior program person. Because of Harold's experience in overseas missions- He had been Peace Corps director in Ivory Coast. He had been AID Mission Director in Morocco. He had been around to a lot of African countries both during his AID period and his UNICEF period. He was able to speak with considerable authority about the realities on the ground when very few of the other country representatives meeting in New York were able to.

*Q: What were some of the main issues that you had to deal with in those relationships in coordinating AID and State?*

WARD: We were always pushing for UN reform, of course.

*Q: What do you mean by that?*

WARD: More efficiency and less bureaucracy. It's kind of like the pot calling the kettle black, I must say.

*Q: Were there some specific things we were trying to get them to do?*

WARD: I don't think we were ever all that specific. We were pushing for simplification of the structure of UNDP, if I recall. We certainly had opinions about who should lead these organizations. We had our candidates, naturally, working together with the State/IO people, for who would run UNDP or who ought to get such and such a position in WHO. We worked very closely for a certain time with WHO on low cost approaches to medicine. WHO was very much interested in the barefoot doctor approach to mass health. We were very interested in collaborating with them on that. As AID got more and more interested in environmental matters and, as it happened, Joe Wheeler was the American representative to the UN environment program for a certain period, we were making sure that we were all on the same wavelength.

*Q: Did you review UN projects?*

WARD: Oh, yes.

*Q: What was our aim in doing that? How did we go about that?*

WARD: Here was kind of an effort similar to what I had briefly gotten involved in after I came back to Washington in 1972 in this Office of Project Review and Evaluation. Here we were trying to bring to bear whatever we might have learned about AID's projects and programs and approaches to see if we could make some constructive criticism about some of the things that UNDP was doing. All of these were done with minimal information and at some distance, but sometimes we were able to actually make some useful suggestions. It was rather interesting to see in our conversations with the representatives of the various European aid groups (the Scandinavians, the Germans, even the French) that sometimes they would be looking with some admiration at AID's approaches and wanting to imitate them in AID's structure and ways of dealing with some of the priority problems. They said, "We're very interested in the way that AID has organized itself. We'd like to do the same thing." This was just about the time that quite a number of people were saying, "If what we're doing isn't the right way, let's try something else." It's all kind of mixed. I would tend to encourage the Europeans to come to Washington and talk with a number of people. I would try to tell them the pros and the cons of what we were doing, of some things were helping and some things were not helping. But I don't really know about how far the various European aid groups went.

*Q: What kind of thing specifically were you talking about pros and cons?*

WARD: It was partly our approach to evaluation and partly our structure by region or by function, of which we had a bit of both.

*Q: Were there any particular common strands to AID's comments on UN projects? Were there some common points we kept making over and over?*

WARD: We tended to complain that UNDP programs didn't adhere rigorously enough to a coherent strategy, that they were just all over the map, based on probably internal UNDP politics or something. I think that was a legitimate concern, but in an international organization, there is not an awful lot you can do about it. We, of course, admired Jim Grant's UNICEF efforts very much. Jim Grant had the ability to not only conceptualize what he was doing and show how a specific set of actions really had some chance of accomplishing what you wanted to accomplish, and also packaging it and presenting it so that you'd be sitting on the edge of your chair with excitement after he got through with you, saying, "I can hardly wait to get out and do something about this." He was just wonderful.

*Q: Do you remember any particular topics or initiatives?*

WARD: I remember, during the period that low cost health and medicine were of interest (That was of considerable priority in the early or mid '70s.), driving once with Jim Grant from the Overseas Development Council up to Johns Hopkins in Baltimore where he was delivering a presentation on low cost health services. He was wondering about what AID's thought processes were like these days. He had, after all, been in AID back in the days when he started off as a Mission Director in Turkey back in the 1960s. He created PPC. I think they had about three or four people back in the early days. Then he was giving me his views on what really might be possible if you could organize a program of barefoot doctors. What the Chinese were doing at that time was very much in the public eye. He was really inspiring. To listen to the way he inspired some of these doctors up at Johns Hopkins to think a little bit more about the proper role of paramedics, it was just wonderful.

*Q: Were there other dimensions of your work with the UN organizations? Apart from UNICEF, which ones did you think were more effective? Or were they all pretty much the same?*

WARD: FAO is hard to assess. It's so big. Edward Saouma, former Lebanese Minister of Agriculture, was the Director of FAO at the time I was going to their meetings. He was considered by the AID people who had much to do with him as something of a Machiavelli, a political intriguer. I think he was quite effective though. However, he had a huge organization which probably has bureaucratic problems. He was very good at publicity, a lot of films and publications to tell you how wonderful FAO was. Talking, however, with some of the people who worked in FAO, some of their areas were very effectively run. The forestry people in FAO did a lot of good work. I just know through Tom something of what the FAO forestry people were doing. Like so many of these larger organizations, you can find what you want to find. There are probably some absolutely terrible aspects, but some of them were very good. Just as you were saying earlier about AID - you can find what you want.

## Returned to USAID/Egypt - 1987

WARD: I left the UN Division in 1987 to go to Egypt.

*Q: You went back to Egypt.*

WARD: That's right, for another two year period from 1987 to 1989, almost two years.

*Q: What was your position?*

WARD: By that time we had a huge AID mission, the biggest AID mission in the world. Your normal division, what would be a division or a separate office in some normal AID mission, would be headed by somebody who had been a Mission Director someplace. It was very large. I was in the Directorate for Trade and Investment, run by Gregory Huger, who is, I believe, Director of one of our missions in the former Soviet Union.

*Q: What was the function of that office?*

WARD: A variety of things. We were pushing private enterprise in various forms, trying to encourage the Egyptians to level the playing field for the private sector. We had a project to try to reactivate the capital markets, the stock market. There had been a stock market before the 1952 Revolution. I even met one old man who was associated with the Egyptian newspaper *Al Ahram* who remembered that stock market favorably. But anybody under the age of 50 wouldn't have the foggiest idea what the stock market was like.

*Q: Was that supported by the Egyptian government, getting the stock market going, the private sector going?*

WARD: No, not the stock market. There was certainly lip service to the private sector. After all, by that time, Anwar Sadat had come into power and there was an effort to try to liberalize, free up the private sector somewhat, not as much as we thought was desirable, but certainly more than your average Arab socialist functionary would think desirable. We met a rather diverse group of people. Some of the people we worked with were fairly substantial businessmen who had made a great deal of money since the arrival of Sadat and since the opening up to the outside world and the relative freeing of the private sector. Not all of these people were clean cut capitalists. They weren't quite as criminal as you read about in Moscow these days, but nevertheless, they were substantial businessmen. They were not so much the kind of people who needed a great deal of help. But some of them were very sincere and serious and effective people, who were very much Western oriented. We used to go all the time to see Egyptians who were members of the Egyptian-American Chamber of Commerce, which would meet regularly. I believe, in a situation like that, there is a lot to be gained by starting off, at least, working with the more substantial capitalists in the same way that in the days of the Green Revolution in

Pakistan, we started off working with the wealthier farmers and there was an imitation effect with the smaller ones. We had a customs reform program. There were some people from the U.S. Customs Agency who were working largely in Alexandria trying to bring more efficiency into the Byzantine complexity of customs administration. I don't know that that was particularly effective. It was okay as far as it went. It's good to try to make a bureaucracy relatively more efficient. But the key issues were not the ones which the working level functionaries would deal with. They key issues were ones which more senior decision makers would have to deal with. The attitude of the government was, "We'd like to keep regulation." So, that was partially successful." This AID mission was so large that it was entirely possible to work in one section and know little or nothing about what was happening in the others. There was a Science and Technology section, which dealt, among other things, with oil prices, energy, coal.

*Q: This was all under the Trade and Investment section?*

WARD: No, this was totally separate. There was a whole other section which funneled a considerable amount of assistance not through the central government in Cairo, but directly to the governorates. The governorates were the provinces. That was largely for different kinds of infrastructure: schools, hospitals, roads, things like that. I think that worked pretty well, at least from the people I talked to.

*Q: What about in your trade investment area? You were doing customs, capital markets. Was there anything else?*

WARD: We had a major Commodity Import Program that was providing dollars for buying American exports.

*Q: How were the commodities selected?*

WARD: It was negotiated between the Americans and the Egyptians.

*Q: Which activities were you directing?*

WARD: First I did a paper to outline the current trade and investment climate and USAID/Egypt's action plan, an analytical framework. The idea was to get an idea as to what it would be necessary to do to encourage greater investment by Egyptian capital in Egypt and what, if anything, it would be necessary to do to encourage a greater openness to external trade above and beyond the commodity import program. We consulted with a number of the Egyptian businessmen who had a choice between investing in Egypt or not investing in Egypt. Basically, the one message that we got very loudly and clearly was the really felt need for external management technical assistance, particularly in the private sector. There was a considerable desire on the part of some of the Egyptian businessmen we met to try to bring in new products and establish production facilities in Egypt. They were constantly feeling the dead hand of government, local governments, which were causing them costs and delays. They also felt the need of advice. I remember, there was a

fellow who was a banker, whose family had been a major textile export before they were expropriated during the Nasser period. He had worked for the International Monetary Fund in Washington and had gone to Kuwait to help establish the Kuwait Development Bank. Now, here he was back in Egypt and he wanted to invest some money. He said, "Well, you know, one of the key difficulties is loan officers in banks. These kids don't know anything. The Achilles heel of banks is that loan officers don't understand how to analyze possible loan prospects. What we need to do is train more and better loan officers. Then, that will open up a serious bottleneck to lending to viable projects as opposed to just throwing your money out the window." He had established a factory for making paper towels. He had a partner who was an Italian, whose family had been in paper making for a long time, purely in the private sector. They worked out an arrangement so they were actually producing things in Egypt for Egyptian consumption. They had some of the Egyptian banker's management skill and the Italian's technical ability. It worked fine.

*Q: Did AID have a role in that?*

WARD: None whatsoever.

*Q: That was the kind of thing...*

WARD: Yes, we were exploring what seemed to be working to see what kinds of things AID might do to be helpful.

*Q: What did you end up with AID doing?*

WARD: We had our Commodity Import Program, which was intended to benefit the private sector more than the public sector. We brought in some people to encourage employee stock ownership plans, which a fellow named Bruce Mazzie was pushing. Bruce was associated with Management Systems International in Washington, run by Larry Cooley. The thought was, "Perhaps this is a form of capitalism which can appeal to people who were formerly Arab socialists because it sounds like popular investment." We never did get it off the ground. There were some discussions between the Pirelli Tire Company and the Alexandria Tire Company. But I don't think it ever got off the ground. One of the things which, during my last year in Cairo, I got involved with was keeping an eye on some of the old projects - loan financed industrial production projects, which AID had begun to finance during the period when we still were not yet against state run enterprises. We had a steel rolling mill and a leather manufacturing place and a soap and oils factory and a fertilizer plant and a couple of others. Some of these were in Cairo. One was down in the Delta. A couple were in Alexandria. Once a month, my Egyptian counterpart and I would go around and visit these places. The idea was to make sure that they came to successful conclusions and to try to quickly solve whatever problems might arise between the American contractors, who were usually carrying out these projects, and the Egyptian state run enterprise directors, who were the collaborators.

*Q: You were trying to privatize them?*

WARD: No, that wasn't part of the project. These were projects that we didn't want to shine the spotlight on because part of our office was very much trying to push privatizing and freeing up, reducing regulations which might hamper the private sector. We just wanted to finish up these old state run projects and get them out of the way.

*Q: Which we had been involved in.*

WARD: Which we had been supporting during previous years. I think they were approved during the period when Frank Kimball was the Mission Director. That was the last period when we were actually putting money into these things. Some of them were working actually quite well. I was quite impressed by the high standards of the Egyptian leadership in some of them, not all of them. Sometimes the American contractors were as much a part of the problem as the Egyptians were. I think they ended pretty well. Basically, we were simply trying to find where there were problems and try to think of practical solutions. Usually my Egyptian counterpart and I would recognize after a few tours of these plants what was going wrong and what needed to be done. We would bring the Egyptians and the American contractors together and try to work out solutions. It was a matter of basically being the honest broker between the American contractor and the Egyptian leadership of the individual factory.

*Q: Try to get them efficient and then get out.*

WARD: That's right.

*Q: And not close them down.*

WARD: One of them was down on the west side of Sinai. Here was a gypsum plant. It was very good. It was very well constructed and it was operating efficiently. The problem was what to do with the product. One of the American contractors who was assisting said, "Well, we can make sheetrock. I think there's a market for sheetrock in Saudi Arabia. They're building a lot of buildings." I left before we solved that problem. But here was a factory which was producing things okay. But the marketing hadn't been handled very well. In any case, the professional quality of the Egyptians was generally good. Usually once we identified what the argument was about, we didn't exactly knock heads together, but we would arrange for some fairly frank discussions - sensitivity sessions. We would get the American contractors and the Egyptian factory officials around the table and we'd all have our cup of tea. I would say for the American contractors, "This is what our Egyptian colleagues are saying is the problem. This is what you're saying is the problem. Now, let's just put our heads together and think about how we can bring this down the pike." Just the fact of our presence as kind of a little catalyst for discussion, just so that people wouldn't walk away mad, helped a great deal.

*Q: I imagine.*



WARD: That's how I spent my last year.

*Q: After that?*

WARD: Then on the Fourth of July in 1989 in Cairo I retired from AID.

I did a bit of independent consulting after leaving, mostly for Washington-based consulting firms under contracts with AID. During the past few years I helped with the design or evaluation of projects in a number of areas - design of a women in development in Burundi, evaluations of the Africa Private Enterprise Fund, a private sector export promotion project and a privatization sector assistance program in Morocco, design of a market development project in Madagascar, and a number of other things. I learned something from all of these assignments. AID, like a number of other government agencies, was in the throes of "reengineering". The "objective tree" approach to program strategy was evolving, also with the active involvement of consulting contractors. These and their successor initiatives were intended, I presume, as efforts to make AID work more efficiently and coherently. In Mission after Mission I visited during this consulting period, I had the impression that almost the opposite result was being achieved. More and more time was being devoted to internal AID Mission meetings endeavoring to apply the reengineering and objective tree concepts and principles to the programs. Contractors were left to do more and more of the actual development work as AID staff wrestled with reengineering and attended to the increasingly voluminous communications with AID/Washington. Then, more recently, the field contract staff was sucked into the same quagmire which deflected their energies from the real work. The AID incentive structure appeared, at least to this outside viewer, to encourage more attention to the increasingly complex AID doctrines and conceptual structures and less attention to the solving of real problems on the ground. I sensed that many AID field staff, however competent, were being prevented from doing serious development work because they were being throttled by a bad system. I discovered in talking with other development professions, both AID direct hire and contractors, that I was not alone in this view. Where there was a political imperative, as in Egypt, AID was able to be very flexible indeed. Elsewhere the demanding rules of AID's style of development assistance ruled more rigorously in the name of accountability. In many cases, I think, AID was thus made less effective both as an instrument of development and for political ends, and I believe this problem continues.

I recall that during my first months with AID in 1961, I met a man who had been seconded to AID from the State Department. He was very enthusiastic, he said, about AID's relatively free-wheeling approach to its work. In State, he said, there was always someone who would pull out one of the volumes of regulations to show you why it was not possible to do something you wished to do. In AID, by contrast, the rules were only then beginning to be written, and it was much easier for a person of vision and energy to achieve something of solid value. It would seem that AID has now reached the opposite extreme, sliding across the scale from opportunities and pitfalls of freedom to the stultifying routines of a self-imposed but not particularly productive discipline. Max

Weber, the German political scientist, theorized about the rise and fall of bureaucratic structures, and concluded that somewhere there was a mid-point at which the proper balance of freedom and order allowed effective action, but that this condition was difficult to maintain and most often government structures became sclerotic over time and declined into irrelevance. This may already have occurred in AID. The level of competence has been rising sharply in many developing countries. Civil society has been strengthening, much more communication and exchange of knowledge now takes place within the private sector - corporations, foundations, NGOs - between the industrialized and developing countries. AID is increasingly a marginal player. Its efforts to redefine itself and its mission have not so far been notably successful, so far as I can tell. Perhaps institutional self-interest is too much at stake.

I feel fortunate to have spent my career with an organization which allowed me to do interesting things in interesting places. It was a time when the organization itself was not yet stifling and we were exploring then uncharted paths in an effort to improve the lives of the many. It was rewarding, even exciting, while it lasted. I'm glad I left in time.

*End of interview*