

CANADA

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Donald A. Kruse	1973-1976	State Department: Canadian Affairs, Washington, DC
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Robin White	1994-1996	Trade Policy Officer, Ottawa
Dale V. Slaght	1995-1999	Career Minister, Ottawa
Thomas G. Weston	1996-1997	Chief of Mission, Ottawa
Victor D. Comras	1998-1999	Director, Office of Canadian Affairs, Washington, DC
Bernard F. Shinkman	1998-2002	Information Officer, Ottawa

JAMES COWLES HART BONBRIGHT
Consular Officer
Ottawa (1930-1936)

Canadian Affairs
Washington, DC (1936-1941)

Ambassador James Cowles Hart Bonbright was born in 1903 in Rochester, New York. He received a bachelor's degree from Harvard University. He entered the Foreign Service in 1927. His career included positions in Canada, Belgium, France, and Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Portugal. Ambassador Bonbright was interviewed by Peter Jessup in 1986.

BONBRIGHT: I was pretty much in Rochester. Finally the doctor said I could go back to work. The question of my reassignment came up. To show how kind the State Department of that time could be, they assigned me to our legation in Ottawa, Canada, in the belief that it would be helpful for me to be that close to my own home in Rochester, New York, and easily accessible to my family. Everything has got too big for that kind of thing to happen very often anymore, I imagine.

Q: In those days, the Department didn't have a huge medical service, did they?

BONBRIGHT: No. I arrived in Ottawa on the First of March, 1930. It was a Sunday, and a wild blizzard was blowing. I didn't know anybody there; nobody met me. I had no place to go, but I had heard that the Chateau Laurier was a good hotel, so I got my bags together and got a porter and asked him to take me to a taxi. He put me in the taxi, and I said, "I'd like to go to the Chateau Laurier Hotel," whereupon the man drove me across the street and said, "This is it." I learned later that there was even a passage under the street, whereby you could walk from the station into the hotel. But I thought at the time that the people were going to be tough, to take a dollar for this much of a trip.

Q: Did you have just a suitcase and the heavy stuff was coming later, or did you have all your worldly goods with you?

BONBRIGHT: The stuff had been checked in the train. We had had a consulate general in Ottawa for some time, but we had never had a diplomatic mission there until 1927, when it was opened up as a result of the Commonwealth Conference and the different status it accorded to the dominions at that time. The first minister was William Phillips, who had been ambassador to Belgium, went there and opened things up in 1927. He left a couple of months before I got there, so I was sorry I never had the chance to serve under him.

The office consisted of a couple of rooms in an insurance company building, and the legation staff consisted of a charge affaires, Ben Riggs, and myself. So it wasn't a very high-powered outfit. Actually, our government bought a nice property opposite the Parliament building and built a handsome legation on Lincoln Street, which was opened, I think, in 1932. It seemed, after our previous quarters, very luxurious and would last a long time. Actually, I think it became too small shortly after I left, which is the way of the growth of those things.

The first minister to come there in my time was Hanford McNider, who had a terrific war record; I think he was the youngest major in the Army. He was interested in politics and became head of the American Legion, and being made minister to Canada was his reward, a staunch Republican, of course, at that time under Mr. Hoover.

Q: So in effect, he was a political appointee.

BONBRIGHT: Yes, he was. He was a fine man and I liked him, and his wife was charming. They got on very well. It was entirely easy for him, because when I got there, the government was still run by Mr. MacKenzie King; the liberals were still in power. The election a few months later in 1930 turned the liberals out and the conservative party came in under R.B. Bennett, a lawyer from Calgary, who was never noted for his pro-American feelings.

Q: Had the Depression struck yet?

BONBRIGHT: Oh, yes, the Depression had indeed struck. Actually, in 1932 they had the

Ontario Conference in Ottawa, in which emerged the system of imperial preferences in tariff matters, which were a great thorn in our side. Actually, it was our own damn fault. They were only reacting against our own so-called Tariff Act of the Twenties, which put a lot of their people out of business. So I think we got what was coming to us that time. It was bad.

In 1933, I was married to Sybil Rhodes, whose father came from Nova Scotia and was a member of Bennett's conservative government, first as Minister of Fisheries and later as Minister of Finance. He was always very kind to me, I was fond of him, and he had a very fine career. He was the youngest speaker in the Canadian House of Commons during the war, and later he became Premier of Nova Scotia.

Q: In those days, did the Department require special permission to marry someone of another nationality?

BONBRIGHT: That began just about that time. I think it originated with William Bullitt, who went to Moscow in 1933 and announced that having dinner with his staff was like having dinner with the League of Nations, or something like that. I never had any trouble getting permission, and I don't think anybody did who married a Canadian. I mean, it didn't make a distinction. I think I had to ask for permission, but things worked out. I think some of them, when they asked for permission, had to submit their resignation, as I remember it, which could be accepted or not. But I think what was aimed at was Europe and some of the Latin American countries. I can see the point if you had too many foreign wives in your official family, it could have been an embarrassment and awkward, but the ones that I saw, they were just as good wives as anybody.

Q: Maybe better than some. Was there any evidence in those days in the Thirties of Joseph Kennedy amassing vast quantities of Scotch for when Prohibition was over, or was that sort of a covert business?

BONBRIGHT: I don't remember that at all.

Q: It's alleged now that he accumulated a vast fortune by buying Scotch and taking it to Canada and then pushing it through when Prohibition was over.

BONBRIGHT: Of course, in Prohibition times, every time we crossed the border in a train, that train was taken apart, looking everywhere for liquor. People got quite ingenious, but it was small-scale, somebody trying to take a bottle in.

But the fellow I was talking about, the first minister, Hanford McNider, he was a great character. Not only did he fight in the First War, he fought in the Second War; I think he was a general out in New Guinea. I often thought that if I ever was in a fighting war, I'd just as soon be under him as anybody I've come across. He was real tough and good. He had some good stories to tell about himself, too. One time he went home to Mason City, Iowa, where he came from, and the train crossed the border coming back from Ottawa at Windsor, I think, Ontario, between Detroit. He was awakened early in the morning by the

immigration customs officers coming through the train. He was mad as hell at waking up. He was very sore. He was "god damning" it up and down, "Why don't you people leave me alone? and all this stuff. The inspectors finally withdrew.

A few minutes later they came back, and they said, "Mr. Minister, we hope your new congregation likes you."

Another one he told was, shortly after he was made minister to Canada, he was invited back to Milton Academy, where he had gone to school, to make the commencement address. He responded to this invitation by writing a letter to the trustees, saying, "Gentlemen, if you would look back in your records, you will find that on such and such a date of such and such a year, a by-law was passed which forbade one Hanford McNider from ever setting foot again on the school property." As a result of that, they had a special meeting of the board to rescind this offensive article. That amused him enormously.

Q: It implied he'd been fired when he was a student.

BONBRIGHT: Oh, yes, I think so. One of the things I remember while he was there was Lindbergh and his wife flew into Ottawa on their way northwest, going to Japan, on that trip. It was a very interesting evening. The MacNiders gave a dinner for them at their house and high-ranking military people from the Canadian Government, particularly the Air Force, and much of the evening was spent by these officers trying to persuade Lindbergh not to take the course that he was going to take. There were no facilities.

Q: Beacons and radar.

BONBRIGHT: They, of course, knew that if anything happened to him or he disappeared, with his reputation and all, they'd have to turn out everything that they had that would fly to look for him, and they couldn't afford it.

Q: Was he going to cross Canada and go up around the Aleutians and down that way?

BONBRIGHT: Yes.

Q: Terrible weather.

BONBRIGHT: Certainly. And he did.

Q: With Anne Morrow.

BONBRIGHT: Yes. She was his radio operator on the trip. She was a lovely person. But he thanked them very nicely but was absolutely immovable. This was the way he was going to go. Now looking back on it, I think they could have said, "You can't. We won't allow it," in which case he couldn't have gone. But they didn't. They were very unhappy and very relieved when he made the trip safely.

Q: And he probably didn't come back the same way.

BONBRIGHT: No, I don't think so.

Q: Ottawa was a lot colder than Rochester, wasn't it?

BONBRIGHT: Yes, yes.

Q: Couldn't it get much, much colder?

BONBRIGHT: Rochester was right on Lake Ontario and created a dampness, whereas in Ottawa, further inland, it was colder but clearer and a better climate. Rochester wasn't as bad as Buffalo.

Q: It's the worst of all, isn't it?

BONBRIGHT: It's right at the end of Lake Erie, where the winds are tremendous. But in Ottawa, I saw it 33 degrees below zero; that's the coldest I experienced there, but glorious, sunny weather. You could hardly breathe, it was so cold on your lungs, but it was bracing, to say the least. I was very fond of it. I had five very interesting and nice years there.

Q: Were there days when cars wouldn't start, or did the people solve all that with heaters?

BONBRIGHT: They had trouble, and, of course, the ruts in the street in the early spring weren't to be believed; they were a foot deep. But they fought the snow pretty well with what they had at that time. Everybody wore chains. I know on my car in the garage I had one of these little electric bug things that you put in and heat it and keep it warm.

Q: So it wouldn't freeze overnight. This is a little bit apart, but since we're on Canada, I always heard, and from what limited observation I have had, the Canadian foreign service is extremely good. They've had some outstanding people, and it's a high quality service. Is that your observation as you went different places in the world?

BONBRIGHT: Yes, very much so. I think they have a splendid service. It is much better now, but when I was there, the Canadian Department of External Affairs -- what they call their Department of State -- I don't think they had more than 15 or 20 officers in it, but all of them were good. Mike Pearson, for instance, was in it at the time, and he later became ambassador to Washington, foreign minister, and prime minister. Norman Robinson was another very bright man. Charlie Richie from Nova Scotia was ambassador to France and to Germany and high commissioner to Great Britain; he had a very distinguished career, very bright.

Q: Did you ever hear of a man called Leolyn Wilgress?

BONBRIGHT: Yes.

Q: I think he served in Moscow.

BONBRIGHT: Yes, he did. I knew him -- very fine. His first name was Dana -- Dana Wilgress. I'll mention him when I get to my next stage.

Q: Good morning, Ambassador Bonbright. You mentioned that you were in Ottawa almost five years. I was wondering about that. I thought the assignments were three years or four years. Did they vary a great deal?

BONBRIGHT: There never was a firm rule about it. I think the average was about three years. I thought that two was too little and four or five was too much. In my case, I never knew exactly why I stayed so long. I suspect it may have been due to my marriage to the daughter of a member of the government, and that they hoped to get something out of that. If so, they must have been very disappointed.

I might just mention the governor general situation. The governor general when I arrived there was Lord Wellington, who had been Viceroy of India. He was a very aristocratic, intelligent man, and I think quite well-liked by the Canadians. His wife was something else again. She had a way of acting in a more than viceregal manor, and when she went into the home of some Ottawa family and saw something that she liked, she would expect that object. As a result of this, many of the local families were reluctant to have the Wellingtons honor their household by coming, so all the more they enjoyed the following little anecdote. As in London, where their newspapers carry a statement every day about who had the honor of doing what at Buckingham Palace, the Wellingtons also saw to it that the Ottawa papers would carry a daily statement of their doings, their comings and goings at Government House. There was a young liberal fellow named Graham Spry, who was somewhat of a prig, I thought, but he was an ambitious young man and was around town quite a bit. So it was with some surprise that the citizens of Ottawa woke one morning to read the following in their local paper: "Yesterday afternoon at 5:00 o'clock, Mr. Graham Spry had the honor of Lady Wellington at Government House." This, of course, immediately became a collector's item in Ottawa.

Q: Was this a disease like kleptomania or a weird trait?

BONBRIGHT: I don't know if it was quite that far, but she had a very high opinion of her rank, I think.

To go back to events in the American legation, after Hanford MacNider retired as minister, his place was taken by a career officer named Pierre Boal, who was Chargé d'Affaires and remained that for well over a year before another minister was sent. Pierre was married to a French woman of some charm and was an intelligent officer. I must say he was a little on the devious side, in my choice, but still, in looking back, he was a good representative. He had a very good war record, and in the first war was affiliated with Lafayette Escadrille; that's presumed to be by his French wife. He, of course, was in

charge of the creation at that time of the Commonwealth Conference, the passage of the imperial preference tariff laws.

He was followed by Warren Delano Robbins, a career man of some charm. He clearly owed his appointment to his middle name of Delano, which indicated his relationship with FDR. He had had a good career, but unfortunately, by the time he got to Ottawa, he was on the way down. To be quite honest, he'd become quite a lush.

Q: That was obvious to other people in the community?

BONBRIGHT: Yes, I'm afraid it was. He was married, his wife, who I think was an Argentinean by birth, was a very attractive and very strong-willed woman. I think she saw the fading hours very quickly and this resulted in her intruding into the affairs of state to an extent, which hurt him pretty badly. If we had a problem that the minister was to take up with the Department of External Affairs, we would coach him as carefully as we could in the morning and have everything pretty well lined up. He would then go home for his two- or three-martini lunch, and he would explain everything that had gone on to his wife, who would automatically and immediately take objection to it and get him turned around the wrong way, usually by saying he shouldn't let his "underlings push him around." So when he got back after lunch, there we were, going in the wrong direction, so nothing we could do but just retire, regroup, and resume the charge the next day. But that was not at all satisfactory.

Q: Did she have her own foreign policy, or was she just thwarting advisors?

BONBRIGHT: A combination of both. She was interested in all these things and had very firm opinions. She just confused her role with her husband's too much -- not unheard of. Actually, she was the cause of further difficulty. When the Wellingtons left Government House, the successor was the Earl of Bessborough, who was married to a very lovely French woman. The difficulty was that Ilene Robbins had been to school with Countess Bessborough, and therefore regarded herself in every way as the equal of the governor general's wife. She therefore declined to curtsy before her former schoolmate, as was the local custom, and addressed her in the way that was regarded as a little too familiar.

Q: First name?

BONBRIGHT: I think so. So this just added to it. It's a small matter, but small matters can cause trouble.

Q: Especially if you're living with them.

BONBRIGHT: Yes. The episode had an unhappy end, as Mr. Robbins went to New York on a visit after he'd been there some time, where he caught pneumonia and died. So that was the end of that interlude.

Q: Was he relatively young? Was he in his sixties?

BONBRIGHT: I don't remember. I think pretty close to 60. After that, Pierre Boal resumed as Chargé d'Affaires and remained in charge as long as I was in Canada.

My own tour of duty ended in the middle of 1936, when I was called back to the Department to take over the Canadian desk. So I spent four years on that stint. In all I spent nine years on Canadian affairs, which was enjoyable and interesting, and probably longer than I should have.

Before I left Canada, the Department sent me out west to visit our consular offices to get some picture in the field. I went to such unsavory places as Sudbury, Ontario, Fort William, Fort Arthur, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Regina, Saskatchewan, Calgary and Edmonton and Alberta, Vancouver. Vancouver was the only city on the trip that I ever had any desire to see again. It was quite a nice place.

Q: There still is a consulate there, I think.

BONBRIGHT: Yes, I think so. I was to have gone on to Victoria, but I had the bad luck to fall down on a slippery street in Vancouver and was run over by a T Model Ford that only went over my foot, which was badly sprained. The pain was considerable, the humiliation even more disagreeable. So I didn't get to Victoria, but I did recover enough to take a fast trip up to Prince Rupert, where we had a one-man consulate. I had a lovely voyage up on the Inland Passage, beautiful, but Prince Rupert itself was a horror. The smell of fish was everywhere. The poor consul did nothing that I could see except sign consular invoices for shipments of halibut to the United States.

Q: It was sort of a commercial attaché's job, wasn't it?

BONBRIGHT: Yes. Anyway, I was to leave by Canadian National train, which went only every other day. After the first 24 hours, I stayed very close to the railroad station, because that was one train I didn't want to miss. I made it along with one Pullman car and about eight freight cars full of fish.

When I got to Washington to take up my duties, I was under the immediate supervision of John D. Hickerson, who had previously been a consul in Ottawa, and who we always have referred to as "Mr. Canada himself." He was a splendid boss, intelligent, hard-working, very, very nice and understanding. I was put in a room with two other men, John Stewart and -- I've forgotten the other man's name. To show how things had grown, the three of us in that room handled the whole British empire. One did the United Kingdom and colonies, another one did Australia and New Zealand, and I did Canada. I had the assistance of one maiden lady named Clara Borjes, who had been in the Department for many years and was our expert on rum-running. She knew all the famous rum-runners by name and all the famous bootleggers, a most unlikely assignment for a lady of spotless virtue. We never would say the word "damn" in her presence. Actually, by this time, Prohibition had passed, but she was still busy on rum-running cases, left-

overs from those days. The famous "I'm Alone" case was still...

Q: That was a ship, wasn't it?

BONBRIGHT: It was a rum-runner that we had intercepted off the Gulf of Mexico inside our three-mile limit, took off, and the Coast Guard took off after her and finally caught up with her, but well outside our territorial limits. We advanced the theory of hot pursuit, considered legitimate in our eyes. This case dragged on in the courts for many years. Finally it was settled. I think we had to pay \$25 million.

Q: It was a Canadian rum-runner?

BONBRIGHT: Yes.

Q: Did it go to the International Court of Justice in Hague?

BONBRIGHT: I don't remember what court it finally ended up in. There was one other left-over from the rum-running business. The Bronfman Brothers in Montreal, who owned Seagrams, the makers of B&O and other Canadian whiskeys, had been running stuff pretty regularly, and this greatly offended our Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Henry Morgenthau. Morgenthau was determined to hit the Bronfmans hard. Well, he finally made such a fuss over it at the White House, that the story was that FDR called him in one day and said, "Now Henry, you say you're suing this family for \$6 million. That's what you think it's worth? Let's write that down on a piece of paper." So he wrote down \$6 million. He said, "Now Henry, let's write down what the actual value of this thing is. It's worth absolutely nothing." So he put zeros down and a little line under that, and he said, "Now let's divide it by half. \$3 million, Henry." And that's the way it was settled.

Q: This was a suit against the Bronfmans?

BONBRIGHT: Yes.

Q: Miss Borjes must have known something about Joseph Kennedy's involvement in liquor.

BONBRIGHT: Probably so.

Q: I think he had some relationship with the Bronfmans as well.

BONBRIGHT: Probably so, but I never heard of that connection, although I should have.

Q: It came out later, and it might come under the head of muckraking. I don't know.

BONBRIGHT: A friend of the bureau in which our affairs were handled was Pierrepont Moffat, who was a very intelligent and good officer. I never had too much to do with him in my time. I wasn't there too long. He, frankly, showed little or no interest in Canada,

which was my feeling.

Q: As if it were no-account?

BONBRIGHT: Europe was his cup of tea. As a result, more than ever, Jack Hickerson became the top level to me. I always thought it was a little poetic justice when Moffat was in the field. For his first post, they made him minister to Canada. I think I could have helped him, but he never showed any interest. Unhappily, he got phlebitis when he was up there and died.

Q: I guess that was before they had those thinning drugs like heparin, because I think about that time, if they had invented it, instead of taking it in pill form or however they do it, they had to drip it with a needle into the vein in a very complicated, uncomfortable way. But you don't hear of people dying of phlebitis anymore unless there's a clot.

BONBRIGHT: It was a real loss. Among the problems of that time, the most important, I guess, was the St. Lawrence Waterway. We had been negotiating with the Canadians for this since the early Twenties, and it was batted back and forth. The cities of the Great Lakes were all for it, but it was very strongly opposed by the railroads, who felt, quite rightly, that it would take a lot of freight away from them. It was an interesting battle, and it finally went through. If I remember, the treaty was not actually signed until after my time, even though we did a lot of work on it.

Q: Where were you physically when you were in Washington? Were you in the old Executive Office Building? Right next to the White House?

BONBRIGHT: Yes. The Navy Building, which was a wonderful building to be in.

Q: I did six years in it. I loved it.

BONBRIGHT: I loved it dearly. It's not pretty, but it looks like what the State Department ought to look like.

Q: High ceilings, fireplaces.

BONBRIGHT: Long corridors with swinging doors like into a bar room into the offices. The only bad rooms in it were some among the inner court; they got pretty hot. Of course, there was no air-conditioning or anything of that kind. Most of the time I was lucky enough, in this particular assignment, I was on the side facing the White House, so I would see Fala playing on the lawn, the President's scotty, where I would watch with disgust Easter egg rolling by a lot of grimy little children.

Q: Cordell Hull was the Secretary of State.

BONBRIGHT: Cordell Hull was the Secretary of State. He'd come in with FDR. He was an extraordinary man. I don't think he was very happy as Secretary of State. I don't think,

on the balance, he was a particularly good one. He was totally committed to the lowering of tariffs and pursued the trade agreement program with great tenacity, which I think was good, but in other respects, he didn't function so well, I didn't think. I was trying to think if Sumner Welles came in at that time. I guess so. Sumner Welles was the Under Secretary of State who was close to Roosevelt, an entirely different kind of mind. He was very brilliant, full of devil and go, we called it, although he wasn't very old. To read his memoranda of conversation was a lesson to all of us. He was superb, accurate and concise, just the opposite of Mr. Hull. Of course, the President leaned heavily on Welles because of these traits, but due to Mr. Hull's strong support on the Hill, he had no choice but to keep the old man on.

Q: Sumner Welles was rather arrogant, wasn't he?

BONBRIGHT: Oh, yes, he was indeed impossible and had a rather bad ending which I won't go into. Mr. Hull detested him.

Q: He did? They were cut from different cloth.

BONBRIGHT: Among his friends in the Department, he referred to Welles as "the horizontal son of a bitch." I never quite knew why that was considered worse than a vertical one, but he apparently did.

Q: I've never heard that expression.

BONBRIGHT: I hadn't heard it either. The other big issue, an issue which was not really an issue, but another big job while I was in there was that we negotiated two trade agreements for Canada which were of considerable importance. The negotiations were about as pleasant as they could be. Our side was headed by Jack Hickerson, and I was his assistant, and then we had David Durand, the head of the entire commission, a man from agriculture with Stewart. On the Canadian side they had the leader, Norman Robertson, a very bright man from external affairs, supported by David Wilgress from the Chamber of Congress department, and Hector McKinnon, who was head of their Tariff Commission. Negotiations were friendly, very informal. In fact, once or twice we adjourned negotiations by unanimous consent to carry them on in Griffith Stadium, where the Washington Senators were playing. While Mr. Hull was a great advocate of tariffs, the American team in the negotiations soon learned that it was a fatal mistake to ever seek the Secretary's approval for a reduction of the tariff on any article manufactured in the state of Tennessee. We remembered that lesson.

Q: Tennessee was exempt?

BONBRIGHT: Tennessee was pretty exempt, yes.

Q: That's not unknown in Congress or people who grew up in Congress.

BONBRIGHT: No, no. It's very common. We should have known better to suggest it.

Q: Cordell Hull had a temper, didn't he?

BONBRIGHT: Oh, yes, quite strong. I didn't get to see him too often; I was too far down the line. But once or twice I would be there when he was having a meeting with the Canadian minister or something and would take notes. I'd write up a summary of the conversation. He was a very difficult man to understand. His speech was very roundabout. The only two officers I knew who could really understand what the old man was saying were Ray Atherton and Jimmy Dunn, but this was in a later period just before the war. When we come to that, I have a little piece of paper I'll read, which shows Mr. Hull's style in a press release.

One smaller matter that came to our work at that time was that we had the Neutrality Act going, and Roosevelt, whatever he may have been trying to do on the side, he was certainly trying to keep us out of the involvement in what soon became the growing danger of war in Europe. He wanted to build up a Navy rapidly, and this involved very small boats, patrol boats. At that time nothing could be built on the Great Lakes of a military nature according to the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1827, or something like that.

Q: Between Canada?

BONBRIGHT: Between Canada.

Q: As if we were going to seize something?

BONBRIGHT: Which provided for the disarming of the Great Lakes. It was all part of that 3,000 miles of undefended frontier which was on the mouth of every orator on the subject of Canadian-American relations. We got very sick of that speech. The Navy wanted to use some of the shipyards in Chicago, Lake Michigan, Detroit, and Cleveland, to build some small boats that were armed. We couldn't do this under the Rush-Bagot Agreement, so we had to get the consent of the Canadian Government to quietly do away with it. I was given the responsibility of drafting the note on this subject, and of all the mealy-mouthed things that I've ever read in State papers, this was one of the worst. It was so bad that Captain Strubel, later Admiral Strubel, of the Navy Department, who was negotiating with us in the State Department, thought it was one of the finest papers he'd ever read. He used to howl with laughter when he saw me ever after.

Q: But it was swept away?

BONBRIGHT: Yes. It was quietly put to rest. There wasn't any great fuss about it. We thought there would be more because of the constant references to it as a great statesman-like agreement of its time.

Q: After the war broke out, I think there was one aircraft carrier in the Great Lakes, and it must have been something that was converted. I don't think it was built from scratch. I don't know whether it stayed there during the war or went out into the Atlantic, but I

think it was mostly used for training in an aircraft carrier.

While you were there in what they call the EOB, were clouds of war obviously gathering? Hitler was rampaging, wasn't he?

BONBRIGHT: Oh, yes. I was there from '36 to '39. Hitler was doing all his stuff.

Q: The Spanish Civil War was coming to a close.

BONBRIGHT: That's right. That's where poor Jimmy Dunn used to get hit over the head by the press. The press was awful.

Q: Loyalists.

BONBRIGHT: The government against Franco. Our policy was not in that direction. That's one thing I always held a little bit against Mr. Hull, who avoided getting out in front with great care of this fight, and the President, too. The fellow who really took the rap was Jimmy Dunn, who was a wonderful man and didn't care. He let them cut him to pieces.

Q: Was he chief of the European area?

BONBRIGHT: Yes, he was at the time.

Q: He wasn't ambassador in Madrid?

BONBRIGHT: No. This was before he was ambassador. But he took it well. He was a very good ambassador later. Later he was ambassador to Italy for a long time.

Q: He had many posts, didn't he?

BONBRIGHT: Right after the war, he was there during the 1948 election in Italy, in which a few tricks were played saving the country for democracy. He was ambassador to France.

Q: Who was Mrs. Dunn? Was she an outstanding person?

BONBRIGHT: She was an Armour, I think, a very charming woman.

Q: She wasn't Norman Armour's sister, was she?

BONBRIGHT: No, I don't think so.

Q: Since you were connected with the United Kingdom and that area, specifically Canada, was it apparent to people in the Department then, some of Roosevelt's -- not covert, but more or less undisclosed getting closer with the British, for instance, Sir

William Stephenson being in New York and setting up sort of an apparatus?

BONBRIGHT: I didn't know too much about that until I read about it in Stephenson's book. There was a very close relationship, no doubt, and the destroyers for bases took place in that time, I think, didn't it?

Q: Just about. Roosevelt had a farsighted vision of what was happening, didn't he?

BONBRIGHT: Oh, yes, I think he did. I'm sure he did. But he also was head of the government at a time when neutrality had a very strong appeal.

Q: Isolationism.

BONBRIGHT: Isolationism.

Q: America first.

BONBRIGHT: Yes, no doubt about it. I think he maneuvered himself in every way that he felt he could to help the British.

Q: Good morning, Ambassador Bonbright. We've had a brief lapse of a few days here. It's a nice cold Saturday morning in your overlook here on Massachusetts Avenue.

BONBRIGHT: There's one small family matter that I think I should mention here before I leave off with my Canadian experiences. In 1937, I think it was, my wife decided to become an American citizen. This was her decision alone, and I had never asked her or intimated to her in any way that this would be a good thing to do. I know it was not an easy decision for her, because she was very proud of her Canadian and particularly her Nova Scotian background. I was pleased that she decided to do this. It was, of course, a direct result of the problem that the Department had had in previous years when they had made it impossible for Foreign Service officers to marry non-Americans without the Department's permission. Anyway, I was a little worried about it -- I didn't tell her so -- but her urges were strictly artistic -- painting. Although she came from a political family, she had no interest in politics or history as such. So I wasn't sure how well she'd make out on the examination. But the day came and she came home from the exam, and I was much relieved when I asked her how she thought she had made out, and she said she thought she had done all right. I said, "That's fine. Were there any questions that were put to you that gave you trouble?"

She said, "Only one that really bothered me."

I said, "What was that?"

She said, "They asked me, 'Who is Ulysses S. Grant?'" After that I decided I'd ask no more questions. But anyway, she did pass, and I don't think ever regretted it. At times when we were traveling abroad, I think it was useful that she was traveling on an

American passport.

My assignment then was to go as second secretary of the embassy in Brussels. Before sailing, I went up to Nantucket to take a final farewell from my father and mother. This was a rather sad occasion. My father was very ill, he'd suffered a heart attack in March, and while he had been improving some over the summer, he was confined to his bed and didn't look right. I felt quite sure that there was very little chance that I would ever see him again. Unfortunately, this feeling proved true, because on September 6 I got a cable from my mother telling me that he had passed away. This was just a few days after the start of the war, so there was no question of my being able to go home, particularly as I'd just arrived at my post a few weeks before.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, II
Vice Consul
Vancouver (1935-1937)

Ambassador Douglas MacArthur, II graduated from Yale University. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Austria, Canada, Italy, Belgium, France, Japan, and Belgium. Ambassador MacArthur was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1986.

Q: As a matter of fact, looking at this, I would say that your time as a seaman certainly prepared you for being in the consular business, which is the main responsibility, often, of seamen, in dealing with the administrative tasks and the problems of Americans whom you might never have met if you'd just gone from Milton Academy to Yale, to the Foreign Service. You were getting really an excellent training for your later work.

MACARTHUR: I couldn't agree with you more. It was really very useful.

In those days, when I came into the Service, about 1,000 people took the examination. It was the depth of the Depression and some of them, I think, just took it as a flyer. Of the 1,000, there were 105 who passed the written examination. Then following the oral examination, there were 35 of us who were selected. But in those days, you had no training before being assigned abroad. After you passed your examination, you were called down to the Department, given your railroad ticket or your boat ticket and your passport, and told to go out and report to the place where you were sent, usually a Consulate General. There you would be exposed to the various types of work that you would get in the Service, except a very important part, which I'll touch on -- political reporting.

So you arrived in the post, green as grass, with absolutely no experience or no briefing in the Department. You spent about three months in each of the major sections, and then you were assigned to one until you were called back to the Department to the Foreign Service School. You were usually gone about 15 months on this probationary period.

You were not secure in your job until you had passed through the Foreign Service school after this first probationary post.

I was assigned to Vancouver. I started out in the visa section. After about three months in the visa section, I did three months of general work, including shipping -- that is, the visa-ing of crewists, the discharge of crew members who sought discharge, the signing and stamping of commercial invoices that had to accompany export shipments to the United States, and general protection work.

While I was doing this work, the old Seattle-Alaska line went on strike. They were controlled pretty much by Harry Bridges' left wing union on the West Coast. There were several strikes stranding a ship in Vancouver. I went down to witness the discharge of these striking seamen, and by a sheer coincidence, I found that one of the seamen was one of the people that had been with me on the old Isthmian Line when I had taken that ordinary seaman's job. The shipping job was interesting, particularly the discharge of a striking crew. There was the usual tough-minded labor union labor leader on each ship, if the crew was unionized, as they were on the West Coast. The union leader always wanted to be present when a crew member was questioned so he could intimidate any seamen not favoring a strike. I got involved in what the French call a prise de bec, a nose-to-nose, with union representatives, saying the seamen had the right to speak alone with the consul and the captain when he was asked the question of whether he accepted the discharge voluntarily or not, or why he was striking. But it was an interesting experience, where, again, my background on a merchant marine ship taught me a lot in understanding the problems of seamen.

Q: Did you find that your contemporaries in the Foreign Service, which one normally thinks of as being recruited from either the middle or the upper classes of the United States, not being very sympathetic to union problems?

MACARTHUR: No. I think of all the 35 people that came into the Service when I came in, only two or three had any outside income. The rest of us were dependant totally on our salaries, on what we earned. We had no outside income.

Q: What was the salary at that time?

MACARTHUR: The salary was \$2,500 a year, less 5%, which ran to about \$199 a month. You did get a housing allowance, and that, of course, made it possible to live. It wasn't rich living. There were, of course, in upper positions, a certain number of people who had come into the old diplomatic service, before the Rogers Act in 1924, when the Rogers Act combined the consular service and the diplomatic service. Some of them were rather snobbish and affected, but some of them were extraordinarily capable and able people. But when I came into the service in the Thirties, as I say, in the depths of the Depression, you felt you were extremely fortunate to have been selected into the Service; you felt that the Service was an elite service, and there was a great deal of pride in it.

I want to go back, if I may, to make one further observation about training in the first

post. In addition to visas, shipping, general protection work, citizenship -- that is, passports, registrations of births and deaths etc., there was one other very important type of work, commercial work. I spent three months doing commercial work. Let me say that in those days, when you went out in a large Consulate General, as Vancouver was, the hard working corps of the Foreign Service that gave continuity were the non-career vice consuls. They were people who had worked up from clerical jobs. They were not "career", but they were extremely expert and proficient in their particular line, visas, citizenship work, invoicing, shipping and commercial work.

I had the great good fortune to work three months with a non-career vice consul, Nelson Meeks, who taught me, for the first time, the tremendous importance of commercial work, which was in those days not looked down on, but, not considered terribly important by some "old school tie" boys in some of our embassies. Nelson groomed me, and then sent me out to do several reports. Later, when we were in the Foreign Service school where one spent two or three days in each of the other interested departments -- Agriculture, Commerce, Justice, etc., they distributed some of the reports that they thought had resulted in sales. Among them was a report that I had done on the toy industry in Vancouver under Nelson's excellent supervision. I think that early training in the importance of commercial work and what it means to our companies helped me immeasurably later. I got some very nice letters from the companies that sold some toys to the toy retailers in Vancouver and Victoria.

It was one of the reasons why, in later incarnations, when I became an ambassador, I attached so much importance to the commercial aspect of our work. In the Foreign Service, the commercial attaché is the fellow with the title, but the ambassador is the only one with access to the government at top level, at the prime minister level, at the minister of commerce level, the minister of finance level. So the ambassador is really the chief commercial attaché. The role of the commercial attaché is to prime the boss -- that is, the ambassador -- keep him fully briefed and informed, and when the proper moment comes, prod him into action, to go and raise hell with the prime minister or the appropriate cabinet minister if we're being discriminated against or our industries and our business badly treated.

Q: In Canada, was John Davis the consul general when you were there?

MACARTHUR: Yes. John Ker Davis was the consul general. He was known as "China" Davis. He had grown up in China. When the rape of Nanking took place, he escaped over the walls. He had spent much of his career in China, and had been the son, I think, of an American missionary in China.

Q: I note he was born in Soochow.

MACARTHUR: Yes. He was an extraordinarily decent man, a very able, capable man, a man who never lost his cool, not terribly charismatic, but tremendously capable and very respected, and a very wonderful person. In those days, we must remember that the United States Foreign Service was very small. I have here a booklet published by the State

Department in 1936. I'd been in the Foreign Service just about a year. The total number of Foreign Service officers in 1936 was 683. We had 1,619 clerks and 1,291 miscellaneous employees of various kinds. That's a total of 3,647, from janitors to Class 1 Foreign Service officers. We had diplomatic missions in 57 countries, because in those days, we're apt to forget now the number of independent countries was relatively small. There were 20-some countries in Europe, if you include Eastern Europe, Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, etc. There were almost 20 in Latin America. That leaves perhaps 12 or 15 for the rest of the world.

RANDOLPH A. KIDDER
Vice Consul
Montreal (1938-1939)

Randolph A. Kidder entered the Foreign Service in 1938, three years after graduating from Harvard University. Mr. Kidder's career included posts in Canada, Australia, Vietnam, and an ambassadorship to Cambodia. Ambassador Kidder was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1989.

Q: You entered the foreign service in 1938, could you describe a bit how the initial assignment and the training was at that point?

KIDDER: At that point, they generally sent you abroad for a year and a half before bringing you back to the Foreign Service School. The married couples they sent to nearby places. In those days they did not pay the wife's travel expenses. I came out of it quite well, because I didn't mention my wife was with me in the car, and anyway, I only had to go to Montreal from Boston.

Q: The idea was not to spend much money on this raw material. I interviewed Robert Woodward recently and he said it cost him something like \$7 to go by bus to his Canadian post from Wisconsin or Minnesota. What type of work were you doing in Montreal?

KIDDER: There were two newcomers at all times and they started us out in the Visa section, issuing visitor's visas, and then they had us for a brief time in the economic section and then for a brief time in the citizenship section. Then we sat in the outer office for a time to greet people as they came in.

Q: How did the foreign service strike you? This was your first look at the real thing.

KIDDER: Well, of course it wasn't all that different. My wife and I lived in Westmount which was then the English speaking part of Montreal, and she and I both talked fluent French, so that wasn't a problem. I just enjoyed it, I had very congenial colleagues. Homer Byington was my chief; he was called a chief in those days, part of the jargon of the Department. It was a very congenial atmosphere and we made a lot of good friends.

Q: How did you find Homer Byington?

KIDDER: He was a delightful and wise person.

Q: The name Homer Byington means a lot to me because my last job overseas was as Consul-general in Naples, and he was "Mr. Naples" for so many years.

KIDDER: That's right; then his family went after him.

Q: Did you get much of a chance to learn the ways of writing for the foreign service and all that?

KIDDER: I would say not very much, because it was a routine job and didn't provide much occasion to do it.

Q: Were you particularly interested at that time in the political life within Canada?

KIDDER: Oh yes, I was quite fascinated. With Montreal being in Quebec, where we had a consul stationed in those days. There were all kinds of disputes going back and forth between the French-speaking and the English-speaking units in the society. We found a number of very good friends, and our first child was born there, and we were very much at home.

WILLIAM L. BLUE
Consular Officer
Niagara Falls (1941-1942)

William Blue was born in Memphis, Tennessee in 1914. He received a master's degree from Vanderbilt University in 1936. After studying at The Fletcher School, Mr. Blue joined the Foreign Service in 1941. His career included positions in Canada, Venezuela, Italy, Switzerland, Portugal, and Washington, DC. Mr. Blue was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1991.

Q: You showed persistence, etc. Part of this is just gaining a little more experience in the world, a little more maturity. Well, when did you come into the Foreign Service?

BLUE: In 1941. I passed the exams in January and then was sent of all places to a small consulate in Niagara Falls, Canada. Of course, the war was on the way and they were not sending people to Europe.

Q: How long were you in Niagara Falls?

BLUE: I got there in June '41 and must have left in August of '42.

Q: What were you doing there?

BLUE: It was all consular work. I don't know whether the Consul General, who had been in Shanghai, did any political reporting or not. We had an awful system in those days. I was a career officer, therefore I was the next officer down from the Consul General and there were three non-career people. That wasn't quite fair. I didn't know the difference between a visa and a passport. So he brings me in and treats me as if I were his deputy. And those poor guys; one of them had been in Milan for 25 years -- this was the old system before they had the Foreign Service Staff category -- and they stick him in Niagara Falls. He and his wife were miserable -- his wife probably more than he was. We had a mail clerk who had been in Paris for 30 years and here she is sitting in this funny little town in Canada, which wasn't really very Canadian, and miserable. It was a very bad system. I learned a great deal and did my best to make these people feel that it wasn't my idea to be put in there over them. But it was a good experience for me.

C. GRAY BREAM
Vice Consul
Halifax (1941-1942)

Born in Indiana in 1914, C. Gray Bream graduated from Midland College in 1936 and earned an MA and a PhD from the University of Chicago. Bream joined the Foreign Service in 1941 and served overseas in Nova Scotia, Greenland, Sweden, Pakistan, Amsterdam and Germany. He also worked in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research as well as the Arms Control and Development Agency. Bream was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1995.

Q: Yellow fever, very handy in Halifax. When were you in Halifax?

BREAM: From September 1941 until the summer of 1942.

Q: What was Halifax like at that particular time?

BREAM: The city was very much at war. It was a staging point for shipping overseas. The ships would gather there and then convoys would go out across the North Atlantic, and then they would come back. Part of my job was to look after American merchant seamen who were signing on there and signing off there. Some of them would sign on in New York, get to Halifax, and then decided they didn't want to go any further and sign off. I recall in particular one group that signed off on the return trip from the eastern Atlantic. They had been torpedoed. There were four of them and one of the four men had been torpedoed three times. Among the four, they had one foot left. They had been in open boats in the North Sea. There wasn't much of that because, while most of the

merchant shipping came in there, the merchant marines rarely got off of their ship. They went straight overseas.

Q: *Was there a consulate general there?*

BREAM: Yes, a consulate general. We had a pretty good visa business. There was also a representative of the Immigration and Naturalization Department whose job was to pre-clear people coming from Europe for the most part, and I guess once he did that, that was enough to get them on their way to the States.

Q: *Were you getting any training? Was it more or less, "This is the manual and this is how you do it?"*

BREAM: No training. In those days the Foreign Affairs Manual was probably only a quarter of an inch thick. [laughter] The consul general, who had started out as what they then called non-career, a vice consul, also a so-called non-career, and two consular officers who had been in the Foreign Service for quite a few years. Both the consul general and one consular officer I think, retired from there. The Counselor Officer was transferred, that would have been his last post.

RALPH N. CLOUGH
Junior Officer
Toronto (1941-1942)

Ralph N. Clough was born in 1917 in Washington. He attended Lingnan University in China from 1936-1937. He graduated from the University of Washington in 1939 with a B.A. He received his M.A. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1940. In 1941, he joined the Foreign Service. His postings included Toronto, Tegucigalpa, Puerto Cortes, Kunming, Peiping, Nanking, Hong Kong, London, Bern, Taipei, and Washington D.C. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: *Then we move back to your Foreign Service time. You were in Toronto from '41 to '42. What were you doing there most of the time?*

CLOUGH: Oh, I was doing the usual things. You know, it was so-called probationary period. The system at that time was that you reported for one year, usually at a nearby post, so it wouldn't cost much to send you there.

Q: *Why didn't they send you to Vancouver?*

CLOUGH: Well, that would have been a little too... No, I was envious of a few friends who got sent to places in Western Europe. That was *really* foreign service. Toronto...not

much foreign about that. So I did border-crossing cards, passports, a variety of consular work. And then I had a short period of doing of economic reporting.

The idea was that you'd spend one year at your post and then, assuming that you qualified, you were brought to Washington for six months of training before you went off to your first real Foreign Service post. But in my case, the war intervened. In December of '41, the war with Japan broke out. The training period for Foreign Service officers was canceled, so we were sent right on from the probationary post to another post.

GEORGE F. BOGARDUS
Visa Officer
Montreal (1941-1944)

George F. Bogardus was born in Iowa in 1917 and graduated from Harvard University in 1939. He served in the U.S. Army in 1941 and joined the Foreign Service later that year. Mr. Bogardus' career included positions in Canada, Kenya, Czechoslovakia, Algeria, Germany, and Vietnam. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1996.

Q: We'll come to that. But I just wanted to get the dates at the beginning. What were you doing in Montreal?

BOGARDUS: I was issuing visas of all kinds. After a year and a half or so, I was head of the visa section. Montreal's main function was as a visa mill. In those days, the Department sent out all beginning young officers to Montreal or Toronto or Vancouver, or Havana maybe. Those were the big visa mills. We had a lot of refugees. The Alien Registration Act had come into effect the year before, in June of 1940, whereby all these aliens in the United States, of whom we had no real record, were required to register. It turned out that there were hundreds of thousands of refugees and others who had come to the United States on temporary visas. They had to be converted to immigrant status.

Q: What was the policy and the attitude towards the various types of refugees in Montreal where you were doing that?

BOGARDUS: The attitude was determined by about five different immigration laws, that's what. We had to look out for immigrants. We had people who were just coming down for a short time. As soon as we entered the war, then the Canadians all had to have visas, even for a weekend trip to New York or Detroit or something like that. I myself issued, like a lot of others, probably about 1,500 immigration visas to refugee Jews. They'd received non-immigrant visas, temporary visas, in 1938 and '39, and had stayed on. It was a real education as to what is Moldavia and Bukovina and Galicia and Lithuania and so forth with documents in four different languages, that you would begin to learn to translate through comparison of texts.

Q: It's been said that the State Department put sort of the "go slow" on Jewish refugees, but, of course, these were people already in Canada.

BOGARDUS: No, they were in the United States at that point. It's not surprising though. Because the rule at that time was, in order to get an immigration visa, you had to get it outside the country. Nowadays, for the last 30 or 35 years, you can change your status from temporary visitor to permanent in the United States with the Immigration Service. At that time, only the Foreign Service could issue a visa, and it had to be done abroad. Now, I have personally seen at least 150 Jewish families who turned up with non-immigrant visas still in the United States, who according to the law, really should never have been given immigration visas in 1938 or 1939. It was obvious that they were never going to leave and go back to where they came from. I remember particularly one man with a Belgium passport. He and his wife and three kids had originated somewhere in Poland. This sticks in my mind because he came up there while employed with the World Zionist Organization. I said, "Please, isn't the Zionist Organization's idea that all Jews should live in Zion, in Palestine?" He expostulated, but that's about all he could do. I gave him the visas, of course. But the point is that our colleagues abroad in the two or three years before that, young vice consuls, Foreign Service people, career and non-career, had been fudging the legal rules out of the goodness of their hearts, as charity. That may be different from the official policy in the higher realms of the State Department -- possibly. But these people were doing it out of kindness.

Q: I think, so often, you can make a law, but if it doesn't sort of make sense, the people who are administering it kind of take it unto themselves. What type of training were you getting? Were you getting any sort of "This is the dispatch and this is how one addresses for certain..."

BOGARDUS: A little bit, but very little of that. A few words, "The proper thing to do is this and here's the way. Look at the regulations." Some hints about your cards and calling on people and having relations with other consular officers in the community, how to behave with the wife of the Consul General and so forth. That Consul General was Homer Byington, who had been chief of personnel himself.

PAUL F. DU VIVIER
Vice Consul
St. John's (1941-1942)

Assistant Commercial Attaché
Ottawa (1946-1950)

Paul Du Vivier was raised and went to school in France for four years and continued his education in Munich, Germany. He received a bachelor's degree in history from Princeton University in 1938 and a master's degree in Foreign Service in 1940. Mr. Du Vivier served in

Marseille, Accra, Ottawa, Stockholm, Berlin, Paris, Bordeaux, Nice/Monaco, Edinburgh, and Frankfurt. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on February 20, 1990.

Q: How did they train you, or what did they do when you entered the Foreign Service?

DU VIVIER: There was no training; they couldn't be bothered. I came down, checked things out, received no shots or briefing, and since I had a Ford roadster car, I said I would drive to Newfoundland, in two weeks. I went through New Haven to bid my parents goodbye and caught the boat at Halifax, sailing through submarine-infested waters to the colorful seaport of St. John's where John Cabot landed in 1498 and immediately I got to work in a wartime atmosphere with blackouts and rationing and practically no visa work but a great deal of public relations with the Canadian Navy and the Americans. There was an American regiment, the famous 3rd Infantry -- based at Fort Pepparell, and after a few months the Atlantic Charter was signed in an outlying bay called Placentia Bay. I was only dimly aware of what was going on, serving as a code clerk.

Q: It was highly secret at the time.

DU VIVIER: Yes, highly secret. No reporters.

Q: The meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt on the...

DU VIVIER: On the U.S.S. Augusta, I think it was.

Q: On the Augusta, no, Prince of Wales.

DU VIVIER: Prince of Wales, you're right. It was highly secret, and I carried messages back and forth. I knew something extraordinary was going on, and I never asked questions. In those days, you didn't ask questions. Once I was mistaken for Douglas Fairbanks, Jr. It was the height of my glory. But afterwards, of course, we heard quite a bit about it. And because I performed satisfactorily there, after a year's probation I was brought back to a very intellectual man called G. Howland Shaw who was Chief of Personnel. He sort of sized me up and said, "You seem to know French very well," and I said, "Yes," and he said, "The Consul General in Marseille has just come home and he needs a replacement for George McMurtrie Godley," whom I'd known in college, and "Would you like to go to Marseille?" and I said, "Fine," knowing nothing about it. So I had thirty days leave and met my wife, incidentally, and then I went off on the China clipper, or the equivalent, Pan-American clipper, that took a day and a half of continuous flight from Laguardia airport.

Q: What was your job in Ottawa?

DU VIVIER: In Ottawa I was assistant commercial attaché under Homer Fox, who was a brilliant...I mean that...a brilliant Commerce Department official. The economic section

of five officers was headed by Henry G. Bankhead, the commercial counselor, who was the uncle of Tallulah Bankhead, and the brother of William, the Speaker of the House, and John, a senior Senator. And "Daddy" Bankhead, as we called him, only wanted to sit in a large swivel arm chair behind a large map of the United States, smoke his cigars, and receive visitors or phone calls. And he let Homer Fox do all the work. I was still very junior -- and early on he said, "We are going to coordinate here all of the reporting on minerals in Canada. You will hear every three months from the various consulates" -- we had fifteen -- "and you will write the required reports to Washington on minerals." And I had flunked in school a course on geology, but I quickly went back and boned up on it at home, and I did a tremendous amount of work on geology, and to a less extent on shipping which was done by Halifax. I wrote, for four years, five hundred pages of dispatches every year. I kept them all for a while. Most of them were unclassified. Some of them were published by the Department of Commerce and the US Bureau of Mines. I was known for my attendance at mining conventions and became an expert on gold, nickel and the iron ore of Labrador. I wrote the first reports on that -- on the petroleum discoveries in Alberta; Leduc, Redwater and Lloydminster. I've forgotten the other names. I went out there to Edmonton one week in January and almost froze to death. I spoke to the engineers there, and really loved the work and learned a great deal.

Q: You left Canada in 1950...

JOSEPH N. GREENE, JR.
Visa Officer
Montreal (1942-1943)

Political Officer
Ottawa (1943-1944)

Joseph N. Greene was born in New York, New York in 1920. He received a bachelor's degree from Yale University in 1941. Mr. Greene joined the Foreign Service in 1942. His career included positions in Canada, Algeria, Italy, Singapore, Germany, Nigeria, India, The United Kingdom (England), and Egypt. Mr. Greene was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993.

Q: I wonder if you would give a little background; when and where you were born, a bit about your family background, and where you were educated.

GREENE: I was born in New York City, April 9, 1920. My parents were both New Englanders, although from different directions. My mother's side of the family had been seafarers and traders in Connecticut and New London, the Lawrence family of New London. My father's family, the Greene family, was actually an Army family. My grandfather had married an Adams from Massachusetts, so I always thought of myself as a born-again Yankee.

I went to day school locally in Pelham Manor, New York, and then I went away to Hotchkiss School, graduating from there in 1937. I went to Yale in the class of 1941.

While I was at Yale, I spent time visiting my grandmother still at the Lawrence home nearby in Milford. One of her sons, my mother's brother, was at that time in the Foreign Service. He was a language officer in China, married to a local Milford girl. During my freshman and sophomore years, I remember the way he talked about the Foreign Service and I knew it was something I wanted to do. I majored in international relations at Yale with Arnold Wolfers. Fred Dunn was the International Law professor. It was a great roster of professors, including, on American diplomatic history, Samuel Flagg Bemis and A. Whitney Griswold. So it was pretty heady stuff.

I guess I got a little better than acceptable marks, and came to Washington the summer after graduation in 1941 and went to Colonel Campbell Turner's cram school for the Foreign Service exam. One of the teachers was Dean Acheson and, as it turned out, I got my best marks in the written exam in economics. It was the subject that Dean Acheson taught. In those days, the Foreign Service Entrance Exam was three and a half days long. It was all essay questions.

Having surmounted the written exam, but before I was called for the oral exam, along came Pearl Harbor. I, meanwhile, had taken a low-level job at Phillips Andover on the understanding that if I were appointed to the Foreign Service I could leave. Even before my oral exam, in circumstances I only later came to fully understand, the State Department wrote all of us who looked like we were going to get jobs in the Foreign Service. We were asked if we would join the visa division, which at that time was overwhelmed with trying to regularize the status of thousands of refugees from Europe.

So, my first job on the payroll was to settle the fate of whether people whose files were sent to me would be allowed to stay in or come to the United States. I had nothing more than a guide sheet referencing something about public dependency, good behavior and no prison record as criteria to consider. When they were approved they had to go somewhere for a visa; they usually went to Montreal or Toronto. Only much later did I comprehend the enormity of the refugee problem that Uncle Sam was dealing with, particularly the Jewish refugees from Nazi Europe.

Pearl Harbor happened in December and I passed the oral exam, I think in January. Joe Green, was the chairman of the board of examiners at that time. Even before Pearl Harbor, my friends were going off to join the Marines, the Army, and the Navy. I remember Howland Shaw, and particularly the Board of Examiners, saying the Foreign Service was just as important as the other services. And the administration's policy was just that. They assured us that if they wanted us and we wanted the Foreign Service, they would square it with the draft boards. My decision was simple, I had invested a lot of time and effort to get in the Foreign Service.

Meanwhile, a nice young lady whom I had gotten to know from Lake Forest, Illinois said

she'd marry me. We were married in March, 1942 and went off to my first posting, Montreal, where the Consul General was Homer M. Byington. I found out only after I got to Montreal that he had been chief of personnel when my Uncle Larry had been asked to leave the Foreign Service. Evidently, while Uncle Larry was in language school in Peking he was living too well. As chief of personnel, Byington, fired him, but later didn't seem to hold it against me.

At that first post, I quickly realized that after studying international relations, government, law and international economics, I was the only one who thought I was ready for that great world out there. At the grunt-work level, the Foreign Service isn't very romantic. Along with another neophyte, Jim O'Sullivan, I was assigned to the task of dealing with border-crossing traffic, natives of Canada who wanted to visit their friends in the United States. I wasn't even in the immigrant-visa mill. It was just a daily routine of border-crossing-temporary visas which was a pain in everybody's neck and didn't do much to preserve our security. But, one did what one was told.

Byington was a good teacher. He didn't let you lose heart by the routine and quite simple level of the work. One day I asked whether I could do something. His answer has stayed with me all these years. He asked me whether I had ever heard of the monk story. Well, I hadn't. It seems there was a young fellow who joined the monastery. His first day after lunch he joined the other brothers out in the garden. He looked around and went over to the abbot to ask if it was alright to smoke there. The abbot said no, it was not allowed. "But those brothers over there behind the big rhododendron bush are smoking." And the abbot said, "Ah, my son, but they didn't ask." The lesson learned was, before you ask a question be sure you need to know the answer and that you can live with the answer.

I remember one day, the counselor, the number two in the embassy in Ottawa came by, Lewis Clark. Only later did I find out that he was recruiting for a junior political officer in Ottawa. I guess I did something right because I was transferred to Ottawa in the summer of 1943. We had been in Montreal about a year.

I loved doing political reporting and reading all that I could. It was fun getting to know people who would tell me things. One of the most valuable contacts I made, most interesting for me and useful for whatever we were doing at the time, was Jack Pickersgill, the assistant to the prime minister Mackenzie King. We had lunch every two or three weeks. In my innocence, I assumed this was a great advantage to me. Only when I grew older could I see it from another perspective, and appreciate he was getting something out of it too.

We didn't have an ambassador, Pierrepoint Moffat had died while I was in Montreal. Ray Atherton had come along and he was a real pro. From him and Lewis Clark, I observed how senior professionals behave; the importance of attention to detail, the importance of sharing what you find out, and being careful what you share outside the embassy.

Q: In the luncheons with the assistant to Mackenzie King, did you get any impression of the prime minister? He was sort of an interesting character, a long-time minister; but

also he sort of lived in his own world.

GREENE: I don't remember what I got from a whole range of Canadian junior diplomats with whom I kept in touch. What I do remember is before our departure from post, the Athertons very kindly included us in a dinner for the prime minister at their residence. Mr. King was such a cool customer, a man unto himself. I've never forgotten one of the things he said in conversation that night: "In politics never make a decision until you have to. The art is knowing when you have to." (A later extension of that I learned at someone else's knee: Politics is the art of timing.) Mackenzie King was a consummate political artist and he cultivated his relationship with Franklin Roosevelt very carefully. What I didn't realize at the time, and don't know how many people in the embassy did, was that the two leaders were discussing the uranium mines in Canada leading up to the Manhattan Project. The project was nuclear research which led to the atomic bomb.

Until 1944 in the context of the presidential election the administration's position was that Foreign Service officers' work was just as important to the national effort as anybody with a gun. The State Department figured if I were assigned to the new embassy for Italy, which was waiting in Algiers, the Department could notify my draft board that I was doing important work in a dangerous place and should be left there.

Everyone didn't share that view. For example, Mrs. Patterson, the publisher of the Washington Times Herald, published a rather strident piece in the context of the 1944 election campaign. It drew attention to what she called the State Department's draft dodging.

I went to Algiers and then to Italy with Alexander Kirk who was the Ambassador-designate to liberated Italy. We waited in Algiers until we could go to Italy. Meanwhile, the State Department notified all the draft boards we were now at their disposal. (I was in Rome by the time the news trickled down to me, 6-8 months later.)

WILLIAM BELTON
Vice Consul
Winnipeg (1944-1946)

William Belton was born in Portland, Oregon in 1914. He entered the Foreign Service in 1938. His career included assignments in the Dominican Republic, Chile, Australia, and Brazil. Mr. Belton was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

Q: You left the Dominican Republic in 1942. Where did you go then?

BELTON: We went home on leave. Previous to 1939 the Department of Commerce and the Department of Agriculture had their own foreign services. In 1939 there was legislation that consolidated those two departments' services into the regular Foreign

Service operating under the State Department. Those departments then had to find within the Foreign Service people who would meet their requirements for reporting and doing all the things that agricultural attachés and commercial attachés were doing. At the Foreign Service school the Department of Commerce and the Department of Agriculture each had people who came over and lectured to the class about the wonders of working on their behalf in the Foreign Service. As I think I mentioned earlier, I had always had an interest in the outdoors, forestry, and that sort of thing. It so happened that Judy's father was a professor of agriculture, which gave agricultural specialization a particular appeal to me.

When we went to the U.S. in 1942 for home leave we went through the department for consultation and in the corridor I passed the same man who had given the lectures in the Foreign Service school, a fellow by the name of Louis Michael, who was the Department of Agriculture's representative to the Department of State and whose job it was to recruit agricultural officers in the Foreign Service. He spotted me, and as I had expressed some vague interest at the time of the Foreign Service school, asked me if I was still interested. I said, "Well, I might be; I was interested in knowing about it." He gave me more of a pitch and I, somewhat innocently as I look back on it, decided it would be interesting to go into the agricultural branch of the Foreign Service. From the point of view of the war, agricultural production was very significant item at that time. He said, "All right, we are going to assign you to the Department of Agriculture for a period of training." So that is what they did. We went home on our leave and then I came back to Washington and went to the Department of Agriculture for a training period.

That was not nearly as productive as it should have been because their idea of training was to sit you down in the middle of a bunch of people in the Division of Foreign Agriculture and let you swim for yourself. I swam for four or five months and I did learn quite a bit about what they did, which essentially turned out to be reporting on the crop situations in foreign countries. There was relatively little negotiating of any kind, at least at that level. Then I was told, I don't remember when, but at some stage of the game I was told that I was to go to Winnipeg as Vice-Consul. My job was to do agricultural reporting for the prairie provinces -- Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. So I went up there and spent a little less than two years there. Again it was a post where there were not a lot of people and when there was a vacancy in the consular section I issues visas or did other consular work. But essentially I was there to report on the wheat situation, the oat situation, the rye situation, the flax situation, and so forth. Each week I had to send off a report. We had an agricultural attaché in Ottawa to whom I was also responsible and with whom I worked on a close basis. At the end of this period I was assigned to Ottawa as assistant agricultural attaché.

Q: You were there from about 1944 to 1946? Who was the ambassador at that time?

BELTON: Ray Atherton.

Q: How did you find the embassy in Ottawa? You had been in Quito, Bogotá, etc.

BELTON: It was a much different place. It was a going concern as opposed to the other places. Relations between Canada and the United States were on a vastly differently level than they were between the United States and the Dominican Republic. We had a fairly substantial staff, we had high powered people at various levels and it was very much of a going concern. I already saw that I didn't want to spend all my life being an agriculturalist and so I went around to see the deputy chief of mission, whose name was Lewis Clark, and told him that while I was in the agricultural section of the embassy I would very much like to keep up with what was going on in other sections. He understood that and let me peruse through the files and see the outgoing dispatches and telegrams and so forth; it enabled me to keep up with the overall tenor of the activities of the embassy. I am sure I wasn't in on everything, but I could see the larger picture, My boss, the agricultural attaché, Clifford Taylor, was a very fine agricultural officer, but he was totally dedicated to agriculture and his vision was rather channeled. Cliff and I would go to luncheon together. I can remember standing in line at the cafeteria in the Chateau Laurier with Cliff, who instead of taking a break from the office, would start speculating on hog production in Canada for the next year. There wasn't anything to talk about with Cliff Taylor except agriculture and agricultural reporting. That contributed to my increasing restiveness and my realization that I didn't want to spend the rest of my life reporting on the wheat crop, the pig crop, the cattle and beef situation, and so forth. I arranged to come down to Washington and talk to the then deputy chief of personnel and tell him my woes and how I would like to escape if I could in some gracious way. He was Harold Tewell, who had been the number two man in the Consulate General in Havana at the time I was there, and who was a very likeable and sympathetic sort of a guy. Again this is a feature of life as things were in those days -- you kind of negotiated your next post on the basis of what your personal needs were, what your interests were, and what the department's interests were. It wasn't a formal business the way it is now. I told Harold Tewell my problems and went back to Ottawa and before long received a letter from him telling me that they were contemplating sending me to Porto Alegre, Brazil where the consulate had had an agricultural reporting officer that they were withdrawing -- by now the war was over. They were also reassigning the principal officer and wanted me to go down and take the job as principal officer with the understanding that I would also do the agricultural reporting. That was a very good solution from my point of view, in the sense that I was able still to continue with some of my reporting activities and feel that I wasn't abandoning agriculture flat, while at the same time I got valuable experience as a principal officer.

MARY SEYMOUR OLMSTED
Junior Economic Analyst
Montreal (1945-1946)

Ambassador Mary Seymour Olmsted was born in Duluth, Minnesota and raised in Florida. She received a bachelor's degree in economics from Mount Holyoke College and a master's degree from Columbia University. Ambassador Olmsted's Foreign Service career included positions in

India, Iceland, Austria, Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Papua New Guinea. Ambassador Olmsted was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

Q: So it was a very practical approach.

OLMSTED: Very practical, yes indeed. And to my surprise when I talked to Walton Ferris, whom you may remember as one of the old timers in the Personnel Division, he seemed interested in my background, and what I had to offer. And I went on for a few other interviews, went back to New York, and a few weeks later I got a letter from Walton Ferris offering me a job as a junior economic analyst in our Consulate General in Montreal. I thought that was pretty exciting.

Q: What was the structure that would call for a junior economic analyst? Normally you'd come in as an undifferentiated Foreign Service officer, or something like that.

OLMSTED: I'm not sure that Montreal was necessarily consulted on this. I think its quite possible that it was someone in Washington who decided that the economic reporting needed a little beefing up and instead of hiring someone at a senior rank, they hired someone at a very junior rank. There were 17 officers in Montreal at that time, and I was number 17.

Q: '45-'46 you were in Montreal. Did you get any training before you went there?

OLMSTED: I was sent to the Foreign Service Training School which was then in the old Lothrop mansion. It was the training that was being offered to all incoming officers whether they were attachés or whatever. That was a six week course, and that was the extent of it.

Q: Did you get any feel for your group? Were you with a group doing that?

OLMSTED: Yes.

Q: Because I think one of the things that would be interesting, here the war is just over.

OLMSTED: This was just before the end of the war.

Q: To get a feel for what were these people like who came into the Foreign Service at that time? What did your group see as the role of the United States?

OLMSTED: It was a very mixed bag. Many of the people were quite a bit older than I was, and they had quite differing backgrounds. Some were in labor, some in economic affairs, some in political affairs, and so on. One of them was Bill Cobb, and he and I like to reminisce when we run into each other at DACOR.

Q: There was an interview with Bill Cobb in our collection. I take it then this was before

the big in-rush of veterans?

OLMSTED: Oh yes.

Q: So this was a particular group in a way because the next cut that would be coming in the next six months or so -- the war ended in August of 1945 -- and then came the great influx of veterans. But this was a group, as you say, of people with more professional backgrounds of various sorts that pertained to the Foreign Service.

OLMSTED: Yes.

Q: Did you feel that there was a sense of mission, or anything like that for the United States? Or was it just a job?

OLMSTED: Maybe a little more than a job but not a great sense of mission, no.

Q: It wasn't, the United States was going to go out and make sure there were going to be no more wars, or something like that?

OLMSTED: No, I don't think there was that feeling. I think people felt they were doing their part, and they realized it was very, very late in the war, that things were obviously winding down. I think a lot of the people there wanted the chance to live abroad, and see what things were like abroad, and that was part of it.

Q: When you went up to Montreal you say you were number 17. You went in as an economic attach? Was that the title?

OLMSTED: Junior Economic Analyst was my title.

Q: What did you do?

OLMSTED: Well, mainly I helped other people with what they were doing. We had a section of...I think there were four of us in the economic and commercial section, and a lot of the work I did was of a support nature.

Q: Did you feel that you were welcome there? I'm thinking in particular your saying it sounded like they wanted to send somebody there to shore up the economic reporting. Or did they feel, what do we need another economic analyst for? We're doing all right, or something like that.

OLMSTED: I'm not sure I could answer that. I think they were a little puzzled that I had arrived on the scene, but they were pleasant enough about it. And a few months after I got there I took the Foreign Service examination which was advertised very shortly after I got there, and I passed it. Then I was called down to Washington to take the orals. I think people were very surprised that I passed the written examination, and also that I passed the orals because the Foreign Service officers at the post I think had mostly had the

experience of taking it three or four times before being passed. And they weren't used to having someone pass it on the first go-around.

Q: This is very much the pattern. Did that change your assignment? In the first place, back to Montreal. Why did we have such a big staff in Montreal doing economic reporting? I would have thought that, one, Toronto would be the business center, and, two, Ottawa would be the political omega economic thing.

OLMSTED: Montreal is a considerable city, and there are American business interests there. There's no question about that. We did not only the economic reporting, but also the labor reporting and there were some concerns over the stability of the labor situation there. And the French angle, of course, was of concern even at that time.

Q: Did you find there at that time that the English speakers were very much running things, and the French speakers were shunted to one side?

OLMSTED: To a considerable degree. I might add that politically that was less true than it was economically. But the store owners, I think, were very largely English, and the store clerks were very largely French.

Q: You really didn't stay there very long did you?

OLMSTED: No, I was there just over a year.

PAUL F. DU VIVIER
Assistant Commercial Attaché
Ottawa (1946-1950)

Paul Du Vivier entered the Foreign Service in 1940. His career included posts in Accra, Ottawa, Stockholm, Berlin, Edinburgh, Frankfurt, Marseille, Paris, Bordeaux, and Nice. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: Well now, you say your personnel in Africa, and back in Washington, understood your unhappiness, but rather than let you resign, transferred you to, what was it, Ottawa?

DU VIVIER To Sydney, Australia.

Q: To Sydney, Australia.

DU VIVIER: But we never went there, because, after I'd had my appendix out, and we'd recovered our health and outlook, I was called in by Burke Elbrick, to be told that the ambassador in Ottawa, Ray Atherton, needed an interpreter for a meeting that weekend of the Permanent Joint Board of Defense, and would I go? I said, "Of course." And he said,

"Furthermore, if Mr. Atherton likes you, you may stay there. We'll see." And so I was sent up to Ottawa on a plane with Mayor Laguardia, and General Foulke. In May I almost froze but I did my job as an interpreter and, as a result, I was allowed to fly back to New York and gather my wife and get my belongings off a U.S. Army transport ship, called the USS Monterey. It was about to sail through the canal to Sydney, but my father called up the U.S. dispatch agent, Howard Fyfe in New York, and said, "Mr. Fyfe, our children are not going to Australia. They're going to Canada." And Mr. Fyfe, in his English laconic way, said, "How like the Department." (Laughter) He was a great fellow.

Q: Howard Fyfe was an institution...

DU VIVIER: You must have known him.

Q: ...for years and years.

DU VIVIER: He was a great man. And he got all our stuff, the golf clubs, shorts, and all. And then we started buying sweaters and underwear.

Q: What was your job in Ottawa?

DU VIVIER: In Ottawa I was assistant commercial attaché under Homer Fox, who was a brilliant...I mean that...a brilliant Commerce Department official. The economic section of five officers was headed by Henry G. Bankhead, the commercial counselor, who was the uncle of Tallulah Bankhead, and the brother of William, the Speaker of the House, and John, a senior Senator. And "Daddy" Bankhead, as we called him, only wanted to sit in a large swivel arm chair behind a large map of the United States, smoke his cigars, and receive visitors or phone calls. And he let Homer Fox do all the work. I was still very junior -- and early on he said, "We are going to coordinate here all of the reporting on minerals in Canada. You will hear every three months from the various consulates" -- we had fifteen -- "and you will write the required reports to Washington on minerals." And I had flunked in school a course on geology, but I quickly went back and boned up on it at home, and I did a tremendous amount of work on geology, and to a less extent on shipping which was done by Halifax. I wrote, for four years, five hundred pages of dispatches every year. I kept them all for a while. Most of them were unclassified. Some of them were published by the Department of Commerce and the US Bureau of Mines. I was known for my attendance at mining conventions and became an expert on gold, nickel and the iron ore of Labrador. I wrote the first reports on that -- on the petroleum discoveries in Alberta; Leduc, Redwater and Lloydminster. I've forgotten the other names. I went out there to Edmonton one week in January and almost froze to death. I spoke to the engineers there, and really loved the work and learned a great deal.

Q: Well then, of course obviously there's a time limitation, so why don't we move on. I have you going to Stockholm. You left Canada in 1950...

DU VIVIER: Yes.

WILBUR P. CHASE
Vice Consul
Montreal (1948-1949)

Wilbur Chase was born in Washington, DC in 1920. He received a bachelor's degree from George Washington University in 1942. Prior to becoming a Foreign Service officer, Mr. Chase served in the Naval Ordinance Laboratory, the War Shipping Administration, and the Coast Guard. In 1945, he joined the Foreign Service. His career included positions in Iraq, Canada, Germany, Israel, Turkey, the Philippines, and Washington, DC. Mr. Chase was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: Now, moving on to your own personal career. Where did you go?

CHASE: I then went to Montreal. I arrived up there in February, 1948. It was very much a visa mill. That was not for me a happy experience, maybe since I'd come from Iraq, where I'd been the senior officer. When I left, I had been the principal officer. Going to Montreal, they said they had all the work, but they didn't have a desk for me that I could call my desk. It was just confusion.

And I never quite understood, all the time I was in Montreal, what in the hell were the 7-C documents. Why do they call it 7-C? The idea that there was a law, the Immigration Act of 1924, that detailed how these things would be done and the various regulations that would implement it, I never got any sort of training in that sort of thing. I was just told to look for a birth certificate and see whether or not there was any financial support. It was day in and day out, sitting at one desk or another desk, never knowing quite what was happening.

And then we were supposed to answer correspondence, people who inquire in: Well, why haven't I gotten my visa yet? I didn't really understand what I was doing. And it seemed that every day things were being done differently.

They were all very nice to me. I was the only bachelor on the staff. I got to know some of the other officers socially and had a good time -- and met my first wife. She came into the office to get a student visa, to go down to Radcliffe to get in what eventually came out as the Harvard Business School. She came in and qualified for a visa. And after the visa was in her hand, I said something about would she accept a dinner invitation if I'd call up sometime. She didn't answer, but she didn't leave. We chatted along about other things, and finally I asked the question a second time. She acknowledged yes, if I'd call up, if she were free, she'd go out to dinner with me.

Q: I notice that you moved rather quickly to Hamburg.

CHASE: When I got to Montreal, I just didn't feel I was getting any place. I didn't enjoy it. Somebody came back from Washington and said they were looking for people to go to Germany in the refugee program, to issue visas to refugees. So I called up a fellow in personnel, who I knew was involved in this, and said that I'd be glad to volunteer for the program. And so about three days later a telegram came up, transferring me to Germany.

ALBERT STOFFEL
Visa Officer
Toronto (1948-1950)

Albert Stoffel was born and raised in Rochester, New York. He joined the Foreign Service in 1947. His career included positions in Saigon, Toronto, Berlin, Paris, and Bonn. Mr. Stoffel was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan in 1994.

Q: That is one of the more unusual Foreign Service duties that I have heard of. Now you left Saigon in 1948 and went to Toronto. That was a sea change in many ways, I presume, for you.

STOFFEL: It was and that was really an emergency move. Because while my wife was pregnant with our first child, they discovered that there was a spot on her lung, as it was diagnosed at that time. However, in Saigon there was not a single lung doctor. By the time the baby, William, was born in July 1948, the doctor told me that my wife was a very sick lady and should be removed forthwith.

I had warned the Department of this situation when we had the earlier diagnosis. Finally, having received no response, I reported them that we were planning to leave in September. I learned later that the Department prepared a response -- to the effect that, if I left, I would leave at my own expense. Mr. Reed, in the meantime, had been assigned to the Department and intercepted the message, turned that around so that the Department treated it like a regular transfer.

I was first transferred to Washington after we put my wife, Jill, in a sanitarium in Rochester, New York. The doctors immediately put her on the danger list because of a very serious condition. The Department then transferred me to the Consulate General in Toronto so that I would be near my wife and could make arrangements for our baby to be taken care of, by my sister, Marion, in Rochester.

Q: What did your work consist of in Toronto?

STOFFEL: I was in-charge of immigration visas.

Q: Of which I presume there were a good many.

STOFFEL: There were because a lot of people were coming from Europe to Canada. Often they would immediately go down to the American consulate to see if they could get a visa to go to the United States.

PHILLIP C. HABIB
Economic Officer
Ottawa (1949-1951)

Ambassador Habib was born and raised in New York and educated at the University of Idaho, the Sorbonne and the University of California at Berkeley. Entering the Foreign Service in 1949 he served in: Ottawa, Canada; Wellington, New Zealand; Port-of-Spain, Trinidad; Seoul, Korea; Saigon, Vietnam and Paris, France. In Washington, Ambassador Habib held the senior positions of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Southeast Asia, Under Secretary, and Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State. He was also Political Counselor in Saigon and participated in the Vietnam negotiations in Paris in 1967-1968. He served as US Ambassador to Korea from 1971 to 1974. Ambassador Habib was interviewed by Edward Mulcahy in 1984.

Q: May 29th with Phil Habib. Phil, you got to Washington, and entered the Foreign Service, and went to the Foreign Service Institute, and you probably expressed a preference for your first post. Where did you want to go to start with?

HABIB: It wasn't very clear what the score was. About that time I thought I wanted to go to India, and I think I put in India. I ended up going to Canada. What happened, they needed somebody in Canada in the economic section. I would be the assistant agriculture attaché being that I had had some economic analysis experience in crops, and I'd had some professional training at the university, they decided to send me to Canada. I spent two very pleasant years there. There was an awful lot of reporting. We used to have a very heavy, regular reporting schedule, and I shared it with the agriculture attaché. He was a marvelous man, called Francis Flood. He died some years later. Francis was an old newspaper man, a lecturer. Francis Flood was the first man to ride a motorcycle across Africa from Lagos to the Red Sea, along the southern Sahara. They rode two motorcycles, his companion wrote a book about it which Francis gave me. He was an adventurer. You know, rafted down the Yukon, and the Irrawaddy, and things like that.

Q: Was he an agriculture specialist?

HABIB: He was an agriculture...he came out of Oklahoma originally. Francis would never claim to be an economist, he was just a practical guy who knew how to write. At one time he was head of the Foreign Agricultural Service. He was a very prominent guy, but beyond that he was just a wonderful human being. And he and his wife treated me

extremely nicely. My first post, and I was lucky to have a boss like that. We got along from the first day.

Q: Who was your ambassador?

HABIB: The first ambassador was Laurence Steinhardt, who got killed in an airplane crash in Canada as a matter of fact, flying out of that airfield up there in a C-47. And the next one was Stanley Woodward, who was a great fellow, a great guy. I still love Stanley. I used to travel with him. Dean Brown and I used to write Stanley's speeches for him. He was a political officer, I think it was his second post. Dean Brown was a political officer, and I was in the economic section, being the assistant agriculture attaché. Stanley liked to give talks, and travel around the country to the different groups. Dean and I used to write his speeches and travel with him often and take care of the press. So it was a very good exposure to me. First of all, writing speeches, both on political and other matters, and then handling the press for him when we'd go places, handling the luggage, if you had to.

Q: Hold the door open.

HABIB: No, he was not that kind of guy. We used to have a great time with him. You know, we'd be traveling west through Canada and by the time we'd get to Winnipeg, he would send his secretary out to get a copy of Robert Service poems, and we'd read "The Cremation of Sam McGee," or one of those things. He loved to read from Robert Service. We'd come back from a reception, or a dinner, and we'd sit in his room. The famous one that we all loved the best was probably "The Cremation of Sam McGee."

Q: I used to know it.

HABIB: The Marge of Lake LaBarge. It's one of the amusing Robert Service's poems where Sam McGee was from Tennessee – is the way it started out. I did, as I said, an awful lot of reporting, a lot of commodity reporting on everything. As I used to tell the guys who worked for me years later, when they wouldn't get their reports in on time, I'd say...everything was deadline, you had to get a report in by a certain time, and I'd say, "when I used to sit up all night writing a hops report, a British Columbia hops crop report, just to get it in on time, and you guys left it..." "Of course, nowadays everybody wants to make high policy from the day they enter the Foreign Service. But in those days you learned from the bottom up, and I wrote commodity reports about everything from poultry and eggs in Ontario, the crop situation in Montreal, the wheat situation in the western province, very important reports in terms of the commodities.

I used to tease some of the guys that are ambassadors now who I used to help train years ago about how they didn't realize how important it was to get something in on time. The one thing that Francis Flood and I used to pride ourselves on was that all our reports went in on time. If I remember right, we had 65 crop reports a year.

Q: Better than one a week.

HABIB: Better than one a week. He used to write some, and I used to write some, which meant you had to get the information, you had to get the statistics, you had to go to the departments in the government in Ottawa. You had to know somebody in the trade. Also, it probably was the first time I ever sat in on an international negotiation. It was in Ottawa. I remember when the Secretary of Agriculture came up to negotiate something about potatoes with the Canadians. I was part of the delegation. It was good experience. In those days, of course, the Foreign Service didn't take care of you as thoroughly as they do now. You had to find your own place to live. I remember the first place we lived in was real Victorian. I remember getting up in the middle of the night with a tennis racket banging the bats down because they were flying in the bedroom.

Q: You had to bring along all your furniture too. Or buy it.

HABIB: We didn't have any. As a matter of fact, I used to play a lot of poker in those days, and I won enough money playing poker...within this group, we had about six of us, we used to meet once a week to play poker—small stakes. But I was very lucky, I used to win regularly. My wife is awfully fond of saying when the fellows would come to our house to play poker, they'd point to the furniture and say, well, I lost that, and I paid for that one. I remember we went down to Sears Roebuck's in Ogdensburg, New York and bought furniture for the first house that we had. I still have two overstuffed chairs, that have been recovered at least three times, from that first furniture, and a couple pieces of sort of a bedroom set. That's about all I've got left from that first batch of furniture I ever bought in the Foreign Service.

Q: Very fine pieces.

HABIB: Yes, that's right. I've still got them. It was hell in Canada, that's what I remember about Canada, about how cold it could get in the wintertime.

Q: I remember once being told in Ottawa when complaining about the cold in August, and they said, oh, you should have been here last month, we had summer.

HABIB: I remember once I went to Manitoba, I was in Winnipeg...I guess Stanley or somebody was making a speech somewhere, and I walked from the consulate to the place where the speech was being given, it was 37 degrees below zero. I had never been so cold in my life. The consul said, come on, it's not far, we'll walk. Of course, he had winter underwear on, and a fur hat and everything else, and there was I in just a plain old common overcoat. Well, anyway, we survived. In those years we had some very nice trips across Canada. The Ambassador once took a speaking tour from coast to coast, and I wrote the speeches, took care of the press, went to the formal dinners. The first time in my life I ever wore striped...well, the first time I ever wore a tux was in Canada. Never owned one, never wore one all my life until I was in Canada. But the first time I ever wore striped pants was on a formal occasion and I borrowed a pair from a guy at the embassy because I didn't have any.

L. DEAN BROWN
Political & Economic Officer
Saint Johns, New Brunswick (1949)

Political Officer
Ottawa (1950-1952)

Ambassador L. Dean Brown was born in New York in 1920. After receiving his bachelor's degree from Wesleyan University in 1942 he served in the US Army from 1942-1946. His career has included positions in Belgium Congo, Ottawa, Paris, EUR, Rabat, Senegal and the Gambia, Lebanon, and an ambassadorship to Jordan. Ambassador Brown was interviewed by Horace J. Torbert in May 1989.

Q: Now, this Saint Johns, New Brunswick--a very pleasant place as I know nowadays because I vacation in northern Maine.

BROWN: Yes. It's a nice little town. There was no reason for a consulate there at all. We were three officers headed by a consul, I was doing all the political and economic reporting, and a vice consul did the consular work. When they closed it down, it made no difference at all.

But, at one time, in that little tiny province of New Brunswick, they had three American consulates. We'd keep wondering how we did that all those years, and why.

Q: It always seemed to me later on, we closed up a few too many.

BROWN: Well, we had modern communications, and when the economic importance of New Brunswick, all the Maritime Provinces, went down, the posts became redundant.

Q: Then you moved down fairly shortly, I take it, to Ottawa.

BROWN: Very quickly. What happened was, Ottawa asked me to come and work there temporarily. I worked there for about six weeks doing some catch-up-economic reporting for them. Then they transferred me to the political section. So I spent less than a year in Saint John.

Q: Less than a year in Ottawa or less than a year in Saint John?

BROWN: No, less than a year in Saint John.

Q: Then, basically, you did political work after the first in Ottawa.

BROWN: Yes.

Q: *By this time, were you a French linguist already? I mean, did you speak French?*

BROWN: Yes. Never very good. I could never speak it very well.

Q: *Of course, in Saint John's you didn't need it.*

BROWN: Certainly didn't need it, no, but we used to go down a lot to Quebec and Montreal.

Q: *Your French used to sound pretty good to me because I was fairly illiterate for Latin languages. [Laughter]*

BROWN: Just speak quickly, and that will fool the Americans, anyway.

Q: *It might get you by in Quebec, but in Paris, no way.*

BROWN: One time I was driving in Quebec and drove into a gas station. As I did, I put the brakes on and skidded.

So the guy came out there and, in impeccable French, he said, "Il faut fixer le lining de brake." [Laughter] That is pure French Canadian. I understood every word he said.

Q: *Wonderful! [Laughter]*

BROWN: Laurence Steinhardt was the ambassador and Julian Harrington was the DCM. Laurence Steinhardt was killed in a terrible airplane accident, in one of the embassy planes, along with several other people. Stanley Woodward, who had been chief of protocol for Harry Truman, came up as ambassador. So most of my service was with Stanley, who is now over 90 and whom I see quite often because he's remained a very close friend.

Q: *Were there any unusual problems in Ottawa?*

BROWN: No, it was still a small embassy. We were still in the days of small embassies. There were two of us in the political section. Dick Bird was the counselor, I was the other one. The economic section was small, but it did include one illustrious character, and that was Phil Habib, who was, actually, assistant agricultural attaché at the time.

Stanley Woodward was a marvelous ambassador because he simply said to me and my wife, and to Phil and his wife, and to the labor attaché, who had come out of the-- International Garment Workers Union in New York--Joe Godson and his wife, he said, "Whenever I travel, I want you three, or you six, with me." It was marvelous. We traveled all over.

Q: *You filled up the attaché plane?*

BROWN: We filled up the plane, which was a converted B-17 bomber, and flew all over Canada.

Q: So you got your early sightseeing in.

BROWN: Nothing really was unusual there. As I say, it was an old-fashioned embassy in which the staff never saw anybody's telegrams. You did dispatches, but you didn't see what the brass was doing, except the ambassador used to keep us informed, but not the minister. It was that old style of embassy where everybody went in on Saturday morning, and the minister came around to check the guard's book to see if you'd come in and volunteered to work on Saturday morning.

Q: Most of us later had to work on Saturday morning in order to catch up with the paper.

BROWN: Well, that's often true.

Q: Well, that lasted until 1952, roughly, or something like that, and then you moved.

BROWN: I became the Canadian desk officer and finally got to see the cases. We were quite involved in military discussions. The desk officer in Washington knew far more than the junior officers in Ottawa because of the lack of downward communication.

But the most notable thing that we got through was the St. Lawrence Seaway Treaty, which was a long, hard, complicated, internal, political fight in the United States.

The way it got through is an interesting example of how you can do things in diplomacy. I had the idea that we weren't getting anywhere with the government. We knew that President Eisenhower had to make an NSC decision in favor of US participation.

So I wrote a draft letter from the Secretary of State to the secretary of the NSC saying, "This is a draft of what the State Department might say."

I had someone approve it, a lawyer. And then the same thing happened in the Department of Commerce and in the Corps of Engineers, and all of that. So we all had draft letters which we circulated to the chiefs, so that when I finally sent my draft letter up to the Secretary to look at, it was accompanied by favorable comments from every other agency--they were all drafts. And that way, we sent a unanimous opinion from the US Departments' concern--all of them--over to the NSC, and the President said, "Yes."

Q: Now, the NSC was pretty fully operating by that time.

BROWN: Yes. You had the NSC and the OCB.

Q: I have a note here that you were also, at one time, assistant to the assistant secretary.

BROWN: I moved on from the Canadian desk.

Q: *Who was that? Perkins?*

BROWN: It was Livingston Merchant, aided by Jamie Bonbright, Wally Barbour, and hiding in an apartment building, Julius Holmes, because he wasn't allowed in the State Department at that time.

Q: *Great man, Julius Holmes.*

BROWN: Absolutely. I used to go, every night, with the cables on the streetcar, with all these cables stuck in my pocket, to show them to him; little notes from Livy and the others about what they wanted him to think about the next day. It was an incredible performance. I always thought, if I'd been arrested on that streetcar, I'd still be in Leavenworth! [Laughter]

But Livy Merchant, of course, I think was one of the greatest of our Foreign Service officers, a great teacher and a very wise, decent man.

Q: *I didn't work that closely, but I did work for him briefly in the Department. He went to Canada, of course.*

BROWN: Yes. He went to Canada twice.

Q: *Well, I guess it was a little early that the great Canadian spy trials occurred.*

BROWN: Yes.

Q: *Did that affect you at all?*

BROWN: No. The US ended up with an overt CIA operation. The FBI backed up.

LOUISE S. ARMSTRONG
Vice Consul and Economic-Commercial Officer
Montreal (1950-1953)

Mrs. Armstrong was born in 1917 in Tokyo, Japan of American missionary parents. After moving to the United States she attended Wellesley College. After graduation, Mrs. Armstrong was a researcher for Time and Life magazine before joining the Foreign Service in 1947. As a Consular and Political Officer, she served in Madras, Prague, Palermo and Montreal. Following her marriage to FSO Willis Armstrong in 1959, she resigned her commission and accompanied her husband to Ottawa, where he was assigned as Deputy Chief of Mission. Mrs. Armstrong was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: Well, then you went to Montreal and you were in Montreal from 1950 until when?

ARMSTRONG: '53.

Q: What were you doing in Montreal?

ARMSTRONG: I was vice consul and economic commercial officer. And mainly they needed someone in that slot who would respond to the many required reports expected from the department of agriculture, the department of commerce, mines and mineralogy – what do we call that department if it is a department?

Q: Department of the interior.

ARMSTRONG: Department of the interior. And so I became acquainted with people in the pulp and paper industry. For example, the headquarters of the association is in Montreal. And I became friendly with people in the mining industry, a number of whom were Americans, and would invite me up to visit their mines and their exploration camps. And then the textile industry, I think, had its headquarters in Montreal and that was another one that there was required reporting on. And one time I had an assignment of investigating the market for small appliances in Montreal. It doesn't sound like very much but by the time it was done my boss said to me, "I didn't think a woman could do something like that," which I thought was ridiculous because women are more after small appliances than men are as a rule. I mean irons, toasters, things like that, what was the market, what was the potential market for American exports? I found out what they were selling now, what they thought they'd be interested in selling.

Q: Who was the consul general?

ARMSTRONG: A good question. I'll have to fill that one in later.

Q: You can fill that one in later, no problem.

ARMSTRONG: I've reached the stage where names don't spring to mind. We enjoyed Montreal. As I mentioned I think, it was a segmented society, a divided society. We meet almost nobody what they would call the French community. And the upper class French community tended to keep to themselves anyway. Fortunately the English community, the Anglo community, was very well-established and very open and easy. There was a garden club in which my mother had participated and made many delightful friends, English friends, a lot of Anglo friends there, whom I came to know as well. McGill University had a substantial number of American medical professors in those days. They had begun to be imported, oh, some 10 years at least earlier. Most of the women I met would have been older than I, so their husbands had been there some time teaching. And they couldn't have been nicer. So we made some very pleasant friendships

GEORGE F. BOGARDUS
Consul
Toronto (1951-1954)

George F. Bogardus was born in Iowa in 1917 and graduated from Harvard University in 1939. He served in the U.S. Army in 1941 and joined the Foreign Service later that year. Mr. Bogardus' career included positions in Canada, Kenya, Czechoslovakia, Algeria, Germany, and Vietnam. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1996.

BOGARDUS: That's why we were sent then to what we thought was a rather pallid posting, Toronto, where after a year, I was promoted to be Consul. We arrived there when the Korean War started. One of the important things I did for the Department of Commerce was to make a basic thorough survey of the machine tool industry in Canada, which was very helpful to the American machine tool companies looking to subcontract war contracts. There were various kinds of machine tools, six or eight different categories, all that sort of thing. They could pass on to them war contracts. I think it helped very considerably.

Q: We're talking about the Korean War and where we were mobilizing again to produce military equipment.

BOGARDUS: Another big job I had was reporting on mining all the time. Canada was extremely important. Mining was 10% of the Canadian GNP and probably still is. There was an enormous American investment of nine or ten billion dollars at stake, and a lot of interest. My reports were incorporated in US Mining Year Book. They were particularly interested in nickel promotion for armor plate and that sort of thing. Then there were developing oil fields out in the west. I had to keep track of them. Also, the approaching St. Lawrence seaway. There were lots of aspects of that: who can draw water out, who was going to be in charge, all that sort of thing.

Q: How did you find the Canadians as far as getting information from them?

BOGARDUS: Oh, splendid. I did another survey on liquor control there. We were eager to get into the liquor sales in Canada and it was all controlled by provincial liquor control boards. The boards were and still are very protectionistic of the Canadian beer and whiskey industries. We had a delightful time with the Scottish people there, going to St. Andrew's Ball and learning Scottish dances and that sort of thing.

But I do want to get to this one incident that really shook me. In the summer of 1953, George Haering, who was the Consul General, turned to me and said, "I've been invited to go to an Israeli bond rally. Would you go in my place?" So, I said, "Well, I've never been to one of these shindigs." It turned out to be quite a shindig, at one of the biggest movie theaters in town. The big speaker there was Moshe Sharett, who was the Israeli Foreign Minister at that point. He had arrived there from Los Angeles and Detroit and

was going on to New York. It's important to remember that background. He gave the usual boast, what you would expect, even going to say, "We've got potash deposits down there in the Negev" and all sorts of things. But the one of the other big things was, he was telling his audience -- the wealthiest, most important Jewish people in all of Ontario -- about 1,400 of them. He subtly, "You folks stayed comfortably home while we overseas were being put through the Holocaust. What have you done about it? If you don't come to join us and live in Zion, the least you can do is to haul out your wallet and sign over a big, big check. It's a good business deal, too." So, that's the sort of thing I expected and we did get. But what I did not expect was, toward the end of his speech, "Hey, put the spotlight up there in the balcony. There is (something like) Sammy Steinberger, Squadron Leader of the RCAF. Stand up, Sammy!" Sammy stood up with his RCAF uniform and medals and the MC announced, "Sammy has just come back from Israel. He spent his vacation there and he helped out the Israeli Air Force, shooting down two Egyptian planes, and now he's back." Everybody gave a big and long applause. Well, I thought, "Had the same thing happened in Los Angeles and Detroit, with the American Air Force?" I believe I reported this routinely with zero response. I was in the Department a few years later, with Tom Hirschfeld, who was a young FSO working for me in Intelligence Research. He happened to be a native of Darmstadt, Germany, and had also been a Marine Corps aviator in the Korean War. When I told him about this, he just blew his top. He said, "That man should have been court-martialed!"

Q: Yes, he should have.

BOGARDUS: Certainly. But it shows you how these people were cajoled into this sort of thing and confusing Israeli citizenship or Zionism and being a Jew. I kept that in the back of my mind ever since and I have occasionally been able to bring it out with some of my Jewish friends. Incidentally, later on about that time, Dulcie Anne Steinhardt, daughter of Ambassador Steinhardt, who had married an RCAF officer, a veteran of the Battle of Britain. She and her husband, Alan Sherlock, were stationed in Toronto. We saw them a number of times. A few years after that, we were down here and they had a son born to them. Dulcie Anne had become an Episcopalian like her husband, the son, Victor, was going to be Episcopalian. We were asked to be his godparents. We were and still are. He is quite active and we know the family very intimately.

Q: She is the daughter of Laurence Steinhardt?

BOGARDUS: That's right. She was 20 years old when we knew her, in January of '46. We're very, very close with Dulcie Anne, Victor and his sister Lauren. We attended his wedding just a couple of years ago. We see them all the time. I'm just pointing this out.

GEORGE S. VEST
Vice Consul
Ottawa (1951-1954)

Ambassador George Vest was born in Virginia in 1918. He graduated from the University of Virginia and served in the military during World War II. Ambassador Vest joined the Foreign Service in 1947. His career included positions in Bermuda, Ecuador, Canada, and Washington, DC. He was Deputy Chief of Mission and ambassador to the European Community, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, and Director General of the Foreign Service. Ambassador Vest was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1989.

Q: You obviously got your second chance, and also the real opportunity to show what you could do. Then you went to Ottawa. This was from 1951 to '54. What were you doing there?

VEST: In Ottawa, I really had my break. It certainly was a break to go and work for the Simmons. I had a chance to sort of catch up. In Ottawa, I was the junior boy in the political section. Now, initially there wasn't a whole lot to do. My wife and I enjoyed the team, enjoyed everybody there. In fact, it may be worth just noting how I happened to go to Ottawa, because that's how they can do things in personnel.

Point of fact, when I was due to leave Quito, I was assigned to go to the Dominican Republic. In other words, there was a rational trend, and they were going to run you through several posts in an area. We spent what little savings we had and bought some tropical clothes in Washington while I was there in an interim for a little course.

Q: S.S. Schwartz?

VEST: Well, yes. S.S. Schwartz and anything else.

Q: In Baltimore, yeah.

VEST: We were prepared to go. But I did go into the personnel people, who were not Foreign Service; they were civil service covering the area. And I said, "Now I'm prepared to go, but I think you should know something. And that is that my closest friend in Ecuador was Juan Alfonseca, whose father is a major exile who claims he ought to be the president of the Dominican Republic and probably one of the people most hated by Trujillo. Everybody in Quito knew that the Alfonsecas were our closest friends, practically. So I just want you to know that."

That went like a lead bullet into personnel, and the next thing I knew, I was told I was being sent to Canada. [Laughter] Just one of those, again, quirks of fate we live with. So we took our tropical wardrobe and went to Canada.

Before Canada, for the first year, I had not done political reporting. I had not done any of that kind of activity. In Ottawa I had, again, good training. I was trained by a wonderful political counselor named Jack Morgan, who just was a superb man, and a great DCM named Don Bliss, who later was ambassador to Ethiopia. Mr. Bliss had come in through

the commercial service, so he had a very strong sense of what I'd call the economic side of things, and Jack Morgan was the traditional or what I'd call political purist officer. I was constantly sort of being pushed or invited by one or the other to do things. Couldn't have been a nicer kind of training. They were the best representatives of the old Foreign Service we could have encountered, I don't think I could have found a better pair than they were, the two senior officers.

They gave me, as a portfolio to follow, what was considered a dead subject at the time. They said, "You follow this and get to know everybody involved in this area." It was called the St. Lawrence Seaway. And I got to know the engineers, and it was one of those cases where no one thought much was ever going to happen. In the end probably the Canadians would build their own seaway, because they were determined to do so. But it was wonderful fun. I got to know every single person I could. It was a case of you may never be able to do anything in it, but here is a pond. You can paddle it, and I paddled as madly as I could.

And then Eisenhower got elected, and he passed the Wiley-Dondero Act that would call for a joint American-Canadian St. Lawrence Seaway. And I will never forget the DCM called me in, Mr. Bliss, and said, "Now, George, there are those who would like to take over this activity and feel they should take this activity over now that it is going to be a high-class negotiation, of top concern to everybody. But you have been involved in it and you know all the people in it, so I'm going to leave you responsible for this negotiation." That was what I would call the real break of all times.

And that meant that the people down the Bureau of European Affairs knew that I was negotiating it. The people in the Defense Department knew it because the Defense Department was ostensibly in charge of the whole thing.

Q: Corps of Engineers and all.

VEST: Corps of Engineers.

Q: Like the highway program, all of which had a defense underline.

VEST: You had the states of Illinois and Michigan and New York and the provinces of Quebec and Ontario, everybody had a hand in it.

Well, I was left to do that. I began the negotiations and did a good portion of the negotiations. I got to know everybody as a result of it, including Livy Merchant, who was the assistant secretary for European affairs. That was another break.

Q: George, later you had a great deal of experience with NATO, and, of course, Canada is often forgotten, but it a member of NATO. We're talking about the early '50s. What was our attitude at the embassy and through the State Department, and maybe your attitude, too, towards Canada? The Canadians talk more about how Americans...

VEST: Take them for granted.

Q: Take them for granted, but how did we look at Canada at that time, would you say?

VEST: Let's divide the we. The embassy first.

The embassy was a very high-spirited, strong morale group, and it took Canada very seriously. Everybody was impressed with what Canada could do or would probably do, and this went all the way through. It wasn't a big embassy. It was a wonderful group. The military were impressed with what the Canadians were doing in the far north and what they were cooperating with our military on. The agriculture attaché thought Canada was one of the greatest things in the world and was going to be one of the breadbaskets of the future. They were building the trans-Canadian pipeline. It doesn't matter what area you were in, for those who worked with them, this was one of the great periods of Canada. I mean, the prime minister was Louis St. Laurent; the foreign minister, external affairs minister, was Mike Pearson; the man in charge of the economy was a great old man named C.D. Howe. These people were tremendous leaders, very important, and they knew everybody in Washington and in New York and in Chicago. It was a very interesting time.

So, in the work terms and in the embassies -- down to their embassy in Washington, and ours up in Ottawa -- it was a period of tremendous appreciation. If you went outside that, to some extent to the other areas of the U.S. Government, to elsewhere in the country, there was a general attitude of, well, Canada is a splendid place and the Canadians are splendid people and they're particularly splendid because they're so nearly like us. And there was a considerable atmosphere of taking Canada for granted. Even when the Canadians sat down and said, "We're going to negotiate and have a joint Canadian seaway, and we're going to do it our way. We're not going to expose any of our citizens traveling on that joint Canadian seaway to McCarthyism or anything like that." They were very forthright and strong on this. But even so, to the Americans at large, there was that attitude.

Q: How did you find the Canadians as negotiators? I've talked to somebody who is on our negotiating team -- on the last couple of years, we've just had basically a free trade pact with Canada -- and said the Canadians were able to play the "You don't understand us, and we're a little country" to a fare-thee-well and that they're some of the toughest negotiators you could imagine. How did you find them in the '50s?

VEST: That is exactly the way they were then. There is no strength like the strength of a weaker neighbor dealing with a relatively moral, strong neighbor. They played the weaker neighbor. They would play the fact that their Constitution was weaker than ours where they had a very bad -- they always used to claim that, you know, if we have a problem, well, "the provinces won't let us do that." And, boy, we got the provinces rammed down our throat over and over. Not that it wasn't true up to a point, but they used it. They are very, very tough, able negotiators, and they're just as your other friend described it. That's the way they were then. [Laughter]

I will say this -- and I've done a lot of negotiations since- -they were tremendously fair and honorable negotiators. There is something special about the Canadians which you cannot transpose to many other situations, and that is at a point where we would appear to face irreconcilable difference over something, the Canadians were people you could sit down with over a cup of coffee or a beer and talk and say, "Now come on. We've got to find our way through all this." They have a nice genius for knowing when to move on from total hard-line position to search for a compromise that's palatable to both sides, and they showed it many times.

McCarthyism was a case in point, and they were very, very insistent to protect their citizens. But they found a way, and they started very hard and emotional about it that they would not expose people traveling on the seaways -- their people -- in any way. In the end we found a working compromise, which, again, was something that they found as the last resort. Oh, I have a great respect for them.

Q: George, you mentioned McCarthyism. You might, for the uninitiated, explain why McCarthyism would be a problem. But also, you came into the Foreign Service at a time when McCarthyism was rampant, although you were overseas most of this time. What was your impression at the time, and what did it mean to the Foreign Service that you saw?

VEST: Okay. I came in just ahead of McCarthyism, and McCarthyism got well underway shortly thereafter. It did not really impact on me until I got to Canada. Quito was so far away. It is best illustrated by the fact that there was no airplane line that went directly there from outside the country. It had dirt runways, and it never had a congressional visit. [Laughter] That describes Quito, as left to itself.

Canada was very different, indeed. We had not been in Canada very long before we began to hear the horror stories. People we knew who were being accused of all kinds of things which we felt could hardly be true. In fact, we were confident they weren't true. People we knew who were leaving the Foreign Service because of this particular kind of thing. And then it hit home when my wife's cousin, who had been raised in China and was a very fine scholar in that area, was hounded out of his -- he was a professor in the United States -- was hounded out of his job and got a job promptly at the University of Toronto, where they were delighted to have him. His only sin had been that, like most China scholars of that period, they had worked with people who were under accusation for one reason or another because, if they were good, they had had some contact with the changing China scene.

It hit me with real force in two episodes. First one was a story in which Scott McLeod in the State Department, who was then head of the security bureau and a great buddy of McCarthy's, questioned whether or not we should be reading magazines like the Reporter.

Q: This is a moderate left wing, very slightly left wing.

VEST: I was just going to say very slightly left wing. And this was carried in a little letter to the New York Times magazine section. So I wrote to the Foreign Service Journal. And wrote them a letter, which I invited them to publish, which said that I had subscribed to a wide selection of magazines and felt that, as a Foreign Service officer, I should, and that it included the Reporter and the Atlantic Monthly, both of which were allegedly viewed with some suspicion by Mr. McLeod. And that I thought that we in the Foreign Service should be told whether or not in the Foreign Service this was the kind of conduct that was approved or not. Very interesting. The Foreign Service Journal carefully wrote me right back and said, "We're going to publish your letter, and we will forward it to Mr. McLeod's office, the text, but we are withdrawing your name because we think it might be too controversial."

Q: It gives an idea of the era.

VEST: That gives you an idea of the era. In point of fact, McLeod did come back and say, "No, the New York Times magazine was wrong. We don't disapprove of Foreign Service officers subscribing to a broad range of magazines. We do think they should be very careful that they are not seduced by ultra liberal propaganda." [Laughter] And my name did not appear. It made me realize then, you know, how sensitive it was.

It reached the stage where I was reporting on Canadian attitudes to McCarthyism, and the telegram went to the ambassador, who was a political appointee -- a very nice old gentlemen named R. Douglas Stewart -- to be approved, and he was very upset. He called me in and he said, "I'm not going to approve this kind of thing." He very much favored what Senator McCarthy was doing, thought he was doing the right thing, and this was terrible.

Now I'll have the say that Ambassador Stewart was always very nice to me, and I never felt he held anything against me. I watched how things could be done. This DCM, Mr. Bliss, got into the middle of it and said to the ambassador, "Well, I understand how you feel about this, but George is only reporting Canadian attitudes so that the United States Government will know how things are viewed in Canada and can affect their conduct of policy. But you don't want to have your name on this as approving it. In the future, any telegrams that are reporting on McCarthyism and whatnot, why don't I just have them held until after you've gone home, and I will initial them." The ambassador was very nice and agreed to this compromise that all telegrams on McCarthyism would come after he went home. [Laughter]

We followed it. We got more and more stories. I don't mind admitting it made a big impact on my wife and me, and it reached the stage when it hit relatives and friends enough that we seriously had a discussion saying, "Look. If this goes on and unchecked, and we find it impossible to be in the Foreign Service, we might just possibly immigrate to Canada." Because I had this feeling if I wanted to, I could go there and I could, indeed, serve -- I would have felt comfortable serving in the Canadian Foreign Service, and I felt I knew enough people that it was a conceivable thing. That was only casual talk between

us and never got further than that. And then, of course, Eisenhower and the Senate and all the rest just gradually took care of all this.

Q: Well, George, I came into the Foreign Service in 1955. I'm not sure if I'm speaking for everybody, but I think this was the attitude. If things got rough on reporting or something, you could not depend on the State Department to back you up. This was a reflection of how we felt about Dulles.

VEST: That's exactly right. That's why I mentioned that DCM, because we did not have confidence in the State Department. We did have McLeod coming out and acting as he did. We didn't see anybody in the State Department reining him in, and we knew our senior Foreign Service officers were terribly worried. You could tell. It permeated the building. This was why I really was so impressed with the action of that DCM saying, "We have to do this reporting, and I will initial it if you don't want to do it." But I was in the lucky position in that the senior officers in the embassy were of such a kind that I was fundamentally inspired by them. They provided leadership.

Q: I'm sure if somebody were to go back and to take a look in our reporting for that period, they would find a great many of the embassies did not report on the reaction to McCarthyism, which was a major issue which obviously should have been reported if you're doing your job. But because of this, this lack of trust.

VEST: Ours was the DCM. He was a rock. He was a Vermonter and he was all those things you think of in Vermont. There were two or three junior officers there. The junior officers who worked through that embassy were Phil Habib, Dean Brown, and I, in succession, so we had a pretty good crowd. I followed Dean there, and I remember one of them -- I don't know which one it was -- saying of Mr. Bliss, he said, "Well, he's a Vermonter. You get the satisfaction of working for him because on your efficiency report, if he says, 'Well done,' it means that you're a superman. He's never going to go beyond well done." [Laughter]

RICHARD P. BUTRICK
Consul General
Montreal (1952-1955)

Richard P. Butrick was born in Lockport, New York in 1894. He joined the Consular Service in 1921. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Chile, Ecuador, Canada, China, Brazil, and Washington, DC. Mr. Butrick was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993.

Q: Then you went to Montreal.

BUTRICK: I went to Montreal. They offered me two different embassies, and this may seem a little strange to you, but my mother was a great influence in my life and she was

ill and in a nursing home in my hometown of Lockport, N.Y. and I wanted to be near her. In order to be near her I took a demotion and went to Montreal as Consul General. I was promised, however, by Loy Henderson, that he would make me an ambassador at some later date.

I was happy in Montreal but I expected to be made an ambassador, but I never was. Instead of that I was transferred to Sao Paulo, probably the most important consulate general in the world. Did you know that Sao Paulo is the third largest city in the world? It wasn't then, but it is now, after Tokyo/Kyoto and Mexico City. New York is fifth and I think Seoul is fourth.

As Consul General in Montreal I was very well thought of there. One of the Montreallers said, "I have never seen an American who came to Montreal that so quickly adapted himself to Canadian customs as you have." But that was my whole life. I never wanted to force my ideas onto other people. Let them have their own civilizations the way they want them.

WILLIAM D. BRODERICK
Visa Officer
Windsor (1953-1955)

William Broderick was born in Detroit, Michigan in 1924. He attended the University of Detroit and then served in the U.S. Army in World War II. Mr. Broderick joined the Foreign Service in 1951. His career included positions in Colombia, Canada, Yugoslavia, Bolivia, and Washington, DC. Mr. Broderick was interviewed by Henry B. Ryan in 1990.

Q: How long were you in Medellin?

BRODERICK: Just over two years. Shortly before my tour was up I had gotten word that my mother had had a cancer operation and was not expected to live very long. So I wrote to the Department to say that if it was possible I would like an assignment in Canada and they assigned me to Winnipeg. I was in Detroit on home leave and looking around for winter underwear and then I got a call from Personnel, and they said, "Listen, the vice consul over in Windsor has just been selected out and he is leaving and we figure it is cheaper to assign you there than anyone else, so you are assigned to Windsor." That was very nice. My mother died about six months later and it was a real privilege to be there during that period. I have always been grateful to the State Department for that.

Q: It has to be the least "foreign" assignment in the world. Did you live in Detroit?

BRODERICK: No, you were permitted to if you wanted to live in Detroit. We decided not to. First of all it was just inconvenient to get from a residential area in Detroit to Windsor. We had a son at that time and we would be over on weekends in any case

visiting the grandparents and so forth.

Being in Windsor was interesting. It was a big visa mill. I was first the passport and citizenship officer and then visa officer. The general run of the mill stuff was pretty routine, but occasionally you would get some very interesting kinds of cases. I had a woman come in one day applying for an immigrant visa and on her application she said she had been born in Cleveland. I said, "You are an American citizen, aren't you? Why are you asking for a visa?" Her story was that she had been born in Cleveland, that her parents had come from the old Austro-Hungarian empire before the first world war. She was born in the early twenties in Cleveland and then the parents had decided to go back, perhaps during the depression. When they got back to their former home, what they used to know as part of the Austro-Hungarian empire was now Romania. They were not ethnic Romanians but there was a law in Romania requiring that by such-and-such a date you had to go down and inscribe yourself in a book at the local town hall. The act of doing that would make you a Romanian citizen. She was a minor, but her parents did it for her as well as for themselves.

As soon as the war ended she was fleeing Romania ahead of the Russian army and got to Vienna. She went into the American embassy there and asked for a passport. They said, "No, you have lost your citizenship, because under the immigration law anyone who has accepted foreign nationality had to have reapplied for citizenship in the U.S. before the age of twenty-one to stake a claim to American citizenship.

Well by 1946 she was twenty-three or so and therefore she was considered to have lost her citizenship; they made out a certificate of loss of nationality. This sounded awfully unfair to me and I started reading in consular texts and other sources to see if there were not some way to overcome this presumption of loss. I discovered some court cases that dealt with the case of an Italian to whom the same thing had happened. The courts held that where there was a state of war in existence which prevented an individual from getting to an American consulate, provided that the person applied as soon as possible after the end of hostilities, citizenship was not lost. That was her case.

I documented all this and sent it in to the Passport Office, then run by the famous Mrs. Shipley. I thought I had come through with a very cogent, persuasive case. Their answer came back that this was a decision by a district court and unless it had been upheld by an appeals court, State would not recognize the precedent. So I talked to her again and asked about the others in her family. She said, "My brother is in the same situation, but with the additional complication that he, by force, was required to serve in consecutively, the Romanian, Hungarian and German armies." That, of course, was another basis for losing U.S. nationality. I asked, "What happened to him?" She said, "Oh, he has got his American citizenship by taking the bus across to Detroit and after the Immigration Service questioned him about this; they admitted him as a citizen. I said, "Well, my advice to you is to take a dime for bus fare and do the same thing." I never heard from her again. I suspect that the Immigration Service may not have known all these details, but what the hell.

Q: You were there how long?

BRODERICK: About two and a half years.

Q: Your work was mostly various kinds of consular issues?

BRODERICK: Very much. Most of them were run-of-the mill. We did have some fights with the legal profession because we put up a sign to say that you did not need a lawyer to apply for a visa. The Detroit Bar Association was up in arms about this because some of them were making a lot of money; they would charge some people \$150 to make out an application. They did not like to see this business melt away.

Q: Who was the famous Mrs. Shipley?

BRODERICK: She was known as "Ma Shipley" and had been head of the Passport Office for about thirty years, at the time, and was tough as nails. She was a strict interpretationist when it came to nationality cases. She was very popular with the conservatives in Congress like John Rooney [Representative from New York on the House Appropriations Committee] who used to pass on the Department's budget. She was always very well treated by John Rooney.

There is another story about Rooney. While I was in Windsor a man that none of us liked who had been on Senator Styles Bridges's staff was made head of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. This was Scott McLeod, one of the former dog-robbers for the McCarthy types. He visited Windsor. On Congressional correspondence he was sound; he said, "Look, you guys get letters all the time from Congressmen and if you do not answer them properly I get in trouble with them. What you want to do is when you get a letter from a Congressman (it is almost always about a visa case) you start off by saying 'we are very pleased that you are personally interested in the case of John Doe'. The reason you do that is because that while the Congressman probably does not give a damn about the case of John Doe or his relatives, he always sends a copy of whatever letter you send him to the constituents. So don't understate his interest. Then you state what the situation is, but use a lot of words about how marvelous the Congressman is. The only exception to that rule is John Rooney. Rooney called me one day, he had gotten one of these letters, and he said, 'What is all this crap about my personal interest? I don't give a damn about these people.' So don't write letters like that to him."

There is one other case I wanted to tell you about, a very sad case. I got this call from the Justice Department. This woman attorney said, "Did you issue an immigrant visa in Windsor in 1954 to John Palavchek (I'm not sure of the name)- -a Ukrainian?" I said, "Well, I have issued thousands of visas, and if you said I did, I guess I did." She said, "As a matter of fact, we have got the actual document here in front of us and your name is on it. We are investigating him and it turns out that he has been involved in some of these concentration camp crimes and the killing of Jews. The question is, when he appeared before you, did he tell you any of this?" I said I am sure he didn't as it would be grounds for refusal. She said, "Would you be willing to testify in court that if you knew the facts

as we now believe they are he would not have been issued a visa?" I said, "Sure, I would be prepared to do that." I did not hear anything for another six or seven months. Then the same woman called to say, "We just called to tell you that you will not have to concern yourself about appearing in this case. We notified Mr. Palavchek two days ago that we were undertaking deportation proceedings against him and last night he committed suicide." That was kind of a shocker.

Q: I don't imagine you came across a lot of cases with ramifications like that?

BRODERICK: No, but we had strange ones; we had an English woman who came in, a youngish woman in her mid-thirties, married to an American citizen. They were living in Windsor, and he was teaching in Detroit. She had a British passport so she could pass back and forth as a visitor with no visa, but she wanted an immigrant visa. During the British general strike of 1926, her father was one of the working men on strike. During a big meeting where Lady Astor was addressing a crowd of strikers, she said, "If all of you love Russia so much, why don't you go there and I will pay your fare." Well, her father accepted this offer and he took his family to Leningrad and he worked in a tool and die plant. (I can't remember if she was actually born in Russia or in Britain.) He died rather young, so the widow was left to raise these two small kids, the woman and her brother.

When the German armies came in, the mother took the girl -- the boy may have been drafted in the Russian army by then -- and in effect became a camp follower of the German army. Then the mother died and this girl, who was by then 19 or 20, became the mistress of a German medical officer and traveled back with him as the Germans retreated. All of this came out of files we had gotten from Germany where she had been in a DP [Displaced Persons] camp. Later she left the German and met the American and married him. He was in the military government at the time. The reason we got the information was that she had applied for a visa some place in Germany, and these facts were on file there. The concern in those early days was not the Russian background but the German connection -- we were still mad at the Nazis. By the time she got to us, this was '54 or '55, the problem was the Russian connection because it turned out she had been a member of the *Komsomol* [Communist youth organization] and the Communist Youth Brigade and they had actually sent her to an intelligence school somewhere to train her to be a spy. So she was clearly ineligible under the McCarran- Walter Act; it was very complicated business interviewing her since usually her husband would be with her. But I did discover that she was very articulate and had lived for some years in Britain after coming out of Germany where she had made speeches to local clubs, women's clubs, and given newspaper interviews about how terrible life was in Russia with these awful communists. By that time we had a so-called 'defector clause' in the law. I documented all of this stuff and said that she has established she is a defector by all of these speeches she has made criticizing the Russian government and therefore she has overcome the communist presumption. We got the visa for her.

We had another case of a woman who was again married to an American; she had been arrested once for prostitution, or soliciting, I forget which, in Germany before she had married this guy. I had to interview her about this, and she said, yes, she had a small child

by her German husband, who was killed in the war, and she was starving and only did it once, and so forth. I wrote to the Department and said there is this defector law for ex-Communists. Two questions are, a) how many times do you have to have been proven to do it before you are a prostitute and b) there is no similar status for the reformed prostitute. As I put it to them, under our law Karl Marx could conceivably qualify for a visa but Mary Magdalene couldn't. It did not help, it did not cut any ice, we could not give her a visa. So much for Windsor.

LOUISE S. ARMSTRONG
Economic-Commercial Officer
Ottawa (1953-1955)

Mrs. Armstrong was born in 1917 in Tokyo, Japan of American missionary parents. After moving to the United States she attended Wellesley College. After graduation, Mrs. Armstrong was a researcher for Time and Life magazine before joining the Foreign Service in 1947. As a Consular and Political Officer, she served in Madras, Prague, Palermo and Montreal. Following her marriage to FSO Willis Armstrong in 1959, she resigned her commission and accompanied her husband to Ottawa, where he was assigned as Deputy Chief of Mission. Mrs. Armstrong was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

ARMSTRONG: Eventually I was transferred to Ottawa, and I arrived on Coronation Day [for] Queen Elizabeth II. You never saw a city looking more splendid, banners everywhere, magnificent. It gave one a great lift. I was there on my own. My mother had gone down to the States. I was going to have to find suitable housing and so forth. But there was just a thrill to walk down this main thoroughfare, near the Parliament buildings and see all the bunting, all the banners, parades. You can imagine what it was like. Again the job was economic commercial and again some of it overlapped with what I'd been doing in Montreal. We were able to make friends readily because my mother joined a book club where we met some very interesting people. There was the younger set, not so young some of them, the governor general was crazy about barn dancing, so he set quite a pattern for society with that. He loved skiing and barn dancing and his name will come to me in due course. One could also go skiing very readily, half hour to the ski slopes, which is about half what it took to go to the ski slopes from Montreal. Wonderful lake country for swimming and canoeing. In fact, endless opportunities to go on canoeing weekends in relatively unpopulated areas, as long as you were with somebody who knew, who had his bearings and knew where we were going. You could go off and camp, spend the night and then canoe some more.

Q: Did you run into something that I've heard people who served in Canada at other times say – one problem about the Canadians is, that when they hear you're American, particularly attached to the embassy or consulate, it's "big you" and "poor little us" and "you have to understand us" and that sort of thing, which meant you better keep your

hand on your wallet as far as negotiating.

ARMSTRONG: Well there's a certain type of Canadian, yes, who's impossible. We used to go to an annual summer conference at which these Anglo-Canadian super-intellectuals would gather and it was always very "loftier than thou" when it came to anything American. We were the uncultured barbarians. We got awfully tired of that. The Globe and Mail was must reading, but it was so full of anti-Americanisms. It's par for the course. I don't think it will ever change.

Q: Did you get any feel within the French community about the role of the Roman Catholic Church at all?

ARMSTRONG: Well I was there at a time before the big change, which is probably why I met so few French Canadians, and those I met were lower class. They were still very much under the influence of the church and the old style. It's only in, well I can't say recent anymore because it's taken some time [for this] to happen, but you go to Montreal now and, by George, they're even beginning to feel so much at home that they don't mind speaking English. And they're on top of things. As we all know, they've got a lot going industry wise, high tech industry wise.

One of the things when we lived in Ottawa that we did was visit outside of Montreal and Quebec the asbestos mines, the asbestos industry. I think it was General Dynamics was trying to make a purchase there. Or else get rid of something they already held, I've forgotten. The curious thing was, the man who showed us around one of the most significant mines and mills of asbestos, came from a family that had worked in that area, with asbestos for three generations and never had any problems with the lungs. People living in the village somewhere else might, but he didn't. In the plant, in the mill, they all wore masks. The mining itself seemed to be open pit mining. But I remember New Jersey, Manville, New Jersey, they had terrific lawsuits. They weren't necessarily the result of people working in the plant, but people living nearby. So it's rather like tobacco I think. It could be that some people are more sensitive than others.

Q: How did you find the Canadian market? Were there various obstacles put on trying to sell American products in Canada?

ARMSTRONG: No, I never felt that way. Immediately after the free trade agreement was signed, which was of course bitterly fought by some vested interests in Canada, not by Canadians who were in senior official positions, who were all for it. But there were lots of smaller manufacturers of things like furniture and so forth who were suddenly making money hand over fist because they had the cheaper Canadian dollar and easy access to raw materials that were used and were doing a land office business here. So on the whole I think Canadians have no regrets though there was an initial bitter, bitter internal dispute.

Q: Well at the time though you were, this was '50 to '53 period –

ARMSTRONG: That was too early for [it.]

Q: Was it hard to market American goods then?

ARMSTRONG: I don't remember that there were any serious impediments. Very often people who were handling, let's say small appliances, had made long term commitments with their suppliers so they were in no hurry to change. But there was no, I never determined that there was any serious objection. If they could make a connection they would. One thing, which has nothing to do really with ordinary commerce, was that you couldn't buy any American wines and very little American booze in the provincially-controlled liquor stores. That's one thing they absolutely shut us out cold. The American wine industry kept working at this and working at this. I don't know how things are today, but very rarely did we see any decent American wines.

Q: I'm told that it was very hard to get American whiskey, I mean regular whiskey because Canadian whiskey –

ARMSTRONG: Well Canadian and British whiskey were better than ours.

Q: Well, it's a matter of taste.

ARMSTRONG: Well I know we don't have bourbon. But the Canadian rye is first class. Of course they could import British scotch quite readily and perhaps more readily, with the trade agreements they had with Britain, than we could. It was the wine that was the big hang-up.

Q: Did the embassy do much to try and open it up?

ARMSTRONG: Oh, yes, constantly. I think we've succeeded to a degree, although I just don't know because I haven't visited recently. There was at the time, when I was there with my husband, a group of commercial attachés who would meet once a month, each one being the host. It would be at a hotel or a dining room of some sort, a public dining room. And the entire menu would be representative of the host country. And the wines that went with it would be representative. When it came time for the Americans to do the entertaining, my husband looked around to see what officer he could spare to send down over the border to Ogdensburg and bring back American wine. He hit on this chap in the administrative office who really wouldn't have known one kind of wine from another. And he came back with Gallo red and Gallo white. Well we had to make the best of it. But afterwards the French commercial attaché came up to Bill and he said, "These wines, you've got us worried," being sincere.

Q: How about during this '50-'53 period, did you get involved in complaints that the Canadians had about cultural invasion – Maclean's Magazine and all that?

ARMSTRONG: Oh, yes, and afterwards when I was there later with my husband. It began to be a more and more burning issue for them. And some of the civil servants who ramrodded these restrictions through were among our best friends. But it was a point of

survival for them, an issue of survival. And of course Readers Digest protested. Of course Time magazine protested. But honestly you can see why they needed to do something like this. Of course they can't control what comes in from Buffalo, over the radio and television. But their own domestic material is so high class, I'd much rather listen to some of those Canadian stations than our own.

RICHARD E. JOHNSON
Consular Officer
Toronto (1954-1955)

Richard E. Johnson was born in Winnetka, Illinois. He received a bachelor's degree from Harvard University in 1942 and then served in the U.S. Navy during World War II. Mr. Johnson joined the Civil Service in 1947 and the Foreign Service in 1951. His career included positions in Hong Kong, Canada, Poland, Bulgaria, Brazil, Yugoslavia, and Brazil. Mr. Johnson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1991.

Q: Yes. You then left there for a much more mundane world, didn't you?

JOHNSON: Yes, I went to Toronto after that.

Q: Yes, you were there for about a year or so.

JOHNSON: That was, I would say, a rather dull assignment, being in the consulate in Toronto. I did only consular work, and it was very open and shut. We didn't find Toronto very exciting, although we had Maple Leaf (hockey) season tickets.

Some of our vice consuls at that time found Canada a surprisingly hostile milieu. They were people, I guess who, like me, had been brought up to think that this was a brother country. Their parents had talked to them about the thousands of miles of undefended frontier. So they expected to be welcomed as brothers. And they were surprised to find the Canadians a little bit prickly about being called brothers, because they thought there was something condescending about that.

One of our vice consuls resigned while he was there. He had, before he resigned, written an article for Macleans magazine, which was titled "I'm Leaving Canada and I'm Glad of It." Fortunately, he had left about two days before Macleans hit the newsstand, because our consul general really blew his stack -- here was a U.S. vice consul stirring that pot.

I don't think I was there for more than maybe a year in Toronto. And I applied for Polish language training.

JOHN A. LINEHAN, JR.
Consular Officer
Quebec (1956-1958)

Ambassador John A. Linehan was born in Gloucester, Massachusetts in 1924. He entered the Foreign Service in 1952. His career included positions in France, Canada, Australia, Liberia, Ghana, Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Sierra Leone. Ambassador Linehan was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993.

Q: Well, then, you went to Quebec. You were there from 1956 to 1958.

LINEHAN: That was a quiet post, a delightful post. I might say that the French in France were difficult to get to know. French businessmen entertained in restaurants. They very rarely entertained at home. On the other hand, once you made a French friend, you had a friend for life. We did have a few. We were very interested to find that the French Canadians were totally different -- much warmer and more hospitable. We thoroughly enjoyed our time there because of that. They were just more open types. Now, the French language spoken in Quebec is a little bit different from that spoken in France. French Canadians have preserved some old terms. They've been heavily influenced by English over the radio and now television.

After two years in French Canada I returned to Washington at the time the Department had instituted language testing. I went, with some trepidation, to my language test, which was conducted by Marie-Louise something or other from Paris and an American who was bilingual. I walked into the room and said that I had just come from Quebec and asked whether either one of them had ever been to French Canada. Well, no, they hadn't. My heart sank, because I knew that I would say something in Canadian French. So instead I said, "Well, it really is very curious. The French Canadians say this, they say that, and the other." And the two of them were saying, "Mais, c'est impossible, incroyable!" [But that's impossible, unbelievable!] I ran out of steam after about 15 minutes, and they said, "Thank you very much."

Q: Which is called taking command of the situation.

LINEHAN: It was sort of a desperate attempt, I might say.

Q: But it worked.

LINEHAN: We had a happy time in Quebec. Nothing very exciting. At that time it was a two man post, with four French Canadian female employees. When I arrived, the consul was George Renchard, who became somewhat famous in the Foreign Service because after he retired, he was appointed an ambassador, presumably because his wife made a very large contribution to the president at that time. He left soon after I arrived, according to schedule. However, he was replaced by an "integrated" officer [i.e., who had not originally been a Foreign Service Officer] who had also been in Paris but in NATO

Affairs, in USRO [United States Regional Office], you might say. He didn't know anything about consular affairs, much less about general Foreign Service matters. So the following year, when he did my efficiency report, he said that he had figured he could learn all about visas and passports in about three weeks. He added, "I'm still ignorant, but nobody has complained, so Linehan must be OK." I really enjoyed Quebec.

Q: Tell me, did you get any feel for the seeds of separatism? Were we playing with that at all?

LINEHAN: No. Those were the days of a man whom many people called a dictator, Maurice Duplessis, the Premier of Quebec. He ran things with an iron hand.

The Catholic Church was very important in those days [1956-1958]. There was very little opposition in Quebec. The only opposition that I'm aware of, however, was a religious order -- I must admit that my knowledge of Catholic orders is not very good. There was an order, composed, I think, mainly of Benedictines, who ran an institution of some kind. They would write and publish things in opposition to the Duplessis Government. But that was about it. This was still a place where people were church-going, where French Canadians had very large families, and where the long-established English families in Quebec City ran the show commercially and financially. The only thing that I saw which gave some indication of what might happen in the future was that many of the people who were of my generation, who were English and running businesses, were also bilingual, although their parents were not. I belonged to an informal group which met once a week with business people -- some French but mostly English speaking Canadians, I should say. The whole problem of separatism and what has happened in terms of the use of the English and French languages in the province, has changed drastically since my time.

Q: How did they feel about the United States?

LINEHAN: I think that it was better to be an American in Quebec City than to be an [English-speaking] Canadian from Ontario. In part this was because almost all French Canadians have relatives in the States. There was a lot of crossing the border, back and forth. Americans were very well appreciated there. I certainly felt very welcome during all of my time there.

Q: Then you came back to Washington.

LINEHAN: Yes, that was at the time [1958] of the integration of civil service employees into the Foreign Service, as you may recall.

LOUISE SCHAFFNER ARMSTRONG
United Kingdom and Canadian Affairs
Washington, DC (1957-1959)

Mrs. Armstrong was born in 1917 in Tokyo, Japan of American missionary parents. After moving to the United States she attended Wellesley College. After graduation, Mrs. Armstrong was a researcher for Time and Life magazine before joining the Foreign Service in 1947. As a Consular and Political Officer, she served in Madras, Prague, Palermo and Montreal. Following her marriage to FSO Willis Armstrong in 1959, she resigned her commission and accompanied her husband to Ottawa, where he was assigned as Deputy Chief of Mission. Mrs. Armstrong was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: She had an operation dealing with Berlin, with Germany.

ARMSTRONG: That's right and where could you go from there? And I wasn't, I didn't have a German background. So I found a slot in INR [Intelligence and Research], and I was working there for a while when my application for advanced economic study was granted, and I went to Berkeley. So I spent the academic year, '56-57 at Berkeley. When I finished that – I'm sorry I'm getting ahead. Before that I went to a tariff conference in 1956 in Geneva. That was out of INR. They needed each particular- [end of tape]

So that was a very happy occasion in the end because who would object to being in Geneva for three months. The rate of exchange was tolerable, and the per diem was quite tolerable. And the weather initially was balmy and then it turned cold. But one could go skiing every weekend, only the man who was head of my team was biting his nails for fear that I and another officer who would go skiing would come back with a broken limb and that would put the kibosh on the broken limb to some extent. But that never happened.

And my particular group was negotiating with the Italians and the Austrians, and we had a representative of the department of commerce on our team and also the international tariff office guy. The representative from the tariff commission knew what he was doing; the rest of us were sort of learning on the job. Bless his heart when we discovered that the Austrians did not have any calculators, that they were doing all these figures in their head to see what would be the trade impact of lowering the tariffs on this or that item, he did it

for them. And they were a very nice group of people that we worked with. They were relatively new because the government was just pulling itself together in those days. And the Italians were very affable so everything went quite well I think. Only we were looking forward to just another few days after Easter of enjoying life in Geneva when the word came back that the bureau of conference affairs had run out of money. Then we didn't have congressional opportunities to go and finish assignments. Then we were just living hand to mouth with what the bureau of international conferences could afford. So it was get out of there, ready or not! Fortunately my work was finished, but there were some people who were very embarrassed by this; they had to do things at the last minute that they had no intention of trying to do in a hurry.

Back home, I guess that's when I went to Berkeley, not immediately but some time soon after. Then I came back to trade agreements, and after a period in trade agreements, which was in the old munitions building, there was an opening which somebody mentioned to me, which was in the Bureau of United Kingdom and Canadian Affairs as economic officer. I jumped at that opportunity and spent most of my time actually on work dealing with Canada.

In the course of that I'd already met Willis Armstrong, but it so happened that since he was economic counselor in Ottawa and we had regular meetings of Americans and Canadians and some cabinet level commission, that he would have to call the desk and the desk would be me. And I wouldn't be on the phone very long, but I would be setting things up with other people that needed to talk to him. When the telephone bills were totted up at the embassy in Ottawa, the woman working in the office responsible said, "An hour and a half, Mr. Armstrong to Louise Schaffner. It'd be cheaper if he'd marry the girl!" At that point we were already becoming serious I should think. But if we told anybody it would discredit us with respect to the arrangements we were making professionally at either end. So we had to keep very quiet about it.

DONALD A. KRUSE
Administrative Officer
Toronto (1957-1960)

Donald A. Kruse was born in Philadelphia in 1930. He later attended Wheaton College and majored in history. Following his graduation in 1952, he received a masters degree in political science at the University of Pennsylvania and then joined the army. Following his two year run in the army, Kruse joined the Foreign Service and served in posts in Canada, Luxembourg, France, Belgium, Jerusalem, Italy, and England. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in March 1997.

Q: Only one of many. You were in Toronto when?

KRUSE: From '57 to '60.

Q: What was your job?

KRUSE: I was the administrative officer. In fact, I tried hard to stay the admin. officer all the three years because the only alternative was the visa mill, which is essentially what Toronto was in those days. Out of the 20 or so officers, I would say 15, were doing visa or consular work. All of my predecessors had been rotated out of the admin. To consular at a certain point. Having observed that visa mill, I thought to myself, "You know, this is not a bad job up here as admin. officer. Let's just see if we can't stay there." So, I spent my three years doing admin.

Q: Who was the Consul General?

KRUSE: We started with Ivan White, who eventually became quite a senior officer as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for EUR in the late '50s. I'm not sure if he did get an embassy, but he got his own post, whether it was a consulate or just what. He was favorably looked upon by the Washington establishment because Livingston Merchant was the ambassador in Canada and when he left Canada took Ivan out and back to be his deputy in EUR. So, that was my first consul general. He was a good boss for younger officers. He paid some attention to us, gave us some good advice.

He was replaced by Bob Memminger, who was a different kind of officer, mostly a consular officer, kind of a southern, laid back fellow, who was pleasant to work for, but a totally different kind from Ivan, who was a political officer. Memminger was very helpful to me.

Q: What type of work were you doing? You say admin., but what does that mean?

KRUSE: It was everything combined, the GSO, the security. I was it. We had three Canadian FSNs working in the section with me. But I was the officer for signing everything. The only thing that, I think, may be remembered 40 years later is that we put air conditioning in the building in Toronto. This apparently took a great revolution in Washington's thinking that any place in Canada would need air conditioning. They kind of think you can keep that winter air all year long without recognizing that it's a pretty warm summer. So, we managed to install air conditioning.

Q: Did you get any feel for what relations were like with Canada at that time?

KRUSE: Yes. I guess this was my interest and I could do it kind of on the side. They sent me out to speak at a couple of Rotary Clubs. There were Canadian elections. In fact, it was rather exciting if you can think of U.S.-Canadian relations as ever being exciting, at least from the American standpoint. Every day it's exciting for Canadians, but very seldom is it for Americans, it seems. This was the time that John Diefenbaker was Prime Minister, who kind of made it his forte to put the jab in the Americans when he could. He had won a landslide victory. So, it was something that Washington became interested in. How are you going to deal with John Diefenbaker? Basically, that's what the consul general said: "Give me your impressions?" So, I wrote him some things. He seemed to think they were well-done. I guess he put some good words for me in Washington. I think my next assignment was really attributable to his reporting favorably on my progress.

Q: What did Diefenbaker think? What was our thinking at that time, that you were getting sort of internally, talking to your fellow officers and all, about this nationalistic anti-American stance? How did we react?

KRUSE: As you could imagine, we expected loyalty of allies in those days. It was the heart of the Cold War and we didn't like some of the Canadian rhetoric. We understood that the Canadians may have some gripes about our foreign policy and our actions, but when it came to defense and security arrangements, we thought that allies should be allies and it was exactly on nuclear issues that we had our biggest problems. Walton Butterworth was the ambassador at that particular time. It became publicly known that he was carrying critical messages to Diefenbaker about American unhappiness. The Diefenbaker-Kennedy relationship was not a happy one at all. So, I would say those were not easy years, not that later years with Trudeau were that easy as well. I think it's necessary for Canadian leaders at some point to show their own electorate that they're standing up to the Americans. But when it came to these defense issues, we really thought that the Canadians and Diefenbaker were unnecessarily tough on us.

Q: How about in Toronto, was this an Ottawa-Ontario manifestation, too, or was this more from elsewhere?

KRUSE: I always think Ontario has the quintessential Canadian attitude toward us because they think of themselves as one of the reasons that Canada is separate. If you try to define a Canadian, it's not often easy to do that as an American. The Ontario situation is usually where there is perhaps the most intellectual argumentation against American foreign policy. I'll never forget seeing the Canadian protestors outside the consulate. I don't know what in particular the issue was, but one day the first fellow came with the sign "Dull." The second guy came with a sign that said, "Duller." The third one said, "Dulles." That was a fairly good imagination for a Canadian to come up with that, not that Canadians don't have good imaginations. But they tend not to be too demonstrative. They don't like to dramatize their problems with us because in the long run, they recognize that the ties are too close. Of course, in Ontario, Diefenbaker won very handsomely.

WILLIS C. ARMSTRONG
Economic Counselor
Ottawa (1958-1960)

Deputy Chief of Mission
Ottawa (1960-1962)

Canada/United Kingdom Desk
Washington, DC (1962-1963)

Willis C. Armstrong was born in 1912. He served in the Lend-Lease administration from 1941-1946. He joined the State Department in 1946, serving in the Economic Bureau, at the Canadian/UK desk, and as Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs under the Nixon administration. Mr. Armstrong was also Deputy Chief of Mission in Canada and Minister for Economic Affairs in Great Britain. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1988.

Q: You were assigned for your first overseas assignment in 1958, to Ottawa as economic counselor. Had you joined the Foreign Service?

ARMSTRONG: I became Wristonized, as we used to say, somewhere around 1956. I had taken the Foreign Service exam for lateral transfer around '46 and '47, when I was in the Department as a civil servant. The trouble was, under civil service rules, I was in an economic position, but I'm not an economist. I never said I was. I'm an historian, a political scientist. I've got a smidgen of economics and a certain amount of common sense. But I was a bachelor and had a dependent mother. My father died when I was in college, and my mother was psychologically and economically dependent on me, and I didn't really think that the Foreign Service was a good idea. But when it came to the crunch, it was the only choice to make.

Livy [Livingston] Merchant was ambassador to Canada, and he asked for me as economic counselor. With a 79-year-old mother, that was perfect, so my mother and I went to Ottawa in 1958.

Q: I have here that Wigglesworth was ambassador in Canada in '58.

ARMSTRONG: He came in '59. Livy was before that, and Livy was after him.

Q: I see.

ARMSTRONG: This involves also my wife. My wife was a Foreign Service officer, and she served in Madras, Prague, Montreal, Ottawa, and then in tariff negotiations in Geneva. She was in the economic bureau when I was, and that's how we met. She was later in BNA, which was desk for Canada, Britain, and Scandinavia.

Q: BNA stands for what?

ARMSTRONG: British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs. It covered Scandinavia, Ireland, Britain, Canada, some pieces of the West Indies, and Malta. I was its Director for two years when I came back from Canada in 1962.

My wife, Louis, was involved in backstopping me, in effect, because she did the economic work in BNA. We became engaged between '58 and '59, were married in May of '59. So Louise, who had served five years in Canada, came back to Canada, lived there three more years as my wife. My mother survived until the autumn of '59.

Q: In those days Louise had to resign.

ARMSTRONG: She had to resign because of the rules. Her expertise on Canada was a great help at all times. I went there as economic counselor in '58. In 1959, Livy Merchant left Ottawa to come back to Washington and became Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Wigglesworth came. My wife had helped brief him in Washington, and we became very friendly with the Wigglesworths. He was a fine man and a good congressman, a very decent, sensible guy, but on the cautious side, which is all right. He and I had a very happy working relationship. He chose me as his number two when Tyler Thompson, who was number two, left to become ambassador to Iceland.

So I became DCM in 1960. Unfortunately, Ambassador Wigglesworth died in the autumn of 1960. He'd been a four-letter man at Harvard and thought he was indestructible. He developed phlebitis and didn't follow what the doctor told him. He'd come back from the hospital and seemed to be all right. I'd gone off for a week's holiday. I hadn't had any holiday all year. Louise and I drove down to New England in October and were on Martha's Vineyard when we got a call from the embassy -- we'd been gone two days -- saying the ambassador had been taken to Peter Bent Brigham Hospital in Boston by RCAF plane. We left immediately for Ottawa, stopping to lunch with friends in Lexington or Concord, Massachusetts. I called up and talked to him. He said, "I feel all right, but the doctors say there are some problems." The next day he was dead.

We went on to Maine. I had a cottage in Maine, and we quickly closed the cottage. I drove all night to Ottawa to take charge. Suddenly taking charge of an embassy, with the ambassador dead, was an experience.

This was just before our 1960 election, and people said, "How long do you think it will be before we get a new ambassador?" I said, "It will be at least March and maybe April, because the outgoing administration isn't going to appoint anybody, and an incoming administration isn't going to make up its mind." So I was chargé from October until about March or April of 1961, when Livy came back.

After he came back, President Kennedy had him doing all kinds of other things, going to Pakistan and Afghanistan and so forth. He didn't pay much attention to the Ottawa job because he had done the job before. He sort of said, "You do it." So I did it. I'd known Livy during the

war in Lend-Lease matters, one of the world's nicest people. We were very, very fond of him and his wife. We were very fond of the Wigglesworths, too. We still see Mrs. Wigglesworth. She married John Hollinter, an old friend whose wife had died. He had been a congressman.

Q: You are mentioning something here on Canada, with the ambassador coming back for a second time. This might be true in any case, but one of the Canadians' great claims which again came up during very recent elections they had up there was that the United States takes Canada for granted, we don't pay enough attention to them. Was this a constant refrain when you were there, or is this something fairly recent?

ARMSTRONG: Every refrain, including this one, that has been heard in Canadian politics is familiar to me. I've been on television in Canada and on public platforms and so forth. My response to that claim is, "How would you like it if we really gave you our full attention?"

"Oh, my God!" they say. "We couldn't stand that."

Q: I'm never quite sure exactly what this means, because we obviously give our full attention to what's happening maybe in the Soviet Union. Let's go back to the time you were there. What did the Canadians want from us that we weren't doing?

ARMSTRONG: The whole time I was there, Mr. Diefenbaker was prime minister. He started out saying, "We're going to divert a lot of our trade from U.S. orientation to the Commonwealth." That didn't fly at all. He was arguing about economic forces over which he had no control. The Canadians were worried about their excessive dependence on trade to the United States. It's a legitimate worry.

The second worry was American investment in Canada, which was responsible for their quite extraordinary rate of growth during the time, but which made a lot of nationalists unhappy. Diefenbaker was sort of a nationalist, but not really as bad as he sounded. He was a prairie populist. He could have run for office in Minnesota or North Dakota and made it without any trouble at all. He came from Saskatchewan, just over the border. Same framework, only he happened to be Canadian.

Canada had just done a big study under a commission headed by a man called Gordon. They always have going some big study by some royal commission, always examining their identity or looking at their navels or whatever. It produces quite a lot of fairly interesting stuff. If you just sit down and read all of it, you learn a hell of a lot about Canada. The study had just come out when I went there, and I didn't know much about Canada. I had been there on tourist trips and had Canadian friends, but I really didn't know anything about Canadian politics. And I learned. I got there the day Diefenbaker won his landslide, March 31, 1958. I watched the television all evening. I didn't know what I was looking at. So I became immersed in learning about Canada.

Then when I became minister, I was responsible for supervising the consulates; we had 11 consulates in Canada from St. John's, Newfoundland, to Vancouver, and I had to visit them a couple of times a year to see their operations and write the efficiency ratings and all that. So I got around in Canada and met people all over Canada. I felt fairly comfortable about it.

Canada-U.S. relations are very much *sui generis*. They want to be different, but they want to participate in our politics. They're very partisan about our politics. I remember going to an election-night party in 1960. It was neck and neck between Nixon and Kennedy. It got to be midnight, and nobody had won. We said, "We're going home. Got to get our sleep. I've got work to do tomorrow, you know."

They said, "Don't you want to stay up and see how it comes out?"

I said, "Louise voted for Kennedy. I voted for Nixon. We're both reconciled to a victory by either candidate. We're going home and go to bed." That's it. They couldn't understand that, because they were so passionately for Kennedy. If you told people in Canada that you were Republican, they looked at you as if you were some kind of monster. "What is a Republican? Why are you a Republican? You've always been in the Foreign Service." I was a Republican because that's the way I felt about it. The state of Maine is my spiritual home, as my wife says, and that's the way I feel. I found this also in Britain, this wonderment at someone being a Republican.

Anyway, the things that bother Canadians are that they want to have everything the way it is in the United States, in terms of material comforts. Now they have it. In 1958, they didn't. The society has matured and grown tremendously. But the same nationalism is there. They have a problem of having an inferiority complex about the United States, and then they have a problem of having a superiority complex towards the United States. You never can tell quite which mode they're going to be in. They switch.

Q: The inferiority complex is because of size and power?

ARMSTRONG: And feeling neglected because they're alone on a continent with a great big power, whereas in Europe, there are a lot of countries.

Q: And on the superiority side, the qualitative thing.

ARMSTRONG: Quality of life and so forth. They used to talk a lot about the quality of life back 25 years ago, but it wasn't that great. Now it's good. It's first class. Lovely, clean cities, good medical care, no poverty, really, no slums, no underclass, very little crime, good gun laws. It's a delightful place to live, except when it gets too cold.

Q: Besides this sort of amorphous problem of dealing with the Canadian identity crisis, what were the major concerns that you had to deal with?

ARMSTRONG: The weapons crisis was the major one.

Q: What was this?

ARMSTRONG: Canada had been building its own interceptor plane, the Avro Arrow. About 1960, Canada came to the conclusion that there wasn't going to be any market for it, as the Canadian domestic market for an interceptor plane was limited. You couldn't get a long

production run unless you could sell it to the United States or some other ally. The chances of selling it to the United States against competition from American aerospace companies was zero. So they decided to junk it and stop the whole thing. It was a courageous decision. It was the right one to make, but it was courageous. It caused a lot of nervous stomachs in Ontario, where the industry was located.

But the Canadian armed forces said, "Here we are, part of NORAD. What are we going to use for weapons? We've got to have interceptors." This was in the early stage of ground-launched missiles. So they bought from us a batch of interceptors and a batch of Bomarc batteries, a short-range ground-launched defensive missile. They were to be located in different places. Of course, they were integrated with us in NORAD, and that agreement has gone on and on and been renewed and renewed. The armed forces of Canada and the United States are like that, very chummy, indeed. The Canadian armed forces' personnel are first class, highly qualified professionals and splendid people.

For the last two years of being in Ottawa, and for the two years I had the British-Canadian desk in Washington, a great deal of my time was taken up with concern about defense matters. I had started as economic counselor and suddenly I found myself primarily a politico-military officer, in addition to running the embassy and dealing with all the normal odds and ends. There's an enormous amount of trivia that goes on between Canada and the United States, and it takes up the time of the guys in the embassy. It takes up an enormous amount of time. You have questions such as, "Who arrested that Indian on the wrong side of the boundary?" and all that kind of stuff.

The trouble was that the Canadians accepted and bought these two weapon systems, but did not make provisions for the nuclear warheads to go with them. They said, "We're going to deal with that later." And within the Canadian government, the defense minister was all for moving ahead and acquiring the warheads. There was a certain time interval available because it took time to get the equipment in place. But by about 1962, most things were in place. But there weren't any warheads. They were useless weapons, interceptors without weapons, and missiles without any warheads. Of course, because they're nuclear, it takes a special deal, special clearances for everybody that deals with it, a special deal all across the board.

The Canadians had people with clearances. They knew what they were getting into the armed forces. They were anxious to proceed, because who wants a weapon system that doesn't work? We had to be very careful about Canadian sensitivities because of another aspect of defense, which was overflight rights for SAC, Strategic Air Command. We had SAC bases in Newfoundland and Labrador, and SAC bases in the U.S., of course. What we needed was to be over Canadian air space on continual patrol, because that's the way you watched the Russians in those days, because they were airborne, too. Their big missile thing didn't come until years later.

Diefenbaker refused to make up his mind about taking the nuclear weapons, and Minister of External Affairs, Howard Green, was firmly opposed to any nuclear weapons or anything nuclear anywhere in Canada, overlooking the fact that Canada was a pioneer in nuclear energy and had a big uranium industry, big reactors and all that, and was selling nuclear equipment around the world, including to the Indians who went ahead and made a bomb with it. But Howard Green didn't want any nuclear weapons, and he was also anti-American, fundamentally. He'd never

been to the United States until he came down to a meeting of the United Nations as External Affairs Minister. Can you imagine that? He grew up in Vancouver and had never been to the United States. He fought in World War I in Europe, but he'd never been to the United States until about 1960. Funny man. He looked exactly like Grant Woods; American Gothic. I found myself, as chargé, doing a lot of business with him. He was always a nice enough person, but he had his convictions on this subject. He was very firm.

Mr. Harkness, who was Minister of Defense, was up the wall because he had weapon systems that wouldn't work. How could he carry out his defense obligations with weapon systems that wouldn't work? As I said, we didn't want to be too rough on them because we were concerned to protect our overflights which was, in our minds, more important. The situation ground on, and the Cabinet was deadlocked. The problem hadn't been settled when I left Canada in the summer of 1962.

After I was back here about a year, the issue really sharpened up. General Norstad, who was retiring from SACEUR, visited Canada and made a speech. He said, "It's pretty stupid to have weapon systems that don't work," some very commonplace remark like that. That led Mr. Diefenbaker and Mr. Green to say that Norstad was intervening in Canadian domestic affairs. The deadlock went on and on.

Diefenbaker made a statement in the spring of '63, in which he undertook to explain to the Parliament what U.S. policy was on nuclear weapons. He had it all wrong, upside down, inside out. It was atrocious, this statement, totally unconscionable. So we in the embassy in Ottawa, and we at the Canadian desk decided we ought to clarify our position. We just could not let his remarks stand. So we drafted a statement which said Mr. Diefenbaker was wrong, but politely, and the way it was like this. We said, "We've been waiting for the Canadians to come up with a proposal to put warheads on these weapons, and they have so far not produced anything that will work." (They were talking about two keys, keeping them in the U.S. until you needed to fire them, and all that.) Ours was a stern statement, but fair. It was correct. We decided instead of putting it in a note (Canadians often ignored our notes), we'd put it in a press release. So we issued a press release, and all hell broke loose in our relations with Canada. Mr. Harkness became convinced that he never was going to get his weapons, so he quit the Cabinet. The Diefenbaker government collapsed. They had to call a new election. Lester Pearson won and threw out Diefenbaker. I'm the guy who wrote the press release! I went back the other day and read it. I thought it was pretty good.

Q: Why did we do it in a press release rather than a note? Just for the reader, a note would have been delivered to the foreign ministry and would have been purely a government thing, whereas a press release went all over.

ARMSTRONG: It was responding to a public speech, so it was not inappropriate to respond to a public speech with a public statement. Also we did this in view of our record of dealing with the Canadians on notes. Ordinarily you don't publish notes when you give them. It's not considered good form. You may later, but you don't do it then. Our experience on this had been very poor, because the Canadians frequently would lie about having not received any notes from us. In my personal experience, I sent them a note from the embassy back in 1958, when they were

proposing an amendment to their trade law. I said, "We'd like your assurances that what you do with this trade law will not be a violation of your commitments under GATT." A perfectly legitimate note. When the minister was questioned as to whether he'd received any representations from the United States, he said, "No, we haven't heard a thing," implying that we didn't see any problem.

So the press all came over and landed on me and said, "What the hell's the matter with you guys? Why don't you protest? This is terrible legislation!" -- which it was.

I said, "Well, we did. We sent them a note." So I took the complimentary heading and closing off the note and gave a copy to the press. We made our point. You have to do this every so often, because they like to bury unpleasant things.

Q: In other words, for somebody looking at this, for each country you have to vary things in a certain manner, and you found that the Canadians, for all the openness and all, had a selective memory in dealing with what they wanted to release to the public.

ARMSTRONG: Yes, and also under that particular regime, a very close-hauled kind of nationalism, which was substantially added to by Ed Ritchie, who had served here as minister, and who was later here as ambassador. He was the Senior External Affairs Under Secretary I had to deal with when I was there. I had known him for years. I thought since he'd served here he'd be helpful. I found he was not. He's a very genial guy, but I found that things weren't always as genial as they had seemed. The Canadians have a very good Foreign Service, very highly qualified, very competent, and very good people. But when they're in negotiations, they're tough as nails. This idea in recent talk in Canada that they got done in by us in the free-trade agreement is nonsense.

Q: You're talking about the trade agreement which was quite a matter of controversy in an election which was held about a week ago, in which the side in favor of basically a free-trade agreement with the United States, the forces there won on an election that was pretty much based on whether or not to have this agreement.

ARMSTRONG: It was. The opposition was outrageous in its campaign.

Q: I used to meet a man from the State Department who was involved in negotiations, talking about the Canadians putting them through the wringer every time because they're very tough negotiators.

ARMSTRONG: They are very tough, indeed. They're as tough as anybody I've ever encountered, and they're also very knowledgeable. They know the detail right down to the ground. I've kept in close touch, and my wife and I have done some work for the Atlantic Council and published a couple of things on Canada within the last ten years. We were very interested in this. My wife just did an article on this for a newsletter which I was reading this morning. In it she said that the French Canadians were very important in the election, because Mulroney got 63 out of 75 seats in Quebec. The French Canadians have their identity problems vis à vis the English Canadians, not vis à vis us. So they're a leavening factor in the situation.

Americans and French Canadians always get along fine.

Q: How was it when you were there? You were there before the French Canadians found their soul, in other words, before they fully blossomed forth as a confident power which sort of got rid of the yoke of the Catholic Church and of British business.

ARMSTRONG: I thought it was high time when they did it. I was all for them. For example, I belonged to the Rideau Club, which was a downtown number-one club in Ottawa, and I found, after I got in as a diplomatic member, they had no French Canadians and no Jews.

Q: My God.

ARMSTRONG: In the year of our Lord 1958, they had no French Canadians and no Jews, and they're across the street from the Parliament. Now, of course, things have changed. I used to have a little fun. For example, Lou Rasminsky, who was deputy governor of the Bank of Canada, was a friend of mine. I'd take him there to lunch. He couldn't belong because he was Jewish. He later became Governor of the Bank of Canada and, of course, did become a member. I used to take French Canadians there and I used to take the Israeli ambassador there. I thought the club policy was outrageous. The way Anglos talked about French Canadians I found shocking. Every so often I would tell them so. They would then turn around and criticize us for the way we treated black people. It was kind of amusing sometimes, but the Anglo Canadians can be terribly stuffy about the French Canadians.

I remember calling on the lieutenant governor of Prince Edward Island as part of my wanderings. A nice guy. It was in the middle of a lot of uproar about the French in 1961. It hadn't really started yet, but it was beginning. He said, "You know, my view about this is to let the French go. To hell with them. You'd take us in, wouldn't you?" Well, you know, what's the minister in the American embassy and the chargé d'affaires going to say in response to a question like that?

Another thing I was going to mention about the time I served in Canada was the Kennedy visit, which was a major political event. I think I've covered the warheads issue. But the Kennedy visit is related to the election of 1963, also. Kennedy came in May, I think it was, of 1961, his first visit outside of the United States as President. I managed the visit because I was number two in the embassy. Livy Merchant was supervising and always there if needed, but I did the pick and shovel work with the staff. The mechanics all went off smoothly enough. It was all right.

But Mr. Diefenbaker had liked General Eisenhower very much. They were of the same age group. He felt comfortable with Eisenhower. I remember seeing him off when he came down to sign the Columbia River Treaty. He had his own plane to take him down, a government plane. I went out to the airport in freezing weather to see him off. I had a nice chat with him and Mrs. Diefenbaker. She was a lovely woman. He was comfortable with Eisenhower. Kennedy was half his age. I think he considered Kennedy a young squirt. Kennedy was abrupt, rough, and he considered Diefenbaker an old bore. They were both right about each other, you know.

So in the meetings they had, Mr. Kennedy dropped a piece of paper, left it behind in Diefenbaker's office. The piece of paper was a memorandum from Walt Rostow to Kennedy, in

sort of shorthand: "We must push the Canadians on the following things." Just the kind of stuff you'd use privately. One of them was to join the OAS, which I thought was an insane idea. Who needed the Canadians in the OAS? We had enough trouble in the OAS without them. Kennedy left the memo behind in the office and we didn't know it. He didn't know it. Nobody knew it, except Diefenbaker. Some months later, damn near a year later, Diefenbaker called Livy Merchant over and told him he had this memorandum. He was going to make use of it to teach the United States a lesson. You couldn't push him around, goddamn it, and so forth. This was just as the nuclear weapons crisis was shaping up. Livy had never heard of this memo. He had no idea about it. So he banged off a telegram and somebody did some good research in the State Department, and they came up with the text of the memo and sent it back to us. We didn't think it was very exciting. Diefenbaker didn't do anything about it then, but he, in effect, had told us that he had something on us, or he thought he had something on us.

Livy Merchant retired and left Ottawa in 1962. I was replaced that summer by another chargé, which is very unusual. Ivan White came up. He had been supposed to be ambassador to the West Indies when it federated, but it didn't federate, so he was out on a limb somewhere, so they sent him up. I'd been there four years, after all. I came back to take over the BNA desk.

I came back in September. In October, I think, of 1962, there was the Cuban Missile Crisis, and in that Mr. Diefenbaker behaved very badly. Livy Merchant was selected to go up and give him a special briefing. He didn't want to believe it, he didn't do the right thing, he didn't say the right thing. The crisis proceeded. The Canadian armed forces, as our NORAD partner in a joint command, went on the same level of alert as our armed forces. The Canadian Navy said to our destroyers on picket duty off New England, "Go on, move further south. You'll be needed down there. We'll put ours out to sea." They didn't have Diefenbaker's authorization for this at all. But the armed forces decided they'd do it on their own because it was the right thing to do. Diefenbaker always believed that we got them to do this and to contradict his orders.

I had the Canadian desk in the winter of 1962-63. I used to have an occasional lunch with Charles Ritchie, who was then Canadian ambassador here. That's another Ritchie, a delightful, entertaining man who has written some wonderful memoirs. He and I would get together and discuss how we could do business with each other in a situation in which the President and the Prime Minister couldn't stand each other. But we managed to conduct business, nevertheless, and most things went along more or less, with no excitement.

Then came the collapse of the Diefenbaker government, which was about February or March 1963. There was to be an election. Of course, Mr. Kennedy was extremely anxious to have Mr. Diefenbaker defeated by Mr. Pearson, so one of our chief problems was keeping Mr. Kennedy out of the Canadian election, because he just wanted to get in there and campaign for Pearson. Can you imagine where Lester Pearson would be when somebody said, "Look, while you're making a speech, the President of the United States is on the phone." We said to the White House, "We think the liberals are going to win, and we're going to do a detailed analysis." We were right within two seats in our analysis of how it came out.

Q: You probably felt that any influence of the President would be counterproductive to the extreme.

ARMSTRONG: Sure. Just as if Reagan had intervened just now. But the White House was very impatient, very impatient indeed. Incidentally, on that press release, which led to the fall of the Diefenbaker government, I had been urged to put out the release by the National Security Council staff and the White House, as well as by our ambassador in Canada, and it had been approved by George Ball, who was Under Secretary of State. The President was out of town, but I had a clearance from Rostow. When the President came back to town, some Canadian reporter who was a friend of his got hold of him, and he distanced himself from the release; he didn't know anything about it. Dean Rusk was called before a Senate committee, and they said, "Who wrote this?"

He said, "I'm responsible."

They said, "You weren't in town."

He said, "I'm responsible."

They said, "We want to know who wrote it."

He said, "I'm responsible." Never told them. There were people on the Senate committee who somehow felt we had mistreated Canada, we'd been too rough. Every time the U.S. Executive Branch gets rough with Canada and it becomes public, the public reaction in this country is always against the Executive Branch for having been too rough with a nice little country like that.

Q: Again, this is sort of a condescending attitude, in a way, that we're bigger and we should be nicer, no matter what.

ARMSTRONG: It's such a good place to go fishing or shoot goose or whatever. They don't realize you're talking hard business, the national defense, SAC, you know, real business. Territory, air space, and all that. You're dealing with a country that is totally underarmed at all times and you have to make up for it. Their NATO contribution is only a shade better than Luxembourg's in being insufficiently armed.

Dean Rusk stood firm and never said who wrote the memorandum. I liked Dean Rusk before, I liked him a lot better after that. We struggled through this period.

Later, President Kennedy told Walt Butterworth, "Those fellows in the State Department who wrote that press release, they were right, and they kept their nerve."

Q: Butterworth was our ambassador at the time to Canada.

ARMSTRONG: Not the best choice because he was so overbearing in style. The Canadians didn't like him. They got on well socially.

Q: When you had the desk, did you also have the British desk?

ARMSTRONG: Yes, I had the British desk. I wasn't very familiar with British relations, but I learned fast because that was the point at which there was a discussion about Skybolt.

Q: Skybolt seems to dominate that period. Could you explain for the record what Skybolt was?

ARMSTRONG: Skybolt was, in concept, not unlike what we now call an air-launched cruise missile. The concept was an extension of a bomber or of an airplane which would be remote-controlled and which would fly on its own over enemy territory and, on instruction, dive downwards as a missile and hit a target. The RAF in Britain had staked a great deal of its cash and future on the use of Skybolt, which was being developed by the USAF, as an extension of the RAF bomber force and thereby as a process for keeping Britain's nuclear deterrent still in being. Psychologically an independent nuclear deterrent is extremely important to the British and has been for a long time.

In the autumn of 1962, there was some talk about the idea of the U.S. Air Force dropping any further work on Skybolt. It was in the developmental stage. I think they probably had a perfectly good point, that the engineering was not up to the concept then, though obviously it is up to the concept now because we and the Russians both have air-launched cruise missiles. Essentially it's that sort of thing.

Our British desk was very concerned about the fate of Skybolt. What we were particularly afraid of was that this would be treated by the U.S. as a simple choice of weapon on practical and financial grounds, and it would not be recognized that the matter was of major political and psychological importance to the British government. We wrote a memorandum to that effect, saying, "Please pay attention. This is a major psychological political issue for the British government."

Q: To get a little idea of the working, this was coming to you from our embassy?

ARMSTRONG: It came to the State Department from the Air Force here, as well as from the embassy in London.

Q: Our embassy in London was saying, "Look, this is a big issue," and telling you, and then you were telling the White House?

ARMSTRONG: The embassy in London knew about it, but we acted on information from the Pentagon. After all, the State Department has a Bureau of Political and Military Affairs. We kept track of what went on with Britain and Canada. My Pentagon contacts included being the American member of the Joint Board on Defense, which is a Canadian-U.S. institution. But in general, it was the State Department's Pentagon contacts that brought us the intelligence that this was liable to be scrubbed.

Q: The idea that, "Look, we better take care because it's such an important political issue," was coming from our embassy?

ARMSTRONG: They didn't need to tell us that. We knew that. They said the right thing. They said the same things we did, but we didn't need them to tell us that. We knew it. So we banged off a memorandum which had my name on it to Secretary Rusk. But nobody paid any attention, and the decision was made on the usual basis of money and practicality. Then the British blew up privately.

Q: Looking at the State Department in the 1960s, I've talked to a number of people who dealt with it during that period, and while they have very nice things to say about Dean Rusk, they often said that Europe was not high on Dean Rusk's agenda. It was delegated to George Ball or somebody else, whereas the Far East absorbed his attention. Did you have this feeling that the Secretary of State wasn't the person who was going to take a commanding position on something such as this?

ARMSTRONG: I think that was a factor, but he was also a Rhodes scholar and quite pro-British. His regional interests was primarily Asia, yes, because he had been assistant secretary for that. But he was perfectly responsive on Canadian matters, and I backstopped a trip for him to Ottawa just after I came back. He was just going up to play golf in Montebello, was going to stop in Ottawa and see the embassy and go see Lester Pearson, his old friend. I said, "You can't do that. You've got to go call on Mr. Green. He's the foreign minister."

He said, "Why do I have to do that?"

I said, "Because he's the foreign minister."

I said, "If you call on any of the opposition after you've seen the minister, that's all right. Then get off to the golf course." I liked Dean Rusk very much. But in the Skybolt case, he was not a man to argue with the military. As I saw it in retrospect, he would see this as a case of, "The military makes its own decision on hardware. There's no reason for us to interfere with that." And he was not an Anglophile in that sense. We've had people like Lovett and a lot of other major diplomats who are Anglophiles, so they spent a lot of time there. Dean Rusk wasn't that kind of man. He didn't go with the British aristocracy in style. He's a plain man.

McNamara was a very strong Secretary of Defense and he made the decision. Kennedy supported McNamara. There you were. The British, of course, reacted, and there was enormous consternation in the British government over this decision. It put in question the whole U.S.-U.K. relationship. This is why you had to go to Rambouillet and then to Nassau. The British went to Rambouillet and talked to De Gaulle, and there was a lot of talk. We fetched up with the Nassau agreement.

Q: This is where Kennedy and Macmillan met.

ARMSTRONG: Kennedy gave Macmillan the guidance system for Trident missile submarines.

Q: Or Poseidon in those days.

ARMSTRONG: I guess they called it Poseidon. They had a nuclear submarine. Their guidance

system was not as good as ours. Giving them the guidance system, as I understand it, made all the difference in the world between a good functioning weapon system and one that was only middling. To get the U.S. Navy to go along with this was very hard work. The U.S. Navy does not believe in giving any other navy anything except the back of its hand. They had to be dragged, kicking and screaming, into this.

Q: Were you involved in this?

ARMSTRONG: I was involved in a political sense in the Department, because before Nassau, we had to do the buildup: "This is what the British are going to ask for." We'd write briefing memoranda. Then afterwards, how do you implement the agreement? How do you keep the Navy from sabotaging the whole thing, which a lot of people suspected they would try to do? So we were involved as briefers and not as negotiators. We had to run against an undercurrent in the State Department and other places in the government which saw this as an absolutely beautiful opportunity to eliminate the British independent nuclear deterrent. A lot of people thought the British shouldn't be allowed to have one any more than the French should be allowed to have one; only we should have one.

Q: Since we couldn't do much about the French, at least we could get to the British.

ARMSTRONG: Yes, that's right.

Q: Where did this come from within the military and State Department?

ARMSTRONG: Some of it came from the Europeanists in the State Department.

Q: The George Ball group?

ARMSTRONG: George Ball, Bob Schaezel, Henry Owen. But some of it was more Henry Owen, who was in Policy Planning. It was more that than George Ball, because George Ball, in the end, would be an Anglophile. when you got down to cases. And Schaezel wouldn't block a British independent deterrent, although he didn't like it. I may be misquoting him; that's my impression. But we had a very rough time. I wasn't involved, except in making sure that the flow of paper from the European bureau said the right thing. By and large, it did.

There was a funny Canadian connection with Nassau, because Diefenbaker thought he'd come down to see Macmillan, since he was nearby. We heard the President talk about this later in a briefing session. The President said, "Well, Macmillan and I hadn't quite finished our business, and Diefenbaker's plane landed, and there was nothing for it except for the three of us to have lunch." Macmillan didn't like Diefenbaker very much either, you know. Kennedy said, "We sat there much like three whores at a christening." A wonderful Boston Irish remark, you know.

That takes me back to one other point about the Canadian election, because this was before the Canadian election. In the election, Diefenbaker kept saying that he had a piece of paper that showed how the United States had tried to dominate Canada. He used the "push" word. This is the piece of paper that he told Livy about. And he implied that it had written on it, in Kennedy's

handwriting, "What do we do with this S.O.B.?"

We asked the President, "Did you write anything on that piece of paper?"

"Oh, no, I didn't. I couldn't have written that because I didn't think that of him at the time." The President was very open about that.

So we get into the Canadian election, which was won by Pearson. Then there was a great business of preparing Kennedy to meet Pearson at Hyannis Port. I was involved in the briefing for that. One thing Kennedy had to learn was that even though Diefenbaker wasn't there anymore, the Canadians were still going to be difficult to deal with on a lot of subjects, because they're Canadians. Pearson, of course, was all over the countryside in terms of most issues. A nice guy, but kind of a screwball. Kennedy and he got on reasonably well. Of course, Pearson and Johnson -- this was after I was off the Canadian scene -- had kind of a hard time getting along.

I'd say the Skybolt was the major British event, Skybolt and Polaris, during the time I was in that job. The other concern was Britain and the Common Market, because the first turn-down of the British by De Gaulle came during that particular period. He vetoed the British application. Our Atlanticists in the group, Schaetzel and company, could not believe that this had happened or was real. I'd been in London and Paris just before that, and I'd talked to the embassies in both places. Neither of our embassies expected the British to get in. Our economic minister in Paris, Jacques Reinstein, an old friend, said, "Of course they're not going to get in."

I said, "Have you told anybody in Washington?"

He said, "They wouldn't believe me, so I didn't tell them." I had the same experience in Canada when I was trying to explain to Schaetzel that the Canadians didn't like the idea of the British going in, for fear of losing Commonwealth preferences and other special U.S.-Canadian arrangements. He never paid any attention to my view on this, because he said, "Well, the Canadians are just wrong, that's all." Schaetzel always knew what was right and what was wrong. Many times he was right. He was a great public servant, but he didn't like to pay much attention to what the Foreign Service really had to say until he got to be ambassador in Brussels, and then he found out. He was very good, a very competent guy.

I'd say the British effort at joining the EC was a major event then, and then became, the second time around, the major event when I was in the embassy in London, where for a while they weren't doing anything about it, then they shaped up to it. It was a major issue on the front burner when I left.

ALAN HARDY
Rotation Officer
Toronto (1959-1961)

Mr. Hardy served in the Army from 1957-1959. He joined the Foreign Service in 1956 His career included positions in Canada, Madagascar, Italy, Somalia, Hungary, Mexico, and an ambassadorship to Equatorial Guinea. Ambassador Hardy was interviewed by Lewis Hoffacker in 2001.

Q: Will you give us some dates?

HARDY: I joined the Foreign Service in August of '56. Let's see, I was drafted in '57, had two years in the Army, came out in '59. It was peace time but the draft was in effect then. From my point of view, the army was a waste of two years. But I fulfilled what was a legitimate obligation at the time. That's the way it goes.

I don't know how I got into the Foreign Service in some ways. I was a poor writer. Writing wasn't in the Foreign Service exam, although there was a written question-and-answer thing about how to write. But there was no real sample required. I was not a good public speaker. In retrospect, I wasn't very tactful. I didn't have a work ethic. I didn't appreciate the value of networking, either with my college schoolmates or with my first-year Foreign Service Foreign Service colleagues. I lacked polish.

So you may ask, how did I ever get in? Maybe it was because it was a period when the Foreign Service was expanding. In my favor, I was articulate in small groups. I regard myself, rightly or wrongly, fairly intelligent and imaginative. I can be assertive. And I can be very tenacious. As it turned out, in my career I overcame most of those deficiencies that I mentioned - some of them early, some of them late. Never overcame the public speaking deficiency, which may have hurt me. Result a satisfactory, not a brilliant, career. So I hope I don't lose my readers with that, but we'll keep on going.

My first post was Toronto. Now we're in 1959. In those days the idea was that when you started you would do visa work, or consular work, you would do administrative work. Then you would do economics work. Maybe someday if you were lucky, but they didn't put it that way, you would wind up doing political work, the most sought after work of all. Which was different from the cone system, which I think is still in force, isn't it Lou?

Q: As far as I know.

HARDY: So, that's going to be a little bit of a theme in some of the things I have to say. Anyway, I started out in visa work. In terms of my later career and my aspirations, I thought most of the visa work I did in Toronto for a year and a half was wasted. I did some administrative work in Milan as well, including carrying out a local wage survey, that seemed a little bit better. It was helpful as I progressed to some other administrative posts in Milan, Italy and Madagascar. Anyway, I'm not a fan of training in visa mills for anybody.

I had a hard time coming to my own conclusion about whether one should come in to specialize in a cone or whether one should get around to different positions in one's early career. On balance the cone system seems better, where if you come in as political, you come in as economic, you receive assignments in that field. Yet it shouldn't be so rigid that you wouldn't

get some out-of-cone experience. I'll have my comments on my very prolific out-of-cone experience in the rest of my career as I go on.

NICHOLAS PLATT
Consular Officer
Windsor (1959-1962)

Ambassador Nicholas Platt was born in New York, New York in 1936. He attended Harvard University and Johns Hopkins University, and entered the Foreign Service in 1959. His career included positions in Hong Kong, Japan, China, Washington, DC, and ambassadorships to Zambia, the Philippines, and Pakistan. Ambassador Platt was interviewed by Paul McCusker in 1994.

Q: I see you promptly got a consular job in the Windsor consulate in Ontario. How did you like that as an introduction to Foreign Service work?

PLATT: The Windsor consulate was a place where lots of people started and ended their careers. Foy Kohler started his career there. And, lots of people who were not as illustrious ended their careers there. It was a very unprepossessing post. Its main job was visas. I learned a lot about visas. I had taken the consular course when I was at FSI, but I took the correspondence course again because I found myself in effect running a busy visa section. My boss was an alcoholic and a very nice man but his basic concern was that he not sign a sour visa. I could do pretty much what I liked if that was...

Q: Was it a two man post?

PLATT: It was a four man post. My immediate boss was an alcoholic and my overall boss was an incompetent, so I had a lot to do. I learned the visa laws cold because I found myself in the position of being judge and jury to people who could see the promised land over my shoulder out the windows of the consulate and who were accompanied by very smart visa lawyers who came across from the American side, and as a 25-26 year old I had better know what I was talking about. So in the end I did. I learned a lot about how to run an office, how to manage people, and how to say "no." I learned a great deal about my own country because I found myself really in the middle of the middle west and as a Yankee easterner from New York, this was a foreign country to me.

Q: I grew up in Niagara Falls, New York, which, of course, had an American consulate on the Canadian side. The consul there, who my mother knew, lived on the American side. Did you live on the American side?

PLATT: I lived on the Canadian side because I thought that was very important. One of our people did live on the American side. But the Canadians really felt strongly about it and being so close to us and so close to such a huge city and economic zone, they were enormously sensitive about their sovereignty. You had to convince them that you thought they were sovereign, and the

first way to do that was to live in Windsor, itself.

JOHN A. BUCHE
Rotation Officer
Toronto (1959-1962)

Born and raised in Indiana, Mr. Burch studied at St. Meinrad Seminary, Purdue University and the University of Tübingen, Germany. After service in the US Army, he joined the Foreign Service, where he served primarily in African countries, including Ethiopia, Malawi, Niger and Zambia. Other assignments took Mr. Buche to Canada, Germany, Austria and Switzerland as well as to the State Department in Washington. He was an Amharic language specialist.

Q: I'll go get my calendar, and we'll pick it up later. I like to quit at a post, so we are going to Toronto in December of 1959. I can't think of any great political crises at that time in Toronto, but maybe we'll find out what happens.

BUCHE: Canada was not only completely devoid of political crises at the time, but the Consulate General was about to close for the holidays. I called Consul General Robert Memminger from the Department, but did not get through to him. His secretary said it was really not necessary to speak to the Consul General to say I was coming, since they had been informed of that. She would tell him of my call. The most-recent arrival at the post, Jim Marshall, would meet me at the train station. He was there to greet me. He took me to the hotel. He said "I suppose you are going to go home now. I understand you are from Indiana." I replied I planned to stay in Toronto since I had been told by the Personnel Officer in the Department that I was urgently needed. Jim seemed puzzled and replied that the Consulate was closing for the Christmas holidays. "We can not take leave during the summer because of the rush of visas, so we close the Consulate from the 20th of December to about the 10th of January, so everyone can take leave. There will be only a few of us in town, but you are welcome to stay in your hotel and get to know the city." Jim urged me to go home to spend Christmas with my family in Indiana. I decided that was a good suggestion.

Q: So we'll pick it up at that point.

BUCHE: Since this was my first assignment as a Foreign Service officer, I was on a rotational basis. I started in the Visa Correspondence Section working for a Canadian national employee who taught me what I needed to know. I just kept thinking if I had just had *her* in the visa course at the FSI, I would have learned a lot more. For about a year, I answered correspondence from people wanting to know about the status of their case, whether they were eligible, what to do about the various types of INS petitions, checking employment certifications, etc.

Q: These weren't Canadians, were they, for the most part?

BUCHE: A good part were Canadians, since most of our correspondence concerned immigrant

visas. About half of our cases were Europeans who had come to Canada, and had decided they would like to move to the United States. We had some correspondence involving non-immigrant visas, but that was perfunctory. Canadians did not need a visa just to visit the U.S., but if they wanted to work, they needed an immigrant visa. I spent a year doing that. Since I was interested in political and economic reporting, and there was no political officer, I was able on the side to cover the developments in local politics. Canada was going through a nationalistic phase at the time.

Q: This was when to when?

BUCHÉ: I was at the Consulate General from December of 1959 until January of 1962. Canada was going through a phase of trying to distance itself politically, to some extent, from the United States. They were tired of being taken for granted. When I arrived, there were several issues in the air. One was a sudden cancellation by the U.S. of a large defense contract. One of the Canadian companies was to be a subcontractor to a US manufacturer for bomber parts or sections. For some reason or other, the Pentagon decided to cancel the contract. I am not sure which U.S. company was the prime contractor, but for them it was only a minor problem. They would just put more resources into another plane or weapons system, but for the Canadian company, it meant bankruptcy. The company had staked everything on being an important subcontractor to an American weapons system. That was just one event, but there were a lot of others. There were disputes about television advertising of American products, the flooding of Canada with American publications, American content on Canadian television, and the reception of American TV in Canada. It was an interesting time, and I did some reporting on the latent anti-Americanism. One of the constant messages from the Canadian business world was: we love the United States; we spend winter vacations down there, but you really cause us problems with your policies and laws. Also there were numerous auto manufacturing facilities in Canada, subsidiaries of Ford, GM, and Chrysler. We were in the midst of an economic downturn, and the cliché “the United States catches a cold, but Canada gets pneumonia” was once again evident. There were layoffs in the U.S., but the headquarters of the American car manufacturers would shut down entire plants in Canada. The feeling in Canada was that American management felt no loyalty to Canadian workers, regardless of the economics involved. This was not only in the auto industry, but in most of the Canadian subsidiaries of American corporations. It was nearly impossible to prove such a case, but the Canadians believed they unfairly were the victims of economic imperialism and bullying by the U.S.

Q: John Diefenbaker was the prime minister?

BUCHÉ: Yes, he was the big winner in the election. He and his Progressive Conservative Party came into power after many years of Liberal control because the Canadian voters saw Lester Pearson, the incumbent Liberal Prime Minister as just too internationalist, too liberal, too much in the pocket of the Americans. Reality may have been otherwise, but that’s basically the way the Canadian voter saw it. Diefenbaker based his campaign on an appeal to Canadian emotions, pride, fear, and nationalism (read veiled anti-Americanism) and won. He was never a beloved figure, but he was a clever politician who knew how to manipulate the issues, especially the appeal to Canadian nationalism. We covered the Ontario by-elections (held when a sitting Member of Parliament died or retired).

Jim Marshall and I reported on the 1960 parliamentary election for the Province of Ontario. This taught me a lesson I remembered for the rest of my Foreign Service career. I spent lots of time trying to figure out which of the five candidates would be successful in winning the Progressive Conservative nomination to run against the Liberal Party's candidate. It was the Canadian equivalent to the American primaries, except the choice was made at a convention rather than by a popular vote. Since Ontario was traditionally Progressive Conservative, the winner of the PC Party nomination usually won the ensuing election. While the outcome of the PC Party convention was of some interest to the Embassy, it was fascinating and important to me. I attended some of the preliminary rallies and met the candidates. I decided who was going to win, who would come in second, third, fourth, and fifth. The actual process involved a series of votes by the convention, with the candidate receiving the least number of votes being eliminated until there was only one candidate remaining. Two days before the actual convention vote, I put my predictions and the reasoning behind my choices in a telegram to the Embassy and to Washington. I followed the proceedings at the convention carefully. When the results came out, they were exactly as I had predicted. I had hit the jackpot; I had correctly picked the double Trifecta. I was elated. The Consul General congratulated me, but I wanted also to get some kudos from the Embassy. A day later, the Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs called me with some questions about the convention. He opened the conversation by saying "We noticed you called the winner." And I replied, "I called not only the winner, but I called the correct sequence of elimination of the other candidates." He replied "You know, John, that's all fluff. You were rather foolhardy to do that, though. We don't care who's going to be the first of five eliminated or the next. We want to know who the winner is likely to be. Very often, if you want to be so clever and try to call them that way and you are wrong, you might be criticized for the secondary miscalls, even if you call the winner correctly. Don't be a show-off. In the future, concentrate your efforts on who is going to win an election and what it means to the United States or what it does not mean to the United States. Pay attention to what is important in political reporting. You are not paid to be a handicapper for a horse race." By this time I was standing at attention holding the phone. I said "Yes, Sir, Yes, Sir." He said, "Well, you're new at the game. You were just damned lucky." I replied, "Well, I guess I was." He closed by thanking me for putting in the effort, but told me to remember his advice.

Q: It was a good lesson.

BUCHE: I agree.

Q: A good lesson to be learned, because I think this is sort of the psychic prizes you get if you can call elections, which sometimes doesn't really make a hell of a lot of difference, but we spend an awful lot of time at it.

BUCHE: I also came to realize it really did not matter that much in the big scheme of things who won the parliamentary nomination of the Conservative Party in Ontario. Well, in any case, I learned a lesson. But I still was pretty proud of what I had done.

Q: Of course you were. One has to set these things up. You had your own little reward system.

BUCHE: Then I went back to visas and passports. I eventually went from the Visa Correspondence Section to issuing passports to the large number of Americans in Ontario. I was not thrilled with consular work, but I knew this was part of my training, something I had to go through, like being a novice in a monastery, or a pledge in a fraternity. What really began to interest me, although I had no interest whatsoever before Toronto, was Africa. Africa was just coming into the headlines – the independence movements and the retreat of colonialism. I got involved in a fund-raiser to set up scholarships for African students to study at Canadian universities.. The project was the idea of a Canadian business man, Jim Grant, and was taken up by a consortium of Toronto churches. One of the fundraisers came to the Consulate and asked whether one of the officers would volunteer to call on American businesses. I asked Consul General Memminger whether I was allowed to do that, and he said, “Why are you asking me?” I replied I did not know whether I was permitted to call on American companies and ask for money for a registered Canadian charity. He said, “ John, you can send a request to the Ethics Office in the Department of State, along with written disclaimers, or you can just go out and do it.” “I’m going to tell you a story, John. There were two monks in a very strict, isolated monastery who had spent their whole adult lives there. On the day they were celebrating their 50th anniversary of entering the monastery, they were invited to the abbot’s quarters. One monk went in, spent some time there, and came out. Then the other went in, sat down, and said to the abbot, “I’ve been a good monk for fifty years and on this special occasion, I want your permission to do three things that are not allowed by the Holy Rule of the Order: smoke a cigarette, drink a Coca-Cola, and read a newspaper.” The abbot replied that such things were not morally bad, but were not allowed by the Holy Rule, so he said, “Permission denied!” The monk was shocked and hurt, and he blurted out, “I know my confrere did it, because I can smell the cigarette – there’s the butt – and there are two empty Coca-Cola bottles over there in the corner, and I see some newspapers around. How come he got to do all those things and I can’t?” The abbot looked him in the eye and said, “He didn’t ask!” So I solicited money from several American corporations.

Q: Did the issue of Quebec come up in Toronto? Were we monitoring that at the time?

BUCHE: The prevalent attitude in Ontario in the early 1960s was “those dumb Frenchmen in Quebec wouldn’t dare to break off from Canada.” The Ontario people did not take the threat of Quebec independence seriously. “It will never happen,” and “They’d be stupid to even consider it.” We reported the prevailing feeling, but were not doing any special monitoring. The Embassy was covering the issue from a national perspective. One issue we did follow was the debate over the sale to the U.S. of oil and gas from the western provinces. The headquarters for many Canadian natural resource companies were in Toronto. They wanted to sell petroleum products to the U.S. on a long-term basis, with dedicated pipelines and refineries and processing plants. Canadian national policy at that time was against long-term arrangements. They could sell certain amounts on a spot or short-term basis, but no north-south pipelines from some of the fields directly down to Kansas, the Dakotas, or Chicago. The U.S. would welcome new supplies of energy for some of our northern states. Most of the American oil companies had Canadian subsidiaries, and were eager to direct production southward. The western provinces of Canada would also have benefited. The national government was mindful of the U.S. auto industry’s damaging practices in Canada and was determined to keep the energy sector from falling into American hands. Ottawa also wanted an abundant, secure, Canadian source of energy for the

eastern provinces, where the bulk of the population lived. While the prairie provinces were not talking secession, they were upset at Ottawa's policies. I think this showed up in the election results later on, in the mid-'60s and '70s. The western provinces protested the policies of both the Conservatives and Liberals by voting for what had been previously splinter or protest parties, the New Democratic Party and the Socialist Party. That was something normally not associated with farmers and businessmen out in the west, but they were really upset with the policies of the eastern-oriented government.

Q: Also regarding anti-Americanism, the Canadian version thereof, I understand that Ontario was the hotbed and it was a residue left over from the loyalists who left the United States. The people in other parts came to Canada with well-developed ties backwards and forwards and did not get as upset over America as they did in Ontario.

BUCHE: Well, I think there are other reasons, too. One of the economic reasons is that manufacturing was centered in Ontario, and it was also where the financial interests were. The banks and insurance companies were headquartered in Ontario. This was the heart of British Canada, and the big money was in Ontario, at least the headquarters. The headquarters of Bell Canada was across the street from the Consulate General. The Canadian companies welcomed capital from the U.S., but they preferred loans rather than equity investments. American companies were so much larger and better capitalized, and often took over Canadian companies and made them American subsidiaries. They had previously been independent, but ended up as a medium-sized subsidiary of an American corporation. I think there were other reasons for the recrudescence of nationalistic emotions. The fact that Ontario was such a predominantly English-speaking province meant they could understand the nuances of what the Americans were saying or not saying. Sometimes the fact that the Americans across the border did not say anything about Canada and simply ignored its presence may have hurt as much as actual criticism. Ontario, and particularly Toronto, was the center of the anti-American sentiments.

There was a differentiation, however, regarding the feelings toward the U.S. between the "old Canadians" and the "new Canadians (those who immigrated after WW II). The new Canadians had come from Eastern and Southern Europe and were very active in their ethnic associations, strongly anti-Communist, and favorably disposed toward the United States. We were seen as the liberator of Europe, the bulwark against Communism, the great leader of the Western world. The Consul General often would receive invitations to participate in the Latvian, Estonian, Lithuanian independence day celebrations, or the 200th anniversary of such-and-such a battle in Poland, Hungary, or Yugoslavia. Memminger had a standing order for his secretary to regret for him, but to pass the invitation to Jim Marshall or me. He joked that we were both bachelors and might meet a nice, attractive Croatian, Latvian, Polish or Macedonian at one of the celebrations. Whoever went in the place of the CG would always be called upon to speak a few words. We were often the fourth or fifth on the roster of speakers and well-wishers. We had a set speech. It was along the lines that the United States has long been a strong supporter of name the country. Our Congress has recently passed a resolution in behalf of name the country. Read the resolution. Offer congratulations for whatever the occasion was and end with a rousing, "Long live Latvia (or whatever)!" My horror was that I would at some time say the wrong country, so I carried a three-by-five card with "This is your host", "This is the occasion", and "This is the country." Fortunately, I did not make that error.

Q: Did you meet that young Latvian girl?

BUCHÉ: I met young women from Latvia, Estonia, Poland, and from all over Eastern Europe. I mentioned in passing one day to Bob Memminger that I had just met a young woman from Estonia at one of the celebrations and was somewhat interested in her. Bob looked at me and said, "You know, of course, you will have to resign from the Foreign Service if you marry her." I looked at him incredulously. He said, "Didn't they tell you in the A-100 course that if you married a foreign national you had to resign. The Department could either accept your resignation or not depending on how the security clearance came out? As far as I know, John, the Department is not going to allow you to marry anyone from the Soviet Union and probably not anyone from Eastern Europe, either. Can't you see the blackmail possibilities?" I said, "Oh, my God!" He said, "Well, I just wanted to let you know before you get too serious with her or any other foreign woman. Fortunately, we had just recently met, so we remained just good friends.

Q: You were there 1960-62. Was there a comparable interest in Canada as in the United States to the election of Kennedy and the young couple taking over?

BUCHÉ: He probably would have gotten a majority in Canada, too, at least in Ontario, where polls showed that he was quite popular. Despite Kennedy's popularity, there was heavy criticism of our policy toward Castro and a lot of gloating on the part of the Canadians regarding the differences in our two approaches to the Castro regime.

Q: The Bay of Pigs.

BUCHÉ: That, yes, but even before the Bay of Pigs, there was delight on the part of the Canadians on how Castro was tweaking the nose of the United States. The Canadians took delight in describing the terrible conditions of Cuba in the 1940s and 1950s, the gambling, the prostitution, the corruption, the terrible health conditions, and the huge gap between the elite and the peasants. They were cheering Castro because he was targeting American investments and was careful not to do very much against Canadian interests. Then came the Bay of Pigs, and the Canadians could really gloat over an American humiliation.

There was also a cultural issue involving our China policy that caused the Canadians to ridicule the U.S. When the Beijing Opera Company came to Ontario, we were ordered by the Department to publicize the fact that it was breaking American law if an American purchased a ticket to the Beijing Opera, because we had the boycott against China. Some Americans who were interested in the Beijing Opera ignored the notice, and some attended just to show their opposition to the boycott. Of course, the Canadians made a big thing about the Opera and packed the halls. They thought our China boycott was short-sighted and stupid, but what angered them was the U.S. Government's attempts to enforce our laws extraterritorially by preventing Americans in Canada from going to a cultural performance there. These were really irritants in American-Canadian relations, and almost daily something new would come up.

Q: You were in a place, where at one level, things were going well, but at another level, at whatever would pass for the intelligentsia, I would assume that they were definitely not pro-

American.

BUCHE: No, they definitely were not. They recognized some great accomplishments that had been done. The intelligentsia recognized and admired much of our literature and music, our inventions and scientific discoveries, our efforts in the two World Wars, Presidents Lincoln and FDR, but there were so many aspects of the United States they just could not stand. I do not know whether they spent much effort in analyzing exactly what they disliked about us and the reasons why. I suppose many accepted it as a given. If you were a native-born Canadian and considered yourself an intellectual, it was *de rigueur* to be critical of the U.S. The Canadian intellectuals whom I met were apparently able to compartmentalize their feelings against the United States without antagonism against individual Americans. I detected no personal enmity toward me, but rather an open and welcoming attitude. They were able to distinguish between the person and the Government I represented. My posting to Toronto was interesting more for the political and economic work I did outside the office than the visa and passport tasks performed within.

In my second year of Toronto, I began to think about my next assignment. I was influenced by the frequent messages from the Department pleading that if an officer volunteers for Africa or for African-language training, he or she will be given priority consideration. I told Bob Memminger about my interest in learning an African language and a posting in Africa. He advised me to learn French and to think long and hard about requesting hard language training for Africa. "Don't waste your time on one of those languages you can't use anywhere else in the world."

Q: Like Twi or Fang.

BUCHE: He insisted that I request training in a language that would serve me well. I agreed and said I would probably ask for French training. I had already started studying French on my own. Not only was I interested in Africa, but also in the Middle East, Turkey, and Iran. I went back and forth in my number one preference. I was attracted to the idea of learning a hard language, but did not want a language with limited use, unless that country was of strategic importance to the U.S. Arabic, Turkish, Greek, and Persian met my criteria. Of the African languages, Swahili seemed the only one to fit my set of conditions. I asked Bill Eilers, the Commercial Officer at the Consulate, for his advice. Bill told me there were plenty of Mideast specialists in the Department who studied Arabic. He also said the Middle East was a tough area to serve in. He suggested I focus on Iran and learn Persian, since there were not many officers who knew the language or the area. I knew it was a key country in a strategic region. I sent in my request for hard-language training with Persian at the top of the list. Since I had to submit several alternates, I added Greek, Turkish, and Swahili. Within a few weeks, I was told I had been selected to study Persian beginning in January of 1962. I was just delighted. I drove down to Washington to check out apartments. I decided I would live in the same building where the FSI language classes were held, Arlington Towers. I would be in Washington one year before going to Iran. I bought a dozen books about Iran. Psychologically, I was beginning to phase out of Toronto and Ontario and concentrating on my next post. I learned this is a tendency in the Foreign Service

Since the consulate closed at Christmas, I went back home to West Lafayette, Indiana. My

family was supportive, as always, of my decision to study Persian and spend the next three years in Iran. The prospects were very exciting for me, so I did not pick up the nuanced reaction of my parents who were hoping I might be posted somewhere closer and safer. I returned to Toronto to pack up and depart post for Washington. There was a message waiting for me at the Consulate saying that I was to study Amharic instead of Persian. My first reaction was, "My God, Personnel strikes again"! I called PER/Training and asked what was going on. The reply was circuitous and involved transfers, an illness, a shift of priorities, and other factors. The net result was that I was to study Amharic. The training officer assured me it would be an excellent boost to my career.

LOUISE S. ARMSTRONG
Spouse of Deputy Chief of Mission
Ottawa (1959-1962)

Mrs. Armstrong was born in 1917 in Tokyo, Japan of American missionary parents. After moving to the United States she attended Wellesley College. After graduation, Mrs. Armstrong was a researcher for Time and Life magazine before joining the Foreign Service in 1947. As a Consular and Political Officer, she served in Madras, Prague, Palermo and Montreal. Following her marriage to FSO Willis Armstrong in 1959, she resigned her commission and accompanied her husband to Ottawa, where he was assigned as Deputy Chief of Mission. Mrs. Armstrong was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: Let's cover the period after, while you were a foreign service wife. Did, you go up to Canada?

ARMSTRONG: I had already served there of course. So I went back as married to Willis Armstrong, I had a lot of friends. And many of them he already knew because I had given him their names. And they all seemed to be not only very surprised, but very pleased and very welcoming. So it was, in that sense, a very happy way to start one's married life. Fortunately for me, my husband was the kind of person who liked to talk shop. He didn't reveal any secrets, but he enjoyed talking shop. Some men want to get rid of it as soon as they leave the office. And in that sense I felt I was still part of the game, so to speak.

Q: So who was your ambassador?

ARMSTRONG: It was Livvie Merchant and then Richard Wigglesworth. I'd briefed him for the post when he was being groomed. I briefed him in the sense of taking him around to see the contacts he needed to make before he went to Ottawa. He was a 30-year congressman from Boston, Massachusetts. Wigglesworth had his, he was a New Englander and his wife Florence was from Kentucky. She was a spirited, outgoing person whereas Richard, or Dick as he was known, was somewhat silent and seemingly retiring. But he didn't miss anything obviously. At any rate, what ticked me was as I took him around to meet the people he was supposed to meet, he was writing everything on the back of an envelope, literally. But a very nice likeable man.

And she lent a great deal of sparkle to the situation. We all enjoyed her.

It so happened though that he thought he was indestructible. He came from Massachusetts, and when the cold weather set in, he went around – he was lucky if he wore galoshes, he rarely wore a topcoat. He used to worry us all. But in the end what did him in, and he died in office, was a blood clot, which seized him when he was on a trip I think, somewhere in French Canada or Montreal. It may have been Montreal. And of course [he] was hospitalized there. But he didn't survive. I guess he had a stroke. It was pretty much immediate and very shocking. So he was to be replaced by Livingston Merchant who was going to serve a second tour there. But in the meantime, Livvie Merchant was designated to be on the team that was to negotiate with the Indians and the Pakistanis on Kashmir, the eternal Kashmir dispute. So he was gone for some time on that project. In the meantime my husband had moved from, he succeeded Tyler Thompson as DCM, when Tyler was transferred to Finland. And therefore as DCM, he was chargé. And he was chargé for a very long time. So that was a very nice experience for him; he enjoyed every bit of it. He was hobnobbing with ambassadors who were treating him as an equal because after all the United States is important enough that even a charge is important.

Q: What was your impression of the ruling political and economic elite of Canada at this time? Because I'm sure you were meeting them at this time.

ARMSTRONG: Well the thing that struck me was that there was a very small group of elite, intellectually and commercially and socially, but they all knew each other even though they spanned the whole horizontal side of Canada. That is, the people who were upper class in Vancouver and Victoria knew the people who were upper class in Montreal. They had grown up together, gone to the same schools together, gone to the same summer places. It was very unique I think in that sense. But everybody that one met in that group was really very approachable, easy, friendly. For example, if we would go on an official visit to St. John's, Newfoundland, the local governor I guess he was, living in Government House, was an elite member of that community. They would spend their winters in Bermuda or on the Mediterranean. Perfectly charming man. I met the woman who was the wife of the Governor of British Columbia; she was a Montreal woman. Her son, whose name was Turner, later became a political aspirant, never made it to be prime minister. He was Finance Minister. But this is just talking in a sense about the social elite.

The intellectual elite, they also rubbed elbows constantly. As for the senior bureaucrats, our dealings would be only with those in Ottawa. It would be the Consul General in Toronto, the Ontario bureaucrats and so forth. We couldn't have been luckier with our contacts. There was only one senior bureaucrat, very charming, very affable, who my husband didn't quite trust because of his fundamental anti-Americanism. He made Under-Secretary of External Affairs. But he was succeeded by a French Canadian named Marcel Cadieux who couldn't have been easier, no anti-Americanism whatsoever probably because he was French Canadian. A very able man. But we've just always been in close touch with those people, heads of the department of finance, external affairs and so forth.

Q: Were there any major that you can think of, obviously you'd been on the economics side and all, during this time, but you got married in '59, how long were you there with Willis?

ARMSTRONG: We left '62 I think it was.

Q: Was there any economic problems that you can think of?

ARMSTRONG: Well there's always. Fish is always a big problem, both east and west fisheries. We're always invading each other's waters and being accused of doing that. And lumber was an issue of whether, because they have a different tax system for lumber, exploiting and cutting down timber, that it would be selling in the United States at a disadvantage to our lumber people. Must be a half dozen other things. We have the environmental issues always. Our smokestacks are blowing up to Canada, and the acid rain is polluting Canadian lakes. It goes on like that. If you were to subscribe to a publication which is put out by the embassy here, it's very well worth having, I get it free of charge, two-thirds of this monthly report has to do with commercial, economic disputes. It's just a fact of life. They're handled amicably enough.

Q: You must have been in Canada at the time when President Kennedy came up to visit because it's usually Canada, Mexico are the two places that a new president visits.

ARMSTRONG: Yes, this was his first visit out of Washington.

Q: How did that work?

ARMSTRONG: Well my husband was in charge through the embassy. And it worked handsomely thank goodness. We had a certain amount of advice beforehand as to what the president required. For example, down pillows no, he was allergic to down pillows. And we were on easy terms with Government House and it's controller, so he and my husband would get together whenever necessary to discuss the further problems that might arise with the hospitality being offered by government house. And everything went swimmingly. The only time you have a problem is with the Secret Service colliding with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and that's a universal problem.

Q: Yes, [the Secret Service] are an immovable force.

ARMSTRONG: It went very happily. The only trouble is that Government House was always inviting guests of his stature to plant a tree. And he did that and he hurt his back again.

Q: It put him on crutches when he went to Vienna to meet Khrushchev.

ARMSTRONG: It was a great colossal mistake, and nobody anticipated that. They should have. And Kennedy I guess was too proud to admit that this was something he shouldn't do. What they should have done was have him throw a few pieces of dirt on the tree and not let him dig anything. But everything went swimmingly and here's an amusing note. After Jackie, who of course knocked them all dead – she had the most gorgeous gowns and she looked so positively entrancing, and she had this demure manner of seeming to hold back and be shy, which she may well have been – after she'd gone, the Russian ambassador's wife commented that it was as if she herself, she felt like the grandmother and Mrs. Diefenbaker like the mother. You see

Jacqueline brought out maternal instincts in all the right places.

Now we were having problems with John Diefenbaker and of course that consumed the embassy and the office back here. Books have been written about it. First of all we had the advance visit of the president's own mafia. These were all guys who'd been working for him from the time he'd been running for office as senator. And they all seemed to come from Revere Beach and were about that caliber of social attractiveness. But they were his boys and they did some stupid and embarrassing things. But the Kennedys themselves won everybody. One of the stupid things was they had to rent tuxedos, these fellows, they hadn't brought any of their own. And there was a place called Classy Clothes from which they rented their tuxedos. And after this preliminary visit, the proprietary visit was over and the real visit was all but taken place, my husband got a call from Classy Clothes which said, "I found a piece of paper in a pocket and somehow I don't think it's something I should be reading." He was a nice guy.

Q: Well there was that piece of paper that Kennedy had left –

ARMSTRONG: "–that SOB..."

Q: "– that SOB", about Diefenbaker, and Kennedy said "I didn't know he was an SOB at the time."

ARMSTRONG: "I didn't think that at the time." Direct quote. He seemed surprised, quite taken aback. "I didn't think that at the time." That's been in history books, and I couldn't begin to do justice to it all.

Q: How was Mrs. Diefenbaker?

ARMSTRONG: A lovely woman, I liked Olive very much. I didn't dare call her Olive to her face, but I thought she was a splendid woman.

Q: Did you sense, you'd obviously been dealing with the Canadian scene for some time then in one form or the other, where do you think he was coming from in your estimation. John Diefenbaker?

ARMSTRONG: Well I should know this but it was one of the western provinces and of course he was in a sense, provincial, in that respect. And his appointments were of people to the cabinet who had limited foreign experience. And one I particular was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, whose name was Green. And he just needed to be tutored on the job all the time, not only by his own people, but by us. He was always very prickly about what the Americans were up to; he was darkly suspicious. On one occasion, at an Iranian reception, he came up to my husband and he pointed his long bony finger and said, "We must have a talk." Well the entire diplomatic community was all ears. And eventually it developed that what he wanted to talk about was the fact that some Canadian Indians who were sneaking across the border and stealing things, especially from summer camps and stuff, had done this and had been caught in the act by the Americans. And now we held these Indians in our jug, and Green didn't like that. I suppose he would have had to answer to his own constituents; he hadn't been up in arms about it. But this

gave him an excuse to be up in arms. And my husband did his best to calm him down. But the next thing that happened came a call from Montreal, from our consulate there and said, "I'm in deep trouble." A group of American businessmen were up here, no, it was a Greek order, of Greek businessmen or whatever their professions were, a Greek social order. They'd gone up to Montreal for a celebration. They'd gone into a local tavern and partied after hours. The hours for closing and serving drinks were very strict. The police raided the place and clapped them all in jail. So when the Consul General from Montreal called up Bill and said, "I'm in a terrible jam," and Bill said, "That's the best news I've heard in a long time." Then he could turn to Green, Howard Green his name was, "What are you doing with my American citizens in jail?"

Q: You're pointing your finger at me, yes.

ARMSTRONG: You're pointing your finger at me about some Indians. What about the Americans who're clapped in jail. So things shook up.

Q: Well did you sense, I talked to people who served in Mexico and they were saying, our ties with Mexico of course are very close too, that the foreign ministry is sort of where a lot of the, particularly at the top, where a lot of the left-wing, sort of anti-Americans end up. Did you have any sense –

ARMSTRONG: It was true in the sense that initially a very distinguished Oxford scholar, Rhodes scholar, was head of the foreign office. The civil servant is the under-secretary. So he had the under-secretary's job for years and years.

Q: Top sort of professional job.

ARMSTRONG: He was venerated in external affairs. He was brilliant and cultivated and so forth. But he was essentially very suspicious of Americans and didn't have sufficient suspicion with respect to the Soviet threat. Livvie Merchant once said about him, "He was a fine man but his instincts were all wrong. So Norman Robertson was his name. He's a Canadian icon, but from the United States standpoint, he was always a problem. Though you'd have this cultural dichotomy frequently of being outstanding Canadians, who were usually distinguished Rhodes Scholars, but they would have a different point of view. I don't think that's true so much any more, but it was then.

Q: One does get the feeling that foreign policy is the one place today where the Canadians sort of like to stick it to the United States in a way. I mean, particularly on Cuba and all.

ARMSTRONG: Cuba is a problem in that sense, but I don't think it worries us. For the most part, we have to give the Canadians credit for standing up to us under a lot of circumstances.

Q: I don't know.

ARMSTRONG: I think by and large we can count on the Canadians. It's just these occasional poobahs that give us a problem. And he was a poobah.

Q: When did you leave Ottawa?

ARMSTRONG: We left in '62. We were also having the problem, and I'm not as well-versed in this, over the extent to which the Canadian military was going to be allowed to develop. Within the military there was a lot of enthusiasm for strengthening their defenses. But we had to share the aerial defense.

Q: Blue Streak, wasn't it?

ARMSTRONG: We had a number of problems because we were their protective shield when it came to flying defenses. And we had radar defenses strung across Canada, and we put them up at our expense too. And the Canadian military were eager to expand but the politicians were eager to cut back the funds. Diefenbaker was one of those that maintained that Canada was being taken advantage of unfairly. I should read up on the history issues there because I really didn't expect to be talking about this. I thought I'd be talking about my own immediate opportunities.

Q: I'm really talking about what you were picking up as essentially a professional in a non-professional job.

ARMSTRONG: I would be more conversant if I had read up on it. It's just a little too long ago. 1960 is, what is it, almost 40 years ago. I can quickly refresh my memory, but I can tell you there were points of exasperation on military issues, largely led by Diefenbaker.

Q: In fact if I recall, he was essentially brought down on –

ARMSTRONG: Yes, he was. On having made a promise, which he denied having made or something like that. And that's very significant. And if you ask a Canadian historian, he'll know in an instant what you're talking about.

STEPHEN J. LEDOGAR
Economic Officer
Montreal (1960-1962)

Ambassador Stephen Ledogar was born in New York in 1929, and received his BA from Fordham University. He served overseas in the US Navy from 1949-1952. Ledogar entered the Foreign Service in 1959 and was posted in Montreal, Milan, Quang Tri Province, Saigon, Paris, Brussels and Geneva. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 1, 2000.

Q: You were in Canada from '59 to when?

LEDOGAR: '59 is when I started in the Foreign Service. By the time I finished training, A-100, the consular course, etc., it was early spring of '60. I was in Montreal from 60-'62.

Q: Were there any Canadian-American issues? You were pretty low in the totem pole, but you were an observer.

LEDOGAR: Within the context overall, the U.S.-Canadian relationship was very close and very intimate. We are each other's biggest trading partners. There were, however, some abrasive issues. One set that sticks in my mind was the so-called "split run" questions with regard to publications and broadcasting. Essentially, this was Canadian irritation at U.S. laissez-faire attitudes which allowed U.S. magazines like Readers Digest and Time Magazine and others to publish "Canadian" editions if they wanted to. The U.S. didn't care. Publishers would take their basic magazine, take out a couple of articles, replace them with a couple of Canadian-slanted articles, and then go sop up all of the Canadian advertising dollars. Similarly with radio and television broadcasts along the border. Somebody who was broadcasting in northern New York or Vermont would manage to pick up Canadian sponsors. So, the Canadians were trying to correct this and were threatening restrictive legislation. We were working to try to get some of our publishers to be sensitive to the way the Canadians saw this as a threat to their own basic magazines, and also sensitive to how much they would lose if "Canadian" editions of U.S. media were outlawed. Canada's Maclean's magazine, for example, was very prominent in saying that the competition for the Canadian advertising dollar was unfair because these big American publications, for very little additional cost, could produce a "Canadian" edition that was thicker and slicker and had more resources behind the stories, and so forth. So, that was one of the things we worked on.

Another one that I found rather interesting concerned liquor. My arrival at post in Montreal, early '60, coincided with the end of the regime of a rather reactionary Quebec province premier by the name of Maurice Duplessis. He was quite a tyrant and dictatorial, very right-wing, and very corrupt. In Canada, the whole question of alcohol and beverage control was a Provincial prerogative. So, the Province of Quebec set its own rules on foreign imports. The Quebec alcohol and beverage commission did not allow any bourbon whiskey to come into the province. I'm sure there was a little bit of a deal with the Canadian whiskey manufactures. Bourbon and Canadian whiskey are very close. Oddly enough, the U.S. couldn't get any U.S. vodka into Quebec either. That was more Mr. Duplessis' anti-Communist attitudes. He thought all vodka was Soviet and who wanted that?

So, we had the U.S. Bourbon Institute trying to encourage our economic section in Montreal to crack this wall. We did succeed. It was a rather interesting way that we were able to get U.S. bourbon accepted. In 1961, the Canadian hotel industry, especially in Montreal and Quebec City, went on a big push to attract U.S. trade organizations to hold conventions in their facilities. We at the U.S. consulate made the case that "You're not helping to attract big U.S. conventions, especially with certain kinds of associations, where the businessmen at the end of a hard day would normally go down to the bar and order a bourbon and branchwater, only to find out that in Montreal you can't get a glass of bourbon. It's not helping your convention business." This argument was developed. In the process, I learned a little bit about spirits through folks from the U.S. Bourbon Institute coming up to Montreal and talking to me about the differences between Canadian whiskey and bourbon. What broke the ice was when we finally got 12 big convention hotels excepted from the anti-bourbon rule. Then the Quebec Commission quickly found that it was too cumbersome to have to have a separate stock and controls, and they just let as much

bourbon in as could be sold.

Q: Did you come up against the Bronfman Liquor empire?

LEDOGAR: I didn't know what was going on behind the scenes.

Q: Did you get any feel for Diefenbaker, the Canadian prime minister? From the American perspective, he was kind of a loose cannon. Did that reflect itself in Montreal at all?

LEDOGAR: Not too much. We at the U.S. Consulate in Montreal were more engaged in provincial politics. At that time, I think there were 10 or 12 U.S. constituent posts across Canada. Our embassy in Ottawa would just have the Consulates feed out political and economic stuff into them.

Incidentally, I made an early reputation for myself in that I had a friend, a journalist who was American, who had gone to school at the University of Toronto. She was very aggressive. I think they called them "investigative reporters" later on. She really dug for stories. She came to me one time and started inquiring about what kinds of deeds would cause one to lose one's American citizenship. At that time, fairly fresh from the consular course, I could rattle off the answer to that pretty easily. As you may recall, it was at that time fairly easy to lose your American citizenship.

Q: Oh, yes. Taking oath of allegiance to other places, voting... It changed within a couple of years.

LEDOGAR: Exactly. Well, this newswoman had a lot of contacts in the netherworld. She was asked if she would participate in what was known as "telegraphing," which was quite simply election fraud – the nefarious practice of getting your hands on legitimate registration chits that were issued to voters a week or so ahead of time and either stealing them or forging them or duplicating them – all sorts of things. The description of the person was there. Then there would be a pool of street people of all ages, sizes, and shapes. When they had a chit and needed someone to approximate a description, they would look around and cast someone from the pool and send them off to the polls. Her story came out in banner headlines in MaClean's Magazine, under the title "How I Voted 22 Times on the 20th of June." She, an American, voted 22 times in a Canadian election. I told her, "I can guarantee you won't lose your American citizenship if you tell me in detail how it's done." I got the whole story of the way this network of voting fraud was organized and executed-details she could not publish-and I wrote some colorful diplomatic despatches. Fortuitously, the party that she was working for fraudulently was defeated by the good guys. It was Rene Levesque, who was quite famous later on, whom she was working against. When he won anyway, she had a story. If the Union Nationale Party had won, then it was just election fraud. But when the Liberals won, despite all the cheating by the Conservatives, she was able to expose it as she did in this story, which was a real show-stopper... So, for a brand new officer, I got a couple of good political reports at that time.

Q: Who was the consul general?

LEDOGAR: Gerard Gaspard.

Q: Was there any thought or consideration about perhaps Quebec going independent?

LEDOGAR: The separatist movement was at its very beginnings at that time. They had not yet begun terrorism. They did so shortly after I left. There may have been the first of the so-called mailbox bombings toward the end of my tour in '62, but separatism was certainly boiling in the salons and among the French-Canadian young Turks.

Q: As a young officer, did you have much contact with the French speakers?

LEDOGAR: I probably had as much as anyone in the consulate. As a bachelor, I was going around to various social events. The higher your rank, the more you had to deal with the establishment, which in Montreal was mostly Anglo-Canadian. So, the Consul General might have a couple of... For example, of the Consul General's few French Canadian contacts would be future Canadian prime minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, who was then a law professor at the University of Montreal. But the boss would much more likely pay attention to the chairmen of the boards of the Bank of Montreal and the Canadian Pacific Railroad and so forth, all Anglos. But we were very conscious of the differences and the separatist storm was really gathering. I was in Italy on my second tour when things in Quebec started getting ugly and they started hurting people.

Q: You were Catholic. Did you get any feel for the Catholic Church there? Later, the Catholic Church was practically repudiated by the younger Québécois. From your experience in New York, did you find this a different church than you had been exposed to before?

LEDOGAR: Well, there were political overtones. The Catholic Church in Quebec was quite reactionary and had been much too cozy with the former political regime, which was the Conservative Union Nationale. In many ways, the church kind of turned a blind eye to the source of some of the largesse that came its way. But I'll tell you an interesting story. Going back for decades, the French Canadian citizenry felt discriminated against, including in financial institutions-getting mortgage money, and so forth. So, the parishes of the church, in order to try to organize better economic opportunity for their parishioners, started little church banks, known as "Caisse Populaire." These parish banks soon became quite affluent. The French Canadian citizens would deposit their savings there and would borrow mortgage money from there. It was non-profit. People were dealing with these matters in an honest and straightforward fashion. They repaid their loans and the "Caisse Populaire" became very solvent. Just after I arrived at post, Duplessis died. There was a Conservative successor for three or four months. Then they had this election, the one in which my friend voted 22 times. The Liberals came in. It was a landslide.

The Union Nationale had the blue color. The Liberals were red and white. Some parish priests were saying before the election, "Where is Heaven? Heaven is in the sky. What's the color of the sky? Blue. Where is Hell? Down there? What is the color of that? Red." But of course they weren't telling you how to vote or anything like that. But the Liberals came in. They had a strong sense of French-Canadian nationalism. As the saying went, they no longer wanted to be "Hewers

of wood and drawers of water” for the Anglos. Rather, they wanted not just to export raw materials but to process them. They wanted to build steel mills and not just to ship ore. They wanted to add value in the aluminum industry and in the paper industry. So, in order to develop these things, they needed capital. Where was their capital? The “Caisse Populaire” were loaded. The Liberals clumsily started making noises to the effect that they would require these parish churches to produce funds that could be used for the capital development of new secondary industries, and so forth. There was a very sharp negative reaction on the part of the Catholics. “We may be in favor of some of your ideas, but don’t you touch our money.” That was not understood by very many people, but if you understood the banking system, it became quite clear. The Quebec Catholics jealously guarded the parish banks. That was for the mortgages. That was where you could borrow money to start small businesses and to send the kids to college. Not that they were against building steel mills, but not with that money.

Another thing that might be of interest: the visa business. In summer months I did non-immigrant visas and that was the largest part of the Consulate General’s business. Canadians don’t need visas to visit the United States, but so-called “new Canadians” do, those immigrants to Canada who are not yet Canadian citizens, but are awaiting their time. In 1956 Canada was very open, and I think admirably so, in taking in Hungarian refugees after the Hungarian revolution came acropper at that time. There were a lot of new Canadians who had stateless papers but they were of Hungarian origin. There had been a practice in Austrian refugee camps, to which many Hungarians had fled, of moving people through and letting them go off to Canada much more expeditiously if they came across with information about the Communist regime in Hungary – in other words, if they would snitch on somebody. So, there was a lot of finger pointing, which the new Canadians from Hungary thought was rather good-natured. One way to grease the skids to get your exit out of Austria was to point out somebody and say, “He was a Communist.” So, on the Canadian and U.S. records, there were a whole lot of these former Hungarian workers who had been tagged as having been members of a Communist union. The U.S. law said that if you had to belong nominally to an organization in order to have a livelihood, that was excusable. But some of the finger pointing had been a little bit too vigorous. We had a number of problems where the name searches would come up with somebody saying that this guy was a shop steward and a dedicated Communist Party member. It became fairly apparent after a while that there was a pattern to this. You could get, as I did one time, a substantive group of people from the same shop in a helicopter factory outside of Budapest, and I got the whole story as to how they pretty much went en masse across the border, went into camp, and agreed that in round-robin fashion “I’m going to point at him and he’s going to point at him and so forth, and we’ll all get out.” There was a whole lot of testimony in which they revealed this. I think that was of interest and helped ease up some of the blackballing.

Q: Were these non-immigrant Hungarians true visitors or were they going to the United States and staying there?

LEDOGAR: Oh, no, they were true visitors. They wouldn’t even come to the visa officers’ attention before they had been very effectively screened. We had requirements that people had to produce bank books and job letters and mortgages and other things that made it quite clear that they were coming back home to Canada. The visas were mostly for skiing in Vermont or shopping in northern New York. We had no problems with people jumping or overstaying. We

were dealing with people who very clearly were putting in their time to become Canadian citizens and were gainfully employed in Canada, and that's where their families settled and were making their homes.

Q: What was the impression that you were getting from your social contacts about what one might describe as the Kennedy phenomenon? He was elected at the end of 1960. The Canadians pay a lot of attention to American politics. Did he catch on in Quebec, too?

LEDOGAR: Very much so. That was also my experience in Italy, where I spent the period up to and including his death. President Kennedy was much more popular in Canada and in Italy than he was in the U.S. and was regarded with an adulation that I didn't find to be the case in the U.S., where his legislative record was not terribly sterling. He had a number of difficulties in terms of solid accomplishments and was a whole lot less successful at home than he was popular in these foreign countries.

DONALD C. TICE
Administrative Officer
Montreal (1961-1963)

Born in Kansas in 1932, Donald C. Tice received his BS from the University of Kansas and served in the U.S. Air Force from 1954 to 1956 as a second lieutenant. His foreign assignments included Antwerp, Montreal, Sofia and Belgrade. He was interviewed on February 10, 1997 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Let's move on to Montreal. When were you in Montreal?

TICE: About 18 months, from January, 1961, to the summer of 1963.

Q: What were you doing there?

TICE: Again, I started out as Administrative Officer. I couldn't seem to "shake" assignments like that because I knew something about the administration of the Foreign Service. I did that kind of work for about nine months. Then, during the remainder of my stay in Montreal, I again had the citizenship job. However, at that time the Consulate General in Montreal was one of the biggest "visa mills" in the Foreign Service. Everybody assigned there issued visas at one time or another. While I had my own Citizenship Unit and that kind of thing, on rotation I would go over and spend two hours a day working in the "visa mill."

Q: Who was the Consul General in Montreal when you were there?

TICE: It was Jerome T. Gaspard. He had worked in the "Point Four" program in Europe and then came into the regular Foreign Service under the "Wriston Program" [lateral entry of civil servants into the Foreign Service in the mid-1950's]. He was in Montreal as Consul General, I

think, for three or four years. Then he moved up to Quebec as Consul General, which was his “retirement post.” He was Consul General in Quebec for a couple of more years.

Q: During this period, 1961-1963, what was the political situation in Canada?

TICE: That’s where I really got into political work for the first time. While I was assigned as a consular officer, I had the great, good fortune to live in an apartment house which was a short way down the hill from the Consulate General. It was an easy, five-minute walk from my home to the office. It was on the main street which goes over the top of Mount Royal.

One day I was admiring a Ford Thunderbird which was parked next to my car in the parking garage under the apartment building. I struck up a conversation with the man who owned it. It turned out that he was the Member of Parliament for the Mount Royal Riding [electoral district]. His name was Allan McNaughton. We became good friends, although he was quite a lot older than I.. At that time he a key figure in the election campaign of Lester [Jim] Pearson, the leader of the Liberal Party, who was running against incumbent Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker, the leader of the Conservative Party.

I got involved in that campaign because Allan McNaughton started using me as a channel to get information down to Washington. U. S. policy at the time of the election was “neutral,” but fairly clearly the Department wanted Jim Pearson to win. However, the Department kept saying “dumb things” which made it more difficult. McNaughton was using me as a channel to “pass the word” to the Department. When he first asked me if I could serve in that capacity, I went to Consul General Gaspard and asked him what I should do. He said: “Write up what he tells you and send it down to the Department. I’ll try to get somebody down in Washington to pay attention to what you write up.” This process worked.

During the final weeks of the campaign I remember an incident that at that that related to the “DEW Line” [Distant Early Warning Line], a radar defense for the United States, which was being built in Canada, with Canadian Government permission. There was a supposedly “classified” Senate Committee hearing in Washington on this subject. I seem to recall that a prominent figure in the U. S. Government, I think that it was an Assistant Secretary of State, or somebody like that, was testifying in favor of the construction of the DEW Line. This person said to a critical Senator: “Do you want Soviet bombs to drop on us or do you want Soviet bombers to be shot down and the bombs dropped in Canada? You have a choice.”

This comment was “leaked” to the press. Allan McNaughton called me up about this. He was “howling mad.” He said: “What’s the matter with those people [in Washington]? They just can’t seem to get it straight.” Nevertheless, I was able to keep up this relationship with McNaughton during the whole time that we were in Montreal.

When Pearson won the election, McNaughton became Speaker of the Canadian House of Commons. On a couple of occasions he invited us up, once when my mother-in-law was visiting Montreal, to have dinner in his chambers, which was a very “royal” kind of place. Before dinner we had drinks with him, and Allan had invited a bunch of Canadian political types to dinner, too. I remember that Allan showed my mother-in-law, who was then in her 60’s, the dining room.

She said: “Oh, my goodness. Look at all of that cutlery! How will I know what to use first?” He said: “You’re going to sit by me. Watch me, and whatever I pick up, you pick up. Don’t worry about it.” [Laughter] He was really a very wonderful guy.

Q: While you were there in Montreal, although only as a consular officer, did you sense any dislike of John Diefenbaker by official Americans? Certainly, President Kennedy had an intense dislike of Diefenbaker. Did you feel that dislike through the consular and diplomatic establishment we had in Canada?

TICE: Yes. The Quebecers [residents of the Province of Quebec, in which Montreal is located] tended to be Liberals and not Conservatives at that time and were very much anti-Diefenbaker. The other political current was the beginning of the Quebec separatist movement. Advocates of separatism for the Province of Quebec were blowing up mailboxes in Montreal. There was an upper middle class, English speaking enclave in Montreal, and one of the separatists’ tactics was to drop bombs in the mailboxes, causing shrapnel to spray the immediate area. So that was going on.

It was interesting that one of the people who was in our younger, social “set” who circulated in the university circles and the Consular Corps was a man who always dressed very dramatically and wore a cape. He was Pierre Elliot Trudeau [a future Canadian Prime Minister]. He would always show up at these functions accompanied by a beautiful young woman.

Q: Were you in Montreal during President Kennedy’s visit to Canada? One of the more or less obligatory first visits of a U. S. President is to Canada and another one is to Mexico.

TICE: I don’t recall it. If I was there at the time, it was not something that affected us in Montreal.

What did touch us, of course, was the Cuban Missile Crisis [October, 1962]. That was the first time that I felt hostility toward the U. S. on the part of the Canadians. Even then, the Canadians had this affinity for the Caribbean Sea and Cuba. God knows, if I lived in Canada, I’d want to get to the Caribbean too, as often as I could.

Q: Did you find yourself getting into arguments about Fidel Castro and U. S. policy toward Cuba?

TICE: Oh, yes. In social settings you would get into that kind of thing. At times it was really “nasty.” The opposition of many Canadians to U. S. policy toward Cuba was very heartfelt on their part. During the Cuban Missile Crisis there were big demonstrations in front of the Consulate General in Montreal.

Q: Was there any appreciation in Canada that this really was not a confrontation between Cuba and the United States but between the United States and the Soviet Union as part of the Cold War?

TICE: Oh, yes, it was very much understood that this was a confrontation with the Soviets. That was when I really focused in on the whole nuclear question for the first time.

Q: If the Canadians were demonstrating against us, what did they want us to do?

TICE: They wanted us to avoid a confrontation with the Soviets. They felt that we were endangering the whole world by confronting the Russians over the Soviet missiles in Cuba.

Q: Really, the Canadians were somewhat "out of step" with the rest of Europe and other places on this issue, weren't they?

TICE: Yes, but this was not unusual.

SIDNEY FRIEDLAND
Consular Officer
Toronto (1961-1965)

Sidney Friedland was born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 1932 and graduated from the University of Wisconsin at Madison in 1955. He served in the U.S. Army from 1955-1957, during which time he was stationed in Stuttgart, Germany. Mr. Friedland entered the Foreign Service in 1957. His career included positions in Canada, Austria, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, and Washington, DC. Mr. Friedland was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993.

Q: You finally got out in 1961?

FRIEDLAND: I finally got out the week after JFK's inauguration, and of course my first assignment, here I was with this central European background, language training, and my first overseas assignment was to English speaking Canada as a consular officer in Toronto. When I got the assignment, I noted that on the same list, there were a couple people going to Montreal, and Quebec, and I went to the personnel people and said, You are assigning me to a consular post in Canada, O.K., but there is a choice evidently between English speaking Canada and French speaking Canada, and you just gave me a four month language course, why don't you send me to French-speaking Canada? I was told in so many words that they didn't take that into consideration at the time, and had we known, we would have but it is too late now, the orders are cut there is no way of changing this, so I spent the next two years issuing visas in what at that time was the second or third largest visa issuing post in the world.

Q: But no particular fee, you were just a transit point for other places.

FRIEDLAND: Really and truly, here I was really hoping I was a political officer, I was hoping that maybe I could use some of my academic, linguistic whatever, and of course that wasn't the case. I could have been sent to issue visas in Munich, that would have really been me, but that would have possibly been too logical, but I didn't know what criteria they used at that point, but

at any rate, there was no input from the officers that I recall, but as it happened, it proved interesting in a number of ways. Although when I got up there it was really quite bizarre. We had a personnel situation that was very strange.

The principal officer was a man by the name of Bob Memminger, and this is where I learned what happens to a person who is on the wrong side of a policy decision, or people who are at the wrong place at the wrong time. Bob Memminger up until 1965 was the Baghdad Pact, the guy responsible for the Baghdad Pact, and when, in the summer of 1958, I was at the fountain in the center of the University at Madison, and the Iraqi students were going crazy, yelling and screaming, having an absolute ball, and Bob Memminger was held responsible for all of this, and Bob's next assignment was in Toronto, taking advantage of his great expertise. Memminger was a nice, pleasant guy, but had two problems, his wife and his son. His wife was wild, and would drink anything she could get her hands on. He was a handsome guy, and had been a stage actor, very courtly gentleman, tall with white hair from South Carolina, the model of a distinguished American Ambassador. She looked 75, wore her grey hair in a bun, flat soled shoes, shapeless garments, red nosed, and you could not imagine any connection between these two people, other than the fact that they were married, and he would leave town any weekend that he could possible leave town, and the vice-counsels were assigned baby-sitting duty, each of us would be assigned for the weekend to the residence, to make sure that the old lady didn't get her hands on liquor.

There was a roster, and the total postings at the consul general at this point, something like 12 FSO 7's or 8 on their first overseas assignment. This was one of the world great visa mills. So, every time a new person came they were put on the roster, and I was put on the roster but I never got to do it because there were 13 ahead of me when I arrived. He was gone within 13 years. And remember when I said that I left when Kennedy was inaugurated? Kennedy's first foreign visit was to Canada, per tradition, and this was the big visit where he injured his back planting a tree. This was a whirlwind new administration, and in Ottawa, Livingston Merchant was the Ambassador at this point, and he yanked in all the consulate's generals from across Canada to serve as his aids to put on the visit and to generate publicity etc. Memminger was away often in Ottawa, visiting the Ambassador. Also having been on the stage and in public relations before, the Ambassador relied heavily on his judgment. The big publicity was that Kennedy hurt his back, but the visit went very well, and one of the reasons that it went well was that Memminger put virtually all of his time and effort into it, and as a result, the two days before Kennedy arrived, he had a heart attack.

Medevaced back to the states, never had a chance to shake hands with Kennedy, after all this work, and was medically discharged, and retired. The other problem was Memminger's son, Tito. He was approximately 20 years old, took after his mother rather than his father, not a very nice looking kid, unable to get into any college or university that his father approved of, and therefore was living at home. He spent his time down at the consulate general propositioning the sweet young things that we had working there in abundance, and causing all sorts of problems. He'd pull diplomatic immunity in terms of parking, when he was picked up for under age drinking, probably now he would be accused of assaulting these women but in those days they would do that. We heaved quite a sigh of relief when Tito, well, what happened was that when his father was Medevaced, and it was determined that he was going retire, his wife and son followed. They

ultimately left. In the meantime things were happening with regards to the visa business, and as you recall, the Christmas eve before Kennedy's inauguration, Fidel Castro overthrew the Batista government in Cuba. Also you may recall that one of Jack Kennedy's best friends was George Smathers from Florida. The question was as soon as Kennedy, no wait a second, I am a year off...

Q: Well, in very late '58, no, '59...

FRIEDLAND: O.K., '59, the visa law at that point said that anybody who enters the United States from contiguous territory, on a tourist visa, or any visa other than an immigrant visa must go back to their contiguous home country to get an immigrant visa, their status cannot be adjusted in the United States. The law does not envisage contiguous territory in communist, well you know and of course the day after Fidel takes over, the prosperous type folks started fleeing, and they all flood to the United States where they all have back accounts, relatives or whatever. By 1961, Bay of Pigs time, there are already hundreds of thousands, if not millions of Cuban refugees in the United States now they all came in as refugees. Bay of Pigs happened, it failed, and it is obvious that the U.S. and Cuba are not going to get together, and what are we going to do with all the at least a million Cuban refugees? It would seem obvious that what you would do, they are all in the States, why don't you amend the law saying in the case of Cuba, people's status can be adjusted, and they don't have to go back to contiguous territory.

Nope, Smathers doesn't like that because his buddies are lawyers, immigration lawyers in Miami. And JFK is also his buddy, and what happens ultimately, is that the law is not changed, and Cuban immigrants in the United States refugee or any other non- permanent standing must leave the U.S. to get permanent residence. A lot of these people don't have any money, medical doctors are swabbing halls to work. We were advised that Smathers did not want this changed. Also there are lots of immigration lawyers in New York City, and New York is also JFK territory, so what they did was got Canada to agree if you Americans agree to take these people back even if you don't issue them a visa, let them come up to Canada, and you take them up at your consulates in Canada.

The entire United States was divided up into areas assigned to aid an American consulate in Canada with New York City going to Montreal, maritime to Quebec, Florida and the South to Toronto, Chicago to Windsor. Closed down Niagara Falls, before I got there, but Windsor was still going strong. California to Vancouver, and it went on this way for years. As a result, you had to have Vice-Consuls and actually it would have been a good post to send vice-counsels if you were going to send out Vice-Consuls for their first post, it would be great for Spanish-speaking FSO's. Not one Spanish speaking junior officer visa Vice-Consul was dispatched, But, somehow we were able to locate a Cuban refugee in Toronto, a lovely young girl and we were able to put her on the payroll, and she served as an interpreter, and ultimately married my successor, Ray Balen.

Plus we had the largest resident American citizen community outside of the U.S. There were 25,000 on the books, and probably at least double that not on the books, who just blended in. I have another special memory of Toronto in that when I got my assignment, my parents were in Florida for the winter, and the people in the next room at their hotel were from Toronto, and so

they mentioned me to them, and they said, "How old is your son?" Same age as our son, and here is his name, have him get in touch. As it turns out, I did. I got up there, and he is a very wealthy young bachelor who is in the magazine subscription business, but as an executive. Marvelous bachelor pad, just rolling in money, and he had a black book of all of the interesting young beauties in town, so he started to fix me up. Ultimately, I met my wife and was married up there.

My assignment stretched to one month less three years, and our first daughter was born three weeks before we left, and for most people, Toronto was an absolute bore, but for me it turned out to be fascinating. And my father-in-law was the personnel manager of the Toronto Symphony Orchestra, and I got an entre into all sorts of local music, arts, whatever surfaced there. I met Seiji Ozawa, who spent five years in Toronto at my in-law's house. A number of world famous artists, all sorts of people, it was absolutely fascinating. And here we had gone up there as sort of an exile, but it really turned out to be fascinating. Also university circles, Marshall MacLuhan, I was at his house, he was on the staff at the University of Toronto. It was fascinating.

MAYNARD W. GLITMAN
Economic Officer
Ottawa (1961-1965)

Ambassador Maynard Wayne Glitman was born in Illinois in 1933. He received his BA from the University of Illinois and his MA from Fletcher School of Law and diplomacy MA, and served in the U.S. Army in 1957. His postings abroad include Nassau, Ottawa, Paris, Brussels, Geneva and Vienna, and served as the ambassador to Belgium. James S. Pacy interviewed the ambassador on April 24, 2001

Q: Then we move on to you becoming Economic Officer in Embassy Ottawa, specializing in international trade and financial and trade policy issues for years 1961-1965. While in Ottawa, Ambassador Glitman served under Ambassador Livingston T. Merchant and Ambassador William Walton.

GLITMAN: We were there relatively short time with Ambassador and Mrs. Merchant. But they made a very strong impression on us. Very professional people, both of them, very good and nice people. We were there for most of our tour with Ambassador Butterworth and Mrs. Butterworth. I enjoyed him very much. In some ways he was one of the last Victorians. Great use of the language, and very forceful personality.

It was an interesting time to be in Canada and both my and I wife enjoyed it very much. A nice place to raise the family. We liked the climate, unlike the Bahamas this place has a really nice winter and I was able to combine business and pleasure often. Skiing with my Canadian contacts and friends, fair amount of work got done going up in the chairlift as well.

There were a number of issues while we were in Ottawa. The U.S. and Canada were constantly having trade issues and that's simply a function of the fact that we are each other's largest

trading partners. I don't know the exact numbers now but I am sure they are in the hundreds of billions of dollars a year in annual trade. And if you have that much business you are bound to have problems. And we had many of them, but by and large we worked well together with the Canadians. They were reasonable people I felt and I enjoyed working with them.

It was a busy post, in part because of these activities but there were two or three specific issues that came up that I found interesting. Perhaps if I look back on what I felt I accomplished there, one would be the Automobile Agreement, in 1965. Canadians were trying to increase their production of automobiles, and as you probably know at that point the companies were the same and the unions were the same, in the U.S. and Canada. Same automobile companies on both sides of the border and same unions on both sides on the border. So that made a difference in how we could approach this issue. What the Canadians tried to do was work out some sort of subsidization in effect, a program which would shift production as much as possible to Canada at our expense. There were different opinions about how we should deal with this, but it seemed to me that we ought to take a very firm line. We had countervailing duty law which essentially works to counter the advantages that another country gives to its trade through some form of subsidies. Some of our colleagues in Washington were hesitant to push forward on this approach. I felt that we should use it, not because I wanted to countervail but because I hadn't though we had another solution to this and needed the leverage a threat to countervail would provide.

And in October of 1963, I believe, I had an opportunity, a cocktail party, to talk to Ed Ritchie, Canadian Foreign Service Officer, also a very able man. During our discussion of this issue and how to deal with it, I asked him whether or not it would be possible to work out some sort of a free trade agreement in order to deal with this. He and I discussed it at some length and I came away persuaded that if we worked it right, were patient, keeping the threat of countervailing duty there, as an element in it of course, but the emphasis would be on trying to work out an agreement whereby we would essentially get close to a free trade agreement on automobiles and automobile parts. That took some years to complete but in 1965 indeed the U.S.-Canada Automobile Agreement was signed into law by President Johnson. It avoided a trade war. It helped I think consumers and producers on both sides of the border. And quite frankly, I had a deeper motive and that was my feeling and a view that eventually we ought to have a free trade area with Canada. That had been tried many times and failed, but I thought that the automobile agreement if it were a success would help set the stage for that. I was not in favor of any political union with Canada, I think we and the world are better off if there is an independent Canada. On the trade side, economic side, the amount of activity is so huge that it makes perfect sense to try to reduce the barriers as much as possible.

So that was one thing that I was able to accomplish while I was there. Another was dealing with a certain amount of economic nationalism on the Canadian side, which took the form of efforts to "buy back Canada," which was the slogan at the time. It didn't really make much sense to spend money to buy back a plant that was already there and functioning. But it was symbolic or emblematic of certain mindset that had set in. I did try to work against that. I tried to ease it and demonstrate that American investment was helpful to Canada and to the U.S. We ran into difficulties with things like Time magazine putting ads in the Canadian edition. Again, the Canadian government was concerned that Canadian magazines were being forced out because of the strength of the American magazines, particularly Time magazine, Readers Digest. That was

another issue that I worked on. We made some temporary fixes to the problem but I notice in the newspapers that it hasn't totally gone away. I can appreciate the Canadians' concern, they want to maintain a magazine industry of their own and not to have everything coming from the U.S. By the same token, they have to try not to be discriminating against the American journals.

And then another issue I got involved in, Quebec. This was at the time of the so-called quiet revolution in Quebec when the French Canadians began to sense that they had to move out of their old culture, not the basic culture, but adjust somewhat more to the modern world and get involved in finance and so on. The Quebec government began by purchasing, nationalizing Hydro-Quebec. The thing that was interesting about that operation was that it was cited as a perfect example of how to do a nationalization of a firm. A bond issue was successfully floated, the bond market approved of this arrangement, and it was accomplished without any punitive actions against the companies. But I found that this was also tied in to some degree with Quebec interest in, if not separation, then more autonomy. And then, I would go to Montreal to talk to the business community, financial community there. During one of those visits I was able to get a tip off that the Canadian dollar was likely going to devalue and it did. Just in talking to the businessman I could see that was where it was heading.

It was interesting going into the banks. I met a couple of times with one of the money traders for the bank. The man must have had nerves of steel. He would sit there and talk to me about the future of the market and then he would get interrupted by a phone call and you could hear him, I couldn't hear the other side of the conversation, but he would listen and say how about this how about that and then he would listen to the response, and then would say, "Sell a million at 340." Just like that. I asked him, "Do you go home at night and think about what you've done?" And he said, "No. Once it's done it's done." I had to admire that.

In this connection with Montreal, Fred Rope, a Foreign Service officer who was number two in Consulate General Montreal, introduced me to Jacques Parizeau, who at that time was a professor at University of Montreal but who had been involved in the takeover of Hydro-Quebec, a friendly takeover. I had two meetings with him and learned an awful lot about where Quebec was heading at least in as far as people like Parizeau were concerned, where they wanted it to go. It really came down to a sense that if they wanted to protect their culture they had to make it possible for people to work in important business, in international businesses and so on, in banking and finance, in production, in companies where they didn't have to give up their French when they got to the office. In other words, the phrase was that you had to "take off" your French language and culture, as if it were an overcoat when you went to work and become anglicized. He made the point that you could never really get ahead in some of these companies. Many of the Canadian companies were headquartered in Montreal, Sun Life and some of the others, banks, at that time, and have since left, but if you want to get ahead in these large companies, you could, but you had to move into English speaking parts and there was no school for their children in French so the children would lose the culture. They just didn't want to see that happen. So they began to figure out ways to try to increase the number of companies in Quebec that would be Francophone owned and operated. It was a complicated scheme, it involved pension funds and so on to use to buy up things like Hydro-Quebec. If not run by the government at least there would be some government tie-in. This was a beginning of what eventually turned into an independence movement. We know that goes on today, it hasn't

succeeded yet in winning any of the votes that they have taken on it, referendums on it. But they don't give up. I'm sympathetic to their concerns about retaining their culture, I think, again, that the world is a richer place for it. I only hope they can do it in a way that doesn't tear Canada apart. It ought to be possible. In any case, that was in the early '60s, that whole movement sort of began and I was able to report back on that to Washington and give a heads-up that it's coming. It was interesting work. Those were things that went on, that I did while I was at the embassy. They were full years, and a lot of good work with the Canadians there.

Q: The Cuban missile crisis, how did that affect your work there?

GLITMAN: It taught me something, a little lesson I guess. We had plans to disperse our aircraft in case of an emergency, and some of them would be dispersed to Canada, to Canadian fields. If you look at the map, at the globe, you could see that a lot of activity was likely going to occur over Canada anyway, if the Soviets decided to head our way. So they were involved with this. But what happened was that when the crisis broke out the Canadian Foreign Minister, Howard Green, I think he was from British Columbia, became quite agitated and concerned that if American planes were dispersed to Canada this would somehow be seen as a provocation and create a war and end up in it itself. The lesson I took away was you really have to be concerned about people reacting that way, and set up arrangements in such a way that it becomes automatic and it isn't seen as a provocation. For example, you need to exercise those things a lot. If you know you are going to disperse there, exercise it. Not when there is a crisis, just do it so that it is a routine kind of thing. Because if you don't have it set up that way then someone is going to come up and say, "You are creating a provocation. You are going to trigger something we want to avoid." I don't know, I think in the end something was worked out, but that was the lesson I took from that. I was able to apply it a couple of times later in my work.

Q: Did you have a presidential visit while you were in Ottawa?

GLITMAN: No. President Kennedy was assassinated while I was in Ottawa and like most Americans, I can remember exactly where I was and who I was with at that very moment.

Q: How about Congressional Delegations?

GLITMAN: I didn't have much to see or do with that. If they were there, I don't recall any visits. Later in life I got to see a lot of them, but not at this point.

Q: How about activity amidst the diplomatic corps?

GLITMAN: There was a fair amount of it. We were young, in our early '30s, maybe late '30s at that point. Chris and I did get around a lot. We lived in a small house, but she was able to make it work and we would often have people over. Sometimes after cocktail parties we would just gather up a group of people and pick up some spaghetti or something and come over to the house and she'd get things set up in no time. So we'd entertain that way. A lot of parties, and usual diplomatic back and forth. I have to make it clear, they are not all fun, most of it is work. I gave a couple of examples already about cocktail parties and agreements coming out of them.

Q: Generally your wife and all, were your children of school age then?

GLITMAN: My two boys went to school there and our eldest daughter was born there, on this tour. We remembered how much snow accumulated in Ottawa and began to think, as we reminisced about this, that we were probably exaggerating. We went back to Ottawa, took our daughter who was born there and her daughters. We went back so she could see the house where we were living when she was born. It was in the winter and we were not exaggerating. There were huge piles of snow outside everyone's driveway. It was a long way to school and again we thought we exaggerated how far our kindergartner and first-grader had to walk from the house to the school. But it was a long walk. And they made it longer by climbing up every snow pile on the way home. It was a nice place to live. I had good friends there, Canadians. We would go fishing together, sometimes we'd do a bit of business, but that would take place on a drive to and from the stream. Some of them were kind enough to show me good fishing holes in the area. There would be skiing, the same thing. I would occasionally work it out so instead of just going to lunch with somebody, I'd pick them up, we'd both go across the river to Gatineau and ski for the afternoon. Of course, there is a plenty of time for talk on the chair lift. We had as I said, a lot of good opportunities and fun together with the Canadians.

Q: What about travel beyond Ontario and Quebec?

GLITMAN: No, we didn't really. We did circumnavigate Lake Superior in one of our summer vacations and that was good fun. And then into Quebec was easy because it was just across the river. As I mentioned we skied there. Learned fairly interesting things about different cultures. There were two ski resorts, Camp Fortune which one Japanese colleague referred to as Camp Misfortune. I forget the name of the other place, but it was an English name. The funny thing is, Camp Fortune had fairly large French Canadian clientele and this other place was almost all Anglophone. So when you got to Camp Fortune I noticed... it took me a while to figure out what was going on. At the other place, there were lines. Everybody got in line and queued up. But at Camp Fortune there was the same phenomena we later saw in the Alps; there were what I refer to now as "French lines." These are triangles, the apex of which is at the entry point. So I learned a lot from the French Canadian kids on how to beat the system. Because if you look at the shape of this triangle, you do not want to enter the line at the back. You want to go off to the side and that's what those kids were doing. So I watched them a bit and I said, "Wow, okay." I got in there and it worked out fine. But when I went over to the Anglophone place, I joined the queue, which I preferred. But we found that same phenomena in Europe. These are good natured lines, these "French lines." You can find some cultures where this becomes a very serious issue. But with them it's just a joke, if you get ahead, you get ahead. If not, well, you take your time. Just a small little thing that popped up there.

Q: Any comment on Ambassador Butterworth?

GLITMAN: Yes. As I said, he was probably one of the last Victorians. Wonderful command of the language. One thing that sticks with me is his reaction to a message we got from the Department of State. This was before one of the Canadian elections, and we had been putting together a series of messages, what were the issues and how the elections were likely to effect the U.S., how was it likely to turn out and how would that affect us, what might the U.S. be

doing in preparation for this. I had written a certain number of them with my colleagues in the political section. A telegram came in from Washington and it effectively said, there is going to be an election up there, how about you guys sending us some information about it. We'd like to know what's going on. Butterworth was furious when he saw this and he called me and said "I want you to compile for me a list of all the telegrams that we have sent in..." Including our aerogrammes we had in those days as well as telegrams. "...on this election, little bit of what the subject is and get back to me as quickly as you can." I went back and went through all the things we had done, brought it in to him, and he said, "Umm, okay, thank you." Next thing I saw was a telegram from him back to Washington. Essentially it said something like this, we had been sending back messages on this election and so on and so forth, and then he said, "The Department, like Aunt Sally, having gotten a glimpse of the obvious now proposes to have us tell it about this election. Well, we already have, and here are the cables. Why doesn't Washington read these?" "Department, like Aunt Sally, having gotten the glimpse of the obvious." Wonderful. That was kind of funny with him. I enjoyed him very much.

LOUIS A. WIESNER
Labor Attache
Ottawa (1961-1967)

Louis Wiesner became interested in foreign affairs in graduate school at Harvard from 1937 to 1942, where he earned a master's degree and went on to do part of the work for a Ph.D. in European history. He was however unable to complete his dissertation due to World War II. He joined the Council on Foreign Relations in New York in the post-war planning unit. His career took him to Germany, Turkey, Southern Rhodesia, Canada, Vietnam, Pakistan and Bangladesh. He also served as Labor Advisor of EUR. He was interviewed by Don R. Kienzle in 1992.

Q: After EUR where did you go?

WIESNER: Now, we had to fill the job of Labor Attaché in Ottawa, Canada, one of the most important jobs. We agreed that Saul would go, but his wife objected and said that the children are in school, etc. Whatever it was, he couldn't go. I came home and talked to my wife about this and said we just haven't been able to find anybody for Ottawa. She said, "Why don't we go?" And we did. Saul and I assigned me. That was the longest Labor Attaché assignment in my career. I went there in February 1961 and left in July 1967, because I had volunteered to go to Vietnam.

It was one of my most interesting [assignments]. Everybody says Canada is a dull place. Nothing ever happens in Canada. It's just an offshoot of the United States. It wasn't true at all. During that period the longest and bitterest international labor dispute between the United States and Canada occurred on the Great Lakes, the Great Lakes Shipping Labor Dispute. There's a book about it that I helped [with by providing information] written by William Kaplan, who was a lawyer at the University of Toronto. [Everything that Floats. Pat Sullivan, Hal Banks and the Seamen's Unions of Canada.] This was a dispute that arose out of . . . Well, the Seafarers

International Union of Canada was as corrupt and violent an organization as you can find anywhere. It was headed by one Hal Banks, who was a crook and a bully and who just terrorized his own men. The union was anything but democratic. He had sweetheart contracts with the largest Canadian shipping company, and eventually this got to the point in 1961 when some of the men, with the encouragement of another shipping company, Upper Lakes, formed a separate union, the Canadian Maritime Union. This organized that one company, as I say with the help of the ship owner. The SIU then, and Paul Hall was of course very much involved in this, boycotted the ships of that company and went to the extent of beating up the members and leaders of the CMU, I think that was its name.

Q: That was the independent union?

WIESNER: The independent union. The Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport and General Workers, the CBRT, supported the independent union. First the CBRT won the representation with this company and then formed the independent union.

Q: How were you involved as the Labor Attaché in the process?

WIESNER: My job was of course primarily to report on what was happening, and I did. I went and interviewed Hal Banks, sitting on his throne, literally a kind of a throne-like thing in his office in Montreal. I got well acquainted with . . . I had already known the people in the CLC, Claude Jodein, the President and so forth, and the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport and General Workers, which was a big, powerful union. The CBRT had William Smith as its president. I got acquainted with the CMU people, the independent union when that was formed, and I reported on what was happening. I followed what was happening in the United States. These ships of the Upper Lakes were bombed in Chicago and other places, and shaped charges were place against them and blew in part of their hulls. I was pretty scathing in my reports to the effect that the SIU was acting not only illegally in the sense of perpetrating all this violence, but the SIU of North America was defying Canadian sovereignty, because first the CBRT and then the independent union were certified by the Canada Labor Relations Board as the bargaining agent for that company and those ships. This is something I said should be respected. Well, it got to the point where the Canadian Government appointed a commission of inquiry, with the Commissioner being Mr. Justice Thomas Norris from British Columbia. He held almost a year of hearings from 1962 to 1963 and called witnesses. It was a very thorough [investigation] like a Royal Commission. I attended as many of those meetings as I could, virtually all of them in Ottawa. When they moved to Montreal, I didn't move with them, because I had other things to be doing too. In the middle of that, Paul Hall came to Ottawa and among others he wanted to see me. So I had him out to the house. He had one man with him, and I had our Economic Counselor with me as a witness. We had drinks and dinner. I explained that if he didn't get Hal Banks out of there and didn't respect Canadian sovereignty, the SIU of Canada was in danger of being destroyed. Mr. Justice Norris had told me confidentially, and I had reported this to Washington, that if they got Hal Banks out, that his report would not be nearly so tough as it would be if he remained.

Q: Plea Bargaining?

WIESNER: Yes. Well, I passed that on. Paul Hall was absolutely adamant that as far as he was concerned this was strictly a trade union matter. The Government of Canada had nothing to do with it, and the CLC was nothing but an enemy and a tool of the employers, etc., etc., etc. It turned out that he had recorded our meeting. There was [recorder in] a briefcase that his assistant had. So he went back to Washington and he demanded that I be fired. Instead, I was promoted. The top labor advisor in the Department of State at that time was Phil Delaney, a trade unionist. He listened to the tape and was given a transcript of it, and others listened too. They said there was nothing improper in my behavior. But in retrospect, what I should have done, and what I would do if I had this to do over again, was I should have offered to Paul Hall to mediate, then done a proper mediation. As it turned out, two Presidents of the United States, Kennedy and Johnson, and two Prime Ministers of Canada were involved eventually and of course the Labor Minister of Canada Mr. MacEachen and Willard Wirtz on the side of the U.S. and I think there was another one; they were all involved in this. Well, the report came out in May of 1963; and it recommended that this union be put under trusteeship; and the government did that. It also recommended that Hal Banks be prosecuted, and he was prosecuted for inciting to grievous assault, and he was convicted. He appealed, but before his appeal could be heard, he fled to the United States. In this book, there is a lot about the fight to extradite him. I didn't know about that. I wasn't involved in it. Eventually the Secretary of State decided not to agree to extradite him, and the Canadians were absolutely furious about that. The union remained under trusteeship for about two years. It was a very gentle trusteeship, and it held democratic elections in a manner of speaking, then was freed from the trusteeship and rejoined the CLC. That was a very tense, bitter dispute that I as Labor Attaché couldn't help but be involved in.

Q: Center of things?

WIESNER: Well, not at the center really, because once the Secretaries [of Labor] became involved and the Presidents, the Labor Attaché was nothing, particularly with Paul Hall being so determined to get me out of there.

Q: How would you describe your relationships within the Embassy as Labor Attaché?

WIESNER: They were wonderful. They were absolutely wonderful. Of course, that dispute was only one of the many things that I did. I was in the Political Section. I had the ear of the Ambassador. There were two ambassadors while I was there, one was Livingston Merchant, and he was followed by W. Walton Butterworth, who was a diplomat of the old school. He dressed conservatively. He kept wide lapel suits long after they had gone out of style, and he used to say, "Protocol oozes from my skin." But he was good. I went everywhere in Canada, visited all the Consulates. It's a huge country, physically speaking a lot bigger than the U.S. I guess not now that Alaska is part of the U.S., at least certainly bigger than the lower 48. And we had ten Consulates...

I followed the employment situation there and the economic situation very, very closely and did a lot of economic reporting, which I hadn't done in Germany. That wasn't really relevant to what I was doing in Germany. I was not an action officer except involuntarily in this labor dispute, but Canada being the largest market for U.S. goods in the world at that time and the largest supplier of goods to the U.S., the largest trading partner in other words, was of interest not only

politically but primarily economically to the United States, so I became very, very enmeshed in the Canadian economic and labor-economic situation and did a lot of what I think was damned good reporting on it. They had an excellent statistical institute, which was really the counterpart of the Bureau of the Census in the United States headed by my very good friend Sylvia Ostrey, who is still my very good friend and was down in the U.S. and gave a lecture in Cambridge just a few months ago. I became well acquainted with the then newly formed Economic Council of Canada under the leadership of Professor John Deutsch of Queens University. As I visited the provinces I met some of the Prime Ministers, all of the Labor Ministers of course, and one of the things that I discovered and reported on very fully was labor-management cooperation, which was more highly developed in Canada and particularly in the province of Nova Scotia than in the United States. For example the firm of Bowaters-Marsey, a big paper company, which was British, had labor-management councils that really went into things like production methods, productivity, and marketing. It wasn't Mitbestimmungsrecht [German co-determination]. They didn't have the legal power to participate in management, but this was done voluntarily and it worked. The reports showed that, where it worked, it did improve productivity and profitability of companies, and I reported on this quite extensively. At the same time I was pulling back from the U.S., principally the Labor Department, information about our economy, our labor conditions, and labor-economics, and such labor-management cooperation as existed here and giving it back to these people. So it was a two way street. It was very interesting and very rewarding.

At the same time we had a number of military bases in Canada at Argentia, Newfoundland; Goose Bay, Labrador; and I forget what the others were. They had their problems with the workers on the bases, who formed unions or joined unions, so I advised our military on labor-relations on the bases, and we had a labor-management committee of the military and myself. We would go visit these various places and a fellow came up from Westover Field in Massachusetts. He belonged to the Air Force, and he was their labor-management expert. I forget his name now. There was never a strike during the period I was there on any of those bases. It would have been illegal, but unions sometimes do things that are illegal. Anyhow, it didn't happen. The relations were good, and new contracts were developed.

In October of 1962, the Military Attaché in Ottawa . . . Well, he had a plane, a C-54 plane equipped for arctic navigation with a huge crew and all sorts of instruments, because you get up there, and the magnetic pole doesn't mean anything. Every few months he would take distinguished members of the Canadian military on flights up to the DEW Line, which was the distant, early-warning system, which ran roughly along the 70th parallel, and BMEWS, which was the Ballistic Early Warning Systems, which was located in Thule, Greenland. I got to go on one of those trips in October of 1962 to the high arctic. It was really fun. It was a wonderful thing.

Well, there were of course labor union problems. There were Communist unions in Canada, particularly on the West Coast, and I reported on that too and you had in Canada, a Canadian Labor Congress and the Christian trade unions, principally based in Quebec, so I got acquainted with them too, under somebody by the name of Marchand. I forget his first name. Their negotiations were of interest. I don't remember details at this point, and I reported on that. I got acquainted with the trade union people across the country and with management people. This was the first time in my career as Labor Attaché that I had gone out of my way to become acquainted with people on the management side, and they appreciated it, and it helped the

reporting, and as I say the labor-management cooperation experiments were really very impressive.

Q: Did you find that the Canadian managers were more supportive of a structured labor-management relationship than say U.S. managers might be?

WIESNER: It varied by industry and by company. Some of them were, and some of them had the same adversarial relationship as is the norm in the United States. In automobiles the companies were the same, General Motors, Ford and Chrysler and so forth. During that period the U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Agreement in Automobiles was negotiated and signed. The Canadian auto workers were always pretty independent minded, and they won autonomy from their headquarters. The same with the Steel Workers. There was no struggle like this; they were autonomous; their autonomy was respected, and of course, as I say, the auto workers were dealing with multinational companies, but the steel industry in Canada is largely national, and that worked quite well. There were strikes of course. The hard rock miners were one of the Communist unions in Canada. There's gold mining and all that sort of thing way up in the arctic, a really tough bunch, but I think overall there wasn't all that much difference. It just varied by company and by industry.

Q: Was the percentage of organization higher at that time in Canada than it was in the United States?

WIESNER: Yes, I think it was.

Q: Now it is something like 40 percent in Canada and 12 or 13 percent in the private sector in the United States.

WIESNER: Yes, it was higher, and there wasn't the resistance to it. They have never gone through a Reagan-Bush period of restriction and fighting trade unions on the Federal Government that we've had here. The public service unions, of course, are strong in both countries, but yes there was a higher proportion, and even out on the prairies. Some provinces at that time were led by the New Democratic Party, the NDP, which was a socialist party, like Saskatchewan. Other provinces have gone that way later. I think British Columbia even for while – I'm not sure about that – after I left. During the time I was there it was under the control of what was called the Social Credit Party, which was an agrarian, rather right-wing party, but never did they have the kind of legislation and government fighting of trade unions that we have seen in the U.S. in recent years. Altogether it was a very, very enjoyable period.

Q: Was that your last labor assignment?

WIESNER: Yes, it was.

Q: Would you describe briefly what you did afterwards?

WIESNER: Yes. One of the things that irritated me about the Canadians was that they were almost like Swedes and Indians in the sense of being sort of preachy about the faults of the

United States, and of course nothing brought that out more clearly than the Vietnam War, where Canadians by and large thought that we were absolutely wrong to be there. Actually behind the scenes the Canadian Foreign Office was very helpful in trying to mediate between the U.S. and the South Vietnamese Government on the one hand and Hanoi on the other hand. A fellow by the name of Blair Seaborne in the Ministry of External Affairs was sent over repeatedly as a emissary. I became quite well acquainted with him too in Vietnam. So what I was reading in Canada was that the U.S. was wrong to be in there, and I wanted to become a part of it, just as I wanted to become a part of the thing in Germany, so I volunteered to go out and I was accepted. I had tried to go to the Senior Seminar in the United States, but I wasn't selected for that, and one of the reasons for it turned out to be a fluke. I told you I have only one eye, but somehow it had gotten in my record what belonged in the record of another fellow with the same last name, who belonged to AID, that he had had detached retinas. I found that out after I was rejected for the Senior Seminar, because nobody with that kind of defect could serve abroad again. I screamed over the telephone at the personnel people that I couldn't possibly have detached retinas in both eyes, because my right eye is artificial. But it was too late anyhow.

ROGER A. SORENSON
Consular Officer
Calgary (1962-1965)

Roger Sorenson was born in Utah and graduated from Brigham Young University. He joined the Foreign Service in 1960, serving in Italy, Canada, Switzerland, Ireland, and Washington, DC. Mr. Sorenson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

SORENSON: It was against the stimulation and excitement of this first assignment that I learned with some reservation that my next post would be Calgary, Alberta.

Q: Why reservation?

SORENSON: Because I feared the ennui that I had known in Utah. Even so, I went, and retrospectively I am glad that I did. I confess to having enjoyed all my assignments.

Q: What were you doing in Calgary? You were there from '62 to '65.

SORENSON: It was my first exposure to the more vicious side of the bureaucratic life and an enormous contrast to Genoa. To go back again, the Consul General in Genoa had been a man of some distinction -- a gentleman in the old fashioned sense of the word. A cloud had fallen over his career during the McCarthy era, as it apparently did over the careers of many, and I have the impression that it was not one of the Department's finer hours. In the case of my first boss, a man who should have been an Ambassador was consigned to a diplomatic backwater, but he nevertheless bore the ignominy of his situation with dignity. He came from an old family; he had been well educated; he was cultivated; his wife had been the daughter of an American General; his first post had been somewhere in China; he had had a wealth of experience; he represented

the best of what had been the old Foreign Service.

My new boss in Calgary, on the other hand, represented the new Foreign Service of the time -- a service that had been democratized -- and the irony of my own situation gradually came home to me: the considerations that had led the Department to recruit from universities so far afield as Brigham Young had been the same considerations that had led it to move people laterally into the Foreign Service from areas of the bureaucracy where they had had little to do with the practice of diplomacy. I would meet a number of these people during my career. Too often, their major skills were self-promotion and the art of bureaucratic infighting.

I should have prefaced this part of my reflections by noting that one of the considerations that persuaded me to accept the Calgary assignment was an assurance I received from the Department that it was a post of some importance. Not only was American investment in the province's petroleum industry substantial, but the consular district had the distinction, it was said, of having the largest number of American citizens of any consular district in the world. Indeed, according to the Department, such was Calgary's importance that consideration was being given to elevating the post to a Consulate General.

However, it didn't take long after my arrival in Calgary for me to realize that the Consul -- the officer in charge -- was scheming to get the Consulate in Edmonton (which was the provincial capital) closed in order to get the Consulate in Calgary elevated. I would not fully appreciate the extent of these machinations until the man had succeeded, in the process of which he was transferred to Auckland and I was left temporarily in charge of a much enlarged consular district until a Consul General could be named.

In retrospect, much of what happened now seems amusing. For example, I found upon my arrival in Calgary that the post was issuing visitor's visas to the United States valid for only six months, whereas the Department's practice was to grant two-year visas. When I pointed out the irregularity of this practice following my arrival, my new boss hinted darkly that there were matters to which I, as a mere junior officer, was not privy, and he reminded me that his former jobs in the Department had been in the security area (I discovered later that he had managed a program having to do with monitoring locks on security vaults and bar-lock cabinets). After his abrupt departure for Auckland, I came to realize that the sole purpose of issuing visas valid for only six months was to multiply by four the number of visas that the post issued, thus creating an impression in our statistical reports of intense activity.

Unfortunately, this wasn't the only activity that had been artificially rigged. We were inspected shortly after my arrival, and I found to my surprise that several day's of normal appointments for consular work had been concentrated into the two days that the inspectors were with us. For some time prior to their arrival we saw nobody; while the inspectors were with us, however, the office suddenly assumed the aspects of a refugee camp. Dismal lines of visa applicants and citizens requiring consular services at times trailed through the entrance into the outer hall and up to the elevator itself. I was stunned, but the inspectors were impressed. Machiavelli had become our mentor.

The long and the short of it was that the Department finally became convinced by the post's

reports and the apparent statistical evidence that Calgary was indeed a post of considerable importance; what the Department was not convinced of was that its man in Calgary had the requisite stuff to manage a larger operation, and he was forthwith consigned to play golf in New Zealand. The Consul in Edmonton was ignominiously sent packing -- poor devil -- and I was temporarily placed in charge of a consular district that, I had been told, already contained the largest number of Americans of any in the world and which had suddenly doubled physically in size.

Under instructions, my first task in this new role was to call on the provincial premier in Edmonton to explain Washington's considered decision to close its post in the provincial capital while elevating Calgary -- the province's second largest city -- to the status of consulate general - not an altogether easy task. Following a script written in the Department, I explained that one of the factors justifying my government's decision was the number of Americans resident in the Calgary area -- some 30,000 according to the consulate's reports. Imagine my consternation when the premier asked how this could possibly be and whether anyone in Washington had ever examined the Canadian census. There were not as many Americans as I had averred, he said, in the whole of Alberta, British Columbia, Saskatchewan and the Yukon, with the Northwest Territories thrown in, much less in the environs of Calgary alone. Like all the statistics coming from Calgary, this too had been rigged.

Even now, I am still amazed when the notion crops up in various quarters, including the Department, that Calgary teems with Americans. My old boss in Calgary, whose only interest was in getting himself promoted, might have had his limitations, but he was a superb propagandist.

Q: You were there until '65, and then you came back to Washington.

DOROTHY M. SAMPAS
Spouse of Foreign Service Officer
Ottawa (1963-1964)

Dorothy M. Sampas was born in Washington D.C. in 1933. As a foreign service spouse she lived in Ottawa, Paris, Iceland, and Washington D.C. After re-entering the Foreign Service she had positions in Brussels, China, New York, and an ambassadorship to Mauritania. Ambassador Sampas was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in October 1998.

Q: Where did you go in Canada?

SAMPAS: He was in Ottawa, so we settled in in Ottawa and stayed pretty much there. I had a child in Ottawa, and we didn't do a great deal of traveling around.

Q: You were in Ottawa from when to when?

SAMPAS: We must have arrived there in very early '63 and we must have left in the summer of 1964.

Q: Having been newly married and with a child shortly thereafter, I take it you must have not been overly enmeshed in the diplomatic social life.

SAMPAS: Certainly not, no, I wasn't. That didn't seem to be the case for many people until you got to the rank of counselor there. It's a big embassy and a kind of modern city. It reminded me of Washington 20 or 30 years ago.

Q: You'd probably have gotten in the way if you tried to be too active.

SAMPAS: Yes, I think so.

Q: Well, did you get any feel for Canadian politics vis-à-vis the United States? Were you getting – I'm not sure if Diefenbaker was still there or not. This was not the sunniest time for American-Canadian relations. Did you pick up any of this?

SAMPAS: Some of it. You have a very good memory for all of these places. Yes, at one point Diefenbaker had talked about some confidential American documents on the floor of the parliament, and that did not make our government happy at all.

Q: I think it had to do with missiles and airplanes, airplane missiles, or something like that.

SAMPAS: Yes, and shortly after that, what would you know? He was defeated. So I think Lester Pearson was much more friendly with the United States. Certainly not a pawn, by any means – I wouldn't say that.

Q: Your Canadian friends – did you find that generally Diefenbaker was no – I mean the people you'd meet – a particular model for them?

SAMPAS: Oh, I think they were somewhat embarrassed by him. He was not the quality that I-

Q: He was really a populist, from the Midwest, in a way. I mean he represented something that normally isn't – I mean he was almost an oddball in the Canadian premier line.

SAMPAS: Yes, there was another what you might call oddball group, even further out – the New Democrats – and it was always interesting to listen to comments about them on the radio. Even further out, there was a religious sect out in the Canadian north and west called the Dukhabours, who removed their clothing upon hearing speeches they didn't like.

Q: Is this the "True Believers" or something?

SAMPAS: Yes, and they gave a very amusing side to Canadian politics.

Q: Did you get from your Canadian acquaintances the thing that's still here alive – poor us and

big you and you've got to sort of plan on the idea that somehow or other we have to be especially nice to the Canadians because we're so big, and so forth.

SAMPAS: Oh, yes, so powerful and so forth. Yes, there is a bit of a chip on the shoulder of many Canadians. It's really too bad because they have been able to carve their own little niche and, I think, have things to teach us as well.

Q: *Oh, absolutely.*

SAMPAS: But there are times that we're not too sensitive in listening.

STEPHEN T. JOHNSON
Consular Officer
Montreal (1963-1965)

Stephen T. Johnson was born in Tokyo, Japan in 1936. After serving in the US Army from 1956-1957 he received his bachelor's degree from Occidental College in 1960. He entered his Foreign Service in 1961 and his career included positions in Canada, Paris, Vietnam, Laos, Romania, and Kenya. Mr. Johnson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in January 1997.

Q: *So you were in Montreal from when to when?*

JOHNSON: Well, I guess I arrived there in September, it might have been a little earlier to 1965 – two years.

Q: *What was the status of Quebec Province during that period of time?*

JOHNSON: Well, it was bubbling. Separatism was becoming respectable. Though it certainly had an unrespectable side. There had been bombs put in trash cans and at least one fellow was killed.

Q: *A minister or something.*

JOHNSON: That was later on. This was an unfortunate watchman who stepped into the alley at the wrong time. There was great ferment. Montreal was a really nice place to live. The consulate was up on the side of a mountain and was in two old houses and was quite nice. This was 1963-65. The Vietnam War was kind of percolating along, but the student, well, the students and things were not agitating about it as far as the United States was concerned even in Canada at the time – beginning to.

But the University of Montreal had lots of ferment about separatism. I think separatism was kind of centered more in Montreal than Quebec City. My impression was that the French Canadians in Quebec City, which was like 95% French Canadian, were rather secure, while the ones in

Montreal, where the English-speaking population was much larger and economically dominant, were not so secure. You did have quite a bit of ferment.

At the time, Rene La Veque was a minister in the liberal government of Jean Lesage in Quebec, and we could see that Rene La Veque was moving towards separatism. When he became a separatist, then separatism would really become a serious proposition. In due course, that happened. We could see that going on, and the consulate had a job in reporting on it. We found not that much interest back in Washington in all this. I think Washington basically goes from crisis to crisis. The fact that you might be a crisis 10 or 15 years down the road, I guess, understandably, doesn't excite anybody too much.

The consulate had a little bit of tricky relationship with the embassy in Ottawa. It obviously saw itself as the premier reporting post in Canada, as it should be. Most of our reports were Airgrams and the like. The telegram was a wonderful and exciting thing. We had no machines or anything like that for encoding and decoding, so we had to do it by the old one-time pad. We had a lady whose job it was to do the coding and decoding, and I learned how to do it myself. Of course, a three or four paragraph telegram would come in, and it would take you all morning to sort it out. So we didn't do much of that sort of thing.

In fact the consulate got bombed one night. I guess, it seems to me this was May, and I really forget if it was 1964 or 1965, somebody put a bomb under kind of a bridge between the two houses that made up the consulate.

Sometime about midnight or one o'clock the thing went off. There was nobody in the consulate. I guess the little man who cleaned up after hours might have still been there. But anyway it blew in about 80 windows. It didn't harm anybody. We called the Operations Center and said we had been bombed. But the consul general was reluctant to send a telegram because of how difficult it was to do so. We were all home. I guess somebody must have called the consul general or something, and he called me and there were several junior officers [who] kind of trooped down there. The police were crunching around in the broken glass. The CG [consul general] gave me the job of staying there all night because there was no longer any security with all these. I kind of sat in the consulate with this wind blowing in and out, listening to the police crunching around outside. There wasn't much else to do. I kind of looked around and found a paperback novel about the kind of high life of the diplomatic circles. I forget the name of the thing. So I read that while I was in this kind of desolate consulate.

The bombing was kind of strange. This was before terrorism and bombing. The consulate had no fence around it or anything like that.

The separatists who were the principal bombers, one might say, had no real argument with the United States. In fact, one of the things that I like about French Canada was in those days at least, when in the rest of the world things did not work out right they blamed the United States, in French Canada they blamed the English Canadians. When you met, separatists and the like, were always very friendly and interested in convincing you of their argument.

[In those days,] the Quebec FLQ was kind of the semi-terrorist organization. When they did do

bombings, they normally announced it and why they did it. No one ever did [time] for this. My theory was that it was Jurassic separatists from Switzerland who had mistaken us for the Swiss consulate next door and then were too embarrassed to say anything. But no one else bought that. I don't know if anybody ever found out about it.

The principal work of the consulate was visas, and that was my principal work was well. The junior officers rotated around the consulate. In the summer, there was a tremendous amount of NIVs. We concentrated on that and did about 80 immigrant visas a day. In those days, under the peculiarities of our law, people who came from Cuba and other Caribbean Islands, particularly all those Cuban refugees, had to leave the United States in order to get an immigrant visa. They couldn't just change their status in the States. So typically, every day we would do about 25 out of our 80 Ivs would be what we called U.S. cases.

Those were for the most part bleary eyed Cubans who had done all their paperwork and would have to get on the bus in New York City and ride up to Montreal, arriving about 5:30 in the morning. They stood around on the icy streets for several hours, came to the consulate at the opening of business, and did the formalities, then got their visas and went back to the States – I guess before lunch, if things worked out well for them. You had to learn a little Spanish as it turned out.

The balance of the cases was mainly Canadians. The NIV load was non-Canadians because Canadians didn't need visas to go to the United States. So it was kind of like a mini-United Nations of people coming in, most of whom were what Canadians called "landed immigrants." These would be our resident aliens – Greeks, Italians...

Q: Was there the feeling that people were becoming landed immigrants in Canada but using this to move into the United States for warmer climes?

JOHNSON: There were a few. No. This was the NIV visitor's visa thing. I don't think that too many of the people, these landed immigrants, that we gave visitors visas to stayed. I am sure some of them did. One of the peculiarities of Quebec was that if you wanted to go to the beach, for instance, the nearest place was Lake Champlain, New York. It wasn't like if you were doing a visa to someplace in Ethiopia. You know, this was going to be a really tremendous deal; the guy wanted to go to the beach. It was perfectly reasonable. And if he was a landed immigrant, and he had been there for a year or some time and had a job, you gave him the visa.

One of the other things was that the Quebec fathers had decided that the drive-in movies were dens of sin. I guess there was some justice in that view. So they had none in the province of Quebec. If you were a hot blooded landed immigrant in Canada – in Quebec – and you wanted to go to a drive-in movie with your girlfriend, you had to go down to Plattsburgh, New York. There was some question as to whether that was "212-A-13," going to the United States principally to perform an immoral sexual act. But we said, "No, they were principally going to see the movie." But one of the thing you learned not to do was hit the border when the drive-in let out down at Highgate Springs. So you had a lot of the visa flow and some colorful people.

One of my additional jobs was kind of being the bouncer at the consulate general. We didn't

have any guards or Marines or that kind of thing. Most people were well behaved, but when there was a necessity to actually take somebody by the scruff of the neck and pitch him out, it fell to me. But it was a nice consulate.

Q: I'd like to catch the flavor of the times. Here is Montreal, which is the commercial and cultural center, but during the 1960s when you were there, the French Francophones and the Anglophones were having problems.

JOHNSON: They were having real problems.

Q: What was the fit of the consulate then? Did you find that you were absorbed into the Anglophone community or were there efforts to bridge the gap? How did it work?

JOHNSON: The consulate was not actively trying to influence the evolution of events. We were obviously observing them. When I got there the consul general was Jerome T. Gaspard, who had been there about six years and then was transferred to Quebec. So he really knew Quebec Province. The later part of my time there, the CG was Richard Hawkins. We tried as much as possible to be in both communities. The commercial side of things was heavily Anglophone. You are correct, the Canadians had been a very kind of repressed right-wing – I'm probably not doing this justice – but kind of clergy-run society for a long time. There had almost been a dictator in Maurice Du Placé, who had been the leader of Quebec for a long time. He had died just a few years before I got there.

So the French Canadians were sort of bursting out of the confines of this closed, inward-looking society. In looking for economic power, looking for political power, they kind of already had political power but more freedom and great effervescence in their universities and their schools.

There was evolution taking place in the economy of the country. There was lots of embracing of left-wing ideas, which would have been anathema before. Obviously, this was causing ructions in the church and other places. There were French Canadians who were strong Federalists. What is his name? Trudeau was a professor at the University of Montreal, and he was reviled all the time in the separatist press because he was an eloquent spokesman of federalism. They were obviously important English speaking Québécois. But everything was in effervescence.

The consulate tried as best it could, given the relative indifference of Washington, to report on all this and keep an eye on it. But we had to watch our step. I know one of my colleagues interviewed or just went down to talk to a fellow who was the head of the Quebec branch of the Social Credit Party, which was a relatively important party in Canada in those days. I think it Saskatchewan. But not so important in Quebec. Basically, he went down to ask him what the program of the party was and things, and the next day the headline in the paper was, "American interference in Quebec political life/internal affairs." You had to be very circumspect.

I might say at the same time, Quebecers – probably for the most part-English Quebecers – were going down to work in the campaign for Bobby Kennedy down in the U.S. Because you could watch CBS and NBC in these places, they really felt so much a part of our culture that they didn't see anything really wrong or any reason why they shouldn't intervene. At the same time,

they were fiercely guarding their own independence and their cultural integrity and got very excited when it appeared that we might be intervening in their lives.

Q: As vice consul, did you get any of this feeling from the leadership level about American cultural dominance and so on? This seems to be a theme that is still very strong, not by the consumers in Canada but by the leadership.

JOHNSON: Well, one of the things about being in Montreal was that the provincial government isn't in Montreal. It is in Quebec City. So we weren't dealing with government officials for the most part. With the mayor –not me – the consul general would do that. Not so much with the French Canadians. The French Canadians were not so worried about American domination of their culture because their culture was quite different than ours. Therefore when I went to places which were separatist and talked to separatists, they were trying to tell us what bad guys the English Canadians were and [pushing] the necessity for an independent Quebec. But the idea that the United States might take them over or was going to absorb them really didn't seem to be uppermost in their mind. I think that it was much more the English Canadian establishment, particularly in Ontario, that worried about that kind of thing. So we didn't have that so much.

WILBUR P. CHASE
Head of Consular Section
Ottawa (1963-1968)

Wilbur Chase was born in Washington, DC in 1920. He received a bachelor's degree from George Washington University in 1942. Prior to becoming a Foreign Service officer, Mr. Chase served in the Naval Ordnance Laboratory, the War Shipping Administration, and the Coast Guard. In 1945, he joined the Foreign Service. His career included positions in Iraq, Canada, Germany, Israel, Turkey, the Philippines, and Washington, DC. Mr. Chase was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: Mainly because of time constraints, I'd like to move on to Ottawa.

CHASE: Then I went up to Ottawa because my tour time at the department was coming to an end, four years, and that was a place I could go to and get schooling for my children, which was at that time very important. So I looked around to find a job that I could grab, and it turned out to be in Ottawa as head of the embassy consul section and also coordinator of consular activities throughout Canada.

Q: You served there from '63 to '68. Canada has always had, particularly in this period, a real spread of consulates. How did they fit into the system? Were they purely working offices, for the local visas, passports, and that sort of thing, or did they play much of a role in our overall American-Canadian policy at the time we're talking about?

CHASE: Back in history, we had, in 1900 I think it was, forty-some consular posts up in Canada.

When I was there, there were ten consular posts. If you think of certain functions being important, then you need the number offices to carry out these activities. So that when we had forty, that was a time when there was a lot of shipping going backing forth, and their crews left visas all over the place. When I was there, each one of the offices, I think, was carrying out a very important function. There was not a marginal post among them, at least at the beginning.

Canada itself is big. It's so much like the United States. But to an extent, if you go around in Canada, it's an archipelago. It's a whole lot of little islands of activity that don't always relate one to the other; they're little principalities.

So that Newfoundland has its problems and its perspective. We had some important military establishments up there. And whether we were going to be able to carry them out required we had a consulate there that would keep in touch with the Newfie government and see things were done.

In Halifax, the consulate general is at the site of the Military Atlantic Command for Canada. I think it's one of the three major headquarters. It has some other important industries, coal mining and things. They gave out quite a number of visas.

St. John, over in New Brunswick, was there just as really an immigrant visa-issuing mill. If you don't have immigrants, there's no reason to have a consulate. New Brunswick is economically unimportant, politically unimportant.

Then in Quebec Province is Quebec City, which is the capital of the province, and if you're thinking about what is going on in Quebec right now, the same forces were afoot then. Montreal was not only a big, major visa-issuing post, but it also is the hub of the economy, the political, the education.

So that each one of these posts is important.

Windsor, again, it's important or it's not important. See, a lot of aliens were living in the United States. They weren't eligible for adjustment of visa status. It was arranged that they could enter Canada and then come back into the United States. And that was Windsor's business, and St. John's business.

Q: Well, how about the ambassador, Walton Butterworth? Did he pay much attention to the consulates? He was involved in other things. I mean, these were in many ways performing more technical functions, weren't they?

CHASE: Butterworth knew what was going on, and he kept his fingers on those things that were important. It was surprising to me the way he would come into a consular problem that would interest him, that was affecting the political and economic relationships of Canada, and he knew exactly what he wanted to know about that. Some of these public relations things, the draft dodger issue, Americans fleeing to Canada to escape the draft, Butterworth knew about that very, very definitely. And yet whether Montreal gave out a hundred visas a day or five visas a day, he wouldn't be interested in that.

Q: What was our attitude? The Vietnam War was peaking at this point, and people were using Canada as a means to get away. What was sort of both the official and you might say what was the attitude of the ambassador, in other words, towards these people? I mean, they're making their choice, let 'em live with it, or do something to 'em?

CHASE: We were concerned by the political implications of this. The total number of draft evaders was really pretty small. It was, though, something that was embarrassing to us. Since it was embarrassing, we were trying to do various things to downplay it, so the newspapers, both in the United States and Canada, wouldn't do anything about it. They wouldn't give these people publicity. I had lots of talks with draft dodgers, and I also had lots of talks with the draft boards down in the United States, and finally evolved the approach that we had to handle this issue very carefully because we were also going to be violating the United States' civil liberties. And also really almost a third of the Canadian men, during the draft ages, were technically U.S. draft dodgers.

Q: Because of going to school in the United States?

CHASE: They were going to these schools, yes. Some were dual nationals. You'd have a person who had lived all their life in New Brunswick and yet when their mother was expecting them, instead of going to a hospital in Canada, which was remote, they went across the border to a hospital in the United States. So this child, a hundred percent Canadian but by accident had been born in the United States.

As the child was growing up, there would be a little bit of a funny affair at the border. The family would come up and they'd say, "What's your nationality?"

And they'd say, "We're all Canadian."

And the immigration officer would say, "Where were you born?"

The fellow says, "In Maine."

"You're an American citizen, come on in, you Yank. What are you going to do, associate with all these Canucks up here?" And they'd joke along in this way.

That little kid, over the years, going back and forth, always "American citizen."

Then at eighteen years six months, the immigration officer says, "Where's your draft card?"

"I'm a Canadian!"

"Hell you are, you're an American. You've been coming in here all the time." And so then the fellow would say, "Well, then you're refusing to register for the draft?"

"You're damn right I am."

"All right, abandon residence in the United States to avoid the draft." Or he'd tell him, "Ok, go up to the consulates and renounce your citizenship."

And then the consular officers also told him he had to renounce his citizenship because he didn't want to register for the draft. And so I then instructed my consular officer, I said, "For Christ's sake, look at this case realistically. Is this fellow a Canadian or is he an American? It's just an accident of birth that he is a U.S. citizen. And what you do is you fill it out, saying: 'I am renouncing my citizenship because I realize there are conflicts in the citizenship. I don't want to be a dual national, I only want to only be a single national.'"

Q: In other words, not to taint it for later on.

CHASE: Right, why taint it? Well, we had a whole lot of these little cases, where a lot of Canadians were being labeled draft dodgers.

And then Butterworth and I had a long conversation with the head of the Canadian National Bank. His son went down to Harvard to get a degree, was offered a good job, and the job was going to involve his taking up residency down there in the United States. So he went down and did his work, and this went along very happily. And then along came the draft notice.

Well, the fellow, first of all, thought that he would never be called, thought he'd have a draft deferment. But eventually, by God, he has no alternative, he has come. So then he comes back to Daddy and says, "I've got to get out of the United States, I can't stay there any longer, I'll be drafted. But also I will then make myself permanently ineligible to go back to the United States."

Well, a whole lot of different politicians called up, saying can't you help this young man? He came and called on Butterworth, and Butterworth asked me to come in, and we talked to him. And finally this fellow really admitted that he was a goddamn draft dodger. When the things were good in the United States, he'd taken it. When the things began to become difficult, he suddenly remembered he wasn't an American.

And that sort of, what do they call it, summer soldier? really that concept still irritates me. And Butterworth, in various ways, said, "Look, in this life it's a matter of making choices. And if you make a choice and you accept the goodies, you then have to pay the piper when that comes around."

Now for the other side, the Canadian who just was tricked into it, he had utmost sympathy. And what we found out, though, our U.S. Draft Boards were purposely picking up Canadians, because they'd look over their roster and they knew Johnny and Bill and Jim all had families living in their districts, but Oscar from Canada doesn't have anybody around here, so we'll draft him. There was an awful lot of skulduggery. On these things, the draft issue was a very maligned issue. It was a political issue.

We did have a major case that I think got me in particularly good graces with Butterworth and Joe Scott, the DCM. We had an FBI agent come up into Canada and conduct an investigation

without clearance, as if he was doing it down in the United States. This was again a draft dodger case, and that really hit the fan.

And we had another case of a fellow who was actually involved in drugs, Revard. He was living in Montreal and had a network going down into Mexico. His runner was picked up at the border. The fellow had a telephone number; it turned out to be a public telephone. We discovered who he was, and we then began to try and extradite him to the United States for drugs. And then this fellow found a way that he began to bribe people. In fact, there was a lead that was going into Pearson's cabinet, Lester Pearson, the prime minister. So here was one of our people, the Customs at this time working legitimately. We were going after Revard, and all of a sudden the trail of this was leading us around to bribery within the Pearson cabinet, which, if the thing had developed the way it appeared to be, Pearson would have been disgraced and thrown out of office.

Q: So how did that resolve itself?

CHASE: The real thing there was to realize what the danger was and be sure that the prosecution of Revard was handled in a way that didn't go beyond anything other than to get Revard. We eventually were pretty sure that this other trail wouldn't involve bribery of the cabinet, but it was a danger there if it had come out. This Revard, the FBI going up there... There were some other consular problems that did threaten our...

Q: But it was not a quiet, non-challenging post.

CHASE: As much as I had disliked my assignment to Montreal I liked my assignment to Ottawa.

JULIUS L. KATZ
Economic Bureau Officer
Washington, DC (1963-1979)

Julius Katz was born in 1925 in New York, New York. He entered the U.S. Army in 1943 and served in World War II. Mr. Katz graduated from George Washington University and then entered the Foreign Service in 1950. He served at EUR, the Economic Bureau, and was Deputy Director to the Special Trade Representative. Mr. Katz was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1995.

KATZ: There's one other major issue that I should talk about, and that is an issue with Canada. The Canadians had this somewhat contradictory policy of being basically supportive of free trade, but were concerned about whether this would permit them to gain sufficient investment to build their own industries. And this came to a head in the case of automobiles. Their efforts to encourage investment were not working very well. The situation was that Canadian consumers, living astride the U.S. border, wanted the same kind of cars as U.S. consumers. And so their purchases were increasing, notwithstanding a rather substantial price difference, which was a result of Canadian tariff policy. The Canadians then introduced a so-called import for export

scheme. They had developed what was then considered to be a large trade deficit in automobiles, about \$600 to \$700 million and they proposed to correct this through this import for export scheme. Basically, a vehicle manufacturer could import duty free a dollar's worth of goods for every dollar worth of exports out of Canada. And what this was designed to do was to skew the trade more in Canada's favor.

This came at a point where there were also some things happening in the U.S. industry. Right about this time Studebaker decided to go out of the automobile business, but they did it by announcing they were moving their production to Canada. In fact, what they were doing was phasing it out. They were going to continue in Canada for a while, but they closed their plant in South Bend. And this caused a big ruckus. A parts manufacturer of mufflers then brought a subsidy complaint against Canada because of this duty remission scheme. And that produced absolute hysteria in Canada at the thought that we would countervail against imports from Canada. Douglas Dillon, who was Treasury Secretary, was just about to issue a countervailing duty order, when Phil Trezise came up with a brilliant idea.

Phil noted that what we had was a single industry sitting astride the border, with the Canadian plants in Windsor Canada is actually south of Detroit. The industry produced the same kind of vehicles, on both sides of the border, except that the production in Canada was inefficient as compared to the U.S., because the Canadian production runs were so small. For example, in the case of Ford, they produced 90 different models in Canada to meet consumer demand there. They would literally have to stop the assembly line to change from model to model. Wouldn't it be better, Phil suggested if there were an integrated industry across the border?

That led to the U.S.-Canada Auto Agreement. Basically, it was negotiated by four people. It was Phil Trezise and myself from the State Department, and two people from the Department of Commerce, Bob McNeill and Ted Smith. We negotiated this agreement over the course of about seven months, and it was a fairly dramatic event in U.S.-Canadian economic relations. There had been several attempts over the years to have free trade, going back to the 19th century. There was a so-called reciprocal trade agreement, which was abrogated at the time of the Civil War. There was a free-trade agreement that was negotiated in the late 19th century, but it was defeated in Canada after the Speaker of the House, Champ Clark, said that "with the approval of this treaty the Stars and Stripes will soon be flying over the Parliament Building in Ottawa." That didn't sit very well in Canada. There was a secret effort after World War II which came to naught, and never got to the stage of negotiations. So this was a pretty big event, especially in Canada, and the agreement was signed on the banks of the Perdinales (Texas) by President Johnson and Lester Pearson and the two Secretaries of State.

Q: Can we talk a bit about this. One of the themes in these interviews I've been doing is about negotiating with the Canadians. Most foreign service officers who've done this, this and negotiating with the Soviets are about on a par. Could you talk a bit about your experiences with these negotiations?

KATZ: I think it is worth commenting on. The thing about negotiating with the Canadians is that, at least in those days, is that you have two parties that are speaking the same language, I mean literally and figuratively. There are some minor cultural differences, but for the most part

the negotiations are between people who think pretty much alike. Negotiations tend to be very direct and very blunt. In this particular case, (the Auto negotiations) the Canadians had a team consisting of four deputy ministers, including one who was very flamboyant, Simon Reisman, and a dominant personality. Simon was a very smart, but volatile person, so that frequently the negotiations were characterized by a large amount of shouting, table thumping, profanity across the table.

The session that really broke the back of the negotiations occurred in Montebello, which was a resort half way between Montreal and Ottawa in November of 1964. We were holed up there for three days and two nights. There was one point in one almost all-night session, when there was a fair amount of disagreement, not only across the table but within each of the delegations as well. Tension was running high. Simon was misbehaving and then one of his colleagues tried to bring him down off the ceiling. Simon turned on his colleague and said, "who is running this f---ing negotiation?" That produced some shock and then great laughter, which broke the tension.

Q: Who were the people on our delegation?

KATZ: At that point we had others than the main gang of four. We had some lawyers there, and I can remember Phil Trezise also of blowing up. He was angry at both the Canadians and his American colleagues. I walked him back into a little ante room to calm him down. So, negotiations with the Canadians can be pretty wild swinging affairs. They are not quite as structured, or as diplomatic, as they are with other countries.

Q: It sounds much more closer to union management negotiations and automobile industry...

KATZ: That would be a fair comparison. In other negotiations I've been in people get excited, but there is much more civility because they are foreigners. But with the Canadians, there are many fewer inhibitions.

Q: Did the Canadians pull the "Big You and Little Us"?

KATZ: Frequently. There is the inferiority complex factor in our relations with Canada. There's an old story about the Canadians that they are a nation that suffers from two inferiority complexes: one with respect to the mother country and the other to the neighbor to the south. (I sometimes said to my good Canadian friends that the reason they had an inferiority complex is that they really were inferior.) So there is that, and much of their argument was that without some protection, everything will go south. That was something we had to constantly deal with.

Q: As this with Phil Trezise and all this idea of doing this industry wide negotiation; trans-border negotiation; was sort of the example of the coal and steel community, which was really the guts of the European Common Market.

KATZ: There is some parallel here. The Coal and Steel Community in Europe was seen as a forerunner of European economic integration. The Auto Pact had a somewhat similar impact, but it was not undertaken with the larger goal in mind. The Auto Pact was intended at the outset to deal with a specific problem.

It just didn't make sense to have economic barriers at the border in the auto industry. But of course there was the Canadian sensitivity about absorption -- being the 51st State. So one had to be sensitive about this. The idea of free trade, complete free trade as we have now, would not have washed at that point in time. But still, here was a sectoral free trade agreement. Of course, the biggest item of trade between the two countries was in the automobile sector. Much more so now, it's about a third of our trade now - I don't remember what it was then, but it was very important.

The success of the Auto agreement did give rise to questions whether there might be other sectors which might be appropriate for free trade. Simon Reisman, who at the time was the Deputy Minister of Industry, was a key Canadian figure in the negotiation because he had done an earlier study on the automobile industry in Canada, trying to address its inefficiencies. The remission plan, this import for export scheme, was a kind of integration scheme. What it did was to permit the companies, the four major companies, to integrate their operations across the border, although it was vulnerable to attack as a subsidy under our countervailing law. Simon was sympathetic to the notion of integration through free trade and had some notions that this idea could perhaps be extended to the tire industry, and chemicals and other things. But a lot of that was very private, and not an element of the negotiations.

Q: Well, one almost has to look at this type of thing incrementally, isn't that so? To get people used to these things.

KATZ: Yes, but that can cut two ways. There were times subsequently when the people began to see Canada as more of a threat, particularly as the trade balance shifted. And then for a while it was going up and down but after it began to shift, when John Connolly came along, I think he had a somewhat different view. In fact, well, we'll get to that later. But there was another point of view.

Q: With Canada, were there problems over cultural that got into your orbit?

KATZ: Yes, there was an issue and some of these issues continue today. There was an issue then about advertising in Canadian publications. They didn't like the idea of split editions of Time Magazine and the Readers' Digest. What they did was to sell Canadian advertising in the Canadian runs of those publications. They had been there for a long time, so they were somewhat grand fathered, but the Canadians didn't like the idea of American publications running a Canadian edition with Canadian advertising because this competed with Maclean's and other Canadian publications. Canadians had a serious preoccupation with maintaining their own cultural industries, although they have not been able to persuade Americans that cultural industries were essentially different from other industries.

Clearly, the Canadian economy was a somewhat difficult thing to manage, because Canada, although a vast country to the north, in terms of population. was a country of about 100 miles deep and 3,000 miles wide. And the natural economic forces flowed north and south, and not east and west. And to make them go east and west, there were various subventions and policies to force economic relations to go east and west. Their railroad system was designed to unify the

country at tremendous cost in subsidies, which they are now giving up; it's just too expensive. So they are ending the subsidies, and they are privatizing what is left of the railroads. But for more than a century they have maintained transportation and other subsidies. That has given rise to many problems with the U.S. This notion of maintaining an independent Canada is an everyday preoccupation with many Canadians. Of course no country is fully independent today, though no country will admit that.

There are a lot of bad jokes about Canadian culture, which I won't go into now, but we have believed that Canada's cultural policies amount to plain old fashioned protectionism. In addition to the problem of periodicals, we have had problems in broadcasting, and with acquisitions of Canadian book publishers by U.S. companies, which were disallowed.

There was also a banking problem, where CitiBank was denied the right to acquire a Canadian bank, whereas a Dutch bank was permitted to do so. I used to say that at any given time in our relations there was somewhere between half a dozen and a dozen issues with Canada. None tremendously large in money terms, after the auto issue, but very noisy disputes, particularly in Canada. Canadians, if not dominated by, live in fear of domination by the U.S. They are in a sense dominated by all of the noise that comes across the border, that generally flows in one direction. In the U.S. on most days when you pick up the Washington Post or New York Times, I daresay you won't see any stories about Canada. Pick up The Globe and Mail, and there will be half a dozen stories about what's happening in the United States. And that is a cause for sensitivity as well. The Canadians feel they are taken for granted. It's occurred to me the other day that the U.S. Canadian border has the longest one-way mirror in the world. It faces North.

Q: During this time, I'm not sure if you were involved in these types of negotiation: was Diefenbaker the Prime Minister then?

KATZ: No, he had already departed.

Q: This did mean a change, then, because he was very much a nationalist.

KATZ: He was very nationalistic. And Lester Pearson was much more international. But the other thing that began to affect the relationship, particularly after '64, but it was not something I was directly involved in, but it was Vietnam. Lyndon Johnson's resentment over Lester Pearson's less than enthusiastic support for our policy was a sore point with LBJ. In fact, one of the reasons I guess, that the Auto Agreement was signed on the banks of the Perdinales, was so that Johnson could ream out Lester Pearson, which he did. In fact, some of this is written about in the Doris Goodman book about Lyndon Johnson.

RAYMOND F. COURTNEY
Consul General
Vancouver (1965-1968)

Raymond Courtney was born in Tulsa, Oklahoma in 1908. He graduated from

Harvard College and Harvard Business School. Mr. Courtney served in the U.S. Navy during World War II and entered the Foreign Service in 1946. His career included positions in Bulgaria, The United Kingdom (England), Cyprus, Canada, and Washington, DC. Mr. Courtney was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

Q: So Vietnam must have played a fairly big role in your final assignment, 1965-68, in Vancouver. Canadian-American relations were pretty cool at this time weren't they, particularly over Vietnam?

COURTNEY: Yes. Not so much in British Columbia as I think, perhaps, in Ottawa. I talked with people in Vancouver and Victoria and on occasion talked to a public gathering and wrote a couple of pieces that were picked up by a couple of newspapers and given some dissemination in Canada. And, as I said, I was convinced that our policy in Vietnam was necessary and right. I remember one article that the Vancouver Sun published giving it the headline, which I wouldn't have...World War III Starts Here. It was something of an overstatement of what I had tried to say.

I think the feeling in British Columbia was perhaps more sympathetic, more convinced.

Q: It is a more conservative area isn't it?

COURTNEY: Yes, it was then. I believe it is not quite so conservative now as it was then. And, of course, they look to the Pacific and the Far East as much as they do back across the mountains to the east. They are very much concerned with stability in East Asia.

Q: What were your main concerns when you were in Vancouver?

COURTNEY: Well, I really didn't have any difficult problems. I was there to try to keep Ottawa and Washington somewhat informed as to developments. There certainly were no difficult problems in any sense between Washington and Victoria during my time there. It was a very pleasant, friendly relationship.

Q: Were there any reflections felt about the increasing Free Quebec development?

COURTNEY: Yes, although it was not so prominent during that time as it has become, but there is a distinct feeling there that if Quebec should separate, British Columbia possibly in association with Alberta and Saskatchewan might elect to establish their own independent identity. I would be very much surprised if that ever happened. But there is certainly that sentiment there. They would have just as much reason to separate themselves from Ottawa as Quebec would.

Q: Well, did you have the feeling that you were in an area that was not emotionally connected too close to the central government?

COURTNEY: Yes.

Q: There are so many ties in the United States that run not from Ottawa to Washington but basically north to south. Did you find in many ways you were dealing more with the State of Washington than one might think?

COURTNEY: Yes, in a sense. There is that very distinct interest in the southern part of the continent in terms of business. Of course, some industrial products are the same and in direct competition with those in Washington or Oregon. British Columbians are very well aware that California, for example, would dearly love to have some of their good water. There is a natural connection of some of the natural gas resources in the northern part of the continent. And, even, to put it in somewhat vague terms, there is a cultural affinity, perhaps just by being on the western side of the continental divide.

Q: How about consular problems? Did you have any problems with Americans coming up and having a good time in Canada and getting into trouble?

COURTNEY: Nothing serious occurred during my time. Of course there is a great flow of Americans. During my time we reckoned there was at least about a million American visitors to British Columbia in the course of a summer. And from time to time someone would turn up with a hardship story and we had to try to get them some help one way or another. But I don't recall having any problem when an American got himself into legal difficulties.

Q: The drug culture wasn't a problem particularly there then?

COURTNEY: Not really. Only just beginning. What I just said probably wouldn't be true today.

Q: Yes, I am sure both sides are having...I remember talking to a Canadian consul in Seattle talking about problems with Canadian Indians coming down to Washington and getting into trouble and having to get them back. You didn't have the reverse side of that?

COURTNEY: No.

Q: At that point you turned 60 and retired. Is that right?

COURTNEY: Yes.

Q: Well this has been fascinating and I thank you.

COURTNEY: Well, I enjoyed it.

RICHARD J. DOLS
Visa Officer
Toronto (1966-1968)

Richard Dols was born in Minnesota in 1932. He joined the Foreign Service in

1961. His career included posts in France, Canada, New Zealand, and Swaziland. Mr. Dols was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

Q: Then you moved from dealing with this problem to dealing with a more passive area...you went to Toronto from 1966-68.

DOLS: What happened was that Congress passed the 1965 Immigration Act Amendment. They were radical amendments as far as the system was concerned. Suddenly the Canadian posts were overwhelmed because they were given jurisdiction over large hunks of the United States for immigration purposes. Western Hemisphere applicants could not change their status while within the US. They had to go abroad to get immigrant visas. There were loads of Cubans, in particular, in the northeast part of the country. Toronto was overwhelmed by the law change. The Personnel people said, "We know you don't want to go back to it but you are going to have to because we have to deal with this new problem." So off we went to Toronto which we found a great post.

Q: Basically we did away with many aspects of the quota system. What type of people were you dealing with and how did you find this was working?

DOLS: We were dealing with basically the usual category of Latino refugee. Many of them, Cuban, Haitians, etc., had been recruited in the islands from New York. Remember we had a World's Fair in 1966, or somewhere in there, in New York. The typical fix by the visa fixer was to have a letter from old aunt so-and-so or old uncle so-and-so to nephew in Haiti, etc. to come up and see the World's Fair. We will pay the fare. Actually this had been put together by runners on the islands who had recruited these potential immigrants. These people were given NIV, non-immigrant visas, and they came up and got lost immediately. They took dishwashing jobs, etc. Then they began the process of trying to get their status adjusted.

For the first six months it was easy. You floated for six months because you had that much time. Then the visa lawyer would have a secretary go down to the INS office and get another automatic extension for another six months. Of course that cost a few hundred bucks and this poor guy who is laboring in a hot kitchen in Manhattan somewhere in a restaurant had to pay.

At the year point, INS would breath a little harder on the necks of these people. The visa fixer would say that it would cost a little more. Does uncle have a house? Oh, yeah, he has a house out in the Bronx. Well, it is going to cost you x number of thousands of dollars for me to take this case and I want a mortgage on that house. I want money up front in some way. So they would, of course, buy in. Each time there was a problem it would cost a little more. It was always family members or whoever who had to come up to finance the thing.

Eventually we would get the case. We would have to go through the process of deciding. In most cases these people were eligible but they had been ripped off in the process.

Q: Speaking as a professional consular officer of many years, one developed a deep contempt of immigration lawyers. Some, of course, were obviously above board, but many were ambulance chasers who could no longer keep up with the ambulances and began to do immigration work.

DOLS: Exactly. When I was a prosecutor I saw the equivalent cut defending drunk drivers.

Q: In your Foreign Service experience, what do you think you gained from this hot house?

DOLS: I gained a lot. I gained mostly management experience. We were in terrible condition. The Consulate was receiving mail by the huge mailbag full. They could not even open the bags. They would simply put a date tag on the bag. They had thousands and thousands of pieces of unprocessed mail. They were receiving 15,000 phone inquiries a month because, of course, everything was delayed. We had five people working the phones because of that. We were getting 20 some Congressionals a month because of all these delays. When someone called to request the status of their application, the person on the phone would ask when they had sent in the last piece to process and with that date the women in my section would go searching the mailbags to see if they could unearth the missing letter, etc. It was chaos. The card file had about 125,000 cards in it. To file a card correctly you had to go down to about the fourth letter in the alphabet before you got it into the right slot. You can imagine the errors.

They had a kind of assembly line immigration processing system where one person handled one little part of it and then passed it on to another, etc. This was chaos because you had no accountability at all. You couldn't figure out who was making errors and why things happened.

We had to do something. We culled that card file down from 125,000 to less than 25,000, the active cases. That was an obvious start so we knew where we really were. We retooled the assembly line so that one visa clerk handled the case all the way through right up to the final appointment. That way you knew who to blame if things went wrong. You knew how fast they were working. You knew a lot of things.

We put together the first teach-in which was basically a re-do of the consular course given at FSI. The locals had never had any kind of really good formal training. So we put on a training program for them. I did huge charts and put them all over our offices showing the flow of applications, etc. We eventually had great success. In fact, it went very quickly. Within 2 or 3 months we were current on the mail. We were able to cut the telephone people from five to two. Our calls went from 8,000 a month or so down to 1,500 or so. Congressionals dropped from 20 some a month to less than five. We had a lot happier crew in the process. Everybody felt so much better about it. So it was really a neat management experience.

Q: Within the Foreign Service often the consular business, especially the visa business, is something to be avoided. But there are great lessons to be learned here. It is one place where you can get management experience at a relatively junior grade.

Then you moved to what was to become one of your two areas of specialization...the first being Southern Africa and then Micronesia. Your next assignment was in Swaziland from 1969-71. How did that assignment come about?

ALLEN B. MORELAND

**Consul General
Toronto (1966-1970)**

Allen Moreland was born in 1911. He received a bachelor's degree from the University of Florida and served in the U.S. Navy overseas during World War II. Mr. Moreland received a law degree from Georgetown University. He entered the Foreign Service in 1947, serving in several capacities in Washington, DC, in Stuttgart, and in Montreal. Mr. Moreland was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1989.

Q: And part of it was not only did we need it, but also there was the need on the part of management to demonstrate the State Department has moved beyond the quill pen. It was sort of revolutionary, but now almost in 1990, one cannot imagine how one lived without it, but then it was men like Crockett and yourself who was forcing this into one small area of the foreign affairs apparatus.

MORELAND: That is certainly the feeling that I have, yes. After this thing was a success in Toronto I was asked by Crockett and the Western European Office Director to take time out on my home leave to lead a small delegation to key posts in Europe to lay the foundation for expanding the system to Paris, London, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and Rome. I did that and subsequently this system was expanded to those points. At the same time, the posts that didn't have the volume to warrant this expense of a direct connection, we reduced the look-out book to microfiche and set up the machines so reference to the contents of the books could be speedier.

Q: Microfiche is film that can be reproduced very cheaply.

MORELAND: And it is much easier to send out because it can be put in an envelope.

Q: Before, it used to be a big book. The look-out book is the book where it is found that people who are ineligible, they appear in a book and it means that you look at them extra carefully, and you have to check with the visa office in order to issue them a visa. Well, in your time in Toronto, you were consul general from 1966 to 1970, was this your main work in setting this up?

MORELAND: No, we had the normal programs of a large consular district, The province of Ontario was one of the most important economic cogs in the economy of Canada and the political situation there was such that it was the key to the political success of the Federal Administration. So we had a political program, an economic program, and a visa program. We didn't have as elaborate a public affairs program in Canada, as in Germany.

Q: Really wasn't necessary. Because of the spillage across the border. How did you find dealing with the officials in Ontario, were they sort of annoyed? The "Well America doesn't pay enough attention to Canada and all this?"

MORELAND: Well, I arrived in Canada in January of 1966. At that time an American could do no wrong. Members of the staff at the Consulate were very much a part of the community, very well liked, and we had very few problem except, of course, we did hear the media complain

about American investment in Canada, and that American advertising was too pervasive, and that Reader's Digest and other periodicals were all were coming across the border with their advertisements. The Canadian media was particularly irritated that Canadians could go across the border to Buffalo and advertise Canadian products on the Buffalo television. These complaints were not voiced by the population at large. As the process of disturbances increased incidental to Vietnam, by the time we left at the end of '70, we had threats on our lives; we had guards around the house; and at times my wife and I wanted to go off on the weekends, police guards were automatically assigned to guard our residence because our daughter didn't go with us. It was a tremendous transformation over a period of three years.

Q: Who were doing the threats? Where were they coming from?

MORELAND: One very interesting vignette. One day the senior Canadian staff member came to me and said "I have just had a very interesting telephone conversation, with a University in Southwest Ontario. I got a call from a Dean of one of the Schools there who said, 'how well are you acquainted with the immigration people?'" This senior representative replied, "American or Canadian?" He said "Canadian." The reply was, "Well, I know them alright, but what is your problem?" He says "we have recruited a Professor from the U.S. for our staff here, but Canadian immigration won't let him in because he has three convictions. Is there any way you can intercede? Can you get the Canadians to waive his ineligibility and let him come in?" The response was "There is no way." The problem was many universities were recruiting U.S. activists, and when they came in their activism was given full vent in Canada and a lot of silly things were done due to their agitation. That is to say nothing of the activism of the students who had fled from America and were enrolled there.

Q: How did you deal with them? Did they bother you or did you bother them?

MORELAND: No not really. The front of the American Consulate General in Toronto was a favorite meeting place for all of the activists and the media. Because all one needed to do was say there was going to be a demonstration in front of the American Consulate General and full media coverage was instantaneous. It was right downtown and very convenient for everybody. I never will forget one day that we had a tremendous demonstration out front. I looked out the window and heard the chant "Get Canadian banks out of Trinidad!" I mean it was a completely local issue, but they had found a formula to phone the media and say we are going to demonstrate before the American Consulate General. We had nothing to do with the substance of it, but this is what happened.

Q: This has been fascinating. Then you left Canada when?

MORELAND: In September of 1970.

CORNELIUS D. SCULLY, III
Visa Officer
Montreal (1966-1968)

Cornelius D. Scully III was raised in Washington, DC. He entered the Foreign Service in 1961. His career included positions in Nice, Montreal, and Washington, DC. Mr. Scully was interviewed by William D. Morgan in 1992.

Q: She, Auerbach, and Frances Knight might have had a lot in common. Then you went on to Montreal?

SCULLY: In 1966, yes, I went to Montreal. There I was assigned specifically to the visa section.

Q: So there you could get a direct feeling for what Washington's policies and machinations meant to the field. Tell us about that.

SCULLY: It was very interesting. I arrived in Montreal in the fall of 1966. The post was preparing for Expo '67, the World's Fair, which was held in Montreal from April of 1967 through the fall of '67. I was assigned to the visa section. There was much concern about volume. It was clear that there was going to be an immense international attendance at Expo '67.

Q: Up to now we've spoken mostly of substance of the visa function, the admissibility issues, the details; the minutiae, if you will. Now we're talking about the other half, which has become today an overwhelming issue, and that is volume, the number of people moving to the United States and wanting to come. You were struck by it in Montreal for the first time.

SCULLY: For the first time it became an issue, because it seemed clear to us, from everything the Canadians were saying about their expectations of attendance at the World's Fair, there were going to be millions upon millions of international visitors to Canada from all around the world, and we fully anticipated that we were going to wind up with a major, major surge of visa applicants from among all those people who would decide, "I'm already in Canada. I want to go to the States." They would not have gotten a visa in their home country for whatever reason, and the expectation was that there was going to be a gigantic avalanche of visa applicants.

Q: After all, they'd come all the way to Canada, and the United States is only thirty, forty miles to the south.

SCULLY: Just so.

Q: Maybe that's a good way to "sneak in the back door." We must remind the reader that Canadians do not need visas. We're only talking about other nationalities.

SCULLY: That was one of the problems that we faced, was that since Canadian citizens didn't need visas, the normal flow of visa applicants in the consulate, while there and meaningful in terms of people passing through Canada or non-Canadian residents of the country, was radically smaller than it would have been if Canadian citizens themselves had had to get visas. So the post was staffed around what would ordinarily be a workload that was way below what the population base in the district might normally have created if it had been a country other than Canada.

Q: The visa section in Montreal being maybe three officers and ten Foreign Service nationals?

SCULLY: Probably not more than that. I think there were two immigrant visa officers plus a supervisor. So you had two non-immigrant visa officers, two immigrant visa officers, and then the visa chief, and then maybe ten or so Foreign Service nationals, ten to twelve. That's not really a very large staff. It was quite appropriate for the volume that they had had without the influence of the World's Fair, but this was the issue that we faced -- what to do with this anticipated huge surge?

Q: And especially in a nice, little, old Victorian, extraordinary inefficient building.

SCULLY: We were downtown in the Stock Exchange Building. That had happened just before I arrived in Montreal. They'd moved out of the Victorian complex up on McGregor Avenue and they'd moved downtown to Place Victoria, which was the stock exchange building. Only the visa section. The rest of the Consulate General was still up the hill on McGregor Avenue, but the visa section was down at Place Victoria on the ground floor of the stock exchange building. I think, in part, that move had been made in anticipation of the World's Fair.

Q: It gave a wonderful example of Quebec, Place Victoria.

SCULLY: Exactly. One of the things that I encountered when I got to Montreal has always fascinated me a bit. We were the second post in the Foreign Service to receive the Automated Visa Lookout System, AVLOS. The first post was Toronto, and that was because of the influence of the man I mentioned earlier, Mr. Moreland. Mr. Moreland, while he was Director of the Visa office, had been one of the pioneers in automation and was really the father of the AVLOS. When he left the Visa Office, he became consul general in Toronto, so Toronto became the first pilot post for AVLOS. We became the second post that went on line with AVLOS, and Montreal was chosen as the second post precisely because of the World's Fair and the idea that having an automated lookout system would facilitate the processing of all these people.

I remember Neal Parks, who was chief of the visa section, and I used to sit and sort of fantasize about all the wonderful things we could do with AVLOS, and how we could send administrative messages and we could send in requests for advisory opinions and do this and do that and all the various things that one could do with it. In fact, for a while we persuaded the Visa Office to let us do things like that, so we were sending requests for advisory opinions by AVLOS messages and all this sort of thing, until we got caught at it. Something happened, one message went awry, and a congressional inquiry didn't get a response back, and there was much storm, and then the people in the Communications Division suddenly realized that here was this post abroad that was sending messages to the State Department outside of normal communication channels, and they issued a dictate that you couldn't do that anymore. So a lot of our wonderful plans went right up in smoke at that point.

Q: I think you've given us the first example of the difference between the field and the home office, and how the field has to make things work, and not always is the home office satisfied with that. And we're going to get you transferred after Montreal back to the home office, where all kinds of behind-the-scenes things happened.

But first, more impressions of Montreal. This is your last overseas assignment. What did you gain from this influx of visa applicants or other experiences in Montreal you want to share with the reader?

SCULLY: One of the things that struck me, as we were in the end of 1966 and beginning of 1967, we were struggling to get sorted out and get ourselves prepared for what we felt was going to be an onslaught, there was a series of very strange triangular communications between Montreal and Ottawa, the embassy, and the department over staffing, what staffing we would get, how many officers we could expect, what we needed, and this kept going around and around. At a given point, it finally became apparent that we were talking off different pieces of paper.

The problem was the department was looking at a staffing pattern that they had and saying, "There are already X number of officers assigned to the consular section in Montreal." Neal Parks and I were looking at the number of bodies that actually reported to work every day in the visa section, and it was noticeably smaller than what was on the staffing pattern.

Q: People were out sick, or what?

SCULLY: No, the slots were there, but the people weren't there or they were slotted against the consular section, but actually were in other functions, or maybe Ottawa had grabbed the position for something, and although the department staffing pattern showed there was a slot in the consular section in Montreal, it wasn't. I'll never forget, this finally came to the point that the DCM from Ottawa, Joe Scott, and the administrative counselor and Will Chase, who was the counselor for consular affairs -- I can't remember the administrative counselor. I think it was Idar Rimestad, as a matter of fact. Came down to Montreal to meet with us to discuss this.

Q: Count bodies and heads?

SCULLY: Exactly. The consul general, Richard Hawkins, and Neal Parks, the chief of the visa section, and I met with these three gentlemen, and we spent some little time discussing this. It became apparent to me, as the discussion wore on, that nobody who was participating in that discussion had a clear fix on what Montreal's complement was, as opposed to how many people were there. I use the word complement. I don't know if the State Department does. In the military, the complement is the authorized number of slots. A ship's complement is the number of personnel authorized to be assigned to that ship, as opposed to the number of people that are actually there.

One of the problems was that nobody had a clear fix on what Montreal's complement was, and, therefore, nobody could figure out how many slots were filled, what percentage of the slots were filled.

Q: Therefore, how many new ones you needed.

SCULLY: Exactly. We had been saying we needed five officers, and the department kept

insisting we only needed three at most, and it finally became apparent that the reason was they felt we had more people than we had. It was one of the most bizarre exercises I was ever involved in, and I think it's something that is not altogether overcome, even today, twenty-five years later. I still see some anecdotal evidence that there are these misunderstandings between posts and the department about, "What is the complement?" And, "Where is Junior Officer Smith?" Junior Officer Smith is supposed to be in the consular section. That's what the staffing pattern says. But the chief of the consular section says, "No, Junior Officer Smith is working as the ambassador's aide. He's not in the consular section." Only the personnel people in Washington don't know that. There's a great deal of that even today.

Q: My experience, picking up from that point and paralleling yours back here in the Department, is not only is that true, but it's magnified by ten, twenty, thirty times. Today we are so "understaffed," we are bringing in substitutes (call them whatever you may) in order to solve this tremendous continuing burgeoning of the population. What you saw in 1966-67, over the next twenty, twenty-five years has been exactly the same -- failure to count the bodies correctly -- but maybe even avoiding counting the bodies correctly.

SCULLY: That may very well be. This may not be an accident.

Q: I think you've discovered on tour too in the field something that has continued and is probably far worse, and often becomes the pushing force behind decisions that really shouldn't be personnel oriented. Maybe you remember, Dick, Barbara Watson's expression at one point where she had to issue a certain number of visas, called the Silva case, in which all of a sudden hundreds and hundreds of visas had to be issued, and the answer from the administration, from the management of the State Department, was, "We don't have the bodies." To which I remember well she said, "Well, then you go to jail, Director General, for failing to carry out the requirements. I'm not." Personnel staffing, as you know, is vital.

SCULLY: A couple of other anecdotal things that I think reflect problems that still exist today. We were very experimental with AVLOS.

Q: Which is just the beginning of a whole series of highly computerized advances.

SCULLY: Exactly. You had a data entry clerk who sat at a terminal, and every visa applicant's name was entered into the AVLOS system, typed in by the clerk, and then certain keys were pushed, and what, in effect, was being done was that name was being matched against the database of names of aliens who had been found excludable.

Q: It typed it out on a long teletype-like, primitive, holed piece of paper.

SCULLY: Exactly. It was typed out on an old tickertape that was run through the machine.

Q: Clunkers!

SCULLY: The system was fine within certain limits. But I'll never forget, on a certain day we had a Portuguese applicant whose name was Gomes. So the operator who ran the thing cut the

tape and put Mr. Gomes' name into the system. The printer started typing out all the Gomezes that were in the system. Needless to say, all of them were Spanish Gomezes with Zs, and this was a Portuguese Gomes, with an S. But it didn't discriminate well enough. Forty-five minutes later, while it was still printing, I simply said, "Turn the machine off. We'll all go to lunch." It was approximately noon. "Eventually it will stop printing Gomezes," but it completely tied the whole system up for nearly an hour. I issued an order. I was chief of the non-immigrant visa section at that point, and I simply issued a decree, "No more Spanish names are going into the AVLOS system. They're all going to be looked up manually in the old visa lookout book, because we cannot afford to have the system run for thirty or forty-five minutes printing irrelevant names every time we enter one in."

Q: There was nothing in the law, nothing in the regulations, nor instructions that gave you that authority.

SCULLY: Well, we still had the lookout books.

Q: Common sense.

SCULLY: But what that reflects, I think, is the limits of technology and the necessity to refine the technology and for human beings to make thoughtful decisions about how you're going to use the technology, because when you're doing a name search like that and you're using as your basic elements the name, the date, and the place of birth, you have to make certain decisions about the scope of the electronic search or the computer search that's going to be made. There's always a tradeoff between overloading that system with a very broadly defined search and thereby making it almost impossible to use the system, and making it so narrow that you're going to miss an entry that you really need to get. Those kinds of things cannot be solved by the technology; they can only be solved by people.

Q: Those words are words I heard from you many years later in the Visa Office, in a very responsible position, in which you said, "Officers in the field are commissioned. They are commissioned to act as sensible human officers, not as bureaucrats, but people with brains and common sense." You certainly learned that in Montreal. You carried it back to Washington. Can we bring you back now to Washington, where some of those practical experiences perhaps came from the field?

SCULLY: Yes. My tour in Montreal was great fun both professionally and personally.

Q: How did the onslaught of visa applicants go?

SCULLY: Actually, it worked quite well. We were ultimately given additional personnel. We managed to reconfigure the workspace.

Q: And they weren't all Gomezes?

SCULLY: They weren't all Gomezes. The volume increased substantially. It never increased quite as much as we had projected, based on some statistical analysis with numbers that came

from the World's Fair organizing committee and those sorts of people, but I'd say it pretty close to tripled. We had anticipated more than that, but it pretty close to tripled. Thanks to the fact that we did have the AVLOS system and we did get extra personnel and did get some money to reconstruct the section so that we could get a better workflow, we were able to deal with it.

Q: And a lot of good common sense.

SCULLY: Although I have to say it was very amusing. We were a ground floor tenant in the Montreal stock exchange building, and, needless to say, our clientele was not exactly at the same socioeconomic level as the people that normally frequented the stock exchange building. One of my comic memories is this building manager in his uniform pacing back and forth through the lobby at about ten minutes to two, anxiously waiting for us to open for the afternoon so that this motley mob that was all out in his lobby could be taken in behind our curtained windows and hidden from the lawyers and the stockbrokers and other elegant people that were going through the rest of the building. But we managed to make it work, and it was fun and it was a very interesting experience.

Q: And those experiences from Nice and Montreal you brought back to the "real world."

SCULLY: [Laughter] Well . . .

Q: You were assigned to the Visa Office?

SCULLY: Yes, I was assigned back to the Visa Office in early 1968. Initially I was supposed to go into the anti-fraud branch, which was then under the Advisory Opinions Division under good old John T. McGill, who all the old-timers will remember, who was a great character.

CHARLES E. MARTHINSEN
Public Relations Officer
Montreal (1967)

Ambassador Charles E. Marthinsen was born in Missouri in 1931. After receiving his bachelor's degree from Gannon College in 1953, he served in the United States Army from 1953-1955. His career has included positions in Dacca, Beirut, Jeddah, Damascus, Montreal, Cairo, Tripoli, and an ambassadorship to Qatar. Ambassador Marthinsen was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in July 2003.

Q: What were you doing in Montreal?

MARTHINSEN: I was handling public relations—actually a tour guide for White House, USIPs, senators, House of Representatives, and an array of state government officials plus assorted realtors, automobile dealers, etc. A lot of interesting and nice people turned up, jumped the line, and were given a quick tour of our pavilion and escorted to see other pavilions comprising the

quite spectacular Exposition. So I had to arrive very early in the morning and leave very late at night to play tour guide for an army of visitors to Montreal. We enjoyed our life in that beautiful city. We were there when De Gaulle visited and ended his speech to the Québécois: "Vive le Quebec! Vive le Quebec libre!"

Q: De Gaulle was disinvented to come to Ottawa after that.

MARTHINSEN: I dare say.

Q: Independence with Quebec, who knows where it will be. It reached a peak and now it's died down quite a bit.

MARTHINSEN: But the emotional appeal is still there. That's something I learned. I expect the increased emphasis on bilingualism together with the exodus of many English speaking Canadians from Montreal and other cities led to the return of calm. I wouldn't be surprised if over time the pressure for independence should revive.

JACK SEYMOUR
Canada Analyst, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Washington, DC (1967-1969)

Mr. Seymour was born in the Philippines, the son of a U.S Navy family. He earned his bachelor's degree from Dartmouth University in 1962. He joined the Foreign Service in 1967 after serving in the U.S Army for three years. His career included postings in Canada, Yugoslavia, Poland, Germany, and Belgium. Mr. Seymour was interviewed by Raymond Ewing on November 20th 2003.

Q: That was their program in Berlin?

SEYMOUR: Yes, it had just opened there, sort of competing with the University of Maryland and its extensive overseas programs, but BU was coming in at the graduate level. It was very good; I did a lot of research in the Free University library to which we had access and also a lot of extensive writing. I'll never forget when Martin after a few weeks on the job asked if I would do a study of Quebec and tensions between Canada and Quebec. This was in the fall of 1967, not long after de Gaulle had made his controversial "Vive Québec libre!" call that outraged Canadians, the English-speaking ones, at least, during a state visit that was consequently cut short. Partly because of the concerns his visit raised, INR decided it needed a full-time analyst on Canada. It turned out to be an absolutely fascinating time because of a changing of the political guard in major parties, the progressive conservatives, the Diefenbaker party, changed leaders when Robert Stansfield succeeded Diefenbaker, and then Lester Pearson relinquished leadership of the Liberals to Pierre Trudeau. Eventually Trudeau won the next elections and launched major reviews of both foreign policy and defense policy, and that was very interesting to follow. Then in Quebec René Lévesque burst upon the scene with a liberation manifesto and a new organization the *Parti Québécois*. All this created much interest in New York and Washington.

I could tell a little anecdote involving a living former statesman, you might say, and that was Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was then in the policy planning staff. He called me very excitedly on the day that the formation of the *Parti Québécois* was announced in the press wanting to know if we had the text of the Party's "manifesto." Fortuitously, I'd just been reading it in French in one of the Montreal newspapers. So I did a cut-and-paste job and brought it up to his office. He was very excited and kind of grabbed it away and went off with it. And then next thing there was a high-level meeting called, and Averell Harriman was there. He was Ambassador-at-Large, I believe, and Martin Packman attended as head of the Western European office of INR. Martin recounted that Brzezinski presented the problem in alarming terms, describing the possibility of a "Cuba on our northern doorstep." There was a lot of discussion about that, and Harriman, the "crocodile," seemed to be sleeping at the far end of the table, when at a certain point he "roused himself" and declared that the whole idea was nonsense. That pretty much ended the meeting, according to Martin, and it ended the perhaps overly emotional concern about Quebec.

We continued to watch the situation, but from a more sober perspective after that. Brzezinski had grown up and gone to school in Canada; including to McGill University; I think his father was a Polish diplomat there, just before or during the war. So he had a special interest in Canada.

Q: Interesting. So you were the INR analyst for Canada, your first Foreign Service assignment, and you probably didn't have a lot of experience with Canada before, except you went to college at Dartmouth, not too far away.

SEYMOUR: Yes, and I had gone up Canada to ski several times but that was it. Still, it turned out to be a really interesting assignment, and I valued what I learned. Later, I enjoyed keeping up with Canadian politics with Canadian colleagues in overseas posts, and I think they appreciated an American who knew something about it.

Q: I was, you know, about this same period, from '67 to '69 was in the trade agreements division of the economic bureau and working on the Canadian auto products agreement and some of the trade issues that we had with Canada at that time and went to Ottawa a couple of times and to Detroit but I don't think I was all that interested, and you probably weren't that interested in the economic trade aspects and I wasn't that interested in the politics at that juncture.

SEYMOUR: That's right. I remember on any given day we would get a stack of cables from Canadian posts and usually three-quarters of them had to do with economic issues of various kinds and a few with politics. But some of those economic issues were interesting, and they were certainly important. It was amazing the tangles we could get into with a neighboring country over things like branding whiskey; which at one time some Canadian firms were producing and calling bourbon, and our people making bourbon in Tennessee and Kentucky got pretty upset about that. There were also pollution problems in Allagash River in Maine and tariffs on our publication like Readers Digest and so forth, so each side had plenty to quarrel about.

Q: And there were issues involving trade and potatoes and turkeys and carrots.

SEYMOUR: Yes. There's so much interchange and along with that along come many problems.

Q: Okay. So, how long were you in INR on the Canadian desk?

SEYMOUR: A good two years, and then from there I went to Zagreb.

MICHAEL E.C. ELY
Canadian National Defense College
Kingston (1969-1970)

Michael E.C. Ely was raised at U.S. Army posts. He entered the Foreign Service in 1955. His career included positions in Malaysia, Algeria, Somalia, Italy, Japan, Belgium, France, and Washington, DC. Mr. Ely was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

ELY: So, anyhow, I packed up and went off to Kingston, Ontario, for a year at the Canadian National Defense College. And went to a marriage counselor, who pronounced the marriage healed. He was wrong. And I had a marvelous year there. I was under a lot of strain. I had intestinal parasites. I had psychosomatic symptoms connected with marriage problems. And I got my head screwed back on in Canada.

Q: One always hears about the Canadian attitude: Poor little us; if you go to bed with an elephant, you may get crushed. All these things, which sometimes seem to be played to a fare-thee-well, but the Canadians always seem to get a little extra out of it. Did you find this at the Defense College, or was this a different game?

ELY: The people at the Defense College were Canadian military. There were three American serving officers, and myself from the State Department; there were three British serving officers, one guy from the Foreign Office; and the remainder were Canadian civilians and military. And by and large, they were very pro-American, very well disposed. They liked to say things like, "Yankee go home, and take your Canadian friends with you." They'd all served in Europe, in the Canadian NATO air units there. And they'd all visited Washington. They have Americans and British there not because they want to educate us, but because they want our viewpoints for the Canadians. So I energetically defended American viewpoints, which is what I was supposed to do. Made a lot of new friends, and generally had a very good year. Compared to Harvard, it was not all that intellectually stimulating, but the lectures were interesting and I learned a lot about Canada. The idea was that I was going to go on as economic counselor to Ottawa afterward. But the job opened up early and had to be filled, so I was going to be sent to Washington to work on Canadian affairs. And my wife said she would divorce me if we went to Washington, so I wrote to the director general and said for once, send me somewhere else. They sent me back to Paris.

There, my marriage continued to deteriorate.

LILLIAN E. OSTERMEIER
Secretary to the Ambassador
Ottawa (1969-1971)

Ms. Ostermeier was born and raised in Illinois. After graduating from Business College she worked as secretary and administrative assistant with a number of organizations in the private and government sectors. From 1956 to 1969, she was assigned to the United States Embassy in London as Secretary, first to Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission Walworth Barbour and subsequently to Ambassadors John Jay Whitney and David Bruce. Her final overseas assignment was as Secretary to Ambassador Adolph Schmidt in Ottawa. Ms. Ostermeier was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

OSTERMEIER: 1971, 1972. I left London in 1969, and went to Ottawa, from 1969 to 1971.

Q: Oh, let's talk a little about Ottawa. What were you doing in Ottawa?

OSTERMEIER: I was secretary to the Ambassador with Adolph Schmidt who was a political appointee. It was a very nice post, but quite a contrast.

Q: Did you feel that it was kind of "small town" stuff.

OSTERMEIER: I suppose I did in a way. I just adapted to the occasion. Are you familiar with the city of Ottawa?

Q: No.

OSTERMEIER: In those days, the Ottawa government was on a hill. The American embassy was across the street. They used to refer to their departments as the block, the south block, the east block, the west block, the north block. They jokingly referred to the American embassy as the south block. We had a very close relationship with the Canadians. But, now they have built a new embassy in Ottawa. I haven't seen it, but I understand it is quite nice.

Q: The government turned over the old embassy to the prime minister, something like that.

OSTERMEIER: Oh, did they? I don't know.

Q: How did Adolph Schmidt work?

OSTERMEIER: He had been a friend of Ambassador Bruce. He was quite impressed to get Ambassador Bruce's secretary. He was extremely nice to me. He treated me like an officer. I sat in on meetings. I had a wonderful relationship with him. Of course, I only stayed a year. This little seal is my parting gift from him.

Q: Oh. Well, you went with Ambassador Bruce to the peace talks. What were the peace talks?

OSTERMEIER: They were going to try to settle the war in Vietnam. I think we had one previous – whatever his title was. It was quite an international announcement when Bruce was going to go to the peace talks. I didn't participate. I didn't really know what was going on. He would go. He was more or less a figurehead, because the embassy had its speakers, the representatives. Because of his prestige, he was a very important person.

Q: Were things going to his office that you were dealing with, concerning this?

OSTERMEIER: Very little, very little. He spent a lot of time on some personal things. These were personal diaries he brought up to date, and what have you. But, he would go to the meetings. What was his name? The Foreign Service office, who is now dead, was the principal representative. They would go together. But Bruce was really the name. I'll think of the man's name.

Q: Did you feel that Bruce was feeling a little left out, or beginning to get bored with the whole diplomatic business, or not?

OSTERMEIER: I don't know. He did something for UNESCO. What does UNESCO stand for?

Q: Social organization; United Nations Social and Economic Organization, I think.

OSTERMEIER: He had some dealings with that in Washington. Then, he had a great tragedy in his life. His daughter was killed.

Q: Yes, terrible.

OSTERMEIER: I think he was probably glad to get back into a more active life, but he only stayed a year. He knew he was only going to be there a year when he took the job.

VLADIMIR I. TOUMANOFF
Counselor for Political Affairs
Ottawa (1969-1973)

Vladimir Toumanoff was born in Constantinople in 1923 to Russian parents. He attended Harvard University and joined the Foreign Service in 1950. He served in several posts including Germany, Iceland, Moscow, and Canada. He was interviewed by William D. Morgan in 1999.

Q: That's right. They've proved it. All right, now you're going to take all that to Canada, to the U.S. Embassy, your next, and as it turned out, last assignment?

TOUMANOFF: Yes, at the end of this wonderful brain-stretching exercise, I was posted to the U.S. Embassy in Ottawa, Canada, in the Autumn of 1969 as the Embassy Counselor for Political Affairs. It was a logical enough assignment as I had been immersed in Canada, so to speak, for

almost a year. But it was decidedly out of my Soviet area field of experience, knowledge and interest.

Q: *And you were there how long?*

TOUMANOFF: I was there until 1973, April 30, to be precise.

Q: *The normal two- to four-year tour.*

TOUMANOFF: Actually, it was a slightly extended 3-year tour, but we can get to that at the end, if you are interested.

One thinks of Canada as a stable, somewhat staid society. Such, emphatically, was not the case during my tour. Three elements coincided to produce turmoil.

One was Pierre Elliot Trudeau, the “J. F. K. of Canada” newly Prime Minister, young, energetic, glamorous, brilliant, charismatic, eloquent in both national languages, but with an attitude toward the United States of an arrogant French intellectual aristocrat. In a word, scornful dislike. Be it said we were not all that likeable – in the midst of the Vietnam war, with Nixon as President, and almost absent-mindedly an overwhelming cultural, economic, political and demographic threat to the sanctity of Canada – 20 million people spaced out like small beads on a long thread along the border of 235 million Americans, a megastate by every measure.

Another was an alienated French Québec so resentful of real and imagined oppression and injury at the hands of English-speaking Canada as to be on the verge of secession, with an impact something like having the Mississippi watershed secede from the United States, with no common language.

And finally, a burgeoning Canadian nationalism, anti-American and anti-Québec in the English provinces, and assertively anti-Anglo and pro-independence in Québec. The alienation of the French Québécois was so intense it had already spawning the terrorist FLQ the *Force Liberation Québécoise*, loosely but accurately translated as the Québec Freedom Fighters, which had started blowing up mailboxes with sticks of dynamite by the time I came to the Embassy. The pro-independence political party, which disowned the FLQ, was the Parti Québécois. It had a near majority vote in the Province and had provoked a constitutional crisis.

Trudeau’s imperative task was to combat Québec separatism and preserve the unity of Canada. To that end he pursued a three-fold program: to stimulate Canadian patriotism/nationalism; to portray the United States as an ugly, aggressive giant constantly threatening to overwhelm Canada; and to assuage and accommodate Québec as a treasured and protected unique component of Canada. His calculation was:-

- 1) To generate in English Canada a combination of ardent Canadian nationalism and fear of U.S. takeover in the event of Québec secession. An independent Québec would have broken English Canada into two small, very different clusters of provinces separated by a French nation; an Atlantic maritime cluster, and a western remnant, each with starkly smaller populations and

economies, and each much less able to withstand absorption by the U.S., perhaps piecemeal, province by province. Thus Trudeau would move English Canada to be more sensitive and accommodating to Québec, and the Québécois to forgo secession in order to preserve their own precious Canadian identity and escape the ugly American.

2) To persuade French Québec that independence would leave them isolated and surrounded by a resentful and vengeful English Canada and a giant America, a tiny French island of barely 4 million in a gigantic sea of 250 million Anglos. What chance had they of preserving their French culture from being overwhelmed and expunged. Better to stay in a caring and accommodating Canada.

Q: Real nationalism.

TOUMANOFF: Yes, and it included, and required, an anti-American spasm. Remember, most Canadians liked, respected and admired America. They had relatives, they shopped, traded, vacationed, many spent entire winters in Florida and the South. A fair number actually thought joining the U.S. might not be such a bad thing, probably bring greater prosperity. Get rid of those pesky Québécois and join the U.S., some thought, especially in British Columbia, which had its own small independence movement.

Trudeau had to alienate that affection and attraction to save the nation. He went at it with a will, partly as he shared neither the affection nor attraction. In large part he succeeded. Let me illustrate. First of all, he was the epitome of the vibrant, new, glamorous and exciting Canada, the J.F.K. of the north, after we killed ours, as well as his killer (Canadian version). While the U.S. was mired in Vietnam and domestic turmoil. Our cities were burning, our students revolting, fighting with police and National Guard, even being shot. Our President distrusted, neurotic, and vilified by the press. Trudeau did not disguise his disdain. His speeches, and those of his Officials and ruling Party leaders were critical and eloquent in contrasting our warts with beneficent Canada. The Canadian press occasionally reminded me of Pravda and Izvestia in its caustic coverage of the U.S. The Trudeau Government pursued a demonstratively divergent foreign policy. It became counter-productive for us to call on the Foreign Ministry (“External Affairs” in Canada) to seek support for a U.S. position. If they did, the inevitable question in Parliament would be “Has the U.S. made any representation to this Government to that end?” And if the answer was “Yes” the Government lost votes across the nation. Canada continued to accept and harbor American draft dodgers, even deserters. American faculty were gradually being dismissed by Canadian colleges and universities. Entry and distribution of American news magazines and other publications were obstructed. Protesters picketed the Embassy and Consulates.

Finally, the anti-U.S. posture became so marked that the opposition Party, the Conservative, introduced a resolution in Parliament condemning the Government for its anti-Americanism which, had it passed would have been the same as a “no-confidence” vote, and the Trudeau Government would have fallen. He countered, adeptly, by announcing a visit by President Nixon, his first out of the U.S. The resolution got nowhere. The visit took place with the usual U.S. hype, although official Canadian reception was proper but measured. My conviction was that Mr. Nixon needed that visit to boost his standing at home, where Canada and Trudeau were

popular. But the truer measure was a scribble by Henry Kissinger found after a session of the two leaders. It read "Trudeau S.O.B." It leaked to the Canadian press but was suppressed. Trudeau went to visit China before, as I recall, his return visit to the U.S.

At the same time he was strikingly accommodating to Québec and was forcing English Canada in that direction. He visited his native Province often giving rousing speeches in fluent French. He engineered constitutional changes, economic aid, and even went so far as to require present civil servants to learn and demonstrate fluency in French as a qualification for promotion and retention, as well as requiring French of new applicants for employment. In the end he successfully defeated Québec separatism, but it was a near thing.

Q: Now there are two target areas here you pointed out. One is the actual terrorism, danger, threat to American embassy people or Americans in general. And then there is the psychological battle, if you will. How did you fight these two principal battles?

TOUMANOFF: Let me come to the terrorism later.

We didn't fight the nationalism, although Washington did defend U.S. interests against some of the discriminatory economic measures such as obstruction of U.S. publications. But those were technical legal issues taken up in established trade treaty institutions, which, incidentally were seemingly always engaged in one or another U.S.-Canadian trade question. We were each other's major trading partners. They drew little if any public attention. The publications obstruction was unpopular among Canadians and eventually died quietly for the most part.

But the Embassy, every Consulate and all other American Government offices in Canada, and the U.S. Government as a whole, consistently and successfully stayed out of the Québec separatism fray. Whenever asked for an opinion, and there was much legitimate curiosity, as well as intentional provocation, the standard and uniform answer was that this was a Canadian matter, and we had no comment on it whatsoever. Public America is, of course, irrepressible. Every talking head and writing pundit had a field day. The resulting chaos of comment provided Canadians with whatever answer they might want to praise or blame, and, by contrast with our habitual ignorance and inattention, lots of satisfyingly prominent coverage.

As for the anti-Americanism, we made believe it didn't exist, and it was not a topic Canadians felt comfortable to raise with us. Besides, there was the Nixon visit's public face to hide behind.

Q: That was wise, they would have been in a fighting mood, and they couldn't fight if there wasn't an enemy. That 'No Comment' about Québec hasn't changed by so much as a comma ever since.

TOUMANOFF: Now about terrorism and the *Force Liberation Québécoise* (FLQ). I'd call them Québec Freedom Fighters, which is how they thought of themselves. That group and their terrorist activities have been well documented since, but there are a few things that may have been missed and may not be readily available in various archives. I'll try to stick to those and make it brief.

By the time I arrived to take up my duties at the Embassy in Ottawa, which was about September of 1969, the FLQ was planting bombs, fuzed dynamite sticks as I recall, in public mailboxes in Québec and blowing them up. Then came the worst.

A Volkswagen in Montreal ran a red light, was flagged down by the police, the driver jumped out and ran, escaping. In the car the police found a stack of FLQ posters proclaiming that they had kidnapped the American Consul General in Montreal and were holding him hostage. Their demands were something along the lines of immunity from arrest, publication and broadcast of their manifesto, and I think resignation of the Provincial government and a plebiscite on Québec independence. They were a bit premature as they had not yet kidnapped the Consul General, and counter-measures were immediately taken. The Embassy and all our 12 Consulates across Canada were notified, heavy police guards provided, and the news of the FLQ plot widely publicized. The FLQ, realizing they had lost their chance at an American, moved quickly and promptly seized a British equivalent, I think the British Trade Commissioner in Montreal. Their demands were rejected and an intense hunt began. However, not long after, the FLQ managed to capture a prominent member of the Québec Government, a Provincial Minister if my memory serves. Him they held in a Montreal house, tortured, and ultimately killed, evidently in his attempt to escape. They fled the house, and vanished. Some weeks later, they were caught in an outlying farmhouse. The Britisher was rescued unharmed, They were tried and jailed, probably for life. Their life in prison, I imagine, was not pleasant, but they and the FLQ dropped out of public sight. They had also greatly harmed their cause.

Q: *And discredited it totally.*

TOUMANOFF: Yes, it was too savage for the Canadian culture.

Q: *Including the Québécois?*

TOUMANOFF: Too savage, even for *Québécois* secessionists. This was simply beyond the pale. I think there were very few, just a handful of these radical madmen prepared to act that way. You were in Montreal later as Consul General for four years. I don't think the FLQ functions any longer, does it?

Q: *Well, they do in telling old stories, but not these kinds of stories, because those terrorists were immediately discredited.*

TOUMANOFF: No activism now?

Q: *No, none whatsoever, except perhaps a bit of "old times" talk.*

TOUMANOFF: That episode in Montreal affected the Embassy and our Consulates General, so let me turn to that now. There was, of course very close contact between the Embassy and the Canadian police, that is the Mounties, the RCMP. But it went through a liaison group in the Embassy for systematic contact with the Canadian Government on security matters. I got involved only once. The Canadian Government had asked all Canadian print and broadcast organizations to refrain from reporting any manifestoes or other statements from the FLQ. I

happened to know that a radio station in northern New Hampshire or Vermont broadcast programs in French to the large French Canadian populations in those two states, and to the Québécois across the border. So I alerted our liaison people to have the U.S. Government request that station, and any others broadcasting in French, also to refrain from carrying FLQ statements until the Canadian media did, and we told the Canadians we had done so.

After that FLQ kidnapping poster the Department had to try to address the whole question of terrorism in Canada directed against the Embassy, the Consulates General, and Americans at large. I'll not get into that larger picture, that's for archive study. Individually, we all knew we were targeted. Measures, now familiar, but then quite novel, were instituted. Guards were posted at the buildings and the residences of the Ambassador and Consuls General. For fear of a letter bomb we were told not to open our mail at home unless we either recognized the handwriting or we were otherwise absolutely confident that it was a legitimate piece of mail. If not, we were told not to open it, to touch it as little as possible, and to call the police.

Q: Security-or Canadian.

TOUMANOFF: The Canadian federal police, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the "Mounties," and we were given an emergency 24-hour telephone number which all family members had to carry with them at all times.

Q: Who are responsible under diplomatic tradition for diplomatic and consular safety in Canada.

TOUMANOFF: Right. In fact, we were given a whole lot of precautions and advice, well intended but by and large pretty useless. We were to vary your route from home to and from the Embassy, as well as shopping and any other habitual movements like dog walking. Call taxis, vary our hours, not walk alone, look both ways every time we stepped out of your house, keep the house doors always bolted and locked, always set our home alarm system if we had one, or perhaps get one. Keep someone informed of our whereabouts and expected time of return. Travel by daylight and in company as much as possible, etc.

Q: Did you? Did we get security alarms?

TOUMANOFF: No. That is, not at Government expense. I installed one after our house had been burgled and set afire, fortunately quickly put out. It was a silent alarm direct to the police. It was tripped late one night by a thunder storm. They came, forced the front door, stepped over our soundly sleeping dog (he was a bit deaf), and we woke up with their flashlights in our eyes. But that's a different story. Had nothing to do with terrorism.

Q: Total security.

TOUMANOFF: Well, total of a sort. Anyway, the advice was really almost impossible to follow, and even if followed, unavailing. Like so many others in the Foreign Service now at risk, the fact is that anybody determined to capture you could easily find a pretty sure way of doing it. To fail they would have to either make a mistake, or be unlucky. As a practical matter the safest place is

in jail, which I fear some of our Embassies are beginning to resemble.

Q: Or shoot you, if that's their objective.

TOUMANOFF: Yes, or shoot you. If that's their objective its even easier. We were very careful with the mail, and reasonably so within practical limits in our movements. But we decided not to tell our children unless orders came to evacuate unessential spouses and children. Such orders never did, and no attempt against us or consular personnel took place that I ever heard of. I think the RCMP would have informed us of any attempt they might have learned of.

But the Embassy received a couple of bomb scares in the next few months, notice by phone that a bomb had been planted in the building. We would all scramble out and stand around while the police searched the place. They never found anything and nothing ever exploded. But it did take a long time and disrupt things some. It also reminded us not to get sloppy.

Q: Lovely targets, standing around.

TOUMANOFF: It also made you feel, as you said, Bill, quite vulnerable, because the entire staff of the Embassy would move out some distance, and gather on the grounds of Parliament across the street.

Q: Very nice open area.

TOUMANOFF: Well, yes. A great big open area with lots of access. But that was the center of Government with the Parliament and Government Ministries on three sides, with police always stationed and on patrol, in addition to the ones who responded to the bomb threat.

Q: You may be pleased to know that those are the same instructions we received in Beirut, and we went outside and stood outside the embassy in Beirut. So at least we're consistent.

TOUMANOFF: Yes, well, yes. But the fact is that there isn't any conceivable way I can think of to have an embassy continue to function and be secure at the same time, unless you plant it behind high walls in the middle of 20 acres of open land. Anyway, very quickly, when you're faced with it in practice, you discover that if somebody wants to kidnap you or shoot you, they're going to do it.

Q: Yes, and that's really the message to get across. Just be careful. Do the following things that might help. Don't make it any easier.

TOUMANOFF: You can, presumably, protect an embassy from being bombed from the inside. You can't really protect an embassy from having some mortar rounds aimed at it or some shoulder launched rocket grenades to be launched at it, or get shot up by a gun. Even in Moscow some character stopped his car, unloaded an AK-47, shot up the embassy, and got away. No one was injured.

Q: Any more stories about Canada that you want to tell?

TOUMANOFF: It is another one on Québec separatism, which is doubtless buried in detail in archives, but may be worth mentioning as a reminder. It illustrates the sensitivity of that issue for Trudeau, its international reach, something of the Québécois illusions, and the weight of Canada on a global scale.

The central issue for the separatists was an historic and very present threat to the survival of their French language and culture, from English Canada by both intention and disregard, and from the U.S. by its colossal influence in every sphere. They consequently turned, eagerly, to France as their mother country, for practical support and emotional sustenance. The French response was modest, lukewarm, nothing like the passionate embrace they sought. The French were friendly and recognized historic ties, but seemed somehow preoccupied with other matters, which, of course, they were.

Québec sought a visit by de Gaulle, the President of France. After some delay, Trudeau evidently decided it was better to invite de Gaulle on a state visit than to delay indefinitely and inflame the issue to a separatist battle cry. De Gaulle accepted, landed in Montreal to a wild, hero's welcome, and stayed, instead of going on promptly to Ottawa, the Capital, as protocol would require. Worse, his public statements increasingly celebrated the ties between Québec and France, until in a public address from the Mayor of Montreal's balcony to the cheering crowd below he ended a real stem-winder with the cry "Vive La Québec Libre!" – Long Live Free Québec – the separatist and FLQ rallying cry. The Trudeau Government promptly invited him to leave Canada, which he did.

I read that several ways. In the first place it was a shocking provocation to all the rest of Canada. Secondly, de Gaulle must have known the economic damage separatism was already causing Québec as capital fled and investment faltered. He also must have known that his act would accelerate that damage. Moreover, he had no intention or even capability to provide compensatory support. It was a wanton act of destruction and as such a profound insult to Canada as a measure of how little importance he ascribed to that nation. The episode was also symptomatic of the illusion, more accurately the delusion prevalent in French Québec that France would somehow be the savior of their culture and shield them from their anxieties.

Q: I find it particularly interesting, and I think it's almost the root of the problem, is the way Canada was founded by two father/mother countries – France and England – and all through its history these two different cultures have been vying with each other in many ways, and one losing.

TOUMANOFF: And fought a war about it.

Q: Yes, that too. And the arrogance of the victorious British colonials, and the opposite French arrogance in complaining about the Anglo presence and activities. That to me is pretty much the underpinning of the separatism. In a sense the Québécois won. In fairly short order they got what they wanted, respect if not honor, dignity, and more elbow room to run their own affairs within the confederation, including more equal terms to compete with the Anglos. Now, can you give us your views from that perspective because I think that's very important to the nationalism

of Canada and their survivability as a nation?

TOUMANOFF: Bill, I think all you say is true, but it would take a book to describe the gains and losses of the separatist spasm. Their successes came at a price, one of which is that assertive Frenchness still retards their material prosperity. It is a modest economic handicap. Probably willingly paid.

But I had a somewhat different take, and it's not limited to Québec, or Canada. But I'd put Québec into the following context. It seemed to me even then that the speed of change in the context of human life was increasingly disorienting people. Put another, narrower way, scientific and technological development and application, for example, was out of societal control and accelerating. Not just their subject matter, but especially their effects on peoples' lives were outstripping common comprehension, as well as the institutions societies had created for some sort of orderly governance of our lives. In noble, and sometimes ignoble, efforts somehow to manage we were creating civilizations too complex for anyone to understand. The forces determining the daily fate of individuals, and of ever growing masses, seem gargantuan, infinitely beyond our capacity to influence, or even anticipate. The result is not conducive to global mental health. Much follows from that aspect of our reality, some of it is about Canada.

It is easy to generate anti-Americanism. We are the origin and engine, not to say main if selective beneficiary and common victim, of most of those forces. How else could Trudeau succeed when Canada's evident prosperity in every realm (perhaps excepting weather) is a product of the United States?

I judged, and still do, that the real forces loose in our world are of such potency, and accelerating, that short of a raging civil war which seemed most unlikely, whether Québec seceded or it didn't secede was not going to govern the welfare of the Québécois, or the Canadians, or the United States: That separatism might be interesting, but didn't really matter very much. Now that would have been the wrong thing to say out loud in Canada.

Q: You couldn't say that. Only the opposite, and that too, would have been a mistake. Now I see what you meant by "no comment."

TOUMANOFF: Bill, I was very conscious of the obstacles which Canadian nationalism, and anti-Americanism to the extent it existed, placed in the way of smooth resolution of lots of relatively small problems, and a few relatively big ones involving more than just the U.S. and Canada. But once again, the power of wealth, the power of economics, the power of the totally permeable boundary-

Q: And peace between us.

TOUMANOFF: Yes, and peace between us, and the wisdom of the United States in, for goodness' sake, not taking sides on any of those internal French/Anglo issues, and Trudeau's French sense of scorn and superiority and the Québécois arrogance about Anglo-Saxon and American culture being part of that whole picture – it still struck me that other forces, not government control, were going to command the destiny of that nation, our own nation, and the

world at large. And it seems to me that that's happening ever more.

Q. *Vlad*, that was your last assignment in the Foreign Service wasn't it?

TOUMANOFF: Yes. I took early retirement from Ottawa and headed home.

ARNOLD DENYS
Vice Consul
Halifax, Nova Scotia (1970)

Arnold Denys was born in Varsenare, Belgium. He emigrated to the United States to study at Gonzaga University in Spokane, Washington. While at Gonzaga, Denys developed an interest in the Foreign Service. He then transferred to Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. In 1955, he became a naturalized U.S. Citizen. Upon graduation from Georgetown University, he was drafted into service for the military. His Foreign Service career included positions in Panama, Egypt, Greece, Mexico, Canada, and Belgium. This is an excerpt from his memoirs entitled Son of Flanders.

DENYS: On January 16, 1970, twelve weeks later, we took off from Pittsburgh airport for Halifax, Canada. Consul Arthur L. Price met us and helped us with Canadian Customs. During the twenty-minute drive to downtown Halifax, Art briefed me on some of the responsibilities I would be involved in. I learned that it was a formal post, with a wide range of social obligations. Before we checked into the Citadel Inn Motel, Nancy Price invited us for dinner at her home.

The Consulate General was located in the Bank of Nova Scotia building. Consul General Alexander Peaslee welcomed me to the office. I was impressed by his frank talk on the post's political and consular objectives, which were to stabilize US-Canadian relations. He said that besides my visa and citizenship duties, I would be expected to participate in protocol functions.

I was impressed by Mr. Peaslee's intellectual background. His specialty was Chinese history and Asian affairs. He was also well-versed in US-Canadian relations. Both he and Mrs. Peaslee were teaching at Mount Saint Vincent University (Catholic college in Halifax). Consul Price and his wife also held impressive academic credentials. Every morning Consul General Peaslee would have a small ten-minute staff meeting. It grew into an interesting roundup of political and cultural topics.

Halifax is an attractive port city. I was often reminded that it was from here that the "Liberty Ships" sailed to Europe at the beginning of World War II. Consul General Peaslee did not waste time introducing me to a number of local officials and other foreign diplomats in the Province. At a lunch at the Halifax Business Club he introduced me to Mr. T. W. Robinson, British Trade Commissioner (equivalent of Consul), and paid a call on Superintendent R. J. Ross, chief of the Royal Mounted Canadian Police of Nova Scotia.

Besides calling on Canadian officials we went apartment hunting. It did not take long to find a nice apartment in a wooded pine tree area of Clayton Park. Our quick settling in helped me to focus on my consular work.

On January 27 the Consul General introduced me to the honorable G.I. Smith, Premier of the Province of Nova Scotia, at Province House, the historic legislative building. Premier Smith was a Progressive Conservative and quite a popular official, with a great sense of humor. I also met Mr. G. A. Reagan, a liberal and the leader of the opposition party in the Province of Nova Scotia. Under the Federalist system of government in Canada, the federal government of Ottawa is independent from the Provinces.

Besides the protocol visits, we issued immigrant and non immigrant visas for all the maritime provinces of Canada (Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island). When reference is made to the Atlantic Provinces it includes the above and Newfoundland.

On January 26, 1970, I received a Department of External Affairs note of the Canadian government's recognition of my consular commission. This official note was sent to the US Embassy in Ottawa. It accorded definitive recognition of my status as Vice Consul. It later appeared in the issue of the Canada Gazette.

Consul General Peaslee observed every detail of diplomatic protocol. He remarked: "Now that the note has been received you can officially call on the Mayor of Halifax." He accompanied me to his Worship, Mayor Allan O'Brien, at the Halifax City Hall. It was a pleasant event. We discussed economic issues of Nova Scotia and learned that Volvo, the Swedish car factory, planned to expand their facilities in Halifax in order to export Volkos to the United States.

The Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia, Victor de B. Oland, received me the next month at Government House, a protocol meeting to recognize my official accreditation as consular officer. It went well, but a few hours later I developed a high fever. A Canadian doctor advised me to cancel appointments, and I stayed in bed several days to recuperate from exhaustion.

I went on my first consular trip, February 3, through Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. For the first time I drove on the Trans-Canada highway. The trip was hazardous because of unexpected strong winds and rain storms. I stopped in Springhill, Nova Scotia, to visit the federal prison. It is a minimum security institution with about 200 inmates. I talked to three incarcerated Americans. A catholic priest who worked as a social worker showed me the modern compound, which included living quarters and industrial-vocational areas where inmates learned different trades. I talked with director warden Hamilton. He said, "Every prisoner of the maritime provinces is first processed at the Federal Penitentiary in Dorchester, New Brunswick, and are then sent to various prisons." A convicted prisoner can apply for parole after having served one third of his sentence. Such action is decided by the Canadian National Parole Board. When US citizens were eligible for parole they were served with deportation papers. My next visit was in Moncton, a French cultural stronghold. French speaking Canadians in the Maritime Provinces are called Acadians. Many earn their living by farming.

I then stopped in Dorchester and saw three other American inmates. I had a good talk with each

one. They appeared satisfied with living conditions and took advantage of vocational reading. Canadian prisons would put some of US and Mexican prisons to shame. Everything was clean and well-organized. There appeared to be no discontent or violence.

I spent the night at St. John, New Brunswick (a former loyalist stronghold), and met Consul General Jorgenssen and Vice consul Richard Howell. They were both preparing for the post's closure March 1.

On the drive back, we noticed how the scenery in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia had long, well kept highways and stands of pine trees. Service stations included ESSO, Gulf Oil, Texaco, and Irving Oil. American investment in Canada was high. I saw a CBC (Canadian Broadcasting Company) TV documentary which showed Canadian concerns with the increase of US investment. In 1970 we felt a strong Canadian nationalist sentiment related to US-Canadian trade and economic issues, but not as much as compared to the nationalist feelings in Mexico. The Canadian economy was very much connected to the North American economy. Both countries were also determined to fight inflation.

In Halifax, I became involved in the adjudication of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas. Many Canadians wanted to immigrate to the United States. Some professionals were qualified, but for many others there was a long waiting list. The labor market in 1970 was not as bright as in the 1950s. The Department of Labor, in conjunction with Immigration and Naturalization Service, approved the jobs which could not be filled by Americans. One of the crucial points for adjudication was the papers offering employment in the United States. I often called potential employers in the States to confirm such job offers.

We also issued a large number of nonimmigrant visas. Some of the tourist applications in Halifax were difficult to adjudicate. There were many Oriental students at Dalhousie and St. Mary's Universities who studied medicine and nursing. Many of these graduates wanted to work in the US, but not all doctors were qualified to practice medicine in the United States. For example, some Indian and Pakistani doctors who worked in a Canadian hospital wanted to emigrate to the United States. These Third World nationals needed to take tests in medicine and English to prove that they were eligible and able to practice medicine in the United States. Canadian doctors who applied for such visas usually did not encounter difficulties as they spoke English.

The tourist visa load was a mixed bag. I had nurses from Panama applying for tourist visas, a family from Argentina applying for a visa to work in Boston, and a Belgian girl (brought up in Zaire) teaching in Dartmouth and engaged to a American doctor whom she met at Louvain University. There were fiancé visas for that. One day I had a Greek-Egyptian lady from Alexandria, U.A.R., who applied for a passport for her US citizen son. I also had a large number of Eastern Europeans (especially from Czechoslovakia) applying for tourist visas. I saw Jose Garcia, the heavyweight champion of Venezuela, who came to apply for a visa so he could fight in Madison Square Garden. This caused quite an excitement in the office.

Our stay in Halifax was a plus for our daughter, Rebecca. She entered Tot Dyke Nursery School, and with the company of other children, quickly learned English. It was at that time that we became friends with Dennis and Barbara Landers, of New Zealand, whose daughter also

attended Rebecca' school.

Maité I attended the opening of the provincial Legislature of Nova Scotia on February 19. It was the highlight of protocol for us. Lt. Governor Victor de B. Oland read his speech from the throne and we joined other consuls, judges, and government officials in reserved gallery honor seats. British Consul and Mrs. T. W. Robinson, and other consular representatives in Halifax, were present. Just before the event we went to the Legislature Library where Premier and Mrs. Ian Smith greeted us. Although the Lt. Governor is the representative of the Queen, his speech was prepared by Mr. Smith's government, the administration in power. The ceremony was full of English traditions: a gun salute, honor guard, and representatives of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Afterwards, we went to Government House where a reception was held by Governor and Mrs. Oland. There I talked with Mrs. McKinnon, wife of the Supreme Court Justice; Mrs. Cooper of the Supreme Court; Mr. Crosby, Attorney with the Provincial government; Commander and Mrs. John R. Ross, of the RCM Police; and Mr. Snowe, Minister of Housing of Nova Scotia. Each province in Canada has a Lieutenant Governor, and in Ottawa there is the Governor General, directly accountable to the Queen of England. (There are ten provinces and two territories.)

The Provincial Legislature was in session for two months. There were many urgent economic and social problems on the 1970 legislative agenda. One was the heavy water plant in Sydney which had so far been a fiasco. There were also talks on the Federal and Provincial levels regarding rent controls and inflation. I was able to judge from my visa interviews that Halifax and Toronto were expensive cities to live in. Rents in Boston were fifteen percent cheaper than in Halifax, and groceries were usually eight percent higher than in the US

On February 25 I was received by his Excellency, James Hayes, Catholic Archbishop of Halifax. We talked for an hour in the drawing room of the Chancellery, a handsome residence on the historic "arm," a lake on Coburg Street. His secretary, Father Buckley, served sherry. We discussed the situation of the Catholic church in Canada. The Prelate pointed out that forty-eight percent of the people in Halifax were Catholic, compared with thirty-five percent in the Province of Nova Scotia. This represented a substantial minority. He remarked, "Many Irish and Highlanders from Scotland were the first Catholics to settle in Nova Scotia." He added that the Protestants owned much of the rural property, whereas Catholics had property in the urban areas.

We touched on the diplomatic relations between the Canadian government and the Vatican. He said, "Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, who is a catholic, insisted on having diplomatic relations with the Vatican in spite of traditional Protestant opposition."

The Archbishop impressed me as a man of vision and a down-to-earth church leader. He invited me for lunch. We were joined by his secretary and two retired American priests who also lived at the residence. During lunch I learned that priests and ministers in Nova Scotia were the only ones permitted by law to perform marriages. Although the civilian type of marriage is allowed in the Province, most persons in Nova Scotia are married by a priest or minister. The marriage document is signed by a priest or minister and has legal validity in the courts. My host remarked that the French Acadians had never experienced secularism, which had affected the Catholics in France. He also referred to the Catholic Bishops' meetings between the United States and

Canada. He said, "It helps to exchange ideas on how to manage Catholic church affairs in North America."

I met with Mr. Falker of the US Border Patrol in Bangor, Maine. The border patrol is the legal enforcing arm of the Department of Justice. They look for illegal entries and the smuggling of persons across the US-Canadian border.

The office workload was normal but the diplomatic social events gave us little time to wind down. On an average, we had about four formal receptions to attend per week. Many NATO ships visited the Port of Halifax so there were many social functions at the port and Canadian military bases, which we attended.

We were invited for cocktails aboard a French escort ship, the *Commandant Beauvais*. This vessel helped French fishing boats along the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon (near Newfoundland). Besides French Consul Michel Ribordy, many Halifax officials were present. We also were hosts at home for drinks for Charles Baislee, Chief of Protocol of the Nova Scotian government, and Rosalie Comeau (who was Consul General Peaslee's secretary). Baislee was like an elder statesman in Nova Scotia. He was very knowledgeable on the intricacies of Nova Scotian politics. Charles also had a good sense of humor.

During my term in Halifax, Mr. Oldland, City Manager of Oklahoma City, was appointed as City Manager in Halifax. Canadian mayors often hired US city managers.

Problems arose at Dalhousie University, in Halifax, when students began a "sit-in" in President Hick's office. They said they wanted more voice in the management of the university. On April 16 we received a confidential report from the Federal Canadian police that left-wing students, headed by Dr. McKinnen from St. Mary's University, would have a "sit-in" at the US Consulate General and take Consul General Peaslee hostage. They planned a mock trial on the Vietnam War, in the presence of Mr. Sullivan, a well-known TV representative in Halifax. Police and private detectives occupied several floors of the Nova Scotia Bank building where our offices were located. Fortunately there was no serious incident. The student group only presented a written protest against US military action in Southeast Asia and the dispatch of troops to Cambodia.

If things remained relatively calm in Halifax, the Cambodian crisis caused discontent and criticism in other parts of Canada. In Toronto and Montreal there were demonstrations in front of our consulates to protect against our involvement in Southeast Asia. The former Prime Minister of Canada, John Diefenbaker, stated, "I know President Nixon well. I am prepared to wait until the final outcome is known."

Canada also claimed jurisdiction over extensive areas of arctic waters. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau introduced legislation in the Canadian Parliament which would give Canadian authority over an area of 100 nautical miles. The United States recognized only a three-mile limit of territorial waters, but, these frictions never caused great harm to US-Canada relations.

On April 20 we attended a reception at the US residence for Leopold Le Clerc, public affairs

officer of our embassy in Ottawa. We met some interesting people from the news media: Mr. Kennedy, President of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation; Mr. Holbrooke, President of Nova Scotia Technical College; and Mr. Doucet with an independent TV company. Halifax had two channels (3 and 5). Channel 3 was sponsored by the government and Channel 5 by private investors. I also met the Pattersons, who had a radio station in Dartmouth, and Mr. Brailey with the Canadian press.

April 24, we went on board the *Lt. Marlene Mathis*, of the US Navy. This vessel was attached to Headquarters of the Canadian Shearwater Naval Base in Dartmouth. Shearwater Naval Base in Dartmouth was the largest Canadian naval base. There were two American officers, assigned to Dartmouth, who learned Canadian techniques of landing helicopters on submarines and aircraft carriers. Canadian personnel were also routinely sent to the Strategic Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) Headquarters, in Norfolk, Virginia.

In late April, US Ambassador to Canada, Adolph Schmidt, arrived in Halifax for an official visit. We all went to the Halifax International airport to welcome him. Following tea with the Governor and Mrs. Oland at Governor's House, we attended a dinner for Ambassador and Mrs. Schmidt at the residence of Consul General Peaslee. It was an intimate dinner which gave us the opportunity to get acquainted with our Ambassador. It so happened that they were from Pittsburgh, and Ambassador Schmidt had been Vice Governor of the Mellon interests. We had a lot of things in common to talk about. Being a political appointee he supported the economic policies of President Nixon. The Ambassador told me that President Nixon would keep inflation under control and that it was a government priority to improve the balance of payments. He stated that the Democrats had created large deficits while the Republicans under Eisenhower and Nixon "had attempted to pay as they went along."

Two major social events took place in honor of Ambassador Schmidt: a reception for Nova Scotia officials, headed by Premier Smith and Mr. Reagan, leader of the liberal opposition party, and a formal dinner at the Nova Scotia Hotel, by the Province of Nova Scotia. The Ambassador then hosted a dinner at the Halifax Club to which we were also invited.

On May 5, the population of the Province of Quebec voted to stay within the Federation of Canada. The Liberal Party, headed by Robert Bourassa, promised to solve its economic and health issues. We all felt that it would have been disastrous for Canada if Quebec had seceded from the Federation.

In early May I had to arrange a local funeral for a US citizen from South Bend, Indiana, who had committed suicide on a Halifax Beach. His mother asked me to take care of the arrangements in Halifax. Since he was a veteran we draped his coffin with the American flag. I accompanied the priest to the Catholic cemetery in lower Sackville.

On May 9, I went on board the *State of Maine*, an old Panamanian cruiser which had been sent by the Marine Academy of Castine, Maine. There were 400 cadets on board. It is customary when an American ship comes into port that a Consular official goes on board to the Captain's quarters to welcome him. This was my first such experience. I was saluted by the officers and the midshipmen. Lt. Bailey of the US Navy accompanied me to meet Captains Hill and Brennan in

their cabins. After chatting a while they went with me to pay a formal call on Consul General Peaslee at the Consulate General in Halifax.

At an evening reception I learned that the US Merchant Marines' purpose is to train cadets and Reserve Officers for the US Navy, and also to promote US products overseas. There are four Merchant Marine Academies in the United States. The one in Castine, Maine, is sponsored by the federal and state governments. "One third of the expenditures are covered by the student tuition," the Commander stated. When we returned a formal call on the captains we could see some popular products of Maine displayed in the ship's main lounge, such as lobster and potatoes.

At the end of May, Roland Wolfe, Treasury Attaché at our Embassy in Ottawa, came to Halifax to assist US taxpayers with their income tax returns. Some post office strikes erupted in Windsor and in other parts of Canada which lasted several weeks and spread throughout the country. It was generally believed there was a need for wage increases in many industrial sectors of Canada.

The government of Canada also decided to let the Canadian dollar float freely on the international market. Before that time, the Canadian dollar was "pegged" with an agreement made with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Canadian government wanted to keep a line on inflation. To us it represented a substantial loss in salary. Exports into Canada would be cheaper. The reevaluation of the Canadian dollar affected tourism, and Canadian exports became more expensive.

My work increased in the summer because many people wanted to go to the United States for summer school and for pleasure.

In the middle of June, the Cuban Ambassador to Canada, Jose Fernandez de Cossio, was in Halifax, and Nova Scotia officials invited us to attend a dinner in his honor. However, we could not attend this Provincial event because we did not have diplomatic relations with Cuba.

The Cuban Ambassador met with Nova Scotia industry representatives and showed interest in buying steel rails from Sydney Steel, which would be used for Cuba's railways. He met with Trudeau and Industry Minister Gerald Ritcey.

On June 18 we attended a dinner by the government of Nova Scotia for Israeli Ambassador to Canada and Mrs. Ephraim Evron. It was a successful evening and several Jewish real estate investors in Nova Scotia attended. One of the guests was Dr. Goldbloom, a researcher with the Department of Defense. The Israeli Ambassador stated, "I hope you will be able to see Israel someday and see what we have done with that small piece of land."

In the middle of June, the Trudeau government issued a white paper on foreign policy. It seemed to reflect that Canada's policies in foreign affairs would move away from its traditional international position, as advocated by former Foreign Minister Lester Pearson, to a more nationalistic, pragmatic approach.

My friend, Frank Barrett, wanted us to meet his mother and aunt. We visited St. Paul's Anglican

Church, the Nova Scotia Legislature, and the Citadel. We also motored to Peggy's Cove.

On July 14 I drove to Moncton, New Brunswick, to attend the French National Day reception given by French Consul to Moncton and Halifax and Mrs. Michel Ribordy.

My French came in handy during my tour in Canada. There were many official events such as this one where it was useful to speak French with French Canadian officials and academic and cultural leaders.

At the French Consul's residence I met many Moncton and New Brunswick leaders: Leonard Jones, Mayor of Moncton; Deputy Cyr, Federal Senator; Thomas Rector Savoie, of the French University, in Moncton; and Judge Brian. I also spoke with the general manager of the French newspaper *Evangeline*. Although Moncton was about sixty percent English speaking there was intense French cultural activity at the University. But there existed no conflict between the two linguistic groups as in the Province of Quebec.

I also met several new US prisoners incarcerated at both Springhill and Dorchester prisons. At lunch with the assistant warden (director), at Dorchester, he told me that they had started a new system of a traveling parole board which was authorized to make on-the-spot decisions and to parole inmates without a formal review. This would improve our consular relations between Canada and the United States.

On August 1, 1970, I visited Fredericton, the capital of New Brunswick, and the Lord Beaverbrook Art Museum where Salvador Dali's "Santiago El Grande" dominates.

The following week I learned of the August 7 murder of USAID official, Dan A. Mitrione, in Montevideo, Uruguay. It was a shameful act on the part of irresponsible terrorists. It put a damper on our Latin American policies.

In spite of the terrorist acts occurring in Latin America there were some positive signs on the horizon - in the bilateral agreement between President Diaz Ordaz of Mexico and President Nixon.

August 24, I met Ambassador of Japan to Canada, Shinichi Kondo, at a dinner in his honor by the Government of Nova Scotia. The Japanese Ambassador came to visit the Toyota car assembly plant in Sydney, Nova Scotia.

A similar dinner was given August 20, in honor of the Indonesian Ambassador to Canada, Darmo Bandoro. I met Dr. Morgan, President of Kings College in Halifax. Attorney General Donohue of Nova Scotia referred to the fact that Nova Scotia and Indonesia had many maritime interests in common.

EMMERSON M. BROWN
Economic Counselor

Ottawa (1970-1973)

Canada Desk Officer Washington, DC (1973-1975)

Emmerson Brown was born in Michigan in 1920. He graduated from Olivet College in Michigan with a teacher's certificate, and worked at a number of jobs before traveling to Algiers, Morocco, Addis Ababa and Egypt to work with refugees. He entered the Foreign Service exam in 1950. His career included positions in Bombay, Bonn, the Hague, Ottawa, and Washington, DC. Mr. Brown was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on February 2, 1990.

Q: This is one of the examples of what can be done with a political ambassador. Then in 1970 you moved to Ottawa as economic counselor. You were there from '70 - '73. How did this assignment come about.

BROWN: How did it come about? It came about because Chuck Wootton, who had been the economic counselor, was posted I believe, to Bonn. So that opened Ottawa. And as I understand, what I am about to say I have had to piece together and I couldn't swear that this is what happened. But it seems to me that this is what happened.

Len Weiss had been involved in GATT negotiations to get rid of so called non-tariff barriers, the new term for quantitative import restrictions, but more comprehensive. He had been led to believe that he was going to go to Geneva as an ambassador work on -- non-tariff barriers -- and he was very sensitive to the possibility of being an ambassador. Oh dear, there's a little more to it than this, because Weiss had been economic minister at Bonn and wanted to be DCM. The ambassador was very happy with Russ Fessenden as his DCM and asked Washington to do something about it; this resulted in Weiss being brought back to Washington and Wootton going to Bonn. Anyway, there was Weiss without an assignment, under the impression that he had a brief to go to Geneva as an ambassador. But for personnel purposes, they had transferred him to Ottawa to take Wootton's job. That's how he was getting paid. Both the DCM and the ambassador at Ottawa did the usual phoning around and finding out, and it was pretty clear that Ottawa would be attractive to Weiss, only if he were DCM or was assured of becoming DCM. That was not on. So then they had to find a place for him and this ambassadorship was held out to him and so Ottawa opened suddenly. (Weiss was later done in, the job in Geneva didn't work out and he ended up doing something else. I guess he went into INR, as I did later). Anyhow, Ottawa came open on short notice. I was at the end of my third year of what was supposed to be a four or five year tour at The Hague. I knew that this couldn't go on forever, even though it was a wonderfully pleasant and interesting assignment. I had learned Dutch and it was great fun. Suddenly I was asked if I would be interested. Our two older children were just getting ready for college so Ottawa seemed too much to hope for. I thought that they would send us to Lower Slobovia or God knows where. The idea of getting to Ottawa was just too good to be true and I jumped at it.

Q: You went as economic counselor. The ambassador to begin with was Adolph Schmidt and then William Porter. How did Adolph Schmidt work?

BROWN: Adolph Schmidt, the ambassador. You couldn't design a nicer person and he had, we thought, a virtual Neanderthal political position, which was a joke around the embassy. This man was a real conservative -- for example, one of the jokes was that his idea of current events was the Punic Wars!

There might have been some grounds for this. He was asked to speak to the English-speaking union on a subject of current interest and I think he did suggest the Punic Wars. Charming, a really fine man who probably thought that Canada should be a state of the union but who realized that that was not on and that the best thing to do was to have the best relations with Canada that one could. Above all you shouldn't throw your weight around in Ottawa. You couldn't if you wanted to, though some of our ambassadors tried, I guess. That's not personal knowledge on my part. I do know that Butterworth had a plane that he flew around in and he literally had a red carpet rolled out for him.

Anyway Schmidt was low profile, low key and relied on Rufus Smith for counsel. But Schmidt was a wonderful man, a fine man. His wife was utterly charming and down to earth. She used to drive an airplane!

Q: Economically it was a time of almost war with Canada.

BROWN: Oh it was. Trudeau had been in office for quite some time by then and the Liberals were very nationalistic and economically nationalistic, with sort of a mad dog fringe. Some of them were utterly charming. You'd go to a party and meet some absolutely charming person and they would say, you know I was brought up to hate Americans. It was so funny.

The Automobile Agreement was the bone of contention when I went up there. We had negotiated a North American Auto Agreement which in effect made a free trade area in automobiles and parts between Canada and the United States. And at that time, because automobile plants come into production in fairly large "lumps"... anyway the trade had gone very drastically in Canada's favor during the first few years of the agreement. So nobody in Washington could remember whose idea it had been, whereas in Ottawa everybody was prepared to take credit for it. That was a nasty one. It naturally was highly politicized and that was my introduction to Canada.

I got there in early July and in September I took part in a meeting where Phil Trezise came up from Washington and said look, we're just getting crucified in the House of Representatives and what we need is a statement on the floor of Parliament. It seemed a pretty innocuous statement to me. If I had been a Canadian, I would have said that it could not possibly do you any good, but instead the Canadians said, no, we can't do it. You've no idea what pressure we're under. Then you know what that one worthy said? He said, when are you Americans going to exercise some leadership? That was Jake Warren, at that time he was deputy minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce. He later ended up being an ambassador here!

You know, all they had to do was to make a fairly innocuous statement on the floor of Parliament and it would have met our needs. Or at least we argued that it would have met our needs. "No, we can't do it and when are you going to exercise leadership?"

Q: How did the automobile thing play out?

BROWN: Well, first of all, the trade began to fluctuate. The trade does fluctuate. There were consultations, during the last year that I was up there, there was an NSC study memorandum on Canada. There was going to be an inter agency study on how to bring those Canadians to their knees. I took part in a meeting, actually as an observer, the embassy representative, where every agency, the Department of Labor was against the Canadians, Agriculture was against the Canadians, Treasury hated the Canadians. and poor old State was in its usual position of saying well, but, well, but. But then, God love Helen Junz, who was at that time a staff economist at the Federal Reserve Board. She started asking questions and, you know, a lot of wild assertions were being made and she said, "Well you know the figures don't support that. As a matter of fact, it's more like this..." She faced them all down. Anyway the study ran into the sand and never was concluded.

The different agencies would get excited about some Canadian delinquency and would start saying, it's time we put those Canadians in their place. Whereas actually, things were going very well.

Q: Were the different agencies in the government in Canada also reacting this way?

BROWN: It's inevitable. If we say let's do the Canadians, the Canadians say let's do the Americans. But that's just the nature of the relationship. It's big business. In economic terms, Canada should be a few states of the union when you come right down to it. You know for railroad inter company purposes, Canada is two or three districts? There's a very complicated system for getting the rail cars back home, so they're assigned to districts and the North American railroad system doesn't recognize the border at all.

Here's another one for you on Canada. Mac Johnson, when he was the Canadian country director, commissioned a research paper by a professor local at American University. This guy did a survey, he and his students, and found that there were over 5,000 individual intergovernmental agreements between governmental entities in the United States and in Canada. Not many of those were at the national level. It's the damndest thing.

Take for example adoption. A Canadian couple moves to Texas and they adopted a child and the adoption regulations in Canada require six month reports. Well they don't want to go back every six months. So they checked in with the local social services. They got the local social services to get in touch with the Canadian social services and they worked out an arrangement. That kind of thing is all over the place.

Q: Pollution of the Great Lakes, wheat sales to the Soviet Union, access to Canadian oil, surtax dumping, eggs, tires, beef. Which ones of these really caused some problems?

BROWN: Well, the auto agreement was the big issue. Agriculture was a standing issue, of course, because those poor Canadians decided to have their country north of ours and you get all kinds of problems. A typical problem would be the Canadians barring the import of strawberries

late in the season. Ours would be in full production, whereas theirs would be just coming in and they didn't want the market swamped with American fruit. So they would put up a temporary ban and we would come up and holler about it and demand compensation and call them dirty names. I remember one of these sessions -- I think it was strawberries or raspberries. Whenever Americans come up to Ottawa they're treated very well in a material sense. There's always a nice luncheon at the Chateau Laurier. All of that thing is done very well, there'll even be cocktail parties and so on. But when it comes to negotiations, they're hard as nails. In this particular case, we'd been talking all morning and stopped for lunch. At the end of the lunch, I was just at the point of telling the Canadian leader that I wanted to congratulate him, because this had been the first time I'd ever been at one of these sessions where the Canadian side didn't come up with the line, "if you really understood what we've been proposing you'd realize it's good for you." Whereupon the Canadian said, "you know, if you really understood this proposal, you'd know it was in your interest too."

Every bilateral issue is about ten times more important to the Canadians than it is to us.

Q: Because of the 10 to 1 population.

BROWN: So they prepare. On a little thing they'll have a big brief and they'll put their big guns in. And we'll send up some guy who probably reads the briefing book on the plane.

Q: How about the difference between Schmidt and William J. Porter?

BROWN: I was the Canadian director for the time Porter was up there and I only met him two or three times.

Q: Was there a difference?

BROWN: It was night and day, night and day. I heard that one of the stories that was told about Porter had to do with the Quebec political movement.

When we went to Canada in 1970, a Brit was being held hostage. They killed a Quebec labor minister. A building was bombed in Ottawa just a few days after we got there. Nobody was killed. So it was tense. Out in Rockcliffe, which was where most of the diplomats lived, and the cabinet ministers, they had Mounties on guard. We lived in a different part of town and we were put out that we didn't get that kind of protection. We probably were safer simply because of location.

So there were tense times on those days. Security measures were justified. I'm told that when Porter got up there he started having drills. Officers were sent out to man the stairwells. The damndest thing.

Q: Porter was coming from the Vietnam experience, wasn't he?

BROWN: Well Porter, was booted out by Kissinger because Kissinger wanted Sisco as Under Secretary. I guess they gave Porter his choice of what was open, and since he was a couple of

years from retirement he picked Ottawa. It was funny. Virtually everything I heard about him up there was personal rather than business. One thing, however -- to point out the essential ridiculousness we sometimes display -- the tradition is for the American ambassador to give his first speech to a joint meeting of two clubs in Ottawa, I've forgotten their names. Well, Porter did that and at the time we were having an awful time on oil. Porter held up a little bottle of shale oil and said, "See, we don't depend on you for oil, we're going to develop all this shale. We've got enough shale to last us two millennia!!" Well we've got it but it's pretty expensive. Anybody who really knew the situation must have thought, my god, what is this man trying to sell?

Porter was very peculiar in his Ottawa incarnation. He left Ottawa to go off to Saudi Arabia where he was back in his element, after Kissinger fired Aikens.

Two things about Porter when he was being briefed. I used to have to pick him up at his office and take him through the halls to wherever his appointment was. He either wouldn't go alone or couldn't go alone. I found that a little strange.

The other thing about him I learned one time I was in Ottawa consulting. We had lunch at the Rideau Club. Porter was a great ham radio operator and he said, "You know, these Canadians, they say they go off ice-fishing, but I talk with them by radio and they don't any fishing at all. All they do is go out and drink." He was right about that.

Q: Going back to the period when you were with Schmidt up in Canada, did you ever feel that the US was trying to economically punish the Canadians for differing with us on the whole Vietnam War issue? Trudeau, after all, was giving us a very hard time.

BROWN: There certainly was bad blood in the White House. You know that from the Nixon transcripts. At that time oil was a problem. It happened that in 1971 the Canadians, for the first time, were not adding to their petroleum reserves. That prompted them to take a completely new look at oil exports to the United States, which incensed Washington. The Nixon people didn't like Trudeau. Trudeau was righter than not on these issues. For example, the way he handled things when the Nixon tapes came out. When Nixon called him an ass hole, Trudeau simply remarked that that he had been called worse things by worse people. He just let it roll off.

Q: Then as economic counselor, you were not under any constraints to find ways of punishing the Canadians economically.

BROWN: On almost any important economic issue, intergovernmental, the thing is so important that it is handled by the departments directly concerned. They'd just have the embassy, the State Department, along as observers. In the old days, the personal relations at the departmental level were so good that these guys got on the phone and settled matters. They kept a lot of problems from getting too far.

Q: So there wasn't any feeling that you got that the White House was trying to use economic force to bring the Canadians around.

BROWN: Well, I think there probably was. That's latent, it's there all the time. Everybody who

has ever dealt with Canada thinks that the relationship is so large and important that obviously if we managed it better, it could do great things for us.

But if you talk to a Canadian about it he would say, what are you hollering about, you own 80% of our factories. You find that when you understand the facts that things are the way they are for pretty good reasons. But as far as being upset, how do you think Phil Trezise felt when Jake Warren told him, we can't do that, we can't do that.

Most people who dealt with the Canadians consider them very difficult to deal with because they're always under the gun. It's the Harvard-Yale game every time, as far as they're concerned.

Well, little things. The New Year's reception at the Houses of Parliament. The protocol guy from External Affairs, gets up and announces the order in which you will go in to shake hands with the Governor General. And he says, "Yeah, we jiggered the alphabet so you would be at the end."

Q: You mean "Les Etats Units"

BROWN: It was funny, really. But he got a certain amount of real satisfaction in doing it.

On specific issues, if they really are hard ones, they are hard to deal with. But things work out pretty well. Take that issue out on George's Bank, with the fishermen, now.

By the way, you know the fisheries treaty with Canada, not with Canada but with Great Britain, I think its our first treaty ever.

Q: And its been a problem ever since.

BROWN: As long as you have fish, you have a fisheries problem.

Q: Did you get much involved or was this pretty much resolved at a different level?

BROWN: Fisheries, well there was always a guy coming out from Interior and there again is a good example of how things work out.

This was a nasty problem. It was Fraser River salmon, a difficult one to handle technically. They talked and came to a kind of arrangement and then the delegation had a meeting in my office. Interior had brought along Washington State representatives, I think Oregon, too. Anyhow the Interior official talked with these guys. He said he thought there would be a problem policing the agreement. And the guy from Washington said, "Well I know so and so on the Canadian side and he's a skookum fellow and I think that we can probably work it out all right." This is the only time I've ever heard skookum used.

Q: People are used to working out solutions.

BROWN: People know we need solutions, and we know we aren't going to go to war over it.

Although these damned New England fisherman are beginning to shoot. By the way, there have been gun shots across the border up in North Dakota on water and trade issues.

Q: Coming back, did you spend most of your time on Canadian matters?

BROWN: I was the Canadian country director for two years.

Q: Then you went to INR?

BROWN: Yes.

WAYNE LEININGER
Consular Officer
Toronto (1971-1974)

Born in New York State, Mr. Leiniger was raised in New York and Florida. After graduating from Florida State University he joined the Foreign Service. His foreign assignments, primarily in the Consular field, include Moscow, Tel Aviv, Hong Kong and New Delhi, where he was Regional Supervisory Consul General. After attending the State Department's Senior Seminar, Mr. Leiniger had several assignments in Washington concerning Personnel Management.

LEININGER: Toronto was a very good “learning” post. We don’t issue any non-immigrant visas (NIVs) to Canadians. In those days, we had a lot of third country applicants for U.S. visitor visas who would tell you that they had decided “only yesterday” to visit the U.S. – that is, after having crossed an ocean or two to get to Canada, they suddenly realized it bordered on the U.S. Yes, right! In those days, we still processed immigrant visas (Ivs) in Toronto – this was before all the immigrant visa processing for Eastern Canada was consolidated in Montreal. Most of those applicants were third-country nationals, also, from all parts of the world. Adjustment of status to permanent resident by a foreigner who had violated the terms of his visa while he or she was in the U.S. was not possible under the law; someone who wanted to do that had to leave the U.S. and apply in Canada or another foreign country. No one at all born in the Western hemisphere could adjust their status – by law – and so they also had to come to Canada to be processed for an immigrant visa. We pre-processed everybody – examined all aspects of the case even before seeing the applicant – because the Canadians were unwilling to let people enter their country unless there was some evidence that they would be re-admitted to the U.S. So we had to check all of these people’s documents – immigrant visa petitions, police certificates, medical papers, etc. – in advance. If they needed and qualified for waivers of any ineligibilities, we pre-processed those as well. So in some cases, we would deny a visa, apply the waiver, and issue the visa, all at the same interview!

Q: Who was our Consul-General in Toronto?

LEININGER: Joe Henderson, a former director of the Visa Office. He was a good man to have

in the front office for those of us who were issuing visas, since he understood visa law. My immediate boss, who turned out to be my best consular boss ever, was Warren Swope. He was an s.o.b., and proud of it. I bet the people in the Visa Office still have a Swope file. They showed it to me before I left for Toronto; it was three and a half inches thick. The file was filled with documentation of battles that Washington had with Swope. He had risen through the ranks from a staff person, to head of the consular section in Toronto. He may have started as a communicator or courier or something like that, and then moved into consular work. He and every other consular or administrative officer at a post were staff officers. I was the only “exam” consular officer at post.

Later, when I became an instructor in consular work at FSI 1976, I had a contact in the Bureau of Personnel (PER) run off copies of personal audit reports of everybody in the consular cone. I found out that, as of that time, still 55% of all consular officers were still non-exam officers. Two thirds of all female consular officers were non-exam officers, and more than half of them had no more than a high school diploma. They had become officers without ever having to pass the Foreign Service entrance exam.

Q: It is important to talk about this issue a little because I think the general perception has been that staff officers were narrow-gauged, "green eyeshade" types, very literal-minded who had no appreciation for the larger picture, often without college degrees. They were people who had begun their career as staff officers in many different areas, such as communications or secretarial work, and had eventually been assigned to consular or administrative work. There were exceptions, but in general that was the view and, in fact, the case.

LEININGER: True. And that was the charge against the consular officers for many, many years. This view had an impact on the new young exam Foreign Service officers who were assigned to consular work during their first or second tours. In fact, we “newbies” wondered, after being at post for three or four weeks, why the people doing consular or administrative work did not measure up to the quality people we had met in Washington. We wondered whether the Foreign Service had damaged these people in some way or whether these people were just left over from a by-gone era, and that in the future the caliber of people in consular or administrative work would improve considerably. We hoped it was the latter!

Q: What was your view of U.S.-Canada relations while serving in Toronto? My recollection from serving in Canada many years later than you did was that English-speaking Canadians often had a very harsh view of Americans.

LEININGER: I found the same. That view was exacerbated by the Vietnam War. The Canadians had always seen us as too barbaric, too prone to flex our muscles, and given to action without enough thought. When I read the op-ed page of English Canadian newspapers, I noticed that almost every day they were filled with anti-American sentiment; what ever we did, it was wrong. This view was reinforced by the ever-increasing number of draft dodgers and deserters who were filtering into Canada. The Canadians viewed these expatriates as perfectly moral people who were doing the right thing. Some of these Americans became quasi-celebrities and small-scale heroes. I met some of these people, but only occasionally. Most of them stayed clear of us; they wanted nothing to do with the U.S. Government. Remember the song “American Woman” by the

rock band “Guess Who?” The “Woman” in the song was the whole U.S. It included a line about “stay away from me.” That was intended to mean, “Keep your cotton-pickin’ hands off Canada and our way of life!” That was the attitude of many Canadians at the time.

Q: Apart from what might be considered the “intellectual” class in Toronto, what was the view of the “man on the street” about the U.S.?

LEININGER: I think only our downstairs neighbors knew that I worked at the consulate. Everybody was quite hospitable. Canadians are very decent folks. Toronto was the most relaxed and fear-free city we ever lived in. It has grown since our days, but whenever we visit, we find the attitude has not changed. They are very accepting of strangers.

ELIZABETH J. HARPER
Consul General
Montreal (1972-1976)

Elizabeth J. Harper entered the Foreign Service in 1951. Her career included positions in Indonesia, Japan, Canada, and Washington, DC. Ms. Harper was interviewed by William D. Morgan on June 18, 1992

Q: Like Montreal.

HARPER: And, not least, I wanted some place with good medical facilities, because the Aunt who lived with me was not in good health. My father had died in the meantime, and my own medical clearance was limited to places that were low level altitude and good medical facilities. So all of a sudden I was asked if I would mind being Deputy Administrator for a year, because Toronto and Montreal were coming up a year later, and one of Barbara's deputies, Fred Smith, wanted to go off for a year's senior training. They couldn't let Fred go to senior training without a backup, so it would mesh if I went into Fred's job for a year, and then went up to Canada. That struck me as splendid, and a year later I went to Montreal.

Q: Barbara hadn't left by then?

HARPER: No, Barbara was still there. She stayed through the Nixon administration, and it wasn't until Jerry Ford was president, and a Republican attorney with political ties wanted the job, that Barbara's resignation, her formal resignation submitted with a change of administration, was accepted, and so she left.

Q: Specifically, Len Walentynowicz who also appears in this series.

HARPER: Yeah, Len Walentynowicz came in. I went up to Montreal...

Q: After your year as Deputy?

HARPER: After the year as Deputy Administrator. We were still "administrators" in those days. Then, while I was in Montreal, they changed the title to Assistant Secretary. Meanwhile, we changed administrations. I was in Montreal through a fascinating five years. The day that I arrived in Montreal was the day after a general election, provincial election, and the Liberal Party had swept in with something like 103 seats out a 110, or numbers in that neighborhood.

Q: Mr. Bourassa?

HARPER: Yeah, Robert Bourassa. I was there for the Olympics in '76, I was there for the elections in '76 at which the Québécois...

Q: What's a "Québécois?"

HARPER: The Parti Québécois was the political party seeking an independent Quebec. It swung into just about the same size majority as the Liberals had three years earlier, and it was all a very fascinating time to have been there.

Q: You had a lot of visa issues during the Olympics time?

HARPER: We had lots of visas, we had lots of visitors, we had lots of everything. I don't know if you know, but Henry Kissinger's very fond of wrestling. The only thing for which the Secretary wanted tickets was the Greco-Roman wrestling. But, we had lots of other VIPs; for instance Secretary of Treasury Simon came up. He was interested in all sorts of sports, and oh, we had an enormous influx.

Q: Part of the problem being semi-fraud, or security, or whatever you want to call it. But there might be some people using the Olympics to enter the back door of the United States?

HARPER: Oh, yes.

Q: Did that turn out to be a reality?

HARPER: We had thought it would be, that lots of foreign visitors to the Olympics would suddenly discover how close the U.S. was to Montreal and seek visas, but the volume wasn't as great as we had feared. Anyway, that was a problem for Bill Maule, the new consular section chief. I was spending my time trying to find out for the Department, from my good friend Roger Rousseau, chairman of the Olympics Organization Committee, whether or not the Canadians were going to admit the PRC (People's Republic of China) to the Games and unseat, so to speak the Taiwanese.

Q: And did they?

HARPER: You know, the funny thing is...although I spent more hours than I want to recall on that issue, I don't really remember. I think that may have been the year that both teams were admitted -- to the satisfaction of neither.

Q: All of those things, even by you, have been forgotten, in part. But the memory of the Olympics stays on, as you know, because the physical location, and all that went with it, is still there and is still lovely.

HARPER: Oh, yes.

Q: And as a matter of fact, recently -- as recent as this morning -- there was an newspaper article, I don't know if you saw it or not, condemning our present exhibit in Barcelona. And, compared the "theme monument" to the one by Buckminster Fuller, a beautiful round ball, which later burned down, but the frame work fortunately stayed up.

HARPER: It burnt, I watched it burn down. I watched it burn down from the window of my office, as a matter of fact. But to get back to the chronology, I went up to Montreal, and had these five wonderful years, at which point I asked for a further extension. I was within a year and a half of mandatory retirement. So I asked if I couldn't stay until then, and the reaction of the Department was two-fold. One, B. J., you have already stretched...

Q: Four years being the normal assignment.

HARPER: You have already stretched beyond reason an assignment to one of the best posts in the Foreign Service, and there are other people who would like to go there. Moreover, even if we wanted to be sympathetic, we can't be because Barbara Watson insists that you come back as her deputy by September. Barbara, once Jimmy Carter took over from President Ford, was promptly reappointed and was back as assistant secretary.

DOROTHY A EARDLEY
Secretary to the Ambassador
Ottawa (1973-1976)

Mrs. Eardley was born in Wisconsin and raised in Wisconsin and Illinois. She attended Rubican Business School before entering the State Department, where in 1951 she was assigned as Clerk-Stenographer at Djakarta, Indonesia. She subsequently was posted to Berlin, Chengmai, Paris, Libreville, Colombo, Ankara, Ottawa, Jeddah and Kigali. She also had temporary duty assignments in Djibouti, Reunion, and Johannesburg. She retired in 1980. Mrs. Eardley was interviewed by T. Frank Crigler in 2008.

Q: I'm flattered. Let's move on to Ottawa.

EARDLEY: I got to Ottawa after more than five years in Turkey. Not much to say about Ottawa. It was cold nine months out of the year.

Q: Shortly after you arrived in Ottawa, Ambassador Schmidt was replaced by . . .

EARDLEY: William J. Porter and his wife Eleanor, whom I liked very much. We were there for a short time — two years? At that time, Kissinger was secretary of state. He hated Porter. So, he was shipping him off to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. That was before Riyadh became the capital.

Q: Why did Kissinger hate Porter?

EARDLEY: I don't know. I guess it was because Porter was very smart. Anyway, Kissinger shipped him off to Jeddah. And Porter asked me if I'd go along. I danced at the chance.

Q: Why did you "dance at the chance"? Why did you want to go to Jeddah?

EARDLEY: Because I wanted out of Ottawa. These fancy posts were never my cup of tea. I liked hardship posts. And it was nice being close to the United States. While I was there, I was once sent to Washington to work on the selection boards, promotion boards I think they were called. Also I had a chance to visit my family periodically, the ones in Detroit and the ones in Illinois. So it was pleasurable. But Ottawa wasn't my kind of embassy, and I was very happy to go to Jeddah. Twenty-five percent post.

DONALD A. KRUSE
State Department: Canadian Affairs
Washington, DC (1973-1976)

Donald A. Kruse was born in Philadelphia in 1930. He later attended Wheaton College and majored in history. Following his graduation in 1952, he received a masters degree in political science at the University of Pennsylvania and then joined the army. Following his two year run in the army, Kruse joined the Foreign Service and served in posts in Canada, Luxembourg, France, Belgium, Jerusalem, Italy, and England. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in March 1997.

Q: In '73, you left NATO for where?

KRUSE: I came back to Washington to work in Canadian Affairs.

Q: You were there from when to when?

KRUSE: From '73 to '76, for three years.

Q: I've often heard people I've interviewed say that dealing with the Canadians and perhaps dealing with the French is certainly as difficult as dealing with the Soviets. Could you describe the Canadian Desk, where it was and how work was divided? Then we'll talk about the issues.

KRUSE: Of course, to start with, there is kind of an anomalous thing about Canadian Affairs. That is that we were dealing with them under the rubric of European Affairs. That had a history

all its own. Suffice to say that there were those who felt that we ought to deal with Canadian Affairs more separately from Europe because they really weren't European. I guess the Canadians were among those who pushed that idea, that they deserved special attention. When I started, the desk was relatively small. We only had a director, a deputy, and two action officers. It grew in the next years because environmental issues became very big and we had to have an officer solely doing environmental issues. We continued to have someone devoted mostly to economic issues. We also had one doing political/military affairs. Then we had a deputy. But a lot of other issues came into play in the mid-'70s. Boundary issues became a big deal. Fishery issues became very big with the Canadians. So, there were a lot of issues which 99.44% of Americans would never know about and never care about. But only about one percent of Canadians didn't know about them fully and were prepared to fight to the last Canadian to get an advantage if they could. But that comes from the nature of the Alliance.

Q: You mentioned boundaries. I thought we had pretty well settle the boundaries.

KRUSE: You're right. We have pretty well settled them, but every boundary issue with the Canadians, whether there are any anomalies or anything that comes up, particularly when it involved fishing rights, are just as tough as dealing with the Russians. They fight tooth and nail, partly because they don't want to appear to be soft on their great friends, the Americans. In Canadian politics, the worst thing that can happen to you is to be considered a toady of the United States. On the other hand, if you're too tough and get in trouble, that also is dangerous for your political health. I think Diefenbaker maybe was an example of being a little too strong.

Q: Who was the Prime Minister at the time?

KRUSE: Trudeau. He was a special force also. He was looking forward to I with the Russians. You do have to realize that the other close neighbor to Canada is Russia, mostly over the pole. But still, in a Cold War situation, the Canadians always thought that if missiles would be flying from the Soviets to us, they'd go over Canada. They also just never were quite as hard line. I shouldn't say "never," but certainly under Trudeau, they were not as hard line anti-communist. They thought the Americans had kind of gone too far. So, it was an interesting time. There would be from time to time some Trudeau ideas which we thought were not helpful. I wish I could think of an example right now, but he was looking often to find ways of dialoguing with the Russians, sometimes on his own, which made us a little nervous. We thought maybe that he wasn't paying enough attention to this NATO solidarity idea, although we have to remember that, even to this day, Canadian forces are still based in Europe to be a part of NATO.

Q: What areas were you in?

KRUSE: I was mostly political/military because of my NATO background. When I became the deputy director, I had to be involved in the other issues. But here again, these are pretty routine issues for the U.S. In the great scope of American foreign policy interests, some of these issues with Canada just don't grab people's attention.

Q: What we're doing here is, we're trying to look in more detail. Obviously, Canadian-American relations in all its glory and difficulties go on no matter where the public attention is paid. So,

we'll look at this. When you got onto the Canadian Desk, what would you say was the accepted psychological profile of Pierre Trudeau at that time? What was motivating him? What was his relationship to the United States?

KRUSE: It's a shame that my memory is failing me, but he had a slogan which implied that Canada was independent of the United States. It was meant to prove to the rest of the world that... He was pushing Europeanization of Canadian foreign relations. There were a lot of things that he pushed. But all of it was against this almost immovable and unchangeable fact that it was living cheek by jowl with the United States and that Canadian business and Canadian prosperity really depended on a good relationship with the United States. If you have a big multinational corporation based in the United States that has factories in Canada, if you're one of the American executive officers of one of these companies, and you dare think of closing a factory in Canada, you're going to have people in Canada screaming, "Why are you picking on us? What is this business? We thought we were all in this together." When the headquarters of companies were in the United States or were clearly American, Canadians always get a little nervous that somehow they're going to get the short end of the stick. The same way with culture. "Time Magazine" sells very widely in Canada. It's not a Canadian magazine. American television is widely seen all over Canada. Canadians have the desire to live close to the American border for practical reasons. It's a little warmer. So they all live about 70 miles from the border and all of these great American cultural scene pours over. There are periodic attempts to stop it, somehow make sure there is Canadian content. Even football teams, the Canadian Football League had to have a certain percentage of Canadians higher than the Americans. You just aren't aware unless you put yourself in Canadian shoes the force of this great American society and how it affects Canadian life in every way.

Q: Let's talk about the military first. Were there any problems with the Canadian military during this '73 to '76 time? Nuclear issues, deployment, radar, or anything?

KRUSE: There were always ongoing questions. We had military bases still up in Canada—mostly for communications, early warning, things tied into our joint NORAD Command in Colorado Springs. Canadians were fully allied with us on this, but were not as zealous about a lot of it, let's put it that way. They clearly didn't have the resources. When World War II finished, Canada had the fourth largest air force in the world. By the time of the '70s, it was very small. It had some well-trained squadrons, but it was not big. That was, of course, the case in Canada in every phase of military. We're talking about a force that eventually got down to 70,000 personnel. It's a very small military. For a serious military man who wants to do the right thing for the security of his country of 25 million people it's constantly frustrating to find that there wasn't much public support for spending a lot of money. So, they had those problems within their own country. Then with us, of course, we tended to be always pushing, encouraging them to do more. The nuclear issues were always the most sensitive. The question of the use of nuclear weapons, that is, the basing of nuclear weapons, even planes on nuclear alert flying over Canada, these things always made the Canadians very nervous and sensitive. They did not want to appear to be a part of any U.S. nuclear initiatives which would embarrass them. Trudeau wanted the least possible reliance on nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were a particular problem for him and for a lot of Canadians.

Q: Did you have the feeling that Trudeau for both political and personal reasons rather enjoyed tweaking the nose of the Americans?

KRUSE: Yes. It always does a Canadian politician a little good in the country to appear to be able to do that. If you can do it with a little good humor and not appear too uptight about it... There is a certain amount that the U.S. knows it has to live with. Trudeau sometimes would do that quite well, but always within limits. He was certainly a strong figure on the Canadian political scene for a long time. So, his appeal was pretty strong in Canada for other reasons, such as keeping Canada together. Here I will express a very strong opinion. I think it would not be to our good to have a divided Canada. So, we were always glad when we had a Prime Minister who appeared to both the French and the English. Trudeau in many ways bent over backwards because he was a French Canadian who appeared to be putting the Anglos in a tight spot. But that's, of course, a constant concern of the Canadians.

Q: At this time ('73 to '76), what was the feeling on the Canadian Desk about whether the future of Canada? I'm speaking of the partition.

KRUSE: It was just beginning to be a big issue. I remember writing a paper on Quebec separatism. It got to the Secretary and he actually wrote something on it with his initials. The EUR Assistant Secretary Art Hartman sent it back to me. So, I know that the paper was read by him. So, there was that kind of level of interest in Quebec. It was beginning to show this possibility of breaking away. But it was new. At that time, the question was whether separatism would grow or was it going to wither away? I am not sure I ever made a prediction, but I have been surprised that, in fact, it not only seems to have grown, but it came close to actually happening.

Q: I'm not an authority, but in 1997 after the last plebiscite, my feeling is, I think it's inevitable that Quebec will split off, but maybe I'm wrong.

KRUSE: Well, I'll put myself on record as saying that I still resist the idea that it is inevitable. I continue to hope that it doesn't happen. I think it would not be in our interest nor really in the interest of Canada and not even Quebec.

Q: What about fishing rights? Did you get involved in various fishing matters?

KRUSE: On the desk, we had to keep tabs on it. In fact, we had Roz Ridgway doing all of the fishery negotiations in those days. So, we were not the prime office for that. That was another interesting thing about the Canadian Desk. Most of the big economic issues with Canada were still being carried by EB. Jules Katz particularly was the man who kind of knew all the economic issues. Any day, something could come up somewhere in Canada which would be totally off our screen. We would know nothing about it. It would happen often between private entities on both sides. Then the governments would have to get involved. Often, the desk was the last to know what was happening. So, there was this kind of history of many of the substantive issues with Canada like economics, the environment, and fisheries. It was somewhat esoteric for the average generalist Foreign Service person. It was being handled by the more functional bureaus.

Q: Was this a period of time, if I recall, when icebreakers in the Northwest Passage were a big issue?

KRUSE: The bigger issue was our submarines and their playing around up north. The Canadians didn't like the fact that the submarines would somehow and sometimes come up in what they saw as Canadian waters. It was a problem. We did our best to kind of walk the narrow line between freedom of the seas and Canadian sensitivities. Except for the odd blow-up and incident now and then, we got away with it. There are a lot of little footnote stories, anecdotal stories regarding this relationship. Once, a Canadian ship was doing target practice out in the Puget Sound area, the Juan de Fuca Straits really. One of the shells went awry and actually hit an American ship. Nobody was hurt, fortunately, but you can imagine the jokes that this was a Freudian slip and that this was the Canadians' aggression coming to the forefront. Given the fact that we were one of the world's super powers and the Canadians just wanted us not to throw that around too much with them, I believe we managed the relationship pretty well.

Q: How about on the cultural side, cultural domination, too much American advertising and magazines and broadcasts, what have you?

KRUSE: Even to this day, there is always the threat of legislation in Canada to cut back on the American content, somehow keep American T.V. down. I have to say that I have a sympathy for the Canadians. I think Canadian society is a very admirable society. There are many features of it that, I think, are superior to ours, particularly gun control and even their feelings of need to have more of a commonality about health care and other social issues. I think, in fact, the whole idea of community is still stronger in Canada than it is here in the United States, where individualism is so important to us. Individualism is honored and respected and practiced in Canada, but there is also the other side, the idea that we are a community. Maybe that comes because they've always had to make a statement to be seen as different from us. So, they're not as assured of themselves maybe as we seem to be. We had an earlier assignment in Toronto. I remember it fondly. I think there is a great deal for Canada to commend itself on. May they live forever.

JOHN C. LEARY
Economic Counselor
Ottawa (1973-1977)

John Charles Leary was born in Connecticut in 1924. He received a BA in 1947 and an MA in 1959 from Yale University. He served in the U.S. Army overseas as a lieutenant from 1943 to 1945. His postings abroad have included Cherbourg, Dusseldorf, Istanbul, Tokyo, Ottawa, Vienna, Sao Paulo and St. George's. Mr. Leary was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 1998.

Q: Okay. And from there you went to Ottawa?

LEARY: Then we went to Ottawa as economic counselor. Very interesting assignment. Very pleasant city for family living. Canadians are very pleasant people to deal with although they can

be very tough negotiators. We had numerous cross border issues with which we were continuing dealing. Ranging from trading potatoes across the state of Washington and British Columbia border to restrictions on advertising in American magazines and all sorts of things. One of the most interesting aspects of this, which differs from other posts, is that Washington and Ottawa are very close together. We had very good telephone communications between the two. We speak a reasonably common language and we found that agencies of the Canadian government were in constant communication directly with agencies of the U.S. government. One of the embassy's jobs was trying to keep track of who was saying what to whom.

Q: And probably on the one hand you welcomed that close communication and contact, because it helped resolve problems before they became really major issues.

LEARY: It certainly facilitated business between our two countries.

Q: On the other hand, sometimes common people were talking directly about things that had wider ramifications and aspects that they perhaps didn't recognize themselves and the embassy would have, if they had been in the loop and involved. How could you possibly catch up with all these sort of moving targets?

LEARY: Well, partly keeping your ear to the ground and partly relying upon the Canadian desk in Washington to keep its ear to the ground in Washington, and learning from our Canadian colleagues that certain things were being discussed and trying to pick up and get back in the loop. It was a continuing problem, but I would say not one that adversely affected our relationship with Canada very much. Something of a frustration for the embassy from time to time.

Q: You were the senior economic person in the embassy, the economic counselor. I would think that the economic issues were probably the most important in terms of the relationship. Obviously issues relating to our joint participation in NATO and events of North America and so on. But the economic issues are the ones that really come home.

LEARY: I think that is correct. Yes, on the political side we did have NATO and multi-lateral matters and UN issues and so on. We were also, of course, following things like the demands of Quebec for greater independence and in some areas separatism and so on. But the issues on the economic side were many and very important. One particular aspect of this was that much of Canadian industry is owned by American firms. There was always a great concern on the part of the Canadians that decisions were being made by their major business firms which were not in Canadian interests. The foreign, meaning U.S., dominance was a big issue. There were continual proposals in the Parliament to take restrictive actions at various times. Most of which didn't get very far because it was recognized that this was a mutual enterprise and that they would hurt themselves to try and rubber stamp and interfere with the business decisions that were being made.

During my time they did pass some legislation which resulted in the establishment of a foreign investment review agency which was designed to review new investment proposals of a certain size in Canada and determine whether they were in Canadian interest and then either grant or

withhold approval. I think that did not result in any particular restriction because in most cases if a businessman is going to invest a few million dollars in a country, it's considered almost by definition to be advantageous. But there were always concerns about impacts on local situations. Canadian labor also had an interest in this whole issue. We were developing the U.S.-Canada Automotive Trade Agreement. We had a lot of cross-border trade in energy and when the various energy crises hit, the one in '73 was one that there was a lot of concern about conserving energy on both sides of the border and how much there were going to allow to flow across. For example, large sections of New York State are depending upon hydro-power from Quebec and this happens back and forth in both directions. We had rather substantial trade in oil products across the border. Western Canada being a big producer. There were issues there as to what controls, if any, should be applied in these cases. Also the greatest attempts to develop alternative energy resources, in particular in northern Alberta. There is a resource referred to as the tar sands, which amounts to basically, as it sounds, sandy deposits with tar mixed into them. A large oil company had begun to exploit these resources and had developed a process for heating the tar sands and separating the sand from the tar, which could then be turned into petroleum products. That was not economic at the time and I suspect still is not. But it was an effort to find alternatives in the event there should be further disruptions of imports from the Middle East and so on. All these things involved us to a degree in discussions with the Canadian government ministries that were dealing with them and with the industries who were back and forth across the border.

Q: You mentioned the U.S.-Canada automotive agreement which actually provided for free trade in automobiles and parts. I think that was negotiated, ten years before you were there. Well, in the mid-'60s. That in turn led to the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, the North America Free Trade Area. Were those subsequent steps under discussion while you were there, or was it more a question of whether we could even absorb what the auto agreement had led to?

LEARY: The auto agreement was the first step and it was still being absorbed. There was a certain controversy surrounding it. A broader free trade agreement was being discussed, but in a more academic fashion, I would say. We had really not gotten to the point where we were talking seriously, government to government, about such things.

Q: One of the concerns about the automotive agreement, as I recall, was who was really benefiting from it. Was it America or was it Canada or both? The industry clearly was a great winner. The statistics were very difficult to understand because there was so much intra-company trade that went on. Did you get quite involved with all those issues at all while you were there?

LEARY: Yes, and there was concern about... This was where companies' decisions came in. In the event that the model was not selling well, there would have to be cut-backs. Where did the cut-backs take place, in Michigan or in Ontario? As the thing developed we, the American and Canadian auto companies, began producing whole lines of vehicles in Canada and in the States. So if a certain amount were being produced in Oshawa and demand fell short, workers were being laid off in Oshawa, but decisions were avoided in Detroit. This was causing some concerns. The trade unions also were joined as well. The Canadian auto workers and the U.S. auto workers had, I'm not sure what the work relationship was, they were essentially the same union, but they were two different departments. So these things were continuing.

Interesting sideline about the Canadian concern for foreign investment. At one time there was a poll taken asking people who had expressed concern about foreign investment to identify which companies were foreign investors. They had, for example, General Motors. All Canadians thought that was a Canadian company. When the company had to plant their own vicinity they thought it was a good thing. It was the amorphous foreign company that no one really knew about that was the problem.

Q: In this period, I think, there was a growing concern about some of the environmental issues that spill over across the border. Acid rain and so on. Were you quite involved in that or was that someone else?

LEARY: I wouldn't say quite involved, we were obviously aware of it and from time to time were involved in discussions, but we had a bi-lateral commission that deals with border water problems; the Great Lakes and the North St. Lawrence Seaway and they were much involved in that. And both countries have environmental agencies that were dealing with these things as well. There was a good deal of cooperation in those areas, which resulted in, it's my understanding, a rather substantial clean-up of the Great Lakes.

We did have some issues in the shipping area, through the St. Lawrence Seaway and so on. And some relating to labor matters. Where Canadian port strikes against certain ships sometimes involved U.S. shipping and so on.

Q: Did you spend a lot of your time as economic counselor in dialogue with Canadians about third countries, about international issues, about Europe, about things to do with the European Union, the European community? Was that a substantial part of your portfolio?

LEARY: Yes, we dealt with Canadians on respective positions on trade issues and GATT and UNCTAD and OECD and various new economic matters and so on. Explaining our position, seeking their position and trying to come to agreement where we could. In many cases our interests were similar.

Q: Another similarity between the two countries is the vast size in terms of area of Canada. Did you travel a lot within the country? To the west and so on?

LEARY: Yes, I was fortunate enough to get from Newfoundland to British Columbia and north to the tar sands that I mentioned in northern Alberta and also I took a trip up the James River in northern Quebec, which was the site of a major hydro project which was still under construction at that time. It's a vast country and acres and acres of open land. The great majority of the population lives within 100 or 75 miles of the U.S. border. There are vast open areas with not much but deer and polar bears.

Another issue relating to that was the Alaska pipeline which was being built and passed through Canada. That was a major issue between the two countries. Working out satisfactory arrangements between the two countries on both the environmental aspects and economic aspects of it.

Q: How about fisheries management issues?

LEARY: Fisheries are also a major issue. We share a lot of fishing grounds and there were continual issues on the amount of fish to be taken and even about who was responsible of the administration of certain jurisdictions. There are still certain areas where the coastal, the off-shore demarcation line is in dispute. If you draw the line one way or another the U.S. has a clear claim to some areas and Canada to others, but there's still a relatively small, but potentially important area that is in dispute. So in most cases we were able to work out arrangements for jurisdiction and satisfactory accommodations for our respective fisherman. But it comes up year after year.

Q: How about Canada's economic trade relations in the period which you were there with other countries in the western hemisphere, other than the United States? Was there a lot of interest in Latin American and the Caribbean?

LEARY: Yes there was. Canada had always refrained from becoming a member of the Organization of American States, although they had become more and more to participate as an observer and they were developing their relationships with Latin America, particularly focusing on trade relationships and investment relationships. A number of their mining companies had operations in South America. And of course they took a different view on relations with Cuba than we did and that also proved to be a bone of contention from time to time. Where we would attempt to restrict American firms from dealing with Cuba and they would in turn try and get their Canadian affiliates to comply with U.S. laws and Canada saying these are Canadian companies and they should abide by our regulations rather than yours.

Q: I'm not sure when it happened, but I guess Canada has now joined the Organization of American States.

LEARY: I believe that's true in fairly recent times.

Q: And I believe the State Department is now treating Canada as part of the Bureau of Inner-American Affairs.

LEARY: Yes, that also, I think, is a recent change.

Q: Which is a recent change as you say. At the time you were there it seemed natural, that Canada, even though it is part of the western hemisphere in North America is treated as an ally as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and part of the European Bureau of the State Department.

LEARY: For a variety of reasons, including its close ties with Britain, in fact it is a former British colony, that we are allied in World War II, and we had a common defense arrangement for North American, which tied in with our NATO arrangements and so on. We were the two developed countries in the hemisphere, dealing with other developed countries, in the OECD for example. So it was natural for them to be in the European Bureau, but I guess as the world

changes it makes sense now for this new arrangement. But clearly many of the issues still relate to European ties.

Q: And the other developed countries in the economic area, including Japan and so on.

LEARY: An interesting sideline on the Cuban matter, the Winnipeg Ballet is one of Canada's great cultural traditions and they were invited to appear and perform in Havana and had accepted the invitation when it turned out that they had a problem when it was realized that several of the lead dancers were American citizens who were not permitted to travel to Cuba. Well, a great negotiation ensued to make it possible for them to get special exceptions so that they could travel with the ballet to Cuba.

Q: Okay. Well, unless there is something else that you would like to say about Ottawa, I would like to finish with one sort of general topic on sports. I know that you and your family did a lot of hockey during this assignment to Ottawa and one of the things from kind of things from an embassy economic/political counselor dimensions, I suppose is that by the time you were there in '73 to '77, not only the National Hockey League, but Major League Baseball, included Canadian teams as well as American teams. Did you get involved in sort of a political level in any issues relating to that or was that just something that you were interested in personally?

LEARY: No, I don't recall that we had any political issues there. I do recall attending a game in Montreal at Jerry Park, which was a place where the Montreal Expos played before they moved into the Olympic Stadium, which was built for the 1976 Olympics. By the way, we did have the '76 Olympics. That was my second time in a country that was hosting the Olympics and we managed to see one or two sessions of the Olympic games. On the hockey side, again, there were no real political issues. One year I was there, it might have been 1976, the National Hockey League and its European counterparts hosted a, it was called if I recall, a Canada Cup, a tournament before the regular season began. They had the Russians and the Czechs and Germans and various others who were there. And each of the embassies was given a few free tickets to each of these games and our Ambassador was not much interested so I inherited these tickets. I went to Montreal to see the Americans play a couple of times. It was a lot of fun. We enjoyed it very much.

Ottawa is a city that is filled with recreational facilities which makes it ideal for families. There were bicycle paths and parks and lots of skating rinks which are open twelve months a year, and if one likes to ice skate, you can do that all year round. Skating on the Rideau Canal during the winter months was one of my favorite forms of relaxation. I would "brown bag" my lunch and skate during the lunch hour. The children were very involved in playing hockey and Ringette (girl's form of hockey) and I helped coach their teams. My family has often heard me say that my most prized possession was my Canadian Hockey Coach's certificate!

Q: Well, it is almost a tremendously important and fascinating relationship. Two countries that are the biggest trading partners in the world, I think. The economies are so integrated and becoming more so, there are frictions and problems arise, but I guess the amazing thing is how well things work most of the time.

LEARY: Canada is a big country and attitudes vary from one part of Canada to another. I recall being in Newfoundland where their ties with the United States are very strong. Especially New England and their sympathies are very much with the United States on many issues. Similarly in western provinces, their ties are more north and south than they are east and west. You find a lot of resentment there about the Ontarians who through numbers largely control the Parliament and so on.

Q: Did you coordinate the economic efforts of the various American consulates in Canada? Or were those consulates generally primarily involved with consular issues and citizens and didn't really do much economic reporting?

LEARY: They were principally consular posts. We've got a huge volume of visa and citizenship issues, protection of American citizens who ran afoul of Canadian law and so on, that have to be assisted. All of the posts reported from time to time and made contributions to our round-up reports and so on. And occasionally became involved in specific issues, but most of the reporting was done through the central embassy in Ottawa. And of course we had very good phone communication with these people so we could pick up the phone and talk to them about issues and get their report on those issues.

Q: Who was the Ambassador most of the time that you were there? This was the Ford Administration.

LEARY: When I arrived the Ambassador was Adolf Schmidt. He was an appointee of the Nixon Administration, as I recall. He had been there for some time, but left shortly after I arrived, so I did not get to know him very well. Then he was succeeded by Tom Enders, a career officer who did a very good job and took what, compared to the past, had been a very high profile in Canada. Discussing policy issues in a public forum we had pended because of the Canadian sensitivities, to take a rather low posture in the embassy, but Enders, with the approval and encouragement of the Secretary of State, who at that time was Henry Kissinger, began to talk about issues and our view of what Canada should be contributing to some these things and super-sensitive to some of our concerns. In southeast Asia for example. In the economic investment area. In burden sharing and NATO and various things. So it was kind of an interesting time. Tom toured the country and about once a month would make a speech on a major issue which became grist for the editorial writers for a few weeks. Toward the end of my tour we had Bill Porter. Another career officer. Again, a very short time. It was Enders who was there most of the time that I was there.

Q: I can't imagine Tom Enders taking anything other than a very high profile. It's just his personality.

LEARY: That also greatly improved our ability to follow what was happening outside of regular channels because Tom did not hesitate to pick up the telephone and call the Secretary of Treasury or the Secretary of Commerce and find out what they were thinking or doing about certain things.

Q: He also, of course, at the time, had a very strong economic background.

LEARY: Absolutely.

Q: He had done economic work himself a lot. Was that a problem for you in a sense that he wanted to do it all or...?

LEARY: No, not at all. No, no. He relied very much on the staff, except when it came to writing speeches. There he asked for input but he was his own speech writer.

Q: Okay. Anything else about your assignment to Ottawa? Great job, I think.

LEARY: Yes, we enjoyed it thoroughly.

Q: You can talk more about potatoes or carrots or...

LEARY: My first direct experience with Canadian trade problems was actually before I was assigned there. There was a problem relating to cross-border trading of potatoes on the west coast. The problem which is similar to other problems which arise, related to the differing seasons. One crop matures before another and trade goes across the border and for example, Canadian crop was just coming in and the U.S. crop was plentiful and we were shipping loads of potatoes into British Columbia and depressing the price. And they were doing the same thing when our crop was not quite ready and it was coming back across the border. Anyway, due to these sorts of things, I was invited to go, this is when I was still in the Department in GCP, up to Ottawa with a Department of Agriculture representative and a man from the Washington State Potato Commission to talk to our Canadian counterparts about this.

Q: I had a similar trip at one point. I don't remember if it was potatoes or turkeys or some seasonal product. And as you say the trade currents ebb and flow and there are lots of these issues.

LEARY: I remember the potato commission guy gave me a little card to carry in my wallet that said "How to Eat Potatoes and Lose Weight" and it had a number of suggestions on it which I never really followed very closely and as a result didn't lose much weight.

RUDOLPH V. PERINA
Rotation Officer
Ottawa (1974-1976)

Ambassador Perina was born in Czechoslovakia when that country was under communist control. He escaped with his family to Morocco, then Switzerland and finally the United States. The ambassador was educated at the University of Chicago and Columbia University. Entering the Foreign Service in 1974, Mr. Perina specialized in Military-Political Affairs at posts abroad, including Moscow, Berlin, Brussels, Vienna and Belgrade. In Washington he served on the National Security Council, specializing in Soviet issues. From 1998 to 2001 Mr. Perino was US Ambassador to Moldova. Ambassador Perina was interviewed by

Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2006

Q: So in 1974 you came into the Foreign Service?

PERINA: Yes, November 1974.

Q: You want to talk a little about your initial impression of your class and how you felt about the Foreign Service?

PERINA: Well, I was very happy to come into the Foreign Service because in the first instance I was happy to have a job. My wife was pregnant, and the first thing we checked was if the medical benefits covered pre-existing pregnancy. They did so we were relieved. I was also very happy because writing my dissertation I had grown a little tired of academia. I grew tired of the specialization and increasingly narrowing focus. Though I was determined to finish the dissertation, and eventually I did, I was excited about being in something new and different like the Foreign Service. It was viewed as prestigious by my friends and family, it was more competitive to enter, it actually paid better than an entry-level job in academia, and I particularly looked forward to the adventure of living overseas. I felt well qualified for the Service: I knew other languages, had lived overseas and so on. So I was quite enthusiastic about it, and my wife was also. She had lived as an exchange student in Berlin, spoke German, also enjoyed being overseas, and of course was relieved that I had finally gotten a job. We came down from New York, lived in Arlington Towers which is where the Foreign Service Institute was at the time, and met our class which was about 35 people or so.

Then I started negotiating my first assignment. This was, of course, before open assignments existed, so it was like a poker game because one had to try to figure out first what was available and how often one could say no before the offers got worse rather than better. I learned very quickly how one has to watch out and negotiate in the assignments process. During my first assignment meeting, the counselor said, "We're going to make you a principal officer." I could not believe that as a new officer I would be a principal officer. I said, "Where?" And he said, "Bukavu," in the Congo, a consulate, a one man consulate and I would be principal officer. I looked at him and said, "Do you know I have a pregnant wife?" He said, "That's why you're perfect. There's no school problem." So I learned very quickly to be careful of what assignment counselors try to sell. I held out and in the end was offered a rotational assignment in Ottawa, Canada. This wasn't the most exotic place to go but I concluded that with a child on the way and still trying to finish a dissertation, it made a lot of practical sense. Certainly more so than Bukavu. The consequence was that in our first two years in the Foreign Service, the furthest we got from Washington was on home leave to California. But we were in fact very fortunate. Ottawa turned out to be a very interesting and pleasant place to live. And very significant in our lives because both of our daughters, Kaja or Katherine and Alexandra, were born there about 17 months apart. I even finished my dissertation.

Q: Let's go back to the class again. What was the composition in terms of ethnicity, gender and so on?

PERINA: It was a mixed group but an impressive group. There were, as I recall, a fair number of

women in the class. It surely wasn't 50-50 but I would say it was about a third women. Racially, there were one or two African-Americans, one Hispanic, but as I recall no Asians. It was certainly an impressive group and very collegial. In fact, the spouses of the group gave my wife a shower in Arlington Towers, a baby shower, which was an introduction to the sense of community in the Foreign Service which we came very much to value.

Q: Were you able to parlay your doctorate into anything?

PERINA: No, I quickly found out that Ph.D.'s were neither rare nor particularly valued. Academic degrees were not really taken into account very much. I finished my dissertation mainly out of principle and as an insurance policy if I left the Foreign Service, but it never helped me much in the bureaucracy. Later I found out that education levels were actually hidden from promotion boards. What I did get credit for were the languages I knew. I tested and received step increases for Czech, German and French. That put me at the top of my pay grade so I started out at about \$13,000 a year, which we were very happy with. I had the highest salary in my class.

Q: Ten years before I started out at about \$3,500. That wasn't bad. \$10,000 was the top government salary. So you were in Ottawa from 1975 to 1977?

PERINA: 1975 to late 1976. We arrived in Ottawa in February 1975 after I had taken the A-100 and the consular course. This was a rotational assignment so I did both consular work and political/economic work, but primarily it was consular. Canadians, of course, do not need visas but there were a lot of third-country applicants in Ottawa and also a lot of complex citizenship cases, plus imprisoned Americans. I worked on all of these. It was the only consular work I have done in my career but it left memories of some very interesting experiences.

Q: Do you recall any of them?

PERINA: Well, I recall one in particular that was when I gave the first visa to the United States to Alexander Solzhenitsyn who had just been expelled from the Soviet Union a few months earlier. He was invited to Canada before he was invited to the United States. He came to Canada and while there he got an invitation from the AFL/CIO to speak in Washington at some convention they were holding. He decided to accept and we received word that he was going to come to apply for a visa. Somebody from the AFL/CIO tipped us off that this was going to happen. I was the junior officer and my boss was a more experienced consular officer so we sat down and we thought about this for a minute. Right away we realized that he would need a waiver for Communist Party membership, which applied to anyone who had ever been in the Communist Party, as Solzhenitsyn had been in his youth. We thought, well, this is Solzhenitsyn, a renowned writer and dissident and very much of a hero to the Western world. We phoned Washington to ask if we could get around the waiver requirement in some way, and the answer was no. We had to go through the whole process of him filling out all the applications, sending these to Washington, and getting approval for the visa issuance.

I remember my boss was very worried about how Solzhenitsyn would take this. Solzhenitsyn had a reputation of standing up to bureaucrats, and we could imagine him getting fed up with the

forms, walking out of the Embassy and denouncing American bureaucrats as no better than Soviet ones. Well, Solzhenitsyn came in with his wife Marina, who was his second wife, and was very polite and friendly. I did most of the talking with him even though I didn't know Russian at the time but I did know German. He spoke German quite well, and that is how we communicated. I explained to him that he had to fill out these forms, and his reaction was the opposite of what my boss had feared. Solzhenitsyn took the process more seriously than almost any other applicant I had processed. He sat down with these forms and began filling them out meticulously. There was one standard question asking for a list of all places where the applicant had lived for more than six months since the age of 18. He started filling this out and then he turned to me and said, "Do I have to fill in all the labor camps?" And I said, "No, you don't have to. Just cover the period. You don't have to fill in all the labor camps." He was immensely conscientious about the entire process. I thought about it afterwards and concluded that his behavior actually made a lot of sense, given his experiences. If you spend your life fighting a bureaucracy, your first thought is not to make a mistake in an official document that the bureaucracy can use against you. So he took the matter very seriously. We obtained the waiver from Washington overnight, and he came back the next day to pick up the visas. I know the exact date, which was May 21, 1975, because he also autographed and dated a first edition, in Russian, of the Gulag Archipelago for me. That was the date of his first visa to the United States, although he subsequently came many times.

Q: He eventually settled in Vermont, I think.

PERINA: Yes. He eventually settled there but then returned to Moscow after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Q: In that period of the '70s and during our involvement in Vietnam there were a significant number of young Americans males who entered Canada to avoid the draft. Did that affect you at all?

PERINA: Not in general, but there was this amazing coincidence where I met a classmate from the University of Chicago on the street in Ottawa. He was in Canada because he had gone AWOL (absent without leave) from the army before deployment to Vietnam. He was not a draft evader because he was beyond the draft. It was a very strange feeling at first because there we met and he was in a sense running from the United States and I was representing the United States. But after a while it really did not influence our personal relationship. We became good friends and still are. He is an attorney in Ottawa but was amnestied many years ago and can visit the U.S. without problem.

Q: How about the Canadians you met? I have been told by some people the one thing that binds Canadians together is that they are not Americans and of course, sometimes being an American diplomat there means bearing the brunt of hearing why they're Canadians.

PERINA: Right. Well, it is a dilemma because you have to be sensitive to their desire to have a separate identity despite the fact that so much of the culture and the economy is dominated by U.S. influence, as they are the first to recognize. It's always tricky because when Canadians ask you, "Well, how do you like it here?" you don't want to say, "Well, it's just like home," even

though in many respects it is. But in fact we found the Canadians very hospitable. We had two daughters born in Ottawa, both delivered by the same doctor who delivered Margaret Trudeau's children, so for that and other reasons it will always be a special place for us. We made Canadian friends with whom we stay in touch to the present day.

Q: Did you find any sort of hostility? I think of Québec and the English-French issue. Did you get caught up in that in any way?

PERINA: Well, there was some resentment of the U.S., of course. Not so much as a result of the French issue but rather because of our enormous influence and the Canadian wish to develop a separate identity. Unfortunately, some Canadians felt that a Canadian identity could not develop unless U.S. influence was restricted and closed off. I did a little bit of work in the political and economic sections of the Embassy. In the economic section, the main problems were Canadian efforts to restrict American TV broadcasts, to somehow limit American content in books and magazines, and so on. We argued that it would not work, as for the most part it did not. Many Canadians enjoyed American TV programs more than CBC programs. It is very hard to legislate a cultural identity, as some people tried to do. At the same time, I think Canadians are genuinely different from Americans in many respects and do have their own identity. One of my jobs in the political section was to attend question period in the Canadian Parliament. The Prime Minister at the time was Pierre Trudeau, and he was a master of debate. Watching him and Diefenbaker spar in parliament was a pleasure. It was a very civilized political culture.

Q: Who was our ambassador at the time?

PERINA: I was there with two ambassadors. When I first arrived, the ambassador was William Porter, with whom I overlapped only a bit, and he was then replaced by Thomas Enders.

Q: During the Vietnam War, there was quite a bit of tension between Trudeau and Lyndon Johnson. Did you get any sense of that during your time there?

PERINA: By the time I got to Ottawa the Vietnam War was basically over. It was no longer as controversial as in years past. So no, I did not get any sense of that. But of course Trudeau was a strong leader, intelligent and unafraid to speak out when he felt like it, so I have no doubt he made some in Washington nervous.

JOHN CLEMMONS
Security Officer
Ottawa (1974-1978)

John Clemmons was born in Greensboro, North Carolina. He graduated from Gilbert College in 1953 and then served as a non-commissioned officer in military intelligence during the Korean War. He joined the SY with the State Department in 1956 and was a security officer for thirty years. He had several assignments in the U.S. and also served in Ottawa, Canada. Mr. Clemmons was

interviewed by Henry Mattox in 1992.

Q: You were in Canada in the Embassy in Ottawa 1974 to '78. What were the differences in duties or responsibilities or implementations, if any, between Ottawa and a field office?

CLEMMONS: Well, they were totally different type jobs as a real security officer. For one thing, you operated pretty much on your own. In my case they had never had a security officer assigned to Canada prior to 1974. So I even had to devise my own filing system and so forth. But as a security officer in the Foreign Service, investigations take a back seat although you do have an investigative program. My particular situation, RCMP did the background checks because I wasn't allowed to do an investigation outside of the Chancery. You learned a lot about security. Some of which I never thought about. Door locks, for example, alarm systems. While you are not a police officer, but you still had to counsel, particularly junior officers and their associations and remind them of the non-fraternization policy. Sometimes our own agencies would try to violate that rule. It was up to the security officer to make sure that a junior officer did not get involved in something that he or she could not extricate themselves from.

Q: A personal relationship?

CLEMMONS: Yes, personal relationship.

Procedural security at the time, we were hardening our offices all over the world because of terrorism problem. A number of our Consulates in Canada had been in place for 35 years and you try to do a security survey of an office with an attic access of a 12' height, what not. There was no way you could do it. So as a result I was instrumental in getting some of our Consulates modernized and placed in better offices than what they had because of the security problem. Travel was tremendous going at the time. We had seven Consulates General going from St. Johns, Newfoundland, which was later closed, all the way from Vancouver. Plus all the U.S. Information Agency offices (USIS), attaché offices, Ambassador's residence, DCM residence. Tremendous amount of responsibility and you had to work closely with the host country police as a result.

Q: You had direct charge with the marines at the Embassy?

CLEMMONS: That's correct and that's an experience within itself too, because while you felt rather fatherly towards them and admired them, most of them were 18 and 19 years old. They could think of more ways to get into trouble than you could imagine. There were times. A lot depended on the gunny. If you had a strong NCOIC, that was helpful. Unfortunately, the first one that I encountered in Canada wasn't that strong because I found drains were littered with their girlfriends outside the marine house. He apparently lost control of the detachment so I had to come on as a heavy and make some requirements. It was a totally new experience. I think probably of the 30 years I spent with the Department, it was probably the most enlightening experience. I look back on my career and I look at those four years in Canada because so much went on up there and there was such a learning process on my part that it was and I regret not taking another tour. I, for certain reasons I was told that I could have Bonn, for example, if I wanted it. I turned it down. Again let's go off the record.

Q: Okay.

Q: Now John, you said that you would have, under certain circumstances, gone on to another assignment in Bonn but you decided not to.

CLEMMONS: This was a career decision I made. Probably more emotional than it was rational. Being, I think, biggest mistake was that I was four years in Canada and worked under two separate distinct Ambassadors. First of whom was the man I respected a great deal and he was very helpful. The second was totally different.

Q: Excuse me one second. The first was Bill Porter, career Ambassador?

CLEMMONS: Yes.

Q: The second?

CLEMMONS: Should I name him?

Q: Yes.

CLEMMONS: Tom Enders.

Q: Also a careerist, but go ahead.

CLEMMONS: But totally different personality. Considerably younger than Porter, had teenage children, wife who, I guess the best way to describe them, as total disregard for anyone but themselves. For example, the resident staff were required sometimes to work 24 hours without a break. As a result, we had several of the older, these were third country nationals, most of them, have heart attacks, develop other illnesses as a result of the stress that was put upon them. They would hire without any clearance from my office and then when they found that they did not like this person, they would arbitrarily fire them. It was a constant battle up there. There was difficulty with the Ambassador recognizing SYB and his security apparatus, has a tendency to lean towards another Federal agency. And, you know, his wife would make unreasonable demands. Call... When the administrative counselor was out of town, I would frequently end up with the brunt of her anger or other resentments even though I had nothing to do with whatever she was complaining about. But she would call all hours of the night and then hang up.

Q: So you had a personality conflict in those circumstances?

CLEMMONS: Exactly, it really turned me sour as far as the Foreign Service goes. Looking back on it, it was the wrong reaction on my part. I should have taken another tour. I think it would have been a much more rewarding career had I, you know, gone back out. When I say Bonn, I was never actually offered Bonn. The rumor mill had it, so at that time it was our largest post. So I think I would have benefited, not necessarily grade wise because when I came back to the Department, I was made a special assistant to the Director who was a Deputy Assistant Secretary

at the time. Then after a brief stint as chief of investigations, I was made Assistant Director for Protection and ran the entire protection program for four years until such time that I retired.

Q: Well there is a special fascination for many people anyway in the Foreign Service in serving abroad in staffing Embassies. It's different from working in Washington. You got a taste of it. You liked it. Would you like it perhaps better in retrospect than at the time?

CLEMMONS: Yes, I let personalities interfere with my judgment. I was told, I should not let the Ambassador, a certain Ambassador and his wife influence my decision but I did. I was burned out. I was frustrated. I felt particularly Mrs. Enders was cause for embarrassment to the American people. Certainly the Embassy as a result of her activities. They had no regard for anyone but themselves and this was shown through some of the activities of their children. They seemed to think they were above it all. So but had I to do it over again, I would definitely, for one thing, I would have tried to go into the Foreign Service sooner. When I came along there was no intermingling between the G.S. and the Foreign Service. If you were hired as a Special Agent, you stayed a Special Agent and you never crossed that line. Whereas now as soon as they unified, you come on as a Foreign Service grade and you will serve time in the field office, you will serve time overseas which, I think, makes for a much more professional organization. It's much more effective. Of course, we've got probably five times the number of people that we had when I started out too. Unless a person has a health problem or a personal problem of some type, a Security Officer or Special Agent, they will be assigned both State side and overseas.

Q: So you would then, I gather, recommend to a young person these days, coming along, you would recommend a Foreign Service career as something that they should look into as a positive possibility.

CLEMMONS: If the person was inclined to be interested in political science and foreign affairs, I'm probably one of the biggest advocates of the Foreign Service as a career for a person who wants to go into public service. I think, without question, it's probably the most professional federal agency there is. Your serving at the dedication of the employees . And I, other than visiting various posts when I was traveling with the Secretary, I really wasn't assigned to a hardship post as such, but I understand that there is a distinct closeness that develops among the employees at a hardship post. Just the friends that we made in our little over four year tour in Canada, we still have any number of friends that we developed in the Foreign Service. Proportionally much greater than the rest of my time in the State Department. Yes, I thoroughly advocate the Foreign Service. I think it is a tremendous experience to be able to represent your country and work overseas and now it is much more, I think. The language training that they give everybody and area studies. You're much better prepared than you were say 25 years ago.

Q: You traveled with the Secretary whoever Secretary might have been at the time in your capacity as Assistant Chief of Protection.

CLEMMONS: Yes, As the Assistant Director in Charge of Protection, one of my responsibilities to supervise the Secretary's protective detail, which then comprised of about 35 Special Agents.

Q: SY agents?

CLEMMONS: Yes, SY agents and on about three occasions I traveled overseas just with the detail to observe their activity, professionalism whether or not they were performing and assisting where I could, you know, policy areas. But I was primarily, I think. I took two trips with Secretary Shultz...I can't... I think it was always Shultz.

Q: I'll have a story for you when we go off the record here. I won't clutter up this tape. John, your greatest accomplishment while with the Department of State?

CLEMMONS: That's hard to say... If I had to narrow it down, I just don't know. I enjoyed it. I benefited. I think, the Department benefited. I can sit here all day and tell you little anecdotes and incidences and what not that occurred. I can't think of anything that stands out that is worthwhile to record as a special accomplishment other than the fact that I felt I had a successful career and we can retire with a good attitude towards any Federal agency and the State Department included, I think you've been fairly successful.

Q: Various professional disappointments?

CLEMMONS: I guess the last four years it was a constant battle with trying to get the resources to staff these protective details and the lack of cooperation with certain other Assistant Directors who had more or actual resources than I had, particularly those in charge of the field offices. There was a constant battle, a constant justification of a request for agents to provide protection of foreign dignitaries. For that matter when the Secretary was traveling overseas, they did not seem to comprehend that understaffed detail was not only unfair to the protectee, but also it was unfair to the agent. Somebody could very easily have gotten hurt. I guess that was one reason I decided to retire. I just got tired of fighting the battle of limited resources, and I'm talking about agent resources.

Q: Well, I probably should have reversed those questions so that we could end on a...

CLEMMONS: Positive note.

Q: But never mind, I enjoyed the talk and I think it will be useful.

RICHARD ST. F. POST
Political Counselor
Ottawa (1975-1976)

Richard Post was born in Spokane, Washington. He graduated from Harvard University and entered the Foreign Service in 1952. His career included positions in Somalia, Hong Kong, Swaziland, Lesotho, Angola, Canada, Portugal, Pakistan, and Washington, DC. Mr. Post was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: Then you went to Ottawa as political counselor. You were there for about a year or so. Who was your ambassador at the time?

POST: First it was Bill Porter. Porter had been office Director for North African Affairs when I went to Ethiopia. I was in Washington, looking for a job and I bumped into him. I told him I was looking for a job and he said, well look, I need a good political counselor, why don't you come up. So we did. He was there for I can't remember how long and then Tom Enders came in early 1976.

Q: Enders was a very controversial figure. How did he operate?

POST: Imperial. A grand imperial style. Of course he is very tall, 6'9". In contrast to Bill Porter, who was a very low key administrator, but one who kept in touch with things in an interesting way. In addition to the grand limousine that the government supplied, he had a beat up Chevy. I don't think he had diplomatic plates on it. He'd drive, stop and talk to people. He got a lot of insight that way.

That was not Enders' style. Enders traveled with the glitterati and the politicians. His wife was very supportive of that role.

Q: What were the main issues that you were reporting on as political counselor?

POST: There was the political situation in Canada, reporting on that. Probably one of the most important functions was that we had responsibility for the environment. So we had a lot of discussions with the Canadians on environmental issues. Back in Teddy Roosevelt's day, we had entered into an agreement with Canada under which each of us agreed not to pollute the other side of the border. So there were a lot of issues that came up where that was precisely the issue. An iron mine in British Columbia couldn't be allowed to proceed because it would be fouling the waters that eventually ended up in Flathead lake.

There was another issue was whether under the treaty there could be a refinery built in Eastport Maine, near Campobello Island, which belongs to Canada. It was a very impoverished area. Pittston Company wanted to put this refinery there. That would have meant supertankers going through this stretch of water that came between Campobello Island and the Maine coast, an area that has the highest incidence of fog per year of any part of that coast. The channel is relatively narrow, and it was clear that they were afraid that it would cause enormous damage to the environment. I agreed with them 100% but I had to argue the other case.

Q: This brings up a point. What did you think of our environmental policy? Was it business driven?

POST: Well, certainly in the case of this Pittston thing. Our position was being driven by business interests. There were legal rights that we had to do that. If it could have been done without the tankers getting out of the channel or running aground or something like that, it would have been perfectly legal and not harmful to the environment. But the danger was clearly there and we finally admitted this and backed down. But there were other issues where business

interests certainly came in. For instance, a dam in North Dakota. Garrison Dam. We wanted to put up a great big dam that would have diverted waters and changed the ecological patterns, there would be exotic organisms in Canadian rivers that would flow up from North Dakota, plus the Canadians would be getting a heavy dosage of the fertilizer runoff from American farmlands. So that was a big issue between America and Canada. Again, our role was both to enunciate as forcefully as we could what were the American positions and at the same time, to report back what we thought about the whole thing in terms of the damage we could do in terms of our relation to Canada.

There is a whole range of these issues. It is really amazing how many Americans are affected by what goes on in Canada. Of course the reverse is even more true, when you have got a country of some 25 million people, and 90% of them live within 200 miles of the American border. It is mind boggling.

Q: I've always been told two things in these interviews regarding Canada, one is their extreme sensitivity, but also that they are the toughest negotiators you will ever find.

POST: Yes, they are pretty tough negotiators.

Q: As far as the politics of Canada. What was our attitude?

POST: We just reported what was going on. They're perfectly free to have whatever kind of government they like. In order to report and keep in touch with what was going on, we had good relations with all of the political parties, including the more or less socialist party, NDP, Ed Broadbent was the head of that. In fact he ended up buying my house when I left.

ELDEN B. ERICKSON
Economic-Commercial Counselor
Ottawa (1975-1978)

Elden Erickson was born in Kansas in 1919. He served in the U.S. Air Force and in the U.S. Army during World War II before joining the Foreign Service in 1946. His career included positions in China, Algeria, France, Laos, Japan, Lebanon, the Netherlands, Canada, and Germany. Mr. Erickson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

Q: Then you went off to the healthy, cold climate of Ottawa. You were there from 1975- 78. You were what?

ERICKSON: The Economic/Commercial Counselor but doing commercial work. I did economic work in Beirut but mostly commercial work in Tokyo and Ottawa.

Q: What were the major problems with Canada? The Canadians are always complaining that it is like living with an elephant.

ERICKSON: We know nothing about them. Yes.

They were the greatest. Of all of my dealings in the Foreign Service, to deal with the Canadians was the easiest and friendliest and the best and honest, face-to-face people you could imagine.

Q: What were your major concerns?

ERICKSON: We were participating in tariff negotiations, etc. But the negotiations were always easy until we didn't agree.

Q: I am told the Canadians are some of the most difficult people to negotiate with.

ERICKSON: Again we were caught up in small things at that time. We had the fisheries problems, which are always with us. And agriculture problems, of course. We didn't have an automotive agreement at that time.

Q: Was oil pipeline a problem?

ERICKSON: No. Not at that time.

Q: Did the problems of cross-culturalism fall into your bailiwick?

ERICKSON: Oh, yes, communications of all kinds, television particularly. They were again trying to prevent US culture from crossing the border, but with television it was fairly difficult.

Q: One of the problems I think was that Canadian firms were advertising on American television because these were the major networks people were listening to.

ERICKSON: Well, most Canadians live within a 100 miles of the borders. Trudeau was Prime Minister the whole time I was there.

Q: Sitting in on country team meetings with the Ambassador and all, how did you view Trudeau?

ERICKSON: Well, that is very difficult to answer. We didn't really like him very much because he didn't always do what we would like to have him do.

Q: Did you feel that he was consistent?

ERICKSON: We thought he was consistent. It was this consistency that we didn't like.

Q: Did you feel he was anti-United States?

ERICKSON: He was totally a Canadian. He did like tweaking the US and I think we considered him not strongly anti-American, but with basically an anti-American feeling.

Q: What about Congress? Did Congress weigh in at all?

ERICKSON: Yes, on the communications and publications and things like that we had Congressional delegations from time to time.

Q: Did they make any headway either way?

ERICKSON: No, I don't think so. The Canadians usually manage to hold their own.

Q: This has been one of their great strengths hasn't it?

ERICKSON: The Ambassador during my period was Tom Enders. He didn't care too much whose toes he stepped on. He was promoting US policy and he made speeches all over. They weren't always that politic, but he was saying exactly what he thought should be done.

Q: What about Tom Enders? He has been a very controversial figure in the American Foreign Service. A very strong, highly intellectual person as you say. How did you find working for him?

ERICKSON: I got along very well with him. Sometimes I didn't approve of his method of operation, but again for preparation of all these speeches he wanted your input and everybody worked long hours supplying it. If he didn't like somebody, however, he would get rid of him or make it known how he felt. He was not an easy person to deal with. But I think he was not all that interested in the commercial side, fortunately. He wanted everything to be taken care of but he didn't want to have to get too involved in it. I was just lucky in that respect.

Q: Did you find yourself running across all those border agreements, practically at the village level, in your efforts to promote trade?

ERICKSON: It wasn't really a problem for us. We had such excellent people in the local employees in the Canadians. That makes a big difference too, when you have experienced nationals.

Q: Were there any problems maintaining them?

ERICKSON: They were still the old timers when I was there and they were really career oriented and really knew more than a lot of the Americans.

Q: This is often the case. How about Quebec and the Separation Movement?

ERICKSON: The Separation Movement was active the whole three years I was there with the banning of English signs and trying to do away with everything Anglo. Levesque was in his ascendancy at that time.

Q: Did this cause commercial problems in having to persuade our exporters to put French into their business or not?

ERICKSON: Well, they had to do it because Quebec insisted that if it was to be sold it had to have French labels. Our duty there was just to make it known to all Americans that they had to meet all these new requirements. It was just a question of communication.

Q: Then you left Ottawa in 1978 and went for a relatively short tour to Frankfurt.

FRANCIS TERRY MCNAMARA
Consul General
Quebec (1975-1979)

Ambassador Francis T. McNamara was born in Troy, New York in 1927. He was in the U.S. Navy during World War II and was also stationed in Japan during the Korean War. He received a bachelor's degree from Russell Sage College and a master's degree from McGill University and from Syracuse University. Ambassador McNamara he entered the Foreign Service in 1956. His career included positions in Rhodesia, the Congo, Tanzania, Vietnam, Canada, Lebanon, and ambassadorships to Gabon and Cape Verde. Ambassador McNamara was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993.

MCNAMARA: I arrived in Quebec on November 2, 1975. I stayed until July 1979, almost four years.

Q: What was the political situation in Quebec during that period?

MCNAMARA: It was tense. The Quebec separatist movement had been growing stronger over the years.

In the early 1970s, there had been some violent incidents in Montreal -- bombs exploded, and separatist extremists kidnapped the British trade commissioner and the labor minister of the Quebec government. The labor minister was killed. Trudeau, the Canadian prime minister at the time, declared a state of siege sending troops on door to door searches in Montreal. The British trade commissioner was recovered unharmed. Nonetheless, the Québécois were shocked by the violence. Thereafter, no separatist party had any chance of winning substantial support unless it firmly disavowed violence.

For a time, the separatist movement in Quebec was cooled down. But, gradually, it took on new life as Rene Levesque introduced more moderate concepts of a peaceful evolution towards something he described as sovereignty-association. The extremists were in eclipse. Moderates, led by Levesque, dominated the separatist movement. They wanted separation, but they didn't want violence. They wanted to do it in an orderly, legal way.

Their chosen formula was Separation with Association (Séparation et Association). What they were talking about was political separation from, but economic association with, the rest of Canada. And this became relatively popular, certainly among the younger-generation Québécois.

It suggested that you could have your cake and eat it too.

The Québécois are a very cautious people. They've survived culturally not by being audacious, but by being prudent. They fear the economic consequences of separation. In their hearts, most of them wanted political sovereignty. But they were afraid of the consequences. And so they were being characteristically prudent. The Parti Québécois had their hearts, but not for immediate political separation.

Nonetheless, the movement was growing stronger as a younger generation in Quebec gained increasing self-confidence.

In prior times, Québécois society had been a theocracy. It was a closed society centered on the church. In late 1950 and early 1960's a "quiet revolution," took place in Québécois society. It came to full flower during the prime ministership of Jean Lesage. Suddenly, the churches were empty and a semi-feudal society turned to social democracy. The French-speaking majority in Quebec were no longer willing to accept the second class status that was thrust upon them after the defeat of the French on the Plains of Abraham.

Q: For example, they've got the lowest birthrate in the world, practically.

MCNAMARA: Well, now. The churches were empty. You'd go into a Catholic church in Quebec, by the time I got there, and you'd see a few old ladies, thumbing their beads. There were very few young people in the churches.

They flipped, in the space of ten or fifteen years, from a virtual theocracy to a modern lay society.

Q: By the time you'd arrived there, this tranquil revolution had already happened?

MCNAMARA: Yes, it had. The social aspects had taken place. Economic and political change were still evolving within the context of the Canadian confederation. The party that was in power in Quebec Province was the Liberal Party, and they were committed to confederation with the rest of Canada, but with some modifications. They wanted changes, while retaining the political unity of Canada. The Parti Québécois was for political separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada.

Q: When you went there, this was a sensitive time.

MCNAMARA: Nobody in Washington recognized it as a sensitive time.

Q: Were there any instructions to play it cool, which I would imagine would be the policy? Don't butt in?

MCNAMARA: No. I was told, by the deputy assistant secretary in EUR who was in charge of Canadian affairs, that separation wasn't serious. "Don't worry about it. It's not going anyplace. The separatists are never going to be strong enough to really challenge Canadian unity. It's a

tempest in a teapot."

About a month after I arrived in Quebec, I came to the contrary conclusion that, separatism was quiet serious, and growing stronger. I began to consider that political unity of Canada could be challenged in the next few years. Should we not begin quietly to consider the possible implication for America? After all, the political cohesion is certainly a matter of considerable interest to the United States. A profound change in our nearest neighbor must affect us in many ways.

So I wrote a long letter to the man who had told me that it wasn't serious (Dick Vine, who was ambassador to Switzerland afterwards, a very nice man), analyzing the situation as I saw it in Quebec and in Canada. I suggested that the Parti Québécois could win the next election, which we expected to come within the year. Should we not quietly prepare ourselves for such a possibility by discreetly studying the implications of such a possibility? We should not allow ourselves to be surprised by a crisis. Far better to think through the problem now when all is calm rather than reacting to a perceived crisis. In any case, contingency planning could do no harm. I suggested that I come to Washington to discuss the possibility of forming a discreet study group. Vine reluctantly allowed me to come to Washington. We had some inconclusive discussions. His opinion was firmly fixed. Separatism had no long-term future. Vine feared that the fact that we were studying it could become public causing us problems with Ottawa.

Q: How about with the ambassador? Who was the ambassador at the time?

MCNAMARA: The ambassador, when I got there, was William Porter, one of the really great people in the Foreign Service. He left shortly after for Saudi Arabia. Tom Enders was named to replace him. I wrote a briefing paper for Enders, informing him of the growth of separatist political strength and of the potential danger I perceived. Enders took my warning very seriously. He came to agree with me, and we were reasonably well prepared when the Parti Québécois did get elected. During the campaign I was able to predict that the Parti Québécois would win a majority.

Q: I would think something like this would be a sensitive as, say, dealing with Israel. In the normal course of events, you can talk about, "Well, we're ready in case there's a problem in such and such." But with Canada being so close, if we talked about Canada splitting, and it got into the hands of the press, which would treat it maybe just as, "Isn't this interesting?" it would blow up all over the place in Canada.

MCNAMARA: That's the danger. And Vine was right in being cautious. But it seemed to me that four or five of us could get together once in a while -- the country director, Vine, me, and one or two others who dealt with Canada -- and think through possible contingencies. I never suggested anything large, certainly no one from outside EUR and the Canadian desk. That's why I wrote him a letter rather than putting it in a telegram. I knew how sensitive it could be, and I wrote him a personal, secret letter, which got no distribution at all.

Q: I might add, for the historian who's going into these records, that this is the sort of thing that happens because you know that things are distributed and that there's no way of really sitting on

it once you launch it. The only real way of controlling it is to put it in something that may never surface ever.

MCNAMARA: If I did not have a copy myself, nobody might ever see a copy of my letter. I have no idea what Vine did with his copy. Eventually, he may have destroyed it.

Anyway, when Enders became the ambassador, things changed. He agreed with me. He saw the danger. He saw this as a potential problem. We were not caught intellectually unprepared when the Parti Québécois won the election in 1976.

After the Parti Québécois victory my job was very delicate. It was like being a member of the family at a family dispute, like an uncle when a father and son were involved in an argument. If you sided with one or the other, the one that you didn't side with was going to be your enemy. And if you didn't side with either one, you had trouble with both. It was extraordinarily delicate.

Q: *Were you finding people trying to recruit you?*

MCNAMARA: Oh, yes, all the time. It went on for four years. It was like walking on eggs all the time. But that's what diplomats are trained to do (or should be).

Q: *What about our consulate general in Montreal? You were at really the political center, but Montreal was sort of the commercial center. What was the relation there? The people there, were they agreeing with you?*

MCNAMARA: Montreal has half the population of Quebec Province. Many of the most rabid separatists lived in Montreal. The real center of the nationalist movement is in the city. It's not out in the boonies. The young, well-educated Québécois are there, the professional class that had been created during this quiet revolution.

Well, my relations with B.J. Harper, whom you know...

Q: *Who is basically a visa expert.*

MCNAMARA: That's right. She was sensitive about being left out of the main political reporting and analysis activities. Enders decided that I would be responsible for politics in the whole province. That meant going to Montreal and talking to people. I insisted on that. I said, "If you're going to give me the responsibility, you also have to give me access." So he told her that I had to be able to go to Montreal, that I was responsible for politics throughout the province, and that she should work with me. At the same time, her Consulate General would be responsible for economics and the bulk of consular work. B.J. was a very senior consular officer. Her Consulate General was large and important. She was jealous about her turf, but she took Enders decision gracefully. On a personal level we got on very well. She wasn't entirely happy with the arrangement, but she accepted it. I used to go to Montreal regularly and talk to politicians, and she would help me set up meetings. At the same time, she did some ad hoc reporting of value. That was great. I would suggest things that she do, and she would suggest things to me. No, our relationship was pretty good. I was surprised it was as good as it was.

Q: In Quebec, did you find, as in France, a powerful intellectual class that sort of had almost a life separate from the real world? Or was this different from the French system?

MCNAMARA: Well, the Québécois are not French. They're North Americans who happen to speak French. A lot of people mistakenly think of the Québécois as Frenchmen who live in North America. The French themselves are especially prone to making this error of judgment. They really don't understand the Québécois. Nonetheless, there is an elite in Quebec that is very Frenchified. No doubt they encourage this misunderstanding. The French are misled because their contacts are mainly among members of the elite. There are people who are incredibly articulate and well educated. A lot of them have studied in France. Many really are French who live in North America. But the bulk of the Québécois are not that at all. They spend their winter vacations, if they can afford it, in Florida. They go to Old Orchard Beach, in Maine, in the summertime. They go to football games and baseball games and hockey. They share few of the continental French interests. Moreover, they love America. It is overwhelmingly their favorite foreign country. This is not necessarily true of this elite, but it is true of the average Québécois.

Q: How important did you find the elite there?

MCNAMARA: The elite is very important. They provide a leadership for the separatist movement. They are the intellectual leaders of the society -- the poets, musicians, writers, etc.

And so, when the election took place...

Q: This was the election of what year?

MCNAMARA: Nineteen seventy-six. Few thought the Parti Québécois would win the election. Everyone, including Rene Levesque, the leader of the party, was predicting that they would do well in the election, but that they would not win. However, I toured the ridings, talked to a wide range of people. Finally, I concluded that they would win. In the last week or so just before the election, Claude Ryan, the editor of the most respected newspaper in the province changed his mind and forecast a victory for the Parti Québécois.

Anyway, they won the election. People trusted Rene Levesque when he said, "We won't take independence without a referendum. We're not going to do anything illegal. We're going to do it within a constitutional context. You will have a chance to vote on separation. And what we want is something along the lines of a continued association with the rest of Canada, in economic terms."

At the same time, Trudeau was saying, "That's not possible. You can't have association. If you break the political links, the economic links will be broken, too. And Quebec will suffer." That was the counter argument.

The outcome of the election was based, to a large extent, on trust in Levesque. People believed that he wouldn't go for separation without a referendum. Therefore, they were able to vote Parti Québécois without risk. Even though many had reservations, they voted for the Parti Québécois,

because they wanted change. They were voting their hearts at this point.

The Parti Québécois came in with a government that was incredible. It was the best-educated government I've ever seen or heard of in any country that I know of, including France. It was full of Ph.D.s and people who were the cream of the Québécois elite.

Rene Levesque was a great character, a marvelous little man. He'd been a journalist, and he'd become a folk hero in Quebec as a result of his radio and TV programs. He chain-smoked, and was about five foot four. He bustled around in rumpled suits. Nonetheless, he was a very complex character. On a personal level, he was decent. The people instinctively trusted him. He provided a degree of leadership that they hadn't had before.

Quebec already had many of the trappings of independence when the Parti Québécois came to power. The province had its own foreign service, for instance. The Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs was run like a foreign ministry, and I was treated like an ambassador. I mean, it was incredible. Enders used to come over. He was treated like a usurper in a friendly way. It was very funny, the whole thing. Levesque really did not like Tom. Part of it may have been his height. Another factor was his arrogant demeanor. In his well cut suits and polished manner he may have personified an Anglo elite for Levesque.

From the outset, the Parti Québécois wanted to get along with the Americans. They wanted to convince us that they weren't going to do something foolish, that they weren't going to hurt the interests of the United States. And they went out of their way to make this clear to me. I was taken into their confidence, especially by Claude Moran, who was their effective foreign minister (he was called the minister of intergovernmental affairs, but, in fact, he acted like a foreign minister), and by Levesque himself. They told me what they were up to, what they wanted to do, how they were going to do it, in some detail, more than you would expect. However, this insider information was not really necessary in analyzing their politics. Their government was open, almost transparent, to anyone who took the trouble to understand them. The society is tribal with a mob of personal relationships that virtually ruled out secrecy.

Q: Were they asking you, "What is the reaction of the United States to what we're planning?"

MCNAMARA: Sometimes they would; sometimes they wouldn't. They just wanted to make it absolutely clear to me what was going on.

Q: Did we have a policy?

MCNAMARA: Our policy was that we would prefer to see Canada remain united, but it was a decision that the Canadians themselves had to take. No one was completely satisfied with this formula. Our expression of preference for a united Canada was enough to minimally satisfy Ottawa. The Québécois were pleased by the formulas equivocation.

A recent book entitled The Eye of the Eagle, written by a Québécois journalist, described the triangular relationship between America, Quebec and Canada during this period. Reading it confirms the degree of attention focused on American attitudes and actions by the Québécois.

Finally, the referendum on sovereignty-association was held and lost. The electorate turned around and gave the Parti Québécois another electoral victory. Their ambivalence could not have been clearer.

Now, they may come back. In the next election, they may well be elected.

During the whole period that the Parti Québécois government was in power when I was there, I was convinced that they couldn't win a referendum. Canada was, at that point, in an economic recession, and I was convinced that there was no way, in those times, that a majority of the Québécois, who were very prudent, as I said before, would vote for something as audacious as political separatism. They weren't about to launch themselves into the unknown, under those circumstances. And so I was convinced that they couldn't win a referendum, no matter what they did, at that point. In the longer-term future, it might be possible, but at that point in history, it was not.

I went on paper saying that, on a number of occasions. Enders agreed with me, and we worked very well together. In fact, he got rid of most of the principal officers in Canada while he was there. He couldn't get rid of B.J. in Montreal, and he didn't get rid of me.

Anyway, that was that. I left in 1979. The referendum hadn't been held yet, but it looked as though they were going to hold it within the next year. Before leaving I wrote a long piece predicting that the referendum would be held and defeated. However, I also warned that separatism would not end.

DAVID M. WILSON
Information Officer/Press Attaché, USIS
Ottawa (1975-1979)

Mr. Wilson was born and raised in Pittsfield, Massachusetts and educated at Columbia University and New York University Law. Joining the USIA in 1963, he served variously as Press Officer, Information Officer and Public Affairs Counselor in a variety of posts including Abidjan, Cape Town, Ottawa, Geneva and Brussels. He also served in senior level positions with USIA in Washington, D.C. Mr. Wilson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: Well then after your time with the European press service, what did you do?

WILSON: I went to Canada to become the information officer/press attaché. Stupidly I left in December of '74. I got there January of '75. It was cold, God dammit. I was frozen. Everything was frozen.

Q: You were there from '75 to when?

WILSON: To January of '79.

Q: Let's talk about Canadian-American relations when you arrived.

WILSON: Pierre Trudeau was prime minister. There was a separatist movement brewing in Quebec. The central government in Canada had set upon a French language immersion program in all the English speaking provinces to try to get Canadians to speak both languages. The U.S. dollar was strong compared to the Canadian dollar. There were a few trade disputes, but Canada was still our largest single trading partner. So those issues were important. Canadian grain problems, fishing problems between the two countries were significant. But Pierre Elliott Trudeau was the dominant force, and was a major factor in the relationship. Of course, he and Richard Nixon didn't get along so well I guess. An amusing sidelight, when I got up there Nixon had just, Nixon was no longer in office in '75. I got a phone call after three or four months from the head of the USA division in the ministry of foreign service saying did I have any pictures of President Nixon. They would like them. Sure we have got a lot of pictures. I took them over to them. I sent back a cable saying, you know the Canadians liked the president so much they wanted to have his pictures. Three or four months later I had occasion to go over to the ministry of foreign affairs around lunch time. I didn't see anybody I knew, so I walked around to the back. There was a picture of Nixon on the wall. They were throwing darts at it. They would back off, and every time they would hit him, they would take it down and put up another one.

Q: Who was our ambassador in '75 to '79?

WILSON: We had a couple. When I got up there, the ambassador was, Tom Enders was there. I don't know whether he was the first one or the second one. Bill, well it will come to me. In any case,

Q: He was a career officer, Bill Porter.

WILSON: Yes, Bill Porter. I think it was Porter and then Enders.

Q: For once rather a career team.

WILSON: Yes. Porter was excellent. He used to drive around the countryside in his old van, regular plates. This is before people worried about security, not what they would do today I suppose. But he was a very straightforward, very frank ambassador. At one point we were going to have an election out west in British Columbia. He made the comment, somebody had asked him at an event that I had organized, to my horror, somebody had asked him what he thought about the election of a certain liberal person out there. He said, "It would be helpful if he were defeated." This is not the greatest thing to say. So there was a big commotion and this got picked up by several of the reporters who were the top reporters in the country there, anchormen. They were top guys. Most of the reporters in the State Department came back and they wanted us to say that he was misquoted. I said, "Frank, I will not." And my boss backed me up. "We could no longer work with these people if we say he was misquoted. We can't do that." That was a problem. Each of us said if you make us do that, we will resign on the spot. You can have my resignation. The Department backed off, and what we said ultimately was the story is without foundation. Okay, the sharpest of the political guys who was also good friends with the

columnist said, "You forgot to say in these stories are without foundation." He said, "Yes, that is correct." He said, "Does that mean my good friend, that you are over a hole?" He said, "Yes." He was over a hole. But Porter was very good, a very fine ambassador. In fact, had been nominated by Kissinger to become ambassador to Saudi Arabia. There was some question as to whether he could do this, did he make a real blunder, they said. Porter said, "If you want to rebuke me, fine, but then I don't go to Saudi Arabia for you." And they needed him. He was acceptable to the Saudis. The oil crisis had passed. He went off to Saudi Arabia. He was well respected in the Foreign Service because he started out as a code clerk and he worked his way up. He was a very solid ambassador. Then we got Tom Enders who was termed by one of the political journalists who could write football, Too Tall Enders, after the Dallas tight end, Too Tall Jones. Enders was a very sharp ambassador. He and I got along very well. More importantly his wife and I got along very well. I didn't set out to do that, but his wife was very interested in contemporary and modern American art. So I became designated as the person to deal with her on art because she said, "David, I know you will tell me honestly what to do, whereas the PAO I don't trust. He is just too diplomatic. He won't tell me what he thinks." So I got to become the designated art person for Mrs. Enders. I went to Toronto and looked at all the art galleries. Not all the time, but on occasion. That was rather interesting because she was a very, a woman of very direct sentiments. She didn't hide them. She was of Italian origin, probably about 4'11", 4'10", 4'11" and he was 6'8". So it was a very interesting couple. But they got along.

Q: What was within the embassy sort of the feeling towards Trudeau at that time?

WILSON: There was a sense that he could be a mischief maker and that he was very much a Canadian nationalist, which he was. He was both, but he was not anti-American by any means. He at that time was having problems with his wife, Margaret. That caused some difficulty, particularly when she walked into my office. Our press offices were in the same building as the press club, and she mistakenly went into, she thought she was going into the press club, and she had mental and psychological problems and she came into the office. She wanted to sit down and talk all about Pierre. It was kind of an interesting time.

Q: How did you deal with this?

WILSON: With great trepidation.

Q: Everybody knew she had problems, and this was not something to either take advantage of, I mean it was something to keep under cover. I mean keep the lid on and not ...

WILSON: Sure, that's right. And by the time she came, some RCMP (Royal Canadian Mounted Police) people came right up and they were there. It was very helpful. It was interesting because our DCM at the time was a bachelor and traveling in very vaulted circles. Actually he was out on some boat parties with Margaret. You just had to be careful, and we were. Things were all right. But there were problems. One of the problems was, as I said before, agriculture. We took a very tough line. The minister of agriculture, I don't know why I remember his name, it just came to me, a guy named Whalen, was extraordinarily critical of Ambassador Enders, and called for his recall in public. Of course that wasn't to be. Meanwhile Enders was studying German from the American Institute. This was sort of known around. One of the reporters from the Canadian press

came to me one day. This was really a problem for him. He said, "You know Enders is studying German; they have asked for his recall. Does that mean he is going to be kicked out?" I said, "Hell no, he is a good ambassador. If he is studying German it is probably to go to Germany because in the American Foreign Service, Germany is a more important post than Canada." Which it happened to be true. I didn't expect it would be published.

Q: It was, oh, God.

WILSON: Yes, in a modified version. It was published. It was okay. I explained to Enders, I went over to the embassy which was in another building, I went over and explained it to him. He had a big smile on his face, and he looked up at me and he said, "You know, we will just wait for an opportunity, and we'll kick the bastards in the balls." That was his operating philosophy, and we did. It was no big deal. At the time I was feeling very put upon.

Q: How about on the cultural side. I mean it is always a problem. People buy Time Magazine and Maclean's magazine. I mean, you know, if you follow it at all, Canadian affairs, as I do sort of from afar, you hear this again and again and again. I mean the cultural dominance and where the advertisements go and all that. You must have been right in the thick of it.

WILSON: Yes. I was.

Q: I mean how did you deal with it both officially and just sort of with your contacts? They must have given you a rough time?

WILSON: Well, if it was a question of advertising in a magazine, the Canadian version of Time usually did things like that, but there was also the television question. This was much more complicated, the television was much more complicated than the magazines because the Canadian cable companies were picking up American channels, and not paying for the pickup. Then they would use Canadian advertisers, put in where they wanted to. Well, we in spite of our, the Helsinki CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), where we talked about openness and free access to information, and criticized the Soviets for blocking things, we, the United States, threatened to block our own signals. I mean, this goes against everything that we stood for as a country. So the Canadians said we can't do that. I said, we can and we will. They said, we can go behind your back and still pickup the U.S. signals. This was a major problem, particularly to some of the Congressmen, Moynihan from New York who said, "What was going to happen to the signals?" This was a big problem. We attempted to block our own signals. The Canadians continued to pick it up quietly, and that part of it went away. Could you get a Canadian tax deduction for advertising on American television? No. But what the American networks did, the American stations did on the border was to lower their rates to Canadians so that it was in effect a tax deduction for the Canadians. The issue of Time Magazine was, you know, several of the American anchors were Canadian.

Q: Tom Brokaw and Morley Safer and several others.

WILSON: At one point Morley Safer came up to do a story on this, and I was helping him. We were sitting on a bench in front of parliament. He took out a lighter to light a cigarette. He said,

“You see this lighter?” “Yes.” He said, “That is the lighter I gave to whoever to set the village of My Lai on fire.” I said, “You’re kidding!” “Yes,” he said, “we set that up for the television cameras.” I couldn’t believe it. He was very honest. The issue ultimately went away without any punitive legislation on either side, but there was just a lot of rhetoric. The Canadians never allowed tax deductions for advertising in the Canadian version of an American magazine. I believe that the Americans lowered the rates, so they were able to accomplish that. It was a major issue. It was a good substantive issue, a good fun issue to deal with. I enjoyed it anyway.

Q: Did you find in sort of your whole professional and social acquaintances, you kept having this “you are so big and we are so small” and “you have got to be more understanding of us” and all that sort of thing?

WILSON: Oh a little but not a hell of a lot. You know there was an issue in Maclean’s right after I got there. A woman named Heather, I forgot her last name, wrote an article about all the American campers coming up with their campers coming up to Canada. We should toss them bombs. Subsequently, one of our better contacts in Canada became and is still the editor-in-chief of Maclean’s. She is certainly not anti-American. They realize the relationship. Sometimes you have, particularly during an election period, you have to make noises about the giant to the south.

Q: I would think that being in the USIA operation, all of you would have to be very careful because in other countries, you make a remark, you know other countries don’t give too much of a damn, but Canada, just the very fact that you say something about Canada can get yourself in the front pages.

WILSON: Canada was very sort of schizophrenic about the United States. It is too easy to say, well, they dislike us. They don’t. We are very much like them. In fact the Canadian journalists were hired by American television networks because they are not American and can use Canadian visas and Canadian passports to get into countries like Iran where we couldn’t. They made a point of wearing Canadian flag on their ass, so that they were not American. They are very proud of that fact that they are not American. As years have gone on, Canadians have built up their own culture. They have a group of seven painters who are very well known in Canada. They have their own film industry, although it is small. One of the things they are doing that irked Americans, the American film industry, many American television commercials are made in Canada because of lower rates of salary scales for the people they have to pay. They have big studios in Toronto for making these things. They still do. They are very big in films. We have, as I say, an American film festival there, Walt Disney. Walt Disney, they are very careful of their image, and we had somebody come up from Disney world, several characters including Mickey Mouse. Well Mickey Mouse lost her birth control pills. This was a major problem. We quietly figured out how to get the birth control pills. Disney would have skinned us alive if it had come out in the press that Mickey Mouse was a girl taking birth control pills.

Q: A girl in costume.

WILSON: Yes. We worked that out very quietly and very carefully. But they are very interested in American film; we did several American film festivals. And I for whatever reasons, became the wine officer of the American embassy. It wasn’t just drinking wine but one of our high goals,

one of our mission goals, was to open the Canadian provincial markets to American wine, particularly Ontario and Quebec, where the liquor control boards control wines that come in or not come in to the country, or what wines could be sold in the liquor control board stores. That was a major issue. We were fairly successful in opening up the Ontario liquor control board.

Q: My understanding is Canada was sort of the Tory stronghold in a way, I mean you are talking about Tories going back to the Revolutionary War. Quebec has its own ethos which is not particularly anti-American, it is anti-British at the same time. Then you have the west going all the way to British Columbia which operates on a completely different set of principles. Did you find, I would think this would prove to be a difficult country to represent.

WILSON: There were obviously strong differences. Well, the west was much more liberal, British Columbia, than Calgary and some of the other parts of the west, all the grain and oil areas of the west. We had a consul general in Quebec City named Terry McNamara. Right after the votes that gave the Parti Quebecois, the PQ power in Quebec province, there was big talk about secession. Quebec was going to secede and become a country unto itself. Well the press talked to McNamara, and they quoted him as saying, "Well it could be the sixth largest country going, and we would be pleased to have a military alliance with Quebec." Of course it was not U.S. policy, and Terry ultimately denied saying this. Tom Enders and I discussed that in Enders' office We talked. Enders liked Terry McNamara.

Q: Well Terry is a feisty guy.

WILSON: Yes, he is a good guy. I like Terry. We talked and we talked to Terry by phone. We put out a statement saying this was completely untrue. Terry had never said this. As we were walking out of the office, Enders looked up at me with a big wink and said, "But do we know he didn't say it?" Much more was said between Tom and me, but we knew he had said it. We certainly protected him. At the same time, some of the maritime provinces were very upset. I happened to be in the library one day at lunch time, and a call came through from the premier of Nova Scotia himself. I forget who it was. "Is this the information officer?" "Yes." He told me who he was and he said, "Can you tell me what procedures one must follow in order to become a state of the United States?" Of course, I said, sure I will get back to him. Before I got back to him, I wanted to make sure it really was the premier. This required some instant political reporting. Then I had to find out what the hell you had to do to become a state.

Q: That isn't something exactly on the tip of our tongue.

WILSON: The answer is there is no fixed procedure. There is nothing set out in the Constitution. You can state how other states have become states and how Congress votes them in, but there no fixed rules. But he was serious. As soon as Quebec, the Parti Quebecois, came in with an independence policy in Quebec, he was concerned about breaking off from western Canada. This is where information work, public affairs work becomes really political. That was a very political type of thing.

Q: Oh, God, yes.

WILSON: We had a consul general, a lovable guy but not overly intelligent, a guy named Ron Gaiter. Again his offices were separated from mine.

Q: Ron Gaiter, I knew him vaguely.

WILSON: And he called me one day and says could he come see me? “Yes.” I said, “What’s up, Ron?” “I can’t talk about it on the phone, but before I get there, I need to know is Alexander Solzhenitsyn a member of the communist party.” I could check that out pretty easily. Ron came up the hill and we talked. He said, “This is very confidential, but as you know Solzhenitsyn is in Canada.” I knew that vaguely. He said, “Solzhenitsyn has applied for a visa to go to the United States, and is he a member of the communist party?” I said, “Yes, he is Ron. Any writer who has done any work has to be a member of the communist party.” He said, “Well I can’t give him a visa.” I said, “Why? For God sakes he has been invited to address a joint session of Congress. I don’t know what you have got to do but call somebody on a secure line. Do what you have to but for God sakes you have got to get him a visa.” Ultimately he did. But I mean he was serious. The rules say that...

Q: Well, once in awhile we get hoisted on that petard. I am an old consular officer, and I have seen this, where people just don’t use their common sense.

WILSON: Exactly. But you said a word that I think pervades my time in the Foreign Service. I am a strong believer in it. Common sense. You have rules. They are not made to be broken, but they are made to be applied with common sense. That is very important in dealing with the Foreign Service. Another thing that not too many people do in the Foreign Service is learn to take individual responsibility. It is easy to hide behind the bureaucracy. In our later conversation I learned the boss of USIA, Charles Z. Wick, who was a son-of-a-bitch. He had one credo. This was who is responsible? I want to know the name of the individual that is responsible. I don’t want to be told it is a bureaucracy. I want to know the name of the individual. That is very important, and I have tried to follow that rule. It’s critical. Who is responsible, for good as well as bad, I mean who is responsible.

Q: Well did you get involved any other way with the Quebec separation movement? I mean was this sort of a minefield that one had to be very careful about?

WILSON: Yes. We did not, in our role, we did not get involved in that issue at all. Aside from going to Quebec City as a tourist or going to Montreal to see some baseball games, or going into Quebec province to eat, we stayed very much away from that issue. Tom Enders though, that issue didn’t worry him. He figured the Canadians would take care of it themselves. What he was concerned about, and what he found he was helpless to do anything about was the relationships between Canadian provinces and American states. Because by natural affinity and geographic affinity, they were having to do a lot of things together. Enders was furious. He decreed that nobody in the States should have any dealings with Canada that he was unaware of.

Q: This is sort of like saying sun stand thou still, you know.

WILSON: He could do that. After this decree went out and State Department certainly approved

of it, you saw in the paper that the prime ministers of Quebec and Ontario were meeting with the governors from Vermont and New York to discuss signage on the roads going up and down. He was fit to be tied. He said, "I thought that this was not supposed to happen." "Mr. Ambassador, there is not a thing anybody could do about it." The meeting was going to happen. But it was frustrating, because if you are supposed to represent U.S. interests, you want to know about this. But there was no physical human way of controlling it. Enders had to learn that that was the case. But we did not get involved really in the Quebec separatist issue, we did not get involved on the Quebec side of the separatist issue. We reported, of course, what happened in parliament, what Trudeau was saying, what his advisors were saying. But we didn't get involved in that. Now one of the things that I did in Canada was to take some of the magazines USIA produced which we were distributing free, and put them on sale. Now this caused some problems back in Washington. I got it cleared through the general counsel's office. My philosophy was if these magazines were any good, people will use some of their disposable income to purchase them if they have any meaning to them. If they don't, big deal. The real issue was a magazine called Problems of Communism.

Q: Excellent.

WILSON: A very well done scholarly magazine. We put that one at a price that was not very much, I think it was ten dollars a year for four issues. Ten Canadian dollars versus U.S. I got a call from someone on Trudeau's staff saying we got your notice. We are not going to pay for that. You are still going to give it to the prime minister. I said, "No. If you want it, you have got to pay for it." There was hemming and hawing, and they paid for it. Washington was very upset, because initially our 600 distribution went down to about a little over 300. But inside of a year it was back up to about 450, and these were honestly 450 people who really wanted the magazine. The economic impact wasn't nearly so successful, but people bought it. It was a good experiment, only in Canada. I suspected we should have done it in other parts of the world, but no one wanted to take the risk. But it was a very important operation, and I got approval from the general counsel's office, and we did it. We used an American firm based in Toronto for distribution. The magazines were mailed to them; they mailed them out. We had cleaned the ads. We didn't have to worry about the distribution anymore. It was a very interesting experiment. I enjoyed setting it up; I enjoyed seeing that it worked, and found we had people who really cared about the product to buy it.

Q: Well this of course has been done. I know we used to give away books in the Arab world, but give them to book stores and have them sell them. It worked much better because otherwise people, if it is a freebie, it sort of gets in the way.

WILSON: We were still doing that several years ago when I was involved in the Bureau of education and cultural affairs. We were giving books to people and letting them sell them in Africa and Latin America, but that's another issue. Let me just back up. After my Hill experience, and after not getting into the language program, I did work a year, and I am sorry I forgot about that, at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). This was before I went to work in the European press office. I was there at a time just at the signing of the SALT I agreement. That was a very stimulating period as far as I was concerned.

Q: What were you doing?

WILSON: I was the, the title was press officer. In fact there were three people there, myself, and a woman, and a deputy head of the office, a guy named Ralph Smith, and this fellow Dave Dorgiss. He was dealing with bigwigs. But he again taught me a very good lesson on bureaucracy. When I first came there he said, "Young man, I want you to remember one thing. I want you to protect my tail. If you protect me particularly vis a vis the people above me so I don't look bad, I don't make any mistakes, I will take good care of you in your ratings." A very simple statement. Just very good. We got the SALT I agreement signed. I learned there was a leak of something on the U.S. position. Of course, there was a leak about the U.S. fallback position. This just brought the FBI over, a lot of questions. With that, of course, the first place they look is public affairs. Obviously public affairs is the last place somebody is going to leak something, but it is the first place you look. They weren't concerned so much about the U.S. position, presenting it to the Soviets, but they were concerned about the damn fallback position, because that hadn't been presented to the Soviets. That kind of blew over, and the agreements were signed. Then they were talking about what was going on next. The deputy head of the office had a good sense of humor, and he decided that the next talks, and he talked to somebody in the graphics design department, and he said, "The next talk should be called the 'follow on arms restriction talks'." FART. He had some letterhead made up. This is because when they did the SALT they were warned that people were just going to be using that, and indeed they were. There were some cartoons with salt, somebody putting salt on a bird's tail, etc. But the follow-on arms restriction talks, I have some of the letterhead stationery, never got used. That became START. But it was a good group of people to work with. The agency (ACDA) was small. You worked with people in State, Harriman was about. It was just a good time.

THOMAS R. HUTSON
Principal Officer
Winnipeg (1976-1978)

Thomas R. Hutson was born in Nebraska in 1939. After receiving his bachelor's degree from the University of Nebraska in 1962 he served in the US Army from 1962-1967. His career has included positions in Teheran, Belgrade, Winnipeg, Moscow, Lagos, Taipei, Belgrade, Bishkek, and Mazar-e-Sharif. Mr. Hutson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in April 1999.

Q: You were in Winnipeg from 1976 until 1978.

HUTSON: Right. It was supposed to be a three year tour, but I only stayed for two because in 1978 Mac Toon asked me to come to Moscow to be his consul general.

Q: In Winnipeg, what were your principal responsibilities?

HUTSON: We covered the provinces of Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and northwest Ontario. We had the usual consular operations – processing primarily third country nationals. The consulate was closed a few years later and even in my time, it was being reduced – from three officers to

two although just as I was leaving, the staffing pattern was increased to the three level again. Ambassador Enders wanted an active presence in Saskatchewan where American industry had major investments in the potash operations. A New Democratic Party-which some called “socialist” – was trying to foster a government take-over of the U.S. potash holdings. I was almost declared *persona non grata* for defending U.S. interests. I used to be followed by the provincial police as I moved around the city and the province. The premier of Saskatchewan would not receive me. Our DCM in Ottawa would give me support – minimal, but finally Ambassador Enders flew out to see the premier and then took me to the meeting.

I was very grateful to the ambassador for that action because after that, I had no problem with the Saskatchewan government.

Q: Wasn't it strange for a Canadian province to be so anti-American? After all, you were just doing your job in one of our closest allies.

HUTSON: In fact, there was a fair amount of hostility towards us. There were a good number of Americans who left the U.S. because of the Vietnam war. There were socialists who had emigrated from other countries – like Australia. These immigrants had a point of view which held the U.S. responsible for all the ills of the world and who resented the alleged the overbearing economic and cultural influence with which we were “overwhelming” Canada. The potash mines were a substantial economic factor and these U.S. opponents saw those holdings as a potential wedge between our two countries. Some U.S. companies were willing to sell their holdings; others resisted strongly. It became a little nasty.

Q: What role did you play?

HUTSON: I simply went around to try to find out what was going on. I tried to meet all of the provincial policy makers including the premier, who, as I said, was unavailable to me until Enders intervened.

The provincial government thought that we were trying to undermine it. In fact, although we had nothing to do with it, the NDP government was replaced by a Tory one. I kept in touch with a lot of the provincial politicians, some of whom actually asked me how they could join the U.S. Tom Enders was extraordinarily effective. He would take an issue which would arise from that huge unguarded borders between the two countries. It could be an environmental one or something to do with wheat exports. He would say that he would visit a province in two months' time to tell the local government what U.S. policy was on the specific issue he was targeting. That forced the U.S. bureaucracies to agree what our policy really was on that issue. That required an extraordinary effort in Washington to come to some agreement. Once he had that, he would go on a public relations campaign, through media interviews, speeches, etc. spelling out U.S. policy on this particular issue. The media loved this approach. When Enders passed away, the Canadian ambassador to the U.S. wrote that there probably had never been a better American ambassador to Canada than Tom Enders. I think he was right. He was fantastic.

So there was an impression that during the Enders period, the U.S. was doing an extraordinary amount of leveraging and pushing. Tom Enders was always quite open by everything that he did.

In Saskatchewan, the natives were paranoid. I had no trouble finding I in which I could explain the U.S. positions. I did that a lot. The interesting aspect of this part of the job was that the Canadians knew full well what our policies and actions were; that meant that there was no other place in the world where I had to defend our policies as vigorously as I had to do in Canada. I loved doing that. I was criticized by our DCM for being "too public" and for casting myself as a consul general when I was really only a consul.

Q: Did you have any other major issues to deal with?

HUTSON: We had problems on grain exports, but I was told by the Agricultural Attaché that that was his problem and I was not to be involved in it. He couldn't say that to the ambassador, but to me that was ok. I thought I would be busy dealing with the Wheat Board, but obviously that did not turn out to be the case.

We had a fair number of Americans in jail in our provinces. It was about at this time that the Department issued an edict that all Americans in prison had to be visited at least once a month. That meant that either I or my colleague had to go to Saskatoon where there was a maximum security prison.

Q: Did you go to Ottawa much?

HUTSON: I got to Ottawa fairly often. Once I went to tell Ambassador Enders that his DCM was no longer welcomed in my consular district. That didn't earn me any great points. But I got to Ottawa often enough.

Q: What was the mood during your tour among the Canadians about their country's future?

HUTSON: Canadians are extremely introspective. Rene Levesque was very active at the time. In Winnipeg, there were about 90,000 Franco-Manitobans. So the issue of relationships with France was very active. In Saskatchewan, the conservatives used to talk to me all the time on how to replace the NDP government – or short of that, how they could get their province to become part of the U.S. In Manitoba, the premier was Ed Schreyer (NDP) who was known as "Red Ed." He later became the governor-general of Canada. He got his nickname because he had shown some early interest in communist China. When the Tories won the premiership in Manitoba, I became good friends with the leadership; as a matter of fact, I took some of them to the Republican National Convention in Detroit – after I had resigned from the Foreign Service.

Among the liberals, we concentrated on people like Lloyd Axworthy, now the foreign minister. During my tour, he was an up and coming liberal leader; we sent him on a IVP tour of the United States.

I think in the late 1970s there was great doubt about Canada's direction. They held a referendum in May 1980 which rejected a plan for a separate status for Quebec. After that, the separatist movement quieted down, although we see some signs of rebirth today. The issue seems to rise about every twenty years. I stay in touch with Canadians and follow their political debates closely. I find it a wonderful place and return to it periodically.

Q: How did you see the “cultural” war?

HUTSON: There was a period when the U.S. knocked the Canadians in my provinces off their pins. This was in 1979 when the Twin Cities – Minneapolis and St. Paul, which are just south of Manitoba – decided to have a “Canada appreciation” week. Canadians are always complaining about not being appreciated by us – “we don’t know anything that is going on in Canada!” What the Twin Cities did just knocked everybody’s eyes out. It was incredible!. Canadian jaws dropped to the ground; we didn’t hear a peep of a complaint for a long time.

It is true that without regard to the cultural medium the American influence is noticeable. I had box seats to the Royal Winnipeg Ballet – a wonderful group which had an American manager and other American presence. There was a terrific art museum in Winnipeg, managed by an American. Some of the Americans had left the U.S. in protest against the Vietnam war or because of other unhappiness with their mother country; they just went north. Now there seems to a better balance with lots of Canadians to be found in movies, theater and other cultural endeavors in the U.S. But I think the “cultural” wars will continue despite the fact that Canadians have made an extraordinary contribution to American culture and could well take pride in that rather than complaining about what is coming north from the U.S.

Q: Did you run into any border problems during your tour?

HUTSON: Trans-boundary environmental issues were always hot. The issue may have been the Red River of the north which may have contained parasites that flowed into Lake Winnipeg which would have killed off the white fish. Or the issue may have been the Lake of the Woods which may have contributed bacteria that might have killed off the wall-eye pickerel. Or in Saskatchewan the issue may have been pollution from a coal-fired generating plant which might have traveled into Montana. I think the Montana National Guard was getting ready to march north to close the plants or some Indian tribal reservation in the U.S. to do the same thing. I had to talk to the governor to bring peace. In the same vein, we had pulp mills in western Ontario that were polluting some of the pristine areas of northern Minnesota.

By the end of the 1970s pollution was a well known hazard. But the question of much pollution represented a danger level was unsettled, much as it is now. Standards on one side of the border might be different from those on the other side. In fact, after I left the Foreign Service, I worked on the Reagan campaign in the hopes of coming back into government as a director of the International Joint Commission - a Schedule C position. I didn’t make it, but I do know that some of the issues we were debating in the 1970s are still alive and well today.

There were some instances of smuggling across the border, but I don’t think I ever got involved in any of those.

Finally, I should mention that I was assigned to Winnipeg for three years. One day I received a call from Bob Barry who was then the head of EUR/SOV. He told that Ambassador Toon would like to have me in Moscow to be his consul-general. I told Barry that I would be delighted with the assignment; I then asked whether he had checked with the Office for Security. I mentioned

that because I had been nominated twice for assignment in the Soviet Union and SY had turned me down because my Latvian wife had relatives there. Barry thought he could take care of that problem and indeed he did. Later I saw my records and this transaction was straightforward. The ambassador had been asked; he was aware of the issue, but didn't think it should be a barrier to my assignment.

ROBERT W. DUEMLING
Deputy Chief of Mission
Ottawa (1976-1980)

Ambassador Robert W. Duemling was born in Fort Wayne, Indiana in 1929. He received a bachelor's degree and a master's degree from Yale University. Prior to becoming a Foreign Service officer, Ambassador Duemling served in U.S. Navy intelligence and was stationed in Japan. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Rome, Kuala Lumpur, Tokyo, Ottawa, Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Suriname. Ambassador Duemling was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1989.

Q: When you arrived in Canada in 1976, what were the major problems facing the Embassy?

DUEMLING: When I went there, Tom Enders expected me to perform the classic functions of a Deputy -- I would run the inside of the Embassy and Consulate General structure. I was essentially the quality control officer and when Tom had any reservations, questions or complaints about the performance on any of the Embassy sections, he would come to me to express his concerns. I therefore devoted a lot of time to being the principal quality control officer and that needed a lot of attention. We had a weak Political Section and I spent a considerable time working with them trying to help it, training and organizing. I was also the principal over-seer of the six Consulate Generals that we had. I visited them and wrote the efficiency ratings of the Principal Officers. I had a big management job. In addition to that, I was drawn into a number of substantive issues such as fishing on the high seas -- specifically in the George's Bank in the East and two places in Alaska in the West. These problems had to do with fishing boundaries for salmon and cod, etc.

Another major issue related to energy and revolved around whether Canada would permit the export to the United States of its natural gas and petroleum in sizeable quantities. One of the key questions was on the need for a pipeline and while I was there, Tom and others negotiated the agreement for construction of a pipeline from Alaska through Canada into the U.S.

We had another low-key but tricky key issue. It was referred to in Canada as the "Orlikow" affair. It had to do with a very unpleasant situation which started in the early '60s when a brilliant psychiatrist -- Dr. Cameron -- working in Montreal on problems of mental illness became a pioneer in "psychic driving" which involved medicating ill people in order to condition their thinking. The CIA was very interested in this experiment. Through one of its assets, it funneled some research funds to Cameron. Several years later, Cameron, was killed while mountain

climbing. Subsequently, some of his patients, who were being subjected to radical treatments, became dissatisfied with that experience and decided that they had been abused. In the late 60s, during the great fuss about the CIA putting secret funds into different research operations, it was discovered that CIA had been funding Doctor Cameron's research. In fact, it only funded something like 3 percent of it. There was a huge political out-cry in Canada. "The long arm of the CIA was destroying Canadian citizens for its own pernicious research interests". This became a hot issue and the husband of one of Doctor Cameron's patients, who was a member of Parliament, would raise the issue during the "Question Period" in Parliament. Then the Foreign Office -- External Relations -- had to come up with an answer for the Minister. That meant that they had to get in touch with the Embassy. I became the principal conduit for the dialogue between the two Governments on how to handle this whole situation. The CIA felt that they were getting a bum rap because Dr. Cameron had started his experiments long before CIA funding came into play. Secondly, CIA put a very small amount into it and therefore they felt that if there was to be any litigation, it should first involve Dr. Cameron's clinic in Montreal and then the hospital of which the clinic was part. The CIA felt that if there were to be any criticism it should be directed to the clinic and the hospital and not to the CIA. This was essentially a political football. The M.P. -- Orlikow -- was a left-winger and some believed it was all an attempt to embarrass the Government of Canada and the U.S. government and the CIA. These kinds of issues can take an enormous amount of time to sort through.

Then there were some trade issues, having to do with the auto pact and transportation -- trucking -- into the United States. There were also some low key defense issues, but they were not contentious because Canada remains one of our very closest allies in the defense sector. We do a lot of things together and there is an exchange of officers serving in the other country's military. I was partly involved in these issues, monitoring them, visiting defense establishments in Canada and the U.S.

Basically speaking, our relationship with Canada is a very stable one and while I was in Ottawa, we did not have anything as politically sensitive as the "Free Trade Agreement" that has just been concluded and which has dominated Canadian politics for the last two years. But we did have a political issue when I was there which was an internal Canadian issue. I refer to Quebec separatism. That came to a head while I was there. Rene Levesque won a provincial vote and formed the Government of Quebec Province. His party was committed to seceding, thus creating a good deal of domestic political turbulence, which was something that we had to follow very carefully because Washington was very interested in the outcome. Essentially, U.S. policy was "hands-off". We were not going to become involved; it was an internal matter for the Canadians, but when pressed we did say that we thought that anything which in any way diminished Canadian geographic integrity as a nation, was not in our interests. There were other perceptions on this issue. I was interviewed very extensively recently by a French-Canadian journalist who is writing a book about this period. He was probing me very carefully on the subject of whether the United States had not seen that if Quebec had split off from Canada and had become independent, that the United States could have dealt much more easily with two weaker powers than with united Canada, which would have been a stronger power and could have more easily resisted U.S. policies. I told him that this issue had arisen during policy discussions, but was quickly dismissed as having far more negatives than positives. He found that very hard to believe. He obviously belongs to a school of politics which prefers to believe in conspiratorial

theses.

Q: Of course, our objective was much more practical and stressed the desire to have a strong central government.

DUEMLING: That is self-evident to us, but obviously if you are a Quebec nationalist, you would prefer to think that the U.S. would support you because the situation could be seen in other terms.

Q: A number of people have thought that the U.S. doesn't pay enough attention to Canada. Did the Canadians really want the U.S. to pay attention?

DUEMLING: That is a question that arises all the time. When you first arrive in Canada, you are greeted by this point. Canadians will immediately tell you that the U.S. doesn't pay enough attention to them. In a certain sense, that is true. We don't pay enough attention to them for a variety of reasons. In the first place, we have much graver problems in other parts of the world. Secondly, we are very happy with the existing relationships with Canada. We admire the Canadians, we think they are doing a fine job running their own country and we don't see why we should have to devote a lot of time to worrying about that. Thirdly, there is a real question whether the Canadians would want us to pay a lot of attention because with that comes a lot of running around in Canada taking a deep interest in some matters which may be the last thing that they really want. That is usually a good riposte to anyone who complains about not giving Canada enough attention. On the other hand, it is true and probably immutable, we as a country exert such a powerful cultural image that the rest of the world has to come to grips with us. In the case of Canada, it is particularly compelling since we are right on their door step with 90% of their population living within 100 miles of the border. Most Canadians have relatives in the United States, visit frequently, those who can afford it spend the winters in Florida. There are large Canadian enclaves in Florida and Maine. They feel a little overwhelmed by the image we project and they feel compromised. That's why they complain and that is also why they have taken steps to protect their cultural and social identity. Some of the stickiest issues in US-Canadian relations have to do with film distribution, television broadcasting -- where signals emanate from, what kind of advertising, who advertises because what they hate, for example, is the fact that people on the Canadian side from Buffalo love watching the Buffalo TV station inducing the smart Canadian advertiser to place his advertisements on the Buffalo TV waves. The Canadians finally passed a law making it very expensive for a Canadian entrepreneur to advertise on the Buffalo TV station. Needless to say, we got into an argument about that because we considered their action as a restraint of trade.

On the general question whether we pay enough attention to the Canadians, we will never pay as much as they would like. On the other hand, happily, we will never pay so much attention that they wouldn't like it. When I was faced with these questions, I would usually treat them with good humor and I would try to offer a semi-humorous response and try to change their frame of mind.

MICHAEL A. BOORSTEIN
Personnel Officer
Ottawa (1977-1978)

Mr. Boorstein was born in Washington, DC and was raised in that area. He was educated at Beloit College, the University of Colorado, Harvard University and the University of Turku in Finland. Entering the Foreign Service in 1970, Mr. Boorstein specialized in administration and personnel, serving in Palermo, Rome, Ottawa, Warsaw Curacao, Moscow and Beijing. In addition, Mr. Boorstein played a major role in the planning and construction of US embassies in Moscow and Beijing and in the renovation of consulates and embassies throughout the globe. He spoke six foreign languages. Mr. Boorstein was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

BOORSTEIN: My next assignment as again as personnel officer was in our embassy in Ottawa. Any more questions about Zaire?

Q: No, not now.

BOORSTEIN: Again I was interested in remaining in the personnel area and I don't recall that Ottawa was tops on my list, but it certainly sounded like a lovely, comfortable assignment. I was looking forward to my ability to use my French in the French speaking part of Canada. The tour in Ottawa turned out to be the shortest tour I had in the Foreign Service. I was only there for 20 months, the reasons I'll explain later on, but I was assigned originally on a four year tour and again like in Palermo we were on a local economy in terms of the living quarters' allowance. We rented a nice house on the outskirts of Ottawa. My daughter attended a Canadian elementary school. My wife couldn't teach so she went to graduate school and got her master's in education from the University of Ottawa and that took her two years to do and that was basically her job. Those years, this again talking about the social norms and what the Department did or did not do for its people. We didn't have reciprocal work agreements with any country. Ultimately, we did get one with Canada that allowed our embassy spouses to work. In those years, unless you were a nuclear physicist or whatever, the immigration people would say, no, you can't be a teacher because you're taking a job away from a Canadian, so my wife didn't work. She went to school. That was her job and it was a good focus for her.

I had wonderful embassy colleagues. Perhaps the best boss I ever had in the Foreign Service was the administrative counselor. His name was Don Bouchard. He's been retired now for 18 years. He retired pretty much as soon as he turned 50 or a few months later. He rose to be assistant secretary of administration. At the time, I believe Ottawa was his first assignment as the administrative counselor. He may have been the admin officer in some smaller countries in Africa. He was just a wonderful guy. Very relaxed, laid back, friendly, non-threatening, person that really mentored people well and it was just a real joy to work for him. I worked for him later on actually in Washington when he was the executive director of the Latin American bureau.

I was the personnel officer. The budget and fiscal officer was a gentleman named Alex Jackson who at the end of his tour developed multiple sclerosis. He ended up staying in the service a

while longer. He actually went with me when I went to my next post, which was Moscow. Then he had to retire for medical reasons and passed away about six years ago. The general services officer was a gentleman named Frank Berry. He basically was a career general services officer. He's been retired a long time. I've lost track of him. The security officer was a gentleman named John Clemmons. John Clemmons was a good old boy from North Carolina who had a twin brother who was a domestic diplomatic security officer. John, I think, his only Foreign Service post as security officer was in Ottawa because he really was a domestic guy. I understand he died just about a month ago. The DCM was Bob Duemling. After he retired became the director of the National Building Museum.

Q: Yes, the old pension building in Washington.

BOORSTEIN: Right. He was a bachelor at the time. He's since married a woman whom I've never met and the ambassador was the legendary Thomas Oswald Enders. All six foot six or eight of him with his wife Gaetana, who was about four foot ten. They were quite a couple. I was as I said the personnel officer. I had a significantly smaller staff than I had in Kinshasa. I just had two Canadian women who worked for me. They were marvelous people. One of them had been there for a number of years and stayed on a long time afterward. I am still in touch with her from time to time. She's retired and still in the Ottawa area.

Ottawa was a great post from a family standpoint and a work standpoint. There were at the time I was there we had consulates in Vancouver, Calgary, Winnipeg, Toronto, Montreal.

Q: Quebec.

BOORSTEIN: Quebec and Halifax. We had seven. Our consulate in St. John's Newfoundland had just closed the summer I arrived in 1976. As personnel officer I got to go to every one of the consulates at least once and in some cases I remember I went twice to Winnipeg. I went three or four times to Montreal. I could go there in a day, but a couple of times to Toronto, but at least once to every consulate. Shortly after I arrived I went on a, flew out to Vancouver and then took the overnight train to the Canadian Rockies to Calgary and then flew to Winnipeg and flew home. I would constantly be on the phone. There was a lot of coordination work we would do countrywide wage surveys. You'd have to coordinate the evaluation cycle for the American Foreign Service staff, which was an enormous job of making sure stuff, was sent by overnight express mail and things were kept on target. To go from a country like Zaire where nothing worked to a country like Canada, which in many respects worked better than the United States, was just a dream. The only down side of the tour in Canada is if you didn't like cold weather because it would get cold fast. You first saw snow by the middle of October. It may have been only a flurry or two, but by early to mid November you had serious snow. The second winter I was there it was incredibly cold. That's when I first experienced the point where Fahrenheit and Centigrade meet. It was minus 42 below. We lived in a house and it seemed like every night it would snow two inches and by the end of the winter, snow by my sidewalk and by my driveway was taller than I was and I did all the shoveling. I had two cars, both of which had those plug ins, which kept the oil viscous in your crankshaft and that got a little old. My wife and daughter were good ice skaters. My wife being from Indiana learned to ice skate at a very young age. My daughter learned it in Ottawa. I didn't ice skate until I was a teenager. I never took to it, never

liked it and just under sufferance would go with them to the Rideau Canal, which was frozen solid, and I was looking for a place to hold on, but I still went. What we did learn there and did as a family was ski, downhill skiing. We took ski classes every Saturday for two hours. We drove to a place called Calabogie Peaks in Western Ottawa, about an hour or hour and a half away from Ottawa. With our class we would go skiing and sometimes it was so cold we'd have to take breaks so that frostbite wouldn't set in. We'd have a bowl of soup or a hot chocolate, something to stay warm, but it was fun. I turned 30 in Ottawa, so I was still quite young. As a matter of fact, I was the youngest Foreign Service Officer in the embassy.

Q: Well, now as personnel officer, I know personnel officers have had terrible times with not necessarily the ambassador, but the ambassador's wife. I was in Athens where Mrs. Tasca, I think had 100 people go through, some were repeats, but going through the household staff and all. Did you have problems with Mrs. Enders at all?

BOORSTEIN: Not me personally even though I would be involved in the hiring of the staff for the residence and the DCM's residence. I would do many wage surveys to determine their salary. I do not recall personally having any issues with Mrs. Enders. She had issues with the security officer because I believe there was a cook who the security officer refused to give clearance to work on the residence because he discovered something about his background and she was very upset because she thought he was an excellent cook and at the end of the day I just don't remember whether he was hired or not. That was a long time ago, but he was just infuriated that she was trying to push him and I just remember him being incredibly angry and wanted to talk to me about and talk to the admin counselor about these kinds of issues. I did not have any problems with Mrs. Enders personally at all.

The ambassador was a whirlwind. In many ways he was like Tom Pickering in terms of being very activist. He was traveling constantly and Bob Duemling was the DCM was really the man who ran the embassy and I remember I had been at post already for three months and it was the night of the Marine Ball. The agricultural counselor, his name was Clancy Jean had a reception at his apartment. My wife and I went and were standing around having a drink or whatever and the ambassador arrived. He went around greeting people. He turned to me and shook my hand and said, "Hi, I'm Tom Enders, a pleasure." Don Bouchard, the admin counselor, just about choked on his drink when he overheard this. He put his arm around me and he said, "Mike, we've got to get you upstairs so the ambassador knows who you are." I'd already been at post for three months. Eventually I did sit in on some more meetings in the front office, budget briefings or this or that and at the end of the day the ambassador did know who I was. I wasn't his next best friend, but nevertheless it goes to show you how he was oriented. He went to the Yukon; he went to the Northwest Territory. He was here, he was there. He was all over the place.

Q: As personnel officer, did you run into a genre that I was familiar with in the '60s, I was a what you called a core management officer in personnel and I was dealing with consular officers. At one point we got a complaint from our embassy in London and also from Canada in different places and some in Mexico saying you're sending all these problem cases to us as consular officers. It was close to home and for one thing we had an awful lot of in those days this was, a consular office is one place where women often became officers, low-ranking and many of them weren't married because of the system and they usually had mothers who they were taking

care of or they couldn't be far from home. So, Canada was the place where we were putting them. It was developing almost a personality of having relatively elderly women at consular posts and also people, I mean in other words, they were problem cases.

BOORSTEIN: Well, there were a number of those in Canada while I was there. I had no particular reason for having to be in Canada, but there were a number of people that had limited medical clearances, had elderly or ill parents in the United States and they needed to be nearby, may have had children who couldn't get medical clearances, who would get better medical care in Canada, but it wasn't that much of a negative factor on how well things ran. The morale among the single women in Canada was not good for a couple of reasons. If they tended to be older by and large they didn't like the cold weather. There was one woman who was the secretary to the DCM and the political counselor who slipped on the ice and broke her arm. She was just miserable before. She was just disconsolate after that, inconsolable. She just hated it there, the cold weather, this or that. The women who were younger the Marines could have cared less about because they had the pick up the crop out there on the street, the Canadian girls. You walked out on a nice spring or summer day it was nice scenery to look at frankly. Again if you weren't the kind of person that embraced cold weather, you'd be unhappy. We just did it. In addition to learning how to downhill ski, we learned how to cross country ski because we lived very close to a large sports complex and park that had trails. We were young. Our daughter at that point was seven or eight years old. She was active. We did a lot of stuff with her as a family that involved physical activity. We went and took advantage of the recreation center and took physical fitness classes, exercise classes, swimming, but other people were miserable. They just didn't like the cold weather. It sort of got to them. Again, like I said I was the youngest Foreign Service Officer even though it was my third tour. But by and large the people who were there had these medical or personal issues, but it wasn't debilitating by and large except like I said the cold weather being the real factor.

Q: What about Canadian contacts? I mean there's all this business love hate relationship. The Canadians follow everything we do avidly in the United States and Americans just think of Canada kind of the cold part of the U.S.

BOORSTEIN: Again, I was struck as coming from the United States how really different Canada and Canadians are. How different it is. Because I was a French speaker and I didn't want to lose my French ability, I enrolled in a course of intermediate conversational French through a local university. There was a night class. I got there in August of 1976, and it was on the eve of that very historic election in Quebec when Rene Lévesque won the premiership of that province and he was advocating separation. I realized very quickly how sensitive Canadians are to the word "America." For example, in most places around the world when you go to an American Embassy and you see the plaque outside the door which says "American Embassy," but you go to Ottawa at least when I was there and the plaque says "Embassy of the United States of America" or you would always refer to it and you learned very quickly never say you work at the American Embassy, say U.S. Embassy. I remember the first night at this French class we went around the room introducing ourselves and I said in French "I am Mike Boorstein and I'm an American." The professor turned to me and replied: "We are all Americans here." As I said, I quickly learned to say "I'm from the United States" in French. Again there was that sensitivity. And there was a lot of internal turmoil in Canada over the issue of separation.

I remember early on taking this orientation trip and flew to Vancouver and went to the admin officer's apartment for a cocktail party and he invited a lot of his local staff. I remember the topic, it was a fairly small group, it wasn't that big of a consulate, getting into this argument about western Canada versus eastern Canada. Basically they were saying, we don't give a damn about those people in Quebec. We can have our own nice little country just British Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan. We can just be fine. We've got the oil, we've got the wheat, we've got the minerals. We don't need the rest of the country. There was that kind of stuff going on and less of this you people from south of the border, you don't understand us. That really wasn't a factor at least not in my experience.

Q: Well, then, did you get involved in any presidential visits? Talking about Jimmy Carter.

BOORSTEIN: That reminds me about another story I forgot to tell you about Kinshasa, but we'll come back to it. Let me jot that down before I forget it. Kinshasa and Kissinger. I still don't know what it is that I forgot to tell you about Palermo, but anyway. Mondale was Vice President in '77 and '78 and that was the first vice presidential and presidential visit that I had had. I was in charge of the hotel operation as the personnel officer. It involved one night stay up all night doing duty in the control room. I don't remember anything problematic. Frankly, just a lot of work, a lot of coordination, keeping tabs on rooms and changes. A lot of time on the phone, but like I said, this is Canada. We didn't have any time zone difference. The phones worked. It was fine.

Q: Well, you wanted to add something about Zaire?

BOORSTEIN: Actually, let me go back. One of the other thrills about my tour in Ottawa was this was the year of Queen Elizabeth's silver jubilee, 25 years on the throne, 1977 so she was touring all of the Commonwealth. She and Prince Philip made a trip to Ottawa. I remember it was in July, my mother was with me. I remember going up to the roof of the embassy to view her carriage going along Wellington Street in a horse drawn carriage. She was riding, she would open up part of it and that was quite a thrill to see the Queen up close.

In Kinshasa, getting back to that, Henry Kissinger paid us a visit, the Secretary of State. This was my first Secretary of State visit and as the personnel officer, again, I was in charge of the hotel rooms at the Hotel Intercontinental. You can imagine. Kissinger made a very historic trip around Africa and he, you know, I don't remember where he was before Kinshasa, but after Kinshasa he was supposed to go to Accra, Ghana. That trip was canceled because of rioting.

Q: Yes and also there was a problem, but I can't remember what it was.

BOORSTEIN: There were riots in the street because of the Kissinger visit and as a result when he landed in Kinshasa, it was announced by the Department that the stop in Accra was scrubbed. So, he had an extra day in Kinshasa and that again was part of the story. From there his last stop was to go to Nairobi where he was delivering an important speech to what was called UNCTAD, UN Commission on Trade and Development. Like I said I was responsible for the hotel. That was my thing to do. I remember there was a very famous French interpreter named Alec

Toumayan who flew out the day before Kissinger was to travel. We had his room assigned. I went out to the airport to meet him and we came back and he didn't like his room. His room overlooked the street and he wanted his room overlooking the swimming pool. I basically told him you're out of luck. These rooms are all booked. They're all assigned; you've got to live with it. He wasn't very happy, but you know. I remember seeing him at Foreign Affairs Day last spring and I reminded him of that story and he looked at me and said, "oh, yes I remember."

In any event, shortly after Kissinger arrived I was also involved in setting up the control room at the presidential guesthouse where Kissinger stayed and while I was there the fellow from the secretariat and his name was Myles Pendleton.

Q: I've interviewed Myles.

BOORSTEIN: Now, he went by something else like Skip or Chip.

Q: Kim.

BOORSTEIN: Kim. There you go, I'm glad you remember. Kim said I need someone to help put together the press release with the text of the UNCTAD speech. Mike I want you to do that. Well, again, think of this 1976, no computers, no fax machines. You had barely functioning Xerox machines in those days. You relied a lot on mimeograph paper and just plain old labor. Very quickly, I had to arrange for the machinery, the paper, the labor and the whole logistics for delivering I don't know 500 copies of the speech once it was polished and ready to go. Then I had to protect it because it was embargoed until a certain point when it was going to be released on the aircraft I guess. I don't know, probably to the traveling press. The Bureau of Reclamation in those years was overseeing a huge dam project called Inga Shaba. I believe it was on the Congo River. Morris & Knudsen was the firm that had the contract. There were a lot of these American contractors and Reclamation folks running around. I had a contact through Morris & Knudsen and got a big warehouse and set up a huge long table and got together the mimeograph machines and had a cadre of I don't know 20 Zairian laborers and literally worked all night to run off I don't know whether it was a hand cranked machine or an electric machine to run off the masters and run off the 500 copies of each page, hand them to the Zairian workers who literally walked around the table to collate. Kim Pendleton said to me, I'll never forget this, he said, "Mike, I'm sure that this requirement is supported by the embassy and that you will succeed. If you don't you will look back on your short and enjoyable career in the Foreign Service." Ultimately, obviously, I did succeed, but I missed part of the concert, the folk concert the Zairian hosts were putting on for Kissinger at this big outdoor arena. My wife was there. We had a baby-sitter for our daughter, and I joined her close to the end of the concert and I think this was actually the second day after I'd been up all night. I went home that night and as we had already made that trip to Angola. I still had several lobster tails in the freezer. I took one of them out, thawed it, grilled it and at 1:00 in the morning had myself a late dinner with lobster tails. It tasted very good. That was my Kissinger story.

Again, the embassy had to fumble around real quickly in preparing a program for him for the last day. Well, as it turned out Kissinger became violently ill. He was just confined to his bedroom popping Lomotil and the press was having a field day. There was all this talk that he was having

secret discussions with the Angolan rebels and he was doing this and that and the answer was that he was going from his bed to his toilet.

Q: Well, of course supposedly he had tummy trouble when he was in Pakistan when actually he went to China.

BOORSTEIN: That's true so there was that suspicion of course.

Q: Oh boy.

BOORSTEIN: Well, why don't we, I think I'm pretty much. Well, let me finish up Ottawa.

Q: Okay.

BOORSTEIN: Yes, this is actually a good way to end it. I was in Ottawa for a year and I get a phone call from Washington and its Mary Ryan who was my career counselor. She said, "Mike, I have a requirement to fill a job in Moscow. I see from your personnel record that you came into the Foreign Service, you have some Russian language ability." I think I tested at a 0+/0+, next to nothing, but I had studied Russian in college, I knew a few words and I tested and that was the only foreign language I tested in. "We have an opening for the number two position as the admin officer working for the admin counselor. It's a double stretch for you."

Q: You might explain what a double stretch is.

BOORSTEIN: Well, because your personal rank usually coincides with the classification rank of the position you hold. Often for shortages or for other reasons you can get jobs at higher than your grade level and that's called a stretch. In my case the job in Moscow was two grades above my personal grade. I said to Mary, "You know, Mary, four years when I was leaving Palermo I was offered the job as administrative officer in Budapest and security wouldn't give me a clearance because I have relatives in the Soviet Union and they also denied me all of Eastern Europe, so I'm sure they would never assign me to the USSR." She said, "Well, Mike, let me look into it." She called me the next day and said, "Security says there's no problem with you going to Moscow." I laughed like crazy. Expediency rules. Again, I'd only been in Ottawa a year on a four-year assignment. My wife was happy going to graduate school; my daughter loved her school. This was a career opportunity for me and at that point I was already pretty much decided that I wasn't going to be a personnel officer for the rest of my career. I wanted to go into the mainstream of things and I was afraid that if I spent four years doing personnel work after almost three years in Kinshasa, I would be classified as a personnel officer. This was my exit. I enjoyed being personnel officer, but I was looking at my career. I went to the florist. I bought a dozen roses and I went home and told my wife who was a Russian major by the way in college. I said, "Sue, I imagine you will be really excited to learn of an opportunity for us to go to Moscow." She said, "Well, no, I'm really happy here." I said, "Well, look the timing is such that you could finish your master's and I wouldn't be going until next summer. Then back to Washington for intensive Russian out of cycle. We could probably stay in Ottawa through the end of your school year so you could finish up your master's." I said and I was trying to be very diplomatic in front of my eight-year-old daughter, almost nine, no she was nine. "You know, this really is a family

decision.” My daughter, the smart little nine year old that she was pops up and says, “Okay, Dad, it is a family decision so this means if I don’t want to go to Moscow, we’ll stay here in Ottawa, right?” I said basically, “No, not exactly.” It’s something that she’ll joke about from time to time to this day; this is what Dad means by family decisions. I agreed and I was curtailed. I left Ottawa in April of 1978. I left my family there and the embassy was very creative in figuring out a way where they could stay in privately leased quarters and get some sort of allowance. That again goes to show you how flexible and benevolent Don Bouchard was as the admin counselor. He said to me early on, “Mike I predict you’re not going to have a full tour here. Somebody is going to snag you away early.” He didn’t plant that seed. It just happened.

Off I went to Washington, left my family in Ottawa. I went to Washington and rented a sublet, rented a second story walk up apartment off the Georgetown campus above a dry cleaning store. Walked across the river every morning. I basically had one on one Russian tutoring and got to a 0+ to a 2+ in about 12 weeks. Nina De La Cruz, who was the dean of the Russian language teachers, became my teacher and it was just wonderful. My wife came down and I went up to help them pack out and came to Washington. She took a little bit of Russian in August of 1978 and we went to Moscow. That’s a good place to break.

GERALD J. MONROE
Canada Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1977-1979)

Gerald J. Monroe was born on October 13, 1933 in New York State. He attended City College in New York where he received his BA in 1955. Mr. Monroe served in the US Army as a 2nd lieutenant from 1955-1956. His career has included positions in Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Germany, China, Switzerland, and Italy. Mr. Monroe was interviewed by Raymond Ewing on March 22, 1999.

MONROE: Well, I was there for about nine months, expecting fully to go to the economic officer in the office of central European affairs. Something else happened and I don’t know what it is any longer. I ended up on the Canadian desk and did the same job as head of the economic section on the Canadian desk.

Q: I would be interested in your view, but my sense is that in some ways you doing economic work on the Canadian desk had far more interesting, difficult, and complicated issues in some ways to deal with than you would on the German desk. On the German desk, you would be more involved with multilateral agencies with political issues that you’d been dealing with on civil aviation, Berlin and so on. You really got off into a different area.

MONROE: That was right, quite correct. It was not a change I regret in the least. I think the Canadian desk experience was very rich for a number of reasons. Not the least of which is it helps you put diplomacy in its proper perspective. The relationship with Canada is so broad and of such depth that there is no way that five or six people can manage the relationship in the sense that one manages a relationship with a European or an Asian country. Canada had about 720

different agreements with the United States. Most of those were at the state level. Most of those involved trucking which was very important in its way, and timber use. We had two major issues with Canada, that is to say we had, the world had extended its coastal areas of economic exploitation just as I had joined the office. We immediately engaged in a negotiation with the Canadians a massive negotiation because we were dealing both with petroleum rights and fishing rights.

Q: Offshore.

MONROE: Off the coast. Now our coastal waters were no longer five miles or whatever the distance. The new distance I think was 200 and some odd miles which covered a lot of oil and a lot of fish for that matter. Interestingly we resolved the oil matter very quickly. Whoever exploited it would exploit what was directly off our coast which in itself was an extraordinarily difficult issue for cartographical reasons. But, that solved, then we agreed that the other, the partner country would then have first dibbs and agreed below rate market prices, so it was easily solved. What wasn't easily solved were the fishing issues particularly on the west coast, because they involved native American rights; they involved in a major way environmental issues.

Q: Particularly off Alaska, the Columbia...

MONROE: The Columbia River off Washington coast. As a matter of fact, when I first joined the office I thought shrimp salmon was a kind of sea life. We called it, it was dubbed by someone royal shrimp salmon. And of course it was American salmon versus Canadian shrimp and mutual access to. Those issues were never solved while I was in the office. Simply and I believe one senator lost a seat as a result on the East coast over the fisheries problem.

Q: What was sort of the vehicle for negotiating both the petroleum and the fisheries issues with Canada? Was there a special negotiator?

MONROE: There was a special negotiator. His name, believe it or not, was Lloyd Cutler. He led the team, and everyone on the desk when he had the time would join in the negotiations. I went to Rhode Island at one point.

Q: This was at a time partly during the Carter administration when Lloyd Cutler was also counsel at the White House.

MONROE: That's right. He was a magnificent negotiator, just an incredibly gifted advocate, as was Vance incidentally. He was very impressive at a meeting.

Q: With the Canadians.

MONROE: With the Canadians, the ones I attended.

Q: But there were periodic cabinet level meetings.

MONROE: There were periodic meetings at all levels. I mean from kindergarten teacher to the

legislatures to governors.

Q: Virtually every federal agency would be involved.

MONROE: And that is a good point. I learned to have a high regard for the federal highway commission. As a matter of fact, that was a little negotiation I ran myself which was extraordinarily interesting. I will cite it as an example and I won't cite any more, the sort of complexities that were involved in U.S. Canadian relations. The Canadians had agreed to permit us to straighten a spur of the AICan Highway which passes primarily through Canadian territory. In return for receiving that control over the engineering of the highway, we were to give them and owe them a military pipeline which they could then integrate into their pipeline grid. And, we were to hire Canadian contractors.

Q: On the highway project.

MONROE: On the highway project, a certain number. This didn't seem to be a problem until some of our students said they are not hiring native Americans. The whole clutch of Indians and perhaps even Eskimos who lived along the border of the Yukon in Alaska. They wanted to work on that highway in Canada. It was an extraordinarily complex negotiation. I don't know how many people we had on our negotiations. I led the standing group from various agencies, including the Bureau of Indian Affairs, up to Yellowknife. You know, don't throw out the garbage because of the bears, that sort of place. We finally worked out a solution that was so complex that no one could understand it which was I suppose the aim in a way, at least the Canadian aim. But it did relate within a certain distance to the U.S. border. The labor force would be 25% American. This would decline as, because we had to decide how far someone could reasonably commute because the thing went on for 700 miles. Because it wound around, it was through something called the Shaklak Valley. It was not straight. In any case, it was a marvelous experience, and it taught me a lot. It taught me that the Canadians could bring to bear at any time as many as 50 or 60 people on a U.S. issue. Whereas I was always having trouble convincing my legal advisor to travel with me which was a requirement, because they always had a staff of lawyers. It took me much longer than it did the, you know, they just put much more resources, far greater resources, into their relations with the United States than the reverse, which I think says something about the relationship. By and large, they were very good, sound negotiators, and as you might imagine, they had an insight into the American political process that simply isn't to be found in anyone else. At least, I didn't during my career.

Q: It is very easy to communicate with Canadians not only technically... you could pick up the phone and call or whatever. Was that a problem sometimes for your areas of responsibility that whatever other agency could just call their counterpart in Ottawa and solve a problem or discuss it and not even tell you about it?

MONROE: Well, surprisingly not as much as one would have imagined. As I expected, certainly not among the border states. It almost seems as if they didn't want the responsibility. Secondly, the Canadians drove a hard bargain. I think many of these other agencies had learned their lesson. In most cases, they called us. Even the Federal Reserve took the initiative in informing our little group of those interested in Canadian economics and held a luncheon once a month in

the Federal Reserve dining room for those of us who were interested in economic issues. Two of us would go from this department. The people would come from all over Canada including CIA, their economic research group participated. The problem was more on the other side. That was because these were the heady days of the Quebecois and Rene Levesque had just been elected governor I suppose for want of any other word of Quebec province. A very interesting and complex man. Again one of those who had the common touch, and I put that in quotation marks. He was easy to meet. Of course, the Quebecois started opening offices all over the United States. They passed the famous or infamous law, the one where everything in Quebec had to be in French which immediately cost Montreal a great deal in terms of investment, and made Toronto the city it is today. It sort of exploded as people fled Montreal. You could see Montreal becoming more Francophone. As a matter of fact, some years later I went back and gave a lecture at Quebec University in Montreal. That was the first time in dealing with Canadians which I had done extensively when I ran in to very educated people who, I spoke in English, of course, who said they would have liked a French translation, did I have one? That was the first time that had ever happened to me, even dealing with the Quebecois. The problem was the embassy didn't want us to call or even return calls from offices of the Quebecois.

Q: In the United States?

MONROE: In the United States.

Q: The embassy meaning our embassy in Ottawa.

MONROE: Well, their embassy I would have said, excuse me, the Canadian Embassy in Washington was, would become quite perturbed if they understood that we were having lunch in New York. It finally became necessary to tell them that while we understood their problem, and we would never discuss issues that were appropriately the purview of the Canadian federal government, we felt that we really did need to speak to the Quebecois on some issues. We would, you know, just as they felt free to deal with the government of Michigan. I had several issues where they were doing just that, some of their agricultural people, agricultural inspection people, which didn't bother me. We had no problem with that. Again there was no way, we were only five people, and the embassy was relatively small considering the range of issues it dealt with. There was absolutely no way the State Department could have handled the relationship without the assistance of the states and the multitude of other agencies.

Q: Did we expect the Parti Quebecois offices in the United States to register under the foreign agent registration act?

MONROE: We did indeed.

Q: So as long as they did that, they had met our requirements.

MONROE: And that included attorneys, American attorneys for the railroad, the Canadian Pacific Railroad, for example. So, as far as we were concerned, those were people on a par with the trade office in New York or the province of Quebec, and bear in mind there were trading offices in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, British Columbia and so forth as well, just as there are

representations here of Texas, New York State and what have you, and in Ottawa. So, you know, we were sensitive to their concern and anxieties and that forbidden system, a kind of reciprocity in access.

Q: You mentioned at the beginning there were two major issues in this period of the late '70s, one petroleum, the other fisheries in the context of the law of the sea and the offshore...

MONROE: Well, we had another issue that was more pressing, and I was going to get to that, probably concluded, and that was the uranium price fixing matter. The Canadians had quite rightfully in fact associated themselves with two or three other uranium producers, and they set prices. This is anti-market behavior. It is behavior that most American courts probably would have ignored except it had a very injurious impact on Westinghouse. Because in selling its particular kind of reactor, it also promised to fuel the reactor for 10 years. That was part of the deal, and it was an important part of the deal because the reactors, there were dramatic differences in the way in which reactors operate. This meant that Westinghouse's nuclear division very quickly became non profitable because of the inflated prices of uranium, for uranium that they were paying. The wrinkle arose when the circuit court, federal court in New Mexico noticed there were a lot of Canadian companies operating in New Mexico and so forth. Ground zero if I may use the term for uranium industry in the southwest. Some judge in his wisdom started to fine people because in his judgment they were interfering with discovery. A court in New York City sought documents and information and testimony from these subsidiaries of Canadian companies. Some American companies that had major subsidiaries in Canada as well. They were forbidden to give this testimony and these materials because the Canadians had passed what they call locking legislation.

Q: Forbidden by...

MONROE: They were forbidden by Canadian law. Canada would take punitive steps within Canada. These companies were really in the middle and discovery penalties or remedies can be Draconian. It was the first time I had run into them. They later played a important part in my career too. Companies were being fined \$50,000 a day and up. This created a sense of urgency which simply had to be met, it had to be addressed very quickly, and so we'd go back and forth. For one month I think we spent two days of every week in Ottawa and vice versa. They came down. Again the matter was handled in a very civilized, very elegant way, considerable protestations of friendship and so forth. Interestingly, the justice department, they called them departments actually, not ministers, their justice department was almost totally Francophone. But, I think there was no need for interpretation. Today, there might well be, but at that point they all spoke English perfectly.

Q: And you were able to work out this problem.

MONROE: We did work it out, primarily on our own. We didn't solve much with the Canadians, although we did move it. I think they did decide they were going to have to settle with Westinghouse. They did recognize that they had done great harm to Westinghouse's interests. That said, they weren't going to settle in anything like our anti trust law would require, treble damages and that sort of thing. I think we were able to move the case from the New Mexico

circuit to New York circuit where the judge was more open to arguments of comit and so forth. Of course, the State Department toward which the Canadians were very generous I might add parenthetically, they took stock in this. The State Department did enter a friend of the court brief pointing out that this was unfair because it was putting a civil question in a conflict of law situation. That, I think, was probably the stickiest issue from our perspective. I think from the Canadian's perspective it was our dealings with the Quebecois they were most concerned about during this period.

Q: Were you, this was pre NAFTA, but the Ottawa agreement...

MONROE: The auto agreement, you are quite right, I remember him. That was Steve Watkins and so forth. The auto agreement was working well. It worked so well that it was I don't know, number 18 on my [list of problems]. We had no strikes as I recall during that period, although the border had been closed by farmers, North Dakota farmers.

Q: What were they objecting to?

MONROE: They were objecting to the seasonal slaughter of Canadian cattle in the U.S. slaughterhouses, thereby dropping capacity for unexpected they had need of slaughterhouse capacity in the winter. They closed the border, quite against the law because, the only law incidentally we could find to work with was the interstate highway system discretion. They were interfering with the trade between states. Fortunately the slaughterhouses were in South Dakota. We found out they had 84 state, not state police, they called traffic patrolmen in North Dakota at that time. We are talking in the late '70s. The solution was to send them to Minnesota who was quite content, who understood. Of course, Minnesota got a lot of business. It was an interesting problem. Life was full for those on the Canada desk, our kidnapping a dolphin by mistake and claiming it landed in a storm. We had a dolphin. The customs people grabbed a dolphin and said, "This is in violation of the Marine Mammals Act just passed" and threw it into the Atlantic Ocean where it immediately died, it being not in its habitat. The U.S. government was sued by the Toronto Zoo. Those were the sorts of things we ran into on a daily basis.

Q: I sometimes summarize my experience with Canadian affairs with suggesting that they were very real, difficult, complicated issues that needed to be addressed and dealt with and solved, which had tremendous domestic political potential in both countries, which the Secretary of State, the President, really wanted to deal with and in some ways the desk officer on the Canadian desk had more responsibility to deal with them than, in fact, in any other part of the world.

MONROE: I think that is probably the case. One example would be blueprint tariffs. Basically what the Canadians were doing was putting such a high tariff on it that they were actually putting a tariff on the intellectual property.

Q: What was on the blueprint, not the blueprint itself.

MONROE: That was another issue we had to resolve. Of course, explaining that issue to a Congressman or other interested senior decision makers was in and of itself could be a farce. The

number of...

Q: When because there was a cabinet level meeting or because the Canadian external affairs minister was coming to Washington or the Secretary of State was going to Ottawa, that briefing papers had to be prepared on all of these myriad of issues and that was challenging I'm sure to be able to explain complicated intricate things in a simple way.

MONROE: Well , I don't know if you were in Ottawa or on the desk.

Q: I was in the department later than this period.

MONROE: I remember you were in EUR at the time. I don't remember quite where
Q: I was in '80 and '81 a Deputy Assistant Secretary for a brief time did Canadian affairs.

MONROE: Well, this was long before that. I think you were in, well whatever, not part of this issue. I think what I left with was a deep regard if I hadn't had it before for the necessity of day in, day out diplomacy. So much of problem resolution depended on our relationship we had with your colleagues at the embassy, and in ours, so that the need to keep in touch with your friends, with your Canadian colleagues was absolutely essential, even if there was no particular problem. So often one could solve things with a phone call. I must say this is one of those rare cases where the embassy was pleased to have this call to the Canadian government directly, at least one of them during this period. Tom Enders was the ambassador; did a magnificent job, and understood how to sense what issues were the sort that would jump up, that is to say jump up and bite you in a tender spot, and those that would not. For example, he was very concerned about the native American labor issue on the AICan Highway. Because the AICan Highway was in and of itself so symbolic of the relationship, but we were able to solve problems like the purloined dolphin or the fact that someone was caught on the Great Lakes with a rifle in a fishing boat, which was a no-no, were the sorts of things we could solve without creating the kind of issue that could get out of hand. Another important issue was tracing people into Canada and Detroit. As you know, it is just going under a short tunnel.

Q: Hot pursuit.

MONROE: A hot pursuit issue, yes, even though it was equitably resolved surprisingly easily. The one intractable problem was the fisheries problem. We just couldn't get a handle on it. It was so enormously political.

Q: Were you involved in environmental issues, Great Lakes water quality, acid rain, that sort of thing, or did somebody else?

MONROE: Somebody else handled that issue, that area, but it would grow occasionally. It would explode; it would become an issue of such major importance that everyone would be doing it. For example, acid rain was the very beginnings of the concept of acid rain, was something that required the entire office at one point. The remark about briefing books was very true, and we tended to have sort of institutional briefing books and would check them to see where the issues were and make the changes accordingly. The fisheries material needed to be

updated.

Q: Nothing was changing.

MONROE: Nothing was changing; it was just incredible. Because we found out, the whole Pacific coast only involved a hundred families.

Q: Who were directly involved in the fishing.

MONROE: Who were directly involved in the fishing. There was this real question of who was a native American. The problem settled on that, and that was a very hard thing to resolve. Anyway it was not a two years I regretted. In fact, it was one of the jobs I have enjoyed most simply because of its [variety] of issues, and the sense that one took home every day that diplomacy was doing the job for the American people.

Q: Okay, and this was roughly in the period from summer of '77 to '79.

MONROE: To '79, that is correct.

JAMES A. PLACKE
Economic Counselor
Ottawa (1977-1979)

Mr. Placke was born and raised in Nebraska and educated at the University of Nebraska. He entered the Foreign Service in 1958. An Arabic Language Officer and Economic specialist, Mr. Placke was posted to Baghdad, Frankfurt, Kuwait, Tripoli, Ottawa and in Jeddah, where he served as Deputy Chief of Mission. At the State Department in Washington, Mr. Placke dealt primarily with Near East affairs. From 1982 to 1985 he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East. Mr. Placke was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: All right, let's talk about Canada. You were in Canada from '77 to?

PLACKE: To the summer of '79. Two years.

Q: When you arrived there, what was sort of the, how would you describe the relationship between the United States and Canada?

PLACKE: As multifaceted and complex as it is today. One thing that I was told by Bob Duemling the DCM upon arrival there and reinforced later by Tom, he said, "Look, one of our main problems here is that both Canadians and Americans speak approximately the same language and that you can dial up any organization or office in Washington from Ottawa as well as you could if you were in Silver Springs and that presents a lot of complications. We're constantly chasing things to find out what's going on with our own government because they

don't have to come through us and often they don't." That was the piece of wisdom that I found very useful. The relationship was, this was the latter days of Pierre Trudeau and Trudeau was a very, very much a Canadian nationalist in a positive sense. Canadians are somewhat discomforted by being next to the United States. The two economies are so intertwined and were even in those days that it would be very damaging to both to try to accomplish any separation, yet the Canadians really work at maintaining a separate Canadian identity and there is a separate Canadian identity. They have a separate history and really a lot of Canada is evolved in the way that it did as a reaction to the American Revolution. The loyalists went to Canada and the rebels stayed in the United States and there are still traces sprinkled over.

Q: This was in Ottawa?

PLACKE: Well, especially in the Ontario province.

Q: I mean Ontario.

PLACKE: Yes. That's right. That was the English speaking province and that was where the loyalists went, there and Nova Scotia. Just as a sidebar in my estimate the nicest English-speaking people in the world are in Nova Scotia, just not a wealthy province by any means, but really nice people. The focus and this probably was part of the reason Tom Enders asked me to come up as his economic counselor. The real focus in terms of issues and relationship, which were military cooperation which Tom handled with support from the attaché's office and energy. There was a lot of back and forth about Canadian oil development. They were just beginning to develop the tar sands in western Canada which are now a major source of oil production, some I think now seven or eight hundred thousand barrels a day. In those days it was under two and the real issue of the day which is still around and is going to become a much more visible issue again was a pipeline to carry gas from Alaska and potentially through fields in northwest Canada as well across Canada into the U.S. It could also serve Canadian markets. Canadians are, well were in those days, perhaps the gap is not as wide now as it was, but in those days they were much more environmentally conscious than the United States was. Also much more conscious of the consequences and the sensitivity of native rights and native American settlements were on this particular pipeline route which was down in the McKenzie River Valley which is an environmentally sensitive area. It's way up in northwest Canada. The warm season is very short. What you do during that time has lasting consequences. We never got the pipeline built because the economics changed essentially, but where the United States is today, one of the things that we'll do eventually is build that pipeline.

Q: How did you find Canadians on economic matters? Did you feel they were somewhat like the French whom I understand, take a certain amount of pleasure in sticking it to you if they can or not?

PLACKE: Not with the vigorousness of the French. The Canadians I always felt are a little vulnerable in a sort of subordinate position. When people feel that way I think they tend to be rather defensive and sometimes also super sensitive to anything that could be perceived as a slight or less than a full understanding. Yes, the Canadians were sensitive to these things, but it was not an inhibition in getting things done. The people I dealt with at the Ministry of External

Affairs couldn't have been better. It was a very collegial relationship. Tom Enders I thought was terrific as an ambassador and like always Tom worked very hard at his job. He went to every provincial capital at least once a year, knew all the provincial governments, knew the mayors of Toronto, Quebec, got around the country, was a highly visible figure in Canada in a positive way. The Canadians liked him and he worked at it because he knew how to manage the relationship and I thought he did it very well. I was there at a very good time. We were very active and generally I thought doing constructive things in the relationship.

Q: What was the feeling of the embassy and all towards Trudeau at that time?

PLACKE: Well, Trudeau maybe was a little closer to the sort of French model that you referred to a moment ago. I was mulling this over as we started out on this segment and had to stop myself from saying anti-American. Trudeau was not anti-American, that would be a considerable overstatement, but he was very much a Canadian nationalist and looking for ways that Canada could balance its overwhelming relationship with the United States. He reached out to Mexico for example, when Mexico was much less sympathetic with U.S. interests than it is today and he was trying to form a kind of coalition that he could use to offset U.S. influence. It happened to be, I was there when his party lost power and Joe, what was his name?

Q: I want to say Clark.

PLACKE: Yes, it was Joe Clark, exactly right. Joe Clark was elected Prime Minister and centrists came to power and the liberals were out. That was quite a blow to Trudeau. Ultimately as I recall the Clark government only lasted less than two years, but it was a hick up in Canadian politics and Clark come in without the sort of prickliness towards the United States that Trudeau had. So, in that sense it made things a bit easier at that level, but the Canadian government is very professionally staffed in dealing with your colleagues day to day didn't really change anything.

Q: Were you looking, I mean you and our economic side looking at Quebec and thinking if this breaks away, what does this mean and all?

PLACKE: Well, that was coming to a boil in those days, but it didn't develop really fully until the decade of the '80s by which time I was off in Saudi Arabia, but it was clearly a major issue and there had been two or perhaps three national referenda in Canada on the separation issue. One of those was in the works at that time. And I think the sensitivities, I've been back to Quebec once or twice since leaving that post, and I think the sensitivities in Quebec if anything have become closer to the surface. Quebec lost a lot. Quebec really had been the financial center of Canada historically and during the time I was there and the transition to Toronto being the financial center was well underway and there were some major moves.

Q: Moving to Montreal to?

PLACKE: Moving from Montreal to Toronto. Financial affairs is another important part of our relationship. I happened to have the only two genuine financial economists that I've ever known in the Foreign Service as part of my economic section at the time.

Q: Who were they?

PLACKE: Warren Clark and Paul McGonagle.

Q: Were we...?

PLACKE: Oh, subsequently, actually after completing his tour in Canada left the Foreign Service, went to a bank and has made lots of money.

Q: Were we looking though, I mean, the Quebec independence movement was always sort of a cloud...we must have been running models of what would happen if?

PLACKE: No, we weren't really. It hadn't developed to that, it was not that acute at that time. It was not that we were ignorant of the issue, but I don't think we saw the possibility at that time that it would actually break away. That became much more of a possibility some ten years or so later, but our consulate in Montreal in those days - we also had a consulate in Quebec City - they were keeping their fingers on the political pulse on these issues, staffed largely with French speaking officers, did a good job.

Q: I'm told that sometimes ties particularly when you move towards the West or the East and the maritime provinces, the ties are really head north-south and don't head across. In a way, this is very healthy, but at the same time it must have caused some problems, didn't it?

PLACKE: Well, this is something that the Canadians themselves talk a lot about, that Western Canada really starting from I suppose Manitoba going west is very different from Eastern Canada and has a lot more in common in attitudes and the nature of the economy and so on with American states to the south than the Canadian provinces to the east. One could easily get into an exaggeration here, but it was not a problem, it was just kind of a phenomenon that everybody was aware of and occasionally would comment on. Because of our interest in oil and gas affairs, I visited Calgary fairly often and one of the things that really stood out was the political attitudes towards domestic politics and to social issues which the U.S. and Canada largely, but not fully by any means, share. So Calgary was very similar or more similar to what you would find in Denver, Dallas or Houston than they were to what you would find in certainly Montreal or even in Toronto.

Q: Were we looking at the health system? Was that part of your portfolio?

PLACKE: Senator Kennedy was looking at the health system and was making a number of speeches. He came to Canada at one point to sort of personally you know, say I've seen the Canadian system at first hand. I remember he actually introduced some legislation in the United States in the U.S. Senate, but would establish a National Health Service modeled on the Canadian system. Those of us in the embassy who relied on the Canadian health care system while we were there thought this was one of the great ironies of our time because the Canadian health care system was under constant attack in Canada and regarded as a failure which it was. Kennedy wanted to replicate it here in the United States.

Q: I have a cousin by marriage up in [Canada] who has, is getting older and has health problems and is having to run down to the United States all the time in order to get on time treatment or something.

PLACKE: This is one of the problems. It's become a problem in the UK as well and that is that the theory is fine, but the implementation is, it has some structural defects that make it almost impossible to work properly. One of the penalties is that to get proper medical attention in a timely way is very uncertain and often just not available.

Q: Well, then you were ripped untimely from a womb of Canada. What did you do about your house?

PLACKE: When I left Ottawa to go to Jeddah by way of Washington I had my wife, three children, two cars, and a house that I just walked away from. We put our house on the market as soon as this decision was made to go to Saudi Arabia and had a certain amount of interest, but no takers and as it turned out one of the parties that seemed to be seriously interested essentially played games because he knew that I was going to be leaving and he figured, well, you know as it gets closer to the time when they're going to have to leave, they're be more flexible and I'll get a better deal. That wasn't the way we played it and ultimately he met our purchase price. It could have been done with a lot less strain, but that was his negotiating tactic. When I left there we were thinking in terms of renting it out because we couldn't sell it. Fortunately we were able to sell it and probably all things taken into account including the tax advantages and so forth, I suspect probably broke even on it, but it was a great house. It was a very nice house to live in.

Q: Well, speaking of negotiating tactics, did you get involved in any negotiating session with the Canadians and if so, how did you find them, I mean I'm told they can be quite good.

PLACKE: They are. They're very, I think as straightforward as Americans in their negotiating attitudes and they come well briefed, they have a good command of the facts in the situation and they simply know what their objectives are and they work hard to accomplish them. The only negotiations that I think could be legitimately termed as such that I was involved in either directly or as an observer was over the pipeline questions. We would negotiate or at least we would meet with some of the commissioners on the national energy board, which was just a block down the street from the embassy. We would come and occasionally call on key people in the Canadian parliament and we could go to lobbying out in Calgary and that sort of thing. I enjoyed my assignment there immensely. I have a very high regard for the Canadians and I think the U.S.-Canadian relationship today is probably even healthier than it was then.

Q: Was there any talk about a NAFTA or a North American Free Trade Association or anything like that?

PLACKE: Under Trudeau, he really was trying to move things in the opposite direction and had worked out an arrangement with the European community. As I mentioned earlier, he was trying to work on sort of a common front with Mexico against the United States. He was not looking for a way to enhance the relationship with the United States; he was looking for ways to

counterbalance and really took the opposite approach and ultimately an unproductive one.

ERIC J. BOSWELL
Consular/Political Officer
Quebec (1977-1980)

Eric J. Boswell was born in Italy in 1945. After receiving his bachelor's degree from Stanford University in 1970 he served in the US Army from 1967-1969. His career has included positions in Dakar, Quebec, Beirut, Amman, and Ottawa. He was interviewed by Edward Dillery in November 1998.

BOSWELL: I had a brief down period and then went off to Quebec, an assignment that had been engineered with Larry Eagleburger's help. It was a reward assignment and certainly one of the nicest assignments I've ever had in the State Department. I went to Quebec in the summer of 1977, I guess it was. It was an extremely interesting time for one principal reason and that is that it was in the first months of the administration of the Parti Québécois [PQ] in Quebec, the first independentist government that had come to power in Quebec. They won the 1976 elections. I got there in the summer of 1977 when they were really just getting underway. It was a wonderful and fascinating time to be a U.S. diplomat in Quebec.

We had a very small consulate. The French consulate was much bigger and the French influence was substantial but in our small consulate we did what I thought was the meatiest work that you could do. We were the only source of any kind of reporting and analysis on Quebec in the U.S. government as far as I could tell. Basically there were two reporting officers, Terry McNamara the consul general, a very, very political reporter with a very, very good sense of where things were in Quebec with excellent contacts, and myself as essentially a junior officer who had never done political work before and was getting my feet wet and enjoying it a great deal. My job was nominally consular but the work was really political. There was not a difficult consular work load in Quebec and I had a junior officer at the time who could do it.

We were able to report on and observe pretty much without interference the first years of this extremely interesting government. I was in Quebec for three years, virtually the entire tenure of the first term of the PQ government. Three years that led up to the famous referendum on what they called "sovereignty association," the softest possible question that they could devise on steps leading to independence. It's not supposed to be good for political officers to predict anything but we predicted a year ahead of time pretty much exactly the outcome of the referendum. Perhaps it was a shot in the dark but I will always retain a great deal of satisfaction in it. It wasn't my call, it was Terry McNamara's call and he was very accurate.

The yes side, that is the sovereignty side of the referendum, went down to defeat by 60 percent to 40 percent in some large degree because of the engagement in the last weeks of the campaign of the prime minister of Canada, Pierre Elliot Trudeau. He decided that there was some chance that this referendum was going to go the wrong way and that he had to take the political risk, a risk that is, that it would create a backlash and help the independentist, of engaging himself and he

did. He was enormously popular in Quebec. It was sort of a love-hate relationship between the French speaking population and one of their own. I think his intervention was decisive and the referendum went down to defeat.

Q: When you said that, what little trade craft or so, how did you go about finding this and what was your routine like?

BOSWELL: We had a rather easy task of it because the Quebec government, the PQ government, was extremely open and accessible and easy to talk to. In fact they were anxious to talk to us because they wanted very much the understanding of the United States. They wanted to demystified their cause, at least to the U.S. government, and they spent a lot of time and effort on it. They made some bad steps in terms of P.R. [public relations] with the United States.

I remember rather early on, René Levesque made a trip to New York to speak to a forum of businessmen in New York City and he made some rather sharp comments down there about what he intended to produce in Quebec. I think he did it under a certain amount of hostile questioning. It got bad press in New York and Bill Safire was writing columns about this enormous gap in our defenses, the NORAD [North American Air Defense] defenses that were about to open up to the north of the United States. The PQ got some very bad press at the outset.

They were associated in the minds of some in the U.S. with the bomb throwers of the '50s who threw a few bombs, but were in fact terrorists. They had kidnapped a minister and killed him. They even set off a bomb in the front door of the U.S. consulate in Quebec City. The PQ government, of course, had nothing to do with that kind of movement. It is a mainstream movement that represents maybe perhaps a culmination or at least an evolution of a long history of nationalist sentiment in French-speaking Canada, and a very important government. In fact, they are in power now to this day. It was very easy to get to know these folks, because they wanted to talk to us. We think we had a very, very, very good inside appreciation of what they were up to. They wanted us to know this.

Q: So even at a junior level you would have I to senior members of the party?

BOSWELL: I had I to senior advisors of the party. I can't say I walked in on Levesque though I had dinner with him in the consulate along with my boss. It was a dinner incidentally that was memorable because one, it was the chief of state essentially coming to dinner which was awfully nice and two, we had a brand new chef that the consul general at the time, who was not Terry McNamara but a man named George Yeager, had brought from embassy Paris who created a wonderful meal. He watched, I could see him, from a swinging door to the kitchen in absolute horror as René Levesque smoked cigarette after cigarette throughout the meal and when presented with this gorgeous wonderful fish dish, proceeded to reach for the black pepper and encrust the fish in black pepper all the while talking and smoking. It was probably a life changing experience for this chef but it was an awfully interesting dinner. I had access below the ministerial level pretty much anywhere I wanted, even as a junior officer, and press access as well. There was a lot of press interest.

Q: What were the young PQ people like?

BOSWELL: They were tremendously idealistic, imbued with their cause, smart as hell and far more interesting frankly than most Anglos that I ran into. Keep in mind that this was at a time when for example you could call the U.S. consulate in Montreal which was located in the Anglo part, in the business part of town, and have somebody answer the phone in English and not be able to answer you in French. This was at a time when there was a tremendous amount of the equivalent of white flight; it was Anglo flight from Montreal which had been the financial center of Canada. It never really recovered from that flight as a financial center. Much of it was transferred to Toronto and there was a tremendous amount of money that went with it.

This was not altogether unhealthy for Quebec. It left a vacuum which was rapidly filled by young active entrepreneurs and French speaking businessmen who did fill the gap. It was a tremendous transition, a tremendous change, in the kinds of functions that French speaking people went into in Quebec. They had in the past been the intelligencia, it had been a limited profession really, and were not in business. Now Quebec has an extremely vibrant business community. They are not all nationalists by any sense, but certainly [are different in a] French [way].

Q: You mentioned the Anglos, what was their party line?

BOSWELL: There was no Anglo party in Quebec, not really. There are not enough Anglos in Quebec to form a party and certainly not enough to win anything. The Liberal Party in Quebec which was the opposition to the Parti Québécois had a great number of Anglophone and what they called allophone which are other immigrants, not French speaking and not English speaking necessarily, but they tended toward the English speaking world. In Quebec City, however, there were almost none. In our consulate we had very little contact with this sector of society; it was in Montreal and the consulate in Montreal kept in touch with it, we felt almost by inclination as well as opportunity and we didn't really see them. We viewed them as less and less relevant in the political debate and I think that was a fact, I think that was true.

Q: Quebec is almost like the embassy to the...

BOSWELL: We had to walk a very careful line because we had to make sure that we were not dealing with the Parti Québécois on questions of government to government issues.

Q: What were your relations with our embassy like?

BOSWELL: Very good. The embassy was headed by Tom Enders, an extremely capable diplomat. He obviously was extremely interested in what we were doing. My ratings were written by the political counselor in embassy Ottawa. They also made sure to give us all the slack and the room that we needed. They thought we were doing a good job. We were doing a good job. We didn't get into any of these internal State Department debates about who reports to who. We reported to Washington with info to Ottawa and that was perfectly satisfactory.

Q: They didn't have an Anglo bias?

BOSWELL: I didn't see it. No, they didn't. I've followed Canadian events over the years as a matter of just personal interest and I think the embassy has always been extremely good at that. We didn't have a French bias, let me make that clear right off the bat. We felt, and I continue to feel, that the separation of Quebec would be a great tragedy for Canada and not in the interest of the United States. But it was our job to make sure that we knew the players and could explain what was happening to the U.S. government.

Q: There were a lot of French people in Quebec who felt exactly that way.

BOSWELL: Absolutely.

Q: What kind of people were they?

BOSWELL: I don't think you can single them out in any particular way. It was a real cross section of the population. Quebecers have always liked to play the nationalist card and keep a foot in the federalist camp and sort of do a balancing act which is I think common and good strategy for a minority.

Q: Was there any leadership in that group?

BOSWELL: Oh, yes. There was excellent leadership, mostly Francophone.

Q: But they were Liberals?

BOSWELL: The name of the party was the Liberal Party. There was good leadership and ultimately they even displaced the Parti Québécois some years later, I think in 1983 or 1984, and took power again and then subsequently lost it again. Now as I speak to you there is a new provincial election campaign. I think the election itself will take place in about three weeks and it is going to be a very close election between a Liberal candidate and the current prime minister of Quebec, Monsieur Lucien Bouchard. Both are Francophones. Obviously there is no way an Anglophone could sway anybody in Francophone Quebec. There have been Anglophone ministers. In fact, even the Parti Québécois government has some Anglophone adherents and some Anglophone members of the national assembly, parliamentarians.

Q: One last question: what do you think of the Canadians' French?

BOSWELL: You know I can say for this tape that if, God save us, Quebec ever becomes independent, my ambition in life is to be named the U.S. ambassador to Quebec. I think that one of my qualifications for it is that I have some knowledge of Quebec French, which always makes French people's hair turn white when they hear it. It is the real French in my opinion. In Quebec City they spoke something called Joul, which is a patois which they also speak in Montreal, in the two urban areas, that is extremely difficult to understand and I don't get it either. But I can speak with a Quebec accent and I can make my mother, who is French, also turn pale when she hears me.

Q: What more about Quebec? Any other thoughts on that? Any thoughts on the role of consulates

as opposed to embassies, that sort of thing?

BOSWELL: Consulate Quebec had a very, very special and particular role. It was unique I think in the entire Foreign Service in that it was the second consulate in the province of Quebec. There was a great big consulate in Montreal and a little tiny consulate in Quebec City so you had two consulates in the same jurisdiction with what we hoped was a very clear division of labor between the two.

Consulate Quebec was almost exclusively just a political reporting post. It existed just to report on the Quebec government at that time, and continues to exist primarily for that function too; to have a relationship and to be able to observe and report on the Quebec government. There is no other reason for the consulate to exist. There is no American community in Quebec City. Quebec City is 95 percent Francophone. There are no retirees in the area. There was very little visa work load. There was little economic reporting to do. All that is done by the megaconsulate in Montreal.

Q: Was there any problem of the consul general in Montreal thinking he was also the consul general in Quebec?

BOSWELL: There were tensions between the two consulates from time to time. It depended on the personalities of the consul general to be able to manage those tensions. I thought Terry McNamara managed them extremely well. I thought his successor George Yeager did less of a job. He was extremely paranoid, I thought, about overlapping jurisdictions. He used to complain any time the consulate in Montreal did any kind of political reporting which he felt was exclusively his jurisdiction. There was room for disagreement. I don't think it ever got too serious. It was a little annoying with the junior officer in the middle.

Q: How far back did the two consulate situation go, a long ways?

BOSWELL: A very, very long way. I don't remember how old consulate Quebec is but consulate Montreal, I am sure, existed before then. The two are, I would say, easily 150 years old. It is a very old post. There used to be a lot of conflicts in Quebec because there were conflicts up on the border, in the border area. There were a lot on conflicts in places where no American has ever heard of, that they existed: Three Rivers, some of the border crossings near Maine, Vermont and New Hampshire. Now there are only two left and we are lucky to have those two left, no question about it.

SIDNEY FRIEDLAND
Canadian Affairs Officer, Bureau of European Affairs
Washington, DC (1978-1980)

Sidney Friedland was born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 1932 and graduated from the University of Wisconsin at Madison in 1955. He served in the U.S. Army from 1955-1957, during which time he was stationed in Stuttgart, Germany. Mr.

Friedland entered the Foreign Service in 1957. His career included positions in Canada, Austria, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, and Washington, DC. Mr. Friedland was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993.

Q: Then you went to the Canadian Desk, '78 to '80?

FRIEDLAND: What happened is that I was offered a job as the Environmental Trans-Boundary Pollution Officer in the Canadian Desk which is a five-person operation. There was the Director, Deputy Director, Economics Officer, and one was the Trans-Boundary Environmental stuff. They offered me the job, having served in Canada, having Canadian-born spouse. So I took it. About a month before I was to leave, I got a call from Personnel. The person that they had selected as Consul General in Zagreb had just gone out of the picture, and would I be interested. Well! Yes, I'd be very interested. Only one problem. We had two kids, one was just starting high school and one was in the sixth grade. So, given the school situation in Zagreb, that meant our oldest child would have had to spend her high school years at a boarding school someplace, and in Zagreb there was an "international school" that was run by three elderly British ladies married to Yugoslavs, and that went up to eighth grade. My wife is a certified high school teacher and she was not about to have our kids in that. She said, If you want to go you go, but the kids and I go back to Washington.

Q: So you went to the Canadian Desk?

FRIEDLAND: I turned down the Zagreb offer. The Canadian Desk was as active a job as I had ever had. Constantly on the go. Environmental affairs were developing into the great -- as much of a major item in US-Canadian relations as anything that we had ever had.

Q: Was this a real issue or was it a way the Canadians were looking to beat us on the head?

FRIEDLAND: Exactly. You know about Canadian affairs., obviously.

Q: I pick up a lot, but Canadians are probably the toughest negotiators, and they love to stick it ...

FRIEDLAND: You have to remember, Americans take Canada for granted. It's up there, they're nice people, they drive the same cars we do, their towns look like ours, they smoke different cigarettes but they eat hamburgers...whereas, as far as Canada is concerned, the US is the greatest factor in Canadian life. You have got to live with everything Uncle Sam does. But Uncle Sam ignores you. So, as a matter of fact, my first week or two, when I got to that desk in July and I started the day I got back -- there was no leave. I arrived in Washington on Saturday night, I was told to be at National Airport noon Sunday and you will meet a man with a red beard, and he was a tall man and his beard was as red as they come, and I found myself -- the day before I was in Geneva, the next evening I was talking to my in-laws in Toronto, and that was on the way out to Regina, Saskatchewan. I spent the next week -- it was that kind of thing.

Basically, our relations with Canada on environmental affairs were very curious in that it was the US, believe it or not, that was trying to get some action while it was the Canadians who were

polluting their own atmosphere like crazy, and a lot of it was coming across the border hitting us. By this point, 1978, we had very strict emission controls, from factories, power plants, whatever. And indeed, any new coal-burning facility built in the US after 1972 had to have a scrubber to take most of the crap out of the air. Canada had no controls, no enforceable control. There was not one scrubber in all of Canada, but yet, the Canadians could yell at us and get the sympathy of their own population, and we wouldn't even yell back because nobody at any senior level was interested in this. We were the good guys, they were the bad guys, and they were beating us over the head and we weren't answering. It was very frustrating.

In Canada, most Americans, most FS officers are not aware, that the Federal government has much less power and control over daily life than the provinces. The province in many ways still ranks supreme in Canada. Here again, we were walking on eggs. In the US, anything that goes over a state line is a Federal responsibility. We have the EPA, we have this, that and the other thing. States have their own environmental offices -- they have different laws, but anything that crosses a state line in the US is a Federal responsibility. So there is a site in the US government where there is responsibility for this stuff.

In Canada, virtually everything, particularly then, everything was fought over. We go only go with the facts. So that any time we asked them, for example -- 95% of the Canadian population lives within a hundred miles of the US border -- any time they set up a power plant, it perchance has to be, not always, within a hundred miles of the border. So that anything that might fall on their people will fall on our people, too. At that point, and as far as I know still, what actually comes out of the stack, regulating it, is actually the responsibility of the Parliament. So we could go to the Feds and say, Hey, Saskatchewan is building this new power plant two miles north of the US border and there's no scrubber. Well -- we'll have to check with the province -- our mandate doesn't carry to this. All right, well, we want to talk to the province. No, no, you can't talk to the province, you can talk to us. OK, how about we talk to the province with you there, the three of us all sitting around a table?

That was my very first meeting, in July of '78, to fly to the Province of Saskatchewan, Regina, and find out what the hell they would do. Also, in Canada, there was no Freedom of Information Act, there was no Bill of Rights, there was no public hearing procedure, so we learned in Regina that Saskatchewan Power was just going ahead, building this huge -- in the US they don't come this big -- huge power plant because it's right on a sea of soft coal. The thing is, the way the border is drawn out there, their major population centers are a hundred miles north of the border. The plant is two miles north of the border. You have a normal prevailing north-easterly wind. So that stuff will pour across on North Dakota and their people are safely sitting north of that and won't get any. So because they won't get any, they figure, why hold a public hearing? We had this happen all the time.

Q: You were there for two years. Were you able to get any response?

FRIEDLAND: Oh, we had meetings galore. We had the Governor of Montana there. We were not able to get anything until after I left, when Canada proclaimed some country-wide controls. But during the whole two years -- unh-unh. Then, the way we came out on the Canadian side was that Uncle Sam is trying to bully us, when, in fact, every generating device before 1972 was

close to the border, how can they dictate that, when in fact, we had controls since '72, tightly-controlled, and they had no controls. Of course, we could have made the point, but there's a couple of things -- when you spend enough time on Canadian things, you get to know that the more you know, the more different the two countries are. One thing that you might think is that Canada has a decent press. Canada has a terrible press. The public daily newspapers are a disgrace.

First of all, the only good people are Brits. Number two, they are press agents for their government. Anything American that does not meet their preconception, does not get -- Ontario Hydro was putting up the largest coal-fired power plant in the Western Hemisphere on the shore of Lake Erie, due north of Erie, Pennsylvania -- forty miles from Buffalo -- this was to be completed in 1982. Not one scrubber, burn soft coal from Pennsylvania. It turns out that Ontario Hydro owned huge chunks of coal mines in Pennsylvania, and simply puts it on boats and ships it up across to Ontario. I called in a number of newspaper people and said, Hey, what about this? You guys want to hear your major utility is going to put up a power plant, the biggest the Western Hemisphere, with no pollution controls. Not a word ever appeared in any Canadian paper. Not a word.

That's the nature of the press. One time, they were so worried about that at the Embassy. I was up for a conference and they scheduled a backgrounder for me to give to the Ottawa correspondents of the Canadian press, the national press, and they had released a report about a week before which contained all sorts of erroneous stuff, so I was there to correct the erroneous stuff. So I gave a backgrounder -- one paper carried it.

The paper broke the backgrounder rules by saying 'a State Department official who was in Ottawa for a conference' -- I was the only State Department official who was in Ottawa for a conference, it had to be me, which is not the way a backgrounder is supposed to be. Then it took my statements and interposed them with stuff in the Canadian paper which gave the impression in certain cases that I agreed with what the Canadians said against what was thought to be our policy. And then, on other issues, misquoted, said I had said X when I didn't say X -- I said something else. At any rate, that put such a gloss on things that the Foreign Office called the Canadian Embassy here and asked them to call the State Department and have me reprimanded because of the backgrounder that I gave. My boss called back the Canadian Embassy and told them to go to hell, he's obviously been misquoted, we've got his statement here if you'd like it, want to publicize it, we'd be happy to give it out.

Then, Canadian politicians routinely bat us over the head any time they are having trouble internally. During this point, the biggest problem we had was with Ontario. Ontario had a Conservative government that was being threatened by Liberals, and therefore, they would blame us for thing that the Liberals were after -- there was an upcoming election. The Liberals would say, Under the Conservative government, we've got very weak pollution controls. The Conservative government would respond by saying, Well, our pollution controls are probably the best we can get by spending what we can spend, but the US is much worse, and they go on after Uncle Sam. Uncle Sam is polluting the hell out of us... . Most of which was not true.

We had another problem in that Canadians are Canadians. American scientists are scientists. So

we would get a scientific delegation together and we'd be, say, arguing the relative pollution of City X in Canada vs. City Y across the river in the US. The Americans would have our position papers, they would know what our positions were, they would know our fall-back positions -- if we can't get this, we can at least try to settle for that. Canadians were invariably Canadian government employees, most of ours were -- some were contractors -- in Canada they were all government employees, they were all briefed to a fare-thee-well on their government's position, they were given all sorts of pep talks, whatever -- you are Canadians, Americans are out to get us, anything you can learn about what they plan to bring up at the meeting, please let the Foreign Office know. Well, our Americans, scientists, would go out for drinks, dinner with Canadian scientists, and they would blab everything away. They had no feeling of being Americans vs. foreigners in a bilateral negotiation. I would talk to them, whoever may have headed up the delegation would talk to them, but it was very difficult because they knew everything. I was one man on the five-man Canadian desk which handling Canadian affairs. My counterpart in Ottawa was an office director with a staff of four officers under him. We had these bilateral meetings, and they are prepared with briefing books and all that sort of thing that we simply couldn't match. This was a very difficult situation. It was fascinating. It was totally fascinating.

JOHN E. WILLIAMS
Commercial Officer
Ottawa (1978-1981)

John Edgar Williams was born in South Carolina. He graduated from the University of North Carolina, Yale University and Victoria University. He has served in a variety of posts in England, Spain, Argentina, Italy, Uruguay, New Zealand and Canada. Mr. Williams was interviewed by Dr. Anne R. Phillips in 1995.

Q: *Did you know that this might be the case? Did you have an inkling of that before you headed to Ottawa?*

WILLIAMS: I had no inkling. I really knew zilch about U.S.-Canadian relations, except of course, I was aware that we had the U.S.- Canadian automotive agreement, which was the predecessor of the NAFTA and which was working very, very well. That was signed back in the mid 60's. I didn't have much to do with it at that time, but it was back in the 60's at the time when I was Senior Economist in the General Commercial Policy Division of the State Department. Many Canadians thought that this was just going to be disastrous for them. I mean some Canadians did, but the government was convinced by some of their economists that it would be good for them, and indeed it was. It was good for them and good for us. It gave the automobile companies a lot more choice about where they were going to manufacture particular models of cars and parts and so on. It has been very good economically for both countries. This is one thing that you did not hear much about during the big controversy over NAFTA when, unfortunately, a lot of people on my side of the political fence went the wrong way on that and opposed NAFTA. I was very sorry to see that. You know, I'm an economist and they aren't. Anyway, it was a very interesting time in U.S.-Canadian relations -- we were having to overcome

or trying to overcome a steady succession of little things, little trade restrictions. Each one of these in itself was not of great significance, but altogether they really ate into what the U.S. was able to export.

Q: *Give us some years in there.*

WILLIAMS: I was there from late '78 to mid '81. I think I told you that I retired out of there.

Q: *So, when you got there you became aware of this way of operating?*

WILLIAMS: Oh yes. It didn't take long.

Q: *Tell me a little bit about the size of the post and other people there.*

WILLIAMS: The Embassy at Ottawa was a medium size Embassy. Nowhere near as big as the ones in London and Paris and Bonn, but pretty big.

Q: *About how many, roughly?*

WILLIAMS: I'm not sure. I think probably, including not only Foreign Service Officers belonging to the Department of State or the USIA, but including CIA, Defense Intelligence, the Military Attaches, the other agencies like the FBI who maintain liaison with their Canadian counterparts, I think we had about seventy-five or eighty officers and probably about that many clerical and communications personnel. That was at the Embassy. Now, at that time we had Consulates or Consulates General in seven or eight cities across Canada. I'm not sure. Some of them may have been closed in the meantime. Montreal, Quebec City, Toronto, Winnipeg, Calgary, Vancouver and out East, in the Maritime Provinces, there was Halifax.

Q: *Oh really?*

WILLIAMS: I think there was also one at Saint John's, Newfoundland. I believe that was all.

Q: *Did you travel?*

WILLIAMS: Oh yes.

Q: *Would people have gone to other posts?*

WILLIAMS: Oh yes, of course. I was in charge of commercial matters. Therefore, I supervised the commercial work of all of the other posts that did commercial work, and this meant all of them, except Quebec. Quebec was exempt, because they didn't do commercial work. They were entirely political. I did visit the other posts just to make sure what was happening there. To see that reporting was being done to my satisfaction and that people there were trying to locate trade opportunities for American companies and so on. That was interesting. Then, of course, we had a lot of people coming up from the United States. It was an easy place to get to, not like Auckland or Buenos Aires, so we would get a lot of state trade representatives. For example, the North

Carolina Department of Commerce. There was a guy that I got to be pretty good friends with who would come up there periodically. He was looking for ways to sell North Carolina furniture or North Carolina textiles or whatever up there. So, I would go around with him and introduce him to the right people. And the same thing would happen with other State representatives. We had Florida, and Texas, and Maryland; we had all kinds of state representatives coming up there. Also, people from individual companies who would say: "I'm from such and such a company and we're exporting this product and how do you advise we go about it?" So, I advised them. That's one of the reasons I was there.

Q: Two questions. About the size, the population of Ottawa?

WILLIAMS: Roughly, I think the greater Ottawa was maybe half a million people. The city itself, within the city limits was somewhat less, but that's true of any city. Washington, DC versus greater Washington.

Q: The second question, was it easier or harder to do your work, to be there because the fact that Ottawa was the capital?

WILLIAMS: Easier, I think. Easier, because I got to know the people in the federal government. I shouldn't say "federal," because it's really a confederation, not a federation. I should say the central government, I suppose. Anyway, I got to know fairly soon who were the people I could talk with. Who were the people who could and would try to solve problems and who were the real obstructionists that I should try to avoid if possible. I think it helped. But, of course, the fact is that Toronto is the biggest business center. I had to go over there fairly frequently, but I did try to keep in contact with the major Trade Associations, the Canadian Manufacturers Association, the Canadian Importers Association, and others. In fact, I was invited fairly frequently to give speeches at these. I remember one time there was the annual meeting of the Canadian Manufacturers Association and I was invited to go to Toronto and give the main address one day. I spoke up for more two-way trade. I mentioned, among other things, that they should send us more of that great Canadian beer, and import more of our wine. Anyway, when I finished I got a standing ovation. I thought this was great. People are supportive of increases in two-way trade.

Q: The beer sounds fine, but I was going to ask you about areas of greatest conflict in trade, or possibility of conflict? Were there surprises?

WILLIAMS: I think of course, one of the major things was in the area of wood products. This involves some subsidies. The international trading community had rules about subsidies under the old GATT and now the World Trade Organization, although I must confess I have not read the entire charter of the new WTO. But a country is entitled to impose tariffs to compensate for a government's subsidies to its exports. Now, the Canadians would subsidize production and then claim that it was not a subsidy to exports, you see. And we decided it is really a subsidy, because if it were not for the subsidies, they would not be able to export at these low prices. We would get sometimes to the point of actually imposing compensatory duties on some of their products. The wood products were particularly a sore point with them, because they seemed to feel strongly that merely subsidizing producers did not constitute subsidies for exports, and we were insisting that they were.

Q: *I see.*

WILLIAMS: Well, without going into a lot of technical detail, which I probably wouldn't remember very clearly anyway, but I think that was the main kind of problem. I think that's probably the best illustration of the type of problem we had with Canada. We would impose countervailing duties on some of their products to compensate for either subsidies or for dumping. Dumping is another problem we had with them. There are two kinds of dumping. Two things that fall under the category of dumping in international trade rules. One of them is when products of a country are exported to another country at prices at "less than fair value." Another is, when they are exported at less than the same product they are being sold for in that country. So, either way, the two tests for dumping, either where its less than what you would call "fair value," because with most products, you know how much it costs to produce them if you're doing it fairly and you're not using slave labor or something. You can figure that out and then figure a reasonable profit. If we were dealing, as we do sometimes, with countries that do not or did not operate on the profit system or the private enterprise system, then they would say, "Well, profit is a very bad word, we do not have "profit" in our country." Of course, this didn't happen with the Canadians, but you see what I mean. So, we would figure out what it should be sold for as fair value and then add transportation costs to get the product to the United States, and if it was being offered for sale for less than that figure, then it was less than "fair value." Also, if it was being offered for sale at a lower price than the same product was being offered for sale in the country of origin, then you would know something is funny. The Japanese do this a lot. But the Canadians did it too. So, we would have to go after them about that and they would come up with all kinds of very innovative and inventive reasons why this was happening. We would come up with all kinds of reasons why it shouldn't be happening. Eventually, we would have to say, "Well look, until this stops we're going to have to put a countervailing duty of X percent. Our backroom guys in the Department of Commerce or in the STR, the Special Trade Representative's office, have figured out this is how much we would have to put on to compensate." They would say, "Oh, no, no, no, that is far too much." Well, you see what I mean. We would have all these problems with them, and it was continual. We had another problem with them, which not in my bailiwick, but it was an interesting one. They wanted to get us out of our Embassy. You see, we were the first country to actually recognize Canada when it acquired independent status within the British Commonwealth. They have had Dominion status since 1867, but until the '20's they didn't get around to having Embassies in Canada and sending Ambassadors to other countries. So, I think it was in maybe 1930 or '31, under the Statute of Westminster that this began. Anyway, we were the first country to actually send an Ambassador to Canada, rather than just having Consulates there. We had Consulates all over Canada. We had Consulates in some of the most unbelievable little towns in Canada over the last one hundred and fifty years. Anyway, they were so grateful to us for doing this that they put at our disposal, (that is, they allowed us to buy) a great big building, great big by early thirties standards, right across the street from the Houses of Parliament. My office window looked right down on the main entrance to the main house of Parliament. When they had a big ceremony or something and people would come riding up in carriages, with the Governor General in his uniform, riding in his carriage into the gate, I would be standing there in my window watching. I was on the floor above the Ambassador. The second floor was the prestige floor. I was on the third floor. Anyway, they wanted to get us out of there. They had given us some land not too far away, still

in the center of Ottawa, but they wanted us to move and we didn't particularly want to move.

Q: You couldn't watch the carriages in the other place.

WILLIAMS: Right. Well, we were going to build a new Embassy, you see and we thought it would be nice to have that in addition to the original. But they wanted us to leave that building so they could do something else with it. Anyway, that little controversy never did get settled while I was there, and I believe it still has not been settled. I forget exactly what it was that they would not give us permission to do at the new site that we wanted to be able to do. These things do get away from me. Anyway, thinking about the Canadians, there are some people who say you can always tell a Canadian, but you can't tell him much. The only way you can tell a real Canadian by talking to him, is if he says he is from Canada or if he says "shedufe" or "aluminum." A lot of them, hate to be thought to be just like the Americans. (particularly the ones from Toronto). Now, the people out West they are good old boys and girls. They are really such nice people. Well, many of the people from Toronto are nice people too, but so many of them do have this anti-American attitude. Toronto is one of the world capitals, of anti-Americanism outside –

Q: Outside Montreal?

WILLIAMS: No, no. The French Canadians seem to like us. They come down to Florida and Georgia and South Carolina to the beaches there, and they really want our sympathy in their conflicts with the English Canadians, their language conflict and their independence conflict. They want our support and our sympathy. I think they really do. I think its not just a ploy, I think they really do like us, because a lot of them do come down and spend a lot of time down here. I English Canadians in Toronto who are the ones most bitterly opposed to a closer relationship with us and are always talking "cultural imperialism." They restricted our magazines, newspapers, radio broadcasts and so on. There's not much they can do about radio and T.V. for people who live right close to the border, but they tried to do everything they could. Of course, if you've got your own antenna of some sort, it's tougher, but the Canadian Government did try to keep their people from receiving our broadcasts. I forget exactly how they did this, but I do remember that there were some regulations to keep people from listening to or receiving certain channels, which to my mind is no better than Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia.

Q: Just jamming signals.

WILLIAMS: No jamming, no. Just enacting regulations prohibiting or restricting people from receiving certain channels. I think they weren't supposed to receive satellite transmissions or certain frequencies or something like that. I mean, how can you do that and be a democratic country? I just don't know. Anyway, that was just one of the problems we had with them. There were no restrictions at all on Canadian newspapers and magazines coming into the United States, but they had restrictions about U.S. magazines and newspapers going into Canada.

Q: And the radio transmission and T.V.?

WILLIAMS: Well, we were always having trouble with them. They were always wanting us to make our radio stations diminish their signal in the direction of Canada, and we had problems

with this. Why should we do that? There is no good reason why the United States should go along with that kind of thing: restricting the people of a neighboring country from hearing or seeing what is actually going on down here. They were apparently thinking they wanted to establish some separate Canadian “cultural identity.” Oh yeah! Well, fellows that’s going to be tough. I suppose in a sense you can sympathize with this, but I really don’t see why. What good does it do to erect cultural barriers and walls there? I don’t see that it does the Canadian people any good. All it does is do some good maybe for the politicians. But, some of the politicians there were – in fact, the M.P. from the District for downtown Ottawa where I lived was an American Vietnam draft dodger who went up there and got into politics and became a leftist M.P. Boy!

Q: And took Canadian citizenship?

WILLIAMS: Yeah.

Q: So, those were some of the problems. Let’s see. We didn’t talk about food or economic or other cultural ideas. How did you feel that your work was progressing? Were there major highs or lows if you think about your whole time there?

WILLIAMS: No. I’m afraid I can’t point to any major highs or lows. It was all sort of a continuum. It was as if I had gone there and gotten on this continuous belt and sort of moved down it over a period of years and then got off again and all the while taking care of problems here and there, except of course, that I did mention that we did take the first steps towards the North American Free Trade Association. Actually, the first step as I think I did mention was already done and that was the U.S. Canadian Automotive Agreement. But then we took steps towards expanding that to include all kinds of trade. We did get that on the road. We would get a lot of delegations coming up from Washington to help out with that. So, it was not as if the entire load of that was on the Embassy. I’ll tell you one good thing that I did. This was a high for me personally. I’m not sure if I mentioned the Society for American Wines.

Q: I don’t think so. I’m pretty sure you did not.

WILLIAMS: Well, that’s good. That’s a nice little high.

Q: Tell me about that.

WILLIAMS: Well, I was sitting in my office one day and I got a telephone call from a lady whom I vaguely knew, because her husband was an Assistant Deputy Minister in one of the Ministries. I did not have too much to do with him, because it was not one of the economic ministries. Anyway, I did know them from parties. I knew them vaguely. Anyway, she said she would like to talk about increasing the availability of American wines in Canada and invited me to lunch. So I went and had lunch with her, and she suggested that we should form a Society for American Wines, because there was a Society for French Wines, (Les Chevaliers du Tastevin) a Society for Italian Wines and one for German Wines. Anyway, I thought, that’s a good idea. She said that she had several friends who were very interested personally, either in the restaurant business or the wine importing business or something who would be interested in helping to

form such a Society. So, I said fine, this is great. At the moment she suggested all this time, it did not occur to me that wine was not in my job description. That was the Agricultural Attaché's job. But, I guess I've never been the kind of person to say, "That's not in my job description."

Q: Sounds like an economic problem to me. A challenge.

WILLIAMS: Yes. Imports or exports from the U.S. into Canada. I did bring the Agricultural Attaché in early in the game. He was quite happy to have me take the lead. Anyway, we got it off the ground. We organized a committee, and I went to the Ambassador and got his approval to have a wine tasting at the Ambassadorial residence. We invited about two hundred people to taste American wines. This was not a formal wine tasting, it was just a very informal one, but we had a number of American wines there for them to taste. We invited everybody in town that we could find who had anything to do with making decisions about importing or serving wine on a major scale, like a restaurant or importers or the provincial liquor and wine stores. Both provinces, because Ottawa is right across the river from the city of Hull, which is in the Province of Quebec. So, we got the Quebec Provincial and the Ontario Provincial liquor store people in there too. It was a very nice little affair. We increased our membership. The Society for American Wines signed up about eighty members. We decided that if we were ever going to do anything really important that we were going to have to make a fairly big splash. So we decided to have a real big-time, world-class, formal wine tasting. We organized it and we did it. What we did was this: we got six of the great California vineyards to donate a case of wine each, and then we went out and bought six cases of French wines, equivalent wines – they were all Cabernet Sauvignon. As you know, I'm sure, there are only five of the French Bordeaux Grand Cru Cabernets. That is only five reds. The other one, Chateau d'Yquem is white. We had Chateau Lafite Rothschild, Chateau Mouton Rothschild, Chateau La Tour, Chateau Margaux and Chateau Haut-Brion. We're talking really big time here. Then, we selected one Premier Cru, I forget which one it was now, (I think it was Chateau Ducru Beaucaillou) but it was one you would pay a couple of hundred dollars a case for, at least. Anyway, we had six versus six. A somewhat similar tasting had been done in 1976. It was called the Judgment of Paris since it was done in Paris, but it was not a direct head-to-head formal, double-blind tasting. The American wines had come out very well in that. But with this, we were going all the way. We invited ten judges. We tried to get the French Embassy to bring a judge over from France, but they didn't want to have a thing to do with it. They didn't want to touch it.

Q: Beneath them, or just didn't have the time?

WILLIAMS: I think they were scared. Anyway, we had at least one French palate, because we had the Dean of the School of Hospitality from the University of Quebec. I forget exactly what his title was, but he was a French Canadian who had been trained in oenology in France. We had ten judges who were professionals in the area of wine, people who were known to be experts, including wine writers. In fact, we invited the wine writer for the New York Times, who was too busy to come to a wine tasting in Ottawa, of all places. Anyway, we had the wine tasting. As I said, it was double-blind which means that the people who were tasting the wine didn't know what they were tasting, and the people who served the wine to the judges didn't know which wine they were serving, because it was poured in a back room and only members of the committee did the pouring and knew exactly which wines were served in what order. You put

down the glasses on little numbered pieces of paper. Anyway, these judges tasted all of the wines, and just not to leave you in suspense, American wines won the top five places. Strangely enough, it was not one of the Grand Cru French wines, that got the top billing on the French side; it was the one Premier Cru which we had brought in to make up six. Well, let me tell you, this did cause us somewhat of a splash in the wine world.

Q: *No puns intended?*

WILLIAMS: Yeah, yeah. The New York Times wine writer, devoted his entire column to it the following week. I'm sure he was sorry he had not come. It did cause some kind of a splash. At first we got good press up there and our Society for American Wines expanded and we started getting results in terms of placement of American wines on shelves in the stores, that kind of thing. That's important you know. Also, getting the Canadian government to not discriminate. They had taxes which, in affect, discriminated against American wines, but they did not apply these same regulations or taxes to French and German and Italian wines. So, we started getting that taken care of, and we also started expanding and setting up chapters of the Society for American Wines in other cities. It was in '80 that we did this big tasting, and by the time I left in late '81, we had chapters in five more cities in Canada.

Q: *All across or mostly eastern?*

WILLIAMS: All across. We even had one in Edmonton and one in Calgary.

Q: *On these winners for the American wines, were these California or New York State?*

WILLIAMS: California.

Q: *Do you remember the ones?*

WILLIAMS: Well, yes. We had a Robert Mondavi Proprietors Reserve; we had a Sterling; we had a Freemark Abbey; we had a Stag's Leap; I don't remember the others now, but they were very distinguished California wines. We had gone after these. We wanted to get the very best. We also wanted to get donations, because we couldn't afford to buy the American wines. We had to buy the French wines, of course, but we had to get the American ones donated, which they did. Needless to say, the American wine people were very, very happy about the whole thing.

Q: *I bet they were delighted to ship the donations.*

WILLIAMS: Oh yes, they were. I think they felt that they had made a very good investment. Anyway, I understand since then that exports of American wines to Canada have gone up tremendously. Even though, as I said, this was not, strictly speaking, my field, but the Agricultural Counselor was very cooperative and he was not at all resentful of the fact that I had taken it upon myself to get the ball rolling on this without consulting him first.

Q: *He didn't consider it a turf problem?*

WILLIAMS: No, no. He was about to retire.

Q: He was probably happy for you to do the work.

WILLIAMS: Maybe so, I'm not sure, but he was a nice guy really. Anyway, it did do some good for U.S.-Canadian trade and it was a very interesting thing for me personally. I felt it was somewhat of an accomplishment. When I tell this, I tell people that this lady was the father and I was the mother of the idea. She planted the seed and I took it and nurtured it.

Q: That's a great story. I'd like to have been there for the wine tasting and.

WILLIAMS: I mentioned before that I had supervisory responsibilities, as the Counselor for Commercial Affairs in Canada, for the commercial activities of the Consulates and Consulates General all over Canada except Quebec, which you remember I said was strictly a political post. Incidentally, I might just mention that, in that job, I was on loan from the Department of State to the Department of Commerce, which by then had been given primary responsibility for commercial activities abroad. Previously, when I had occupied a similar position at the Embassy at Buenos Aires, it was a Department of State responsibility. But, by now the primary responsibility had been passed over to the Foreign Commercial Service of the Department of Commerce. But being on loan to the Department of Commerce really didn't affect the substance of my work at all. I do recall, however, that our Ambassador when I first arrived there, was a career man, Tom Enders, who did not think much of commercial work. He was one of these people who had been in political work most of his career and thought that the real essence of the Foreign Service was political work and that all of this business about economic and commercial work was almost irrelevant. In fact, prior to my arrival, he had wanted to downgrade that position from Counselor to Attaché. I let them know that if they did that I would not accept the position, because I would consider it very much a personal down-grading. So, they dropped that idea. At some point, this Ambassador wanted to exclude me from the daily staff meetings. I really took exception to that. In fact, since I was on loan to the Department of Commerce, I called them up and I said, "Look, the Ambassador here wants to cut me, as Commercial Counselor, out of the daily staff meetings; out of the group that discusses the important things that are going on every day." Well, apparently Commerce got hold of somebody in State and that idea got squashed. Fortunately, not long thereafter, Enders was transferred elsewhere and we got a former Governor of Maine as Ambassador, Larry Curtis, I believe, was his name. He was a very good guy. He was very conscious of and supportive of commercial work. Now, I'm not going to say that Tom Enders did not support me, because as I mentioned before, he did allow the Embassy residence, plus some of his representation money, to be used for our first wine tasting of the Society for American Wines. I don't want to sound like I am condemning him out of hand or anything like that. But, it's just that he had an attitude that was, and I fear still is, widespread in the career Foreign Service among the people who are in the political cone. I just have a feeling that that is the real Aristocracy and us economists and commercial types are just on a lower rung.

Q: Yeah. And they wouldn't want to do in any of their hands or whatever and not get in to the market.

WILLIAMS: That's right, yes. My gosh, to have to mess around with "businessmen" and "manufacturers" and pedestrian people like that. Anyway, maybe that casts a little light on some of the things that go on in the Foreign Service. I did get out to the Consulates and Consulates General just to let them know that somebody was watching and somebody cared. I really wasn't in a position to tell them precisely what to do and how to do it unless they asked me for some help along these lines. But I did want to let them know that the Embassy was looking to see what they did in the commercial field. That is, either looking for trade opportunities for U.S. firms or investment opportunities or whatever. Any way to increase our trade.

Q: *We ought to put in some years in there.*

WILLIAMS: Oh yes. We're in '80 and '81. Well, '79, '80 and '81 I'm talking basically. I found it very interesting. I remember when I went out to Vancouver, I thought of the only previous time that I had been in Vancouver which was in 1953 when I was on my way to New Zealand on the Fulbright scholarship. I went from Wilmington, North Carolina to Vancouver by rail. I went up from Wilmington to Montreal and then all across Canada on a Canadian Pacific train. It was in the dead of winter. It was in February of '53 and there was lots of snow. When I got to Vancouver we were out of the snow.

Q: *I was going to ask you what you saw. You said you saw snow.*

WILLIAMS: Oh man, did I see snow. All the way across. I remember getting out of the train at Winnipeg thinking, we've got maybe an hour stop here and I'll get a chance to see a little bit of Winnipeg. So, I got out of the train and started walking around. My ears almost froze solid in the first five minutes so I turned around and got right back on the train. I thought, I'll see Winnipeg another time. The other time was when I came out to visit as Counselor of Embassy.

Q: *What season of the year was that?*

WILLIAMS: When I went to Vancouver?

Q: *Yes.*

WILLIAMS: It was spring, but they were still skiing up on the mountains above the city. I went up there, not to ski, but just to visit the ski place, because I thought I might come back and ski later. But I never did. Anyway, it was very nice weather.

Q: *So the main economic or commercial interest there, is it vastly different in the western part of Canada from eastern Canada?*

WILLIAMS: Well, Vancouver is a major port and there's a lot of stuff shipped in and out of there that is not actually grown in the Province of British Columbia. They are particularly interested in forest products there, whether logs or sawn wood or whatever. That is a major product there. But, then they get a lot of –

Q: *Hardwoods as opposed to –*

WILLIAMS: Some hardwoods, but mostly conifers, whether pine or fir or whatever. It was a lovely place. I thoroughly enjoyed that part of the job, going around and letting them know that big brother was watching in their commercial work and giving them whatever help I could. A couple of places had new commercial officers –

Q: *So, you enjoyed that part, and it was quite lovely.*

WILLIAMS: Yes, indeed. I did enjoy Calgary and Winnipeg. Winnipeg is no great garden spot, but I always enjoyed going to Montreal. That's a lovely city. I had some personal friends there too. I always took any excuse to go there. Actually, it was only a hundred miles from Ottawa to Montreal.

Q: *I can remember the hard cider. I do remember that.*

WILLIAMS: What about the maple syrup there? Go out in the early Spring. Go out to what they call a sugarbush. A place where they tap the trees and get the maple syrup, and where in the early spring they would put on these enormous breakfasts with bacon and sausage and everything. Lots and lots of freshly made maple syrup on pancakes. Oh man, that was beautiful.

Q: *Yeah, I would like that.*

WILLIAMS: Quebec City is a lovely place too. When I saw the Plains of Abraham, I thought about how different things might have been if Benedict Arnold had succeeded in his effort to take Quebec in 1775, or early '76. Anyway, that was when he was a General in good standing in the Army of the United States. Benedict Arnold was one of the better Generals that we had, and it was just a shame that that idiot, General Horatio Gates pushed him in the direction of going back to his first loyalty to Britain. It was an interesting period. Just think, suppose we had taken Quebec and suppose instead of thirteen colonies we had been sixteen, and today, we were the United States of North America including Canada. Wouldn't things be different?

Q: *That would be something.*

WILLIAMS: You know the thing is, the Canadians know so much more about us than we do about them. Of course, that's true for practically every country in the world. But, we are so utterly ignorant of Canada. I must confess that I was ignorant when I went there, and still am, because there's a lot about Canada that I don't know that I should. But most Americans just don't pay much attention to our closest neighbor and biggest trading partner.

Q: *I have no comprehension at all. I remember taking the train from Toronto to Montreal and on to Quebec. I do remember the fresh raspberries in Quebec City. That would have been maybe July or August. Probably in July, for the raspberries in Quebec. They were wonderful with real cream.*

WILLIAMS: Oh, yes. Not just what passes for cream at your local Food Lion.

Q: Yes. Yes. Well, the people in that area enjoyed food. What about food at the Embassy or food at homes, social gatherings?

WILLIAMS: At that time since I was a Counselor of Embassy and I had a fairly sizeable apartment rented by the U.S. Government. This was because I had to entertain a good deal. I think I did certainly my share of entertaining, probably more. At that time my wife was not living with me in Ottawa. We did not have any formal separation yet, but although she was living most of the time in Washington, she would come up periodically and stay for a while. I would try to arrange my entertaining so she could be there. I'd give a dinner or something or a reception and she was there. It was an apartment that was big enough to do a good bit of entertaining and I certainly did. As far as the food, it was very good. One advantage I had that I told you about. Our Embassy on Wellington Street, right across from the Houses of Parliament. Well, right next door to the Embassy was an old and distinguished club, a men's club. Ah! Shock and horror. But, it was a very old traditional club and they had very good meals there. Of course, if one were a diplomat one could join without paying the enormous initiation fees that other less-favored people would have to pay. Another advantage that I had was that I made some very good friends among my colleagues in other Embassies. One was my counterpart from the Spanish Embassy. We still correspond, and I have visited him in Spain. Now he's actually head of their Geneva office, the Spanish Government's Mission to the United Nations Agencies in Geneva. Anyway, we got to be quite good friends. The same was true of my Argentine counterpart. It turned out I had known the Chilean Ambassador when he was the Chilean Ambassador to LAFTA, Latin American Free Trade Association in Montevideo, Ambassador Silva Davidson. We were friends already, so I was immediately welcomed at the Chilean Embassy, to all their major parties and receptions. The European Common Market representative and I got to be very good friends. We could all support each other and help each other. We were all looking at the same thing, trying to overcome Canada's remaining trade restrictions. Canada is not as bad as some countries, but as I mentioned before, they were very clever and very innovative and very efficient in trying to find new and sneaky ways to protect this or that industry. So, we were all looking at these things and exchanging ideas. There's one thing I suddenly remember now, just from talking about that period. There is one thing that kind of illustrates the difference between the culture of the United States and the Latins. My Spanish friend and I would be walking down the street, going to lunch or coming from lunch. Now, in Spain, and in some Latin American countries, it's the custom for men to link arms when they're walking down the street talking to each other. Just link arms. He would link arms with me and I always felt very uncomfortable with this, but tried not to show it. We just don't do that here, of course.

Q: I do remember that custom.

WILLIAMS: I remember trying my best not to let him see that this made me a little uncomfortable.

Q: That you wanted to unhook?

WILLIAMS: Yes. I think he didn't realize that that really was, for me, a strange custom.

Q: Yes. I do remember that. I can remember walking with my daughter, 'cause people didn't

know that. I was aware of the arm linking. I guess I was more aware of women.

WILLIAMS: I've just never run into that since. Anyway, that was just a little interesting sidelight on differences in culture.

Q: *That was in Ottawa?*

WILLIAMS: In Ottawa, yeah.

Q: *On the streets of Madrid would be one thing. The streets of Ottawa would be another. I'm thinking about your two comments, that South American friends would have been very grateful for your language, the wonderful language ability in Canada.*

WILLIAMS: Most of them did speak pretty good English. Speaking of language ability, that was a good tour of duty for me, for among other reasons, I sort of re-learned French. I had studied French in college for only a year and I never had much occasion, except on short visits to France, to practice the language. But, when I went to Canada, of course, there were news broadcasts and other broadcasts too, at any hour of the day or night in French. So, I used to listen, especially in the morning. I always got the morning news on the French channel on the radio or T.V. So I got to where I could speak French reasonably well. It came in handy. One incident I recall was when the Foreign Ministry was sending a new Consul General to Atlanta. He was a French Canadian. I was invited to his departure lunch. Everybody at the table, including the English Canadians, spoke French because, let me tell you, the Canadian Government was getting really tough on making sure that everybody was at least taking lessons in both languages. There was not so much a problem with the French Canadians, because most of them spoke English, but not very many of the English Canadians, spoke French, so they were the ones who were feeling the pressure. But, anyway, we would be sitting with 16 or 18 people around a lunch table and everybody would be speaking French, so I just had to speak French too. That was a very good experience.

Q: *That's amazing. Another question, not necessarily about language. Thinking about all of you from different countries wanting to increase the chances for trade with your own country, between your own country and Canada, how did you keep from being their competitive? How does this work?*

WILLIAMS: We did have a sense of being competitive, but I think our collegial interest in breaking down Canadian trade barriers was stronger than any competitiveness unless there happened to be a particular question of a particular product at a particular time. It seldom came up that there was that much competition between us and, say, the European Communities over a particular product at a particular time; so we managed to avoid most of the competitiveness. I'm sure that it was in the background of everybody's thinking. I think that we felt in the long run the advantages of breaking down Canadian trade barriers would be much greater than worrying about our own specific problems of the moment.

Q: *About who got what share of the market?*

WILLIAMS: Yes. I think we all were sophisticated enough to realize that you can't predict

who's going to get what share of the market. It's hard even to predict in any particular product, much less overall. Lowering trade barriers is to everyone's advantage to some extent. Let's suppose we break down a Canadian trade barrier and we increase our exports for that reason by a hundred million dollars a year and the Europeans increase their exports by two hundred million dollars a year. That doesn't mean we've lost a hundred million dollars. It means that we have just for one reason or another not been able to take as much advantage as the Europeans did. But, there are people who feel that in a situation like that, we have lost. Well, we didn't lose. You see, the problem I have is that going to Yale and getting that M.A. degree in economics destroyed my ability to believe utter nonsense.

Q: Right. I was thinking as you were talking about trade and how it works. How did your formal training and your experience at the post, how did all that fit together and make you a better or worse diplomat?

WILLIAMS: Well, I think it really helped a great deal. At the Embassy in Ottawa, we use to do a lot of purely economic reporting. That is reporting on the state of the Canadian economy and where we thought it was going over the next six months, a year, two years. We did some pretty good work – we had some good economists there. I was not personally involved in writing or drafting up the major economic reports. I contributed to them, because we had other people whose main job was that. My main job was looking out specifically for trade, rather than analyzing the economy. However, I did get a chance to read and clear the reports, so I would make sure that my point of view was reflected in them, including my thoughts on where the economy was going. This was reflected in the reports. You're familiar with the Conference Board in New York?

Q: Somewhat.

WILLIAMS: They are a think-tank that does economic analysis of the United States economy and the impact of other economies on ours. They use to call us and ask, "What do you guys think?" They were doing their periodic reports. I thought that was pretty good, when the Conference Board calls you instead of you calling the them. I think that indicates that you are doing a pretty good job.

Q: After all, you were in the field, you were there.

WILLIAMS: Yes. I was there and I was contributing to the reports.

Q: But not there just for your health, but because you were doing a good job. You had the theory and the knowledge to go along with the protocol and diplomatic scene.

WILLIAMS: Oh sure. I remember when Larry Curtis, Governor Curtis was the Ambassador there. He use to take me along when he would go to talk to groups of business men or economists or whatever. One time we went down to Pittsburgh – he was making a speech there which I drafted for him. He went over it and made some suggestions, but I basically drafted the speech for him. A lot of the audience were senior American business people in Pittsburgh: CEO's of the major corporations that are based in or have major operations in or around

Pittsburgh.

Q: I'm thinking steel or coal?

WILLIAMS: No. It was Pittsburgh Plate Glass, Westinghouse and ... I forget them all now, but they included Bethlehem Steel, not far from Pittsburgh. Curtis really made an effort there to help boost U.S.-Canadian trade or U.S. exports to Canada. He explained to these guys that Canada was the major area where they had a better chance of increasing exports and what would be the best ways to go about it. He told them that we were there in Ottawa to help, and they should come to us if they needed any assistance, such as getting appointments with the right people in the Canadian government or in Canadian industry and so on. So, I would go around with the Ambassador and back him up on these occasions. While I was in Canada I concluded that I would retire from the Service, take early retirement. I had been in Ottawa a couple of years and I was inquiring around the Department of State as to what my next assignment might be, hoping that I would maybe get a Deputy Chief of Mission job at some Embassy or even maybe an Ambassadorial assignment in some smaller Embassy somewhere, but it became apparent that for whatever reason that the Department of State had no thought of assigning me to such a job.

I had been hoping that my next assignment would not be merely doing once again what I had been doing during this assignment. But that was what they seemed to be thinking about for me, sending me as their economic or commercial counselor to some other Embassy. For a long time I had had in the back of mind the idea of going back to graduate school and get a doctorate and have a second career at teaching. So, eventually I decided that was what I was going to do. Just take early retirement. I had been in close to twenty-seven years. I was calculating that that much time would give me a reasonable pension. So, I decided that was what I would do. I wrote to the Graduate School here at the University of North Carolina, thinking that since I had a Masters Degree from here, there wouldn't be any question about them admitting me to Grad School; but, boy, was I in for a surprise. They said, "You got to take the Graduate Record Examination." I found the GRE was being given only once more before the date when they had to have my application complete with GRE scores, well before August, 1981, if I was going to be admitted. So, I went over to McGill University and took the GRE on one week's notice. I had no problem with it, (scored about 1250 – nothing exceptional) but still it was an interesting experience.

Q: That's not a lot of notice to cram.

WILLIAMS: No, it's not a lot of notice for the GRE.

Q: It would seem a strange exercise to say the least, I would say it, to have to do that.

WILLIAMS: To have to do that when one already has two Master's Degrees, including one from the University to which one is now applying ... But, when I got those other two degrees I never had to take the GRE. I don't know whether it even existed when I went to graduate school in '51 at Carolina. They didn't even mention it when I was admitted to Yale under the Department of State program.

Q: Yale wouldn't be quite good enough for Carolina? Carolina can't uphold its standards and so

forth.

WILLIAMS: So, I did retire out of Ottawa. I retired on a Friday afternoon and on the Monday morning I was registering in Grad School here at Carolina.

Q: *That was fast.*

WILLIAMS: Well, I arranged it that way so there would not be any major gaps. I had come down previously and rented an apartment and so on. I'd come down actually for my thirtieth class reunion in 1980. I was in the class of 1950. So, in 1980 they had a thirtieth reunion so I came down for that and I started looking around to see which of my old professors might be able to recommend me. There were several still around then. They're gone now I'm afraid, most of them.

Q: *As you were leaving Canada and making the shift southward, what were some of your thoughts about leaving and your post there, the good, the bad, any different?*

WILLIAMS: The good, the bad and the ugly?

Q: *Yeah, all of that.*

WILLIAMS: Well, I thought on one hand, it's a pity that I'm not going to have a chance to go forward in the Foreign Service, because I thought I'd really done a terrific job in Auckland as Consul General. I thought I had done certainly as good a job as anyone was likely to do in Ottawa, which as I mentioned, is the capital of our largest trading partner, by far. I was in charge of all U.S. Government commercial activities in Canada, and thought I did a pretty good job. I thought I was ready to do something bigger, and I was disappointed that the Department of State apparently, did not share my opinion. But, on the other hand, I had had a brief stint at teaching before when I was in Grad School in '53-'54, just before I went to work for the government. I'd always thought that it would be really good to get a Ph.D and to teach for a while. So, I thought, that's a new opportunity. In the Foreign Service, I got into the "tour of duty" idea. You serve several years in one place, that's your "tour of duty," and you move on to another one – something different, something new, something challenging. I figured that this was going to be a challenge, not like any challenge that I had faced before, recently. Yes, of course there was my academic experience during the year at Yale. I think I told you that was my toughest year in the Foreign Service, in one sense at least. But it was a challenge. So, I thought, this is going to be interesting, and indeed it was interesting.

RICHARD J. SMITH
Canada Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1978-1980)

Deputy Chief of Mission
Ottawa (1980-1983)

Richard J. Smith was born in Connecticut in 1932. He graduated from the University of Connecticut in 1955. He served in the U.S. Coast Guard from 1954-1958 and entered the Foreign Service in 1962. His career included positions in Japan, Sweden, Canada, Germany, Poland, Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and Malta. Mr. Smith was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on July 30, 1996.

SMITH: At which point I was asked to take over as the country director for Canada, a job that I filled from 1978 to 1980. I have no clue as to where that assignment came from. I had never served in Canada. I went in without any preconceived notions about Canada, I guess would be the best way to put it. I worked for Deputy Assistant of State Richard Vine, who was an old Canada hand, so he was able to bring me along. After I got used to it, I enjoyed working in that relationship very much.

Q: In a way, our relationship with Canada is one of the most complex ones that we have anywhere.

SMITH: Yes, absolutely. I couldn't agree with you more. There's more going on in that relationship, there are more things happening across the board that affect people in the United States than probably in any other relationship we have.

What I found fascinating was the way we've developed a theory of that relationship, which has served us well and is quite different from the way we relate to most other countries. Because of the intensity and the range of relations with Canada, we've basically decided that you can't engage in niggling trade-offs between one issue and another. You have to look at the relationship as a whole and put a value on it. And when you have an issue that is so difficult that you can't resolve it quickly (as you often do in the US-Canadian relationship), rather than making it a cause celebre, you try to manage it. You find a way to keep it from blowing up and affecting other aspects of the relationship, because once you've started that, with a relationship this complex and dense, the whole thing would unravel. If you started saying, "If you don't do this for us in area X, we won't do this for you in area Y," they'd come at us in a couple of other areas.

I contrast that with what I see now with regard to Japan-almost an enthusiasm for making issues more intense and more of a problem than they need to be, in order to exert leverage on other positions. I frankly think the way we manage our relationship with Canada should be an example of how two countries with a big relationship can effectively get along together.

Q: What was your impression of the Canadians? One of the themes that runs through many of the interviews when Canada is touched on is how the Canadians always play "Poor little us and big you, you've got to be nice to us." This theme is attempted at least to be played to a fare-thee-well. In many ways, the Canadians, along with the French, are probably our most difficult people to negotiate with.

SMITH: They're not easy people to negotiate with. They know their interests, they press them hard, they do their homework, and they're very competent in what they do. Also, you have a disparity there. For the United States, although the Canadian relationship is important, we have

lots of important relationships, and we spread ourselves around. We have a fairly small presence. When I was director of Canadian affairs in State, my office had about five or six people; whereas the Canadians devote a huge portion of their time and effort toward working with us, because the United States is the major relationship for them.

Q: I'm sure they wouldn't have as their director of United States Affairs somebody who had never served there.

SMITH: No, they wouldn't. Not likely. And they'd have lots more people working on the relationship.

But although they are difficult sometimes, and they do sometimes play the poor Canada card, or try to, my experience with them has been quite positive. They're tough negotiators, but suitably tough. If you're fair and open with them, as I have been-and I've had a lot of opportunities to negotiate with Canadians-you have, on balance, a productive and not unpleasant experience, once you get used to working with them.

We had a lot of environmental issues, such as pollution of the Great Lakes, where we had to cooperate in cleaning them up. There's a whole series of issues concerning trans-boundary waters.

We deal with Canada through a dense array of mechanisms. There's the International Joint Commission, which works on water issues. There's the Joint Board on Defense, where we deal with defense issues. And there's a constant series of other meetings and forums, where we're dealing with various issues.

The job of the Canadian desk is to try to orchestrate (at least keep track of) what's going on and try to make sure that we're doing the things that have the highest priorities. The Secretaries of State make a point of going to Canada fairly regularly. Cy Vance went up a couple of times in my years to spend a day or two in Canada going through these issues. We give good and appropriately high-level attention to Canada, and I think the relationship benefits from that. Basically, it's been a very good relationship for us.

Q: At this time, we're talking about '78-'79ish, was anybody raising the issue of whither Canada, because of Quebec?

SMITH: Yes.

Q: This has always struck me as being one of those things that you've got to think about, although if the Canadians find out you're thinking about it, it can get played up and turned into something.

SMITH: In 1980, Rene Levesque, who was the premier of Quebec at the time and has since died, called a referendum on "sovereignty association." There's always been ambiguity in the relationship between Quebec and the rest of Canada. There are two different founding people, who have never really resolved what their relationship should be. Quebec feels that it is an island

of French language and French culture in the sea of English Canada, with which they don't share a lot of cultural similarities, and yet they recognize the advantages of being part of a broader country, and they like many things about Canada. So there is tension. Even a separatist party like Rene Levesque's Parti Québécois based its referendum, not on independence, but on sovereignty association. The difference between those terms is significant because in order to have a chance of generating a majority vote, at least up until now-and things may be changing-separatist politicians in Quebec have had to say, "Well, sort of independence, but not quite. We'll still use the Canadian dollar, and we'll have close association." And in many ways, the rest of Canada, more and more, has been saying, "That's not the way it goes. You're in or you're out."

The recent referendum was much, much closer. The one in 1980 they lost about 40-60. This last one was within a percentage point or two. And there is a real prospect that the next one could result in some sort of an independent status for Quebec, or at least a move toward it. So that issue has run through Canada's history. But it is evolving in a way that makes it a very serious issue, and one that I hope the people who are working in Canadian affairs now are paying a lot of attention to.

Q: When you were there, were you even, maybe in the afternoon bull session or something, talking about what would happen if Quebec became independent?

SMITH: Oh, sure, of course, we talked about that.

Q: What were the thoughts then?

SMITH: On balance, it was felt that it wouldn't be a disaster for the United States, certainly. An independent Quebec would probably develop good relations with the United States. There's no reason why it wouldn't. It would be complicating. We've got a lot of agreements with Canada that would come into question. Defense arrangements where we have defense facilities on Quebec soil, what happens to them? Would Quebec have the same kind of relationship as Canada has as a partner in NORAD, the North American Air Defense arrangement, and sit with us in the headquarters of that operation? What would be Quebec's role in NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) now, for example? Would they come in as a full partner?

Q: But, of course, at that time, there wasn't a NAFTA.

SMITH: There was no NAFTA at that time. But the issue is the same: What would our relationship with Quebec be? Would they be as free-trade oriented as the broader Canada is? Or would they be more protectionist? And how would that affect our relations, our trade and investment in Quebec? Would we be as comfortable having as high a level of investment in Quebec as we have now, if it were independent and not part of a broader Canadian market? How would that market evolve?

I guess the bottom line is that we saw lots of uncertainties and things that we were not quite sure how they would work out. But we had no reason to believe then that if Quebec did become independent, it would be antagonistic to the United States.

Q: At that time, anyway, there was no particular reason to develop contingency plans or anything like that.

SMITH: Not really. We were predicting the result. I felt that there was not enough support in Quebec to carry even this weak sovereignty association referendum, and that they would lose substantially. And, indeed, they did.

A new situation has been created now, a different result than that referendum and a different kind of leadership. Levesque was charismatic in his own way, but Bouchard, who is now the premier of Quebec, is a more effective politician and a more determined person in terms of bringing Quebec to independence. Levesque had, I felt, some personal misgivings about how far he wanted to go, which I don't think Bouchard has.

Q: Did you have any feeling while you were on the desk about the Canadian government at the time? Who was prime minister?

SMITH: The prime minister for most of the time was Pierre Trudeau. Joe Clark was in for about eight months.

Q: But it was really the end of the Trudeau period, wasn't it?

SMITH: He lost the election to Clark in May 1979, and about eight months later, he was back in for several years. So his era was briefly interrupted, and then he was back until 1983.

Q: You were doing the Canadian desk from when to when?

SMITH: I was doing the Canadian desk from 1978 to 1980. Then I went up to Ottawa and became deputy chief of mission at our embassy there from 1980 to 1983.

Q: While you were on the Canadian desk, what were you getting, again the new boy on the block, about Pierre Trudeau? Because Pierre Trudeau was again, like Palme, somebody who could talk our language, yet at the same time, he was an intellectual and had pursued his own course.

SMITH: Yes. He, like Palme, considered himself, and was considered by others, to be a significant intellectual and a thinker. He was not the usual sort of politician. He was rather critical of the United States.

As I said about Sweden earlier, popular opinion in Canada is strongly favorable toward the United States, so that, although a politician may be, on the margins, critical of the United States, there is nothing in it for him to run an anti-US campaign. He's going to lose on the national level in Canada because Canada is not anti-US. But Trudeau didn't mind tweaking and annoying the United States; in fact, he kind of enjoyed it.

Q: Were there any major issues while you were on the Desk?

SMITH: Yes, there were a lot of significant issues.

The most contentious issue, which evolved over the next 10 years and in which I was involved throughout that period, was the acid rain question. Canada had come to the conclusion that its lakes were being acidified and losing the ability to sustain fish and other life. Their forests were also being damaged to some degree by acid rain, which resulted largely from the sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide coming from industrial and power plant emissions in the United States. It came from the US to Canada because the prevailing winds went that way. And you also had the fact that the Canadian shield, the rock that underlies much of eastern Canada, is less capable of absorbing and neutralizing acids than the soil south of that in the United States. So for those two reasons, they felt that they were getting the short end of the stick and that they were not getting enough attention on this issue from the United States. They were banging on our door rather regularly, saying we had to do something about this problem.

The issue was politically sensitive in the United States, because the higher-sulfur coals that were in part the cause of this problem were mined in Appalachia, whereas the lower-sulfur coals that could be substituted for them were largely surface-mined in the West. Any measures to shift away from high-sulfur coals to lower-sulfur coals would be disruptive of the economy in Appalachia, which already had its problems, and would be politically controversial.

We were not anxious to get involved in this, and we took the position, "Well, we really don't know enough; we've got to take a hard look at this; you've raised an interesting question." We put together something called the NAPAP (National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program), which ran for ten years and spent hundreds of millions of dollars before it came out with its results at the end of the 1980s.

There was a real imbalance, with Canada jumping up and down and saying, "You know, this is the litmus test of our relationship. We need your understanding and help in resolving this problem," and the US saying, "Well, maybe there's a problem. Let's look at it. Let's not rush into this."

Q: What was your feeling personally? Did you feel that there was a major problem?

SMITH: I felt there might be. I wasn't convinced; I saw the benefit of some further research. But I felt that we probably should be looking for some balance between finding out more, so that what we did made sense and solved the problem, and doing it expeditiously enough so that a problem that might already exist didn't just get worse for too long a period. So I felt that was where the area for compromise lay between the United States and Canada, and we needed to explore it.

The other major issue was the East Coast maritime boundary. In the early part of my time as country director, we were negotiating a boundary. The two countries and other countries around the world had declared a 200-mile exclusive economic zone, and you had to take the interval from the edge of the territorial water-this varied from 3 to 12 miles depending on the country-to the 200-mile limit and figure out where the boundary ran through that zone. And there was one such boundary of major importance in the Gulf of Maine, which went through some of the

world's richest fisheries.

We negotiated hard with Canada. We brought in Lloyd Cutler, a high-powered Washington lawyer, to head our negotiating team. Some people thought that might help. Ultimately, he did come to an agreement. But because of the nature of the agreement, I felt from the beginning, and told him, that it was unlikely that we could get it through the Senate.

Indeed, we signed the agreement but failed to get Senate ratification. We had virtually no support in the Senate for it. When Ed Muskie was made Secretary of State, I was happy because I thought he would make a wonderful Secretary of State, but I also was concerned that we were losing our one supporter on his committee in the Senate for the Gulf of Maine solution. So, ultimately, the issue had to be referred to a panel of the World Court, which resolved it basically by splitting the difference.

But that was a very significant part of the relationship during that time. It was a very sore point in US-Canadian relations, in part because Allan Gottlieb, the senior career person in their foreign office (the Office of External Affairs), felt burned by the fact that we had negotiated this agreement and then couldn't get it ratified. He soon became ambassador to the United States. He deeply resented the fact that we had negotiated the agreement and signed it without getting the political support we needed for ratification. So that created some bad feeling in the relationship.

Q: What was the major issue in that agreement?

SMITH: There are various ways of approaching the boundary issue in the 200-mile zone. One is that you make the boundary a line equidistant from the shorelines of the two countries. The Law of the Sea agreement and tradition, however, permit the consideration of special circumstances. For example, on the Grand Banks, where we have a major fishery, there's a bottom configuration that indicates the line should follow an underwater canyon and go a little bit more toward Canada than toward us. Canada didn't feel that was appropriate. The World Court eventually came up with an agreement that gave something to each position, basically splitting the difference.

Q: Was it mainly fishing interests?

SMITH: It was fishing interests, yes.

Q: I'm told the fishing interests in both countries have a tremendous stake in matters.

SMITH: Oh, yes. No question.

Q: Was there ever any thought of the fishermen getting together from both countries?

SMITH: Well, there were fisheries, and then there were potential oil interests, since there might have been oil under everything. So Lloyd Cutler tried to come up with an agreement that would include, in addition to drawing a line, some sort of a condominium arrangement involving the oil resources. We were never able to contemplate that with regard to fisheries. The fisheries interests in both countries, maybe in all countries, are very tough and very nationalistic. It is not easy to

reach compromises on fisheries issues. Ultimately, the arrangement that Lloyd Cutler put together, which included the drawing of a line and arrangements for a minerals condominium that would share resources, collapsed. And that's why we had to go to the World Court in order to get it resolved.

Q: Next time, we'll pick it up in 1980.

Q: Today is the 9th of August 1996. Dick, let's start

SMITH: We have talked through my career up to 1980. I was then country director for Canada in the State Department. In the summer of 1980, after I'd been two years on the desk, the election was coming up.

Q: You're talking about the American election.

SMITH: Yes. A new US ambassador had gone to Canada, Ken Curtis, who had been governor of Maine. I was asked to go up as the deputy chief of mission, which I did in the summer of 1980. I served as the deputy to Curtis until he left on January 20, 1981, due to the results of the election. Then I was the chargé from January of 1981 through July of 1981, until the new ambassador was appointed. That was Paul Robinson.

Q: When you went up with Curtis, did you have the feeling, because of the election timetable, no matter who was elected, that this probably was a short-term thing?

SMITH: Well, no. For me, I figured it would be a normal tour, in any case. If the Democrats won, I assumed Ken Curtis, who hadn't been there very long, would probably stay on. And if he didn't, there would be another ambassador. I assumed there would be at least a period during which I would overlap with any new ambassador, so I went up with the expectation that it would be pretty much of a full tour.

Q: When you arrived in Canada, although you'd been the desk officer, and, obviously, you'd been in Canada, but this was your first time sitting there, viewing it from Ottawa. What was the state of Canadian-American relations when you got there?

SMITH: They were quite good.

The issue of acid rain was heating up. But looking at the whole range of US-Canadian issues—there were the usual set of irritations—you'd find that the relationship was in quite good shape.

Joe Clark, who was Prime Minister briefly from June 4, 1979, to February of 1980, was a Conservative and felt very close to the United States. We had a good relationship with his government.

After Pierre Trudeau came back, in October of 1980 the Canadians came up with a National Energy Program in which they asserted what they called a crown interest in existing investments in oil exploration projects, many of which involved US companies. That caused the relationship

to get more tense, because there were a lot of American companies that felt that what was happening amounted to expropriation without compensation. And our government basically agreed with them. So there was a very difficult time that lasted for a couple of years in that second Trudeau administration .

Q: What sparked this initiative on the part of the Trudeau government?

SMITH: One can speculate. I think that there was a feeling that the center, Ottawa and the Trudeau government, wanted to reassert its authority over some of the oil-rich provinces like Alberta, which were benefiting from these investments and establishing their own relationships internationally. I think it was sort of a federalist thrust. Also, there was money involved, and there was a general feeling on the part of some of the people who were running Trudeau's energy policy that the Canadian government needed to get inserted more into that area.

Q: What happened as far as American companies were concerned? What was the impact?

SMITH: Basically, the impact was that if you had an investment that was majority-owned by Americans, the crown would assert a twenty-percent ownership in that project, without any compensation. And the US side was very upset about it. The Secretary of the Treasury came up, and there was a series of very difficult discussions between the two governments.

The way it worked out was interesting. The Canadians had picked a peculiarly bad time to do this, because, in effect, they were moving from equity financing to debt financing of their oil sector. They were backing out equity and depending more on bank financing. And they were doing it at a time when interest rates were skyrocketing. If you remember, they got up to almost 19 percent, so it was very painful financially for some of the major Canadian companies. By the end of a couple of years, I think Canada recognized not only that they were affecting the relationship with the United States, but they were causing some unnecessary pain to their own industry. So they eased off and backed away from that policy. And relationships got back on an even keel.

Q: From the embassy point of view, how did we combat this?

SMITH: Of course, there were lots of demarches and private conversations. But I also undertook to write some letters to the editor and to do some speaking in Canada during that period, explaining the US position. I think that was helpful, and we did get the word out on our concern.

Q: How did the Canadian Finance Ministry and others respond? Were they understanding? Basically hostile? Was this sticking it to the Americans?

SMITH: They didn't react hostilely to what I was doing in carrying the message. I don't think they were particularly happy with the way we were doing it. But it was a situation where neither side was particularly happy. And we were probably less happy, because we perceived ourselves to be the aggrieved party, so that there were concerns on both sides that needed to play out.

Another element of tension in the relationship then was the Gulf of Maine maritime boundary, on

which we had tried to negotiate. (I talked a little bit about that at our previous session.) We finally had to go to a panel of the World Court to resolve that dispute. That took place in the early 1980s.

Q: What were the sticking points on the boundary agreement?

SMITH: As we discussed earlier, the boundary agreement was mainly a fishing issue. The boundary line runs through one of the richest fishing grounds in the world, the banks off the east coast of the United States and Canada. Also, there was the potential that there would be hydrocarbon oil resources under the water.

Q: When something is referred to the World Court, isn't the expectation that they're going to split the difference?

SMITH: It was our expectation. And they did. It was the sort of solution that we should have been able to reach on our own. But, in a way, I suppose it's easier for governments to accept the World Court's splitting the difference than having their own negotiators agree to do it.

Q: What about the Quebec separation issue? Was that much during this time?

SMITH: As we discussed earlier, that was very much an issue at that time. As you may recall, a referendum took place in 1980, shortly before I went up there, on the issue of what was called sovereignty association for Quebec. It lost by a 40-60 split. But the issue never goes away; it has been there since the founding of Canada.

Q: Did you find you wanted to be very careful, representing our embassy, to stay the hell out of it?

SMITH: That certainly was our policy, and we had to be very careful in how we talked about that. Both the Canadians and the Québécois were anxious to get us on record with any kind of a statement that could be viewed as favorable to them. Our policy then, and I think now, was one of neutrality leaning towards a united Canada. What we would say was that we would regret seeing this great democracy split up, but that this was a matter for Canadians, not Americans, to decide. It was a neutral position, but with a gloss on it that made it clear that we would not welcome seeing Canada split.

Q: How did Ambassador Curtis operate?

SMITH: He's a very outgoing and ebullient politician. Everybody who knows him likes him and reacts strongly to him. He was very well thought of in Canada. Being a former governor from Maine, he knew Canada and he understood Canadian issues.

Q: Did he feel a bit lame-duckish most of the time there?

SMITH: No, up until the election in November, he thought that Jimmy Carter would win. So he didn't feel lame-duckish then. Of course, after the election, he did. He told me that he wanted to

be out of Canada by noon on the 20th of January. He did not want to be there when the new president assumed office. Governor Curtis was, of course, a national politician, too. He had been chairman of the Democratic National Committee briefly in the 1970s.

Q: What about Canada and foreign affairs during this time? You were there from when to when?

SMITH: I was there from 1980 to 1983.

Q: Canada is involved in peacekeeping. This was the early Reagan years. How did we view their role in the world?

SMITH: Reagan was not as sympathetic a figure in Canada as Carter had been. Although the relationship was in good shape, the Canadians don't feel as warmly toward conservative politicians in the United States as they do toward liberal ones.

With regard to foreign policy, however, their interests and ours are broadly shared. They are fellow members of NATO. They pride themselves in taking a somewhat independent position. And that's often helpful for us because they can make proposals and explore issues that it might be awkward for us, as a great power, to pursue.

On the other hand, there are strains in some areas. We would prefer, for example, that they weren't as close and forthcoming with regard to Cuba as they are. Vietnam, of course, was over by the time I was there. They were never sympathetic toward our role there.

But on most foreign affairs issues, most of the time we were quite close. They're very sensitive about being consulted. If we wanted their vote in the UN on some issue, or if we wanted their support in some matter that was being discussed with the EU or within NATO, we were much more likely to get it, and they felt much better about giving it, if we had talked to them. So I did a lot of demarching on foreign policy issues. I would get sent to talk to the people at the External Affairs Ministry about what we were doing and what we hoped they would support us on. There was a lot of discussion of foreign affairs with Canada through that period.

Q: When did the story break about the Canadian role in helping the six Americans escape from Iran after the hostages were taken?

SMITH: It broke in January of 1980, when I was on the Canada desk. Canada's assistance with the escape of the six Americans was quite a boost for US-Canadian relations. The warmth of feeling that came out of that was tremendous. I remember it very vividly. Later, there was a ceremony at the State Department for Ken Taylor, who was the Canadian in charge of their embassy in Iran at the time the escape occurred. Ken Taylor himself is a delightful, open person. When I was chargé, he was making the rounds, making speeches and talking to groups. I sometimes got involved with that, so that's how I got to know him.

Q: Were you chargé while the Reagan administration was coming in?

SMITH: Yes, for about seven months.

Q: Here was Ronald Reagan (whom every Canadian had seen in movies and who was probably hard to take seriously) talking almost extreme rightist rhetoric. Did you find yourself, as the American representative, trying to put the best face on it, or at least going around and saying, "Look, this man is serious, he's our President, don't judge a book by its cover," or what have you?

SMITH: Sure, there was some of that. The situation was helped very early in his administration because, within the first seven months of his presidency, when I was chargé, he visited Canada twice. His first state visit was to Canada, which is typical for US presidents. He came in early March, slightly more than a month after he was inaugurated, for a very successful state visit. The Canadians, as do Americans, react very well to President Reagan on a personal level. In person, he has a charm that is not lost on anybody. And then he came back in late June or July for the Ottawa-hosted G-7 economic summit meeting, which again was a very good experience in terms of introducing Reagan and getting Canadians familiar with him. I think his two visits within that first six months made a big difference and were very helpful.

Q: Did you get any feeling from Reagan or his entourage about how they felt about Canada?

SMITH: Yes, they all expressed, and their actions showed, that they viewed Canada as important. That's why he scheduled his first state visit there. He wanted that relationship to be good.

I remember when the advance team was up there. Michael Deaver and I were visiting the governor general's house, and I showed him the tree that Kennedy had planted on a visit early in his administration, spraining his back in the process. And Deaver said, "Well, you don't have to worry about this president. He really does plant trees. So he can do it without any trouble." And then at the G-7 summit, which was held at a resort advertised as the world's largest log cabin- outside of Ottawa on the Quebec side of the Ottawa River- the Canadians actually put in a store of logs for the President to chop, if he chose to do it. I don't know whether he actually did.

He did create a considerable amount of warmth in the relationship by those visits.

Q: At the embassy in Ottawa, were you always discovering relationships between American and Canadian bodies, regional or national, that you would find out about ex post facto and have to clean up?

SMITH: Absolutely. The nature of the relationship is that there is a tremendous amount of activity in relationships between state and local officials all across the border, and between organizations of different kinds. And you have to recognize in Ottawa that the most you can do in that regard is try to keep track of them as best you can. You can't really orchestrate or manage those relationships. And you shouldn't try. They're very healthy. So, yes, I did find out a lot of interesting things that were going on, after the fact. And I would try to learn enough about them so I could be helpful.

Another characteristic of the relationship (I called it direct-dial diplomacy) is that because

Ottawa is geographically close to Washington and is in the same time zone, there's an awful lot of direct telephone communication between interested agencies. And there are a lot of interested agencies in Canada and in Washington. You're in a position to be perhaps more of a player in the policy of Washington toward Canada than you would be in most other countries, because you were in touch. And you could easily go back to Washington, and Washington officials could come up to Ottawa, so there was a tremendous amount of traveling back and forth between Ottawa and Washington.

Q: What was the role of the consulates?

SMITH: They were very busy with consular work. It's little known, but Toronto is one of, if not *the* busiest consular post in the world, with tremendous visa work done for people from all over the world who come into Canada and then want to go to the United States. It makes the operation there quite complex. And this is true of the other posts in Canada, too. You have people coming from everywhere, so that getting the documents you need and the right kind of a picture of who they are and what decisions you should be making is much, much harder. The consulates were all very important in their regions, and Canada is such a regional country. Vancouver is very different from Halifax. The consuls general, I think, did represent America. The distances are great enough so that people from the embassy weren't there that often. I had to write the evaluations on all the consuls general, so I tried to get around at least once or twice a year for a brief visit and to keep in touch with them. But they very much acted as independent centers of the US presence. In all cases, the United States had senior consuls general who played a strong role.

Q: Were there any minor issues that came up? Not like boundaries or oil policy, but people getting into trouble or some crises that came up at the time?

SMITH: Not anything out of the ordinary. There are always people problems across the border, but these were well handled and well managed by very strong and competent consular posts throughout Canada, running from Halifax to Vancouver. There were seven or eight posts across the country at that time, and each of them had its own regional emphasis, and dealt with the problems of the region. But there was no major people problem that I can recall.

People were concerned about lots of border issues involving pollution of waters, flowing one direction or the other. You were constantly having a lot of issues like that in play.

As I noted earlier, the Secretaries of State made a point of visiting Canada at least twice a year, for a day or a two. In every case, they would have a huge briefing book, and go over literally dozens of issues that had to be discussed, even briefly, in order to keep the relationship covered and dealt with appropriately.

Q: What about the perennial problem (which the Canadians see as a problem and we never have) of cultural dominance from the south?

SMITH: Yes, this is a great concern in Canada. The one thing, as an American, you don't want to say there is, "You're just like Americans." That is not considered a compliment in Canada. They

define their own identity in terms of their differences from the United States. They consider Canada a kinder, gentler place than the United States. They're very proud of their welfare programs and of their less aggressive approach to life. They're concerned about the encroachment of US culture. And that was one of the sources of a lot of the issues that we had to discuss. For example, there was an issue concerning Time magazine and its operation in Canada, which the Canadians eased out in favor of Maclean's magazine, which is printed in Toronto. There were also issues involving radio signals. They would try to keep out our signals, or at least try to delete the commercials from the United States. That was a big and difficult problem for a while.

In general, they are always sensitive about being dominated by or overwhelmed by American culture. They recognize that almost everything in the relationship is on a ratio of ten to one. Their population is one-tenth of ours. Wherever you go, there is that kind of relationship, so that there is this, perhaps inevitable, sensitivity that's always there in Canada.

Q: How did you deal with this sort of thing?

SMITH: You just tried to be nice and say that we recognized their concerns, but at the same time, we needed to insist on a certain fairness in the way Americans were treated and American industries were treated, and emphasize that the Canadian identity was certainly robust enough to handle the flow back and forth.

Q: Who took Curtis's place?

SMITH: He was replaced by Paul Robinson, who was a financier in Chicago and a fund raiser in Illinois for Reagan.

Q: How did he fit in?

SMITH: He was a very different sort of personality. He knew Canada, and he traveled there. But he came out of the private sector, and he was new to diplomacy. He was very vigorous and robust in the way he approached people and issues, and outspoken, which can be a benefit, I guess, but also, from time to time, would cause a little bit of a stir. He took some getting used to for Canadians. They found him rather jarring at first.

To use just one example, he was giving an interview in Toronto while he was visiting there. An editor from the *Toronto Star* asked him some question that he didn't particularly like, and he said, "Shove off, kid." And the headline in the next day's Toronto Star was: SHOVE OFF, SAYS AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO TORONTO STAR. Ambassador Robinson loved that; he thought that was terrific. And he had little buttons made up that said, "Shove off." That gives you a flavor of his personality.

Although there was an initial strain because of his style and approach, that eased. And when you got to know him, he was a very nice, fun loving man. I think the Canadians actually were growing quite fond of him a few years later, when it was time for him to leave.

Q: This was a new administration, coming from a different sector of the political spectrum. Did you sense a difference in the way the Reagan administration was going to approach Canada?

SMITH: I think it changed as the years went by, but, initially, they had the major problem involving the National Energy Policy and what they felt was unfair treatment of US companies. They wanted to face these issues and to make it clear that, if we didn't get some satisfaction here, it could affect other issues. And this was contrary to the catechism of the US-Canadian relationship, which is that you don't try to trade-off issues. If you're having trouble on one set of issues, you try to deal with them in their own context, and don't threaten retaliation in other areas.

Q: Because otherwise it just ends up in absolute chaos.

SMITH: Initially, the new US administration was not convinced of the merits of that approach. But they did get there, because they saw the difficulties. Indeed, the energy policy issues started to get resolved, for a variety of reasons, so there was change. But there was a period of some time when the conversation between the United States and Canada was at a higher pitch and a little more confrontational than is typical even when there are difficult issues we have to deal with.

Q: This could be taken wrong, and I don't mean it to sound condescending, but did you find yourself, with an ambassador who was obviously a very competent person but in a new field, acting a little bit like a tutor, to get him into it, but also to tell him to be a bit careful about relationships between the two countries?

SMITH: Sure. It was part of my job (and I think it's in the job description of any professional DCM with a political ambassador) to try to read him into some of the conventions and to raise flags if I saw something that was not going quite the way it should. I think it's fair to say that Ambassador Robinson gave me a lot of scope for running the embassy, too. He was sympathetic to the idea that I had that kind of a role to play. So I don't think he resented it or resisted it.

L. MICHAEL RIVES
Consul General
Montreal (1979-1981)

L. Michael Rives was born in New York in 1921. He received a bachelor's degree from Princeton University in 1947. Mr. Rives joined the Foreign Service in 1950. His career included positions in Germany, Vietnam, Laos, Guatemala, France, the Congo, Burundi, Cambodia, and Indonesia. Mr. Rives was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1995.

Q: You left there in '78, and then what?

RIVES: Diplomat in Residence at Rollins College in Florida.

Q: Sounds like a challenging assignment.

RIVES: It was very pleasant, for a year. And then I was up for another assignment and was asked what I would like. I said I would like an Ambassadorship, since I'd been Charge something like five times. I was told they would "do their best." So then they called back and said, "We keep sending your name up and it keeps bouncing back." So I said, "Try again!"

Finally the poor guy in Personnel called me one day and said, "We just can't get anywhere with you as an Ambassador. Won't you accept something else? Maybe a Consul Generalship or something." So I realized I wasn't going to get an Ambassadorship, so I said, "All right. But there are two conditions: (1) it's got to be comfortable, and (2) it's got to be interesting." So he said, "What about Karachi?" I said, "That's interesting, but uncomfortable. The answer is no." They finally came up with Montreal, which I accepted.

Q: So you were in Montreal from when to when?

RIVES: '79 to '81. I retired from there. It was during the Referendum. That's why they wanted me there, because the Consul who had been there was a very good Consular Officer, but he'd never sent a political report in, so he didn't have any idea what was happening.

Q: This was the referendum on the independence of Quebec.

RIVES: Yes, the first time. They're going to do it again this year, probably.

Q: How did we view it at that time?

RIVES: We were against it. Of course, we were neutral. But I must say this of my Consulate staff, we told the Department within two percentage points what the result was going to be.

Q: Did you find you were a little bit like the Coup officer in... I mean, if there's anything we want to stay neutral on, this is it... that you couldn't nod, you couldn't shake your head, you couldn't do anything...

RIVES: Well, that's true. But I had very frank exchanges with both sides. They were both willing to talk to me, give me their point of view.

Q: What was our appraisal? Were we talking about: if Quebec went, what this would mean?

RIVES: Yes.

Q: What did we feel about this?

RIVES: I don't think I had an opinion from Washington about this. My own opinion was it was absolutely stupid. I said that to one of the people one day when we were really off the record. What would happen, even today, even if they broke relations amicably, which is what they think

they're going to do? They kept saying to me, "Well, if worse comes to worse, we can always ask to join the United States." I asked, "Are you sure we want you?" (You know, don't we have enough problems...?)

Where I told them they were being foolish was, if Quebec came in tomorrow -- Quebec, I think, could survive alone. It's got a lot of natural resources, and able, intelligent people, they're very well educated, it's not an undeveloped country -- but, as I said to the man, "What you'll become in Quebec, you'll become like Senegal. You'll be a small, unimportant country. As long as you're part of Canada, you're one of the two most important provinces in Canada, and you're part of Canada, which is one of the five big powers in the economic sphere. If you break up Canada, Canada will be nothing, and you'll be even less than Canada. If that's what you want, fine. But I think, again, that the polls show it... when it comes down to the nitty gritty, the Canadians will vote with their pocketbook."

Q: I would imagine that being up in Montreal during this political situation, you would find yourself... there were so many connections with Canada that really had nothing to do with the Federal Government.

RIVES: Well, that's right. Those didn't affect it at all. The American businessmen stayed there. After all, Mulroney, who became the next Prime Minister after I left there, and by the way, I introduced him to the Embassy -- the Embassy had never heard of him until I made them meet him, because I felt he had a future, and he was the representative of Hannah Corporation -- those relations were all right.

The main problem we had with Canada was El Salvador. The Canadians were violently against us, especially the Quebecers and the Church. I was always being attacked by the Catholic Cardinals. I was once asked to give the U.S. position on El Salvador, which I reluctantly agreed to do on condition that I would just read a statement giving U.S. policy, which I cleared with Washington to be sure I had the right line. That was one of the most interesting evenings I had in Quebec, because I was on a platform with six or seven people, including the leader of one of the opposition parties (not the liberal, one of the small ones, whatever it was called) who had just returned from El Salvador. I wouldn't debate with him, because I hadn't been in El Salvador for twenty years. They had representatives from the opposition in El Salvador, and they had Canadians, and everybody had his turn to talk, and they were all anti-U.S. First of all, they opened with a film which was absolutely outrageous, a film about human rights violations by the United States in El Salvador -- it was absolutely outrageous.

So then, finally, last of all, I was asked to get up. Well, there were hoots, cat calls, screams, yells, boos, you know. I got up to the podium, and I speak French, so I said to myself, "I'll give it to them in French." It took quite a while for it to quiet down, then I started off, and I gave them the official position, then boos, catcalls, you know. Then I sat down. In the question and answer period, the guest of honor was asked about three questions, and then everything was turned to me. I didn't really want to get involved, but I got up there because they'd asked something ridiculous, I can't remember what. I stood up there for two hours answering questions.

In front of me were Americans who had gone to Canada rather than go to Vietnam. One of those

guys (I knew who they were) got up and asked me a perfectly ridiculous question, and I said to him, "I'm not going to answer you. You're a traitor to your country. You shouldn't even be allowed in here. Sit down or get out!" Boos and howls and screams!

I went upstairs after this. I was exhausted. My PAO was there, who hadn't done anything. I said I needed a drink, so we went in the bar. We sat down at the bar, and then all the opposition came in at the other end. I was sitting there quietly, and all these young students came in, and they said, "Could we sit with you? We were so interested to hear the other side." So I had another round with those people. It really was a fascinating evening.

Anyways, then Washington asked (my tour was coming to an end, but there was a new Ambassador) if I would stay on. I said, "What do I get after this?"

"What would you like?"

"An Ambassadorship."

Then we went through the same thing. They said, "We'll give you a Consul Generalship."

I said, "I've had it."

"Country Director?"

"I've done it."

All those. Then I said, "I'll make it easy for you. I want to be Ambassador to France." Then they accepted my retirement.

JACK SHELLENBERGER
Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Ottawa (1979-1983)

Jack Shellenberger was born in New York in 1927. He entered the USIS in 1955, serving in Japan, Burma, Nigeria, Iran, and Canada. Mr. Shellenberger was interviewed by Lew Schmidt in 1990.

Q: This is Lew Schmidt interviewing Jack Shellenberger. This is now July 21, we're in Jack's office at the Foreign Service Institute. Jack, I think today we'll finish up the interview and we'll start with your assignment to Ottawa.

SHELLENBERGER: Okay, I'll be glad to respond. I'll begin with the phone call I received from Ben Fordney when I was in Tehran saying that I would be assigned to Ottawa sooner than later, and to make plans to come back and be on the job by September 1. I had thought I would stay in Tehran until November 15 and was loath to change that timetable, but it became clear that either

I change that timetable or I would be without an agency connection. So I came back the end of July, out of that chaotic, no longer a kingdom, and had a few weeks of home leave and then for the first time in my career drove to my next post, that is, Ottawa. I found a place to stay overlooking the Rideau Canal, a very lovely condominium-type apartment about a 15-minute walk to the USIS office which was located in the Press Building, or Press Club of Canada, half a block from the Embassy itself.

During my time in Ottawa I can recall vividly the three very different ambassadors under whom I served, the first being Tom Enders, a forbiddingly tall career Foreign Service Officer who had very specific ideas about USIS activities. And then, within months, a very benign and gentlemanly Kenneth Curtis, who had been governor of Maine and after that the Democratic National Chairman, who knew nothing about USIS. With the Reagan victory, in 1980, came Paul Robinson from Chicago, a tank of a man who really wanted to be I think Secretary of the Navy because his abiding interest was defense and Canada's poor performance in terms of defense modernization.

Canada was the destination of President Reagan's first state visit soon after he was elected. I remember sensing even then that the Alexander Haig role in the Reagan administration was stressful with the Secretary of State seeming to make his own agenda without much coordination with the White House. And so USIS was caught in between these different camps and these different agendas. I remember I got a call from Jock Shirley after the Reagan visit saying that Jim Brady was complaining that he didn't see enough of me. Well, that was because I couldn't find Jim Brady very often. He also had an agenda. So it was, while successful for the public's sake, the trip was a bit of a downer for me.

A month or so later I guess the Reagan assassination attempt occurred but that did not bar his returning to Canada in June for the Economic Summit. And that's when I got to know David Gergen, who was Director of White House Communications. And Gergen thought up an idea that since has characterized all the Summits, and that is to have USIS people monitor the press briefings by the other participating countries -- it had never been done before -- and report back to him so that the Reagan camp would have a heads up as to what was going on among the other delegations in terms of the spin they were giving as the summit progressed. We succeeded in this all to well. It meant that the following year, 1982, in preparation for the summit at Versailles David called me down to the White House to be the USIA coordinator for that summit, and indeed to go on to Bonn and Berlin as part of the White House press team. The next year, of course, was Williamsburg and I was dubbed the USIA coordinator for that, a very, very big job, of providing press facilities for some 3,000 journalists.

One of the highlights of my Canada period was getting acquainted with a student who was studying farm production and livestock. His name was Paul Sim and his family owned a farm in Saskatchewan, to which he invited me. I went there with daughter Karen out on the plains, and learned about harvesting grain, driving a truck next to the combine as it spewed the grain into the back of the truck, making sure I didn't turn left and destroy very expensive equipment. It was an eye-opening experience to get some sense of the culture of the prairies.

During my Canada days also I did a lot of amateur theater. Ottawa had a seemingly near

professional group called Ottawa Little Theater and I managed to be cast in as many as eight different productions. I certainly found that a wonderful avocation.

What differentiated Canada from my other career locales was that it seemed my best friends were also in many cases my most important contacts. That doesn't happen in our business too often, but it certainly happened to me in Canada. And it gave me, I think, insight as to how to handle the abiding issues that caused resentment in Canada towards the United States on trade and investment, cross border TV, fishing rights, and acid rain. These, along with defense, were the kinds of issues that we had to contend with.

Margaret Atwood and Robinson Davies are two of the great names in literature and again the Canadian environment is such that you can make overtures to and make contact with celebrated people with greater ease than is the case in other countries and cultures. For me the opportunity to eat a dinner in the company of such individuals, hear their ideas, was extremely rewarding.

Then Canada of course had USIS representation in Montreal, Vancouver and Toronto, which gave me quite a vast territory to roam through. It was always a pleasure to go out to Vancouver, especially in the cold months, getting away from what is said to be the coldest capital in the world after Ulaanbaatar.

Q: Even worse than Moscow?

SHELLENBERGER: Yes it is, it's colder than Moscow.

After two or three years in Canada I had believed that perhaps I might think about doing another kind of work, my theater experience had tempted me to do something outside of government. I'd written a few plays and I'd made some overtures and I went to New York and did the rounds and then came back and decided no, I was better off staying within my chosen career. The question is, what to do next.

Q: Before you -- I presume you're about to leave the discussion of Canada. Do you have any evaluation as to how effective your work was with the leading journalists and media people? Do you think that you were able to explain the U.S. position and perhaps assist somewhat in the relationship between the two countries over these things, trade and acid rain were particularly difficult areas of contention at that time, still are to a considerable extent.

SHELLENBERGER: I think everybody contributed to amelioration of attitudes. We certainly had access to the public pulpits in making our views known on any of these issues and I think we were not dismissed but were fairly treated in the media. The contacts we had in Montreal and Toronto and Vancouver with the media were extraordinarily close and constructive. I think we were able to make a difference in terms of attitudes by means of the International Visitor Program, which one might argue, well, Canada, it's just across the border. The fact is the Canadian movers and shakers see very little of the United States in their visits. They go either to the sun region for the winter, as the Canadian snow goose contingent, or they go to New York or Washington. And what we did was give them an opportunity to see parts of the United States far removed from these more familiar places.

GEORGE JAEGER
Consul General
Quebec (1979-1983)

Political Counselor
Ottawa (1983-1984)

Mr. Jaeger was born in Austria and raised in Austria, England and the US. Evacuated from Austria to Holland and England, he immigrated to the US. After serving in the US Army he was educated at St. Vincent College and Harvard University. He joined the State Department in 1951 and the Foreign Service (USIA) in 1953. Primarily a Political Officer, Mr. Jaeger served in Washington several times as well as in Monrovia, Zagreb, Berlin, Bonn, Geneva, Paris, Quebec (Consul General), Ottawa (Political Counselor) and Brussels (Deputy Assistant Secretary General of NATO for Political Affairs. His final assignment was Diplomat in Residence at Middlebury College. Mr. Jaeger was interviewed by Robert Daniels in 2000.

Q: What did they dream up next for you to do?

JAEGER: Well, Personnel called one day and said that I had been chosen to be Consul General in Quebec. Rene Levesque was going to have a referendum and they wanted me to go up there to look after our interests.

Q: In effect, to be the American pointman to Quebec?

JAEGER: That was how, in a way, it actually worked out, although initially the idea did not appeal to me at all. I tried to explain that I was a Europeanist, that I really knew nothing about Canada and certainly didn't want to preside over a lot of visas getting issued. In any case, what had just been done to me entitled me to a better choice. All to no avail. They insisted and said that I would have to go.

Well, I was very upset, and literally went on strike, refused to go to the Department and spent a month walking the towpath along the Potomac River to make clear that I was seriously unhappy and close to quitting. When personnel would phone up to ask that I come in to see them, my wife just said, "Well, he's walking the towpath, and he's still very angry."

Q: Laughter

JAEGER: After some weeks Bob Barry, my old friend from Zagreb who was one of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries, called and said, "Look, George, you've made your point and we are all aware of it. We're all sorry about what happened. But its now time to get over it. Come in and see Dick Vine (the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Europe then responsible for Canada). He

wants to talk to you.” So, I went in to see Dick Vine, who was very nice but said, “You know, the trouble with you is that you’re ignorant.”

Q: Laughter

JAEGER: “You don’t know a damn thing about Quebec, and you haven’t thought through how important this job is to the US and how challenging it’s going to be! Here is this—”

Q: Yes, just the point I was making.

JAEGER: “Here is this huge country north of the United States thinking about breaking up into bits and pieces, and you’re going to be our man up there. Unlike Czechoslovakia, which we all know a lot about and where nothing is going to change in the immediate future, this is the place where you can actually play a role!”

Q: Here in Vermont we were acutely aware of the tension between French and English Canada and the possibility of separation, and were even expecting an influx of refugees. We thought Burlington might even become the Miami of the North.

JAEGER: Well, you’re lucky it didn’t. To cut a long story short, I told Dick that I’d made my point and would do my best in Quebec in face of these challenges. I then asked, “But what do I need to know?” Dick said, “Oh, you’re bright. You go up there, and you’ll find out!” I said, “OK, but what are my instructions?” He said, “You’ll figure that out too. Go up there and see that things go right.”

Q: So you pretty much had carte blanche!

JAEGER: That’s how it turned out, since he then shifted the discussion to ornithology and we spent the next half hour discussing the implications of bones in wing structures, of flight patterns, and oddities of bird behavior! With that I left and prepared to go to Quebec.

Before arriving at post, I did, of course, call on the Ambassador in Ottawa, Ken Curtis, a delightful former Governor of Maine with whom I developed a warm relationship; and on our highly competent and consistently supportive DCM, Richard Smith. Both offered helpful background and advice but also left things essentially in my hands. I also met my very perceptive predecessor, Terry McNamara - famous for his heroic rescue of many Vietnamese, in spite of orders to the contrary. He drove them on a liberated ship down the Mekong to the open sea, where they were all eventually picked up.

Q: When did you actually take over in Quebec?

JAEGER: Pat, Christina and I arrived on a lovely fall day in September ‘79, having, for the first time ever, driven(!) to a new post in our car. We were welcomed by Eric Boswell, a tall, able young officer with good French, who was to be my number two, and began to establish ourselves in our quarters on the second floor of the spectacularly sited Consulate building next to the Chateau Frontenac, whose large reception and dining rooms have dramatic, sweeping views of

the Chateau, the harbor and the St. Lawrence River. It was a setup ideal for entertaining. The living quarters proved more modest, but were supplemented by a nice garret apartment on the third floor, well-suited for guests. The only obvious problem was the tiny, under-equipped kitchen, which became an ongoing challenge.

The surroundings too were fabulous: In front, the famous flag-bedecked 'Terasse' along the wide St. Lawrence, thronging with people in clement weather while during the long, cold winter months its famous toboggan run and skating rink were centers of attraction. On the side of our building I found a tranquil little park also facing the river, whose monument to Wolfe and Montcalm commemorates the famous contestants of the Battle of the Plains of Abraham. Once a farm, this vast battlefield in time also became a lovely park extending far beyond the battlements of Quebec's citadel, which dominate the town.

We were also delighted with Christina's new school, the famous 'Ecole des Ursulines', the first girls' school in North America, founded by Sr. Marie de l'Incarnation in 1639. Although still run on rather old-fashioned Catholic lines, the Ursulines were excellent and caring educators, and Christina was, by and large, happy there. So far so good.

Q: So what were your first impressions of the atmospherics in Quebec?

JAEGER: Puzzling and complex. Even though 95% Francophone, Quebec, for all its splendid hotels and restaurants, quaint streets, and historic sites, was different from any comparably-sized provincial capital we knew in France. One immediately sensed the ambivalence in a place where KFC fast-food outlets and other clearly North American establishments competed with the Norman architecture of the older houses and the reminders of Quebec's 'Anglo' past, such as the white Episcopal Cathedral in the very center of town and the former 'Anglo' stronghold, the Chateau Frontenac, one of the great railway hotels built in the 19th century to tie the new Canada together. It's this complexity which, as I came to understand, reflects Quebec's tangled history - first French, then taken over and governed by the English and finally, and not always happily, Canadian.

That these contradictions, and the grievances they had caused, had come to a head and that passions were now running high, was also obvious. As I arrived, the towns and villages were saturated with PQ (Parti Quebecois) posters demanding Quebec's separation from Canada. PQ rallies, dominated by oceans of blue Quebec flags bearing the fleur-de-lis, were of an intensity which was astonishing. The PQ's pervasive theme song was the haunting melody of Gilles Vigneault's 'L'hiver c'est mon pays', his moving, sentimental hymn which somehow summed up the French nationalists' determination to achieve their mythic fatherland.

Opposing the separatists in this visual and spiritual battle were red Canadian flags which flew defiantly over Quebec city's citadel, the 'Terasse' and all federal institutions throughout the province, as well as the many red maple-leaf banners and posters on houses, barns and businesses, notably not only in the English-speaking parts of the province, but throughout the French part as well, reflecting the critical division on the issue among the French themselves. Canada and Quebec were clearly approaching what most thought would be a fundamental showdown in the 1980 referendum which would determine their future.

Q: Given these first impressions, what, as you saw it, were the main challenges you faced ?

JAEGER: The first and most obvious was how, given our miniscule staff of four Americans, eight or so locals and a tiny entertainment budget, I could reach out to the conflicted leaders of this roiled society of four million Francophones and two million Anglophones and allophones, who had a provincial government larger than many medium-sized countries.

To give you a sense of scale, Quebec's "foreign office" alone, the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, had at least five hundred officials! More importantly, there were dozens of major players on Quebec's political stage with whom I needed to establish working and personal relationships, ranging from Premier Rene Levesque, his entourage and key Ministers and Claude Ryan, the Liberal opposition leader and his party, to Quebec's Mayor, Jean Pelletier, key journalists, academics and business people, as well as influential, remnants of old 'Anglo' society.

Q: All with a tiny staff and a shoe-string budget? That was quite a challenge!

JAEGER: Well, it was Pat who came up with the brilliant idea. She reasoned that if the Quebecois were anything like the French, their affections would run through their stomachs, since, as we had learned in Paris, French people worship good food. So the answer was to get a first rate chef! To help, Pat offered to give up an as yet unfilled domestic position and make do with a part-time cleaning lady!

No sooner said than done, I called up the housekeeper in the Ambassador's residence in Paris whom I had come to know and asked if one of the three first-rate young sous-chefs in the Ambassador's world-class kitchen might be interested in a year's adventure in Quebec. We could offer free transportation (at our expense), free living quarters and an admittedly small salary.

Lo and behold, three weeks later, John-Claude arrived, a superlative young chef trained in two and three star Paris restaurants. Within another week or so we were able to give our first major reception at which Jean-Claude's offerings simply knocked people's socks off. From then on, as we gave dinners, lunches and many more receptions, our residence became one of the very few places in Quebec where its deeply divided politicians and others, from all sides of the argument, genuinely liked to come and, as importantly, could talk to each other on neutral ground. We had, in short, turned the American Consulate General into a political salon at the center of the storm!

Q: Well, you're illustrating the crucial importance of good diplomatic entertaining which the American public thinks is such a waste of taxpayer dollars! Your point also reinforces the contrast you described earlier of French reactions to the contrasting styles of those two American Ambassadors in Paris (Rush and Hartman). What, by the way happened after Jean-Claude's year was up?

JAEGER: He was succeeded first by Dominique, who subsequently became the Aga Khan's chef in Chantilly, and finally by Frederique, who liked Quebec, or at least its girls, so much that he decided to stay there. They all did well, but were very different personalities. When we were not entertaining, they ate with us as part of the family, something unheard of in France at the time.

On some of those long winter evenings when the St. Lawrence was frozen solid I even taught John-Claude how to play chess in front of the fire.

Q: Laughter

JAEGER: Years later we visited Dominique in his country house in France, and have remained good friends.

Q: What were some the other challenges as you were getting started?

JAEGER: The second, and even more important, was to try to understand what I was dealing with. When I arrived I only had the vaguest grasp of the historic background of Quebec's crisis and of the events which had produced this Parti Quebecois which so passionately wanted to break up Canada. Nor was it clear to me what the implications would be if Levesque did win his referendum, whether and how the outcome would affect American interests, hence to what extent I should lean in one direction or the other.

Q: But wasn't there a clear American policy on Quebec separatism?

JAEGER: Yes and no. The standard policy sentence, then and now, was that "the United States prefers a united Canada, but that it is up to the Canadians, themselves, to decide." It dates back to a Department paper of the late seventies, the basis of a National Security Council document, neither of which, as I said, I had ever seen. The difficulty with that sentence, particularly if you were the fellow on the ground, was that it didn't tell you how strongly to emphasize US preference for a united Canada, or, for that matter, Quebec's democratic right to push the other way - precisely because it was designed to straddle the issue. The distinction, as we will see, shortly became critical. And as Dick Vine's 'briefing' had suggested, he apparently understood that and wanted me to feel my way.

Q: I see the problem.

JAEGER: So I set off to call on all the key players in this feverish struggle, who, besides becoming my principal contacts, helped me to understand Quebec.

Q: I suppose Rene Levesque was high one that list.

JAEGER: That was the first order of business- after I had made contact with officials on his staff. Among them was the well-intentioned, but invariably unctuous Protocol Chief Jacques Joli-Coeur and the people on the Quebec 'Foreign Ministry's' large 'American desk', who, I quickly learned, had little independent influence, peddled the party line and did not look very useful.

A bit later, I met the heavyweights: Louis Bernard, Levesque's powerful, wise and generous Chief of Staff, who again and again helped me greatly in maintaining perspective; Richard Pouliot, a warm, highly educated Assistant Minister in charge of managing their American operations, with whom I was to have many productive talks; Robert Normand, the intensely competent and influential Deputy Minister, whose military bearing and natty dress gave the

misleading impression of a corporate executive who had somehow strayed into the wrong camp, rather than the key policy figure in Levesque's intra-Canadian, constitutional and foreign strategizing he actually was; and, last but not least, Louise Beaudoin, the boyish, seductive powerhouse, whom I called the 'Passionaria' in my telegrams because of her deeply emotional commitment to the PQ's cause.

She served as Intergovernmental Affairs Minister Claude Morin's Executive Assistant, where she was often the fearless counter-weight to her cautious boss and a major, often explosive personality in Parti Quebecois councils in her own right. For added poignancy, the Quebec rumor mill had her romantically linked with a whole series of PQ luminaries, including for a while Morin, and some years later, when the PQ was in decline and she was working for Air Canada in Paris, with the French Socialist Michel Rocard before he became Prime Minister. Her retiring husband was rarely seen and was reportedly much more radical she.

This, by and large, was the core group in the PQ 'Bunker', as Levesque's and Morin's rather jarring cement office block was called - symbolically situated along the 'Grand Allee' across from Quebec's 'Assemblee Nationale' and below the Citadel, the Canadian home of Quebec's all-French Royal 22nd Regiment, the famous Francophone 'Vingt-Douze'.

Q: Then there was Claude Morin, himself.

JAEGER: Yes. A tweedy, pipe-smoking reflective man, completely accessible, but not transparent. He had an MA from Columbia, had taught Social Services at Laval and become a PQ member of the 'Assemblee Nationale' in 1976 when the PQ's victory swept him and Levesque to power. He was, if not the, at least one of the grand strategists of Quebec's constitutional tactics with respect to the rest of Canada, would be the main drafter of the critically important wording of the 'Referendum Question', and was in charge of the global promotion of Quebec's cause as its 'Foreign Minister'. It was therefore a special shock when it was reported in the press some years later that Morin had, all along, been a paid agent for the RCMP (the Canadian Mounted Police), in short Ottawa's man at the heart of the PQ, a charge he vigorously refuted in a book called 'L'Affair Morin'.

Q: Well, that made him a complex and mysterious figure. You said he had a substantial staff of over 500?

JAEGER: Many of which were staffing Quebec Delegations all over the world. In the PQ's heydays they tried to behave like Quebec embassies to the extent they were allowed, propagating the Quebec cause and fighting at every turn for as independent a role from Ottawa's as they could get.

Needless to say that almost always set up an awkward dynamic with the local Canadian Embassies, with which Quebec's Delegations were in constant competition. This tug of war was worst in Paris, which quite overtly sympathized with Levesque's cause, and where the Quebec Delegate General was often treated a good deal better than the Canadian Ambassador. But the dynamic also applied at Quebec's many other delegations in Latin America, Europe, Africa and

elsewhere, where Levesque's emissaries promoted their cause, encouraged separate political, economic and cultural relations and tenaciously vied for recognition.

Q: How were they represented in the US?

JAEGER: Their main operation was in New York, with Delegations in Boston, Chicago and, I believe, Los Angeles.

Q: Why New York and not Washington?

JAEGER: Well that goes to the heart of one my early tussles. I think Quebec's representation was set up in New York in earlier times to promote commercial relations.

Since the PQ came to power, and we are now jumping a bit ahead of my story, its overriding objective became political, to persuade America that an independent Quebec would pose no threat to the United States. At my predecessor Terry McNamara's urging, they had even dropped their earlier neutralist stance and had committed themselves, somewhat reluctantly, to join NATO and NORAD once independence was achieved - to reassure Washington in those late Cold War days that an independent Quebec would be a good friend and ally, even though its actual contributions would be very small.

The PQ leadership was, of course, fully aware of Washington's nuanced policy on Quebec independence which we just discussed. Even so, their ongoing nightmare scenario was that Washington might panic and, at the end of the day tilt actively against Quebec if it began to look like the PQ might actually win its referendum. Given the finely balanced Quebec electorate, some of it very attuned to the possible price it might have to pay for this adventure, active US opposition could then make a PQ victory virtually impossible.

Keeping Washington reassured and, as one PQ policy wonk put it, "as sound asleep as possible", therefore became critically important and led them to launch a multi-pronged PR operation in the States; somewhat handicapped, they felt, by the fact that they had no operational base in Washington. Getting US agreement to opening a small Quebec office in DC therefore became a major Ministry objective. The issue was raised with me insistently by Robert Normand and others shortly after my arrival and confronted me with my first substantive challenge.

Looking into it, I concluded that the status quo was not as great an inconvenience for them as it might seem, since the State Department had interposed no objections to their officials in New York calling on people in Washington, including State Department people who occasionally met with them outside the building; but had repeatedly made clear that US diplomatic relations were with Ottawa and not with any of the Canadian provinces.

Q: Did you get any clear instructions when you reported this?

JAEGER: Strange as it may sound, no. On this and most other issues, the response, when there was one, left me leeway: They would prefer things to remain as they were, but implied they

could live with a minimal Quebec presence in Washington as well, as long as it did not claim to be a 'diplomatic' post.

Well, the more I thought about it, the less this seemed to me a good idea. Making this move some months before the referendum scheduled for May 1980, would be seen from Ottawa's and the Canadian medias' perspective, as a worrying US gesture favoring the PQ cause; would provide the Pequistes an improved propaganda platform in the US capital; and, once the initial small office grew larger, as it inevitably would, would set up the same genre of tensions with the Canadian Embassy in Washington which was so deleteriously played out in Paris and elsewhere. All this would unnecessarily complicate the situation, and could, in any case be reconsidered if and when Levesque won his referendum and an independent Quebec became an international reality.

Q: So what did you do?

JAEGER: Well, with our Embassy's support I simply maintained the line that we could not agree - a big disappointment for Normand and the American desk at the Ministry. Although I suspect the Department would not have made a big fuss had Quebec simply opened a small Washington office without further ado, Morin's Ministry grudgingly accepted the decision - partly, I suspect, because, in the then hothouse atmosphere, they had a wildly exaggerated notion of the interest in Quebec issues in Washington, and so assumed, as I learned in due course, that my instructions came from 'the highest levels'. While I did nothing to foster this illusion, my real problem was, quite the contrary, maintaining sufficient interest in Quebec developments in Washington. As we will shortly see, the Quebec issue would not be on the administration's front burner till a month or so before the referendum.

Normand, later the editor of Quebec City's most important newspaper 'Le Soleil', still spoke of this decision somewhat bitterly many years later, when, as Diplomat-in-Residence at Middlebury College, I took a group of students on a study trip to Quebec City. As far as I know Quebec still does not have a Delegation in Washington and, now that the prospect of independence has receded, may in fact find it more useful to have its main office in New York.

Q: Did that incident crimp your relations with Levesque? How did you get along with him?

JAEGER: I was granted my first meeting with him shortly after my arrival and liked him immediately. Unlike the rest of his crew who were largely earnest types, Levesque was self-deprecating, wry and often very funny - a bit of a Charlie Chaplin type in his invariably unpressed suits or his incongruous safari outfit. I always had the feeling that he was both the principal actor and amused observer of the PQ drama, whose risks and limitations he understood as well as anyone.

One of the first things he told me was how much he liked Americans, a predilection he acquired as a 'Stars and Stripes' correspondent during World War II, when he was first stationed in London and then followed Allied troops across Europe. He clearly felt comfortable in the US and with Americans, in contrast to English Canada, which he saw as unwelcoming to francophones and uptight.

Levesque's post-war career did not really take off until the late 'fifties when he became beloved and famous for his CBC French service television show, in which he explained politics, the world and all sorts of more mundane subjects to his francophone Quebec audience, making cracks and scrawling on his blackboard. His program was a critical factor in the French Quebecers' awakening, greatly broadening their horizons.

As a result, when the Quiet Revolution hit Quebec in 1960 and marked the end of Conservative Premier Maurice Duplessis' long, reactionary rule, Levesque's great popularity and quixotic magnetism helped make him a major political figure; powerful enough, in time, to draw most of the separatist, marxist, reformist, nihilist and violent revolutionary factions which had sprung up, into the overall moderating framework of his new separatist Parti Quebecois.

Q: But that didn't happen till the late sixties, right?

JAEGER: That's right. The Quiet Revolution only led to the 1960 victory of Jean Lesage's Liberals, which promised ingoing reform, and Levesque's first election to Quebec's parliament, the Assemblée Nationale. He was made Public Works and then Natural Resources Minister, nationalized Quebec's existing hydro-electric resources and so became the father of its vast new hydro-electric facility on James Bay, Hydro-Quebec. Levesque understood from the outset that only modern industrial development could draw Quebec's largely rural and still very parochial French population into the 20th century and that the key was the availability of ample power. It is this fundamental contribution, more than his ultimately unsuccessful role as a separatist leader, which has made him the father of modern Quebec.

Q: So how did Levesque then become leader of the PQ?

JAEGER: The crisis came when the Liberal Party convention in October 1967 refused to consider Quebec independence. Levesque walked out, formed his own 'Sovereignty-Association' Party, and later merged with other independentist factions to form the Parti Quebecois in 1968.

Even then, however, time was not yet on his side. Quebec remained nervous about taking the leap toward independence, fear which was accentuated by the Montreal crisis in October 1970, when the small but violent FLQ, the Quebec Liberation Front, kidnapped a British diplomat in Montreal and seized and executed a Quebec Labor Minister, leading the Quebec Government to ask Prime Minister Trudeau in Ottawa to invoke the War Powers Act and to bring in the Army to assure security and order. Fear of extremism, socialism and dangerous radicalism, which most anglophones and many francophones associated with the PQ independentists, lingered, and the Liberals, led by Robert Bourassa, remained in power. It was only in 1976 that, to Levesque's own intense surprise, the PQ was swept into power and Rene Levesque became Prime Minister.

Q: Well, that helps set the stage. How did your relations with Levesque evolve?

JAEGER: I think he liked me from the beginning and was surprisingly frank during our meetings in his office, over the occasional dinners at our place which he clearly enjoyed, and during many casual encounters at other functions. I think he understood that his subordinates and colleagues

would often provide me with filtered or overly emotional information, and clearly wanted Washington to have balanced accounts of his actual views and intentions - which were generally more perceptive and moderate than the party line.

The result was a long series of detailed telegrams in which I was able to report his concerns and assessments: About his intention to nationalize Asbestos Corporation, which had a particularly bad reputation in Quebec, about the struggles over the referendum question, the PQ's electoral successes and failures, relations with Ottawa and even some intra-party fights: Accounts which became specially critical before the Referendum and during the constitutional discussions in 1981. When, as we will see a bit later, many of these telegrams were prematurely declassified by the Department at the request of a Canadian journalist, there were shocked reactions from high-level Pequistes as to how much 'secret' information Levesque had revealed to the Americans!

Q: You mentioned Asbestos. Wasn't that one of Jacques Parizeau's great projects?

JAEGER: That's right. Parizeau was Levesque's formidable Finance Minister, arguably the second most important man and by far the most brilliant and incongruous of Levesque's cabinet.

A round and florid man in three piece suits with gold chains, he loved good food and serious wines, and looked and acted every bit the Victorian English lord, rather than the passionate separatist and defender of the (French) people he was. It was Parizeau who created the 'Caisse de Depot', the Quebec Savings bank, and the 'Societe Generale du Quebec' to foster investment in key Quebec industries, both of which came to play major economic roles in and beyond Quebec, and who played a key role in bringing Quebec's unions onside. He could have been a finance minister in a country of any size and done extremely well. At the same time he was a much harder-line independentist than Levesque, and eventually broke with him over this issue in 1984.

Q: Did you ever find out how he came to this position to the left of Levesque? It seems almost out of character.

JAEGER: I saw him frequently in his office and over lunches at the Chateau Frontenac, during which he talked among other things about his political evolution. He was the son of a very comfortable Montreal family, was educated at St. Stanislas, an old-fashioned but excellent Jesuit school in Montreal, studied in Paris and got his PhD at the London School of Economics. He was at the time a conventional Canadian federalist, destined for a prosperous career, until, one day - he said it happened on a train to Ottawa - he was struck by the profound injustice and incongruity of Quebec's position and resolved then and there to become an independentist.

Interestingly, he sometimes reminisced, almost all the people who later became prime movers in the Quebec drama, Levesque, Trudeau and Parizeau himself, had gone to the same Jesuit school, were close friends, sometimes shared the same digs and even girlfriends and talked endlessly about the issues thrown up by the Quiet Revolution. Yet, at the end of the day, they went in quite different directions. As he told the story, one night, after a good drinking party and a final emotional discussion, they simply split. Trudeau went off to become a Canadian nationalist, arguing that you can't just break up Canada. Parizeau remained firmly on the separatist side, while Levesque, somewhat less radical, argued that independence could be a process achieved in

stages. So the drama which shook Canada throughout the sixties, seventies and eighties, had a very personal side which may have made the fight more poignant and even sharper.

Parizeau also stood apart from his PQ colleagues. A man with a large head, a powerful, highly educated brain, a witty tongue, an Oxford accent with just a little French tinge, a passion for women, and charmingly old fashioned courtesy and grace, he was both intensely professorial and a snob. When I asked him one day what he thought of a fellow Minister, Bernard Landry, he said, “You know, just because one shares the same politics, doesn’t mean one has to lunch with people!” Even so, as long as he was on Levesque’s team he was always loyal, even when he disagreed and would have preferred a harder line.

In the end, it was his unyielding separatism and sharp tongue which brought about his downfall when, many years later, it was his turn to be Prime Minister. As the press reported it, he told a group of diplomats during the 1995 referendum that despite the guarantee of an offer of partnership with the rest of Canada before declaring sovereignty following a “Yes” vote, what mattered most was to get a majority vote from Quebec citizens for secession from Canada, because with that, Quebecers would be trapped like “lobsters thrown into boiling water”. Even worse, when the PQ lost that referendum by only a few thousands of votes, Parizeau blamed the defeat in his concession speech on “money and the ethnic vote”. It was typical Parizeau, but he did not recover.

Q: I remember hearing of that uproar. Did you have any major issues which involved him directly?

JAEGER: Apart from the 1980 referendum and its aftermath, the only major issue, toward the end of my tour, involved the sharp dispute with Canada and with Quebec over what we considered unfair subsidies of soft-wood lumber. My instructions were to put pressure on the Quebec government to stop this. Parizeau’s amused response was, “What subsidies?” and challenged me to document our claim. He had made sure that they were so well hidden that they would be very difficult to prove! Since I left shortly afterwards, I don’t know how this was resolved.

Q: Let’s turn to the Quebec federalists, the provincial Liberal party who opposed the PQ and wanted Canada to remain united. They were obviously a formidable force, since they succeeded in blocking the PQ. Who were they?

JAEGER: There were in the first place all the anglophones and other non-French Quebecers in and around Montreal and the Eastern townships, a bloc of give or take 2 Million people who for language and cultural reasons did not want Quebec to become a separate Francophone entity in which they would be a permanent minority. So to offset this and win a majority in the 1980 and all subsequent referenda, the PQ had to get the support of a very substantial majority of the 4 Million francophones in the province. And, counter-intuitively, this wasn’t as easy as it may sound.

For French Quebec is far from homogeneous. Much of the francophone business community and its middle class and wealthier members were and, I am sure remain, conscious of the economic

importance of Quebec's links with the rest of Canada and concerned about the uncertainty which a separation process would inevitably entail, including its effect on the US.

Beyond that many worried that an independent Quebec would not, in the end, be able to hack it if they cut themselves off from the rest of Canada. Where, for instance would all the social subsidies come from, or the money for all the other trappings of an independent state? There were still others who were simply francophone Canadian patriots, i.e. people who had served in the Canadian army; and those who, while concerned about Quebec's grievances, thought they could be redressed by continuing negotiation within Canada.

So whatever they may think of Quebec's ties and problems with English Canada, for many of the Francophones the language issue was not the only or even the primary concern.

Q: Politically these people rallied around Quebec's Liberal party?

JAEGER: That's right. And together they constituted a formidable conservative force, which advocated resolution of problems through ongoing negotiation within the Canadian framework.

Q: Let's talk a bit about the Liberal party's leadership. I assume you worked closely with them as well.

JAEGER: The head of the party and Levesque's protagonist was Claude Ryan, a craggy man who looked like he could have been a brother of Abraham Lincoln - who, by the way, was his great role model and hero. Ryan had been the highly respected editor of the prestigious French language paper 'Le Devoir', had incurred Trudeau's enmity over the federal government's intervention during the October crisis in 1970, but, like many other francophone Quebecers, was not at all satisfied with the state of Quebec's relations with Ottawa. His fierce quarrel with the PQ was primarily over his conviction that these issues could be dealt with by means short of separation, which he thought would be disastrous for both Quebec and Canada. He was indefatigable in his opposition and particularly in the winter before the referendum crisscrossed the province in ice and snow, with his galoshes and trademark umbrella, urging francophones not to jump ship.

Curiously, for all his passion and commitment, Ryan was not a great speaker and was even difficult to talk to since he tended to mumble rapidly and was superficially aloof. What shone through was his deep commitment and the intellectual power of his arguments, always meticulously developed and researched. Although he was usually overscheduled, since, unlike the PQ, he did not dispose of a large staff to back him up, Ryan was always kind to me and took time to receive me graciously from time to time.

When I asked him one day if there was anything I could do for him, he allowed that the thing that would give him the greatest pleasure was a set of Lincoln's writings which had just been published! I was able to present this three volume set to him on behalf of the US government a few weeks later and am sure he worked through it in detail.

Q: A rather strange personality for a successful politician. Ryan is also an odd name for a francophone. But I remember there were others like Daniel Johnson...

JAEGER: ..the Liberal leader in the 60's before Lesage. This happened often, usually as a result of Scottish or Irish immigrant families who intermarried and became francophone.

I should add a word about Ryan's famous young assistant, Pierre Pettigrew, who was constantly at his side, wrote many of his speeches, advised on tactics, in short was Ryan's indispensable amanuensis.

I still vividly remember seeing Pierre for the first time languidly reclining in the members gallery in the 'Assemblée Nationale', a tall, Byronic, strikingly handsome young man, who stood in stark contrast to his somber surroundings in his brilliantly white suit, vest and gold chain, while Ryan was giving a major speech on the floor. I came to know him well and found him not only intellectually interesting - he had studied at Oxford and in his late twenties been Political Director of the NATO Assembly, an alliance think tank - but a valuable source for understanding the Quebec Liberals' assessments of the rapidly evolving situation, a cause to which he was passionately devoted. Although just starting his political career, Pierre was already intensely ambitious and, inter alia, introduced us to the Lieutenant Governor of Quebec, the Crown's representative, whose daughter he was dating - an affair which ended unhappily.

Clearly a rising star, Pierre joined Trudeau's staff after the referendum, became a Vice president of Deloitte & Touche, and eventually fulfilled his real ambition by becoming a Minister in Chretien's cabinet and then Foreign Minister under Paul Martin. Whether he was a sufficient heavy-weight to cope with the world of George W. Bush and Condoleezza Rice has been widely questioned. Following some incidents of a personal nature, he ultimately lost both his job and his seat in parliament in 2006.

Q: Yes, I remember reading about that. In this line-up of players, was the Church still a factor?

JAEGER: Only indirectly because of the respect enjoyed by then Cardinal Maurice Roy, who had become beloved for his dedication and valor as a military chaplain in World War II. Roy had lived with the troops instead of in some comfortable billet in the rear and had often risked his life in the thick of combat to give last rites to dying soldiers.

Q: Did you see him from time to time?

JAEGER: He was among the first I called on. He always received me in a plain black cassock and talked very frankly about the dramatic turn Quebec had taken away from the Church. His message to his priests, serving half-empty churches, was above all to be modest and repentant of the Church's past excesses and to focus on being good shepherds. Even so, the Church in Quebec had been so discredited that he was never a major player in the independence fight. Even so, people like Parizeau and Levesque, who certainly didn't go to church, treated the Cardinal with courtesy and serious respect.

I am tempted to record two short exchanges which characterize the man. At one of our receptions I asked him whether his frequent trips to Rome, where he was on a Committee of Cardinals which supervised a revision of Canon Law, were interesting and productive. He looked rather dubious and said, you know, the discussions are always about the same thing, sex, sex and more sex! On another occasion, Pat and I were seeing him to the door. He stopped, looked at us and said: "You two are a nice couple. Keep it that way!"

Q: In a way he was reflecting the Vatican of John the Twenty-Third.

JAEGER: That's right, although after the Quiet Revolution the Quebec church faced very special problems which it has still not overcome.

Q: Maybe this is the right point to step back and discuss how you came to understand Quebec and the crisis which led the independentists to want to break up Canada?

JAEGER: Quite obviously the answer flowed from Quebec's unusual history, a point driven home to me by all sides.

Q: Just look at the license plates - "Je me souviens"!

JAEGER: That's right. The starting point to understanding Quebec nationalist feelings was that the French were there first: Not only because Jacques Cartier discovered the place, but because early French settlers under Samuel de Champlain, who arrived in 1608, and their little band of successors, mostly from Normandy and Brittany, built up this French outpost in the New World against tremendous odds.

We don't have the time to go over the next century and half in detail, except to stress that it was a very hard struggle. It took a man a year to clear and plant an acre of land in rocky virgin terrain where winters were cold and long. For hundreds of years Quebec remained a place whose French rural population remained physically isolated, poor and dominated by an ultramontane Catholic church - which had not gone through any of the European reform movements and had missed the French revolution...

Q: ...and on account of that, lost much of its potential for modernizing cultural contact with France—

JAEGER: Precisely. It was the church which, through these centuries, constituted not only French Quebec's moral and religious authority, but provided virtually all the social services in its many little villages and towns, which were almost inaccessible in the winter and hard to reach at any time, where people often lived under conditions of great hardship and where new ideas and modernizing influences rarely seeped through. It was the local priest, and some nuns perhaps, as well as the local monasteries, on whom people depended for advice, judicial services, old age help, medical assistance and what-have-you and who at the same time told them how to live.

Moreover, because of the peculiar arrangements Louis XIV imposed at Quebec's founding, which gave the church vast land grants and its bishops a co-role in governing, the province's two

cardinals, one in Quebec City and one in Montreal, remained highly conservative potentates to whom Quebec's prime ministers and other senior people usually deferred - until their hold on people suddenly collapsed in the Quiet Revolution of 1960. The extent of this stifling ecclesiastical power is still reflected in the silver-steeped churches, and in the vast, now empty, monasteries and seminaries which dot Quebec's landscape to this day.

Q: Essentially the medieval role of the church.

JAEGER: That's right. So when you visualize an eighteenth and nineteenth century, even an early twentieth century French village up on the St. Lawrence or in the hinterland, it was a very closed community, with few comforts, lots of backbreaking work, considerable drinking, frequent death, childbirth often still on the kitchen table, particularly in the winter, and, at the center of it all, the village priest, who kept them all deferential and on the straight and narrow.

Q: But then the British defeated France on the Plains of Abraham, I think it was 1759.

JAEGER: And that's when the English fact was added to the equation. New France became an English Province. And, after the Loyalists came pouring north after the American Revolution, English power came to prevail not only in Quebec but in the areas west of it, today's Ontario and beyond, leading to the division of the country under the Constitutional Act of 1791 into Upper and Lower Canada.

British dominance brought large investment, control of the fur trade and much land, and, inevitably set in motion the bitter conflict between the poorer and often less well educated French and their new English rulers. This played out in the first part of the 19th century in the battles between British Governors and the French dominated legislature, until Lord Durham in his famous or infamous report, depending which side one was on, advised Whitehall in 1839 that the gradual amalgamation of the 'inferior' and backward French into a larger English whole, a united Province of Canada, was the only viable long-term solution.

Canada was accordingly created in 1840, but the problem was not solved.

Q: They achieved political and economic control but not amalgamation.

JAEGER: That's right. In Quebec the English dominated the economic scene, especially in Montreal and to a somewhat lesser extent in Quebec City, the key cities in which the French population became the more or less docile working class and the attendant inferior social and economic status. Huge fur trading and related operations were launched through the new Hudson Bay company and almost every part of Quebec's economic life brought under English control. The church accommodated itself by preaching "let the English get rich, we'll go to heaven." Indeed I have read accounts that Cardinals of Montreal actually made deals with the powers that be in which they promised to keep the French Catholic workers pliant in return for commitments of no interference with the Church's interests.

Q: And all this assured that English was the dominant language, even in Quebec.

JAEGER: The English language was certainly the dominant language in business dealings and also became a means of control. For example I learned that insurance contracts and all sorts of other business documents were usually produced only in English, so that francophones had to get someone to translate or sign without understanding what they were agreeing.

This kind of insult led to a pervasive feeling that, while the French were the majority in Quebec province, they were, by definition, second class citizens in their own home, under what, in effect, was a de facto colonial regime. This put the French in many of these relationships in a position rather analogous to that of American blacks before ...

Q: ...the Civil Rights movement in..

JAEGER: ... in this country. Unequal relationships were also replicated in the social realm, where there was no doubt who the top dogs were. The Garrison Club in Quebec City, and many similar exclusive institutions in Montreal were clearly English in atmosphere and membership, with a handful of upper-class French token members to disprove the rule.

Q: Still, Quebec was allowed to retain its parliament and Catholic religion, and the French language clearly was not eradicated as Lord Durham recommended.

JAEGER: That's right. It was all a grand compromise, which broke down only from time to time, i.e. in the World War I and II conscription crises, but otherwise simmered just below the surface.

Throughout most of this time the English-speaking upper classes dominated but wisely allowed some French Quebecers to occupy fairly important positions and to make good careers, like Pierre Trudeau's father, who was rather well to do. The disparity was nevertheless underscored in Montreal, to cite the most important example, by the fact that the English upper crust lived in their richer, more fashionable world in Westmount, while the better-off French, who were seen by some as Uncle Toms, lived in Outrement below.

As for the large underprivileged, less educated French working class, life was less pleasant. They struggled under sometimes appalling living and working conditions as English-dominated industries sprang up. While long-suffering, they often felt humiliated and were sustained mostly by their close community ties, their shared sense of French identity and the spiritual support and control of dominant Mother Church.

It was from this background of real and sometimes imagined grievances that Quebec's license plate theme "Je me souviens" (I remember) derives its poignancy.

Q: So how did all this finally come to a head?

JAEGER: Things went on pretty much like this until after World War II. Then all kinds of things began happening simultaneously. Although the French Quebecers had resisted military service in anglophone units, they nevertheless fought valiantly once overseas and came back to their towns and villages with a different, expanded world view. Radio, followed by telephones and television made a huge impact. Roads began to be built and paved throughout the province,

making cars and busses more ubiquitous. The effect was the creation of new levels of connectedness never seen before. And, with them came new ideas and a gradual awareness that the rigid, profoundly conservative, backward world of French Quebec could in the fact be changed. It all came together in a sort of snowballing effect which reached its peak in 1960 in, what has come to be called the “Quiet Revolution.”

Whatever it was, it was spontaneous, simultaneous, and immensely powerful. In the beginning of the year, the churches were full. By the end they were empty and the power of the hierarchy was broken. With this came the end of conservative Uncle Tom governments, like the autocratic and corrupt Duplessis regime, and of the old order in Quebec society, replaced, almost overnight, by a bubbling cocktail of surging new forces. There was a sudden flowering in the francophone arts, in music, literature, theater and movies, all of which rejected traditional conventions and reached in new directions to express the excitement of this new Quebec. There was an equally sudden flowering of more or less radical new political groupings, which ranged from extreme Marxists, nihilists and anarchists, to an array of Quebec nationalist factions, all pulling in different directions but united in a general sense that the old order had to go, that English dominance had to go, and that Quebec needed to find a new identity.

It was a critical turning point and an intensely exciting period, albeit a potentially dangerous mix, since it was directionless and there were all kinds of competing personalities who wanted to lead Quebec in quite different directions.

Q: Until Levesque sort of pulled it all together?

JAEGER: Well, as he himself recounts in his Memoirs, it was not a straight line process. Duplessis, as we have said, was in the first instance replaced by the Liberal Lesage government, which started major reforms: It secularized education, passed new labor legislation which made forming unions easier, encouraged investment, nationalized key resource sectors, such as the Province’s power companies, and under Levesque’s guidance as Minister for Resources, launched Hydro-Quebec, whose power resources were to transform Quebec’s economy.

Had Lesage’s Liberals been willing to consider separatism Levesque might have remained a Liberal. As it was he quit their convention in 1967 and, in a major act of political courage, founded the Sovereignty Association Movement, which later merged with other independentist groups into Levesque’s new Parti Quebecois, which from the outset was committed to achieving Quebec independence.

Q: Well, the idea was certainly in the air.

JAEGER: It certainly was. At the extremes, the FLQ terrorists had been bomb throwing all through the 60’s, culminating in the crisis of 1970. Rejection of English Canada’s dominance had been and was the dominant theme of the Quiet Revolution. And de Gaulle had just made his historic call of “Vive le Quebec Libre” in Montreal.

Even so, as we discussed earlier, the PQ did not actually come to power until it swept the Province in 1976 and Levesque became Prime Minister. The rest was history.

Q: So there you were, only months before the Referendum which could potentially break up Canada. You had seen all these key people and, I would think, had read a lot. What conclusions did you reach after coming to understand the situation?

JAEGER: The more I delved into Quebec history, the more sympathetic I became to the francophones' complaints, hyped as they were for political effect. But the issue was not whether French Quebec had just grievances - even the Quebec Liberals called for major reforms, internally and in Quebec's relations with the rest of Canada. The core issue was whether Canada should therefore be broken up.

And there the answer was simpler. When I looked at the map of Canada and visualized this vast country broken into two, and eventually even more parts - since both the Maritimes and some of the Western Provinces would probably also want to splinter off in time - it became clear that, with the Cold War still raging, a disintegrating northern neighbor could not be in the US interest.

I thought of the additional Soviet and Iron Curtain Embassies this would create to our north, of Canada's diminished strength and stature as an ally, and of the new alignments an independent Quebec might enter into as a potential French surrogate in North America. Our policy formula therefore struck the right tone: We don't interfere, it's up to the Canadians to decide, although we don't conceal the fact that we prefer Canada to remain united. The rest was a matter of emphasis.

This was soon to be resolved in a down-to-earth way. From the moment of my arrival, the Chief of Protocol and others had inundated me with invitations to government or PQ functions and gatherings of various kinds. I usually found myself near the center of the table next to a Minister, sometimes beside Levesque, and soon came to realize that I was put there to be photographed for the press or seen in television clips. The idea was to create the impression on TV, radio and the provincial press, that here was the Consul General of the United States, sitting happily next to the PQ potentates, being chummy with them and having a good dinner...

Q: ...all to convey the impression that the US was backing them, which in effect we were not?

JAEGER: That's it. Once I realized that I was being used as a media prop I made my counter move. I told the Chief of Protocol that I would be delighted to participate in whatever functions they wanted to invite me to, but on condition that I too would be asked to say a few words. Since my brief remarks invariably ended with a low key repetition of our position, with its famous sentence, that it's up to Canadians to decide, but that we prefer Canada to remain united...

Q: Reminding them of the basic American policy...

JAEGER: ...my official invitations dropped off considerably!

Q: [Laughter]

JAEGER: Even so, my occasional toasts and brief statements on public occasions helped make our position clear across Quebec. In the end this probably cost the PQ some points in the

Referendum, since there was a significant number of francophones, particularly middle class and business people, who wanted some kind of separation from Canada but only if it would not cause trouble with the US.

Q: You mentioned the French. What was their role in Quebec?

JAEGER: The French had built a major presence in Quebec, which assumed additional importance since de Gaulle's 'Vive le Québec libre!' - a statement which, in retrospect, turns out to have been intended more as a poke in the eye for Washington, rather than a French commitment to Quebec independence.

*Q: Do you remember the Canadian response—Vive le Bretagne Libre! (Live free Brittany)?
Laughter.*

JAEGER: Yes. Neither one is 'libre' at this point, so it goes to show.

Be that as it may, de Gaulle did build up the French Consulate General in Quebec City into a quasi-Embassy with a staff of around fifty, over ten times larger than ours. They had all kinds of exchange and media programs and were into everything. There were even rumors of French money was flowing under the table to PQ political operations, media and what have you. The whole thing was not entirely transparent.

My courtesy call on the French Consul General shortly after my arrival was not a success. He kept me cooling my heels for 20 or 25 minutes, presumably to establish the terms of our relationship. When, at that point, I informed a staffer that I would come back another time, my distinguished colleague emerged from his office and welcomed me in French with a rather condescending "Dear colleague, how are you, I am certain we will get along well together."

Q: Laughter

JAEGER: We didn't hit it off. He was stiff, hyper-protective of his perceived role, and clearly suspicious of Americans. Mercifully he was soon replaced by Henri Rethore, a much more sensitive, intelligent and open man, with whom I formed a genuine personal friendship and had long interesting and very realistic conversations about Quebec developments, even though French policy hewed much closer to the PQ. Long retired, Henry is still a friend.

Q: Were there other foreign representations in Quebec City?

JAEGER: The Brits closed their small Consulate just after my arrival and consolidated in Montreal. The only other diplomat was a lone, largely invisible Haitian Consul General, who appeared only occasionally at official functions.

Q: But I assume there were many more in Montreal.

JAEGER: That's right. Besides the large American Consulate General, which did the bulk of the consular work in the province and followed business and economic issues, the Soviets had a big

post in Montreal, with a major KGB component focused partly, I have heard, on the US. There were many others, mostly interested in business and consular relations.

The Intergovernmental Affairs Ministry convened them all from time to time for lavish Consular Conferences in Quebec City, at which Levesque would speak to them and they were served excellent lunches or dinners. But I think only the French and we, and possibly the Soviets, followed the PQ's independence campaign in detail.

Q: Is it unusual to have two Consulate Generals in one Province? How did that work out?

JAEGER: There are often several Consulate Generals in large countries, although in Quebec is the only Canadian province to have two. The reason is that the political center is in Quebec City, where we first sent a Consul during the Civil War to keep tabs on British naval activities, while Montreal has long been a major economic hub. The American Consul General in Montreal is therefore a significant figure in Montreal's context, particularly if he or she is a strong and active personality. In my time it was Mike Reeves, an elegant and very competent Far Eastern expert who, besides the economic and commercial reporting, occasionally contributed political reports. We usually worked well together with minimal overlap.

Q: Was this the usual division of labor between these two posts?

JAEGER: Historically, this has changed from time to time. Quebec City has usually been a minor consular post, until separatism made it advisable to send experienced political officers - McNamara, myself and then Lionel Rosenblatt. Since then, wise or not, consular people have again been assigned there as the independence issue has receded.

Q: Let's get back to the main issues. What happened in the run-up to the Referendum and how did you see it?

JAEGER: First, it was important to understand the pressure the PQ was under. They had been in power since 1976 and were in the fourth year of their five year mandate. Levesque had used the preceding years for a wide range of economic and social reforms, including the passage of the famous (or infamous, depending on one's perspective) law 101 defining French as the official language of Quebec and the law governing the financing of political parties.

Time was beginning to run short and the PQ's foot soldiers were getting restless for action on the central issue of separatism, the PQ's raison d'être. It was essential therefore, from Levesque's perspective, that the Referendum be held no later than the spring of 1980.

Q: You described how passionate and heated the atmosphere was when you arrived. Did that translate into optimism that they would actually win?

JAEGER: Curiously not. While many francophones wanted to separate from Canada, others remained unconvinced. Moreover, the mere prospect of Quebec independence galvanized anglophones and other non-French people into passionate opposition. To understand how passionate, one has to think back on the psychological and practical impact of the new language

laws, which led many major corporations to leave Montreal for Toronto and elsewhere and had other damaging effects, particularly for the many people who wanted their children raised in English, not in French.

In fact things were so unsettled that the Levesque government lost six by-elections in a row, three in close succession during that fall of 1979. I remember reporting to Washington that Levesque was depressed, hectored his staff and blamed the left wing extremists in the PQ for his political setbacks.

Had the Referendum been held then, my assessment was that the 'Yes' vote would have lost badly, getting, I estimated at best 44%.

Q: How did you arrive at figures like this?

JAEGER: There were all sorts of polls in the press and people from both sides shared their impressions. I had the further good fortune of getting help from Professor Maurice Pinard of McGill University, a distinguished Quebec sociologist who was the foremost pollster and interpreter of polls in Quebec, with whom I had regular lunches in Montreal. So in addition to my conversations with Ryan's people, with Gilles Lamontagne, the Liberal minority leader in the 'Assemblée Nationale', who had his finger on the pulse, as well as with my many contacts on the PQ side and elsewhere, I probably had as precise a reading of evolving Quebec opinion over these weeks and months as anyone. Good political analysis is a matter of putting lots of bits and pieces together in a mosaic until they make sense.

Q: Did anything happen which affected your initial assessment?

JAEGER: Off course. The most important were the publication of the actual Referendum question just before Christmas and the return of Pierre Trudeau to power in February 1980.

Q: You mean the PQ hadn't decided on what it was going to ask in the Referendum until then?

JAEGER: That's right, and for several reasons. One was the ongoing internal struggle between the moderate and the more extreme separatists. The latter wanted a more or less straight up or down vote on Quebec independence, whereas the former, headed by Claude Morin and Levesque himself, had a much clearer understanding of the complexity of the knot that would have to be unraveled: Since Quebec and the rest of Canada are linked by all sorts of ties, a shared, currency and central bank, complex tax and subsidy arrangements, defense and foreign policy etc.

It's for these reasons that Levesque had, from the outset, made 'Sovereignty-Association' the battle cry of the PQ, a new sovereignty in key domains, tempered by ongoing association arrangements with Canada which would have to be negotiated.

What's more there were the not unimportant questions of what the voters might actually accept, since there was no use holding a Referendum on a too extreme a question to please hard liners if it was clear from the outset that it would fail.

So the precise wording of the question was critically important, both as to its substance and the likelihood of its success.

Q: What did they come up with in the end?

JAEGER: Well, Claude Morin, Louis Bernard and Daniel Latouche, a young political advisor, struggled with the conundrum, drove Parizeau and others who wanted a straightforward ‘yes or no’ question up the wall, and, with Levesque making the final changes and decisions, came up, not with a simple question, but a two-stage process:

First they would only ask the voters in the upcoming referendum, for a mandate to negotiate an agreement with the rest of Canada, “based on the equality of nations..” to “.. enable Quebec to acquire the exclusive power to make its laws, levy its taxes and establish its relations abroad” - in other words sovereignty - “and at the same time to maintain with Canada an economic association including a common currency”.

No change in political status would be effected until the results of these negotiations had been approved in a second step by a further referendum.

Q: Sounds, a bit cumbersome to fire up the faithful?

JAEGER: Long and cumbersome it was, and disappointing to those who wanted a more direct question - although Parizeau and the rest of the more radical Pequistes went along loyally once the decision had been made.

Levesque then launched a massive PR campaign in the National Assembly, across the Province and at all levels of society. For the next months Quebec was aflame in campaign rhetoric, flags, posters, rallies and gatherings of all sorts; a fierce contest in which the less frequently seen Canadian flags seemed as outgunned as taciturn Claude Ryan - who, although deeply committed and indefatigable, seemed no match for the avalanche of passionate PQ speeches in advocating the “OUI” for sovereignty-association.

Q: Did that publication of the question and the PQ’s PR campaign affect polls significantly?

JAEGER: The polls went up, but, as far as I could gather not quite enough to put the “Yes” vote over the top. The softening of the question and the introduction of a second referendum, I reported to the Department at the time, had reduced anxiety over voting “yes” by making the vote seem less final. Trudeau’s election, in a perverse sense, had also been reassuring, since many borderline voters now felt he would not let Quebec go off the deep end. As a result there had been an atmospheric transformation which put the two sides almost neck-and-neck. I estimated that the situation remained volatile, but that the most probable outcome was a narrow defeat of the Levesque forces with the ‘Yes’ getting between 43 and 47 percent.

For all his public exhortations, Levesque himself was still uncertain of the outcome at that time. He told me at a dinner at our place in late March that he thought they had a chance to win, but spent more time on the implications of outcomes under a 50% majority than on outright victory.

If the result was over 45%, he said, he might call a snap election to press home his advantage. If it fell below that he was afraid he would not even be able to claim a moral victory. In his "Memoirs" Levesque cites an internal poll from that same period, which he may have had in mind, in which the "Oui" came in at only 46%, and was supported by only 55% of francophones, clearly below what was needed to put the PQ over the top.

And that was probably the high point. Toward the end of March Lise Payette, Minister for the Status of Women, called Claude Ryan's wife an 'Yvette', the pejorative nickname for the perfect little pre-feminist housewife. This set off a firestorm of protest, since Madame Ryan was a widely respected woman, and lost the PQ some of the women's vote.

Then came Trudeau's intense federal counter campaign to impress on Quebeckers the high cost they would incur if they went through with this. Finally, early in May, Trudeau himself appeared in Montreal and Quebec City and made three passionate speeches which had a powerful effect.

Trudeau was not unmindful of Quebec's grievances and issues of cultural identity, having been the main promoter of biculturalism - which meant, inter alia, that as a result of his initiatives all English-Canadian officials had to learn French and many groaned for years trying to memorize French phrases.

At the same time Trudeau was an unbending federalist. His performances rallying Quebeckers for the 'No' were brilliant and electrifying, and offered them a new constitutional deal if they rejected sovereignty-association and painting a grim picture of their future if they did not.

Q: Were you able to hear any of his speeches?

JAEGER: The one in Quebec - which involved an awkward and, in retrospect, rather funny incident. Having asked for a reserved seat, I presented myself at the auditorium where he was to speak. After some confusion a young usher took my down some corridors, opened a grey door and said, "In here."

10 feet from me stood Pierre Trudeau concentrating intensely on the historic speech he was about to give. At a respectful distance, another 10 feet or so behind him, stood his cabinet and other Liberal leaders in equally total silence. Trudeau looked at me and for several seconds said absolutely nothing. After what seemed like an eternity, I finally thought, well, I've got to do something. So I said, "I'm George Jaeger, the American Consul General in Quebec." There was another awful pause. Finally he said glacially, "I am Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada!"

Q: Laughter.

JAEGER: I managed to mumble some excuse and beat a hasty retreat, swearing all the way.

Minutes later Trudeau gave an absolutely rousing speech, which had a considerable impact.

Throughout the run-up to the Referendum one of Claude Morin's major objectives, as we discussed earlier, was to keep the US as unconcerned as possible to avoid any last-minute Washington reactions which might frighten fence-sitters to vote "No". Morin, as Jean-Francois Lisée wrote in his hyped, PQ-slanted book "In the Eye of the Eagle" on Washington-Quebec relations, was therefore delighted with the continuing "strategic lassitude" of the Americans who did not even seem to envisage the possibility that the "Yes" might win.

Actually, our reporting did not exclude it, but projected a narrow "No" victory as much more probable. Regardless, I again counseled in a now declassified, then secret telegram of April 14 against being drawn into the Quebec-Ottawa contest, even though, I expected, there would undoubtedly be pressures on us to do so. This was all the more important, since the situation remained volatile and the separatism issue would probably re-emerge in the next Quebec election.

Almost inevitably, the catalyst which brought the issue to the fore was Cyrus Vance's visit to Ottawa on April 23, a month before the Referendum on May 20. A couple of days before his visit one of my colleagues at the Embassy, I think it was Dwight Mason, the Political Counselor, phoned to say that the Trudeau people were urging that Vance make a statement in Ottawa emphasizing our preference that Canada remain united; that it was unclear what Vance would actually do; and suggested that I discreetly warn the Levesque government of this possibility, so that, if he did, it would not come as a complete shock and lead to accusations that we had stabbed the PQ in the back.

Q: Well, that would have put the cat among the pigeons!

JAEGER: That's right. I couldn't think of anything worse than for the US to suddenly get in the middle of this fight and get blamed for the outcome, particularly since it seemed so likely that the 'No' side would win in any case. I therefore used a lunch with Richard Pouliot to pass on a low-key warning, stressing that I had consistently urged that Washington not get involved, but that it was obviously up to the Secretary to decide how to deal with these alleged Canadian pressures.

This apparently rang all the bells, since within hours I was called to a meeting with a visibly agitated Claude Morin, who saw his worst fears of a last-minute US intervention realized. As my recently declassified telegram reported, Morin "earnestly" hoped that the Secretary would finesse the Quebec question during his Ottawa visit, since anything else would produce a wave of anti-Americanism in Quebec, particularly if it was felt that the US had tipped a close Referendum to the 'No'. I made clear that these were precisely the reasons we had decided to alert him and assured him that we would reiterate our longstanding recommendation that the less the Secretary managed to say about the Referendum in Ottawa the better - which I did.

The next day, April 22nd, Morin called me in again and reiterated his and Levesque's "deep concern" over reports that Secretary Vance planned to make a "strong statement" on Quebec during his Canadian visit, which he said they had now confirmed from their own sources in Ottawa.

Levesque wanted us to know that, if he were to win the Referendum, his real intention, which he had so far not shared with others in the PQ, was to proceed gently, not to provoke any avoidable confrontation with Ottawa, but to carry the technical talks only to the point where Levesque could claim that Quebec had achieved a “special status”. He would even settle for some kind of joint representation in foreign affairs, a far cry from what the independentists expected. Once “special status” could be claimed Levesque would then call his promised second referendum to ratify agreements reached and the “Quebec problem would be solved”. Conversely a ‘No’ victory would lead to a permanent psychological stalemate, and francophone backlash against anglophones. If Vance made the rumored statement it would be the “first major foreign intervention”, broadly resented, particularly if the ‘No’ side wins.

In short - and this is a direct quote from the Secret Night Action telegram I sent to Assistant Secretary George Vest, declassified on April 3, 2001, “Levesque wants us to know in strict confidence that he accepts the fact that he will have to take the half loaf he may be able to get, rather than none, and that Quebec’s future should therefore not be a cause for US alarm”.

At the end of this rather dramatic revelation, I told Morin that I understood and reiterated that I would again advise that we avoid getting involved. As I put it in my telegram, “we continue to feel that the US will be best served by referring to our standard position clearly but by indirection since... nothing is to be gained by our becoming a party to this emotion laden issue ourselves...”, a recommendation in which the Embassy again concurred.

Since the Secretary’s party was already on its way to Ottawa by the time this was drafted and typed into our antediluvian code machine, I asked in a caption, which the declassifiers subsequently removed, that it be passed to the Secretary on his plane.

Q: So what actually happened?

JAEGER: As it turned out Vance did not raise Quebec in his prepared statement and then deflected a reporter’s question about American recognition of an independent Quebec, saying this was “a speculative question on which I do not wish to comment. I have already stated that this is a question for the people of Canada to decide. That is all I wish to say.”

Either the rumors picked up by our Embassy and by Morin that a much stronger statement was being urged by Trudeau’s people were groundless, which I doubt, or our interventions had been effective. In either case, Morin and company should clearly have been pleased.

Q: Weren’t they?

JAEGER: Apparently not. Lisée’s book, which appeared in French and English editions in 1990, argues at length that I must have dreamed up this “psycho-drama” and created this “bizarre incident” to make myself locally important, since Ottawa never intended to seek a strong Vance statement and Vance wasn’t really interested in Quebec.

Q: But that doesn’t square with your report of Morin’s statement that they had confirmed these Ottawa pressures from their own sources, and therefore doesn’t explain the high level of

Levesque's concern. Moreover you sent in these urgent high-level telegrams and no one denied their relevance. What happened?

JAEGER: Exactly. In preparing his book Lisée had persuaded the State Department to declassify almost all my reporting telegrams from Quebec, virtually the whole kit and caboodle, even though the information was only ten or eleven years old and many of the people who had shared confidences were still active and alive. I was at no point consulted in this process, and remained unaware of it until his book came out.

Q: Let's get back to that in a moment. You said that they declassified "almost all" your reporting telegrams.

JAEGER: Almost all. Lisée didn't get, and was apparently unaware that he didn't get several key messages which were highly classified or marked for very limited distribution, including the two referred to above, reporting my April 21 and 22 conversations with Morin.

As a result he only had a partial impression of what had happened, and no evidence that I had in fact made an exceptional effort to assure that the US did not make a last-minute intervention which could have affected the outcome and got us blamed for the result.

I should add, in this connection, that the late Professor Jeanne Kissner of SUNY Plattsburgh's Center for Canadian Studies, whose students I had often briefed, vividly recalled that I had once told her this story, and therefore arranged for Lisée and myself to debate the issue before a meeting of the Canadian Studies Association after the French version of his book came out. She subsequently told me that, after hearing my account, Lisée said to her on his way out, "My God, I think this guy is really telling the truth!" However he only toned down and did not correct the subsequent English edition.

Q: How did these key messages eventually get declassified?

JAEGER: Dwight Mason, who had been Political Counselor in Ottawa and was equally outraged by the unfairness of Lisée's book, succeeded on appeal in getting these messages declassified in 2001. Although George Vest is quoted as telling Lisée ten years after the fact that he didn't remember this incident, the record clearly confirms the reality of this potential crisis and my efforts to avoid it.

Q: Did Lisée try to interview you directly at any point?

JAEGER: He phoned me in Vermont after I had retired, I think in 1989, and said he was doing a book on the US role in Quebec. I declined, telling him that the issues were still too sensitive and that my reports on all this were still classified. I wasn't aware of the fact that he already had most of them!

Q: Was his book embarrassing to some people?

JAEGER: Apart from caricaturing me, what I found most deplorable and mean spirited was that Lisée castigated Renee Levesque, who had died in 1987, three years before the book was published, for the extent to which he took me into his confidence.

Levesque certainly liked me. But his frankness, which went beyond beyond what hardline staffers may have thought appropriate, reflected the importance he attached to keeping Washington correctly informed of his assessments and intentions. Lisée, like Parizeau, whose referendum advisor he became in the mid-nineties, was a more radical separatist than Levesque and used this book to castigate Levesque's moderation - perhaps to promote his own career. After the loss of the '95 Referendum and Parizeau's resignation, Lisée stayed on as a senior advisor to Lucien Bouchard but left him, reportedly over disagreements over sovereignty strategy. He has also written other derogatory books about Liberal Premier Robert Bourassa, a rather nice man who happened to be a federalist.

Q: One last question on this. Beyond this immediate issue what was the effect of declassifying so much of your reporting?

JAEGER: Actually it proved to be quite positive. Even Lisée's book admitted that we were surprisingly well informed and on the mark. In her April 21, 1990 review of the book for the 'Globe and Mail', Lise Bissonette, the dean of francophone journalists whom I knew well, went further: "Central to Mr. Lisée's discoveries are the numerous well informed analyses produced by a string of [American] diplomats...who outdistanced most public comment with their clear and exact views on the issue. .. If Washington never cared to give a helping hand to the 'No' forces in 1980, it was because the need was never felt.Quebec's US strategy was dismal....".

Even so, I thought it important to publish a rebuttal of my own in Quebec City's 'Le Soleil', then under the leadership of Morin's former deputy Robert Normand. It appeared that June, albeit in severely pared down form.

Q: When were you sure how the Referendum would come out?

JAEGER: It became clear about a month before the May 20 Referendum that the PQ would lose, not by a hair but by a substantial margin. This raised concerns in Washington that so great a disappointment in the overexcited, passionate atmosphere prevailing in Quebec could lead to now outbreaks of violence reminiscent of the FLQ (Front de libération du Québec or Quebec Liberation Front) crises of the '70's, when Montreal was plagued by mailbox bombs, James Cross, a British Trade Commissioner was kidnapped and Pierre Laporte, the then Quebec Minister of Labor and Vice Premier, was murdered.

The Department therefore instructed me to ask for a private meeting with Levesque to discuss these concerns.

Q: That was a bit tricky, wasn't it?

JAEGER: It was. After the Protocol people had left, I tiptoed into the issue by explaining that I had been asked to see him since we had the impression that he wasn't going to win. He said, very

candidly, that that was his impression too - although, publicly he was still campaigning hard. I then conveyed Washington's concerns and said that the United States very much hoped that he would do what he could to make sure that things ended peacefully. Levesque said that he too had been thinking about this and asked me to assure Washington that, while he was committed to sovereignty-association, his whole effort as the PQ's leader had been that change had to be brought about by constitutional and democratic means and not by violence. Tell them, he said, that I will do my best.

Q: So what happened?

JAEGER: As we now know, the Referendum was lost by about 40% 'Yes' to 60% 'No', leaving it unclear whether the "Yes" had even carried a simple majority of francophone votes...

Q: . . . unlike the '95 Referendum when they had a strong majority of the francophone population, but still lost by a whisker because the anglophones and others were united behind the 'No'.

JAEGER: That's right. In 1980 the francophones remained deeply divided, so that Levesque couldn't even claim that a decisive francophone 'Yes' gave him a mandate to some limited "restoration work in the old federal homestead", as he wrote in his Memoirs. Fear had prevailed, fear of the unknown, of failure, of outside retribution. "We hadn't dared", he wrote sadly, "hadn't been numerous enough to cast off our moorings." It was a bitter pill.

Q: Yes.

JAEGER: Even so, the PQ convened a huge rally in the Sauve Arena in Montreal that night where Levesque made his perhaps most famous speech. He walked on stage before this vast crowd, a modest, self-deprecating man in baggy pants, as they were cheering, singing and waving a sea of Quebec banners in an immensely moving demonstration which, as everyone knew, marked not victory but the end of an era.

When things settled a bit Levesque began to speak sadly but calmly, to the theme that Quebec had pursued, but had not been able to achieve its aspirations. But Quebec was a democracy. Quebecers therefore had the duty to respect the will of the majority. This they should do peacefully and well, until the issue could be raised again. He ended, with tears running down his face, waving to the crowd, by telling them, "A la prochaine" (Till the next time).

Q: Well, that was certainly a demonstration of statesmanlike quality, a lot more so than that of his successors (A reference to Parizeau's outbursts after the Referendum of 1995.)

JAEGER: That's right. It was very moving. The amazing result was that they all went home peacefully. That night at most one or two windows were broken and some gangs roamed the streets yelling and waving flags. But nobody was hurt. Levesque and his deep belief in peaceful democratic change had prevailed, even when he lost.

There was a sequel. A couple of weeks later I saw Levesque in a receiving line. After I greeted him he said with his little wry smile, "Well, George, does your government think I did okay?"

Q: Laughter

JAEGER: I said very sincerely, “Mr. Prime Minister, we’re very grateful!” He said, “So am I.”

So that was the end of the first referendum.

The post-mortems. confirmed that the PQ had failed to reassure a substantial percentage of francophone Quebecers, some of whom feared the economic consequences of separation from the rest of Canada, while others remained torn between their loyalty to Canada and the PQ cause. All this, of course, produced the predictable morning-after recriminations, ranging from moderates who blamed Levesque’s too complicated and unclear question, to the hard liners, like Parizeau, who still argued rather irrationally, that he should have called for outright separation. For all of them it was a huge emotional set-back in a nationalist struggle which had, in one way or another, been underway for twenty years.

Symbolic of this time of mourning was Louise Beaudoin’s appearance for lunch at the Consulate a day or so after the Referendum.

Q: She was Morin’s assistant, whom you earlier referred to as the ‘Passionaria’?

JAEGER: That’s right, a thin, intense, amazingly attractive woman, whose green eyes mesmerized a long series of men.

She turned up in a startlingly revealing T-shirt, with little or nothing underneath, announcing:” Monsieur le Consul General, Je m’en vais a la monastere!” (Consul General, I am going to a nunnery!)

My cook, who had gone to open the door, was so rattled he dropped his tray of hors d’oeuvres!

Q: Laughter

JAEGER: Well, she didn’t go into a nunnery. She actually went to work for Air Canada in Paris, then served as a Quebec Minister for implementation of French language Laws, which she did with gusto, and as Quebec’s Intergovernmental Affairs Minister. But her depression was symptomatic of the time.

The next chapters were intertwined and continued to pose major reporting challenges. Almost immediately after the Referendum Trudeau, who wanted to capitalize on Levesque’s loss of the Referendum and ‘solve’ the Quebec problem for good, launched his great constitutional project to “repatriate” the constitution from Westminster: Including his pet project, an American-style Bill of Rights for all Canadians, which would have had the effect of weakening provincial powers in critical areas like, education, culture and over the language issue. Levesque and several other provincial Prime Ministers opposed this perceived infringement of provincial powers from the outset, formed the famous “Gang of Eight” and battled Trudeau for eighteen months.

I will spare this record a detailed constitutional discussion of the ins and outs of this prolonged and complicated contest which went through several phases:

- The rejection of Trudeau's repatriation proposal by the Newfoundland Supreme Court and its referral to the Canadian Supreme Court.
- The negotiation of the Vancouver formula by the "Gang of Eight Provincial Premiers", which would have provided that any amendment of the Constitution would require approval by the federal parliament as well as by seven provincial legislatures representing 50% of the population; a provision sufficient to protect Quebec and others, in return for abandonment of unilateral provincial 'vetoes' - a huge concession by Levesque.
- The argument as to whether to 'opt' out, a Province would have to have a two thirds majority in its legislature as against a plain majority, as Levesque insisted.
- The Supreme Court's somewhat Delphic decision, which said that Trudeau's project was legal, albeit not in accord with convention.
- Trudeau's last-minute proposal that, if there was no agreement he would settle for repatriation and provide two years to negotiate the Charter of Rights and the amending formula; and, if this failed, a nation-wide referendum would be held, subject, however, to the unlikely prior approval of all the Provinces a tempting proposal which undermined the provinces' common front.

The denouement came on November 5, 1981, when Levesque, Morin and Louis Bernard discovered that all the other provinces had, during the night, agreed to a watered-down deal with Trudeau while Levesque was at his hotel in Hull, a Quebec town across the river from Ottawa. The critical point for Levesque was not only that they had agreed to eliminate financial compensation for opting out of a provision, a point of make or break importance for Quebec, but that the deal had been struck behind his back. Trudeau abetted by a number of other provinces had, in effect, surreptitiously engineered a situation in which the final provisions of the repatriation of the constitution from Westminster was agreed without Quebec's presence and over its objections.

Levesque stormed out of the meeting, leaving behind a trail of four letter words directed at Trudeau and the other Prime Ministers of Canada and raged for weeks thereafter. The National Assembly and the PQ Press resonated with accusations of stabs in the back, betrayal and so on. It was a critical turning point. From then until Levesque's departure as Premier he was a bitter man. What had been a politically challenging and demanding game for most of the period before the referendum had turned into a sour, vindictive discourse with Trudeau.

Q: Did Quebec ever approve the new Canadian Constitution?

JAEGER: No. When Queen Elizabeth II came to Canada on April 17, 1982 to proclaim Canada's new Constitution, it was the crowning moment for Trudeau. But Quebec was absent, and the Quebec government under neither party has approved it since.

Q: You said this and other issues were intertwined?

JAEGER: Yes, most importantly the elections which Levesque had called for April 1981, unaware that this would also be a critical week in the ongoing constitutional saga.

Briefly put, Levesque had assumed that, after losing the Referendum, his dispirited PQ would be trounced in the elections as well. As it turned out, our reporting picked up on the fact that Quebec voters made a clear distinction between their views on separatism and their feelings about the PQ as a competent governing party. There may also have been a sympathy vote by francophones who had voted "No" but wanted the PQ to stay in power to push their interests.

For all these reasons, Ryan's efforts to capitalize on his referendum victory collapsed and the PQ not only won but increased its seats in the National Assembly by 12%, allowing Levesque to stay in power until 1985. In contrast to the Referendum, when the PQ lost 60% - 40%, they won the election with a popular vote of 49.5% against the Liberals' 46%. Even so, the joy was short-lived in view of the brewing constitutional crisis and looming new problems with Quebec's economy.

It all made for fascinating but heavy reporting, which earned all sorts of commendations. If I remember we sent out something on the order of 170 telegrams a year, a huge number considering Irma Scott, my wonderfully competent and patient Secretary and Communications Officer, had to code them all by hand on a rattling World War II vintage code machine.

Q: Well, that was certainly a tense and demanding time. What about some of the other issues that you were concerned about?

JAEGER: There were all sorts of them. A persistent one, then and during my brief follow-on assignment in Ottawa, was acid rain which adversely affected Quebec's and Canada's forests and lakes. I also helped an expert from Washington negotiate a Social Security Agreement with Quebec, a complex negotiation somewhat inconsistent with our position that we only dealt state-to-state with Ottawa, but necessary due to Quebec's separate social welfare arrangements.

Another major theme was electricity, since Vermont and the New England electricity people were negotiating a major new long-term contract with Hydro-Quebec. The general feeling was that long term electricity export arrangements between Quebec and the United States were in everyone's interest since we needed the power and the Quebec government was interested in making the most of the surpluses Hydro-Québec was able to produce, although there were differences between them for a while as to how much power it would be prudent to export.

My role was mainly to make sure that the Commerce Department and other federal agencies in Washington, including the State Department, were carefully kept abreast of these discussions. A side benefit was that I came to know Claude Decoteaux, a thoughtful and kindly young Deputy Minister of Energy, who has remained a lifelong friend. I also had several opportunities to fly up

to James Bay to see Hydro-Quebec's installations half way to the Arctic, where existence gets so tough that hundred-year-old trees only achieve a diameter of a few inches. The dams and turbine plants are vast, exploit water reservoirs backed up over hundreds of square miles, and can still be expanded further. Its strange to realize how much of our energy comes from so far away and barren a place and how badly we will all need these clean energy resources in the future.

Q: The feeling now is that Vermont paid too much, since electricity prices declined for a number of years.

JAEGER: I have heard that said, but everyone at the time thought they had negotiated a reasonable long-term deal. Obviously its hard to foresee how prices will trend over a twenty or thirty year period.

Q: Did you ever meet Governor Dick Snelling who negotiated this deal for Vermont?

JAEGER: Of course. Snelling was in Quebec city frequently and we became good friends. He was a wonderful bear of a man, broadly informed, pragmatic, articulate and respected. I made a point of being advised by the Protocol people when he was coming and had several delightful lunches and dinners for him and his wife Barbara. I met him again, as we'll see further on, when I was at NATO, and, then when we came to Vermont for my last assignment as Diplomat in Residence at Middlebury College, when he and Barbara had us for a family dinner which he cooked himself!

Q: Did the PQ try to influence him on the independence question?

JAEGER: Morin's Ministry no doubt wanted to, and sometimes tried to entertain important American visitors without giving them a chance of getting more balanced briefings at the Consulate. But we reached an understanding early on that it was only appropriate that the US representative in Quebec should be made aware of important American visitors.

Partly as a result, we had constant briefings for visitors, ranging from War College classes, University groups, members of Congress, Governors of New England and other States, journalists, business people and even plain tourists. Although time-consuming, these many visits were also useful pegs for inviting Quebec contacts for receptions, lunches or small gatherings. We even had a California wine tasting once, which was a great success, although the Quebec alcohol monopoly remained unpersuaded and committed to buying primarily French wines.

Q: Your reference to Governor Snelling raises the question of any relationship you had with the organization of New England Governors and Northeastern Canadian provincial premiers which met regularly every year.

JAEGER: I went to several of these meetings. They met, and still meet, each year in a different places to discuss regional issues like transport, commerce, communications, electricity, fishing - whatever needs cross-border communication.

Q: I know, I came to one at Sugar Bush in Vermont.

JAEGER: I was at one in Nova Scotia and then again at Basin Harbor, on Lake Champlain. Besides the fact that the Levesques had a rather loud family argument which kept us awake that night in an adjoining cabin ...

Q: Laughter]

JAEGER: ... that meeting helped mitigate a longstanding, bitter argument between Quebec and Newfoundland over the price Quebec paid for power produced at Newfoundland's Churchill Falls dam and power station.

Q: What was that all about?

JAEGER: When this installation was first built, Newfoundland had to get Quebec's permission to move this electricity across Quebec to the US market. Quebec drove a hard bargain with Newfoundland's Premier Joseph Smallwood, the father and driving force behind Churchill Falls, resulting in a 75-year deal that Newfoundlanders long considered to be utterly unfair because of the low and unchangeable rate that Newfoundland and Labrador receives for the substantial amounts of electricity bought by Hydro-Quebec.

So, to get back to the Basin Harbor meeting, all of a sudden a Vermont State Police boat appeared. The premier of Newfoundland, Brian Peckford and Rene Levesque came out, jumped into the boat, and roared off across lake together. Excitement mounted as they stayed out for a couple of hours. As it turned out, it was during this boat ride that the foundation was laid for reconsidering these arrangements and creating a more harmonious relationship between the two provinces.

Q: Another subject. What were the PQ's relations with the 'Francophonie' and with francophone and other linguistic minorities elsewhere?

JAEGER: The Morin Ministry attached great importance to this and had major programs to strengthen relations and encourage cooperation with other francophone groups, including those in the US, in Maine and Louisiana. Obviously the main emphasis was on their "diplomatic" relations with France and members of the French-sponsored 'francophonoi', which occasionally produced issues with the Canadian foreign office and Canadian Embassies. In addition, I discovered they assisted and encouraged other irredentist movements around the world by giving them how-to-do-it advice.

Q: Just as the French were advising Quebec City, Quebec City was going to advise others?

JAEGER: Yes. I ran across this one day when I walked into the Chateau Frontenac and found to my amazement that it was full of Walloons, Basques and irredentists from the Val d'Aosta in northern Italy and elsewhere. People from Morin's Ministry were giving talks as to how far to push on various issues without getting in serious trouble with their government, how to run effective propaganda operations etc., in effect offering them an irredentist training program. It wasn't a covert effort, but clearly unpublicized.

Q: Did it get into anything you might call abetting terrorism?

JAEGER: I would doubt that, given Levesque's strong commitment to achieving independence democratically and within the law. This and related programs did show, however, that there was a broader dimension to PQ separatism, which placed it in the context of mutually supportive independentist or nationalist movements elsewhere. Indeed one of the concepts occasionally discussed during those years was that even the US might, in time, resolve itself into several linguistic entities, predominantly French, English, Spanish etc. which they thought would be helpful to Francophone Quebec.

Q: That's fascinating. Did you have any other indications of this sort?

JAEGER: Yes. Among our periodic visitors were groups of French-speaking fellow citizens from Louisiana, who made subsidized visits to Quebec and were given talks, not only about the PQ's cause but their own French identity and how they could strengthen it through education, cultural activities etc. to gain greater influence. I always gave a reception for them and found them a very pleasant and lovely group of Americans.

Nevertheless, the more ideologically vigorous Independentists in the Ministry somehow kept thinking that if they could just run more effective programs in Louisiana or in Maine that they might, in time, gain the kind of American domestic constituency for their cause that Israel had gained through parts of the Jewish community in the United States.

Q: Was there any contact between Quebec City and French cultural groups in Vermont, similar to Louisiana, that you know of?

JAEGER: Yes, there were, but not on the scale of their efforts in Maine or Louisiana, where they ran quite substantial programs.

Maine's response to all this was very clever. Joe Brennan, the Governor of Maine at the time, appointed a Special Representative to Quebec, a francophone who came up regularly, called on everyone and facilitated a good deal of Maine's business in the Province. In addition he arranged for large convoys of buses to bring French Maniacs to Quebec Winter Carnival each year and encouraged the Quebec government to put on a good entertainment program for them, so that they would all have a good time. Maine, in effect, joined the party and, while diluting the PQ's political and propaganda, got some of its own business done.

Q: How about US academia and the media? Were they too propaganda targets?

JAEGER: Of course. I first became aware of this when a well-respected Professor of Canadian Studies told me that the Ministry had offered his Institute regular subsidies in return for sympathetic treatment of the separatist cause. I gradually realized that this was not an isolated case, but was part of a systematic program to get friendly treatment from academics and journalists in the Canadian field. I even had a case where an academic had been told that his payments would be reduced, because the Ministry officials involved were displeased with his

performance! When asked for advice, which I sometimes was, I would urge them not to take influence money in the first place, although I would not have been surprised if Ottawa had not been doing the same thing on behalf of their cause.

Q: Well, isn't this done by countries all over the world? The Japanese have been particularly prominent in funding Japanese studies and journalistic coverage.

JAEGER: Of course. The point at the time was that Quebec was not a sovereign country but a province in the process of trying to break up Canada, an outcome the US did not favor. While I reported these and other Ministry operations in the US, they were never very effective - even though Morin's people pursued them vigorously as part of their rather grandiloquent effort to 'neutralize' the US.

JAEGER: Another, more pesky issue involved American films. Both Ottawa and the Levesque Cultural Ministry were pressing for a severe cutback of American films. Quebec not only wanted to reduce our linguistic footprint, even though English-language films were usually sub-titled, but wanted to reduce competition for their small but growing French-language movie industry.

Q: Well this is part of the whole Canadian resentment of American cultural imperialism and of the inundation of the Canadian media with American content.

JAEGER: I understood this and personally sympathized to some extent. The trouble was that, as a result of heavy pressure in Washington by our film industry, I had very firm instructions. I was to go around, and rattle doors and try to persuade them to be more reasonable.

Being a good soldier I did, and in this case, overplayed my hand. I know I annoyed the then Culture Minister and others by repeatedly making our case. After several months of unproductive back and forth I was flying with Levesque to an electricity meeting in the States one day. He looked at me and said, "Look George. We've got your point about films. No Way. Tell your government, and stop yakking about it."

Q: Laughter

JAEGER: I had obviously got under everybody's skin and told Washington that I had done my best. Even so we succeeded in averting de facto expropriation of our film industry in Quebec and contributed to an emerging compromise.

Then there was the Landry incident. After his devastating constitutional setbacks in '81, Levesque decided that the PQ should make one more determined independence try, which eventually foundered. Even so one of its tactical themes - of encouraging the impression of some kind of new triangular Quebec-US-Ottawa relationships, which would imply a special status for Quebec -produced a minor crisis. As my notes from this period record, I thought I had neutralized this idea in meetings with Morin, Levesque, Parizeau and others. It was further discouraged in a moderately worded Department statement which we prepared and placed in the 'Globe and Mail'. It nevertheless came to head as a result of a public statement by Commerce Minister Bernard Landry early in 1983, suggesting the creation of a Quebec-US-Canada

“common market”.

Q: He was a bit ahead of his time, before NAFTA.

JAEGER: What Landry promoted was not a Canada - U.S. free trade agreement in which the Province of Quebec would play its part, but a triangular arrangement between Quebec, the US and Canada, as between equals. As such it reflected Quebec's interest in replacing its constricting Canadian trade arrangements with full and unhampered access to the US market; a breakthrough which, as Parizeau once said to me, would give it 'de facto' independence.

Q: I see. so what happened?

JAEGER: Well, as soon as I read Landry's statement I realized that if the US did not respond we would be seen as having passively acquiesced, an acquiescence Landry and others would then exploit further.

Q: Which would have made a major step towards separatism?

JAEGER: Precisely. I made this point in urgent messages to the Department and Ottawa asking for permission to issue a rather sharp statement, in which the United States repudiated any such idea and reemphasized the traditional policy that we have our relations with Canada, which we hoped would stay strong and united, and not with individual provinces.

My draft was promptly approved, issued as a press release and made headlines across Quebec and Canada. That the United States should publicly intervene came as a considerable shock to the PQ, and particularly to Landry, who responded by denying that he had ever said what we thought he had said, or at least that he didn't mean it in the way we had interpreted it.

Q: So he retracted?

JAEGER: In a confused sort of way, yes. Certainly it put an end to that idea, and did not overly damage my own relations with the Levesque government, since, I gathered, even Landry's cabinet colleagues thought he was grandstanding and considered that keeping the peace with Washington was more important than grabbing headlines over hypothetical issues.

Q: Did that hurt his career?

JAEGER: May be in the short run. He was certainly very angry with me personally. However, in spite of his reputation as an ambitious, sometimes abrasive eager beaver he was talented and persistent. He became the undisputed number two in Bouchard's government and succeeded him as a not very successful and controversial Premier of Quebec in 2001.

Q: Did the Ambassador ever show up in Quebec during this difficult period?

JAEGER: My first Ambassador, former Maine Governor Ken Curtis, came at least twice after my arrival...

Q: ...I remember Curtis. I met him in the '60s when he was a very close friend of Phil Hoff, the then Governor of Vermont.

JAEGER: Yes, he was a very dear man. It was probably because of Curtis's confidence in me that I was able to play the role in Quebec that I played during this time. He could have reined me in and made me clear everything I did. Instead he and Dick Smith, his highly competent Deputy Chief of Mission, gave me wide latitude throughout that period, which Smith continued when Paul Robinson became Ambassador in June 1981.

Q: More than is usual for a Consul General?

JAEGER: Much more. My understanding is that recent incumbents were told by the Embassy when and what to report, which is, of course, totally counterproductive and inhibiting. Good reporting and analysis, and the development of sound recommendations, are creative acts, tied to one's perception and understanding of the evolution of events...

Q: Particularly in Quebec which is such a distinctive cultural and political community. Ottawa people aren't going to have a very fine sense about it...

JAEGER: I think that's often the case, since the political people assigned there usually don't speak French or have the time or inclination to follow Quebec affairs in any detail.

Q: Has this been a problem all along, the lack of French language capability in the American Embassy in Ottawa?

JAEGER: I shouldn't speak for the present, because I don't know. But traditionally Ottawa has often been used as a place to assign people who, for one reason or another, need to be close to the US, rather than for their language skills. What's more, Embassies usually reflect the atmospherics of the places they are in, in this case Canada's predominantly English culture.

Q: Is there a certain analogy with the Consulate in Zagreb, when you served there years earlier, since the Croatians had their own ethnic identity vis-a-vis the Belgrade Serbs?

JAEGER: Joe Godson in Zagreb also played a fairly strong role in my time there. On the other hand, Tito was in firm national control and Croatia, at that point, was not trying to break away. Moreover, all the substantive officers in Belgrade and Zagreb had Serbo-Croatian language training, so the situation is not really analogous.

Q: Can you think of any others which are?

JAEGER: There are lots of situations where we have strong Consulates General, although each is unique and much depends on the context and the personalities of the Ambassador and the Consul General. For instance, as things calmed down in Quebec there was less need to give the post special status. This is reflected, and there's no disrespect intended, by the fact that most recent Principal Officers assigned there have been career consular officers.

Q: How did things develop after Paul Robinson's arrival?

JAEGER: Well, it was a new ball game. Robinson, was a big bluff man with a strong personality, given to wearing boots and leather belts with silver buckles. He had been a naval officer in the Korean war, proud of his work at the time with the Canadian navy. After the war he had founded a large and successful insurance brokerage firm and more recently been Ronald Reagan's Republican finance chairman in Chicago. He often stressed his Loyalist Canadian ancestry, loved English Canada, was a passionate and vocal anti-communist, considered the PQ subversive and often felt compelled to give unsolicited advice to the Canadians - not only in diplomatic circles, but, to the Embassy's distress, on radio, television and what have you. He was also noted for his capacity to drink good whiskey and had a rather nice wife with a somewhat '50ish beehive hairdo. Many Canadians, including many in government, thought he was simply off the wall, although, in spite of his frequent bluster and indiscretions, he produced a sort of love-hate relationship, since people somehow recognized that he really cared about Canada, which was endearing and more than could be said for certain of his predecessors. From the Embassy's and my perspective he was of course a challenge.

Q: Well, this raises a question I've had in the back of my mind from some of my own observations at meetings in anglophone Canada, that it is hard for Americans to keep in mind that they're in a foreign country.

JAEGER: Precisely, and particularly Americans who are not trained to international sensitivities. Robinson was a self-made man in a muscular business and, as Illinois Finance Chairman, had major Republican credentials. He was one of the few people who could pick up the phone and ask to speak to Ronald Reagan. That gives you a lot of moxie. Sometimes after they had talked on the phone, he would come into Embassy staff meetings and say, "Well, I talked to the President last night, and we both agreed that I should make it clear to the Canadians..." The next thing you knew he was on television making whatever it was clear to the Canadians, leaving the rest of us all over Canada picking up the pieces and dealing with the fallout.

Q: You must have worried what he would say in Quebec during these very agitated periods?

JAEGER: I worried a great deal, and did what I could to delay his visit, arguing that the time wasn't right for this or that reason. My procrastinations, as well as distractions in Ottawa worked for a considerable time with Dick Smith's delicate and important help. Then, in the spring of '82, history took the matter out of my hands when Robinson got himself an invitation to go to sea with the Canadian navy, which he loved. He went off to Halifax, had a wonderful time over several days on the bridge of a Canadian frigate, had himself conveyed to another ship on a breeches buoy in heaving seas, almost fell in, and, with the huzzahs of his naval hosts still reverberating, arrived happily and excited in Quebec.

I had organized what you might describe as a minor state dinner in his honor, which Levesque mercifully declined, but which did include some of the least ideological or combative PQ Ministers. I studded the rest of the table with polite opposition leaders and other interesting people, like Quebec's Mayor Jean Pelletier, who couldn't possibly give offense, in the hopes that

we could somehow get through this dinner mellifluously and without incident. It all went well for a while. Our dining room was resplendent in candle light. The food was superb. And all seemed serene until the very moderate, civilized and pro-American Social Affairs Minister, Pierre-Marc Johnson (who briefly succeeded Levesque following his resignation in 1985) said something about Quebec social policy of which Robinson disapproved and led him to boom across the table, "It's Commies like you who are the reason why the United States is opposed to Quebec independence!"

Q: Good Lord! There goes all your diplomacy.

JAEGER: Well, not really, because most of them understood this wasn't to be taken seriously and pretended nothing had happened. As for the Ambassador, he enjoyed the dinner thoroughly, and after the guests had left stayed on for what turned out to be some serious drinking.

For me this became the crucial moment, since he had sent word just before going to sea with the Canadians, that, as part of Ronald Reagan's budget cutting drive, he had decided to close down my Consulate General! "This bunch of Commies," as he put it to me that evening over his third Scotch, didn't deserve a fine officer like me! My task that night was to somehow persuade him otherwise on the grounds that the United States would need this listening post at the heart of francophone Quebec for decades to come and that closing us down, as the British had closed their Consulate, would be a huge tactical mistake.

Q: Now the British were there when you arrived, but they closed down?

JAEGER: Yes, also for budget reasons. They concentrated their work in Montreal, which is what he had in mind.

Q: Well, I am all tenterhooks. You apparently succeeded?

JAEGER: What followed was one of those wonderful, unforgettable scenes, with the two of us sitting on opposing sofas getting sloshed together. I made my case as best I could until well after midnight, when, with both of us pretty far gone in our drinking, I noticed that he had fallen sound asleep. It was a bit awkward, since I could hardly go to bed and leave the Ambassador sitting there with his big toe protruding from a hole in his sock.

All of sudden he roused himself, looked at me a little blearily and said, "Okay George, you can keep your goddamn Consulate. I guess we do need you here. You're doing a great job. Keep it up. Keep those Commies in line." With that he fell asleep again until I put him to bed.

Q: Laughter

JAEGER: And that's how we saved the American Consulate General in Quebec which is still going strong. Somehow, even though there had been that outburst at dinner, he got the point that having our people there was in fact important for the United States in the long-term. I am sure Dick Smith and others at the Embassy had helped as well.

The remarkable thing was that Ambassador Robinson seems to have respected me for the hard fight I had put up, which a year or so later led him to invite me to come to the Embassy as his Political Counselor. Of that, more later.

Q: We haven't talked of the management side of things. Was that a challenge?

JAEGER: One of the first things which struck me when I arrived was the condition of our offices. The building itself is as an architectural gem, wonderfully sited across a little park from the Chateau Frontenac and fronting on the boardwalk of the St. Lawrence River. Its shell goes back to the 18th century but was extensively modified, expanded and restored in the late '30s or early '40s to suit the needs of a small consular outpost of that time. Nothing much had been changed to the time I arrived. The Consular office was still a rather small space, dominated by the long green linoleum counter which confronted you as you came in from the park side, then the building's only entrance; behind which our four local employees performed their consular tasks, totally unprotected. On one side was a little office for the consul and the vice-consul. On the other, a low swinging double door like in a bar, led into a larger room, the equally unprotected inner sanctum of the Consul General.

There were other problems besides lack of security and privacy for people being interviewed. In the winter, and often in the spring and fall as well, our floors were a sea of slippery slush or mud, since everyone came in with dripping boots and overcoats; and, since there was no adequate waiting space, the place was often overcrowded and so smelled to high heaven. In short the consulate was hardly representational, was inefficiently arranged and left all of us without protection against any troublemaker.

Q: Were there ever any incidents?

JAEGER: One very close call when a Quebec film company was making a movie, 'The Plouffes', a spoof about the lives of a very typical Quebec family. We had agreed to let them put up an antenna on our roof, which they needed for some technical reasons for shooting some scenes on the boardwalk outside. I had forgotten all about this, when one day a tough-looking guy in a black turtleneck sweater, black trousers and black shoes burst into my office and without further explanation shouted, "Take me up to the roof! Take me up to the roof!"

I had a tear gas spray can in my right hand drawer, my only security device. I reached for it, having no idea what this was about, and almost knocked this guy out, until it dawned on me that he was talking about the film antenna on the roof. I said, "Are you from the film company?"

He said, "Yes, of course. Hurry up! Hurry up! It's not working, and they're filming!"

Q: Laughter

JAEGER: I said, "Buddy, you are very lucky that I realized this in time!" In an age when there were real risks of terrorism, particularly in Quebec's then hyper-charged atmosphere, the incident underscored that we were hardly secure.

So, for all the above reasons I worked up a plan to turn our offices into an attractive, secure and efficient space. The key was to make use of our extensive unused basement, which was a warren of storage rooms, full of newspapers and files going back to World War II, when the Consulate General had played a key role because of the critical importance of the St. Lawrence for US naval and submarine units fighting in the Atlantic. We found all sorts of records, newspaper files, photos and clippings - which I hope have been preserved - of American and Canadian naval officers and, of course, of social events surrounding the Quebec Conference itself, with Roosevelt and Churchill.

Once we had cleared this space, the plan was to convert this lower floor into the new Consular office, by giving the building a second public entrance on 'Terasse Dufferin' on the river side of our steeply sloping building. I will spare you the details of this process, except to say that in the end we pretty much did the design work ourselves and used an architect primarily for technical issues like plumbing, wiring and so forth.

To get there proved to be a long process. Obtaining the half million dollars we needed from Washington, working out all the security wrinkles, i.e. the number of bullet proof glass doors with high security locks we would need, having everyone agree to our plan, hiring contractors and getting the actual work done all took considerable time.

When, I think it was in 1982, it was finally finished, the upstairs had become a quiet, modern, airy and secure work and reception area, while all the consular work took place in the wholly redesigned, modern and efficient space on the floor below, which now had its own secure door for the public. I was especially pleased with some of the minor touches, which added elegance: The grey stone wall in the otherwise modernistic consular section evoked the material used in many of the buildings of Old Quebec. And the original National Geographic photographs of great American scenes which the Society generously, and exceptionally, donated, made our now elegant first floor waiting and conference space outside the Consul's and Consul General's offices particularly attractive. In sum, it all came out better than we had hoped.

We had a block party for the formal opening on Terasse Dufferin and invited everyone on our guest lists, as well as Dick Smith the DCM in Ottawa.

It was a huge success, there was Quebecois music, lots to eat, everyone had fun and liked our new offices. For some reason which I don't remember, Jacques-Yvan Morin, Claude Morin's rather fussy successor, was the only one who refused to come because he was momentarily offended about something the US had said or done. Our DCM, Dick Smith, said to me on leaving, "You know, I knew this was a tough post, but I didn't realize how tough it was until today!" I appreciated that.

Q: That was certainly a major accomplishment. How about staff morale? Was that ever a problem?

JAEGER: Only occasionally. Quebec's long, very cold winters are hard and confining. And we all worked very hard. But we had TGIF's (thank God it's Friday), the American staff often participated in and contributed substantively to the post's entertainment or joined Pat and myself

at drinks or family dinners. Eric Boswell, my number two when I arrived, spoke good French, which was important, and had developed a wide social circle in Quebec where he and his wife were quite at home. His successor, was I think the least happy, feeling that hers was a largely consular job, which she did well, but she never really lived her way into the charms and complexities of francophone Quebec.

Betsy Anderson, the last of my three Consuls, was the most successful and outgoing of the three. She took a lively interest in Quebec issues and politics, was not shy about speaking and improving her French, related easily to people and often told me the latest joke, or gave me an earful, when she thought I was becoming too involved. She particularly distinguished herself one blustery winter night when a Greenpeace crew was arrested and jailed for allegedly interfering with a seal hunt somewhere far out on the St. Lawrence. She insisted, with my very reluctant consent, on flying out there that night in a small plane, in spite of a pending snow storm, because, as she put it, helping Americans in distress “is my job”. What’s more she sprung them!

She also earned my gratitude for her sensitive and effective management of the consular staff and for setting a fine example to two successive Vice Consuls, one of whom, Frank Urbancic, a genial young man, went on to Arabic training and a Baghdad assignment after Quebec. Another, was also nice but less successful, having, for one thing, never mastered the skill of writing a coherent page.

The heart of the post, as always, were our five local employees who uncomplainingly managed the brunt of the consular work and almost never failed us. My hero of the lot, however, was Mr. Cote, my good hearted old driver and the post’s jack-of-all trades who knew how to fix everything, opened and closed the doors, raised the flag and had the gift of getting our rattly car going even at twenty below zero.

Q: That all sounds like a great adventure. And then you left Quebec for Ottawa?

JAEGER: Yes in August 1983. Ambassador Robinson , with whom I had fought so hard to keep Quebec in business, had clearly come to like and respect me and asked me to be his Political Counselor in Ottawa for a year. I agreed, albeit with some reluctance.

Q: Leaving Quebec must have been an ambivalent experience.

JAEGER: It was, although after four years it was clearly time to move on. The great issues of sovereignty-association and the constitution had been settled, at least for the time being, and it was time for someone new to take up the post. My successor, Lionel Rosenblatt, had distinguished himself in resettling over a hundred thousand Vietnamese refugees, and had made major humanitarian contributions to Khmer refugee resettlement. He became a nationally known figure after he left the Foreign Service in 1990 as President of Refugees International which helped large numbers of refugees in Bosnia, Rwanda and many other global trouble spots.

Still, there were good-byes to be said to the many we had worked with and some who had become close personal friends: Like Mayor Jean Pelletier, who, with extraordinary skill had navigated Quebec City’s fortunes through the clashing political forces of the time and actually

managed to make the place flourish with support from both Ottawa and Rene Levesque. Quebec City's attractive new port and waterfront are among his accomplishments. Pat and I often saw Jean and his thoughtful and wise wife Helene, and have continued our friendship over the years since he was, and then retired as, the powerful Cabinet Director to his friend Prime Minister Jean Chretien. When I left Quebec, he said, "George, a friendship is a conversation which can be interrupted for years and then taken up again exactly where it left off". We have often resumed.

There was James DePreist, the now famous African-American conductor, who in later years was to raise the Oregon Symphony to world status. At the time he was Music Director of the then rather anemic Quebec Symphony Orchestra, struggling with inadequate budgets and latent prejudice because he was not a francophone, although he had mastered the language in short order and even written a small book in French! The nephew of Marian Anderson, and a protégé of Leonard Bernstein, he had contracted polio on a USIA tour to Thailand, which left both his legs useless and forced him to conduct perched on a thin metal chair. He was a huge capacious man, warm, passionate and intensely perceptive. He and his lovely Quebecois wife Ginette became and remained lifelong friends. I will never forget his struggle to perform Mahler's 8th Symphony in Quebec, a vast work requiring many more performers than his Board would sanction. So he went out to high schools and colleges, collected a pick-up crew of promising young musicians, rehearsed them intensively for three months, and then put on an overwhelmingly powerful performance which left his audience cheering! He was by far our best Ambassador!

There were others who had become part of our lives, including General Francois Richard and his wife Marie, the first-rate commander of Vallecartiers, the Canadian Army base outside Quebec City, who had taken me out on winter maneuvers and helped me understand Quebec from the perspective of francophones who are also passionate Canadians. We were to meet again shortly when he, as a two star, became Canada's representative on NATO's Military Committee.

Lastly, there was, of course, Rene Levesque, whom I had probably cost a percent or two in the referendum and sometimes differed with on other issues. He received me late one afternoon in his office for my good-bye call, to my surprise surrounded by his wife, Corinne, and a dozen or so other PQ heavyweights, dressed in his favorite safari jacket, with a bottle of Scotch before him on his desk.

After I had thanked him for his many kindnesses to me, he looked at me with a little grin and said, "You know, George, you are a son of a bitch, but you are my favorite son of a bitch!" We had an odd but real friendship, and knowing him, not as the 'bete noir' he was to so many English Canadians, but as a three-dimensional Quebec nationalist who passionately saw to it that his movement remained constitutional and democratic, had been a revelation.

The Levesque I remember was a warm, caring, vulnerable man of enormous talent and many human failings, who had a pretty clear vision of the world, just wanted to right the wrongs that had been done to French Quebec, but ran into forces he could not democratically overcome. When I am in Montreal these days and cross Avenue Rene Levesque I still see him clearly, a charming, self-deprecating, vulnerable and indomitable leader, a clown, laughing or sad,

gesticulating with his endless cigarettes, and inspiring his people when he spoke to them from the heart in language that moved and which they could understand.

Q: So then you were off to your new job in Ottawa?

JAEGER: Oddly enough, once again by car! We found a lovely old brick house on Prince Street in Rockcliffe, the 'nicest' suburb of Ottawa, Christina was happily enrolled in nearby Elmwood School and so settled quickly into Ottawa's comparatively serene routine. As Political Counselor I now had much greater scope than I had had in Quebec, since I was now responsible for all the issues which affected Canadian political relations with the United States, Canadian domestic politics and following Canadian issues globally. Since we were in substantial agreement on many of them, and some of the more difficult issues were handled by the Department and the Canadian Embassy in Washington, the workload was large but manageable.

Even so, I was limited by the fact that I was a one man band, having at most one junior officer to help on a sporadic basis. There was also awkwardness from the outset in my relations with John Rouse, the new DCM who had succeeded my friend and mentor Dick Smith, a nice precise man with sharp pencils and polished eyeglasses who, as Pat said perceptively, was a 'beige' personality. Although a veteran of Canadian affairs, he somehow lacked 'grandezza del animo' and tended to do things impeccably but by the book.

My relationship with the Ambassador, on the other hand, was more productive, since, in spite of our diametrically different world and political views, he clearly liked me and trusted my advice. I would see him frequently, often using his backdoor, which bypassed the front office, for a private chat; and was on several occasions able to talk him out of explosive statements he wanted to make which would again have rocked the Canadian scene. Part of this perilous balancing act involved invitations to the Residence, either for official occasions or for more private evenings with a few other key people. The image which sticks in my mind is of this big, bluff man wearing a train conductor's cap, delivering his guests' drinks with a hoot and a clang of the bell of his super-sized toy railway which coiled through every room on the Residence's second floor! It was the talk of Ottawa!

Q: He sounds like the model political appointee! On a different note, did people in Ottawa seem interested in your experience in Quebec?

JAEGER: I am glad you asked. Tony Price and his wife, who were among the remaining 'anglo' aristocracy in Quebec City, had given us a farewell party at their lovely place on the Isle d'Orleans, at which they asked if we knew anyone in Ottawa and kindly offered to drop a line to introduce us to some of their friends. As a result, we had a number of very elegant and high-level invitations shortly after our arrival.

What became apparent at all of them was that most of the anglo-Canadian elite didn't really understand or, for that matter, like Quebec. I particularly remember a sparkling dinner party with several Deputy Ministers and other 'Mandarins' at which our rather famous host turned to me and said, "Well, Mr. Jaeger, you have just spent some time in Quebec, tell us about it" - as if

Quebec were a subsection of Baluchistan! I couldn't help my probably impolite reply, " But Minister, this is your country. I should ask you that question!"

To be fair, there were many Canadians who followed the issue fairly and with real interest. Even so, Ottawa confirmed the adage that Canada consists, or at least consisted, of 'Two Solitudes'.

Q: That's sort of what I expected, What was the Foreign Office like?

JAEGER: That was also a bit of a shock, since we were not received with the kind of warmth you would have expected, given the general friendship between Canadians and Americans.

The Canadians certainly are our closest allies and biggest trading partners and share our longest open border. Even so, official contacts were generally cautious, since the Foreign Office people consistently tended to see us as the big elephant - we were at the time 250 to their 25 million people - which, when it coughs, can give them pneumonia. So no matter what the issue was, they wanted to make quite sure that they would not be perceived as knuckling under and that we dealt with them as equals. I gradually learned to expect that chip on the shoulder, but it took some getting used to. By contrast, once you were with people outside of the Foreign Office realm, relations could not have been warmer and more friendly.

Q: What were the major issues?

JAEGER: Acid rain, fisheries and our joint projects in the Great Lakes, somewhat in that order.

Q: Acid rain certainly was a major concern in that period, here in Vermont as well. How did it play out in Ottawa?

JAEGER: There were endless, sometimes animated and even angry high-level meetings with senior EPA officials and Deputy Assistant Secretaries, like Tom Niles, who came up from Washington. Much of the talk was technical, but nothing much was resolved, partly I suspect because the Reagan administration wasn't really willing to take on the American polluters and was stalling. The Canadians did, in time, establish an acid rain regime in their country which has helped. But it was not till 2002 that we were to conclude a US-Canadian Air Quality agreement which, together with other initiatives, has helped to mitigate this problem to some extent.

Q: Were the other issues as frustrating?

JAEGER: Pretty much. The complaints and recriminations of the salmon fisheries on both sides of the Pacific border precipitated ongoing discussions without, in my time at least, achieving major breakthroughs. We also had to deal with large and small Great Lakes issues, which laid the groundwork for negotiations in the binational Great Lakes Commission, a slow process which occasionally produced significant results

As to the ongoing battle over cultural relations, i.e. the controversial issue American film and magazine exports to Canada, this proved not to be as demanding as in Quebec since much of it of it was handled by the USIA.

Q: How about the big east-west issues like arms control, which was a major theme in the 1980s?

JAEGER: We were only tangentially involved. Occasionally Washington would ask us to talk to the Canadians about some aspect of the arms control negotiations or the coordination of some position in NATO, the UN or in some other international forum. A highlight was Paul Nitze's visit to brief the Canadians on his INF (Intermediate Nuclear Force) discussions with the Soviets, one of my heroes whom I had come to know first as an intern and later when I was Staff Director of the McCloy Committee. He spoke brilliantly for almost two hours without notes and gave all of us an object lesson of what excellence in this business is all about.

Q: What about the issue of Canadian dealing with Cuba?

JAEGER: It's interesting you should ask that, although I can't recall that we did much finger wagging. I think their enthusiasm for Cuba had waned a bit by then.

Q: This was also a time of great change on the domestic front in Canada.

JAEGER: That was our main focus, since we witnessed the decline of Trudeau and rise of Brian Mulroney, who was elected Prime Minister in September '94 with the largest majority in Canadian history. A powerful rising star, this anglophone Quebecker had defeated accident-prone, pigeon-chested Joe Clark, to become leader of the Conservative Party in June of '83, to the delight of and with, some thought, quite excessive public support of Ambassador Robinson and the Reagan administration in Washington. Be that as it may, these months were largely consumed with reporting of the evolving trends, while Robinson was unabashedly beating the drums in and outside the Embassy for the conservatives.

Q: Did the Consulates General across Canada play a big role in this?

JAEGER: Very much so. There was a steady stream of reporting from Winnipeg, Vancouver, Calgary, Montreal, Quebec and Halifax, as well as much discussion at the annual Principal Officers' Conference, held that year in the Hotel Montebello outside Ottawa, where we could all get together and exchange impressions. The one that stood out that year was our Consul General in Halifax, usually a backwater staffed by lesser lights.

Q: In Halifax?

JAEGER: Yes. Our colleague in Halifax, whose name I am very embarrassed to say I can neither recall nor locate, had just arrived there. He was virtually blind, had a related nervous disorder and was a beneficiary of new legislation prohibiting discrimination against physically handicapped people. The Department provided him with an optical reader, which enlarged letters to a huge size and gave him an additional staff member to read things aloud to him. We were all dubious whether, even with this support, he would be able to manage during a politically very active time. In fact, as I said, he turned out to be the best Consul General of the lot!

Q: Really!

JAEGER: What's more, he had, in his second marriage, married a woman who was also blind! In the weeks after his arrival he went out and visited every Premier in the Maritimes, got to know lots of the cabinet members, business and ordinary people throughout the Provinces and did a voluminous amount of excellent, insightful reporting - in great contrast to his physically splendid, but otherwise lazy predecessor. What's more his blind wife gave skiing instructions (!) to the blind and handicapped, and was equally involved. They were both a great success in the Maritimes and to us an inspiration!

Q: Did you want to extend your assignment in Ottawa?

JAEGER: Not really. I had been in Canada since 1979 and it was time to move on. Various assignments were dangled before me, none of which had much appeal until I was asked if I would like to compete for the job of Deputy Assistant Secretary General of NATO for Political Affairs, working on the staff of Lord Carrington who had just been made Secretary General. I got the job after a two-hour interview in Brussels chaired by my boss-to-be Fredo Dannenbring, a senior German diplomat, the then Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs.

DWIGHT N. MASON
Political Counselor
Ottawa (1980-1983)

Dwight Mason was born in New York, New York in 1939. He attended undergraduate school at Brown University and graduate school at the University of California at Berkeley. He entered the Foreign Service in 1962. His career included positions in Morocco, Colombia, Ecuador, Canada, and Washington, DC. Mr. Mason was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993.

Q: Why don't we talk about...now you went to Ottawa as a political officer?

MASON: Yes, as the Political Counselor.

Q: When did you go?

MASON: I went in 1980, in the summer.

Q: You were running the political section. I would think it would be both a difficult job to be the political counselor in Canada. I mean everybody is reading the news, and we're so close that you don't have the thing when you're translating some unknown society for the Americans. How did you find reporting on Canada?

MASON: I found reporting on Canada to be easy because information was freely available and officials and politicians were easily accessible. I've never served in a post where I had such access at all levels. You could call people up and they'd answer your questions, and you had

never even met them. It was an entirely different world. All countries are unique, and Canada is too. It's our northern neighbor, we have a long history with Canada, a lot of it not so good. Our first arms control agreement was with Canada, demilitarization of the Great Lakes. We didn't do too well in the War of 1812 versus Canada, which they never hesitate to point out. But Canada's only foreign affairs relationship that matters is with us. They're almost completely dependent upon us economically. We take 80% of their exports, for example. Ten percent of the country lives in the United States at any one time; 20% during the Easter break. The largest ethnic minority in New England is from Quebec originally. The relationship is very, very close. No one knows the full dimensions of our relationship with Canada. It is too large, and there are too many players at all levels. For example, there is no complete list of agreements with that country, because the agreements extend not only to treaties, but also to memoranda of understanding between agencies, between pieces of agencies, between states and provinces, between cities, police organizations agreements, and so on. One of the jobs of the political counselor is to try to know as much as possible about that.

We were in the same time zone as Washington which helps considerably in terms of communicating with the USG. The embassy was able to dominate the policy agenda with respect to Canada in Washington most of the time. This was because we were able to exploit the communication system. An officer in the State Department who wants to send a memorandum to say the Secretary of State, or worse, the White House, that officer is faced with a hierarchical project that can take days or weeks. We in the embassy could send a cable anyplace directly. We discovered this was an effective way to communicate. We would work with the desk to present positions to Washington through the cable system to create an opportunity for the desk to exploit. We were able to set the agenda most of the time simply through initiative and by staying ahead of things and offering analysis and policy recommendations before anyone else did.

Q: It's something I haven't heard expressed that way before.

MASON: We discovered it, and then adopted it as a conscious practice. We would consult with the desk, and other places in the government about what we all wanted to get done, and then we would take the lead in pushing a cable on the matter to the appropriate agency and official with copies to the right places. I found both times I was up there that this was an effective strategy to influence policy.

Q: You were there the first time as political counselor from 1980 until when?

MASON: 1983.

Q: What were the main issues that you were dealing with at that time? You were there at the time when there was a change from the Carter to the Reagan administration which must have sent some shock waves through Canada, didn't it?

MASON: Well, the Canadians imagine themselves as more liberal and to the left of Americans; so they tend to assume that they should sympathize with the Democrats. So the election of Reagan did send shock waves which turned out to be unjustified. The relationship, in fact, between the Reagan administration and the government of Canada was a very good one. It's a

truism to say the countries' relationships are determined by their interests, and the interests don't change when a new administration changes.

The problems in Canada that I dealt with as political counselor, were really divided into two parts: one was domestic Canadian politics, that was not a problem as much as a reporting challenge. And the other was various kinds of disputes with Canada, primarily in the area of fisheries, boundaries and some military matters.

In the case of domestic politics, the Province of Quebec has never been happy in its relationship with the rest of Canada, and it had just gone through a referendum on whether it should separate from Canada or not -- I guess a month before I arrived. The voters in the province defeated the resolution, just barely, and it's pretty certain that a majority of francophone voters favored it, by a very slight majority. The issue has never gone away. It's still present. But after the referendum there was a period of euphoria when it was believed that the issue had finally be settled and Canada could move on the other matters. But as it turned out, the question of what kind of a country Canada was to be never really was off the agenda. Prime Minister Trudeau was trying to make it a more unitary country, and it became clear over time that this wasn't in fact what the Canadians really wanted. So throughout my time in Ottawa Canadian domestic politics revolved around this classic issue This subject came into sharp focus in 1982 when Prime Minister Trudeau convened a meeting of the provincial premiers to try to forge an agreement to "repatriate" and amend the Canadian constitution. The Canadian constitution is not a document like the U.S. constitution but then consisted of the British North America Act and certain customs or political conventions. One of these conventions was that the constitution would not be changed without the consent of Quebec. Mr. Trudeau wanted to make the British North America Act a Canadian statute and thus formally end the requirement for legislative action in Westminster when changes were desired. This proposal in itself was not very controversial. What was controversial was the idea of including a Charter of Rights patterned after the U.S. Bill of Rights. Opponents correctly saw that such a Charter would limit the powers of Parliament and the provincial parliaments and increase the power of the courts because it would for the first time give citizens standing to sue on such issues. Thus Quebec, for example, could anticipate suits over its restrictive and anti-English language laws. Quebec therefore opposed the notion of the inclusion of the charter in the constitution on the grounds that it would diminish its ability to protect its French culture.

The long and short of this affair was that the premiers did agree on a proposal except for Quebec. The deal was cut after the Quebec delegation had left the meeting. Naturally, the government of Quebec was infuriated. But Trudeau pressed on and eventually succeeded but at great political cost since Quebec was now an alienated province and the issue of Quebec's place in Canada was once more prominent.

Q: Was there a problem, from your point of view, of trying to keep the United States out of the game? Were people trying to drag us in? Were you having problems with gratuitous statements from the States?

MASON: Yes, there were efforts to drag us in on the part of the government of Quebec. The government of Quebec at that time was a Parti Québécois (PQ) government, and the PQ was the

independence party. That government did try to influence the United States by appealing to New Englanders of Quebec descent (of which there are a great number). This strategy did not work. The Federal Government of Canada, of course, wanted us to stay out of it, and that was our policy. We stated when asked from time to time that the U.S. hoped to see a strong and united Canada, but whatever Canadians wanted to do with Canada was their business. It's still our policy.

Q: Trudeau, particularly during the Vietnam war, had been sort of a thorn in our side. How did we view Trudeau at this stage of the game?

MASON: Trudeau had been Prime Minister at that point for almost 15 years. He was the senior prime minister in the western world. The man is brilliant, and we recognized the man's brilliance, and his experience, but we were impatient with his advice at times, sermonizing, and his needles. But we also recognized that he had a tough domestic political row to hoe, that Canada really is a minor Power, that it doesn't usually matter what foreign policy positions Canada takes because it can do nothing about most of them -- that it's mostly posturing. We knew that Trudeau had to assert policy independence from us for political reasons and that this situation is a basic Canadian problem. We knew that Canada would be there when it really did matter; so, our policy was one of patience although that was not always easy. Furthermore at that time, most people in Canada opposed our policy in Vietnam and American draft dodgers were being welcomed into Canada as refugees. This grated on us and made relations more difficult. The Canadians see themselves, I think not entirely accurately, as a different from Americans in the sense that they are more socially conscious and orderly than Americans. Canadians are preoccupied with their national identity or lack of it. The general English-Canadian view is that Canadians are primarily not Americans. This is a rather weak and negative world view, it is constantly commented on in a hand wringing sense. The origin of this self-image is the outcome of the Revolution. The first large group of immigrants to arrive in English Canada were loyalists leaving the U.S. They were on the losing end of the Revolution and were anxious to justify their often very unfortunate economic situation by differentiating themselves from the rebel Americans. This attitude persists today particularly in Southern Ontario. It has been augmented by envy because the big leagues are always to the south and Canadian influence in world terms is marginal. This marginal status is exacerbated by the fact that they are located right next to us, and it is rubbed in every day. Curiously, the latest real wave of U.S. immigrants was the Vietnam group, and they have reinforced this anti-U.S. mind-set for the same reasons that the Loyalists did: the psychological need to justify their political choice.

The central Canadian foreign policy problem is us. How to relate to us, and how to stay independent in an economic and foreign policy sense. The Trudeau's government's strategy was called "the third option." The idea was to reduce Canadian economic dependence on the U.S. by increasing Canadian economic relations with other countries. In this context, the Trudeau saw the EC as a potential Godsend because it appeared to offer a real trade alternative to the U.S. The third option was anti-American in the sense that Canada was trying to achieve a better balance in its trade relationships at some cost, perhaps, to U.S. interests.

From the U.S. point of view the third option could have been a good thing because it would have made the U.S. - Canadian relationship less emotional and would probably have made Canada a

stronger trading partner in the end.

Unfortunately the third option policy was a failure. Canada was unable to increase in relative terms with other countries relative to the United States. Canadian trade with the United States was growing at such a rate that no matter what Canada did with the third option, the results were inconsequential. This was a great frustration, but in the process, the government of Canada took various other steps to increase its economic independence of the United States, and some were directed at U.S. interests and led to serious disputed between the two countries. The best example was the National Energy Policy, (naturally but unfortunately known as the NEP which reminded many people of the old early Soviet New Economic Policy).

Q: New economic policy, yes.

MASON: The object of Canadian NEP was to reduce foreign and in particular U.S. ownership of Canadian petroleum resources and companies. American ownership was quite high at that time. Obviously we didn't like it very much but there was not that much we could really complain about. Canada decided, for example, to start its own national oil company, Petro Canada or Petrocan. Canada did this by buying other petroleum companies, it didn't nationalize. Petrocan wasn't a horror but it wasn't a great success. (It was privatized under the Mulroney Government.) The issue with us, the burning issue, and an emotional one was something called the "back-in." This policy meant that Canada could take without compensation (or "back in" on) a portion of petroleum concessions and do so retroactively despite previous agreements and contracts. It was the retroactivity which was particularly offensive, and it has left a bad taste to this day.

Q: In my interviews with people who dealt with Canada, one thing that comes up almost every time and that is, dealing with the Canadians as negotiators. That they play, "Gee, we're a poor little country...." I mean they're a very difficult group to deal with.

MASON: Yes they are. They complain, we're a little country and you should be generous, but we don't have to put up with that. The Canadians are difficult to negotiate with, but that's because they're negotiating from weakness. Their analysis is the elephant and the mouse -- whenever the elephant turns over, the mouse is in trouble. Well, it's true. So any negotiator representing the mouse, has got to be difficult. What's he got in his cards? Next to nothing. The basic Canadian strategy, not in each negotiation, but overall for relations with us is to bring as many other factors to play on their side as possible. Their fundamental strategy in that respect is to stress international law, or international agreements, on getting us to agree to put things in the UN, or in the case of the Free Trade Agreement to have binational trade dispute settlement commissions in which the two countries have equal powers to balance off the power difference between us. This is why you see the Canadians always emphasizing international agreements, international organizations, and it's a very rational strategy.

Q: We're talking about the '80 to '83 period, was there either a counter strategy on our part, or just say, "Let's not raise too many, it's not that big a deal for us."

MASON: It was a big deal for us in the petroleum sector. But these were not being treated by the Canadians in international council.

However, a basic rule of U.S.-Canadian diplomacy is that in the end, we all have to live together in North America, and therefore we must never allow one issue to affect other issues. This is the "no linkage" policy. So just because we're having a trade dispute doesn't mean we're going to have trouble some unrelated area. The fact is there's a very serious effort to avoid linkages, because we both recognize that if we ever linked things, there's no limit to the gridlock that could result. Periodically new political regimes in Washington and Ottawa want to link, and it takes about a year to get them to understand that this is simply not a useful strategy.

Q: When the Reagan administration came in, obviously Canada was not very high on its agenda, but did you see any change?

MASON: Canada was high on the agenda. President Reagan's first foreign trip was to Canada, and it was an experience. I haven't forgotten it. President Reagan came to Ottawa several times while I was there. And I might add that he did a very good job every time he was in Canada. I was present at many of his meetings there, and I can tell you that he had read and mastered the briefing materials.

Q: What about on the cultural side? There's always been a complaint that our TV overlaps, and magazines are read more than their magazines, etc. Did you have to fight this? Or get involved in that?

MASON: Yes. First of all, it is true that all our magazines, major newspapers and television programming are available throughout Canada. Canada is a more cabled country than we are, and all the major American stations are carried on Canadian cable. An example to the degree to which they watch us is that the border PBS television stations obtain half or a little more of their funding from Canadians. These stations play to that audience; they do programs focused on Canadian issues and their sign-off and sign-on features both national anthems. They may be the only effectively binational television stations in the world.

The U.S. cultural penetration of Canada is up-setting to Canadian nationalists and to the cultural elites whose position is threatened. There is a group in Canada who thinks Canadian culture is in danger, that they know what this culture is, and that they can and should prescribe what it is to the rest of Canada. The rest of Canada, of course, does not agree with this or they wouldn't be watching all these U.S. programs or buying U.S. magazines and books. Nevertheless this nationalist group is important politically because it's very literate and very present.

The issue that focused this problem during my first tour in Canada was television and magazine advertising. In an effort to conserve Canadian advertising dollars for Canadian publications television stations, the government of Canada mandated in law that Canadian advertising expenses for ads in U.S. media aimed at the Canadian market would no longer be allowed as a business expense for Canadian tax purposes. The effects of this legislation on U.S. interests were minimal (except in Buffalo) but the policy was nevertheless extremely annoying to the USG because of its discriminatory nature. It has not made Canadian magazines into a profitable business.

This issue is also expressed in Canadian restrictions on foreign ownership of Canadian publishing companies, in the prohibition of the sale in Canada of "split-editions" of U.S. magazines (a "split-edition" is a regular run of a U.S. magazine with special inserts concerning Canada. Such editions are very attractive for Canadian advertisers), and in attempts to limit U.S. penetration of the Canadian movie market.

The bottom line is that we don't agree with the Canadian definition of culture. We see magazines, publishing and television as a business. In our view, the cultural elites in Canada are simply an interest group who have an economic interest to defend and are seeking various kind of economic protection to that end.

The latest iteration of this group of disputes is Sports Illustrated, in Canada, which has succeeded in leap-frogging the split-edition prohibition printing in Canada, through satellite processes, a Canadian edition -- essentially a split-run in terms of content but entirely made in Canada physically. All parties have admitted that this was a real stroke of genius, but it once again put the split-edition issue in the limelight. Canadian publishers sought Government intervention to prevent anymore such publishing, and the outcome is that now Government permission is required to start publication of a magazine in Canada. The cure may be worse than the disease.

Q: Sometimes I almost have the feeling...I've Canadian relatives, that the real definition of what is a Canadian, is that they're not Americans.

MASON: Well, that's an exaggeration. On the whole, Quebecers and Western Canadians do not have trouble with their identity. They know who they are. The people who have that problem tend to be from southern Ontario. They are a critically important group in Canada because southern Ontario is the population and intellectual center of English-speaking Canada. This problem to the root of Canadian domestic problems. Originally Canada was founded by two different sets of colonists: the French and the English. The French were in Quebec, and the English were in Ontario. These original groups are still in place, and both tend still to see Canada through the prism of its origins. Furthermore a major fraction of the early population of Ontario came from the United States during or immediately after the Revolution as refugees. They brought with them an attitude about the United States which was negative and defensive. They stressed loyalty to the Crown and their respect for law and order in contrast to the situation in the U.S. at the end of the Revolution. They were determined to be different from the Americans to the south because that difference was the justification of their departure and self-respect. That determination is the origin of the tendency in Ontario to identify as not being Americans. It continues to this day in varying degree and is a partial explanation of why many Canadian accepted the NEP and the third option as good policies.

Q: You probably had two ambassadors while you were in Ottawa the first time.

MASON: Yes. Former governor of Maine Ken Curtis was my first ambassador. He left early January 20, 1981. I remember seeing him off in his driveway in the snow. He said he was going to be over the border to Maine by noon because "I'm not going to serve one minute under a Republican." Then Paul Robinson, an insurance executive, and a Republican party figure and fund raiser from Illinois came that summer as ambassador for the rest of my time during as

Political Counselor.

Q: How did he operate?

MASON: Well, Paul Robinson was my first political ambassador close up, and they're at sea really when they arrive. As a businessman, Robinson had run an insurance businesses. So he had an immediate problem of scale. He had also been used to exercising greater authority and control over his business than he could do as ambassador. Finally, as a businessman he had not dealt with the number and kind of issues confronting him in Canada. In short, Robinson faced a far more complex and subtle environment. Paul Robinson did know a fair bit about Canada, but he didn't have much feel for its government at the beginning. It took some time for him to sort out what the different agencies did, and how they related to each other, and what this had to do with him as an ambassador in Canada. We had 16 agencies in the Embassy, not counting about ten Defense Department agencies. They were mostly extensions of domestic agencies up there for reasons that had nothing to do with foreign policy. For example, the largest number of officials stationed in Canada were from the Immigration Service and the Customs Service. They were stationed at twelve airports and two seaports around Canada to clear travelers bound for the U.S. There were 300 of these people. The FBI had a significant office up there, but its business was entirely related to police cooperation. There was no policy in any of this.

Ambassador Robinson was an activist. He believed that Canada should do more in the common defense of the West, and he did not hesitate to speak up about this and other issues which affected the U.S. This directness startled the Canadians, but many of them agreed with what he had to say. It is interesting to note that Robinson was really the first U.S. official to push hard for the notion of a free trade agreement. It seemed crazy then, but his talking about it eventually had an effect. A career officer would probably have considered the notion so exotic that he would not have invested any time in it.

Once Robinson got used to the DCM and me, we were able to work together well. He went through the classic sequence of distrusting the Foreign Service to admiring it.

Q: Your DCM was?

MASON: Dick Smith.

Q: Were there any other major issues during this time?

MASON: Yes, the major issues in the political area were maritime boundaries and fisheries. It may surprise you, but we have no settled maritime boundaries with Canada. We have four maritime boundaries with Canada. The only one which is partially settled is in the Gulf of Maine, and it took a special panel of the World Court to arrive at an agreement there. That boundary line starts off-shore, and gives Canada part of the nose, it's called of George's Bank, a rich fishing ground for scallops, and goes on out to sea, but not the 200 miles. So it's unfinished at both ends. Up until the court settlement, this boundary was a source of very serious problems because our fishermen and the Canadian fishermen were fighting -- really fighting -- each other over the scallops. The management of the fishery there was not going well; it was being over-fished. We

could not agree with the Canadians on the management strategy to be followed, mainly because the New England fishermen couldn't agree on any reasonable strategy. The Canadians wanted to manage the entire area by species without regard to the boundary, which was very sensible. We almost agreed. We had negotiated a treaty to that end with Canada which it turned out could not get through the Senate. We therefore recommended that the treaty be withdrawn from the Senate, and it was. This decision really upset the Canadians because they didn't understand, and had never focused until this point really, on how our political system works. Just because you reach an agreement with the Executive Branch, doesn't mean it's a done deal. This was a revelation to them, and it led to fundamental changes on how they manage their affairs in the United States. After the treaty was abandoned, we ended up agreeing to go to submit the issue to a special panel of the World Court. The strategy was successful, and a boundary determination was made which split the difference (something that neither country could have done without the cover of the Court), but it did not settle how the fish would be managed. Each country now manages its own fishery in its own way, although I think we're coming more and more to the Canadian view on management.

The other maritime boundaries are in the west. There are three out there: 1) between the bottom half of Vancouver Island and the state of Washington in the Strait of Juan de Fuca. It is not an important difference. 2) Further to the north of Vancouver Island, where the Alaska panhandle comes down, is the Dixon Entrance. The issue is fishing. There we have agreed with the Canadians on an interim regime for the fisheries management of the disputed area which is quite large. Each country enforces more or less agreed fishing rules on its own vessels, with its own ships. This is called "flag state enforcement" and has worked rather well. The effect is the creation of a zone where the fishery is more or less managed on an agreed basis. The Canadians periodically backslide by trying to assert authority over U.S. vessels in the area. From time to time we have had to take a strong line with them up to the point of saying, if you try to board our vessels, we will really take some serious action about it. We have in fact used Coast Guard cutters to interpose physically between a Canadian enforcement vessel and our fishing vessels. We've never used any weapons. I don't think we ever would, and they never have. But nevertheless, this is the area where things could happen. There seems to be no possibility of an agreement on settling this dispute because the government of British Columbia has even more extensive claims than the government of Canada, and doesn't want to settle. I don't think the federal Canadian government has the political will to do so.

The last difference is in the Beaufort Sea where Alaska and Canada meet on the north slope. The issue there is whether the maritime boundary line goes straight to the North Pole from the coast, or veers a little bit to what is called the equidistant line, that is, a line drawn perpendicular to the shore line, if you can agree on what the shore line is. We argued for the equidistant line, and they for the longitudinal line to the North Pole. The difference is important with respect to petroleum exploration. Many of the companies doing the oil drilling (or interested in exploration) are American; so the issue really comes down to how the tax revenues are shared. We proposed all kinds of ingenious solutions on that, but again there's been no real will on the part of Canada to settle this. And it's complicated by whether or not the Yukon has any right to that part of the Arctic, or not. As it happens, the Yukon boundary almost touches the Alaskan boundary at the top, and whether they have any off-shore rights at all isn't clear. But in the meantime it complicates our life, and it's further complicated by the native peoples and what rights, if any,

they have. So it doesn't look like much is going to happen on that problem in the near future.

WILLIAM V.P. NEWLIN
Canada Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1980-1983)

Mr. Newlin was born and raised in Pennsylvania. He obtained degrees from Harvard University and the Fletcher School and, after serving a tour with the US Army, joined the Foreign Service in 1960. A generalist, Mr. Newlin's service took him to France, Guatemala and Belgium, where he dealt primarily with European Organizations and NATO. In Washington his assignments concerned Trade, Law of the Sea and other economic matters. Mr. Newlin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: You did that from '80-'83. You were a political officer. You got energy and fisheries, which strike me as being sort of the perpetual problems of Canadian-American relations. Fisheries starts even before the Republic came into existence and continues to this day.

NEWLIN: The big issue on the fisheries, the biggest issue during that time, was the boundary issue. We were working on that boundary negotiation for much of that time. If you remember, we pretty well lost our case. It was decided after I had left. The Canadians got more of what they wanted than we got of what we wanted.

Q: What was the boundary issue?

NEWLIN: Who gets the Georges Banks. When you extend your fishing rights out from three miles to 12, where does the boundary fall? It's kind of more complicated than you might think. There are various principles on drawing that line. Both countries want to get as much as we could and we didn't. We lost.

Q: Where did it go – to the court somewhere?

NEWLIN: Yes, it went to the court in the Hague.

Q: Were you having people from New England pounding on your desk all the time about the fishing interests?

NEWLIN: Yes, but it seems to me that that was not as much on the boundary as on the regulations for fishing. Who would determine things like net size, big holes or little holes for Grand fish? The Grand fish industry was being hammered by more and more fishing and fewer and fewer fish. The Georges Bank was essentially fished out. It went from being one of the richest fishing areas in the world to being practically fishless. The U.S. and Canada were negotiating things like net sizes to protect that industry. That's when we got involved with the American fishing industry. They almost always wanted the more immediate gratification, the

smaller net size, even though it looked to me as if in the long run that was cutting off their nose despite their face.

Q: Who was setting the net sizes? Was this within our government or was this also an international agreement?

NEWLIN: It was international on areas that were in dispute. We had to agree with the Canadians. I can't remember whether it was that we really had to agree, whether there was going to be an international agreement that dictated what each fisherman did, or whether there was going to be a gentleman's agreement that we would each in disputed areas do the same thing.

Q: What were the issues on energy?

NEWLIN: It had to do with gas pipelines and the extent to which they could undersell us with the gas coming down from Canada. They could produce gas more cheaply than we did or they were willing to sell it more cheaply than we were.

Q: I would imagine that the role of trade negotiators or experts would certainly take over there. Did you find yourself dealing with...

NEWLIN: Sure, the Canadian Desk was certainly not taking the lead role in any of these things. In the negotiation, it was the Legal department who was conducting the boundary negotiation. Our role was kind of peripheral. On the energy side, it wasn't the State Department either.

Q: Did you have much dealing with the Canadian embassy on these issues?

NEWLIN: Sure. We were very cozy with the Canadian embassy. But they were a conduit. It's easy to get to Canada. It's easy for Canadian officials to come down here. I think that the Canadian embassy didn't have a particularly substantive role to play. We could talk directly to the Canadians.

Q: Who was the head of the Canadian Desk?

NEWLIN: It was Wingate Lloyd.

Q: The Canadian Desk was quite a large one, wasn't it? We have so many issues of immediate impact all over the country.

NEWLIN: Yes. One of the things that the Canadians were disappointed in was that they were still part of European Affairs. They would have liked to have had at least a Hemisphere Affairs Assistant Secretary. But we argued that our issues with Canada were the same issues we had with other well developed, advanced, western economies like the European economies, not the issues that we had with the Latin American economies and therefore it made more sense to link Canada with the Europeans. They would have really liked to have had an Assistant Secretary for Canadian Affairs.

Q: Now, they are with Latin America.

NEWLIN: Yes.

Q: I understand they're rather unhappy because what are they doing with all these Spanish-speaking people whose problems are not Canadian problems?

NEWLIN: Yes. It made much more sense to have them part of EUR.

LAWRENCE P. TAYLOR
Energy Officer
Ottawa (1980-1984)

Lawrence P. Taylor was born in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1940. He graduated in 1963 from the University of Ohio with a degree in history and economics and received his MA from American University. He served as a member of the Peace Corps in the province of Antioquia, Colombia, in 1963. He was posted to Yugoslavia, Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Canada, England, and Estonia. Mr. Taylor was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

Q: Well, you left there in 1980.

TAYLOR: Yes.

Q: Where did you go?

TAYLOR: I went to Ottawa, Canada.

Q: Did you find this a foreign environment?

TAYLOR: Ottawa?

Q: Yes.

TAYLOR: I found it a real education, because I had never been to Canada and, like most Americans, knew it was up there and knew it was nice and didn't really know what that meant in any specific terms. And I got up there and found quite a fascinating country, full of interesting little issues that I didn't hear anything about when I was in the United States, and I was lucky enough to get there at exactly the time that the Canadian government made a decision to bet its entire economic future on inevitable price rises in oil. And it busted itself. I mean, it imploded as a result. It made a huge mistake, but the consequences of the mistake didn't come home for three or four years, until they realized what a huge mistake. So I bumped right in, in a very fortuitous timing, to being at the center of U.S.-Canadian relations in this kind of energy niche that I was in, and as a consequence, really had a fascinating assignment in Ottawa, got to travel everywhere

in Canada, and was on the cutting edge of the issue that dominated U.S.-Canadian relations for about two and one-half years.

Q: *You were there from 1980 –*

TAYLOR: -to '84.

Q: *I assume you had several ambassadors at that time.*

TAYLOR: I had two. I got there in the summer of 1980, and President Carter would lose the election in November, and so we would get a new ambassador, but President Reagan's ambassador who came was there throughout my entire period.

Q: *Who was that?*

TAYLOR: That was Paul Robinson. Ken Curtis was there when I arrived. He was a very nice man, but he left, really, the day of the election – didn't even wait until January 20th, I think – and he had been the former governor of Maine. He was a great fellow, but I only worked under his leadership for a couple of months.

Q: *As you were still, what, the fuels officer?*

TAYLOR: In Ottawa it was called the energy officer because there was, in addition to oil and gas, other important energy relationships with the United States, not the least of which was a massive electricity trade out of Quebec.

Q: *Was there a difference in emphasis, set-up, or anything between being the energy officer in Ottawa and being the fuels officer in Indonesia, in the pecking order or emphasis?*

TAYLOR: No. In Indonesia, it was just by self-definition a very important job. I had succeeded two great officers in that job who had really established it as in its own unique niche – James Matts, who had it in the early '70s and went on to work for Fluor after he left the job, and then Mark Johnson (and I succeeded Mark). They had defined the job and shaped its role. Because Indonesia was such a well-known petroleum country and petroleum exporter, the importance of that job went with the territory. Now that was not true in Canada, and under ordinary circumstances, I think in the pecking order the job I got in Canada might not have been too visible or even too exciting. It would have been a run-of-the-mill thing, but as I mentioned earlier, by dint of fortuitous timing, I arrived there just a few months before the Canadian government launched this massive, bold initiative called the National Energy Program, which bet the country's economic future on large, inevitable price rises in oil, and sought to use what I call a set of measures that approximated creeping expropriation to, in essence, nationalize the private sector, which was heavily American. That is, betting your future on price rises would have been Canada's own mistake, and we would have left them to stew in it, but adopting a set of measures that look like creeping expropriation along our northern border went right to the top in the U.S. government, and so I found myself in a portfolio that had immediate immense interest at the top levels of the U.S. government, surprising – they were shocked by what Canada was doing.

Q: *How was this reflected in what you were doing, this expropriation-*

TAYLOR: *-creeping expropriation.*

Q: *-creeping expropriation –*

TAYLOR: And that's my term. I mean, the Canadians would not like it.

Q: *As you went around when this first came out, was this evident in the legislation?*

TAYLOR: Oh, absolutely, totally clear. It first came out as part of the federal budget, which is a big exercise in Canada, in any parliamentary system, the announcement of the budget, and the embassy stays up all night. The budget is given in the evening, and the embassy stays up all night and analyzes it. That's a tradition. But usually it's the Treasury part of the embassy, the financial part of the embassy. This time we knew that the energy legislation would dominate it – we'd already discovered that – so I was there to stay up all night as well. I know the very first cable that we sent said that this massive, bold initiative had two central themes. The first was to federalize the energy sector and the revenue flows from the energy sector within Canada, and the second was to nationalize the petroleum industry, which meant that the U.S. private companies were going to come under great pressure either to sell or to take on Canadian partners.

Q: *It was still the Carter Administration when this came out, was it?*

TAYLOR: Just barely, that's right. It came out in October. President Carter would lose the election a month later.

Q: *What was the reaction in Washington and elsewhere in the States?*

TAYLOR: You could tell it was a lame-duck administration. We had done enough work to see that something big was coming that was going to affect American interests, and we had sent a cable actually saying this is worth somebody senior, like maybe a Secretary of the Treasury, maybe an under secretary of State, calling the Canadian finance minister and the Canadian energy minister and expressing concern, based on embassy reporting. Nobody was interested, and I think the reason nobody was interested – maybe we weren't convincing enough that something big was coming – but I expect the political environment here just wasn't willing to take on what seemed to be such a marginal task at that moment.

Now once it hit, lights went on all over Washington, not necessarily because of the embassy reporting, although that should have been sufficient, but because they were getting immediate from the American industry saying you've got to do something about this.

Q: *Well, I assume you were talking to the appropriate ministries in Canada.*

TAYLOR: Oh, sure.

Q: There has always been this sort of “we’re-the-small-guy” and sticking it to the United States-

TAYLOR: Yes, very popular.

Q: You know, it’s what you do when you don’t have anything else to...

TAYLOR: And this was Pierre Trudeau, you know, and he’s so good at that.

Q: Were you catching this?

TAYLOR: Oh, yes. They loved it. That portion of the Canadian public opinion that thinks in the way you describe just thought this was wonderful. But Canadian public opinion is not homogenous. It is diverse, although you may not realize it down here because you never hear about it, and this program was very popular in central Canada, which was energy consuming and has that foreign policy attitude, anyhow. In the energy-producing sections of Canada, out west, particularly in Alberta, this was almost a declaration of war, against them more than it was against the United States. As I said, the first theme here was to federalize the Canadian energy sector. Canada has a very decentralized system. The provinces have a great deal of power and authority, and Alberta opposed the National Energy Program, for its own reasons and its own set of interests, as fervently and as effectively as did we. So there was support, and within the Canadian system, that we tried to work with and mobilize to achieve our interests in opposing some features, the features that we felt violated Canada’s international obligations in the OECD and elsewhere and those features which we felt were a direct attack on international comity and contractual relationships and the status of American industry already operating within Canada.

Q: I take it Pierre Trudeau was not a favorite of our embassy.

TAYLOR: It depends on what you mean by a favorite. I think most of us thought he was absolutely masterful at what he did. The problem was we didn’t always like what he did in terms of U.S. interests. So I think there was a mixture of great respect and admiration for him as a Canadian leader, and a recognition that U.S. interests were going to be under some pressure from the kinds of policies that he believed in during the early 1980s, particularly regarding the oil sector, and more generally U.S. investment.

Q: What cards did we have to play if the Canadians wanted to move ahead with this creeping nationalization?

TAYLOR: That’s exactly what senior officials in Washington soon came to ask. Where’s our leverage? What can we do to them? And I’ll tell you, at the end of the day there are a whole set of things that we went through. We tried to sort of identify specific programs, activities, and relationships that could be used as leverage, and in the end we rejected that, and I think rightly so, because there’s a much bigger leverage that we did play and eventually played extremely effectively. And that is that this is a relationship of importance to both countries, and while as you pointed out a very substantial portion – a majority of the Canadian public – likes occasionally to stick it to the big guy down south, the Canadian public knows and understands and will not tolerate a government that picks a continuous fight with the United States. Canada

can only lose from a souring of the relationship across the board and from the top, in which the President of the United States, senior Cabinet officers are giving speeches about Canada's unfairness, about Canada's violation of international practices and obligations and of questioning whether we can trust Canada in our commercial, our economic, and our political relationships. It was that constant drumbeat of sort of saying, Canada, you've really gotten off the reservation this time, and we may not be picking this or that issue to hit you with, but we're not going to let you be this far off the reservation without speaking out about it, without pointing it out, and without holding you under the spotlight of critical analysis. And eventually, along with the fact that they made a huge mistake (oil prices went down, not up), that proved effective in reversing that set of proposals.

Q: I suppose it was also helpful to have the Reagan Administration in, because he was considered not to be an internationalist and a rather tough person as far as if you started messing around and certainly was not in favor of nationalization or federalization of our property.

TAYLOR: Yes, I think the Reagan Administration did take a tough attitude about this. I suspect any American administration would have, but maybe not to the same degree with the same intensity as the Reagan Administration did. I think that's right. The Canadians caught a little bit of bad timing from their point of view in that respect, too, because they got no sympathetic ears in Washington with the Reagan Administration. There was no part of Washington that was saying, oh, well, we have to understand their point of view. We did understand their point of view, and we damn well didn't like it, and that was all of us. So they caught a bit of bad timing on that.

Q: When did the downturn come in oil prices?

TAYLOR: Well, almost immediately, but I think that it became persuasive that the *trend* was down only after a couple of years, and at that point Canada's National Energy Program simply wasn't working – never mind whether you liked its philosophy, never mind whether you believed it was right-minded or right in some political or international sense – the plain fact of the matter is that it didn't fly, so something had to be done about it.

Q: How did you find dealing with the Canadian bureaucrats dealing with your area, energy?

TAYLOR: It was interesting, is what I would say. I acquired, eventually, a great deal of respect for their technical competence and for their integrity. This was an issue of such importance we had to go above the bureaucratic level. They simply couldn't meet our concerns, and we fought this out at a much higher level, and in fact, at some points, probably were pretty close to the line of what they considered overreaching for an embassy. We did work closely with those sections of Canadian public opinion, including provincial governments, that were opposed to Canada's policy, and we did have a big network of non-governmental contacts that we used to try to mobilize opinion and to try to make sure that our position was well understood in Canada. And so this was an issue in which we didn't just present demarches to the Foreign Ministry and wait for their answer, which was always unsatisfactory.

Q: You know, one of the things that all of us observe in foreign embassies that come here is often they don't really understand how America works. And they come and they go to the Department of State, when actually you should be out in the halls of Congress and appearing on a television show and hitting the media. How about Canada? Was there a different way for an embassy to work there.

TAYLOR: There was, and we did, and that's what I was saying, that we didn't just work through the federal government on this issue. I'll tell you, though, the point you're making is very interesting, because one of the biggest effects of this National Energy Program effort and its blowup, internationally and domestically, was that Canada changed the way it dealt with the United States. The Foreign Ministry was out of the loop in the development of this plan in the first place. They were as surprised as we were. They knew that- (end of tape)

They learned that they had to, as a foreign ministry, get on top of the development of issues like this before the fact and not after the fact, and they went through a reorganization internally, a redefinition of the foreign ministry's role within the government in the development of such policies, and they staffed and managed their embassy differently here in Washington as a result. And so the ripple effects of this National Energy Program, its boldness and its sensitivities and controversies and its failures, extended into the Canadian system as much as they did into the U.S.-Canadian relationship.

Q: Were you working with the American oil companies to help coordinate our attack on this initiative?

TAYLOR: Yes. When you say "you," I did, but also very much our consul general in Calgary, where the companies were mainly located, was heavily involved in this, too. I must have spent half of my time in Canada in Calgary as a result of this program, and the consul general spent probably all of his time.

Q: Who was he?

TAYLOR: Rich Wilson. He was terrific. He did a terrific job. In fact, you ought to interview him if you haven't.

Q: Where is he now?

TAYLOR: I don't know where he is now. Rich Wilson. In fact, after that he went to Jakarta, so it would be a good interview about Indonesia, too.

Q: Were there any issues concerning U.S. oil up in Alaska? Did that have any effect, or was that just a different matter?

TAYLOR: There was a lingering issue because there had been an agreement to build a natural gas pipeline from Alaska into the United States that went across Canada, and there was a whole organization and budget in Canada dedicated to shepherding that along, even though by the time I arrived that project was dubious because of the economic changes. Managing the fate of the

Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System (ANGTS), was one of the jobs that the embassy had and that I was the point person for from the embassy. That turned out to be very useful, though not on a project basis, because it eventually had to fade away like such projects must, but because there were such senior Canadian officials involved in that project that my relationship with them, which began and was nurtured through my role in that project, became important on the wider energy relationship, on the National Energy Program and these more controversial, dynamic issues. And I had an access and an ear and a network that I wouldn't have had without having been able to use that project to get into it.

Q: Well, we talk about energy. Did you cover the electric grid, too?

TAYLOR: Insofar as there was an international dimension to it we did. And there was some all across the border, actually, but the issues we dealt with always seemed to be associated with Quebec and Hydro-Quebec and the Quebec factor in Canadian domestic politics. Other than that, the cross-border electricity exchanges really worked extremely well, and they worked with Quebec, too. It's just always their sensitivities in the U.S. capital markets or the U.S. energy market about whether Quebec is going to be in Canada or not and what that means to them. So it was really more of a political interest, even though the energy sector seemed to be the occasion of it.

Q: Well, while you were in that embassy, sort of the great unspoken thing, I think, for some time, and obviously is today still, is what if Quebec moves out? I mean, this is a very important factor in how our relations will go, but if we even talk about it or plan about it and the Canadians hear about it, then we'll go up in smoke, you know, and everything we do, I mean, whispered consultations on "What if?"

TAYLOR: In the period 1980-84, there were not. Now I'll just jump ahead and remind you that I went back to Canada as economic minister from '89 to '92. That was a period of the abortive Meech Lake Accord, and during that period, there was quite a bit of discussion on this issue, very senior-level discussion, and in fact, as you might remember, President Bush went further than any American president has in departing from the traditional mantra that this was up to Canadians. So that issue became much more electric and actionable in the '89-92 period.

Q: Which we'll cover when we get to this.

TAYLOR: Yes.

Q: What about, since it has something to do with energy and all, did you get involved in the acid rain business at all?

TAYLOR: A little bit. Now Canada was one of these countries in which we had a science attaché, and the science attaché covered the environmental issues. And the acid rain issue was very interesting. I can remember President Reagan made his first international trip to Canada after he was elected, and it was a subject of some controversy. Even Canadian cabinet officers, one at least, demonstrated against his visit, carrying a sign saying "Stop Acid Rain." I remember very well that the vast army of people that accompany a presidential visit had never heard of acid

rain, and so most of the U.S. staffers were running around with buttons that said “Stop Acid Rain” because it sounded like something you should stop, and they’d never heard of it before. So it was a very interesting moment.

Q: But that didn’t really intrude on your-

TAYLOR: At that time, it was not an issue that I managed. Somebody else did. Now, again, in the ’89-92 period, acid rain had not disappeared, and we had incorporated the science attaché in to the Economic Section, and so when I became the economic minister-counselor in the later period, kind of managing the acid rain issue was something that was more directly in my portfolio later.

Q: Well, dealing with this very sensitive issue, how about the politics of Canada during this ’80-84 period? Were there any elections?

TAYLOR: Sure.

Q: And how did we view – I mean, were we sort of looking at, Gee, I hope one side will win over the other – you know, from your perspective?

TAYLOR: You know, the watershed here was the departure of Pierre Trudeau from the political scene. He had made his decision to retire in, I think it was, ’84. And that was a real watershed in the relationship. I think clearly the Reagan government had a preference for the Conservative Party. That manifested itself clearly, and later in ’89-92, when we were so close to the Mulroney government. But I think the Democratic Party in the United States probably would have a more philosophical preference for the Liberal Party in Canada, so we made no effort, ever, to interfere in Canadian domestic politics. I think different governments in the United States did have different philosophic preferences, but the basic commitment is to get on together as good neighbors. We’ve got so much in common, we’ve got so much to do together, and I think that transcends, really, any of these philosophical preferences.

Q: What was life like, living in Canada, working with your Canadian colleagues. I mean, did you have to go through sort of this “poor little us” and “you’re such a big” and “it’s like sleeping with an elephant” and –

TAYLOR: Oh, yes, you hear that all the time. Those are the mantras. They’re all over the place, but you don’t pay any attention to those. Let me tell you what life was like. Life in Canada, in the early 1980s, was like life in the United States in the early 1950s. It was calm, decent, civilized, and it was the nicest family community from that middle-class American vantage point of an earlier period that we have ever lived in. Your kids could travel all over safely on buses and walk the streets at night, and if there were problems in the schools it was because somebody was throwing a spitball, you know, and things like that. So it was a wonderful middle-class family sort of environment at that time. The Canadians do have that. You sort of just have deal with it, but you don’t take it too seriously, is the way you move forward. We enjoyed living in Canada very much, and we learned a lot. Again, I think it’s an interesting country. It’s full of people that have kind of a different perspective on North American culture and North American

life. You don't get that perspective south of the border too often. We found it fascinating, even when we didn't agree with it, and we still have so many good personal friends who are Canadians who were made – established friendships with them – in that earlier period, and then they were reinforced when we went back in '89-92. We kind of think of Canada, from a personal point of view, from a family point of view, as a second home.

Q: What about Ambassador Robinson? He was, I gather, a businessman, a bit of a rough cob, wasn't he, or not?

TAYLOR: Yes, I think that would be a fair assessment of him.

Q: But how did he operate and how effective was he?

TAYLOR: Well, he operated kind of on his own level and in his own way, which was to sort of speak his mind quickly about things. He, I think, had a rough go, at least initially in central Canada, where there is all these sensitivities about elephants and mouse and stuff. They loved him in western Canada. In fact, when this National Energy Program came along and divided Canada as much as it divided the U.S. and the Canadian governments, Ambassador Robinson didn't get friendly receptions in central Canada, but he got standing ovations all the time in western Canada. In fact, I remember a big audience in Calgary once, and Ambassador Robinson was lambasting the National Energy Program, as only he could do – he certainly wasn't using any of the talking points that I had given him, but there he was – and when he was done he got this stormy applause, and this one leading Calgary citizen stood up and said, "Ambassador, I don't know what you said, but keep on saying it." It was just kind of the perfect expression of Ambassador Robinson's diplomacy.

Q: Well, you left there in... Do you have to go soon? Is this a good place to stop?

TAYLOR: Why don't we finish up this. Are we finished on this portion?

Q: I think we're finished unless there's something else we should cover.

TAYLOR: No, because whatever else we need to cover we can get in '89-92. We're going to come back to Canada.

Q: Were there any other issues that covered energy that I might not have talked about?

TAYLOR: Well, there were some interesting... Again, this was a time when Canada had bet its future on rising prices, and Canada wasn't the only organization or country that had. There were going to be companies that go broke that had thought they could bet on rising prices, and so a lot of things came out of that. They have these huge oil sands projects in northern Alberta which are almost like science fiction in terms of size of the machineries involved and so forth, and those were at the time thought by some to be the wave of the future, even though it cost 40 or 50 bucks a barrel to extract oil from these tar sands, that people thought that with oil prices trending up they would be something of a major future production source. Visiting up there was really an eye-opener for me, and there there is an interesting impact, because I got my first introduction

later reinforced elsewhere in Canada, in Quebec, at the impact of these sorts of operations on, I guess we're going to have to call them, Native Canadians. They're Indian tribes that live in Canada. And they were really in quite desperate situation and not profiting very much by all of these high-powered activities going on all around them.

The other thing was that there were interesting projects in the works. Some of them never materialized, like bringing LNG into Canada all the way from Indonesia. It was Dome Petroleum that was going to do it, and I remember sitting in their office in Calgary with the president of the company, and I said, "I just don't understand this. You're sending gas from British Columbia down south, and you're talking about bringing gas into Canada from Indonesia. There's just got to be some disconnect here. I just can't follow the logic. Of course, the question is what makes sense for a company may not make sense for a country, and if you can get the economics right, you can do a lot of things like that. And then you had Mobil Oil developing what was thought to be a massive – it turned out to be less so, but nonetheless interesting – oil opportunity off the coast of Newfoundland, the Hibernia Oil Field, which was a project of interest then and, of course, then, later turned into this terrible disaster when that rig tipped over and hundreds of Newfoundlanders were lost at sea.

And this was a period in which Canadian gas exports to the United States actually went up, and the embassy played a big role in that, working with some entrepreneurial companies in the United States that really thought they saw a creative niche, to bring Canadian gas into central and eastern United States, and it gets all the way in to Boston and New York now, and that was quite a vision and quite a piece of work to put all of that together. So we were involved in a lot.

Q: Well, on these things, did you find, was there any element that was trying to stop cooperation between the United States and Canada within the Canadian body politic? I mean, extreme nationalists or anything like that?

TAYLOR: Well, the people that wrote the National Energy Program would not have put their intentions in the way you just did, but the consequences of the policies that they advocated and then passed into legislation were such that energy cooperation between the United States and Canada was put in great jeopardy for a while. There were a number of features of the Canadian legislation, particularly a retroactive feature, in which the Canadian government acquired retroactively a 25 percent interest in existing projects and discoveries (that is what led to my characterization of the package of measures – that plus three or four others – as creeping expropriation) that put a chill, not just on government relations and the way we thought of each other and talked to each other, but on private sector investment decisions. If a government like Canada's was going to come in and pass retroactive confiscatory sorts of pieces of legislation, how could you trust it? I mean, could you trust that it wouldn't be 50 percent five years from now or a hundred percent some day. So the consequences of what they did initially with the National Energy Program did put a chill on new initiatives in the region.

Q: Did you at some point after this act came out do an analysis of who were the sort of apparatchiks who drew it up? It sounds to me like this would be coming out of the more virulent anti-American academic world.

TAYLOR: Well, Stu, you must know something about this, because you've sort of hit the nail on the head. There was one person in particular who was really the chief architect of this, and he had three or four others. It was only that small group, centered in the Department of Energy and in the Department of Finance, who, speaking directly with the Prime Minister, put this together and surprised most of the rest of the government, including the Foreign Ministry, with such a bold initiative there in October of 1980. You're absolutely right, there was a small coterie of people whose brilliance brought forth this. And I remember telling the man who was the chief architect –

Q: *Who was this?*

TAYLOR: Well, Ed Clark was his name. I remember telling him that if he'd written this as a book, I believe it should win a prize, but to put it full blown into practice is a disaster. It's just a horrible disaster. It's one thing to have these theoretical concepts and this kind of nationalistic proposals. It all sounds wonderful as long as you don't *do* it, as long as you're just talking about it. But doing it was monstrous. And there we were.

WILLIAM D. MORGAN
Consul General
Montreal (1981-1985)

William D. Morgan was chief of the consular section in Beirut, Lebanon from 1968 to 1973, consul general in Paris, France from 1978 to 1981, and consul general in Montreal, Canada from 1981 to 1985. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1988.

Q: *Bill, you were talking about being the supervising consul general in Paris. I'd like to move on to your last purely consular assignment. You were consul general in Montreal. There it was quite a different role. You had consular affairs, political reporting, economic reporting, the whole works. Looking at it from a consular officer, how well do you think you were trained to move into what we call a broader or more diversified role?*

MORGAN: I would argue that my training in the consular function was largely in management areas and therefore prepared me for juggling the various demands as a post program director. So the quick answer is yes, perfectly trained. I think specifically, the experiences I had with S/IG, BEX, in Paris and Beirut and so on, all, in one way or another, exposed me to the issues that I faced in Montreal.

But what I want to answer first is the question you haven't asked, and that is how did I get the assignment. That, I think, is more relevant because I didn't necessarily seek out Montreal. I was told that Montreal was going to go again to a political officer, and that it was consular designated. I don't know if we have designations any longer to principal officerships, but Barbara Watson got that thing going a number of years ago. (Barbara was former Administrator, then Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs for a goodly number of years under Carter and before.)

By designating certain principal officerships for the consular function was the only way you could fight the system to get a consular officer into a senior Consulate General slot. "Obviously a consular officer is not substantively qualified to manage a post, because he isn't competent to deal in political and economic matters", was and is the bias consular officers must face to attain top consulate general positions.

Q: In the framework of how the personnel system, run by political officers and economic officers, felt.

MORGAN: Yes. That's the way our system has worked and it probably always will. In those early days, this was the only way you could possibly force the system to assign a consular officer to a Program Direction job.

Q: This was 1981 to 1985.

MORGAN: That's when I was in Montreal. But this phenomenon of designation of post took place ten years before that. I was told almost, "You've got to go to Montreal, because it's in the hands of a political officer now, and the only way we can maintain Montreal, which is highly consular, like Toronto, is to have a consular officer fill the slot." It was a good opportunity, and I looked forward to it professionally, but I did feel that when you get to be more senior in our business, you are a symbol. I'd been around a lot of younger officers, and I do know that they look to see, "Am I going to make it to the top or not?" I feel that those of us who do achieve senior ranks should, indeed, go into those jobs. Lorie Lawrence felt that when he went to Jamaica as ambassador and then to Grenada. He felt it important to show that we can go into the competitive jobs at the senior level. Yes, you've got to have qualifications, but based on my own experience, I know a consular-cone officer can develop such qualifications. It's a long answer, but I wanted to go on record to say that the battle to maintain competitiveness on the highest level must be kept up, because the system is tilted and will always turn towards the "substantive officer" as better qualified for such opportunities. I would argue they are, however, less qualified in many cases as senior managers.

Q: Being the consul general, having political reporting, economic reporting, other responsibilities. How did you deal with the consular section?

MORGAN: Carefully. Rule number one was: I'm not in charge of the consular section. Ann Campbell, when I arrived, was the chief. She welcomed me with open arms. I think it was sort of like the famous two lies in the Foreign Service: the inspector, when he gets off a plane asserts, "I'm very glad to be here;" and the ambassador answers, "I'm very glad that you've come." I shouldn't say that. I believe Ann, indeed, did welcome me, because she had known me over the years and believed that some of the experiences I had would be of use to her.

But you know, it is that same question we talked about in Beirut. How does the senior boss find himself involved with subordinates without the middle-level supervisor feeling caught in the middle? Ann was replaced by Mike Mahoney, quite different in his approach to how Morgan should be the consul general. Back to your question: you make sure that the intermediate supervisor knows everything you're doing as you "muddle" in his section. In the Montreal case,

none of the other sections had the staffing size -- 8 to 10 officers -- that the consular section had. You walk a tightrope, because you've got experience, you've got opinions. In some cases, you know what's being done by a subordinate is not right, but you want the correction to come from the chief of the consular section. So, by lots of chatting and lots of sharing of information and maybe a little drama now and then, you work out that relationship. But this same approach also applies to managing the other sections, particularly Admin and the other agencies.

Another issue that we haven't talked about, surfaced in Paris, but it really came out in Montreal. That is, when you're consul general, you don't realize the authority you've got and the way you're looked at by subordinates. You think you're still one of the troops, and you aren't. Worse yet, you can feel you're exceptionally important and you have incredible authority, and you can forget that you're simply a bit older, more experienced. Or you can go the other way, avoiding the reality of being in a command position. It's a tightrope, too, the specific role the principal officer has to play. How do you remain one of the guys, at the same time be the leader?

Q: Bill, I think we might wrap this up at this point.

MORGAN: It was great fun. If I had to do it over again, I'd do exactly the way I did it, but hopefully learning better from my mistakes.

PAUL H. ROBINSON
Ambassador
Canada (1981-1985)

Paul Robinson was ambassador to Canada from 1981-1985. This interview was conducted by Willis Armstrong in 1989.

Q: This is a interview with Ambassador Paul Robinson, who was ambassador in Canada from 1981 until 1985. Paul, what got you interested in being ambassador to Canada in the first place?

ROBINSON: Well, it wasn't quite that, Bill. Before the election of 1980, in October, I was asked by Dan Terra, who later became Ambassador for Cultural Affairs -- really an ambassador-at-large -- would I take a position in a Reagan Administration if then-Governor Reagan was elected. I said that I would be interested in a major position. I would consider a major position or want to be considered for that or nothing at all. I was asked to put down a list, which was a very short list in my case, which included Canada and Secretary of the Navy. And, of course, I was greatly honored to represent the President in Canada.

Q: When did your name go to the Senate, for example, and then how did the procedure go with the Senate? Was it all comfortable?

ROBINSON: It was seventeen-to-nothing committee vote and the voice vote on the floor of the Senate. I was posted at Canada on the 15th of July 1981. And I was there until September 9, 1985.

Q: How did you feel about the way you were treated by the senators? I guess there was then a Republican majority in the Senate, wasn't there?

ROBINSON: Yes, there was. I was very fairly treated. And even Claiborne Pell, whose politics are certainly different than mine --

Q: Or mine.

ROBINSON: Yes, he is a very nice man. He was very helpful.

Senator Percy from Illinois was the Chairman of Foreign Relations Committee, and he had been extremely difficult, even though we were both Republicans before I got to the Senate, because he had foolishly made his own selection without checking with the White House. And when it became apparent that I was the nominee and hit the papers, he exploded. But he seemed to think, of course, that he was running foreign affairs for the United States. He hadn't read his Constitution, I'm afraid.

Q: Some senators haven't.

ROBINSON: But he was, in fact, helpful in the end. But I knew that he had been working behind the scenes against me.

Q: That's fascinating.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: When you first encountered the State Department, how did you feel about the career people and the desk, and how were you handled in the bureau?

ROBINSON: Well, I was handled very well. In fact, I came to State for some briefings pending my hearings at the Senate with some preconceived ideas, which were largely wrong. I thought that the State Department people would be largely useless and wouldn't really know how to conduct foreign affairs. They may well have thought the same thing of me.

But what happened was that I was impressed, very much so, by the people I met. I thought they were dedicated. I thought they were able. I never had any problems in my subsequent four years and two months in Canada with State Department people. They were, I think, largely of the other party, but they nonetheless were good Americans. I was proud to be with them. We worked very well together.

Q: This is, of course, what I heard from them, too.

ROBINSON: Is it really? Is that right? [Laughter]

Q: [Laughter] A mutually satisfactory arrangement.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: Well, what did they tell you in 1981 were the chief problems with Canada at that time?

ROBINSON: I not only traveled in Canada for pleasure, but I had some business dealings there going back to 1974, in December of '74, when I first went to Ottawa on business.

But there were several. One, of course, was the FIRA, Foreign Investment Review Agency, which is really active in restraint of trade in trying to keep American and other foreign investments out. Subsequently, the Trudeau government, at my urging, appointed Ed Lumley and Clay Ducfera. And then Mulroney came in. He abolished it.

The other was a national energy program, which confiscated our assets retroactively; that is to say, those who had invested in Canadian oil and energy shares. And then I wasn't able to accomplish the removal of under Trudeau, but it was also abolished by Mulroney when he was elected.

The third one, of course, was the acid rain problem, where, of course, we were polluting Canada. But what isn't realized is that Canada was polluting the United States, as well. Half of Canada's air pollution is generated in Canada. And a quarter of our pollution comes from Canada in the New England states.

So it is clearly a serious problem, and I wasn't able to solve that exactly. But one of my last acts was to set up and get approval for a special envoys to deal with this problem. And I did in face of White House opposition. They didn't think the President would go along, but the President did go along. And primarily I would say because he wanted to help Brian Mulroney. He never felt that the acid rain problem was quite as serious or could be approached at that time because we didn't have enough information. Nonetheless, he did appoint these envoys.

And finally, Bill, a fourth problem between the two was one that I raised, and that was defense. Canada's expenditures towards defense were 1.8% of gross national product. I never questioned for a moment Canada's loyalty to the NATO alliance or to the defense of our continent, but it was clear that they had to do more. I got them to turn the corner, not really demonstratively, but yet up to 2.2% when I left. At that time, we were at 6.5%, going to 7%.

Q: And we went higher.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: Up into 1984, '85.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: And had, I think, a very important impact on the general international situation.

ROBINSON: NATO had agreed to 3%, you see, so Canada was really far below.

Q: Well, they always have been below. I had experience with Canada in my day in regard to their defense budget.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: Now, one of the things that you have been described as being in Canadian press is the godfather of the Free Trade Agreement.

ROBINSON: Well, that's --

Q: Can you tell us something about how that developed? That was not an immediate problem when you went there because --

ROBINSON: No.

Q: Trudeau was in power. But after Mulroney came in, they took a different look at it.

ROBINSON: Well, that's right. The first working day of 1983, in a bubble I announced that we were going to reinstate the Free Trade Agreement, which you'll remember, of course, failed in 1911 in Sir Wilfrid Laurier's government fell on the question of no truck nor trade with the Yankee.

I said I wanted to leave something that would live beyond all of our service in Canada. So I entered into a program where I had leading people -- Tom Bakeele, for instance; Jake Warren, a former Canadian ambassador to the United States; the Chamber of Commerce man, Sam Hughes. And then we called on Gerry Regan, then in charge of Trade and External Affairs, and Ed Lumley, who was the liberal minister at that time for trade as well. We knew, of course, Bill, that it wouldn't do any good unless it was initiated by the Canadians. It wouldn't fly at all because we would be accused of gobbling up Canada.

There was a meeting in May of '83 with Gerry Regan. His staff was opposed to this concept, but I noticed Regan was taking it in. As a result, subsequently, and meeting with Bill Brock and Gerry Regan, we decided to proceed with some kind of a freer trade agreement. They were afraid to say free at that time; they said freer trade agreement on a sectorial basis, product by product or industry by industry. And so that the liberals did, in fact, make a turn towards this. And then, of course, when Brian Mulroney was elected in September of '84, it was full speed ahead on freer trade. Later they had the guts, and we had the guts, to just call it free trade.

Q: The election of Mulroney was in '84, wasn't it?

ROBINSON: I think it was September 4, 1984.

Q: I remember watching the returns.

ROBINSON: That was the biggest landslide election in the history of Canada.

Q: I was in Canada when Diefenbaker won his landslide.

ROBINSON: Really?

Q: Yes, in 1958.

ROBINSON: You know what Diefenbaker said? One of his greatest quotes is he said, "Polls are for dogs." [Laughter]

Q: [Laughter] That's a nice line.

ROBINSON: Yes. It is interesting that Diefenbaker, a conservative, is actually far more anti-American than the liberals were at the time that I was there. Trudeau was most helpful to me. I think you could say that what he had done, intended to do, he had already done. And I don't know if that was best for Canada or not, but he was -- in fact, I have opinions of that. But he was very fair.

It brings a point up too, Bill. I had the honor of serving with four of Canada's eighteen prime ministers: Trudeau, Turner, Mulroney, as prime minister, and Joe Clark as Secretary of State for External Affairs. And I liked them all.

Q: They are all good people, basically.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: And very competent people.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: And that's one thing you usually encounter with Canadians. They knew their jobs, and they are quite competent.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: You did know Diefenbaker.

ROBINSON: No, I never met --

Q: Or had he passed from the scene?

ROBINSON: Yes, he was dead.

Q: He was dead when you went there. I had forgotten the date of his departure.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: He was prime minister the whole time I served in Canada.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: I was chargé frequently, so I got to know him, you know.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: He was an interesting man. And he really wasn't as anti-American as --

ROBINSON: No. Well, there was the Bomarc Mitchell thing and a few other things.

Q: Well, he didn't have the courage or the convictions of his defense minister.

ROBINSON: Oh, really? Yes.

Q: He had the lack of courage of his foreign minister, and that was the issue.

ROBINSON: Who, Pearson?

Q: No. Green, Howard Green.

ROBINSON: Green, yes.

Q: Did you ever meet Howard Green?

ROBINSON: No, I didn't.

Q: He is still around. He was foreign minister, and he just didn't want to have any nuclear weapons at all on Canadian territory. This is why the Diefenbaker government fell.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: And, for your information, I was in charge of the Canadian desk at the time they wrote the press release, which knocked over the Diefenbaker government.

ROBINSON: Really? Is that right?

Q: I wrote it myself. I mean with some drafting help, but you know how those things go.

ROBINSON: Then remember (inaudible) at defense in Canada said to me, "I was the only ambassador that ever came to Canada and brought down a government." Well, that's not quite true, but . . . [Laughter]

Q: [Laughter] Well, that's a way that you didn't say it.

ROBINSON: All right, true, I think I did the same.

Q: If you want to, you know, argue that if you take this position, then something falls down. Why, there it is.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: That's simply, you know, it's a kind of simplistic view of the matter.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: I mean, the Diefenbaker government was bound to collapse at some point.

ROBINSON: It was bound to go, anyway.

Q: At some point.

ROBINSON: So was Trudeau.

Q: And Turner's government was bound to lose at some point.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: Well, are you pleased with the way things developed after you left, in regard to the Free Trade Agreement?

ROBINSON: Well, very much so. Of course, as you know, I didn't negotiate. I think it was very well done. I think the key was Baker as Secretary of Treasury. STR was not -- I mean, certainly they did the hard foot-slogging work. But Baker was the one that provided the clout that got it through. Wilson, on the Canadian side, I think, was they key man. In fact, Mike Wilson and I met before all of this ended. I said, "Look, what should we do?" We raised over some of the things which I said I would pass on to Washington, which I did do. And I remember publishing was one of them. And I said, "How does this look to you, Mike?"

And he said, "Well, I think we can work it out." He said, "You can press this, and don't press that," and that sort of thing. So I was able to be a good messenger. I reported all that duly to the Special Trade Representative's office. So I played a marginal role in the actual negotiations.

Q: This was after you were --

ROBINSON: Ambassador.

Q: Negotiations took place after you left.

ROBINSON: Yes. Right.

Q: No, I know you played an important role in that. I think the embassy in Ottawa worked hard on it, also.

ROBINSON: They did.

Q: I visited them a couple of times and was impressed with the way they had taken hold of this issue.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: And made themselves expert. And Jim Tarrant was on the --

ROBINSON: I liked Tarrant.

Q: He was a first-class man. He used to work for me when I was assistant secretary.

ROBINSON: A fairly younger fellow.

Q: Yes.

ROBINSON: He's very good.

Q: Very good, indeed.

ROBINSON: Did he leave the Foreign Service? I know he's down in Ottawa now.

Q: I don't know what his next assignment was or whether he left.

ROBINSON: Yes. I liked him.

Q: I liked him very much.

Now the acid rain question, you know, is still, it seems to me, scientifically up in the air. Did you feel that the Canadians were unwilling to accept the possible scientific evidence would go against their political convictions on this matter?

ROBINSON: Yes. I mean, clearly, it was. I mean, they liked to kick us in the shins, you know -- the press, particularly. I think it was blown out of proportion, but it nonetheless is one of those realities of public life. I mean, it didn't matter what the facts were. It was a real political issue.

Q: It certainly was.

ROBINSON: And it is.

Q: And it remains so.

ROBINSON: It remains so. I think it's mitigated somewhat. I do think that President Bush and his administration would do more. I know that President Reagan wasn't convinced that we had found out how SO₂ and NO_x got into the atmosphere and then fell to the earth as acid rain. I think the Bush people are more likely to do something about it.

Q: I read an article recently in the Washington Times by Warren Brooks, who is one of my favorite commentators and analysts. He is a superb analyst. I will try to get you a copy of this. It raises the question as to how much money it takes, really, to have an impact on acid rain, and is it worth it. In the sense that --

ROBINSON: That's incredible.

Q: It says the data are very confusing.

ROBINSON: Conflicting. You know, if we spend, say, ten, fifteen, twenty billion, and at the end of the day, find out it doesn't work, then where are we?

Q: Well, then you have just blown your money.

ROBINSON: That's right.

Q: I've talked to a lot of people under the Reagan Administration because, as you know, we were working on that Atlantic Council project on Canada.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: My wife and I. And we talked to quite a number of people about this issue, and we were never really convinced that the scientific evidence was all that convincing.

ROBINSON: That's right. Reagan wasn't, either.

Q: And I'm sure he wasn't. I think there were a lot of other people who knew more science than he did who were also so convinced.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: But they probably conveyed that thought to him.

ROBINSON: Speaking of the Atlantic Council and off the subject, the University of Illinois is prepared to join with ESU and the Atlantic Council on this lexicon thing. How much with the Soviets, how much money is involved.

Q: Let me pause a minute. [Tape recorded turned off]

We are back on the air. Paul, you've had a lot of experience with Canada, both during your ambassadorship and since. What are your views on the general nature of Canadian-American relationships and what you see coming in the future?

ROBINSON: Well, I think that, of course, the average American doesn't give the time of day to it. They take it for granted, the relationship, as being good. And it is basically good. And, frankly, it will always basically good if we pay attention to Canadian needs and sensibilities and if they, on their part, behave in a similar manner. They also take us for granted, you know, Bill, in questions like defense, for instance.

But, I mean, if you or I have a business in Australia or New Zealand -- if you are down under, and you look up, and you say, "Well, I can't see the difference between Americans and Canadians." We look down, we see Australians and New Zealanders. We say, "Well, there isn't any difference." Well, of course, there is in both cases. There are no two people in this world closer to each other than the United States and Canada, not only by blood and by language, but by basic outlooks on life. That doesn't mean there aren't differences; there are. We, as Americans, want to make sure that we are aware of these.

I'm an American of Canadian descent. It sustained me in many a time when the press was all over me at the beginning. At the end, I made really more friends than I thought, than I could in the press and beyond that. After two and a half years, I think I beat them. They were writing good things about me. And I was really wondering whether I was doing my job or not. Because they were actually agreeing with me and saying nice things. And I thought, "Well, I must be doing something wrong."

But they find it easy to criticize us. And, of course, as you know, 80% of the population within a hundred miles of the border, they can't help but be informed on what we are doing or polluted by what our television produces. They asked me once, some of them, "What can we do to limit the influence of American television?"

I said, "I don't know. But let me know so we can do the same thing in the United States."

But they do have -- I think you have to treat this -- I found that the way to work with Canadians was to treat them straight on and be consistent. It's always better to be consistently wrong than right sometimes and wrong some other time. But it is better to be consistently right, and I think I was. And I think, in fact, President Reagan wrote me a letter, which I have framed in my office in Illinois, saying, "The relationship now between the United States and Canada is greater than at any time since the end of the Second World War." And he said, "You can be proud that it happened on your watch."

Q: I think that's true. I would confirm that in my own experience with Canadian affairs, which began in 1958. So I would say relationships are currently very good.

What do you see as happening in the Free Trade area? Do you think that this agreement is going to survive? You know, all the media in Canada now talk about are how many jobs are lost or many plants are closed. And, of course, rationalization was bound to occur. But they don't

emphasize, or as a Canadian told me the other day, "They don't emphasize all the new jobs and all the new investment."

ROBINSON: No.

Q: How do you see this? And this relates to the media, of course, who are always very difficult in Canada.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: As they were with you.

ROBINSON: Yes. Speaking of the media, I want to say that the U.S. press is malicious. The Canadian press is stupid, because they don't do their homework. And they are, basically, anti-American -- the press is. The Canadian people aren't.

But an answer to that is that it's estimated by the best judges -- and, of course, that doesn't mean that it's right -- that trade will be enhanced in the next five years by 15%. Right now, as you know, it is over 150 billion. The biggest trade relationship in the world, twice what our trade is with Japan. Over the next five years, 15% at least increase. And a 1,500,000 jobs, of which 500,000 would be Canadian jobs, new jobs. That won't stop the press. But I think we will see something even better than that.

Back to the press and the letter -- as I mentioned, the President's letter. Brian Mulroney's office said, "What kind of a letter do you want the prime minister to send you on your departure?"

Q: That's a delicate question.

ROBINSON: Yes. It was Fred Doucet, the prime minister's chief of staff. And he said, "Do you want us to tell the truth, or do you want something that we can release to the press?"

I said, "Well, have him write the truth," which was a very kind letter, also framed in my office. But the thing is it was positive, and it would have embarrassed the conservative government had it got into the press. I was told in no uncertain terms that I cannot release it to the press. I could frame it, put it in my office in Illinois, but I couldn't let anybody see it otherwise.

And that shows you how delicate the relationship is on the Canadian side, that the opposition would have got a hold of it, socialists and maybe the liberals and said, "Well, there goes the prime minister again playing up to the Americans." I think that is a sensitivity which we Americans have to recognize exists.

Q: How do you think we can get more attention to the reality of Canadian-American relations by Americans? You know, I have felt we were afflicted by apathy and ignorance to an incredible degree.

ROBINSON: I agree. Well, first we could have Louis Real again do a northwest rebellion, and

then we would pay attention to it. But that's been over a hundred --

Q: Our new separatist.

ROBINSON: You know the disturbing thing is that Americans would ask me not about Trudeau, but about Margaret Trudeau. I mean, it just struck me -- I mean, our view of Canada is that it is very cold up there, and that Margaret Trudeau still lives up there. And then they don't have the slightest idea -- we don't have the slightest idea about the separatist thing, which, of course, is a great danger. They ask you a question.

You know, I have suggested to Derek Burney before he became Canadian ambassador, that they buy a section of Time magazine and put it in there, like Saudi Arabians do, and just put it in there. I don't care what it costs. I mean, that at least Americans would recognize what Canada is and what it is doing.

The only other thing I think could be through television. If we can generate the interest, I think the Public Broadcasting System might do more on Canadian subjects. I know my daughter is working with a program called the Editors in Montreal. She is an intern there while she is at McGill. And that program appears on some 300 channels in the United States, PBS channels. So not in every case, but oftentimes, I know I appeared on it. And a friend of mine in Topeka saw it. So that sort of thing, I think, would help.

Q: The Canadian Embassy's got a new news bulletin out, a weekly news bulletin.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: Which strikes me as quite good.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: Which they will send you if you ask for it.

ROBINSON: Yes. I don't think -- I get the one from Chicago. I guess that is the same one. Yes.

Q: It's Can News or something like that.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: And I thought it was very good.

The media in Canada -- we've talked about the print media. How do you feel about CBC and the Canadian television? Did they treat you any worse or any better?

ROBINSON: Well, they tried to, but they couldn't, you see, because I was on television. They can't just quote you when you are on television. In fact, CBC has asked me to be on a panel, which I'll be glad to do, on December 9th in Vancouver, which will be Canada coast-to-coast in

Canada with P. R. Burton and (inaudible) and a good New York Times man, Malcolm, and a few other people. But, you see, they can't misquote me when I'm on television. They would often throw in these high hard ones, you know. They would dwell on some issues which were almost trivial. I think they liked to interview me because they got a straight answer, and they got a story.

I gave over 150 speeches in Canada. I stopped counting at 156. I was on radio and television at least as many times and more times than that. I've traveled 250,000 miles. So there was hardly any -- I think I've traveled Canada more in my tenure there than any politician. I was everywhere including --

Q: Probably more than any ambassador. Although our ambassadors have always tried to get around the country quite a lot.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: And I did when I was DCM. We had eleven consulates in those days. And I supervised the consulates, so I had to get around.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: Eleven consulates is a lot to supervise.

ROBINSON: It is a lot, absolutely.

Q: They have been consolidated now.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: So you think the CBC tries to give you more of a break than --

ROBINSON: Well, the interviewers were sometimes hostile, but they were relatively fair. They had to be because the people are watching it.

Q: Yes. And if they weren't, the people wouldn't.

ROBINSON: That's right.

Q: Because, of course, a lot of Canadians watch American television all the time.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: Any other subjects that you think are important? How do you feel about French Canada? Have you been around French Canada?

ROBINSON: Quite a bit. I must say that my attitude changed on that subject. Of course, I detest separatism as much as the Canadians, or good Canadians, do. I was invited by the Levesque

government on November 11th, I remember, 1981, remembrance day, our Veteran's Day. I laid the wreath in Quebec City. Levesque was, I thought, a despicable man. He refused to wear the king's uniform during the war. He came in the U.S. Army as a cameraman. In his office was no maple leaf flag. He didn't attend the ceremony. There was the Quebec Flag. I called on Ryan, who was also a separatist, but a responsible one, I think, if there is such a thing as a responsible, I don't think there is. But he at least had a maple leaf flag in his office. Levesque had pretenses of being a great friend of Americans and would join NATO when they were independent.

I was asked what I thought of the separatist movement by these separatists. And I said to them, "Whereas that is entirely a Canadian matter (I didn't say Quebec matter; a Canadian matter), the United States favored a strong and united Canada," which, of course, didn't go down very well with them. And six months later, I took the trouble of having it made official U.S. policy. And that's what it was.

Q: It had been said before in an earlier day when I was familiar with it. It was said particularly at the time when the separatists were raging in some various kinds of terrorism and violence.

ROBINSON: Yes. In '71.

Q: Yes, '71. Late '60s and '71. It was a very tight time, and they had a very hard time up there. I remember going to the NATO meeting in '63 in Ottawa, and there were extraordinary security precautions taken by the Canadians.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: In that time. I know the American delegation was horrified because, as a member of the delegation, I wouldn't stay at the hotel. I didn't want to pay the price at the Château Laurier. I went and stayed in a motel over in Eastview in the French part of town.

ROBINSON: Really?

Q: Yes. They had good steaks, anyway. It's a place I knew.

Do you consider separatism still a threat?

ROBINSON: It is always a dormant threat. You know, this last election, the liberals won with ninety-three seats to twenty-nine or something like that, over the separatists. The separatists still got 40% of the vote, which is the exact percentage that they got in 1980 on their referendum.

Q: That's right.

ROBINSON: So it is always there. And I think that the rest of Canada, Aglophone Canada, really must be attuned to this. I don't think separatism will ever occur. Although not a Canadian, I have strong pro-Canadian views. To me, it is treason. I mean, if the governor of Illinois was saying the things the Levesque said, we would hang him. And then we would try him later, I suppose.

Q: You mean you don't have due process in Illinois?

ROBINSON: No, not for treason. But, you know, the French Canadians -- you know this firsthand better than I do -- but the sign of the revolution in the '60s and early '70s really freed the French Canadians from the Roman Catholic Church to the point now really where they have almost gone too far, where they don't pay any attention to the teachings of the church. But what they did was they came in the marketplace, and today French Canadians are far more entrepreneurial than your average Anglo-Canadian in Ontario. They are sitting back waiting for the government to do things. And the French Canadians are the ones, in many cases, I would rather do business with because they are --

Q: They are out and at it.

ROBINSON: They are out and at it, that's right. And I tell you they have -- bilingualism, of course, is absurd, as far as the United States is concerned. But with two founding societies, even though it is a terrible problem involved with it -- in many cases, a needless duplication -- it is, nonetheless, working. I think in the long run, it will do a lot to mitigate any separatist feelings. That, with their entrepreneurial spirit, I think, will eventually kill the concept of separatism.

And French Canadians are now regarded -- I mean, in the privacy of our drawing rooms or living rooms -- as, you know, as being first, Canadians; second, North Americans; and only third, French. Because they don't like the French any more than the French like them. And the only time they say they are French is when some Anglophone gets on them for being French. Then they really become French. Otherwise, they are as good a Canadian as anybody.

Q: Yes, I couldn't agree more. I was horrified when I went to Canada in 1958. I was horrified by the anti-French tone of most Anglophobes over there.

ROBINSON: I know it. There were second-class citizens.

Q: It was very, very repulsive.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: You know, in the Reno Club, there were no French Canadians.

ROBINSON: No, that's right.

Q: And I used to take French Canadians for lunch now and then just for the hell of it, you know.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: And, incidentally, I am trying to get the Reno Club and the Cosmos Club to have correspondence.

ROBINSON: That would be good. I remember the Reno Club.

Q: I used to be a member.

ROBINSON: Well, I can help on that side.

Q: Well, they want it. Ambassador Robinson and I will talk about it then. They want it.

Well, let's see. Is there any other subject?

ROBINSON: I was just thinking. You know, Bill, there have been more ambassadors shot since the Second World War than generals. Now I don't know whether it's killed --

Q: Four of them were friends -- five of them were friends of mine.

ROBINSON: Really?

Q: Yes.

ROBINSON: Yes. I don't whether it is accurate to say shot or killed. But, in any event, shot would be correct. I am probably the last ambassador to walk around freely in Canada. I had, as you know, my driver, and we had an armored car and all of that. Against regulation, I carried a -- in the back seat in the briefcase, there was always a snub-nose thirty-eight. The problem was never Canadians, but these terrorists -- Iranians. Armenians were our biggest threat because they wanted to get back to us for trying and jailing an Armenian in Los Angeles for shooting a Turk.

One of the funny things was we had an informer in Nicaragua who had prior been a Marine or something in one of our excursions down there. He found out that the Tupamaro European communists were meeting at some point in the United States to engineer the kidnapping of the U.S. ambassador to Canada. So I was alerted to all this. And there was a two-week period -- John Rousebeck my DCM, said, "Boy, if they do get you, they are in for something." But anyway . . . [Laughter]

It didn't work. I was almost, you know, disappointed, because when you are on a two-week alert, and they are looking at everything real carefully and there doesn't come, it is somewhat of a letdown.

One time I was walking in Ottawa. I came out of a government building, and a young man came up to me quite rapidly. And I thought, "Oh, my God." Well, I noticed he had a clean tee shirt on. It is funny how much you remember. It wasn't a dirty tee shirt, so I thought maybe he might be one of us, rather than an attempted assassin. And he said, "Ambassador Robinson," like that.

And I said, "Yes," looking and watching his hands.

He stuck out his hand and said, "God bless America." [Laughter]

And I had other people come up to me on the street and say, "God bless you, Mr. Ambassador. What you are doing for our country is . . ." That, as opposed to what some of the people were saying initially in the press. That we were telling them what to do. Reagan was a bomb-slinging cowboy, and I was his clone, and all of this. Given time, we can all rise above that and get the point over. But we have to be consistent.

Q: You have to remember also that the Canadians, in the end, do believe in fair play. Their standards are all right.

ROBINSON: Even more than we do.

Q: Even more so, yes.

ROBINSON: At the retroactive backing provision of the National Energy Program, I said, "I send my people, and I've got one ace card." Because, of course, I ruled out any reciprocity. I said, "And that ace card is Canadian sense of fair play, and I will play that card." And I did play that card. And believe me, it worked wonders.

Q: Yes. I think perhaps it is worth recording that one of the best advice I got when I went to Canada was by somebody who had been in the Canadian desk a long time. And he said, "You know, you can kick them in the shins, you can argue with them, you can fight with them, that's all okay." He said, "One thing, never dent their halos."

ROBINSON: Oh, that's right. You don't want to dent their halos. That's right. They are holier than thou.

Q: The moral sense is very strong there, and it goes back a long ways. No, I am familiar with the way the media treated you, and the fact that by the time you left, you were fully respected across the board, not only by the media, but everybody else.

ROBINSON: I appreciate that, Bill.

Q: I have been told this by a great many Canadians with whom I maintain contact.

ROBINSON: In dealing with them, Bill, just to finish on that point, I think the open, direct approach is the best with the Canadians. I never went in with a false position, which I was prepared to negotiate.

Q: No hidden balls.

ROBINSON: No hidden balls. I mean, I just told them what I thought. And we sat down, and we tried to work it out, and we were always able to do it. But I didn't have any cushions. I suppose I always have a fallback position. By playing that ace card, you know, they didn't have to agree with me. But at least they understood I was telling it like I saw it, and it really worked.

Q: I always thought that, you know, you might as well be straightforward with them. You know,

in the end, you get down to what are the issues, anyhow. Because they are very able people. They would analyze problems very successfully. They were good negotiators.

ROBINSON: They were great in both world wars. My ship was with units of the Royal Canadian Navy, destroyer units, Tribal-class. They were damn good at Korea.

Q: Oh, their military, their professional military are first-class. They don't have any tools to do anything with, but --

ROBINSON: No. But you know, one time Trudeau, Shultz, and I were at lunch at External Affairs, and Trudeau looked at Shultz, and then he looked at me, and he says, "I don't think I've got enough money for Paul's ships." That was the first batch of patrol frigates, which, of course were authorized and now are building. And now there is a second batch, six each.

Q: They are building them?

ROBINSON: They are building them.

Q: What they had was far more.

ROBINSON: They had twenty destroyers, sixteen of which were beyond, were superannuated. Not really a naval term, they were beyond --

Q: Beyond recovery.

ROBINSON: The other four of the new Tribal-class were mid-life. They are now fifteen, sixteen years old. Normally, the life is twenty, twenty-two years as a destroyer. So, of course, if they get rid of the sixteen and replace it by twelve, they are still not where they were ten years ago.

Q: Yes. In quality, they are improved.

ROBINSON: Oh, yes.

Q: Because the newer stuff will have more technology.

ROBINSON: I played a role. The British Founder-class would have been selected had they not pulled our appropriation rug from under their submarine program. But what they need are surface capacity. They need destroyer types, frigates. They didn't need subs, but the reason they wanted subs was because they wanted to patrol under the icecap to assure their sovereignty.

By the way, I don't think anybody can argue that those waters and lands in the north are Canadian. And, finally, we got off our high horse on the rule-of-the-seas business and said that you can't walk across the Gulf of Sidra, you know, in Libya, but you can walk across the Bering Straights in Canadian frozen territories.

Q: Do you think rationality has overcome the wall in our view?

ROBINSON: Yes, I think so. That's right. That's the sole issue that I agreed with the Canadians on where we were -- but, of course, I couldn't quite say it publicly. What I did was merely point out the two sides, and let it go. That came at the very end of my tenure in Canada. I pooh-poohed a lot of it.

Q: That was kicked off the by the polar sea --

ROBINSON: That's right.

Q: That went through the last summer you were there.

ROBINSON: It did.

Q: Yes.

ROBINSON: We knew about it, and the Canadians knew about it.

Q: Well, we had negotiated the whole thing --

ROBINSON: I know.

Q: Through External.

ROBINSON: Sure. But, you see, the press got hold of it. I played it down as if it wasn't anything. In fact, it really wasn't anything, except here again we get the perception, and the perception was something that we Americans don't respect our territory. And, of course, I did. And as it turned out, we agreed.

Q: Well, now we have negotiated a modus vivendi on icebreakers.

ROBINSON: Yes.

Q: That will take care of all these problems in the future, it seems to me.

ROBINSON: It will.

Q: But it was a great uproar. A lot of people got very excited about it in Canada. And nobody ever heard of it down here, you know. We got one line in the Washington Post.

ROBINSON: Well, it really didn't get that.

Q: Yes. Well, I think we have boxed the compass pretty well. You have appointments.

We are most grateful to you for this opportunity for an interview. Thank you, Paul Robinson, for being so frank and straightforward, but that is your normal style.

ROBINSON: Thank you, Bill.

Q: Thank you very much.

STANLEY ZUCKERMAN
Counselor for Public Affairs
Ottawa (1983-1986)

Mr. Zuckerman was born and raised in Brooklyn, New York and educated at the University of Wisconsin. After service in the US Army, followed by newspaper reporting and a position with the Governor of Wisconsin, he joined the USIA Foreign Service in 1965. He subsequently served as Information, Press and Public Affairs Counselor in Congo, Belgium, Mexico, Canada and Brazil. He also had several senior level assignments in Washington at USIA and the State Department. Mr. Zuckerman was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.

Q: Well then you went up to Canada where there is absolutely no paranoia concerning the United States.

ZUCKERMAN: That is not true. I specialize in paranoid countries.

Q: I would say, other than a different accent.

ZUCKERMAN: Well you see, it is the birthplace of anti-Americanism. The United Empire Loyalists went there at the end of the revolution when they were the first non-French speaking white settlers allowed to settle in Ontario. To this day you go to the York club in Ontario, and you have to toast the queen before cigarette smoking is allowed both before and after dinner. I think that still exists. It certainly was true when I was there. I went to Canada for very specific personal reasons. I was at the time a single parent. My kids were of high school age, and this probably would be the last post when I had any supervision over them before they went off to college. I wanted to take them to a post where they could learn to live in a world different from the world of young children in a diplomatic setting, which meant they would have to learn to use public transportation, go to a public high school, and get jobs after school. The only place I could do that was in Canada. It was coming open a year after I was due to leave Mexico, but I stayed an extra year, despite my disagreements with Ambassador Gavin, which we worked out, in order to be in line for that posting. We spent three very interesting and very cold years in Ottawa. My kids achieved everything I hoped for and went off to college far better able to cope with the real world. And I also persuaded Adriana Bianchi, an Argentine scholar with a US education who I met when she was teaching at a university in Mexico, to join us in Canada where we were married.

Q: Well you were there from when to when?

ZUCKERMAN: I was there from 1983 to 1986.

Q: What was your job?

ZUCKERMAN: I was the counselor for public affairs.

Q: Who was the ambassador, and how did he operate?

ZUCKERMAN: Well he was a very interesting and colorful man. His name was Paul Robinson. He was the president of an international insurance company that his father had founded in Chicago, and was the chief Illinois fund raiser for the Reagan campaign in Illinois. He had made many waves in Canada by making it his personal task to travel the country berating the Canadians for not pulling their weight in meeting the common defense obligation, that their spending on military hardware and on military mutual defense was disproportionate to their GDP, the lowest proportion in NATO. He trotted out many figures to describe the disparity between NATO's defense posture and that of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies at that time. It seemed that every time he gave a speech the figures might change, to the delight of our critics. My first task was to find some way, because he was a very determined man and was not easy to contradict, to get him to use accurate numbers and stick to them. I had, when I was in Mexico, very good relations with what we then had – a world class printing plant that served all of Latin America and much of other parts of the world. Our two major printing plants were in Mexico and the Philippines, and the magnificent book of 90 full color reproductions of the works in our Mexican exhibit were all printed in collaboration between those two printing plants. I called them up and asked if they could produce a pamphlet which would contain the Ambassador's basic speech, with his photo, and get it to us very rapidly. They said they would do it in record time. So I went to Ambassador Robinson and told him that his basic speech was important enough to warrant a mailing to universities, defense institutions, periodicals and newspapers, but since he didn't use a text, it would be useful if he would dictate the speech to his secretary. He thought that was a great idea, and did it right away. We then gave the text to the Embassy's defense attaché and asked him to get every one at the Defense Department whose armaments was mentioned to vet the numbers and make sure they were accurate and up to date. We sent the corrected material to Mexico and I believe it came back in a fine little pamphlet with the Ambassador's photo on the cover within a week or ten days. From that time on he stuck by that text, with the correct figures that we could defend against critics. And from that day on we were on fine terms.. He was a great baseball fan, a lifelong Chicago Cubs fan with a box seat for all their games at Wrigley Field. The manager and a few stars of the Toronto Blue Jays would annually come to Ottawa as guests at a dinner that was held in a beautiful hall in the majestic Canadian parliament building to discuss the outlook for the team in the coming year and answer questions. A collection of the leading lights of Canadian politics were invited to the dinner, and the Ambassador, knowing that I grew up in Brooklyn and was a Dodger fan, invited me to join him at the dinner since his wife was not a baseball fan. There were four large round tables, with about 10 people at each. The majority leader of the Canadian senate was the host at our table, and before dinner and the session with the Blues Jays, called on each of us to tell his favorite baseball story. It started with the Ambassador, went around the table, and ended with me. I had only one story to tell, and while others were telling theirs I wondered whether it would be acceptable to tell it in that august company.

Q: Why ?

ZUCKERMAN: There is a rather strong word in it, without which it makes no sense, but since this was hopefully among friends, I took the risk of telling it... I told about having gone to see the Brooklyn Dodgers with some friends of mine when we were about 12 or 13 years old at Ebbets Field, a night game. There was pitcher called Hugh Casey who was a real roughneck. He once reportedly had a fight in a saloon with Ernest Hemingway when the Dodgers trained in Cuba. He was a heavy drinker and was one of the early relief specialists in the major leagues. That night the Dodgers were getting beat up, and he came in to relieve, in the 5th inning as I recall. He pitched the rest of the game, getting in and out of trouble, but won it. It was a marvelous exhibit for a guy who was out of condition and getting by on sheer guile. We waited at the players exit to get his autograph, and finally he came out dressed like an insurance salesman, snap brim hat, brown pinstripe suit. Now we were only interested in his autograph. We congratulated him on his performance, and offered him our pads and pens. . He said, "Not now kids, I am really a little tired." So we followed him down the street, and just before the elevated subway station he stopped to get the News and the Mirror, which came out late in the evening, and to get a shoe shine. While he was getting his shoes shined we asked, "Can we get your autograph now?" "Let me rest a little kids. Let me just read the paper," Well he tips the shoe shine boy, goes up the stairs of the elevated and goes through the gate leading to Manhattan. Our route was to go the other way, back to Coney Island, change subway trains and go up to Bay Parkway. Instead we followed him on the train to Manhattan, standing by as he read his paper, repeating our request. He said, "Not now kids, just let me read a little more." Before we knew it we were at Union Square, 14th Street in Manhattan. He gets up to leave the train. We follow him off the train pleading. "Mr. Casey, we have done everything you said. We are in trouble now. We should have been home a long time ago." (This was long before cell phones.) He went through the turnstile and I called out to him. "Mr. Casey, if we go through this turnstile it is going to cost us another nickel to get back on the subway. Why don't you just show us some kindness and give us the autograph. We followed you all this way." He stopped, and he turned around and came back to the turnstile, and we extended our pads and pens certain that he wasn't going to walk off and disappoint us. When he reached us he stopped and said, "Fuck you, kids," and he turned and walked away. I have used that story to describe to people in various cities what could be in store for them if they really want major league baseball players in town as a constructive influence on their kids. Well those at the table, to my relief, roared with laughter, especially Paul Robinson. We got on even better after that evening. The next morning I found a copy of the new annual baseball almanac on my desk. Inside the cover page it was signed: "Good Luck Kid. Hugh Casey." I knew it came from the Ambassador and we had a good laugh about it.. I'll never forget that, when he left the Ambassadorship after the election to go back to Chicago, he threw a huge dinner at which he charged an attendance fee of \$500 a head, all of which went to the Kidney Foundation. (His mother's life was saved by the donation of a kidney from his sister.) It was hugely attended. He had gotten the best hotels into putting up tents and serving their favorite desserts, and it went on and on until one or two a.m. and there were about 12 or 14 of his closest friends and a couple of us embassy types left. I would not attempt to reproduce his articulation at the end of such a long and wet evening, but as I remember he said to the groggy assemblage, throwing his arm around me: "I never would have guessed that when I left Ottawa, my best friend would be a New York liberal Jew." I have seen him since, both in Washington and

Chicago and we always exchange Christmas cards. He was such a baseball fan that he put up a pitching machine and a backstop on the front lawn of the ambassador's residence, and made me get up to hit soon after I got there. I had played some baseball in my life. He said, "I have finally got a PAO who can hit. A slash hitter." He promised to reward anybody who could hit the ball far enough to break a window in the residence, but the lawn was huge and thankfully nobody did it. Everybody sort of laughed about his miniature baseball field until one day Pierre Trudeau, then prime minister of Canada, stopped by with his three sons to have a go at the pitching machine. He was colorful, and I think that despite the fact that he was a target for lampooning in the press, they knew that he was a man who had a good sense of humor, loved Canada deeply, and I think that in the long run, because Canada did increase its defense budget, he had an effect on Canadian defense policy.

Q: This concentration on the defense thing, was there some guidance from the State Department or was this his thing, or were you people from Washington told to cool it?

ZUCKERMAN: Well I think there was consternation on the Canada desk over the stridency of his message, but he was regarded as a powerful political appointee. It certainly was not a contradiction to the President's own message, and whatever the concerns were, he did as he chose in this matter. He was not off line on the message. He was just not a traditional State Department type. But that is true I think in the case of many political ambassadors who choose to be proactive in public affairs. I am not at all convinced that it is a bad thing. It is very rare for most career ambassadors to call attention to themselves by haranguing the host country on an issue of mutual concern. But sometimes a political ambassador who comes there for a short time can get away with something that needs saying. Any foreign ministry can observe that, well he is not really a career diplomat, is he? But they hear the message. In the case of the political ambassadors for whom I have worked, they had an advantage in being able to make phone calls that most career ambassadors can not, to people in Congress and the Senate and the White House, whereas most career ambassadors have to wade through State Department channels.

Q: How did you find, well, a little bit of compare and contrast between the environment in your job in Mexico and Canada?

ZUCKERMAN: The issues were in some cases similar. But the context and the style were very different. The Canadians were every bit as hostile as the Mexicans to our involvement with the contras in Nicaragua and the right wing government in El Salvador. And when we brought the son of Violetta Chamorro, who later became president of Nicaragua, to speak in Ottawa, there were those who thought we were out of line. The son was the editor of the only remaining independent and outspoken newspaper, La Prensa. His father, the editor, had been killed. The son was a very bright guy, educated in the US and we had his appearance sponsored by the International Press Association representative in Ottawa, who was editor of the major Ottawa newspaper. Chamorro gave, I thought, a very realistic assessment of where the Sandinistas were headed and what the opposition was like, discounting the contras. I mean the political opposition within Nicaragua, what was happening to them. When it was found out that we had paid his expenses, somehow the Ottawa papers made that the story. Even if we asked how else he could get there, since there was no money in Nicaragua for people who are not in the government to come up there, they played it as if we had used subterfuge. It seemed silly and somewhat

amateurish in our eyes to characterize is as underhanded. Later on when the strategic defense initiative became a high administration priority, and we were told to flog it, we had speakers coming up who were greeted with total derision. It was not an issue for Mexicans to be concerned about because they had no direct involvement in the strategic defense of North America. But the Canadians did, and they thought, as many Americans did, that the concept was eyewash. Canadians loved to feel that they had built a society that was free of the violence and poverty that existed in the US, and that they had a better life. And yet, when you take a look at the number of Canadians who have come here to make their name, they are everywhere. They are everywhere in the arts, the sciences, the universities, and the media. During the Vietnam War there were a large number of Americans of draft age who had come to Canada because of their opposition to the war or, in some cases, just to avoid the draft. A number of them ended up teaching in Canadian universities, and became some of the harshest critics of American policy in Canada. But those issues were conducted and talked about in perhaps a less paranoid level, at a less paranoid level than in the case of Mexico, mostly because there was so vastly more interchange between the two societies. That was not only on the level of the academies and the newspapers and business, but in government. In the embassy in Mexico, at the time I was there at least, there was very little direct interchange between Mexican government officials outside of the presidencia and the foreign ministry, whereas in Canada, our environmental people and their environmental people would talk directly. Our commercial people and their commercial people, our treasury people and their treasury people had direct lines to each other's offices.. They knew each other. They traveled back and forth. So the differences are subtle, but real. The Canadians are determined not to become a mirror of American society, although that varies depending on where you go in Canada. Canadians in Ontario and Manitoba fear that someday they will lose Alberta, Saskatchewan and British Columbia to the United States because the Canadians there are so much more pro American, feel so much that their lives and concerns are very much like those of Americans.. When you get a little further east in Manitoba, Ontario, and then certainly Quebec, attitudes are far more nationalistic, although Quebecers seem to feel more comfortable with Americans than with their English-speaking Canadian countrymen..

Q: Well then you go to Nova Scotia where Boston is their capital.

ZUCKERMAN: That's right. And Quebec is a very complicated issue because it's Canada's great divide. But the Quebecers use that. They like to feel closer to us than they do to Canadians, the Quebec nationalists anyway, than they do to English speaking Canadians. They had a consulate in Boston of about 34 people, which was extraordinary. They were very active in developing business ties, particularly in energy. They sell a lot of power to the United States from their vast hydro electric resources. But the recurring efforts of Quebec nationalists to gain autonomy was an issue that we obviously stayed strictly out of, because it is for Canadians to decide. We would gain nothing by entering into it, although obviously we don't relish the idea of Canada splitting. The pressure within Canada waxes and wanes. Right now it is in a waning period. I think certainly every American administration would prefer a united Canada, although when you get out to the West of Canada many people say "let them go and be done with it." I doubt that it's going to happen. At least I hope it won't.

Q: Well did you work well say with our consuls general in Montreal and Quebec and Toronto. Were you having a problem of keeping the Quebec nationalists from snuggling too close to us

and trying to co-opt us.

ZUCKERMAN: Well not ourselves personally. It might happen in different areas, in commercial areas or others. We had offices in Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver, consisting of one American plus a Canadian staff and a library.. Those programs were very active because they were in great cities. The major universities of the country were in those places. Carleton University and Ottawa University had some decent departments, but the strongest centers of higher education were elsewhere. You had McGill in Montreal plus several French-speaking universities. The PAO in Montreal was also responsible for Quebec City which was the site of Laval University. Toronto of course had the University of Toronto, which is the great university of Canada, but also York University and in Lower Ontario some very good universities, Kingston, Queens College, the University of Western Ontario and a university in Waterloo that was probably the best center for computer science in the country. In Vancouver, the University of British Columbia was outstanding, and there was a first rate university in Winnipeg, the University of Manitoba. There were also consulates in Calgary and in Winnipeg. We tried to serve them by sending materials for one of the State Department local staff to distribute. Canada is a vast country but it is not very deep. About 80% of the population lives within 150 miles of the U.S. border. So you can't cover the whole country, but we really seldom try to cover any country geographically. We try to find the people who shape attitudes in the country and the institutions to which they belong. We tried to form cooperative relationships with those people, the gate keepers, to reach the country as best we can.

Q: Well talk about Quebec. I somehow have this feeling that Quebec in a way parallels France in that they have their intellectuals at the university and all. Were these important people?

ZUCKERMAN: Yes, but there is a very important distinction to be made here. The French in France don't accept the Quebecers in the way the Quebecers would like them to. Their accent is very different; it's still rooted in 17th century French. The Quebecers are North Americans, but they love their French roots; they love their language. Their differences with English speaking Canadians are not merely linguistic, but really involve a matter that may be more serious, since it represents a question of economic and class distinctions. Ottawa adjoins the province of Quebec, separated only by the Ottawa River. Just across the river is the town of Hull. When we were moving in to our house in Ottawa, all the workmen, all the delivery men who would come to our house were French speakers. During the heyday of Anglo ascendancy in Montreal, there were clubs which would not accept French Canadians as members. There was a class distinction which is much stronger I think, ultimately, than the language distinction. But still the same, the movement for independence has given rise to much greater sensitivity within Canada and the realization that if they want to remain united, they would have to address the language issue and the class issue as well. It is a healthy country. They have really good, strong partisan battles, and the strength of their several political parties wax and wane as ours do not.

Q: When they lost, the party almost disappeared.

ZUCKERMAN: Yes, the Progressive Conservatives almost disappeared and really have not recovered from their high water mark in the 1980's. They were the dominant party while I was there and then a couple of years later they had a handful of members of parliament. So there are

much stronger swings of fortune there than here. There was a strong third party in Canada, the New Democratic party which is pretty much a socialist party. One major difference between us is that Canada has a parliamentary system, which produces a very different style of politics than we practice in the US. Here, the most useful attribute in Congress is the ability to rise to a committee chairmanship, that is achieved by longevity and developing strong alliances that may not be visible to observers. The accumulation of debts owed by those whose careers you have advanced can be collected once you advance to more important committee chairs. In Canada, the give and take of parliamentary debate values the legislator who is fast on his feet and shines in the quick response that brings hurrahs from his fellow partisans and also brings him attention in the press and on television. American congressional leaders must be powerful. Canadian parliamentary leaders must be brilliant. And they are the product of an enviable educational system. I was friendly with a professor who lived in Ottawa but was born in a tiny town in the north of Saskatchewan, I think it was Ruppert.. His father came as an indentured servant, a Jew who spoke only Yiddish and an Indian dialect that he learned in Saskatchewan. And he worked his way out of that, but the son, because of a Canadian policy of trying to ensure equal education throughout the nation by paying more to young teachers who would go to very distant, rural areas, got a good enough education in that tiny town to be accepted at the University of Saskatchewan. His education there was good enough to get him accepted into the PhD program in economics at the University of Chicago. It is possible that a story like that can occur in the United States, but only in the case of an exceptional teacher who spots an exceptional student. Canadian schools, and the entire educational system, are not tied to local property taxes as ours are. Good schools don't exist because they are located in wealthy areas. The money is spread around to all, and it results in an educational system that is far more uniform across the country than is our own.

Q: Well now did you find that you were keying programs to the English speaking and then to the French speaking. Did you have different focuses or something?

ZUCKERMAN: Not really. We had good relations with the University of Ottawa which was French speaking and more left than Carlton University. In Montreal we dealt with McGill which was English, and with Concordia which was French. But if it was a common venue, we invited people equally. We did start a Fulbright exchange program, which really didn't exist much in Canada because everybody thought we didn't need one. We did it in a different form though, and this was with the international relations department of Carlton University. We worked out an agreement whereby professors from the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins would come up and teach a several day course in their specialty at Carlton University, and Carlton University professors would go down to the school of advanced international studies to lecture in their specialties in Canadian affairs. It was the only way you could do it with Canada; it had to be two way. It served a very good purpose. Canadian studies in the US are not what they might be. It is a rather rarefied field for a small number of students and scholars but it does exist. The North American Free Trade Agreement created new interest in the relationship. Originally it was a bilateral free trade with Mexico only. Then the complication that followed out of an attempt to design an agreement which would benefit all three countries took very extended negotiations which concluded long after I left. It created more controversy in the US than in the other two nations, even though Canadians undoubtedly lost some jobs to the US, but there was a fear that jobs in the trans-national auto industry would move to Canada. The tri-lateral

negotiation was an undertaking that I couldn't believe at the time I was in Mexico was ever possible. I bumped into a favorite professor of mine with whom I studied at the School of Advanced International Studies, Isaiah Frank, during a visit in Washington during the time I was working in Mexico. He told me that a group of his fellow economists were kicking around the idea of a free trade agreement with Mexico. I told him that I thought it might make economic sense, but that at that time – about 1981 – it would seem politically impossible. The Mexican press would have gone through the roof with warnings of American control of the Mexican economy and of Mexican jobs being taken over by Americans. And at the time it was true, but I was amazed at how quickly the agreement was brought about. I think it was because we weren't as fully aware as we might have been of the growing power of the new Mexican middle class, people who were professionals or white collar workers who no longer felt they needed political tutelage. This is ultimately what brought about the political change in Mexico that made NAFTA possible. In Canada, there was already an enormous amount of American manufacturing and there was significant Canadian-owned manufacturing in America, as well as significant cross border investment in each other's industry. So in a sense it was easier. But reading Mexico into all of that was a great achievement, because of the significant cultural differences and production processes. I am not an economist, but I salute the negotiators who were able bring it off, and the political skills it took to not only negotiate it but also to have it accepted by a majority of the political actors in all three countries.

Q: You know that for years there were these battles where people holding your job and similar jobs had implied, and that was, I don't know what you want to call it, but the overflow of American advertising and all, and American oriented radio, magazines, TV what have you all to the Canadian side, and their attempts to stem this. How did it stand when you were there?

ZUCKERMAN: Well it was certainly there. The Canadians at the time still had restrictions requiring movie theaters to have X percent of Canadian productions on their screens. There was a fuss about American books overwhelming the Canadian products on the shelves of their book stores and libraries. But I think that is changing. You know I make films now, and I get a little check each year from the Canadian consortium that protects American film makers by tabulating the amount of American programs seen on Canadian television and send us a our pro rata share of the royalties owed by Canadian cable systems. I think what is happening is that Canada is now producing some first rate films that are seen in the United States. They have extraordinarily good writers. Margaret Atwood and Robertson Davies are probably read by as many Americans or more than Canadians who are reading American authors. Stephen King might be an exception along with more literary writers like E.L. Doctorow, Phillip Roth, Joyce Carol Oates, or John Updike, But at that same time there is a sensitivity on the part of most countries who feel that their own cultural achievements are being neglected by those of countries like the US, France and the UK whose international media dominate much of the planet. Hollywood is probably the *bete noir* of foreign cultural commentators because its output dominates local productions simply by the unmatched production values of its films, even if they are artistically inferior to many of the superb small foreign films that serious film fans in the US enjoy. American films are hugely popular in every country I've worked in, including Canada, where our common language and cultural affinity makes them more accessible. But I can't imagine that that will remain a serious issue forever because of the growing strength of Canadian culture and Canadian identity. They are proud of their distinctions and are gaining in self-confidence.

Q: Did you get called in, I mean is this an issue had this become an issue while you were there on any particular thing.

ZUCKERMAN: When we would have meetings on cultural issues we would bring up the Canadian content issue and point out that it was unbecoming a nation that was justifiably proud of its writers, artists and film makers. They would acknowledge that we brought it up and move on, sort of the same reaction that Mexicans have when we point out the distortions in their textbooks. It was a political issue because most Canadian film makers would probably find it more difficult to have some of their films shown without the cultural protection laws. And yet they could point to figures that showed that American films were easily within reach to most Canadians, which was certainly true in all of the video stores and on television. Canadian channels and Canadian cable services carried American television coming from the cities across the border closest to them. So it is really a hopeless task to seal the border off from cultural flows each way. And it is inevitable that the cultural flow would be greater flowing north than flowing south, except for the fact that proportionate to their size, I think Canada is holding its own.

Q: What about Cuba?

ZUCKERMAN: Cuba was a freebie for Canadians. Canadians loved to be friendly with countries with warm climates. Even working class Canadian families spend a couple of weeks as far south as their budget will allow. If you go down to Miami in the winter you will hear a French Canadian station that operates only in the tourist season. Canadians discovered that travel to Cuba was cheap and fun and then the hotels began improving as foreign investment went in. So although their differences with us over how Castro should be handled were not very different from the way Americans who disagreed with American policy would describe it; nonetheless, it was one of those areas where they were free to tweak us, free to pull Uncle Sam's beard without any consequences. We understood that. There were problems of course, once you start trying to export to the United States Canadian products containing sugar that was bought in Cuba ran afoul of American laws restricting Cuban goods. I don't know how they could determine which box of cookies has Cuban sugar in it rather than beet sugar from wherever. It is pretty silly, you know, when you get right down to it.

Q: How did you find say the Canadian media? Did you go to the Globe and Mail or any newspaper and you know, say could you get a little more even sided coverage in this issue or that?

ZUCKERMAN: Yes, but that wasn't usually the way we would do it. We would, if somebody was in town, a lecturer, a government official who could state our case, we would make them available for an interview. I mean we would not lecture the Globe and Mail, which is a great and responsible newspaper. They had a first rate correspondent in Ottawa, a columnist who we were very close to. He agreed with us on some things and not on others. But you earn a good relationship with newsmen by doing certain things that allow them to develop trust in what you tell them. We had several high level visits while I was there. George H.W. Bush came to Canada when he was vice-president and enjoyed a very successful visit. Then later there was what was called the Shamrock Summit between Brian Mulroney, who was prime minister, and President

Reagan. It was held in Quebec City which I got to know very well by running back and forth a dozen times before the visit. Before a presidential visit the Washington press corps scheduled to accompany the visit was given a special briefing on the issues. The briefing was to be given by Richard Burt, the then Assistant Secretary for European affairs before Canada became part of a new bureau called Western Hemisphere Affairs. The briefing was to be given in Washington, and we arranged with the White House for a hookup to be set up at the National Press Building in Ottawa, where most newspapers and broadcast media had their offices, and where we had ours. There was a nice studio downstairs and we were able to get a video and sound feed directly into it. The Canadian press came out en masse – about 100 people were there. We had an agreement that, at a certain time in the briefing, the briefer would accept questions from the Canadian press. As far as I know, it was a first, and I'm sure it has now been done wherever facilities are available; at least I hope it's done, because it's important that we treat the press of a host country where the president travels as professionals deserving equal treatment with our own press. There's always a desire by the White House press office to take care of the US press first for obvious reasons, but we got much better treatment for the president than I recall from visits I worked on where the foreign press was clearly given second-class consideration. Once we got a satellite dish and USIA started WorldNet, we would invite a half dozen or so Canadian reporters to our office to participate with press in several other countries in interviewing important US officials. Once Secretary of State Shultz participated in such an interview, as did a number of other cabinet members, and the press was very enthusiastic about the program. The interview subject couldn't see them, but he heard their questions and answered them directly. It gave the press in the participating countries the opportunity to ask questions relevant to their own bilateral issues and not only those important only to the US agenda, and created a lot of good will along with many useful stories. Virtually every post now has access to this kind of activity, and I understand there is now new technology that permits programs that are directed at single countries, even smaller posts.

Q: Well did you get this “poor little us” stuff? You ignore us and all that. I got a little taste of this from this program we have here, this oral history program. Oh about six or seven years ago, in our collection we have taken excerpts from interviews dealing with various countries and lumped them together you know, for the help of someone. One day one of the Canadian correspondents, I think a major one from the Globe and Mail ran across ours at Georgetown University. The next thing we knew, there were front page, “American diplomats expose all. Feel that Canadians suffer from an inferiority complex.” I think one of the people was Paul Robinson who mentioned he carried a gun with him in his car.

ZUCKERMAN: I was not aware of that.

Q: This is after. This was a time when I think we had some stuff going on. But I mean you know it was front page stuff when it came. Then of course, another Canadian man in Washington was beaten so he went and called some more on it. It is the only time our embassy wrote and said, “What the hell is this program.” It is the only time we ever had this.

ZUCKERMAN: Well every country in the world is sensitive to how they are dealt with in the United States, and especially in public. You know I have heard some people say Canada is a great country but in baseball terms it's Triple A. They feel a bit neglected because of being so

close to a giant and seemingly, in the eyes of others in the world, so close culturally. People talk about North America and they mean Canada and the United States and they make no distinction between us. When you live there as an American, you realize the differences are quite real, and yet we are probably more alike than any other two countries. Americans are more like Canadians and Canadians are more like Americans than either of us is like any other people. That is a fact of life, and most Canadians understand that, and most deal with it. You know, Canadians have a great sense of humor. They kid themselves. They kid themselves vis a vis the United States as well. I am neglecting here also to mention that Paul Robinson was not the only ambassador I had served with there. Tom Niles was a career officer, came to Ottawa about midway during my three years there, and we had a very different embassy when he ran it. He was a very professional diplomat, a very serious man, and got along very well in Canada, was respected. He didn't make, and didn't seek to make, the kind of public splash that Paul Robinson did. I wasn't there when he left, and I'm sure he left great admiration behind him, as did Ambassador Robinson, even on the part of many people who disagreed with his politics.

Q: Well did you find while you were there, was the Reagan-Mulroney friendship, two big Irishmen a factor in your work?

ZUCKERMAN: Oh sure. As I mentioned, they called that summit the Shamrock Summit because of the Irish antecedents of the two principals. Reagan was not uniformly popular throughout Canada. He certainly was as popular among conservatives in Canada as he was among conservatives in the United States. But the strategic defense initiative was particularly problematic, as was the fear among many liberals and socialists that he was taking too aggressive a stance in our dealings with the Soviet bloc.

Q: Known as Star Wars.

ZUCKERMAN: Star Wars was simply not taken seriously in Canada. Nonetheless, despite strong political and attitudinal differences, nobody really hated Ronald Reagan. He didn't stir up the personal hostility that there was in the case of Richard Nixon or these days in the case of George Bush. There were strong differences over issues, but it was a time of reasonably good relations. You know, there have been periods in American-Canadian relations, I guess especially during WWII, where there were some very sharp elbows on both sides, particularly because Canadians entered the war several years before we did. Now there were some issues that are sort of bedrock in the case of Canada and the case of Mexico. In the case of Mexico it is immigration, where they know they are wrong but they need it. They need the money that flows in from migrants and they need the relief of population pressure among young people for whom there are no jobs. In Canada, it's largely economic; it could be fisheries on the west coast and east coasts – the salmon fisheries in the west and the cod fisheries in the east. And then there is always litigation about some economic disagreement or another. Most recently it was the legitimacy of stumpage fees we'd levy on Canadian logs.

Q: Well fish go back to colonial times. You could make a full solid diplomatic career based on fish.

ZUCKERMAN: A friend of mine has. He is retired and still working on the salmon, called back

to work by the State Department because he knows more about the issue than anyone else.

Q: Were you married at this point or no?

ZUCKERMAN: Yes. I was married in Canada to an Argentine professor of international relations who I met when she was teaching international relations in Mexico at the University of the Americas at Cholula, a town near Puebla. After I went to Canada with my children, who were 16 and 13 at the time, she came up to visit and scout employment opportunities and found a job teaching and doing research. She wanted to get married in a town with a nice name, and we found a small town 130 miles straight north of Ottawa with the lovely name of Mont Laurier. We drove up there and noticed the trees getting smaller and smaller the further we went. We had discovered a wonderful little Belgian restaurant up there, and after being married at the City Hall, had a lunch for a small group including Ambassador and Mrs. Robinson, my children of course, my sister and her husband from Dallas, a Canadian couple who became our best friends, and the Ambassador's chauffeur. That was on October 20, 1984, and we had arranged for the restaurant, which was opened that day only for our party, to have a roaring fireplace going, since that late in October in northern Quebec could be extremely cold. As it turned out, it was probably the hottest October 20 in northern Quebec's history. We all took off our jackets but were still sweating. But the meal was wonderful, and then went back to the Ambassador's home where the rest of the embassy staff had been invited by him and his wife to a reception in our honor.

Q: Did energy issues come up at all?

ZUCKERMAN: We were great importers of Canadian oil from the oil patch. There the Athabasca oil fields produced an oil derived from tar that was more expensive to mine and refine than crude oil at the time, but is far more competitive at today's oil prices. They have a goal of producing up to three million barrels a day by 2015. We also get a sizeable amount of electricity from Quebec's hydroelectric plants, and I believe there have been other sources of oil found in Alberta and other western provinces.

Q: How about I can't see why it would involve us, but did we get involved with problems the Canadians had with their Native American, or Canadian, tribes along the border?

ZUCKERMAN: I believe the only issue that arose, and I don't think it was much of an issue while I was there, was the trade in cigarettes. There is a tribe that overlaps the New York and Quebec border.....

Q: Probably Mohawk Confederacy.

ZUCKERMAN: Yes, and they can sell duty free, tax free cigarettes. All borders have border issues. But no, that was very much a Canadian issue. They dealt with it with a soft touch and I don't remember it being of any great trouble. My one great regret dealing with the question of Canadian native Indians, or Inuit, was that the Canadians never followed through on a proposed tour for information people from foreign embassies to the far north, as they had arranged for ambassadors at one time. I thought I had my counterpart in the Canadian Ministry of External Affairs convinced he should really take some information officers from different embassies on

such a trip. He thought that was a great idea, but it didn't happen. I was counting on that, even though when I retired I did on my own get to Antarctica, but I was really hoping I could get to the Canadian Arctic. There is a wonderful trip I never had the time to make on a train that runs from Winnipeg up to Churchill where, if you get up there at the right time, you can watch the polar bears come in to feed on people's garbage cans.

Q: What about did you get involved with media along the border? I am thinking the Montana border, British Columbia, affairs that would involve you. Any city's newspapers picking on the Canadians?

ZUCKERMAN: It might have been an issue in the Pacific northwest because of the scuffle over timber imports, but it just wasn't the same situation that we faced on the border between the United States and Mexico, where you had a situation like El Paso and Ciudad Juarez, where there are three times as many people in Juarez as there are in El Paso. Both cities are drawing from the same aquifer, and we are using two or three times as much water as the Mexicans are. Or the situation between San Diego and Tijuana with the waste water from the Tijuana River polluting Imperial Beach south of San Diego. You don't have that kind of friction between publics on either side of the border born of issues that really divide them. There aren't that many twin cities as such. People from Manitoba tend to think of Minneapolis as their shopping destination, just as people from Ottawa went to shop in small towns in upstate New York. Even with the Canadian dollar weaker than ours at that time, prices were better in the U.S.

Q: Vancouver sits off by itself. I mean it is like 100 more miles from Seattle. There is no particular relationship.

ZUCKERMAN: There is no dependency for jobs the way there was along the Mexican border. So no, I don't think so; we were relieved of that.

Q: How about Nova Scotia?

ZUCKERMAN: Well we had an interesting coincidence that then Canadian foreign minister Allan MacEachen and George Shultz were classmates at Stanford. MacEachen was from Halifax, and so he insisted on meeting every three months, which was an impossible schedule to maintain. But they met several times a year, and they met a number of times in Halifax. Halifax is a wonderful town, and I enjoyed going there, but we met in other places too, I remember meetings in Calgary and Toronto. They were not meetings designed to try to settle a specific issue, but rather to try to keep current the management of the relationship, and they were largely successful.

Q: Well then you left there when?

ZUCKERMAN: I left in the summer of 1986.

MICHAEL M. MAHONEY

**Chief, Consular Section
Montreal (1983-1987)**

Michael Mahoney was born in Massachusetts in Jun of 1944. He received a bachelor's degree from Saint Michaels College in Vermont in 1966, a master's degree in American studies from the University of Wyoming. Mr. Mahoney then went to Liberia with the Peace Corps. In 1971, he joined the Foreign Service, serving in Trinidad and Tobago, Greece, the Dominican Republic, Italy, and Washington, DC. Mr. Mahoney was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1995.

Q: You left in '83.

MAHONEY: The summer of '83.

Q: Where to?

MAHONEY: I went then to Montreal, to a tandem assignment with my wife. She was a USIS officer, so in the interest of compromise, the first year in Montreal, I was the number-two person in the Consular Section, with the agreement that after one year, when the chief of section left, I would become chief of section and do the rest of my tour there in that capacity. And that's, in fact, what happened.

Q: How did you find Montreal?

MAHONEY: The post, you mean?

Q: Both the post and also the political situation.

MAHONEY: Montreal is one of the most liveable cities, I think, in the world, even though it has four or five months of very tough winter weather. It's an extremely civilized, urbane place to live.

The political situation was that, in 1980, there had been a referendum on the issue of separatism, which had been defeated by about 60 to 40 percent. The feeling, when I went to Montreal in the summer of 1983, was that separatism was a fading issue, and that, in fact, the issue had probably been settled for quite a long time. And so there was the beginning of, I felt, a great deal of optimism, even though certain indicators, such as property values (we bought a house while we lived there), were very low. Interestingly enough, by the time we left, they had gone up significantly. The separatist government had been voted out, the Liberal government in Ottawa had been voted out, and the Conservative leader, Brian Mulroney, a Quebecer, succeeded Trudeau, a Quebecer, as prime minister. It appeared that with a Quebecer as prime minister and with a decisive majority of the Liberal Party in power in Quebec, separatism was a dead issue, and that the economic situation in Quebec was on a dramatic upswing.

Q: Did you all at the consulate general feel under the gun to be careful about what you said

about Canadian separatism?

MAHONEY: Yes, we definitely did not get into it. There was a standard guidance from Washington that said, in essence (I'm paraphrasing), that the United States has always been happy with a united Canada, and that having said that, the decision about the future of Canada is up to Canadians.

We never said anything else besides that, and it was made quite plain that we were not to get into it, which, I must say, I agreed with.

Q: What did the visa work consist of?

MAHONEY: We had an odd situation in Canada, because we did a lot of immigrant visas there for non-Canadians, under a program whereby people could come up from the United States for a couple of days, who had to leave the country to apply for immigrant visas, but were not compelled to go back home. That is, if you were from Nigeria or you were from Haiti or you were from the Philippines and could not adjust status in the United States, you could get your visa in Canada and go back to the United States. And if the visa was for some reason denied, you had a letter that automatically re-admitted you to the United States, even if you were the worst kind of murderer or something else, because the Canadians would not have let these people into Canada except for the agreement that they could go back to the United States. So we did a very large number of third-country immigrant visas. And since Canadians did not need visitor visas, all our visitor visas were essentially for non-Canadians. That was the nature of the business. It was interesting, but not terribly demanding.

The most exciting thing that I did while I was there was to preside over the installation of an automated WANG computer system. I was asked, during my first year, to be the systems manager, because the admin. officer was too busy with a number of other, high-profile projects. So I literally was the systems manager and oversaw the installation of a full automated system, which was a very interesting thing to do.

Q: This was sort of a trial run, wasn't it?

MAHONEY: It was one of the early posts. They began putting significant consular automated systems overseas about 1982, and this system came to Montreal in the fall of 1983. So it was one of the first posts to get, in effect, a central processor, to have everybody have a work station, to automate all the immigrant-visa files, and to put in a new non-immigrant-visa management system as well. So it was very, very exciting and quite a good learning experience for me, since I had had no previous experience with computers.

Q: How'd you find your staff?

MAHONEY: I thought they were quite good, very capable, and an extremely interesting mix. There were several Italians, or Italo-Canadians, I guess you'd say, because Italians made up the third largest ethnic group in Montreal, after English Canadians and French Canadians. There were Anglo-Canadians. So, in a way, it sort of reflected the Province of Quebec.

One of the things I found fascinating was that everyone in that office could speak what we would think of as Quebec French. But the Anglophones could not write French or compose or anything in it. They all had learned their French, in effect, in the street or from their friends. But they couldn't do any correspondence or translating in French. So they could do the window work, the counter work, in French, and certainly converse with all of their associates, but only the Francophones could really do any translating or written work. I thought that was quite fascinating.

Q: How about the younger officers that you had there?

MAHONEY: Yes, I thought they were pretty capable. They were all in good spirits in Montreal, I thought, because, one, it's a very civilized, sophisticated city, and they were all happy to be there; two, the nature of the work was not the same as it was in the Dominican Republic, for example. There were a certain amount of immigrant cases that people were unhappy about. Some people came up from the States who were not qualified for one reason or another, but they still had to be re-admitted, even if they didn't get their immigrant visas. But by and large, I thought there was a fairly good spirit that prevailed at the post.

The thing for me was that the work, after a couple of years, was not terribly demanding or challenging. Once the automated system was installed and working, which took about a year and a half, the work just somehow became less interesting to me.

Q: What did you do? In a way, you'd kind of had enough of the visa concentration, would you say?

MAHONEY: I found that to be true, and also simply that once the automated system was in and functioning, the actual running of an operation in a place like Montreal wasn't very demanding.

Q: How about American Services? Did you get involved in that at all?

MAHONEY: Yes, there was a certain amount. But the main American Services problems were pretty routine -- issuance of passports, reports of birth, that sort of thing. Welfare whereabouts cases or people who ran out of money were generally dealt with, because you could give someone a \$7 bus ticket and send them back to New York State, to the northern county welfare systems in the State of New York. We did that occasionally with people who fell into economic problems in Montreal. But it wasn't a terribly demanding situation.

We had a certain number of dual-nationality cases, because so many people had gone to Canada and become citizens. But by the middle '80s, most of the old grounds by which people were at risk for their citizenship had been rendered invalid by court decisions. And so you could, by that time, work for a Canadian government office; you could become a Canadian citizen, as long as it was necessary for you to get a job; certainly if you had been born dual-national, that was acceptable. All of those things meant that the old kind of citizenship cases that many of us grew up with had pretty well gone away by then.

Q: How about Americans who'd left because of Vietnam, to avoid the draft?

MAHONEY: President Carter had put in an amnesty, and by the middle 1980s, certainly in Montreal, we didn't encounter any of those people. That was really a forgotten issue by then. I don't think I ever came across a case like that.

Q: Did any of the extreme Quebec separatists feel any anti-Americanism?

MAHONEY: No. There were a couple of incidents in the 1970s, with the kidnaping and murder of the Labor minister and so forth. But if you live in Quebec for a while, that sort of thing seems so out of character. I can't imagine a more civilized discussion of separatism than what goes on in Canada. Quebecers, if anything, particularly French Quebecers, were strongly, strongly pro-American, in a whole number of ways.

For example, the ones that I knew, in the summer, never would leave Quebec to vacation in other parts of Canada. They went to Cape Cod, or they went to Old Orchard Beach in Maine, but they didn't go to other parts of Canada.

Large numbers of French Canadians, from the middle of the 19th Century, had immigrated to the northern part of the United States, to Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont. They felt, I thought, a very strong affinity for the United States.

And they were very well aware of Americans. I'll just give you this example. I felt that most French Canadians could speak anywhere from quite good to very serviceable English. And they could tell immediately the difference between talking to an American speaking English and an English Canadian speaking English. No matter where you were, in a store or a restaurant or a gas station or anyplace else, as soon as French Canadians recognized that you were an American, they would begin to speak English with you, and they were polite to you. Whereas, I saw them on many, many occasions, if they thought the person was an English Canadian, immediately you could see their hackles go up, and all kinds of unpleasant social mechanisms made themselves felt, not least of which was the fact that they wouldn't speak English with the English Canadians.

So that as far as the United States was concerned, it was not the Quebecers who saw themselves so much threatened by the United States, I always felt, as it was by the English Canadians.

Q: Bill Morgan was your consul general there, wasn't he?

MAHONEY: Bill Morgan for the first two years, and Bill Maule for the last two years.

Q: How did they run the place?

MAHONEY: I thought both of them ran it well. Both of them had spent the previous, say, ten or 12 years running consular sections. But despite that, they did not attempt to run the Consular Section in Montreal on a nitpicking, day-to-day basis, which I thought was very good.

Morgan spoke very good French and was very good at outside contact work.

Maule was intensely involved in the attempt to relocate the Consular Section. It was on the first floor of a building in an office complex, and the diplomatic security people had concluded that that was essentially unsafe because of terrorist issues, although there were, in fact, no specific terrorist threats while we were in Montreal. An enormously complicated logistical problem therefore came up about trying to move the consulate. Trying to do anything like that within the context of State Department bureaucracy is extraordinarily difficult.

Maule was forced, willy-nilly, both to do that and to spend a great deal of time seeing to the repair and maintenance of the consul general's residence, which was an old but very beautiful building on one of the hills in Montreal.

So he simply had to spend a lot of time on that, and the rest of his time was largely spent, I thought, in useful and sensible outside contact work.

Montreal is the economic and cultural capital of French Canada, and, in fact, is probably the second most important city in Canada. So there was a good deal of work to be done. And I thought both of the principal officers organized themselves to do that in a sensible way.

Q: You left there in what?

MAHONEY: In 1987.

WILLIAM A. WEINGARTEN
Energy Officer
Ottawa (1984-1987)

Mr. Weingarten was born in New York in 1936. He received his BA from Colgate University and his MSFS from Georgetown University. He served in the U.S. Army overseas from 1958-1961. His postings after entering the Foreign Service in 1962 included Paris, My Tho, Belgrade, Brussels, Canberra and Ottawa. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: You were in Canada from when to when?

WEINGARTEN: '84-87, and I was the energy officer in Ottawa, and I hit that at a very lucky time, because that was when the Canadians decided to deregulate their energy industry, and they export a lot of oil and gas and electricity to the United States. It's a major trade sector, ran about \$10 billion a year. And so we had a specifically designated energy officer up there, so I loved that job - terrific job. And I got to go out to Calgary, where the energy industry was located, got to know all the oil company people, helped the government, which was very friendly. It was the Mulroney government. It was very friendly to the United States. We helped them deregulate, dismantle their very complicated regulations that they had that prevented the U.S. investment, and so we played a major role.

Q: It had been a policy, I guess initially under Trudeau, hadn't it, to try to do something about our energy for us and not... had that been gradually changing over the years?

WEINGARTEN: Well, it changed. Part of this is some of the research I'm doing now for this project I'm on, but in the early '70s, in '71, we put restrictions on Canadian imports of oil because they were swamping our import control system. Two years later the Canadians put on export controls to keep the oil from coming down to the United States and causing them shortages. But then later in the '70s and '80s, the Canadians had some major energy projects, and it's a small country so they don't have the investment pool to draw from, so they needed U.S. investment, but they were very reluctant to have U.S. companies come in and take control of things. And then the Mulroney government in 1984 came in, and they changed the policy 180 degrees, and they welcomed investment, and they dismantled the regulations that kept U.S. investors from... They did this progressively, over the three years I was there. And so trade boomed; big projects got underway; offshore projects, arctic projects.

Q: How about water projects from Quebec?

WEINGARTEN: For the electricity?

Q: Yes.

WEINGARTEN: Those were big projects. We always had problems with that because it was a question of reliability, but in the other sense of reliability, not the sense that they couldn't supply it. But they had these gigantic, very high tension electric power lines that spanned all the way from James Bay, up in northern Quebec, down to New York, but if any kind of lightning struck one of these things, it would make the whole East Coast system of the United States wobble because it made such a major contribution. And normally, in the United States there are so many interconnections and doubling that if one main line is put out the system can adjust very quickly to compensate, but not in when that big Canadian line goes out. And as I recall, that's what happened in '79 when we had that big blackout in New York. That was where it originated, up in Canada.

The Canadians did not like the idea that they were hewers of wood and drawers of water, just selling raw materials to the United States, and so there was a terrific degree of sensitivity to that in Canada, which made the job interesting and made the... It was really one of the few countries I've been in where the embassy really made a difference. We could really get into serious problems if you didn't understand what was going on.

Q: How would this work, for example? You said you were helping another country deregulate or take away its own regulations. How did that work out?

WEINGARTEN: You'd just say, "Hey, that's great, atta boy [good job]." Take them down and show them how things worked in the States. Basically, we just encouraged them to do this. It's sort of like pushing on an open door.

Q: *Were you looking and saying, "This is causing problems; that's causing problems"?*

WEINGARTEN: Yes. And we'd tell them that this is slowing investor interest in the states and this doesn't work and you ought to consider getting rid of it.

Q: *The impetus was that the prime minister said, "It shall be done"?*

WEINGARTEN: Yes, and so then we'd track it and make sure it was done and identify if there were a roadblock to it, try to identify that.

Q: *How did you find the Canadian bureaucracy?*

WEINGARTEN: It depended. The Ministry of Finance was very good. The Department of Energy and Resources was good. The Foreign Minister was probably the one most sensitive to slights. The people in the Foreign Office could be rubbed the wrong way very quickly. There was always a kind of envy and distaste, maybe equally balanced. They don't like a lot of what they saw going on in the States, but they can't help but be fascinated by it. Also, Canada's not a very competitive sort of place, and it has a host of restrictions on cultural things and so on. And they have restrictions on Americans buying property up there. They want to keep Canada for the Canadians, but on the other hand, they also have expressions like, "If you're so good, how come you're still in Saskatoon?" So Canadians that want to make it, there's the U.S. to go try your hand at, New York or LA, San Francisco or Chicago. So there's just a host of difference between Americans... Canadians are very keen on being different from Americans, and there are differences that most Americans wouldn't notice, wouldn't consider to be real differences. But it's a terrific country.

Q: *Let's talk about the Quebec power grid. Was there anything that could be done about that?*

WEINGARTEN: No, not really. On the receiving end you just had to be very careful and try to have enough power elsewhere to compensate for sudden loss of it coming down. And so they'd have to make those kinds of preparations back in New York State, basically. And then selling all this power to New York, which needed it, but then they got involved in... Environmentalists in Canada objected to these gigantic projects for environmental reasons and also because of the impact that they had on the indigenous Indian people up there. They'd flood huge parts of western Quebec to build these dams. It was country that people figured was really not productive in any way. But they didn't really consult very closely with the Indians, and so they had some real problems. And New York finally decided against importing a lot more extra power from Quebec, in part because of the reliability issue, and in part because of the environmental issue and also in part because they figured they could promote conservation and coax people to use energy more efficiently.

Q: *How about the oil? I would assume that oil producers in Canada would be delighted to sell their oil wherever it would go?*

WEINGARTEN: Sure, and there were always tensions between the people in western Canada who produced the oil and people in eastern Canada who ran the government. And it was even

more acute than that. They had the same kind of problem in the States, Washington and some of the outlying areas, when we were doing a free-trade agreement, the forerunner to NAFTA. We discovered that the Bonneville Power Administration in Washington State, which is an autonomous outfit but comes under the Secretary of Energy, and they didn't like what the federal government was doing with the Free Trade Agreement, and so they were able to have an effective veto over it. And they made that stick. You know, here's an autonomous federal government agency, and they made their view successfully known through the Congressional delegations from those four states out there, from Washington, Idaho, Oregon, and Montana.

Q: What were they concerned about?

WEINGARTEN: They were concerned that we were going to give the Canadians an opportunity to get into the California electric power market by forcing Bonneville Power to let the Canadian power come in over its lines to California. It would have made sense for the consumers in California. They would have got cheaper energy, but we couldn't get that through. Bonneville refused to go along with it. But that was a much more acute relationship or controversy between the federal government in Canada and the provinces, which have a great deal more independence in most respects than the states do vis-à-vis the federal government.

Q: Was this a matter of nationalism with the central government, or was it a matter of things being diverted from going to Ontario and going south? Did sort of the petroleum grid and electric grid go east and west, or was it pretty much designed just to go north-south?

WEINGARTEN: It pretty much goes south, north and south, and the two economies are complementary in the sense that you have your big surge in electric power use in the States during the summer when it's much cooler up in Canada, so they had spare power; and then vice versa in the winter time. And so the oil pipeline grid doesn't extend in to eastern Canada. It doesn't go to Quebec, and it doesn't extent to the populated part of Ontario. It heads south, and so the Canadians find it more economical to sell it to us. Of course they could build a pipeline across the whole country, but it wouldn't be economical. It wouldn't be competitive with oil that came in from pipelines that begin in Maine, for example, and go up to Quebec. And so they have a line, the Ottawa Valley Line, and pretty much east of that is where there are 100 percent imports. The oil, and especially now natural gas, in Canada is very competitive, very sought after on the West Coast and Midwest markets and also in the East. It complements the gas that's brought up from Louisiana and Texas and Oklahoma. And we have a system that is so big, so enormous, of pipelines that they can connect into at various places. They make a lot of money on it, and they negotiate very tough contracts.

Q: Did you get into the contract negotiations?

WEINGARTEN: Sometimes. Once in 1987, there was a \$5 billion deal where Amoco in Chicago was going to buy a big Canadian company called Dome, and the chairman of Dome, who was never accessible, came to Ottawa and saw the finance minister in the morning to tell him that he was going to sell to Amoco, told the foreign minister in the afternoon, and had lunch with me in the interim and told me about it.

Q: *Your general marching orders were to try to keep this moving as well as we can.*

WEINGARTEN: Yes.

Q: *In other words, to knock down as many barriers - I mean, this was what we were after.*

WEINGARTEN: Yes, and it also was to look into the federal and provincial regulations and see where there were obstacles.

Q: *Well, did you find it was the federal regulations that were more the obstacle than the provincial ones?*

WEINGARTEN: Yes, much more so.

Q: *Basically this was Ottawa trying to control things.*

WEINGARTEN: Yes, and it's a much more consensual form of relationship between the provinces and the federal government than it is in the States. The federal government had constitutional crises with the oil-producing province of Alberta in the late '70s, and part of it was the same sort of thing that you get here. The people in the west say, "These goddam people in the East, these people in suits in Washington who don't know what they're doing are screwing up our business." It was very acute up there.

Q: *Did the French-English conflict intrude at all into what you were trying to do?*

WEINGARTEN: Not really. It was an advantage to speak French there, but you didn't really need it, because there were very few energy - apart from the electric power people in Quebec - very few people that you would find to speak French to in business terms. And the French up there is a French that's got a lot of... it's sort of the French of Brittany of 300 years ago. It hasn't evolved to the extent that modern French has, and so it's really a dialect. And my wife, who speaks really good French, lived for 24 years in France, always spoke French in the market... In Ottawa they all come from across the river in Quebec and sell goods, sell their fruit and veggies and meat and so on. And she always figured if she spoke French to them, they would have a higher regard for you, give you a better cut of meat. So she'd speak French to these guys, and they'd all respond in English, in very good English. And she'd insist. She'd speak to them in French. And finally, they would speak back to her in French, but it wasn't the French they were used to speaking. This was *français de France* -

Q: *School French.*

WEINGARTEN: Yes, school French for them. It wasn't their dialect, which is really hard to understand. It's called *Jouale*. You really had to have a sharp ear for that. Of course, you go up to Quebec City or Montreal, and if people took you for Canadian they would really insist that you spoke French, but if you were American, you know, they'd just give you a pass.

Q: *Did the Maritime Provinces play any role in what you were trying to do?*

WEINGARTEN: Did they what?

Q: *I mean, were they of any concern to you on the energy side?*

WEINGARTEN: Oh, yes. There were some big projects off Newfoundland and Nova Scotia that we were interested in that were being promoted to provide gas to the northeastern part of the United States or to provide oil. Oil from Canada was always considered a much safer source. At one point in time, we had an actual tariff preference for oil from the Western Hemisphere. It's no longer there, but people are still anxious to see Canadians develop these projects because they are more secure sources of oil than many of the other oil producers you think of.

Q: *What was going on? Was it a lot of exploration?*

WEINGARTEN: A lot of exploration and a couple of big projects, both of which have taken place, finally, only recently. They were pretty high cost. They were offshore projects, an offshore gas project and then an offshore oil project off Newfoundland. And so they've both come on stream, and presumably I think they're both making money.

THOMAS M.T. NILES
Ambassador
Canada (1985-1989)

Ambassador Thomas M. T. Niles was born in Kentucky in 1939. He received his bachelor's degree from Harvard University and master's from the University of Kentucky. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1962, he was positioned in Belgrade, Garmisch, Moscow and Brussels, and also served as the Ambassador to Canada and later to Greece. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 5, 1998.

Q: *Today is the 26th of August 1998. Tom, let's talk about the great neighbor to the north, who we keep forgetting.*

NILES: We do from time to time, unfortunately.

Q: *Your position, again, was what?*

NILES: I was one of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries in the European Bureau, beginning in June 1981, working for Assistant Secretary Eagleburger. One of the three offices I supervised was the Office of Canadian Affairs. That began an eight-year period of intensive involvement in Canadian affairs, four years as a Deputy Assistant Secretary through the beginning of August 1985, and then from September 10, 1985 through June 30, 1989 as Ambassador to Canada.

Q: *Before we get to this, what was your knowledge of Canada? What were your experiences and*

visits to Canada before this?

NILES: As is the case of many Americans, it was very limited. I had never been to Canada. I had been stationed in Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, Germany and Belgium, and I had traveled all over Europe and the former USSR, but I had never been to Canada. I knew a lot of Canadian diplomats with whom I had worked on assignments and generally liked them. But my detailed knowledge of Canada was close to zero. I had begun to get a familiarity with the U.S./Canada relationship during my time as Director of Central European Affairs, from 1979 to 1981, simply because we had regular bureau staff meetings every day with all of the directors. The Canadian director, Richard Smith, who went to Ottawa in 1981 as DCM, would talk about his issues: acid rain, fisheries, trade, etc, and I had begun to get some familiarity with the agenda by listening to him. Of course, working on economic summit issues (Canada and Italy joined the group in 1976), we had some interaction with Canada, specifically with Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau. I had also worked fairly closely with Canadian officials during my time with IO/UNP from 1977 to 1979 because Canada was on the Security Council at that time. Don Jamieson, who was the Canadian Foreign Minister and Secretary Vance worked closely together on a wide range of issues. The Canadians were good partners in the Security Council. We were lucky to have them there. Anyway, I took over the responsibility, as is true of most Americans who became involved in Canadian affairs, not knowing a lot about Canada, except there was a general good feeling toward Canada. We thought it was a wonderful country with great people, as well as the other half of the National Hockey League. By that time, I guess we were also beginning to get involved in major league baseball with them because of the Expos and soon the Blue Jays. So, it was a new experience with a rather steep learning curve.

Q: Prior to having the responsibility, when you were in European Affairs, with purely Canadian issues, did it fit in European Affairs? When you are looking at NATO, you are looking at the Soviet menace, you are looking at European cooperation, and all that. All of a sudden, somebody is saying "Well, we have a problem with salmon on the west coast." I would think that just by its nature, it didn't fit very well.

NILES: It took us a little bit far field, to be sure. But, if you think about the European Bureau, it circled the world. It ended in the Bering Straits with the Soviet Union and picked up with Canada. We were the only worldwide bureau. Now, of course, it has been partly dismembered because of a two stupid decisions, first in 1993 by setting up a separate Bureau for the former Soviet Union to accommodate Strobe Talbott, and then in 1998 moving Canada to ARA. Canada does have important associations with the other states in the Americas, but its principal foreign association is still with Europe through membership in NATO and the OECD. Its population is largely European culturally, it is European with an important, unique Canadian intermixture of Asians and the native people. From our point of view, I think it makes sense to have Canada as part of the European Bureau. But, obviously, you could make a case for it being elsewhere. From the Canadian point of view, what they always wanted was a separate Bureau of Canadian Affairs in the State Department, as they have a separate bureau of the United States Affairs in the Ministry of External Affairs in Ottawa. Of course, the fact that we could never justify doing that reflects the reality that while our relationship with Canada is important for the United States, the United States relationship is vital for Canada. It is that disparity in the relationship which is really the principal problem, if you will. At any given moment, we have with Canada a series of

bilateral, sometimes multilateral, issues in which the Canadians play a role. A recent example of the latter would be the land mines treaty on which the Canadians were particularly outspoken and Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy was a key player. Though important, the multilateral issues tend to be rather transitory, particularly compared with those that last longer such as environmental disputes and fisheries. But, there is one underlying issue which is always there which concerns the basic nature of the relationship: does Canada matter to us, and, if so, what are we prepared to do about it? The United States' response to that question varies from time to time. In the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, the answer was "Well, Canada is important, they are good friends, but there are no real problems so we won't worry about it." With the exception of John Diefenbaker in the 1960s, the Canadian leaders did not create waves in the relationship with the United States until Trudeau came along in 1968.

Q: Except for Diefenbaker.

NILES: Well, John Diefenbaker was unusual, you have to say. He was unusual in Canadian terms and certainly in terms of U.S./Canada relations. President Kennedy mishandled his personal relations with Diefenbaker to such an extent that it made the problems worse than they had to be. Actually, John Diefenbaker became Prime Minister in 1958, and his relations with the United States during his first two years or so, while President Eisenhower was in office, seem to have been quite good. It was only during the Kennedy Administration that problems seem to have arisen. The Diefenbaker era - 1958-64 - was a relatively brief interlude when the Progressive-Conservative Party was in power during the otherwise unbroken Liberal Party dominance in Canada from 1940 until 1984. In any case, after the close collaboration during WWII, and the close personal links between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister W.L. MacKenzie King, our policy in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s tended to be one of what I would call "benign neglect" up until the time of Pierre Elliot Trudeau, who really injected a different element.

Q: When did Trudeau come in?

NILES: 1967. He replaced Lester Pearson as leader of the Liberal Party and Prime Minister. He was very much a 1960s person. He was older, of course, than the flower children of Berkeley and the people who made the student revolution in North America, although he married one of them, Margaret Sinclair. She was about 30 years younger than he was and very much a flower person. In his heart, Trudeau was of that generation. He was a person who was philosophically radical, attracted to trendy ideas, and socialist in his economic orientation. He was certainly a collectivist in economic and social policies and in terms of his view of the role of the state. This has always been a more prominent trend in Canada than it has been in the United States, so in this sense he was not among a small minority. He was also, I think, distrustful of the United States in ways that his predecessors, Lester Pearson, Louis St. Laurent, and MacKenzie King had not been. In this sense, he was closer to John Diefenbaker. It is true that Lester Pearson had some tough times with President Johnson over issues such as Vietnam and reacted badly when brow beaten by Johnson, as he frequently was. But Trudeau added a new element, in terms of his personality and his political predilections and his willingness to adopt policies which were distinctly unpopular in Washington, both in the political area and in the economic area.

Trudeau was always pushing, always right on the edge, whether in terms of his relations with the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, which was an issue then, as it is now, with Canada, and in the economic area. In the mid-1970s, Trudeau with good support from his Party, at least the leaders of his Party, and the acquiescence, if not support from the Canadian people, embarked on a policy which was explicitly designed to reduce Canada's economic dependency on the United States. This led to the establishment of an institution, the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA), and a policy, the National Energy Policy, steps which were seen in Washington as unfriendly acts. They were designed to control American investment, in the case of FIRA, and to reduce the level of American involvement in the energy sector, in the case of the National Energy program. Trudeau also embarked in 1975 on something he called the "third course" which was designed to enhance Canada's trade and economic cooperation with the European Community and reduce Canada's economic dependency on the United States. It did not achieve its objectives. We should keep in mind that Trudeau was always on the edge of the acceptable, whatever it was. The story is that during WWII, Trudeau drove his motorcycle around the streets of Montreal decked out in Nazi paraphernalia.

Q: Was there anything else, at that time, on the cultural field?

NILES: There were continuing efforts to reduce the level of American "cultural penetration" through the media, films and so forth, to protect "Canadian culture." There were programs to support the publishing of Canadian authors and the production of Canadian films and TV programming, as well as restrictions on investments in so-called cultural industries such as book publishing, movies and so forth. And, of course, American companies adopted all kinds of artful ways to get around them, such as in the television business and cable TV, which was invented in the Toronto area to pick up the signals from Buffalo, despite the fact that the government of Canada was intent on trying to reduce that. Canadians, by and large, said, "Yes, we are Canadians, and we support Canadian culture, but we would like to be able to watch what we want to watch on TV, if that is the Buffalo, Detroit, or whatever channel. Canadians still feel that way.

So, in summary, you always had this underlying, basic question: How important is Canada to the United States? In the 1950s and 1960s, in part because Canada wasn't causing any problems, and because we were preoccupied with other things, East/West confrontation, plus big problems in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, we didn't pay much attention to Canada. This began to change in the 1970s, in part because of FIRA and the National Energy program. This change continued in the 1980s, and intensified after 1984 when Brian Mulroney took over and the basic orientation of the Canadian government changed.

Q: You came in just about the time of the Reagan administration. Did the Reagan administration have any policy feeling toward Canada?

NILES: Not at the outset. It was just not on anybody's scope. President Reagan's first foreign trip was to Chateau Montebello in June 1981 for the G7 Economic Summit. He did not visit Canada again until the March 1985 Quebec summit with Prime Minister Mulroney. Trudeau came to Washington several times, and he was at Williamsburg for the June 1983 G7 Summit, and had very amicable relations with President Reagan, but there was no great substance in the

relationship. During the 1981-84 period, there was a fairly strong push, in which I was involved, to try to persuade the Canadians to back away from the National Energy Program (NEP) and to relax some restrictions on U.S. investment established under FIRA. This happened, but whether it was due to our pressure, or to the realities of the economic situation, or a combination of the two, is hard to say.

Q: How did these programs work?

NILES: The Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) was just that. If a foreign company wanted to acquire a Canadian company, or to increase its existing share of a Canadian company, under certain conditions this was subject to review by FIRA and could be vetoed by the Canadian government. There were some cases where the Canadian government vetoed investments in what they considered sensitive industries, and there was always an element of uncertainty. New investments were vetted but were generally not prevented. The controversies arose over proposals to take over existing Canadian companies. Now, if an existing American company wanted to increase its investment in Canada, by and large, that wasn't a problem. The National Energy Program (NEP) subsidized Canadian energy companies at the expense of foreign, mainly American, energy companies. A state energy company, Petrocan, was formed and built up its business through Canadian government purchases, sometimes at fire sale prices, the Canadian assets of some international oil companies. I don't think there were too many Americans selling, but FINA, the Belgium state company, sold out, as did BP. There were several other smaller operations that were all coupled together into Petrocan. Then, there were some private Canadian operators that were favored by the Canadian government, given investment assistance and other benefits, in competition with American companies. These were companies such as Dome Petroleum, which was really a child of the National Energy Program. The bankruptcy of Dome and its acquisition by Amoco in 1987, when I was Ambassador, really charted the National Energy Program's rise and fall. But we have to realize that the National Energy Program collapsed not because the United States was opposed to it but due to economic factors, particularly the fall of the price of oil and natural gas, the heavy investments by Dome and other favored companies, and the inability of the Canadian government to come up with more money to support it. The energy market killed the National Energy Program. This is jumping ahead, but at the beginning, the points of controversy were...

Q: This is in 1981?

NILES: Yes. FIRA (Foreign Investment Review Agency), the NEP and acid rain were the key issues. At the end of the Carter administration, but the last EPA Administrator, had taken some fairly forward leaning positions on acid rain, including commitments to curb United States emissions, particularly from coal fired power plants in the Midwest of the United States to reduce acid deposition in the Eastern United States and Eastern Canada. When the Reagan Administration came in, it was a totally different story at the beginning. Environmental policy effectively, in the early years of the Reagan Administration, was made by James Watt. James Watt was, of course, Secretary of the Interior, and not directly responsible for environmental policy, but Anne Gorsuch, who was the EPA Administrator, had been an associate of James Watt in the Mountain States Legal Foundation, and she was very much his persuasion. He was generally opposed to any kind of federal government action to protect natural resources or the

environment. So, too, was Anne Gorsuch, and she was the EPA administrator. She and some of her associates at EPA, notably Rita Lavelle, ultimately, ran afoul of various ethical problems and went by the wayside, as did, ultimately, Jim Watt.

At the beginning, though, our attitude was very much different from that of the Carter administration. I, as the Deputy Assistant Secretary responsible for Canada, was given the unenviable task of being the acid rain negotiator. I had to cobble together a position and hold together an interagency team, representing some very disparate trends within the Reagan Administration. There were some career people, who had been working on these issues for years, who favored putting together a policy aimed at gradually reducing acid deposition in the United States and Eastern Canada. Then you had the political types and their people, down through the EPA and the Council for Environmental Quality. There was a guy from Ohio named Jim McAvoy, who worked in the Council for Environmental Quality in the White House. He was a very nice fellow who was easy to work with. But, he was dead set against doing anything that would have the effect of reducing coal mining and consumption in Ohio or anywhere else in the Midwest. Ann Gorsuch was dead set against doing anything, too. She was also not very interested in dealing with foreigners and was cool, to say the least, toward our Canadian friends, who were causing trouble for us. I can understand that. The Canadians were pounding on us and trying to raise pressure on the Hill and in the press, and trying to mobilize the New England Governors against the administration. Gorsuch saw this, as it was, as being unfriendly toward her policy. This was a difficult thing. My job was to tapdance around these issues and to keep the process going and to avoid a big political storm, which I was able to do, more or less, successfully, by fast talking and obfuscation, basically, for the better part of three years.

Q: On this issue, there still was a debate about whether there was really such a thing as acid rain.

NILES: That's true. There was.

Q: You were in the middle of this thing. What was your feeling on this issue?

NILES: At the beginning, I didn't know the first thing about acid rain. I had never heard of acid rain until I came into Canadian Affairs. I read up on it, talked with people, and looked at the scientific results. The scientific results were, as is often the case, inconclusive in one sense, and there was always a factor of doubt. There was no question that there was a process of acidification going on in the lakes and forests of New York State and New England and Eastern Canada. But, you could always find one lake, or two, or 20, where this process wasn't happening, where the fish weren't dying. And it was always difficult to prove that there was a cause/effect relationship. The SO₂ and nitric oxide emissions from the power plants in Ohio, Illinois and other parts of our Midwestern region went up into the atmosphere, and somehow, as a result of atmospheric chemistry, were turned into weak sulfuric and nitric acids and were then deposited in these lakes. Over time, the PH level in the lakes declined, and the fish died and various other negative environmental consequences occurred. Trees died as well. Today, we know so much more about the atmospheric chemistry and the whole acid deposition process, that there really isn't any argument about acid rain. It is a recognized reality. You can mitigate it, and we are mitigating it because of the agreement that President Bush signed with the Canadians in

1990 and the legislation that was enacted, the amendments to The Clean Air Act. The economies of the Midwestern states have not collapsed. This was the argument raised in 1981. In a way, the argument posed against policies to reduce acid rain was not that acid rain wasn't a problem. Many people in the Midwest and elsewhere were prepared to accept the fact that acid rain was a problem, but they didn't want to be responsible for paying for the solution. The answer, from people like Jim McAvoy was "Okay, fine, I recognize that acid rain is a reality, but you can't expect us to stop mining coal in Ohio just because it is relatively high sulfur and import all of our coal from the Powder River Basin in Wyoming. First and foremost, we couldn't get it here because the railroads couldn't carry all this additional coal," which was true. "Secondly, the electric power rates would go up tremendously. We can't afford these scrubbers that you want us to put on the power plants."

Nobody refers to the Midwest as the "rust belt" anymore, except maybe in a nostalgic sense. But, at that time, 1981/1982, there was a big concern about what was going to happen in the industrial heartland of the United States. Unemployment was high, and people reasonably asked, "Do you want to raise electric power rates in the Midwest by 25% and close the place down?" So, it was not really an environmental argument, it was an economic argument, and it was a particularly tough argument in the United States because it pitted one region against another: New England and Mid-Atlantic states against the Midwest, and there were some states that were caught in the middle, such as Pennsylvania which produced a lot of high sulfur coal and burned it in Western Pennsylvania, but in Eastern Pennsylvania, they tended to have nuclear plants and suffered from acid rain. They were schizophrenic within the state. Of course, Canada had the world's single source of SO₂ in Sudbury, Ontario. At the INCO Smelter in Sudbury, with the help of an American company, Bechtel...

Q: Secretary Shultz' company.

NILES: Exactly, Secretary Shultz' company. Bechtel built in the 1970s what was called Superstack. Superstack is an engineering marvel. It is as high as the World Trade Center and sits, figuratively, in the middle of nowhere, the world's highest smokestack. It takes exhaust from the Sudbury Smelter up to 1250 feet and emits them into the atmosphere. Not surprisingly, the Sudbury area, which had been a wasteland from SO₂ and acid rain prior to Superstack, became green again.

Q: Sudbury is where?

NILES: Sudbury is in Western Ontario, about 150 miles inland above Lake Superior. It is a wonderful area with wonderful people. Jack Kent Cooke was born in nearby Timmins, which is a big copper mining center. You have nickel, copper, and gold up there. Echo Bay on Lake Superior has gold and uranium and was a big uranium mining area. Anyway, INCO thought they solved the problem of SO₂ pollution with Superstack. They didn't really think about where all the emissions were going. It was "out of sight, out of mind." But, in fact, the emissions were going to Eastern Canada and the New England States. You could track the Sudbury emissions very easily because they had trace elements of the heavy metals – nickel, copper and gold – mined at Sudbury. But Sudbury and the surrounding area in Western Ontario suddenly greened up. Everybody said, "Hey, this is terrific, the fish have come back." In a way, the experience of

Sudbury confirmed all of the hypotheses about atmospheric chemistry and acid deposition. The Canadians were conflicted within themselves, too. When the Canadian government discovered that Superstack didn't really solve the problem of acid deposition, it forced INCO to install SO₂ scrubbers, which cut down substantially on acid deposition downwind. Of course, then, they had the problem of what to do with an enormous stack of sulfur.

The acid rain issue was very sensitive in Canada, and my effort was to try to make it appear that the Reagan Administration was listening to Canadians and was prepared to try to find a solution to this problem without making any commitments beyond additional scientific research. We had absolutely no support within the Administration for additional controls beyond the 1970 "new source" controls on power plant emissions. The problem then, and now, is that most of the coal-fired power plants in the Midwest had been built before 1970 and were exempt from the controls on emissions unless they were expanded or modernized substantially.

Q: How about from Secretary Haig, and then Secretary Shultz?

NILES: Secretary Haig had a lot of things on his mind and this was not one of them. I admired Secretary Haig. He was fundamentally a good person and fun to work with. He could always be counted on for some choice remark about one of his senior colleagues. I sympathized with his problems within the Administration that caused his fall. We talked a little bit before about some of them on the pipeline issue. But he did not get involved in the acid rain issue at all. The U.S. position began to change subtly when Secretary Shultz came. Secretary Shultz is an excellent example of a sensible environmentalist, committed to environmental protection but not at the cost of shutting down American industry. He has a very analytical mind, and he carefully analyzed this issue, focusing in particular on the economics and science of it. For example, he asked us for material on the science of acid deposition and what could be done to mitigate it. He did not simply see the problem of acid rain as a political management problem and one on which our effort should be to contain the political consequences. He wanted to know what the facts of the case were and what we could do, if, indeed, this was a serious problem.

Coincidentally, at the time that Secretary Shultz took over, around the 4th of July 1982, an old friend of his, Alan MacKeckon, came in as Foreign Secretary in Canada. I remember going to Secretary Shultz' office, (I can't remember what the occasion was) mentioning to him that Alan MacKeckon had just become Foreign Secretary of Canada, and adding that we had a message for him to send to MacKeckon welcoming him and saying that he looked forward to working with him. The message was drafted on the assumption that Alan MacKeckon was just another Canadian politician, but it turned out that they were close friends. They had been together in college in 1947-1948, I believe, at MIT. Secretary Shultz graduated from Princeton and then served in the Marines. He and MacKeckon were together at MIT after the War. Secretary Shultz used to refer to MacKeckon as "my professor," to which MacKeckon said, "No, we were all about the same level." But, anyway, they were good friends. In any case, the Secretary sent the congratulatory message back to us with a big X through it and the words "Warm this up." The close personal relationship between the Secretary and his Canadian counterpart, and the Secretary's commitment to learn about the issue to see if it was in fact a real problem and, if so, what we could do about it, were very important. Also, the anti-environmental zealotry of the Reagan Administration, for reasons having nothing to do with Canada, gradually waned. James

Watt, Anne Gorsuch, and Rita Lavelle left office. You will recall that Bill Clark replaced Dick Allen as National Security Adviser in April 1982. Ambassador Stoessel moved over to be Deputy Secretary. Eagleburger went up to be Under Secretary. Bill Clark stayed as National Security Advisor for maybe a year or a little bit more. When James Watt left Interior, Judge Clark moved over to be Secretary of the Interior, which was really his interest. He was an outdoors type guy.

Q: He's a rancher, isn't he?

NILES: He was from California, a westerner. He was quite conservative, and not a great environmentalist, but he was not an anti-environmental zealot or crusader like James Watt. He may not have been terribly effective as Deputy Secretary or as National Security Adviser, but he was a good person, unassuming and polite. After he went to Interior, his major involvement with us, providentially, was not on the acid rain issue. He left that to the EPA, which was in the hands of sensible people too, notably William Ruckelshaus, who had replaced Anne Gorsuch. For us, his interest was in Germany, through his wife, who was a Sudeten German refugee. So, John Kornblum, who had replaced me as Director of Central European Affairs, and I worked with Judge Clark while he was at Interior, arranging his trips to Germany with Mrs. Clark, which was totally harmless.

So, the Reagan Administration gradually began a new approach to US-Canada relations in July 1982, with Secretary Shultz leading the way. Shortly after the new Progressive Conservative government came into power in September 1984, Prime Minister Mulroney visited Washington in October 1984, and he and President Reagan agreed to appoint two special Commissioners to deal with the acid rain problem. They were to study the problem and come up with recommendations. The U.S. Commissioner was Drew Lewis, who had been the Secretary of Transportation, and by that time had moved to be CEO of Union Pacific Railroad. His Canadian counterpart was Bill Davis, who was a former Premier of Ontario, and a good solid guy. He was a serious politician and respected in Canada. These two Commissioners came up with a report to Prime Minister Mulroney and President Reagan in the summer of 1985, as I recall. The two governments accepted the report as a basis for further work, and this took us a fairly long way toward acknowledging that acid rain was a problem, and it committed us to work with Canada to find a solution. Now, it took a lot longer, five years in fact, to come up with an agreement, and it was only in the Bush administration that that happened. But basically, this process was a consequence of Secretary Shultz' insistence that we analyze the issue unemotionally. He felt that if it was a real problem, we should know that and decide what we should do to ameliorate it, and that included determining how much it would cost. His attitude was to work with Canada, instead of engaging in this exchange of insults, which was increasingly what we were doing during the James Watt and Anne Gorsuch period.

The Canadians had their own extremists on their side. At one meeting I chaired, one of them accused us of throwing garbage into our neighbor's back yard. I took strong exception to that, although it was not a totally inapt analogy. They had their extremists and we had ours. Fortunately, under the Mulroney administration, and by that time, in the United States, the extremists on both sides had been marginalized or moved out. By then, we had serious people on both sides who realized acid rain was a serious problem and wanted to work it out. We still had

our extremists. One of them was Gary Bauer, who is with the “Christian Coalition,” or some operation like that. But, at that time, he was on the Domestic Policy Council in the White House. He was basically leading a rear guard struggle initiated by James Watt against doing anything at all on the environment. He was a marginal player, although he was a pain in the neck.

Q: How did the media play this? Being here, we were hit by the east coast establishment of the New York Times and the Washington Post. It seemed like they bought the acid rain thing right from the beginning, a good thing to beat on the administration with. Did you have that feeling?

NILES: Absolutely. But there were other, opposing voices in the media, The Chicago Tribune, and others. The Chicago Tribune had an odd involvement in the acid rain issue because it had major timber lands in Eastern Canada – north shore Quebec to be precise – that were badly affected by acid rain. Colonel Robert McCormick established the Quebec North Shore Paper Company at Baie-Comeau, the birthplace and home of Brian Mulroney. The Chicago Tribune Company had two pulp and paper mills in Canada: one in the Lake Ontario area and one on the north shore of the St. Lawrence River, at Baie Comeau. The Tribune was schizophrenic. On the one hand, they had the interests of the Midwest with its high sulfur coal and coal-fired power plant to worry about, but they also had their own Quebec North Shore Paper Company to worry about. Of course, in Chicago itself, Commonwealth Edison depended heavily on nuclear power plants for its electric power production, and the CEO of Commonwealth Edison was on the board of the Tribune company. It was a difficult issue for the media folks from Chicago. But, basically, you are right. The New York Times and the Washington Post essentially took the Canadian position and lambasted the Reagan Administration for being neanderthals on environmental issues, particularly on acid rain. They enjoyed attacking Jim Watt. Jim Watt was fun to kick, and he loved it. He was such a combative personality that when he was attacked by the New York Times, it made his day. The worse the attack, the better, from his point of view. If they called him an environmental neanderthal that wasn't strong enough. He wanted to be called an environmental Nazi, or something of that nature. But, in any case, acid rain was a good example of the interaction of an international and a domestic issue, which is so frequently the case with Canada along the border. I think it is very much to the credit of Secretary Shultz and others such as Bill Ruckelshaus, who took over the EPA, after Anne Gorsuch left, that we gained control over this issue and ultimately resolved it. For the record, we should note that the results thus far reveal that the costs of reducing substantially emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, the precursors of acid rain, has been much less than we expected, in part due to the emissions trading program that was adopted along with the tougher controls. By the way, I should add that Vice President was another who played a very positive role in resolving this issue, both during the Reagan Administration and then during his Presidency. He made a significant contribution.

Q: His summer home was up in Maine.

NILES: Kennebunkport, and he came from Connecticut. Vice President Bush was in the same camp as Secretary Shultz. He was a sensible person who looked at this issue and tried to strip away the emotion to see what the problem was, and then tried to fix it. That was his attitude. He took a considerable interest in Canada. You had a turn toward a more responsive and a more engaged U.S. attitude toward Canada when Secretary Shultz took over. He had a personal feeling toward Canada. He had been very actively engaged there as President of Bechtel in the 1970s.

They built the Churchill Falls Hydroelectric Plant in Labrador. It was a huge project, with a 6,000MW power plant. Bechtel was also very much involved in synthetic crude oil production (from the Athabaska tar sands) other energy projects in Alberta. Secretary Shultz knew Canada. He had a lot of friends there. His close friend, Alan MacKeckon, was Secretary of State for External Affairs, and John Turner, who replaced Trudeau as Prime Minister in May 1984, was also an old friend. They had been finance ministers simultaneously in the early 1970s. Turner was Prime Minister from May through September, 1984. Then, when Brian Mulroney took over, things really changed.

Mulroney is a controversial figure now, and generally not well regarded in Canada. In terms of the relationship with the United States, Mulroney had a totally different attitude from that of Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Trudeau, as I said, was not great admirer of the United States. He seriously tried in the 1970s, though he failed, to develop an alternative to close economic ties with the United States. He felt that the European Community could at least balance, if not replace the United States as Canada's external economic partner. It didn't work, but he tried hard. For Mulroney, a close relationship with the United States was not a bad thing. He was a proud Canadian, a proud Quebecker, bilingual. He was an Irishman whose roots were in Quebec. He was an interesting fellow, with no hang ups vis-a-vis the United States that I could ever detect. He was very relaxed with Americans. His father had worked for Colonel McCormick's Quebec North Shore Paper Company.

One story used by Mulroney's political enemies, and Mulroney never denied it was that when Colonel McCormick visited Baie Comeau, Quebec, young Brian Mulroney would be brought around to sing Irish songs for the Colonel, who would always give him \$50.00. At that time, in Baie Comeau, Quebec, getting \$50.00 was like discovering gold, and those visits by Colonel McCormick were always eagerly awaited by the Mulroney family. This little history of Mulroney singing for Colonel McCormick was used against him by the liberals when he was Prime Minister. Whenever Mulroney would say something nice about the United States, they would say, "Well, Mulroney is always singing for the Americans and they are paying him to sing," just like when Colonel McCormick gave him \$50.00 when he sang Irish songs for him. "Now, President Reagan gives him favors and he sings the American song." Mulroney paid no attention to that. He went on and did his own thing. He and President Reagan had a very good relationship.

Q: They were two big Irishmen.

NILES: Well, the Irish business could be exaggerated, although they both had their roots in the Irish immigration to North America. But there were three other factors: 1) Mulroney liked the United States and wanted to work creatively with us. President Reagan understood that and appreciated it; 2) Mulroney is a genuinely nice guy and President Reagan liked him personally; and (3) Mulroney was smart in that he knew how to play up to President Reagan. He wasn't insincere, and he did like the United States, but he also knew which buttons to push with President Reagan to get sympathy and support. Mulroney's attitude was, "Look, the United States is very important to Canada. If I can get a more sympathetic attitude from the United States on issues of concern to Canada by supporting the United States on things that are important to them, like east/west arms control or Libya, Iran, Iraq, or whatever the issue happens

to be, why not?" I think he asked a very valid question: "What does it profit Canada to annoy the United States on these multilateral issues that don't bring us any profit?"

Q: I'm being unfair, but this was kind of an ego trip, on the part of Trudeau, wasn't it?

NILES: Trudeau loved sticking a pin in the United States from time to time. But I think Trudeau also philosophically disagreed with our policy, in a lot of areas: Cuba, dealing with the Soviet Union. He found us to be a difficult partner. There is no question that Trudeau got some pleasure out of sticking a needle into the Americans from time to time, and Mulroney didn't. Quite the contrary, his attitude was, "What benefit is it to Canada for us to take a position different from that of the United States on some arms control issue? Show me how we gain." His attitude was on these multilateral issues of great concern to the United States, that were perhaps of lesser concern to Canada, Canada should support the United States, particularly since, when the chips are down on an issue of great importance to Canada, President Reagan will remember Mulroney as someone who helped him out. And this is what happened, I can tell you from my experience while I was Ambassador. Although we did some dumb things from time to time toward Canada, overall President Reagan's attitude was "Look, if we can do something that would benefit my friend, Brian Mulroney, do it." Vice President Bush, Secretary Shultz and Secretary Baker, who also had good working relationships with Prime Minister Mulroney and other members of the Canadian government such as Foreign Minister Clark and Finance Minister Wilson, felt very much the same way. Personal ties do count, particularly when you are talking about countries that should work together and have all kinds of reasons to work together. Sometimes personalities can get in the way as they did at the beginning of the Reagan Administration. But from mid-1982 to the end of the Bush Administration, the good personal chemistry between those at the top of the two governments really helped.

Q: What about issues such as energy policy, and all of that? I want to stick to the 1981 to 1985 period.

NILES: Well, from 1981 to 1984, we put a lot of pressure on Canada to step back from some of the more outrageous aspects of the National Energy Policy (NEP), and in the end this happened. The question is did it succeed because of U.S. pressure or did it succeed because the policies weren't working for Canada? I think it was more the latter. Sensible people in the Trudeau Government realized that the NEP had been a failure, and some of the ministers such as Marc Lalonde, who were philosophically ill-disposed toward the United States, left office. Some of those at the sub-ministerial level who saw that the NEP was a failure, such as Deputy Finance Minister Mickey Cohen, who subsequently went off to run the Molson Company, were also helpful on energy issues. There was a generally successful effort in the period from 1981 to 1984, the end of the Trudeau administration and first years of the Reagan administration, to try to resolve the issues. In May-June 1981, we worked out a deal, which in a way, was a harbinger of a more cooperative energy relationship between Canada and the United States, involving the Alaska Natural Gas Transmission System (ANGTS). At the very beginning of my time as Deputy Assistant Secretary, I negotiated understandings with the Canadians for the construction of the ANGTS which involved some tax legislation in the United States and commitments on the Canadian side regarding the construction of their part of the system and transit rates. This is an enormous project, which would have taken gas from Prudhoe Bay, Alaska by pipeline, halfway

down Alaska, paralleling the Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline, and then cut off to the southeast, across the mountains into the Yukon Territory, and then to Zama in Northwestern Alberta, which is the beginning of Trans-Canada Pipeline Company's gas gathering system, which would deliver the gas to Chicago and the Eastern United States. Unfortunately, because of the enormous inflationary process we were going through (18% in 1981), and very high interest rates, the costs of the project went out of sight. It was unbelievable. I have never seen anything like this and I hope I never see anything like it again. The estimated price tag on this project went from something like six billion dollars, at the beginning of 1981, to \$24 billion, by the end of 1981. By the time interest rates and come down to a normal level and the inflationary pressures subsided, the wholesale price of natural gas had fallen to \$1.50 per 1,000 cubic feet, which made the entire project uneconomic. The project is still on the drawing boards. But we were able to reach an agreement with the Canadians on this very important energy project, which it was a good sign that we could work together on energy issues. The fact that the Reagan Administration was prepared to go for legislation, which we needed, in order to make this project happen, was important. The Canadians very much wanted it to happen, and our cooperation helped establish a better mood.

Q: Wasn't there a point during the Trudeau administration, where they were saying that they wanted to keep their energy for themselves?

NILES: Not really. What they wanted was to exclude United States oil and gas producers from the development/production side of their energy business. This was the essence of the National Energy Program. There were some restrictions on exports to the United States of "light" oil. They wanted to save that resource for the future and use more "heavy" oil. But there was limited refining capability for very heavy, very viscous, often higher sulfur Canadian oil.

Q: During the 1981 to 1985 period, was there any concern that whatever we did on the energy side with the Canadians, there might be another government who might cut off supplies?

NILES: There were crazies in Canada who sometimes called for that, on occasion to force us to implement policies to reduce acid rain, but if you looked at the economics of it, you realized that Canada would suffer as much as we would.

Q: Yes, what do they do with it?

NILES: What would they do with the energy and how would they replace the income from the United States? So, that wasn't a very serious threat. Actually, just in BTU terms, the major Canadian contribution to U.S. energy balance is not oil and gas but electric power, largely from the province of Quebec, and to a lesser degree the provinces of Ontario and Newfoundland into New York and New England, as well as from BC into Washington state. Quebec Hydro sells electric power into New York State at an incredible rate. Of course, that continues to this day. It is an enormous element in our trade.

Q: What about fish, during this 1981 to 1985 period?

NILES: Fish were less controversial than they are now, particularly the Pacific salmon. We had

problems from time to time over the so-called "Dixon entrance." This is the very, very narrow passageway between the northern tip of Vancouver Island and the southern tip of the Alaska Panhandle. It is less than three miles across. The Canadians claim that it is all Canadian water and we claim that it is an international strait and it should be divided down the middle. There are continual fishing disputes there. What we have is so-called "Flag State Enforcement." What it means is that they shouldn't seize our fishing vessels, and we won't seize theirs, but we will try to make sure that our vessels don't get into the wrong areas. We enforce it ourselves. Generally speaking, that has worked, but it hasn't prevented problems from time to time. The big issues in the late 1970s in the fishing area were over the Georges Bank area off the east coast. There, it was a question of drawing the line to divide the Grand Banks. It was really an international law issue. When you draw the line out from the border, between Maine and New Brunswick, does it go perpendicularly to the coast or does it continue straight on the line established by the land border when it reaches the coast? This might not necessarily be perpendicular to the coast. This issue was very hot and it had major implications for the Grand Banks, in terms of dividing the fishing resources there. Ultimately, we couldn't agree in bilateral negotiations and we agreed to go with the International Court of Justice. The International Court of Justice drew the line, which both countries said was unsatisfactory, but both accepted it. The ICJ gave the Canadians one-sixth of the area, and gave us five-sixths. However, the Canadians got the richest fishing ground, which they proceeded to over fish, so there probably are no fish out there either. The International Court of Justice gave us a framework for managing the fisheries issues on the East Coast. On the West Coast, we had problems, but they were not as serious as they are now because the fish stocks were more plentiful. Everybody was making money on salmon when I was Deputy Assistant Secretary and Ambassador. When salmon stocks went down through over fishing and prices went down, because of fish farming, largely in Chile and Norway, in order to make any money you had to bring in more fish per boat or more fish per fishing expedition. Therefore, people fished more intensively, because the price of salmon was declining due to all these fish farms around the world having been set up. Salmon apparently is a good fish for fish farming. That issue really erupted big time in the 1990s. But in my time, we didn't have that problem.

Q: One of the things that I've heard about this is, with both Canada and Mexico, often, on an awful lot of matters of joint concern between the two countries, the State Department plays a very minor role because you have the State of Washington dealing with British Columbia, Maine dealing with New Brunswick, Quebec. Did you suddenly find out that their agreements were coming out and things were being done that we were out of control with?

NILES: Constantly. It was very difficult. You had state and local groups working with their counterparts in Canada, and cutting deals all the time, making arrangements, special lists, special this, special that. Sometimes Ottawa and Washington would find out. Sometimes we didn't even know. I'm sure there are tons of things out there that go on between the United States and Canada that the national capitals don't even have a clue about. I remember something Senator Alan Simpson once told me at the Canadian Embassy in April 1986, at a dinner that Ambassador Alan Gottlieb had for Prime Minister Mulroney during his visit here. Vice President Bush was there. Senator Simpson and I were talking about Canada and U.S./Canada relations. He said, "You know, I feel very much at home in Alberta. The Albertans come down to Wyoming and they feel very much at home. We are really much, much closer to each other than we are to the

people in either Washington or Ottawa. I feel much more at home in Calgary, than I do here in Washington.” I think that is true, across the board. People in Washington State feel much more of a kinship, if you will, with people from British Columbia, than they do with people here in Washington, or elsewhere in the United States. The same is true all up and down the border.

They also manage from time to time to get into some very specific local disputes.

For example, when I was Deputy Assistant Secretary, we had a very bitter dispute between North Dakota and the neighbors across the way, particularly in Manitoba, over the Garrison Diversion Project. According to the Manitobans, this created the risk of transferring fish and other species from the Missouri River Basin to the Red River of the North Basin, which would put alien fish species into Lake Winnipeg and possibly spoil the sport fishing business there. But, still and all, these people were very similar and had strong ties across the border and tended to cut deals with each other. They sometimes wouldn't tell anybody else about it. Of course, we also had a problem with local law enforcement. The Mounties, from time to time, would go down and capture somebody in Washington State, North Dakota, or Minnesota, or our local police would go across the border. There are all kinds of anomalies along the border. In the lake area, between Minnesota and Western Ontario, and Manitoba, there is one little tip of land which is part of Minnesota, but can only be accessed through Canada. There is another called Point Roberts in Washington State which is exactly the same thing. In order to reach it by land, you have to go through Canada. It is a complicated border and all kinds of little arrangements are worked out to make it work. There is another problem, which I call The Time Zone Challenge. Ottawa and Washington are on the same time zone, which means that government offices in Ottawa and Secretaries in Washington are open at the same time. So, people have eight or ten hours when they can pick up the phone and call their counterpart in the other capital, whereas, in Western Europe, you have a five, six, or even seven hour time difference. They don't interact quite as easily, and you have language problems and various other problems. But, between the United States and Canada, you have this constant interplay between the Secretary of Treasury and the Minister of Finance in Ottawa, or the Minister of Defense and the Secretary of Defense. It is hopeless for the State Department to try to control it. The only thing you can do is try to monitor it and to know what is going on. That is hard enough as it is. It is a real management challenge for External Affairs in Ottawa and the State Department, and for the Ambassadors. Ambassadors can frequently be cut out and find out about things after the fact.

Q: How did you find you related to External Affairs in those days?

NILES: As Deputy Assistant Secretary things went extremely well. They had a Bureau of North American Affairs, or United States Affairs, (can't remember what they called it) headed by people whom we found very congenial. I remember Don Campbell, who is now the Deputy Minister, the number two guy in the Ministry, was in charge of that office. Derrick Burnie was in charge of it at one point. He became Mulroney's Chief of Staff and then Ambassador here. He is now CEO CAE. We worked very well with External Affairs. They were an excellent group of very professional people. I enjoy working with Canadians.

Q: During the 1981 to 1985 period, who was our Ambassador or Ambassadors?

NILES: When I first came into this job, Peter Towe was the Canadian Ambassador. He was a wonderful guy. He was replaced at the end of 1981 by Alan Gottlieb.

Q: This was a name to conjure with.

NILES: Very much so. Alan Gottlieb was an excellent Ambassador, very competent, but not a warm and cuddly personality. His wife, Sondra, was a tart-tongued, very intelligent lady who wrote a column in the Post, *Letters from Washington*, which sometimes could be fairly abrasive and dismissive of people and customs that she found here in Washington. Sondra was a little bit of a burden from time to time for Alan, but I liked her. She was a very entertaining lady, but very outspoken. She always said what was on her mind, which could be a problem. Our Ambassador from 1981-85 was Paul Robinson. He was President of an insurance company in Chicago. He was a wealthy guy who had Canadian antecedents. His father was born in Canada and he was very pro-Canadian. Robinson was our version of Sondra Gottlieb. He combined an outspoken personality and a large stature, and he became a fairly controversial figure because he tended to say what was on his mind. If he thought some Canadian policy was inappropriate or stupid, he would say so, publicly. Canadians sometimes didn't take too well to that, so he was a rather controversial Ambassador. I got along well with him. As Ambassador, Paul Robinson demonstrated the strengths and the weaknesses of non-career Ambassadors. He was easy enough to work with, and he would look to us for advice and guidance. Generally speaking, he took our advice.

Q: There was a little flurry in the Canadian papers about a year ago. In one of our Oral Histories, which was done with Robinson, he mentioned the fact that he carried a gun in his car. This was headline affairs.

NILES: Well, it was illegal.

Q: Probably illegal, but...

NILES: That is typical of Paul. He told as he thought it was. It wasn't always right, but he was very outspoken. Now that he is a private citizen, he can say any thing he pleases, and I am sure he does.

Q: One theme that runs through some of my interviews dealing with Canada is that in negotiations, the Canadians feel they have the stronger team than we do, because they are usually people who are focused on the United States, and were more professional and all. You are giving me a doubtful look, and I would like your impression.

NILES: It could happen, just by chance, that the Canadian team would be stronger than the American team on a given negotiation. They do sometimes have the advantage of continuity, but they are not the only ones. We tend to change our people around too frequently in some complicated negotiations. We do, from time to time, put people in charge of negotiations who don't necessarily have all the substance right at hand, and require a fairly intensive period to get up to speed. In my experience, Canadian negotiating teams have been very strong, particularly in the really key negotiations such as the 1985-87 Free Trade Agreement negotiations. Their chief

negotiator was Simon Reisman, who was an older man with a tremendous track record as a trade negotiator. He had been at the 1947 Havana founding conference of the GATT. He knew everybody and everything. In some cases, he knew too much. He was so burdened down with experience and knowledge of previous trade negotiations, and he couldn't begin to think in different terms. It was sometimes a burden for him, as well as an advantage. Our chief negotiator was Peter Murphy, who tragically died four or five years later, of a brain tumor. Peter was 35 years old. His was never a household name in the United States, but he became one in Canada. People in the United States didn't know who he was. In Canada, because of the importance of the Free Trade negotiations, Peter Murphy was one of the most famous people in the country. He was a big engaging guy, with bright red hair. The team that we assembled for the Free Trade negotiations was at least as good as the Canadian team. At the end of the day, the key negotiators on the Free Trade Agreement were James A. Baker III, who cut the final deals with the Canadians, and Derrick Burnie, who was Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister, soon to be appointed as Alan Gottlieb's successor as Ambassador to Washington. So, Burnie and Secretary Baker...

Q: He was Secretary of the Treasury at the time.

NILES: This was in 1987. The negotiations took place in the Treasury building, not at USTR, but in Treasury, in Secretary Baker's office, looking out over the east side of the White House. There is a wonderful conference room next door to the Secretary's office. This is where the negotiations took place, over mountains of pizza brought in. In the end, both sides won. By and large, Canadian negotiating teams tend to be headed by professionals whereas our teams sometimes are not, for political reasons. You have political people heading the negotiating team. Is that a good idea? Perhaps not always for the substance, but maybe for the domestic politics in the United States, particularly as far as Congress is concerned, having a political figure in charge is a good idea. And when your political figure is as talented as Secretary Baker was, you have a real winner. This is much less of a problem in Canada. The different political systems dictate different types of delegation leaders.

Q: During the 1981 to 1985 period, did Cuba, and of course, Grenada, raise their heads at all?

NILES: Not much. Trudeau had a fascination, as others have, with Fidel Castro. But, the best I can remember, while I was Deputy Assistant Secretary the Cuba issue came up from time to time only in the context of the Treasury Foreign Assets Control Regulations. Under which we try to prevent Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. companies from dealing with Cuba. It was not a high profile issue as it is today with Helms-Burton and, of course, the Canadian role in that. There was no appreciable Canadian investment in Cuba. This all comes post-1993, when Sherritt-Gordon invested in the nickel mines and tourism. There was a Cuban Airlines flight that went back and forth between Montreal, Dorval Airport, and Havana. It was an important link, not just for Canadians, but more generally with Cuba.

Q: Were there any cultural problems during the 1981 to 1985 period?

NILES: Endless cultural problems. We said it was protectionism and the Canadians said, "No, it's culture," an argument which will never be resolved. One aspect of it was the Canadian content

issue.

Q: *Canadian content being?*

NILES: This is an effort by the Canadians to say that a certain percentage of the films, television programming or music played should be Canadian. There was discrimination against U.S. magazines, particularly the so-called “split editions.” Time or Sports Illustrated have a Canadian edition, in which they would run ads aimed at Canadians. That drove the Canadian publishers, such as MacLean’s, crazy. They were able to persuade the government of Canada to refuse to allow Canadian companies advertising in these split editions of American publications to write-off the costs of their advertisements against their Canadian income tax. So, if you advertised in Time, for example, you couldn’t write it off. If you advertised in MacLean’s, you could. There were also discriminatory postal rates. The MacLean’s postage costs the Canadians practically nothing, and Time or Sports Illustrated costs a lot. All of this has now been found contrary to WTO rules, and the Canadians are going to have to cease and desist. I’m not sure that they have yet. Restrictions abound in Canada on investments in “cultural industries,” for example, the book publishing area. We had some celebrated cases involving Simon and Schuster, which by that time was a subsidiary of Gulf & Western (Paramount). Simon and Schuster, in the United States, acquired Prentice Hall. The question was what would happen to Prentice Hall Canada? This is a tiny company with \$25 million in sales, but you would have thought it was the world’s largest book publisher. The Canadians put all kinds of conditions on whether Simon and Schuster’s Canadian subsidiary would be able to acquire Prentice Hall Canada. It was an endless thing. The Chief Executive Officer of Gulf & Western at that time was a guy named Martin Davis, a really hard-charging businessman. He subsequently lost out to an even harder charging guy, Sumner Redstone, when Viacom took over Paramount. When I had to go down to explain some of this stuff to Martin Davis, he was not too sympathetic. Fortunately, they had a very fine General Counsel for Gulf & Western, named Don Oursman, whom I worked with very closely. We managed to smooth all of this stuff out and ultimately Prentice Hall/Canada was acquired by Simon & Schuster, and they made all kinds of commitments about selling Canadian books and publishing Canadian authors. I don’t know whether they ever fulfilled it. It was very hard to follow up on all this stuff and to police these companies. It was a big, big issue.

In 1947, there was a consent decree in the United States under which the major Hollywood studios were given a choice either to make films or exhibit them, but not both. It did not apply in Canada. In the United States, Paramount sold their movie theaters. They decided that they would continue to make movies rather than exhibit them. They could distribute the films, but they couldn’t actually own the theaters. In a sense, that would be self-dealing. I think that is a good point. In Canada, Paramount was not forced to divest, and they had the largest chain of movie theaters called “Famous Players.” That was a source of constant controversy. Canadian cultural nationalists were trying to persuade the Canadian government to force Paramount to divest itself of famous players, focusing on the question the company would show Canadian films. The answer from Martin Davis in New York, was “Yes, if you have a good film, we’ll show it. If it’s no good, no. If people won’t come to see it, are you going to subsidize my theaters? Are you going to buy the tickets?” The Canadian answer was “No. But unless you show the movie, nobody is going to come to it.” This argument will never end. It was particularly tough during the Free Trade negotiations.

Q: *Which started when?*

NILES: In the winter of 1986, and they concluded in September 1987. It was a two-year negotiation. The so-called “cultural issues” were the last item settled. At the very end of the negotiation, basically, what we got was a standstill. The Canadians agreed not to make their cultural regulations any worse than they were. If they did make them worse than they were, they had to compensate. Since we are talking about pretty big bucks here, we were confident that the Canadians would not embark on totally outrageous cultural nationalist policies, although there were pressures in Canada to do just that. But, at the end of the negotiations, there were some unhappy people in the United States. This was the last deal that was cut. It was after midnight on a Saturday night. We had “stopped the clock,” after agreeing that we would negotiate to midnight but no longer. I know that Jack Valenti feels that at the end of the day he was thrown overboard.

Q: *He was the President of the Association of...*

NILES: The Motion Pictures Association of America (MPAA). I know that Jack feels that he was thrown overboard. I don't agree with that, but that is his feeling. I think if you look at the subsequent experience, U.S. films continue to do pretty well in Canada. The Canadians continue to try to find ways to curb the percentage of U.S. films shown in Canadian movie theaters. Sheila Copps, who is now in charge of Cultural Policy for the Chretien government, a very outspoken lady from Hamilton, Ontario recently held a meeting of cultural ministers from around the world designed to deal with American dominance. She got some people from Europe and elsewhere to come and say how terrible it is to have to turn on your TV and see an American program or go to see an American movie. My answer to those guys is “If you don't like it, change the channel.”

Q: *During the late 1920s, early 1930s, they had something in Britain called “Quota Quickies,” which are horrible little movies. They were churned out because you had to show so many movies in Great Britain in order to show American ones. These “Quota Quickies” are almost unseeable. Nevertheless, they were shown at 2:00 in the morning, or something like that, so that they could show the American movies.*

NILES: Well, there were subterfuges like that adopted in Canada to get around some of the Canadian content requirements. I noticed, long after I had left, there was a controversy about including a country music station, the “Nashville Channel,” on Cable TV. The Canadian Radio and Television Commission (CRTC) did not agree to its inclusion the Canadians, believe it or not, have their own country and western cable channel. It was favored, politically, over the American channel. I think at the end of the day, substantial sums are spent in Canada to promote Canadian alternatives to American cultural products, without any great benefit to either Canadian culture or Canada. But, that is a choice that the people of Canada have to make. Ultimately, if they play within the rules of the World Trade Organization, okay. I also have the feeling that for most Canadians this argument has a rather academic quality. There are cultural nationalists there, particularly in Toronto. I think of them as the descendants, in spirit, of the United Empire Loyalists, who left the United States after the Revolutionary War and settled in Upper Canada (Ontario). They maintain a very skeptical attitude toward the United States.

Q: They concentrate often in what the Brits would call “The chattering class,” wouldn’t they?

NILES: They talk a lot. There is no question about it. They were very outspoken during the Free Trade negotiations when I was up there and during the NAFTA negotiations, which came later.

Q: Did Quebec raise its head, the Quebec separatists of issue, during the 1981 to 1985 period?

NILES: Not too much, but it is interesting that you ask about that. In 1976, of course, Rene Levesque was elected Premier of Quebec. In 1980, he had a referendum on independence which failed fairly spectacularly, 60% to 40%. Everybody thought that this was the end of Quebec separatism. The next year, however, Rene Levesque had a provincial election and won another fairly convincing victory. So, you had a separatist government in Quebec City, elected by the people of Quebec, who at the same time had rejected the independence option in the 1980 referendum. Levesque, at that time, was in declining health. Literally never without a cigarette, he resigned in September 1985 and died of lung cancer that December. Even though his Parti Québécois won the election in 1981, a lot of steam had gone out of that particular phase of the Quebec separatist issue. We took the position which we have maintained ever since, which was to keep out of that particular fight, although no-one ever doubted that we opposed the independence of Quebec. Our stance was: we value very highly our relationship with a strong and unified Canada. But the question of the status of Quebec within the Canadian Confederation is a matter to be settled by the people of Canada. Secretary Baker once said when asked about possible US involvement in Yugoslavia in 1991 that “We don’t have a dog in that fight.” We do have a dog in the Quebec issue, but we wisely decided not to talk about it. That is where the United States has been and where we should stay.

Q: During this period, 1981 to 1985, there were no referenda there, so it really wasn’t an issue?

NILES: It wasn’t an issue in the sense of a referendum, but it was never absent. Although you had a separatist Parti Québécois government in Quebec City, it appeared at the time that some of the steam had gone out of the independence movement. This was perhaps confirmed in December 1985 when the PQ, under Rene Levesque’s successor, Pierre-Marc Johnson, lost the provincial election to the Liberals under Robert Bourassa. Johnson’s father, Daniel Johnson, had been the last Premier of the Union Nationale Party of Maurice Duplessis, who died in 1960 after having ruled Quebec for more than 20 years. Daniel Johnson was Premier of Quebec for the Union Nationale from 1968 to 1970, a brief period when they came back.

Q: Union Nationale being a fairly populist movement?

NILES: It was a populist, traditionalist movement, closely linked with the Catholic Church, under Duplessis. Daniel Johnson’s rule was a brief interlude from 1968 to 1970, and his son was Premier of Quebec for an even briefer period, from September until December 1985. In December, the Liberals won the election, and Robert Bourassa returned as Premier of Quebec. He had been out of office since September 1976. Some incredible things had happened in Quebec from 1970 to 1976 when Bourassa was Premier for the first time, particularly the FLQ incidents in 1970, the murder of Labor Minister LaPorte and the kidnapping of the British Trade

Commissioner James Cross. Trudeau declared a state of emergency in Quebec, and emerged from the crisis considerably strengthened throughout Canada. The FLQ terrorists were arrested and sent to prison, but by the time I got there most of them had been paroled. One of them, Paul Rose, was a teacher.

Shortly after I arrived in Ottawa, the Liberals returned to power under Bourassa in Quebec. This lasted into the early 1990s, when the Parti Québécois returned under Lucien Bouchard, who had been a close friend and associate of Mulroney but betrayed him in over the issue of the status of Quebec in Canada.

Q: Was it ever a topic of conversation (I almost hate to ask this because I can see what the Canadian papers might make of this), but in later afternoon, did everyone sit around and say, "Well, what would happen if Quebec goes?"

NILES: You have to think about what **might** happen if you are concerned about the relationship between the United States and this very important neighboring country. You have to at least raise the question, "What if?" "What might happen?" But, for me, this was not in the sense of preparing for it, or anything like that, but sure, we speculated on that.

Q: So, it wasn't an eminent thing, as it became, at one point in the early 1990s?

NILES: Well, during the mid-1990s, the second referendum created a different situation. It failed 50.5% to 49.5%, but it was much, much closer than it had been in the case of the Levesque referendum of 1980. At the time of the Bouchard referendum, people had reason to speculate on what might happen. When I was there as Ambassador, the conventional wisdom in Canada was that separatism in Quebec was dead. It was at a very low ebb, no question. Interestingly enough, our Political Counselor, Bob Montgomery, who tragically died of cancer in 1991, and knew a lot more about Canada than I did always said, "No, Quebec separatism is definitely not dead. It will come back. I cannot tell you exactly when and in what guise and under what leadership, but this thing goes in cycles. We should not assume that it has gone away." Of course, that was at the time when it appeared that Prime Minister Mulroney's solution to the issue of Quebec's status in Canada, the so-called Meech Lake Accord, which recast the Constitution of Canada to give some special recognition to Quebec, would be accepted. But Bob Montgomery said, "It will come back. It comes back in a cyclical pattern and we will have to deal with it at some point in the future."

Q: Were you looking at a new breed of Quebecker where (1) The Church was almost completely out of the game; and (2) You had a young population that was feeling its oats? Were you looking at a political development that almost demographically was changing then?

NILES: I don't think any part of the western world went through greater social, economic, cultural change during a brief period than did the Province of Quebec from 1960 to 1970. This was the period of the so-called "quiet revolution," and it was a true revolution. In 1960, you had the end of the Duplessis government, the Union Nationale government, which had dominated the Province since 1938. This was a very conservative, traditionalist, populist government. The Catholic Church was very strong in Quebec, socially and politically.

Q: A very conservative Catholic Church, from my understanding.

NILES: Yes. One interesting manifestation of the change is that in 1960, Quebec had the highest birth rate of any area in our western community: Western Europe and North America. By 1990, it had the lowest. It was below zero population growth, I believe. In the 1960s, after Duplessis, under Liberal Premier Jean Lesage, the slogan was “Maitres de Chez Nous,” which meant “We run our own show here.” It was not separatist, but it was nationalist. It was a reaction to the fact that French speakers were not running the province of Quebec. In business, everything was in the hands of people of English descent or foreigners such as Americans. This included the banks, the insurance companies, and the industries, as well as the media. Everything worth having was in the hands of the English. The government might have a French Canadian Premier and Ministers and so forth, but the levers of power were very much in the hands of the Anglo community. That is no longer the case. Now, to a degree, that is because during the government of Rene Levesque, large parts of big business packed up and moved to Toronto. All of the banks did this, SunLife, and the Canadian National Railroad (Canadian Pacific was still headquartered in Montreal). Even the Bank of Montreal moved its headquarters from Montreal to Toronto. By the time I was there, the CEO of the Bank of Montreal was an American citizen named Bill Mulholland, whose office was in Toronto. Basically, the Parti Québécois had been very hostile toward these banks and other big companies. This was not just because they were run by Anglos, but because they were big private companies. The Parti Québécois was a left-wing group, and they didn’t much care for big companies, and the big companies decided to leave, and the nature of the business community in the province of Quebec changed substantially. Basically, French Canadians came to dominate the business life and social life of Quebec. In a way, that partly fed into the separatist push manifested in the Parti Québécois government, beginning in 1976. People said, “Well, we have taken over the commanding heights of our economy. Maybe we can continue to process and become independent.” It wasn’t necessarily a logical conclusion because there are some big differences, but you can understand why people would ask that question.

Q: Was there any reflection of this Quebec and the rest of Canada, our American dealing with Canada during the 1981 to 1985 period in that there is a Quebec foreign policy and there was a rest of Canada foreign policy or anything of that nature?

NILES: No, there was not. We dealt with Canada. We had a Consulate General in Montreal and a Consulate in Quebec City, which dealt with the local authorities. We dealt with the government of Rene Levesque through our Consulate in Quebec City. The Ambassador of the day, who was Paul Robinson, would visit from time to time. You would have to ask Paul what his relations with Rene Levesque were like.

I remember Rene Levesque visiting Washington during that time. Quebec had an office, and still does in Washington. I knew the guy who ran the office. He was a nice guy named Raymond Poulliot. When I went to Canada, he was working in the energy business in Quebec. He was obviously a Quebec separatist, I’m sure, but we never talked about the position of Quebec within Canada. But if he were appointed the head of the Quebec office in Washington by Rene Levesque, I’m sure must have been of the separatist persuasion. When Levesque visited Washington, he refused to request appointments at the State Department through the Canadian

Embassy. So, under our policy, we declined to meet with him. He had no meetings in the Executive Branch when he visited Washington because he refused to go through the Embassy of Canada. We were consistent on that policy, and we did not meet with Rene Levesque. Ray Levesque was able to meet with members of Congress. And this was amazing. On one occasion, Levesque's host on the Hill was Senator Jesse Helms, who at that time was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. So you had the spectacle of the left-wing Socialist separatist Premier of Quebec being feted by the right-wing conservative Senator. What did they have in common? More than anything else, it was hostility toward Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Some people found Trudeau just to be too much and Ray Levesque hated him. When Rene Levesque came down to Washington, he was delighted to join with these anti-Trudeau American members of Congress. While you cannot say that we took sides in the dispute, we maintained our commitment to a united Canada. The same thing was true when the Premier of Ontario came. If Bill Davis or some other Premier of Ontario had come to Washington and said that the Ontario office would make the appointments, we probably would have told them to go through the Embassy in Canada. The other provinces didn't have any problem with that. In fact, it was a convenience for them. But not using the Canadian Embassy was a matter of principle with the government of Quebec.

Q: Well, Tom, I think this is probably a good place to stop. We will pick this up the next time when you go off to Canada as Ambassador, 1985 to 1989. I particularly want to ask how the hell you got the job, when it is usually handed out as a political plum.

This is September 2, 1998. Tom, we are off to Canada. In the first place, how the hell did you get that job?

NILES: Well, it was luck, pure and simple. Although I would argue that I was well qualified for it.

Q: That has nothing to do with it.

NILES: In the spring of 1985, there were lots of changes made at home and abroad in the State Department and in the Foreign Service at the beginning of President Reagan's second term. George Vest came back from Brussels to be Director General of the Foreign Service, and Ron Spires was the Under Secretary for Management. George and Ron put me forward to be Ambassador to Finland. I thought, "Well, okay, that is an interesting place." I had spent a lot of time there during the CSCE preparatory phase and visiting from Moscow. It sounded fine, but that did not work out. There was a prominent Republican from California, a very nice fellow named Rockwell Schnabel whose wife was Finnish. He got the nod to go to Finland. But my name was on the table, as it were, in the process that went on at the White House. It seems that there were two political candidates to replace Paul Robinson as Ambassador to Canada. But neither one was backed overwhelmingly, and each one had support in the White House. So they canceled each other out, and in the process, as best I can determine from what Ron Spires told me, I slipped in because I had worked on U.S./Canada relations and knew people in the White House. It turned out that some of the Canadians were shocked at the idea that a mere Foreign

Service officer would come to the Ottawa Embassy, although there had been in the past Foreign Service officers there. Tom Enders was there from 1979 to 1981, and Livingston Merchant was there twice in the 1960s and 1970s. Of course, he was a very distinguished Foreign Service officer who also served as Under Secretary for Political Affairs. I'm not comparing myself to those guys, but it was not unheard of that a Foreign Service officer should be Ambassador to Canada. But some of the Canadians, including Alan Gottlieb, were skeptical about this, and actually came back and expressed their skepticism. Gottlieb raised it with Bud McFarlane at the NSC, who told Alan Gottlieb in a polite way to mind his own business that the President would make these decisions. He also said, subsequently, "Well, if Alan Gottlieb doesn't think a Foreign Service officer is capable of serving in this important relationship, perhaps we should not have anything more to do with Alan Gottlieb, who after all is a Canadian Foreign Service officer." I thought that was a wonderful thing. I always liked Bud McFarlane, but I particularly liked him after that comment. In any case, this problem was overcome, and I got the job.

Q: What would be the rationale on the side of the Canadians of not having a Foreign Service officer?

NILES: Some people thought that they would be much better off if they had somebody in Ottawa who was close to the President and who could pick up the telephone and call the President. I tried to explain to them, subsequently, that there were only about five people in the world who could do that. President Reagan had a lot of friends, but after he became President he didn't take telephone calls from all of them. It was very unlikely that one of those four or five people were going to go off as Ambassador to Canada. But, anyway, that was their view and a lot of people around the world have the view that you do better with a political appointee, because things that are really important are decided at the White House, and you might as well have a conduit into the White House.

Q: Well, I think, also too, isn't there a certain rationale in Morocco and other places, Foreign Service officers don't tend to get as enthralled with a country as a political appointee? They sometimes may take a more American viewpoint, rather than succumb to "localitis"?

NILES: I think Foreign Service officers can succumb to "localitis," too. I don't know that political appointees inevitably do, but that is a consideration. But after talking with a few people in Ottawa, it was clear that what Canadians were worried about was that the new Ambassador might not have quite the contacts with the NSC and with the White House that were necessary. This passed, and in September 1985 my wife, two children, our cat and I arrived in Ottawa.

Q: You were there from 1985 to when?

NILES: September 1985 until June 30, 1989, almost four years. I prepared for Canada very carefully. I went and talked with all the members in the Cabinet because every one of them had something going on with Canada. I even called on Bill Brock at the Department of Labor because of the strong links between the unions in the two countries. Interior had the Porcupine River caribou herd issue and lots of natural resource problems. So, I talked with everybody and got a good background on Canada. Then I was served up an all new problem when in August 1985, the Coast Guard decided that they needed an extra ice breaker on the east coast. Their ice

breaker on the east coast had broken down. They sent the ice breaker "Polar Sea" across the Northwest Passage with no reference to Canada. This reflected our view that the Northwest Passage was an international strait which passed through Canadian territory. The Canadian threw a fit about this. So we had yet another major issue on our agenda just before I got up there. It stayed with us for the largest part of my stay in Canada. But I arrived in Ottawa in September 1985 for what proved to be an extraordinarily exciting, creative, productive four years there.

Q: Let's take one thing at a time. Let's talk about the Polar Sea.

NILES: The Polar Sea and Northwest Passage? Well, you could make a case under international law that the Northwest passage was an international strait through which innocent passages are permitted without permission of the bordering country. On the other hand, the Northwest Passage is not a very widely used Passage. There is not even complete agreement on exactly where it goes. For instance, does it go this side or that side of Elsmere Island? The Canadians claimed that the Passage was part of their territorial waters and we should ask permission to go through it. The United States Navy, although it has never sent a surface vessel through there, and never will, was concerned because of the precedent that might be set. Their fear was if you agree to ask the Canadians for permission to go through the Northwest Passage, the Indonesians might start doing the same thing with the Molucca Strait or the Lombok Strait, or with the many other straits that pass through the Indonesian archipelago, and other archipelagic states around the world might do the same. They were worried that this would begin to cause problems for the U.S. Navy, and then the world would end. So, the Navy was a problem on this issue, and so was the Coast Guard. The Canadians were so outraged by this that they embarked upon what turned out to be a unsuccessful quest to acquire nuclear submarines, which raised yet another issue. Would we, if the Canadians asked, sell them 688 Class, Los Angeles class, nuclear attack submarines? There was a lot of controversy about that, not because we thought that the Canadians would sink our icebreakers with Los Angeles class nuclear attack summaries, but rather that the Canadians didn't fully understand how complicated, expensive, and dangerous it is to run a nuclear submarine program. They might botch it up. It would make it more difficult for us to run our nuclear submarine because people would be concerned about health considerations and public safety, and so forth, as a result of the nuclear submarine program. It is remarkable that this has not happened, but it's because we have run a very safe nuclear program since the time of the "Nautilus." In any event, that was a continuing issue throughout my time there.

The Department did a very wise thing. At my suggestion, we selected a senior State Department official, former Congressman Ed Derwinski, who had prestige and standing to conduct the negotiations with the Canadians on this issue. Ed did an excellent job. He brought a number of qualities to this task, including patience, good sense, and a pragmatic view of things. He also was obviously respected and persona grata on the Hill, where there was interest in this issue. He was able to manage successfully the Pentagon, which was all fired up about this, including Secretary Weinberger. John Lehman, Secretary of the Navy, was fighting mad on this issue. He was ready to fight on all kinds of issues. These talks lasted for the better part of four years. At the end of it, we worked out an arrangement under which the United States Coast Guard, when it wished to send a vessel through, would not ask permission but would inform the Canadians. The way this was drafted, both sides could claim victory. It was a classic U.S./Canada issue in the sense that

the Canadians interpreted this as another example of lack of American respect for Canada. And, to be fair, we rode rough shod over the Canadian interest. I was asked about it at my initial press conference. I decided that the best thing to do on this was, in a sense, to punt. I did not take a high posture on this, and without apologizing formally, I did by saying, "We did not handle this properly." I didn't specify exactly how we handled it "improperly" or should have handled it, but simply said that we did not handle it properly. I did this to reflect sensitivity to Canadian concerns. I also said, "I'm sorry we have this problem. We are going to work it out." I took that position on my own without consulting Washington, because I could never have gotten approval. The Coast Guard would have never accepted that, nor would anybody else. That basically calmed things down. Washington was unhappy for about one day and a half, and the Canadians eventually forgot it. It was one of those issues that would pop up from time to time, unexpectedly. Suddenly, the Polar Sea case would be an issue again in Canada, but never in the United States. It was a public press issue that would last for a few days.

Q: My understanding is that, practically the entire Cold War, we have been running submarines under the Polar ice.

NILES: Another story entirely. Submerged transit of submarines is something that people don't talk about. Nobody can see them. I never got into this, deliberately. But, I wouldn't be surprised if there were not some kind of coordination between the U.S. Navy and the Canadian Navy on these submerged transits or submerged passages of nuclear submarines. We certainly don't have any more submerged transits of SSBNs because the Tridents have so much range with the D-5 missiles.

Q: You might explain what that is.

NILES: Ballistic missile submarines. The only ones we have left are the Trident submarines which require such an enormous area to maneuver in and have 24 D-5 missiles with a range of something like 6,500 miles. They don't have to be under the Polar ice whereas it is possible that the early Polaris submarines, in order to cover some parts of the Soviet Union, might have done better up there. Basically, what we were doing in the Polar regions was watching and looking for Soviet Yankee and Delta I class submarines, their first generation missile submarines, which had relatively short range missiles and probably did spend sometime out under the ice. But mainly they were off the east and west coasts of the United States. The submarine issue didn't really come up. Some Canadians, from time to time, would claim that the United States was running submarines under the Arctic ice and we would refuse to comment.

The other difficult bilateral issue was acid rain. There we had the process which I discussed before, initiated by President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney at the summit in Quebec in March 1985, conducted by Union Pacific Railroad CEO Drew Lewis and former Ontario Premier Bill Davis. This resulted in a report which considered what we knew and did not know about acid rain. Although it did talk about uncertainties where more research was needed, it essentially accepted the Canadian position that acid rain was a real problem, that it was acidifying lakes, killing forests and injuring crop lands, and that it was basically caused by SO₂ emissions that go up into the upper atmosphere and through some chemical process that we don't fully understand, was transformed into weak sulfuric acid. Likewise, the report said that nitrogen oxides were

transformed into weak nitric acid. We began a process of on and off negotiations with the Canadians to devise a framework for implementing the Lewis-Davis Report which lasted throughout my tour in Ottawa. It tended to keep the issue, more or less, under control. We had acknowledged that it was a problem, that we needed a bilateral agreement, but recognized that there were problems in reaching one. The agreement was concluded in 1990 during President Bush's Administration. It required a revision of The Clean Air Act to put tighter controls on SO₂ emissions, largely from "old source" power plants. My job in Ottawa was to keep the process moving forward, recognizing that we weren't going to have a breakthrough on acid rain during the Reagan administration. My view was that if we could keep the talks alive, keep the scientific research program going in the United States, which was funded largely by EPA, and use the annual meetings between Reagan and Mulroney to give them a shot in the arm, sooner or later, we would agree with the Canadians. I personally believed that the Canadians were right, that acid rain was a problem, that it was caused by SO₂ and NOX emissions and that by controlling those emissions or reducing them we would reduce acid deposition in the Eastern U.S. and Eastern Canada, and it would be beneficial to everybody. I felt it could be done with existing technology at costs that were not terribly detrimental to the United States economy. But, I also recognized that politically, this was going to take time. I tried to keep the process going, to avoid a blow up with the Canadians, by not telling them that they were on a hopeless quest and that we would never agree. We didn't want them to conclude that the effort was hopeless, in part because we feared that in that event they would a massive public campaign in the United States to put pressure on the Reagan administration, which would have failed, too, but could have derailed something we wanted, namely the Free Trade Agreement. There was no way they were going to be able to move the Reagan Administration by external pressure. The only way they were going to move the Administration was through a process of careful discussions, scientific research, and more work by Mulroney on President Reagan. Gradually, it worked.

Q: This is now the second term of Reagan. Was there still a battle for Ronald Reagan's soul on acid rain? How did you see the forces in the United States lining up in this second half of the administration?

NILES: Yes, there was a battle. I think the Lewis-Davis report, which had been commissioned by President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney, played an important role in pushing the President in the direction of trying to cut a deal with Canada. His close ties with Prime Minister Mulroney, his personal affection for Mulroney, played a role. I think, ultimately, Secretary Shultz was very helpful on this. He helped convince President Reagan that this was a problem that needed to be dealt with and we were going to deal with it responsibly, in a way that didn't do damage to the American economy. President Reagan liked to think of himself as an environmentalist. A lot of people would scoff at that. He took environmental problems seriously, but he was very skeptical about the possibility of some miraculous government solution to environmental problems. In some respects, he was right on that. What we were looking for was a free market solution using more environmentally-friendly means to generate electric power combined with better, cheaper means to clean up coal-fired power plants found through this scientific research program. To a degree, it worked out, and the research program contributed to it. Today, acid rain is not an issue in the United States. Occasionally, you hear complaints about how The Clean Air Act needs to be relaxed, but I don't think that is serious. As far as I am aware, it is not a problem between the United States and Canada, although it is an issue between

the MidAtlantic/New England states and the Midwestern states. Even though it took longer than we might have hoped to reach an agreement, we were able to keep the process going and ultimately succeeded.

Q: When you arrived in Canada, obviously you had been dealing with Canadian affairs, but did you find that the perspective from Canada and the Embassy different than what you had expected?

NILES: Not really. I was pretty well prepared for what I found in Ottawa. The Embassy is always influenced by the surrounding environment. The Canadian attitude toward the United States is complicated and somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand, they watch everything we do with great concern. Sometimes they pay more attention to what we do than we do ourselves. There is a strong feeling by most Canadians that they get too little attention from Washington, but at the same time there is a recognition that too much attention from Washington might not be a great thing either. They are a little bit schizophrenic on that point. I was fortunate as Ambassador in that I had to work a government which was avowedly pro-American. Prime Minister Mulroney made a point of emphasizing his affection for the United States and his high regard for President Reagan. He is probably the only Prime Minister, certainly in my experience, and probably back to the time of Prime Minister Mackenzie King, who didn't have any particular hang ups or problems with the United States. Certainly, Trudeau had a very ambivalent attitude toward the United States, as we discussed before. His immediate predecessors, Lester Pearson and John Diefenbaker, were certainly ambivalent in their attitudes. Mulroney was an unabashed supporter of the United States, but he had a strong sense of Canadian pride. He did not like to be taken for granted. He particularly felt that if he was going to be a close friend and supporter of the United States, he deserved to be treated with respect, and not to be taken for granted, and not to be shown to be out of the loop with the United States. It absolutely drove him crazy, and understandably so, when decisions were taken in Washington, or announced in Washington, that had a big impact in Canada, which he learned of in the newspapers. It was infuriating for him, and for me, too. I can sympathize with him. That happened, and it happens to every Ambassador. It happens because of the size of our system and the uncoordinated nature in which it operates.

The best example in my experience was a trade case, and I should talk a bit about the trade issues, because that was really the biggest single item on the agenda. Before turning to the Free Trade Agreement, I should mention another trade case that was an example of what can go wrong in U.S./Canada relations, even under the best circumstances. This was a case involving western red cedar shakes and shingles.

Q: It sounds like those things come out. You've used the terms many times.

NILES: Western red cedar shakes and shingles. The words have a nice ring to them. Before this case hit the fan, I had no idea what the product was. I soon learned that this is a product that people like to use to achieve rustic effect in vacation homes. A shake is a large shingle that you put on the side of your house. This was a trade item, maybe \$100 million in a trade turnover of \$150 billion. Some producers in Oregon and Washington brought a trade case claiming that the Canadian forestry management system, the so-called "Stumpage System," gave the Canadian producers a western red cedar shakes and shingles an unfair advantage. This was found to be the

case by the Department of Commerce and then the International Trade Commission, which has to decide whether the subsidy actually resulted in injury, decided that there was injury. It went to the President. We knew about this and were watching this case, and keeping the Canadians informed. Keep in mind that this was May/June 1986, and that the Free Trade Negotiations had just begun. Then, somehow everybody lost sight of the case, until suddenly it was approved in the White House at a relatively low level. It never got to President Reagan, although formally he had to approve it. It was released in a press announcement by the White House, which stated that the President had approved the imposition of countervailing duties on Canadian western red cedar shakes and shingles. I found out about it from a press release, so did Brian Mulroney. He hit the ceiling. The Canadian government was in a state of great agitation. Mulroney was calling everybody in Washington, as was Foreign Minister Clark. Alan Gottlieb was going nuts. I was upset too. I recognized that you could not suspend all other trade-related activity during the Free Trade negotiations, but I felt that you had to handle these cases intelligently. That included giving us time to prepare the way, to get the press statement, to inform the Canadian government. You don't just kick this thing out the door in the middle of the night. I later learned that the people in the White House assumed that because the case was so relatively small, you did not have to take any particular precautions in dealing with it.

It happened that this case came immediately before a NATO Foreign Minister's meeting in Halifax, involving Secretary Shultz and all the other NATO foreign ministers. I sent a telegram to the Department describing the situation, saying that the Canadian government, which was pretty nervous to begin with because the Free Trade negotiations had just begun, had lost its nerve and panicked. Some helpful soul in Washington leaked that telegram. This was the situation: Niles' telegram in the Canadian press; headlines say "Government Panics." Secretary Shultz arrives in Halifax. My wife and I were out there to meet Secretary Shultz and his team from Washington: Charlie Hill, Roz Ridgeway, and all the folks. I had always had great respect and affection for Secretary Shultz, but I loved him after this. They asked him as he got off the plane, "Your Ambassador has written this telegram describing the Canadian government as having panicked. The Canadian government is upset with that. Do you support your Ambassador?" Secretary Shultz said, "I always support my Ambassadors." I thought, "What a great man." This thing ultimately died down and we solved the problem. Ultimately, the Canadians made some changes in their forestry management practices, specifically concerning red cedar forests, and we were able to remove the countervailing duties. I think that was in 1987. But, this was a classic example of how badly the system can operate from time to time. A sensitive issue was handled as badly as it possibly could have been, and we extracted the maximum negative publicity out of it. That was a little blip on the screen, but it was an example of how things can go off the track. The important thing...

Q: Before we get to that, as you talk, it would seem to me that you would almost have to have your Embassy do a dual thing. One would be keeping a very close eye on developments in the United States opposed to most other embassies abroad, you understand what is going on. Here, where you have seismic things happen, every time something happens within our government, you really almost have to have your radar implanted within the United States and Oregon, Maine, and all over. Was this true?

NILES: Absolutely true. Although we were concerned with the actions of state governments and

other jurisdictions along the Canadian border, we were primarily concerned with things going on in Washington and being taken by surprise. Every embassy depends, to a tremendous extent, upon the country desk and being kept informed. We were more dependent than most because there was so much going on. There were so many government agencies that, one way or another, did things that had an impact on Canada. Many of them, left to their own devices, would go along blithely unaware that there was a Canadian aspect to the pending action. I was very fortunate. I had two Deputy Assistant Secretaries for Canadian Affairs who were really on top of things and did a terrific job supporting Roz Ridgeway as Assistant Secretary, and supporting us in Ottawa. The two guys were Jim Medas, who was in the White House during the first couple years of the Reagan administration. He came over to the European Bureau in 1983 when every bureau in the State Department was required to add a “political” deputy assistant secretary. Jim stayed until 1986 when he went off to be Consul General in Bermuda. He was replaced by Fred Jones Hall, a businessman from Oklahoma City. He, too, proved to be a very capable guy. I was very fortunate in having those two and a good Canadian desk supporting them. As you suggest, they spent a great deal of its time trying to keep on top of the extraordinary agenda in Washington and being an early warning system. We needed an early warning radar system like the DEW Line, but in this case facing south to warn us of incoming missiles.

Q: Did you also have somebody within your Embassy keeping an eye on the United States?

NILES: We all did. We were in touch with Washington every day, three to four times a day. This was something that I didn't have to tell people who were working for me to do. It was absolutely essential that they be aware of what was going on down there and keep us all informed of potential bombshells that might erupt south of the border. President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney agreed tentatively at the Quebec Summit that...

Q: This was when?

NILES: March 1985. They agreed to negotiate a U.S./Canada Free Trade Agreement. President Reagan was a consistent supporter of free trade, although, as the case of the shakes and shingles case, sometimes things just slipped through. He liked the idea and shortly after I arrived in Ottawa, in February 1986, we began the Free Trade negotiations. The negotiations lasted for almost three years, and the formal signing occurred right after January 1, 1988. The breakthrough negotiating session occurred in September 1987, in the Department of the Treasury, led by Secretary Baker, who proved to be an extraordinary, capable negotiator. He did a great job, with Clayton Yeutter, who was the Trade Representative, Dick Lynn at USDA and various others who were involved. Mac Baldrige played a very positive role. He was tragically killed that in the summer of 1988 in a rodeo riding accident. We got a lot of help, of course, from Secretary Shultz, who was also a strong supporter of the Free Trade negotiations. We had a good team supporting Peter Murphy, our principal negotiator. He did an excellent job. He tragically died from brain cancer in 1993.

Q: What was your initial take when this Free Trade thing came up with Canada? Did you think this was a possibility?

NILES: I thought for sure we could do it. One thing that most people in the United States didn't

realize was that we had had Free Trade agreements with Canada in the past. We had a Free Trade agreement in 1854, negotiated for what was then British North America, by the Colonial Governor, Lord Elgin. This Agreement lasted only 10 years. We renounced it in 1864 because we were angry at the British for having supported the Confederacy during the War Between the States. We couldn't do too much to the British, so we took a swing at Canada and renounced the Free Trade Agreement. The Canadians, particularly manufacturers in Quebec, had done well during the War, selling goods for the Union forces, and probably to the Confederate forces as well. The Free Trade agreement helped. Then, of course, in post-1865 period, the war-generated demand ended and the Free Trade Agreement ended. This threw Lower Canada, as Quebec was called then, into a profound depression. One of the consequences of that was that millions of Quebecers left Quebec and moved to New England. One of the striking things, if you go through New England today, in a city like Providence, and you open up the telephone directory, you see masses of Quebec names such as Cournoyer and Levesque. The estimate is that somewhere in the neighborhood of three or four million people, over the next 30 years, moved south from Quebec into the United States. If they had not done so, the French-speaking population of Canada today, had those people stayed in Canada, would be close to 25 million people, which would probably be a majority of Canada. That was an important event, the renunciation of the first Free Trade Agreement.

We signed our second Free Trade Agreement in 1911 with the Government of Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier. That government, a Liberal government, was defeated in a Canadian election shortly after the Agreement was signed, and it never went into effect. Free trade was an issue, no question, in that Canadian election of 1911. The Tory Party ran on an anti-Free Trade platform. Finally, in 1946, Prime Minister W.L. MacKenzie King negotiated, secretly, a Free Trade Agreement with the Truman Administration. However, at the very last moment, mindful of what had happened to Laurier, he back away and decided to drop the entire project. So, Free Trade between the United States and Canada was nothing new. In 1986, as before, it was not a big issue in the United States, but it was very controversial in Canada. I recognized that this was not going to be easy. It was going to be a tough negotiation and it was going to be a tough political selling job in Canada, not for us, although we could help, mainly by keeping quiet, but for the Canadian government and Prime Minister Mulroney personally.

In the inevitable, domestic political controversy in Canada, you had this strange realignment of forces. The Progressive-Conservative (Tory) Party, which had traditionally been the protectionist, anti-Free Trade party, was finally in power again and was negotiating a Free Trade Agreement with the United States. The Liberal Party, which had been the traditional Free Trade party in Canada, went into opposition in September 1984, under John Turner, and became the anti-Free Trade Party. One reason the Liberal Party and John Turner personally, were not as effective as they might have otherwise been in opposing the Free Trade Agreement was that, in their hearts, they didn't agree with their position. They were uneasy. You could see that when John Turner went on television, attacking the Free Trade Agreement, he gave the impression, with his body language, that he was in a pair of shoes that didn't fit him properly. He was uncomfortable. This was not the traditional policy of the Liberal Party. With that said, there were lots of tough issues that had to be resolved. The Canadians have a different kind of federal/provincial relationship than ours, and those differences had to be accommodated in the Free Trade Agreement. We had some American constituencies that had some strong concerns

about Canadian practices, particularly the Motion Picture Association, the MPAA, lead by a very powerful figure, Mr. Jack Valenti The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association had some big problems with Canada because Canada didn't recognize pharmaceutical patents. There was a big generic industry in Canada that the United States Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association believed, correctly so, was taking advantage of that situation. We had to resolve that problem, which we did. The Canadians agreed that to the international norm that you have to give patent protection to pharmaceutical products like everything else. There were other big issues, including conditions for investments and the phasing of tariff concessions. All these things had to be resolved. One issue that had to be resolved, for example, was what to do about some of the provincial practices in the area in the lumber/timber industry, the so-called "stumpage" problem. All these problems were very difficult. At the end of the day, they were all resolved and the Agreement was signed, approved by the United States Congress and sustained in Canada by the Mulroney government's victory in the November 1988 general election. The final cleaning up of the text took place in Ottawa. Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Peterson, who is now President of Michigan State University, was the key negotiator on that process. He and I were responsible for working out little language issues that arose as we prepared the legislation that had to be approved by the Congress before the Free Trade Agreement could go into effect. At the end of the day, it's an Agreement that worked well both for the United States and Canada. It led directly to the NAFTA Agreement, which has had an even more fundamental impact on the economies of the three partners.

Q: North American Free Trade Agreement.

NILES: Right. The North American Free Trade Agreement, which added Mexico. One other issue which was extremely important...

Q: Before we leave this, what was your role and the role of the Embassy in this? As you mentioned, the Treasury and Commerce was very much involved.

NILES: Well, the negotiator for the Agreement, right up until the very end, when Secretary Baker took over the final cut, was Peter Murphy. There was an Embassy representative on his team. Our key job was really between the actual negotiating sessions. We had to follow up on the various issues and try to come up with ways of accommodation to resolve issues or to prepare the ground for the negotiators at the next negotiating session to be able to make progress. I think we were able, on some of the issues, to make a contribution and did so. That was basically our role. I got personally involved in some of our issues, although some of my suggestions did not go down well in Washington. For instance, I proposed in early 1987 that we drop the concept of dumping in US/Canada trade and replace it with the anti-trust concept of predatory pricing. I still believe that would have made a lot of sense, but it was not politically salable in Washington. I don't know whether I can take credit for any particular breakthroughs, but we helped keep the process moving forward. The other thing that the Embassy did, and in which I played the key role, was kind of a missionary effort with the Canadian people. We had a very large public affairs program where I gave approximately 200 speeches a year. It was almost one a day. I talked with high schools, colleges, business groups, social groups, labor groups, on television. At that time in Canada, their major Sunday talk show was a show called "Question Period," on CTV. I was on that television program probably once every three or four months for four years. I

still have the tapes. It would be interesting to roll them again. One of my objectives was to contribute to the effort to demystify free trade for the Canadian people, to the extent I could, and also to reassure them that this was something that would serve their interests and would be in the interest of Canada. I think, to a degree, we certainly contributed to that. At the end of the day, the Mulroney government won a substantial reelection victory in November 1988 after the conclusion of the Agreement. And the election really was primarily about the Free Trade issue. Obviously, the Canadian people bought the argument that this was a good thing for them.

One interesting aspect of the impact of the media on Canadian attitudes is the role of United States media. As far as the electronic media is concerned, the influence of the United States is strong and pervasive, but there is so little in the public affairs programming of the U.S. networks that concerns domestic developments in Canada that its impact on political developments is negligible. The United States print media are much less pervasive, and their impact is also limited by the fact that their coverage of Canadian events tends to be very sparse. Even in the fall of 1988, with the election campaign in Canada effectively about the relationship with the United States, coverage of Canadian issues in U.S. newspapers was very limited. However, since both the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal have substantial readerships in Canada and are viewed with respect, I thought it would be helpful if each ran an editorial endorsing the Free Trade Agreement and, as a practical matter, the reelection of the Mulroney government. With the help of David Rockefeller, I got in touch with senior editors at the two papers and discussed the issues, and the stakes for the United States. Both papers then ran lead editorials in October 1988 on the Free Trade Agreement and the Canadian election. The Times editorial was very serious, in the spirit of the paper. Its impact was probably limited. The Wall Street Journal editorial was another matter. It was written by Paul Gigot, with whom I spoke at some length, and was entitled "North to Argentina." In it, the author compared Liberal leader John Turner with Juan Peron, and made the point that Turner's policies, if adopted, would do for Canada what Peron's policies had done for Argentina. It was a brilliant, if slightly exaggerated, piece of work. Paul Gigot and I had discussed the comparison between Canada and Argentina, which really is quite apt. The two countries have some striking similarities and began the post-WWII era at roughly similar levels of economic development, and Argentina, which sat out the War and did good business with both sides, was the more prosperous country. The subsequent experience of Canada and Argentina was an excellent example of how good and bad policy choices can have huge impacts on the fate of a country. In any event, the Journal's editorial really struck home, to the extent that John Turner felt obliged to respond to it publicly with the remark at a press conference somewhere in Atlantic Canada "Don't cry for me Wall Street Journal," a play on the musical "Evita." I thought this was a good use of the media.

Q: How did you find the Canadian media on this thing?

NILES: It was a challenge. There were some smart, well-informed journalists in Canada who tended to be skeptical of the United States, but I wouldn't say they were as a general rule hostile. Most of them were friendly, but skeptical. Of course, some were not at all friendly. There were newspapers there, The Toronto Star for example, which had an ingrained, automatically hostile attitude toward the United States, whether the issue was acid rain or free trade or baseball, it didn't really matter. It was the largest circulation newspaper in Canada at the time, about 600,000 or 700,000 copies a day, centered in the largest metropolitan area, Toronto. The Toronto

Star, then and now, was an influential media voice, which was not at all receptive to our arguments. On the other hand, the Globe and Mail, which was a national paper, also published in Toronto, was prepared to listen; you could talk to them, and argue with them. They listened, whereas The Toronto Star generally did not. By and large, I got along well with Canadian journalists. It was a challenge and I worked very hard at it. As I said, we had a very active public affairs effort. I had excellent Public Affairs officers from USIS working with me in the Embassy, and excellent Consuls-General around the country. We had seven when I arrived in September 1985. Unfortunately, for budgetary reasons, in February 1986 we had to close our Consulate-General in Winnipeg, Manitoba, which was established in 1879, before Winnipeg was called Winnipeg. At that time, it was called the Red River Settlement. In any case, we developed a coordinated public affairs program involving all of the Consulates which focused on the free trade issue.

Q: How about unions on both sides during this period?

NILES: It is interesting that you raise that. The Canadian Labor Congress (CLC) and the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW), its most powerful unit, were generally hostile to the Free Trade negotiations and to the concept of free trade. The CAW was concerned about the US/Canada Automobile Pact, negotiated by Assistant Secretary Phil Trezise and signed in 1964. This had created largely free trade in automobiles and parts between the United States and Canada, with certain protections for Canada. As a result, Canada had a disproportionate share, at least on a population basis, of the North American automobile production. All three major U.S. manufacturers had big production capabilities in Canada. The CAW was very interested in preserving its status. All the key union leaders - Shirley Carr, the CLC President, Robert White, head of the CAW, who subsequently replaced her as CLC President, Buzz Hargrove, who is now the head of the CAW and then headed the CAW's Chrysler union - were hostile to the concept of a Free Trade Agreement. The AFL-CIO was generally favorable to the Free Trade Agreement with Canada. They were skeptical about some aspects of it, but Lane Kirkland was a very responsible leader of the AFL-CIO at that time. He saw that the Agreement was beneficial to labor, although business, too, benefited from it. I met with Bob White and Shirley Carr regularly, and with others such as Buzz Hargrove, in an effort to persuade them of the wisdom of this negotiation. I was unsuccessful. But, I maintained good relations with the union leaders. The political party linked with the CLC and the CAW, the New Democrats (NDP), were also strongly opposed to the free trade negotiations. I saw NDP leader, Ed Broadbent quite frequently, and kept him informed of what was going on and tried, again unsuccessfully, to persuade him of the wisdom of this negotiation for Canada. I have a feeling that Ed Broadbent saw the wisdom of the negotiation and the virtues of an Agreement. But his base, particularly the CLC and CAW, was so opposed to the Agreement that the NDP had no choice but to oppose it.

Q: Did Quebec, as a unity, play any role in this or was it along party lines?

NILES: That was an interesting situation, too. Quebec was pro-free trade and it remains pro-free trade today. Lucien Bouchard stabbed Mulroney in the back on the question of Quebec's position in Canada, but he didn't abandon him on free trade. And the Liberal Party in Quebec under Robert Bourassa, which was in power from December 1985 on, bucked the national Party and supported the Mulroney government's efforts. All of the big enterprises in Quebec also

supported free trade.

Q: *Why?*

NILES: Because of the American market, which the Quebeckers see as an alternative to total dependency on the “rest of Canada.” For the separatists, the United States appears to be a key to eventual success. For the Federalists in Quebec, free trade with the United States simply made good economic sense. In addition, the “cultural” issues that loomed so large in English Canada did not seem very important to French speakers in Quebec. An English-speaking United States culture did not seem to be much of a threat in Quebec. One of the interesting issues of the sovereignty argument involving Quebec is whether a sovereign Quebec would automatically be part of the Free Trade Agreement? I don’t think so. They would have to be admitted to the Free Trade Agreement, and one of the countries that would be able to say whether a free and sovereign Quebec could join the Free Trade Agreement would be Canada. I would take a look at that if I were a Quebecker. But as I said, the Liberal government in Quebec under Robert Bourassa was a supporter of free trade. It is one of the peculiarities of Canadian politics that a provincial affiliate sometimes can and does take positions on key issues that diverge from those of the national party. So, Bourassa made no bones about the fact that he supported efforts to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement, even though the federal Liberal Party and its leader, John Turner, opposed it.

Separatism in Quebec while I was there was largely quiet. But, as I think I mentioned in our previous discussion, the political Consul in the Embassy, Robert Montgomery, told us not to believe that it was dead and that it would come back. And it did.

Q: *We talked about free trade. What other issues were there?*

NILES: We had a whole range of what I would call the multilateral issues, arising from the East/West confrontation. For example, What would Canada’s role be on European security issues, on East/West arms control issues? One issue that was fairly sensitive in Canada was the testing of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). We had an agreement, reached with the Trudeau government, under we launched ALCMs over the Beaufort Sea. They would fly down the McKenzie River and land in Northern Alberta. They would be pursued along the way by Canadian Air Force CF-18s and by F-15s from Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska. You had a virtual air armada flying along behind the ALCMs. You might ask why we wanted to test ALCMs over Canada? Obviously it was because the terrain and other conditions were very similar to those of the USSR. If we ever had to launch one over the Arctic toward a target in the Soviet Union, we wanted to know how it performed in Arctic conditions, going South down river valleys. This might very well be what we would want to use one of them for in a worst case scenario with the Soviet Union. There was opposition in Canada to cooperating with us in this test program, but the Mulroney government said that they were cooperating with their American allies in an important defense program. We had to manage these cruise missile tests carefully, to get ready for them, and make sure that everybody knew what was happening. One of them failed. The ALCM was dropped from a B-52 over the Beaufort Sea but the engine didn’t start and it fell through the ice. Ultimately, it was retrieved at great expense to guard against the possibility that the Soviets might retrieve it. That, of course, occasioned a lot of hilarity, laughing, and finger

pointing by those in Canada who opposed the test. That was one issue.

We had relative calm on the fishery front. The East Coast fisheries' issue had been largely resolved by the International Court of Justice's delineation of fishing rights in the Gulf of Maine. At that time, we had not yet reached the point, which occurred in the mid-1990s, when the fish stocks sank so low that the Canadian and US governments had to close the fishery. I think it is still largely closed today, which has reeked terrible havoc on poor areas in Eastern Canada, particularly Newfoundland, that depended so much on it and abused it so much. This was a result of years of over fishing, not just by the Canadians but by boats from the USSR and countries of the European Union, notably Spain. This was a very rich resource, but they depleted it. In the West, we had periodic disputes over fisheries around the Dixon Entrance, which is the passageway between the southern tip of the Alaska Panhandle and the northern tip of Vancouver Island. We and the Canadians do not agree on the location of the maritime border. We claim that it is equidistant between Alaska and Vancouver Island; the Canadians claim that it runs along the coast of Alaska. To avoid problems, we agreed on so-called "flag-state enforcement." That means that the U.S. Coast Guard would seize any U.S. ships that were breaking the rules while the Canadian Coast Guard would do the same with Canadian ships. The problem is that we did not agree on what the rules were, and, occasionally, a ship would be seized by the other country's Coast Guard. But we were able to generally manage that. The West Coast salmon issue was there, but it was not as acute as it became in the mid-1990s because the stocks were not as low. While I was in Ottawa, the West Coast salmon stocks were sufficiently high as to obviate the need for a dispute between the United States and Canada over how they should be divided because everybody had enough. It is clear now that everybody was over fishing then, and we didn't manage the stock very well. The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1971 was a flourishing agreement. We had meetings from time to time to deal with ongoing problems, but basically it was a classic example of how the United States and Canada worked together to solve problems along the frontier.

As I said, we had major trade disputes which went along concurrently with the negotiations for the Free Trade Agreement, particularly on softwood lumber. This was a major Canadian export to the United States, probably \$2.5 billion. It wasn't like western red cedar shakes and shingles, which amounted to \$100 million. Softwood lumber was a serious issue for both countries. We also had a trade dispute over Canadian grain subsidies, particularly transportation subsidies, which we claimed made Canadian grain more competitive vis-a-vis American grain than it would otherwise have been. This is an issue which continues to this day. One thing about U.S./Canada relations is that you never had a dull day. There was always something going wrong, something unexpected; all along the border there was a potential for things to go wrong.

There was another interesting negotiation that we concluded successfully with Canada during my time there. This involved the Porcupine River caribou herd, which migrates from the Yukon to Alaska, along the Porcupine River. The importance of the Porcupine River caribou herd is that spends summers in the Alaska National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). That happens also to be a place where there is a lot of oil, although there are disputes about exactly how much there is. I visited ANWR in the summer of 1987 and saw where the oil and gas seep to the surface. It is in those spots that the caribou cows have their calves. I was told that the oil and gas that come to the surface contain a natural insecticide that keeps the mosquitoes away. Whether we did a good

job in that negotiation or not is hard to say, but I doubt that most Americans know that we have an Agreement with Canada that gives the Canadians a voice in determining whether we can drill for oil in the ANWR. Secretary of Interior Hodel and his Canadian counterpart signed this agreement in 1987. It essentially sets up a system of joint management of the Porcupine River caribou herd. That was basically how we managed things between the United States and Canada, where you have cross-border migration of birds, caribou, elk, fish etc. It works pretty well.

Q: Were there any problems with airlines?

NILES: Yes. When I was there, the Canadian/U.S. airline arrangement was very restrictive. It was very much a managed service, and it was hard to get from here to there. We sought while I was there to expand service and proposed an "open skies" agreement to the Canadians, which they rejected it. Their position was understandable. They were in the process of privatizing Air Canada, and Canadian Airlines, their number two carrier, was weak (it was eventually absorbed by Air Canada). So, they said they couldn't compete under an "open skies" agreement. We subsequently achieved an "open skies" agreement, I believe in 1993 or 1994, and it has worked out beautifully for Canada and the United States. Air traffic has expanded enormously and they have cut fares. It really has turned out to be a win/win situation for everybody, including travelers and airlines. But while I was there we didn't have any major disputes. We had a system of managed civil aviation, which worked reasonably well, but didn't really serve the traveling public. For example, there was no direct service between Ottawa and Washington. You could fly from BWI.

Q: That's not really Washington.

NILES: No, it's not. Now, you can fly from National to several cities in Canada. Part of the problem was the availability of customs facilities, which you do have in Ottawa but do not exist at National. The solution has been "preclearance" by US Customs and INS personnel at Ottawa, which works well. This is the same system we have at other Canadian airports.

Q: How about on the cultural side, TV and publications?

NILES: That was a major area of controversy because of Canadian discrimination against U.S. publications, films, and TV programming. Under the guise of "protecting Canadian culture," the Canadians had a fairly restrictive policy and subsidized Canadian productions. This was a big issue in the Free Trade Agreement. In the end, in the Free Trade Agreement the Canadians undertook not to make the existing situation worse from our point of view. That was all we could get. They stood on their "Canadian content" requirements and protected their programs to promote Canadian culture. We subsequently took the Canadians to the WTO on their restrictions against American magazines, the so-called "split edition" issue, and we won that case. It was a difficult issue and one that goes on to this day.

Q: What was your personal impression of this push for Canadian culture? Was this something that the people in Canada whom you met were all for it, except you found that they were really watching American tv programs and reading American magazines?

NILES: There was more to it than just protecting Canadian culture. Most Canadians wanted to have a unique voice, their voice, which is quite understandable, although many of them balked at paying for it and they also wanted to have access to world culture, including culture from the United States. When I say “culture,” I put it broadly. We are talking about pop culture, too. We are talking about movies, music, rock n’roll, country music, etc. But what was not always expressed with quite the same clarity on the Canadians side was that much of the pressure for protecting Canadian culture came from the industries in Canada that benefited from it. This came from the Canadian movie people, publishers, and so forth. It was, for them, a very real economic issue, and we were dealing with protectionism in the guise of cultural nationalism or protecting culture. That was not, necessarily, a very popular argument to make in Canada, because when the Canadian media got hold of it, they reacted quite negatively. But, I think it was a fact.

Q: What about the Canadian intellectual class? I think we have talked about this before, but when you were up there, was there an identifiable group of opinion makers?

NILES: There is a political class everywhere, and parts of the Canadian political class was allied with cultural nationalists and were among those who were more skeptical of the United States, in particular some of the policies of the Reagan administration. I do not believe this included the broad mass of the Canadian people. One of the reasons that I thought it was so important to have a very active public affairs program in the Embassy was so that we would be able to speak to the Canadian people directly. One of the reasons I particularly liked to go on live network television in Canada was that it gave me the opportunity to bring our message into Canadian homes without the filter of some journalists who would put his or her spin on whatever it was I said. I cannot remember one opportunity to go on television that I passed up. We sought out the most obscure programs. I felt that this was the way in which we could get our message across most effectively.

Q: Were there any criminal problems while you were there, such as people hopping across borders, law enforcement problems?

NILES: We had very good cooperation between the FBI and the DEA on our side and the RCMP on the Canadian side, but, inevitably, we did have problems. One way people can escape from the law in Canada or the United States is to go to the other country. That frequently happened. We had an active extradition process going in both directions that worked well. Problems did come up with people who were potentially subject to the death penalty in the United States because in most cases the Canadians would not extradite them unless we could give them assurances that this person would not be subject to capital punishment. In many cases, we were unable to give that assurance. The federal government couldn’t give that since the cases were under state jurisdiction. One of the realities of life in North America, is that the criminal syndicates, organized crime families work together and don’t respect the border. Drug smugglers don’t care that there is a border between the United States and Canada. We found that many people who were engaged in narcotics operations in Canada, for example, were allied with crime families in the United States. There was one guy named Frank Catroni whom the Canadians were trying to get back for heroin smuggling. We jailed him in the United States, and we were trying to extradite him. Mafia lawyers are good. They took full advantage of all the legal loopholes and made it difficult for us to do what we wanted to do, which in this case was to send Frank Catroni back to jail in Canada.

Q: Words keep changing, but how about indigenous people, Indian tribes, Newts? I can see two aspects, (1) a certain amount of backwards and forwards business, but also (2) a look at the way the Canadians were dealing with their tribal problem as opposed to what we were doing. Was that at all a factor while you were there?

NILES: It wasn't a problem. The Canadians claimed to be more sensitive to the needs of their indigenous people, but I think in reality the problems of the indigenous people in Canada were very similar to the problems we have in the United States. Whether they were living on "reservations" in the United States or "reserves," as they call them in Canada, the situation was not good. I remember visiting the DEW Line base at Hall Beach in northern Quebec, which was about half way between Ottawa and Elsmere Island as part of a visit to Alert Base, the northernmost point in Canada where we and the Canadians maintain a communications intercept post. We flew up in a Canadian force plane. The Hall Beach DEW Line site was in the process of being phased out, but it was neat and spiffy. We had breakfast there and a briefing on the status of operations and the phase-out process. As we were going back to our airplane, we were invited to visit the town of Hall Beach, which we agreed to do. So, we went to the Indian settlement of Hall Beach, which was about two miles from the DEW Line site. The contrast could not have been greater. Whereas the DEW Line site was very neat and tidy, the Hall Beach settlement looked like a group of marauders had just ridden through and destroyed half of it. It was full of wrecked automobiles, wrecked snowmobiles, wrecked boats and, sadly enough, wrecked-looking people. There was trash everywhere. It was awful. We walked through the streets of Hall Beach with the group who had been with us at the DEW Line site, one of whom was a French-Canadian Catholic priest. I was looking around at this awful place and said to the Catholic priest, "What is going on here?" He answered me with one word: "Welfare." The point is that it was worse than what I have seen of some of the poorer Indian reservations in the United States. Although the Canadians talked a good line about doing better than the Americans in dealing with problems of the indigenous people, but I don't think they did. I think the problems are very, very similar. In eastern Canada, the native people in places like Iqaluit, which is the Inuit name for Frobisher Bay, had depended traditionally on two sources of income: sealing and fishing. By the time I got up there, in 1987, both were essentially dead. Sealing had been killed by environmental protests in Europe against the killing of the baby harp seals. The decision originally taken by the Europeans theoretically exempted indigenous sealing, but the fact was that the protest against the method used in killing the seal pups essentially destroyed the market for seal pelts. It killed the industry irrespective of whether indigenous or non-indigenous people were sealing. So, there was no sealing going on for the people in Frobisher Bay, which meant that the seal population mushroomed. Each seal would eat several pounds of fish a day. One of the things that had helped kill the fish reserves off Eastern Canada was the proliferation of seals. You lost the sealing and then you lost the fishing, and the economy of Frobisher Bay, or Iqaluit, was in a state of very serious distress when I was there in 1987. In western Canada, there was basically nothing for the Inuit and the Indians to do in the northern areas. Some of them worked on oil rigs and mining, but that was small scale, compared to the numbers. So, there was tremendous unemployment. It was a very serious problem.

Let me mention one other thing because this was a classic U.S./Canada issue. We have treaties with Canada, going back to the 1800s, that exempt the native tribes that lived on both sides of the

border from customs duties and other excise taxes. They can move back and forth without hindrance. One of these tribes is the St Regis Mohawks, who live near Messina, New York and Cornwall, Ontario, and in western Quebec, along the St. Lawrence River. These people took advantage of their special to run huge bingo parlors in northern New York. This was before casino gambling became commonplace on United States Indian reservations. They also engaged in a huge cigarette smuggling operation. Cigarette prices in Canada then were about \$6.00 per pack, about four times what they were in the United States. The St. Regis Mohawks were making tons of money buying cigarettes in the United States, taking them to Canada and selling them. The Canadians tried to crack down on this. The St. Regis Mohawks resisted and claimed that under the v various US/Canadian treaties they were exempt from customs and excise taxes, which was true but missed the point that the products were for personal use. Legally, some of the tribes had the right to U.S. and/or Canadian citizenship, and some of them had U.S. and Canadian passports. One of whom was Bryan Trottier, the famous hockey player who played for the New York Islanders. He is a Micmac Indian. He played with Mike Bossy on the Islanders team that won four consecutive Stanley Cups in the early 1980s, and he could play for the American or the Canadian team, depending on his choice, in international competition.

Q: What about, as you looked at it, during this time, some of the regional things? In the first place, what you call the Maritime provinces?

NILES: The provinces on the Atlantic Ocean: Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Isle.

Q: Yes.

NILES: These provinces are very much linked with New England. By the way, if you go out to Halifax, you don't see the kids wearing sports paraphernalia of teams from Montreal or Toronto. They are wearing Red Sox hats and Bruins hats. I don't remember seeing too many hats or jackets from the New England Patriots. But for hockey, it is the Boston Bruins all the way. As far as baseball, they don't care about the Expos or the Blue Jays, they are big Boston Red Sox fans. Many people in the Maritimes call New England "The Boston states." Boston is really the center of their world. There is a lot of movement back and forth between the Maritimes and New England. The governors and the provincial Premieres meet very frequently. I used to go to some of their meetings. They were very convivial meetings. People had similar problems. It is a very close relationship. The same thing is true all along the border. In British Columbia, the people feel much closer to the people in Washington State and Oregon than they do to people in Manitoba or Ontario, not to speak of Quebec. Canada, in a way, breaks north/south, and they tend to look south to the neighboring region of the United States. People in Alberta look to the inter-mountain region of the United States. If you look at the inhabited part of Ontario, it is surrounded by the United States. It cuts down into the United States and borders on states ranging from Minnesota to New York. The Premier of Ontario was in constant contact with his counterparts from Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, New York, Illinois and Wisconsin. They recognize that they have to work together on environmental, trade and other issues, and they do so, generally quite well. It works both ways. I remember once when Chief Justice Burger and his wife visited in the initial visit of what became an ongoing exchange between the two Supreme Courts. It turned out to be extremely productive for both sides. But Mrs. Burger remarked that

living in Minneapolis, where they were from, they thought nothing of driving to Winnipeg to see a hockey game and vice versa. She said that people used to drive to Minneapolis/St. Paul for dinner from Winnipeg. There was a tremendous amount of movement back and forth between the border states and the Canadian provinces. It was very healthy. It makes people understand better the strong common interests that we have with Canada.

Q: Did the language, French/English thing, intrude at all on your work at the Embassy? Did you have to be careful about this?

NILES: We had to be careful. In Quebec, I did business largely in French except in Montreal, where the language with the people I generally dealt with was English. I gave speeches in Quebec in French, not in English, unless it was a business group that was clearly not Francophone. We had our two Consulates in Montreal and Quebec City, and the Consulate in Quebec operated almost exclusively in French. Even with a liberal administration in the Province, the city of Quebec was very much French, whereas Montreal was mixed.

Q: Did the French Embassy have much influence? Did you find it to be an Embassy to be reckoned with?

NILES: That is an interesting point. The French Embassy in Ottawa was careful about its relationship with Canada and handled the Quebec issue with care. I kept in close contact with the French Ambassadors. One of them, Bujon d'Estang, is now the Ambassador here. He was a close associate of Chirac and was appointed Ambassador to Canada at the end of the "Cohabitation" government of 1986-1988 when Chirac was Prime Minister. When Chirac came back in as President, he was Ambassador to Washington. The French, perhaps duplicitously or deviously, basically allowed their consulates in Quebec to lead the way on support for Quebec nationalism, whereas the Embassy in Ottawa was very, very careful. I had the impression, frankly, that for the French Ambassadors in Ottawa their consulates in Quebec were very independent. It was probably convenient for the French Ambassador to Canada, not to know too much about what was going on.

Q: Deniability?

NILES: Yes, deniability. I don't think there is any question that some elements in France, up to and including the President in the case of de Gaulle, were playing a dangerous game with Quebec nationalism. De Gaulle came to Canada in 1966 on board the cruiser *Colbert*, a choice of conveyance that the Soviets would have said was "not accidental." As Louis XIV's Finance Minister, Colbert had established the "factories," which the French colonies in North America were originally called. He was responsible for the establishment of French Canada. So de Gaulle came up the St. Lawrence River on the *Colbert* and had a tumultuous welcome in Quebec City. He came out on the balcony of the Quebec City Hall and cried, in his own dramatic way, "Vive le Quebec Libre." This created an enormous stir in Canada. I had one very interesting personal insight into this, 19 years later. My driver when I was Ambassador, Vaughan Cameron, a wonderful Canadian from Nova Scotia, was at that time the Regimental Sergeant Major of the Guard's Regiment in the Canadian Army. They were the ones who marched in front of the Parliament Buildings wearing ceremonial red coats and tall bearskin hats, very much like some

of the units in London, and deliberately so.

Q: The Sixty-Nines, or something like that?

NILES: No, that was the Quebec regiment. Vaughn Cameron told me that he was out drilling his regiment on the lawn in front of the House of Parliament, between the House of Parliament and the American Chancery to prepare for the reception of President de Gaulle. Prime Minister Lester Pearson came down from his office in the Center Block, walked up to Regimental Sergeant Major Cameron, and said, "Regimental Sergeant Major, you can send your men home. We won't be needing them because he is not coming. I withdrew the invitation." So, Vaughn said, "Yes, Sir" and ordered his men back to their barracks. De Gaulle's intervention in Canadian politics was doubtless the worst example of French meddling in Canada politics, but there is no question that in the period since then Governments of France have consistently played an unhelpful role in the whole Quebec issue. I don't think there is any question that the Quebecers assume, as I am sure Lucien Bouchard did when he treacherously stabbed Mulroney in the back, that France would recognize an independent Quebec one minute after the Declaration of Independence. Bouchard had lots of contacts in French, where he had been Canadian Ambassador from 1984 to 1988. When he returned to Canada, he became Minister of Environment. He resigned in 1991 and became a separatist again. He makes no effort to conceal the fact that he expects France that would recognize the independence of Quebec the moment it was achieved. I am sure he is right. So in my view, France has played a very unhelpful role in the Quebec issue. Can you imagine what the French would do if the Italians were found to be supporting the separatists in Corsica? Remember that France bought Corsica from Genoa in 1768, which was a few years after they lost their North American colonies to the British. The Italians, or at least the Genoese and the Branco San Giorgio, have as much of a right to be concerned about Corsica as the French have in the case of Quebec. I can tell you that if that happened, the French would go crazy. Managing the situation in Corsica is already difficult enough for the French. Or if some foreign country supported the independence of Brittany, can you imagine what you would hear from Paris? The French would go absolutely into orbit. But they seem to think that they have an absolute right to encourage Quebec separatism. It is a sort of French version of the "Brezhnev Doctrine." They ought to be more respectful of Canada, I think.

Q: During the time you were there, were there any people in the Canadian government who were of Quebec origin, come and say, "Well, this is what I really feel," or did they say, "What would the United States do if...?"

NILES: Absolutely not. You might have expected something like that, but it never happened. As I said, Quebec separatism, on the surface, seemed to be a thing of the past while I was there. We fortunately had Bob Montgomery in the Embassy constantly reminding us that the issue would not go away. Mulroney made a valiant effort to solve the problem with the so-called "Meech Lake Agreement." This Agreement between the Federal government and the 10 provincial governments recognized that Quebec was a "distinct society" within the Canadian Confederation and it gave all the provinces, including of course Quebec, almost total autonomy in areas such as education and culture. Had it gone into effect, the anomaly that Quebec has not signed on to the Constitution of Canada would have been removed.

Q: When did that come in?

NILES: The Agreement was signed in 1988. It was finally torpedoed in 1990 by an odd collection of provincial Premiers: Gary Filmon (Tory) in Manitoba, Frank McKenna (Liberal) in New Brunswick, and Clyde Wells (Liberal) in Newfoundland. It was very unfortunate for Canada, I believe. The Meech Lake Agreement was by no means perfect. After all, it was a political compromise. But it was a step ahead. And its rejection by the group of three English-speaking Premiers was the key element in the resurgence of separatism in Quebec. The separatist leaders told the Quebecers that the failure of the Meech Lake Agreement meant that they would never get a fair deal in Canada, and many believed it.

Q: How did we view the Meech Lake Accord and the rejection of it, from the Embassy?

NILES: It was rejected after I left. Although we kept resolutely out of it, we devoutly hoped that it would succeed. We thought it was good for Canada, and if it was good for Canada, it was good for the United States. We also recognized that the one thing that would probably kill it quicker than anything else would be an endorsement from the United States. To use Secretary Baker's idiom, we did have a dog in that fight, but we didn't want to recognize it. We didn't want to say that that was our dog.

Q: Well, Canada, particularly since the time of Trudeau, or maybe even before, has played the American role, except in a minor key, or maybe a major key, being the world nanny, going around on various things, peacekeeping and also coming up with resolutions, and all this. Did this cause difficulty?

NILES: There was much less of that during the Mulroney Administration. Mulroney didn't change the basic Canadian approach, particularly on peacekeeping. Canada remained very active on peacekeeping around the world. But, Mulroney deliberately avoided what might be considered gratuitous slaps at the United States. Generally, speaking, he was careful about initiatives that were likely to be of concern to Washington. He didn't see any particular virtue, from Canada's perspective, in getting out in front of these things. The current and Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, in particular, obviously do not feel that way. So, on the Land Mine Convention and the International Criminal Court, Canada took a very forward leaning position on both.

Q: How about the role of Canada and NATO? Their military force is pretty blinded by this time.

NILES: By now, yes. They have cut it back and they have withdrawn their forces from southern Germany. Of course, they would have done that anyway, because of German unification. Canadian forces have been really paired back. While I was there, it was still during the Cold War, and Mulroney tried to maintain a capable Canadian force in NATO. He took the NATO commitment seriously, not to say that the present Canadian government doesn't. Obviously, the situation has changed. Jean Chretien is also a supporter of NATO. While I was there, there were no major problems that I can recall between the United States and Canada about the defense spending issue, even though Canada did not achieve the three percent of GDP target that NATO had established for defense expenditures at that time. They did their best to keep up their forces,

and did so. They were limited, but capable.

Q: *Cuba?*

NILES: It didn't raise its ugly head. Canada had relations with Cuba. There was a Cuban Embassy in Ottawa and Canadian Embassy in Havana. But, the kind of grandstanding that we get on Cuba today, did not happen. For whatever reason, Canadian corporations had little or nothing to do with Cuba. At that time, Cuba was basically living off the Soviet Union. They had their sugar-for-oil deal, and Cuba was receiving a fair amount of support from the Soviets. They really didn't have to look to countries like Canada, Spain, France, United Kingdom, for help. It was only after the end of the Soviet gravy train that the Cubans realized that they were out of luck unless they were able to find an external source for financial support and began to encourage foreign investment. Canadian companies have invested there, as have others.

Q: *Did Iran Contra business of Central America cause an annoyance to you?*

NILES: We got some spin off from it. There were a few loose ends of Iran-Contra that lead to Lebanese people in Montreal who claimed to be able to influence the groups that were holding some of our hostages in Lebanon. We coordinated all of this with the Canadians and worked with the RCMP. I was in touch with the Department and with the FBI. But it was a minor part of it, and fortunately it was never publicized.

Q: *What about the Central American policy during this time?*

NILES: We didn't have any support to speak of in Canada for our Central American policy from the Canadian political class, the media or the population. Essentially, nobody understood what we were trying to do and why we were so concerned. But, again, the Mulroney Administration, though not supporting our policy, sought to downplay the issue. The Prime Minister knew that this was an issue of importance to President Reagan, and the position of the Mulroney Administration was, "Look, we value our relationship with the United States. We don't agree with you on everything. Where we don't agree with you, we will let you know, but we will try not to make a federal case out of it." The Canadians let us know, on things such as Central America, that they didn't agree with what we were doing, but by and large, they did not make too much of a fuss about it. It was a fairly low-key, but clear expression of their policy, I would say.

Q: *Well, Tom, before we end this session on Canada, is there anything we haven't covered?*

NILES: Overall, it was a great experience. There was one great disappointment, namely the outcome of a competition to sell aircraft to Air Canada in which Airbus won over Boeing, with the help I believe of large amounts of money spread out in the Canadian political system. This issue continues to surface from time to time in Canada. If the German go-between, Karl-Heinz Schreiber, who is now under investigation, ever tells his story, it could still, almost 15 years later, have major repercussions in Canada.

I benefited tremendously as Ambassador from the excellent personal relations between President

Reagan, Vice President Bush, Secretary Shultz and Secretary Baker with their Canadian counterparts. President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney had annual meetings. President Bush's first foreign trip was to Ottawa in February 1989. Prime Minister Mulroney came down to Washington in June 1989 to inaugurate the new Canadian Chancery. This interchange at the top cannot be overestimated in terms of its beneficial impact on the relationship because it forces our system to focus on the issues. It gives you a reason to say to all these recalcitrant bureaus and agencies in the United States that the President is involved, therefore, they need to get with it. It really helped. But, overall it was a great experience.

Q: With this telephoning back and forth, and chatting and getting together, they didn't need an interpreter. Did you find yourself out of the loop sometimes?

NILES: It was a danger. You could get out of the loop quite easily, and I had to make a tremendous effort to stay, at least, partially in the loop. I spent a lot of time doing that. People in the NSC were understanding and they generally kept me informed. Sometimes I found out what was going on from the Canadians, which was a little embarrassing, but you have to do that. It was not just between the President and the Prime Minister, but it was between Canadian ministers and our Cabinet officers. They were on the phone constantly, and I frequently had to be playing catch up ball. But, that was just part of the relationship.

Q: Do you have any stories to tell about Reagan and Mulroney, while you were there?

NILES: Not really. It was a very warm, and I think, genuine relationship. They liked each other. Their spouses got along well. The Mulroneys were very solicitous and respectful of the Reagans. They played that card well. They knew it was important. For the Ambassador, the tremendous advantage of those close personal ties at the top cannot be exaggerated, not just in substantive terms, but in terms of my access to Prime Minister Mulroney or President Reagan. I got to know the Reagans in ways that career officers rarely get to know the Chief Executive of our country. When Mulroney came to Washington in 1986 and 1988, we invited upstairs in the White House before the dinner an hour with the Reagans and a very small group of Americans and Canadians. It was quite a remarkable experience, something that every American should do.

Q: One last question. In one way, Mulroney was riding pretty high. Did you see any cloud on the horizon about Mulroney and his party at that time?

NILES: It is strange what happened. He was riding high. He won a big election victory in 1984 and a big reelection victory in 1988. He retired in 1993 and was replaced by Kim Campbell, who people thought was a sure winner but then suffered the greatest loss in the history of Canada. The Progressive-Conservative (Tory) Party went from 180 seats in Parliament to 2. It disappeared practically at the Federal level. By the time Mulroney retired in 1993, he had lost much of his popularity and was generally seen as not entirely honest. While in office, he was, I think, respected but not liked, and not trusted by many Canadians. This was what the poll data would suggest. Many in Canada saw him as too slick, too smart, too telegenic, too "American." Ultimately, he paid the price for it. There were corruption scandals in his administration, whether more or less than the norm, I don't know. Several of his ministers were clearly engaged in inappropriate conduct and there were other cases. This happens in the best of families. Mulroney

himself was the subject of investigation in 1997/98 growing out of the Airbus affair I mentioned a moment ago. But I cannot explain why the Prime Minister fell from grace after he retired from politics. My explanation, to the extent I have one, would be that while the Canadian people saw him as competent and effective as Prime Minister, he never really connected at a personal level with most Canadians, who found him to be a little too smart, too slick, and too handsome.

Q: Well, Tom, we will pick it up the next time. You left Canada in June 1989.

NILES: June 30, 1989. I went on a direct transfer overnight from Montreal to Brussels.

**JOHN E. HALL
Economic Officer
Toronto (1986-1990)**

John E. Hall was born in Niagara Falls and was educated at Kenyon College. He entered the Foreign Service in 1962 and has served in a variety of posts in Switzerland, New Zealand, Liberia, and Canada. Mr. Hall was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 1998.

Q: We're now in the summer of '86 and after two years in Liberia, where did you go then?

HALL: I went on then to the Canadian Defense College, to a program that has since been shut down by the Canadians, having been a very costly program for them to operate. But the way the Department handled the assignment was that year was considered a year of area studies, preceding an assignment in Canada – a very wise way to look at it, I believe. I went to the college knowing that I would then go on to Toronto afterwards, as indeed I did. Each year the State Department student at the college then went in to one of our posts in Canada.

Q: About how big was the college, in terms of students?

HALL: Forty-three students, 12 were Canadian military colonels, two of whom made brigadier general during the course. There were representatives from a few other Canadian government agencies, but not very many - one from External Affairs. There were seven foreign students - I was one, and all the others were uniformed military. One Brit, one Australian, one New Zealander, three from the U.S., one from the Foreign Service. The remainder, which is to say probably half of the students, were either from provincial or municipal governments or from the Canadian private sector -- not many from the private sector, but a few. One of the students, as an example, was a news reporter from the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, who simply took a year off from reporting to go to the National Defense College. Another was a priest from the staff of the Archbishop of Toronto who spent a year at the course. And having concluded the course he went back to Toronto where he became what he called President of the Church of the North. Which is to say that from the Diocesan headquarters in Toronto he administered assistance programs to the churches in the Inuit areas where there was an extensive network of small mission churches. Barry was their central coordination point. So very interesting people at

the college, an interesting mix, and I think a richer mix than we have in our War and Staff Colleges. It was an extremely expensive program; in a nine month college year we spent four months in travel status. We visited 20 foreign countries, every province, both territories... a very expensive program. And the Queen bore all the costs for all the students. So in the end I think the program was just found to be too expensive in a country which at that time did not have much of a military, and certainly since then has shrunk its military even further.

Q: Do you know what senior Canadians do now in terms of higher-level training if this does not exist anymore?

HALL: I don't know if they do anything at all, quite honestly.

Q: At that time they presumably did send some senior officers to the United States or to Britain, to Fort McNair...

HALL: Yes, that's right. And I'm sure they still do. And I am not aware of anything – I must say, I'm not informed -- within Canada recently that would supplant this.

Q: Remind me where the Canadian Defense College is located?

HALL: Kingston, Ontario, on the northern end of Lake Ontario, has always been the military hub point since long before the War of 1812. And there are an array of military establishments there, including their equivalent of West Point and this college. It was a one and a half or two hour drive from Ottawa, so it had fairly regular access to federal entities and people. There was infrastructure to support it, there was an airbase just a few miles down the road in terms of our travel program and getting in and out of the college. And of course there was ready access to the U. S., as well.

Q: You have your own faculty, as well as using visiting lecturers, I suppose, from other...

HALL: They had a core faculty of uniformed military personnel, but they relied very heavily on outside lecturers. And I think that probably was not a small part of the cost. In Canadian terms, they got top level people; the most prominent members of Canadian society addressed the College. And when you addressed the College you had to go there for a whole day, and that had to cost them something.

Q: And you mentioned travel. Very extensive travel?

HALL: Very extensive. Indeed, my understanding was the Canadian Air Force relied on the National Defense College for much of its training time, and certainly for the only experience its pilots got in flying to an awful lot of obscure destinations. They had no possible reasons to go to these places otherwise. We were usually flying in a C-130 which was not exactly comfortable, but functional, but every now and then we'd get a ministerial plane or something like that.

Q: And you went to Europe, or the Far East, or...

HALL: Sure, you name it, we went. We made five trips, one to each geographic continent, basically, two trips to the U.S., and then trips in Canada itself. We did all the provinces and both northern territories in three separate trips. So it's a great deal of travel. But in terms of preparation for an assignment in Canada, I don't think any other one-year program could have done what that one did. When I went to Toronto, maybe it was just me, but I felt that I could speak with Canadians in a way that I never felt that I could speak with any other foreign group. I felt that I could understand what they were saying – not just the words – and that I could respond to them. I think that experience cheek-by-jowl with 30-odd literate Canadians for a full year was terribly instructive. No Canadian studies program at American University could do the same.

Q: And that experience really brought you into Canadian society at large, and certainly in Toronto, in particular. But it was more than just the contacts that you established...

HALL: It was the understanding. It was the ability to hear them and understand, and the ability to communicate with them. You know, I watched other officers around me struggling with what the newspaper meant when it said this or that. I usually felt pretty confident that I knew what they were getting at - certainly in their commentary on the U.S. But also in terms of their dealings with each other, their commentary on international issues, their own domestic problems, that was tremendously instructive.

Q: It's probably valuable to the defense college and to Canadian students to have foreign students, to have Americans, to have not only the three uniformed service members, but to have somebody from the Foreign Service.

HALL: I think that we collectively brought a perspective that was useful to them. In the Canadian military, I think you know, the movement from colonel to brigadier is, theoretically at least, one that takes you a quantum leap into an entirely new universe and a new array of issues. And I think from their point of view this was very good preparation. By the time you become a brigadier general you are dealing with foreigners, there is no way to get around that. And I think to be a general officer in the Canadian services you have got to be able to work with foreigners. That is not true in ours, but it is imperative in the Canadian. And you have got to be able to work with civilian society - you can no longer isolate yourself on base or on shipboard. You have got to be able to interact with your own society. It was a very cleverly constructed student body. It certainly served the Ministry's purposes. It also happened to serve mine.

Q: And from the viewpoint of the Canadians -- with their involvement with peacekeeping for the United Nations and in other ways, as well as their involvement with NATO and NORAD and all of these multilateral bodies -- that training experience with foreigners and learning to work with them was valuable.

HALL: More than valuable, essential, absolutely essential.

Q: And besides that, the year was probably a lot of fun.

HALL: A great deal of fun, no two ways around it. Canadians are great folks to have a beer with. And they're great folks to pick nits with. They certainly don't hesitate to shoot barbs our way,

it's nice to shoot back. They enjoy it.

Q: So you went from Kingston to Toronto, which is how far?

HALL: About three hours, by car.

Q: And you were what in Toronto?

HALL: I went in as the economic officer, which was the number two. And then when the consul general left a few months later, I replaced him, but everyone understood when I got there that I was the successor. I think I dealt with him correctly and successfully. I don't think he ever felt threatened, but I did use those several months to sort of position myself for what I knew was coming. The college certainly gave me historical knowledge and understanding. It also gave me a number of absolutely superb contacts, contacts that even as principal officer I could not have had otherwise. And so I fairly systematically developed and maintained those contacts, with the result I think that by the time I became principal officer I was already very well positioned in that role. That was at a time when the Free Trade Agreement, which was then a two-country agreement, was in the discussion and negotiation stage. There was the possibility of a role for the principal officer in Toronto which far transcended managing a visa operation and auditing the books.

Q: Often in the past the principal officer in Toronto has been from the consular side of things, because historically that had been an important part of the post's operations.

HALL: And I think historically there were not a lot of issues. On the commercial side, the two countries are essentially one, and therefore the concept of trade promotion is almost ludicrous. On the economic side the linkages are intimate. The Canadians know us as well as we know ourselves, and quite possibly better. We, of course, know nothing about them, but that's an ongoing problem. But I think in most times managing a very busy visa operation probably is what being the principal officer in Toronto is all about. I happened to come on the scene at a time when there was an issue and I think I got that job because I had, on paper, a credential that didn't seem totally irrelevant.

Q: Not only was there an issue, the negotiation of the free trade agreement, but I think one could argue that, even though the economies are intertwined, when problems arise in the relationship over the years much of the time they're in the economic realm.

HALL: Sure.

Q: And the solutions have to be found, and you need knowledgeable people to deal with that. I guess I support your assignment.

HALL: I think at the time it was right to have in the principal officer job someone who was prepared to look beyond the office. Over time, I suspect it largely was a management job. I think on my watch there was the potential for it to be an issues-related job.

In the Canadian structure the provinces are far more powerful than our states are. And they have the constitutional possibility to thwart almost any agreement the central government arrives at: trade or otherwise. So the authorities in Ottawa dare not enter into any international understanding without having figured out how they're going to handle the provinces. And of all the provinces Ontario was the most powerful, the most vocal, and on this issue it was the most negative. And it was the most negative for a variety of reasons, many of which had nothing to do with the issue. So I found myself responsible for our relationships with that entity in the Canadian system that was most staunchly positioning itself as an opponent to the very agreement that we so desperately wanted, and that Ottawa so desperately wanted.

Q: So you obviously needed to explain this to Washington and to our embassy in Ottawa, as well as trying to interpret and explain what we were doing to Ontario authorities.

HALL: I think that's true, it was a dual role, and the Canadian authorities in Ottawa perceived that there were definite limits in how they could propagandize vis-a-vis the Ontario authorities. There were all sorts of constitutional issues, there were rules around the fringes of this free trade proposal. And there were moments when the U.S. representative could say or do things that the federal Canadian authorities just can't do. And sometimes I was the one who had to do it. So it was a very interesting role to have. I went into it fairly confident in my understanding of what had gone before, through the college experience and during my understudy when I was at the post initially.

I went into it with some very good contacts - I had excellent relationship with the provincial premier, the deputy premier, the guys who were leading the charge - we were very good friends, and we had some very frank discussions, and very quickly got beyond the garbage and into the meat. And I think I was able to contribute some understanding to Washington which it might not have had - or might not have believed - otherwise. And maybe occasionally coached a little bit on what our policy would be at that moment in the evolution of things. It was interesting ballet to watch: Ottawa had to handle Toronto and we had to handle Toronto, and we had to do it in a way that we didn't get in each others' way.

Q: Were you directly involved in negotiations of this...

HALL: Not with the negotiations per se, but with the political side... and I guess you could say, a little bit with the politicking behind the scenes. I did some public speaking and made some public appearances in connection with the agreement, but no, my role was not to lead, my role was to explain, support, define.... But it was great fun, and I think that by the time I left that assignment in 1990 the contribution that a principal officer in Toronto could have made was made. The agreement was there, Ontario had staked out its position, we knew roughly what areas they were going to make trouble in and how they were going to do it. So I think I just happened to be in the right place at the right time.

Q: There's a few other times over the years that, having to do with things Canadian, that Washington officials prefer to deal directly, to pick up the phone: they speak English, they see things the same way, it's easier to do business with Canadians. Maybe we don't need our embassy in Ottawa to the same degree we need our embassy in Monrovia, say, or wherever. How

do you feel about that?

HALL: At the time that I was in Toronto Tom Niles was in Ottawa as ambassador. I worked with Tom Niles, I saw him in pretty close quarters not infrequently, I had an awful lot of respect for Tom. Had he not been in Ottawa at that time when that issue was there, I think the embassy's role would have been very different, certainly much smaller. But I think he was one of the proofs that I have witnessed that ambassadors – even now – can make a difference. And I think he made a real difference. Niles was absolutely doing the right thing at that time. He made a major contribution to the way Washington handled that issue, and was basically indispensable.

So, yes, most times I think you probably could do without much of those operations. This happened to be a moment when there was something out of the ordinary and particularly in Tom Niles, you had an individual who was very much out of the ordinary. I think he was the right man at the right time.

Q: I think from what you said you also made a significant contribution dealing with Ontario.

HALL: No... Nothing like what Mr. Niles did. His contribution was at the White House level was very public; he was working with the Prime Minister and the President directly... Believe me, I was in a totally different area. I was able, I think, to do some things that were helpful and useful. I think he did things that were critical.

Q: How about the business community based on Toronto. Did you spend a lot of time with them, as well? In terms of supporting the free trade agreement negotiations as well as in other respects...

HALL: Oh, they're terribly influential. Absolutely. And the movement back and forth between the private business sector and the government - not just of people, but of ideas - is, I think, even greater than it is here. So if you're talking to a business executive today, in fact through that person you're talking to a government minister, or you're talking to an aide to a government minister tomorrow. People with influence in Canada exercise their influence over a lot of Canada's interest.

Yes, working with the business community is essential. Interestingly enough, one of the communities I tried to work with... I developed a very good relationship with the Cardinal, an excellent relationship with the chief rabbi, and I made overtures to the Protestant churches, which didn't work out quite so famously. But then the Protestant churches, particularly the United Church, which is the biggest one, are one of the hotbeds of anti-Americanism, so I wasn't too surprised at that. But, yes, I think I was able to move in a lot of areas, many of which were useful.

Q: The consul general in Toronto has a large consular district and a large staff, and a lot of visas, American citizen matters... Your subordinates and others pretty much took care of that, or did you travel quite a bit, were there other problems or issues that you had to deal with, or was this your preoccupation?

HALL: This was certainly my preoccupation, personally. The way the post was structured at the time, and it's since changed somewhat, the staff totaled about 80 people. I went in as the economic officer. Because I was already a senior officer, I became the second-ranking officer, of course. I was replaced by an O3 as economic officer, and that was exactly as it should have been. That left the head of the Consular Section as very clearly the second-ranking officer, an O1. I had the very good fortune to have two heads of the Consular Section in succession, each of whom was absolutely superb. And basically I left that function to them. I very quickly determined that I trusted them and I think they earned that trust. So they each had very big responsibilities in areas in which they were specialized, knowledge that I didn't have. With the support of my O3 economic officer and our USIS officer, and of course contact with the embassy and so on, I could work on other things.

It did include a considerable amount of travel, although if you look at a map of Ontario, the vast bulk of that land surface is uninhabited. It is true that with a couple of exceptions, 90 percent of all Canadians live within 50 miles of the U.S. border, or something like that. And that's certainly true in Ontario. So where the decision makers were, where the industry heads were, where the things that interested me professionally were, all were within a relatively finite band. The rest of the province had very little interest to anyone except the curious, and I certainly classified myself among them, so I could get into those things, too. But business was within a fairly finite part of the province.

Q: Did you go to Ottawa on a regular basis?

HALL: I suppose I would have gotten up there every six or eight months... I had a very nice relationship, I felt, with the embassy. They gave me very little guidance, just let me do my thing. And part of keeping it that way, I thought, was to keep them in Ottawa and keep me in Toronto. Mr. Niles came to Toronto fairly frequently, he couldn't not do so. But I felt that I had excellent relationships with the other officers in Toronto, and they were probably kept good by non-direct contact.

Q: And did you have a fair amount of direct relationship with the Office of the Special Trade Representative, the Commerce Department...

HALL: Some, but again, I was a subordinate player. Their contacts had to be with Ottawa. If USTR had called the provincial premier, believe me, that would have been a major bad move, and they understood that, and that didn't happen. Sometimes they wanted to but then wisdom prevailed. I and occasionally Mr. Niles dealt with the Premier.

Q: But occasionally they perhaps would call up, in Ottawa, say, the Minister of Trade...

HALL: Oh, by all means, and would not understand why the Minister of Trade would not call the Premier. There are rules within Canada that aren't written down. You always have to keep your eye on the objective in Canada. And subordinate tactics to the objective.

Q: Anything else about your time in Toronto? That was about three years?

HALL: Yes, three years, and it was the three years from the beginnings of serious talk about free trade, basically to the conclusion of the agreement. It was also three years during which the so-called Meech Lake event occurred, the sort of nonstop interwoven questions about the relationships between the provinces and the federal authorities and the French-English issue. It was all interwoven during the Mulroney administration. There was a lot of activity in those areas.

The French-English thing I have always regarded as a tiny game the Canadians play for the consumption of foreigners. It has no real meaning for them. But the provincial-federal relationship is meat and potatoes. And it is never stable, it is constantly in flux, somehow. It is constantly being redefined. And one of the interesting things I have found as an observer of Canadian affairs, was to watch how that issue was played. And again, being in the largest, most colorful province, and the most negative province, I had a front row seat. That and what to do about the elephant to the south, those are the real issues. I happened to be there at a time when both were very much active.

Q: You mention that the free trade agreement had just come out. Of course, it had a lot of history, too, in the sense of the automotive agreement going back 20 years earlier.

HALL: Oh, of course. And with major investments across the border, it's hard to know what major Canadian corporation is really Canadian.

Q: How about agricultural trade – was that a problem which you had to deal with? I know occasionally there are problems with potatoes, or carrots, or whatever.

HALL: Problems with timber, problems with fish... there are a lot of problems and those usually occurred more in the western provinces. Now, fisheries were sometimes off the eastern coast, but not in our area. Sometimes we would comment on how those problems were handled, but the real negotiations were Washington to Ottawa. And again, one must always remember that Ottawa had also to negotiate with the provinces on international trade issues.

Q: How about acid rain and environmental issues, Great Lakes, water quality, and so on?

HALL: That is very hard, but again, I think it was a more active issue before my time. Not that it was inactive, but it had been a more emotional issue before my time, for want of other issues. And by the time I came on the scene, all of a sudden there was this trade issue and others had to move aside to make room for it. Also, I think the science on acid rain, and I would not claim to expertise, but my understanding was that the science on acid rain was very clear in the '50s and '60s, became rather confused in the '70s and '80s, and remains confused today. It was easier to be adamant earlier, and it's more difficult to be adamant now. So yes, those issues were there, but I can't say that they were a source of enormous concern. We did occasionally report on them, but I think other issues were more important on my watch, anyway.

Q: Okay, John, is there anything we should say about your four years in Canada, because we can't forget the Canadian Defense College for 9 months...

HALL: No, I think we've pretty much covered it.

DWIGHT N. MASON
Deputy Chief of Mission
Ottawa (1986-1990)

Dwight Mason was born in New York, New York in 1939. He received a bachelor's degree from Brown University and a master's degree from the University of California at Berkeley. Mr. Mason entered the Foreign Service in 1962, serving in Morocco, Colombia, Ecuador, Canada, and Washington, DC. Mr. Mason was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993.

Q: You went to Ottawa when?

MASON: 1986.

Q: You were there until when?

MASON: The Summer of 1990.

Q: How did you get selected to go to Ottawa as Deputy Chief of Mission?

MASON: Oh, the classic way. Tom Niles was named as the ambassador, and he had been the Deputy Assistant for Canada when I was the political counselor in Ottawa. What happened was that Dick Smith, the DCM during my first tour in Ottawa and who had returned to the Department as a Deputy Assistant Secretary in EB, called me and said, "I think you should go over and see Tom about being his DCM." So I went did, and Tom said, "Sure, I'd like you to do it." So that was it. I stayed in M another year waiting to go because the current DCM's tour there wasn't up.

Q: Tom Niles was a junior officer in my consular section in Belgrade many years ago. His DCM in the EC remarked to me that Tom was a difficult man to be a DCM for because he knew all the ropes, and he knew everything and he was a very hard worker, a nice guy, but...

MASON: He was not difficult to work for at all. He is extremely smart. He may be the smartest person I've ever worked for. But the way he and I worked...he focused on some things, and I focused on the rest. Tom focused on the Free Trade Agreement negotiations, for example, and that left a lot of other things. I also had two important advantages: I had served in Ottawa before and very recently so I had a good grasp of the issues and knew the Canadian players, and I had had extensive management experience in the Department and knew how to make things work. Most DCMs do not have those advantages. Because of them, Tom could and did leave the management of the Embassy, Consulates and many issues to me.

Q: I was not saying because he was difficult to work with, he was just so good in the EC thing

Mike Healy found himself sort of adrift because he almost felt...

MASON: Well, USEC is small and highly focused compared to Canada in terms of issues and management problems. I was responsible for management of the embassy, the six consulates, and much of the substance of what went on, with the exception of the free trade agreement. That was plenty of work. A mission like USEC probably does not need a DCM.

Q: How did you find, at that point, the operation of the consulates other than consular work?

MASON: Remember, several of those consulates (Montreal, Vancouver and Toronto) are major visa issuing posts primarily for third country nationals. So first of all, as a management problem, you've got that.

Canada is a very regional country. There was no supervising consul general, that was my business. Most of the principal officers were substantive officers by our choice because we saw these consulates as important reporting posts on their regions. There was at least one substantive officer at the largest posts, other than the principal officer, and they did a lot of reporting because it really did matter what went on in the provinces in terms of how things were going to go in the country. Quebec City is the most obvious example of such reporting requirements.

Q: Substantive in Foreign Service lingo is political and economic reporting.

MASON: Toronto is another good example. Canada is our largest bilateral trade partner. If Ontario were a country, it would be our second largest trading partner. But Ontario is also Canada's most important economic unit. The provincial government's financial policies directly affect those of the federal government. Indeed, the provincial government's economic policies can nullify those of the federal government in many cases (debt for example). As it happens, at present, the provincial government is not of the same party as the federal government, and the two do not cooperate well together. This interaction has important implications for the US and requires close attention. We have one economic officer in Toronto, that's all. It's crazy. We need a lot of economic reporting out of Toronto.

Q: You now have the Brian Mulroney government. Did you, having also served when Trudeau was Prime Minister, see a difference in our relations between the two Governments?

MASON: Many people say there's a big difference. There wasn't. Countries' interests determine their relationship. On a personal level, the relationship was closer between Mulroney and the President, whether it was Reagan or Bush than between Trudeau and the President. Mulroney and the President talked to each other on the phone all the time. Mulroney made an effort to cultivate the President. There was a theory in the Prime Minister's office, which I think says more about the Prime Minister and the government of Canada, than about us, that you really had to get past the bureaucrats, you had to deal with the top guy to get anything done. That says a lot about Canada, but it doesn't say much about us. That attitude led to very odd moments where we would tell the president, "Look, the Prime Minister is going to see you and here is what's on his mind." What usually was on the PM's mind was second order matters -- the kind we would ordinarily resolve at the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State level. On the other hand, the

Presidents would put up with it. And this Canadian practice was convenient for us because it gave us a chance to get US-Canadian issues before the President in concrete terms.

Q: In effect, not pernicious, but basically the control. The president was briefed for it, the president passed it back.

MASON: He got the briefings from us. We would go around to External, and say, "What's the Prime Minister going to raise?" And they'd tell us. They had to if they wanted an intelligent answer, after all. The positive side was, when there were issues, this galvanized the bureaucracy in Washington to agree on what the president was going to say. So in that sense, the Prime Minister was doing us a favor, because we could never raise some of these issues above the general noise level. Some of these issues really were petty from the point of view of the United States, but they were not minor from the point of view of Canada.

Q: What about an issue that you must have had with Reagan et al. both your times, the environment, acid rain.

MASON: Acid rain was a very big issue throughout my tours there. Initially the issue was whether or not to negotiate an agreement to limit emissions of nitrous oxide and sulfuric acid. Up until about 1980 the standard way Americans and Canadians had worked on issues that appeared to be capable of objective analysis was to form a technical group to agree on the data. The best example of this strategy is the International Joint Commission, established by the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. But this didn't work in the case of acid rain. There really wasn't agreement on the data, not to mention its interpretation, which was surprising to both sides -- particularly to the Canadians because they had good and sufficiently complete information. I discovered scientists were just like anybody else, and they're perfectly capable of twisting data, or interpreting it in a political sense. The net result was that we never did completely agree on the data about acid rain; its origin, and its effects. Personally, I think the Canadians were generally right, and many Americans thought so too. Anyway, we formed all kinds of groups and committees to study this issue to death and kept doing it over and over again. Over the years the weight of the data began to overcome the US position. The net result was in the end, we did agree to limit emissions in various ways, and we do have an acid rain agreement. But the unknown, underlying facts of all this are that most of the US emissions which create acid rain in Canada come from the Ohio Valley. They come from old electric power plants that are frequently using high sulfur coal. Most of these plants were scheduled to be rebuilt on the basis of new and higher standards and therefore their emissions were expected to decline in the normal course of events. But they were not, and have not been rebuilt. You will recall that at that time interest rates went right through the roof to 20% or more. Nobody could afford to rebuild anything. Who could afford to borrow the money? So all of a sudden they began to retrofit those plants. So the anticipated decline in emission never happened because these plants were still on-line, which made, of course, an agreement all the more important.

Q: Were the Canadians contributors to the acid rain problem?

MASON: Yes. But remember Canada is one-tenth the size of the US in economic and population terms. There's a rule of ten up there, it's ten of everything. They produce acid rain, yes, but

nothing like what we produce. And as it happens, the way the weather works emissions from the Ohio Valley tend to go up the St. Lawrence Valley, and they tend not to come the other way. The largest single point source of acid rain causing emissions in the world, however, is the International Nickel plant, INCO, in Sudbury, Ontario. INCO has the tallest smoke stack in the world. The idea was that the emissions would be widely dispersed if emitted at such an altitude. It didn't work quite that way, and INCO's emissions have been detected in Rhode Island but not in significant concentrations. There's been a lot of work at INCO to reduce emissions. But the amount you're talking about is tons and tons of sulfur.

Q: Were there any other major issues while you were there.

MASON: Yes, the issue of Quebec's place in Canada returned. Quebec had never gotten over the repatriation of the constitution done without their consent. Mulroney, an Irish Quebecer, took office saying, "We're going to bring Quebec back into the fold, and we're going to make this right." He attempted to do so. His Government worked up an agreement to correct the situation, and it failed. And a subsequent attempt to correct that also failed spectacularly. So the net constitutional situation was left worse.

The first attempt at a solution was called the Meech Lake Agreement because the negotiations were held at the Prime Minister's summer house on Meech Lake. The second attempt was made at Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island. This latter effort came closest to success. But it failed badly in a national referendum. People voted against it for several reasons. One, because it was chance to repudiate the politicians and the "political class." For various reasons, Canadians were sick and tired of the Quebec issue, and they were tired of the Mulroney government. Quebecers voted against it because they thought it didn't do enough for them. The other parts of Canada voted against because they thought it did too much for Quebec. The net result of all this was to underscore and sharpen the deep difference in Quebec and the rest of Canada. Quebec sees Canada as a partnership between Quebec while the rest of Canada sees all provinces as being equal. Quebec is further threatened by demography -- the other parts of Canada are growing more rapidly than Quebec and apparently will continue to do so. Furthermore fully one-third of Canadians are neither of Quebec origin nor of English origin, and they don't see Canada through the prism of its origins. The Quebec issue has sharpened, and indeed, there is now a national party, the Bloc Québécois, which advocates independence, as well as a provincial party, the Parti Québécois, which is going to run in the next Quebec election next year on a platform of independence. Their scenario is first to win the provincial election and then, within a year, to hold a provincial referendum on independence in Quebec.

Q: When you were there, you were seeing this movement and as an outsider looking at this, Quebecers can call wolf so many times and my guess is that sometime they will have a separate nation. You just can't keep playing that game all the time. But I would think it would be almost politically dynamite for anybody in our embassy to do what you normally would do, and that would be say, "All right, let's say Quebec goes. Here is how things might be." But the fact that Washington leaks, the American embassy is looking at Canada as maybe splitting up. Did you find yourself under constraints about talking about this problem?

MASON: Yes and no. There was a certain amount of anxiety that we could add to it if we

prepared contingency plans. But a lot of reporting and analysis has been done on this over the years, and a National Intelligence Estimate was done in 1990. I did the first draft.

Q: Yes, but it could be embarrassing. This thing could be used, it could cause a flurry.

MASON: I don't think it would cause much flurry in reality, but we never did do any contingency planning. It's time to start.

Q: Did you have any problems with groups either in Canada, or in the United States, sounding off about, "Well, if Quebec goes, we'll join the United States."

MASON: There is a sizeable element of the population of Canada which has some degree of interest in joining the United States. If the question is, are you inclined to join the United States, 20% of Canadians will say yes. If ask that question in a hard edge group, 5% will say yes. But 5% is, of 30 million people, is still a real number. Oddly enough, the highest percentage in favor is in Ontario.

Q: Yes, I would think this would be the last place.

MASON: You would have thought the sentiment for joining would be strongest in the West, but the least interest is in British Columbia. And there is a fair number of Quebecers that wouldn't mind.

Q: You left there in 1990?

MASON: Yes.

RICHARD L. STOCKMAN
Communications
Ottawa (1986-1987)

Richard Stockman was born in 1940 in Kansas City, Missouri. He went to seminary at Cape Girardeau in Missouri, and was then drafted into the U.S. Army in 1963, where he spent most of his tour in Germany. Mr. Stockman entered the Foreign Service in 1966 as a communications specialist. He served in Brazil, Honduras, Singapore, Togo, Switzerland, Ireland, Saudi Arabia, Canada, and the Soviet Union. Mr. Stockman was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993.

Q: Then you came back to the Department for a little while and then off to Ottawa. Is that right?

STOCKMAN: Right.

Q: And you were in Ottawa for a relatively short time.

STOCKMAN: Yes. That was not by design or planning. It was a job opportunity that developed my last year in the Department and I could not pass it up. It was a very unique operation going on there. Ottawa is a particular kind of assignment. I assume in the past most of the ambassadors have been political appointees. That speaks for itself. The relationship with the President is always a very close one. So in terms of a standard State Department assignment it is not that. It can be a tough one. Every agency in the Federal phone directory in Washington DC, I think, is up there. A lot of work goes on. There are numerous visitors. It is a very different kind of assignment.

Anyway the assignment lasted barely a year. I became ill and had to return to the States for treatment for cancer and spent a full year doing that in Kansas City, my home place of residence. At the end of that period I had had a lot of time to think about all these things and felt very strongly that maybe things like this happen for a reason and perhaps it would be in my best interest to retire. We had planned to do that anyway after a four year assignment in Ottawa, but it was curtailed by about three years.

So consequently when I started getting some phone calls from Washington from my friends in communications, I didn't exactly know why in the beginning, this was in late 1991 and early part of 1992. Slowly but surely the mystery became revealed and I applied for the retired annuitant program that I am now in.

JAMES P. THURBER, JR.
Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Ottawa (1986-1990)

James Thurber was born in Milton, Massachusetts. He graduated from Stanford University in 1950 and joined the USIS in 1967. He served in Tanzania, Malawi, Nigeria, Pakistan, Canada, and Washington, DC. Mr. Thurber was interviewed by Emily Thurber in 1990.

THURBER: Nothing that happened during my subsequent posting to Canada and visits by Ronald Reagan led me to change my mind. The Canadian assignment was my final assignment in USIA and a most enjoyable climax to my career.

Actually, in the winter of 1985-86, I knew that my three years as Area Director would be up in the summer of '86 and bid on the post of PAO Pretoria. Both my wife and I felt this would probably be one of the most interesting and exciting posts to go to, and would give us a real seat in history being made as the blacks assumed more and more power, or tried to assume more and more power in South Africa.

I was paneled for the job by Personnel and selected, and my name went forward to Director Wick on a list of other PAO appointments. It sat on his desk for several weeks and the list came back with my name crossed out and Gene Friedmann's put in its place.

Personnel called me up, the Director of Foreign Service Personnel called, and said that Friedmann had written a letter to the Director and asked for the position, and the Director had given it to him without a by-your-leave to Personnel.

I was about ready to take up the cudgels myself on this when Barry Fulton, the Director of Foreign Service Personnel, said to forget it, there was no way I would change the Director's mind; that the Director had promised Friedmann a favor, and here it was, and how would I like to go to Ottawa as PAO for Canada, a most appealing suggestion and one we accepted quickly.

Not only did I know a little bit about Canada and liked what I knew, it also kept us close to the United States and given the age and physical condition of my wife's mother, this was important to us, and the fact that we wanted to be near to our children, particularly our daughter, who was having some problems that we felt we could help her out with.

South Africa would have been a good assignment, but it would have been a long way away and would have required a great deal of travel, frequent travel back and forth, so we accepted Canada and undertook preparations for this assignment.

This was the first post in my entire USIA career that had a language requirement, and the PAO in Ottawa was supposed to have a 3-3 knowledge of French, because Canada was a bilingual country and he would have frequent use, so I was told, for the language.

We diligently set about to learn French. I am a very poor language student. I have a very poor ear for languages and, while I started early in the year with an hour of French language training every morning and then in April, went into full-time French at a so-so school, not the Foreign Service Institute, which I wish I had been at, the time for our departure came around late July and I still was barely above a 2-2, 2 plus, something like that, level.

The Agency, with a great deal of reluctance and finger pointing and so forth and making me feel extremely guilty, gave me a waiver and sent me off to Canada. When I got there and after three years in the post, what a farce the requirement was.

Unless you spoke French like a native, the Canadians you were working with, even those from Quebec, spoke English better than you spoke French and the minute you opened your mouth in French, they would come right back in English.

I suspect that there were two or three times in my entire career in Canada that I really needed the French, and this would have been for asking directions on how to get some place, and that required minimal French.

When we got to Canada, we continued French, an hour a day, every morning. We had a teacher come to the house for two years and, in that two years, whatever French I had almost disappeared, and we dropped the program.

I did, at the same time, persuade the Agency to drop the requirements to 2-2 and, if I had my druthers, which I tried to do and didn't succeed, I would cut it to the courtesy level. What is the

ruling now is that if you get a PAO for the post who is well versed in everything but language and there isn't time to give him language, send him to the post. It is not a controlling factor.

Also during the pre-departure time, I took a one-week program at the Foreign Service Institute, their area studies program on Canada. This was very well done, the best of any of the area studies programs I've attended, and I came out of it with a much better knowledge of what I was going to face when I got to Ottawa and the general attitudes in Canada and the problems in Canada relating to the United States.

I also talked with quite a few people in Washington in my briefings before I went there, and was very puzzled by much of the briefings I received. Here was the world's second largest country, though only 25 million people, but sitting on our northern border and nobody in the NSC or the State Department, outside of a couple of exceptions, or the White House or USIA, in that fact, were much concerned or very much interested in Canada.

It's there; it's our friend; it cooperates with us; we can't really be bothered about it. This attitude - this was the beginning of what I found the minute I got there to Canada, a general ignorance in the United States about Canada, a general lack of appreciation for Canada, a general lack of interest, and the feeling in the U.S. government that it wasn't important.

Oh, it's important when we want to run cruise missile tests or it's important when our plane crashes at one of the air bases up there, but the rest of the time, forget it. Canada is there. It will always be there. It will always be our friend; and, we don't have to do much about it. How terribly wrong the U.S. government is on this attitude.

Canada is not in our pocket. By reasons of geography and size, it is forced against its wishes to go along with many things we're doing, but if you look at the recent history, and I predict this is going to continue, we're going to have more and more problems with Canada, particularly as the conservative government of Brian Mulroney is voted out of office and we get a more liberal government up there, or even the socialist government, as just voted in, in Ontario.

The lack of interest in Canada is also coupled with a feeling of arrogance and "We'll tell you how to run your country" attitude that one sees in Washington. It's mind boggling to look at some of the cables and the instructions to our ambassador to go into the Canadian government and tell them, "We want them to do this," and "You will do that," and so forth.

I was quite pleased to see the Canadian government objected to some of these, but, also, they did do our bidding all too often, griping about it, grumbling, and wishing they didn't have to, I guess the problem of being a small country and being one sitting next to the most powerful country in the world.

We drove up to Canada, a delightful way to get to a post, and our furniture actually beat us there and we took over the house of our predecessor. I should mention we actually flew up for a weekend on our own funds in May, saw the house and decided to keep it.

So, when we got there, it was a Wednesday afternoon, we had enough material in the car to keep

us for a couple of days. Our furniture arrived Friday, and when I went off to work Monday morning, two days later, we were settled, an unbelievably rapid move considering the Foreign Service.

The embassy was run by a really top-notch ambassador, Thomas Niles, who knew more about Canada than a lot of his predecessors ever dreamed of knowing. Tom was an economist and a lover of obscure figures. At a time when Canada and the United States were moving towards a free trade agreement, he was the perfect ambassador to have there.

He had a mousetrap mind, unbelievable. He could read a page of figures and just recite them off weeks and years later. He had an interesting attitude towards USIA. He recognized we were important, and he recognized our existence, but he never utilized us.

Tom's attitude was, "I can do anything USIA can do and can do it better. I can do better interviews. I can do better briefings with the press. I have better judgment on public relations matters, so why bother with USIA?" He almost never took our advice. He refused to write out any speeches and give them to us.

He refused to let us program him for public affairs matters and the one time we did do it, it was a disaster in that we carefully crafted, with Washington approval, a speech on security matters and U.S. foreign policy, brought together an audience in Toronto, notified the press, had a large group there, had the speech printed up, and passed out to the press, and then he got up there and ignored it and gave his own speech.

We never asked him to do it again after that. He knew we were unhappy, but he really didn't care. Outside of that, Tom ran a good embassy. It was a large embassy with a large number of other units such as the FBI, Internal Revenue Service, Customs, Immigration and so forth, there in Canada.

All of them suffered pretty much the same way I did from their home offices ignoring the importance of Canada and Canada's rights as a sovereign nation.

I knew very little about Canada personally. I'd been to Vancouver and British Columbia a bit. I had taken the train across Canada on a vacation. I had canoed in Northern Ontario and, as a child, visited Nova Scotia, but that was about the extent of it. It was all basically recreation.

I was determined to learn as much about the country as possible, starting out with extensive courtesy calls on government officials in Ottawa and then traveling out throughout the country, meeting with information, cultural, educational types in each of the cities I visited.

By the end of the three years, I had visited all ten provinces, both territories, all capitals, all major cities, and all major universities as well as media outlets and producers. We drove east to west on the ground, flew, took the train, and went north on vacation to the end of land in Canada, the northern tip of Ellesmere Island, about 500 miles south of the North Pole.

We got to know a lot of Canadians. They are probably the nicest group of people in the world.

We became real friends with them, friendships that I think will last over the years, which I can't say is the truth about any other country we served in.

The one thing I did find traveling around Canada, though, was a woeful ignorance about the United States. They knew the facts about the United States. They could cite you the dates of the Revolutionary War and the Civil War and the invasion of Canada, as they call the War of 1812 and all of that, but they really didn't understand the United States.

They didn't understand how our country worked, what our hopes and aspirations were, why we acted the way we did and so forth. This all falls under the rubric of American studies, which I found was woefully neglected in the Canadian schools at all levels.

In fact, when I got to Canada, there were three programs that could be called full-fledged American Study programs, one of which folded almost immediately after I got there, and the United States government was putting almost nothing in the way of funds into these programs.

On the other side of the border, the Canadian studies programs in the United States were flourishing. There were 72 of them going. The Canadian government put over \$2 million a year into various grants and incentives for Canadian studies, and there was a very active association of Canadian studies in the United States operating throughout the 48 states.

I decided that this was one program that I could really put some effort into and maybe make a bit of a change. Tied in with this was the fact that I quickly discovered -- in fact, I knew this before I left Washington -- there was no Fulbright Program with Canada.

Senior officers over the years had decided that Canada was our friend and we were close by, and a lot of Canadians came to the States, so there didn't need to be a Fulbright Program, and their attitudes were hardened in concrete.

So, I started in to see what I could change along this line. First of all, I took the grant money that we had, our grant program, we had about \$45,000 the first year I was there and then, thanks to Washington cutbacks in our budget, it dropped down to about \$15,000 by the time I left, but I set up a small grants program.

As a result of trips both in the United States around northern New York, where there are a lot of Canadian studies programs and in Canada, we set up this small grants program, grants in the amount of around \$500 to younger Canadian faculty members who wanted to become involved in American studies.

Grants could be used for travel to conferences, to set up a small library, to buy supplies, anything in that type, and they had to be matched. This was a very successful program. It was over-subscribed every year I was there, and I think it got some good American studies programs started.

I went around the country when I was traveling, promoting American studies, talking about them, trying to get more interest in them, and particularly worked with the fledgling American

Studies Association in Canada, giving them some money to help with their journal and their meetings and hoping for a long-term advancement of this organization.

Then, I took on the Fulbright Program. After finding out where the problems lay on establishing a Fulbright Program in Canada, I started in the summer of 1988 in Washington visiting Washington on leave, to sound out the possibilities there, found that I ran headlong into an individual called Jean Smoot, who would have no part of a Fulbright Program, as well as several other people in the E Bureau who shared her lack of interest.

The one thing I had going for me at that point was the fact that all of these people were about to depart, and depart they did during the fall of 1988. At the same time, we were inspected, and I persuaded the inspectors to include the notion of a Fulbright Program in Canada as part of their inspection report.

By December of '88, things had rapidly changed. I visited Washington and with the strong cooperation of E/AEE, Donna Culpepper and her staff, as well as Bob Gosende, the Deputy Director of E, who was most enthusiastic, we started out with the initial action for a Fulbright Program.

Bob Gosende visited us in February of 1989 and gave his strong endorsement to the program, however, with one condition, which went back to the December meeting with Donna, that the U.S. government, Donna Culpepper's office, would contribute \$200,000 for two years only, if it were matched by the Canadian government and, after that, we were on our own.

The program would not be government-financed, which was unlike any other Fulbright Program, but we would have to find other ways of financing it, which meant this would be a privately financed foundation.

That was agreeable to me, because I could see the handwriting on the wall as far as government funding was concerned and didn't want to commit myself to that limited program, so I came back to Ottawa in December and, after Bob's meeting, Bob's visit in February, and went to work with the Canadian government.

Over a period of ten, eleven months, weekly meetings with my counterparts in the Ministry of External Affairs, we produced an agreement between Canada and the United States to establish a privately funded Fulbright Program between the United States and Canada, to develop a foundation, and to hopefully start by the fall of 1991, with the first Fulbrighters moving back and forth between the two countries.

I won't go into the whole history of this. It was a fantastic jumble of bureaucracy, bureaucratic rules, errors, delays, legal problems and so forth. The net result was, though, that early in 1990, when Secretary of State Baker visited Canada, through a series of flukes, we got him and the Minister of External Affairs, Joe Clark, to sign the agreement.

We then got to work setting up a foundation, appointing the Directors, and the first meeting of the Fulbright Foundation was conducted in May of 1990, and the program was launched.

And let me give credit to Ambassador Ney, George Bush's political appointee to Ottawa. He supported the Fulbright program 100 percent and got his wealthy friends to serve on the Board. His only problem was he took complete credit for the program, saying that he did things which occurred before he was appointed Ambassador.

Part of this was selecting the Executive Director, which we did in June, to come on board in September. The files in Ottawa provide a complete history of this whole situation. It's now up to the Board of Directors and the Executive Director to raise the money necessary to run the program.

I and the Directors feel this can be done and it will be an interesting experiment, plus an idea for other Fulbright Programs who want to expand, and are feeling the pinch from government cut-backs in funding.

A couple of other points about Canada I should mention. The Agency, in late 1986, the winter of '86-'87, was conducting a series of visits to Central America by PAOs to convince them of the righteousness of the American policy towards Nicaragua and the other Central American States, and I was invited to go with four other PAOs from Europe in January of 1987.

Why I was selected, I'm not sure. I don't think anybody in Washington knew I was less than sympathetic for our policy there, but I'll tell you, the other five PAOs were very sympathetic when we went down there, but they certainly had lots of doubts when we left.

The trip, as far as convincing us of the rightness of the American cause, was a dismal failure. Nothing changed my mind at all and, in fact, some of the things I saw and the way we were treated hardened my position.

One of the problems was the fact that the military and embassy people in Nicaragua, particularly, treated us like a bunch of tourists and gave us the equivalency of declassified briefings, which were an insult, plus very damaging to trying to convince us we should change our position or at least go along with the government's policies.

The other thing I should mention were the budget cuts. The Agency, in spite of what I said as Area Director, continued to do across-the-board percentage budget cuts. This effected Canada extremely hard because of the small budget and the high administrative costs of running that post.

When I got to Ottawa, we were running a total budget of around \$1.3 million, of which around \$150,000 to \$200,000 was for programming. When I left, less than \$100,000 was available for programming and that was rapidly decreasing.

The net result was that we had more officers than we had money to keep them busy, and attempts by me to make some major adjustments, to release more money for programming and cut back on administrative costs, were refused by Washington.

I went so far as asking to shut down Vancouver as a branch post. This was rejected. The Agency wanted to hold it as an ace in the hole, in case they were ordered to shut posts, and, therefore, the money for programming just continued to decrease and decrease and decrease.

My griping to Washington got some of it reinstated, but not enough to really do any real good. This, again, reflects the lack of overall Agency planning and leadership as to the role of various posts and their importance in the world.

To continue posts like Burundi and Rwanda and similar operations and to cut back on very important operations such as Canada and to continue to have the European area by itself fund the expanded Eastern European Program, which I think is very important, rather than take it out of the whole budget and cut back in other parts of the world, is a very blind way of running an operation, a budget operation for a government world-wide agency.

In spite of that, I found the Canadian experience extremely rewarding, I guess particularly since the Fulbright Program did come to fruition while I was there and because of the attitude of Canadians and the appreciation by them, if not by anybody else, of what we were doing.

In the summer of 1990, my time was up, and my wife and I decided to return to California to our home in Los Altos, and establish our own consulting business here.

Mrs. Thurber's Comments on Canada

MRS. THURBER: This is Emmy Thurber again. I'll just add a bit about Canada. It was a wonderful post for me, mostly because it was close to the States. I was able to keep track of my mother and see the children and to keep in touch with friends on the telephone.

It was more foreign than we had imagined for a country that's so close and has the same language. I tried to take advantage of its foreign-ness by studying French and trying to meet people from Quebec. We both took French in the beginning, as Jim has probably said, and then I carried on the whole time I was there, going to the Alliance Francais the last two years.

My big activity was getting involved in the University Women's Club, which is the Canadian counterpart of the American Association of University Women. I joined because I wanted to be in a book group and became deeply involved serving as, first, head of their small groups and secondly as their program chairman.

It was kind of a laugh to have an American -- they always said Americans exert too much influence in Canada -- as program chair, but, still, I had a very good year, made lots of Canadian friends. I found them very nice and friendly people, and even though there was a gratuitous amount of anti- Americanism, I never personally ran into that.

We again spent a lot of time skiing and learned to cross country ski, improved our down hill skiing, learned to skate again after many, many years, and took advantage of the winter. Otherwise, you would have spent your time indoors just complaining, so we welcomed the advent of snow, and we also traveled extensively.

I went with Jim on almost every trip and went on calls with him, which raised some eyebrows, I remember, with the Consul General in Quebec. He didn't think that was such a great idea, but I felt that I was able to add some substance, and it certainly contributed to my understanding and appreciation of Canada, and my ability to represent our own country well.

We did lots and lots of entertaining. We were called the most "entertaining" couple at the embassy, beyond the DCM and the ambassador. This time, I did all the cooking and had just a cleaning woman come and help, who would do some of the simple cooking and do the clean up. So, it was really a lot of work, but we made some good friends and found the Canadians much jollier and friendlier than I think our predecessor had found them.

I don't know if Jim has mentioned how cold the embassy was. We, who had lived only in developing countries, were quite shocked to see how little cooperative spirit there was in the American embassy, partly because our first ambassador's wife was not eager to play a supportive role, but I think, in general, it was probably the way it is in Europe where people are just expected to go their own way, and we really missed that.

Also, we didn't have much of a diplomatic life. There are so many embassies that, even though Jim was moderately high up on the diplomatic list, we did not get many invitations, although, towards the end, we got some because of the people I had met through the various women's groups. Still, we didn't miss that because our main contacts were Canadian and those were very satisfying.

ERIC J. BOSWELL
Administrative Counselor
Ottawa (1987-1990)

Eric J. Boswell was born in Italy in 1945. After receiving his bachelor's degree from Stanford University in 1970 he served in the US Army from 1967-1969. His career has included positions in Dakar, Quebec, Beirut, Amman, and Ottawa. He was interviewed by Edward Dillery in November 1998.

BOSWELL: That takes us to 1987 at which time I was transferred to embassy Ottawa, my second tour in Canada. I had served in Quebec many years before. I was transferred to Ottawa as minister counselor, as it turned out, working for Ambassador Tom Niles and DCM Dwight Mason. It was a home leave and transfer from Amman, another overseas tour, and a senior position. I think I had been promoted to the senior Foreign Service by that time. I think I was promoted while I was in Jordan and [since December 1985 was an] FEOC.

I went to Ottawa and again while the important work in Ottawa didn't involve security, it was more a big management job involving a large embassy and a lot of consulates. We were also in the process of acquiring a new embassy. Much of the tour was spent in an unsuccessful search for the right kind of property. The chancery in Ottawa was located directly across the street from

the Parliament Hill. Essentially the fourth side of Parliament Square happened to be the American side and the Canadians, not unnaturally, wanted to get it back.

There had been a 30 year process of trying to find a new chancery which had culminated I think in 1985 or so with the selection of a site in downtown Ottawa. It was more than the selection of the site, it was the selection of the site and the design of the building. In other words a couple of million dollars had been spent already but it was a downtown site with no setback. The first thing the new assistant secretary for Diplomatic Security at the time, Bob Lamb, would have had to do is waived the brand new Inman standards for this embassy. Not surprisingly he wasn't ready to do that even in the lowest of all low threat posts, embassy Ottawa.

That sent us all back to the drawing board to the great shock of the Canadians. We had to start over in a search for a new embassy that went on for many years including some false starts. We agreed on an embassy site out of town and then at my urging actually, Tom Niles reneged and told the Canadians that we wouldn't take it. It simply wasn't a good enough site. It wasn't prestigious enough. It met all the security standards but it just wasn't a good site for a U.S. embassy, out in a field in a suburb.

Ultimately, after I left Ottawa, a new site was selected. It was the site of the old agreed site and setback was waived given the very, very low threat post. It is a very prestigious site right off Parliament Hill, an excellent site, but without setback. Nevertheless there was incorporated into the design of the building a lot of the security features and minimal windows and things like that. The building was designed and approved but it is a little bit ironic that it was only years later that the Department felt that it could approve an embassy on that site. That embassy is under construction now and I think it is going to be finished this summer. It is a beautiful new embassy.

I think if we had been going through site selection now in the wake of the Nairobi and Tanzania bombings, that site would never be built. As assistant secretary I signed some of the waivers for it. Not the setback waiver but a couple of other little waivers that had to be done late in the design phase. I do think that it is the kind of place and the kind of building that we can build without as much of a setback as we want though I have to tell you that I'd think about it awfully hard now in light of what we've seen.

Q: When we get to the point of your assistant secretaryship I'm going to really grill you on things like the recent bombings and the very interesting report by the accountability review board, but we'll do that later.

BOSWELL: I'll look forward to talking about that later in this case. There we are in Ottawa where I spent three years as administrative counselor, an extremely enjoyable tour. I had some personal problems there. My marriage was falling apart but the tour itself was very good. I worked for Tom Niles, a superb ambassador, and Dwight Mason, a superb DCM. I had a very good relationship with both of them.

Tom was eventually replaced by Ambassador Ed Ney, a political appointee. He was an advertising whiz, former head of Burson and Marsteller, a major New York advertising firm and very much a friend of George Bush. He was an absolutely wonderful man. I liked him a lot. On

substance of course he was nowhere near Tom Niles but on political instincts he was very strong. He was a very, very smart guy who took administration seriously and supported me in what I did. I liked the tour.

Q: You said your ambassador and DCM were superb, what qualities does that mean they had?

BOSWELL: I'm referring mostly to their management skills. They both paid a lot of attention to management. Dwight Mason of course had come out of the M area. Though he was a political officer his own predilections and interests were management to a large degree. They very much supported their administrative officer. It was a little bit different from what I'd seen in my previous posts. We instituted a certain number of changes in allowances, housing, and in education policy. We did a lot of work in supporting the consulates particularly in getting new buildings for the consulate in Vancouver and the consulate in Montreal, both large consulates. I always felt that I could always count on both my ambassador and my DCM in that regard, and I could. They were very, very supportive and interested in my work without looking over my shoulder too much. They did what every good manager does which is to empower his or her subordinates and I felt good about that.

Q: One more question about that is, with all the consulates, as the administrative minister counselor, what kind of different challenge did they present?

BOSWELL: One is the challenge of distance. Almost all of those places, or the largest ones, have their own administrative officers and I was the reviewing officer for those people. Canada is an enormous country. It is several thousand miles from one end to the other, from Halifax to Vancouver, and it was hard to stay on top of what was going on in the consulates. The consulates were huge. Toronto and Montreal were as large as the embassy I think. They had large consular operations with huge visa crowd control kinds of problems that the embassy did not have. There were big management issues in each of those and it was hard to stay in touch. I should have probably spent more time on the road than I did. That was one big challenge.

I suppose the other biggest challenge was that since they were large consulates they felt like running their own show, like any constituent post always feels like doing. They wanted their own budget and while this never became a real point of contention we had to keep them happy without micro managing them, so that was a balancing act.

Q: You got your turn at what the ambassador did for you.

BOSWELL: That's right. We had mixed success I think. We had an inspection just before I left Ottawa. It was an extremely good inspection report on every post in Canada including embassy Ottawa, including from the administrative side, except for one and that was consulate Montreal. There were serious problems involving the consul general; problems of management style and problems of possible conflict of interest. That consul general eventually had to retire before the end of his tour. We just flat missed it and Montreal isn't that far away. We missed it in my three years. I had been to Montreal a couple of times and so had the ambassador and the DCM and we just didn't pick up just how bad it really was. It seemed like a lot of people just held their fire until the inspectors came and then they really did it. They were right basically. I think they were

proved right. That was a flaw in an otherwise good performance.

Q: I would take it from that that you think inspections are a good idea?

BOSWELL: I emphatically think that inspections are a good idea. In fact, I now work for a UN agency where the whole inspection function is something new and strange, and foreign and evil. UN reform which is being pressed by the United States among others includes establishment of inspection functions in UN agencies. There is a brand new inspector general after years of U.S. pressure, a brand new and extremely capable inspector general at the UN in New York. My agency, the Pan American Health Organization has no inspection function and neither does the World Health Organization which is the parent. These organizations have doctors who don't believe that there is any inspector in the world who is competent to tell them how to do their work.

I miss it. I miss having inspectors. They perform an extremely valuable function as enervating and nerve-racking and irritating as they can be. You want inspections to be good of course and above all you want them to be there, you want to have them. They are a very, very important counterpoint and an outside look as well.

Q: One last question on Canada and that was having served in both Quebec and Ottawa, what differences did you see between the two communities?

BOSWELL: It was very easy to see the differences. I had a long-standing bet with two Anglo-Canadian friends, journalists, in Ottawa that Quebec would be independent by the turn of the century. I think I am going to lose the bet and I think they've forgotten about it. The stakes were very high, dinner at Maxim's in Paris including airfare. I think I am going to lose the bet and I'm very glad that I am. I think I was just wrong in terms of timing.

I think in the end Quebec will be independent or some form of independence that is a lot more than what they have now. I think it is largely because English Canada doesn't get it. They just flat don't get it. They don't get what Quebec nationalism is. They don't get what Quebec sympathies are. They don't get what Quebecers really want. In fact I kept hearing whenever I was in Anglo Canada, "What on earth do those guys really want?" Listen, they are the co-founding people and you've lived with them for many, many decades. If you can't figure out what they want there is something missing in your own attitudinal makeup.

I think that more than even Quebec nationalism per se, just the lack of response from English Canada is going to ultimately break apart that kind and gentle giant to our north. It will injure all of us including Canada when that happens though not greatly. Some form of Canada will continue and Quebec is certainly very viable as an independent country but I think it is a wonderful country as it is now and it's a shame to break it up.

Q: What happens to the maritime provinces in that situation?

BOSWELL: As everybody knows the maritime provinces are not particularly prosperous. They benefit greatly from their inclusion in Canada. They get a lot of money from the feds that they

would not otherwise have. Some are better off than others. There are some that would be absolute basket cases, notably Newfoundland though Newfoundland has now acquired offshore oil and gas and may be in a somewhat better position to take care of itself.

I don't know what would happen to those. Presumably they would remain in some sort of divided Canada. It is conceivable that they could split into province sized bites and some may even want to associate with the United States. I have my doubts about the U.S. Senate agreeing to any of these folks associating with the United States. The closest equivalent would be statehood for the District of Columbia which would mean absolutely certainly two Democratic senators and one Democratic congressman forever and I think the senate would have a little trouble with that. The same thing for Canadian provinces. They are far more progressive social democratic governments and orientation, more on the European mode than we have. Even the prairie provinces are far more liberal than most U.S. states.

Q: Much more than the western U.S. states.

BOSWELL: And much more than the western U.S. states including the blue-eyed sheiks in Alberta, the oil sheiks who are very conservative by Canadian standards but quite liberal by western U.S. standards. They are used to a different level of government involvement in their lives and they want to keep it going.

Q: With that maritime thing, the geography escapes me, would it create kind of a West Pakistan, East Pakistan kind of thing?

BOSWELL: Yes it would. Quebec separates the two halves of Canada and if you take Quebec out you have a big hole there that is several hundred miles across. Yes, they would be a West Pakistan, East Pakistan. Obviously they would work out some kind of arrangement but it would create a physical separation. Canada looks strange geographically. It is this enormous land mass but most of the population is clustered within a couple of hundred miles of the U.S. border. It is strung out horizontally so all access to the east has to go through Quebec, or the west.

Q: It is going to be very interesting no matter what, I'm sure.

BOSWELL: Whatever is worked out, and as I said I think it will be some form of separation, it will include ways to keep those two sides of Canada whole, they will try.

Q: What about Canadian's attitudes toward the United States?

BOSWELL: Again I would sort of separate Canadian into several parts because there is no monolithic Canadian attitude to the United States. Western Canada, that is British Columbia, looks very much to the Pacific Rim including Washington, Oregon and California as part of its sort of sphere of interest if you like, and sort of the Asian countries. British Columbia has always been sort of across the Rockies and in its own world. The plain states, even though as I mentioned before they differ somewhat in terms of attitude from the American west, are also very like the American west. They are cowboy, ranching, oil kinds of states and I think they feel very close to the United States. They sound like Americans. Quebec is very close to the United

States. The Quebecers feel the Americans feel more sympathetic to them in terms of their language thing but also don't feel threatened by America. America is separate.

It is Ontario where the bulk of the Canadian population is, where there is a certain amount of wariness of the United States, of being the mouse sleeping next to the elephant with the mouse being Ontario and the elephant being the United States; a term that Trudeau used. There is some feeling that, there is concern about being enveloped by the U.S. culture. It is where all the concern about the Canadian versions of Time Magazine and Newsweek taking over, and American TV programming taking over, and American attitudes taking over.

Many of my friends from Ontario when they discovered that I was being transferred back to Washington rushed to express their sympathies because they were sure that living in Washington I would have to go around fully armed at all time. They had this strange, a little bit strange, I don't want to make them sound unsophisticated because they are not unsophisticated but there is this wariness of us. Quebecers don't have that. It is a very striking thing. I occasionally found even a little anti-American sentiment where the kids in school would sometimes get a little harassed about being Americans. It was nothing remotely serious and not enough to upset them but it would happen from time to time.

ROBERT J. KOTT
Consul General
Calgary (1988-1991)

Mr. Kott was born and raised in New York City. He earned degrees from St. John's University in New York City and from the University of Oregon. After service with the Peace Corps in India, Mr. Kott joined the Foreign Service in 1971. An African specialist, Mr. Kott served in, Togo and Cameroon as Economic and Political Officer and in Malawi and Senegal as Deputy Chief of Mission. He also served in Indonesia and Canada. Mr. Kott was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: Today is February 9, 2001. I think where we broke off last time a few months ago, we have gotten you through the Canadian Defense College and in the summer of 1988 you went to Calgary as Consul General, Consular Officer. Tell us about that assignment, what did it entail, what sort of staff did you have, what were your major preoccupations?

KOTT: It was great fun. Probably the best assignment I ever had. Consul General is probably the most fun job in the Foreign Service, I think, having been a DCM twice I think I have a good basis of comparison. You have all the fun and very few of the problems that you have as being a DCM. Calgary was one of six American Consulates General in Canada at the time, down from probably double that number a few years earlier. Canadians seem to go on a two to one ratio, they seem to have about twice as many Consulates in the U.S. at any one time as we have in Canada. The last time I looked they had 12 in the U.S., we had six in Canada. Of course they pride themselves on knowing an awful lot more about us than we know about them, which is

perhaps true at a certain level, but not necessarily at a serious level. Anyway, it was great fun.

I was there for three years, I arrived just after the Calgary Winter Olympics. My predecessor was going to be sure to stay for that, of course, can't blame him. But the spirit of the town was and the good will and the spirit of volunteerism was very much in evidence, and people were just on a real high. So it was a great time to arrive there. The Consulate General was located in an office building on something like the 10th floor and it overlooked Olympic Square where the medal ceremonies were held. So it was very centrally located, right downtown. A very manageable-size city, in those days about 600,000 people, give or take a few. Not a capital of the province. The capital of Alberta province is Edmonton. But Calgary is certainly the commercial and business center, probably the most important city in Canada arguably between Toronto and Vancouver.

The Consulate in Calgary, in those days at least, was responsible for the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan and Manitoba, the three prairie-provinces, if you will, and the Northwest Territories which had subsequently been re-divided up, but in my days it was a very large chunk of snow and very few people. That said, probably that piece of land mass, that consisted of Calgary Consulate, probably would have been, if it had been an independent nation something like the U.S.' 12th or 15th largest trading partner. An awful lot of trade going back and forth in agricultural products, gas and oil of course, lot of familial ties, lots of Americans living in the consular district. I think more Americans living in that consular district than in any other consular district that is not headed by an Embassy. It was the largest consular district in the world, physically outside of an Embassy. Obviously the one in the former Soviet Union, Moscow, would have had a larger land mass. After that I think it was Calgary, in land mass. In terms of numbers of Americans, if I am not mistaken I think it was probably more Americans in that consular district than anywhere else in the world. But I stand to be corrected on that, if my memory doesn't serve me correctly. But there was an awful lot of Americans. A lot of dual citizens. Happily Canadians for the most part didn't need visas so while the staffing of the Consulate was largely on the consular side and handling that function it wasn't a lot of non-immigrant visa cases, at least not for Canadians. For third country nationals it was, but Canadians by and large didn't need non-immigrant visas.

We had a staff of as I recall six American officers, myself as Consul General, three other American officers, all of whom had consular commissions but at least under my managerial style all had ancillary duties. We divided up the functions amongst them. My deputy did the political work that I chose not to do. One of the other Vice Consuls did the economic reporting such as it was except for petroleum which I reserved for myself and the other Vice Consul did administrative work. In addition there was an American Secretary/Communicator to handle the classified traffic and we had a Foreign Commercial Service Officer there in our suite as well. I think that totaled six Americans. I think we had about 20 local staff. The issues of the day: Calgary, clearly not only the American presence but the energy center of Canada and probably arguably one of the leading, some would say the third most important, energy center in the world. The U.S. imports a lot of crude, a diminishing amount as the resources diminish in Canada, crude oil from Canada, but increasing amounts of natural gas. All the major American firms, the sisters if you will, are represented in Canada, incorporated in Canada of course as Canadian entities. So that was a major part of the portfolio.

On the political side, because of the structure of the Canadian confederation, the provinces have an inordinate amount of power, relative to the power that states in our federation have, in the U.S. vis-à-vis the central government. So reporting on the political developments within the three provinces to which I was accredited, much less so then Northwestern Territories, as that was a separate sort of political entity and not a very important one at the time, was rather significant. Especially given what was happening in Canada at the time. That was, the favorite indoor sport of Canadians is not really hockey, it's constitution making and what have you. The so-called Meech-Lake debate. An accord that was struck at the federal level with the provinces, which was multifaceted, very complex, I won't go into all the details here, it had a lot to do with Quebec and the demands that Quebec was placing on the central government as well as the other provinces, and Alberta being at the other end of the spectrum, although one might say very much in league with Quebec because they both shared this sort of strong sense of provincialism, provincial rights vis-a-vis states rights in this country. Reporting on this political development over the years as it dragged out, was rather significant. And Ottawa I think was appreciative of that, as was Washington.

Q: Did you report to the Embassy in Ottawa or Washington or both?

KOTT: Both. We were not constrained to send our reports to Ottawa first for approval, if you will. We had a lot of autonomy. In fact that was one of the first questions I asked, of course, before going to Calgary, "Did we have authority to send directly to Washington?" The answer was, "Yes." And we did a fair amount of reporting. It was lot of fun. It was easy to have access, obviously. Very little was highly classified. Very rarely did we send anything higher than confidential. And in fact in those days we were allowed to send confidential dispatches in the Canadian post. There was some agreement between Washington and Ottawa that allowed us to use Canadian post to send what in the old days might have been an airgram to Washington or to Ottawa or circulated around to the Consulates, what have you. We used confidential to protect sources. Perhaps a misuse, but nevertheless, typical of the Foreign Service I suppose. Canadians were good friends and there was more sharing than there was anything else.

Q: Let me ask you a little bit about how you managed to do this job and I guess my question relates to travel. To what extent did you get to Ottawa to the Embassy? Was there much coordination, much meetings that took place?

KOTT: No, not really. It was all done by phone and by fax. We didn't use e-mail in those days. Mostly telephone. We went in the three years that I was in Calgary I think we might have had two meetings of Consuls General in the Embassy. During my first year there '88 to '89, Tim Niles was the Ambassador. He was finishing up three of four years in Canada and really didn't feel as though he had a need to deal with his Consuls General as much. He was succeeded by a political appointee under George Bush, named Ed Ney. A neophyte to diplomacy per se, but I thought a rather effective Ambassador. Certainly one could argue that the Canadian establishment, both political and I think even the bureaucratic at least in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was just as pleased to have a political appointee who they thought, and I think correctly, had access to the President. He had a very good relationship with the Prime Minister of the day, Brian Mulroney, with the Deputy Prime Minister, Don Mazankowski and the ministers in general, as I think the Embassy enjoyed a very good access from what I could see and tell to the

establishment in Ottawa. Ed Ney was, again I am viewing this from afar, but I think he was very effective, he had access, he was able to deliver the messages that we needed delivered and keeping the Canadians in tune with Washington desires, and delivering the Canadian message back to Washington. I think he was a very effective Ambassador.

Q: Did he travel out to your Consular District some?

KOTT: He did, at least twice if not three times in two years that we overlapped. And as I said he had his Consuls General come into Ottawa at last once a year. He had very good deputies working for him in Ottawa and properly delegated to them and to his very effective counselors in the Embassy. I mean, this is a senior Embassy, let's face it. I think virtually all of the sections were headed by senior officers, with Counselor or Minister Counselor title. And we had lots of interplay, it would be on the phone, or faxing back and forth between the Economic Counselor on my petroleum matters, energy matters, with the Political Counselor on subject such as Meech Lake and the political parties and elections and what have you. And we did go through a national election when I was there, and then any a number of provincial elections that we reported on. And our reporting was valued, as was the reporting of all the Consulates.

Q: Who did you report to in the Embassy? Who was considered your supervisor?

KOTT: My supervisor was clearly the DCM. He supervised all the Consuls General. On the day-to-day basis we were free to deal with virtually anybody we felt we had a need to. I was in frequent contact with the petroleum reporting officer for example, with the Political Counselor and with his staff. Good Embassy at the time, well staffed.

Q: How did you manage to cover this big consular district? You said that Calgary is not even the capital of the province even though it may be the most important city in western Canada to Vancouver.

KOTT: By buying tickets in advance and staying over Saturday night. We had very small travel budget. I think it came to something like 1,000 dollars a quarter, and I made a pledge to myself when I got to Calgary that I was going to visit my parish, if you will, at last the other two provinces plus the capital of Alberta in Edmonton, at least once a quarter. And that was tough to carry out on that stringent a budget. Because the distances are vast and if you chose to drive, you waste an awful lot of time, at least if you are going to Saskatchewan and Manitoba, it would be a full day to Winnipeg, a 12-hour day of driving. So I flew, but I did it on the cheap, as I said I bought my tickets in advance, I stayed over on a Saturday night and I was able to minimize the prices. Canadian air fares were kind of high at the time. And I was able to maintain the standard which I set for myself, which was visiting the parish once a quarter. I would go out, I would spend a day or two in Regina, capital of Saskatchewan and usually two working days in Winnipeg, capital of Manitoba. We used to have Consulate in Winnipeg and it was closed a year or so, I am guessing, maybe two years before I got to Calgary. Needless the say that Winnipeggers weren't delighted at that development. So I felt it was a part of my job to sway them and to sooth their feelings, ruffled feathers, that we were maintaining our interest and we did have bona fide interest there, especially commercial interest. So I made sure I visited the right people on every visit.

Q: Don't I recall dimly that a former Consul General in Winnipeg used to go back, maybe still does, and have a 4th of July celebration, P.J. Mullin? Does that ring a bell?

KOTT: It does, it does, vaguely. I don't think I've met Mullin but I think I may have heard that story.

Q: When you would go to say Winnipeg, would somebody there make arrangements for you or would you do it by phone in advance? You didn't have a local delegate?

KOTT: No, very easy to do it because all of these provincial governments have their protocol offices and they take their jobs pretty seriously. And they'll help you to the extent that you want them to help arrange appointments. Basically we had a very informal arrangement. Very hand-in-glove. I would officially notify them that I was coming, from the protocol aspects, but in essence more often than not they would agree that I could make my own appointments, and if I had trouble along the way I could rely on them to try to help me out. Access was very easy. To get to see ministers of the provincial governments and to even see the Premier, and I didn't want to abuse that, necessarily see him on a schedule every three months but when I needed to, there was no problem getting appointments. You could see judicial officials, you could see military authorities, police authorities, and that was all part of any Foreign Service Officer's job, to do that. Winnipeg for example was the home of Canadian Air Force, such as it is. Regina has the home of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. It was necessary to touch base with all of these institutions occasionally, the newspapers, the universities, and that was the job. That was the fun part of the job actually.

Q: So you kept in touch with police, law enforcement and military? As well as all the politicians?

KOTT: Completely. Across the board. Absolutely. On the military side it was more protocol than anything else because, let's face it, that would have been run out of Ottawa, with Defense Attachés. But in terms of dropping in on them, as a matter of protocol and good taste, sure.

Q: And how about Northwest Territories?

KOTT: Went up there once. The budget just didn't allow for it. It was very expensive and very far removed. And given the fact that the population in those days was only about 75,000 in all of the Northwest Territories, with the capital Yellowknife perhaps only having five or ten thousand people you just couldn't really justify it. There was very little to report on at that particular point in time and it could be done from afar.

Q: What about transit, border issues, with the northern tier American states? This would be - what? - North Dakota?

KOTT: North Dakota and to a lesser extent Minnesota. North Dakota with Manitoba and Saskatchewan, and Montana - Saskatchewan and Alberta. Generally very good relations. The Governors of those states and the Premiers of Canadian provinces would meet periodically. I was not invited to attend those meetings. I don't know if there was a history to that or not, we just left

it at that. I had personally very good relations with the then Governor, now deceased, sorry to say of Montana, who came up to Calgary. Actually his roots were in Calgary, his family emigrated to Montana number of years ago, so he was sort of half Canadian, half American, Stan Stevens. And the Governor in fact, after we met once, decided that he wanted to open up a Montana Trade Office in Alberta. We worked very closely with him and in fact we welcomed his representative to set up shop right in the Consulate on a temporary basis, and of course with Washington's and Ottawa's approval. Just to help them out till they got sorted out and got started. So we had a very hand-in-glove relationship with the then Governor and the staff in Montana. As I said before, the amount of the two-way trade, the amount of familial ties, the great number of familial ties were staggering. Largely self regulating, they didn't need governments to get in the way, but occasionally issues came up, as you might imagine, trade irritants, they usually went to Washington and Ottawa for resolution. We would report on them, but we usually didn't wind up doing the negotiating.

Q: And there were I suppose some environmental issues or ... I remember something called the Garrison diversion in North Dakota?

KOTT: That actually I think was an active issue much more so prior to my arrival, because I read the file in preparing to go out to Calgary and when I got to Calgary, but I must say, happily it didn't really rear its ugly head very much when I was there. But there were other issues.

Q: In a previous incarnation, in must have been 1981 or 1980, I actually conducted an interview with Canadians and the Department of Interior and the people from North Dakota, to talk about the issues involved. The Canadians were very upset about the plans at that time. They really wanted to make sure that their interests were considered.

KOTT: The whole relationship is filled with so many clichés, you know, the elephant and the grass and the mouse, the worlds' longest undefended cliché as I like to call it. The Canadians are very sensitive to being trampled upon and their sovereignty, protection of their sovereignty and their cultural identity especially is important to them. Let's face it, they are bombarded by the American media. Whether is the four or five major TV networks, the printed media, Time magazine what have you. In many ways without any disparagement to the Canadians, they can be viewed upon almost as an appendage to American culture. But of course they reject that, and rightly so. They have their own very deep rooted culture. Canada is first of all a bi-lingual country, officially, one of two in the world, the other one, I think we talked about before, I served in, Cameroon. With traditions that stretch back to France and to the United Kingdom, and the loyalist tradition, I mean the Queen of England, when she comes to Canada is the Queen of Canada. So their loyalty is to Her Majesty and not to Uncle Sam. And they are very persnickety about that. They like Americans, generally, but they don't want to be Americans. Don't ever suggest that they should be the 51st state of something like that, because it's just never going to happen. Canada's Canada, and after you are there a few weeks, a few months, you understand that it is not America, even though you can easily fall into that trap of thinking it is. Because everything around is so American-ish, if you will, the cars they drive, the media, the TV, what have you.

Q: You were there before and after NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement)?

KOTT: It was happening when I was in Kingston, the debate was very heavy when I was in Kingston, in Canadian Defense College and I can't remember chronologically if it had been put into affect before I got to Calgary, I think it did. And a part of our job, certainly in the public dimension of the job, the speechifying, what have you, the little bit that I did, was trying to sell that thing in terms of... not in terms of de facto, de jure passage in the legislature, that was done, but just setting it in terms of public relations effort, to try to convince Canadians that it was in their interest as much as it was in our interest to have freer trade. Happily in the western part of Canada I didn't have much of a struggle. The Westerners were very much pro-free trade, they saw the benefits. It was really the center-Canadians, the Ontario crowd for the most part, and eastern, the Atlantic Canadians, who were more anti-NAFTA than the West.

Q: To what extent were Canadians thinking in terms of the hemisphere, in terms of Mexico, as well as Central and South American in economic trade terms and political terms. It seems to me that has changed over the last couple of decades?

KOTT: Of course, NAFTA has been expanded to Mexico so now it's a tri-partied agreement. In those days when I was in Calgary it was not, it was a basic bi-lateral agreement. I think, again, the Westerners, I'm going out on a limb in saying this, I think being a little more worldly, maybe perhaps having a more global view at least in the area of trade and economic and finance, I think they, especially the energy producers, had more foresight than the people of the center of Canada. I think they did see the benefits of potential energy sales, especially natural gas, right down through the 48 and into Mexico and Central and Latin America. There was talk, as you might remember, of Chile being one of the first members of whatever might follow the bilateral NAFTA agreement. Of course, I think history has addressed all of that. I think there was at least a nascent understanding that NAFTA had a greater potential than simply the bilateral potential that came to fruition.

Q: To what extent, you mentioned that you did give some speeches and tried to argue in favor of the benefits for both countries of NAFTA, freer trade. To what extent did you sort of have to do public events or was it... did you go to hockey games, or...?

KOTT: Yes, there is a lot of fun to the job. To answer your questions, there wasn't an awful lot of speechifying. Occasionally I'd be asked to speak to a group. I remember once sharing a platform with, I guess he was the Canadian Ambassador in Washington, still, Alan Gottlieb, who was here for year. Famous. If anybody's heard of Alan Gottlieb, probably it's because of his wife who had the famous slapping incident in Washington. But we won't talk about that. He was a brilliant observer of America. We shared a platform at a conference one day and when I got up after him, unfortunately, I had to follow Alan, I said it was sort of humbling to be in the same room with this great observer of the American scene. Sort of modern day De Tocqueville. And that brought down the house, everybody liked that, especially Alan Gottlieb. He had quite a big ego. But he was, he was quite a good observer. Anyway, that was probably the most significant public speaking event that I had. Others were more like speaking to the petroleum groups or what have you. Not an awful lot of that. There was a lot of the representational part of the job. As much as you wanted to make of it, actually. We did a lot, both in Calgary and as I traveled around in the parish we'd have various events. One thing we did happily, we promoted American

wines. There was an American Wine Society and we were able to import wine duty free, as long as it was used at these functions, for state purpose. That was a fun part of the job. The travel, the representational events, the invitations, the dinners... Good fun being the CG (Consul General).

Q: Hockey, baseball...?

KOTT: Yes, I was in Calgary when the Calgary Flames won the Stanley Cup and went to a couple of the games as a guest. In those days you could accept those sorts of things.

Q: Of course Calgary Flames are no longer in Calgary – isn't it now the Atlanta team?

KOTT: No, they came from Atlanta. They were the Atlanta Flames.

Q: There is another team in Atlanta now, a new team?

KOTT: Probably. Calgary had the Stampede football team, Canadian league, Calgary Flames in hockey. They had a AAA baseball team called the Cannons I believe, in the Pacific Coast league. There was no shortage of sporting events to attend and there was a fairly lively, not too extensive but fairly lively, pick-and-choose cultural scene. They had a cultural center right downtown, very nice one, very modern, that contained several theaters as well as a symphony hall. I remember seeing opera there, ballet, mostly touring companies, of course, coming through. I can't remember if they had resident companies. They had a resident theater company. If you were interested in that as I was, there was enough opportunity to keep you busy. If you were fanatic about it, no, but if you were just dabbling in it, high culture, there was enough. Great city, great people.

Q: And the Consulate General in Calgary is still open?

KOTT: It is. In fact I was back there in different capacity visiting Calgary a year and a half ago, and I met the then Consul General and I think the staff has perhaps been diminished by one officer, perhaps two, perhaps the Commercial Office may no longer be there, I am not sure. But the State presence has been reduced by at least one. I think they lost the immigrant visa function. We used to issue immigrant visas from Calgary and I think we've lost that function.

Q: To nationals of other countries, not of Canada in particular?

KOTT: Well, Canadians...

Q: Those who wanted to immigrate?

KOTT: Yes, yes, right. Both.

Q: Anything else you want to say about your time in Calgary?

KOTT: No, it was great fun. I thought of extending. I didn't think it would be a good career move at the time. I had my window open. I opened it when I got to Calgary, so I would have had

three efficiency reports coming out of Calgary. I didn't think it was a promotable job, quite frankly. I was wrong, because I no sooner got back to Washington and I fact was promoted to Senior Service. Had I known that, of course, I would have extended a year in Calgary.

DALE V. SLAGHT
Commercial Counselor
Toronto (1988-1991)

Mr. Slaght was born in Oregon in 1943. After serving in various capacities on Capitol Hill and in the Department of Commerce, he joined the State Department under the Commerce-State Exchange Program. As expert in commercial and trade policy, Mr. Slaght had assignments as Commercial Attaché and Minister Counselor at US Embassies and Consulates in Uruguay, Panama, Germany, Canada, Soviet Union and Mexico. He also served as Mexico Desk Officer at the Department of Commerce. Mr. Slaght attained the rank of Career Minister. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

Q: And you were in Toronto from when to when? '88 to...

SLAGHT: ...to the summer of '91 where I was asked to curtail yet once again to take on our Moscow office, but that's for next time we meet I suspect.

Q: Let's talk about Toronto.

SLAGHT: Toronto was a wonderful place, a good staff. For once I could deal in English which was nice, a respite from struggling with German sentence structure and verbs. An international city that had a lot of the flavor of being an international place, and in a very interesting time. In 1988 there was a national election in Canada, and the principal issue was whether Canada would join the United States in a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The local party opposed it, and the conservative party supported it. There were major debates in the society on the pros and cons of coming so close together with the United States, what it would do to its cultural industries, what it would do for its business sectors, what it would do for resolving the necessity to restructure much of Canadian industry so they'd be competitive with what they viewed as more competitive U.S. sectors. Fascinating time. Wonderful time to be there. We helped organize a group in Toronto of business leaders who supported it. I got to know some key business leaders as a result of that organization. Eventually they voted for the FTA, for the Canada -- U.S. Free Trade Agreement, and it's now almost uniformly supported in Canada. I gave a speech there just last month on NAFTA which is the son of the Canada -- U.S. Free Trade Agreement. One of the things I said was one of your parties was strongly opposed it. As soon as they came into power years later, they firmly adopted it, and even some of the labor unions support it. There are still some groups, the academics, who were concerned about the cultural infiltration of U.S. values into their country, but you see very little of that going on.

Q: First place, this is the Bush administration essentially. How...

SLAGHT: Reagan and Mulroney who was the conservative prime minister who won in '88 were two Irishmen who liked each other, who got along well, who sang Irish tunes when they met together, and the relationship between the two governments was excellent. We had our soft wood lumber issues and other trade issues, but they were minor compared to the overall relationship and the overall trading relationship.

Q: This was something that was on the front burner of both North and South administrations, and Bush ...

SLAGHT: Yes. Reagan started the good feel if you will between the two countries, but it was Bush who really brought the economic relation to a head with the Free Trade Agreement. It wasn't nearly as close when Bush was president. Bush is not the warm touchy guy that Reagan was, so the relationship wasn't that personal, but it was a good one.

Q: Why was Toronto so important? You think of Montreal as being...maybe not... Is Toronto the main business...

SLAGHT: Yes. If you're our age, you think of Montreal, but in fact, with the Separatist movement in Quebec for now 40 years, a lot of the business in Quebec has moved to Ontario. They didn't want to fool with Separatist issues and radical nationalist groups in Quebec. A lot of the banks...most of the banks...are now headquartered in Ontario. Ontario is the manufacturing center of Canada. The GDP of Ontario is just about as large as the rest of Canada put together. It's where the manufacturing base is and where most of the commercial activity remains today.

Q: I've interviewed others who have served in Ottawa where sort of within the chattering classes or the academic pacifists there was a significant amount of anti-Americanism. You define yourself as Canadian is not being an American. How did you find this?

SLAGHT: Toronto is the focus point of this. University of Toronto, the Toronto Star, the Globe and Mail. These are three elements of the culture in Canada that dominate the anti-American spirit. We saw a lot of that there. It came out in the election of '88 from the liberal point of view. I collected campaign literature from that period and used it in my class on NAFTA at George Mason University I taught several years ago and reminded me of the vehemence in which the socialist class or the liberal class in Canada feared United States dominance politically and culturally. It's still the case. In fact, it's probably more today given the differences on the war in Iraq that we have. The differences on the appropriateness of gay marriage set us now apart further.

There is no American Chamber of Commerce in Canada. Why, you ask? Because the U.S. companies in Canada want to be viewed as Canadian companies, not American companies. In many U.S. companies, you won't see an American flag flying on the flagpole outside. You'll see the Canadian flag. To this day there's not an American Chamber of Commerce in Canada. There is a group that we started to support to Canada Free Trade Agreement, the Canada -- U.S. Free Trade Agreement that had U.S. companies and Canadian companies involved, but that did not become the germ of a large organization across Canada. It folded after the Free Trade Agreement

was agreed to.

Canadians aren't really clear who they are. Quebeckers know who they are, but the rest of Canada has problems defining themselves unless it is *vis a vis* the United States, and then they're more clear. They view themselves as having a more representative government, a more functional government, Parliamentary system they view as more effective than the system of checks and balances that we have in our system. They view their social safety net as more deep, their net being more finely woven than ours. They pride themselves in their universal health coverage and they talk about how you can live with 40,000,000 Americans without health care insurance. They argue that their concern about the environment is greater than ours. There is a bit of "holier than thou" attitude *vis a vis* the United States in general. You'll see this particularly in universities and in the intellectual classes and the journalistic elite in Canada. You'll seldom see it or hear it among your friends. They may think it, but they seldom say it.

Q: How about in the schools?

SLAGHT: We had a very good experience. It was a mix. In Toronto our boys went to a public school for a year, and then we transferred them to a private school. We didn't have any issues there that I can recall. They didn't. Our younger boy years later in Ottawa did have a little bit of that, but mainly because he had been born in Germany they called him a Nazi. This is third grade stuff. We put him in a private school in Ottawa the next two years, and he had a wonderful experience.

Q: Did you get involved in the place where the Canadians seemed to be particularly sensitive? I mean, newspapers, magazines, books, that sort of thing. Was that brought to your desk?

SLAGHT: It was one of the sticking points of the negotiations for the Agreement. The Canadians said, you will not impact our cultural industries negatively. And we said, if you restrict our access to your cultural industries, we will take action against you. We left it at that. As far as I know, we have never taken trade measures against Canada for their restrictions on advertising in Canadian magazines or U.S. magazines that circulate in Canada, preventing radio broadcast or television access. I listen to Fox News here on occasion, and they announced just a couple of weeks ago they now are in Canada. This was nearly 20 years after the Agreement. The local ambassador here in the Post -- did you see the Post the other day? -- he was saying that one of his jobs in the United States is counter the Fox mentality that Canadians frequenting the United States pick up about the relationship. He wants to set matters straight because Fox is not telling the story that should be told in his view.

ANDREW F. ANTIPPAS
Counsel General
Montreal (1988-1992)

Andrew F. Antippas was born in Massachusetts in 1931. He received a bachelor's degree from Tufts University and entered the Foreign Service in 1960. His career

included positions in Africa, Japan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Korea, Canada, and Washington DC. Mr. Antippas was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on July 19, 1994.

Q: Then where did you go?

ANTIPPAS: I went to Montreal as Principal Officer. I'm telling you a lot of this to lay the groundwork for what I'm going to tell you about Montreal, in terms of where I thought I stood in the "pecking order" of things in Korea--in terms of my personal status. It was more than being just chief of the Consular Section, the guy who issued the visas.

Q: All right. So we'll pick it up when you left Korea. We'll talk about your going to Canada.

Q: Today is December 21, 1994. You left Korea. Where did you go? Could you give the dates?

ANTIPPAS: I left Korea in the first week of August, 1988. I was assigned as Principal Officer in Montreal, a position which I had sought over a number of years. I thought that would be a very nice assignment. I was not unfamiliar with Montreal. It seemed like a "classy" town. I had the choice between being DCM in Haiti or Principal Officer in Montreal. My wife wanted Haiti because the weather was nicer, obviously.

Q: But she is Canadian, isn't she?

ANTIPPAS: My wife is Canadian--from Ontario. And there's a difference. She's always tried to learn a language wherever we've been assigned--at least pick up some of the language. When someone suggested that she should pick up French, she just dug her heels in. This is the Ontarian coming out, loud and clear. I had to "shut her up" a few times over French-English issuers in the Province. It was interesting to see how the nationalist fur rises, you know.

Anyway, I decided that I'd rather be "Number One" in Montreal, rather than "Number Two" in Haiti, plus the fact that I just felt that I had watched what had happened in Haiti from the vantage point of the Bahamas. As I knew a number of people who served in Haiti, I thought that there wasn't a future in Haiti for anyone. However, as it turned out, there wasn't a future in Montreal, either. That's the unique feature about Montreal, as pleasant an assignment as it was.

I finally arrived in Montreal in October, 1988, because my predecessor had delayed his departure because of some medical problems. Instead of going to Montreal in mid-September, which would be the normal transfer time, I had to delay my arrival for three weeks.

We decided that, after spending the requisite period of time here in the United States, doing my French test, taking home leave, and arranging for consultations and all of that, we wondered what we would do. We thought that we couldn't sit around in a motel some place. So we decided to go back to Korea for the opening of the Olympic Games. With all of the travel we had done, we had enough pieces of tickets left over from the four years we had been in Korea, plus the fact that my daughter was studying in France and in Quebec during that whole period. I was bringing

her home every two months, so we had lots of tickets lying around. We decided to go back to Korea and be with our friends.

The Koreans were so enthusiastic about the Olympic Games. We had watched them put this altogether over a four-year period. We thought that it would be nice to be there. It was a fun time. I mention this because it has relevance for what happened later.

I arrived in Montreal in the first week of October, 1988. The snow was just about ready to fly. I thought that it was a nice post, heavily oriented toward the consular and commercial functions. At that time the Consulate General had been in a high-rise building in downtown Montreal. The Consular Section was on the ground floor. Twelve floors up was the rest of the Consulate General. We had a problem of a bifurcated office, which caused a bit of difficulty in terms of organization and the flow of information. The problem was not insuperable, but it was still difficult.

Montreal is a post where you probably get a hundred different nationalities coming in, asking for visas. This was a different experience from anything I ever had before. Montreal really is a "gateway" to North America. In terms of the consular function it was an interesting and busy post.

The first decision that I had to deal with, which, I think, eventually became a problem for me, was who was I going to designate as my deputy. There was no "deputy" slot at the post. Obviously, I had to have a senior officer, whom I would leave in charge when I was not present. It was a "toss up" between the Economic Officer and the chief of the Consular Section. Both of them were FSO-4's--and experienced officers. They were at the same grade, but the chief of the Consular Section had a bit longer in grade than the Economic Officer. The chief of the Consular Section was not at post when I arrived. He was on home leave. My predecessor left me a note, saying, "This is a decision which you're going to have to make on this issue." He gave me some hints and his thoughts.

I decided to designate the Economic Officer as my deputy, first, because his office was close to my own office. He worked very closely with the Principal Officer. We also had a Commercial Officer. The chief of the Consular Section, of course, was located down on the ground floor. I decided that it probably made more sense to designate the Economic Officer as my deputy, because the chief of the Consular Section really had a "full plate." He had a busy office, a large staff, and lots of things to do. I was sympathetic to his position, as I had just left a Consular Section. The Economic Officer spoke French very well. The chief of the Consular Section did not speak French very well. That is really critical for a post in Quebec Province. You have to speak French. You just get laughed off the street if you're not able to handle office business in French. I mention this because this ended up by becoming a problem, due to the resentment generated by this selection.

I had a pretty good Administrative Office and a first class Secretary. One of the problems that the Consulate General in Montreal had faced previously was that, at one time, there were two American secretaries assigned. This was subsequently reduced to one American secretary. The post also had a communicator. One of the things that the American secretary had to do was to be

able to handle communications and stand communications watch every other weekend. In the past this situation had posed a problem. In fact, the previous Secretary had made a real "fuss" about doing communications work, aside from the fact that the communications watch required a commitment to be present every other weekend. It's also a difficult job. The equipment now has become so sophisticated. It's not just the old "punch a tape" business. You really have to be able to work with this equipment. It's all computerized and takes a lot of savvy. I can understand that. However, I remember that in the inspection report for 1987, the year before I was assigned there, this was mentioned as a problem.

The question of the communications watch every other weekend for the American secretary eventually became a personnel problem for me because the new Ambassador, a political appointee, arrived in Ottawa.

Q: Who was that?

ANTIPPAS: This was Edward Ney, a New York advertising mogul and a personal friend of President George Bush. They had gone to the same prep school. He was a nice enough guy--not a bad sort. He listened to what I had to say. Anyhow, he "hijacked" my secretary to be his secretary in Ottawa. What could I say about that? It was a promotion for her, a step up, and all that. I put the best face on it and said, "Well, at least I've got one friend at court. Not only that, I've got an ear at court."

However, I think that the loss of my secretary was a disaster for me during my tenure in Montreal. I'll tell you why in the course of this description of the post. I found that the biggest problem that I faced in Montreal was something that I didn't realize until I actually got there. I discussed this problem with Tom Enders, the previous Ambassador to Canada and an old colleague of mine.

Montreal and Quebec City are unique in the Foreign Service in that they are the only two constituent posts in a single province that we have in the Foreign Service. Normally, the arrangement is that you have a constituent post to cover several provinces in a country. Of course, the other aspect of this is that Montreal, historically, has been perceived as being "the English" town in the Province. That is, it is "the enemy." In point of fact, that was not true. Almost half of the population of Montreal are now French speakers. Most of the officials of the provincial government are French Québécois. Ironically many are from Montreal and live in Montreal.

Q: Also, by the time you were there, the English-speaking "establishment" had moved over to Toronto.

ANTIPPAS: Exactly. They had all moved out. They were scared to death when the PQ [Parti Québécois--the Quebec Party] came into power in 1976. However, the fact is that the perception was that Montreal is the "enemy" [of the French speakers]. Most countries represented in Canada have their consulates in Montreal because it is still a commercial and banking center. In fact, when I was in Montreal, there were only two Principal Officers in Quebec City.

Q: Well, Quebec City is relatively small.

ANTIPPAS: It's a provincial capital. Only the U. S. and the French have Consulates in Quebec City. In fact, the French had a Consulate whose Principal Officer had the rank of Ambassador.

Anyway, this posed a real problem for the Principal Officer of the American Consulate General in Montreal because he really doesn't have a job. The basic function of the Principal Officer of a Consulate General, of course, is to manage the post. His other main function is political reporting. That's your reason for being, really. That's why one is expected to speak French, when you go to a post like that. However, the Provincial Government of Quebec didn't want to talk to Principal Officers of the Consulates in Montreal if the discussions were to be in Montreal. If you wanted to talk officially to the Province you were to go to Quebec City.

Now, one of my predecessors, B. J. Harper, had a good experience in Montreal in the mid 1970's because the then Premier of Quebec, Rene Levesque, had an office in Montreal and most importantly wanted to talk to the Americans. He spent a lot of time in Montreal, and B. J. Harper had access to him. That's what it takes--some kind of access to the political leader. It doesn't matter whether this access is formal or not. The fact is that this is the basis on which you can write reports. Who cares what the Mayor of Montreal says? So, in fact, I was accredited to the Mayor of Montreal but no first person discussions to report.

Of course we had a lot of fun. It was a nice post. I'm not taking away from the fact that Montreal is a lovely city. We had a nice house, a car, and a couple of servants. We were living better than I did when I was chargé d'affaires in the Bahamas. But from the point of view of the job, Montreal was a cipher and a great disappointment to me.

As you well know, if you want to cover yourself with glory for onward promotions and assignments, a Principal Officer at least needs to "set the agenda" in terms of what the post is going to do and the kind of work you are going to do. So when you have the basic function of political reporting taken away from you, or denied you, because of the structure of things, it is really rather disappointing. I tried very hard to make myself "relevant". I was never, never formally presented to the Premier of the Province of Quebec, in spite of the fact that I asked for appointments on several occasions. I met all of the other cabinet members in Quebec and was treated very nicely. They have the tradition that, when a new Principal Officer comes to the province, the office of protocol takes you up to visit Parliament. You sit in the gallery at the Parliament, you're acknowledged by the Speaker of the Parliament, and they even give you a little video tape of that event. They were charming and very considerate. Obviously, Québécois understand the United States and Americans very, very well. We're practically one country. We don't know them, but they know us very well. So it's not exactly like dealing with a Third World country.

I understood this situation very quickly, after a couple of months, when I discovered that I was never going to be able to formally meet the Premier of Quebec, even though most of the time the Premier lived in Montreal. His home was actually in Montreal. Many of the political figures had to commute between Quebec City and Montreal, a three hour drive each way.

I took on other projects. Aside from the management of the post, I tried to become involved and, as I said, to be relevant, politically. Montreal is a very ethnically diverse city. As I am a Greek-American, I was, of course, readily and happily accepted by the very large Greek community in Montreal. There are over 80,000 Greek Canadians there. The Lebanese community was also very sympathetic and understanding. There is even a Kurdish community which would invite me to their national day of commemoration of what the Turks had done to them in 1915. Anybody who had ever, or whose family had ever been colonized by the Turks was very welcome.

I also became very involved in the functions of the Consular Corps, because that appeared to be something that was useful to do, since the Consular Corps basically was run, master-minded, and dictated to by the Honorary Austrian Consul, who happened to drop dead the month after I got to Montreal. As the Consular Corps struggled to reconstitute itself, I became very involved with trying to refashion it to something which would be more useful to the professional diplomats and also to give us a way to talk to the Provincial Government.

Every government treats honorary consuls differently. In the case of the Province of Quebec, because the "separatist," Parti Québécois government was looking for more international acceptance, it had tended to give much more authority and privileges to the honorary consuls than I had experienced at other posts. They were even accorded "duty free" importation privileges and Consular Corps license plates for their cars. The career consuls objected to this sort of treatment because the non-career consuls don't have the same responsibilities as the career consuls. Anyway, that was a "hobby horse" that I was able to ride and be involved with. At least, it allowed me to "mix" with my colleagues in a constructive fashion.

I became very friendly with the Russians. The only other post that the Russians had outside of Ottawa was in Montreal, which also maintained representation at ICAO, the International Civil Aviation Organization. This was just before the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Q: Basically, you were talking about the Soviets, rather than the Russians.

ANTIPPAS: Initially, it was the Soviets, and then it became the Russians. But before the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Consul General made it very clear to me that he would like to be able to get together periodically and discuss issues. Of course, this was very interesting to me, given my own 30 years of Cold War experience. Suddenly to be in charge of a post and to have the Russians say, "Let's talk," would be very useful, in my view, from an intelligence-gathering point of view.

So I asked the Embassy what they wanted me to do and how they wanted me to handle this. We have had these long-standing requirements to report conversations with Soviet Bloc representatives. Of course, there were other Bloc representatives in Montreal: the Poles and the Czechs had consulates. The North Koreans did not. The South Koreans did. The Chinese Communists eventually opened a consulate in Montreal. The Cubans had a consulate there. However, I was struck by the indifference of our Embassy to the whole thing. It was made rather clear to me that I could do almost anything that I wanted to do. I thought that this was one of the "straws in the wind" which raised the question in my mind, "What am I doing here?" It was completely different from anything else that I have ever experienced.

Q: I found the same thing when I was Consul General in Naples. The Embassy didn't really care. It just didn't want me to cause any problems and wanted me to keep out of the headlines.

ANTIPPAS: This really gave me pause for thought. I realized that the Embassy really didn't care what the Russians were saying in Montreal. Anyway, I developed a good relationship with the Russian Consul General. We discussed matters of general interest. It was interesting to watch that transition as the Soviet Union broke up and how they coped with that. The Russians were really not 10 feet tall, after all.

When one of the major GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] conferences was held in Montreal at the end of 1988, it was hard for me and my team at the Consulate General to play any role in that relationship, because people came from Washington to deal with the various issues. We provided the delegation with some transportation and escort service, but there was no real way to get involved in this kind of thing.

I wondered how I was going to "cover myself with glory" and, in fact, "make a difference." I was still in the FEOC. I needed a promotion to MC [Minister Counselor]. Obviously, I would have to "shine" as Principal Officer. The question was, how do you do that?

I thought that one way I could do this was in the management of the post. One of the requirements that developed was that we had to move out of the existing office facilities and move into new, specifically-designed and constructed facilities, as a result of what had happened at other posts in terms of protecting them against terrorist attacks. The Department decided that, although we would have liked to remain where we were, there was a problem with the security of our office building. The building we were in was basically part of a shopping center--a large, high-rise office building and shopping center. The owners of the building objected to our "bricking up" the windows, for example. They allowed us to put vehicle barriers out in front so that a "suicide bomber" couldn't crash a car into the Consular Section on the ground floor. However, the Consular Section was vulnerable if someone decided to blow up a car in front of the building.

The Department eventually was able to negotiate a lease on space in another high-rise building, two blocks away and closer to the center of Montreal. We were allowed to redesign two of the top two floors of that high-rise building for new Consulate General offices. I had a lot of input into designing that facility, given the structure that we had. We had two floors, plus the basement, to work with. What we clearly had to consider was how to handle the flow of visa applicants. We had several hundred visa applicants per day. It was nothing like the Embassies in Seoul or Manila, but still a busy place in a very tough climate. So that was an interesting challenge for my first year in Montreal. I helped to design the facilities and to negotiate the lease, plus working with the contractor to set up a "hard line" and figure out what space we should have.

The chief of the Consular Section, who, I guess, still resented the fact that I hadn't selected him to be my deputy, tried to pull a "fast one," communicating directly with the Department about his desire to have his own conference room in his section. He did not even tell me about it. The

Department actually put that idea into the plan, based on his conversations with people in Washington. I came down on him like a ton of bricks. We were going to have a nicely-appointed conference room which everybody would be able to use.

I had other designs for space that would be available. For example, VIP [Very Important Person] quarters for the Ambassador, who would come down to Montreal from time to time. We had had U. S. cabinet and sub-cabinet officers come to the post, but there had been no appropriate space to put these people. We had a visit from the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Energy. I had no suitable place to put him and his staff, outside of giving him my own office. So I created a VIP office suite. It worked out fairly well.

Eventually, we managed to move into the new offices in the spring of 1990. During the move we were only closed to the public for two or three days. We were able to move everything and still get into action quickly. There was money to build the place but no money for curtains or signs. We didn't even have money to make signs as to where the visa lines were supposed to be. We had paper signs all over the place. It looked a little "tacky," initially. Nevertheless, the move was relatively painless because we planned and worked it out in advance. Everybody cooperated in the move.

Two weeks after we moved the Foreign Service Inspectors showed up. I had planned for the arrival of the inspectors, although this was my first experience with the "new" Inspection Corps--that is, the post-1987, Jesse Helms inspired, Inspection Corps. Inspections were no longer under the control of the State Department.

Q: One felt that it was an adverbial process.

ANTIPPAS: I discovered this painfully afterwards. Up until that experience, I'd been inspected probably at seven different posts during my career. I'd worked as a TDY [Temporary Duty] consular inspector in China. I thought I understood how the inspection system works. I had learned about the system from contact with inspectors on a number of occasions who were thoughtful and helpful to me. I had no real fear of the inspectors. You try to do the best job you know how to do, under the circumstances. If you make mistakes, OK, you make mistakes.

Q: And also they can put in a word for you, saying, "He really needs this or that." They can suggest ways of straightening things out if there are problems.

ANTIPPAS: I've described to you my experience in the Bahamas. It was the same kind of thing. The inspectors said that I needed more administrative people and all of that.

The inspectors were going all over Canada, because there are four or five posts involved. I talked on the telephone to the senior officer leading the team which was going to inspect the Consulate General in Montreal and worked out the schedule. One of the things you need to work out are the ground rules, what kind of representational functions I would plan to demonstrate the depth of our contacts, the kind of people we knew, and what was going on in the post. I had known this senior inspector because I had replaced him at a previous post. We weren't friends, but we were

acquainted with each other and, I thought, had a fairly amicable relationship. He was a very competent officer, who since has died, but I won't mention his name.

I guess I should have gotten a clue when he told me that basically all of the plans were fine but he didn't want a lot of representational functions. He suggested an initial dinner reception for the section chiefs at the residence the first night that they were in Montreal. He said that they didn't want any other representational functions, although they would like to go to a couple of baseball games. It was spring, and the Montreal Expos were playing major league baseball. The inspectors were going to be in Montreal for two weeks, but they really didn't want any representational functions put on for them. That should have tipped me off that there was something very different going on. Why would inspectors come to a constituent post for two weeks? All of my experience had been that the inspection of Embassies took two weeks, but not a constituent post. They were going to inspect the Consulate in Halifax before coming to Montreal, so maybe they were going to write their report on Halifax while they were in Montreal. So perhaps that was why they needed the extra time.

No, that wasn't it. They sent us a flock of questionnaires that everyone was supposed to fill out, which we dutifully did. I gave the requisite lecture to the staff, Americans and locals, instructing everyone to tell the inspectors whatever was on their minds and answer candidly whatever questions they might have.

It had been my practice in Montreal, building on the experience of my predecessor, to hold two staff meetings a week for the American staff. There had long been a weekly staff meeting for the American staff--early in the morning on Fridays, as I recall. I found that this was really a problem for the Consular Section because their public was waiting for them in line...

Q: It's not the same thing as with a Political Section.

ANTIPPAS: I was very conscious of the fact that I would be talking, other people would be "gassing," the public was waiting, and these guys in the Consular Section were going to have to work through lunch to get through their workload. You always have to be aware of the pressures that they are under. At the same time, you don't want to leave them out. We had two junior officers in the Consular Section. Inevitably, they were torn between priorities. How do you deal with this problem? I also had to hold my staff meeting at a time when the morning telegrams hadn't been processed yet. I hadn't even read them. I couldn't even tell people what was in the morning cables.

I decided to have a second staff meeting on another day of the week for all of the section chiefs, including USIA [United States Information Agency representative], the commercial officer, and a DEA, Drug Enforcement Administration, representative. We also had a representative of the Department of Agriculture, from the Grain Testing Service, because of the grain storage facilities in use in connection with the St. Lawrence Seaway. I also invited the U. S. representative to ICAO to come over--either he himself or his State Department political officer--to sit in on those sessions, just to "plug in" to what was going on. This was unique, because it had not been done before. The ICAO staff had always been separate. They were basically friendly, but apparently we had always stayed at a distance from each other. I was interested in what ICAO was doing

and was looking for something to be involved in. So I would have what I called my "Country Team Meeting" and then would have a staff meeting for all members of the American staff.

So there were two American staff meetings per week. One of the problems I faced when I first came to Montreal was with the local employees. The Foreign Service local employees in Canada are very vocal. They're probably the most vocal, local employees in the world, because Canadians don't view themselves as anybody's employee. They are your equal.

Anyway, just after I arrived in Montreal the local employees had been very disappointed over the decision by the Embassy not to accord them a cost of living increase which they regarded as due them. This had transpired because in several previous cycles an Administrative Officer in the Embassy had unilaterally granted them increases in salary over and above what they should have received under the schedule approved by Washington. He did this because he wanted to be a "good fellow." Well, to pay Peter, you have to take it away from Paul, so to speak. It had come out that this Administrative Officer had done this on his own responsibility, so the Department, in effect, was "docking" the wages of the local employees.

This angered the local employees, and they asked to talk to me about that. So, just after I arrived in Montreal I had a meeting with them along with my Administrative Officer. There was just one Administrative Officer at post, as was the case in the Bahamas. I met with the local employees and heard them out. I told them, "Look, I can't do very much to solve this problem, and neither can the Embassy. This was dictated by events which took place previously and was a Washington level decision. I understand that and I want you to know that I sympathize with you." I took the occasion to tell all of the Consulate General's local employees that I was going to follow an "open door" policy. I understood the difficulties resulting from the fact that initially there were 12 floors between most of the local employees and my office. Furthermore, there were several locked doors to go through. I said that I realized that it was not easy for a local employee to go and see the "boss" to talk about problems. However, I wanted to let them know that I understood the "peer pressures" that go on. I was going to encourage them to try to talk to management.

The way I would do that is that I would have a meeting periodically--say, once every two or three weeks--with the local employees. Myself alone--no other American from the Consulate General. Obviously, we couldn't take everybody away from work to do that, but I wanted each unit from the whole office to send a representative to these meetings. Actually, the local staff was largely made up of USIS and State Department local employees. I said, "I want you to select a representative from each unit who will come in and talk to me. You can empower that person to tell me what your problems are. I will tell you what I think about this and I will tell you about other issues. We can try to create a 'flow of information back and forth.'"

I found this practice useful. It lowered the temperature, to some extent. It reduced the level of rancor that was felt. But it wasn't until the inspection that I appreciated how many problems there were at this post. The point of all this is that I made it my business to create a lot of "flows of information." Of course, there were other, more informal things that I did, like "trooping the line"--walking the "trench line," a policy which I had followed at other posts where I had served and had a supervisory responsibility. I also invited some of our local employees to the residence.

Various Principal Officers have used their residences in different ways. My predecessor had worked very hard to get money out of the Department to refurbish the residence, because it had "run down" over the years. I knew several of my predecessors as Principal Officer in Montreal. In fact, I think that I knew all of them, with one exception, dating back 30 years. You know some of them, as well. Many of them didn't want to entertain.

Q: Montreal is a "retirement post."

ANTIPPAS: It's a "retirement post," a "golden hand shake post." Many of them thought that they weren't going to break their backs bringing people in to entertain them. Many of my predecessors did their official entertaining at restaurants or at a club. There was a club in Montreal that the Consular Corps used a great deal for entertaining. There was no lack of places where you could entertain. However, I felt that the U. S. Government had spent all of this money, refurbishing the house and so forth, so why not use it for entertainment purposes? It was a nice house, and we had household staff to serve. My wife and I happen to like to entertain people. It's part of the pleasure that we got out of the Foreign Service.

So I tried to include not only the junior officers but also local staff members. I had Christmas parties, for example, at the residence. I had known of Principal Officers at that post who had never even invited local staff members into the house.

I used all of these various ways of getting people to talk, to open up, and to be accessible, which I figured was the name of the game. The other aspect is that I don't think that you should look at a place like Montreal and say, "This is a problem post." This was not a "problem" part of the world. Montreal is a very nice town. The functions at the post are primarily routine, and it's a routine kind of Foreign Service post. We did our work, and the biggest problem was the climate for a few months of the year. The people who live in the Province of Quebec solve that too, by going "underground"--staying out of the weather. Nobody really suffers terribly in a place like Montreal and nobody really has any basis for complaint. I've been to some of the really "crappy" places in the Foreign Service. While I was not particularly "relaxed," or "blasé", I took my responsibilities seriously. I did not feel that anybody had any particular reason for complaint.

I was concerned, for example, about what we could do for the junior officers. In Seoul I had had eight junior officers to deal with. How do you supervise these guys so that they are not "burned out"? I mean, "burned out" and disgusted with the consular function, if they are treated like galley slaves. How do you do that, particularly when the work has to be done? There is a given amount of work to be done and statutory responsibilities which we have to perform. Still, I thought, with a little "give and take" and a little imagination, maybe we can do something to broaden their horizons.

For example, I pushed to arrange for one of the junior officers to spend some time working with the Economic Officer--a few hours a day, just so that he'd have something else to think about. He was an economic cone officer and wanted to be able to do something else beside consular work in the Foreign Service. It was like pulling teeth to get the Consul to agree with this, but that's the sort of thing that I did.

If Quebec City, for example, which is just a two-man post, had a problem because they ran out of people--one man was on leave or the other guy was sick or had a family emergency of some kind--I would send somebody up there to help to hold the fort. I didn't send a supervisor. I would send a junior officer up there. I would say, "This is what I did 25 years before. The way to learn how things are done is to jump into the deep end of the pool. So go up to Quebec City and help to manage the place." I felt that I was doing my duty by doing this. I'm telling you all this because of what happened as a result of the inspection.

The inspectors came in, and I found that out of the five inspectors, only one or two had previously been in the Foreign Service. Most of the inspectors had primarily auditor type experience. They had worked in other agencies of the government, such as the Defense Department, for example. As I said, this was my first experience with the new type of inspection, which the new Inspector General set up in the Department. Previously, the Inspector General had always been a very senior Foreign Service Officer--an Ambassador, for example. The new Inspector General of the Department came from outside the Department.

So we went through this drill. The inspectors handed out their questionnaires and went around and talked to everybody on the staff. Of course, I tried to be as helpful as I could with them.

The team leader came into my office one morning the day I was having a reception for the Consular Corps, city leaders, and other notables to cut the ribbon for opening our new offices. I had invited the Ambassador down from Ottawa to preside with me and I got the Mayor of Montreal to come over. Nobody from the Provincial Government showed up, which didn't surprise me. I had my household staff prepare the food. We didn't have to cater it. It was a very nice reception.

The wine industry in the United States was pressing very hard to persuade the Québécois to open up the wine market. The French had had this market pretty well "sewed up." The American wine industry had a hard time selling wine in Canada. What the American vintners would do would be to sponsor a wine exhibition. Over the years we had accumulated a fairly large "wine cellar" of excess wine, under the care and keeping of the Consulate General. We would use some of this wine for representational functions. I tried to keep very careful control over it, because I was afraid of a scandal developing over what had happened to all of that "free" wine from the American wine industry. Anyway, there was plenty of wine available for a function like this one, for the July 4 celebration, and other things that we would do.

As I said, the senior inspector came in to see me on the morning of that reception. I will never forget that date or the experience of it until the day I die. He looked at me with a very sad face and said, "I'm sorry to report to you, but you've got a very unhappy post, a post that's in trouble." I tell you, I was so shocked that I was speechless. Then he went on to describe all of the statistics which the inspectors had collected from the questionnaires and from the confidential interviews with the employees at the post. I was absolutely dumbfounded. Of course, I realized immediately that my career had ended that day and that I was "finished" in the Foreign Service. I remember sitting in my chair as if somebody had hit me with a two-by-four. I just couldn't believe what the

man said. Groggily I thought that, if I could have gotten away with it, I would have canceled that stupid reception.

The date was early June. We had the reception. I made a speech in French. The Mayor of Montreal, the Ambassador, and everybody else had a great time. They all thought that it was a wonderful office "layout." They thought that we had done a marvelous job of outfitting the Consulate General. We took our guests on tours of the facilities. I know that the inspectors were dumbfounded by what they saw. I recovered my public persona pretty well. I decided that I would not go out "feet first" but would go out as a professional. I thought that I had obviously failed and that it was the end of my career. I thought that I would not be promoted again. I needed to be promoted or I would be retired for having exceeded the allowed "time in grade." I thought that I would go out with the knowledge that I was probably the only FEOC who served his whole time in class doing jobs rated at the highest level and didn't get promoted, which takes a lot of doing. But there it was. I was angry about this whole thing.

I remember that, as we went through the process of "negotiating" what the inspectors' report would say, we had a lot of angry meetings with them. I felt "betrayed" by something, that I'd been "sandbagged," but I couldn't figure out what had happened. I didn't understand what had happened to me. Of course, the Ambassador felt humiliated by this. He had given me a good Efficiency Report, which the DCM had drafted. I felt that my management skills had been quite "up to the task" and that I had done very well. But here I came out of the inspection with the reputation that we had a "shoddy" shop. This was absolutely not the case.

During the summer of 1990 I obviously thought about this a great deal. I "stewed" in this. That was the summer when we had the great "Indian uprising" in the Montreal area. You may remember it.

Q: Oh, yes. They were blocking roads and bridges...

ANTIPPAS: The key bridge across the St. Lawrence River was blocked by the Mohawk Indians of the area, which almost caused bloodshed. The commuters were pretty sore about it. It was like having the Indians take over the 14th St. Bridge in Washington. Imagine what would happen in Washington, D. C., if somebody did that. It was kind of interesting to report on that because I happened to know the Mayor of the little town on the other side of that bridge. He was one of the people I had gotten to know. I went around and met the mayors in the various towns in my consular district. I talked to him on the phone. They had the Canadian Army out there, the RCMP [Royal Canadian Mounted Police], and the provincial police. It was kind of like reporting on a war zone. I enjoyed writing little telegrams about this.

We also had the only military ship visit during my tour of duty in Montreal. I think that the name of the ship was the USS AUBREY FITCH, one of the frigates which had supported our efforts in Grenada, when I was chargé d'affaires there. I had gone on board this ship as chargé. [The AUBREY FITCH is a Guided Missile Frigate of the OLIVER HAZARD PERRY class.] They had given me a hat to commemorate the occasion. When the ship came through Montreal, it was going down to the Great Lakes and then coming back. We were discussing by phone a joint reception which we would have on board the ship. The ship made its way through the St.

Lawrence Seaway, right at the time of this Indian uprising. The captain was concerned. So when they were going through the Seaway, they "buttoned the ship up" [went to General Quarters].

The Executive Officer of the ship, with whom I was in telephone contact, said that he flew the biggest American flag that he could find. There was nobody on deck when they went through the locks. There was a Mohawk Indian out there in camouflage uniform. I don't remember whether he was carrying an AK-47 automatic rifle. He might have been carrying a U. S. Marine flag. It was obviously somebody who had served in the U. S. Marines. The Mohawk Indians are allowed to cross the U. S.-Canadian border without any immigration formalities. Many of them served in the U. S. military. I think that he gestured to the ship and said, "Shell Montreal, shell Montreal!" I put that in a reporting cable to the Embassy to "lighten up" the situation.

We had a lot of fun at the reception on board the ship. I was treated very nicely by the ship's officers. I have an plaque which they gave me, saying that I am an "Honorary Fitchman," because I had been on board the ship in Grenada and now in Montreal.

But over the summer of 1990 I "stewed" in this humiliating experience of the inspection. The Ambassador was required to come down and "read us the riot act." I had to sit there and listen to him go on with all of this jazz.

I decided to engage a lawyer and said to him, "I'd like you to find out what happened to me in this inspection." He came to Montreal and, in fact, inspected the inspection. By that time I had figured out who was on my side and who had probably participated in "hanging" me in this "lynching." Based on my recommended list of local and American employees of the Consulate General in Montreal, the lawyer interviewed a lot of people. He came up with enough written, sworn statements which indicated that there had been a conspiracy to "sandbag" me in the inspection.

This conspiracy had been orchestrated by several people in the Consulate General. These people apparently had reason to dislike me. They persuaded two of the junior officers and several others to say things to the inspectors about my management of the post and to make comments on the questionnaires. Of course, the questionnaires were shredded as soon as they were reviewed, so there was no way to find out who said what.

For example, the minute that the inspectors learned that the DEA representative had nothing but good things to say about me, they never went back and talked to him. I learned this from the Drug Enforcement officer who spoke to my lawyer. Based on these sworn statements, it was clear that the inspectors would bring a person in for an interview and say, "Now, tell me what the Consul General is doing now, or did, or whatever. None of this is going out of this room, and your name is never going to be mentioned. Just tell me what he is up to.

I had thought initially that the local employees of the Consulate General were at the bottom of this. I never suspected that the Americans were involved. In point of fact the local employees, if not neutral about me, were complimentary. There were between 18 and 20 Americans assigned to Montreal. 18 questionnaires were collected and analyzed. If you have six or eight people who put you at the bottom of the list, it's going to bring the entire score down. It's going to "skew" the

results. I don't know whether or not the inspectors were instructed to "get" me because I had allegedly done something "wrong" in Seoul but couldn't prove it. But they may have wanted to make sure that I was never promoted. Again, I don't know if that happened or not. People could go to their graves and never admit it. You could hypothesize, but basically, if you can "skew" that score, why didn't the inspectors say, "Hey, wait a minute. There's a real range of opinion here about what happened in the Consulate General in Montreal. This post has just moved into new quarters. It is in a bit of an uproar, and there are these other problems with Canadian posts, because of local dissatisfaction." And so on. None of that was ever mentioned as mitigating factors. Basically, the inspectors came in with an agenda, and then they decided that somebody was going to get it "in the neck."

The other issue that had a lot of bearing on what happened to me, is that the courts found against the Department in terms of the women's class action suit. This was the suit brought by several hundred women who said that they had been systematically deprived of assignments and awards and had been discriminated against by male Foreign Service Officers. As you know, that had been fought by the Department for a long time--10 years. Finally a woman judge in the Appeals Court told the Department that she had found against it and told the Department to promote 300 women into the Senior Foreign Service.

You don't have to be a personnel genius to figure out what has to happen in that sort of situation. In fact, if you had the problem, and were told that there are 600 or 700 people in the Senior Foreign Service, and then were told to promote 300 other people, how do you do that, without creating circumstances leading to another class action suit? You could have people saying, "Hey, I've just been forced to 'walk the plank' here."

I think that, basically, the Department decided that it had to "get rid of" a certain type of officer. Men coming near retirement who had done all right and were senior officers. However, it is necessary to make room, somehow. You can't "buy" people out and you can't say this openly. If you say it openly, you'll have a class action suit that will rock the whole of foggy bottom. I believe that the system decided that it was going to be necessary to get rid of a number of people. It's clear that anybody who was a supervisor was fair game, because you can go into any operation, anywhere in the federal government--and particularly in the State Department or Foreign Service--and find something "wrong." If you are out to "get" somebody, you can "get" somebody. That's a cliché, but I think that it's absolutely true. I think that that's what happened.

I don't even take all of this personally. I think that they said, "Antippas fits the profile--59 years old, white, male, he's out." This came to me in a blinding "flash" in 1990. I couldn't figure out what had happened. I guess that I'd been out of the Department so long that I hadn't realized what had happened. I knew about the female-male conflict. In fact, I even knew the woman who precipitated all of this.

Q: Alison Palmer?

ANTIPPAS: Alison Palmer. We were all in Vietnam together, right? I was in Seoul on vacation in 1990. After this Mohawk Indian incident in Montreal I decided to take some time off. I went to Seoul for a vacation.

While I was in Seoul, I did two things. First, I called on the president of Korean Airlines [KAL], an old friend of the Embassy. He had worked as a contractor for the U. S. forces in Vietnam and is a person I had a lot of contact with at the time because, obviously, KAL needed a lot of help from the Consular Section. We had a good relationship. I went to see him to say hello. He said to me, "What is this about the State Department Inspector General's Corps? When I was in New York last spring [1989], I was interviewed by two investigators who came to my daughter's apartment in New York. They asked questions about you. They wanted to know if I'd given you free airline tickets at any time." He continued, "I told them that we had dealings with each other because that was our respective jobs. However, I'd never given you free tickets. If you want to look at my records, I'd be happy to let you do that." He said, "What the hell is going on with these people?"

I was really shocked when I heard that. Here they were approaching a private Korean citizen in the United States. I also read the "Asian Wall Street Journal" or, rather, the Asian edition of the "Herald Tribune", during the time I was there in Seoul. There was a column in it written by William Safire, in which Safire described what the FBI was doing to people in their investigations. Do you remember our colleague who was the Assistant Secretary of State for Security at the time the story broke about the DCM in Vienna [Felix Bloch], who allegedly passed secrets to the Soviets?

Q: I remember.

ANTIPPAS: You remember the Assistant Secretary, because he was head of the Passport Office at one time. He was apparently under consideration to be appointed Ambassador to Cyprus. His appointment was held up. Apparently, he had taken a polygraph at the time of this investigation of this situation with the DCM in Vienna. There had been a "blip" on his polygraph. Because of that the FBI wouldn't give him a clearance. They left the file "open". Because the file was open, he couldn't be appointed. However, Senator Sarbanes [Democrat, Maryland] very much wanted him to go to Cyprus and pushed the FBI into "putting up or shutting up."

That was what Safire's column was about. How the FBI "punishes" people by keeping the file of their background investigation open. This hit me like a blinding flash of light. This was something that I hadn't "understood" previously. I said to myself, "This is what happened. This is where the system has changed." In the old days it was more of a gentlemen's organization. There could be accusations and suspicions, yes. That's the name of the game. We've had that since the beginning of the Republic. People have been accused of malfeasance or whatever. However, as I understood the system from my own, personal experience, if they didn't have a case to make, they closed the file on an investigation. They may have made a mark somewhere else that never saw the light of day until later on. However, the fact was that if they didn't have a case, they closed the file after a decent interval, and people got on with their lives. What has changed is the nature of this "beast." The other development which led me to this conclusion is what happened within the Inspector General's organization itself. It grew. They...

Q: They acquired a lot of auditors. They had to have "raw meat."

ANTIPPAS: They brought in investigators, auditors, they quadrupled the staff. I don't know. I have these figures somewhere. Somebody said at one point that the Inspector General's Office spent \$60 million to collect \$30 million.

Q: They needed "raw meat" for this.

ANTIPPAS: You justify your existence by the number of cases you can make out. How do we do our "consular packages?" We do it by workload, right? And the number of cases that you have open, which may never be resolved...

Q: Andy, I'd like to come to some sort of conclusion to this.

ANTIPPAS: The reason why I'm going through all of this in excruciating detail--I'm not trying to make a legal brief out of it--is that it shows you what happened to the Foreign Service because of that. What are the implications of this, once it gets to be known that the Inspector General's basic function is to "terrorize"? What does this mean for people who are expected to be senior officers, to show initiative, to make decisions--especially if you're the boss? It means that anybody who has his own agenda can "take you out," and you don't have any legal recourse. When did I surrender my civil rights when I became a federal employee?

Q: When did you retire?

ANTIPPAS: I retired in 1992.

VICTOR D. COMRAS
Minister Counselor for Science and Technology
Ottawa (1989-1990)

Victor D. Comras was born in New York State in 1943. Comras graduated from Georgetown University in 1964, the University of Florida Law School in 1966, and promptly joined the Foreign Service. While in the Foreign Service, Comras served overseas in Zaire, Nigeria, South Africa, France, Canada and Macedonia. He also worked on the Law of the Sea negotiations. Comras was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

Q: In '89, where did you go?

COMRAS: My next assignment after Strasbourg was Ottawa, Canada. I was assigned as Minister Counselor for Science and Technology.

Q: You were there from '89 to when?

COMRAS: I was there for just about a year. From the summer of 1989 to the summer of 1990. Ottawa was not my first choice. In fact, I have planned on the assignment. I was left cold during

the bidding process, after having tried to get another Principal Officers Job in either Bermuda or Belfast. At the time I was not very popular with the European Bureau front office. They thought me too independent, especially since I had run against them on the Strasbourg closing issue. I guess they didn't come out looking so good on that one and they blamed me. They were upset with the dissent message I filed and the fact that it leaked. In fact, I had to wait until the change of administration in Washington and a new EUR front office before I could get any onward assignment in the European Bureau. It was not that I didn't have the support of the most of the rank and file. It was that I didn't have the support of the front office itself. When the front office changed, several of my colleagues in Washington pushed hard for me to get a good onward assignment within the bureau. It appeared that the science counselor in Ottawa might be the right job. It looked like a busy enough job at the time with acid rain negotiations going on and clear air a major bone of contention between Canada and the United States. I'm afraid it didn't turn out as busy or important a position as I hoped it would be. My predecessor was the first to get the Minister Counselor designation. But, in fact the job didn't merit that rank or title. And it didn't keep it for long. There are a number of reasons for this.

Q: I would think the business relations and everything were so close.

COMRAS: Right. Our embassy in Ottawa is a strange bird. It is an embassy having difficulty understanding its role. And that's because the relationship between Washington and Ottawa is so close and so strong. There was almost no need for an embassy. And the Canadian Embassy in Washington kind of usurped the main role of communicator between Washington and Ottawa, anyway. There didn't seem room for both embassies to play that role. The Canadian embassy in Washington was much much bigger in size, and had direct access to the highest levels in the Foreign Office and Prime Ministers Office. The Embassy in Ottawa worked through an office in Washington that was, in many respects an adjunct within the Office of European Affairs.

As I said, the relations between Ottawa and Washington were very close. Much of the business between the capitals was conducted directly, through simple phone calls, or through personal visits. It was just so easy for officials in both capitals to talk with each other directly. There was really no need for an intermediary. The Officials in one agency knew their counterparts in the other country well, and on a first name basis. They did not change as often as those assigned to the embassy. This was particularly the case in the areas involving science and technology. Having an attaché for science and technology in Ottawa made as much sense as having an attaché in Chicago. The scientific and technical agencies and communities worked so closely together already. Scientists moved freely between the two countries. In fact many worked in each others countries. And these people knew a lot more about the technical and scientific issues that were of concern to them, than I ever could.

When somebody in Environment Canada wanted to talk to somebody in EPA, they got on the phone and talked directly. When those interested in space station issues wanted to talk about space station issues they spoke directly - the Canadian space agency directly with NASA. People from the U.S. government agencies would often visit Ottawa without even telling the embassy they were coming or that they were there. In fact, they never bothered the embassy. They just came and went. We might find out about it later, or we might not.

The United States never seemed to treat Canada with the same urgency or level of interest that the Canadian government took vis a vis the United States. Most of the issues appeared to be one-way. I guess the Canadians had a much greater need to try and influence decisions in Washington than the U.S. had to influence decisions in Ottawa. I learned that again first hand when, later, I became the Director of the Office of Canadian Affairs. But that comes much later in my oral history.

All this is to say that the embassy in Ottawa had a particularly hard time understanding and fulfilling its role.

Also, I probably was not fully suited to be a Science Counselor. My background was a legal one, not a scientific one. Of course I had a good foundation in high technology that came from my COCOM years. Yet, advances in science and technology had probably passed me by.

Shortly after I arrived in Ottawa the post underwent a major inspection cycle. The inspectors began asking hard questions about the role and function of the embassy. And they had a lot of hard questions to ask of me - What did I do. How did I do it. How successful was I. What additional support did I need. What were my most important duties and my least important duties, etc. I guess it dawned on the inspectors pretty quickly that my position was marginal and over-ranked. In fact, my most exciting responsibilities seemed to be associated with making hotel and meeting reservations, and accompanying visiting dignitaries. I think they decided wisely to recommend that the position be downgraded and integrated into the Embassy's economic section. That's where it had been before my predecessor was given his vaulted title.

The Embassy fought these recommendations tooth and nail. But, for me, the writing was on the wall. I needed to move on at the first opportunity - particularly if I wanted to remain competitive for promotion and advancement. Also, I just found the job BORING.

About that same time I received some encouragement from friends in Washington to put my name up for election as chairman of the Open Forum. The Open Forum had been an important institution for creative and alternative thinking in the Department of State for decades. It had played an important role in channeling constructive dissent and allowing for internal policy debate. But, it had declined in the late 1980s and was on the verge of disappearing. My friends suggested that I was the perfect person to reinvigorate the institution and win its renewal. I decided to accept the challenge. I won the election by an absolute landslide. In fact I got just about all the votes. Now I needed the Embassy to release me so that I could take up what is one of the very few elected positions in the State Department. With the Ambassador's permission, I curtailed in Ottawa and went back to Washington to be the chairman of the Open Forum from summer of '90 to '91. I think the Ambassador was happy to see me go.

Q: Sticking to Canada, people who served in Canada talk often about having to deal with the great sensitivity of Canadians to American relations where Americans really don't think about Canadian relations. Did you run across this?

COMRAS: Oh, yes. Canada is much more aware of American attitudes, feelings, prejudices, and policies than Americans are aware of the Canadians. Canadians enjoy being our closest

neighbors and being able to travel to and through the United States, They enjoy crossing the border to buy products in the United States, They enjoy being able to move freely in the United States and to be accepted mostly as if they were American. But, they also enjoy being able to define themselves differently than Americans. They like their cake and want to eat it, too. They are often resentful that Americans take them for granted. But all that aside, we're truly brothers. Although we can have our little spats and differences, and differences of interest and view on certain economic, political and cultural issues, it's a bond that's so deep that there is no threat to it coming undone.

Q: In your position was the groundwork being laid for a free trade agreement between Canada and the United States? How was that seen?

COMRAS: This was an active period for many of my embassy colleagues that were working on bringing NAFTA about. The Embassy was engaged mostly in trying to explain NAFTA to special groups in both countries. But NAFTA was a harder sell in the United States than in Canada. Certain Canadian groups had concerns, but never were in a position to thwart an eventual agreement.

I'd like to get back to Canada a little later in the interview. You see, my real involvement with Canadian Affairs came later, when I served as the Director of the Office of Canadian Affairs 1998 until late 1999.

LAWRENCE P. TAYLOR
Economic Counselor
Ottawa (1989-1992)

Lawrence P. Taylor was born in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1940. He graduated in 1963 from the University of Ohio with a degree in history and economics and received his MA from American University. He served as a member of the Peace Corps in the province of Antioquia, Colombia, in 1963. He was posted to Yugoslavia, Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Canada, England, and Estonia.

Q: You were in Canada from '89 to when?

TAYLOR: '92.

Q: As economic counselor, is that right?

TAYLOR: Yes.

Q: What was the job of economic counselor?

TAYLOR: Well, "many" is the answer to that. You've got to manage the economic section; you've got to work within an interagency structure in Ottawa of a number of economic agencies

and players to get a cohesive and strategic product and program for the U.S. government; you've got to work closely with the Ambassador and DCM to make sure that they're priorities are integrated into the way your section and the way you operate. And we have a very large number of consulates in Canada - it's a decentralized society and economy - that have very important economic dimensions to their consular districts, and you have to work with the principal officers in all of those consulates on a number of economic issues.

Now, those are all sort of process and relationship answers to your question. There was one overriding task at the time I was there, which was to get a really strong and effective implementation of the recently negotiated U.S.-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, which was still extraordinarily controversial and unpopular in Canada.

Q: Before we move to that, who was the ambassador?

TAYLOR: The Ambassador was Ed Ney, who was the former chairman of Young and Rubicam, a political appointee by President Bush.

Q: N-e-y?

TAYLOR: N-e-y, yes, like Marshall Ney, that's right.

Q: How did he operate?

TAYLOR: He operated first by being an incredibly hard worker at all levels. He worked hard at establishing a relationship with his normal contacts in the Canadian government and Canadian society, and he worked hard at getting on top of the way an embassy functioned and establishing priorities and trying to move the embassy functions in the directions that he believed were the most important. I liked Ambassador Ney very much, and he's a good personal friend today. One of the stories I'll tell you was when we first prepared the Mission Program Plan - you know what that is, a huge document that matches resources and priorities - it went down to him for signature. It was about 23 pages long. It took him about five minutes to stroll out of his office and call us all together and inform us that he'd only been the chairman of a very large private sector organization and that any organization that had its priorities on more than one page simply didn't have any priorities because it had too many and, therefore, it couldn't focus. And he wanted to see the Mission Program Plan on one page.

After a week of heartache, the 23-page Mission telegram had become a 21½-page telegram, and there wasn't going to be any further reduction without violence in the embassy, and that was sent back to him. Well, he couldn't... So he came out and informed us that he would go ahead and write his own Mission Program Plan on one page and called me down about three hours later and showed me his one-page Mission Program Plan. It was very interesting. It was on one page. It had five priorities. They were all completely understandable and actionable. It was not written in good Foreign Service language. I mean, you know, it didn't have all the nuances and the flow and so forth, so I said, let me have a shot at this, and I took it upstairs, and I just took his exact ideas and put them in more fluent Foreign Service language and brought it back down to him, and once he had that he was very happy with it. And he sent it out to Washington in a cable and

sent it out to all the principal officers and gave it to every section chief in the embassy and said, "Go ahead now, send in your 21½-page cable because some bureaucrat in Washington might need it, but *this is the real plan*. You guys organize, prioritize, and make this work." And I have to say, if you could find one person in the whole world who remembers anything that was in the 21½-page plan, I'll - give you my house. I'll give it to you. There's also about a score of people who could probably remember all five of the priorities he had on one page, and certainly one or two of them. It was a much better product, in terms of being actionable. It had no bureaucratic value, the way the other thing did, but in terms of what we did in Canada; USIS [United States Information Service] redid its whole plan to fit into those five priorities; consulates redid reporting plans and representation plans. It was very good and very actionable, and it taught me a very good lesson.

Q: *What were some of the priorities?*

TAYLOR: First priority was strong and effective implementation of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, just what I thought it should be.

Q: *Well, what was the status of the Free Trade Agreement when you arrived in '89?*

TAYLOR: It was a done deal, signed, delivered, and ratified, but brand-new and as yet untested and still very controversial in Canada. And that was at a time in the economic cycle where things were not all that robust in the United States, but they were less robust in Canada and would be moving, not dramatically downward, but gradually downward over the next two or three years - I mean the little mini-recession that killed George Bush, in a sense, was even deeper in Canada, and that led the critics of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement to come out of every bush and from behind every tree to claim that the downturn there was not just associated with but was a result of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement.

Q: *What was sort of the feeling in Canada, as you were monitoring it, about this free trade agreement? Was it a particularly popular one, or was this... It was Mulroney, wasn't it? He was the -*

TAYLOR: Yes, Mulroney was the Prime Minister.

Q: *Was this felt to be something the Americans put over on the Canadians? I mean, what were you getting?*

TAYLOR: Well, it was very controversial, and probably the majority of voters in Canada were critical or suspicious or negative about it. You know, U.S.-Canada free trade has a long history in our relationship, and that idea has been squelched often in the past, usually by Canadian leaders who are symbols of Canadian nationalism and sovereignty standing up and certainly protecting Canada from being swallowed up by this huge economy and social system and culture to the south of it. And so in those portions of the country that subscribe to this sort of view of the United States and this sort of nationalist definition of being Canadian, this agreement was very unpopular. So that included large sections of Ontario, by far the most populous province, but the Free Trade Agreement was popular in Quebec, which just has to be different from Ontario no

matter what, and it was popular out west in Alberta as well.

Q: Well, did you find yourself having to go around saying “Gee, this is a great thing?”

TAYLOR: Well Ambassador Ney wanted me to do that, and I kind of resisted that because I felt that I represented the American government, and I didn't mind going around talking about the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, but it didn't seem to me that my role was to be a cheerleader for Canadian political decisions. I thought Canadian ministers and government officials, my counterpart in the Foreign Ministry and in other ministries, should go around and make that case to the Canadian public and that my job was, frankly, to make sure that it got implemented in a professional and strong and effective way that protected American interests. And I really didn't want to sort of get on the line of trying to say this is a good deal for you. I mean, that's for them to decide. I wanted to make sure it was a good deal for us. It is a win-win deal. It opens markets. It creates new opportunities for players on both sides of the border, reduced bottlenecks and impediments to trade, so both countries should win. And I'm perfectly comfortable explaining that concept and that theory, but I did not want to become a cheerleader for the Canadian government and particularly for a government that itself was reluctant to step out and defend the agreement.

Q: How did you feel with the various ministers and their subordinates in the Canadian government? Were they looking at this agreement as a political document, or were they looking hard at the economics of it?

TAYLOR: I think both, and they knew that the economy was in a shape that was going to cause criticism for this agreement, but that's cyclical and short-term, so they didn't want to run out and get in the way of that tidal wave. I think the government that negotiated this and signed it fundamentally believed that was in the long-term interests of Canada to do this and that Canada would greatly benefit from entering into this whole new relationship in North America, and these people were content to let time show that that would be the case and not to get caught up in today's newspaper headline or next week's economic statistic, so in a way, I think they adopted a sound strategy for the circumstance of the moment.

Also, they had other priorities. They had just signed this agreement they were confident in the long run would be validated by circumstances and events, but at the time, their country was crumbling apart again. It was the old Quebec-English Canada issue, and I think rather than sort of cheerlead for an agreement he'd already signed, the Prime Minister and the government of the day felt they'd better get on and deal with the Quebec question.

Q: What about the intellectual community?

TAYLOR: Oh, totally against it, totally against it. Again, Quebec would be an exception, but again, the intellectual fountainhead of Canada in Ontario, in the University of Toronto and all of their world-class authors and so on - they were very much against it as a sellout of Canadian identity, Canadian nationalism, Canadian culture.

Q: What about the cultural issue? I mean, this has been something that's gone on for so long,

basically the American spillover of its TV, it's magazines, media, and all that into the Canadian thing. Was this a problem for you?

TAYLOR: Oh, it was a big work issue, absolutely, because most of these protective measures we deemed barriers to trade and investment, and so we just came at the same situation from a different perspective. Now, I'll tell you, Stu, I have a lot of sympathy for Canadians' concerns that they have a unique and precious culture and that they want to maintain and even enhance it. The point that I tried to leave them with all the time is they were doing so in what I considered a 19th and early 20th century fashion and what they needed to think about was doing so in some sort of 21st century fashion because all of these border controls and legal restrictions, if they made any sense at all at any time, could make no sense in a period of time when technology was shifting so rapidly that any Canadian citizen in a few years (then - by now it is the case) could go down to Radio Shack and buy a little box, put it on top of their television, and beam in anything they wanted no matter what they said along the border. No matter if they lined up the Royal Canadian Mounted Police from one end of the country, it's still going to come in.

And really what they had to think about doing was getting away from these anachronistic and antiquated ideas of protectionism and try to help promote and foster a culture that was so good that it was competitive on a global basis, that it didn't need to exist in a 50-mile-long strip along our northern border, it could produce senses of identity and symbols of identity and programs and content that people south of the border and in Europe and Asia would relate to and say, "Isn't that good - it's Canadian." I don't know. Some Canadians thought that was the way to go, to look forward rather than looking back, but there's a lot of inertia there, and it had a deep root, especially in central Canada's identity, that if you open up in one generation we'll all be Americans, and that's something we don't want to do.

Q: Did you have a different set of problems with the people from Quebec? What do you call them, the Québécois or Quebeckers?

TAYLOR: Yes, either one.

Q: Did you have a different focus with them?

TAYLOR: Well, again, we have two consulates, a consulate general in Montreal and one in Quebec City, and the embassy was located right along the river. You drive across the bridge and you're in Quebec. And that is the dominant domestic political issue. So that's something that all the embassy was aware of and worked on, the political section, of course, more than anyone, but we were all involved in it in some way. Now I think it is true that Quebeckers have an affinity for the United States, in part to balance off their sort of tension with Ontario and English Canada. The Quebec energy industry, the hydroelectric industry, is financed and tied to the United States in a number of ways, and there is a kind of booming trade between Quebec and the parts of the United States that are to the south of it. So there's a lot of purely economic and commercial dimensions to it, but they're not abnormal. They're what you would expect, given the geography and the state of development in the region. I think the overriding issue there is the future of Quebec within Canada, and the issue I worked on from the Economic Section most closely was a point of view that came out of Washington which I radically disagreed with. There was an

analysis done in Washington, the bottom line of which was that Quebec could not economically afford to be independent, and that is nutty. That is such a nutty point of view. Of course it can afford to be independent if it wishes. There may be costs, but it may wish to pay them. You know, I was ambassador in Estonia, and I can still look at the documents in which the Russians said, "Well, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, they'll never be independent; they're too small to be independent; they can't afford to go it alone." Well, they're doing much better than Russia, thank you very much - much, much better. And Quebec could easily afford to go it alone. So I did an awful lot of work on sort of saying, "I'm not predicting Quebec's going to go it alone, but if you're relying on an argument that economically it can't afford to and therefore will not, you have a flawed argument, and that's not one that we here at the embassy subscribe to."

Q: Was the argument that was coming from the Department basically politically motivated, do you think?

TAYLOR: I thought it was self-serving, and I thought it was people who really didn't understand economics at all reaching for an easy answer to a complicated problem.

Q: You were the economic counselor, so I imagine you were part of the country team.

TAYLOR: Oh, yes.

Q: How were we viewing the Mulroney work on this? Or was this the Lake Accord?

TAYLOR: Meech Lake, yes, it started as Meech Lake, right.

Q: What was our response to this?

TAYLOR: Well we followed it very closely, I mean, incredibly closely, and we have very good contacts, and Canada is an open country, and everybody spoke to us and wanted us to know what was going on. So an immense amount, a steady stream of reporting, very good, accurate reporting, and it was headlines in Canada, it was the be-all and end-all of the six o'clock news for months and so many strange twists and turns, so it was a fascinating story. I think the U.S. position on this issue has always been that we value and support a strong and united Canada, but that Canada's political future is up to Canadians to decide. Now you don't have to be a mind-reader or a genius to know that means we'd like to see Canada stay together because that's just the best possible outcome for the United States, and all of us, therefore, were hoping that things like the Meech Lake Accord would work in satisfying the differing aspirations and expectations of Canada's diverse people, and I think it came close, but through a variety of unbelievable situations - and some fundamental flaws that sat beneath it - it did not pass, and now we sit... You know, it's important to understand - again, people will differ, and I'm not an expert on the Meech Lake Accord, that was for the Political Section to evaluate - in my view the Meech Lake Accord in no way would have solved the fundamental problems of French and English Canada. What it would have done is it would have channeled those tensions and disagreements and conflicts into a legal channel for a generation. It would have provided a new road in which to quarrel and fight, but a road that would have kept Quebec in the system while it did so, and that's what was lost, in my view, a long term process, sort of conflict resolution, that would have

prevented, at least for a long time, any sort of movement toward ultimate breakup. It wasn't that Meech Lake would have solved these things; it just would have moved it in a more healthy and more constructive channel than the one that it happened to in. But that opportunity was lost, and so we sit here today now, you know, people talking about another referendum sometime soon.

Q: *What was the feeling about Mulroney at the embassy?*

TAYLOR: Well, again, he and President Reagan had, I think, a close relationship, shared a philosophy. I think those of us who followed the system and who knew Canada fairly well - I mean, I'd been there at that point almost seven years toward the end and had a lot of Canadian friends - knew that Mulroney was terribly unpopular in Canada and couldn't win reelection and so forth, but I thought the relationship with the United States was extremely good while he was Prime Minister.

Q: *What about the Maritime Provinces? You know, whenever you talk about Quebec breaking away, you've got those provinces out there which are not self-sufficient.*

TAYLOR: Yes, you're absolutely right.

Q: *And in a way, one can almost, I mean, you have the feeling that everyone in Canada looks sort of towards us and says, well, what are you going to do about them?*

TAYLOR: Yes, there is a lot of that. Let me tell you, the point I made earlier about trying to deal with this idea in Washington that Quebec couldn't afford to separate, which I think is absolutely wrong. At the end of my analysis I came to the point you're making - but it's more than the Maritime Provinces - and argued instead, at least for argumentation's sake, not in a conclusive sense, that Canada couldn't survive without Quebec, that if Quebec went, it was not Quebec that was going to fall apart, it was the rest of Canada that would fall apart, and it began in the Maritimes, that they would crumble. So I think your point is an extremely good one, and I think that it's a huge unanswered question what the ripple effects would be in Canada if Quebec were to obtain its sovereignty, and I suspect there would be a movement in some provinces to try to join the United States, bizarre as that may seem to us -

Q: *No, I mean the logic of the lines of communication are such that -*

TAYLOR: Sure, it already exists, that the people in Nova Scotia feel a lot closer to the people in Boston than they do to people in Vancouver, and vice versa. People in Boston feel closer to people in Nova Scotia than they do in San Diego in many respects. So you remember that book *The Nine Nations of North America*, that has this map on it and says, sure, there's three political nations here, but what you've got is nine social and cultural and economic entities, and North Atlantic North America is one of those, sure.

Still, you know, I don't think they'd be very happy as part of the United States. They think Ottawa is overbearing in this tremendously decentralized system. They have no idea what [laughter] overbearing is really like once they joined the United States!

Q: Yes, I mean it's not as though one were sitting there plotting; in fact, it's like seeing your neighbor's house fall apart and saying, my God, who's going to weed the yard next door? Somebody's got to do it.

TAYLOR: And we've still got a consulate in Halifax, which is interesting.

Q: Were you watching developments in Vancouver and all? I mean, were you beginning to watch this Asiatic change, money going in.

TAYLOR: Yes, sure.

Q: It's a remarkable thing that's happening. Could you talk about how we saw that?

TAYLOR: Well, I think we just saw it. I'm not sure that we had a judgment about it at the time in terms of what it meant for U.S. interests, except to some extent it was a lot of money - and people - who for one reason or another couldn't locate in the U.S., which might have been their first preference, finding a way to do so in Canada. But we have, still have and had at the time, an extraordinarily effective consul general in Vancouver and one in Calgary as well, and as the economic minister at the embassy, I traveled out there a lot and worked very closely with them on these sorts of things. We saw it as a trend; they saw it in sort of nuts and bolts terms, right where they lived every day in terms of the effects on the economy and immigration and property values and so forth. So that was something we were clearly on top of.

Q: In many ways this continues today. Canada, with all its problems, is an extremely dynamic and changing place, and everything that happens there has some repercussions. Did you find yourself having to sort of monitor our states along the border?

TAYLOR: What an interesting question. When I first went there, back in the early '80s, there was actually a position established, as well as one in Mexico, I believe. The officer worked exclusively on regional relations, state, provincial, and border community relations because so many of the decisions in the U.S.-Canadian relationship are made at that level without any reference to Washington or Ottawa whatsoever, and I thought it was a terrifically innovative idea. It fell victim to budget cuts and priorities. It may be time to bring that back, though, in my view, given the way the economy and social systems are developing. But the state and provincial relationships, regional governors and provincial premier conferences, and so forth are just absolutely critical. Now they're generally covered out of the relevant consulates general now, so that our consuls general in Halifax will go to the Maritime Provincial and New England governors conference and so forth; same thing out on the West Coast. But it's a fascinating thing. In fact, I remember back in the early 1980s, just to regress back into the period of the national energy program, Larry Eagleburger, who at that time was assistant secretary for European affairs, I believe, gave this speech in New York in which he claimed, rightly, that U.S.-Canadian relations were falling into an abyss as a result of the implications of the National Energy Program, and that's sort of what they were. And I remember a senior official in the Canadian Foreign Ministry mention to me at dinner, he said, "Larry, relations between our two countries have never been worse." And my response was then we ought to be ashamed of ourselves because the average Canadian and the average American who cross this border millions of times

a week and who have the world's largest commercial relationship don't know that, and somehow we're not meeting the standard they're setting, so why don't we start to get with it? And the point is, I think, what you've just mentioned, that the U.S. Canadian relationship is a whale of a lot more than the diplomatic and government-to-government relationship, and those of us who work in the government-to-government channel really need to keep that in mind and not think that we're the center of the universe in that relationship.

Q: Was there still the usual thing during this time where the Canadian foreign office, or what do they call it -

TAYLOR: External Affairs.

Q: -External Affairs was sort of going and making a big point of their Canadian-made policy and all this?

TAYLOR: Oh, yes. This was the heyday, this was the last hurrah of it, but boy it had a big bang before it collapsed - the National Energy Program, FIRA (the Foreign Investment Review Agency), everything was made in Canada, "be Canadianized," Canadian ownership - it was Pierre Trudeau's last effort, and if oil prices had gone up, he might have gotten away with it. But they went down, and the whole thing collapsed.

Q: You were saying they'd bet the barn on -

TAYLOR: Rising secular oil prices.

Q: It didn't happen.

TAYLOR: It didn't happen.

Q: Were there any great energy problems? I'm thinking about electric power and things like this. Did this get into your bailiwick?

TAYLOR: Well, it was in my bailiwick in the first period in Canada, '80-84, and by '89-92 it's still in my bailiwick, but it wasn't an issue. Now in the earlier period, thank goodness, that the commercial partners and the regulatory authorities at the National Energy Board in Canada and down here in FERC and ERA at the time, before ERA went out of business, were run by very sensible, pragmatic people who refused to let this political ideology and philosophy get in the way of making sane, sensible decisions. So the on-the-ground practical cooperation in the pipeline business and in the cable or transmission business and so forth was not affected by these sort of big policy and political disputes.

Q: When you were at your desk, you open up what would be The Toronto Mail or the -

TAYLOR: [The Toronto] Globe and Mail, sure.

Q: [The Toronto] Globe and Mail or something. Would this be something that represented sort

of an Ottawa establishment, of blasting you? How did you set your agenda?

TAYLOR: Well, first, at least while I was there, and it's just a personal style, I have a very aggressive outreach to the media. I try to know all the key reporters in the area for which I'm responsible and make sure I have good relationships with them. Now some of them have their own agenda, and it's not going to work. But most of them are delighted, and I have to say that in both '80 to 84 and in '89 to 92, our position on the issues for which I was responsible were continuously and fairly represented in the mainstream Canadian media. I thought that went with my job, to be sure that that happened. Now editorializing on big things like the Free Trade Agreement, that was always going to be sensitive and touchy, but I tried to make sure that it was balanced somewhat by sort of talking with us at the embassy and getting our view.

Q: What was your feeling as you looked at the Free Trade Agreement? Obviously you were monitoring it and all. Did it seem to be on track?

TAYLOR: Yes, it was on track. It had some teething problems in some of its mechanisms, but that's to be expected. You just work them out. You work them out together, and make the thing work and go forward. There were no real problems with the Free Trade Agreement. It can't solve everything. Some issues are too big to be solved by it or too sensitive, but what it did was it opened up opportunities in trade and investment that didn't exist before, to entrepreneurs and companies on both sides of the border and established dispute resolution mechanisms that were mutually agreed, that while they didn't cover 100 percent of the issues, and couldn't, covered an awful lot of them and provided for a professional, mutually recognized way of coming to a bottom line about how to proceed in areas where we couldn't do that previously.

Q: Well, were you looking around for business opportunities for Americans in Canada? Were the Canadians or their equivalent doing the same for Canadians? Or were you sort of letting gravity take care of that situation?

TAYLOR: Well, more the latter. I do remember that when Larry Eagleburger, I think, was deputy secretary - I think this was '89-92, he sent out a worldwide cable from him to ambassadors saying get in there and promote American goods. That's at the top of your agenda and make sure it's done. I remember Ambassador Ney called me down and he showed me this cable, and he said, "What am I going to do? Politicians here don't make decisions about American goods." I said give me this, I wrote him a nice thing to send back. Of course we had a much stronger argument - we didn't live in a country where you had to go in and twist arms on a project-by-project, trade-by-trade agenda. We lived were in a country where we liberalized the whole damn economy through the [North American] Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA] and through its effective implementation. We didn't just get one deal or this trade deal, we got billions and billions of dollars and thousands and thousands of new deals through changing the rules of the game, and that's a much more ambitious and a much stronger way to approach these things when you're in a country that's willing to do that. Now if you're in Indonesia at the time, or something like that, you've got to go in and twist arms on a deal-by-deal basis. Yes, we tried to affect the rules of the game in ways then that the weight of gravity gave American companies then many, many more opportunities than they could have had previously. And I think the embassy there, in the period I was there and the previous period, just did a tremendously

successful job of that, and then toward the end of my time, Ambassador Ney made quite a strong point, and I think it was very effective, when President Bush announced there would be a free-trade agreement between - you can go back and read President Bush's announcement on the free trade agreement with Mexico. It was announced as a bilateral agreement. And I think Ed Ney was one of the first - of course, it became a bandwagon, but he was one of the first - to go in and say no, Mr. President, we need a NAFTA, It's got to be Canada, U.S., and Mexico, and so taking the Canada-U.S. agreement, not just as a great achievement (which it was) but then as a stepping-stone to the NAFTA, was sort of what dominated the last eight months or so of my time there, and Ambassador Ney was extremely effective in working with Washington in promoting that.

Q: What was sort of the initial reaction when Mexico was sort of raised on your part and maybe other people and within Canadian -

TAYLOR: It was ho-hum.

Q: Really?

TAYLOR: Yes, because there's so little trade between Canada and Mexico, they did not immediately see they needed to be in this, which was a little disconcerting for Ambassador Ney's and the embassy's argument that this should be a three-way agreement, when one of the parties was a little slow to get out of the starting blocks. But again, it was just a question of timing. After a little while, as soon as the idea started to percolate around, the leadership there grabbed on real quick. They'd better be in on this or they were going to get left out-

Q: Right.

TAYLOR: And that what would happen is there would be a hub-and-spoke system in which the United States would be the hub and there would just be a series of bilateral agreements.

Q: Were there any particular industries or corporations or anything else that were particularly problems either way that you recall during this?

TAYLOR: Listen, sure, this is one of the big educational things, and again, I thought it was handled beautifully. It is a model. In the negotiations for the free trade agreement and then for the NAFTA, USTR and the whole establishment, USTR as the lead -

Q: The U.S. Trade Representative.

TAYLOR: Yes, and you know, it was Carla Hills back in the days when I was there - but really set up a whole process of engaging American industry and American workers to give them an avenue to make their views known and the bring them along. If we hadn't done that, these things couldn't have... I mean, they may have been good ideas economically; they would have been dead politically. It was an absolute political prerequisite. I thought it was done beautifully. And so these industry consuls and advisory groups and participation were all a part of the process, and an essential part of the process.

Q: Well, were you watching with a certain amount of trepidation that concerned that we might be too successful in getting American business into Canada? You know, it had to be pretty sure that Canadian businesses got into the United States; otherwise we'd have a real problem.

TAYLOR: No, again, I think here what you do is you open opportunities, and then you let the chips fall where they may. Once you start to be worried about how the chips are falling, that's a degree of micro-management that I would be uncomfortable with in a relationship like the U.S. and Canada. If Canada isn't strong enough and big enough to be able to play under the new rules, then it shouldn't agree to them. That's why I didn't want to go out and defend the agreement in Canada as good from Canada's point of view. It creates reciprocal and equal opportunities, but they have to be taken advantage of, and I think experience has shown that the Canadians have been able to step up to the plate and handle those opportunities.

Q: Well, was there any concern that the Canadians might have been used to a too cozy relationship and that this might have dulled their competitiveness when they had to come in and play games in the United States?

TAYLOR: They had been too used to a cozy relationship, but I think, fortunately, they developed a vision of Canada at just the right time, a Canada that, if it was going to be competitive, looking ahead into the 21st century, had to set sail, had to have the courage and the confidence to move away from its sheltered shores and take on some bigger risks for the sake of the bigger opportunities. If you look at the way the global economy has accelerated in the last 10 years, if Canada had rejected the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, it would have condemned itself to a degree of second-class performance in the world economy that was unnecessary.

Q: What about Cuba? Was that a burr under our saddle?

TAYLOR: Always, always up in Canada.

Q: Any problems, particular problems, during the time you were on the country team there?

TAYLOR: Always, because of the differences that the two governments have in their approach to Cuba and then because there's American investment or ownership in some Canadian companies, but companies located in and operating out of Canada, which laws are they supposed to follow? But it never exploded to the point where it became a crisis. It's just one of these burrs under the saddles that rubs you the wrong way when, on occasion, you have to deal with it and move on. So that's still - I just saw in the news the other night that senior U.S. officials were briefing the media about their unhappiness that the Canadian Prime Minister is going to Cuba soon. Maybe he's there already, I don't know. So that's still an irritant.

Q: What was our analysis at that time? Was Cuba really an issue, or was this one place where you showed that, by God, you were Canadian and had a different policy? Or were the Canadians really interested?

TAYLOR: No, they were interested, and it was both. There was a lot in intellectual circles and in

Canadian nationalist circles. There was some sympathy for some guy in Cuba that would stand up and poke American culture and the American economy and the American political system in the eye, but some of it was just occasionally “We’re Canadians - we’ve got to have a different position on something than the American do, and we’ve got to be able to get away with it occasionally, too.” So that dimension was in there as well.

Q: Well, Larry, was there anything else we should cover, do you think, on Canada?

TAYLOR: No, it’s a great country. You never hear about it when you’re down here south of the border, but when you’re up there you’ve got a lot of nice people, a unique culture, and a lot of interesting issues. And I think I mentioned in the first period that it was probably the nicest family community, from middle-class American values and standards, that we’ve ever had the pleasure of living in. We’ve still got a lot of friends up there, and I certainly enjoyed my time there, and I think I was lucky that I got to work on two big issues, the National Energy Program and FIRA and Trudeau’s last gasp of social federalism in Canada in the earlier period, and then the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and the NAFTA in the second period. So it was a good experience.

JOHN RATIGAN
Chief Consular Officer
Toronto (1989-1992)

Mr. Ratigan was born in New York, raised in Minnesota and educated at Dartmouth College and Yale Law School. After service in the Peace Corps and ten years in private law practice, in 1973 he joined the Foreign Service. A specialist in consular matters, and particularly immigration, Mr. Ratigan served as Consul Officer in Teheran, Cairo, Toronto and Seoul and from 1984 to 1985 as immigration specialist and Pearson Fellow on the Senate Immigration Subcommittee. In 1989 he again served on that subcommittee as immigration expert. Mr. Ratigan was interviewed by Ray Ewing in 2007.

Q: So you went up to Toronto, You were the chief of the consular section. This was 1989. There was a consul general named John Hall you said who was an economic commercial officer by background. I assume the consular section of Toronto is a pretty big part of that post.

RATIGAN: It is. What did we have we probably had close to 15 officers.

Q: In the consular section alone.

RATIGAN: Twelve, fourteen, fifteen something like that. Anyway it was a good size. It was by far the biggest thing I had done to date as far as supervisory duties.

Q: Probably many of them were first tour.

RATIGAN: Yes. You know I mentioned earlier that Con Gen Rosslyn was the beginning of the time when I spent, call it mentoring or whatever, but I spent a lot of time supervising junior officers. We saw, since Canadians don't need visas, our visa clientele was people from everywhere but Canada. So it was from that point of view a more interesting visa experience I think than most other visa posts provide. We saw bundles of Russians because Russia was going to hell at that time. A lot of chaos over there.

Q: But they were able to get to Canada.

RATIGAN: They were able to get to Canada. I never knew quite how. So we were regularly in contact with the consulates in Moscow and St. Petersburg and so forth about these Russians we were seeing. You know you just saw a wide variety of people from around the world, I will just spend a little more time. Toronto is a kind of vestibule to the United States. Well Canada is but Toronto in particular was a place where people could go to get sort of last chance visa opportunities. So we would get, and of course there were people coming up out of the States. So you saw a fair number of unusual cases. We saw, for example, we had visits from both Mick Jagger and Keith Richards of the Rolling Stones because their drug convictions made them ineligible, and they had to get waivers and so on, so they came to Toronto.

Q: Came from where, the U.S.?

RATIGAN: I think they came from abroad, from presumably London but it could have been almost anywhere. It was kind of interesting. I will just take a brief time to say that Mick Jagger couldn't have been more charming. He came in and signed. All the FSNs knew he was coming in. He came not in a waiting room but behind the glass and so forth, and the FSN's were ready for him and they had record albums and clothing and everything you could imagine. He just couldn't have been more charming. Keith Richard the guitarist couldn't have been more the opposite. He looked like he was still in a drug daze and didn't spend really any time. He had a "manager", my sole recollection of it was she had about the shortest skirt I have ever seen. She ran around and did business for Keith Richard and he waited in somebody's office. Somebody's dark office I will say. So we had a number of kind of unusual things like that.

Q: You mentioned that some people came from the U.S. to get a, to regularize their status?

RATIGAN: There has been a long standing practice about people whose visas run out or who change status or whatever. We had a number of hockey players who would come up and get their visas to go in and play. Some of the Czechs or Poles or Russians I suppose whose visas we couldn't issue for more than a year or something like that. They had to do this almost every year. So we saw a fair number of this. So for all of these people who wanted to come up or come to Toronto for a visa we had an appointment system. There was an 800 or a 900 number you would call and get an appointment and pay for it and come in. We, to carry on a little bit more about that, we had problems making the facilities which were probably 60 years old, many decades old in Toronto. A great location right on University Blvd, but out of date. So one of the things that we did was to rent a trailer and bring the trailer right into the parking lot behind the consulate general. So we got the trailer and took it off its wheels and set it right down there and it gave us basically three additional windows to do whatever we needed to do with visa applicants. It got a

little cold in the winter, but on the other hand the volume wasn't as great either. When they finally took the trailer out of there, one of the FSNs showed me, sent me the photographs of the trailer leaving the parking lot. So it was there for quite awhile, and served a very useful purpose in helping us to adapt the space to our needs, for maybe ten years or so. I had a couple of other things that I might just say about living in Canada. It was a bit of a shock to me. Well there were a number of things, but it was probably the most. We rented a house on a block, my wife and I, that was probably where we still have friends. We made wonderful friends there. We still go back. We just got an invitation to their annual block party cum golf tournament. This was 10-12 years later. It was a great experience in that sense, but also I mean Canadian, so many Americans who haven't been there think oh Canadians are just like us. They are definitely not just like us. They don't appreciate our saying so. One of the best books I ever read on this subject was a book called "Why We Act Like Canadians" by a French Canadian named Pierre Berton. It just tells why Canadians are different and why they react differently to things than we do. It is very good. I always recommend it to people, new officers or just friends or whoever just plans to go up there. I won't try to summarize his points but it is definitely a different experience. You see it every day when you wake up and as I did went out to the front step and hauled in the Toronto Star. The Star is an eminently more readable paper than the Globe and Mail which is probably a better paper but not nearly as interesting. The Toronto Star found a way literally every day to take a whack at Americans. It got to be a pain. You just realized there is a different point of view on these things. When we first met our landlady, for instance, we had not been talking with our landlady for more than ten minutes at the most before the subject of the War of 1812 came up. The Canadians are still upset that basically we took a swipe at Toronto in the war of 1812 and weren't very nice to them. So along that same general line when I was there and John Hall was still the CG, we had a call one day from a U.S. military fort at Fort Drum in upstate New York right near the Canadian border. We didn't get a call, actually I think it was a cable. The Fort Drum PR people said we have got a request from Canadian television channel to bring a reporter and a camera man down to Fort Drum so they can interview the commandant and take pictures of the place that will be the jumping off point for the U.S. invasion of Canada. The request was I mean from all that we could determine the request was made in seriousness, and certainly the fort was taking it seriously. You know I think there is some background around Fort Drum and certainly areas around upstate New York in terms of military planning going back 200 years or something. This just came out of the blue, and I think John Hall basically said, "Tell them very nicely to get lost. We are not going to host a reporter," I forget the exact advice. But the fact that the request for guidance came – and had to be sent -- was indicative of some of the sensibilities that still go on up there. And then the first Iraq war went on when I was up there. Just about the time that it began the CG got contacted, this was Mike Durkee at the time who succeeded John Hall. He received a call from the RCMP, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police about security. They had observed and even arrested some people who were looking at license numbers and license plates and so forth in the parking lot of the U.S. embassy in Ottawa. So the RCMP was concerned that there was going to be retaliation against the United States in Canada. So Mike Durkee basically had an RCMP bodyguard around the clock 24 hours. I think it was just one person, but there may have been a driver. Anyway Mike was fully covered. They assigned an RCMP car to basically sit outside of my house, our house 24 hours a day. Of course I went to work on my own, but the house was there. So of course this kind of made us rock stars in the neighborhood. But the only unusual incident that occurred was one night we decided to order pizza for dinner, so the pizza man shows up and comes up to the house and rings the doorbell

and so forth. I came to the door and paid him. I am kind of looking over his shoulder and he has no idea why. He turned around and sees this Mountie who was really quite big. I think his eyes got about that big. It was quite an amusing moment. How he missed the car I don't know. It was dark, so maybe that was the explanation. It was quite a fun moment. Then after about a week it kind of ratcheted down and they withdrew the car.

Q: Interesting bit of spice, yes. Toronto the consul general in Toronto had a big consular district covering a good part of, maybe all of Ontario. It sounds like from what you said so far, most of your responsibility was supervisory of the visa issuance function. To what extent did you get involved outside of Toronto or in things other than visas?

RATIGAN: Let me just say this. There is also a very fascinating American citizen side of things and there were other non consular issues I will get to in just a sec, but one of the things you see in Toronto is the tremendous variety and complexity of the relationships between Canadians and Americans, marriages and cross border citizenships. You kind of feel there is every conceivable combination of relationships that could exist. So you get some really unique citizenship problems there, and also problems of American men or women marrying Canadians, how do they get across the border. We had quite a bit of that as well. On the non consular side, I was the number two guy, so I would fill in for John Hall or Mike Durkee at functions but I also tried to do some bit of what reporting I could. There was at that time a new political party developing in the western part of Canada. It was kind of slowly working its way east. They were trying to crack Ontario. Basically western Canada is much more compatible with the United States and sympathetic with the United States. Ontario is probably the least sympathetic of the Canadian provinces.

Q: You think Quebec is more so?

RATIGAN: Oh yeah, I do. Certainly the French Canadians in their battles with the English Canadians, they hope that the U.S., they try to treat us very well in hopes that we will not mess with them if they try to break away or that sort of thing. So what was this called. I think it was called the Reform Party. It was coming out of the west, and Prime Minister Mulroney and the Conservatives had really kind of gone down the tubes. President George Bush Senior, George H.W. Bush had come up to Toronto at one point when Mulroney was still in office but still very unpopular. Mulroney's line at the time was, "What do you mean unpopular? We have a 100% approval rating. He has got 80% and I have got 20%." So anyway out of the ashes of the Canadian conservatives came this Reform party, and a guy named Preston Manning. So I covered that development for awhile. I tried to help John and Mike with some of those things. And of course there is all kinds of lunches and business things that you have to do, so we tried to divvy that up. I certainly didn't do half, but I did a fair number. It is particularly interesting in Canada because the old traditions, in the Toronto area anyway, the old traditions are very strong. When you have a luncheon meeting or you have an honored guest, the group will have gathered in the luncheon room and the honored guest will arrive and will be piped into the room by a bag piper in full regalia and so forth. Pipes blaring, and it is just wonderful theater. Yeah they really do it up right.

Q: Let me ask a couple more questions if I may. Unless there is something else.

I know having worked on things Canadian, I know one of the chronic perennial issues for the embassy in Ottawa and I am sure all of the consulates in Canada is that American officials in Washington or elsewhere in the United States, feel that they know their Canadian counterparts and there is no reason they just can't pick up the phone and discuss something with them. They don't need to go through the embassy or through the Consulate General. They can deal directly. Was that an issue for you or a problem?

RATIGAN: I am sorry; I don't quite understand.

Q: Instead of going through the embassy or the consulate they would just deal directly.

RATIGAN: Who would?

Q: Well and official in a U.S. government agency in Washington or elsewhere.

RATIGAN: I think I didn't really run into it too much. There are of course all kinds of things going on some of which, all these cross border commissions. Some of it, I think John and Mike had a handle on some of those, but not all of them, so there was some of that you never quite know what was going on.

Q: Great Lakes commissions. Boundary commissions.

RATIGAN: Yeah Great Lakes, that sort of thing.

Q: What about I know after 9/11 and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, there is a lot of pre clearance done at Canadian ports, airports and presumably land crossings, so that American immigration and customs officials are located physically in Canada. Had that started when you were in Toronto?

RATIGAN: Actually it had. There has been quite a history of that for quite awhile. I don't know how long it goes back but certainly at the principal airports of Dorval in Montreal and Pearson in Toronto and the one in Vancouver, that has been going on for decades. I would say a couple of decades at least, that pre clearance process. I think everyone was very happy with it. From the Canadian point of view when you get off that airplane in the United States, you go right to the baggage carousel or you take your bag with you and go right to the taxi. There is no need. But definitely after 9/11 those processes, I am guessing now. I don't really know if they are back. We just heard in the last few days at the Mexican border about cranking up the screening process. They were certainly tightened at that time. Then there was also this initiative between the U.S. and Canada and I think Secretary Rice went up there or maybe it was Powell. There was an effort because the Canadian businessmen were really concerned that they were going to have problems getting access to the United States and they were going to have problems getting stuff in and so forth. They I think, really pressured the Canadian government to say you have really got to work with the Americans to make sure that this cross border movement of material and everything is smooth. So there were all kinds of efforts to work with homeland security and Canadian RCMP and all that to try and get sort of a common policy and make sort of a true

North American border so that we would have common policies on the border. How far that ever got I don't know.

Q: When you were there, to what extent did you have responsibility or knowledge or did you coordinate presumably in those days it was immigration, the INS people at the Toronto airport?

RATIGAN: We talked to them all the time.

Q: Were they part of the consulate staff?

RATIGAN: Not really but they were very well established there. There is a western suburb of Toronto called Mississauga. I think most of them lived out in Mississauga. It was pretty close to the airport, but I knew the head of the operation and we would have lunch together every couple of months or something like that. There were a lot of those guys out there, probably 25 or 30 people. It was quite a good number. So we were in regular touch. I think back briefly to the question of admissions into Canada, we always felt, and I think the INS people felt as well, the Canadians were very lenient about who they were letting in. They just had all kinds of people running around there who certainly wouldn't have made it into the United States. So we kind of thought we had to, I mean there wasn't any heightened sense of security at that point or insecurity at that point. We certainly knew there were people out there who would be applying to us for visas who were on our excludable list. How much that has changed I don't really know.

Q: OK, anything else about your three years in Toronto? Let me ask you one more question about the structure of the consulate general. I assume there was no political officer as such. The consul general and you yourself did whatever political reporting there was to be done.

RATIGAN: There was a single political econ officer. Len Hill was the guy who was there for the most part while I was there, but also Jack Felt. I think they were both econ officers but they served in that function.

Q: Were there foreign commercial service officers?

RATIGAN: Yes. Not in the building with us, but they were pretty active, and they were definitely part of a mission We saw them regularly. I think there was a two man office there of FCS, right down the street from us?

Q: Did you have a presidential visit? You mentioned President Bush.

RATIGAN: He came up to go to the ball game with Prime Minister Mulroney. But the Consulate did not have an awful lot to do with the visit.

Q: In Toronto at the Toronto Blue Jays?

RATIGAN: Yeah. Actually, we had a lot of consular business with the Blue Jays. David Wells the left handed pitcher was a star on the team, married a Canadian girl. We did all that stuff for his wife's immigrant visa, and of course there were all kinds of visas for Latin and other ball

players. So we ended up, a man named Paul Beeston who kind of later became a number two to the Commissioner of baseball was the president of the Blue Jays at the time, and just a wonderful guy and a terrific executive. I think major league baseball was very smart to grab him. Anyway I mean we had so many relationships that when I wanted to go to a game I had to say, "Look Paul, I cannot take free tickets. I need to pay for these." And it got to be a real struggle. But we did interact in many ways. So one time one of my FSNs, she had a very real proper crush on one of the ball players. We asked if we could get an autographed jersey from this guy. His name was Manny Lee. Sure enough we were able to do that and got the autographed jersey. I still hear from that FSN every Christmas.

Q: She got the shirt.

RATIGAN: Well she did, and she was a terrific FSN too. But there was more than you would expect of that kind of interaction between us. Oh and I have one wonderful story. We had one of my officers was a man named Lincoln Benedicto who had come out of Cuba in what was called the Peter Pan Brigade when he was about 10 or 12 years old. These were people who were flown out of Cuba at the time of the revolution and were re settled in the United States. So Lincoln ultimately became a foreign service officer. Then in Toronto he was the immigrant visa officer. So every morning Lincoln would go out to the waiting room, and he wouldn't stand behind the glass or he wouldn't talk to them over the microphone. He would simply go out to the waiting room and stand there and his speech would begin something like 30 years ago I was sitting where you are sitting now (as a visa applicant) and I went through this process and tell his whole sort of Horatio Alger story. One day when he did this a reporter from the Globe and Mail happened to be in the waiting room waiting for her immigrant visa. She wrote up the whole thing. It was just a wonderful story. It was a great thing for Lincoln; it was a great thing for us. It was just a great story. Lincoln was a Cuban refugee who came out of Cuba at the about the time of the revolution, and in his youth was a very good baseball player. So when his assignment ended in Toronto he was assigned to the U.S. embassy in Santo Domingo. I don't know quite how the connection was made except that we did have a lot of immigrant visa business with the Toronto blue Jays. One thing led to another and Lincoln became sort of actually sort of a semi official talent scout for the Blue Jays in Santo Domingo. It wasn't too long after that in '92 or '93, I think that the Blue Jays were in the World Series. Some of my friends in Toronto reported that the Blue Jays brought Lincoln back from Santo Domingo and sort of feted him and the other scouts at the time of the world series, taking them to lunch and giving them the congratulatory treatment and everything, which I am sure was just a wonderful moment for Lincoln. So anyway that was kind of an interesting story.

Q: Got involved in a lot of things, interesting things in Toronto. Anything else about your time in Toronto.

RATIGAN: I think not.

DELL PENDERGRAST
Public Affairs Officer, USIS

Ottawa (1990-1994)

Mr. Pendergrast was born in Illinois in 1941. He received his BA from Northwestern University and his MS from Boston University. His positions abroad included Belgrade, Zagreb, Saigon, Warsaw, Brussels and Ottawa. Charles Stuart Kennedy interviewed him on June 24, 1999.

PENDERGRAST: And, of course, the country had the added advantage of being close to the United States where we had a son in university and an elderly parent to monitor. It was also in the same time zone with Washington, but I didn't know yet whether that was an asset or a disadvantage. In any case, I left Dutch language training, had some French refresher, and then in the summer of 1990, went off to Ottawa, Canada, and spent four years there.

In many ways it was probably the most illuminating and educational experience I've had in my Foreign Service career because I went there with virtually no knowledge of Canada. Like most Americans, I took it for granted. It was there. Canada, I thought, was a *de facto* extension of the United States, but as I arrived and got into the job, I realized that you're dealing with a creature very different from the United States.

Q: Also, I would think, particularly in the kind of work you're dealing with, I won't say it's hostile, but it's one that - particularly in the media and all - there are real tensions and concerns. I mean, you're talking about a very touchy group of people.

PENDERGRAST: You're absolutely right, and I say this quite honestly after substantial overseas experience, but I have never witnessed a more virulent, almost pathological anti-Americanism than I did in Canada. I've been in Germany and in Belgium and other places, but it was almost an insidious anti-Americanism exhibited by people who are superficially very much like us, who have similar cultural background, but the Canadians - and obviously there are variations - had a very strong resentment of the United States for our power, culturally, politically, and militarily, as well as our proximity. It's a significant reality I don't think fully appreciated in the United States, where people assume the Canadians are just like Americans. The intensity varies from one region to another. Strongest by far in Ontario, the largest province of Canada. That's important, of course. The anti-Americanism weakens as you go toward the coasts, and if you get to Alberta or British Columbia or into the Maritimes, the anti-Americanism is muted or doesn't exist at all. Quebec is a separate case. The Quebecers tend to be basically positive to the United States, mainly because we're viewed as sort of a balancing force to English Canada. But the bottom line is that particularly in the dominant English Canadian establishment concentrated in Ontario, a strong undercurrent of anti-Americanism persists. I ran into it constantly in the media and the universities. On the personal level, I hasten to add, the Canadians are friendly, open, hospitable. But probing beneath the surface, one finds an often hidden impulse of resentment as well as a sometimes patronizing attitude that the United States is a violent, cold, culturally defunct society in contrast to Canada.

The attitude is not just the result of envy and insecurity but also a misguided arrogance of presumed knowledge. One of the things I always used to say to the Canadians (to Americans as well) was that the Americans know very little about Canada, which is true, but the Canadians

think they know more about us than they really do. They have this arrogant belief that they know all about America's weaknesses, problems, and shortcomings, but it is, however, a distorted image of the United States shaped by popular culture and American network news, which of course are accessible across Canada. Their direct knowledge - and this is true of most Canadians - of the United States is limited to Florida...

Q: *Or Myrtle Beach.*

PENDERGRAST: Or Myrtle Beach or maybe New York City, which they like to visit. But one USIS activity was the International Visitor program, where we selected individuals from a variety of fields and send them around the United States to get acquainted with our country. And we had a fairly large program in Canada, and people would always ask, particularly in Washington, "Why do you have a program for Canadians to come visit the United States? They can just go across the border and go to a shopping mall," which many of them do. But the program obviously was not a shopping trip. We took them to all parts of the United States, and invariably, when these people came back - including people who were anti-American by instinct - invariably would say, "You know, I'm a Canadian, and I thought I knew the United States, but I never, never did. I saw America on this trip through eyes that I'd never used before." I think - like most Canadians - they never appreciated the size of the United States, because they think that they have a large country (which they do), but they didn't realize how much larger we are in both our geography as well as population with all the regional variety, which most Canadians do not understand. They had especially little appreciation for those mainstream values and experiences found in Middle America in the small towns and cities, which I knew from my own Midwestern roots. Going to New York City or to Florida doesn't really expose them to the reality of the United States, which we helped to provide by the IV program that emphasized the variety and diversity of the United States. It was a revelation to the Canadians.

Q: *I would also suspect that the Canadians really don't know their country very well. I mean, just from what I gather - I may be wrong - people in Ottawa don't bounce over to the Maritimes or to Alberta or something. If they're going to somewhere, they're going to New York or Florida.*

PENDERGRAST: Well, that's true. One distinct impression I had after being in Canada for those years is that the country tends remarkably to be even more diverse and decentralized country than the United States. We are a diverse, multicultural country but in Canada they deliberately sanction and cultivate the heterogeneous character of the country.

Q: *Mosaic. They're not a melting pot.*

PENDERGRAST: The "mosaic" is what they constantly cite. They're not a melting pot (i.e. like the United States); they're a mosaic. And their provinces exercise far more authority than do our states. The national government is much weaker. And culturally, of course, we know the French-English gap which exists, but it goes beyond that. There's a profound regional diversity. The people in the far west of Canada almost look upon Ottawa as a foreign capital. In many ways, the people in British Columbia have more in common with the people of Washington State or Oregon than they do with the people of Ontario. So there is clearly a vast diversity, almost an estrangement, among the different peoples of Canada that creates a continuing tension and

distrust among the different parts of the country. It's not just the French-English problem, which of course continues to simmer, but a deliberately cultivated society which is a collection of many widely varying communities and regions. And I don't know whether that's going to work over the long term, particularly given the geography. They're spread like a thin ribbon across the continent, with most of the population concentrated in an area 100 miles from the U.S. border. Lacking confidence in their own unity, the Canadians always seem to be worrying about American annexation, which seems impossible to us but is a recurring theme among Canadians.

Q: God forbid!

PENDERGRAST: And I would constantly say, "Listen, we have enough problems coping with our own 50 states and our own problems." The United States hardly would want to take on more territory. But the Canadians have a great deal of insecurity and unease about the deficiencies of their own country, an explanation in fact for the patronizing, anti-American attitudes which one encounters. They view us as a society where there's more violence, more incivility, more tension, and more inequality, a contrast to their self-image as a humane, orderly country. The problem, as they've found in the last decade or so, is that the so-called just society can be expensive. Their celebrated national health insurance program, which on paper is very attractive, was starting in the early 90s and now is getting worse to bankrupt the country and compromise the quality of health care that they have - so that people with really serious problems often go to the United States for treatment. Canada is finding the elaborate, jealously protected social net more and more difficult to maintain.

Q: I have a cousin who lives in Canada, and she came down to Johns Hopkins as a surgeon.

PENDERGRAST: It's unfortunate, but Canadians have harbored this self-image of being superior to us in different ways, which simply reflects the underlying resentment toward our political, economic, and cultural power. Because they are a relatively small country next to this giant, powerful society, it makes them feel both vulnerable as well as self-conscious.

Q: Well, one last question and then I'll put at the end what . . . because we'll continue this discussion. One of the things that I've heard is that the Canadians really don't have in their own minds much of a history, and so they sort of define themselves as not being Americans.

PENDERGRAST: Yes, that analysis has a great validity, rooted in a sense of their own lack of history as an extension mainly of the British Empire as well as the cultural fragmentation between French and English Canada. Canada was not really totally independent of Great Britain until the 1960s, and so they have not had an identity apart from the Commonwealth and the British Crown that the United States enjoyed for more than 200 years. There is no real ideological or cultural unity for Canadians. They define themselves primarily in terms of not being American, a fragmented, decentralized society and culture united mainly by hockey, but most of those teams are now in the States as well.

The Canadians are a wonderful, hospitable people and I enjoyed making friends there. On a social level, there is little anti-Americanism and they exude a sophistication and cultural level that really enhances an assignment there. They were a delightful four years for my wife and me

to travel their country - and a beautiful country it is. But one is still left with a sense of incompleteness and insecurity about Canada. Whether it will all one day unravel and North America emerge as a single massive unit is hard to predict right now, but nothing is impossible over the long term. We'll see.

Q: Okay, well, we'll pick this up the next time. We've talked about the Canadian attitude towards the United States and all, but I'd like to talk on more specifics - one, we haven't covered the ambassador or ambassadors who were there at the time-

PENDERGRAST: Three of them.

Q: -and how they dealt with the situation; the North Atlantic - what was it, trade?

PENDERGRAST: The North American Free Trade Agreement.

Q: Free Trade Agreement; the cultural wars; and your observations - you traveled around - how the embassy worked, and all that.

PENDERGRAST: Okay.

Q: Great.

Today is the 16th of August, 1999. Dell, let's talk first about the ambassadors you had and you felt they operated in this situation.

PENDERGRAST: I had three ambassadors during my four-year tour, which made it challenging and interesting at the same time.

Q: Your four-year tour was from when to when?

PENDERGRAST: From 1990 to 1994, and so I had an exposure to three very different chief of mission personalities and managerial styles. They were all political ambassadors, but yet they each had positive qualities and an effectiveness which belied the common image of an inept, inexperienced political appointee rewarded for campaign contributions. They were, I think, very good ambassadors in their own ways, particularly because each had high-level connections in Washington. In Canada that's very important, an ambassador who has the access, who has the ability to pick up the phone. Canadians regard the political connection as absolutely important. They view the Canada-U.S. relationship as indeed very special, and a political ambassador is perhaps more appropriate in Canada than in practically any country in the world. And each of the three, I think, did the job quite well.

My first ambassador was Edward Ney, the former president and CEO of Young and Rubicam, the public relations worldwide conglomerate, prominent in New York business and social circles, and of course a fundraiser for George Bush. He had been in Ottawa for a year or two before I

arrived and was close to then Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. Ney was an older gentleman, well into his 70s, patrician and dignified in style, which I think some people found made him a little bit distant. But I myself was impressed by his keen interest in USIA programs, perhaps a result of his public relations background. In fact, he was the primary force that got a Fulbright Program started in Canada.

Ironically, although we've had Fulbright Programs in more than 100 countries over the last 40 years, we never had one in Canada, and Ed Ney quickly recognized that vacuum and took it upon himself as really his biggest ambassadorial legacy to create a Fulbright Program in Canada. I think he realized, as we all do when we've come to Canada as career or political diplomats, that the Canadians and the Americans do not understand each other very well. We're in a real sense so close but yet so far. Geographically and culturally we're linked in many ways, but our histories, our psychologies, our cultures are very different. Such an educational exchange initiative as the Fulbright program was absolutely essential. And Ambassador Ney worked hard to get the program launched, sometimes against a reluctant bureaucracy, which ignorantly wondered why Fulbright was needed in Canada. I was delighted to be Ney's partner in getting the program launched, but he was the dominant force, particularly in fund-raising. The Canada program was and remains the only one in the world funded primarily by non-government funds. He did a superb job of fund-raising. He assembled a powerful board of directors, who further enhanced the fund-raising reach of the program. Fulbright in Canada today continues to prosper and makes, I think, a truly important contribution to Canadian-American relations.

Ed Ney was close to Mulroney, which paralleled the affinity of Mulroney and President Bush. At the time, there was clearly a special U.S. relationship with the Conservative government in Canada, which ultimately, however, failed, because of its inability to solve the nagging French-English divide that has separated Canada. Mulroney, who started off an extremely popular prime minister, left with poll numbers scratching the bottom of the barrel.

Ney departed with less than a year left in the Bush Administration. He had served there for four years, and it was basically his time to move on. But he did leave a very important legacy, the Fulbright Program and I think overall was an effective chief of mission. I understood that he originally wanted to be Director of USIA in the Bush administration but did not get it. He would have been, I think, a very good USIA director.

Q: Well, with his background in public relations, did he seize on the cultural wars, you know, the Canadian effort to try to keep American advertising and programming from spilling over into Canada?

PENDERGRAST: Well, during his tenure this was less a front-burner issue than it became later under his two successors. It has always been, of course, a matter of sensitivity in Canada, the concern about American cultural predominance in North America. It's something that ambassadors as well as the embassies have attempted to address quietly, because clearly there is a plausible case that American culture - because it has the advantages of scale, of resources, merely the size of the country - will overwhelm and dwarf Canada, an inevitable and natural imbalance. But at the same time we're dealing with what is supposed to be a free, open market of culture and ideas, and no one is forcing the Canadians to see American movies or buy American

magazines and books. I think our position has always been to respect Canadian sensitivity on the issue but at the same time pointing out the trade and the commercial rights that are basically inherent in any free-market economy in the world. Ney, like his successors, both Republican and Democrat, have pressed this point. But it is an intractable issue in the relationship that is not going to go away very easily.

Q: Well, now, did USIS at this time get involved in that, or was that more almost on the economic and political side?

PENDERGRAST: It was handled primarily in quiet behind-the-scenes diplomacy and negotiation rather than in an open public diplomacy way. We did not stand to gain much by provoking debate or attention to the issue. As I mentioned, while American culture was undeniably not only very popular but very dominant, our position was based on commercial and trade law, which the embassy pressed quietly. And I think in general we've done pretty well with the exception of tough Canadian limits on U.S. magazine editions sold in Canada. It is curious, however, that the Canadians who try so desperately to limit American presence in their country are never hesitant to seize any cultural opportunity here. The Cineplex Odeon theater network, one of the largest distribution networks in the United States, is Canadian-owned. To say nothing of Seagrams and Universal Studios, but the Canadians usually just smile about that form of cultural imperialism.

Q: Oh, yes?

PENDERGRAST: And of course, Americans don't protest, but anything similar in Canada would be immediately and fiercely resisted. So there's a little hint of hypocrisy in their jealous protest of American culture. A lot of it was - and I found this true in many aspects of the Canadian critique of the United States - that because the Canadians themselves are so fragmented, divided, diverse, about the only thing that unites them is being Not American. In other words, to be Canadian is to be not American, and that is really what sort of unites the country, or at least large segments of it.

Q: Well, then, Ney was followed by whom?

PENDERGRAST: Ney was followed for a relatively brief tenure by Peter-

Q: Ney must have left in ninety-what?

PENDERGRAST: He left in early '92, I believe it was, replaced by Peter Teeley, who was a very different personality, considerably younger. He had served as press secretary to Vice President Bush and was close to the President, but he was in style and approach a contrast to his predecessor. He was what one might call or liked to think of himself as a blue-collar ambassador. Much more relaxed, more open, more accessible, and even prided himself on his working-class origins. And he particularly relished - again, building on his longtime experience as a press secretary - in personal relations with journalists. And so he was passionately interested in developing personal contacts and social relationships with the Canadian media community, which was rather unusual for an American ambassador. The Canadian journalists were initially somewhat surprised, but then eventually delighted in this man who would literally spend

workday afternoons in a bar or restaurant with them, trading stories and jokes over rounds of beer. The ambassador actually loved this type of interaction, and often on a Sunday afternoon I would get a call from him wanting me to get a few journalists and come over and have a few drinks to enjoy Sunday afternoon over at the residence. It was, again, a rather unusual style, but I think that as a result, the Canadian media did warm up to him and in a sense to the United States. Given the brevity of his tenure, only a matter of months (he, of course, left after the election of Bill Clinton in '92), he never was able to get involved in the substance of Canadian-American relations as much as his predecessor or successor, but I think he was a good ambassador. And if George Bush had been reelected, he would have stayed on and probably would have had a very successful tenure as ambassador.

Q: Well, then, he was succeeded by whom?

PENDERGRAST: He was succeeded by another quite different personality, Jim Blanchard, the former governor of Michigan and a long-time friend and political ally of Bill Clinton. Blanchard had been apparently a prominent candidate for a cabinet post in the new Clinton Administration, Secretary of Commerce, but did not get it mainly because, I understand, they wanted an Hispanic in the Cabinet and the position went to Secretary Pena. Canada was in a sense, I guess, a consolation prize for Blanchard - although he never really acknowledged or said that. And in the interest and the enthusiasm and the passion he brought to the job, he certainly demonstrated that he was absolutely committed to being ambassador. He was, again, in my experience with these ambassadors in Canada as well as others over the years, the quintessential political animal. I've never known anybody who breathed, lived and exuded politics so completely. This had been, of course, his life's profession, and he knew the nuances and the intricacies of politics, both American and Canadian, exceptionally well. And of course he also had good ties - probably the best of the three ambassadors - with the Washington policy community. He knew all the cabinet officers and of course the President, and he had extremely good access that I think resulted in his very effective and productive tenure as ambassador.

He set forth, really, two priorities as his primary interests. One was, of course, the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement, which was concluded during that period. The very intense debate in the United States over NAFTA was, in large part, mirrored in Canada, where it took on, again, maybe an even more emotional, even irrational element because of the anti-American paranoia in many circles. The NAFTA was viewed as another example of opening up Canada to American companies and products, undermining Canadian industry, and so on. And it was a sharp debate that divided Canada, as the bilateral Free Trade Agreement had several years earlier. But I think Blanchard - primarily working quietly behind-the-scenes because for us to get overtly and very publicly involved in the Canadian debate would have been counterproductive - but he developed good relations with the new premier, Jean Chretien, and his staff and was very effective in interpreting and explaining the American political scene as well as showing to Canadians that the great advantages that came with NAFTA - the access to the American and the Mexican markets - and how Canada, as a small country, really in the end would benefit more than be hurt by it.

Q: How did he use you?

PENDERGRAST: As a very political person, from the very start, he recognized the importance

of public diplomacy. Even before he arrived in the country, we were talking on the phone, working on different things that we wanted to do in a public relations context. The first thing he did - literally, before he even started work in Ottawa - was a transcontinental train trip across Canada to meet people and to get a sense of the country- (end of tape)

Ambassador Blanchard was intensely public relations conscious, but always, of course, linked to finely tuned political objectives and activities. He was a regular on the various Canadian TV talk shows and did a fair amount of public speaking as well. All of this was coordinated by USIS and required me to work closely with him. He became - I like to think - a good friend and colleague, who took me into his confidence on some of his political interests. At one time there was a great deal of speculation that he would return and run for the Senate in Michigan in 1994, which stirred up a lot of media and public interest. He was consulting with people in Michigan as well as in Washington. There's no doubt that he seriously considered it, but I think in the end he did not mainly because he was taken with the challenge in Canada and thought he could accomplish more there than as a junior senator from Michigan. He never mentioned it, but as it turned out, 1994 was a Republican year (the famous Gingrich revolution) and it probably would not have been a good year to run for Congress, particularly in a volatile, bellwether state such as Michigan. He did tell me that if the President had personally weighed heavily on him to run for the Senate as an act of loyalty to the Democratic Party, he would have done it. But that did not come. I don't even know whether he really talked to the President about it, but after a lot of back and forth with the people in Michigan and Washington, he decided not to run for the Senate and he stayed on.

And I think it was probably the administration's and the country's advantage because he was exceptionally effective, not only with presiding over NAFTA's acceptance in Canada and in the United States, but also with his other defining policy priority, the Open Skies Agreement, to open up long obstructed commercial aviation links between the two countries. Getting from one side of the border to the other side had been very difficult and expensive by plane because of the severe constraints on American carrier access into Canada. The ambassador really did an absolutely marvelous job, both publicly and behind the scenes, to get that agreement approved, which has yielded enormous gains for both countries in both tourism and trade. It really has opened up things because now travel is much easier and much less expensive with increased competition and additional city-to-city connections. So when it came to NAFTA and to the Open Skies, I think Ambassador Blanchard was a truly outstanding chief of mission, and I was very proud to have been part of his team. And because he was so public-relations conscious, I think USIS had an especially major role in the mission.

Q: *Well, now, he's written a book, by the way.*

PENDERGRAST: That's right. I've read it and I'd rank it among the best ambassadorial memoirs.

Q: *It's quite a good book, a short book, but it gives you a real window. Behind the Embassy Door. It came out around '97 or-*

PENDERGRAST: No, it actually came out last year, I think.

Q: *Okay, '98.*

PENDERGRAST: I was actually very surprised that the book did not get more attention here in the United States. The only way I heard about it was from friends in Canada who told me that he was up there doing book tours. Naturally, the book aroused a great deal of interest in Canada - and mostly favorable, I'm told - but I have never seen a review of it in The Washington Post or The New York Times, which is critical for such a book in stimulating U.S. readership. I may have missed it, but as far as I know, it was surprisingly neglected here in the States. I can't explain it, because it was, in my opinion, one of the better diplomatic memoirs ever written.

Q: *There was a major election when the Conservatives were practically wiped out. That was during your watch, wasn't it?*

PENDERGRAST: That was, yes.

Q: *Can you talk about how the embassy reacted before and during this period, I mean, what sort of was expected and how it came and did it cause any problems for you?*

PENDERGRAST: The Mulroney government had been very pro-American and identified closely with George Bush and Washington. Mulroney and Canada had been a strong supporter of the U.S. in the Persian Gulf War. But the longstanding identity with the United States during the Reagan and Bush years probably worked against him, especially in Ontario, the largest (and most Ameriphobic) Canadian province. He became closely associated with the Americans, which only stirred up the latent sensitivities among Canadians about the United States. Canadians just don't like their leaders to be too close to Washington. And that hurt Mulroney. There's no doubt about it. I think the embassy was very much aware of this, and certainly our position was starkly neutral. But everybody in the embassy - and across Canada - sense that the Conservatives were headed toward a major defeat. It was plain to everyone. Even the most astute Canadian experts, however, could not anticipate how the Tories were almost totally wiped out in Parliament. It was a Conservative catastrophe related also to the Mulroney failure to bridge the simmering Quebec/English Canada tension. As an Anglophone, French-speaking Quebecer, he staked much on bridging the gulf separating Canadians, but he ended up alienating both sides. I don't think in the embassy there was any great apprehension about the new Liberal government, which exhibited a more nationalist tendency than did the Conservatives, although it wasn't always the case over a period of time. A conservative PM like Diefenbaker was perhaps the most anti-American premier we've ever had in Ottawa, but there was some concern that maybe Jean Chretien might put more distance between himself and Washington to avoid replicating the experience of Mulroney. And certainly that was the case initially. There was no doubt that Chretien was not going to be in Washington or Maine every other week. But we were clearly - not only during the campaign but afterward - reassured that there was not going to be any real anti-U.S. orientation in the new government, that they were going to stay the course on free trade, that they were going to remain strong allies - which, of course, they've done. So I think even though while the embassy recognized that an entirely new crew was taking power with the Liberals coming to power, we recognized that the relationship would continue to be strong, as indeed it has been.

Q: Were you giving out any cautions to your colleagues in USIS. Usually the idea is to get as much about America in, a fairly aggressive selling America - that's what USIS does - but particularly during and election time or in Canada, I'd think you'd almost want to keep it low key.

PENDERGRAST: Well, we kept that pretty much in control in Ottawa. I was country public affairs officer and able to monitor and moderate any tendencies that might be coming out of Washington. Because Canada was geographically separate from the rest of the world, you didn't have people sort of launching propaganda volleys directly at Canada. We were able to pretty much control that, and we did keep a deliberately low profile in the campaign. USIA operations in Canada have always been unlike USIS operations elsewhere in the world, reflecting a necessarily more low-key, low-profile approach to public diplomacy. We've never had big cultural centers or major programs like we have in other countries. Most of our work has been largely quietly in the background working with universities, working with community groups, trying in a measured way to present the American positions. And doing the same, of course, with the media as well - depending on the issue and depending on the ambassador as well. It's a very different kind of place to run a USIS program.

Q: Talking about some of the foreign affairs issues, how did the Gulf War - we're talking about when Iraq invaded Kuwait and our counter proposal: George Bus assembled a very effective force against this - how did that play initially in Canada as these things went on?

PENDERGRAST: The Canadians were on board from the beginning in the Gulf War, and were active, reliable, and effective partners in the Allied coalition. It was, in large part, a direct result of the close Bush-Mulroney relationship, but I think the Canadian people did realize that this was a serious act which Saddam Hussein had committed flagrant aggression against Kuwait and something had to be done. Canadian forces did participate, at least they had some aircraft in the coalition action. We didn't have, really, any type of public affairs problem on that issue, certainly compared to what happened in other countries in the world.

Q: What about Cuba? I always feel that Cuba is almost the designated hitter as far as this is where the Canadians can show they really differ from the United States.

PENDERGRAST: Absolutely, and with both conservative or liberal administrations in Ottawa, this has always been something that separated the United States and Canada. It has been a serious public relations problem, something that we did work on with limited success. The Canadians clearly feel that human rights and democracy can be advanced there through political engagement, trade, and tourism, and they have told us this many, many times. Of course, there has been some self-serving profit for Canadian business, which has benefited from the absence of the United States. So perhaps it is not all just ideological purity; there are clearly some commercial reasons involved. But it is something that has been a nagging sore in Canadian-American relations, particularly when we try to impose any sort of extraterritoriality in our policy.

The Canadians have never fully appreciated the depth and the influence of the Cuban community

in the United States. As with many other things, the Canadians really do not have a good understanding of the American political system. They really look at everything through the parliamentary optic. They see other governments and cannot understand that they operate very differently, and certainly the United States, a federal system, with its separation of powers, is a very much more complicated democratic system. There is no prime minister who basically is the legislative and executive authority, and they never have really understood that fact very well. And of course, it's not only true with Canada but with many other countries in the world, but it is ironic that here our closest neighbor, linked to us in so many ways, has had such a blind spot when it comes to the politics of the United States.

Q: Well, was there any effort on our part to say, "Okay, you Canadians have been working on this so-called 'close relationship' with Castro for the last 30 years, and human rights haven't gotten any better"?

PENDERGRAST: Of course, we've made that point to them, and they feel that this is a long-term, cumulative process. The noble impulse perhaps belies the commercial objectives and purposes, but in some ways, I personally am sympathetic to the idea of some engagement with Cuba. Hostage to a handful of Cuban émigrés upset that Castro won and Batista lost, I think maybe we do close ourselves off to that country more than we should. I saw first hand how commercial and cultural relationships with other communist countries was absolutely critical in opening up those societies. And, why should it be any different with Cuba? It is small and geographically close to the United States and probably will be far more vulnerable to change and external influence than was Eastern Europe. But we ourselves have helped to maintain the Iron Curtain around Cuba, which I think is a major reason that Castro's communism has outlasted his comrades in Europe.

Q: What about the various ethnic groups that were coming into Canada? I mean, they take great pride in saying they're a - what is it?

PENDERGRAST: A mosaic.

Q: A mosaic - and did you find, were you looking at these various ethnic groups and targeting things towards them?

PENDERGRAST: No, I think that we didn't want to get involved in any identified ethnic separatism or targeting. In a way, the Canadians, in my judgment, probably did too much of that themselves. It was extraordinary how they adamantly reject the idea of assimilation and a melting pot - again, trying hard to make themselves different from the United States. But the mosaic ends up, in many ways, a blurred and confusing kaleidoscope with a bewildering array of ethnic communities actually financially supported by the government. In other words, they're able to develop their cultural programs and activities with the assistance of the government, a deliberate policy by the Canadian government to encourage multiculturalism. And as a result, you do have not just the French-English chasm separating Canada, but cultural barriers erected by the minorities that have come in just in the last 10 to 20 years, particularly from Asia, especially from the Far East, Eastern Europe, and the Caribbean. But it just further erodes the already thin sense of being Canadian, which Canadians are always trying without success to

define. The mosaic unfortunately pulls apart Canada rather than brings it together. It is such a contrast to the American experience, which is historically that of a melting pot where assimilation is the main objective and ancestral cultural loyalties are steadily diminished. But certainly in Canada that is not the case, and I think in the long term that's not going to help the country.

Q: Well, I would think, too, that you would build up a big infrastructure of people who were essentially bureaucratic tribal leaders of the Greek community or the what-have-you who really almost will try to do everything to make sure that Greek marries Greek and that they don't. . . . very much like the old ward politics of New York, where the idea was to keep them segregated in their little ghettos and not let them get out.

PENDERGRAST: No, you're absolutely right. That is happening across Canada. The development of these tribal communities is rampant in places such as Toronto or Montreal or Vancouver, which has a very large Asian population. All of this is not bringing the country together. It is dividing the country, and I think a disturbing trend. They were never able to solve the French-English problem, and they still haven't been able to, and now, on top of that, is this elaborate network of other ethnic communities compounding the French-English problem.

Q: I assume that you got involved in speeches and this sort of thing, and you and your colleagues. Was it hard to be frank - I mean the way we're talking now - or did you just keep off subjects, like saying "We're going for the melting pot; you're going for the mosaic; and frankly, we do it this way and we think our thing is going to come out better than yours"?

PENDERGRAST: Certainly in public speeches I would try to be a little bit diplomatic and not as challenging in my remarks, but in private with Canadians, I would not pull my punches and make my views clearly understood about the mosaic and the implications for Canadian unity. And, many Canadians acknowledged the problem. It was not something they automatically defended. I think the idea that every ethnic or linguistic community must retain and strengthen its separate identity has become so deeply embedded in the Canadian political fabric - if you will, a form of political correctness - that it isn't going to change very easily. They are a society much more decentralized than is the United States. The provinces have significantly greater power than our states do. Ottawa is really rather weak compared to Washington in terms of its national authority, and that sort of decentralization continues with a society rippled by the many ethnic communities. Canada just does not have the strong unifying elements which helped bring together the United States as a nation, particularly after our civil war. Part of it ultimately goes back to the decisions made in the 18th century by the British, who at that time, once they had consolidated control of Canada and North America at that point, decided that assimilation would not be pursued in French Canada. A decision to break down cultural and linguistic differences, traumatic in the short term, might have had a much better outcome for the country. But they decided in the 18th century that French culture and language would be respected and maintained, and of course that planted the seeds of the disharmony and alienation we have witnessed over the last century. And it also set a precedent for future decisions about ethnic rights and ethnic identity at the end of the 20th century.

Q: Well, did you find much of this impetus towards this - because this has really increased even

in the last 20 or more years, hasn't it as different groups come in? Was there a sort of an intellectual engine, the intellectuals, who seem to play a little greater role than they do in the United States, the "chattering class?"

PENDERGRAST: It was certainly true in Quebec in the debate over association with Canada, which has taken place over the last 20 years. The intellectuals were the primary force for Quebec separatism, an impulse now generally in remission but almost certainly to return if les Quebecois see any cause of humiliation or discrimination by the rest of Canada. Younger, better educated Quebecers born after World War II have been much less influenced by the traditional subservience or inferiority complex of the French Canadian and have cultivated in their arts, media and political discourse a bolder, more confident nationalism that will not go away. They have reflected a feisty, unintimidated spirit similar to anti-American nationalism in English Canada - again, mainly in the chattering class, the intellectuals, university professors, media people - that is much less mirrored in the ordinary man-on-the-street.

Q: I've heard, and I don't want to overstress this "them versus us," but I've heard, and I think Blanchard in his book brings this out, that in the Canadian bureaucracy it's almost as though. . . and the bureaucracy has been brought up in the Cold War, and the Cold War is Canada versus the United States, and the bureaucrats are trained. . . they win a battle if they can stick it to the United States. I think this was in the Open Skies and all this that he mentioned. And it has almost a life of its own. Did you sense any of this?

PENDERGRAST: Yes, no doubt in the government bureaucracy as well as in the intellectual community of Canada, there was an almost visceral enjoyment in sticking it to the United States, showing how they are different, showing how they aren't going to be pushed around by the United States. This happened even in some of our very nonpolitical USIA-type programs and exchanges where they could be occasionally difficult to deal and negotiate with. One had the sense they were doing it particularly because it was a way that they could show that they were independent of the United States. I think it's absolutely correct that in all of our relationships nothing happens very easily or quickly because there is the recurring impulse that we Canadians can't be too compliant, we can't be too responsive, we have to show that we're Canadian. But in the end, as I mentioned earlier, it's not so much that they're showing they're Canadian. It's to show that they're not American. And because one really detects, in dealing with Canadians, that they themselves aren't certain what is a Canadian. There is this glaring absence of a unifying cultural and political theme, a lack of a Canadian identity that ultimately translates into this, "Well, we've got to show the Americans that we're not American."

Q: Did you find there was a difference - I would assume that most of what we are talking about is pretty much Ontario-based - that when you got out into the west you felt almost you could relax a bit more, these are more like us?

PENDERGRAST: Oh, absolutely. Ontario was the hotbed of Canadian nationalism, which often surfaced in some form of anti-Americanism. And I had a personal family experience to understand this reality. My son was a high school student when we went to Ottawa, and we ended up putting him in a private school in Ottawa - in fact, a prestigious school called Ashbury College, sort of a breeding ground for the Canadian English establishment over many, many

years. Naive about Canada and Canadian attitudes (like most Americans), we did not fully anticipate the fact that our son was being brought into an environment which in many ways was decidedly, although often subtly, unfriendly. He was the only American in the whole secondary school, and even though the anti-Americanism was not strident, it was clearly there. And it took time and effort for him to develop a few Canadian friends.

We mistakenly thought, as Americans usually do, that Canada was just like the United States. Well, it wasn't, and it was very different and particularly for our son, it was a real challenge. Probably in the end he benefited from the experience, but it was not easy, especially at the start. Other Americans arrived at the school in a year or two. Perhaps the atmosphere has changed, although a colleague who has a child there now says Ashbury still has that sense of Canadian entitlement and superiority which is often focused on the United States. I remember one student assembly at Ashbury when a teacher was condemning another student for chewing gum and said in a condescending way, "Why do you want to be like the Americans?" Everybody, of course, knew that our son Kevin was the only American there and they all turned and looked at him. Fortunately, he wasn't chewing gum. But that sort of remark in a public situation clearly illustrated the mood in that school, but I think it was generally concentrated in English Canada, particularly in Ontario - but by far the largest province and the most dominant in terms of the economics and culture of Canada.

As you go towards either coast, the attitudes toward the United States really do relax remarkably, and in a place like Calgary, Alberta, closely identified with the energy industry, they almost proudly talk about themselves as being another Houston, and they relish their ties with the United States. And in fact, Alberta was settled primarily by Americans who, back in the last century, came up from Montana in search of land during the 19th century. They did not come from eastern Canada. So I think that even though living in Ontario there was a recurring sense of anti-Americanism, particularly among the educated political and cultural elites, you didn't get that impression very often in the East or West of the country.

Q: You know, I'm a great Anglophile, but I notice when I watch British television in the programs we get here and all, there's a strong element in this of putting people in their place, putting people down in social conditions. Did you find that the good citizens of the upper class of Ontario worked hard to put you Americans down and all that?

PENDERGRAST: Not that significantly, no. I think that being American diplomats, we had a fair degree of acceptance by the Ottawa and Ontario community. The neighborhood where we lived was dominated by the Anglophone establishment, where Ashbury College was located, with a strong Anglophilic tendency. And these same people often had a somewhat patronizing attitude toward the cultural barbarians to the south. But it wasn't projected in an impolite or hostile way. It's just that in dealing with these people - professionals, intellectuals, university people - you could not escape an undercurrent of superiority and smugness derived from their Anglophilic tendencies and connections. There's no doubt about it. It was there. But it was not one that made daily life unbearable or unpleasant.

Q: How did you find your colleagues that you dealt with in our consulates, both in Nova Scotia - to the eastern provinces - Quebec, and then out into the prairies and Vancouver? Were they

different? I mean, was their world a different world?

PENDERGRAST: Oh, absolutely. Because of the profoundly decentralized country, the consulates were operating in very different environments. Their priorities, their operating styles - everything was governed by that fact. But we at least, certainly in USIA, we tried to work closely with our consular colleagues. We had regular meetings bringing people together from the different USIS posts, trying to get on the same page because advancing our common interests and activities had to be done in very different cultural environments. And so working with the consulates in Halifax, Quebec City, Montreal, Toronto, Calgary, and Vancouver was a major challenge, but we at least recognized the problem and tried to address it.

Q: Particularly Vancouver, things were changing rapidly there. It was becoming a Pacific city - I mean, a lot of people from Hong Kong and Asians and all that - were you able to sort of encourage north-south relations, or did it just happen? In other words, I would think Vancouver and Seattle and maybe San Francisco and all would have such... I mean, those would be the ties, and in a way it would be different, and particularly for a USIS-type operation you'd almost have to have a different axis than you might have in Ontario.

PENDERGRAST: The people in the Northwest region, including not only British Columbia but the states of Washington and Oregon, have a very special relationship, economically as well as in other areas. There is constant movement and interchange back and forth across the border. And in many ways there was a greater sense of identity by the people of British Columbia with the American Northwest than with Ottawa. In talking to people in Vancouver, there was clearly a real element of distance and alienation from Ottawa not much weaker than the intense feelings of Quebec separatism. There was no detectable interest in separating the Canadian West and joining the United States - mainly because it was not something the Americans really wanted - but culturally and economically that region of North America has a lot in common. And the cultural and psychological distance separating the Canadian West and the rest of Canada should not be underestimated. But the Pacific orientation, because of trade and the immigration you mentioned, is an equally strong force. I remember visiting Simon Fraser University in Vancouver and discovering that they had a large program in Indonesian studies, reflecting their region's close ties with Asia. I asked the president or the provost at the time, "I'm very impressed you have this Indonesian studies program. Do you have an American studies program?" and there was a blank look on his face. After a long pause he said, "Well, we really don't think we need that." Of course, this again is not just true in Vancouver, but throughout Canada: the attitude that Canadians already know everything they need to know about the United States. That was a principal reason we started the Fulbright Program, a belief that the United States does need more scholarly study and understanding. As I have said, the Canadians think that they know more about the United States than they really do, while on the other side, the Americans don't even think about Canada.

Q: Are there any centers for Canadian studies here in the United States?

PENDERGRAST: There's an expanding network of Canadian studies programs around the United States, funded at considerable expense by the Canadian government. They put a lot of money into Canadian studies. But it is still largely limited to academic specialists and has not

taken root in the general population. Most Americans pretty much take Canada for granted unless Quebec separatism starts to get headlines.

Q: Are there any American studies programs in Canada?

PENDERGRAST: Only a few. We worked on this but our budgetary resources were limited, much less than what the Canadians did in our own country. I think there were only three or four functioning centers across all of Canada, and usually American studies in Canada really meant literature with relatively little attention to the social sciences. Of course, this is true elsewhere in the world as well. People everywhere are fascinated by American authors and literary giants, but there just doesn't seem to be much interest in going deeper into the social, cultural and political character of America. I think most people around the world - particularly intellectuals and university communities - have deeply fixed, ideologically distorted pictures of the United States, which they don't want to challenge or examine seriously. Too much of the world sees the United States through the optic of CNN and popular journalism. The global information revolution has not really eroded distortion and bias.

Q: As we both know, you really would have to strain yourself to find good American places where they study the American political system in Europe, whereas an American - if you get a good liberal education - gets a pretty good solid dose of certainly European government.

PENDERGRAST: What is interesting is that though our histories, Canada and the United States, are closely integrated, if you go into the Canadian schools - and my son was there - you see everything through the Canadian perspective. The American Revolution, the War of 1812, everything is all interpreted from a British or Anglophile position, and there's really no serious attempt to understand the United States. And this extends even to things like the American Civil War. As we know, the Canadians, like the English, were in some ways not only tolerated but actively encouraged the rebellion in the South. There were, in fact, Southern combat units which actually operated from Ontario-

Q: Oh, yes, the St. Albans Raid.

PENDERGRAST: -and so American history is poorly understood and studied in Canada, although the United States is such an important country to them. You would think that they would want to learn more about us, but they really don't make much effort at least in the schools. Canadians go every year to Florida or maybe New York City and think they know everything about the United States.

Q: What was your impression of the effectiveness - again from looking at it from our embassy in Ottawa - of the Canadian embassy in Washington, DC, the ambassadors, how they work with Congress, and all that?

PENDERGRAST: I think the Canadian embassy in Washington is undoubtedly one of the most effective missions that they have overseas. Again, it sort of belies the fact that most Canadians don't understand the United States very well. That doesn't seem to hold true with the embassy. I think that they're very well connected and very savvy about how Washington operates. They

work the halls of Congress well. They have good ties within the foreign affairs bureaucracy as well as in the White House.

Q: What was your impression of the Canadian Foreign Service?

PENDERGRAST: I worked quite a bit with the Ministry of External Affairs and with the embassy here in Washington on a number of activities. I was overall very impressed by the professionalism of their Foreign Service. And I've gotten to know over the years many Canadian diplomats at other foreign postings. I think that they really are a very impressive group of people. The idea of public service in Canada still has, I think, a strong appeal, unlike, I fear, in the United States, where the Kennedyesque summons to public service has faded over the years. In Canada, however, you do get some really outstanding people going into their Foreign Service.

Q: Did you find in dealing with the bureaucracy, the foreign affairs establishment particularly, but others, that this effort to try to balance the Frenchness and the Englishness and all - did that get in the way?

PENDERGRAST: I don't think it got in the way. It was obvious that the French Canadians had a disproportionate presence within the Ministry of External Affairs and I think in many federal ministries. I'm uncertain how deliberate or contrived that outcome may have been. It may have been partly just a matter of linguistic competence, because not only in the Foreign Service in Canada but generally in the Canadian federal service, bilingualism in French and English is required, which excludes many English Canadians who really can't manage an acceptable level in French. On the other hand, educated French Canadians almost always speak English quite well. It was clearly apparent that the French Canadians had a strong tradition within their Foreign Service. From time to time you might detect some quiet griping about favoritism toward the Francophones by a few English Canadians, but it wasn't that common. It was just a fact of life, probably close to 50 per cent French Canadian, in their foreign service.

SUZANNE S. BUTCHER
Deputy Principal Officer
Vancouver (1991-1993)

Born in 1948 and raised in Pennsylvania, Mrs. Butcher was educated at Allegheny College and American University. Entering the Foreign Service in 1970, she had assignments in Venezuela, Poland, Mexico, and Canada, where she served variously as Political and Consular Officer. Her Washington assignments included Policy Planning, Cultural Affairs, Staff Secretariat, International Organizations, and Scientific and Environment Affairs, Mrs. Butcher also served on Capital Hill as Assistant to Congressman Solarz. Mrs. Butcher was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: Then, your next job was Vancouver. Is that right? That would be from 1991 to when?

BUTCHER: 1993.

Q: What were you doing there?

BUTCHER: I was Deputy Principal Officer. I took a down-stretch to take that job. For the first many years, I was always the youngest of everything, because I came in when I was 21 and moved up quickly. In this period, of course, I was dealing with all the issues with my son, so I took a job that was lower than my grade in order to get the place we wanted. The department was being very good about letting us stay in Washington. When we first came back from Portugal in 1983, I was feeling trapped in Washington, by my son's disability. Then, for a while, I became quite settled here, and thought this was fine. But, then, I got the old Foreign Service itch, to go out again. There weren't many places we could go.

Q: To capture the time, what do you need for an autistic child, when he is going to a place?

BUTCHER: I could talk hours and hours. When we were in Portugal, there was no program, or anything. We were very lucky to find some individuals who worked with him. Some people have put together programs here and there for home schooling, that sort of thing. DOD and a handful of embassies were beginning to provide services for learning disabilities, but autism is way beyond that. We went to visit Montreal, Ottawa, and Toronto, and talked with people in London. It's a huge challenge. We were very lucky to be able to go to Vancouver. Their support program and their schooling were just as good as we had here. Different in some ways, but just as good.

Q: So, this is obviously a prerequisite before you can go somewhere.

BUTCHER: Yes.

Q: In Vancouver, who was the Consul General while you were there?

BUTCHER: Dave Johnson.

Q: How did he operate? How did he use the deputy?

BUTCHER: The relationship was fine. For somebody who is your boss, who is the same rank, and younger, it could have been awkward, but it wasn't. He was very good. He was fine, but the job itself wasn't. It was supposed to be an economic job, but also supervising the administrative staff. I had absolutely no administrative experience, or training. Before I went, I was asking, "Can I get some kind of training?" I was also going to be the post security officer, and they did a one or two week introductory training. It doesn't make you a security officer, but at least it lets you know what you need to keep an eye out for and what to ask questions about. The regional security officer from Ottawa was wonderfully supportive. He came out once a quarter. I could pick up the phone anytime. That whole operation worked just right, the way it should.

On the administrative side, it was awful. They taught you how to do the cash count, but beyond that, there was no training. You would have to take the whole six-month-long course for admin officers or you would get nothing. You could take pieces of the course, but they only covered

very specific, narrow areas, not a good overview like the security course. I found it terribly frustrating, frankly.

When I got there, the consulate had just moved. We had a conference room with no furniture in it – we had staff meetings with everyone standing up or sitting on the floor. They had put gorgeous, very expensive furniture in the Consul General's office and mine, while the furniture downstairs for the consular and administrative staff was old and shabby. There apparently had been a problem between FBO and EUR as to who was going to pay for what during the move, and they ended up not having enough money. Anyway, the whole administrative side of things was very unpleasant.

The Admin people in Ottawa were not at all helpful, until one person in my second year, when they got a new General Services Officer. I had to beg and plead to be able to stop in Ottawa before I went to Vancouver, to at least meet the people at the embassy and try to get briefings. The Admin Counselor basically sent me to find out about my own personal allowances. That's not what I came to Ottawa for - I wanted to know what I was supposed to be doing as post admin officer. I didn't even know what questions to ask. Anywhere you are giving someone the responsibility, you ought to give them the training or at least briefings and backup. That doesn't mean six months of detailed training, it means just a couple weeks, so that you have some sense of what you are supposed to be doing.

Besides that, I did the economic issues, mainly trade issues and fisheries, and cross-border environmental issues. This was interesting; the relationship between the consulate, the embassy, Washington and the state governments.

Q: Yes. Let's talk about... Why don't we take fish? To Canadians, fish seems to...

BUTCHER: We have Mom and apple pie. They have fish.

Q: Since the Revolutionary War, fish problems have existed. Why don't we talk about 1991 to 1993 fish problems and what we were doing there?

BUTCHER: Well, we had a framework agreement that was supposed to work out who was going to fish where, when, each season. But each season, you had to negotiate the specifics, and that hadn't been working for several years. Dave Colson, an OES DAS, was the chief negotiator. As in so many things, negotiating among the Americans is as much of a challenge as negotiating with the foreigners.

Q: Who were the principals?

BUTCHER: Washington state, Oregon state, and Alaska were the big ones, plus the native Americans, the tribes. You also had the Canadian tribes, the Canadian provincial governments, and the Canadian federal government.

Q: Was there a pronounced difference between the Alaskan side of things, and the Washington, Oregon side of things?

BUTCHER: Definitely. The Canadians basically wanted to count the fish based on where they spawned, where they came from. They felt they had a right to a lot more of the fish on that basis. The fish are born in the rivers, then go out into the ocean, swimming toward Alaska, and then return. It's a four-year cycle, so every year, you get a different run. Some years are healthier than other years. However much the Alaskans catch, then that run is smaller as it is returning to spawn in British Columbia and Washington State and Oregon, and if it's overfished, that cycle is smaller four years later. The Alaskans always wanted more. They were very insistent. The whole process is set up in the framework agreement. It was quite different from many fields where the federal government has the final say. The Alaskans or the other states seemed to be quite able to dig in their heels.

Q: Were we just reporting on it?

BUTCHER: Yes. Really, we didn't do any of the negotiations. It was Dave Colson and people from OES, and National Marine Fisheries Service. NMFS had an office in Seattle, and they played an important role in all of this. (End of tape)

There were a lot of immigrants in Vancouver from Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Asia. Vancouver was very much in transition. They also had a lot earlier immigration. So, if you saw a person who looked Chinese, you didn't know if they were second or third generation Canadian, or were newly arrived. A lot of people from Hong Kong did come over and invest and buy houses, with all the uncertainty about Hong Kong's reversion to China. Often the wife and kids, or just the kids would stay there. The father would be back in Hong Kong, until they saw which way the wind was blowing on Hong Kong. So, you had a lot of very wealthy, quite unsupervised teenage kids. They also had a lot of Canadians coming from the east. The economy was much better in British Columbia in those days, very attractive. It's a wonderful place to live. Lots of Eastern Europeans, South Asians, a whole range of ethnic mixture among teenagers my daughter went to school with. It did also still have somewhat of a British flavor, especially in Victoria.

Q: How about the environment? Did you all get involved in environmental affairs?

BUTCHER: Yes. There were environmental issues wrapped up with trade issues and labor issues. That is exactly what environmental issues are and should be. Forest issues, of course. What stumpage fees should they charge the logging companies? Could they export round logs or did they have to be processed? Then, we also had situations where there were rivers that crossed the border, where they were dams upstream on rivers going into Washington State, or one river that would flood the Canadian side because it wasn't controlled on the U.S. And air pollution issues, and Canadians' concerns about the Hanford nuclear site in Washington State.

Q: Did you have direct connections to Washington State?

BUTCHER: Yes. The governor and the prime minister set up regular meetings. This was all cooperative. I don't even remember whose initiative it was, but one of the things I'm sure every new governor, every provincial leader is going to say, "Oh, we are going to have better and closer, and more cooperative relationships." So, it started while we were there, but I'm not sure if

it had gone on earlier. They met every six months or so. They would have the meeting with all of the heads of the relevant agencies, with an agenda, with David or me mostly observing. It was very good and very useful. Some people seemed to think we were trying to play the nanny or something. I think the direct relationship was very appropriate and useful, but it was also really appropriate that we be a part of it to keep an eye on whether there were issues coming up that might affect broader bilateral issues, or international issues.

Q: Well, NAFTA must have been on the front pages, or not? The Bush administration, and you were there during the end of it, up through 1993, but Clinton picked up with NAFTA. Within the next year or so, pushed it through.

BUTCHER: My husband worked on it. He was on the Canada desk back here. But in Vancouver we weren't involved in the negotiations, or even much selling it to the public.

Q: Were we watching Canadian politics there?

BUTCHER: Sure.

Q: What was happening at that point?

BUTCHER: The NDP, which was center left, was in power in B.C. while we were there. The rightist Alliance was just beginning to gain a foothold, including with our neighbor across the street. The country was going through one of its efforts to figure out the role of Quebec in the country, and there was a lot of discussion of that. Actually, Dave was the one, the Consul General, who did more of the political contacting, reporting and all of that.

Bill Clinton's first trip outside the U.S. as president was to Vancouver to meet Boris Yeltsin. We were involved with the advance teams in all the logistics, selecting sites, etc., of course, but the main awkward thing I remember was over what the Canadian role would be. The Prime Minister was coming and he, or at least his staffers, seemed to want to make this practically a trilateral rather than a friendly third-country venue for a bilateral.

Q: People who serve in Ottawa, Americans, get a little bit tired of saying, "Oh, big you, and little us," as far as the Canadians would say. "You have to be extra nice to us because we are so small." Did you get a lot of that there?

BUTCHER: I did find that very tiresome because I went there not expecting that. I expected Canadians to be much more self-confident and proud. There is so much about Canada that I admire that I was very surprised to get some of that feeling. It was interesting later dealing with the Australians. I didn't get that sense...Australia's size and role in the world are similar in many ways to the Canadians, but no inferiority complex there, whereas the Canadians were often sensitive.

Q: Sometimes Canadians define themselves as being not Americans.

BUTCHER: Have you seen or heard about the beer ads? "I am a Canadian."

Q: Yes.

BUTCHER: I think that is pretty fun.

Q: *What about trade issues there? Were there any great problems?*

BUTCHER: Of course, lumber was always a big, huge issue. Then, we had other things like wine. Fruits and vegetables and issues about whether certain FDA requirements were really for food safety or the where they trade barrier. There were issues about milk. We would do some reporting, but most of that was going on in Washington.

Q: *How about the cultural wars? It really wasn't a war, but it was the Canadians feeling they were threatened by American publication, TV broadcasts. I always think of the western Canadian who is not being as bothered by some of this stuff as the overly British people who are in Ottawa.*

BUTCHER: No, no, they were bothered. This was part of this defensiveness that I was talking about before. We didn't get involved much in the cultural trade issues. I do remember our guy from USIA was working on social studies curriculum issues. My husband dealt with that when he was back on the desk. My daughter, in 10th grade social studies - what an education for her to study social studies from a different perspective. Her teacher tried to tell her that Maryland was pronounced "Mary Land," like the Canadians pronounce "New Found Land." My son, in fourth grade, was taught about the traders during settlement. Even there, you could see the message, "Those nasty Americans were trying to take over, or had an unfair advantage," or whatever.

Q: *The trading wars in that area.*

BUTCHER: Yes. It's very much there. I don't particularly remember getting involved in issues except for the USIA guy, but it was very much a part of life.

Q: *I wouldn't think of it being a problem. Obviously, your sister consular general to the south, Tijuana, is loaded with people in jail. But, I can't imagine people going up to Canada to blow off steam. Maybe I'm wrong.*

BUTCHER: Certainly we had drugs and immigration issues. We would do extradition papers and stuff like that. We had problems with Americans not realizing you can't bring a gun into Canada, or even mace.

Q: *There weren't a bunch of Americans in jail, particularly?*

BUTCHER: We had four consular officers. There must have been Americans in jail, but it was not a big issue.

Q: *It seems like British Columbia, particularly Vancouver, was being a chapel of the west. Did it seem to be going through a transformation, almost through removing itself from Ottawa and all*

that?

BUTCHER: The Canadians are forever consulting themselves about their relationship with Quebec and how they are going to organize themselves as a nation. We did go to some of these rounds of consultations, but a lot of people sort of felt like, "Here we go again." I was there only two years. People who lived there for 20, 30, or 40 years of their life must find this repetitive, if nothing else. Yet, on the other hand, they don't fight, they talk and talk and talk. They have public meetings and town meetings, and exchanges in the newspapers. I have great respect for Canadians. Here, people tend to yell at each other more, but there they will talk and talk and talk about an issue, until they reach consensus. There are issues where they haven't been able to reach a consensus, but they aren't just going to hold out and have somebody win and somebody lose. They will talk and talk.

Q: How did you find your impression of the Canadian medical system and its delivery service? By marriage, I have a Canadian cousin who is debating on whether... She has been down to American hospitals from time to time. There seems to be some problems. I was wondering what you were noticing, in your official and unofficial capacity?

BUTCHER: Unofficially, I will never forget the day my son was sick and we called our doctor and he said, "I'm about to leave, I'll stop by your house on my way home." He came by the house on his bicycle. I have a picture of him on his bicycle. That is such a typical experience with the Canadians, in general. They are warm, and wonderful and not this horrible, big and impersonal government health system that some people fear in "socialized medicine." We had a wonderful relationship with an individual doctor that we were able to choose. At the same time, one of our employees was on a waiting list for a hip replacement. She had been on medical leave for months and months when I got there. The waiting lists were real, even then. Now, I gather that they have budget problems just like all governments have budget problems. There are cuts and waits and so on, but our personal experience with the medical profession was very positive. I wish the United States would do the same.

MARIE THERESE HUHTALA

**Consul General
Quebec (1992-1995)**

Ambassador Huhtala was born and raised in California and Graduated from Santa Clara University. Joining the Foreign Service in 1972, she studied Thai and Chinese languages and became a specialist in East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Her overseas postings include Paris, Quebec, Hong Kong and Chiang Mai (Thailand). In Washington, she dealt primarily with East Asia and Pacific Affairs. From 2001 to 2004 she served as US ambassador to Malaysia and, from 2004 to 2005, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Ambassador Huhtala is a graduate of the National War College and the State Department's Senior Seminar. Ambassador Huhtala was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

HUHTALA: I went to Canada. My window for promotion into the Senior Service was open and I still had 4-4 in French, and it was time to go overseas again. In fact I was recruited by my friends in personnel to bid on the job in Quebec City as principal officer. This was the year that my daughter was getting ready to go to college, our oldest, the one born in Paris. She was going to go to the University of Virginia. There weren't any great opportunities for me in Asia that year, and I thought it would be nice to be in the same time zone as Karen. So I took that job, and it was a completely different experience, very interesting.

Q: Well let's talk about that. You were there from '92 till when?

HUHTALA: To '95.

Q: '95, three years. What was the situation in Quebec at the time?

HUHTALA: Quebec was on the verge of voting in a second referendum as to whether they should secede from Canada, a major issue. Of course there was huge American interest in this since Canada is our biggest neighbor and a very close friend and ally. They had had a referendum in 1980 that had not passed but they were building up to another one. For several years there had been a series of negotiations among all the Canadian provinces with Ottawa to try and meet the demands of the Quebecois, who felt that they had a distinct culture, and deserved special treatment. There was a historical burden as well; many Quebecois felt that after France lost Canada to England in 1759 their rights had not been protected. They were demanding all kinds of special concessions in terms of assistance from the other provinces, fiscal transfers, language policy etc., etc. There was something called the Meech Lake process which Prime Minister Mulroney had tried to set in place, but the negotiations were not successful and there was frustration on all sides.

When I first arrived in 1992 the other provinces were getting increasingly fed up with Quebec and soon the negotiations fell apart spectacularly. The Liberal Party in power in Quebec Province fell; the separatist party, Parti Québécois was elected and began putting the machinery in motion to conduct another referendum on sovereignty.

This was the only place in the world we actually have two consulates general in one province; a big one in Montreal that caters to the business community and the many different economic interests that we have with that part of Canada, and the special purpose post up in Quebec City. Montreal had several agencies and about 40 American staff; in Quebec we had a Consul General (me), a vice consul and a few local staff, that was it. But because the Quebecois considered themselves a separate nation within a nation, Quebec was their capital and so the diplomatic corps in Quebec City outranked the diplomats assigned to Montreal. There were only two Consuls General in Quebec (aside from several honorary consuls), from France and the United States. We, apparently over the years, had taken turns being dean of the corps. In this case I beat my French colleagues opposed by two weeks and so I was Madame la Doyenne of the consular corps, which the ambitious French Consul General could never get over. When they would have meetings of the entire consular corps they'd bring all the consuls from Montreal up to Quebec. My French colleague and I would be at the head of the table and I was the dean of the entire

corps. Quebec was a province that maintained its own diplomatic missions around the world and they had done so for like 25 years. They had their own aid program for francophone countries. They had one of the major international meetings of La Francophonie there in Quebec City while I was there. All in all, they had a lot of pretensions to independence already.

Q: Did you find when you went there, first place this has not been on your radar scope before, but before going up there what was the feeling of the people you talked about, lets say, okay what if the Quebecois do vote for separation what does this mean for the United States and would it happen anyway?

HUHTALA: The U.S. government was very strongly opposed to seeing Canada break up, for very sound reasons. Quebec is a huge province, stretching from the Vermont and New York border up to the Artic Circle. If it became independent it would cut off the maritime provinces of Canada, which are mostly Anglophone, and it would also possibly encourage a different separatist tendency at the other end of the country in British Columbia. We were very concerned about this. The people I talked to inside Quebec, on the other hand, kept assuring me that this would be a good thing; that an independent Quebec would be the U.S.' seventh largest trading partner, and that they were very pro-American (which they were, in fact). If a Quebecois thought you were an Anglo-Canadian he'd likely be very hostile, but once you let him know you were an American he'd cover you with charm. They really liked America. There was a lot of U.S. investment there and a lot of Quebec investment in the United States. Quebec even had a trade office in New York. So they were trying to spin this as something that would be good for the United States. Nevertheless, our policy never changed.

I found that I actually got a little bit cross-wise with our Embassy in Ottawa and with Washington because I was travelling all around the province talking to people of all walks of life and reporting back that pro-separatist sentiment was very strong, and there was a good chance the coming referendum could pass. Here's what I heard in this part, here's what I heard over here. I was allowed to report directly to Washington, with a copy to Ottawa. On one occasion I sent in an analysis that said the referendum was probably a year away but it looked at that point as if it could go either way. I recommended that Washington start thinking about policy options in case the referendum passed. Boy, did I get in trouble! My DCM called and reamed me out for making policy pronouncements as a mere Consul General. Technically he was right, of course. But I think the real problem that this was very unwelcome news. They didn't want to think about that in Washington. In the end the referendum took place a couple of months after I left Quebec and the separatist question failed by one half of one percent. So I had been right; it was very, very close. I remember that discussion with my DCM, when he said, "Marie, you shouldn't have reported that," and I said, "Well, I'm sorry but it's what I'm hearing here." He said, "Yeah, but you're just talking to all these French speakers." I said, "Yes, that's right, I'm doing all my work in French. That's why I'm getting something that you're not hearing in Ottawa." The implication was that French speakers were not to be trusted!

Q: Who was our ambassador at the time?

HUHTALA: For most of my tour it was Jim Blanchard, former governor of Michigan.

Q: Was he concerned on this issue?

HUHTALA: Well, yes, I mean everyone was concerned about it. He only made a couple of visits to Quebec. When he first got to the country he made a very high-profile train trip across Canada. He started at the eastern seaboard and went across the entire country, visiting every province except Quebec. A month or so later he finally came to Quebec. Of course the Quebecois noticed this. I'm sure it was calculated on his part to show that he was going to be most friendly with the "loyal" parts of Canada and not these upstarts. But it was not well received. He spent a lot of his time doing some very important work in the trade field. He negotiated an Open Skies agreement on aviation, for instance, a major accomplishment. He was a successful ambassador in many ways but he didn't come off too well in Quebec.

Q: We'll move to Quebec itself but did you get much feeling that the Maritimes, I mean I realize this wasn't your bailiwick but here they're very Anglo, I mean their capital is essentially Boston.

HUHTALA: I never even travelled to the Maritime Provinces. I conferred with my colleague in Halifax and yes, I was getting some of that sense. They were very worried about being cut off by an independent Quebec. That's a very valid concern. As I said, the other provinces were really fed up with the Quebecois because they'd been negotiating with them for a couple of years, giving them concessions, and the Quebecois just pocketed them and wanted more. The Quebecois really did want to be sort of functionally independent, at a minimum. This was really getting under the skin of the rest of Canada.

Q: I would think that if I were living in British Columbia and had to learn French as for a government job I'd say what the hell is this?

HUHTALA: They do, of course. All government officials are expected to be bilingual.

Q: This is a bone toss. I would imagine that you would be walking on egg shells most of the time you were there or not? The media, others who were trying to get something out of it you couldn't give.

HUHTALA: It was good training. It was really good training. It's the first time I had to do a lot of media interviews, and having to do it in a foreign language was extra hard. It was the first time I did television interviews, for instance; also major speeches with extended Q & A's in French. I learned to be very clear about what our policy is but to also be open and receptive to what they had to say to me.

Q: Was our policy, we might feel that we don't want Canada to break up but at the same time this is sort of your decision and our being the colossus to the south would mean that you would have be very, I can see headlines, American counsel general calls for a no vote on this or something like this. How did you handle it?

HUHTALA: We had a mantra that we were always using. I can't remember exactly how it went, but it was along the lines of: the United States values a prosperous, democratic and united Canada. I would just repeat the mantra over and over again. I'd be pressed to say what the U.S.

would do if Quebec seceded, if it became an independent country. I would say, “The situation were to change, we would look at that of course.” This was as far as I could go. Sometimes I would add that Quebecois had the right to vote however they wanted to vote, but we had a preference. Our preference was that Canada stay united.

Q: How did you find contact with the Quebec government?

HUHTALA: They were delightful to work with, but they were wooing me of course, they wanted U.S. support for the separatist cause. They were charming, urbane, and intelligent. They were also sort of balancing their international relationships between the U.S. and France. My French colleague had a huge “cooperation” budget. I had zero budget for aid or anything like that. He was always bringing over cultural troops, having big parties, sponsoring trips to Paris. They call it cooperation instead of aid. His cooperation budget was over a million dollars a year for this little province. Yet he was making about as much headway as I was.

Q: In a way, during the winter does the place shut down and everybody head for Florida?

HUHTALA: A lot of them went down to Florida, a lot of snowbirds.

Quebec’s relationship with the mother country, France, is very complex. They felt deeply abandoned when the Conquest, as they call it, of 1759 took place, the climatic battle on the Plains of Abraham, Wolf versus Montcalm. When that happened, when England won all of Canada from France, all of the functionaries, the administrators, the bishops and many church leaders, just got on a boat and went back to France and left the colonists, who were all French peasants, basically, to fend for themselves. Quebecers still resent that to this day. In recent decades France has made a big effort, with shiny baubles and De Gaulle visiting and saying, “Vive le Québec libre!” Many Quebecers took a jaundiced view of that. They didn’t trust France anymore. Instead they look to their south, they would love to be our friend, but they view themselves as a little French island in the huge Anglophone sea of North America. They firmly believe that they cannot exist as a people if they lose their language. So they have ridiculous language laws, for example all the schools are in French, the shop signs have to be in French. If they want to have a sign in English it has to be in smaller lettering than the sign in French and the French lettering has to be above the English lettering. They have pitched battles over these language policies. They’re very chauvinistic, it’s really unfortunate. That was especially true in Quebec City. Montreal was more cosmopolitan, with immigrants from all around the world. In Quebec, sometimes they would shock me. Once for instance there was an immigrant from West Africa who spoke native French but he was black. He had lived in Quebec for 40 years and he was running for the federal parliament; he seemed like an attractive candidate to me. I remember one of my local employees in whose district he was running, saying, “Never in my life would I ever vote for somebody like that.” It was just racist, just pure racist. That was distressing.

Q: You were there at a time when there was this abrupt cut-off from the church which had run everything and then all of a sudden the whole youth group or something said screw you to the Catholic Church.

HUHTALA: You know a lot about this, that’s good.

Q: Well, I follow these things.

HUHTALA: They called it the Quiet Revolution. It started in the 1960s when a new generation came of age. The Church had been repressing the people very much, very greatly. I heard horrible stories, like the one about Mama and Papa in church with their four children, and the priest at the altar looks down in front of the whole congregation and says, "Well Madame, your youngest is already three, what are you doing? Get busy!" The people, by and large, were poor and they were not well educated. So when a new generation came of age in the '60s which was a time of intellectual ferment around the world anyway, they basically just turned their backs on the Church.

Q: It was a very really abrupt

HUHTALA: It was very abrupt and by the time I got to Quebec in 1992, 40% of all children there were being born out of wedlock. Huge numbers of people were living together with their partners without marriage. They called them *conjoints*, they would say, "This is my *conjoint*" instead of "This is my spouse," and it was quite acceptable. At that time Eino and I had been married for 20 years and we kept making mistakes in this area. For example, if I said something like, "My daughter is in university," people would respond in a way that indicated they thought: "It's not his daughter, it's your daughter, so you must have been married previously."

At one point the head of the Liberal Party in the province was preparing to become premier because his party had won the elections, and so big news item was that Daniel Johnson had married his *conjointe*. The two had been together for ten years but they suddenly felt they should get married.

Throughout the province beautiful churches had been abandoned, turned into restaurants or even condos. The amazing thing about Quebecers is the way they curse; while people in a lot of countries use scatological terms, Quebecers use religious terms. When they are really angry they'll say, Chalice! or Host! Or even Tabernacle! (This was kind of horrifying to me as a Catholic girl.) But you know what you found too, by the '90s, though many people felt they were not Catholics anymore, not religious at all, many cults were starting to spring up. Several odd, crazy, whacked out cults, similar to the Branch Davidians, were gaining a foothold in Quebec, because after all, people do need meaning, they need something.

Q: Their birth rate had gone way down.

HUHTALA: Yes, it had.

Q: The culture there, society was not responsive to immigrants were they or?

HUHTALA: There had been huge immigration. This is another really important factor. Because of the declining birth rate, the flight of English-speaking Canadians to other provinces, and because of their aspirations to independence, the Quebec government through its missions overseas was actively encouraging immigration from francophones. As a result there were

Lebanese, Romanians, Africans, Greeks and any other people who could speak French coming into Quebec, disproportionately to Montreal because it was a more cosmopolitan area. But it turned out that when it came time to vote, these people didn't view themselves as having immigrated to a future independent country. They were happy to have come to Canada so they were not inclined to vote for sovereignty. So for demographic reasons, the referendum of 1995 was seen as a last-chance opportunity. Native Quebecers were having fewer kids than recent immigrants who were not going to support sovereignty. This really was their last chance. And in the end, they lost by a margin of less than one percent.

Q: How about the French intellectuals? A lot of my knowledge of France is based on two films I've seen, the Decline of America and then the other one was the Barbarian Invasions. But both of them are a bunch of French intellectuals talking away. They have sort of their chattering, their intellectual class didn't they?

HUHTALA: Yes, of course they did. They had good universities and they had many people who had studied in France. Educated Quebecers speak beautiful, grammatical, poetic French (but with a horrible accent). They have well-justified claims to being intellectuals of their own. And there were certain circles that were very francophile.

Q: Did you find yourself getting engaged in dinner parties where everybody was sort of quoting the French masters or something like that?

HUHTALA: Sometimes, especially when my colleague, the French consul general, would have dinner parties. One time my poor husband was so frustrated because we all sort of sat around and had this extended intellectual discussion of politics in French. It was kind of tough on him although he had gone to the local university, Laval University, and brushed up his French there. They had a very good program there for non-native speakers.

Q: Well, I mean this is sort of intellectual show off time.

HUHTALA: Yes, very much so.

Q: The French are much more inclined to do this.

HUHTALA: Sometimes I would find opportunities when I had visiting American groups to invite the French consul general so that he would have to speak English. He could do so, but he wasn't real comfortable. I'm afraid I took a perverse pleasure in that.

Q: Did you find yourself sort of in competition with the French consul general?

HUHTALA: Not really. We were essentially colleagues and we became friends. We also made lots of wonderful friends among the Quebecers. If you can put their politics aside and just get to know them as people, they're delightful, and we had a lot of fun. They used to always ask, what kind of name is Huhtala? They all seemed to have an obsession with tracing ancestry, and all of them claimed to be "pure laine" French. So what kind of name is Huhtala? At first I always explained the Finnish origin of our name, but in time I began telling people it was American.

They would start to get upset with that answer, and I'd say, "Look, we have every kind of name in America. We don't care that much about national origins."

Q: Who was the president, our president while you were there?

HUHTALA: Bill Clinton was elected the first fall I was there.

Q: How was he seen there?

HUHTALA: He was the object of fascination, like American presidents always are, but people were wary about him. I must say that the sovereigntists believed that they had a better chance with the Republican administrations than with Democrats. At that point Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was very badly discredited and was about to lose office. I believe Clinton and Mulroney were old buddies; I think that was part of the problem. In early 1993 I was asked to give a presentation on the Clinton administration's foreign policy to the provincial cabinet ministers. They were very, very interested in it.

Q: Of course you were there when NAFTA had already gone into effect.

HUHTALA: No it went into effect while I was there. There was a bilateral U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement that had been in effect for about 10 years and was beginning to show sizable payouts, economically for both countries. The tripartite North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was in the final stages of negotiation.

Q: This was to include Mexico.

HUHTALA: To include Mexico, yes. Remember Ross Perot saying there would be a giant sucking sound, as all the jobs will go down to Mexico, a prediction that did not prove true. The Canadian government was very interested in NAFTA. (Of course Quebecois wanted a quadrilateral agreement once they became independent.) I gave several speeches supporting NAFTA and explaining what it would mean for Quebec.

Q: Where there any disputes on, well not disputes but what was our view of the Canadian medical situation? They're very proud of their medical program but at the same time if there are any problems everybody runs down to the United States. It's peculiar.

HUHTALA: That certainly did happen, though I never knew anybody who failed to get critically needed medical care because of the socialized medicine system. For elective procedures people would tend to go outside of the country. We had some Quebecois who would go into Maine or New Hampshire to have their children, seeking better or cheaper medical care perhaps, then come back and file reports of birth of an American citizen with us. I remember my staff objecting to this. I reminded them firmly that these were new American citizens, and we had to treat them courteously like any other constituents."

Q: Did terrorism or people running from the law or something intrude in your territory?

HUHTALA: We had very good law enforcement cooperation through our Embassy. This was in the period right after the first Gulf War when the U.S. was periodically doing bombing runs over Iraq to enforce the no-fly zone. Whenever something like that would flare up I would get personalized protection from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The Mounties would drive me around in their car and protect me 24 hours a day. The Consulate General is located on a bluff overlooking the St. Lawrence River, near the Chateau Frontenac in Old Quebec. The top two floors are the residence, the bottom two floors are the office. We knew we'd be sitting ducks if anybody wanted to take a barge out into the middle of the St. Lawrence and fire a rocket at us. So I would get personal protection whenever things got tense in the world of terrorism. We were there during the first attack on the World Trade Center and during the Oklahoma City attack. Especially in that latter case, Quebecois of every stripe expressed great sympathy and support for us.

Q: You left there in what year?

HUHTALA: 1995.

TERESA C. JONES
Political/Economic Officer
Montreal (1992-1994)

Mrs. Jones was born in the Soviet Union of Chinese diplomatic parents. She was raised in the USSR and the United States. A specialist in Scientific Affairs, both civilian and military, Mrs. Jones' Washington assignments were primarily in the fields of international nuclear and scientific matters and included non-proliferation, arms control, East-West Trade as well as general Political/Military subjects. Her foreign assignments were in the scientific and consular fields. She holds two degrees from the University of Pennsylvania.

Q: So you did Canada from when to when?

JONES: '92 to '96.

Q: OK, you were in Montreal and David was in Ottawa.

JONES: I was in Montreal for two years and when the science counselor retired early, and the position opened up in Ottawa just at the time my tour finished in Montreal, they did an inter-Canada transfer which worked very well. In Montreal I worked for Consul General Susan Wood as the deputy in and main reporter in everything.

Q: Who?

JONES: Susan Wood. Roberta Susan Wood. I can't remember. I enjoyed it a great deal.

Q: All right, let's take Montreal from 1992 to '94. How would you describe Montreal sort of politically and economically vis a vis the rest of Canada?

JONES: It was truly two solitudes, that was one of them. This was at the peak of the discussion. The Meech Lake Accords on which Mulroney had staked his prime ministership on had collapsed when one of the provinces said no. that was it. This gave a tremendous boost to the Quebec Sovereignists who played the refusal for all Provinces to agree to Meech as proof that the Rest of Canada didn't want them. The Canadian government then something called the Charlottetown Accord which was also failed. I did all the political and economic reporting. I did a lot of "checking the box" items such as reading the Pequist (Parti Quebecois or the Separatist party) platform. Oddly enough I also advised David who was the political counselor in Ottawa, but my efficiency report was reviewed by the economic counselor

I made a many of friends, and I joined one of the last remaining North American salons in Montreal run by a David and Diana Nicholson who held an open house every Wednesday Night for discussion. So, for the price of one bottle of wine I would get the kind of intelligent and in-depth discussion from prominent Montrealers that no amount of diplomatic entertaining would get. It was all off the record, and I kept it that way.

My focus was on Quebec's position in Canada. There had already been an exodus of Anglophones from Quebec when Rene Levesque, head of the Parti Quebecois, had become premier. I was tremendously impressed by the civilized way tone of the debate. While other countries had violent separation debates, for the Canadians it just meant longer discussions. I went to separatist rallies in which I was immediately spotted as what they thought was a Francophone Allophone and practically loved to death by various Sovereignists who wanted me to feel welcome. I had more bad coffee offered to me and thought sure my kidneys were sure to go. Some would even translate from the Quebec French into French French for me.

Q: At that time how did we view the Quebecois separatist movement, and how serious was it for Canada? And I am looking at this what would this mean for the United States? I am trying to capture this.

JONES: Well one thing that was particularly of interest. A man called Jean-Francois Lisee had written a book called Eye of the Eagle. Using freedom of information material he got on our writing from Canada during the period at which Rene Levesque had been elected premier of Quebec. All the analyses in it were very high quality. The point however is that this high quality work was produced by Americans who were not Canada hands. We don't have Canada hands. They were professional foreign service generalists who did standard political analyses. They called the results correctly. But while we were doing all this correct analyses, in Ontario, which after all had co-existed with Quebec all along, all the pundits, all the Canadian policy experts were wrong.

The fact that they could be wrong meant that there was a tremendous divide. My point when I talked to various businessmen was that both Ottawa and Quebec had such bad debt situation at the time, in case of separation, both would have to collude to assure world financial markets. The U.S. tried to help in the 1995 Referendum in Quebec and slightly modified our mantra (we

preferred a strong, united Canada). Instead of gratitude for this, we had newspaper editorials (especially out west) suggesting that the U.S. butt out. U.S. business men assumed that if a separate Quebec wanted them, they would have to make it worthwhile.

Q: Had the ambassador said something that...

JONES: Later yes. That was after I went to Ottawa.

Q: But that was the time, were you there during the referendum?

JONES: No, I was already in Ottawa then. It was a curious situation. I was David's Quebec eye basically. My biggest contribution was suggesting that the Embassy pay attention to Lucien Bouchard, who was head of the eight member Bloc Quebecois, and a nobody in Ottawa - though later he became Premier of Quebec. I also urged him to contact journalists, some of whom were superb analysts - one of these, Chantal Hebert remains a valued friend today.

Q: Well let's go back to Montreal. How did we view the situation there at the time you were in Montreal. Did you see this as potentially ripping Canada apart?

JONES: No, our figures didn't indicate that nor did U.S. debt rating agencies. They saw it as a chance to make money. Financial markets react ahead of the event, so when the event doesn't happen, there is a bounce back. Therefore there was a 25 to 50 basis point difference between Ontario and Quebec debt. The U.S. anticipate a Cuba of the north. We were just seeing it as all right, this is something Canadians have to handle. We got the most complete picture by talking to all sides. For example, when I had a project on strategic anti-submarine warfare, I talked not just to anti-submarine warfare people but to all the Submarine hunters as well to get a more complete picture. But the experts saw even for separation was protracted negotiations and at worst an economic hit of a drop of three percentage points in GDP for a few years. The key was no violence. Quebec has all the resources you would need for a country. The Parti Quebecois platform was very much a social democratic type of program with some trade and business friendly aspects. Francophones are still 80+% of the population, but they saw the Anglophones as a necessary asset, especially in the financial sector. For instance, once at a Nicholson Wednesday Night soiree, someone asked, "Hey, how much to you manage?" I think the total for that evening among attendees was about \$9 billion dollars.

Q: These were Anglophones basically.

JONES: Mostly Anglophones with some federalist Francophones. There has been serious intermarriage for years among all the groups.

Q: How did you find the sort of the intellectually community there. I am aware of some of the films that have come out of that thing the wives of

JONES: Barbarian Invasions. is a movie I would strongly recommend for anyone who wanted to get a feel of Quebec views.

Q: Barbarian Invasions. Anyway I had the feeling that there was quite a chattering class of French intellectuals who didn't seem to go anywhere. Was this important, and how did you fit into this?

JONES: Well I chattered with them. The Anglophones had certain very specific interests and concerns. Both sides did much navel watching, *nomrbilism*. It is a smaller pond so people could make bigger waves.

We did meet the number 2 of the Parti Quebecois at the time, Bernard Landry. [Later, he became the head of the party and then Premier). He, in fact, invited David and me to one of his little yacht trips on late. We had a chance to talk. He was a trilingual economics professor and also a dedicated Sovereigntist. You could see that he felt that there is a potential destiny for Quebec as a country with very close ties to Canada but only if the people were willing to make some sacrifices for a few years. Then they, would, forever be able to protect their own culture. Their culture is not French culture by the way - it is a very distinct North American one with roots in 17th Century Brittany, Normandy and France. My feeling was that if they achieved independence, then France would step in - Canadian relations or no. But there was never any intimation that the Parti Quebecois would support violence. Everyone had horrified by what had been done by the FLQ in the 80's and by Trudeau's imposition of Martial Law..

Q: This was a series of bombings.

JONES: They killed someone. They kidnapped two people and murdered one of them. Pierre Trudeau is not the popular icon in Quebec that he is in the rest of Canada. They saw his attempt to force all Canadians to make Quebecers feel at home all be becoming a bilingual country as not protecting their culture in Quebec. In fact Quebec used a notwithstanding clause in the Canadian constitution, the repatriation of which did not have the Quebec Premier's agreement - so the repatriation was considered a betrayal and was called the night of the long knives. Quebec and Ontario are two groups who have wonderful command of each other's dental nerves. They know exactly how to lift an eyebrow to give someone in Ontario heartburn. The same goes the other way. The same between the Anglophones and Francophones.

Q: did you get the feeling that this was Ottawa versus Quebec, and the western provinces were doing their thing and it is a completely different world.

JONES: Except for the national energy plan, which was known as destroying the patrimony of the western provinces to give cheaper gas in Toronto. There were Quebecers who told me they had lived in British Columbia and there had been serious bias against them. One had been beaten up at a bar. So there were things the Canadians didn't particularly want to face. As an American I will say that in Quebec I found less of the knee jerk anti Americanism.

Our daughter Margaret, went to High School for two years in Ottawa -- Lisgar Collegiate. She finished three years of their program in two years so and was able to graduate with her friends. [High school is five years in Ontario]. She faced a fair amount of anti Americanism. She was 5'2" 100 pound Eurasian who certainly wasn't threatening. is She said in teaching and in classes,

they made a big thing about the fact that we attacked Kingston, Ontario. Her comment to the teacher was that Canada was British North America then and it was the War of 1813. We never went to war with Canada. They also sacked Washington D.C. - so it could be considered even. She ran into this constantly. They would have biases on what they felt Americans were like.

For example, the school paper, The Lisgarite, had to go to the PTA for money- they needed about \$250 Canadian dollars. She was editor of The Lisgarite. This was at the time of the 150th reunion. Alums were all over the halls, but The Lisgarite staff were told that to sell copies of their anniversary issue from their office which was in a dark corner of the school basement. Margaret looked and she said, "This is dumb. All we have to do is walk to the alums." So they each grabbed a stack of papers, went to through the school and earned hundreds of loonies in an hour. She was then reprimanded for acting un-Canadian. No matter how much things look alike, Canadians are different. Quebecers didn't seem to have this defensive anti-American attitude as they were much more secure in their identity. They didn't have to trash us to feel more Canadian. My husband's book Uneasy Neighbors made this point in detail

Q: Well the anti Americanism has always been generated essentially from Ontario which was the residue of where the loyalists ended up, a certain amount of the loyalists ended up We fought a little war around there in the war of 1812.

JONES: We went to Halifax. We went to New Brunswick. We went to Prince Edward Island. You could see an incredible number of little communities with plaques honoring the American Loyalists as founders. But there was much less of an anti American undertone in the Atlantic Provinces. Again, I think they are very secure in their own identity. Identity Security is the key. A Swede is a Swede. They don't have to trash Norwegians to feel like a Swede. Those that don't like Americans, don't like Americans for other reasons rather than to affirm their own identity.

Q: You moved to Ottawa and you were there, did you find the view from Ottawa different or were you sort of the Quebec watcher in the embassy?

JONES: No, I was now an economic officer, so my focus was much more on economic issues. Then it was all science and technology on which we had enormous levels of contact. Canadians could bid for our government contracts; for U.S. funded government grants and did so with good success. We did have a scandal that started in Quebec where a Quebec doctor who was part of the national cancer and bowel study faked his results. His lab made an error and turned in something to NIH that said false data. He was reporting on patients who had died as if they were alive because he wanted to continue his access to getting Tamoxifen which at the time was used to treat aggressive breast cancer. He felt the NIH guidelines were unfair so he decided to get around them by lying about his patients which probably killed a good number of his patients. Curiously enough his name was Dr. Poisson, and the manager in the states was Dr. Fisher. The issue was that the NIH folks who came to investigate didn't bother to tell the embassy. The science counselor at that time, Tom Wajda, called me to tell me to tell them that "Without formal permission from the Canadian government they couldn't take any information out." So we had to backtrack to find the NIH people. He was able to locate someone in the medical research council in Canada - who had every reason to help as we funded 15% of Canadian medical research purely through their success in getting NIH grants. Dr. Poisson was offended by the NIH

protocol which denied entry into the study for any woman who had cancerous tissue in both breasts since that meant the cancer had spread and she needed more than Tamoxifen. He lied. They died.

Q: What happened on the investigation?

JONES: Well first we had tons of lawyers come calling us saying they would be happy to represent NIH when NIH sued. We talked to NIH, and they were thinking seriously of suing because it cost a lot of money to dig the data the doctor had turned out of the results. They were going to leave it to the Canadian authorities as to what else was to be done to the doctor. I was amazed that none of the patients or the families of the deceased patients sued. We explained to NIH that suing the hospital was probably not a good idea because they were already down to their last cents and had patients in the hallways. Barbarian Invasions did not exaggerate.

Q: Yeah I mean you had somebody, I mean patients routinely sent to the United States for treatment and others, I don't know about the unions, but it appeared the hospital wasn't being used, This was a movie The Barbarian Invasions, the hospital wasn't being fully utilized because the unions didn't want to work there.

JONES: Well they had all sorts of things. In order to cut costs they let a whole lot of nurses retire early. Well there are only some ways to cut costs when you have a system that does not allow a private sector. The ideal of free universal health care with the government as the only paymaster sounds lovely. In actual fact with limited resources and a cap on what doctors can earn, it means rationing. One of the Canadians who worked at the consulate general had coronary artery blockage. He was only 67 years old. He was put on a waiting list. Six months later he was still on the waiting list when he died of a massive coronary. We had a friend in the states who was diagnosed with a similar condition at the same time and he got his bypass surgery in 24 hours.

Q: Well I went in to have a routine angioplasty about a year and a half ago. They stopped looking at me after about 15 minutes and said, "Well you are going to have to have a triple bypass, and we can either do it today or tomorrow." Well I had it tomorrow.

JONES: Yeah, and there is a reason for it.

Q: Yeah they said this is what is known as the widow maker type of thing.

JONES: Yes. It is much easier. The doctors care a lot about their batting average or success rate and its much easier and safer to do the surgery before the heart attack. You don't have the scar tissue. You don't have dead cardiac tissue. So they fix it, and your heart retreats back to what it was before you had the blockage. Dealing with the Canadians as Science Counselor was a lot of fun. I also had the responsibility for International Joint Commission which was managing the Great Lakes under the U.S.-Canada Boundary Waters treaty.

Q: How did you feel about God I can't remember the name, emission, exhaust or something.

JONES: Oh there are two different philosophies on environmental controls. We are extremely

legalistic. We battle to the death over the actual levels, every group screaming and yelling, and finally we have a standard set. Then if you violate the standard, we really get you. EPA actually has the right to put a city that violates the air quality standards under some kind of draconian extra regulations. We fine companies incredible amounts of money when they violate it etc.

The Canadians are different. They set an extremely low standard that the environmental groups can only dream of achieving in, but they don't enforce it. The standards are set by the federal government. The implementation is by the provincial government. For example, the St. Lawrence River is polluted despite being very fast and efficient at getting the pollutants out to sea. Their regulations say that a company that dumps in the municipal water supply, which then goes into the St. Lawrence is not considered as dumping into the St. Lawrence. For example, let's say I make titanium oxide paint and create all sorts of nasty stuff. I dump it into the local town's water supply, sewage supply, and they dump it into the St. Lawrence. I am not covered. I have not dumped into the St. Lawrence river. A few times they have caught a titanium oxide plant dumping directly into the St. Lawrence River, and they fined them I think \$10,000 - not even a wrist slap.

Air quality depends often on which way the wind is blowing and who has more cars. We and they both have problems because they allow additives that we don't. I think MTBE (methyl tertiary butyl ether) is an additive they use because they think it makes the fuel burn better in the winter time. We see it as a bad additive, so it is banned on this side of the border. There are never ending border issues.

For example, there is the example of Devil's Lake for instance in North Dakota which feeds into the Red River which goes into Manitoba and eventually Lake Winnipeg which supplies Winnipeg's drinking water. It also regularly floods. There is a long history of problems in trying to keep the flood waters on the other side. They built a barrier, we tried to dynamite it. The lake waters have been rising since the 1940's and the whole area has been flooding. The town of Devil's Lake used to be ten miles from the shores of Devil's Lake and right now is right on the shores of Devil's Lake. N. Dakotans wanted breach the lake to pour the extra into the Red River. The Canadians said no unless we pretreat the water so that it is potable. Plus they worried about alien species introduction. Our people were beginning to make noises about dynamiting a breach anyway. Unsaid in all this is that the Canadians already have thoroughly polluted all the water going into Lake Winnipeg drinking because of runoff from the farms. I believe that the argument will continue until a major drought when both sides can fight on water allotment.

Water level management is another issue as the St. Lawrence Seaway requires the Great Lakes to provide enough water for ships to move. This occasionally means that the Thousand Islands area becomes the Five Hundred Islands.

I also worked with the Navy Attaché by providing technical advice on the potential of CANDU (Canadian Deuterium Uranium) reactors to burn Soviet weapons plutonium.

DAVID T. JONES

**Political Counselor
Ottawa (1992-1996)**

David T. Jones was born in Pennsylvania in 1941. He received a B.A. and an M.A. from the University of Pennsylvania and served as a first lieutenant in the U.S. Army overseas from 1964-1966. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1968, his postings abroad included Paris, Brussels, Geneva, and Ottawa. Mr. Jones was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: Today is October 5, 2001. In 1992, you went to Canada as political counselor. Let's talk a little about the embassy first, in Ottawa. Who was the ambassador? What sort of a political reporting staff was there and how did that develop?

JONES: The ambassador had also literally just arrived. His name was Peter Teeley. Pete Teeley was an interesting guy. He had a very close connection with George Herbert Walker Bush, having been a public affairs staffer in charge of some of his campaign press during the '88 campaign. He had been in and out of government in that regard, but he was given the appointment and obviously would never have taken the appointment if he didn't expect that the Bush presidency was going to continue on into '92-'96. Nevertheless, he had just arrived and was barely getting his feet on the ground at the same time that I had arrived. I had met him in Washington. He was a very pleasant man, intelligent, thoughtful. At that point he had a very young wife, who had been the press photographer for Bush at one point in his government, and a couple of young children. Teeley was also a recovering cancer victim, so there was some additional poignancy associated with this man who was then in his early 50s with a very young wife and two young children. In effect, and by summing up the Teeley administration before it began, it was one of the very shortest that you were likely to have. He left on February 20th. During the time that he was ambassador, he was also out of the country a fair amount of time. His mother became quite ill while visiting Ottawa, was medically evacuated, suffered extensively from pneumonia, and then died. So, I won't say that Teeley ever put a definitive stamp on the embassy. At the same time, there was a very substantial turnover in the senior staff. Not only was there a new political counselor but there was also a new economic counselor, and a new agricultural counselor. The defense attaché also was new. The longest lasting incumbent was the DCM.

Q: Who was that?

JONES: That was Todd Stewart. He stayed one more year and then he was replaced by James Walsh.

As a political section, I had a pretty standard section. It had a labor counselor, two political officers, and a political-military officer, and two secretaries. Again, the action within the political section was really a pretty standard bifurcation. On the one hand, it consisted of making demarches to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the like so that they understood what we wanted them to do (or at least were able to appreciate what we were trying to do) or got a straight briefing from us on developments that we thought should be of interest to them. The other side of it was our reporting and analysis of what was happening in Canadian domestic affairs and what

was likely to be happening. All of that, of course, was not done just from the embassy. There were and still are consulates in Halifax, Quebec City, Montreal, Toronto, Calgary, and Vancouver that provided a certain amount of additional provincial level analysis and reactions from those parts of the country. The political section coordinated the overall reporting for the country through the consulates as well.

Q: When you arrived, how would you say the role of the Canadian embassy in Washington was? I would think you would all be all in play together.

JONES: The Canadian embassy and the U.S. embassy each had a special set of problems. Essentially, our relationship with Canada is so close and it meets in so many dimensions and so many facets that sometimes it's the role of the embassy simply to try to catch up with what is happening in Washington and in Ottawa. You have a situation in which many of the senior people in both governments know and are comfortable enough with one another to pick up the phone and just call. Since we don't even have international dialing code problems, you just pick up the phone, dial the local area code, you can be in your colleague's ear that very moment. But no, on another side, we did not deal specifically with the Canadian embassy any more than the Canadian embassy dealt with us. By definition, your embassy deals with their Ministry of Foreign Affairs. You end by knowing a little bit more sometimes of what was happening in Washington when you got a report from your Canadian colleagues. Getting a report from the State Department in Washington about what was happening at the Executive Branch level or within the White House was sometimes far more difficult – indeed totally problematic.

Q: To get down to the substance, when you arrived there, how would you say the status of relations was? Then what were the issues you were dealing with?

JONES: Essentially relations with the Canadians are almost by definition good. The Canadians have a major stake in maintaining good relations with us. They have a number of throwaway phrases associated with us such as, "The Americans are our best friends whether we like it or not." The truth of it though remains that on better than 95% of all of our issues, the relationship runs very smoothly. The overwhelming weight on the relationship is the economic rather than the political relationship throughout most administrations. There are times when there are disconnects between administrations. That was particularly true during the Trudeau government era when there were a number of disconnects between a liberal government and a Republican administration. But that was not the case initially. What we had in the Canadian government, at that point, was a progressive conservative Tory government that had been in power since 1984 and the then Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney, had made a major point out of being America's best friend. His throwaway phrase in that regard was that every morning when he got up he thanked God that he was living next to the United States and assumed that every morning the Americans woke up and thanked God that they were next door to Canada. But underlying all of that comment was a very strong relationship between the Republican administrations during 1980 and 1992 and the Tory government that existed in power between 1984 and the fall of 1993. There were times when Prime Minister Mulroney was not just the first but the foremost in support for foreign policy in the United States – times such as when we removed Noriega from Panama or earlier than that when we had sent air strikes against Qadhafi and Libya. He was front and center in promising Canadian support for the U.S. after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. So, the

baseline level of support for American foreign policy from Canada was very strong and very clear.

The problem, which will evolve over time, was that the Tory government was extremely unpopular and was in effect entering the fifth year of its mandate, entering its fifth year because it was hoping against hope that its fortunes would improve. It was hanging on as long as it possibly could. The Canadian government is parliamentary in style, and it has a five year period that it can run out between elections and the ability to choose when it goes to the polls by its own volition rather than any preset electoral schedule. But, traditionally, most governments go to the polls at the four year mark or around then. A government that is hanging on into the fifth year is one that is in very bad condition.

Q: What were we seeing that made this government unpopular?

JONES: It was a combination of the all strikes that you could possibly have against a government. At first it was running into a recession. Mulroney promised by endorsing the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA] that there would be great prosperity. Second, Mulroney had implemented a national sales tax called the goods and services tax, the GST. This was done for very good financial reasons and indeed replaced another tax of essentially the same category and dimension. But this tax was also identified clearly on the bottom of every sales slip while the previous manufacturing sales tax had been buried within the total cost. So, you had a seven percent national sales tax, a very painfully obvious sales tax and one that was roundly disliked.

Then Mulroney had attempted to struggle with the national unity question for Canada, a longstanding historic difference between English speaking Canada and Quebec. One of his baseline commitments when elected in 1984 had been to resolve this problem. He had undertaken so with energy, creativity, and failure. This first failure, which was called the failure at Meech Lake, was rejected by Quebecers. The second effort on constitutional reform to resolve the national unity problem was in process when I arrived. Instead of dealing only with Quebec affairs and problems, it was to address problems Canada-wide in a very comprehensive manner. But this effort was very divisive throughout Canada. That made the Mulroney government even more unpopular.

On top of that, there were style problems. The Mulroney government was viewed as at least somewhat corrupt, perhaps not more corrupt than normal and not corrupt on the level that you will find outside of western democracies, but nevertheless there were enough people at a reasonably senior level who had struggled with malfeasance type questions while in office that there was an impression that it was not a good government.

Then finally Mulroney's personal style, one of a glad-handing, mellifluous-voiced exaggerator, who dressed beautifully and whose wife was always impeccably turned out with perhaps not Mrs. Marcos' selection of shoes but nevertheless a very fine assortment of couturier goods and the like, also left people feeling that this was not "Canadian," that he was too "American" in style. This combination of things had driven his popularity down into the low double digits. Mulroney used to joke about this and say that more people believed that Elvis was alive than

were supporting him at that time. That's essentially the core set of his problems with Canadians. Canadians really were in a position that they were simply waiting for the opportunity to pound the living daylight out of the government and the Tories and replace them. So, of course, the government, having no special desire to be pounded into sand, held on hoping, like the old story of Mr. Micawber, that "something would turn up."

Q: From the embassy perspective, what did this mean for the United States? You knew the tidal wave was coming more or less. But were we seeing what's in it or what's not in it for us?

JONES: Well, obviously, yes. My throwaway phrase in this is, "The time to really get to know the government is when it's not the government." We could read the polls as well as anybody else. Part of our job was to go out and make all the contacts, connections, associations, linkages, with those that we expected to be senior players within the coming Liberal government as we could. This was just our job. We knew it was coming. My predecessor had been working on it. I simply plunged into the same kind of process of analysis and review. I oversaw the writing of an extended series of cables. For instance, I remember writing one six months ahead of time saying, "Prime Minister Jean Chretien, what does this mean?" Things of this nature. We were always going out to speak with people who we knew would be key within the Liberal government about what Liberal foreign policy would look like or what liberal defense policy would look like. We had opportunities to meet with the people who became the senior members of the establishment. We had meetings with Chretien, with other members of the establishment such as Sheila Copps, who became the Deputy Prime Minister, and John Manley, who became the Minister for Industry, and Paul Martin, who became the Finance Minister, and just right down the line of senior people in the Liberal government.

Q: With this group, were we seeing a different attitude towards the United States?

JONES: Well, yes. The Liberal government had at least on paper a far more skeptical view of American foreign policy. Ostensibly, they were saying that they wanted to review NAFTA, which was in its final stages for agreement. The existing Free Trade Agreement, or FTA, was the result of the arguments associated with the 1988 election. The Free Trade Agreement had been in effect, but it hadn't been producing the economic benefits that Canadians had believed it was supposed to produce. Just about everybody was in a mild recession. In the United States, it was that mild recession – "the economy, stupid" – that cost Bush his reelection. This circumstance is best described that when the United States catches cold, Canada gets pneumonia so far as economic downturns are concerned. The Canadian finances were poor. They were running significant deficits at all times. Unemployment was above 10%. Inflation was higher than that in the United States. There were a series of the kind of economic indicators that left people pretty unhappy. So, the fact that the Liberal opposition, the Liberal Party, was saying things like, "We think that NAFTA should be renegotiated" were at least a warning signal. The question had been, who is the leading individual so far as foreign affairs? Well, the shadow foreign minister was Lloyd Axworthy, a man who was a very liberal skeptic of United States policies. When he ultimately became foreign minister in 1996 – he did not become foreign minister immediately, but when he ultimately became foreign minister in '96 – U.S.-Canadian relations on many foreign policy issues became much more pointed and irritable. So, knowing what his general policies were because he was a left-wing liberal from the Vietnam era who had a Ph.D. from

Princeton and his issues and interests were those of people that graduated from liberal schools in the 1960s, one could anticipate problems. Also, the Liberals were rather skeptical of U.S. policy, even as obvious a policy as resisting Iraqi aggression in Kuwait. They were quite critical of the Mulroney government initially. Eventually, they came around and gave support, but we saw that as rather halfhearted support. Canadian views on defense are really rather feeble, but the Tory government at least verbalized a little more positively while the very first thing that Jean Chretien said he was going to do was to cancel the purchase of a major set of helicopters that were and still are very badly needed by Canadian forces. But he argued that these were “Cadillac gold plated helicopters” that were far too expensive and he was just going to cancel these. And there were other aspects in which we simply looked at Canadian foreign policy and thought that it was going to be likely less supportive of U.S. foreign policy or U.S. economic interests in NAFTA than would have been the case if the Tories had continued in office. We didn’t say that the world was going to come to an end or that the 4,000 mile undefended cliché that exists between us was going to change dramatically, but we expected more problems with the Liberals.

Q: Was this your first time serving in Canada?

JONES: Yes. I had not been to Canada since 1967 when I had been to the Montreal Expo. My entire Foreign Service career and my entire career in government had never taken me to Canada, although I had met and dealt with Canadians while I was at NATO.

Q: Looking at Canada, one of the things that comes up often is the Canadian concern, “Poor little us and great big you. You’ve got to be nice to us.” The other one is that it’s been said that the Canadians really don’t have any great sense of unity. We had our Revolutionary War and our Civil War and things which went across – real trials. The Canadians, it was sort of handed to them by the British government. This has caused a country without... There is no theme to the pudding.

JONES: That’s more obvious from the outside than from the inside. One of the first things you were cautioned about when going to Canada was that Canadians did not consider it complimentary to say, “You’re just like us.” Indeed, if you look at the externals, they are very obviously similar. You have first world, high tech, freedom loving, human rights respecting, democracy in which both the major leadership elements of both countries speak English, understand each other’s issues, and can pick up the telephone and dial directly and talk to each other. The similarities look more obvious than the differences. Yes, you’re in Canada. You can get your automobile repaired. Water will be pure to drink. You can go to a hospital and expect to get better rather than worse medical care. These things are all true. But in its core, I consider Canada very different from the United States. Canadians themselves are unnecessarily worried about their similarity to the United States. The core of the difference lies in the difference between the U.S. system of division and balance of powers and the Canadian system of parliamentary rule, which is true across the country. A parliamentary system, without belaboring it under these circumstances, is simply very different in the levers of control that are exercised, in the manner in which influence is delivered, and the manner in which the population is governed. That point is defining plus there are obvious differences in the views that Canadians have toward how public health should be delivered, how crime should be handled and managed; what the right to bear or not bear arms should be; the degree to which aboriginals, which is the Canadian

term for first nations, Indians, should be compensated and assisted, and the emphasis – even greater than that in the United States – on the rights of women and minorities and the protection accorded these groupings. It's a very different society. It's a very different society in many of its facets and at its core.

There is also the essential difference between what the key problem of Canada continues to be, which is national unity. While we say that the United States solved its national unity problem, not in a way that is necessarily to be emulated, in a bloody civil war, but following the Civil War, the United States changed in description from the United States “are” to the United States “is.” Canada has never ultimately resolved this issue. Part of the problem is that Quebec could indeed be an independent country. There is no question that Quebec has the size, the resources, the economic strength, the skill of its population, the quality of its government leadership, to be a quite workable and effective small state of about eight million people whose trading level relationship with the United States was about eighth across the world. It could work. But whether it would be a smart idea for Quebecers to do this or it would be a very disruptive set of circumstances, how long it would take to sort these things out, and the rest, that's a completely different story. We can explore that at whatever length you wish later. But I don't consider Canada as a country akin to a themeless pudding.

Q: I'm going under the assumption that dealing with the Canadians, it was easy to get to see their officials and officials to be, that it was a fairly easy governmental structure to work with.

JONES: I would say that is correct. The level of access that official Americans had with official Canadians was very high of course. There was a division as to whom you saw. The ambassador saw ministers, the DCM perhaps might do so in the absence of the ambassador. But outside of that among government officials and within normal members of Parliament, people of that nature, you could pick up the phone and ask for an appointment and sooner or later you were likely to get that appointment. People also spoke very frankly to you. They assumed a degree of confidentiality on your part and you assumed that your questions could be asked in a straightforward manner and you normally got straightforward answers. This was as true among Quebecers as it was among English speaking French Canadians and English speaking non-Quebecers. Quebecers in particular wanted the United States to understand exactly what it wanted, exactly what it was trying to do, exactly how it was going to go about it, and to emphasize that it could do so without being a security, economic, or political concern to the United States. So, wherever you went, you had a lot of access, particularly on political, national security, and defense issues. On things that were of financial concern, they were more careful, more reticent, held their cards closer to their chest. These were issues and problems that were very high financial value. But on the areas in which the political minister counselor was dealing, I would say that I was almost always able to get good access and clear indications of what Canada was interested in knowing and clear indications of what they were willing to do.

Q: One knows that the Canadians are extremely effective and have been around for so long in Washington and they know the Washington game, in which the Department of State plays essentially a minor role. It's the White House, Congress, the media, maybe the think tanks. It's a diverse field. What was the game as far as our embassy in Ottawa? What were the places you had to touch?

JONES: The situation in many respects was completely different. Canadians find out very quickly, if they don't already know ahead of time, that getting the President on board is just part of their problem, and that 100 different senators and 435 congressmen can be individually very important on a special issue. In Ottawa, it's the reverse. Almost nobody counts except a senior minister, or somebody within the Prime Minister's Office, or the Prime Minister himself. Individual members of Parliament are sometimes referred to in a derisory manner as "potted plants" or "trained seals." They leap up and applaud during the day-to-day question period, discussion, and debate. But as individuals they are completely invisible 100 yards from Parliamentary Hill, as Prime Minister Trudeau memorably put it. So, the people that you need to know or need to have on board to deliver an answer are your senior "Mandarins" within the specific bureaucracies or a minister or a member of the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). These are not huge establishments. It's not as if you're working through anything like an American style bureaucracy. One or two men in the PMO might be the individuals who would be the key "go to" persons so far as a difficult problem was concerned. A man named Eddie Goldenberg has had this position with Prime Minister Chretien throughout his entire prime ministership. He has been the Prime Minister's chief "fixer" in this manner and presumably will be as long as Chretien remains Prime Minister.

Q: Is it called the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

JONES: It used to be External Affairs. Now it's the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade [DFAIT].

Q: You got there in '92. How important were they from your perspective?

JONES: The things that I had to do, had to be done with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. My point, so far as the first half of my portfolio as political minister-counselor was concerned, was to deliver demarches and seek their support. By and large, the things that we were trying to accomplish were not really highly visible foreign affairs foreign policy issues. A lot of things looked as if they had just ended. This was the "end of history" era. One subject in which we were engaged was to get their participation in a maritime interception force, a Gulf interception force, in the Persian Gulf. This effort involved a series of ships that rotated and were inspecting traffic moving in and out the area toward Iraq. We wanted the Canadians to provide a vessel and made a series of demarches in this regard. Eventually they agreed to do so. Over my entire period of time there, to skip ahead, we regularly went to them on foreign affairs related issues – assistance that we hoped they would provide in Haiti or assistance that we hoped they would provide in Bosnia in the way of contributions to joint multinational forces that were being created. I think that, more or less, we were successful. There was one time that we were not successful and that was when we attempted to persuade the Canadians not to withdraw from the international peacekeeping force in Cyprus. They had come to the conclusion that they had provided a battalion for about 25 years, and that 25 years was enough. Although we attempted to persuade them to stay because they had been very successful in their presence there, they decided that it was too large a continuing commitment to finance any further for a point that they thought was obviously open ended, not likely to be resolved, and not have a level of tension that required them to be the peacekeepers any longer. In effect, they were probably right in that judgment. In

the intervening eight years, nothing has happened on Cyprus to gainsay their decision to depart. There was no horrible flare-up of fighting, and there has been no progress in resolving the standoff on the island. Despite the fact that I was personally worried that the absence of peacekeepers from the Canadians might lead to a breakdown and a resumption of significant hostilities, I was wrong.

Q: What about the Canadian military? How did we evaluate it? The world was changing. The Soviet Union was breaking up. But we were getting involved in Bosnia. We were looking around for solid troop commitments and effect troop commitments.

JONES: This is an interesting question. It's one that I spent a fair amount of time studying. To a degree, I spent some time on it before going to Canada. One of the trips that I made with General Sullivan when I was the foreign affairs advisor to the Army Chief was to Canada to look at Canadian forces. The estimates that we made of Canadian forces from the time I got there, which I made one of my personal areas of interest, were ones that were steadily negative. It was a judgment that we made with increasing regret. We saw and recalled that in both World War I and World War II Canadian military participation had been outstanding. In World War II, Canadians put over a million of their citizens into uniform out of a population of about 12 million, which was very directly comparable to the commitment that the United States made, which was about 12 million in uniform about of 140 million. As almost all of the Canadians who served were volunteers, it was even more remarkable. Canada didn't have conscription until almost the end of the war and virtually none of the people that went overseas were draftees. So, Canadian participation in World War II was really quite striking. At the end of the war, I believe they had something like the fifth largest army, the fourth largest air force, the third largest navy, and they were well positioned to have been able to build nuclear weapons had they desired. They had a heavy bomber force. They were operating an aircraft carrier, at least one. This was a very, very capable military. Throughout the core of the Cold War, the Canadians put a very effective brigade into Europe that was there full-time. They had an air wing stationed in Germany. The brigade was a unit that I saw during a NATO Exercise Reforger where I went to the field in Germany and saw various units, including the Canadian brigade. It was a very fine unit. The Canadian expertise in peacekeeping was rooted in the fact that they were first and foremost fine soldiers. It's certainly been one of my conclusions, and one of the conclusions with the military with whom I've dealt, that before you can be an effective peacekeeper, first you have to be a good soldier. But the Canadians, like everybody else around the world, with the collapse of the Soviet Union elected to take a "peace dividend."

The amount of money in proportionate terms and even in real terms that was committed to Canadian defense fell steadily. Their force levels fell steadily. This was pointed out by military commentator after military commentator, including the man who led their forces in Bosnia under the United Nations connection, Major General Lewis McKenzie, who very quickly noted that there were more Toronto policemen than there were Canadian infantrymen. It just went all the way along the line. The Canadians had steadily reduced military capability in virtually all fields. They have a basic societal problem that has developed over the last 50 years that has become akin to the old Chinese saying that "just as you don't make good steel into nails, you don't make good men into soldiers." Canada has sort of buried their very small military in penny packet units spread out of sight of the population in small bases across the country. There is no social-

political cache to having been a former soldier. For example, no general officer has ever become prime minister. If you think of the number of generals who became President of the United States, there is simply no comparison. When I arrived in Canada, there were out of a Parliament of about 300, I don't think there were five people who had had military experience. In the United States, the number of people with military experience in Congress has steadily declined, but our World War II generation also became very much engaged in politics. Canada's World War II generation is not reflected in their Parliament. To a degree, that may be a reflection of the fact that politics in Canada is more of a young person's game than it is in the United States. You can get involved in Canadian politics at a lower level for less money than is true in the U.S. Because the party system oftentimes presents you with a lot of safe writings and constituencies, if you can get into one of those, you are going to win. The party label is far more important than individual personalities in getting you elected or defeated in Canada. But still, the point is that Canadians seem to do this younger while we seem to wait until we've had a full career before we enter politics. Canadians will go into politics in high school in serious youth parties associated with the individual national political parties. They can be running for office in their 20s. The burned out, about to be defeated Tory Party that had been in office for eight years, had most of its leadership quit and not run in the 1993 elections, these were people in their 40s or at their most early 50s.

Q: When the Clinton administration came in, what was your impression of how it dovetailed... The Clinton administration came in before the Tory government lost.

JONES: Yes. Of course, the Clinton administration was elected in November of '92. It came to office in January of '93. The Tories were still in power and would be until October '93. So, there was a certain amount of overlap. At the same time, the Tories tried to develop a relationship with the Clinton administration. Mulroney did indeed meet with the President. This was a standard kind of scheduling. The first foreign leader that American presidents usually meet has been the Canadian prime minister, even if very briefly. Mulroney was adroit enough so that, while it would have been obvious simply from looking at the circumstances that he would have preferred George Bush to have been reelected, he had never said anything that was so publicly supportive of Bush during the campaign that it would have been impossible for the Tories to have a reasonable relationship with the Clinton Democrats. John Major, on the other hand, had made it more painfully clear than was appropriate that he wanted Bush to be reelected. So, there was a desire on the part of the Tories to have the best relationship they could have with the incoming administration. At the same time, it was very much in the Liberals' interest to try to get to people to Washington to sell their side of the case. After all, they said, we are the government in waiting. We are going to be the government as soon as there is an election. Don't waste your time with these people. By and large, they were successful in making this point. We did what we could with the Tories as long as the government was in power. We were planning, expecting, analyzing, doing our biographic work, and doing our studies that were designed to see what the new government was going to be like.

Q: On foreign policy issues, during this first period, did Cuba come up?

JONES: No, not really. Cuba was generally viewed almost with a smile as the way in which a conservative Tory Canadian government would use to differentiate itself from the United States. The Canadian policy toward Cuba, which is recognition and engagement, has not changed and

was the same as long as Castro has been the leader of Cuba. But we were not pushing them on Cuban issues at this juncture.

Q: Were we almost considering Cuba being a throwaway and Canada showing us how different they were could hit us with that and we'd shrug our shoulders and get on with more important things?

JONES: This was the point in which the Mulroney government would differentiate itself to its critics from those who said, "Oh, you're just a lackey of the Americans" and they would say, "No." There were other points of difference that they could find on specific African issues. They had been stronger earlier on for the elimination of apartheid and on not dealing with South Africa. So, it was not a question of the Canadians invariably under the Tories leaping up and saying, "Yes, Sir" to the Americans. No, we didn't have any major problem in them holding this particular point of difference. We would have preferred it not to be the case, but it wasn't an issue that we were going to make primary in a relationship that was going so very well in so many other ways.

Q: In many ways, particularly in matters such as Cuba and Africa, the Canadians from our perspective didn't count for much anyway, did they?

JONES: Canada is at best a second level power. Its presence around the world is very thin. They have points and they have issues to make in Africa through what used to be the British Commonwealth, now just the Commonwealth, and they have a certain amount of leverage in this manner. But it's on the margins rather than primary. Working through UN peacekeeping operations, they had a presence in many places around the world. At this point, they took special pride in having participated in one level or another in virtually every single UN peacekeeping operation. So, you could say Canada was "punching a little bit above its weight." It was a member of the G7, now the G8. It had done all of its peacekeeping. It could be seen by a number of countries as an interlocutor with the United States. Or, if you can't really deal with the U.S., maybe you can work an angle with the Canadians. There were times, although I can't put a finger on it for specifics, in which the Canadians would carry our water in areas where we were not going to be given anything other than a dismissive hearing but in which our interests and those of the Canadians were not significantly different. The Canadians were willing to make points along the same lines that we would like to have heard. So, I wouldn't overestimate their weight, but I wouldn't just drop it out of hand.

Q: With Canada in these early days, how did we see the Quebec separatist movement? Did we see this as still being a viable possibility or did we see this as beginning to fade?

JONES: If anything, we saw it beginning to rise. Although there had not been a referendum since 1980, the major efforts that the government had made to resolve the national unity question had either failed or were struggling desperately in this first year. The Quebec government was run by the Liberals – and this is a provincial Liberal, and they are always very different from the national parties – but the Parti Québécois, the PQ, was strengthening. There is no question about that. The Liberals were weakening. You could say there was a reasonable to good likelihood that the PQ was going to win the next election, which would be held in 1994. As a result, I spent a

fair amount of time dealing with the Quebec separatists and the Parti Québécois. On the national level, the Bloc Québécois had really just been formed. The leader of the Bloc Québécois, Lucien Bouchard, had been a close personal friend of Brian Mulroney's but broke with him over disagreements over how the Meech Lake Accord was to have been drafted and how it ultimately failed. He took out of the Tories a group of about eight or nine members who were Quebecers and he formed this small party. The DCM and I met with Bouchard twice during the course of my first year there in an attempt to get to know who this man was, what he was doing, and how he struck us. He was very impressive. He had learned English in his 40s. It was good, workable English. He was clearly an extraordinarily well read man in English, not just in French. He was thoughtful, articulate, smart... So, we didn't run around saying, "Well, he's going to do fantastically," but he was a respectable very small party leader at that point. On a more general basis, 1992-'93 was the last period before traditional Canadian three party politics shattered completely. Canada in 1992 had three parties – a New Democratic Party, which is a socialist party; the Liberals; and the Progressive Conservatives, the Tories. You had this tiny splinter group of Bloc Québécois, which had broken off who were Quebec nationalists. You had a single individual from the west, Deborah Gray, who represented the Reform Party. But after the 1993 election, which has continued in '97 and 2000, although this is outside of my purview right now, Canadian politics completely changed. The Liberals are labeled the "national governing party." Over history, they've probably run Canada two-thirds of the time. When they get themselves into a position where there has been a hideous depression or they have more than normally arrogant, Canadians have been willing to vote them out and turn to the natural opposition party. The natural opposition party normally consists of the west, a selection of dissidents within Quebec, and certain numbers of Ontario and Maritime voters. But following the 1993 election, you had a group of regional parties with a regional opposition element, where you had the Bloc Québécois, which held the majority of the Quebec seats, the Reform Party, which held the majority of seats in the west, a splintered social democratic party (NDP) which had just become less and less relevant and more and more marginalized, and a very powerful Liberal Party. One of the major rocks on which Canadian politics came apart was one of the first things that I encountered when I came to Canada; this was a national referendum, the first in more than 50 years, on national unity. The government presented the Charlottetown Accord, designed to fix a substantial number of constitutional problems in Canada. It was an evolution from the Meech Lake Accord, which had been designed to fix only Quebec problems. With the failure of that effort came a decision that they had to address the problem Canada-wide. Meech Lake had been approved by Quebecers, but it failed in a couple of other provinces.

Q: The Maritime provinces, didn't it?

JONES: Meech Lake failed in Manitoba and in Newfoundland. In Newfoundland, they had approved it and then the approval was withdrawn. In Manitoba, one man refused to give unanimous consent to continuation of the parliamentary session discussing it, and it ended without them being able ever to take a vote on it. But nevertheless, there were serious problems in the review process for Meech Lake. The emphasis consequently was that they really had to address problems nationwide regarding issues like what kind of senate reform there was to be, what the position of aboriginals should be, as well as specific problems associated with the role of Quebec within Canada. This was brought to a national referendum. When the presentation was made initially, it had support across the board. Every significant member of the power elite in

Canada, all the major newspapers, as well as all of the national party leaders with the exception of the Reform Party, all of the provincial party leaders and opposition parties – everyone supported it. But during the course of the campaign, a situation developed in which more and more people became less and less comfortable, not perhaps with the elements which might have been the goodies for others but on the elements that were supposed to be attractive to them. It was never enough or it was never done in the right way. On a province by province basis, it failed in all of the key provinces except Ontario. It failed in one of the four maritime provinces, in Nova Scotia. It failed in Quebec, much to the surprise of many people. It failed in the west. Canadian aboriginals, who voted on it separately, also rejected it. It was one of those situations in which all of the elites were on one side and the majority of the people were on the other. So, that, in effect, ended serious effort at constitutional reform for the rest of this decade. There have been things that happened after I left of which I'm fully aware because I follow events in Canada very carefully. But for the rest of the period of time in which I was in Canada, people were dealing with the ramifications of the failure of the national referendum, the constitutional fatigue that followed it, and the combination of irritation and anger felt in other parts of Canada because Quebec was being offered a special deal or in Quebec because they wouldn't give them the rights which they should have been normally accorded.

Q: This interview is dealing pretty much on the first year you were there. Any developments then that you would like to comment on?

JONES: Yes. The other point was that as we were seeing the Tory government play itself out, one of the issues that came up was, would Prime Minister Mulroney resign and give them a chance for a facelift, some revival? This was a major point of discussion. Indeed, what you had was a situation, as often happens in Parliament, where nobody knows what the leader's plans are going to be. Every leader holds this decision as close to his vest as he can. The minute he indicates what his plans are, he's dead. He's not a lame duck; he's a dead duck. Well, Mulroney was so good at this that in the departure interview Ambassador Teeley had with Mulroney (and Teeley saw him maybe around February 18th), Teeley said in his reporting telegram that he would be amazed and flabbergasted if Mulroney did not continue in office. By February 24, Mulroney announced that he was resigning. So, you can see Teeley with years of American political experience – it wasn't as if he was some businessman or academic who became an ambassador – he was a political analyst/observer/political animal/media expert, he was completely, totally, absolutely faked out by what Mulroney kept in. But then you had the next question: who was going to replace Brian Mulroney? You had an interesting contest within the Tories. They generated a good half dozen candidates. The leader from the very beginning was a well regarded and carefully groomed woman named Kim Campbell. Although she was relatively new in politics – she had only been elected in 1984 – she had had a series of good portfolios. She was the justice minister, which is in Canada considered a key cabinet ministerial position. After that, she became the defense minister, which is not a very prominent ministry in Canada, but since she was the first woman to be the defense minister, it was also considered to be something of a plus. It was clear they were trying to give her a series of appointments that would lead her to a leadership prospect. Well, she was the frontrunner from the beginning. But another younger Tory, Jean Charest, was encouraged to run by Mulroney to provide a little competition. Charest had been not much more than a minister of sports. I think he might have been the minister of health. But that, too, was not a very prominent position. He was not expected to give much

opposition. But it turned out otherwise. Charest caught on with a lot of young enthusiastic, energetic, bilingual, French-English capability... He looked right. He looked like the kind of man that every young woman would like to say, "Well, he's a teddy bear. He's not a sex object, but he's very nice." He was not threatening to any man either while at the same time being an individual who, if not regarded as intellectually brilliant, at least could give a hell of a good speech, look very dynamic, and had that perfect combination of French-English bilinguality. So, by the time you had reached late March during which there had been a series of debates and a lot of effort, there was something of a question as to whether the Charest tortoise "would overtake the Campbell hare." There were people that looked at Campbell and said, "Maybe we've made a mistake. If we had not all rushed to leap on her bandwagon, maybe we would have been better off to have gone with Charest anyway." Well, they had a good rousing, exciting, old fashioned convention held in Ottawa, and Campbell won; but she didn't win overwhelmingly. She won professionally because of the work that had been done in her favor by the team that had been assembled and put together beforehand, and because she very adroitly at the last minute made a compromise with one of the other candidates and got him with his votes to come on board with her. She had very little growth room if she had not won on the first ballot as she did. As a result, we had Kim Campbell become the first woman as prime minister in Canada in early June. We also had then notification of the nomination and the expected arrival in Canada of Michigan governor James Blanchard, who had a variety of interesting background aspects to him and the expectation that he was going to be the Secretary of Transportation rather than what he got. But that's another story.

Q: Maybe this is a good place to stop. We'll pick this up going into '93.

JONES: I'm political minister-counselor in Ottawa.

Q: Where do we pick up?

JONES: The summer of '93. We have gotten through the first year that I was there. I arrived in August of '92. At that point, the most interesting initial element was the arrival of the new ambassador, Ambassador James Blanchard, who was previously the Governor of Michigan. He has subsequently written a book called Behind Closed Doors. It created a minor stir in Canada and had absolutely no resonance in the United States. Among other things, an observation he made which I have used subsequently is that Canadians and Americans view each other through a one way mirror constructed along the border of Canada and the United States. Canadians looking south see everything that's happening in the United States and we looking north see only our own reflection in the mirror. But Blanchard was a one of the illustrations of why it is difficult to claim that only career professionals should be ambassadors. It's not that he was so much better than any career Foreign Service officer would be as ambassador. It was simply that he was one of the people that could say, "Well, I'll talk to the President about that" and indeed could pick up the phone and call the President. I could pick up the phone and called the President, but the President is less likely to answer me than he was to answer Jim Blanchard.

The other circumstance that made it helpful for people in Ottawa, in comparison to people who had suffered under other political ambassadors, was that Jim Blanchard is a politician. Of all the types of people that become ambassadors who are not career ambassadors, whether they're

academics or businesspeople or politicians, if I had to endure one as the political ambassador, I would prefer it to be a man who has been a politician. I draw that conclusion essentially because politicians realize that the staff is not their enemy. They deal with civil servants whether they're governors, or on their staff in the House, or whatever their position is, but they realize that civil servants are there to serve the leadership of the day and they will serve the leadership of tomorrow just as they served the leadership of yesterday. They aren't your enemy. They're pieces of functional machinery to get the job done. The other side of it is that most politicians are likeable. You rarely find a politician who is very unlikable – maybe Joe McCarthy was considered an essentially unlikable politician. Most politicians, who go elsewhere in the world, still carry with them the essential aspect of electability, that people like them.

Q: Could you explain where Blanchard's power came from?

JONES: Blanchard's power came from being the first governor to endorse Governor William Clinton of Arkansas for a nomination to the Democratic candidate to become President. Blanchard met Clinton relatively early on, was one of the people that supported him early, was the person that organized his campaign in Michigan, and he won Michigan, although Blanchard was defeated, subsequently, in the race for Governor, a very close defeat, but he was still defeated. As a result, people tagged Blanchard to be one of the people in the Clinton administration. Indeed, Blanchard had been promised that he was going to be the Secretary of Transportation. He says this openly in his book: "I was promised that I was going to be the Secretary of Transportation. The announcement was going to be made shortly." He found that he was not going to be the Secretary of Transportation when there was an announcement on CNN that Pena was going to be the Secretary of Transportation. He was told quietly that there was just one white male too many in the Cabinet and, as a result, he lost out. So, they sort of came to him and said, "What do you want? What would you be interested in doing?" My understanding is that he had a number of ambassadorships, including the ambassadorship to Germany, offered him as a possibility. He chose to be ambassador to Canada. Subsequently, he said that he had always wanted to be ambassador to Canada, that he had had close relations with various Canadians, dealing as he did out of Michigan, and that this was a place that he knew something about intellectually and personally, having visited or traveled or met individuals who had been provincial premiers, aspects of that nature. As a consequence, he took that particular position. Also for a while, his wife worked in Personnel at the White House. She, too, was reasonably well connected within the White House circle. So, Blanchard because he knew Clinton early, because he had connections within Congress (He had been a representative before he became Governor), and because he had spent some time at least with Clinton's staff, had a respectable heft in that he was able to call people around town, call people within the White House itself, and get a hearing on the issues that were important to him and important to Canada.

Q: How did he bring himself up to speed when he arrived there? This is true of anybody – when you arrive in a new country, particularly as ambassador, and you've done some reading, but you go to your staff and ask what's up.

JONES: Here again, Blanchard deserves substantial credit for doing something that was very smart. He immediately started a full and comprehensive tour of Canada. He traveled for a substantial period both west and east, hitting major spots, meeting each one of the U.S. consuls,

and consul generals and had the full range of high level appointments with provincial premiers, senior politicians in the provinces, individuals of that nature. So, instantly, he would be in a position and was in a position to say, "Well, I met so and so at such and such a place" and, with the exception of virtually nobody else, have had a wider grasp of what was happening in Canada from having seen it on the ground. This isn't all that easy. Canada is continental size. It took probably, although he didn't travel every single day, much of a month of travel time. He did it in some sections. At first he took a long western tour. Then he went to the Maritimes. He separately went into Quebec and to Ontario. But as a result of that, he gathered a "gestalt" of Canada that put flesh on the bones of fact and briefing papers and briefings that his staff had given him. He didn't take anybody other than his wife from the embassy along with him on this trip. He was met at each point by the consul generals in the areas in which he was going to travel. It worked quite well for him.

Q: Starting in the summer of '93, what were the issues that you were looking at and dealing with?

JONES: The primary issue for '93 was when there would be a federal election and just how massive a defeat the Tories would absorb. It was clear and had been clear even before I arrived in Canada that it would have taken a substantial political miracle for the Tories to have been reelected in '93. They had been in office for two terms. Although they came in because of a variety of Liberal disasters, and the Liberals had just worn themselves out as a party, during the eight years in which the Conservatives had been in control, they had put in a hated goods and services tax, a GST. They had run themselves directly into a depression, not by anything that they had done but by the same bad accident that "the economy, Stupid" defeated George Herbert Walker Bush and also was driving the Tory Conservative numbers down to virtually the single digits. Mulroney had attempted with great energy and substantial goodwill to create a circumstance in which Quebec would sign on to the constitution. He reopened the constitutional question based on his original campaign in 1984 that he would bring Quebec willingly and eagerly back into full Canadian participation. In two substantial, even monumental, efforts, including the national referendum that I discussed earlier, he failed. The failure left Canadians even more irritated and divided than they had been before and left the Quebecers essentially highly alienated as a result of this effort. Then, finally, on top of that, you had an endless sleaze factor. The Tories having been out of power for many years got back into the trough with all four feet – and not just the one or two feet that you would normally expect in the trough. There were endless scandals of essentially minor nature, but attrited away popular approval and left the impression of a fundamentally dishonest party.

Brian Mulroney personally, although his glad-handing, almost bombastic, style of speech and action went over well as an Irish politician in some areas, for others, and particularly the fact that he dressed with elegance and his wife, if not Imelda Marcos in the number of shoes that she purchased, was also very fashionably dressed and very prominent on the Canadian social scene generated a level of personal irritation to the effect that this was not "Canadian" somehow. As a final thought, he liked the United States. He gave the U.S. a great deal of specific and general support in a way that few Canadian politicians and certainly no Liberal politician would ever do. So, all of these things combined created a circumstance in which Mulroney said that more people believed that Elvis was alive than were willing to support the Tory Party. What happened as a

result was that Mulroney resigned and there was a party campaign in which the first woman ever to become Prime Minister in Canada, Campbell, became Prime Minister. Of course, she then had to suffer the opprobrium of being a “Mulroney in skirts,” as Jean Chretien put it, plus having all of the overburden that I just described, and although there was a flash of popularity that associated with the newness of having a feisty younger woman in charge of their country, she ran into the same kind of problems that I have just outlined and a number of her own as well. As a politician, she had advanced too fast. It would be as if Geraldine Ferraro somehow had become President with all of the baggage that she might have had associated with it and no real national leadership experience. Well, Kim Campbell had only been elected in 1984. She had never run a national campaign. She had held a couple of prominent ministries within the Mulroney administration. She had been the Justice Minister. She had become the Defense Minister. It was a position that they had put her into because they wanted to give her a certain amount of exposure and experience in this area. She was somebody that the leadership was grooming. With a “Hail Mary” pass type of political maneuver, they made her Party leader and consequently Prime Minister.

Q: This campaign was going on in '93?

JONES: Yes, in the summer. They knew that an election had to be called. They have a five-year window, and the election had to be called by late 1993. Any Canadian party that goes into the fifth year of its mandate is a party that's in desperate trouble. Most of the time, they go somewhere in the late three to early four year mark, and that's seen as the appropriate time. If you run into the fifth year, you are expected to lose.

Q: Were you telling the new ambassador, “Make your due obeisance to the party in power, but you'd better start getting close to the Liberals?” Was that just self-evident?

JONES: It was self-evident. It was something that you walked around and did all the meeting and greeting at the official level. I don't even know which of these senior Tories that were in government he did meet. It was during the summer and the government was closed. Since the government was closed and then almost immediately went into campaign mode, I'm sure he met some of the people who were ministers in the Campbell government, but most of them he wouldn't have met. For a good two years beforehand, the embassy was working full time to meet and cultivate the people that had anticipated would be senior leadership in the new Liberal government.

Q: You said something that strikes the difference between the American system and the British system, which the Canadians have to some extent, and that is the government was closed. In the United States, life goes on. When you say the government was closed...

JONES: What I meant was that Parliament was in recess just as Congress would be in recess. It was not that there was nobody at all minding the store, but that you did not have normal political activity in Ottawa during the summer.

Q: In the parliamentary system, it tends more to close down than in the presidential system, doesn't it?

JONES: Yes, because the parliamentarians are also the ministers. What you can do with a parliamentary system that you can't do with the American political system is largely identify from the shadow cabinet the people that will be having prominent positions in the next government, assuming that it is the government. The phrase that I've always used is, "the time to meet the government is before it becomes the government." It is certainly far easier for political counselors, economic counselors, etc. to meet the key and senior members of the opposition in a country such as Canada than it is to meet ministers who are essentially the point of contact for the ambassador, and the ambassador reserves them to himself.

Q: Were you and your team putting together the new government and were you able to get out and meet them?

JONES: Yes. This was just normal political work. You looked at the people that had the shadow ministry portfolios and you tried to get a chance to meet them and talk to them. People that were prominent and active within the Liberal Party or who had been for a number of years and the people that were deemed to be closer to the Prime Minister, part of his basic entourage, you tried to get to meet them and at least develop points of contact there. But these were all very standard. The man who is now Deputy Prime Minister in Canada, John Manley, was simply a normal standard Member of Parliament from Ottawa, although he was considered to be a very smart man and was expected to have a cabinet position. So, we obviously met him. The man who was the shadow foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, didn't immediately become the foreign minister. Within about three years after Chretien won the election, he became the foreign minister. It was true for other senior people within the Chretien establishment. They either became senior people within government or they were senior advisors close to him. By no means will I say that we met and knew them all, but we did have a fair number of solid contacts within what became the government, and we were able to make at least some reasonable judgments about what kind of people these were.

Q: Were you seeing trouble on the horizon with the new government coming in, which I take it was working to keep itself somewhat separate from the U.S.?

JONES: You have a situation in Canada where they really have only one foreign relationship. That is with the United States. Their "be all and end all" in foreign affairs is their management of their relations with the United States. Their A-team is directed to dealing with their issues, problems, circumstances, and relationship with us. So, at the same time, our predominance in North America in the economy, on the continent, in the world, is so massive that they have to get along with us. It's one of these "we're best friends" whether they like it or not. The relationship is one that has to work. They are our largest trading partner, but we are overwhelmingly their largest trading partner. Right now, the trade relationship is about two billion Canadian dollars a day each way. It's an enormous trading relationship. It's the largest trading relationship in the world. But it's even more important to the Canadians than it is to us. Something like 80-85% of their experts go to the United States. This moved up over the years. I think it was 60-65% when I first arrived in Canada in '92. But the Free Trade Agreement and now the North American Free Trade Agreement has stimulated trade to the extent that has been magnificently advantageous economically to the United States, Canada, and Mexico, but it has made Canada even more

reliant upon the United States than was the case in the past. So, what we have a situation where for eight years the relationship had been extremely good. Brian Mulroney in some instances was virtually our only supporting voice in some things that we did. While the role of the opposition in a parliamentary system is to oppose, there were times that we thought that the Liberals took more glee and more seriousness in their pointed opposition to what the United States was doing or intended to do than what would suggest that the relationship would be smooth, calm, and congenial. Indeed, the Liberals had talked about during their election campaign renegotiating NAFTA, which had been completed. At different times in the past, they had been pointedly critical or very slow to get on board in support of the U.S. effort to reverse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in '91 for the Gulf War, and rather skeptical about the need to do so. Finally, they smartened up, but it was not something where they gave an instant response of support. "This could not stand. This had to be changed."

Q: In a way, that one seems clear.

JONES: Yes.

Q: At least to a professional Foreign Service person. But was it visceral on the Canadians that they just didn't want to get on board?

JONES: I honestly don't know, but I think to a degree it reflects the foreign affairs ignorance of the Prime Minister. The foreign affairs ignorance has persisted. It has been consistent. He has little or no interest in foreign affairs and less competence in it.

Q: This is Chretien?

JONES: Yes. As Prime Minister and as leader of the opposition, Chretien, had and has very little sense for foreign affairs. I say that he has perfect pitch for domestic politics and a tin ear in foreign affairs.

Q: How did we prepare ourselves for the election and what happened?

JONES: We did not expect that there were going to be major problems, although these flags were at least available for viewing. We thought it was going to be a situation, as is so often the case, of "where you sit is where you stand." It is much easier to oppose for the sake of opposition than it is, when you are in power, to change everything that has been done. We hoped and anticipated on the basis of the track record of U.S.-Canadian bilateral relations that we would have a reasonably good relationship. In preparation for the election, which was in October, once the writ was dropped, which is their phrase for calling the election on a specific date, the Political Section did a comprehensive series of telegrams outlining how Canadian politics work, what the baseline descriptions of each of the parties were, where they stood, how they viewed life and politics. I set up a reporting schema by the consulates so that on a weekly basis they put in a short sketch as to how things were evolving in their area of responsibility. Then we followed the election campaign quite closely. I had the interesting experience of joining the Liberal election entourage with a media seat for about four days. I rode around on the plane with them and the bus... These were transits around Ontario and Quebec. It was toward the very end of the

campaign. This was something that I understand that people in the embassy had done previously. The media buys a seat on the plane for a period of time and I - or the embassy - bought a seat for me to go around and travel with them. Previously, I had done some visits with Members of Parliament who were campaigning again and gone to some rallies to see how they were working and evolving. I saw Chretien work while he was on campaign as opposition leader. I met and talked with people that I had known before from the run-up to this campaign and new people as well. So, this was an interesting experience. What I found was that Chretien has an almost reflexive set of comments that are, if not absolutely hostile, at least strongly skeptical about the United States – things that he didn't need to say. He would make comments like, "We're not going to be the 51st state of America!" Who had invited him to be? "I'm not going to be Bill Clinton's fishing buddy," the reference being that Brian Mulroney had spent a fair amount of time with George Herbert Walker Bush as a visitor and colleague and things of that nature. Okay, that's fine, but were these relevant comments to make on campaign? And he didn't make them just once. He made them at every other campaign stop that he hit. Was this necessary?

Q: Did you find this hostility reflected by his members of the campaign staff that you came up against?

JONES: No, I won't say that this was an overwhelming aspect of the Liberal Party by any matter or means. They, too, are friendly, congenial, personable, and very approachable. I had enormous amounts of access. Virtually anybody would talk to you. Virtually anybody at almost any level in government would talk to you. Indeed, it was a skepticism that was evident in Mr. Chretien and it was also a skepticism certainly about American foreign policy and foreign affairs by Lloyd Axworthy, who eventually became Foreign Minister. Mr. Axworthy is one of these people who, because he had a Ph.D. from Princeton, is convinced that he knows how the United States should run its foreign policy better than we do and doesn't hesitate to tell us very loudly exactly how we should be doing it, why we should be doing it the way that he thinks we should, and does so in a way that is totally counterproductive for his own interests.

Q: At the time, when Chretien and company would talk about not wanting to be the 51st state, basically using the United States as the straw man on which to win some votes, did we treat this with a certain amount of a shrug because it didn't make much difference?

JONES: We weren't belaboring this and we certainly said nothing in public. This isn't our business in that way. I think Canadians are always under the impression that Americans pay no attention to them at all and, consequently, they can say anything about us that they care to. On the other hand, when someone's pissing down your back, you're sort of silly to call it "rain." From time to time while I was on the trip, I made it clear to Chretien's minders that I didn't think that that was a terribly productive line of approach. But I wasn't saying anything in public and I wasn't saying anything to the other media on the bus or on the plane or anything of that nature. I just sat and listened and took note. But again, it was an exercise of an illustration of the inner man and not even necessarily what we were predicting. We certainly were not predicting that there was going to be essential hostility in our foreign policy or economic relations.

Q: We didn't think this was going to go back to Diefenbaker times.

JONES: Or even to the earliest and most pointed Trudeau period, where there was very pointed hostility all the time. Of course, you could also say that so many things had changed that there were almost by definition going to be fewer points of controversy. A lot of the controversy between the United States and Canada during the Cold War era was in their view that we were not being sufficiently supple in our relationship with the Soviet Union. After all, how could they possibly be an “evil empire” or be told that they should collapse and take down the Berlin Wall? That was just ridiculous. Of course, by 1993, there was no Soviet Union. Apartheid in South Africa had ended. There were no Contra battles going on in Latin America. There was a great deal of democracy where there had been a great deal of dictatorship in South and Central America. So, as a result, many of the points of neuralgic conflict in foreign affairs between the United States and Canada had pretty much evaporated. Now, the fact that the U.S. policy in almost all these issues had turned out to be correct is a point that the Canadians would never accept or admit. But nevertheless, the issues weren’t there.

Q: It left them with Cuba.

JONES: Yes.

Q: Of all the issues, that’s a throwaway.

JONES: Well, it’s an issue on which we have – I won’t say agreed to disagree, but since we have, in effect, disagreed on it for 40 years, it remains a baseline for a Canadian foreign policy expert to differentiate themselves from their views on foreign policy with the United States. So, while we thought then, think now, and will think in the future that the Canadians are on the wrong side of history so far as Cuba is concerned and, as I politely told my Canadian colleagues, that they had better advise their investors there to make all their money they can now because when the government changes, they certainly will not be the preferred investors in a new Cuban government. But okay, you make your choices. If the Canadian government continued to align itself with Castro’s Cuba, that’s their choice.

Q: Let’s go on with what you were up to.

JONES: We simply watched the election evolve and did our analyses as we went along. Of course, beforehand, I wrote the proverbial kind of predictive telegram of a smashing Liberal victory, and that’s exactly what it was. It created circumstances in Canada that exist today. It virtually annihilated the Tory Party, which went from a majority of something like 160 seats – they had an outright majority and they were reduced to two seats. The Prime Minister and virtually every member of the Cabinet was defeated. It left a Liberal government with a majority and it shattered the opposition into these three pieces: the tiny remnant of the Tories; a Reform Party, which grew from one seat to more than 50 seats and dominated the entire west; and the Bloc Québécois (BQ), which is a separatist party and seeks the independence of Quebec. That totally destroyed the Tories in Quebec. The BQ didn’t gain a seat anywhere else but got enough seats to become the official opposition, which left a number of people scratching their heads because the opposition is supposed to be the loyal opposition and this was a palatably, identifiably, and certifiably disloyal opposition. This group was led by probably the most interesting and charismatic Canadian politician of the 1990s: Lucien Bouchard. He is one of

these stormy petrels of politics who has ranged Churchill-like across parties being different things at different times and then being the same thing again. He had been a senior member of the Tory government, a close friend of Brian Mulroney's, broke with Mulroney over one of the constitutional accord solutions, one called Meech Lake, and set up his own party that was carved out of a hunk of the Tory party and a couple of Liberals called the Bloc Québécois. He did that prior to the election. They had something like 11 members. But in the 1993 election, they virtually swept Quebec with about 54 seats. That put them in a very curious position of being the official opposition and, in theory, advancing the interests and attitudes of all Canadians in opposition, but by and large clearly devoted to the independence of Quebec. They were regarded as and regarded themselves as the vanguard in Ottawa to prepare for separation from Canada. What you had still was a province in Quebec that was headed by the Liberals on the provincial level. It was not until 1994 that they had a provincial election that ousted the Liberals and put in the Parti Québécois. But back to the federal level, the other major winner from this election was the Reform Party. This was headed by another extremely interesting, charismatic, and highly intelligent Canadian politician, perhaps the second most interesting and intelligent politician in Canada in the 1990s, Preston Manning. Manning's view was that the West had been systematically disadvantaged and cut out of real power and authority in Canada at the federal level because of the manner in which the parliamentary system works. The parliamentary system rewards the parties where the greatest population is. If you don't have the population, you don't have the seats. If you don't have the seats, you don't have the influence. There is no substantive political equivalent to the U.S. Senate, where small groups of populations and small areas can have a blocking power and influence at the federal level. The Canadian West is less populated than Ontario and Quebec and has significantly less influence. The Tories had promised the West that they would bring them more into the center of power and authority. At the end, the Westerners, particularly as headed by the Reform Party, came to the conclusion, correctly, that the Tories had continued to pour their fiscal preferences into Ontario and Quebec. The Reform Party was sufficiently convincing that it changed the circumstance from one in which virtually all of the representatives in Alberta were Tories to a situation in which there were no Tories in Alberta and every Tory in Alberta was defeated. So also was the case in British Columbia and less so in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, but there were representatives in these provinces. Where the Reform Party failed completely and totally was east of the Ontario-Manitoba border. They had one seat in Ontario at that point and no seats in Quebec or in the Maritime Provinces. So, you had a situation in which the Conservative Party in Canada was now in three segments – the old Tories, the Reform Party, and the Bloc Québécois. There is a socialist party, the New Democratic Party, the NDP, in Canada and they, too, in 1993 lost very substantial numbers. They had about 40 seats going into the election and were reduced to about 19. So, that, too, suggested the marginalization of the left and a real socialist view in Canada, partly because people hypothesized as a result of the end of the Cold War the Soviets had failed politically and a recognition that socialism wasn't working and had failed economically. These divisions that were manifested in 1993 have persisted through the present and the present election, although the Bloc Québécois has declined somewhat and Reform changed its name, restructured itself, and gained a few seats. The Tories in two elections went up and then back down. It's a little hard to go anywhere except up when you have two seats. In the '97 election, they went up to 19 seats. But then in the 2000 election, they declined to 12 seats, the minimum for official party status in Canada.

Q: What did we see was in it or not in it for the U.S., this division of the west becoming quite discontented and not really attached to the government and then the Maritimes? Did we see any problems here for us?

JONES: Not at the initial structure. It was simply a phenomenon that the Conservatives had totally and absolutely collapsed. They had been as thoroughly repudiated as any party in democracy virtually ever has been. The concern and the obvious foreshadowing was that this was headed to a constitutional crisis in Canada, that a referendum was clearly coming on Quebec independence, as it was also very easy to predict that the Quebec Liberals were going to be defeated whenever they went to provincial election. That meant that there was going to be a referendum on Quebec sovereignty. That was what we were most focused on and most interested in. In a longer view, the continued division of a conservative party has meant that the Liberals have totally dominated Canadian politics, and I have said that it's Liberals as far as the eye can see so far as the predictability of Canadian politics well into the next decade. There simply is nothing and no likelihood of a coherent conservative rejoining that would make it possible to oppose the Liberals, who stride the center of the spectrum. They are what is called in Canada the "natural governing party" and they are an extremely effective political force. They will move slightly to the left or slight to the right as economic, social, etc. circumstances require and they win elections. They are extraordinarily effective politicians and they run by what used to be the maxim of the Old Democratic Party in the U.S., spend and spend, elect and elect.

Q: After the new government comes in, from the point of view of our embassy, was there any adjustment? What was our goal?

JONES: Our first and primary focus was concern over NAFTA. It was an issue that the Liberals had made one of their key points in their campaign: they were going to renegotiate NAFTA. That left every person who had ever had any association with this agreement with their hand on their forehead wondering what this was going to mean. Nobody knew exactly what it was going to mean. There was some upset in Washington about what this meant, how it was going to act out, how people were going to act as a result of it, and what the Canadians were going to do. As it turned out, the Canadians and the Liberals made some minor suggestions, and had some very minor adjustments, as far as I can recall, in NAFTA. Ambassador Blanchard played at least a reasonably helpful role in telling Washington fairly directly and telling people within the White House and in the presidential entourage to stay calm, don't get excited, let's wait this one out a bit. Blanchard met with Chretien even before Chretien officially assumed power as prime minister. Their transition is very quick. Their transition between a defeated government and a victorious government is a couple of days, not any extended period. We got the impression, at that point, that things could be worked out, as they were. This was what we had hoped for and expected, but it was nothing about which we were assured. That generated a degree of tension within the embassy where you expect something is going to work out but you don't know because you have no control over what the other side eventually does. Of course, they are on record as saying that they're going to do something that would make that which we wished to accomplish much more difficult. They didn't do it. That was helpful.

Q: As things kept rolling along, did you find that this new government was relatively easy to work with?

JONES: We started just back into our long laundry list of specific issues and problems on foreign affairs. The foreign minister who was selected was Andre Ouellette. He was not a career foreign policy expert either. He was essentially Chretien's Quebec manager. He had been a longtime Liberal. His position was pretty much to listen to his foreign ministry staff. So, we were not faced with a lot of specific crises. Most of the crises we were not faced with were those crises that had evaporated from the Cold War, from the end of apartheid in Africa, from significant increases in democracy in Africa and in Latin America, and the end of many of the guerrilla exercises that had been running either in Nicaragua or elsewhere. Since we didn't have these problems in which we would be doing one thing and the Canadians would be feeling that we should be doing another, and we didn't have foreign policy direct conflicts. The issues that were largely in play were former Yugoslavia exercises. Here you really have to have somebody who was an expert in Central Europe, Yugoslavia, and the former Yugoslavia, to sort your way through who was doing what, to whom, when. The Canadians had had UN subordinated forces in Bosnia and elsewhere for a good stretch of time. They continued to do so. By and large, they supported the efforts that we were attempting to do to stabilize one part of former Yugoslavia or another. So, we were engaged in constant coordination on demarches and on policies for the area. The Canadians with whom I dealt were largely skeptical about greater involvement in the former Yugoslavia and wanted to let the Europeans work it out to the degree that was possible.

Q: This brings up a point. How did the Canadians feel themselves? Did they feel themselves to be North Americans or Europeans? Bosnia brought a division there.

JONES: The Canadians view themselves now as North Americans. I think they have increasingly done so as the relationship with Europe distances itself, as the relationship with the United Kingdom is reduced, and as the UK itself grows closer to Europe. The Canadians in the late 1980s entered the Organization of American States, which they had declined to do previously, as full members. They had previously been observers. They had not really wanted to be associated with all those tin pot dictators who were under American influence. They committed themselves within NAFTA and by joining the OAS even more so to a continental North American view than a European view. By definition, the Canadians had paid less and less attention to military concerns. With the end of the Cold War, they grabbed onto the peace dividend immediately, drove their spending in defense terms both in real and in absolute terms to much lower percentages of their budget, pretty much withdrew all of their forces from Europe, and focused, to the extent that they continued to have any real military interest, on peacekeeping exercises either UN related or not.

Q: How did things flow after that?

JONES: The relationship was a reasonably straightforward, solid working relationship on the many individual demarches and issues in foreign affairs. This was simply a constant flow. We presented in the course of the year hundreds of demarches on issues of every dimension to the Canadian government, sometimes seeking their support, sometimes simply informing them of our views and positions, as is naturally standard consultation in foreign affairs terms. One issue that did arise was that on cruise missile testing. We had had a longstanding agreement with the Canadians to fly, test cruise missiles over certain areas of their northern provinces. This was

designed so that we could perfect our terrain contour matching radar.

Essentially the cruise missile agreement had expired. We thought it was still a useful agreement to have. I'm not sure whether I mentioned that the reason that we wanted to do it was because the terrain in Canada was a close approximate of the terrain over which such cruise missiles would have to fly for strikes against the old Soviet Union. The agreement had proceeded throughout the time of the Cold War without difficulty, but there were, of course, always individuals who were critical of any such agreement with the United States including environmentalists who claimed that it was scaring the elk, I think. The politicians in Alberta who were representing those areas were Reform Party politicians, so as a result they had no weight in the decision-making. Although we had been told that the Canadians were going to renew the agreement, three days before the Secretary of Defense, Perry, was due to visit, there was a conference of the Liberals in Ottawa. At that conference, the young Liberals voted that they should discontinue this agreement with the United States. The government decided that since the young Liberals had so said, that was going to be government policy. Now, that to me was the limpest kind of excuse that I had ever heard from a government. It also was an embarrassment certainly to the career professionals within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to a degree their Department of Defense because we had not been informed that this was going to be their policy prior to its public announcement just a couple of days before the Secretary of Defense arrived.

The Secretary of Defense was very gracious and just sort of let it pass along. But it was illustrative of the manner in which the Canadian government can make essentially ideological decisions.

Q: Did you sense any pulling back on our side, saying, well, let's do what we have to, but let's not initiate anything new?

JONES: I wouldn't say that. You had a liberal but democratic administration in power in Washington and you had Liberals in Canada. They were more philosophically in tune than not. The issues that we were presenting and trying to get support on were by and large straightforward issues that had less contention associated with them. Over the next couple of years, one of the issues that was one in which we most steadily worked and tried to find a solution was that of the military dictatorship in Haiti. The Canadians had a certain domestic interest in Haiti. There were a fair number of Haitians who happened to be in the "riding" (parliamentary district) of the foreign minister. These Haitians were strong supporters of the Liberal Party. So, the Canadians had an interest in a positive resolution for Haiti. We were groping, as we did for an extended period of time, with all of the issues associated with the military rule and the ouster of Aristide from Haiti. So, we had a steady stream of cooperative efforts and consultations and policy discussions with the Canadians on how to manage the regime change in Haiti. The Canadians participated at a modest level in the force that eventually did oust the military dictatorship. They had and may continue to have a presence in Haiti in the way of RCMP [Royal Canadian Mounted Police] trainers for the Haitian police. These people, being French-speaking, had an entrée that many Americans would not. They also attempted to train Haitian police in Canada. They tried to encourage Haitians who were residents and even citizens of Canada to contribute positively to the success of a new regime in Haiti. So, we were really pretty congenial in this regard. In a couple of other areas, although these were more

economic than political, we were working on improving the relationship. One in which Ambassador Blanchard had a particular interest was a modernized Civil Aviation Agreement. He found, much to his displeasure, that it took an inordinate amount of time to get from Ottawa to Washington, that he had to fly through this or that place or fly on a very small plane. There simply was no convenient connection between Ottawa and Washington. There had been repeated failures in attempts to modernize the Civil Aviation Agreement, essentially because of Canadian aviation protectionism. It was one of Blanchard's efforts from the time he arrived. After quite a long extent of time, an aviation agreement was solved at the same time that President Clinton visited, which was in February '95. You can see that it was at least a year and a half effort on the part of Blanchard to get this particular problem solved.

Blanchard also worked on another one of the neuralgic economic problems, the issue of Pacific Coast salmon. Here all I can do is shorthand it to say that it's a problem of too many fishermen chasing too few fish. It has been a problem akin to that of softwood lumber that is on the endless, repeating "laundry list" of issues that come up. Out of our entire economic relationship of the magnitude that I've earlier described, maybe five percent comes under problems of one sort or another. These problems constantly change, but some of them repeat. Among those are things like fishing, softwood lumber, and magazine publication. They are essentially economic. They don't become really political until they become very pointed or reach crisis level. But these were also problems in which the ambassador worked and on which I was somewhat aware but I was not directly engaged.

Q: Did they call it External Affairs?

JONES: It used to be called External Affairs. While I was there, they changed it to Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade [DFAIT].

Q: Did that name imply anything?

JONES: It was meant to imply that there was a greater economic component in DFAIT than in the past, but part of the decision to change was that "External Affairs" was close to being a "Britishism" that seemed to be a part of the past and which they wanted to modernize and update.

Q: How did you find dealing with the professionals in those places? Were you dealing mainly with career Canadian diplomats when you were over there? Were these sort of the experts? Or did political appointees go down fairly far?

JONES: Political appointees really don't exist on the scale that they exist at in the U.S., at least at the ministerial level. The political appointees will be involved in the Prime Minister's Office and the Privy Council Office. If you had to give a very rough analogy, you would say that this was equivalent to the White House staff and the NSC. These are people that can have the position of: where does the 800 pound guerrilla sit? The 800 pound guerrilla sits wherever he wants to. So, a man who is a close personal, longtime associate of Prime Minister Chretien by the name of Eddie Goldenberg puts his hand in any issue that he considered to be of importance. He was engaged in many bilateral U.S. issues. Goldenberg essentially is a very adroit "fixer"

who wants to solve problems and move forward on these. He is not an ideologue. So, you had someone such as Goldenberg involve himself at times in specific issues. But the people with whom I dealt were virtually invariably career professionals. They were very high quality. As I suggested to you earlier, Canada's primary requirement is the management of its relationship with the United States. The emphasis is on management to Canada's benefit. When they work it most effectively, they can leverage their position and our disinterest in certain areas to their advantage. Their people are invariably intelligent, well trained, hard working, and effective. They were also almost invariably quite straightforward. They gave you clear opinions of their position, and clear views of where our positions were, right or wrong. When they made demarches of their own, they were well staffed, intelligently presented, good pieces of work.

Q: Were they working to repair a certain amount of the tenor of Chretien as far as foreign affairs go?

JONES: Remember also during the initial portion of the time when I was political counselor there, the foreign minister was Andre Ouellette. He was not out making waves. Lloyd Axworthy was consigned to an enormous and complicated bureau that overviewed health and human services and a wide variety of things of that nature, a whole variety of things in which he was not terribly well suited to do, but that was the assignment that he got. It's a very difficult, very complicated, enormous assignment. He managed it in that way.

Q: When did you leave Canada?

JONES: The summer of '96.

Q: I think we've laid the groundwork. Were there any major developments?

JONES: What I have mentioned is what we could see coming was the development of a referendum for Quebec sovereignty. This was a situation in which the groundwork had been laid. The foreshadowing with the enormous majority and support that had been given to the Bloc Québécois in 1993. Then we headed into an election in Quebec in 1994 in which it was very clear that the PQ, the Parti Québécois, were going to win. We anticipated this victory. Once again, we had gone out and spoken to many of the people in the Parti Québécois and tried to get a sense for where they were coming from, what they were going to do, and how they were going to go about it. Here also you have a situation in which Canadian political leadership is almost across the board intelligent, hardworking, sophisticated intellectually and politically, and recognized what could be done by politicians in a North American 21st century constituency. So, we had a situation in which the PQ was also a known quality. It was not as if this was the first time they were seeking election in Quebec. They had been elected earlier and defeated earlier. While they expected to win the election in 1994, this was not an election being run by a bunch of wild haired, wild eyed fanatics who were headed toward cobblestone erected barricades. These were a group of sophisticated people who were a combination of parties and views both directed to obtaining Quebec sovereignty. I met with the man who at that time was the deputy head, the number two man, in the Parti Québécois, Bernard Landry. He is now the "prime minister" of Quebec. The woman who is now the head of their foreign affairs operation, Louise Beaudoin, and a variety of other PQs who have obtained substantial levels of influence in their party. Another man of particular interest is Jean-Francois Lisée, who wrote a book called In the Eye of

the Eagle, which was an extended and sophisticated compilation of American views on Canada and Quebec which he constructed largely from FOIA [Freedom of Information Act] documents that probably should not have been released. Subsequently, we have been far, far more careful about what was released related to Canada. But what actually these documents and that book illustrated was that Quebec separatists are quite eager to tell Americans what they are going to do and why they are going to do it, because they don't want us scared. They want us informed rather than surprised. That was the case for me and it was the case for other American diplomats prior to me and subsequent to me in dealing with these people, and this party.

Q: The election came in '94.

JONES: Yes. Roughly October of '94.

Q: How did it come out?

JONES: It came out with a very substantial victory for the Parti Québécois. It was not, however, as large a victory as they had anticipated and which the polls had suggested they would win. Because of the manner in which votes are distributed and ridings are gerrymandered, it gave them a substantially larger majority in Parliament, their National Assembly, than they would have if it had been a straight differentiation of the vote, although they did get actually a technical majority of the votes cast and certainly a majority of the French-speaking Québécois who had voted. So, they were very firmly in control of the government. As they had had previous people with experience in government, they were not starting from a ground zero of ignorance. Their leader, Jacques Parizeau, was a sophisticated London trained economist with very substantial skills both in politics and in economics and a fine English speaker. Their deputy, Bernard Landry, was also an economist and a lawyer who speaks three languages - Spanish as well as reasonably good English. The head of their combination of culture and foreign affairs, Louise Beaudoin, is a French-trained but English-speaking, very effective spokesman for sovereignty in that manner. So, you had a group of people about whom you could say, "Well, we know they are headed toward a referendum." Their effort and their requirement was, how do we hold a referendum that we're going to win. How do we marshal enough support, how do we organize ourselves so that we're able to win this referendum? It's the most important thing we're going to be doing. It's the objective that we've set out for. It was what Quebeckers anticipated when they elected us. How do we go about it and do it?" They thrashed about trying to figure the best approaches and solutions, what question to pose, how to pose it in a way that would be one that was not "Do you support independence of Quebec with no relationship to Canada subsequently," the kind of question that the federal government in Ottawa would have posed. They wanted one that was vaguer, one that suggested a future relationship, one that suggested that it would happen only after an offer was made to the federal government for a renewed relationship or a radically changed relationship, one that was ambiguous in a way that would be interpretable in a positive light for them. In the end, it didn't really matter what the question said. It meant that if you voted yes, you were going to have an independence Quebec. If you voted no, you were going to have the existing relationship. All of the intellectual fibrillation associated with how this went about perhaps was important, but I think essentially it was unimportant. So, too, the PQs efforts to go forth and have a series of complex studies. The studies were done, and then they were suppressed because they didn't like all of the answers that had come out of all of the studies. It was a

situation in which they had to mobilize support. You had a circumstance in which you could anticipate that better than 90% of the non-French speakers, those who were English-speakers, Anglophones – those who had originally spoken a language other than French or English were called Allophones – would vote against sovereignty while what percentage of the French-speakers, who were still better than 70-80% of the population, was an unknown. What percentage of these Francophones would vote for sovereignty? Sovereignty has its attractions and its liabilities. While Americans can't see what possible attraction independence would have for Quebec and why anyone would want to break up a country as successful, positive, and good to live in as Canada, a certain basic percentage of Quebecers feel very much to the contrary. That percentage has always run at 30-40%. The job of sovereigntists was to boost it an additional 10%, from 40% to over 50%. Throughout 1994 and 1995, that was what they worked to do. We could see this coming. The only question was when they would announce the referendum for and at what time? They selected in the end October 30th, 1995.

I want to digress a little bit and talk about two points. One was the devastating illness that Lucien Bouchard, the leader of the Bloc Québécois, suffered in December 1994. He was struck by necrotizing fasciitis, which in layman's terms comes out to "galloping gangrene," an infection which has a very high percentage fatality. As a result of this, Bouchard went almost instantly to death's door. He suffered the amputation of his leg. He made statements as he was going into the operating room that were translatable as "Continue the effort. Continue the work." Here you had the man who was already considered to be the most dynamic pro-sovereignty politician coming out in a situation after his amputation as almost a heroic character. Some people referred to him as "St. Lucien" and said that it had been a miracle that he had survived.

Let me just set that as one of the factors in the coming Quebec referendum and talk for a moment about how American politics changed a bit with the November 1994 elections. That left us in a situation where the Republicans for the first time in most people's living memory were in control of both sides of Congress. It left a very much weakened President Clinton. But at the same time, there had been preparations for a presidential visit to Ottawa. It would have been the first visit on a presidential level in quite some time. George Herbert Walker Bush had never visited for whatever series of reasons – and I think they were Gulf War related. Through the first couple of years of his term, President Clinton had not made a visit. But an official visit was scheduled for late February 1995. This generated all of the horror associated with any presidential visit. Anyone who has ever been a Foreign Service Officer knows that the visit of a President, a visit that is not almost a spur of the moment visit or a visit that is not directed into a specific short, multilateral meeting, is just an endless disaster for the embassy associated with it. It's great glory and magnificent prominence and just a tremendously unending workload for the staff and the group that comes. At the same time, learning to love the White House staff, let alone the Secret Service, is not the easiest thing for either the embassy or the host country. Anyone who has ever borne up under the visit of the Secret Service knows that these are testosterone-charged confrontations between local security services and the Secret Service, most of whom would like to come armed like Rambo and have the local security services in the position of being Tonto to our Lone Rangers. Well, that doesn't go down very well in most areas, and it didn't go down very well in Canada either. As a result, in at least one instance, the traditional laying of the wreath by the Head of the State at the national war memorial, which was within about a block of parliament, was canceled because the Canadians refused to permit us to put snipers on all the

building surrounding the monument. Ambassador Blanchard recounts one instance in which a driver and two huge security guards, one from the RCMP and the other from the Secret Service, were jammed into the front of the presidential limousine because while the Secret Service, of course, demanded that their person be present, the RCMP also claimed that it was responsible for the protection of a visiting dignitary in their country. There was always the question of just how much weaponry would be brought by how many people. In a Canada that is very significantly unarmed, the amount of weaponry that the Secret Service was going to bring was - let alone the total numbers of the Secret Service that actually arrived - such that verged between impressive, awe inspiring, and ridiculous. But that depended, of course, upon the observer. Nevertheless, this was an exercise in which the President came, spoke to Parliament, had a variety of meetings, brought his full American entourage with him. They had a variety of meetings. Certain agreements were signed, particularly the Civil Aviation Agreement. Things worked out reasonably well. There were a couple of clever elements to the parliamentary speech, one of which was that the Prime Minister said that regardless of the President's current political circumstances, he should know that no president who had spoken before Parliament had ever failed to be reelected. President Clinton responded in an aside to show just how intellectually quick he was, he said never had he so believed in the "iron laws of history" than hearing what Prime Minister Chretien had just said. He also took account of the fact that he had just delivered himself of one of the longest and most turgid State of the Union addresses by saying that he promised that he would not speak as long as he had spoken before Congress in the State of the Union. Obviously, this worked out very well. The Prime Minister and the President had a good relationship. They had a boys' afternoon out with wives in a pleasant spot on the Rideau Canal, the canal being frozen at the time. Mrs. Clinton went ice skating on the canal, having had some ice skating experience as a girl. They had a visit in which, according to Ambassador Blanchard, they went away considerably more upbeat in spirit than they had been certainly in the early days after the November election.

The other element of the visit of some interest to me was that I was responsible for Secretary Christopher and the monitoring of his work and his meetings. Unfortunately, after his first meeting, the Secretary became ill and was hospitalized briefly in Ottawa and Deputy Secretary Talbott took over for the meetings and circumstances that followed that.

This was a very successful visit. Perhaps all presidential visits are condemned to success. This had the same result.

In any event, following this, we began to focus even more pointedly on the run-up the referendum in Quebec. I was meeting regularly with the federal group that was monitoring how the federal government was going to handle and coordinate the "No" campaign, the "Yes" campaign being run by the Quebec sovereigntists and the Parti Québécois. So, you had two umbrella groups in Quebec, the Yes and the No campaigns. They had a variety of financial restrictions and controls associated with who could contribute money and how it came. As a result, one of the endless arguments was the degree to which federal intrusion into what was the responsibility of Quebecers to determine was one of the sub-themes in the referendum. By early September 1995, the Quebec government announced the official question, which was a vague, elliptical question that had a variety of circumstances to it, including reference to a large document that had been developed beforehand as to what kind of circumstances had to be

created for a new relationship between Quebec and Canada. The point really was that if you voted “yes,” you were going to have an independent Quebec in one form or another. If you voted “no,” you would have a continuation of the existing circumstances.

What happened was that the early days of the referendum went quite badly for the Yes forces. They did not get the bounce from a debate in their National Assembly that they had hoped for. The ripostes by the provincial liberals had been sharper and clearer. The pro-sovereignty team was less effective in its own presentations. The fact that a group of studies associated and commissioned for sovereignty had been suppressed was a negative for the sovereigntists. Generally, this campaign was not going well.

What happened in early-mid October was that Lucien Bouchard, who had opposed having the referendum at exactly the time for what it was scheduled and had been a secondary character in the campaign until then, was, in effect, brought to the fore and virtually given control of the remaining portion of the campaign. Bouchard had a “career year” type of campaign. This was a man who had come back from death’s door, who was viewed as a monumental figure, and that his efforts were all but miraculous in survival. He is a man who was not a natural politician. He had even been a rather poor politician in his early stages. But he developed communication and speaking skills that were as good as any Quebecker has seen in a generation. People just flocked out to see him. People rushed just to touch him. People went wild over him. He was able to say things that would have left a normal politician lying in the gutter like a dead dog. He said, in effect, “Well, Quebec’s white women should be having more babies.” Instead of saying, “My gosh, you racist sovereigntists pig,” it wasn’t quite the equivalent of, “Well, I’m bearing your baby.” But there was just no negative resonance; this was the kind of statement that an average politician could never have made and survived. Bouchard, as a result, virtually single-handedly drove the Yes vote up. He drove it up to the point where immediately prior to the referendum it was too close to tell. Quebec polling is very sophisticated. It’s as good as polling anywhere in the world. They were polls not done by a couple of hundred people, but they were polls done oftentimes by well more than 1,000 out of a population of seven million. We were getting polling that should have been accurate to within one or two percent. But you had a problem in the polling. Although the Yes vote was leading and often leading by a significant percentage, four to six points, you had a significant number - 15% or more - that would say they were undecided. Historically, the “undecided” wasn’t really undecided, but they weren’t willing to say to a pollster what their viewpoint was. Their viewpoint was that they were federalists, that they would be No supporters. Historically, they had broken at 2/3 in favor of the federalists and 1/3 in favor of the sovereigntists. So it became an extremely difficult judgment call as to how it was going to work out. I made several trips to the Montreal area at the time, spoke several times to Yes and No group leaders, including in particular Bernard Landry. Each side expressed confidence without being willing to say that, “Yes, we are sure that we are going to win.” So, the weekend before the referendum, the embassy caucused on what the result was going to be. I said that the No vote was going to win, that the federalists were going to win, that it was going to be very close but the federalists were going to win. I said that we should be able to send a telegram to the Department making that prediction. The ambassador declined, suggesting a “too close to call and Canada will still be here on the morning of the 31st”-type of telegram, which is the telegram that we sent. The weekend before and the week before had seen a great deal of action on everybody’s part, in particular during this period of run-up to the referendum, the question of

the position of the United States to this event was a key element or certainly was viewed that way. We had had for a relatively extended period a set piece statement that we ended by calling the “mantra.” It was that “We have had an excellent relationship with a strong and united Canada. However, the choice of Canada is for Canadians to decide.” This is paraphrasing at best. During the course of the referendum, in consultation between Canadians and Americans at a very senior level, there was the feeling that we should weigh in a little more strongly. This was certainly the position of Ambassador Blanchard. We orchestrated a statement by Secretary Christopher when Ouellette, the foreign minister, visited on October 18th. The Secretary came up with a statement that I still have at hand. He said, “The United States places great value on its excellent ties with a strong and united Canada. These ties have been carefully cultivated and a different entity could not take this type of relationship for granted.” That unfortunately was a statement that was not sufficiently clear or was reported in a muddled and mangled way in the press so that it really wasn’t clear what the Secretary had said.

It wasn’t really clear what the Secretary had said. In any event, it was decided that something more prominent, more pointed, would have to be said. Here, too, we, and particularly Ambassador Blanchard, orchestrated at a press conference on October 25th or 26th a statement in response to a planted question at a presidential press conference where the President said something that was viewed as a stronger endorsement of a strong and united Canada and not being able to see how a country as successful as Canada would have a need to be changed. Unfortunately, that particular statement by the President came out at exactly the same time that Bouchard and Chretien addressed national audiences on the referendum. So, while the President’s statement was reported and had some media prominence, by no means did it have the weight or attention that it might have had if it had been delivered at a point when something less dramatic than dueling spokesmen for the life of Canada was on national television. As a result, although subsequent polls said that voters had taken into account the view of the U.S. on this, there really isn’t any indication as to how they felt about this, whether they divined that the U.S. didn’t want this to happen and therefore they voted that way or they divined that the U.S. didn’t want this to happen, which would have been clear to anybody with a fourth grade education, and therefore voted in favor of it. We had a polling result that said that perhaps as many as 20-25% of Quebeckers took this into account when we voted, but we have no idea how it affected them. It’s just one of those interesting things that we were heard but whether we were agreed with or simply heard remains unknown. Also this final week stimulated a major federalist rally in the heart of Montreal which was led by a number of Canadian politicians, in particular the Minister for Fisheries, Brian Tobin, a very dynamic and energetic politician from Newfoundland, and others who gathered a “Canada loves Quebec” rally in the center of Montreal. This effort was designed to demonstrate to Quebeckers the depth of federalist feeling and Canadian support for Canada from sea to sea to sea and that Quebec was in their view and in Canada’s view an integral part of Canada and they should vote No. There are people that feel that that the rally was a vast success. There are others that look at polls and say that it was a negative, at least according to some polls. But it happened and it was part of a demonstrable campaign to rally support in favor of federalist Canada and for Quebec to remain in Canada. I didn’t attend that rally but one of my political officers did. We sent him down along with it. He said that it was a dramatic and effective rally. I attended a rally that was held in Hull, Quebec, just across the river from Ottawa, on Sunday the 29th immediately before the vote. That, too, even though it was conducted in a steady rain, was a major rally of thousands of Canadians who were attempting to demonstrate

support for a united Canada and a Quebec that remained within that framework.

On October 29th in mid-morning, I got a telephone call from Bernard Landry, who said that he just wanted to inform me that their polls now conclusively demonstrated that the separatists were going to win and that he wanted me to be aware of that fact ahead of time for whatever I wanted to do with it. During the course of the day, I informed the ambassador, the DCM, and the desk that this was the information that Landry had conveyed. The ambassador said – and he apparently conveyed this also to the desk and to others in Washington – that on the federalist level, they were now convinced that they were going to win.

The result was about as close as it conceivably could have been. We sat and watched a very interesting mechanism for determining this vote. It was a fever thermometer that ran back and forth across the bottom of the television set as to where the vote was. It started significantly above the 50% line. Slowly during the course of the evening, it declined until the sovereingtists ended with 49.4% of the vote and the federalists got 50.6% of the vote out of something like a 93% turnout for eligible voters. So, you can see that it had been a very substantially mobilized society on an issue that as closely divided Quebecers as almost could have been possible. As a result of that vote, the Premier of Quebec, Jacques Parizeau, and his deputy, said some nasty and bitter things. Parizeau was quoted as saying on the night of the election that they had been defeated by “money and the ethnic vote.” While that was accurate, it was certainly nothing that was acceptable to be said either by sovereingtists or by federalists. Of course, you could have said that they were equally defeated by the number of French-speakers who didn’t vote for them. But it was clear that probably something like 95% of the Anglophones and Allophones had voted against them. Whether money had anything to do with it, certainly there was heavy campaigning by the federal government to retain a unified Canada. It would have been totally derelict in their duties if they had not done so. As a consequence within something like a day, Parizeau resigned and then the question became who would assume the leadership of the Parti Québécois and the PQ’s government. Although it appeared and was obvious that Lucien Bouchard was really the only choice, it took a stretch of time for reflection and consultation and other discussion before Bouchard actually moved from Ottawa to Quebec City and became Prime Minister of Quebec. Actually, the ambassador and I saw Bouchard the day that he left Ottawa finally on something like December 13th, 1995, and had one of these generally not terribly memorable conversations other than Bouchard saying that he had just come from a long conversation with Jean Chretien, which he didn’t really reveal but that it was much longer than he had anticipated having with Chretien, and that he was indeed committed to the independence and sovereignty of Quebec. In discussions which we did not know until they were revealed in his book, Ambassador Blanchard had had far more extensive high level conversations with Canadian politicians and leaders than he conveyed to his senior staff. He also had a conversation with Preston Manning to the effect that Manning had asked how the Canadian debt should be handled if Canada separated, which is something that Blanchard revealed in his book but which he had not bothered to tell anybody else, at least anybody that I knew of on the staff beforehand and which was certainly more revealing than would have been anticipated in a subsequent public account. Blanchard also said that subsequent to the referendum that he had a couple of conversations with Bouchard on how Canada and Quebec should resolve their differences. Again, to my knowledge, these were not reported, or if they were reported they were reported in channels which I never heard and I have never subsequently encountered anyone who had heard about these conversations, let alone any

upshot from the conversations. But we move now into 1996. At that point, people spent a good deal of time ruminating over what the next steps for Quebec would be, whether it would mean there would be another referendum in the near term or whether it would be something in the further term, how Quebec and Canada would resolve their continued differences, whether some of the promises that the Ottawa government had made so far as giving Quebec additional powers and position and circumstances would come into effect for whatever. Bouchard decided that what he wanted first to do was to prove that sovereigntists could really demonstrate good government, that they had spent the first year of their mandate preparing for and really running this referendum, and that now, if they were going to be successful, they had to show that they were a real working, effective government and worthy of an endorsement to be an independent country. That was the focus that he followed for the rest of the time that I was in Canada. There were polls that suggested that this was an effective approach, that he was gaining strength and sovereigntist support. There were sovereigntists, however, who were very skeptical and critical of Bouchard that he had never been part of the “pure and hard” *pur et dur* sovereigntist campaign, that he had been in too many camps at too many times throughout his life, and that they were never totally convinced that he was an absolutely committed separatist. It’s almost like a man who has an absolutely beautiful, gorgeous, and attractive wife and can never quite become convinced that she is totally committed to him and is so critical and skeptical and suspicious of her that in the end he drives her away. Actually, in the end, Bouchard, although he ran and won an election in 1998, left Quebec and Canadian politics in 2000 partly because he was no longer interested in struggling with those who didn’t believe that he was sufficiently committed to sovereignty or that his path to sovereignty would eventually get them there. That with the exception of one other generalized topic, NORAD, is about all that there is left.

NORAD has been in effect for a period of time back into the 1950s. It has a U.S. commander and a Canadian deputy. They are responsible jointly to the heads of government of Canada and the U.S. It has been responsible for air defense over North America throughout the period of the Cold War. It has slowly grown into a system that is supposed to at least recognize and provide alert for any ballistic missile attack. It has also, however, been a point of question at times for Canadians as to whether they wish to continue this agreement, whether it sucks them into subordination to the United States and whether it reduces Canadian sovereignty to have this agreement. This has been reflected in questions concerning how the agreement itself operates and how long they should renew the agreement for each time. What we did throughout a fair portion of the time that I was political minister-counselor was to work on NORAD Treaty renewal. This was batted back and forth between the Department of Defense, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the U.S. government to try to find a formula and appropriate language that would get it done. Well, it got delayed and it got delayed. Although it in theory could have been one of the pieces signed when President Clinton visited in 1995, it ended by not really being agreed until March of ‘96 in an agreement that probably made the technical specialists a little happier but didn’t really change the scope and thrust of the agreement from where it had stood previously.

In any event, I continued as political counselor until the end of July 1996 doing the standard things that I had done until then. I left on August 1, 1996, and returned to Washington. I spent time doing various assorted assignments. I did some work on “benchmarking” for the Department of State, what works best at other agencies, other companies, or organizations

outside the Department of State. I worked for a stretch of time on human rights reports during the period of mid-October to the end of January 1997, the annual creation of the Department's Human Rights Country Reports assessing the status of human rights in countries around the world. I spent another stretch of time working on Freedom of Information declassification and review while on active duty. Then I retired roughly at the end of January/early February 1998.

TERESA C. JONES
Economic/Scientific & Technical Officer
Ottawa (1994-1996)

Mrs. Jones was born in the Soviet Union of Chinese diplomatic parents. She was raised in the USSR and the United States. A specialist in Scientific Affairs, both civilian and military, Mrs. Jones' Washington assignments were primarily in the fields of international nuclear and scientific matters and included non-proliferation, arms control, East-West Trade as well as general Political/Military subjects. Her foreign assignments were in the scientific and consular fields. She holds two degrees from the University of Pennsylvania. Mrs. Jones was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.

Q: OK, you were in Montreal and David was in Ottawa.

JONES: I was in Montreal for two years and when the science counselor retired early, and the position opened up in Ottawa just at the time my tour finished in Montreal, they did an inter-Canada transfer which worked very well. In Montreal I worked for Consul General Susan Wood as the deputy in and main reporter in everything.

Q: Who?

JONES: Susan Wood. Roberta Susan Wood. I can't remember. I enjoyed it a great deal.

Q: All right, let's take Montreal from 1992 to '94. How would you describe Montreal sort of politically and economically vis a vis the rest of Canada?

JONES: It was truly two solitudes, that was one of them. This was at the peak of the discussion. The Meech Lake Accords on which Mulroney had staked his prime ministership on had collapsed when one of the provinces said no. that was it. This gave a tremendous boost to the Quebec Sovereignists who played the refusal for all Provinces to agree to Meech as proof that the Rest of Canada didn't want them. The Canadian government then something called the Charlottetown Accord which was also failed. I did all the political and economic reporting. I did a lot of "checking the box" items such as reading the Pequiste (Parti Quebecois or the Separatist party) platform. Oddly enough I also advised David who was the political counselor in Ottawa, but my efficiency report was reviewed by the economic counselor

I made a many of friends, and I joined one of the last remaining North American salons in

Montreal run by a David and Diana Nicholson who held an open house every Wednesday Night for discussion. So, for the price of one bottle of wine I would get the kind of intelligent and in-depth discussion from prominent Montrealers that no amount of diplomatic entertaining would get. It was all off the record, and I kept it that way.

My focus was on Quebec's position in Canada. There had already been an exodus of Anglophones from Quebec when Rene Levesque, head of the Parti Quebecois, had become premier. I was tremendously impressed by the civilized way tone of the debate. While other countries had violent separation debates, for the Canadians it just meant longer discussions. I went to separatist rallies in which I was immediately spotted as what they thought was a Francophone Allophone and practically loved to death by various Sovereignists who wanted me to feel welcome. I had more bad coffee offered to me and thought sure my kidneys were sure to go. Some would even translate from the Quebec French into French French for me.

Q: At that time how did we view the Quebecois separatist movement, and how serious was it for Canada? And I am looking at this what would this mean for the United States? I am trying to capture this.

JONES: Well one thing that was particularly of interest. A man called Jean-Francois Lisee had written a book called Eye of the Eagle. Using freedom of information material he got on our writing from Canada during the period at which Rene Levesque had been elected premier of Quebec. All the analyses in it were very high quality. The point however is that this high quality work was produced by Americans who were not Canada hands. We don't have Canada hands. They were professional foreign service generalists who did standard political analyses. They called the results correctly. But while we were doing all this correct analyses, in Ontario, which after all had co-existed with Quebec all along, all the pundits, all the Canadian policy experts were wrong.

The fact that they could be wrong meant that there was a tremendous divide. My point when I talked to various businessmen was that both Ottawa and Quebec had such bad debt situation at the time, in case of separation, both would have to collude to assure world financial markets. The U.S. tried to help in the 1995 Referendum in Quebec and slightly modified our mantra (we preferred a strong, united Canada). Instead of gratitude for this, we had newspaper editorials (especially out west) suggesting that the U.S. butt out. U.S. business men assumed that if a separate Quebec wanted them, they would have to make it worthwhile.

Q: Had the ambassador said something that...

JONES: Later yes. That was after I went to Ottawa.

Q: But that was the time, were you there during the referendum?

JONES: No, I was already in Ottawa then. It was a curious situation. I was David's Quebec eye basically. My biggest contribution was suggesting that the Embassy pay attention to Lucien Bouchard, who was head of the eight member Bloc Quebecois, and a nobody in Ottawa - though later he became Premier of Quebec. I also urged him to contact journalists, some of whom were

superb analysts - one of these, Chantal Hebert remains a valued friend today.

Q: Well let's go back to Montreal. How did we view the situation there at the time you were in Montreal. Did you see this as potentially ripping Canada apart?

JONES: No, our figures didn't indicate that nor did U.S. debt rating agencies. They saw it as a chance to make money. Financial markets react ahead of the event, so when the event doesn't happen, there is a bounce back. Therefore there was a 25 to 50 basis point difference between Ontario and Quebec debt. The U.S. anticipate a Cuba of the north. We were just seeing it as all right, this is something Canadians have to handle. We got the most complete picture by talking to all sides. For example, when I had a project on strategic anti-submarine warfare, I talked not just to anti-submarine warfare people but to all the Submarine hunters as well to get a more complete picture. But the experts saw even for separation was protracted negotiations and at worst an economic hit of a drop of three percentage points in GDP for a few years. The key was no violence. Quebec has all the resources you would need for a country. The Parti Quebecois platform was very much a social democratic type of program with some trade and business friendly aspects. Francophones are still 80+% of the population, but they saw the Anglophones as a necessary asset, especially in the financial sector. For instance, once at a Nicholson Wednesday Night soiree, someone asked, "Hey, how much to you manage?" I think the total for that evening among attendees was about \$9 billion dollars.

Q: These were Anglophones basically.

JONES: Mostly Anglophones with some federalist Francophones. There has been serious intermarriage for years among all the groups.

Q: How did you find the sort of the intellectually community there. I am aware of some of the films that have come out of that thing the wives of

JONES: Barbarian Invasions. is a movie I would strongly recommend for anyone who wanted to get a feel of Quebec views.

Q: Barbarian Invasions. Anyway I had the feeling that there was quite a chattering class of French intellectuals who didn't seem to go anywhere. Was this important, and how did you fit into this?

JONES: Well I chattered with them. The Anglophones had certain very specific interests and concerns. Both sides did much navel watching, *nomrbilism*. It is a smaller pond so people could make bigger waves.

We did meet the number 2 of the Parti Quebecois at the time, Bernard Landry. [Later, he became the head of the party and then Premier). He, in fact, invited David and me to one of his little yacht trips on late. We had a chance to talk. He was a trilingual economics professor and also a dedicated Sovereignist. You could see that he felt that there is a potential destiny for Quebec as a country with very close ties to Canada but only if the people were willing to make some sacrifices for a few years. Then they, would, forever be able to protect their own culture. Their

culture is not French culture by the way - it is a very distinct North American one with roots in 17th Century Brittany, Normandy and France. My feeling was that if they achieved independence, then France would step in - Canadian relations or no. But there was never any intimation that the Parti Quebecois would support violence. Everyone had horrified by what had been done by the FLQ in the 80's and by Trudeau's imposition of Martial Law..

Q: This was a series of bombings.

JONES: They killed someone. They kidnapped two people and murdered one of them. Pierre Trudeau is not the popular icon in Quebec that he is in the rest of Canada. They saw his attempt to force all Canadians to make Quebecers feel at home all be becoming a bilingual country as not protecting their culture in Quebec. In fact Quebec used a notwithstanding clause in the Canadian constitution, the repatriation of which did not have the Quebec Premier's agreement - so the repatriation was considered a betrayal and was called the night of the long knives. Quebec and Ontario are two groups who have wonderful command of each other's dental nerves. They know exactly how to lift an eyebrow to give someone in Ontario heartburn. The same goes the other way. The same between the Anglophones and Francophones.

Q: Did you get the feeling that this was Ottawa versus Quebec, and the western provinces were doing their thing and it is a completely different world.

JONES: Except for the national energy plan, which was known as destroying the patrimony of the western provinces to give cheaper gas in Toronto. There were Quebecers who told me they had lived in British Columbia and there had been serious bias against them. One had been beaten up at a bar. So there were things the Canadians didn't particularly want to face. As an American I will say that in Quebec I found less of the knee jerk anti Americanism.

Our daughter Margaret, went to High School for two years in Ottawa -- Lisgar Collegiate. She finished three years of their program in two years so and was able to graduate with her friends. [High school is five years in Ontario]. She faced a fair amount of anti Americanism. She was 5'2" 100 pound Eurasian who certainly wasn't threatening. She said in teaching and in classes, they made a big thing about the fact that we attacked Kingston, Ontario. Her comment to the teacher was that Canada was British North America then and it was the War of 1813. We never went to war with Canada. They also sacked Washington D.C. - so it could be considered even. She ran into this constantly. They would have biases on what they felt Americans were like.

For example, the school paper, The Lisgarite, had to go to the PTA for money- they needed about \$250 Canadian dollars. She was editor of The Lisgarite. This was at the time of the 150th reunion. Alums were all over the halls, but The Lisgarite staff were told that to sell copies of their anniversary issue from their office which was in a dark corner of the school basement. Margaret looked and she said, "This is dumb. All we have to do is walk to the alums." So they each grabbed a stack of papers, went to through the school and earned hundreds of loonies in an hour. She was then reprimanded for acting un-Canadian. No matter how much things look alike, Canadians are different. Quebecers didn't seem to have this defensive anti-American attitude as they were much more secure in their identity. They didn't have to trash us to feel more Canadian. My husband's book Uneasy Neighbors made this point in detail

Q: Well the anti Americanism has always been generated essentially from Ontario which was the residue of where the loyalists ended up, a certain amount of the loyalists ended up We fought a little war around there in the war of 1812.

JONES: We went to Halifax. We went to New Brunswick. We went to Prince Edward Island. You could see an incredible number of little communities with plaques honoring the American Loyalists as founders. But there was much less of an anti American undertone in the Atlantic Provinces. Again, I think they are very secure in their own identity. Identity Security is the key. A Swede is a Swede. They don't have to trash Norwegians to feel like a Swede. Those that don't like Americans, don't like Americans for other reasons rather than to affirm their own identity.

Q: You moved to Ottawa and you were there, did you find the view from Ottawa different or were you sort of the Quebec watcher in the embassy?

JONES: No, I was now an economic officer, so my focus was much more on economic issues. Then it was all science and technology on which we had enormous levels of contact. Canadians could bid for our government contracts; for U.S. funded government grants and did so with good success. We did have a scandal that started in Quebec where a Quebec doctor who was part of the national cancer and bowel study faked his results. His lab made an error and turned in something to NIH that said false data. He was reporting on patients who had died as if they were alive because he wanted to continue his access to getting Tamoxifen which at the time was used to treat aggressive breast cancer. He felt the NIH guidelines were unfair so he decided to get around them by lying about his patients which probably killed a good number of his patients. Curiously enough his name was Dr. Poisson, and the manager in the states was Dr. Fisher. The issue was that the NIH folks who came to investigate didn't bother to tell the embassy. The science counselor at that time, Tom Wajda, called me to tell me to tell them that "Without formal permission from the Canadian government they couldn't take any information out." So we had to backtrack to find the NIH people. He was able to locate someone in the medical research council in Canada - who had every reason to help as we funded 15% of Canadian medical research purely through their success in getting NIH grants. Dr. Poisson was offended by the NIH protocol which denied entry into the study for any woman who had cancerous tissue in both breasts since that meant the cancer had spread and she needed more than Tamoxifen. He lied. They died.

Q: What happened on the investigation?

JONES: Well first we had tons of lawyers come calling us saying they would be happy to represent NIH when NIH sued. We talked to NIH, and they were thinking seriously of suing because it cost a lot of money to dig the data the doctor had turned out of the results. They were going to leave it to the Canadian authorities as to what else was to be done to the doctor. I was amazed that none of the patients or the families of the deceased patients sued. We explained t to NIH that suing the hospital was probably not a good idea because they were already down to their last cents and had patients in the hallways. Barbarian Invasions did not exaggerate.

Q: Yeah I mean you had somebody, I mean patients routinely sent to the United States for

treatment and others, I don't know about the unions, but it appeared the hospital wasn't being used, This was a movie The Barbarian Invasions, the hospital wasn't being fully utilized because the unions didn't want to work there.

JONES: Well they had all sorts of things. In order to cut costs they let a whole lot of nurses retire early. Well there are only some ways to cut costs when you have a system that does not allow a private sector. The ideal of free universal health care with the government as the only paymaster sounds lovely. In actual fact with limited resources and a cap on what doctors can earn, it means rationing. One of the Canadians who worked at the consulate general had coronary artery blockage. He was only 67 years old. He was put on a waiting list. Six months later he was still on the waiting list when he died of a massive coronary. We had a friend in the states who was diagnosed with a similar condition at the same time and he got his bypass surgery in 24 hours.

Q: Well I went in to have a routine angioplasty about a year and a half ago. They stopped looking at me after about 15 minutes and said, "Well you are going to have to have a triple bypass, and we can either do it today or tomorrow." Well I had it tomorrow.

JONES: Yeah, and there is a reason for it.

Q: Yeah they said this is what is known as the widow maker type of thing.

JONES: Yes. It is much easier. The doctors care a lot about their batting average or success rate and its much easier and safer to do the surgery before the heart attack. You don't have the scar tissue. You don't have dead cardiac tissue. So they fix it, and your heart retreats back to what it was before you had the blockage. Dealing with the Canadians as Science Counselor was a lot of fun. I also had the responsibility for International Joint Commission which was managing the Great Lakes under the U.S.-Canada Boundary Waters treaty.

Q: How did you feel about God I can't remember the name, emission, exhaust or something.

JONES: Oh there are two different philosophies on environmental controls. We are extremely legalistic. We battle to the death over the actual levels, every group screaming and yelling, and finally we have a standard set. Then if you violate the standard, we really get you. EPA actually has the right to put a city that violates the air quality standards under some kind of draconian extra regulations. We fine companies incredible amounts of money when they violate it etc.

The Canadians are different. They set an extremely low standard that the environmental groups can only dream of achieving in, but they don't enforce it. The standards are set by the federal government. The implementation is by the provincial government. For example, the St. Lawrence River is polluted despite being very fast and efficient at getting the pollutants out to sea. Their regulations say that a company that dumps in the municipal water supply, which then goes into the St. Lawrence is not considered as dumping into the St. Lawrence. For example, let's say I make titanium oxide paint and create all sorts of nasty stuff. I dump it into the local town's water supply, sewage supply, and they dump it into the St. Lawrence. I am not covered. I have not dumped into the St. Lawrence river. A few times they have caught a titanium oxide plant dumping directly into the St. Lawrence River, and they fined them I think \$10,000 - not

even a wrist slap.

Air quality depends often on which way the wind is blowing and who has more cars. We and they both have problems because they allow additives that we don't. I think MTBE (methyl tertiary butyl ether) is an additive they use because they think it makes the fuel burn better in the winter time. We see it as a bad additive, so it is banned on this side of the border. There are never ending border issues.

For example, there is the example of Devil's Lake for instance in North Dakota which feeds into the Red River which goes into Manitoba and eventually Lake Winnipeg which supplies Winnipeg's drinking water. It also regularly floods. There is a long history of problems in trying to keep the flood waters on the other side. They built a barrier, we tried to dynamite it. The lake waters have been rising since the 1940's and the whole area has been flooding. The town of Devil's Lake used to be ten miles from the shores of Devil's Lake and right now is right on the shores of Devil's Lake. N. Dakotans wanted breach the lake to pour the extra into the Red River. The Canadians said no unless we pretreat the water so that it is potable. Plus they worried about alien species introduction. Our people were beginning to make noises about dynamiting a breach anyway. Unsaid in all this is that the Canadians already have thoroughly polluted all the water going into Lake Winnipeg drinking because of runoff from the farms. I believe that the argument will continue until a major drought when both sides can fight on water allotment.

Water level management is another issue as the St. Lawrence Seaway requires the Great Lakes to provide enough water for ships to move. This occasionally means that the Thousand Islands area becomes the Five Hundred Islands.

I also worked with the Navy Attaché by providing technical advice on the potential of CANDU (Canadian Deuterium Uranium) reactors to burn Soviet weapons plutonium.

Q: OK, well probably this is a good place to stop. You left what happened then?

JONES: After we left Canada I came back to counseling and assignments in the State Department doing a CAO's work. I planed to retire when David did which was 1998. Before I retired I worked as a Counseling and Assignments Officer and learned much of what I should have known years earlier. Someday Dave and I hope to write a book on the inner workings of the Foreign Service. Both David and I have published articles on the Foreign Service over the years. One that I did was always rejected, though I thought it made some good points. My view was that the system is at fault for the abusive people in at Embassies and at State. They deserve the dysfunctional supervisors they get because they never seriously reflected in efficiency reports. I know of one case where the Administrative Counselor was pulled out of a post after a No-Confidence Cable from the Ambassador. He wrote it because the entire section threatened to resign if she didn't leave. Yet, the efficiency report on her said absolutely nothing about this. Good management means preventing abuses.

Q: Well I am just thinking again if you have any thing from your experiences particularly if they pertain to actual cases you can add that to this.

JONES: Oh yes. In the science work it was very straightforward. I did have one fun case, not case. The head of the international joint commission came to Ottawa, our person, Tom Baldini he had a very unique problem. The Clinton appointees to the International Joint Commission were all experienced environmental types, very collegial, and competent. Two were women who were tops in tact and expertise. The Canadians were also named some stellar people. One was a world class whale scientist from Quebec. One was a very prominent Liberal-Party connected senior lawyer from British Columbia. They balanced geographically. One was an environmental activist from Ontario. Alas, the Canadian side went to war with each other as the female head of the Commission from Ontario was extremely sensitive as to her perks and refused to accept the other two as peers. But, they were not people you could order about. So our people were unable to determine what the Canadian position was, because they would hear one, and then they would hear the other, and then they would hear the third. Baldini was in a position of trying to deal with warring relatives. So he said he wanted us to know so we could at least let the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs know. He didn't want to go directly to them because that wasn't right in the chain of command. So, I wrote it up and faxed it to my contact. I sent explained the discord problems carefully in neutral terms and within minutes, I had a phone call asking me to classify it. Someone listened because eventually the difficult one left and her replacement had no problems. Apparently the last straw was when she insisted on some ministerial privileges that weren't appropriate. I saw her in operation and found her to be very bright, very dedicated, and with no people sense.

ROBIN WHITE
Trade Policy Officer
Ottawa (1994-1996)

Ms. White was born and raised in Massachusetts and educated at Georgetown University. After graduation she worked briefly on Capitol Hill before joining the Foreign Service in 1973. A Trained Economist, Ms. White served at a number of foreign posts as Economic and Commercial Officer. In the State Department in Washington, she occupied several senior positions in the trade and economic fields. Ms. White was also a Japan specialist. Ms. White was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005

WHITE: Then I went to Ottawa as trade policy officer.

Q: This must have been an interesting time to be trade policy officer wasn't it?

WHITE: It was interesting after having so much experience with Japan on difficult trade policy issues to find out that with our dear neighbor Canada we have equally intractable issues with an enormous amount of emotion involved. I think it is partly because the two countries are so close. Also I found that the Canadians officials who worked on trade policy issues were capable and nice people but very defensive. Canadians see a ten to one American to Canadian ratio and see most of their media coming across the border, so they really do have a lot of cultural identity problems. I think they've relaxed a bit since then. It was interesting to see how hard fought these

issues were. Some of them never get resolved.

Q: In the first place where did the trade policy officer work? You've got the Department of Commerce, you've got the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), you've got the economic counselor. Where did you fit in?

WHITE: The embassy had an Economic Minister and I was in essence his deputy. In addition to an excellent Canadian trade specialist, there were two American FSOs working for me, one on trade policy and the second person who did finance and macroeconomic reporting. He was a State person but reported to Treasury. Treasury used to have one person in Ottawa but had eliminated that position. Also in the econ section were a fisheries officer, science and technology officer, and a transportation officer who handled things like aviation and customs which were quite difficult because of the enormous border traffic.

Q: Fisheries are a problem that goes back to colonial times. The issues really don't get any easier. As the number of fishes decreases it gets worse.

WHITE: Yes, Pacific salmon was very difficult. The tricky part of Pacific salmon is that during the course of their lifetime they keep moving from American to Canadian to American Alaskan waters and the question is whose fish are they? There were also some Atlantic coast problems having to do with scallops and other things. Yes, you go back to the 19th century and I'm sure they were dealing with the same kind of issues.

I worked very closely with the U.S. Trade Representative's office and the Economic Bureau at the State Department as well as the Canada Desk in the European Bureau. We handled a lot of delegations and negotiations. I also worked closely with the Agricultural Counselor and the Agriculture Department.

Some of the issues really were border issues. There was a constant small and long-running potato war going on between Maine and parts of Quebec that was rather strange because it seemed that all the people involved seemed to be related. They were families on both sides of the borders who had common great grandmothers. It had to do with the size of potatoes and which ones could come into Canada. It was a standards issue that never really got resolved. The Maine senators were upset because their potatoes were being kept out of Canada because they were the wrong size or shape.

Of greater economic significance were the grain issues. Senators like Max Baucus and other northern state Members of Congress were upset about the shipments of Canadian wheat coming across the border. They felt that the Canadian Wheat Board provided Canadian farmers with an unfair government subsidy. They have a very complicated way of setting their prices which I couldn't begin to remember, but which the American farmers and congressmen claimed gave an unfair trade advantage. The Canadians countered by saying that the U.S. had export subsidies for wheat, which meant that we were sending our wheat overseas, which meant there was demand for Canadian wheat, particularly wheat used for pasta. Therefore, the Canadians said, we're just meeting the demand.

Canadians softwood lumber was the most difficult issue and it continued for years.

Q: What were the issues in lumber?

WHITE: The provinces have government control over the lumber, generally because they own the land and set fees, so again it's a subsidy/ countervailing duty issue.

Q: Well, you were saying it was a very complicated issue, but how did you operate? I'm talking about you personally. Did you sit on delegations and act as embassy spokesperson or the embassy observer or participant or something like that?

WHITE: I sat on delegations as the embassy representative but I didn't play the role of intermediary between the Canadian and U.S. governments as much as I might have in another embassy. For one thing it got to the point where people on both sides knew each other well because these talks went on so long. Also geography played a role. Because we were in the same time zone, if the deputy USTR wanted to talk to the director general in Ottawa, he wasn't going to send a message to me to deliver to the director general. He'd just pick up the phone. There was a lot of direct phone contact, which took away the need for the traditional role that embassy officers play. For example in Japan people just didn't make phone calls like that. We'd get interagency cleared instructions from Washington, then make an appointment to make a demarche to ministry officials, then write a reporting cable. It was a bit frustrating for people working on different initiatives at the embassy, as people in Washington did a lot without them.

Q: I've heard people say that one of the problems of dealing with trade matters, negotiating with the Canadians is that they can put forward a team that's been together and dealing with the issue for a decade or more whereas we change the administrations and officials. Was this a problem?

WHITE: In this case I don't think it was because the people who were working on these issues really did spend a lot of time on them. On lumber, even the deputy USTR was forced to learn the details fast because it was so political in the U.S. They got up to speed pretty quickly. I don't think there was that much of a disadvantage. The political fight was because softwood lumber in the U.S. is grown in a number of states, particularly a wide band across the South. It is used in construction. The American producers contended that the Canadian "subsidized" lumber was coming in at such low prices that it was causing injury. This got a lot of resonance on the Hill. What got totally ignored was the interest of the consumer who actually benefited from having a good supply of lumber. In fact there was one big meeting where one representative of a construction association, representing those who wanted an abundant supply, was there. We noticed that the State people and this man were somehow not being told about all the meetings that the softwood lumber people were having with the Commerce Department and USTR. There was a certain us against them sense at least with some of the Commerce Department people. We wanted to find a reasonable solution and they wanted their solution, which was very pro the softwood lumber growers' position.

The solution that was reached during that time was that the Canadians agreed to what was essentially a voluntary restraint agreement that they would enforce a certain level of lumber

shipments and the U.S. would not apply countervailing duties. It became a real problem for the Canadians because they then had to divide the numbers up by province and the interests of the British Columbians were very different from the interests of the Quebecers and others. I think they realized that it just wasn't worth it to try to keep this agreement and eventually they let it lapse and the U.S. put on heavy countervailing duties.

I saw something in the press a few years ago that the countervailing duties of the U.S. government were judged illegal under NAFTA and the U.S. was refusing to give back the money, which would seem to put us in direct violation of NAFTA, though that happened after my time.

Q: As you looked over the whole trade issue policy of the two countries at this time, were they adjusting to NAFTA? This was a period of learning because this was quite new.

WHITE: It was new and we were working hard at it. I got involved in several judicial proceedings under the NAFTA. The dispute resolution boards looked at cases involving the U.S. and Mexico and Canada. I don't remember the details of a lot of them, but people took it very seriously. There were long involved presentations before a dispute resolutions board. The people on the board were long time trade experts, academics and people who had worked on trade issues for years. We respected the experts and the procedures and tried very hard to make it work.

Q: Did you see our Special Trade Representative Mickey Kantor in operation? What was your impression of how he worked?

WHITE: He was good working with his counterparts. The one meeting I remember most specifically was a meeting that brought in the Chilean trade minister. It was NAFTA plus what was supposed to be the next member of NAFTA, Chile.

Q: NAFTA was at that point completed but we were talking about bringing Chile in.

WHITE: Yes, a meeting was held in Toronto with the four trade ministers. Kantor could be very tough but also diplomatic. He was good with people and had a politician's touch. At the Toronto meeting, everyone was very positive about Chile's economic policy and situation and how the country would fit well in NAFTA. It still hasn't happened and that has been a big disappointment.

Another Kantor trip to Ottawa was during a visit of the Clintons. I was with his entourage in the hotel lobby just after arrival. A young man stopped him and gave an impassioned two or three minute speech about how awful the death penalty was in the United States and we shouldn't have it. People were standing there looking a little upset that this person just came in and grabbed Kantor unexpectedly. Kantor listened to him very politely and thanked him for his opinion on a difficult subject. I thought that was very gracious of him given the tumult and tight scheduling of a visit.

Q: Did you find a lot of bureaucratic rivalries?

WHITE: It was a small trade community in Canada. One interesting thing is that their Department of Foreign Affairs and Department of Trade was consolidated as DFAIT. At any rate they didn't have the split that we had in the U.S. between State and Commerce or State and USTR. We didn't see any obvious signs of internal conflict. They were usually pretty up front about what their positions were

Both the Canadians and the Americans had protectionist policies, with guilt on different things, usually involving agriculture. The U.S. has a protectionist sugar policy. The Canadians had an equally ridiculous poultry and dairy policy. Even ice cream exports from the U.S. were restricted to protect Quebec farmers. In domestic Canadian politics, there was always the complication of Quebec separatism. Given how tense things were at the time, nobody was about to touch the protection of their farmers.

Q: Did Cuba cause problems?

WHITE: Yes. This was when the Helms Burton legislation was passed which put sanctions on foreign companies that gained benefit from properties expropriated in Cuba. One of the first cases involved a nickel producer in Alberta. The company had major operations in Cuba and the head of it planned to continue doing business with Cuba. There wasn't a lot the U.S. could do since one of the provisions was to refuse officials of offending companies visas to go to the U.S. This man didn't try to go to the U.S. and was happy with his business in Cuba.

Canadian attitudes toward Cuba were very different from those of the U.S. A lot of Canadians went to Cuba on vacation because it was cheap. The Canadian government objected to Helms-Burton because of its extraterritorial aspects, as did most of our European allies. A dinner topic conversation was about how ridiculous American policy was, but of course as a Foreign Service officer one had to either keep quiet or make a lukewarm defense.

Q: Well, when you think about it the Helms Burton amendment was not done with great care. Apparently one of the aims was to penalize companies benefiting from property confiscated from Americans and Cubans who later moved to the U.S.

WHITE: Yes, that is why this Alberta company was in violation. They either leased or managed a property that had been expropriated and the owners not compensated.

Q: What about social life there? I've heard varying accounts from people who had a wonderful time and those who found pervasive anti-Americanism. How did you find it?

WHITE: I loved living in Ottawa. It's a small city. It doesn't have much in terms of lively night life but I wasn't looking for that anyway. There was an orchestra and a nice concert hall, though it wasn't particularly world class. There were some good restaurants. There is a lively downtown marketplace where stalls sell fresh foods and flowers, a great place on weekend mornings. At that time the embassy was in an old building directly across from the Parliament. Every summer day I could watch the changing of the guard, with a marching band and ceremony. It is a picturesque area, great for outdoor activities. Quebec is just across the river and the Gatineau Hills have places to hike. The Rideau Canal runs through the middle of the city and one can walk

along the path in the summer and skate on it in the winter. So in terms of lifestyle it was very pleasant.

Canadians as individuals, not in their official roles, were friendly and pleasant to work with. In their official roles they could be very prickly and sometimes anti-American, but that tended to be a few individuals who I think just had been looking at trade issues too long.

Q: Well, how about what the British call the chattering class, the intellectuals?

WHITE: There was a certain amount of fashionable intellectual anti-Americanism, particularly in Toronto. That's where the media and the media money were located. They felt threatened by American magazines and other media. They had rather ridiculous rules about what could be played on the CBC radio, the Canadian Broadcasting Company, where there were quotas for air time. An artist had to be Canadian, the song had to be written by Canadians or it had to be produced by Canadians, two out of three. I believe that the songs of Celine Dion didn't qualify because she had a production contract with somebody in the U.S. and some of her songs had been written in the U.S. Even though she was the major French Canadian singer and one of the biggest stars in the U.S., she didn't qualify for the quota at least for a time. That was one of the absurd examples.

Culture was definitely a concern of some Canadians as they felt that their culture was being overwhelmed by American culture. It was only natural, as most of the population lived within 100 miles of the border and so they received American TV and radio. It is too bad that they couldn't accept and be proud of Quebec culture, Ontario literature, Maritime music as vibrant parts of a North American culture, just like Cajun in the U.S. or country music from Texas. But of course there were commercial interests involved.

One interesting thing I'll mention is the military band marched down to Parliament each day as the guard was changed and they always played marches. In all the time I was there I never heard them play a John Philip Sousa march. That shows how ridiculous their cultural hang-ups could be, as it takes a lot of effort to find good marching songs and completely avoid John Philip Sousa.

Q: I've talked to people with kids at schools and all say that their kids came back telling about teachers who were always criticizing the United States. Was this a problem?

WHITE: I heard such complaints, but I had no direct experience as my daughter was then in college. Some teenagers seemed to deal with it pretty well and find it a little silly, but it was hard for them when a teacher aimed pointed comments at them.

Q: In addition to the Quebec issue, were there a lot of local and regional differences that affected U.S. interests? Canada is quite decentralized in a way and Ontario is its own world. Quebec of course everybody knows about, but also you have the Maritimes and then the prairie states and British Columbia. Did you find that the differences manifested themselves in your work?

WHITE: This was very much a concern of the Canadian government and the Canadian press at the time. I did one long trip where I basically started in British Columbia and worked my way back across the provinces in order to do a long report on devolution. I wanted to call the cable "you say you want a devolution," but people didn't get the Beatles allusion. The report didn't attract much attention in the USG. It was internal politics and it didn't seem particularly relevant to policy makers, except of course for the Quebec question.

I did sense clear regional differences and often a real lack of attachment to the central government. In the Pacific Northwest, people felt they had so much in common with Washington, Oregon, Northern California that they could see themselves surviving without the central government in Ontario. Vancouver felt very different with its strong Asian orientation. They felt disconnected from Toronto and Ottawa. Alberta, too, felt quite independent because they had so much oil and gas revenue and at that time a very healthy beef industry. They were the richest province in Canada and they were developing politically along what you would call red state lines. They wanted low taxes, little government involvement, and wanted the central government just to stay away from them because they were doing perfectly well by themselves, thank you very much.

I went to Regina, Saskatchewan, and Winnipeg, Manitoba; there wasn't much dynamism there. I remember asking about unemployment in Saskatchewan and the official said it was very low -- but because young people left after they finished high school or college due to the lack of jobs there. The Maritimes were similar in losing population because of the declining fishing industry. There was some oil and gas revenue and some tourism but they felt without a strong central Canada they'd really be in trouble. There were jokes that the U.S. could help them by adding them to the New England states.

Q: I'm told that the Maritimes look more towards Boston as their capital.

WHITE: There are strong ties. I'm from New England and saw great similarities. Names of people, styles of towns and houses in Nova Scotia and Massachusetts are all the same. The other joke was that if the Maritimes wanted to join the U.S., the U.S. wouldn't want them because they were in such economical difficulty.

The Quebec question of course was the most important political issue while I was there. At that time there was a major referendum in Quebec as to whether they would vote for independence. It was traumatic for many people in Ontario. I don't think the western provinces were so deeply affected. We watched rallies on the Parliament lawn where average people talked about what Canada meant to them and begged the Quebecers not to leave. Everyone was glued to the TVs that night as the very close vote was tallied. They had a kind of a gauge and it would slip from 49% for to 51% for and then back to 49 ½ % against and it ended up something like 51% to stay with Canada and 49% voted to leave. That seems to have been the high point of the separatist movement.

The U.S. had a tricky role to play because obviously we did not want to see the Canadian government blown apart by this vote. It was by no means certain that Quebec would have been able to leave as neatly as the proponents claim and there would have been a period of instability.

But we couldn't be seen as interfering in their internal affairs. I used to get a lot of questions about NAFTA and whether an independent Quebec could quickly join. Our position was that Quebec should not assume that they would automatically be a member of NAFTA if they left Canada, though that was their assumption. It wasn't something we wanted to discuss publicly. In fact, Quebec would have faced tough negotiations as we didn't like some of their textile exports in addition to the dairy protection. Anyway it was a relief when the effort failed.

DALE V. SLAGHT
Career Minister
Ottawa (1995-1999)

Mr. Slaght was born in Oregon in 1943. After serving in various capacities on Capitol Hill and in the Department of Commerce, he joined the State Department under the Commerce-State Exchange Program. As expert in commercial and trade policy, Mr. Slaght had assignments as Commercial Attaché and Minister Counselor at US Embassies and Consulates in Uruguay, Panama, Germany, Canada, Soviet Union and Mexico. He also served as Mexico Desk Officer at the Department of Commerce. Mr. Slaght attained the rank of Career Minister. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

SLAGHT: I went to Ottawa.

Q: You were in Ottawa from when to when?

SLAGHT: From '95 to '99.

Q: This has been an interesting time. NAFTA was in full effect.

SLAGHT: Ottawa was a wonderful respite after Moscow. After Russia. We bought a house there out in the rural area, two and a half acres. My son went to public school for the first two years there. There was a very good church which we joined and became very good friends with a lot of the people there. I played golf with a man in the church who had invited us out for first time we were there. He now lives in New Jersey, works for Nestlé's in New Jersey. We played golf regularly. We still have very close friends in Canada. We were up there last Memorial day when I gave a speech on trade issues. A wonderful place. Jim Blanchard was the ambassador when we arrived. Former governor of Michigan and House of Representatives. Good man. Did some good things. He and I got along very well. He and his DCM, Jim Walsh. We had a very good experience there. After Blanchard came, Giffin, an attorney from Atlanta who was the chairman of the Clinton-Gore Committee in Georgia. Nowhere near as effective as Blanchard was. Well over his head in my view on what to do and how to do it. We got along, however.

Q: What were the issues that you had to deal with?

SLAGHT: For Canada it really was the issue of NAFTA. NAFTA had been implemented in

January of '94. We had had a Canada Free Trade Agreement since '89, but Mexico came into the picture and negotiated with the other two NAFTA members, Canada and the U.S., and NAFTA was created. As I did in Toronto in the late '80's after the Canada Free Trade Agreement was implemented, I spent a lot of time speaking in the United States on the issue of why U.S. firms ought to be doing business in Canada. I did it with the financing of a freight forwarding firm who paid the bill and with the cooperation of Canada Customs. A representative of Canada Customs and a freight forwarder and I were a threesome, and we went to 50 U.S. cities, maybe more, and my staff did another 50 or more seminars in Indianapolis, in Dallas and in Minneapolis, Seattle, etc. on why U.S. firms ought to be looking at Canada. In fact, we called it The Canada First Program. We developed a brochure, did some marketing and it became very successful. Our idea was that if you haven't exported before, Think Canada First. Then when I went to Mexico everyone said well, I suppose you're going to change it and have Think Mexico First. We had an interesting time.

Q: Were there any issues that cropped up promoting this. Were there any particular issues that came up as being Canada and American trade?

SLAGHT: One issue that we dealt with was called the Rules of Origin. When you have a Free Trade Agreement with another country, you have to determine what goods qualify and what goods don't. If you have a Czech product coming into Canada and it's merely transferred from Canada to the United States, that's not a Canadian product, so it shouldn't qualify. A very serious, a very complicated series of rules were designed product by product, tariff number by tariff number, on what products qualify, under what conditions these products should be given the preferential treatment within the Free Trade Agreement. There were serious penalties if you shipped a good, claim NAFTA status, and it doesn't qualify for it. So, firms have to keep records of what kind of inputs they have into the final product that's shipped. They have to keep documents on the value and, in some cases, from where goods came. For instance, if you put together a suit made from material from the United States, it qualifies even though the final assembly is in Canada. The apparel manufacturer would have to keep track of the cost of the zippers and the buttons and the fabric and all this and where it comes from. Very complicated rules, but we spent a lot of time helping firms understand those rules to avoid the penalties which were serious.

Q: Was there an appeals process that you often stood by?

SLAGHT: One of the benefits of NAFTA was the establishment of, if you want to call it, an appeals court where you didn't have to get attorneys and the local courts involved either in Canada or the United States. There were NAFTA panels set up. If I remember the rules correctly, five member panels in some, maybe three in others. If there are five members, two from each country and they would alternate among the panels who gets the third member. They'd study the case and determine whether the laws of the country, whether the Commerce Department, for instance, and the International Trade Commission, in a dumping case or a subsidy case followed its own rules, and whether the assessments, judgments, made by those two parties were fair. We got overturned on some, we won some, but the process was in a sense a way to channel all this anger and furor into a quasi-judicial effort that took the heat out of a lot of the bilateral relationship. We have more than a billion dollars a day traded between our two countries, every

day, 365 days a year. Most of that trade, 98% of it, goes without a problem. It's only the few cases, softwood lumber and now we've got cattle issues and occasionally a car issue, car parts, raise problems. By and large, it's a fairly good trade relationship.

Q: More with Mexico, but also with Canada. There have been tremendous concerns with Canada, more than the United States when we have the...what was the North American Treaty...what was the first trade...?

SLAGHT: The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.

Q: This is going to allow the American firms to take over the country and all. By the time you got there in '95 to '99, how were things holding out?

SLAGHT: The Canadian federal government, which had opposed initially this agreement with us when it was in opposition, was now very supportive. They had campaigned on a promise to study the whole thing and maybe turn it around. They realized very quickly that this was in Canada's benefit, this was to Canada's benefit, and had been that way. It's not an issue in Canada any longer. NAFTA has been a success for the United States and for Canada. One could argue it's been more of a success for Canada. It had its deal with the United States. They didn't need to do anything. Maybe there were some ways the Canada-U.S. Free Trade could be improved. They didn't like some of the dispute settlement procedures that had been agreed to, but they didn't want initially to join Mexico in this relationship. They did eventually because they feared that the United States would become, if you will, the hub of investment decisions in North America. Firms that wanted to enter into relationships, business relationships, in North America, could only go to the United States if they wanted to trade with both countries, because United States had an agreement with Mexico, and the United States had an agreement with Canada. If Toyota, for instance, wanted to put in a new car plant, where would it go if you wanted to sell both to Mexico and Canada? There was only one place it could go -- the United States. Canada and Mexico would become spokes in this wheel with the United States as the hub, and they were right fearing that. Toyota just made a recent decision not to go to Alabama, but to go to Ontario, and that would not have happened had it not been for NAFTA because NAFTA gives Toyota the rights to sell into the United States so long as they meet the Rules of Origin just as if they were making cars in Alabama.

Q: When you were there was the issue of too much American...?

SLAGHT: Canadians are very sensitive to their cultural industries. The folks that were the loudest opponents to the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement initially back in the late '80's were the intellectual elites: the professors and the journalists, the elite media, very concerned that they would be overrun by American culture. I find this so interesting because there are so many Canadians: Morley Safer and Peter Jennings and a half a dozen comedians are all Canadian. You'll never hear a peep from us about the infiltration of Canadians into our culture here, but boy, was it an issue in Canada!

Q: Did you get involved in this thing?

SLAGHT: No, not so much, no.

Q: Did you see a change in attitude toward Americans by the Canadians?

SLAGHT: I'd like to say yes, but I don't think so. There will always be under the surface for many Canadians a little tension with respect to us. We're the big boy next door. They're always a little more sensitive about what we do and how we do it because it might draw them into something that they don't want to be drawn into. They are very careful to promote multi-nationalism. They're big on international organizations to, if you will, thwart the overbearing United States in the bi-lateral relationship with them. They're very big in the United Nations, very big in other international organizations. They joined the OAS in the '90's to play a role there. They hadn't been a player before. We might feel that way with the tables turned.

Q: What about commerce? Did the State Department around that time change its structure and put Canada into essentially North and South American?

SLAGHT: This was devastating for the old-line State guys who said my God, we aren't in EUR anymore, we're in the Western Hemisphere down there with Bolivia and Chile? This was a big...on the margins I heard the discussions and had to chuckle. I think the transition worked well, and I don't think there were any substantive issues.

Q: Did you get involved in any commercial problems with commercial relations Cuba and Canada?

SLAGHT: A law was passed...

Q: Helms-Burton...

SLAGHT: Helms-Burton. That would somehow punish Canadian businesses that did business with Cuba, particularly in areas where our properties had been expropriated. For instance, an American company owned a hotel there, it's later taken over by Canadians, and they're doing business with our property in a sense, with U.S. private sector property. There was a case once where the son or daughter of an owner of one of these properties in Cuba was a Princeton student or was planning to attend Princeton. What was the embassy going to do? What advice were they going to give the Department on how to handle this? I frankly don't know how this was resolved, so I...in the end, but I know it was an issue, a sensitive one, because the businessman was clearly someone that needed to be handled delicately. I know it was an issue. Canadians are big investors in Cuba today, remains so, primarily in the hotel business there.

THOMAS G. WESTON
Chief of Mission
Ottawa (1996-1997)

Ambassador Weston was born and raised in Michigan and educated at Michigan

State University and in France. Entering the Foreign Service in 1969, he was posted first in Zaire, after which he began assignments in the Bureau of European Affairs and abroad. His posts include Zaire, Germany, Belgium and Canada. Ambassador Weston was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

Q: Well then, after these two years you worked until '96, then what happened?

WESTON: Then it was time to do something again in the Foreign Service. We were going through the usual selection exercise, D Committee, what's the list of ambassadorships coming up. Remember I'm a European specialist so the list of ambassadorships coming up for career people is of necessity somewhat limited. I got a call from Jim Blanchard, up in Ottawa, and I think we spoke earlier that I had had something to do with convincing him to go to Canada in the first Clinton Administration, when he had hoped to become the cabinet secretary for transportation but I'm not going into that.

At any rate, Jim had decided, I'll put it that way, that he was going to have to leave Ottawa to campaign for the President's reelection, the '96 election, not only in Michigan, but there is a mid-western head of the campaign. He hadn't announced any of this and he was going to do this at a particular time but the situation would be created that there would not be a U.S. ambassador in Canada until after the election. It is the sort of thing that if the ambassador leaves and there is an election, especially at a post like Canada, you've got to have the election, new guy has to be selected, go through confirmation, etc. So, it looked like there would be about a year gap in Canada. His idea was that I come up and be chargé for that year. The person who was there who would have been chargé, the sitting DCM, had been there three or maybe four years and wanted to leave and was going to go to Madrid or something like that. At any rate, would this be a good idea? Of course it was going up there as chargé so it's the chief of mission job up in what turns out to be our largest mission in terms of executive branch personnel. It also was Ottawa and at this particular time my youngest daughter was about to enter the 12th grade so we didn't want to pull her out of school to go somewhere else especially the range of other possibilities in Europe were somewhat limited for a career person. So this sounded like a very good idea and I went up to Canada as chargé.

Q: And you were there for how long?

WESTON: I was there for almost two years. I thought I was going for about a year, there would be the election in '96, the President inaugurated, they'd choose a new ambassador, he would get confirmed sometime in the spring. I went up in the spring of '96 and I thought by the spring of '97 I'd be gone. So, even when I first went to Canada I was working with the bureau... what are you going to do in '97, we talked about going to Croatia and all kinds of places like that to another chief of mission job. As it turns out, there was a disagreement among two political appointees about who would be ambassador to Canada, this is after the election. In essence it did not get resolved until one of those appointees, London, opened up surprisingly. Admiral Crowe left London early and one of the people who was interested in going to Canada of the two was what's his name, he was Renaissance Weekend, Phil, anyway he ended up going to the Court of St. James as ambassador. That finally left the other guy to come to Ottawa, a fellow named Gordon Giffen. By the time this all got accomplished I ended up staying in Canada as chief of

mission for about two years which for a career guy is pretty good because Canada was really interesting.

Q: We are going to talk quite a bit about Canada next time so we have gotten you to Canada in the spring of '96 and we talked about how you were assigned there but we really haven't talked about Canada so we can do that the next time.

Q: Today is May 12, 2005. Tom, first of all you were in Canada in '96 until when?

WESTON: It was until '97, it was the middle of the fall in '97.

Q: What was the sort of diplomat's view of Canada in '96 when you got there? American views in Canada?

WESTON: First of all, the relationship between Canada and the United States is one of the most complex you are going to run into. There is so much integration in almost all sectors of activity, you know, environment, health, trade, obviously a billion dollars a day in trade. It's an incredibly complex relationship and hence a complex Mission. I think your question, what was the American diplomats' view of Canada is that it is a northern neighbor that you don't know much about. You can count on them for just about anything you need to count on them for but they are not terribly important in the greater scheme of things even though they are members of the G-7, G-8 and all of that, but seen very much as someone you can count on. But the relationship itself I think is viewed as almost self managing in the sense that the relationship is so close that the view is that an awful lot of the activities you would undertake in diplomacy with another country are basically done directly. Not only with the federal government but with state governments a lot of the time like on law enforcement and things like that. I think that was the common view. I don't think that's how things actually work with Canada because what actually happened is that the only place where all of this relationship comes together is in the Mission in Ottawa. You have this really complex situation. First of all you have 1700 executive branch employees under Chief of Mission authority. That is a big group of folks. Now, a lot of those folks are in law enforcement in one way or another. You have every law enforcement agency of the United States represented there which is a complex management problem to say the least, if you are the Chief of Mission. But, you have all kinds of issues that you are dealing with all the time and the Mission reflects that. Canada itself at that time was just coming out of the most recent referendum on Quebec sovereignty, which took place in '95. That vote was very, very close, I mean to the point where the expectation was that if another referendum were to be repeated any time in the near future Canada could break up. It was kind of an unusual thing if you think of this stable northern neighbor that you could have break up on you. There was a new premier in Quebec, a separatist premier named Lucien Bouchard who was incredibly charismatic. The United States had quite a solid policy on the unity of Canada which was to support unity including an intervention in the referendum campaign which probably was helpful in assuring that Canada didn't break up in '95. I would say probably the most sensitive area in dealing with Canada at that time was the U.S. role in the continued unity of Canada along with this incredibly complex Mission and relationships covering all areas of endeavor by the two respective

governments.

Q: How was the Canadian government constituted when you went out there in '96?

WESTON: The premier Jean Chrétien, the Liberal Party head, only left the prime ministership about a year and a half ago so he was prime minister for a long time. Relations with the United States in particular were very much the province of the prime minister. You had a full liberal government, so the foreign minister was a fellow named Lloyd Axworthy, who was very active in all other aspects of Canadian policy and the relationship with the U.S. The real relationship with the U.S. was kept pretty close by the prime minister. It is a parliamentary system of course and it was a majority liberal government at the time but with these kinds of political dynamics of Quebec separatism accelerating.

There was another thing going on politically. The Conservative Party of Canada had basically for a whole series of reasons some of which are scandal related, some of which are the tired old party had pretty much become weaker and weaker throughout Canada. They had traditionally been the opposition. When I was in Ottawa the opposition in the parliament was actually the Bloc Québécois, the Separatists Quebec Party. It is unusual to have an opposition party dedicated to the break up of a country. You had a reconsolidation of center right, right wing politics in a growing movement which turned into something called the Reform Party which was centered in the prairies and Alberta and found some support in Ontario. It was a party which was in flux at the time and which eventually became a party but it was a movement at the time which looked a lot like Ross Perot and his momentum, it was that kind of a populist movement. So, you had some interesting political dynamics but the government itself was a majority government.

Q: How did we view the Bloc Québécois and the leadership there? How serious were they about the consequences, or was this more a stance than a real driving force? How did we view it?

WESTON: The Bloc Québécois or the Parti Québécois which is what the provincial parties called it in Quebec, was dedicated to the sovereignty of Quebec, taking Quebec out of Canada, having Canada break up. That was their motivating force, that was what they campaigned on, got elected in Quebec and everything else. That being said, whether it was the Bloc Québécois in the federal parliament or whether it was the Parti Québécois as the Quebec government, Canada is a federal system. Because of the nature of the relationship a lot of the time you are working in provincial politics as much as you are in federal on both sides of the border. That is another interesting thing about Canada for an American diplomat. Because they were the provincial government and the opposition they had to deal with the full range of issues facing Canada, passing the budget, health reform, whatever the issue of the day might be as well as some very significant foreign policy issues. This was the time when we, the United States, were trying to have Canada play a leading role in police operations in Haiti. We were trying to have Canada play a leading role in dealing with post-genocide, well, genocide and then post-genocide Rwanda, as well as the usual range of policy issues be it on the European side, Canada being a member of NATO, OECD, OSCE all the European institutions we dealt with, but also being a member of all the Pacific organizations like APEC that we dealt with as well. All of these foreign policy issues are all involved in a relationship that both the Bloc Québécois at the federal level and Parti Québécois at the provincial level had to deal with in addition to the question of

separatism. Our job is to influence these things in a direction which is favorable to U.S. interests. Their motivating force may well have been sovereignty for Quebec but you had to deal with them as an important decision maker in their own right on a lot of issues of importance to the United States.

Q: What was your judgment on Chrétien and also other members of the political section? Was he a solid character, a slippery character? What? How did he feel about the United States, what were you thinking of?

WESTON: Now there is a huge scandal going on in Canada and the government is about to fall because of things that Chrétien was doing on funding and an advertising campaign related to sovereignty in Quebec at the time we were talking about. I think the view of him was as a very tough but skilled political figure who certainly could deliver politically things seen to be in U.S. interest, so very important from that point of view. As to his personality, he is very easy to work with, very easy to talk to, to talk to very frankly, exceptionally easy to work with for someone like myself. He is also a very likeable person as a human being which made it very pleasant. There was an element in liberal politics which he used which was an issue with the United States and that was any Canadian who wants to be successful for a long time in Canadian politics has to have some perceived independence from the United States. It is the same kind of problem Tony Blair just had in the most recent election although it works for Blair because of Iraq. A Canadian prime minister cannot be seen as doing the bidding of the United States all the time; it's just part of the Canadian political culture.

Chrétien, I think, had no problem working with the United States, had a very good relationship with the President, a direct relationship with the President which did play to that posture of "I'm independent from the United States." This could, did, sometimes create difficulties in the press because of statements. I remember one very specific one. I don't remember what the meeting was but it was in Ottawa, there was some meeting about Europe and Chrétien was sitting next to the Belgian prime minister and the microphone was left on at his table and he said -- it was picked up on the microphone -- something to the Belgian prime minister along the lines that the United States is very easy to deal with. You just pretend you like them and they'll do everything you want. which was extensively an accident that the mike was left on. I believe it was part of dealing with Canadian political culture about how you deal with the United States but of course it became public and created a bit of an incident with Washington at that time. That's just a little illustration.

During the time I was there, Chrétien made an official visit with the state dinner at the White House and two days of meetings and all these different things in Washington. Because I had worked in European Affairs so much where Canada used to be and was at that time in the Department of State I had seen a lot of these. This was one of those best sorts of visits, a lot was accomplished, a lot of deliverables, a lot of movement on issues of concern to both sides, in particular law enforcement, things like that. So, a fairly easy relationship with the United States. That's not unusual for Canadian political figures as long as they take care of this one element of Canadian political culture, not being seen as instruments of the United States.

Q: I can see two things. In a way wasn't Cuba sort of the designated point to show we are

independent, sort of, Chrétien I don't know if it was during your time, made a well publicized trip to Cuba and then asked for some things which he didn't get?

WESTON: Right, it was actually before my time but you are right. In part it wasn't only to differ from the United States but it was something you could point to as being a big difference with the United States because there were a lot of other interests involved. For example, when I was in Ottawa we had the initial implementation of the Helms-Burton Act, if you are familiar with that, which related to assets which could be seized.

Q: That was directly pointed to Canada wasn't it?

WESTON: The first case involved a Canadian mining firm. I don't know how familiar you are with Helms-Burton, but it prevents officials of the company (doing business with Cuba) and their families from entering the United States. You can seize assets and do all kinds of things under it. There was a Canadian firm which was first chosen for this, an Alberta mining firm. That was one area but it wasn't the only one. Another little incident we had when I was up there was you had the seizure of a ferry between Alaska and Seattle, a car ferry, by the fishermen of Prince Rupert protesting the salmon wars, fish war, all over the place, but to the point of seizing a vessel which technically is piracy.

Q: These were pirates?

WESTON: Well, they were Prince Rupert fishermen but Canadian officials did not rush to end the difficult situation in which we found ourselves.

Q: How was that resolved?

WESTON: Eventually an agreement to release the ferry and no one would be prosecuted for it and we appointed a special envoy to work again on the salmon issue or something like that.

Q: With Canada if you are going to point to a continuing thing, talk about fish. I mean this goes back to the beginning of the Republic...

WESTON: Remember, we still have unsettled maritime boundaries with Canada. On three separate boundaries, the Alaska-Yukon, Alaska-British Columbia and then Washington state-British Columbia and then Maine and New Brunswick. We do not have settled maritime boundaries with Canada and we still have some disputed territorial islands in these waters.

Q: As two diplomats talking to each other, this is giving employment to Canadian and American diplomats for well over two hundred years, so let's not knock it.

WESTON: Well there aren't many fish left in the Atlantic. Where it's still an incredibly active issue is in the Pacific and in particular over salmon. Once again a limited resource like all fish in the ocean and all kinds of complex issues in both the United States and Canada related to it both politically and economically, people's rights, all kinds. You spend more time on fish than you might think; you do on whales as well of course because of Inuit native people and all kinds of

whaling issues. That is what I mean, a place like Canada is so fascinating to do all this sort of stuff.

Q: At the ambassador/chargé level it gets turned over very quickly to commissions and such doesn't it?

WESTON: Well, there are in place a whole structure of U.S.-Canadian instruments for resolving issues. You see these most importantly in water issues, Great Lakes Commissions and things like that. Those are formal structures with regular meetings and participation and ways to deal with it and they negotiate what the water level ought to be, Lake Ontario and that sort of thing, it works very well. What happens on a lot of other issues and certainly fish, a lot of environmental issues which are harder to manage than water, air pollution and things like that, trash, solid waste, whatever, an incredible number of law enforcement issues as well as a lot of agricultural issues, mad cow is the big deal now but there is always something. You know, pine wood nematodes or some biological issues going on with Canada as well. What tends to happen is something will bring an issue to a head, an act by the United States, or an act by Canada, or by Americans or Canadians or whatever, and it will be a crisis and sometimes it will get resolved very rapidly and then ambassador/chargé/chief of mission is deeply involved in it. But if it is something, like many of these things are, which inevitably lead to incredibly complex arrangements to deal with them which usually involve either law enforcement or regulatory agencies on both sides of the border then they do get referred to not so much commissions but special negotiators or experts. It will be something like you pull someone out of the Department of Agriculture, APHIS, to work out a system for tracking cattle across the border and things like that. It is not so much turned over to commissioners as it gets turned over to technical experts, if it is the something that can't be resolved very rapidly.

Q: NAFTA (North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement) was still fairly new. How did it work at that point? How were the Canadians evaluating it and how were we evaluating it?

WESTON: The Canadians were perfectly happy with the Free Trade Agreement (FTA), between Canada and the United States, which was the predecessor to NAFTA. NAFTA brought in Mexico and I think it was working perfectly well in terms of increasing openness between the North American market which would have been Canada, the United States under the FTA and Mexico. Depending on the sector you were talking about, you could get very different views. For instance, people in the automobile sector were quite worried about the export of jobs from Canada, as they were in Michigan and Ohio, to Mexico, because of lower labor costs under NAFTA, so you had some mixed feelings about it. It clearly was successful in the sense of increasing trade throughout North America, that is Mexico-U.S. and Mexico-Canada. There were a lot of technical problems with it. Under NAFTA there were all kinds of commissions set up to deal with its implementation. Look at trucking regulations across the United States. If a truck is going from Mexico to Canada it's got to cross the United States, environmental issues, what have you, but there was a structure to deal with these matters and it functioned quite well. It was very active but it functioned quite well. There were misgivings about it in Canada more than in the United States, although in the United States there were the same misgivings and they tended to be centered in the mid-west and related to the auto industry. As an example, you had a very powerful congressman from Michigan in those days named David Bonior who was a great

supporter of the FTA, the free trade area between Canada and the United States in particular because of the great effect it had on the automobile industry, a very positive effect, but he was a diehard opponent to NAFTA. Some of the things that you saw in Canada related to NAFTA you would also see in the mid-west in the United States. Then they played out politically.

Q: Did Canada's military turn into a sort of peacekeeping operation, as a military force it is not much. It's basically got some battalions to help in peacekeeping, I'm not discounting it but one of the stances they took great pride in was an anti-mine movement. Was that...

WESTON: Yes, the Ottawa Convention.

Q: Were you there when that happened?

WESTON: Yes, which we of course opposed.

Q: I've talked to people who have been involved with this and these are Foreign Service Officers who tried looking at it saying this whole thing could have been taken care of very nicely and we could have signed it but it was designed almost to make sure that we couldn't sign it. Did you pick that up at all?

WESTON: No, I wouldn't agree with that assessment at all.

Q: The only place that we used mines was in Korea, and then an exception could have been made for that.

WESTON: I think it's important to remember how this came about, basically through NGOs, not governments originally. Canada lobbies NGOs who are Canadian-American in nature, like everything else an integrated kind of peace movement. Canada picked up on it much more rapidly than the United States because it was one of the issues that Canada is into: soft power and conventions and multilateralism for all of the reasons you understand when you are in bed with an elephant like the United States. It also found great resonance politically in Canada; that Canada was a leader in eliminating this class of weapons which were clearly very destructive to a lot of people. It was responding to a very strong NGO movement. So to say that it could have been fixed with an exemption for the United States for Korea, you know, once it had taken on the life it did I think that it is a real stretch. I don't think that was a real option then, not when you had the support of the rest of the world for the convention as it was.

Q: So then, the two main producers which are Russia and China?

WESTON: Yes, and of course Russia has adhered to it now.

Q: At the time I don't know, maybe.

WESTON: Yes, but it was a real issue, because the Administration then was supportive of the goals of it, this is the Clinton Administration, which had the problem that you have to think a lot about what the administration's relationship with the military and everything else. It really could

not find a way past this Korean problem. Was a quick fix possible? I don't think so, certainly not by the time I got involved with this in Ottawa.

Q: How about the military to military relationship. Were there problems or over flights or cooperation or various things?

WESTON: It's really complicated because it depends on what you are talking about. We of course have a joint air defense command (NORAD) with Canada and that's more integrated than anything you have in NATO.

Q: Canadian generals have been in charge of...

WESTON: Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado Springs. You've got American officers at every Canadian military facility from all over the place, all of whom, incidentally because they are not under a regional command come under the chief of mission. So you are technically responsible for these folks up in the Arctic and their security, a very complex thing. At any rate, I think relations between the two militaries were absolutely excellent, including NORAD, the most integrated military command the United States has. Most integration that the United States has with any military in the world is with Canada. There is a lot of frustration on the part of the American military that the Canadian military has become, "hollowed out" is the normal term that is used, but that frustration is just as problematic in the Canadian military so it's not a military-military issue. I think there is a lot of appreciation, I mentioned already that a couple of things we worked on at that time were Canadian civilian forces to police Haiti. You have the Mounties, you have a lot of French-speaking policemen and also in the Great Lakes region in Africa, but there was a counting on Canada for the military peace-keeping role both military and civilian and that was a Canadian niche and still is. I can't think of a single instance where there were any real difficulties between the American military and the Canadian military in any of our cooperative enterprises.

That being said there was a real policy difference which lead to a strange situation in the Arctic. Canada asserted sovereignty over a lot of the waters of the Arctic, which we use by nuclear submarines for various purposes. We had a situation of American submarines under the Arctic ice all the time, passing between Canadian islands in the high Arctic, ostensibly against the will of Canada because we hadn't sought permission because we didn't recognize these Canadian claims. Canada couldn't do much about it, but it was a strange situation given you have an integrated air defense command. It was more something which came out of Canadian political culture than anything else. The one "we are sovereign, we don't do everything that the United States demands of us." Secondly out of political culture concerns about the North, the Arctic, the Inuit, a lot of nuclear submarines, what impact is this having on the ice and on the temperature of the water, all kinds of things like that. It's the one instance which was very anomalous in the military-military relationship. Of course, when you go into military matters you also get into the whole intelligence area which we can't say much about here but of course we have a very different relationship with Canada in that area than we do with anyone else.

Q: Did the genocide in Rwanda come up during your time there? And as I recall the Canadian military was immediately called upon to do something.

WESTON: Yes, the UN Military Commander in Rwanda was a Canadian, General Dallaire. If you've seen the movie "Hotel Rwanda," he's played by Nick Nolte. He has been very active since over at the Holocaust Museum, talking about failure of prevention, what have you. The UN force was headed by a Canadian. It was a very small force obviously. There were other Canadian officers there but it was UN not Canadian.

Q: Was there any thought of putting Canadian troops in there?

WESTON: You know the history of the period. There is difficulty in creating an adequate UN force and more particularly a mandate and rules of engagement to prevent genocide which most people say was blocked in large part by the United States and the Security Council. While that was going on, this is a year and a half after Somalia; reluctance of the U.S. to get involved in Africa. We were pursuing certain policies of the UN related to the Great Lakes Region in Rwanda, which was not necessarily geared to stopping the genocide, and that is an understatement, obviously, and a sarcastic one at that. We were at the same time exploring with Canada the possibilities for a unilateral effort. At that time, and we've talked a little about the Canadian military which was basically a peacekeeping operation, which is not a bad description, it is not totally accurate but it is not a bad description. If you start looking around, a number of Canadian military were already deployed in the Balkans. That helped us in Cyprus of all places, you know all over the place, because they were very active in peacekeeping. They were talking to them about Haiti about a civilian operation that which was not needed in Rwanda right then, that was a straight forward... you needed military intervention then. You can call it peacemaking or to stop genocide, it would have been a military action. When you started to look at the available forces, of course, there were very few without pulling them from somewhere else which we didn't want Canada to do, certainly not from the Balkans. The fact of the matter is you couldn't have gotten them there without the United States, I mean Canada has no real independent lift capability, certainly not logistical capability reaching into Central Africa. We were exploring all of this and Canada was willing to take a leadership role in all of this. But then one starts to look at the available assets, and what you can do is try to recruit others to participate, starting with the United States because of the need for lift capability. It didn't get very far. Meanwhile the genocide was going on. You could describe it in all kinds of different ways, whether it was the fault of Kofi Annan for not pushing hard enough, whether it was blocked in the Security Council, you will find all kinds of explanations. I have my own view as to what happened. I think the United States did not play a positive role in this in the Security Council in New York. Dithering resulted in no real action being taken by a coalition led by Canada, not that there wasn't a willingness to do it, but the ability to do it on their own. Meanwhile the genocide took place and that was that, but it was a very active account when I was in Ottawa.

Q: A theme has come by, I think, I don't know if it's still going on, but do we have the cultural wars when you were there? Can you describe how they were when you were there?

WESTON: These were related to almost every sort of intellectual endeavor, print, film, whatever, and television. When I was there the two really active issues were related to advertising in magazines. Unless the magazine had X-amount of Canadian content, it couldn't

use its tax deduction for advertising. But, it was a measure which discriminated against non-Canadians in print material, magazines in particular. There was another issue on requirements for Canadian content on television which related once again to how you dealt with advertising revenues, because much of television is cross-border. You know, if you are trying to sell something in Ogdensburg, New York, more likely than not you were advertising on Canadian television not Syracuse or whatever it is. It's all part of the same issue, measures which are discriminatory to foster Canadian culture which would translate normally into Canadian content in either print or broadcasting or whatever medium it happened to be. In other places it could be the issues of subsidization of cultural production. That was not the big issue with Canada because it was about Canadian content regulations and the relationship of those to tax issues, but it was part of the same issue.

Q: What was their stand?

WESTON: Well, we didn't believe any American company should be discriminated against under Canadian law. Pretty straight forward.

Q: Were we doing anything regarding Canadian firms who were using American TVs to reach their people?

WESTON: No, it was more if they are discriminatory, remember by this time we are all members of the WTO (World Trade Organization) and have signed all of these commitments including the audio/visual exemption and WTO rules and such. We would be opposed to using the retaliation mechanism which is what you are suggesting. By then we were at the point where you would threaten a WTO case which could lead to retaliation but it would not be in the same way. Remember you had the end of the Uruguay Round in '94 and then it moved to WTO.

Q: It moved away from direct confrontation...

WESTON: To putting trade issues into another mechanism.

Q: Calling on the international people to beat up on the guy.

WESTON: Right, but with more transparency and a set of rules of the road.

Q: How about anti-Americanism there? I've talked to Bud Shinkman, was he there, anyway he was a USIA PAO there at one point. Anyway a former PAO there at some point during the '90s. He was saying that his son went to a prep school and found it was supposed to be one of the most prestigious in Ottawa...

WESTON: I even know the prep school of what you speak.

Q: His son came back with tapes of lectures which were quite anti-American. They were teachers, sort of a virulent strain of anti-Americanism in that particular academic setting. Did you find, was this a, the academics of any country can be a peculiar group anyway.

WESTON: Now remember you are talking to an academic.

Q: All I'm saying is. These interviews are essentially designed for academics to a certain extent but at the same time it is a place where extreme prejudice can come out when someone is lecturing you.

WESTON: You have a complicated factor in Canada. I agree with whatever you said, but there are two issues here. One, you do have in Canadian culture, not only political Canadian culture, the cliché, how do you define a Canadian? They are not American; they are not from the United States. Even being Canadian you are defining an opposition to something else, that you are not something else, and there is in Canadian culture a very strong strain of not only are we not the United States but we're more communitarian and socially responsible, We have a health care system which covers everyone, we are better than the United States socially, and that is an element of Canadian culture. You have another and that can have elements of what can be seen as anti-Americanism to it. I would not tend to see it as anti-Americanism but remember I spent a lot of my life in Germany with people beating down the walls over the Dual Track decision on nuclear weapons. So if you want any anti-Americanism, I can point to some anti-Americanism, but this was pretty soft if it is anti-Americanism.

There is another strain, though, and I think it has particular relevance to the academic community, primary, secondary and post-secondary education, and that is you have the whole Canadian academic establishment heavily populated with ex-Americans, and there's a whole generation which are basically folks who went up during the Vietnam war. These numbers may not seem big by U.S. standards but you're talking of a country of 30 million people, as opposed to the size of the United States, concentrated in a very small area. You go into any school and in particular you notice it in British Columbia but you notice it also in Ontario, and you'll find out at the university faculties, you have large percentages of Americans. There is a whole generation which is basically there because of opposition to the Vietnam war, children of the '60s, Americans of the '60s, counter culture, call it what you will, but it is embedded in the academic establishment. I think that that is another source of something which can be called anti-Americanism. Thinking of this particular prep school of which you speak, which I know, it is in Rockland, just outside Ottawa, that's particularly an issue.

It is anti-Americanism with an American source. It finds resonance because of this Canadian cultural phenomena which is "we are not you." It translates into political behavior that the prime minister of Canada can't be seen as being the instrument of the United States. Okay, he is not alone in the world in that position, that's for sure, but I guess I just don't see it as a hard anti-Americanism which has a deleterious effect on the relationship or on policy issues. It is certainly very hard to find anything remotely compared to anti-Americanism on a personal level. It is really almost non-existent in Canada. That's not true in a lot of the world, but it's almost non-existent in Canada, and of course you have a contrary phenomenon with a lot of Canadians who think boy we ought to be joining these guys. If you get out in the prairies or the Maritimes a lot of folks who really wonder whether being Canadian is all its trumped up to be.

Q: How about on the cross boarder thing, did the Native American issue come up much?

WESTON: All the time, all the time. We talked about the salmon fisheries. There's a native people, big native people issue there. We've talked about the whaling issues, big natives issue there. We had the Circumpolar Conference which is an international Inuit organization with Canadian-American participation, along with Laplanders and Russians and what have you. We had all kinds of issues of native peoples on reservations/reserves which cross the border, in particular the Mohawks in upstate New York which has a tremendous amount of smuggling going on. You had a large number of legal issues because Canada, in its judicial decision making, is ahead of the United States in restitution if you will of the wrongs done native peoples which were just as bad or worse in Canada as they were in the United States but there's been a lot more judicial restitution based on judicial decisions, return of land. Right now the city of Sanya in Ontario is basically almost all native peoples' land and all those refineries that people had to build are now long term leases on someone else's land as a result of judicial decision. There is a whole complex of issues involving native peoples that they will be different with the Inuit, they are different from the Athabasca and so on. It's the only place I know of where as charge, chief of mission, you are dealing with native people's issues literally all the time in one form or another.

Q: How did you find the utility of our consulates around Canada?

WESTON: I think they are incredibly important. Canada is a federal system; it's stretched across almost 4,000 miles just along the border, if you add the Alaskan border. For the political point of view, from the economic point of view, they are incredibly important. Three of them are also huge consular establishments in which is kind of strange because Canadians don't need visas to come to the United States, but the Mission in Canada is the largest issuer of visas to non-Canadians, non-Americans, getting their visas, or they are folks in the United States who have to leave the United States. So, we have really big, really huge consular establishments in Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal. There are also on any given day, I don't know what the statistics are now but there used to be something like a couple million Americans in Canada which is another big consular function.

There are all kinds of cross border issues, economic, political, law enforcement, all kinds of other things in which the consulates play a crucial role. There is so much province-to-state work to be done, and they are there to do it. You have things like the consulate in Vancouver working very closely with the state of Washington government or up in Toronto it's New York and Pennsylvania, Ohio and Michigan, whatever. I think they are very important. In fact, one thing that happened wasn't actually established when I was there but shortly thereafter we even reopened a consulate in Canada in Winnipeg that had been closed, just because you had this big gap in the middle of Canada at a time when throughout the rest of the world, of course, you weren't opening a lot of consulates. I think they were very important. Once you ended up having this, if you are the chargé this is your mission, all these consulates as well. I traveled I don't know how much of the time, about 40 percent of the time around Canada. I was not in Ottawa all the time and you can't effectively do your job in Canada. What you would see happening is a tremendous amount of, well, almost all relations with third countries, third world issues, getting the Canadians to police in Haiti, dealing with Rwanda, getting the right decision out of the G-7 communiqué, right support of NATO, whatever, whether Security Council in UN, whatever, you did in Ottawa, because that was all Federal Government. The vast majority, whether it is

economic work, commercial work, law enforcement work, political work, is done in the provinces by the consulates.

Q: Did you see observing on the whole, I mean you had the Quebec separation there, did you see much of a distancing say from Saskatchewan, Manitoba others to the West? I mean, did you see almost a disconnect with Ottawa?

WESTON: Yes, I mentioned before at this time you had this growth in the Reform Party, what became the Reform Party that was centered in the prairies of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and to some extent Alberta. You have a lot of centrifugal forces that play in Canada and they are different depending on what part of Canada you are talking about. You have obviously the Quebec situation which is sui generis linguistic, it's historic French Canada, well it's not French Canada, it's Quebec, because other parts of French Canada will want to separate Arcadia and what have you. But Quebec and the rest of Canada issue. You have another issue in the Maritimes, which tend to be far more depressed economically and they feel very neglected by the rest of Canada and tend to look towards New England for most of their ties as much as to Ottawa.

Q: The Boston Red Sox...

WESTON: Absolutely, they talk about the Boston Sox. A lot of this is historical, romantic almost, history to some extent, but you have a degree of some sense of non-integration with the rest of Canada in the Maritimes.

You then have the prairies which feel very far from Ottawa. I think there is a good solid strain in the prairies in western Canada of independence of a type you see to some extent in the United States in the Rocky Mountain states and on the west coast. You then have Alberta, which is the richest province in Canada because of oil and natural gas. These revenues are provincial revenues not federal for the most part, so it feels it's in a very different situation from the rest of Canada. British Columbia which most Canadians describe as la la land, which is very, except for the cold, very much like southern California. Vancouver, you could be in either Hong Kong or Bombay, you have a very cosmopolitan place, yet the capital is Victoria where you think you are back in the last century in the midlands of England. It feels different from the rest of Canada, and then of course you have the whole North. At the time I was there of course it was the Northwest Territories in Yukon. Now it's Northwest Territories Nunavut and Yukon, Nunavut being Inuit territory now, also, for all kinds of reasons feeling separate from the rest of Canada. When you look at it as a whole, we think we have regionalism in the United States, but it is nothing compared to the regionalism you find in Canada. I think it's made more complex because of the Quebec question, the separatist tendency right at the heart of Canada because of Quebec. It is very strong.

Q: I realize you probably could never put it on paper because it would leak and there would be a horrible mess but what about a war plan that if Quebec, I mean, do we feel let's say, that must have been something you had to think about for anybody who has served in Canada? Let's say Quebec votes to secede, one, would it happen, could it happen and two, what would that mean for us?

WESTON: It certainly could happen because I don't think there is a will in the rest of Canada to prevent it from happening in any way which would prevent it from happening, if it passed in a referendum, for instance. I don't think you can find many Canadians willing to go to war or to have a civil war to keep Quebec in Canada. I just do not have that sense at all. What it would mean in the first instance you'd be dealing with two sovereignties there. There would be immediate economic consequences which would have a great effect on certain elements of U.S. business and so on which would have to be dealt with right away and would be dealt with. There are technical sorts of ways of dealing with those sorts of things. I don't think there is or should be a great concern about stability in the sense of when other countries break up, like former Yugoslavia, you are not going to have that happen in Canada. You would have a far more complicated situation. I should add that if Quebec left Canada, I think that would start the breakup of Canada in all kinds of other ways because of some of these differences we've been talking about.

Q: Like the Maritimes...

WESTON: What do they do? What if they don't enjoy any of their current transfer of funds from Ontario and Quebec to the Maritimes? If the Quebec part of that is gone, what do they do? I think it would set in motion all kinds of other ways to think about what Canada is, was, and would be in the Maritimes, and in the prairies in particular, which are very oriented towards the United States. I mean you get out there and the whole orientation of people is not looking towards Ottawa or Vancouver for that matter, they are looking towards Chicago and Minneapolis. All kinds of things are set in motion. It's not something with great economic and stability and economic implications, you're not talking about anything in terms of violence.

Q: No, but...

WESTON: You are talking about a situation in which the range of things the United States traditionally thought it could count on from Canada, support and all kinds of efforts, peace keeping in Haiti, whatever in NATO, whatever it happens to be, obviously it wouldn't be the same situation because you wouldn't have only one Canada. Then there would be real questions about how you dealt with that. I think over time the worse problem would be what it might set in motion for the rest of Canada. It is hard for me to see a kind of a rump Canada led by Ontario given the other regional feelings. I think you would likely see further splintering with economic consequences and all kinds of political consequences. You know we just completed an agreement for a smart border, trying to deal with the border traffic in the age of combating terrorism. All of a sudden you'd have to do that not only with 'x' number of entities to your North, if you are the United States, but you would have to deal with those entities just because of the geography involved. It creates all kinds of higher costs in terms of a lot of U.S. interests but it is not the sort of thing that you really worry about in the same way in the breakup with other entities.

Q: No, but in looking at this, let's say there is a referendum and it comes out 51 percent for leaving...

WESTON: That was pretty close to what it came out to the last time.

Q: I was saying it was very close to that. I mean that's a very dubious thing because often there is a vote of "Oh screw you", people who don't expect something to happen...

WESTON: In a referendum all kinds of things can effect it, unhappiness with the tax collector from Ottawa, whatever.

Q: But, what were we, how were we playing it? Do you think there would be another referendum and say, fine, this is going to happen, but this time we really mean it, or something like that?

WESTON: I think that what happened after the last referendum is you basically had efforts starting to concentrate on consolidating Quebec, in fact I mentioned Lucien Bouchard, who was the Premier of Quebec at this time, is no longer. In fact, Parti Quebecois is not governing Quebec right now, it is the Liberals. You had a consolidation of Quebec in the sense of economic consolidation and a lot of attention being paid to improving the competitiveness of Quebec industry, to prepare the ground for the day when Quebec might be sovereign. That was the view that ultimately there would be another attempt to achieve sovereignty, and I think that's still the operating mode of the Parti Quebecois. The strange thing about what is going on in Canada now, there was a vote of confidence which the government lost just three days ago, rejected on procedural grounds. There will be another governmental fall elections. The net effect of it will be to increase the representation in the Federal Parliament of the Bloc Quebecois, and in all probability lead to the collapse of the liberals in Quebec and a restoration of the Parti Quebecois in Quebec. You are getting rapidly back to where you were back in about '94 before the last referendum, and it is I think the Parti Quebecois has every intent in making another go at this.

Q: How about water power? Was that much of an issue when you were there?

WESTON: Yes, well water or water power? Because water is a huge issue.

Q: Is there much of a difference?

WESTON: They are very different things. Water power is basically centered on Niagara Falls, where we have a common grid.

Q: I thought there were some big dams up in Quebec?

WESTON: Well, there are, but those are plugged into the grid system, it is an integrated electrical grid system, and you have the rolling of electricity basically, well it's the whole north, at least northeast quadrant, actually it goes deep into the south of the United States. It's all tied into the same grid. It's all basically run by either private corporations or parastatal co operations sometimes like Hydro-Ontario, is parastatal. It all works perfectly well until something blows outside Toledo and we lose electricity over half the country.

Q: But basically that isn't a particular issue, that's a technical issue more or less.

WESTON: It's a technical issue. Insofar as you get involved as chargé it would be doing things to improve the conditions of business behavior between these various corporations. You don't have the same sort of border crossing issues like in the auto industry where the big concerns are you can't get the truck across the Ambassador Bridge with the transmission you need for just-in-time assembly. But you don't have the same problem with electricity. It's kind of creating or reducing as much as you can, skewing effects whether it is investment or taxation law, whatever, so it that it works free of government interference, understanding that this is a regulated industry.

Water more broadly, of course is a huge issue, and it's from quantity of water, environment. The Great Lakes, use of fresh water or salt water marine resources, ultimately sale of water, remembering that we're a water short world. Roughly a third of the existing fresh water supply of the world happens to be in Canada and you won't have to guess very long until you figure out who the biggest consumer of water in the world happens to be. We have this issue up in the Dakotas and Manitoba, the Red River keeps flooding and it floods all of North Dakota and so we built this huge Army Corp of Engineers project called Devil's Lake to control flooding but it risked the ecosystem of the whole Red River Valley through Manitoba. Water, water everywhere and some kind of issue attached to all of it. This has been going on for a long time, having to deal with these sorts of issues.

Q: Well Tom you left there, is there anything else? We've covered a lot of issues.

WESTON: What was interesting was several months before I left, this visit to Washington which was the first since Clinton had been to Ottawa. Traditionally, until the Bush Administration, the first visit an American president makes abroad is to Ottawa. That's changed now. This was the first visit of Chrétien during the Clinton Administration but I don't know that we have to go into detail, it's just a terribly interesting time to see how the personal relationship between two people can make such a difference in the relationship in every way. The closest relations between any two countries on earth, I think.

Q: You left there, when? '97?

WESTON: '97 right, the fall of '97.

VICTOR D. COMRAS
Director, Office of Canadian Affairs
Washington, DC (1998-1999)

Victor D. Comras was born in New York State in 1943. Comras graduated from Georgetown University in 1964, the University of Florida Law School in 1966, and promptly joined the Foreign Service. While in the Foreign Service, Comras served overseas in Zaire, Nigeria, South Africa, France, Canada and Macedonia. He also worked on the Law of the Sea negotiations. Comras was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

COMRAS: Yes, I remained the director of the Office of Canadian Affairs through 1998 and into early 1999. However, it became clear in early 1999 that I was working full time on Kosovo and needed to be replaced with regard to Canadian Affairs.

Q: You mentioned something off-mic about President Bush, Bush II, about a Canadian and a death penalty. How did this come about?

COMRAS: During my tenure as director of the Office of Canadian Affairs, I had to deal with the nasty business of a Canadian national who had been sentenced to death in Texas for murdering an 80 year old women. The crime took place in the early 1980s and had run its course of appeals. The Canadian charged was mentally retarded. It appeared that he was more an accomplice than the main actor. The other person charged with the crime was given life imprisonment.

There were also serious questions as to whether he had received an adequate defense. But, the most serious issue from our perspective was that he had never been apprized of this right to seek assistance from the Canadian Consulate. Nor had the Canadian consulate been informed of the case until its latest stages of appeal. This ran counter to our treaty obligations vis a vis Canada.

There were strong grounds to believe that his attorney at the trial that found him guilty was incompetent. He fell asleep during the trial. Despite these questions, the appellate court, though critical of the trial attorney, held that it had not really affected the outcome of the trial.

The Canadian government is officially opposed to the death penalty. And so the Canadian government began to take a great interest in this case. It became a major issue in the Canadian Press. The Canadian government made special appeals to Governor Bush to provide some clemency particularly in light of the violation of the consular agreements between the United States and Canada. They maintained that had they been notified they would have assured that he had a more adequate defense attorney.

The Canadian government put considerable pressure on the State Department to intervene in the case. Our attorneys, while sympathetic to the Canadian position, felt constrained from making any direct intervention in the matter. Rather, they wrote Governor Bush to inform him of the international requirements to contact the Canadian Consulate when a Canadian national is arrested. Governor Bush's office never responded.

Governor Bush brushed aside the numerous appeals for clemency and pro-forma referred them to the Texas clemency board. That board was known for its conservative approach and had granted clemency from death sentences in only very exceptional circumstances. They did not seem inclined to grant it here.

The case eventually made its way up to the Supreme Court of the United States. A stay was granted for several months while they looked at the issue but they could not agree there was sufficient federal constitutional grounds upon which to intercede in the case.

It was clear that once Governor Bush had made a decision, he was going to stick with it. This case left a very bad taste in every ones mouth.

BERNARD F. SHINKMAN
Information Officer
Ottawa (1998-2002)

Bernard F. Shinkman was born in New York City and raised in Vienna. He graduated from Dartmouth College. After entering the Foreign Service in 1978, he served in Accra, Mindanao, London, Belgrade and Ottawa. Mr. Shinkman was interviewed in 2004 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: *You were there from 1998?*

SHINKMAN: 1998 to 2002. Four years.

Q: *Well let's talk about the Canadian press. I know our little organization with our oral histories, a Canadian correspondent here got a hold of our file on Canada. The most innocuous things. But guys were always talking about how sensitive the Canadians were to what Americans did and how it was kind of silly. And this is all of a sudden on the front page: "American diplomats find Canadians sensitive," or something like that.*

SHINKMAN: Canadians are super sensitive. It was interesting, Stu; let me recount a couple of anecdotes that give measure to the relationship. We have a very good friend who was the science and technology officer in Ottawa who served most of his career – he had two or three assignments – in Moscow back before the fall of the Wall. And he said he had never come across anti-Americanism in Moscow as virulent as he experienced in Canada.

My sister-in-law is British by birth, like my wife, and she and her husband live on a farm north of Toronto. We'd gone up for several years and spent summer vacations with them. Had a very pleasant time. Never noticed this anti-Americanism. If you travel and visit on holiday, you just don't notice it. And in retrospect, I don't know how I couldn't have. But you don't. Until we got there. And then we started experiencing the anti-Americanism. It's rife in the press. And it astonishes most Americans. It certainly astonished us. I could deal with it comfortably because most of my interlocutors were smart media people who knew not to say irritating things . . .

Q: *And also, we're used to dealing with hostile governments anyways.*

SHINKMAN: Absolutely. But the people hit hardest were my wife, who attended university while we were there, and my son, who was in prep school there. And he got this anti-American crap in his prep school every day, from other students, from faculty in the school. And you know, we spent a lot of time thinking about it – and I try not to now – trying to figure it out. There have been books and books and books written about it. But it's mostly, I think, the "little brother" syndrome. You know, "take me with you when you go to the dance. Take me with you when you go to the movies. You don't pay enough attention to me. You don't respect me. You don't think I'm important enough. You don't care." And so they will take everything as a slight.

Everything. And it rarely is a slight on our part. But if it is, it is unintentional. We don't have anything against Canadians. But their anti-Americanism can be virulent.

Q: As press officer, could you have rational discussions about the papers' attitude with the people? Or was it sort of a "this is showbiz" or something like that?

SHINKMAN: Well both. Those whom I knew well and whom I respected, I would lunch with regularly. I tried at least once a week to take some journalist to lunch. And we got to know each other pretty well, would have dinner with our wives and that sort of stuff. And those sorts of people, you could have a talk with. And their usual response was – I mean, they are not stupid people; they are not unkind people, basically – “you are being oversensitive to this.” But I wasn't. I mean, if you hear the things that people say, when you first hear them, you think “I must have misheard” or “That person can't have meant what they said. They didn't understand what they were saying.” Well they do, because there is this just virulent anti-Americanism.

They also think that we don't know them, we don't pay attention, so they can say anything. The most conspicuous example was when Prime Minister Jean Chrétien's press secretary called President Bush – what did she call him? – an idiot or a dolt or something. Some harsh, harsh word that she had no business using about any head of government, and she used it in front of the press. No Canadian was surprised – well, they were a little surprised that she was so stupid to do it where it would become so quickly visible – but no one was surprised that she said those words, because I do believe that's the way she felt.

Q: You were there during the whole Monica Lewinsky affair. How was that treated?

SHINKMAN: No. Lewinsky was . . . when was she? Was it '98? Was that the beginning?

Q: I think we're on '98.

SHINKMAN: That's right, because I was in the ops center. So yes, yes, it was going on. I think probably the Canadians reacted less to that than did other Europeans. But I always remember that period – before I went to a post like London or Ottawa I went out of my way to meet all of the Washington correspondents for the major bureaus in that country – and I kept in regular touch with all the Canadian bureau chiefs here in Washington, the bureau chiefs for Canadian media in Washington during my time at post. The thing they found most frustrating about the Lewinsky matter was not the story itself, but that their editors kept them chained to their desks in Washington as long as Lewinsky was in the news. They couldn't leave Washington and they couldn't try to cover this enormous, magnificent, rich country. They had to cover just Lewinsky. And I'm sure journalists around the world, and American journalists, felt the same way.

Q: Yeah. Talk about television and silliness really. You know, nothing like a little sex scandal. It really wasn't that big a deal.

SHINKMAN: Well, certainly not to the French and the Italians and certain other people.

Q: Were there sort of key people in the major newspapers, say the editors who were always

trying to give it an anti-American press? Did this sell papers or was this how they felt or what?

SHINKMAN: I think all of the above. I think it's the way they felt, many of them. It certainly sells newspapers. There are some newspapers that are more conservative. Of course, Conrad Black started a new newspaper called the National Post and that was much more in synch with American views than was the rest of the print media in Canada, which is largely left wing. But it is what Canadians want to read. They want to believe the worst about us. And any news story, if there are two ways to take it, they will want to take it the way that's negative about the United States and prove their own superiority. They are always going on about how they have free health care. Their health care system is close to a state of collapse, but it is still free.

Q: We have Canadian cousins who spend most of their time running down to Rochester or Baltimore to get things they can't get up there.

SHINKMAN: That's right. It's ridiculous. When we left, there were something like ten MRI machines in the country. You would have to wait nine months to get an MRI, so everyone would travel across the border to get their health care.

So the Canadians have this inferiority. You know, they are the little brother. They're one-tenth our population. They like to say that we don't know anything about Canada. But I came to the firm conclusion that they don't know any more about us than we know about them. They know about Washington. They know about Florida, where they spend their summers. And that's about all they know about. Or the border states.

Q: Next month we are going down to visit our Canadian cousins in Ft. Lauderdale.

SHINKMAN: That's right. Snowbirds, as they call them. I always remember, there was one campaign: the U.S. had done something which the Canadians interpreted as being egregiously anti-Canadian – and someone tried to start a campaign to stop snowbirds from flying to Florida for the winter. Well, good luck. They want to be down there, just like we do, in the warm weather. I think practicality trumps politics.

Q: Cuba seems to be the designated neuralgic point that the Canadians keep making a big deal about. They know how to deal with the Cubans. I mean, Chrétien went down there, maybe during your time, and made a bunch of requests and all he got was a raspberry from Castro.

SHINKMAN: Yes. I think they think it's an easy one to do. It's one again where they can disagree with us for very little cost. A lot of Canadians don't realize what's going on on the island. They go to Cuban resorts. You know, you can go to a Cuban resort for dirt cheap fees and have a wonderful time on a sunny beach, not realizing quite what the dictatorship is doing on the rest of the island. So yes, they think it's a no cost thing on which they can disagree with us and show their moral superiority. But Chrétien, yeah, accomplished nothing by going there.

Q: Was this when – I think it was during this time or close to it – when we came up with – it's a double name of a congressional act . . .

SHINKMAN: Helms-Burton.

Q: *Helms-Burton. Were you there then?*

SHINKMAN: Well I was in place during Helms-Burton.

Q: *Did that have any effect. I mean it was basically aimed against Canadians.*

SHINKMAN: Well, yes. It was quite strictly applied, to foreign firms which took advantage of American assets that had been taken over by the Cuban government in Cuba. There were more stringent aspects to the act which the President waives each year which are not applied. But the elements of the act which do apply were fairly limited. There was one company called Sheerin, or something like that, that had moved into an office building and was using the assets of an American corporation that had been taken over by the Cuban government. And so we took them to task about that. We may have even closed down some of their business in the U.S. Some actions were taken, but they were not a lot. It wasn't a big thing. But it gave the Cubans a soap box to stand on and say how they were being more tolerant and understanding than we were.

Q: *Did you notice a difference between, say, Ontario, which I'm told is the seat of this anti-Americanism, and then when you get out to Saskatchewan and Manitoba? It's a whole different world.*

SHINKMAN: Absolutely. I think there is sort of an axis from Ottawa to Toronto, which is the focus of this anti-Americanism. But when you get to the Maritimes – I traveled as much as I could because it's a beautiful country – I didn't find it as much. You get out to Calgary, the oil patch, there are just hard charging businessmen who are either assigned to Calgary or to Houston and they move back and forth, or somewhere in the Middle East, and they just want to get on and do business. And you don't find it nearly as much in the press there. You find it to a certain extent, but not nearly as much in the press. Or in public discourse in Vancouver, British Columbia on the West Coast and Saskatchewan and Alberta, or in the Maritimes. And less actually in the Francophone regions, in Quebec. Quebec is sort of odd because they always want to be different. There's a line about "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." They felt a certain association with us because they disliked the central government in Canada in Ottawa. So there's a funny sort of triangle. But the French Canadians could also be difficult if they wanted to, be superior.

Q: *Well I would think that with the French Canadians you would run into the mirror of the French intellectuals.*

SHINKMAN: A certain amount. But thinking about intellectuals, the other thing you come across the more you spend time in Canada is the number of Americans there who have been there a long time, many of them in academia and in the media, who went to Canada during the Vietnam War. It's a long time ago. But there are people who, maybe in their early twenties in 1973, moved to Canada. Say they were born in '53, they would now be in their middle 50s, or early 50s. (Is that right? Am I doing my arithmetic right? Something like that). And who have burrowed in. Do not readily identify themselves as Americans. Want to be – I don't know if they

want to be – but it appears that they would like to be taken as just another Canadian. And you start slowly to find out that some of these people are American, or American by birth and probably still American citizens. I think particularly in academia there is a strong influence from expatriate Americans who have been teaching up there since they fled the United States in the ‘70s. That’s still an influence. That will wane over time, but I don’t think it’s waning yet.

Q: Showing sort of the American bias, did we really care about this anti-Americanism? Or was this a funny quirk of these people to the north and what the hell?

SHINKMAN: It’s what my mom called when we were children an “attention getting dodge.” It’s an attempt to get our attention. And we don’t really care. I remember going to a talk where someone said that the Mexicans and Canadians vastly overestimate how important they are to us. Yet they’re just not. There is the very important business and trade relationship. And that really is terribly important. It’s actually much more important economically to them than it is to us.

Q: And that goes – I mean it’s like a force of gravity. What people think has nothing to do with business.

SHINKMAN: Yes. Eighty-five percent of their exports come to the United States. Well that’s just an overwhelming dependence of one country on another. Something over forty percent of their GDP is in products that travel south across the border. So, politically the country may not be that important to us. Why they should still be in the G-8 is a major question I think that people ask. I don’t think countries will be removed from the G-8, but it makes you wonder.

Q: Are they that big a commercial power to be there?

SHINKMAN: Where are they? I don’t know where they are in the world. They’ve just been partners with us. I mean, it is an extraordinary successful relationship. It works extremely well. When I say that there are a hundred million people crossing the border each direction every year, almost all those crossings go effortlessly, almost seamlessly. There is hardly ever a problem. So the relationship works very well. They are members with us in NATO. They are, of course, UN members. They’re in the OAS with us. They are in many associations with us and so they are important allies in those fields. And there are ways that they can and are helpful to us in those forums, like the OAS.

Q: Let’s take an example. Say as press officer at country team meetings, or something like this, up comes the fact that The Globe and Mail has a nasty article. Would the ambassador pound and say “How dare they say that?” or was it just sort of shrug . . .

SHINKMAN: You have to let it roll off your back, unless it’s factually wrong or really egregious. But the number of times that the ambassador – and we would generally not do letters to the editor, because I don’t think ambassadors should do letters to the editor - but we would do an op ed piece and say to the newspaper “Would you run this because we think your view on this is out of whack with reality?” But that would happen maybe not more than maybe a couple times a year. The rest of the time you just let it sort of roll off your back. I would call up journalists occasionally and say “This really is wacky stuff” and we would chat about it a while. And I

would hope I made some impact that way. But you were never going to make any progress by. . .

Q: Well again, it comes back to show biz, doesn't it? I'm sure that reporters are hanging around looking for something to show how stupid or brutal we are.

SHINKMAN: Absolutely.

Q: How about the major papers outside of the Ottawa area? Were they different?

SHINKMAN: Well a lot of them belonged to chains. There is a large chain that used to be called the Southam newspapers. I'm not sure if it's still called Southam or not. There are very few large independent newspapers. The Toronto Star is one, and that's actually the largest circulation newspaper in the country, but almost all of its circulation is in Toronto. And then The Globe and Mail of course has national coverage. But most of the other papers in Calgary or in Vancouver or in Halifax are part of a chain, so they get their news from the same set of sources. And they hew pretty much to the same line.

Q: Who was our ambassador while you were there?

SHINKMAN: I had two ambassadors. Gordon Giffen was the ambassador when I arrived. He was a corporate lawyer from Atlanta. Very smart guy who had been very active in the second Clinton campaign. Was credited with having won Georgia for President Clinton, and he was given the posting. Did an exceptionally good job. Good to work with. I enjoyed working with him very much. Very bright guy. Very sensitive. He had actually been raised in Canada. His father was, I think, an insurance executive for one of the multinational insurance companies and had been in Toronto when Ambassador Giffen was in school.

But he was also – given his background as a political operative here in the States – he was very much as a behind the scenes kind of guy. He didn't do a lot of public speaking. He was good at it when he did it, but I never felt he was comfortable doing it. He wasn't a comfortable schmoozer. He had excellent connections in the government, knew all the people he needed to know and was very effective in dealing with them, but kept a lower profile.

After President Bush was elected, for my last year there, he sent up Paul Cellucci, the former governor of Massachusetts, to be ambassador, and he had had decades in public office and was much more comfortable in that sort of environment. He also did a brilliant job and is still doing a brilliant job as ambassador, but with a much, much more public face. Gave a lot more speeches. Was in the news a lot more, because he was comfortable in that environment. And as I said, he did an exceptionally strong job managing this awkward, enormous, relationship.

Q: How were speeches by the ambassador, other than trade?

SHINKMAN: They were received fairly well. Ambassador Cellucci was much more outspoken than Ambassador Giffen was. He said repeatedly in public – that his marching orders from the President when he came to Canada consisted of just one item, which was: Tell the Canadians they need to spend more on defense. They had cut back and back and back, so they had hollowed

out their defense structure. They had, you know, peacekeepers here and there, but really had hollowed out the military.

So Ambassador Cellucci delivered that message repeatedly, effectively, politely but clearly. And that of course hit the press. And of course the immediate reaction was outrage - “Who is this man to come and tell us what we should be doing?” But he was, as I say, always thoughtful, never harangued anybody, and presented the case about why Canada needed to do this. If Canada wanted to be a world player, then it needed to invest and not rely entirely on the United States for its military defense. It needs to have some sort of a defense program.

Q: The time you are talking about, Canada really had a couple of battalions that would go for peacekeeping and, from what I gather, they made a big deal about this. Essentially, they really didn't have much of an armed force.

SHINKMAN: They didn't. And of course they'd have to rely on us to transport their forces overseas. They really, really, had – Jean Chrétien had – really hollowed out the Canadian military. And it was a shame because they have a fine military and a proud heritage. I always remember when General Anthony Zinni, the guy used to be commandant of the Marine Corps, he came up for a talk that I went to. And of course Canadians had become famous as peacekeepers, and still do a fine job as peacekeepers, the Canadian forces. But Zinni told their Ministry of Defense in speeches that they needed to make a decision. If they wanted to be peacekeepers, that's fine, and that's what they will be. But they cannot be both a war fighting military structure and be peacekeepers, because they are very, very different roles and you can't train for both at the same time. You will lose your effectiveness as a military force if. That's entirely a decision for the Canadians to make, but they need to make that decision and not think they can fill both roles at once because they can't.

Q: Were there any crises that you had to deal with?

SHINKMAN: The major one, of course, was 9/11. And the outpouring from the Canadians was just extraordinary. I mean, the outpourings of sympathy and support. It was just a crazy time in the press office. I was in the office almost 24 hours a day for at least the first week. You know, there were countless offers of support. But there was a classic example. You know, we have so much that is similar about the two of us, living in the same continent and speaking the same language. We have a lot of similarities and the Canadians admire the United States in some ways if you get them privately, alone. But the offers to help were extraordinary.

If you remember, briefly, all the flights that were in the air, coming across the Atlantic, were told they could not come into the United States. Many of them, of course, were beyond the point of no return and could not fly back to Europe. So they all landed on the east and west coasts of Canada. Canada opened up all these old airports – there are amazing photographs of old runways, with weeds in them because they had been shut down Air Force Bases, with gleaming 747s and 767s lined up along side them. Thirty thousand foreigners, mostly Americans, landed suddenly in these places ... in these remote outposts in Newfoundland and other places. And the travelers were to be put up in whatever remained of an airport or at a gymnasium or whatever. Well Canadians all got in their cars, drove out to the airports, and said “We want to bring these

people back to our homes and they can stay in our guest rooms and we'll feed them." There was such an outpouring of affection and support that way that we ran out of Americans to give them. We had more offers of help than we had people who needed help.

So the Canadians can come through – clearly they can come through – when the situation calls for it. You would have the occasional – as you did in every country, and I suppose even in this country – you had the occasional rabid left winger who would say “Well, America had it coming to them.” But that was really, really rare in the early months after 9/11.

Q: Were you seeing a concern at the time – wouldn't be particularly in your bailiwick, but you were there – in Islamic fundamentalism?

SHINKMAN: Not very much. The main way that came up was that there has always been a feeling that the border with Canada is porous, and that terrorists would come into Canada – because their immigration rules are less strict than ours – and then slip across the border (tape over, change tape). But there are large Muslim communities in Toronto and to a certain extent in Montreal, but, at least then, Islamic fundamentalism wasn't a major influence that anyone was worried about more than in the Muslim community in Chicago or somewhere like that.

Q: Were the universities – you mentioned that there is this solid core, probably former Americans sitting there pissing on the United States. Did that reflect itself in American studies or anything else like that?

SHINKMAN: An amazing fact that used to always astonish me: you could not get a degree in Canada in any Canadian university – well now you can, in Simon Frazier University – a degree in American studies. Now, you would have thought it was the most logical subject for a major other than math or something to have American Studies because nothing could be more important to Canada than their relationship with the United States. Clearly. But you could not major in American studies. So I think that partly answers the question, that academia doesn't want to study the relationship as seriously as they should.

Q: Just as a last thing, what about your son at prep school? What sort of things was he getting?

SHINKMAN: I'll give you two quick examples and we can discuss it more next time. He came home from school one day and said that his history teacher had taught the class that the American constitution was a racist document. I said “My God, what are you talking about?” Well, I know what he was talking about, the clauses that say that an African American is three-fifths of a man. And I called the teacher absolutely outraged and I said “That's an element of our history that we have been struggling with for 250 years and doing darn well on, making progress on. It's something that no one thinks is right. They did at the time. No one in their right mind today certainly thinks of it as supportable. We've been working to correct it. To call the document, which is one of the most liberating documents in the history of the world, along with the Magna Carta perhaps, to call it a racist document to teenagers when you know that they're just taking shorthand notes in their notebook is highly irresponsible. The students are going to write ‘U.S. constitution = racist’ and they are not going to put any context. And racist is such a late 20th century, early 21st century adjective, that it's just not right.” And the guy – we had a

nice talk – said he completely understood my point of view and said he would stop teaching it.

The other one, where I was less successful, was where a social studies teacher had taught in Paul's class that American treatment of blacks was equivalent to Hitler's treatment of the Jews. And I was absolutely outraged. I called her, and I said "How can you say that? There is a history of abuse and segregation that we have been struggling to improve and have improved and continue to work to improve for generations. Comparing that to a system that was set up to eliminate a race of people, that's so unfair it's just not right." She was, in fact, from a family that had survived the holocaust, which made it all the more bizarre to me. She was not to be moved. She said "Nope." She said it was genocide or, I don't know what noun she used, but . . .

Q: Well was this a regular school?

SHINKMAN: It was a very elite prep school. It was the smartest prep school in Ottawa, called Ashbury.

Q: Were you able to sort of make this stand known to the authorities?

SHINKMAN: We did. And they were very responsive. The administration was very responsive. We met with the headmaster individually, my wife and I. And we met with their counselor, who was, interestingly, a Ghanaian-Canadian. Brilliant guy, very respected by the students. And both of them were very effective. The headmaster called a student assembly and talked to them about anti-Americanism. And obviously most of the bile that these kids were laying on my son was stuff that they brought from home. You know, the kids didn't think this stuff up. So the administration was very responsive. The teachers, as I've demonstrated, some of them were responsive, some of them weren't. And it was hard on my son.

It was the only time, Stu, in my whole career, when I came close to curtailing an assignment. One night when my son came home with one of these outrageous stories, my wife and I talked about it and I said to Paul at dinner, "If you want to leave here, I'll put in my papers tomorrow. Even if I have to resign from the Foreign Service, I'm not going to have you subjected to this." He said, "Let me think about it overnight." He was only sixteen at the time. And in the morning he said "You know, I'm not going to let them chase me away." He worked with a counselor and was taught some good ways to deal with this stuff. And he formed a group of friends who were not that way and he got through it and had a happy senior year. But his junior year was very difficult.

End of reader