

KENYA

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GEORGE F. BOGARDUS
Consular Officer
Mombasa (1944-1945)

George F. Bogardus was born in Iowa in 1917 and graduated from Harvard University in 1939. He served in the U.S. Army in 1941 and joined the Foreign Service in 1941. In addition to Algeria, Mr. Bogardus served in Canada, Kenya,

Czechoslovakia, Algeria, Germany, and Vietnam. He was interviewed on April 10, 1996 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: In 1944, you're off to Mombasa, is that right?

BOGARDUS: That's right.

Q: Did you go there? How did you get there?

BOGARDUS: Well, it was the dead of winter and Montreal was very cold at that point. I was to go by RCAF (Royal Canadian Air Force) to fly from Dorval Airport in Montreal non-stop to Rabat, Morocco. It turned out it was a DC-3, the workhorse. I got out there at 12:30, according to schedule, to the airport. They put me off and put me off, "Another two hours... Another two hours." Eventually, we didn't get off until 11:45 p.m. There was one other passenger, a British RAF officer who had had medical treatment. We huddled in blankets because there was no heating and so forth. I looked out the window and felt very much reassured because we were not crossing going southeast across Maine, we were going northeast down to Newfoundland or Labrador. That's where we landed at Goose Bay, Newfoundland with only three of the four engines going. We had to lay-up there for 24 hours while a replacement engine was flown from Montreal.

Q: It must have been a C-24, I think, or something.

BOGARDUS: It's the kind of plane that worked for decades. The crew were half American pilots and half Canadian, but in the RCAF Transport Command. We sat around for about 30 hours, getting a new engine flown up there. In the course of that, the chief pilot, who was from Texas, said, "You know what? There were two of those engines that were new replacements and had to be tested before we left. We were uncertain of them, but at 11 o'clock in the evening, the British Air Vice marshal called me up and said, 'Captain, look, if you don't get that aircraft off the ground by midnight, I'll court martial you.'" So, we landed with three after a motor failed. We got another motor there. Then the flight was to go from Goose Bay, nonstop to Rabat. After we had passed the Azores islands, once again the other replacement engine conked out. We just barely limped into Rabat with three engines again. We would never possibly have made it unless they'd changed those engines.

Then the RAF took over, flew me to Algiers. I saw my colleagues there. Then, the Air Transport Command of the US Air Force flew me to Cairo. From Cairo, I went south by a slow flying boat. The British military had a courier plane service carrying diplomatic pouches, maybe two planes, which flew from there without any wheels, all the way to Johannesburg. It took two and a half days to get to Mombasa, flying up the Nile and across the great Sudd in Sudan, which is a huge swamp, then down to the Indian Ocean. After I was in Mombasa, one of my duties was to meet this courier plane. The American courier would be on it going south and then coming back north. So, twice a week, I would meet that plane. It was very peculiar.

Q: You were in Mombasa from when to when?

BOGARDUS: It was beginning February 1944 until the first of January, 1945. I was drafted a second time. That's why I had to leave. I came back on the only thing available, a slow boat, a Victory freighter.

Q: Let's talk about Mombasa. Mombasa, was this part of South Africa at that time or part of Portugal?

BOGARDUS: It was the main port of the British Colony called Kenya (pron. Keenya) at that time, on the Indian Ocean. Now it's called Kenya and it faces east. At that time, there were only 1,500 white people there and 120,000 blacks and Asians. But it was also the headquarters of the Royal Navy Indian Ocean Fleet. The Royal Navy felt that it was too risky--they couldn't stay in Singapore, obviously, and then even Trincomalee in Ceylon was too dangerous for them even.

I know about the population figures because the British colonial authorities rationed food to restrict imports and shipping. No immigration was allowed, including from upcountry. There were three sets of rations, one each for Europeans, Asians (Hindus, Sikhs, Goanese), and Africans.

Q: Singapore had been bombarded by the Japanese.

BOGARDUS: Well, they went all the way across to the western side of the Indian Ocean there, to Africa. We had to look after some missionaries from the United States. I did all sorts of things. I ran the household, for one thing, with five various kinds of Africans: Kikuyus and Coastal Arabs (very dark skinned), and Muslim and Pagans. It was very exotic, extremely exotic.

Q: How many officers were there?

BOGARDUS: Two.

Q: Who was your Consul?

BOGARDUS: Joseph Touchette. I think he came from Providence, French Canadian descent, a typical French Canadian name. Joseph Irene Touchette.

Q: You say you were doing the administrative chores, but were there any consular problems that were particularly involved?

BOGARDUS: No. We registered a few births. The British were nervous that American missionary Jehovah's Witnesses were subversive. There were two U.S. Navy officers there, and three yeomen, who were liaison with the Royal Navy. The only other thing was, the Gripsholm came through with all the people (over a hundred) being exchanged back from Japanese occupied areas. There was a dreadful rain that day. It was a monsoon. We had to do our best to keep these people occupied in our house, (one sole toilet).

The only other really sticky problem we had was that one day, in our office, which was on the second floor, five big black Americans came in in Army khaki and topee sun helmets, but no

insignia. The five of them had a lot of luggage, too, with boots and so forth. They were definitely Americans, all well-educated. The head man came in and addressed us and said, "I'm Colonel So and So" and produced these orders that they were to proceed to Addis Ababa (all five of them). All American authorities were enjoined to help them in whatever way we possibly could. Well, that was fine except that from Mombasa, or even Nairobi, to Addis Ababa is 1,000-1200 miles through virgin territory via Kismayu, Somaliland, which has become much more familiar to Americans lately. The tricky part was that no local hotel (there was no really good hotel there at all) would take them and we couldn't accommodate them in our house. We had only two bedrooms. To survive you need mosquito nets in places like that, too. Eventually, the British Army agreed, "Well, we'll take care of them." They did take care of them in a decent little camp outside of Mombasa, which they had been using as a transit point for the King's African Rifles going to Burma, and it was empty at the time. Anyway, our airmen were out there, and our Negro officers were in good shape for the time being. Two days later, we got a telephone call Sunday morning at eight o'clock. It was a British police officer, who said, "There's a certain Mr. (I forget the name) I have with me." I said, "Yes?" He said, "He's one of that group of five." I said, "Yes?" He said, "Well, he's causing a disturbance." I said, "What's so disturbing?" He said, "Well, he's going around the souks and the bazaars with lots of money and he's wearing shoes. All the natives are beginning to get in a hubbub about this, because they've never encountered a well-to-do black man. Won't you please come and take him back?" I had to do that. Fortunately, the British Army arranged for the group to go up to Nairobi and get on a convoy of British Army trucks going to Addis Ababa, and they were gone. It was terribly embarrassing to us, but we couldn't really do anything to change the situation. The segregation and race distinction was so strong at that point. The authorities feared a recurrence of a stevedore strike of a year before. Also, they were nervous about our American Jehovah's Witness missionaries in the back country, including Tanganyika.

Q: Well, those captured the era. Were there any seamen problems?

BOGARDUS: Yes, we had one minor boatswain or something like that died in his bunk on a US freighter. The smell of ammonia there was such that he probably had imbibed too much of that, and alcohol. I had to see that he was properly attended to and his remains taken care of and everything sealed up, and so forth. We put him back on the ship. They did have cold storage on the ship and that's where they put him. The same ship took him back. Burial or ship cold storage within 24 hours was the limit in that climate.

EDWARD W. MULCAHY
Principal Officer
Mombasa (1947-1949)

Ambassador Edward W. Mulcahy received a degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in 1943. Within eight weeks of the bombing of Pearl Harbor, he enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. At the end of World War II, Ambassador Mulcahy joined the Foreign Service. In addition to serving in Germany, he served in Kenya, Ethiopia, Southern Rhodesia,

Tunisia, Nigeria, and Chad. Ambassador Mulcahy was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 23, 1989.

MULCAHY: They said, "Well, we're sorry. There just isn't a vacancy. They don't need a new third secretary or vice consul at any of the fairly few posts we had in the Arab world at that time. But we'll send you to Mombasa because we've heard that in Swahili down there, there's a great deal of Arabic and you might start to become familiar with Arabic through Swahili."

Anyway, I went to Mombasa by way of the Cape of Good Hope. I spent 62 days on a Victory ship which belonged to the American South African Lines, now called Farrell Lines, and went all around the Cape of Good Hope stopping at everything from Walvis Bay clear around to Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar and then finally Mombasa. There was great congestion in the ports of Africa in those days and, even for small amount of cargo, you'd have to spend a great deal of time--three or four days--before you could get alongside, or, in case of a very crowded port like Durban, five days before you could come alongside.

In those days that was a bit extraordinary to spend two months getting to your post, but, on the other hand, the Division of African Affairs had encouraged me to take this trip and go by sea, not to fly. Personnel wanted me to fly.

Q: Because you'd be dealing with shipping affairs anyway, wouldn't you? Were you the sole Foreign Service officer in Mombasa?

MULCAHY: It was a one-man post. It was supposed to have been a two-man post. During the war we had representatives from the War Shipping Administration, from various other civilian agencies, plus the Navy, all with people attached to the consulate. It was supposed to be a two-man consulate. The poor officer in charge, Bill (J. William) Henry, had been left there, four years, two years all by himself, so tied down that he hadn't even seen Nairobi, 300 miles away. He was so conscientious he never got off the coast in all that time. One after the other the people assigned to replace him politicked their way out of the assignment when they read the horrendous post report about living conditions there. I think in those days a lot of the post reports were written to justify keeping the unhealthy-post status, which meant an 18-months tour.

Q: As long as we're doing this for researchers, they should read post reports with a certain amount of skepticism because it's not just a plea, saying this is the way it is in such and such a place, but it was also to make sure that you got special allowances, etc.

MULCAHY: I think that hasn't been quite so true in recent years because you . . .

Q: Recently they've changed it, but this is up through the 1960s and 1970s, until they finally came down and sent other people out to write them or something like that.

MULCAHY: That's true. But Mombasa was nowhere near as bad as I thought it was going to be.

Q: What were our concerns there? What type of work were you doing?

MULCAHY: It was a terminal port for Robin Lines, American South African Lines, Moore-McCormick Lines--and Lykes Brothers. These were all separate shipping companies. Some of them have since been amalgamated with other lines. We had in those days--you won't believe it--a lot of tramp steamers under the American flag. We had a very large merchant marine and an enormous surplus of shipping, Liberty and Victory ships built in World War II, that were plying the waters of the world going after cargo wherever it was available, often with non-American crews, but still flying the U. S. flag. We had important shipping interests then and extensive exports. In those days we also had consular invoices, which you may not remember.

Q: It stopped the year I came into the Foreign Service.

MULCAHY: That's just about right. But during 1947, 1948 and 1949 we issued consular invoices. It became a two-man post while I was there. They sent out a staff vice-consul and left me in charge less than two months after I reached the post and I stayed in charge for the next 14 months until my tour was up. We would write consular invoices on zoo animals, on minerals, on coffee, on papain extracted from papaya in Kenya that was used to tenderize meat products, the extract of the African daisy which went for insecticides such as the popular DDT in those days. There were millions of dollars worth of exports from East Africa including coffee and tea and there were large quantities of that. There were also American expeditions arriving frequently and I was able to be helpful to at least three that arrived in my day there.

Q: These were exploring expeditions?

MULCAHY: They weren't explorers; the era for that had passed. We did have Commander Attilio Gatti, whose books I had read as a boy, books on Africa, who posed as an explorer in the eyes of the world. But he was really a commercial type and was sponsored by various manufacturers, including Hallicrafter Radios. He was to make the first radio broadcast from the top of Kilimanjaro. I had never had the time to climb Kilimanjaro but, in those days, being in good health I could have climbed it without any problem at all. You can drive up to within 5,000 feet of the summit and in two easy days or one overnight stop on the way, you can get up to the top of Kilimanjaro. It's nothing more than about a 45-degree slope. It's not in the Everest category. But his enemies and creditors, who were legion, sent a Sikh with a ham radio on his back up there the day before to make the first broadcast from the top of Kilimanjaro.

Q: Looking at this at the time, how did we see Kenya? Was it always going to be the way it was or did we see it changing or did we care?

MULCAHY: Well, before leaving the Department I talked to Joseph Palmer II, who had spent four years in Nairobi during the war and was delighted with anybody going to Kenya, about that. He told me over coffee in the little snack bar in the basement of the then new State Department building when I said, "Well, now, what about policy in East Africa?" My district included Tanganyika, Zanzibar Protectorate, Mauritius and the Seychelles Islands besides the Kenya Protectorate--the coast of Kenya up to ten miles from high-water mark--and the Coast Province of Kenya beyond that. Joe said, "Basically, we come down on the anti-colonial side. We think that some day--maybe not in our lifetime but eventually--those people should be prepared for

independence. The Africans should run that whole continent by themselves." That was about the extent of my briefing on policy matters.

Q: That was 1947 to 1949.

MULCAHY: 1947, yes.

EDWARD MARKS
Economic/Commercial Officer
Nairobi (1960-1962)

Ambassador Edward Marks was born in Chicago in 1934, and received his BA from the University of Michigan. He served in the US Army from 1956 to 1958. Entering the Foreign Service in 1959, his postings included Nairobi, Nuevo Laredo, Luanda, Lusaka, Brussels, Lubumbashi and Colombo, with ambassadorships to Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on August 12, 1996.

Q: No, but at least understanding parts of the United States. Then you got this telephone call saying you were going to Nairobi. This, of course, again was high Africa. The Kennedy Administration was just coming in. Everybody was thinking Africa. I remember I put in for Africa and ended up in Saudi Arabia instead. But this as considered where things are.

MARKS: I was not unhappy once I got over that first reaction. You are quite right, it was to be high adventure.

Q: You were in Nairobi from when to when?

MARKS: I got there just between Christmas and New Years of 1960 and left just before New Years' Eve of 1962.

Q: What were you doing?

MARKS: I was a junior economic/commercial officer, in a two officer economic/commercial section.

Q: Can you describe the embassy at that time?

MARKS: Nairobi was a consulate general as Kenya did not get its independence until after I left, in 1963. To me of course it was all so new. Although not an embassy, it was a reasonable size post for Africa for those days. There was the Consul General, of course, a Deputy Principal Officer, two officers in the economic/commercial section, one or two in the consular section, a CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] section of about 3 people, a labor/political officer, and of course an Administrative Officer and a communications section (actually two; one State and one

CIA). There were also USIS [United State Information Service] and USAID [United States Agency for International Development] Missions. About a dozen American officers plus American staff, but it was very high profile. Interestingly, both the senior economic officers during my assignment were women, FSOs who dated back to World War II. We had had the post there for over thirty years and Kenya and Nairobi were well known and even glamorous places - what with Hemingway and the movies and all. Nairobi was quite a city in those days, really a glorious place, the major city between Cairo and the Cape and everyone was there, consulates, airlines, banks, journalists, etc. The whole eastern side of the continent was covered or serviced by governments or companies out of Nairobi.

Q: This is where the phrase, Are you married or are you from Kenya arose?

MARKS: That dates back from the thirties, the white settlers days. It was still very much a white settler country, although it was actually the end of the line.

Q: This was the time of the winds of change with Kenyatta.

MARKS: The phrase was actually coined by a British official, the Prime Minister I believe. Kenyatta was incarcerated when I arrived and was released just before I left.

Q: What had happened to the Mau Mau uprising?

MARKS: The Mau Mau rebellion had been essentially crushed several years earlier, by 1958. There were still Mau Mau hiding in the Abadare Forest and, of course, lots of them in jail. There was still some nervousness among the British, but basically the rebellion had been over for a couple of years.

Although independence - or the "Winds of Change" as a British Prime Minister characterized it - was clearly imminent, Kenya was still very much a British colony with only whites in Government House and young officers of Her Majesty's Guards regiments available for parties. As I mentioned, there were still over 30,000 Europeans (that meant Europeans, Americans, South Africans, Latins, and I believe even Japanese) in the country, plus well over 300,000 Asians, largely descendants of laborers imported from the Indian sub-continent in the early days of the colony. But the core of the society were the 1,500 or so white settlers who owned the farms or ranches. They were unusual for many reasons, but the most important was that they were - by and large - from a social class "at home" equal if not superior to the officials who served in Government House which is, I believe a unique situation in the colonial world where officials always looked down on the lower class merchants and farmers of the private sector. It was this class of white settlers who created the image of romantic Kenya mentioned so often in English novels of the '30s. They used to say, vis-a-vis the white settlers of Rhodesia that "Kenya was settled by the officers mess, Rhodesia by other ranks." This class consciousness, this arrogance of the English country gentry class, it should be noted, was picked up by Black Kenyans who persisted after independence in wearing Saville Row suits while their peers around Africa experimented with various forms of "authentic" African garments. I remember several years later running across a Nairobi paper showing Tom Mboya and several other worthies of the government wearing dark suits and bowlers hats to the annual Nairobi agricultural fair - always a

very posh and social event.

Anyway, I had a new British sportscar and wore a dinner jacket there as much as I have at any post I have ever been in. The best nightclub in Nairobi, the Equator Club, required black tie on Saturday night, unless, of course, you were brought by your white hunter. I was present the night the Equator Club was integrated when Tom Mboya showed up with a party of black Kenyans. It had obviously been arranged with the manager, Ron Partridge, and the members of the party were all in black tie or appropriate female equivalent.

There was also a huge Asian community of over 300,000 in the country - mostly from the Subcontinent. I was struck by how the society resembled eastern Europe of the last century. There was a defined aristocracy (all whites), an "outcast elite" (Asians playing the role of the Jews of Eastern Europe), and the great mass of peasants (all black Africans).

There was a large consular corps, with about 40 career consular missions. Many international people, including a remarkably large number of Japanese. There were many restaurants of different cuisines, and a very active social whirl. All in all, Nairobi was a very cosmopolitan as well as attractive city, much more than one would have expected of an African colonial city of about 350,000. Being the last days of the Raj combined with the expectation of African independence gave it a certain heightened air.

Q: Were you under any particular instructions or limited in your contacts as you went about your work?

MARKS: No, in no way except for the social restrictions still extant among the British, but that was beginning to break down. Being an economic/commercial officer I focused essentially on the white and the Asian communities. The Asians were basically the middle class, owning or running most of the small to medium size businesses, while white people were either farmers, professional, or employees of large companies, - in addition of course to providing the officer or official level of the government and the security forces.

Q: When you say Asian, you mean?

MARKS: Indian and Pakistani largely, although they all - or rather their ancestors - had come from what was then the India of the British Empire. They had been imported as laborers on the railway at the end of the 19th century, and had prospered as a merchant and petit fonctionnaire class, with the second third generations also reaching for professional status. Among them were some very serious industrialists like the Madovanis of Uganda.

Q: What were American commercial interests and what did you do?

MARKS: First of all there were the transportation companies, TWA and Lykes Lines, as Mombasa and Nairobi were regional entrepots. Kenya was a major exporter of coffee and tea, and there was the beginning of the tourist industry. The Consulate General had been in operation for many years and had always done a certain amount of low-key commercial work. With independence looming in Kenya and in Africa in general, there was a growing interest in market

penetration with the expectation that the colonial restrictions and Imperial preferences would [be abolished]. You will remember that there was a great deal of enthusiasm and optimism about the future of Africa in those days. In reality there were some openings; I remember the Dymo man came through with his new invention for labeling and packaging equipment. He did well. There was a small American business community resident in Nairobi, but basically it was very much traditional marketing within the British colonial situation. Of course, we did macro-economic reporting as well, and the interest in that grew as independence approached.

Q: I was the commercial officer in Dhahran just about this time, a slight overlap, and I had never done this before and was rather wide-eyed. But in retrospect, I found American business wasn't very good at this market penetration, particularly small businesses. They had their headquarters up in Brussels or Geneva and maybe somebody would show up. We put out trade opportunities and never heard a word. You very seldom got anybody down there.

MARKS: Yes, I had much the same experience. Nairobi was a little bit better because it was the major commercial and financial entrepot for half of Africa. If you were on-site anywhere in the eastern half of Africa at all, and that included Central Africa and the eastern Congo, you were bound to be in Nairobi: consulates, banks, airlines, shipping companies, distributors.

Q: What was the feeling in the business community about the end of British rule and independence?

MARKS: There was a whole spectrum of attitudes. The traditional Brits and some other long-time European residents were opposed but becoming resigned (although they predicted chaos and catastrophe). Others, newer types like the Japanese, were saying, "Well this may open up things, let's see how it goes. There may be new opportunities here." By and large, the foreigners who favored "Africa for the Africans" were not in the business community, and that included American businessmen.

Q: What was the situation in Tanzania.

MARKS: Similar in many respects but with some differences as Tanganyika, as it was then called, was not actually a British colony but a League of Nations mandate. The British "claim", if you wish, therefore was not as clear-cut. Also, while there were very few British settlers of the Kenya type, and they did not have the social prominence and economic weight as in Kenya. We had a separate consulate general in Dar Es Salaam. The U.S. interest in Tanzania was based on the same perspectives as in Kenya and Uganda, indeed in all of Africa, with two particular twists: because it was part of the East African Community (EAC - a British experiment in regionalization), and third because of the prominence of Julius Nyerere, everyone's favorite African liberation leader of the time.

In the Consulate General in Nairobi, we were reporting on the East African Community as well as Kenyan national affairs; particularly communications, transportation, and of course the future of regionalism. Much of the agriculture and industry in fact was regional: tea, coffee, and light industry developed by Asian industrialists in Uganda for instance. This was in addition to the regional commercial, transportation, and communication business. But as there were US consular

posts at Kampala and Dar Es Salaam, we in Nairobi had to be a little careful about crossing turf lines. However as the headquarters of the EAC was physically located in Nairobi we spent a good team of time on it, asking whether it survive, would it not grow?

In the end it did not survive independence very long. There have been some efforts recently to revive it but there is very little chance. It was an interesting innovation by the British but it was too late in many respects, and the new emerging African political class saw it as a colonial relic. Nyerere broke it up as soon as he could. A pity.

Q: Was Nyerere a name by then?

MARKS: Very much so, clearly destined to be the leader of and independent Tanganyika and a major voice in the African independence movement.

Q: Did you the feeling that the consulate general was making any approach to people like Tom Mboya and trying to position itself?

MARKS: More than the feeling; it was what were doing. Mboya and others were being solicited by us, as well as others. By the time I arrived we had, as a government and a diplomatic post, pretty much aligned ourselves on the side of African independence.

Q: This was the time of Kennedy and we were making quite an effort to reach out to the emerging African community.

MARKS: Definitely. That policy was well launched before I got there and before the arrival earlier that year of the Consul General.

Q: Who was he?

MARKS: Richard Freund. One of the first things he did after his arrival was to remove the white/black signs from the restrooms on our two floors of an office building. We were definitely and openly trying to reach out to Africans. The Agency was clearly cultivating them and probably had Mboya on their payroll by then.

Q: By Agency you mean the CIA.

MARKS: Yes. The Consulate General had by then long desegregated our social invitations. We had especially opened up to the Asian community, which had formed a separate segregated social element by itself not too many years. The Asians were extremely important part of society; numbering about 400,000 in a count of about 6 million, they constituted the largest part of what were the small and medium sized business community, and the lower ranks of the civil service and security services. They were increasingly important among the professional groups such as lawyers and doctors. One interesting political experiment was the attempt to form a multi-racial political party committed to independence, called the Zebra Party. Although obviously well received by "progressive Europeans" it never really got off the ground.

Q: How did you find Freund? He was your first leader overseas.

MARKS: He was an interesting and competent officer, but introverted and ungenerous. He was fairly young for his rank and position and had entered the Foreign Service as a Wristonee.

Q: Which means someone who had come into the Foreign Service from the Civil Service.

MARKS: Yes, about eight or nine years before coming to Nairobi. He had obviously had a very successful career as a civil servant after the war, had transferred to State as a GS-15 [Government Service rank 15, a pay grade], and quickly moved to the old FSO-1 [the equivalent Foreign Service officer pay grade] just prior to being appointed CG [consul general] in Nairobi. At 44 or 45 he was sent out to be Consul General in one of the major African countries with independence likely to occur on his watch. He had the diplomatic equivalent of a marshal's baton in his knapsack.

He was a big, good looking man, who wore beautiful, transatlantic cut suits from England.

As for me, I was bright eyed and bushy tailed and as innocent as could be. In the end he was not very satisfied with me; there were several incidents which in retrospective are not particularly complimentary to me but reveal his lack of generosity and leadership qualities as well. What is most pertinent, I think, to this oral history is that he did not perform the leadership mentoring role to the puppy dog of a junior officer that I was. My faults and shortcomings were largely due to my youth and inexperience and he did not make the effort which I think was required by his rank and position. It may have been a question of personality as anything else. He was not a warm or sympathetic man, which is not a criticism but an observation. He was very ambitious, and a snob, carefully hiding his own American immigrant antecedents (second generation German Jewish I would guess) under his suits, his rank, and his Swedish aristocratic (second) wife. (She was actually quite a nice lady, but much under his thumb). He was not popular with most of his staff but I did not realize how unpopular until later.

Although very bright, Freund really lacked good judgment. For instance, he got into competition and then a quarrel with the head of the newly opened office of the African-American Institute, a well-know American non-governmental organization [NGO]. This man was quite well-known in American and African political circles, having been heavily involved in the pro-independence activities of the 1950s, and had opened up the office in Nairobi in order to be on the ground as independence approached. It was the AAI which organized the so-called Kennedy student airlift from Kenya - a hundred students who traveled by special charter to go to U.S. universities. Freund somehow got himself into competition with this man (whose name I have forgotten), to the point that Freund formally ordered his staff not to appear at the opening ceremony of the AAI office. This was crazy and a scandal, as well as professionally suicidal for Freund as the AAI was very tight with the Kennedy Administration. I don't fault Freund for having differences of opinion with the AAI or with the Administration for that matter, but how do you allow yourself to get into a public debate with another American (especially a prominent one) and then forbid the American official staff to show up at the inauguration of the local office of a prominent pro-African American NGO? By the way, none of us could figure out any substantive basis for the quarrel. Needless to say, Freund lost that fight and was withdrawn from Nairobi shortly

thereafter. He never got his embassy, a development which was discussed with pleasure by several of his staff whenever they ran into each other over the years. The ambition and desire of becoming an ambassador is normal and natural in the Foreign Service, but Freund's lust was excessive and his failure seemed to be the judgement of a just God - or so some of us thought. He flew back to Washington to become a special assistant on arms control or something and retired a few years later.

It was all the result of bad judgement, arising out of personality traits. There was little of a substantive or policy nature involved. That is what I mean by bad judgment. Of course, it was all happening above my level, but Freund ruined himself. As for me, he did me some harm, although I am quite sure some of his comments about my performance in Nairobi were valid. I don't fault him on that, but I maintain he failed in his responsibility as a senior officer, and the Post's Principal Officer, to make an effort to train and direct me. I was the most junior officer at Post, and on my first foreign tour. He obviously did not see that he had any responsibility in that respect.

Q: You left there in 1962?

MARKS: December, 1962.

JOHN HOGAN
Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Nairobi (1963-1965)

Mr. Hogan was born in Maine, graduated from Mercer University, after which he served in the U.S. Merchant Marines. After World War II he went into the radio business in Portland, Maine before joining the U.S. Information Agency in 1949. He has served in a number of posts abroad including Cairo, Dar es Salaam, Nairobi, Tripoli and Saigon. He was interviewed by Michael Brown in 1988.

HOGAN: After a two-and-a-half year tour there, I was transferred to Kenya as the PAO in that country. That country was a year away from independence, so I had the unique experience of serving in Tanzania or Tanganyika, as it was called then, a year before independence, and a year after; and the same in Kenya, a year before independence and a year after.

So, all told, I spent almost five years in East Africa.

Q: What were your impressions of Africa at that time?

HOGAN: Well, those were exciting days, you know. We watched this country become independent and the people who ran it, who were supposedly non-corruptible, little by little go down the slippery slope. Tanganyika never has fulfilled all of the hopes that we, in the Western World, thought it would achieve after independence because of, I believe, President Nyerere's African socialism, as he called it.

He was very fond of the idea of socialism and he would -- you could talk to him and, incidentally, that was one of the more interesting thoughts of serving in East Africa, you could talk very frequently face-to-face with the leader of the country.

It was not at all like Egypt, where, of course, if you saw Gamal Abdel Nasser in some military parade, that was as close as you got to him. The only people who ever saw him at the Embassy were the ambassador and maybe the deputy chief of mission or something like that.

But we had access to the cabinet ministers in Tanzania--well, Tanganyika--as it was called. Incidentally, it did not become Tanzania until it merged with Zanzibar and that is where the name came from, Tanzania.

Q: Yes, you followed, of course, you were there at the time when the British were moving out because they were certainly influential in both of those countries. Was there still a lot of British influence in Kenya and Tanzania during your time?

HOGAN: Oh, there was, indeed, a lot of British influence. However, there was more in Kenya than there was in Tanzania. In Tanzania, the British had had that as a colony only since the end of World War I, whereas in Kenya they had settled that as early as 1902, and so on. I think that is when they started building a railway from Mombasa up to Kenya and then further on to Uganda.

However, they encouraged settlers to come to Kenya, which they never did in Tanzania or Tanganyika. Tanganyika was not a colony by any means. It was a trust territory of the United Nations. So, they really did not have quite the free hand there that they had in Kenya.

E. GREGORY KRYZA
Administrative Officer
Nairobi (1963-1967)

Ambassador E. Gregory Kryza was born in Michigan on March 12, 1922. He served in the U.S. Navy extensively. He was a U.S. Naval attaché in Tangier, Morocco. After joining the Foreign Service, he served in Washington, DC in the Near East Bureau and was Director of African Affairs. Ambassador Kryza also served in Nairobi, Kinshasa, and Mauritania. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 14, 1988

KRYZA: The Messageries Maritimes, the French line that serviced the Indian Ocean. We sailed through the Suez Canal. My children enjoyed that immensely. We spent a day in Djibouti. And I recall my younger son saying, "Dad, is this Africa?" And I said, "yes, this is Africa." And he said, "let's go back home." But be that as it may we arrived in Mombasa and flew on to Nairobi where we had four, almost five years of one of the most interesting assignments that I've had.

Q: Could you describe the situation as you saw it in Nairobi when you got there?

KRYZA: As I say, we arrived in March of 1963, which was nine months before independence, the normal gestation period. Jomo Kenyatta was still languishing in jail.

Q: He was really in jail. I had forgotten that.

KRYZA: Still in jail.

Q: He was still in jail.

KRYZA: In fact, the story was that the British were deliberately trying to make him into an alcoholic by almost force feeding him whatever he wanted to drink. The situation, especially in the light of what had happened over the past two years in the Belgian Congo, now called Zaire, the British settlers in Kenya were obviously a little concerned. There were some good things about it from our point of view. One could buy real estate dirt cheap, but one had to have cash on the barrel. I did convince the Foreign Buildings Office that now was the time to buy some property. And they did, which is rather unusual for the FBO people to do. We bought five or six very choice pieces of property, residential properties, which have probably increased in value at least ten-fold, more than that I'm sure, in the last 25 years.

But independence came on December 12th without too much of a hitch. I'm not sure of the exact sequence, but it all happened within three to four weeks of independence. Incidentally, Tanganyika and Zanzibar, which in those days before independence were treated as two separate countries, had obtained their independence either just before, within a matter of days, or just after Nairobi. I'll have to check my records to see how it happened.

Shortly after independence there was a minor rebellion, a military rebellion in Kenya. The British wasted no time in sending back some paratroopers and put law and order back in. There was still a tremendous power struggle going on within Kenya as between Kenyatta and his political party and the man we refer to as Mr. Double O, Oginga Odinga, who was somewhat of a radical, probably supported by the Soviets. But there was a much more serious event that took place in Zanzibar. There was an uprising both in Tanganyika, still called Tanganyika, and in Zanzibar.

Let me go back just a second. At independence we agreed with the Kenyans that we would not have a military presence there. We would not have a military attaché, a defense attaché. Nor would we ever become involved in military aid, because the Kenyans felt that if they gave us permission to do that they would have to give the same kinds of permission to other countries, the Soviets and perhaps the PRC and they weren't willing to do that. As a result, I happened to be the only officer at the post who had had some naval experience. Mombasa was a Port of Call for the Navy. And it was my very pleasant duty to go down to Mombasa every time before a naval visit, do all the administrative arrangements and protocol arrangements. There was a British liaison office in Mombasa.

The point I'm trying to make is at any given moment there were usually U.S. naval ships in the area. So when things erupted in Zanzibar the destroyer USS Manley was in the area. And we from the American Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya in effect gave the Manley its instructions. We maneuvered the Manley. The Manley brought--his name was Piccard, our Consul General--and his family. We used the Manley to evacuate U.S. citizens from Zanzibar, brought them into Dar es Salaam in Tanganyika.

It was a very hairy experience. It was either just before Christmas or right after Christmas. It was during that. It was an all-hands evolution for the people in the Embassy. And I must say everyone at the Embassy involved did an excellent job.

Q: Well, let's talk a little about this. How did this work? There was a crisis in a country, a neighboring country where obviously you had the best means of helping them? But what could you do other than say to the Manley, go get them?

KRYZA: That's about all. The U.S. missions both in Zanzibar and Dar es Salaam were out of business for all intents. They did not have the communications capability. At the time of independence the Department of State had decided that Nairobi would be sort of the regional, and still is, the regional center for East Africa, that is the Regional Security Officer was in Nairobi, the Regional Labor Officer, etcetera and etcetera.

Also we had a regional communications. Nairobi had the link with the rest of the world and Zanzibar, Uganda and Tanganyika had feeder lines into Nairobi. So we were the communications hub. Anything coming from those posts had to be relayed through us. Their only alternative was to go through the British or through the local post office. That's why we were so heavily involved, because we were, among other things, the communication link. We also sent officers to Dar es Salaam because the post was a relatively small one, understaffed. In fact, our DCM, Jim Ruchti, went there for a couple of weeks. And a more junior officer, a fellow named Dave Segal, acquitted himself extremely well with reporting events.

Q: The other person was somebody named Ruchti?

KRYZA: James Ruchti, R-U-C-H-T-I. He was the Deputy Chief of Mission. The Department had not yet named an ambassador to Kenya. So all this happened, we were operating with the--. The man who had been the Consul General and had arrived the same time I did about nine months before independence thought that he was going to become the first ambassador to Kenya. He probably would have but he made some speeches that I think sounded too liberal to some of the Senators who have to pass on ambassadorial appointments and apparently his name had to be withdrawn. So the first ambassador to Kenya was a political appointee, a good close friend of John F. Kennedy's. Of course, John F. Kennedy had already been assassinated, that just two weeks before independence, which also put a damper on anything we could do for the independence. We did send a rather impressive delegation from the United States to be the official participants.

Q: Well, the new ambassador is William Attwood.

KRYZA: William Attwood, a journalist by profession, Look magazine. He had worked for the Herald Tribune after World War II in Paris. He and Art Buchwald were close friends. He was an American born in Paris and he married a French lady born in the United States, if my recollection is right.

Q: *Let's talk about--here you had a political appointee at obviously an emerging situation, which would call for a certain amount of professional handling. You had a newly independent country. You had revolts sort of in the area. I mean, there was unrest around there. And how did Ambassador Attwood work?*

KRYZA: Let's remember he was no neophyte. He was a political appointee but he'd spent his entire adult life reporting on political and other events just as a very young man after World War II in Paris. He's very recently published a book or written a book recently published, recounts his adult working professional life. He'd also had one tough embassy under his belt. His first assignment was in Conakry.

Q: *Oh, yes.*

KRYZA: So he's had his experience.

Q: *Conakry is the capital of--*

KRYZA: Guinea.

Q: *Guinea.*

KRYZA: He'd had, and this is the only totally communist country in Africa in those days.

Q: *Yes, that's right. So he was loaded for bear when he arrived at your--*

KRYZA: I'll digress a little bit. Unfortunately, just after leaving Kenya where he'd had a very successful two or two and a half year tour of duty, he'd even bought a large piece of property with the idea of coming back and living there, to retire. But he very hastily wrote a book. And he says he wrote this book on the train between New Canaan, Connecticut and New York. This was after he'd left Kenya and went back to Look magazine and then later became the editor publisher of News day. But in any event, he hastily wrote this book which he called The Reds and The Blacks, After the Pushkin novel, whatever. It was kind of a kiss and tell. And it was too early after, so he became persona non grata. The book offended Kenyatta and other members of the--.

Q: *Well, as a matter of fact there were repercussions on this. Because in an interview I have done not too long ago with Robinson McIlvaine who was ambassador there.*

KRYZA: Right, exactly.

Q: *He was saying that Kenyatta and his top cabinet people were so burned by this book that they weren't seeing ambassadors very much. And that this did leave really a bad atmosphere there.*

KRYZA: It did. It did.

Q: But going back to the situation, let's talk about how the Embassy worked. Did you have sort of staff meetings? Did you get involved in things other than administrative work? What were your responsibilities and how did you work within the Embassy?

KRYZA: Bill Attwood did believe very, very thoroughly in the staff approach. We had--I'm at a loss for a word--what do you call the team?

Q: The country team.

KRYZA: The country team. Thank you, sir. That's my old age. We had country team meetings at least once a week. There was close coordination. Sometimes the representative of the CIA was a little bit too coy, but normally our discussions were pretty open. Jim Ruchti was an excellent Deputy Chief of Mission. Unfortunately, as is often the case, the senior representatives of the other agencies, namely USIA, USAID--we had a huge AID mission there, not only a country mission but a regional AID office. And, of course, CIA. We also had a Civil Aviation attaché. We had a Labor attaché. And as is usually the case most of these people were senior to our Deputy Chief of Mission in personal rank and in salary. So it made the job of the Deputy Chief of Mission a little bit difficult.

Q: One of the problems that one notes in this, you were talking earlier about sharing administrative costs and all and this has come out in other interviews, is that if a post is attractive as Athens was at one time, as Paris is, Switzerland, what have you all the government agencies that have some regional interest such as Treasury or Civil Air all flock to what is considered the most healthy post. Not with the reason that they've got good communications but it means that a post in a healthy climate such as Nairobi can get overwhelmed. Did you find this is a problem? Because it was really your baby.

KRYZA: That brings to mind a story that I'd almost forgotten. And this gentleman has since then become one of my best friends, but I recall we got a message from the Library of Congress. It said, "Mr. So and So plans to come to Nairobi and would like to speak to you"--this was addressed to the Ambassador--"to you and your administrative officer." And this gentleman appeared and he approached the Ambassador, we met in the Ambassador's office. He said we want to establish a Library of Congress regional office. The Ambassador said, you've got to be kidding. What is this, some kind of cover for another agency? And the guy said, no I'm serious. We feel that there's--and we have other regional offices. We have one, either have one or are going to have one in India, and we're going to have one someplace in South America. It's our job to collect data, I mean, get these books, get them identified and classified and get them into our Library of Congress records and so on. And sure enough we established a Library of Congress regional office in Nairobi. It soon, God, it was one of the larger, maybe 30 or 40 employees. I ran into the same person a few years later, in fact, he was my next door neighbor in Rio de Janeiro where he headed up a much larger Library of Congress regional office. But that I think illustrates the point that people do tend to flock. These other agencies that feel they have some interest

abroad or in the conduct of foreign relations one way or another tend to gravitate towards the more pleasant spots.

Q: Well, did you find that these organizations which at least one could say were somewhat peripheral to our main interest in Nairobi itself, do these tend to overwhelm your peripheral interests in Kenya? Do these tend to overwhelm sort of the administrative side? You spent more time than you felt you should?

KRYZA: They could. They were not only peripheral. They could sometimes raise eyebrows among the Kenyans, especially in the government. We had to make certain that they understood that this was exactly what it purported to be and nothing beyond that. Yes, it did create administrative workloads. But I think that number one, we had some very understanding people back home in the Bureau of African Affairs and we were able to get the resources. They doing the same things that I used to do in the NEA Bureau, making certain that before these activities were allowed to be put in place that they were reasonably adequately funded. There was always a running battle between the State Department and USAID regarding who does what to whom and where the money comes from. But we were usually able to work that out mainly through goodwill or good rapport with one's opposite numbers.

Q: How effective, again looking at it strictly from your viewpoint, how effective do you think USAID was in Kenya at the time you were there?

KRYZA: I would say on balance reasonably effective. They were involved in--it's been so many years ago I've forgotten the projects they were involved in. I know they were heavy in education. They were heavy in, of course, agriculture and drought correction and so on. I would say by and large it was--

Q: Did you find the hand was, or the AID influence was a little too intrusive did you think? Or was it designed really for the country?

KRYZA: I think you've hit it. It was, maybe not too intrusive, but it certainly was intrusive. Depending upon who the AID director happened to be, he could exercise a great deal of political clout if he wanted to. The man who hands the government these huge whopping checks certainly is going to get their attention perhaps a little more readily than the ambassador.

Q: Was this a problem?

KRYZA: It could have been. I don't think it ever was.

Q: Because I know there were other places where I've heard stories where all the local government officials would flock and talk to the AID Director and ignore the Ambassador.

KRYZA: Yes.

Q: Which did not leave for good feelings or effective policy.

KRYZA: Yes, I saw that happen when I was a Post Management Officer in Dacca, in those days East Pakistan. When the AID Director--incidentally the same AID Director we've had for a while in Kenya--after a hurricane, outmaneuvered our consul general. It made the headlines of the paper and so forth.

In any event, I think the country team concept in Kenya worked reasonably well. And I think Ambassador Attwood did have his hand on the throttle and had things under control. One of the most interesting, if I can tell an anecdote. Around Thanksgiving Day 1964 the Congo, the Belgian Congo, was still the scene of very bloody warfare. Various factions were at war with one another. And one faction of rebels under a man named Thomas Kanza, K-A-N-Z-A, had captured Stanleyville. They took the Acting American Counsel, a man named Mike Hoyt, as a hostage, and one or two other official Americans. It was a very small post. But they also captured several American missionaries including--the name escapes me but I can fill it in later--a missionary doctor, M.D. In fact, they forced the American consul to eat the American flag. They also captured a rather large number of Belgians. The OAU, the Organization of African Unity, had just been formed with headquarters in Ethiopia.

Q: *Addis Ababa, yeah.*

KRYZA: And the OAU, because this situation in the Congo had come to an impasse, the OAU had asked--by that time Jomo Kenyatta had achieved the stature of sort of a senior, elderly statesman in Africa--they asked Jomo if he would try to mediate. And so Jomo called a meeting, asked Mr. Kanza to come to Nairobi and Ambassador Attwood to participate and the Belgian ambassador, and somebody from the Moise Tshombe side of the Belgian Congo. Meanwhile, we had already put into place. We and the Belgians had poised and ready on the Ascension Islands some U.S. aircraft. I think they were C130s, with Belgian paratroopers, so that if the talks failed-

Q: *This is called Operation Red Dragon I believe.*

KRYZA: Something like that.

Q: *Dragon Rouge.*

KRYZA: Dragon Rouge. Well, the talks did fail. And we had the telegram ready to go and we sent the telegram. Little did the Ambassador know, and Jim Ruchtli and everyone else know, that it just happened on that day we were redoing our telephone lines within the Embassy, which was a rented building--we had the four top stories of the building--and somebody had clipped the wrong wire. And we had lost communication with the outside world. I sweated blood but I got the message out. I had to call upon my friends in the British Embassy and so on. But to this day the powers that were in the Embassy did not know that we literally had lost, owing to some Indian poobah, you know, the expression Indian poobah. Most of the skilled labor in Kenya was performed by Indian Sikhs, the electricians and so on. But somebody had clipped the wrong wire and for just that critical period we were out of touch with the world. That couldn't happen in these days.

Q: *One would like to believe that.*

KRYZA: In any event, the operation happened. It took place. Most of the people were rescued. I have a painting on my wall in my office, an African artist perception, of what happened there. He's given it a lot of poetic license. In any event, the medical doctor was killed in the operation. Everyone else was saved.

Q: *We've done an interview with Douglas MacArthur who helped put this together in Brussels.*

KRYZA: Brussels, that's right.

Q: *With the Belgians. Well, now moving to dealing with the government of Kenya, you were there at a time where I assume that many of the colonials, now ex-colonials, British, who were a particular group in Kenya were always considered a rather spoiled lot. They had had a very nice life and they didn't like to see this change and many were not taking this very graciously. Kenyatta came in but sort of at that point was co-opting the ex-colonials. How did you as the Administrative Officer, having to deal on an hourly basis with the Kenya government, whom did you deal with? How effective were they in this time of transition?*

KRYZA: Okay. I dealt I suppose principally with the Chief of Protocol who was an Arab, a Zanzibari Arab, named Inowe who later on transferred his allegiance to one of the emirates I think and later became an ambassador for--I've forgotten the name of one of the Arab countries, the ambassador to the United States about ten years ago. He was very cooperative. In fact, he and I worked very closely together. I helped get his brother a job, which didn't hurt matters any. In fact, they were setting up something very much akin to our Foreign Service Institute. I helped them set it up. I gave them copies of our regulations. They didn't have a real body of regulations to guide their foreign service officers. So they were forming a foreign service of their own. And we worked very closely with them.

Q: *Well, did you find the Kenyans were sort of looking to the Americans--in the first place we were English speaking and this was their second language--looking to us as sort of an alternative to the British for technical expertise and this type of thing.*

KRYZA: Probably. I think they were still more or less wedded to the British system, but I think they were looking for alternatives. At least they were testing the water. They wanted to see if there were ways where they could use the techniques of perhaps both where they weren't in direct conflict with one another. That was my impression. Among the British that were held over as permanent secretaries or whatever, the one that I remember most vividly is a Scotsman, his name escapes me now, who was responsible for the real property. I was very much involved in purchasing, well, first purchasing these five residential properties but more important than that, prior or just I think at the time of independence, we purchased some land. No, it must have been before, we purchased it from the British. We purchased some very choice property as the site of our potential Embassy. There were some payments that kept coming up and the Foreign Buildings Office never had the money. It was my unfortunate duty to go hat in hand to this Scotsman and explain why we were not making this payment, but we wanted another year's extension. I had lots of fun doing that. We eventually resolved the whole thing. We now have a

chancery. I don't think that it's the identical site. I think because we delayed so long that the Kenyan government took that particular site away from us and substituted another one. But in any event the problem seems to have worked its way through. And we now have--I haven't seen it, but they tell me it's a very handsome chancery.

Q: Well, were you having any problems with the--I mean, after all, a new government coming into place is bad enough in the United States dealing with a new administration, but when you all of a sudden have a country independent and one that has been kept very dependent up to that point. Were there some major problems in running things?

KRYZA: There could have been, yes. There could have been. And things could change literally overnight, a government policy. For example, I alluded to the Indian poobahs. The first level of supervision and the skilled labor level was dominated by the Indians. The Africans hadn't achieved these skills. So they were the straw bosses, the first line supervisors. Depending upon which way the wind was blowing among the top government leaders, the Indians were either in favor or they were in disfavor. We relied very heavily, particularly at the airport. Nairobi was a Mecca for delegations from Washington and elsewhere in the United States. As I recall, Senator Robert Kennedy came two or three times during my stay. Tom Mboya who probably would have succeeded Kenyatta as President, was a bright young guy, close to the Kennedy family, all kinds of intercultural agreements.

Q: He was later assassinated.

KRYZA: Later assassinated, that's right. So we relied very, very heavily on the people that actually did the work at the airport. You know, it's one thing to get all the clearances for the airplane and get the use of the VIP room. But if you don't have someone at the airport who can make sure that everything happens on time you're lost. So there were times when for reasons that we could understand that suddenly a new policy said, henceforth, these Indians will no longer be in charge. From now on the African's going to be the boss. We still had to work through the Indian even though he was no longer the boss. But it took a lot of--

Q: It was a transitional period.

KRYZA: It was a transitional period. One had to be very light-footed. One had to be able to change, to adapt to a new situation. One could not allow his frustrations to create problems. Yes, it was difficult. But the problems were never insurmountable. One always found a solution. But I'm sure that the job in Kenya and later on in Kinshasa in my view is much more interesting than the job in Paris or in London where things--you have a different set of problems obviously. But I was much closer to, in a sense, being a mayor of a little city running the various aspects of it. Because we provided housing for all the Americans there and furniture and so on.

Q: Before we move to your next assignment, I would like to ask you as I was turning over the cassette you had mentioned that there was our own problem of transition after Attwood had left which is something that maybe future managers might keep in mind. And that is not leaving a Deputy Chief of Mission too long at a post and then expect them to take a subordinate position. There was some sort of a problem there.

KRYZA: I think you said that very well in a nutshell, yes. I want to preface anything I say with the statement I'm talking about very good people, every one of them. What I'm saying should not be taken in any sense as disparagement. There was a long hiatus between the departure of Ambassador Attwood and the arrival of Ambassador Glen Ferguson. Jim Ruchti was in charge during this period and I must say ran a very good ship. It was also during that period that Attwood wrote the book, The Reds and The Blacks, which made Jim's life a little more difficult. But I think we had adequate access to the Kenyan government.

I'm not sure it's anyone's fault. But the time span was just too great. Jim in effect had become the Ambassador. So there was the inevitable differences when Ambassador Ferguson had to establish himself, put his own cache on the operation. I think the only lesson to be learned is to try to limit the length of time between the departure of one ambassador and his successor. Or alternatively, after a very brief turnaround period transfer the DCM and let the new ambassador bring in his own alter ego.

WILLIAM ATTWOOD
Ambassador
Kenya (1964-1966)

Mr. Attwood was born in 1919. He was a political appointee ambassador to Guinea and Kenya. He was interviewed by Leonard Saccio in 1988.

ATTWOOD: I think they are overstaffed right now, in many parts of the world, and possibly understaffed in others. I'll give you an example. In Africa--when I was in Kenya--we had a PL 480 program, you know, food aid program, going to five countries there. We had one agricultural attaché, and a secretary. You had to travel around to find out where food was needed, what were their problems--their agricultural, irrigation, fertilizing. There were very few statistics in those countries. They were just achieving independence, and they couldn't understand their own statistics, many of them.

This one man was on the road nearly all the time--a back breaking assignment. There were millions of dollars involved, in PL 480 food. Now, in Holland--the Netherlands--we had five agricultural attachés, with a whole suite of offices. There was no agricultural crisis in Holland; nothing we were going to do about it, or needed to do about it. What did they do all day? They'd go out and inspect the fields.

But the tradition in the Foreign Service, going back to the 19th century, is that Europe is where the action is--Europe matters. When I came in--in the '60's--the rest of the world was, you know, unexplored, virtually. Africa was a British and French problem. We still had a neo-colonialist attitude towards these countries. So we didn't staff them; we'd staff them with a few people, but not enough to do that kind of job. Although, the administration sections were always very well staffed, because of the paperwork. Paperwork, as you recall, is one of the suffocating aspects of our State Department bureaucracy.

Let me give you one example. The British have a system, whereby they recall a consul from, say, Thailand to London. They say we want you to be in London on such and such a day, and you can leave anytime you want, and here's your allowance. They have an allowance for every city in the world, to London. Now you can take a first class plane, you can walk, you can hitchhike, but you can't go with the allowance. If you want to travel first class, you pay for it. You just get there, that's all.

Not us! Oh no. We have forms, as you know, you fill out. You depart home at such and such a time, arrive embassy, arrive airport. For every hour you are in the airport you are paid at a different rate than when you are out of the airport. You arrive in Washington. Everything has got to be accounted for. And in those days, the vouchers cost about \$50 to make up--just one voucher. One man, that I mentioned in one of these books, was questioned when he got back. They said he got to National Airport--his mother was traveling with him. He said, "Did you take a cab? Did your mother take the cab?"

So finally he said, "No, I took the cab, and my mother walked and carried the bags!" It just got so ridiculous. But that's just an example of the kind of infatuation with paperwork that I think is more typical of our bureaucracy than those I've come in contact with elsewhere.

ATTWOOD: . . . of nationalism is a much stronger force in the world than any isms like communism, or democracy. When you have a world in which 2/3 of the people are way below what we would call our poverty line, they care very little about ideology, or whether they can go to the ballot box or not. They'd like to have things work better so they can eat; and have clinics and hospitals they can go to; and have jobs and work to do; and many a little plot of land to cultivate. If they have any ideology, at all, it's nationalism; it's a feeling that--we're somebody, we are not just the wretched of the earth.

When I was traveling around the world with Stevenson--in 1953--he took note of this. And he said what people in the world really want is rice, and respect. It's not enough that we satisfy their hunger, but they've got to feel that they're not considered to be nobody. But nationalism, which means having a seat at the U.N., and being able to have their representative stand there in front of the world, even criticize and attack the major powers, does a lot for their self-esteem.

These huge projects were demanded by the leaders of these new countries, but it's not what they needed. And this is where I felt we did know best.

In fact, in Kenya once I was interviewed by one of the local papers--"The Daily Nation." The headline was, "U.S. envoy admits strings to aid." I did, I said that. I said, "Sure, there's strings to aid. It's the U.S. taxpayers' money. We're not going to see it dissipated on projects that aren't going to be of any benefit to your economy; on Mercedes Benz for a few of your top people"--they knew who I meant. "Yes, our strings are that anything that we bring into this country be used for the benefit of the whole nation, and benefit of the people." It got attention, and it was true. I think we've got to be very careful. I said, "I can't recommend to the American taxpayer--and I'm one of them . . . we have things to do at home. We're not going to do it here, and see it all line the pockets of corrupt officials."

Well, that's blunt talk, but they don't mind that. I think the small schemes. The ambassadors--we had a fund of \$75,000, discretionary fund, which the ambassador could use. He could go to some area of the country where the people had built a school, but they had no roofing. We could provide them with roofing for the school, desks, books for the school. That was worth a lot more--for a few hundred dollars. That \$75,000 would leave a good feeling for America all over the country; much more than a huge dam and aluminum smelter.

Fortunately, in Kenya--the British pretty well controlled and supplied the army; but we were, I think, helpful in starting something called The National Youth Course--similar to the CCC, of the days of Roosevelt. Unemployed youths, who were coming into the city and committing crimes, could be drafted. We provided the uniforms, and jeeps, and shovels, and all that. They could go out and do some practical work--like building roads, and so forth. That's the kind of help! They were in uniform, but they weren't armed.

I said, "Wait a minute, Mr. President." I was leaving the government so I could interrupt him. "They're compassionate people. My wife worked in a hospital in Africa, and they had no incubator. We sent a letter back to our hometown paper, and they raised \$3,000 and sent us an incubator. My father's church, on Long Island, sent us a generator for lights in a hospital, in Kenya. But they want to know where the money's going. It's not true."

These were always presented on the Hill--these programs--as being long-term, of strategic importance, rather than getting them down to the human level.

I remember Senator Vance Harkey came to West Africa once when I was there. And he had a lot of black constituents in Gary, Indiana. Well, we got him out to this little hospital. We had promised them a generator; they had no lights. And four months had gone by and nothing had arrived, you know, from Washington.

So we got him holding a couple of little African children in his arms, surrounded with all these Africans; and this he could use back in Indiana--this picture. And when he heard about the generator he fired off this press release, saying, "I have stood in this hospital, and seen these young black children delivered by candlelight. It's an outrage. We promised them a generator, and I'm going to see to it they get a generator." By god, we got it within three weeks.

But you see, his interests coincided with ours.

WILLIAM BEVERLY CARTER, JR.
Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Nairobi (1965-1966)

Ambassador Carter was born and raised in Pennsylvania, and was educated at Lincoln University. After a career in journalism, he joined the Foreign Service in 1965, serving first in Nairobi as Public Affairs Officer and then as Deputy

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. In 1972 he was appointed United States Ambassador to Tanzania, serving there until late 1975, at which time he was named Ambassador to Liberia, where he served until 1979. Ambassador Carter subsequently served as Ambassador at Large from 1979 to 1981. Ambassador Carter was interviewed by Celestine Tutt in 1981.

CARTER: Carl called me one day and said, "Look Bev, would you be willing to have your name placed in consideration for...ah...ah...one of these slots in the Foreign Service?" I said, "What are you talking about?" And he said, "Well, we're looking for a Public Affairs Officer in Ethiopia and one in Nairobi. Do you think you can take a leave of absence from your newspaper as the publisher of the Pittsburgh Courier?" I said, "I don't think I can. For one, I don't think my board will let me do it, and two, I've got a son who's getting ready to go to college and I'm not sure I can afford it.

But to make a long story short, we talked back and forth and I finally agreed to take a two-year leave -- my board gave it to me -- and I went to Nairobi as our Information Officer. And three months after going there as Information Officer, I was asked to become Public Affairs Officer, which in effect is the Director of the Information Service Program, in Kenya. And that led to other assignments, and other assignments, and other assignments. And finally my board said, "You either come back or not." And I found I was enjoying my work. I had by that time taken the Foreign Service examination; I passed it and decided to make the Foreign Service my career.

Q: And exactly how did you move into the position of Ambassador for Tanzania?

CARTER: (1augh)s...Well, I think I did a pretty good job in Kenya at a time just following their independence, and based on that job, I was asked to go to Nigeria as Minister-Counselor for Public Affairs. And at that time, you may recall, Nigeria was involved or about to become involved in a civil war. I got there a year before the Biafran Civil War. And I got there in the summer of '66, and in April 1977, Biafra, the Eastern region, attempted to secede from the Federation of Nigeria.

GLENN W. FERGUSON
Ambassador
Kenya (1966-1969)

Mr. Ferguson was born in Syracuse, New York in 1929 and graduated from Cornell University and the University of Pittsburgh. He was appointed ambassador to Kenya in 1966. He was interviewed by Kirstin Hamblin in 1993.

Q: That is interesting. When you were appointed, what was your mission as US Ambassador according to the State Department? What were you to do in Kenya?

FERGUSON: There was no specific detailed job description. I had the opportunity to meet with the President before departure. He questioned me (which I thought was intriguing) about Kenya.

I had learned Swahili, and he was testing me as to whether I had made an effort to learn about Kenya. The subsequent guidelines from the Department of State included briefings with the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. The guidelines dealt with specific political problems in the area, e.g., the status of the East African Treaty, and a variety of other issues which had little to do with the overall responsibility of an Ambassador. At that time, I thought, and I still think, that there was little time spent in Washington, prior to the assignment, delineating the role and relationships, for example, to what extent was I to have access to senior members of the Department of State. This was never stipulated, and in many cases colleagues who were ambassadors agreed that you serve by sufferance and indirection. As an issue emerges, you deal with that issue. There is no clear understanding of the normal procedures that should apply. We dealt with a desk officer in the Department of State who was responsible for Kenya. That was clear. If there were policy questions beyond the desk level for a country, the instructions were not clear.

Q: So how did you personally feel about your mission? What did you feel that you were going there to do?

FERGUSON: That is an excellent question. Obviously, you are representing your country in the country to which you are accredited including the management of the American mission. The American mission in Kenya did not include a military component, but virtually everything else was represented including a Marine guard detachment. The panoply of agencies included AID, USIS, Commerce, Agriculture, and the Library of Congress.

Secondly, you serve as the eyes and ears of your country. I made certain that the mission for which I was responsible reported dutifully what was happening to the Department of State. Basically, the reporting relationship, and the running of a mission, were the principal assignments.

Q: At that time what were the main issues that you were going to have to deal with? And that you did deal with between the United States and Kenya specifically.

FERGUSON: It was clear that the specific issues with which I was trained to deal (for example, the future of the East African Treaty Organization which included the three countries of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania) would take a great deal of time. This was two years after the independence of Kenya. The initial euphoric feeling about the three countries cooperating had been dissipated. I knew that there would be issues regarding the US role. We were prepared for that, but the issue that arose very quickly after I arrived in Nairobi, I was not prepared to handle.

That issue was created by my predecessor, Bill Attwood, who was the former editor of Look magazine, and who was appointed by President Kennedy as Ambassador to Guinea. Subsequently, he was appointed to Kenya, and he arrived in '64 at the time of independence. He left shortly prior to my arrival in Kenya in October of '66. Within a few weeks, his book, called: The Reds and the Blacks, appeared in the book stores in Nairobi. As the first American ambassador to Kenya, he included personal conversations including those with Jomo Kenyatta, the president. Confidential information to which Ambassador Attwood was privy in his role as ambassador, was reflected in the book. It was explained that because he was a journalist, and was

returning to journalism, there was no obligation to protect the government officials who were cited. On the contrary, at the time he was chosen as an ambassador, he signed a US Government statement that he would not write about, or talk about, things to which he was privy, in a confidential sense, for ten years after leaving his post.

I was ostracized by the Kenyan community. I had great difficulty presenting my credentials. There was talk about declaring me persona non grata, and this was shortly after my arrival. I asked for advice from the Department of State, but I did not receive any. As a result, I called a press conference at the residency, and I took a voluntary oath that I would not write about, or talk about, anything to which I was privy in my role as ambassador for a period of five years after leaving Kenya. It worked. The Kenyans were willing to accept the good faith declaration, and within a period of months, we had rebuilt relationships.

To give you some idea of the significance of that action, as adjudged by the Department of State, I received subsequently the Arthur Flemming Award, as one of ten outstanding young men in the public service. It was the first such award for the Department of State, and it was based upon a nomination from the Department of State. The only reason that I mention the personal reference is that the Department of State endorsed the result; however, it was unwilling to provide guidance at the time of the emergency. That is responsive to your earlier question. There is no way that you can be fully prepared for your role as ambassador. How could we have predicted that my predecessor would release a book in Kenya, that would damage US interests, shortly after my arrival.

Q: So thereafter, how was your relationship with Jomo Kenyatta?

FERGUSON: Solid. He provided the opportunity to see him regularly, including the members of his personal staff and his cabinet. We met on a variety of important issues, and I felt that he was giving me the substance I needed to discharge my role as ambassador.

Q: And how did you see him personally as a leader? What were your personal feelings about him? Did you like the man?

FERGUSON: I liked him personally. He was a father figure. He was probably at the time 45 years older than I. He had a presence that was magnetic. His appearance was almost electrifying. He had mannerisms that were truly unique in enhancing that charisma, e.g., a fly whisk which he would wave as a symbol of tribal identification in Kenya.

Q: He was with the...

FERGUSON: ...Kikuyu tribe which was at the time the second largest, second to the Luo. The Kikuyu had the greatest commitment to education. He was an impressive figure, an articulate person, very committed to his country, and he discharged a remarkable role as what was then considered "the George Washington of Kenya."

Q: Did you hear a lot of criticisms from his enemies? I think one of the main ones was Odinga. He was the leader of the Luo tribe. Did you have any sort of relationship with him? And how did you view their relationship--Odinga's and Kenyatta's?

FERGUSON: They were political enemies. They had emerged from the Mau Mau period of insurrection with different political views. Odinga was identified with the far left. Kenyatta was more moderate in all respects. In addition, they were enemies because Odinga represented the Luo in the western part of the country, and Kenyatta the Kikuyu in the central part including Nairobi. There were tribal differences and differences in style. Odinga was threatened with jail frequently. His efforts to organize politically were many times misunderstood. He did lead the opposition party during the period I was there, and Kenyatta and he gave no appearance of working together. Odinga was the leader of the Luo and of the KADU party, the counterpart of KANU. He is still a major political figure, he is probably 90, and a very active politician representing the left on the political spectrum.

Q: What was your relationship with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles? Was he the Secretary of State at the time?

FERGUSON: No, he had left in the Eisenhower administration. In 1966, the Secretary of State was Dean Rusk. I did not have the privilege of meeting him at the time of my appointment. I was sworn in by Ambassador Averell Harriman. Dean Rusk was Secretary of State, I believe, if my memory serves, until early '69. I worked under Nicholas Katzenbach who became acting Secretary of State.

Q: Was that a good relationship?

FERGUSON: I don't think I ever met Dean Rusk. At that time, from '66 to '69, Vietnam was the reality. Part of my responsibility was to talk with secondary school students, college students, and young politicians in Kenya about the meaning of US involvement in Vietnam. There was concern not only in the United States but in many countries of the world. Even in Kenya, the military presence of the United States in Vietnam during that critical period from '66 to '69 was relevant. The Secretary of State had little time for the Third World, and certainly not for Africa. Of equal importance, Kenya was a small country. In the absence of an emergency, when you represent the United States in a small country you deal with an assistant secretary, in this case the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa.

Q: Being rather new with the actual hands-on business of diplomacy, how were your relations with your embassy staff? And what was your method of operation within that embassy?

FERGUSON: I had been an executive officer in non-profit institutions previously, so that management was not the issue. I had lived overseas; therefore, adjustment to a cross-cultural situation was not the issue. The problem I had was not related to dealing with Kenyans, or with individual American personalities. The problem was relating disparate elements of United States interests in a country team or senior staff setting. For example, in dealing with the USAID Director in Kenya, I was working with a person appointed by the AID director in Washington, with a different portfolio, different policy guidelines, and a different reporting relationship. With

agricultural or informational issues, I was normally involved with a person who was accountable to the Department of Agriculture or USIA in Washington.

With each issue, we were attempting to articulate a US position in country. Even if you felt you had an agreement, there were independent transmission channels, so that members of the country team could return to Washington through their own channels and obtain advice, or state a position, that differed from the position that we had taken in the country team. There was a constant problem of making certain that in-country policy reflected a single US position or if differences were meaningful, that we could give the Kenyans the rationale for that disparity.

Q: Did you find this inefficient, or frustrating? Is that the best word to describe it?

FERGUSON: It represents a frustrating, debilitating, in many ways counterproductive, extension of the reality of bureaucratic interaction in Washington to the field. In a foreign country, the US Government cannot afford to speak with more than a single voice. I am not suggesting an autocratic approach. I am merely suggesting that if resources are limited, then the allocation of those resources, in lesser-developed countries, must be dependent upon a clear statement of principle. In country policy making was always exciting, and always a learning process; however, it was frustrating that the Ambassador was dealing with unclear lines of authority at the country team level.

Q: At the time what was the United States' stand on South Africa, and how did it affect our relations with Kenya, if at all?

FERGUSON: With the Administration of President Kennedy in 1961, the policy towards South Africa changed appreciably, and the US became very sensitive to black African concerns in South Africa. There was a deliberate change of policy, because of the preoccupation of the Johnson Administration with Vietnam, US policy towards Africa received limited attention. Because of the sustained interest of the Kennedy-Johnson era in civil rights, including South Africa, Sub-Sahara African countries, including Kenya, were more receptive to the Ambassador from the United States.

Having said that, the rigidity of the Kenyans with regard to travel to South Africa was remarkable. I could not travel to South Africa on my passport, even as a diplomat. If I had, there would have been a problem in returning to Kenya. Several Americans, at that time, were taking the precaution of having a second passport issued, and the second passport was used for travel to South Africa. I considered that duplicity; therefore, I did not go to South Africa. It would have been useful to have visited South Africa in representing the interests of my country in Kenya. In Kenya, on one hand there was more sensitivity in the 1960's to the United States and its representative. On the other hand, Kenya was demonstrating a rigidity that precluded visiting South Africa. Now, that has all changed. At the time, negative feelings toward South Africa were profound.

Q: What were our interests, if any, in the border frame, and the eventual diplomatic rift between Kenya and Somalia?

FERGUSON: At that time, the rift between Somalia and Kenya was restricted to a manifestation called the Shifta. The Shifta were renegades. It was difficult to determine whether they were led by Somalia, or whether they were an indigenous Somali ethnic group in Kenya. The Shifta were roving bands of armed intruders who stole cattle and occasionally raided settlements. I remember that a few missionaries were temporarily incarcerated or inconvenienced.

The Shifta menace represented a deeper problem. Somalia and Kenya did not have solid relationships. Kenya had public and private support from the developed world, including the UK, and the USA. Somalia, in contrast, no longer had meaningful support from Britain in the north or from Italy in the south, and the country was extremely poor. Kenya did not have much to gain from improved relations. What they tried to do was to contain the Shifta problem in the extreme northeastern part of the country which adjoins Somalia. The containment policy was successful, but the Shifta did not disappear. Today, Somalis are coming across the border into Kenya as a result of the current emergency. It has become a major international refugee problem.

Q: Did you have anything that you really had to do concerning this situation?

FERGUSON: When I arrived in Kenya, the first visit I made upcountry was to Peace Corps volunteers assigned to Turkana and Shifta famine regions. Peace Corps Volunteers, and a few USAID projects, were providing food, medical supplies, basic educational support, books for school children, and support mechanisms. Because the Kenyans did not perceive the Shifta as a major issue, limited aid was provided.

Q: As far as other major problems that you had to deal with, aside from your initial problem when you first came to the country, what other things did you have to deal with during your three years there?

FERGUSON: The East Africa community was falling apart. The United States' position was that even though politically the three countries might not work together effectively, functionally there were cooperative options: the postal system, tourism, customs, transportation, etc. Part of the assignment was devoted to working with counterparts from the United States in Uganda and in Tanzania in an effort to maintain a cooperative regional spark.

There were a number of visits of American ships to Mombasa. During the Vietnam war, Mombasa served as an excellent port, and there were sensitive problems when there were naval visits. I was accredited to the Seychelles, the islands which were 1500 miles off the coast of Kenya, and the Seychelles were in the middle of the routes to the Far East including Vietnam, and they were fairly close to sources of oil. They were also close to Diego Garcia which had become a staging ground for bombing missions. We did have involvement with some aspects of the military effort as a result of the Vietnam War.

The principal responsibility was economic development in Kenya including USAID and the Peace Corps.

Q: My next question is, in January of 1968, Vice President Humphrey, along with his wife, and Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall, made a visit to Kenya. Could you describe the nature of this visit, and how it went?

FERGUSON: I respond with a smile. It was a triumphant visit. Hubert Humphrey was a Pied Piper. He walked down the main streets of Nairobi "leading the band." Vice President Tom Mboya and hundreds of Kenyans joined the parade. I cite the parade as an indication of Humphrey's style, as well as what the style provoked, which was a heartfelt response. I introduced him at an open forum where there was an exceptionally large crowd. He did a remarkable job in conveying his commitment to civil rights, his commitment to Africa, and in turn, America's potential commitment. He believed in the Third World. He believed in the future of independent African countries. He believed that America cared about the Third World, and he was one of the few who was able to communicate, even during the Vietnam War, that sense of commitment. When he met with the Kenyan leadership, there was a very positive reaction to him as a person as well as to the Vice President of the United States.

Q: When visiting African countries--generally there is the President or Vice President, or perhaps a Congressman, but Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall was there. Was he a figurehead, or was he there because he was really interested in Africa? Why was he present at the time?

FERGUSON: It was a small delegation. I remember that the Humphrey staff was confined to one person. Thurgood Marshall, as the first black appointed to the Supreme Court, had a deep interest in Africa, and I think that he probably took the initiative in suggesting that he make the trip. He was an active participant. There were no problems resulting from his presence in the delegation.

Q: What was the purpose of the entire visit, basically to show African countries support from the United States? Or to show interest in Kenya?

FERGUSON: The Vietnam situation had not improved appreciably. As a result, very few senior people, other than a large number of Congressmen, had come to Kenya. It was Vice President Humphrey's mission to make certain that African countries recognized that the United States, in spite of its preoccupation with Vietnam, was also continuing to reflect interest in the developing world. I don't think there was anything more profound than that.

While he was in Kenya, he tried to articulate an aid program on a broader regional scale. Before his arrival, his office asked our mission to comment on what the United States ought to do with regard to aid to Africa. Our response was to try to broaden the concept of aid from a bilateral to a regional reality. Vice President Humphrey had some impact in talking about a regional program for Africa with US and other donor support. He also advocated greater donor country coordination.

Q: Pardon me for dwelling on this, but one last question about that visit. Did you have any administration problems as far as where to put them? Or just personal difficulties concerning the visit.

FERGUSON: I think it was the most difficult visit we had because of the popular enthusiasm which it generated. Humphrey was generally, and genuinely, liked. Every American in the mission wanted to meet him, and it was equally true of the Kenyans. The resources of the American mission were limited. Every official group of visitors presented logistical problems. Ostensibly, the missions were substantive. In reality, the flora and fauna intervened. Hubert Humphrey was a major exception. He was there to listen, to learn, and to talk (as you know from his reputation).

Q: Did you have any problems during your time as Ambassador protecting US citizens, or any sort of citizen problems?

FERGUSON: We had problems with regard to accidents, security issues, passports and visas, etc. In the absence of terrorism, there were not any major issues regarding American citizens.

Q: To go back to the beginning of your post when you first got there, and the book that the past ambassador had written and was on the shelves which was called The Reds and the Blacks. Did you see any sort of communist threat in Kenya?

FERGUSON: There was no internal communist threat in Kenya. The Communist Party was virtually nonexistent. We did not deal with representatives of the Communist Party, and it was outlawed specifically by Kenyatta's government. Communism was not a local factor. It was equally true of socialism because Kenyatta, in contrast to many other African leaders, did not have a political credo. He called his program African Socialism, but it was really a way of attracting private capital, of inducing American, British and European firms to invest in Kenya. He was not threatened politically by Odinga, or by anyone else. He wanted to create an economic miracle, and during the period I was there, he succeeded. There was no disaffected opposition that might have germinated a communist threat.

There was always the problem of an external communist threat, and we dealt every day with the question of Eastern Europe, the USSR, and China, being involved in a series of acts and schemes geared to undermine stability.

Q: What do you feel was your greatest achievement as the US Ambassador in Kenya?

FERGUSON: I have never really thought in those terms. I would be hard-pressed to cite a specific personal achievement. I am a manager. I choose to think that part of my leadership, wherever I am, is to attempt to work with others in a meaningful way. I suppose that I would be pleased if we conveyed a sense of mission, that we worked together effectively, and that the Kenyan government responded to our leadership. The rebuilding of effective US-Kenyan relations, after the book episode, would be high on the list. For my wife and me, our three years in Kenya provides a very positive memory. There were problems; we dealt with them, and we feel that we had made a contribution.

Q: And what do you feel was your greatest frustration while you were there?

FERGUSON: I would say there were several. First, the relative lack of interest of the United States in Kenya, in Black Africa, in the Third World, and in the developing world. Secondly, the absence of any policy to deal with the area I have just described. There is a tendency to leave the ambassador, and those working with him or her, in the position of coping with emergencies in a policy vacuum. During the 1966-1969 period, we did not have a US foreign policy with regard to Kenya, with regard to East Africa, or with regard to Sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast to Great Britain, and several other countries, the United States does not define self interest.

Thirdly, I would suggest the absence of adequate financial resources. We were always in the position of saying "no." We respond to a moral challenge, but there are never the requisite funds available to fulfill our promises.

Finally, I would cite the issue of continuity of ambassadorial service. It took almost three years to rebuild the relationships that had been nearly destroyed by a thoughtless act regarding the book. When President Nixon assumed office, as a political appointee, I was ordered to leave Kenya immediately. I understand the process. An Ambassador, who is not a member of the Foreign Service, upon the election of a new President, must submit his or her resignation. On the other hand, the timing of the removal of a political appointee must be evaluated in the context of US interests.

Eleven months elapsed before a person was assigned to Kenya to replace me. The interests of the United States, in any country, should not be affected by such bureaucratic accidents.

Q: A final question. In retrospect, is there anything that you would change about your time in Kenya?

FERGUSON: The changes in Kenya since 1969 have been profound. To provide an example, Daniel Arap Moi was then Vice President. He is a Kalenjin from a small tribe in the Rift Valley. As a teacher; a person with religious convictions; and a person who cared deeply about his family, he returned to the homestead at every opportunity. He was the pacifier; mediator; the person who was willing to respond. He kept the Kenyatta cabinet focused on the human dimension. Today, Daniel Arap Moi is considered a tyrant. The United States has had great difficulty in dealing with him. He has become, according to media reports, venal and arbitrary. What effort has been made to evaluate systematically the changes in the behavior of a chief of state? Could not waves of US ambassadors to Kenya shed light on this critical issue?

I would not change anything with regard to my assignment in Kenya, but I would suggest that once leaving the country to which they are accredited, ambassadors should be asked formally to respond to critical in-country issues. For each country, a panel of former ambassadors could be appointed as a review mechanism. The panel could meet annually to discuss important issues. The results of these panel sessions might become a cornerstone for the formulation of US foreign policy for the country involved.

DAVID HAMILTON SHINN

**Political Officer
Nairobi (1967-1968)**

David Hamilton Shinn was born in Washington in 1940. He received three degrees from George Washington University. During his career he had positions in Kenya, Washington D.C., Tanzania, Mauritania, Cameroon, Chad, Sudan, and ambassadorships to Burkina Faso and Ethiopia. Ambassador Shinn was interviewed in July 2002 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

SHINN: I was interested in going to an African post; I may have suggested that I would be interested in learning an African language. The inspectors were instrumental in getting me assigned to Swahili language training, to be followed by an assignment to Kenya. That was very nice; it worked out well.

Q: *Where did you take Swahili language training?*

SHINN: In Washington at the Foreign Service Institute.

Q: *How did you take to this language?*

SHINN: Language training was not easy, but I appreciated the opportunity to learn Swahili. It is not an overly difficult language, even though it is somewhat strange to one accustomed to European languages. It clearly required more effort than learning Spanish, for example, but it is not nearly as difficult as Arabic or Chinese. It is written in our script and about 40% of the vocabulary comes from Arabic. One can recognize these words even though they are pronounced differently.

Q: *Did the language training also include area studies?*

SHINN: We did attend a two week course on Africa at the time. It was probably similar to the one that is offered today. I did not have an opportunity for any study in depth. I was so consumed with language training. There may have been some projects that we undertook, which would have required some research into African issues. But that was minimal.

Q: *When were you in Nairobi?*

SHINN: From the summer of 1967 until the latter part of 1968. The tour was cut short because I was offered the opportunity to study at Northwestern University's African studies program. I told Personnel that I was just getting started in Kenya; I asked whether I could attend Northwestern a year later. I was told that the funds were available in 1968; they may not be available in 1969. It was strongly suggested that I take the sure bet rather than gamble on a possibility. I talked to the ambassador who suggested that I go to Northwestern while I could.

Q: *What was Nairobi like in 1967?*

SHINN: It was in a post-colonial phase. It was a lovely place to live with considerable European

settler influence. Kenya was doing well economically. Crime had not yet become a serious problem. One had the feeling that Kenya would do well economically. I think most of us were pretty optimistic about Kenya's future. It was and still is a wonderful country to travel in. The U.S.-Kenya relationship was strong in those days. The Peace Corps had a large presence.

Jomo Kenyatta was President. Our ambassador was Glenn Ferguson. He had succeeded William Atwood, the author of the book "The Reds and the Blacks" which had been so controversial. Ferguson and his wife Pattie were delightful people with whom we have stayed in contact over the years. He was a political appointee, close to Robert Kennedy, I believe. He had been director of the Peace Corps in Thailand. He went on to an illustrious career in academia.

We thoroughly enjoyed the Kenya assignment. It provided some unexpected benefits. I had been assigned originally as a consular officer, but never served in that section. Once I got into language training, Ralph Jones, the chief of the political section, said he wanted me in his section. The country was divided into regions and each member of the political section was assigned to cover certain regions. I was assigned to cover the coastal areas, which put me in charge of naval visits to Mombasa. An additional benefit was my assignment as the first American vice-consul to the Seychelles Islands. That was a wonderful opportunity because it is unusual for a junior officer to have such a niche all to himself. I made regular trips to the islands. The only way to get there was either by a very long boat ride, which we didn't do, or by an Albatross Flying Boat run by Pan-American on contract to the U.S. Air Force. It was a six or seven hour trip at about 1,000 feet altitude over the Indian Ocean. The plane would land in the harbor at Mahe. You would then either stay for an hour, the time it took to turn the plane around, or a week until the next flight. I chose to stay for a week so that I could meet all the necessary people. The Seychelles at the time was a British Crown Colony. I dealt with the governor, complete with white shorts and monocle, and his British staff as well as the young Seychelles political leaders, some of whom were left-wing. I would try to figure out where the Seychelles were going in the next five or ten years. We were interested in that question because we had a U.S. satellite tracking station on the main island staffed by about 120 Americans. I also did consular work for those folks.

It was a fascinating experience. The Seychelles is a complex of about 99 islands; I didn't visit all of them, but I did see quite a few.

Q: How were the Americans doing? Did they suffer from the isolation?

SHINN: A number of Americans married Seychelles women and brought them back to the U.S. A few went "native" and stayed on the islands after they were discharged. By and large, I think the Americans managed very well. They lived in a "little America" environment; it was a nice existence for them. They had American food and the trappings of a small town-USA. They also had glorious beaches and attractive local women. The climate was great; I don't think many resented being assigned to the Seychelles.

Q: Did you feel any resentment from the British on whose territory we now sent a vice- consul?

SHINN: I think my assignment did raise some suspicion in British minds. Some thought we

might be stirring things. They would have preferred that we only talk to them. But they understood that we did have an interest in the Seychelles. The Brits understood that we needed to keep track of what was going on among the population. So I had *carte blanche* to see whomever I wanted and to do whatever I wanted. They were very cooperative, but I did sense that some raised their eyebrows at my presence. I did spend time with people who were undoubtedly looking forward to independence and that may have raised some concern among the British authorities. Actually, I found these “rabble rousers” to be delightful people; one was France Albert Rene, who is now the prime minister. He was one of the more left wing politicians. I got to know him reasonably well and he turned out to be a decent sort.

Q: Were these people relatively well informed about what was going on outside the Seychelles?

SHINN: They were insulated. Rene’s party, for ethnic reasons, had close connections to Tanzania, which at the time was very socialist. Tanzania had adopted some socialistic policies. Rene was studying them to see how they might be applied to the Seychelles. Those that he did try did not work that well. But beyond the African East Coast, I did not find that the Seychellois knew much about the rest of the world. The other opposition leader, who held power briefly, was Jimmy Mancham. He came from a large family that was prominent in the Seychelles. He had strong connections in London and had knowledge of the wider world. He traveled frequently between London and Victoria. His view of the world was different from that of Rene. Perhaps because of that, he did not stay in power for very long. Rene and his followers were closer to the local population.

Q: Was the Seychelles yet the popular destination for European vacationers?

SHINN: No. There was no airport. The only way you could reach the islands was by ship or amphibious craft. Occasionally a rich American would pull into port on his yacht. I remember tangling with one of them. He was the inventor of TANG; he made a fortune with this powdered drink. I just happen to be in the Seychelles the week his yacht pulled in. Initially, he was very friendly, but eventually he took an enormous dislike to me and to the commander of the tracking station. Apparently, we had not shown enough subservience. He ended up writing a piece about both of us which he dropped off at each subsequent port of call. It got back to the Department which read it for what it was: a diatribe by a bitter old man who had too much money. Nothing ever came of this episode, but at the time it shook me up - a young Foreign Service officer publicly reprimanded by a rich American.

Q: As far as your Kenya area, what interested you about what was going on at the coast?

SHINN: I was focusing on the political situation. The Swahili culture is predominant in the coastal areas, which is why I was assigned the area since I could speak the local language. And then there were the ship visits to Mombasa. I went there whenever a U.S. navy ship visited. I also did a lot of basic political reporting on the mood and views of the coastal inhabitants.

Q: Was there a naval officer resident in Mombasa?

SHINN: We did not have one at the time. We did later on. At one time, we even had a consulate

in Mombasa, but not during my tour. One of our officers died of malaria while serving at that post. In my time, there weren't that many naval visits, perhaps one every six months. Furthermore, the ships were not big ones; they tended to be fairly self-sufficient once they docked. I didn't have to provide that many services; reliable local providers did most of the work. The visits were not onerous; my main job was to grease the skids when necessary and to help out when sailors got into trouble, an inevitable event. I remember one sailor who tore down a Kenyan flag and urinated on it in a public street. That was not a great experience. The fact that he was inebriated did not much help.

Q: How did you get him out of this predicament?

SHINN: This problem came to the attention of the ship's commanding officer before it came to my attention. An officer immediately went to the police station. The officer got the sailor to apologize profusely and the ship left immediately thereafter.

Q: What were the politics of Kenya during this tour?

SHINN: This was the era known as "Kikuyu domination." The president was a Kikuyu. That ethnic group held the power in the country. At the same time, other ethnic groups such as the Luo were trying to increase their political power. Tom Mboya, a bright young labor leader and a Luo, wanted to succeed Kenyatta. He was later assassinated. I had the sense that the Kikuyu were still deeply entrenched and would remain so while Kenyatta was around. After that, our crystal ball became cloudy; it was possible that after Kenyatta's demise, the political situation in Kenya would change drastically. As it happened, the situation did change, but in a more orderly fashion than we expected. Kenyatta's vice president, Daniel arap Moi, a Kalenjin, took power as Kenyatta's anointed successor. Kalenjins were a minority, but managed to develop a coalition with other ethnic groups and became the power brokers who controlled Kenya until recently.

Q: What tribes were on the coast?

SHINN: There was a series of small minority tribes. The Kamba, a fairly large tribe, lived just back from the coast. Some of the ethnic groups were known as Swahili; there were others that did not belong to that grouping; they lived in the hills above the Indian Ocean. There was no predominant tribe along the coast.

Q: Were they a factor in Kenyan politics?

SHINN: They were not insignificant because the coast was a highly populated area. So the coastal folks had some voting power and had to be taken into account. Furthermore, control of a coast is an important factor in any country; no regime wants its major port to be independent of central control. But the coastal people were politically marginalized.

Q: Kenya at the time took votes seriously - every vote counted.

SHINN: I think that is correct and I would argue that votes still matter in Kenya today, although Moi has been fairly adept at manipulating the system. Parliament has always been a strong,

viable institution. It certainly was when I was there. It had a strong opposition which was quite outspoken. Kenya had and has a free press. So there exist several basic components of a democratic system, which so far has not come to fruition because of Moi's manipulations. Elections were something the population paid attention to.

Q: When you covered your area, what did you do, who did you see, where did you go?

SHINN: My beat was not parliament. Other officers in the section covered that institution. As the most junior officer in the section, in addition to my coastal and Seychelles assignments, I would get a lot of grunt work such as required reports. I also covered the Swahili press.

Q: Who would you see as you covered the coast?

SHINN: It was mostly civil servants, the Kenyan Navy and port officials. There would also be politicians and labor leaders. There was a fairly active labor organization on the coast dealing with Mombasa port activities. I had good relations with the police primarily because of the ship visits. They were useful contacts for other purposes as well. I would sometimes prowl the bars to see if I could get a feel for what was on the mind of the ordinary citizen. I traveled up and down the coast to follow the economics of the area. That would put me in touch with some members of the business community. There was a British consul in Mombasa whom I would always see.

Q: Tell us a little more about the economy.

SHINN: Tourism was just beginning along the coast. It is now a major component of the economy. During my time, the economy was relatively weak. There were a fair number of tourists visiting Tsavo National Park. That added to the economy, although it was not a major contributor to Mombasa's economy. There were two well known tourist locations - Malindi and Lamu. But in general, the coastal area was poor. Much of the economy relied on subsistence agriculture.

Q: Was your research on Somalia at all useful in Kenya?

SHINN: Somalia did not affect Mombasa very much, but did impact the northern part of the coast where Somalia and Kenya meet. Somalia's major impact was on Kenya's Northeastern province, which was inhabited by Somalis. Somalia claimed the province as its own and wanted to reincorporate it into Somalia. The Somali flag has a five pointed star. One represents former Italian Somalia, one the former British Somaliland, one Djibouti, one the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and the last the Northeastern province of Kenya. My previous research on Somalia was relevant.

Q: Was Tanzania a factor in the politics of the Kenya coast?

SHINN: Not so much on the coast because there weren't very good transportation connections between the coastal regions of the two countries. The best connections are further inland. Tanzania loomed large in Kenya because of the old East African Community, which during this time was still a viable organization, although there were signs of fraying. Ultimately, it collapsed

entirely; in fact, at one stage, the Kenyan-Tanzanian border was closed entirely. There was always some jealousy by the Tanzanians at Kenya's perceived economic success which Tanzania was not able to match, in part because of its socialist policies. Kenya was also seen, and rightly so, as having gained the greatest advantage from the East African Community. Both Uganda and Tanzania resented that very much; this was probably the principal cause of the Community's collapse. While we were in Kenya, there was a common East African currency, a common university system, a common shipping line, railroad and airline, and free and unencumbered movement of goods among the three member countries. They are trying to revive this concept, but I don't think it will ever return to its former importance.

Q: Did the British actually leave the running of the government to the Kenyans or did they keep control?

SHINN: The British hand was still noticeable in Kenya, probably more than in any other independent African country. In comparison to Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana or Sierra Leone, there was nothing comparable to the Kenyan situation. This was largely due to the small white settler community that remained after independence. At the time of independence, that community may have represented only about 1% or 2% of the population, but it had a major impact on the country; it controlled the largest farms and held a few key positions in the government such as the minister of agriculture. There were a fair number of British advisors in the Kenyatta government. British influence was substantial. In much of Africa, the U.S. has replaced the United Kingdom as the predominant foreign power; in Kenya, it is still probably the UK that exerts primary influence.

Q: Did the social life in Nairobi show this British influence?

SHINN: Absolutely, although we did not travel with that crowd. We would hear stories about that life style. I can recall one story about an American diplomat who reportedly just before our arrival had a convertible and traveled around town with a cheetah in the back seat. I think the story was true and was a reflection of the colonial mentality that the British left behind. The former life style continued in the British settler community and among some of the long time members of the expatriate community. Kenya attracted some interesting characters. I ran into one of them at a party to which we had been invited. I had no idea who was coming to the party. When we arrived, I mingled as was expected. I walked up to one person and we introduced ourselves. He told me that his name was Bill Holden; I asked him what he did. He said he was in the movie industry! I never realized until the next day while talking with the host that I had been talking with Bill Holden the "movie star." I was left speechless because I had not recognized him.

Q: Did your seniors spend any time trying to improve your skills?

SHINN: I was actually very blessed in that regard. I had a supportive ambassador who encouraged his staff to take every possible opportunity to enjoy the tour and improve oneself. My immediate boss in the Political Section was Ralph Jones; the second in command was Russ Heater. I worked closely with both and they were most supportive. They would take time to teach me the finer points of reporting and other political work. I think that happens less often

today. I could not have had a better introduction to political work than what I received in Nairobi. Heater was a talented labor affairs officer; he also followed parliament closely. He and Jones regularly included me in social events so that I could become acquainted with the various players even though I did not have any reporting responsibilities for those areas. It helped me understand the country better. Heater would review my work carefully; he did not nit-pick, but would take time to explain to me why I should take a different approach. His advice was always helpful. I was very fortunate in having Jones and Heater as supervisors.

Q: Too often people misunderstand the reason for political reporting. It is not like journalism reporting on events. A political officer has a specific audience whom he or she must target and write for.

SHINN: That is right and I learned that in the Kenya assignment. I had not learned that in Beirut because I did not serve in the political section there. I did write some commercial reports, but those are entirely different than political reports.

Q: You mentioned labor work. It was important in those days.

SHINN: It was much more important than today. My tour in Kenya was during a Democratic presidency. There was more focus on labor issues. George Meany loomed large and Irving Brown of the AFL-CIO was very interested in African labor movements. It was an important subject for reporting, particularly in a country like Kenya because it had a strong labor movement.

Q: How in a tribal society, did labor become so strong and important?

SHINN: It might well have happened because Kenya is a tribal society. Tom Mboya's union tended to be heavily Luo; it was built around that tribe. I am sure that was not by accident. I don't recall the tribal origins of the other labor leaders or whether their unions tended to be tribal, but I would guess that tribal allegiance contributed to the strength of the labor unions. Political party structure also tended to be ethnically based.

Q: How was Kenyatta viewed?

SHINN: He was revered. I was too junior to have met Kenyatta. I have always regretted that because he was one of the people that I wished I could have met. I met a lot of African presidents later in my Foreign Service career. As a Swahili language officer, I would be asked periodically to attend his rallies and report on his speeches; I also read the Swahili press since I was the only officer who could speak the language. That gave me a view of Kenyatta that others in the embassy did not have. He had a tendency at public events to say things that were never reported in the press. I remember on one occasion, while speaking in Swahili, Kenyatta criticized the Kenyan Asian community. That spread like wild fire among the Kenyans who heard the speech; it was exactly what they wanted to hear. He was not threatening, but at the same time, he was clearly putting the Asians on notice that they had better be good citizens or they might run into difficulties. His words were never reported in the English or Swahili press. He had an effect on people at rallies; he was charismatic and impacted his audience. He was a leader during the

“Mau Mau” period and a true nationalist.

The only negative aspect of his leadership was his tendency to encourage Kikuyu domination. Some other ethnic members resented that, but as long as he was alive, he was seen as the leader of his country.

Q: Was our embassy in general quite positive on political developments in Kenya?

SHINN: I would say so, in general. It was concerned about the post-Kenyatta era.

Q: You mentioned Ambassador Atwood's book "The Red and the Black". I understand that it was not well received in Kenya.

SHINN: It was very badly received. Atwood preceded Ferguson as ambassador. The book was published as I arrived in Nairobi. Kenyatta and the government were very unhappy with the book. It revealed things about Kenya which were critical. I think what irritated the Kenyans more than anything was that Atwood took the opportunity to describe his private conversations with senior Kenya government officials, including Kenyatta, and published them for private gain, in their view. They viewed that as a violation of an ambassador's role. These days one hears of such conversations quite often and we don't think much of it, but then it was a new phenomenon. Kenyan anger towards Atwood was palpable; I can remember that many of the press articles in Swahili which I was translating were very critical of Atwood and his book. I should note that half of the book was on Guinea, where Atwood also served as ambassador. It was never much of a problem there because the Guineans are French speakers and few of them could read the book. In any case, it never became an issue in Guinea.

Q: Atwood was a journalist; the book was well written. I remember the scuttlebutt in the Foreign Service which took the opportunity to point out that this was one of the problems with having political appointees who abused privileges to advance themselves after leaving the Service.

SHINN: I remember Ambassador Ferguson, who was also a political appointee, was absolutely livid during the first part of his tour because he spent so much time trying to put out fires in order to minimize damage to the Kenya-U.S. relationship. The Kenyans were suspicious that Ferguson would also write a book after his tour. They were circumspect in what they would say to the American ambassador. The book caused a real problem.

Q: Did you and your wife get to know Kenyans fairly well?

SHINN: Not as well as we would have liked. That was in due part because my tour was cut short. We were not in Nairobi long enough to become as closely acquainted with some Kenyans as we would have done during a full tour. There were some exceptions, but in general we found that the foreign community tended to spend a lot of time together. In addition, I think the Atwood book made the Kenyans a little suspicious of us and they did not want to get too close to Americans.

Q: Had the social scene and facilities, like swimming clubs, pretty much integrated by this time?

SHINN: It was just beginning the process, but was still largely influenced by British colonialism. My wife and I joined the golf club, even though I did not play golf. I think there may have been a few Kenyan members. I played softball with an embassy group. By and large we were not very involved in the social set. My wife had our second child in Nairobi; that constricted our activities. We occasionally attended local theater productions. We traveled extensively around Kenya, climbed Mount Kilimanjaro and visited most of the game parks. Kenya was a nice tour; there wasn't much excitement such as we encountered in subsequent assignments.

ROY STACEY
East African Community Office, USAID
Nairobi (1967-1968)

Mr. Stacey was raised in Hawaii and educated at the University of California and George Washington University. Joining USAID in 1963, he served first on the Somali desk in Washington and was subsequently assigned to Mogadishu as Assistant Program Officer. Continuing as an Africa specialist, Mr. Stacey served with USAID in Nairobi, Mbabane, Abidjan, Paris and Harare. From 1986 to 1988, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Following retirement Mr. Stacey worked with the World Bank, also on Southern African Affairs. Mr. Stacey was interviewed by W. Haven North in 1999.

Q: Part of the Korry report was to emphasize regional programs?

STACEY: Right. To emphasize regional. I do think there that looking back I don't have a lot of observations on the program with the East Africa community, but I think it was a missed opportunity. Our approach to the East Africa community was very technical. We were doing things with seed sterilization and all kinds of things with livestock and veterinary control. It assumed that the political consensus on the institutions was there. The political consensus wasn't there. Our diplomats and our ambassadors had no major political interest in the East African community, so it seemed like our whole approach to it was technical. We didn't have a political strategy. If we had a political strategy we would have recognized that one of the things that has enabled Europe to get to progress has been the compensatory mechanisms which made sure that poorer countries like Portugal and Greece would come along with the rest. Of course that is what was missing in the East African community, with most of the growth and economic activity going to Kenya. If we had more of a political approach and more of a political strategy, I think that maybe we could have preserved more of that regional program in that period. It looked like such a wonderful opportunity at the time.

Q: Their future very much depended on linking into some sort of regional complex for trade and development issues.

STACEY: On the donor side, during this time, we had a tough situation in that the Sahara already had very high levels of aid. In a sense the Club had done it's job in increasing donor

flows to the Sahel and as a result we had a group of countries who still ranked among the poorest in the world, who, a lot of people would say, were not developing - in other words, managing vulnerability, managing crisis, is not a development success. It certainly doesn't show up in the data. There was an improvement in infant mortality rates, which of course increased the population growth rate. The donors felt that one, there was a lot of aid going in there; two, that it wasn't having an impact and wasn't succeeding because look at the aid flows and look at the per capita GDP, the literacy rates, the number of kids that aren't in school. At that time donors began "picking winners and losers" as I call it. Coming up with various criteria for trying to concentrate their aid on countries that were going to progress more rapidly or countries that had a better approach to democracy or human rights, countries who had gone through these kinds of democratic transitions.

In the process of trying to pick these winners or losers, it was difficult. For instance, I had come to the Club as officially nominated by the U.S. government. My nomination had to go through the White House even. Then immediately AID starts closing down. It closed down in Cape Verde, closed down in Chad, later closed down in Niger and Gambia, because of coup d'etat. It also closed down in Burkina Faso. Now the World Bank thinks Burkina Faso, Chad and Gambia are all good performers, but we didn't reopen. So it was a difficult time. A lot of donors were willing to consider their regional programs with CILSS, but they were closing down bilaterally. You could see the double standard setting in. Even if Kenya perhaps had a worse record on corruption, human rights and democracy, we weren't going to close down in Kenya. Even if Egypt has issues with human rights and democracy, we weren't going to close down in Egypt. This double standard was not lost on the Sahelians. In a sense, we had to change the debate.

Elliot Berg was instrumental in working with us on this, because the Sahelians had to begin to see that the high level of aid dependency that had resulted the last twenty years was not a healthy situation. It worked against capacity building. It tended to maybe de-responsibilize their officials. We all had a mutual interest in financing a sustainable development from things other than aid as we've known it-ODA. How do we make that shift to finance development from trade and investment over time, and not just this aid dependency conundrum that we had gotten into. We have had a very healthy dialogue with the Sahelians during the last five years on this. And I think that it's not an easy answer, because there are all sorts of impediments other than policies which prevent the kind of private investment coming in that you would like to see. We like to think that it's as simplistic as policy, but there's human capital, infrastructure and being land locked, and these are major factors.

THEODORE A. BOYD
Regional Communicator, USIS
Nairobi (1967-1969)

Theodore A. Boyd was born on October 9, 1941 in Terre Haute, Indiana. He served in the U.S. Army from 1959 to 1964. Throughout his career he has held positions in countries including the Congo, Kenya, Ethiopia, the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Iran, Nigeria, Ecuador, Togo, and Cameroon. Mr. Boyd was

interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on November 29, 2005.

BOYD: OK, let's see in April of '67 to Nairobi.

Q: To Nairobi. How did that come about?

BOYD: Rumor was that if you served in Leopoldville or Kinshasa or a major hardship post, if you asked for something better you would get it and at that time Nairobi was very good duty.

Q: So you were in Nairobi from when to when?

BOYD: '67-'69 and I was regional communicator there.

Q: What does that mean?

BOYD: That meant that if there were posts that needed a communicator (some posts where there was just one communicator and that one communicator wanted to go on vacation), I would go out and fill in. During that time I was based in Nairobi but also served TDY (temporary duty) in Lusaka, Mauritius, and Eritrea.

Q: That was a pretty good way to get a feel for Africa.

BOYD: Yeah.

Q: How did you find the embassy in Nairobi?

BOYD: The U.S. Embassy in an insurance company building and we occupied the upper floors. It was quite well appointed. We had a Vice Presidential visit and we also had a Secretary of State visit back when Rogers was Secretary of State just before Kissinger was elevated.

Q: Did you see a difference in how the embassy fit together, morale and all that then compared with Kinshasa?

BOYD: In Kinshasa morale was pretty good but there was kind of close knit, people spent a lot of time together.

Q: A little more danger.

BOYD: Nairobi was a major tourist attraction so we had a lot more to do. There was AID (Aid for International Development), Peace Corps and other activities so there was good socializing.

Q: Did you get out and around?

BOYD: Yeah we got out and around there. In addition to the regional travel, I got down to Mombassa and traveled in country in Kenya, yes.

Q: How did you find Mauritius?

BOYD: Well, at that time it was one big sugar cane field. The embassy had just opened and didn't even have communication facilities. We were using the facilities of a British ship that was off coast called the H.M.S. Mauritius. So everything came in encrypted, all the classified stuff came in encrypted that was ok. The embassy was just opening so they had a series of regional communicators I was one amongst several.

Q: I'm sure things have changed a lot so we aren't divulging any secrets at all. Basically did we have machines or something that took care of things or did you have to do it by hand?

BOYD: Depending on the availability of equipment. There is one-time-tape where you have two machines running and then there is a one time pad where you had to decrypt by hand. I didn't have to do that much because Mauritius wasn't that strategic at that time but it was part of our plan of globalization. You have to be everywhere.

Q: After the time in...

BOYD: Nairobi.

Q: Nairobi...

OWEN CYLKE
East African Regional Capital Development Officer, USAID
Nairobi (1968-1969)

Mr. Cylke was born and raised in New Jersey and educated at Yale University. After a tour with the Peace Corps in Ethiopia, he joined USAID in 1966 and served several years in Washington, where he dealt with African matters. In 1968 he was posted to Nairobi, the first of his overseas posts, which include Kabul, Cairo and New Delhi. In all, he dealt with environmental and development matters with USAID. Following retirement Mr. Cylke continued work in his field, including holding the Presidency of the Association of Big Eight Universities, which also dealt with developmental and environmental matters in the developing world. Mr. Cylke was interviewed by W. Haven North in 1996.

CYLKE: My next job, though, was the same business. This is how it happens again. You may have been at the meeting - I was on an African Development Bank trip in Nairobi. I was walking down the street at 10 o'clock at night and I ran into Al Disdier, who had been the deputy director of CDF, my mentor, who got me into African Development. He had just come out of a mission director's meeting. (inaudible due to static)

Q: This was in 19-

CYLKE: This was in 1968. He said, "I am probably the first person to know that this office is going to come into being (inaudible due to static)." I said, "My God, would I like to go to Nairobi." He said, "Well, you're the first employee selected. You can go to Nairobi." So, I went there with my wife, who was pregnant at that time (inaudible due to static), to Nairobi, which really excited me, to open this new office called "The East African Regional Capital Development." Still capital development office. There was one in West Africa, which opened before I left Abidjan. (inaudible due to static) came out. He was the director of that office.

Q: This was (inaudible).

CYLKE: (inaudible) when it was set up. It was called "EARCDO:" East Africa Regional Capital Development Office. Four projects were set up. They didn't have the support function that you have now. Recall that, I think, up until this time, the Capital Development Office stayed just in Washington. This was in '68, soon to be abolished.

Again, it was the Capital Projects office, so I revisited old projects that I had worked on: the water supply in Mogadishu, the Tanzam Highway, etc. But, at this point, something had dramatically changed. I think the economy of the East Africa office was really being challenged by the mission director, as was the Capital Development operation. There were tremendous hassles with the mission director in Ethiopia (inaudible due to static), with the mission director in Tanzania, who was (inaudible due to static). (Inaudible due to static), who asserted the authority of the mission director over the program. It was the teaming of the capital development officer (inaudible due to static). (Inaudible due to static) due to its institutional history, but we almost felt that they were another agency. This was at a time when the agency was (inaudible due to static) of AID, which was being born (inaudible due to static).

The issues that were being argued over were not the most important things in the world, but they were perceived to be bureaucratically. It was quite clear that there was a tremendous amount of tension. Fortunately, we had a director, John Withers, who's greatest skill may be a diplomatic interagency, interpersonal kind of style. I remember saying once in the office, "Gee, John, you must have great confidence in us" because we were all young guys, seven young people in the office. He said, no, he had no confidence in us. His confidence was that he could get out of any jam you could get him into. I think that was fortunate because there were quite major battles.

But, at any rate-

Q: Why did they create these two offices? What was the motivation for doing that?

CYLKE: I don't know. You may know better than I. I would have a hunch that it was the sense that the Capital Development office was in Washington, wasn't close enough to the action, wasn't relating enough, was too removed. This was part of the argument that missions made. The next step, of course, was the abolition of that separateness of capital development and moving it right into the mainstream agency. This was an interim step, I think, on the way to that. I would assume that that's what that was about. Also, perhaps creating opportunities for loan officers, to keep them. Otherwise, they were going to leave the Africa Bureau and go someplace else. So, I wouldn't be surprised if that had something to do with it.

I only stayed a year. As it turned out, (inaudible due to static). My dad had passed away a month before we were married in '68, right before we went to Abidjan. My daughter in law died while we were in Abidjan. My mother died while we were in Nairobi. (Inaudible due to static). My wife was just horrified from this and she was going home. There was just too much to handle, so we just stayed a year and went back to Washington. Nairobi was such a brilliant living experience. My landlord turned out to be the number two in the Kenyan police, who I have seen as recently as three years ago. We've maintained a relationship over time. The former tenant of my house was a CIA officer. I'm absolutely convinced that this guy thought I was a CIA officer, because I lived in the house and he used to come and report. He used to come and tell me the most incredible stories about the inner workings of the political system of Kenya. I always wondered why I was selected to have these crazy conversations, but I think he thought I worked for someone else because my predecessor had. At any rate, I traveled a lot. It was a wonderful (inaudible due to static) carrying on of a project activity (inaudible due to static).

When I came back to Washington, it was really quite a dramatic change. The Capital Development office was abolished. So, that was the end of it. That was 1971. (Inaudible due to static) of the combined office, which took technical offices and the old Capital Development office and incorporated them into a central office. Another person like John Withers, with extraordinary interpersonal inter-institutional skills to smooth that (inaudible due to static) and a very successful person, Princeton Lyman, our Ambassador to Nigeria, South Africa, and now responsible for Refugee (inaudible due to static).

DICK ERSTEIN
Country Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Nairobi (1969-1971)

Dick Erstein entered into the Information Program in 1951. His postings abroad included Greece, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia, Ghana, and Kenya. Mr. Erstein was interviewed by Jack O'Brien in 1989.

Q: And then what was your assignment after that, Dick?

ERSTEIN: After that it was Public Affairs Officer in Nairobi. There was a small hiatus between the arrival of Ben's new deputy and the then Nairobi PAO's departure, about two months, during which time I made a couple of inspections.

Q: What was the nature of our program in Nairobi?

ERSTEIN: We were very well liked by the people, by Kenyans. It was a very pleasant milieu. They made good use of our facilities. We were welcome wherever we went. For instance, while I was there we had the moon landing and shortly thereafter, as many posts did, we received a piece of the moon rock and traveling throughout the country into the most primitive areas the moon rock caused excitement and great admiration for the United States.

Another example was that the then deputy prime minister, Daniel arap Moi was nearly always available for our activities. He had been to the US on a leader grant. When Jomo Kenyatta died, Daniel arap Moi became president of Kenya and as of this date is still president of Kenya.

Q: And so you had how many years there?

ERSTEIN: Two years.

Q: Dick, as we leave Africa, do you have any general observations or conclusions you'd like to record?

ERSTEIN: The main impression one gets in Africa during those years and today is one of diversity. Some of the countries had an English overlay, some had French, and some had even Belgian or Portuguese. There was great diversity in the quality of the local employees. In some countries you were starting from scratch with people with little or no education. On the other hand, when I arrived in Rhodesia there was a good number of the leading senior employees who were of English extraction, very competent. One of the best secretaries I've ever had was an English lady in Salisbury. In Kenya, even years after the independence, the USIS librarian still was a German who had come there as a refugee during World War II, and he was kept on after mandatory retirement because we could not replace him with any Kenyan or African who had any library management experience. About six months before I left, we were able to hire an African employee who was a graduate of the Library School in Uganda to replace our librarian who then retired to Europe. This was as late as 1971.

ROBINSON MCILVAINE
Ambassador
Kenya (1969-1973)

Ambassador Robinson McIlvaine entered the State Department in the early 1950s. Before his career in the Foreign Service, he graduated from Harvard, served in the Navy and worked in both journalism and advertising. His overseas posts included Lisbon, Dahomey, Guinea, and Kenya. Ambassador McIlvaine was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in April 1988.

Q: You went from Guinea to Kenya.

MCILVAINE: That's right, yes.

Q: This was under the Nixon Administration. Did changes of administration mean much in Africa?

MCILVAINE: Not really, no. I went to the Congo under Eisenhower, to Dahomey under Kennedy, to Guinea under Johnson, and to Kenya under Nixon.

Q: The only difference being that if you were a Harvard man, you had a little more difficulty. You couldn't go to Senegal. [Laughter]

MCILVAINE: [Laughter] I guess that particular day, I couldn't have gone anywhere with LBJ. It didn't matter.

Q: How did your assignment to Kenya come about?

MCILVAINE: Joe Palmer, a good friend of ours, was then Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, and he wrote me a letter and said he wanted me to go to Nigeria. At this point, we'd had six years in the "armpit" of Africa. So I wrote to Joe, I said, "Look, Alice really, cannot take much more of this subtropical stuff from a health point of view, and I sure as hell don't want to, but I'll go where I have to go. Could we possibly get some place like Morocco, you know, a dry area?"

Well, he came back and said, "Sorry, we hear that a politico's been promised Morocco, but would you mind going to Kenya?"

Mind? I said, "Mind? When?" That's how it happened.

Q: Again, what were our interests in Kenya? We're talking about 1969. You were there from 1969 to 1973. What were our interests in Kenya when you were going out? How did you prepare yourself?

MCILVAINE: Kenya was considered, as a much bigger embassy, more important to the U.S. than either Dahomey or Guinea, which were always considered basically French provinces. Of course, a lot of tourists went there to look at the wildlife. So there was much more interest in Kenya. Indeed, we'd already had two non-career ambassadors there. In fact, I was the first career ambassador there. There was some concern about Jomo Kenyatta, who was of a certain age and Tom Mboya, the obvious successor to Kenyatta, had been assassinated.

Q: This was in July of 1969.

MCILVAINE: That's right. So there was some concern about it. I think, frankly, another non-career would have gone there had this not happened. Maybe they decided there might be a coup d'etat, and you'd better have old anti-insurgency McIlvaine there. [Laughter]

Q: You'd already been through this sort of thing.

MCILVAINE: A few times. I'm sure that's how I got the job. But anyhow, it was nice. We loved it there, and liked it so much that after it was over, I retired from the Foreign Service and stayed on there and ran a wildlife conservation program.

Q: You said that our interests in Dahomey and Guinea, Guinea was bauxite, Dahomey was the presence. How about Kenya?

MCILVAINE: I think that our interests there were more substantial from a geographic point of view. Nairobi is very definitely a meeting place in Africa, a fantastic number of airlines coming in, criss-crossing, the continent and coming in from India, from Arabia, to the U.S., to Europe, and I guess Nairobi is the most sophisticated city in black Africa.

Then you had in Jomo Kenyatta a very remarkable man, who, despite having been imprisoned by the Brits, when he finally got to power, was the guy who saved all their hides. It was very interesting to me to find how many of the Brits stayed on, particularly on the farms. When they had problems, they would go to Kenyatta. That guy who had been called a demon and a leader of the Mau-Mau, and everything you can think of just a few years ago, was the one who saved their bacon. He understood what his country could do and what it couldn't do. He was very much like Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, and as a result, I would say that those two countries have done the best in Africa, as far as economic development is concerned, because they did not jump in over their heads with things that they couldn't handle. They kept enough people around to manage things until their people could be trained. Today, almost everything is run by Kenyans, but they couldn't have done it in 1963 when they became independent. I am not as familiar with the Ivory Coast, but I would say it's somewhat similar there.

So we had an interest in the stability of Kenya and in Kenyatta, and in what happened after his death. Everybody who ever came there would always ask me, "Has Kenyatta named a successor?" I would explain that people don't do that. I mean, it's either a total dictatorship and a guy gets knocked off, and whoever knocks him off is the successor, or you have a constitutional government. According to the constitution of Kenya, the vice president becomes president. Well, indeed, when President Kenyatta died, that's exactly what happened. Mr. Moi, vice president for about eight years, became president, and he's still president. So that's one of the interesting things about Kenya, that they were able to get over this transition from the founding father to a not-so-well-qualified successor, without bloodshed.

Q: Did you have much dealings with Kenyatta?

MCILVAINE: Not a great deal, because one of my predecessors--and I've said this to his face, so I don't mind saying it--Bill Attwood--by the way, Bill Attwood had been ambassador to Guinea and to Kenya. In other words, I followed him twice. But he was basically a journalist. He had been editor of LOOK magazine, and he was a political appointee by Kennedy, so the minute he decides he's going back to journalism, he has to knock off a book about his experiences. It was called "The Reds and the Blacks." Well, he put in that book what various senior officers told him about other senior officers in Kenya. I mean, any damn fool would know better than to do that, but, of course, it made much better reading that way. So Mr. Attwood was declared a prohibited immigrant, and by the way, he'd bought some land there and hoped to go back, and he was never able to go back and hasn't to this day.

As a result of that, the old man--that's Kenyatta--was very annoyed, as was the attorney general, because he was the one that was quoted as saying nasty things about other people still around. The word went out that nobody in the government was to have anything to do with Embassies,

except the foreign minister. And you could never find the foreign minister. I had to take up golf in order to see the foreign minister.

So we didn't have much contact with Kenyatta. My main contact was with Moi, who was the vice president. I found that I could get to see him relatively easily. He was very serious, no great intellect, but he was a hard worker. He was a very loyal vice president to Kenyatta and probably couldn't have had the job if he hadn't done it that way. Because he was from a minor tribe, he was not considered a threat to the Kikuyu establishment. In Kenya, you've got tribalism, same as you have elsewhere in Africa.

Q: Was the main tribe the Luo?

MCILVAINE: No. The Kikuyu are the largest...Kenyatta's tribe...the "Eastern establishment." The Luo, which was Tom Mboya's tribe, are smaller and from the west of Kenya.

Q: I see. What sort of things would you be going to see the vice president about?

MCILVAINE: Oh, mostly nitty-gritty. I remember I was going to go to the northeast. That's the area on the Ethiopian and Somali border, and they'd had a lot of troubles there with the Somalis and other tribes. Indeed, it was kind of a prohibited area. I wanted to go up there and look around, so I did. I came back and since it wasn't easy to go and chat with the president, I chatted with the vice president. I said, "They all feel totally left out there. They're not a part of Kenya. Nobody ever goes there. There hasn't been a minister there in five years. You've never been there, the president's never been there. In your political interest, you ought to start doing something about it."

Well, he was very interested in that idea. I had a long talk about it, and I got him to go. He became very keen on this. When I saw him again, he said, "Where else haven't I been? That was kind of interesting, and I see a lot of their problems." So I got him to go to other places. We sort of became friends as a result of that.

In Kenya, most of the politicians were in business, and it was awfully hard to find any of them in their office, and it really wasn't worthwhile to find them in their office, because they really didn't know much about what their office was doing, they were so busy with their gas stations and their factories and their farms. You talk about capitalism, Kenya's got it! It makes some of our robber barons of the 1880's look like pikers--but it works. It really works.

Q: Were we having a lot of American tourists there getting into trouble? Did you have trouble trying to get them out?

MCILVAINE: Not too much. I was there six years, four as ambassador, two with wildlife. But I don't remember any really serious problems with American citizens, except with a man named Peter Beard or with students who were on drugs.

Q: How was the staff of the embassy?

MCILVAINE: Most of the time it was very good. Some were better than others. It was much bigger than I was used to in Guinea.

Q: There's a tendency, I've noticed, that the nicer the place, the larger the staff.

MCILVAINE: That's right. You can count on it.

Q: Which does not have to do with the relative importance of a country.

MCILVAINE: I recall one time a gentleman arrived, and he turned out to be a representative of the Federal Aviation Agency. He wanted to talk to me about having a Federal Aviation attaché. I absolutely horrified him. I said, "What for?"

"Oh, oh, oh." Nobody had ever asked him that before.

He said, "We have a requirement." I hate that word. A lot of people use that for self-serving purposes.

I said, "Who requires you?"

"Well, the President and Congress."

And I said, "Well, tell me about this requirement."

He said, "That is, we're responsible for U.S. airlines and how they operate, and we have to have a guy out here to check on Pan Am and TWA."

I said, "Well, you know, I date way back when Pan Am was the first airline we had, and it's slogan is the world's most experienced airline." I said, "My guess would be that if Pan Am can't get from New York to Nairobi without your help, it ought to be abolished." And I said, "In any case, if it does require your help, why can't you put your guy on New York and he can do a round-trip and see how they fly both ways?" Well, he was furious about that. [Laughter]

And we had a Library of Congress attaché, and what did he do? He went around and bought books everywhere and magazines. We had a huge Peace Corps, a huge AID mission, and I guess there must have been 500 or 600 Americans getting a government check one way or another.

Q: Again, looking at it at that time, how effective was our Peace Corps and our AID mission?

MCILVAINE: I think the Peace Corps was very good, very good. We had to change its emphasis during my period. After independence, there was a big push to get education, naturally, because prior to independence there had been no schools, except missionary schools, a few, very few. So to get real public education going required a lot of help and a lot of teachers, so the Peace Corps was the answer to that. They were in schools all over the bush. It soon got to be too difficult; I thought it was unfair for a Peace Corps kid to be in a bush situation where he's the only foreigner around, set up and running the school, while the head of the school board is probably absconding

with half of the funds, and this poor kid knows it, and what does he do about it? If it's a girl, she's being chased all the time by the mayor or the head of the School Board. I just felt that was an area, rural schools, we ought to get out of, so we changed.

By this time, anyhow, they had trained their own teachers. If you keep doing the job for them, they'll never put them in; they'll go to something else. So we got out of teaching in rural primary school and limited it to the bigger high schools on hard subjects like physics and math and so on and so forth. Then we shifted the emphasis to practical things such as kinds of fish, soil conservation, and other projects of a basic nature, which I think was the correct thing to do.

The AID programs, I don't know as all of them were very effective. One example would be our efforts in range management: the concept of digging more wells when the cattle did not have enough water. That's the worst possible thing you can do. You dig a well, and then the cattle will come for 100 miles around to that well and trample everything. So the Sahara moves south. Too many cows is the real reason for the Sahel and all those problems. Too many people, too many cows, both.

Q: What about the British? Did you defer to them on many of the AID things, or were we in competition with them?

MCILVAINE: No. That was the big difference between the francophone and the Anglophone colonies. The French were very jealous of their prerogatives in French-speaking countries, and I for one didn't feel that I wanted to contest it, anyhow. I mean, we've got enough on our plate without taking over something that they're willing to do. Now, the Brits didn't have this attitude at all. They didn't mind our helping in Kenya. Sure, we coordinated as best we could also with the United Nations effort and World Bank. They all had their offices there, and we used to have regular monthly meetings with the government on AID and what needed doing and so on and so forth, which was not ideal, but I think it saved a lot of duplication and other problems.

Trade was another matter. The British naturally wanted to sell Brit and we, U.S. We had a big battle over three aircrafts for East African Airlines. In the end we won and then bought 3 DC-3's.

Q: You were there during a major crisis or problem, that is, the expulsion of many of the so-called Asian, basically they were Indian, weren't they, of India and Pakistan?

MCILVAINE: Yes.

Q: From Uganda. And there was pressure put on those in Kenya. Did we have any role in this?

MCILVAINE: No, no, we didn't.

Q: Did we try to help or issue visas or protest to the government to alleviate the problems?

MCILVAINE: Well, the real problem was in Uganda, and I had nothing to do with that.

Q: Idi Amin.

MCILVAINE: He threw them all out overnight, just like that. That did create a tremendous dislocation problem. In Kenya, they never did anything like that, but there was often subtle pressure. After all, the classic thing that happened was that after independence in Kenya, an African who's been dealing always with an Asian, because all shops were run by Asians, particularly in the bush, and even a lot of them in Nairobi. So he'd been dealing with this guy all his life, owing money, and now you have independence! There is pressure to get the Africans in business so the Asians would sell out to them. The African thought all you did was sit behind the counter and dish out the food and take in the shillings, which, of course, is what you do up to a point, and then you run out of goods. The Africans didn't know where to go to replenish the stock. So they would go to Nairobi, and, of course, the only place they could get goods was to buy at retail prices from that same Asian who had a brother in Bombay and a cousin elsewhere to get things for him wholesale. These poor Africans were having a rough time getting into business. But they aren't dumb.

Today, 15 years later, I was just out there last year, and by God, there are a lot of African shops now running, and a lot of Africans in small businesses that used to be entirely Asians, and I don't know, I guess a lot of Asians have emigrated to Canada, and some to Australia.

I remember one time my wife, was talking to her Asian butcher, and he was complaining about conditions in Kenya. She said, "You know, why don't you go back to India?"

"Oh, Madame, we couldn't go do that. They're just as smart as we are there." So obviously they were there in Kenya exploiting (a) us whites, and (b) those blacks. [Laughter] They wouldn't think of going back to India, where the competition would be too stiff.

Q: There was no pressure on us to try to do anything. This was a local problem.

MCILVAINE: Yes.

Q: Were there any geopolitical problems there? Were we concerned about--I think of Tanzania, Somalia, Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan.

MCILVAINE: I think the main thing of that nature was the East African community, which we thought was a good thing. It was set up by the British before independence, with the idea that it would be so much easier for these fledgling countries to have a common railroad, airline, post and telegraph, and income tax system, actually, which would be run as the East African community, and you wouldn't have to have separate airlines, separate railroads, separate this, that, and the other thing. Indeed, it worked very well, except that pretty soon the disparity between the economies of the three countries became a telling factor. Tanzania, with Julius Nyerere, was sort of following the Sekou Toure line of African socialism. Nothing was working. And pretty soon they couldn't pay their share of the airline and this, that, and the other. Then you've got Idi Amin in Uganda and all that dislocation.

But what happened was that Kenya soon found itself financing the two neighbors in all their trade, and they got tired of it. At one point when all the East African Airline airplanes happened

to be in Nairobi, they grabbed them all. This, of course, made Julius Nyerere furious, because it happened to be at a time when he was having an international meeting and had counted on using one of the three DC-9s that belonged to the airline to transport people around, and he couldn't do it.

So the Kenyans just grabbed all the aircraft and, some of the boats on Lake Victoria. Anyhow, there was a big brouhaha. Then Nyerere closed the border between Tanzania and Kenya, and grabbed off all the airplanes there from the Kenya safari types. They sat around for five years. I used to see them every year, grass growing up around their wings. Finally, it got all settled.

Q: We played no particular role in that? We sort of sat back. We didn't act the role of the conciliator or anything?

MCILVAINE: No. The only role we played was, whenever we could, to encourage the concept of the East African community. Then when it was clear what was happening, we laid off that and said, "Well, too bad."

Q: How about bases? Were we at all interested in bases?

MCILVAINE: We weren't in my time. I believe that we have some kind of a training mission in Kenya now, Air Force. What it is, I don't know. We never even had military attachés.

Q: How about American business there?

MCILVAINE: There was a lot of it. Several plants. Union Carbide had a plant, Colgate-Palmolive-Peat. There were several banks. Firestone and General Motors each had manufacturing plants.

Q: Did they take care of themselves, or did you have to intervene to help?

MCILVAINE: Very occasionally. Pretty much they took care of themselves.

Q: How about oil exploration? Was that going on?

MCILVAINE: They never found any of that. People would come and go from various consortiums, trying to find it. As far as I know, oil has never been found.

Q: Businessmen could pretty well come in and do their business.

MCILVAINE: Yes, it was relatively easy, because English was spoken, and enough sophisticated people around to help out and so on and so forth.

Q: Did you retire in 1973? Was this of your own volition?

MCILVAINE: I had been there four years. We had just had an election, and I knew we were going to have another ambassador--well, somebody had been trying to get my chair the whole

time I was there! I think the only reason I had it for four years was the candidates sort of canceled each other out.

SAMUEL VICK SMITH
Economic/Commercial Officer
Nairobi (1970-1972)

Samuel Vick Smith was born in California in 1940 and graduated from New Mexico State University. He served in numerous posts including Nairobi, Vietnam, Madagascar, Tokyo and New Zealand. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: After Swahili training and whatever, you went off to Nairobi. You were there from when to when?

SMITH: From June of 1970 to December of 1972. So, two and a half years.

Q: What was your job?

SMITH: I was an Economic/Commercial officer, the third person in a three-person section. I forget how the numbers worked in those days, but I guess the head of the section was an FSO-3 and her or his deputy would be about an FSO-5 and then the junior officer was me at this point, an FSO-6.

Q: Who was the ambassador when you got out there?

SMITH: Almost the whole time I was there it was Ambassador Robinson McIlvaine.

Q: He just died.

SMITH: He just died, I think maybe since we last saw each other. I went to his funeral. A wonderful man. A man who hadn't really gotten into the Foreign Service and the State Department until he was forty or fifty.

Q: He was a newspaper editor.

SMITH: Yes, I guess owner and editor.

Q: Yes, a small newspaper.

SMITH: Yes. I didn't know until I went to this funeral service that he'd actually written a book about it which had been made into a movie. I think it's called, It Happens Every Thursday. I've got to see that movie. So, they had a weekly newspaper obviously. I just want to say that I can't say enough good things about Robinson McIlvaine. A wonderful man.

Q: Yes, I interviewed him a long time ago, but he struck me as being a very solid, nice guy.

SMITH: Solid, intelligent, a real gentleman, not a wimp, a gentleman.

Q: During this time, I know, you were at the bottom of the food chain, how did you see American relations with Kenya?

SMITH: Well, they were very good. Kenya had only been independent for seven years at that point. Jomo Kenyatta was still the first president. He and us and the British didn't like communists and were more or less in favor of a capitalistic society and not in favor of socialism. So, on almost all policy issues and for all I know, all policy issues, we got along very well. Mombasa, Kenya was one of the few ports on the Indian Ocean coast of Africa that the U.S. Navy not only could go to, but wanted to go to. So, one of my jobs in addition to being the Economic and Commercial officer was to take care of the U.S. Navy when it showed up in Mombasa, because this was one of the many periods when we did not have a consulate or any other office in Mombasa.

Q: What sort of commercial economic work were we doing?

SMITH: Thinking about it, I guess the commercial work that I did was all kinds of trade promotion. I was in charge of the commercial trade center we had which we called the "commercial offices." A separate office in an unsecured area where businessmen could come in and out and be assisted. We had two or three staff there. We would have catalog shows and other sorts of trade promotion events. Some of them we would gin up ourselves and some we would do at the behest of the Commerce Department. I enjoyed that and I got to meet a lot of the American businessmen who came through. In those days at least, Nairobi was one of the places that American businessmen wanted to go to for whatever reason and they'd come there to try to sell their things or buy something or invest. Everybody was pretty optimistic that Kenya was on the right track and that these relationships would prosper. The economic work I did was mostly the scheduled reporting, but I did a little bit of spot reporting on things that interested me like aviation, but most of what I did on the economic side, was the old CERP reports.

Q: These were reports on, I can't remember were these reports that were on a CERP system?

SMITH: Yes. Every post was assigned to do a certain amount of reports. Most of these were reports that lots of posts were doing and CERP I guess was called the "combined economic reporting program" and I think it depended on what kind of post you were in, what report you would do. There was a long list of these and in fact there was even an IBM card you were supposed to send in when you did the report. It produced a uniform reporting system.

Q: Did you find that sort of a bureaucracy or the way business was conducted, was conducive to Americans selling items there?

SMITH: Whose bureaucracy?

Q: The bureaucracy of Kenya.

SMITH: Even then it wasn't always easy. I think the investors were the ones that soon became the most disillusioned. At that time it was all very new and there were, probably four big U.S. investors who'd come in there optimistic and they were beginning to get less optimistic. The one I remember in particular and I guess I shouldn't mention the name of the company, in fact I won't even mention what they were making. They were a large American company with a well-known product and they were told that once they invested and started production they would have import protection. It didn't come to pass and they were bitter. They were in production, they were employing, I don't know, a couple hundred Kenyans, they had a large plant and I don't know how many millions of dollars they'd invested and they had all new equipment and they were making a good product, but they had competition, which they hadn't counted on. They were also unhappy because just across the border in Tanzania another U.S. company had set up a plant to make a similar product. That company had brought in old equipment and I suppose their investment was less and that was part of their competition. I think at one point they had thought that by setting up this plant in Kenya they would be able to service all of East Africa. Well, that wasn't going to be true. Those sort of things happened. It was all very new at the time I was there. You couldn't say it developed into a pattern. I believe that it did though. I believe that other investors were unhappy, too later, but I can't say that for a fact because then I got out of that business and the rest of it was only hearsay.

Q: What about competition with the British? I would have thought that by the time you got there the British would have had very deep roots as far as their products and all that, how did that work?

SMITH: What you had more were British trading companies whose products might come from anywhere. In many areas we weren't really competitive for a lot of reasons. For instance, motor cars. In those days, you may remember, our cars were these great big boats. They were horribly fuel inefficient and they weren't very good for the bad roads, as opposed to in the '30s. I used to talk to friends who had been in Kenya in the 1930s and they said in those days the only cars that would navigate the roads of Kenya were American cars because they were built for our bad roads here. By this time, if you had a lot of money you bought a Mercedes. If you didn't have much money at all, you bought a Volkswagen or an English Ford. If you were in the middle level, you got a Peugeot. The Japanese cars were just starting to come in. The most evident were the Toyota Land Cruisers. We should have been competitive with Jeeps and I don't know why we weren't.

Q: Did you find in the economic field, particularly in the commercial field, was there a major problem for American firms dealing with it because of payoffs, bribes, corruption and that sort of thing?

SMITH: I didn't find that. I think that later it became a real bad problem, but to tell you the truth, the time I was there I don't remember anybody saying that. There may have been problems. There was a competition for East African Airways for new airplanes. There were three international manufacturers interested in it. The rumor was, it was only a rumor, that each of them had had his man in the woodwork and one of them won.

Q: Which one won?

SMITH: McDonnell Douglas sold them DC-9s, which did very well, but there wasn't much business after that. I was in Madagascar, probably around '77 when the East African community just fell apart, and East African Airways did, too.

Q: While you were on the economic side, did you get involved in observing and listening to others talk about the political situation there?

SMITH: Yes, and as a matter of fact, I was also sometimes the labor reporting officer. I read about it in both open and closed sources.

Q: What about the political situation? Was Tom Mboya a figure?

SMITH: No, he was murdered while I was in the hospital in GW in the summer of '69 or shortly before then.

Q: He came out of the labor movement, didn't he?

SMITH: Yes, he did.

Q: How did you see the labor movement when you were there?

SMITH: A good question. We saw it as an important force, which we were trying to influence. We've always tried to promote free trade unions and the trade unions in Kenya were fairly free. There was probably some politicalization of them, but not that much.

Q: Did the embassy sort of play any role? Did we have any you might say favorites or was the political system one with which we were comfortable with and we just sort of observed it as it tipped over?

SMITH: I don't quite understand what you're saying.

Q: Well, I'm saying were we concerned with elements within the political spectrum at that time?

SMITH: I don't think we were very much unless there might have been some very small ineffective elements that we were concerned about, but as long as they remained small and ineffective we weren't. Of course, President Kenyatta did his best to make sure that they remained small and ineffective.

Q: Was there any spillover from Tanzania where you had a country in the area who was playing with a very socialist regime and monkeying around with the economy and with the populous and all that? I was wondering whether it had any repercussions up in Kenya.

SMITH: I don't think it did. I think the only repercussion was that most people looked at what was happening south of the border and were saying, boy we're glad that's not happening up here.

At that time Tanzania was trying all of these things and I think probably it was too early to say they weren't working. In the end they didn't work. The one thing that Nyerere did which I think deserves some credit is that he managed to create a political system that didn't depend upon tribalism and also didn't seem to be ruined by tribalism. I think he had advantages going into it. There wasn't, as far as I know, in Tanzania, any one single large tribe. But he, for all his faults, and there were many, mainly along the economic lines, he caused Tanzania to avoid the horrible excesses of tribalism that we saw in Uganda and the continuing tribalistic resentment that we see in Kenya and the mess you see over in what has become the Congo again. So, I think Tanzania's Nyerere deserves a lot of credit for that. I think, we all know he was the darling of the world's socialist governments and I think one other point is I don't think anybody's ever laid any charges of corruption against him. He was, I think, a guy trying to do what he thought was best. It just didn't work out.

Q: Now did you, you spent your time in Uganda and when you got over to Kenya, this time could you sort of from what you saw, say how was Kenya different from Uganda?

SMITH: First of all you had the difference that I mentioned earlier that Kenya had been Kenya Colony and Uganda had been Uganda Protectorate which meant that, except for a few minor exceptions, the Ugandans hadn't had their land taken away from them by the white man, where in Kenya, the British came in and took the very best land in the highlands and sort of pushed the Kikuyu off of it. I feel certain this was the thing that caused the Mau Mau rebellion in the 1950s. So, you didn't have any leftovers from that in Uganda and you still had the leftovers of that in Kenya. Although it was hard to tell that there were any leftovers. It was amazing what Kenyatta had been able to do, and what the British had been able to do to bring the country to independence with Kenyatta as president. He had been in a prison out in the middle of the desert. He became president and they're all good friends.

Q: How did you see the British?

SMITH: I ought to say a little bit more. What was the difference between the two countries? In those days Kenya was leaping ahead of the other two countries economically. It had always been more developed. There had been more European type industries established in Kenya and fewer in Uganda and Tanzania. So, at that time it looked like it was really surging ahead economically. The others were lagging behind for various reasons, one reason being that Tanzania was much bigger and didn't have the immediate economic wealth Kenya had. Uganda was landlocked.

Q: From your perspective, how was tribalism, what all did you see? I mean you'd been in Uganda and you were now in Kenya. Did you see tribalism playing a major role in sort of a social and economic life of the country?

SMITH: Yes, we did. The Kikuyu were the largest single tribe, not a majority, but the largest single tribe. They were also the tribe that had been behind the Mau Mau rebellion and, therefore, felt that they were the tribe that had brought Kenya to independence. The rest of them, the rest of the tribes hadn't done that much but the Kikuyu had, and Jomo Kenyatta was their leader. So, in the period I was there, you saw the Kikuyu gradually taking more and more control of the important aspects of the country, the politics, the military and the economy and you had Kikuyu

starting to go off into the Rift valley into lands that they had not occupied before or traditionally and taking them over one way or another which was causing a lot of resentment. (I should parenthetically say that, in the way they tended to do things in colonial times, the British would pick one ethnic group to be the army. The group they picked was a group called the Wakamba. I should say what the tribal areas were. The Kikuyu areas were in the central part of the country so their province was known as the Central Province. That's the so-called white highlands between Mount Kenya and the Aberdare Mountains and north and south of that. Nairobi is just on the southern end of the Kikuyu area as you go off into the dryer plains. To the southeast of them, sort of on the south side of Mount Kenya, was where Wakamba lived. A much dryer area, much harder to get by on. Then out in the far west, the second largest tribal group was the Luo, living on the shores of Lake Victoria. Their language is a different language group from Bantu. Kikuyu and Kamba are Bantu languages like Swahili, whereas the language group of the Luo is called a Nilotic Language. They were the group, the tribe that during the Cold War had appeared to align themselves with the Chinese. The infamous man was Oginga Odinga who had been the vice president, but was from a different tribe, a different tribe for sure and a different political party than Kenyatta. I'm a little on shaky ground there, but in any case he got on the outs with Kenyatta while I was in the Peace Corps in Uganda. The Kenya police raided his office building, the vice president's office building. They found in the basement a cache of Chinese arms. I believe he went to prison. When I was in Kenya the vice president was Daniel Arap Moi who was from a small group of small tribes called the Kalenjin who were way out on the other side of the Rift Valley and have yet another whole different group of languages. In the past they had not been an important political force at all and one could think that that might have been why Kenyatta chose Moi to be his vice president and head of the police force. Well, that's how Moi became the president when Kenyatta died in about 1979 and he's still there twenty-two years later. I understand he has now, in spite of the small size of his tribal group, put his people in all the important positions, but I only understand that, I don't know for a fact. (Note; in December 2002, Daniel Arap Moi permitted free elections and Mwai Kibaki became Kenya's third president, defeating Moi's chosen candidate, one of Kenyatta's sons.)

Q: Do you feel, you know, when you're in the Peace Corps, you have this sort of certain freedom, you're not particularly defending anybody's policy. I mean you're going out and doing your thing and you're coming up during this, particularly during the '60s, kind of I won't say rebel period, but you know. Did you find it hard to come back to Africa and be a non-Peace Corps person and be part of the American establishment there?

SMITH: No, no, not at all because my views on most things hadn't changed and I hadn't been particularly quiet about my views on those things when I was in the Peace Corps.

Q: Were you able to, did the embassy do you feel have relatively good contact with the various elements of Kenyan society, the tribes and all?

SMITH: I think so. I think we did. Needless to say the political section wasn't huge, but they made an effort to deal with all sides and all parts of the political leadership. A conscientious effort to not be dealing only with the Kikuyu or whoever.

Q: Well, you didn't mention the Masai? Are they from that area?

SMITH: The Masai are in the Rift Valley also, but more on the southern end and in the lower ground, too where the Kalenjin are sort of on the other side of the Rift Valley, up the west side of the valley up towards the north. Incidentally that's the tribal group that produces most of these long distance runners.

Q: Did you get much of a chance to travel around?

SMITH: A fair amount, yes, but mostly as a tourist. The only travel I did on business, except for a couple of trips, were these trips down to Mombasa to take care of the U.S. Navy and that would mean taking the train or plane down and back and then being there on the coast. I had to go meet the ship, take the captain, to meet the mayor and the district commissioner, then back to the ship and over to the Kenya navy and so on and so forth.

Q: How about Mombasa? I have a, why was this a place that the navy liked to come to?

SMITH: It was a very good port, which is still run well. A sheltered port and lots of facilities and touristic things for the sailors to do. Among underdeveloped countries, a port and tourist industry that was even in those days quite well developed.

Q: Did you find yourself at all acting as protection and welfare officer down in Mombasa when you know, I mean, there's always some 17 or 18 year old sailors getting in trouble.

SMITH: Except for one case, I stayed out of that. That would be taken care of I think quite adequately by the Kenyan police and the two navies. I think, well, I think most of the time they behaved themselves. When they did get in trouble, it was minor. The one case where I got stuck with it was when and I was already back up in Nairobi when a young ensign lost his temper and his cool in a bar and started throwing his shipmates across the bar. Somehow he was subdued and ended up in the only mental hospital in Kenya, which is up in Nairobi, and I had to get a Navy psychiatrist to come down from Naples to escort this young giant back to Naples on an airplane. That was the only time I was involved in that sort of thing. I should have mentioned and I'm glad you asked. Since our embassy only had one full time vice consul, we other junior officers had to fill in behind her whenever she was away or if things got too heavy. So, I often did consular things and of course I was duty officer every ten or twenty weeks and had to do it then, too. I did a lot of consular things and it would tend to be these welfare things - American tourists in trouble. An American tourist turns up in the newspaper being accused of being a demonstrator and it turned out the poor guy was having some sort of seizure, a shell-shocked veteran from the Korean War. I later heard he had a history of going to the mental hospital in America and being taken care of and subdued and taken the cure, so-to-speak, released from the mental hospital getting a new passport and going off to some foreign country and then gradually losing it. It would then come to the attention of the American Embassy and he would be sent back to America and start all over again.

Q: A friend of mine, Fred Elfers, I'm not sure if it happened during this time, was killed in an automobile accident. Was that during your time?

SMITH: No, he was the chargé in Madagascar, wasn't he?

Q: Yes.

SMITH: That happened just before I went to Madagascar in 1976. By the time I got there, there was a new chargé and everybody was still talking about Fred. Fred was killed on a highway near Thika in Kenya. It was in the middle of the night and he was killed. This is what you and Ken Brown and I were speaking about a few weeks ago; the number of Foreign Service Officers who died on the highways. We lost our beloved political counselor there in Nairobi, Howard "Hap" Funk. He was out doing just what you were asking about. He was on a field trip in Western Kenya to visit the Luo, to see what was going on, feel the pulse, etc. He was in the back seat of a car that came around a corner. A truck coming the other way ran over him and the only one killed was poor Hap. This was on the four-day Easter weekend of 1971. I was the duty officer. Ambassador, Robinson McIlvaine, called in the administrative officer, told him to take over the duty officer desk and told me to go to the airport and hire a plane and pilot and go get Hap. While we were in Kenya a young marine guard was killed in a car wreck. After I left Madagascar in '78 my replacement, Jerry Cook, was killed in a car wreck in Madagascar. Howard Funk's and Jerry Cook's names were added to the AFSA memorial plaque in the H.S.T. building lobby in May 2003.

Q: Where were you while you were in Kenya?

SMITH: I didn't answer fully other travels. I went out on at least two trips with Ambassador McIlvaine to things he'd been invited to. One was to a sort of a labor ceremony celebrating the establishment of a youth training facility in the Rift Valley. Another one was the opening of a school or something very far out in the west. Then the other travels I did were on my own in this old Land Rover I'd bought from my predecessor and also, as I said earlier, I was flying. I was able to fly around there, which was excellent. I could get to a lot of places other people got to with great difficulty and with great expense.

Q: Later it became almost endemic, but how about at that time with burglaries, violence against people, how was that?

SMITH: At that period in the early '70s it was practically nonexistent. It was almost unheard of.

Q: Was there any residue of the old happy valley crowd of British expatriates? Particularly during the '20s and '30s they were expatriated mainly because their families didn't want them back and they were almost remittance people and they were sort. Was there any of that stuff going on or was that pretty well over?

SMITH: All I can say is what I saw at the Aero Club of East Africa Christmas party where in the afternoon there were these grown men throwing buns back and forth across the Aero Club dining room. I thought that was kind of strange.

Q: Well, apparently it's down in the regimental messes.

SMITH: Apparently, but I'm sure there were all sorts of things going on that I didn't know about. It wasn't very noticeable.

Q: Well you left there in '72, is there anything else you should tell do you think?

SMITH: We had an official visit from Vice President Spiro Agnew where my job was to find a portrait of each vice president, Daniel Arap Moi and Spiro Agnew, that matched and to make sure that the Kenyan police band could play the Star Spangled Banner. I owe my colleague of that time, Bob Blackwill (recently U.S. Ambassador to India), a lot for that. When I told him the Police band said that they have the music and they can play it, he said, "Go out and listen to them." He was so right because they started out with the Star Spangled Banner and went a few more bars and then stopped. I said, "Where's the rest?" They said, "Oh, you want us to play the rest?" They didn't realize that we played the whole thing. So, that would have not looked good in front of Vice President Spiro Agnew. When they played the two nations' national anthem ours would have been abbreviated. Fortunately I had the good advice of Bob who was probably all of two years older than me.

Q: What was your impression of the Agnew trip? This was your first sort of official.

SMITH: Everything went smoothly as far as I could tell. There was, let's see that was in the spring of 1972, so the election campaign was on, but not the election. As you know, Nixon was reelected by a landslide. Nobody was paying much attention to the two young reporters of the Washington Post and Nixon required that all the ambassadors submit their resignations and he accepted them. So, Ambassador McIlvaine left. Then before he could appoint a new ambassador, the whole Watergate thing blew up and the chargé ended up being chargé for a long, long time.

Q: Who was the chargé?

SMITH: I can't remember anymore, he came after I left in December 1972.

ALAN W. LUKENS
Deputy Chief of Mission
Nairobi (1970-1972)

Mr. Lukens was raised in Philadelphia and graduated from Princeton and Georgetown. He served in numerous posts including Ankara/Istanbul, Paris, Brazzaville, Rabat, Dakar, and Nairobi. In 1984 he was named ambassador to Congo-Brazzaville. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1989.

Q: And then you moved again as a DCM to Nairobi in Kenya.

LUKENS: That's right.

Q: This is from 1970 to '72. How did this come about?

LUKENS: It came about because the Ambassador, Bob McIlvaine, asked if I would come, the way Personnel used to work. He'd been a friend for years dating back to when we were in the Congo days together. That was a very exciting time at that point in Kenya. There was a lot to do, a great many relationships to build with Kenya. Again, the Embassy was much smaller than it is today, and we didn't have all the regional functions that we seem to now. It was pleasant living. It was a nice place for the children and we were intensely busy there. But, of course, it was great fun to be with the McIlvaines who were close friends.

Q: *Why would you be so busy there?*

LUKENS: Maybe part of it was American tourism, CODELs, and everything else. People came through because they liked Kenya with all the game parks. But the British had a very different attitude from the French. When they left both these places, they didn't have the money. They welcomed Americans coming in, and so I guess we were still behind the British but we were certainly well up there as No. 2. There were American companies coming in, and all kinds of exchanges going on, and a great deal to be done in a representational way.

Q: *Well, looking at both Senegal and Nairobi--one of the a thesis put forward often by people in the academic world, is that economic interests drive our relationships with countries. And I wonder if you could remark about that at that time both in Senegal and in Kenya.*

LUKENS: I don't think that's true. We had more economic interests in Nairobi and Kenya than we did in Senegal, but I think that's a very cynical point of view that many people take. The French specifically take that, very much. But a lot of other people do, I mean "the oil companies decide our position on this and that" and so on. I think it's a more personal thing in Africa--puts this generality to the rest of the world, but I think that how the Chief of State feels he treated by the United States, how his top people are, is at least as important and maybe more so than any commercial efforts. Obviously commercial interests are important and we support them. But I think, when you look over the history of Africa, where our interests are basically minimal compared to the rest of the world, our influence--whatever there is--has been developed by personal contact, by diplomats, and by how we treat their people and not so much just by commercial rationale.

Q: *We hope that people--one person has asked, "Please hurry it up because somebody else is writing their obituary for them and they wanted it."*

Were there any particular problems you can think of in Kenya that you had to deal with that might be mentioned?

LUKENS: I can't recall any particularly. I think it was a very harmonious time in our relationships. Kenyatta was still president and he liked us. There wasn't much to do there. You had undercurrents of corruption and problems going on but not nearly so much as later on. He was still the grand old man and people came to see him from everywhere. Haile Selassie went through and met him. It was a fascinating period in African history but not one that was crucial as far as U.S. relations went.

AFIF I. TANNOUS
Acting Agricultural Attaché, FAS
Nairobi (1971)

Dr. Afif I. Tannous was born in Lebanon in 1905. He received a B.A. from the American University in Beirut, an M.A. from St. Lawrence University and a Ph.D. from Cornell University. Following World War II, he worked in the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) and later with the U.S. government as an expert on Middle Eastern agriculture, a career which took him to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco, and Kenya. He was interviewed in 1994 by James O. Howard.

Q: You did a great job Afif, and we will always be appreciative. There was one other short time assignment during this period, in quite a different environment. You went to Nairobi to be Acting Agricultural Attaché, talk about that. Nairobi, you spent 2 months there.

TANNOUS: This happened in 1971, at the end of my career in FAS. We had a gap at the Nairobi post, between the departure of the attaché and the arrival of his replacement, and I was asked to fill in. That time, I took my wife, Josephine, with me, and had a wonderful experience. It was the first and last time that I served as attaché; also it was the time of transition from British colonial rule to Kenyan independence. I was able to work smoothly with both sides, British and Kenyan, because of my knowledge of Africa and my experience with colonial systems in Lebanon, Palestine and Sudan.

JOHN NIX
Personnel Officer / Assistant General Services Officer
Nairobi (1971-1973)

John Nix was born in Alabama in 1938. He attended the U.S. Military Academy and served in the U.S. Army from 1960 to 1971 as a major overseas. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1971, his assignments abroad have included Nairobi, Moscow, Nicosia, Athens and Berlin. Mr. Nix was interviewed in 1994 by Raymond Ewing.

Q: Your first two assignments, I see, were in the administrative area. Tell me about particularly the first one. Where did you go after your period of training in Washington?

NIX: For first four junior officers in those days, there weren't a great number of overseas assignments available. I was offered a job in the administrative section in Nairobi and I was very happy to accept it. In those days, it was called a rotational position. I was the Personnel Officer in the embassy and also the assistant GSO. It was one of those periods when embassies were

downsizing. They had cut the position of assistant GSO. I rotated between personnel officer and assistant GSO. I would normally spend my mornings in the personnel office and my afternoons in the assistant GSO position, which was very interesting and gave me a good background, I think, in both jobs. It certainly kept me busy, which was very important.

Q: Were either of those jobs regional? Did you have regional responsibilities beyond the borders of Kenya?

NIX: Not technically. There were no formal guidelines setting up regional responsibilities for me, but in fact, we did have a lot of regional offices in the embassy. We had the regional medical officer, for example, and the regional security officer. By association and extension, we ended up supporting a lot of other posts. I remember, we supported Mogadishu in those days for an awful lot of things they couldn't get locally. We would run around and find what they needed and ship it off when they gave us an urgent call in the middle of the night.

Q: The U.S. military, certainly the Navy, used the Port of Mombasa quite a bit. But I guess that was later in the 1970s after you had left?

NIX: No, that had started in the period I was there. Because of various political factors, the Navy had been restricted in the number of ports it could use. Requests were being denied all up and down the Red Sea and Indian Ocean coasts. Many of the countries of Africa and Asia were not allowing our ships to make port calls in those days. The Navy started using Mombasa quite regularly while I was there. We did not have a defense attache office in the embassy. I was appointed by the DCM to be the liaison for these port visits. That was a very interesting aspect to my work because we had as many as four vessels in port at one time and I was able to go down and spend a week in Mombasa. We did not have a consulate there at the time. It was quite exciting work for a young junior officer to be able to go down and make all the arrangements for a port visit and liaison between the local authorities and the U.S. Navy.

Q: Did the Navy have any personnel ashore as opposed to on board the ships?

NIX: No, the Navy did not have any personnel on shore. We would make arrangements with an agent in Mombasa to handle all the resupply operations for the Navy. Then, of course, we would be responsible for handling any problems which arose, such as the inevitable disciplinary problems ashore. These usually fell to us to resolve after the ships had sailed off into the sunset.

Q: I suppose, as far as the government of Kenya was concerned at that point, the arrangements were fairly informal. I assume there was not a status of forces agreement.

NIX: There was none. This was true. It created some problems at the time. We had some serious issues, but we were able to resolve them. The government was usually very cooperative. In fact, at that time, the Kenyan navy was still commanded by a British officer. We had very easy liaison with the naval authorities in the port.

Q: Was there anything else particularly about that tour in Nairobi that stands out in your memory?

NIX: The thing that stands out in my memory is that it was such a wonderful country.

Q: I spent about three weeks on a vacation in Kenya and Tanzania in 1965. I had many of the same recollections from that visit.

NIX: East Africa is easily the most beautiful place I've seen in the world so far.

Q: At the time you were there, in the early '70s, was crime a major problem in Kenya?

NIX: Not at all. We were, I felt, totally secure. We had a local guard force which looked out for your house. But actually, during they year and a half to two years I was there, I don't remember a significant incident ever occurring.

Q: Of course, Nairobi has a wonderful climate.

NIX: A beautiful climate.

Q: Major attractions to see and experience.

NIX: It was one of the few African posts where there was absolutely no allowance. That tells the story right there. The climate was thought to be healthful and there were no factors which would give you a reason to expect an hardship allowance or a cost of living allowance.

JOHNNY YOUNG
Supervisory General Services Officer
Nairobi (1972-1974)

Ambassador Young was born in Georgia and raised in Georgia, Pennsylvania and Delaware. He was educated at Temple University and entered the Foreign Service in 1967. Before being named Ambassador, Mr. Young served in a number of embassies in the administrative field, including Madagascar, Guinea, Kenya, Qatar, Barbados, Jordan and the Netherlands. In 1989 he was named US Ambassador to Sierra Leone, where he served until 1992. He subsequently served as US Ambassador to Togo (1994-1997), Bahrain (1997-2001) and Slovenia (2001-2004). Ambassador Young was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

YOUNG: Following Conakry I was looking for an onward assignment. We had had a temporary admin officer in Conakry, Marsha Martin, and she liked my work. She liked me. She had received an onward assignment to be the admin officer in Nairobi, Kenya and she told me later on, she said, "You know I like your work a lot. Would you mind coming to Kenya to be the GSO?" I said, "I would love it, but that's a sort of like a triple stretch." At the time I was an FS-6 and she said, "Well, I'll see what I can do, but I can't make any promises." She left and we of

course put our bids in on a number of other things. I can't remember what they were, but in the back of my mind I had it in my head well maybe this will work out. One day we got a call and she says I think I have it worked out. I think they're going to allow you to go into this stretch assignment as the supervisory GSO in Nairobi. That's what happened. That was my reward and we were assigned to Nairobi. We went to Washington for a while to have some more training and then in the summer of 1972 we arrived in Nairobi. My wife was very pregnant at that time with our second child and she planned to give birth in Nairobi. Our relatives, her mother and my mother, thought that I was out of my mind to allow her to go to Kenya and to give birth in Kenya. They had in their mind an Africa of huts and things like that.

Q: Lions?

YOUNG: Yes. They had no idea that we were going to a pretty sophisticated city with good facilities and things like that. We went there and that assignment turned out to be really quite a nice one for several reasons. The place is spectacularly beautiful. The job was a dream. As I said it was sort of like a triple stretch. The people were nice, the country was stable. We had a good embassy. Good ambassador. Terrorism wasn't something that we dealt with at that time. Anybody could walk in the embassy and come up and see me and that was it. It was a different time altogether. It had so many positives working in its favor and of course my daughter was born there which made it very special. On October 11th she was born there in the Queen Elizabeth Hospital and was healthy, never had a problem which was really quite special because our son was born in Philadelphia at one of the best hospitals in Philadelphia and shortly after birth had an infection or rather my wife developed an infection and was isolated from the baby for about 10 days, but yet we didn't have any problem like that in Nairobi. She had a C-Section, which was what she had in Philadelphia as well, but it all turned out very well.

We were very happy there, very pleased. I had an assistant GSO, a fellow who had been an army officer and had left the army and had come into the Foreign Service. A guy by the name of John Nix, and he was quite good. He stayed for about a year and then I subsequently received another GSO to replace him. My wife and I went out to the airport to receive this replacement, this was in 1973 and we met him. We stopped by Kentucky Fried Chicken, bought chicken, took it home, ate it and gave him some. We put him in the car and took him to his new house, got him settled and my wife and I got in the car and we said we've got a winner. He was a winner. His name was James Walsh and he subsequently many years became U.S. ambassador to Argentina.

Anyway, I'll tell you about some of the fun times in Kenya. Of course we enjoyed ourselves very much there. We were freed. I mean we could travel all over the country. We could travel to neighboring countries and we took advantage of those countries. We went on Safari and we did all kinds of things. One of the big events of our time there occurred in the fall of 1973. At that time Kenya hosted the first meeting in Africa of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. It was a big event. The U.S. government decided it would send a huge delegation to this gathering. George Shultz was the Secretary of the Treasury, Arthur Burns was the head of the Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker was the head of the Counsel of Economic Advisors. We had Andrew Young. We had Wright Patman, who was the chairman of the House Banking Committee. It was just an incredible group and they were going to be there for 10 days. We had them scheduled to be in two hotels with two control rooms set up for both. I worked the control

room in the Hilton Hotel and I remember we were scrounging around for help in supporting this huge activity that was a first for the mission in Kenya. The executive director of the Bureau of African Affairs, Bill Bradford, said I'll send you some help. He said, "You know, I have this new young officer here who is bright and smart. I'm going to send him out there and he can lend you a hand and I think he'll help you out. His name is Pat Kennedy." We said, "Well, we're happy to take whoever you send." Pat came out and he worked with us on this. I'll never forget it. I went out to the airport to meet this group and the plane arrived. We went out with the cars and we had a bus that we were going to put them on. Shultz and some of the other key VIPs were taken in cars, but I had the bus where I rode with the senators and the congressmen and in the bus with me was Congresswoman Margaret Heckler.

Q: Oh, yes from Massachusetts.

YOUNG: From Massachusetts. I'll never forget her as long as I live. There I am in the bus with her and all these other senators, Andrew Young was in there and a whole mess of them. She says, "Oh, I'm so excited to be here. I'm happy to be here. This is great. This is wonderful. I've never been to Africa before. I'm so happy. I can't wait to get to the bush." Then she turned to me and she said, "Are you from the bush?" I said, "No, I'm not. I'm a Foreign Service Officer. I'm from the United States, Philadelphia." It was really so funny. I then got them to their hotel and the majority of the senators and congressmen stayed in the Hilton Hotel where I had the control room and Volcker and Burns and Shultz and company, they stayed at the Intercontinental Hotel, that was another control room. We took care of them for 10 solid days. They went on safari. They traveled around. I'll never forget, I wish I could remember the name of the congressman, I think he was from New Jersey, but anyhow he went on safari one day and this is the way the story was recounted to us. He had been told don't take pictures unless you get approval from the person you want to take the picture of. They went on this safari and they were in this little minibus and he had his camera with the big lens and he was snapping pictures and he didn't see anybody around. They're way out on the way to their camp and suddenly the bus is totally surrounded by Masai tribesmen. He thought they were going to be harmed and the story goes that he said, "You want my camera? You want my watch? Please don't hurt me, whatever you want, don't harm me." They weren't there to harm them. That's the way it was. You could be out in the middle of nowhere and suddenly there would be Masai or somebody else and that's the way it was. They let them go and they had a good safari and they came back and they told us the story and everybody had a good laugh.

Wright Patman was a very distinguished looking gentleman from Texas. Looked every bit the part of a distinguished ambassador or statesman and a fine gentleman, there's no question about that. Well, I'd been working with all of them for 10 days, day and night in this control room so I thought they knew who I was and what I was or wasn't. They all arrived at the airport and the plan was everyone would get on the plane and the chairman would be the last one to get on the plane and then that would be it and the plane would go. It worked that way. I escorted him to the steps of the plane. He turned to me. He said, "Thank you son." He shook my hands and slipped me \$2.00. I said, "Thank you very much Mr. Chairman, but I can't accept tips. I'm a Foreign Service Officer." I returned the \$2.00 to him. He understood I assume and then he went on, but I thought that was rather amusing.

Q: Oh boy. Who was the ambassador while you were there?

YOUNG: We had two ambassadors. The first one was Robinson McIlvaine who was a very fine ambassador, did an excellent job.

Q: He was ambassador in a number of countries.

YOUNG: Including Conakry, Guinea.

Q: Yes. I was going to say, yes.

YOUNG: Yes, a good man, a good fellow, he did an excellent job. He was particularly keen on trying to limit growth at the embassy. He would face fights on that going and coming from his AID colleagues because AID wanted to just grow and grow there. They were already bigger than any other component of the mission. They were giving about I guess \$70 million a year to the Kenyans and they were doing it with about 50 or 60 people. The Germans were giving the same amount of money with six people, but that's just the magnitude of how we had this huge AID apparatus to give this amount of money. The ambassador wanted to limit it. He said, "You know if trouble comes to this country one day there will be a price to pay in having all of these people here. We don't need to be any larger. We want to keep it at a certain level at least during my time here." He just refused to go along with it and it worked at least during that time. Subsequent ambassadors to Kenya did not succeed as well and some of them were very much in favor of growth.

Q: Who succeeded him?

YOUNG: Tony Marshall, a political appointee had been PNG'd from Madagascar and came to Kenya. A very nice man, not the same as McIlvaine, but he was quite good. He wasn't just a run of the mill political appointee, he was someone who had considerable experience in Africa as a private businessman and private citizen. He had had interest in Africa and he had been appointed previously as I mentioned as ambassador to Madagascar from which he had been declared persona non grata.

Q: Do you know why he had been PNG'd or not?

YOUNG: The Malagasy government thought the U.S. was involved in a plot to overthrow the government and they PNG'd the ambassador, the DCM, the political officer, the administrative officer the economic officer and on and on.

Q: Oh, yes. Well, now as GSO the supervisor of GSO could you talk a little bit about working in that environment. Were local employees getting things done?

YOUNG: Getting things done was a dream compared to Conakry. You could actually do the job in a place like Nairobi at that time. The infrastructure was good. The government was stable. Systems were in place that had been put in by the British. They worked very nicely. The Kenyan civil servants were professional. We didn't hear of problems of corruption. We didn't have to

bribe officials to get goods in and out of the country so it was the way it should have been. It worked very nicely. The job was a pleasure. I had a super staff of Kenyan employees and East Indians, not East Indians, but Asian Indians from Sri Lanka, Pakistan, India and Goa. The Goans in the embassy were an incredible group of extremely talented, very well educated people.

Q: At that time, Goans were still under Portuguese rule?

YOUNG: It was part of India at that point. They were incredible employees. They all did very well. Now, they were there at a time when the situation for Asians in Uganda turned very bad. They became very frightened and they turned to us and asked if we could help them to leave and we managed to get many of them jobs at our embassy in England. We got a number of them jobs throughout our missions in Canada, in Vancouver, Ottawa, Toronto and many of them moved on. As they moved on we replaced them with Kenyan employees which was going to happen eventually in any case and that worked out very well.

Q: Did we have a subsidiary post in Mombassa?

YOUNG: We had a consulate in Mombassa at the time, but it was very quiet and sleepy, not very much happened there.

Q: Was this our port, I mean did we have much in the way of port calls and that sort of thing?

YOUNG: Yes, we did. In fact we were there when we received I think it was for the first time one of the U.S. aircraft carriers that came through.

Q: A whole city coming through.

YOUNG: They had not seen anything like it. Now, mind you, I have to put all of this in perspective. The aircraft carrier had come from the Arabian Gulf. Now, you have on these aircraft carriers a lot of young men full of energy shall we say and coming from the Arabian Gulf they were looking for a bit of amusement. So, Kenya and the Seychelles, let's put it that way were places where the kind of amusement they sought could be found.

Q: We're talking about females.

YOUNG: Well, I didn't want to get to that. That's a fact.

Q: There it is.

YOUNG: That's it. It was like they had died and gone to heaven and of course the economy in Mombassa welcomed them and did quite well during those visits. The aircraft carrier would not come into Mombassa, but it would anchor out and then bring 200 or 300 in at a time by boat and it worked out very nicely.

Q: When I was in Korea when we used to get aircraft carriers to come into Pusan and there would be buses loaded with young ladies, professional capacity _____ and I would assume there would be busloads going.

YOUNG: Exactly. That's what happened. We were always on the lookout for trouble and what have you, but we had very little trouble.

Q: I think the navy is used to this and it's something they have to deal with and it works.

YOUNG: Yes. We loved that assignment in Kenya. It was good. It was interesting. We loved Jomo Kenyatta, a fantastic man.

Q: Was he the president?

YOUNG: He was the president and he had charisma. You felt that you were in the presence of a truly great and mysterious and wonderful man and he was. He kept that country together. Everybody loved him. When we were there, the big question was well, what will happen when he will no longer be on the scene? All kinds of speculation as to who would replace him and how things would evolve as a result of that. When we left which was in 1974 he was still there and still doing quite well. Now, in '74 we had completed our assignment. Our children had grown up a little. Our son was then four years old. Our daughter was going on two years of age and I was looking around for an onward assignment.

I got a cable one day asking me if I would be interested in setting up the American Embassy in Papua New Guinea and I said yes. I was very excited by that prospect. This was at a time when Papua New Guinea was preparing for its independence. In preparation for their independence they had placed a number of junior government officials in British embassies around the world so that they would be the corps of a new Papua New Guinean diplomatic corps and one of these fellows was at the British Embassy in Kenya. We got a chance to meet him. There was also one at the Australian embassy in Kenya. We got a chance to meet him and we liked him very much. As it turned out there was a delegation passing through Nairobi and this delegation included a fellow who was likely to be the new head of Papua New Guinea. So we got a chance to meet these people and we hit it off with them very nicely. We looked forward to it and we got ourselves very excited by this. People gave us farewell parties. We presumptuously told them we were going to Papua New Guinea, mind you we hadn't received any orders and then two things happened.

It was at the end of the fiscal year and at this time in 1974 the government had run out of money so the State Department had no money for travel for onward assignment travel. I got a cable saying we've very sorry, but someone else was selected for this opportunity. I was heartbroken. We basically had to stay in place until they found another assignment for us. So, our friends jokingly said, we're not going to give another party for you. We've given all these parties for you. We're not having another one. We just cooled our heels and waited until something else came along. Then I got a cable asking me would you be interested in setting up the new American Embassy in Doha, Qatar. I said yes I would be. They said, we will be sending the first American ambassador there, and we need someone to set up the embassy. I said, sure I'd be glad

to. Mind you I had no clue where Qatar was, but it was just the opportunity that was so exciting. Discussed it with my wife and we agreed that we would do it. That's what we did in 1974 and I will continue things next time around with that one.

RICHARD G. CUSHING
Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Nairobi (1972-1976)

Richard G. Cushing joined USIS in 1949. In addition to serving in Chile, Mr. Cushing served in Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, Kenya, and Washington DC. This is a self-interview from 1988.

CUSHING: USIA Deputy Director Henry Loomis assigned me to Kenya as PAO, observing that in his view, "it's the best damned post in the foreign service". It was where Henry and his family had made several hunting safaris.

In a way Henry was right. Kenya was a delight as a place for good living: the best year-around climate in Africa, game abounding in 17 game preserves (one at the edge of Nairobi), a newly-independent nation with an African hero, Jomo Kenyatta, as president.

Aside from the usual attention to media, USIS sought to influence opinion with an active library program, lectures, art shows for promising young African artists as well as resident Americans, film programs, and books to outlying African libraries.

No major coup can I claim from my five years there, but I believe we did well in getting high exposure for US policies, at least those which the audiences considered palatable. No kind of USIS activity, to my mind, can sell foreigners on a US policy which they consider against their own best interests.

Kenya, like many posts, was a favorite objective of frequent-fliers like Congressmen, journalists, and other dignitaries, as well as being the locale of numerous international conferences, all of which meant briefings for visitors on the local situation. On several occasions business men or professional people holding their tax-free annual conferences in Nairobi would sit through such briefings in khaki, while their tour buses double-parked in the street outside.

Politically, what was disturbing about Kenya to me was the widespread corruption at and near the top, and the intense tribalism. Kenyatta may have been relatively clean, but everybody knew that his wife, Mama Ngina, was deeply involved in the ivory poaching trade, and he had numerous relatives, all of the dominant Kikuyu tribe, of course, on the government payroll. Almost every day there would be publicized ceremonies of business men giving huge checks to Kenyatta or his wife for "charity". (After Kenyatta died and the vice president, Daniel Arap Moi, took over, Mama Ngina was placed under house arrest and prohibited from leaving the country--Moi's effort to show he was against corruption.

I would have liked to fill out my second tour in Kenya, but I was transferred to Washington, into a made-up job rewriting the PAO handbook, because -- it was explained to me -- of my of my problems in getting along with the cultural affairs officer, whom I down-graded in a performance report because of his penchant for golf during working hours. He, in retaliation, accuses me of racial intolerance.

Whatever, I was nearing age 60, and at that time that magic birthday meant goodbye, Charley, unfair as that sounds today.

I took my retirement a few months before I had to, because I was bored doing practically nothing in USIA, and after 26 years of service, and a Meritorious Honor Award for running VOA during a time of crisis, I walked out of 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue having been wished God-speed not by any Director, or even Deputy Director, but by an assistant in the Personnel Office, who even pronounced my name wrong.

It's not inspirational to realize that every country where I worked for USIA is in worse shape now than when I was there. Chile is no longer a democracy, but a rightist dictatorship. Cuba is a Marxist state, its leadership antagonistic toward the United States. Mexico has deep resentment toward the United States, and, poverty-stricken, is in hock to this country. Kenya is rife with corruption and in economic trouble, with the world's highest birthrate. All this was beyond our ability to do anything about. Nations go their way, for good or bad, regardless.

Having worked 12 years as a newspaperman in San Francisco, I convinced VOA that I would be a suitable string correspondent, and have been covering the Bay Area for the past 10 years, voicing stories and features of all kinds. I also cover for the USIA Press service. So, despite my misgivings about some of the USIS activities overseas that I consider extraneous in today's world, and despite a rather disquieting last half-year in USIA employ, I still maintain my lines of communication with the Agency in order to keep my hand in Journalism.

MARCUS L. WINTER
Agricultural Officer, USAID, REDSO
Nairobi (1972-1977)

Marcus L. Winter was born and raised in Minnesota. He received a bachelor's degree in agricultural economics from the University of Minnesota at Minneapolis/St. Paul. His career included positions in Peru, East Africa, and Zimbabwe. Mr. Winter was interviewed by W. Haven North on January 23, 1997.

WINTER: After Korea I transferred to the Regional Economic Development Support Office in East Africa or REDSO. REDSO was newly established and an expansion of the East African Capital Development Office. I was the first agricultural officer. We were located in Nairobi and John Withers was the director.

Q: This was what year now, again?

WINTER: I arrived in Nairobi in December, 1972 and remained about four and a half years until mid-1977. The work in REDSO was very different from what I had been doing because of the regional nature of the office. And the role of the REDSO-the whole time I was there-was constantly being debated. Some of the confusion over REDSO was not surprising. The previous regional office managed capital projects in several countries and consisted of engineers, capital project officers and lawyers. Now we suddenly added some agricultural expertise as well as an economist or two. Simultaneously in Southern Africa the small regional mission in Swaziland started to post staff to most of the countries. So there was a USAID Direct-Hire in Botswana and in Lesotho and so on.

At the same time, there were well-staffed USAID Missions and large programs in Tanzania, Ethiopia and Kenya. When I arrived, there were no Missions in Rwanda, Burundi and Somalia. So, partly there was a need to create a niche and a role for REDSO. I think that over time we were quite successful.

I remember that I arrived in Nairobi and two weeks later I was in Botswana as part of a design team for the Botswana livestock project. That got me started on the project design side. And for the next four and a half years I basically designed new projects and prepared country and project analysis of various kinds. Those country analysis were often related to agricultural issues and many of them were related to AID documentation requirements such as Country Development Strategy Submissions. But I also did analysis of areas like education and health.

I also completed environmental examinations and assessments because Missions and REDSO did not yet have environmental officers. And I think this responsiveness was a reason for the success of REDSO-we really tried to meet mission or country needs. If they needed a rapid analysis of a health program and a health expert wasn't immediately available, we didn't wait but proceeded to do the best job that we could. If more was needed, we would make an extra effort to find someone to do it, but it was surprising how often what we did was enough. It was a fairly enjoyable four and a half years.

Q: Which countries did you work in?

WINTER: While there was a great deal of variation year-to-year in where I worked, over the 4+ years I spent the largest amount of time in Tanzania, mostly on project designs. I also worked a substantial amount on country strategies and project designs in Swaziland and in Lesotho and a more limited amount in Malawi and Botswana. I worked on assessments, evaluations and designs in Ethiopia. In Rwanda I helped prepare the first assistance strategy and the first project to begin implementing that strategy. Later I worked on additional projects designs there as well as several preliminary project designs in Sudan.

Q: What about Kenya?

WINTER: Yes, I did quite a bit of work in Kenya on sector assessments, preliminary and final project designs and analyzing various agricultural issues. I remember working on agricultural credit, range management, soil conservation, agricultural planning and agricultural marketing. I

also worked on rural road development. There was some tension between the Kenya mission and REDSO which at times limited the work, but generally I was able to work around that. Although I did work in Kenya a fair amount, I spent about 60% of my time traveling to other countries. So, the amount of travel was pretty substantial. The constant travel was getting kind of tiring by the end. Tanzania wasn't bad because you could go down and spend a week and fly back to Nairobi for the weekend for less than the cost of per diem in Dar es Salaam.

Q: Did we cover your work in Kenya itself?

WINTER: Only very briefly. I believe my first major involvement in Kenya was the development of an agricultural sector strategy for AID as part of the DAP process. The Work Bank was very active in Kenya at the time so I used a lot of their analysis and material which I supplemented with other published reports, with meetings and interviews with Kenyan government officials and the staff of other donors and with field visits to various parts of Kenya. I remember that employment was a major issue as well as the relative emphasis that should be placed on cash versus food crops. I don't think the sector strategy I developed was really ever seriously used.

What I remember most in Kenya is a proposed project that was never finalized. Land management and soil conservation were areas of considerable interest to both the Kenyan Ministry of Agriculture and AID. This was particularly true for marginal rainfall areas where vegetative cover was often poor and soils were subject to serious erosion when the rains did come. To address this problem in a particular region, two REDSO staff and Kenyan Ministry of Agriculture staff developed an activity that involved the provision of simple tools to rural residents that would work on conservation activities. In other words, farmers building terraces, water diversions and other soil conservation structures would be provided with hand tools.

Interestingly, the Kenyan government at more senior levels finally said, "No," to the proposed activity because it did include the provision of bulldozers and other heavy earth-moving equipment. We seemed to have run into a bias for more sophisticated technologies than the technologies already being productively employed. There was a feeling that the use of hand tools should not be encouraged. Larger-scale activities with heavy equipment were better. I believe that later a program involving the use of hand tools for soil conservation did go forward but as part of a drought program.

Q: They went ahead with the bulldozers or they didn't go ahead at all?

WINTER: The Ministry had a modest soil conservation program that involved the use of bulldozers. But AID did not support the bulldozer program. AID just took soil conservation off the list of areas where they wanted to be involved.

Another example of differences in approach related to the AID and other donor supported livestock development program in northeast Kenya. As part of the program being designed we were proposing the use of heavy equipment to build watering points, for land clearing and for construction and maintenance of access roads. But we were concerned about the government's ability to maintain the equipment. We were discussing this with a district-level official and he

said, I think in seriousness, "that it is easier for me to get a new bulldozer from a new donor than to get my government to provide maintenance for the existing fleet". So he didn't think that this was something that he wanted to focus on because a new bulldozer would be easier to obtain than maintaining the old.

At the same time we found out that the Kenyan construction workers were using road graders for transportation forty miles or so each way in the mornings and evenings because that was the only way they could get to where they were working. You could see that some of these equipment items were not going to last very long because they weren't being used in the way we thought they would be. And this was not unique to Kenya, equipment provision and equipment maintenance were problems I seemed to face in every country I worked in.

Q: How would you characterize the agricultural situation in Kenya? Was it quite promising, or what?

WINTER: Kenya was the first country where I saw a real mix between large commercial farms and smallholder areas. And there were very well endowed areas in terms of soils and rainfall and areas with much less potential. The climatic differences also allowed the production of both tropical and temperate climate crops. I thought at the time that there was tremendous under-exploited potential in Kenya, although they probably couldn't be self-sufficient in everything. Wheat was a good example. Substantial quantities were produced but given the expanding demand for wheat they wouldn't be able to be self-sufficient.

But there were great opportunities to expand the production of horticultural and vegetable crops. The problem was the market. The Kenyans were flying flowers to Europe but air transport of fruits and vegetables was still being developed. While I was there we really didn't figure out how to get that moving. We were just a little bit too early I guess.

But generally, Kenya was doing fairly well at the time. This was the time of President Kenyatta so it was a very tightly controlled government in many ways.

Q: How did you find working with the Kenyan people?

WINTER: Kenyan people and the Kenyan officials were, compared to my experience in Nigeria, much more reserved and conservative. Establishing social relationships had been relatively easy in Nigeria but it was difficult to establish such relationships with Kenyans. I guess there were just cultural differences. Also as part of a regional office, I really didn't have regular Kenyan counterparts. We usually worked through and with the staff of USAID/Kenya. Another factor as I believe I mentioned, was the tension between REDSO and the Mission that at times was a factor in what we were able to do.

Q: Was that just between personalities or was there something structural in that?

WINTER: I think it was largely personalities. But there was something structural in the sense that it was difficult within a country and within the same building to have separate groups with separate management and different priorities working on many of the same issues. And the

Kenya mission was expected to provide the administrative support for all the groups. That had some implications in terms of rules and regulations. I remember a simple problem with travel...obviously the mission director approved all travel for the Kenyan mission staff. He suggested at one time that he approve all travel for REDSO since it was being processed by his staff. The REDSO director of course said, "Wait a minute here, that is unacceptable!" But from the Kenyan Mission Director's point of view these budget, these travel items, were handled by staff under his control. The travel, the financial people are all part of his operation. So he wanted to know what is going on and to feel he had some control over the situation.

Q: Who was the director at that time?

WINTER: Carlos Nelson was the Director of USAID, Kenya. And Hogan, Ed Hogan was the director of REDSO-East Africa.

Q: Did you have any contact with the embassy on any of those functions?

WINTER: Minimal. I had virtually no contact on a business basis with the embassy. I can't even recall working with the embassy on any of these issues.

Q: Could you in some way give a sense of how you perceived the agricultural situation throughout the region? Since you had a tremendously broad view from Ethiopia down to South Africa. How would you characterize the agriculture problems and issues? Or were they all different?

WINTER: There was tremendous variation in the potential among countries. For example, just in Southern Africa the agricultural potential of low-rainfall Botswana was so different from that of small but much higher-rainfall Swaziland. Tanzania had large areas of well-watered land and even larger areas of un or under utilized land. But they but they weren't getting the necessary system of support services together. Kenya probably had less potential than Tanzania but seemed to be doing a better job of using what they had. There were enormous agricultural development opportunities in Sudan although the size of the country and poor inter-regional links were a constraint. I remember AID providing food relief in Western Sudan while there was a surplus of sorghum in the east. Rwanda had very productive land but the overall potential was constrained by location. An inland location was also a problem for Malawi. But overall in Eastern and Southern Africa, I felt that agricultural production growth would be able to keep up with the population growth and that we could expect the agricultural sector to continue to contribute to development.

Q: What would you consider the primary impediments to increasing agriculture production?

WINTER: In most cases I believed that appropriate technology was available and that was it was largely a matter of getting the technology out to farmers and providing the inputs necessary for the technology to be adopted. This included making credit available for farmers to have access to the needed inputs such as improved seeds, fertilizer, etc. Without such an increase in capital availability, I did not believe farmers would be able to raise their productivity. If all they had was a hoe, there is only so much you are going to be able to do even with better seeds. Farmers

needed credit for fertilizer or maybe for an animal drawn plow or something else to improve their productivity.

Q: Some people have argued that the size of the farm was just too small to produce a viable agricultural sector?

WINTER: In some areas that was perhaps the case. But in most cases production levels per unit of land were not very high. In other areas there was uncultivated areas that were not being used. In Ethiopia the population pressure on the land was apparent in some areas. Also in parts of Kenya, the land plots were getting smaller. In Tanzania I don't believe land availability was the issue. In many rural areas at certain times of the year there was actually a shortage of labor.

Q: It was more of a labor constraint than the size of the farm?

WINTER: And the infrastructure and the lack of productivity increasing inputs. As I said before, without technology and the inputs to utilize that technology there is only so much a farmer can do. When the distances or lack of infrastructure make the availability of inputs uncertain and expensive, farms are likely to be small and the returns to farm labor are likely to be low. Unfortunately, I don't believe we have figured out effective solutions to these issues yet. We have had some success in getting prices right and getting the private sector more involved in input supply and marketing. New productivity enhancing technology has been developed. But it still appears that getting the fertilizer to western portions of Tanzania or to Rwanda is a pretty high cost operation. My later experience in Zimbabwe was more positive in terms of even small holders having access to inputs, marketing outlets and credit.

WILLIAM D. WOLLE
Economic/Commercial Officer
Nairobi (1973-1974)

William D. Wolle was born in Iowa on March 11, 1928. He received a bachelor's degree from Morningside College and a master's degree in international affairs from Columbia University. He served in the U.S. Army from 1946-1947. Mr. Wolle was an Arabic language officer whose overseas posts included Baghdad, Aden, Kuwait, Amman, and Beirut. He was interviewed in 1991 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: You had just six months in Nairobi.

WOLLE: Nine.

Q: What were you doing there?

WOLLE: Again I was to run the economic/commercial section. I had two officers working with me and a secretary. It was an entirely different environment for me. Ralph Lindstrom was

Chargé d'affaires when I arrived and remained as such until Tony Marshall, a newly appointed ambassador, came in. Both were very easy to work for, very supportive.

But I expected that it would be a three year tour and was approaching it in that fashion. I can't say that I made a lot of progress because I was trying to establish contacts. And that was difficult. Far more difficult for me, at least, in that environment than in the Arab countries that I had become so accustomed to.

Q: I am surprised. I thought Kenya would be very open.

WOLLE: Well, no. Maybe it was just a matter of needing more time to work on this, but you could see that the government, sort of a tribal based government...the father of the country was still running the show, Jomo Kenyatta. The ministers were from his favored branches of the Kiyuku tribe. But I was not dealing quite at that level, I was dealing more with the working level. Tom Forbord, an excellent officer, who was working under me and had been there for some time, had some excellent contacts in the American business community. Things were just sort of getting underway when I got news that I was to go to Oman as Ambassador.

Personal safety was a consideration. Every American home had a guard around it all night and usually a big dog or two in the yard. There would be the so-called Panga gangs coming around to break into homes and steal money, jewelry, etc., so security was a big consideration for the Embassy. Every bank downtown had a couple of uniformed types standing out front with a club, or in one case I saw one with an American baseball bat. There was a very high incidence of crime in the urban center of Nairobi and the residential areas. Fortunately, except for someone who tried to steal my wife's purse on a busy walkway, we weren't affected. But the city was growing rapidly and there weren't jobs for everybody.

Nairobi was an interesting place, it had a large thriving industrial center but there were poor people all around who literally lived from hand to mouth. Many of them had come in from the rural areas leaving their families back home.

We had no particular major political problem with the Kenyan government at that time. There were a lot of American firms and banks located there. We had a very active American business club which held monthly meetings. I was involved in helping to arrange these. One of the leading figures, the head of Exxon, was tossed out of the country for being too aggressive in trying to collect on bills for petroleum products supplied to Kenyatta's personal estates. He went a little too far and zip, he was out of there. A protest was to no avail.

Q: Was corruption a major problem?

WOLLE: I think it is in Nairobi. We heard a good many stories about that. Kenyatta was kind of losing his touch. I think he was getting well along in years and was not able to keep some family members and other ministers in check.

The game parks were great. So it was very different for me and I must say I really didn't have time to get my feet solidly on the ground. It would have been a real challenge because I know my

two immediate predecessors had done excellent work so I like to think that with time I could have measured up to that.

CYNTHIA S. PERRY
Educator, UNESCO
Nairobi (1973-1976)

Ms. Perry was born in Indiana in 1928 and graduated from Indiana State University and University of Massachusetts-Amherst. She was appointed ambassador to Sierra Leone and Burundi. She was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

PERRY: Well, Kenya first of all did not fit my expectations. It was not like what I had in mind for Nigeria, perhaps, or one of the West African countries. Kenya was very British, you know everything was British. The British had departed but not totally; many of their civil servants remained, and many of the settlers as well. The Kenyans spoke British English. The first thing I was concerned about coming from the background I had was that the Africans were not being given a chance for employment in their own government, under the guise that they were not yet prepared. All positions other than political, including secretarial positions in the various ministries, were held by British citizens. My job there with Colby College was to help begin the training of Kenyan men and women in secretarial skills.

I wrote a proposal, during that period, to the United Nations Economic Commission in Addis, to begin a regional commercial training program to provide a broader based skills development activity. It was well received by decision-makers and a few years later I was recruited by UNECA to return to Addis to design the program. I began to travel back to Kenya at least once per year for several years, before going there to live for three years with the UNESCO in 1973. I did not experience culture shock in Ethiopia or Kenya; that happened on my first trip to Jamaica.

Q: Your visits back to Kenya in the early '70s, did you see much of a change? Was the education of native Kenyans beginning to permeate the Government?

PERRY: Yes and it happened very quickly in hindsight. I returned in '73 with my new husband, who had taken a position with UNESCO at the University of Nairobi. We were there for three years, and when you live in one country for a spread of time, you began to see things very much differently. A lot of people were being trained not just in Europe but in the United States, some in Indiana, to come back and do specific things. But, the government and economy of Kenya was never totally in the hands of Kenyan people. President Kenyatta was still alive at that time; things began to change when he died, and not for the better. Things really did get bad and we were sort of in the middle of that too when there were a lot of student riots and my husband suffered from tear gas when students were demonstrating on campus. We were always on the side of the Kenyans no matter what did happen. But what happened then was internal fighting as opposed to having a common enemy. I think they stopped seeing the European presence as a common enemy and began to fight among their tribal factions for power.

Q: That is true of most communities and anything else. We are having our problem with the Soviet Union which is going right down the drain. When you went out the initial time in '69 were you looking at the Peace Corps at all? Did you have any feel for what the Peace Corps was doing?

PERRY: Yes, I knew Peace Corps well, since the majority of my doctoral fellows were returned Volunteers. A part of my doctoral program in 1969 was to recruit volunteers in Africa, for a master's degree program that I had designed at U/Mass. Even prior to that I became involved with the Peace Corps starting in 1963. I always considered it to be a fine introduction for American youth to other worlds, and that they could provide assistance, at low cost, to developing nations in terms of education and health. If I hadn't had small children at the time, I would have volunteered myself for Peace Corps. I liked the work that the Peace Corps was doing and I still do. Later, while my husband was with UNESCO in Kenya, I became a Peace Corps trainer, especially for medical volunteers who would teach in the training hospitals. My job was to give them teaching skills and so I did that for a couple of years. Interestingly, my son in later years also become a Volunteer, in Nepal.

Q: I would have thought that of all the programs the hospital one, the doctors and nurses would be one of the most effective one?

PERRY: Yes, they were truly effective, but most found conditions in the institutions deplorable and the absence of drugs inhibited their work.

Q: I don't have a particular feeling on this one way or the other. One of the great advantages of the Peace Corps is what it does for the people, I mean the Peace Corps Volunteers. Did you feel that the Peace Corps beyond the nurses or doctors who had obviously supplemented the health care, the ones who went out into the bush and the field, do you feel they were making a real contribution to Kenya at the time?

PERRY: Yes, I know they were effective, primarily by example - their willingness to do whatever had to be done to carry out their jobs. They also aided in teaching the English language to children who had no exposure to formal education. I was also working in Ethiopia at the same time. And Ethiopia was the first to impress upon me that the Peace Corps should not work with their young children, because of the transfer of culture. They wanted to preserve their cultural training in the primary schools, for fear that western influence would destroy their heritage. They feared it would deprive Ethiopian teachers of jobs and also of the respect they deserved. That concern was well founded.

Q: I'm told there were battles in villages to get an American teacher?

PERRY: It did happen in the early days of Peace Corps in those countries. The teachers were good and they were enthusiastic, bringing excitement to their classrooms. They had the advantage of knowing what could be, and what could work, how to utilize the environment to teach about things. They really wanted to see the effects of their being there. Some completed their two-year assignments and returned to Kenya and other countries to do something more. For

most, the Peace Corps experience influenced in a positive way the rest of their lives. But I found in my research, that Volunteers went out to Africa without any real personal or professional goals. Had they known that they were going to be doing certain things they would have prepared. Secondly, had they known when they were out there what they wanted to do when they came back they would start bringing things back with them. So that's why the two programs I began in the early 1970s were especially effective. I'm still very much for the Peace Corps.

Q: As Foreign Service Officer I was sort of dubious when I first came and then I got in to the Board of Examiners and selecting people and I found the Peace Corps head and shoulders above many of the others. They proved themselves, really more internationally mature, not just tourists, which they might have been otherwise.

PERRY: Some of my teacher trainees who became Peace Corp Volunteers later joined AID and the Foreign Service, and they have done well climbing their respective career ladders. I'm very proud of the contribution Peace Corps has made in all fields. In my experience, they have been most effective change agents around the world, and the experience also made favorable and distinctive changes in them and in the societies to which they returned.

Q: Yes. How did you find in the late '60s early '70s the Government of Kenya as far as the work you were trying to do?

PERRY: I had easy access to the Ministries. The ones that were most important to me were the President, of course and his offices, and the Minister of Education. The Minister of Education was married to an American woman and received his training in the U.S., which gave me easier access to him. There were the undercurrents between the two major tribes, the Kikuyus and the Luos. The Luos were an educated and cultured group of people. The Kikuyus were President Kenyatta's people, leaders of the government, landowners and very powerful. I was there in 1969, when Tom Mboya was assassinated. He was an outstanding, young Luo and potential challenger to Kenyatta. He died just a few yards from where I stood, and that had a profound effect on me.

Q: How did that happen?

PERRY: Well, it was one result of the political rivalry between the Kikuyus and other tribes, over power and control vested in the Office of the Presidency. And any leader espousing opposition to Kenyatta and his clan was surely going to die. So, a truly great man, Mboya, had to die. I was in Kenya that same year when we put our first man on the moon. As I walked down the main street, I saw people gathered around a store window that had a television set. I expressed aloud how wonderful it was that we put a man on the moon and due to modern technology, people in Africa could witness this event. But, one fellow turned to me and said, "Oh, it isn't true. It's Hollywood. In America, you can do anything you want and make us believe it."

Q: I'm told this is one of the things felt everywhere; people think they are all myths, it never happened.

PERRY: Yes, I found that a curious observation, and perhaps my introduction to a certain level of mistrust of Americans. I thought, unlike other countries, America would never say we did something we didn't do! But, I concentrated on my plans to become American Ambassador to Kenya, and the basis of this mistrust was something I needed to research along with other information I might find, tribal conflicts. Every little thing was important and exciting to me.

Q: Were you getting to know the people? Do you remember the name of the Ambassador?

PERRY: Yes, McIlvaine, I believe. He wrote a book on the conflict called "The Reds and the Blacks," which made him quite unpopular with the Kenyan government.

Q: Were you sort of casing the joint seeing what they were up to and all that?

PERRY: It's interesting that I didn't care so much for the Ambassador's role, which I saw primarily as pomp and circumstance - at that time. It seemed to be very political, and unrelated to the real problems facing the Kenyan people. I was more into development and development issues. I worked with USIS. They sent me out on educational project design in Kenya, Nigeria and Zambia while my husband was working with UNESCO. I guess I've done a million things at one time. But I had a good chance to contrast what was going on in Zambia in particular and Nigeria, a country I thought was vibrant and exciting. I also returned there many times in subsequent years, but I didn't want to live there. Kenya was sort of a peaceful oasis between every other country at that time.

They replied almost immediately with orders to go to a UNESCO project at the University of Nairobi. He was delighted - marvelous what ego can accomplish. It didn't matter to me which of us had the assignment. My plan was to go and live in Kenya. So we packed up the children and went to Kenya for those three years. During that time, I did consultations with USIS and Peace Corps, projects that paid well for the things that I did. They kept my nose to the grindstone, but gave me opportunities to meet the people on a social basis. I joined a lot of civic organizations and worked unofficially with NGOs, some of them were also foreign groups. I learned a lot about women's issues in Kenya by affiliating with the local and international groups and accepting speaking engagements throughout the country. I was able to help them move up the ladder to move into UN employment; some I helped to come to the States to be educated. I have run into many of them on my return visits to Kenya and other countries in the world.

Q: Were women in Kenya being able to begin to have opportunities or was it still pretty circumspect?

PERRY: In my earlier years in Kenya, women had a very hard time. The man took his cues from the male lion, it seemed, and in many ways women suffered not so differently the things American women endured at that time. A woman's purpose for being was to serve the man. He did whatever he wanted, and the woman did whatever he wanted. There were few options. I wrote an unpublished novel, one I vowed to finish, which dealt with this problem in a dramatic way. I couldn't have published it at the time - a story of trust and betrayal between a man and his wife, both professionals and American educated. Since I plan to publish it, I choose not to reveal the plot here, but it deals with the inevitable conflicts between tribal traditions and western

values in a modern society where one would think it should not happen. How does one live in between these two?

RALPH E. LINDSTROM
Deputy Chief of Mission
Nairobi (1973-1977)

Ralph E. Lindstrom was born in Minnesota in 1925. Following high school, he entered the U.S. Army, serving in the Office of Naval Intelligence. He received a bachelor's degree in political science from Harvard University in 1950 and entered the Foreign Service in 1952. His career included positions in Kabul, Hong Kong, Oberammergau, Moscow, Nairobi, and Dhahran. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy on October 28, 1994.

Q Then you went to Nairobi from '73 to '77 as Deputy Chief of Mission. How did that come about?

LINDSTROM: Well, through the personnel system. I didn't have any inside pull. I heard later on they gave the ambassador at that time, Ambassador McIlvaine, three names. Mine was one of them, he knew the other two and didn't like them. I don't know that. That may be wrong. So that was a fantastic assignment and it is one of the nicest places in all of Africa.

Q: What was the situation, '73 to '77 period, in Kenya at that time?

LINDSTROM: Well, at that time Kenya was one of the leading countries, in our opinion, in Africa. It's a mixed economy but with a lot of freedom. It wasn't at all like the Tanzanian economy when it was being choked by Julius Nyerere, and other economies where they were pursuing a strictly socialistic approach. So the Kenyan economy was quite prosperous. President Kenyatta was alive during the entire period I was there. A very interesting old character, and a laissez faire type of man, but still not a great delegator. They always had trouble when I was dealing with military subjects. They'd tell me how difficult it was to get a decision out of him, and how he wouldn't delegate. By then he was somewhat over eighty, and his attention span was increasingly short. And one man told me, he said, "Every day I go over with a stack of papers this high, and then I come out with a stack about that high. Then I go back in the next day and I've got to rearrange everything again; so some things never got to the top," such as creditation of diplomats, which tended to be lower priority. Kenyatta's mind would wander quite a bit. I remember he had a certain speech that he'd say to all ambassadors, or chiefs of mission. For long periods I was Chargé d'Affaires because there was no ambassador there, and he'd say, "Please remember my door is always open," in English, which he spoke very well. I studied Kikuyu at one time too during his late reign. The Kikuyans were so dominant in that regime that they would speak Kikuyu to each other in front of non-Kikulan Kenyans, which was very bad form. So I thought, "Well, I'll start studying this language." Terribly difficult, and 32 noun classes, and that kind of thing, really almost their secret language. But I did speak to Kenyatta in Kikuyu. I don't think he really liked it. It's a little bit like Arabic. You run into that problem, too.

sometimes. But It's their secret language and if you speak fluent Arabic, which I don't, but I have seen people do it, you must be from CIA. I ran into a little bit of that psychology in Kenya.

Q: How long was McIlvaine there?

LINDSTROM: We only overlapped four days, and I was on my own. But he did stay on in Kenya, not in any official U.S. government capacity, in a wildlife organization. But it was fully a year before he was replaced by Tony Marshall who was a political appointee. It was his third political appointment, and his mother is Mrs..., well anyway, very monied and she had made a big contribution to Nixon's campaign and he'd been held up because of that. He turned out to be really an excellent ambassador. We worked very well together.

Q: I'm surprised because usually after someone has been a Chargé for about a year they become spoiled. They're used to running the show, and then a new ambassador comes and so the word is it is best to get rid of that person as quickly as possible because it doesn't work.

LINDSTROM: It worked it out very well. Somebody had talked to him in Washington. Somebody who wanted the job for more of an Africanist than I. He said, "No, I'll see how I do with Lindstrom." One of the things I did to put him at ease was to schedule a trip out of Nairobi just a few days after he got there. After making some basic introductions, we went to visit Ethiopia with my wife, who had never been there. Unfortunately our arrival in Addis Ababa coincided with the first day of the revolution and we had to cancel all of our trips on Ethiopian Airways. We had to cancel our trip to the old caves and churches in Ethiopia, and retreat to Nairobi. But I didn't show up in the embassy. I went on down to Mombasa and spent the rest of our vacation down there. But that gave the ambassador a chance, I think, to be in direct touch with all of the other embassy officers and he did not have to feel that I was keeping anything from him. So we worked very effectively together during the rest of his tour.

Q: What were some of the major issues that you had to deal with?

LINDSTROM: The most important ones really did tend to be in the security area and the defense area. You may recall that the Entebbe raid took place at that time.

Q: You better describe what the Entebbe raid was.

LINDSTROM: This was a raid by the Israelis on Entebbe airport to rescue Israelis who were being held hostage by Idi Amin. It was quite a successful operation, and they could not have done it without the complicity and support of the Kenyan government. They had been in secret and very close contact with the Kenyans on this; so the Kenyans gave them refueling rights, after they had made the raid on the Entebbe airport, at Nairobi airport. They also dropped off their wounded who were taken to the hospital in Nairobi. Of course, this became known to Idi Amin. He was just furious about this, so he was determined forever after to get even with Kenya. He had more armaments than the Kenyans had. He had some MiGs, MiG-17s or MiG-19s. I'm not sure which, but it was more than the Kenyans had. They had some old outmoded British aircraft. So they began to take this threat seriously, and the head of the Defense Ministry with whom I dealt regularly, made inquiries. He said, "We're not having much luck with the British. They

don't seem to think we need any more advanced aircraft. What about F-5s or something like that?" So I said, "We can look into that." So people from Northrop did come in and make presentations to the Kenyans. This, of course, didn't resolve the problem of how they would pay for them. That was another matter for negotiation. But it finally all went through, and they did get a squadron of F-5s, and the training to go with them, and stationed these planes up in the northern part of the country. Once, before they got these planes, Idi Amin was threatening to bomb Nairobi airport. We sent in all the way across the Pacific some aircraft that the Navy had.

Q: *Orions, probably.*

LINDSTROM: Yes, and we had them land ostentatiously at Nairobi airport, and kept them parked there for a time as a deterrent. It worked. Idi Amin, if he was seriously thinking about bombing Nairobi airport, decided not to do that. On another occasion, just to show support for the Kenyans, before they got their own aircraft, we did a fly-over on National Day off a flat-top off the coast of Mombasa. It worked quite well.

Q: *A flat-top is a Naval aircraft carrier.*

LINDSTROM: A small aircraft carrier. These were not enough for regular fixed wing aircraft. I remember later on my counterpart in the Soviet embassy was just furious with me. He said, "Ralph, why didn't you tell me about that? My ambassador saw these American planes come over and knew nothing about it." And I said, "Well, I'm sorry. We don't work for the same organization exactly." So then they landed the planes there in Nairobi, refueled them, and sent them back later. Up until then the Kenyans had been planning again with their Israeli friends. The Israelis had a very close relationship with them, as I mentioned before. They said they would fly some of their planes over and would put on black face. The ambassador and I thought that was the stupidest idea we'd ever heard of. So we conjured up this idea of coming in with our own planes, which were American planes, not with Israeli markings, or Kenyan markings, or anything like that. It went off well.

All in all, it was a very interesting tour. Both Ambassador Marshall and I did a lot of traveling around, meeting people in all parts of the country, very friendly people. I got to know more about Kenya than I did about the United States, I think, in political terms. They are always willing to discuss politics.

Q: *What was the role of the British expatriates there at that time?*

LINDSTROM: By then it was not very significant, and being phased out. The people who were staying tended more to be just retired people. Some of them even had gone to South Africa and thought it was so horrible they came back to Kenya. So they were playing less and less of a role. In fact, the head of the Defense Ministry, told me, "Well, Ralph, it's a very important day. This is the last day any British presence will be in our compound." And he said, "You're the only person who can come in." He would not allow us to bring in any attachés or anything like that. The Pentagon kept pushing us to put this up, "No, we don't need it." So I had my political counselor get training on how to do training assignments for the Kenyan pilots. Curt Kamman, who is now our ambassador in Bolivia, did an excellent job. He flew up to Germany and got the training

necessary, and another one of our political officers too. So that satisfied the Kenyans that we weren't bringing in too many military people. We did later on have to bring in technical people when the F-5s were delivered, but I wasn't there at that time.

Q: How about tribal politics? Does this play much of a role?

LINDSTROM: Yes, a very, very great role. As I mentioned earlier, the Kikuyans were overly dominant and were resented by the other tribes. And after Kenyatta went, there was more diversification, and they tried to balance constantly. They balanced within the armed forces. They'd have one tribe the head of the navy, one tribe head of the army, one tribe head of the air force. But there was no getting around that this was a major factor. The only troubles they had really were with the Somalis who are very difficult to get along with, as we Americans learned later on...

Q: They're a contentious crew.

LINDSTROM: There are about 400,000 Kenyans of Somali origin and the Somalis were a real thorn in the side of the Kenyans. They would come over, not necessarily government sponsored, probably not, raids way deep into Kenya territory to capture cattle, and game trophies, and that sort of thing, all the way over to Mombasa, and then up in the north. I later learned that they had this very careful balancing among major tribes when I asked about the Somalis in the armed forces. They said they had one, just a token. So they considered them to be something very much apart. I used to meet with the Somali ambassador from time to time for lunch, a rather interesting person. My ambassador didn't want to meet with him, so I said, "Okay, I'll meet with him." A very tricky sort of person, spoke excellent English.

Q: How about with Tanganyika? What were relations like as far as you were seeing them?

LINDSTROM: I went down there several times and crossing the border from Kenya into Tanzania was like crossing the border from Europe into a communist country. Immediately you got over to the Tanzanian side, it had that rundown, neglected look. Everything was state owned. Tanzania was blessed by having a large number of very small tribes, unlike Kenya which has a small number of very big tribes, which makes Kenya a little more difficult to manage. But still the Tanzanians did have one very aggressive and enterprising tribe that lived up around Mount Kilimanjaro. They were the coffee farmers, about 400,000 strong. They could not stand that socialist regime, so increasingly, since they weren't permitted to grow coffee very well, they would vote with their feet and walk over to Kenya. They were very much like the Kikuyans in terms of attitudes. I've met many Tanzanian diplomats down there when I visited people and we would discuss the Kenyan way versus the Tanzanian way of running an economy. And, of course, they would always defend what they were doing down there, but I don't think very wholeheartedly. Since then Julius Nyerere has had to give up most of his control. He had a British woman adviser for many, many years.

Q: Who was straight out of the Fabian socialist thing. I think the Fabian socialists probably did more damage than Marx and Lenin combined.

LINDSTROM: And then I also did travel around. I did get down to South Africa too because this subject kept coming up and this was very useful to see first hand how things were in Johannesburg.

Q: Did you get over to Uganda?

LINDSTROM: Uganda, I did. I was sent there on an official mission to meet with Idi Amin, which was one of the more interesting things I did. We had closed our embassy by then because he had made it just impossible. Bob Keeley closed it.

Q: We sort of slipped out.

LINDSTROM: Yes. Anyway, the reason for my going out there was I guess I was more expendable than our ambassador. Idi Amin, at the time I went there, was head of the Organization of African Unity, first chairman. It's a revolving chairmanship. So I went up with instructions to see if I couldn't get him to support our policy on Angola. I flew up, all alone on a commercial aircraft, and went to the leading hotel there. Fortunately I had taken food along with me, as I used to in the old Soviet Union, because the hotel was so run down at that time there was practically no food to be had there. Then the next morning I was picked up by a government Mercedes and taken to one of Idi Amin's hideouts. I discovered that the young man in the car from the Foreign Ministry was Russian speaking, so I spoke with him in Russian. He had been educated in the Soviet Union. And the German ambassador who was representing our interests there, also rendezvoused with us at the hideout. So there were really only the three of us, Idi Amin, the German ambassador who didn't participate in the conversation, and I. I had a yellow legal tablet with me. Then there were two guys with tape recorders, two military people. We had about a one-hour meeting...I think it was actually longer than that. And the next day my picture was on the front page of the Uganda newspaper with Idi Amin. He agreed to everything I suggested in my talking points. He said, "All right, I'm going off to visit so-and-so, a couple of African leaders. I will tell them what you presented to me." And he actually held that position all the way up until he could see it was going to go the other way up in Addis, where the meeting was being held.

But the more interesting thing was his personal pitch to me. "Please tell your president that if you were as generous in your arms supply policy as the Soviet Union is, every black African country would be your friend." I said, "I would report what you have to say, but I have no instructions on this subject." And he said, "Do you think I would have these inferior Soviet aircraft if I could get first-rate American aircraft?" And, of course, there was absolutely no interest in Washington.

Q: That is one of the major terrors of the time.

LINDSTROM: So I was quite relieved in a way when I was sitting right next to this man who had personally and otherwise been responsible for so many untimely deaths. He ran this so-called state research bureau, and looking into his eyes I remembered people had said to me, "Well, the Israelis were peddling the story that he has tertiary syphilis. Did you look into his eyes and did you see it?" I said I wouldn't know what to look for, but he looked like a fairly healthy individual.

GREGORY L. MATTSON
Political Officer
Nairobi (1974-1976)

Mr. Mattson was born in about 1940 and graduated from Georgetown University. He served in numerous posts including Lisbon, Nairobi, Seychelles, Athens and Copenhagen. He was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 2000.

Q: Okay. Why don't we go on to your next assignment? Where was that, and how did that come to be?

MATTSON: As I was concluding my tour in Lisbon. I received a letter from my former DCM, Diego Asencio, asking if I would be interested in joining him for my next assignment in the political section in Brasilia. On that very same day a telegram arrived from the Department asking if I would be interested in the Swahili-designated political position in Nairobi, Kenya. I was really torn, because I enjoyed working under Diego Ascencio's tutelage; on the other hand, I thought the prospect of learning another language, Swahili, and going to a very interesting place like Kenya would be a unique experience. And I thought, I could always go back to Brazil, which, of course, I never got to do. So I accepted the assignment to Nairobi via about six months of training in Swahili in Washington.

Q: So you went into the political section then in Nairobi in 1974. What sort of work did you do there, and what was the situation like for the American embassy at that time?

MATTSON: Well, again, my responsibilities focused on something that I always enjoyed, which was domestic political reporting. I had studied Swahili in a tutorial and had done very well. I had a wonderful Kikuyu teacher; John Thiuri, as my instructor.

Q: He may still be here. Was the head of the union for a long time, I know.

MATTSON: Yes, I saw him a year or two ago. John Thiuri and I had a wonderful six months together. We took long walks conversing in Swahili.

Q: You were the only student during that entire period?

MATTSON: Much to my advantage, I was the only student during that entire period. The day after we arrived in Nairobi, Jomo Kenyatta, the President, changed the parliamentary language from English to Swahili. So for the next two years, as the only Swahili language officer at post, I had the opportunity to learn parliamentary Swahili along with the Kenyan parliamentarians, who up until that point had all been dealing strictly in English. Kenyan Swahili on a parliamentary level variety was, unlike Julius Nyerere's Swahili in Tanzania, a little underdeveloped. So it was a very interesting experience. I think of the languages that I've studied, the one that I enjoyed the most, because of the character of the language and because of its utility, was Swahili. Kenya had

only one political party, the Kenyan African National Union, KANU. But they had very lively elections. Even though everyone had to be a member of the same party, they have five or six people contesting for each seat. Shortly after my arrival there was a general election, and I traveled all over the country and actually spent significant time in Kisumu near Lake Victoria with several deputies who were out campaigning. Domestic political reporting was deemed significant by the Department because Kenyatta was getting older and weaker and Kenya was becoming an increasingly important country in East Africa. For example, during my period we established our military sales relationship with the Kenyans, persuading them to buy a squadron of F-5 fighters. Even though they wanted more modern attack aircraft, we were determined to offer refurbished F-5s, a fighter aircraft rather than a ground attack plane, from Jordan or some other country. There were various tensions in the society even then, and the direction Kenya would take after the passing of Jomo Kenyatta was deemed to be important. The single most fascinating aspect of the domestic scene was the murder midway through my assignment of J. M. Kariuki. J. M. Kariuki, a fellow Kikuyu with Kenyatta, was a parliamentarian, and a likely heir to Kenyatta. He was murdered in the Ngong Hills outside of Nairobi. This caused the greatest political crisis in Kenya since the murder of Tom M'boya, which occurred in the late 1960s. Tom M'boya was a Luo, again thought to be a rival to Kenyatta. He was murdered under suspicious circumstances. J. M. Kariuki was also murdered under suspicious circumstances, and there was tremendous tension in Nairobi and throughout Kenya for a couple-week period afterwards. I was very active in trying to understand the dynamics that were at work, had good contacts in the Kenyan army, and also had also regular contact with the Kariuki family. J. M. Kariuki, for example, had a sister who was married to an Englishman and these were long-time contacts of the embassy. Shortly after the murder of J. M. Kariuki, a telegram arrived from the Department asking if I would go to Angola on a short TDY - I guess because of the Portuguese language - to be the American liaison officer in what was called the Nova Lisboa airlift. This was the airlift of several hundred thousand Portuguese settlers back to the metropole at the end of the guerrilla war. Unfortunately, the post wouldn't allow me to go though I was very keen to go, because of the Kariuki murder and the reporting that I had to do. Three or four months later I was given a similar offer to go as acting consul general in Lourenco Marques, Mozambique, and again was held back. Either of those opportunities would have been terrific in terms of professional growth. As a side note, a fascinating feature of the Nova Lisboa, now Huambo, airlift process, was that I became very friendly during my assignment in Lisbon, the second one, with the Portuguese officer who would have been my counterpart on the airlift operation. So he described to me where I would have lived and what I would have done and so forth, so I felt I almost had been there, even though I didn't get to go. General Rodrigo Gonzalez was his name.

Q: Kenyatta, I assume, not only tried to encourage Swahili to be used during this period but presumably used it himself more than he had earlier and insisted that his cabinet members do so.

MATTSON: Exactly. When they would have their various national holidays, Uhuru Day and Jamhuri Day, in contrast to years past, Kenyatta would speak in Swahili. It was difficult for some Kenyans to master Swahili because they all had a tribal language and most of them had English. Swahili, which had been the *lingua franca* among the various tribes, in a way had been supplanted by English. So, they had to relearn Swahili. But this was part of Kenyatta's move toward what he called African socialism, and it was, I think, a step that was welcomed by the Kenyans.

Q: You mentioned that Swahili was also being used in parliament and that the elections for parliament, even though they were restricted to the members of KANU, often were quite competitive because several candidates would stand for one seat. Did that really work, or in fact people knew who was going to be elected and some other names were on the ballot? Was it truly a competitive election?

MATTSON: Our impression was that it was highly competitive. In fact, what you had in the Kenyan parliament was an interesting dynamic, because the major tribes - for example, the Kisii or the Luos or the Kikuyus or the Swahilis from the coast - would have an important figure from within their community elected and many of those were active critics or even opponents of the regime. I remember, for example, Martin Shikuku, who may still be alive and may still be active. I went to parliament one night at eight o'clock knowing in advance that six or eight dissident parliamentarians were going to be placed in detention. They were going to be taken by the police to a place of detention, not arrested but to a camp in an isolated place because of anti-regime activities. I knew all of them very well, and I remember as the police were leading Martin Shikuku out of parliament, he turned to me and said, "Greg, tell your government that Martin will be back." And, of course, he did come back after Kenyatta's death and became an important opposition figure. So I think the elections were largely free. There were always surprise results. Of course, money helped. They had something called the pombe vote, which was you invited people to a rally and would provide them a beer, pombe, and you would hope to secure their vote through this small bribe. But in terms of the vote counting, it was, I think, very straightforward. And Kenyatta himself was prepared to accept a certain level of opposition, in contrast to many other African leaders at the time or since.

Q: Now your work was primarily related to the internal political situation? You were dealing with the government, the ministries, so much?

MATTSON: No, very little of that, although I did get involved with the defense ministry because they gave me the responsibility for working on the emerging political-military relationship which included greater access to the port of Mombasa, which was a very significant Indian Ocean port, the largely air force-oriented modernization of the Kenyan military, which we were helping the British to undertake.

Q: Let's talk about the defense role just a little bit more. You mentioned the Port of Mombasa was a popular place to visit for U.S. Navy ships in the Indian Ocean. Later on Kenya ports became even more vital in some of our Persian Gulf and Horn of Africa interests. At this time, '74 to '76, I assume that aspect wasn't particularly significant.

MATTSON: No, although - and we'll get into this a little bit further when we talk about the Seychelles - there were emerging big power rivalries in the Indian Ocean, and we very often had a deployed aircraft carrier in the region. The carriers were beginning to be deployed in the Indian Ocean for the first time in that period, and Mombasa was the only port which was large enough and which had an infrastructure sufficient to handle a carrier task force. There was really no other practical alternative in terms of true shore leave except Mombasa. I actually was given the job of what they called port liaison officer, so each time a naval contingent came to Mombasa, I

went to Mombasa, took up residence in a hotel, and tried as best I could to keep the sailors out of jail - if not out of mischief, at least out of jail. So I was present for nearly all of those visits in 1975/76.

Q: And you acted as liaison with the local authorities. How did they feel generally about this? I assume they welcomed the spending and the economic injection, but was there reluctance from a political point of view or otherwise?

MATTSON: The central government in Nairobi was very enthusiastic about the emerging political-military relationship of which this was a component and, I think, gave fairly strong encouragement to the local authorities to be accommodating to these visits. Mombasa was and is very much of a port town with bars and such, and so there was really an economic boom every time these ships would come. Many of the sailors would go off on brief safaris into the very close Tsavo West game park which was close to Mombasa, and others would go to hotels on both the south and north coasts. It was a wonderful three or four days for them after long deployments. The infusion of capital into Mombasa was really tremendous. Mombasa, of course, had for centuries been an important town. This was again fascinating for me because the Portuguese had built one of their major Indian Ocean ports in the early 1500s in Mombasa. It was called Fort Jesus and is well preserved. It was interesting for me, having spent my previous tour in Lisbon, to see a remnant of the early Portuguese colonial empire in Fort Jesus in Mombasa. I later learned that all the stones of Fort Jesus are from Portugal itself as the Portuguese used stones as ballast on their outbound voyages.

Q: But they had been supplanted, I guess, by the British. Why don't you talk just a little bit more about the British military/British political role in Kenya at that time. I don't know the extent that you were really involved with either the British embassy or this question.

MATTSON: I've always been interested in military history and military activities. The British were, of course, the primary suppliers of the Kenyan army, and there was a strong British tradition throughout the Kenyan army. You had the King's African Rifles, which was, of course, a colonial unit at the time when Kenya was a British colony. It later became the Kenyan African Rifles. They had British-style uniforms and British marching techniques. The air force consisted of Hawker-Hunter aircraft, British designed. All of their heavy equipment was British. Their tactics were British. There was a very large contingent of British military advisors, and, of course, promising Kenyan officers would be often given advanced schooling in the U.K. So long before we came in largely on a technological basis with our Air Force - and with the ability to actually give them military equipment at rock-bottom prices - the British had and maintained a very strong influence on the Kenyan military.

Q: I paid a brief visit to Kenya in 1965 shortly after independence, but at that time the East African community was functioning pretty well. I think by 1974 it had essentially broken down. Do you want to say a few words about how the Kenyan relationship with Tanzania, Uganda.

MATTSON: During my tour, the border with Tanzania was closed. I don't recall the exact date of the breakup of the East African community, but it was in the early 1970s, I believe, and it literally occurred overnight. The Kenyans ended up with all of the aircraft, for example, of the

East African Airways, at their airports. So, they were all expropriated. The Kenyans actually ended up with the lion's share of the capital goods that were in the community. But the border was closed. I went to Amboseli Game Park many times - and you were close to the border but couldn't cross into Tanzania. The relationship with the Ugandans was better than with the Tanzanians but still not very positive.

Q: Who was the ambassador to Kenya at that time? And do you want to say any more about how the United States saw the domestic political situation? You talked about in Portugal how we were balancing several interests and the embassy was able to report effectively within that context. Was anything similar going on in Kenya at that time, in Nairobi?

MATTSON: With five or six tribes vying for power and resenting the Kikuyus, which was Kenyatta's tribe governing the country, the concern was palpable that there would be an unstable situation after his demise. So we did a lot of reporting on leading personalities, on the tactical alliances and alignments of various tribes, the resentment of the Kikuyus, the position of the Luos, the second tribe, in the society. We felt that there was a very strong central bureaucracy which would help smooth things along, and the assumption, more a hope, really was that it would be a peaceful transition despite pent-up resentments against the Kikuyus. But there was definitely a concern of a destabilized Kenya after Kenyatta.

Q: Kenyatta was still functioning, alive, when you left?

MATTSON: He was very much in control of events. He would take up residence of the various state houses in Nakuru, in Mombasa, in Nairobi, depending on the seasons of the year. Important figures would come and call on him. He was always present at major national days. It was clear that he was making important decisions. There was an increasing visibility of Charles Njonjo, who was the Attorney General. Many people thought that he, rather than Daniel arap Moi, would be the ultimate successor to Kenyatta. But Kenyatta was very much in control. However, most Kenyans associated Kenyatta indirectly with the murder of J. M. Kariuki, and there was a strong tension in the atmosphere for a couple of weeks. At one stage, Jomo Kenyatta decided to have a pass-by of the military in the streets of downtown Nairobi so that he would take the salute of the troops that passed by as a sign of their continued loyalty. This was very close to the current site of the American embassy on Government Road. The army dutifully marched by, several thousand of them. He took the salute. He then got into his stretch Mercedes limousine from which had the ability to stand up through the with his fly whisk wave to the populace. What was fascinating about all this was that at the end of the parade, in front of a very sullen crowd of tens of thousands of very quiet Kenyans, Kenyatta got into his car and did what he did at all such public occasions, which was to wave at the crowd. Only this time no one cheered, no one waved. They looked menacingly toward him as he drove by. But, of course, he continued to do what he had always done, which was, with fly whisk in hand, he would wave. That night, or the next night, I saw the Chief of Staff of the Kenyan Army, who thought that this was a tremendous display of bravado and courage on the part of Kenyatta. The president was going to do what he always did, and if the people were not going to applaud, that was their problem rather than his. Whereas many leaders might have gotten down into their car and sped away or had some other overt reaction to the disappointment of the crowd with him, he just did his usual thing. He was a very impressive person, had tremendous presence and charisma. Henry Kissinger, Secretary of

State, visited Nairobi during the period. I went up to State House Nakuru with the Kissinger party for his meeting with Kenyatta. That meeting, which lasted several hours, was by all accounts a very good meeting from the point of view of Dr. Kissinger. The Kissinger visit was probably the highlight of the then emerging close relationship we had with Kenya.

Q: Was the purpose of Kissinger's visit primarily related to bilateral relations and the place of Kenya in terms of U.S. interests in the region, or was it related to Rhodesia or some other African issues, Angola?

MATTSON: No, it was very much tied in with the emerging relationship, and this was going to be a signal to the Kenyans that they had reached a new level of importance for the U.S.

Q: Who was the U.S. ambassador during this period?

MATTSON: Anthony Marshall, a political appointee, was the ambassador when I arrived. He had been previously ambassador in Madagascar and in Trinidad, I believe. He was the son of Mrs. Vincent Astor, a stepson - I think that would be the connection. He was an effective ambassador, relaxed and with good judgment. He was there for the entire period that I was there.

Q: What was Daniel arap Moi doing during this period, and did you have any particular contact with him? You mentioned that the Attorney General was seen as perhaps the ultimate post-Kenyatta leader. Let me just make another general comment. I suppose, a little bit like the embassy in Madrid, always looking at what's going to happen post-Franco and the embassy in Belgrade thinking about who's going to come after Tito, there was a lot of preoccupation with what happens after Kenyatta in Nairobi.

MATTSON: Absolutely. Daniel arap Moi was the Vice President. I attended many meetings of CODELs and U.S. government officials who would call on Daniel arap Moi. He was originally a schoolteacher who became involved in KANU politics. Kenyatta had him as a subordinate for many years. Frankly, the overall opinion in the diplomatic community and among other observers was that he wasn't up to the task of succeeding Jomo Kenyatta, that he was intellectually limited. He was inarticulate, didn't speak good English, didn't have a grasp of policy issues, and many of the meetings were very perfunctory. In addition to that, he was not considered a particularly strong person. Moreover, he was from the Kalenjin tribe, which is a grouping of very small tribes in western Kenya, so he had no power base. If you didn't have a power base within an important tribal group, you were thought as not having much political clout. Njonjo, the Attorney General, was a Kikuyu, and there were important Luas, and you had important people in the army from around the Machakos area. So, if one were to draw up a list of the half a dozen likely presidents five years after Kenyatta's death, Moi wasn't going to be on anyone's short list. It was expected that he would simply be shunted aside very quickly. Of course, what actually happened was that he eliminated all of his rivals and each one of them sank into political oblivion.

Q: And that has happened elsewhere too in terms of what might have happened. Anything else about your two years in Nairobi that we should cover at this point? You mentioned CODELs and a visit by Kissinger. I assume that Nairobi was and is a very popular place to visit because of the

game parks and wildlife, the climate, the ocean, beaches.

MATTSON: Well, it's an ideal city from that point of view. It's high enough, nearly 6,000 feet, that the climate is absolutely wonderful. Of course, it's quite cool at night. An interesting aspect is you needed to have a heated swimming pool in Nairobi even though it's nearly on the equator, because the water never becomes warm enough to allow for comfortable swimming. But it was a wonderful city at that time, not as crowded as it is today and not run down as it is today. I was back there a few years ago in the early 1990s. Crime was very limited at that time of my tour. The so-called panga gangs, the machete gangs, were very few and far between, and there were few incidents. Nairobi was a city you could enjoy at night with ease. Now, at sundown, everyone heads quickly for cover. It was a very pleasant city. Of course, everyone who has ever served in Nairobi arrives and people say, "You should have been here before," because it was allegedly so much nicer at an earlier period. When I went there, for example, in 1974, people would say, "You should have been here in the late 1960s." You mentioned, Ray, that you were there in 1965. I'm sure that people in '65 would say, "It was so great in 1960." But it's still a wonderful country, though, and the Kenyans are truly marvelous people. So, however bad it has become, it's still quite a nice place. It's just that it was always nicer some time back.

Q: Or at least it was said to have been so much nicer.

MATTSON: Yes. And the thing about Nairobi, in contrast to the Seychelles, is that the British arrived in Kenya and said, "This is like the Highlands. This is a place where we can have a large and successful settler community, so let's put in a great infrastructure so that we can live here at least as well as we could in the English countryside." So you had, for example, six or seven very good golf courses in and around Nairobi, you had wonderful neighborhoods with beautiful English-style homes, amateur theater, tennis and cricket clubs, even a thoroughbred race track. I think among all the colonies that the British had, certainly the ones in Africa, Nairobi was the one that they put the money and the effort into to make it into something that would be attractive for large British settler populations for many, many generations to come.

Q: And in the mid-'70s when you were there, what was the extent of the British settlers, the white community, both in terms of the numbers and their political significance?

MATTSON: They were still quite numerous. You had the famous Long Bar at the New Stanley Hotel which was crowded every afternoon with the up-country settler types who were coming to Nairobi for whatever purposes. They had some political clout. Kenyatta himself had spent some years in England and, in fact, had a British wife at one point. He had a very strong affection for the British even though he had been in rebellion against them. He was very tolerant of the British settler community. He was also very tolerant of the Asian commercial community. In fact, during his rule, I think a hallmark, a very successful hallmark, was the fact that it was a successful multicultural African country. The whites still controlled tremendous amounts of farmland. They were still prominent in the government, in advisory positions, and very important in the business community. There was certainly none of the notion that "this is an African country now and we have to purge ourselves of all the British elements in it." That was not at all present during my time.

Q: Where was the American embassy located at the time you were there? I ask this partly thinking of what happened with the bombing in 1998. Was that the location, or was it in a different place?

MATTSON: No, the embassy from 1974 to '76 and for a few years after that was located in a commercial building called Cotts House, which is on Mama Ngina Way. Our location in the '70s was good from the point of view of work, because it was close to parliament, close to the Jomo Kenyatta Conference Center, close to the downtown business area. We occupied several floors of his building, which was similar, I think, to the buildings which were adjacent to the U.S. embassy when it was blown up. One tragic aspect relating to where the embassy was in 1998 and why it was there was the fact that for many years the Kenyans offered the U.S. parcels - land to build a new embassy. These were located in various parts of the city, highly desirable parts of the city. There were at least a half dozen parcels of land which the Kenyans offered to the U.S. government, but there was always a time constraint: "You have to take this land and build your embassy within a year, start within a year, two years, five years," whatever it might have been. In each of those cases, because of typical Washington inertia, the time lapsed and the land was otherwise disposed of. While I was there, the current site of the American embassy was the one that was on offer, and, incredibly, it was that one that was accepted. I remember those of us in the embassy saying, not from a security point of view because we didn't think of things in those terms in those days, but we said, "Why would we ever want to build an embassy down in that part of town close to the railroad station?" It was a very undesirable location in a very crowded, sort of run-down part of town.

Q: And not close to the parliament, the other places where you at the time saw that the embassy needed to be located in order to be effective.

MATTSON: Exactly, or in the close-in suburb which is where many of the embassies were, where you would have some grounds and some facilities. This was going to be a block structure in a run-down part of town miles away from any other embassy. We would be moving into a sort of industrial park type environment, which we all thought was awful. Those of us at the embassy thought, "What a shame that we didn't accept one of these other parcels of land which were on offer for 10 or 15 years."

Q: I suppose one of the reasons why we didn't accept those various offers is the time that would be involved in getting approval, funding, and so on.

MATTSON: Exactly, that was the reason why they all slipped by.

Q: You mentioned in passing UNEP, the United Nations Environmental Program. Had that already been located in Nairobi, or did that come later?

MATTSON: I don't remember when it was established, but it was already at the conference center in a fledgling state.

Q: But you weren't involved with that at all?

MATTSON: No. Out of curiosity, I would go to their plenaries and so forth just to see an international gathering, but we hadn't had any work to do with them.

Q: Anything else that you want to cover about your time as political officer in Nairobi?

MATTSON: I don't think so. I think that pretty much covers it. It was, again, a very interesting period in Kenyan political history and certainly in the emergence of a much closer U.S.-Kenyan relationship. I feel privileged to have been posted there with the one regret that I didn't get to spend some time in then colonial Portuguese Africa.

Q: Were there significant frictions that had begun to emerge in terms of the U.S.-Kenyan relationship, or were they sort of minor incidents of sailors overstaying their visit and that kind of thing that, I think, could be expected?

MATTSON: Yes, that was really the extent of it. Of course, after my departure there was an attempted coup d'etat in Kenya which was led by air force officers who had had training in the U.S. on some of these aircraft that we were providing, and I think at that point the relationship changed to a certain extent. In subsequent years there has been a lot of criticism of the corruption of the Moi regime. But at the time of my tour, we had a very smooth and positive relationship.

ANTHONY D. MARSHALL
Ambassador
Kenya (1974-1977)

Ambassador Marshall, the son of Brooke Astor, New York City socialite and philanthropist, was born in New York and educated at Brown University. After service in the Marine Corps in World War II, Mr. Marshall joined the Department of State in 1950, transferring to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) the following year. In 1958 he was assigned to Istanbul, after which he left the Agency and worked in the Private Sector. Returning to the Government in 1969, Mr. Marshall served as US Ambassador to the Malagasy Republic (1969-1971); Trinidad and Tobago (1972-1973); Kenya (1973-1977) and concurrently, the Seychelles (1976-1977). Ambassador Marshall was interviewed in 1998 by Richard L. Jackson.

Q: You stayed two years in Trinidad and Tobago and then moved on to Kenya and Seychelles. That would have been in '73?

MARSHALL: '74. Yes, I left in January, '74, and arrived in Kenya in '74 in Nairobi. Before leaving, I went to the White House to see President Nixon, who had appointed me originally to Madagascar and then to Trinidad and Tobago, which I think I've already covered, and we had a nice talk. It ended up by his giving me a little farewell, Godspeed message of "Now Tony, don't get kicked out of any more countries." So, we shook hands, had the usual photo op, and I went on my way to Nairobi, which, I believe I've already said, I knew very well. From 1954 when I

was there as a private citizen for six weeks, and intermittently on business and safari, and then up to Madagascar, and now I was really getting what I wanted, which all along had been Kenya. Needless to say, I was absolutely delighted. I followed Rob McIlvaine, who was our ambassador there, but who resigned a year before and a charge had been in charge of the embassy for a year – Ralph Lindstrom, an extremely competent Foreign Service officer. Rob stayed in Nairobi and took on a job with the Africa Wildlife Leadership Foundation. Then he moved back to Washington. But he was there for a good deal of the time that I was there. I hasten to add, although that could be a problem, it was not. In fact, I either gave dinners for him or invited him to many dinners. We were on very good terms, and it all worked out. Generally though, in principle, I would disapprove of that. I think it's a bad idea. I also think, I know, it made it difficult for my DCM, who was then charge – Ralph Lindstrom – do some of his work. Not that Rob was interfering, but people would go in and ask him questions because he was there. My coming actually took a load off of Ralph Lindstrom's shoulders because they finally recognized that Rob was no longer ambassador.

Our first ambassador to Kenya, though, was William Attwood – Bill Attwood – who was editor of Look Magazine and a writer. He liked very much to write. He wrote before and he wrote after he'd been to Kenya, and he wrote a book called The Reds and the Blacks, which was published as quickly as he could get it onto paper, and into the press when he came back. And this was not at all well received by the Kenyans because he reported conversations which they thought were confidential. And certainly they were not historic, in the sense that what he was saying was still the matter of the moment. I believe, and I think it can be done, the trick is for an author to write about something that is “his in history” and not of the moment. But being a journalist, he thought like one, and he got back and wanted to write a story. The part the Kenyans objected to most was his representative role to Thomas Kanza, the self-appointed middle man and arch rival to President Kasavubu. He, Bill Attwood, and the Kenyans ran into a number of problems where the U.S. was either taking action or saying things that the Kenyans didn't approve of. Kenyatta, though, who at that time was appointed chairman of an OAU (Organization of African Unity) committee to take a look at what was happening in the Congo, which then became Zaire, as you know, and is now Congo again. So when Bill Attwood's successor got there, Glen Ferguson, who is a good friend of mine, he came back and said to me that it was like operating in an iron curtain country. The Kenyans simply didn't want anything to do with the American ambassador, which was most unfortunate indeed. If one wants to look at the area handbook for Kenya, it states that diplomatic ties with Kenya received a setback in 1967 with the publication of The Reds and the Blacks, by previous U.S. ambassador William Attwood.

So, he wasn't entirely forgotten by the time I got there, but what I was pressing was not politics, I was pressing business. And they were interested in business. And there was an opportunity for business in Kenya. The proof in the pudding evidently was not in Madagascar. And in Trinidad and Tobago there was really nothing to do. I presented my credentials to Kenyatta on my arrival, along with the Yugoslavian poet and Malawi ambassador down at his state house in Mombasa. Kenyatta, in fact, had several state houses; one in Mombasa, one in Nairobi, one en route to Nakuru, one in Nakuru. He need not necessarily perhaps have had as many. They weren't palaces, but they were very nice buildings – all of them. The reason he did this was, he believed he should be out of the capital with the people –and he didn't like being in town, although I did occasionally see him at the State House in Nairobi. The first matter of business was when I paid

my calls on the diplomats, my colleagues, the high commissioners, and the ambassadors.

There were 74 countries accredited to Kenya at the time. Ambassadors such as Sir Tony Duff later left Kenya to become head of MI-6. He was replaced by Stanley Finland. There was Hamid Ganane, who represented Pakistan and became a very good friend. I told him that one of my deep desires was to visit the province of Spat – or the country of Spat really – in northern Pakistan. He said he could arrange it and I always wished that I could have somehow talked myself into giving myself two weeks pure pleasure, but I felt I really couldn't leave Kenya for something like that, but I really wish I had gone. There was Rudolph Resse, a Norwegian, who was an admiral and who was really receiving a post that was below his capabilities and his rank, but doing so because of his health. He was extremely competent and a terribly nice man. He and I had a very strong interest in common and that was the land and development of Kenya. He and his country, through him, was building roads and developing the water and the shores for fishing of Lake Rudolph and Lake Turkana and other water and road projects, as we were doing in part but I hoped we'd be doing more of. I knew the Iranian ambassador quite well, but that was mostly just a pleasure. He always brought a pound of caviar when he came to play backgammon with me. The Belgian ambassador I found extremely nice. He was very helpful to me because we could not, at that time, go to Uganda because Uganda was under Amin. He not only went there himself but had very good contacts there with missionaries and others. And every time he went there and came back, I'd meet with him and get considerably good information. Not just information, but good intelligence. And I became as friendly as I could during the cold war with the Soviet ambassador, Boris Geroshinknov. We talked about UNEP, which he was interested in, and which I was then accredited to as a permanent representative.

Q: It was by then already headquartered in Nairobi?

MARSHALL: Yes, the United Nations Environment Program. It was just becoming established then. I presented my credentials to Maurice Strong, who was the head of the conference center. UNEP then moved outside of Nairobi. Maurice Strong turned his position over to Dr. Mustafa Tolba, an Egyptian, who then operated from outside Nairobi. And we, the United States, then appointed a full-time permanent representative. I gave my job up to him, and we were represented directly by one person, who is responsible to the ambassador, but accredited to the UNEP. I made contacts with people whom I knew well in the past, with whom I wanted to continue to establish contact, for one reason or another. Dr. Mike Wood, who is head of the Africa Medical Research Foundation, on whose board I served since 1960, and which had a flying doctors' service in Kenya, and headquartered at Wilson Airport, and radio contact in those days with 65 different clinics throughout Kenya and later expanded its interest in the Sudan in particular. I was on the New York Board – there were several country boards and their headquarters were in Nairobi – and I had the highest regard for Mike Wood, and we were great friends. I also continued to see, and had seen a great deal of him over the years when I was in Kenya, Richard Leakey. I knew his father sometime before I knew him, Louis Leakey. Richard was and is a controversial person. I'm not going to go into the present; I'm only going to stick with the past in this report. In those days, I very much valued sounding some problem off on Richard and getting a totally independent, non-diplomatic, non-black Kenyan – Richard is a Kenyan citizen – non-embassy view on some problem. I did this with Richard a number of times. I hate to say this, but he became more and more, maybe even bitter, but certainly more

opinionated through the years. A lot of it was – I said I wasn't going to talk about it, but I am now really – because of some of the experiences he went through, such as losing his kidneys, both of them, and being given one by his brother, Philip, almost dying in the process. And then, somewhat more recently, when his plane crashed and he lost his legs. But in those days, and that's why I'm mentioning it, he was younger, active, lively, ambitious, and had achieved some of the goals which he'd set out to do. I naturally knew his brother, Jonathan, who was an entirely different kind of person, who lived up in Lake Loringo. He grew melons, and milked snakes for their venom, which he sold. But Richard was a true Kenyan. When he was born, a man by the name of Konange, who, when I was there, was the Minister of State in President Kenyatta's office, spat on Richard. For the Kikuyu, that was a great honor. That meant that he was accepted into the Kikuyu tribe. I knew a number of other people there. Tubby Block, who was a colonial, and I saw a great deal of him, although there were a very few colonials who I did see. Actually I stayed away from the colonial group. I spent my time talking with the black Kenyans.

Q: The colonial group was associated with certain places, clubs and spots and was an enclave of its own?

MARSHALL: Yes, very much. Although I was a member of one club, the Muthaiga Club, which is about as colonial as you can get. There were black Kenyans who were members, but the LOLS (for little old ladies, as they were called), would come in and put their foot up on the stool for their arthritis every day and sit and have tea. It was pretty colonial.

A very good friend of mine, whom I'd corresponded with a number of times and had met before I got there, was Joe Murumbi, former Vice President of Kenya. He was retired when I got there. He lived very close to where I was. He was a person I could turn to for a completely different kind of reading. He was half Masai and half Goan, but he was a Kenyan citizen, very much so, having been Vice President. He was the kind of intellectual whom I like. I'm not against intellectuals, but having just criticized Eric Williams as an intellectual, I want to make it clear that I like people who have good minds and Joe Murumbi certainly did. When he lived in London as a student there, he would often, he told me, go without any lunch in order to save 10 shillings or five shillings to go buy a book. And he had the most marvelous library; I think about 5,000 books, all on Africa, in his home in Nairobi. He also had an extraordinary stamp collection. He very kindly gave me a rather large sample of them when I left. And a good coin collection. And maps. He had wonderful maps of Africa.

I then got to know really very well Charles Njonjo, who was the Attorney General, who in those days was the second most powerful man in Kenya; more powerful than the Vice President, because in those days he had absolute authority, which was taken away.

Q: The Vice President was already Moi, the current President?

MARSHALL: Yes, he was. But Charles ran into problems. They were political problems. He did nothing wrong, in my opinion. But he was charged with high treason. He wasn't put into prison, but his passport was taken away from him. To give you an example of the way things were run in Kenya, one day Charles went to the airport (this was quite a bit later). It was after I'd left, but I'd returned on a visit to see his wife off. His wife was English, and she was going to England. She

still had her passport. Kenyatta was at the airport. He said, "What are you doing here? Why aren't you going with your wife?" Charles turned to the President and said, "You took it away from me." And he said, "Oh, you should have it back." And the next day he had it back. And that's sort of a strange way for bureaucracy to work. I liked Charles. There were a number of issues which I went to him on or which he called me about. I'll go into some of them in a minute.

I turned my attention at the same time, naturally, as I was making calls and meeting or catching up with people, to the embassy. The embassy had 41 Americans; 83 locals, plus the staffs of USIA, USAID, Peace Corps, which had 208 volunteers in the country. I'll stop on the Peace Corps for a minute. A month after I'd been there, my wife and I gave a reception on two consecutive nights for all Peace Corps volunteers; and if they had a friend, they could bring a friend. I felt this was important for them to know they weren't just operating in a vacuum there. In addition to those organizations, the Library of Congress had a small staff there, and the Foreign Agricultural Service and the IESC, the International Executive Service Corps, was headed in Nairobi by a man by the name of General Ryder. I felt very strongly about IESC, which was founded by Frank Pace and David Rockefeller, using retired people. I'm sure that all people who either read the text of what I'm saying or hear me say it know about IESC. IESC sends retired or available executives out into developing countries to help with regards to the management of businesses.

I then had my meetings with my country team – an absolutely essential group. I didn't make any major changes in the members of the team. What I did was sometimes include people who were not members of the country team in a meeting of the country team on issues that I felt it would be a good idea if they knew about them or got their opinion. A word about Ralph Lindstrom, whom I've already mentioned. As I say, he was extremely well qualified, and we worked very well together during my time there. But I think, and I'm saying this even though some day he might know what I've said even though I've never faced him with it, that he was a little disappointed that a political ambassador was coming. And, if a political appointee was coming to Nairobi – to over-simplify it – there are two kinds of political appointees sent out as ambassador. One is someone who just wants to play golf and have fun and go to receptions and there's the other, which was me. And that is I wanted to run the embassy. And it's a little hard, and I recognize that, for a career Foreign Service officer to be displaced – not replaced – by a political appointee even if he's already been to another country or two as ambassador; particularly if he's been charge for a year, by someone who wants to run the embassy, which is what I did do. Also, I know that it hit him rather hard when I left Kenya because there was a change in Administration and Jimmy Carter then became President and I submitted my resignation. But submitting my resignation at that time – it wasn't done in January, but was later – I don't remember exactly when – but it wasn't until April that I was told – I got a cable – telling me that I was to be replaced. Ralph, I know, was hoping that I would leave in January of my own volition. I didn't want to for a good reason, and in April I even sent back a cable saying, "Can I stay on active duty until (I can't remember the exact date) about six weeks ahead?" I did. I was two weeks in Nairobi and then went to a chief of missions conference in Abidjan and then back to the States, because if I was on active duty for another six weeks, I would have 20 years of government service and that meant something to me. That was my motivation, but I think it was hard for Ralph Lindstrom to swallow.

Q: Probably, there was even a financial side, to have a longer period as chargé with chargé pay..

MARSHALL: Of course.

Q: I feel from a career perspective that the DCM has far more responsibility and challenge working with a motivated political ambassador than he would with a career person with the same knowledge base.

MARSHALL: Yes. I'd like to think so. We did work rather well together. After we got adjusted to each other, which didn't take any time, and I'm not just saying this; it's absolutely true, until the time I left, no until January. But from January on, I did note a change.

Q: Certainly the relationship you would have had sets the tone for morale in the embassy. A good relationship radiates good morale and a sour one sours the whole operation.

MARSHALL: Yes. I had a very good staff. The ones who were there the longest – there was an economic officer who then left. There was a man by the name of John Eddy, who was my economic officer. He had I got along absolutely – because my interest was economics – perfectly. He went on to become consul general in Dhahran. And then consul general in Bombay. Two ideal posts. And he's now living in Vermont. I see him now. He's terrific. I had a very good chief of station, I suppose I can say that. Murat Natirboff was very good; he was absolutely outstanding. He became chief of station in Moscow and he also was chief of station in New York at the UN. He and I stayed in touch, as I did with John Eddy. I had a good political officer, a good consular officer; they were all good.

Q: For the Chief of Station, you had come yourself from higher reaches of the Agency working for Dick Bissell.

MARSHALL: We had a perfect understanding. It sounds maybe like I'm honking my horn by saying this, but my reputation for an interest and activity in intelligence affairs was well known to him when I got there. They were all outstanding, but Murat was absolutely outstanding.

Q: That would have been in the Angleton years. This was a period of go-go activity for the Agency. Did you, as chief of mission, feel these guys were pushing the envelope, that you had to pull them back a little bit? Were you concerned that something might blow up in your face?

MARSHALL: You bet it was. I was all for it. But they also protected me. They probably would have for anybody, but the PLFP, one of these splinter groups of the PLO, but a radical one – I don't say the PLO isn't radical – but the PLFP is even more so, had sent a team down to Kenya and there were some others with them who were going to blow up a plane at the airport with a bazooka or something similar to that. There was a very close watch on them by the Special Branch. The Agency worked very closely with the Special Branch. The Special Branch were able to apprehend them just before they did it. That was one thing. But there were four people who, we knew, were in Nairobi and they wanted to make an example. They wanted to make the noise that terrorists make – they wanted to embarrass Kenya. Sometime later, maybe you remember, a

bomb ruined a whole wing of the Norfolk Hotel. This was the same sort of thing. Anyway, it was understood that they wanted to probably kill me. So the chief of station and the embassy's security officer came to me and said, "You should have maximum security." I said, "What do you think that is?" They said, "Well, we think you should have somebody ride in the front seat of your car with a machine gun and a car following you. Maybe a car preceding you, too." I said, "No. No way. Absolutely not. That simply draws attention to me and I'm not going to do that." They said, "What will you accept?" I said, "I'm a damn good shot. I go out and shoot with the Marines at the firing range here. I've always been a good shot. Give me a weapon, and for as long as is necessary, I'll carry it." So I did, for three months. But I did find it very embarrassing. I was the only one who was embarrassed about it, because no one else knew about it; but to be carrying a weapon with me when I was in black tie, sitting next to some lady at dinner!" The Agency and the chief of station, because of their good relations, all of that might have happened, but if you know what people are talking about, you have a clearer view, and they accepted the way I wanted to do it.

Q: Staying with the Agency, did the charges in Madagascar of CIA involvement in the episodes there at the time you left cause any ripples with the Kenyans? Did you have anything to overcome with Kenyatta?

MARSHALL: None whatsoever, not even mentioned. They even complimented me on it.

Q: They were aware of course?

MARSHALL: Oh, yes. It was in the agrément.

Q: Why that difference between those two countries? Francophone/Anglophone or

MARSHALL: The British and the Americans always wanted to work together. The French were different. Two days ago – this has got nothing to do with it – but two days ago the Duke of Edinburgh was here and we were asked by the British consul general to come for a drink. And he had all kinds of huge receptions, but he only asked about 60 people. I had met him years ago, but by this time when I met His Highness, the Duke of Edinburgh, he said, "You were an ambassador. Are you still?" I said, "No, Your Highness, I was an ambassador" and he said, "To what countries?" I said, "To Kenya and Madagascar, with Trinidad sandwiched in between." He said, "Oh." I said, "Yes. I enjoyed Kenya very much; and, of course, the French were in Madagascar." He roared with laughter.

Just some few notes about the embassy. We had a groundbreaking ceremony for the new Chancery on the 17th of December, 1976. Funds were approved in '74, and some years later I went into it. Looks great now, at least it looked great when I went into it in the '80s. Has two basements and four floors, and 60,000 square feet, but believe me it was a real pain getting built. The hole kept filling up with water. They put all kinds of things in it to try to take care of that and couldn't. Also, it's at a place where there is no parking, which was too bad. It was a third location that we were offered. Either of the other two would have been infinitely better, but we weren't prepared in Washington to shell out the money.

I've been honking the horn about business in Madagascar and trying my best in Trinidad. Here was really my opportunity to do something; at least I felt there was. There were 125 American businesses represented there, either in manufacturing or plantations, some small plants, or service facilities, or area representation. Or franchises. And what I really wanted to do was to visit all of them, and I did. I knew all the representatives of American business. And they weren't all Americans. What I did do was – and this had not been done before – start an American businessmen's meeting. There was an American businessmen's club, but that was lunch and a talk every month or six weeks, or whatever. I invited, not all – and I selected those I wanted – there were about 60 or 80; (there were very few left out) of the representatives of American business. There was a Nigerian, there was a Greek, Brits, several different nationalities. But I put it on the basis that it was up to the company who they wanted to have as their representative, not me. And I'm interested in American business. Coca Cola was headed by a Greek, Alexander Paresis, and he was representative for all of Africa. He was a Greek citizen, but it was an American company. I first had one session, and it got to be too big, so I had two sessions on two consecutive nights at 5:15 for drinks, 5:30 you sat down, and at 6:30, I stopped. I remember even stopping Paresis half-way through a talk (he could be a long talker). I said, "I'm sorry. It's 6:30." I said, "I'm doing this, Alex, so that people can come here and know that they're not going to be here until quarter to seven, or whatever, and they will come again." I sometimes brought a visitor, a Congressman or whatever, but most of the time we simply talked about problems the companies had: one company's problems, discussing them, help another, taxes, whatever. So that proved to be useful.

AID: the U.S. aid program in Kenya was twelve million dollars in 1974, for cattle, ranches, water facility, a seed project, and a population program, a family planning program. I had trouble with AID. I approved generally all of the projects they had on the agenda, but I had serious questions on some of the management of it and the distribution of funds and the accountability of funds. The greatest problem I had was with the director of AID. There was an acting director when I arrived. Then a man by the name of Carlos Thomas Nelson arrived. I have to say that he was black because it became an issue. He had been ambassador to Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho. They did not have independent ambassadors; there was only one ambassador for all three. My problem with him was that he would not send me copies of any cables received or sent. And I said that he had to. And he said he wouldn't. So we had a small meeting with Ralph Lindstrom, my economic officer, and one or two of his people, and he still said he wouldn't. So I communicated this to Washington, to Sam Adams, who was head of AID for Africa, and who was black. Extremely nice and extremely capable person. And Dan Parker, who was then head of all of AID.

Q: You had a very strong letter from the President laying out your supervisory responsibilities for all of these agencies in no uncertain terms?

MARSHALL: Yes. I said I just can't have this. And Sam Adams said to me when I was on consultations back there at one point (I've forgotten if I raised it or if he did.), "Look, Tony, if you want to have him recalled, that's alright with me. And we will recall him." I was talking to a man, fortunately, who was black and whom I liked. And I said, "Sam, you know, there is a question he's black and there may be repercussions about this." And I felt this fellow, Nelson, might make them – create them. Sam said, "Whatever you want to do." I went back. Carlos

Nelson wouldn't meet again. Sam then came out to Nairobi, and the three of us sat down, and in front of Sam, I said, "Look, will you change, Carlos?" There was a long silence and he whispered, "Yes." I said, "Alright, but you are going to have to prove it. I want to see those cables." It did work alright. I did get the cables. It was an unnecessary thing to have gone through and, as a result of that, we worked well together on what was being done. We did not get to the creative state, to which I was hoping we could have gotten. I had one creative project which did not succeed that I did do, which was a self-help project and I needed some USAID input, which he gave me, unwillingly, but there was a self-help project which I thought could have been very helpful if it had worked out. But I think it was unfortunate. I don't think I would have changed my mind about changing because I think there was a black PAO (public affairs officer) who was rather vocal, and I had had another problem of the suffragan bishop of Washington, Walker, who came out and went back and wrote to The Washington Post that all political ambassadors cared about was having fun and never talked to the locals. And that I didn't pay any attention to this group of clergymen that came out there. In fact, I saw 15 of them. He never came around to see me. And it wasn't a delegation. They were there for a conference. So we had an exchange of letters through The Washington Post. There was enough of black American criticism, and I didn't want to exacerbate it. I wanted to sidestep it, if possible. And so I tried to work things out, rather than letting this possible problem become worse. One little footnote on AID: about a couple of months after I'd gotten there, there was a population conference just outside of Nairobi at the Outspan Hotel in Nyeri. I guess I didn't take time to ask what's our policy on population control or family planning, and nobody briefed me on it or gave me any paper. There was a man by the name of Ravenholt from Washington who came out, who was head of the whole family planning program in AID. I was asked to open the conference. So I got up and said that I felt very strongly that one had to take social conditions and cultural conditions into account in family planning and that you simply couldn't go off and distribute a lot of condoms into the countryside. Well, the truck was waiting outside full of condoms in boxes that they were planning to dump on somebody's doorstep, which is what happened the next day. There was a sort of flutter of emotion when I was through because I was saying just the opposite of what the head of family planning was saying. I still don't agree.

A word about Seychelles: Seychelles was covered by the embassy until I was accredited as non-resident ambassador for reporting purposes. I think I'll just skip that for a moment and come back to it, when I did present my credentials.

There were a number of problems in Kenya, as there are in any country one has to deal with. One was the Saul Miller Ruby Mine case. Saul and Miller, American citizens, came in and received a permit from Kenya to go off into Tsavo Park (a particular corner of it that is well documented) and to dig for rubies, which they began finding. But that was the problem. They then were going to be arrested for not having a permit, because all the papers were lost and one could not find them. It became a scandal. A lot of reporters descended on Nairobi specifically to find out about it and interviewed me. I maybe should have left it to the PAO to comment on it, but I didn't. I became involved. I involved myself. I thought it was important enough in our relations with the Kenyans to get this solved. Washington was saying, if it can't be resolved, we were going to cut off aid and such things as that. And I thought I wanted to do it myself. It was a long story. It went over a six-month period of time, all in all. Newsweek, The London Times, The Washington Post and a number of others came in. Ordway, I think it was, of The Washington Post, came in

and he was going to have a story to break. He came to see me when I was giving a dinner one night for the Indian High Commissioner. It was about 10:30 at night, and he said, "I've sent my story in. It's going to break tomorrow." He said he'd like to stay around a couple more weeks and see what happens. I said, "Get out. Maybe nothing would happen, but you don't want to even take a chance of being put in jail. And that could well happen." He left the next morning.

There were a lot of rumors as to what happened. Certainly, some Kenyans – and I can't state who they were, although I'm pretty clear – had a personal interest in the mine and wanted to get it. Saul left, and Miller was left in Kenya. He was going to be arrested if he didn't leave. I had him come in and give himself up. They took his passport away and then kicked him out. Strangely enough, not too much longer, but a bit later, the lost file was found. At the same time, a legal process was pursued by which the mine was declared invalid for prospecting. I think that I heard – and I'm not sure of this, but considerably after I left there – that Saul and Miller somehow tried to get back there and do something, or somebody else. I don't know. I'm only reporting on my time there. But that was quite a problem. I also heard through the chief of station that there was a counterfeiting ring operating in Nairobi, and one day I got a call from Charles Njonjo, the Attorney General, who said, "I have a young girl by the name of Laura Wood who is being detained and she will serve seven years in jail if it goes to court for counterfeiting." I said I'd like to see her. He said that was a little unusual. I said, "Well, have a guard bring her to my office." He did. I asked the guard to leave us alone, and I asked her what was this all about? Evidently, there was a ring and she was part of it. She was guilty. There were Union Bank of Switzerland false notes that were total forgeries that were printed, which the ring would get these young girls and maybe young boys to get exchanged in camera shops or whatever. Anyway, she got caught. The Attorney General said, "If she will tell us all, maybe we can be lenient." To make a relatively long story short, I did persuade her to tell all, and she went back and told them all she knew, which she hoped would be enough. She was then sentenced to one year in jail and, at that point, her uncle – not her mother or father – they were divorced and her mother couldn't care less about her – came over. He said, "Really, I love this girl and she's run into trouble and what can I do?" So, I got hold of Njonjo again, and to bring the story to an end, she was released. She spent about a month in jail, which was a far cry from seven years. He took her back. He was in the publishing business, and he sent a lot of books and textbooks to the government in appreciation.

I had innumerable ship visits, which I love. I love ships.

Q: You would go down to Mombasa?

MARSHALL: I went down to Mombasa. They didn't come to me. One of the ones I was on in 1974 was the guided-missile cruiser Chicago. The captain of the ship wanted to stay on shore at night, and I said I'd like to sleep onboard ship, so he gave me his cabin. Just before I went to bed – I was you might say on American territory – the news came over that President Nixon had resigned. I then went up to Somalia to visit our ambassador, Roger Kirk. I'd been to Somalia in 1954 and found a considerable difference.

By the end of 1974, the first year I was in Kenya, East Africa was certainly tensing up. Somalia had been invaded by the Soviets, who established airfields on Somalia's mainland, as well as maintaining a base on the Island of Socotra. Ethiopia and Somalia had been engaged in border

war since 1964, in their efforts to unite a greater Somalia: British, French, Italian, Ethiopian, the Ogaden...

Q: Was that concentrated in the Northern Frontier District?

MARSHALL: Yes, in Northern Kenya. Then in 1974, the Somalis were living in Northeastern Kenya, and they revived gorilla warfare against Kenya. And then in Ethiopia after Emperor Selassie was deposed, a military government took charge, which advocated socialism and leaned towards the Soviets. In 1971, Idi Amin overthrew Milton Obote and assumed the presidency of Uganda. He not only created havoc in his own country, and border clashes with Tanzania, but publicly claimed that Uganda's border should be rightfully extended to Lake Naivasha in Kenya, which certainly brought me and President Kenyatta into conversation on the subject.

Q: How did he feel when we were getting so much deeper into Somalia and the Somalis were disrupting the northern provinces of Kenya? Did that create any frictions for you?

MARSHALL: Not really. No it didn't. I think because we reacted positively to some of his requests. He was very concerned about what they might do. Particularly Amin. I'll get to that in just a minute, but he was also concerned about Somalia, and he had reports that Somalia and Uganda might gang up together in a united clash with Kenya. But before I go into that, beginning in 1975, in February, the Enterprise, the aircraft carrier, came to Kenya. I got a very nice cable from Admiral Oberg inviting me and any four people whom I wished to bring to come aboard and spend the night. This was absolutely great. I make the point here that this is the sort of thing, not only the ship visits in port, but if you can get – if it's an aircraft carrier and you can land on it – a carrier, it is absolutely wonderful for your relations with your host country. Anyway, I chose Colonel Tedan Kichuru, who was Commander of the Kenyan Air Force, Lieutenant Colonel James Kimaro, Kenyan Navy, and a man by the name of Claudius Wachugwe, who was Under Secretary for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Philip Kitongu, who was Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense. And that seemed like a good balance -seemed like the obvious balance – plus my political officer, Gregory Matson. Gregory Matson, when I was asked to suggest someone who might go to open the office in the Seychelles – and I was very pleased that Washington would ask me and not just send somebody – and become the chargé, was the person I recommended, and that worked out very well. So, anyway, all of us took off in an aircraft – I can't remember what the aircraft was, but an aircraft from Mombasa and had a tailhook landing with the cables on the carrier. And then we were treated to a day show of all kinds of activity and also a nighttime show. I never realized – although I had been on an aircraft carrier from Hawaii to Guam, there were no planes taking off – the pyrotechnics that go on when the cables have gone across the deck and the plane lands. It really was spectacular! They also had the F-14s. All the Kenyans were able to sit in the cockpit of an F-14 on the deck and have their picture taken, and that was a great hit. They went up to the bridge and from the bridge we saw an F-14 pass at bridge level at supersonic speed and then they had a rescue at sea with a helicopter demonstration, and it was an enormous hit. And then we got into Mombasa and they took us off the helicopter.

I had to come back to the United States several times, but '75 was not an altogether good year for me. I came back once because Manchem, who was the Prime Minister and then became

President of the Seychelles, was going to be in Washington. So I had to be there to take him to IBRD and EXIM, and we had a meeting with Sam Adams and AID, and the Department of Defense and lunch, and we discussed ship visits and the Peace Corps, and I took him out to see Representative Diggs, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Africa Subcommittee, who visited me in Madagascar, but also visited me in Nairobi when I was there.

Q: Charles Diggs? Who subsequently had some difficulties.

MARSHALL: Oh, yes. He had some difficulties. He went to prison, yes. Well, he deserved it. Then I went to Memphis because Holiday Inn was planning to put up a Holiday Inn in Kenya. That didn't happen, at least not on my watch. And Kevin Wilson, who was head of Holiday Inn, invited me out there to see what it was all about and go through, which was very interesting, but it didn't turn out as productively as it should have. And that didn't work out. But I saw Holiday Inn's University, where they show people how to run a hotel. Then I went to Chicago and spoke before the Mid-America Committee. It was hosted by the Continental Bank. Then I had a medical exam. The doctors at State saw that I had a little spot on my lung. They sent me off to someone else to take a look at, and I had an independent opinion. They decided that I should have an operation on my lung. I first went back to Kenya and then came back and had the operation. That sort of set me back a little bit; a couple of months, unfortunately.

I had a number of visitors come out in 1975. My family did; my mother did; one of my sons did – Philip. Did I talk about a man by the name of George Reppas and the cattle project?

Q: You talked about a cattle project.

MARSHALL: Right. There were two cattle projects: the one I was interested in and then another with these two Greeks, an American-Greek and a Greek-Greek, in Southern Madagascar in Molitave and they were doing all the wrong things. But this was two years later. I'd been away from Madagascar and then in Trinidad and then come to Kenya. I was in my office one day and my secretary came in to see me and said there was a Mr. Reppas, who was here and would like to see me. I said, "What?!" And George Reppas came in, and I said, "Where were you from? Where have you been?" He said, "I just escaped." I said, "Well, sit down and tell me about it." So he told me a bit about it, and I said, "Well, George, who?" (And he admits it. He was just stupid.) My wife was away, but I said, "Come on back to the residence, and let's have lunch." So he then told me his whole story, which I will abbreviate, and that is that he was put in prison in Madagascar along with his associate, Boucopoulos, and Boucopoulos went berserk in prison. Reppas tried to establish a sort of stability for himself there. He smuggled in sleeping pills. He had a man who was allowed to be in prison with him who waited on him. Cleaned his cell and did his cooking, but then he was taken away from him. The cooking equipment was still there – a little open fire. George made a cake, in which he stuffed all the sleeping pills, and he was about to give this to his guard, when a revolution broke out. A shell hit the prison that he was in, so he rushed out of the prison through this hole along with Boucopoulos. But Boucopoulos turned left and was immediately apprehended, but Reppas turned right, and looked up a Malagasy girlfriend, whom he stayed with for a few days. Then he reported in to the embassy. Mind you, I wasn't there. This was another ambassador. He was given a room in the same building where the Marine Guards had their rooms – their headquarters. Then the ambassador told him he would not

be able to stay there very long. He'd have to give himself up. So he got hold of his girlfriend (I'm abbreviating this. There's a lot more to it.). He got a hold of his girlfriend and arranged an escape. He somehow or another had some money and he had a car waiting for him and went in the car on a seven-hour drive to Magunga. At one point, a policeman opened fire on him and hit the vehicle, but didn't hurt him. And he finally got to Magunga. He had made previous arrangements there with a man who owned a little sloop. He got hold of the man and said he wanted to be taken to the Comoros. The man hemmed and hawed and, anyway, they agreed on an amount which would be paid when he got to the Comoros (It was a Frenchman.), and they got into the sloop and it had a motor that stalled. They started drifting toward a naval boat, some sort or other, a police boat, but the Frenchman was also an expert diver, so he went over and cleaned out the seaweed that had gotten caught in the propeller, came up, and took him to the Comoros, where he somehow or other arranged for some money to be sent from San Francisco, his home, to the Comoros to pay this man off and got the French to give him enough authority on paper – not a passport or anything – to go from there to Nairobi, which is when he walked into my office and wanted a passport. I think that is quite a little story.

Also, in 1975, I was still at the embassy and we received a cable saying that some guests or visitors were coming to Nairobi, and I thought it appropriate to ask them for Thanksgiving lunch, which I did. It was Mrs. Coretta King and two of her children, and an energetic young Congressman by the name of Andrew Young. At the lunch, Mrs. King said, "You will be hearing more about this young man." We certainly did. And Margaret Kenyatta, I asked, who is the daughter of Kenyatta and also the Mayor of Nairobi, and a man by the name of George Githii who is head of the Nation newspaper. So, during the year I had numerous meetings with Moi, with other ambassadors, with other CODELs, with U.S. business, and with masses of visitors to Nairobi.

One person who came and is a very good friend – was and is – and had been a good friend since my days in the Agency, was Dick Helms. He, at the time, was ambassador to Iran, but he was being recalled to Washington at that time regarding previous testimony in which he was convicted of having perjured himself, for lying to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about Agency efforts to mount a Chilean military coup. Which all brings me to the obvious comment: "How the hell can you have an Agency, how can you have any organization that runs intelligence and then call them up on the mat and expect them to tell you the truth about something that is supposedly covert and confidential?" That's not the way to run a business. Fine, have a little committee that reports to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, one committee, not seven. He made about 10 trips back. He arrived in Nairobi pale as the proverbial sheet – looking green even – he and Cynthia, his wife, and they said, "We need a rest." He had a bodyguard with him, and he wanted to go out on Safari. The bodyguard said, "Yes, Sir, I'll make the arrangements." He said, "No. Do whatever you want to do. I want you to stay here in Nairobi. The ambassador is going to make the arrangements for me. I don't even want you to know where I am." That's what happened. He went out, and he and Cynthia had a wonderful safari. He met wildlife, and he came back looking healthy and refreshed. In fact, he wrote a very nice note in our guest book when they left, saying that they had really had been rejuvenated. He's a wonderful man and I think very highly of him. In any organization, there are differences. Dick Bissell, in his book on his years in the Agency, criticized Dick Helms for not having given him, Dick Bissell, his views on the Bay of Pigs Operation before it went into effect. But then, if you turn the page in his book, you'll then

read that Dick Bissell said, "It was not up to him to tell me because if he had, he knows that I would have disagreed with him and not listened to him. It was up to me to ask him and I didn't. I made a mistake. I should have."

By the end of 1975, Kenyatta had regained much of his political ground.

Q: He'd previously been in poor health and there had been a big bus bombing in '74?

MARSHALL: Yes. There was this business about Jan Kariuki, who was a highly regarded individual, a critic of government who all of a sudden disappeared. In fact, he disappeared right in front of the Hilton Hotel along with some other people, and he was later found on the other side of the hill in Ngong Hills, dead, and in pretty bad shape, too. I mean, beaten up. Which brings me to another point about Kenyatta – a point on Kenyatta. I'm not saying that Kenyatta ordered this to happen. Let me put this in parenthetically, that when you're working for, when you're under someone like Kenyatta – it doesn't have to be Kenyatta, it can be in this country or anywhere else; it has happened in our country every day probably – the top people under the top people, the top person, tend to want the top person to like what is happening and they do things to please him without his knowing it. They sometimes please themselves more than him. That can even happen as an ambassador. But things are done in your name – the ambassador wants, the ambassador thinks – which is all wrong, and I'm sure it happens a lot in business. The President wants, the President thinks. So, of course, if you're number one, you're like the captain of the ship or the president of the company. You have to – or you should – take the blame for what is happening under you. Having said all that, what I believe is good, was good then when I was ambassador and is good still for a developing country, is a benevolent dictatorship.

I am not as solidly sold as some people, including President Nixon, that all the world should have democracy. I don't think that developing countries can jump right into being a democracy. I think they have to go through some painful steps first. I think that one of the processes that can take them more quickly and better through painful steps is a benevolent dictator. I would cite as a prime example – although I think that Kenyatta was a benevolent dictator – Ataturk. One might agree with me in including Salazar, although I think he was a candidate for being a benevolent dictator. Ataturk – I know his history well, and what he did – had people killed, but he brought that country into the modern world. It may be regressing now into fundamentalism, but that's another matter. I do think that Kenyatta was the right person at the right time. I think that whether or how much he may have been responsible for the deaths of Kariuki or for Tom Mboya is questionable. But I think that, as a whole, the management of the country the way he managed it was good and better than now.

Q: But as the architect of the Mau Mau insurgency and author of Facing Mount Kenya, there is a good deal of violence there, so it's conceivable that...

MARSHALL: But he changed a lot. He changed a great deal. Doing this a little chronologically, let me move into 1976, which was an extremely active year for Kenya and for me.

Q: Kenyatta had been reelected in '75?

MARSHALL: Yes, he was. I should have mentioned that. You're absolutely right. Well, beginning in 1976, Kenya and Kenyatta reacted to Amin's statement of aggression, which I've mentioned, and this led to President Kenyatta – who in Kenya was referred to as Mzee, meaning the old man, literally, but it was a reverent term used – Mzee led a march in Nairobi and meetings in Nairobi. He was trying to show that he was in command of the country and supporting the people. I'm going to give a few dates through here. In February of '76, Vice President Moi asked me whether the United States would give credits for military purchases. Things were hotting up a bit, as I say, because of Kariuki and a bit of violence and some bombs in Nairobi which didn't seem to bother me very much at the time.

Q: Those were, though, not externally launched.

MARSHALL: No, they weren't PFLP or anything like that.

Q: They were rivalries between the Kikuyu old guard and the Moi people? Or were they Odinga and the communists?

MARSHALL: No, they were anti-government really. Yes, to a certain degree, they were tribal. In Kenya, the Kikuyu is the dominant tribe, although that is not the tribe of Vice President Moi, now President Moi, who is a Kalenjin. He comes from, you might say, the mid-west, up near Lake Marengo. But there are two Kikuyus. There is one that comes from Nyeri and then there is the Kikuyu that come from just outside of Nairobi. And they don't always agree. In fact, they disagree almost as much between each other as they do with the next largest tribe, which is the Luo, or with the other 18 tribes. So, it's a bit tribal.

Q: Mboya, who was assassinated, was a Luo?

MARSHALL: Yes. But Double O – Odinga – as he was called, had pretty much quieted down. He was making political noises and receiving a little money from China to help him along, but nothing terribly critical.

Q: So, Attwood's book notwithstanding, there wasn't a real communist menace of any kind?

MARSHALL: No. No communists, none at all. And the Russians really had no interest there either. They did in Ethiopia, but not in Nairobi. And in Somalia. Anyway, I gave a considerable number of speeches when I was in Kenya either opening a conference, or a session, or a meeting, or the beginning of something or other or at a school. I gave a bicentennial speech in Nairobi in February, '76, to the Rotary Club and in Mombasa, the second half of my bicentennial speech in March. I made a point in Mombasa, not in Nairobi, doing what I think is very important, if you can – and I put a lot of time in it – and that is I gave the first five minutes of my speech in Swahili. All of my lessons, and I had two lessons a week – really that one time was almost worth the whole thing because it was really appreciated. I had a Swahili teacher who came from the coast, where the best Swahili is spoken. I drove her up the wall practicing my speech, but it really is important.

Q: Were you perhaps he first U.S. ambassador, and maybe any ambassador, to do that?

MARSHALL: One of the first, I think so, but I'm not entirely sure. I think so. The 25th of April, 1976, was the first meeting of our Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger with President Kenyatta at the State House in Nakuru. President Kenyatta asked for an additional amount of 20 million dollars. We had already approved 45 million dollars to purchase a squadron of F-5Es; actually it turned out to be F-5Es and Fs – Fs being the two-seater and Es one. They also asked for A-4s, which is an attack aircraft, which the Ministry of Defense wanted, at least head of the Ministry of Defense wanted. Henry Kissinger felt it should be considered. I was against it, because I felt that they should not have an attack aircraft. I think Henry came around to that thinking, too. I felt that if they wanted them to defend themselves – that was the point they were making – against neighbors, and that's fine, but why an attack aircraft? Also, at that meeting Henry asked Kenyatta whether he would visit the United States and that was the subject of several follow-up meetings. In principle, he wanted to come to the United States, but he really wasn't well enough and he didn't want to fly, but he didn't give these excuses. He said, "Yes. I will come some day." But it never happened. In principle, he wanted to.

Q: His problems in those years were heart-related?

MARSHALL: I don't really know exactly what they were, but he was not well, and he went to England a number of times for treatment. Anyway, the subject of the F-5Es was a protracted one. Moi was the first one to bring it up with me, as Vice President, when I went to see him one day in the office, which is really quite funny, at least I thought it was funny, because I knew what he was going to talk about before I went. When I went to see him, we chatted about I don't know what, inconsequential for several minutes and then he said, "Well, Tony, you know we would like to get, we would like to get-" I couldn't stand it. I said, "F-5Es." He said, "Yes. That's what we want." I also felt that in giving it away he wouldn't really catch on that I knew it and I don't think he did. Anyway, as I said, that was a subject of considerable conversation. I also pointed out to President Kenyatta that you couldn't just have the planes tomorrow. Who was going to fly them? It would take two years of training in the United States. So we ended up giving them credits to buy the aircraft, which they did. They bought six, while I was there. Then we gave them a grant for the training of the pilots. I saw Kenyatta a great deal. Another time I talked to him about South Africa. Henry Kissinger was interested in going down to South Africa or to Southern Africa, trying to be a catalyst. I don't think he would put it that way, but in trying to be a catalyst in bringing changes to South Africa and bringing South Africa and the rest of Africa together. Parenthetically, I think South Africa will be the leading country in Black Africa within the next one to two generations.

Q: It is already, no?

MARSHALL: South Africa? Not leading the Black countries. They're not doing what I thought Nigeria could have done. Nigeria has missed the boat. That's what I mean. They're simply the best organized and in better shape than anybody else. I didn't mean that. I meant leading the Black Africans. They're selling to them, they have promise, but they're not the leader. They haven't quite achieved that pinnacle of political capability yet.

I had a lot of fun on the 14th of June, 1976, mind you it was our bicentennial year. I had an

Independence Day celebration at the Hilton Hotel. I got them all interested in it, and they decorated a room like the Wild West, which I wasn't too keen about, but I guess that's an image of America. What I did, though, was I had given these talks, one in Nairobi, one in Mombasa, a relatively straight talk on independence, although I did refer to George Washington and the cherry tree. Then I talked about change. That's what I focused on. I wanted to do something different. At the Hilton, after everybody had had dinner, I got up at the podium and said, "You know, I've given these talks on our independence celebration of 200 years and tonight I'm not going to talk to you about our independence. I'm going to talk to you about your 200th anniversary. And it is now 2163. You arrived here – so forth and so on – and the whole thing was science fiction and magic. They loved it! Because what I had done was to invite not a lot of Americans, as I also pointed out, because this wasn't for Americans, it was for the Kenyans to understand and share our day with us. I had invited 100 Kenyans who had been in America, one way or another, either on a scholarship – one was a dentist – and I had a menu program printed with the names of all of the people and the reason they were invited, their association with the United States, all 100. The whole thing was translated. It was printed in English the next day in the paper, but also printed in Swahili and put in the Swahili paper. It was kind of a pixyish thing I sometimes like to do. And I did it, and it seemed to work. But it was a fantasy.

Then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was coming out, and I went to see Kenyatta in preparation for that. On the 17th of June, Rumsfeld was to meet with Kenyatta. On the 16th of June, I met Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld at the airport and brought him into the Intercontinental Hotel. We had a talk. After I talked to him, I went down and I found out that one of the members of his staff was holding a press conference and telling them about the 5-Es and Fs. I blew my lid! I went back and told Secretary Rumsfeld, who was absolutely appalled and took very strict action. I'm not quite sure what he did. This was not his fault, at all. I don't know if it was a PR man or what, but it was somebody else's fault. It was a press conference. That's what he was giving. And the papers would have it the next morning before Kenyatta would meet with Rumsfeld, which was wrong in every way. First of all, Kenyatta did not want this information released so the neighbors would know, at least not at that point. Also, for it to come out in the press before Russia even... I mean... We had a dinner for Rumsfeld that night and I called up Konange, the Secretary of State in the President's office, who was coming to the dinner, and I asked him to meet with me before the dinner. I took him into the library and I said, "This is what's happened." He turned pale. He said, "This is terrible. I'm not hearing this." I said, "Yes, you are. I want you to know. I won't say that I've told you, but I want you to know what has happened, when you wake up tomorrow morning, and see what has happened." Anyway, to this day I don't know if he told him everything or not. I don't think he said anything, but I did want him to know.

Q: Was that because Kenyatta was not somebody who would suffer bad news easily from the messenger and the people around him were scared of him?

MARSHALL: Oh, terrified! Anyway, the next morning, I later learned that Kenyatta was furious and he thought it was one of his people. He said, "Tell me who this man is and I will have him properly punished." We walked into the State House in Nairobi; we walked into this large room with a long table and all of Rumsfeld's people were down one side and all of Kenyatta's people were down the other side. I think I was the second one; I think Rumsfeld was next to Kenyatta and then I was next, and icicles were forming on the ceiling. I mean, Kenyatta was frigid. And he

said, "I want to welcome you to Nairobi." No further welcoming words. And then he said, "I think you want to say something," turning to Rumsfeld. And I interrupted him. I don't know that I'd do it now, but I interrupted Kenyatta. I said (It was a little bit of gall, but it turned out to be the right thing to do.), "Mr. President, I just would like to ask you whether we are going to be going to a smaller meeting after this, whether this is our only meeting?" With that, he got up and said, "We're going to a smaller meeting now." He hadn't even been thinking of it, of course. So we moved into the other room with just the Secretary of Defense, myself, and a couple of others. The first thing that Rumsfeld said was, "No, this wasn't your fault. This was mine. One of my people did it and he's going to be punished." Immediately, it got warmer. And then they got down to it and worked it out. But believe me, the lessons: don't let a visitor let the cat out of the bag before the President knows.

Then Kenyatta, at a different meeting, said to me, "I may have a lot of trouble with Uganda and that fellow." He never said Uganda; he never said Amin. He said, "That fellow," and I knew that meant Uganda. "And he may gang up with those people up there," meaning Somalia. "I would like to know whether the United States will back me up if we have a problem. Would you ask Secretary Kissinger if the United States would do that?" So I sent whatever one did – a flash – Henry liked flashes. I do, too, but only if the walls of the embassy are coming down, which they seemed to be all the time. I got back to Henry and reported it. I got a cable back saying that, indeed, the United States would cooperate and help Kenya. So, I immediately got into the car and rushed back up to Nakuru and told this to Kenyatta. He said, "I cannot find words to thank him. What does that mean, though?" So I thought, "Can I say nothing? I probably shouldn't. What can I say?" So I gave him what I thought was an innocuous, fair, honest reply, that the United States would not come in with troops, that we would probably help them by taking a stand in the United Nations, and they would certainly have our support in that. But I made it clear – no troops. I got home late and, when I got home Schaufele, who was the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, called me that evening (I've been debating whether to say this to you, but I'm going to.). He said, "Tony, you got a cable today." I said, "Yes." He said, "What have you done about it?" I said, "Well, I went off and I've just prepared a report on my having seen the President and I told him what was in the contents of the cable." He said, "Tony, a word was left out." I already guessed it, but I couldn't believe it. He said, "Not." And so, I didn't like that. And then I got a cable the next morning ignoring that from Henry, saying that I should not interpret these cables.

Q: This was in response to your report?

MARSHALL: In response to my report, but not putting on paper the "not." That was on the telephone. I got another trip in between, but I'm going to skip right now to Henry's second visit, which was on the 23rd of September, when Henry visited Kenyatta again. When he came, I said I'd like a private meeting with him soon. I went to his room at the Intercontinental. I said I was sorry that there was a misunderstanding when you gave me the message that the United States would fully support Kenya, and I reported that to President Kenyatta. Then I received Schaufele's telephone call, in which he said a word had slipped out – "not." I said in no way was I going to go back to Kenyatta and tell him that. "But I just want to say this to you personally, Mr. Secretary." And then he said – and this is what I wasn't sure I wanted to put on the tape, but I am. He then said, "It was intentional." And there's only one interpretation for that. I went down

and my good friend, my economic officer, John Eddy, was sitting in the lobby, and I took him aside and I said, "I'm only going to tell you. I'm not going to tell anybody else this. Anybody. But there's only one interpretation. Officially, we're supporting, but if anything happens, he can say that stupid ambassador of ours out there got things all messed up." I know Henry well. I see him from time to time, but I will not forgive him for doing it. And I don't think I was the only one he did that to, but I just think that's not the way to treat an ambassador. I think the ambassador should have your confidence, and you should have his.

Anyway, going back a bit, back to July, I went up to Germany because I wanted to see what an F-5E looked like, and I wanted also to get an area briefing from the command in Germany. So I went up there and I stayed with General Robert Huyser in Stuttgart and went over to Ramstein, Germany, where I saw the F-5E and also – it was not on my list to look at but there was one there and I was intrigued by it as I'd never seen one before at that time – a C5 and also the Black Light Harrier. Then also, in August, there was another ship visit, the USS Barry, and I had to come down to Mombasa anyway to deliver a message from Henry Kissinger to Kenyatta who was at his State House in Mombasa. That turned out to be quite an interesting time – a little different. Kenyatta did not like diplomats, he didn't like high commissioners, and he didn't like ambassadors; and he and I, very fortunately, got on very well. I'd arranged for four of his children to go on the USS Barry and so when I saw him and gave him this message – I think it was on South Africa – he said, "Oh, my children had a wonderful time and they're still here." So he called them and they came in, and they still had their caps on. That was sort of a hit. But then he said it's terrible how sometimes you say something that comes first in your head – but then he had to explain it. He then said, "When are you going back to Nairobi?" I said, "I'll go back after our meeting – now." Then he said, "Won't you stay for dinner?" I never had heard, never, of him having any ambassador for dinner privately. Then he said, "And then stay on and join me for the dancers," which is like turning on the television for him. That is what he did every single evening. The first thing that came into my head was, "Mr. President, that's an offer I can't refuse." I didn't want to quite explain to him who the godfather was after having said that, so I sort of fumbled and mumbled my way out of that. It was an offer I couldn't refuse, so I did stay on and had a delightful evening.

Another time I saw President Kenyatta about the Kenyan ambassador to Washington. Kenyatta was rather annoyed because a man by the name of Kireni had received agrément. I told him, I said, "Your ambassador-designate to Washington has received agrément and I am delighted." He said, "Who? Why?" I said, "Kireni. You appointed him." He said, "No, I didn't. Sometimes people do things I don't know about. And sometimes they do it because they fear me." I said, "I'm not at all surprised. They have every right to fear you." He roared with laughter. It turned out that he didn't go. A man by the name of Imboiga went. And he didn't know about it, or if he did, he'd forgotten it. But at the same meeting, I told him I was going on consultation to the U.S. in a few days, and was there anything I could do? Any message? We talked about the arms request again and I said, "In December, we're going to have our national day, and could we have a fly-by of American planes?" I said, "I don't know if that's possible or not, but I'll do everything I can." He'd also brought this up with Kissinger. I said, "It's a little difficult, but I'll see what we can do." Then he said, "On the planes, I'd like to have Kenyan markings." And I said, "Mr. President, I don't advise that because, first of all, no one will believe it. Maybe they won't even see it, but nobody will believe it. And it would be wrong if they did." And he said, "Well, will

you please ask whether that's possible?" I said, "Yes, I will, because you're asking me to. But I want you to know that I'm recommending against it."

That very same evening, he said, "Yes, there is something you can do. I would like to send a letter to President Ford." I said, "What would you like to put in the letter?" He said, "Well, oh, you know. Here. Here's some paper. Go in the other room and write the letter for me." So I went in the other room. Kongange was looking over my shoulder. He was the only other person present. And I wrote this letter. I could hardly read it myself. At least it's not as bad as my handwriting now, and I took it into him. It was on a yellow scratchpad or whatever or white paper. I said, "Would you like me to read it to you?" So I read it to him. He said, "That's fine." So two hours later, I had it signed and on my desk. So I took it back to Washington. (This is, I think, a funny story.) I gave it to the country director, and I said, "I don't know whether to send this to the Assistant Secretary or to the White House. He said to send it to the White House. So we sent it to the White House. They sent it back to the desk officer and asked them to prepare a letter. I said, "Give it to me, and I'll prepare it." So I went to the typewriter and prepared a reply from President Ford to President Kenyatta to my letter. And then I took it back and gave it to him. That, I thought, was fun.

Then Diggs came, and he saw the President, along with Representative Collins and Dr. Challinor. At that time, they talked about the past and American blacks and Kenya. Kenyatta, though, talked to him in a different way than he talked to Henry Kissinger. And he tapped his wrists and said in those days you had to wear bracelets and, around his neck, he made a motion and said you had to wear tags at that time. He said "We were treated like dogs and we were very bitter. But our bitterness gave us strength." Then, on the 12th of December, Kenyan Independence Day, the Marine Corps had Harriers which they flew by. Unfortunately, they were not able to do it from the Guam, which they sent down from Naples. This is how the government spends its money. So they flew off from the Guam and then down into Mombasa to fly by. What I was hoping they would do, which they would have done but they didn't have enough fuel to fly up and back, was to stop in mid-stadium in the air. I mean, all the people would have dropped out of their seats. But they weren't able to do that. But one thing that was amusing after this event was that the Soviet ambassador broke away from us as we were all going down the steps – the diplomatic section – he broke away from his interpreter for a second and came up to me. This was the only time, the whole time we were there, that he spoke to me in perfectly good, simple English, and he said, "That was wonderful! I enjoyed it."

I took a number of trips when I was in Kenya. I did take some safari trips, but "safari," after all, is a word that in Swahili means simply "journey." If you call someone at the office and talk to the secretary, she says, "He's on safari," which means he's out on a business trip. I did take some wildlife safaris for a night or two or three, or whatever. Also, I went on a two-day trip – the government chartered a plane – I took members of the embassy up for all the obvious reasons to stop here, there, and there, all was well planned-out – to the Northern part of Kenya to Wajir, to Garisa. At Garisa, we saw an irrigation project and the secondary school in Meru.

Q: The first two were in Somali areas?

MARSHALL: Yes. They were all Somali areas. Then Haresane where Chevron oil had a rig. In

Habasway, there was a camel auction. I loved that. I threatened to buy a camel and ride him back to Nairobi. In Wajir, there were all kinds of little things – handicrafts, etc., so forth. We gave books away and I gave out ten kilos of candy at the school in Wajir. There were some Peace Corps volunteers up there and I went around and saw them, and gave books away, as I said, to the school.

Then I went back to the States in May for a medical check-up. I went back for just two days on the 19th of June because my friend, Frank Malloy, whom I've spoken about before, had been killed in Lebanon. And I arrived at Dulles just in time to get to Andrews at 4:20 in the afternoon. Then the funeral service.

Then the 27th of June till the first of July, I went to the Seychelles for their independence ceremonies and, getting off the plane with a lot of other diplomats who either were resident in Nairobi or came for the occasion, including the Italian ambassador – the British, German, French – but we all went off in some order that had been predetermined and walked down the steps of the plane, and a car was waiting for us there with our flag, and we were introduced to the driver and to our ADC. My idea of an ADC is a Brit, who has polished boots, maybe with spurs, a sword at his side, epaulet, everything spic and span. I was introduced to my ADC, whose name was Jeannine, who was a 16-year old, very buxom, Seychelloise girl! I said, "Get in the back seat with me so you can tell me what we are doing here and what the program is." She got in and she said, "What should I call you, Mr. Marshall or Your Excellency?" I said, "Please just call me Mr. Marshall." That would do. She said, "Mr. Marshall, may I open the window, because I get car sick." Anyway, the whole thing, as I told Mancham, who became President the next day, at the party the night before, "Look, this whole thing is a debutante party." He appreciated that because he spent thousands of dollars on this party. I'd been to the Seychelles when Governor Allen was there, when we were still only on a reporting basis from Nairobi, and then come the time when Mancham was there. The important thing when Allen was there was to decide which way to pass the port. And I went when Mancham was there, and he had two blondes, one on each side of us, that he picked up at the cosmetics counter at Harrods. It was a little different atmosphere. We all had to sing during dinner. He had a guitar coming in. Anyway, the whole thing was quite amusing. Independence was about five minutes late because he had insisted on reading a poem in French, English, and Creole, which he had written. He had to turn and silence the French horn which was already beginning to boom up for independence.

Anyway, one or two small items for '76, we had a mini-con meetings which we had had in Madagascar, which I think are a good idea. I don't think you have to wait for the regional Chiefs of Mission conference. I think you can have a mini-con. There were just four of us – and Hummel, who later went on to become ambassador to China – and two others. I think we all found it quite useful, to compare notes about the region. What does your country think of ours? And up and down from that. Then Billy Graham came out there in the summer of '76. I got a good suntan while up in the stands on that. And Lady Bird, whom I'd known before, in fact I had a memorable time once in Washington when I went down with my mother, because Buchanan Park was to be opened in Washington which my mother's foundation put some money into – a grant. And Lady Bird Johnson was interested because she was interested in flowers. She was at the opening of the park. She asked us to go back to the White House and have lunch in Lincoln's Press Room. They set up a little card table there for the three of us – and to me that, even though

I'd been to the White House for dinners – that is the most memorable time. I think because it was so private. It was wonderful. Anyway, she came out because of the National Geographic Board Meeting that was held out there. I saw quite a bit of her, and we gave a dinner for about 80 people, and had ballroom dances, and all kinds of things for her. So that was nice. In 1977, I was only there until April.

There was one project that I alluded to, a self-help project that I wanted to get started up, not Lake Beringo. Cimarron and Degours had an area above the gorge, which in rainy weather, which was infrequent, would fill up with water and then flow through the gorge. My ideas was that this is an example of how you can dam up this very narrow gorge and then have a pipe running down from above where the water was stored that, for at least a while, you'd have some water that could be of use, not for irrigation, I don't think, but at least water for camels, and people and goats. Since this was then-Vice President Moi's area, Richard Leakey and I and Ken Mueller, who was head of an agricultural organization here in the United States, and President Moi went up in a plane and took a look at this gorge. This all sounds rather farcical now that I think of it, but it was very serious then. We all hiked up this riverbed and Moi's bodyguard was right in front of me. All of a sudden, I heard this terrible noise, something banging, right in front of me. This bodyguard's gun had fallen on the rock; thank God it wasn't cocked! It could have killed me! Anyway, we all thought it was a good idea, but it never worked out. I thought if we could set this as an example, then on a self-help basis, if we gave money to other regions with a similar geographic situation, we could do it because only 17 percent of all Kenya's land is arable. And if semi-arid land, no matter how small, could be used in addition to wells – ground water – we could also get water from above. More meetings with Kenyatta and that's a farewell... I think that sort of sums it up.

Q: And then Kenyatta, if memory serves, died the year after you left.

MARSHALL: Yes, he did. A year after I left.

Q: So you were there at the end of an era in Kenya? An historic period.

MARSHALL: Yes, it was.

Q: People say that Mama Ngina was a major force behind the throne. Were you able to interact at all with her?

MARSHALL: No, I wouldn't describe her that way. I would describe her and Margaret Kenyatta, both his young wife and his sister, as not forces behind the throne; I really wouldn't describe either of them that way, but independently. They were – I mean it was all over the papers – they were notoriously in the ivory trade and making a lot of money out of it. Kenyatta himself, I felt, was the most unavaricious head of state in Africa.

Did I mention going down to Lesotho? That made me think of Mobutu. Lesotho had its 10th anniversary of independence while I was in Kenya. I think it was Dave Newsom who was supposed to go down there to represent the U.S., but he had something else he had to do. So I was asked to go down from Nairobi and, anyway, I went down and spent two nights in Pretoria

with our ambassador there, and then went to Maseru, Lesotho. Actually, although the ceremony and all that was interesting, and the people I found absolutely fascinating, and the horses really wonderful and the pageantry. But the most interesting thing didn't have anything to do with Lesotho. Mobutu was there. He thought David was going to be there and he asked to see him and was told that he wasn't, but I was. So he asked me to come up to the palace where I was staying – nice house – and he asked me whether I spoke French. I said, "Yes I do." So he said we didn't need a translator. I had met him once before at a Chiefs of Mission meeting in Kinshasa where I thought he seemed terribly arrogant. So I was prepared for that and, think what one may about him and all the horrible things he's done to his country, I liked him for that moment. Just like with a lot of other people, you may like them for a moment even though you may dislike them for a lot of other things. He said, "I'd like to send a message to Secretary Kissinger." The subject was Southern Rhodesia and personalities and who he was hoping Henry Kissinger would support – one rather than another. He said, "Here's what I'd like you to say," and then he said, which I thought was very thoughtful of him, "Now let me just repeat it. These are the points – one, two, three." Fortunately, I got the communications officer at home and out of bed and got him to send off a cable and had an answer for him the next morning. But I rather enjoyed meeting him and seeing what is not an image of him.

Q: You certainly have covered Kenya. Winding down, as you said, we have done three hours, do you have any general comments reflecting on your three ambassadorships? Quality of the staff, the career Foreign Service as you saw it? Maybe the direction of Africa, overall?

MARSHALL: Can I comment on that one first?

Q: Sure.

MARSHALL: Good. Commenting on staff, I had excellent staff at all three posts! No question about it. I've the highest regard for Foreign Service officers, the ones I have known and worked with, and certainly the Agency and, for the most part, all the other agencies. Obviously, as I pointed out, I had problems with AID, but I got support in Washington. It was just an individual. I think it is unfortunate, and nobody can do anything about this at this point, I don't think; but I make the observation. I think it is unfortunate that we've gotten to the stage where an individual's rights are so protected that you can't make a frank statement about their good qualities as well as their bad in a fitness report – an efficiency report (I'm getting the military and the Marine Corps at this point mixed up.). But it really is unfortunate. And you can't talk about their wives because this is invading their privacy. You can't say whether a man drinks too much or not – whether he drinks too much – and that's not good for his job and performance. You have to use all kinds of cues to lead the person who is reading it to understand that there is a problem and leave him guessing. I think that's unfortunate. You can't commend a wife, either. It didn't happen with me, but I heard of a case in Japan where a wife had learned the language; she was doing all kinds of things to benefit the embassy, and the reporting officer could not say that she was such an asset because you were talking about a wife, or a spouse, one way or the other. I think that is unfortunate. That's the comment that comes to mind most readily, because I think it would be healthy for the Foreign Service to do that.

Q: There certainly is a lot of sentiment that way in the Service. On the other hand, the feminist

movement is looking the other way

MARSHALL: You're not going to be able to do anything about it.

Q: You can't do anything about it. And there's also a feeling that it might disadvantage the man who is single; the woman who's single.

MARSHALL: It gets all entangled.

Q: Africa has been a focus for you over many years. You've seen it at different periods. You were involved earlier, I think you told me, in a development fund for Africa. What are your reflections about the way it's going? President Clinton is about to go in the next few days on his first African trip to demonstrate U.S. interest. How do you feel as you look back on it as we're on the verge of the 21st Century?

MARSHALL: I think first of all, overall, Africa is far worse off today than they were at the time of their own independences, which began with the Gold Coast and then Uganda in '54, I think – '56. And most of them in the 60's. Perhaps they were not given the right kind of help and guidance by the British, the French, the Belgians, the Portuguese, the Italians. Somebody said this to me in just the last few days – how long can the Africans continue to blame the colonial powers for things not going right for them now? I would agree with that comment. The time has come, and is well past, I believe, where they simply have to get a hold of their own management of their own countries. And I think that management, corruption, and mismanagement are the three major problems of Africa. In some parts, population is a problem. I think that misdirection of education and economic development – the two together – which allow (depending which way you want to look at it) the unemployed to come into the cities, or (looking at it the other way) not keep or provide some incentives for employment throughout the country results in strife in the major cities and that leads to crime. Which certainly happens in Lagos, Nairobi, and many other places. I think that there are some countries that have surprisingly turned the corner; Ghana is in better shape than it ever has been. There are a few others that have. Kenya, which we've been talking about, I wouldn't say it's in worse shape than at the time of independence, but it is heading down from where it was. There is no doubt about that. The reason for that is mismanagement, if you have to use one word and not go into why, but I think it's obvious from what I've been saying what the why is.

With reference to the new AID effort program for Africa, and President Clinton's trip, I would hope that we would – and if I read it right in reading about the new AID program, we're doing what I had suggested all along – and that is that we get something for our aid. We should get – and each country may be a little different – an economic benefit of some sort. I'm not looking for reassurances or for promises, we've gotten those all along, but we should get some beneficial aspect which could be just for the United States, or it could be something more general. It could include Europe. We could do it in partnership with Europe. It's a little bit like when you charge admission for an organization that you're going to go in to visit – whether it's a museum, amusement park, or whatever. If you charge admission, you're going to get more interest in that organization and you're more likely to get a more organized, politer attitude toward it, and people will enjoy more getting out of it what they're going to get, what they're going to see or do. So if

there is more of that sense that “we have to give back something in order to get it,” it could lead to economic benefits. We could talk about taxes, property, land, whatever, something we think should be established – a free zone, whatever's best for the country and for our relations with it. We shouldn't be too careful, too sensitive – I know I'm trampling on real feet here – about human rights. And that's a dangerous thing to say. I certainly believe we should focus our attention on human rights and should constantly hammer the point home that they must be observed, but when it comes down to the nitty gritty, I don't think we should not be helping somebody or not going into relations with somebody because they have a bad human rights record. I think the two must be considered for their own benefits and separately.

As for the President's trip, I was a little sorry, and I can't even remember at this point, but I looked at them carefully at the moment and now I've forgotten them, the countries he's going to. I don't say that he should go to Nairobi, I don't say he should go to Lagos (Maybe it would be good if he went to Lagos.). I just felt that, of the countries he's going to, I don't know quite frankly why they've been selected. I hope they weren't selected to come back and state conclusions which had been reached before he went.

CHARLES J. NELSON
Director, USAID Mission
Nairobi (1974-1978)

Ambassador Nelson was born and raised in Michigan, educated at New York University and Boston University and served in the US Army in World War II. Prior to his appointment at Ambassador, Mr. Nelson served in senior positions with the State Department, AID, International Cooperation Administration (ICA), the Mutual Security Agency and the Peace Corps. These appointments took him to the Philippines, Egypt and Iran. In 1971 he was appointed Ambassador to the nations of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, where he served from 1971 to 1974. Ambassador Nelson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1991.

Q: You left Botswana in 1974 and went back to being director of the AID programs to Kenya from 1974-78. Kenya has always seemed like a peculiar society. It seems to be a country that has a lot of riches but lately seems to be falling apart. The political system doesn't seem to be holding up very well. The criminality seems to be going up. How did you find Kenya when you were there at this particular period?

NELSON: Moi was Vice President and he is of the Kalenjin tribe, a very, very minor tribe. Kenyatta was President most of the time I was there. He was, of course, a Kikuyu, the dominant tribe.

Kenya was a different kind of deal. There had been five AID mission directors before I came. They ceded away over time a lot of the authority and power of the mission. So you had to recapture what you could, plus we had several regional aid organizations. We had domestic issues as well as other issues.

I will just tell you a few stories. I had assembled a relatively good staff over time. I had one real crackerjack, a woman, who is now the highest ranking in the Foreign Service in AID. We went to see the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and Planning. I introduced the two people who had accompanied me and myself. We sat down and the Permanent Secretary said, "My name is Nganga. You wouldn't know how to pronounce it anyhow." I went on ignoring that and told him what we were there for. The room was ice cold, figuratively speaking. We walked out. It was really chilly.

We made one good friend in the Ministry of Finance and it was through him that we did a great many things. We brought a program which was virtually nil back to a point where it was very respectable, despite some elements in the government and others.

I will tell you one other story about this friend of ours in the Ministry of Finance. He took us to his parents' home. It was in the rural area. We had a meal prepared by his parents. There were no facilities there so he stopped by someplace where there were facilities after we had finished. It made me extremely proud because here was a person who was willing to, in a sense, expose his circumstances, if you want to use that kind of expression, but he wasn't standing on ceremony; this is what I am, what I come from; I trust that you can accept a situation like this without ridicule and with understanding; this is a real demonstration of how comfortable I feel with you as a person. I spent four years in Nairobi and that was a high point for me.

But, we did have a good program. We developed an extremely good program.

We saw the beginnings once Vice President Moi came in of people beginning to be more bold in terms of their larcenist conduct. I attribute it to one thing primarily and that is that the Kikuyu tribe had been dominant for such a long time. Moi was from a very minor tribe, Kalenjin. He and his associates used his office to loot. I don't think expressions that you read in the paper by the American ambassador do any good for the United States - "We will provide humanitarian assistance. The rest of us are gone. When you fellows come to your senses, we will talk." But he is defiant.

Q: There was just a tremendous upheaval in Zambia where Kaunda allowed free elections and he was thoroughly trounced, conceded defeat, and walked out slowly into the sun set in a gentlemanly way.

NELSON: He and Nyerere were the two who have walked away. Nyerere did so before he was defeated. Kaunda walked away in defeat. Unfortunately Moi and some of the others can't quite do that.

We became increasingly apprehensive in terms of thuggery. We had to put a lock on our bedroom door and had loud sirens and guards through the night, etc. It was becoming a very disruptive society.

Q: What were the main thrusts of our AID program than?

NELSON: We were in the university, agriculture, commodity lending, PL 480 programs, and small farm loans. That is about it.

Q: Nairobi is such a nice place irrespective of the thuggery. There is a tendency for operations to locate there--any type of organization in our government. Was there a problem of keeping your staff down and not getting too many regional people there?

NELSON: It was a regional location for AID, including the Economic Development Services Organization of AID. It was fairly large. We had the Auditor General there and that too was a large office. Then we had the AID mission. I think we could have done better if we had fewer people. But on that side of Africa, you couldn't go to Addis Ababa, Dar es Salaam, the Sudan, Zaire, etc. Kenya was certainly the best place for the East and West offices. I didn't care for it because you get offices besides your own located in places that belong to the same organization and idle hands want to get into your business. They want to tell you how to do your work. I made no bones about it in the sense that I rejected this main approach. It didn't help me much with AID/Washington, but so what.

Q: Having been on both sides, how did AID and the sort of traditional State Department Foreign Service work together in Africa as you saw it?

NELSON: It depends on the personality of the ambassador in the first instance. Also I think it depends on whether he is career or non-career. Bohlen, for example, in the Philippines said, "Don't bother me. You are big boys and you ought to be able to do your business and if you get into trouble you have had it," In Ethiopia, Korry was more intrusive, because he has a lot of nervous energy. He is a highly energetic person. I think he has at least 10 blue striped suits and a blue shirt, blue or red tie, and black shoes. He never appears any differently. He never has to think about that. So the only thing he thinks about is what he can get into. So he is intrusive and you have to deal with that. Sometimes an ambassador's staff can stir up a lot of trouble.

In Tanzania, John Burns and Tony Ross couldn't have been better. They told me very firmly and frankly what they see as their responsibilities and what were my responsibilities, etc. AID directors do have more meaningful contacts with the government, more contacts concerning purpose, policy and principle than in a sense any other U.S. employee in country x or country y. And you have resources that you can deploy.

During the previous years that I spent as an ambassador, I had an AID person who had worked for me and who was in charge of AID for the three countries. There was the Peace Corps and USIS. I tried to work with all segments of the government - to call on ministers, and know ministers and call on the president. We had to learn that you don't run the other U.S. agency's show. Sure you want consultation with them. You want them to feel that they can talk with you. But you don't [interfere]. Even though you are buddies and have worked together elsewhere, you are not in charge of their affairs. So that is a transition you have to make.

Kenya was a very tough place for me in the sense that there were five mission directors, acting, etc. They had lost the mission director's house office. The Agency had paid \$25,000 to improve it. Because maybe the people were weak and because you had so many AID organizations, they

were able to play off one against the other. So much of the authority of the mission had been ceded, it made it difficult to impose the personality of the mission.

I had some tough times with Marshall, who came from Madagascar, where I think he had been PNGed. He was a contributor to the Nixon campaign and his mother's picture, Mrs. Astor, was on the cover of The New York Times Magazine yesterday. He was to me a disaster. His DCM [deputy chief of mission] wasn't any better. I think I did the job that had to be done there. It wasn't always the most comfortable circumstance and you fought that alone.

This is a generalized observation. Embassy substantive officers gather information without responsibility for specific programs. They are reporters. The State officers turn to this agency or that agency, whatever the case, in terms of wanting to get into your business where they shouldn't be in your business. My program officer consulted or briefed the economic counselor of the embassy often. If there were messages going out, maybe she would discuss them with him. This is routine in any country you might be in because the economic counselor is usually designated to look at AID affairs.

I was in the State Department, but I was not of it. Going back to x country or y country, you had a real disadvantage because they don't want you. Most in the Service have the idea that they are going to be an ambassador, and when he sees someone from the outside, they think he or she doesn't belong. In some way, that is an affront to them that this person has this particular role to play. Therefore, there is a tiny bit of jealousy, which is not endemic, but it exists amongst certain people in the club. They resent your salary, because AID people advance more quickly than Foreign Service types. He is also most likely from a school other than an Ivy League school. You are accepted but tolerated.

A. ELLEN SHIPPY
Kenya-Tanzania Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1975-1977)

Ambassador Shippy was born in Colorado and raised in New Mexico. She was educated at the University of New Mexico and the George Washington School of Law. After a tour with the Peace Corps in El Salvador, Ms. Shippy joined the Foreign Service, where she served first in positions dealing with Latin America and later in with those concerning Asian and African affairs. She served as Political Counselor in Bangladesh, Deputy Chief of Mission in Uganda and she served as Ambassador to Malawi from 1998 to 2000. Ambassador Shippy was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: What was the government like in Kenya?

SHIPPY: President Kenyatta was still alive. We were doing the preparations if he were to die, and he didn't. He lived on several more years. Corruption was an issue.

Q: Did we see his daughter being a major player?

SHIPPY: Not at that time. I don't recall that she was particularly prominent, or at least we didn't talk about her. Nyerere was still president in Tanzania.

Q: Nyerere had mixed reviews. He was really the darling of sort of the socialist camp in Europe.

SHIPPY: And of many academics here in the U.S.

Q: Yes, and I was wondering were we at that point looking at what he had done to Tanzania and was doing to Tanzania and saying hey wait a minute?

SHIPPY: Nyerere was either hugely loved and admired or hugely criticized. The U.S. government at that time was leery of the benefits of everything he was trying to do. I don't know that we were as harshly critical as we were later.

Q: Did we see that eastern part of Africa as being a place where we could have, do we have interests there as say opposed to western Africa, the Franco and Anglophone countries there?

SHIPPY: I haven't worked in West Africa, but neither Tanzania nor Kenya have the kind of natural resources that West Africa has, oil, diamonds, gold, whatever. Kenya and Tanzania have mostly things like coffee and tea. Their political stability and their importance in the region make them of interest to the U.S., and are two of the reasons we have put significant amounts of USAID money into them.

Q: Did you find any sort of division, because Nyerere as you said, either you loved him or had very serious questions about him. Did you find that division ran within the African bureau at all, or was the African bureau skeptical of him at that point?

SHIPPY: I was saying that Nyerere had great charisma and personal charms. Many people who met him personally were influenced by that.

Q: Yes. Well at some point you did have the feeling that, I have talked to people American ambassadors around used to get mad, annoyed because the area would get all this money, particularly from Norway, Sweden, you know, and it was essentially destroying the economies where they were trying to help get aid money to help their countries where they represented, and were not getting much because it was going to Nyerere, and his various schemes which you know even looking at it at the time was destroying what there was of the economy.

SHIPPY: Right. The two countries that I know about, Kenya and Tanzania, were both getting fair amounts of U.S. aid. Certainly the Scandinavians were putting huge amounts into Tanzania because they did think Nyerere was a good leader and had good ideas. The destruction of the economy was more clearly seen later. The damage to individual rights where he made villagers move into villages was of less importance to the Scandinavians, perhaps because of their own social structure, I don't know. In defense of Nyerere, in fact, it is easier to provide education and health if you have a populace living in smaller concentrated areas. Whether it would have been

more successful if he had gone about it in a different way, I don't know. But since the villagers were forcibly moved into the villages, it didn't work.

Q: How about in Kenya? Kenyatta had gone from being the great enemy during the Mau Mau times to being considered the great democratic leader. Was there a halo around Kenyatta at that time or was that beginning to fade or had it faded?

SHIPPY: It was beginning to fade. The corruption was starting to color people's perceptions.

Q: How about in Kenya at that time, was tribalism as much of a problem as it certainly has been in so many of the western African countries?

SHIPPY: Tribalism was an issue because Kenyatta and the Kikuyu tribe were so dominant. There was a prominent Luo politician, Oginga Oginga, who was a competitor to Kenyatta. But the people who might have posed a threat to Kenyatta were taken care of one way or another. After Kenyatta died, several years after I had left the Desk, and Moi became president, it was thought that that was a good choice because he was from a small tribe and tribalism would become a lesser factor. It didn't turn out that way, though.

MADISON BROADNAX
Title XII Officer, USAID/REDSO
Nairobi (1976-1978)

Madison Broadnax was born in Georgia and graduated from West Virginia State and Michigan State. He served in various USAID missions in Sudan, Korea, and Nairobi. He was interviewed by W. Haven North in 1998.

BROADNAX: I was in Nairobi from '76 to '78.

Q: What was your function?

BROADNAX: I was appointed as Title XII Officer.

Q: What's that mean?

BROADNAX: That was, you know, the 1975 Food Program, called Title XII in the legislation. That's how it got its name. That's what I was supposed to go out there and promote and find senior officials in agriculture that could qualify for training under the Title XII concept.

Q: You were assigned to the REDSO, right?

BROADNAX: REDSO, right.

Q: You served a whole region.

BROADNAX: Right. Princeton Lyman's (Chief of the Development Resources Division in the African Bureau) idea was to have a Title XII officer in the REDSO region — one in Abidjan and one in Nairobi. But then, when the politicians heard about it, they took an exception to it. They said they better find something else for me to do because they didn't want me doing that.

Also, I was trying to keep the peace between the Mission Director and REDSO. That was tough. But earlier on I was on TDY in Nairobi for review of the extension teaching syllabi at Edgerton College. During this assignment Mr. Isaac Oquirri, who had visited me in West Virginia, gave a luncheon for my wife and me to meet President and Mrs. Jomo Kenyatta, President of Kenya.

Q: What was the problem between the REDSO and the USAID Mission?

BROADNAX: Well, turf and a misunderstanding of agency goals there. That's what it was. Truth. Here I was the Senior Agricultural Officer, but I was forbidden from working with the Kenyan Senior Ministers of Agriculture. So we had a International Livestock Station there, and I knew the Director. So I spent my time there productively, too.

Q: What were you doing with that?

BROADNAX: Well, more or less liaison. Back when I was in AID/W, my job was to help set up these International Research Stations. And I was familiar with that. So when Golar Butcher (Assistant Administrator, Africa Bureau) came to Nairobi, I told her about my plans for retirement. I told her, "My time is running out." She said, "What?" I said, "My date for retirement is when I'm 64 years old." She said, "When is that?" I said, "I'll be 64 years old February 9, 1979." She said, "What do you want me to do?" I said, "I want TDY back in Washington to finalize my work preparatory to orderly retirement." She called that same night. You gave orders to bring me in. I came in and got everything in order. So on the 31st of January, all of my retirement papers and everything were done. I told everybody goodbye, and they said, "We've got to give you a party." I said, "No, not in your life." They said, "Why?" I said, "Because you tax these secretaries the same amount you tax these high-paying technicians. It's not fair. You're not going to do that on me."

Q: For the party, you mean?

BROADNAX: Yes, right. I went to the Comptroller. Everything was in order. They said, "You've got a sizeable check coming. You going to come back and get it?" I said, "No, I've got a good mailman. Just put it in the mail." It was for \$10,000. And I walked out.

Q: We started a credit program?

BROADNAX: Well, no, there was need for some assistance. There was an office in Kenya which provided the funds. I can't think of what it was now. But they got their seed money out of USAID/ Washington. We recommended a small donation from that and they were happy to get it.

Q: But otherwise we were providing technical assistance?

BROADNAX: That was it.

Q: So it was short-term limited.

BROADNAX: Yes.

WILBERT LEMELLE
Ambassador
Kenya (1976-1980)

Mr. LeMelle was born in Louisiana and graduated from St. Augustine Seminary and the University of Denver. He was appointed ambassador to Kenya and Seychelles in 1976. He was interviewed by Richard Jackson in 1998.

Q: With this background, you were a logical choice for Kenya and Seychelles. This was the beginning of the Carter presidency. How did that all come about?

LEMELLE: Interestingly, as I mentioned earlier, I had just returned home to New York at the end of 1976 from my post as Representative for the Maghreb to our New York office at Ford. In fact, when I received the call on a Saturday morning in February, from then Secretary of State Vance, that President Carter had asked me to serve as ambassador to Kenya and Seychelles, my sea freight from the Maghreb had not yet arrived back in New York. So, we were just getting resettled in New York. I was back in our New York office at Ford. I was notified that I along with 10-12 other individuals were recommended by the Harriman Commission to President Carter as the first group of ambassadors. Governor Harriman had been asked by President Carter to chair a commission to select individuals for 12 or so key posts. It was in that commission that my name surfaced and the recommendation was made for me to serve as a U.S. ambassador to Kenya and Seychelles. So, that's the origin of the nomination. It was very interesting because what Secretary Vance did was to invite all of us (that is, this group that was nominated by the Harriman Commission) to spend three days in May in Washington for us to become acquainted and also to be briefed and receive an orientation on our assignments. It was a very good group. Some of the people you know well. Mike Mansfield was going to Japan. Bob Goheen was on his way to India. Anne Cox Chambers of the communications publishing family out of Atlanta, was going to Brussels. Kingman Brewster was nominated to the Court of St. James. So we had a very interesting group and got to know one another and in many instances have stayed in touch. And it's been a lifelong kind of camaraderie between us.

Q: You had some time left in the Africa Bureau getting ready. Dick Moose was then head of it. David Newsom was under secretary, having been earlier assistant secretary.

LEMELLE: That's right. I was very happy to work with Dave. Dick Moose was the assistant secretary for African Affairs. Another very good friend who was ambassador in Tunis, Tunisia

when I was heading up the Ford Foundation programs for the Maghreb was Ambassador Talcott Seelye. I remember calling on him. We had developed a good friendship while I was in Tunisia and he was ambassador there. I saw a number of other friends whom I had met in my work overseas who were Foreign Service officers or ambassadors and the like. So, it was a warm reception. Everyone tried to be helpful. I appreciated that very much.

Q: This group was obviously on a fast track through the Senate. No problems there with confirmation.

LEMELLE: No. We did not have any problems. No one of the group encountered any real problems. It was very interesting that Senator Starkman was heading the committee in the Senate when I went before the Foreign Relations Committee. He was very forthcoming in his questions. The other members were as well. Senator Pell was on the committee and was always a gracious man. He was also very helpful and asked some supportive questions. So, that went quite well.

Q: So you got back to Nairobi. That was a homecoming. You knew the place well, but you were looking at it with different eyes as ambassador.

LEMELLE: That's right. As I mentioned earlier, I was returning to Nairobi after having served three years as the Ford Foundation Deputy Representative for East and Southern Africa. We had become friends with many of the Kenyan authorities. People we had worked with in higher education and the various ministries in which Ford Foundation had projects; so we knew a number of people. In fact, I had been to events to which President Kenyatta had invited me and my family, so we knew the First Family. It was a real homecoming. There was a huge crowd of people at the airport when I came in. We were warmly welcomed. With me in Kenya was my wife Yvonne, our daughter Patrice and our three sons, Wilbert, Jr., Gerald and Edward. Throughout our stay in Kenya, we were successful in furthering good relations with Kenya, building on the knowledge, interests and experience we had acquired during my earlier period there.

Q: Kenyatta was still on the scene.

LEMELLE: Yes. His health was failing. It was deteriorating. But he was on the scene. In fact, when I presented my credentials to him, we had a few chuckles. I told him in Swahili that I came not as a foreigner, not as a "mgeni," but as a "rafiki" to Kenya. So I opened my remarks to him in Swahili, which he very much appreciated. We ended up seeing one another on a number of occasions subsequent to the presentation of the credentials when our families got together and the children had an opportunity to play and become friends.

Q: President Kenyatta passed on when?

LEMELLE: In August of 1978.

Q: So you were there.

LEMELLE: Yes, I was there during the transition, which if you recall, was an event that many

people anticipated. There was a large question mark over what might happen when the "Mzee passed," as the Swahili people would say. The fact is that nothing happened, but what should have happened, and that was that we had a very correct, constitutional transition from Kenyatta to the assumption of the presidency by acting president Daniel Arap Moi, the current president of Kenya today. Moi was Kenyatta's vice president. The procedures that had been provided by the constitution for his being sworn in as the interim president and the procedures for the official confirmation of the new president of Kenya were followed to the letter of the law. I was very happy about that and did everything that I thought was necessary to make sure that the procedures and the process would be carried out in accordance with the constitution of the country.

Q: You must have had a major U.S. delegation to the funeral.

LEMELLE: Yes, we did. We did have some very notable Americans in attendance. Thurgood Marshall led the delegation. He was a member of the Supreme Court at that time. Former Ambassador Andrew Young was in the delegation. We had the late Congressman Charles Diggs, who had done so much for Africa-U.S. relations when he chaired the subcommittee in the House on Africa. We also had any number of other important dignitaries from the United States who came and participated in the funeral of President Kenyatta.

It was a sad day for Kenyans and those of us who felt close to the Kenyan people, but we were happy in that this was a transition which was impeccably pursued in accordance with the law of the land.

Q: You had followed Tony Marshall.

LEMELLE: Yes. Ambassador Marshall preceded me and had done an excellent job in Kenya. He was well-regarded by the people that I came in contact with that knew him. I followed him. He had departed a month or so before I arrived. I arrived just in time to celebrate the Fourth of July at the Embassy, which was quite interesting. This was the first time that I would preside over our national day celebration. Everyone was very helpful. We had a great time both at the residence and at the celebration.

Q: Still, in the transition from a period of a republican presidency to the democrats under Carter, there must have been significant policy changes. How did that work itself out in the case of Kenya?

LEMELLE: In the case of Kenya, I think that what was happening in Washington was very good for us. One, Kenya, as you know, was and considered itself a friend of the United States during the years of President Kenyatta. Both President Kenyatta and President Daniel Arap Moi always reinforced this that we were friendly countries. They expressed to me their admiration for the United States and particularly their gratitude for the special assistance the United States had provided from Kenya for Kenya from the very beginning. You will remember the so-called "Kenya airlift," which was not a world-shaking phenomenon, but this effort to bring several plane loads of young Kenyans to study in the United States in order to move as fast as possible with the development of administrative personnel and begin to develop the Kenyan leadership, is

still regarded in the minds of older Kenyans as a singular gesture of generosity in the relationship between the United States and Kenya.

On the policy side, Kenya was trying very hard to understand and to embrace the spirit and basic principles of governance that have characterized the philosophy of democratic government in the United States. Obviously, there was during the Kenyatta period a kind of clash of two systems. On the one hand, Kenyatta was a chief. He was an Mzee, an elder, a leader, an absolutist as it were. On the other hand, we were looking for openness, for transparency, and for participatory government. There was this constant effort of trying to get both sides to understand the values and attitudes of their side. The result was that we sought to constantly remind the government of Kenya that we believed in participatory democracy, that every man and woman should have the vote, that government was accountable to the governed, that there should be an independent judiciary, that the military should be responsive to the civilian government, that politicians should be responsible to the people, and that military dictatorship was not a form of government we felt was in the best interests of the people of a modern state. So, all of these ideas we were promoting through our public education program, our USIS activities, personal contacts; whatever we did, we were trying to encourage those values. That was very important when one looks back today and sees how important the concept of human rights is today. It is something which every country has to deal with and accept that there are penalties for the violation of basic human rights, of fundamental political rights, and the other rights that are becoming part of the international consensus of people's rights. You will recall that a hallmark of the early years of the Carter administration was President Carter's emphasis on human rights. This was particularly true after they were enunciated in, I think, the address by Secretary of State Vance at Notre Dame University. That was a very important speech made on human rights. I personally took that as something that was fundamental to what I wanted to do while serving as ambassador - not that I was going to ram these notions down the throats of my Kenyan friends and colleagues, but that I was going to encourage the examination and acceptance of the basic tenants of democratic governance. I very much appreciated the leadership that President Carter gave us. It was ready-made for what I certainly felt was an important part of what was happening during that time in Kenya.

Q: One thinks of the final years of the Kenyatta period as one of some things being out of control, reports of corruption frequently centered around the family and Mrs. Kenyatta. There were some human rights abuses. Did you see a change in that as Moi came in?

LEMELLE: Yes, I did. This is why it's very paradoxical that in the more recent past, Moi and his reputation have been tarnished and he has become controversial. I'll give you a telling example. I had met Vice President Moi when President Kenyatta was ill. I called on him, I think, two or three times for one reason or another, but certainly to become better acquainted with him. So we knew one another and our relationship became friendly. He has a great smile. There are a lot of things that we were able to smile and talk about. I remember very well the warmth in which he welcomed me to his office and the relationship that was budding. When Moi became president, he and I met several times during the transition period when I was conveying to him our continued desire to support the Kenyan government and to support the constitutional transition, which we were encouraging. I also carried messages from President Carter and from Secretary of State Vance to President Moi. One of the things I had told President Moi was that as a friendly

country and as someone who had a very personal interest in the progressive development of Kenya, I felt that the problems of human rights, particularly the detentions without trial that had occurred in the last several months preceding the death of President Kenyatta were in conflict with constitutional guarantees in Kenya and that there was no basis for this and that he had an opportunity to start his administration without these kinds of difficulties. We talked about it on several occasions. He indicated to me regarding this and certain other matters that had occurred (one I would like to talk about later: the purchase of armaments) and he said, "That did not happen on my watch. I did not do that. I was not responsible for the detention of the 23 so-called political prisoners that were in Kenya's jails." So, we talked about this on several occasions. What happened, which was very interesting, was that on the morning of the national holiday, October 20, he told me before the ceremonies in a personal call that I would be happy to know that he was going to announce the release of all political detainees. In fact, they were released so that when Moi became effectively the president of Kenya, he took the bold step of releasing all political detainees. In the beginning of his administration, he did do this. I congratulated him. There was opposition to this. Certainly the attorney general, Charles Njonjo, was not for this. I am not sure, from what he told me, that he had consulted fully with the attorney general about the release of the political prisoners. But the jails were clear of political prisoners in the beginning of Moi's tenure as president. During the months that followed, certainly during my time in Kenya, we continued to work on the question of transparency, the question of arbitrary decision-making in which from time to time one would hear of police detaining some political opponent or some other controversial incident. I had the opportunity not only with President Moi, but also with other senior members of the government and of the parliament to encourage good governance. As I said, I felt accepted enough by the Kenyan power elite that I could be candid and open about these matters. I never did get a rebuff indicating that this was beyond what I should be doing. I never thought to try and dictate my ideas to the Kenyan government.

I don't accept that approach. I don't think it's necessary and I don't think that you get much by challenging political leaders in their country particularly where it is unnecessary. If one has a situation in which this or that particular leader or leadership is uncommunicative and keeps you at bay and is very autocratic and authoritarian in doing what they are about, I think one can find oneself in a position that could be confrontational; but even so, as a diplomat, I feel that there is a way or several ways in which to try and approach these things. I never on any of the issues on which there was some contention with the Kenyans or with the Seychellois - like Somalia, Ethiopia, Uganda- that I had to go public and make something of a public fight in order to make the point. I think we were quite successful on those issues about which we had different views.

Q: Do you think some of the earlier human rights abuses were along tribal lines and that Moi, being from a very small tribe, the Kalengin, was perhaps in a particular position to deal with that?

LEMELLE: I think that the fact that he was from the Kalengin tribe, a small tribe in Kenya, was a mark of President Kenyatta's astuteness. There was very little controversy over Moi as vice president. Everyone accepted him. Most people felt that he was innocuous, in a way, that he did not represent a large group interest, that he would try to compromise between the various large factions and tribal factions in the country. If one compares this with what we saw transpire in other African countries when the head of state was from the largest or the dominant tribe and the

next in line, the vice president, was from the next largest or next dominant group, that was a successful strategy that President Kenyatta pursued in asking Moi to serve as the vice president. So, I do believe that there was some wisdom in that choice.

Q: You mentioned you wanted to come back to arms sales. Could you talk a little bit about that and maybe some of the other particular issues in the bilateral relationship that were major ones?

LEMELLE: Yes. One of the developments in Kenya that I found out about after Moi assumed the presidency was that Kenya, during the Kenyatta period, had contracted with the British to buy some 80 Vickers main battle tanks. This was something which I felt I needed to look into a little more to try and understand why Kenya was buying 80 tanks when I didn't see on the horizon any tank battles that might occur in East Africa, nor did I see Kenya preparing to receive 80 tanks, and with the continuing strain on the resources of the country and the uncertainty of basic food in the country and the need to purchase basic food grains from overseas, that Kenya should be spending what was, in effect, \$250 million on 80 tanks. So, I had my economic counselor do an analysis of that transaction. He did. An example of what I felt a friendly country should do followed: I called to State House to arrange for a meeting with President Moi. I said that there was something I wanted to talk to him about and he kindly arranged for me to come over. I brought the analysis that we had done on this transaction. I laid out for him how long it would be that Kenya would be paying off this money, what it would mean in terms of what he would not be able to do in terms of national development priorities that were yet unfunded or underfunded. I said to him, "Look, Mr. President, whatever you can do, and I'm speaking to you as a friend from a friendly country, you should try to do whatever you can to cut back on this. This is going to be ultimately a big waste and could present you with very serious problems in terms of your basic needs in the country as you look towards the future." We had a very wonderful conversation. Here again, as he told me on a number of occasions, "Well, Mr. Ambassador, you know, I am not responsible for having done that." I remember that perfectly. He was smiling at me, saying, "I am not the one who got us into this particular contract, but we are going to look at this." Interestingly, I can't tell you today what the final outcome was, but I happened to be down in Mombasa when the first 12 tanks arrived. I went down to see them. They were on flatcars to be brought up to Nairobi. Our analysis was such that I was able to tell President Moi that maintaining and running these tanks would cost \$17 a mile for the Kenyan government. I said, "If you saw the need that your national sovereignty was so threatened that it would put you in need of tanks, I would be the first to say that you have a justification for doing that to protect national sovereignty. I just don't see it." He was very appreciative of this. I think that meeting really sowed the close relationship I had with Daniel Arap Moi. This wasn't something that I was instructed to talk to him about, but it seemed to me that if we were working ourselves to the bone trying to get Kenya to be a success story in terms of development, increasing the number of young children going to schools, increasing the number of schools, increasing the number of kids in the technical schools, increasing food production, increasing manpower at the higher level in the university sector, and doing everything possible to promote peace and stability in Kenya, that it behooved us to take notice of these things which were completely wasteful.

Just recently, I had occasion not to speak about this, but to recall that Kenya has not fought a traditional war during these many years. So, for about 20 years, if they purchased all of those 80

tanks, it's been a complete drain on their limited resources.

Q: Had the previous administration been selling or trying to sell them fighter aircraft?

LEMELLE: That's right. We did. The Kenyans had purchased their first fighter aircraft from the British, the Hawker aircraft. Those discussions about modernizing the Kenya Air Force and all had begun before I got to Kenya. In fact, during my tenure the Air Force did take delivery of six F-1Es, the Northrop fighter aircraft. A detachment of U.S. Air Force officers was assigned to Kenya to help train the Kenyan Air Force. What happened then was that the Hawkers that the Kenyans had become back-up in the Air Force. There were only six and two were lost in crashes. The Hawkers were aging. There was no feeling in the Kenyan Air Force that they should continue with an aircraft that had been passed by already in terms of its maneuverability and its capability. They felt very strongly that the purchase of the F-1E was a modernization of the Air Force. That did occur. The six aircrafts were delivered during my period at the embassy.

Q: You mentioned your economic counselor who did some analysis. What kind of a staff overall did you inherit? Did they meet your needs? Did you eventually replace them with your own people? Did you have a deputy you could rely on?

LEMELLE: Looking back, I think that we had a very good staff at the embassy. I selected John Blaine as my deputy chief of mission. John was a seasoned Foreign Service officer and also an Africa hand. He had served in Chad and Somalia. He had served also in two other posts and was very capable in terms of the skills. He had good skills and was, I think, a very sober person in making judgments. I interviewed five or six people before leaving Washington. I was happy at the choice that I made in asking John Blaine to serve with me. I think that we worked well together and that he was always solicitous of the priorities that I established at the embassy and worked for us to achieve the goals that we had set for ourselves.

I have a story to tell about the staff which, I think, reflects my style of management and what we were able to accomplish. When I got to Kenya, I inherited a number of officers. While there, a number came to the post. What I said to myself was, "If what they say is all true about the Foreign Service officer, these are a lot of very able people in terms of their intelligence, their judgment, their commitment, and I should before starting to make judgments about this or that particular officer and his or her performance, do what I would do if I were taking over a department, or as I did when I became president of Mercy College here in New York." It was a way that I always approached my responsibilities. I said, "What I'm going to do is see what these guys can do since they appear to be pretty sharp. I had about three officers who were approaching their time in grade when they were at the embassy. They had to make the next promotion or be selected out of the Service. It would be a shame for someone who has been in 15 or more years and was forced to leave, if he had the ability to serve. Why is it that these guys who obviously didn't get in this highly selective service without having something to contribute were falling behind?" What I did was, I turned every other weekly country team meeting into seminars. Every two weeks, instead of the usual country team meeting, we would have a seminar presentation on issues in U.S.-Kenya relations. I assigned the officers to lead the seminars. So, I said, "I'm going to challenge these guys and put them on the spot, give them a topic to wrestle with and to come in and then open them up to their colleagues here." I wanted to create an

intellectual atmosphere. What I find and you find on college campuses is that once you reach tenure, once you reach the associate professor level, many professors don't work as hard. You go to bed earlier rather than stay up and try to write another article for a refereed journal or that book just somehow doesn't get written. So, I said that I was going to do this. We instituted this kind of program. I think it was quite successful. All of the officers who were on the bubble, as it were, were promoted. I did not lose one officer for being released from the Service. When I returned to Washington following my assignment, the officers who had served with me gave a party for me. It was in recognition of the special effort we made to make sure that the careers of all of our officers would be enhanced. I tried to drive the officers in such a way that they would reach their potential. Those who were slipping behind were goaded to get back on track. I think we were successful. As I said, we had about three persons who were facing possible elimination from the Service, and they succeeded.

Q: As we come to the conclusion of this period in Kenya and Seychelles, are there any issues that we haven't touched on that you would like to comment on? Would you like to comment on how it was as a family experience?

LEMELLE: First, on the government side, I, like others who have spent many years in Kenya, was somewhat surprised and saddened by the downturn in the relations, particularly in the 1980s, between the U.S. and Kenya. We had worked very hard to establish the basis for a productive, mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and Kenya. And it has been upsetting to see what has occurred. You mentioned that one of our ambassadors, Ambassador Smith Hempstone, had had a confrontational approach while there. That was very unfortunate. I had known of Smith Hempstone from the early 1960s when he was a journalist reporting on the Congo. Quite candidly, I've always been suspect of his views on Black people. I was chagrined that he felt it necessary to confront the government in the public way that he did during his tenure and I wish that other approaches had been taken to try and preserve the good relationship that had existed and to work on what many of us had tried to do for so many years - and that was to help the Kenyans understand, appreciate and embrace the values that we hold to be fundamental to good government. I think a lot was lost during that confrontational period. I'm happy to see that President Moi participated in the Entebbe Summit with the other presidents from the region; that President Clinton met with President Moi in Uganda; that they all signed the Entebbe Declaration, and that more recently President Moi attended the Africa Summit in Washington. It was so unheard of that someone would go to East Africa and not go to Kenya. So I think it should be said for the record, that we had a very, very solid basis upon which to develop and cultivate relations with Kenya for sometime and somehow more should have been done on the part of the Kenyans and on our side to preserve that understanding and trust and not let relations degenerate to the point that we had all this finger pointing and name calling that occurred during the period when Ambassador Hempstone was in Kenya.

Obviously, with others, I was also saddened at the bombings that took place in Kenya. I still don't know and I guess we're all still wondering how it all happened and who was involved. Here again, there was no basis for this to happen in Kenya during the time that we were developing the kind of close relations. Certainly, Kenya would have done everything possible to prevent anything like that happening and would have been, I think, in fact, very vigilant during the early period about people with evil intentions against the United States or any other friendly country.

That is a sad little piece of our relations and I hope that we will be rebuilding and reestablishing our relations and that the kind of trust and confidence that we were able to develop at a certain time will be restored. In all of my time in Kenya, I did not meet any Kenyans who had an implacable hatred of the United States. To the contrary, we now have trained or provided opportunities for higher education and training for more Kenyans than the UK has ever done. As regard our relationship in terms of attitudes and values, there are now more Kenyans who have had the American experience and who believe in and accept basic rights and equity and feel that government should be open and free and who have developed these attitudes because of their opportunity to come to the United States to study, to interact, to experience. That kind of legacy is one that we need to do everything possible to support and to further develop. I hope that those who now have responsibilities for this are looking towards that side of the ledger and less to the kinds of personality things that relate to whether one likes a new president or doesn't like him or feels that it's in good diplomatic or good friendly country taste to publicly stoke the kinds of fires that we saw sometime during the past 15 years.

ERNEST WILSON
Controller, USAID
Nairobi (1976-1977)

Assistant Director, USAID
Nairobi (1977-1980)

Ernest Wilson was born in Louisiana in 1925. He graduated from the University of Illinois in 1949 and served in the U.S. Air Force from 1943 to 1946. His assignments abroad included Ethiopia, Brazil, Ghana, Kenya, and Egypt. Mr. Wilson was interviewed in 1998 by W. Haven North.

WILSON: After that, I was assigned to Kenya as the USAID/Kenya controller and director of the East Africa Accounting Center, which was responsible for all the disbursing and accounting functions for all of the USAID missions in Eastern and Southern Africa, plus residual activities in Turkey and start-up in Lebanon.

Q: How did that work?

WILSON: It worked fine. It was a challenging job. Kenya at that time had the biggest AID program in Africa. I think, when I left, we had about \$30-40 million per year. A lot of the places like Sudan that had been closed were reopening. Then there were the new programs that were starting up in Burundi, the Seychelles, and places like that. We were again in Ethiopia to some extent. There was a lot of activity there. We were not blessed with the communications of today.

Q: How did you handle something that dispersed? Did you have controllers in each of the missions or accountants?

WILSON: No, we didn't. We established a work plan where, for instance, in Uganda, we worked

through the embassy and put the AID missions in these places that were just restarting and were small on a cash disbursement basis through the embassy cashier. The embassy Budget and Fiscal officers sent us monthly expenditure reports.

Q: How big a staff did you have for all of this?

WILSON: We didn't have a large enough staff. That was one of the problems. There was a controller. I was the controller. I had one financial analyst. I had a deputy. That's all. One of us always had to be there because there has to be an American there to certify vouchers, and disbursing funds was a large part of the service we provided to client missions.

Q: For all of the missions?

WILSON: Yes. There were times when there was a tremendous time lag requested between the time a Mission requested issuance of a check and receipt of the check because the documentation came up to us through the pouch. That was before DHL, FedEx, and e-mail and faxes. We had to process them on an expedited basis and get disbursements out of Paris, again, through the pouch. So, there was a tremendous lag between the time missions sent vouchers to us for processing and the time they received reimbursement from the regional disbursing officer in Paris.

Q: Do you know what scale of funding you were handling?

WILSON: All together, maybe disbursing \$50 million a year. Not only we were we responsible for East Africa, but also for Southern Africa, the BLS countries (Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland). Communications facilities were poor. Some days, you might get through on the telephone. Some days, you might not. The only other thing you had were telegrams. But somehow, we made it through.

Q: Is that still continuing as the arrangement?

WILSON: There are controllers in individual countries. The programs grew and they put controllers in. But there's still the regional office. They still do the accounting for missions where there are no controllers, but those are few.

Q: Your major problem was simply time lags.

WILSON: Time lags. Communication flows. Lack of equipment capable of handling the accounting work for so many missions

Q: Impatient missions?

WILSON: Understandably impatient. We couldn't get a payment through on a timely basis unless it could be processed through the cashier, who could only make payments of up to \$300.00 each. The cashier needed to be replenished. By the time we got the replenishment voucher processed through the system, three or four weeks had passed, because it had to go through our accounting system, be pouched to or mailed to the Regional Financial Management

Center in Paris, processed there and pouched to the post in Africa.

Q: You had to operate through the Paris office?

WILSON: Yes. There is a disbursing office, the Regional Financial Management Center/Paris, which at the time handled disbursements for Europe and Africa.

Q: Was it under AID?

WILSON: It was under Treasury and the State Department. It's still there. But we've got better systems and better communications. Those didn't exist then.

Q: That must have been quite a challenge then in that job.

WILSON: It was.

Q: You traveled to all these countries?

WILSON: Practically all of them at one time or another to get them set up, and to help with budgetary work at the end of the fiscal year. There were small staffs, maybe three U.S. direct hires, in a lot of those places. So, they needed all the assistance that we could give. Not only did we have that, but we also had USAID/Kenya and REDSO, which was as large as USAID/Kenya. REDSO and USAID/Kenya each had 35 U.S. direct hire positions. And you had the IG Regional Audit Office there, too. So, we had to give financial services to all of those with three Americans. We were mechanized, but we were not in the computer age. We had what I would call bookkeeping machines, which had limited capabilities. They were a little bit better than manual systems, but nowhere near computerized operations. But we handled the job. We handled the expansion. It was a challenging, but a rewarding experience.

Q: Any issues besides lag times and things like that that you had to deal with?

WILSON: My greatest problem was upgrading the equipment to move to more efficient mechanization of the accounting records. Just before I left, we ended up getting a computer, something like a PC, not as versatile. Somebody in Latin America had computerized his accounting operations and we got that system and sort of replicated it there. That was during the period when we went to the "project specific input accounting," where you had to account for any number of project elements. We couldn't do it with the system that we had and service all our client posts. After I left, they did have problems. The company from which we bought the equipment was already present in Kenya, but they were mechanizing bank accounting. They claimed that they had programming capability, which they did not possess. So, it was tough going. But then the system did come on line eventually.

Q: Was there a name to this system?

WILSON: No, it was just a mechanized system. It was before the computerized MACS [Mission Accounting and Control Services] accounting system, which was still seven or eight years away.

During that period, toward the end, I left the accounting field and I served as the assistant director at USAID/Kenya.

Q: So, you left the controller function altogether?

WILSON: Yes.

Q: What year was this that you made this shift?

WILSON: I went in 1977, really toward the end of 1976, and to some extent from the time I got there. The Mission Director had been ill. I think within three months after I got there, he traveled to the U.S. for an operation and I was Acting Mission Director even then.

Q: Controller and Acting?

WILSON: Yes. But we had good people. We had a good staff and produced a lot.

Q: What was your responsibility in this new position? You were responsible just for the mission, weren't you?

WILSON: Just for the mission. The regular Deputy Mission Director. The division chiefs reported directly to the Deputy Director, who reported in turn to the Director. So, I had responsibility for the technical and the support offices.

Q: You had all of the staff reporting to you. What were you trying to do? Did you have a particular goal or mission that you were trying to pursue?

WILSON: What we were trying to do there was, instead of having each office director report directly to the Deputy Director, we organized a technical division and put somebody over all the technical offices. That person was responsible for the whole portfolio with Agriculture, Health and the other divisions reporting into that individual. We thought that might cut down on the span of control.

Q: What were you covering?

WILSON: I was responsible for the work in the technical office and the support officers. I still had that. But I didn't have four division chiefs reporting to me. It was something that was worth trying. I think, eventually, they went back to the old system. That didn't work as well. The next Mission Director wasn't as comfortable with all the technical offices combined into one office.

Q: What was the program like? What was the mission trying to do?

WILSON: Most of the program was in agriculture and education, some health (not a great deal, but some). We had a big program in semiarid agriculture where we were the leaders in a multi-

donor financed effort to do something in semiarid agriculture. That was one big effort. We did a lot of work in agricultural education. We established an agriculture college.

Q: Edgerton College?

WILSON: Yes.

Q: What stood out in your mind as being the most significant of all the projects in terms of their impact and potential change in Kenya?

WILSON: Finding ways of increasing agricultural productivity. Kenya is mostly semiarid desert. The pressure on agricultural land was great. They needed assistance in doing the best that they could with what they had. We brought in a university consortium from states like Utah, Colorado, Arizona, that were familiar with semiarid agriculture.

Q: Were there any particular technologies that they were promoting that you recall?

WILSON: We just were getting the project off the ground and getting it started when I left. The consortium had arrived. They were in place. They were starting to pull together the various elements of the project, as was the case with Edgerton College.

Q: These were all fairly new programs when you were there.

WILSON: That's right. I left in 1978.

Q: How was it working with the Kenyan government?

WILSON: Fine. They were very cooperative. If anything, our problem was getting and holding their attention. There were a lot of donors in Kenya. Everybody liked to work in Kenya. If there was a problem, it was that there were probably more donors than the Kenyans could work with successfully. They might have been better off to have had fewer donors and worked more closely with those fewer donors. Different donors have different styles. We had a hands-on style. The Scandinavians who were there, even the British, operated with very small staffs, maybe two or three people in the embassy. But they all looked to us for guidance. We had the expertise in house.

Q: Was there any effort in coordination?

WILSON: Yes.

Q: What did you do?

WILSON: We met and discussed our programs and what we were doing on a quarterly basis.

Q: Were the Kenyan government people present?

WILSON: No, with the other donors. The Kenyans were present twice a year when we had multi-donor meetings, usually under the aegis of the UNDP [United Nations Development Program] Resident Representatives.

Q: Did that work?

WILSON: I don't know that it changed anything. There were still a lot of donors there and the Kenyan capability was limited. There are a few good people in each ministry. There are only so many decision-makers. They all had lots on their plates.

Q: Were there any particular issues that the group was dealing with as a group?

WILSON: It's the perennial problem of the host government being ready to implement when everything is in place, coming up with their share of whatever they had pledged themselves to contribute. We generally financed the offshore costs, the foreign exchange costs, of the project. They were to come up with the local cost: staff and office space. They were often not ready when we had the contractors on the ground. We spent a lot of time back and forth improvising.

Q: Trying to get them to come through with their commitments?

WILSON: Yes. If you had office space, you didn't have staff. If you had staff, you had insufficient office space. It just meant that the timetables that were constructed were too optimistic. It takes a lot more time. On the other hand, in order to get the money to obligate, you have to show that you can obligate on a timely basis. If you can't obligate this year, you can't implement. If you can obligate this year, you've got to show that you're going to implement within a certain period of time.

Q: Did you have to work with the embassy much in this role?

WILSON: Yes. We worked with the embassy, but only as a member of the country team. There were weekly meetings of the country team. That's the forum in which the ambassador keeps track of what is going on, what each agency is doing: the Peace Corps was there. The USAID Director or his representative was there. The REDSO Director was there, as were all Heads of Sections in the embassy and other U.S. agencies present in country.

Q: Did you have any experience where the embassy, the ambassador, was pressing you to do certain things that perhaps you felt were not appropriate or, at least, where you had to respond to some political security interest or personal ambition?

WILSON: That was not so much the problem. We sort of satisfied the ambassador by having the Special Development Fund.

Q: What was that?

WILSON: That was an amount of money, usually \$50,000, where the ambassador could respond quickly to requests for assistance.

Q: But that wasn't there an issue on the question of the overall level of assistance?

WILSON: Well, there were always those. The ambassador always felt that we ought to have more money and we ought to be doing more things.

Q: But you were relatively independent in terms of where you should work?

WILSON: Yes. There were no restrictions on what areas and where we should work.

Q: How was the relationship with Washington at this time?

WILSON: My perception was that Washington was supportive of the program. I think that they thought that we were doing a good job with what we had. Ultimately, all of the other organizations in Kenya depended on the USAID mission for support. There was the responsibility not only for the USAID program, but for support of REDSO, the auditors, and others.

Q: You mean administrative support.

WILSON: Administrative support.

Q: Did you get caught up in a lot of issues and conflicts between these groups?

WILSON: Yes.

Q: What were they?

WILSON: Mostly administrative support, housing and travel. You had to support REDSO because they were in a constant travel status. They needed quick turnarounds on voucher processing. Or we made large cash advances to them so that they could travel without being held up by the processing of documents. But the whole gambit of administrative matters would come up. Housing, you've got to try to make everybody comfortable so that they are satisfied and they can concentrate on their work instead of their perks. But it takes a lot of patience. Eventually, it resolves itself if everybody is reasonable.

Q: Generally, the relationship among these units was pretty good?

WILSON: They were pretty good, I would say, overall. But there were some problems within USAID. The Director was relieved while I was there. That didn't happen in a moment. There had been things going on all along. So, that made my life a little more hectic. The auditors were constantly critical of him. There were reports and charges and countercharges and justifications and all that sort of thing. So, in addition to the real work that we were trying to do, we had that problem. But nevertheless, whatever was on the agenda was completed. We got the project papers approved and the money allocated and obligated.

Q: Did you have any particular view about the program thrust?

WILSON: No, I thought we were doing what we ought to be doing. Traditionally, the mission had worked in particular geographic areas, in the area of the predominant tribal group in Kenya. But during my time, we got approved a large program in the western area of Kenya, where the Luos, the next dominant tribe, was located.

Q: This was the poorer area.

WILSON: Yes, it was a poorer area - poorer in some regards, but in the mountainous regions, there were a lot of big farms with Kenyans of European extraction. So, there was a lot of production over there. But it wasn't in the hands of native Kenyans. Then we got through a big integrated project building farm to market roads, health centers, housing, all that sort of thing in western Kenya.

Q: Did that work or was that too soon?

WILSON: It worked. We had problems finding engineers at that time. We needed several engineers on the farm to market roads project. But it did get off to a good start. It was a successful project.

Q: Is it still going on?

WILSON: No, this was almost 20 years ago.

Q: Do you believe it had a significant impact?

WILSON: I think it had an impact on the region and the people in that area.

Q: Anything more on your Kenya experience? That was quite a demanding time for you and quite a shift in your role.

WILSON: Yes, it was. But I enjoyed it. We had a good staff, able people. We came up with an engineer for that roads project. In general, it was for the most part a very satisfactory experience.

Q: Did you use the REDSO services a lot? Some people have been saying that, in Kenya, the mission sort of turned its back on REDSO.

WILSON: I thought we used REDSO where they had the capability. It is true that we went out and contracted for a lot of expertise, but I think it was motivated by the fact that, in those particular areas, they didn't have the expertise. We used their contracting, procurement, and legal services. But they couldn't satisfy all the demands from the field on the technical people anyway. So, we did our own project design and we organized our own teams. We had good people to do it in house. But with all the mission that were starting out in the mid-1970s in East Africa, REDSO was hard-pressed to service all of them.

Q: Anything else you want to mention?

WILSON: No, I think that's it for Kenya.

JOHN PROPST BLANE
Deputy Chief of Mission
Nairobi (1977-1980)

Ambassador Blane was born and raised in Alabama and was educated at the University of Tennessee and at the University of Vienna, Austria as a Fulbright Scholar. Following a tour of duty with the US Army during the Koran War, he entered the Foreign Service in 1956. A specialist in African Affairs, Ambassador Blane held several positions at the State Department in Washington and served in a number of African countries including Somalia, Ethiopia (Asmara), Cameroon and Kenya. From 1982 to 1985 he served as United States Ambassador to Rwanda and from 1985 to 1988 as Ambassador to Chad. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: Well then, whammo, in '77 you are right back into your old pea patch, aren't you?

BLANE: Oh, absolutely.

Q: What happened and where'd you go?

BLANE: In '77 I had been at EPA for two years, and I didn't know what the future was going to have in store for me. Then I was wandering down the hall in the State Department one day and passed the senior officers' assignment office and went in and asked somebody what sorts of jobs they had going.

And they said, "Well, the only thing we have right now that you might be interested in is DCM in Nairobi."

And I said, "Yeah, I would be, I would, I, I, I, yeah, I'd die and go to heaven, yes, very, *very*, interested. Got it?"

I was told that I shouldn't bother, however, because there were forty-some-odd names on the list already.

And I said, "Fine, put my name on it, too."

And then, without waiting for the system to do what systems do, I trotted around and met the newly appointed ambassador, a political appointee, Wilbert LeMelle. We had lunch together, and at the end of the lunch he asked me would I like to come out and be his DCM. And I said, Yes, thank you."

Q: I might add, in the African Bureau when you die and go to heaven, Nairobi is where you go.

BLANE: Exactly. Exactly.

Q: What was LeMelle's background?

BLANE: Academic. Academic and Ford Foundation. He came to the job directly from the Ford Foundation, but he had spent most of his career teaching or working in foundation work. He's president of a college right now, back in academia.

Q: So how did he use you, as an ambassador?

BLANE: Fortunately he pretty much let me run the show. Because he had no background in embassy management or anything of that nature. And so basically I ran the embassy, the day-to-day function of the embassy, I ran it just, you know, totally.

Q: You were in Kenya from 1977 to 1980. What was the political situation and our role in it?

BLANE: In 1978 Jomo Kenyatta died. Kenyatta had been the first president of Kenya following independence and had been in office ever since. He was one of the truly great men of Africa and, as far as I'm concerned, one of the truly great men of the Twentieth Century. But he passed away and was succeeded by the present president, Mr. Moi. It was a time of general prosperity, stability. Coffee prices were good.

When I first got to Kenya, I met at a reception a parliamentarian. They were just coming up to parliamentary elections, and I asked him how did he think he would fare in it, what were his chances of reelection. And he just smiled and said, "Well, if coffee prices are still good, I'll get reelected. If coffee prices fall, I won't." He said, "Unfortunately, although I can't control the world market or the weather, in my district if coffee prices are good, people are happy and they don't want to change things. If coffee prices fall, they're unhappy and they do want to change things."

But it was a peaceful period by and large. There was some friction between the Kenyans and the Somalis, but it never blew up into anything of great importance.

The Middle East was going into a very tenuous period at this time, with the overthrow of the shah and this sort of thing, and it was decided that we needed a naval presence in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf. And if you're going to have a naval presence, you've got to have some place to park your boats. And we didn't have any place to park our boats.

So therefore we went to our Kenyan friends and persuaded them to enter into agreement with us to give us military access to the port of Massawa [Mombasa?], where we could bring our ships in to provision them, give the sailors shore leave. They had good dry dock facilities, all of this sort of thing. It was absolutely essential at that time, because that was the only possible port

anywhere on the eastern African littoral, or anywhere else. That was it. So that was probably the policy high point of my time in Kenya, negotiating the agreement and getting it signed.

Q: Were there any great problems? Were the Kenyans reluctant? You're shaking your head.

BLANE: No, no, they were not at all reluctant. They were perfectly happy to have us. We had an ongoing military relationship with Kenya, in that we were doing an Air Force fighter squadron program there. We sold them the airplanes, and had American instructors living in the country, teaching the Kenyans to fly, that sort of thing. So it was not breaking totally new ground to have a military relationship. And this made the whole thing more reliable, if you will.

Q: What was the Kenyan attitude towards Tanzania? It had sort of an extreme Socialist leader, Nyerere, who just seemed to be running it down to the ground.

BLANE: Did a good job of it, too.

Q: What was the attitude in Kenya towards this?

BLANE: The Kenyan attitude was one of antipathy, I think you could say. They had no dealings with one another. The border was closed, you couldn't go across the border between the two countries.

Q: How about Uganda? That was not a good situation there at that time, was it?

BLANE: The Kenyans had no real policy problems with Uganda. They knew, or felt, that Idi Amin was a madman, and they had great problems with some of the things he did. But most of the things he did, though, did not vitally affect Kenya. It was the other way around: Kenya could vitally affect Uganda because it sat between Uganda and the sea. But the other way, the Ugandans had no real leverage on Kenya at all.

Q: I'm assuming that there was no great problem with, say, the State Department. One, it was the Carter administration. The one thing they wanted was a place to put their boats.

BLANE: Had to have it. They had to have it.

Q: And you gave it to them, I mean, essentially, as an embassy, so that things must have gone fairly well.

BLANE: Oh, yeah, very well indeed. Our relations were very trouble free. It was a good period. It was a good period.

Q: In oral history, of course one always dwells on the trouble problems. But it does show it was a good, solid relationship.

BLANE: Very good, solid relationship. When we needed a port, we could get one. And we needed one very badly. As I say, there was no alternative, nowhere else to go.

LARRY C. WILLIAMSON
Economic Counselor
Nairobi (1977-1980)

Mr. Williamson was born and raised in Arkansas. After graduating from the University of California and serving a tour of duty with the US Marine Corps, he entered the Foreign Service in 1958. His foreign assignments took him to a number of African posts, including Sierra Leone, Northern Rhodesia, Tanzania, Kenya and Gabon, where he served as Ambassador, and in England. He had a number of assignments in Washington, several dealing with African Affairs. He also served in the Department's Executive Secretariat and as Assistant to the Counselor

Q: You left there in 1977.

WILLIAMSON: Yes. For Nairobi. I was minding my own business and negotiating again for a job. This time I felt it was about time I went home because my daughter was going to go to college. Again, the Department of Commerce called and said, "It's none of our business, Larry, but the Counselor job in Nairobi is opening. We'll back you if you want to go for that." I was in good shape with the African bureau still. I picked up the phone and called and said, "Who've you got going for that?" They said, "Nobody in particular. Do you want to go?" This is the shameful way personnel is handled. I said, "Yes, and I can get Commerce to back me up." They said, "We didn't think that was going to be a problem anyhow." Sold!

It worked out very well because my daughter went to college when she was just barely 17. She went for her freshman year to an American college on a campus in London. Actually, it was down by Brighton. Everybody else went back to the land of Jambo and Habari Gani, and I spent three years there. It wasn't quite three years. Actually, I got hijacked there, too.

Q: This was '77 through '80?

WILLIAMSON: About that.

Q: What was the situation in Kenya?

WILLIAMSON: Kenya was still very colonial, but in the hands of the Kikuyu aristocracy. It ran like a top from our point of view, not so if you were African, but from our view, and it had lots on interesting things to do. Lots of fun. The International School was built in the midst of an old, decrepit, and dying coffee plantation. Marijuana grows wild in Kenya and is widely used, so my son thought that was grand stuff, and I had more trouble with him. Plus by that time he discovered girls which distracted him somewhat. My daughter would come back and forth, and it was very nice. We liked it extremely well. The work was interesting. I was a senior commercial officer for Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya while resident in Kenya. My writ didn't run all that

widely. I helped the people over in Uganda a lot because they were going through the Idi Amin stuff. I used a lot of my time on these problems.

Q: There was a time when they very quietly one by one departed. Did that happen?

WILLIAMSON: That was starting to happen. Yes. As I was leaving we were getting people out of there rather rapidly. One of the last guys to go was my junior officer - he wasn't a junior officer; he was a two or three, I guess, who hung on because: a.) he was interested; he was a very good officer, and b.) he was the only Swahili speaker they had left. There were a couple of spooks but we couldn't use them for the kind of work we had to get done. We were deeply involved in various problems with Uganda I won't even go into the whole thing, but that was a mess. Then Tanzania was starting to come back. They were so far behind the eight ball, it didn't really make any difference. We had several meetings, and I went down there a couple of times just to see what was going on. My basic business was with the American business community in Nairobi which was big. I was called out on any and all occasions when their bosses showed up and invited to many a lunch. I had a patented briefing.

Q: What type of business? What were you pushing?

WILLIAMSON: There were three or four American banks. There was a car assembly factory. There were a number of people who had invested in real estate of various kinds. A lot of tourist business. Firestone had a factory there. It was a great place to have a factory. It was a great regional headquarters because in those days it was pretty safe, and the schools were good. A guy could go off and leave his family with some trepidation but not too much. It wasn't like he was leaving them in Freetown in Sierra Leona. We had a lot of regional businesses working out of there. The American Chamber of Commerce was about 70 people. Some were two people from the same firm. It was a good size group. A lot of investment in hotels and game parks.

Q: You say the government was working.

WILLIAMSON: In Kenya?

Q: Yes.

WILLIAMSON: Oh, yes. It worked like a top if you were a Kikuyu, particularly if you were a Jomo Kenyatta kind of Kikuyu. It was an oligarchy, and it was very efficient. There was a 10% graft factor; everybody knew that. Once you accepted that as a way of life, and I did report extensively on that, you could do quite a bit of business down there. There were the usual knifings and the betrayals. I say knifings; that's figurative. Somebody would invariably rent the wrong guy thinking he had the inside scoop.

Q: How did you there deal with business? This was after Carter, and we'd gone through the anti-corruption. You couldn't pay a graft note. In a society where you're implying it was accepted you had to pay a certain amount commission or what have you, how did you deal with that?

WILLIAMSON: Don't ask. Almost all of the Americans who were there: the Firestone guy, the bankers, all these people were very experienced businessmen. They didn't tell, I didn't ask.

Q: Did you find again, a man from Des Moines, brand new. Were they coming in or not much?

WILLIAMSON: They were coming in in droves. After they left the game parks, the name of the game was to collect my business card and go home and put my name down as the person they called on to justify the business expense. For themselves and their wives. In those days you could do it. We had a lot of those guys dropping in, but nothing serious. Serious investors, there were two kinds. There were a reasonable number of sharks who hoped they could come down and cut some kind of deal with somebody building a Yugo car factory or something like that.

Then there were some people who just wanted to get in on the action. Kenya looked like it was really going to go places, and it has gone pretty well eventually. As to whether we were able to help them too much, I don't really know. We had some American lawyers there at the end who did a very nice business. One of the ways you get into business in Kenya in a hurry is you get yourself a Kenyan partner. These were guys you didn't buy: You just rented and maybe for no more than a couple of hours, just long enough to get your signature on a piece of paper. There was a ton of trade disputes and "who struck John," but luckily I was always able to push them over to the legal side because there was usually a question of, "This guy promised to do this and he didn't. In fact, he stole my factory." That was quite true. You've got to be careful around there. This is real shark water.

We also had three very sticky cases. Just after independence all the large European farms were nationalized in essence, and compensation was to be paid after the present owner died. Four or five of those guys had married American wives. They had died, and the wives were now living in Minneapolis or someplace, and they wanted their money on the dot. That wasn't the deal. The British government had guaranteed the deal, and one had to wait until the wife died before the money was available. If she didn't like it, she could come back and live on the farm. These were huge; whole valleys and up to the highlands of very good land and almost always full of squatters. If you weren't there you couldn't do anything about it. I had those kinds of cases, and they were messy.

There were three or four good lawyers, a couple of nice guys, who had been dealing with these women at great length. The women always came in, always wanted to see the ambassador. The ambassador who in my day was LeMelle formerly worked for the Ford Foundation. He was a very able guy and very good and got along fine with everybody, but the sight of a wealthy widow coming in, plunking herself down and rattling her chains rattled his, so he always would get me in. My role was always to say somehow or another, "Mr. Ambassador, we're supposed to be at the State House just now," and take the lady into my office and make sure she was duly soothed.

Q: Was there any reincarnation or residue of the old happy valley days?

WILLIAMSON: Yes, there were plenty of places up country still that had... The deal was that when those farms were taken over by the government, almost always they were looking for

management, and they almost always rehired the guy who had lived there. So he got his money. Sometimes they returned to Great Britain but came right back down—one British winter did it for them—and then they would run the farms. The social life up there was pretty good, pretty effective. The participants were getting a little antiquated for it, but they still seemed to be interested. There was the Mt. Kenya club which was American owned by William Holden and a couple of guys, a very nice place with honeymoon cottages spread out. That place was always full of honeymooners and tourists and guys there for the weekend with their secretary. We had a fair amount of that.

Q: Had the street crime...

WILLIAMSON: Yes, crime was a big problem even then. You couldn't go downtown without help and in the dark. The embassy was in a building just downtown: not the one that got blown up but the one before this. We had an armed guard car park. Nobody ran around downtown. You'd go to a movie, and you'd arrange to drive up, and a guy with a pistol would come out and take you and your family in to the movie, and another driver would take the car off. After dark in Nairobi even in those days it wasn't very safe. Lots of crime down in the suburbs, too, but they usually picked on the Asians because they....

Q: Asians more than the Indians.

WILLIAMSON: Mostly Gujurati. Their families came over and helped build the railroads, and they stayed on as their relatives came. They had control of the retail trade and a lot of the farm produce.

Q: How did the ambassadors you had treat the commercial function?

WILLIAMSON: My major ambassador, William LeMelle, a Ford Foundation guy, didn't know beans about running an embassy. He'd never been in the diplomatic service or anything close to it, so he found me convenient again because I could speak Swahili and because I seemed to have a face that the wealthy widows trusted. I could also get out and about. Wilbur LeMelle is still around I gather. I've seen his name on a lot of pictures. He was my only ambassador there. My tour was shortened because Dick Moose got into a huge fight with his country director for East Africa.

HARIADENE JOHNSON
Office Director of East Africa, USAID
Arusha, Tanzania (1977-1982)

Hariadene Johnson received a bachelor's degree and a master's degree from University of Texas at Austin prior to joining USAID in 1967. Her career posts included Ghana, Liberia, Tanzania, and Djibouti in addition to serving as Office Director of East Africa for USAID from 1977-1982. Ms. Johnson was interviewed by W. Haven North in 1998.

Q: What about the program in Kenya?

JOHNSON: The program in Kenya was a strong program from the very beginning at independence. Kenya had been the center of agricultural marketing for the whole East Africa and had a lot of ex-patriots who stayed and became Kenyan citizens. You had a higher level of transportation infrastructure; you had a higher level of basic education. You had again, all of the things that people felt were needed as a basic foundation that would allow the Kenyans to really hit development and make major strides, But it didn't happen, partly because of local Kenyan politics where you got into so much nepotism and corruption. Partly due to the handicaps on USAID, due to the New Directions legislation that before a foundation or a development program really got built, we were suppose to disburse and be out in the rural communities. And, because we didn't have the infrastructure to where that mattered and because we had layered on top of that a host government — Kenyatta's — which was very much in favor of private enterprise.

When it came to the agriculture sector, which we primarily went into, because that's the way the legislation read and we had the most money in agriculture. Kenyatta was not willing to undertake free marketing, so the farmers had to sell at the government price or to the government marketing board. Since the government marketing board seldom offered an incentive price, they either black marketed or just grew enough for subsistence.

Again, we did a lot in Kenya. We worked with a two year vocational school and that became a four year college. That was very much of an agriculture and mechanics arts college.

Q: Is this Edgerton College?

JOHNSON: Edgerton College, which is having lasting institutional impact and still exists. It still turns out that mid-level manpower that Kenya needed. But, it was not a popular project. Everybody tried to kill it every time it came up for funding.

Q: Why was that?

JOHNSON: It just seemed fuddy, duddy. There wasn't anything there that the donor had to do. It was something that was in the capacity of Kenya government to carry out without a donor and so why should a donor do it. Donors should pick off those things that are beyond the capacity of the government to do. It should be high tech things, introduction of the new technology, adapting American technology to a new situation. I think it went back to the early days of the USAID where there was a mentality that a donor should pay only for the foreign exchange costs and the host government would pick up all local costs. If a very worthwhile project like Edgerton, okay, we could build the buildings in a sense of brick and mortar approach. But, they were low tech buildings that could be maintained by the Kenyans. The teachers came out of the Kenyan system, everything was working fine and so, what are we doing here.

Q: Did we have technical staff there? Did we send people for training and all that?

JOHNSON: We had technical staff there with the new facilities, scholarships and fellowships. We encouraged Kenyans to go into that kind of agricultural set up, as opposed to going into working for the oil marketing board, or the textile marketing board and becoming rich. It was not a popular project.

Q: Well, you implied that they really didn't need all of that, so that it could have been done by the Kenyans?

JOHNSON: Well, we always defeated the argument. We always kept it alive. We kept it going through one more generation or one more phase two. It was interesting, because it was a project that worked. It was a project that met a very strong need and the Kenyan government liked it and the Kenyan government did what they could to support it. But, it wasn't seen as innovative; it wasn't seen as unique. The U.S, as a major donor, should go for the cutting edge kind of program. But, like I said, we always managed to defend it, we finished phase two. In terms of projects, it had a lasting impact. I would put Edgerton College out there.

Q: What other projects did you observe in Kenya?

JOHNSON: We had a major rural roads project, road infrastructure where the emphasis of the project was on training Kenyans on how to build and maintain rural roads, rather than us just buying bulldozers and going in and putting a road in, which I think worked fairly well. I think maintenance of the roads suffered as the Kenyan government budget got in to trouble, maintenance on the roads was one of the first things that could be cut. But, I think in many ways we succeeded in doing what we set out to do and did leave behind the capacity which the Kenyan government hadn't had before to put in rural roads that were appropriate to whatever the local engineering situation was.

We had a major family planning program in Kenya, because at that point, Kenya had the highest population growth rate of any where in Africa. I don't remember if it was in the world or not, but it was like the ideal family size was eight to ten. In order to have eight to ten children who survived, they'd go for 15 or 16 and they also had multi-marriages, so they could have one father with three, four or five wives. You had a very strong cultural biases on having children as proof of your manhood and it added to the family strength and was a good thing as perceived by all your neighbors and peers. One point during the drought, the U.S. put in yellow corn, while the preferred corn in Kenya is white corn. We shipped yellow corn out as part of the emergency feeding program. The Kenyans, well I want to say that the Kenyans started it, but somebody started a rumor that the reason the corn was yellow was because we had infected it with drugs that would cause sterility and so, this was part of our hidden family planning program, that anyone who ate the yellow corn would therefore be sterile and not able to have more children. I think it was the guys, Kenyans who were growing white corn, personally, but it's the kind of rumor that once it got started you could never tell who started it or how far it had gone.

But, we did a lot of family planning education activities in conjunction with health activities of trying to approach the problem that with better health families they could come to perceive the merits of having fewer children. Kenya also became, fighting ground is too strong to put it, but it was the area in which the different merits of how you approached family planning were argued

very intensely and strongly, because Kenya happened to have such a high birth rate was seen as a problem, and so everyone was in with a solution. The main effort that we made there was in conjunction with health activities. That with improved health would come a recognition of smaller families and spacing of children as opposed to ceasing to have children. The education people who felt that they had statistical proof that the higher the education of the mother, the fewer children she had. That family planning should be approached in the context of education for women and getting more and more girls in to the school system. Essentially, it was four to six years of school that had had an impact, a statistically significant impact, but went up the more years in school they had. But, the basic education, four to six years did have a statistically significant impact.

You also had the people who felt that the best thing we could do for the Kenyans would be to subsidize the sale of condoms and other forms of contraceptives, because you had an unmet need. You had more Kenyans who wanted help in family planning than could be met because of local laws and/or availability of supply. And, that as long as the demand exceeded supply, we were best off just to put our money into just providing the commodities.

Kenya was a microcosm for the three approaches, for the arguments that were going on about population, demographics, family planning, you know, throughout the Agency and throughout the developing countries. We wound up with doing a little bit of each in Kenya. The idea was to try and maintain some sort of statistical data base. I don't know that that ever happened. I think that there was so many variables involved that they never had the data. Kenya's population growth rate has come down. The program made a major significant impact on the number of children desired and the number of children people had. Statistically, whether or not you could trace that to one of those three approaches, I don't know. I never saw convincing statistics. I think the education people managed to do a better job of selling their statistics in terms of also fitting into other initiatives that the Agency wanted to support for women in development, for human rights meaning equal education for everyone. So, we wound up with a very active program in Kenya in many different sectors.

Q: What was the U.S. political relationship? Didn't we have an Economic Support program (ESF) at that time?

JOHNSON: We had an economic support program.

Q: Why were we doing that?

JOHNSON: Primarily because of the Navy's use of Mombasa for port visits for various ships that came through.

Q: How much was it?

JOHNSON: It wasn't a very big program. Again, Kenya always managed to get big support in a sense of being a favorite of the donors. It was easier to work there; your infrastructure was better; there were a lot of reasons why people thought that development should happen in Kenya, because they didn't have problems that some of the other countries had; but they never managed

to get their act together. Essentially, the Kenyan political process did not give priority to development, I guess is the best way to say it. The government had no qualms whatsoever about flim-flaming donors, making commitments to donors that they never intended to live up to or providing inaccurate data to donors in terms of what's the problem. Oh, well that's not a problem, because it's really minor. In fact, if they'd disclosed all the data, it was major. There was a World Bank Consultative Group (multi-donor group) that was probably one of the toughest groups of all the IBRD/CGs that I witnessed. The one in Kenya.

Q: You attended the meeting?

JOHNSON: Yes, I attended the meeting,

Q: What were the issues?

JOHNSON: The issues were primarily macro-economic. They would have a number of sector specific issues. There were a number of areas in which the World Bank was trying to raise funds among the donors. But, the World Bank also felt that unless the government of Kenya managed to solve some of their macro-economic problems, the donor funding for individual projects was simply going to waste. And, they took an extremely tough position with the Kenyan government on their incurring short and long term debt and on the games they played with the exchange rate, and the corruption that interfered with a lot of other policies that were supposed to be happening that weren't happening. I give a lot of credit to the IBRD. They managed raised enough funds. They were seen by the Kenyans as critical to the country's creditability. Among the donors, the Bank did work to try and raise money for things that the Kenyans felt were important. Enough to establish its own credentials while being critical of the Kenyan government. So, they were constantly walking this tight rope between: are you on the donor side or on the host government side, and what does it mean to be on somebody's side or not on somebody's side.

Q: Did that have any impact on policy?

JOHNSON: Short term. You always felt that it did. You always felt that there was just enough progress to warrant hanging in there, that they're going to turn the corner, they're going to do it, And I think that was probably, well this was '77 through '81, '82. (Then I ceased working on Kenya; on those two East Africa countries and moved to Africa Development Planning Office.)

Q: What were the major issues in Kenya at that time?

JOHNSON: The impact of population on natural resources; The government was to provide the education, the jobs that would be required if you carried out population projections, agriculture, both working with the Edgerton College in terms of training for Agricultural Extension Agents, working with administrative education in trying to get the Extension Agents to have a story to tell so he (Kenyatta) actually had something he could offer to the people. The rural roads project.

Q: What did we use the economic support funds for?

JOHNSON: We tried to get the government of Kenya to put the brakes on its own monetary

policy in order to come up with a structured enough budget that it would reassure donors to then go to a debt rescheduling, which would allow the Kenyans to get out of the position of owing so much money in short and long term debt that they simply didn't have any foreign exchanges to go for anything that was needed. And, the Kenyans tendency to use what foreign exchange they did have for more or less the luxury market things.

Q: What did we spend it (economic support funds) on?

JOHNSON: We spent it mainly on transportation equipment to back up the rural roads program. I don't really recall that the mission was that active in terms of the macro-economic problem. This was a period when the New Directions was insisting that we should leave all of that to the IMF and the IBRD that the U.S. didn't need to worry about that, that we could worry about replicating things that were having impacts upon peoples lives.

KATHERINE P. KENNEDY
Peace Corps
Nairobi (1978-1980)

Ms. Kennedy was born and raised in Massachusetts and earned degrees from the University of New Hampshire and the University of Kent in England. After a tour with the Peace Corps in Kenya, Ms. Kennedy taught briefly and then went to Northern Ireland, where she became involved in searching for a solution to the North/South Irish Problem. A large part of her career thus far has revolved around the subject of Conflict Resolution, both in teaching assignments and work with governmental and private organizations. Ms. Kennedy was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

KENNEDY: One day, about a month after I graduated, I was teaching in a summer program on the campus. I walked along and saw this bright green sign (green is my favorite color, of course) that said "Peace Corps Recruiting Here Today." So, I walked into the library and the woman at the desk said, "Well, we are mainly interested in education majors." I said, "Well, I just graduated." So, six months later, I was in Kenya in the Peace Corps. That's what I did.

Q: Okay, so you signed up for the Peace Corps. You were in the Peace Corps from 1978 until?

KENNEDY: 1980.

Q: Did you have any choice of where you would go?

KENNEDY: Well, on your application, you are supposed to number your preferred areas. So, I said, number one, Africa, number two, South America, and number three, Asia. Your next question is going to be "Why did you pick Africa first?" I have absolutely no idea, but I did.

Q: How did they train you?

KENNEDY: We had about a week of what they called orientation, in Washington, DC. I remember doing the cultural simulation. You get oriented on the country a little bit. I remember the Kenya ambassador came to speak to us, because we were a mixed group, from different backgrounds. But, we were all going to Kenya. Then, when we got there, we had six weeks where we all lived in a residential hotel. It was Karen Blickson from Out of Africa. It was actually part of her original plantation. They rented it out. They had some regular guests who would come for a few days, but most of it was long-term. So, for six weeks, we had Swahili language and cultural training.

Q: You get involved in this much later on, what sort of things stuck in your mind about dealing in Kenya with culture?

KENNEDY: Well, there were a lot of gender warnings, to be careful, and where to go. The differences in the American female culture, and expectations in perhaps the Kenya male culture. is what strikes me.

Q: I know Kenya is broken down into basic tribal things, Kikuyu is the one one thinks of, but there are others. Did you know, kind of where you were going?

KENNEDY: We didn't know where our placements were going to be until probably halfway through, or maybe almost the end of the six weeks in-country training. My first placement was in a school for mentally retarded children in Nairobi. I was very disillusioned and disheartened because I hadn't been out of New England. When we took a vacation, the family went to the Cape or New Hampshire, or Maine. I had never been out of New England. Idealistically, going to the Peace Corps, I was young, sincere and wanted some kind of a cross-cultural experience. Most of these handicapped children were driven in chauffeured limousines to the school. I wished them well, and I wanted them to thrive, but it didn't seem to me that's what...

Q: Did you have the feeling that the elite children with problems were getting the attention, and those who didn't have the family financial backing, were sort of discards?

KENNEDY: Well, actually, I think there were only three special ed schools in the country for the mentally retarded at that time. The Salvation Army had quite a network of schools for physically handicapped, and blind kids, but the mentally retarded schools were new. This project in Kenya was actually the very first special ed project that the Peace Corps ever did in the world. Christina Kenyatta, the daughter of Jomo, came and did a masters of special ed at Lehigh. When she went home, she said to daddy, "Let's create something," and so he did. We were ahead of our time, and weren't ready. Christina Kenyatta died very soon after I got there.

Q: How did you find you were received at this facility?

KENNEDY: There were some Kenyan teachers; there were a couple British teachers, and then a couple of the Americans, who were living there full time. We were accepted and welcomed. I am the one who wasn't happy.

Q: I have no idea how this works, but was there a sort of accepted international way of dealing with the mentally retarded, or were there different theories?

KENNEDY: In the U.S. at that time, the mainstreaming, bringing kids out of sheltered classrooms into the regular classrooms, had just become in vogue, and they were just developing the theories and practice on that. In the Kenyan culture, families say “up country” and certain villagers in that part of the country, wouldn’t even admit they had a mentally retarded child. It was a shame. The stigma was there. That’s an interesting question because what I ended up doing, after being there for about a month, was I went to the Peace Corps director and said, “This isn’t the Peace Corps. I wish these beautiful children health and happiness, and develop as much as they can, but to be chauffeured?” It was strained. For the rest of my time, I ended up working for the Kenya Society of the Mentally Handicapped. Actually, in 1979, they had the world conference on mental retardation in Kenya. One of the main things I did was to help organize that. So, going back to your question about different theories, and how people approach it, they literally had people from all over the world. It was fascinating.

Q: Did Kenya have an established cadre of people interested in mental health and helping children?

KENNEDY: I think it was a small group, but it was growing. By the time I had left, it had grown more. Some of us did some seminars together at the University of Nairobi, on theories: institutionalize and formal life, teacher training, in that area. It had just developed.

Q: Were there any other volunteer agencies that were working in this field that you were coming across?

KENNEDY: No, except for the Salvation Army volunteers.

Q: But that was for physical disabilities.

KENNEDY: And the blind, but no. As I said, mental retardation services were practically nonexistent. It was because of the president’s daughter’s interest.

Q: Did you deal with her at all?

KENNEDY: I worked with her a lot the first year. Her father died not long after I got there, within months. She still stayed in that position for another year, year and a half. But eventually, she got married and left. That was the other thing, her offices were in the UN conference center.

Q: Did the politics of Kenya intrude at all? Was this something you were aware of?

KENNEDY: Just vaguely, I remember in the back of my mind, when Daniel Arap Moi came to power. I remember there were rumblings because he wasn’t from the main tribe. I do remember starting to hear about Kikuyus, and the different tribes, a little bit.

Q: Did you have much contact with the other volunteers who were out teaching?

KENNEDY: There were a few of us based in Nairobi, but most people were scattered in other parts of the country. But, the good thing about the job that I had was that I would spend two weeks a month in Nairobi, and then two weeks a month somewhere in the country. So, I saw every single part of Kenya many times. There were two of us, and we would go to the district education officers in that part of that country. They would take us to do some evaluations on children. We went to people's huts, people's homes. We went into schools. We worked with teachers. Then, we would go back to Nairobi for two weeks, so it was a back and forth.

Q: Was there much effort to coax the people to produce their handicapped children?

KENNEDY: Absolutely.

Q: I would think that was the biggest problem.

KENNEDY: As I mentioned a few minutes ago, many of them would just hide them, deny they existed. I remember having a meal in somebody's hut one night, and there would be a child in the next room. They never even admitted the child existed. Yet, they didn't rush us off. They were happy to have American visitors around.

Q: What about life in Nairobi? I've heard people who have lived there concerned about crime and all that?

KENNEDY: At that time, it was just beginning. I shared a wing of a house with another Peace Corps volunteer, who was also a special ed teacher. They had a security guard at night. Unfortunately, it only got worse. That was just the beginning. But, after that, all would have security, whether they were working for government or business.

Q: We mentioned expats. These were British. How did you find them?

KENNEDY: Pretending or trying to pretend they were still in Britain. They were arrogant, condescending. The owners of the house that we lived in were Greek. The house man was Moses, and the way they treated Moses used to break my heart.

Q: How did you find the staff of the organization you were with?

KENNEDY: There was one American man, so they got along well with that culture. That was great. Then there were two Kenya women; one of them was an administrative assistant, and one was a paraprofessional. We were based in the office of this very rich Kenya businessman. I sometimes wonder if the Kenya mafia was building that. There were all kinds of comings and goings in his part of the office, which we never quite understood. He had a mentally handicapped son. That's why he gave office space to this non-profit.

Q: What did this conference that came about consist of?

KENNEDY: Panels of experts talking about various teaching techniques, diagnostic teaching.

They had medical doctors, and they had teachers, psychologists, literally from around the world. They had parents' panels. The Association for Retarded Citizens had a very large arc network in our country. They had a large delegation there.

Q: Being in the Foreign Service for as long as I have, I would think something like this would probably wipe out any office for a couple years, as far as getting ready.

KENNEDY: Absolutely. I probably spent half the time on that. When I was in Nairobi, 100% of my time was working on that. Then, when I would go up country, I would work with the teachers in the district education offices, kind of identifying students.

Q: When you identify students, what happens then?

KENNEDY: We try to give suggestions on how to help them. It was hard. It's interesting because I think that my interest in cross-culture communication and my long struggle with the efforts of international intervention in all kinds of areas, mainly started from that. In so many ways, what we were trying to do was culturally inappropriate, imposing. We were young, sincere, naive. We were getting this mandate from the Peace Corps, from Christine Kenyatta. How much we actually accomplished or how much we were trying to accomplish that was helpful, useful, and appropriate, I still question.

Q: Just to get a feel for this, what was appropriate or inappropriate? In fact, what was happening to these?

KENNEDY: Well, for instance, because the great theory that was just being developed, the mainstreaming, getting these kids out of self-contained classrooms and putting them in regular classrooms... These poor kids who were shamed in the family, culturally, that weren't even acknowledged by their families, and all of a sudden, they are pushed into a regular classroom situation, it just didn't work.

Q: I would imagine there would be an awful lot of finger pointing, laughing.

KENNEDY: Humiliating.

Q: It would make them miserable.

KENNEDY: Absolutely.

Q: Were you beginning to question why you were there?

KENNEDY: Oh, almost from the very beginning. That's why I couldn't stay in the chauffeured driven school. From the very beginning, I questioned.

Q: Well, you were getting close to your conference and all that, were you thinking about what you were going to do next?

KENNEDY: I think I was ready to go home. Two years was enough. On some level, I always felt the project was a failure. I wasn't a failure, but the project itself wasn't really appropriate, so I always questioned that. I was ready to leave, but it was my time in the Peace Corps that really began, formally, my interest in other countries, and cultures. It was really the first step and others that led me to do what I do, my work in the international arena.

ALEXANDER RAY LOVE
Director, USAID/REDSO
Nairobi (1979)

Mr. Love was born in Oakland, California and graduated from the University of California-Berkeley and Harvard. He served for USAID in South Asia and East Africa. He was interviewed by W. Haven North in 1998.

LOVE: So I said: "Sure." So I left the Asian Bureau and went overseas. Now the factors leading up to this were that, at this point, I was a "GS" employee [member of the Civil Service]. I had joined the Development Loan Fund as a loan officer and "GS" employee and stayed there. In 1975 I was married to a Foreign Service Officer in AID. That was all right for two or three years, because she was stationed in Washington. However, then, what started to happen was that we would go out of Washington for a week and we would come back to find that she was assigned to Central America! Or she was assigned to Africa or somewhere else. Finally, I went to the Director of Personnel and said: "If you're trying to tell us something, why don't you just tell us? I told my bosses in the Asian Bureau that every time we left Washington on leave, my wife was assigned overseas. Now, if the agency is trying to tell us that it's time to pack up and go, that's fine. I'll start looking for another job, and we'll go." The personnel director said: "No, we're not trying to push you into doing anything." Well, it was obvious that the personnel system was saying one thing and that the Bureau of Management was saying something different.

So I think that we had reached the point of saying that we both had to be in the same personnel system. We were either both going to have to be "GS" employees or we would both have to be Foreign Service employees. We couldn't be members of two different personnel systems. I think that this was the first time that I was exposed to this problem of "tandem" couples which, over the years, became a far more serious problem for AID. In this case it was the same agency, AID. However, many couples, as you know, were "tandem" State and AID or USIA [U.S. Information Agency] and AID. The question of how to deal with that, and particularly the evolving character of married couples, reflected what was happening in society generally. There were more and more women who were professionals, who had their own professional qualifications, and who wanted to pursue a career path of their own. The old days, when the wife stayed home to take care of the kids, seemed to be disappearing. In those days, when the couple went overseas, the wife's job was to play a supporting role for her husband. This was beginning to change, and now we were beginning to grapple with the question that if we tried to get the young people that we wanted, we were going to have to deal with this "tandem" couple problem. Or we could bring in bright, young people, and they get could get married while in the service!

Q: Right.

LOVE: Then the service would have to deal with it. In my case it was time to move on to something else anyway. We had more or less decided that it was time to go overseas. So when you called me and asked if I was interested in going to Nairobi...

Q: How did we resolve the "tandem" couple problem?

LOVE: I came into the Foreign Service, which actually worked out well. The procedures at the time for going from "GS" status to the Foreign Service were pretty easy. This was before the new Foreign Service Act [of 1980], the "Senior Foreign Service," and all of that. There was less concern about where people were put, what this does to the hierarchy, and so forth. It was just a question of what my grade was in the Civil Service and what was the Foreign Service equivalent. Then I was just "moved across" in terms of where I was. So I did that, and I was transferred to the Foreign Service.

Then, of course, we had the "tandem couple" problem of being at the same post. One of the reasons that Nairobi was particularly attractive was that there were four component parts in the AID Mission. These were: the "Bilateral Mission," the Regional Office, the Regional Auditing Office, and the Regional Financial Office. There were four operations there, so that my wife, Mary, was able to take on a position in the "Bilateral Mission" and pretty well stayed out of any official "interface" with me during the whole time that we were there in Nairobi. Not totally, because she handled personnel matters. The "Bilateral Mission" basically provided a lot of personnel support for the whole system.

Q: Please describe your understanding of what the rules were all about and what they covered, so that people will get an idea of what this phenomenon was which, I think, is disappearing from the scene.

LOVE: You obviously know more about what was being done than I do. When I got to Nairobi, the Africa programming and mission support mechanism had been "decimated" in 1963 and 1964, when one of the Ambassadors, whose name I can't remember...

Q: Ambassador Korry.

LOVE: Yes, he prepared the "Korry Report." I had never seen that report until I got back to Washington. It still wasn't generally available then. However, the "Korry Report" resulted in "decimating" the overseas AID Missions and the creation of offset mechanisms, which included the establishment of some Missions in Washington. I never understood what they were supposed to be, because they were gone by the time I got to the Africa Bureau in Washington. However, they resulted in the establishment of some "regional centers." These included OSARAC [Office of Southern Africa Regional Assistance Coordination) in southern Africa. Large, regional offices were established in Nairobi [Kenya] and in Abidjan [Ivory Coast] which provided general support to the eastern and western parts of Africa.

Then there were some sub-regional operations which did different things. There were the "BLS"

countries, or Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, which combined to form one mission entity. I think that there was one Ambassador, if I remember correctly. I'm not as familiar with the situation in West Africa, but there was a sub-regional operation to cover it, and I think that David Shear had something to do with it at one time. Anyway, the nub of it was that, we weren't maintaining AID Mission staff as such, in a given country. If we had somebody "in country," we had a minimal presence there. However, we needed regional support in the field to compensate for that. The combination of regional support, plus the "in country" presence, if there were any. Operating out of regional offices was an ingenious invention of the Africa Bureau to take care of the reduced field presence.

I think that this mechanism was also driven by the problem that Africa had a lot of countries, many of which were small. Obviously, it was a hell of a lot more difficult to justify putting a full AID Mission in a country that has 1.0 million people, rather than a country like Indonesia, which then had 100 million people, or the Philippines, which had 60 million people. So there was an economy of scale problem there.

It was also difficult to handle that, aside from what came out of the "Korry Report." Our AID Missions in Africa experimented with a variety of regional approaches. When I got to Africa in 1979, the two regional offices in East and West Africa had substantial responsibilities. Outside of some of the bigger missions, the mission presence was substantially less at that time than it became subsequently. However, the Africa Bureau was engaged in a steady and fairly methodical process of beginning to build up these missions where they could justify it and so to expand the programs and field presence.

I always thought that the REDSO's [Regional Economic Development Office] acted as kind of a "surge tank." My attitude in Nairobi was always that, as soon as the people "in country" could pick up a responsibility, they should handle it. When they needed complementary activities, it was better to get it out of somebody who was in Africa than having to go all the way back to Washington and going through the process of recruitment there.

Q: What was the geographic and the functional coverage of the REDSO/East Africa?

LOVE: Geographically, it covered 22 countries. It covered Ethiopia, South to Southern Africa, and the Indian Ocean countries out to Mauritius. It included Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Zambia, and ultimately Zimbabwe. It also covered the "BLS" countries [Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland] and then, of course, Tanzania, and Sudan. It covered Angola, although we had no program in Angola at the time. All of West Africa was picked up by REDSO-West. So the geographic extent of the office was reduced. North Africa proper did not come under the Africa Bureau. So REDSO/EA had 22 countries in all.

Then we had roughly 30 people assigned to the REDSO in Kenya. We had the legal and economic staffs and staffs covering a number of "project people." We had an economist, we had procurement expertise, and we had technical specialists in the fields of health, agriculture, population. WE had one well rounded engineer. So we had project people but no program officers as such, because the program function was vested in the missions themselves. Even if they had only one person, the primary programming responsibility was handled there. We might

go down and help them do their CDSS by sending down people who would assist them by doing the background support and so forth. However, the primary responsibility was theoretically theirs.

There was a complementary, fairly broad, full service staff. I thought that we got a lot out of it.

Q: Where would you say that most of the activity took place?

LOVE: It varied. I was in Nairobi for four years, and we went through different cycles. For one thing, we found that it was very difficult to do anything for the Kenya AID Mission.

Q: Why was that? You were right there.

LOVE: I think that it was because we were right there. The AID Mission had a couple of Mission Directors during this time, and there were people assigned there whom I knew. However, the AID Mission really didn't like to use REDSO people and be somewhat " beholden" to them. There was somehow a feeling that REDSO was "getting into" their operation, and they didn't want that.

Q: So it was not just personalities. It was...

LOVE: It was not an individual Mission Director, or a Program Officer, or anybody in particular. It was sort of "inherent" in the relationship. We really tried. The first AID Mission Director was Glen Roane. We sat down with the AID Mission people a number of times and said: "Look, this is crazy. We can see what you're doing because we read the same cables that you read. Why don't you take advantage of the people who are two floors away?"

Q: The AID Mission had a full staff but they didn't have all of the specialists.

LOVE: It was not a full staff, but even when they had a generally full staff, we were "stronger" in a number of ways. Well, they did use our lawyers, because they didn't have a legal staff. We had more strength in project work, in procurement, and in a whole series of areas. They were a little less reluctant to use what I would call "policy neutral" people, especially if they did not get involved in their strategy documents or even the conceptual frameworks of their projects. They were very, very "schizophrenic" about being "second guessed" on policy. We never got into that.

So the bulk of our "market" was outside Kenya. This meant that our people were on the road all the time. Maybe different people could have solved the Kenya problem, but there just seemed to be something inherent in the relationship that the people in the Kenya AID Mission didn't like. However, the majority of the people in the other AID Missions had exactly the opposite attitude. They welcomed the outside help we offered them. If they disagreed with it, they would tell us and we made it clear that they didn't have to do what we advised them to do. We were advisors, consultants, not a supervisor layer.

I think that we tried very hard to avoid "undercutting" the AID Mission. My feeling was that the relationship that we had with the Mission Director or the AID Representatives in other countries,

and the trust that was involved in that, was incredibly strong. At times, we really had to "bite our tongues" to avoid picking up the phone, calling Washington, and saying: "You can't let this happen!" But this would have killed our effectiveness. We had to go back and try to convince the AID Mission that they shouldn't be doing this or that. If we went behind the Mission's back, even if we were "dead right" on the merits of the case, we would sacrifice the relationship that we had built with the Mission people. You can't do that. Once you lose the relationship of trust that you have, you are basically ineffective, and they won't use you.

Q: Did you have many experiences like that, or was that fairly rare?

LOVE: It was very rare. I would say that we had a good, working relationship with most of the AID Missions. Now, the other thing that we would do is that, any time that one of our people would go into an AID Mission, we would try to assess, not just what happened substantively, but we would also try to get a "reading" from the AID Mission Director as to how that individual from our staff worked with the mission. Most of the time we got this kind of evaluation "unsolicited," particularly if there were a problem with this individual from our staff.

So over the course of time we had to do a little bit of "sorting," in the sense that certain people didn't work out at certain posts, for a variety of reasons. Some of this was due to some personal habits and some of it was due to friction between certain individuals. That is what I mean by "sorting it out." However, for the most part, that wasn't too much of a problem. Then it became a matter of favorite choices. Certain AID Missions would say: "We want you to send down this or that person, because we are comfortable working with them. He or she understands 'our country,' our thought process, or our strategy, and we can work together." So we would sometimes get that reaction. Sometimes we didn't want to support that way of doing business, but we had to build a working relationship with the missions that had trust in it and which they saw as being "complementary" to what they were doing.

In turn, the AID Missions liked this arrangement better than asking AID in Washington, if they needed outside help. This was because, first, they could get help almost overnight, because we were in the same time zone. Certainly, if a given AID Mission had an "emergency," we could get them help within two days, at a maximum. It was harder to get access to AID Washington. The missions never "trusted" Washington quite as much, because Washington never quite knew the situation. There were too many people reading cables reporting on what was going on. Washington was a bigger community for the AID Mission Director to control, and he was farther away. So the Mission Directors appealed to Washington when they had to, but if they could get help somewhere else, they would do it. However, I think that the major consideration was familiarity, working relationships, and easy access. The cost of obtaining help was basically already covered by REDSO's own budget - e.g., travel, per diem, etc.

Q: Let's talk about some of the significant examples that you recall.

LOVE: When we got to Nairobi, Ethiopia had a functioning AID Mission of sorts, although I think that Colonel Mengistu was already in power. However, the "shift" of U.S. emphasis from Ethiopia to Somalia was already under way. We were beginning to get into a weaker and weaker position in terms of our program in Ethiopia. This was before a full-scale war had broken out in

Ethiopia. So we had a big program in Ethiopia.

In Uganda the AID program had been totally shut down because of the behavior of President Idi Amin. In Sudan the program was pretty good-sized. Southern Rhodesia was still Southern Rhodesia. At the time we were doing nothing there. We had a big presence in the "Horn of Africa," still keyed around Ethiopia and Sudan. Of course, the AID program in Kenya was very large. We were also active in Tanzania.

Then in southern Africa, the concerns of the "front line states" and how we would deal with apartheid in South Africa were our major concerns. Through regional coordination down there and our efforts to support Zambia in particular, we were trying to help the southern African countries. Now, we were doing nothing in Mozambique, even though it was one of the "front line states," because of the communist orientation, nor in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) because of white control.

In the Central/East African countries, Uganda had no program. We had a solid, ongoing program in Rwanda, which was pretty good, though small. There was a less "solid" effort going forward in Burundi because of ethnic tension. I always thought that the Rwandan program was pretty good and the ethnic problem under control - how wrong!

However, during the four years that I was in Nairobi, major changes took place. In Uganda, Idi Amin was thrown out of office. A series of successive governments came and went in Uganda. We went through the experience of trying to open up and deal with the changing character of successive governments, until the current government finally came to power. This happened after I left Nairobi. Uganda then began slowly to become a part of the scene.

In Ethiopia we had to "shut down" the AID Mission. The "trigger point," if I remember correctly, was the U.S. request that the Ethiopian Government compensate for the expropriation of some damned Herb and Spice company. I don't remember who it was. To me that was the vehicle for doing something that people in Washington wanted to do as a political matter. The Ethiopians were bending over backwards, saying: "We can work this out!" However, Washington claimed I didn't believe that the Ethiopian Government was not going to work this problem out. The Mission Director in Ethiopia was one of my predecessors in REDSO. He was Ed Hogan and had been the REDSO Director at two incumbents before me. Ed was trying very hard to keep a "core," working relationship in Ethiopia, particularly with the RRC. The RRC was an instrument which AID helped create in the earlier years. As it turned out, during the height of the war in Ethiopia and at the high point of the Mengistu regime, RRC turned out to be an extremely effective operation critical to the drought relief effort.

Q: The RRC was the Ethiopian National Relief and Rehabilitation Commission.

LOVE: Right. I think that the RRC was one of AID's more successful efforts to build an institutional capacity "in country" to handle that kind of problem.

So an effort was made to try to "hold onto" some of the key elements of the AID program, even though we weren't trying to carry on a major effort in Ethiopia. However, it was fruitless, and

eventually the AID Mission was shut down. It wasn't the first time that I was involved in shutting down a mission. In Pakistan, we went through the process of shutting down the program and deciding what was involved in doing it. When we decided to shut down the program in Ethiopia, we would also have to go through the program project by project, program by program, and contract by contract. As we started "pulling these plugs," we had to decide how to do this. How much flexibility did we have under the law to continue projects in Ethiopia?

Here I thought that, even though the policy decision had been made to "back out" of Ethiopia, there were questions about what was the common sense thing to do. In some cases it seemed to make more sense to "finish" this or that activity, if we could, and carry it through, rather than "abort" it mid stream and waste a substantial amount of taxpayer money. This was particularly true if we took the long term view and realized that we would be coming back to Ethiopia at some point.

So we went through a fairly complex process of doing that, which I found kind of interesting. As I said, we had done a little bit of that in Pakistan because, at the time that they were trying to put that fertilizer project together, we knew that the nuclear proliferation issue was already "hot" at that time. It eventually led to a program shutdown.

Q: Right.

LOVE: And we knew that the Pakistanis were doing some kind of work on nuclear weapons. They were not yet technically in violation of the non-proliferation agreement, but we expected that they might become in violation of it. So, again, it was a question of trying to decide what to do. In the case of Pakistan the decision was made to go ahead with the \$40 million loan on the fertilizer project, even though we knew that, within 12 months, Pakistan might be in "default" under whatever the law was at that time.

Q: You mentioned that before.

LOVE: I say that because yesterday I was talking with a person who was involved in Central Asian operations at the World Bank. The World Bank had just "chopped off" all of its loans to Turkmenistan because of a problem on one aid project. They did this rather precipitously. Of course, what happened was that the contractors and everybody else who was being funded by the World Bank started packing up and going home. Everything started "shutting down" throughout the whole country.

I said: "You know, if you're going to do this, you have to stop and ask yourself: 'What does this mean? Is this really what I want to do?'" In other words, do I want to "destroy" all of these things and end up having to pay all of that extra money later on because, theoretically, this is going to be resolved in a month or two, or six months at the most. Then we would have to "start up" all of this activity again.

Q: Right.

LOVE: Then we would have to pay more to get these people back on the ground, "re-energize"

contracts, and all the rest of it. So I was really kind of surprised that the World Bank was not more "sophisticated" in handling this kind of problem. However, they were not.

ALLISON BUTLER HERRICK
USAID Mission Deputy and Director
Nairobi (1979-1984)

Ms. Herrick grew up in Minnesota and Graduated from Smith College and Yale. She served in AID missions in Kenya and Zimbabwe. She was interviewed by W. Haven North in 1996.

Q: *Your assignment overseas to Kenya was in what year?*

HERRICK: That was in 1979. Up until that time I had been a Civil Service, GS, employee. More and more it seemed to me that to make my best contribution in a foreign affairs agency I should be a Foreign Service Officer and should be able and willing to go overseas. At the same time, my second husband had retired from government and had set out his shingle as a Labor Management Arbitrator and so he had his own schedule. All the children were grown and educated. Thus we thought it would be quite possible for me to go overseas and for him to stay at home in Washington, schedule his hearings at their various U.S. venues, and then schedule writing up time at my post overseas. I think my husband expected me to be assigned to Central America because that was the region I had traveled to most often from AID. Africa was a little farther than he had bargained for, but it was interesting for him to go out there. His first visit coincided with Christmas and with the arrival of my household goods which had been delayed since August. One of my daughters was there too, so I had good help unpacking. Unfortunately, it was Terry's last visit, because he was diagnosed with lung cancer when he returned home, and died shortly thereafter.

The Kenya Program at the time ran somewhere between \$5 and \$7 million per year, as I remember, and was basically a technical assistance program. There had been a time shortly after Independence when there was a larger element of financial transfer in the program. But when I got to Kenya it was technical assistance, primarily in health delivery--particularly rural health and primary health care, family planning, agricultural education, agricultural research and some private voluntary organization training programs. There was also a food aid program--a food grant program for school feeding and a few food-for-work projects.

I went to Kenya as Deputy Director for the bilateral AID program. The structure of the AID organization in Kenya was somewhat larger than usual for an African post, because Nairobi was the home of several regional offices. Among these were a Regional Economic Development Support Office (REDSO), a Regional Housing Office, a Regional Controller and a Regional Inspector General's Office. The Director for bilateral assistance was responsible for all the management functions, providing support for all of the people in all of the offices there. At the time there were about 85 Americans and over 100 local staff. During that first year there the AID Director systematically involved me in everything that was going on and included me in all his

deliberations. He also asked me to review the operations of the management staff and make recommendations for improvement. So, I had a good introduction to the program and management operations of an AID Mission.

Q: Who was the AID Director?

HERRICK: It was Glen Roane, who was thinking about going on to something else. I think he really made a deliberate effort to involve me in everything on the assumption that I might become the Director when he departed. That's not necessarily an assumption in AID because most often another officer is brought in as the new Director. In fact, within a year Glen Roane did move on--he took a position partly financed by AID at Virginia State University--and I did move up to become the AID Director. I must say that I found a very keen and instant difference being Director. As much as Glen Roane had asked me to advise him on what to do, as much as I felt I had been involved in everything at the Mission, when it was my desk and my final signature, I really felt the change. I found that I was very glad to have a senior controller at post who was the head of the Regional Controllers Office servicing a number of Missions in the area but was also my advisor on financial matters. The REDSO had a staff of lawyers and I was very glad to be able to call on counsel.

While I was in Kenya, the character of the program changed, as program assistance in the form of financial transfers was added, perhaps in 1980 or 1981. The United States made an agreement with Kenya that gave us access to Kenya as a base for military exercises and for access in the event of strife in the Middle East, and specifically to the port of Mombasa as a liberty port for U.S. Navy ships stationed in the Indian Ocean for which the islands of Diego Garcia were the only accessible port. The establishment of that base-access agreement, as it became known, was awkward for the American Ambassador. A delegation of people from the White House, the National Security Counsel, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Pentagon had come out from Washington and had asked for an appointment with the Chief of State, President Daniel Arap Moi. The Ambassador was not told the subject of the meeting.

Q: Who was the Ambassador?

HERRICK: He was Wilbert LeMelle, not a career foreign service person but someone who had been very active in other countries as representative of the Ford Foundation. He was put in the position of having to listen to his colleagues propose a security agreement to the President, not having heard of the proposal beforehand. He protested later to Washington, and apparently never received a satisfactory explanation. As some of us heard later, there was some head shaking back in Washington about his protest: "Well, you know, he's an outsider and he doesn't know how to play the game." Soon after, Will LeMelle was asked to leave, and a career Ambassador came out to Kenya. In my view LeMelle had very good relations with the Kenyans and was very much respected by them. Some of the diplomatic group was a little surprised that his wife didn't do as much as some wives on the social and committee circuit, but she was pursuing a master's degree. She certainly did her job as a hostess at the residence and that kind of thing, but she wasn't available for all of the little charity things. A situation about which I was very sympathetic.

Q: Who was the Ambassador that replaced Wilbert LeMelle?

HERRICK: Bill Harrop, a career Ambassador, a Foreign Service Officer who had been Ambassador to Guinea before. He was a man who knew about the AID Program, one with whom I had attended a workshop to expose senior officers to issues of population growth and family planning. He was very liberal in his understanding of gender and labor issues, supportive of his staff, straightforward in his dealings with the Kenyans--altogether, I think an effective Ambassador. His strong interest in the AID Program led him sometimes to rely more heavily than we might have wished on his economic staff to keep him informed. The Peace Corps Director had a similar problem, resenting the role of the Economic Counselor, saying "I do not report to the Economic Counselor at the Embassy." But we were both included as contributing members of his Country Team. I think of one the important aspects of an AID Director's job is the ability to adapt to the styles of different Ambassadors. It is important to assure oneself of the Ambassador's understanding and support. When the time came to negotiate conditions for our program assistance, which took the form of expanded food aid the first year, and of grants for purchases from the United States in subsequent years, Harrop was very supportive. He added his views to our internal discussions regarding how far we could go, stood firm on our negotiating stance, and put his own prestige on the line.

Q: Did you meet with him regularly about the program?

HERRICK: Oh, yes, at regular meetings and in separate sessions. In the beginning he had senior staff meetings, including the AID Director, every morning, though he reduced the frequency later. One day each week he included a larger group of staff--adding the other members of his Country Team: the Peace Corps Director, Public Affairs Officer, Regional Agricultural Attaché and, later, the military representatives. Less frequently he called in the heads of all the regional operations in the country to bring them up to date on topical questions and hear what they were doing. Harrop was concurrently Ambassador to Seychelles, and during that time the United States began an AID Program for Seychelles, which was the responsibility of the Director of the REDSO. Because of that he developed more of a relationship with the REDSO Director than is usual for an Ambassador where regional offices are located.

Q: Who was in that position?

HERRICK: It was Ray Love, who later became Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa, and after that Counselor to the AID Administrator. Love had gone out to that position shortly before I went to Kenya, and we ran into a curious thing. He also had been a GS employee for many years, though he certainly had some overseas experience, particularly in Asia. After I arrived in Nairobi the representative of the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) in Kenya sent a message to Washington one behalf of the AFSA members protesting that when people are being brought into senior positions in the Foreign Service from outside, this puts downward pressure on the ability of employees of lower rank to earn promotions. They may have had a point, in the context of the class rank system of the foreign service, but it was one that was statistically not very significant considering our relative rank and the ranks of the protesting members.

There had been a period when the relations between the Directors of the REDSO and the AID Mission had been very poor. The relationship was competitive and combative and had

disintegrated to the level that one of the Directors told his staff not to speak to members of the staff of the other organization in the elevator--we shared offices in the same building and had a common elevator. Issues converged in the management arena. One of the most keenly disputed matters was the assignment of housing. Members of REDSO staff invariably felt that they had been discriminated against and that members of the AID Bilateral Mission staff had been given undue preference. In some instances that may have been the case, but of course it wasn't the general intent and it wasn't as common as the view at the time would have indicated. So Ray Love and I were two new people and neither of us were of the kind of personality that would want to continue such a thing. I established a management committee that included the heads of all the resident AID organizations. We met regularly to review issues and make decisions in common. We dealt with questions of economy in operating expenses, of the degree of physical security to be provided to residents, of adequacy of the portfolio of housing, and so on and so forth. We went over the budget together, and generally managed to have an open forum to deal with issues. I think it went very well.

Q: That was one of the first times in the long history of that Mission that there had been peace and cooperation. There had been terrible problems.

HERRICK: Well, yes, but there factor of competition in program development, as occurred in the Central America situation, was lacking. The function of REDSO was a service function and REDSO served the AID Mission in Kenya as well as other Missions. Our lawyers were on that staff. There were economists whom we could draw on. There was a social scientist who helped with our social analyses when we were developing projects. But there wasn't the competition about whether the Agricultural Research Program should be in their portfolio or in ours. The REDSO did manage some regional projects, elements of which took place in Kenya. In retrospect, I would say that the effectiveness of those projects was difficult to assess, and as far as the Kenyan element of certain of the projects went, somewhat problematic.

It is more difficult, I think, for a regional office to make tough decisions when dealing with some of the common problems of a technical assistance project. I think of one project that remained dependent on AID funds long after the time projected for the countries benefitting from the project to support it themselves. Such a problem is common in many projects, but for a regional project it frequently happens that the project managers simply carry on, because the idea of the project is still a good one. Even when a separate decision can be made about the operations of a regional project within a particular country, I think it is generally a little easier for an AID Mission than for a regional office to come to difficult conclusions and to deal with host country disappointments. I also observed that the staff of REDSO, who were on the road up to 50 percent or more of their work year, were always pleased to be able to work with a project located in their country of residence. It was something that helped them to get to know Kenya better. If I could digress, I think many Africa-wide projects that were managed from Washington were kept alive long beyond their usefulness. Sometimes they become the "baby" of the project manager, who wants to hang onto them whether or not they fit within the context of the country development strategy.

Q: Did you draw on technical people or central bureaus from Washington very much in supporting your program?

HERRICK: Not very much, because we had services from REDSO. In the later years of my time there, when policy emphasized assistance to small business, and more involvement of the private sector in all activities, it was helpful to bring out some expertise from Washington. But, back to the central bureau projects. One of our concerns was that we simply did not know of, much less understand, all the things going on in country that had been initiated in Washington. The staff of the Program Office, shortly after I arrived in Kenya, tried to develop for me a list of all activities that any part of AID was engaged in. They were not sure they had captured them all, but they found over 100 centrally managed projects.

Q: Over 100?

HERRICK: It was 103 one day and 117 the next day.

Q: In all sectors?

HERRICK: In all sectors. We were uncomfortable because we didn't understand them all. We didn't know what they were doing, or why, or whether it was effective. When the time came that the regional bureaus were required to check an AID Mission overseas before starting a part of a project in that country, we found that was done sometimes conscientiously, and sometimes not. If we had an opportunity to comment on a project proposal, and our response was negative, our view did not necessarily prevail. We would find on reading the next Congressional Presentation that Kenya was one of the countries listed for the project. Yet, there had been no communication after we had expressed our view. That was common.

Some of the programs managed from Washington in Kenya were very useful. One that I recall, and want to talk about because it illustrates something else, was a radio education project originating in the Technical Assistance Bureau (perhaps by then in its next incarnation with another name). Radio education was something that had been in the Kenya bilateral program some 10 or 12 years earlier in the late 1960's, or early 1970's perhaps. That project had been completed in perhaps five or six years, but the Kenyans had not carried on afterwards as had been expected. The regional project was actually able to build on what had gone before. The institution set up to run the program still existed, and the chief person trained to manage the project was still around and could be brought back in. The situation in the government was a little different, the U.S. technical team was excellent, in substance and in ability to pass responsibility to the Kenyans, and the project was working well. But I think that the situation illustrated a fact we must always in mind and that is, that new things take a long, long time to be established. The technical expertise and the financing that come in at first (no matter how hard you try) are not going to be embedded in a few years. It's going to take longer.

Q: This project worked well?

HERRICK: The second time it was going much better.

Q: What was it supposed to do?

HERRICK: The project was producing lessons that the teachers in rural areas, (in basically one room schools) could use by turning on the radio in the classroom. These were teachers who were barely trained themselves, perhaps not even a full secondary education. In many subject areas they simply were not literate. Through a system of feedback, and visits at the schools to help the teachers use these programs, the team had been quite successful. An additional factor was that the Kenyans had learned how to develop the curriculum, and it was appropriate to the national syllabus and the capabilities of the teachers. It was going to founder eventually, I'm sure, on the question of equipment--the radios were going to be stolen or in schools without electricity there was not going to be money to buy batteries. It was an excellent idea that was going to work only as long as there was enough local budget to continue it.

Q: Do you know how many schools this program reached?

HERRICK: I don't recall.

Q: Was it in the thousands?

HERRICK: No, no. This was part of a demonstration project in the manner of the central bureau, still in a sense a pilot project that was taking place in certain schools of the 42 districts of the country. I think it had a good chance of continuing under Kenyan auspices after the technical assistance team departed. That was partly due to the personalities of the two key expatriates on the team, who were very much loved by the people they were working with.

Q: Were they Kenyans or Americans?

HERRICK: They were Americans. They were technical experts that America can be very, very proud of. They knew their work and were able to deal with the Kenyans in a way that would help them understand and enable them gradually to take over full responsibility. To hand over responsibility is something that's often hard for an outside expert to do.

Q: These were contractors?

HERRICK: Correct. That was one regional program that was working very well. Other projects did not work out so well. Very often I think the Kenyan entrepreneurial spirit really came through under these regional projects. An agreement of sorts was drawn up, the money came out, and the local person in charge benefitted nicely by the use of a vehicle and the ability to establish an office from which he could maybe start a little import/export business, or something else.

Q: What about the main lines of your program?

HERRICK: Oh yes, what about the bilateral AID program? We learned a number of things as we implemented the program and it evolved somewhat during the five years I was there. An early focus was on the livestock development project, one of several the Kenyans had asked various donors to do. They had more or less parceled out parts of the country for those livestock projects, and later had done the same for their arid and semi-arid lands development program. AID's livestock project was in the far northeast, in a very arid part of the country. The project was

intended help the nomadic herders of the area by providing watering points for their camels and cattle. It was not working. If the watering points--the bore holes--required pumps, the pumps were not being kept up. If the Ministry staff had vehicles, they had abused them by speeding over poor roads, rolled them into ditches and failed to maintain them. The watering points were overused so that the area around was trampled and overgrazed to the point where it took a day to get the cattle to water from where they had decent feeding.

But the more basic problem stemmed from the lack of understanding of how nomadic livestock growers managed the land themselves and the imposition from the outside of structures that didn't work. The local people did know how to move their cattle seasonally, reserving the grazing of areas near their watering points until other areas were too dry. They were not nomadic in the sense that they moved from one part in the country to another, but they did move with their cattle within certain designated territories, clan territories. The plan for watering points had ignored the clan territory lines. One bore hole had to serve up to four traditionally mutually hostile clans, and that caused conflict. Machinery was rotting on the landscape and in the yards.

During my first year in Kenya, with the highest level officials from several Ministries--those of Agriculture, Livestock Development, Rural Development and Water--we reviewed the project. We went out to the project location in two small planes provided by the police in order to save the time required to drive, and received some hospitality from the local District Commissioner. We were able to come to a mutual decision that the project was costly, to government and the donor, and wasn't working as it had been designed.

Q: What was the regional purpose? To improve the livestock production?

HERRICK: The purpose was to improve livestock production and, eventually, the marketing of livestock to improve the incomes of the herding groups. It was, of course, another faulty assumption that these people would cull their livestock for purposes of sale for beef. Such faulty assumptions were affecting other livestock projects in Africa, like the one directed toward the Masai people in Tanzania that was specifically designed as a marketing project. The fault lay in the basic lack of understanding that livestock in those cultures is the wealth of the people; livestock are not slaughtered for money--not until the modern sector economy is impinging heavily on the pastoralist areas, and the population has grown too heavy for their traditional ways to support. Then the people may see a need for participation in the monetary economy and may be prepared to lead a more settled existence, and make other changes.

We concluded that, in their current state, the pastoralists of northeastern Kenya were not ready for the project that had been offered to them. At the same time AID was finding similar problems in livestock projects in West Africa, in the Sahel and in Southern Africa. Together with World Bank, I think AID did a major report identifying the issues that would have to be addressed before undertaking new livestock projects. I believe someone called Haven North was involved in helping AID think about that (laughter).

Q: What other thrusts were there in the program?

HERRICK: There was an agricultural education program. We had been helping to develop an agricultural college in the Central Highlands of Kenya called Edgerton College. It has now become a university, but at the time our aim was not to create a university level institution but to improve the ability of this diploma granting institution. The diploma was granted after three years of study for a person who had come from the Ordinary Level of secondary education. Almost all of the graduates of the college were employed by the government as agricultural extension agents and some of them went on later to higher education and perhaps became involved in agricultural research. It was a large effort, to expand the physical plant and teaching facilities of the campus, to train Kenyans to teach at the college, and to provide American teachers in the meantime. When I reached Kenya there were 28 Americans on the campus, including a chief of party who did little teaching himself and one procurement specialist whose entire job was to oversee the building and the procurement and installation of equipment from the United States. From the American side the project was managed by a consortium of American universities. I recall that it was a person from Louisiana State who was doing the procurement.

Q: Do you remember which consortium?

HERRICK: It was SECID, the Southeast Consortium for International Development. The Americans teaching at the college while Kenyans were in the United States to earn advanced degrees developed curriculum in areas that had not been offered at the college before and helped supervise the teaching farm. By the time this project was coming to an end, in about the middle 1980's, Edgerton College was a premier diploma granting institution in Africa. The curriculum was excellent, the staff was qualified and the students--who were mainly Kenyan but included a few from other African countries--were well trained in what was offered at the college. But of course what happened then was that the College wanted to go onward and upward; the staff became ambitious. The professors should have Ph.D.'s instead of Master's degrees and the College should be able to offer an agricultural degree.

One of the problems structurally in agricultural education in East Africa, and it was the case in southern Africa also (and even perhaps in French-speaking Africa, though I don't know), was that the person holding a diploma in agriculture who wanted to go on for a university degree had to start over again. An education to the level of diploma was equivalent to the last two years of a British-style A(for Advanced)-Level secondary education plus one year of university education. A university degree required three years. To have to repeat what was, in effect, one full year of university time was very expensive for the country and for the student, in both time and money. This issue was one we tried to work on in Southern Africa later. We tried to find a way for the universities to grant a credit equivalent. But it is not easy for relatively young institutions, such as those universities, to change the standards they had adopted in emulation of European universities.

Q: Was there another agricultural college at the time?

HERRICK: There were other agricultural schools that did not grant a diploma, but covered two years and granted a certificate.

Q: But there was no agricultural university in Kenya?

HERRICK: There was, yes. There was an Agriculture Faculty of the University of Nairobi, located on a separate campus. That Faculty trained students toward research careers as well as well as for government positions. A person graduating from Edgerton College, and going out to work a few years, rarely had the opportunity to go back to the university for further training. And since almost all employment was in the public sector, there weren't private employers who would finance an agricultural education.

Q: Did you think that was a successful project?

HERRICK: In my view, yes, emphatically yes.

Q: Was it eventually turned over to the Kenyans?

HERRICK: It was not totally turned over to the Kenyans. The next challenge--after the project ended--was to find a way for Edgerton College to continue its relationships with the American universities of SECID which had been involved in the project, as well as other U.S. universities where Kenyans had been trained. The U.S. institutions wanted to continue their relationship and the Kenyans wanted to continue to send faculty to the United States, to upgrade and maintain their expertise in their fields. The challenge to an AID Mission is always to try to design a way for institutions to maintain a linkage, but to ensure that they will finance the major part of that linkage. After my time in Kenya, I believe the Kenya Mission did extend the project for Edgerton College in order to help maintain linkages, but the drive to bring Edgerton up to a degree granting institution was so strong that the AID Mission eventually supported that move as well.

Q: I gather that there was a considerable contention within the Kenyan government about whether there should be a university or not.

HERRICK: I think there was probably competition from those in Nairobi who didn't want to see a university competing with them. No doubt.

Q: That's a classic example of a diploma level school moving up, it happens all over.

HERRICK: And a classic and very understandable ambition on the part of the Principal and the professors.

Q: I do recall that the Principal was very effective.

HERRICK: The Principal at Edgerton College was energetic, dedicated, well connected and astute. He was politically savvy in his own country so that he was able to maintain his government support for his institution. He was smart and effective in his relationships with his American advisers. He was a good Administrator; he knew what his faculty was doing and he inspected the building program himself daily and knew what was going on. He was personally concerned about his students; on an annual trip to the United States he visited all the Kenyan

students. In that way he began to establish relationships with other American universities, because his students were not all at members of SECID. When his students told him they were engaged in courses that they didn't think were going to help them back home, he spoke to the university and negotiated a change. He was a truly effective Administrator of his program. He needed a lot of help, he got a lot of help, and he knew how to use it.

Q: I don't remember his name, but I recall that he was very effective.

HERRICK: I can't remember his name at the moment. He was educated at Makerere University in Uganda in livestock sciences, I believe.

Q: Do you think these graduates were really able to be effective?

HERRICK: The graduates with U.S. degrees, yes, though they were not paid very well in their posts at Edgerton. If you are asking about the new diplomats, I would say that most of them ended up in frustration, because they were posted to a district agricultural office where they had insufficient support to get out and to do the work of extension that they were supposed to do and had been trained to do. They didn't have a vehicle, or they didn't have fuel for the vehicle or they didn't have paper, or they didn't have a typewriter. They were also frustrated in the Kenya scene because Kenya is divided ethnically, and a new graduate is often sent to a rural district that is foreign to him ethnically, where he does not know the mother tongue and where he might not be accepted as readily as someone from that district. Those were discouraging situations for them. And, as I mentioned, there was practically no private sector employment. The few large farmers would hire family member, or perhaps a certificate-holder, whom they could mold to their liking, rather than an educated agriculturalist.

Q: Did AID have role in the extension program?

HERRICK: We had had a very heavy role in helping develop the extension service itself. In the past agricultural officers placed by the Office of International Cooperation in Development of USDA were in Kenya, working directly with farmers. We also had supported the Kenyan Ministries of Agriculture and of Livestock Development by allocating funds generated from food aid credits and direct financial aid. The funds were used in the districts to build schools, to build farmer training centers. You could hardly move around Kenya without being shown some kind of a building that had been financed with local currency brought in through the earlier AID programs. In addition, several of the major world-wide agricultural research programs carried out by U.S. universities were active in Kenya, helping the research and extension services.

Q: Was there one on pest control?

HERRICK: Yes, we had a pest control project, but it was bilateral. We had a central project on small ruminants and we had...

Q: This was CRSP? Cooperative Research Studies Program.

HERRICK: Yes, or was it Cooperative Research Support Program, pronounced "CRISP". In any case, that was a major program of AID's central agricultural group, established in response to an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to call for support for the land-grant universities and historically Black colleges of the United States.. I was in Washington when the program was established, and I remember my surprise to discover that "cooperative" referred to cooperation between AID and the U.S. institutions, not to cooperation between AID and cooperating governments overseas.

Q: That's right.

HERRICK: Those programs operated in certain districts in Kenya, in Western Kenya a program to develop a multi-purpose goat and in the Central Highlands one to improve nutrition. The programs raised some issues that I think were common to other overseas AID programs. The Nutrition CRSP was doing some interesting work. They started by analyzing the nutrition level of the people at the local level and then began an education program to show the people how they could use their local resources to provide more nutritious meals for their families. Because it was a research program requiring recurring visits to homes in the district, the CRSP called for a large number of research assistants. I think the research protocol was well designed, and would bring interesting results, BUT... The program was not designed to continue until the research results had been effectively adopted by the local people. And, in addition, the program had provided income to the local community--by paying the research assistants and by financing demonstrations of food preparation. When the researchers left, the income they had provided through their program would leave with them. The U.S. professors managing the program were aware of the issue; I don't whether they could resolve it. It happens too often, that we send U.S. experts to a place to stay for three to five years, and when they leave, the local community is not totally prepared to continue any development improvements they have introduced, and cannot replicate the increments to income that had been provided.

Q: I recall one of the key issues in the CRSP was that it was strictly a research program-- and therefore they had no institutional development responsibility and therefore they were just to carry out their research. That was a controversial feature.

HERRICK: In Kenya, there was a well-established agricultural research organization which AID had assisted, through the East Africa Regional program in the old days, and the bilateral program later. For the small ruminant research program, the Kenyans insisted that it be part of their system, and I think that was important. The major issue that I recall was one revolving around the assignment of American personnel. In one instance, a Chief of Party who was a retired American professor did not put forth on the job as the scope of work intended. More generally, a number of the Americans sent out were graduate students whose role appeared more to be one of gathering material for a Master's thesis than one to help the Kenyan in research. We were concerned in the AID Mission, but the wonderful thing is that the Kenyans were also concerned, so, at their behest, we had some very serious discussions with the leadership of the CRSP. It was uncomfortable for them, and unhappy for them, and we had a number of self justifying communications from the home office of the lead institution in the United States, but in the end they were able to understand and to make a change.

Q: What about pest control?

HERRICK: We called our project a grain storage project. We worked in Western Kenya to develop ways in which farmers could diminish the damage from pests after the harvest was gathered. We were especially concerned about disease from the aflatoxin mold. I think our statistic was that about 20 percent of the maize in storage on the farm was subject to aflatoxin. It was a matter of health as well as one of income, because the farmers were losing a large part of their harvest. The project was intended to understand local practices and to design some changes in the grain storage that would reduce the damage from pests. The project was conducted in conjunction with Kenyans. There were workshops at local farmer training centers to present to the farmers the new way of building their storage, to show them how it would work and send them back to introduce the new practices. But it was going slowly. It was not happening very fast.

A change in something as traditional as the way the homestead is organized around grain storage is one that is not easily made. The local grain storage system originally was directed by the spiritual beliefs of the people and so changes in shapes of storage units had to do with changes in values. It was going to take a long time before it took effect. I have a feeling, I'm guessing, that in Western Kenya, where the agricultural land is pretty good and where the farmers can produce a decent amount (more than they need for their own consumption), that they have by now made some changes in their storage system and have better control over the pests. I doubt if you could go out with the drawing that was produced by that project and find an example of that very design, but I'm quite sure that the project started something.

Q: It got people thinking and weighing alternatives?

HERRICK: Yes, so that the local culture could take over and develop something in the end.

Q: What about the population area? That was an area of importance I would think.

HERRICK: That was an area of great importance to us and to some people in the Kenya Government. It was a difficult area. Kenya along with Burundi and Rwanda, statistically broke the bank for a known population increase rate. It was something like 3.7 percent per annum, which meant a doubling of the population in 17 years. The government had a family planning program but that program was the responsibility of the Ministry of Health and much of the leadership of the Ministry of Health was not truly committed to the program, nor were many of the individual health practitioners.

The cultural values in Kenya did not promote small families. One of the important aspects of the value system was the classic traditional need for a large family in a rural area to help work the farm. That does not mean that the labor is needed all year, but when labor is needed at harvest time the family can't afford to hire helpers. There is more than that--in Kenya, among most of the ethnic groups and certainly among the larger ones, it is very important to name one's oldest son for the father's father and one's second son for the mother's father, similarly with the daughters. Then you have to name a child for the father's oldest brother, and the mother's oldest sister and the father's oldest sister and the mother's oldest brother. By thus naming your children you will

ensure that the souls of those important family members continue in the afterlife. Therefore the Kenyan couple has to have eight children before completing its family obligations.

Q: That's right. I never thought about that.

HERRICK: That was very important, and the older women, the mothers, really watched over whether this was going to happen, whether the wife of their son was going to do the right thing and was going to have enough children. I recall a conversation with a very senior official in government, the Cabinet Secretary (there was a period of time when we were meeting with him every week on some policy issues). One time I congratulated him, because I had heard his wife had just had a baby (she was sharing a room with the wife of an American on our staff). He just shook his head and said, "Oh yes, and thank goodness it was a girl. I already have a family, with this wife I only had two children: we had two boys. We were perfectly content with our two boys but it was just murder when one of our mothers came to visit. Her mother and my mother, we didn't have a child to name after them. Finally my mother-in-law put on so much pressure we decided we would try again. We've named the girl after both of them." [laughter] Now this was a modern man, in the modern world, in a very high government position, with an educated wife who had an advanced degree. He said that until all of the old grandmothers were gone we were not going to be able to change the value system.

In effect, the story of family planning in Kenya today is a very good one. It is not so good that they have achieved zero population growth, but the World Factbook for 1995 published by the CIA estimates they have gotten down to less than two percent annual growth. That is remarkable, because as we all know, in a population with a large number of young people, if each woman among those young people has only two children, the population as a whole is still going to grow.

The use of modern contraceptives in Kenya had increased remarkably. (I'm going to refer to some documents for the actual figures.) In 1977, only seven percent of Kenyan married women in their fertile years used any contraceptive method, and only five percent used a modern method. In the early 1980's the rate of modern contraceptive use was creeping up to six percent, but the total number of births to each woman averaged about eight. Some thought that rate might continue to go up, as the traditional practices encouraging the spacing of children were abandoned--such practices as sustained breast feeding and polygamy. These things are measured through a project AID has sponsored, the Demographic Health Survey. In 1989, five years after the project started, a remarkable 27.3 percent of women were using modern contraceptive methods, and the population growth rate had moved down to 3.4 percent. By 1992 the desired family size was smaller, and according to World Bank estimates the growth rate was down again, to 2.7 percent.

I believe one thing that helped to stimulate such a remarkable change in Kenya was a pioneer project that we developed. It was the first example in Africa of a private sector family planning program. It was designed to offer family planning services through the clinics organized by employers at the place of work, and also through some private clinics. The place where it really took off was the workplace. Six years after authorization of the project, its 50 employer-run sub-

projects had reached a full 10 percent of Kenya's population. Project services accounted for 14 percent of the total contraceptive usage rate of 27 percent measured in 1989.

That Family Planning Private Sector project has been duplicated in many other African countries, and around the world. In fact, when I got to Zimbabwe, AID's central Office of Population was helping develop such a program through a central project, the Enterprise project. I found that the Zimbabweans were inviting my friends (Kenyan women) to come down. They came down three times while I was there, to help the Zimbabweans organize their private sector family planning program.

Q: Why did you take this track in Kenya?

HERRICK: Partly because the family planning through the health system was not working. The nurses were not being given sufficient training and they were not convinced that they should be talking to parents about their family size, even for health reasons. We found that the private sector employers were interested. We interested them first through a financial analysis that responded to their basic humanitarian instincts. Then we had to deal with their reluctance to do something the government would disapprove.

The tradition is that a large employer provides housing and provides health services for employees. The health services had always included services for all employees and for the families of employees. None were providing family planning counseling. The arithmetic showed that if they had female employees and had less need to give long maternity leave, they would save money. But if they had only male employees and they were providing services to the family as a whole, they would still save on health services for the women if they offered family planning counseling. And the health of the children would be better. So we started negotiating with government about a project that would train the staff of the employers' clinics in family planning counseling and in contraceptive services. Basically we required the employer to provide a space that allowed privacy for counseling.

We were also going to provide some assistance and the contraceptives to a few private clinics we found in the country. There weren't very many private health clinics that could really make a go in the country. Some missionary health delivery points which had not been doing very much were now ready to do more in family planning. The government was very resistant to this project. I recall one conversation with the top civil servant in the Ministry of Health who said to me, "Mrs. Herrick, those women aren't going to want this family planning counseling. They're not going to come and talk to that nurse until they have had so many babies that they hurt." He simply did not understand. We were able to put the program through finally with the help of a Family Planning Council established under the nominal leadership of the Vice President of the country, Mwai Kibaki, and the actual leadership of Philip Mbithi, then Vice Chancellor at the University of Nairobi, a sociologist with excellent political connections. The Council included representatives from the university, from government, from the major church groups, with one or two from the private sector. In the end however, it turned out that the Council had to back off from its promotion of our project.

On the final day, when I got a signature from the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Health, I went to the meeting by myself. We signed. We had agreed with the Ministry of Health on the training, which would have their supervision, and on other specific aspects of the project, but we had not really won the larger general support that we were seeking. The Permanent Secretary said, "Well Madame Director, I hope you succeed in this project, but I think you will fail." [laughter] I went back to the AID Mission, and the word began to go out. It turned out that the whole group of our supporters, from the head of the largest women's organization to Philip Mbithi, had given up on the project. They flocked to the office to congratulate us, and we had a big hug and a tea party. They were surprised that we had gotten it through.

That project took off with a bang. A separate office was established by the implementing contractor, and that office has now become a Kenyan entity registered to do business as a registered non-government organization. The statistics are showing the changes, and last November the project won an award from the Association of Professional Anthropologists here in Washington DC

Q: This project was to do what?

HERRICK: It was to provide family planning services through private organizations. Some individual health clinics and church missions were assisted, but the main effort was at places of employment.

Q: So the non government organization was servicing the private businesses?

HERRICK: Yes, the organization, which began as a separate arm of an American firm, John Snow Incorporated, implemented the project. I should say that we spoke earlier of the importance of analysis in the design of AID programs, and in this project the social analysis was very important in identifying what would or would not be appropriate and in estimating the response of the women of Kenya. Ned Greeley of our staff, who developed the project, was an anthropologist who had done his graduate work in Kenya and had stayed there teaching for some years after that. He knew from his research that the women of child-bearing age in Kenyan households of Kenya were ready to see some change. Of course, if AID is to do something in the private sector, it must be assured that there is demand for the service to be offered. So, another terribly important part of our analysis covered the question of demand on the part of the employers and on the part of the women. Obviously, we concluded the demand was sufficient, and the project has proved us to have been right.

I might use the family planning situation to talk about something else which is a general issue in AID, and that is donor coordination. We always think it is important for donors to coordinate what they are doing, not to stumble over each other, not to do things that are similar but somewhat in conflict in the same rural area, to get together to agree on issues to discuss with government. It's very hard to make donor coordination work beyond the abstract, however. We tried very hard in Kenya, and we Americans were usually the leaders in getting the donors together on a regular basis, even though the World Bank considered that the responsibility was theirs--in Zimbabwe, the UNDP insisted on controlling the coordination, and was not at all effective.

It's always a threat to government when they hear that the donors are getting together: "Oh dear, they're going to gang up on us." We established two forums, one in which we invited government to join us, and one which our own informal luncheon get-together. What we did was to kind of remind each other, maybe once a month, "Don't you want to have a lunch and have some of us over?" So the donors would get together and discuss some issues that we shared in common or simply tell each other what we were up to, what was happening at our respective headquarters and our legislatures. Then we also made sure that we participated with government on more formal occasions.

Q: But the government was not enthusiastic about this?

HERRICK: The government thought that it was important to coordinate the donors, but their way to coordinate the donors was to give us each a district to work in, as they had done with livestock, with integrated rural development and with arid and semi-arid lands projects--ours was in Machakos and Kitui Districts, south of Nairobi. I think their worry that we would gang up on them and ask them to do things that they weren't ready to do was stronger than their confidence that they could influence a combination of our resources positively. They had been through some very searching and uncomfortable reviews of the World Bank's integrated rural development project, and were wary of multilateral approaches.

Q: This was the donor coordination in general or just on the population program?

HERRICK: This was in general. I started by saying that I would use the population program as an example. There came the time in Kenya when the World Bank was going to renew a major, large health and family planning project. They wanted to develop a multi-donor project through which they would offer some basic financing as other donors put up funds for specific aspects of the program; the Bank would be the financing organization of "last resort" if there were some gaps. We were included in the total reckoning through our public sector family planning project. The Danes were involved, the Swedish, the Norwegians, the British in a very small way as I remember, and perhaps others. The bilateral donors had some issues with government. We wanted to see a greater effort to get contraceptive supplies out to people who wanted them, and we wanted changes in the rules affecting eligibility for family planning services. No woman was eligible for family planning counseling until she was at least 34 years old and had already had four children. Initially the World Bank mission from Washington was not going to insist on any changes, but we donors gained the support of the Bank's Regional Representative and were ultimately able to persuade the visiting mission.

Q: Was this mainly on the age issue, or a whole set of issues?

HERRICK: On a number of issues affecting the way the government would handle the delivery of family planning services. The most important changes were in the area of training for the staff of local clinics--the medical assistants as well as the nurses--and other steps that could institute a real dedication to the program in the way it was intended.

Q: Was there any opposition for the Kenyan medical society?

HERRICK: There's no such thing as a medical society. Almost every doctor, unless he worked at a Mission, was a public employee. But there was the classic opposition of the professionals to giving responsibility to nurses or to medical assistants. In any case, this was an example of effective communication among donors. The Swedes and the Danes were smaller in financial terms in their assistance to the sector than we were, but when they had a concern they would call me and ask me if I would please get in touch with the Regional Representative at the World Bank to ask for a meeting on the issue. That always worked very well; we were able to have a meeting and discuss the issues.

At this time the AID Administrator, who was keen on donor coordination, had begun a series of annual consultations with the Japanese. In the field, the effect of those consultations was minimal. After all the chiefs had met and had learned once more about each others' various spigots of aid, and how the commercial business works, the local person at the Japanese Embassy would call on the AID Director, but communication usually was not very effective. We knew of several aspects of the Japanese program that we hoped might be a little different. They were increasing their program to Africa and wanted to commit \$50 million a year but did not have much in the way of overseas aid staff to develop a program. We were, at the time, much concerned about grain storage policy--about the monopoly control by government, the ownership of storage facilities by certain people in government. We thought there should be a much greater role for private sector in the handling of grain. The major donors to Kenya were all working on this issue--the World Bank, the Germans, the British and the Americans. Then the Japanese made a commitment to build some new public sector grain storage facilities, to our disappointment.

Q: Anything more on the population program? Was it a big program dollar wise?

HERRICK: I don't know what's big anymore.

Q: Several million dollars a year?

HERRICK: Oh yes. In that sense it was big--\$8.4 million in the first six years of the private sector project, plus perhaps \$2 to \$4 million for the public sector..

Q: We were providing most of the contraceptives?

HERRICK: We were providing most of the contraceptives. Which brings us to another issue which I'll talk about when we get to Zimbabwe.

Q: Okay. Were you also involved in health at the same time?

HERRICK: We were involved in rural health delivery in several ways. It was really very interesting because we were investigating ways to deliver basic health education and basic health services at the local area at low cost. I don't think we ever found the way to do it at truly low recurrent cost for a government. But we were supporting programs that were taking varying approaches in the local communities of Kitui District. One was through the African Medical

Research Foundation (AMREF), which is known under one of hats as "the flying doctors", another was through the Ministry of Health, and a third through another non-government organization.

We were learning that in order to establish a local delivery program of that sort you have to spend a lot of time getting to know the community. AMREF was working in other districts as well. In one they found they could use young people, but in another district the health assistants had to be mature people or they weren't acceptable to the community. So, you had to know what was acceptable. The local health assistants in the AMREF program were very careful to ensure that the health assistants were selected by community members. The Ministry of Health program did that somewhat, but they were more apt to appoint somebody who was already known, maybe to a local health worker in the area.

The local health assistants were supposed to be remunerated, as they were spending time away from their own household or farm work, and they had to ride a bicycle or walk to the other communities they were serving. The local community was, in principal, supposed to support them. But, in effect, the local community never supported them sufficiently, and that's the dilemma for a public health delivery system. Because even at a low rate of remuneration for the local assistants, there is a continuing recurrent cost for the government, and a need to train the local assistants and provide regular refresher courses. But I think our various experiments were indicating that delivery by local assistants was acceptable to the community and that was important. Because if your interest is in primary health care, in preventive health care and in health education, that's the best way to get it out.

Q: Of course you said earlier that this was a time when there was a major political interest in Kenya and it resulted in increased aid.

HERRICK: Yes, and then we had money!

Q: What did this lead to?

HERRICK: What did we want to do with money? It was about \$6 million the first year and then \$10 million per year subsequently, on top of a \$5 to \$6 million dollar technical assistance program. Well, we didn't just want to drop the money on the government, we were very serious about agricultural policy. We chose to concentrate on two major areas of the agriculture sector. One was grain storage and grain marketing issues, and the second was the provision of fertilizer. On the grain marketing issue, it was curious to me at the time, and it's still puzzling in retrospect, how extremely rigid the government was in its determination to maintain absolute control of the buying and selling of grain. That kind of rigidity begins in Africa because a newly independent government continues the monopoly practices of the colonial power, which was controlling production for its own economic purposes. It continues, in many instances, because somebody is making some money off it.

Grain marketing was so centralized in Kenya that no person was able, by law, to transport more than one bag of maize across a district line, and there were 42 districts in the country. So you couldn't even take one pickup truck load to your aging grandmother who lived in the next

district. They enforced the regulation strictly through road blocks and an informant system. The system to establish the annual prices of grains was ancient; its results ran counter to market wisdom. We know it's not easy to estimate the size of next year's harvest, or predict the weather, but here we observed a system totally lacking in flexibility. A group of private farmers who were invited to advise the government on the price to be paid to farmers for their grain had historically been much better forecasters than the government, but their views did not prevail. We took various approaches to government and one year after another we managed to negotiate a small change in the way things were being done. Each step was very small, and each was taken reluctantly and was not always implemented quite in the manner in which we had anticipated. So, we took the opportunity the next year to refine the step.

Q: What kind of steps are you talking about?

HERRICK: One step we thought was minor, but they did not, was to allow free distribution of grains across district lines in a small selected group of districts, just to see whether or not the consequences were as dire as government anticipated (and we did not, of course). We suggested certain parameters for establishing floors and ceilings on grain prices (hoping to move toward eventual removal of controls). We wanted them to reduce the proportion of production that a farmer was required to sell to the central grain marketing organization. These were all very small steps toward a larger goal.

The second issue to gain our attention was the handling of fertilizer. There was a nice connection, here, because the fertilizers required in Kenya were available from the United States. Thus, the program funds we were offering to provide could be used by the government to purchase from our manufacturers. The government was acting as the sole importer of fertilizer and was establishing the price of resale to the farmers. We thought that they should permit the private sector to bid on the right to bring in the fertilizer and sell it themselves to the farmers. We knew of more than one company, and one major agricultural cooperative, in the country that were capable of handling fertilizer imports and distribution, so we thought that market competition would be possible. There had been an unfortunate episode about ten years earlier involving corruption in fertilizer imports, and everybody in government was afraid the same kind of thing would happen again.

In the end we managed to obtain agreement on some private sector role, but the government insisted that the Ministry of Finance should process the bids from the private sector importers and would deal with the suppliers overseas. This put the Ministry of Finance into the position of being the technical manager, a ridiculously unnecessary burden for them. But that was, indeed, one first small step. There were others, affecting pricing, and the monopoly role of an agricultural cooperative in the distribution chain. That cooperative became very unhappy and mounted an intensive campaign against the changes and against USAID by name. In fact, they did lose some of their former role and the result was worse for them than we had anticipated, because, as it turned out, they had been dependent on certain government patronage, much more than we had realized.

Shortly after negotiating these policy changes, I left Kenya for an assignment in Washington. I recall three years later hearing the, then, Director in Kenya report how slow the process of policy

reform can be, and how much time is required before real policy change is implemented. His example was the private sale of fertilizer. He was still working on it, and two years after that it was the same story. That was an effort that probably required eight years before the move was truly complete.

Q: What about the marketing of grain? Did you hear anymore about that?

HERRICK: I'm not sure how that finally worked out. I imagine it was a series of forward and backward steps, and that President Moi's cronies were able to hang onto their profit schemes.

Q: It was the same sort of problem?

HERRICK: Yes, the same sort of problem. Because there were very direct connections between power in government and profits from grain storage.

Q: I think we need to continue a little bit about the program, and also your relations with the Kenyans and some important people.

HERRICK: Another element in our program assistance, in our negotiation of conditions in conjunction with the annual financial transfer to Kenya, was our desire to see some basic macro-economic structural adjustment in Kenya. The IMF was a regular supporter of Kenya and the World Bank as well, with some ups and downs in the size of their support as they found that the Kenyans had or had not complied with the program agreements. The Kenyans were prepared to launch an austerity program and to try to restructure their budget in ways that, at least to their outside advisors, made economic sense. We wanted to support those moves. Our economic analysis certainly supported that of the multilateral agencies, and we had done a good deal to train economists and to help place economists in government who would be advising on fiscal and monetary policy and the general role of government in the economy. After several years the views of these people was beginning to percolate through government.

We included provisions in our ESF agreements each year that were consonant with the provisions that World Bank was putting into its agreements and with the aims of the IMF program in the country. In fact, the amount of our program aid each year was part of the IMF arithmetic when they estimated how much external support the Kenyans could expect for their reform program. An evaluation of the ESF program in AID completed a few years later indicated that that kind of provision didn't really add much force to the AID agreement. As I recall, the conclusion of the evaluation team was that there was too much detail in the agreement, that it was very hard to verify whether things had taken place as intended or not, and that in spite of our care to word things that were already part of government thinking and were understood by government it was difficult for the two sides to interpret whether the commitments under the agreement had been carried out or not. It was just too much to keep track of. We had thought that we were being very careful, but it's even more difficult than we had realized.

Q: There were too many provisions?

HERRICK: One of their comments was that there were too many provisions. One of the things we were trying to do was to identify, and to piggyback on, specific elements of the program that IMF and World Bank were recommending and that we thought were likely to move forward. Perhaps we should have gone for larger, more general provisions. Yet, at the same time, we were under a prohibition laid upon AID by the Congress. We could not refer to World Bank conditions in our agreements. So, we were trying to refer to specific actions, that's how we got into having too many provisions.

Q: We were under an injunction not to be carrying out the bank or IMF's provisions, because it was too heavy handed or something?

HERRICK: We were under specific legislative injunction. I'm not sure of the origins of that injunction.

Q: I think there were some countries that objected to those and perhaps were trying to divorce itself from those...

HERRICK: Yes, they would have objected to the donors ganging up. There also may have been on our own Congressional side, some people who didn't think that World Bank and IMF were on the right track. Of course we only selected things to put into our provisions that our economists thought were a good idea and also that we thought were possible. There are things that a government may be ready to do in future years but is not going to be ready to do this year.

Q: The Kenyans had already agreed to do or were committed to doing anyway?

HERRICK: We did try to identify things that they were likely to do, in the belief that a push from us might bring about the action. Some World Bank conditions struck us as unrealistic. I'm thinking of certain budget allocation conditions. Donors always try to get the government to raise the percentage of budget allocated to health, for example. But, in my observation in Africa, a total budget may be increased, and the total funds for health, but the relative allocation to health never seems to go above 6 to 7 percent.

Q: Was there a Consultative Group for Kenya at that time?

HERRICK: There was.

Q: Did you attend any Consultative Group meetings?

HERRICK: Yes.

Q: What was your sense of that experience or that practice?

HERRICK: I think the Consultative Group was somewhat effective in pulling the donors together into almost one voice on some of the bigger policy issues. The Consultative Group meetings themselves, which are chaired by World Bank in very nice quarters in Paris, were sometimes a "shadow play" on the surface. The country representatives would make a speech

that had been prepared at the last minute by their expatriate advisers, one that was a mixed apology and brag about what they were doing. They would then make a plea for greater donor assistance and would very rarely, at the public meeting, make any commitment to change. If you just took the surface of the meeting you could go home quite discouraged. But at several of the meetings I attended, the "smoke filled" room sessions involving only the heads of delegation were quite effective. So the result any one Consultative Group meeting, and the pressure to prepare for the meeting (the pressure on the donors and the pressure on the recipient government as well) did bring some forward movement.

Q: Did you get a sense of how the Kenyans reacted to the Consultative Group process?

HERRICK: I think that the Kenyans thought the Consultative Group was a necessary process-- that their external assistance would be less if they did not participate in that process. They didn't prepare easily for the meeting. They found it difficult to pull together the kind of presentation the donors were looking for, and they usually gave the task to their outside advisors, who were financed either by us or by the World Bank. They didn't do it themselves.

Q: What were their problems with it? Was it technically difficult or did it open up too many issues?

HERRICK: It required the precious staff time of competent officials, and opened up a number of difficult issues on which there might not be agreement within the government. I also think that internally, it was easier for those in the Ministry of Finance and Planning who agreed with the advice of the donors to say, "Our advisor's tell us that we should go to the meeting with this point of view." It was better to put the blame on somebody else, because of the internal relationships within government.

Q: Do you have a sense that they felt these meetings were productive in the sense that their expectation of what the donors were going to respond with?

HERRICK: In terms of quantitative results, I think they were satisfied.

Q: Sometimes governments are resentful of them. They feel that they have to go through the ringers and then they don't get much from it. I guess in this case you found that it worked.

HERRICK: I think that they were fearful that they would get less if they didn't go. So in that sense even if there wasn't a tremendous increase in aid, they needed to fulfill IMF expectations for their total budgetary resources, because they were already at the point where repayments to the IMF would have exceeded disbursements from the IMF if they didn't have new funds coming in. I imagine they had concluded that the meetings were necessary. I also think, quite frankly, they were getting plenty of external assistance. They were managing at their current levels.

Q: At that time Kenya was a fairly favorite and popular country to provide assistance to. Why was that?

HERRICK: That's right. I think Kenya was a good place for donors to live, let's face that one right away. Secondly, Kenya was a place where, after independence, there was a cadre of individuals with sufficient education to be able to benefit from the kinds of technical assistance that donors were bringing in. I think Kenya was a country, (up until the more obvious and systematic erosion of democratic processes), that outsiders were very proud of for having managed its independence. I think the donors were sympathetic to some of the problems the Kenyans faced, stemming from colonial times and the structures that had been established under the British. And the British, themselves, were loyally supportive of their former colony.

Kenya is a beautiful country, multi-ethnic, and very interesting for outsiders. Jomo Kenyatta, the father of the country and first President until he died in 1978, although he gave most privileges and give government responsibilities to people of his own group, the Kikuyu, did include some people from other ethnic groups of the country. Daniel Arap Moi, in his first two cabinets, had been very, very skillful in establishing an ethnic and geographic distribution. Then came his systematic exclusion of the Kikuyu, beginning with his moves to drum out of government the former right hand man of Kenyatta, Charles Njonjo. There were many interesting, and still effective, people to work with in the country.

Q: It was quite private sector oriented, wasn't it?

HERRICK: It was, in a way. The people of the country seemed to have an entrepreneurial spirit. Some private sector business had been built by foreign investors, British and American in the main. But the "Asians", the descendants of Indian and Pakistani imported workers and immigrants, who had not been permitted by the British to own land, played an important economic role. They had become the service providers. And in Kenya, in contrast to Tanzania and Uganda, they had not been deprived of their capital and their businesses after independence. I believe there were something like 700,000 Asians in a total population at that time of 10 to 11 million. African Kenyans and white British or Kenyan citizens (depending on whether they had changed their passport or not) and missionaries serving in the country were able to establish real working relationships and some very real and true mutual friendships. There was a tradition of people being able to work together in the country, that enabled assistance programs to be workable.

Q: How did you find it working with the Kenyan Officials?

HERRICK: I found great satisfaction in working with Kenyans as individuals in government and in getting know some Kenyans privately. Some of them I still keep in contact with. It was possible to get to know Kenyans, to a degree. That was generally not the case in Zimbabwe, where I was posted in the late 1980's.

Q: Were there many social relationships or exchange?

HERRICK: There was some social exchange, but more often among Europeans (whites) than with Africans. We Europeans lived in very nice houses and were accustomed to entertaining at dinner, whereas the Africans lived in modest places and were not accustomed to entertaining in our manner. Sometimes one would be invited out to the home area, or to participate in a full two

days-worth of a local wedding, or something like that. That was always a great help in learning to understand where people were coming from, where their ideas were coming from. We also had some well educated and very productive Kenyans on our staff with whom we met socially.

Q: Did you meet the President?

HERRICK: Oh yes, I met the President in his very formal manner. Relationships with President Moi were totally within his control, as he waved his mace and called on his cronies to do his bidding. One time I was present when he reprimanded our Ambassador for something or another, I don't remember what it was for, but it was not very pleasant. As time went on the President's group of friends and advisors, his "bag men", became very powerful and were very unpleasant to deal with. They progressively took over, on his behalf, the profitable enterprises of the private sector of Kenya. Any large thriving business found itself in one way or another bought out by a nameless firm and put into the portfolio of the President, and found its top management changed. Places that were resistant to that kind of thing found that the rules had changed. One well known example was the casino in Nairobi, the only one licensed in the country at the time. The rules were changed to require the use of foreign exchange in the casino; the casino's income went down; it was "sold" at a loss; and then local currency was permitted once more. It became more and more difficult for companies with some foreign ownership, for instance with American ownership, to keep expatriate staff in the country, to repatriate their profits, and to keep their originally negotiated share of the capital.

Q: Were we involved apart from your family planning example, in promoting private sector development at that time?

HERRICK: Not private sector projects, *per se*, but our efforts toward policy change in the agriculture sector were designed to promote the private sector. In every new project, I insisted that there should be private sector elements: trainees were not all to become government employees; private clinics were to be included in health projects, and so on and so forth. We also created a project to support the small business efforts of non-government agencies. There were some small projects of AID's central bureaus, designed to promote small enterprise, but these usually did not work very well. The least successful were those that created enterprise funds that went through a government agency. These became de-capitalized because the loans weren't called back in.

One of the most successful things that happened in small enterprise in the country came through an alternative energy project of the AID Mission. The project conducted a study of the construction of the small stoves used by people in their cooking huts in rural areas, stoves from Kenya and elsewhere, provided a demonstration at the big UN conference on energy in Nairobi in 1982. The winning design was one developed by a Kenyan, Mr. Kinyanjui, and that design, of what they called an "improved" *jiko* (stove) was promoted by the project. The *jiko* is of simple construction in a kind of hour glass shape, made of metal and clay. It can be made in a garage or shed with simple tools and can be sold by a vendor at his little house or workshop in any rural or urban area. The stove was designed to save fuel, to heat water most economically, to be less dangerous to the babies who fell on it, and to be less work for the housewife. It was definitely a

low technology, low cost item that has taken off. It was featured in an article on cook stoves for the developing world in *Scientific American* in July 1995.

Q: *Was that one of our projects?*

HERRICK: Mr. Kinyanjui deserves the credit for inventiveness and persistence, but our alternative energy project was able to help spread the word and the technology. The basic intent of the energy project had not been to promote small business. When I was in Ethiopia last April, I saw the improved *jiko* all around the country and little models of it for sale to the tourists in shops. It was that very East African improved *jiko*.

Q: *Did it use wood?*

HERRICK: Yes, wood, but it could be charcoal.

WILLIAM C. HARROP
Ambassador
Kenya (1980-1983)

Ambassador William C. Harrop was born in Maryland in 1929. He received a bachelor's degree in English literature from Harvard University. Prior to joining the Foreign Service in 1954, he served in the U.S. Marine Corps and studied for a year in the graduate school of journalism at the University of Missouri. Ambassador Harrop's career included positions in Italy, Belgium, and ambassadorships to Guinea, Zaire, Kenya, and Israel. He retired from the Foreign Service in 1993. Ambassador Harrop was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993.

Q: *I thought we might talk about Kenya and then stop for the time being. You left the Bureau of African Affairs in 1980 and served from then until 1983 as Ambassador to Kenya. How did that assignment come about? For one thing, one looks at this and says, "Kenya is the sort of place which a lot of political appointees thirst to have." How did you happen to get that post?*

HARROP: I was probably fortunate. I replaced a political appointee, Wilbert LeMelle and was replaced by another political appointee, Admiral Gerald Thomas. I don't know -- it just happened that way. The position was coming open -- I think that there was a little dissatisfaction, perhaps, [in the Department] with Ambassador LeMelle and a feeling that it might be time to send a professional diplomat to Kenya.

It was a fine tour from my point of view. Kenya is a country of great fascination. The British heritage there, I think, was as strong as in any of the former British colonies. There was a sense, when I arrived in 1980, that Kenya had greater prospects of success than almost any other place in Africa, because it appeared to have a better balance [than most other African countries had]. It appeared to have a better appreciation of the "rule of law." It appeared to have something closer

to a true democracy, a parliament that had some effectiveness, a respect for property rights, and a certain degree of free enterprise. It had substantial natural endowments and many capable people. It also had a lot of former British colonials who had stayed on and had become, in fact, Kenyan citizens. This was seen as providing balance and a rudder for the country.

However, even while I was there, worry grew over the level of corruption, a concern that has become endemic to Africa, often in connection with all ethnicity. We saw tribal issues in Kenya that refused to go away and became very, very destructive. Then there was the ambition of individual leaders who would not bow to democracy, quite evident at that time. So the handwriting was pretty much on the wall. We also had had some rather difficult relations with Kenya over economic questions. We were trying to support the Bretton Woods institutions [the IMF and the World Bank], which advocated imposing more classical budget stringency and discipline on the Kenyan economy, trying to shrink the parastatal sector and to reduce a really exorbitant level of price controls. On the other hand Kenya became important to our problems in the Gulf.

Q: You're talking about the Persian Gulf.

HARROP: The Persian Gulf, yes. Kenya was really the only location on the Western rim of the Indian Ocean where we could provide shore leave for our sailors. At that time we always had a Carrier Task Force near the mouth of the Persian Gulf. So we negotiated agreements providing military access to Kenya. It was very difficult for President Moi to agree to this, because of Kenya's tradition independence. He didn't want to be subservient to the United States and didn't want any military alliances. So the [port access] agreements were public and publicly ratified by the Senate of the United States but were secret in Kenya, a most unusual and really unworkable situation. We had as many as 40 ship visits a year for a time -- to Mombasa. We got into some difficult, bilateral problems. Two different prostitutes were murdered or were killed by American sailors in two consecutive years while I was in Kenya, under circumstances which obviously were complicated and difficult to unravel, extremely political. We had trials, bilateral frictions, and great emotion over those issues, which, in fact, absorbed a disproportionate amount of my time.

Q: What was the political situation -- who was running the country and how did you deal with the government?

HARROP: [Jomo] Kenyatta had died in 1978 and had been replaced by his vice president, Daniel arap Moi. Kenyatta was a member of the Kikuyu tribe, the largest group, which had been the heart of the rebellion against the British in the 1950's. His vice president, Moi, was from a small, minority tribe, called the Kalenjin. Somehow, the formal succession system held together. Moi acceded to power as Vice President and then was reelected. He is not an educated man -- he did not complete secondary school -- and appears to be somewhat slow-witted. Actually, he is cunning in understanding power and the tribal politics of Africa, which is what the politics on that continent come down to. The common denominator is ethnic rivalries. While I was there, Moi was consolidating his position as president and doing so quite successfully. He had a group of cronies from his own tribe around him who were extremely corrupt -- not just in political but in money terms. He was himself involved in a lot of business ventures. There was a revolt by the

Air Force while I was there -- in August, 1981. That was put down, but you could see on the horizon that the clouds were there and that there was going to be more trouble. There has been more trouble, and the Moi regime has become more and more authoritarian.

We had considerable American investments in Kenya and some bilateral trade. Kenya is a tremendous tourist destination for Westerners and for Americans. There are many Americans in Kenya at any given time. Kenya is also the headquarters of the United Nations Environmental Program, a specialized UN agency with its central office in Nairobi. Nairobi was a very busy place.

Q: Here you are, the American Ambassador, in an area with a lot of business activity and Americans coming there and working there. Corruption is endemic and massive. How do you function in this type of situation? We have this attitude that, "We don't mess around with corruption and all of that." Yet this is how things are done. How did you keep the Embassy going and give advice to [American business firms]?

HARROP: It's a very difficult proposition, and I saw more of it in Zaire. I can't recall the year when the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was passed [by Congress]. It must have been some time in the 1980's. I was more directly involved in [these matters] in Zaire than I was in Kenya, although I think [that this law] may already have been in force [when I was in Kenya]. American companies overseas just can't engage in bribery or "sweetening" of officers because they'll get in trouble with their own Department of Justice. Also, the majority of American companies feel that, over the long pull, they're better off not doing that anyway. That's not always the case, but the big companies feel that way. We had a few big companies that were very successful in Kenya. Delmonte was very successful in growing pineapple on a large scale and exporting it to Europe. Some of the American pharmaceutical companies were there, General Motors assembled motor vehicles in Kenya, the Corn Products Company was involved in food production and packaging, Union Carbide manufacturing batteries, and there were quite a few others. It was an active place. It's a difficult thing to be in competition when you have the government openly corrupt, openly trying to get payoffs and bribes from companies.

Q: Let's say that an American businessman comes to you or your commercial officers. He says that somebody's asked for this or that [kind of bribe], and he's a cabinet minister. He asks, "What do I do?"

HARROP: I think that the only thing that an ambassador can do is to tell him that he can't pay bribes. That became literally the case when the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was passed. You try to support him as best you can. I had many meetings with cabinet ministers and with President Moi himself in support of individual American companies and interests. Often, I supported them institutionally. I had meetings every month with American business representatives at my residence in Nairobi and talked over issues that were coming up. When there were customs or tax issues or regulatory problems, I would go to bat for them -- often successfully.

Q: Did you find that, in a way, if you carry on a policy such as this and really stick to it, the government and the people involved conclude that there is no point messing around with Americans and that it's more trouble than it's worth. Did you find that this worked?

HARROP: Well, unfortunately, all too often the Americans decide that it's not worth it. My concern is that Americans kind of cop out, on the grounds that it's too much trouble, it is too costly, too much red tape, it is personally too difficult for them, from the ethical point of view, and also, it's risky for them legally. So you have American companies that opt out of a developing country, often after years of presence. A major American tire company backed out of Kenya while I was there. [It decided that it] didn't want to produce tires any more, because it was too costly, too much hassle. It's too bad to see that, although you cannot argue about a decision based on the balance sheet. American firms retain a certain prestige in Africa. Local people want to work with them and for them. For both political and economic reasons it was useful for Kenya to have them there, among other reasons as a foil to British firms. Some contracts were lost to Europeans because, when you have two, comparable firms -- and one will make payoffs and one won't -- the first tends to get the nod in Africa.

Q: Did you find that other countries, say the British, the French, and the Dutch...

HARROP: Oh, they're much less sensitive or much less "correct" than Americans are in this regard, if you can generalize in that sense.

Q: Did you have much to do with President Moi?

HARROP: Yes, I saw the president every few weeks. I felt that I developed a degree of personal relationship with him, although he's not a warm man, a bit withdrawn. There was always that sense of tension over economic issues and, more importantly, over military issues and human rights questions. He was always reserved on human rights issues. I was repeatedly instructed to go in and "bang the table" on human rights. Then we had some very difficult Congressional visits when some of our more liberal Congressmen would criticize President Moi and his human rights practices in an outspoken and public way.

Q: What were the human rights problems?

HARROP: There were people in jail for political dissent. There was a refusal to allow opposition parties to organize, the authority of Parliament was circumscribed. Newspaper editors were arrested -- the usual things.

Q: As you [arrived in Kenya], the Reagan administration was coming into power in the U. S. Did you find any diminution of interest in human rights?

HARROP: Probably somewhat so in the case of the executive branch [of our government], but Congress was still controlled by the Democratic Party. Some of the people in positions of authority in the committees interested in Africa were very keenly concerned about human rights and were very outspoken about it. They kept pressing us and pressing the Moi Government [on

such matters]. So you had the case of the executive and legislative branches taking a somewhat different attitude.

Q: How did the government of Kenya respond to these [expressions of concern about human rights]?

HARROP: There is a tradition of free speech in Kenya, so the [local] media continued to try to keep after these issues, and would be put down, over and over again -- and more and more harshly. It was a confrontation which just did not end. President Moi was consolidating his personal power all the while, and successfully. He was getting rid of possible opponents within the system. There was a resentment in the government, on the part of President Moi and his immediate supporters, of this persistent American concern over human rights. However, you felt that they recognized this was something that they were going to have to live with and that it wasn't going to go away.

Q: How about the borders? You had Somalia, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Tanzania. Were we getting involved in...

HARROP: There were continuing problems. With Tanzania there was no love lost between [Julius] Nyerere and [President] Moi, as you can imagine. The Tanzanians were trying to establish a socialist society, depicting Kenya as heartlessly corrupt and capitalist. Uganda was in turmoil with insurrection and continual warfare. The same thing could be said of the Sudan. There was a sense of complete hostility between Kenya and Siad Barre's Somalia, and then there was persistent marauding over the border by ethnic Somalis. There is some Kenyan admixture in the population of Somalia. There were tensions all the way around. The area in which we played the greatest role was in supporting a United Nations effort to mediate the historical problems among Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania -- the old East African Federation under the United Kingdom. There was a quite brilliant, former central banker from Switzerland, named Ulrich, a man for whom I have great admiration. Just as I was leaving he finally succeeded in negotiating out the interests of the three parties in the complicated common possessions of East African Community under the British regime. This led to a lessening of tension, with Tanzania opening the border with Kenya. The border was closed almost the whole time that I was there. You couldn't easily travel across the border to Tanzania.

Q: Is there anything else you want to cover on Kenya?

HARROP: I think that I might mention the unusual circumstances of population questions. Kenya, at that time -- and perhaps still -- has the highest population growth rate in the world: about 4.0 percent annually. This meant that Kenya would double in population -- I think the arithmetic states that this would happen every 17 years. There also was a persistent migration toward the cities. About half of the population of Nairobi was unemployed. Crime was beginning to grow. We spent a lot of time -- most of our very large AID program was devoted to family planning programs, in which the Kenyans were interested.

Q: What about family planning under the Reagan administration?

HARROP: We kept it up. We were able to keep it up.

Q: *The Reagan administration was taking a rather strong stand...*

HARROP: They did, and even though a new Assistant Administrator for Africa in AID was appointed, a Catholic who was ideologically and religiously opposed to family planning, we still kept the program going.

Q: *Did you do it by not asking?*

HARROP: No, they weren't able to stop the program. The momentum was there, and they weren't able to stop it. There was no issue of abortion, which was the most sensitive issue during the Reagan administration. We worked very hard, and the Kenyans worked hard. I think that we actually made some progress. I understand that [population growth in Kenya] is now down to something slightly over 3.0 percent, which is phenomenal progress. But [population growth] was a major problem and will continue to be. Kenya was self-sufficient in food but, I believe no longer is.

GRETA N. MORRIS
Junior Officer Trainee, USIS
Nairobi (1980-1984)

Ambassador Morris was born and raised in California and educated at the University of California at Los Angeles, University of Redland and Claremont College. Before becoming a Foreign Service Officer she accompanied her FSO husband to Indonesia. In 1980 she entered the Foreign Service (USIA) following which she served variously as Public Affairs, Cultural, or Press Officer in Kenya, Uganda, Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia. Her Washington assignments at State and USIA concerned primarily African Affairs. She served as US Ambassador to the Marshall Islands from 2000 to 2006. Ambassador Morris was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2008.

Q: *Did you get any feel...had you ever been in Africa before?*

MORRIS: Never. I had never been in Africa.

Q: *So you are up against African future leaders?*

MORRIS: Right.

Q: *How did they impress you?*

MORRIS: I think the ones who came to Washington on the program were certainly the crème de la crème so to speak. They were very well educated and very impressive young people so I was

certainly impressed with them. I will have to say that both my experience working in the visitors office but also my experience in Kenya were wonderful experiences because I really didn't know much about Africa except what I had read in Ernest Hemingway and that was my exposure to Africa; so it was a very different feeling to be there.

Q: At least Hemingway was writing about your part of Africa.

MORRIS: Yes, he was.

*Q: The *Snows of Kilimanjaro* and that sort of thing.*

MORRIS: Yes, that's right. It was very nice to at least have that background. Of course, being in Africa in the independence period was quite a different experience.

Q: Did you get involved, I think in the visitors program, not just about Africa, but in fact all of them sometimes you have these people who come in from outside and for one reason or another take the wrong subway or something like that and get into problems. Did you have to clean up any problems?

MORRIS: No, I don't think so. There were very good people at USICA who actually went out to the airport in most cases to meet these visitors. I'm not sure that this is always done anymore, but they would help them get to their hotels and make sure that they were well situated before they would show up for their program meeting.

Q: You went out to Nairobi when?

MORRIS: It was at the beginning of October.

Q: Of 1980?

MORRIS: Of 1980, yes.

Q: And you were there until when?

MORRIS: I was there for almost four years until June of 1984. During the time that I was there I started out with my assignment as a junior officer trainee, which actually turned out to be a really fascinating assignment. What they did with new U.S. Information officers is have all of them rotate and serve for certain periods of time in different parts of the embassy as well as in both the information and the cultural sections of the U.S. information service; of course, it was still called the U.S. Information Service overseas.

I had an opportunity, for example, to work in the information section during a UN conference on renewable energy. That was very exciting because since the information officer was on home leave at the time of this conference, I got to be essentially the press officer for this major UN conference; that was a very exciting time.

Q: It was and maybe still is it is really the site of an awful lot of if something is being done African wise it was often considered the best equipped capital to deal with this sort of thing.

MORRIS: Yes, yes and I would say that that was certainly the case. At the time that I went there, Daniel Arap Moi had been president for two years. He had been the Vice President and came into power with the death of the first president, Jomo Kenyatta. At the beginning of his term things were still relatively good. The economy was still in relatively good condition; the political system had a lot of democratic aspects. There was a parliament; there was a relatively free press as long as the press wasn't too critical of the president; so things were still relatively stable. It was, of course, a very nice place, there were still very nice homes there and it was a wonderful place to go on safari. We went on several safaris that were really wonderful experiences. In many ways Kenya was an absolutely marvelous place to be.

I loved being in the Foreign Service. I would get up in the morning to get ready to go to work and I would think, "I would pay somebody to let me do this; I'm having so much fun;" it was really a great experience. To get back to some of the things I was doing, for the election of 1980 there was an American cultural center in Nairobi...

Q: This was between Carter and Ronald Reagan?

MORRIS: That's correct, yes. We had an election watch program at the Cultural Center and we invited a lot of people to attend the election watch and, of course, had the television, and this was in the days before CNN so it wasn't all that easy. We had to depend a lot on the Voice of America to get the news, but it was a very interesting experience. I remember one of the people who attended was Oginga Odinga who was a very strong opposition leader at the time and was, I believe, the father of Raila Odinga who is now part of the government and was the opponent of Mwai Kibaki during the most recent Presidential election. Mwai Kibaki at the time was the vice president, the man who is now the current president of Kenya. I believe Mwai Kibaki also came to our election watch. It was very exciting and a wonderful opportunity to meet these people. I was impressed with how interested they were in the American electoral system and in the American system of democracy. That was a very nice experience.

Q: Did you have any problems...I was the consul general in Naples and I remember having to adjust my thinking with Ronald Reagan running for president because the Italians the night of the elections they were running a Ronald Reagan movie on one of his swashbuckling things about World War II. I had to work up my spiel because I wasn't sure about Ronald Reagan personally but you do what you have to do. I was explaining to the Italians, the ones I met, Ronald Reagan was a governor of a state that had a higher gross product than Italy.

MORRIS: Yes.

Q: That sort of thing but was Ronald Reagan sort of a known figure or not?

MORRIS: No, he really wasn't. Of course I knew Ronald Reagan mainly as the governor of California because I came from California so I was very much aware of his role in California; actually I'm not sure that I've seen any of his movies. I wasn't so aware of his role in the movies.

But, no, he was not a very well known figure so certainly we had to provide information to the Kenyans about Ronald Reagan, particularly after his election.

Q: What about here you are in Kenya at that time. How did you find the media, the press, the TV, the radio?

MORRIS: I remember that there was a sort of opposition newspaper; it was a weekly. It was quite interesting and often quite critical not only of the Kenyan government but of the United States. There was a daily paper, I believe it was called The Nairobi Times, which was sort of the standard. It was kind of a middle of the road newspaper, I would say, relatively balanced and included some international news, not a lot of international news but they certainly picked up news from the wire services. Of course, there were American correspondents there from AP and from UPI; I think there was a New York Times correspondent there. We had a Washington Post correspondent; of course, Voice of America was there; so there was a fairly large international press corps there as well. For our international news – this was in the days of the wireless file, so we depended on the wireless file for much of our official news and international news.

Q: How did we view the press in Kenya? Was it reachable?

MORRIS: Yes, it was relatively reachable. They wouldn't, of course, always print our press releases but usually they were pretty good about carrying our press releases if we sent them.

Q: Did you sense was there a difference between the view of the Kenyans toward the United States and Great Britain? Were we differentiated because we had not been a colonial power or not?

MORRIS: Yes I think so. I think that we were considered the democratic model, not perfect, not a perfect model but we were considered really the democratic model. This was also a period well it was really right after a lot of Kenyans and other East Africans had gone to the United States to study on the famous East African airlift. One of the things that I was able to do also – still in my “junior officer trainee” period when I was working in the political section – was a long paper on the education of the Kenyan elite, which was a fascinating thing to do. That included a lot of information about the airlift and which Kenyan leaders had studied in the United States. There were a lot of Kenyans who had studied in the U.S., including people in the government who had studied in the United States and who knew the United States and were quite favorably disposed toward the United States.

Q: Would you explain about the airlift, it has certain relevance today.

MORRIS: Yes, it does.

Q: You might explain that too.

MORRIS: Yes, well the airlift actually was the brainchild of Tom Mboya, who was one of the independence leaders in Kenya which, of course, was still part of British East Africa at the time. He went to the United States and appealed to leaders there, including John Kennedy and Robert

Kennedy, for scholarship funds and funding for the plane travel to be able to send people from East Africa – Kenya, what became Tanzania, Tanganyika at the time, and Uganda – to go to the United States for study. There was funding that was provided – some of it came from the government. I believe some of it came from the Kennedy family's own resources, some came from various colleges and universities; so several hundred young people from East Africa were able to go to the United States to study; one of those people was Barack Obama's father. I think it was a very important initiative.

Q: This was done in the late '50s?

MORRIS: Late '50s and in the '60s also. I can't remember when Barack Obama's father went to Hawaii but, yes, it started in the late '50s and then continued in the early '60s. So, just as Africa was making that transition from being a colony to an independent nation.

Q: What was your impression of the impression of this trip to the United States had had on these young people; mostly men I suppose?

MORRIS: Mostly men; there were a few women but very, very few. Of course, there were Kenyan women later who went to the United States but not many on these early airlifts. I think certainly it provided them with an excellent education and knowing about this program made me more convinced than ever of the important role of educational exchanges, the value of sending people from other countries to the United States for study.

Q: This I've said in many of these interviews and I will make this aside but I think this is probably if not the most one of the two or three most important arrows(?) in our foreign policy program.

MORRIS: Absolutely, it's very important. Of course, these people and anyone... I found this throughout my Foreign Service career, that people who have studied in the United States don't come back necessarily as fans of the administration that happens to be in power or of all aspects of the U.S. policy. Sometimes they are very strong critics, but they understand the American psyche, they understand American democracy. They are people that we can engage with really on an equal level because they have an understanding of us. I think it is just so absolutely valuable, the fact that they understand American democracy. I think that many of these former scholars are so convinced of the value of American democracy that that's where their great disappointment and frustration sometimes with the U.S stems from – they feel we are not always living up to our own ideals, our own constitution.

Q: What were you doing, were you involved with trying to place articles and that sort of thing?

MORRIS: I was not the press officer, except really during this UN conference. I know that our information officer was placing articles with the media and arranging interviews and the standard thing that the press officer does. But that was not specifically my role at the time that I was there.

After my junior officer training experience, I had an opportunity to have a real job; my real job there was as the director of the American center. This was absolutely a wonderful job. I've loved

all of my jobs in the Foreign Service but I will have to say this was one of the best; it was a fabulous job. The American center, it was called the American cultural center though we were really supposed to be doing information, but it was over in a separate building in what was called the national bank building so it was about two blocks away from the embassy proper. We had a library of about 6,000 volumes of American books about American policy but also American literature. We did outreach by sending information to Kenyans about the United States. But also we had a small auditorium and so we were able to do all kinds of programs; that was the part that I really enjoyed.

Q: I imagine Nairobi being such an attraction that you get quite a few pretty good lecturers and also English being a language there. In many ways you didn't have to really work, I mean I use that in the wrong term but you didn't have to try...it would be hard to get people to come to Chad.

MORRIS: Right.

Q: Who spoke French or could do something but to go to Nairobi particularly in those days I think you would get good authors, good speakers, how did that work?

MORRIS: Of course we did it mainly through what they called the American participants program, which was part of USIA, and they would recruit. I should say with Reagan in office we went back to USIA, it was no longer the U.S. International Communication Agency. We did get some speakers; I don't remember any terribly notable speakers that we had except for Coretta Scott King who...

Q: The widow of Martin Luther King...

MORRIS: ...yes, yes she gave a talk at the American center and it was very nice having her. I don't remember any other notable speakers that we had. We did other things; we had an exhibit of books, for example, that had been published by various American University Presses; some very good books, very good quality books. One of the officers of the American University Press association came out to talk about this collection of books. That was very nice and we were able to invite people to the opening of the book exhibit and have a small reception; so it was a very nice occasion. We had a photo exhibit and I would put together film programs. Yes...

Q: You're back. Did you get to show Casablanca?

MORRIS: We showed both Casablanca and The Grapes of Wrath. Some of these were films that made the circuit because in those days USIA still had films that would go from one country to another. These were the sixteen millimeter films and so I guess I was glad that I knew how to thread a film projector although I did have someone on my staff who also had had training, a Kenyan, in running the film projector. We showed these films on the sixteen-millimeter film projector. Sometimes we would have special themes. I remember one time we arranged an American literature in film festival; we would have a different film each week. I think that's when we did The Grapes of Wrath and A Place in the Sun (based on Theodore Dreiser's An American Tragedy). I can't remember what the other ones were, but they were all American

films based on various works of American literature. I think we did Moby Dick and The Great Gatsby as well. It was very interesting and just a lot of fun.

Q: How did you treat I think this would be both responsive but also a ticklish audience about race relations in the United States as they were at the time. When you talk about a movie I'm thinking one that might have been on your circuit or not To Kill A Mockingbird. It's not...

MORRIS: We did show that.

Q: ...I was wondering these things you...

MORRIS: Yes, and there was definitely a feeling in Kenya that America still had a lot of problems with racism and there were concerns about that. Of course, Kenyans, having been part of a British Colony, had had some of their own experiences with racism; so I think they were certainly sensitive to it. Sometimes we even felt that there was this "edge," the kind of feeling of "can I trust you, how do you perceive me?" It took a while to get beyond that, to develop real friendships with Kenyans because of that sort of perceived feeling.

Q: How did you find your Foreign Service nationals as being the Kenyans who were employed by the embassy?

MORRIS: Some of them were very good. My two senior people had studied in the United States – I think one at Michigan State and the other one at Indiana – so these were people who were well educated; they again had some understanding of the United States. They were very good people to work with and very nice people. I think again like most Kenyans they had some reservations about American society particularly about American treatment of African-Americans. But nonetheless they were people with whom I felt I was able to develop a good relationship.

Q: Did you find yourself in competition with the British Council, which is the equivalent to our program or not? How did that work out?

MORRIS: I guess not really in competition. Actually there was a British Counsel, there was an Alliance Française and there was the Goethe Institute. All of those institutions, I would say, had a lot more resources than I did and the heads of those three institutions also functioned as the cultural attachés for their Embassies, because they had responsibility for the scholarship programs also, where as I did not; that was run by our cultural affairs officer who was over at the embassy. I only had responsibility for my little cultural center. But it was very nice because actually we used to get together on a regular basis. The heads of these four cultural centers in Nairobi would get together for lunch on a monthly basis and it was just delightful. All of my counterparts at the other centers were very nice people and very good people to get to know and I learned a lot from all of them.

Q: Did you have a feel for the universities there or the university?

MORRIS: There were two universities; there was the University of Nairobi and then another

institution called Kenyatta National University. The University of Nairobi was kind of the center of intellectual ferment. From time to time there would be demonstrations at the University of Nairobi and the government would threaten to close down the campus; I don't think that ever happened during the time I was there. But it was very much where the intellectuals were; this is where the people would be more on the radical side. Certainly on the left would be people who would be critical both of the Kenyan government and also of the U.S. government. But it was a very interesting place. Again, the Fulbright program was not under my administration, but we did have American Fulbright lecturers who were there; so there was an American presence on campus.

The Kenyatta National University had been a teachers college and even though it had been upgraded to university status, it was still much more focused on teacher training and it was not...it was outside of town so it wasn't right in the middle of town where it could stop traffic if they had big student demonstrations. It was much more conservative, much less the sort of center of ferment but also not the intellectual center that the University of Nairobi was.

Q: Did tribal matters play a part in what you were doing? Who came when, who did what and that sort of thing or not?

MORRIS: Certainly, I was very much aware of the tribal differences and some of the problems between the tribes because I could even see it in my staff, for example. One of my senior staff members was a Kikuyu, the dominant tribe and the of Mwai Kibaki who was the vice president. Another one of my senior staff members was a Luo from the western part of Kenya and you could see the friction between them. There were other members of the staff who were Kikuyu, Luo or Abaluhya or one of the other tribes from the west. I could feel the ethnic tension even within my own staff and the staff of the embassy at large.

As far as other kinds of activities, it was something that I was aware of but it really had a greater impact, I guess, in 1981, when there was an attempted coup against Daniel Arap Moi. It was by a group of people from the Air Force trying to overthrow Moi. There was a situation of chaos for a day and then Moi was able to reassert control. But after that he became, I think it is fair to say, very concerned and really kind of paranoid about people from outside of his own tribal group. He was a Kalenjin, which is a very small tribe from the western part of Kenya. So he began to surround himself with his fellow tribes people in the government. This was really kind of the beginning of a lot of very serious corruption, nepotism and a lot of the economic and political problems that went along with that. I think all of us then became much more aware of the role of tribalism in Kenya after that attempted coup.

Of course, it was difficult when we would have various kinds of scholarship programs or even short-term grants. There was a program called the Eisenhower Fellowship; I don't know if it is still in existence but it was a wonderful program run by the Eisenhower Fellowship Foundation, a private foundation that sends people from different countries to the United States for basically a ten-week kind of professional studies tour. It was kind of like a long IV (international visitors) program that really included very intensive meetings and discussions with professional counterparts; it was very prestigious. The selection is made by a bi-national committee of Americans and people from the host country. In choosing the recipients, something we had to be

very mindful of was the role of tribal tensions. If you had someone on the committee from one tribe, then there was a tendency to want to select a fellowship recipient from that same tribe. You could feel that there were these tensions, with people very much mistrusting people from the other tribes.

Q: Then did the heavy hand of the Cold War hit you all there with the Soviet Union and all?

MORRIS: Yes, certainly the Soviets were there; they had a very active program. It was something that we were aware of. For example, the press (particularly the more leftist media) would flirt with the Communists. Oginga Odinga, the opposition leader, was quite close to the Soviet embassy. I certainly don't think that the majority of Kenyans (or even a minority) wanted to have a Communist government, but particularly if they became disillusioned with the United States or the Kenyan Government about something, there was this kind of flirtation with the other side.

Q: This is almost the left. My understanding and again earlier on I got some reflection on this in various places. The Soviets were not very successful in bringing students from Africa to Lumumba University because the Russians are violently xenophobic and they are just not well treated there.

MORRIS: There were some who had gone there but not so many in Kenya as in Uganda, which we will get to later. There were certainly some who went to Patrice Lumumba University but I would say not very many.

Q: And didn't take very well or at least my understanding that the experience wasn't overly positive.

MORRIS: Not particularly positive. Of course, most of them didn't learn Russian so their experience was quite limited.

Q: Were you teaching English...did you have an English language institute?

MORRIS: No, we did not.

Q: How good was English training would you say in the country?

MORRIS: English was certainly taught in the schools; at the best schools it was the language of instruction. It was certainly the language of instruction at the universities. The well educated people had very good English, British English. Among the less well educated people, and particularly if you got outside of Nairobi, then the level of English was not so good. You could communicate in English but the English was not so good.

Q: Was Swahili useful or not?

MORRIS: Yes, Swahili and English were really the national languages. For example, my staff, if they all communicated with each other, in most cases they would use Swahili rather than

English. If the Kikuyus were communicating with other Kikuyus they would use Kikuyu and the Luos would use Kiluo. But if they were all trying to talk to each other they would use Swahili.

Q: What was the East Asian or East Indian, I'm not sure but anyway, basically the Indian influence there? I know they were heavy in Uganda at one point, I can't remember when Amin kicked them out from there. Was that during your time or not?

MORRIS: No, that had been before and it was very interesting, actually both in Kenya and Uganda and probably all over East Africa. They were referred to as Asians; they were not described as Indians or Pakistanis, they were considered Asians. Some of them of course, had come from India, some of them had come from Pakistan, but they were all called Asians. There were certainly quite a number who were in business. There were a couple who were in the media. I remember Salim Lone was a journalist from, I believe his family originally came from Pakistan, and he was a journalist with one of the local newspapers. He later became a spokesperson for the UN. There was another Asian-Kenyan named Mohammed Amin who is a very famous photographer. He did a lot of wildlife photography as well as other photography. There were certainly quite a few Asians; they were in the minority but there were quite a few. At the time, one sensed that there was some resentment by the African-Kenyans because a lot of these people were fairly well to do, but basically people got along pretty well. We had some Asian-Kenyans who worked at the embassy, some from Goa. Those people were Christians and some of the others from India would be Hindus; there were some Muslims as well and many more Muslims on the coast of Kenya.

Q: What else were you doing? I'm really out of questions on this particular...

MORRIS: Of course I was working as the director of the American cultural center. Kenya was a wonderful country for travel, so I enjoyed doing that very much, going down to the coast of Kenya – Mombasa and Lamu – which are very, very different from the highlands, from the Kenyan highlands; so that was a wonderful experience.

I remember one time my husband and I went with another couple – it was actually the public affairs officer and his wife – to a game park and we decided that we were going to camp out in this game park. This was in the Masai Mara, which is the biggest game park in Kenya. We had our camp built, two tents, and we decided we were going to have a nice dinner, so we built a campfire and cooked our steaks and had our steaks with a nice bottle of Pinot Noir. It was a wonderful evening but around three o'clock in the morning we heard something outside of our tent. This was actually in the days when people were very worried about the Somalis, they called them shiftas, these were basically Somali bandits who came across the border and attacked people; I think there had been one attack of some tourists up to that point. That was my immediate first thought – that this was a Somali shifita. But then – and particularly when I heard sort of a sniffing sound – I thought well maybe it was an animal. So my husband stuck his head outside the tent and the wife of the public affairs officer said, "Don't come out, Chuck, we are surrounded by lions." There was a mother lion and her two half grown cubs who were within our campsite. Apparently we had not cleaned off the grill as well as we should have and there was still some smell of that wonderful steak that we had enjoyed. The lions, I guess, were scared by the sound of the human voice and left shortly after that carrying away our lawn chairs we had

brought to sit on – very light aluminum lawn chairs – in their mouths. I don't think we slept the rest of the night or the next night either. Anyway, that was quite a dramatic experience. We saw lots of lions.

Q: Tell me going way back to this UN conference what was this about that you found yourself in charge of or...

MORRIS: Well I wasn't in charge but I was kind of in charge of the press. It was a UN conference on renewable energy. This is way back in July of 1981 and the UN had a conference on a subject that is still obviously very relevant today. There was a U.S. delegation, headed by an ambassador, and a number of other people who came with the U.S. delegation; then, of course, there were journalists who came. It was an interesting conference; I don't know that the United States got everything out of it that we wanted. Obviously, there was a lot of push by some countries to do more work on renewable sources of energy, which the United States was perhaps not as supportive of then as some of these other countries might have liked.

Q: Who was our ambassador when you arrived there?

MORRIS: It was William Harrop, a very fine career diplomat.

Q: I've interviewed Bill.

MORRIS: Robert Houdek was the DCM. They were very good people to work with.

Q: Were they there or did they change while you were there?

MORRIS: Bob Houdek was there for the whole time. Bill Harrop left and it was Ambassador Gerald Thomas who replaced him. Ambassador Thomas was a political appointee.

Q: Gerald Thomas.

MORRIS: Yes.

Q: Did both give due accord to the USIA program?

MORRIS: Yes; I would say that Bill Harrop was a particularly very fine supporter of all aspects of the program. He attended all of the events that we had at the American center and was very, very supportive of the program. Gerry Thomas was also interested but I think he was more interested in the media side.

Q: What was life like in Kenya at the time? Now we are deluged with stories about attacks, carjacking, rapes all these things. What was the situation then?

MORRIS: As I mentioned, the situation was relatively OK when I first got there. Then because of a lot of economic problems and I'm sure many other kinds of problems played into it as well, the crime situation deteriorated quite significantly during the four years that I was there. During

the same UN energy conference there was, I think, certainly the first carjacking that affected the U.S. embassy directly. This was a reporter who had come out from the wireless file to do a story on the UN energy conference, a woman named Everly Driscoll. She was in a car with the Voice of America correspondent. The car was followed by another car and when they got to the driveway of the VOA correspondent, a man got out of the other car, came over to the window where Ms. Driscoll was riding and told her to roll down the window. She did not roll down the window and they shot her through the glass and she died later at the hospital. That was a terribly, terribly dramatic and tragic event that I think certainly made all of us at the embassy very aware of the deteriorating crime situation.

Then there were other examples; there were break-ins at various homes of people in the embassy including a very dramatic break-in at the home of our political counselor. The groups that carried out the break-ins were called “panga gangs” and these were basically groups of Kenyans who had hatchets they called pangas, the kind of thing that they would use to cut the grass with. They were actually trying to chop down the door of the safe haven. It was a time when people were very much aware of the crime situation. That situation I would say deteriorated with the increasing corruption and nepotism. The economic situation started getting worse and the crime situation also got worse.

Q: Let's take you and your husband. What did you do? Did you have a strong room?

MORRIS: Yes, everybody in the embassy, all the embassy houses, had safe havens. This was the locked area, with a very heavy door, and you had to set your alarm at night. They were taking the security seriously. We had a night guard, of course, not that the night guard was very helpful because the night guard was not armed, so if there had been a panga gang, for example, I don't think the night guard would have been able to do much.

Q: Did that circumscribe how you worked functions at night and that sort of thing?

MORRIS: It didn't really that much. No, certainly, for example, one would never and particularly a woman would never walk around alone at night in the city. So if you went out for dinner you would make sure that you were with somebody else and you would not walk around by yourself. You would park near wherever you were going and you would be very careful obviously because there were stories – very true stories – of a woman having a gold chain ripped off her neck even in broad daylight. So I think that was the other thing; you were very careful about not wearing flashy jewelry and that sort of thing. It was something that people were certainly very conscience of.

Q: Well then where did you go then, this is in '84?

MORRIS: Right.

Q: This is a pretty long time to be in well your trainee period and...

MORRIS: I really had two assignments in Nairobi.

Q: Well how old were you at the time?

MORRIS: I was 32 when I joined the Foreign Service.

Q: So in many ways you really didn't need that and you'd been a Foreign Service spouse and all that. It probably made more sense to show you all the ropes and all that. Where did you go after that?

MORRIS: Then we went back to Washington. But I want to say one other thing about Kenya, to provide the flavor of the life there. There were still a lot of British people and other expatriates who lived there. There was quite a large expatriate community. There was a pretty active social life that included a lot of these expatriates but also, and this was very nice for me, there was also really a wonderful musical community. Since music was and still is one of my great interests, this was wonderful. There was an orchestra; they called it the Nairobi symphony orchestra. My understanding was that at the time it was the only full-scale orchestra in sub-Saharan Africa, and so I played in the orchestra.

Q: What instrument?

MORRIS: Cello.

Q: Cello.

MORRIS: Cello. We did some really nice things. We did all the serious orchestral works – the Brahms symphonies, Beethoven, Mozart – so that was a great experience. The orchestra I would have to say was mainly expatriates, there were perhaps a few Kenyans, but it was primarily expatriates. Then also I did a lot of chamber music with, again, other diplomats. There was a couple of Dutch diplomats and I was part of a piano trio with them – piano, violin and cello – and we had some wonderful times playing together. Then I played in a string quartet with some British people. They, probably it was not very nice, but the Americans would refer to these people as the “old Brits,” but although they had been there for a while, they weren't really old. But they were wonderful people, wonderful musicians, and it was a great experience.

There was a choir there, the Nairobi music society. So every year or a couple times a year the orchestra would accompany the choir. We would do the major choral works: Haydn's Creation, the Brahms German Requiem, and of course, we would do the Messiah at Christmas; we also did Mendelssohn's Elijah. It was a wonderful experience.

Q: On the music side were the Kenyans...one gets these wonderful recordings and all, I'm not familiar with them but I don't know what you would call it but the African vocal sounds which are quite distinct.

MORRIS: Wonderful.

Q: Was that part of the ...

MORRIS: It was very much part of the culture and, in fact, there would be these big choir festivals, choirs from different churches and schools would come together and compete. It was a wonderful sound, beautiful harmonies, so yes, there was some really marvelous singing.

Q: Were churches important there?

MORRIS: Yes, there was the Anglican Church and there were quite a few Kenyans who were members of the Anglican Church. There were also more Evangelical Churches, Protestant and Evangelical Churches. Of course, there had been some American missionaries in Kenya. I think the Presbyterians had been there; I don't know if the Baptists had been there but they had played a role in education, in setting up some of the schools during the colonial period. There were still some missionaries there; there were even some Mennonite missionaries there. But the majority of Kenyans were Christian; there were, as I mentioned, some Muslims, there were a few Hindus, not too many Catholics but there were a few. The majority of people were affiliated with a Protestant denomination.

Q: Moving away from Ecclesiastical was there any residue of what was known as Happy Valley there? This is the British colony where swapping around of various couples. I mean the whole thing sounded sort of exotic...

MORRIS: The Out of Africa sort of Happy Valley.

Q: Was there any of that around?

MORRIS: I think there were still some people who had been there during that period.

Q: Getting a little long of tooth.

MORRIS: Yes, but I would say that that kind of activity at least as far as any kind of public show of it had more or less died out.

Q: How about sort of the British Colony? Was it getting assimilated at least into the international set or did it stay off to itself more or what?

MORRIS: You mean the...

Q: I'm thinking the Brits who were there. Was it...

MORRIS: Had they become integrated with the Kenyans?

Q: Well, integrated is almost not the right term but at least part of the international set as opposed to a specific...

MORRIS: Yes, very much so. For example, certainly in these musical circles they were very much integrated with foreign diplomats. So, yes, and many of them were in government holding various positions in government still. For example, the chief justice of the high court was British.

Others were teachers at various schools so yes I would say they were very integrated with the international diplomatic community.

ROBERT E. GRIBBIN
Consul
Mombasa (1981-1984)

Ambassador Gribbin was born in 1946 in North Carolina and graduated from the University of the South in Sewanee, Tennessee and SAIS. He served in numerous posts including Bangui, Kigali, Mombasa and Kampala. He was named ambassador to the Central African Republic in 1993 and ambassador to Rwanda in 1996. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: *Well, then, in 1981, where to?*

GRIBBIN: In the summer of 1981, I went directly to Mombasa, Kenya.

Q: *Aha. And you were there from 1981 to -*

GRIBBIN: 1984. Ambassador Bill Harrop in Nairobi and his deputy, Bob Houdek were interested in establishing a consulate in Mombasa, principally because the United States had signed agreements with Kenya, Somalia and Oman for military access in the Indian Ocean. These defense agreements came in the wake of the Iranian hostage affair and reflected the possibility that the U.S. would need to deploy military force in that part of the world in the years to come. Mombasa, of course, was the preferred harbor of all of these nations. U.S. naval ships regularly visited, but the ambassador wanted to be sure that we had our finger on the pulse of the coast. If an officer were permanently posted to Mombasa, he could keep an eye not only on events on the coast but on other U.S. entities, including the U.S. Navy. Ambassador Harrop asked me to open a consulate and take on that responsibility.

Q: *What was the situation in Kenya when you arrived in 1981?*

GRIBBIN: President Moi had taken over from Kenyatta four or five years earlier. Kenya was a fairly stable country and very pro-American in some respects. It followed what we thought was the right path in terms of economic development. It focused on the private sector. Political cronyism and corruption were problems in Kenya under Kenyatta, and remained so under Moi.

Kenya was very much a going concern. The economy was growing, but growth was internal. Kenya's markets were limited to itself, Uganda and Tanzania. Industry was protected. Those who wanted to open up to the rest of the world were in the minority. But by and large, American relations with Kenya were excellent - positive and forward-looking. Kenya was supportive of our intent to deploy more military assets in the Indian Ocean.

Q: *Why was it in the interest of the Government of Kenya to support our military buildup?*

GRIBBIN: We were one of Kenya's largest donors of development aid. Additionally, over time we had developed a considerable military assistance program. We had an F-5 fighter jet program, for example, in Kenya. So the access agreement was a logical step in the progression of our relationship.

Q: How did you find opening up a consulate in Mombasa? Was it a consulate or consulate general?

GRIBBIN: It was a consulate.

Q: How did you go about this?

GRIBBIN: This was the third time America had a consulate in Mombasa. The first time occurred when the consulate in Zanzibar, which was opened in 1837, moved to Mombasa during World War I. It moved over in 1915 and stayed till 1919-1920 and moved back to Zanzibar. Then we opened a consulate again, I think, in 1942, primarily to buy war supplies - skins and hides and pyrethrum, which is a natural insecticide that was needed in the Pacific. That consulate stayed open until about 1952. When I opened again in 1981, it was also for strategic reasons, related to the troublesome situation in Iran and in the Middle East. Jim Mark, who was the admin counselor in Nairobi, and I went down to rent space, find housing and set things up. The U.S. already had a Navy office, in the sense that we employed a local shipping agent to buy up stores and fresh fruits and vegetables and to make arrangements for port calls. I worked out of Chris Soper's office for a while, but soon we found a building and leased housing. I advertised in the paper and hired staff. In the course of a couple of months I went from the Navy agent's office to operating a small consulate. I started alone. A secretary and eventually a communicator were assigned, but not for a while. My fiefdom grew. In addition to State Department employees, I was joined by a senior chief from the U.S. Navy, who was responsible for ship visits, and a naval construction team that spent \$50 million on various projects, mostly having to do with widening the harbor entrance, building ramp space at the airport and a parallel runway so we could use the airport without conflicting with regular commercial traffic. Finally, I added an associate Peace Corps director. We had a small American team, but spent a lot of money - \$50 million was a lot of money even in Mombasa. In the course of my tenure, about 60 American naval ships came for shore visits. Often they arrived in groups of 10 or 11 with up to 13,000 sailors.

Q: Good God! Well, having been in Athens and watched port visits there and all the problems, I'm thinking of what it must have been like. Did you have any particular problems with all these young men come ashore?

GRIBBIN: We did, we did. I think by and large our sailors acquitted themselves well, but then I have dozens of stories that relate to ship visits. Once we had a tender come in, and tenders, you know, travel independently of the fleet because they're not warships, they're support vessels. The Navy assigned the first women sailors to tenders. The first one in Mombasa with women aboard had about 200 on it, out of a crew of 1,000. The women were on shore leave and wandering around town in their uniforms and so forth, and the fleet was due in the next day or two. Rosemary, my receptionist called. She said, "Mr. Gribbin, there's a delegation out here to see

you." I said, "Oh, who is it?" "Well, I can't tell you over the phone. Maybe you had better come meet them." I asked, "What's it about?" She replied, "It's about the ships visit." I said, "I'd be glad to see them." It turned out to be a delegation of prostitutes, who came to tell me it wasn't fair that we brought our own women. That was their job. I assured them that there would be plenty of business for everybody.

Serious incidents also occurred. During the visit of the battle group around the *USS America*, a prostitute died. The police decided that she'd been killed, murdered. Then pursuing a long chain of circumstantial evidence, they decided that the killer was a sailor off the *USS America*. In cooperation with the Kenyan police, the Naval Investigation Services screened men to find out who was ashore that night and where they might have been and so forth. Two witnesses might be able to identify the perpetrator of the crime outside the little hotel where the death happened. One was the night watchman, and the other a taxicab driver who picked up a man near the hotel and drove him back to the rendezvous point where he could get the bus down to the dock. The driver was paid - the guy didn't have any money - with a lighter with the insignia of the *USS America*. Armed with that evidence, the Navy agreed to do a walk past on the *America*. That was done, but the witnesses did not identify anyone. But as they were sitting in the ward room waiting to go ashore, the ship's executive officer brought in two or three young men who hadn't made the identification parade, but who had been ashore the night before. So asked, "Is it one of them?" One of the eye-witnesses said, "Yes, it looks like him." Which was less than a clear identification. Remember, these two witnesses were sitting there with two Kenyan cops, and they knew that if they went ashore without having identified somebody, they would be in trouble. The upshot of all of this was that this young man - his name was Tyson - was ultimately taken ashore, left in my custody when the fleet left, and then when properly charged and so forth, transferred to the Kenyan Police custody, imprisoned and tried for murder. In what would be amazing in any judicial system - the event happened in April - the trial got underway in late June. It was a fairly complicated trial in and of itself, but hanging over it all was the fact -before I had gotten to Mombasa - sometime in 1978, on an earlier ship visit, there was a similar death of a prostitute killed by an American sailor. In that case the sailor admitted to the crime, and was convicted of manslaughter by a British judge sitting on the Kenyan bench. For punishment he was slapped on the wrist and told to go home and not do it again. People remembered the earlier case and so hanging over Tyson's trial were emotional issues of justice, racial equity, and kow-towing to the U.S. It was clearly politically important for Kenya to get a conviction. What was also evident to me and to others was that whereas someone from the *USS America* might have been involved in this crime, it was not completely clear how the girl had been killed. She was certainly dead, but it also appeared that she may have asphyxiated in her own vomit. Autopsy reports conflicted on that point. But it was clear that some Kenyans would be determined to get a conviction no matter what. Those of us who had gotten to know this young man and who had studied his alibi story strongly believed that he was innocent. The court heard all the evidence. Essentially the Kenyan prosecution did not try to refute Tyson's story; they just tried to add the murder event into the middle of it. This got fairly ridiculous, but it still seemed possible that Tyson could be convicted. There was no jury; but three assessors gave non-binding opinions. One wouldn't make a decision, one said that the American hadn't done it, and the other one said that he must have done it. The judge, this time a Kenyan judge, decided that the police had not proved Tyson's guilt. Therefore, although not acquitted, he was released. Tyson went back to America and then on to whatever he's done subsequently in his life. It was a learning experience for him. He admitted

that he had not been serious about life, but he said there is nothing like a murder charge to sober you up and get your attention. So if anything good came out of this, Tyson emerged a changed man.

Q: How did the Kenyans, the shopkeepers and all, with all these people coming in? Did it seem to work fairly well with the Americans?

GRIBBIN: Ship visits were marvelous for the economy of Mombasa. 10,000 to 13,000 sailors came ashore. They bought everything there was to buy - tee shirts, jewelry, souvenirs, wood and soap stone carvings. The price of everything, of course, quadrupled or quintupled as soon as they hit shore. They ate in the restaurants, they rented cars, they drove up and down the coast and visited hotels. They went to the casinos, and out to the game parks. Everybody liked ship visits. The sailors also did some good works. They painted orphanages, visited schools, played local teams in basketball, delivered books, medical supplies and so forth. Except for the one or two negative incidents, ship visits were very popular events.

Mombasa was a cosmopolitan and tolerant place. It had been for centuries. It was a place where people of all races and religions met over the centuries and intermingled in the marketplace.

Q: What was the politics of Mombasa and the surrounding area as compared to Nairobi?

GRIBBIN: Our concern was that the coast was Islamic, and so if we were looking at the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East, and particularly of Shiite sects, and there were some Shiite groups in Mombasa, that we needed to understand their positions and that they needed to hear from us. I developed a good relationship with the MPs - members of parliament - from the coast, with the provincial commissioner who was the political representative of government at the coast - and his staff, the mayor and city councilors the police, and the Kenyan Navy. Even though I was a one-man diplomat in the consulate, I had a vast variety of people to deal with and interact with on a range of issues. Certainly one of the things I tracked was sentiment about the U.S. presence.

Q: Was there a feeling of growing Islam, greater Islam, at that time?

GRIBBIN: Yes, I did detect that. Yet, as I said, the coastal Kenyans were tolerant people. They had run into all sorts of people over the years, and were not generally attracted to the more militant forms of Islam. However, certainly some ascetic preachers came to visit and their ideas were heard and appealed to a radical fringe. If you recall the bombings in Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi many years later, some of the perpetrators of those crimes were from the coast.

Q: Well, then, were there any other issues that you had to deal with?

GRIBBIN: I was the consul, so I had to deal with consular issues, and even though Nairobi issued visas, I would give advice on NIVs. However, the coast was my consular district when it came to deaths. In the period of time I was at the coast there was one death in the Nairobi consular district, which comprised the bulk of Kenya, and seven in mine. I got to be something of an expert in providing all the necessary mortuary and other certificates and making the

arrangements for the return of bodies to the U.S., which occasionally was very difficult.

Q: *Why were there so many deaths?*

GRIBBIN: Three of the deaths were American merchant seamen who died of alcohol related illnesses. One man, in fact, died in Madagascar and had a death certificate from Madagascar, but his captain brought him to Mombasa in the ship's freezer. If you think it's hard to get a corpse out of the country, try bringing one in with the wrong papers.

I had one particularly tragic case of a young girl of 19 who was just out for the summer. She contracted cerebral malaria and died in about three days. And others were more predictable deaths, of people with illness or in accidents.

Q: *Was there any reflection of the old Kenya - I should say, "Keenya" - where the "happy valley" and the-*

GRIBBIN: They all lived in Mombasa.

Q: *I was wondering about the old, dissolute British aristocracy, remittance-type people, who were sent to get the hell away from the family.*

GRIBBIN: Mombasa was composed of many different groups, one of which was the resident white Kenyans, the British Kenyans. Most of them were people who had come to Kenya to settle, farm and raise their families. They had either been bought out or had retired and moved to the coast. Most of them had come to terms with independent Kenya. Still, there were some very, very colorful characters. Another interesting group was their children and grandchildren who had been born and raised in the more modern sector of Kenya's economy. They were what was called "Kenya cowboys." They were the guys that raced rally cars and tried to make a living as safari guides or entrepreneurs in the tourism business. Europeans from many countries were engaged in the tourist industry that catered to tens of thousands of visitors on package tours from Europe. A still different group of Europeans were in the shipping business and had lived in ports around the world. My colleagues in the consular corps, the honorary consuls - I was the only legitimate consul - were all in the shipping business. I had a foot in all of these different camps, not to mention the various Indian groups, the Arab groups, the Swahili groups, the up-country Africans - Kambas, Luos and Kikuyus - who had come to the coast to work as government officials, and the navy. It was a fascinating place.

JOSEPH F. STEPANEK
Program Officer, USAID
Nairobi (1983-1987)

Mr. Stepanek was born in Houston, Texas and was raised primarily abroad. After earning degrees from the Universities of Colorado and Minnesota, he joined USAID and was sent to Bangladesh as economist. Subsequent assignments took

him to Washington DC in USAID's policy bureau and as Chief of the Development Planning Office for Latin America. His foreign assignments were to Indonesia as Mission Economist, to Tanzania and to Zambia, where he was USAID Mission Director. He was interviewed by W. Haven North in 1997.

Q: We'll come back to that in a larger context. Well, we move on from there to Nairobi, [Kenya], where you were Program Officer despite your reservations. Where were you Program Officer?

STEPANEK: In the bilateral mission in Kenya, I worked under Allison Herrick, then Charles Gladson, and then Steve Sinding. All three of them continued my education. I learned a lot from all three. I also learned that ESF can be a very troubling program to run. I worked first with Dick Greene, and then with Kurt Toh. I had a fine office of people working under me. I had very good secretaries. The program analyst assigned to my office was marvelous. I had a marvelous program economist and a very good Deputy Program Officer, so I walked into a situation that was "robust" and remained that way during my four years in Kenya.

Q: During those four years what kind of program strategy were you trying to encourage?

STEPANEK: It involved negotiations of policies agreed to under the base rights agreements, for which ESF was the funding mechanism. I spent most of my time worrying about "leverage" and the "conditionality" of base rights - ESF - agreements, which were renegotiated annually. We also worked on a Title I agreement under the PL 480 legislation. I was involved to some extent on other subjects.

Q: What kind of "conditionality" did you seek to promote?

STEPANEK: Under ESF there was an agreement to "liberalize" the economy, which involved liberalizing the foreign exchange system and grain marketing. As best as I can remember, we accomplished nothing.

Q: Why was that?

STEPANEK: Because the Kenyans had already contributed their share of the ESF agreement, namely, access rights. They didn't feel like contributing a second time. I can't say that I blame them for that. They knew it, and we knew it, but we were much too idealistic to admit it.

There was a very famous "showdown" when Peter McPherson [USAID Administrator] visited Nairobi to review progress made under the ESF. We had briefed Peter McPherson well. Little did I realize that that was a mistake! Halfway through the meeting with senior Kenyan officials, Peter "blew his stack," slammed his hand on the table, stood up, and said, "I've got to catch a plane."

Q: Because he was not getting anywhere with the Kenyans?

STEPANEK: That's right. They were "backsliding," they were "hemming and hawing," and they had no intention of letting go of state controls on the Kenyan economy. Even today the Kenyan

economy is still pretty tightly controlled. Kenya knows that it's an attractive investment haven in Africa. It's a very attractive tourist center. Aid donors love being there. The Embassy has at least 300 people assigned. So it's one of those problems.

Q: And despite that we continue to provide assistance? This didn't affect our support for Kenya?

STEPANEK: Yes, that particular program came to an end. Following the hostage crisis with Iran and the seizure of our Embassy in Tehran, the U.S. military decided - years later - that they really didn't need Kenya any more. The State Department, not surprisingly, became the proponent of the ESF program. However, I think that even the Embassy people would have to admit that it didn't amount to much.

Over the past five or six years the AID program has been caught up in the debate about democracy, pluralism, and so forth. So the program is smaller, staffs are down, the ESF program has since been ended. I believe that it has come to an end.

Q: What was ESF mostly used for?

STEPANEK: It was used for fertilizer and the procurement of replacement parts for American made machinery. We set up an elaborate, administrative program to run the CIP [Commodity Import Program], in spite of other problems. Again, we were building "barnacles upon barnacles" for what should have been an open trade system.

Q: Why was this? Was it because of the Kenyan situation in general?

STEPANEK: It also was tied to USAID. We had to police the program to insure that there were competitive bids, quality controls, and sole source procurement. It was a good example of how not to conduct an aid program. There was a rural enterprise program which was fine in concept, but it proved to be a nightmare, bureaucratically. I'm not sure that it ever did get going.

Q: Why was it a nightmare?

STEPANEK: There were committees on committees, complicated rules and regulations, oversight arrangements and approvals, return flows of moneys, and all of those aspects. It was so complicated that very few people in the USAID Mission ever understood what it was about.

On the "good news" side we set up an umbrella organization for NGO's [Non Governmental Organizations]. I think that it was one of the first in the world. We were able to provide a lot of money outside the grip of government. We tried to get a scholarship program going, but I don't think that it was ever launched.

This was a period, though, following on Bangladesh and Indonesia, when Gary Merritt and others, with Steve Sinding's support of course, got a very major family planning program going. I think that that's still working well, though I may be wrong. We also supported Edgerton College agricultural graduates.

Q: Was this a time when it was "embarrassing" to move into an institution at the university level? Was there ever an issue about that?

STEPANEK: Yes. We were mostly arguing about winding down our program and getting out of Kenya. Then we decided that we didn't have the courage to do that. We weren't about to take our "flag" out of Edgerton College and allow the Japanese to raise theirs. So it remained AID-funded. David Lumberg was intimately involved in it. I was a critic of this program but was on his side on other issues.

Q: How did you find Edgerton College as an institution?

STEPANEK: It's impressive to see. I believe that there are many graduates of it who hold very good jobs. So I guess that, under conditions of state control, Edgerton graduates are fairly well used in the public and private sector.

Q: Did you travel much around Kenya?

STEPANEK: Yes, I did. A little bit on business but, quite honestly, mostly for pleasure. My family and I went camping very frequently. We enjoyed that immensely. We didn't see all of Kenya but we saw a good part of it.

Q: How did you find the rural communities that you were able to observe?

STEPANEK: I did not get to know rural Kenya, face to face, the way I felt I knew Bangladesh. I think that, as Program Officer, I felt sort of removed from the country a bit. Honestly, I don't remember very many business trips. I like developmental tourism. I think that I'm about the only USAID employee who's ever taken his family on R&R [Rest and Relaxation] to Djibouti. I used my R&R time to go and see USAID Missions in other countries because I was very interested in the forms of aid programs around the world.

However, much of my time in Nairobi was disappointing. I spent an awful lot of time with the Kenyan Minister of Planning, who became a well respected friend. However, he was caught, just as the aid donors were caught...

Q: In the whole political situation? Was there any corruption at that time?

STEPANEK: Yes, very much so. The Kenyan Government was, in fact, using our foreign exchange administrative system, set up at our expense, to "skim" margins on foreign exchange. We never had the guts to stop these practices.

Q: What about the aid donor community? Did you work with them very much?

STEPANEK: Less so. That was a period when I remember going to meetings, but I don't know that much was accomplished. I don't feel that I took issues to be discussed in the donor forum or paid much attention to it.

Q: Were you involved in any of the Consultative Group meetings?

STEPANEK: I was.

Q: How did you find that function?

STEPANEK: It was pretty routine and predictable. Promises were made, and reports were prepared and read. It was a period in the history of Kenya's relationship with aid donors before things started coming to a head. Things were "bubbling." You could sort of see issues coming. People predicted that a showdown would come. It was before the era of the presidential jet or the president's skyscraper in Kenya. It was during the period of the Airbus "deal" and corruption and the building of Karkana Dam, involving great cost and a lot of corruption. It was a period of wildlife "poaching." However, it was also a period when there was a tourist "boom." It was a period when Nairobi was still known as a pleasant place to walk around in, but those days were clearly coming to an end. It was a period when we started to plan the office "move" to new quarters. This covered the period from 1983 to 1987.

Q: There was a REDSO [Regional Economic Development Service Office] in town at the same time. Did you have any dealings with them?

STEPANEK: Yes, I did.

Q: How did they work out?

STEPANEK: Oh, they were sort of professional friendships, or maybe it was just my engaging nature. I'm not sure. However, I thank my lucky stars that I said nice things to all of them because when I became Mission Director later, it paid dividends every which way I turned. I was very fortunate. I worked with the FSN's [Foreign Service National, or national employees of the Mission] well and with the American staff. Although I did not appreciate it at the time, that paid dividends for four years in Tanzania and two years in Zambia.

Q: Did the USAID Mission in Kenya use the REDSO very much?

STEPANEK: As Program Officer I didn't have much to do with the REDSO. I think that our technical people did. I didn't see that much of them. I spent a lot of time with the Embassy and particularly with Embassy Economic Officers, dealing with "conditionality" and reporting on the macroeconomic situation. I helped to brief people coming through Kenya. I passed judgment on projects which were either "cooked" or "not cooked."

I'll never forget a very important meeting with Chuck Gladson. Chuck swore up and down that it was just a preliminary meeting to another meeting at which a decision would then be made on a given issue. After the meeting I said to Chuck: "Well, you did a nice job of approving that one." He got really angry with me for saying that. Six months later he came into my office and said: "Joe, you were right." The program had been approved, although nobody said so.

I think that one of the things that drove me away from being an economist is that I gradually started to gain a sense that there were bureaucratic "games" going on which acquired their own momentum. I learned how these systems really worked. You think that you're in "control," but you're not. It was very frustrating. I grew to be very fond of Chuck Gladson. Allison Herrick was a bit distant at first; the warmth and the stories come later. I worked closely with her and learned about over control. Chuck was just a different kind of character. First of all, he is a lawyer, a golfer, a smoker, and a Republican. I thought that, clearly, I had nothing in common with this guy and I might as well pack my bags. Well, it turned out to be completely the other way around. We talked a lot. We didn't really socialize together in the evenings but, in the office, it was a very strong relationship, which I enjoyed thoroughly. He would always come into my office, which faced the setting sun side of the Union Tower building. We had a lot of fine conversations.

Q: What was your sense of how the USAID Mission operated?

STEPANEK: Oh, I guess fairly well. The reason I say that, Haven, is not because I knew whether it was working well or not. I just knew that I wasn't in Jakarta. Jakarta was a "war zone." There were nasty, nasty frictions, not involving me but other people. And other people had ulcers, lay awake at night, there were tears and aggravations around Niblock himself, the Program Officer, the Deputy Program Officer. It was all very unpleasant. In retrospect and in many ways this was one of the things that drove me in the management direction. I realized that anybody could do a better job than these "turkeys."

Q: Rather than driving you away it...

STEPANEK: It did.

Q: Well, do you have anything more to say about your experience in Kenya at that point?

ARTHUR M. FELL
Deputy Director/Director, USAID/REDSO
Nairobi (1983-1987)

Mr. Fell was born in Bloomington, Indiana in 1935 and graduated from Indiana University. He served in AID missions in Cameroon, Senegal and Nairobi. He was interviewed by W. Haven North in 1997.

Q: Well I think there must be more on the Sahel we need to cover. Why don't we leave that now because that is something you could add on your own. Let's go on and finish out Kenya.

FELL: Incidentally, when you say a career, I actually never considered myself in a career. I considered myself in a series of jobs in AID or a profession, maybe. It is sort of like sinking into the ooze; I eventually was caught up into it.

Q: Each was self contained.

FELL: Anyway, a colleague of mine who worked in West Africa, Peter Bloom, was Deputy Director of REDSO in the early 80's. The Director at that time was my old colleague from Cameroon, John Koehring, who was the director of REDSO, which was a service operation based in Nairobi. It had survived from the early days probably having been set up by John Withers in the early 1970's. The other office on the other side had originally been set up by Don Gardner, and then David Shear became the Director. The REDSO/Nairobi handled East Africa from Ethiopia all the way down to South Africa and had programming responsibilities for the Indian Ocean countries including Madagascar, Comoros, and the Seychelles, and Mauritius. It was one of the larger offices in Africa.

Q: How large was it roughly?

FELL: I think we had about 25 or 30 direct hire in the REDSO/Nairobi itself. The Kenya complex was a very big complex, probably the largest complex in Africa, because we had a regional finance office there that did the accounting for almost all the missions in East Africa. We had a RHUDO office, a housing office, there with three or four direct hires. We had a Kenya mission which was quite a large mission, 25 or 30 people. All together we had about 70 US direct hire based in Kenya at that time. We were all in one building, and REDSO occupied a couple floors of that building. We were under the management of the Kenya Mission which did the administration for that mission. I think Charles Gladson was Mission Director at that time when I first arrived. Barry Reilly who was a colleague of yours in earlier years in Ghana or Nigeria was the Deputy Director of the Kenya mission. Anyway I replaced Peter Bloom as Deputy Director of REDSO, and John Koehring was the Director. We provided technical services to all the missions in West, in East Africa, and as I say managed those programs for those four Indian Ocean countries.

Q: What was your specific function?

FELL: My specific function was an alter ego. I absolutely did everything John Koehring did when he wasn't there. John liked to do things hands on. He liked to see things and get involved in the field a lot. He would travel a considerable amount, and I would travel a considerable amount, so we just alternated being in charge of the office so when he wasn't there I would do whatever needed to be done.

Q: Well what were some of the most significant projects that you were directing?

FELL: That I was directly involved in?

Q: Right!

FELL: Well to talk about the projects we actually managed when you were working in REDSO, even when you were working a mission, sometimes you get the feeling that you are one step or two steps removed from the action in the field. We have contractors or technical assistants actually doing the projects themselves, and we are in an office. So we are one step removed. At REDSO we were not only one step removed, we were two steps removed. In fact three steps

removed when you are the Director or Deputy Director because it is the actual people in your office that are doing the work. What we were doing was a lot of programming or planning for who would be available to cover what activities. So we would help the missions plan out what projects there are going to be designing? What inputs the need to do those designs or implementation or evaluations? What resources could we provide as a first line of resource to help or if not, get them from Washington, or contract for it. So a lot of that is an administrative aspect of finding people for planning or for doing certain activities. So that's a planning activity. Another activity we did was sometimes we'd do functional studies and we'd actually go out ourselves and do things. I'll just take an example - Burundi. At one point, we were at complete odds with the government in Burundi. I can't even mention on this tape how much we were at odds with that government at that time. The object was to send out a mission from REDSO or Washington and REDSO to go there and see if it was possible to carry on any sort of program in Burundi at that time.

Q: This was political?

FELL: Political, yes. It was an extremely bad political situation, almost to the point that they were going to break relations with the government we were so mad at them over certain things they had done. This was 1985 or so. They brought two people out from Washington and myself. I led this mission to go to Burundi to see what is going on at least from a development standpoint. How can we continue having an AID mission operating in this atmosphere? Our results were there was absolutely no reason why we shouldn't continue our AID mission. Our relations with Burundi on the development side were perfect. It couldn't have been better in a way given the status of the country and the way they were operating and who they were. Of course a lot of problems, and ethnic problems of all types. But as far as a development program goes there was no reason why. The problem was strictly on the State Department side, on the political level, that they were having a serious problem. So we have to divide these two. We said look, if you want to have a development program, there's no reason not to; they accept us; we can talk to them. They are perfectly cooperative, as cooperative as any government can be in the situation they are in. If you have problems on the political level, that's another type of decision you have to make. The decision made was to keep our AID program going because that was our thread to talk with many Burundian officials at the time, whereas the State Department people were absolutely behind their desks not talking to anybody.

Q: You kept the door open.

FELL: We kept the door open, absolutely. I think that is an example of what we talk about when we refer to development diplomats.

Q: But there was pressure to terminate the program.

FELL: Yes, heavy pressure to terminate the program.

Q: From where?

FELL: From Washington, from the State Department side. They wanted to close up the whole thing.

Q: *As a show of displeasure.*

FELL: Serious displeasure. I think there were legitimate reasons for displeasure, but we don't want to talk about them.

Q: *But you were able to turn that around.*

FELL: I think we were able to turn it around. I think this was the most development diplomacy as far as the development side goes, the Burundians had no quarrel with us whatsoever. They were relatively happy with the program and the way it was going. They were happy to see us in there and were delighted the AID mission was cooperating with them.

We had another example of a different type. We were on the verge of pulling out of Tanzania in 1985 at the end of the Nyerere years. The economic situation in Tanzania became very bad. We'd almost come to the point where we were going to wind up the mission in Tanzania.

Q: *This was on development grounds.*

FELL: Strictly on development grounds. We can't go any further; this had gone to the end of the wire. When you think this is one of the grand imperial missions we had in Africa with one of the emphasis countries, and we had done lot of projects there. So our assignment in REDSO/Nairobi was to wind up everything and to take possession of all the properties USAID was responsible for in Tanzania and wind everything up. We were taking steps to do that.

I remember going to Arusha. Those were the days when we had outlying offices, one of three places in Africa where I worked that had outlying offices out of the capital cities. One of them was in Cameroon; we had an outlying office in Buea. In fact Sheldon Cole who was later an aide to Samuel Adams worked in that office. We had our main office in Dar es Salaam and our outlying office in Arusha. We actually owned real estate in Arusha. We had two nice pieces of property in Arusha owned by USAID, the US Government. And in Sudan we had in Juba an outlying office out of Khartoum. I can't think of other examples of this where we had actual mini AID offices outside of the capital cities. It was interesting to go to Arusha where you find sort of a miniature USAID office that was still ostensibly operating 20 years after it had been ostensibly shut down practically. Still with all the old forms from the old mission and people. There was one local hire who was keeping everything going, maintaining in Arusha we called the guest house in those days. It had been headquarters for AID operations in northern Tanzania. I remember looking at our properties and determining what they might be worth and if we want to sell them and making recommendations and things like that. At the last minute, a new election was held and President Mwinyi was elected in Tanzania. New hope came on the horizon and USAID in its wisdom decided not to wind up the AID office. I think Fritz Gilbert went down there and became the director and we continued operations down there.

Many years ago in 1969, a project in Madagascar had gotten me into Africa to begin. In the 1980s, we began to warm up to Madagascar after many years of being on the outs. We'd pulled completely out of Madagascar in 1972-73 with the Ratsiraka government (who had just been re-elected incidentally), a very socialist government which took an anti-American approach to things. We just closed down completely and didn't do any more cooperating with Madagascar starting in 1973 or 1974. I think they PNGed our ambassador Marshall out of Madagascar.

Q: What happened to that livestock project you were on?

FELL: The project never came to fruition because our bad relations with Madagascar shut it down. We went back in to Madagascar with a PL 480 Title I program in about 1982-3. It was a rice project program that was using PL 480 Title I. We sold the rice and generated counterpart funds and started programming the counterpart funds with the Madagascar government and actually found they were quite happy to work with us and were inviting us to come back and wanted us to come back. Then we developed a kind of a hybrid agricultural import-technical assistance project for Madagascar. Madagascar agricultural research I think it was called, a MARS project. I think it was developed by Jim Graham who was one of our project officers in REDSO/ Nairobi. I worked with Jim on that and went to Madagascar several times and developed that project, also with Bob Kidd who was our PL 480 officer there. We re-instituted the program there in Madagascar and ultimately assigned, Sam Ray to become our Mission Director there. We set up an office there starting in '85 or '86. That was one of the things I worked on.

I remember going to Mauritius on our little program in Mauritius. It was an interesting program. Mauritius is one of the countries we point to as a success program, a success story in Africa. Maybe, as we say, there are no typical missions, no typical countries. It is atypical because there are many Asians. It has a different ethnic mix than any of the other countries, because they have Indians. It is also both Francophone and Anglophone. The Seychelles, too. I was involved in both of those programs. In Mauritius we helped work on the export zones. They had export processing zones which was a concept set up in Mauritius whereby they could import raw materials, process them and sell them. They actually got quite an export market going.

FELL: The point I'd like to make in programming, we were operating the REDSO office. We basically had three roles I would say. The first of the roles was as a service organization to provide service to the missions. We were spending a lot of our time programming out people, the experts we had on the staff, the engineers, the lawyers, the economists, the project officers, the social analysis officers, the various disciplines we had represented. We had approximately 30 direct hire people on the staff of the REDSO. We were servicing all the countries in East Africa. That was our first role, the main role for which the REDSO was set up. The second role was to provide programming and oversight in those countries that didn't have an AID presence or where the AID presence had to be pulled out for reasons of security or one reason or another there wasn't any AID presence. That happened a couple of times in Uganda. There were some posts that were very small like Djibouti. There was only one person there, our friend John Lundgren. At various times I went up there to help out. At one time working with the EGADD the regional

organization for the horn of Africa that was based in East Africa for the horn of Africa bringing together Ethiopia, Djibouti, Sudan, Somalia, and Uganda, and Kenya I believe. These countries tried to do something similar to what was done in the CILSS, the interstate committee to fight drought in the Sahel zone, but of course had much more difficult political problems overcoming their differences to set up a viable organization. Anyway, REDSO provided services of various types.

The second role was operating programs in countries where there was no presence. At one point there were the Indian Ocean countries: Madagascar, Comoros, Mauritius, and Seychelles. We had to manage all the programs in those countries until we did set up an office in Madagascar, and then we took care of the other three countries. We provided a great deal of support for Madagascar in the early periods. Setting up a program in Mozambique at that time 1984-1985, was a major thrust. There was very little representation in Mozambique at that time, maybe one person if at all in the beginning and then someone was assigned. So REDSO had a very big role in designing the early projects there. Of course this means discussing strategy and trying to stake out what AID would do in a country where we hadn't been present before.

The third was regional projects. There were a number of regional projects still floating around. Regional projects with regional organizations, pest control projects, working with the lake, with the countries around the great lakes. There was an economic organization that had been part of the East Africa development group of countries, formerly based in Arusha which still existed. So we had several of these regional type projects, and we supported those and in many cases, managed them.

When John Koehring left REDSO to become director in Khartoum in Sudan, a major mission that we provided a great deal of assistance to particularly emergency assistance, I became Director of REDSO/Nairobi. I would say that my main thrust was to keep things going. I think we had an excellent office. John Koehring was a first rate project officer, a very far sighted program person, and REDSO had an excellent staff. I think that was one of our big jobs, trying to get a good staff because this is a staff that is helping and doing jobs, for other staffs, and in some cases doing things that the staffs in the missions themselves either didn't have the technical expertise to do or the time to do. So we devoted a great deal of time to selecting staff going through the USAID grapevine to see who was competent and good and trustworthy, and who could operate with a good deal of independence and flexibility in the field. REDSO people would fly in and do their work in two, three, four weeks, whatever it took to design a project, or help implement a project. They had to know quite a bit themselves to really do their jobs. So we wanted to get good people. We were successful and had an excellent office.

DEREK S. SINGER
Chief, Human Resources Development, USAID
Nairobi (1985-1989)

Mr. Singer was born in New York City and graduated from NYU and SAIS. He served in numerous USAID missions in Zaire, Kenya, Ecuador and Cameroon. He

was interviewed by W. Haven North in 1999.

SINGER: Right. As I said, I volunteered fast when it turned out that there was an opening in Nairobi, Kenya, as Chief of the Human Resources program (HRDO) at that mission. Fortunately, I was selected for this job and it was a wonderful four years, 1985 - 1989 - probably the best four years I had with the Agency.

Q: What was your assignment then? What does Human Resources Development entail?

SINGER: It really was an expanded general development office (GDO) job. I was responsible for participant training, Food for Peace, private voluntary organizations, women's programs, some work in human rights and refugees. It was an interesting platter, and a truly fascinating country. The complex of AID offices in Nairobi was very large and quite complicated. There was a regional REDSO operation, there was a regional inspector general, a regional finance management office, a regional housing and urban development office, and I don't know what all else. We had a lot of people there doing a lot of interesting things, as a matter of fact. My own work centered on an extensive participant training activity, and on work with a more sophisticated group of nongovernmental organizations, or private volunteer organizations. There were literally hundreds of such groups. Throughout Kenya, PVOs were operating in all kinds of different areas, functionally and geographically speaking. To work with them and then to come up with a new umbrella PVO group, called our PVO Financing Project, as well as to expand and then consolidate a lot of our training programs (both public and private sector) under something we called "Training for Development", those were sort of the accomplishments, if you will, . . .

Q: What is this PVO umbrella you were talking about?

SINGER: Well, we were given a generous line of credit by the mission, and then crafted criteria for applications, screening, and selection for competitive awards on a merit basis to local NGO's, as well as mixed local-international PVO partnerships. In some cases, Kenyan and third country NGO's formed new partnerships and submitted applications for our grants. We also awarded, in a slightly different, but related program, additional awards to American PVOs whose purposes and programs were compatible with the Mission's development portfolio.

Q: Was there any development strategy or simply a funding mechanism?

SINGER: It was essentially a funding mechanism, but what we did was to develop criteria for excellence, or merit criteria, if you will, in terms of deciding which kinds of awards . . .

Q: What kind of criteria are you talking about?

SINGER: Largely what they have done, and what they seemed likely to do and capable of doing. We examined the impact already made by the group, and its reputation of each organizations before we decided to make a grant to them, and we decided if it would be best to help them expand, or to start up new activities that they wanted to get into. So, we did a lot of field work on this one to try to get a much better feel for...

Q: Were we pushing any private sectors?

SINGER: The sectors were the kind that the mission itself was interested in promoting. The private sector - small businesses, micro-enterprise, capital formation and women's programs, especially were especially popular. So, we gave some emphasis to them. But we tried not to be a complete tail to the mission's priority kite, in terms of the fields of activities. We worked to develop internally excellent criteria that we could use, regardless of what the particular field or fields of activity for which the applicants sought help.

Q: On the scale, what was your budget for this?

SINGER: Well, something like five million dollars to give out, but that was over a three year period. So, it was somewhere in the million and a half range on an annual basis.

Q: Individual grants were in what range?

SINGER: Individual grants could go up to \$200,000, as I recall, but we had many more smaller ones. They were for five, ten, fifteen thousand, but we had quite a lot.

Q: Did they apply to you, or did you go out and find them?

SINGER: A little bit of both, actually. The word got around. Then, what we decided to do was to help start up a national umbrella group. The mission director became particularly interested in this. We had some problems later with it, but something called VADA, Volunteer Agency Development Assistance, evolved as a Kenyan counterpart umbrella group. It was meant to do the applicant pre-screening, and also to get funding from other international donors, besides USAID, that might get interested in this approach.

Q: How did it work?

SINGER: Unfortunately, it looked good on paper, but in practice it didn't work so well because the guy who was running it turned out to be somebody who was a little more interested in lining his own pockets than he was in filling the pocketbooks of anybody else. We had quite a bit of a scandal about that one, before we finally decided it was just too much of a mess to deal with. Conceptually, everybody thought the idea was fine, and I still think it is a good idea if you can do it. Unfortunately, the Kenyan umbrella group was managed by a businessman who ran it into the ground.

Q: This was the Kenyan people?

SINGER: Yes.

Q: But I suppose the selection process could get very political?

SINGER: It could indeed. We hoped very much to keep some of the politics out by developing and applying objective, merit-based standards for our awards. But, like most African countries, Kenya is a tribal country and, sadly, unfortunately, some of our partners in the project often

showed a preference for making grants for activities in certain regions where their favorite tribes were the strongest. We had to sort that out. That was a bit of a challenge to try to keep down open "tribalism" as a key influence.

Q: What was the government's attitude towards it?

SINGER: Their attitude was, "Yes, generally speaking, that is good, but we have some suggestions." We said, "Thank you very much for your suggestions. We would like to hear any ideas you have, but we are going to run this thing." Fortunately, we managed to keep the government at arm's length, because there we felt that the political and tribal influences combined would be something that would be extremely difficult to cope with. When we got into private enterprise, which we did, in a parallel program, subsequent to our PVO umbrella program, that was a different matter. Then we encouraged government and private enterprise to join together to help decide on assistance and grants, when they were made in the private enterprise area. But, as far as the more vulnerable world of nonprofit, non-governmental organizations was concerned, we wanted to keep that away from the government.

Q: How did you find the caliber of the indigenous institutions?

SINGER: Some were just great. Some were recommended to find a partnership with either the U.S. or an international Canadian, European, or whatever, PVO to work with to help strengthen them sufficiently so they could reapply after being turned down the first time for internal management weaknesses in their organizations. But some of them were ready to go and actually were operating - Wangari Maathai's Women's Banking Organization, for example, which is still active in East Africa in that whole area; some of the coop and women's groups that were assisted by outfits like Trickle Up, the American PVO that gives very small micro-enterprise loans . . . You may have heard about their \$50 grants, that kind of thing. Some groups had recently become established by virtue of small grants from people like Trickle Up - we managed to help make some of those really become viable; some had connections with established American missionary organizations in the field and had been given seed money by them; small cooperatives; water supply groups; women's groups, in particular, handicraft groups; and so forth. There was a good deal of talent and a lot of enthusiasm to grow and branch out from their early beginnings. As I said, Kenya was relatively advanced in this whole area.

Q: Did you give a lot of attention to capacity building of these organizations?

SINGER: Yes, as much as we possibly could. In some cases, we, our Controller's office in particular, was very helpful. We did ask some of the Controller's staff go out to a number of these organizations, not only to assess their financial capacity, but also to make specific suggestions on training and hiring additional financial management staff, and in some cases, helping to find them.

Q: What do you think the significance of that program has been?

SINGER: Well, I think you can make a pretty strong case that we are talking about a mixed economy now, one that has a strength in the nongovernmental sector, economically speaking,

that is at least partially attributable to programs of this kind. We put in a good deal of time and effort into this program, and I believe we still are expanding this work in Kenya. I think it is making a difference. It might even be making a bit of a political difference, in the sense that President Moi, even though he is pretty autocratic, at least is not a corrupt, bloody-minded military dictator, and the country does hold periodic elections for its parliament and president. Kenya does have serious problems; however, I believe that AID's help in strengthening the counterbalancing influence of non-governmental sectors (NGO's, private sector, etc.) has indeed helped to keep Kenya from being dragged down into the kind of hopeless morass that Mobutu led Zaire into.

Q: You must have had a large number of these various organizations you were working with?

SINGER: Yes, we sure did.

Q: Do you have any idea how many were involved?

SINGER: I would say, over the three years or so that we had this program going, maybe 100 all together. Some were pretty small.

Q: That is a lot to keep track of. I assume you had to keep pretty close tabs on each one?

SINGER: We did. We had people going out in the field all the time. We had reports coming in frequently. Some of the AID staff people who traveled around, not necessarily from my office, helped us keep an eye on these activities.

Q: It was fairly substantial.

SINGER: Yes, it was.

Q: There was no particular field that was predominant?

SINGER: No, I would say, as I said, maybe small business, micro-enterprise, coops, women's groups - probably these groups were predominant.

Q: That was only one of your responsibilities. What were some of the others?

SINGER: International training. As I said, we reorganized and expanded our "Training for Development" program. We took a look at whom we had trained, and we did a sample-based assessment of where our returnees were, and how well they were doing.

Q: What did you find out?

SINGER: I think, on the whole, we were gratified. Most of them did come back, and most were doing something constructive with the kind of training we had offered them. So, the training side of things was good.

Q: Did you rewrite the program at all, or change it in any way?

SINGER: Well, I guess, in taking a look at who had been trained, we did come up with a few areas where we felt there wasn't as much training as perhaps there should be. Those were more in the technical fields, rather than the more academic, liberal arts fields, which had predominated in years past.

Q: Like what? What are you talking about?

SINGER: We are talking about, in this particular case, privatization, banking, financial management, brokerage, insurance. Those kinds of things, in fields which Kenya had been making progressive steps, making real progress, but where advanced training hadn't caught up. So, we did manage to reorganize a little bit in that direction. The mission itself was also expanding its outreach towards private enterprise, private sector programs, so our new training efforts helped support that. We would offer scholarships to our participants, and many would enrol in national institutions, thus helping to strengthen them.

Q: You said one of the other areas was women and development. What were you trying to do in that?

SINGER: The women and development program, the Women's International Banking activities, women's handicraft organizations, women's coops and other rural-oriented programs - certainly including family planning and population - we stressed training in those key areas as well. Those were the kinds of things we were pressing for.

Q: Were these well received?

SINGER: I think so. Like most African societies, Kenya is patriarchal, but the country does have a pretty fair record of moving women up into positions of responsibility in both the public and private sectors (there are also a number of women MP's.)

Q: Human Rights was one of your... What did you do there? How did you approach Human Rights, in a kind of situation like that?

SINGER: Since we were lucky enough to have an Ambassador like Elinor Constable, who is very strong on human rights and women's rights, it was a lot easier. A retired admiral was our Ambassador when we arrived, and he left a few months later. Ambassador Constable took over right away. She was very supportive. She stood up firmly and effectively to the most egregious attempts by President Moi and his "strongman" government, as did Mission Director Steve Sinding. Overall, it was a great time to be working for Uncle Sam in an excellent post. We were very reluctant to leave this wonderful country, but I was fortunate enough to successfully bid on another great place - Quito, Ecuador.

ELINOR CONSTABLE

**Ambassador
Kenya (1986-1989)**

Ambassador Elinor Constable was born in California in 1934. Constable graduated from Wellesley in 1950 and joined the Foreign Service in 1955. Constable met her husband, Peter Constable while in the foreign service and resigned to care for her family. During her break from the Foreign Service, Constable traveled overseas to Spain, Honduras, Pakistan and helped organize the domestic Peace Corps. Constable rejoined in 1974 and returned to the Economics Bureau serving as an office director and later a deputy assistant secretary. Constable also served in Pakistan in A.I.D and Kenya as ambassador. Ambassador Constable was interviewed in 1996 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Where did you go after EB?

CONSTABLE: I went to Kenya as ambassador.

Q: I just want to put at the end, you were in Kenya from when to when?

CONSTABLE: From 1986 to 1989.

Q: We'll talk then the next time about how you got to be ambassador to Kenya, and then being an ambassador.

CONSTABLE: Anyway, I was just saying very indiscreetly that my predecessor in Kenya had been ungracious. He did not communicate with me at all. His wife did not communicate with me at all. I had no information whatsoever about the residence, or the residence staff. As a result when I left Kenya three years later, in spite of the fact that my successor was the infamous Smith Hempstone, I went out of my way to be as helpful as I could. In those days nobody did this, but I took a video camera and I videoed every inch of the residence and sent them a copy. I gave them, I think, a five or six page memo that I wrote myself about the servants, everything I could think of, and had lunches with him, and lunches with his wife. And I had even, we'll maybe come to this story later, Planned to do a couple of things that the embassy wanted done in terms of morale, and I saved them for Smith, and said, why don't you do them when you arrive. I had been treated, I thought, so badly, I wasn't going to do it to my successor.

I don't really know an awful lot about Gerry. He was very weak analytically apparently, and my deputy told me a lot of stories about him, there's no point in repeating them. Basically to the effect that he was very weak on substance, but he was a good people person. He didn't want to leave and he wanted another post, and he was a little bitter. I think it got directed at me because I was his successor. He knew nothing about me but used to make very hostile comments about me in country team meetings before I arrived, which was not smart because I had friends in the country team, including my friend Steve Sinding. That made it a little bit rough, but nothing insurmountable.

I find it a little hard to talk about being an ambassador because it's a very tough job. It isn't what you expect it to be. It isn't what the public at large thinks it is, glamour and fun, and gadding around. It is excruciatingly hard work. If you're going to be a good ambassador, you have to get involved in a level of detail that really isn't interesting all the time. You have to, in the current Foreign Service, worry about morale, I think much too much. My philosophy about morale, which is very unpopular, is that you carry your own morale around with you, and that you're responsible for it. If there are specific external circumstances that are a serious problem, you bring those to somebody's attention, and you see if there's a reasonable solution. You don't whine all the time. I think part of it is the modern Foreign Service, part of it is Kenya.

Kenya, at the time I was there, was one of those posts about which people have unrealistic expectations. Like Paris. It's supposed to be marvelous. It isn't marvelous. There are health problems. There are security problems. Your work can be interesting, or less interesting. You could end up working for somebody who is unpleasant. I think one of the things that happened, particularly with the support staff and the large regional staff, was that they would arrive in Kenya, they would be less than enchanted, and then they would worry that there was something wrong with them because this was supposed to be paradise, and it wasn't. And then they would focus on remedies that were silly.

The one thing that everyone wanted was a commissary. Now in Kenya we had APOs, everybody knows what APO is. Which means you can send goods in the mail from the United States to Kenya using U.S. postage, and using the military to transport it. And the other thing you had in Kenya was the availability of anything you wanted, the food in Kenya was extraordinary. Kenya was a garden spot then, probably still is.

My predecessor, Gerry Thomas, who was a people person, liked doing nice things for people, refused to open a commissary in Nairobi. His predecessor, Bill Harrop, refused to open a commissary in Nairobi. In fact, Bill Harrop's last words to me as I left were, Elinor, please don't do it. I said, why would I do it? But we reviewed the issue, and I said no. Then people wanted a 10% differential. Now they had applied from Nairobi for a 10% differential the year before and had been turned down by the Department.

Q: You better explain what a 10% differential is.

CONSTABLE: Okay. It's sort of like combat pay.

Q: In other words, in a difficult post.

CONSTABLE: In a really difficult post your salary is augmented by anywhere from 5 to 25%. Are there any 25% posts left?

Q: There might be, Uzbekistan, or something like that.

CONSTABLE: If you're in an isolated and physically dangerous spot, and can't have your family with you, and it's a real ordeal, your pay can be increased by up to 25%. Kenya was a garden

spot, Nairobi was delightful. Everybody wanted to come to Nairobi. The idea that we should have hardship pay in Nairobi was laughable in Washington. So I said to the staff, if you can document a deterioration from last year's message, and show that since we applied crime has gotten worse, health has deteriorated, or anything, I'll send it in. They never could. So while I was there I refused to send in a message. Since that time things have deteriorated, particularly security, and Nairobi would qualify for a differential but now, of course, we can't afford it. So morale was a serious problem, and both of my deputies and I worked very hard on that, and that took a lot of time.

I think the A.I.D. director and I were successful in refocusing the A.I.D. program. We coordinated very, very closely. The economic officers in the embassy had been taking a somewhat simple-minded approach with A.I.D., bashing them for being insensitive politically and that sort of thing. And the A.I.D. folks were, by the same token, being a little high handed. It was not a good situation. When Steve Sinding arrived he set about correcting the A.I.D. side. When I arrived I set about correcting the embassy side. I remember a very awkward meeting in my office...I shouldn't have done this but nevertheless, my economic counselor and I, and the A.I.D. mission director, and maybe four or five other people, were talking about an issue where I had a very clear view, and the staff knew what it was. The economic counselor started arguing with the A.I.D. folks, and he said, the embassy's view is, and then articulated something 180 degrees from what I thought. And I looked at him and I said, is that really the embassy's view? And he caught himself, was very embarrassed. And obviously with my predecessor, who didn't know any economics, he could get away with that. We managed to get the A.I.D. mission and the embassy folks working together much more effectively.

Our approach focused on two or three things. First we tried to identify those aid programs that made sense whatever the political environment. And there are some: family planning is one; agricultural research is one; there are some health programs that make sense. What doesn't make sense in a country where there is economic mismanagement is unrestricted balance of payments support. Then in another account we put the economic support funds, and military assistance, which I've always viewed as payment for services rendered, or goods provided, as long as you're getting the goods or service. In Kenya's case it was free access to their ports and airfields if the U.S. military needed that in connection with what was going on in the Gulf. Well, if Kenya provided that we should be willing to pay for it, and we had a limited military assistance program.

Then the next thing we did involved conditionality. When we negotiated an agreement with the government of Kenya we insisted that the terms be implemented. For example, under the health program we would provide money to the government of Kenya to undertake certain activities. When those activities weren't carried out exactly as agreed in the contract, we stopped disbursing immediately. The first time we actually did that was before I even arrived, because the A.I.D. director had consulted with me in Washington. After I arrived one of their ministers, George Saitoti (who later became vice president under Moi), came up to me and said, ambassador, you need to understand that this is a poor country. We don't have money in the budget for this. We can't support this. We're desperate. We really need this money, and I hope you'll agree, and I hope you'll direct your aid colleagues to resume disbursements. I looked him in the eye, and I said, absolutely not. He was quite startled. Diplomats aren't supposed to talk like that. I said,

absolutely not. A deal is a deal, and you welshed on your part of the bargain. The deal is off. I think the next week they resumed the activities we had agreed on, and we were able to resume disbursements. We ran every program that way for the three years I was in Kenya. We suspended disbursements three or four times, and by the time the Kenyan government got the message they started conforming to the conditions that were in the agreement. I feel, and still feel very strongly about that. A contract is a contract. It's not some mushy thing.

Q: Very soon it becomes sort of general support.

CONSTABLE: Yes. A bribe is also a bribe, we call them something else as diplomats but there are times when pouring money down a rat hole is necessary for some strategic or political purposes. My only quarrel with our support for, say Zaire or the money we've poured into Honduras to train and arm the Contras during the '80s, my only quarrel was not with the concept, but with the amount of money. We spent too much. We could have gotten Mobutu's support, I think, for a lot less, but I leave that to other experts like my husband.

Q: You mentioned family planning. This is the Reagan administration. Family planning was not high on their list, in fact it was high on their list of what became known as the Christian Coalition. In other words, the more fundamentalist Christians. It meant family planning and abortion, and it meant all sorts of other things. How did you deal with that at this particular time?

CONSTABLE: The real problem was abortion. So as long as you weren't explicitly supporting programs that provided abortion services, you were all right. The other point was, and is, that we put family planning (and I think we continue to do it), in the broader context of maternal and child health. There are fertility determinants that you can work on that are more powerful than the simple provision of commodities. It is possible to create the demand for the commodities which can be provided by somebody else at the end of the day, although we still do some of that.

I remember early in the Reagan administration going to a subcommittee with the Under Secretary of the Treasury, and various other officials, and I was supposed to be there just to be there. Doc Long was chairing the committee, the infamous Doc Long. One of the members of the committee started going after the Treasury Under Secretary, Beryl Sprinkle on family planning, someone who was very supportive. Why is the Reagan administration opposed to it? What is the Reagan administration going to be doing? How? Some hammering. And Beryl didn't have a response. He didn't quite know how to deal with it, so I said, Beryl, I'll take it. Again, when you agree with a policy, or not, if you're at a hearing, you had better defend yourself. And you could make some arguments, not totally persuasive. But anyway, I said to the committee, don't focus exclusively on the provision of commodities, condoms and the rest. There are fertility determinants that are very powerful. For example, education. If you keep a woman in school for six years the odds are much greater that she is going to insist on limiting the size of her family. And then I said, the other powerful fertility determinant is rural electrification. Doc Long said, would the lady like to explain that a little further? And I said, no, I don't think that's necessary. So it is true, if you work on the agenda in a broader context, you can get an awful lot done.

Witness Kenya, which is a dramatic success story in terms of family planning. When we started working in Kenya, not Steve and myself, but our predecessors, Kenya had the highest birth rate in the world in terms of population increase. It was over 4% a year, which is just extraordinary. There has been a dramatic drop both in the birth rate, and in the desired number of children per family unit, which is in some places an even more significant indicator. And it's been a success story. So Reagan administration, or no Reagan administration, we were able to do a lot of constructive work in Kenya in that area.

Q: While we're still on the economic side of things, and then we'll move to being a woman ambassador. I've heard stories, I've never dealt in Africa, I never dealt much with an A.I.D. country, but often A.I.D. people will go to a country, particularly an African country where they can do almost whatever they want, and if you send a forestry man, he'll put in trees. If you send a water woman, she'll put in water systems. And the next person who comes around may be something else, another specialty, and that often there really isn't a significant plan for the country, and the follow through. I mean, it's a project and then a new group comes in, and you've got new projects. I'm talking about the American side. Did you run across this?

CONSTABLE: Not while I was there because we were very disciplined. We had a plan. We focused on health, we focused on agriculture. We tried to use the military assistance money as constructively as we could. We were very strict about conditions. This would be of interest to an economist: I was shocked to discover that the IMF in Kenya was much too permissive. The International Monetary Fund has a reputation in Africa of being very tough but I thought that they were very lax in Kenya. The World Bank on the other hand, and this may have been a function of their representative there, understood Kenya a lot better. Kenya was on a long slow slide economically, and it has continued. The health projects and the family planning projects succeeded and we had some small rural loan projects. It's hard to measure their success, but I've always liked economic pluralism as a way to get to political pluralism: if you've created a group of farmers with a vested interest in making the system work for them, you've done something. The overall economy can be sliding, Moi can be slipping into sort of more and more venal and corrupt senility, which I think he probably is, but I don't today think that the money we spent in those areas was wasted.

There were other activities, which you could argue, and I did argue, should be phased out. It would be interesting to see if any Kenyans read this, I hope they don't. I always felt while I was in Kenya that we should have been reducing ESF, Economic Support Funds associated with the military assistance. I didn't fight very hard for them back here, and in fact, I sent a couple of messages to the Department very close hold at the time, that we ought to go for some reductions.

Q: Could you explain what these funds are?

CONSTABLE: How do I explain it in an appropriate way? Crudely, what ESF is, is money over and above what you're providing in military assistance to another country in the form of hardware, and military training, and related goods and services. It started out as a grant, or loan, and it was unrestricted. No conditions. It was really just balance of payments support. I mean, it's a bribe. We want you to be nice to us, we want you to support our objectives in a particular area, here's 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 150 million dollars. We gave enormous amounts of ESF to Egypt and

Israel following the Camp David Accords back in the late '70s. We gave, at the time, large amounts of ESF to Mobutu. It has been phased out in some places and the overall numbers have gone down.

Back in...I don't know exactly when this happened, it was certainly by the early '80s, the Hill had decided to look at ESF. Congress gives contradictory, conflicting, and incompatible policy advice to the executive branch where aid is concerned. And a lot of it gets written into law, so it's pretty tough to deal with. On the one hand, ESF is supposed to persuade countries like Zaire or Kenya to cooperate with the United States. But then in the early '80s the Hill decided, well, we better make sure that this money is spent for useful purposes. That sounds like a reasonable idea. But to ensure that that happens you have to apply a second tier of conditionality. Here's 20 million dollars so you'll do what I want you to do. But by the way, you have to spend it exactly the way I tell you to spend it, and if you don't, I'm going to stop giving it to you. It didn't make sense. It would have made more sense, in my view, to lower the ESF amounts and forget about this additional layer of economic conditionality which never worked very well. In Kenya we used ESF for fertilizer imports. And I had to laugh because when I was in Pakistan years before we had terrible problems with fertilizer imports and bagging. And in one of my early country team meetings, everybody knows what a country team is I assume, the A.I.D. director informed me that we had a problem with fertilizer bagging. I burst out laughing and the country team thought I was nuts. I had to explain that Sinding and I had struggled with bagging in Pakistan ten years earlier.

Now, the issue on bagging is as follows: you could bag here and ship the fertilizer abroad. That's terribly expensive. So you ship it, and you bag there. That offers wonderful opportunities for crooked contracts. In Kenya there were several cases. The last one, not long before I left, was the president's cousin who was going to bag the fertilizer for a suitable sum, and of course he wasn't going to do it right...used low quality material, lots of wastage, you name it. Sinding came to my office and he said, Elinor, I think it's the president's cousin. And I said, so what, suspend it. And we suspended ESF. The cousin's contract disappeared quickly.

It was ludicrous. It didn't accomplish anything. We were constantly fighting about it because to ensure that this kind of money is properly spent in a country that is relatively corrupt...Kenya is more corrupt today than it was in 1986. But in 1986 there was an enormous amount of corruption. So to monitor this, is very labor intensive. Either you have to look the other way, and that comes back to haunt you, or you have to really monitor it which creates a lot of political friction.

Q: We've covered more or less the aid side. I do want to talk more about the government, but you mentioned something else, and we might talk about that right now. Being a woman ambassador.

CONSTABLE: Well, it's an issue, not a problem. But it is definitely an issue. I found in most of my career that being a woman is an advantage rather than a disadvantage, once I get my hands on the job. For most of my career being a woman has made it harder to get the job in the first place. I don't think it had anything to do with my going to Kenya because George Shultz liked me, and he didn't care.

When I arrived the staff mostly had never worked for a woman. Most of the country team was male...I'm trying to remember. The deputy was male, econ, admin, political, agency, military, they were all men. They were all white men as a matter of fact. Before I even went to Kenya I had to take care of one little problem. I cannot abide the term "madam". I cannot abide it. To me it conjures up either a woman who runs a bordello, or a woman in white gloves and a fancy hat pouring tea. And it does not correspond with mister. This is one of dilemmas if you're a woman because Mrs. Ambassador doesn't work. Ms Ambassador would be appropriate, but that still sounds silly. Maybe some day it will sound all right but right now it doesn't. So I didn't want to be called Ms Ambassador, and I was fretting about what to do about this, when Ann Miller Morin, who was writing a book about women in the Foreign Service, said you don't have to use madam. I said, I don't? All the women use it. She said, no they haven't all used it, it came into use as a custom because Frances Willis didn't want to be called Miss Ambassador, there was no Ms in those days. So I thought about it, and I decided...I don't know of anyone else who has done this, I urge women to do it, I decided to just drop the madam, and use the military and the British system. Now, you don't refer to a general as Mr. General, or Mrs. or Ms General, or Madam General for that matter. So I simply dropped it and referred to myself as Ambassador, and people got used to it and it worked fine. It took a while, but it worked fine. So I arrived in Kenya, I explained to the country team that they couldn't call me madam, they had to call me Ambassador. Then I said, the way to approach working for a woman was to treat her just like a man, except when we needed to look for a bathroom. Other than that, there is no difference. You don't have to worry about it. Some of them thought that was funny, who knows what they thought.

One of my very first field trips was hysterical. I arrived in November. A little later that month a U.S. carrier arrived in Mombasa. We used to use Mombasa as a liberty port. The Admiral commanding the carrier would always invite the ambassador to come down for a meal, and it was a good thing to do because you could go down, show the flag. I like the Navy, my father was an Admiral in the Navy. It was thrilling the first time I was piped aboard an aircraft carrier. And I could do some work in Mombasa, anyway, it was a good thing to do. So we flew down to Mombasa, we helicoptered out to the deck of the carrier. And then someone decided, again without consulting me, that I shouldn't go down the ladder, it might be too steep. I was wearing flat shoes with cork soles that I always wore on field trips, and they took me down the ramp at the rear end of the helicopter, which unfortunately had a very thin coat of oil, or grease of some kind on it. So I took three steps...it's too bad somebody didn't catch this on film, and my feet went out from under me straight up into the air. I landed on my rear end, and slid half way down. The Admiral and all the flag officers were standing at attention waiting to say hello to me. The look of horror on their faces, which I did see because I did go completely over, and of course several people helped me scramble to my feet, and I got up and turned to my aide and I said, don't you ever take me down a ramp like this again. What's wrong with a ladder? And they never did again. That was just stupid. So I walked across the deck and there was a photographer with me and he said, are you all right? And I said, yes, I'm fine but do not take any pictures of my rear because it was covered with a big oil stain. And there's a photograph of me snarling at the photographer which I have. There were silly things like that.

The only real problem, and it's very hard to articulate this. A number of women have tried, and I don't really think they've succeeded. I think there is a different set of expectations about a woman

ambassador with regard to things like morale, family, that sort of thing. Not necessarily about policy, you can get through that. The first agency representative, CIA, which in those days was notorious for not having women in any senior positions, was a good buddy of mine. We were very fond of each other, we had no problem doing business together. The same was true of all of the military personnel who worked for me. The military is very sensitive to chain of command, and therefore work for you.

Q: This is something really an ambassador has over a woman officer somewhere else. Because when you're the ambassador you're the 500 pound gorilla in the American system, and that's it.

CONSTABLE: I think that's right, and the military is very good about that. And I can be fairly tough, and I'm analytically tough. That part wasn't a problem. I do believe, however, that the community at large expected me to be more sympathetic about things like commissaries, housing, and that sort of thing. It's very hard to pin that down because it's very amorphous, and it's rather subtle, and I'm not sure people even realize that they're doing this.

Q: I think the term is they expect you to be more nurturing.

CONSTABLE: Yes, and I'm not, and I'm just the opposite if anything. I used to tell people who whined about Nairobi, if you don't like it here why don't you go to Ouagadougou. Do you want to transfer to Somalia? That was not smart, I shouldn't have done that, but that's how I feel about it. I cannot abide whining. So I think that was the only problem.

The Kenyans, of course, didn't know what to make of me. I remember very early on there was a British Kenyan who had grown up in Kenya, or Keenya as he called it, a funny fellow. We don't need to spend a lot of time on this. But the British in Kenya were a wild bunch.

Q: Are you married, or are you from Kenya?

CONSTABLE: Yes, exactly.

Q: I saw the movie White Mistress.

CONSTABLE: It was silly, but it was not inaccurate, and this fellow in his youth had been part of that crowd. But he was now early '60s, and very pompous, and of course my predecessor had been black. I was the first woman to go to Kenya. Of my predecessors, and we started sending ambassadors in the early '60s, all were white men with two exceptions. I was introduced to this fellow, his name was Markham, he was related to the famous Burl Markham. He said, well, a woman ambassador, I suppose they will be sending us an American Indian next. And I hit him. I didn't slap him across the face, I just shoved him very hard. And I laughed, and I said, oh, that's a naughty thing to say. And he couldn't figure out what had happened to him. He just didn't know what had happened to him. My deputy knew exactly what I had done, and he was trying not to smile.

The Kenyans, forget the colonials for a minute, the Kenyans I'm sure expected me to be soft, and sweet and nice. So I would let them believe that when it suited me, or I would get very nasty

when it suited me. The president of Kenya and I had a very good relationship, partly because as a woman I could get away with things. I would have private meetings with him, and Moi would say something and I'd lean over and pat him on the knee, and say no, you don't want to do that, now come on. And do things that no man could ever get away with.

I was very fond of Moi. I fervently disapprove of him, and there's a big difference. I think he's a very clever, street smart, politician who like most human beings is very vulnerable to the corruptions that power offers. His cronies have taken full advantage of that, and he has just slipped into a mode...I don't think he's ever going to come out of it frankly.

Q: He's still president.

CONSTABLE: He's still president.

Q: His first name is?

CONSTABLE: Daniel arap Moi. As I say, we had a very good relationship. This may lead us into the political side through the back door. There was a lot of corruption in Kenya and a couple of...

Q: Can we finish up. Are there any other things...

CONSTABLE: Oh, the women thing. As I said, there were many opportunities to take advantage of being a woman. When I first arrived the political section wanted to set up a lunch with me and other key women, and I wouldn't let them do it. They did not understand the point. I said, first I have to establish myself as the ambassador. When I have done that, then we can go back and start doing this sort of thing, but I am not a woman first, I'm an ambassador first, and you better get that through your head. They didn't get that at all. This is less necessary now. My successor was a man, then a black woman, and now a white woman. It is now okay for a woman to be ambassador. But I was the first one. The diplomatic corps had three other women, two from fairly small countries, and the Indian High Commissioner. And the Canadian High Commissioner, who was a man, came up to me when I arrived and said, oh, another lady ambassador. I just looked at him. He said, whoops, I put my foot in it, didn't I? And I said, yes, you did. Then we had a little discussion about what ladies meant. I asked him if he was a gentleman, and we mixed it up.

Then the American Women's...this was a sore point, and I would do the same thing all over again, the American Women's Organization wanted me to be the honorary president. And I said no. I said this was not a professional organization. It is (was then) an organization of spouses, and I am not a spouse. I said, I will come to your events. You can host them at the house, I'll help you out, but it is not appropriate for you to ask me to run the organization, and many people did not like that. But I couldn't do that.

But then as I got myself established as the ambassador, and there was no question about who was in charge, and after having poked Moi in the eyes a couple of times, figuratively, not literally, and some of his ministers, it was very clear they were going to take me seriously. Then I began

to cultivate some of the senior women, and became friends with them. And the other thing I began to do as I traveled around the country (more than any of my predecessors, or probably successors), I would talk about women. And I would often start speeches in villages in Kenya with "I understand the women do all the work here." And the women would all smile from ear to ear, and the men would turn to me, oh, that's not right Your Excellency. And I'd say, I don't know, that's what they tell me, that's what I hear. And do a certain amount of that. It was very touching, rural farm women would come up to me and say how excited they were to see a woman ambassador. And boy, that was just wonderful.

Q: Did you have any women officers? And were you finding this a new breed. I'm talking about at lower ranks, but women coming through into the Foreign Service in greater numbers. Did you find them a new breed? Or how did they relate to you?

CONSTABLE: Yes, and I tried to recruit women. It wasn't easy because there wasn't a very large pool. I tried to recruit a woman economic counselor, and actually offered the job to a woman who turned me down. Did have a woman political counselor who I think had a hard time. She was part of a tandem couple, and there was no work for her spouse, and it became difficult for them. I don't think she had any professional difficulties because she was a woman. Then we had a junior political officer who was a woman, and who in my estimation was practically the strongest officer on the whole staff. She was just terrific. There were several women in the A.I.D. mission including Steve Sinding's wife, Monica Knorr, who is a friend of mine, who had a senior job with A.I.D., and I thought she was the strongest person on the regional side. But it was scattered, and there weren't very many women on the staff.

Q: Could you tell me about dealing with the government of Kenya?

CONSTABLE: Kenyans are a rough bunch. Charming, smart, a bunch of rogues, sort of like the Nigerians in West Africa. Half the ministers I had to deal with were corrupt, or more. I can think of a number of colorful incidents to illustrate that.

Q: Let's have a few.

CONSTABLE: All right. Let's start with the then finance minister, George Saitoti. We had a case involving an American insurance company that had a subsidiary in Kenya. The Kenyans decided they wanted to Kenyanize the insurance industry. This is typical third world nonsense. The U.S. subsidiary had to convert in some way to majority Kenya ownership. They agreed to do that under a deal that would have had Kenya pay them for some of their assets. At the last minute the Kenyans reneged on the deal. The Americans didn't have enough documentation. Frankly, my view was that the American company had cut a very sweet deal with the Kenyans, and thus didn't want embassy help. In any case, folks who were doing the negotiating suddenly ran into difficulties, and the thing ran into the ground, and then they came to me for help. On the board of directors of the bank that was going to control the new insurance company was one George Saitoti, the finance minister. So I went to Saitoti, and I said, look, I don't care how you take care of this, but take care of it. Don't let it just sit like this, it looks bad for you, it's not fair to the company. I don't want to get in between you and the company and dictate the terms of the deal, but finish the negotiations, do it reasonably, and move on. Oh, ambassador, oh yes of course, we

will do this. I've just learned about it myself. That was a lie. He had been in the adjoining room dictating the terms throughout the negotiation. He had made the decision to renege on the deal because he decided he wasn't getting enough money out of it. This sort of thing that happened all the time. He dragged his feet. The thing did not get resolved, and it came to the Commerce Secretary's attention. He generated a letter that they wanted me to deliver to the president which accused Kenyans of mishandling this, of being corrupt, and did name the finance minister as somebody who was behaving badly.

Instead of delivering the letter, I took it in to George Saitoti, and I said, look, this is getting out of hand. You have got to take care of this. Look what people are saying about you, and I showed him the letter, and then I took it away from him. And he was apoplectic that anyone would dare call him corrupt. And I said, I didn't call you corrupt. I'm not saying you're corrupt, but if you don't get this sorted out soon, more and more people are going to be making this charge.

You never knew for sure how much they knew that you knew. But it was assumed that you knew something. The Kenyan system is modeled after the British system, and they have what they call Permanent Secretaries, the chief civil servant who works effectively as the minister's deputy. The Permanent Secretary in the finance ministry was a fellow by the name of Charles M'Bindyo, a very charming rogue. My A.I.D. director came to me and said M'Bindyo is on the take. And I said, well that's probably a good thing. He said, what? I said, if he were scrupulously honest, he wouldn't be able to do business with the president, or the finance minister, or anybody else, and we wouldn't be able to work with him. He would be isolated and cut off and marginalized. But Charles was trying to persuade me to persuade American companies to invest in Kenya. This was one of Moi's themes. Companies were leaving South Africa. We had finally done the stupid thing and imposed sanctions, and were giving U.S. companies an excuse to get out. A lot of them were just waiting for an excuse. Moi said to George Shultz when he came in January of '87, and to me repeatedly, can't you get these companies to invest in Kenya? And I said no. But ambassador...I said, you have to get them to invest in Kenya. If Kenya is a good place to invest, they will see it, they will come. Right now it isn't, and right now quite honestly I cannot recommend that a single dollar of U.S. investment come into this country. Well that didn't go down too well. So they would say, how can we get it together? I asked the Permanent Secretary if it would help if I put together a list of all of the problems that current investors are facing. These stories are getting back to other companies, which is why they aren't coming. And he said, yes, that would be good. So I had my folks draw up a three page list, cleaned it up, and on some of the more difficult cases I checked with the companies to see how much of the story they would let me tell, etc. And I went back to Charles with three pages, and I put it on plain white bond, no American embassy, no nothing. And I said, you can do anything you want with this. Here it is. And we started going through some of them. I mean they were absurd.

Flowers are a big business in Kenya, and a lot of the flowers that you see in Europe come from Kenya. A company in the northern part of the country did all its business by short-wave radio because, again, it's so much of the third world, there's no infrastructure, the phones don't work, the mails at snail's pace, etc. Nowadays, presumably, they use E-mail but they didn't have it then. The government took their radios away because it decided that somebody was using them to stir up political opposition to Moi. Well, that wasn't happening. Even if it had been happening, taking the radios away from the company wasn't going to solve the problem, they could just go

someplace else. And I went in and tried three times to solve that, and couldn't get the radios back for them.

Charles looked through three pages of the list, and he said, well, ambassador...Your Excellency he called me, you left something off the list. And I said, what's that Charles? And he said, corruption. And I said, Charles, that's at the top of the list, but if you think I'm going to put it down in black and white, you're crazy. But you know it's a problem. I know it's a problem. And then we had a long discussion about corruption. And I told Charles, and this is somewhat delicate, and I never put this in writing. I said, you need to think about your economy. Think of it like a cake or a pie, and what you want to do is you want to take a small sliver out of that cake, put it in your pocket. But you want to keep the size of the piece constant. And you want to keep the pie growing, the percentage size constant, keep the pie growing. That way the economy grows, and you get more money. But what you guys are doing is, you started out with an eighth of the pie, you move it up to a quarter of the pie, one of these days you're going to be up to a third of the pie, and two-thirds of that is not enough to keep your economy going, and you are strangling economic activity in this country. So redesign your rip-offs, do it the way Kenyatta did it. Kenyatta, Moi's predecessor, was the famous Mau-Mau freedom fighter who became the first president of Kenya in 1962. Under Kenyatta, who was corrupt, the deals were struck, and then a little bit was skimmed off the top. So you could have a viable economic or commercial activity that could function on its own merits, and the payoffs were taken out of the profits. Under Moi the payoffs are riddled all the way through the deal. So by the time you get finished with them, the deal was uneconomic. And this process was proliferating, and as far as I can tell hasn't really slowed down. This is why Kenya is sinking.

The minister for local Industries, a very funny guy actually, was one of the few Maisi in the cabinet. After he was appointed I went to call on him, and we had a grand time together telling jokes to each other. The next day there was a picture on the front page of all the papers of the American ambassador and this new minister laughing uproariously, both of us had our mouths wide open, and everybody thought that was wonderful. But he was corrupt as the day is long.

And finally there was the security fellow, Oyugi, who was not of cabinet rank, but was in charge of domestic security, and other activities for Moi, who created all kinds of problems for us. I went to see him one day to see if I could connect in some way, and I took my political counselor with me. We spent about an hour with each other, and had a delightful meeting where we said marvelous things to each other, small talk, talk about Kenya, and that sort of thing. And afterwards the political counselor who sometimes could be a little bit naive, said, gee ambassador, that was a really good meeting. I said, not here. I didn't even like to talk in the car although I trusted my driver implicitly. I didn't like to talk in the elevator in the embassy. I said, come back to my office. We went back to the embassy and we went up to my office, and I turned to her, and I said, Judy, you have to understand that man was lying through his teeth for one solid hour. He was? I said, of course, he was. So corruption was a feature.

There were a lot of other reasons for the relationship to deteriorate.

Q: With the United States you mean.

CONSTABLE: Between the United States and Kenya. I think, under the circumstances, we kept going pretty well. But aid levels were declining. Military assistance was going down. The ESF was going down, and I would go in every year and I'd say, hey, good news, they only cut us by a third, instead of a half.

There were also growing internal political tensions. When Moi took over in '78 there was enough money for both walking around money, and economic growth. He could take care of his friends without interfering with basic economic activity. As the number of his "friends" grew, he began to crowd out legitimate economic activity with some of these corrupt payments. But our aid levels were going down, and at the same time we were paying more attention to Kenya's human rights record which was odd because it was a Republican administration, and the Democrats are supposedly the ones that are more militant about human rights around the world. I'm not quite sure why attention was focused on Kenya. But things were deteriorating dramatically. The particular event that triggered the slide was the arrest of a famous Kenyan lawyer by the name of Gibson Kamau Kuria, and it's a fascinating story.

Moi was getting ready to pay a working visit to Washington, and I was trying to prepare the Kenyans. At the same time, this would have been February of 1987, the then Washington Post correspondent, Blaine Harden, was working on a human rights story. He hadn't published anything yet. I heard that he was doing this. I'd never met the guy, so I invited him over to the residence. I said, what do you like to drink, and he paused. And I said, I'm going to have a martini...I still drank martinis in those days. He said, oh, that would be good. So we sat out on the veranda, and had several martinis. I think we probably both got a little sloshed, I'm not sure. And I said, Blaine, I want to ask you to do three things for me. He looked at me very warily. I said, I want you to give me a heads-up before you file. I want you to give the government an opportunity to tell its side of the story if they are willing to do it. And I want you to be very precise in your story about the difference between allegations and facts that have been proven. He looked at me and said, done. I think he expected me to want to stifle the article.

And then he explained that Gibson had been working with clients who were allegedly political prisoners. They probably were, but I still feel the need to be careful about my terms. Gibson was being threatened by the government. Blaine said that if Gibson was arrested he planned to file his story.

We'd had another incident late the previous year in which Howard Wolpe had come to town and stirred things up.

Q: Howard Wolpe being?

CONSTABLE: Howard Wolpe was then the Democratic congressman from Michigan and chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee for Africa. Howard had a staffer by the name of Steve Weisman who was very militant on the issue of human rights, and didn't like the Foreign Service much, and particularly disliked ambassadors. He had had a huge run-in with my husband a few years earlier in Zaire. We're not talking about Zaire, but I can tell that story in 60 seconds.

A congressional delegation had gone to Zaire. Mobutu was trying to be on his good behavior because he needed a little more money. Peter was there, I was in Washington doing economic stuff. I had gotten Zaire into the IMF program, and got their debt rescheduled. So we were trying to manage everything and Mobutu was on his good behavior and had released a bunch of prisoners from jail. The CODEL wanted to meet with the prisoners, and Mobutu was very nervous about this but the government said okay, one by one. No, we're going to meet them as a group. Okay, but don't wear coats and ties (in Zaire, like Mao's China, clothes were a political statement. Mobutu decreed Mao collars rather than coats and ties for the modern Zaire). They met them as a group, they wore coats and ties to be provocative. After the meeting, which was in a downtown hotel, the parliamentarians went out to the back parking lot to get into their respective cars, whereupon they were set upon by a bunch of goons and beaten to a bloody pulp. Mickey Leland, a Democratic congressman from Texas, who since then was killed in an air crash in Sudan, was part of the CODEL and watched all this out of hotel window, and reported back to Howard. Howard then said he wouldn't meet with Mobutu. Peter was trying to get them to meet and they finally negotiated a meeting on a yacht provided the yacht didn't weigh anchor, and no food was served. Well, as soon as they got on board, Mobutu had them weigh anchor. There was one whole deck devoted to food. The congressmen wouldn't eat it. Peter couldn't eat it, it was hot, for seven hours they floated up and down the Zaire River shouting at each other. Peter wrote to me about it and said it was the worst week of his life.

Howard Wolpe arrived in Kenya without a CODEL, but with some staffers including Steve Weisman. He had been in Zambia at some sort of a regional meeting of African officials, and then he came to Kenya where he had asked for a series of meetings that were a little impractical. He wanted to meet every minister. He wanted to meet some ministers in groups. So we worked out the best schedule we could. He wanted to meet all the human rights activists in Kenya. Shortly before he arrived, the Kenyan chief of protocol called me at home. He had a drinking problem, and by the end of the day he was usually in very bad shape, and he was pretty drunk when he called. He said, ambassador, we don't like this visit. I said, that's too bad, he's coming, what's your problem? Well, we don't like it. And I said, don't be ridiculous. And of course he was drunk, I knew I couldn't reason with him. So when I got off the phone I called my deputy, I told him to drive over to the Permanent Secretary of the foreign ministry's house, he was a friend of sorts, to warn him that Gideon was having a problem, and to make sure that things were still okay. They weren't okay, they were beginning to unravel. The government had decided that Howard Wolpe was not going to meet with Wangari Mathai, who is a world famous environmentalist. That he was not going to meet with Timothy Njoya, who was a Kenyan priest, active in human rights. The first meeting Wolpe had scheduled was with Njoya, and security guards came and prevented Wolpe from going into the guy's house, which was real smart of the Kenyans, real smart.

To go back to Wolpe's arrival, he had come to the embassy for the obligatory country team briefing, and he opened the meeting by looking at me, and saying...and he and I had met before, and saying, I have to start with bad news. Someone in your embassy is sabotaging my visit. I said, I find that hard to believe. Your visit has been handled personally by me, my immediate deputy, and the political counselor. Are you accusing us of sabotaging you? Whereupon Weisman hissed we have proof. And I said, I think you better share it with me then. We can't. Well, I think we better drop it then. Well, you better look into it. I said, I'm not looking into it

unless you tell me the details. I was this close, one millimeter...how do I define it orally, getting up and walking out and saying this meeting is over.

Wolpe changed the subject and we started briefing him on human rights. By this point I was furious. They started asking about a Kenyan who was in jail, and he said, what about this fellow, and he mispronounced the name. He had the first name wrong, and he mispronounced the last name, and I said, I never heard of him. He kept saying, yes, he's in jail, and he's this and he's that. I said, I don't know who you're talking about, I never heard of him. I knew who he was talking about, of course. I let him go on for a while and I said, oh, you must mean Professor so-and-so. Well, yes. Okay, I'm sorry you were giving me a different name, and you were confusing me. Weisman knew what I was doing. And at one point in this meeting he hissed at Howard. Steve loved to hiss. "She's worse than her husband". I liked that.

In any case, when the meeting broke up late Friday night, they went back to their hotel. My then deputy and I went back to my office, and I said, what is this about? George Trail, who later became ambassador to Malawi, said, I don't know but I have a theory. Wolpe was just in Lusaka. Mwangale, the then foreign minister of Kenya was also in Lusaka. He was anti-American and a trouble maker. Very charming to me all the time, but for some reason he didn't like the United States. So I called the ambassador in Lusaka, and I said, let me ask you something. Did Mwangale and Wolpe have a conversation? And he said, yes they did. I said, was it interesting? He said, it was very interesting. I was there, one of my guys was there, would you like a verbatim transcript? And I said, that would be very nice. He said, I'll just send it up open channel so nobody will even notice, no cable traffic or anything. So first thing the next morning we got the transcript, and it went like this. Mwangale to Wolpe, why is the American embassy sabotaging your visit? Wolpe to Mwangale, I don't know. They're just a bunch of Reaganites up there, they hate me. Mwangale to Wolpe, well, I just don't understand it, they sure are trying to mess up your visit. Then they laugh. Then they talk about some other stuff.

The next day I had to have Wolpe over to lunch, and before lunch started, I said, come into the living room. We stood next to the piano...if I ever write a short story about all this, we need the piano in the background. I said, now listen Howard, I want you to stop this business about the sabotaging. He said, no. I want you to look into it. And if you don't look into it there's going to be a huge problem. I said, I'm not looking into it. Unless you tell me where you got it, what the basis of the charge is. And he said, I can't do that. I said, I really don't understand how you could take what a guy like Mwangale would say to you at face value. Howard's eyes got big, how does she know it's Mwangale? And I said, it didn't take me long to figure it out, and it's not true and we're going to drop it. He was very conflicted. Weisman was obviously really pushing this.

So we went out, we had a perfectly nice lunch. And at that point I peeled off and told my political counselor, you stick with this guy like glue. I'm not speaking to him again. Howard then set out trying to have these meetings that kept getting cancelled, and it was just a disaster. And I told the Kenyans, you guys are really being stupid about this. I didn't talk to Moi that way, but I did talk to Kenyans that way. In the meantime I called my friend at the foreign ministry, and I said...I never put any of this in a cable because I thought it was too messy, but I told Chet Crocker all of it afterwards. I said, you know, there's a very strange story circulating that I thought you ought to know about. Somebody claims that your foreign minister is the one who

told Howard Wolpe that we're trying to sabotage things. I said, you know it isn't true, and I know it isn't true, but I have to tell you, do you know where that could be coming from? Well, this fellow, knew perfectly well where it was coming from. He knew Mwangale had done it. Then I don't know exactly what happened, but Moi pulled Mwangale back from Lusaka where the meeting was still going on, and apparently read the riot act to him.

Mwangale then asked to have lunch with Wolpe, and of course my political counselor was right at his heels, and they met for lunch by the pool at the Intercontinental Hotel. And Mwangale starts, listen I never said anything to you about the embassy sabotaging your visit. And Howard said, you did too. It was right by the shrimp, we were standing right by the shrimp. Mwangale kept saying, I never said, I never said it. Well, of course, at this point poor Howard realized that he's been had, and he tries to reach me, and I won't talk to him.

And finally the next night, as he's getting ready to leave, he's at the airport departure lounge, I get this plea from one of his staffers. Would I come out and please speak to him. And I said, okay. So I drove out to the airport, went into the departure lounge, and Howard Wolpe looks me in the eye, and in front of Steve Weisman and his whole staff, he says, ambassador, I apologize to you. And I said, I accept the apology. Steve was furious. And from then on Howard Wolpe and I were fast friends. I would go to see him every time I came to Washington. Steve started in and he said, now ambassador you have to admit that we haven't done anything about human rights in Kenya. I said, I don't have to admit anything. I just got here, let me take a look at it. Well, you have to admit...Wolpe turned to him and said, just shut up Steve.

Q: Where was Steve Weisman coming from, do you know?

CONSTABLE: The only information I have comes from Zaire where he spent some time many years ago as a student. He was thrown out of the country by Mobutu because he was talking about, or writing about, political and economic corruption in Zaire. And he was very bitter about it. I mean, this motivates a lot of congressional staffers, which I think is unfortunate.

Q: It is. I think this is one of the unfortunate things is that you do have this internal commitment of many people on the staff using congress for their own purposes, and often it gets into legislation, it corrupts the whole system. If we see it from the foreign affairs, I'm sure it's in other elements too.

CONSTABLE: Anyway, I told Howard, I said, listen Howard for heaven's sake I'm a Democrat. I'm a career Foreign Service officer and an ambassador. But my human rights agenda is not that far from yours. I would come to see him in Washington and we would talk about all of this. I did work more actively, not as actively as Weisman would have liked, or as Dick Shifter, who was the HA Assistant Secretary, would have liked. In fact, I tore up the first human rights report in front of the foreign affairs secretary. I told HA I would do this. Washington refused to make a distinction between allegations and facts, and listed allegations as facts. I said, you must specify that this is an allegation, that we haven't proven it yet. Yes, but we've concluded. And I said, no you haven't. You don't know, and you don't have enough information. I said, if you leave that in I'm disowning the report. They left it in, I took it out. Shifter and I worked well together later.

The next time around, oddly enough, I thought the HA report was too soft and I would have strengthened it.

Then there was the Blaine Harden article. The article was published on the front page of *The Washington Post* underneath a picture of Moi and Reagan, with me in the background. Moi came to town in March, 1986, we had a series of uneventful meetings. Uneventful except for the lunch where we were in the middle of a discussion about I don't know what. Reagan looked at the ceiling, and said, I wonder what it would be like to be up there in a space ship looking down. I wonder what we would think? And the Kenyans looked him as if he were nuts, but his staff was obviously used to this, and they brought the discussion back around.

Peter was in town on business. We were staying at a local hotel. The next morning we got up, he comes back with a paper, and he said, oh, here's a picture of you, and Moi, and Reagan on the front page, right under a headline about torturing in Kenya. I said, that's not funny. And he said, I'm not joking, and he hands me the paper, and there it is. Blaine had given me the promised heads-up, and I knew it was coming. I didn't expect the Post to play with it. And from then on it was rough. I worked with the Kenyans, and worked with the Kenyans, and of course the article had been precipitated by the fact that the Kenyans threw Gibson in jail. I finally got him out, privately, not publicly, but behind the scenes I just hammered the Kenyans. I said, you've just got to let this guy out, got to let him out, got to let him out. In one meeting with the Permanent Secretary of the foreign ministry, there were a couple of other people in the room and I said, look, for heaven's sake why don't you let Gibson out on Jamhuri day which is their national day. And he looked at me and he said, if you don't stop pressuring us, I don't know whether he'll ever get out. And I said, did I say anything. Did anyone here hear me say a word about Gibson. He laughed, and sure enough they let him out.

Shortly before I left Kenya, Ethel and then Kerry Kennedy came to Kenya to present a medal to Gibson. It was the first time I've ever felt like a real celebrity. I went to the church where Gibson was getting the medal, and I sat right behind him. I always wore a hat in Kenya because I had an eye problem and had to shade my eyes. So everybody could see me, and I leaned forward to say something to Gibson and every photographer in the room sprinted to the front of this church, and flashed God knows how many photographs, some of which appeared in the press.

I would have given their human rights record C, maybe C minus, and it was getting worse. But it wasn't nearly as bad as Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, Zaire, half the other countries in Africa. Moi used to ask me, why so much attention to Kenya. And I said, because we hold you to a higher standard, you have a better record. He said, yes, but I don't kill people. Kenyatta killed the two politicians that were the most threatening to him. Tom Mboya, whom everybody has heard of, and another fellow by the name of Kariuki, were killed. It's just assumed by everybody that these were political assassinations. It's hard to prove. And there had not been any assassinations under Moi, and he felt that was a terribly important distinction.

My own feeling was that we were tilting at a windmill. We could work on cases. You could get somebody out of jail. You could focus attention on someone who was in jail, and probably get better treatment for them than they would otherwise get. But it was the institutional erosion that

was the problem. The judiciary had started out as an independent judiciary, and it was slowly losing its independence.

Q: Did you have a feeling at that time that the situation was going down economically, politically, etc.

CONSTABLE: Definitely. We had no leverage because our aid was declining. The only leverage we had, if any, was the court of public opinion. We did have influence. I think we used that fairly effectively, but it was my sense, as I said in my farewell message when I left in the fall of '89, that Kenya was in a long slow political and economic decline. That there was very little we could do about it. That we should distance ourselves somewhat from the government, but not try to influence events too directly. And, of course, the policy we followed since I left was just the opposite. We cut off all aid. We persuaded other donors to cut off aid unless Moi agreed to have multiparty elections. Well, he's not stupid. He said, sure. He knows the opposition is divided and ineffective. He knows that he can play around and rig just enough of this without being too blatant about it, so that he'll get reelected. He was reelected by an overwhelming majority. Now what do we do?

My successor lobbied publicly on behalf of the opposition. That's a long story.

Q: Was your successor a career Foreign Service person?

CONSTABLE: No, Smith Hempstone, a political appointee. I need to back track and talk about my departure. I mentioned that a lot of Moi's ministers were corrupt. There were a couple of other incidents that are worth recalling. One didn't involve economic corruption, but was messy. We had a radio system, dependent on antennae for relaying signals. I don't know whether it still does, and I don't think that part of the story is classified, the location might be so I won't mention it. I got a call one night that the antennae were being ripped out. So I set some things in motion, told people to try and figure out what was going on, and who was doing it. Traced it back to the security guy I mentioned earlier, but at the same time I called the president's special assistant, and I said, this is Ambassador Constable, our communications network has just been destroyed by your people, and I want immediate round-the-clock police protection. I want five guards posted at my residence. I want a police contingent surrounding the embassy. I want guards at my deputy's residence. I want a vehicle assigned to me with police in the vehicle 24 hours a day. I want...and I was going on and on like this. He said, but wait. And I said, I'm sorry but I have no way to communicate in an emergency now. So we're just going to have to use a different...but, but ambassador. No buts, get me those folks. I want them now. I want to see them on my front doorstep in the next ten minutes. They put the antennae back up. I'm not sure the president knew what was going on. We used a little blackmail which I still can't talk about, in addition to my yelling. But it was a nasty incident.

Q: What was the motivation?

CONSTABLE: The motivation was to make trouble for us. To flex muscles. We hadn't received permission to put them up in the first place. It was one of these look the other way things. They

had gone up well before I got there. And there was a fair amount of that. And this fellow just decided we'll have a little fun at their expense.

The other incident that I might mention involved the kidnaping of a retired American judge, the chairman of the board of the Lawyer's Committee on Human Rights in this country, a very distinguished fellow. He had asked the Kenyans for a visa to come to Kenya to observe a trial, and the Kenyans didn't want to give it to him. I persuaded them to do it. I said, look, you are always saying that you have a fair and open system, that you don't have a human rights problem. What better publicity could you have than to have a distinguished American jurist come to Kenya, observe your due process in action. I talked them into it, they gave him a visa--Marvin Frankel was his name. He showed up on a Tuesday (he and I were going to meet on Wednesday) and he went straight to the court room. My junior political officer was there with him. I was in my office, the political officer came rushing in breathless, ambassador, the judge has disappeared. What? The judge has disappeared. He was sitting there, I was sitting there, I was watching the trial, I turned around and he was gone. He was very upset. I said, calm down Jerry. He's just disappeared. I said, do you have any idea what might have happened. And he said, none. He talked to people at the scene, and they reported seeing a couple of goons come in, and he said the judge walked out with them. He'd been kidnaped.

Q: In a court.

CONSTABLE: In full view of everyone in a court room, and he had been carted off to a place called Nyayo House, which is a building in downtown Kenya where political prisoners were allegedly tortured. I never knew for sure. It was plausible, it was a plausible accusation.

There was an event that had preceded this which had some bearing on it. We had some missionaries in western Kenya who were being thrown out of the country. The government of Kenya was, for reasons that nobody understood, refusing to renew work permits or visas for a group of missionaries in western Kenya. A couple of the missionaries had been a little bit rough and controversial, but it seemed like a disproportionate response, and we were in the process of trying to sort it out, and I was trying to make sure that they weren't physically mistreated in any way. The government had a perfect right not to have them there, but it seemed stupid. And again, all these things seemed to happen on a late Friday afternoon. The same political officer who reported Frankel's disappearance came in and he said, I think I may have figured out what's going on, and he handed me a letter. The letter was from one of the missionaries to a minister in North Carolina, and it reported on the success that he and his colleagues were having in overthrowing Moi. It went on to say that no large country should be run by a black man. There were references to the Ku Klux Klan as being involved in this plot to overthrow Moi, and various other silly things. The letter was clearly a forgery.

So I called the foreign ministry Permanent Secretary at home, and I said, listen, you better know this letter is a forgery. If you're throwing the missionaries out because of this letter, then think again, because somebody is messing around here. I got a vague reply. The next morning at home I got the three local papers and all of them...I still have them, had two and a half inch high banner headlines across the front page. Ku Klux Klan plot to overthrow Moi foiled. It printed the text of the letter, and it then reported that the missionaries were being deported. Well, I picked up the

phone and I called my friend at the foreign ministry and I really let him have it. I think he never forgave me for this because I swore at him, and he didn't like that. I said, I don't give a damn what you guys publish in your stupid newspapers. But if you touch one American citizen, it's war. I will pull out the stops here. You will be so sorry. Calm down, calm down. No, I won't calm down. This is outrageous, this is inflammatory. You are nuts, it's a forgery. No, please stop ambassador. No, I won't stop. I'm telling you right now. Within an hour Moi was out on the hustings, and he made a speech, and he said, do not hurt any American missionaries. There may be a few bad apples, but most of these missionaries are wonderful people, and we love having them in Kenya. And there were no incidents. Nobody was hurt. That was the end of that incident.

And then I tried to get to Moi, but nobody wanted me to talk to him. Everybody, I think, was a little embarrassed. The missionaries went home. There were a couple of articles, and then it all stopped. I kept trying to get to Moi. Finally I talked to my friend, Kiplagat, and I said, look, if I don't talk to him about the missionaries, can I meet with him? We met, we started chit-chatting a little bit, and I said, I wish you'd do me a favor. If you think you have a problem, I wish you'd call me. Kiplagat started getting a little bit nervous, and I said, just promise me that if you think something is going wrong, call me. And Moi said he would. And then I said to him, you know you're right about the KKK. I could see Kiplagat was ready to jump across the room and throttle me. And I said, they'd love to overthrow you. The Klan thinks it's an outrage that a black man as powerful as you runs a country like this. Where is she going to take this? And I said, but you have to understand something. The Klan is bankrupt. They don't have enough money for an airplane ticket. They can't get over here. They can't do anything to you. And we started laughing about it. Afterwards Kiplagat said, you promised. And I said, just missionaries, just missionaries. I didn't say I wouldn't talk about the Klan. So we put that behind us.

But then not long after that they kidnaped Frankel. Now, what to do? My political counselor started getting hysterical, wanted me to call Moi. And I said, no, not yet. I want to know where he is first. I didn't want the Kenyans to hurt him. We had enough contacts in the Kenyan police and intelligence and military, so I figured we'd be able to do that pretty fast. We found him, I've forgotten who got the information, but we found him very quickly. He had been taken first to a local jail, and just thrown into a jail cell. They took his shoe laces away, his tie, his belt, and dumped him in with some common...we don't know if they were criminals or not, but they were in the cell with him. Then they moved him to the Nyayo House and started interrogating him, among other things about the Ku Klux Klan, and they wanted to know why he had come to Kenya. I just came to see a trial. Yes, but why? Who sent you? They were getting almost paranoid about this.

When I found out where he was, I sent my chief of the consular section over to Nyayo House to find him. They didn't want to let him in, and he said, I'm here for the American ambassador, and I'm here to find the judge. While he was trying to get in, he saw someone at the end of the corridor, and he shouted, are you Judge Frankel? And Frankel said, yes. And he said, I'm here to rescue you. At that point I did call Moi, he wasn't there but I talked to his personal assistant, and I said, you have Judge Marvin Frankel detained at the Nyayo House. He's a distinguished American jurist. This is a scandal. You release him immediately. He also has a serious heart condition, and if you don't let him out of there immediately, he could die. That was a lie but that sometimes gets to them. He was released in 15 minutes. We took him straight to the airport, and

put him on the next plane. He said, I want to get out of this country. I don't ever want to see it again. Of course, that was marvelous publicity for Kenya. It was idiotic.

Moi claimed that he knew nothing about it, that this was the work of this security fellow. And that when he found out about it, he was horrified, and he'd released him immediately. I had no basis for contradicting him except to point out that there was a climate that existed in Nairobi.

Q: I take it Moi had pretty close control. Did the security man have his own base, or was he Moi's man?

CONSTABLE: He was Moi's man but he often did things that Moi wouldn't have done. I interpreted the fact that he was released in 15 minutes as evidence that Moi didn't know about it. If Moi had issued the order his staff would have been terrified of going in and telling him he was wrong. They were scared to death of him. And the fact that it happened so quickly, I think probably meant that he didn't know that the man had actually been taken to the Nyayo House, and was in detention. Anyway, Frankel went straight to the airport and got on a plane, and we then corresponded for a while. He wrote me a letter and said, I'm sure you'll understand that I don't ever want to come to Kenya again. I wrote back, and didn't clear it with anybody, and said that I thought his behavior under these trying circumstances was classy. He's a wonderful man, and it was just idiotic.

But I interpreted these events as evidence that on the political side things were deteriorating. That the relationship was fragile. That Moi was not always in complete control. And when I left I had an excellent interview with him. My predecessor, Gerry Thomas, had had a meeting with him before he left, but never reported anything about it, which frustrated the DCM because these can be interesting meetings. I came back and I said, I'll tell you why Gerry didn't report anything. It's not a meeting, it's a photo op. While we were having our picture taken, and there were three ambassadors being rotated in this little photo op, Moi was just about 6'4" and I'm 6', and I leaned over, I didn't move my lips, and said, I've got to see you. 8:00 tomorrow? And he said, done.

So I came back the next morning and we had a long talk. And in that talk I told him that I was leaving, and I was sorry, I was fond of Kenya but I was very worried about Kenya because too many of his close associates were corrupt. I had never put it that boldly to him. I mentioned to him particularly the energy minister who was the worst, and the security fellow. I said, you need to know that we know. I'm sure you assumed that we know. We know where their money is. We know when they get it. We know how much they get. We know where they take it. We know what the deals are. We know all of it. And it's getting worse, and you've just got to stop it. It's leading Kenya down the garden path. And he said, oh, my political opponents tell you all of this. And I said, no, that's not what it is. It's true, and you know it's true. Then we said a cordial goodbye. He was livid. I think he would have PNGed me on the spot if I hadn't been on my way out of the country. He sent instructions to the embassy in Washington to not have any communication with me.

In Kenya itself the word was out that I was off, that my successor was going to be marvelous, and of course Smith Hempstone rode in to great welcome. Nobody knew about my meeting since it was classified. People wondered why the government was so welcoming to Smith Hempstone.

Nobody knew anything about him. So Smith started out very well, but then his access to Moi started diminishing. He got mad at Moi about something or other, bad mouthed him in public. Moi then cut him off completely. He then decided that he liked the opposition, and in a very unprofessional way, I think, publicly supported them. That's another story which we don't have time for here.

Q: Before we leave Kenya, could you talk about the security situation as it impinged on the embassy?

CONSTABLE: You mean in terms of personal security?

Q: Personal security.

CONSTABLE: I didn't think there was much of a problem. We were a low threat post. We were a medium threat for purposes of ordinary crime.

Q: That's what I was really thinking about.

CONSTABLE: It's much worse now.

Q: I've heard that it really is not a very pleasant place to be.

CONSTABLE: No, it's awful. And now it would qualify as a hardship post because of the crime. It's just terrible. You can't walk anywhere in Nairobi, you get mugged. When I was there, there was some problem with crime. It was manageable, we had a guard system. I was fairly careful. I think you have a responsibility as an ambassador not to put yourself at risk. I think people who, oh, they're going to be a hero, and they're not going to have their security, they're not only foolish, but they're being very inconsiderate of the organization around them. There were certain things I wouldn't do. My security guy wanted me to wear a bullet proof vest when I went out. I wouldn't do that. He didn't want me to travel with CD plates. I didn't think that was a problem. I was fairly popular around the country. And Moi liked me a lot until that last meeting and sometimes would send police to guard me against my wishes. This happened three different times. Once they actually caught up with me. I was up near the Uganda border and a car followed us all around. He said he was worried about my safety because things between Kenya and Uganda were unsettled. Once when I headed up towards Somalia and I was staying at a friend's ranch. When I got there, there were eight policemen waiting, and I got rid of them. And once down at a game reserve, an American couple had been robbed and beaten and taken to the Tanzanian border. When they found out I was going down there they sent a police escort, which I evaded. I really didn't think that I needed it, and I didn't. It was manageable. I was never worried for my own personal safety. There were a couple of incidents of people being robbed. It was very different from what it is now.

STEVEN W. SINDING

Mr. Sinding was born in Orange, New Jersey in 1943 and graduated from Oberlin College and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He served in the Philippines, Pakistan and Kenya. He was interviewed by W. Haven North in 2001.

SINDING: I arrived in Kenya in July 1986. The Assistant Administrator for the Africa Bureau at the time was Mark Edelman, who had been a classmate of mine in college. We were never particularly close friends. Mark called me up one day and said, "How would like to be the Deputy Director in Kenya." I went home and talked to Monica about it. We realized among other things that Kenya was the only country in the world where we could both be assigned and not be in a direct supervisory relationship with one another. So I went back to Mark and said, "if there were a job for Monica in REDSO that might be quite interesting." Frankly, I didn't view the deputy directorship in Kenya as a particularly attractive alternative to what I was doing, but I also recognized that, as a foreign service officer, it was inevitable that we would have to go back to the field. Kenya seemed like the best opportunity. So I actually called McPherson and said that Mark called me and that we wanted to do it. And he said, "Well, I can't afford not to have you where you are. I recognize that you are foreign service person and have to do this; now is not a good time unless you can come up with a replacement that I can trust." So we had a long conversation, he, Brady and I about Duff and whether Duff could handle the job and I said I thought he could. So ultimately both Brady and McPherson were convinced. But McPherson said, "Do you really want to go out as the deputy?" And I said. "Well, yes, if I had stayed in Asia/TR, I would have felt that at the end of a three year Washington rotation that I would know enough to go out as a mission director. To be perfectly honest I haven't had exposure to the broad range of things that USAID does. So it would probably be a good thing for me to go out. What I really would hope would be that when Chuck Gladson, who was the Director, leaves I could be considered to become the director." Mark said, "That sounds like a good idea, a good arrangement to me; I will commit to that."

So we were all set to go out, and then one day Peter calls up and says, "How would you like to go out as Mission Director?" "Well, if you put it like that. I would like to do that." He said. "I think we need Gladson back here; so that is what we are going to do." He was bringing Gladson back to be head of the Private Enterprise Bureau, and that cleared the way for me to go out to Kenya as Director. Within the Africa Bureau, Ray Love (Deputy Assistant Administrator) knew me, and I think he thought I was good, and he knew Monica and her work. But, I think, generally speaking there was a lot resentment in the Africa Bureau about somebody who had never worked in the region coming in as director in one of the plum posts, maybe the most sought after post on the continent. There was a big surprise in the Kenya Mission about this guy they had never heard of except as a distant population person. So I think I had a lot to prove when I got to Kenya. The expectation was that McPherson was making a political payoff; and people understood that, but what business did I have being a mission director in Africa? A reasonable question, I might say. I don't blame anybody that held that view. But it turned out okay.

For one thing, I did not have a tough act to follow; Gladson had established such an adversary relationship with the Kenyan government that there was no where to go but up. And while I think, he was respected by people in the mission, he wasn't loved. So somebody who would come in and pay attention to the staff and be supportive and spend time and listen was a welcome

change, especially among the Kenyan staff. So it didn't take me long to win the support of the Kenyan mission, in part because I did again the same thing that I had done in the Office of Population that Joe Wheeler had taught me, which was to establish a management style that made you as much a listener as leader. And, particularly in the first year or two, that approach served me very, very well; it is a great way to learn. If you say I am coming to meet with you and it is your agenda, and then you sit and listen to what people are telling you about their program, it is a wonderful way. Of course, what they will also bring you is their problems. In addition to what is going well and what they want you to know about, they would also say we need your help to meet with the Minister.

So one of the early things I did was - after I arrived in July 1986 - to go to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, Harris Mule who was a great man. And I said, "I really want to establish a different kind of relationships with you than you had with my predecessor. You will not hear any speeches from me about what Kenya should do. I want to very much conduct our negotiations as a dialogue; to be responsive to your needs, to make suggestions where I think it is appropriate, but basically to understand Kenya's development has to be under Kenyan control, that our role here is to help." All the things we believe but often don't do. And Harris said to me, "that's music to my ears." I believe that I conducted the policy dialogue with the Kenyans that way. I had very strong support from the Embassy, at least from the Ambassadors with whom I served - there were three of them. With a couple of exceptions, the mission staff was supportive. Some of the Gladson holdovers really supported the Gladson approach which was hard nosed, stick it to them, never trust the Kenyans. And I have to say that the Kenyans gave you every reason not to trust them. But you know when you are a guest in somebody else's country - even if you are providing assistance - you still have to be deferential to sovereignty. You can't go in there and tell people what to do, even if what you think they ought to do was right. In a four year tour there are four relationships that are really important to a mission director: the relationship with the Ambassador, the relationship with the host country, the relationship with one's staff, and the relationship with USAID/Washington. Those are the four. So in a four year tour there are sixteen possibilities for things going wrong. And, I have to say, in my four years in Kenya I was fifteen for sixteen I had fifteen wins and one loss. My one loss was in my third year with USAID/Washington; I had a rough year with Larry Saiers. But, other than that, for four years I had a exemplary relationship with the government. A superb relationship with all three Ambassadors and a love affair with my staff and in three of the four years a good relationship with Washington. I look back on the four years in Kenya as the highlight of my career.

Q: What were you trying to do programmatically?

SINDING: Having made negative comments about Gladson in terms of his operating style, programmatically I had no quarrel with what he was trying to do. It was a very sensible program strategy. So I changed very little. In some ways, I suppose, like the Office of Population, I believed that I had inherited a fundamentally strong program. My job was to try to implement it properly. And where I thought it was not doing the right thing, to make some changes.

Before I get to what we did, there is one thing I did do that having made the speech to Mule. (And, of course, a speech like that to the Permanent Secretary very quickly gets repeated

throughout the bureaucracy - "hey, this new Aid Director is someone we can work with." It doesn't take long for that word to get around.) Having made that speech, one of my first acts as director was to suspend disbursements under the population program, because the Government of Kenya was renegeing on its budgetary commitments. Not long after I got there, Gary Merritt, who was the Population Officer, came to me and said under the Family Planning Services and Support project. (It was biggest bilateral program in Africa and the beginning of what proved to be a dramatically effective assistance program in Kenya.), the Kenyans in the second year were supposed to put up 25% of the funding of salaries and local costs, and it was in the budget - I can't remember the term that was used - but in the first articulation of the 1986 budget, the Kenyans had committed to a certain amount money for salaries and recurrent costs. In the final form of that budget that money had disappeared and became a Finland funded hospital in Kakamega District, or at least so we thought. So I went to Mule, and asked him, where was the counterpart? And he said we couldn't do that, so I said then well we can't do it, and I am going to suspend disbursements on this project until you come up with the money to meet the Kenya commitment in our agreement. We were at an impasse for about three months. In the end the people from the Ministry of Health and the population program screamed loudly enough that Mule found the money. So I established both credibility as a partner who wanted to work with them but also someone who was prepared to be tough. I did both of those things early enough on that they knew who they were dealing. It also gave me enormous credibility in the Mission to have done those two things. And, that I had such a great relationship with the Ambassador didn't hurt.

The other thing that happened was in my second year, Saiers came out as part of an evaluation team. They were doing these Missionwide assessments of program effectiveness, and we got just unbelievably high ratings from that team. I was feeling pretty good about my ability to be a Mission Director.

What were we trying to do? We had a program with Edgerton University to help it evolve from what had been basically a training program for white farmers into an agricultural university for East Africa by fostering a partnership between Edgerton and the University of Illinois. That was a very successful project. I spent a lot of time working with the ViceChancellor at Edgerton and with the Illinois people. We had a very able Agricultural Development Officer, Dave Lundberg who was succeeded by Jim Gingerich. The both of them were just terrific.

I think the capstone of the Kenya program during my time was the population program. We saw fertility in Kenya drop by the most rapid rate on record from the highest level on record. Kenyan fertility dropped from eight children to five during the time I was in Kenya. It was a marvelous program. It was, in part, effective because of President Moi; Moi really cared about it; he provided the kind of leadership and advocacy and a sense of direction to the bureaucracy that Marcos hadn't provided in the Philippines. I alluded earlier to my experience in Kenya. I think that political leadership in these kinds of situations is crucial, particularly in fairly authoritarian regimes. What the head of state says makes such a huge difference to what people down the system actually respond to, how they spend their time, and how they allocate their resources, and their influence. And Moi made it clear that population was a very, very top priority. He did that in part because the first Ambassador I worked under, Gerald Thomas, was just a fanatic on the subject, the only thing he talked to the Kenyan Government about. He was not a particularly

effective Ambassador not particularly well liked, but he really got through to Moi on the population issue.

Generally speaking, the Kenyans under Kenyatta, who had resisted population planning and family planning, came to a realization that, if they didn't do something about this... First of all, they were embarrassed by having the highest population growth in the world. And secondly, they came to recognize that, if they didn't do something about this, the whole place was going to fall apart, as it has. I wouldn't argue that population was the primary cause of that, but it didn't help. Mwai Kibaki, who was the Vice President and the head of the Ministry of Home Affairs, who was an LSE trained economist, was the primary internal force pressing Moi to work on this issue. But we were there with precisely the right kinds of resources at the right time. We had been supporting two or three private organizations with operations research which proved beyond a doubt that there was a demand for family planning, in large parts of the country, particularly in the central and eastern provinces and in the Rift Valley. That information was extremely reassuring to the Kenyans at the point that they made the commitment of government resources to the program. At the same time, we had helped to build up private service delivery organizations that could work in a complementary relationship with the public sector. Kenya had by far the best rural health service delivery system in sub-Saharan Africa, except for South Africa. And so there was a system in place into which you could put family planning. It was a combination of a service delivery system in place, high level commitment by the President, a strong complementary NGO sector, and a population that was frankly ready to accept the idea of voluntary fertility control.

Q: What about the Ministry of Health role?

SINDING: The Ministry of Health had the lead role. We didn't have the problem that we had in Asia of divided responsibilities. There was a National Population Council in Kenya which had policy and coordinating responsibilities. But implementation responsibility was in the Family Health Division of the Ministry of Health; they were pretty good; they weren't great, but by African standards they were pretty competent and quite committed. So the program went well. We went from a prevalence of contraceptives use of 7% in 1978 to about 14% in 1984, and during the time I was there it jumped up to 3638%. And the total fertility rate dropped from eight children per woman to about 5.15.2 between '78 and '89. (I left in 1990.) It has continued along same trajectory since I left. So I think programmatically that has to be regarded as one of our big successes.

Q: You had some sort of multi-donor coordinating arrangement?.

SINDING: Yes, we did. The World Bank, the UNFPA, U.S., U.K., Sweden, Denmark were the principal donors. It was ok; I wouldn't say it was great. We coordinated better in some other sectors and worse in others. Agriculture was a disaster because we believed very strongly that subsidized grain storage and government controlled grain movement, maize in particular, was a bad idea. We wanted the private sector to take over those functions. And the Europeans kept building grain storage facilities and reinforcing the government's tendency to control the movement of grain in the country. That was an area in which we simply couldn't coordinate. In population, we coordinated pretty well. We had terrific coordination on the private sector side

where we were supporting a policy regime of liberalization in coordination with the World Bank. We were doing some project assistance that went along with their policy dialogue. They were doing basically policy based structural adjustment disbursements, balance of payments support. And we were providing project assistance to provide technical assistance in the creation of capital markets. We helped create a commercial bank-based small and medium enterprise development program to demonstrate that commercial banks could make money lending to African firms. We did that with Barclay's and Standard Banks. The Kenya rural enterprise program, which was a microcredit program, was really the first micro-credit program success in Africa. We did the first health care financing reform project in Africa. That was policy, program-based rather than project-based assistance with the Ministry of Health. We disbursed against a change in the way the Ministry financed health services, including user payments for certain elective procedures and so on. A gradual shifting from 100% free health care to cross-subsidized health care in which the middle class, which was in a position to pay for certain curative and elective procedures, would provide resources that could then be used to subsidize preventive and promotive health care for the poor. It got off to a rocky start because we didn't make adequate provision for technical assistance in the initial grant, and because a really gungho Permanent Secretary of Health jumped the gun on the reforms and alienated all of the politicians in the country when their constituents came screaming about unanticipated user charges. But, in the end, it proved to be a really very successful and, in Africa, the first successful effort at health sector financing.

So we did a lot of useful things in Kenya, but in an atmosphere of such thorough corruption and deteriorating public administration that it was swimming upstream. The population impact was lasting. I'm not sure that there was much lasting in the impact of the other things we did; they were swept away in the tide of corruption and declining economic performance.

Q: What would be the difference between the ones that worked the ones that didn't? Was there something inherent in the program?

SINDING: I think when fertility starts to decline it is irreversible. It had gotten sufficiently embedded in the social structure so that even incompetence on the part of the Kenyan government wasn't going to stop it. Whereas a lot of the policy-based things - capital markets development, health care financing reform, although that, I think, has stuck; some of the things we tried to do on fertilizer subsidies and imports, on grain marketing, and on the whole question of cash crops versus subsistence crops. A really interesting question in Kenya, which was never really satisfactorily resolved, was whether Kenya has sufficient comparative advantage in export agriculture that they ought to stop producing subsistence crops and move toward export-based agriculture. They have a very limited area of arable land, and the land that is arable is highly productive. The best soil in Africa. They probably ought to be, from a strict economic rationality standpoint, producing high value crops - coffee, tea, export vegetables, flowers - that sort of thing, and using the money to import grain. But that is risky business. There are political considerations that obviously intervened between what would be economically optimal and what...

Q: How do you judge your experience as a mission director?

SINDING: I thought I was a pretty good Mission Director. I got enough feedback from those who evaluated my performance to think that was justified - the self-evaluation was justified. There was, of course, still a lot substantively that I had to learn.

Q: Were you involved in economic supporting assistance, commodity aid at that time?

SINDING: Yes, the fertilizer program was commodity aid, and we had some PL480 tied to policy reform. And the money in the health sector was tied to policy reform. And I believed in program assistance and policy-based lending. So yes, there was quite a lot of that we were doing.

I think that I would have been a better mission director, if I had had better training in macroeconomics. I had some real battles with the Embassy economic staff over macro questions where the roles were sort of reversed. They were taking a hard nosed, hard line approach, which is usually what USAID does with the Embassy usually wanting to just give them the money. And I think I would have been better equipped both to engage in the discussions and perhaps to make good judgements if I had had better training as an economist. I had three very good economists on the staff. Joe Stepanek was the Program Officer and Mission Economist when I got there and Kiert Toh, who is now the Mission Director, was his number two. There was another guy who now works for the IMF his name I've forgotten who was in between the two who was also a really good economist. So I had very good support on the macroeconomic side, but, I think, the lack of training. I learned an awful lot on the job. If I had gone to another post as Mission Director I would have been stronger on some dimensions of policy dialogue than I was. I would have been able to make better judgments and better decisions about what USAID should be doing than I was able to make in Kenya. But I think my management style, my openness, my willingness to listen, my ability to recruit the best people - we had the best mission staff in Africa by general acclaim, my diplomatic skills in being able to work with the host country - when you take all those things together, I was a good mission director.

STEPHEN EISENBRAUN
Kenya-Uganda Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1986-1988)

Principal Officer
Mombasa (1988-1990)

Mr. Eisenbraun was born in central Iowa in 1947 and graduated from the University of Northern Iowa and SAIS. He served in Dhaka, Lahore, Freetown and Mombasa. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.

EISENBRAUN: Yes. That was the summer of 1986.

Q: And you were on the Kenya desk?

EISENBRAUN: Yes, it was combined Kenya and Uganda desk.

Q: From when to when?

EISENBRAUN: That was summer of '86 until about January of '88, when I started five months of Swahili language training.

Q: All right. So, describe how the Bureau of African affairs was set up at that time. Who was in charge?

EISENBRAUN: The Assistant Secretary was Chet Crocker, an articulate and thoughtful man from the academic world. He had been at Georgetown University, and then he went back to Georgetown when he was finished at the end of his eight years as assistant secretary. I thought he was a really astute fellow; everyone thought he was an astute fellow. He had made his mark in international affairs and I think caught the eye of the early people putting together the foreign policy team of the Reagan administration when he argued for constructive engagement with South Africa instead of total and utter isolation. That appealed to the Reagan administration, I believe, and that's what brought him in as assistant secretary.

So I dealt with him on Kenyan affairs, which were not his primary concern; his primary concern had to deal with South Africa and other matters in southern Africa, including Angola, where there was still an on-going conflict. I had to learn from scratch matters related to East Africa. It didn't take long because the American relationship with Kenya and Uganda was not that complex. There was a reasonably good bilateral relationship with Kenya, but it was going downhill steadily because of the corruption of the existing government, that of Daniel arap Moi, who had been in power for many, many years and who ran a relatively benign authoritative government, if such a thing can exist. In other words, if no one in Kenya crossed Moi, then life went on pretty smoothly. But anyone who crossed Moi or members of his party, KANU, then they were in big trouble. There was an element of tension and human rights abuses and certainly corruption within the government, causing difficulty in our bilateral relationship.

Q: Well, let's stick to Kenya first, then we'll move over to Uganda. Who was our Ambassador out there when you were on the desk?

EISENBRAUN: I arrived just as Elinor Constable was preparing to go out. My days in the August-September period of 1986 were taken up virtually exclusively by helping prepare Elinor for her Senate hearings. She also didn't know anything about East Africa or Kenya; she had dealt with other matters, economic matters primarily. So both of us had a lot to learn and it was pretty worthwhile for the two of us to go around together. She wanted to meet a lot of actors up on the Hill and in New York and elsewhere; anyone who had political or business interests in Kenya, and that included military interest also. For example, she and I went on a day's trip to CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, which had the responsibility for U.S. military interests in Kenya, as well as the greater Middle East.

Q: What were our military and business interests in Kenya at the time?

EISENBRAUN: First the military interest. That involved me also, as I eventually went out as

principal officer in Mombasa, which was a port city with a US Consulate devoted to the interests of the US Navy using it as a port of call for refueling and R & R. I'm getting ahead of the story. The military interests were essentially one of pre-building infrastructure for military use, and pre-positioning equipment for any potential conflict in the Middle East or the Horn of Africa. There was also some provision of military assistance to the government. Building infrastructure meant deepening the harbor of Mombasa to accommodate US naval vessels including carriers, and lengthening the runways in Mombasa and in Nairobi to handle the very large cargo planes the military might need to bring in during a regional conflict. .

Q: Were we looking at that time- I mean, the Middle East is always in turmoil, but were we looking at Somalia and Ethiopia as possible trouble points?

EISENBRAUN: Yes, we were, certainly, looking at Somalia, not necessarily as a point of intervention of U.S. troops but nevertheless as an area of concern to us. I think that, though, our military interests in Kenya were more aimed at the Middle East, that is, we wanted a friendly environment where we could land equipment and troops for staging purposes. We learned that there's a lot of redundancy in the military, deliberate redundancy, in pre-positioning elements all around the world, redundancy with the idea that if political conditions exclude the U.S. from one point of entry, there will be three or four other points of entry, so they aren't going to be shut out of any situation strategically. .

The U.S. business interest in Kenya was limited. There was some trade back and forth, some tourism, with Americans on safaris. There was little American direct investment. There were some sales of agricultural products--bulk commodities such as wheat and some rice that came in through the Port of Mombasa. Later on I was to see those ships come in and have to deal with all their problems. We did have an aid relationship and we were trying to work with the health infrastructure, for example, and yet that was a source of tension, that is, the economic assistance relationship because we were demanding a lot of conditions upon our aid, conditions of transparency in the use of the monies provided.

Q: Was AIDS a major problem at that time or was that not yet known?

EISENBRAUN: No, HIV/AIDS was a major concern. This was 1986 when AIDS was already pretty well known, and researchers had discovered how extensive it was in parts of Africa. And at that time it was said that Kenya, and especially the coast of Kenya, had about the highest prevalence of HIV of anywhere else in Africa, if not the world at that time. I think we had some HIV/AIDS programs in place, but probably not very much. We also had a large Peace Corps presence in Kenya as well.

Q: What were we doing, say, with the Moi government? I assume the embassy was reporting on it but you always wonder what an embassy can report on when a government doesn't tolerate opposition.

EISENBRAUN: Well, that's a very perceptive question. There wasn't a lot of political reporting, in comparison with what comes in from India, for example. In fact, when I later served as principal officer in Mombassa, that was the follow-on to the Kenya assignment, I wanted to

move around and meet politicians and try to report what was going on. I found that there wasn't anything going on, essentially. There were party activities of the only party allowed, KANU, that is, the Kenya African National Union, Moi's party. Later, I met Moi's major political hatchet man on the coast, but the truth was, there wasn't a whole lot of political activity. But I'll get to that story later. There was a little bit of underground activity which I was able to tap into a bit but that's a later story.

Q: That was a different time.

EISENBRAUN: Right, that was between 1988 and 90. What little happened politically was all focused in Nairobi, unlike in South Asia, where there is a lot going on in the countryside and you might get a distorted picture by spending all of your time in New Delhi or Islamabad. In Kenya, what passed for politics, at least on the surface, was juggling of responsibilities and authorities within the government and the in-fighting of the various politicians within the official party.

Q: So basically a court battle-

EISENBRAUN: Yes, essentially.

Q: Well, what was our evaluation of President Moi at that time?

EISENBRAUN: We had good and correct relations with him, but we also were quite suspicious of him because of his suspected personal corruption. We knew he had a heavy hand and that he seemed to tolerate, if not foment, corruption throughout his government. So we did not have an easy relationship with Moi. On the other hand, he had been friendly to American interests through the years, the military interests I've spoken of and whatever business interests were there, so we wanted to keep that friendliness alive. It was a balancing act between trying to encourage him to be more responsive to the needs of his citizens, to practice good governance, the rule of law and human rights, while being friendly to our strategic interests.

Q: Were the Soviets or the Cubans messing around in Kenya at the time?

EISENBRAUN: No, I don't think so at all.

Q: How about border events, when there was Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan...

EISENBRAUN: You were asking about the regional relations that Kenya had with its neighbors, and I said that there was some tension with Somalia where central authority was breaking down in Mogadishu and there were bandits coming across the border and robbing Kenyans. And there were some refugees moving across already into Kenya so that was an unstable situation in the north. And then there had been a great deal of trouble in Uganda during the Idi Amin years. By the time I got to the desk, Idi Amin was in exile and another fellow named Museveni had assumed control. He was a pretty responsible leader, so Uganda was returning to political stability.

Now, there had been an attempt in the earlier years to develop a regional trade and political bloc between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania that hadn't worked very well. However, there was still stability among those three countries and Rwanda- there was stability on the western front as well with Rwanda. So except for Somalia, there wasn't a great deal of regional instability at that time.

Q: Well, was there any reflection of the ever lasting conflict of the Sudan between the north and the south?

EISENBRAUN: The Sudanese rebels had- the SPLA (Sudan Peoples Liberation Army), John Garang was the leader. By the way, he was killed in a helicopter just recently after patching up his long conflict with the government in Khartoum. The SPLA had representatives in Nairobi, and some American Congressmen occasionally met the SPLA there. Our embassy tried to keep very close contact with them and that was a source of some reporting. I think the Kenyan foreign policy toward Sudan was to recognize the government in power in Khartoum while looking the other way, essentially, with the rebels in the southern part of Sudan. Because after all, the rebels were essentially Christian, the government in Khartoum was Muslim, and Moi himself was Christian and he had a very large constituency of Christians in Kenya.

Q: How did the constructive engagement policy vis a vis South Africa work? I mean, how was it perceived by Moi's government?

EISENBRAUN: I don't recall ever dealing with South African issues while on the Kenya desk. The Kenyan Government would probably put in every one of its meetings a statement regarding the need to urge the apartheid government of South Africa to cede its authority, or at least to recognize the majority interest, the Black Africans. They would probably always say that but they weren't particularly antagonistic, as my memory goes, toward our policies of trying to deal with the de Klerk government at that time in South Africa. .

Q: Did UN votes come up at all, getting Kenya to vote in the UN?

EISENBRAUN: That wasn't a major part of our policy. In fact, our interests were fairly limited. Kenya, after all, was going to vote with the African Bloc in the General Assembly. We would certainly lobby them as we would all African countries on certain issues in front of the General Assembly. I those days the General Assembly was stridently against the de Klerk government, and there were some very harsh resolutions against South Africa. I did not follow that issue until I got back to Washington in 1990.

Q: Well then, sort of moving over to Uganda, how was the government there constituted at the time and who was our Ambassador and what were the issues we had with them?

EISENBRAUN: Museveni had assumed control. I believe that they had had some elections and the southern two-thirds of the country had stabilized pretty quickly after some horrific human rights violations and deaths, but the northern third of the country was still unstable and there were a number of indigenous groups fighting against the southern authorities; it was essentially tribal based. And yet Museveni dealt with a fairly benign hand with the situation in the south and

it seemed that he did not have the resources or the inclination to go up into the north and try to subdue that area, so there was sporadic fighting going on, a low level insurgency all the time. In fact, this is 2005, it's still going on and Museveni is still in power. Bob Houdak was our Ambassador in Kampala. He was a life-long Africa specialist, a very pleasant, thoughtful, and vigorous individual. I got a chance to travel around the countryside with him for a week in January of '87.

After Elinor Constable had had her rounds of consultations in Washington and her Senate hearings, which were completely non-controversial, she went out to Kenya. I settled in to the daily affairs of the Kenya desk.

One of the first things that came up that autumn didn't have anything to do with Kenya, but with Sierra Leone in that the Peace Corps had its 25th anniversary celebration in Washington. As part of that program, they had a series of country updates so that returned volunteers could go to these panel discussions on various countries and get updates. And as I had recently returned from Sierra Leone and I had been pretty involved with Peace Corps activities while there, the Peace Corps office in Washington was kind enough to invite me to the 25th anniversary celebration and ask me to be one of a panel of speaker for the Sierra Leone country update. When I got there for that program, I discovered that there were about three or four other people on the panel, most of whom I had known while in Sierra Leone, and maybe 200 people in the audience. So here I was with friends to participate in the update on Sierra Leone.

I'm mentioning this because afterwards, several of these people on the panel introduced me to a larger group of their friends, maybe 10 or 12 people, all of whom had served as volunteers in recent years. There happened to be this lady who had served in Sierra Leone from '83 to '85, departing just before I had arrived in Freetown. I'm mentioning this because I ended up marrying her. We all went to an African restaurant for dinner after the program, and Lorraine and I exchanged telephone numbers. I had just become separated from my first wife, so I was technically available for dating. I didn't have any money and I didn't have much time because I had two little kids living with me, so dates were a cup of coffee or an ice cream cone and maybe a walk around the block. Lorraine had been back from Sierra Leone a year. I already knew I was going out to Mombasa, and Lorraine had been there as a tourist after her Peace Corps tenure in Sierra Leone. So it was pretty logical for us to get together and start dating. Men always say logical. It was pretty romantic, in fact. We got married only weeks before we left for Mombasa in the summer of 1988.

Q: That's very interesting.

EISENBRAUN: In that fall of '86, there was another encounter with the Peace Corps related to my Sierra Leone days. The Director of the Peace Corps in those days was a very popular lady named Lorette Ruppe. She seemed to wield a lot of authority in Washington because of her activism on the part of the Peace Corps. She was popular with volunteers because she traveled around a great deal, she would go out to volunteer's villages, she would sit on the floor of their mud huts and eat whatever food they were eating.

It had come to her attention that I had also spent a great deal of time with Peace Corps volunteers

in Sierra Leone, so she invited me to her office as a gesture of thanks. We talked a bit about Sierra Leone and then, since I was on the Kenya desk and there was also a big Peace Corps program in Kenya, we talked a bit about Kenyan affairs and the Peace Corps activities there. Now, it just so happened that I had become quite friendly with the former director of the Peace Corps in Sierra Leone, a gentleman named Habib Khan, who I knew had his eye on being Peace Corps director in Kenya. Habib was a naturalized citizen born in Pakistan. I said to Lorette Ruppe, I know that Habib Khan has his eye on being the Peace Corps director in Kenya and I just wanted to say I worked with him really closely in Sierra Leone for an entire year and I think he's pretty good and I hope that you'll give him some very serious consideration for Kenya. This was at the end of a 45 minute cordial meeting, and she said, yes, Habib, well he will never, ever be director in Kenya. I know he wants to go there, but I'll never appoint him. I asked with much surprise, why would that be? We had just agreed he had been effective in Sierra Leone, where there was one of the largest programs in Africa, and perhaps the world. She replied, yes, but he's of Asian origin and there is a large Asian community in Kenya, and Asians don't get along there with the government.

Q: In fact, Idi Amin had thrown them out of Uganda, right?

EISENBRAUN: That's right, in the, what was it, the late '70s? I had learned that the Asian community in Kenya feared that the same might happen to them. So here is Lorette Ruppe saying Habib, because of his national origin, would never be Peace Corps director there. I was shocked to have a federal official telling me this because I think even then it was illegal to discriminate on the basis of national origin. I replied that that's all the more reason for you to show some courage and appoint him as Peace Corps director, in the same fashion that the White House had just appointed Ed Perkins, an African American, to be Ambassador in South Africa.

Well, she was infuriated by my comment about showing some courage, and gone was the niceness of earlier. She said you don't understand anything about this issue; it's completely different from the Ed Perkins situation in South Africa. And that was the end of the conversation, and I was essentially hustled out of the office.

I feel it important these 20 years later that I should relate this story of blatant discrimination. Well, Habib Khan did not become director in Kenya, although he went on to work with USAID in South Africa, ironically. And I burned my bridges with the Peace Corps.

At any rate, I enjoyed my tenure as Kenya desk officer, partly because it was refreshing to deal with new topics, and partly because I was dealing with some very pleasant people. The director of the office was a fellow named David Fisher, who was laidback and knowledgeable about the area, and he let me do whatever I wanted, essentially. And it was a little surprising, at first, that whatever briefing papers I did for the secretary or any ranking official and later on for the White House, they were just passed up the line. I mean, after all, Kenya wasn't that vital to U.S. interests and so it wasn't like the India desk, where every word was agonized over and there were multiple drafts of every document. When you discover that what you are writing is going up unchanged to the most senior levels, it causes you to be a whole lot more careful.

Q: Yes.

EISENBRAUN: In the spring of 1987, President Moi had a working visit to Washington. He came and had lunch with President Reagan, and another lunch with Vice President Bush. As was usual, I as the desk officer had the responsibility of preparing virtually all the briefing papers for the secretary and the others, including at the White House. It's not so complicated to do these papers when it's a relatively small country. It's a mammoth undertaking, however, for a country like India, where I had cut my teeth as a desk officer preparing for a big visit.

The reason I'm telling this story is that President Moi was scheduled to have lunch with Vice President Bush. There were only going to be about 20 guests at the luncheon. When you had to do a briefing paper for Vice President Bush, you just did one, whatever you thought was worthwhile, there were no rigid requirements. So that left some room for creativity. I did write a pretty good paper for the vice president, I thought, and when the office director saw it, he said, did you write this?

Anyway, so it went over to the White House as a backgrounder for the VP's luncheon with President Moi. The morning of the luncheon, I got a call from Don Gregg, who was the chief of staff for Vice President Bush. He said, there's this luncheon today, and the vice president wants to invite you to attend as a guest in thanks for the great briefing paper you did for him. I said, what's that again? Gregg repeated that Bush thought the briefer was unusually helpful, and now there happens to be a place at the table and he wants you to come over and join. I replied, okay, and strolled over. The luncheon was not at the White House, it was opposite the White House just off Lafayette Square; there's a corner house as a museum, called the Stephen Decatur House. He had been a naval hero during the Civil War.

Q: During the Barbary Wars.

EISENBRAUN: Oh? I see. Well, thank you for setting me straight. He had had quite a lovely home on Lafayette Square, which I should go back and tour properly someday, reading all the signs. On that occasion, they had taken over the dining room of the home for the luncheon for President Moi. There were only two other Department officials present, Assistant Secretary Chet Crocker and Ambassador Elinor Constable, and neither knew I was invited. In fact, they knew specifically I wasn't on the guest list because they had seen all the briefing papers. Anyway, I just walked over and had my name checked off and there I was. It was very nice, particularly because I didn't have any official duties; just drink the wine and chat with the Kenyan officials. Afterwards, there was a moment to thank Vice President Bush for including me on the guest list, and he was very gracious about it, saying he hoped that I had enjoyed it.

Q: Well then, in '88 you moved on?

EISENBRAUN: To Mombasa. My new wife, Lorraine, and I went there in the summer of 1988 after about five months of Swahili language training, and six weeks after getting married.

Q: Wow. And you were there when?

EISENBRAUN: I was there two years, from '88 to '90.

Q: All right, describe Mombasa to me.

EISENBRAUN: In some ways it was for me almost the perfect Foreign Service assignment, almost a throwback to the 19th century. On the one hand, Mombasa is very much up to date as a center of European tourism, the Riviera of East Africa. The beaches are glorious, there's one luxurious hotel after another, Europeans by the tens of thousands came down during the season. It had a glamorous side, and the major responsibility day by day was which exotic restaurant to go to. So how does that square with the 19th century?

It was also about as far away from Washington as you could get. The embassy was consumed with its affairs in Nairobi, and they figured nothing much happened in Mombasa except tourism and shipping, so they let the consulate go its own way. Just don't get in trouble, essentially, was implied. Show the flag and keep us informed, but you can pretty much do what you want. I had a communicator at the beginning, so there was the usual telegraphic capability of sending things to Nairobi and Washington. However, I had almost nothing to report directly to Washington.

Mombasa was a port city where about four different ethnic groups got along pretty well. There was the indigenous African community; there was the Swahili element, that is, the Arabs from the Persian Gulf, Yemen primarily. The Arabs had come down over the past millennia and settled the coast of East Africa in for a distance of five or 10 miles inland and created an Arab-African hybrid called the Swahili culture. Then there was the Indian community of those who had come from the subcontinent at the end of the 19th century to build the railroads and then stayed on and got rich. Finally, there were the white Kenyans, by this time second and third generation, children or descendants of the original pioneers, and a few of the original pioneers left in retirement. So that's the white Kenyans, the African Kenyans, the Swahilis and the Asian community. Four communities living side by side and getting along pretty well was impressive. Mombasa was the principal port in East Africa, so it was a very busy place with lots of ships going in and out of the modern harbor, and sailing dhows plying between the Persian Gulf and Zanzibar Gulf still using the old harbor.

Q: Was it a well run port?

EISENBRAUN: Well, it seemed so at first in that lots of ships went in and out. It looked to the casual observer like a pretty busy place. My job was to get to know all of the shipping interests there. They weren't American; they were German and Dutch and British interests. Their representatives told me a different story from what it appeared to be, that is, they said that the place was rife with corruption and incompetence and inefficiency. Apparently there were major managerial problems with the port, and ships that should be able to come and go in a matter of a day or so, what in Singapore would have been a 24-hours turnaround, would take five or six days. There'd be no reason to take that long in Mombasa except for deliberate inefficiency, usually caused by not paying a sufficient bribe to move things along more quickly.

Q: What about our military connection there? How did that play out while you were there?

EISENBRAUN: The consulate was there primarily because of military interests. When I got there, I inherited a number of Navy people on the staff, but they departed as the scaled back. As I said mentioned earlier, the ships of our sixth fleet would come in and refuel and restock and give their crews some R&R. Our Navy did this occasionally, but the British Navy was in port almost weekly, and ships from about every navy in the world made it to Mombasa at some point in my two years there.

I went around and saw the lengthened runways at the airport, which the Kenyans were getting the benefit of from all the tourist planes coming and going. The port had been widened and deepened, which was beneficial to the Kenyans from their commercial point of view, but when our aircraft carriers came they chose not to enter the port. A skipper of one of the carriers told me no way were they going to get into that port, it was just too tight as far as they were concerned and they felt vulnerable from a security point of view. So they would anchor a couple of miles off shore and ferry men back and forth. So the fact is, the USG spent all that money and widened and deepened the port but the Kenyans got the benefit, not us.

I was surprised to find that we had offices built and stockpiled, ready to go, and secure warehouses with desks, typewriters, file cabinets, wastebaskets, phone connections, everything ready in case it needed to be used. In case of emergency, you can imagine huge planeloads of people coming in and boom, all they had to do was turn on the lights.

Q: Okay, you were saying so we had the, you know, everything was ready to go.

EISENBRAUN: That's right. Our navy did come in for occasional joint exercises with the Kenyan navy.

Q: Yes, when you bring an aircraft carrier in with its whole task force, what was it like?

EISENBRAUN: Within two months of my arrival, I had the Carl Vinson carrier come in with its entire battle group of about a dozen ships. The Carl Vinson is a Nimitz-class nuclear carrier, the biggest and most modern of them all at that time. The carriers don't operate on their own, they're part of a battle group of anywhere up to a dozen ships; destroyers, cruisers, probably a submarine, although that was never acknowledged, and a number of supply ships. So you're talking five or six thousand men and women, a really big deal. And they would never come in for less than about five or six days. The Carl Vinson visit in October of '88 was typical in its size, but atypical in that everything went so well. There had been some real problems in the past where some ladies of the night had been killed by sailors, and there had been highly public trials, and so forth. But I needn't have been concerned, even about the new worries about AIDS. The Navy was prepared. Those men were so scared of AIDS that instead of going and hanging out in all the bars, the sailors signed up for upcountry tours and went off on safaris. So there was virtually no incident, nothing serious. With all these men walking the streets of Mombassa, you can imagine it was a circus atmosphere. The military had its own MPs everywhere; they were determined that there wasn't going to be any trouble on that ship visit.

The main reason I enjoyed the Carl Vinson visit was that a few days before the group got to

Mombasa, the admiral of the group asked if I would like to put a group of local officials together and fly out to the ship for a lunch and an air show. I did it, and my secretary, Sharon, and my wife Lorraine went along, as well as the Mombasa Mayor and other officials. We landed on the Carl Vinson and indeed we had a great air and artillery show. The cruisers fired their guns at a target that the airplanes had dropped out in the ocean, and the planes flew over and broke the sound barrier right above our heads, which we weren't told was going to happen. We had lunch with the admiral and everyone was very friendly. That was great public relations.

A day or so later, the ships arrived in the harbor, with the carrier remaining offshore. I had arranged a lot of public relations activities, so there were volunteers from the crews to go and paint an orphanage and I think we may have painted a school as well. I took the captain of the carrier and the admiral around to meet the mayor and have our pictures taken for the papers. In the evening, we hosted a reception held at my residence, a beautiful compound on an acre or two with a pool, a tennis court and plenty of space outdoors for 300 people, plus the ship's band. It was all very pleasant.

We had another battle group visit during my tenure in Mombasa, and that was the carrier Midway with all its ships. In between, there were perhaps a half-dozen individual warships.

Lorraine helped a great deal in Mombasa in a whole manner of ways, from working very hard to hold social functions, both elegant and casual, to getting to know a wide variety of local people, especially members of the Asian community. She also, by the way, had a shrewd eye for hypocrisy and sincerity, a real gift, and advised me accordingly so I didn't go over as many cliffs as I no doubt did before she was there.

Q: I would have thought that, you know, the beaches were full of Europeans, I mean, usually when you say Europeans usually you're talking about an awful lot of young women, secretaries and the like. I would have thought this would have been a bonanza for both the young women and the sailors. Or not?

EISENBRAUN: Well, it was, it was. There were many men who went upcountry, as I told you, for a couple of days on safaris, but there was always that whatever, 10 or 20 percent, that hit the beaches and bars. For years, the professional sex workers from all over East Africa had been coming to Mombasa when the ships arrived. They could make a huge amount of money really quickly. But not to the extent that had been the case in the '70s and early '80s. By 1988, there were stories in the press that the women had little to do and the bars were complaining of no business, comparatively speaking, because all the men were upcountry.

Q: AIDS is a great inhibitor.

EISENBRAUN: My hat is off to the U.S. Navy for the way it educated the men about AIDS. One has to remember that there were women on these crews too. It wasn't just men coming off the boats. And remember, the ships were there to re-supply the ships, so a lot of people were working hard, with smaller boats plying the harbor and helicopters whizzing overhead. It was really a sight to see a whole battle group come into a relatively small town like that.

Q: Were you there when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait?

EISENBRAUN: No, no, I had left the first of July of '90 and that happened about the first of August of '90. It is interesting as a footnote, I told all about this military repositioning of supplies and equipment, but when the actual Gulf War came, they didn't use Mombasa. They used other facilities that were better and nearer.

Q: Diego Garcia was certainly one.

EISENBRAUN: Yes, Diego Garcia, and I think Djibouti was very important, and Saudi Arabia was cooperative.

Q: Everything was duplicated or triplicated because you just don't know.

EISENBRAUN: In 1992-93, when we did have the major military humanitarian effort with Somalia, the facilities in Mombasa were used extensively.

Q: Were there any signs of Muslim extremist activity at that point?

EISENBRAUN: Yes. During the two years I was in Mombasa, '88 to '90, I would hear second hand that there were some extremists mullahs in the mosques who on Fridays would preach some very incendiary, anti-American remarks and fire up the local people. I reported these stories back to Nairobi and then on to Washington, and Washington pricked up its ears and was interested to know more. I did what I could to try to develop contacts that could tell me more of the story. But it was always secondhand; I did not meet any mullahs myself.

Q: That was probably the only way you could in any case.

EISENBRAUN: We were aware that there was unrest in the Muslim community along the coast and it was anti-American, primarily because of U.S. policy vis-à-vis Israel.

Q: There was a bombing recently of hotel in Mombasa owned by Israelis. Was there much Israeli connection in your time?

EISENBRAUN: Yes, there was a bit, but it must have grown quite considerably. The bombing you're referring to happened about 2003, I believe. When I read the news reports about very luxurious Israeli hotels on the coast, with jumbo jets back and forth from Israel bringing Israeli tourists in, I was amazed. Nothing like that was going on in my time. I don't remember any hotel catering to Israeli tourism.

Q: What about the tourism? As a former consular officer of many years I always think of tourists getting in trouble. Did you have much?

EISENBRAUN: Yes, I wanted to talk about that because here I was a political officer in charge of the consulate, but I was the only officer, actually, so I had to do everything, including consular work. I would issue half a dozen visas a day, that's all, but I took care also of any Americans

who got in trouble. That duty ended up being the most fulfilling, the most interesting of my responsibilities during my two years there.

I'll mention just a few cases. One involved about eight or nine young backpackers, one of whom was an American and the others a mix of Dutch, New Zealand, and British. They'd gotten in trouble one night on the beach. I learned of this when on a Sunday afternoon my wife and I drove up the coast 40 or 50 miles just to have lunch and sightsee. We were waved down on the road by a young western backpacker who simply told us the story. He said I know that eight or nine people like me were arrested the night before in Kilifi, the next biggest town up the road from Mombasa, and they're in jail. It was Sunday, and I hadn't been informed of the arrest of any American, as was the protocol. I drove over to the police station to see what the story was, and I learned that indeed there had been these arrests and they had already seen the judge and he'd sentenced them to 30 days of hard labor in the Mombasa prison, where they had already been taken. The charge was marijuana possession.

The next morning I went around to the prison and asked to meet the American, or first, to confirm that there really was an American in the prison. Yes there was. To make a long story short, I was pretty convinced after talking to the American that they had been railroaded with the charge of marijuana possession. The young American told that they had been partying on the beach at night, drinking some beers, I guess, which was not illegal, and had a campfire, and the police just swooped down on them at midnight, beaten them up and thrown them in jail. Later, the police claimed to have found these joints in their backpacks. The American said they didn't have any marijuana, it was planted.

I believed them because everyone knew how serious it was to have any kind of illegal drug in Kenya, and I think these people did too. Anyway, there hadn't been any due process, they were just simply beaten up, the evidence was found and then they were sentenced to 30 days at hard labor in the tropical sun breaking rocks. The consulates and embassies hadn't been informed. There had been a pattern of this kind of thing happening on the coast.

I protested, but of course that didn't do any good. By the way, I ended up looking after the interests of the entire group, all nationalities, because I was the only official consular officer on the coast. I should say that several of those arrested were women.

A day or two later, I went to a social function and mentioned this story to one of the most prominent of the attorneys in town. He said our procedures weren't followed, and he too thought it sounded like a trumped up case. He said, I'll represent them pro bono, or better, I'll charge them one shilling. So I went out pretty excited the next day and I met the American and asked if the group wanted to let this Kenyan lawyer represent them. He consulted, and the answer came back yes. By the way, he was telling me pretty awful stories of their treatment; their heads had been shaved, for example, and they were out there breaking rocks in the sun. By the way, Mombasa is right on the equator, so it was pretty darned hot.

The attorney took this on. In the meantime, it just happened that the New Zealand state minister for legal affairs was visiting Kenya on an official visit, and he raised the issue in Nairobi. Then he came down to the coast and he met with me and he went around to all the authorities. So the

New Zealanders took this about as seriously as they could. I got the newspaper clippings eventually; it was big news in New Zealand. So the New Zealanders and I were the ones that were pressing this. But New Zealand didn't have any representation on the coast; I don't even think they had an embassy in Nairobi.

Q: Usually the Brits would take this, being part of the Commonwealth.

EISENBRAUN: Yes. Well, they had a very fine honorary consul in Mombasa who backed up everything I did, but he ceded the authority because I was the official representative. Not to say that he didn't take responsibility; it's just that I took the lead.

The Kenyan attorney prevailed. He got a court order to release these people. They served about 20 days of their 30-day sentence. He got a release order around five in the afternoon, gave it to me and with the order in hand I went out to the prison, presented it to the warden, who was pretty darned surprised, but he couldn't do anything but release the prisoners. So all these people were called together and just released, with their original backpacks and clothes, and told to leave the country the next morning.

There were about ten of them. I'd taken a big van from the office, maybe I had two vans. So they had to be out of the country within 24 hours, but what to do that night? I brought them all back to my home. So from breaking rocks and eating gruel, they went to grilling hamburgers around the pool, swimming and listening to Blood, Sweat and Tears on the stereo. It was a surreal and unbelievable party, and they never went to sleep. My wife and I stayed with them until 2:00 or 3:00 in the morning listening to them compare stories of prison life, especially the differences between the women and the men, until we got too tired and had to go to bed.

It was a human rights bonanza as they told what conditions were like in the prison, what had happened to them and then the women and the men were comparing stories back and forth. There was everything you could think of from maltreatment to sexual harassment to you name it; virtually everything came up. I don't think they were personally mistreated but they witnessed it to the Kenyan prisoners, beatings and so forth. I asked them if they minded if I reported back to Washington what they were relating, and they said fine, do it. There was a vivid cable that went back in the following days telling about this. The next day, I took them around to the travel agent's and to the lawyer's office, where they made a great ceremony of giving him the one shilling, which I think I had to loan to them. By 4:00 in the afternoon, they were all on planes and gone.

A number of these people kept in touch for years. One invited me to his wedding in Amsterdam.

One day, an American man came around and reported that he and his lady friend had been mugged. He was not too hurt, but she was badly beaten and was in the hospital. He said he had to catch a plane. I went around to the hospital to meet this lady. She had broken bones and was in terrible condition. However, she wasn't American; she was German. She'd lived in America for about 30 years, in Minneapolis. So I took care of her as though she was an American citizen. The German consul didn't really have a role; he sent flowers around, but all the business had to do with me to contact her employer in the States and so forth and eventually get her on a plane. She

had to go in a wheelchair to the airport. The Kenyan authorities were very helpful, and her employer in the States sent money for the ticket. She sent a letter to me later, saying I had taken such good care of her that she realized it was time for her to become an American citizen.

Q: Did you have, you know, I'd heard reports about Nairobi and how the security situation had gone down and gone. I mean, roving gangs of people, you know, really quite dangerous. Was that reflected in Mombassa or not?

EISENBRAUN: Yes. First, your story about roving gangs terrorizing homes, like 10 or 15 descending upon a home and robbing it and taking off, that was the case in Nairobi. It did not happen in Mombasa, fortunately. A few tourists were killed in ad hoc situations. But no, these roving gangs had not yet developed on the coast by 1990, but I was told that in subsequent years it became just about as bad in Mombasa as in Nairobi. We were pretty well protected in our compound and there was a panic button in several strategic places, one in the kitchen, one in the bedroom so that we could alert a local security guard office. Sure enough, in the first week or so my wife, mid-morning, bumped that panic button. I don't think she even realized it because it wasn't as though bells and whistles went off in the house but they did go off in the security office down the street. She realized she'd bumped it but since she heard nothing, she didn't think anything was going to happen. But within 30 seconds, 15 or 20 machete-wielding guards came storming in the gate and overwhelmed the entire compound, looking for miscreants to kill, I guess. They were quite disappointed when there was no one to be found.

Q: Well, anything else to talk about Mombasa or not?

EISENBRAUN: Well, I would say that American naval vessels never caused me any problem, but probably once a month an American freighter came in, usually carrying bulk grain. They would spend maybe 10 days in port while the grain was being laboriously taken out. It wasn't even bagged; it was just dumped in the hold. I don't think they do that anymore but they did then. That meant a crew of 15 or 20 was loose on the streets, and they could cause more trouble than you can imagine. I had one seaman do a drug overdose and die. I was one of the few consulates in the world that still had to deal with the merchant marine. So I had all the books on official procedure, and had to consult them constantly. One day I got an anonymous call from a mate on a ship that had pulled in that morning. The caller said I had better investigate his captain because he's crazy and had just taken someone to the airport and dismissed him and not followed due process, which was to discharge before an American consul.

Q: And signed off.

EISENBRAUN: Needed to be signed off and had to be paid off in U.S. dollars and had to be properly given a ticket. Well, none of that had happened. I called the agent because I knew all these agents, then got to the captain and I said I'd like to come down. And he was very accommodating, he said yes, why don't you come and have lunch. So I went down for lunch on the ship. I said I'm here to investigate the fact that you discharged a sailor and took him out to the airport. And he said yes, that's true. Well I said, I'd like to look at your log. So he showed it to me, and there was the discharge. I asked why he had not brought the man by the consulate for discharge. He replied, Oh I just, I don't know quite why, I guess I was too busy or I forgot there

was an American consulate in town or something , but he said, oh don't worry, next time I'll do it. And he also paid him off in shillings, not dollars, as required.

I'm telling you this story only because before lunch, I said, I'm going to have to report you to the American Coast Guard, which was the standard procedure. And he said oh, no, no, no. Please don't do that. I said I've got to; it's my job, that's why I'm here. We had our lunch and talked about other matters entirely. And then as I was leaving, he said again, are you sure you can't reconsider the need to report this to the Coast Guard? He added that he was going to be back in port in about six weeks and if there was anything I wanted, anything at all, I'm in a position to make sure you can get it, what would you like? It's the only time in my Foreign Service career when I was offered a bribe. I thanked him for his generosity but said I would have to report his infraction anyway. I did, and I never heard another thing about him or his ship.

I came back from lunch when another merchant marine ship had come into port, and the waiting room was filled with people in coats and ties and a bride in a white wedding dress. The groom had come from the ship, and he thought I could marry him and the local African girl whom he had met on a previous port visit. I didn't know I had this authority so I had to look it up and of course it turned out I could not do that. They had to get married by the Kenyan authorities down the street. So the entourage and the bride left with her gown and her trail dragging down the steps. There is a sad ending to this. Months later, she came back to the office, very much pregnant to report that she had never heard from him again. I steered her to the local agent of the shipping company, but I'm sure that didn't do any good.

One morning in late November , 1988, the Kenyan newspapers reported that Benazir Bhutto had been elected Prime Minister of Pakistan. A few days later, a front page story headlined that Benazir had appointed four women to her cabinet. Reading the story with interest to see whether I might know one of them, I was nonetheless startled to learn that one of the women was Shahnaz Wazir Ali, who had been named State Minister of Education. I had known her as a teacher at the Lahore American School, and I had traveled with her and her parents out into the countryside of Pakistan in December, 1979.

Around the same time I read about Shahnaz's elevation to government minister, the administrators of the American schools in Africa had a conference in Mombasa, to which they invited me to give the welcoming address. I remember my theme to them was: treat your teachers with respect and value what they have to contribute, as they will have good ideas, and you never know when a staff member will be suddenly elevated to high position. The administrators liked that theme and afterwards, one of the participants mentioned a similar story to that of Shahnaz, but set in an African country. I think that that concept of treating all staff with utmost respect is a pretty good one, regardless of whether one is managing a school, an embassy, or a commercial office.

I said earlier that there was not much political activity going on challenging Moi's government, yet I became aware that there was some underground political activity. I finally was able to meet one of the principal coast opposition opponents to Moi. His name was Ahmed Bamahriz , of Arab descent, though he'd been born on the coast. He challenged Moi at every step, and he'd been arrested a few times. He was quite friendly and wanted to talk to me, but he had to be

awfully careful. We would meet in obscure restaurants in the quiet parts of town, sitting far in the back. Through him, I got a picture of people who were trying to challenge the Moi government.

I took him around to the Mombasa Club for lunch one day. The club was a wonderful environment, right out of the 19th century British colonial days, with the building opening out onto the old harbor and next to Ft. Jesus, built by the Portuguese in the 15th century. I doubt the club had changed much physically in a hundred years. I didn't think it would be a problem taking this leader of Arab descent into the dining room for lunch. It created quite a stir, however. The dining room staff was almost universally African. They were amazed to see Bamahriz at the club. To my astonishment, we were treated like royalty by the African staff, and during the course of the lunch, every single one of them made it a point to come by to shake his hand and ask if there was anything that they could get for him. It was quite an education for me to see that he had such an electrifying effect in the club and clearly enormous respect, even among Black Africans. .

I had hardly gotten back to the office when one of my friends, an African attorney prominent in the club, came to see me. He said Steve, it's not appropriate to bring somebody like that around to the club. He said, you surely can appreciate that we take great efforts to keep the club utterly and completely apolitical, and to bring in an opposition politician is just too dangerous, frankly, for the club's interest. He asked that I not do it again. I realized immediately he was right, and was rather embarrassed. In retrospect I don't know what I was thinking. I didn't realize Bamahriz was that popular, frankly; I didn't think that anybody at the club would know him. I apologized for using the club in that fashion. He said well, okay, I just wanted to make sure that you don't ever even dream of doing this again. I didn't. Fortunately, there were no other repercussions.

I learned at least that the political opposition was stronger on the coast than I had thought.

Q: Could you have brought in Moi supporters?

EISENBRAUN: I never tested that. I never saw any of the officials from the government at the club.

Q: So it was just, you know, I mean, it wasn't they would take one side but not the other; they just didn't want to get involved.

EISENBRAUN: No, they didn't, and for some reason the Kenyan political leaders ignored the club. Now, I should say the club was completely integrated with members from all the ethnic groups on the coast, although the largest contingent was the white Kenyan settlers, many of them quite elderly.

I want to say a few things about the new Ambassador, Smith Hempstone, who came out to Nairobi in December 1989, replacing Elinor Constable. Hempstone was a political appointee who knew a lot about Kenya, as he had lived in the country decades earlier as a journalist. He said he had met Ernest Hemingway in Kenya, which was interesting, as Hempstone seemed to pattern himself after Hemmingway. He looked like Hemmingway, had a sense of adventure that

probably would have appealed to Hemmingway, and he wrote about as well as Hemmingway did. Hempstone started traveling around the country and got to know even the most remote places well. He also set about trying to clean up the mess the embassy was in after the neglect of Constable, with her uncanny ability to destroy morale while doing little of substance.

Hempstone early on came down to Mombasa and started out by taking Lorraine and me to lunch at the Tamarind Restaurant, where we spent the afternoon getting drunk together in what was no doubt one of the world's most beautiful settings overlooking the old harbor. We had met each other in Lahore, Pakistan, around 1980, when he added Lahore to his schedule at the last moment on Tom Thornton's recommendation (he was on the NSC staff) that I could introduce him to some useful people. Hempstone was visiting Pakistan to do a piece for one of the major journals, the Atlantic Monthly, I believe. I took Hempstone around to Nur Noon's for dinner, where he met several senior PPP leaders important under Bhutto, who had been hanged by that time. I was surprised and put off that Hempstone was willing to convey to these Pakistanis that they, as feudal landlords and their sycophants, didn't represent Pakistan's political future. He didn't say this directly, but he had a contemptuous manner that clearly rubbed the Pakistanis the wrong way, although they were too gracious to say anything directly, then or later.

Now in Kenya, Hempstone came to Mombasa on successive visits and met all the local politicians and personalities I knew, something Constable had never even considered. Hempstone had the right priorities in that he quickly figured out that we ought to know more about the Islamic leaders in Mombasa, but that was easier said than done. I put together a meeting with Hempstone and a variety of Islamic personalities, but we were never able to crack the nut of meeting anti-American Imams preaching in the mosques. But we got some good information second-hand. One of the meetings I set up for him was with a fellow named Shariff who was Moi's important political hatchet man on the coast. It was not a friendly meeting, dominated mostly by Hempstone's pointed observations about growing corruption, political misrule, and economic deterioration from the days he had been in Kenya previously.

The next day, a hot and sunny Sunday, Hempstone, Lorraine and I went down to the ferry en route to spending the day on the southern beaches and meeting a few American friends of ours who lived there. While we waited for the ferry, we bought a few papers from the hawkers, and to our surprise, the bold headlines proclaimed that Shariff had told off the American Ambassador the night before for some unfavorable things he had said about Kenya in a meeting with Shariff. In truth, Shariff had said very little at the meeting, but he got back at Hempstone via the press.

On one visit to Mombasa after he had been in country a few months, Hempstone and I went together to a big Kenyan Government program at the fairgrounds, and I was surprised that Hempstone did not choose to sit with any of the government officials, despite their offers. At one point, he turned to me and said, look at those clowns, nodding at President Moi a few feet away, acting like friends of the people while they steal the treasury bare. I was taken aback by the scorn in his tone and his willingness to speak so bluntly when he could have been overheard by any number of Moi's ministers just around us. His point was true, of course, but his distaste seemed too personal, to say nothing of his lack of discretion.

After I left the country, I continued to hear about Hempstone's adventures there. He let his

dislike and contempt for Moi and other Kenyan leaders be known publicly as Hempstone campaigned for better human rights and stricter accountability of US and other donor assistance, some of which was undoubtedly going into secret personal bank accounts of Kenyan government officials. I heard that Hempstone became a household name and a hero of the common man for his open antagonism to the Kenyan Government. This is hardly the usual role of an Ambassador. I wonder how he ever got any work done with the government. He appropriately entitled his memoirs Rogue Ambassador.

I've often wondered why Washington let Hempstone create his own foreign policy of being in open contempt of the government he was sent to try to work with, while encouraging behind the scenes reform in the very areas Hempstone was publicizing widely. My theories are that he had sufficient protection in the White House that no one at State wanted to confront him. It is also possible that Hank Cohen, the Assistant Secretary for Africa, didn't care sufficiently to confront Moi because Hempstone's open antagonism fit with our own policy of dislike for Moi's corrupt government.

STEPHEN T. JOHNSON
Leave Without Pay - Spouse of FSO
Nairobi (1987-1989)

Stephen T. Johnson was born in Tokyo, Japan in 1936. After serving in the US Army from 1956-1957 he received his bachelor's degree from Occidental College in 1960. He entered his Foreign Service in 1961 and his career included positions in Canada, Paris, Vietnam, Laos, Romania, and Kenya. Mr. Johnson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in January 1997.

Q: Then in 1987, where?

JOHNSON: What happened in 1987 was, we went through the bidding process and had a difficult time finding anything together. We finally decided that whoever got assigned first, the other one would go on leave without pay. Judy got assigned first in Nairobi. So I went on leave without pay and floated off to Nairobi for two years, where I did a lot of safaris and did some pieces of work for AID and other things.

Q: How did you find being the spouse of a Foreign Service officer? How was this?

JOHNSON: It wasn't bad. Nairobi was nice. All our relatives came and visited, and it is a wonderful, beautiful country. So I enjoyed it a lot and did enough work for AID doing various things to make a little bit of money. It was very pleasant.

GEORGE G. B. GRIFFIN
Deputy Chief of Mission

Nairobi (1987-1990)

George G.B. Griffin was born in Turkey in 1934. He graduated with a BA from the University of South Carolina in 1957, and served in the U.S. Navy as a lieutenant overseas from 1957 to 1959. After entering the Foreign Service in 1959, his postings abroad have included Naples, Colombo, Calcutta, Islamabad, Lahore, Kathmandu, Kabul, Lagos, Seoul, Nairobi and Milan. Mr. Griffin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

GRIFFIN: Ok, moving to Nairobi. I was there from September 1987, to July 1990. Nairobi was our largest Embassy in Sub-Saharan Africa. We had over 800 employees in 15 agencies, and the number grew while I was there, despite our attempts to keep a lid on it. That was partly because it was regional headquarters for several agencies, which I'll come to later. It's much smaller now because after the August 7, 1998, bombing many of those offices were moved to Embassy Cairo, which is now our largest Embassy in the world. Our primary focuses were essentially bilateral political relations, economic assistance, human rights, democracy, the environment, and military issues.

The latter involved support to U.S. military activities in the CENTCOM region, especially in Somalia, Sudan, and the Horn of Africa. When I got there, the Consulate in Mombasa was quite large, with a staff of about 50 Americans – mostly U.S. Navy communicators. Mombasa was also about the only port on the East African littoral where our Navy ships could visit with any regularity and provide shore leave. Not long after I arrived, the Navy upgraded its systems and wound down its Mombasa presence. So the post was eventually reduced to one American, and became our first special consular post in recent history. That meant that the Consul had no classified capability, so he would come to Nairobi to read traffic and get briefed. That whole process took a lot of time and effort.

Although the Moi Government considered it extremely sensitive, the Navy retained some landing and base rights there. It continued to maintain a hangar in Mombasa for a variety of aircraft. CENTCOM – the Central Command – and the Commander, Middle East Force conducted annual military exercises in Kenya. They were not as extensive as some British military training there, which is conducted semiannually. Sometimes our people would exercise with the British forces. So there's quite a lot of military activity, much of which is invisible to most Kenyans.

I was Elinor Constable's DCM for almost two years, and then Chargé for six months before a political appointee, Smith Hempstone, showed up. We had a lot of visitors. Not surprising, because Nairobi is the regional headquarters for many agencies. For example, the UN Environmental Program, UNEP, at one of only three headquarters the UN has outside of New York. The other two are in Geneva and the Philippines. One of our first visitors was Al Newhart, the founder and Chairman of Gannett, the publisher of *USA Today*. He was on an around-the-world junket on his own plane, and brought with him a huge staff, including a photographer, who happened to be my niece. He was a bit reminiscent of Senator McConnell. He wanted to see President Moi and berate him about everything he was doing wrong. With the help of his top editor, we managed to cool him of a bit, so it was a reasonable visit.

Several Senators visited Nairobi, including my friend Fritz Hollings from South Carolina, Terry Sanford of North Carolina, Paul Simon of Illinois, and David Boren of Oklahoma. President Carter came three times after he left office. His mission was to mediate between Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. He also climbed Mount Kilimanjaro. While his visits were not “official,” we handled them as if they were. When I told Carter that I, like he, had gone to Georgia Tech, he seemed to think I was okay. But when I tried to offer my opinion about Afghanistan or Iran, he didn’t want to hear about it. I didn’t bother to complain that he didn’t read my INR analyses. His wife Rosalyn was with him each time, but she was very unhappy about the Kilimanjaro climb because she never made it to the top. They had a couple of grandchildren and a Secret Service team with them. Their agent who was in the best shape was the first to come down with altitude sickness. One of the kids was next, and Mrs. Carter was sent down the mountain with the failures, while her husband managed to stagger up to the rim of the crater and back down. He was quite proud of it.

Naturally, we had our share of official State Department visitors. They included Under Secretary for Management Ivan Selin, Africa Assistant Secretaries Chet Crocker and Hank Cohen, and Art Ford, who was FBO Assistant Secretary.

Some of our biggest personnel problems were with USAID. Elinor and I lost a big bureaucratic battle with them. USAID had five offices there: there was the bilateral AID mission, plus four regional missions. REDSO was the Regional Economic Development Services Office; RHUDO is the all-Africa regional housing office. There were two regional inspectors’ offices – one for investigations, and one for inspections. At one point, the new Inspector General of AID, a retired Marine general, decided to “save money” by stationing his investigators at 5 major posts abroad, including Nairobi. He came out on a charm offensive, seeking the Ambassador’s agreement. As he spoke, we realized that, where there were 11 American officers, and 20-plus local staff in those offices, the planned shift would bring another 20 Americans immediately, and eventually another 35; not to mention additional local staff and administrative burdens. Elinor asked him where he thought we would put those people. She told him we had no extra office space and no available housing in a tight market. She said we couldn’t do it. The IG thanked her politely, and left.

We tried to fight this, but soon learned that the other four posts targeted by the IG had already caved, without checking with the Department, or with us. We argued that we had a special problem. At that time, many people, especially in Washington, viewed Nairobi as the Paris of Africa. They saw it as a wonderful place where people could live happily, in the case of USAID closer to their work. Not so. What we had was a group of people, mostly men, who were on the road most of the time, leaving behind unhappy families who didn’t like the schools or the place. As DCM, I saw more wife problems than at any other post I’ve ever been. As a group, they were very lonely, and many of them drank too much and played around. Their kids would have been a lot happier in schools here in Arlington. It kept a big school going, but most of them felt lost abroad. If they could have worked, it might have helped, but the Government of Kenya would not allow them to do so. I spent a lot of time sorting out family relationships, since I was the family advocacy officer, an official part of my role as DCM. Moreover, the employees’ trips were longer than they would have been if they were based in Arlington. Travel in Africa is not

simple. I don't know if you have served in Africa, but all the airline routes go north-south. So, for example, if you wanted to go from Nairobi to Lagos, my previous post in Africa, you had to go to Europe first, and vice versa. There was one flight a week at that time out of Addis Ababa, on Ethiopian Airlines, which would jump around Africa, but not directly east-west. There were almost no flights from an Anglophone country to a Francophone country, or vice versa, without going to Europe. In Nigeria, the easiest way to get from Lagos to, say, Cote d'Ivoire was to go to Paris and back, even though it's a half-hour flight distant from Lagos. So the USAID employees spent much of their time on airplanes. They covered something like 70 countries, including Pakistan, Greece and South Africa. I thought it was nuts. They shouldn't be in Nairobi at all. But we came late to the party, found that everybody else had already caved, and lost the battle.

After the Ambassador's introduction of me at that first Country Team meeting, I learned that she had a reputation for being unsympathetic to many employee concerns. Normally, the DCM is the whip-cracker and the Ambassador is the good guy, but I saw that it was going to have to be the other way around in this case. I held weekly brown-bag lunches, and tried to pack them with diverse people from every section and agency. In almost every session, for example, there would be a senior FSN, a junior American officer, and a Marine security guard. We were headquarters for the Marine company for Africa, so there were something like 50 Marines at post. There were mixed results. Some people wouldn't show up after accepting the invitation from my secretary. Some said they were just too busy. Others said they were afraid to come into my office because I was too important for them. I kept it at the sub-counselor level because I had enough interaction with the senior staff. It worked sometimes, and some people improved markedly, both socially and professionally.

A battle erupted shortly after I arrived, led by the AFSA Representative, an economic officer. He and others were convinced that we needed a commissary. The Ambassador had already dismissed the idea, noting that they could buy anything they wanted in the local market. There was a major supermarket two blocks from the Embassy where they could buy almost anything they wanted at reasonable prices. Earlier, there was a period when imports were blocked, but then everything became available. Moreover, there was a convenience store in the Embassy basement which sold American liquor, cigarettes, candy, and a few emergency supplies like aspirin. The AFSA Rep said that wasn't good enough. I told Elinor I didn't think responding with a flat "no" would work. I suggested that we build a good case and spell it out at an AFSA meeting. She agreed, and addressed the session, noting that we had APO facilities, which enabled everyone to order from the States and get it delivered in two weeks. She said she was willing to listen to their concerns, if they still had some, but needed specifics. When it was apparent that they hadn't been satisfied, she asked AFSA to make a list of everything its members didn't think they could live without. AFSA canvassed everybody, and came up with a list of a dozen "must have" things. When she saw it, the Ambassador collapsed in laughter and said, "This is the stupidest thing I ever heard." The first thing on the list was pantyhose. She said, "Huh? We're going to run a store with pantyhose? How many different kinds and sizes and shapes and colors can we stuff into our little store?" The second item was peanut butter, because the nurse was convinced that local peanut butter was full of aflatoxin. (It was not, by the way.) The third was corn flakes. There was an American company making perfectly good corn flakes in Kenya, which were for sale everywhere. I had the unhappy duty to tell everyone there would not be a commissary after all. I think it cost me in the end. I was fortunate to be promoted to

minister-counselor shortly after I arrived, which made my stock a little higher, but very few of the staff forgot the commissary issue.

Democracy and human rights were always on our front burner. President Daniel Arap Moi often ran hot and cold, in calculated ways. He has been in power since 1963, and knows how to maneuver politically. He has been called a dictator, and a crook who runs a kleptocracy, but there is a benign side to him as well. I got to know him fairly well, perhaps better than most other diplomats, but he was certainly not easy to deal with. If he thought we were giving him problems, he would make trouble for us about every six months. Three months later, the world would suddenly become wonderful again. It was a predictable cycle, which rarely failed to materialize.

During my time, Kenya was a so-called one-party democracy, which was the way Moi wanted to keep it. But influential Americans came to argue that he was wrong. One memorable visit was that of Ethel and Kerry Kennedy. They came to give an award to a member of the Opposition who was pushing for multiparty elections and to unseat Moi. Moi had thrown him into jail more than once, and didn't want to hear about him again. They demanded to see Moi, and we pressed State House to set up an appointment, stressing that the Kennedys are politically important in America. I think Ethel Kennedy probably handled it reasonably well, but Kerry...

Q: Who's Kerry?

GRIFFIN: Daughter of Bobby and Ethel. In their meeting, she couldn't hold back, and lit into Moi. She was maybe 20-something. She called him names. This does not sit well with a big chief in Africa, especially coming from a girl. They were almost thrown in jail. We managed to block that. They were almost deported on the next plane. We got them another 12 hours, restricted to their hotel. The Ambassador used lots of her political capital to get them home without being hurt. I saw Kerry's cousin recently at a dinner. She reminded me of all this and thanked me effusively for helping them out. But Kerry didn't then; she was attacking me, too.

Then we had a visitor named Reece Smith, a lawyer from Tampa, Florida. He was a past President of the American Bar Association and later the International Bar Association. He came on a similar mission – to check on the situation and write a report on human rights in Kenya. He was thrown in jail. He didn't check in with the Embassy, and we only found out about him after a local law firm got him out on bail. He was told not to leave the country until he was put on trial for subversion. We went to work to get him out, and finally managed to do so. The Ambassador told Moi's top aides that one of the stupidest things they could do was to take the head of the ABA and throw him in jail for no good reason, especially when he's looking into human rights violations. That seemed hard for them to grasp, but Moi finally relented and we got him on a plane home. He said he would never return to Kenya as long as he lived.

We had some nearly disastrous visits by Americans, including some CODELs, who were also pushing democracy and human rights issues. We tried to help them understand Kenyan attitudes, not that they would always listen.

I usually went with Ambassador Constable to call on President Moi, unless one of them didn't

want me there. But that was pretty rare. When she wasn't there, I saw him one-on-one, though he didn't like to meet junior people. He made it clear that it was not me, but what I represented. Except for the Brit, I was the only Chargé d'Affaires whom he would see.

Ambassadors Constable and maybe Hempstone may have mentioned a pattern in the President's behavior. He didn't want to hear about human rights or multiparty democracy, especially after the Foreign Minister was killed. If we pushed too hard, he would usually find some way to get back at us. He or one of his henchmen would create some kind of crisis for us, and he wouldn't see us or accept messages from us for awhile. But soon he would "listen to reason," and we would be invited to call. It got to be such a pattern that we could predict that, if things got too good, something bad was going to happen, and vice versa.

Elinor and I had good relations with Foreign Secretary, Bethuel Kiplagat, who professed to be a voice of reason in the Moi Government, as a career bureaucrat. With the Department's blessing, I had a series of separate meetings with him when he was working behind the scenes on an effort to resolve the Mozambique crisis. His wife was from one of the French islands in the Indian Ocean.

Q: Mauritius, the Seychelles, one of those?

GRIFFIN: Or maybe the Comoros. They both spoke excellent French. Kiplagat was dealing with Afonso Dhlakama, the head of RENAMO, who also spoke French, although Portuguese was his better foreign language. We kept our embassies in South Africa and Mozambique apprized of what was going in those talks. It got to be quite interesting, and in the end, after the mysterious death of Samora Machel, Dhlakama made peace with Chissano's government, so I guess it worked.

Q: What was his interest in doing it?

GRIFFIN: To bring peace to that part of Africa; it was a peacemaker role. President Moi liked to think of himself as a peacemaker all over Africa. Most big chief heads of state in Africa like to play such roles. They don't want Americans or Europeans doing it. The Nigerians are usually most effective at it, but the others try their hands now and then.

Another problem that arose – another one of the crises – was a law that Parliament quietly passed, banning foreigners from owning land. That created a bigger problem than they expected because there were not only Americans, but also Ugandan, Italian, British, and you-name-it owners. Some were absentee, but many foreigners lived on the land and worked it as well. We lined up some of the more powerful foreigners, including an American who had been there for 35 years and had good relations with Moi. The law was eventually rescinded.

Q: How did that work? Were we making proposals or...

GRIFFIN: We pointed out that the law had no provision for adequate compensation if the land was taken away from the foreigners. It never got as bad as the situation in Zimbabwe today, but it was similar, in that there was pressure on the land from a burgeoning population. Kenya at that

time had the highest population growth rate in the world, at 4.2 percent per year. We knew there was pressure on the Government to give poor people land. But we pointed out to Moi that our law – the Hickenlooper Amendment – forces us to cut off aid if a country seizes American property and doesn't adequately compensate for it. I stressed to others, including the Vice President and some ministers, that if we took such a step, other aid donors would likely follow suit, and at least decrease their aid. We noted that American businesses were looking for new opportunities in Africa, but if they saw that Kenya was confiscating foreign property, they would turn away. We enlisted the American Business Association – it was akin to an AmCham, but not associated with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce – to help make our point. While it had become rather moribund, its members understood the need to combine forces, and went to work to help us convince the Kenyans to rescind the law. The point was taken. This happened just at a time when fingers were being pointed at the USG for having something to do with the assassination of Foreign Minister Bob Oki.

Q: What happened?

GRIFFIN: It's a very strange story. Nobody seems to know exactly what happened even today. The Minister disappeared one night after someone came and knocked on his door. He went out with a man, and never reappeared. His charred remains were found in a distant game park several days later. It was not the first time such a thing had happened in Kenya. The man eventually charged – but not convicted – and blamed by most people for having done it was one of Moi's henchman. He was ousted and sent to jail – for another crime – but is back again in the Government. His name is Nick Biwat. He is very close to Moi, quite powerful, and greatly feared. He is married to an Israeli woman. The last time I was in Kenya, several people predicted that he would be the next President if something happens to Moi. I suspect he had something to do with Oki, but I don't know what. Why the Minister was killed I don't know, but people immediately started pointing their fingers at us, saying that we were unhappy with Oki. That couldn't have been further from the truth. He was probably the friendliest Kenyan Foreign Minister we've dealt with in the last 25 years.

Q: When this law was passed, anybody who's been in government for a while knows how potent a weapon this is and the backlash and all that. In other words, this is an extremely controversial thing. Hadn't there been a lot of debate and talking about what would happen?

GRIFFIN: That's not the way the Kenyan Parliament works. It is, by and large, a rubber stamp legislature, though Opposition members certainly try to start debates. Moi paid close attention to things that affected him directly, and I doubt if he thought that one up. There were ministers and other henchman – I use the word advisedly – who would dream up such things. They usually were after something for themselves, while claiming that they were doing it in his name. Whether he had advance knowledge about it is difficult to say. Those of us with access to him would often ask him about rumors, and would get differing answers. State House in Nairobi is a very secretive place. It was difficult to know what was going on there, so we used multiple contacts to check out what we heard. I suppose the White House is pretty secretive as well, but they're a lot more open than State House was, at least in my day.

In an effort to improve bilateral relations, when I was Chargé between Ambassadors Constable

and Hempstone, I launched a campaign with the business community – something that had worked well in Nigeria and Korea. I invited the top American and Kenyan businessmen to form an organization to work together. It was a binational organization – there hadn't been an effective one there – which we dubbed "KUSA," for the Kenya-U.S. Association. I'm not sure what happened after I left. I heard that Hempstone didn't put his weight behind it, so it probably withered away. But it worked for a while.

I also tried to reorganize and re-direct the work of the Embassy. Most Americans only go to Kenya to look at wildlife, but there were serious problems in doing so. It seemed to me that every section of the mission needed to pay attention to this. There were frequent threats to tourists. Officials were taking bribes from Persian Gulf Arabs who came to shoot rhinoceri and elephant with submachine guns, for their horn and ivory. After the Government realized the real cost to the rest of the nation, it was finally stopped. Anyway, I thought every section should have a piece of the wildlife action. For example, it was important for the Economic Section, the Political Section, USAID, and USIS to collaborate on this for obvious reasons. We put together a task force to tackle the issues, and to try to influence the country's various programs, including wildlife, conservation, and the environment. The Economic Counselor chaired it. It worked so well that other embassies all over Africa began to implement similar programs.

It paid off several times. There was an annual foreign assistance meeting chaired by the World Bank and the IMF. The USAID Director usually represented us, but once when I was Chargé he wanted a little heavier weaponry, and asked me to come. Our staffs put together some talking points in two versions – one tough, and one not so tough. They asked me which one I preferred. I said it would depend on what the Kenyans said. The Kenyan side was chaired by Vice President Saitoti, whom I had gotten to know reasonably well. He opened the meeting with a speech, saying everything was wonderful and getting better, but that the country needed more money to maintain progress. We disagreed strongly with his analysis, so I used the tough set of talking points. I threatened to suspend our assistance, including the military part. When we had a break, other donor ambassadors sidled up to me and said, "Keep going. We don't have the authority, but it needs to be said, and you Americans will be listened to."

We worked well with the World Bank Resident Representative, a German named Peter Eigen, who is even better known now. He left the Bank after Kenya, having seen enough, to form Transparency International, an organization headquartered in Germany. It tries to stop corruption around the world, largely by spotlighting it. He was intrigued by my experiences with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and has put its principles to good use.

As you would expect, I spent a fair amount of time on commercial work. We managed to get the Commercial Section upgraded slightly. It wasn't anywhere near as important as those I headed in Korea and Nigeria, but there was enough potential business to keep the small staff busy. Using some USAID seed money as a come-on, for example, FCS nailed down a huge contract for computerizing Kenya's largest bank. The British had the inside track, and the Japanese were close behind, but we managed to push them out of the way.

Back to wildlife: again when I was Chargé, we had a problem with a group organized by the Audubon Society of Connecticut. It happened to be led by the husband of one of my wife's

classmates. They were touring in the south near the Tanzanian border, just northeast of Mount Kilimanjaro. When they were flagged down by a couple of Masai tribesmen, the driver stopped. The men hauled out guns and demanded their money, jewelry, and cameras. When they didn't hand over the loot fast enough, one of the Masai fired off a round, which grazed a man and killed one of the women. To his credit, the driver sped off and got them back to Nairobi. When I heard about it, I went to their hotel and tried to calm them down, and thought I did reasonably well. We got them all on a flight home the next day. But later, the man whose cheek had been grazed accused us – the Embassy – of not warning them that it would happen, and of not giving them proper protection. He went to Senator Dodd, who called me to ask how we planned to satisfy his constituent. The man threatened to sue the Embassy, the State Department, and me personally. As far as I know, the lawsuit never was filed because I never heard anything more about it after we sent in all our reports.

Then there was the famous case of a British girl whose charred bones were found in the largest of the game parks, the Masai Mara. It's still a *cause celebre* in the UK and Kenya. We followed all these events, and concluded that safari-type tourism was reasonably safe if people took the right precautions and went with a reliable guide. We didn't ever try to stop people from going on safari, which was usually safer than staying in Nairobi.

We complained repeatedly to the Department, despite what's been said in the press lately, about our own security at the Embassy. I was especially concerned about our proximity to the intersection of two major streets, with no setback. At first I was more concerned about people being shot on their way in to work. There had been recent incidents in Pakistan, where a Consulate bus in Karachi was attacked, and in Cairo, where DAO employees in a traffic jam were shot by men on motorcycles. So I looked for a way for the staff to get quickly into the Embassy parking lot. This was a problem because, of course, the security officer, the RSO, insisted that the guards inspect the bottoms of every vehicle, plus inside the trunks and hoods – the whole bit. Every morning there was a long line of cars outside our back gate, making our people perfect targets. We might as well have painted bull's-eyes on them.

The AID mission was down the street several blocks, with much less protection – no Marine guards – and shared the building with Kenyan firms. The AID Director, Steve Sindig, was one of the best I've ever run into. We worked up a proposal to Washington, which would move us all out of the center of town. His people identified a piece of property, which is where the new Embassy will be – 12 years later, after the place was blown up. We had a good price, we had everything, but FBO told us to get in line, as there were many other posts ahead of us, and not enough funds to take care of all of us. So we did try.

Another set of problems I had as DCM was with families. It kept me running, with events of that sort every week or so. There were a couple of violent ones.

Q: Was there the problem that I've heard about - I don't know whether it's a recent manifestation - attacks on people, mainly through robbery and all that?

GRIFFIN: Yes, there were a few robberies at mission homes. The staff was scattered all over the city. There was no official compound, and people lived everywhere. We had a large security

network to protect them, using guards from outside contractors such as Pinkerton or one of the other well-known names. They were pretty effective, so the worst incidents didn't involve Embassy personnel, but people in the private sector who didn't have our level of security. At my house, which was on seven acres of land surrounded by a five-foot fence, I kept a large dog outside at all times, and a small dog that would bark if the big one slept. Three or four guards were posted around the clock. There were two at the front gate, one at the back gate, and another who was supposed to roam the entire property. They were on shifts, and kept two fierce-looking shepherd dogs with them. Still, we were invaded a couple of times. People came over the fence and tried to overwhelm the guards, but they were able to fend them off. We were also across the street from a police station. We were never sure whether that was good or bad, but it seemed to have some effect. In any case, it wasn't as bad as Lagos. In Kenya, most thieves tended to be armed with knives or bows and arrows, so we could sleep a little easier.

On another level, we knew of the existence in Nairobi of some Libyan terrorists. The Kenyans kept a pretty close eye on them, and so did we. They seemed to be supported by Muammar Qadhafi. We worried that they might try to pop off some of us. The Ambassador had a fully armed Mercedes, something Hempstone tried to get rid of, and my official car was armored. We had several others, but most people didn't use them, and no armored car would have stopped the 1998 bombing.

After Ambassador Constable left, signs suddenly appeared downtown in Uhuru Park – Freedom Park – announcing construction of a 60-story skyscraper. A model had a huge statue of President Moi in front. The USAID Director and others on the Country Team agreed that it was a terrible idea, which we should try to nip in the bud. It turned out that Vice President Saitoti was in charge of the project and probably stood to make money out of it. In the end, he was made the sacrificial lamb. We thought we had stopped it, and then Ambassador Hempstone came. But before I get to that, let me talk about other things that happened during the interregnum.

Q: What was the issue as far as we were concerned...?

GRIFFIN: It was a huge waste of money. They didn't have much money, and were always appealing to us for more. Then they wanted to pay top dollar for this very fancy...

Q: So it wasn't a matter of security or anything like that?

GRIFFIN: No. Here was a poor government, on its knees begging for more foreign aid, proposing a ridiculously expensive vanity project in a public park. They claimed to have found a flaw in the law that made it a national park, and argued that an exception could be made. I'll go back to Hempstone's leap into this fray in awhile. Ambassador Constable left. She became Assistant Secretary for OES, but spent her first year back in Washington as Diplomat in Residence at Georgetown University. In any case, her time was up, and the new George H. W. Bush Administration decided to send a political appointee to replace her. The President chose Smith Hempstone.

During the interregnum of about six months when I was Chargé, OIG inspected the post, a fairly common practice. It was to help set the scene for the new Ambassador, and give him a picture of

what he was about to command. But that inspection affected me particularly. I had just reached, in retrospect, the high point of my career. OIG sent a relatively junior inspector out as the team leader. For some reason – I don't know why – he took a dislike to me, and I guess I reciprocated. He gave me an awful efficiency report – it's called an IER – and I was devastated. To my surprise, the entire Country Team wrote a letter of protest to the IG. My secretary had mentioned it to a friend, and word got around quickly. Their letter called the inspection report a travesty, saying the situation was nothing like what it portrayed. Inspector General Sherman Funk called me when he got the letter, and asked me several questions. Then he called again to say he had destroyed the IER. So it's not in my record, but the oral reports of the inspection team cost me my next job. I had already been approached about two chiefs of mission jobs, but all of a sudden my phone calls weren't returned. Then I talked to my career counselor, who said he had been ordered by the Deputy Director General not to recommend me for chief of any mission. I screamed and yelled, but by that time the damage was done, so the COM jobs vanished.

I met Smith Hempstone on home leave here before Elinor Constable left. We knew many people in common, and he invited Chrissie and me to lunch at the Chevy Chase Club. We had a nice time, and he seemed very friendly. After that, the inspectors returned and obviously talked to him. He changed his mind about me overnight, and decided that I had to be replaced. The Department didn't agree, and both the DG's office and AF Assistant Secretary Hank Cohen told me I had to stay in Nairobi for at least another year. They said I knew the Department's system and the territory, the Ambassador did not, and he was political. It turned out to be a pretty rough slog.

After meeting Hempstone here, I talked to friends who knew him well. He had been at the *Washington Star*, which was his family's newspaper. He had also been the first Editor of the *Washington Times*. The new Editor of the *Times* told me Smith was fired because he couldn't stay sober or awake. It turned out to be like that. First, he was rejected by the medical bureau – MED – because he didn't pass his physical exam. He pulled some chain in the White House, and got that overridden. PER wouldn't give him orders for awhile, but he finally beat them down and came anyway. He wrote a self-promoting piece in the *Washington Times* before he left for Nairobi, in which he compared himself to Ernest Hemingway, William Shirer, and John Gunther, saying he was going to go out and do good works.

He wanted to bring his own secretary, a personal assistant and another political appointee. The DG finally said he could have one, but not all three. He chose to have a personal assistant, the daughter of one of his college roommates. The only way we could get her on the rolls was to abolish one of our regular positions. After much debate, we abolished a much-needed political officer slot, and she sat in that office. As far as I could tell while I was there, she didn't do anything. She traveled with him, but that was about it. I could never figure out what she did every day, but he insisted having her in most meetings. In the end, I think she took enough notes to enable him to write his book – *Rogue Ambassador*.

When Smith landed in Nairobi, he insisted that we do things “right.” That meant that we were all to go directly to the residence for what he called a *vin d'honneur*; in other words, a drink. It was nine o'clock in the morning. So the Country Team went out and had a glass of champagne. He dismissed us after saying he would come to the chancery a bit later. When he came in, he opened

his briefcase, which was full of cigarettes. He asked me where he could buy cigarettes. I told him there were two ways. He could go to a local shop and buy them. They might not have his brand, and if they did, they might be stale. But the best way was to order them through the APO, through which two cartons would come within a couple of weeks. He said that wasn't good enough. When I asked why, he said because he would need more than that, faster than that. I pointed out that he had a whole briefcase full. He said they would only last a day. He needed more, and needed them "now." That's how much he smoked. He paid no attention to the Department's worldwide ban on smoking in offices.

Smith looked around the reception area outside the executive suite and saw the "rogues gallery," photographs of all the previous ambassadors on the wall. He said, "I want my picture up there tomorrow." I noted that Ambassador Constable's wasn't up yet, and said that standard practice was to put pictures up after the departure of the incumbent. He repeated that he wanted his up "now." He added that he didn't like the picture of President Bush, and there was no photograph of Vice President Quayle. I told him they are all supplied by USIA, so if they hadn't send them to us, we didn't have them. I guess I wasn't paying attention to the tone of his voice. He growled, "You better get them, and get them now." While the staff was working on that, he tried to get a copy of an informal photograph of President Bush he saw at Embassy Paris, where he had stayed with Ambassador Curley, also a political appointee. But that was a personal photograph taken by Curley, who wouldn't send Smith a copy. Anyway, we had Smith's picture up in less than a week. I can't recall when Elinor Constable's arrived.

Next, Hempstone insisted that he must present his credentials that day. I tried to explain that it didn't happen like that. I said we hoped to get him in there in a week or so, but warned that most ambassadors waited a month or so. I stressed that it was rather like Washington. Smith scowled at me. He said, "I'm the American Ambassador. I want to do it tomorrow." So I called Foreign Secretary Kiplagat, told him my problem, and asked what could be done. He understood, and shortly called back to say the Foreign Minister would receive Smith to accept his credentials to pass to State House. We went to the Ministry, where things instantly became tense. Without listening much to Hempstone, Minister Wilson Ndolo Ayah began to complain about the way he, a black man, had been treated as a student in the United States. The Ambassador essentially ignored him, except to ask more than once when he could present his credentials to President Moi. Ayah didn't give us much of a response.

On the way back to the Embassy, Smith asked, "Where's my air freight?" I said I didn't know, and asked when it was shipped. He said, "The day before I left Washington." I doubted that it had yet arrived, noting that it usually took a couple of weeks. He said, "That's not acceptable. Mr. DCM, if my air freight is not here by tomorrow, you get on an airplane and go home, and don't bother to come back." That's the way we started. The air freight arrived two days later, by the way, and I didn't go home to get it.

Q: Was he trying to pick a fight? In your analysis of this, was he trying to prove something?

GRIFFIN: He was trying to prove lots of things, especially that he was in charge. Since he already had revised his opinion of me and thought I wouldn't do him any good, he was, by God, going to take charge of his Embassy and run it his way. He was in the Marine Corps at some

point, maybe during the Korean War, but I don't think he ever saw any action. Smith is a very intelligent man, with some good sense. He understood a fair amount about Africa, where he had worked as a journalist in the 1960s. Some of his policy ideas were unimpeachable. What I didn't like was the way he tried to bully everybody, including President Moi. I tried to advise him against it, but he didn't want to hear it; certainly not from me. When I told him his approach wasn't going to work; that there was a better way, he ignored me.

For example, he finally got his appointment to present his credentials to Moi. On such occasions, the President is surrounded by, depending on the importance of the ambassador, his Cabinet, or some State House staff. For Hempstone, the whole Cabinet was there, plus TV cameras, reserved for envoys from the most important countries (to Kenya). The Ambassador was accompanied by most of the Country Team. There were half a dozen of us, including the Defense Attaché, the Political Counselor, the PAO, the AID Director, and me. Hempstone's prepared remarks had been sent ahead, so the President could respond intelligently. He was to read the remarks (which were less than a page), hand them over, hand over his credentials, and wait. The President was to say something nice in return, shake hands, do an about-face, march out, and that was it. When we walked in, Hempstone walked straight up to Moi, handed him the credentials and said, "I'm supposed to make this speech, but you know that neither you nor I are diplomats. We're going to be friends, Mr. President!" He went close to Moi, as if to embrace him or something. The security staff, the ministers, and staffers all froze. Moi recoiled. Someone motioned to the TV crews to turn off the cameras, but they didn't. Smith kept going. He said, "You and I are going to get along wonderfully, Mr. President, because we can talk together man-to-man, and solve a lot of the world's problems." He went on like that for 15 or 20 minutes. He tried again to shake hands and grip Moi, who kept backing off. Finally, Moi turned and left, and we were hustled out without the usual pose for still photographers. Then we went to see the Vice President.

Q: Did Hempstone ask you when you left how did that go or something like that?

GRIFFIN: No, he said, "I think that went just right, don't you?" I said, "Well, it's not the way I would have done it." I didn't want to disagree with him every five seconds, but the way he put it, what was I supposed to say? Later someone called from State House to ask, "Doesn't he know the President is a sovereign head of state?" All I could say was, "Yes, he knows."

So then we went to see the Vice President. In our briefings, I had told Hempstone that Saitoti was behind the 60 Story Building, which I hoped was a dead issue, though the fence and the sign were still up. We went in and were placed on one side of a large table. The Vice President came in with two aides; Hempstone had me. There was a TV camera, and one microphone, a gold microphone - I'll never forget it. The room overlooked the 60-story building site. Saitoti started talking for the camera: "Mr. Ambassador, let me welcome you formally and officially to our country." Smith didn't let him finish. He lit into him, saying, "I hear you're trying to build a 60-story building over there. That's the dumbest thing I've ever heard of." He said, "If you do, we will cut off aid." As he continued, Saitoti reached over and pulled the microphone away from Hempstone, since he couldn't get his aide to turn it off, and moved it in front of the other aide. Misunderstanding, that poor fellow pushed it right back in front of Hempstone, who was still talking. It was wonderful. I don't think the Vice President ever received Smith again.

On the way back to the Embassy, he said, “See, that’s the only way. You can’t let these guys get away with it. They probably thought we had forgotten all about that, so I had to tell them, by God, that we wouldn’t tolerate it.” I said, “You’re the Ambassador.”

A couple of days after Smith arrived, we had an awards ceremony. A couple of the Marines had been promoted, so as an ex-Marine he insisted on pinning on their new stripes. Part of that USMC ceremony apparently is to “pin” the stripes with a sock to the upper arm. So he smacked them all and had a good time. He also began a friendship with the Gunnery Sergeant. In addition to our own contingent of Security Guard Marines, Nairobi was F Company Headquarters. The Gunny was in charge of our guards, but his own supervisors were also there. The Company was run by a lieutenant colonel, whose staff included a major, a couple of captains and a couple of lieutenants. The Gunny had been caught abusing his daughter. After consulting with the Company Commander, I decided that the best thing to do was to transfer him back to the U.S., where he could be disciplined, and the child would get the care she needed. An American psychiatrist had interviewed the girl and told me she needed full-time care, which she was not equipped to provide. But after the promotion ceremony, Hempstone began talking to the Gunny about how well they were going to get along. The Gunny told him he was about to be shipped out, adding, “They don’t like me here.” Smith shooed everyone else out of the room and sat down with the Gunny. Later, he came into my office and said, “That man is not going anywhere. He’s staying here.” I told him the background and argued that he was giving everyone a bad message. He wouldn’t listen, and the Gunny stayed.

Smith’s first diplomatic dinner was at British High Commissioner John Johnson’s house. He nabbed Hempstone first, using the “special friends” line, noting that he had been in Nairobi longer than most ambassadors, and offering to introduce him to some of Kenya’s most important people. So both Hempstones and my wife and I went to dinner, which featured former Attorney General Charles Njonjo and his wife, among others. The Brit and Hempstone took an instant dislike to each other, and barely got through dinner. I don’t think they said another ten words to each other for the rest of Johnson’s tour of duty. He had tried.

The next one was dinner at the residence of the Japanese Ambassador, who was Dean of the diplomatic corps. There were several other ambassadors at the huge granite or marble table, which was so large that the guest list could have been doubled, and we still could not have touched elbows. At the end of dinner, the host rose and launched into a rather lengthy toast. About halfway through it, Smith went face down on his plate, asleep. My wife tried to rouse him, to no avail. When the host finished, Kitty Hempstone stood up and returned the toast. Then she hauled her husband to his feet, and he staggered out the door and went home.

Q: This was his drinking then, I guess?

GRIFFIN: It wasn’t jet lag. Hempstone is overweight and smokes like a chimney. That’s why the doctors in MED refused to give him a medical clearance. They didn’t think his heart couldn’t stand such abuse at Nairobi’s altitude of 6,000 feet, but it did. He was only about 60 years old at the time. He would start in the morning. He probably smoked eight packs of cigarettes a day. As for drink, at lunch he would down three or four martinis. He swigged beer in the afternoon after he finished playing tennis. And then he’d have cocktails. According to Kitty, he downed a fifth

of bourbon every night, plus lots of wine, cognac, and cordials. The man has an iron constitution, I must say, but he did have a hard time staying awake, and constantly looked hung over.

One of the most difficult rows I had with him was soon after he arrived. He said, "To further my burgeoning friendship with President Moi, I'm going to give him a bull." I said that was nice, and asked how he was going to do it. I knew that one of the American ranchers whose land had been threatened gave Moi a prize bull every year. I suppose it was the price of staying in business. I told Hempstone that gifts from private citizens was one thing, but since he represented Uncle Sam, I didn't see how he could do it. I asked him who would pay for it. He said, "Don't worry, I'm not going to pay for it. My friend in Virginia is going to give it to me, and the Agency will fly it out one of their special planes." Before going any further, I advised him to check with the ethics people in the Department. He said, "All they'll do is tell you no." Since he didn't expressly forbid me, I called Irv Hicks, our Deputy Assistant Secretary in AF, who put me onto Assistant Secretary Hank Cohen. They agreed that it must be approved by the ethics people in the Bureau of Legal Affairs. AF queried L, which very quickly said "no," unless Hempstone were out of the picture. In other words, the USG could accept the bull from the Virginia farmer and have it presented to Moi by the U.S. Ambassador, but it could not be a personal gift from Hempstone. So Hank Cohen called Smith and told him that, if it were done just so, then maybe, but his take on the old red-face test told him it didn't look right. He said the deal was off. Well, Smith was livid, and furious at me for having brought the matter to the Department's attention. Later, after I left, I heard he asked the owner of the bull to give it to Moi, bypassing the Embassy, but it didn't happen.

Then he wanted to go hunting. Before he arrived, Smith called to tell me he was bringing several guns with him, and wanted a gun safe installed in his bedroom, so he could lock them up right away. He said he recalled from his earlier times – he was in Kenya for several years as a journalist in the 1960s – that Kenyan law required that. I guess someone in the Department got wise, because the guns came by diplomatic pouch, not on the plane with him. Anyway, the gun safe was ready but, as advised by the RSO, I told him that the law restricted the use of gun safes to the night before the hunter wanted to use the weapons. He said, "I'm the American Ambassador, a diplomat. To hell with the law." I said, "Yes, sir." He wanted to go big game hunting with a local hunter, but I had to tell him that Kenya had outlawed that sort of thing, partly because of a lot of poaching. About the only thing left was seasonal bird hunting. I put him in touch with some of my shooting friends. The day after his first outing, one of them called me and, very apologetically, said he was sorry, but he and his group would never take Smith with them again. He said the Ambassador got drunk on the way out and, when the shoot started, began firing wildly, almost killing one of them.

Hempstone didn't like his official car, the armored Mercedes. His driver didn't either, because of Smith's smoking. Elinor Constable had banned smoking in the car because she had a breathing problem, and the air conditioning system just wouldn't handle it. The windows couldn't be opened. So he sent a long telegram to the Department saying it was obnoxious for the American Ambassador to ride around in some German car. He asked for a Cadillac, though he confessed that it was not likely to happen in his lifetime.

Then he tried to lower our threat rating. I had been pleading with the Department to move the

chancery because of all the threats. Smith said, “Nah, this is Kenya. It’s not some dangerous place like Cairo.” So we fought about that. I don’t remember whether we put our disagreements into a telegram to the Department, but in the event, nothing changed.

He kept up his bullying approach, perhaps in part because of my efforts to make him more diplomatic. He liked to order people around, and soon began trying to give orders to President Moi. That was something no president – certainly not Moi – would tolerate, so they soon became enemies. It began with a Rotary Club speech, in which Smith called for multiparty democracy. It was calculated to annoy Moi, who quickly had the captive press and some of his ministers on a counterattack. They asked how the American Ambassador dared preach to them about how to run their country. Who does he think he is? The Minister of Livestock demanded that Hempstone be declared *persona non grata* for interfering in Kenya’s politics, and “probably” giving money to the Opposition. Smith shot right back in a newspaper interview, saying, “If anybody knows about illegal money, the Minister does.” That created a bigger storm, much of it going in circles.

Before I was transferred, Smith came back to Washington for a chiefs of mission conference. In the course of that meeting he was asked what was he doing to further democracy in Kenya, one of the Department’s key goals. He stood up and defended one-party democracy, saying it is better than no democracy at all. Then, back in Nairobi, he jumped back into the fray, pushing multi-party democracy. One never knew which way he was going to blow.

I don’t mean to dump on political ambassadors. There have been many good ones. But the ones who don’t listen and think they already know everything are the ones who cause problems. Smith did have some sensible ideas, and he followed what was going on. But after I left he got so thick with the Opposition, he was out leading marches in the streets, which is not the way an American Ambassador should do it, no matter what you think of the leader’s policies.

Hempstone accused Moi of allowing poachers to slaughter the wildlife in the country. That was certainly true of some officials and politicians in the 1980s, before Smith and I were on the scene. But we had put out a travel advisory after the American woman was killed in Masai country. He tried to get it lifted, saying everything was safe, and noting that the Kenyan economy needs tourists. He gave the Department an ultimatum. He fired off a telegram, saying he would give a speech announcing that he had unilaterally lifted the advisory, unless he was ordered not to in 24 hours. Of course, the time difference made that damn near impossible. As I recall, the Department stopped him from saying it, but he made the speech and said he had asked that the advisory to be lifted. He wanted to be hailed in Nairobi for trying to get it done.

When Moi objected to his comments about multi-party democracy, Smith gave an interview to a journalist in which he called Moi a dictator. Then, he turned around and asked Washington to send him a C-130 aircraft to give to Moi as a bribe to keep our military access agreement alive. He was shot down on that one too. You never knew which way he was going to jump. He fired off a telegram slugged for Secretary Jim Baker, saying, “Some nannies that work for you have sent off an obnoxious” - what’s the Russian word?

Q: Ukase.

GRIFFIN: He entitled the telegram “Potted Palms.” He said, “What do you think ambassadors are, potted palms? We’re supposed to sit here and do nothing until you water us?” He said, “There’s this obnoxious *ukase* from your office telling me that I have to pre-clear interviews with the media? I used to work in the media. Why should I pre-clear anything? Who do you think you are, Mr. Secretary?” He got a very sharp answer back on that one, but it came from PA, not from Baker, who didn’t deign to respond.

Q: Tutwiler.

GRIFFIN: Probably. It said that the offending telegram was a worldwide instruction, which didn’t necessarily pertain to him. It was to ensure that anyone who talked to a major American media outlet, such as CBS News, would tell the Department what they were going to say before they went on the air. It wouldn’t necessarily apply to him in talking to the Kenyan press, but if he wanted to talk to the *Washington Post*, it would. He didn’t like that.

Once or twice a week he would send a telegram to either Baker or Cohen saying, “Do this, do that.” I refused to clear most of them, as did most of the section chiefs, but he sent them out anyway. Sometimes I used the secure phone to alert the Department, saying I had nothing to do with it, but that the message better be checked out before anyone reacted to it. Washington knew what Smith was like. When plans were being made to invade Somalia, they sent out an LOU telegram telling all ambassadors in the region about it. It was sent at that low classification because they knew Hempstone would respond strongly, probably negatively, and that it would be leaked to the press within hours. Sure enough, he fired back one called “The Somali Tar Baby.” He was actually right.

Q: I recall the phrase that came out, ‘If you like Beirut, you’ll love Mogadishu.’

GRIFFIN: That’s right. He said the President’s idea to mount an invasion under UN auspices wouldn’t work. It would become a tar baby, and if anybody didn’t know the story of Brer Rabbit, they better go find it fast. They didn’t heed his advice. But when it got into the press, both Larry Eagleburger – who was either Deputy Secretary or had just become Secretary – and Dick Cheney, who was Secretary of Defense, tried to get Smith removed from Nairobi and shifted to the White House, but they failed. So he bounced along. As may be evident, it was a fairly rough road for the time I was there.

Q: What was happening to morale within the embassy during this period?

GRIFFIN: Some people whom he took under his wing, like the Marine Gunnery Sergeant, thought life was wonderful. Others had a hard time dealing with it. My morale was at rock bottom. Maybe it was wishful thinking on my part, but my general impression was that morale was down across the board. Certainly, the various AID Directors, the PAO, and the Economic Counselor were not happy campers. The Political Counselor, the Station Chief, and the DAO may have been reasonably happy. Things were constantly changing as he reversed course, leaving the rest of us trying to figure out what to do. In the end, after a lot of tension between the two of us, Smith wrote an efficiency report which was complimentary, saying I had done a great job. He recommended me for a performance award, which I got. At the end of the report, he said, “You

know, it would have been better if he had a different personality or his style was more like mine.” He said I left something to be desired.

There were some strange moments: One of our junior political officers said he had had enough. He quit, and went into politics with a fat job.

Smith had a farewell dinner for him at the residence, attended by mostly embassy officers and one or two Kenyans. At some point, in front of the Political Counselor, two other Embassy officers, and me, Smith made a speech. He said, “As far as I’m concerned, you [the one who quit] are the only person in this Embassy who is anything like what a Foreign Service Officer ought to be.”

The night before we left, Smith and Kitty invited my wife and me over, just the four of us. He got very maudlin, held my hand and said, “I wish you weren’t leaving. We’re getting to be friends. We’re going to get together when we come back to Washington.” Smith has a nephew who’s a friend of ours. When he and Kitty came back to Washington, the nephew and his wife invited us to a party. Mrs. Hempstone greeted us warmly. But he wouldn’t even look at me, much less speak. I’ve seen him two or three other times. No recognition. When Smith came back he was ill, and he told others he thought Moi had sent someone to put poison in his food or drink, trying to kill him.

So, I left Nairobi, as all the jobs that had been dangled in front of me disappeared. But I did get a call from my old bureau, NEA.

MARCIA BERNBAUM
Chief, Human Resources Division, USAID
Nairobi (1989-1991)

Marcia Bernbaum was the daughter of a Foreign Service officer and born in Quito, Ecuador. She joined USAID in 1977 as an International Development Intern. Her placements abroad included Panama, Nicaragua, Honduras and Kenya. Ms. Bernbaum was interviewed by W. Haven North in 1999.

BERNBAUM: We arrived in Kenya in August of 1989 but we got off to a shaky start.

The Mission Director wanted Eric as his Deputy. This was Eric’s first assignment to Senior Management. He really wasn’t that interested in me. In fact, he was getting ready to fold the Human Resources Division that I was to be in charge of, in with the private sector office and put someone else in charge. The other person, needless to say, was extremely unhappy with the decision and this got us off to a bad start.

Kenya was not an easy move for me. By that time we had both acquired very good reputations. I received many very good job offers, but I turned them down because Eric was at the point of moving into Senior Officer ranks; I think implicitly we had decided all the way along for the

better or for the worse, it was Eric's career that was probably more important, although it bothered me more as we moved up.

I went to Kenya with some fear and trepidation. Number one was Eric's job. Number two was good schooling for the kids. Number three was me, who, as I perceived it at the time, had landed a relatively "mediocre" job. I was in charge of the Human Resources Development Office, which was a relatively small office.

However, when I arrived in Kenya I discovered that I was being given a wonderful opportunity. I had a terrific Kenyan staff. I had a fascinating PVO [private voluntary organization] co-financing project, a large participant training project that had all the benefits of the CLASP program without the political baggage. I had another management program with the Directorate of Personnel Management.

Most important was the caliber of my staff. I had 11 Kenyan Foreign Service nationals, one U.S. Direct Hire who was my Deputy and one U.S. contractor. By this time I had become very interested in mentoring and career enhancement. I decided to make this office into my guinea pig. During my first couple of weeks I met with each of my staff from anywhere from an hour to four hours. I asked the same questions of each one, "Tell me a little bit about yourself, what you want me to know about yourself. You can start at birth, at the end of primary school, whatever, because I want to know about you outside of your work. I want to know what you like about your current job, what you don't like, what you'd like to be doing that you are not doing, where you want to be in five years."

I told them all I was deeply committed to career enhancement, and that I saw as a manager that half of my job was to manage the office and to make sure that resources were available on time so they could do a good job, but that my coequal priority was attending to their career enhancement. If that meant their staying in the office and in their current job, fine. If it meant moving up within the office, fine. If it meant moving out to another office, that was fine. If it meant leaving AID, that was fine, too.

Then I told them a little about myself. I said, "I'm here and I'm learning to be a manager. This is the first time I've been a real manager so you're going to have to teach me how to become a good manager. I'm going to try out a lot of skills I've learned in the Management Skills course but you have to help me. You have to give me feedback and let me tell you a little about my expectations."

I put in place everything I learned in the Management Skills class. We did a vision valuing exercise. We did feed backing. We did everything I learned and it all worked! Eric, meanwhile, was having a somewhat frustrating time as a Deputy. But I was loving my staff and my job. I was back in development.

When I was in the LAC Bureau, every day I would come in with my "to do" list. But the crises permitted me to do maybe three out of the 20 things I had planned for each day. When I arrived in Kenya, I prepared my "to do" list. I came in the first day, and no crisis. I came in the second day, no crisis. Third day, no crisis. The fourth day, I went up to the Mission Director's Office. I

said, "Steve this must be a very slow time of year?"

He said, "No, why?"

I said, "No crises."

He looked at me with a twinkle in his eye. He said, "You don't understand. We don't have crises here."

That's when I realized, in addition to the fact that Kenya was outside the political limelight, that part of what I was seeing was a change in management style. The Assistant Administrator for the Latin America Bureau thrived on crises. If there wasn't a crisis, he would create one to keep us "active."

Not long after I arrived in Kenya, we received a visit from CDIE [Center For Development Information and Evaluation] and MSI. Kenya was slated as the first Mission worldwide to produce strategic objectives for its programs. I took advantage of the arrival of the outside team to do a little "maintenance" on the portfolio I inherited. While it was a good portfolio, the log frames for each project were weak and the indicators, where they existed, were lacking.

I spent a lot of time with my staff revisiting our log frames, rethinking where we were going, and throughout the process went out of my way to use the management principles I learned at the AID management skills course I had taken two years before.

Other AID offices in Kenya thought we were nuts. "What's going on? Marcia and her staff have so much time on their hands that they can 'dream' and not implement their programs?"

While I appreciated their concern, the time invested was well worth it. Over a six month period we recrafted our log frames, came up with indicators that were much more appropriate. Two outcomes of the process were increased staff buy-in to their programs, which in most cases they had inherited. We also ended up with a much more credible tracking and reporting system.

We also developed a vision and values statement for our office, which we all took very seriously.

And most important of all, we became a "family". I opened our weekly staff meetings to our secretaries. I arranged to have our Mission Director, who had been meeting once weekly with his direct hire staff on an office by office basis, meet with all of our staff, including the secretaries. No other office did this.

In the beginning both my staff and people in other offices thought it was strange. Over the months, the Mission Director became so accustomed to meeting on a weekly basis with all of us that one time, when he came to the weekly meeting in our office and the secretaries weren't there, he said, "What happened? What's wrong?"

It was a wonderful period.

I had excellent counterparts. It was my first experience in Africa. I had exposure to African tribal traditions as well as British traditions. In the two years I was there I was able to see concrete results of our PVO Co-Financing program. Both indigenous and international NGO's participated in this program.

We also had a wonderful Participant Training program. It was just a very satisfying experience.

I went from a crisis management, highly politicized program in USAID/Washington to doing real development work with a great group of people. No crises. I actually had time to think and strategize. I was in my element.

All went well for the first eight months. And then the Mission had to prepare its five year plan, its CSP - country strategic plan. The Mission was forced to limit its objectives and, in the process of cutting its objectives, removed a human resources objective that justified the existence of our office. I recall that I was not pleased about this, but, at the time, I did not appreciate the ramifications.

Several months later, the Africa Bureau underwent its first staff cut in the field. USAID/Kenya was asked to cut its U.S. Direct Hire staff by 4 from 25 to 21 within a year. It just so happened that the year in which we were to undergo the cut there was minimal staff turnover.

So instead of permitting staff to leave and simply not replacing them, as was done in several other Africa missions, AID/Kenya had to cut three staff positions.

Mine was one that was slated for cutting. Our office didn't have a strategic objective so, in the eyes of some, there was no necessity to have an office with an office chief. Better to take my portfolio and distribute it to other offices in the mission.

This meant that I was out and, along with myself, Eric.

We were devastated. We had just arrived in Kenya, were really enjoying the experience of being in a different area of the world, I was loving my job, and our daughters were very happy in school.

I remember when the Mission Director delivered the news that we were going to have to leave. Our daughter, Shana, who doesn't travel easily and is very shy, was in the second semester of 9th grade at the International School. Our plan was that we would stay in Kenya for four years and that she would graduate from ISK. Leah, our younger daughter, would finish 8th grade which would position us nicely to go to our next four year post from whence she would graduate.

Eric and I tried to appeal the decision. He called the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa in USAID/Washington. He called the head of the Africa Bureau Executive Office. His calls were not returned.

While we were trying to appeal the decision, we decided not to tell our daughters or anyone on the AID staff.

My staff knew something was very wrong. Up until then I had come into the office every morning with a big smile. And then suddenly that smile disappeared.

In July (we were given the news in early May) it became clear that our appeal was going unheeded. We returned to Washington for R&R and began to look for our next assignment. We received no help from the Africa Bureau. Their attitude was that they had no obligation to help us since we had come from the Latin America Bureau, even though it was through their decision that our jobs were cut. I can't tell you what a disillusioning experience that was.

One day in July, while on R&R, I was in the Africa Bureau sending a fax. I was getting ready for a meeting with the acting Assistant Administrator of the LAC Bureau. The Africa Bureau DAA [deputy assistant administrator], who was responsible for that decision, and the head of the Executive Office walked by me, didn't say a word, walked into an office, came out, and walked by me again, without a word.

I followed the DAA into the outer hallway as he was preparing to return to his office on another floor. In a loud voice, he was about 20 steps ahead of me, I said, "Hi, I'm Marcia Bernbaum." He turned around with a frozen grin on his face and said, "Yes, I know who you are." And without a word of apology, nothing, he turned on his feet and walked down the hallway.

Had I not gone into the Acting Assistant Administrator's Office in the Latin America Bureau five minutes later and received a big hug, along with a "Welcome home to the Latin America Bureau family," I would have been devastated.

Q: That was pretty bad.

BERNBAUM: .It was horrible. But it's not the only case of its kind. I've found talking to other people in the Africa Bureau that, with the exception of a chosen few, that's pretty much how the Africa Bureau handled its personnel. It was a real wake-up call.

Then, John Wesley came in as Mission Director to Kenya. I was livid with him at the beginning, ready to strangle him for what I had perceived he had done. Before he came, I called and asked him "I need to know what you are going to do with my staff. I have to tell my staff tomorrow that I am going to be leaving in a year. What should I say to them about their futures? Are they going to have jobs?"

He said, "Yes, tell them they'll have jobs."

Of course, when I told my staff the next day, they were devastated. It was as though our "family" was going through a premature "divorce."

When John Wesley arrived a month later I said, "John, I assume you're going to make your decision of what you to do with my staff based strategically on where it makes sense for them to go. I would also like to make a pitch for including in that decision the consideration of where they want to go and where they are wanted. It hardly makes sense to force-place them on an

office director who isn't going to take the time to guide and orient them."

He promised that he would take these factors into consideration.

To his great credit, he permitted us to go through a period of analysis and reflection that resulted in my staff moving to offices that wanted them, where it made sense, and where they wanted to go.

During this process I said to the staff, "We can look at this as a cup half empty. We're being disbanded, the family is over, I'm leaving. Or we can look at it as a cup half full: we have a whole other year together. Think of all that I can do in the way of staff development and to help prepare you for that transition."

So that's what we did that last year. We had our ups and downs, but I put my heart and soul into career enhancement, staff development.

The day before I left, the last day of our office's existence, my staff had a farewell lunch for me. We made it into a ceremony. We gave each other awards for exemplifying the values we had identified for our office. I also arranged to have the Mission Director give us an award for "excellence in program implementation." By this time we had also conferred an award on the Mission Director for his integrity in helping us to make this transition.

We celebrated the demise of our office with our heads high.

I maintain very close contact with my former Kenya staff to this day. We still refer to the HRD "family." There's a great deal of caring. The decision I made to move into my next job in AID/Washington was taken based on the values we developed in that office. These values which we developed together had become very important to us.

On a related theme, while in Kenya the Training Resources Group, which had trained me in management a couple of years before, came to Kenya to provide their Management Skills Course. I sent three of the Foreign Service Nationals in my office that I had just promoted to be Project Managers, to the course. During the first couple of days of the course apparently my staff kept raising their hands and saying, "Yes, my boss does that."

Quite curious, the trainers decided to have lunch with my staff the fourth day of the course. He asked them, "What's going on here? Tell me exactly what your boss is doing."

They responded, or so I'm told, "Well, Marcia does most of the things you are teaching us." The trainer interviewed them and then published an article in the Management Skills newsletter which went out to all Management Skills Course graduates, an article which focused on the work I had done in my office promoting the career enhancement of my foreign service national staff. I felt deeply honored. As I said before, the Kenya experience was an extraordinary experience for me both personally and professionally.

Q: Before we leave it, let's talk a little bit about the program that you were dealing with. What

was it?

BERNBAUM: One project focused on training Kenya's leaders. It was called Training for Development. In 1963 at independence there were between 50 and 100 black Kenyans with bachelors degrees. Bobby Kennedy came to Kenya on a whirlwind trip, linked up with a labor leader by the name of Tom Mboya, and they organized what has come to be known as the Kenya-Mboya airlift. The United States sent in two airplanes, and 400 young black Kenyans were transported to the United States to receive college degrees. Four years later, the ranks of Kenyans with college degrees swelled to nearly 500. While we didn't have the full data, 20 years later we could tell that many of these people had moved into leadership positions.

So, before I came, the AID/Kenya Mission decided to design a follow-on program to identify Kenyan leaders in the next generation, from both the public and private sectors, and send them to the United States for training. The program was very well designed. It ended up selecting leaders from a wide gamut of Kenyan society, people who were leaders or aspiring leaders. Unlike the prior group, those that went to the U.S. for training studied at the masters or doctoral level. A number also went on shorter trips of up to three months that were individualized to meet their needs. The program had built into it pre-departure orientation and follow-up after returning to Kenya. It was very well thought through.

Q: In a program for training for leadership, what do you train them for? Was it substantive training?

BERNBAUM: Yes. While there was definitely a home stay, experience America element to it, most were going to the U.S. for substantive training. You had aspiring doctors, engineers, businessmen. While I was there we designed an evaluation to assess the impact of the program similar to what I had done for the Peace Scholarship program before leaving the Latin America Bureau. However, it ran into difficulties because some people in the Mission were uncomfortable with an evaluation that had the flexibility to adapt to the individual training plans of each person and with what they saw as high costs for the evaluation. It is a shame, because the testimonies we were able to obtain were impressive.

The program is now long over. It didn't continue because the funding got cut in Kenya, and this training was not attached to any specific sectors the Mission was working in. I do, however, understand that the Training for Development alumni program is going strong.

Q: What kind of criteria did you use for selection?

BERNBAUM: We looked at academic competence. We looked at leadership. We had specific criteria for assessing leadership and leadership potential. We interviewed the employer and colleagues. Based on this information we selected a subgroup who we met with one on one to interview. I would say the selection process was quite thorough.

Q: You didn't get pressure from the government to select their candidates?

BERNBAUM: No. This was a private sector program. Our counterpart, the Directorate of

Personnel Management, played a very minimal role. And we never received any pressure to select people. I must say this was quite surprising. Also surprising was that the government gave us the leeway to identify and select leaders from both the public and private sectors. This could have been quite threatening to them.

The other program was patterned on a similar experience in the Philippines. It was called PVO Co-Finance. Similar to Training for Development, we worked across sectors. Part of the purpose of the program was to link international NGOs with local NGOs. While I was there, we moved the focus more and more toward indigenous NGOs, of which there were many.

In the beginning we had a lot of money for this program. But then funding starting going down. We had a very rigorous selection process that drove our NGOs crazy. However, in addition to giving grants, we provided training for them in strategic planning, project monitoring and evaluation.

Q: Who were some of the outstanding ones that you worked with?

BERNBAUM: Oh, my gosh. My memory is getting so poor.

Q: Well, we can come back to this.

BERNBAUM: Yes. I'll have to come back to it. I'll have to refresh my memory.

I went out on a lot of field trips. That was the beauty of Kenya. There was time to go on field trips, as I wasn't attending to daily crises. I was very impressed. Many of the groups were religious groups, who were able to separate their religious activities from their development activities. I was impressed with the commitment of these groups to what they were doing.

One of my favorite field trips was to visit a wonderful program that the YWCA [Young Women's Christian Association] submitted for consideration. It focused on providing Kenyan women with business skills. Women, as you know, in the Africa region have a strong tradition of forming self-help groups. The YWCA was smart enough to build on these self-help groups and then design a small business development project around the groups. One of the beauties of the work I saw with NGOs is their ability to build on existing group structures as well as tribal and cultural traditions and trust networks. From my experience, NGOs that build on these existing structures are destined to be more successful than those that build from scratch.

My contribution to the PVO cofinance project was trying to put in place a set of indicators that were more than just numbers tracking. We spent a lot of time and effort trying to develop simple, easy to track indicators. For example, if you were doing well drilling or if you were supporting small business or if you were doing child care activities, you had some overarching indicators that could be tracked and not be limited to just inputs.

Q: What do you mean by cofinancing?

BERNBAUM: Well, the NGOs had to provide a pretty high counterpart financing. In the case of

the PVO cofinancing project, I believe we were talking about a 40-50% counterpart.

Q: How large were the grants?

BERNBAUM: They varied from one hundred thousand dollars to five or six hundred thousand dollars. Of course, these grantees were getting money not just from us but from other European donors. It was my first experience in a country where there was money coming from so many donors. Unlike in Central America where we had a track record that went back decades, our involvement in countries like Kenya was of much more recent vintage. Our foreign aid program had a good reputation, and there was receptiveness to working with us which was very nice. With one exception, our relations with our counterparts were excellent.

The third one was with the Directorate of Personnel Management. We provided financing that permitted the Directorate of Personnel Management to organize and carry out management training programs for primarily mid-level civil servants. I had mixed feelings about this program because what we were providing was primarily budget support in the form of funds to cover per diem to hire trainers, travel to and from courses, room and board for trainees. I was often invited to open or close these courses, which gave me the opportunity to do a significant amount of traveling to different cities in Kenya where the training was offered.

Q: This was local training?

BERNBAUM: Yes and I felt that that wasn't an appropriate use of .

Q: Civil service training or management training?

BERNBAUM: Both. Management training for civil service personnel.

I would like to take this opportunity to comment on one aspect of our stay in Kenya that was less than agreeable. The whole time we were there Eric and I were under tremendous scrutiny. This was a Mission that had many tandem couples and that was the irony. The Mission Director's wife was the Deputy Director of the REDSO Office. The Program Officer and the Executive Officer were tandems. There were about eight or nine tandems between USAID/REDSO and USAID/Nairobi. Ironically enough we have never had such a difficult assignment as a tandem.

We found, from the day we arrived, that the other tandems were looking at us very closely. There was some jealousy that I was reporting directly to the Mission Director, which meant that I, as an Office Director, had a supposed "in" with the Mission Director that nobody else did. But I had no choice because the Deputy Director was my husband and I couldn't report to him.

The second day after I arrived in Kenya, the Mission Director pulled my husband and myself into his office and said, "This is the last time the two of you are ever going to be in the same office alone with me in the same meeting." He said, "Eric, I want you to have nothing to do with Marcia's portfolio. You are not to be involved; people are afraid of what you are going to do. Not because of what you've done." The previous ambassador who had just left tried to bar my coming to Kenya because she thought it was inappropriate for me to come.

I will never forget. I'd been in Kenya about four months. There was a six month portfolio review of our Office and Eric sat like a fly on the wall in the corner because he wanted to just see what was happening in the portfolio. The head of the Projects Office, who reported to him, went to the Mission Director afterwards and complained. He said, "I don't feel comfortable having Eric there. If I want to grill Marcia, and her staff, I would feel Eric, who writes my personnel evaluation, is watching over me."

So the Mission Director said, "Eric, you will never come to that meeting again."

It was very awkward, the whole two years we were there. That was the only downside. There were a couple of people in the Mission, who we knew were watching us like hawks. They never found anything.

When the new Mission Director came, he had his initial meetings with all of his Office Directors. When he met with me, he invited Eric to join us. I looked at him, and without thinking, I said, "Eric is not allowed to be in this meeting."

He said, "What do you mean?"

I said, "We have been programmed. We're just not to be in the same room."

His response, "I don't have any problem with having you in the same meetings."

However, Eric and I decided to keep things as they were, because the situation was very tense. That was our first wake-up call regarding the challenges we would face of being a tandem when one or both move into senior management.

Q: .What year was that?

BERNBAUM: 1991. We left in late May of 1991.

SMITH HEMPSTONE, JR
Ambassador
Kenya (1989-1993)

Ambassador Hempstone was born in Washington, DC in 1929 and graduated from the University of the South/Sewanee. He was appointed ambassador to Kenya in 1989. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

HEMPSTONE: Yes, spokesman for Kissinger. Then he went on to be head of Catholic Relief. I knew Bob very well. He was a friend of mine. He said, "I just can't do it because all my career, I've inveighed against political appointees and it would be incongruous for me to support your candidacy." I didn't say to him, "Bob, I'm a different kettle of fish and you can take your

incongruity and stick it up your..." I said, "Okay, I understand perfectly." Also, I have a nephew who worked in the White House at a low level. As it happened, I was over there chatting him up one time in the old State War Navy Building, the Executive Building. We ran into in the hallway Chase Untermeyer. He was the head of White House Personnel under Bush. My nephew introduced me to him. He knew that I was interested in the Kenya appointment. The time came when he arranged for me to go with General Vernon (Dick) Walters on a small group to represent the United States on the anniversary of the accession to the throne of King Hassan of Morocco. There was no substance at all of the trip. It was just protocol. But it gave somebody (I don't know whether it was Dick Walters or Mrs. Potter Stewart, who was a big pal of Mrs. Bush) a chance to see me over a period of time and see how I behaved myself and that sort of thing. So, I guess I passed that test because the time came in the spring of 1989 when Jim Baker called me. He said, "Well, Smith, how are you doing?" It was a very friendly conversation. I was on vacation down in South Carolina. I said, "I'm doing fine, Mr. Secretary." He said, "I understand that you're a candidate for the ambassadorship to Kenya." I said, "You bet I am." He said, "I think that's grand. I can't promise you anything, but I can tell you you're on the short list. My advice to you would be to get a little more support in the Senate. What you've been doing is fine, but you need some more in the Senate." So, I said, "Okay." I went about doing that. It was a simple enough thing. I simply called up the senators or their administrative assistants or their press assistants and got an appointment with them and went up and said, "Mr. Senator, I am hopeful of being appointment ambassador to Kenya. I think you know my background. I just want to present myself to you so that if you have any concerns about me or about policy towards Kenya, you can ask me and I'll do my best to answer." I worked both sides of the aisle on that, Democrats and Republicans, although naturally I tended to go to more conservative Democrats (Sam Nunn, Chuck Robb, and so forth). So, when the time came in the spring of 1989, it was a Sunday and my wife was out on a walk across the Bay Bridge, when the phone rang and it was a Camp David operator and he put Mr. Bush on. Mr. Bush said, "Smith, I wonder if you would be prepared to temporarily give up your very interesting newspaper work to serve as my ambassador to Kenya." I practically jumped through the ceiling. I said, "Well, Mr. President, I would be pleased and honored to do that." He said, "Fine, that's done then. I want to get you and Kitty over here to the White House a couple of times and then you're on your way." I said, "Thank you very much." So, I was named and then I sat around cooling my heels for four or five months. There were people I needed to see here in the Department and outside of the Department. I spent some time over at the Foreign Service Institute brushing up on my Swahili. In due course, I went before the Committee for Foreign Affairs. It was a big disappointment for me because I was loaded for bear. I had reviewed all my files. I knew everything you could possible ask me about Kenya. I think I was asked two questions. Paul Simon asked me how my Swahili was and I told him it was rusty but redeemable and that I was doing my best to redeem it at FSI and that pleased him. He said, "Will you continue doing that if you are appointed" and I said, "Yes, I will, Sir." He said, "How do I know that we can count upon you to defend human rights in Kenya?" I said, "You can count upon me because I am an American, Senator." He didn't seem quite satisfied, but he accepted it. That was all. It took about three minutes. Then we were off shortly thereafter.

Q: You were there from 1989 to when?

HEMPSTONE: I arrived there on December 1, 1989.

Q: And you left when?

HEMPSTONE: February 26, 1993.

Q: Before you went out, you had been reading up about the country at the State Department, talking to other people. What were you carrying with you as your mental portfolio of things that you felt needed to be done? How did you see American interests in Kenya?

HEMPSTONE: Not at all the way it worked out. In the first place, that was a rather benign period in Kenya's history. There were no political detainees. Daniel arap (son of) Moi's grasp on the country as far as I could see from there was fairly easy. There were probably worse tyrants than he around. I thought I was going to spend my time getting the security treaty with Kenya, which had expired in June, reupped and helping Richard Leaky preserve the elephant (He is a paleontologist) and do whatever I could do in terms of AIDS. I assumed that we had some programs out there.

Q: You had obviously traveled extensively in Europe, Africa, and Latin America. What was your impression at the time you arrived of the American Foreign Service and how it operated?

HEMPSTONE: Of course, on my arrival, any pro or con bias really was not very strong. I hadn't really worked with them on a day in, day out basis. As far as the time in the Department was concerned, I had a very good desk officer, Jim Entwhistle. So, I had a good impression from him of that end of things. I suppose my initial impression was positive enough. I had no reason to think otherwise, though that did change a bit for the worse. I had some very good officers in Kenya. I mention most of them by name in the book, Rogue Ambassador. I knew my political officer, Al Eastham, was first-rate. Both my station chiefs were okay. I had a good economic officer, good consular officers. I had no complaints. But I did find as I got to know more of them better that there were amongst them many to whom the assignment to Kenya was just another job. They were what we would call in the private sector "Clock-watchers," many careerists amongst them who seemed to spend more time on the telephone to Washington trying to line up their next job. Many of them never left Nairobi, never had any interest in the country. There certainly wasn't any such thing as a cultural bath going on. I was disappointed in that.

Q: Who had been the ambassador before you?

HEMPSTONE: Elinor Constable.

Q: I've interviewed her. How did you find at the time the connections with the embassy with the Kenyan government and the various organs, newspapers, T.V., and all that?

HEMPSTONE: I want to be fair to Mrs. Constable, but I don't think she had particularly cordial relations with any of the power areas. I think that was probably largely because of her physical condition. Her eyesight was so bad that she had to have an aide stand next to her to tell her who somebody was. Her hearing was also bad. Her husband was not with her. He was then in Rome on another assignment. So, she was by herself, in poor health. She became sort of a semi-recluse.

The only one whom I'm told ever saw much of her was George Griffin, her DCM. She didn't tend to open up the residence to members of the staff and so forth.

Q: Now that you were on the ground, what did you feel that you'd better start doing?

HEMPSTONE: Being the new boy on the block, there were a number of things I had to do. First I had to deliver my letters to Moi, which was accomplished rather quickly, within a week. Then I had to call on the ministers and I had to call on the other ambassadors, just protocol things really to open up lines of communication. While I was doing that, I had to make some connections in the private sector, white and black, American, British, and Kenyan, and other denominations. I should say that the first four months almost was a honeymoon period. The Kenyans, the government, had been delighted with my appointment. Mrs. Constable they did not feel was the greatest thing since sliced bread, maybe because she was beginning to articulate some of the concerns that I later did. They knew who I was. They knew I was conservative. They knew I was a political appointee and had George Bush's ear every day. I never saw George Bush again. I knew Moi slightly. I knew lots of the old timers around there from the days right after independence. So, they thought they had gotten a patsy. I followed around dutifully on Moi's heels and went to things other ambassadors wouldn't dream of doing like agricultural shows and college graduations. At all of these places, I saw Moi and the members of the Cabinet, even those I hadn't formally called on. So, that's what I was doing.

Q: What was your impression of Moi?

HEMPSTONE: At first, he seemed like a rather genial, avuncular type. He wasn't any nuclear scientist in terms of intelligence I did not think and do not think now. He was a little uneasy. He didn't accept any sort of criticism at all well. You could say he was paranoid. I would say now he was paranoid, but I didn't know that then. He was very nice to me in those initial months. I guess I knew him for what he was, a pastoralist, a member of the pastoral tribe, a tribe that was economically disadvantaged, and he from one of the poorer families of the tribe.

Q: What tribe was this?

HEMPSTONE: This was the Tugen of the Kalenjin language group. It's 14 small tribes, one big tribe, the Nandi. They're sort of decent, stalwart guys who serve in the police and the army. All Moi had was a high school education and not a particularly good high school. He never traveled until he got into politics and that sort of travel was worthless in some ways. He was not a sophisticated man.

Q: What about the people surrounding him?

HEMPSTONE: As things began to go bad, let me just mention that. Things started to go bad, at least in my view, when Robert Ouko, the Foreign Minister of Kenya, was murdered in Kenya after a visit to Washington. The head of the police initially put out the story that he might have committed suicide. He died of a broken leg with his hands crushed and most of his body burned and a couple of bullet holes in the back of his head. So, that first awakened my eyes to the fact that maybe we were dealing with some guys who weren't nature's noblemen. I initially

subscribed to the view which a number of people held that Moi was a pretty decent individual, but he was surrounded by some evil advisors. He certainly was surrounded by some evil advisors like Nicholas Biwott, the Minister of Energy; and Willie Entimama, the Minister of Local Government; Wangale; and some others whose names I've forgotten. I used to call them the thug wing of the party and they were thugs. I thought, "He's a captive of the thug wing. The thing to do is try to separate him from that group and get him to move against them, replace them with decent people, of which there are plenty around." But it soon proved, as things deteriorated after the Saba-Saba riots in which at least 20 people were killed (The opposition says it was more like 200), that was not the case. Moi was at the center of the policy of that group. He probably couldn't even if he wanted to separate himself from someone like Biwott, who had been with him personally (He was also a Kalenjin), who had so much on him and probably had it stashed away in a safety deposit box to be opened on the occasion of his death, that Moi wouldn't dare move against him.

Q: Why had the Foreign Minister been killed?

HEMPSTONE: We don't know. That is a very interesting story. I tried to find out. I was constantly being asked this by the Kenyans and by other people. The Russian ambassador pointed out that he had just come from Washington, obviously something had happened with us that caused his death. The rumors were, and it was probably somewhere close to that, that someone had made the mistake of mentioning that he might make a good president of Kenya, which is enough to get you killed. Also, there was a report that he had seen Bush, whereas Moi had not. When I say "seen him," they both saw Bush at a prayer breakfast and had maybe shaken hands and said a few words. But certainly Moi had not been to the White House. As it happened, a few months later, I received from Joseph Verner Reed, former ambassador to Morocco and Chief of Protocol, (I always got along well with Mr. Reed. He was always kind to me. A lot of people don't like him in the Department, but that didn't make any difference to me. I did like him. [He sent me]) a photograph and asked me to deliver it. It was a photograph of Ouko shaking hands with Bush on the steps of the White House. There was no date on it. There was no explanation of it. I wrote back to Ambassador Reed and said, "I can't deliver this, Joe, because, as you will recall, the Foreign Minister departed this veil of tears some six months ago. I will send it to Mrs. Ouko," which I did. I never pressed him for an explanation. I should have. I have been in contact with him a couple of times. He has read my book.

Q: Is he here in Washington?

HEMPSTONE: No. He lives up in Connecticut. He works at the UN now. He has read the book, so he knows the story, which I repeated in the book. He hasn't challenged me on that, nor made any explanation. So, I don't know. Of course, there are other reasons, too. There is allegedly a molasses factory up in Ouko's area which was deeply enmeshed in corruption - and he was including some other ministers in the government that he was trying to blow the whistle on. That may have had something to do with it. It could have had something to do with a woman, "cherchez la femme" [French: search for the woman]

Q: As you were beginning to realize the thuggishness of the government, did this set off the human rights alarm bells?

HEMPSTONE: Yes, it did, but prior to that, back at Christmastime there had been what they would call in the Department, the Peterson cable, from Ambassador Donald Peterson, who was then in Tanzania. He served all around. He's an old hand.

Q: I've started to interview him. He's up in New England.

HEMPSTONE: He made, as far as I know, the original suggestion that the United States now that the Cold War was over, which it was, should change its policy to support most vigorously those nations which shared our ideas and ideals for human rights, expansion of democracy, and the rule of law. Herman Cohen, the Assistant Secretary for Africa, had had the cable copied and sent to all of us with his imprimatur. Then he had called a meeting of all the ambassadors. I think as frequently, I gather, as is the case at the State Department, there was no need to call the meetings and the conference because it had already been decided that that would be U.S. policy. In fact, I believe, both Baker and Bush had articulated it even before that. I was prepared to get on that human rights horse extraneous from what happened to Robert Ouko. But it helped contribute to it, as did the government's reaction to the formation in June of 1990 of the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD). This involved dissenters from the Moi line, some of them former Cabinet ministers like Ken Matiba, some of them youngsters like Paul Muite, who had been involved at a very high level. Since Kenya was still a single party state, they couldn't call FORD a political party. They called it a movement to discuss the future of Kenya. I had put out my lines already to the opposition. It was clear that Moi didn't like my doing that. But I told him, "It is my duty to know and to report what is going on in this country to the Department." I pointed out to him what had happened in Iran, where we had had no contact with the opposition because the Shah didn't want us to and we ended up with egg on our face. So, I said, "I'm sorry, but I feel I must do this." So, I did. At the Fourth of July party, I had many opposition leaders. I also had government servants. That again was part of my idea to make the embassy and the residence a place where men of good will could gather and discuss things in a rational fashion, as indeed they did. Everybody had a good time. You could see the judges who sent them to jail talking to guys and laughing like rails. But right after the Fourth of July party, there had been a FORD rally scheduled for July 7th, but the government had denied them a permit. So, the leaders of FORD (Matiba, etc.) said, "Okay, we won't hold the meeting, but we will continue to press for such a meeting." As it happened, the government moved against the leaders anyway on the 4th, 5th, and 6th, arresting the eight most prominent of them and many small fish also. They were detained and then rioting broke out on the 7th. Those were the so-called Saba-Saba riots. It was the 7th day of the 7th month. A number of people were killed, somewhere between 20 and 200. I protested openly both the opposition's brutality and the security force's brutality in putting it down. The General Services Unit (GSU) was out there with ax handles beating up grandmothers and all that sort of thing. I also said I didn't think much of the arson and looting that the democrats on the left engaged in. A human rights lawyer, Gibson Kamau Kuria, had taken refuge in the embassy and asked for asylum, which I granted him. I wasn't the one who talked to him. I had my political officer, my station chief, and my consular officer talk to him and they all agreed that his concern was genuine, that if he were put out on the street he would be arrested. He had been arrested before and tortured. So, I said, "Okay, Gibson, you can stay for the time being and we'll see what we can work out." Then I informed Cohen. I didn't ask Cohen's permission. I told him. I don't think he was pleased as punch. I don't suppose he should have been. He said, "You

know you're going to have a hard time ahead of you there." I said, "I guess I do know that, but I didn't see that I had any choice." We worked out between us (and I will give the Department the lion's share of the credit for this) getting Kuria out of Kenya, working it out with the Kenyan government that he could leave and I escorted him to the airport and saw him on the plane. He came to America, got a job at Harvard and Yale. Relations were very cool between me and the Kenyans.

Q: Had you developed a relationship with Kuria?

HEMPSTONE: I knew him. I had met him. He was one of the young lawyers who had been around to my house. But he was by no means the one I knew best. He was one that I knew really least.

Q: Around the Fourth of July, what about what our concerns were on human rights? How did we talk to a government when they're supposedly putting down unrest?

HEMPSTONE: I know what I did. My immediate concern was to get the conditions of detention improved. They were held under rather draconian conditions. They were treated like criminals and criminals aren't treated very sweetly in Kenya. Matiba was denied adequate medical assistance and suffered a couple of strokes while in prison, which permanently impaired him. He still can't read, can't use his right hand or right arm. I wanted to see that they received visits from family and clergymen. Oddly enough, when I went to the Attorney General, who was then Muli, he was not well thought off. The guy had spent a little too much time drinking. He gave me the list of visits to each of these guys. It was damning. He was fired two days later for having given it to me.

Q: In a way, a government can rightly say "What the hell's business is it of yours to talk about how people were being treated."

HEMPSTONE: Except I would say it is our business. We don't just export Coca-Cola and blue jeans. We export democracy. Thomas Jefferson didn't say that all Americans have these rights. He said, "All men have these rights." I thought, "If you want to have warm relations with us, you will give them these rights. If you don't give a damn about your relations with us, you treat them any way you want to."

Q: What was in it for the government of Kenya to have good relations with the United States?

HEMPSTONE: Money.

Q: Could we talk about that a bit? This was early on.

HEMPSTONE: We started cutting aid, which was at that point about \$80 million a year after Saba-Saba, the riots. We froze all military aid. We started cutting and now it's \$27 million or something like that. It cost them millions of dollars.

Q: You mentioned that there was a security treat that was in process. What was that about?

HEMPSTONE: That was kind of a strange treaty in that it is well-known in this country, at least in circles that interest themselves in such things, but it's top secret in Kenya. You can't even mention it. What that allegedly did was give us these three airports (Mombasa, Nairobi, and Nanyuki) and also the Port of Mombasa when we had need of them. I say "allegedly" because it wasn't automatic. Any time you had an airplane coming in, you had to go with all the numbers and so forth. You had to get permission for it. We didn't pay very much for that treaty. I think we gave them something like \$270,000 a year. Before I went out, one of the people I talked to was Mike Armacost, who was then doing the security portfolio. I said, "I know these people are going to ask for more money and we don't pay them very much. How much have I got to play with?" He said, "Not a dime." So, it became clear in that instance that we didn't put that much importance on the Kenyan bases because we had the Indian Ocean. We had good relations with Oman and could use [the island of Diego] Garcia.

Q: This was July 1990. How were things going in the Persian Gulf at this point?

HEMPSTONE: It was on. I've forgotten the dates. We, like everybody else in the region, were sort of geared up to support to the extent that our support was necessary or desirable. In our case, it wasn't much. I don't think we had a single ship visit during that time. The Department was concerned about the activities of Iraqi terrorists. They put out a lot of security stuff which I tended to ignore. The Department during Desert Storm told us to take all kinds of security precautions which seemed to me unnecessary and indeed deleterious in the sense that I didn't want the Kenyans or the other ambassadors to think that we had the wind up so much about this bunch of ragheads and go running for cover. We were supposed to use different routes coming to work and come in at different hours. I did carry a pistol during that time, the only time I did out there. Otherwise, I flew the flag from the car just to show them where we were.

Q: Actually, Kenya didn't play much of a role in Desert Storm.

HEMPSTONE: No. Guys came there for liberty.

Q: What happened with our treaty? Did they ask for more money and you said "No?"

HEMPSTONE: As I recall, it was mutually determined given the atmosphere which existed between their government and our government (or at least between their government and my embassy) that this would not be a propitious time to renegotiate. I don't remember whether we set up a committee on the military side just to talk about things so we knew more or less where we stood. Anyway, the impression was, "Okay, not too much of a hurry. You can probably use it." We did use it in providing relief food for Somalia. We used the airports and the port. That was an interesting thing, too, in that I was out of Nairobi down on the Tanzania frontier when my radio in the jeep came on saying to get back to Nairobi right away. They didn't want to talk about what it was, but said I might be able to guess. Somalia was certainly a strong header for what it might be and it was. The word I had was that we were going to launch a food relief program from Kenya. I said, "When?" They said, "They're on their way." I said to Michael Southwick, then the DCM, "Have you informed the Kenyans?" He said, "I tried, but it was a weekend and there was nobody at the Foreign Ministry." I said, "Go and park at Sally Koskie's house (She was

the Permanent Secretary for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and let her know that this is happening. Meanwhile, I'm going to get down to Mombasa to meet the planes when they come in." At that point, I think there were maybe two or three C-130s. I went down there and they arrived on schedule. There was Brigadier General Frank Lebutti, now Lieutenant General Frank Lebutti. He was then a brand new brigadier. He had just gotten his star about two weeks before. He seemed a little bemused about where he might be. He was an American Marine. He was the head of the operation. He said, "Are we going to have a security problem here?" I said, "No, Sir. You may be overrun by souvenir hawkers and prostitutes and that sort of thing, but your greatest pain is going to be sunburn. These are friendlies really." He was glad to hear that. We got the headquarters set up. It had been well set up by my people. I had a very good consul in Mombasa named Don Stader. We had a shed out there, a hangar that we maintained and he had gotten that all fixed up for headquarters for Lebutti and gotten them all hotel rooms. Then he said, "There is a message for you at the consulate to call Southwick in Nairobi," which I did. He said, "Moi has called it all off." I said, "What are you talking about?" He said, "He's called off Operation Provide Relief." I said, "Well, get word to him. Go see him or at least talk to him on the telephone and see to it that he doesn't say anything more in public until I get there, which would make it more difficult for him to climb down." In point of fact, the statement didn't have Moi's name attached to it, which made it easier for him to climb down. I said, "I'm on my way up there." I got up there and called Moi. I said, "Mr. President, I feel I must be misinformed because I am told that you have canceled Operation Provide Relief." He said, "No, you're not misinformed. I have canceled it." I said, "Sir, if I may point out, this is entirely a food operation. A lot of the food is going to go to your people when you've got an election coming up. I just wonder if you might want to reconsider. The foreign press is pouring in here (which it was) and if we have to tell them, and I've got a press conference set up for tomorrow, that this thing has been canceled, the effect is going to be very bad for Kenya, bad for you." He said, "Well, I think you'd better get over here and bring your top people and I'll get my top people." So, we gave him the full court press. By then, Lebutti and his assistant were out there. I took them along and took along our military in their war suits and medals and all, and our political people, and the Agency people. He had a flock of Cabinet ministers there, including the Foreign Minister and the Defense Minister. So, it was a pretty heavy crowd on both sides. Moi started out the discussion. The thrust of it was how, yes, he had canceled it because we hadn't gone about it properly; we hadn't asked permission; and we didn't do that because we took them for granted now that the Cold War was over; we had forgotten that he was the first person who opposed communism. Before he got too carried away, I interjected and said, "Mr. President, we have not forgotten that you're the first person to oppose communism. Of course, we honor you for that. This is just what it appears to be. It's a food operation for your people and for the Somalis."

Q: When you say "your people," what was that?

HEMPSTONE: A quarter of the stuff was going to northeastern Kenya.

Q: We're talking about an extreme drought.

HEMPSTONE: And disorder. Many Somalis had fled into Kenya, most of them armed. I said, "One out of every four tons is going to go to Kenyans. It will be based out of Mombasa so that we will not be too conspicuous, we Americans. I can't see why you would want to cancel such an

operation. If I may make a suggestion, why don't we change my press conference into a Kenyan press conference, let the Foreign Minister handle it. He can put whatever spin he wishes on this. Our only interest is in getting the food through to people who are hungry." Michael Southwick suggested, knowing how all bureaucrats love a committee, "Why don't we set up a committee, half Kenyan, half American, to monitor the operation on a day to day basis." Lebutti chimed in, saying, "I think that's an excellent idea and I'll send an officer here who will sit with you people (meaning General Mohammad) and you send one of equal rank down to me and he'll know everything that we're doing." So, Moi sort of hesitated then. It was clear that he had been somewhat mollified by this. He said, "I'll think about it." I said, "Mr. President, we haven't got time to think about it. The press is coming in here. Lebutti is here with his planes. Even now, he needs to be flying reconnaissance missions into Somalia. We want to start the food going by early next week." He finally said, "Well, alright, you can start it on a day to day basis. But if I don't like it, you'll cancel it." So, that's what we did. We got the thing off the ground, but just barely.

Q: Obviously, a drought doesn't just happen overnight. Had this been something that we were monitoring? Strictly from your embassy point of view, were you looking at and realized we had a situation developing?

HEMPSTONE: To give myself credit, I had spent some time recently up in the northeast. I had written a couple of cables which were sufficiently moving that they were brought to George Bush's attention. That apparently is what got it off the ground as far as Kenya was concerned. Of course, we had an idea of what was going on in Somalia.

Q: Who was our ambassador in Mogadiscio at that time?

HEMPSTONE: We did not have one. We had evacuated the embassy earlier when it was Jim Bishop.

Q: That was during the height of Desert Storm, so there were Marine Corps assets, such as helicopters, in the region.

HEMPSTONE: It was quite an operation. The Marines never got credit for it because so much else was going on. Not only did they snatch all our people, but they snatched most of the diplomatic corps.

Q: That was a close run thing.

HEMPSTONE: Oh, yes, the bad guys were coming over the wall.

Q: Had your country team been getting ready, thinking, "We're going to have to do something here?"

HEMPSTONE: Oh, yes. We already had I don't know how many refugees in Kenya in camps run by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) under bad sanitary conditions. Clearly, they were hungry already and they were going to have cholera and stuff like

that. So, yes, we were sending out stuff all the time.

Q: When you get situations elsewhere other than right on the ground, usually, it's because the T.V. is there and the pictures are there. My understanding of this is that our response was very much driven by the pictures from Somalia on the nightly news. Were you getting reverberations from this?

HEMPSTONE: I can't say that I was getting reverberations. I had taken the precaution of assuming that we might very well have to evacuate our people from Addis Ababa overland. I had sent people up to the border to make arrangements up there. [The entire embassy], Ambassador Cheek and his people, [were evacuated] out of Sudan [to Nairobi hours before the air war started]. I had sent Michael Southwick into southern Sudan. I had been up there myself on the border. We were looking at any number of ways.

Q: We're talking about a widespread famine of the whole area.

HEMPSTONE: We were talking also about genocide in Ethiopia and Sudan. I don't know what you want to call it in Somalia.

Q: Tribal disturbances with heavy weapons. What about AID at that time? Was AID gearing up to do something or weren't we prepared for that sort of thing?

HEMPSTONE: I suppose they were. We managed in most instances to have a fairly decent supply of food, blankets, medicine, and so forth on hand when people started pouring in from wherever they started pouring in. It was never enough. I really didn't see as much of the AID people as I probably should have and they should have seen me. I don't think that was too well coordinated in that I don't remember a lot of...

Q: How was the government of Kenya responding to this, prior to the arrival of food aid?

HEMPSTONE: In a rather ambiguous fashion. In the first place, General Mohammad, the Chief of Staff of the Kenyan army, is an ethnic Somali. He is now retired. He was up to his armpits in Somali politics, including gun running and everything else. So, he was very much an interested party. The Kenyans themselves don't like Somalis, don't trust them, didn't want Somali refugees in their country. So, it was difficult.

Q: The original intervention there was staged through Mombasa. How did that work?

HEMPSTONE: That worked very well. It was limited in its scope. All we were doing was delivering food to a number of airfields in Somalia where the Red Cross was taking it over as our agent to distribute it. If there was trouble around an airfield, we didn't go in there that day. We went someplace else. When we did go in, they kept the engine running. They could unload one of those big planes in 20 minutes and get out of there. So, we never lost a life. Material damage was insignificant, a couple holes in airplanes, that's about all. Then there followed, and that's when I got really deeply involved, the second phase, which was unilateral American armed intervention in Somalia - 20,000 [troops].

Q: Had you envisaged before that we might get into this?

HEMPSTONE: I had envisaged it in the sense that it almost always happens that way when you start with food. Whatever you do start with, it tends to expand when the situation does not respond the way you hope it will and it almost never does. I was asked at that time what my view was of an armed unilateral American intervention in Somalia. I said in words that will be engraved on my tombstone, "If you liked Beirut, you'll love Mogadiscio." That was the so-called "Tar Baby" cable. That cable of mine was leaked, not by me (although there are people who say I leaked it, but they're either uniformed or lying), to U.S. News and World Report and published in that magazine. That caused a furor here in Washington. Dick Cheney, the Secretary of Defense, got on T.V.; and Larry Eagleburger, who was Deputy Secretary of State, both spoke out. Cheney was particularly strident, I felt, in his attack on me, since I had been asked for my opinion. I was so naive, I figured when people asked for my opinions, they really wanted them, that it was not just a cover your ass program, which I think it was in retrospect. He said two things that were untrue and make me sore to this day. He said that I had opposed humanitarian aid, which I hadn't. There wouldn't have been any if I hadn't gone up there and bent Moi's arm out of shape. He also said that I didn't know anything about Somalia anyway. Well, I never claimed to be a Somali expert, but I was filing a copy out of Somalia in 1957 when Dick Cheney was still in short pants. Eagleburger, who maybe has a better respect for me than Cheney does, was more restrained in his criticism. He said what he had to say, obviously. He said, "Ambassador Hempstone sometimes exaggerates." I suppose I do.

My situation at that juncture was, I could either go on head to head with Cheney and Eagleburger, in which case I would have lost, or I could shut up. I chose to shut up, both because I knew I couldn't win and because we had the election coming up in Kenya within six weeks and I felt I had to be there to keep an eye on Moi and his boys to keep it as straight as possible. So, I shut up.

Q: What were you getting from your embassy? Essentially, your embassy was the closest one to Somalia at that point. Prior to this, using the station chief and your political officers, did you feel yourself sort of a listening post on Somalia?

HEMPSTONE: Yes. We had one officer (I think his name was John Fox) who had been in the Mogadiscio embassy who was assigned to my embassy to keep a watching brief on Somalia. We sent people in there, mainly CIA and AID people, on an ad hoc basis and got them out again as quickly as possible. We didn't like people spending the night there if we could avoid it. That's what was going on. We were getting some information out of there, but a relatively small number of individuals was involved.

Q: When the Beirut/Mogadiscio cable occurred, was this essentially something that was supported by those of the rest of your staff who were familiar with Mogadiscio?

HEMPSTONE: I think so. It was certainly supported by almost all the people I knew in Kenya. There were a lot of old Somali hands around there, Brits. Anybody who knows the Somalis and knows a little bit of history and remembers the mad mullah and that sort of thing knows when

you grab Somalia, you've got a tiger by the tail.

Q: We put our forces in. I sort of had the feeling that we went in to Mogadiscio really not for great policy considerations, but just the drum beat of the press talking about how awful conditions were there. So, this was one of these almost hasty responses to the emerging of human catastrophe.

HEMPSTONE: It was that and the combination of the fact that the U.S. military did not want to go into Bosnia-Herzegovina and hoped that Somalia would be a softer option, which it was, despite the horrible things that happened. It worked pretty well under the Marines when it was a unilateral operation for obvious reasons. Multinational operations are a pain in the ass for everybody, even multi-service ones like the rescue attempt in Iran. But with one service, the Marines, who know each other and know what the drill is and so forth, that worked pretty well. It was in the third phase, the multinational one, that things began to come apart.

Q: Did you find yourself sort of the odd man out? How did you find yourself within the foreign policy establishment having already said this thing wouldn't work? There you are and we're getting deeper and deeper in.

HEMPSTONE: I had told them at the time after the exchange with Eagleburger and Cheney and so forth, "I will support the President's position publicly," which I did. Mainly, I did it by not saying anything. When people asked me questions, I would say, "That is not my bailiwick." By then, we did have someone in there, Pete De Voss first and then Bob Oakley. When I was [first quoted], there was no American ambassador. There was no embassy there. I would say after De Voss came up, "It's not my bailiwick. I've got enough to do with Kenya. Go ask somebody else."

Q: Did you find the Department of State since you had Cheney and Eagleburger down your neck, did they kind of freeze you out? Did you have any feel of that nature?

HEMPSTONE: Yes, in a sense. I had sought permission seven times to go into Somalia. I thought I could help [General] Lebutti and his Marines, which are my Marines. I was refused and refused in very direct terms one of the seven times by Eagleburger. I am a Marine. I do obey orders if I have to. I thought I did have to. So, I saw Lebutti and his gang off at the airport at dawn and I didn't like it at all. I think there was a chill in the atmosphere after that towards me from some members of the Department, not all by any means. Eagleburger always supported me. Bob Houdek always supported me. There were others that did. There were those who thought I was pressing the policy in Kenya too hard and too fast, so they already regarded me as something of a loose cannon.

Q: When you use the term "rogue ambassador," I don't get a rogue feeling from our conversation so far.

HEMPSTONE: I was not a rogue ambassador in that what I was doing (or at least what I thought I was doing) was implementing the President's policy. But the Kenyan government believed or purported to believe that I was a rogue ambassador, that I was acting on my own. Various individuals said on various occasions, "We have no problem with the United States. We have a

problem with Hempstone. He acts on his own." I said to some of the brighter ones amongst them, including Bethuel Kiplagat, who had been the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before, a very good man, "I am a political appointee. If I were doing something that President Bush didn't want done, he would have me out of here in five minutes. You know that. So, why do you talk all this nonsense?" It's sort of ironic.

Q: At a certain point in this operation in Somalia, it did turn into a Beirut type situation of real chaos. We had to leave ruinously. Sometimes being the Cassandra who tells what's going to happen doesn't endear you. How did you find this?

HEMPSTONE: I found that true. It didn't endear me to Eagleburger, with whom I always had and still have a good relationship. He wrote the review in The Washington Times of my book. It did not amongst many who served in the Pentagon, some of them regular officers, some of them reserves. When I came back to the United States in 1993, I taught at VMI for a while and I was in touch with a lot of military. They all said, "You were dead right on Somalia. Many of us felt that way at the time," but being military junior officers, they couldn't say.

Q: What happened in Kenya itself aside from the Somali thing?

HEMPSTONE: We had had the Saba-Saba thing in July 1990. There continued to be jabbing and sparring, some of it more serious than others. They didn't like my traveling around the countryside talking to people. They weren't used to ambassadors doing that and were also afraid I might learn something, which I did. The well-known substance hit the fan in late 1990 when I went to Kisumu and I called on Oginga Odinga, who was the first vice president of Kenya, but was a non-person really by then. He couldn't travel freely, couldn't speak to the press. If he did speak to the press, the press couldn't publish what he had to say, although he had been guilty of no crime other than being opposed to Daniel arap Moi and Kenyatta before him. Oginga had a reputation of being a leftist, but I always felt that was kind of a silly approach to it. He was a massive capitalist himself, very wealthy. He was an opportunist. If we were going to support Tom Mboya, which we were, who was his great rival amongst the Luo people, then he would then take help where he could get it. He got it from the Russians and the Chinese. At that party, which was also attended by Bishop Okulu, an Anglican bishop who was anti-government, very much in the government's bad book, and other opposition figures, but also other government figures, I invited the provincial commissioner and the local district commissioner.

Q: This was down in Kisumu.

HEMPSTONE: Yes. You wouldn't think that an old man in his late 80s attending a party would create banner headlines, but it did. They put out some other extraneous but untrue stuff that I and my staff (because we were again going by land when we left Kisumu and went over to Homa Bay) were cavorting in rough public houses, drinking, wenching, otherwise carrying on. They got everything wrong in that newspaper article except the fact that I was in Homa Bay. They got our license plates wrong. They got the names of the guys who were along wrong. They failed to mention that Kitty was along, so there wasn't much red hot wenching going on. But I was hopping mad. Meanwhile, Bishop Alexander Muge, who was an Anglican bishop, a very fine man, a former GSU (General Services Unit, paramilitary, heavily armed) enlisted man who had

been decorated for valor in the fighting against the Somalis after independence, but had turned pretty much opposition, was killed in a "road accident." It may have been an accident, I don't know. But it was suspicious to many people because a cabinet minister had said that if he visited a certain town, which was within his see, that he would see fire and die, which he did. The cabinet minister did have to resign, but they never established anything. So, I was hopping mad by the time I got to Nairobi. I went to see Kiplagat and said, "Look, I am not really all that concerned about the lies that The Kenya Times tells about me. (I mentioned the editor's name, which now escapes me) I'm not interested in what he said, but I am interested in who is pulling his chain. You know and I know that nothing appears in The Kenyan Times of which the President does not approve. What does that say to me about the type of relations that you people want with me and with the United States? I'm not going to come in here and complain every time this guy, the editor, complains about me because I wouldn't have time to do anything else and neither would you. But I'd be very interested in whether it stops or whether it goes on." It stopped immediately. I heard nothing from that guy for about two months.

But there were other instances. They followed me every place I went. The police interviewed everybody I saw and some of them rather roughly. Some of them were totally innocent. A little Lamu innkeeper who I had never known, but I had to stay with, I hadn't been off the island for 10 minutes before they had him down at police headquarters and kept him there for the better part of the day, wanted to know what I had told him and how much money I had given him. Due to their own corruption, they assumed that I was corrupt, too, and so forth. They nailed me for distribution of seditious books to the people of Kenya. These were the same books that USIS had been delivering to Kenya for 20 years, mainly self-help volumes, Up From Slavery, and stuff like that. I responded to that simply by publishing the titles and the names in the local press to show how ludicrous this thing was.

There came even more problems. There were problems going on between the Brits and the Kenyans. I had gone through three British High Commissioners. Each time, they were improving a bit. Sir John Johnson was terrible in my view. He wanted to stay on in Kenya in his retirement and he wanted to be an adviser to the Kenyan government. The only way he could do that was with Moi's support. The only reason he didn't do it is because his daughter fell very ill and he and Lady Johnson had to go home. Moi was about to fire Richard Leakey as head of the Kenya Wildlife Service. Leakey had been promised carte blanche as far as personnel were concerned. He had discovered that something like at least half the game scouts were corrupt, in league with poachers and everything. He was going to fire them. Well, Moi didn't want them fired. They all were members of constituencies that he needed with elections coming up. About that time, he did agree to legalize the opposition, which is what we had been trying to get him to do all along. I went to see Moi. Queen Elizabeth was coming through there on her way to Harare, where the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference was taking place. So, I went and saw Moi and said, "Look, if this demonstration which the opposition has scheduled takes place on the eve of the Queen's visit, there's blood on the streets, and you fire Richard Leakey, your profile in the world is not going to be very good. You know very well that if you instruct the police to use restraint that they will do so. I want you at least to delay this Leakey decision until you have had time to think about it." He did those two things. The demonstration worked out very well. There was only one person killed and that's not bad. The Queen came and stayed and was able to leave without being embarrassed. Leakey stayed on for the time being.

But then there was a strong backlash from that. The Foreign Minister called me (the only time he did call me) and tore an enormous strip off me, claiming that I was a drug dealer and that I was providing children with liquor and money to demonstrate against the government and that indeed I was running the opposition. I told him, "Mr. Ayah, if I were running the opposition, it would be running a lot smoother than it is, I can guarantee you that. I don't accept what you have to say." He said, "I'm going to leave it up to you whether you stay or not." I said, "I don't accept what you're saying and I feel that my duty requires me to remain here and I will remain here until my President calls me back or your President expels me." He repeated all these things, really scandalous remarks, in a press conference. The Germans by that time had sent in a new ambassador who was a great help to me. He was my strong right arm in terms of human rights and so forth. The Scandinavians had always supported me, but they didn't have the specific valence that the Germans did. Those guys were worked over by the Foreign Minister also.

Then they held a whole day's session in Parliament on my merits, which seemed to be few, and my demerits, which were many. At the end of the day, Parliament voted unanimously for my recall, which I will always remember as a badge of honor. At that point, both the White House and the Department really came through in first-rate fashion. The President through his spokesman gave total support to me and so forth. So, there we were. It more or less ended on that note, except we still had the elections to come. They didn't like me worth a darn. They wanted me out of there. But they didn't have the guts to kick me out. Bush was not going to recall me.

So, up comes election time. This was December of 1992. There was hassling over foreign observers. They turned down a democratic party group here, the Institute for Democracy or something like that. It was run by Brian Atwood, who ended up under Clinton as head of AID. He refused to accept them. I told him, "You are making a mistake here. Should a Democrat be elected, Brian Atwood is likely to have a fairly high powered job in the new administration. I think you ought to reconsider." He said, "No, I'm not going to take it." He did accept the Republican crowd. But there were other hassles with other nations. The Germans finally withdrew. I was concerned about the lack of the numbers of foreign observers of which there may have been 150 to have a look at 10,000 polling places. So, just to help a little bit, I've put together embassy teams. There were only 15 of them, four members in each, all volunteers. There were two Americans, a Kenyan driver and a Kenyan interpreter. I sent them out to key constituencies to observe there. I think we had a positive effect. We had white hats made up for us and that sort of thing. I think it also indicates a true basis of the popularity of what I was doing with the rank and file at the embassy. Certain elements did not take part. No CIA guys went because the acting station chief didn't think it was what she wanted them doing. No military people were engaged. All the rest were volunteers. I had 30 Americans and an equal number of Kenyans who were willing to give up their weekend and take some slight risk to observe.

You know how the election worked out. Moi won the presidency with 36% of the vote. There were three opposition leaders dividing the opposition vote against him. The German ambassador and I told them that this was the sort of thing that would happen if they couldn't agree on a common candidate. Opposition won 88 out of 200 seats in Parliament, which was a pretty good showing for the first election in 25 years. The opposition swept the local council elections. That was it. Moi had eased up a bit on beating up journalists. He started up again after the election.

Kenya is a different place than it was when I went there in 1989. People are not afraid to talk anymore. They're not afraid to come to the American embassy. There was a time when they were. So, I think we didn't do too badly.

Q: What about crime as far as living, not just for you but for the staff? I've always heard that this was a real problem.

HEMPSTONE: It certainly is a problem in Nairobi. It certainly is a problem after dark. I haven't been back in Kenya in four years.

Q: We're talking about the time you were there.

HEMPSTONE: While I was there, that was about it: the problem in Nairobi after dark. You didn't wander around Nairobi after dark, particularly on foot. There were some problems outside of town occasionally.

E. MICHAEL SOUTHWICK
Deputy Chief of Mission
Nairobi (1990-1994)

Ambassador Southwick was born in California and raised in California and Idaho. Educated at Stanford University, he entered the Foreign Service in 1967. Basically an Africa specialist, Mr. Southwick served largely in African posts, including Burundi, Rwanda, Niger, Kenya and Uganda, where from 1994 to 1997 he was United States Ambassador. He also served in Switzerland and Nepal. In his Washington assignments, he dealt with African and United Nations matters. The ambassador was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.

SOUTHWICK: DCM to Nairobi.

Q: All right. So, we will pick this up when you went as DCM to Nairobi in 1980?

SOUTHWICK: 1990.

Q: How did you get the job as DCM in Nairobi?

SOUTHWICK: Something that happens to some of us, maybe most of us. I thought this was my time to be an ambassador and I had been given to understand by a number of people that this would be happening. I was in the senior seminar. It looked like a logical kind of progression. I'd been a DCM three times. I was pretty well known in the African bureau, but to make a long story short, that was not to be. It came down to two possibilities, one being consul general in Johannesburg and two being DCM in Kenya to a political appointee ambassador, Smith Hempstone, who was a journalist by profession. He'd been an editor at the Washington Star and

the Washington Times, known as a conservative in the old sense of the term. I started looking into this. Our ambassador in South Africa at the time was Bill Swing, a very eminent Foreign Service Officer and somebody for whom I had worked in personnel. I called Bill and said you know, this was a possibility for me. I would think that he knew that I was in the running. What did he think? He said, "Oh, Johannesburg is a great place. I've been here two months and I've been down there 52 times." I said mentally at least, thanks a lot Bill. That's very interesting. I could have my numbers mixed up, but the gist of it I'm pretty sure is correct and I put the phone down and I thought, you know, Bill was a great activist, he's a compulsive worker, he's a workaholic. If I go to Johannesburg, I'll have no independence. I'll see what I can do in Nairobi. It was one of the best decisions I ever made.

Q: Well, I think it would be a lot of fun. I've interviewed.

SOUTHWICK: Bill Swing?

Q: Not Swing, Smith Hempstone. An interesting chap. How did you contact him? How did you two mate?

SOUTHWICK: Okay, a very good friend of mine was the desk officer for Kenya, He and I had served together in Niger where I had been DCM and he was the sort of relatively junior officer doing political and economic work and he told me, you know, you might like Hempstone and he might like you. I said, really? He said, yes, you should talk to him. So, we arranged an appointment and I had a meeting with Hempstone and I think maybe this is recorded in his book, Rogue Ambassador, that he was down to me and one other officer. One of the things he had against the other officer was that he was short and he felt that short people were always trying to make up for their "shortcomings." I had a little bit of an edge, not a total edge, but we had a very interesting interview. Hempstone asked me, kind of the classic question, is what was the last book you've read. I said, well, I've been reading a history of the American West in the year 1846 written by Bernard DeVoto. This is kind of obscure to people now, but it's part of a trilogy.

Q: Year of Decision?

SOUTHWICK: Year of Decision, very good. Anyway, this led to discussion of the West and Bernard DeVoto, and we obviously just hit it off. I liked him. It was pretty clear to me that he would be interested, as I think most ambassadors should be, in bigger picture things, relationship with the very top officials and establish them and a lot of running the embassy should be left to the DCM. That's sort of where we left it. He had proceeded me to post by some months. The interesting thing was over the course of those months his relationship with the government steadily deteriorated. He was beginning to challenge them on democratization, human rights and basic governance issues, particularly corruption. This was put together in an article in the New Yorker written by Ray Bonner who earlier made a reputation exposing some of America's misdeeds in Central America. Ray Bonner was then married to Jane Perlez who was a New York Times correspondent. Basically the issue in 1990 in Kenya, as it was in a lot of countries, was that the Cold War was coming to an end. What did that mean for U.S. policy particularly in Africa where the record on democratization, human rights and so forth, general management had been very poor? The excuse had always been, well, we can't be too hard on them because we've

got this Cold War and if we are nasty to these dictators they will kiss up to the communists, the Russians and the Chinese. That was basically it. Hempstone kind of wandered into this. It's not as if he had a big strategy. He was kind of reacting to events and a lot of what he saw on the ground was an effort by indigenous political forces to change things.

Q: What was the thrust of the New Yorker article about him?

SOUTHWICK: Well, that he was out there trying to define these issues and trying to be helpful, but to also be kind of forward on it. I think the Bonner article was basically how far do you push? How up front do you get or do you even get up front and how does American diplomacy operate in those circumstances?

Q: The articles came out before you went out there?

SOUTHWICK: It came out about the time I went.

Q: I was wondering how this reverberated within the African bureau and all.

SOUTHWICK: The issue had certainly been engaged. I went out there in August. There had been in July a big rally that was put down by the government and the opposition leaders had called for multiparty democracy. Hempstone had given a speech at a rotary club, which frankly was written by the Econ officer, but you know it's his speech so he got the credit and the blame depending on your point of view. He had a mild formulation which basically said that the Bush administration would be very mindful of how countries manage their affairs, how they lead their countries, democracy, human rights, economic management and so forth in their relationship. That would have an impact on the relationship. It looked to the government, which was paranoid, that Hempstone was in league with this opposition.

Q: You were there, I just want to get it, from when to when?

SOUTHWICK: I got there in August, I'd have to check the precise date, and I was there for four years.

Q: So, '90 to '94?

SOUTHWICK: '90 to '94.

Q: Did you get anything from within the African bureau of saying my God, keep an eye on this guy. In other words, sort of an unease or something like that or not?

SOUTHWICK: Well, interestingly nothing ever explicit, although my final interview with the Assistant Secretary of State who was Hank Cohen was a strange interview. He said that he was going out to Nairobi to try to rescue the situation. Hempstone was in trouble and he said, you might be chargé when you get out there and you might be chargé for a long time because this is going very badly. In fact, Cohen did get out there a couple of days before I did and he was leaving on the same plane that I arrived on and I never got a chance to compare notes with him.

Cohen did have a private meeting one-on-one with the President. An unusual thing to have a meeting like that with the American ambassador not present.

Q: Yes. I mean arriving in this thing, in the first place, what did you make of what the Cohen visit and the situation was with?

SOUTHWICK: Well, I knew quite a bit about the political situation there. I had had very good briefings. I had studied up. I had followed Kenya off and on for some time. My feeling was that the government really did need to change. I never had a problem in a broad sense with what Hempstone was trying to do. I tended to feel that the government was kind of making him an issue, and to a certain extent, he was making himself an issue which kind of clouded this whole thing up and got it a little bit more personalized. The fundamentals of Hempstone's analysis was that the country was going downhill, corruption was rampant, it needed to open up its political and economic system. All of that was right.

Q: So, how did you find the embassy when you got there because you're in charge of morale, effectiveness and all that?

SOUTHWICK: Morale was high and part of it was Hempstone's wife, Kitty Hempstone who is a warm, engaging, fascinating, energetic person in her own right; interested in what people do. I found morale there to be quite high because most of the people in the embassy kind of understood what was going on and were trying to do their best to aid our efforts to bring some liberalization to Kenya. Hempstone, for his part, thought that I was there to spy on him and that I was there to report back to Washington and make sure that he didn't go off too far on policy initiatives that weren't approved. But despite what some people might think, we had a very good relationship and there's only one point where we got into a big fight and that kind of settled when I got the help of a U.S. government employee there who was also a Marine and he could talk Marine to Hempstone.

Q: Where does that come chronologically?

SOUTHWICK: That came about oh, a year or so later.

Q: Okay, well, let's talk a little before it. Did you have the usual sit down and divvy up what you were going to or sort of what you were going to do?

SOUTHWICK: We had done that in effect over a lunch at the Metropolitan Club before both he and I went out. He was in for the big picture, the relationship. He had tried to cultivate President Moi. He tells this story in his book. He wanted to bring out a prize bull from America to give to Moi who was a big farmer, rancher and this would improve Moi's herd and sort of cement the relationship. That initiative didn't get very far because who's going to pay to bring the bull out? The visuals were a pile of bull semen and were not quite as good as the visuals for a big prize American bull. Then, Hempstone had the notion of maybe the Kenyan air force could get a C130 airplane. Basically these were initiatives to kind of butter-up Moi and cement the relationship, but it wasn't getting very far. It didn't get very far at all.

Q: What was your reading and Moi,, not from Hempstone at this point, but your reading on Moi and his government? First the personality of Moi and then his government when you got out there?

SOUTHWICK: I really felt his government was corrupt and that he himself was corrupt, but I didn't feel I knew enough initially about him to make some judgments. Nor did I know enough about the kind of political culture there because my training had made me want to concentrate on the political culture of the country as much as the individual personalities. What I began to find as I went along was that Moi was a very underestimated person because he wasn't very articulate in public settings. He was very articulate privately I came to find out, and he was a very complex man. I used to think he was either a schizophrenic or somebody with multiple personalities. He was the guy who turned up in church every Sunday. He fancied himself a good Christian. He gave lots of donations to schools and individual students and so forth, yet he was also the person who was shipping millions of dollars outside the country.

Q: Well, that could describe certain leaders in our business, I mean going back through the centuries in any country.

SOUTHWICK: I guess it was Dorothy Parker, a reference to some individual, but I think it applies to politics, most politicians are as pure as the driven slush. I didn't have these expectations and I also, as time went by, began to have a split with Hempstone because of my analysis. The problem with Kenya was not Moi as a person. It was a political culture which was basically corrupt. The question was whether a change would necessarily bring in a new regime which would be any different from the other one except that it would have a different name and face. I had a different analysis on that.

Q: How did you analyze the political culture of Kenya, as say, to some other African countries that you had served?

SOUTHWICK: Much more highly advanced. It had never really broken down. It had one coup attempt in '82, which was put down. They'd had a record of continuous elections, which, by the standards of the Third World or Cook County, Illinois in former days in America, were not bad. Regularly, despite the fact that it was a one party system, a lot of the bad apples would get tossed out. It was a very vibrant political scene. I hoped they could start opening up and have a policy of gradualism multiparties and peoples' rights to assembly and freedom of speech, right of assembly and right of association, things fundamental to the democratic process. You had a lot of intellectual capital at the embassy. They had very good people in the AID mission. The best AID director that I ever worked with.

Q: Who was that?

SOUTHWICK: John Wesley who later became our AID director in Egypt. It was a gung ho staff and morale was sky high. We were rocking and rolling.

Q: Tell me on this, I've heard people say they were concerned to go to Nairobi particularly for some years now because of the crime.

SOUTHWICK: Yes, crime had been a problem with urbanization and slums. If you go back to the colonial period or the period of independence, Nairobi was a town of maybe 100,000 people and it had gotten to be well over a million by the time I got there. It's probably over two million now with these vast slums. A lot of poor, unemployed or scarcely employed people, and street crime was high and crime out in the suburb was high. Hijackings and so forth. We calculated at the embassy that a person had a one in 20 chance of being mugged, robbed or otherwise assaulted during his tour there.

Q: How did you deal with this?

SOUTHWICK: Well, the embassy had guards. Each individual residence had guards. I felt pretty safe because I had a driver who had been in the General Services unit and was military part of his career. He was a big, tall Kalenjin, which is part of Moi's tribe, but he was part of a subgroup, which happened to oppose Moi in some respects, so he was kind of perfectly positioned which is often the case. You get very well acquainted with a driver if you have the same driver year in and year out. The only time I really got worried about security in the sense that it could hit me personally was when my son started to drive. He turned 18 and could drive and he was driving around, and I told him if anybody ever wants this car, you give it to them. You don't do anything crazy or try to resist or be smart-alecky or anything else. You be cool and give them the car. You know, he's an 18 year old, and I was kind of worried about it, but fortunately such an incident never occurred.

Q: How about the secretaries and all this? Was there a problem particularly of rape and robbery and that sort of thing?

SOUTHWICK: We had a rape incident when I was there involving two women who worked for AID. They were just out for a stroll at a fairgrounds when the fair was going on, but they were kind of off into the sidelines and they were accosted and they were raped. Rape per se was not usually what you had to worry about there. What you had to worry about was petty street crime and thievery. Household staffs were notorious. My own was notorious. I could never get to the bottom of the thing. Bottles of liquor, cameras, clothes. Never anything super valuable, but very cleverly done. It was kind of a continuous drain and that marred my attitude about a lot of things.

Q: How tribal were politics?

SOUTHWICK: Very tribal. This was not fully appreciated in the lead up to the 1992 elections, by which time there were multiparties in Kenya. When that election took place, we found that it was virtually all on tribal lines. The estimate we had going into the election that Kenya was to some extent urbanized. There was an educated, somewhat middle class there, unlike the middle class in a lot of other countries that they would kind of be above this, and that did not prove to be the case. Getting to that point in '92 when they had multipartism was a combination of things. Hempstone was a public voice at the embassy setting the tone that Kenya needed to change and clearly challenging the government to do better. Then some steps that some of the rest of us took, and I was involved, the ring leader, if you will, of a group of development people that decided that Kenya would not change; Moi would not change on the basis of dialogue. There needed to

be some clear pressure. You're obviously not going to send in the Marines, and we fastened on the idea that we needed to do something about the aid flows, particularly the cash aid. Kenya was getting about a billion dollars worth of aid; about 200 or 300 million dollars over a year of cash; loans from the World Bank primarily. We felt that a message needed to be sent on that. I, with my Japanese counterpart and my Dutch counterpart, essentially launched a diplomatic campaign, lined up our capitals, lined up our representatives in the World Bank. Much to the surprise of the World Bank who kind of mouthed a lot of sentiments about other concerns about governance and so forth, but they stayed out of that and they just did development. We cornered the government in the fall of 1991 and suspended all cash assistance. The first time that this had happened in an African country. Within a month of that, Moi had his worst two people in jail, who didn't stay there very long. His worst two people were in jail, and he had decided to change the constitution. This policy of putting on economic pressure had been by that point an absolutely resounding success. The next elections a year later in '92 were going to be multiparty elections. The political officer then was Al Eastham, a very talented guy. He said, you know, you're doing a lot of things and he says, he didn't think that the ambassador really understood what I was doing. I said, "Well, I sent him all these memos and we've talked about it." Al said, "Well, you need to talk to him about it again." I ran into Hempstone and I said "it's pretty plain to us that sweet reason isn't going to get us very far and we need to do something more." Some economic pressure would help, and this is how I intend to proceed lining up all these other Western countries, Japan and doing something about aid. It was a little bit unclear exactly what we were going to do. Hempstone was kind of hesitant for a moment and I thought, oh my God, this is going to go down the drain. He said, "Well, all right," he didn't want anything to interfere with his relationship with Moi. I thought to myself, what relationship with Moi? I said quite honestly I don't think this will inflict any further damage to the relationship with Moi.

By that time I had been chargé enough and I had seen Moi personally myself a couple of times. There was one kind of strange incident when the government was in this campaign to discredit Hempstone. They had all kinds of planted articles in the newspaper that he was an unfit ambassador. They tricked me into a meeting which I was supposed to have with a minister. I arrived there and who did I have the meeting with, but Moi. I couldn't get out of it, but as soon as it was over, and this was at Moi's private residence in Nairobi, I went to Hempstone and I said, I want to tell you this. I didn't plan this. This just happened. We just had a good conversation and I told him everything that had happened. Hempstone was terribly upset. I probably could have been canned right then and there. I frankly expected to be, but I said, "This is something we've just got to put in the past and just keep going." I think Hempstone knew or came to appreciate that I was not trying to undermine him there and as a matter of fact the staff was very good at supporting him. I think he always saw me or tended to see me as someone who represented this kind of vile State Department system of careerist bureaucrats who don't want to take risks.

Q: But actually we were, weren't we?

SOUTHWICK: Absolutely.

Q: Could you talk a bit about the diplomatic corps there. You were saying you got support. So often the United States ends up acting on its own because nobody else will support it. I mean it's

not like you had more proactive group.

SOUTHWICK: It was a group of DCMs there, basically deputies. I had very good relationships with the key ones and one of the institutional things there was a kind of a DCM lunch that happened every month and it would travel around among I guess 12 or 13 DCMs. The problem we had was with the British who had more interest there than we did. They had more investment, they had a longer history, they had more of their nationals living there and the ambassador there I think kind of found Hempstone a loathsome character and was very condescending in his treatment of him. This was Sir Roger Tomkys, a very venerable Arabist and sort of central casting of the British diplomat. I was well acquainted with the deputy there, Hayden Warren-Gash who had spent the first 12 years of his life in Kenya. He had this kind of visceral feeling for Kenya. The British kind of went along with this because the Dutch and even the Japanese who usually are very (*inaudible*), but (*inaudible*) and I were frankly asleep at the stage and he was unlike most Japanese diplomats I ever met. He was diffident and careful and so forth. He'd been educated in the West and he was an advocate of Japan using its tremendous economic power particularly in aid. It was about that time that Japan was surpassing the United States as the biggest bilateral donor and thinking that it should get something out of it. It should produce some results in these countries, which badly needed some change. I have never ever felt comfortable with the United States acting alone unless it absolutely has to. It's just far better for us given our power then and it was even becoming clear then, you know, Russia had faded from the scene. We are sitting astride the world like a colossus that if we didn't work carefully with our friends, we would engender a very bad reaction over time. We really had to work with them. The British were important, the French were important to some extent, the Dutch, the Japanese. If you couldn't convince them to go ahead I felt that we were just pissing in the wind, excuse me.

Q: How about getting out and around and talking to leaders and others?

SOUTHWICK: There was quite a bit of that. Hempstone himself liked to go on these big trips and I didn't want to go with him and I didn't think it was appropriate. If he's out running around the country, the DCM should be running the embassy and vice versa if I needed to go on a trip. I would always defer to him. He would take a lot of people with him. These are beautifully written up in his book. He's a great travel writer. He brings in a lot of history and incidents and personality portraits. Some of his dispatches were just wonderful to read that he sent back. I did somewhat less travel than he did. My wife and two other women were working on a book, a tourism book of Kenya. It started out to be a little pamphlet on the best hotels in Kenya and ended up being a full length book which covered over 250 places to stay and required two years of research. She was going all over the country, my wife, with these two other women and trying to put this book together about Kenya's best hotels. It became eventually Kenya's best hotels, lodges and homesteads. She was getting out.

Kenyan society is very fascinating. It's a mixture. You have different kinds of Asian groups from the Indian subcontinent. People who have been there for decades originally brought over to help build the railroad. You had a big European population, which was aid workers and so forth. You had vestiges of the old white Kenyan culture.

Q: Was Happy Valley still going?

SOUTHWICK: Happy Valley was not going, but I'm sure a lot of happy stuff was going on. Then you found Kenya attracted all these sort of wildlife people. It was sort of a Mecca for that and then the democratization. There was a lot going on. Partly through Susan, my wife, and partly through my own efforts, we ended up knowing lots of people. I don't want to brag, but I don't think there was anybody of consequence in that country that we didn't know from the president on down.

Q: What about the South Asian community? They'd been sort of expelled, many of them from Uganda and Idi Amin and all. Had that increased, what was the South Asian influence?

SOUTHWICK: They were the commercial class and to a certain extent the industrial class. They were astute enough to form alliances with prominent Kenyans in many instances. They clearly brought revenue and entrepreneurial skill to the country. Even though there were sometimes accusations of racism and accusations that they have all the money, the Asians have all the money and they're not sharing; well, it was not a nasty, hostile relationship by and large. I think the Asians were fairly careful, although, in individual instances, and I watched this sometimes in shops and so forth. Africans would be treated very poorly by the Asians. By and large I think the Moi government had made a decision, a consensus decision on the part of the indigenous African elite, that they didn't want to do what Idi Amin had done, expelling the Asians that helped lead to the ruination of Uganda and to make the best of it. The Asians I think responded to that by, in many instances, doing good deeds, foundations, public works, bringing money back into the country.

Q: How did the government work? Was this a parliament? Were decisions made in back rooms, consensus, how did things work?

SOUTHWICK: Well, the president was clearly the dominant figure and everybody knew that. He had some trusted aids, which were people of his own tribe. He had a very uneasy relationship with the Kikuyu tribe which is the tribe that in some ways is still the dominant tribe because it was the entrepreneurial class, had most of the best farmland in Kenya and Jomo Kenyatta, the first president of Kenya had emerged from their ranks. What I found about the political system was that even though there was tribalism and personalities jockeying and so forth, there were some breaks. Forces for stability to keep things from going seriously off track. You noticed time after time that Moi seems to be kind of heading for something bad and they would go back from the brink. This didn't work all the time. During the period we were there, there were tribal clashes in the Rift Valley.

Q: How were relations with Tanzania and Uganda?

SOUTHWICK: They were fairly good. Those three countries had been together at independence in something called the East African Community, the EAC. It broke up in the late '70s I believe, but they were making some efforts to put that together realizing that they had a lot to gain by cooperating economically and maybe adding a customs union, kind of a European union model thing. They were taking steps in that direction. Moi also kind of fancied himself as kind of a peacemaker in the area. He had a very able current secretary for the ministry of foreign affairs

who had worked on the Mozambique issue. Moi tried to work on the Somalia issue and tried to be a regional statesman. During this period the whole area was kind of in flames. There was a civil war in Ethiopia. There was a civil war in the Sudan. Things were building up in Rwanda by the end of my tour. There was the genocide in Rwanda. Biggest of all in terms of involving the United States was the Somalia intervention. I was intimately involved in all aspects of that.

Q: How did we find Kenya worked as far as the United Nations and things we were trying to get support for and all that?

SOUTHWICK: They were fairly good. Kenya had distinguished itself from our point of view by being one of the African countries that had boycotted the Olympic games in Moscow in 1980 because of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. That was kind of interesting because Kenya as a sports country, an athletic country, is a powerhouse on the African side, particularly in running, long distance running. They had stayed out. They had cooperated with the Israelis on the Entebbe raid. In the UN generally, they tended to go along with the African consensus. That unfortunately then, as now, is kind of manipulated by countries are mired in some of the issues of the past in North-South approaches. That wasn't as good as we had hoped, but on the Marines in Somalia we could count on them for support if we really needed it and often got it.

Q: Let's talk about these conflicts. The Somali one was the big one and the famous quote of Smith Hempstone.

SOUTHWICK: If you like Beirut, you'll love Mogadishu.

Q: Yes.

SOUTHWICK: He was absolutely right. There's a contradiction here. A huge contradiction because there's a civil war in Somali, but there was also a huge drought. The two things kind of came together to have a devastating effect on the population, and refugees were pouring out of the country; many of them into Kenya. We started having visitors from Washington and we increased our reporting on this phenomenon. There was still an embassy in Mogadishu headed by Jim Bishop, and Hempstone visited some of the refugee camps. The civil war though was going badly for the government and it was pretty clear to most of us it was only a question of time before the rebels took over. It also seemed to us that Jim Bishop, our ambassador in Mogadishu, felt that this would take a lot longer than any of the rest of us thought it would take. One of the things about my career in Nairobi, stemming from my time in INR, I knew how to deal with the intelligence community. I knew how to get analyses. I knew how to get more information than what they would otherwise provide. I could conjure up analyses if I wanted to. I could get access to a lot of their reporting just because I think once you've been in the intelligence community, you're sort of part of a fraternity or sorority depending on your point of view. Anyway the boys and the girls respect each other. It's more common I agree at least at that time I felt in the agency than there was in State. There was more esprit and more in the seriousness about the importance of the work. We had an extremely talented station chief. Anyway, this whole situation in Mogadishu was deteriorating. I went off on home leave to Washington and then California. About the time I had left Nairobi, Hempstone had filed a big report about his visit to a refugee camp on the border with Somalia in the northeast of Kenya. He

had focused on an eight or nine or 10-year-old refugee. It was a brilliant piece of journalistic reporting, not necessarily Foreign Service reporting, but journalistic reporting. By this time we'd had the evacuation of our people from Mogadishu. Where was Jim Bishop? He was back in Washington I think in the human rights bureau. Jim had been a friend of mine for a long time and a mentor and I went to see him and obviously Jim was still following things in Somalia and said, "Why did you send this Hempstone cable classified? There's no reason to have it classified." I thought for a minute and I said, "You're absolutely right. I honestly don't know." He got on the phone with Hempstone and said, "Send it again, and send it unclassified." A couple of days later it was in the Washington Post. The story goes that President Bush read it, was deeply affected by it and it was one of the things that made him decide, among others, I'm not saying it was a sole thing, but it was an important element in his decision to do something. We'd already had congressional delegations out there who felt that despite all advice, and I'm a big one for trying to get all of the best information from all of the wisest and people about the situation. I organized briefings and to a man people said the worst thing that you could do is to go in there militarily. Everybody said that, but I remember John Lewis, the congressman from Georgia, after a briefing with the press after his visit out there and he says, "We can't, I know I'm hearing that we can't intervene, but we can't just do nothing in the face of all this human suffering." Things were kind of brewing. I went back to Nairobi.

Q: Had you sounded out Washington before you went back or did you go sort of?

SOUTHWICK: I sounded out Washington and I felt that they were watching the situation very closely. They were trying to as they usually do in the State Department, they manage things. I didn't sense there was any big idea for doing anything drastic. I honestly didn't, but we were going to excuse me, piddle along with working with the UN and working with the NGOs in trying to alleviate the suffering caused by the drought and the civil war.

Q: Just to clarify, when you say civil war, civil war usually implies there's a red side or a blue side or what have you. Did you feel there were two different sides because it didn't turn out to be that way?

SOUTHWICK: There are very few people who understand Somalia, and I'm not necessarily one who does, but I understand it well enough to realize that it was not a country in the classic sense. It had tribes. It had clans, it had factions. It was governed in the colonial era by both the British in the northeast and elsewhere by the Italians. Those two things were glued together at independence. It was basically kind of a rival clan structure, kind of the mountain kind of place. I remember very clearly this vivid conversation that Hempstone and I had with a couple of Somalis who had been with the previous government who were in Nairobi after the government was overturned. I remember asking one of them, I said, everybody said Somalis like to fight, but how do you envision this coming to an end. I couldn't understand people wanting to fight because you had this Hatfield McCoy kind of stuff, in some ways defined Somalia. He said Somalis don't stop fighting until they're exhausted. It wasn't a question of one side winning; no it only happens when everybody is exhausted. They can't fight anymore. I took that to heart and it seemed to be sensible.

Q: Were we seeing this though as a classic civil war or was this a complete breakdown of

authority at the time?

SOUTHWICK: At the time, there's nothing ideological about this. It was just in effect like two rival gangs. Even the gangs had their alliances and so forth, but nothing was terribly clear cut or organized. The huge problem was legitimacy of African governments and it's whoever gets the power holds power. It was one bad apple replacing another bad apple.

Q: When you went out there from home leave you didn't feel there was any?

SOUTHWICK: I thought that this thing would just keep bubbling. The Gulf War was over by then and I thought that my experience with Africa is that the United States does not like big adventures in Africa. It will occasionally be drawn into them, but when it does it doesn't like it. There's no sustaining power. I felt the best thing to do was to try, however clumsily and however messily, to work in a political process with our allies in the UN and trying to do what we could for Somalia. I was back in Nairobi. While on a trip to Lake Naivasha, I got a call from the embassy saying come back to Nairobi now. I got on the phone with Washington and Washington was making this decision to send out a bunch of aircraft to help with humanitarian airlift, some C130s under the command of a Marine Corps General. I said, "Well, where does this stand now?" They said the planes were coming, C130s, C141s and they were leaving tonight and they were coming my way. I said, "Well, has anyone in Washington had any conversations at all with the Kenyan Embassy?" No. This was Robert Houdek on the phone. I said, "Robert, it seems to me that given time differences and so forth that is where you need to make the contact. Obviously we need to make it here, but we need to double track this thing." He wouldn't do it. He said, "No, you do it out there." This was a weekend, Saturday. I finally got in touch with Hempstone. He was at the embassy, but he wanted me to handle this or at least I was handling it and he didn't want to get involved. Anyway, I started trying to phone people in the government that I knew, the secretary of the foreign ministry that was close to the president. Other people that I knew. Couldn't get anybody, left notes, sent my driver with notes. He spoke the language and all the rest of it. Called where the president was. Tried to speak with the president's private secretary who I knew very well. Couldn't reach him. He was off somewhere and somebody else was taking his place. Didn't get him until midnight. I finally said, someone needs to talk to the president about this because these aircraft are heading our way and will want to land and its with this humanitarian relief.

Q: Nairobi was the only place they could land essentially?

SOUTHWICK: Well, there were several places. There's an international airport there. There's a military airport there and there is a big airport in Mombasa. The feeling was that the relief effort for a Somalia was really being run from Mombasa. We needed to land in Mombasa. We had a security agreement with Kenya, which gave us access to port facilities and bases, but it didn't. It assumed consultations with the government. You don't just show up and land. I was, to put it mildly, getting a little bit frantic, finally talked to, got a substitute secretary to the president. I said, could somebody talk to the president about this? (*inaudible*) talked to the president. Ambassador Hempstone talked to the president: but these aircraft are coming and could you please give them clearance and then we'll have discussions about how to do this. Moi was livid, as one would expect him to be. Absolutely livid. All of this sort of emerged the next day. By the

next day I had gotten them to let the planes land and they landed. The poor general was there and we asked for a meeting with the president and Hempstone was there. We had a meeting with the president, which was a kind of a stiff meeting, and he had some of his ministers there. Hempstone was there and the Marine Corps general and a couple of us from the embassy and it was not a nice conversation.

Some of my colleagues in the Kenyan government denied they had been contacted on Saturday when I knew they had. I had left a written message with one of them. They knew the essence of what was going on and they could have called me back. This was a Third World government. It doesn't work very well. Kind of paralyzed on weekends and they didn't like what was happening and they didn't know what to do about it. I guess I'll credit myself and disappoint Hempstone a little bit. I just thought maybe the way out of this was to co-opt Moi, that this was all his idea and that he's in charge of it. So, we put forward the view that there could be a kind of a joint committee established with key people in the government, people from the embassy. We would work under President Moi's direction to use this capacity we now had to enhance the humanitarian relief effort and the first area of concentration would be Somalis in refugee camps in Kenya. Anyway, this worked. Hempstone and a couple of others worked on as a joint statement and Hempstone appeared with the Kenyan foreign minister and they detested each other. As I said, to try to be sweetness and light, but we created this. In some ways it was fiction, but by then it was fact. There was a U.S.-Kenyan joint effort to beef up the humanitarian relief effort and wasn't this just dandy? Isn't this what the world wanted? Off we went. We started delivering food. I went with one of the planes. Then the effort was to move this into Somalia proper. We did have problems with Hempstone because he wanted to get in one of the planes with the Marine General and lead the charge and be the first American political figure to land in Somalia and show the flag and announce salvation, compliments of Uncle Sam. I was not too happy with this. I told him, I said, "Our job is to make sure that Kenya is the 51st state. We have the airport. We have the ports. We have total cooperation and we can move in, we can move out, we can do what we need. Somalia should be handled in a different fashion and that was what Washington was saying." We got into a little tiff then. He told me not to interfere; he was going to try to work this out with Washington. I thought, well, if you can work it out with Washington, I'm not going to complain. So, he did with a little bit of slight of hand, did go in with one of the planes into Somalia, first and last time.

Q: While you were there had plans been made other than getting this relief supplies to Mombasa and plans for maybe what to do with it afterwards?

SOUTHWICK: Yes, there was a whole network established. We had a big operation with OFDA, the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance. There was a lot of food coming into Mombasa. We were already running into difficulties about that before the General and his planes arrived, moving things forward because there were logistics problems. There were capacity problems. There were cooperation problems with the Somalis. There's no question that that operation initially with this humanitarian focus was really needed. In retrospect I had to admit that it would have taken a long time for the relief effort to get running smoothly and adequately. I had had experience with this because of my experience in Niger and I knew what it took to get food moved in massive quantities, thousands and thousands of tons. You can't do that with a business as usual approach.

Q: Did we have places in Somalia? I mean were you getting stuff to places in Somalia?

SOUTHWICK: Yes. By that time I think some of the UN people were in. We did not initially have any Americans on the ground. I worked it out with my EU counterpart. We had two adventurous people, an American woman who spent many years in Somalia, spoke the language, knew the place like the back of her hand. She was willing on a volunteer basis; I was not twisting her arm. She was the first American who went back in there after the embassy had been evacuated and she had made several trips and sometimes with this EU counterpart. It was sort of a Bobbsey twins approach. It was basically scout out the situation and talk to local officials. People liked her. We gave her a lot of money. She went over there, hired technicals, Toyota pickups with guys with machine guns on them, and went to see what she could find out. She had made a couple of trips like that. I was always scared to death that she was going to come back in pieces. From a humanitarian relief point of view, my recollection was that we had pretty good information on where the food was needed and how, once we could get airlift into places required.

Q: While you were there, how did it work, how did the situation work?

SOUTHWICK: Well, we basically operated out of Mombasa and that's where the Marine General installed himself. We had, I think, at its height, maybe about 1,000 Americans in uniform down there and then it suddenly dawned on the Kenyans that this was good for business. We had at that time a consulate in Mombasa. Our consular officer down there, it's just a one man post, sort of a classic 19th Century operation in a 19th Century town. It's right out of Sir Richard Burton.

Q: He had a pith helmet?

SOUTHWICK: He was a character. He was totally unlike a typical Foreign Service Officer, but if we ever had the right person in the right place, this was the guy. Right now the name is escaping me, but it will come to me any second now. You know there are two kinds of Foreign Service Officers. There's the inside of the office kind and sort of the outside guy and sometimes you get one person with both. This guy, forget about the office and forget about ever seeing reports unless you strapped him down and tied his hands to the keyboard. He knew everybody in town. We had reports from Washington, oh, there's Muslims down there and they hate us and oh, we don't know there might be radicals and they might try some funny stuff. This consular officer went around to all the Muslim leaders. They had barbecues together with the military. They were just thrilled to death to have all these people with lots of money out there. We owned that town and relationships between people in uniform and the local establishment were fantastic.

Q: When did this thing turn military other than the airlift portion?

SOUTHWICK: I'm going to have to check everything I say because memory can play tricks, but we gradually got people on the ground in there. I think we were just sort of drawn into it more and more and we were having trouble with Aidid in Somalia who was frustrating, the political reconciliation process was frustrating as well, some of the relief operations. He became a kind of

a nemesis and somebody to deal with. Over time there were a lot of troops who got established in there. I think Bangladeshis, some of these who come in on peacekeeping operations and there were some clashes from time to time. We had people on the ground, not a whole lot, but we had people on the ground and ours naturally were far better equipped than others. We got into this situation where the idea was to capture Aidid. I knew some of the people in the other organizations who were involved in this and I knew them and I thought at the end of the day Mogadishu is not going to have one rock on top of another rock or we're going to have Aidid. I mean these were very tough, determined, skilled people, but despite many attempts we could never get the guy. This threat had gone I guess until October of '93 and you had the famous Black Hawk Down incident.

Q: What were you getting from your side, I mean how was this whole operation affecting our relations with Kenya?

SOUTHWICK: Once we got over that initial distress of lack of consultation and so forth, they got used to it. They felt it kind of in many senses worked to their advantage. It made them a little bit more important in the whole thing and gave Moi some scope to try as he often did to play the role of peacemaker. When Robert Oakley left Somalia, Moi had a meeting or two with Oakley. I think the Kenyans were trying to be helpful. Kenya has an uneasy relationship with Somalia. Kenya, to a certain extent, is a manufactured country like most African countries.

Q: It's got that one section that's part of the five pointed stars.

SOUTHWICK: Five stars. Yes. Whatever it is on the Somalia flag, but anyway, a third of Kenya geographically is ethnically Somali. There are not too many people who live up there, but the northeast corner of the country, a pretty good swab of it is ethnically Somali and the Somalia government would like to have that as it would a big chunk of Ethiopia and have Somalia's borders conform to its ethnic reach.

Q: Were the Kenyans putting troops in there at all or anything like that?

SOUTHWICK: I don't recall them putting troops in. I could be wrong on that, but I don't recall them putting in troops. They were involved in some other UN peacekeeping operations. I think they may have been stretched a little thin. They felt they were the platform there. They were the 51st state as it were in terms of the logistics or whatnot for U.S. operations and this gave them some scope so they got used to the idea. A little bit frustrated, they would have liked to have gotten the refugees back to Somalia. They didn't want this influx of refugees. Some of them were in the northeast corner of Kenya, but a lot of them were in the area between Mombasa and the Somalia border and that's where a lot of the tourist trade is. The people who like beaches and that kind of stuff as opposed to game parks.

Q: Did sort of the collapse of the situation and our pullout happen while you were there?

SOUTHWICK: Yes, it did.

Q: What did that do?

SOUTHWICK: Well, it was humiliating and it showed the limits of a number of things. Our staying power, we lost 13 soldiers when Black Hawk Down occurred. It was a very dramatic event. The imagery in the press on the cover of Newsweek magazine was really distressing. Naked or almost naked dead American soldiers being dragged through the streets. This is '93. I guess Clinton was president by then, yes. There was just no interest in perpetuating this anymore. I mean it started drying out and about six months later we were out. We just left it to the UN and kind of abandoned much of an effort to do anything there.

Q: Did you notice a cooling off or a certain disdain or anything like that on the part of the government of Kenya?

SOUTHWICK: Not so much, but they're not as afflictive as some of the idealism that we have. We went in there for quite good notions and kind of lost our way. I'm not staying it's exactly like Vietnam, but there are some parallels with what we're going through right now in Iraq. You get in, things are more complicated than you think, they get worse, you start paying a cost as Hempstone put it in his famous cable about Mogadishu, somebody pays the butcher's bill. We had a butcher's bill there. It was only 13, it wasn't hundreds, wasn't thousands. We'd had some casualties in other respects, but nothing quite as dramatic as that Black Hawk Down incident.

Q: What about you say there was a civil war going on in Ethiopia in '91.

SOUTHWICK: Tigray.

Q: That's of course quite removed from the Kenyan border.

SOUTHWICK: Yes it is although they share a border. There's a border crossing point.

Q: They share a border, but I'm saying the fighting was.

SOUTHWICK: The fighting never got down there and that was going on in '91. Bob Houdek by then was our chargé. He's a very capable guy and that thing was coming to an end. I had flown up to the border post. We needed to make contingency plans because we thought we might have a situation where a lot of the foreign community Americans would have to evacuate overland to the southwest of Ethiopia along the Kenya border. We'd have to go up there and meet and help them in Kenya. There's no good road up there, and bring them down to Nairobi. During the Gulf War we had evacuated our embassy in the Sudan and there was a C141, one or two had brought out everybody late one night because we didn't think the place was safe. I mean we were used to chaos in countries and evacuations and contingency planning and trying to make the best of bad things. Houdek and the rest of the staff up there did a masterful job of arranging things so that when the rebels came into Addis Ababa it was maybe not like Paris in 1944, but it was a relatively peaceful takeover. Mengistu fled and initially fled to Nairobi. When that plane landed he was in effect in Kenyan custody. The government got in touch with us. I was on the phone with people at the foreign ministry and the president's offices. They didn't know what to do with him. They said this guy's crazy. He still thinks he's president. He's crying. He's emotionally out of control and he is terribly upset. He was saying his country needed him and there were still

things that he needed to accomplish. This was somebody who brought nothing but ruin to Ethiopia. Shows you what megalomania can do. Well, the Kenyans were inclined to ship him off somewhere else. I said I think the furthest you can get him from here the better. He ended up in Zimbabwe.

Q: How about the Rwanda situation when you were there?

SOUTHWICK: That had gone through several phases. There was a peace process that was producing results, there was a peace plan. Rwandans were very happy. I remember going to a Thanksgiving service at a church, an American Thanksgiving at a church with the Rwandan community in Nairobi to thank God for this agreement that was going to end this civil war in Rwanda. Then in April of '94 we heard over the radio that Habyarimana, the president of Rwanda, was in a plane that had been shot down. There was chaos in Kigali. I went to the embassy. We had a very good staff there. They were all geared up as they had been before to do what needed to be done. We just assumed that eventually the people in Kigali would be coming through Nairobi and that was the case. A few of them we got out by air, but most of them, there was a land convoy. Ambassador Rawson went down to Bujumbura. We brought people over by plane. We had quite a few people in Nairobi for about a week or two including Joyce Leader who was the DCM there and was a good friend of mine. I had watched Rwanda. I had served there. I had served in Burundi. I knew that if things started tipping they would get really bad, but even I didn't anticipate how bad it would get. I just didn't.

Q: Was there any sort of marshaling of Tutsi forces in Kenya or was that all Uganda?

SOUTHWICK: No, Kenya was completely out of it although there was a resident Rwandan exiled community in Kenya. One of the exiles was the former king of Rwanda, Kigeli the fifth, like that whom I came to know. He would visit the embassy from time to time and the marines were just sort of awestruck. This guy was nearly seven feet tall. He was a very nice person and didn't seem to have much money or anything. He was under some kind of UN support I guess. He wanted to go back to Rwanda, wanted to play a role, but was not pushing it. He was very careful about all of that.

Then this is a wonderful little Foreign Service left hand right hand story. He wanted to go to the States. I thought I don't know whether this is a good idea or not, it might mess things up. So, I got in touch with Washington and we worked this issue for a while and we didn't get a clear decision, but Kigeli had been invited by some group in the States to come there. Well, one day Kigeli came to see me, came up to my office and thanked me for the visa that our consular section had just issued him. I called down to the consular section as soon as Kigeli left and said, "What on earth did you do?" He said, "Well, he seemed to give the criteria in this organization which was sponsoring him and all the rest of it." I mean I could blame myself for this because I'm supposed to be running the embassy so to speak, but I thought that there had been sufficient discussion in country team meetings that this is somebody who is politically hot. If we do this we've got to it in a kind of a careful way. I wasn't necessarily opposed to it, but I didn't want it to be kind of sprung on me. Anyway, Kigeli went off to the States and stayed there for months and months. I don't know where he is now. There were no untoward repercussions from it. I think he was being sponsored by the Seventh Day Adventists, I'm not sure.

Q: What about, you've mentioned, a feeling when you talked to Houdek about the planes coming out. Did you ever find out what came, that sort of the idea of sending off planes without getting clearances and all that?

SOUTHWICK: No, I never got a formal apology. I never got a further explanation, but I just, frankly I still think that's a lousy way to do business.

Q: Oh, a terrible way to do business.

SOUTHWICK: I like to think that if they had talked to the Kenyan government at the embassy here in Washington, maybe they would have gotten a no. There was so much a head of steam behind this that they just said, well, this is heavy pressure from President Bush. He wanted to do this, so let's just close our eyes and hope for the best. Our embassy, despite the fact that I think we were regarded as an antithetical force to Moi, we had a pretty good relationship. I personally had and still have a very good relationship with Moi and we'd been able to pull some other things out of the hat. For a while we had a whole bunch of Libyan prisoners of war who had been captured in Chad. They were fighting in Chad. When it looked like the government holding these Libyan prisoners of war was going to fall we evacuated them, took them first, I don't know where, a couple of countries. They went to Zaire. When I got involved in this, I got a phone call one day saying do you think Kenya would lodge these Libyan prisoners of war for a few months while we process them as refugees? I said, why don't you take them to Panama?

Q: How did we end up with them?

SOUTHWICK: That's a good question. We were involved with them and I think we were trying, with the agency and others, to get some of these people, I suspect, I don't know this for sure, to go back to Libya.

Q: This is in the aftermath of the Toyota wars wasn't it?

SOUTHWICK: Yes, well there was always a kind of a civil war going on in Chad, one group takes over and then it's sort of South versus North kind of stuff. Libya was aiding the Northerners who were Muslim. Anyway, that was another incident which is described incorrectly in Hempstone's book. Hempstone said he went over to meet the president alone which was not the case. We went together and we went first down to the foreign ministry our best friend over there Bethwell Kipplegott and explained all of this. Kipplegott who was very astute said why don't we get in a car and go see the president? What Kipplegott was trying to do was to make sure that nobody else got involved in this so that we would be the ones to spring it on Moi before Moi had a chance to talk to some of his ministers who would be opposed to the idea. I'll never forget this. Sitting in Moi's office. Moi doesn't even want to look at Hempstone. Hempstone does the talking. I'm watching Hempstone. I'm watching Moi and then at the end of this presentation Moi looks at me and he says, "I always like to help the Americans." I was flabbergasted because I didn't think he would do it. I thought he would sort of laugh us out of court. So, Moi agreed to it. Once he agreed to it, there was no going back. He just called some of the ministers, some of the security people and we set up a little system to handle this. Within a

week or so we had 500 Libyan prisoners of war in Kenya at some youth camp upcountry all being processed to become refugees to the United States. Some months later we rented a big plane, a Swiss Air 747, to carry the whole kit and caboodle, early one morning, still dark, we wanted to do it in darkness and moved those folks out. Somebody needs to write this story up sometime. It's a fascinating story.

Q: They went where?

SOUTHWICK: They went to the States. Somebody said, well they'll all wind up lined up in Detroit, which has a lot of Libyans and other Muslims there, too. Whether some of them drifted back or not. Some of them wanted to get out of the youth camp in Kenya and go back and that was allowed to happen. With Kenya we had a love hate relationship. I remember Moi was raised in part by American missionaries so I don't want to call them fundamentalist, but more austere Protestant sects. He had this kind of emotional feeling about Americans.

Q: You've mentioned, maybe you've already done this, but you had this one sort of big blowup with Smith Hempstone?

SOUTHWICK: Only one, yes. We got wind of a big group of people, hundred of them, marching through the streets and they were heading toward the embassy. We knew that they were basically a pro-Hempstone group. This was during the lead up to the election. So, Hempstone calls me and he calls in a public affairs officer and says he wants to get a loudspeaker system set up in front of the embassy with a podium so he can address the crowd. I said I don't think this is a good idea. The station chief and the security officer were there. I think this crowd will probably have some bad apples in it who might be, who knows what they might do, they might want to pick you off. Hempstone said, "Don't get in an uproar. I'm about to become a hero." I looked at the station chief and he looked at me. I said, "Well, I think we need to really think about this." I got some help from the station chief. I think he passed away a couple of years ago in retirement, but he finally told Hempstone it was too dangerous. We did close the gates to the embassy, these metal bar kind of things, but we allowed Hempstone to go there and talk to some of the citizenry which he did, but it was a relatively controlled environment. He was angry with me then because he thought that this was his big chance.

Q: What about, I take it, when Clinton came in Hempstone left?

SOUTHWICK: That's right. There was an effort. He wanted to stay on. He felt as a lot of ambassadors do, indispensable. He brought things along in the relationship that things in some respects were going well. There was this democratization process underway. He had been there through the election which had its ups and downs and tensions, but which led to a Moi victory, but it was still by anybody's account a step forward for the country. He wanted to stay on and I could understand that in a way, but I felt in another way it might be good to have some fresh people there. It certainly wasn't my decision to make and he made some entreaties. I just stayed out of it suspecting that Hempstone, a political appointee, conservative Republican, ties to Jesse Helms, would have to go and so he did have to go by March of '93. That left me in charge.

Q: Did you feel during Smith Hempstone's time that he was bringing considerable political

attention to Kenya sort of from the political right in other words?

SOUTHWICK: It's just that he had a capacity to get headlines. His cable about if you like Beirut, you'll love Mogadishu. That was a classified cable, which was leaked. Hempstone was accused of leaking it. I don't think he did. It was leaked somewhere in Washington because it was too good to keep under covers. I got e-mails from all over the world. Boy that Hempstone's quite a guy. I'm glad somebody will tell it like it is. Darn right. Then he had done this refugee camp thing that had gotten in the press and then he had done the Ray Bonner article and there were others about him. There was even a Readers' Digest profile. Hempstone was not immune from the criticism. He's a great guy, but he's a little bit too much of an exhibitionist. I said, well, I still believe that he's got contacts with Kenya. He's still talked about in Kenya as somebody who was trying to do the right thing for the country to end all the corruption, make it more democratic, make it more humane. I told him when he was feeling down in the dumps, I said, to the extent that the American people know that there's an American ambassador in Africa, it's you. That was true. Nobody wrote profiles of our other ambassadors. They wrote profiles of Hempstone. He was known.

Q: Yes. When you arrived there and during the time you were DCM, I can recall at an earlier stage the problem with Nairobi was that everybody in the government, the American government wanted to put a representative there. You have to have a representative somewhere, let's put it in Nairobi rather than in a God forsaken, you can put it in Lagos or some place like that. I would imagine that the embassy was getting almost unmanageable.

SOUTHWICK: It wasn't. When I was there were there a little over 200 direct hire Americans and that had stayed pretty steady. Fifteen agencies. It was the largest single embassy in the African subcontinent. About half, maybe about a little more than half, were people there who had regional responsibilities; even the State Department had a regional finance office there. We had a regional medical officer there. We had regional technical support groups on communications and so forth. Then we had a regional AID mission, which was responsible, for I can't remember 17 or 18 countries. The regional quality of that had been established for some years basically because Nairobi was an attractive place. When I was in personnel as I may have mentioned in a previous interview, I regarded Nairobi as essentially the one European like post in Africa that I didn't have to worry about, no matter what the job was I'd have plenty of bidders for it. I'd just pick somebody and that was true. The luster was beginning to fade, but.

Q: Who was your new ambassador?

SOUTHWICK: Well, it was interesting. We were into the Clinton administration and I thought for sure as many did that there would be a political appointee ambassador. There had been a fair number of political appointees there. That's also an attractive place. So, I expected to be charged for a while. I was trying to get myself appointed ambassador somewhere. I was very happy to stay on in Kenya because I felt I could provide continuity and all that. My daughter was in school and it just seemed to be a good thing. My wife had finished her book. We were enjoying life and I really felt that I knew where all the skeletons were. I got a call one day that the State Department decided to put forward a career person and it was an African American officer in Brazil who I knew about a little bit, but I didn't know her well. She had never served in Africa,

was basically an East Asia hand, and at that time was our ambassador in the, not the Marshall Islands, but it's some other group of islands.

Q: Micronesia?

SOUTHWICK: Micronesia, yes. No one would admit it, but this was, the Foreign Service, an African American woman and it would be hard for the White House to say no to that. They were worried about getting another political appointee because they felt they had had too much trouble with Hempstone. I think it was Houdek who said, "You know, this probably won't work, but it will at least make him think twice and they will try to get somebody good." I said, "Bob, I think you're wrong. I think this will work like that." I had my strings with White House presidential systems and it did. She got the nod and she wanted the job. It was a big career move for her and another thing happened when she finally did get approved by the White House. Now, I give myself some credit. They called me up and said we want to get agrément (agreement) from the Kenyans on this right away. You know agrément sometimes takes weeks or even months. They said they needed it right away since the administration wanted to show that they were moving ahead on appointments. I said, "Okay, I will do what I can." I went over to see the president's secretary and I said, "Can you do this like today or tomorrow? Why don't we go see the president and I'll explain who this person is." She said, "Oh, I guess we owe you a favor or something like that. Look, I'll talk to the president and I'll see if we can get a decision." So, we got it in 24 hours. They said, "We're not so sure we want an African American here. We're happy with a career person. Career people are better than political appointees." Oh yes, but African Americans, they'd had a former admiral and then they'd had an academic and they didn't have a high regard for either one of them. That was pretty clear to me. The poison to this thing which has been written about, not much, about African Americans and their presumptions about their dealings with Africans and East Africa which has no connection with American slavery, zero with the American slavery phenomenon. All this authenticity stuff was a bunch of crap. Americans learning Swahili, African Americans learning Swahili, which first of all is a made up language, which is indigenous and again is a part of Africa, which has nothing to do with American slaves. They didn't like this sort of presumption which so many African Americans brought to the picture. So, anyway we got agrément in a day. Washington was happy about that. We had to prepare for her arrival.

Then I got word through the grapevine that she would like to bring her own DCM. By that time I had turned down an offer to be an ambassador which I decided I just didn't want. I wanted to wait it out another year. The family had made plans. I was sort of irritated at this because she didn't know me, but George Moose helped me out. George Moose wanted me to stay because we were bringing in somebody, an officer, but not somebody who knew Africa.

Q: So, how did it work out?

SOUTHWICK: Well, Rea Brazeal and I hadn't met before, but I felt we should give this our best shot and we met at the airport and the staff was very helpful. I was very helpful. We tried to do everything we could for her. We found frankly that she was a difficult person to deal with. She was very uneasy in the position. She was suspicious of the staff. She felt that we all supported Hempstone and didn't want her. She felt that Hempstone was too aggressive with the Africans. I

think that some of us suspected that she felt that Hempstone was both a racist and a misogynist. Hempstone personally had been quoted as saying things negative, but by sending an African American woman who had no qualifications for the job that the administration was not paying attention. It was obviously just sort of sociology at large. That didn't help matters either. It took a while, a few months, but Rea I think became very negative and suspicious of the staff there. Some of this extended to me and it really had a damaging effect on the embassy. She was trying to make nice with the Kenyans. She said she had a mandate to do that. I said, "There's nothing in the written record that we're supposed to make nice with the Kenyans just for the sake to make you nice." We always try to make nice with them, but we've got these problems with governance, corruption, democratization, human rights and those are the things that, we have a legacy here from Hempstone which whatever you think about Hempstone, that is how this embassy made its mark. She was quite willing to let all of that go. It was not a good situation.

Q: You left there I guess?

SOUTHWICK: I stayed on until about March or April of '94. It wasn't a whole year with her. It was more like seven or eight months. Our relationship, I think she recognized that it needed to be correct and I recognized that it needed to be correct and for the sake of the staff there, but it was very hard because basically, for a lot of us over time we just lost our respect for her. We felt that she was not maintaining our policies. Her personal relationships with some of the staff were very negative, oddly because a lot of them were women including African American women and we thought this should be good. It became very sour. The inspectors came out there early on and gave the place a very bad report and gave her personally a bad report, which was probably expunged from her record. All the inspectors have told me that within a day or two you know when a place is in trouble and what the problems are because people just unload and they really unloaded with them.

Q: Well, how did this affect you?

SOUTHWICK: I felt bad on two counts. One, I felt that the policy legacy of the embassy and Hempstone and so forth was all being drained away, deliberately just dumped overboard. Then I felt that an embassy that had been one of very high morale, very energetic, with a sense of purpose, that it all was just getting deflated. She wanted reporting that more closely reflected the Kenyan government's view of everything. She was very distrustful of the opposition. She hadn't served much in Africa and she really felt that embassies couldn't do much. That all these things took time and were best left to indigenous efforts. We could mainly do nothing.

Q: But you spent a hell of a lot of time in Africa. Were you being pumped or used as a tutor in Africa?

SOUTHWICK: For her?

Q: For her.

SOUTHWICK: I think she was a little bit distrustful of me because I felt we should be some activists as we had been before and we should be skeptical of the government. We should be

skeptical of the opposition. We knew some of them were low life, self-serving politicians, but we shouldn't pretend that the virtues are on one side rather than the other. I mean if Hempstone had made a mistake, he felt that there was more virtue than there really was on the part of the opposition. There were senior people who came through, people I knew, who talked to her about various kinds of things. She was a very insecure woman. I said, well, I have come to realize that, I did not understand it at first, but Rea was someone who sort of gained her power by being negative, by saying no and that was what she tried to do.

Q: What was her background?

SOUTHWICK: She was part of the Atlanta African American League. Both her father and mother had been administrators at Morehouse College and she had gotten into Harvard, but she didn't stay there. She was there for a short time and then went off to Spellman College. I don't know whether she did much in the way of graduate studies. I developed some grapevine on her. She had been economic minister counselor in Tokyo, which is a big job. I checked with somebody who had been assistant secretary in economic affairs during that period and I said how did she do? This person said, "Oh, she was a big flop." I said, "how does somebody who is a big flop get an ambassadorship, admittedly to Micronesia, World War III is not going to start there, and then come out to Kenya?" Then I kept checking with other people, this was a record, a very undistinguished record. So, the only explanation which is a sad one is gender and race trumping everything and that some people just get away with a lousy performance because of the other thing that is going for them and nobody is willing to take it on. People who knew her superficially like at parties and so forth, could not see this. It's not on exhibit. It's only when you were sort of working for her.

One time we'd had a tiff because in a staff meeting we'd had a slight different perspective. I can call it a disagreement, but she was very angry with that afterwards and I said, "well, we've got to have open discussion or we're not going to get everybody to tell us what's on their minds and we can analyze and get the truth of things." She didn't want that. She says she wanted the embassy to be like Mike Mansfield in Tokyo. I'll never forget this, I said, "what in your view made Mansfield a great ambassador?" She couldn't think of anything. She just knew he was a great ambassador because somebody told her he was a great ambassador because everybody said he was a great ambassador. What he did to make him a great ambassador she hadn't a clue.

Q: Did you get any feeling and we'll finish this off, but did you get any feeling about the Clinton administration, sort of when the new administration comes in sometimes you might say that almost uneasy or they don't know what they're doing?

SOUTHWICK: Yes and Clinton came in with more of a domestic agenda not being an expert on foreign affairs and he brought a lot of people back from the Carter administration. I thought Clinton then as now sort of a phenomenal individual and brilliant in engaging and presence. I found out when he came to Africa, though, he wanted to just use it as a kind of political payoff to the African American community. I honestly felt and I still feel that the Republicans are a little bit more realistic about this even though they don't pay a lot of attention to Africa either, but at least they're more honest about it whereas I think the Democrats were just playing domestic racial politics

CONSTANCE J. FREEMAN
Economic Officer
Nairobi (1991-1995)

Constance Freeman was born in Washington, DC in 1945 and graduated from American University and the University of Denver. She served with the Peace Corps in Brazzaville and Yaounde and with the Foreign Service in New Delhi and Nairobi. She was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1996.

Q: You went to Kenya when?

FREEMAN: I left the Economic Policy Staff after a two-year stint, and I then went over to the Economic Bureau, where I was deputy in the Food Policy office. I did Uruguay Round negotiations. I was the State Department's member on the DCC (Development Coordinating Committee), which allocated PL480 Title I aid. And I did that for 18 months.

The economic counselor position in Kenya opened up in early September of '90, and I heard about it right away. It was unexpected; the incumbent went home on compassionate leave. It's a job I had always wanted to do. As long as I had been in the State Department, I had looked longingly at the economic counselor position in Kenya, as much as anything else because, compared to where else I had served in Africa, that was my reward post, that was my bennie. And so I started to lobby for that. The Economic Bureau didn't want to let me go, but finally did, so that I actually went to Kenya in January of '91.

Q: And you were in Kenya from '91 to...

FREEMAN: Ninety-one to '95.

Q: What was the situation like in Kenya when you got there?

FREEMAN: It's symbolized by the fact that one of my colleagues said to me that they were afraid that I would get bored, that three years in Kenya would be too long. Kenya was originally one of the only two real capitalist countries in Africa. Kenya had been our friend. Kenya was developing well. The big argument was: Was Kenya really about ready to join the NICs [newly industrialized countries] of Asia, or was it too far behind? Could you apply those standards? But what we didn't realize was what terribly desperate shape the economy really was in. And it was falling rapidly. I got there in January, and it became really apparent by September.

Q: This is a question that's very pertinent today, because during the last year, the whole Asian economy seems to have collapsed. How is it that you can have people like yourself and your predecessor and bankers and everybody else come to a country and think things are going along all right, and then all of a sudden they discover they're not? Can you explain this?

FREEMAN: In my own case with Kenya, one of my excuses is that I was new, I was just getting to know the economy. I was very aware of the fact of the corruption, right from the beginning. The first major cable I wrote was on an airline scam, the Aniset deal, and that was in March. I was gone during that summer for a couple of months, back to the States on a set of family issues that took me away, and came back in September. We were alerted. I think everybody saw signs of an economy that was beginning to crumble and beginning to be in serious shape all along. Donors were getting more and more disaffected with Kenya, because the Kenyan government promised a lot and delivered very little. But donors were deceived for a long time, because they wrote wonderful program documents and project documents. They presented well. It's a very sophisticated place. Also, Kenyans themselves, particularly folks in the government, are very good at presenting a facade, and presenting to you what they would like you to believe, and having you think that's a full picture. They're very good at this, and it's only if you really dig that you get behind this facade.

The reason we were alerted was, a young AID economist did a series of computer runs on the statistics from the budget. The budget came out in June, but he was playing with this in late August and into September, to see what he could come up with. And what he came up with were some very serious indicators of a decline in the economy. [The] rate of capital accumulation was going down rapidly, for instance. That's the one that sticks in my mind.

So, shortly after I got back from the States, he came to me and he said, "I think this economy is in very serious trouble, and this is why." And he ran through the series of indicators with me. I agreed with him, so we went to the DCM, Michael Southwith, and said, "We think this economy is in much worse shape than anybody thought it was before." And he agreed. That was maybe the third week in October. And we agreed that something needed to be done.

The big donor meeting to allocate aid was coming up at the end of November, so we went around to talk to all of our fellow missions. The essence of our message was, "We're very uncomfortable with where this economy is going. Here are the economic indicators that show that it's going in a bad direction. There is clear evidence that the Kenyans have promised a lot and delivered little." A guy named David Gordon, who currently works for [the] ODC [Overseas Development Corporation], had written a brilliant political economy paper a year or so before, documenting the fact that the Kenyans promised a lot and delivered little, through the whole period of the '80s, and we used that as our intellectual backing. With the exception of the British, almost all the other key donor missions, not the Bank or the Fund, but bilateral missions, agreed with us.

Gary, the young AID economist, was convinced that if we suspended program assistance, (cash assistance for budget support, not project assistance - he didn't want to interrupt projects - but the budget support, which they had already programmed as going into their budget), if you suspended that \$350 million, you'd get attention fast. And within four months or so, the Kenyan government might come around and begin to honor their promises. And that is what the delegations went to the donor meeting with.

The whole campaign that we orchestrated from the embassy was, locally, with our fellow diplomatic missions [and elsewhere], with Washington, asking them to intervene with diplomatic

missions, with other governments in Europe through the capital-to-capital access, through a whole series of cables that documented this, and got all the delegations on board. But we still did not think that we would pull it off at that particular meeting. And so, when it came through, we were amazed and delighted.

What happened was, they suspended [the] \$350 million of program assistance. In the public, up-front, in the meeting room, the reason for this was lack of adherence to promised economic reform, and the way they'd get the money back was to start to do that. In the corridors and in the halls, all of the discussion was political, so that today people say that the aid suspension was done to try to force the government to come to terms with multi-party democracy. In fact, that's not true. That was in the corridors. It could not have been true, because consulting economic groups chaired by the World Bank traditionally have not been allowed to deal with political issues.

The Kenyan government's reaction to this, in the beginning of December, was two-fold. One, they arrested two of the worst of the culprits, in terms of corruption and also political suspicion, Miwadenougi, and put them in jail, but only for two weeks, and didn't charge them. Two, they repealed 2A, the section of the constitution that called for a one-party state, declared a multiparty state, and then underwent a transition that moved up to the elections, which took place in December of '92.

Unfortunately, the economic impact was to increase the economic disintegration throughout the year, when the campaigning was done for multiparty elections, because two major things happened. One, the level of degree of graft and corruption increased tremendously. It was the time of the Goldenberg scandal. Two, in connection with that, a great deal of money was created to finance those elections, both through shipping in- bills and by creating money through the banking system. So that, by the January after the elections, the economy of Kenya was in much worse shape than it had been the year before.

Q: Had this been anticipated?. You know, you make an economic decision and it has repercussions in the political. And you say the corridor talk was political. Was this a battle that was going on in our embassy, too, political versus economic?

FREEMAN: Yes. Yes, it was. I think it's always fought out to some extent, which comes first, chicken or egg, democracy or economic development and reform. It was not fought out with the passion it might have been, because the economic counselor and the political counselors got along with each other. I stayed out of the political realm virtually entirely. I used to say, I don't do politics or windows. One of the reasons I stayed out of it was because there was such a battle going on between State and AID about who was going to do the democracy account (AID was paying for it, but State felt that the political sections in State should take the lead because they have the training, etc.), that I didn't want to get involved in that. And I had my hands full on the economic front.

I also had serious concerns and questions about this multi-party democracy and democratization portfolio per se, because I could never figure out what kind of democracy we were trying to export. Was it Minnesota? Was it Tammany Hall? What model of the U.S.? Was it Texas? Was

it California? I thought that it was a little bit disingenuous to try to insist that other countries undertake a theoretical model that we couldn't identify for them in our own country. But the only way to deal with that, since it was *the* thing of the period, was to stay out of it. And so I stayed out of it pretty much. But I had my hands full on the economic front, and there were clear indications that that was serious.

The ambassador, Smith Hempstone, is a folk hero in Kenya for representing multi-party democracy and democratization and [having an] opposition, etc. And he was really beaten upon by the government [whose government, U.S. or Kenya?], and that was the big story going on in 1992. He was not interested in economics, and if one reads his book that was recently published, *Rogue Ambassador*, he hardly mentions economics in the whole book. So this whole economic initiative that we had undertaken, and continued to follow very carefully and built the groundwork for in '92, was completely ignored by the political types.

During the whole time I was in Kenya, starting probably right after the aid suspension, I wrote a cable every two weeks reporting on what had happened vis-à-vis the aid suspension, our economic initiative, reform, corruption, etc. It was pretty much an analytical cable, and it became widely read throughout the bureaucracy, to the point where I finally produced it [in] unclassified [form], because it was too difficult for people to use otherwise. It's a wonderful record of all the vicissitudes of that process as we went through it. It was hard to write, because it was very analytical, and the discipline of [doing it] every two weeks sometimes really got me down. But I'm really glad that I did it.

I was very involved in Kenya in the move toward economic reform, very deeply involved with journalists and others who were tracking down corruption. I felt that I was a part of that process. So I was both reporting on it, to the embassy and to Washington, and influencing decisions that were made in the government and by people who were influencing the government. [Again, whose government?] And it was very exciting.

Right after the elections, the economy collapsed further. The IMF could not renew its grant. And by March, Moi told the IMF and the World Bank to leave. He didn't want them anymore. He didn't want them meddling in his business. So between March and April, there was a lot of shuttle diplomacy that was going on back and forth, to try to convince him that was a bad plan. Eventually, Kim Jaycox, who was vice president of the World Bank for Africa, came and conferred with Moi. And what they agreed to was to change the terms of the suspension just enough so that if Kenya undertook some reforms, they would get some money. The Kenyans had been objecting that they were supposed to go 100 percent before they got a cent back. They also had spent a great deal of time blaming the suspension for everything that went wrong in the country. So they gave it a lot more weight than it in fact had. \$350 million is not that much money in a country that size. So that broke the gridlock. The World Bank was able to make its first [loan since] suspension. And Mdadade, who's currently the finance minister, began to be able to move toward reform. They started to go after Goldenberg, which was the big corruption case, and Exchange Bank. And by August, they had a new governor of the Central Bank, Cheshirum, who is very serious.

Q: This was August of...

FREEMAN: August of '93. I went on home leave in August and September of '93, and by the time I got back, the attitude of the World Bank and the IMF people was totally different from when I left. They were optimistic. They felt that these guys, through the finance minister and the governor of the central bank, were serious about what they were doing, [and] maybe had some clout. We were all afraid that their heads would be chopped off if we favored them too much, because the government would react against them, but we were on the road to reform.

In fact, in an 18-month to two-year period, Kenya opened up its exchange rate so it was freely floating, took off price controls, let interest rates float, took off a number of agricultural controls, and in essence undertook all of the most basic economic policy reforms that have to be undertaken to open up an economy.

What Kenya did not do was get a real handle on corruption. That is true today, and that is Moi's issue of today. It's very difficult to do, because the big cases of corruption all lead right to the circle around the president. So he will cut off the hands of those who feed him, if he does that.

Q: Were you under any constraints about reporting about Moi and his ties to these people?

FREEMAN: No. Not particularly at all. I reported what I knew and what I saw, what I heard. The only constraint I had [occurred], in the end, when I was trying to make the cable unclassified. But then we'd do it in another way. It was very open in the press. When I arrived in Kenya in '91, nobody said Moi's name out loud, and the press was really restricted. By '93, it had opened up. The kinds of things the magazine, *The Economic Review*, was able to say, for instance, were truly amazing. Now they were very careful. Moi was still shutting down newspapers and confiscating issues, and some presses were raided, so that they had to shut down. But by and large, his government was moving against those publications who would have been in court in the U.S. for slander, and they were very egregious. But if you carefully documented it, or you made sure, as Peter Waretere, who edited *The Economic Review*, did, that if you didn't have all your facts or you hadn't verified them all, you couched what you were saying [carefully], it went through. And so it was a very active and a very vocal environment by the time I left in '95.

Q: When you left in '95, in your opinion, whither Kenya, economically?

FREEMAN: I was quite optimistic, as I am still, because basic fundamental economic policy reforms had been undertaken.

The problem was that the investment response had not been nearly as fast as we had hoped it would be. That is the carrot: "You undertake these reforms, and foreign investors will come in. You need capital, and therefore this is what you have to do." But they weren't coming. And the reasons they weren't coming [included] corruption, an inefficient court system, and just fear, fear of getting embroiled in this. They were coming into the stock market, because you could run from the stock market fast if you had to. But the concrete, real, direct investment, to build factories or invest in things, was not being done. I was more optimistic then than I am now about infrastructure, because the last few years have been very hard on the infrastructure, and nothing

really has happened to rebuild it.

The encouraging thing is, even given the very chaotic political year that Kenya has just been through in '97, ending with chaotic elections and Moi back in office, they never backtracked on the fundamental reforms that they undertook. They've still got a freely floating currency, they have free interest rates, they don't have controlled prices anymore, etc. But they've hit a plateau. It can't go any further, in terms of reforming and developing the economy, unless they grapple with corruption.

Q: As far as investment, was public security a problem, too?

FREEMAN: Yes.

Q: One thinks of Kenya as not a place you want to go to, because there's a lot of thievery and attacks.

FREEMAN: Just in Nairobi. Just like South Africa, where it's in Jo-burg. There are isolated cases in game parks and stuff, but that seems to me to be luck of the draw, kind of normal. There were riots on the coast, but the riots were definitely not targeted on tourists. The only couple of tourists who got involved got involved by inopportunity. That was Kenyan-on-Kenyan. So I think that companies consider the crime situation to be a deterrent, but it's way down the list of the things they consider. If there's money to be made, and the conditions are ripe for that, they'll work their way around the crime issue. And [you] can. I lived there for five years, and I had a couple of incidents, but nothing that was too serious. So crime is a problem, but it isn't top of the list. It is top of the list if you get into any kind of dispute and you don't have any fair protection from the courts or the legal system. You can be robbed blind by the police, which gets into crime, too. You are asked to make very significant, far-reaching bribes. And you can't do that because of the American Corrupt Practices Act. You fear that you're going to lose everything from the exchange rate dropping. Basically, it's an insecure country because of corruption.

Then there's infrastructure. The infrastructure has collapsed in on itself. Until something is done about that, Kenya is infinitely less attractive for investment purposes.

PRUDENCE BUSHNELL
Ambassador
Kenya (1996-1999)

Ambassador Bushnell was born in Washington, DC into a Foreign Service family. She was raised in Washington and at Foreign Service posts abroad and received degrees from Russell Sage College and the University of Maryland. After working as a clerk at Embassies Teheran and Rabat, she became a Foreign Service Officer in 1981 and subsequently served in several posts before serving as Ambassador to Kenya 1996 – 1999. There she experienced the bombing of the Embassy by al Qaeda. In 1999 she was named Ambassador to Guatemala, where she served until

2002. During her career, the Ambassador served in several senior positions in the Department in Washington. Ambassador Bushnell was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

Q: So, we'll now talk about your time in Kenya which was from when to when?

BUSHNELL: 1996 to 1999.

Q: How did this appointment come about?

BUSHNELL: I had completed three years as Deputy Assistant Secretary in African Affairs and was known to have handled some tough portfolios. I had a good chance at either Kenya or Zambia and at the very last minute I decided to go for Kenya.

Q: Well, I'm surprised that Kenya wasn't more of a political plum. .

BUSHNELL: You never know what makes a country a political favorite. Tanzania, for example, has fairly consistently gone to political, non-career people. Why high contributing friends of the President would vie for Tanzania is beyond me. For all of its beauty, Kenya was politically tough and held in poor esteem in the USG.

Q: Talk about President Moi and his rule and how we viewed it. What was the problem?

BUSHNELL: Daniel Arap Moi was Vice President under Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta. When Kenyatta died in office, Moi stepped in and never stepped down. He continued to rule through a coalition of small tribes.

Q: Was he Kikuyu or Masai?

BUSHNELL: Neither. Kenyatta was Kikuyu. Moi came from the Kalenjin tribe and, with a coalition of other small ethnic groups held power through corruption, force and divisiveness. He also played the U.S. pretty shrewdly during the Cold War. In return for his support, we turned a blind eye to how he ruled domestically. When the Cold War ended, we began to insist on democratic elections.

In order to "stay at the table," which is how Kenyans referred to presidential politics, Moi and company held fraudulent elections in '92. We showed our disapproval by withdrawing aid and giving Moi the cold shoulder. By the time I arrived in '96, we were down to about 19 million dollars in bilateral assistance directed through non-governmental organizations. Nothing went to the Moi government. Among donor groups, we were pretty small potatoes. The Japanese, the Brits and the Germans were giving much more money than we were.

Q: Was there a reason why they were giving more or were they getting something for the money they were putting in?

BUSHNELL: I didn't think so. I asked about corruption during my rounds of courtesy calls on

other ambassadors and initial meetings with Kenyans. What bothered Kenyans most was the effect of corruption on schooling, which they valued highly and the abominable condition of roads. Stolen road taxes meant greater difficulty getting goods to market. Among diplomatic colleagues, I found huge frustration both with the level of corruption and Moi's reaction should anything be said about it. It usually entailed public blasts about interfering in domestic affairs.

The game was pretty simple: the Moi government would steal assistance money, then insult us if we said anything. People would suffer, the government would go to more donors to get more money which they could steal, etc. I decided to try to change the dynamics by taking on the game. I was lucky that our embassy had a large and experienced Country Team, so there was plenty of experience, support and enthusiasm for confronting corruption.

When I told my German counterpart of our intentions, he peered down at me and said, "Oh Pru, don't be naïve!" This was hardly the first time I had been patronized for addressing an issue others – men especially – had put in the category of "too hard."

I began talking about corruption in my speeches, something Kenyan people could not do with impunity. Pretty soon things were showing up in media and more and more people, including my diplomatic colleagues, began to chime in.

Q: What was that ambassador referring to about being naïve? In other words, why were they continuing to put money in to it?

BUSHNELL: It was an attitude I had seen before – "this is Africa; what can you do?"

Q: Were the other countries, or were we getting anything out of it?

BUSHNELL: Most of the donors were involved in Kenya for humanitarian and developmental purposes. The U.S. government also wanted continuing military access to Kenyan airports and ports. I suspect Moi had similar quid pro quo agreements with other countries.

Q: Pru, this is the 24th of August, 2005. Let's talk a bit about Moi. Did you go in to see him? Was he a person you could see or not?

BUSHNELL: Initially, he wouldn't see me. I was the second consecutive woman ambassador, and Moi was not at all pleased to have another female.

Q: Elinor Counselor had been there before that too.

BUSHNELL: Elinor Constable and then Smith Hempstone, who caused an enormous great controversy by going head-to-head with Moi, then Aurelia Brazil and then me. Moi was convinced that the U.S. Government was intentionally sending him women as a message that he was just not good enough to merit a white male. Nor, evidently did he like what he heard about my promotion of human rights. After presenting credentials, I had a hard time getting him to see me. Once I did, we crafted an interesting and rather strange relationship.

It started when I invited him to the Residence for breakfast one day. That one-on-one started a precedent which led to some very heated discussions. Respectful but blunt.

He would fly into tantrums sometimes, or just get mad and cranky. I'd bring him up straight by asking point blank, "Why are you yelling at me?" Once I stopped an argument in mid stream and asked if he enjoyed fighting with me. "Yes," he responded, "I am a democrat." I think he rather enjoyed our interchanges. For a time, some members of his cabinet would intercept me before entering a meeting requesting that I bring up a subject to get a decision of their behalf.

For his part, he delivered on items he knew were important to us. I was on a short fuse for a renewed access agreement to Kenya's ports and airports and he handed it over.

Q: Did you feel, that power had gone to his head? Did he see himself aging gracefully in the job to keep things calm. How did you see him at that point?

BUSHNELL: By the time I got there he had been in power for 20-some years, far too long for anybody. He was in his '70s, in good health physically and mentally, still very shrewd and fairly competent. Sometimes he'd ramble, but then don't we all? I think he is corrupt to his soul and had found a way to bring his actions into harmony with his evangelical religion. I think he really believed that he was beloved by his people, clueless that the opposite was true because he surrounded himself with sycophants. Domestically, he was shrewd and ruthless; around the region, Moi behaved as statesman. He used this to his advantage to keep us in his debt. We would ask him to pull together the Somalia warlords, and he would do it. He was sympathetic to our efforts to bring peace to Sudan and, at our request, would talk to his crony, Mobutu, president of Zaire. Like a lot of presidents, Moi wanted to be known in history as the elder statesman and a regional peacemaker.

Q: Again I keep coming back, in my interviews there's a theme that if somebody is going to take an initiative it often seems to be the Americans.

BUSHNELL: Right, which means that as U.S. ambassadors we need to be fairly circumspect. When the Country Team and I decided to take on the issue of corruption, we had to be clever about it. The last thing other diplomats want is direction from the United States ambassador or the United States embassy, which was why in Nairobi we worked through the World Bank director to create an Economic Governance Group of donor countries.

The Bank was going to provide around one hundred million dollars in an energy sector loan. Given the government's proclivity to steal, to say nothing of their lousy completion rate – something like three percent – my colleagues in Washington and I decided to do something. I knew the U.S. delegate to the World Bank. With other colleagues, we decided she would vote "no" on the energy loan. That got a lot of attention. Both the World Bank and other governments took notice that we were serious about corruption.

Q: Didn't the Kenyans know that the fine hand of Pru Bushnell was involved in this?

BUSHNELL: Of course, but we were all very polite. The proposal put to the Kenyans was to

direct the energy sector loan through a private sector bank that would ensure transparency.

A social friend of mine arranged a meeting with Moi on a Sunday afternoon at his private residence – very hush-hush – to discuss this. I was struck by how sterile and lonely the house appeared. He said to me, “If I agree to this it’s going to set a precedent, and I’m worried. I said, “You’re right, it will and I’d be worried about it too if I were you, because it means doing business differently.” He said, “I don’t want to do business differently.” And I said, “Then you’re not going to get the money. There you are Mr. President, you need to choose. I know life is unfair and this doesn’t seem good and right, but you need to understand our perspective and you have a choice to make. That’s what leaders do, they make difficult decisions.” He called me after I got home, about an hour later and said, “I’ve decided to do it.” And I said, “Good for you Mr. President, you’ve made the right choice.” I felt like a life coach.

Q: Were you around long enough to see how this worked?

BUSHNELL: It worked pretty well at least on that project. Not to say that corruption ended. We came up against other issues, including the International Monetary Fund’s readiness to put Kenya on a “shadow program” which would have helped Kenya gain economic credibility they did not deserve. The Economic Governance Group of ambassadors representing donor countries was in agreement to halt assistance until the government improved its efforts to combat corruption, which had been done in the past. This would provoke the Kenyan government to say, “We promise we will not steal again. Now, where’s the money?” Some changes would be made, the spigot would be turned back on and the stealing would start again. The experience left me with very strong opinions about reforms required of the Bretton Woods institutions, as well as bilateral assistance.

Q: Were you seeing anything going beyond the three percent completion of projects?

BUSHNELL: No. Politicians would open projects with great fan fare, then move on to the next. One of public arguments we made over our decision to suspend assistance was the amount of money – hundreds of millions of dollars – in the pipeline. We made the point that the government should effectively use what it had first.

You know, it’s very easy to be holier than thou over the issue of corruption in African and other developing countries. But, when you think of it, a lot of these countries, certainly Kenya, were founded in corruption brought by colonial powers that came for the sole purpose of extracting wealth or exploiting the land and its people. They thought nothing of stealing land, enriching themselves, and degrading local communities. Some European powers were worse than others, but all of them showed to one extent or another their so-called civilizing mission meant “we win, you lose.” No wonder emerging African leaders came in with the attitude “it’s our turn.” Outsiders need to be careful of the sanctimony.

Another aspect of what we saw as corruption was based on cultural differences and obligations.. Like many Africans, Kenyans have a very strong sense of community, as great as our sense of individualism. Under their custom of “harambe,” an entire community would pool money to send one child to school or university. That’s an investment and when one child makes good, that

he or she is expected to give a return on the investment, right?

Q: Yeah.

BUSHNELL: So, when someone goes into government or gets another kind of job, the community or extended family, has a sense of entitlement. That puts enormous pressure on the individual to share the good fortune.

Q: And the benefit is, public job, public funds being directed towards that particular community?

BUSHNELL: Right, or money or jobs. It goes on all the time in the States via earmarks and lobbyists.

Q: You're also breaking some American rice bowls when you cut off money and cut off projects. Did you run across people saying, you know, if you do this I don't have a job anymore, that sort of thing?

BUSHNELL: Not on the U.S. side.

Q: So this wasn't a problem?

BUSHNELL: No. What was a problem was the moral conundrum of punishing people for having rotten leadership. We talked about this very seriously in the Economic Governments Group -- what would the consequences of cutting assistance be on the people. We concluded that the corruption was so bad that it was worth doing.

Q: In other words, it wasn't delivering that much to the people who should benefit by it?

BUSHNELL: Exactly, right.

Q: We talked about corruption. What about human rights? What was happening to human rights? Think of women's rights, minority rights. What was happening in that area?

BUSHNELL: Moi played ethnic groups off against one another, particularly in the Rift Valley which saw periodic killings. On at least one occasion I went there with Jesse Jackson, who was very popular in Kenya. He publicly called for President Moi to visit and call a halt to ethnic clashes. "Where is President Moi? President Moi, where are you and why aren't you here with your people making peace," Rev. Jackson was quoted as saying. The next day, a disgruntled Moi came to the Residence for breakfast. Jesse had the three of us hold hands as he prayed to the Lord to give guidance and wisdom to his servant, Daniel Arap Moi, to go and make peace in the Rift Valley. What a scene. And it worked – Moi went to the Rift Valley a couple of days later.

Part of what I loved about being ambassador was fostering relationships. From what one reads, you think diplomatic conversations are rather dry. In fact, there is a huge amount of strategy and theatrics involved.

Q: What about, one of the human rights concerns or women's rights, particularly in Africa has got very much tied to aids and tribal practices. You know, young virgins who are untainted by aids. I mean, all those things going, was that going through in Kenya?

BUSHNELL: At the time, the Kenyan government and religious leaders refused to acknowledge the problem of HIV/AIDS. I was active in trying to make it more public. Kenyan society, like many African societies, is very conservative. Talking about sex is taboo.

I have to say, though, I was even more active about women's rights. Too many young girls were taken out of school at 10 or 11, married off and treated like chattel.

Q: Was this at the tribal level? Was this where the problem was or was it in the city where people were?

BUSHNELL: Oh, it was throughout. There was an acknowledgement that African women did most of the work. The men said, "That's the way it should be." So, I spent a lot of time talking to women and visiting with women. USAID had a lot of projects that offered the opportunity to talk about women's political rights, girls' education, women's health, and so forth. We used the presidential elections of 1997 to do a lot of training for women.

The U.S. embassy was instrumental in creating a democracy group through which different embassies pooled their money. It was a kick to see ambassadors from newly independent countries of the former Soviet Union ask to be included. Along with the "usual suspects," we had Poland, Hungary, Romania...I can't even remember them all. Anyway, we ended up funding of the training of 28,000 Kenyan election observers, many of them women. The staffs from these embassies served as the international election observers. It was a huge endeavor and one in which I was very, very proud, and I'm very sad that it hasn't been done since. That really irks me.

Q: Yeah, because once you do it too, you will have a cadre.

BUSHNELL: Exactly. What we wanted was local civil participation so that the electorate gets a sense of ownership. It was a sign of maturity that you don't get through watching an outside observers.

At any rate, in the run-up to the elections, AID was involved in training women trainers to advise others of their rights and to get them to vote. What I found in Kenya, which I never found in Guatemala, was a feistiness and a readiness among many rural women to act once they found out they had certain rights. "You mean it's against the law for my husband to beat me? Where is the policeman??" or, "You mean I can inherit? Where's a lawyer? I found that these were very strong women, and it was wonderful to see them act. It was such a gift to be able to spend time with them.

Q: Were they able to make themselves felt while you were there?

BUSHNELL: Well, yes and no. There were some women political candidates who ran for office.

Most of them lost. But, after the elections, they got together, all the women candidates, win or lose, to talk about their experiences, share the best practices and to provide the kind of moral support that they needed to go back to do it again.

Q: I'm thinking and I may even have the wrong country, but recently there have been reports about women visited in Kenya who were not, when their husbands died was not going to get back and thrown back. I mean, they're forming their own little community.

BUSHNELL: Yes, you read that article about the woman who created a women's village.

Q: Could you explain what that was?

BUSHNELL: Evidently up in the northern part of Kenya a woman was rejected by her husband's family or her husband because she had been raped. She was a strong enough person to say, "To hell with you" and went off to live separately and create her own village. More and more women who were abused by their husbands or their families began to join her. Men started up a male village nearby and would come and jeer and give them a hard time, but these women went on with their lives. They created a campground for tourists and also a cultural center. It's been a pretty big success. At the end of the article it said that the men had tried to do the same thing, but it was not a success.

Q: The men couldn't do it.

BUSHNELL: Couldn't do it, because the women weren't there to do it. Kenyan women from a lot of these ethnic groups are responsible for raising the children, they're responsible for raising the crops, they're responsible for the education of their children and they're responsible for the household. So, what's left? A lot of the women are very self sufficient.

Q: What about on the educational side; were you seeing any progress? Were we trying to do anything to improve the educational system?

BUSHNELL: The Kenyans recognized at independence how badly they needed education and they took it seriously. They are very proud of their high literacy rate and infuriated when the government disbanded free primary education and when they saw corruption worm its way into the educational system. The teachers and principals in some places were demanding bribes to show up or to pass a student or to not beat students.

Q: Was Peace Corps in Kenya involved in education?

BUSHNELL: We had lots of Peace Corps Volunteers working on economic development: micro-enterprise work, environment and ecological projects, and small businesses. Gave me great opportunities to travel.

Q: Talking about the Peace Corps as one of the agencies at post, I use to laugh when I'd look at the growth of federal agencies at any embassy. You must have had many.

BUSHNELL: We had 17, including the Library of Congress, a unit of Walter Reed Hospital, Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Departments of Commerce and Agriculture, and all of the usual traditional agencies.

Q: These were all basically regional offices?

BUSHNELL: A lot of them were regional, right.

Q: This is where they were. Did you find the care and feeding of them a problem?

BUSHNELL: It was difficult in that Nairobi had a very high rate of crime, and staying in touch with the community was important. It was harder to do so when this employee is away for great periods. It can also be very lonely for spouses whose husbands or wives are away from post a lot. They need to make a much greater effort to get the sense of belonging to the community.

Q: How did this play out? When you take people who were coming with no exposure to the overseas experience before, it must have been difficult. How did you work with that?

BUSHNELL: Nairobi was known as a low morale post. Supposedly, Nairobi always had low morale. I don't buy it and I put a great deal of stress on community. One of the only requirements I levied on employees was mandatory orientation on arrival, spouses, strongly encouraged. The day would start in my office so that people could get a sense of what an ambassador's office looks like, and I emphasized at that time the importance of community. I reinforced my appreciation for community involvement during courtesy calls. My husband, Dick, and I made sure that we had a strong sponsorship program for new arrivals and we held a number of community activities at the Residence. We also opened the Residence tennis court and swimming pool to the community. The biggest problem was what to do with teens. So, somebody created an American Club to bring people together and give teenagers a place to go.

It helped that Nairobi had a very good international school, a game park close to the city, lots of good restaurants, shopping centers, things to do and an incredibly beautiful country complete with beaches and mountains. People's experience in Nairobi depended a great deal on where they had served before. AID and State people who had been all over Africa thought this was great. People who had never been to the third world thought it was awful. As ambassador, I considered it my job to do my best to create an environment in which people could be happy. The rest was up to them.

Q: What sort of volunteer things did you have going there for Americans to get involved in?

BUSHNELL: We had a very active International Women's Club, an active Community Liaison Office, and lots of interesting opportunities to help locally. There was an animal orphanage, a National Museum and corresponding Friends of the Museum. There was a theater group, there was a Mason group, there were book clubs, there were garden clubs, a huge international diplomatic community and lots of ex-pats.

Q: What about the actual violence? How did one deal with this?

BUSHNELL: We put a huge emphasis on security and had weekly radio checks. Our regional security people went to great lengths to advise people how to stay safe without terrifying them. Nevertheless, we had terrible things happen: a mother and child hijacked at a school bus stop; a school teacher killed in a car-jacking; muggings around the embassy, the whole lot. Unfortunately, you can't keep bad things from happening to people, but you do your best.

Q: How about Mombasa? How did that work out for you? Was this an interesting reporting spot? Or was there not much point in political reporting?

BUSHNELL: We did a lot of political reporting. Mombasa was the port city with a U.S. Consulate until we closed it in the early 90s. There was an active business community and a huge Muslim population. Also, lots of American missionaries. I made a point of going there every three or four months. Thanks to our Muslim political counselor, we had a strong outreach to Kenyan Muslims, so I had many reasons to visit.

Q: What about the tourism business? That must have brought you an awful lot of high rollers from the American scene?

BUSHNELL: Not very many Americans go to Kenya. Many thousands of Europeans go to Kenya, but not very many Americans go. It's too far away. American tourists who did come were usually going on safaris, which were wonderful but very expensive. So, we tended to get the older American who had enough money. They spent a minimum amount of time in Nairobi.

Q: Did you get involved, speaking of safaris, in protection of animals or was Kenya doing a pretty good job of that?

BUSHNELL: Kenya forbade the hunting of wild animals and was a strong party to the treaty that banned the sale of ivory. The U.S. supported their conservation and wildlife efforts with AID funding and Dick and I became good friends with the Director of the Kenya Wildlife Service and his wife. We had many wonderful outings, both official and unofficial.

Q: How did you find, the social side, reaching out to the Kenyan society?

BUSHNELL: Kenyans are nice people and, as I said, Nairobi had a large diplomatic community. That said, it is hard for an ambassador to have social friends to whom you divulge what you are really thinking. We had acquaintances. One of the people I was closest to was the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a woman who had gotten her PhD. at Stanford. She was a Moi insider and as frank as I. Sally and I did a lot of good work together maintaining good relations between our country notwithstanding the attitudes and behaviors that sometimes leaked out from both our governments.

Q: This is where it is probably much more than with a man ambassador, I mean there is this sort of getting together of females and figuring out what to do about these peculiar creatures, politicians and all this.

BUSHNELL: First of all, there are so few women who are in senior-level positions, that we tend to either bond or not at all. I think there is a sense of cooperation, and there certainly was with Sally.

Q: What about the political life there? Was there much political life?

There was an enormous amount of political activity. Kenya was known as an island of tranquility in a turbulent region and Nairobi was very livable. So all kinds of people made their way there -- Rwandan Tutsis who had fled the genocide in '94 and Hutus who came after they lost the war. Somali war loads, Sudanese leaders like John Garang, members of The Lord's Resistance Army from Uganda. Large refugee populations lived on the borders of Sudan and Somalia and some of them made it into Nairobi.

Plus, I think I mentioned that Moi was involved in a number of regional issues, including Great Lakes, Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda. Our embassy provided offices to our Ambassador to Sudan, since we had closed the embassy there. We also did the political analysis for southern Somalia, as well as the reporting about the UN agencies. So, we were very busy.

Q: Okay. Well, Prudence this is probably a good place to stop. Is there anything we should cover before we cover, come to the rather climatic events of getting yourself blown up?

Today is the 30th of August, 2005. Shall we talk now about the security situation as you came as ambassador? We're talking about in the mid 1990s. What sort of directions as ambassador did you get vis a via security and also when you went to Kenya. How did you see the situation?

BUSHNELL: Well, remember that in the '90s, President Clinton felt compelled to give the American people their peace dividend, while Congress thought that now that the Cold War was over there was no need for any significant funding of intelligence, foreign affairs or diplomacy. There were discussions about whether we needed embassies not that we had 24-hour news casts, e-mail, etc.

Q: When it's done by faxes and e-mail, yeah.

BUSHNELL: Right. You may remember Newt Gingrich and the Congress closed the federal government a couple of times. Agencies were starved of funding across the board. Needless to say, there was no money for security. Funding provided in the aftermath of the bombing of our embassy in Beirut in the '80s -- that created new building standards for embassies and brought in greater numbers of diplomatic security officers -- dried up.

As an answer to lack of funding, State Department stopped talking about need. For example, when we had inadequate staff to fill positions, State eliminated the positions, so we no longer can talk about the need. If there's no money for security, then let's not talk about security needs. The fact of increasing concern at the embassy about crime and violence was irrelevant in Washington. So was the condition of our building.

The first day I walked into the Chancery I knew something had to be done. Here was an ugly,

brown, square box of the concrete located on one of the busiest street corners in Nairobi. We were situated across the street from the train station. Street preachers, homeless children, muggers, hacks and thousands of pedestrians came by our threshold every day. The security offset prescribed by the Inman Report in the aftermath of the truck bombing of our embassy in Beirut in the '80s, was non-existent. Three steps from the sidewalk and you were in the embassy. In the back we shared a small parking lot with the Cooperative Bank building which was a 21-story building. We may have had about 20 feet of offset from the rear parking lot, but no more. We had an underground parking lot, which was inadequate, and we were squatting on some space in the front, but that was it.

I had learned before I got to Nairobi that the Foreign Buildings Operation, now Overseas Building Operations, was planning to a \$4-7 million renovation of this building that was unsafe and much too small for us. Having spent three years in African Affairs dealing with an assortment of disasters, I thought it was dumb to invest more capital in a building that would never be considered safe. There just was no way to protect the building. I suggested that FBO sell the building and pool the proceeds with the money proposed for the renovations to buy a new site. Washington's response was somewhere between "are you nuts?!" and get out of the way, the renovation train has already left the station."

Q: Did your security office or the apparatus in charge of that back in Washington pay any attention to the problem?

BUSHNELL: Our security officer, for whom I had a great deal of respect, understood the issue, as did the entire Country Team.

Q: Now, just to get a little feel for this, had any incidents happened, like the Khobar towers, or was that later?

BUSHNELL: The terrorist attack on Khobar Towers had already occurred but terrorism was virtually unknown in Kenya.

Q: Again, we're setting the stage. Did Osama Bin Laden or al Qaeda or the Taliban or anything like that cross your radar much?

BUSHNELL: I think I mentioned before that Nairobi was a favorite spot for a number of characters and groups. As ambassador I was told there was also an al Qaeda cell in Nairobi and that interested the intel community in Washington. Bin Laden at the time was considered a terrorist financier, not an activist, at least so far as I was told. I had been told in Washington that we wanted to disrupt his activities, which seemed pretty sensible and benign to me. I was not told that a special unit had been established to watch bin Laden's activities, nor that there was a secret indictment against him because of his hand in shooting down the black hawk helicopter. I was aware that a "walk in" had warned us in December 1997 that the embassy may be bombed but I was assured that the guy had done the same thing a number of times to other embassies in Africa and that he was considered "a flake."

Q: Well then, go ahead, you were having these bureaucratic battles.

BUSHNELL: Right, with the Overseas Building Operations. But my energies were focused on Kenya. As I said, we were an active embassy and as Kenya moved toward presidential elections in 1997, the political tension and violence increased. Around the corner from us stood a technical college, and the closer we got to elections in '97, the greater activity. I could stand at my office window and watch students running away from tear-gas hurling police who were being followed by the press. When the tear gas came wafting into our building I would go down to the Consular Section to do a sniff test. Once, I actually had somebody count the number of gas masks.

My concern was not just employees and visitors. Like most embassies, we had a morale store, cafeteria and medical unit that brought families to us. We became active at issuing warnings about student demonstrations and other reasons to stay out of the area of the chancery.

In 1997, I was told that we were under what was deemed to be a credible threat from a Somali quasi-humanitarian group called al-Haramain. I was also told that the intel side of the Washington interagency wanted to let things unfold to see where the leads would go. I reported this back to State, along with measures we were taking, but got no response. When I learned that the arms the group was waiting for were allegedly on their way, I asked the Kenyan government to break up the organization. Moi personally assured me they would comply. Some of the members of al-Haramain were deported and life went on.

Then I got word of a threat from the Lord's Resistance Army, a rebel group in northern Uganda. Again, we advised Washington and again we got nothing back. Meanwhile we continued to do everything we considered reasonable and cautious. I remember that in early 1998 a delegation of counter-terrorist types visited. I met with them in the secure conference room, and when they ended with the pro-forma, "Is there anything we can do for you"? I angrily declared they could answer the god-damn mail. The cursing was intentional because I wanted them to see how frustrated and annoyed I was.

I also continued to send cables about our vulnerability, which only became more apparent as we dealt with these threats. When I reviewed them before meeting with the Accountability Review Board after the bombing, I was astounded by their frequency.

General Tony Zinni, Head of Central Command, the military theater under which Kenya fell, understood force protection and agreed with me about the vulnerability of the embassy. With my enthusiastic concurrence he cabled Washington offering one of his own vulnerability assessment teams. That got a reply -- not just "no," but mind your own business.

Q: This team that eventually came out was, I take it, a basically a routine thing from Diplomatic Security?

BUSHNELL: No, it was not a routine thing. I think Tony's cable, along with continuing concerns we were voicing, finally provoked a response in the form of an assessment team. Meanwhile, when I returned to Washington on consultations in December of '97, I was told point blank by the AF Executive Office to stop sending cables because people were getting very irritated with me. That really pushed up my blood pressure. Later, in the spring of '98, for the

first time in my career I was not asked for input into the “Needs Improvement” section of my performance evaluation. That’s always a sign! When I read the criticism that “she tends to overload the bureaucratic circuits,” I knew exactly what it referred to. Yes, the cables had been read, they just weren’t appreciated.

Q: Was anything happening at this time from Tanzania from Dar es Salaam? Was there concern there or any of the other?

BUSHNELL: No, the greatest concern was to our embassy in Uganda, a far more vulnerable building than ours. Dar es Salaam chancery had been built as the Israeli embassy, so it was pretty hefty. Politically, the region was pretty tense. Hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea never diminished entirely. Somalia was chaos. Uganda had rebel forces at work. Eastern Congo – Zaire at the time – was embattled and the entire Great Lakes region, including Rwanda and Burundi was smoldering while the north-south war in Sudan continued. Kenya and Tanzania were looking pretty calm by comparison.

In May ’98, the Director General visited Nairobi, and was exposed to the concerns of the community. While he thought we were on the verge of becoming obsessed over security, offered to take a letter back to Secretary Albright. So, I penned a letter suggesting that, when next defending the State Department budget before Congress, she use our vulnerability as an example of why we needed more security funding. I also wrote to the Undersecretary for Management. I received a highly bureaucratic response from the Undersecretary’s office – sorry, greater needs elsewhere and no money – but none from the Secretary. That, frankly, didn’t surprise me. To my knowledge, no one in the media has seen the letter to the Secretary so why it has been described as “highly emotional” or a “plea” is beyond me. Actually, it’s not. Stereotyping is alive and well even if wrong.

In June, Dick and I took vacation. By this time, renovations, including some security upgrades, were getting started on the chancery.

When I returned from vacation, among other activities, I continued to participate in the outreach effort to the Kenyan Islamic community initiated by our Political Counselor, who was Muslim. A minority population in Kenya, they felt alienated and marginalized by Moi’s government and held a profound distrust of the U.S. I had lots of conversations with these guys, which served us well after the bombing.

In the years since the bombing, I learned just out just how much I did not know about U.S. national security and law enforcement efforts against al Qaeda. The information was highly compartmentalized, on a “need to know” basis and clearly Washington did not think the US Ambassador needed to know. So, while I was aware of the al Qaeda presence and various U.S. teams coming and going, I did not know, nor was I told, what they were learning. When the Kenyans finally broke up the cell in the spring of ’98, I figured “that was that.” Whatever threat may have existed – and we never had a sense that there was any threat – was removed.

On Friday, August 7, we started another business day as usual. The DCM was on leave. Our Political Counselor was “acting” DCM and I had asked him to preside over the Friday Country

Team meeting. I was finally successful in scheduling a meeting with the Minister of Commerce to talk about an upcoming the U.S. trade delegation – a big deal given how we stiff-armed Kenya --so I was not present. I remember asking that the Country Team discuss how our newcomers were settling in and whether we were reaching the right balance on issues of security – alerting but not paralyzing people to the dangers. In retrospect, that was a very ironic conversation.

The office of the Minister of Commerce was in the high-rise building across from our small rear parking lot. I walked across with two colleagues from the Department of Commerce, teasing my driver Duncan who was escorting us that he should be holding a little American flag we flew for official government calls. The Minister's office was on the top floor.

As was the case in many official meetings, the Minister had invited the press to ask questions and take photos before the real talk began. A few minutes after they left, we heard a loud “boom.” I asked, “Is there construction going on”? It sounded like the kind of boom you get when a building is being torn down. The Minister said, “No there isn’t.” He and almost everybody else in the room got up to walk to the window. I was the last person up and had taken a few steps when an incredible noise and huge percussion threw me off my feet. I’ll never know whether I totally lost consciousness or whether I was semi-conscious, but I was very aware of the shaking of the building. I thought the building was going to collapse, and I was pretty sure I was going to die. At the same time I was calmly thinking “this building is going to fall and I’m going to die,” I was physically steeling myself for a fall. I vaguely remember a shadow, like a white cloud, moving past me and the rattle of the tea cup. Then I looked up. With the exception of a body prone on the other side of the large office, I was the only person left in the room that had held about a dozen people before the explosion occurred. Almost simultaneously, the man I took for dead raised his head, and one of my Commerce colleagues returned.

Q: They left you.

BUSHNELL: My colleague rushed in saying, “Ambassador we’ve got to get out of here!” I tend to be calm in emergencies and I was probably in shock and maybe denial because I didn’t want to leave the floor until we made sure that everybody else was out. We met up with a couple of people including the elevator operator literally ringing his hands saying, “Sorry, I’m so sorry, oh sorry, sorry!” For some reason I thought the building had been bombed because of a nasty banker’s strike that was taking place. We were, after all, in the Cooperative Bank Building. So, off we went, down an endless flight of stairs. I have no idea how long it took, literally no idea. At every landing we would have to climb over the steel fire doors that had been blown in. Debris, blood, shoes and pieces of clothing were scattered at every floor.

What I did not know was that around 10:32, as the Country Team was meeting in my office, a truck with 2,000 pounds of explosives drove into the small rear parking lot I had walked across earlier. The lot was squeezed between the embassy, the Cooperative Bank Building, where my Commerce colleagues and I went to meet with the Minister of Commerce, and a seven story general office building. The truck drew up to the guarded entrance to the underground parking lot of the embassy. One of the two occupants got out and demanded entry. The guard refused and tried to alert the marines via radio. The perpetrator then hurled a stun grenade (the noise we and thousands of other people first heard), then ran. Seconds later, his companion detonated the

explosives. The two tons of energy that hit the three buildings surrounding the parking bounced off and over the bricks and mortar with devastating effect. Two hundred thirty people were killed instantaneously. Over 5,000 people were injured, most of them from the chest up and most of them from flying glass. Vehicles and their occupants waiting for the corner traffic light to change to green were incinerated, including all passengers on a city bus.

The seven story office building next to the embassy collapsed and the rear of our chancery blew off. While the rest of the exterior of our building held – it had been constructed to earthquake standards – the windows shattered, the ceilings fell, and most of the interior simply blew up. Forty-six people died – about a quarter of the occupants – while others were struck or buried by rubble. All of the cars in the parking lot caught fire, which spread to the top of our generator. On the opposite side of the building, all of the windows blew in. In my office, the Country Team ducked as the windows blew, then crawled downstairs and exited the building along with everyone else who was still able.

The Acting DCM asked for volunteers to go back in and rescue colleagues, as the medical unit staggered onto the sidewalk and set up triage and medical help. The two front office managers began to record the names of people as cars still fit to drive were flagged down and the injured sent to hospital. Thousands of people were drawn to the scene, many of them crawling over the rubble of the collapsed seven story office building to try to save those who were buried. Some of them climbed into the rear of the embassy to lend help and, some, to loot.

All this went on while, unaware, my colleague and I descended those endless flights of stairs in the Bank building with hundreds, maybe thousands, of Kenyans pressed together so tightly that I could barely keep my feet on the ground. All I kept thinking was that I just needed to get out of there, to get to the Medical Unit and we would be okay. At one point, the slow parade of people came to a standstill. Some people yelled, “Hurry up, move; there's a fire!” As smoke wafted up the stairwell, I thought for the second time that I was going to die. Again, it was a peaceful though because at least I'd be asphyxiated and not burned to death. Everyone around us remained just as calm.

When we finally exited the building, I looked across the street to see thousands of people behind a cordon gawking in shock. My colleague exclaimed, “Ambassador, there's press, put your head down!” He took the back of my head and literally pushed it down. Members of the press present at the beginning of the Minister's meeting were still in the area when the bomb was detonated. (Much later a group of Kenyan photographers won the Pulitzer Prize for the bombing photographs, the first time that black Africans had ever won the Pulitzer Prize.)

Because I was looking down, my first sight of the bomb's impact were shards of glass, twisted steel and, all of a sudden, the charred remains of what was once a human being. That's what caused me to look up. What I saw was fire (hence the smoke in the stairwell), rubble, destruction and the remains of what had been the rear wall of the chancery. A few steps further and we met the Acting DCM coming around the corner. He looked at me very calmly and said, “Hello Ambassador.” I was astounded and very reassured that he seemed so calm. Maybe things were not as bad as they looked. What I didn't know was that, having organized and helped the team that returned to the building to help the buried, dead and wounded, he was now searching for his

wife, like us, in shock.

At almost that same second, others caught sight of me and my colleague. I was grabbed and pushed as someone yelled, "Get her out of here, go, go, move, move, get her out, go, go, go!" I was literally thrown into a private jeep, where we met the second of Commerce colleagues who had been with me in the Minister's office. He looked awful, blood pouring down his face. He kept apologizing for that and for having so swiftly left the office. One of our Foreign Service National security people jumped into the front seat and yelled at the driver to get going. The driver, who worked for one of our political officers, had been walking up the front steps of the Embassy when the bomb was detonated. He had been knocked down, regained consciousness and had gone back to his car to assemble himself when it's bang, bang, "get them out of here, move, move, move, go, go, go!" The fellow stamped on the accelerator and --I will never, ever forget, so vivid is the vision -- we careen toward a crowd of people almost crashing into a woman in Somali dress who had just stepped forward. We almost killed her. That was it; time to take charge. I ordered the driver to, "Stop, just stop and go pole, pole --slow, slow."

Because I thought the hospitals would be overcrowded, I opted to go to a hotel in the hopes it would have a resident doctor. God knows why I thought that. At any rate, we went to the Serena Hotel where my Commerce colleagues were staying. The one colleague was still insisting that I cover my face, but when I looked at the two of them, blood streaming down from head wounds, I decided I couldn't possibly look worse. Except for my lip, I did not feel any severe wounds. You can imagine the spectacle we made as we walked into the lobby, punched the elevator button and ascended to one of the rooms. Fortunately, there was a doctor, as well as a nurse at the hotel. One look at my companions and they were whisked off to the hospital. I was deemed fit enough to go to work, provided I have stitches put in my lip that afternoon.

Adrenalin had kicked in and I was very anxious to get out of there. The embassy radio net made clear the chaos around the embassy and listening to it I began to get a sense of the enormity of what had happened. I used the phone to call Dick, asked him to contact my parents and stay away from the downtown area. It didn't occur to me to break into the radio and it was only when I heard my driver who had been out on an errand and had gone to the British High commission requesting instructions that I spoke. I later found out this was the first time many people realized that I was still alive. I should have gone on earlier to reassure them. Lesson learned.

Q: Do you want to keep going for a while?

BUSHNELL: Well, let me finish the day. As soon as I could I went over to the AID building, located in a near suburb. The front office managers had already begun to establish a 24-hour operations center and were getting a satellite telephone hooked up when I arrived. The phone system in Nairobi, by this time, had gone dead. We were also in radio contact with colleagues doing rescue work at the embassy. A big part of my job was coordinating orders to the people on site to make sure they had what they needed to muddle through. It was chaos for a long time. Thousands of people were digging bare handed through the rubble of the 7-story office building that had collapsed in search of rescuers. The generator behind our building was going full blast with a fire on top of it. The water main in the area had broken, water was flooding the basement of the embassy as electrical lines swung loose. We also had people still buried in rubble.

At the AID building, I picked up the embassy mission telephone directory and handed it to somebody with instructions to start looking for our people, not stopping until everyone had been accounted for. Teams of Americans and Kenyans went into neighborhoods, hospitals and morgues looking for our folks. No one asked why, no one second guessed, everyone did what was necessary – did it heroically and well.

I had lost total track of time, but at some point early on the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs called. I had barely said hello, when the Secretary of State called on the other line. Both voiced shock about the bombing and about the vulnerability of the building. When I told the Secretary, “Madame Secretary, I wrote you a letter,” there was silence. She had not seen it, she said. I wasn’t about to quibble.

Not much later President Clinton called. When he called me “Pru” I knew someone was passing him cue cards because there’s no reason he would know that’s what I call myself.” Anyway, he instructed me to secure the perimeter of the chancery. He may have said “I’m sorry,” I don’t remember because I was so astounded by the importance of security now that we’d been blown up. This is supposed to be the guy who feels our pain. Once I confirmed that the building next door had collapsed, he ordered me to secure the perimeter there, as well. “But people are still trying to get others out from under the rubble,” I explained. “Oh,” he replied. “Well, then secure the perimeter.” To this day that’s the only interaction I ever had with the President about the bombing!

The information about what had happened and how people were doing came in waves. It got worse and worse as time went on. I mentally kept track of the people I saw or heard from and those I didn’t as I learned that there were looters as well as people who wanted to help who got into the embassy from the rubble in the parking lot. I learned that our Marines had been sitting in their van outside the Embassy waiting for one of their colleagues to cash a check when the bomb went off. The one who went in to get the money was killed. Another fell down the elevator shaft but returned with broken ribs from the hospital to help in the rescue. I learned about the janitor who put his life at risk to turn off the generator before the water hit our electrical wires. I learned about acts of incredible courage and terrible deaths. As to security perimeter...that had been taken care of during the first hour. The Marines and a visiting security team donned helmets, flack jackets and guns and grimly kept people away. Kenyans who arrived on the scene to help, or not, were incensed.

As the day went on, the nightmare grew. Too many dead, too many wounded. Hospitals were flooded with thousands of walking wounded, most bleeding terribly from wounds to chest and face. Many had gone to the window when one of the perps threw the stun grenade and paid a terrible price. At some point I called as many of the Country Team as I could to organize ourselves. Washington, meantime, had set up a task force and questions were coming in faster than we had the information.

When a semblance of organization took hold I went home to change from the bloody suit and get my lip stitched up at the children’s hospital next to the Residence. I returned to our operations’ center at AID as soon as I could. Can’t remember everything we did but I know I was incredibly

grateful for the fact that we had a large mission with lots of willing hands and a senior team that was alive and experienced enough to take over when necessary. I was also thankful for the experience of having handled disasters before so I could provide the kind of instructions that would hopefully help save lives. About ten that night, I left the ops center in the good hands of AID and Embassy officers who could cope and went home exhausted. I was too tired to even wash off the clots of blood stuck in my hair.

Q: Okay. One thing before we cut this off. What was the reaction of the Kenyan government and all during this first day?

BUSHNELL: They were as responsive as they could be. Moi sent out the military, but the military is taught to be warriors. This was not the National Guard or FEMA. They had no idea what to do and became more a part of the problem than the solution. So, they stood down. Moi himself was on the scene within hours to view the damage. The citizens of Nairobi really came together to begin organizing. A real estate developer brought a crane down to start lifting the rubble and thousands were on the scene to help out.

It was very clear they needed help and it was going to take time for any USG support to arrive. When someone in Washington asked if we could acquiesce to Israeli offers of help, I gratefully concurred – provided they check with the Kenyans, of course. It was a good thing they did come because the planes with the Fairfax County Rescue Squad and the one with State's FEST team both broke down! Both of them. It took over 30 hours before we got any real help from the States. By that time, the Israelis were the heroes and our name was mud.

Q: One last thing. Did you learn, I assume at some point you learned about what happened in Dar es Salaam.

BUSHNELL: Yes, almost immediately.

Q: Was there concern that there might be other bombs or other things happening?

BUSHNELL: The news I heard was that an embassy in Dar es Salaam or Kampala or Khartoum was also blown up. There was an awareness that there were simultaneous explosions. It took awhile for it to come to light that it was our embassy in Dar but it was clear that these had been well planned terrorist attacks.

Q: Was there any concern about further attacks??

BUSHNELL: Not that day but we sure thought about it in Nairobi. State was going to pull out the combat Marines sent to provide perimeter security at the AID building within a couple of months, so they obviously didn't think so. On August 7, we were far too busy trying to save lives, tend to the wounded and find the missing to worry about further attacks.

Q: Was the media all over you? Were they a problem?

BUSHNELL: The Kenyan media was already on the scene. The next day the international media

arrived in droves.

Q: We can talk about that next. We'll stop at this point and pick up with the second day.

BUSHNELL: OK..

Q: Today is the 1st of September, 2005. Pru, what happened? The second day you woke up, I assumed washed your hair?

BUSHNELL: The next day, yes, I washed my hair. To be exact, Dick, my husband, washed my hair. Bandages on my fingers, hands and arms from superficial wounds prevented me from putting them in water so Dick did it -- one of those moments that would be accompanied by schmaltzy music in the movies.

It had been a horrible night. The phone in our bedroom kept ringing and when I answered, I'd get silence. I honestly thought that perps were telling me there were more of them out there and they knew I was still alive. We finally got it resolve a few days later -- a disconnect between the guard house at the front and the one at the gate.

Downtown people had worked all night to dig survivors out of the collapsed office building. At our operations center, the night shift had been relaying information to the Washington task force (because Nairobi was eight hours ahead we usually interacted during evening and night hours) and keeping tallies our dead, wounded and missing. We had reached forty-something and were still looking for both Kenyans and Americans.

I needed to see the embassy so went there first. Reinforcements for the marines providing perimeter security had still not arrived but everything was calm. Our Security Engineer had established a lean-to office on the sidewalk and escorted me through the remains of our building. The devastation inside had a deathly stillness to it. I laid roses sent to me by Sally, the Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Ministry on the steps leading into the building because it had now become a sacred place. Duncan, my driver and I then went to the AID building.

President Moi had convoked the diplomatic corps to State House. Meanwhile, the worst of our injured had been prepped for imminent air evacuation via military plane. Our wonderful Regional Medical Officer suggested I go to the hospital to say good-bye, lest some not make it. I think it was at that point that the advice of a former mentor clicked in: "take care of your people and the rest will take care of itself." I asked our Econ Counselor to represent me at State House and went over to the hospital. Don Leidel's words became my mantra and leadership philosophy.

The wounded Kenyans and Americans, were heavily bandaged but putting on as bright a face as they could muster. Even the most seriously wounded gave me a thumbs-up. On the way out of the hospital, I stopped by the room of the Minister of Commerce, the man who had been sitting next to me on the couch and had gone toward the window when we heard the first boom. He had forty stitches in his head. Had I not paused when the bomb exploded, it would have been me.

The rest of the day was a blur of activity. The medevac plane had landed without supplies or

back-up crew and we were informed that the pilot and others required the mandatory 8-hour crew rest before taking our wounded to Germany. My hair caught on fire, as they say. Angry calls to the task force as I went up the DOD chain of command demanding action peppered the other activities.

The medical officer and I went almost as bezerk when Washington instructed us that we had to put at least some of our wounded on a plane the South African government had sent – to show good will. We sent the three most stable, all Americans and got thanked by the Kenyan press a few days later with accusations of preferential treatment. Neither of the aircrafts carrying the Fairfax County Rescue Team and the State Department FEST team was going to arrive on time. All in all a lousy day. Thank heaven we had no further deaths.

The search for our people continued. We put an announcement out on the radio requesting all employees of the American embassy to report in. Meanwhile, family members of the missing were frantically coming in or calling to get news of their loved one. Our human resource people couldn't provide the information others were so desperately seeking, which stoked the stress. Americans, too, were calling the task force in Washington. The ultimate loss was 12 Americans and 32 FSNs but it took us until Sunday afternoon to make that determination.

Q: Where were they? Were they located in any particular place?

BUSHNELL: They had either been in the rear of the building near the parking lot where the detonation took place, or along the corridors that ended at the back of the building. The energy from the explosion came roaring down the corridors; anyone who happened to be in its path was killed.

American members of the community had gone to sit with those waiting for news of the whereabouts of loved ones, or reeling from information of the death toll. I visited a couple of them that day. Sue Bartley, spouse of our Consul General, Julian Bartley, was already aware that her son had been killed and was holding out the hope that Julian would be found alive. We were sure that he was not but did not want to stamp out that hope until we found the body. Julian, like other of our African American colleagues, had been mistaken for Kenyan and taken to one of the many over-crowded morgues around the city. It was not until Sunday afternoon that he was found.

One of our newcomers, Howard Kavalier, having learned that his wife, Prabhi, had been killed, decided to leave post immediately with his two daughters. Howard was amazingly kind to me when we said good-bye.

That evening the FEST team -- I think it stands for Federal Emergency Support Team --and the Fairfax County Search and Rescue Squad finally arrived, along with a host of military personnel, as well as FBI agents. Suddenly, we went from having to manage chaos and tragedy to managing chaos, tragedy AND hundreds of people. The fact that no one came with a specific role or objective made things worse -- something I subsequently talked about at length: if you're going to help people in chaotic circumstances you really need to have your act together because, if not you create additional management issues for people already in crisis. The Department at this

time had very little experience with the kind of situation Nairobi and Dar were in. We're very good at evacuating people and we're good at taking out our dead. But a terrorist attack that leaves some dead and some not was something we had much less experience with. So, there were inevitable run-ins.

Our Security Officer, for example, was prohibited from entering the AID building, to which we had transferred operations, because his embassy ID been lost in the attack. One of my most senior people, meanwhile, wanted to resign out of frustration that no one in the new group was listening to him. I pulled everyone into our operations center and laid down the law. I told everyone to "take a good look at me. I am the Chief of Mission. This is my mission and nothing happens unless I say it happens. Here is the Acting DCM. If I'm not here, he's the one who says what's going to happen." We then organized the visitors so that rather than meeting with all these little groups separately, they would coordinate among themselves, and I would meet with a couple of them every morning or twice a day. Over a period of hours and days things settled down.

Another example of how things became unwittingly complicated was the composition of the FEST team – an interagency group. Our senior Security Officer was brand new; his predecessor, who left only a short time ago, was put on the FEST team. I completely understood the logic of that but it gave me two senior security officers; one who knew Nairobi and had contacts, and another who needed to establish himself. I asked the former RSO to take on liaison with Washington as shadow consultant to the new RSO. If there was any trouble between them they were both gracious and professional enough not to let me know about it, for which I was most grateful.

Q: Well, you know, we'd talked earlier about Nairobi as being the magnet for every agency in the government, many of which have a very small presence abroad. You know, bad things aren't supposed to happen to bureaucrats who work out of Washington and all of a sudden something happens here. I would imagine you would have the Secretaries of every department wanting to show concern and all. I think it would be a bloody mess. Did you find this coming at you?

BUSHNELL: I think that the task force in Washington was dealing with that because I didn't experience much of that. Actually, I think the size of the mission and quality of people allowed us to fare far better than smaller embassies may have. Let me give you an example. One of the agencies was the Medical Research Unit of Walter Reed Hospital, which gave us people with medical backgrounds who were a great boon to us. Also, by the time we were attacked I had been in Nairobi two years and had worked hard to form a community. As I said the other day, it didn't matter what your job description was, people just went to work. We were also very lucky to have two Community Liaison Officers, who were both terrific. The CLOs, along with my husband Dick, were instrumental in working with the community.

It became really clear that there's no such thing as enough information. I think of New Orleans today. People were just desperate for information. I was not able to go on the radio every time there was an update, so we arranged to have the Marines at Post One who were accustomed to using the radio net to do it. We would write things out for them to read, because it was important that the information be absolutely accurate. Eventually, things settled down.

The worst three days of the crisis were the first three: Friday, when we were blown up; Saturday when the rescuers finally arrived to create even more chaos; and then Sunday when we held a memorial service for the Americans and dealt with the international news media. Of course they wanted a press conference. I did not want any photographs taken, because I looked pretty banged up but was persuaded otherwise. I smile, because about a week later my OMS came up to me and said, "You know Pru, I really shouldn't be saying this, but I've been seeing pictures of you on television and in the newspaper and I have to say it's good that you got your hair done a few days before we were bombed. As bad as you looked, your hair was okay."

The experience with the international media was a lesson that I hope created systematic change in the way we handle situations like ours. The mission had a small USIS Public Affairs Office that was flooded with press requests from newspapers all over the world. Washington's concern, as always, was the American media; they could not have cared less about the local media. Any ambassador could go on the local media and say pretty much whatever he or she wants – not so with American media. So, instinctively our public affairs people were focused on taking care of the international and American press. They were aware of the Kenyan press and in the press conference they asked, "Does anyone from the Kenyan press have any questions"? But, essentially the international media came in and ran over the local press. That was going to come back to haunt us pretty soon.

Q: One question. I'm thinking about the American press. Were they picking up on the point of why hadn't something been done? In other words, it was probably common knowledge that you had been complaining.

BUSHNELL: No it wasn't.

Q: It wasn't?

BUSHNELL: At that point it wasn't.

Q: It wasn't. So, that didn't come up?

BUSHNELL: That did not come up at the time.

Q: Because that would have been a very tricky subject to handle.

BUSHNELL: It did come up later. I'll talk about that in a couple of minutes. But at that point, no, that hadn't come up. I had the press conference on Sunday morning. I was also dealing with what was going to happen to the remains of the deceased Americans. I got word that the FBI wanted to come in and do autopsies in Nairobi, which would have taken up to two weeks. I told them, "Under no circumstances." The people who had lost their loved ones wanted to leave and there was no way I was going to ask them to wait for autopsies. Instead, a plane was sent to return the bodies to the U.S.

I thought we needed to have some farewell and decided to hold a memorial service at the

Residence on Sunday afternoon. It was extraordinary to me. Word went out over the embassy radio net. Dick and I usually let the household staff go home on weekends because we enjoyed our privacy and we had completely forgotten to tell them to come in on Sunday. No one was there. I was enlisting my driver, Duncan's support to help when in walks a member of our community. "Can I help?" she asked. "Yes"!

A few minutes later, a neighbor offered her help and with the hard work of a couple of people, we organized the memorial service that included a pianist and distribution of roses. Our CLO brought a recording of taps. I was desperately searching my brain for memorial services I had attended to come up with a format. I remembered the funeral of a dear friend during which people had gotten up and talked about this person. So, I offered the opportunity to people to get up and talk about our friends and colleagues who had died in the bombing.

I started it off and soon others were coming up to speak, including the family members of the deceased, which was so poignant and sad. One of the last people to say something was Duncan, my driver. He may have been the only Kenyan there, because the event had been organized so quickly. At any rate, he stood up and said, "I'm a Kenyan by birth, but in my heart today I am an American," and went on with the dignity and the oratory skill which is so wonderful in Africans. He talked particularly about Julian Bartley, because as CG, Julian had decided that every FSN who wanted a tourist visa to go to the United States deserved to have one, and Duncan was one of the first people who had been given one. That had done so much to make the FSNs feel a trusted part of the United States Government.

After the service the head of the FEST team, who was the liaison with Washington, met with the family members of the deceased to let them know what would be happening. He told them that the bodies would go through Germany and would be met on Tuesday at Andrews Air Force Base at a ceremony attended by President Clinton. One of the family members protested because he would not have the time to meet his son in college in the South and get to Andrews to attend the ceremony. The response was a kindly "too bad." I asked the team leader to get back to Washington to see if the ceremony could be delayed by a day so that all family members would get a chance to collect themselves. He did and the problem was fixed. I don't know if you see the trend here – I kept pushing back and pushing back on Washington demands, creating a double-edged reputation for myself.

Q: Let's talk for a minute about, the problem of casualties of the Foreign Service Nationals. How many were killed or injured, approximately and what were we able to do about them?

BUSHNELL: Thirty-two Kenyan employees were killed. We lost a good part of our motor pool, a good part of the Consular Section, almost all of the shipping section, half of our budget and fiscal section, someone from USIS, and the FSNs in our political and economic sections. The Admin Section was hardest hit, and the horrible reality was that it was also the section on which we relied upon the most to keep things going.

Q: As always.

BUSHNELL: As always, exactly. It was the Kenyan employees who bore the brunt of bringing

out the dead and wounded, finding the missing, renting the refrigerator truck when Nairobi morgues became too full, informing families of the status of loved ones, initiating contacts with the insurance companies, and on top of everything else, tending to the visitors. They barely had time to wipe their tears.

In Kenyan culture it was an important sign of respect to have the employer present at an employee's funeral. Some of our people were from the hinterlands of Kenya. We sent at least one American to every funeral, no matter where. Having made the decision, I didn't have to do anything further – I knew it would be taken care of.

When it came to the injured, Gretchen McCoy, our medical officer, and I insisted that Kenyan and American employees be treated exactly the same. FSNs would be evacuated along with the Americans. And if they needed long-term care, they would get it. Washington agreed, fortunately, and I know that some Kenyans to this day return for medical care.

That turned out to be one of the easier decisions. One example of the unforeseen complexities dealt with life insurance payments. A number of the FSNs who died were lower-wage employees whose families faced both incredible tragedy and continuing expenses. The local insurance company did a great job in coming up with the money quickly but the problem was who would get it. What about the employee who had two families, one in the village and another in Nairobi. So, who gets the money? Well, it was the person named as beneficiary, the others were out of luck. What about the families who decided that the widow should not inherit and literally took the money from her hands? What could we do about that? For some we helped open bank accounts, for others we could do very little. Problems went on and on.

Q: I want to ask a question. I'm speaking as somebody who is 77 years old, so I belong to a different era. There's something I've seen grow up and that is professional grief counselors. I find this something, almost alien to me. I mean, who in the hell are these people, but it's become part of our culture you might say. Did you have these people? How did you deal with them?

BUSHNELL: The US military had sent a number of doctors and counselors to help the Kenyans, because the Kenyan medical establishment was overwhelmed. Some of them did a good job and some did not. Grief counselors were pretty much an anathema to the Kenyan communities.

The very first person to arrive to help the embassy community was the Regional Psychiatrist from Pretoria. He decided that all employees of the mission should go through debriefings and he used military counselors to help. I think the results were mixed. We decided to do it at the Residence, because we wanted a safe comfortable place, and the Residence was a very pleasant spot. We also decided to have mixed groups of Americans and FSNs. Our motives were good but I'm not at all sure the decision was the right one. I was desperately trying to make good decisions – we all were – but I'm not sure all of them helped as much as we had hoped.

I did have a separate debriefing for the Country Team because I could not talk as openly with other groups. Plus, some happened to be out of country that day and we wanted to integrate everyone into one team again.

My husband, Dick, played an important role in getting people to these debriefings. He is one of the most cheerful souls I have ever come across, the kind of man who almost literally wakes up singing, full of energy and enthusiasm. He made sure that all of the FSNs attended the debriefings and made all of the arrangements at the Residence. At one time we had five or six debriefings going on simultaneously.

Q: Well tell me. Did you find this briefing therapeutic?

BUSHNELL: I found it very useful. In the psychiatric community now there is some controversy as to whether these debriefings are good or not, but I'm glad we did them because I thought the "stiff upper lip" and "move on" tradition of the State Department was completely inappropriate to us.

Q: Which is the old attitude, I mean get on with it.

BUSHNELL: Right. So, as a gesture that I cared enough about the people under my leadership to take advantage of this was important to me, and I will stand by that. The concern was that there were some people for whom debriefing may discharge really high emotion and be more negative than positive, and I understand that. I'm still glad I did it and I would do it again tomorrow.

The briefing went like this. Everybody in the group was asked the question, "Where were you at the time of the bombing"? So, one would simply get the information out. By doing that one was able to see the different perspectives people had from those who were in the building to those who were out of the city or even out of the country. The next question was, "How did you feel then and what are you feeling now?" That's probably the part that could be more controversial. It was for me a critical question to address. I was the only woman on the Country Team and I was the leader. I was so aware of the fact that I had failed in my mission to keep people safe. Even though I had tried, I had failed. It was helpful to share that and to get the full-fledged loyalty of the team. While we never put words to it, it was certainly obvious in retrospect that we would have done anything for one another. I had a senior staff committed to dealing with the incredible challenges in ways that focused on taking care of our people. How much was directly due to the debriefing, I'm not sure but I know it was important.

Q: Was there a different attitude toward this from the Kenyan side of things? I mean, Americans are pretty prone to speak out and particularly the newer generation. Not my generation, but a newer generation is able to talk about feelings.

BUSHNELL: Dealing with post-traumatic stress and talking openly about feelings continued to be a big issue in the community for a long time to come. Among the Kenyans, therapy is not a part of the culture. We had counselors available for months, and once the military counselors left we tapped into the local Kenyan counseling community -- not just for embassy employees but the Nairobi community at large. A study on the effectiveness of the counseling that was done after I left post found that Kenyans did not take advantage of it, nor did they find it particularly helpful. Far more helpful for them was their church community and their families' support.

Q: I think Americans have been almost trained to accept counseling.

BUSHNELL: Americans maybe, but Foreign Service people, no. After all, if you see a counselor, you have to 'fess up for a security clearance. A lot of American employees feared that getting counseling would jeopardize their careers and so refused to go.

Q: There were hundreds killed who were just not part of our show, the embassy, I mean. They just happened to be there. Did this create any sort of a backlash?

BUSHNELL: It created an immediate backlash. Within a few days the local press was publishing horrible things, some of them due to decisions I made. A couple of days after the bombing, for example, we got word that Secretary Albright wanted to visit to pay condolences to the Kenyans. I took one look at the Admin Counselor, and I saw that no way were we in any position to host the Secretary. I told her that. She took it very well, though her staff did not. When she came on August 18, eleven days after the bombing, the Kenyans press was very negative.

Local media and opposition politicians were already making hay over efforts I had made to explain what happened on the day of the bombing. Immediately after the blast, our marines and other security people formed a protective cordon around the embassy. First of all, Kenyans did not understand why in the immediate aftermath we did not rush over to the rubble of the seven-story building to help dig people out. Second, they not understand why we were keeping people from our building. What they saw were armed white men with guns, which they interpreted as indifference at best and hostility at worst.

The attitude portrayed by the press and some politicians went like this: "We allowed you into our country and in our city and look what happened to us. Just what have you done for us lately? Worse, on the day of the bombing, rather than helping us and showing the spirit of *harambe*, you point your guns at us, you yell at us to stay out of your building even though we're there to try to help, and you don't do anything to help us."

Three or four days after the bombing, I went on local television and radio to explain our side. While the exterior of the chancery building didn't look so bad, at least from the front, the interior was devastated. The building was unsafe and we didn't want people going in and jeopardizing their lives. Furthermore, there were looters who had gotten in whom we had to get out. Saying that just put match to dynamite. The next day, the press and some opposition politicians were ranting "American Ambassador accuses Kenyans of looting." I learned a big lesson that day: Sometimes telling the whole truth is completely inappropriate. I paid hard for that lesson, I can tell you.

When Secretary Albright did come I had two conditions: that we not have to prepare briefing papers, because we had lost all of our computers, and we had nothing, nothing. And the other, that she not spend the night, because the security involved in that would have been so astronomical. As it turned out, the plane had problems in Dar, where she had first stopped, and she had to cut her trip short. Rather than meet with the opposition political figures one by one, we invited them to a wreath-laying at the site of the embassy and the building that had collapsed. They were further outraged.

I, in turn, became almost as angry with them. We had personally supported all of them and funded quite a few. I was so mad at them that I refused to see them until Christmas. I didn't invite them to my house, I cut them off. The Country Team advised me to contact them earlier but I had decided to hell with being ambassador. These politicians were human beings to whom I had paid respect and support who chose to make a spectacle of circumstances for no reason but political show. Others at the embassy continued meetings but I didn't until December when we finally reconciled with all but one.

Q: Well, I think, you know, political posturing, at certain times this is not appropriate. I mean, it's disgusting in any culture. I think people should be called on this. What about the Kenyan reaction to al Qaeda and Islam? Did they get nasty?

BUSHNELL: The majority of Kenyans are Christian. The Muslim community, mostly concentrated on the coast and Somali border, had already felt marginalized, which frankly they were. Feelings didn't get better after the bombing, especially when, within 48 hours of the bombing, 250 FBI agents arrived. I had some tough negotiation about whether they would come with guns. Fortunately, the Special Agent in Charge, a woman, was terrific and we settled on short guns and soft clothes, i.e. regular suits and discrete weaponry. The Canadians gave the FBI a place from which to work. To understand the trail they were following I need to take you back to the moment of the bombing. Two guys in a truck with 2,000 pounds of explosives planned to enter the underground parking lot of the embassy. Our security guard said no. One of the men got out of the vehicle to argue, threw a stun grenade, panicked and ran away. The guy left in the truck detonated the bomb.

The perpetrator who ran away first returned to his hotel. Because he was injured, he then checked himself into a hospital. In his pants pockets were the plans for the bombing. The hotel clerk thought this guy was suspicious coming back in such bad condition and then leaving to go to the hospital, so he alerted the police. The police went to the hospital, found the guy and found the plans. So, there was suspect number one.

The FBI sifted through the rubble and pieced together the make of the vehicle, which was a key lead that soon led them right into the Muslim community. Of course they were working with the Kenyan police, so it was the Kenyans who were knocking on doors, but nobody was particularly fooled. Everybody knew that the Kenyans were serving as the surrogates, if you will, and even if they weren't they had a lousy reputation. So, not surprisingly, rumors started about how people brought in for questioning were being treated, etc. I was deeply concerned both because the rumors weren't true and because I was now, in addition to everything else, trying to recoup the friendship of the Kenyan people. The last thing I needed was to deal with lies about how people were being treated by the police and FBI.

I was also concerned about the security of the FBI. If members of the Muslim community really got up in arms, so to speak, it would add another layer of danger. A couple of times I met with the leaders of the Muslim community with whom I had fortunately created a link long before we were bombed. I was able to bring them together with the Special Agent-in-Charge – who, by the way, changed every 90 days – to say “Would you please exchange telephone numbers so you can talk with one another, clarify rumors and help one another.” For a while it would work, then

rumors and charges would begin.

Q: The perpetrators of the bombing in Kenya, were they indigenous or recruited or had they been Saudis or Pakistanis or somebody like that?

BUSHNELL: None came from Kenya. Egypt, Comoros, Yemen I think, but not Kenya. I learned that when the Government of Kenya took down the al Qaeda cell in the spring of '98, we all falsely concluded that al Qaeda no longer had a footprint in Nairobi or in Kenya. Actually, they had simply gone underground. I also learned that there were a number of U.S. embassies under surveillance. Nairobi and Dar looked easy; plus, there was a female ambassador in Nairobi, and they thought they would get more play if they killed a woman ambassador. I was shocked when I learned that at the trial.

Q: Well, let's get back to the recovery. You mentioned that after the remains of the American dead were sent back to Washington you entered a new phase.

BUSHNELL: Things shifted. The worst of our wounded were in safe hands, the initial chaos was over as we could focus on the extent of our losses and what we needed to do. Dealing with the anger of the Kenyans was one thing; paying respect to the members of our FSN community was another. We held a memorial service in the garden of the Residence before the end of the first week for the Kenyan colleagues we had lost. We were a large mission so I spent a long time greeting people. I could immediately see those who had lost a loved one. I'll never forget the haunted, shocked, sorrowful expressions on their faces. Then, as I said before, there were individual funerals to attend and additional memorial services for individual Americans.

We also had to manage Washington, because once the press left and the crisis task force disbanded, we lost a cohesive way of dealing with the myriad of issues we faced. The Africa Bureau was as usual flooded with problems all over the sub Sahara and we were just one of many problems. The Department returned to business as usual much faster than we were ready and we felt that there was a lack of understanding as to just how blown away we literally had been. People would start saying, "Well, you didn't respond to our cable, what's wrong with you"? "Well, our communication system had been blown up." For a while I was interacting with the Department via Hotmail – we were lucky that AID had an internet link.

Q: That's a private e-mail account.

BUSHNELL: Right. And via cell phone. We had nothing else. Our people literally had to dig through the rubble of the embassy and move as much as could be salvaged over to the AID building, where we were squeezed in. OSHA would have had a fit if they had seen us. Your office here would probably have had six people in it.

Q: We're talking about an office about 25 feet by 10?

BUSHNELL: We were cheek to jowl with wires all over the place. The AID building was in the suburbs of Nairobi. It had been built as an apartment building, but by Kenyan standards. It was so vulnerable that on the eighth floor where my office was we were allowed only one safe and

that was put next to a pillar for fear it would otherwise fall through the floor. The AID Director had arrived just a few days before the bombing. He offered to give up his office but I thought that we would be in there temporarily, so I said, “No, no, no, I’ll just take this little side office.” It ended up being my office the rest of the time I was in Nairobi. It was a tiny little office. There were times when I wished that Jock had offered his office a second time, but he didn’t. On the other hand, it showed people that I was in it with them, that I did not have any more perks than they did. Fortunately, the AID office building was not too far away from the Residence, so I could have many meetings there. It turned out not to be a big deal.

As you can imagine, we were hemorrhaging money. We were getting to the end of the fiscal year and rather than scrubbing the books we were writing checks. The Department kept saying, “It’s okay, eventually we’ll cover them” but our new financial management officer was terrified that he was going to be in violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act. The communications people fashioned a section out of the floor I was on and began to cannibalize the computers that had been blown up. Everything seemed to take so long to get fixed. I won’t even talk about personal issues, like trying to get insurance to pay for vehicles or belongings that were lost. Being bombed didn’t fit the guidelines for anything. Eventually, the Department created the Office of Victims Assistance to help in cases like ours but it didn’t exist at the time.

Once the Secretary and her entourage came and left, we received what I began to call the disaster tourists. Well meaning people from various parts of Washington who couldn’t do a thing to help us. In November I sent a cable to Washington requesting by name the people we wanted to visit. The response was “Now wait a minute, you’re complaining about the visitors who are coming and now you want others. You’re sending very mixed messages here.” They didn’t seem to understand the difference between those VIPs who could be part of the solution and those having their photographs taken in the remains of the embassy.

Among the visitors were two Congressional staffers from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which, at the time, was chaired by Jesse Helms – not exactly someone enamored of the Foreign Service. I had them meet with school teachers and community members because I wanted the staffers to understand the ripple effects of the bombing on the entire community. They heard the concerns and complaints of the community and took those back to Washington. I got into big trouble!

A colleague from Washington, and someone I had known for years, let me have it on behalf of the “Seventh Floor.” He told me I had gone too far and that some folks back in Washington thought I had lost it entirely. He ended by saying that we were going to get what we wanted--attention from the Director General--but that he (DG) was coming to shake his fist in my face. I thought I was going to melt away. It took every bit of resilience I had to keep control.

Q: How did you respond to all of this?

BUSHNELL: I was dumbfounded. I hadn’t been so upset since the week of the bombing when I was ambushed on camera by CNN with a question about the letter I had sent to the Secretary regarding security concerns. Someone had leaked the information and the Department had not yet figured out how it would respond. They were shocked and most upset when they called me

and found out I had already been asked about it – as if I were the person responsible for the leak.

Anyway, the fact is that the Director General did come, listened and committed himself to run interference back in the Department when we needed it.

We desperately needed volunteers to help us get back up and running and people responded in best Foreign Service fashion. As an example, a FSN came from London to do nothing but write job descriptions for six weeks. We couldn't advertise the jobs of the people we had lost because all of our job descriptions had gone up in smoke. Without advertising the jobs, we couldn't hire, train or replace. This was typical of kinds of things we had to do to get as far as Square One. Another example of the invaluable help some people provided was the re-establishment of our Post Office.

I don't want to give the impression that we had received no help from Washington. On the contrary. Some of our colleagues were extraordinary. For example, there was a TDY team in town to review the status of our Army Post Office, given the few number of military personnel at post. They were likely going to close it down. The bombing, of course, made it a moot point. But rather than just leave, these people took it upon themselves to set up a new APO in the AID building where we had moved. I'm not sure anyone told them to do it. They just did. I can't tell you what a morale booster that was! Within ten days we were getting mail.

People volunteered from posts all over the world to come help. It was amazing.

Q: That was what you needed.

BUSHNELL: By contrast, a few weeks after the bombing I was told that the combat marines sent to provide the security perimeter lacking at the AID building would be removed for lack of funds. That conversation and my threat to call a press conference should the decision be implemented continued for months. The rationale in Washington was that, having been blown up, we would not be harmed again. We felt quite differently where we were.

We had already experienced the results of an intercepted package at the AID building. The sniffer dogs behaved as they do when coming across bombs and we all had file down into the basement of the building to wait the results of the investigation. It turned out to be an innocent package but the experience shook people to the core. The looks on their faces told me just how much we were still dealing with bomb effects.

Another security test came as a result of President Clinton's order to bomb the al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and a chemical factory in Sudan. Louie Freeh, the Director the FBI, had arrived that day and he and I were to meet the following morning. That night, however, I received an urgent telephone call advising me the Director was coming over to see me immediately. I got out of bed, threw on some clothes on and called one of the Country Team members who lived nearby to hasten over. This sounded serious.

When Freeh arrived he was beside himself. He had just learned that the U.S. was going to launch missile attacks and no one had given him prior warning. He wanted to know what I knew –

which was less than he, at that point – and what my plan was. “I assume,” he said “that you’re going to evacuate. I’m removing all FBI personnel; I have five seats left on the plane coming in that I’ll give to you. You can decide whom you want to send out.” Then, he dashed off.

Huh?? I called Washington to verify the news – AF was as much in the dark as we – then had our security team come over to the Residence. We looked at one another with both shock and bemusement, then settled down to figure out the worse reaction we could think of. Given the anger Kenyans were feeling toward al Qaeda, and the small number of Muslims in Nairobi, about the worse we would experience was the ire of people coming back from Friday prayers at a Mosque some distance away from AOD. We decided to close the embassy at noon, advise people to stay home and see what happened. Nothing. Meanwhile, the FBI with all of their long-guns, short-guns and soft suits had high-tailed it out.

Yet another security ordeal came just before Christmas when we received credible warnings from Washington of another possible attack on a U.S. embassy facility, along with a local threat against the International School in Nairobi.

Q: This is an American school, not your school specifically?

BUSHNELL: It was the International School of Kenya, the school that the U.S. Government supported. We decided to cancel all Christmas festivities, close the embassy, and arranged to have the Christmas packages and mail delivered to an offsite location. I didn’t know how much worse things could get. Fortunately, they began to look up in the new year.

Q: Alright. We will pick this up from New Year’s on when we move in to the real recovery phase.

BUSHNELL: Right.

Q: Question, and you can answer it at another time. Given your prior complaints about embassy security, did you have a feeling that your record would be negatively affected or not, or do ambassadors get that sort of thing?

BUSHNELL: It was much more subtle. I had the feeling that I was deemed untrustworthy by senior people, especially after my efforts to get attention to the post after the bombing. The Accountability Review Board came to Nairobi with the full intention of holding me accountable. Members felt differently after they heard our views and concluded, among other things, that a succession of Administrations and Congresses, including the current one, did not pay sufficient attention to security.

Q: Which was a bad thing to happen to you?

BUSHNELL: In some respects. On the one hand, I became a pioneer among ambassadors who started pushing back because of their security responsibilities. On the other hand, to some of my colleagues and political appointees, I would forever be a person who didn’t stay in the box.

Q: Well, we’re going to have to continue this, but I’ve heard people who dealt with the Secretary

of State, Madeleine Albright at that time, she was surrounded by a group of people for the most part who were very protective of her and you know, almost vengeful on anybody who might hurt her reputation. Did you feel that at all or at least did you feel that there was a cocoon around her?

BUSHNELL: Very much so. I know they were very mad at me for not allowing the Secretary to visit in the immediate aftermath of the bombing -- they made that very clear to me. But, I really didn't see them as that vengeful. I had traveled with Madeleine Albright and her team when she was at USUN. So, I knew a couple of the people and we had gotten along all right. That said, there was no doubt in my mind as to where their loyalties lay.

Q: Okay. Well then, we'll pick this up the next time after New Year's, it will be '99?

BUSHNELL: Correct.

Q: And we'll pick it up then and the new phase.

Today is the 8th of September, 2005. Pru, you mentioned before that really up to the end of 1998 it was really an initial recovery phase. Now, we're talking about 1999. When did you put it together and back to being a diplomat again?

BUSHNELL: We didn't waste much time getting back to work. When I look at my calendar at the time I can see that I was juggling all sorts of things... memorial services with meetings on the economy; reconstruction issues with political issues, starting by repairing our relationship with Kenyans.

If I had to pick a point representing a new chapter it would be New Year's Eve, 1998. A longstanding embassy tradition was the sun-downer at Nairobi Game Park. Families would gather and watch the sunset over the park before going off to other New Year celebrations. It was terribly important that we reinitiate our traditions, and certainly the New Year's Eve sundowner was one of the wonderful ones.

A lot of people went out. All of us felt the presence of ghosts, people who had been there the year before who were no longer with us. Given the tension around Christmas when threats forced us to close the embassy and cancel holiday activities, emotions were high. Here we were, in this extraordinary landscape of savannah and acacia trees, near the Ngong Hills looking at a rhino in the distance. The sun began to set as someone played Auld Lang Sine. We hugged one another, many of us with tears in our eyes. We had survived but so many of our friends, colleagues and neighbors had not. Then I looked up and saw one of the most extraordinary sunsets of my life. Bright shafts of light and blue skies appeared between two thin layers of pink clouds. It was such a message of comfort. The sun does come up and go down, no matter what happens to individuals. It was a fitting end – or beginning.

The Consular Section was the first part of the embassy to be re-opened at a brand new site. Which reminds me of an amazing story. At some point after the bombing I ran into an American citizen in Washington who came up to me and said, "Are you the ambassador from Nairobi?"

“Yes I am.” He said, “Let me tell you something. My wife was in Nairobi as a tourist on the day of the bombing. Her passport had been stolen along with a number of other things. She was on her way down to the embassy to apply for a new passport when the bomb went off. When she arrived at the embassy a number of hours after the bombing, she met up with an American Foreign Service Officer, going through the rubble. My wife explained her problem and was issued a new passport.” Isn’t that an incredible? Our consular operations in some respects were never down, although we lacked the facilities.

FBO purchased and renovated a house for consular operations. They also found a building to which we could move pending the construction of a new embassy -- the AID was clearly unacceptable.

Mending our relations with the Kenyans was also a priority of reconstruction efforts. In early ’99 we finally received Congressional funding -- \$40 million -- to assist with the enormous costs the Kenyans had borne. We were not, however, to spend a penny for overhead costs, which meant that in addition to everything else, we had to figure out how to dispense funds fairly and accountably. The AID staff did a wonderful job. We were able to cover medical costs, reconstruct some of the buildings and establish a limited scholarship fund for orphans. Unfortunately, the needs far outweighed the funds and a lot of Kenyans remain angry with us to this day for lack of compensation.

I became the human face of the USG – of course, I always was. I spent a good amount of time visiting hospitals and orphanages, going to various kinds of commemorative events and talking with people. It was heart-wrenching work and very important.

We also got back into policy issues. I already talked about what we were doing on the corruption front. Moi had won another term in the ’97 elections; opposition parties were arguing for constitutional changes and power sharing; regional conflicts continued and our agenda remained as full as ever. In addition, we began working on joint and then regional military exercises. Easier said than done because Tanzania and Uganda were in the European Theater Command and Kenya was in the Central Command. Still, we were able to initiate disaster assistance exercises, which proved a wonderful precedent.

But, we could not ignore community issues and the impact of the bombing on the staff, families, teachers and thousands of Kenyans. As I’ve already said, counseling was not a part of Kenyan culture, nor the Foreign Service culture, so while we offered it, few took advantage. People were all over the place in their reactions to the trauma. Some moved on very quickly and others could not. The embassy community was divided. I called in as much help as I could get – from State psychiatrists to an expert from Oklahoma City to FSI trainers. I learned a lot from them but as a community member and leader, I can tell you that we had lots of ups and downs.

I learned that I could not make people heal. I couldn’t take away people’s anger or sadness or denial or anything that they were going through. What I could do was to create an environment in which they could help themselves to heal. I could create an environment in which people cared for one another. "Take care of yourself; be kind to yourself, and be kind to one another" became a mantra and a leadership philosophy. I was determined that we were going to get

through this as a community even if as individuals we staggered and stumbled now and then.

Q: How did, you get this out?

BUSHNELL: Town hall meetings, staff meetings, newsletters, memos...all of the usual communication vehicles. Plus, we had memorials. Absent a location to commemorate the 44 people who had died in the embassy, I set aside a part of the Residence gardens to create a fountain, the lip of which had the names of all of our deceased. It was personally healing. I had hoped to use the commemoration as part remembrance, part celebration of the many acts of heroism displayed since the bomb was detonated.

Washington had given us a general Mission Award for Heroism but that was it. It was up to us to take care of whatever individual or other group awards we wanted to give. I asked one of the political officers, poor guy, to do nothing but talk to people and write up awards. Another lesson learned. It was absolutely the wrong thing to do and turned into a mess. The process opened all sorts of wounds, anger and finger-pointing; it pulled people apart rather than bringing them together. So, we focused on commemorating the memorial fountain that day rather than the awards.

The Assistant Secretary for African Affairs came and, to our surprise, so did many of the family members of the Americans who had been killed. Unlike the family members of our deceased Kenyan colleagues, the Americans were very open in their anger -- at the way they had been treated by the Department, at the fact that their loved ones had died, at the tragedy imposed so suddenly. It was so painful to witness and even more so, to absorb during a tense meeting after the ceremony.

Q: Well, I assume that your husband played resident physiatrist when you came home?

BUSHNELL: He took wonderful care of me and of others. He had served as CLO years before and had always remained active in the community, even more so after the bombing.

I also had to help myself -- focus on first things first and one thing at a time and avoid becoming overwhelmed at the totality of our problems. I started the day swimming laps, did exercises, meditated -- whatever I could do to keep body and soul together. Since I knew I was going to Guatemala, I also began studying Spanish, first on my own, then with a tutor. It helped a lot to concentrate on something that had nothing to do with the bombing. Before I knew it, May had come around and it was time to leave.

Q: A question I want to ask. The immediate aftermath of the bombing, did you have a feeling that anybody in Washington was saying, "Maybe we better get her out of there." You know, I mean I can see people saying, "Well, maybe we better send a man in or an ex-soldier in" or something like that. Was this ever a factor?

BUSHNELL: If there were such conversations in Washington, they never came to my ear.

Q: Well, you're a powerful person and talking to you I would think it would be ridiculous. But,

knowing Washington and people sitting around there....

BUSHNELL: The Assistant Secretary for African Affairs was a woman and so was the Secretary of State. These were formidable women who knew me before the bombing. I think I would have had to have gone pretty far astray. People got frustrated with me and people got angry with me, but I don't know that they ever thought that I was not up for the job.

Q: Were you aware or hear of happenings in Dar es Salaam?

BUSHNELL: I actually had very little contact with Dar es Salaam. In part, because it took us a few months to get our communication systems up and running. I knew John Lang who was the Chargé in Dar at the time of the bombing. He and I communicated I suspect through Hotmail on a couple of personnel issues. The new ambassador arrived, a political appointee whom I did not know. Dar was somewhat different in that it did not have the extensive loss of life that we had. I was aware that they were reconstructing as well, but I can't say that we had that much interaction. Up until the moment I left, there was so much to do in Nairobi.

FSNs, in particular, were concerned about the transfer cycle and how their new bosses would interact with them. Would they understand the extent of the damage and trauma? Johnnie Carson, who had been DAS in African Affairs, was to replace me which was great news, but many of the others were unknown. On the Washington end, MED held briefings to alert people as to what to expect. In Nairobi, the DCM – who, fortunately was staying – and I met in small groups with all of the FSNs to give them whatever information we had about the building to which they would be moved pending the construction of a new embassy, and to listen to their concerns.

One, which had come up earlier, was the disposition of the old chancery and grounds. Fortunately, it was too damaged to every use again, so we pulled it down. (Among the myriad of decisions was whether to blast it down or chip it down. I decided that Nairobi residents did not need to hear another blast from that spot, so opted for chipping. Oh, the complaints!).

The grounds had been leased to us by the Kenyan government for 99 years and we still had lots of time left. People voiced concern that if we returned the land, one of the land-grabbing members of Moi's cabinet would seize it to construct heaven knows what.

I went back to FBO requesting that we construct a memorial park and began another round of mutually irritating conversations. "We don't do memorials!" My instructions were precise: hand it back. We did, but not before I cornered every senior member of Moi's government with the request that he support the establishment of a memorial park. The local American business organization had offered to landscape it and provide money for upkeep. I took a cue from the Vietnam Memorial in Washington and asked that a wall be constructed with the names of everyone who had died in the attack so that their children and grandchildren could come and remember them. By the time I left plans were well along and the park remains there today, although I understand it is short of funding.

I did my best to implement a good exit strategy and noticed that people were taking our

departure fairly easily. At first I thought this was great. Then self satisfaction turned to irritation and then hurt. After all we had gone through, no one was going to organize even a standard good-by ceremony? The day before our departure, Dick and I had inevitable errands which included stopping by the DCM's Residence. We pulled into the driveway and there, lining each side were all of the mission employees. They had worked up a surprise party for me! I was shocked. It was one of the most memorable points of my life, because the message was, "Hey, Ambassador, you who have prided yourself on having such a good pulse on your community didn't know what we were doing. We put one over on you. We did this as a community. It's okay, you can go." It was just such an incredible message. If it were a movie, you would have had schmaltzy music and garish sun sets.

Moi and I had our final tiff at the formal going-away ceremony. He was mad, I learned later, that Washington was not sending a white male to replace me and decided it was my fault. Fortunately, he did confirm that we could use the land for a park, so we got what we wanted in the end.

Q: Did you ever get any feedback about how Carson and Moi got along?

BUSHNELL: Oh, they got along very well. Three years later, when I returned for the commemoration of the memorial park and Moi was as nice to me as could be. He just happened to be grumpy when I took my leave as ambassador.

Q: But, it wasn't a time to get grumpy.

BUSHNELL: Well, like many despots, it was always about him.

Q: Before you left Kenya you knew you were going to Guatemala. How did you feel about that?

BUSHNELL: When Secretary Albright visited Kenya after the bombing, she asked about my next assignment. My husband, Dick, and Linda Howard, who had been my OMS for years, had already decided they wanted Guatemala. So, when the Secretary asked where I wanted to go, Guatemala was what came out of my mouth. It was a complete accident. She thought I'd be good in Guatemala, so that was it. WHA, the Western Hemisphere Affairs bureau, was less than thrilled to have an interloper come into their turf and let me know that in no uncertain terms. I was told they already had their "minority candidate."

Q: So, you were considered a minority candidate still at this point?

BUSHNELL: Yep, that's right.

Q: When was this?

BUSHNELL: We left Nairobi in May, 1999 and I had my confirmation hearing within two or three weeks of our departure. I then went into Spanish language training.

ANTHONY C. ZINNI
Commander-in-Chief, CENTCOM
MacDill AFB, Tampa, FL (1997-2000)

General Zinni was born and raised in Pennsylvania. After graduating from Vallanova College he joined the Marines, which became his lifelong career. His distinguish career took him to Vietnam, Okinawa, Philippines and Germany, where he served in senior level positions. Attaining the rank of General, Zinni served as Commander-in-Chief of CENTCOM, where he was deeply involved in worldwide missions including Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan. General Zinni was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.

Q: Could you talk about blowing up our embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam?

ZINNI: In 1998 Osama bin Laden issued a series of fatwas. For us in there, they were watching him pretty closely. It was clear to our intelligence people that this was his coming out party and he was announcing that all Americans were targets, not just military. He announced he had the right to a weapon of mass destruction. He was setting the stage for, I think he had finally jelled this network together and he was now making the announcement that he was coming onto the world scene. The first, of course, major act we end up with is the bombing of the two embassies. Of course, Kenya was in our area of responsibility and the one in Tanzania in EUCOM's AOR.

The Nairobi bombing occurs and I immediately sent a team down there to take charge, to set up a joint task force, provide military support, medical, engineering support, security. We had a magnificent ambassador there, Prudence Bushnell. She was wounded. I went down there. You know, the Kenyans blamed the Americans. You know, it was not easy for her to see this Embassy blown up and she was personally wounded and she carried on like a Marine. I have tremendous respect for her.

They set up the embassy in the only place they had available which was in the middle of this, you know, cluster of buildings in the middle of Nairobi, a really terrible situation in terms of the security. We had a company of Marines in there and found that among the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon many would bail out on this thing. You know, they kept arguing that this was State's responsibility. We went and took care of the emergency part. I kept coming back saying, "You can't leave these Americans. You can't leave them." I lost one of my troops killed in that embassy bombing, a security assistance sergeant, Air Force, and you know, you have to be there. You're going to take time for them to find another property to buy, to make sure the security arrangements are in place and we had to provide protection. I put my foot down. I mean, this was a, you know, "fire me but we're going to stay there and stop making an issue out of this." So finally they didn't fight me on it, although they were really tough. They really chipped away at me.

The other thing that is hard to talk about, six months before the bombing, I sent a personal forward message to the Secretary of State saying we have two embassies in my AOR that are going to be blown up by a car bomb. One of them is Nairobi, the other one is Qatar and I said

I'm willing to help with a security assessment and willing to help in any way I can. These are vulnerable embassies and I said that because both ambassadors had come to me because they weren't getting any answers. Basically, I got a message back saying butt out. It is not your business. Thank you for your interest, but sorry. The only two embassies and of course, I had security assistance people in those embassies. There were obviously Marine security guards and attachés but my own people and Prudence and at the time Pat Theros was in Qatar. Those two embassies were a security assessment nightmare, right on the streets, very vulnerable. And they kept coming back saying well, the Intel says there is no threat. You know, the threat is going to go where the vulnerability is. We hardened everything else in the region and I couldn't get their attention. I didn't say anything about it after the bombing. A reporter had gotten it and State just sort of dismissed it. But I sent the message.

Q: Prudence Bushnell noted that she had been talking about this for a long time and got nowhere. Everyone talked about what a great heroine she was, she said, "Where were you when I needed you?"

ZINNI: And she was the one who had asked me. So I sent the message.

It hurt our relationships in Kenya, you know, but the military to military relationship always stayed strong. The difficulty became in the region, you know, I felt it important for security reasons to keep strong military to military relationship but you take the countries like Pakistan and Kenya, where non-proliferation, human rights, issues with the government and everything else, it punished the military. I would get restricted in places where we had excellent contacts like General [inaudible] in Kenya, we knew from our own intelligence had cleaned up the military, had gotten rid of the corruption. The military was clean, he was doing everything right, no abuses in military and I would be limited in what I can do with him because of Moi's administration. Thompson would come to me out of frustration and say, why are you punishing me? We what you want me to do? March to the palace and takeover of government? Is that what you advocate?

End of reader