Sudan Experience Project:
Executive Summary Guidelines and Sample

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Contents
Guidelines for Executive Summary
Sample Executive Summary

I. Guidelines for Executive Summary

Executive summaries should be written in 12-point, "Times New Roman" font. The summary should begin with the basic information that is outlined at the top of each question set: name, Sudan rebuilding specialty area(s), age, education, employer, relevant professional background, job duties and location, training specific to Sudan assignment, period of service, future plans. These references should be brief.

The body of summary should consist of no more than a page describing the interviewee's experiences, characterizing their various aspects, and providing an assessment of his/her program and activities. For example:

Interviewee was assigned to train police recruits but found that insurgent threats were such that police were too afraid/ill equipped to be effective

Interviewee saw the Sudaneses with whom he/she worked as friendly/distrustful/fearful.

Lines of authority were clear/unclear; equipment was sufficient/insufficient.

Interviewee did not/did feel adequately trained for responsibilities.

Project was/was not well organized; successful/unsuccessful/too early to tell.

Overall, interviewee's experiences and impressions were positive/negative/mixed.

[Not "interviewee has strong views on what worked or did not," but what are those views and why did things work or not.]

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II. Sample Executive Summary

Please note the following example is purely illustrative and is not based on an AEP interview or any research into PRT or local governance building in Sudan.

United States Institute of Peace
Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Sudan Experience Project

JOHN SMITH
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Interviewed by: Interviewer Name
Initial interview date: Month Day, Year
Copyright 2006 USIP & ADST

John Smith, 42, is an active duty Foreign Service Officer with 17 years of service. He has a B.A. from Columbia University and a Master's in International Affairs from George Washington University. During his Foreign Service career he has served extensively in North Africa and South East Asia. In Sudan, Smith was detailed to a PRT in Khartoum, where he focused on developing and assisting institutes of democratic governance at the municipal level. He was stationed in Khartoum from June 2002 to June 2004.

Smith found local governance in Khartoum had deteriorated under the Taliban. Local level government was non-existent. Local military commanders were acting as de facto municipal "governors", although they worked closely with community religious leaders. There was also a lack of local-level politicians. Political parties/militias efforts were geared more toward national government involvement. Smith goal was therefore two-fold; (1) foster community political participation; (2) design an institutional format for democratic governance that was acceptable to local socio-cultural norms.

Smith found implementing democratic structures challenging, as there was no such structures in Sudan's recent history. With the exception of a few outspoken community "leaders" (who often lacked any real public support), there was initially little community involvement. Smith posits that this unwillingness to participate was a legacy of the Taliban's policy of "rule by fear".

Smith implemented several outreach programs to foster greater community input, including (1) meetings with local religious, tribal, business, and professional figures; (2) media campaigns through leaflets, newspapers, and radio; (3) outreach to the burgeoning local NGO community, including several women's groups; and (4) "town-hall" meetings targeted at discussions with the community at large. Smith used input from his meetings with community members to design a "town-council" format based on the American model. He also worked closely with staff representatives from the Northern Alliance and local US military commanders.

After formulating a design for local governance, Smith worked with local groups and the US military to conduct council elections at the district and municipal levels. The elections were moderately successfully, which Smith regards as a great triumph given the adverse conditions, short timeline, and lack of democratic tradition.

Smith's next major task was to support the local councils. He used US military emergency reconstruction funds to provide councils with "block grants". Councils had discretionary use of these funds, which were used to finance small-scale infrastructure repairs, reconstruction projects, and council operating budgets. Smith found that not enough money was available, a fact that initially undermined the credibility of the local councils. The council funding source was later changed to USAID congressional supplemental money, which Smith found moved too slowly. He blames this on a lack of contract officers and overly-stringent regulations.

In addition to financial support, Smith worked to provide local councils with the technical capabilities to function as institutes of government. Many local people had only low-levels of education, if any, and so training (finance, budgeting, contracting, procurement, etc.) became a top priority.

Overall, Smith believes his efforts were successful n developing participatory, democratic, local governance. Given his background in the region and the dynamic situation on the ground, Smith did not feel there was any special training he could have benefited from. He notes his knowledge of the local language was an enormous boon, as he did not necessarily trust many of the translators. He also notes strong communication amongst civilian and military components on both the American and Sudanese sides. Communications with Washington were more difficult, and "the federal bureaucracy was the number one thing holding us back." Local persons he interacted with spoke positively and optimistically about the future of Sudan, a view Smith shares.

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