The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training  
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project  

**NORBERT L. ANSCHUTZ**  

*Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy*  
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INTERVIEW

[Note: This interview was not edited by Mr. Anschutz.]

Q: Today is July 13, 1992. This is an interview with Norbert L. Anschutz concerning his career which is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies. I am Charles Stuart
Kennedy. I wonder if you could give me a little about your background--when and where were you born, where you were education, etc.?

ANSCHUTZ: I was born in 1915 and I always say that I am a Missouri Volk Deutscher because my family comes from St. Louis and they were German for several generations in St. Louis. In my own case, I spent most of my childhood in Kansas City, Missouri. I went to the University of Kansas to college, and to Harvard Law School. I finished law school in 1935. I went back to Kansas City where I passed the Missouri Bar and was in a law office until called to active duty in the Army in the summer of 1941.

I spent five years in the Army. I had been a reserved officer and was shifted up to Panama in December, 1941 to the first, and at that time, only battalion of United States barrage balloons. After a couple of years down there, during which I was married to a girl I had known in college who managed to get a job in the Canal Zone, I came back to the United States and was in various posts in the United States. By the time that I was about to be shipped overseas again, the United States had air superiority in Europe so I was sent to the military government school at Charlottesville, at the University of Virginia. I spent my last tour in the Army as the deputy chief of the legal division of the US element of the Control Commission for Austria.

During that period I developed a considerable interest in international affairs. When I came back to Washington in the early summer of 1946, I went around to the State Department to inquire what the possibilities were of finding gainful employment. I suppose it is well known that if you go into personnel offices that is the worst place in the world to find a job.

In the course of my wanderings in the State Department ...which, of course, was Old State...

Q: Which is now the Executive Office Building.

ANSCHUTZ: Yes. I remember one hot summer afternoon in 1946 I was just about to give up on everything when I ran into Joe Gray. He had been in Vienna where he was the deputy chief of the US Political Advisor's Mission. Joe was a Tennessean, a very old shoe type of fellow who had been special assistant to Cordell Hull and then later was sent to Vienna. Jack Erhardt was the Diplomatic Advisor and Mark Clark was, of course, the Commander of US Forces in Austria. On this particular day I met Joe and he said, "How are you? What's up?" I said, "Well, I'll tell you Joe, I have been going around here knocking on doors and I think I am going to go take a job in a law firm in Chicago." He said, "Well, don't be hasty." I was living at that time with my parents-in-law and wife. My father-in-law lived in the residence at Mt. Alto, which is now the Russian Embassy. So by the time I got home on that scorching afternoon, my wife said, "Mr. Gray wants you to call him." I called him. Joe, in his understated way said, "Well, there is a man here that I would like to have you talk to. So you come down here tomorrow morning and speak to a man called Loy Henderson." So I did.

In obtaining my interview with Loy Henderson I was first received by Joe Satterthwaite, who was Loy Henderson's right hand man for the Middle East and North Africa at that time.
Loy took me on and my first assignment was...I think they used to call them policy information officers...each of the geographical bureaus had a policy information officer. The function of the policy information officer is to read all the incoming traffic and to prepare a summary for his area, which appeared in the daily intelligence summary which was produced in the Department. That was a very educational assignment for me.

Q: This would be for what was then Near Eastern and African Affairs?

ANSCHUTZ: Well, Near East South Asian and Africa.

Q: This included India, Near East and all that?

ANSCHUTZ: That's right.

Q: With the exception, I suppose, of Algeria?

ANSCHUTZ: I don't know if Algeria was in it or not, it was part of France at that time. I can't remember whether we were reporting on Algeria at that time. I suspect we were, as a matter of fact.

I did this for a while. I had an office on the top floor of the Executive Office Building, the Old State building. I remember one day I was at home because I had a bad cold. I had a telephone call from the office saying that Mr. Henderson had assigned me to the staff of the US Representative on the first Security Council Investigative Commission.

Now this was a commission which was the first organization of this type set up by the Security Council to investigate the charges of Greece against its northern neighbors...Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Greece alleged that these Communist countries were supporting the Communist effort in Greece to overthrow the monarchical-fascist government, as it was referred to.

Q: This was when?

ANSCHUTZ: This was in the fall of 1946. Again I have to owe an early indoctrination to Loy Henderson's thoughtfulness of putting me on the staff there. The US Representative was Mark Ethridge, who had been the editor of the Louisville Courier General what had a very high professional standing. Mark's deputy was a fellow by the name of Harding Bancroft, who was also a Harvard Law School lawyer, a couple of years ahead of me, I hadn't know him before. He came from the United Nations sector of the State Department. Also on the staff was Cy Black, who later was a professor of Middle East and Balkan history, as well as Russian history, at Princeton. Another staff member was a former scholar by the name of Harry Howard.

Q: How did we operate and what were the issues which you were dealing with at that time? The NEA branch included Greece in those days.

ANSCHUTZ: Yes. In fact it was included in NEA until about 1968.
The American interests, of course, were to arrest the spread of Soviet influence. The Soviets, of course, had moved into Bulgaria and had supported Tito in Yugoslavia as well as the Communist elements in Albania. The object of Soviet East Bloc policy was to overthrow the more or less conservative government...Royalist Government...in Greece. There had been all during the war considerable amount of fighting between the monarchical-fascists on the one hand and the Communists on the other hand. The Security Council investigation had been requested by the Greek Government and supported by the Western Allies, the United States, France, Britain, all of whom, of course, as members of the Security Council were represented on the Commission. So the Commission was no small thing because there were 11 Representatives and their staff.

When the Commission established itself in Athens, which was just about the end of December, 1946, a considerable amount of effort was spent trying to determine what the modus operandi of the Commission would be. The Communists, as it were, the dissident elements in Greece supported by the Soviets and their allies, had been extremely active and were making a rather, I think, transparent effort to influence world opinion concerning the situation in Greece by alleging all sorts of atrocities and human rights violations, etc. by the government of Greece, which were inflicted on their opponents, again largely Left and Communist elements. The tactics of the...let me call them Soviets because they in effect orchestrated the resistance to the Security Council Commissions' activity. Their tactic was to allege all sorts of violations, not only activities along the northern border of Greece, but in an effort to show general discomfort and resistance to the Greek Government, they picked out alleged atrocities or problems in various parts of the country, including the Peloponnesus and in the Greek islands.

In order to respond to these various allegations, the Commission was broken up into subcommittees in which most, if not all, of the participating nations had a representative. In my capacity, as the American representative on one of the subcommittees, we went to places like central Greece, to Larisa; to some of the Greek islands where there were prison camps; we went into the Peloponnesus and, of course, later we went up to the northern border area. Later, the Commission as a whole, went into Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania.

As the subcommittees approached the site of their respective investigations, the opponents of the government had their orchestrated reception committee who were demanding the expulsion of the monarchical-fascist government. This was all done, of course, not only to impress the committee but such members of the press as accompanied the subcommittees.

In our deliberations in Athens as to where and when the subcommittees should be despatched, one of the places was up in the hills in the central mountainous area of Greece, to the west of the Larisa of Plain, a town called Agrinione. We paraphrased one of the slogans we used in the United States during the war...Is this trip really necessary? But the Soviets insisted that we had to go to Agrinione. So we went by jeep to the nearest place and then had to walk overland for some hours.

Now, as I have suggested, the Soviet tactic was always to appear as liberators in every area which we visited. They had also arranged for a welcoming committee for us. We had come to decipher
the tactics and it was decided that we would no longer let the Soviets be the first ones into these little towns or villages.

Q: On the committee I assume there was always a Soviet representative?

ANSCHUTZ: There was usually a representative of each of these countries. Now some of the smaller countries didn't have staffs large enough to have a representative on each one, but the major powers did. So we had what I call the Agrinione handicap where the Soviet representative and I virtually foot raced ourselves over several hours of mud and slush to...I don't remember if I arrived first, but at least simultaneously with the Russian.

We were quartered in these extremely poor houses. I am sure the inhabitants gave us everything they had. The hospitality was warm. The next morning we were awakened by a bugle call. We got outside and here about 200 yards away was a group of men all lined up in military formation. They provided some military exercises, as it were, and then marched away into the hills.

Well, apparently the point of this whole exercise of going to this remote spot in the mountains was to provide the Leftist Communists and their associates with the opportunity to present their men and resistant fighters as an organized military force which could theoretically permit them to qualify under the Geneva Convention as organized forces of war. These several hundred men dissolved themselves into the hills, but it was one of the few times...the only time to my knowledge, but there may have been others...where our group actually saw an organized military type activities on the part of the guerrillas.

After a period where we had exhausted most of the charges induced by the Soviets and their allies, we then moved the mission up to Salonika and there was more of the same. We went into various small areas in northern Greece in our subcommittees. We also got into southern Albania. Then, having been through all this, it was decided that groups would go into Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. So there were groups, in which I participated, that went into Bulgaria...Sofia, and to Belgrade, where the usual ritual hearings were held and all the allegations of the depredation of the monarchical-fascists were repeated ad nauseam all for the benefit whatever press, both Western and Eastern, was available.

Then I think some of us got back to Salonika. The Commission had decided that it would in the great tradition write its report in Geneva. So three of us made a jeep trip from Salonika to Sofia, to Belgrade, to Budapest, to Vienna, to Geneva. One of them was Bill Lawrence, who was a well-known international correspondent for the New York Times, and the other was Mark Ethridge's wife, Willy Snow Ethridge, quite a character.

We eventually emerged in Geneva and the report was written in which the Western powers said all the right things and the Eastern Bloc contested all these things with their dissent. We returned to the United States and the matter was discussed by the Security Council. At least, to a certain degree, the allegations of the Greek Government were sustained by the Council report. At least the Greek Government was not censured in a way that would have been politically embarrassing to it.
Q: After these reports were written did the group of you from the West, and you particularly, could you sign this report with ease?

ANSCHUTZ: Well, I think we tried to be objective about the matter and I think we fully understood what the Soviets and Communists were trying to do. We felt it was our mission to lay that out to the extent that we could in this type of diplomatic document, and I think we did.

Q: I take it that the Greek Government was not playing completely with unsullied hands.

ANSCHUTZ: You know, I don't recollect the detailed incidents that we looked into, but the civil war in Greece was a very vicious thing.

Q: Oh, nasty.

ANSCHUTZ: And it in effect continued for several years thereafter. One little story that always amused me. The story goes that Churchill came to Greece at the end of the war, or in the final days of the war, and is alleged to have in effect said, "Now, who is in charge here?" And one of his staff said, "Well, General Plastiras is the head of the government." Churchill is alleged to have said, "Plastiras? Me thinks he does have feet of clay."

Q: I take it that that trip turned you into a Greek specialist?

ANSCHUTZ: Yes, it very much influenced my future assignments.

Q: Was that about the time when you moved into Greek Affairs?

ANSCHUTZ: Yes. While we were still in Greece, on March 7, 1947, I was in southern Albania some place, the Truman Doctrine was announced. The Truman Doctrine, which provided for the support of Greece and Turkey against Soviet pressure, had been influenced, I think it is fair to say, to a degree by the reporting of the Commission. I do not say it was crucial or critical, but the reporting from our embassies and from Mark Ethridge, I think certainly tended to support the decision to declare the so-called Truman Doctrine. This was a decision which was taken before the final writing of the report and before the consideration of the report by the Security Council. But it was part of a general political reaction to Soviet pressure on Greece and Turkey.

Shortly after I came back I was assigned to Greek Affairs in the Office of...I have forgotten exactly what it was called. There was an office set up to implement the providing of assistance to Greece and Turkey under the terms of the Truman Doctrine. It was called the Greek-Turkey office. George McGhee, who was later Assistant Secretary of State, was appointed to be the director of the office. I was in charge of the Greek segment under that. I spent some time, a year or so, in that capacity.

Subsequently I was assigned to the Greek Desk, I think first as an assistant and then became the Greek Desk Officer. During this period while I was the Greek Desk Officer, Jack Peurifoy was
assigned as Ambassador to Greece. It was in that connection that I met Jack for the first time. I did the usual things that the Desk Officer would do in arranging briefings, background and other activities to prepare Ambassador Peurifoy for his post. As it happened, Jack went to Greece and came back on consultation about a year after going out. In those days, this would have been early 1950, people from the Desk went out to meet the Ambassador. So I carried my spear and stood strictly at attention as the Ambassador returned. He got off the plane and greeted everyone warmly, as was his wont. He then took me by the arm and said, "Norb, you are going back to Greece." Well, in point of fact I did.

I arrived in Athens in October 1951...

Q: I would like to backtrack just a bit. While you were working on the Greek Desk and Greek-Turkish affairs, these sort of meld into each other, George McGhee was running things. How did he operate? He was an important figure in the diplomatic equation in those days.

ANSCHUTZ: George had been a very successful petroleum engineer. He also married the daughter of a very well-known petroleum engineer. So George had made a lot of money and I think his wife's family had a lot of money. He was, I think, very well established with the Democratic machine. He was a very intelligent, able fellow and had a businesslike approach to problems. He approached his problems with great energy.

I have another little anecdote about George. Some years later, when I was in Athens, and George was Ambassador in Turkey, George came over to Greece to make a visit to Mt. Athos. In those days less use was made of the radio and telephone and telegram and more use was made of despatches. So in the course of human events, I received in Athens a copy of the despatch that George had written describing his visit to Mt. Athos. He described in great detail the dilapidation and general deterioration of the situation which he found there. But the thing that I have always remembered was the final sentence of this despatch which is a typical McGheeism. He said, "What this place needs is some young, vigorous monks."

Q: While you were in Washington, what was your impression of how things were going in Greece?

ANSCHUTZ: This would have been in the late forties and maybe 1950. We, the United States, under the Greek-Turkey program was spending what was a very substantial amount of money at that time. We had developed an aid mission and a military mission which was to train and support the Greek armed forces. In a sense they worked well because the Greeks were so needy. They were highly cooperative and with the American military supplies and some American military counseling from the Joint US Military Advisory Group, the sort of shattered Greek military organization was gradually put into some sort of workable organization. And the work of the guerrillas was somewhat circumscribed.

I think it is also fair to say that as the American assistance increased so did the assistance from Yugoslavia and north increase. So there were some rather significant military conflicts during
that period. But, basically, it went reasonably well, as we all know, and the guerrillas were vanquished or expelled.

In that period too we had not only the military thing, but, for example, there was a campaign of abducting Greek children and sending them up to Bulgaria, Eastern Germany and possibly Poland.

Q: I think also to the Soviet Union, around Odessa.
ANSCHUTZ: That's possible. I don't think I ever knew where they all were.

Q: We are talking about significant numbers, thousands.
ANSCHUTZ: Yes.

Q: Were you getting some of the heat from what appeared to be sort of a bureaucratic problem in Greece at the time where the economic assistance mission had direct access...I heard that when a diplomatic reception was held all the Greek officials would head towards the head of the economic assistance group and leave the Ambassador sort of standing by himself. Did you catch any of this feeling?

ANSCHUTZ: Well, certainly the senior members of the economic mission were very important and I am sure that they were cultivated by the authorities. But I didn't have the feeling that the American Ambassador was ever eclipsed by them. I wouldn't have said that. We did have a large American presence there. There was the economic mission, the military mission, the CIA and all of the Service attachés had substantial staffs plus the fact that there were Air Force units stationed down there at Hellinikon Airbase for various types of support missions which were conducted, I think, in a number of countries in the Balkans and Turkey. It was an important airbase to the whole region. We also had, which I think was more important later, important communication and monitoring facilities in Greece.

Q: What was your impression of the reporting of Ambassador Grady? What was your impression of him and Peurifoy?

ANSCHUTZ: I think Grady was an able fellow. I never served directly under him. I think I made a visit there once while he was ambassador. I think Grady was adequately in control of the situation there. I guess part of this time under Grady, Sophocles Venizelos was prime minister.

Jack Peurifoy was a very different sort of man. Jack had come from the administrative side of the State Department and, I think, he had been very active in organizing things like the United Nations Drafting Convention in San Francisco in 1945, in his senior administrative position. Jack was a very warm personable fellow. He made many friends and as a result of friends both in the State Department, but also in the Congress, he was then appointed Ambassador to Greece. For the most part I think he was a very effective ambassador.
I came to know Jack very well because I worked for him twice. I have always accorded him very high marks for leadership. Jack had courage to make decisions, but he also, which was almost equally if not more important, inspired loyalty and effort on the part of his staff. People liked to work for him because he was very genuine and warm, but also because he took the general attitude that your function, whatever it was, was to tell him what you thought the situation required. He did not try to pretend that he understood more about everything than everybody else. This, at least in my experience, is the kind of thing which evokes response out of the subordinates. If the subordinates have the feeling that the superior is looking to them for guidance, it tends to invoke a strong loyal effort on the part of the subordinates.

In his relationships with the Greeks he was very warm. I think the environment within the Embassy was highly satisfactory under Jack Peurifoy. He did not pretend to be the world's greatest expert on Greece or Greeks, but he was open to comments and advice and frequently accepted it with appropriate appreciation.

**Q:** Were you either on the Desk or at the Embassy when the Polk case came up?

**ANSCHUTZ:** I guess I was on the Desk at that time.

**Q:** I can't remember his name.

**ANSCHUTZ:** George.

**Q:** George Polk, a correspondent who was killed in Thessaloniki.

**ANSCHUTZ:** I don't remember whether I was on the Desk or still handling Greek affairs in the Office of Greek-Turkish Affairs. But I had very little to do with that except to read about it.

**Q:** Then you went out to Athens and were there from 1951-53. Had the situation pretty well cleared up? Were the Greek Monarchy forces pretty much in control by that time?

**ANSCHUTZ:** Yes. They were. By the time I left, they were very definitely so. Of course, the monarchy, King Paul and Queen Frederika, were extremely able and gracious people. They invariably made a very good impression on visiting American dignitaries, Congressmen or other government officials. And they also recognized early on that the Central Intelligence Agency was a effective and relatively direct route into the White House. They played that accordingly.

**Q:** Did we see Queen Frederika as a problem at that time, or did that come later on?

**ANSCHUTZ:** I would say that became more of a problem later on. In the early days she was lady bountiful. She was very effective in going through beleaguered areas and bringing various types of relief supplies, etc. She developed something called the Queen's Fund, which supported various types of Greek handicrafts. She did a number of those things. She was extremely effective in public relation activities.

**Q:** What were you doing at the Embassy?
ANSCHUTZ: At first I was in charge of political/military affairs. One of the things I got involved in was the Greek application to become a member of NATO. There was always the problem of military budgets as well.

Then I was shifted over to become the Political Counselor the second half of my tour there.

Q: What was our initial reaction when the Greeks applied for NATO membership? Were we encouraging them?
ANSCHUTZ: I think basically we supported it. I remember one of the early issues was who should be in command of the NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean. The position which I took and which was accepted by Charlie Yost, who was our DCM, and by Peurifoy, was that it wasn't a question of trying to displace the British in the Mediterranean. The British at that time didn't really have the capacity to do it and the Greeks wanted to be on the side of the angels. They wanted us to have control in the Mediterranean and to have our substantial deployment in the Mediterranean and that was finally accepted.

Q: It became CINCSOUTH stationed at Naples.
ANSCHUTZ: Yes.

Q: When dealing with political/military affairs you must have always been looking over your shoulder at the Turkish situation? Did you feel that you were the Greek advocate and somebody in our Embassy in Ankara was the Turkish advocate, or were you trying to work together to balance this very contentious relationship?
ANSCHUTZ: Well, there was that. Of course, at that period the Greeks weren't sufficiently vigorous so that they could make much of an issue about the Turkish thing. So those relations that were historically very tenuous were at that very particular moment not so bad...I guess the question of Cyprus had not become very acute at that time...

Q: It was still really under British control.
ANSCHUTZ: Yes, that is correct. I wouldn't have said that at that time the Turkish problem was too great. I don't remember whether there was the question of sovereignty of some islands or not.

Q: When you were running the political section there...later this became a very split area over how we should approach Greece...but in this period were the people looking at the Greek picture and dealing with political affairs pretty unanimous on how we were going to operate?
ANSCHUTZ: I think there was always some tension in the situation between what might be called the conservative and the liberal factors in the body politic. There were elements in the government which were basically anti-monarchist. I think at that time the general feeling in the Embassy was that the monarchy was a very useful unifying political force in the country. There were leftists in the government or at least in the Parliament, who were anti-monarchists. I am
thinking now of George Cartalis who was a very intelligent man who was an officer or minister in the economic sphere. And there were people who had been involved in the non-Communist resistance in Greece. There were elements who felt that the monarchy had sort of eclipsed itself and gone off to Egypt during the war after the German invasion. In Greece there are always, as you know, many different points of view.

Q: Was George Papandreou a factor in those days?

ANSCHUTZ: Yes, he was. I wouldn't say he was a terribly important factor, but he had been at one point Prime Minister. I remember we used to see him from time to time.

Q: One further thing before we move on to your next assignment. Later, when I served there from 1970-74, I had very much the feeling that our Embassy was dominated...some embassies are AID embassies, some embassies can be military embassies or State Department embassies and some CIA embassies...I had the feeling that we were in a CIA embassy, that it was running things. How did you feel about the role of the CIA, we are talking about the early fifties?

ANSCHUTZ: The role of the CIA was important, very important. When I first arrived in Greece the Station Chief was a Greek-American by the name of Tom Karamessines, a fellow for whom I had very high regard. I think they worked fairly closely together...the Embassy and the CIA Station. Because of the general situation there, that is to say, the political fragmentation and the economic poverty, it was a fairly rewarding environment in which to operate. As is so often the case, one wasn't always sure just what relationships some of your contacts in the Greek government had with other agencies in the American government.

Q: Well it was a period when the CIA was being generous with payments to people, which has its negative side as well as its positive side.

ANSCHUTZ: I remember, for example, when we were there the first time, we developed a very close relationship with Caramanlis, who was, I think Minister of Roads, or something like that. We used to see each other socially because he loved to go to the movies and his favorite movies were what were when I was a boy Saturday afternoon serials. He liked those and, for example, we would occasionally go and they would have an evening of, shall we say three or four sequences, or something of the sort. Then we would go out to supper. Caramanlis came to be well regarded and I am sure when he became Prime Minister that he had sympathetic assistance from the American apparat.

There is no question about that and, of course, these are the operational challenges of any large mission, whether it is Greece or any place. Each one of the services wants to have its finger in what it considers to be its pie. And I was much more aware of this in my second tour in Greece. The military mission would have its tentacles into the military organizations. The Air Force people would have their tentacles into one part of it, the Service attachés would have their tentacles into another part of it. The Agency would maybe have tentacles into the whole thing.

Q: Well, then, you left Athens in 1953 and moved rather quickly to Thailand. Is that right?
ANSCHUTZ: Yes. We went back to Washington and for a period of time I was the officer in charge of political/military affairs for NEA. At that time we, of course, had continuing military support for Greece and Turkey, but the question of Egypt had become very active.

Q: Nasser was just appearing on the scene at that time.

ANSCHUTZ: That is correct. Nasser, I think, appeared in 1952. We had a period there when we were trying very hard to find common ground with Nasser. I think it is fair to say that in general we were sympathetic to some of the objectives of the revolution.

Q: Wasn't that around the period when one of the most significant arms deal was made when John Foster Dulles presented a 45 to Nasser?

ANSCHUTZ: That may be true, I don't remember that. First let's all realize that Nasser was fanatically nationalistic and tended to be somewhat anti-Western because he felt that his country had been subjected by the British and the West. So Nasser in his early days was trying very eagerly to rehabilitate the Egyptian armed forces. There were very significant military equipment agreements with Czechoslovakia, which was very disconcerting to us. The United States had passed legislation which may have been the initial embryo that may have been in the Greek-Turkey Assistance Act, whereby under certain circumstances the United States would provide arms and assistance. But in order to provide arms and assistance, the host government would have to receive a US military advisory assistance group.

This became a great bone of contention with the Egyptians. In the first place they were bitter about our posture in Israel and secondly they did not want to receive a military mission. So, I think, Ali Sabre, who was one of Nasser's right hand men, some sort of counselor in the Presidency, came to the United States and no progress was made. Then, at a later time, I was sent out to Cairo to talk to Ali Sabre. My recollection is that Dulles was quite prepared to provide arms to Egypt, but one of my tasks was to make it clear that under the legislation he had no alternative but to insist on an acceptance of an American military advisory group in Egypt. My few hours with Ali Sabre were futile.

After a certain period of time, Jack Peurifoy, after Greece, had been named Ambassador to Guatemala, which was one of the colorful periods in his career...they were all colorful. Here again, as in Greece, I think Jack managed to work very harmoniously with the Agency. He was then appointed Ambassador to Thailand.

Q: He certainly played a key role in the overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala.

ANSCHUTZ: That is correct.

Q: So he wasn't there very long. I guess he had to get out.
ANSCHUTZ: I think they considered that that phase had more or less come to a close when Arbenz was ejected and the situation in Asia was becoming very worrisome. The situation in Vietnam was beginning to heat up.

Q: We were moving up towards Dienbienphu, which was in 1954.
ANSCHUTZ: Yes. And there were problems in Laos, problems with the Chinese.

Q: Malaysia was having its...

ANSCHUTZ: Yes, they had problems, but it was not as difficult...there were guerilla forces in Malaysia.

So an effort was made to strengthen our diplomatic and national position in Southeast Asia. In that process, Jack Peurifoy was sent to Thailand and Charlie Yost was sent to Laos. Bob McClintock was sent to Cambodia. I have forgotten who was in Vietnam.

So when Jack was assigned there he requested I be sent as his deputy.

Q: So you went to Bangkok.

ANSCHUTZ: Yes, as Peurifoy's DCM. Always a bridesmaid and never a bride!

Q: Yes. Here is Peurifoy who is...a very complex situation in Greece where you say he used his staff well; then he is quickly dumped in Guatemala which had a major situation where he played a key role in essentially a CIA-sponsored coup; and then all of a sudden he is off to Thailand. These are very different places. How did he operate there? Also for you, this was not your specialty at all. So in a sense you had two of you sitting at the top who had no particular feel for the area.

ANSCHUTZ: That is correct. I think as far as Jack is concerned, the feeling was that his talents were rather ably used in Greece and in Guatemala and that they could be deployed effectively in Thailand. Again, Jack had a very warm, outgoing way and he became extremely popular with the Thai. Again this was a situation where you have a mega mission. The military advisory mission, the economic mission, the whole panoply of American foreign policy instruments. The Agency was training people, the Thai forces. We were trying to reinforce the Thai military establishment. So actually it worked, in my view, very well. As you know, Peurifoy was killed in an automobile accident there, which was tragic. He lost a son and himself and then he had another son who was physically handicapped and spared but died a couple of years later.

But Jack was also favored by having an extremely attractive wife. Betty Jane Peurifoy was an extremely attractive, personable lady. She was very effective in her role, both in Greece and in Thailand.

Q: What was the situation in Thailand? What were our concerns there?
ANSCHUTZ: Our concerns were to try to determine to what extent the Chinese and the Southeast Asian Communists were moving down into Southeast Asia and to create a bulwark in that part of the world. The whole Southeast Asia situation, as you have already pointed out, was somewhat tenuous, particularly because of Vietnam. The Communists were becoming more and more aggressive in China. And then the situation in Indonesia was not too stable either.

Q: This was the height of Sukarno.

ANSCHUTZ: Yes.

Q: How did we view the situation in Thailand as opposed to China? Did we think of Red China being an aggressive force moving out into Southeast Asia?

ANSCHUTZ: Well, I think we considered them a very aggressive force in their efforts to control and subvert the governments of the area. At least as far as Thailand was concerned at that particular moment, I don't think there was any particular fear of an eminent invasion or anything of the sort because of the terrain. But the terrain was so difficult that it also was almost impossible to make the borders imperious. The situation in Laos was very unstable. Thailand was in effect one of the core issues in Southeast Asia because of its geographical location.

Q: Looking at it at that time, how well did you think you were served by the Southeast Asian and Thai specialists within the Embassy? Obviously you had to be pretty dependent on them for language or contacts.

ANSCHUTZ: We didn't have much of what I would call Thai specialists. We had a couple of officers who had had Thai language training. But one of the factors that seems to have applied in places like Greece and in Thailand...the educated population usually speaks a second language, English or French. The language was a problem but not as much as one would think because most educated Thais know they are not going to get through life on Thai alone. But it is always desirable to have the language and I think everything we do in the language area is terribly, terribly important. But it wouldn't be, in my view, correct to say that we were victims or sitting ducks of the situation because we didn't speak Thai.

Q: What were your contacts and what sort of government was there in Thai while you were there?

ANSCHUTZ: Thailand was and is a monarchy. When we were there, there was a ruling junta. Pribun was the Prime Minister. And as has been the case since almost the history of modern Thailand, the military is the backbone of the government. The senior military and the senior intelligence and police officer were two of the most powerful people in the Kingdom.

Q: Did you find then, because it was a military junta with the head of the military and of the police senior participants, that in order to really make points one had to work with either the CIA or the military? Were these important factors in our connection with the government?
ANSCHUTZ: Yes, they were. However, it is also true that because of their importance, they wanted and we wanted to have certain contacts with them too. So I would say that the relationships were more or less joint relationships. I am speaking now of the head of the military and General Pou who was the head of the intelligence and police forces. We weren't limited entirely to our American associates in the military and intelligence community. As in Greece, and I guess in most places, this tends to work out as a joint enterprise. One of the tricky things is to maintain the diplomatic relations without, as it were, embarrassing the intelligence connection, and yet at the same time trying to keep abreast of what the intelligence agencies were actually doing, promoting, etc. So it is a team work type of problem.

Q: You were there at the aftermath of the Dienbienphu debacle when the French pretty much lost the war in Indochina. What was the impression of our Embassy of how this was affecting the attitude of the Thai?

ANSCHUTZ: I think the Thai were apprehensive, but they weren't frantic.

Q: Thailand was in SEATO which was still in its early years. How did we feel at the Embassy about SEATO, because it did become to some extent a paper alliance?

ANSCHUTZ: I think we thought it was a useful coordinating effort. Actually, while we were there we had a SEATO meeting in Bangkok and Dulles came and Anthony Eden came as well as the French Foreign Minister. It also helped tie in countries like the Philippines, Australia and other right thinkers.

Q: So you didn't have the feeling that this was one of these deals cooked up in London and Washington that really didn't have much significance?

ANSCHUTZ: I think the Southeast Asian countries appreciated the sense of participation. I think it was useful to establish personal contacts and to do a little contingency planning.

Q: Just to get a picture, because in the last couple of years we have moved into a new era. We were in the cold war era and now we are in what is being called the post-cold war era since the collapse of the Soviet Union. How did we view the Communist movement? Did we feel it was on the march...not just in Communist China but in other areas?

ANSCHUTZ: There were those who felt very strongly that way and certainly the menace of China was real enough. After Peurifoy's death, the next man to be appointed ambassador was a fellow by the name of Max Bishop, who was virtually a McCarthyite, anti-Communist. He saw Reds everywhere.

Q: Did you find yourself uncomfortable with him?

ANSCHUTZ: Yes, I did. He found himself uncomfortable with me.

Q: What was the clash?
ANSCHUTZ: Well, I think...

Q: First, what was his background before he became ambassador?

ANSCHUTZ: He was a Foreign Service Officer who had served in Japan. I think it is fair to say that the focus of his service had been more or less East Asia. He was a very complex fellow. I would say that he had very little personal charm. I think these judgments would probably be corroborated, I am not trying to express a strong personal view in this. I think that was widely known. He really never established any serious rapport with Thai leadership. I was very fortunate because I came out with Jack Peurifoy. Jack included me in everything so that I met almost everybody that he ever met. I frequently accompanied him on his calls. So when he was killed I was very well positioned in terms of relations with the Thai. I knew the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the chief of the army, the head of the police, General Pou, etc. Not only were our __________ situation considerably different, but because of the fact that I had a personal relationship with these senior people in the Thai government, I think Max developed a sense of jealousy that he never could overcome.

Q: This is always a problem--the new ambassador whose DCM has worked with the previous ambassador and also been Chargé at various times too.

ANSCHUTZ: Sure.

Q: Did you leave fairly soon afterwards?

ANSCHUTZ: I have forgotten exactly what the time interval was. I would say I left about three or six months later. I found the situation extremely unpleasant.

You know on the fitness reports, Max really hammered me. One of the Freudian comments that he made was "This officer is not well equipped to serve in this area because he has a colonial attitude towards the natives."

Q: Before we move on I want to go back. You mentioned that Max Bishop was sort of a McCarthyite in a way. You were mainly dealing with Greek affairs during the McCarthy business. Do you have any comments or examples of how that hit either you or around you or what it did to any of the attitudes?

ANSCHUTZ: No. I was not directly involved in any of this business.

Q: That wasn’t particularly blowing up in Greek affairs at that time?  
ANSCHUTZ: I don't remember any.

Q: I suppose for one thing you were busy essentially fighting Communism there and it was pretty much black and white.
ANSCHUTZ: Yes, now that you mention the McCarthy business. Bishop was one of those who was very antagonistic and whether he actually testified against them I don't know, but he was bitter against Jack Service and the old China hands.

Q: Well, you left in 1956 and did what?

ANSCHUTZ: I think Max and I agreed that what I really needed was a tour at the War College...so that was the way that problem was solved. So I came back here and went to the War College.

Q: And after that?

ANSCHUTZ: At the end of the War College I spent some time, about a year, as principal spear carrier to Bob Murphy, who was at that time the Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

Q: Since he and Loy Henderson were two of the major figures in the Foreign Service, I wonder if you could tell me about your impression of Robert Murphy and how he operated?

ANSCHUTZ: Bob Murphy was a relatively smooth operator. He was very personable and had an easy manner. He certainly was alert to what was going on, but he was not the stiletto type of operator. I think most people liked him. He was very much in control of his office and because of his wartime experience he knew many senior people in the government and in the congress.

Q: He had been the political advisor to Eisenhower who was President at the time. He also had dealt with Churchill and de Gaulle.

ANSCHUTZ: I remember at that time that I was in the office we had sputnik.

Q: This was the first satellite launched and it was launched by the Soviets.

ANSCHUTZ: That is correct. It was a great shock to the United States.

One day I came back from lunch and here was a long telegram on my desk and a note from Bob Murphy saying, "Take this over to Alan Dulles and clear it."

Q: Alan Dulles was the head of the CIA.

ANSCHUTZ: At that time they were down there in the old Navy building not too far from the State Department, in walking distance. As a dutiful young man I picked up the telegram, which purported to be our assessment of the implications of sputnik. This was directed to all of our missions. So I managed to penetrate the fastness of the CIA and was finally ushered into Dulles' office. He read the telegram and then started calling people in. I don't remember exactly who were called, but senior people there. They would come in and then ask me questions. Finally, in desperation I had to say, "You know, I am sorry, I can't answer that question. To be honest about
it I don't know who wrote the damn thing." There was no drafting officer on it. Whereupon Alan Dulles looked up over his glasses and said, "My brother did." He was the Secretary of State.

Then Bill Rountree wanted me to go out to Cairo as DCM.

Q: Rountree at that time was Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs.

ANSCHUTZ: That is correct. Bob Murphy said, "Oh, you can do better than that." But I decided I would take the offer.

Q: Before we continue, were you there and can you talk at all about the twin crises we had in October, 1956...Hungary and the Suez crises? Do you have any recollections of Murphy at that time?

ANSCHUTZ: No. I think I was in the War College at that time. I didn't come into Murphy's office until the spring of 1957.

Q: Oh, then you wouldn't have been there during the crises. Well then you went to Cairo. How did you feel about going to Cairo?

ANSCHUTZ: Well, I think in general I was pleased to go and it turned out to be very interesting. It was the longest tour of duty I had at one time at one place.

Q: It was 1958-62.

ANSCHUTZ: That is correct.

Q: The ambassador was?

ANSCHUTZ: Ray Hare was the ambassador when I arrived and then I had Freddie Reinhardt and then John Badeau.

Q: What was the situation? This was two years after the Suez business. Nasser was in full power. What were our interests there and concerns?

ANSCHUTZ: I think at the moment we would say it was to try to hold what position we had. Relations were not warm or cordial with the government. This was the period of the positive neutralists...Tito, Sukarno, Nehru and Nasser. Of course, Nasser was marketing his Arab nationalism at a tremendous rate.

Q: During part of 1958-60 I was in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia and everywhere you went there were pictures of Nasser on thermos files and everything else. He was a tremendous influence.

ANSCHUTZ: Oh, yes, tremendous. As you know subsequently he got himself involved in the Yemen and got somewhat bruised in the process. Of course, because of his positive neutralism he
had to take a very strong position in the Congo where we had a very serious clash of interests, because he was supporting Lumumba and we were not.

So we had periodic spontaneous manifestations outside the Embassy when...my wife always likes to tell the story that when she was coming down to the Embassy and was trying to get in when we had a spontaneous demonstration in front which said, "Down with the USA. Down with the USA." They were all filing pass and the car was waiting to try to get through. One of the demonstrators talked to Said, our driver, and said, "Are you an American?" Said said, "Yes." He said, "I love America. Down with the USA."

Q: We used to call them rent a mobs when I was in Yugoslavia. They would have these demonstrations for their brothers in the Congo. As a Yugoslav, if he did know where it was, he probably didn't like them.

Did you have dealings with Nasser? What were your impressions of the man?

ANSCHUTZ: Yes, I had a few dealings with Nasser. I was Chargé on a number of occasions, not only because of the changes but because of absences of the ambassador. So it was a situation not unlike Bangkok where because of the circumstances I had the exposure to people. We had the occasional aid agreement so we knew the Minister of Economy well. Of course we knew the people in the Foreign Ministry. Here again this was the situation where the Foreign Ministry was frequently not as important as the Presidential staff where they second guessed everybody on the political level. That was where Ali Sabre was. There were other people whose name don't come to me at the moment. Some of these I used to see and try to cultivate from time to time.

Nasser, of course, was extremely full of himself in those days. It was his high period. In a way it was awkward socially because he was nationalizing everything in sight and the people one met socially were usually people who were impacted by his policies. I had occasion to escort the Secretary of Commerce, or whoever it happened to be, around to make a courtesy call on Nasser.

One of the people who was highly cultivated by parts of the Embassy was Hagle, who was the editor in those days of [name of newspaper], but one of the closest advisors to Nasser.

Q: (Which) was the major newspaper.

ANSCHUTZ: Right. We saw people like that. The military people used to see their opposite numbers from time to time. There was still in existence some of the old school politicos who were in the political cosmic, but mostly critics. They were sources of information and assessment.

Q: When you took people to Nasser did he come on strong? Was he trying to sell himself? Was he pugnacious in dealing with Americans?
ANSCHUTZ: No, I wouldn't say he was pugnacious. He could be quite gracious and smile and say the standard things. I suppose it was fair to say that he would have liked to have been friendly with the United States if he could have done it on his own terms.

Q: Did you ever run across Anwar Sadat?

ANSCHUTZ: Only rarely. In those days there was another ritual when an international leader visited Cairo. The diplomatic corps would be dragooned to go out to the airport to meet him. Tiresome as that might be, it did provide an opportunity to meet senior Egyptian officials who were out there. It did have its useful aspects.

Q: This was before the 1963 Seven Day War. What was our assessment of Soviet influence in Egypt? Did we feel that they were a tool of the Soviets?

ANSCHUTZ: I am not sure it would be accurate to say they were a tool, but that they had a very close relationship is undeniable. Of course much of the military assistance in that period came from the Soviets. There were a number of senior people who had served in Moscow.

Q: One of the things that has often been pointed out or claimed was that there was a bias by the Arabist against Israel. You were able to go there without any particular feeling one way or another on this. What was your impression of the people who specialized in the Arab world in our Foreign Service in their view towards both the situation in Egypt but also towards Israel?

ANSCHUTZ: I know very few people who I considered to be expert in the Middle East who don't have serious reservations about our policy vis-a-vis Israel.

Q: Was this based on being opposed to Jews in particular or because with problems of Israel, itself?

ANSCHUTZ: As you are well aware the Arab world takes this all very personally and the performance of the Egyptians in the 1947 war certainly left a festering memory. Then, of course, you had the whole later problem of the Gaza Strip, Sinai and other direct Egyptian involvements. I don't think, in my view, that the Egyptian attitude was much different than that in other countries.

Q: One is sitting in Cairo and you read the telegrams that go out from Tel Aviv as well as from other posts in the area. What was your impression? Did you feel our Embassy in Tel Aviv was reporting well or was a captive of...?

ANSCHUTZ: Now that you mention it, I don't have much recollection of reporting from Tel Aviv. From Damascus, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, but I don't remember very much from Tel Aviv. Perhaps a Weeka, which was a weekly roundup.
Q: During part of this time I was in Saudi Arabia and we kind of had the feeling that the Egyptians would be delighted to overthrow King Saud. What was the feeling towards Nasser not only being an influence but also messing around with other governments such as Saudi Arabia?

ANSCHUTZ: You mean in Egypt?

Q: Yes. Our view of what the Egyptians were doing.

ANSCHUTZ: Well, I don't think we looked upon it with great favor. The Egyptians, as they always have been and still are, are very short of resources. We felt that their energies and activities would be much more profitable if they were focused on their domestic problems, but Nasser's positive neutralism and pan-Arabism, which he was the apex, demanded that Egyptian influence be deployed in the area to a very important extent.

Q: You had three ambassadors there. First was Ray Hare who was a well-known specialist in the Middle East. How did he operate?

ANSCHUTZ: Ray had very deep experience and was very low key, very understated. But he had a tremendous knowledge. He was somewhat more philosophic...if you just wait the situation will change.

Freddy Reinhardt was more the alert, experienced diplomat.

Q: He had been in a number of places, Vietnam and eventually ended up in Italy.

ANSCHUTZ: That is right. He tended to be, with the exception of Vietnam and Egypt, a European hand. I think he was to a certain degree a Russian language officer. I don't know how fluent he was. He was very personable, alert and a fully experienced professional diplomat.

John Badeau, who had spent many years as a missionary in Iraq, was probably the one with the deepest knowledge of the Arab world. Ray Hare had a lot of experience and time in the Arab world and it is very difficult to try to compare them. But in a certain sense I think Badeau's prior role as preacher...

Q: Had he been President of the American University in Cairo?

ANSCHUTZ: He had at one time. I think from that particular perspective he was very well qualified. He, too, I think, was quite a good ambassador.

Q: Did you sense a difference when the Kennedy administration took over? The relationship with Nasser had always been one of the sort of debatable ones. I heard it said that at one point there developed an almost visceral dislike between Dulles and Nasser.

ANSCHUTZ: I am sure that is true.
Q: Did you ever feel that the Kennedy administration when they came in were ready to try a new tact?

ANSCHUTZ: Yes, I did, very definitely so. One of the professional joys that we had in the Embassy was that you would have all these unofficial visitors who would come in and see you. They would say, "I don't want you to do anything about it. I have a few friends here in the Presidency I want to talk to. But please don't take any notice of me." Then you would find out after a day or two that they had conversations with people you had been trying for weeks to contact.

Q: Who were these people?

ANSCHUTZ: One of them was Bob Neumann. Do you know Bob Neumann?

Q: Well, he later was ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan.

ANSCHUTZ: He was an academic from some place in California in those days. Then a fellow by the name of Polk who used to have something to do with the foreign relations apparat in Chicago, their equivalent of the Council on Foreign Relations. Then a couple of clerics. The Bishop of Washington, whose name I have forgotten.

Then they would come back having seen somebody of importance and might say, "Oh, I saw Colonel so-and-so last night. Very charming fellow. We had a lovely time. You know what I really think is that they just need a little massaging." That kind of thing was what we had at the change of administration.

Q: These were the people from groups that take impetus from a new administration.

ANSCHUTZ: They had some kind of connection with the administration, who knows what.

We had business people come in too. We had serious problems. We had a spontaneous pro-Lumumba manifestation in Cairo, in the course of which they thought it proper to burn down the USIS library. We, of course, as dutiful diplomats immediately dropped them a Note requesting compensation. Nothing happened. When the Kennedy administration came in Freddy Reinhardt was sent to Italy. We discussed this and I said, "One thing that we have to do before you get out of here and you make your farewell calls, we have to find out what happened to our Note. We haven't had any action on this at all." Occasionally businessmen would come in as result of potential new programs under the Kennedy administration. So we went over to see Hussein Sabre, who was Ali Sabre's brother and a fairly poisonous type. He was Deputy Foreign Minister. We asked him about the Note and he said, "Oh, I am very sorry. You never should have put that into a Note. There is nothing we can do about that. It would be very embarrassing for us to do anything about that." We duly reported and Freddy went off to Italy. I was in charge and these people were coming in wanting to profit from what they thought would be new aid programs.
When Nehru came to Cairo I went out to the airport, as I have described, and Ali Sabre was there. I said, "You know, there has been a lot of talk that this administration would like to do something in terms of providing assistance, PL 480 assistance to Egypt, but we have this problem of compensation for our USIS library. I am not in any position to recommend that we move forward on aid until we can resolve this issue." He said, "Well, come and see me in my office." So I went out to the Palace, where his office was, and he gave me the same line that his brother had given me. It was just to bad that we had to make it a matter of record, because there was nothing they could do. I said, "Look, there is no problem about this." I picked up the Note and tore it up.

So I went back to the Embassy. After some time my secretary said there was a Mr. Mohammed here who would like to speak to me. I didn't know who Mr. Mohammed was, but in comes this little man carrying a briefcase and wearing a black homburg hat.

Q: A real bagman.

ANSCHUTZ: He came into the office and opened the briefcase and counted out whatever it was...50,000 Pounds, 100,000 Pounds, I don't remember what it was. I signed the receipt. He replaced his hat, left and was never seen again.

Q: Had the UAR, the United Arab Republic, been created by that time?

ANSCHUTZ: Oh yes.

Q: How did we view that? At that point it was Syria and was Yemen included in that?

ANSCHUTZ: No, the first days it was just Syria.

Q: How did we view that thing?

ANSCHUTZ: I don't think we were particularly upset by it. But I think a lot of Syrians were upset by it. Poor old Pete Hart, who I succeeded as DCM in Cairo, was supposed to be ambassador to Syria and became a consul general.

We went over to the Syrian region from time to time.

Q: But you never took it very seriously?

ANSCHUTZ: No. But for administrative purposes we had to make the visits. Then, of course, there were periods of tension (tape interruption)

Q: Was this considered the fact that for a while then Syria and Egypt were under the same government

ANSCHUTZ: I suppose marginally but (recording interruption)
Q: Just one thing, when you left Cairo, how did you feel the situation was, this was in 1962, what did you feel it was going to be doing in the area?

ANSCHUTZ: Well, the so-called UAR was already sagging under the strain. Ironically, Pete Hart, who was my predecessor as DCM in Cairo, had been scheduled to go to Syria as the ambassador. But when the UAR came along, Pete found himself as consul general in Damascus, technically under the Cairo Embassy. Pete, of course, managed everything with his own hands in Damascus. But structurally it was a bit ironic that he should leave Cairo to go on to greater things and find himself as consul general in Damascus.

In that period, 1962, we had a change of administration. The Kennedy regime had come in. There was a great deal of talk about new relations between the incoming administration and the governments in the area. Of course, one of the manifestations of this was an increasing number of visitors to Cairo.

Q: When you left, did you see Nasser as leading a big jihad against the West or that there was bound to be a war against Israel?

ANSCHUTZ: The tension with Israel was obvious and continuing. Nasser had made his great play to be one of the leaders, if not the leader, of the non-aligned group. Egypt was involved in supporting the so-called liberal democratic elements in the Yemen, which, of course, was creating apprehensions on the part of the Saudis as well, of course, as the outright enmity of the Aman and ruling factions in the Yemen. The Egyptians, of course, took a very strong view of the developments in the Congo and they were ardently supporting Lumumba. Those activities, of course, also created tensions between the United States and the UAR.

Q: As you left was it your impression that Nasser was a force that really was going to eventually get the Arab world really aligned against the United States, or did you see him as having limitations?

ANSCHUTZ: He obviously had a tremendous influence in the Arab world, but then, as now, there were vested interests in various countries which were basically antithetical to Nasser. The ruling group in Jordan, Iraq, and Libya. Libya less because Qadhafi regarded Nasser as one of his models and heroes at that time. There was also, of course, the problem of the French-Algerian relations. Cairo was also a mecca for many of the Algerian nationalists who later participated in the Algerian government. But I think the economic programs of Egypt were already beginning to burden the regime and the limitations of Nasser's approach to many of these area problems had resulted in basically rather tense relationships, I think, between Nasser and the Western powers. At that time, of course, the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc were actively supporting Nasser. But I think while no one was prepared to discount Nasser, one had the feeling that the internal problems and strains on the regime, much of it economic, were already limiting the scope of the role that Nasser and Egypt could play under the circumstances.

Q: What about the relation with Israel? Was it a matter of acceptance that there was going to be another go round between the Israelis and the Egyptians?
ANSCHUTZ: Yes, I think it is fair to say that. No one knew exactly how or when another conflict would break out, but no one was prepared to accept the status quo. Nasser, of course, was very much interested in improving the capacities of the Egyptian armed forces. Those were the days when Egypt was still receiving military equipment from Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Yes, the Israeli-UAR tension was a common element of the total situation.

Q: While you were there you must have been getting reports from our military attachés. What were they saying about the Egyptian army?

ANSCHUTZ: In the first place my impression is that they were well aware of the efforts the Egyptians were making to improve themselves. I don't think they were dazzled with the inherent capacity of the Egyptians. But Egypt was a large country and was receiving foreign military assistance and certainly was not a thing, given the regional context, which could be discounted. Again, I don't remember any particular assessments which I could cite.

Q: Your next assignment was to Paris from 1962-64. What were you doing and how did you get that assignment?

ANSCHUTZ: With the change of administration there were naturally widespread changes throughout the Service. I was offered the opportunity to come back to Washington as Chief of Foreign Service Personnel, but I wasn't interested in the job. I really wanted to continue in the activities in political work. I wanted to go to Paris, not so much because it was Paris, but to improve my French. So in the course of human events it was decided that I should go to Paris as the Political Counselor with rank of Minister. It was a direct transfer in 1962.

I was in Paris just long enough to go broke but not long enough to achieve a great deal, because I was then requested to go down to Greece to become DCM by Harry Labouisse, who had taken over as ambassador in Greece. So in the spring of 1964, I went with my family back to Athens.

Q: During the time you were in Paris, what was the political situation there--1962-64?

ANSCHUTZ: The political situation was in a way quite tense particularly because of the Algerian situation. This was also a period when de Gaulle's policies vis-a-vis NATO led to the removal of the NATO headquarters from Paris to Brussels. That move began about that time.

Q: Had de Gaulle already made his pronouncement regarding NATO before you arrived?

ANSCHUTZ: No, I think it was during the period I was there. I think it was very interesting because one had the whole problem of the Gaullist approach to Algeria and the even more conservative elements of the military who were resisting any kind of change in the Algerian arrangements. It was also a period of activity with regard to the Vietnamese war, because the French were very much beleaguered in Vietnam and it was an issue...

Q: You mean the Algerian war?
ANSCHUTZ: No, the Vietnamese war.

Q: I thought they were basically out of there by 1962.

ANSCHUTZ: Well, they were still lingering and trying to extricate themselves. There were a series of negotiations with regard to Vietnam during that period, some of which were held in Paris.

Q: In regard to Vietnam, in 1962 Kennedy was just beginning to start putting in the special forces and this type of thing. The French were telling us it was a big mistake, they having gone through that. Dienbienphu was in 1954. How were we receiving the French advice about Vietnam?

ANSCHUTZ: My recollection is that they didn't strongly discourage us from assisting there. I think they had a view as to personalities in Vietnam, but I think broadly speaking they, as I remember it, did not try to dissuade us from doing something in Vietnam. We had the whole issue not only of Vietnam but China at that time and what the Chinese were doing with regard to Vietnam.

Q: Was this the period when de Gaulle recognized China?

ANSCHUTZ: Yes. I remember talking with various people at the Quai d'Orsay and elsewhere, I coming to the conclusion that de Gaulle was going to recognize China. Chip Bohlen, who was the ambassador at that time...I advanced this view in staff meeting and Bohlen very cavalierly discounted that possibility. I was amused because afterwards Cecil Lyon, the DCM, said, "Well, you know Chip never knows what he is against until he finds out what you are for." Unfortunately I proved to be right about that.

Q: That was a severe jolt to our relations because the recognition of China in those days was a real litmus test as far as we were concerned.

ANSCHUTZ: That was correct.

So, we had the NATO issues, we had China and Algeria, and, to a certain extent, the Middle East. There were an adequate number of issues to justify our presence.

Q: On the NATO issue. When you got there was the severing of the French membership in NATO seem to be something that we just accepted.

ANSCHUTZ: There wasn't much that we could do about it, but the basic factor, of course, was the unwillingness of the French to integrate their commands into the NATO command structure. That led to a fall out with regard to the location of the headquarters and the decision of taken to move to Brussels. The French, as I remember it, were leaning much more to the European Union type of approach to the military. Also the French were very aggressive in their cultivation with
the Russians. They were speaking of Europe to the Urals. They were making a great effort to find accommodation with the Russians at that time.

**Q:** What was the impression that you got from the Embassy when you got there of their feeling about de Gaulle? Was he a good thing as far as America was concerned?

**ANSCHUTZ:** I think de Gaulle was respected and to a certain extent deplored because of what many considered to be his megalomania. But there was no question but that he was a very able fellow and was respected as such. But our relations with France under the circumstances were always rather delicate.

**Q:** I have heard that there were times in the Embassy when you had people within the Embassy who were pro-de Gaulle and others were anti-de Gaulle, that the Embassy was sort of split on this from time to time. Did you have any feeling of that?

**ANSCHUTZ:** I wasn't aware of that, no. As I said, de Gaulle was respected as an extremely able national leader, but one, of course, whose views were frequently antithetical to our own...and to many other people too.

**Q:** What about Charles Bohlen as ambassador? He was always considered as one of the great stars of the Foreign Service. How did he run the Embassy?

**ANSCHUTZ:** He was certainly one of the stars of the Foreign Service. He had served in Paris before and was certainly well known and highly regarded. He was, I always thought, among other things, one of our foremost ambassadors in terms of dealing with the public and third parties. He was a handsome, personable, intelligent man and as such was an excellent ambassador. He had a tendency to be rather opinionated, in my opinion, but he had the vast background and experience. I think his period as ambassador in the Soviet Union and his tours in the Soviet Union and his participation in various types of negotiations involving the United States and the Soviet Union had given him a great deal of prestige. So that all things considered he was, in my opinion, a very fine ambassador. I found him at my level sometimes to be a little bit top heavy, but nevertheless, I certainly felt he was an excellent ambassador.

**Q:** I had the impression talking to people who served with him in the Soviet Union who said that he harked back to an earlier time when he had had relations earlier on with almost all the heads of the Soviet Government and when he moved into a period where Kremlinology was a little harder to penetrate and you examined it in a different way, his impressions were based on his personal relationships. I would have thought that this might have carried over from what you have said in a way to figuring out the way things were going because he would not be using the political section the way a less prestigious ambassador would.

**ANSCHUTZ:** I think I would agree with that. I think that was probably true. They say that he had a great deal of confidence in his own opinion. Because he had great professional, personal prestige, he had relatively easy access to senior people in the French context which other perhaps
might have had. Armed with that access, he was able to form opinions which owed much less to his staff then another ambassador might have done.

Q: Were you there during the Cuban missile crisis?
ANSCHUTZ: Yes, I was.

Q: What was the atmosphere early on when this thing was developing?
ANSCHUTZ: The attitude of the French press to these stories?

Q: This had been in October, 1962 and de Gaulle was one of the first people to give us very strong support in this. Was this sort of a surprise?
ANSCHUTZ: I don't know if it was a surprise. It certainly was welcomed because gestures of sincere collaboration with the French were never likely to be rejected. So I think that one was pleased about that. I remember that Acheson came over as a personal emissary of the President and was received by de Gaulle and was assured that the French would do what they could under the circumstances.

Q: What was your impression of French politics that was going on underneath de Gaulle? Were you able to get good access to the various French political parties?
ANSCHUTZ: Yes, we did have access to the French political parties. I remember, among others, we had access to people like Francois Mitterrand, Jacques Chirac, etc. We did have reasonably good contact with French political leaders.

Q: Were we able to talk with the French Communist Party at the time or was this out of bounds?
ANSCHUTZ: I think it was pretty much out of bounds. To a certain degree we had some insights into the French Communist Party as a result of the work of the Labor Attaché. But in terms of sort of an ongoing dialogue, I don't remember that.

Q: Were you there when Sargent Shriver became ambassador?
ANSCHUTZ: No. Bohlen was there when I left.

Q: How about the Algerian crisis? How were we viewing the situation there? Did we think it was going to be resolved in the French favor or did we feel they were fighting a rearguard action?
ANSCHUTZ: I think we felt they were fighting a rearguard action. I think Bill Porter was our consul general in Algiers at that time. He was a very able officer. I think that we felt that the French position ultimately was untenable and that we welcomed evidence of compromise or softening of the French position at that time.
Q: Well, then you went to Athens in 1964. Henry Labouisse had asked for you to be his Deputy Chief of Mission. You served there during a very interesting period, 1964-68. What was the situation when you arrived in Athens?

ANSCHUTZ: I think the political situation had been deteriorating for several years in a modest sort of way. George Papandreou and the so-called Center Union had just won a very impressive political victory. Karamanlis had left. The American position in the Karamanlis days had strongly supported Karamanlis, rather openly, to the dismay of some of the elements in the Greek party politic. So there was a change in position.

There were tensions within the so-called Center Union, Papandreou's party and at one point there a significant number of the members of the Center Union abandoned the Center Union party. This led to a very delicate situation in Athens, in the political cosmos, as it was called.

About this time George Papandreou's son, Andreas, returned from the United States with his American wife and began to be active politically in a way that caused tensions within the Center Union. So elements of the Center Union, who had been playing the politics of the situation for a number of years, were very much dismayed to find Andreas coming in with rather obvious intent of seizing the leadership role when his father stepped aside.

As a result of all this, a group of the Center Union, including the current Prime Minister, Constantine Mitsotakis, and others, withdrew their support of the Center Union and in effect entered into a sort of unspoken collaboration with the conservative party, ERE it was called.

At this time there were allegedly certain plots within the military, both in Greece and later down in Cyprus. These issues became extremely delicate politically. There was something called the Aspida trial which was supposed to have involved certain officers down in Cyprus who were allegedly working with Grivas, who had been one of the leaders of the Greek Cypriot...

Q: Grivas was a colonel.

ANSCHUTZ: Yes, he was.

The issue of enosis, the union of Cyprus and Greece, was one of the political problems which was being bandied about in those days. What that would have involved would have been the incorporation of Cyprus into Greece with the attendant collision that would have imposed with the Turks. One of the key figures in all of this, of course, was Archbishop Makarios, who was the senior political personality in Cyprus. It was believed by some of us that Makarios, himself, had visions of not only enosis, but as a result of enosis of perhaps achieving political control in Greece.

Q: I have heard people who knew him say that he was too big a political leader to be stuck on that little island.

ANSCHUTZ: Well, that was his view, I am sure.
Makarios and Andreas apparently had reasonably good relationships. This was a cause of tension.

Then there was allegedly another officers organization which was known as Pericles, which again was allegedly sponsoring leftist, liberal whatever activities. And there were trials of these officers conducted. As a result of these trials the issues of the control of the armed forces became very important in the political context. The Palace had always tried to maintain very close and direct relations with the armed forces.

*Q: This was King Constantine and his mother, Queen Frederika.*

ANSCHUTZ: That is right.

These issues all tended to complicate the situation and at one point as a result of all these issues the question arose as to whether or not the Prime Minister could or would discharge the Minister of Defense. This was much opposed by the Palace and the relationships between the conservatives and the Palace on the one hand and the Center Union on the other hand became quite venomous.

I am not getting the sequence of this in a very orderly fashion, I regret to say.

*Q: With all of this going on...we had bases there and this was certainly a time of real confrontation with the Soviet Union, we had the Berlin Wall, Khrushchev was talking very tough, the missile crisis, all these things were going on...it was a period of high cold war. Greece was considered to be a key element. What were we doing in the Embassy while all this was going on? Where did we feel our interests were? Were we making our wishes known? Was the CIA messing around?*

ANSCHUTZ: As you are well aware, because of our post World War II active interest in Greece and the considerable volume of aid that had been provided to Greece as a result of the Truman Doctrine, the American position in Greece was extremely important and strong. We, in the Embassy, tried very hard to prevent ruptures within the parliamentary system. Some of us had reservations as to whether it was wise to push on the part of the conservative ERE party and the Palace to push too hard on the military. At the same time, the left wing of the Center Union, which was controlled by Andreas, was campaigning very hard against the Palace and against certain elements of the military, so that the tensions built up very considerably.

Our view was, in the Embassy, that the talk of a coup should be discouraged, because we felt that that type of a solution was not tenable over a longer period. Plus the fact, for all the reasons you mentioned, we weren't eager to see this type of ferment in Greece.

At one point, a modus vivendi was developed between George Papandreou and the Palace, and to a certain extent the so-called conservative opposition. This was not accepted by Andreas, who with his more leftist associates was campaigning very hard on an anti-Palace and, to a degree, anti-American thesis.
At one point, as a result of the compromise, a caretaker government was established...a compromise between Papandreou and the Palace and ERE...and one of the Center Union politicians, a man by the name of Stephenopolis was put in as the Prime Minister. He governed with the support of part of the Center Union, which had pulled away from George Papandreou and the Center Union, itself, and another small party called the Progressives which was led by a politician by the name of Markazenis.

At one point another caretaker government was put in led by Kanalopolis, who was an ERE minister, which was established with the support of the moderate group of the Center Union and his own party, ERE, on the premise that elections would be held in May, 1967. As this date approached it is fair to say that the Center Union of not only George Papandreou, but taken with the faction led by his son, Andreas, would probably win those elections. Andreas was campaigning against the Palace and against the Americans, in a very vigorous and brutal way. This produced tensions, not only in the country where tensions ran very high, but also anxieties in the military forces, and therefore in the Palace. There had been talk of a military coup led by certain senior generals who were well seen by the Palace. The position of the Embassy was that a coup was not the proper solution to the problem.

Nevertheless, on April 22, 1967, a coup did take place. It was led by three relatively junior officers. In other words it was coup which anticipated a coup which might have taken place by the senior officers. These were Papadopoulos, Pattakos, and Makarezos.

Q: Before we move into the coup period, what was our analysis and efforts to try to do something with Andreas Papandreou to try to tone him down?

ANSCHUTZ: We had, I think it is fair to say, numerous contacts with Andreas. I think the ambassador saw him from time to time.

Q: The ambassador was by this time...?

ANSCHUTZ: By the time of the coup it was Phillips Talbot. I had seen him over the years on a more or less continuing basis.

Q: Was Bob Keeley a friend of his at that time?

ANSCHUTZ: He may have been. Bob came later and was very sympathetic to Andreas, I think. Wait a minute, I take that back. I don't know that Bob was sympathetic to him. I don't remember that he saw him, he may have, but I don't remember that. John Owens knew him and Bob McCoy, who was the economic counselor, saw him. Andreas was at one time the so-called Minister of Coordination and therefore had frequent contacts with the Embassy in the economics sphere.

Andreas was not an easy man to deal with. There were occasions when there was, at least on my part and maybe on others, rather blunt talk with Andreas. One of the things that I tried to do was to try to build bridges or a bridge between Andreas and the Palace, but I was unsuccessful.

Q: What were you thinking of when you say a bridge?
ANSCHUTZ: My thesis was that a coup was not in the interests of Greece or the United States, and if there could be a dialogue on a personal basis between the King and Andreas there might be some hope of reducing tensions. Neither party was eager to be compromised by seeing the other. Each felt it would be a loss of face. So my efforts in those regards were unsuccessful.

Q: Was the CIA...Greece in that period and sometime after was known as kind of a CIA country. Certainly the time I was there, 1970-74, the CIA was in bed with the Colonels. Did you have the feeling that things were going on with the CIA that you weren't completely aware of?

ANSCHUTZ: Yes. Strangely enough I had during my career a very good relationship with the CIA and their representatives. But I was fully aware that the dynamics of the situation I could not always accurately assess. It is also true that on the basis of a long historical connection, the Palace and particularly Queen Frederika, had always felt that while relationships with the Embassy were quite good, that the real route to the Oval Office was through the CIA. So these connections were very assiduously cultivated. It was much less easy for the Embassy to have a continuing dialogue with the Palace, in my opinion.

Now, I was not the ambassador. I was the DCM and Chargé. But I think it is fair to say that our relations with the Palace, although they were quite cordial, were not as close as the relations with the CIA. I don't know to this day how much the CIA knew about the Colonels' coup. I do know, as everyone else knows, that Papadopoulos had worked as an intelligence officer of some kind and had long and continuing contacts with the CIA. And in many cases the situation was such that if you wanted to deliver a message you delivered it through the CIA. I am not saying that they didn't accurately and faithfully transmit the message, but there was a feeling that their contacts were frequently better than ours were.

Q: This was my impression when I was there in the post coup period. This was during the Lyndon Johnson administration. Were you getting much interest in the State Department and White House on developments that led up to the coup, or was Vietnam pushing it to the back?

ANSCHUTZ: Yes, there was interest. One of the factors in this, not so much the State Department...but because Andreas had connections, associations, with some of the senior economic personalities in Washington, we frequently had reactions which were transmitted through those channels. Because Andreas and Margaret, his wife, had lived a long time in the United States, they had a number of sources and connections which they used for political purposes in the United States. The Embassy, as such, was taken completely by surprise and perhaps the Agency was taken by surprise too, except that they had had ongoing relationships with some of the members of the coup, particularly Papadopoulos. And, of course, as in every large mission where you have a large economic mission, a large military mission, a large Agency mission, etc., everybody gets into the act. So we have intelligence reports which would emanate down at the airfield and come through the Air Attaché, or maybe the air section of the military aid mission. All of these various sources recording part of the political tremors in the period before the coup and each one of the various sources have his own solution as to what a course of action should be.
In any event, the Embassy proper was certainly taken by surprise. We were looking at some of the senior generals but we were not looking closely at the colonels at that time.

I think the reaction of the Embassy was that we didn't want to completely upset the domestic situation, so the reaction was one of great reserve and the expression of hope that the constitutional government would be promptly restored. I think Jack Morey, when he heard about the coup, was alleged to have put on his reserve officer uniform and gone down to the Embassy. One could conclude from that that he didn't really expect this at that time.

Q: Who was Jack Morey?

ANSCHUTZ: He was the Chief of Station at the time.

Q: How did you find out about the coup? I assume the Embassy assembled and tried to figure out what to do.

ANSCHUTZ: It was not as orderly as that. If I remember correctly, Kanalopolis, the leader of the ERE party, was, I believe, arrested. Some how or other the word got to Phil Talbot, the ambassador, and he saw Kanalopolis. I don't remember whether he went...Kanalopolis lived not too far from the Residence...over there or whether Kanalopolis came to the Residence. But that was the first intimation that we had, as far as I am aware. I think Phil Talbot telephoned Washington. Dan Brewster, who had been the political counselor in Athens was then on the Desk in Washington. I first heard about it when he called me. There was a blackout of communications and the way that he was able to reach me was to go through the airfield at Ellinikon for telephone service and they in turn were able to get up to me. I dutifully jumped into my track shoes and went down to the Embassy. There was a curfew and all transit was forbidden, but I managed to go by back streets...

Q: You walked over?

ANSCHUTZ: No, I went by car. There were only a few people who managed to penetrate the curfew. I think soon thereafter Phil Talbot saw the King and told him that we felt a military coup was not the solution. The King said, "Well, this wasn't our solution." I think it was pretty clear that they had been talking with some of the senior military officers about the possibility. But they were pre-empted by the Colonels who took the ball away from them.

There was obviously a great hue and cry at the time and the position, I think, taken by Washington and the Embassy that this was not the proper solution and that every effort should be made to restore constitutional government as soon as possible. By the same token, we had to be restrained because we didn't want to take a series of action that would catapult Andreas and the left into power by permitting them to play on American displeasure and concern.

If I remember correctly the King went up to northern Greece shortly thereafter where there were several of these more senior loyalist officers. The King had, I think, gone to the Greek military headquarters the night of the coup and tried to discourage these activities.
Q: I know later there was the King's attempted coup which came somewhat later. He went up to Larisa. But that was later. The main thing is in the Embassy did we have any feel for these guys...Papadopoulos, Pattakos and Makarezos?

ANSCHUTZ: Well, we got feels quickly. As I say, Papadopoulos had been known to the Agency for a period of time. I think some of the people in the military aid mission knew Pattakos.

Q: I think Pete Peterson was a friend of his too. He was the chief of the consular section.

ANSCHUTZ: Yes, that is correct. I have forgotten who knew Makarezos. Anyway, early on, one of the first reactions was to stop providing military assistance. At one point consistent with the policy of very, cool, reserve to the new government, Talbot and his family went on leave. He went back to the United States. This also afforded him an opportunity for consultation.

I was called on at my residence by all three, if I remember correctly. I regurgitated the Embassy/State Department position that we had to get back to a constitutional government at the earliest possible moment. I remember one of them saying, "I know, but the constitution has to be revised. We can't use it in this form." I said, "Well, if the constitution has to be revised, let's get about it. You ought to be able to do that in a week or two." "Oh, no, this is going to take months in order for us to do that." Well I was not very sympathetic to that because I felt that whatever changes had to be made in their view could very promptly be made. So my lack of sympathy for that was very clear.

Then they insisted that I join them for dinner. I did and it was very pleasant, polite and civil, but the gap in the positions was very wide. Of course nothing occurs in Greece that isn't known all through the country within a few hours, as you are well aware. So the fact that I had met with these people was interpreted by their...they chose to interpret that as a sign of implicit endorsement, or something of the sort.

Q: What was your impression of these men? From accounts that one hears, they belonged to a group which really wasn't very sophisticated. They had been regular officers and had dealt very little with anything beyond the horizon of a serving officer and saw things in rather simplistic terms.

ANSCHUTZ: I think that is very true. I think they were sincerely concerned about the consequences if Andreas and the leftists took over in Greece, both economically and particularly to the military. I have little doubt that within their framework they thought they were acting at least patriotically.

It was ironic...my own antipathy to the group was quickly deciphered and as a result of that I was invited by the Mayor of Athens down to his headquarters and I had an honorary citizenship of Athens conferred upon me, which was, of course, intended to be a kick in the teeth to the junta. I don't think it would have happened under other circumstances.
Q: The coup happened. We obviously had our instructions that you don't recognize until a decision is made at the top. I assume this is part of them coming to your house, the coup leaders.

ANSCHUTZ: Part of it. I think the initial position had been stated by Talbot and ratified by the State Department shortly after the coup and before his departure on leave. So the broad outlines of the American position were promptly established. Of course the meat on those bones were very slow in presenting themselves.

Q: The position was what essentially?

ANSCHUTZ: That this was undesirable and that prompt, firm steps should be taken to restore constitutional, parliamentary government. Obviously it was not happening and the confusion continued. At a later time...was it December when the King actually went up to Larisa?

Q: I think it was around then when the King made an attempt to rally the army.

ANSCHUTZ: Well, it was not well done. In a sense it was perhaps too late. My own view was that...there was talk among some people including a few people in the Embassy, that we should bring in the Marines and the Sixth Fleet, etc...which I though would be folly. But I did think that if the King had at that time gone up to northern Greece and put himself aside the established loyalist senior commanders up there, a negotiation could have taken a much different and more favorable turn. But that didn't happen until almost six months later.

Q: After they had already consolidated themselves.

ANSCHUTZ: Then the reports began to come in, particularly from our military, since all the junta was military. They would say, "We know old Pattakos is really very pro-American," And then you get the same thing about Makarezos. Everybody has his three cents to throw in. I have to say that I didn't feel that the military assessment about some of these things was particularly helpful.

Q: My impression, I am talking about a slightly later period, was that our military was heavily loaded with Greek-American officers there, for one thing, who were very happy, many of whom settled down later on to stay. But the point being that they were an extremely conservative bunch and felt at home there. They were not really representing what I would say were mainline American interests. Did you have any of that feeling?

ANSCHUTZ: I think there may be some of that. Yes, there were a number of Greek-Americans, both in the military and in the Agency. Like most of us they were willing to be persuaded that what their friends and acquaintances were doing was in the common good.

We had an amusing incident. There was a Greek journalist who has lived in Washington for many years since the coup, by the name of Elias Demetrakopoulos. He at one time had been very close to Andreas and took a very liberal view. He arranged, somehow, for one of the senators from Indiana and a prominent economic journalist to visit. Now, visits to Greece during this
period by Americans were discouraged and particularly by prominent or distinguished men. Elias and the senator came to call in my office. They said they wanted to call on Papadopoulos, who was the acting Prime Minister, and they wanted me to escort them. I said that I don't think it was appropriate and didn't see any reason for the senator to call on Mr. Papadopoulos. At any rate, they insisted. I went over to the Hilton Hotel and the senator and Elias were there coming down the stairs. We all piled into my car. All the time I was arguing against this call, which in my view was completely inappropriate. Our policy at that time was trying not give status to this group. You may remember that you come out of the Hilton and had to turn right and there was a divider between the highway and you turned right and went down towards the Palace. I argued all the way down in the elevator, in the car, etc. I was making no headway at all. So when the car stopped to make a U turn to turn down Queen Sofia, I just got out of the car and said, "I am sorry, if you feel that you have to make this call it will have to be your privilege, but I will not escort you." I walked off.

I just sent a very brief message to the department and said that I had declined to escort the senator. It was as though I had dropped a rock in the water. There was no reply from Washington. So they made the call.

Q: I am a little surprised at Makarios, because he was such a foe of the regime, being on Andreas' side. Why was he trying to screw up this?

ANSCHUTZ: Well, it was only afterward that he became anti-Andreas and particularly in later years.

Q: He was a real thorn in the side of the Embassy for many years being opposed to the junta and going after our policy all the time, and had quite a following here in Washington.

ANSCHUTZ: Oh yes. He is a very good publicist. He is really completely devoted to his work. He has worked ceaselessly in his PR activities.

Q: Why was he trying to establish contact with that group at that time?

ANSCHUTZ: What they wanted to do was to embarrass the government. The senator was going to presumably be critical of the action they had taken. This was a pro-Andreas call. That didn't give it any particular luster in my eyes either.

Q: What about Andreas? Right after the coup he was in prison and it looked like he was going to be shot, or something. What did the Embassy do? Here was a guy who had been an American citizen and served in the American Navy and had been a professor at Stanford and a few other places and had been spending most of his time out on the hustings attacking the United States so he obviously wasn't over popular. Yet his life was being threatened.

ANSCHUTZ: Of course as an American citizen we were opposed to any summarily action against Andreas. There was also an organized effort in the United States to free Andreas, led by a very good economist from Minnesota who was, I think, the head of the Council of Economic
Advisors. His name escapes me too. Walter Heller, I think. So this had wide international publicity. I think it is fair to say that we may well have saved Andreas' life. I think he might have been executed.

Q: *Were we making representations?*

ANSCHUTZ: Oh, yes. I think by that time Phil Talbot was back and I think he made representations too, pointing out that any such action on the part of the government would certainly compromise the already delicate relations we had with the government. Our relations with the government was a very brittle, tenuous thing. But we did in effect have relations of a sort. So Andreas may well have owed his life to American intervention.

Q: *During this period...you left when?*


Q: *So at the time you left...it was only April to June...we were being very distant?*

ANSCHUTZ: Yes, we were.

Q: *Did you retire shortly thereafter?*

ANSCHUTZ: I came back here and was assigned to the Senior Seminar. Then I had met George Moore, who was chairman of City Bank, both in Cairo years ago and actually spent a weekend with him on Nasser's yacht. When I was in the Senior Seminar...I remember I was down in New Orleans, I believe, and my wife called and said, "Onassis wants you to call him." I did call him and he said, "Get in touch with George Moore, he wants to give you a job." I was just 50 and I could retire under our regulations. I had been very fortunate in the Service. You will recall there was another regulation which said that if you were a Class 1 officer for more than ten years you were vulnerable to being retired. I was a Class 1 officer at 40.

Q: *You were promoted early.*

ANSCHUTZ: I was promoted early. But I had to hang around and wait for something to happen or take the offer. So with a great deal of regret I left the Service in 1968.

Q: *When you came back to Washington, this was still during the Johnson administration, did you find the Desk with Dan Brewster and others, fairly firm that we were going to keep our distance from this Greek government?*

ANSCHUTZ: I think it is fair to say that. We were in a delicate position. We strongly disapproved of this government. But the trick was to divest ourselves of this government without toppling the whole situation into the hands of Andreas and his friends. So this was why basically the maneuver was so delicate. Instead of pushing too hard and thereby making sure we lost the game, we thought we could, by gentle persuasion, ease out. Well, it didn't work out that way.
Q: Then the next administration came in which tried to have a much more positive approach.

ANSCHUTZ: Well, we had Henry Tasca so there was some love making at that time. Again, I am sure it was in the hope that we could convert them.

Q: I think this is behind it, but also again it represented the cold war and these were anti-Communists and so our friends.

ANSCHUTZ: That is right.

Q: Well, I want to thank you very much.

End of interview