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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is the 7th of June, 2002. This is an interview with Colonel Broadus Bailey, Jr. on behalf the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, and I’m Charles Stuart Kennedy.

In the first place, tell me about "Broadus."
BAILEY: Broadus is a Virginia family name spelled with two “d’s.” The story in my family is that probably my grandparents couldn’t spell, so they named my father Broadus with only one “d,” and it was passed on to me by my father and mother. We did not pass it on to our children; it’s a little difficult to handle Broadus in French or German or other foreign languages one might encounter.

Q: So tell me when and where you were born, then let’s talk about your family a bit.

BAILEY: I was born on January 28, 1930, in Greenville, South Carolina. My mother Rebecca Furman Bailey was from Greenville, and Dad met her there when he was in the army during World War I.

Q: On your father’s side, what was your father doing, and what was his family background?

BAILEY: My grandfather Bailey was a millwright in Nashville, Tennessee, and had quite a sizeable family. My father was the youngest one, and he was in the National Guard, the Tennessee National Guard, and when it was federalized for World War I, he came to Greenville, South Carolina to Camp Sevler, and met my mother there, and after the war married her. My dad was in his father-in-law’s business, the Alaster G. Furman Company. The company handles insurance, real estate, stocks and bonds, mortgages, and it had been founded by my grandfather Furman. It no longer exists, though the name exists in a real estate company at least.

Q: And your mother’s family?

BAILEY: The Furmans were South Carolinians from the low country of South Carolina, and my great-great-grandfather was J. C. Furman; he founded a college in the lower part of the state, and moved the college west to Greenville in 1857. He was the President of what is now Furman University, and was also a Baptist preacher.

Q: Did you grow up in Greenville?

BAILEY: Yes, I grew up in Greenville, and attended public schools there, but went to the Lawrenceville School in New Jersey in 1945 when I was 15.

Q: Let’s go back to the time you were in Greenville. What was Greenville like in the 30’s?

BAILEY: Greenville was a mill town at that point, cotton mills primarily, quite a textile center – it called itself the textile center of the South. When I was a child I think the population of Greenville was said to be about 30,000 people, and it was a delightful town to live in.

Q: In your family, did you have brothers and sisters?
BAILEY: I have one sister who is 5 years older than I am; she lives in Greenville to this day, and is married to someone she met who was in the Air Force in Greenville during World War II.

Q: And did you read a lot?

BAILEY: Yes, I’ve always been an enthusiastic reader. I remember as a child of nine or 10, I was a member of the Book of the Month Club, and how I managed to pay for this I’m not sure, but I did. And I had a sizeable collection of books for someone my age, and still do – my wife would like to throw some of them away, but we have yards and yards of books.

Q: What about any particular area of interest in your reading?

BAILEY: I would read history in preference to fiction, and the history could be most anything, but primarily it’s European history. My service in Vietnam and Laos would lead me towards Southeast Asian history, too. But if you looked in our library, I think you’d find most of the history books are probably centered on Europe. I also read what might be called contemporary political history.

Q: But I’m really talking about early times. How about “the war” when you were a kid?

BAILEY: “The war” when I was a child was World War I.

Q: Really? Not the Civil War?

BAILEY: Well, yes, one of my earliest recollections was going to Confederate Memorial Day services. I rode in my grandmother’s open Dodge touring car, past the Confederate Memorial, which was said to have been modeled on my great grandfather Hoyt, as a matter of fact, and then to the cemetery to put flags on graves. But maybe “the war” was the Civil War, but my household, my parents’ household, my father having been a Lieutenant in WWI, never, never forgot it, and he was a great raconteur of WWI stories, to the excruciating boredom of all the family.

Q: I was wondering, because your generation is about the last generation to get the full brunt of the lost cause, and all that.

BAILEY: Oh, yes, it meant a lot; the war meant a lot to my grandparents. My grandparents were born just after the Civil War, 1867 and ’69, and they had memories of Reconstruction, and they certainly told me about them.

Q: My grandfather took a little excursion, too – he was an officer with Sherman.

BAILEY: Oh, was he? Gee, that’s a hated name in South Carolina.
Q: Now, school: how did you like school before you went to the prep school?

BAILEY: School was not really very much of a challenge; it didn’t require an awful lot of work, but I did reasonably well in public school. There were in those days only 11 grades, and my father thought that was not adequate, and that’s why he sent me off to Lawrenceville.

Q: Yes, I remember some of the states, to save money, cut down some grades.

BAILEY: My graduating class from public high school was the last class to go through 11 years; the succeeding classes had 12. But the South Carolina educational system at the elementary and primary school level was shot through with politics. The textbooks were controlled by the legislature, and it was not, in my father’s view, a very adequate education. He himself did not have a college degree, and he was always very, very interested in his children’s education.

Q: How about the black/white situation when you were there?

BAILEY: Well, my parents were very patriarchal, I guess is the word, about the servants. They took care of the servants; they didn’t pay them much, but nobody really was paid very much in the late ‘30s. They took care of their housing and their medical expenses, and in our instance, they provided them with a car, because we lived out of town. But it was slavery by another name. My father had an old black man, Uncle Ed was all I know as his name, and he was my father’s attendant and companion, and hunting friend, and he was with my father every week. There was another black man, Thomas Johnson, who worked for the family for years and years, in much the same relationship.

Q: As a young boy growing up there, did the separation intrude at all?

BAILEY: I never thought about it. I had a black playmate who was hired to play with me, named Robert E. Lee Smith, or Jones, I forget. He was a couple years older than I, and it was his job to come play with me every day. But it didn’t occur to me that there should be blacks in the elementary school; there weren’t; that came along later in my life.

Q: Well, then, your father picked Lawrenceville. Why did he pick Lawrenceville?

BAILEY: He and I, in the Spring of ’45, made a tour of northern boarding schools, and I was more impressed by Lawrenceville than by Choate, or Andover, or Exeter, or McDonough, in Baltimore. It was just more appealing to me, and it was to my father, too, so it really wasn’t a difficult decision.

Q: You were at Lawrenceville from when to when?

BAILEY: From September ‘45 until graduation in June of ’47.
Q: What was Lawrenceville like when you arrived?

BAILEY: It’s a magnificent physical plant, was then and is even more so today; very pleasant physical surroundings, sport fields, golf course, tennis courts, nice academic buildings. The ambience I found very conducive to fellowship and study. We lived in houses, individual houses, and I suppose a house’s average size would be about 30 boys, something like that; it was obviously a unisex school.

Q: I remember, in fact it wasn’t too long ago, I reread the Lawrenceville story.

BAILEY: Oh, yes, “Dink” Stover? Oh, no, Stover is Yale.

Q: It was the Tennessee Shad and other things of this nature. Well, at Lawrenceville, what sort of studies were you taking interest in?

BAILEY: What I was interested in was history. I was forced like everybody to take sort of a mix of courses, in Latin, science, mathematics. I was never good at math, I did not like science, I was flunking physics and very worried about whether I was going to get into Princeton because of that. I read just recently a letter from the assistant headmaster to my father assuring him that just because I had flunked physics didn’t mean that Princeton was going to turn me down. He thought I would have no trouble at all getting in.

Q: Well, then, you did go to Princeton?

BAILEY: Yes, I did.

Q: At Princeton, I guess being New Jersey, it was sort of a natural extension of Lawrenceville in a way, or not?

BAILEY: It was said that Lawrenceville had been founded as a preparatory school for Princeton. That’s less and less true as time goes by, but in my day, the largest block of students from my class did go to Princeton. It was only, I think, about 18 or 20 out of about 100, but that was the largest single block. But today, it’s not really true.

Q: You were in Princeton I guess from ’47 to ’53?

BAILEY: ’51.

Q: ’51, I mean. What was Princeton like when you went there?

BAILEY: It was still in those days, I guess one would say, still pretty elitist. Half of the student body even in those days was on financial aid of one sort or another, but the private school students, at least in my life, seemed to dominate the social scene. It was a challenging environment intellectually, I think; it certainly challenged me. I was not really
all that well prepared for it. But I enjoyed my college career tremendously, I think, a marvelous time.

Q: Were there any issues that sort of stirred the student body at that time?

BAILEY: Yes, Princeton had some pretty liberal student organizations in it among the student body. The SDS, I think, was around at that time.

Q: Students for Democratic Society.

BAILEY: Yes. I was a member of the Young Republicans Club, so I don’t think I had very much to do with them, but yes, there were some social issues around. Adlai Stevenson was a very liberal hero on the campus, and his son, I think, was at Princeton while I was there.

Q: Speaking of politics, where did your family fall? In those days the South was called solid democratic, but how about your family?

BAILEY: My family were Republican, and Dad liked to say that he was one of the few Republicans in South Carolina without a patch on the seat of his pants and his elbows, but they were Republicans and had nothing good to say about Roosevelt at all – couldn’t stand him.

Q: So while you were in elementary school did this all cause any problems?

BAILEY: No, I don’t think so. Most of Mother and Dad’s friends and the parents of the children I was with in grammar school probably thought more or less the same way. That may not be true, I never really thought about it. But no, it did not cause problems.

Q: At Princeton you had a very good football team in those days.

BAILEY: We did.

Q: Charlie Caldwell, and...

BAILEY: Charlie Caldwell was the coach, and some of my closest friends were members of the football team. Dick Kasmire was in the class behind me, and he was a Heisman Trophy winner.

Q: Good social life there at the time?

BAILEY: Oh, yes. Probably too good a social life. Yes, I was a member of one of the eating clubs, and was an officer of the club, and that probably occupied more of my time than it should have; my grades would have been a lot better had I not been one of the officers of the club, I think.
Q: Well, when you graduated, you graduated what, with a degree in history?

BAILEY: Yes.

Q: In ’51, of course, we had a little problem in Korea at the time. Did that have any effect on you?

BAILEY: Oh, it did, indeed. I was commissioned through the ROTC on the 12th of June of 1951 and went into the military, into the Army, on the 16th of August following that, as were all of my ROTC classmates.

Q: How about these international affairs – did they raise much of an interest while you were at Princeton?

BAILEY: Yes, that’s not really why I was in the Army. I said earlier, my father was very much interested in his children’s education, he not having had very much. Despite what I said, one of the few things my father ever told me about the details of my education was about the ROTC. Dad had been an enlisted man in World War I, and he said in ’47 that he thought there was going to be another war pretty soon, and I did not want to be an enlisted man, I wanted to be an officer, and I’d better be in the ROTC program at Princeton, and I did what he said. When I said he was interested in my education, he wanted to be sure that I got in good schools and that he did his share of getting me into those schools, which really amounted to paying the bill for it. But he didn’t concern himself with what courses I took, except for the ROTC, and I participated in that because he wanted me to.

Q: Did you have summer jobs?

BAILEY: No, I never did, and I think that was a mistake, and all three of our children have had summer jobs.

Q: What happened when you came in to the military?

BAILEY: I was one of a group of the Army ROTC who were ordered to the 82nd Airborne Division, without ever having volunteered for it – the 82nd is now and was then a volunteer outfit, but a number of us were ordered there. We were expected to volunteer at some point, and all of us did at some point or other, except for one member of our class, who is an enormously successful guy right here in town (Washington). And he refused to. He said he was bedamned if he was going to jump out of an airplane, and we sort of looked down our noses at Dick at the time, but I think he was really the only guy who had any guts; the rest of us, like lemmings, went over the cliffs, signing the volunteer statement. But I found the 82nd Airborne a marvelous assignment, and very vibrant, wonderful people, a lot of WWII veterans still around, enormous responsibility – I was a battery commander when I was 22 hears old.
Q: They put you in the artillery?

BAILEY: Yes, that’s right, Princeton’s an artillery ROTC unit. And my classmates on Wall Street had only a fraction of the responsibility that I had at the age of 22 as a battery commander, and I enjoyed the responsibility. I was battalion executive officer, normally a major’s job, when I was 24. And I had a great time doing it. I had the usual number of lemons in the group, but I don’t think any more so than anywhere else.

Q: The 82nd was sort of used as a strategic reserve, something they have in the United States?

BAILEY: Yes, and most of us stayed right at Fort Bragg; as the saying was, “whitewashing the rocks and polishing the brass,” while other people went off to fight the Korean War, and I was not in Korea during the time of the war.

Q: Well then, did you stay in the 82nd Division?

BAILEY: I did stay there for four years, for a variety of reasons – my initial term of duty was 21 months, and that was extended by Truman to 24 months, and then I decided to apply for a regular Army commission, and it was extended one more year, and eventually I left the 82nd after four years and was commissioned a Regular Army officer in a matter of months after I left; it was just a question of the paperwork percolating through the bureaucracy.

Q: Then what happened?

BAILEY: I went to Allied Forces Central Europe, then located in Fontainebleau, and I was the aide to the senior U.S. military officer at the headquarters.

Q: You were there from when to when, about?

BAILEY: I was there from ’55 to ’58.

Q: At that time how did we see the Soviet threat?

BAILEY: Well, it was pretty all-encompassing. It influenced everything we did every day at the headquarters. My boss was a U.S. Army major general, and he found the duty very frustrating because the headquarters was really not very long established, and the boss thought he knew, I’m sure he did know, what needed to be done, logistically – he was the Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics, and he was reasonably well-trained in our logistics procedures, and he knew what needed to be done, but it was very, very difficult to do anything. Headquarters was staffed by, I think it was eight nations, and to get agreement to accomplish anything, particularly in the field of logistics, was very difficult.
Q: So often in diplomacy, a constant theme is that the French always seem to be a burr under the saddle. You were located in France, what was your impression in this ‘55-’58 period of the French participation in NATO?

BAILEY: Troublesome, truly a burr under the saddle. I happen to be a Francophile, I traveled in France while I was in college, spoke French, and still am a Francophile, but to my boss really, they were the bane of his existence, trying to get something done with the French officers at headquarters, and headquarters was dominated by French, from Marshall Juin - who was the commander in chief, down to the clerks in the office.

Q: Was this looking at that time, do you feel this was a French characteristic, or was this coming from on high?

BAILEY: Oh, I think both. I think the French, I would suspect, had not gotten over the fact that we came to save them in the first World War, and once again in the second, and they’re very conscious of what happened to the French Republic in the second World War, I mean, it meant something to all the officers there, and they resented our presence and they were not cooperative in the way that we would have liked. But it also, I would be willing to guess, though I have no first-hand knowledge, they were doing what their government wanted them to do.

Q: How about the British at that time; was that an easier relationship?

BAILEY: Oh, yes, sure, yes. And the British were easy to get along with, the language barrier there didn’t exist, and we worked very closely with the British. The British were much more anti-German in those days than were the American officers at the headquarters. The Americans tended to say, “well, that’s past, and we need their help and they need our help, and let’s get on with the job.” The Brits did not feel that way at all – they really wanted nothing to do with the German officers at the headquarters.

Q: And you were there, really, kind of at the beginning of the integration of Germany into NATO?

BAILEY: That’s correct – I was there the day General Hans Spiedel, General Doktor Professor Hans Spiedel, came to assume command of Allied Land Forces Central Europe.

Q: He had been Rommel’s Chief of Staff, hadn’t he?

BAILEY: Yes, that’s right. And I was standing next to a British Grenadier guards major on the balcony overlooking the courtyard which had been prepared to welcome General Spiedel, and the British major and other Brits standing around me refused to salute to the German national anthem when it was played to welcome General Speidel. And they made no effort whatsoever to socialize with the Germans, and wanted no part of it.

Q: Did you see any gradual change during this time?
BAILEY: During that brief time? A little, but not much, no.

Q: How about the two cataclysmic events that happened at this point, the Hungarian Revolution and the Suez crisis? I was a vice consul in Frankfurt at the time, and we tried to figure how to get people the hell out of that place. But how did that hit you all?

BAILEY: Well, it scared the living daylights out of the people in the headquarters, and you know, it didn’t help that the president was making encouraging sounds toward the Hungarians, and the realization was that there wasn’t an awful lot we could do about it. And it was very scary. As far as the Suez was concerned, the most immediate effect was we didn’t have any oil to heat the houses and the headquarters. But I happened to have been on a house party in Portugal, and that would have been the summer of ‘57 – when was Suez?

Q: Suez was October of ‘56.

BAILEY: Okay, then it was the summer of ‘56, and several wing commanders and their wives were on the house party, and they disappeared. Then I got back to Fontainnebleau after my leave, I found the British contingent had been decimated from headquarters, because the planning was going on in London, and the people were needed on the planning staff. We didn’t really know that at the time, but it crippled the headquarters – headquarters wasn’t enormously competent to begin with, but the Brits being gone...

Q: Did you notice also, because the Brits and the French were doing this together, an absence on the French side?

BAILEY: No, I didn’t, not as much. It may have been there, but I did not notice it as much.

Q: During the Suez crisis, did that cause fissures in the alliance, would you say?

BAILEY: Well, at my level it would be hard to say. I’m sure the Brits must have resented our, in effect, stopping the operation, but you know, I was a lieutenant, and paling around with lieutenants and captains, and it didn’t affect my life. Whether it affected the bosses’ life, the major general, I don’t really know.

Q: Well, then, by the time you left in ‘58 the Brits were back on board?

BAILEY: Oh, yes, they were back on board in, I guess, ‘57, or early ‘57, I would think.

Q: I was wondering whether there was a lot of grumbling on their part either on their government or against us – were you hearing any of that?

BAILEY: No, and I don’t know that I would have been privy to that sort of thing.
Q: No, I was just wondering, you know, sort of military men grousing, either that their government had led them down the garden path, or that the Americans hadn’t supported them.

BAILEY: No, I can’t say that – the attitude that I remember is that, you know, we’re servants of our respective governments and we go do what we’re told to do.

Q: Well then, in 58, whither?

BAILEY: ‘58, I had been married in February of ‘58 at the Presidio at San Francisco.

Q: Where did you meet your wife?

BAILEY: In Frankfurt, when her father was commanding Fifth Corps.

Q: So she was an Army brat?

BAILEY: Yes, she was born at West Point, an Army brat, and my boss in Fontainebleau and his wife were old friends of her family, and we went over to Frankfurt for a weekend, and my function was to drive the car and drive them over and date the host’s daughter.

Q: Good military, you know, I mean, this is how they breed.

BAILEY: And we were married about seven or eight months later. My father-in-law in the meantime had been transferred to the Presidio San Francisco, and we were married there, then came back to Fontainebleau, and the following summer, went to Fort Sill for the artillery school for the artillery officers’ advance course. Stayed there for nine months and then went to Harvard. Somebody in the Pentagon thought it would be amusing and perhaps interesting to send a Princeton guy to the Harvard ROTC unit, so there I was.

Q: So how long were you doing that?

BAILEY: Four years.

Q: Tell me, this would be Harvard from when to when?

BAILEY: ‘59-’63.

Q: Going back a bit, while you were involved with the Arab war and then in Europe and all, did McCarthyism hit you all, or was this much of an issue or not?

BAILEY: It was somewhat of an issue. The Attorney General’s list was certainly a big part of our life, and it was very fine print – I can see it right now – it occupied an 8 x 10 sheet of paper with very fine printing of one list after another.
Q: Things like, I remember having to answer whether I’d ever been in the Black Dragon Society, but essentially, it was Communist organizations.

BAILEY: We went over that very, very carefully, and it did mean something to us. But beyond that and reading in the newspapers, or I guess we watched on TV, the hearings, I can remember, it was Mr. Welch, or the Secretary of the Army, testifying, stood up to McCarthy, and I remember that very clearly, and people cheered that, thought that was great.

Q: How about when MacArthur was removed? How did that hit your military unit?

BAILEY: I think by and large my contemporaries took General MacArthur’s side of the case. Personally, I did not; I thought the President did what had to be done, and the President had the right to do what he did, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended it, that General MacArthur be relieved, and I thought it functioned just the way our system should. But I don’t think that was the general feeling among my contemporaries.

Q: Back at Harvard, how did you find ROTC – did you find a different attitude in officer candidate and ROTC people?

BAILEY: With rare exceptions, most everyone’s motivation was to avoid the draft, and if caused to be in the active military, in as interesting a job as possible, and to the Harvard undergraduate at the time, that usually meant the Intelligence Corps. And I was in the ridiculous position of trying to recruit people to join, for example, the Army Security Agency, but I wasn’t allowed to tell anybody what the Army Security Agency did for a living. The functions of NSA and ASA were classified in those days, and the kids had no classified clearance, and yet, they wanted to be involved in intelligence, and the military wanted them, but we couldn’t tell them what it did.

Q: This is kind of where I always felt college misfits ended up. I ended up in the Air Force security service, and most of my colleagues were Harvard, Princeton, I was a Williams graduate. We all ended up as enlisted men going to the Army language school, and I figured it was probably safer keeping us there than putting us into units where we might get into trouble.

Q: Also did you find the ROTC at all was used for a lot of young men as a way to help pay for the college expenses? Was this almost a class thing, in other words, the people with a lot of money wouldn’t bother with it, or not?

BAILEY: I don’t think that was the case. We were not paid very much; I think they got a stipend of something like 30 or 40 bucks a month, and that was in the last two years. The first two years, I don’t believe they got anything, and there were no ROTC scholarships in those days. I don’t think money was a factor, no, I wouldn’t have thought so, and there were some very well-to-do students in the ROTC program at Princeton.
Q: Well, also, you were there during the Kennedy period.

BAILEY: Yes.

Q: How did that hit, the campaign and all?

BAILEY: Well, it struck me that Harvard was a much more political institution than was my alma mater, and there were loads of undergraduates who were very enthusiastic about the presidential campaign, and involved in that on the campus, and off the campus, for that matter.

Q: Were you looking at international things during this period, I mean, honing your credentials or anything like that?

BAILEY: No, I was then and I remain today a fairly attentive reader of the national press, and we took the Christian Science Monitor and also the Boston Herald, I think, and I would read those fairly closely, but the occasions when I had time to take courses at Harvard, which members of the faculty could do, it was in the history field, and it was not in contemporary politics.

Q: Well, then, you got out of there in when?

BAILEY: In the summer of ’63 I went to the command and staff course at the Naval War College in Newport, and was there for an academic year.

Q: Did you find there was a Navy way and other ways?

BAILEY: Oh, yes, there is. The Navy lives in its own little world, and the fact that it floats around the ocean reflects in their everyday life, and the hierarchy is much more rigid and there’s the Navy way to do things, and that’s the way they expect to have it done, at least they did then. And my experience is not very different in the intervening time. I remember at the time of Kennedy’s assassination, my parents were coming to see us for, I guess it would have been Thanksgiving, and we were having a small cocktail party for them, to meet our friends, and the commandant, the rear admiral that commanded the post, said I couldn’t have a party, just like that. I wasn’t accustomed to being told by anybody things like that. He said we are in mourning, and it can’t be done, so since it was in the officer’s club, it was canceled.

Q: Well, then, after ’64 was Vietnam raising its head at all?

BAILEY: Oh, yes, that’s where I went, from Newport to Vietnam.

Q: Had you thought about Vietnam before that?
BAILEY: Yes, I had written my paper – the command and staff course had to write a fairly long paper, and I wrote mine on Vietnam and I had a pretty good idea that’s where I was going when I left Newport, and sure enough, I did.

Q: So you went to Vietnam from when to when?

BAILEY: From August of ‘64 to September of ‘65.

Q: What were you doing there?

BAILEY: I was the sector or provincial advisor in Tuyen Duc sector; the provincial capital is Dalat. And it was a fascinating tour. I was chosen for that job because I spoke French and I think perhaps because I knew some of the people in the headquarters, and they thought it would be a suitable assignment. It was not an awful lot of military duties. My principal duty was really trying to keep track of the generals who were running Vietnam, and they liked to spend time in Dalat.

Q: It’s sort of the Switzerland of “A Beautiful Place.”

BAILEY: Oh, yes, beautiful – we were back there several years ago, and it’s just the same today.

Q: I had heard that it was considered by both sides to be an R&R area, and the Viet Cong wasn’t doing much there; was this true, or not?

BAILEY: That’s generally true, yes. The Viet Cong were not very far away, they were not infrequently in the morning market, left propaganda messages. They were never more than four or five kilometers out of town, but trying to get the Vietnamese to stir up the VC in the provinces was very difficult. They did not- (end of tape)

Q: Well, was your job sort of to stir it up and try to get them to do something?

BAILEY: Yes, and they did things, they did go out on operations, and I went out with them from time to time. But the province chief’s principal duty was to maintain security in the city and around the palaces, so-called palaces, in the town for the VIPs who came, and to ensure the safety of those VIPs, and as I said a moment ago, that didn’t include much in the line of military operations.

Q: I’ve heard at other times there was an effort made to keep American military from going there.

BAILEY: Yes, I think that’s true. I think it was more after my time; I think the town was in effect off limits to some of the American units, but the American Army units were just beginning to arrive as I left, so I’m really not sure about that. There were always more military in town than I knew about although they were asked to be sure that my office
knew that they were in town. The attack on the Pleiku headquarters, Pleiku compound
and airstrip in February of ’65, I guess it was; there were six helicopters from Pleiku in
town. They had not bothered to let me know that they were there, but Pleiku was on my
telephone saying send those choppers back, and I didn’t have a clue where they were. I
knew where the choppers were, but not the people.

Q: That attack was the one that sort of kicked off the major reinforcements, wasn’t it?

BAILEY: Yes, that’s right, yes.

Q: It was actually, I guess, the first real attack on American forces, their advisors...

BAILEY: I guess the Rex BOQ in Saigon was bombed about Christmastime of ‘64,
maybe; I’m not sure I’ve got those dates right, but that was the first real big attack, and I
think almost simultaneously, a couple planes were satchel-bombed at Tan Son Nhut
airport. A friend of ours from Newport was killed.

Q: Was the province chief a military man?

BAILEY: He was a Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel Phan, a delightful person. He was a
protégé of General Thieu, and later was involved in the police force, I believe the national
police, but he was a very able guy, young guy, I think he was about my age.

Q: Obviously you’re off in the nicest part of Vietnam. Did you get any feel for the
situation in Vietnam at the time?

BAILEY: Elsewhere in Vietnam? I realized that the situation elsewhere in Vietnam was
much more serious than it was around us, and we were briefed regularly on the activities
around Kon Tum and Pleiku, and I had access to the intelligence, and in the delta, and on
my trips to Saigon for one reason or another I talked to my contemporaries. I knew that
the war was a lot hotter elsewhere than it was where I was spending my time. Most of my
time was spent trying to figure out what the generals were doing, and for that purpose I
had a direct phone line to General Stillwell, who was the chief of staff of MACV
(Military Assistance Command, Vietnam), because MACV would be very concerned
about what General was in town, and what were they talking about.

Q: You’re talking about Vietnamese generals.

BAILEY: Yes, right. And Colonel Phan, the province chief, was reasonably candid in
telling me what they were talking about; I’m sure he was operating under his own rules,
and he certainly didn’t divulge everything.

Q: Well, this is a time of rotating generals, wasn’t it? Rotating governments, before
General Thieu more or less settled into the job.
BAILEY: Yes, Nguyen Khan, the general with the little goatee that he wore, he was chief of government, maybe chief of state, I think chief of government, about Christmastime of ’64, and I had the not very pleasant duty of telling him that Ambassador Taylor, General Taylor, wanted to see him in Saigon in the Ambassador’s office the next morning. This being Christmas Eve, I believe, and the message came by phone from Saigon, and I said to the other end of the phone in Saigon, I think it was General Stillwell, but I’m not sure.

Q: Is this Stillwell with one “l”?

BAILEY: Yes, Dick Stillwell, yes, not related to Vinegar Joe. Whoever was on the phone, I said, “Well, I think I’d better have that in writing,” and there was no capability to provide it to me that way, so I wrote it down longhand and took it and put it on a message form and delivered it to palace #1, I think it was, and I got only as far as the gate where the guard properly stopped me, and I said I had a message from the American ambassador to General Khan. And the guard got on the phone and one of General Khan’s aides came down to the gate to meet me, and I told him what I was there for, and that I needed to deliver the message and had been told to deliver it only to General Khan. And the captain aide told me that I would not be permitted to do that. And the aide took my written message form to the general and he read it and came back and the message sent back by me to Saigon was that General Khan was not available to see General Taylor in the embassy, but General Khan would be back in Saigon in the next several days and would be glad to receive General Taylor at the JGS compound. So he let Ambassador Taylor know exactly where he stood. But that sort of political military errand was what I really was involved in, and also the hope that I could pick up incidental intelligence on what the generals were up to.

Q: Well then, in ’65, whither?

BAILEY: ’65 I came back to the Pentagon and was in the international policy division of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations.

Q: And you did that for how long?

BAILEY: For two years, I would guess, then I was moved to the front office and was the executive officer to the Director of Plans.

Q: Then when did you go to Laos?

BAILEY: We went to Vientiane in ’72 from Heidelberg.

Q: Before that, you’d been where?

BAILEY: From the Pentagon I went to the Army War College, from the Army War College I commanded a battalion in Germany for 13 months, from there to headquarters U.S. Army Europe at Heidelberg, and it was there that the phone rang and it was
Washington saying, “Would you like to go to Laos?” And at that particular moment, we were pre-empted by a higher priority call, and that’s all of the phone conversation I got. But I was sent to Laos primarily because of my French; I believe someone fell out who had been trained in Lao, and was not able to go and they needed somebody quickly and we came here to Washington for three months, I think it was, and then we arrived in Vientiane, where we had the kids’ ice hockey sticks and our feather comforters from Heidelberg, which were not very useful in tropical Laos.

Q: So you were in Vientiane from when to when?

BAILEY: From May of ’72 until May of ’74.

Q: What was the situation in Laos when you got there?

BAILEY: They had had a difficult winter dry season campaign, December of ’71 and January of ’72, and they were sort of licking their wounds.

Q: “They” being...

BAILEY: The Americans and the Lao Royal Lao Army. And they were planning or scheming as to how they could recapture the Plain of Jars, very much obsessed with that, and it proved to be a task that was beyond the competence of the Lao, even with considerable help from us.

Q: Who had taken over, was it North Vietnamese?

BAILEY: Taken over?

Q: The Plain of Jars.

BAILEY: Oh. Well, nominally the Pathet Lao, but the real fighters were the North Vietnamese, and there was a division, I forget its number, that was by and large occupying the Plain almost as far west as Luang Prabang. But if you were engaged in a firefight, the first line probably would be Pathet Lao, but behind them would be professionals from North Vietnam.

Q: Well, it seemed to be a pattern going on for some time about the rainy season things would stop, then there would be fighting over the Plain of Jars, and then the rainy season would come and they’d go back and forth. Principally, what was your job in...

BAILEY: I was the Army attaché, which involved traditional overt intelligence collection, as any attaché office would do anywhere in the world. The additional duty that I had was as the supervisor of JCS Project 404, which was in effect an advisory detachment that had been created after the Americans had withdrawn from Laos in ‘62. Sometimes later this element was introduced into Laos. There was an Air Force Project
404, the boss was the air attaché; there was an Army element, and I was the boss of that. The additional boss, and it was really a confused military structure, was the Deputy Chief, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand, who was headquartered in Udorn. I wrote the efficiency report on the Project 404 Army officers; the deputy chief, a brigadier general, endorsed those efficiency reports, and that’s the easiest way to characterize the organization, which was sort of strange.

Q: Was the Ambassador Mac Godley?

BAILEY: Mac Godley, yes.

Q: What was his role?

BAILEY: Well, he, Mac, was the proconsul of Laos.

Q: Sometimes some people know him as Field Marshall Godley.

BAILEY: Field Marshall Godley, that’s absolutely right. Mac Godley had more leadership ability than almost any general I ever served with. I was very devoted to Mac, and I enjoyed working for him tremendously. And he was into everything. He didn’t hesitate to dip into squad operations if he chose to, and quite often he did, and he was a very adventurous, very brave person, and he went all over Laos. I’m right now sending off some pictures of Mac and Charlie Mann, who was the chief of the AID mission, overlooking a river in central Laos with the North Vietnamese on the other side of the river, and we’ve just gone down to see because Mac wanted to find out who they were and what they were doing there.

Q: I was interviewing Dick Howland, who’s telling the story that he had heard about you going in a helicopter, that Mac Godley wanted to go up and see some ruins or something?

BAILEY: Well, that’s true. Since Mac is not living, I guess I can tell the story. But the reason we were forbidden to tell the story was because of Betty Godley – Mac didn’t want Betty to find out. We had gone to Pak Ou. We were in Luang Prabang.

Q: Which was the royal capital.

BAILEY: Yes, and Mac wanted to see Pak Ou, the mouth of the Ou River, where the Ou flows into the Mekong, and the Lao military region commander, he was a half-brother of the king, said he’d be glad to take us there. My assistant, a major, a resident in Luang Prabang, said “No, I don’t think the Ambassador ought to go there, I don’t think you ought to go there,” and Mac overruled my guy on the scene, as well as Lou Connick, the AID representative, and we piled into one of my helicopters and off we went. And we were descending into what in New England would be called a village green, at the Village of Pak Ou, and as we were coming down, I noticed the school building on one side of the
little green, and all of the blinds were raised, were up, and I could see in the schoolroom, and there were desks with papers on them, but there were no students around, and I thought that was very strange, but by this time we were 15-20 feet off the ground. So I put one leg out on the skid of the Huey helicopter to be on the ground and help Mac get out, when a rocket round went underneath the helicopter just before we landed, and fortunately, my pilot, Scooter Burke by name, saw it and heard it, and he got us back in the air quickly. We were taken under fire also by a 50-caliber machine gun, which was undoubtedly North Vietnamese, on the north side of the river, and we were very lucky to get out of there; it was a very competent pilot who got us out of there. And Mac made us swear that we would not tell anybody about this, but of course, the stringer picked it up, and it was in the Washington Star the next day, I think, and somebody sent that to Betty, and Betty let us know that she didn’t like it. Mac got a “rocket” the next morning from the Secretary of State.

Q: Well, this 404 – what was it doing?

BAILEY: They were the same as advisors in Vietnam; they would have been called sector advisors there. I had one lieutenant colonel in each of the five military regions. I had sort of a liaison officer at Long Chen, which was the MR2 headquarters. That was CIA turf, and I didn’t really get much involved in that, but I did have a liaison officer there. And each of the lieutenant colonels had sometimes a captain, always a couple of sergeants, and they were in charge of advising the military region commander on what it was that we thought ought to be done, and helping them in any way they could to carry out and prosecute the war.

Q: Well, what was your impression, not just yours but your colleagues’, of the military effectiveness of the Royal Lao Army?

BAILEY: The military effectiveness was almost zero. They were not disciplined, they were not adequately trained, they were not adequately paid, they were surrounded by their families. The Laos, as so many people have said, were - are and were - a very gentle people, and they prosecuted the war very, very haphazardly. The burden of combat was carried out by the Hmong, under the tutelage of the CIA, and the Thai irregulars; they were really the ones we counted on if something had to be done. If the fire brigade really had to be sent out, you’d look for the Thai irregulars or...

Q: When you’re talking about Thai irregulars, were these sort of ersatz Laos, I mean, were they really irregulars, or were they sort of regular type troops with Lao markings?

BAILEY: I’m not sure I can answer that; they were recruited and managed by a Thai general named Pai Tun. Whether they were recruited from regular Thai divisions or not, I don’t know, but they were recruited for fighting in Laos.

Q: They were a separate breed, evidently.
BAILEY: Yes, as far as I knew, yes, they were. Paid by the Agency.

Q: Well, how did you find relations with the Agency?

BAILEY: Relations with the Agency under the station chief who was there when I got there were very good – Hugh Tovar. And Hugh is a wonderful person to work with; I would do almost anything Hugh asked me to do. He has a knack, had a knack for making you think you were in on all of his secrets and a part of his operations, which goodness knows, I hope I wasn’t, but he made me feel that way, and I enjoyed tremendously working with Hugh, and we traveled together. We inspected units together; that was always a pleasure. His successor was more difficult to get along with, and I really spent more time trying to get along with him than I ever spent trying to get along with the ambassador.

Q: What was the problem?

BAILEY: He was, as so many of his agency are, enormously secretive, and not candid or not frank or not forthcoming on subjects that I really thought he should be. For example, I had a wide variety of capabilities of people working for me, and I found that I had generator operators that had been borrowed temporarily from me that were really running the electrical systems at Long Chen; they were generator mechanics. I had all sorts of skills available among the people who worked for me. And I didn’t realize it for quite awhile, I was not very bright, but the agency was in the process of pulling out of Long Chen, and of Laos, and, though I didn’t know it, I was taking on a lot of their functions. And it was never said to me, it was just, “Broadus, could I borrow Sergeant So-and-so for a few days?” “Sure.” And then Sergeant. So-and-so wouldn’t reappear. And finally, we had sort of a showdown on the subject, and I said I was very sorry, but the sergeants had to return to my control in Vientiane or go other places where they were supposed to be assigned, and there would be no more unless I was told to do so by the Joint Chiefs, and I prepared the message to Washington to this effect. I took it to the station chief for his concurrence, and I would routinely ask for concurrence (on things that I thought were in their field though the reverse was not the case). And he realized I was serious about it, and it came to an end. But he was very, very difficult to get along with.

Q: You were there again, let’s see, this was...

BAILEY: ‘72 to ‘74.

Q: So this is the beginning of the winding down, I mean, our commitment there; how were you feeling this?

BAILEY: How was I?

Q: I mean, your operation in Laos - were you seeing this as the beginning of the end?
BAILEY: Not the beginning of the end, because I think we hoped that Souvanna could once more pull off a coalition government that would maintain some semblance of neutrality or interest in the West, and I don’t think we viewed it as the beginning of the end, though that was always sort of in the back of your mind, as that could happen. But the peace treaty was, I believe, finalized, I think it was our wedding anniversary, which was February 22; that would have been ’73. And it of course established certain deadlines for the formation of the government that never happened. The new government was supposed to be inaugurated in April of ‘73, and it didn’t happen until April of ‘74, just before we left. But we viewed it as workable, as possible. The Lao did not at all - they viewed it as being abandoned by us, and they were quite frank in saying so; the people that we were close to among the Lao, the generals, the hierarchy, they thought they were being deserted.

Q: Was there a problem of one form or another of corruption involved within the Lao structure?

BAILEY: Oh, sure, I’m sure there was. I didn’t have any real first-hand knowledge of it, but supplies would disappear out of warehouses - military supplies, AID supplies. There was a problem paying the troops - there were ghosts on the payroll. There were certainly rumors about the Sananikone family, which was in Lao terms enormously wealthy and had their fingers in any number of commercial pies. The bottling plant was said to be partially owned by the Sananikone family, so there were all sorts of corruption that we thought was going on.

Q: Did you have problems keeping your advisors, young officers, sergeants and all, from getting involved in firefights? I mean, trying to push, you know. When you’ve got a rather reluctant military force you’re advising, it’s hard to keep your own people from going out and doing the job.

BAILEY: It wasn’t their job to be involved in firefights, and it certainly was not a problem for me. It was appropriate on limited and rare occasions, and on those occasions we did participate. There was one firefight northwest of Vientiane in December of ‘72 and January of ‘73, and it’s my lieutenant colonel (I sent him up there, at the ambassador’s request. Mac wanted an American on the ground there), the MR (Military Region) advisor’s job to be there, and he went, and he supervised the firefight. But I don’t think there was a problem with the troops that worked for me getting into firefights that they weren’t supposed to. I don’t think that was a problem.

Q: How did you find supervision, or oversight, or whatever you want to call it, from both the Vietnam and from CINCPAC or the Joint Chiefs, I mean on the military side - where were your instructions coming from?

BAILEY: In Laos?

Q: Yes.
BAILEY: My instructions were coming from Mac Godley. Very rarely did CINCPAC get involved in anything I was doing. That’s not true of the air war, but it was true in my case, and the JCS was not involved at all. But Mac was very much involved in whatever the sergeant and the lieutenant colonel were doing, and what they were seeing, and he had his ideas about what they should be doing. They were very conscious, the people who worked for me, that Mac was the boss.

Q: How about the Lao leadership? Did you have much to do with them?

BAILEY: Oh, yes, I saw them a lot. Not much leadership ability there. They just weren’t trained, they didn’t have the experience; they viewed the senior rank in the military as being an opportunity to profit one way or another. The profit might simply be a nice house in Vientiane to live in, provided by the military, it might be a BMW car, but they viewed the perquisites of their job as truly justified, and that was what they were interested in. But field leadership of soldiers, no. There were a couple, a few, but not many.

Q: Was Kong Le at all a presence while you were there?

BAILEY: No, he was not in Laos at all. He was in Paris, I believe, and Souvanna sent him a monthly check, I believe. I think the prime minister sent him a stipend quite regularly, is what I’ve heard, but he was not in Laos, and I don’t think really he exercised any influence.

Q: Well, while you were there had the AID and all... You were at the seat of the throne.

BAILEY: Oh, I think so. You mean the AID program or the military? AID, I believe it was still carrying on, but I’m not certain about that. The military program was being phased out, and of course, I was in a sense replaced by the deputy chief. The deputy chief when I got there was General Jack Vessey, later chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And General Vessey was replaced by Dick Treffrey, at the time a Brigadier General, now Lieutenant General (retired), and he moved to Vientiane from Udorn, Thailand. That was one of the big things that the U.S. military wanted, was to have the deputy chief resident in Vientiane. General Vessey had made the trip every day from Udorn to Vientiane. And Dick moved to Vientiane, I think, in September of ’73, I believe, about the time that Charlie Whitehouse arrived. And so he was more involved in the military assistance program than was I, and the details of the budgetary aspects of the military assistance program. But my knowledge of it, second hand, was that that was phasing down.

Q: Well, you left there in ’74. What was your impression of whither Laos?

BAILEY: Well, the hope was that the Lao could pull it off. As I said a moment ago, the Lao didn’t think they could pull it off, and that was a self-fulfilling prophecy; in December of that year, many of them fled. I believe the embassy was occupied briefly in
the fall of ‘74, and the Lao, the hierarchy, many of them, left at that time.

Q: Well, then, where did you go after you left there?

BAILEY: From Vientiane we came to Washington, and I was the military guy in the East Asia Bureau at State. Mac Godley, as I said earlier, and Monty Stearns, had cooked up the scheme to have me assigned to the Bureau, and Jack Vessey sitting on the other side of the river, had made the arrangements, and I moved into EA/RA in the late summer of ‘74, and stayed there for three years.

Q: What was your impression of working in the State Department atmosphere as opposed to the Pentagon?

BAILEY: State, Foreign Service people that I’ve been with, thought the bureaucracy was just stifling in the State Department, thought it was just awful; to me, having worked in the Pentagon, I thought it was a joy! It was very easy to get something done, I thought. And I enjoyed my tour in EA. I was sort of expected by the military to be the spy in residence in EA, and I chose not to be that; I thought I was sent there to be a staff officer and bring some military commentary to whatever subject was under discussion, but not to report back on the State Department. That didn’t really endear me with my nominal supervisor in OSD/ISA.

Q: Well, now, what sort of issues were you dealing with?

BAILEY: Well, a large part of the time was very routine export licenses; that was very dull, boring, with an occasional interesting case. I also dealt in the military assistance program; I remember some wonderful fights with Ann Swift in the Philippine office.

Q: Oh, yes, I’ve interviewed Ann.

BAILEY: Well, Ann was bound and determined that the Phils were not going to have F-5s.

Q: Freedom Fighter...

BAILEY: Yes, and they had T-28s, which were World War II trainers. And Ann was bound and determined that that was good enough for the Phils, and the Phils wanted the F-5s and the Defense Department wanted them, and I was caught in the middle arguing with Ann Swift.

Q: A very trying lady.

BAILEY: Oh, she is; she’s a wonderful person. In the end, I think we won; I think Ann lost.
Q: Was there a difference in arms sales and all? Did you find that basically the Pentagon wanted to sell, the State Department wanted to put controls on, and was this part of...

BAILEY: Yes.

Q: How did these things get resolved?

BAILEY: Well, my recollection is that the State Department won its share. The Defense Department was not interested in the political aspects of the sale most of the time to anybody, by and large. They didn’t have the people who were interested in what the political questions might be, they didn’t have the people trained to see those political consequences. So the State Department’s view was to try to determine those, and I would say by and large, did so. And it was not resolved at my level, it's usually resolved in the political military bureau, between them and DOD.

Q: You left there when?

BAILEY: I left there in ‘77, to be the Washington staff boss of the defense attaché system in the East Asia area, actually a little more than what State calls East Asia, because our parish went as far west as Afghanistan.

Q: How did you find the attaché system? Often military attaché, certainly the navy military attaché thing is not the greatest job. I mean, it’s a very important job, speaking as a State Department person, but career-wise - and if you’re in the military, you really have to think career-wise - if you get too much of a tag of being a foreign affairs specialist, this is not helpful.

BAILEY: That’s true. I did not find the attaché staff in my parish to be particularly inspiring. They deserved a good bit of criticism leveled at them by the Foreign Service. There were too many elderly colonels who were interested in the sedan that came with the job, and the nice set of quarters, and whatever allowances might have been available. They were not particularly attuned to working with the embassy. There are notable exceptions to that, and a lot of young people were being trained, language and area schools, and they were much more professional and deserved much higher regard, and I think were better regarded.

Q: You know, when you look at it as a practical measure, what you really want is a young lieutenant colonel who’s still quite active, to get up and talk to other officers of the foreign country, not to sit back in his office, to be sort of a galloper and go all over the place.

BAILEY: That’s true, but that can also make the Foreign Service very nervous, to have lieutenant colonels galloping all over the place, and it can make Washington, the Pentagon, nervous, too. I don’t really know the answer to the problem; I think the military’s made progress since my day in professionalizing the intelligence, the overt
intelligence gathering element. I hope so.

Q: Any countries gave you particular problems?

BAILEY: Well, I had some people problems in Afghanistan, an Air Force major who was a very difficult problem. I had problems in India; they were people problems also. That was a Navy guy; he was drugged aboard a Russian cruiser, which was making a port call. I had some people problems in Bangkok. I flew in there one day and thought I was going down to Phu Ket immediately from the airport in Bangkok, and the DCM met me and said Mort Abramowitz wanted to see me in the embassy, so okay, off we went. Well, Mort was having a problem with the Army attaché, who was a full colonel, very senior to me, and Mort wanted me to fire him! And I said, “Mort, I’m sorry, but I don’t have that authority.” “Well, you can stay here and investigate him.” And I said. “Well, to do that I’ve got to be told to, because I’m very junior to him, and normally we don’t have junior officers investigating senior officers without being appointed to do so by competent authority.” And I said, “Mort, you can’t appoint me to do it; I’m sorry.” We worked it out one way or another, and the colonel was reassigned. But most of my problems in embassies were people problems.

I had also intelligence collection problems in the sense that I found some of the people were just obsessed with cranking out intelligence reports, IRs; numbers meant everything, not quality, and that’s difficult to manage from half a world away.

Q: Then what happened?

BAILEY: In 1980 I was in DIA in Washington, I was the supervisor of the attaches, and my phone rang and a classmate on the Hill asked me if I’d like to work for Jacob Javits on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, and I thought about it over night and called Peter back - an ex-Foreign Service officer, by the way, and said I’d be delighted. And I retired on very short notice; the Army didn’t spend much time mourning Bailey’s loss. Senator Javits called the Secretary of the Army and said, “We’d like Bailey next week,” and there I was.

Q: Who was on his staff that called you?

BAILEY: Peter Lakeland. Peter was a Foreign Service officer (Albert Aston Lakeland).

Q: He had a brother named Bill, I think, too, doesn’t he?

BAILEY: No, I don’t think so.

Q: That’s not the one? There are two Lakelands, I thought.

BAILEY: I don’t think Peter has a brother; he has a sister, I believe.
Q: But what were you doing with him?

BAILEY: Well, initially, the Republicans were in the process of building a Republican or minority staff for the committee. In the spirit of Arthur Vandenberg, they had maintained the fiction that they had a committee staff that was non-partisan. That really was never true, but that’s what the committee maintained. But Jesse Helms got on his high horse in late ’79, and insisted on there being a separate Republican staff, and Jacob Javits was the ranking Republican on the committee, and so he was given the task of building the staff. Peter Lakeland left the staff when Javits was defeated. The Republicans took control of the Senate in January ’81. Initially I covered both EA and Africa.

Fortunately, I lost the African portfolio before I had had to do anything very serious in that area, and so for the rest of the time I was the East Asian guy, and when the Republicans took control of the Senate in January of ‘81, the staffing pattern allowed two for each geographical area, and Mary Locke and I shared the East Asia portfolio for the next three years, four years.

Q: What was your major concern in East Asia during this period?

BAILEY: Initially, the primary concern was getting the new administration’s people confirmed, the ambassadors and the assistant secretaries.

Q: This would be the Reagan administration?

BAILEY: The Reagan administration in January of ‘81. And I spent a lot of time on that, a lot of time on Al Haig’s nomination, a lot of what some people would call “fanny time” sitting for 31 hours while we listed to General Haig drone on and on. It takes a lot of time for nominations in the beginning of an administration.

Q: General Haig’s time wasn’t a happy one. Not so much because of the State Department, but because of his relations with the rest of the administration. You as a professional army officer in this sort of now-unique position we’re looking at, what were you getting from your colleagues about Haig being a Secretary of State?

BAILEY: General Haig has an enormous ego, and he’s been in a series of jobs that allowed for or tolerated his ego, and this one he found some other people that had ego problems. I don’t think he was really suited for the job.

Q: And really, it wasn’t a happy mix. Were you getting the flavor of this as he...

BAILEY: Oh, yes, sure. We read the newspapers, and that’s where we picked it up from. You could also get it on the telephone from friends at State, but new secretaries of state don’t always get off on the right foot with the Foreign Service anyway, so I was surprised when he resigned.
Q: But he was kicked out.

BAILEY: Yes.

Q: What was your impression of the nominations from the foreign affairs field that were coming out of the early Regan administration?

BAILEY: Well, I’m a friend of the Foreign Service, and I regret seeing a lot of political appointees. I don’t, though, have any one or more of the political appointees standing out in my mind as being not particularly qualified; I enjoyed working with the Foreign Service to try to help them get confirmed as painlessly as possible, and made a point of trying to talk to the desk officers in the bureaus and the candidates themselves, to make sure they knew what sort of questions were of interest to the senators, and quite often I provided the questions themselves to the candidates.

Q: Well, Javits, of course, had a very solid, positive relationship with the State Department; he was considered a moderate, well-informed, helpful person there. Were there any others on the Senate or even on the staff who were sort of anti-internationalists or something like this?

BAILEY: Well, certainly Jesse Helms fell in that category, but let’s back up just a minute. Senator Javits hired me in the spring or early summer of 1980, but he was defeated in the primary in the fall, and therefore was not in the Senate in ‘81 when the new Congress convened. And Chuck Percy became Chairman of the committee. There were members who were certainly not very interested in international relations - one was the senator who later hired me, or tolerated me, at any rate, Senator Murkowski, who’s still on the Hill (in ‘64, he was Governor of Arkansas). Frank Murkowski is interested in international relations only so far as it pertains to Alaska, his constituency. And when I traveled with him, he was interested in selling Alaska wood to the Japanese, for example, and he was interested in permitting Alaska oil to be sold to the Japanese, which the legislation did not then permit. But his interest beyond that was minimal.

Chuck Percy has to this day an interest in foreign affairs, but he had to keep his eye on the ball, too, and what did Illinois get out of this, and his interest was by and large soybeans. When we traveled to Japan and Korea and Bangkok and other places, he wanted to be sure that he got a chance to make a pitch for Illinois soybeans. And that’s something, I think, that the Foreign Service doesn’t always understand, and it needs to be understood if you’re going to deal with the Congress; they have to worry about who elected them. There has been a series of chairmen of the Foreign Relations Committee who have been defeated because in the minds of their constituents they had paid too much attention to foreign affairs.

Q: Senator Percy, of course, came up against the Jewish lobby, and was essentially defeated by the Jewish lobby.
BAILEY: He carried the administration’s water, so to speak, for the sale of the AWACS to Saudi Arabia, and the political contributions dried up, the Jewish money in Chicago dried up, and you’re absolutely right.

Q: You continued doing this until when?

BAILEY: ‘84.

Q: And then what?

BAILEY: I retired then. Excuse me, I didn’t retire, I resigned from the committee staff; probably would not have lasted much longer, because Jesse Helms would return to the senior Republican slot on the committees. Richard Lugar took over from Percy; and then Jesse Helms reinserted himself into the committee, and I could never have gotten along with Senator Helms’s staff.

Q: Could you tell me your opinion, because it became a very important thing within our foreign relations, what motivated both Jesse Helms and his staff, because it does seem to have had a very pernicious effect.

BAILEY: Well, I would only be guessing, but I would say that it was just parochialism, an interest only in North Carolina or how something might affect North Carolina, or the conservative view of the world, and that is sometimes a very narrow view, and Senator Helms was the proponent of that narrow view. I think Dick Holbrooke, one of his great contributions was, in fact, in getting Jesse Helms to agree to the UN contribution; I think that’s a major achievement on Dick’s part.

Q: How about Jesse Helms’s staff, which I’ve heard some horror stories about, particularly in dealing with Latin American affairs. Did you get any feel for that?

BAILEY: I did not like to work with his staff at all. Brought up in the military, I thought if you say you’re going to do something, you do it, and that doesn’t need to be questioned. And you couldn’t count on Senator Helms’s staff to do what they said they were going to do. I found some of his staff, the way they poked around - this was a case in London, I believe, there were negotiations going on in London not with the Brits, I don’t remember who it had to do with (Rhodesia? South Africa?), but for Pete’s sake, there was Senator Helms’ staff member throwing his weight around in London during the negotiations. I thought that was deplorable, I thought it was terrible. I avoided them as much as I could, because I just couldn’t count on them doing what they said they were going to do.

Q: Then after ‘84, what?

BAILEY: After ‘84 I would like to think that I just do the things that I want to do, but I seem to be busy doing all sorts of things - I’m much busier than I would like.
Q: Well, I want to thank you very much.

BAILEY: My pleasure. And if you have additional questions you’d like me to answer, just let me know.

Q: I sure will. Okay, great.

End of interview