The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

CARL A. BASTIANI

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
Initial interview date: February 25, 2008

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Environment
Jews
Tourism
Social Security recipients
Secret Police
US Ambassadors
Security
Sanitation
Living
Social life
Local employees
Vietnam War

State Department: Special Exchange Office, European Bureau 1968-1969
Soviet bloc Fulbright visitors program
Poles
PL-480 program

State Department: Intelligence & Research; Romania 1969-1971
Autocracies
Ceausescu/Brezhnev relations
Comecon vs NATO
Eastern Europe relations with Moscow
Human Rights
Congressional Resolutions
Sino-Soviet differences
Vietnam War
Romanian nationalism
The Ceausescus
Totalitarianism

Genoa, Italy: Deputy Consul General 1971-1974
Genoa port
Operations

Rome, Italy: Political Officer 1974-1976
Ambassador John Volpe
Embassy organization
Political Parties
Role of Consulates
Relations with government
Italian communists
Congress of Communist Labor Unions (CISL)
Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani
Italian Royal Family
NATO

Red Brigades
Andreotti
Government personalities
Local press
Reporting
Currency
Economy
The Vatican

State Department: Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs; Technology and Space — 1976-1978
Technology data bank
Technology transfer to LDCs
Office inspection

State Department: FSI; Polish language study — 1978-1979

Krakow, Poland: Principal Officer — 1979-1983
Communist Party
Reporting
Government
Protest strikes
Economy
Dissidents
Solidarity movement
Embassy personnel
Security
Visa applicants
Revolution
Polish Workers Party
Walesa
Soviet problems
Polish Army
Scarcities
Students
Intellectuals
Catholic Church
Warsaw Pact
Local Agreements
Visit to Bielsko-Biala
Solidarity gains
Farmers
Prime Minister Jaruzelski
Polish Workers Party Congress
Local and foreign media
Solidarity National Congress

Front of National Accord
Polish Parliament
Official calls
Martial law
Social Security checks
Communications
Contacts with Solidarity
Intelligence
Barbara Walters interviews Jaruzelski
Jewish community
Stephen Solarz visit
Common myths re Polish revolution
Family

Torino, Italy: Principal Officer 1983-1987
Operations
Local industry
Ambassador Rabb
Relations with Embassy
Family
Auto industry
Missile concerns
Terrorism
Personal threat
Ambassador's visit
Consulate closed

Retirement 1988
Grievance Panel
Flying and other hobbies

INTERVIEW

Q: Today is the 25th of February, 2008. This is an interview with Carl – middle initial?

BASTIANI: Middle name is Anthony.

Q: And Bastinia.

BASTIANI: Bastiani, pronounced as in Italian.

Q: B-A-S-T-I-A-N-I. And the Carl is spelled with a "C."

BASTIANI: That is correct. I was actually baptized "Carlo," which is Charles in Italian but my parents got bad advice from a neighbor about the English equivalent, so I became Carl.

Q: Okay. And you go by Carl?

BASTIANI: That is correct.

Q: Well, let's start at the beginning. When and where were you born?

BASTIANI: I was born in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, southwest side, on March 8, 1928.

Q: Alright. You were born in the year of the dragon.

BASTIANI: Is that right?

Q: Yes, I know, because I was born in 1928 too.

BASTIANI: Okay.

Q: So, let's start, get some background. Can you tell me something about your family on your father's side first?

BASTIANI: My father was an immigrant. He was born in Italy in 1892.

Q: Where in Italy?

BASTIANI: In the area called Ascoli Piceno. It is northeast of Rome on a national highway, known as the Via Salaria since ancient Roman times. "Sal" means salt; the Romans used to bring their salt from the Adriatic along that road. My father immigrated into the United States in 1913. He went to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, because he had a relative there, a sister married to a man named Monti. He was trained as a coppersmith. Have seen those hammered copper pots from Italy?

Q: Oh yes.

BASTIANI: That was his trade. He had a little shop right on the Via Salaria in my mother's home town, Acquasanta Terme. With this skill, he got a job with National Casket Company in Pittsburgh making copper ornaments. He was drafted into the American army, served in California but never went overseas. Through his military service, he became an American citizen. Congress had passed a law granting citizenship to aliens who had served in the U.S. army. Then he went back to Italy with his stake, bought a three story house in the center of the village of Acquasanta Terme – the name means holy water baths. There are mineral baths in use since ancient Roman times in the Tronto river valley below the town which is literally perched on the side of a mountain.

There he married my mother and brought her over in 1920. He intended to return, but never did. He died young, at the age of 50, in 1942.

Q: What sort of education did your father and mother have?

BASTIANI: Both my parents had the required minimum education in Italy at the time, five years of elementary schooling; that is all. And while they grew up in an area with a dialect, Marcheggiano, spoken in the region of Le Marche, they learned the national language of Italy in school which is based on Tuscan, the regional language of Tuscany where Florence is located. However, the Marcheggiano dialect is very close to Tuscan.

Q: Some of the dialects – I was in Italy, I was in Naples at one time – some of the dialects can be very far away from standard Italian.

BASTIANI: They can be totally incomprehensible to anyone who learns standard Italian. I had a maid in Naples and used to drive her and her friend who worked for a colleague back to their homes at night after babysitting. They would carry on a lively conversation in the back seat of the car. I never understood a single word – not a single word.

Q: Did you get much from either your father or more probably your mother, about life in the old country and all that?

BASTIANI: Indeed I did. Not so much from my father because I was only 14 when he died, but my mother was always telling us how things were done much better in Italy. I got tired of hearing it. All I wanted to do as a child growing up was identify with my environment, my *American* environment; I even preferred the, you know, that mushy white American bread to the crispy crust bread that my mother baked herself.

Q: Wonder Bread, as I think it was called then.

BASTIANI: I am one of six siblings and we kind of got tired of hearing her tales, until she finally she returned to Italy for the first time in 1963 or 1964 during my first tour overseas in Naples. I took her up to her home town to see her sisters – she was one of six sisters and an older brother; only one other younger sister had immigrated to the United States. All of these sisters had married and had families. I was amused to observe her lecturing them on how things were done so much better in America. In fact it was that visit and, formally, my application to enter the Foreign Service which finally made an American of her. Earlier, when she learned that I had applied to the Foreign Service she jumped through all the hoops to become a citizen, because she thought that would help me accepted.

Q: Well now, you grew up in Philadelphia.

BASTIANI: No, Pittsburgh.

Q: Pittsburgh. Did you grow up there as a kid?

BASTIANI: Until the age of 14, yes. Until then I had never been farther than 75 miles away from home. I went to the local parochial school. My mother revered the Church and education, and insisted on sending us to the parochial elementary school, despite the family's limited income.

Q: Well, let's talk a bit about what your life was like as a young kid there?

BASTIANI: Well, I remember going to a public kindergarten briefly, because the parish did not have a kindergarten. About all I remember of that experience is the school's big red brick building which I survives to this day. I had two very close friends; one was a cousin who lived across the street, another who lived on the same street, of a family of German origin. We were crazy about sports, especially softball, baseball, and football. Baseball was my favorite; I am still an emotional Pittsburgh Pirate fan – in fact I used to get down on my knees and pray for them to win.

Q: That's your parochial education coming out.

BASTIANI: That certainly was part of it. We had pickup games all the time after school. We walked downhill a mile to school and uphill a mile back, and my mother, being a great believer in education, would accept no excuses for not going to school. On really cold days she used to line us up and give us each a spoon of anisette, which is a liqueur made from anise. The more commonly known anise liqueur is the French Pernod which strikes me as less strong than the Italian Meletti she dispensed, made in her own region of Le Marche. That would really warm you up on its way down inside. And then, you know, if it was there was snow we would have snowball fights, now and then with other "gangs." We also pretended to box.

Q: Well boxing, of course, everybody followed the heavyweight championship fights on the radio. Joe Louis was the…

BASTIANI: Indeed, indeed. At that time we had Billy Conn from Pittsburgh; he was a light heavyweight who challenged Louis for the heavy weight championship in two bouts, but got knocked out in the first round or early round of the rematch. Of course, we were really rooting for him.

Q: Well, just to get an idea about the neighborhood, how would you classify the sort of the neighborhood in which you grew up? What was it like?

BASTIANI: I would say working class. It was certainly not affluent, on the poor side economically, although we lacked for nothing in terms of food. My father at times used to walk five miles to work just to save some money.

Q: Well, what we are talking about is that you were a child of the Depression.

BASTIANI: No question about it. I was a child of the Depression that was still on throughout my childhood. But we didn't think we were poor. Our days were full and pleasurable. Between school, regular meals, listening to the radio, talking sports, and playing pickup games, our days were full. We played tackle football without a bit of equipment. We all had roller skates and bicycles. Helmets were unknown and we somehow survived the excursions we took on busy streets with no bike lanes or sidewalks. And there was a city recreation area nearby at which we spent a lot of time playing ping-pong and board games besides sports. We also played the board games we got for Christmas at each other's homes.

I was fortunate to make another close friend at school, Joe Cucinelli, who was extremely bright; he had a measured IQ of over140. We didn't play sports together – only walked and talked, and played chess. He introduced me to it. He too came from a poor background; his father earned his living in construction, working on his own. His father was also a news fanatic, keeping newscasts blaring on the radio all the time. Joe used to complain about it, but it certainly introduced him to current national and world events. And he stimulated my interest in them as well. I can remember in the early years of World War discussing the war in Europe when the Germans invaded the Soviet Union. And I lost a bet with him; I thought the Nazis, the Germans would take Leningrad then under siege, and he said they wouldn't. And that, besides the daily newspaper, is what first got me interested in foreign affairs. Foreign affairs reminds me of another classmate friend, George Kuztmark, because I was using his electric jig saw in the basement of his home when his mother came half-way down the stairs to tell us that the Japanese had just bombed Pearl Harbor.

Q: Was there much of an ethnic divide in your neighborhood or not?

BASTIANI: Well, we had our own little Italy because I had an aunt across the street from me who was the sister of my father and another aunt next door who was also another sister of my father. Each of them, had several children with whom we played. However, we associated freely with the other neighbors on the street, only two of whom were Italian. One of them, Mrs. Contrucci, I think had me picked out for her daughter, Roddy. She had more than an elementary school education; my mother called her la Toscana, since she was from Tuscany. When she moved, she gave us an upright piano which I assume she could play. No, there was absolutely no ethnic divide in our neighborhood. In fact, some of those whom you might call "traditional Americans" were very helpful to my father, like providing information and inviting him to ride in their cars when going shopping. My father never owned a car.

Q: Did you speak Italian at home?

BASTIANI: We spoke the dialect; it gave me ear for standard Italian. But when I entered the Foreign Service, I did the dawn patrol for a year to learn standard Italian. It took me forever to get used to the polite *Lei* form, which grammatically is the use of the third person feminine singular pronoun to address the person you are speaking with, male or female. It took me a long time to have the feeling that I was talking to that person and not

about someone else. But yes, it was a great benefit to speak the dialect as a child; not only for pronunciation, but for sensing the meaning of Italian idioms.

Q: I might add, for someone reading this, that the "dawn patrol" was taking early morning classes for an hour and a half before starting work at a quarter of nine, or so.

Obviously you were a Catholic; can you talk about the influence of the Church on you and your family and your neighborhood there?

BASTIANI: Pittsburgh is a very ethnically mixed city. The parish we belonged to, St. Martin's was actually an ethnic German parish, and the school was taught by an order of nuns which originated in Bavaria, Germany, the Sisters of Divine Providence. They believed in corporal punishment to convince you to behave and apply yourself. If you misbehaved, on the principal's next visit to the classroom, you had to stick out your hand and swish, swish, swish you would get it across the fingers from a bamboo switch she would bring out from under her robe. My fourth grade teacher, Sister Josepha, actually banged my head into the blackboard one day. I don't remember exactly why – I must have made a stupid mistake on a problem I was doing on the board – but the head bang I remember vividly. It is one of those little unconnected vignettes you remember from childhood. And unlike today, the nuns had no need to worry that the parents would complain. Another vivid vignette from my early childhood was standing by my mother while she told my teacher, "If he doesn't behave, just whack him," and swinging her hand in a right cross to demonstrate. That was a terrifying moment, but it worked; I didn't misbehave much in school.

Q: I assume you attended mass, did you go to mass each…?

BASTIANI: Without fail, every Sunday and on school days when there was a funeral in the Church which was the top floor of the building. There was no escaping it; I was in the choir. At funerals we sang in Gregorian chant, the "Dies Irae, Day of Reckoning – literally, Day of Anger," dressed in cassocks, surplices, white stiff collar tied with black ribbons. And this reminds me of another little childhood vignette. One year just before the Christmas holidays, our little choir was invited to the big public high school auditorium to sing hymns. We belted out "O Come All You Faithful" in English and Latin. I remember that big, new public high school, Westlake, with affection, because when I was in the seventh or eighth grade, we went there one afternoon a week for what they called "manual training." It's still there. There I learned the elements of carpentry, from a Mr. Higgins, tall, thin, grey mustached, and incredibly adept with tools. And I've used those skills off and on ever since. And almost every time I do I think of think of Mr. Higgins and my godfather who was also a carpenter, and whom I idolized.

Q: That is very good. About that time I learned – learned how to print – I learned typesetting. You know, a completely useless field of knowledge today, but I actually used to put the letters in.

One other thing: as a kid, were you much of a reader?

BASTIANI: Indeed. I was. I do not know how it came about; I think it was because I had this ravenous curiosity about just about everything, and because I found my everyday life somewhat boring. We got the daily newspaper delivered, and I used to open it up on the floor, and read it lying down. And not just the comics, as we called them then. I got into books very early in elementary school. There was a Carnegie public library only a few blocks from the school, and I went there regularly. Another vivid, just horrific vignette of childhood memory was almost getting run over by a trailer truck on my way to that library one day. But yes, I could not get enough of reading. I had a sister two years ahead of me, and I can still remember reading her high school history textbook, just to satisfy my curiosity.

Q: Do you recall any type of books or any particular books that early on were, you know, rather influential, or something you especially remember?

BASTIANI: Well, one of the most influential authors for me was the writer of The Northwest Passage.

Q: Kenneth Roberts.

BASTIANI: Kenneth Roberts, yes. I used to get totally absorbed in his historical novels. Another vignette: I can still remember getting whacked by my mother because, while deep into one of his books, I had let my two much younger brothers I was supposed to be babysitting wander off.

Q: You mention Kenneth Roberts; it is interesting because looking back on it, I think one of the most influential books I read as a kid was his Oliver Wiswell, *because this was the story of a loyalist, and all of a sudden I realized that there was another side to things, since in our normal course of events you only hear about the revolutionaries; and all of a sudden, you know, this one really opened my eyes to, gee, there are other people with other outlooks. And I have never forgotten this, so…*

BASTIANI: I had exactly the same impression. Thousands of them had to immigrate to Canada when the Brits lost the war.

Q: Yes, it is interesting. How did you do in school? Let's talk about elementary school first.

BASTIANI: Okay. Well, I was a good student, but I never could ace anything. You know, it was always 98 or 99 but not 100. And the nuns – the way they taught – they encouraged competition between students and the boys and the girls. I would always lose to Joe Cucinelli, my best friend on the boys side, and we would both lose to Rose Casasanta, whose name means "holy house" in Italian. She always went home with her arms wrapped around a ton of books, and, unlike me, she aced everything. The nuns used to set up competitions on the board, like finding the square root of a big number with a boy racing on the left and a girl on the right, and the girl usually won.

Q: My vivid memories are of competitions with girls in spelling bees and I was usually at the bottom; I hated those girls that could spell. I still can't spell on my own; I require mechanical or digital help on spelling.

Did you get into the big city? I mean, did the kids go downtown in Pittsburgh much?

BASTIANI: Not a lot, but we did. Pittsburgh is not a huge city, you know, and in the mountains. We lived about a 15 minute bus ride from the center of town. I can remember once walking about five miles on a Sunday with friends to the newly established Buhl Planetarium and Science Museum. That's when I first became fascinated with astronomy. Yes, I have vivid memories of downtown Pittsburgh, the so-called "golden triangle" formed by confluence of two rivers, one from the north and one from the south, the Allegheny and the Monongahela…

Q: That is Fort Pitt…

BASTIANI…which formed the Ohio river, which then flows southwest, off into the Mississippi. Pittsburgh right after the war got started on a very ambitious cleanup campaign. It was then known, of course, as the "Steel City" or "Smoky City."

Q: I remember as a kid going through there. Of course, you were there and you know, we would look at the smoke, and say, my God, what a place.

BASTIANI: It was probably about the most polluted city in the United States at the time. But they got this very ambitious clean-up program going. I believe they copied it from St. Louis, which started one a little earlier. I remember them cleaning these large limestone buildings, and I cannot get over my amazement one day – another of those vivid vignettes – at seeing this building that was half cleaned: on the left shining white limestone, on the right dark, black soot. It was incredible; I had had no idea that the building was originally white. Pittsburgh went on to turn itself into one of the cleanest cities in the country. Gradually, businessmen and politicians combined to eliminated the railroads that ran right along the rivers to the Point – steam locomotives were banned anywhere in the city; they eliminated all the steel mills and warehouses that lined the rivers; and they eliminated the huge Bessemer furnaces. Pittsburgh became a fantastic city, a desirable place to live and visit.

Q: Since we are almost, within a month, absolute contemporaries, I was an absolute addict of movies. How about you?

BASTIANI: Also…

Q: It was a great era. I mean, you could not have asked for a better era; some of the best movies that are still shown today came from that era.

BASTIANI: Well, we had a little theater in Elliott – Elliott was the community in which I lived above the West End. And it had this little theater which played these weekly western serials; I can still remember prowling vacant lots with friends picking up empty bottles to get two cents…

Q: A big bottle of Canada Dry ginger ale got you five cents; I remember that vividly.

BASTIANI: Yes, to pay for our tickets..

Q: Because that is what I used to do.

BASTIANI: Yes. And we used to pay 10 cents for the ticket and one cent tax, eleven cents, to go these movies every weekend.

Q: I am just thinking, I am going under the assumption that your family were staunch New Deal Democrats or not?

BASTIANI: I never really got to know my father's politics; he died at age 50 in 1942 when I was 14. But yes, yes, the New Deal. I can remember an argument between my uncle across the street who was a staunch New Deal Democrat and his son-in-law, who was a Republican. My uncle practically attacked this son-in-law, threw him out of the house because he had dared criticize Roosevelt.

As for our family, when my father died, my mother was left to raise six children, including my two younger brothers, one 10 years younger than me and the other 12 years younger. When those two came along, seven and nine years after my younger sister, we older siblings were surprised. My brother, the oldest, in 1942 had just graduated from high school. The local draft board exempted him from military service, because he was the sole financial support of the family, beyond Social Security. Roosevelt was revered by my extended family for that, as well as the WPA, the Works Project Administration, which provided jobs to some of them.

Q: Well, how about the radio? Did you listen to Jack Armstrong at all, the serials?

BASTIANI: Yes indeed, almost every late afternoon, one after the other. My father had bought us a new Zenith radio, a standup thing, and we spent hours sitting on the floor in front of it, listening to the 15 minute serials, Jack Armstrong, Orphan Annie, Tom Mix, listening to Pirate baseball games, listening to those Joe Louis fights that got you all up tight inside. It is amazing how well they did those serials. Your imagination painted all the pictures.

Q: Yes. Between your reading and the radio, I mean, this gave great room for one to develop one's imagination.

How about the war? I found this a great way of increasing one's knowledge of geography and all. Did you follow the war closely?

BASTIANI: I did indeed. I got started on it largely because of my good friend, Joe Cucinelli, who was into world events before I was. I said I used to read the newspaper lying down on the floor spread out. I can still remember an article about Stalin with the title, "The Most Powerful Man in the World." He had the biggest army – this was before Barbarossa, before the Nazis invaded – and learning a lot about Europe in that way.

Q: How did Italy coming in on the side of the Nazis play in your neighborhood, do you remember?

BASTIANI: I have no real memory of that. In fact, at age 14 I went away to a boarding school; so my memories of ethnic divisions about the war are more related to high school. This boarding school was about 14 miles from Erie…

Q: Where did you go to boarding school?

BASTIANI: At Sacred Heart Mission House, a so-called minor seminary of the Catholic missionary order, the Society of the Divine Word, of German origin. It was near a little town called Girard, Pennsylvania, on Highway 20, about 14 miles east of Erie, and about three miles from the shore of Lake Erie to the north. What happened was that one day while in the eighth grade, a priest of the order of the came to speak to the eighth graders about the missionary vocation. And Father Hafner was the best salesman in the world for this missionary vocation. The thought of going away to boarding school was exciting to me, because I thought my life kind of boring. He was very inspirational as well. He showed slides of the campus and sports facilities. My good friend Joe Cucinelli got interested and I got interested as well, so we both applied. Unfortunately, it turned out that Joe Cucinelli could not be accepted under the rules of the Church at that time, so I ended up going alone.

Well, the other thing was the cost. Your parents were supposed to pay some kind of room and board; but, because of my mother's financial status, they took me tuition-free. And so I went, and Joe didn't, and that was when we separated.

Q: Well, was this school designed to turn out priests or not?

BASTIANI: It was a so-called minor seminary. However, it had a regular high school curriculum, with very strong emphasis on languages, especially Latin and Greek. We had a very strict regimen; there was hardly a moment during the day when you weren't programmed. I had Latin twice a day, morning and afternoon as a freshman and got right into Caesar's Gallic Wars, which were absolutely fascinating. The good priests were smart enough to keep all the ponies out of the library, so the only way you could figure out what happened next was to struggle with the Latin, like how Caesar outsmarted the German tribes who were trying to keep him from crossing the Rhine by staying opposite his army on their side as he marched up the shore.

Q: I never was able to build that damn bridge in my Latin. I might add, for somebody who is reading this, a pony, was… you might explain what a pony was.

BASTIANI: Well, a pony was an English translation or summary of the Latin text.

Q: This is an all-male school, I assume.

BASTIANI: All males, all boys who had the intention of eventually joining the order but getting a very intensive education, not just languages, but lots of Math, and English, and History as well. And Greek; I had two years of Greek, third and fourth years. Math proved to be my favorite subject. Getting back to your point about ethnic divisions over the war; some of our teachers were from Germany. I can still remember the rector who taught German. He kept telling us the Allies would never be able to cross the Channel and invade "Fortress Europa." You could see they retained these emotional loyalties – at least some of them – but we, the student body, whose parents were from different ethnic backgrounds, were all for the U.S. And that goes as well for our teachers who were of American background.

Q: Well, as you went through school, was it sort of just understood that you are going to end up in the army or other military service?

BASTIANI: At the time, of course, if you were a divinity student you got a deferment, 4D. So after I graduated from high school…

Q: This would be in 1946.

BASTIANI: This would be '46, exactly. I had a moment when I wasn't sure I wanted to go on to the Novitiate; this is like a boot camp for religious life, two years of intensive religious ascetic training. The seminary was located in a little place called Techny, Illinois, just north of Chicago, between – I don't if you know that area – but it's between Northbrook and Glenview. I almost didn't go, but I did and I got my divinity school deferment. I may still have the ID card. Of course, the draft board in Northbrook, Illinois, didn't like this at all. I mean, here you had this seminary full of strapping, young men who were deferred – who couldn't be drafted.

Q: How long were you at this divinity school?

BASTIANI: At the Seminary? St. Mary's Seminary, Techny, Illinois. I went to the Novitiate two years, during which, academically we reviewed high school Latin and Greek *ad nauseum*, but the main fare was the reading of meditations in asceticism from an old Spanish author, Rodriguez, if I remember his name correctly. We were completely under the direction of a Novice Master, Father Glorius, who lectured us every day. He often called us "dish rags," for lack of will power. We did a lot of manual labor, mostly cleaning; we criticized each other's faults; we even practiced the old asceticism which included self-inflicted corporal punishment; lots of meditation; hours of prayer daily, a thoroughly monastic regimen.

After these two years you made your first annual vows of Poverty, Chastity and Obedience. And then you had two years of the so-called Juniorate; really, an intensive program of university studies. I had a year of physics, had a year of biology; a semester of Hebrew, a semester of French, and, especially, a continuation of Latin and Greek. This curriculum was modeled on the so-called humanistic program in vogue in Europe, especially Germany, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

The next two years were a continuation, but with a switch to philosophy as the dominant subject, taught in Latin, two classes a day. That's when I got hooked on philosophy; defined – as my professor, Father Esser emphasized – as the study of reality under the pure light of reason – not faith. He wrote himself the six text books in Latin we used; Logic, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Psychology, Ethics, and Cosmology. I still have them.

Then a complete change in curriculum followed: four years of Theological studies – what you might call professional studies. I only had the first two. At the beginning of the third academic year on September 8, after five years of renewing vows annually, one takes perpetual vows. I left the seminary in mid-August 1954, and did not. Ordination to the three major orders, sub deacon, deacon, and priest would have followed during the third year of theology. Then there would have been one more year of theology during which I would have received my first assignment, most likely as a missionary to a foreign country.

The Society of the Divine Word, like all religious orders, has as the first objective for its members, "self-sanctification," an endless inner struggle to perfect oneself. However, like most religious orders, it has a social objective; for it the objective of propagating the faith primarily through missionary activity in mostly Third World countries.

Founded only in 1875 by a German parish priest, Arnold Janssen, it is now active in over 60 countries, making it one of the largest orders in the Church, certainly one of the top 10. Because of restrictions on religious activity in Bismarck's Germany arising from the so-called *Kulturkampf*, Culture war, Father Janssen founded the order just across the border in a little town called Steyl, S-T-E-Y-L, in Holland for the training of German missionaries. The order's original institutions were called Mission Houses, where, as in Techny, Illinois, they were as self-sufficient as possible with a farm, dairy and grain, a plant nursery, a bakery and the practice of various trades like tailoring and carpentry by Brothers of the Order. Father Janssen gave special priority to printing magazines and other publications, so where possible, there was a printing press as well. The first two missionaries went to China. While vocations in the U.S. have pretty much dried up, they are they are plentiful in some missionary countries. There are now many Vietnamese, Philippino, African, and Indonesian priests and seminarians in the order – especially Indonesian. Early on, about the largest mission of the Society was in Indonesia. They have a seminary there with now with about 700 seminarians in training.

Q: That's probably a carryover from having moved to Holland, and when Indonesia was the Dutch East Indies.

BASTIANI: Exactly, yes. When I was in the seminary, we all kind of dreamed of where we wanted to go as a missionary. I settled on wanting to go to the Catholic University of Beijing, of Peking. The order had founded a university – not a seminary – there, some years before the Communists took over, and that was my dream, to go there and teach. My second choice was the University of Cebu in the Philippines where they had also founded a university. Of course, the Catholic University of Peking was taken over by the communists, and the rector at the time ended up serving 25 years, making matches in prison, because allegedly he was an American spy. He told us his story at the Seminary after he was finally released and repatriated with the help of the State Department.

Q: Well then, how far did you go with this?

BASTIANI: Well, let's see, four years of high school in Girard, PA, two years of Novitiate at St. Mary's Seminary in Techny, IL, two years of the so-called Juniorate, one year of which was spent in Epworth, Iowa, along Highway 20 in the middle of corn fields where the order had taken over a little Protestant little seminary, then back to Techny, St. Mary's in Illinois for two years of Philosophy, followed by two years of Theology; where are we now in years? I went through all this from age 14 to age 26, so 12 years, if you count high school; otherwise 8 years. I left the order in August of 1954, just before I would have taken perpetual vows on September 8.

Q: Okay, let's go sort of towards the end game, the last couple of years before you reached 26. What happened? What were you doing…?

BASTIANI: Well, I got hooked on philosophy, and I also got hooked on science as a result, even though there hadn't been much science in the curriculum. Modern physics in its origin was called *natural* philosophy. I can remember setting up an experiment in the science lab one Sunday afternoon which shows water in its three forms simultaneously as a vapor, liquid, and solid. You put water in a shallow disk, in a sealed glass chamber and pump out the air creating a vacuum until it happens. I was that enthused about science. I used to spend Sundays in the library reading the history of science and, within physics got very interested in nuclear physics and the philosophical questions it raised.

Now, the first principle of philosophy is that you look at truth only under the light of reason; no faith, no revelation. I really became enamored of that idea and fantasized that I was going to write the definitive proof that the one, holy Catholic Church is the one true Church from, arguing purely from reason. I said earlier that my philosophy professor, Father Esser, had written his own six textbooks in Latin. My favorite subject among them was Epistemology. The theory of knowledge, how do we know what we know? We have our minds and there is what we call the real world out there. It was pretty much accepted that all knowledge of the world comes through the senses. But how can anyone be sure that the world isn't just an illusion, a projection of his mind? How do we get from here to there?

Q: You're pointing to your head and then pointing to…

BASTIANI: From inside my head to the outside world, the real world. He selected to give a talk on the subject on the feast of St. Thomas Aquinas, which is March 7. Modern philosophy pretty much began with Descartes. All we really know is what is in our heads. How can we be sure that what we see is really out there, not just a projection of our minds. Descartes in his Meditations tried to solve the problem without assuming anything at all. The Anglican bishop Berkeley became famous for having posed this conundrum, and arguing that we were logically trapped within our heads. This philosophical teaching is called "*solipsism*;" the Latin etymology means "self-alone." Unfortunately, I no longer have the text of the talk I gave in Latin on the subject, but what happened while I spoke is another of those vignettes etched forever in my memory. I spoke from a lectern set in front of the curtain on the stage. Alongside the lectern they had hung a large picture of St. Thomas Aquinas. Well, while I was lecturing away, the picture fell down, so I am not sure Aquinas approved of my thesis.

Not long afterward, my passion for philosophy received a real jolt. I asked permission to read Kant…

Q: Immanuel Kant...

BASTIANI: Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in the original. He, as far as I'm concerned, is the greatest of the so-called idealist philosophers, one of the greatest philosophers ever, because his theory reconciled idealism and realism through his categories which he said are innate in the mind. It's hard to deny that some knowledge is innate; the aptitude for it, or the ability to order it. I'm in no position to go into detail here. Well, I asked to read him in the original, and I was turned down. You know, at this time the Church still had its Syllabus of Forbidden Books, and you needed permission to read any book in it. At age about 24, with all my education and with all my high motivation, I really found it hard to take that I could not be trusted to read Kant in the original.

At about the same time, I began to wrestle with the relationship of faith to reason. According to Aquinas, there can be no contradiction. What we believe in divine revelation cannot be comprehended by human reason, because these truths are beyond the capacity of human reason, such as the true nature of God, but they do not contradict or can be contradicted by genuine truth discovered by human reason. To reason, they are simply mysteries. If I got it right, this Thomistic doctrine has been the view of the Church since the Middle Ages. But in his own day, Aquinas almost got himself burned at the stake for some of his teachings. Truth – reality – for him was fundamental and eternal. He said he would even accept truth from the devil, as long as it was the truth. So he was and remains a model for me, an ideal. In the Seminary I had a copy of his *Summa Teologica.* I passed to a friend when I left. It must be very valuable as an antique book by now; it had printed in the 19th century. I got it as a gift from my philosophy teacher, Father Esser, when he gave an optional seminar on Aquinas Sunday afternoons.

My obsession with looking for truth under the light of reason alone led me to realize that I wasn't sure I any longer believed everything I was being taught in my professional studies, *just as it was being taught*, particularly in a course called Apologetics – arguments in defense of the divine origin of the Church. It's a branch of Theology, but doesn't use divine revelation, but facts, mostly historical, and reasoning. I thought many of the arguments assumed too much and seemed superficial and arbitrary. And if you're going to be an officer in this army, well then you accept these arguments, or get out. You would have to be using them.

I didn't have the guts to say I wanted out or even challenge openly – I was at an advanced stage in my training where it was much easier to go along than get out. Instead I wrote a kind of manifesto of my intellectual problems – somehow I remember it was 18 pages – and began to discuss it with my superior, the Prefect of Seminarians. I'd give anything if I could get a copy of it; I'm not sure I even kept a copy at the time – it would have had to be a carbon. At first he didn't see that I had any serious problem, but as time went on – I don't know how many sessions we had – he did. Let me say that, unlike the professor of Apologetics, I really admired this superior, Father Musinsky; he was absolutely brilliant. In fact he eventually served as the Superior General of the entire order in Rome. He died this last year, and I deeply regret not getting out to Techny to see him before he passed away. But he had no problem with faith, and I kind of marveled that he didn't. I read various books by Jesuits and others on faith and reason. There's at least a shelf of them in Catholic libraries, probably a whole bookcase, if you started researching this subject.

My case got passed to the Society's headquarters in Rome, along with my manifesto, I assume. I was told the decision came back in one Latin word, "*Dimittatur*," which translates literally as "Let him be dismissed," or, more idiomatically, "Expel him." Looking back on it, instead of deciding myself to leave, I forced them to expel me by being so sincere about my doubts. I also heard from someone that the Apologetics professor said I was one who had lost the faith – but through no real fault of my own.

And so, about August 15, 1954 – I don't remember the exact day – I ended up on the railroad platform at Northbrook, Illinois, with father Musinsky, a suitcase of clothing, and 140 bucks in my pocket to take the train to Chicago. I did not continue on home to Pittsburgh, but went straight to a house of the lay order, *Opus Dei*, to stay temporarily. Father Musinsky had made the arrangement for me. I did not go home because I knew there was no way I could make my mother understand why I left the seminary. I had written a long letter to her and my older brother and sister who lived with her. I didn't want to try to explain myself further. Some months later they drove to Chicago; they were still mystified, but supportive financially. They gave me one admonition: Get out of philosophy and into something useful.

Q: Was this fairly routine that young men were, you know, going through the process and a significant number, I won't say lost their faith, but did not…

BASTIANI: Persevere?

Q: Not persevere, but just could not accept what they were being set up to do.

BASTIANI: I wouldn't say that. I will say that I don't know of anyone else who left for the reason I did. In fact, most of seminarians I studied with did leave; very few made it to the priesthood. Early on, some were expelled because our very tough Novice Master decided they were too frivolous, fun loving, weren't serious enough. I later concluded he did the Order a great harm by getting rid of people who would have become great missionaries. Some of these went on to become parish priests. Some were expelled simply because they couldn't pass the courses, despite great effort. But, yes, many left because they obviously decided that this was not for them. When someone simply disappeared from the community, we used to joke, especially in the Novitiate, that he had decided to propagate the faithful instead of the faith. I found that most outsiders assume that a person simply wanted to have a normal sex life, wanted to get married. At least I found that most assumed that about me after I left. Anyway, I went directly to the University of Chicago campus, because…Did you ever hear of Mortimer Adler?

Q: Yes.

BASTIANI: And Robert Hutchins.

Q: Well, Hutchins, was he still around at the time or not?

BASTIANI: I don't know that they were still around, but, as I remember, they had established a program at the University of Chicago for so-called mature students. These were mostly people who went into the military right after high school, did not get a college education, but then after discharge used their military benefits to go to college. Adler and Hutchins had devised a battery of tests for such applicants, I think over three days. Depending on the results, they would then write a specific program for each student to qualify for a degree. I took this battery of tests because my seminary education at the time was not accredited, and received graduate standing without the need to meet any other requirement.

In the meantime, I was casting about trying to find a job while I was staying at that Opus Dei house. Everybody's heard of Opus Dei these days because of that novel. Opus Dei is made up of lay people, non-clerical persons who live a religious life as bachelors while pursuing a career like teaching at a university, and live in small communities. They don't proselytize, except perhaps by example. They are extremely admirable persons, which is why I will never read that novel which denigrates and libels them.

Q: The novel we're talking about is <u>The Da Vinci Code</u>.

BASTIANI: That's right. Anyway, I stayed with them a couple weeks while I cast about trying to find employment, husbanding what was left of my $140 dollars, while paying Opus Dei for my room and board. I remember taking two buses out to the far west side of Chicago to work for a real estate agency for about two weeks. I went with one of the

agents as a trainee, knocking on doors and asking the owners if they wished to sell their houses. Almost everybody says he is, even if he isn't, because he wants to know how much his house is worth. The agency's objective was to get an exclusive listing to sell the house, exclusive because that meant that no one else could sell it. All I got out of that experience were two or three free lunches. When I quit, I was told the agency would send me a commission if any of the listings that I participated in getting ever sold. Of course, I never heard again.

I remember also going downtown and filling out bunch of questionnaires at an IBM office. They were recruiting junior executives. I was really put out by some of the psychological questions which obviously probed whether you would cheat if you could, things like that…

Q: Oh, this is a period where, I think the book, The Organization Man, had come out, and they were really, the corporations were really looking at people who, you know, if given the choice between furthering the interest of the organization or letting your mother die, would obviously would opt for the organization.

BASTIANI: Yes, that's exactly how it was. There were also a bunch of little math problems I had no trouble with, since math had been a favorite subject from grammar school on. When I finally got my interview with a middle-aged, lady, I was simply told that I was *overqualified.* And that was the end of my application to work for IBM.

I vaguely remember applying for a management job with some milk company. That too came to naught. I finally ended up taking a job – I can't remember how I came to apply for it – in the admissions office of the University of Chicago. I got a job transcribing dictated letters from admissions counselors to prospective students from Dictaphones which used plastic belts. Do you remember them?

Q: No.

BASTIANI: Anyway, What got me the job is that I was a touch typist, even though they hadn't been taught touch typing in high school or the Seminary. While a sophomore in high school I had just decided I wanted to learn touch typing, so I used to borrow a friend's little portable and touch typed all my letters home on this thing, no matter how long it took. Once, right through the time I should have been in the Chapel for the prayers at noon. That got me into trouble, because my family had telephoned during that time, and the prefect found I wasn't where I should have been. I never went through all those A-F-D-F-G-F exercises and what have you because that was boring, but I did become touch typist by simply not looking at the keys.

Getting this job was a stroke of good fortune. The head of this office was a fantastic woman named Ruth Benedict. By this time, I had my graduate standing and had applied to enter the Department of Philosophy, without knowing how I was going to pay for it. I must have applied for a scholarship, or what they call financial aid these days, but I didn't have much hope. So it came as great pleasant surprise when Ruth Benedict told me that I

would receive a full, renewable tuition scholarship for graduate school. She had apparently made sure I got it. I remain eternally grateful to her, and eternally regretful that I did not look her up when she came to Washington later on to accept a management position – I believe with the National Science Foundation

I went straight into the Philosophy Department because I wasn't looking for a profession; I was looking for answers to questions which had led to my leaving the seminary. Chicago was famous as the school for the study of the works of major philosophers. You start with Plato and Aristotle and you go right through…

Q: Yes, they have the great books program.

BASTIANI: They had the great books program, too, and they also had an internationally well-known professor, Richard McKeon, an Aristotelian. The original center of the University of Chicago is a beautiful campus which looks like I think an institution of learning should: two quadrangles of ivy-covered buildings of gothic architecture. The philosophy department was in a building right on the main quadrangle. The theological school where students trained for the ministry was in the same building, and they took philosophy courses as well. In fact, I believe the University of Chicago had been originally founded as a theological school. And so I found myself in this exciting intellectual environment.

In June 1957, I got a master's degree in philosophy with specialization in logic and the philosophy of science. My specialization was sort of out of the main stream for the U of C. The Department had recognized its deficiency in these fields which then – along with positivism and the philosophy of language, both closely related to the philosophy of logic – were in fashion then at some of the Ivy League schools, especially Harvard. So they brought into the faculty a pure positivist from Montreal – whose escapes me at the moment – under whom I wrote my master's dissertation, and Hans Dreben from Harvard, a young disciple of Quine, a leading language philosopher. Dreben loved to perform intellectually at table in the cafeteria at lunch time. I found these sessions better than his classes. His enthusiasm for his abstruse subject was infectious. He introduced me to mathematical logic, about the hardest subject I ever encountered. Needless to say, I didn't master it.

Now, let me make back flip to when I was leaving the seminary. I became 26 in March 1954. That was the age limit for being drafted into the army. Just before I left in August, I called the local draft board and said, "I have this 4D deferment, but I'm leaving the seminary. What does that to my draft status?" This lady I was speaking to came right back without a pause, 1A, 1A, 1A." 1A was the classification which got called into the service tomorrow, so to speak. And then I asked: "Does it make any difference that I'm now 26 years old?" And again without missing a beat she came right back: "Can't touch you, can't touch you, and can't touch you." Eligibility for the draft then expired at age 26. So that put an end of any idea I had of joining the military. However, there were times in those penurious following years that I wished I had. Without the benefits veterans received for education and buying homes, and health, and pensions, I sometimes felt like

a second class citizen. In fact, when I later took the Foreign Service exam, I found that veterans received a bonus of five points on their scores. I certainly could have used them.

Anyway, back to Chicago. I got my Masters, and the normal thing to do was go for a doctorate. After all, what other occupation is open to philosophers, but to teach philosophy. My two closest friends in philosophy at the time did go on to a doctorate, and so did just about everyone else in our larger circle of friends. But by this time – I was 29 years old – and damned sick of being in an academic environment. Besides, the dominant fads of the day in modern philosophy, language philosophy and existentialism didn't appeal to me at all. Existentialism makes for great novels, but is not really philosophy. It's all in the mind and emotions. And language philosophy, Semanticism, is a dead end. It never gets past the dictionary. I'm a holistic philosopher in the tradition of the Ancient and European philosophers. Philosophy must be comprehensive and consistent. But since it speculates beyond what is accepted as established knowledge, it can lead to endless speculation more and more divorced from what we accept as reality. My two closest friends and I used to take walks talking philosophy. They were really into speculation, and argued endlessly. I took less and less part in the conversations, and finally told them, "Well, if you divorce yourself from reality and just speculate, possibilities are infinite, and you can gorge yourself on speculation without ever saying anything relevant to the world as it is. That was my approach. So I was open to an alternative to going on for a Ph.D., at least for a few years. I never completely abandoned the idea of teaching at the university level.

While getting my degree, I had taken the Foreign Service written exam, which is given annually all over the world still today to about 20,000 or more applicants.

Q: How had you heard about this thing?

BASTIANI: Well, just before I left the seminary, a fellow seminarian had suggested it. His name was Urbik, and, after he too left the seminary, became rather wealthy in the insurance field. At least so I heard; I never spoke saw him again. I passed the written, but not with great grades because I had done nothing to prepare for it and had never taken an economics course. However, I did not pass the oral exam which came next. The three-officer panel didn't think much of my limited background; in fact one of them advised me to join the military to get some experience.

Q: Do you recall any of the questions that were asked?

BASTIANI: One I think was "Why is the Canadian dollar worth less than the American dollar? I said I hadn't had any economics. I may be confounding – there's a better word for confounding…

Q: Conflating.

BASTIANI: Conflating, exactly; conflating questions on the first exam with questions on the second oral exam. Another question was, "You're in India, at our Embassy in New

Delhi. At a cocktail party this Indian professor comes up to you and asks, 'Who are you to be telling us what to do, when there is so much crime and corruption in the United States?' It's in the news every day. How would you answer him?" At that time, of course, Congressional Committees like the Kefauver Committee were holding hearings on the wide corruption in the labor unions. As these oral exams were conducted then, at least, there was no way of knowing what kind of questions you were going to get. It all depended on the backgrounds of the three guys you were confronted with, and they're not going to ask questions they don't know the answer to.

Failing that first oral proved a traumatic experience, because by then I really wanted to join the Service. So I decided to go back to Go without collecting $200.00 and retake the Foreign Service written exam the next year. I passed it again, and so I was determined to prepare as I could for the oral exam. At the same time I was in the middle of writing my Master's dissertation; so, intellectually, it was a very busy time for me. I went to the library and took out a stack of books on the geography and history of the U.S. and economics. At the same time I read Time or Newsweek every week from cover to cover to be current on events – then, at least, they pretty much covered the latest developments in the major fields, even nuclear physics. I made sure I knew the answers to the questions I had flubbed on the first oral exam. But the book I found most useful, at least enjoyed the most, was a diplomatic history of the United States by…who is our famous diplomatic historian?

Q: Let's see, a man named Stewart wrote books about…oh, of course, Bemis.

BASTIANI: Bemis, yes, Samuel Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States.

Q: Samuelson was the economic author you read, I'm sure.

BASTIANI: Yes, Principles of Economics, Samuelson. Well, anyway, this time I was much better prepared; but I think what got me through was telling them about my dissertation which I was up to my ears in. When someone near the beginning of the session asked me what I was doing, I launched into it. It had a very ambitious title, "The Meaning of Probability in Quantum Mechanics." The question from the beginning of physics, even from ancient times, has been, "Is light a wave or a particle?" It demonstrated the properties of both in experiments. My thesis summarized the history of the issue, and supported Einstein's criticism that Quantum Mechanics was not the last word on what happens within the atom. So I just sort of lectured these guys on this subject; and they showed a lot of interest by asking follow-up questions. But of course I also gave better answers to some of the other questions they asked.

Q: So, when did you take the exam?

BASTIANI: I took the oral exam in 1957, the physical exam and background investigation soon followed, and I was put on a rank ordered waiting list. In the meantime I met my wife, my future wife and...

Q: Well, you were getting pretty close to the age of non-acceptance, weren't you?

BASTIANI: Yes. There was a limit of age 31 or 32 to enter from the bottom. I entered the Service on January 4, 1960, after waiting about two years. What had happened was my rank order was not all that high and people with higher grades kept getting inserted ahead of me, and so I waited and waited. I was told there was a budget problem as well; for one year they hadn't taken in anyone. I kept waiting for this call to Washington. And so in the meantime, what did I do?

First I worked part time at the University of Chicago Clinics, a research hospital in the so-called Special Services Department, a euphemism for billing and complaints. I also audited a couple of graduate courses in the International Relations Department of the University, a privilege I had as an employee, since I didn't have the income to pay the tuition. The one which greatly influenced my thinking throughout my career was given by Hans Morgenthau, the author of Politics Among Nations.

I met my wife and got married. The next year I taught algebra and geometry in a Jesuit high school in the upscale suburb, Wilmette; five classes a day totaling about 140-145 students; and a weekly activities class in ham radio. I also earned additional money driving one of the school buses on my way to and from the school. I would start out from the little garden apartment my wife and I rented – these are the ones that are half underground – in Rogers Park, Illinois, drive to the Loyola University campus where they parked the school buses, park my car and then drive this devious route through the suburbs to the school, teach the five classes of math, then drive the bus back dropping off the kids I had picked up in the morning.

On Tuesdays and Thursdays after parking the bus, I would take the train to Loyola's downtown campus to teach a seminar in symbolic logic to graduate students in philosophy at the University of Loyola's downtown campus.

The Jesuits at Loyola University in Chicago had finally realized that the syllogisms of Aristotle and Aquinas were not the last word in logic. I had studied modern logic, symbolic logic. Theoretically, you can take any written argumentation, put it in symbols and, following simple logical rules come out at the bottom with a conclusion showing the argument, truth or false. Something like solving mathematical equations. But its fatal flaw is interpreting into symbols the terms you use; words don't all mean precisely the same things to everyone. It was the most pleasant teaching experience I had in all my life – no disciplinary problems which caused me no end of grief in my high school teaching. But we got ahead in our finances while we waited to enter the Foreign Service.

Soon our first daughter was born, and we were still waiting and waiting for that call from Washington. I had rushed the wedding in anticipation of being called into the Service.

Q: Give me a little quick background of how you met your wife and her background.

BASTIANI: Okay. At the University of Chicago, after I had finished the Master's dissertation, I took a job at the University of Chicago Clinics, in an office working evening hours called the Special Services Department. "Special services" was a euphemism for billings and complaints. When patients were discharged they had to come down to this office to settle their bills and insurance. Also working in that office was a woman married to a medical intern, and we used to talk. Her husband took care of children at La Rabida Children's Hospital behind the Museum of Science and Industry. La Rabida was a private organization for cardiac children, children who had had rheumatic fever or what have you, and whose days were numbered. One of the hobbies I had picked up in the seminary was ham radio. I had managed to get a General Class ham radio license; my call letters were W9BBY. Of course I had told Eva Gross this – that was her name – she told her husband, and he suggested that I teach ham radio to the children at La Rabida.

The FCC had recently established a new Novice Class license for which a speed of only five words a minute in Morse code was required. Anyone holding a general class license could teach it. So I agreed to do it. My future wife, Dorothy Gietzen, was on her first job as the licensed occupational therapist at this hospital. So that's how we met. Our first sort of date was to go to Allied Radio at 100 Northwestern Avenue to buy the components to make a code oscillator, a code practicing gizmo. She was as interested in me as I was in her from the moment we met. In the end, she not only got a Novice Class ham radio license, but a marriage license as well. Since her income was much better than mine, the downtown jewelry shop where I bought the engagement and marriage rings required her to co-sign the credit loan. She was from Grand Rapids, Michigan; her grandfather had immigrated from Germany.

Q: This is tape two, side one with Carl Bastiani, and we had just finished leading up to your joining the Foreign Service. You came into the Foreign Service when, Carl?

BASTIANI: It was January, 1960. I came in actually from Chicago, from Illinois, where I had been residing for several years.

Q: Was this your first time in Washington?

BASTIANI: Practically speaking, yes. I had once visited Washington in 1946 for a few days, I believe in '52, by car with my brother, just for tourism.

Q: Okay. Well, so in 1960 you went into what we now call the A-100 course, the basic officer course?

BASTIANI: That's correct.

Q: Could you sort of describe the composition of the course and how it struck you at that time?

BASTIANI: As I recall it was an eight weeks course at the old FSI, Foreign Service Institute. We were about 25, 26 entering officers, an eclectic group from all over the country, and I would say about half of us were older than the normal-entry-from-the bottom age. For budgetary reasons, the Service had not been qualifying any new applicants for about two years. Most of us may have been the bottom of the barrel of people on the rank order list. I suppose it was my good fortune.

My high school teaching credentials had not been renewed in mid-1959 for not having acquired the educational credits I was supposed to acquire when I was hired in the first place – at least that was the reason given me – so I had taken a full time job as a sales correspondent in a tightly managed manufacturing firm in Lake Zurich, Illinois, just northwest of Chicago. My main job was to back up sales correspondents on the road who solicited orders for sets of baking pans from companies which supplied bread to the stores. I was supposed to gin up quotes in the thousands of dollars and immediately phone them to the salesmen. They had hired me because of my mathematical background, because they had just fired someone because he had made a mistake. I only learned that later.

Anyway, I was doing well in the job, but I didn't like it; I couldn't see myself doing this for the rest of my life. Well, around Thanksgiving day, six months into the job, I get a phone call from Washington informing me that a new class was entering January 4th, 1960 and asking if I was interested. I almost leapt through the phone and accepted immediately. The awkward thing about it was that my probation with this firm had just ended, and I had been accepted. I knew this, because on the previous Friday evening, I had been invited to the Green Lantern for cocktails. Only the in-group went on Friday night to the Green Lantern for cocktails. The boss grudgingly congratulated me when I resigned, saying, that for anybody else but the U.S. Government he would have been really teed off with me. It was liberation, absolute liberation. I drove to Washington having placed my wife and daughter with her parents in Grand Rapids, Michigan.

Getting back to your question about the A-100 course, well, I don't remember a lot of detail. What stands out is the extended weekend or a week at a house in Front Royal, Virginia, where I guess we were under observation.

Q: Yes. Well, the idea was to get you off-site, to get you out and away from the nine to five thing; I think it's to mold you into a cohesive group or something.

BASTIANI: Well, it really worked; we really bonded out there. We played bridge one night and I'm not a skillful bridge player because I always refused to memorize all these darn openings and what have you, but it was remarkable for me because I did bid and make a grand slam, about the only time in my life. And I was fired up; I was really enthused about the career. We came in in 1960 in the depth of the Cold War, Kennedy and the missile gap; you may recall the talk about…

Q: Yes, that was during campaign.

BASTIANI: It was during the campaign.

Q: The missile gap and Quemoy and Matsu were the main issues between Nixon and Kennedy.

BASTIANI: Yes. I just don't recall most of the specifics of the course, but it accomplished its purpose.

Q: Did you feel, I mean, this is certainly true of me and others who have gone into this; you've heard about diplomacy and when you looked at it, did you feel at all apprehensive? I mean, who am I to be in this business?

BASTIANI: Indeed, but I'm not a guy who underestimates his potential; I overestimate it all the time. Later on when I was much more mature and had to rate some young officers, I came to realize that an officer who doesn't think he's better than he is isn't really a suitable officer. You want somebody who's got a lot of confidence in his abilities. And so I never faulted young officers for seemingly being overambitious.

As for how I felt when I entered, I had been following international relations quite closely on as broad a scale as I could from the newspapers and some courses that I took at the University of Chicago. I saw East-West relations as the great problem, the Cold War. The focus was in Europe, and in Europe the focus was Germany, and in Germany, Berlin. So that's where I wanted to go. I wanted to contribute to the solution there. We were asked to list our three preferences in order as to where we wanted to go on our first assignment; I said Berlin or anywhere else in Germany or anywhere else in Europe except Italy, because I had relatives in Italy, and I assumed they wouldn't send me there anyway. But I was assigned as a staff assistant to the Senior Seminar, which was about 50 feet down the corridor of FSI.

Q: It was what's still today called Arlington Towers, which is about the first apartment complex when you go to Roslyn in Northern Virginia, right across the Potomac from the State Department.

BASTIANI: And I found out that I had been selected for this job by the Director of the Senior Seminar, Charlie O'Donnell, the late Charles O'Donnell, because of my general academic and philosophical background, because the course itself is a smorgasbord of subjects. In effect, I took that course twice as a junior officer.

Q: Yes…

BASTIANI: And it was the best Washington assignment that I had in my whole career.

Q: Okay. Well, we're talking about '60 to '62. Let's talk about the course; how was the Senior Seminar; what was it designed to do, and what was it doing, and what were your experiences?

BASTIANI: The Senior Seminar was designed to update Foreign Service officers with 15 or more years of experience on what was going on in the United States, economically, politically, socially, scientifically, and in the various geographic regions of the United States which some had never even been to. At that time many senior Foreign Service officers hadn't lived in the States for a decade or more; they went, often directly, from one foreign assignment to another. There was a perceived need to educate the leaders in the Foreign Service on their own country. The staff was very simple; the Director, the Deputy Director, me and two secretaries. One of the senior seminarians told to me I as the staff's only officer on the working level. It was quite flattering because you had these 20, 25 officers, four to six of them from various agencies, CIA, DIA, Defense, Agriculture, Commerce…

Q: Treasury.

BASTIANI: Treasury. Often, you know, the Director was out, the Deputy Director was out, and someone like Colonel Itz – he used to call himself, one plus two, I-T-Z – would say, I need to go to a doctor's appointment or I need to go fly: may I? And I would give him permission, as the only one in authority.

I definitely was on the working level because we would have two or three different speakers a week for seminars on what is going on today in the speaker's field. A professor would be invited, say from MIT, and when he accepted, would be requested to send us his bio, a relatively brief required reading, and short bibliography. I would then do the syllabus for the session. Quite frequently these speakers would not submit anything in advance, so I would end up getting their bios from Who's Who and other sources, and looking at their major publications, find an article that seemed to fit our purpose to assign as required reading for the session, and also make up a little bibliography of recommended reading. I would then have it printed and distributed. I would meet speakers and escort them as necessary. I remember vividly escorting Margaret Mead, the anthropologist, on the shuttle bus from the Department to FSI; because that was the day the Pirates beat the Yankees in the World Series with a homer in the 9th.

And then we would have these so-called critique sessions, once every two weeks or so – I don't recall the exact frequency – for which I was the note-taker. I would dictate these notes to the secretary for distribution. I also handled all the dealings with the administrative office for trips to different regions; the trips I remember best were to Los Angeles, Detroit and Texas, especially the latter; and handle all that bureaucratic paperwork, you know, travel vouchers and payment for the tickets. Our hosts usually provided dinners and other hospitality. It was a fascinating two years.

Q: Do you recall the changeover to the Kennedy Administration; it was an interesting time because more changed than the normal changes of the parties, but it was a generational change as well. Were you able to pick up some of that?

BASTIANI: There wasn't much talk of national politics in the course environment. But speaking of change, what really hit me was the difference of dealing with foreign policy issues in an academic environment from which I had just come, and dealing with them in the State Department environment. I was struck with the contrast with that graduate seminar given by Hans Morgenthau. While the course was on political ideologies, he was also sounding off about the Vietnam War. I remember him strutting back and forth in his striped suit with vest and pocket watch, pontificating on how Washington didn't have a clue on the issues; how stupid the policy was, and how little Washington knew what it was doing. The contrast in approach came as a revelation. At the U of C I found that to be so much the general attitude, that I was almost embarrassed to tell friends that I had accepted an appointment to the Foreign Service.

Yes, in academia you can sit in your ivory tower and devise solutions for international problems like the Middle East. And your solutions would all be so reasonable and logical. But the State Department then has to figure out how you get from here to there. The academics for the most part don't take into account when they formulate their solutions, that, to carry out policies, the State Department must deal with powerful leaders in independent countries who have specific prejudices or biases, the sentiments of the people and what have you. So the nitty-gritty part they ignore; but no solution can be applied, no solution can be pursued unless you have these day in and day out, nitty gritty dealings with the leaders and peoples of the countries involved.

Q: This is why sometimes it works well when you have this academics coming in and working on National Security Council or in the State Department or Congressional Committee staffs, and then going back to the academic world.

You know, you're pointing out something; I was wondering what the reaction of people participating in the Seminar – I'm , I'm talking about the State Department but others too – was to this almost complete disconnect between the academic world, a sort of chattering class, and the Foreign Service. You know, after I interview people and I go back to doing my own thing, I hardly ever read the literature that comes out. I mean, these are people talking to themselves at the universities; there doesn't seem to be much there that's practical. Was that coming out to the students in the Seminar?

BASTIANI: I think so, yes. I think they were extremely good in their questioning of these experts who had facile solutions to problems. One speaker I remember very well; he was an economist, I don't remember his name, but I never forgot what he said. He related how the only thing that got us out of the recession finally was World War II, by going to total production. And his solution for keeping the economy going was to just keep producing, producing even if we have to take these tanks out and dump them in the middle of the ocean. It's the flow of economic activity that creates jobs and causes money to circulate.

I took the Principles of Economics course based on Samuelson's book by the same name evenings at Georgetown. FSI offered officers the opportunity to courses in line with your career interests and pay for them as long as you completed them. That course was a great

help to me because the big gap in my background was economics. I never forgot learning about the multiplier effect of money as it circulates through the economy. Also, I became Keynesian in the belief that government sometimes had to sort of prime the economic pump with deficit spending to restore economic activity in a recession. I had studied theories of probability at the U. of C., and was happy to see that Keynes had devised his own theory of subjective probability, a theory I had favored in philosophy. Of course, the only one we ever hear about is the so-called objective theory, the scientific theory; you know, for example, flipping a coin repeatedly and noting how many times it comes up heads or tails divided by the number of flips, statistics generally.

The other is subjective, internal; for example, you walk the door, you look at the clouds, you sniff the air and say; it will probably rain today. So you go back in and get your umbrella. Here you are not applying the scientific notion of probability; but a sense of probability most of us operate with every day: a sort of wisdom derived from experience.

However, the weather predictions we get today on radio and TV are, of course based on the scientific notion, statistics.

But that's a digression. I couldn't have had better preparation for a Foreign Service career than having been on the staff of the Senior Seminar.

Q: Well, tell me about what's his name, the head of it.

BASTIANI: Charlie O'Donnell had been head of the political science department at DePaul University in Chicago, and came to Washington during the war. I don't exactly know to what job, but somehow or other after the war he transferred to the Foreign Service, and had a rather successful career. He was very academic in his approach because of his background. You know, everybody has his little quirks, and I found out how to deal with Charlie O'Donnell. If I proposed an idea – you know, a speaker to invite or whatever – he would usually dismiss it out of hand, and I would say no more. But then, maybe a day or two later he might say – without any reference to my previous suggestion – I think we should invite professor so-and-so to speak. So, you had to seed ideas into his mind; apparently he would work them over, and they would come out as his own. The deputy director, Harry Byrnes, was often at odds with him. He was a generous guy, but, ideologically, very liberal and emotionally anti-fascist. Once I mentioned as a matter of fact that the German economy had improved in the late thirties under Hitler. He got emotional and said it hadn't at all. Apparently, he found it impossible to accept that anything had improved under Hitler. His brother-in-law was Walter Lippmann, then in his heyday, and he used to tell me of his differences of opinion with him. He was very generous and a dear friend. I much enjoyed the relationship.

The thing about me is – I don't know if it's my personality, a gene or what – but my approach in a discussion is not to give priority to *who's* right, but *what's* right, and accept it, even if it is contrary to what I would *like* to be right. It's what I learned through philosophy, and what I think is the only way to practice philosophy. And this tendency goes way back. I can still remember being criticized by my high school teacher in a

debate in for conceding a point to the classmate arguing the other side of the question. The teacher immediately intervened and said, "In a debate, you never concede anything." Giving priority to *what's* right sometimes leads dedicated officers to oppose official policies, as during the Vietnam war. However, I question the sincerity or motivation of those who do it openly, resign with fanfare, and publish dissents in the Washington Post or New York Times.

But to be insistent on the "what's right" approach can get you into trouble in a bureaucracy, or any institution. So, I developed a sort of algorithm for applying it during my early tour in INR (1969-1971), the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. First, an issue had to be important to even think of arguing about it. For many, it makes no real difference whether decision A, B, or C is taken – as long as one of them is taken. It makes no sense to oppose the one the person with authority chooses. Secondly, always, you treat what you *think* is right on a specific issue only as a working hypothesis, subject to change as more facts come to your attention. Reality is a process, open ended, particularly international developments; you seldom have enough relevant facts to be absolutely certain of what the right policy should be. No one ever has all the facts to be certain he is right. But if an issue is a major one and up for decision – requires a reaction from the U.S. Government – and you are in a position to influence it, then you argue. But you do so within the system, you don't call a press conference. And, finally, if the issue is one of conscience – very few really are – then you resign.

I don't know what I would have done if, during the Clinton years, I would have been ordered to make a demarche to a foreign government to promote abortion, which I am convinced is wrong on grounds of basic natural morality, not just for religious reasons. Anyway, I found that tour in INR so beneficial for doing political reporting and analysis, that I concluded every Foreign Service officer specializing in reporting should be required to do two years in INR as an intelligence analyst.

At the end of my first tour in 1962, because I was a junior probationary officer they were required to send my abroad under the rules. At that time, at least, entering Foreign Service officers were considered interchangeable parts to staff consular positions – at least that's how we viewed it. It didn't matter what your background was, you went out as a visa officer on your first foreign assignment. But they didn't seem to have an assignment for me. Finally, they offered me a choice as visa officer in Liverpool or visa officer in Naples. Well, since they were willing to send me to Italy despite the relatives I had there, I said fine, I'll go to Naples. Who would prefer Liverpool to Naples? Also, Naples would allow me to bring my Italian up to the working level: speaking 3, reading 3, in a range of 5 levels, thus fulfilling the requirement then for promotion: a minimum 3, 3 in one of the so-called world languages.

Q: A question before we move to Naples; what was your impression of what assignments they gave the people from the Senior Seminar afterwards? You know – I'm a graduate of the Senior Seminar – and then all of a sudden they say, oh my goodness, you're graduating, and what are we going to do with you? But this was back in the '70s; how did you find this then?

BASTIANI: Well, I didn't pay particular attention to the onward assignments of senior seminarians – or simply don't remember much about them. I do remember that Carol Laise, who much later became Director General of the Foreign Service, was in one of the classes when I was there. Another, one who was most helpful to me and the one perhaps I admired the most, was directly assigned as our first ambassador to Ouagadougou in Upper Volta; Burkina Faso is the name today. He had started out as a Marine guard, later got into administrative work in the Department, and later worked his way up to deputy assistant secretary with responsibility for the construction of New State. New State had just been completed when he entered the Seminar. New State added three city blocks to Old State. Once he offered me some humorous advice when I expressed my frustration at all paperwork I had to do to satisfy FSI's admin office to get the orders and tickets for the trips the Seminar took. He said, "In a bureaucracy, you do whatever the bureaucrats want you to do, because otherwise you won't get what you need. And then, when you become Secretary of State, you fire the people you found most obstructionist." But John Thomas who headed FSI's administrative office at the time was really a very nice guy, and helpful – you may have known him…

Q: Yes, John Thomas, I think actually I've interviewed him; I think he was one of the people I interviewed.

BASTIANI: He passed away too, of cancer, did he not?

Q: Yes.

BASTIANI: I had a lot of dealings with him and we had a good time. As Secretary, I would never have fired John Thomas. Anyway, he went much further than I did in his career.

Q: Okay, now, you went to Naples and you were there from '62 to when?

BASTIANI: Sixty-two to '64.

Q: Okay. Let's talk about Naples. Who was Consul General and what was the situation like there?

BASTIANI: When I arrived in Naples Henderson was Consul General on his way out. I never really got to know him. But on his way in was one of the most colorful characters I ever knew in the Foreign Service, Homer Byington III. And he had been born in Naples, you know.

Q: Oh, yes, his father was, you know Consul General in Naples. I mean, it's a dynasty there.

BASTIANI: Yes. And he had just been ambassador to Malaysia, I believe, but he got what he wanted next; he went back to Naples. He spoke the Neapolitan dialect as well. And I have very pleasant memories of him. In Naples I was on a junior officer rotation; you know six months in this office and six months in that. While I was doing my stint in the commercial section, we were much involved with the construction of his little cabin cruiser, Zio Sam III, Uncle Sam the Third. Then, frequently on weekends, he and his wife, Mrs. Byington, who is a character in herself, would invite an officer or a couple to be their guest on an outing on this boat, down the coast to a little bay, where we would anchor and swim and have a meal pre-packed by Mrs. Byington. As guests we weren't allowed to do anything. I couldn't be part of the crew; she was up on the prow doing everything while he ran the engine. The two or three outings we had with them on that little boat were among the most pleasant experiences we had in Naples.

The big problem was finding a residence for Homer Byington III because the villa that the Hendersons had occupied was for some reason no longer available. Before the Byingtons ended up in the penthouse apartment built over the Consulate General, they rented a place overlooking the bay on the Via Caracciolo.

Q: Yes, Via Caracciolo.

BASTIANI: Yes. The house was down on the cliff. To get there you parked on the right of Caracciolo going uphill from the city, took an elevator down to a tunnel which went back under the road to a path on the cliff which led to this house. The problem was that there was a nightclub just up the street, also perched on the cliff. The story goes that on a particularly noisy night Homer went out on his terrace in the wee hours of the morning and shouted, "*Silenzio! Silenzio*! (Quiet! Quiet!) Both the Byingtons were great persons, and much appreciated by staff, partly because of their idiosyncrasies. Mrs. Byington had the theory that every spouse should become adept at plumbing; she had her own tool kit, and once lectured the spouses on the subject.

Q: Did the Byingtons – were you there when they moved to the penthouse?

BASTIANI: I don't believe I was still there when they finally moved to the penthouse. The Byingtons were there forever, until '71 or '72 at least when they retired. For us, I did find an apartment much farther up off Via Caracciolo on the ground floor of a four flat building. We had a small front yard with a view of Vesuvius from our front yard across the neighbor's yard.

But getting on with what I did. I was on rotation to the various sections, but I spent most of my time as the non-immigrant visa officer. It was depressing; I disliked this work enormously because it was my job, every day, to refuse 60, 80 people as non *bona fide*, ineligible to receive a tourist visa. For example, Luigi, 18 years old, from a village south of Naples would apply for a visa to visit his uncle in Brooklyn who had filed a declaration of support for him. Then you find that Luigi had never traveled anywhere, not even to see Rome. Tourists are not allowed to work. The uncle owns a construction company. It's obvious that Luigi is trying to get into the states to work and become an

illegal immigrant. It is such an open and shut case of ineligibility, so you have to refuse it; but at the same time I didn't like to be telling people…

Q: No, it's no fun.

BASTIANI: No fun whatsoever. I was almost hoarse, you know, by the end of a morning. And at the same time we were handling immigration visas and there was a lot of fraud involved in applications for first preference, to immigrate as a skilled worker in an occupation in which there were not enough skilled workers in the U.S. I got involved in an INS, Immigration and Naturalization Service, investigation of a lawyer in West Orange, New Jersey, who had set up an operation in Puglia to produce fraudulent affidavits attesting to the skills of an applicant, especially in landscaping and tailoring. This lawyer's chief collaborator was an official in the *municipio*, city hall, of a little town on a mountain in the region of Puglia. This guy would get local people to sign affidavits attesting to the skills of the applicant as a favor, or for a pittance.

INS collected hundreds of documents that they were sure were fraudulent, sent them to the INS officer in Naples, and asked him to get proof that the documents were fraudulent. Wohlstenholm as I recall was the name of the INS officer; I really liked him. Well, he got permission to have me as a vice consul to accompany him to this little mountaintop town in the middle of winter. What he had done was gone to the town official who was the center of the ring, and said, "Look, I've got enough evidence to put you in jail if I go to the Italian police on this, but I don't want to do that. What I'd like you to do is call in each one of the persons who signed these fraudulent documents testifying to the skill of applicants, and we will interview them." He of course complied. My job was, as vice consul, to authenticate the documents so they could be used in a U.S. court. And so for several days we interviewed these people in this cold, humid, dark hall, all of whom admitted to their lying Wohlstenholm sent them all back to INS. INS went to court; this lawyer had his own criminal lawyer front for him, and, as far as I know he was never convicted. But it was a fascinating experience for me.

When we interviewed immigrant applicants allegedly documented as tailors, we'd ask them to show the palms of their hands. If they had calluses, you knew they didn't come from designing and cutting clothing. We would ask them also to sketch the pattern of a suit coat.

Another task that I disliked was enforcing the 212(a)(9) provision making candidates ineligible for a crime involving "moral turpitude," which I think equated with a felony.

Q: I want to insert for the record that 212(a)(9)is a section of the Immigration Nationality Act.

BASTIANI: Thank you. We even had a special office with a full time local employee who did nothing else but obtain criminal records from the police so that we could determine whether an applicant's crimes involved "moral turpitude" and thus made him ineligible for a visa. And then of course there was the exclusion for being a member of

the communist party, for which waivers could be obtained only for a visitor's visa. Since the largest labor union, the CGIL, was a handmaiden of the PCI, the Communist party, many otherwise qualified applicants were formally ineligible.

But I hated to say no. I learned something special about how to handle visa applicants in that job from Gene Zimmerman, who was head of the Visa Section for the initial time I was there. Gene was a seasoned consular officer; and he told me once, if you get a case that you sympathize with, which seems to be a meritorious case, but doesn't seem to fit the regulations, just send it to me, and I will decide it. And later on in Krakow, many years later, that's exactly what I told my vice consuls, that if the case is compassionate and the applicant seems sincere but he doesn't, you know, fit the criteria that are laid out in the regulations – I'm not talking about the law now, but the regulations – well, just send the applicant to me and I'll make the decision.

In Naples I wish I had followed Gene's advice in one compassionate case especially. There was this guy who was married and separated from his wife; then another woman became what we here would call his common law wife. At this time there was no divorce in Italy. Over the years, decades, they had a number of children. One or the other of these children immigrated to the United States and, gradually, all the children and the mother got immigration visas. However, this guy, the father, was ineligible for an immigration visa.

Q: Because he wasn't a legal spouse of somebody who was in the United States.

BASTIANI: Yes. So when he applied for a visitor's visa, I, as a new visa officer, turned him down. It was hard to believe that he would return to Italy after a short stay in the U.S., given that his family ties by this time were in the U.S. rather than Italy. It was so compassionate a case. And if I burn in Purgatory someday, it's going to be because of that case. If Gene Zimmerman had gotten to me first, he may have gone; I don't know, he may even have gone later. Anyway, visa work was not the kind of work that I had entered the Service to do, or that I fantasized as doing. I did not, professionally, enjoy my tour in Naples.

Q: Now, I'm a professional consular officer but I found this true with a lot of my colleagues. I mean, it was always a problem. I would agonize, but at the same time I wasn't loathe to circumvent the regulations if I felt there was a compassionate situation, so I shut my eyes or something like that. But I think it's a matter of personality, of people who are or aren't this way. I did notice this.

BASTIANI: Well, the way I justified it and practiced it, after some time was: Under the *law* all the applicant has to do is convince the consular officer that he intends to go for a brief visit and return, and that he would not work while there. And I think that applicants in compassionate cases were *bona fide*, sincere, when they were talking to me; they had every intention of coming back after a visit. Now, quite a few of them you knew could later be persuaded by their families to stay in the U.S. and apply for a change of status,

but that didn't make them an automatic refusal when they applied for the visa. And it didn't make it a mistake on my part when I issued it.

In Poland later on as the Principal Officer, I found out that the young vice consul's practice was to have the visa FSN, our Foreign Service National employee, collect the applications and passports of the maybe 40 people who had jammed into the waiting room that day, some of them having traveled for hours and hours, then quickly flip through them, and decide that most were what he called "statistical refusals." And then he would have the FSN give them back tell them they weren't eligible for visas. When I found out about that I called him on the carpet. I said there's no such thing as a "statistical refusal"; there are individual people and individual cases. Statistics are only an abstraction; every one of those people should be personally interviewed. And then I told him to send the compassionate cases which didn't seem to meet the criteria in the regulations to me. At this time we were getting lots of congressionals, letters from Congressmen to whom constituents had appealed on behalf of relatives in Poland they had invited to visit. The Department required that we reply to these letters with explanations of the reasons for the refusals within three days.

There were complaints that the relatives applying for visas had been treated like cattle and what have you. In a communist country I liked to say that one of our greatest advantages was to show that we respected individuals as individuals, and not as members of a herd or group. So I really insisted that every applicant get a fair hearing. But I think I know how the statistical approach originated. If you're a young officer and you have been trained at "Consulate FSI" you are led to think that the regulations are to be applied as the law – I'm speaking of the *regulations*, the blue pages of the manual, not the *law* as passed by Congress. I could not see ever deliberately violating a law.

And I had one very sad experience in this matter. One day as I was doing immigration visas…

Q: This is in Naples?

BASTIANI: In Naples, still in Naples. A woman adopting a child came in with a petition already approved for that child's immigration visa. Our very sharp FSN – they often knew the regulations better than we did – pointed out that the petition was invalid. The law, at least at that time, required that the adoptive parent must have spent six months with the child before the child was eligible for an immigration visa, and she hadn't. She had tried to live with the child in a village for the six months but couldn't bear it. An INS officer apparently took mercy on her and signed the petition. I saw no way I could issue the visa. Next thing I knew, my supervisor, Norm Redden, who had replaced Gene Zimmerman was at my desk and as much as ordered me to issue the visa. Apparently, he had agreed to have it issued with the INS officer who signed it. Neither had said anything to me about it. I said I couldn't but, if he thought the visa could be issued, he could sign it himself. He didn't, at least not then and there, and I don't recall ever learning what happened with the case. At the worst, the adoptive parent could go back to the village and tough out the rest of the six months.

My refusal to sign the visa certainly didn't help me with Norm Redden when it came time to write my evaluation report. Shortly before I left post, he wrote the annual evaluation report on my performance which I later realized had me leaving the post with knives sticking out of my back, so to speak. At that time, I don't believe rating officers had to show their drafts to the rated officer to get their reactions before filing them. If he did, then what he showed me in draft did not seem that harmful. But I was naïve about these things then. Some months later in the cafeteria at FSI while in Romanian language training a gentleman came to my table, and asked if I was Carl Bastiani. When I said yes, he told me he had just sat on a panel which reviewed Redden's evaluation, and that the panel had decided in my favor. Otherwise I would have been out of the Service; I was still in probationary status. Norm Redden had made a name for himself in the visa field. He once complained that he couldn't reach me when he needed me. Well, for a lengthy period I was running from one end of the building to the other, between the visa office and the 212(a) (9) office, because the officer assigned was home with a severe case of measles; so I was actually covering two jobs. And it was a traumatic, emotional experience for me, coming out of Naples that way after having worked my tail off for the whole time I was there.

Q: Before we leave the crime subject, thing, was there any problem with members of the Camorra? The Camorra was the southern equivalent of the Mafia in Sicily. Were there ties to the United States that came to your attention?

BASTIANI: During my tour, perhaps not being as informed as I should have been about the Camorra, I don't recall that the subject came up.

We didn't do much political reporting, except at the time of the 1962 elections when the Christian Democrats opened up to the left.

Q: The Centro-Sinistra, or something like that.

BASTIANI: Yes. They called it the *Centro-Senistra* to entice the Socialists into an alliance with the Christian Democrats, and wean them away from the communists. These were very important elections because there was a real threat that the communists would gain as a result. Al the Consulate's officers as political officers to go out and interview people to find out what was going to happen. And so we did. We wrote our reports, and contrary to everything we had been told and reported, the communists made a big jump forward as changes in the politics of Italy are measured; always in small steps.

And then came the order to go back out all those people again to find out how it had happened. I especially enjoyed the political work and commercial work I did in Naples.

I played the major role in the Department of Commerce's exhibit at the Bari trade fair set up one year. It took me to Bari a couple of times with our outstanding local employee in the section to select and photograph the site for Commerce to.

Also, Cuban missile crisis occurred while I was in Naples; I remember heatedly discussing this with colleagues in the cafeteria. One woman officer, I don't recall her name, said after the Soviets had backed down and were removing the missiles, that there has to have been a *quid pro quo*, a concession we had made in exchange. I attributed it simply to the fact that the Soviets saw they if it came to an exchange of missiles, God forbid, they were outgunned and would get the worst of it. But later I learned there was a sort of *quid pro quo*: those missiles in Turkey that we quietly removed.

And it was through the missile crisis and Adlai Stevenson's too quick willingness to compromise – he was then our Ambassador to the UN – that that I came to realize was a time too when I came to realize that Plato was wrong when he said philosophers should be kings. Intellectuals, people who see too many sides of things, cannot really be good leaders. You need a leader who's willing to take a calculated risk, who does not insist on waiting for overwhelming evidence taking a decision to act in rapidly evolving situation. By that time, it's usually too late. You need somebody with leadership qualities and practical judgment, which is willing to take, as the Italians say, a *salto nel buio*, a leap in the dark; and Kennedy proved that that was the kind of person he was. Practical judgment is essential. The more academic, the more research oriented, you are to examine all sides of an issue, or anxious to get all advisers to agree, the less likely you are to make a decision when it needs to be made.

This goes back a little bit to my FSI experience when Dean Rusk was Secretary of State. He was a great Secretary of State. I came to realize that in full only later on when, as a reviewer looking at documents to declassify or not in response to Freedom of Information requests, I went through a whole box of memcons of his conversations, of *his tête-à-têtes* with Gromyko. On Berlin he made clear: you take over Berlin, you will have a nuclear war. He said it in no uncertain terms, on the QT, of course – none of this was said in the press conferences.

But what really reminds me of Rusk is this point: He was all for reducing what he called layering in the Department which causes delays in deciding anything. He said if a decision on an issue is delayed because of the layered process – getting everyone to agree beforehand, or because we just can't make up our minds – that is a bad decision in itself. But if after looking at it closely, we decide it's best to put a decision off, then that's a good decision. I don't think the layering problem has been resolved to this day.

Q: I wonder if you could talk a little about life in Naples.

BASTIANI: You mean…

Q: You know, how you…

BASTIANI: …The social environment?

Q: Yes. I mean, this is your first time abroad as a Foreign Service officer, you and your wife, and how did you find Naples?

BASTIANI: I think my wife never ceased telling people for the rest of our career that the nicest Italians she ever met were the Neapolitans. They couldn't have been nicer to us. At the same time, of course, Neapolitans have a reputation of being lazy and I recall one good joke they told on themselves. I have come to realize that a people which hasn't yet learned to laugh at itself is still up tight. Neapolitans certainly weren't. A they told me has a Neapolitan sleeping on the sidewalk, his back against the wall, his feet outstretched, when a tourist, an American tourist, comes along looking up with his open guide book in his hands. He trips over the Neapolitan's foot and wakes him up. The American apologizes profusely; but the Neapolitan says no, no apology's necessary; rather, I am in *your* debt. You did me a favor. I was dreaming that I was working.

Q: You know, when you look at Neapolitans, many of them had two jobs, an official job and the real job.

BASTIANI: That's true, that's very true. The black market, so-called, is a part of the economy that doesn't get into the official statistics, but yet you have to resort to it to explain what you see, how well most people are living.

Q: Well, did you find that you could you make many Neapolitan friends? Or was this a problem?

BASTIANI: No problem whatsoever. The only limitation on making friends was work; I mean, all the time and energy you had to spend working and taking care of your family left little time for much socializing outside the Consulate community. I remember another humorous experience that kind of shows the character of the policemen and their tolerant and friendly attitude towards the Americans. Naples in my time, because of the Sixth Fleet, had about 10,000 Americans all over the place.

One day I was in a hurry to get home and I barged into traffic on Via Caracciolo from a narrow side street without a stop sign. A cop flagged me down. Before I could say anything, he said don't you know that that you must yield to the traffic on Caracciolo, or, like other Americans, are you going to tell me that you don't know this rule? I was dumbfounded. Before I could answer, he simply waved me on. They tolerated us very well. In that time, of course, there was no open anti-Americanism at all – or anonymity. On a trip through southern Italy once, you know, I'm walking through a piazza of a southern Italian town and a guy comes running up to me to say in very friendly fashion, you're the American consular, aren't you? Another thing I noticed about Naples when I was there. There was still some nostalgia for Mussolini.

Q: Mussolini, I think, went once to Naples during his time and I think his hat was stolen. And the Pope had never been there, I mean in recent times. Naples was, you know, kind of looked down on by Italians from Rome up. They had a very poor opinion of the whole South.

BASTIANI: No question about it, even my mother, told me to beware of those Neapolitans; "*sono tutti ladri*," they're all thieves.

Q: How about the younger officers; what sort of a group did you have, and what was your impression of them?

BASTIANI: There wasn't a single one I didn't admire. I think, in my time, they were bringing in really talented, well prepared officers. I saw them either on their first or second tours, John Holmes, for instance; he later became DCM in Rome when I was in Torino. And there was a young officer, his name was Crawford, I believe, who got to know more Neapolitans outside work than anyone. Nobody learned Italian faster than this young officer because he took up with a young lady. If you want to learn Italian, the local Italian in a hurry, that's the way to do it. And this was a very proper relationship, because every time he took her out the young lady's aunt was with them. Good families chaperoned their daughters on dates still at that time.

Q: Did Kennedy make a visit to Naples while you were there?

BASTIANI: Indeed, he did.

Q: Can you talk about that a bit?

BASTIANI: Okay. By this time I was such an admirer of Kennedy and he was so well received. He was considered, you know, a super person by the Italians. I will never forget watching from a Consulate window the cheering crowds along the sidewalks of Caracciolo as his open car passed. He was idolized, and deeply mourned for a lengthy time after his assassination.

Italians were also grateful for the economic assistance they got from his administration. About this time the Italian lira was on very shaky ground, so much so that I got an request for help from my relatives – the only time they asked for any favor. A cousin made a special trip to Naples from the family home town in Ascoli Piceno on the Adriatic side, northeast of Rome, with a bagful of lira notes he wanted me to exchange for dollars. Of course I had to refuse, even if I had the dollars to do it. Fortunately, I was able to give him that news that the U.S. was about to grant a two billion line dollar line of credit to Italy that stabilized the lira, and put all the wild fears about the lira's devaluation to rest. And I would add that the Italy for most of the post-war period was our most loyal ally in Europe. In my time, Italians still remembered the 1948 crucial elections when it seemed possible that the Communists and Socialists would win. At this time those parties were close to and assisted by the Soviet Union.

Q: Very much so.

BASTIANI: Italy going communist would have created an enormous problem for all the other West Europeans. I am really proud of how we helped the anti-communists win in 1948; today a lot of people would call it intervention in violation of international law. We

had people going to rural areas supplying food and other necessities well marked as from the United States. We were actively talking to and supporting the Christian Democrats and other pro-Western leaders, financially as well. Many of them stuck their necks way out in the campaign, and would have been finished if they had lost. And the Italians never forgot our assistance under the Marshall Plan which resurrected the European economies. Even as late as the 80s when I was in Torino on my last Italian assignment, that gratitude was still there. And we could always count on the Italians to support us in the UN.

Q: And also during the response to the SS-20; over where we could put our counter missiles. The Soviets were putting in intermediate missiles, and the Europeans, Western Europeans were sort of balking at having cruise missiles and Pershing missiles to counter them. But the Italians accepted the cruise missiles.

BASTIANI: Yes indeed.

Q: And it was extremely important help to actually to disarming the issue.

BASTIANI: Yes indeed.

Getting back to the visit of Kennedy, I didn't get a chance to greet him personally, but I went to an upper Consulate window that overlooked the main street down which the parade of automobiles came and had a good look at him and the cheering throngs. The picture is indelibly etched in my mind. I believe prior to that Vice President Johnson visited Naples and he I did meet him in the parking lot of the Consulate I have a picture of my daughter number one in Lyndon Johnson's arms. He was well received by the Italians, but with none of the enthusiasm and adulation they showed toward Kennedy. I was still in Naples when Kennedy was assassinated.

Q: Well, this would be '63.

BASTIANI: Yes.

Q: Sixty-two.

BASTIANI: I was there '62 to '64, and it was in '63. Yes, I remember the moment vividly. The outpouring of grief and sympathy as a result of his assassination went on for months. Each of us in the Consulate were going out to this or that town to represent the U.S. at a memorial mass and/or the naming of a street or piazza. I have vivid memories and some photos to show for an elaborate one I attended.

So, I was there during some historic events, but not a participant. I just witnessed how the Italians responded. We were inspected during my tour as well. By that time I had volunteered for Romania, Embassy Bucharest, and I remember one inspector asking why I wanted to go there. Everybody that goes there, gets divorced or worse. He was very

discouraging about life there, but I saw Eastern Europe as a specialty I wanted to develop, and was happy to have been accepted for Romanian language training.

Q: Well, while were in Naples, was immigration a major industry, as you might say; I mean, for the Consulate General at that time?

BASTIANI: Indeed. We had well over 100,000 non-preference registered applicants. The Consulate's rather large basement, was full of file cabinets with visa files. Norm Redden had invented what was called the Montreal System, which reduced all these non-preference files to three by five cards, and he made his reputation there doing this. And so he had out to Naples to clean up the files. He put me in charge of a team of FSNs temporarily employed to go through these files and reduce them to these three by five cards. I hated this job as well because these employees knew that as soon as this job was finished, they would be let go. And I was the guy who was to make sure they did it as quickly as possible. We got it done.

I liked the commercial work, I liked the political work. I didn't like most of consular work, but, at the same time, developed an appreciation for some aspects of it, like Protection and Welfare. To me it's perhaps the most important of all the consular functions; protecting and assisting American citizens.

Q: Did you have any cases that stick in mind of welfare and protection?

BASTIANI: No, not there, I didn't get much time in the section. I do have memorable cases from Bucharest and other posts..

Q: Well, we'll come to that. On the commercial side, what sort of work were you doing?

BASTIANI: The big project when I was in the Commercial Section was getting the Department of Commerce's exhibit set up at the Bari trade fair. This trade fair caters to all the East Mediterranean countries, the *Levante*, as the area was called, and the major function, practical function in commercial work, was trade opportunities, finding companies in Italy which were looking for a U.S. partner, or vice-versa. I traveled twice to Bari, along with our very experienced FSN, a woman, to contract a suitable site in the Fair for Commerce. I made good use of my amateur photography skills on this job.

Somehow, the most vivid memory I have of Bari was the insight I got into its traditional social environment while eating with the FSN in one of the best restaurants in the center of town. Small tables were arranged along the four walls. At most sat obviously affluent middle-aged or elderly males, each alone, with his back to the wall. No doubt their wives were home, also eating alone or serving other family members. About the only conversation underway was mine with the FSN, the only woman at any table.

Also, while I in the section Pittsburgh Plate Glass dedicated a big new plant not far from Naples in Salerno down the coast. Forschner, the commercial officer, for some reason couldn't go so I accompanied Consul General Byington. My wife came along because

Mrs. Byington was ill. After the ceremony, we were escorted to the bar with innumerable options to drink on display. My wife's favorite drink at the time was sherry. Byington asked her what she wanted, and Dorothy, somewhat flustered at the priority given her could only think to say sherry. That's the one drink they didn't have, and with embarrassment chose the first thing offered instead. Well, Byington just thought this was funny – asking for sherry in Italy – and teased her about it in the car on the way back. At the residence he invited us in and went immediately to the bar saying, "Dorothy, you can now have your sherry; you ask for sherry in Spain, not in Italy," and with a smile pours out a sherry for her. But Dorothy was so embarrassed. Byington liked to tease in this manner; he once did it to me in a similar situation once as well.

Q: Well, one of the problems in Naples was unemployment. Alfa Romeo, put in a plant, and they got kids from the farms around there to help build the place. Then when it came time to put in skilled workers the union – the local people – said no, you have to use our kids, you know, the same people who built the plant. In other words, jobs were extremely hard to get and, often recommendations were sought. This made it very difficult for an American firm, I would think.

BASTIANI: They were almost essential, because it was an employers' market, and people would come to us for *raccomandazioni* just to get an interview, just to have a hope for getting a job. The way the unemployment situation in the South, the *Mezzogiorno*, was to a great extent alleviated was by worker migration to the North. Many southerners migrated to the North to work at Fiat and other industrial plants, would marry northern Italian girls and establish families, but retain their attachment to the South. Meanwhile, the northerners who made use of all this labor complained about the investments in the South as a drain on the country's resources. Without these workers from the South, the North would never have been able to develop their industries as they did.

Some old-timers, told me in all seriousness during my tour in Turin that the stupidest mistake that Garibaldi and Cavour had made when they united Italy under Emanuel-Victor Emanuel II, was to go below Florence; they should never have extended Italy below Florence. This results from the fact that the Southern Italy has a different culture than Northern Italy. Most people don't know that Southern Italy was under the domination of the Spanish for 400 years and gave it a definitely different culture. At the same time Southern Italy was much more exposed to migrations from all over the rest of the Mediterranean.

Q: The Normans were there.

BASTIANI: In fact. And so it's been a crossroads of migration.

Q: I was Consul General there from '79 to '81, and by that time emigration to the United States was a very minor factor, because most emigration was up to the North or to other parts of Europe; so it wasn't much of a factor.

BASTIANI: But in my day it was the main business of Consulate. And then in the '80s, I was upset to see them shutting down posts all over Italy, but that's a later story.

Q: Okay, Now let's talk about 20 minutes your assignment to Romanian language training, and then we'll go on to Romania. How'd you find Romanian? It's supposed to be a little like Italian and Latin. Did you find it was a fairly easy language to learn?

BASTIANI: For me it was. In fact, it was so easy that it interfered with my Italian. I had the privilege of being tutored by Nicolai Chiacu. He was the Romanian tutor, absolutely dedicated to forcing you to speak this language whether you liked it or not. I was in a class with just two others and he practiced the oral-audio method exclusively from the first day. *Buna dimineata*, good morning, *Inco data,* again, slamming his fist on the table. And he would drill, drill, drill listening intently with eyes closed until he heard you say it exactly. '*Im para bine se va cunosc*, pleased to meet you, over and over. He wouldn't tolerate any slow speaking; you'd be sweating by the time you got out of there. I became a total convert to this method of learning a language, because after nine months of Romanian language training, I was speaking it fluently; my only real limitation was vocabulary. And he gave me a grade of four; I thought that was a little exaggerated, but…

Q: A five is bilingual, four is..

BASTIANI: Expert or whatever.

Q: A very fine mark, three is adequate in the FSI series, goes one to five.

BASTIANI: Yes. Every work day I had six hours with him. At this time my wife was home pregnant with our third child; all her pregnancies were difficult and she was in bed most of the day. We had this manual of conversations and exercises based on them conversations which he drilled into memory. The idea was that after six hours of tutoring you would go home and do some more studying of the manual. I never cracked a book when I got home. I was so saturated by the time I got home I didn't look at it; during the last few months anyway, I was doing dinners and household chores besides watching TV with the family.

And I can tell you a good story regarding a friend's experience with Chiacu. Bob Frowick was my predecessor in INR, Intelligence and Research, and before that we had served together in Bucharest. Bob was in Romanian with Chiacu before me. Over the Christmas holidays he went skiing and broke a leg. While he was in the hospital, Chiacu went every day after tutoring at the Institute to the hospital to tutor Frowick; he wouldn't let him get out of it.

I learned well too from Chiacu because he would make statements one would consider anti-Semitic. He would say he wasn't, he was only citing facts, just being objective. He wouldn't accept any rejoinder in English. I think he provoked me deliberately to force me to argue in Romanian. He is the best language teacher I ever encountered in my entire life.

Q: Were you picking up any feeling about Romania? Often when you're a language student you get an idea from your tutor and maybe other sources before you go out. And this was Romania before Ceausescu, I guess.

BASTIANI: He had just come in.

Q: He came in around '67 or so?

BASTIANI: He came in around '65.

Q: Sixty-five.

BASTIANI: Yes, after Gheorghiu-Dej.

Q: Well, What were you picking up about him and from your reading about Romania?

BASTIANI: Okay, we had area studies as well. We knew it was one of the Soviet satellites, totalitarian, but also, well I also learned that it was a country extremely well endowed with resources and beauty. And that reminds me of another joke making the rounds at the time about Romania. When God created Romania he said oh, I'm going to put there the most beautiful mountains with beautiful forests; and leading up to these mountains the most beautiful rolling hills; and a river winding down to a beautiful delta, the Danube River; with marvelous climate and beautiful white beaches on the Black See., St. Michael interrupts and says, "God, you go on with this, Romania will be Paradise on earth." And God said, "You're right. I know what I'll do; I'll put Romanians there." Well, you can't tell that joke without insulting any Romanian who hears it; and you can use it to put down any ethnic group you chose by substituting them.

But you had asked about the Romanian language itself. I learned from Chiacu who is a linguist in his own right, that it is closer to the spoken Latin at the time of the Romans than the Western Romance Languages are. It is very faithful to the orthography, spelling of the words. It is what spoken Latin developed into in the East, as opposed to Western romance languages. At the same time – and this I think I got elsewhere or discovered myself – it is spoken more with a different cadence, and has many Slav words and Turkish words in its vocabulary. You know, of course that the Ottoman Turks dominated the Balkans for about 400 years, including Romania. To one who knows Italian, Romanian sounds like a language you should understand, but don't. There are many phrases that are almost identical in meaning; and words that are identical, but with somewhat different meanings. Good evening in Romanian is *buna seara*, and in Italian, *buona sera*. Good bye, until we meet again, in Romanian is *La revedere*; and in Italian, *Arrivederci*; and so on. I became so immersed in Romanian that I was embarrassed when I would try to speak Italian to an Italian diplomat in Bucharest. I found I couldn't without Romanian popping up. That's how I realized that the social environment is very important to speak fluently in a language you know. At some point during my Romanian tour I flew to Rome for a Conference, I believe. On arrival at the airport, Customs raised

a problem with my luggage. Suddenly my Italian came on strong with no Romanian whatsoever mixed in. I was back in the environment in which my buried Italian came up onto my frontal lobes, so to speak.

Q: Okay. This is a good place to start your tour there. You got to Romania when?

BASTIANI: I got to Romania in 1965, in the summer.

Q: And you were there how long?

BASTIANI: For about two and a half years.

Q: Was this your first exposure to the Communist world?

BASTIANI: Yes, that is correct.

Q: Okay, let's talk about the situation. Before we get to what you were doing, what was the situation in Romania in '65, both internally and externally? And after that we'll talk about American interests in Romania.

BASTIANI: Nicolai Ceausescu had just replaced Gheorghiu-Dej. Gheorghiu-Dej was one of the three founders of the Communist party, and leader of a triumvirate in Romania. He was the chief. Ana Pauker, I don't know if you ever heard of her?

Q: Yes.

BASTIANI: She was a member, and considered loyal to Moscow. Dej, although originally loyal to Stalin, had long since put Romania on the road to autonomy from Moscow. He set the stage for this by getting the Soviets to withdraw their troops from Romania in 1958, in exchange, I would guess, for the cooperation he gave them in crushing the Hungarian revolt in 1956. I recall reading that he had permitted transit of Russian troops to crush the revolt, and the temporary imprisonment of Imre Nagy in Romania before his trial and execution. Since then he had begun opening up to trade with West, and not cooperating fully with Comecon's Socialist Division of Labor among the satellites. When Dej died, Ceausescu, with the help of other leaders who supported the policy of national autonomy, emerged as the strongman and took over.

Now, Ceausescu at this time was favored by us because he continued the policy of autonomy vis-à-vis the Soviets. He gained some popularity among the people for it. I characterized him as a nationalistic communist. He was thoroughly Stalinist on how to run the country, but at the same time very Romanian in autonomy toward the Soviets. In defense of it toward the Soviets and its more subservient satellites, he used to the hilt as boilerplate in his speeches the language of the Moscow Declaration of 1957 that socialist countries based their relations on the principles of complete equality, independence, sovereignty, and non-interference in one another's affairs. Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin's crimes in 1956 had opened the way to it.

At this time toward East Europe, our policy was polycentricism, dealing with each of the satellites as though they were really independent, just to encourage autonomy. The Romanians had clearly shown that they were giving priority to national interests. Ceausescu was actively negotiating to buy modern turn-key industrial technology from the West without a by-your-leave from Moscow. Moscow was doing the same anyway, and could hardly object openly. To pay for this technology he squeezed his own people and exported to the West whatever products were salable, oil and wheat especially.

Q: Yes. And of course Romania was basically a country full of agricultural bounty; I mean it was a breadbasket.

BASTIANI: Indeed. Agriculture was wheat and very much cultivated because of Romania's endowment of fertile land. Western tourism was also very much promoted as an industry to acquire marks, dollars, francs, and other convertible Western currencies. There was a good joke that was told by the Romanians themselves that well characterized the situation. One night it was given to a person to visit hell. There he was wined and dined, and enjoyed himself with every kind of entertainment. So when he got back to earth he thought well, that wasn't bad at all. I could take that for all eternity instead of heaven. Why should I live a good moral life to avoid going to hell. So he lived a very immoral life and when he died was sent straight to hell. When he got there, they immediately slapped on the chains, put a shovel in his hands, stood him in front of a hot furnace and ordered him to shovel coal. He screamed, "What happened? This is not what I found when I was here before." And they told him, "Ah, but then you were a tourist."

That's how the Romanians considered their own situation. They were in a sort of living hell; they were exploited; all the best products were exported. I remember an instance when we had a visiting military attaché or diplomat from Moscow. Now, they were exporting the best not only to the West but found it necessary to export some of it to the Soviet Union for imports they needed. We were discussing what produce and eggs were available on the local market; in Bucharest there were only these little golf balls they called eggs. The best eggs in the diplomatic store in Moscow, said our guests, are imported from Romania.

The Ceausescu regime even resorted unscrupulously to selling people for money, Jews primarily. There were still many Jews in Romania, and the Israelis were quite willing to have them immigrate to Israel. A system was set up whereby the Israelis paid a price for every emigrant who was allowed to immigrate to Israel via a refugee camp in Italy. There was a price list based on education, profession, sex, what have you. The Israelis paid it. The Jewish emigrants who were processed for exit had all their valuables taken from them. There was a special arrangement with Alitalia to fly them to a refugee camp between Rome and Naples as I recall. From there, some with relatives in the U.S. would opt to go to States or other countries, but most would then continue on to Israel. In my time the estimate was that 25 percent of Israelis were of Romanian origin. Prices were paid also for Germans, though as far as I know, not according to price list. As a result of

the war, there were many divided families from ethnic German communities in Romania which had been there for centuries.

Speaking of divided German families, the most were in East and West Germany. East Germans couldn't travel to the West, but rather easily within the Eastern bloc. West Germans could easily get tourist visas to go to Romania, under Romania's program to acquire hard currency. By pre-arrangement they would meet on the marvelous beaches of Mamaia in Romania.

Q: Were the East Germans able to slip out and get to the West from there?

BASTIANI: I don't believe many could. It was simply a way of visiting with each other.

Q: How would you describe the differences as you saw it at the time between our relationship with Tito's Yugoslavia and with Romania at the time? He had early broken with the Soviet Union and we had quite close ties with Tito at that time.

BASTIANI: We, of course, had been supporting Tito economically for a much longer time and in many more ways after he broke with Stalin for the same reasons as we supported Ceausescu. Tito even accepted Marshall Plan aid at a time when he was considered a member of the Soviet bloc. Moreover, in the '60s as Yugoslavia became more liberal internally, this support was much easier to justify, especially after he made his peace with the Catholic Church.

Tito was also a leader and organizer of the Non-aligned Movement.

I don't think Ceausescu ever dared join it in its heyday, but he did try to imitate Tito in establishing bilateral relations with just about everybody and anybody on every continent. While the Romanian analyst in INR, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, I did a piece in 1970 or '71 I titled "The Peripatetic Ceausescu," simply listing the many visits to foreign countries he had scheduled over the next six months or so. But I don't think Tito ever got as close to China as Romania did when China and the Soviet Union were openly at odds. They were much more compatible with respect to their domestic policies. Romania I learned while in INR was used as an intermediary by China to send one or two secret messages to us on the issue of Vietnam.

They had a common border and did collaborate over it. There were ethnic Serb villages in the western Timisoara area of Romania. We have always talked about balkanization in the Balkans, but it wasn't just between countries; it was also within countries.

During my tour in Romania, I did consular work the first two years or so and economic work the rest of the time. While in the Consular section, I and the economic officer I eventually replaced made a trip with the embassy suburban…

Q: Suburban being a type…

BASTIANI: …Being a vehicle, a four wheel drive vehicle that could travel these muddy roads in Western Romania, to check out some Social Security recipients. Our Social Security system is very generous in that it pays benefits to anyone who paid into it for the required period, even if they did so as an illegal resident, and then retired to their home country. There is no citizenship or legal residency requirement. When they reached 62 or 65, they could file for it through our Embassy or Consulate. Most countries then and now, I believe, will not pay pensions to their citizens living outside their boundaries – certainly in my time no Eastern European country did this sort of thing. I'm not sure we ever insisted on reciprocity in the matter.

In Romania, the monthly checks would come to the Embassy for distribution by mail to the recipients. But we began to worry whether some of these recipients were still alive, considering their ages. The receipt we enclosed would always come back signed before we sent the next check, but we were afraid this receipt was signed by some relative or cousin. So we picked out what we thought were potential problem cases and went off to visit them; it was a real education for me about Western Romania.

You go down a muddy road and you come to a village and every resident was Romanian and spoke only Romanian. You go two miles down the road, you come to another village, and every resident is Hungarian and speaks Hungarian. You go two miles west or two miles north and every resident is German and speaks German. And you went the other direction and you'd have a Serb village and they spoke Serb. They were just fragmented as villages into ethnic groups. I assume the children had to learn Romanian in the local school, but it wasn't spoken at home.

Well, on this trip we were shadowed by the secret police, and they didn't make a secret of it either. We knew they were in that little car behind us. On one occasion we had gone down a muddy road and visited a woman. Coming back we saw them stuck in the mud. In our visits, the Polaroid camera I brought along worked magic in breaking the ice and getting communication started. You would take a picture and a minute later give it to the subject. One woman was so pleased she begged us to return after the children returned from school to take their picture. In return, almost invariably, they would give us a bottle of homemade tuica, which was triple distilled prune juice, almost pure alcohol. You could put a match to it, you know, and it would just burn until it was gone.

Q: While you were doing that I was in Yugoslavia as Chief of the Consular Section doing the same thing, going out and looking at Social Security cases too. What were you finding? Were most of these people still alive? I mean, was there a widespread problem?

BASTIANI: No, we did not find a widespread problem. In fact I don't recall finding a single fraudulent case on this trip.

Q: This is true in Yugoslavia too.

In Turkey there were major problems but I'm not saying that I found them when I went out. I don't think we were followed as much, but I used to go out by myself and travel

around to areas and do investigations. I always made a point of dropping by the local police and saying I'm the American Consul; can you help me find so and so, and explain what I was doing. I'm sure they called up and checked, but the idea was to let everybody know what I was doing so that you weren't having people wondering what the hell is this guy doing with local police?

Well, let's take a look at the Embassy. Who was the ambassador while you were there?

BASTIANI: When I arrived, the Ambassador was William Crawford, but for most of my tour it was Richard Harding Davis, not to be confused with the other Davises who were ambassadors. I must say he was my favorite of all the ambassadors I served under. As a person, he was outstanding. He really looked out for his people and kept up the morale at this post.

Q: Would you say this was an embassy kind of under siege? Was it a difficult post or what?

BASTIANI: It was a difficult post. The embassy even today is still in the same mansion it took over when it opened after the war. It's walled in and the Romanians always have had their own police outside. In fact, they would intercept people, not even let them come into the Embassy. Because of Ceausescu's autonomy from the Soviet Union, we found that the Soviets were watched about as much as we were. He did not collaborate with the Soviets on the various ministerial levels like most of the other satellites did, all of them, really. Later on I'll have some interesting things to say, I think, about how the relations between the Polish authorities and the Soviet Union were handled, and contrast those with what I am telling you now about the relations between Romanian authorities and the Soviets.

But at the same time Ceausescu was, already in the 60s, probably more Stalinist towards his own people than the Soviets were then. His secret police were absolutely brutal. We had a Romanian writer employed as an FSN, Alexandru Ivasiuc. He was I assume required to report to the secret police about us, but he was really a dissident knowledgeable about everything, you know, party politics and all the rest. To us he was an invaluable source of information. How he was allowed to be employed as an FSN in our Embassy I don't know, but when Ceausescu came to power, there was a brief liberal period. I'm sure that he was forced to make reports as other Foreign Service nationals. None of them could have worked for us without permission from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and particularly, the secret police, so you had to assume they all reported. At one point he was beaten up, had teeth knocked out.

I don't know when he left the Embassy's employment, it must have been soon after I left in 1968. He obviously remained a dissident, but had several novels published and became a recognized author. He died in 1977, allegedly in the severe earthquake which hit Romania in 1977. I wonder. When I researched him on the internet, I discovered that another Romanian author had died in the same earthquake, but I couldn't find whether he too was a dissident. The secret police of those East European regimes had ways of getting

rid of controversial dissidents through so-called accidents. They learned this from the Soviets.

And then we had an extremely helpful administrative FSN who had been there forever, Rick Samoil. Anything you needed, he would find. Without these people we couldn't have operated. We couldn't hire except through the Diplomatic Service Office of the Foreign Ministry. You couldn't even hire maids except through them. And so we lived in a kind of a fishbowl where we couldn't have contact with the local people. When we arrived – my family and I – we traveled by car, a ship and car. I always maximized per diem on travel to and from post as I could. At this time we had three children, the youngest was only two months old when we brought her from the United States all the way to Romania. After arrival we were put into temporary lodging, an apartment in an building that the Embassy rented through the Diplomatic Service Office. The neighbor in the adjoining apartment was a professor of some sort with a daughter about 17 who was studying English. We liked her and began to use her as a babysitter. Then one day we couldn't talk to them. They had been told not to associate with us in any way. Of course it would have been foolish for us to try; it would have only gotten them into trouble. The only Romanians you could really associate with were the ones who were obviously agents of the secret police. I came to know three or four of them because you'd see them in the major restaurants talking to foreigners very freely. They had no fear whatsoever in doing so, because that was their job. They would even offer to exchange money for you at a black market rate.

Q: You know, sometimes in the Soviet Union and some of the other countries, there were times when our relations weren't that great, and the secret police would puncture your tires or rough you up. Was there any of this going on?

BASTIANI: In Romania at this time, no. I personally, and other officers of the Consulate under martial law in Poland did later on.

Q: But you didn't in Romania. How about the young blond girl who all of a sudden says I wonder if you could help me with my English, or something like that. I kept waiting for that; I spent five years in Yugoslavia and it never happened, but in the Soviet Union of course, this is…

BASTIANI: …I got my approaches, not in person, but when I was the duty officer sleeping in the Embassy. At this time the Embassy did not have direct communications with the Department other than through a dedicated telex line to Vienna. We did not have Marine guards during the first part of my tour, so the male members of the Embassy staff took turns, week by week, sleeping in the secure area of the Embassy where we had a buzzer. If there was a flash telegram, an immediate action telegram from Washington this buzzer would go off and we would then do what was necessary to receive it and get it decoded. We also had to make regular rounds all over the Embassy several times a night to security stations into which we inserted a key to prove we checked. The basement was infested with about the largest cockroaches I ever saw. I always hated to go down there

because before you could get to the light you'd hear the crunch of cockroaches underneath your feet. And then they would all scurry when the light came on.

But, getting back to your original question, two or three times the phone rang while I was on duty, and a sweet voice would come on the line asking whether I was lonely, and try to engage me in conversation. Each time, I simply slammed the receiver down.

Q: So, could you travel around the country without getting permission?

BASTIANI: There were closed areas. We had to get permission to travel to certain areas – I don't remember where they were – of course the travel of our military attaches was what they watched the most. But you know all this security is not just because they were worried about us spying, but because they didn't trust their own people. They didn't want their people to have contact with Western diplomats. This was especially true in Poland under martial law.

Q: Well, let's talk about consular work. What was consular work? I mean, you talked about investigating Social Security; was there much in the way of visa work?

BASTIANI: Yes. As in the rest of East Europe, we intervened as we could to have exit visas issued to applicants qualified under our immigration law. These concerned almost exclusively divided families, a spouse or child or parent or sibling of a U.S. citizen or legal immigrant resident wishing to join family in the U.S. In East Europe, this was not just a major consular activity, but we made it political by getting the ambassadors and high level visitors, even presidents to bring these cases up when visiting or hosting leaders of these countries. So we processed immigration visas. There were of course some citizenship cases. If we found a claimant was under our law entitled to a passport, we really went to bat for him or her to get an exit visa from the Romanians. They of course considered such people Romanian citizens under their law. In such cases, you might say that possession is nine-tenths of the law; they had them there. Of course we also processed all requests for diplomatic visas, the so-called A visas, no problem there on the basis of reciprocity. I'm reminded that I once had a visit from couple of their counterintelligence people – they were so obvious – pretending to be interested in traveling to the U.S. I played along, and gave them the information we gave everyone.

Q: Well, in the early days in Yugoslavia, before my time, I'm told that these people would come into our Embassy, but they all wore the same type of shoes that were issued to policemen, and shoes were scarce at the time.

BASTIANI: Yes. I mentioned this little transient apartment we lived in on arrival; I don't think they'd cleaned the drapes for 10 years and the carpet was filthy. We had a maid of German origin maid who had a terrible time keeping our little Carol from crawling around on the floor,0 because it was so dirty. My oldest daughter came down with a severe case of boils that we had to have an American doctor come in from Belgrade to treat. It was hardship. Well, our own technical security people would come from Frankfurt to sweep the Embassy, and our residences.

Q: You're talking about sweeping, in that they were looking for bugs?

BASTIANI: They were looking for bugs. In that apartment, they pulled a microphone from the wall between the beds in our bedroom. On the other hand, there was an upside to being bugged. Any time you had an urgent need for a repair service, you complained about it loudly to make sure they picked it up. For example, "We've already had three requests put in to the Diplomatic Service Office of the Foreign Ministry, to repair the plumbing leak in the kitchen, and we've gotten no service at all. They are really inefficient." And maybe the next day a plumber shows up.

Q: Were there many American tourists, and did they have any particular problems?

BASTIANI: There weren't a whole lot, but I did have a couple of interesting protection and welfare cases. One was kind of tragic. One had to do with a Romanian who had come to the United States and become a citizen, and amassed a substantial amount of money; in his old age, having no relatives in the U.S., he returned to Romania where he had some distant relative. After some time he fell ill, became disillusioned with his life there and the relative, and wanted to return to the United States. He had not given up his citizenship, but because he had all this money this relative was supposed to inherit, the Romanians would not allow him to leave the country. He was bedridden with a tube into his abdomen…what do you call it?

Q: Well, in other words for waste.

BASTIANI: For urine, yes. He wanted to give this money to a charity in the United States. My predecessor had been pushing this case for a long time, and had already helped him to do a new will which bequeathed all his money to the charity. I believe he had even given the Romanians a copy of the will.

Well, I continued the pleadings, and eventually they finally issued an exit visa. so he could leave because he had dual citizenship. The tragic thing about it is that he never made it back to the United States. We flew him to a hospital in Germany where he passed away.

The second case is almost unbelievable. There was a young lady who was obviously a mental case. She had been in a mental institution in the United States somewhere in the Midwest, Kansas or Nebraska. Somehow she got it into her head that she had a marriage proposal from Kosygin – I guess he was the Soviet Prime Minister at the time – and she had to go to the Soviet Union to accept this proposal. And I don't know how she managed it, but she flew to London, and then got herself onto a flight to Bucharest. On arrival at the airport she tried to board a flight to Moscow to accept this marriage proposal.

Well, the Romanians had to restrain her physically; they forcibly put her into a cab, escorted her to the Embassy, and dumped her on us – on me – I was the consular officer.

She was obviously exhausted, disheveled, her dress torn at a shoulder, and I get this amazing story from her. At one point she laid her back on the couch and put her feet straight up in the air. Then she tells me that, if she didn't get to Moscow, well, she also had a marriage proposal from the Romanian Foreign minister, and she would accept that instead.

Of course, what I had to do was get her back to the States as soon as possible; this was not a P and W case you could fob off to Belgrade or Vienna. There was putting her in a hotel while we made arrangements. I wasn't going to bring her home to my three children. Fortunately, I had an assistant vice consul, a young lady, who had a kind of circular apartment with an inner sanctum bedroom so to speak which could be closed off. So we put her in this apartment with the vice- consul – Walsh was her name – watching over her. There weren't many Western airlines you could go to at the time, only Austrian Airlines and Sabena as I remember. Fortunately, I had a very good relationship with the Sabena agent. In fact, he's the one who also took my bedridden case.

Q: The Belgian…

BASTIANI: The Belgian airline. He accepted her as an escorted passenger all the way to New York where we had arranged through the Department for some institution to take her in hand. I don't recall dealing with any U.S. relatives. The Department did it all. The Romanians, I'm sure, were happy to see her go. In any event, from the time they dumped her on us, she was not violent in any way.

Q: Well, on the economic side, it must have been kind of dismal reporting these administrative shortages. You know, the place was almost a basket case, wasn't it?

BASTIANI: It was a basket case for the local people but not for us. The thing about being in the Foreign Service abroad is the U.S. Government really takes care of you, almost too much to my mind. We are so well taken care of. and we have the best of both worlds.

So how did we solve that problem in Romania? Well, the ambassador was entitled to his own transportation. Periodically, he would arrange to have a C-130, the big Air Force cargo airplane to come from Frankfurt to pick him up. In advance, every American on the staff put in his shopping list for Commissary and PX items to a sergeant there who moonlighted filling these orders. And all these orders, identified by name, would go onto this C-130, you know, meat, everything, cereal, just as you would shop in a supermarket, or at Macy's to the extent the PX had what you wanted. The Air Force loved to do these trips, because it gave their pilots experience flying over East Europe. At the airport, the plane would park along the fence near the terminal, and our trucks would load directly from it while a Romanian Customs official walked back and forth with his hands behind his back – as I once observed. The orders were delivered directly to the homes. Most of us had an extra freezer.

The other line of supply food from the West was Ostermann and Peterson, a Danish or Dutch company. They used to run a truck to Bucharest about every two weeks, and my

wife and I bought these big beautiful eggs from them, six dozen at a time. It's amazing how long eggs will keep if refrigerated.

Q: Well Carl, what about the economic statistics and all? What were we interested in? How did that work?

BASTIANI: The Romanians, of course, put out their official statistics. The Agency, the CIA and INR, State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research in Washington had figured out that they were falsified, over or under by a factor of about 10 percent. They had to have numbers which were reasonably consistent; you can't run a country without them. And the U.N. was always asking for them. So we used their statistics a great deal in our reporting as corrected at times by our own people.

When I switched from consular to economic work about midway in my tour, I found I couldn't go out to talk to people at all. I couldn't go out to a factory and talk to them; I couldn't even talk to an official in an economic Ministry. Every meeting had to be arranged officially through the Diplomatic Service Office, and most of the time you got no reply whatsoever. In order to try to prime the pump, so to speak, I requested a meeting with someone in their Ministry of Minerals or Mines for the purpose of presenting our Department of Interior's two volume publication on the world's mineral resources. It was – and probably still is – a world authority on the subject. Of course, in the U.S. the Department of Interior does not correspond to Ministries of Interior in the rest of the world which are the police. I did finally get a reply to our Note requesting the appointment, setting up a meeting. Well I went over, made the presentation, go no information in return, and that was the end of our relationship.

If we wanted to invite Romanian officials to a dinner, we would have to send the invitations through the Diplomatic Service Office and often not know who was going to show up until the last minute. You knew they couldn't come unless they had permission, and you just could not establish a personal direct relationship if they did. The only people outside our own community you could establish personal relationships with, of course, were other foreign diplomats. And so we all lived in a sort of a fishbowl; you would go frequently to receptions at other embassies – national day receptions were happening all the time, and we diplomats were seeing each other all the time. At one, I remember I wanted to punch a particular Swede in the nose one day, but that's another story.

Q: What happened?

BASTIANI: Well, this was the time in the mid '60s when the Russians were way ahead of us in space, Sputnik and all the rest. Meanwhile our very open rocket program was having one failure after another. This Swede was openly anti-American and pro-Soviet, and was rubbing it in to me when we got on the subject of space programs.

Q: Alright, you're talking about punching…

BASTIANI: Yes. I said, Kennedy had committed us to going to go to the moon by 1969, and we would get there first. He just laughed and I got the urge. We'd each had a couple of drinks, which probably had something to do with it. Anyway, I've often wished

I'd kept his name or some way to get in touch with him when we landed on the moon to send him a message.

You know, when you're going to so many receptions – once to three on the same evening – you have to watch yourself, and I developed this technique. My drink then was Scotch and soda and I would start with one and drink it slowly, then I would have a coke or a mineral water, and then another Scotch and soda. And when I lost count I quit. It worked.

Q: With me it was one Scotch and water, double Scotch, and then after that ginger ale. You know, you had to do that.

BASTIANI: You had to do it.

Q: And I think most people do because it's a working occasion, these are not cocktail parties just for fun.

BASTIANI: For me not in Romania and Poland. I sometimes found that when I was being entertained by the other side, they were out to get me drunk.

Q: Yes..

BASTIANI: But I managed to avoid that.

Q: Was there any contact, almost sort of mutual suffering with the Soviet diplomats, or not?

BASTIANI: I keep getting Poland and Romania a little mixed up. But no, in Romania, as far as I know, we didn't have any contact at all with Soviet diplomats. I certainly didn't.

And I don't think it would have sent the right message to the Romanians who were watching us both.

Q: But of course, to somebody who's not familiar with the situation during the height of the Cold War, there were no Soviet troops in Romania.

BASTIANI: That's right. And Ceausescu did everything to make sure they never came back. He was quite good at that.

Q: What was sort of the general reading that you were getting at the Embassy of Ceausescu and Madame Ceausescu?

BASTIANI: OK. Of Madame Ceausescu, to my departure in 1968; she had not yet emerged as a co-ruler. Because of Ceausescu's autonomy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union we favored him – you know that old diplomatic saw: the enemy of my enemy is my friend. So early on we gave Romania most favored nation treatment to encourage direct trade between us. I told you he was after modern turnkey technology. Well, as one German representative of a company remarked, "Just because you put a Steinway piano in a house, doesn't mean you're going to get good music out of it." He doubted that the Romanians could run these plants. But Ceausescu would not accept secondhand technology; he was always looking for the latest. His way of running the Party and the country was to select able people loyal to him, people who were as equally ruthless as himself in getting things done.

On the economic side, I remember we had an organized visit at one point to Ploesti, oil producing area north of Bucharest at which I got to converse with some Romanian economic officials. It had to do with a potential deal between an American oil or oil equipment supply company.

And Ploesti reminds me of the one and only occasion on which we mixed socially with Romanians, when my wife and I were guests at a large open air wedding celebration amid the beautiful vineyards on the foothills of the mountains north of Ploesti. We had previously witnessed the wedding itself in a Romanian Orthodox church done with full liturgy and chants. The vineyards had been confiscated from the family of the bride – they may have retained some formal title to them. We had a marvelous time conversing, and even trying to dance at the banquet. The story about me my wife liked to tell was that when a small cockroach came out from leaves of lettuce on my plate, I simply pushed it aside and kept eating. I didn't want to embarrass the hosts by calling attention to it. Dorothy had a phobia for any kind of insect. I'm still trying to recall how we got invited; it must have been through our marvelous visa FSN, Ms. Gane, whose first name slips my mind at the moment.

The Romanians we associated with on a daily basis, of course, were the local the FSNs. Ms. Gane had been the daughter of the chief of police prior to the war. I believe she still held formal title to the mansion she inherited, but she was confined to a small former servant's room in which to live; the rest was inhabited by Romanians who were given residence there by the authorities, presumably persons loyal to the Party. But it hadn't broken her spirit; she was a cheerful and charming person, and extremely skilled in our visa procedures. The other was also skilled and efficient, but I suspected the one who reported to the Secret Service. You had to assume they were all forced to report. But she too I felt was as loyal as I felt she thought she could be, and efficient in our passport procedures. And we learned so much from them about what was going on in Bucharest.

Q: This is one of the mistakes that people outside make. At one point I think Congress said get rid of all Foreign Service National employees in the Soviet Union, and put Americans in. It put us at a tremendous disadvantage because – though we knew that in communist dictatorships they had to report – these people saw how open were, and eventually it caught on, and they reciprocated. And you learned so much more from them

than if you had Americans only working for you, Americans trying to deal with the public when they have no idea what's going on in it.

BASTIANI: Yes indeed… For recreation, the Embassy leased a large home in Sinaia, a ski and winter sport resort in the mountains north of Bucharest, near Brasov. The American staff paid for the lease, and we took turns going up there on weekends with our families. It had belonged to an official to the king, his personal secretary if I recall correctly – the king's mountain castle was located there – and was big enough for two families to go up together. That's were our older daughters were introduced to skiing. These excursions are also happy memories.

Q: I was wondering whether our economic Counselor in Belgrade when I was there – this was say '62 to '67 – who talked about Cleveland setting up a golf course there ever succeeded. Was there a golf course in Bucharest while you were there?

BASTIANI: There was indeed. There was the one-third remnant of a full pre-war golf course bordering on a lake. All that was left were six holes though before I left they were adding three more. The rest had been nationalized and turned into farmland and/or a public park. There still existed a golf club known as the Diplomatic Golf Club, with an excellent professional, Paul Tomita, who gave lessons. We'd play the six holes three times around to get our 18 hole scores. On those six holes, on certain fairways you would encounter a flock of sheep; I guess that's how I guess they mowed the fairways. For fertilizer, I guess, the sheep left little black stuff in their wake which got on your balls.

You couldn't play alone; you couldn't carry your own bag, let me put it that way. There was a group of caddies, who would assign one of their number to regular players. I was assigned this woman caddie, I didn't pick her. As soon as I showed up at the golf course on the weekend, she would emerge from the group pick up my bag, and off we'd go.

Well, I was a lousy golfer. I refused to take lessons. I overswang; I guess I used golf there as a way of releasing my stresses rather than working at it to improve my game. Anyway, at one point my caddie became pregnant, and she was getting bigger and bigger and bigger around the middle. I'd slice the ball into the bushes and say, forget it, forget it; I'll play another ball. I kept worrying that she was going to need delivery assistance on the course. She was have caddied for me practically to the day of delivery. She disappeared for a week or two. I knew from the other caddies that she had given birth. When she reappeared, Dorothy, for the next weekend or two a few weeks Dorothy would load me up with a bag of baby clothing for her. We had it in abundance. That golf course was such a boon to those of us who played. Of course, our military attachés were the best golfers among us. I used to like to watch *them* play. I imagine that was true at most of our Embassies which had access to golf courses.

Later on I heard that the Clubhouse, which was a beautiful wooden structure had burnt down and then that the whole course got taken over. But we used to brag that we had the only golf course between Western Europe and Taiwan. Businessmen, especially the Japanese used it. It seemed the first thing they would do after checking into a hotel was

come out to the course and swing away. I mean that literally. I once watched one miss the ball three times in a row on the first tee.

Q: Well, when you left there, you left about when…

BASTIANI: I left in ’68 I left. I was there from about the middle of ’65 to August ’68.

Q: How was Vietnam treated?

BASTIANI: We had the coordinated, worldwide demonstrations against our policy in Vietnam with the same slogans showing up in Bucharest as in Warsaw, and Berlin; the Soviets and North Vietnamese were good at getting these demonstrations staged against our intervention in Vietnam. They were not spontaneous. They were always controlled; you know; there was always a limit on how violent they could be; how much they could throw at us. It was a ritual; it but it wasn’t the people protesting; it was the party, the authorities who staged them to show their solidarity with their Vietnamese comrades.

Q: Did you get any high level visits, Americans coming…?

BASTIANI: Yes. I think I mentioned that my first job in INR in 1969 the day I reported there was to do the first draft of the briefing book for President Nixon’s visit in August, which had been announced on the weekend. That was about two years after I left Romania. I remember vividly the moment when I heard the news on the radio while sitting in my living room. In my time we had a Secretary of Commerce visit with his retinue. And there were more. The Romanians really rolled out the red carpet for this sort of thing, given the priority they were giving to the purchase of turnkey plants.

Mention of turnkey plants reminds me that I had a death case to deal with while in the Consular Section in connection with one of them. An American engineer/executive from Corning had come over to close a deal for a plant or advise on one already under construction in Northeast Romania. There, in their usual fashion the Romanians were wining and dining him, when he had a fatal heart attack.

They notified us immediately and offered every cooperation. I think they were really worried that that we were going to blame them for this guy’s death, and interfere with this deal. So they almost insisted that a consul go there immediately to do the consular thing. It was quite an experience. I flew on a local Romanian airliner. It was the Soviet made version of our C-47 or DC-3. I sat near an open door in the back. There were mail bags thrown on the seats in front of me. And because of the overcast it flew at a low altitude, just clearing the hills. I no sooner got there than they rushed me in to observe the autopsy from start to finish, you know, with gown and mask. I think they had delayed the start for my arrival. And I had no doubt that this had been an honest to gosh heart attack. He had a heart condition for which he carried a nitro-glycerin medication.

And then, of course, it was my job to write that letter to his wife in the States, and arrange shipment of the body to the States. The widow couldn’t have been nicer in her thanks to

the Embassy for what we did. It was another case that proves that protection and welfare work is about the most interesting consular work you can do abroad.

Q: So what happened then? You left there when?

BASTIANI: In the summer of '68. By that time I had been reassigned to Washington to the Special Exchanges Office. This was a little office in EUR, the Bureau of European Affairs which handled exclusively cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union and the satellite countries. The Embassy got into a tug of war with the Department over me. EUR's personnel office wanted me there like yesterday, and the Embassy said it had no one to replace me until later in the summer. The end result was that the 4-6 weeks of home leave I was entitled to had to be postponed, and I reported to work in Washington within ten days of arrival. I just had time to ship the family off to Grand Rapids, Michigan to stay with my wife's parents, and search look for a home in the area. That's a story in itself.

In SES, I was the desk officer for Poland. There was no overlap at all. My job was to process requests for J-2 or so-called Fulbright visas for the rather numerous exchange visitors from Poland, and also handle requests for waivers from the J-2 requirement that the visitor return to his own country for at least two years, before he could apply for an immigrant visa to the United States. This provision was put into the regulations because the purpose of the program was to train people who would then return to their countries to apply the skills learned here; also to promote understanding of in these countries of American society and arts. In the physical sciences, it was a sort of aid program with Third World countries. The Soviet bloc countries obviously exploited it to have scientists in sensitive fields from a Defense security point of view accepted.

I would circulate the requests for approval to issue the visas to any government agency which had an obvious interest. A university or research institution may have already accepted them on a provisional basis. The CIA was interested in reviewing everybody, and DOD, the Defense Department, anyone from the Soviet bloc coming to work in a hard science or mathematics, and usually with good reason. However, we did have the power to overrule objections , in the rare cases we saw their concern was excessive.

Now, I didn't particularly value that job but I liked it, because I got all the daily take from Poland and about Poland in my in-box, every report sent in by the Embassy in Warsaw and those in other countries of Eastern Europe, as well as cables sent to Poland and Eastern Europe from the Department. It was a real education on developments in Eastern Europe, and our relations with Poland in particular. However my job was limited to requesting and coordinating clearances from other agencies on applicants from Poland for exchange visitor visas, the J-2 visa, and then authorizing the issuance or denial of the visa. It quickly became a routine procedure. More interesting were the requests for adjustment to immigration status from exchange visitors in the U.S; that is, for a waiver of the J-2 requirement, that visitors return to their home country after the completion of their program, and remain there for at least two years before they could apply for an immigration visa. The explicit purpose of the exchange visitor program was to advance

the skills of applicants in their field which they would then apply in their home country. In this matter, I had almost exclusive authority to grant or deny the waiver. Our regulations were strict in the matter, allowing a waiver only if the case could be made that an applicant would probably suffer persecution on his return, or if strong compassionate circumstances existed.

And I had one famous case; concerning a Polish scholar of Shakespeare, Jan Kott. He had written a book that was internationally esteemed, Shakespeare Our Contemporary. He came to the States on an exchange visa taught at Yale, and California, and, I think Harvard as well. He not only taught literature, but participated in the protests rampant at the time in academia against our intervention in Vietnam. He write and producing an anti-Vietnam play in which the student actors performed on stage in the nude. He applied for a waiver to adjust his status as an immigrant and accept employment on the faculty of the University of California, claiming that he would likely suffer persecution or hardship if he returned to Poland. I saw no justification for this claim; in fact, by actively supporting protests against our intervention in Vietnam, he was doing here exactly what the Polish regime was doing internationally. Prior to his arrival in the U.S., he had in Poland ingratiated himself with the Soviet mercenary regime as a creative proponent of "socialist realism," the communist theory of the arts.

I could find no justification whatsoever that he would suffer any hardship if he returned to Poland. And so I turned him down. Shortly thereafter, my office received two appeals for a reversal of the decision from the highest levels of the Department, one originated with the Johnson Administration's cultural czar, and the other came through the Rostow brother who was then, I believe, Undersecretary for Political Affairs. The Rostow brothers were prominent Democratic Party supporters in the academic community. I don't recall that either appeal provided any evidence or argument to support the claim; they were just requests for a reversal of the decision.

Of course, normally, any request from on high in the Department is viewed as a command. My two supervisors in the office, the Director and his Deputy, merely passed them on to me. Neither, I recall ordered me to approve the waiver. I maintained the refusal. They could have simply overruled me and approved the request, but they didn't, even though I'm sure they wish I had. I took that to mean they knew I was on solid ground under the law and regulations.

But that didn't end the matter. I assume they merely held the requests in suspense, because I no sooner transferred to a new job in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research than my successor approved the waiver as one of his first acts. So Jan Kott did get his waiver; I had only delayed it.

While reviewing all the take from Poland at this time – we are talking now about the late '60 – I began to wonder what was going in our Embassy. I was a sort of cold war warrior, and commented sarcastically that it seemed on any issue between the U.S. and Poland, our people would go to the Foreign Ministry, ask what they wanted them to tell the Department, and make that their recommendation. I saw this as a form of "localitis," in

which you want so much to promote relations as a diplomat that you end up working more for the other side than our side.

I don't know if you ever heard this one about the reason why we don't leave people longer than three years in one post: The first year on the job you work for your government; you pursue the interests of your own government. The next year you push the interests of the other government; that's called "localitis;" and the third year you work for yourself. I got the impression that some of localitis was occurring, especially in our cultural relations for which USIA, the United States Information Agency, was responsible. Within the U.S. its name was the United States Information *Agency*; abroad it was the United States Information *Service, USIS*. Congress, for domestic political reasons, barred it from including the American people as a target in its promotion of U.S. policy. It no longer exists. It was incorporated years ago into the Department of State as the Bureau for Public Diplomacy, which I think was a mistake.

On the Polish side, there were these fellow-travelers in the cultural field who allowed themselves to be used by the regime without joining the Party. Unfortunately, in Poland which was domestically liberal in comparison with Romania or Czechoslovakia after 1968, you could not advance in your field in academia or the media without authorization from the regime. Some compromised themselves willingly; most, I suspect, reluctantly. Anyway, these were the people most accessible to our USIS officers, who cultivated them as contacts. I remember once getting a request from a USIS officer from Warsaw for the urgent issuance of a visitor visa for one of his contacts, a journalist then on a visit to Canada. The request was to have the visa issued at the border by way of exception on a weekend. This Polish journalist too had a reputation of lambasting the U.S., especially over Vietnam. I saw no reason to ask our Consulate to have their duty officer go down and issue this visa on an emergency basis, so I denied it.

At the same time, I don't mean to imply that I thought that the Embassy was manipulated in all of the recommendations it made on policy. They were promoting a lot of things which supported our general policy of "polycentrism," and benefited the Polish people, especially in trade. The PL-480 program, Public Law 480, is perhaps the best example. Under it, the U.S. sells grain, accepting payment in the local currency which cannot be converted to dollars. We then use it to pay expenses of our Mission within the country.

Q: And paid for in local currency.

BASTIANI: And paid for in local currency. It's actually a form of aid, because we accept the official, unfavorable rate of exchange. I never disagreed with the PL-480 requests strongly supported by the Embassy, and was disappointed when Washington refused some of them.

Q: Did you have much contact with the Polish desk in the European bureau?

BASTIANI: Yes, indeed. However, the desk almost invariably supported whatever the Embassy recommended. They, I think quite rightly, coordinated all Embassy needs and

requests with other offices of the Department and other agencies. The country desk is the highway, so to speak of all the Embassy's relations with Washington. But while in the Special Services Office, I had no need to work closely with them. In my next job in INR, Intelligence and Research, I worked much more closely with the desk, more at their initiative than mine; they saw INR as a resource.

Q: Well, looking at it as a practical measure, I think probably one of our most successful programs has been the exchange program, because the United States is infectious. People come here from other -- particularly communist – societies and other dictatorships, and they see our open society. Despite all its faults and problems and its many critics, it's an eye opening to them.

BASTIANI: I couldn't agree with you more. In fact, especially in Italy, I really did my best to find and recommend influential applicants for exchange visas I thought would benefit from this eye opening experience. In my last tour, Torino, I got the mayor, a socialist, then in alliance with the Communists, an exchange visitor visa.

Q: I understand we're having very difficult relations right now with the, well, I won't say the Soviet Union, but the Russians, I heard somewhere that 10 percent of the Duma, which is a rubber stamp outfit, have been on exchange visas to the United States. This is going to pay off eventually.

BASTIANI: It does and it will; there's no question about it. Our strongest asset is our open democratic society. Long ago I formulated – "subscribed to" might be the better term – the theory that there were three legs of international power: military, economic – of course, these two reinforce each other – and political power in its broadest sense, the attraction of our open society which puts individuals first, not groups. It has enormous appeal. There's no reason for me to be lecturing like this here, but that's the way I am; my daughters say I never stopped since leaving the Seminary. We're the oldest democracy in the world, and the whole world has been imitating us.

One of the things about the Polish people is that they were just as democratic as us back around the time of our Revolution. Some of them came over to help us in the war. Their democratic movement was crushed by their more powerful neighbors, but we won, and have been favored ever since. We are favored, because we're a nation of immigrants, attracted by our free society. Most people everywhere want the same things, to make a better life for themselves and their families. And as long as we maintain this culture, these ideals, we have nobody to fear, really.

Q: We have a problem right now; we've had an administration, Bush II administration, which has been a real problem. I mean, it has undercut many of our values, say to fight terrorists, overplaying this, but we're coming back, you know, it happens.

BASTIANI: That's getting into current politics. Some day we could have a separate discussion about the Bush years.

Q: No. Well, I'd like to stop at a good cutting place. You left this exchange program… I might explain that you would think that this exchange program would have fallen within the purview of the U.S. Information Agency in Washington, but I think it was Fulbright who insisted that it be in the State Department.

BASTIANI: That's right.

Q: And so that's why it was not a bad idea, because we are able to, you know, bring the political element in.

BASTIANI: However, later on the Special Exchanges Office in EUR was eliminated, and its functions taken over by the Bureau of Cultural Affairs. I don't know when it went out of existence, but it wasn't too many years after I had served there. This would probably be a good place to break, but what happened while I was still there is that a friend I mentioned earlier, Bob Frowick, who was then in INR, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, had wrangled himself a choice assignment to which he couldn't go, unless the personnel officer in EUR could find a replacement for him. They offered the job to me, and I jumped at it.

Q: So we'll pick this up in…this is 1968?

BASTIANI: Sixty-nine.

Q: In '69 you moved to INR.

BASTIANI: Yes, I had only spent about a year in the Special Exchanges Office.

Q: So we'll pick it up then. Okay?

BASTIANI: Yes. I even began to speculate or analyze the meaning of the words we used in our intelligence briefs. For instance, the word that came up constantly, especially in the output of the Soviet office, was "may." What does "may" mean? For example, the Soviets are selling missiles to Egypt; this could be for four different reasons, each listed as a "may" as the purpose for the policy makers to choose from. If the intelligence analyst doesn't know which reason it was, how can the one responsible for reacting to the Soviet move? Does it mean 50/50 probability, or more likely than not likely? In this particular piece I don't recall that they listed them in order of probability. You know, there's a huge difference between possibility and probability. And in my academic work in philosophy I had really focused on probability because anything is possible that is not self-contradictory. So I couldn't see that kind of writing as useful to a policy maker.

Policy makers, the guys who have to call the shots in the bureaus; they really need good intelligence analysis. They don't have time to do all this research, and I didn't think we were fulfilling our mission in INR very well with the way we hedged and fudged. You got the impression that a report would never come up with a definite or highly probable conclusion, unless it was already obvious.

This is what was going on in my time. In this work, we never have all the facts, but on the basis of what we do have, we have a working hypothesis which we carry forward day after day as more data becomes available until we where you can say it's highly probable that this is what they are up to. Of course you don't want to blow your credibility; you don't want to predict something, and then find out that you are wrong. So you hedge when you aren't sure. But being wrong in some cases need not hurt you, if you are the most knowledgeable person on a subject. In fact, Hartman; is that his name?

Q: Art Hartman?

BASTIANI: He was in INR in 1968 and had assured the White House that the Soviets would not go into Czechoslovakia to crush Dubcek's Prague spring. But shortly thereafter, when Kissinger became Nixon's national security advisor, he went to the White House as Kissinger's man for East Europe.

Q: No, you can't be sure, but I think this has been one of the great criticisms of the Central Intelligence Agency in that it seems to be almost a straight line of conventional wisdom. I have my own little philosophy on this. If you're talking to the President every day you can't say, "Gee, I think the Soviet Union may fall." You know, you can't speculate very much as the Principal Advisor to the President; whereas in the State Department, you know, there are real indicators that something might be going on here or there, and it doesn't gain notoriety, though, of course, everything leaks. And people I talked to have not found the CIA overly useful. These are bright people. But I think it's too big, and the more layering you have the more they tend to modify. I mean in other words, analysts can't get out of line. I imagine you might have observed that in the Vatican and the Church, a big organization like that.

BASTIANI: It's common to any large institution, I think. It's how human nature reacts within an institutional environment. You know, the one principle I set on quite early in analyzing is you must try to see *what's* true, not *who's* right. So if you only have "what's true" as your objective you're going to err far less often than when your vision is complicated by sentimental loyalties to your office's position, or you have too much concern for your relations with your boss because he happens to have a different view.

Q: But in INR you were dealing with two, really dictatorial, autocratic and rather peculiar people in Albania and Romania, Ceausescu and… how do you pronounce his name?

BASTIANI: Hoxha.

Q: Hoxha. But did you find the fact that these were sort of freewheeling types, I would think more freewheeling than you'd have coming out of the politburo types in the Soviet Union where, I mean, it was really a joint operation.

BASTIANI: You're right. Both of these maximum leaders were more like Stalin. They ran things; everybody else kowtowed to them, because it was dangerous, even physically dangerous, to contradict. Whereas, from the time of Khrushchev, it was much more of a collective leadership in the Soviet Union. Not of the entire politburo; the politburos of all these countries included token representatives of businessmen, women, what have you, with no real influence.

Q: Minorities.

BASTIANI: Minorities, etcetera. But there was an inner core which collectively wielded all the power. I can speak much more to that subject when we get to Poland.

Q: But I'd like to speak to these two because these are rather peculiar countries; they weren't very vital to anybody but at the same time I would think that you would sort of find one or the other leader sort of running off at the mouth or revealing things that probably wouldn't happen say in the Soviet Union.

BASTIANI: Yes. Well, with regard to Ceausescu, he disliked, hated the Russians. I heard different stories, but one was that as a young, upcoming Romanian leader, while in Moscow for training he was beaten up by Russian colleagues. In fact he spoke with a sort of a lisp, and people attributed it to the fact that he had had his jaw broken by roughnecks in Russia. At the same time, as the national leader he had a lot of guts.

Another story I heard is that on one of those usual consultations in Moscow Brezhnev held with individual satellite leaders, Brezhnev was upbraiding him for breaking ranks on trade with West Germany or whatever. "How dare you? And Ceausescu said, "This is how." He got up, walked out of the room, went straight to the airport, and flew back to Bucharest. The autonomy was real; and I was a good analyst on Romania because I saw that, and in my reports showed how he demonstrated it.

And we at the same time, this is when they began to talk about polycentrism in Eastern Europe where we would deal with each of these East European countries as much as possible directly. The aim was to loosen their ties with the Soviet Union. The Soviets had this grand plan for the Socialist Division of Labor: this country specializes in this industry, that one in another and so forth in the Comecon. Soviet post-war policy in East Europe was really in a way a reflection of our own policy. We found it necessary to found NATO, and then they founded the Warsaw Pact. We organized NATO, or the Europeans organized among themselves the Common Market, and they organized Comecon. The difference was that in the West, this was all voluntary, whereas in the East it wasn't; also that we wanted countries across the curtain to deal with each other directly, especially in the economic sphere, and they wished to control it from the center.

Q: Well, we'd started this polycentric approach or whatever; is that the right term?

BASTIANI: That was the term, yes.

Q: You know, we really jumped for Tito – given the fact that he had broken with the Soviet Union, and we supported him for his lifetime. When you were dealing with Romania, were we calling Ceausescu the new Tito?

BASTIANI: Well, I don't recall that we ever used that term, no. Tito openly broke with the Soviet Union and was never a member of the Warsaw Pact. Ceausescu never did leave the Pact, I think, because that would probably have caused the Soviets to invade. He had to limit himself to what he was sure he could get away with. But we followed Romania's relations with Yugoslavia, which were better than they were with other East European countries, and we saw that they were, to some extent cooperating where they could. Tito wasn't a thoroughly totalitarian leader domestically like Ceausescu. Another country in the bloc Ceausescu could collaborate with on the issue of Soviet intervention was Hungary with its so-called "goulash communism."

Q: Kádár?

BASTIANI: Kádár, yes. You could see that the Romanians and they were together in opposing, as they could, international trade policies being imposed on all of these countries by Moscow.

Q: No, Tito was, quite frankly, much more benevolent and smarter. But he had to deal with a rather fractious country which did fracture 10 years or so after his death. To keep it together, he had his constraints.

BASTIANI: Indeed he did.

Q. Did you find that our policy was turning sort of a blind eye to human rights, because one, this country, Romania, was showing its independence from the Soviet Union and two, in one way or another was helping the Jewish problem by getting people out either to Israel or the United States? I would think these issues would have dominated our policy.

BASTIANI: Yes. Well, I don't recall in my career that human rights in East-West relations, became a major issue until President Carter. Human rights, yes – we were constantly trying to reunite families – but we, even though we never recognized the incorporation of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia into the Soviet Union and supported their little governments in exile here in Washington, we didn't make human rights a condition to improving direct relations. A good friend of mine, Irv Shiffman, when he was in the Office of East European affairs, had the responsibility for maintaining relations with the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian Embassies, which some teased him about. We did have the annual Captive Nations Congressional Resolutions and Presidential Proclamations, but these were to some extent a reflection of domestic politics to satisfy ethnic groups from the bloc who pressured Washington. Just about everyone in international relations sort of accepted the division into East and West as a permanent fact you had to adjust to like the weather or the Alps. The only things that we could do usefully were to relieve tensions through disarmament negotiations, trade and cultural relations across the divide.

Most academics accepted the permanence of the division and pursued careers writing about it.

In international relations, when you have an impossible situation which can explode into a major war, you do what you can to contain it. That was our containment policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union from the late '40s onward, of which Kennan was the author. Then you try to change the terms of the equation over time until a point is reached where a solution might become possible. That's why we got into all those disarmament negotiations in Europe, measures to promote coexistence, and all the rest. And that's how I see the Middle East today; I don't think we're anywhere near the point where an agreement acceptable to both sides is possible.

But anyway, that's how we were operating in East-West relations. Part of trying to change the terms of the equation was polycentrism. We did give most favored nation treatment on trade to Romania. We didn't get all that far with cultural relations. But we did have some secret communication with them in intelligence.

I remember while I was in INR, and we were in this bind in Vietnam, the Romanians were particularly friendly with the Chinese who supported their autonomy. I forgot to mention that. Sino-Soviet differences at their height at that time, and an issue in their relations to with North Vietnam which they both assisted. The Chinese considered Vietnam within their sphere of influence only. At one point, the Chinese passed a message to us through the Romanians, saying that if you want an honorable settlement in Vietnam, deal with us. Don't rely on the Soviets. I remember learning that this report came through, but did not see the actual message. I assume it got short shrift at the White House.

Personally, I think this was one of Kissinger's big mistakes. He didn't make many, but I think he relied too much on trying to get the Russians to help us in Vietnam with the North Vietnamese. To my mind, the Soviets couldn't have been happier with our problems there; they went all out in supplying them with SAM missiles and training their pilots.

Q: From your perspective, how did the Nixon trip to Romania go?

BASTIANI: It went extremely well. Off hand, I only have memory of the impression. But I believe he was accompanied by maybe the Secretary of Commerce and one or two others at that level.

Q: And Hearst Junior of the newspaper family; I know he was there, and brought some other people with him, reporters. The reason I remember this is his whole party at one point wanted to go to Vietnam to see it. They had visas from Romania in their passports, so the only way they could get into Vietnam if they arrived from the Belgrade airport, was if the American Consul General went out to the airport and sign them in. I was the American Consul General and I cursed that trip, because I had to basically assure the South Vietnamese that Mr. Hearst, of a very conservative newspaper, was all right to go

there. Obviously the South Vietnamese didn't want people who traipsed over Communist countries to come into their country unless they were assured by us.

But anyway, I was just wondering what we were afraid of. Did we make too much of Romania? I mean, how did we feel about it from your perspective?

BASTIANI: Well, my perspective results from the fact that Romania was my job: I spent most of my working day on it. Other people would probably say we made too much of Romania because of its relative unimportance. But I saw that Romania was not just an irritant the Soviet Union tolerated, but seen as an obstacle to working its will within the bloc. One story I'm sure was well-sourced had to do with an official visit of Khrushchev. Khrushchev was a kind of blunt guy in his dealings, both within the bloc and in Western countries as we well know. Well, Khrushchev was there on a visit said words to this effect to Ceausescu and Romanian leaders, "You know, we have this very cooperative ally, Bulgaria, separated from us by Romania. You are the problem; you should fall in line so we can have harmonious relations." Todor Zhivkov, Bulgaria's maximum leader at the time was so close to the Soviets, that he may have even envisioned Bulgaria becoming another Socialist State of the Soviet Union. I once mused that that original maximum druthers of the Soviets was that all the countries of the bloc would eventually ask for admission into the Union.

Ceausescu's Romanian nationalism did have the sentimental support of the Romania people. Since liberation from the Turks, they prided themselves on their Western culture rooted in Roman Empire. The architecture in the center of Bucharest was modeled on that of France. I recall a French diplomat was quoted as saying: "The Romanians say Bucharest is the Paris of the East; just so they don't try to say that Paris is the Bucharest of the West." In fact, while Bucharest is large with a population of more than two million in my time, as soon as you got a couple of kilometers from the center, it was an overgrown village. The streets weren't paved, little modern sewage, just an endless expanse of cottage within the city limits.

I used to say to say as we traveled through Vienna, Budapest, and Bucharest, that Vienna was obviously once the capital of a great empire. You could see that Budapest, the former co-capital, also was a flourishing great city. But Bucharest with a similar population was really an overgrown village. The majority of the population was poor, to some extent even worse off than the Bulgarians.

Q: Well, at the time how was Madam Ceausescu viewed?

BASTIANI: During my tour and even my two years in INR she wasn't all that prominent. She was becoming prominent when I was in INR but not yet important enough for me to write any intelligence briefs about her. She flaunted an advanced degree in something.

Q: Yes, I'm told the whole thing was very dubious.

BASTIANI: But there was no evidence that she was influencing her husband when I was there. Ceausescu's system was quite simple; he chose good men, good in the sense of efficient and bright and so forth, and demanded that they get things done and that's the way he operated. Her notoriety came somewhat later.

Q: Well at the time was Ceausescu seen as, you know, I mean, when we move into the '80s, he really, was doing terrible things as far as having too many children born and uncared for and sort of destroying the economy and starving the people. Was that as apparent when you were there, and in dealing with it in INR?

BASTIANI: Yes. Ceausescu was ruthless in exploiting anything that could earn hard currency. And that meant squeezing the people, the standard of living. It must have gotten even worse in the 80's when Ceausescu decided to pay off the billions owed to Western countries and banks. But there was no overt opposition; there were no riots because the controls were so severe. You know, there is passage from the New Testament, Christ saying that there's not a bird that flies that isn't cared for by my Father, or something like that. Well, there was nothing that went on in Romania that wasn't followed and controlled by the secret police. Nobody dared to rebel.

With regard to the decree banning abortion, issued while I was there, to increase the population, the joke then was: Under Communism all the means of production were nationalized and belong to the State, but now Ceausescu has even nationalized the last private means of production, childbearing.

In the schools, the children were taught to glorify Romania's industries – even my little daughter who went to a German kindergarten came home singing songs in German like "Romania we love you, your chimneys are smoking;" "smoking" as evidence of industrial production. Pollution wasn't even a minimal concern. It was totalitarianism down to the individual level. As I remarked earlier, more so at that time, than in the Soviet Union itself.

Q: How would you describe your relationship with, particularly, the Romania desk, and the Soviet office of the European Bureau?

BASTIANI: My relationship with the Romanian desk was quite good. Kaplan, I can't quite remember his first name, was then the desk officer. Anyway, he was a desk officer who solicited information from me and even asked me to do things. So I had an excellent relationship with the desk. Not with the Soviet office in the Bureau; I had no reason to have any relations with them. All my troubles were with the Soviet analysts in INR. I do believe as a result of my experience in INR that I think any Foreign Service officer who really wants to work in the political/economic sphere would do well do have an early tour in INR. It is so educational. I had the mindset already because of my educational background, but to learn to evaluate intelligence write intelligence reports is absolutely essential.

One thing which bothered me about intelligence work when I was doing it is how we responded to requests about specific developments on which we had limited information. This concerns CIA's output as well. For example, something takes place in say an African country harmful to our relations, and we're asked whether the Soviets were involved. The least helpful answer was to say that we have no confirming information that they were, and leave it at that. That answer implies that, if the Soviets were behind it, we would know about it. This sort of response was made repeatedly even with respect to the extent of Soviet involvement in the imposition of martial law in Poland. And I will have a lot more to say about that when we get to Poland – those years were really the best professional four years of my career.

Q: Obviously the question I'm posing now will have much more pertinence in Poland, but in dealing still with Romania, did the Vatican have any – not influence – but any representation in Romania? And also, was the Vatican a source for getting intelligence. And I'm speaking of overt stuff; I mean from nuncios and that sort.

BASTIANI: To my recollection, no. I can't recall any kind of relations or exchange of visits or anything between the Vatican and the Romanians. Only after the fall of Communism did that become possible. And then a priest I knew well from my Seminary days was made a Bishop and the first Nuncio to Romania, Bukovsky, originally from Czechoslovakia, specifically Slovakia where Catholicism was strong. He later became the Church's first Nuncio in Moscow.

In fact, the Catholic Church in Romania was tiny; it had the Orthodox rite, but was loyal to the Vatican. Restrictions on religion under Ceausescu amounted to persecution. Religion was made the handmaiden of the regime; public manifestations were forbidden. Atheism was the official religion and inculcated in the schools. Not even the Orthodox Church to which most Romanians belonged had any kind of autonomy; in fact it was used by Ceausescu's regime, domestically and internationally.

There was one church in the center of Bucharest with the Western rite my wife and I used to go to. I guess that it was like the one in Moscow, ministering more to the diplomatic community than the Romanians. It was sparsely attended then; quite the contrary to what we found when we visited Romania as tourists in 1999 – so crowded with *Romanians* that we could hardly get in.

Q: Okay. Well then, you left INR in '71 or so?

BASTIANI: I left INR, yes, in 1971.

Q: And then where?

BASTIANI: I went to Genoa. Then another officer who walked on water in the Service, Stromayer, was the number two man at our Consulate General in Genoa, and he had wrangled some good onward assignment. The Bureau's personnel officer, Joan Clark, offered me the opportunity to replace him. I had to resist an immediate transfer, because I

had children in school and said no way until school ends in June. Once, someone facetiously remarked that with four assignments to Italy which was a so desirable place to serve, I should be investigated. But the only one I really asked for was the direct transfer to Rome. I like to say I was thrown into breaches.

And so my next assignment was Genoa in 1971. Because of my Italian and previous experience in Italy I didn't need any special training. It was a good position, and I thoroughly enjoyed my tour there. I was deputy to the Consul General, and the economic/commercial/ political officer; just about every function outside of administrative and consular work; when substituting for the Consul General in his absence, I got into this as well.

Q: You were there from when to when?

BASTIANI: From '71 to '74.

Q: Who was the Consul General there?

BASTIANI: When I arrived the Consul General was Gori Bruno, who was about to retire. He was succeeded then by Tom Murfin, who had served in Japan. I found them both great people to work for.

Q: What was the political situation? What did the Genoa Consular District consist of, and what were our interests? I don't imagine shipping was big in those days.

BASTIANI: No. It was.

Q: It was?

BASTIANI: Genoa was and is a major port of Italy, especially for the shipment of containers. As for the general political situation, the center-left was depressed and worried; the Communists were coming on. Nationally, there was talk of the *Compromesso Storico*, the historic compromise, which would bring the Communists into the government. As far as consular work goes it, was not overly burdensome in Genoa. We did issue immigration visas. The head of the Consular Section for most of that time was Bob Ode, who was later a captive in Tehran when the Iranians took over our Embassy. At that time he was already retired, but working as a WAE, temporarily employed to help out there. We became close friends with him and his wife, Rita.

Q: O-D-E?

BASTIANI: O-D-E, yes.

Q: Excuse me, let me just stop here. Today is the 4th of April, 2008. Carl, how'd you get to Rome?

BASTIANI: My transfer is a story in itself. During my last year in Genoa I asked for a direct transfer to the political section in Rome. As an Italy specialist, Rome was like a Mecca for me. When I raised this possibility – I'm not sure if the reply came from the Embassy or the Department, I think the Embassy – they told me in effect, "Who do you think you are? Don't you know that Rome is an R&R, Rest and Recreation, post for people coming out of Africa and other hardship posts? So I dropped any thought of a direct transfer.

I was eventually told that I would soon be paneled, officially assigned, as Counselor of Political Affairs in Jamaica; and I was quite happy with that. It came down to about a week before departure in early July, when – out of the blue – I got a call from a personnel officer in the Department: "Carl, how about Rome?" is how he opened the conversation. An officer, who had gone through Italian language and area training for the political position in Rome to follow the Socialist, Republican, and Social Democratic parties, seized an opportunity to switch to the economic specialty; so they were suddenly left high and dry for somebody for Rome who wouldn't need training. And so that's how I got a direct transfer to Rome. Again, I was thrown into a breach, so to speak, but I liked it.

Q: Okay. You were in Rome from when to when?

BASTIANI: I was in Rome from mid '74 to mid '76, two years.

Q: Who was the ambassador and DCM, and how did you find the Embassy?

BASTIANI: The Ambassador at that time was John Volpe, who had made a fortune in construction in Boston, been governor of Massachusetts twice, and Secretary of Transportation under Nixon. He was a prominent Republican in a State where Democrats normally dominated. The DCM was Bob Beaudry; he had been an office director in EUR before going to Italy. Bob Beaudry was one of the best supervisors I ever had in the Foreign Service.

The Embassy itself I found to be compartmentalized, like the Department. It had so many sections, including other agency offices like, Treasury, the FBI, INS – the Immigration and Naturalization Service – even the Coast Guard; you name one. And my experience was that they hardly talked to each other, you know, just as in the Department. They dealt primarily with their Italian counterparts and their agencies. Turf protection was a paramount priority, especially on the part of the Economic Section. I was in the Political section of about six officers headed by a Political Counselor. Four of us had different parties to follow and maintain contacts in them. It was pretty hard to avoid mention of some economic development in a political reporting cable, and you soon heard about it, if you had failed to clear it in advance with the Economic Counselor. So I found the work environment in the Embassy kind of stuffy and formal, more like in the Department than in any other post in which I served. In fact, in some ways I thought the Department wasn't quite as bad.

But my family and I really enjoyed living in Rome. I mentioned before that in the Foreign Service, you have the best of both worlds abroad. And in Italy you really have a great other world.

Q: You had the Socialist, Republican…?

BASTIANI: …I dealt with the Socialist Party, PSI; the Republicans, PRI; and the Social Democrats, the PSDI who had broken off long ago from the PSI over the latter's alliance with the Communists. I personally didn't consider the PSDI really relevant after the Socialists broke with the Communists, the PCI, but it is amazing how they continued to survive.

Q: Well, before we get to that, what was your impression during the time you were there of Ambassador Volpe and how he operated?

BASTIANI: Volpe was very dependent on his DCM, Beaudry, in political matters, and I believe he followed his advice quite closely. He had good relations with the many Ministers of the Italian coalition Governments. By rank, only the Ambassador, or in his absence, the DCM met with government Ministers; Ministries correspond to Departments in our government. We in the Political Section dealt directly with lower ranking officials on the government side, but even with Party Secretaries on the political side. Having served both in embassies and consulates, I came to realize that embassies primarily deal with governments and bureaucrats, while consulates deal primarily with the local people and power elites. So, from the point of view of promoting understanding between our peoples and influencing local power elites – economic and cultural – I think consulates are far more important than the embassies.

This is a bit of a digression, but trying to centralize all our work in the Embassy in a large country is just nonsense. You can't carry out the Foreign Service mandate legislated by Congress without consulates in the major metropolitan centers of a democracy; and now they're trying to do it with one person and a computer for budgetary and security reasons – as Third World countries do – in many cities of Europe where we've closed consulates.

Q: Well, how did you find the people within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who dealt with the U.S.?

BASTIANI: They couldn't have been nicer. The powers that be, the powers that were in running Italy at the time I was there maintained this tradition of extremely friendly relations with the United States and its representatives. These people still remembered their debt to us through the Marshall Plan and other support the U.S. had provided when the Italian lira was under pressure. Also, our military bases provided much employment to local populations.

But the Italian electorate was pretty much split between pro-Western people, still a clear majority, and leftists who saw NATO and the United States as adversaries. And on the labor union level the idea that the Soviet Union was still a paradise and what have you

was very strong. At the same time Euro-Communism was on the rise a re-thinking by many Communist leaders in Italy and other West European countries, that democracy was not so bad, and that NATO could be tolerated as a necessity in the Cold War, until agreement could be reached to dissolve both the blocs. The French Communists were probably still closer to the Soviet Union than the Italian Communists, but the Italian Communists had that hard core within their labor unions for whom Marxism-Leninism was a religion, and the Soviet Union its Mecca. They still revered the Soviet Union as having defeated Hitler and, through its agents in the Communist guerillas in the latter years of the war, of even helping liberate Italy from Fascism. The role of the U.K. and U.S. was ignored or downplayed.

Q: What was CGTOL?

BASTIANI: CGIL. I don't recall exactly the Italian words of the acronym, but an Association or Congress of Communist Labor Unions. They were the strongest of the unions. Each of the other major parties had their own affiliated unions; the CISL was the association of Christian Democratic unions. There were also unions affiliated with the Socialist Party, but I think dominated by the Communists – even unions affiliated with the Social Democrats, the PSDI. As I said before, I considered them no longer relevant, because they had split from the Socialists over the latter's ties with the Communists, but the Socialists had since split with the Communists in the early '60s. Logically, one would have expected them to reunite with the Socialists, but that is not how politics in Italy was played.

Q: Well, let's talk a little bit about the Socialists about this period of time. In the first place, what was the common reckoning of why the Socialists in Italy were not the power that they were in the rest of Europe?

BASTIANI: Simply because the Communists dominated the Left from the outset; that was pretty much it. The Socialists split off in the early '60s when the first Center-Left government was formed. Amintore Fanfani of the Christian Democrats was the Prime Minister when it happened.

It was a dramatic move, but the Socialists didn't take that much of the left with them. There were even splintered leftist groups, extremist groups to the left of the Communists. And all of this arises from the last months of the war and the immediate post-war period when the Communist guerillas not only attacked Italian Fascists and the Germans, but even non-Communist guerilla fighters. I am convinced that the true history of what went on in Italy during the war after it was obvious that Italy and Germany would be defeated has still to be told to most Italians. I'm not sure even Western historians are aware of all that went on. Anti-fascism and eradicating it became the religion of the day. Any moderate who had associated with it in any way was tarred with its brush. Those who envisaged a restoration of the Monarchy had no say at all. I don't know whether it would have been good or not for the Italians to retain a monarchy like England's, but in the referendum the Monarchy was rejected. I don't think that was any real loss.

Q: Well, the House of Savoy was not exactly…

BASTIANI: It wasn't esteemed…

Q: It was actually, you know, less than 100 years old, and as monarchies go, it was relatively young. Did you know that Naples voted for the Monarchy?

BASTIANI: No, I didn't.

Q: This is, you know – I won't use the Italian term – but it was " screw you." The country had no desire for the return of the House of Savoy.

BASTIANI: On the other hand – I may have mentioned this earlier – when I was in Naples from '62 to '65 I sensed a certain nostalgia for Mussolini. You know that famous quote about him that he made the trains run on time. I think Mussolini's big mistake was allying himself with Hitler. If he'd done what Franco did he would be in the Valhalla of Italian leaders. But, of course, that would have been psychologically impossible for him to do. He thought he was a modern Caesar. Success in Ethiopia and Hitler's early imitation of him had gone to his head.

Getting back to Rome, to the political situation in Italy while I was there, these were years of deep pessimism for us and our interests. Enrico Berlinguer, First Secretary of the Communist party, was a euro-communist who explicitly accepted NATO, and he was a popular personality as well. His aim was to bring about the historic compromise, the *compromesso storico* by which the Communists would be admitted into a coalition government and share power. For most observers, it was not a question of whether, but when. U.S. policy was still very much against seeing the Communists admitted into the Italian government, to which we were so closely allied.

I remember once, just before a political staff meeting with the Ambassador, we got word that Andreotti who was given the mandate to form a government had secretly met with Berlinguer on the subject. The Ambassador was upset that Andreotti was apparently betraying us. When no one else said anything in defense of Andreotti for whom I had an admiration, I spoke up in his defense saying it doesn't necessarily mean that he is working to have this happen. In fact, actual inclusion of the Communists in a coalition government never came about.

In a way, we have the Red Brigades to thank for that. After they kidnapped Aldo Moro, the First Secretary of the Christian Democratic Party, who was actively promoting the historic compromise, a deal was struck whereby the Communists refrained from voting against a government made up of DC ministers only in return for collaboration in the Parliament on some major bills, and for some influential positions in the organization of the Parliament. The other parties went along with this sort of non-Government of solidarity.

I had always admired Andreotti whom I only met once at a reception. First, he was not corrupt in the sense of using public or party funds to enrich himself. And he had always shown himself a loyal ally of the United States. He was very much a clever manipulator in managing Christian Democratic relations with the other parties. I defended him on that basis – who could be sure what he was up to? Even we for some time already had recognized the need to have some kind of relationship with the Communist Party, the PCI, given recent gains at the ballot box when it threatened to outpoll the DC, and, because of the social democratic and euro-communist tendencies of some of its leaders. So about the time of my arrival, we assigned a Foreign Service officer in the section, Marty Wenick, to meet with leaders of the PCI as we others did with leaders of the parties for which we were responsible. The so-called other agency had been doing this for some time.

Q: Well, I would hope so.

BASTIANI: Exactly. But this didn't increase the optimism of our loyal friends in the other parties so as to what the U.S. was up to. They, of course were aware that we were doing this – there were really no secrets in Italian politics. We seemed to be pursuing contradictory policies in our relations with the parties.

Q: Well, while you were there, was there any reference at all to what had happened in Portugal? Because the Portuguese revolution was in '74, and at that point the young officers looked like they were heading right down the path into the Communist arms, and we were thinking of getting Portugal out of NATO, when actually the work of Frank Carlucci and others there at our Embassy, was quite magnificent. Was that at all on your radar?

BASTIANI: I don't have any explicit recall, but I'm sure it was in the context of Euro Communism. There was considerable optimism on the part of many analysts and observers that Communism in Western Europe was becoming democratic. And so that kind of mitigated the pessimism of some. Skeptics wondered, however, what they would do once they achieved power through the democratic system. In this regard the Italian Communists were popular within academia in the U.S. I can't recall the name of this professor at Harvard or Yale who each year attended the PCI's National Congress as a special guest.

He was telling us that they were the true democrats, the uncorrupt politicians in Italy, and urging the State Department to embrace them. Personally I saw a contradiction within the PCI itself, between an ably led still emotionally loyal to the Soviet Union base, and other leaders who wanted their party to become a full member of the of the ruling government coalitions. Italy was a democracy, but not as direct a democracy as ours. There you voted primarily for parties, rather than individual candidates to whom you could only give rank order preference within the party. So the real power resided in the parties. Some called it *partitocrazia,* a "partyocracy" to coin a term, the group of center-right to center-left parties from which governing coalitions were formed, but continuously dominated by the Christian Democrats since the war. This system was so important to each of the parties

that they cooperated with each other to maintain it, despite their differences over policies. Or, as I liked to put it: as a group they were not about to let power to slip on one side to the people or to the government or the other; the party First Secretaries remained the most powerful leaders within the system.

Q: Who were the party secretaries in the Socialist and the Social Democratic Parties?

BASTIANI: On the Socialist side Bettino Craxi had emerged. He was the Benjamin of Pietro Nenni, the patriarch Socialist, who finally broke off with the Communists back in the early '60s. He was then in retirement. I once acted as escort and interpreter for Hubert Humphrey who visited him in his apartment. I'll never forgot Humphrey's comment as he looked out the window of our car, stuck in traffic in the affluent commercial area near the Embassy. "This is the most affluent damn country I have ever seen in economic difficulty."

Q: This is Nenni…

BASTIANI: Pietro Nenni, yes. But Craxi was always seen as his favored son to replace him. At the time I was there Craxi was a Deputy Secretary of the party, and De Martino – I keep forgetting first names – First Secretary. And I met several times one-on-one over lunch with Craxi.

My way of handling my work was first to read four or five newspapers, starting with Corriere della Sera, which had a journalist who was absolutely outstanding. I wish I could remember his name. His column was usually on the front page. When something was going on, he would talk to leaders of the parties involved, summarize their views, and come up with his own analysis. He had access to them because he represented Italy's most prestigious newspaper. Then I would look at the party organs, the PCI's 'Unitá, the PSI's Avanti, and so on. And then I would pick out somebody from my three parties – more often a socialist, because they held the balance of power. They had a relative small percentage of the vote, but it was enough for them to swing the balance from center-right to center-left. Using my "representational allowance," as it was called, to host Italian politicians in fine restaurants so you can learn something from them to report was about the most pleasurable aspect of my work.

There's a restaurant in Rome, it still exists I'm sure, run by nuns, missionary French nuns, called *Joie de Vivre*. It's down in the heart of old Rome, near the Senate, and was a meeting place for politicians. In fact, the Christian Democrats used to hold leadership sessions in a private room on the second floor. The menu was fantastic. And so more often than not that's where I took my guest. I'd always ask him to choose the wine, because there's no Italian who doesn't consider himself an expert on wine. I was an amateur in this area, and it kind of flattered the guest.

I came to like Craxi, even though I had no admiration for the Socialists as a party. It became obvious to me that Craxi was very anti-communist, because the Communists were the major threat to his party's autonomy. The Communists had so many members of

the Socialist party, including representatives in parliament, in their hip pocket, so-to-speak. They supported these fellow-travelers; even helped them get elected as Socialists.

Q: You're making a gesture, showing a payoff.

BASTIANI: Yes. And I remember my counterpart on the other agency side several times approaching me and suggesting I establish contact with this Socialist representative from Umbria; but from other sources I had within the Socialist Party I knew that this guy was in the pocket of the Communist Party, so I refused ever to meet with him. The Christian Democrats were notorious for having corrupt politicians, those who used party funds for personal ends. But the Socialists seemed to have an even bigger reputation for personal corruption. Craxi was anti-communist and I favored him. I recall writing a cable in which I promoted him as a man we should support. That pretty much was the situation when I left in 1976.

From a career point of view, I made the big mistake of refusing the offer of a third year in Rome – my assignment was for only two – which Bob Beaudry had gotten for me without a by-your-leave from me. I turned it down because at that time my children had already been out of the United for five years. I've always been a kind of chauvinistic American in the sense that I wanted my children to be culturally American, feel like Americans, and not just be American citizens unfamiliar with their own country. I'd seen children of colleagues who had spent so much time abroad that they were more at home in Europe than in the U.S. And so, with the motivation of getting my children back into an American environment, I turned down the opportunity to stay on in Rome. I opted for an out-of-cone assignment in OES, the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, because of my love of science and technology. Career wise, that was an even bigger mistake.

Q: Before we leave Rome, one of the things that always struck me – again, I'm not a political officer and I followed you there by about a year – I came in '79 down in Naples as Consul General. I had never served in Italy, never served as a political officer; I'm a consular officer. And I kept getting these things from Rome on political developments asking how does this or that play here in Naples. Well, the point was it didn't play at all. And I came away with a very distinct impression that our Embassy, obviously the political section, was part of a minuet that didn't amount to a damn thing as far as Italian politics were concerned. I think things have changed now but in those days it was all the Christian Democrats. Ministers may have changed, but they were all part of the same thing; and when the chips were down the Italians were with us; all this political maneuvering, particularly the reporting on it, which included Carl Bastiani's reporting, what the hell difference did it make? I'd like you to comment on that.

BASTIANI: Okay. Yes, we very closely monitored developments within each of these parties. In a less open way, we also tried to influence. That was our job. Remember, I said we were worried about the C*ompromesso Storico*, about the Communists coming into government. It wasn't a completely stable system. In the Italian system a gain of one and a half percent for one party in an election was a lot. Had the PCI's percentage of the vote

ever exceeded that of the DC – they were both around the mid-30s at the time – they would have become the party of relative majority, and, under the system, been given the first opportunity to form a government by the President of Italy. That was one of his few responsibilities. Fortunately, none of this happened. After cresting just below the DC's total in, I think, 1976, the PCI's share receded until about 1980 when they gave up making deals in Parliament and returned to active opposition. Many of their faithful followers had been unhappy with the compromises they had made.

With regard to reporting, despite all the resources we devoted to it, I had a very interesting experience, which illustrates how hard it is to know what was going on. The government of the day was Center-Left, a coalition which included the center parties and the Socialists with the balance of power. Then one day in this particular period the Socialists threatened to withdraw from the coalition, and bring down the government. To learn what the socialists were really up to, the Ambassador invited the First secretary, De Martino, to lunch at the residence. And I, of course, did the briefing paper in advance. We always had to do a briefing paper for the ambassador for such meetings. I was invited to the dinner as the note taker and to do some interpreting. De Martino said the Socialists created the threat of crisis to negotiate for more power within the coalition, another Ministry or two, I guess, but had no intention of bringing down the government.

I don't recall the specifics but he assured the ambassador that they would not bring down the government. So I rushed back to the embassy, and drafted a cable reporting what De Martino had said, got it approved, ran it to the communications section, and handed it in for transmission. I no sooner got back to my office than I learned that the government had just fallen; the Socialists had just withdrawn. So I zipped back down the corridor to the communications section to retrieve the draft if I could. Fortunately, they had not yet finished coding it for transmission. I and the Political Counselor hastily edited it to say what had actually happened, despite the First Secretary's assurances. I'm sure De Martino didn't deliberately mislead us; not even he knew what his party was up to in Parliament while we were together. That just shows you how uncertain politics were there.

Q: You know, beyond the Compromesso Storico, was there any particular issue – this is before the SS-20 missile crisis and all that which came later – were any particular issues that we were concerned about with Italy?

BASTIANI: Well, one was the stability of the Italian lira, a convertible currency. Chronically, it became very weak because Italian governments were perennially in deficit because of social spending, particularly on health care, which from the beginning was a single government payer system. At this time, all the Western European countries fended financially on their own. The U.S. bailed them out more than once.

I remember vividly the crisis which occurred during my first Italian tour in Naples. The people were in a panic that their lira savings would become worthless. That included my numerous relatives. One of them, a first cousin, made a special trip to Naples with a bag full of lira notes of large denomination to ask me to convert them to dollars. It was the

first and only time they asked a favor of me. Well, of course I couldn't; there was no way I could do it properly, even if I had the money. For most of my career, I practiced my own brand of deficit spending, rolling over loans with the State Department Federal Credit Union, to which I remain eternally grateful. Fortunately, news reports had just appeared that the United States was extending a two billion dollar line of credit to Italy. That stabilized the lira, and I was able to assure my relatives that their money would not become worthless.

Of course, everybody knew about the black economy which didn't pay taxes and which didn't get into the statistics. I think I first came to realize this during my tour in Genoa. You never really knew how badly the economy was globally. I came to realize that, in spite of all this talk about how bad things were, more people were living better every day. Not to deny that some people obviously were suffering more, but statistically more people were living better every day. And I considered that part of the continuing Italian economic miracle. The first one, of course, occurred shortly after the war.

Q: What about two things? What about the problem of the Red Brigades, you know, these homegrown terrorist groups. What was happening while you were there? How did we react about them and how did we see their influence.

BASTIANI: The Red Brigades, I guess, were the most well-known and the most successful in carrying out their operations. While I was in Rome I didn't feel personally threatened, because they were not targeting diplomats and practicing indiscriminate terrorism like planting bombs in restaurants. They were targeting businessmen and politicians. They were shooting them in the knees, kneecapping. We can revisit this years later when I go back to Italy to reopen the Consulate in Torino. Then terrorism against Americans was very much in vogue.

Q: In general, the criminal sort of situation, did it spill up to where you were? Or were we finding out that their money going to political parties or anything like that?

BASTIANI: I think this was pretty common in the South, the *Mezzogiorno*, and of course these deputies were in Parliament. But, in the mid '70s, I don't know that it was all that common in the North, as it later became. But to my knowledge and recollection, this was not a major public issue at the time. I'm talking '74 to '76. And I don't think at that time that the Mafia in its various forms had penetrated Northern Italy to the extent that it had by the time I got back there in the '80s.

Q: Alright. You're a good Catholic; how about the Church?

BASTIANI: Okay. The Church. We had at that time a Vatican office. I guess it was not until the Reagan Administration that we raised our relations with the Vatican to formal Embassy status. The Vatican office was almost like another office of the Embassy, even though it had its own site. However, even after it became an Embassy, it relied entirely on the Embassy for communications and administrative resources.

Q: You're talking about the Embassy to the Holy See?

BASTIANI: Yes. You had one American Foreign Service Officer there permanently handling day-to-day business. The Special Representative and later Ambassador appointed by the President weren't even there much of the time. It was a job I coveted, to tell you the truth, because I was so familiar with the Church. But from my earliest days as an analyst in foreign affairs, let's say from the beginning of my career as a Foreign Service officer, I never thought very highly of Vatican diplomacy. I didn't think they were very good.

Q: Well you know, it has this reputation of being so wonderful but I'm not quite sure what it's based on.

BASTIANI: They hung on to old positions far too long. The major one in my mind was Israel. They wouldn't recognize Israel and have relations with it far beyond the point of diminishing returns, and advocated making Jerusalem a free city. Realistically, this was never in the cards. Not recognizing Israel only supported the impression – which wasn't true – that the Vatican was anti-Semitic. I thought their policy toward Latin American countries, was until John Paul II changed it, much too stuck on tradition and so identified with the wealthy. Toward East Europe, they had their own *Ost-Politik* which I thought gave too much priority to establishing or maintaining relations with Communist regimes even in countries like Czechoslovakia after 1968, while the regime it was actively persecuting the underground Church.

Q: You know there are certain elements in Liberation Theology that make great sense, getting down more to the people and all that.

BASTIANI: Indeed it did. But the Church was quite right in opposing the use of violence to help the poor. It's kind of funny, both in Latin America and even more so, I think in Africa, that the leaders, the people who emerged as maximum leaders had been educated in Catholic schools. They weren't loyal to Catholic teaching when they got into politics. Church missionary activity always emphasizes education, and so, I surmise, these people were the best equipped to become political leaders.

Q: Well, in the Socialist, Social Democratic field, did the ideology of these two parties reject the Church, or did the Church play much of a role there?

BASTIANI: Socialists and Social Democrats?

Q: I mean the two parties, the main parties, and the Republicans that you were dealing with; did their ideology sort of reject the Church?

BASTIANI: I don't recall any explicit anti-Vatican pronouncements by the Socialists after their split off from the Communists; but they certainly weren't friendly with the Church. They did think their main adversary, the Christian Democrats, were allies of the

Church. Overall, the Church had great political influence, and I doubt that the Socialists would have considered it politically wise to make it an issue.

The Church was mainly concerned with general morality and crusaded on issues like divorce and abortion. The thing about the Church in Italy was that you had individual Cardinals in the conservative-liberal spectrum. The Cardinal of Genoa at the time I was there was an extreme conservative. The Cardinal of Milan was quite liberal. And then you had the liberal Pope John the XXIII who actually called the Vatican council. But no, the only party that had really good relations with the Vatican was the Christian Democratic Party.

Q: Well then, you left Italy in '78 to go back to Washington. By the way, how did your wife and kids find living in Rome?

BASTIANI: I left in '76, not '78; I was there from '74 to '76. My wife and children enjoyed Rome as much as I did. When we were in Rome only a few of the top officers received government-furnished quarters. They were not in a USG ghetto, but individual homes in the city. The rest of us received housing allowances which were always below current rentals due to inflation, so I was a bit out of pocket, which led me, with three kids, to finding affordable housing in half of a brand new duplex villa with a walled acre of yard north of Rome, in La Storta, on a dead end side road off the highway which went past the Vatican's international radio antenna farm. The children went to Marymount International School, about half the distance down the Via Cassia toward the Embassy in the center. We received a full educational allowance for that. I am eternally grateful to the Department for the educational allowances we received while abroad. I had found that overseas I always had enough money to pay down on my loans with the Credit Union. In Washington I always had to add to make new loans.

An advantage to having your children with you abroad is that they're much more dependent on you, and much less exposed to the distractions of television and peer influence, as they are here in the States. For children what's normal is what they've experienced as small children. I remember daughter number two asking after two or three years in Washington, when are we going overseas again. And it's not because she was unhappy with her situation in Rockville where she had good friends and was doing well in school. Every one of my five daughters speaks Italian to some degree, and they were all open to friendships with peers of other ethnic origin. My youngest daughter, in fact, seemed to *attract* these people Rockville High School. Most of her friends were of Latino, Asian or Black origin.

Q: My kids did the same thing. I mean, their group ends up being Foreign Service or foreigners because this is their milieu. Well, let's go off to the office of Oceans, Environment and Science, OES, in the State Department. You were there from when to when?

BASTIANI: I was there two years from mid'76 to mid '78, two years. And I had asked for this assignment because of my infatuation with science and technology. I was placed

in OES's Technology transfer and Space Office. I was the only FSO in it; it was a small office, two of whose people trained as scientists and had transferred from the Department of Defense, to the State Department. I soon came to see that when a scientist transfers to managing our relations on scientific issues with other countries, he is no longer a scientist, but becomes a bureaucrat, like every other bureaucrat. The office reported through a Deputy Assistant Secretary, Ozzie Ganley, to the Assistant Secretary.

We had these responsibilities, but we had no budgetary resources to implement them. I think this was true of most of the other offices in OES, but they didn't need targeted budgetary resources as I thought we did to carry out our mission. OES was, and may still be, just a collection of disparate offices that deal more with offices outside of OES than with each other. We were not a cohesive Bureau.

The big project in my office was implementing Kissinger's promise, among others, in a UN speech that the U.S. would help create a databank of technology within the UN to which Third World countries would have free access. The people on the American side – now I'm talking about transfer of technology theorists in academia and industry – advocated so-called "appropriate technology," which created employment for unskilled people in primitive economies…more of the nature of crafts. "Small is beautiful" was one of their sayings. Well, somewhat like Ceausescu for Romania, the political leaders in these countries with primitive economies, wanted modern turn-key technology; and they wanted it for nothing. I worked almost exclusively on trying to carry out Kissinger's promise of a technology data base in the UN. I went periodically to the UN for meetings with the corresponding UN people, and it was mostly talk. It was just talk. Neither we nor they disposed of resources to do anything ourselves. I'm talking now about OES, our Technology Policy Office. So I was moved to respond to a general call for foreign policy ideas from the Policy Planning Office on the 7th floor. I spent a lot of time writing a paper proposing U.S. technology initiatives toward third world countries. Did I get the name of the office right?

Q: Yes, it's the Policy Planning Office.

BASTIANI: So I wrote this paper – I still have a copy of it – entitled "Prolegomena for an Effective US Policy on Technology Transfer to LDCs." That title harkens back to the philosopher Immanuel Kant, one of the greatest epistemologists ever, and my academic background in Philosophy.

We were still in the colder part of the Cold War then, and I proposed a project in it as means to influence third world countries, like India, to go with us rather than the Soviets. Essentially I proposed a fully funded U.S. initiative to beam educational instruction from satellites to third World countries in the languages of the countries. Under it, we would give these countries millions of simple radios to receive the transmissions at no cost to them. And I proposed it as a Federal Government initiative administered by AID rather than OES, since OES had no resources anyway for such programs. I submitted my paper directly to the Policy Planning Office, rather than up the chain of command, with a copy to the deputy secretary, Ozzie Ganley.

Well, the next thing I know I'm called into Ozzie Ganley's office to explain myself. Why hadn't I submitted it just to him? I said I was afraid it might not get any farther, because I proposed that the leading role be given to AID and not OES. And, if memory serves me well, he said it wouldn't have gone any farther.

Q: I take it that the call for papers were designed to do just this. In other words –this is still roughly the bureaucracy – let's hear from the troops what they think…

BASTIANI: Well, that was my feeling in the beginning. I didn't even give it a thought that anybody would object. As I wrote it, I began to worry that it wouldn't go any further because I wasn't proposing money for OES to administer it. I didn't see that as realistic at all at the time.

My tour in OES proved to be the worst assignment I ever had in the Foreign Service – and I had asked for it. It was a dead end assignment. For most of the time I was there, Patsy Mink was the Assistant Secretary. I don't recall the name of her predecessor who was there when I arrived; but he was quite qualified and professional. Patsy Mink had no background whatsoever in this area. A former member of the House, she had run for the Senate and lost.

Q: From Hawaii or…?

BASTIANI: From Hawaii. And after the months and months it took the Carter Administration to get up and running in certain areas, she was finally appointed. I saw the appointment as her safety net for political and personal income reasons. She was pleasant enough toward me, until the day she sent word that she wanted to see me after the business work hours at 5:30. So I went to her office and took a seat in the waiting room. I waited and waited to be called in. At the time, I was a member of a five-person car pool, then the only practical way to get to Rockville, other than driving one's own car. We had a rule that if you didn't show up in the garage by ten of six, you would have to find your own way home. And there was no Metro at this time or bus service to near my home. Shortly before the witching hour, I explained all this to the receptionist and raced to the garage. Well – this I learned immediately the next morning – had infuriated Patsy Mink, so she had given the assignment she had for me to another in the office.

I apologize for talking more now of my personal problems in OES than the foreign policy work I did, but it was a traumatic period in my career.

During this tour OES was inspected by the Inspector General's Office. Now, I had gone through several inspections in my career, and every one of them, for me, had been very positive. Well, in this particular inspection, I was interviewed by an inspector who soon made it very obvious that his mission was to find jobs that should be eliminated. I don't know what he had been told in advance about me and my work, but it couldn't have been positive. Apparently the Department was on one of its periodic kicks to eliminate positions. These usually occur at a change of administration, and are call RIFs,

Reductions in Force. And so he very aggressively questioned me on what I did and why. Of course I put my work in the best light. I mean, I wasn't going to say this technology transfer initiative Kissinger had committed us to made no sense. I had sole responsibility in the office for it. It was a foreign policy commitment.

He must have written a lousy report on me. As I said, it was the worst assignment in my career. And I couldn't wait to get out of it. So as soon as I could I volunteered for Polish language training and transfer to Poland as Principal Officer at Krakow. I am eternally grateful to the personnel officer who gave me this assignment. But before we get to that, a new Assistant Secretary took over OES just before I left; I'm trying to recall his name…

Q: Tom Pickering. I just saw him yesterday.

BASTIANI: Is that right! Well, in came Tom Pickering and I remember well our meeting when he made the rounds to meet each of us personally at his work place. I knew of him already, and admired him. After our little session, I thought that if he had only been the Assistant Secretary during my tour in OES, things might have been very different. But it was just my bad luck to have come into OES at the worst possible time.

But anyway, what happened was that this personnel officer whose name I can't remember – I believe it was Tom Kruse – not only got me assigned to Krakow, but when at the last minute he was under pressure to break it, maintained it for me. Apparently, a woman officer had asked for the assignment, no doubt one who was well qualified and ambitious. I found that out later. And that assignment turned out to be the best four years of my entire professional career. I had about twelve years in Italy, but in total they didn't weigh as heavily on the scale professionally as the four years in Krakow.

Q: Well, we're talking about '78. You were taking Polish, is that right?

BASTIANI: Yes.

Q: Seventy-eight to '79. How did you find Polish language?

BASTIANI: Difficult. Remember, I was in my 50s and, while I had studied lots of languages – and the more you study languages the easier it gets to acquire another – I found Polish difficult. Polish is a Slav tongue, but it has lots of Latin words in it. I've heard it said that the Poles are the Italians of the North. They do have this Italian Western Catholic culture that I think is very civilizing, because it abhors violence. You can sense it when you are in Poland.

Polish is totally inconsistent. Because it is so inconsistent, the only way to learn to speak it is the oral-aural method, based on the principle that you should learn it as much as possible as you learned your mother tongue as a child, by imitation. Studying a grammar and putting words together may teach you to read, but it doesn't teach you to speak. That

I call the code cracking approach. Learning to *speak* a language is not primarily an intellectual exercise. The object is to short circuit the brain: to associate patterns of sound directly with ideas. You ignore grammar; that's embedded in the patterns of sound and comes naturally, as it does to a child learning her mother tongue.

I had a good tutor, but she was not nearly as demanding as the one I had for Romanian many years ago. And I was in with two other officers, one going out as the military attaché and the other as the admin officer, neither of whom had had much experience with foreign languages. And so the pace was slow and relaxed, and we spent too much time talking about other things in English. One day somebody knocked on the door and said, "They've just elected a Polish pope. Our first thought was that this is just another of those Polish jokes. But sure enough, Cardinal Wojtyła had just been elected. Of course we didn't speak Polish for the rest of that class. Anyway, I did test out at the 3,3 level, which meant I could converse well enough to get along without an interpreter before I arrived at post.

Q: Well, you went right to Krakow. You were there from '79 to?

BASTIANI: Eighty-three.

Q: How would you put the state of relations between the United States and Poland at the time you went out in '79?

BASTIANI: At that time our relations with this Communist country, a Warsaw Pact country loyal to the Soviet Union, were probably better than with any of the other East European countries. The Polish Workers Party, that is, the Communist party, which, as is standard in all those countries had the monopoly of power – this so-called leading role was written right into the constitution – was sort of liberal in its application. Hungary, among Warsaw Pact countries by that time was also. There, some analysts called it "goulash communism," and even alleged that the Hungarians preferred it to a Western democratic system. I considered that an insult to the Hungarian people.

But, to answer your question, our relations with Poland were good, given these limitations, they being a member of the Soviet bloc. More Poles were getting exit visas to come to the United States than in almost any of the other countries. I don't have any numbers but I think even more so than from Hungary itself. And cultural relations were rather good. We were also providing economic assistance, loans, and substantial agricultural assistance through the PL-480 program.

Gierek had long been in power and had an attractive personality. I think he had worked in Belgium early in his life, and knew Western ways. He succeeded in getting all kinds of loans from the West, from Germany especially, and squandered them to maintain the standard of living in a failing economy. There was also a lot of corruption; I assume some of the money found its way into Swiss bank accounts. But in any event our relations, given the limitations, were better than with most of the other Warsaw Pact countries.

Q: When you went out there who was our Ambassador?

BASTIANI: Our Ambassador when I arrived was William Schaufele. He had previously served in Africa. I had rather little to do with him, because he retired shortly after my arrival.

Q: Well, did you go to the Embassy first?

BASTIANI: Yes.

Q: What were you told about what they hoped they'd get from you and from Krakow?

BASTIANI: The trip to the Embassy is a story in itself, but, to answer your question, the Department, specifically EUR/EE, the office which handled relations with East European countries, urged me to report as fully as possible on what was going on at the local level. The Embassy gave me the same mandate, and even authorized me to send my reports directly to the Department through the Embassy's communication facilities, with a copy, of course, to the Embassy. There was this political/social ferment going on in Poland which had attracted the interest of the world.

When I got there I had constantly to remind myself that I was in a Communist, totalitarian country, because on the person-to-person level, it was as though I were in a Western country. Nobody was afraid to talk to me; in fact, they welcomed me. There didn't seem to be any fear of repression. All sorts of unauthorized publications circulated freely, even though they were really underground literature. It seemed like democracy was establishing itself from the bottom up. This contradicted all of my previous experience in Romania. We had access to just about anyone. One courageous and informative contact I prized especially headed the Krakow branch of the Catholic Intellectual Club, Potocki, if I remember correctly, was his name. He was a member of the expropriated landed aristocracy.

The Party leaders readily received me for official calls, and our conversations were quite friendly. You would never have guessed that we were on opposite sides in the Cold War. One, the Krakow First Secretary, obviously showed pride as a Pole in the election of Wojtyła as Pope, by telling me a joke. John Paul II had made his first visit just prior to my arrival.

The story is that the Pope had just taken off in an airliner. The stewardess asked if he'd like a drink. The Pope asked, "What's our altitude now. She said about 5,000 feet, and he accepted the drink. Later, she asked again, got the same question about altitude, and the Pope accepted a second drink. Then, after they were cruising at 30,000 feet, she asked if he wanted another. This time the Pope said, "No, thanks. Too close to the boss."

Washington had asked for as much reporting as we could produce, but they also welcomed analysis. In the spring of 1980, I thought that I understood what was going on, and decided to do a think piece. I had concluded that the Communist regime, the Party,

was really very clever. They were allowing all this ferment at the local level while retaining, firmly in their hands, all the levers of power. It was a way of letting the populace express its frustrations with the poor consumer situation; let off steam, so to speak, while they made sure it didn't go any farther. Fortunately for me, I never got it written, because I was so busy. Then along came the summer when they tried to raise prices on meat, and the ferment boiled over.

Q: We're talking about…this is the summer of '79?

BASTIANI: No, this is the summer of '80; I got there in the summer of '79. Factories here and there went on strike to protest these increases in the price of meat. Of course the main strike was in Gdansk at the shipyards where Wałęsa, an electrician who wasn't even working at the time, climbed over the gates to take over the leadership of the strike. He been fired for agitating for an independent trade union and this became the principal demand. His rehiring had been one of the original demands of the strikers. A Committee of Catholic intellectuals formed to advise the strikers; some of them were present even within the shipyards. And then the strikers had the support of Jacek Kuron and his Committee to Defend the Works (KOR), which he with other intellectuals, including Adam Michnik, had formed in the aftermath of the 1976 strikes in Radom which had been brutally suppressed. They had used the Constitution and the laws to defend workers in court, and to raise money for their families. In court they had some success; there were some judges, who went by the evidence and the law rather than what the Party wanted.

The strikes became so general that at a certain point the regime realized it had to yield; stone-walling, the threat of the use of force, and hints in television addresses by leaders – and even Cardinal Wyszynski – that Poland's national existence was at stake from a Soviet occupation hadn't worked at all. More and more of the economy was paralyzed by the hundreds of strikes. So to end the strikes as quickly as possible, on the 30th of August, the regime gave in to almost all of Solidarity's demands, which, besides an independent labor union, included a number of other non-economic demands like access to the media and broadcast of Mass on Sundays for shut-ins. Of course, the plan was to gradually take it all back, as Gomulka had done after the concessions of 1956. And so, the next evening, August 31, the formal signing at Gdansk was broadcast on national television. Wałęsa signed with a huge pen. For me it was the single most exciting evening I spent in Poland.

Around the corner from the residence lived a courageous, dissident professor I admired greatly with a courageous daughter of university age I had come to know reasonably well; she in the park fronting the residence where we both walked our dogs. She had mildly criticized me for keeping my daughter's cocker spaniel on a leash while her large dog walked freely by her side. She really believed in freedom, I mused. Anyway during the strikes this young lady had acted as a courier between striking factories as so many of her fellow students did, since the regime had shut down telephones to isolate them. To stop her and probably keep her father from communicating with strikers, a security police car had been parked in front of their house for about the last 10 days.

Well that night they disappeared and she came into the residence after the signing ceremony was over. My wife and I offered her a glass of champagne – in my elation at the event, I had popped a bottle. She declined and said she didn't believe that the regime's promises would be kept; she wasn't even sure what would happen to her after she left the residence; she didn't want to have alcohol on her breath. And during the first few days, I found that most Poles shared her pessimism. History had made the Poles a fatalistic and pessimistic people. Their hopes for freedom had been so often dashed in the past, that they couldn't believe that Solidarity's victory would last.

Q: In between the Germans and the Russians.

BASTIANI: Yes. But then the following days the Solidarity movement swept through society like a wind-driven brush fire. The party below the level of the Central Committee crumbled. Party members in droves joined Solidarity, many without giving up their Party membership. For a time, the media seemed to operate with complete freedom; I remember watching a television program in which a woman Communist local official, said: "Isn't it great that words now mean what they say!"

In the park I met a professor from the Jagiellonian University I knew casually, and he exclaimed: "Isn't it marvelous that 35 years of Communist indoctrination did not make idiots of us all?" For many Poles enthusiasm had replaced pessimism; and I thought how happy I was that I never got to write that analysis in which I concluded that the regime had everything under control.

Q: Well, during this strike and leading up to it; in the first place, describe the Consulate; how big an office was it? What staff did you have? What were your…?

BASTIANI: Well, we had five Americans, including me: a BPAO, that is a Branch Public Affairs Officer, who was number two and headed the Cultural Section, a Political Officer who I had do reporting exclusively, an Administrative officer and a Visa officer. And then we had about 22 Polish employees, Foreign Service Nationals, as they were called.

It would be well here to briefly describe the history of the Consulate. About 1970 we had proposed opening a consulate in Krakow to the Polish government; they were anxious to open another consulate here as well, I think, San Francisco.

Q: I remember interviewing the Polish Consul General back around '75 when I was with the Senior Seminar. He had said "Here I am in Chicago, and I'm covering Alaska and Hawaii and everything, the whole rest of the United States". They needed to branch out too.

BASTIANI: Yes. But the regime did nothing without the OK of the Soviets. Anyway, when we asked for Krakow, the answer that came back was; Consulate no, but Cultural Center, OK. At least that is what I recall being told. Len Baldyga, the retired USIA Cultural Officer who established it can give the full story. Vic Grey…do you know him?

Q: No.

BASTIANI: Vic Gray, a Foreign Service Officer, was detailed to the United States Information Agency to establish this Cultural Center. He was tragically killed by a bus while crossing the street as a pedestrian here in Washington after he retired. Anyway, he first worked out of what is still the official residence and established this marvelous Cultural Center practically on the main square, the *Głowny Rynek* which is a UN recognized world historical site. In fact, the back entrance opened right into the main square. The Consulate is a row house, similar to those we have in Georgetown, with common walls with adjoining buildings; ideal for a cultural center, but a nightmare for physical security officers. Its glass front doors open onto a very busy small street. A constant stream of pedestrians passes by on the sidewalk. One small step across the threshold and you are in the teeming life of Krakow.

Well, as soon as the flag went up in Southeast Poland from which most of the immigration into the United States had originated, the Poles started flocking to the Consulate asking for visas. Somehow or other the visa work was authorized or allowed without objection by the Polish government. Vic Grey's replacement was an outstanding cultural officer but, quite understandably, didn't know a damn thing about visas. The next thing you know the Department was overwhelmed with protests from Congressmen on behalf of constituents about their Polish relatives being treated like cattle at the Consulate, so the Department decided it had to take it over. A State Foreign Service Officer took over as Consul and Principal Officer. The post officially became a Consulate in 1974, but it was not raised to the status of a Consulate General, until after my departure in '83.

Q: So this is about the time you took it over?

BASTIANI: No. It was Nuel Pazdral. He incidentally is also a private pilot, much more qualified than I. I never met him, but it was his wife who started the English conversation group that my wife took over, and through which she made so many friendships. I replaced Pazdral in 1979 without any overlap.

Q: Okay. You've talked about the general strikes that came about in 1980, about the food and price increases, and all the immediate aftermath, but my next question is what were you and your officers doing during the strikes? Were you consulting with the Embassy? Were you all seeing this as a major thing? What were you getting from your contacts? Who were your most important contacts? What was the role of the Cultural Section in all of this? I mean, were you having to be careful not to be out there with a banner leading the way? And then we'll talk about all the elements of Krakow, its importance in the political sphere and economic sphere and cultural sphere and tone of your general work there.

BASTIANI: OK. Well that's a pretty big order.

Q: Carl, do you want to talk about what you all were doing during the strikes? Because this is a pretty exciting and important time.

BASTIANI: Yes. As the strike became more general and more organized, the eyes of the world were on what was going on in Poland. The regime did start negotiations and they didn't seem to be going anywhere until it became obvious that the strikes were total, almost total, and that they had spread; not just from the shipyards in the Baltic, Gdansk, and Szczecin, but also to major industrial centers, Krakow's Nowa Huta Steel mill, and Silesia, which is Poland's major industrial area, particularly for the mining of coal. We were reporting as much as we could as to what was going on, what was being said.

The regime, when it saw that the situation was pretty much out of control, and that the news was getting out, despite its cutoff of telephones and communications, decided, all of a sudden, to concede everything it had to to bring the strikes to an end. A Deputy Prime Minister, Jagielski was his name, who in the Polish government was not considered a hardliner handled the final negotiations. Agreement was reached on August 30, and signed with all the nation looking on through television on August 31st. That's why the revolution, and it was truly a revolution, came to be called August 1980. The government caved on just about everything in writing The primary demand of the labor unions was met: to be free of government and party control; to be independent.

Q: This is Solidarność? Or was it called that?

BASTIANI: Yes, *Solidarność*, Solidarity. The name arose during the strikes and they organized under the name *Solidarność*. Independent labor unions in a Communist system were a contradiction. Unions are meant to be transmission belts for the orders of the Party to the workers. Solidarity's emergence was in effect a loss of the Polish Workers Party's of monopoly of power.

Q: Carl, I want to get back to what your Consulate, your officers and all. What were you doing during this time?

BASTIANI: We all became reporting officers. We had access to everybody and anybody; nobody was afraid to talk to us. This was a situation that had existed for some time, as I mentioned earlier, this social/political ferment in which technically illegal newspapers were circulating openly. Also, we were mandated by the Department and the Embassy to check on the availability of food in the stores and open markets. Even our wives contributed, going to markets and noting down prices and availability.

Now, contrary to standard opinion by experts and analysts on Poland, intellectuals, workers, and peasants did cooperate. There is a traditional division in Poland between the intellectuals, the educated, and the others, a real cultural difference. If one did not speak proper Polish, it was considered a liability. In this regard – I'm jumping out of context here momentarily – I remember about 10 years later, when Wałęsa was running for President after Communism had collapsed, I received a phone call from a Polish intellectual, a woman who had been active in Solidarity, but had since immigrated to

Chicago. By this time too, Solidarity had split, and Wałęsa was running against a Solidarity intellectual who was Poland's first non-communist Prime Minister. She asked, "Who do you think will win?" And I said, "Wałęsa, of course; in a landslide." And she said – I'm sure in all seriousness – "No, no, he can't be President, he does not speak good Polish."

But getting back to your original question, we were under pressure to supply as much raw information on the social and economic situation at the people's level to Washington, because there was a real concern that there would be violence over shortages, which would provide a pretext to the Soviets to come in to restore order. Washington's obsessive fear that the Soviets would invade I personally came to regard as exaggerated for reasons I will explain later.

Q: But the Soviet presence wasn't very visible, was it, in Poland, from my understanding?

BASTIANI: The Soviet presence was not very visible at all during this period of ferment. They had a large military base from the time of the Second World War in Southwest Poland but their presence on the streets was not evident, even though their ties to the important Polish Ministries were tight. The way the Soviets controlled these satellites, as I think we properly called them, were primarily direct Party to Party relations; direct Ministry of Interior to Ministry of Interior relations – that is, all central police relations – and direct Ministry of Defense to Ministry of Defense relations. I learned from somewhere that no officer in the military was promoted to colonel without first being vetted by the Soviets. These Ministries were the most important. There were Soviet advisors within the Ministry of Interior of Poland at, I would guess, most levels. International relations were subsumed by the Party to Party relations, except for the formalities which were left to the Foreign Ministries. Proof of Poland's satellite status was that it had no foreign policy of its own. The Soviets pretty much got their way in all of these relations, including trade.

Q: But at that time, was there, I won't say concern, but questioning about what the Polish army would do? I mean, Poland sits across the supply lines that lead to any attack on Western Europe. In the popular mind, there were questions about the Polish army. What were you were getting from your colleagues and your own information about the Polish Army at this particular stage?

BASTIANI: Well, the opinion which developed during the legal period of Solidarity, was that the Army was not a reliable instrument the regime could use for a repression. It almost became a given of any analysis that, if the regime decided to quash Solidarity, the military at the lower levels might rebel: and this was seen as a deterrent to resorting to martial law. The military was still viewed by the people as more Polish than Communist. I'm talking now, again, of the lower levels. The Polish uniform was esteemed.

Also, reportedly, at the time of the workers' violent uprisings in Gdansk in 1970, and Radom in 1976, Jaruzelski, who was already head of the Ministry of Defense, had

refused to use the army to suppress the strikers. Whether it was because he didn't trust the soldiers or was defending the military's honor, as those who are sympathetic to him claim, is moot.

The Polish army, of course, was periodically engaged in joint Warsaw Pact maneuvers with the Soviet, Czechoslovak, East German, and, sometimes even the Hungarian, armies So as the situation developed in the so-called legal period of Solidarity when it was recognized as an independent labor union, the Army was always considered an unreliable element for the regime to use to repress them, and therefore an argument against the possibility of an internal repression, which was sort of dismissed as a possibility by Washington analysts.

The legal period was one of repeated confrontations over individual issues; getting registered, getting access to the media, union relations with plant managers who were all appointed by the government, etc. Besides striking and threatening to strike to get the terms of the national, original agreements observed, numerous provincial strikes occurred over local issues, primarily to have entrenched, corrupt Party officials who were Party and Government appointees, removed.

This period, from September 1980 to December 1980 was exciting, because in these confrontations over specific issues, the Politburo – at least its liberal majority – did apparently try to find a way of carrying out its commitments to Solidarity without at the same time giving up the Party's so-called leading role. Solidarity had formally accepted the Constitution.

Meanwhile, from the Soviets, Czechoslovaks and, especially, the East Germans, there was an incessant drum beat of calls to reverse "anti-socialist, counter-revolutionary and reactionary" trends in Poland, mixed with ominous hints that if the Polish Party didn't, then they would do it for them. The real revolution had of course had been the "Socialist revolution" immediately after the war when the Soviets made sure it happened. Washington and Europe's fear of an invasion was at its height. In late November 1980, the East Germans closed their border with Poland.

Q: Well, what was the figuring? In a way this is way above your pay grade, but at the same time you're sitting in the field there; what was your feeling? Because if the Soviets moved in that could well mean fighting with Polish troops, which would mean they might have a major war on their hands.

BASTIANI: In fact, the alleged possibility that the Polish soldiers would resist if the Soviets came in was also considered a deterrent to Soviet military intervention, possibly even by the Soviets themselves. But there is no doubt that the Soviets in the fall seriously did consider an invasion and occupation. They were alarmed in this period at how regularly the regime yielded to the demands of Solidarity. It all came to a head in early December when…

Q: Of 1980?

BASTIANI: Yes, of 1980. This was a period – late November, early December 1980 – when we had reliable information that the Soviets were massing troops on the Polish border. It was a period of very high tension. In the Carter Administration Zbigniew Brzezinski – a Pole in origin – was the National Security Advisor. Our position was from start to finish that the Poles should be left to work out their internal problems alone, and that, if the Soviets occupied the country, it would inevitably have dire consequences for East-West relations. I'd say most people in Poland and outside of Poland at this time considered a Soviet/Warsaw Pact intervention in Poland almost inevitable.

Now, like you said, this is way above my pay grade but I was following these events day after day, full time, talking to people, reading every analysis which came my way through the media and the pouch. This may sound like blowing my own trumpet, but my own personal analysis was that the Soviets with so many very important irons in the fire with the West, particularly economic…

Q: Well, they were in Afghanistan at this point.

BASTIANI: They were in Afghanistan, yes, and the Poles were very unhappy about contributing anything to that effort. At the same time the Soviets had so many industrial trade relations going on with the West, the importation of technology, primarily. There was talk of the construction of a pipeline to Western Europe to export gas and oil which would pay for both the pipe line and the technology they needed. If they did to Poland what they did to Czechoslovakia in 1968, they would lose tremendously in the economic sphere. There was no way that the West could have continued relations as they were.

Anyway, my view was that the Soviets in the end would not invade, because, while intolerable, it wasn't an emergent situation they needed to end from one day to the next. They could afford to bide their time, and make sure their Polish mercenaries backed by fear of an invasion would do their work for them.

Q: Well, were you getting instructions or was this obvious, having to sit on your officers and all not to get out there and show a little solidarity with Solidarność?

BASTIANI: Nobody was telling us not to associate with Solidarity; nobody was telling us to be cautious or anything of that sort. The Embassy was doing the same thing. When I arrived in Poland I was told that I could report directly to the Department, with a copy to the Embassy. We had to keep real time reporting at an unclassified level, because our only real-time facilities were the telephone and telex, both of which were monitored. The one time I laboriously used the one-time code pad only got me into trouble with the Embassy's communication officer who saw that as a waste of his time. All our sensitive reporting was by pouch to the Embassy. No, there was just Washington's insatiable demand for information on what was going on at the local level in my District, and no restrictions put on whom to talk to.

Q: But there can often be a problem with junior officers; they can get pretty enthusiastic about a revolutionary situation, and, you know, overstep the bounds.

BASTIANI: Well, yes. In fact, we had a young woman officer; she had a very strong academic background, spoke Polish very well, and developed very close friendships with Solidarity people. I worried about how close they were at one point, and, tell her not to get too familiar with them. However, her reporting was so good that the Embassy offered her direct transfer to Warsaw's Political Section. She did me an honor by preferring to remain on my staff.

Our BPAO, Branch Public Affairs Officer, had close relations with the students at the Jagiellonian University – we were within walking distance of the campus. At one point they asked him to drive a student queen into the city on his official Ford station wagon. I put the kibosh on it, somewhat to his dismay. Yes, there was the danger of enthusiastic young officers getting so close to Solidarity that it would support by appearance the charge that we were subverting the Poles against the legitimate authorities. This charge the regime made over and over again in the media and even in some official conversations with us.

Q: What about food? How were food supplies? You were monitoring that, which kicked off this whole thing. In your area what was the situation?

BASTIANI: Food was scarce and it's hard for me to separate the food scarcities later during martial law from those that led to the revolution of August 1980. Yes, food was scarce in the lead up to August '80. Poland has enormous agricultural assets, lots of fertile land. When the Communists took over they started to carry out the Leninist plan of collectivization in order to make the agricultural workers dependent on the state for their livelihood, just like the industrial workers. They did collectivize much of the best land, but they never succeeded with the peasants who owned smaller plots of a few acres. Periodically they tried in the early years, but each time they encountered so much resistance that they put it off.

In the end, most of the agricultural land was never collectivized, and most of the peasantry never became economically dependent on the State for their daily bread and basic needs. So the party was never able to dominate the peasants through party controlled rural organizations as they did the workers through the official unions. And then there was the Church which supported the farmers. Because the non-collectivized farmers were so much more efficient in agricultural production, the State came to depend on them to supply much of the food to the residents of urban areas; that is to the workers, professionals, bureaucrats, and their families. Moreover, many urban residents, workers especially, had migrated from rural areas and retained close family ties there. The food support they received from their relatives also diminished the control the party had over them through official labor unions and party organizations.

In my view, this is a major reason why, among the satellite nations, Poland led the way in throwing off Communism from below. To put it another way, the Communist-Leninist

revolution which makes every individual dependent on the powers that be, and isolates him from his neighbors through fear of collaborators among them, was never completed in Poland. Those foolish enough to resist are made examples through disappearance into camps and severe punishment. They do this not only to those who actively dissent, but, initially, even to those who *might* resist. This in fact is what happened to so many who had worked in Germany and occupied Europe under the Nazis whom we forced to return to their native East European countries after the war. As soon as they got home, they were shipped off to concentration camps as Western spies. I had met one egregious survivor in Romania.

This Leninist totalitarian control was never fully established in Poland from the beginning. In fact, as I came to see later under martial law, there were even a few in the security police who didn't enforce the control of Solidarity activists paroled from camps as they were supposed to. They were part of the system of repression, but as Poles, must have salved their consciences in this way.

Q: Did you get any feeling about students; as you know, in the Communist world horrendous amounts of time are spent sitting in schools learning Communist economics and all; and yet, with a blink of an eye it all went away. Did you get any feel that there were Poles committed to Communism?

BASTIANI: Well, the students were among the most rebellious even though they'd been brought up under the Socialism and forced to learn Russian right from elementary school on. Just about every Pole educated after the war spoke Russian, but they resented this, and when Solidarity arose, many students were active in it. During the strikes they ran messages from one plant to another as couriers as Solidarity set up its network. The function was essential, because the first thing the regime did everywhere when workers struck was to shut off all means of communication in the striking areas.

Q: That's how Solidarność developed. I mean that it was not just a workers' strike in Gdansk.

BASTIANI: Indeed. By mid -August '80 Solidarity, *Solidarność,* had become a national organization headed by Wałęsa at the striking shipyards in Gdansk.

Another point I want to stress again is that contrary to the expectations of the Party and some western observers, the intellectuals and peasants and workers actually cooperated during the strikes and throughout the so-called legal period until martial law was imposed; that is between August '80 and December 12, 198l. I can still remember the visit of a Washington intelligence analyst in this period who held the theory that they wouldn't or couldn't cooperate. I had a hard time convincing him that the facts contradicted his theory. They cooperated despite the regime's efforts to provoke animosity between these classes through misinformation.

Q: Well, during this time, particularly the time of the August revolution, how did you view the role of the Church? Were you able to monitor the Church, Catholic Church leaders, in your area?

BASTIANI: Indeed. As is well known, the Church hierarchy in varying degrees supported Solidarity. As the American Consul in Krakow, I was in a particularly advantageous location, because Wojtyła had been the Cardinal at Krakow when elected to the Papacy, and I was talking to his successor, Cardinal Macharski, and his former close collaborators. I had almost immediate access to Cardinal Macharski, even under martial law. My most memorable meeting with him was immediately after it was imposed. He drew me into the corridor and spoke in whispers, warning me that his office was bugged.

While fully supporting Solidarity's demands, including the right to strike, the Church gave almost overriding priority to making sure that Solidarity avoid violence. I attribute the fact that Solidarity did so largely to the Church's influence. Wałesa, who was personally very loyal to the Church, was certainly open to its influence. That Solidarity did consistently avoid violence, in contrast to the workers' protests of 1976 and 1970 proved to be one of its most effective tactics in confrontations with the regime's Security Police.

Macharski as a national Church leader, second only to the Primate in Warsaw, had to be prudent and circumspect in his public words and actions, indeed like the Pope himself. However, many parish priests who were closest to the workers were as active as local Solidarity leaders were themselves. In the hierarchy, perhaps the most defiant and courageous Bishop was Tokarczuk in the city of Pzemysl close to Lwów in the Ukraine whose population prior to the war had been over 90% Polish. He was still ministering to underground Catholics there by sending priests secretly across the border. My visit with him when he told me all this was one of the highlights of my tour.

Another relationship I prized was that with the priest philosopher and close collaborator of the Pope in the philosophy of man, Father Jozef Tischner. He was one of Solidarity's closest advisors, and was considered its unofficial chaplain. I will never forget our one and only meeting in my office during that hot autumn of 1980. Then he was convinced that the Soviets would invade. I argued that they wouldn't. I didn't see him more than twice after that, but the last brief encounter on a street in Krakow during one of my long walks shortly after the imposition of martial law is engraved in my memory. We hardly got past greeting each other than he hurried on. Obviously, he had not been interned because he was close to the Pope, but there was no doubt that he was under surveillance when I encountered him.

Anyway, the Warsaw Pact leaders met in Moscow in early December 1980, and they were divided. The Romanians and Hungarians were definitely against any invasion. The First Secretary, Stanisław Kania, was accompanied by General Jaruzelski who had long since been Minister of Defense and a member of the Politburo. Kania and Jaruzelski

promised that they would roll back Solidarity, and they were told in no uncertain terms to do so by each of the other leaders present.

From that moment on I don't think the Soviets ever seriously considered military intervention; the solution was going to be internal repression imposed by their Polish mercenaries. During the whole following year of 1981 there was no evidence that they had massed troops on the border as they did that December, but they made no secret of their pressure on the Polish leaders to carry out their plans.

The next serious crisis developed in March. It was at this time that Cardinal Macharski told me that he no longer considered a Soviet invasion the major threat, but internal repression.

Q: Eighty-one?

BASTIANI: March of '81. At this time the peasants decided they wanted to organize as a sort of green Solidarity, to negotiate their economic needs as an independent union.

The regime at first stone-walled, but then promised to talk. This was the regime's reaction to any new demand, but, unlike what usually happened in fall of 1980, in 1981 it was no longer certain that talks would end with concessions. In preparing for this session, I reread what I said in a talk I gave at John Carroll University in 1988 about my experiences in Poland, and would like to quote a paragraph of it here:

"The totalitarian system seemed impotent, confused, and no longer relevant, but it remained in place. A revolution had been wrought, but it had yet to be consummated. The agreements in Gdansk, Szczecin and with the miners in Jastzębie had been signed, but a protracted struggle was underway to have them implemented. From September 1980 through 1981 the Poles found themselves forced to remake their revolution through successive confrontations with the regime, just to maintain it."

And that's exactly what was happening. The leaders of the regime were constantly trying to stonewall, especially after that December 1980 Warsaw Pact meeting. In the period before that – let me backtrack just a bit – between August '80 and December '80 Kania had become the First Secretary, replacing Gierek. His previous job in the Party had included relations with religious and other social organizations. He for a time tried to co-opt the revolution. He talked about renewal, *odnowa*; how in cooperation with Solidarity and the people, the party was going to rebuild Socialism. *Odnowa* was a catch word, repeated over and over on every issue; and it was during this period that the leaders more readily yielded to Solidarity's demands, especially those listed in the agreements. They did orally also to demands of provincial organizations all over the country for the removal of corrupt, entrenched government and party officials; but the removal of most was constantly postponed.

In 1981, after their December 1980 promises to the Soviets that they would roll back Solidarity, they began to try to carry them out. In February of 1981, Solidarity struck the

entire province of Bielsko-Biała in my Consular District because the twice-postponed removal of corrupt officials had not happened. This time the regime responded by cutting of communications within and with the entire province, and having the official national media lambast the strikers for the losses they were causing to the economy. The Embassy asked me to find out what was going on. I went there with my wife in the Consulate's big white official car which I drove myself – about an hour's drive. The car made it obvious who we were. We were not stopped and were able to drive freely into and within the city. We saw some armored security police units at the edge of the province on our way in and out, but none within the city or its environs – not even police cars.

The entire area was at a standstill. Only restaurants were open and only taxi cabs were providing transportation. They charged no fees. The red and white Polish flag and Solidarity signs and logos were everywhere, and displayed in all the store windows. It seemed more like a holiday than a strike. We were treated as honored guests at a restaurant. We stopped at a metal smelting plant and spoke with workers at the gate wearing red and white armbands. It and all the other factories were occupied by the workers. At this one, we were told that they were keeping fires stoked within the smelting furnace to prevent the interior brick walls from cracking if they cooled. In the end the Prime Minister, Pinkowski, who had authority over the contested government positions, yielded. But this time the Party fired him, and replaced him with Jaruzelski.

Incidentally, this Solidarity tactic of occupation strikes in the factories, and not going into the streets to demonstrate, made it much easier for them to avoid violence by any of their members, and much harder for the regime to use it to end strikes.

Okay. Picking up where I left off about the demand of the peasants in March '81 to form their own rural Solidarity, their leaders were invited to attend a meeting of the local city council in Bydgoszcz in central Poland. However, at the meeting no substantive discussion was permitted; after a standoff the peasant leaders and Solidarity union representatives supporting them were escorted out where they were severely beaten by security police in mufti. At this time much of the press was still operating freely and the Politburo's immediate cover story blaming the violence on Solidarity was soon exposed. Gazeta Krakowska, officially the Party's local organ, took the lead. It sent its own correspondent to Bydgoszcz and published the full story with pictures of the beaten Solidarity people in the hospital.

Almost overnight, the entire country was enraged. Never since immediately after August '80 were the people in the vast majority so united behind Solidarity. Shortly before, there had been the news that joint Warsaw Pact military maneuvers of Soviet, East German, Czechoslovak and Polish military forces would begin about the middle of the month. Wałęsa and the leaders of Solidarity met, and decided on a national warning strike near the end of March to be followed by a full strike a few days later if a series of demands were not met. Wałęsa and the Party's most liberal leader by reputation, Mieczyslaw Rakowski negotiated openly; he was then a Deputy Prime Minister in the government. I recall that at least one of meetings was held on an open stage on national television.

In Krakow, Solidarity leaders were convinced that the Soviet Army would move in. They counseled against direct resistance, but distributed leaflets on how to resist passively, like taking down or reversing street signs. At the same time, in the expectation of violence, they had hospital emergency wards prepared to give emergency care to large numbers. By this time, Jaruzelski was also the Prime Minister. But he played no visible role in this crisis. While his Deputy negotiated with Wałęsa, he was off participating in the joint *Soyuz*, "Friendship", maneuvers, as they were called.

There is no doubt that Kania and Jaruzelski were at this time under enormous pressure from the Soviets to carry out their commitment to crush Solidarity, and the Bydgoszcz events may have been contrived to force their hand. The military maneuvers had apparently been timed to serve as a backup to intimidate Solidarity and the people. The Bydgoszcz incident was also intended to show that the Party was putting Solidarity in its place. For the regime, it proved a colossal blunder. In the end they agreed to Solidarity's demands for talks to establish an agricultural Solidarity union, and investigation and punishment of those responsible for the beatings.

Q: Well, the agricultural group, I take it these would be the collective farmers, not the individual peasant landholders.

BASTIANI: No, on the contrary; it was the individual, independent peasants who wanted to have their own organization. The collective farm people were pretty subservient to the regime. An oddity here is that the individual peasants out-produced the collective farms by a great margin, despite the fact that the collective farms had prime land and received all they needed from the Government in the way of equipment.

Q: Well, I think this is true all the time. And how as part of our diplomatic establishment in Poland, did you view Jaruzelski and his rule early on?

BASTIANI: As I put it in a piece I wrote after retirement, when Jaruzelski was appointed Prime Minister without giving up his military positions, the Polish people extended to him a line of credit, so to speak, as a leader – this is very much my own way of putting it. They hoped that his "Polishness" would assert itself. After all, he was from a landed wealthy family in Eastern Poland which sent its sons to the Army or the Church. He had been educated in a Catholic boarding school; he spoke good Polish; and his wife was a practicing Catholic. He was head of the military, and the Polish army retained respect among the people. And there was the story that, as a member of the Politburo, he had prevented the use of the Army against the workers in the 1970 Gdansk uprising. So there was hope that he would find some kind of solution to the struggle between Solidarity – that is, really between the vast majority of the people – and the regime subservient to the Soviets. For the people from time immemorial, the primary enemy of the Polish nation, the *naród*, had been the Russians.

As I saw it, all he had to do was show in some way that he was defending Polish national interests vis-à-vis the Soviets. None but a very few were looking for open defiance. I had seen how the otherwise execrable Ceausescu had done it. He never ceased to harp on the

rhetorical boiler plate in fashion among the so-called "socialist states" of independent ways to Socialism and Equality among countries, while doing to the extent possible what in his view served Romania's national interests; ignoring, or finding ways to put off, Soviet demands which didn't.

Jaruzelski did none of that, absolutely none of that. Instead, when he came in there was a clumsy attempt to present him to our posts in Poland and the world as a popular national leader. To my amazement, we were given the results of a so-called poll by contacts who came into our posts at about the same time which allegedly showed that he was more popular with the Polish people than Wałęsa. I had witnessed myself the adulation bestowed on Wałęsa by the people and knew how ridiculous this was.

Jaruzelski made televised visits that winter to rural areas which showed him guaranteeing food and coal supplies to the peasants. There were in fact dire shortages. But he went over, you know, like a lead balloon. He spoke haltingly; the people stood there stiffly and expressionless; and there was no sign of any rapport.

There was even a foolish attempt to compare him favorably as a popular leader to Piłsudski; Piłsudski was the one…

Q: Marshal Piłsudski, prior to World War II.

BASTIANI: During and after World War II; yes, Piłsudski was largely responsible for putting Poland back on the map when he defeated the new Soviet army in the battle of the Vistula (*Wisła*) river, just outside Warsaw – the so-called miracle of the *Wisła,* and sent them fleeing all the way back to Moscow. It was incredible that they tried to do this; Piłsudski is the last person the Russians would like to be reminded of. So promoting Jaruzelski in this manner ended abruptly.

As Prime Minister Jaruzelski gave a few well-phrased, moderate speeches, but there was no evidence that he was leading as the Prime Minister in negotiations with Solidarity. I've mentioned his absence on maneuvers during the Bydgoszcz crisis. Later, he took no visible role in important negotiations with Solidarity over how factory managers would be appointed, and the union's relations with them. When I mentioned this once – I think to a Church figure – the comment was that two of his predecessors had soon disappeared after becoming identified with recent debacles, so he was wise to keep a low profile.

The other major objective of the Party and the Soviets was to rebuild the Party in Poland. To do that, they had to maintain the orthodox hardliners in their positions in the leadership and in the Central Committee. For this reason, the Party's extraordinary National Congress at which well-intentioned liberals at the base hoped to make it more democratic after August 1980 was constantly postponed. Many party members had actually joined Solidarity. It was originally due to be held at the end of 1980 or early '81.

Q: The Polish National Communist Party Congress?

BASTIANI: Yes, the Polish Workers Party Congress which was the Communist Party. So, with Kania's help, hardliners managed to get it put it off until July 1981. But prior to it, in June, hardliners led by Tadeusz Grabski, tried to take over the leadership from Kania and Jaruzelski at a Party Plenum with the open support of the Soviets. They have these Party plenums of the leadership with the Central Committee every two or three months. The main business at this Plenum was an open letter from the Soviet party in which Kania and Jaruzelski were criticized by name for allowing this counter-revolution, as they called it, to continue. After Kania and Jaruzelski had postponed imposing martial law in March as planned and made concessions to Solidarity, the Soviets had apparently lost faith in them.

The annals of that Plenum make incredible reading. Beginning with Kania, one speaker after another gets up and acknowledges the criticism in the letter as one hundred percent correct, and pledges that the Party will amend its ways. Neither Kania nor Jaruzelski said a word in their own defense; Jaruzelski didn't speak at all. It was left to Kazimierz Barcikowski, to say anything in their defense. Barcikowski was a Party Secretary from the Krakow area and a key member of the liberal group. I had met him early in my tour. I remember he received me casually, wearing slippers, and that the conversation was pleasant and unremarkable. But nothing else. In the end, this blatant Soviet attempt to have hardliners replace Kania and Jaruzelski failed. The forthcoming Party Congress was the excuse used to put off any leadership changes at that time.

Q: Well, were you seeing any real enthusiasm for Communism among the party faithful during this time? I mean, was Solidarność sort of absorbing the…

BASTIANI: I would say that by that by this time Communism, Soviet-style socialism had lost all credibility, not only with the people but with most of the Party. In the paper I wrote about him, I described Jaruzelski as the last of the true believers that Soviet-style socialism was good for the Polish people. He was not corrupt in the normal sense of the word. He believed in the ideology. It had become a political faith for him; and he was loyal to it right up to the end. I don't believe most of the Politburo really believed in the ideology any longer. But since their personal survival as Soviet mercenaries depended on carrying out Soviet demands, they had no alternative. The most the so-called liberals did was postpone the repression, despite Soviet pressure, until their planning was complete and they no longer saw any way of getting Solidarity to give up its gains voluntarily through fear of a Soviet intervention.

Q: I interviewed somebody who was in Poland who said that they were convinced that there were at least three dedicated Communists in Poland at the time.

BASTIANI: I can think of one; I'm not sure of the other two.

Q: It's sort of looking at this as almost a spiritual thing, because Communism in a way is a belief – you can call it a religion or whatever – but it's a belief. And you had this whole area in the Soviet Union and in the satellites where by this time generations were moving

into power which had gone through the full Communist educational system – and it didn't take at all.

BASTIANI: Yes, particularly in Poland for some of the reasons that I mentioned earlier, where they were never able to establish the totalitarian system completely. But originally yes, there were probably quite a few believers in Communism immediately after the war. Never a majority, never a majority, but there were people who saw "socialism" as a solution to their economic and social problems. But by this time, by I would say the late '60s, mid '70s, most of this faith was gone and many people were Communists because it was the only way you could get ahead and support your family. There was no alternative to working within the system to get ahead. I sometimes wonder what I would have done in a similar situation. Only heroes have the guts to sacrifice and resist when the situation seems hopeless.

Here I'm reminded of what a courageous professor who lived round the corner from the residence told a New York Times reporter, John Darton, I believe: "Socialism is a system which strives mightily to resolve problems which don't exist in other systems."

Q: I know, in order to get a job with the government or in a factory or something like that – to move up you had to be a member. Well, Carl, how did things play out? You got there in '80 and all hell broke loose.

BASTIANI: I got there in mid '79 and all hell broke loose in mid '80. As I say in a paper in which I review the whole period I was there, a ferment was going on for a long time, and the question was what would come of it? Would it boil over? By the summer of 1980 I had reached the conclusion that it would not. I had decided that the regime was very clever; they maintained all the levers of power firmly in their hands, and allowed all this unorthodox activity at the people-to-people level to go on as a way of releasing their frustrations – letting off steam – but nothing was really going to change. Fortunately for me, I hadn't found the time to write this up and send it in to the Department before it happened.

Q: To a certain point, you can play this game, but it does lead to eventual collapse.

BASTIANI: It does indeed, and when it collapses, it collapses like a house of cards.

Q: Were you, as Consul going up to the Embassy, and, with the other Consul and with the Political Section and Ambassador saying whither Poland?

BASTIANI: Well the question, whither Poland, was constantly on our minds. Within the Embassy I did not detect prior to August 1980 any real belief that this thing was going to end in revolution as it did. And when it did, it surprised the whole world. After all, all previous post-war uprisings in Poland and the other satellites had come to naught.

Q: Well, you never know in things like this when a really popular movement gets going.

The leadership knows there's discontent, but doesn't know what to use against the will of people. I mean, it's just like when the Soviet Union collapsed; it's the same thing. All of a sudden the will was gone at the top.

BASTIANI: I like to say that from one day to the next all of the experts on Eastern Europe suddenly became amateurs, because all of their expectations had been deceived.

I also came to realize that for totalitarian regimes, a little liberalism is a dangerous thing. When people see that dissidence is no longer ruthlessly repressed, they will let their will be known.

Q: Well, you were there until when, '84?

BASTIANI: No, until mid '83.

Q: Eighty-three. So what happened; were the screws gradually tightened?

BASTIANI: Well, let me continue from the summer of 1981. This all important Party Congress which could have changed the party from an orthodox one to one genuinely social democratic was finally held. Prior to the Congress, many party members had joined Solidarity, and started the so-called lateral movement to reform the Party from the bottom into a genuinely social democratic party. They were crushed. Even though Kania with his high sounding promises of renewal stayed on as First Secretary, the orthodox hardliners remained in positions of power. The reason why the Congress which was supposed to be held in early '81 had been repeatedly postponed was to insure this result on which the Soviets were insisting.

During July-August I was back here on home leave. When I returned a month later I immediately saw that a total change in the political/social environment had taken place. By this time, the regime had succeeded in regaining control of all the media. Solidarity was constantly being blamed for the economic problems and shortages in food and coal. The regime had dropped the pretense of good faith negotiations with Solidarity to resolve them. I was told by a Solidarity leader in Krakow that a party negotiator had confided to him that his instructions were to meet – but to concede nothing. In fact, I was then getting reports that the regime was deliberately withholding perishable food in warehouses even to the point where it spoiled, rather than allowing distribution to the stores. One particular province was a notorious example. Tons of butter had gone rancid on the shelves because the regime had not allowed it to be put out into the stores. In the media, failures to reach agreements on these local issues were always blamed on intransigence on the part of Solidarity.

Q: Well, what about the Voice of America and BBC? Were they able to get this news and were they listened to?

BASTIANI: They were getting the news and they were listened to. However, Radio Free Europe, RFE, was really the best at this. They used to get local news from people in

Poland like Reuters and Associated Press gets theirs world-wide from stringers. RFE was broadcasting it to the Poles like a local network. They had great credibility and were very much listened to. RFE played the role in Poland of the voice of a responsible opposition in a democratic country, exposing the shortcomings of the powers that be. And that's why the regime's misinformation was not believed by most Poles. Because of VOA and the BBC as well, but they focused more on presenting the views of the West and what was going on in the rest of the world.

The next great event occurred in September of 1981 when Solidarity held its National Congress with delegates elected locally from all over Poland. It was without a doubt the most democratic convention held in all East Europe since before the war. No union in a Western country could have done it more democratically. They met for two or three weeks, they actively debated, they voted and majority decisions were accepted by the minority. To me it was an edifying model of democracy in action.

And at this convention, Solidarity proposed solutions for the problems of the Polish economy. The regime accused Solidarity of violating its status as a union, becoming a political party, and wanting to take over the Government.

During the Congress, Solidarity adopted a message of greetings to workers in the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries supporting efforts among them for union autonomy. This set off a firestorm of criticism against them from the Party and the regimes of all these countries. This was truly frightening to the other satellite leaders and the Soviet Union, because the last thing they wanted, the one thing they were anxious to avoid, was workers following Solidarity's example in their own countries. Solidarity was accused of imperiling Poland's statehood and interference in the internal affairs of its allies. It was seen as proof of the charge that it didn't want to cooperate with the Government, but take it over.

In fact, Solidarity had accepted the position of Poland within the Warsaw Pact; they weren't calling for Poland to change its international policy and international alliance. But this appeal to workers in other bloc countries was considered a major mistake of Solidarity – even by well-intentioned Solidarity advisors and most Western analysts, and they did not pursue it. It gave occasion to the regime to accuse Solidarity of wanting to change the political system, of anti-Sovietism, and counter-revolution, their favorite charges.

The Convention ended peacefully but the provocations, the bad mouthing of Solidarity went on increasingly, and I think everybody had a sense that a crisis was building.

In October, Jaruzelski becomes the First Secretary of the Party, replacing Kania. Now he's got every position of power and, in my analysis, he was the one man who could have effected a peaceful transition to a mild form of democratic socialism within the communist world without giving the Russians any pretext to invade.

I considered it a kind of analytical advantage to have once been a specialist on Romanian affairs, because I saw how well Ceausescu had been able to utilize the ideology and the opportunities available to him to keep the Soviets from ever coming back into Romania, and to get away with his trade with the West, relations with Israel, and so many other things that were contrary to Soviet dictates for the bloc countries.

If Jaruzelski, with all the assets he had, and with all the support he would have gotten from the Polish people; had he publicly stated in a non-adversarial manner – you know, using that ideological boilerplate regarding relations between Socialist countries, "equality, autonomy, separate roads to Socialism", and all that, while reaffirming loyalty to the Warsaw Pact – had he done this, the Soviets would have been left with no ideological pretext to use for invading. And privately he could have hinted to the Soviets that he might not be able to prevent open resistance to an invasion by the lower levels of the Polish Army and Solidarity.

Had he done this, Jaruzelski would have had the support, I'd say, of 80 to 90 percent of the Polish people, and been able to effect a transition to a limited, but genuine, form of social democracy in which the Party no longer had a total monopoly of power. And Solidarity would have accepted it, I'm sure. But he did not; he remained the obedient mercenary of the Soviet Union, bent on finally achieving the rollback that he had promised.

I had alluded earlier to the fact that the core leadership was divided between liberals, including Jaruzelski, and hardliners. However, they were not divided in their objective; they were just divided in how they were going to accomplish it. What the liberals were trying to do was get Solidarity itself to accept the rollback, to return voluntarily to subservience.

The device they put forth to accomplish this was the organization of a Front of National Accord to advise the leadership. This Front, a so-called Council, would be made up of Solidarity, the regime unions and just about every other organizations subservient to the Party, all with equal status. And the Front's power would only be advisory. If Solidarity had accepted this, they would have given up most of the gains that they had made in the agreements of August 1980.

This solution was promoted by a high profile meeting between the Cardinal who succeeded Wyszynski when he died, Cardinal Glemp, Jaruzelski, and Wałęsa. Glemp, and therefore the Church because he was the Primate, for a time actively tried to mediate some sort of solution along these lines – so much so that some Solidarity people criticized him for being red as a Cardinal in more than one sense. He was in no sense pro-regime, but somewhat authoritarian, and did not show a whole lot of sympathy for Wałęsa and Solidarity. In this regard, I noticed, that, though the majority of the Polish people rightly saw the Church as their supporter, they gave priority to the interests of their autonomy as Poles, the *naród*, the nation, when they perceived the Church as not supportive enough on an issue. In the end, this solution was generally seen as a ploy by the people, was rejected by Solidarity, and came to naught.

And another measure that the regime attempted at this time was to get the Sejm, the Parliament, to authorize emergency measures it viewed necessary, in other words, martial law, allegedly, to restore social peace and salvage the economy.

Q: It was S-E-M-J, wasn't it?

BASTIANI: S-E-J-M, yes.

Q: Which was the Polish Parliament.

BASTIANI: Which was the Polish Parliament. In Parliament the Church as well as Solidarity, opposed a law to allow these measures, and it too came to nothing. And that's why, when they finally did impose martial law they tried to justify it constitutionally under the article that authorized a "state of war," *stan wojenny*, as though the country had been or was about to be invaded. Of course, the only ones threatening invasion were their socialist brethren, the Soviets, East Germans, and Czechoslovaks.

To summarize, it had become increasingly obvious from August '81 that a countdown to the imposition of martial law was underway. At the same time, Solidarity was organizing its own National Convention which took place in September. They had been formally legalized as an autonomous labor union, and had to maintain this public stance. But in reality, shortly after August '80, they had become a national revolutionary movement supported by up to 90% of the people. Early the next year, early 1982, local elections were due to take place and Solidarity by September, having despaired of getting the Government to reach an agreement which honored their gains in the August '80 settlement, had decided that they would bring about change legally from the bottom by winning these local elections.

I think when this intention of Solidarity became clear the regime realized it had to move up the date for the imposition of martial law. Apparently they hadn't originally intended to impose it until after the end of 1981, but in early December the situation heated up enormously because of their provocations and Solidarity's reactions to them, including the threat of a national strike on December 17. I think the provocations were intended to get these reactions from Solidarity as proof of the charge that Solidarity was violating its legal status as a union only, and was trying to take over the Government.

Q: 1980…?

BASTIANI: December 12th and 13th 1981. The arrests of Solidarity activists country-wide began during the night of Saturday the 12th, but Jaruzelski's speech imposing martial law wasn't broadcast until early Sunday morning, the 13th. It was a gloomy, smoggy morning in Krakow. I somehow learned of it quite early in the morning. The phones were cut off, so I went by car to each of the Consulate officers' homes to tell them the news, and called a meeting later that morning at the Consulate. The streets were absolutely abandoned, nobody was out except some very elderly people with red

armbands; these were the old guard, I guess, of the Communist party. They were out there, I assume as the eyes and ears of the regime. I don't recall seeing any troops in the center of Krakow.

At the Consulate I got word that the *woyewoda,* the prefect of the Krakow *woyewódstwo*, province, wanted me and the French Consul General to meet with him that afternoon. France was the only other Western country with a Consulate in Krakow at the time; it had the status of a Consulate General, even though it had only two officers. In a polite and sorrowful tone, the prefect explained that the government had been forced to impose martial law; and that, for our own protection, we could no longer travel freely outside the city; that to travel anywhere else we needed an authorization in writing from him.

I remember seeing the French Consul General diplomatically nodding in an "I understand" way. I on the other hand had been fuming internally as I listened. Indeed, I had been fuming all morning since I found I couldn't call any of the other American officers on the phone who resided elsewhere in the city. They had cut off all our communications with the outside world, consular and residential. So speaking as calmly as I could, I said in substance: "You have just said this is a purely internal situation in Poland. However, we have an international agreement; we have a formal, signed, international consular agreement with Poland. Under international law, international agreements take precedence over local laws and situations. Under this consular agreement, I am entitled to continue traveling freely within my Consular District. Therefore, we will continue to do so. Moreover, under international law the Polish government is responsible for our safety, and I have full confidence in your ability to provide it." This took him aback. I was spouting all this diplomatic stuff about international law of which he obviously knew nothing. He didn't argue. I'm sure he realized he had to consult. And so that's how the meeting ended.

And for about a week, we traveled freely. I either would go out myself with one other, or send others in pairs, every day to a different part of the Consular District which was the whole southeast quadrant of Poland, to see what was going on and write a report. There were five of us. Guards stood outside our door. No Poles were admitted, but American citizens were. There was no more visa work, there was no more cultural work; every American officer suddenly became a reporting officer.

Then one day I had to drive alone to the city of Katowice about an hour's drive west to pick up two officers who were stranded there. All four tires of their car had been slashed. I don't recall how I got the word, probably from someone they had asked to carry it to the Consulate; it certainly wasn't by phone. A few days later, our Branch Public Affairs USIS officer and his wife on their way to Vienna were stopped well before they reached the border and forced to open the trunk of their car, contrary to the diplomatic privileges we enjoyed. With distant hindsight, I now think they were probably making sure our officer wasn't helping some Solidarity activist they were searching for leave the country. We were being harassed, and I realized that, under protest, we would have to file for authorization to travel outside of Krakow.

As it turned out the only permission they would grant for about six weeks or more, was directly to the Embassy in Warsaw. So we ran pouches of our reports and APO mail to the Embassy about twice a week in the middle of winter, and brought back pouches, mail and supplies, including food, on the return trip a day later. Five or six road blocks along the way during which our authorization was checked turned what was normally a four or five hour drive into a seven or eight hour drive. There were sometimes lengthy waits while those manning the blocks checked with their centers by radio.

How the road blocks were manned provided abundant proof that the security police, not the military as was alleged, were really running martial law. Two of them sat in their cruiser with the engine running to keep warm, while a lowly soldier took our authorization to them without looking at it, and returned it to us after approval. There wasn't a military officer in sight. The soldier was under the command of the security police.

My most memorable courier run was the one I did myself with our FSN administrative driver on return from the Embassy with the Consulate's suburban vehicle loaded with our APO packages and mail just before Christmas. We had made it through to Kielce, about an hour north of Krakow, when we were stopped by security policemen in mufti. I don't recall seeing any soldiers. The one we spoke with through the window had an automatic weapon slung across his chest, and in no uncertain terms, ordered us to return to Warsaw. The authorization we showed him didn't impress him at all. With all those APO Christmas packages and perishables for the staff in the suburban – it was loaded to the gills – I wasn't about to.

Fortunately, before martial law was imposed, I had made an official call on the *wojewoda* of the Kielce province who was the First Secretary of the Party as well, and still remembered his name. It had been a rather pleasant encounter. I insisted that he be called, as though we were friends. My driver who did some interpreting for me volunteered no comment. Well, I don't know how long the standoff lasted – prolonged I'm sure because all this was happening late at night – but finally, we were brusquely waved through.

Getting back to the permission business, despite the fact that the *woyewoda* had made it clear, even explicitly, that the only permission you're going to get is to Warsaw, I put in a request almost every single day to go to a different place in the Consular District, all of which were turned down. I did this on my own authority, since I couldn't consult with the Embassy anyway on a real time basis. I found liked being able to operate throughout this period as my own boss without consulting my superiors in Warsaw. I think we got up to about 15 refusals before it was all over. I was building a case for a demarche based on international law through the Embassy to the Foreign Ministry, if I could convince the Embassy to make it. No additional travel restrictions had been placed on Polish diplomats in the U.S. The issue became moot after the restrictions were later dropped.

One day in this period, the local party newspaper, Gazeta Krakowska, headlined a story about the visit of the Soviet Consul General to the city of Tarnów, about an hour's drive to the East. With a copy in hand I made a demarche on the Prefect to ask how he had

approved his travel and wouldn't approve mine. He had no answer, but didn't change the policy toward us either. The fanfare visit of the Soviet Consul General to Tarnów showed who really was running things in Poland.

Mention of our administrative FSN who drove for me on that return from Warsaw in the suburban reminds me of one more thing that happened that fateful Sunday morning in Krakow. We knew he worked for both sides. That day – I think it was while I was meeting with the Prefect – without any by-your-leave from me or any American officer, he had put up a sign on the glass front door, saying the Consulate was closed until further notice. When I saw it, I ripped it down and replaced it with one saying we were open as usual, and confronted him. I really laid into him, and was close to firing him on the spot.

Q: In these communist countries you have sort of embedded spies, you might say, but this was also a way of getting information to the other side you would like them to have, so they played a useful role.

BASTIANI: Yes, this guy was particularly resourceful in getting things we needed locally – I think because of his connections with the other side – so I restrained myself.

Even before my arrival, he regularly took orders for meat from the American officers and delivered them on a weekly basis. Any cut was available; I've never had before or since better pork loin roasts. I'm sure he got the meat from the special stores to which only the security people and high party officials had access. Well, because of the scarcity of meat and other food under martial law when supplies worsened, most of our FSNs were losing a lot of work time standing in lines to buy food. I asked him to do the same for the FSNs on a reduced basis as he did for the Americans. He did, and I'm sure he got his cut, but it was a great boon both for the Consulate and the employees.

It was essential that we remain open under martial law because we had a fair number of American citizens residing in Krakow for whom we were responsible under our consular mandate. Many were medical or other faculty students of Polish ethnic origin at the local universities, who were suddenly isolated from the world, like ourselves, but without our access to Embassy and APO communication facilities. There were well over 50 students. Early on I had a meeting set up in the Consulate for all Americans residing in the District, and told them we would help them as much as we could. We made sure they all registered with us. That is about the only genuine consular work we did.

Using my own U.S. stamps, I even pouched their personal mail to their families who were frantically asking the American Services office in the Department for news about their welfare. I put my own American stamps on the letters, and sent them in fat envelopes to the country desk in the Department, so that the desk would have nothing more to do than drop them in the mail. That got me into trouble with the desk and the Embassy for misusing the APO pouch which was restricted to USG employees by agreement with the Defense Department. I was ordered to end the practice and did. In hindsight, I now see that I should have addressed the packets containing the students' letters to the American Services Section in the Department, and said nothing to the desk.

Q: Were you having the problems during the martial law of delivering checks to Polish pensioners, Social Security, and that sort of thing?

BASTIANI: That was all suspended for several months. We normally did that through the mail which for some weeks at least did not function after the imposition of martial law. All the telephones were down in Poland for I don't know exactly how long, longer in the areas where pockets of workers were still resisting. But even after they were restored within Krakow for the citizens, they were still cut off for the Consulate and our homes for some time longer.

I assumed that what they were trying to do was get us to close the Consulate by our own decision. The security police, I'm sure, had had that sign put up on our door the day of martial law itself. I think the reason for that was they didn't want us to see what they were doing to their own people; they didn't want people talking to us. And so they made this obvious effort first to close us down, and then to induce us, through lack of communications and contact with the people, to close the Consulate.

Q: Did they put a guard outside the Consulate?

BASTIANI: Yes. They put guards outside my house as well, the official residence. One of the reasons for that, I'm sure is that, Gil – I can't remember his first name – the Solidarity union leader at the Nowa Huta steel mill had not been apprehended, and they had the idea that we might be giving him asylum in the Consulate or the residence. My best evidence of that is that one evening, after dark, I emerged from the garage under my house to the sidewalk for some reason. The guards immediately rushed over from the front gate and grabbed me, thinking I was Gil. They backed off immediately when they saw who I was. Also, one local Solidarity leader on the lam did get into the Consulate through our back gate which opened onto the main square which apparently at first wasn't guarded. We never used it, and kept it permanently shut. We persuaded him to leave the same way, since there was nothing we could do for him. They weren't shooting Solidarity activists on sight; only interning them in camps as they did thousands. On second thought, this guy may have been an agent from Gil to ask whether he could come in for asylum…I don't recall the details.

But the main reason they had these guards there was to keep Poles and other country nationals out. I was so afraid that the Department and the Embassy might decide to pull us out on hardship grounds that I kept telling the Embassy it was absolutely essential we keep this Consulate open. Ambassador Meehan got so fed up with me harping on this, that he told one of our officers to tell me on his return from a courier run to the Embassy, that we'll close the Embassy before we close the Consulate in Krakow. So that put my mind at rest on the issue.

Q. *We're talking about when martial law was imposed and the problem about closing the Consulate. Then we'll talk more about your contacts and keep going from there. Today is*

the 15th of April, the Ides of April, 2008. Carl, was there steady stream of people into the Consulate, or were people shying away from you?

BASTIANI: After the imposition of martial law we didn't see any Poles at all for quite some time. They were prevented from entering. We dealt immediately with Americans who were not prevented from entering, a fairly large number given where we were. There were well over 50 students studying at local universities, and a few others, including a university professor from John Carroll University in Cleveland on a Fulbright Exchange program. He himself was of Polish origin, born in the States but emotionally attached to Poland. To this day he remains a good friend. Later on some Poles were permitted entry, and were quite brave in doing so because there was a window on the second floor of the shops opposite the Consulate through which the security observed and presumably photographed visitors to the Consulate. All the other windows on the second floor were painted over.

Q: How long did this all last?

BASTIANI: The severe restrictions lasted about six weeks. I regret I can't give a precise date. Restrictions on travel within the consular district lasted some months longer. It was only after the regime was convinced it had overcome all remaining resistance that they were removed. There had been active resistance in the Katowice area and Silesia which were in the eastern part of the consular district. Silesia was the center for coal mining. In Katowice there was a huge white elephant steel mill built by Gierek when he was First Secretary. The coal mines at Jastzębie in Silesia is where the strongest resistance took place. That resistance went on for at least a couple of weeks but it was the only place in Poland that I recall where there was real resistance of this sort. We had estimates of deaths from 8 to considerably more when the striking miners were assaulted by the security police utilizing tanks.

Getting back to communications, I forgot to mention that we also had an army surplus transmitter-receiver that had been given us by the Embassy for use in emergencies. They had given it to us before martial law without going through the diplomatic channel to obtain official approval for it. Well, we at the Consulate set this radio up in the attic with an inside antenna – the roof was made of tiles, which do not block radio waves. While in the seminary before entering the Foreign Service, I had acquired a ham radio license, so I knew enough about the technology to set up this dipole antenna within the attic so that it could not be seen from the outside. We American officers took turns talking to the Embassy on this radio in pig Latin and slang to report some things informally on a real time basis and our personal and administrative needs. While martial law had made social/political/economic officers of us all, it took at least a week for our typed cables to be pouched and run up to the embassy through all these road blocks.

Well, you can't control where radio waves bounce to. They hit the ionosphere and do multiple bounces in all directions. Now this I didn't learn in full until sometime after I left, and only indirectly. These transmissions were picked up in the Soviet Union and the Soviets used them as an example of how the U.S. was subverting the Poles; by

transmitting instructions to Solidarity. They of course pressured the Polish Foreign Ministry to lodge an indignant protest to the Embassy. As a result, the Embassy immediately ordered me to cease all transmissions, and told me we could only use the radio to report a life or death emergency threatening our American personnel. That ended my reporting by that means. I then assumed the reason the Embassy complied was because the radio was diplomatically illegal, and did not wish to aggravate relations further.

The indirect manner in which I found out what had led to the demand from the Foreign Ministry to shut us down was receipt in the mail after I had left the post of a copy of a story from a Leningrad newspaper which charged that the Consulate in Krakow was transmitting orders to Solidarity by clandestine radio. I don't recall exactly who sent me the copy of the story, and hope I thanked him properly. Vaguely I recall it was from someone who knew me or of me, and was stationed in the Middle East at the time.

Q *Did you have any contact with Solidarność?*

BASTIANI: After the imposition of martial law for a long time none whatsoever, because practically all the Solidarity leaders in this extremely well organized repression had been arrested the night before the announcement of martial law and hauled off to concentration camps throughout Poland. The only contact we had for a while, practically speaking, was indirectly with an interned Solidarity professor through his wife, after they began to allow family to visit internees in the camps. He would secretly pass to her reports written on rolls of cigarette paper about what was going on in the camps, and she would come to the Consulate to deliver them to us. By this time they were allowing Poles to enter. Our political-economic officer, John Ritchie, would decipher then as well as he could and report. One of the reports about the number of Solidarity internees interned and released directly contradicted what the Foreign Ministry had told the Embassy. From the beginning, we, the US, had told the regime no real relations with you until you release the internees and go back to having a dialogue with Solidarity to resolve your problems internally, without outside interference. That was the U.S. position – a very solid position – right from the start to not give any pretext for a Soviet invasion and at the same time preserve as much as the autonomy that was left to Poland.

I don't remember the exact date, but this was a time when some in the Department who saw that martial law had succeeded, thought it was time to for a few carrots to get back into some sort of relationship with the regime such as it was. This recommendation had already gone, or was about to go, from the Department to the White House. Our report shot this initiative down because it proved the Polish regime was lying to us about the internees.

Later, Embassy reaction to another of our reports from I believe a different source we in Krakow knew to be very reliable caused a problem for me. We were reporting directly to the Department with a copy to the Embassy as mandated from the time I arrived there. We were also having so-called info copies sent to posts in Europe most involved in East-West relations, particularly our NATO mission. Of course, we never identified the source

of a report beyond rating its reliability. Well, the Embassy received a routine request from our NATO Mission asking whether the report could be shared with our allies. Without checking with us in Krakow, the Embassy immediately replied that they did not wish the report to be distributed because they knew the source, and did not consider him reliable, which contradicted our own rating. About a week later when we got a copy of this exchange in the pouch, and I saw how the Embassy had misconstrued the identity of our source and rating, I lodged a protest with the Embassy.

Intelligence, reporting, was our prime mission, and I had thought long and hard about it during previous experience in INR. Intelligence to be useful must be factual and neutral with respect to policy objectives, because it is supposed to tell us what the real situation is, what the facts are. Only In their light can we see how to advance our policies. So we shouldn't slant intelligence or limit it in order to support policy objectives.

I don't know if I related this last time, but on one of my visits to the Embassy for consultation – this was after the imposition of martial law – I discussed my views on reporting together with the DCM and the Ambassador together; we were walking in the Embassy grounds. I told them Krakow couldn't report everything – there was just too much – so we had to be selective. Aside from the intrinsic importance of an event, I based my selection on what I saw of Embassy reporting. If I saw the Embassy was fully reporting on a subject, I didn't report the same thing – what I call a sort of me-too kind of reporting – but tried to report from what we got from our contacts, and other information what the Embassy *wasn't reporting,* to fill out the picture. Occasionally, I said, we may report something which contradicts what the Embassy is reporting, or an Embassy's analysis.

Neither the DCM nor the Ambassador to my recollection commented on what I had said, and I took that for agreement. However, later on I found that they had decided to vet everything from Krakow before sending it on to the Department. I suspected some things were never sent on, and remember seeing a few reports later in the archives which were substantially edited or summarized.

From about the spring of 1982, after all open resistance had finally ended in Silesia, martial law measures were gradually ended, and most Solidarity activists were released from camps. However, some measures were still in effect when I was transferred out in the summer of '83.

Q: *Were there were sermons in the church which referred to the situation telling people what to do.*

BASTIANI: I know there were in parishes elsewhere in Poland; to my knowledge, there were none in the Church around the corner from the residence which I attended. I had some trouble understanding the sermons that were given anyway, given my limitation in Polish and the acoustics. There was a priest in Warsaw who became rather notorious. He was kidnapped and tied up and thrown into a lake. This was well into the martial law period, and a movie was later made about it.

To Foreign Ministries in the West, after about six months, all this looked like this had been a brilliant victory by the regime and Jaruzelski's reputation as decisive leader was very much enhanced. There were even some people in the West who openly admired him. I don't know whether I have mentioned this earlier, but right after I came out of Poland in mid-1983, by which time most of the restrictions imposed by martial law had been lifted, Barbara Walters had an exclusive interview with Jaruzelski…

Q. *A well-known TV personality who interviews people…*

BASTIANI: Yes, and she is still prominent. I witnessed this on television in a highly emotional stat. I had just come back…I think I was close to a nervous breakdown, because I had just gotten some severe criticism from my supervisor, the DCM Herb Wilgis. An inspection of our Mission in Poland by the Department's had taken place, and what I told the inspectors, and what he told them had apparently clashed. This happened when I was on the way out and my replacement, Mike Metrinko, who had been a hostage in Teheran, was on the way in. We were both guests at a dinner given by the DCM at his residence in Warsaw. I no sooner arrived than Herb confronted me in front of everyone, demanding to know what I had told the inspectors, I assume with hindsight about my protest to the Embassy on how they had handled two of our reports. I was shocked, and don't recall saying anything. I think Mrs. Wilgis intervened and the subject was dropped.

Anyway, getting back to the Barbara Walters interview with Jaruzelski, I watched it in my room in the hotel on the corner of Virginia and 22nd Street which is now a dormitory of George Washington University. I vividly remember it; there sat Jaruzelski with his dark glasses in a throne like chair– he had some sort of eye problem – and she was sitting much lower, looking up at him with admiring eyes. And she said, "Now tell me, General, how did it feel for you as a Polish nationalist to impose martial law on your own people in order to prevent a Soviet invasion?" I was so close to kicking in that television set that I had to restrain myself, because the exact opposite was true. He was finally carrying out his orders from the Soviets; to roll back Solidarity for which they had given him all kinds of support.

I have just reviewed on the internet what the National Security Archives had put up on their web site on this subject. They published a book of translated documents, From Solidarity to Martial Law, obtained from the State Department archives, the Polish government, the Polish Workers Party, the Kremlin and others about the imposition of martial law in Poland. I have just ordered a copy. One document was the notes of a Russian officer who attended a meeting between Kulikov, the Russian General who headed the Warsaw Pact at the time, and Jaruzelski a few days before the imposition of martial law, in which Jaruzelski emotionally expressed his distress at having been told that the Soviets did not intend to introduce troops into Poland when martial law was declared.

Far from imposing martial law in order to forestall a Russian invasion, he was carrying out the solution which most met Soviet interests in the bloc and internationally with the

West. He was distressed that Kulikov no longer intended introduce additional Soviet troops into Poland simultaneously to back him up. These notes were shown to historians and principals of the events at a meeting in Poland organized by the National Security Archives and others in 1997. Both Jaruzelski and Kulikov were present at this meeting.

Jaruzelski had no ideological reservations about socialism under Soviet leadership, and, unlike Ceausescu, saw no reason to defend Poland's autonomy within the bloc.

Also, unlike his predecessor as First Secretary, Władiswław Gomułka, who in 1956 had been made Party First Secretary in the wake of the Poznan uprising, Jaruzelski not only was not opposed to the introduction of Soviet troops, but was counting on them to back him up when he imposed martial law. Khrushchev was quite prepared to send troops into Poland in 1956 as he did later that year in Hungary. Gomułka, stood up to Khrushchev on the issue of troops; but we can imagine him having made the same promises to roll back the concessions which had been made to the workers to end their opposition, as did Kania and Jaruzelski in December 1980. He did in fact gradually roll them back over the next few years.

Q: *During all this period I imagine one of the things we had been watching very closely in the aftermath of World War II was Polish anti-Semitism?*

BASTIANI: It was there, but the Nazis having eliminated almost the entire Jewish population, was not evident. The influence of what was left of the Jewish community was nil, so it did not even come up as an issue in society. Both before and after martial law, the Consulate in Krakow was intermittently pressured by Rabbi Leaders of the Jewish community in the United States to intervene with the Polish authorities for the restoration of Jewish cemeteries and monuments which had been vandalized or obliterated during the Nazi period. I hosted several such visits, and we found that the Polish authorities were reasonably cooperative in dealing with these requests.

Regarding the Jewish community in Krakow, I recall one experience that concerned Pope John Paul II, who as a youth in Krakow had close Jewish friends. Some Jewish extremists have questioned what he did or didn't do to help them when they were being rounded up by the Nazis. He was at the time an unskilled laborer and secretly studying for the priesthood. The vestigial Jewish community in Krakow – I don't recall any numbers, but it was only a few thousand – was divided between strictly orthodox and liberal members. The latter were the majority which had a sort of cooperative relationship with the regime which allowed them to receive welfare assistance from international Jewish organizations. Well, about this time, a New York congressman who is very militant in defense of Jews everywhere…I can't recall his name; he was an extremely demanding guy…

Q: Was this Stephen Solarz?

BASTIANI: Of course! And I'm sure you know his personality. Well, he announced a visit to Poland, and in his request to the Department practically demanded appointments

with Polish leaders from the top down. I don't now recall whether this was before or after the imposition of martial law; I think after. In any event, the Poles were largely responsive, because they were anxious to maintain or restore economic relations, especially with the U.S. In Krakow, I hosted him to a luncheon with just four of us at the residence: the leader of the Jewish conservative group, the leader of the liberal group, Solarz and myself.

Solarz at one point in his very aggressive way asked: "And he Pope, the Pope, was he anti-Semitic? The orthodox leader answered immediately with emotion: "The Pope is not anti-Semitic at all; he is pro-Semitic. He said that so strongly; the orthodox man defended him to the hilt. I don't recall the liberal leader saying anything at all; he just kept his mouth shut.

One more experience regarding the Pope – John Paul II – comes strongly to mind in this context. Of course he was enormously popular with the people, and credited by many analysts with a major role in the collapse of communism. I'm reminded of here. Toward the end of my tour with martial law still in effect, he made his second to Poland. The regime had hoped to use the visit – which it felt it could not refuse – to help legitimize itself with the people. But, as on his first visit in June 1979 shortly before my arrival, this second visit attracted enormous crowds; and here and there within them, Solidarity banners were prominently displayed. This was especially true in the last city he visited, Krakow where an estimated two million filled the vast open park-like area called the *blonie* to attend the Solemn Mass and listen to the Pope's words of encouragement. For me, on the platform with my wife near the altar, it was a truly moving experience. Here too, Solidarity banners were prominently displayed, making clear to the world that Solidarity still lived.

Presumably, to deter crowds from being present at the Pope's departure, the regime had his plane leave from a more distant military airport to which access was restricted. Told at first that consular representatives were not invited, I insisted, and, to my pleasant surprise was permitted to join the end of the motorcade, just behind a couple of police vehicles. It was about the only time in my four years in Krakow that I had the chauffeur put the flags on the fenders. At points along the route, people had gathered. Invariably they booed the police vehicles ahead of me, but then quickly burst into cheers as my car went by. Despite being denigrated in the rigidly controlled media for so long as having subverted the people, I was pleased to note that official Americans were still popular.

Q: You mentioned that you had been criticized by the DCM at the time you left; how did that go?

BASTIANI: Well, that was the end of it. I went home and, though we never saw each other again, we resumed our personal relations by mail for a time which had been good during my tour. I recall paying off a sports bet I lost by sending him a box of Turin's famous chocolates, *gianduiotti*. He had once told me that I had the best job in Poland, and I had no disagreement with that whatsoever. In fact, when he went on to another assignment not long after I left, he became our Consul General in Barcelona. I never tried

to review the matter of the criticism with him or anyone else as perhaps I should have. After home leave, I went on to Torino, to reopen the Consulate there.

Before we move on, I would like to address some myths about what took place in Poland while I was there, which have pretty much become the conventional wisdom. One is that Jaruzelski pulled off a *military coup* which is totally false.

Yes, he was Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief; and yes, he organized this Council of Military Generals which allegedly ran the country. But he was also the First Secretary of the Party and the leader of the moderate core of the Party's Politburo. It was the collective decision of this political group to impose martial law to crush Solidarity and restore the Party's monopoly of power as the Soviets had pressured them to do throughout 1981. The military takeover was formal window dressing, because they well knew how much the Party and government were discredited, and the Security police of the Ministry of Interior, who actually carried out the repression, were hated. The military uniform on the other hand retained some respect among the people. The military was used – I like to say "prostituted" – in the imposition of martial law. Even the anchors on evening news program were dressed in the uniform, which gave rise to this joke: "What is the lowest rank in the Polish Army?" The answer: "News announcer on TV." Many Poles actually took walks during the program as a protest of its propaganda.

Despite several requests for an appointment, I was never received by the General appointed to run the Krakow province. He never appeared publicly, and, to my knowledge, never gave an order.

However, I did get to meet the Air Force General who allegedly ran the important province of Katowice. He received me jointly with the First Secretary of the Party there, who like everywhere else also was also the Prefect or *woyewoda,* before and under martial law. The conversation with the General was very pleasant; he proudly named the many different aircraft he had flown in his career, and we shared a common interest in flying and aviation. I enjoy the memory. The conversation with the First Secretary on the other hand was an adversarial exchange over martial law, Solidarity, and the allegations of U.S. subversion of the latter. It was easy to see that he was the hardliner in charge.

Martial law was actually carried out by the Security Police of the Ministry of the Interior, the so-called Zomos who I liked to call the attack dogs of the regime. Their forces were large, and they were mechanized as well. The people well knew the difference between them and the regular militia who arrested thieves and directed traffic. I can remember a Party conference in Krakow during martial law at which the head of the police was quoted in Gazeta Krakowska as boasting that the prime mission of the police was to protect the Party. Protection of the people from criminals was obviously secondary.

This reminds me of what a courageous Solidarity supporter, Barbara, whom my wife and I had come to know well, had her children say when the police visited their school to explain their role. She primed them to ask: "Are you the police who protect us, or are you the police who beat people?" Barbara and her husband – both engineers – later defected

and reside with their children in Chicago. Dorothy and I wrote testimonials in their behalf to the Immigration Service while they were in a refugee camp in Germany. I've recently received a tourist card of the Arizona Memorial in Honolulu where they vacationed.

Q: *Before you left, I take it was stressful for you and your family toward the end.*

BASTIANI: It was indeed, but more so for some of the other officers and Polish employees. I see it as an obligation to memorialize the loyalty and courage shown by most of the Consulate's local Polish staff under martial law. They too, for whom we Americans could provide no protection, were harassed by the security police. One, especially, the late Andzej Głowacz, I learned was brutally beaten with his wife after I left. I have already mentioned that John Ritchie, the political reporting officer, was hit by water cannon in the Main Square. On that occasion he, along with demonstrators was knocked down several times and had to take refuge in a bookstore which had its windows smashed. The aim, obviously, was to *beat* demonstrators including women children – not just break up demonstrations. On another occasion, he along with John Schmidt, then Visa Officer, were dragged into an unmarked car and only escaped being beaten with rubber truncheons after their diplomatic status was verified. I came under attack only once; when zomos dressed like workers attempted to break the rear view window of my official car by beating on it with rubber truncheons. They didn't succeed. I had driven with the chauffeur to the steel mill in Nowa Huta after demonstrations to see what I could see. We made a wrong turn and came upon a square where the buses of the zomos were parked.

As for my family, we had an experience which was not all that stressful, but certainly memorable. At the beginning of martial law when my number two daughter, Teresa, was scheduled to make a visit from Washington University in St. Louis? Under the educational benefits the Department provides, she received round trip transportation for two visits during the academic year. She was all set to come for the holidays. When martial law was imposed, her trip was cancelled. Well, prior to that she had invited five or six university friends who were on short-term university exchange visits in Europe to come visit her in Krakow over the holidays. In anticipation of their arrival, my wife and I had made a special trip to the Commissary at a U.S. base in West Berlin to stock up on food. I joked that we had enough supplies to feed the Soviet army if it invaded.

My daughter's trip was cancelled; but, would you believe it, five or six of these guys and gals showed up. Train travel to and from Poland in the period was disrupted and unpredictable. For over a week, while I had the Consulate administrative people trying to arrange return travel for them to Western Europe, we had twelve people residing in the residence and around the table every day. Those pantry supplies disappeared so fast. My two resident daughters, Linda, number four, then 12, and Patti, number five and 5, had the most enjoyable time with all these students who played games with them and otherwise entertained them.

When we finally got them tickets on the Warsaw train to Vienna which stopped at Katowice, about an hour's drive west from Krakow, I personally drove them to the

station in the Consulate's suburban vehicle to make sure they got on it. The station was chaotic and the train was bulging with passengers with some people on the roof. The students managed to get on it, through a window, with me pushing.

Another development regarding Teresa who had invited these students and never showed up was her engagement to be married. We received the news in a State Department cable. When her trip was cancelled, a friend, John Petros, who was courting her, invited her to spend the holidays with his parents in suburban Chicago. While she was there, he popped the question, she accepted, and the Department passed the news in an official cable. They are now long since married, both medical doctors, and have five daughters as my wife and I.

Back to the myths; I could go on illustrating how the military wasn't the institution which actually imposed martial law or ran the country under it, but another myth which has become part of the conventional wisdom was that Solidarity with its strikes was to blame for the economic chaos which prompted – even justified – the imposition of martial law, as Jaruzelski claimed in his address to the nation.

Yes, a Solidarity leader in Krakow once told me that we could work harder, but not when we see so much waste and corruption in the factories. I may have already mentioned my visit to a machine tool factory in Tarnow or Zszezow, east of Krakow, in the fall of 1981. Solidarity had replaced the regime labor union in the factory early on, and, in effect ran it, while observing a correct relationship with the management appointed by the authorities. Its machine tools were exported to the West. Despite more difficulty than in preceding years in obtaining the necessary raw materials, it had increased production and earned more hard currency for Poland in 1981 than in preceding years.

In the conventional wisdom, much is made of the fact that throughout 1981 Kania and Jaruzelski resisted Soviet pressure to have martial law imposed. However, at no time did Jaruzelski disagree with the need to roll back Solidarity and reestablish the Party's monopoly of power. At no time did he contemplate an agreement with Solidarity to resolve economic problems with their cooperation. He remained a believer in Soviet-style socialism as good for the "too romantic" Polish people, as he characterized them to a Western interviewer after martial law's success.

When he replaced Kania as First Secretary of the Party in October 1981 without giving up any of the other positions he held – Prime Minister, Defense Minister and Commander in Chief -- it became clear that the Soviets had restored their faith in him, and relied on him to deliver on the promises made the previous December. After the success of martial law, Jaruzelski also became Head of the Council of State or President of Poland, again without relinquishing any of the previous offices, and was apparently looking forward to being made Marshal before his death, the highest military honor available in East Europe.

A final point I'd like to make is how surprised and unforeseen the imposition of martial law was to the CIA and State Department. In fact, our Ambassador, Francis Meehan, was here in Washington on consultation when it occurred. He left Poland at a time when the

signs of crisis were rapidly multiplying. He was obviously relying on CIA reports which attributed little possibility to the imposition of martial law by the regime; reasons for which I have mentioned earlier. I would add that they had apparently interpreted Kania and Jaruzelski's resistance to the *timing,* the Soviets and their hardliner allies in the Polish Party wanted for its imposition as *rejection* of it as a solution. The documentary revelations I mentioned earlier show that they – and the Soviets – may have been right about Kania, but certainly not about Jaruzelski.

This was a great failure of intelligence, as Douglas MacEachin, a former intelligence analyst and director in the CIA explains in his book, US Intelligence and the Polish Crisis, published in 2000. It is really difficult to understand this failure because we had the best spy you could possibly imagine within Jaruzelski's inner circle, Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski. In fact, part of his responsibility was to help plan martial law. He gave all of this information, almost on a real time basis, to the CIA. When he was threatened with exposure in a general investigation for sources of leaks, the CIA in a truly brilliant operation, managed to spirit him and his entire family out of Poland. The details of the operation read more like a spy novel than facts they were. All of this is explained in a book and articles about him.

So we had the final plans and the source with his family in Washington, yet we did nothing with them. We could have blown this thing, but didn't. This remains for me a mystery to be resolved. It remains even a mystery to MacEachin as he explains in the closing chapter of his book. I hope to go into it later on, if and when I write the book it's been my intention to write since I left Poland.

Since 2008 Jaruzelski has been on trial in Poland. His defense of course is that he imposed martial law to save his people from a worse evil, a Soviet invasion. As I explained in a previous session, Jaruzelski was in a position to reach an agreement with Solidarity in which the Party gave up its monopoly of power, and bring about a transition to a limited, but genuine, form of democracy while deterring the Soviets coming in to crush it. I'm convinced of that thesis, but you can never rerun history to prove it. So it will remain debatable, perhaps forever. Recent documentary evidence however, neither supports Jaruzelski's defense, nor the thesis that the Soviets would have invaded had he refused to impose their solution; indeed, to the contrary.

Q: *You left Poland, when?*

BASTIANI: I left in August of 1983.

Q: *Did you have any idea of where you wanted to go; what you wanted to do?*

BASTIANI: Yes, I felt – and this may have been arrogance on my part – but I thought I was ready for a good DCM job. I had long ago set the objective of becoming an ambassador, and I thought I was ready for the normal step to an ambassadorship by serving as a deputy chief of mission. At this time the job in Prague was open, and I volunteered for it. I wrote the Ambassador, but he had already picked his man. However,

as I was about to leave on a trip it took six months to set up to visit Moscow and Leningrad to celebrate our 25th wedding anniversary – I had never been to the Soviet Union – I received a phone call from Personnel in the Department, offering me the job of Political Counselor in Prague, which from a career standpoint I should have taken.

I had also received an offer directly from the DCM in Rome, Peter Bridges, to go to Torino and reopen the Consulate there which had been closed in 1980 over the vigorous protests of the entire Torinese power elite, from Agnelli on down. They hadn't persuaded the Department, but belatedly convinced the Congress which by a line item appropriation mandated the reopening of Turin and four other posts in Western Europe.

The Department in the late 70's and early 80's was really bent on closing posts, and there seem to be an unholy alliance between the Office of Management and Budget in the White House and the Department's Bureau of Administration. Congress therefore forced the Department to reopen these posts. I accepted this offer seeing it as an opportunity to establish a small post as it should be established.

Part of my rationalization for making this choice was to get my family out of that polluted environment. We had spent four years in Krakow which had one of the most polluted environments in the world, and what I had seen of Prague's on the two or three drives we took through it on our way to and from Vienna seemed just as bad.

Q: Carl, so now you're in Torino. You were there from '83 to?

BASTIANI: Eighty-seven.

Q: Eighty-seven. In the first place, overall, how did the one-officer post work out?

BASTIANI: I can best characterize my activity at this one-officer post as doing a little bit of everything a post normally does, and not enough of anything. Because it was a one-officer post I was the only one who could do anything classified above Limited Official Use – not really a classification – and had to rely very much on my number one Foreign Service National secretary for just about everything else. She was not just a secretary, but an executive assistant, often acting even as my deputy in dealing with the police and some other local authorities. At a one-officer post you're really on call 7/24, particularly for emergency protection and welfare cases, the one consular function you cannot avoid. You are a permanent duty officer.

When I went away to a conference or a vacation, the first call every morning from my hotel was to the office and Carla Maria Fumai – that was her name. She would tell me what happened the day before, what requests had been made, and get my decisions on all items that couldn't wait. And I would sometimes call again in the evening, or be called, when there was a particularly urgent item, to make sure that it had gone well.

In my last year at Krakow as Principal Officer a Foreign Service inspector had come to Warsaw and told us that there would no longer be one-officer posts. At such posts, the

officer is burdened by innumerable administrative reports that he must make, the classified pouch, and security functions which cannot be delegated to local employees. They figured that he spends over 50 percent of his time on nothing but these purely administrative tasks. Whatever happened to that decision I don't know, because when the State Department was forced by Congress to reopen five posts in 1983, including Torino, which they had closed in 1980, they limited the staffing to one officer and two FSNs at all of them.

The Department had long been trying to close small posts purely for budgetary reasons. They finally had success in the late 70's and early '80s, I think because of the great additional security costs to protect against terrorism, which had become a major concern.

So, I was busy all the time, at this one officer post. But I kind of welcomed the challenge of trying to get as much done as possible with practically no staff. I even put the uniformed security guard to work. He sat at a desk facing the metal entry door, and admitted and logged visitors. Though a consulate, the Department did not require us to issue visas. We arranged for a contract courier service to run sealed bags containing applications in sealed envelopes for visas to the Consulate General in Genoa, and bring back the processed cases the same way.

The system worked extremely well; but at one point we had to put out a notice that we were not charging the applicants a cent for this service. Some local travel agencies were charging clients for whom they handled the paperwork rather exorbitant fees, and alleging or giving them the perception that we were charging these fees. That was the only glitch that we had to deal with.

Q: How about protection and welfare? What kind did you get?

BASTIANI: Emergencies were about the only ones we ever dealt with. The ones that were not true emergencies we referred to Genoa. One particular case stands out in my mind. A young man with a knapsack and tattered clothing, unshaven and obviously exhausted showed up one day. He was so badly off that I had him take a shower in the private bathroom off my office. I think it was about the only time the shower in it was ever used. I sent one of the FSNs out to buy clothing for him. We processed an emergency loan from the Department, and got in touch with his parents in New York. The father was a prominent executive of an aerospace company, a manufacturer of helicopters. The parents had been absolutely desperate about the welfare of their son who had set out months earlier to travel the world.

They of course immediately came up with all the additional money needed for his travel home. The most rewarding thing about Protection and Welfare work is the feeling that you've helped somebody, and the appreciation the families often show in cases like this

I recall another interesting case which also illustrates how efficient my Carla Maria was. While shaving on a Saturday evening to go to a dinner she relayed this frantic phone call from a little town in the mountains, pleading for assistance. A young man, a naturalized

American citizen, who had come back to visit his mother, had just been thrown into jail because he hadn't done his military service before he left years earlier. All I needed to do was over to Carla Maria and authorize her to call the police on my behalf. In no time at all on a Saturday night she got in touch with the our friendly official with responsibility for foreigners in the *Questura*, the regional Police Department, who had this guy returned to his family that same evening, and the issue of his draft violation deferred until the following Monday. I don't recall ever learning what happened, since by Monday it was no longer an emergency, and we referred the case to our Consulate in Genoa.

Q: What was your impression of the trade unions there, Torino being a big manufacturing area? Well, in the first place, was it CSIL or UIL or was it…?

BASTIANI: The main one was CGIL, the Italian General Confederation of Labor, it was the largest and tied to the Communist Party. They were dominant among industrial workers in the north. They put on these tremendous, endless marches every May Day in Milan waving red banners. These workers were the loyal members of the Communist party, its base. I went to witness it once and was awed. CISL was a Christian Democratic Party federation of unions, and UIL was a smaller one tied to the Socialist Party.

Q: Did you have much contact with the labor leaders there?

BASTIANI: No, I did not, and I'm a little surprised that I didn't. When I was there from '83 to '87 there was not a lot of labor unrest. However, I do recall hearing constantly about what happened in 1980, the year the Department coincidentally had closed the Consulate. During a strike which had FIAT on the ropes, there was a march of about 40,000 technicians, employees of FIAT, *against* the strike. It effectively brought an end to the strike, and FIAT survived.

Q: I remember that very well. I mean, when you have union workers protesting basically on the side of...

BASTIANI: …Of the owners.

Q: ...Of the owners. I remember that very well.

BASTIANI: And it was a watershed event. One of my first cousins I recently visited in Torino, a retired FIAT technician, participated in the march. In 1980 FIAT's automobile division, its largest, was just about ready to collapse. They had suffered major vandalism within the plants, vandalism perpetrated by extremists to the left of the Communists themselves, but the union leaders did nothing to stop it. It was a time when it was politically impossible for the Communists to admit that any extremist violence came from the left, even though it was a threat to their national policy to enter the government coalition.

1980 was also the year when Fiat retrenched. They quit making certain models and brought in new managers and really resurrected themselves. But more recently – this is a sidebar – in the early 2000s they were on the ropes again, and seem to have survived.

Q: What about Fiat management, the Agnellis and all that? You know, they were the big lobbyists to keep the post open in 1980. Did they pay much attention to you?

BASTIANI: Yes. I had good relations with both the Agnelli brothers who ran the company at the time, Gianni and Umberto, but particularly with Umberto. Gianni was already in semi-retirement in his home on the *collina*, as the hill overlooking Turin was called – my residence was on the same hill with a magnificent view of the Alps. I only had contact with him directly when the Ambassador visited, I guess twice during my tour there.

Q: The Ambassador was who?

BASTIANI: Raab. R-A-A-B. I just can't drudge up his first name but he was a prominent Republican politician from New York, and was quite diligent in carrying out his ambassadorial duties.

Q: He had actually served as an official in Eisenhower's administration, I think, like a sub chief of staff or something like that.

BASTIANI: Yes, I guess he had clout within the party. But I thought he was an effective Ambassador.

Q: Maxwell Raab.

BASTIANI: That's it. You have an excellent memory, I see. And we had excellent relations. When the Consulate reopened under Congressional mandate, he came up for the official reopening. At the ceremony, both he and I tried to counter skepticism as to whether we would maintain it, given its small size in an office suite, and the fact that we had closed a larger one in 1980 despite their pleas to keep it there. In my remarks I said the U.S. makes mistakes, but unlike other countries, has the rare virtue of recognizing them. Therefore, in deference to the importance of Torino, we were reopening. Beginnings are usually small, but we're going to expand. The Ambassador emphasized that point too. That's what made the bitterness – and I use the word literally here – my own personal bitterness over the decision to close the Consulate again in 1987 is so strong.

Anyway, at the time, I saw the assignment as a challenge to develop the Consulate as one should be developed, to create a new concept of a small consulate. Closures of consulates elsewhere in Europe, including Italy, after our reopening continued. To the extent I could, I urged the Embassy to oppose any more closures in Italy, and as a contribution to the cause submitted an article to the Foreign Service Journal entitled, "Consulates: To Be or Not to Be," arguing that the Foreign Service cannot carry out its legislative mandate

without posts in major cities of democracies, where local leaders have such an enormous influence on the policies of the national Government. Another point I made, among others, was that consulates deal directly with the public – the people – while embassies deal primarily with government bureaucracies. So in pluralistic democracies, it is absolutely essential to have consulates in major urban centers to carry out our mandate.

I guess that partly explains why I was hyper-active. No federal agency could come to me without me giving a lot of attention to its request. I did a lot of commercial work though it was not in my mandate; and I gave very high priority to cultural work though it wasn't either. Consulate General Milan was supposed to cover commercial work in my District; but I never saw them except when I went myself there to pick up pouches. The USIS officer in Genoa was responsible for cultural in my District, but his or her attempt to do so was limited to two or three evening visits a month to use my office to interview candidates for grants. They did have an excellent USIS FSN who spent more time in Turin. Because I was there and his American supervisor was in Genoa, I found it necessary to get involved in his support on a regular basis.

I consider my greatest single achievement in Turin a self-initiated project which combined both commercial and cultural promotion. At lunch one day at the *Vittoria* family restaurant, the young proprietor hesitantly asked me whether it was really true that the U.S. had landed men on the moon. With some embarrassment, he said his communist friends had assured him that it had all been a publicity hoax. I was amazed – and he was relieved – because he was himself pro-American.

At this time, the director of Turin's prestigious International Auto Show – also very pro-American – was imploring me to persuade Washington to participate in some fashion in the Show's next occurrence later that year. As I recall, he offered centrally located space gratis. So I put it to USIS to mount a U.S. man on the moon exhibit. While sympathetic, USIS replied that the request was too late and there was no budget for it. I then persuaded four U.S. companies in the space industry each to contribute $2,500 to the project. In the end, USIA in Washington supplied large translucent photos, those films we have all seen on television of U.S. astronauts gallivanting on the moon, and even a moon rock exhibit which had to be guarded while on display, and secured in a safe overnight. Commerce's staff in Milan mounted the exhibit for us. Shortly after the President of Italy, Sandro Pertini, cut the ribbon opening the Show, he was escorted by the Director and our own DCM up from Rome to tour our exhibit. Many thousands visited it.

I spoke to groups, mostly to Lion and Rotary clubs. Once I even spoke once to the Monarchist National Party in Milan on the Constitutional Powers of the U.S. Presidency, because USIS Milan couldn't find anyone else in answer to their request. I did my research for it with books from their library. Ironically, USIS finally decided to assign their Genoa FSN permanently to the Consulate, at about the same time the Department decided to close it again.

The Consulate also provided support to NASA. They had a man there full time with his dependent wife to work on a tethered satellite launch project with the Italian Space

agency which was located in Turin. NASA provided funds to the Department for the administrative support we gave him, under an inter-agency agreement. With their funds we even bought a fax machine for his use and ours.

Political and economic reporting, and cultivating relations with the local political and economic power elites, were my primary mandate. FIAT was my major reporting subject.

Q: As for Fiat, how much was it about an economically viable entity, and how much of it an almost political entity?

BASTIANI: Well, it was political-economic. FIAT also to some extent created commercial and consular work for us, because we had a number of American businessmen residing in Torino with their families for work with various branches of FIAT or other local companies. So we had a little private international school to support under the Department's program for such schools. I managed to get donations from the Agnelli family for this school because Umberto Agnelli had two of his children enrolled in it. Quite a few Italians sent their children to this school so that they would learn English early on. They saw speaking English as a big asset for their children's future.

In fact, because there were so many Italians in the school, the playground language was Italian. I saw this as an advantage for the American children to pick up Italian from the Italian friends they made. I had one daughter, my fifth and last, Patricia, in that school. She had previously learned Polish extremely well in pre-school and kindergarten in Poland. In Torino we put her in this school and she was mum for about four or five months on Polish or Italian. But then, all of a sudden she started speaking Italian fluently, having picked it up from close friends that she made at the school. You know what happens with children, the parents of friends of your children invite them to birthday parties, or just to play together, and you reciprocate. Our best friends at all our posts were parents of friends of our children. So Patty learned Italian almost as fast as she had learned Polish.

Anyway, the school was also one of the means by which I came into contact with influential people, particularly Umberto Agnelli. But I guess your original question on FIAT was…?

Q: Well, my experience was in the South and there they had a suit against Alfa Romeo. The issue was almost more political than economic. Alfa Romeo was there because it provided employment, and that seemed to be its major purpose.

BASTIANI: And it was huge financial drain on the Government; so much so that in my time Alfa Romeo came up for sale and Ford very aggressively went after it with the full support of the Embassy. I mean, the Ambassador himself became a commercial officer, so to speak, to promote this sale. At the same time Fiat saw Ford taking over Alfa Romeo as a great threat to them because, in my time, Fiat still had about 60-70 percent of Italy's auto market. It was almost a monopoly. I learned through my contacts that Fiat was fighting any decision by the Government to sell to Ford. I became convinced that no way

would Ford win because Fiat and Agnelli were just too influential. I remember writing a report or two expressing this view and that's exactly what happened. In the end Fiat took over Alfa Romeo and, as far as I know, they still own it.

Q: You were there during the time when I think the SS-20 situation had arisen?

BASTIANI: It had indeed.

Q: The Soviets had introduced the SS-20 that was aimed at Europe. The idea was to scare the Europeans into giving less support to the U.S; we responded with a medium range missile.

BASTIANI: The Pershing.

Q: The Pershing missile and the cruise missile. And there was a lot of pressure put on members of NATO to accept these shorter range missiles, and Italy turned out to be cooperative. So often this was the case, Italy very strong in helping us. How did this play? This was really the final, you might say propaganda or popular battle of the Cold War in Europe. How did this play in Torino?

BASTIANI: It was a major topic of concern and conversation. And I tried to carry out the mandate we all had to present our side on this issue to our contacts. The approach I used was to point out that, we hadn't had a nuclear or major war in Europe thanks to the deterrence of our nuclear umbrella. The fundamental principle for deterrence to work is to have credible power for response that is equal or greater than the power of the other side. I was convinced – and could say with all sincerity – we were not about to use our nuclear power to attack or intimidate the Soviet Union, but only maintained it as a deterrent to prevent the Soviet Union from doing that against us or any NATO country. Deterrence was our basic policy.

And then the point I'd make was that the *possession* of missiles and bombs by both sides was not so much the problem, as an *imbalance* between the two sides. I remember making this gesture, exactly.

Q: You're showing a vertical distance between your two hands.

BASTIANI: Yes, between one side and the other. The Soviets by deploying these SS-20s, which brought all of Western Europe within their range had created an imbalance intended to intimidate West Europeans and increase their influence over the policies of the West Europeans. These missiles did not threaten the U.S. directly, but did threaten our bases in Europe. By doing this, the Soviets increased the threat of nuclear war, because under the NATO treaty, an attack on one member is considered an attack on all members. They were counting on the doubts of many Europeans that we would fulfill our commitment, and instead agree to compromises at the expense of the West Europeans because we ourselves were not directly threatened. So the only way we could bring the situation back into balance was by deploying our own medium range missiles which

brought a similar area of the Warsaw Pact under their range. We could of course do this only with the consent of individual NATO countries in which the missiles would be deployed. So, as you mentioned, a great propaganda war was fought over the basing issue in which the Soviets, their sympathizers, and especially pacifists in Western Europe pulled out all the stops.

Q: Well, discuss what was happening there in Italy. In your area, did you find the Communist party, the Communist unions…were they sort of willing supporters of the Soviet side? Were there demonstrations or how did this play?

BASTIANI: I don't recall major demonstrations on this issue inspired by the Communists on deployment of our Pershing and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles in response to the SS-20. Traditionally, the Communists opposed deployment of missiles in Western Europe, but, in the '70s, they were promoting the Historic Compromise, and had explicitly accepted the NATO alliance until both blocs could be eliminated by agreement.

Moreover, the basing of GLCMs (ground launch cruise missiles) at a huge base in Comiso, Sicily provided much needed employment, and was welcomed by many of the people there. I recall that the basing of Pershing IIs and GLCMs in other NATO countries received much more popular opposition in those countries.

Q: Yes. And in Germany…

BASTIANI: … I think what overt opposition there was in Italy was much more in the South and Rome, than in the North. In fact, I found much understanding for our position in Turin, where the power elite, especially the *economic* power elite, were even more supportive of U.S. policy and actions than the Government in Rome. When Qadhafi attempted to hit our LORAN installation on the southern coast of Sicily in 1986 with two Scud missile which fell short into the sea, Rome's reaction was less than firm. At a reception some there told me they were embarrassed by it and apologized as Italians for their Government.

Q: What about terrorism? Where was this coming from? Had this moved over to being Palestinian or Middle Eastern terrorism, or was it still pretty much homegrown terrorism?

BASTIANI: I think it was primarily still homegrown terrorism during my time in Torino – the mid-80s – and still directed primarily against individual politicians and business leaders. The most prominent and still the most successful in their terroristic activity were the Red Brigades. They had kidnapped and killed Moro, the leader of the Christian Democrats who was about to consummate the *Compromesso Storico* as I described earlier. This has led to wild charges, still current today, that we, i.e., the CIA, were really behind it. What I may not have mentioned is that they later kidnapped a U.S. NATO general, General Dozier, in December 1981 while I was coping with the first days of martial law in Krakow. The Italian police rescued him in a brilliant operation in Padua in which one of my cousins took part. He was then a detective there.

But at the same time we were very conscious of Middle Eastern terrorist threats to ourselves as U.S. diplomats and consuls. In January 1982 there was the assassination in Paris of Charles Ray, one of our military attaches by the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction. What really got my attention however was the assassination attempt on a colleague, Bob Homme, who had just reopened a Consulate in France under the same Congressional mandate under which I reopened Torino.

Q: Strasbourg?

BASTIANI: Yes. Bob in fact works with me now as a WAE declassifying documents requested under FOIA, the Freedom of Information Act. Fortunately for Bob, the single terrorist of Middle East origin was a lousy shot. Only one of five shots he fired at Bob while he was leaving for work from his driveway grazed him in the neck. I don't know whether they ever caught the would be assassin. I would have to ask Bob about that.

Until then I hadn't considered myself all that threatened, because I saw the terrorists as a sort of megalomaniacs, targeting ambassadors and higher profile diplomats. I then saw myself more open to threat, because Turin is on the road between Paris and Rome which I assumed they traveled. Given the location of the Consulate in the city, I was in a very vulnerable position.

When the officers from Consulate General Genoa prior to my arrival had picked out the office suite for the Consulate they chose a spacious, plush, newly renovated suite, ideal for our work; but, from a security standpoint, very much exposed. We were on the third floor of a four-sided building with an inner courtyard. There was only one entry to the courtyard in which we parked, through an archway from a busy narrow one-way street. Entry from the courtyard was through an open archway to a glassed in elevator around which wound the stairway. I seldom used the elevator, because I saw how easy it would be for an assassin to conceal himself on the dark stairway, and let me have it through the glass. I usually took the stairs two at a time – for the exercise as well.

Despite the threat, I refused to give up my habit of taking long walks over lunch hour through the city, so the *Questura* had a detective in mufti follow me with a newspaper folded around his Beretta pistol. I ran him ragged with my pace. The precautions I did take were to vary my times and routes. I wouldn't give up the walks I took in lieu of a regular lunch, because I was on one of my ambitious weight reduction programs at the time.

Sometime after my arrival, the Embassy had my official full size Ford Granada armored at the factory in Germany: bullet proof glass, armor plate, wheels with a metal rim inside so that you could continue driving even if the tires were shot out, backup battery, etc. All that extra weight took all the pleasure out of driving it; and, as my administrative assistant/driver found out later, made it hard to control at higher speeds. The security people at the Embassy had me take the car there so they could put dark plastic on the inside of the windshield. I ripped it off on the drive back, because it was almost

impossible to see through it against the sun. I figured it was much more of a hazard to my driving than a protection against terrorists.

I only used the administrative assistant as a chauffeur when I was going on official visits where I'd be met at the entrance to the prefecture, for example, by the prefect or his subordinate. Otherwise, to and from my residence on the *collina*, I always drove it myself, both because the staff was small, and as a security precaution on the theory that would-be assassins wouldn't think the driver up front was actually the Consul.

Despite the precautions I took, I know I probably survived because that terrorists never targeted me. I never forgot what a security officer had said when he briefed me with other officers just prior to an assignment abroad. "If they target you, he said, they'll probably get you." And the way you deal with that, I told myself, is to accept the fact that exposure to terrorism had become part of the job. If you want to be perfectly secure abroad, you are not Foreign Service material. The same, of course, can be said in spades about a military career.

Back to my administrative/chauffeur FSN. Ford knew that their armored cars were hard to control at speed, so they offered a training course of several days at the factory in West Germany for our chauffeurs. I tried to get my driver enrolled, but the Embassy's Administrative Office told me the budget wouldn't allow it. Well, sometime later, James Baker, then Secretary of the Treasury, made a lightning late afternoon/early evening visit to Turin with a small Air Force jet on a confidential round robin trip to talk urgently to his major European counterparts. I don't recall if I ever found out what the urgent issue was; I was excluded from the meeting. Italy's Treasury Minister was from my District and there at the time – it was, if I recall correctly, on a Saturday or Sunday. On very short notice I and Carla Maria arranged police escort from and to the airport with the very cooperative *Questura*.

They did it grand style, police cars, motorcycle police, sirens, all the many intersections blocked to other traffic, no stops from start to finish, a mad dash. Well, during the short reception following the secret meeting to which I was not admitted, the head Treasury Agent accompanying the Secretary took me aside and asked me to request the Italians not to race so fast back to the airport as they had done on the way in. Moreover, they needed a ride – maybe to avoid riding with the police – so I gave up my plan to go to the airport myself, gave them my armored car and driver, and arranged for him to join the procession. Well, the request to drive slower was ignored, my driver lost control of on a turn; and a minor accident ensued in which no one was hurt.

When the Embassy Administrative Office tried later to fire my driver, I reminded them of their refusal to give him the special training Ford thought was necessary, refused to comply, and then won my appeal to the DCM and Ambassador on the issue. He in fact has long since immigrated to the U.S. and lives in the Boston area where he has a family, and became a private pilot who has flown much more than I have. I only found out these last details recently.

For my wife and non-official driving, we bought a brand-new FIAT compact sedan, and registered it locally to keep it anonymous. I was glad we had sold our Chevy Malibu station wagon in Krakow instead of bringing it to Italy where it, literally, would have stood out like a white elephant. The FIAT served us well the four years we were there. The only thing my wife didn't like was its color which she, an artist, described as nauseous green, but it was the only color available for immediate delivery when we arrived. Incidentally, we found it was stable in cruise at 100 mph on the French super highway to Paris when we went there for a short vacation without the children. It handled much better at high speed than the classier British rental I drove on the same highway on a post-retirement private business trip to Europe. It also survived a mild collision she had with a slow moving street car when she turned across its tracks, which was easy to do in Turin. No one was hurt but the car; fortunately the street car had good brakes. I won't talk about the left rear door she tore off as she backed out of our garage.

Q: You were there until '87. Well, what happened when they closed the post? How did the decision come up, closing the post?

BASTIANI: The decision for me was a bolt from the blue in January of 1987. As I mentioned earlier I had been following the closure of consulates in Europe very closely, feeling threatened. Every time I went to the Embassy on consultation , I would bring up the subject, and every time I would be reassured by Ambassador Raab that Turin wasn't threatened. I got nothing but reassurances. Well, in January of 1987, which was my last year there – I served there four years – I get this phone call from the Deputy Chief of Mission telling me that the Secretary had just signed off on the closure of 10 consulates, including most that had been reopened in 1980. And that was it. Well, I was bitter and I was furious. The stated justification was budgetary, given the outlays for security and federal budget cuts mandated under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act.

I no sooner hung up than I called Carla Maria into the office with her pad and dictated a six page cable arguing against the decision. I had it transmitted unclassified through the Dissent Channel, and asked that it be given the widest distribution, even to the White House and Congress, if possible. In it I emphasized Turin's national importance in both Italy's economy and politics, including the fact that many of Ministers of the national government were based in the District. Some I saw at receptions in Turin more often than the Ambassador did in Rome. Three of the First Secretaries of parties in the Government's coalition were also based in Turin's Consular District.

As I mentioned earlier, I had been following the continued closure of Consulates in Europe with foreboding, and had in May 1986 submitted an article to the Foreign Service Journal, "Consulates: To Be or Not To Be." In it I argued that the real reason for the closure of Consulates was not really budgetary constraints, but the low priority given to Consulates in the competition for funding. I pointed out that Department's budget for the following fiscal year was actually 19 percent higher than the previous year's, and that it was also 40 or 50 percent higher than the Department's actual expenditures two and three years before. It was rejected for publication by the editors with the incredible comment that there did not seem to be enough interest in the subject.

Q: Well, what happened? I mean, when did they shut it down and how did it happen?

BASTIANI: What happened was that I from that day on went on a quixotic crusade to try to get the decision on Turin reversed by the Secretary by refuting the budgetary argument through documentation of all our expenses, and proof that it would actually cost the Department much more to close the post than keep it open, given that it already had the physical resources it needed. Moreover, some of our small cost was offset by payments the Department received from USIA and Commerce for the support we provided them. I also showed how our fixed cost for the rental of post's office suite would be drastically reduced if we accepted the offer of a substantial villa in the city for almost no rent, because the owner – a wealthy widow – merely wanted it occupied and maintained. Its high fenced garden and gate would also have been a security asset. The reply to this was a reprimand from someone in the Administrative Bureau for opposing the decision to close.

I did all this well aware of the wisdom of that saying, "You can't fight city hall," and really didn't expect to win. But I couldn't help myself; so great was my realization of how stupid the decision was, and my personal feeling of betrayal at how it had been taken. As I later learned, the Department had earlier decided to close down the Consulate General in Genoa. The Embassy and Genoa had then persuaded it to allow Genoa to remain open until 1992, the 500th anniversary of the discovery of America by Christopher Columbus. Closing Turin was offered as a tradeoff in return. This was done without any notice to me whatsoever. That as I argued in the Dissent was contrary to the Foreign Service Manual's requirement that one in my position be consulted when such decisions are made.

I even submitted a draft Decision Memo with all the protocol formatting, for submission to the Secretary to reverse the decision. I never got a response to that or most of all the other documentation I submitted. It was simply ignored by both the Department and the Embassy.

Q: Well Carl, let's move on. So when did you have to shut down?

BASTIANI: Well, I actually didn't shut the post myself; that was done immediately after my departure by our people from Genoa. I kept waiting for a direct order to do so, which, of course, I would have obeyed. But it never came. They spared me that. As July approached, the Embassy even offered me supplemental representational funds for the traditional Fourth of July reception, to which we had invited hundreds of guests the previous years. Its only purpose would have been to provide an occasion of personal farewell for me – and that's maybe why the Embassy offered it, as some sort of consolation. I refused to hold any reception at all; I was not about to try to explain or defend the Department's decision as if there were some sort of need for it. It would have been very embarrassing as well in light of what the Ambassador and I had said at the reopening a few years earlier. Spending all that money on a reception when we said we couldn't afford to maintain the Consulate would have seemed a contradiction.

Q: So you left in '87 and then what?

BASTIANI: In '87 I came back to Washington. By this time, my six year limit for promotion across the threshold to the Senior Executive service had expired, and I had received a letter informing me that I would be involuntarily retired – but with honor – by a certain date, I think September 30, along with others for the same reason. We were Cohort I, as it was called, the first group of FS-1 officers to which this new provision was applied.

I then joined a class action suit against the Department, along with about twenty others, which in retrospect I came to regret. I hadn't known any of the others previously, but soon came to see that we couldn't make as strong a case as a group, as some of us, at least, could make individually. Our backgrounds were all different. At least that is what I thought about the one I could have made on my own.

However, as members of a class action suit, the Department extended us as employees until the suit was decided. But it kept us in limbo in the Department, so to speak. We couldn't be regularly assigned as we had been in the Service, and couldn't compete for positions. To earn our salary, we had to find an office which could use our voluntary services. I did work in two, one dealing with labor union relations toward Poland where I was appreciated. I also worked for a time in an office dealing with technology policy.

As far as the Personnel Office was concerned, we were simply marking time until the suit was decided, and they could formally retire us.

I found this limbo status demeaning and soon was fed up with it. So in June of the following year, I told Personnel I would accept involuntary retirement as of July 1, 1988, even though the class action suit was still unsettled. Because I hadn't been promoted to the Senior Service which I considered the Department's loss, I looked forward to kicking the dust of the Department off of my heels and doing something more satisfying. But since I had been one of the original members in the suit, I felt obliged to stay in it. We were contributing our own money to pay a prestigious firm of attorneys to bring the suit. Before and during my retirement, I did research on a voluntary basis for the firm to keep costs down.

Q: How did the suit come out?

BASTIANI: It wasn't argued in court, but before the Grievance Panel of the Department, and summarily dismissed. As I recall, we lost on all counts. I had long lost all enthusiasm for it anyway, but was also disappointed at how weakly I thought our attorney made our case. Also, I had come to realize that if the Panel gave us justice, the Department would probably have been forced to reopen an innumerable number of cases in which they had retired people involuntarily. So, as I saw it, it was a grievance the Department couldn't possibly afford to yield on.

Q: A personal question. You were talking before this interview that you've been a pilot for a long time. That hobby of aviation, how did it play in your Foreign Service career?

BASTIANI: Well, I don't think it helped or hurt my career. It was strictly a hobby. I had wanted to be a pilot from the time I was a little boy. I can still remember saying to myself as a little boy, "Why would anyone want to drive, if they could fly?" Already then, I was in love with flying. I built models, and when in the 7th or 8th grade began study of the theory with a course my older brother had bought for me. I was set on becoming a Navy aircraft carrier pilot. Then in the eighth grade, along came this vocational director for of the Society of the Divine Word, a missionary order of the Catholic Church. He sold me and my closest friend on this vocation. So for high school I went to a boarding school, a so-called minor seminary for boys wishing to become members of the Order. I was on this track until I left the Order at the age of 26.

But I never lost my love for flying. When I was at the Seminary in Techny, Illinois, between Glenview and Northbrook, Glenview Naval Air Station was still operational. Every time those planes flew over I would gawk at them, whatever I was supposed to be doing at the time, like meditating with my eyes down.

I left the Seminary and went the University of Chicago in 1954, and the desire to fly stayed with me. While there I took a couple of informal lessons in a Piper Cub from a medical intern who had been an instructor in the Army Air Force.

Then, after I entered the Foreign Service, at every post, especially while I was in Washington, I'd go out to the local airports and find out what it would cost to take lessons, and decide I couldn't afford them. Finally, in Italy toward the end of my tour in Genoa and transfer to Rome, I decided it was almost affordable and would give it a try. I rationalized the cost by telling myself it was time to find out if flying was really for me. Maybe I would find that it no longer thrilled me. I had a couple of lessons there which only fanned my desire into a passion.

I no sooner got to Rome on assignment as a political officer in 1974, than I joined the Flying Club there, at Urbe Airport, along the Tiber just north of Rome. On downwind in the pattern, St. Peter's dome was a one o'clock. To commute in Rome I had bought a 10 year old Alfa Romeo sport car from an FSN in Genoa. At lunch time once or twice a week, I raced out to the airport for a lesson instead of eating. I also took lessons on weekends when I could. My bed time reading was a Jeppesen flight manual, which probably saved my life with the wisdom it imparted, because the instruction I received from a retired Italian Air Force colonel was very inadequate. I did get the basic Italian license which gave me limited privileges. What the Italians did in style in contrast to the FAA here is give you an impressive official ID-like license with photo, and a leather bound logbook with entries officially stamped and signed. I still have them as trophies. The FAA until recently only gave you a flimsy piece of paper.

When I realized I didn't have enough time left to get the full Italian equivalent to a U.S. private license, I joined the Navy Flying Club in Naples. I took a week's vacation, stayed

at a *pensione*, and monopolized the Club's instructor who was also its manager and mechanic. When I wasn't flying with him, I was studying the manuals. When I wasn't studying the manuals, I was doing flight planning with the charts. It was total immersion, the best way to learn anything. I fulfilled all the remaining requirements for a U.S. private license. The required solo cross country from Naples to Bari to Sicily and back to Naples remains the most exciting – and dangerous – flight ever of my life. Someday I'll write it up for submission to a flying magazine.

Now in my senior years flying kind of sustains me. It's the one hobby, activity, which still excites me. As a senior so much in life is in the category of "Been there, done that." I love golf too, but I do that mainly for exercise. My main joy for which I don't hesitate to spend whatever is necessary is flying. I never thought I would be able to own my own plane, but have owned one since 1981 when I saw I could "almost afford" a used one built thirty years ago. My wife and I flew it to the West Coast and back in 2004.

The real thrill of flying is being up there, soaring like a bird and dancing with the clouds as a poet put it, while looking down on the rest of humanity, pasted to the earth by gravity.

Q: Well, This might be a good place to end. We've got you dancing in the clouds. Great!

BASTIANI: Okay. Thank you.

End of interview