

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

ROBERT M. BEAUDRY

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
Initial interview date: October 5, 1992
Copyright 1998 ADST

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background	
Born and raised in Maine	
Catholic University	
U.S. Army, World War II	
Entered Foreign Service 1946	
Dublin, Ireland	1946-1948
Visa officer	
Visits by U.S. politicians	
Visit of John F. Kennedy	
IRA	
Casablanca, Morocco	1948-1950
Public Affairs officer	
French influences and control	
African desk	1950-1953
Second to CIA for Scandinavian affairs	
Koblenz, Germany	1953-1955
Military security board	
Surinam	1955-1956
Dutch influence	
Medical problems	
Bern, Switzerland	1956-1959
Economic officer	
End-use certificates	
Major issues	
Ambassador Frances Willis	
Ambassador Henry J. Taylor	

Swiss banking	
Economic Affairs	1959-1963
Swiss-Benelux Affairs	
General Analine and Film case	
Robert Kennedy	
EFTA	
Dutch Foreign Minister Luns	
Indonesia and the Dutch	
Brussels, Belgium	1963-1966
Chief of Political Section	
Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II	
Congo (Zaire) Issues	
Congo rescue mission	
Canadian Defense College	1966-1967
European Bureau	1969-1972
Secretary, International Regional Group on Europe	
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia	
Under Secretary Alexis Johnson	
Rome, Italy	1973-1977
Ambassador John Volpe	
Red Brigades	
Embassy operations	
Communist Party	
Italian political parties	
Inspection Corps	1977

INTERVIEW

Q: Today is October 5, 1992. This is an interview with Robert M. Beaudry on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. I wonder if you would give me a bit about your background--where you grew up, was educated, etc.?

BEAUDRY: I was born in Lewiston, Maine and grew up in Auburn, Maine. I graduated from the Catholic University in Washington, D.C. and took the Foreign Service exam while in the military in 1945. I passed the oral in the spring of 1946 and came into the Foreign Service in June.

Q: What attracted you towards the Foreign Service?

BEAUDRY: According to the blurb on the bulletin board, if you passed the exam and were accepted, you could get out of the Army.

Q: What were you doing in the Army?

BEAUDRY: I was a personnel technician. I was in Camp Blanding, Florida at the time.

Q: I can see that this was a great incentive to get out.

BEAUDRY: I found that when I came in I was surrounded by people who had been going to cram courses forever and had been pointing towards the Foreign Service since age 12. I was just fortunate, lucked in. And I never regretted it.

Q: I think there were a lot of people who ended up that way. I was an airman first class and remember having to convince my captain that I wasn't trying to pull some steal by taking the exam...I had to take leave to take the exam.

BEAUDRY: That's right. I think in my case had the exam not been given at Camp Blanding, I probably wouldn't have taken it.

Q: You came in in 1946. What did you start doing? Did you get some training?

BEAUDRY: Well, we all had a month. FSI at the time was up at the Lothrop mansion at Columbia Road and Connecticut Avenue. It was a good group. Mac Toon was there and Frank Meloy, and Dean Brown. Everybody was in or out of the military. Bud Sherer was there. Most of the people were around 30 years old. I was a 23.

We did that and then we had our first assignments. Mine was to Dublin, at the Legation. I am one of the few people you will run into who was a third secretary of legation. It was split. There was a consulate general in Dublin, but they had nothing to do with us. We were stashed away out at the Residence at Phoenix Park--almost two miles from the nearest bus stop. That cut down on the casual visitors.

Q: Was anybody interested in it? What kind of relations did we have at that time?

BEAUDRY: The first thing was that the Minister was David Gray, who was married to Maude Hall, who was Eleanor Roosevelt's aunt. But everybody in the world was interested in Ireland it seemed. They all came...all the politicians, including John Fitzgerald Kennedy. He was then a congressman.

Ireland had been neutral during the War, yet they got in on the Marshall Plan. The doing of that and the fights with the people who wanted to penalize them for being neutral made the work interesting. So that was good for a couple of years.

Q: What were you doing?

BEAUDRY: Everything. It was a three man post. David Gray, the Minister, was a writer. He and Somerset Maugham had collaborated prior to World War I, so he did the heavy writing. Then we had Montgomery Holiday, then Vinton Chapin and Jack Poole, who were the senior...we would have called them DCMs in a later day. So I did political, economic, admin, everything except consular.

Q: While you were dealing with this was the understanding always that you really had to watch out because of the Irish vote and Irish political influence within the States? Was this a major factor in how one looked at anything there?

BEAUDRY: Nobody got very excited about it. One of the things that was interesting though was that Dublin was on the Israeli circuit. A lot of Israelis came through in those years because they were carrying on an urban guerrilla warfare against the British themselves, and they thought the Irish had written the book on the subject. They used to come and consult, but not with us.

Q: At that time it was Palestine.

BEAUDRY: That's right.

Q: How did you find dealing with the Irish authorities?

BEAUDRY: Congenial. When dealing with traveling American statesmen out of Congress, they would give them the blarney treatment. It was my first experience with the future President Kennedy, and I was fascinated because he would not put up with that nonsense. They would give him all this business about his ancient relatives and he would say, "But Minister, why did you let the teachers' strike go on for nine months?" I figured that he was a cut above the average.

Q: So essentially, two people would be carrying on most of the work?

BEAUDRY: Pretty much. The other big issue was visas because there hadn't been any visas issued since 1941. The consulate General had a backlog of 6,000 active cases and the filing system was such that the files were in boxes sitting around the consular offices. You could tell when a case was coming up for decision by whether the file was within three feet of the door.

Q: But you didn't get involved in that?

BEAUDRY: No. I don't know why, but I didn't.

Q: After that...you left there in 1948?

BEAUDRY: The very end of 1948, like December 30th.

Q: Oh, one other thing, did you get involved with the IRA...was it doing much at that time?

BEAUDRY: No. They had been active in the early days of the war, but they were tainted by having had German connections. The Germans were obviously going to exploit them for whatever it was worth. The Irish, also, during the war interned the IRA types. But that was also in the past.

In FY 49, the budget was tight so some 40 or 50 of us were blanketed into the Information Program which was in State, of course, but which had its own budget. I was sent off to Casablanca to be the public affairs officer there.

Q: What was the situation in Casablanca? You were there from 1948-50.

BEAUDRY: Well, Morocco was a French Protectorate. The French ran it. There was a certain tentative rumblings about independence...the Istiqlal Party, as I remember, was active. The French were hostile to our information program. I think in the first place they thought it was an effort to meddle in the politics of Morocco. The use of the term "Service d'Information" didn't soothe their suspicions.

Q: Which in their terminology was intelligence.

BEAUDRY: So they weren't very friendly or helpful. We didn't have any equipment for goodness sake. We had the library stock that was left when the US military hospital pulled out. A balanced collection. We had a little money for slide shows and things like that. The French said we could put out almost anything we wanted in English and we could put out more things in French, but nothing in Arabic. It was that kind of a situation.

It was not successful from a career point of view. My only training consisted of consulting for four days with Bill Tyler in Paris on my way down. I had never seen a PAO. I was backstopped by some very nice people who were not part of the Department really. They had been established by a kind of ad hoc arrangement. I survived it for a while.

Q: Then, after that not very inspiring period, you went back to the Department for a couple of years, from 1950-53. What were you doing there?

BEAUDRY: After six months on the African Desk of the Information Program in the Department, I was seconded to CIA down by the reflecting pool near the Lincoln Memorial.

Q: Yes, they had some temporary buildings there.

BEAUDRY: I was with them until the spring of 1953, working on Scandinavian affairs.

Q: Another place that you had great knowledge of.

BEAUDRY: Absolutely. When I heard that Finnish had 15 declensions, I started looking for the exit.

Q: Before we move on, what was your impression of the CIA operation? You were seeing it at a rather benign level and all this, and the people in it.

BEAUDRY: As for the people, they were like the girl with the curl. When they were good, they were very, very good, but when they were bad, they were horrid. As for the stuff they were doing, you have to remember that most of the experience was World War II. It was current stuff then. They were thinking in terms of a possible Soviet move in Europe? Then you reestablish what you had against the Germans.

Q: Basically the stay behind operations, which now have a very bad odor because they don't realize the context in which they were put together.

BEAUDRY: Precisely. But it was an "anything goes" type of attitude, you know. The farthest out idea would be considered, although not necessarily funded.

Then they made a lot of mistakes...in the way they ran the Agency, I think. It was hurried. You see, the Korean War started. That pushed everything and they opted for the quick and easier solutions to get operations going.

Q: Yes, the Korean War started in June, 1950 and it changed everything.

BEAUDRY: Yes, that's right. You see it made them speed up. It made them do a lot of easy stuff, where if they had had time, I think, to lay real deep ground work and move more slowly, they would have had better results.

But, anyway, it was an interesting period. And they asked me if I wanted to stay, to go overseas. My reaction to that was, "If you want to be overseas, let's go first class," so I said, "Thank you, no."

I went back to the Department in early 1953 and was sent to Germany. As your readers will know, Germany was so big, that it had its own personnel section. You were assigned to Germany and they parceled you out.

Q: We still had posts all over the place.

BEAUDRY: Right. I ended up in Koblenz in a thing called the Military Security Board and was the Secretary of the US Element. It was one of those Tripartite boards that rotated...the Secretary of the Element in the chair for that month signed all the documents and administered all the papers that went to the Board for consideration. It was the early days of international multilateral diplomacy, if you will.

Q: You were in Koblenz?

BEAUDRY: Yes, I was in Koblenz. I did that from June or July of 1953 until January, 1955. What they did, as Germany was becoming independent, they stopped these High Commission laws that we were administering. We administered all the laws that forbade the Germans to own, possess or operate aircraft, munitions factories, and all of that kind of thing. In fact I ended up signing the first pilot licenses for Lufthansa, because there was no German authority to authorize the use of aircraft. We did that and then somebody said that they would need somebody to issue pilot licenses. So we called around to find out what was in a pilot's license. We made it up.

But it was all coming to an end, so the Department or the powers that were, made a decision...do we take the old timers and fling them out and reshuffle or do we just send people out as their function is abolished? They opted for the latter. So with only a year and a half I came up for transfer. I was transferred first on paper to Bordeaux and something happened and that was canceled. Then I was sent as principal officer to Paramaribo, Suriname, which turned out to really be a pretty good deal after I got over the shock of trying to find out where it was.

Q: Was it called Suriname in those days too?

BEAUDRY: Yes. It always was called Suriname. Dutch Guiana, I think, was something American map makers used.

Q: I was wondering because I always thought of Dutch Guiana, mainly because there was British and French Guiana.

BEAUDRY: In fact, it was the Suriname River that gave it its name. What's her name, Behn? An English novelist of the 17th century wrote books about Suriname. It was the place that the British swapped the Dutch for New York.

That was also a pretty good assignment, really. The principal officer job there. People get ambassadorial titles for that now.

Q: What was the situation in Suriname? You were there from 1955-56.

BEAUDRY: Yes. Well, the Dutch had just established a new, what they used to call "Dominion" status for Suriname and the Antilles. It was sort of a commonwealth arrangement. They really had local self government. The Dutch had a military presence, maybe a battalion, and were in charge of the police who consisted of local people except at the top. And they had a governor general, who was Dutch. But they subsidized the place quite a bit, although our main interest was Alcoa's bauxite mines, which were much more important than they became later when they found bauxite lots of other places. So the Alcoa manager was very important. But it wasn't as dominant as some other interests had been in those countries in that part of the world.

We got along pretty well with the Surinamese and we didn't have any serious problems with the Dutch. There was no business of the US being sort of between the Dutch and the locals.

Q: It wasn't the case as so often happens in some of these colonial places where the colonial authorities from the home country are pretty suspicious of the Americans of trying to promote independence, etc.?

BEAUDRY: A number of the Dutch were unhappy about our role in Indonesia, but that was another ball game, although some of them had been there. But basically, we did not have that kind of political question. In fact...I am trying to think what our major problems were. There was one bit of investment that came in. Somebody wanted to fish for the shrimp in the area and there was a little back and forth about that kind of investment, because the Surinamese were used to the Alcoa type investment and they weren't used to smaller operators who were demanding this or that. But we really didn't have any serious problems. My problems were personal, and medical. I ended up being flown out. I lost ninety pounds down there.

Q: Were you married at the time?

BEAUDRY: Oh, yes. In fact a child was born on the way. The medical scene there was not at all promising.

Q: Wasn't there a Dutch hospital there or something?

BEAUDRY: Yes there was a hospital, but let me just say that blood samples were taken Monday to catch the KLM flight to Amsterdam and you hopefully got the results back Thursday, but probably not for another week. Anyway, I wound up being flown back to Bethesda, to the Naval Hospital, where I stayed for a month. That kind of stuff wasn't very well handled in the Department in those days, but I managed to get to Bethesda because I had home leave orders which they could use as a travel authorization. They arranged for one of the guys in Curacao to come over because it was only a two man post, plus a seven man AID mission, or whatever they called it then.

But, that was pleasant as a post. We had four children by then. From there, after a month in the hospital and home leave I went to Switzerland where I was the number two man in a three man economic section in the Embassy in Bern.

Q: What was the situation in Bern at the time?

BEAUDRY: Well, there never is a situation in Switzerland. My big problem was that I used to do the monthly economic report and I had to find an inventive way to start the first paragraph. Of course, you have to remember that Switzerland doesn't allow any foreign governments to mess around in their economic affairs. We had a Lt. Colonel from the Army who had contracts for pasta from a Swiss company. He went to the pasta factory and the owner blew the whistle and the cops came to arrest him, thinking he was trying to get commercial secrets. They were very difficult on that score.

I found that every month in their statistics there would be about 30 or 50 people unemployed. I finally found out who the hell these people were. They were musicians in between gigs. But everybody else in the country was working. From the economic side the one thing we had in those days was end-use certificates to prevent East-West trade.

Q: This was to prevent the reshipping of strategic material from the United States to anywhere in Eastern Europe.

BEAUDRY: Exactly. Then on the other side there were elements in the US that said our watch industry was essential to national defense. The Swiss had 95 percent of the business and wanted 100 percent.

Q: We had Wesclox, Elgin and a few like that in Connecticut, I think.

BEAUDRY: The US government was having a series, one after another, of these deals where they would have a study to determine whether or not the jeweled watch industry...you see in World War II jeweled watches had played a role in artillery shell fuses and the like, but with the advent of proximity fuses, which was an electronic deal, it became much less important. So we had that as an issue.

Then we had the infamous Interhandel case. I.G. Farben had a subsidiary called I.G. Chemie.

Q: I.G. Farben was a German chemical conglomerate.

BEAUDRY: Yes. They had a big American operation, which were sequestered by the United States when we went into World War II. We were talking \$200 million when that was real money.

So they said that was owned by a Swiss company called Interhandel, formed the day before we went into the war. The Swiss kept arguing that it was their company. That was a major issue because Cromwell and Sullivan, the big New York law firm...

Q: Which was Dulles' law firm.

BEAUDRY: Yes, that is right. They had the Swiss brief and there was a whole series of Department of Justice lawyers who were making careers on this case. And nobody wanted to deal with it because there was a lot of pressure on the Hill. The Swiss wanted it back. A lot of people said, "Look, you can't have it back." It was in the courts...beginning of putting evidence in computers, etc.

One of the interesting things, I would be with the Swiss Ambassador talking to the then Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, who is flipping a football around his huge office. It was all part of that Kennedy period when there was a lot of pizzazz.

Anyway, I drafted a letter that the Secretary of State sent to...

Q: This actually was later wasn't it, because you were in Bern...?

BEAUDRY: Yes, but I came back to Washington...

Q: Why don't we talk about the Bern side first. You had two ambassadors while there, Frances E. Willis and Henry J. Taylor.

BEAUDRY: Miss Willis was great, except she had one problem. She just focused on everything. I can remember sitting at staff meeting and her saying, "It was thus..." Somebody would say, "Well, I am not sure, Madam Ambassador." She would say, "I know it was." She would sweep out of the room into the file room, find the airgram and bring it back. That was great, except I thought it would limit her in a larger mission. But she was first rate. I enjoyed working with her.

She did the kind of nice thing. In those days when you went to a post you would say, "May I call?" and then go around and bring your wife, etc. When I did that to her she said, "Why don't you come to lunch and bring the family?" I said, "Well, two of them are house broken, but..." "Well, bring those two." It made a kind of family relationship for the staff...not that she wasn't demanding on having everything up to snuff.

The next person was quite different. Henry J. Taylor was a journalist, Scripts Howard. He was a columnist and had a radio show before or at the start of World War II for General Motors. So he was very in with the General Motors crowd. We met every General Motors person whoever came.

He had his standing, this was the Eisenhower administration...

Q: Which was "What is good for General Motors is good for the country too."

BEAUDRY: Well, he came too, that Charlie Wilson. But what you had was, this man was the only journalist who had praised and supported then General Eisenhower for making his deal with Admiral Dalan, the French quisling in the North African campaign.

Q: This was December, 1942, if anyone wants to look it up.

BEAUDRY: The press really exploded over this, but not Henry J. Taylor. So that meant he was golden. Well, what can I say?

Q: How did he operate?

BEAUDRY: A guy from the Irish Embassy said one day, "You know your Ambassador drives, it is only about three minutes by car from his Residence to the office over there, why does he leave the house and go to the railroad station and make phone calls? Why can't he make them at home or in the office?" Well, he had all kinds of extracurricular personal arrangements, things of a nature that got him into trouble. He had a newspaperman staying with him. Pretty soon the newspaperman wrote an article about the revolution which took place in Iraq, in 1958. He said, "This was all financed through Swiss banks." Well, the Swiss government went "tilt." The Ambassador said he had nothing to do with it. And they said, "How come we have a copy with your handwriting on it?" They would have liked to have seen him go, but the President wasn't going to send him away.

Q: Was he messing around with that sort of thing?

BEAUDRY: No, he wasn't messing around. Some guy, a friend of his, had a story which may have had some validity, I don't know. But he didn't realize that he was no longer just another news guy with a buddy.

Q: Did he intrude very much in the operation of the Embassy?

BEAUDRY: Yes, he was a presence. He didn't intrude in the functioning because it was all pretty technical. The things, though, that he got into...some mountain climbers came to grief and he got all enthusiastic about doing something...he started from a newspaper base. Those were the things that interested him. Basically he was a good enough fellow. He didn't cause people any trouble. He never could get names of the personnel right. He would call me by my colleague's name and vice versa. It wasn't that he was senile.

Q: What was your impression of the Swiss financial system?

BEAUDRY: Not as smart as their reputation, in my view. We realized that the Foreign Service wasn't furnishing what you might call a hard economist or banker types, so Washington recruited a fellow, whom I still see, out of the Federal Reserve system. He

came into the Service laterally and stayed in for 25 years...Tom Summers, who was assigned to Zurich, where he became quite close to the bankers. He gave us that professional dimension in our reporting.

Q: Well, were we, I don't want to use the word pejoratively, but were we trying to penetrate what the Swiss were doing economically just to have a feel because they had a disproportionate influence in the European economy because of their banking prowess?

BEAUDRY: You know, I never thought of them as having a disproportionate influence. They played a role, but I don't see the Swiss going out and saying to the Dutch, "You really ought to extend the polder and expand your economy in the north," or any of that kind of stuff. Established businesses would come in for financing. They did a lot of third world stuff under their secrecy business, which at the time the Embassy ignored. Maybe intelligence agencies did more, that I couldn't say, because we had nothing to do with that.

We went through things...during that period they revised their tariff. Well, you know, you have to support your exporters in all of this and it took an inordinate amount of time in a small office.

Then, on banking secrecy, later when I worked in the Department, we negotiated an agreement with the Swiss which helped to support our international drug operation and other white collar crime. I think it has worked fairly well. We do get assistance from the Swiss, including bank stuff now. That is since the early seventies.

Q: Well, then you left Bern in 1959, still in the Eisenhower period, and came back to the Department. What were you doing there?

BEAUDRY: I was the economic officer for the office of Swiss-Benelux Affairs which was in the Office of Western European Affairs. Later the Swiss were put in an office with Austria and Italy. Benelux was a natural. They were countries that were not dissimilar...mostly economically, commercially oriented and financially active, a high degree of intelligence and education and generally speaking they were a reasonable group.

Q: You were mentioning your dealing with the Swiss on the I.G. Farben business and going with the Swiss Ambassador to Bobby Kennedy. Could you tell me a bit about that?

BEAUDRY: Ambassador Lindt had an appointment with the Attorney General. This was early on in the first months of the Kennedy administration. As the man on the Desk dealing with these things I went along with the Swiss Ambassador. His position was...look, why don't you guys settle this case? You see these companies in the US (General Analine and Film), were functioning under a government manager put in by the Justice Department. There were people in America who felt, "Gee, we are not getting any financing to expand because nobody owns it, it is under a cloud. Why don't you solve it and let me buy it cheap and I can make a lot of money with it."

The Swiss on the other hand wanted to have time to make their deal and say, "Look, it is ours, you've got to give it back to us." They were trying to negotiate. At the Desk level we said, "You know it is cluttering up our relations with the Swiss all over the place." There were Americans in the broader financial area who didn't want the Swiss unhappy with us. It was much better for all of them that we had good relations.

So on the basis of improving US-Swiss relations the EUR Bureau favored a settlement. The lawyers at Cromwell and Sullivan who represented the Swiss were dying off. They had been dealing with this thing since 1941. So the feeling was, "Look, let's solve it." I did a memo to the Secretary and his instructions were to convert it to a letter from him to Robert Kennedy. The point being that somebody had to cut the Gordian knot and Kennedy had the moxie, they said, to do that. He said, "Okay, dammit, we will write legislation and push it through." And he did. I don't remember the details but there was a certain selling off of shares in this thing and the Swiss took a certain amount of money off the top of the sale. This got it out of the government, but didn't give it back to the Swiss, it was sold to Americans and others...I don't know who the purchasers were, but they weren't necessarily Swiss. And that seemed to solve the problem and I guess it still has, I haven't heard about it since.

Q: Yes, but the story about Kennedy and the Swiss Ambassador?

BEAUDRY: Yes, Kennedy had been down there waiting with his assistant for the Ambassador to come in. They had a football...they had their shirt sleeves rolled up...the AG's office was about 40 feet long and they could get a fairly long pass. It was very much what you had been reading about. In the '60s it was touch football--now it's jogging.

Q: One further thing on this problem. Was it our impression, it sounds like there had been a paper transfer just before war was declared so that the Swiss claim to this complex was pretty...

BEAUDRY: This I am pretty weak on. I guess what I should say is that their claim was sufficiently solid so that they could push it for 20-odd years and not be laughed out of town.

Q: Were there any other issues in this Swiss-Benelux time that you were there?

BEAUDRY: Yes, in a way and it is coming up again. That is the period when the European Community, as it then was, the Common Market Treaty was signed, in 1957. There was a big move at the time to sidetrack it. The six, as it was then, Benelux, Italy, Germany, France, had as part of their goal a community that goes beyond just a customs union. But there were a lot of other people, including the British, the Swiss and the Scandinavians and others, who felt that this would get them into all kinds of sovereignty questions and financial questions. Wouldn't it be better just to have a free trade area?

There was a battle in the Department. We on the Swiss Desk, reflecting our client, were sort of saying, "Hey, in the free trade area you could do this and that and could be assured that we weren't penalized, etc." Well the true community believers in Washington won that one.

Q: Well, this was led by George Ball, particularly in Western Europe.

BEAUDRY: Well, Ball, Schaetzel and Jack Tuthill and those guys.

Q: When you are talking about true believer you are really talking about TRUE believers, aren't you.

BEAUDRY: Well, they were. And they were right. What happened then was...that was when the US government weighed in, I believe. I was out there at the end of the line and was not privy to headquarters stuff. But that was when we got instructions not to go around giving the Swiss the idea that we think the free trade area is a good thing. They, in fact, formed their free trade area, called EFTA, European Free Trade Area. Portugal and Finland were included. Up until just a few years ago it still existed, although getting smaller all the time.

The Swiss concern was that 60 percent of their trade was with Germany and they couldn't stand to be excluded from the German market. That is what they were after. And so were a lot of these other people...the Austrians and people like that.

I have often felt that the degree to which the US government weighed in for support of the European community concept is perhaps not appreciated. Because in that period when it might have gone the other way...I don't know, but certainly we rallied to Monnet and all the "institution builders."

Q: We certainly pulled out all stops as far as that was concerned. And this was a real policy.

BEAUDRY: Yes. And we believed it for reasons well beyond commercial, financial and economic. It was the heart of our European policy after World War II.

Q: The whole idea I suppose in essence was that if Europe is united they won't fight. If France and Germany fight we get dragged in and we want to stop that. Everything else flowed from the France and Germany equation...Get those two married.

BEAUDRY: That's right.

Q: We are talking about 1991-92.

BEAUDRY: It is an example of how successful that policy was that we were totally irrelevant at Maastricht. They are doing their thing now. Our policy worked.

Q: Did you get any impression at all...I mean I realize you were pretty far down on the totem pole and all that, but when the Kennedy administration took over it was one of the major political shifts. Did the State Department feel this at all?

BEAUDRY: You bet. It was the high water mark of our policy towards Europe. The Paulus Kirke speech in May, 1963 set it off and it never happened because the people who believed were eclipsed by Vietnam.

For example, they ran the government differently. People at the Desk level were included in White House meetings. People like me went and took notes at the White House. The minute Johnson came in, only Assistant Secretaries took notes.

One day the Dutch came in. Bobby Kennedy was making a trip around the world and we had a big hassle with West New Guinea, (Irian) at that time, and were kind of brokering the solution between the Dutch and Indonesia. That was one of our more successful efforts at preventive diplomacy, I might add.

Anyway, he was going all around the world and with a stop in Indonesia. So the Dutch came in with an invitation for him to come. Time went by and nothing happened. I called the Attorney General's office and got Angie Novello, who was his administrative assistant. I said, "What about this?" And she said, "Oh, he hasn't dealt with it. I will put it right in front of him." So about an hour later the phone rings. It is Bobby Kennedy. He says, "You know, gee, I am going on this long trip and I don't know why I have to do this. We all know about the Dutch." So I try to get in a few words about how important it was in Dutch politics and how important they were to us, etc. So then he says, "Well, okay. You get a hold of McGeorge Bundy and if he agrees..."

Q: He was the National Security Advisor.

BEAUDRY: ...if McGeorge thinks it is okay, I will do it." Well, you know, here I am down in my office having to try to get high enough up the chain to make sure Bundy says the right thing. And eventually he does.

But the point there is that we had Cabinet officers who went right back into the stacks. The guy sitting next to me, Hans Imhof had the French Desk and was an O-4 in those days. He gets a call from the President. President Kennedy calls him up and says, "I have an appointment with the French Ambassador. Can you tell me why he is coming in?" Imhof said, "Yes, I think this, this and this." But then he has to run upstairs to tell the Assistant Secretary level what he has been advising the President to do. Hey, you never had more gung-ho O-4s in your life.

Q: O-4 being at about the Major level of the State Department Foreign Service.

BEAUDRY: So we had that. I felt that really worked. But the policy. We were out doing things.

In this question of West New Guinea, the Dutch Foreign Minister came, Joe Luns. He was a real character, I might add, a joker. He was a very serious, solid citizen. One of our best friends in the Alliance.

Anyway they were having military troubles with the Indonesians down there. So the Dutch decided that they were going to send a submarine down there. Well, he was here on a visit and the last thing in the day was a call on the President. So Bill Tyler and I...

Q: Bill Tyler was Assistant Secretary for European Affairs.

BEAUDRY: Yes, I think Foy Kohler had gone on to Moscow by then.

So we go over to the White House. In typical Department fashion we couldn't get a car so we had to hike. The meeting was in the Cabinet Room. There was just Kennedy...I don't think he had anybody from his staff...the Dutch Ambassador, a very able man, Van Rajen, Joe Luns and Tyler and me. Luns takes that opportunity to let us know that they are sending a submarine through the Panama Canal, which we can't stop. But it makes the Indonesians think we are conniving with the Dutch and that kind of upset us.

After the Dutch left, Kennedy pulls the two of us over and says, "Well, what do you think the Secretary of State's position on this is going to be?" I was interested. He didn't say Dean Rusk. He said the Secretary of State.

So we put together what we thought the Secretary of State's position was on it which was a) because of the rules of operation on the Canal we couldn't do anything about it and b) it doesn't do us any good to publicly jump up and down in rage at the Dutch; and c) the Indonesians were just going to have to live with it. Of course, there wasn't anybody worried about Indonesia in the room, you understand. Then we walked our way back to the Department.

Nothing untoward happened, but it was the way things were done in the Kennedy administration. The people at the working level had access to power in the sense that you were at least in the room. That I found over the years deteriorated until it got down to a point where in the Kissinger administration, the Italian Ambassador would come and debrief me so that I would know what went on in meetings with Italians because he knew that Kissinger wouldn't let any of that stuff out.

Q: Then you left Washington and went to Brussels where you served from 1963-66. What were you doing there?

BEAUDRY: I was head of the political section. In the course of time in this Office of Swiss-Benelux, as economic officer I was number two. I covered all the countries and the only one other than the guy who ran the office, Galen Stone. Then Galen moved up as a deputy in Western Europe and I sort of moved up to be the director, or whatever, and still carried the economic job. So I got to know MacArthur when he came through.

Q: This is Douglas MacArthur II.

BEAUDRY: He was moving from Tokyo to Brussels as Ambassador. I was his den mother in the Department for the transfer. Not that he needed one and not that he was around much. He spent most of his time on the Hill explaining to the Members of Congress why he had recommended the cancellation of President Eisenhower's trip to Tokyo. But we established a working relationship.

Then Margaret Tibbetts, who was head of the political section was selected for senior training and so that job came open. One distinguished citizen turned it down because he would rather not work in that atmosphere.

Q: Douglas MacArthur was known as a difficult man to work for.

BEAUDRY: Yes, with a difficult wife.

Q: With a very difficult wife.

BEAUDRY: I was ambitious at the time so I agreed to go. I also had a thing that I found was very valuable with MacArthur. I had been in the Department then over three years and knew everybody. I could call people. That was very important to MacArthur. I could tell him when something would come up..."Well, the Under Secretary thinks such and such because I talked to so and so." And that helped. That made my time with him.

The big thing we had then in our relations with the Belgians, was the Congo (Zaire). When I came back in 1959 to take on the job, the Congo had blown up and they were giving it independence in June or July, 1960. The Department selected Clare Timberlake to be the first Ambassador. So he was in for briefings. Well, all of Francophone Africa was covered by two men in the Department. This extensive territory, increasingly complex and it had no support in the Department. AF just didn't have any people. So I ended up doing a lot of the briefing because at least from the economic side and from the Belgian political side, I was more knowledgeable. We were always part of the task force in the Department working on the Congo.

The other man in this in the very beginning was Bob Miller, the Belgian political desk officer. He and I were on these task forces, he more than I as time went on. When I got to Brussels the Congo was still a major issue.

But then we had things like the nuclear relationship in the Alliance. Remember the MLF, the multilateral nuclear force? Those were the kinds of issues we had. We didn't have any direct bilateral problems. We were slightly concerned whether Belgium might fragment because the Flemings and Walloons were very much head to head. Now they have worked it out where they have devolved all kinds of political power at lower levels. I would really have trouble grasping where they are today, but in those days it was the Flemings and the Walloons. And it created an instability in the government and we didn't want that in NATO. Again, it wasn't an issue that kept us up nights.

If the Socialists were in or out of the government, or the Christian Democrats, that didn't really bother us either. They were both very pro-NATO and pro-European, etc. So the big problem was the Congo and we ended up by mounting that rescue mission. This was quite interesting because all we did was provide transportation. The Belgians provided a 500-man combat battalion of paratroopers and we dropped them over Stanleyville. In a way it was a marker for other people in Africa that even though you weren't on the coast, the 20th century gunboats could get you if you weren't careful.

It was done at the behest, pretty largely, of Averell Harriman. MacArthur had been in Washington when they decided to do it. A number of people quailed a little bit when the explosion took place at the UN over this because there was outrage on the part of the Third World. Yet we ran the second one. We had about four or five rescue missions planned.

Q: Basically these were rebel units that were threatening a group of Europeans, including some Americans at the Consulate at Stanleyville.

BEAUDRY: Yes. There were 40 or 50 Europeans who were about to be slaughtered, we understood. It was a rebellion against the central government.

Q: Massambas, I think they were called.

BEAUDRY: That is right and they had this mystical thing that they were impervious to bullets. They got that way because none of the local constabulary could shoot.

Q: Because we are under a time constraint, lets move on. You were then in the Canadian Defense College for a year and then with the NSC from 1967-69.

BEAUDRY: No, I worked for John Leddy, who was Assistant Secretary in EUR, but I was the Secretary of the Interdepartment Regional Group on Europe. So I did that along with everything else. Leddy, I found, was one of the really fine people in this business. He was not a Foreign Service Officer. He was a career Civil Servant and had much to do with the establishment of the GATT. He was really an economic officer. I first met him when he was special assistant to Douglas Dillon, in that era. He is still alive, a fine man and very able.

Anyway, I did that for...it was kind of a management job. You know when President Johnson was sending letters to everybody in the world over the balance of payments crisis, I was the person who had to find the person who could get the letters out. It was good experience.

After the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 it was a little bit interesting because there was a meeting set up for nine o'clock between the Soviet Ambassador and President Johnson and Dean Rusk and John Leddy to discuss Johnson's trip to Russia. I am sitting home planning to come in later as staff support. I am watching television. It was the Democratic Convention preliminary and Rusk is testifying on the Foreign Policy plank when he is called away. I called the Department to ask what is going on? The Soviets had invaded Czechoslovakia. So we all charged back and set the Task Force in motion.

One of the things we did in the course of that night was to stop all troop movements heading towards the German frontier for training. When we turned the troops around our oldest son was in one of the units that were going out there. We didn't want to spook the Russians. But after that we had to develop contingency plans if the Russians did anything like that with Austria. Mac Toon was running it. But Mac Toon was named Ambassador to Czechoslovakia and so in the vacuum I took it over and we ended up doing nothing because the Defense Department wouldn't play because they said they had no resources to commit. So we finessed it and said NATO would do the planning.

Then I spent a year working for Alex Johnson. That was fascinating.

Q: What was your impression of how he operated? He was the Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

BEAUDRY: Alex Johnson moved out of the Foreign Service in a way in 1954 when he went to Geneva and took over the Chinese Talks. He was an ambassadorial level type, political appointee ever after that, except for a very short period. He, Dean Rusk and Dean Acheson would go almost every day to see President Truman during the Korean War. They would come back from the meeting and Acheson would say to Alex, "Well, you are going to draft the instructions Alex and you and Dean bring them around when you get them ready." That was a different world. So he operated at that level ever after that.

He was a very prudent man, not a bold stroker, in my view. He was totally decent. I was his executive assistant for a while. He said when we started, "There are a bunch of things that are going to happen around here and I am not going to tell you. You are not going to know." I understood what he was saying and that was okay, but that was the way he maintained security. He didn't have enough people involved to have things just dribble out. Only once do I recall that it really irritated the hell out of me. But by and large we...

Q: What was that?

BEAUDRY: That was when we were transferring every aircraft and other piece of equipment to the Vietnamese rather than bringing it out of Vietnam when our troops left. I guess it was secret because it was probably an AID program which wasn't authorized by Congress.

Q: Then you went to Rome from 1973-77. How did you get the job?

BEAUDRY: I got that job because the system...John Volpe, who was the Secretary of Transportation and former Governor of Massachusetts, went to Rome because Haldeman and Ehrlichman wanted to get him out of town. John Volpe is a very honest man. He kept trying to tell Nixon that people were doing things to him behind his back. His understanding of Nixon may have been a little naive, but nonetheless ...these guys wanted him out of town, so they gave him an offer that he couldn't refuse, Ambassador to Rome. And he took it.

So he needed a DCM. Wells Stabler had the job and had been there about four years and was due out. Bill Hall was Director General and I was on the short list. But then Volpe kept getting bombarded by messages from all over the world from people saying, "I have just the perfect guy for you." He didn't know, he didn't have any personal candidates. So he went to the system and asked what was happening. I barely knew Bill Hall. He was no great friend or anything. I forget how come I was the one he went to bat for, but he talked Volpe into interviewing me. We had the interview, Volpe and I and my wife. My wife is not tall and this was of major importance, I think, that neither of us were much taller than Volpe. Basically we got along very well.

He looked on me, as I've heard him say, like he looked on the Lt. Governor of Massachusetts when he was Governor. He was demanding and could be difficult but never in that way with me. I obviously occupied a different niche from the rest of his staff. But, as I say, an honest man whose main interest was in things Italian and bilateral. He didn't have a whole lot of interest in multilateral affairs. NATO, in general, but...he had no background in the specifics...and the European Community was even less interesting to him.

Q: How did he operate?

BEAUDRY: One year he traveled. He wanted to visit every province and there were 90 provinces. He got damn near it. He liked that. He would go and be received and be an event. He could talk to people. He was very conscious of being the son of an immigrant. Somebody said to him once that he spoke funny Italian. He said that a few looked down their noses at him, but the other 95 percent thought it was great that a son of an immigrant had done so well.

Q: What did you think of the Embassy that you were managing.

BEAUDRY: Of course I had worked on it. I was well acquainted from the Desk point of view. I knew the principal American personnel.

Q: Yes, would you pick up on that?

BEAUDRY: After the election in 1968 we had a new team. They asked John Leddy to stay but he turned it down for personal reasons. So Martin Hillenbrand came in as Assistant Secretary. I thought it was time for me to leave. I had done the job for a couple of years. Marty and I had good relations, but nothing special.

So I left just as a job opened up of Country Director for Italy, Austria and Switzerland. So back to Switzerland. That is when I got into Italian affairs. I should have mentioned that earlier when talking about my selection as DCM. Having held this job was a major factor. I was up on all the issues, etc.

Q: Let's go back to that time when you were dealing with that from 1969-72. Where did Italy stand in our policy? What were we after from Italy?

BEAUDRY: We had 700 plus ship visits a year to Italy. The Command of the Sixth Fleet was located in Naples. We had a missile defense organization in northeastern Italy. We had a paratroop regiment in Vicenza. We had a fighter aircraft base in Amiano. We had a small Navy base at Sigonella which became a large base. And CINCSOUTH, the NATO Commander, was at Naples as well as the Sixth Fleet Command. So that was the big item.

Then we wanted Italian support in all international bodies, and we largely got it. And we have a large segment of the American people who are of Italian origin and therefore are interested in what happens there. Italians have been big in international financial matters most of the postwar period. They have high quality people running their central bank and have been important financial players.

But those were the real reasons. The Italians have had one consistent policy since modern Italy became a state. Italy always has to be at the meeting, no matter what. If the big powers are there Italy has to be there, too. One of the major developments of that period was the economic summits. When Giscard d'Estaing started these things there were five countries. The Italians screamed and yelled and jumped up and down and insisted that they be included. Well, the result was that we added Italy and Canada, so it became the seven. But the Italians, by and large, to be honest, don't contribute a whole lot at the policy level, but they are there. And they generally supported the kind of policies that we are interested in. I don't want to create the impression that they don't understand the game and they don't have ideas, they do. But they had serious problems in pulling everything together.

I became quite sympathetic to Italy. Look at the way they handled the terrorist Red Brigades. They overcame that problem without destroying democratic rights. Now they have to fight organized crime and seem to be making progress.

Q: In Kissinger's book he talked about a call on Italy and you got the feeling it was more symbolic because there was nobody with whom he could really deal. It is a coalition government so there is nobody that a man like Kissinger would want to sit down one to one to talk with.

BEAUDRY: And some of the things he said were outrageous, I thought. His contempt for the Italians showed. He was absolutely right in that sense, that the Italians didn't have much to say, but the problem of not meeting with the Italians became more trouble than it is worth. And generally speaking you don't want to go around alienating people who usually support what you are trying to do.

Q: You were essentially the Desk Officer for Italy, did you find that you were having to keep your nose in everybody's business in Western Europe just to assure Italy's participation?

BEAUDRY: It wasn't so much with the other Europeans, it was with the Washington establishment. The average American gets an amused look on his face when you mention Italy. They don't realize that in the meantime Italy has moved ahead of Britain as an economic power and that these guys are very successful at what they do. But that is one of the problems on the Italian scene. You are always fighting each time, or making sure they are not left out.

Q: When you got to Rome, did you find the constant reminding people about Italy persist-on trips of important people, etc.?

BEAUDRY: Yes. If you are going to come to Europe you have to come to Rome too. That got Ambassador Reinhardt in trouble with Lyndon Johnson. He was on his famous around the world trip and wanted to spend Christmas Eve with the Pope. This was when he made that infamous trip to Vietnam just before Christmas. I forget what year it was. So this was a big issue. Reinhardt fell on his sword. You have to call on the President of Italy. Johnson wanted no part of that. He finally did call, but he was mad at Reinhardt ever after, I gather. That was prior to my time.

Q: Well, when you were there what was your impression of the Embassy staff? I have to state my prejudices this time. I later came from outside as Consul at Naples for a short time. I was not part of the Foreign Service Italian group. There were some people who had been there for a long, long time and had gotten immersed in Italian life.

BEAUDRY: One of the reasons for that was that the Italians are not good linguists, they speak only Italian pretty much. They don't travel a lot because they figure why go any place else which is not as good as here. Americans as a rule didn't learn Italian in school. So almost all officers who could speak Italian learned it in Italy. You had a small number of people who grew up in Italian speaking families, but not many. So you would have

people like Bill Barnsdale who had, I think, five different Italian posts. There was an officer down in Palermo who had been in Milan, for example.

You tend to get repeaters because you are always looking for someone who has good Italian and the only ones you have are these repeaters. So you are quite right. I was an outsider in that sense. But there were consular people, too, who kept repeating.

I went to Rome a month after Volpe arrived and about two weeks after Stabler left. It had been Graham Martin's Embassy. He had it for four years. He was an accomplished administrator. He had a good Embassy, it worked. We had good people in the political section who dealt with the various parties. On the economic side we had good people. I thought the consulates were pretty good. One of your predecessors had grown up in Naples when his father was stationed there.

But I felt the mission to Italy, by and large, worked well for what we had to do. You had the problem of replacing people from time to time when you got certain slippage and one thing or another. The Ambassador did no harm and he did certain things that I think were a plus. Coming from the political life he didn't have a thin skin about public attacks. He could take it. If he took a position that people didn't like in Italy, he didn't crumble at the first whiff of criticism. That wasn't true of other people.

Q: What about one of the policy debates that assumed almost religious overtones, the opening of the left and dealing with the Communists? How was that treated during your time there?

BEAUDRY: As you know that had been a real trauma at the beginning of the Kennedy administration. The opening to the left had happened. They were talking there, let us be clear, of socialists. In my time we were attacked for being rather rigid about Communists and out of touch with reality. We were there during the Euro-Communist period. My own view about that was altered as I learned more about Italy. There were a couple of problems. One, the Italian Communists had a smiling face. They were benign, decent chaps. But they insisted in retaining their original charter which called for democratic centralism and which really was a hardline Stalinist core. They never quite got around to changing that. I said, "I really don't care how you take care of your trash or deliver your water supply, etc. But I do care about how you are going to deal with us and the military with this kind of Stalinist background."

You know Italian politics has been affected by outside forces at least from the time of the Guelphs and the Ghibellines. There was a German party, a Vatican party, a French party, Austrian party. We were the American party and the Christian Democrats were our local friends. And there was a Russian party represented by the Communist Party.

We had to play our role, not because we didn't understand how the Communists were evolving, changing, but if we started giving visas to Communists, for instance, they weren't going to harm America, but it might give the wrong signal to the Christian

Democrats. So we were locked into a rigidity that we perhaps didn't welcome but felt we really had to keep up.

For instance, there was a famous written interview that Volpe had with one of the news magazine. He was always getting requests to answer questions, etc. I can't remember which year it was, but we were pulling our ships out of Greece. I think we had an aircraft carrier based out there and we were going to pull it back.

Q: We had a home port arrangement set up during the time of the Colonels and then the situation changed and we had to pull it back.

BEAUDRY: In the process, the Italian Left, Communists in particular, had a big campaign in the local press stating they were not going to let us bring it to Italy. I don't think we intended to bring it there, but the point was that after about three months of this raving, we couldn't have brought it to Italy if we wanted to.

Well, the following year, between Carter's election and inauguration, when Euro-Communism was at its height Rome rumors insisted that the Americans were all set to talk to the Communists. We were going to change our stance of total abstinence with some kind of relationship.

Well, this question came in from this magazine and we had a very able man by the name of Martin Wenick, who was our specialist on the Communist Party. He had been in Moscow and later went to Prague. He was very knowledgeable and he had good Italian. So he knew these people. It wasn't that we had no relations whatsoever, but none that you could put your finger on. Anyway, we persuaded Volpe to sign the letter in which we went out of our way to make the point that the US government was not about to sit down with the Communists. It was a hard line that wasn't appreciated by a lot of people including some of our own. If I might digress, the American intelligence community at that point had persuaded itself that the Communists were in fact going to come into government through this Euro-Communist group and that we ought to be ready to deal. Our view was that we didn't think they were going to make it because the Italians had too many domestic reasons, among other things to keep these guys out of power. And if we were indifferent or silent about this, we would end up with the same situation we had about the aircraft carrier the year before. These people through their public relations would have created a situation where we would be presented with a fait accompli that we couldn't change.

So we took this hard line, which was based, I might add, on things that Kissinger had previously told the Italians. We got some flak, but this is where Volpe's ability to take it came to the fore. He wasn't upset. When you are in politics you get this stuff. And it worked because they never really did get into power. They got close, but we never had to make a deal with them at a time when it would have had some significance. Now I don't know what we do with these guys.

Q: They call themselves something else anyway.

BEAUDRY: I think the Socialist Party of the Left or something like that. Anyway all of those countries including France, Germany and maybe even England and Italy are going to change governments, as I think, perhaps the United States is going to change governments.

Q: Is there any thing else you would like to note?

BEAUDRY: I don't think so.

Q: Just one thing. What was your feeling about the consistently shifting Italian political scene which was always the same? It seemed to me that the political section would get into exquisite detail about this little minuet that essentially in your time and my time hadn't changed since 1948.

BEAUDRY: That is the problem. You get these bright young men and they are not going to sit there and say that nothing happened this month. They get mesmerized with all the little deals that are happening, you know.

One thing I must say, that sort of intrigues me. In 1975 the administrative elections were the high water mark of the Communists. They reached a higher percentage than they had ever had. That was the time when the American intelligence community concluded that in the other elections in 1976 they would make it. Well, we carried on a campaign trying to convince them...and I must say that our best weapon in trying to support our side was USIA. We got people around and started talking up the Western position. Anyway, in the next election the DC did better and the Communists did worse. About that time our man in the political section who covered the Christian Democratic Party, Ted Russell, was being transferred. We were having a farewell reception at our house. He had been talking to one of his close contacts, who said, "I am sorry that I am late to the party, but a man from the Russian Embassy had been in talking to me about the Christian Democrats, etc. and I told him that I was sorry I have to leave because I am going to the American Minister's house to a reception. And the Russian said, 'What is it, a victory celebration?'" We had managed in that election, the one they thought was going to be their breakthrough and it wasn't.

It was a pleasant time. I felt, in personal terms, that it was as good a job as I had done and that was it.

Q: Well then you came back as many at that time were almost free floating.

BEAUDRY: There was no job that I wanted to go to from there. They were fooling around with the Inspection Corps, which was all very nice. The thing at the War College sort of came up, again it was pleasant. I could see that my generation had passed. I didn't know many people anymore and those I knew pretty well who were still working weren't

in any position where they were hiring. They were off at post, whatever. Sometimes you can stay in and you can see the situation is going to change in four or five years, but I wasn't going to live long enough to do that so I decided to quit. And I did. After I retired I did inspections as a WAE for a while.

Q: WAE is while actually employed. It is sort of using the reserve capacity for retired people.

BEAUDRY: After that I sort of blundered into the Inman Panel, when they were doing that security thing. I was attached to them drafting parts of the report. At the end they put on this exercise of going out and trying out posts' emergency action plans and I did some of that.

Q: You were in RPE for a while which was what?

BEAUDRY: Well, that is the European Community and the OECD. At that point I was going to either Paris or Brussels at least once a month.

Q: This was 1978-81.

BEAUDRY: Yes. That now gives me insights into what is happening there. I feel it is one of the major things of future policies now that the Cold War is over. I don't know how the Department is dealing with it now.

Q: Well this was Carter time, wasn't it?

BEAUDRY: Yes. But it was the time of Eurosclerosis as they called it. The Europeans didn't have much pizzazz and had sort of reached a stagnation. In this country there was increasing wonder that maybe we had created a monster and we shouldn't help it. So that the job in RPE which had been a real dynamic job in years past had lost its glamour. People like Dean Hinton had it, and Jack Tuthill, etc. But it had fallen almost by the wayside when I was there.

Q: Which was significant in showing our policy at that time.

BEAUDRY: Yes, people didn't care.

Q: And it then picked up later on.

BEAUDRY: Well, it came in the eighties when the Europeans, themselves, jazzed it up with Jacques Delors, the Frenchman who shook it up with the Single European Act in, I think, 1985 and the whole thing began to...

Q: You had a small period of dealing with administration or management with Richard Kennedy?

BEAUDRY: Yes, I was his executive assistant replacing Sam Gammon. But I found that there was a lot of running around and spinning of wheels.

Q: Well, he was a difficult man to work for I understand.

BEAUDRY: He used to get upset whenever he had to appear on the Hill. Unlike Volpe, who had a thick skin and could take it, Kennedy got excited whenever there were any possible attacks around. I said to myself at a certain point that I was too old for this. I had dealt with somebody who could be difficult like MacArthur earlier on, but I had a future then. At this stage I only had a past and it was clear to me that these people didn't have much to offer. My successor ended up in Bangladesh, which didn't strike me as a major career move.

Q: Since you mentioned Douglas MacArthur, who was the nephew of the General and a Career Ambassador at many posts, he had a reputation of being a very difficult man to work for himself and his wife even more so. How did you find being in that atmosphere?

BEAUDRY: My wife gets along with people very well, and she also had to deal with the MacArthurs when we were in Brussels. The DCM's wife was Dutch and the economic counselor's wife was French. Well, my wife was the first American wife in the rank order and Mrs. MacArthur set great store by that. So she and Jackie got along pretty well. Except for one night when Averell Harriman was there and my wife sat on one side and Mrs. MacArthur on the other at dinner. We are from Maine and Harriman had a place in Maine and lots of background on it. Jackie and Mr. Harriman started talking Maine politics and Mrs. MacArthur didn't like that. It wasn't so much the politics but the fact that she was ignored by Harriman.

Q: Mrs. MacArthur's father was a Vice President, Alben Barkley from Kentucky. Okay. I want to thank you very much.

BEAUDRY: But anyway, it has been a great life.

End of interview