Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR RICHARD W. BOGOSIAN

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INTERVIEW

Q: *This is an interview with Richard Bogosian, and the date is April 1, 1998. Dick, thanks for taking time to do this. You have had an exciting and long involvement with foreign affairs. You've been in from 1962 until right now because, although you're retired, you're still going strong and you've been ambassador several times in some very challenging places - Niger Republic, Chad, Somalia, where the ambassadorial title came, Rwanda - a very exciting career, and what I'd like to do is ask you to share some of it with posterity and with this tape as well. Dick, can you share a little bit about where you're from and your early background. You're a Massachusetts man.*

BOGOSIAN: Vlad, when I think about where I'm from and so forth, there are a number of thoughts that have crossed my mind, and the fact is I have thought about this from time to time. I think in my case there really is a sort of relevance to when and where I was from. I'm from Massachusetts. I was born on July 18, 1937, in Boston and grew up in Medford, Massachusetts, which is a close-in suburb of Boston. I like to think of it as the least insignificant town of 66,000 people in America, although Fanny Farmer, for example, was from Medford, and Amelia Earhart used to live there at one time. It's also the locus of Tufts University. There are two or three things that I think are kind of relevant to my background because I think they have affected me throughout my life. One is that I'm of immigrant stock. My parents were both immigrants, and they were both from Armenia. My mother was born in what is now called Diyarbakir - we call it Dikranagert, the City of Dikran - in 1898.
Q: Dick, can you tell me, how did you say it, the first of those three?

BOGOSIAN: Diyarbakir is the Turkish name. It's actually the capital of Turkish Kurdistan, and she was born there in 1898, and her family moved in 1901 to Cairo, and then in 1903 to the United States, and they settled in Chelsea, Massachusetts, where her father worked in a mill. My father's family was from Kharpet. My mother's hometown was on the Tigris, and my father's home town was on the Euphrates. He was born in 1891. His father lived in America alone from 1892 to 1902, when he returned; so my father was raised by his mother. They both came from large families. My father's father died in 1902, I think it was. Anyway, his family moved to America in 1907, and I think it's worth taking a moment to say something about what happened when he moved, because it's -

to use this phrase - counterintuitive.

Their emigration to America was certainly a function of the turmoil in the Ottoman Empire at that time, but my family was not directly affected by the massacres that occurred either in the 1890s or in 1915. When my father's mother came home one day, her older boys were in jail because she couldn't pay their debts, and she went to a Turkish official and she said, "I don't know what to do." She said, "I don't have the money." He said, "Why don't you go to America?" And she said, "But I can't even pay the *baksheesh*," meaning the bribes. And the Turkish official said, "I'll take care of it." And somehow he did, and they went by covered wagon from Kharpet, which is in southeastern Anatolia, over the mountains to Samson on the Black Sea, and they proceeded on to America. Now in both the case of my mother and my father, respectively in Naples and Marseilles, there was one relative who had to stay behind because they didn't have enough money. But ultimately, they all got to America. And in my father's case, the family paid off its debts and was in business for itself by 1914. They had blue eyes, and their nickname in Armenian was *Gabod*, and so they Anglicized it and called themselves Cabot, so their last name was a good Yankee name. His Armenian name was Karekin, and the Irish said, "We can't pronounce that. We'll call you Carrigan." So he had an Irish name.

The point of all this is to just say that it was a highly ethnic environment that I grew up in. My first language was Armenian. My neighbors spoke Italian or English with an Irish brogue. And there was also the experience of coming from overseas. And one result of that was that my father in particular always had an intense interest in international affairs. He became a citizen in the 1920s; my mother became a citizen in the 1930s. She thought she became a citizen when he did, and it was only around 1939 that she realized that she was not a citizen just because he became one. I asked him once why it took him so long to become a citizen. He said, in the aftermath of World War I, there was hope that, as Wilson had proposed, the Americans would take a mandate over Armenia. He said if that had happened he would have gone back, and it was only when it became apparent that that wouldn't happen that he decided he was here to stay. Certainly by the time I was growing up, any thought of returning to Armenia was simply nonexistent. The family was, certainly psychologically, thoroughly American. The children went to the public schools, and like many immigrants, that turned us into Americans. But again, to show you the kind of experiences they had, my two brothers were born in 1920 and 1922, so they began public school in 1926 and 1928, and my first brother was named Antrabik, and when he went to school the teacher said, "We'll call you Anthony." And he came home, and he said, "Teacher said my name's Anthony." And the family said, "Okay, your name's Anthony." My other brother's name was Hurrach. The teacher said, "Your name is Henry." So this is the "Don't rock the boat. Do what the teacher tells you" philosophy that we grew up with in my house. So maybe that's why I'm in such an, at times, inert profession as the diplomatic service.

In any event, my parents were married in 1919. I was the fourth of four children. I was born in 1937. And that takes me to the other important element of my background, which is to say, I was young enough to have avoided the Depression. My family's business failed in 1934, but by 1935, my father had a job with the John Hancock Life Insurance Company, and by the time I was young, he was fairly well settled with John Hancock. And therefore, I missed the more difficult times of the Depression, but that Depression experience had a searing effect on my father. And one result of that was that, at least speaking for myself, the notion of security was always important. And I think at times when others might have gone into business or tried a somewhat more daring lifestyle, I was comfortable working for the U.S. government as a Foreign Service officer. On the other hand, I was enough of a romantic to want to experience the world at large, and so this was the perfect way to do it: a lot of variety and some excitement, but within a fairly stable and secure environment.

The third thing was coming from Boston. Even though my parents were immigrants, that New England Yankee ambience permeated our lives - that and particularly the Irish, or the Catholic, character of Boston. In those days, we somewhat resented what we thought was a certain overbearing quality, particularly among the Irish, not so much among the Italians. We could relate easier to the Italians. But there was tremendous respect for the Yankees, and so growing up we had teachers like Miss Ladd, who was carved out of the granite of New Hampshire. And in 1952, when I was a sophomore studying Latin under Miss Ladd, she said, wiping her mouth with a handkerchief, "I'm glad Eisenhower got elected. I don't think anyone else could do the job." And I said I thought Stevenson could do it, and she said, "That'll do, Bogosian." So we tended to have two kinds of teachers. We had the remaining Miss Ladds, which at that time was kind of a dying breed, and then the celibate Irish Catholic, what we used to call spinster. And these were phenomenal teachers in the public school system, with a great deal of dedication.

The other thing that happened in my youth was simply World War II, and all that goes with World War II, whether it's the music, which I continue to like, the swing music of the big band era, whether it's Roosevelt - when Roosevelt died, his picture was on our kitchen wall for 40 days, because that's how long you mourn in our culture. We couldn't imagine the world without Roosevelt. We were strongly pro-Roosevelt in our house. It was interesting because later in 1952, my mother voted for Eisenhower, and my father said, "I didn't tell you to do that." And she said, "That's right, you didn't." So we grew up in a typical Boston double-decker (that's the way we say it), two-family wooden house, rather modest but quite common for that neighborhood. In those days, the assumption was that you'd either go to the local public high school or perhaps, if you were Catholic, you'd go to a parochial school system. It was only beginning to be assumed that you'd also go to college. Now my home town, my graduating class in high school was 540, of which a fair number went to Harvard, MIT, and other good schools, but the vast majority did not go. It was essentially a blue-collar group. And so I,

in using the modern terminology, didn't come from a particularly advantaged background. We were neither wealthy, nor was there the kind of experience that comes from parents who had graduate degrees. In fact, my parents each had only a ninth grade education. My mother went to junior high school and graduated, and that was about what you did in those days. She graduated in 1914. My father went to an American Presbyterian missionary school in Armenia up to the ninth grade, and then once he got to America, he worked, starting by pushing a cart around with groceries and working every day for the next 55 years.

On the other hand, it was a very stable family environment, and I was good enough at school to be encouraged. They weren't big on PTA or driving me to soccer. We were sandlot football and everything. I did play sports in high school and to some extent in college. I was not particularly good, but at one time or another, I played football, basketball, track, and lacrosse. And again, this was sort of the way it was done. One didn't anticipate scholarships; one didn't begin at the age of eight to become a national qualified champion. You just played football because that's what you did, especially if you were big, the way I was. And then you went on.

I suppose the next thing that I should mention that again was very much a function of the times I grew up in and the place was I met my wife, Claire, when we were seniors in high school. She was also in Medford. She had gone to a parochial high school until her junior year. And we got married after a courtship of seven years when we were both 23. I was almost 24. In those days, that's what you did. You got married and you had a family fairly early on. And in her case - this was before many more opportunities were available to women - she became a teacher. She taught in the Medford school system until we got married at a time when I was in law school, and she taught for a while in Harvey, Illinois. I went to Tufts College. I went to the University of Chicago Law School, where I had a full-tuition scholarship. I was a member of Delta Tau Delta Fraternity, mainly because when I started at Tufts I lived at home, and that gave me a place on campus to hang my -

Q: *What did you study at Tufts, Dick?*

BOGOSIAN: I was a history major, Vlad, and notwithstanding that I've been in the Foreign Service, I didn't even think of applying to Fletcher because I didn't think I could get in. I nearly flunked out of college. I was going to be a dentist, and organic chemistry and physics nearly put me out of the picture. And around that time, I changed my mind and ended up majoring in history. And I basically took survey courses in all the regions of the world, rather than concentrate on one narrow part of history. I began to think about law school, and did well enough to get into Chicago. And then while I was at Chicago my second year, I took the Foreign Service Exam, not expecting to pass, but I did. And then I took the orals and passed those as well, and as a result, all during my third year of law school, I knew I was admitted to the Foreign Service, and the notion was to do that for a

couple of years and then get out. And indeed, I was admitted to the Massachusetts bar shortly after I entered the Foreign Service. For us, 1962 was a very big year. We got married in 1961, and on May 31, 1962, I left Chicago after my last exam to take the bar review course in Boston. I drove straight through, took the bar exam June 24 and 25th, and entered the Foreign Service on July 10, 1962. I was admitted to the Massachusetts bar, I believe it was, in September.

Q: *A question, if I may, Dick, had you thought about foreign affairs? Had you thought about a career in foreign affairs at any time before you took the Foreign Service Exam?*

BOGOSIAN: Not really. To tell you the truth, I wasn't even sure what existed. And even after I took the exam, I still couldn't have told you what an embassy did. My motivation was to see a bit of the world. In that sense, I really didn't know what I was getting into. There were two things that were the stimuli. One was this curiosity about the world. This began in elementary school when I used to look at Richard Haliburton's *Book of Wonders*, and he said things like, "The Taj Mahal is the most beautiful building in the world." And I made a vow then to see it. The other was simply an interest in international affairs. My father was one who loved to discuss current events and politics at home, and we did that all the time, and so I was interested in international affairs, without ever going further and saying, this is what I want to do. One fall, I went back to Chicago, and said to one fellow, "What did you do last summer?" and he said, "I worked for Esso in Sweden." And I said to another fellow who had been my roommate, "What did you do last summer?" He said, "Joel and I walked across France." And I said to myself, I'll never be able to do it. I simply didn't have the money. And this was at a time when, at least in our circumstances, you didn't do your junior year abroad or anything like that. So to me, the Foreign Service was the way to get overseas. The other thing was I had never been in the military, nor was I interested in sort of - well, AID was virtually nonexistent then, and neither was the Peace Corps, and USIA didn't attract me - I was not drawn to the peripheral parts, and I was not drawn to the business world. Having said all that, I couldn't have really told you what the Foreign Service was or what we did or what the difference was between an embassy and a consulate, for example. I did have a certain interest in the Middle East, and upon joining the Foreign Service, I indicated a desire to serve in the Middle East; and as it happened, our first assignment was in Baghdad, by which time we had our first child. My second child was born in Baghdad, and our third child was born in Paris.

Q: *Dick, can we back up for just a bit? You joined in 1962, which, as you just pointed out, was a very eventful year.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, our son was born in 1962 as well.

Q: *What happened from the time you joined the Foreign Service in the summer of 1962 till you went off to Baghdad?*

BOGOSIAN: Which was almost a year. It turned out to be almost a year.

Q: *Almost a year. What happened at that time?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, first of all, as I say, we began July 10 -

Q: *Did you learn Arabic, for example?*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, that was part of it.

Q: *Okay.*

BOGOSIAN: For about two months we were in the initial training course, called the A-100 course. My recollection is that six months or so of Arabic followed that. And then there was consular training in the Middle East, area course, and by then it was the spring of 1963, and in those days the fiscal year ended June 30, and quite typically, there was a travel freeze in the spring because they had run out of travel money. And so for about two months I worked in the NEA Bureau on CENTO affairs because one of the fellows needed to get out of his job to do training and the other fellow hadn't come in yet. So the net result was it took almost a year. I joined the Foreign Service on July 10, 1962, and we sailed for Baghdad on July 9, 1963.

Q: *A year of preparation.*

BOGOSIAN: A year of preparation.

Q: *How good was your Arabic?*

BOGOSIAN: When I finished the six months, I was graded at S-2, which was enough to get me off language probation. Now, I never really did follow up. I never took the extended course in either Beirut or Tunis, and in that sense I never really got much beyond that, as far as Arabic is concerned, although I've served at four posts where Arabic is spoken.

Q: *Do you understand it and you can-*

BOGOSIAN: I can manage up to a point. There's a world of difference between me and someone who is S-3 or S-4 in Arabic, nor did I ever really learn to read Arabic. But it has been useful. I've been able to make use of my Arabic. In fact, in studying Arabic, one of the first sentences they taught us was "Where is the American embassy?" *Wayn as-safira al-amerikyia?* And we got to Baghdad in the evening on July 23, 1963. It was like landing on the moon, and the next day we got up, and I could see the flag, but I couldn't figure out how to get there. And this old Arab walked down the street, and I said, well, here goes nothing, and I

looked at him, and I said, "*Wayn as-safira al-amerikyia?"* And he said to me in Arabic, "Well, just go down the street and turn left." So it worked.

Q: *Good for you. So it was worth every month. Dick, Iraq, 1963 - tell us a little. What was it like?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, the first thing to note is that in February of 1963, during the Muslim month of Ramadan, the Baath Party mounted a coup and overthrew Abdul Karim Kassem, who five years earlier had overthrown the monarchy. In Baghdad we had had very close relations at the time of the Baghdad Pact; in fact, the Baghdad Pact was headquartered there. And the régime was very friendly to the United States. And they were swept away in what was clearly an anti-Western and essentially radical coup in 1958. But then Kassem, who I guess was somewhat idiosyncratic, fell to the Baathis. Now the Baathis have remained in power ever since, and they also took over power in Damascus at about the same time. The thing about the Baathis is that they're secular, notwithstanding Saddam Hussein's protestations of Islamic issues, but they're relatively secular, and they tend to be radical in terms of their position on Arab-Israeli issues. They're not particularly friendly to the West.

Now when I got to Baghdad, there was a group in power that, if you will, is the direct ancestor of Saddam Hussein's faction. He was not around in those days, or certainly not that anyone would notice. They were overthrown in November, and I would note that in November 1963 there were three things that were quite memorable for us, and they happened all around the same time. One was the assassination of John Kennedy, and when one of the embassy employees called me to say that the President has been shot, we thought he meant Iraq because those things didn't happen in countries like the United States. So as you can imagine; it was quite a shock. Now this happened shortly after a coup in Iraq, and as a result, during our memorial services, people had to walk to certain places. The coup in Baghdad was an internal Baathi thing, the moderate faction overthrew the radical faction, and then after I left that radical faction came back into power.

The third thing that happened was around that time we had Duke Ellington and his orchestra playing for us on a USIA program. He gave concerts, of course. I got to meet him. But he was increasingly nervous about being in Baghdad. On the other hand, to some extent as a result of my cajoling, we got Duke Ellington to play for our Marine Ball that year, and needless to say, it was one of the greatest Marine Balls that ever took place.

When you say "What was Iraq like?" I think there are two or three things to mention. One was that of all the assignments I've had, that was the one where the government was most unpleasant to us. During the two years I was there - first of all we maintained diplomatic relations - it isn't the way it is now - and there were times when they were a little easier than others, but after all is said and done, they

were hostile in the sense of being very difficult to deal with. Our ambassador had no real access beyond the under secretary of foreign affairs.

Q: *Who was our ambassador?*

BOGOSIAN: Robert Strong in those days. Robert Strong was really a China hand, but he had, effectively, had to leave during the McCarthy purges, and he ended up in Middle East affairs, where he had previously headed the part of the Middle East Bureau that dealt with the Arab countries. In any event, the Iraqis weren't hostile in the sense of, say, the way the Iranians were after the revolution, but they were difficult. They took one of our local employees, one of our Foreign Service nationals, who was our main political advisor, and they put him in jail. And he was a diabetic, and they wouldn't let him have insulin. Later, they took a Kurdish employee we had and pulled his fingernails out. They took an Armenian employee we had and literally put him on the rack. They were a very mean and nasty régime, albeit not as bad as Saddam.

Q: *Was this a tradition they'd picked up from their predecessors and predecessors before them?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, you know, the Iraqi people are interesting. I think there probably is a certain history of extremely harsh governments. I will say that some of the most wonderful people we ever met were Iraqis, and in fact, as my wife says, when you have an Iraqi friend, you have a friend for life who'll do anything for you. But on a governmental level - for example, we went to Babylon as tourists, and the security person sat just a few feet from us and watched us the whole time. And we were, of course, the most junior people in the embassy. So there was this kind of pervasive suspicion, very different attitude toward issues involving the Middle East, the key Middle Eastern issues, and in that sense it was not a very pleasant assignment.

That said, I would note a couple of other things that perhaps are more personal. Baghdad was our first assignment, and as was done in those days, they consciously gave us a rotational assignment. Now there were two of us there at the time. There was a fellow named Cameron Sanders and I, and we arrived within a few weeks of each other. So we sort of went around the embassy, and I forget what Cameron's rotation was, but I began in Political, and the Ambassador said, "Oh, you're getting dessert first." And as you know, most Foreign Service people seem to like political work the best, but it was probably the single most boring assignment I had, mainly because they simply didn't need me. They had a three-person political section that could cover the issues in Iraq. The rest of my time was divided equally between economics and administration, and I found that I enjoyed those much more. The trouble with administration was that you could never leave work behind you because people were forever pestering you, and sometimes it was difficult. On the other hand, there were days one had a lot of fun. I was sort of the junior GSO, and I took my clipboard every day. We had a wonderful compound. It was designed by José Luis Sert, who was a renowned

architect at Harvard, and there was a brief period in the late '50s and early '60s when the State Department retained the services of the most renowned architects in the world, and he was the one for Baghdad. And he designed an embassy and an ambassador's residence that was supposed to evoke an Arab tent in the desert. We had an embassy gardener who was growing flowers that had never been grown before in Baghdad. Our garden was irrigated by the Tigris River - our property went down to the river. And so I would go out every day, and I would talk to our people, like Nimrod K. Mansour, who managed the laborers. Nimrod spoke eight languages. He spoke English-

Q: *Nimrod, the Valorous.*

BOGOSIAN: Maybe. I remember Nimrod K. Mansour. He was Assyrian. He spoke Assyrian, his mother tongue, and Arabic, of course, because it's the language of Iraq, and English, because the British were there, and Urdu, because they brought all these people from India, and Armenian and Kurdish and Turkish, because that's who he grew up with, and Persian and so forth. And then there was George Debaizer, who ran the warehouse, and a few other people. But my favorite was the guard who watched the embassy boat, and he lived in a lift-van down where our property met the Tigris River, and this is dead serious, and he said, "Mr. Bogosian, can you get me a little bit of stuff for the lift-van?" So I would get him a pillow and a rug maybe. I can't believe that these people existed, but they did.

Q: *I think what you're saying is it was much more fun to work as a general services officer than as a young political officer.*

BOGOSIAN: It was indeed, yes.

Q: *I'm not surprised.*

BOGOSIAN: But what I did particularly enjoy was Econ because in economics what I found, and one reason why I chose to specialize in economics, was that there were issues of substance - there were bilateral issues and so forth - and yet you had a chance to get out and about, and so that hostility that greeted one disappeared when you talked to a businessman. For example, I did a report on the insurance industry, and this got me around to a whole range of people. I did a report on the cement industry, and some time later the Ambassador said, I need to get in touch with so-and-so, he's a key political figure. I said, "Oh, I know him, he's the head of the Cement Marketing Board." Well, I was a junior officer, but I had access to him in his capacity as chairman of the Cement Marketing Board, and when I went to call on him at the Ambassador's request to try to set up a meeting, he said, "I'd love to see the American Ambassador, but politically I can't. It'll kill me." So that's where I learned that sometimes, through doing economic work, you can actually penetrate.

The other thing that happened in Baghdad that is worth remembering is that we had a school, and in our wisdom we worked out an agreement with the Iraqis that if we did not accept Iraqi children, then they wouldn't make us teach Arabic and Islam; and that worked out fine because we had no desire to get involved with local children. The teachers were all Americans. My wife taught. Most of the teachers were wives of Iraqis, and what this meant was that, through her, I had contact with a much broader range of Iraqis than I might have had otherwise, so in that sense, notwithstanding the fact that I was the youngest person in the embassy, I did have an opportunity to meet and work with Iraqis in a way that might not have been possible if my wife wasn't teaching.

Q: *Can I ask a question? How would you characterize American policy at that time toward Iraq?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, it's interesting, Vlad, in the light of some of the things that have happened over the last few years. Our Ambassador expressed gratitude for the fact that nobody had any interest in Iraq. We had no Congressional delegations; there was no press interest; nobody was really pushing to come out there. In that sense, it certainly wasn't the way it was ten or twenty or a hundred years before, but I think I joined the Foreign Service when it still wasn't that easy to make a phone call. Frankly, it wasn't that easy to make a copy of a document. The technology that exists today that permits faxes and e-mails and who knows what-all didn't exist in 1963, and so as a result, in Iraq we were kind of on our own.

And there were three principal elements to Iraq, not counting the Cold War, which of course permeated everything in those days. One was the Kurdish problem, and the Kurds were in revolt, as they've been almost permanently for as long as anyone can remember. I don't recall that we got that involved. I mean, we tracked what was going on. We had people who were in touch with the Kurdish community. But frankly, we weren't' about to do anything with the Kurds, so it was more just a reporting function. I don't believe - and things may have gone on that I didn't know about - that we ever got involved in any really serious programs with the Kurds. The second was the Arab-Israeli issue. Now you couldn't be at an Arab post and not be involved in the Arab-Israeli issue, and the point there was that Iraq always thought of itself as in competition with Egypt for dominance in the Arab world. But in fact, I don't think Iraq was a major player in the Arab-Israeli issue. Now the main event that occurred in those days was the '67 War, which by definition was after I left Baghdad, and so what happened was that the Iraqis would take a very strident tone in their media. They were totally unsympathetic, very strongly opposed to Israel, and needless to say, that carried over to their attitudes toward the United States. The third factor of Iraq was oil, and while I was there the oil flowed. Now when I was there, I don't think people realized the vast reserves that Iraq has. Maybe some people in the oil company did. The company was called the Iraq Petroleum Company, and some of its ownership was American, but it was essentially the British that were running it. It

was the British part of IPC that was managing it, and there again, I think we essentially kept a watching brief.

Frankly, the other things that went on - Iraq is the largest exporter of dates in the world, and they make the best dates, but it rarely became an issue. I mean, we were always trying to get them to improve the quality and so forth of the dates. We had a consulate in Basra in those days. There were always Christians who were hoping the Americans would protect them the way the British used to, and a certain amount of emigration.

Q: *Dick, you're describing an Iraq of 35 or 37 years ago, and in certain ways it doesn't sound too different, maybe a little less extreme.*

BOGOSIAN: Well, I think it depends on what you're talking about. I visited Iraq in the mid-'70s, and what I noticed was the city of Baghdad was a little, not cleaner so much, but there were some new buildings and new mosques and even statues - things like that. But all the people walked looking at the ground, and so this sort of a police state - evidently it's as bad now as it ever was. Iraq should be much, much richer, but they've been hobbled by war and one thing or another. What's new, Vlad, when the Gulf War was emerging, I couldn't believe that Iraq represented such a threat. That is to say that they had that kind of weaponry or that kind of research. And my wife and I agreed that there's no way that the Iraqi soldiers could be a threat, because they're terrible fighters. And in the event that proved to be the case. So you have a kind of ambivalence or dichotomy - I don't know what the right word is - because on the one hand, they've developed a kind of military structure that is indeed frightening, and, as has been pointed out, they used some of these weapons on their own people; on the other hand, I can't believe that that régime has any popular support. What we know, though, is this. One of the teachers my wife worked with has been living in Baghdad, and of course we really don't have any contact with her anymore, but at one point it was evident that she was so insulated from the outside world that she had developed a rather distorted view of how people... And so I can imagine how the Iraqi Arabs feel.

On the other hand, it has been 35 years since we've lived there and 25 years since I've been there, so I can't speak to what's going on now.

Q: *So, Dick, Iraq, then, lasted for your family until 1965.*
BOGOSIAN: Yes, from '63 to '65. I did want to mention one thing, Vlad, and that is that in our system, my grade, when I went to Baghdad, was what they called FSO-8. And it's common for people to get promoted after one or two years. And I didn't get promoted in Baghdad, partly because my writing wasn't very good, and one of the things that happened to me in Baghdad, which is common though I'm not sure it happens to everybody, but I had one boss, a guy by the name of Lonnie Morin, who was my boss when I first went in the Economic Section. Whereas my previous boss said, "You know, maybe the reason you can't

write too well was that your first language was not English," Lonnie said, "Do this report on insurance." He made me write it I don't know how many times, and in the process I finally learned how to write. I've been fortunate in my career to have a number of bosses like that who gave me the kind of help that really makes a difference. In a personal sense that was a major turning point in my career, to have Lonnie "teach" me how to write.

Having served in the Middle East, having wanted to go there, I began to think about maybe going somewhere else. And keep in mind that that was at a point when I thought we'd leave the Foreign Service rather than stay in. So I thought that the whole point was to come back to Washington or, if not, go to Europe.

Q: *Was your family enjoying it?*

BOGOSIAN: My wife loved Baghdad. The children had no notion of what was going on.

Q: *So basically four years after you joined the Foreign Service and after three years overseas, you were getting the bug.*

BOGOSIAN: Hold on, two years.

Q: *Two years overseas.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes. By the way, when we got to Baghdad, each of us got sick, and my son lost a third of his weight, so we had our moments, but by and large it was a good assignment. We had some awfully nice people in the embassy and so on.

So I was pushing to get an assignment out of the Middle East, and as a result, I was assigned to Cairo. And when I talked to the people in Personnel, I said, "You know, you told us you tried to assign people where they want, and you've sent me to Cairo and I wanted to get out of the Middle East." He said, "Oh, but we have an investment in you that we have to get back from teaching you Arabic, and by the way, they like you in NEA." So we said, well, all right, and we got ready to go to Cairo, which was one of those posts where you needed to buy everything and so forth. I remember we got a champagne-colored love seat, and there was no time to Scotchguard it, and years later, when it was dirty and smelly I kept remembering that. Anyway, a week before we were to leave for Cairo, they called and said, "Your assignment's been changed," and I thought they must mean that we were going to Yemen or some awful place. And they said, "You're going to Paris." I said, "Paris? I don't even speak French." They said, "That's right, come down and learn French." And when I did, I saw the fellow who told me why they assigned me to Cairo, and I said, "You explained why they assigned me to Cairo, and I'm going to Paris." He said, "Well, the position was abolished, and that made you the property of the Junior Officer Division, and they thought you should have a world language and a totally different experience," which proved to me that

Personnel can justify any action they take.

Q: *Any, absolutely.*

BOGOSIAN: In any event, what this led to - and again, I consider this one of the great gifts of the Foreign Service, to have learned the French language -
Q: *Absolutely.*

BOGOSIAN: And so what happened then was, we came to Washington in the late fall and early winter, learned French, and proceeded to go to Paris, arriving in January of 1966. And Paris was my consular tour, and as you know that's a big, huge embassy, and as a result, what they did was make that a rotational tour, which is to say, for the first few months I worked in what was in the vernacular called "Welfare and Whereabouts," which is now called American Citizens' Services. Then I was notarials officer in the Passport Section and then, for about a year, visas. But the thing that made Paris a wonderful place to be a vice consul is, first of all, we were young and we were junior, so we had no social responsibilities. We couldn't take full advantage of Paris, because that meant money, and we didn't have money; in fact, there was an opportunity to get in with sort of a young, fast crowd of French people, but we didn't have enough money to do that. But we did have a wonderful opportunity to travel in Europe and so forth, and while we were there we managed to get up to Holland and over to Germany and down to Spain. And keep in mind that this was my one European assignment, so I was always grateful to have had that experience. When we got to Paris there was a fairly substantial American military presence in France, and as a result we also had the benefit of things like PX's and the American Hospital, when my wife was pregnant.

Q: *That was in NATO days, the days when SHAPE was in France.*

BOGOSIAN: It was all in France, the way God meant it to be.

Q: *Absolutely.*

BOGOSIAN: The only trouble was, so was De Gaulle. And in 1967, De Gaulle kicked us out. Now it's interesting in all my whole career I never served with a political ambassador, even in Paris. Our ambassador there was Chip Bohlen, and when the French were doing that, he said at a meeting of American embassy personnel, he said - this was rough for some of the Americans to see what was happening - and he said, "Just remember, there's more to French-American relations at any given time than what the two governments are saying to each other." And I always remember that in the various places I've been associated with.

Q: *Who was DCM at that time?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, we had two DCMs, and the first was a man, Robert McBride, who later went on to be ambassador to Zaire and to Mexico, and his name, I think, was McSomething-or-other, and I just can't think of it right now.

Q: *Jack Maguire?*

BOGOSIAN: No, it wasn't Maguire. Maguire was there, but he was the head of the Pol-Mil Section. He became ambassador to Mali. The second DCM was W. Woodruff Wallner - unforgettable. Jeez, I can't think of who the DCM was.

Q: *Let me ask a follow-up question to that. Embassy Paris, from my soundings over many, many years, is traditionally, despite Paris, a very low-morale embassy. How was it when you were there?*

BOGOSIAN: It may have been, Vlad. I think the thing to remember is, in an embassy like that, when you're a vice consul, it's like working in the State Department, and you don't necessarily know what people are thinking in some other part. There were like seven buildings. I'm not sure I ever was in all the buildings.

Q: *It may have been a high-morale embassy.*

BOGOSIAN: Well, I don't know whether it was one way or another. I know that, speaking personally, in some ways this was the low point of my career because I was really coming to grips with whether we were going to stay in or not. I did get promoted, finally, in Paris.

Q: *Promoted? You mean after -*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, from 8 to 7.

Q: *Congratulations, I tied you. I was the champion.*

BOGOSIAN: Really.

Q: *Four years in class as an 8.*

BOGOSIAN: Really, I thought I was the last one of the group. But anyway, there was a friend of mine, a contemporary named Ron Freeman, who currently is, I think, the number two person in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and he was a young lawyer. He had gone to Columbia, and we were kind of friends, and he'd come in and he'd say, "Hi, Dick, are you still processing wetbacks?" And so it was not easy to see this guy move ahead as he was working for McKinsey and Company.

The thing about Paris was the following. First of all, Paris was Paris. You simply

couldn't avoid all the beauty and interest of that city. Secondly, we had our third child there, so it was a period when our family was very young and growing, and we could take them here and there and enjoy some of the things that Paris and France had to offer. We had a lot of friends, and because they were part of a big embassy, it wasn't quite the way it is when you work all day with people at a small post and then you socialize with them. We really didn't see them that much. We had friends that were in USIA, with Treasury, with the military, and so in that sense we made friends, some of whom have remained close friends for all the years since.

There was a very diverse and interesting American community in Paris in those days, and we had some exposure to them. The other thing, frankly, was there was just this passing parade of people who came to the Consular Section, some of whom were more interesting than others.

Q: *Dick, did you enjoy consular work?*

BOGOSIAN: I enjoyed consular work the way I enjoyed administrative work, which is to say, there were parts of it that were very interesting, but I wouldn't want to specialize in it because there were too many emotional things that tear you to pieces. There was a Turkish man who had come in for an immigrant visa, and we had to refuse him because he was a convicted felon, and his wife was American, and she had left him and he wanted to join her, and we had to tell him he couldn't go. And he said, "You're telling me I'll never see my wife and children again." I frankly had no desire to go through that. I prefer the more voyeuristic parts of our profession, where you watch other people do things and not get involved directly.

I emerged from Paris feeling that everybody should have a consular tour so you'll have enough stories to tell for the rest of your career, because there were just innumerable incidents. I mean, I had to refuse a Nobel Laureate a transit visa. I think he was the first Frenchman to win a Nobel Prize in one of the sciences for years, and he wanted to go I don't know where, and he needed a transit visa, and finally after all my questions, he said, "Well, take your visa and shove it." And my boss came and said, "You know, you probably should have bucked that up to me." I said, "What could you do? He's ineligible." He said, "I know that, but sometimes it goes down a little easier when you're more senior." We had Americans who were in jail or on drugs, just people who would come in and they would tell you their story. The woman who came in, she was of some sort of Eastern European origin, and she flashed a Nicaraguan or a Costa Rican passport, and as I was refusing her, I said, "You want to go to America and live as an immigrant." She said, "No, I want to go and live as a tourist."

Q: *Wonderful.*

BOGOSIAN: So that's what made it interesting. And in contrast to some of our

other assignments, after all is said and done, it was only two years, but two years can go by fast.

Q: *So, Dick, what happened then. We're now in 1968.*

BOGOSIAN: I would note one thing. If I had gone to Cairo, I would have been there during the '67 War and probably would have been evacuated, so we kind of missed that.

Q: *Did you stay in Paris for those amazing... Student uprising and - -*

BOGOSIAN: No, that happened after I left. As it happened, our Baghdad assignment was two years and two days, and our Paris assignment was two years and two weeks, and as it happened as well, from Paris I was assigned to the Middle East bureau, to NEA, and as the CENTO Desk officer. I would note that this was at a time that when I had to have some major surgery done -

Q: *This was 1968.*

BOGOSIAN: '68, and what happened was, we got home, and we had to get settled. We rented a house in the Potomac Palisades part of Washington, DC, just a gorgeous neighborhood, and our children were beginning school. They went to the Key School for kindergarten, Our Lady of Victory School.

The job I had was one of those jobs that is alright but not that exciting, and around that time I was really debating about whether to leave the Foreign Service. It didn't seem to be going ahead very well. The CENTO job itself was all right. It was referred to usually as a "moribund alliance." The most interesting thing is we got to go to London for a ministerial meeting. Now you don't want every anecdote out of my -

Q: *No, no, no, no. Dick, when did CENTO finally fold, officially?*

BOGOSIAN: I think it officially folded with the Iranian revolution in 1979. It certainly was moribund; it was the old Baghdad Pact. In fact, the first policy paper I had to write in 1963 was why we should support the Turkish-Iranian railway, which was a big infrastructure project meant to link Turkey and Iran. But by the time I was CENTO Desk officer, there were meetings you had to prepare for and so forth, but there were so many fundamental contradictions. The Pakistanis really didn't support our Middle East policies, and so forth.

Q: *We're basically in a strange situation because the Baghdad Pact was a child of the Cold War.*

BOGOSIAN: It was also a child of John Foster Dulles.

Q: *It was a child of Dulles.*

BOGOSIAN: And by the late '60s the atmosphere had changed.

Q: *Well, the atmosphere that you just described in Baghdad was -*
BOGOSIAN: Well, Iraq was out, of course. Iraq left in '58; but we had Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, plus Britain. And they were referred to as the Northern Tier, and the fact is they were all important countries, and indeed, Pakistan was also a member of SEATO, the South East Asia Treaty Organization. But as you know, Pakistan itself had a civil war and split. There were other aspects of that relationship, without getting into more detail, that frankly could be handled better on a bilateral basis, particularly with Iran.

Q: *Did you feel you were wasting your time?*

BOGOSIAN: Not so much that. For one thing, I was too stupid to know whether I was wasting my time. I just never really-

Q: *But, Dick, how much of diplomacy is a waste of time?*

BOGOSIAN: No, that isn't what I mean. Do you mean *diplomatically* were we wasting our time? I thought you meant in career terms.

Q: *No, no, I was thinking more of - well, both, both. No, in terms of - you were working in a moribund alliance.*

BOGOSIAN: Let's put it this way, Vlad -

Q: *Did you feel that you were wasting your time?*

BOGOSIAN: Not really in the sense that I guess I took it as a matter of faith that we were making our contribution to what, frankly, was still the Cold War. I mean, we're talking about 1968 here. There was no question that the three countries were important to us, and CENTO provided a kind of complement to what was being done in terms of the bilateral relations.
Q: *If it could make certain forms of bilateral cooperation safer for those countries and easier than it was -*

BOGOSIAN: The problem was, was it? You see, in the case of Turkey, their lake was NATO, and in that sense, you didn't really need CENTO. In the case of Pakistan, it was caught up in its rivalry with India and a number of other problems, and we were not willing in the CENTO context to back them foursquare on Kashmir, and that's what they wanted. Iran was in the middle, and the relationship with Iran, frankly, was thriving in 1968, but then the question was, who needs CENTO? It was there, frankly.

Q: *How long did this incarnation go on, Dick, your incarnation as the CENTO Desk officer?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, the CENTO Desk job essentially lasted for about, say, a year and a half, and in terms of my career that also was a major turning point. What happened there was, the CENTO job was one where I said the first thing that happened that we had to prepare for was the London Ministerial in 1968. Then I had my operation. Then it was the summer, and you know, between leaves and everything - there was two of us, Bob Stein and myself - and we also did a few other things; we did some UN work - so one way or the other, we kept busy. I forget where the Ministerial was in 1969, but we had to prepare for that. But it certainly wasn't a challenging job, and I guess I'd have to say it was the least challenging job I've had in the Foreign Service. Then one day, my boss, Sid Sober, came to me and said, "By the way," he says, "You're going over to INR," the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. I had no warning about that, and as you may know, a lot of Foreign Service people look at INR as kind of a dumping ground. What had happened was that there was a new assistant secretary in NEA named Joe Sisco. He wanted a Jerusalem expert, and there was a fellow named Bob Munn, who knew Jerusalem, who was in INR, and Sisco said he wanted Munn. INR said they wanted a replacement plus an undisclosed amount of cash, and the idea was there would be some transfer. The job was offered to a couple of people, and ultimately I was the most expendable.

Q: *So you were traded.*

BOGOSIAN: I was traded. The thing that was fascinating about this was that it was simply one of the best jobs I ever could have hoped to have. It was a phenomenally good job. It was a job that was good in almost any way you can imagine. I had a wonderful boss, a guy named Frank Perez. I worked with people like Leon Fuerth, who is now the Vice President's National Security Adviser. Leon did chemical and biological warfare. I worked with a guy named George Monk, who did nuclear physics. George worked with Enrico Fermi under those stands at the University of Chicago.

Q: *What was the nature of your work, Dick?*

BOGOSIAN: We were the people in the State Department that monitored the strategic programs of mainly the Soviet Union, China, but everyone else, too - Israel, France, you name it.

Q: *The Bureau of Intelligence and Research.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, but we were linked to the intelligence community. We were the people that, on the one hand, put in a political context what was happening in the strategic realm for the rest of the intelligence community, and we were the people who explained to the policy community in Washington what was

happening in strategic terms. To give you an idea of what was happening in those days, at my initiative I started briefing the deputy assistant secretary for European Affairs, Dick Davies, on a quarterly basis, and one day, the assistant secretary, Martin Hillenbrand, came to me - I'm a junior officer - and said, "Dick, do you mind if I attend your briefings?" As far as I could tell, nobody was telling, that somehow the Office of Soviet Affairs was not following what was going on.

Q: *Fascinating.*

BOGOSIAN: Bob Baraz in INR and Helmut Sonnenfeldt knew this stuff. This was the Kissinger era, and this was at a time when this stuff was being watched by the topmost levels. Kissinger would read things I wrote. I've got a note he sent to Ray Klein complimenting a paper I wrote. He didn't necessarily know I wrote it. We had the President's Advisory Committee on Disarmament that included John J. McCloy, who was the chairman. It's members included Douglas Dillon, Loris Norstad, a guy named Casey, who I wondered who he was, and he became-

Q: *Bill Casey.*

BOGOSIAN: Bill Casey. That job involved substantive issues that were among the most important we were dealing with. It involve -

Q: *Did you get the feeling - if I may just interrupt - that the Bureau of European Affairs you were briefing, the Assistant Secretary and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, did you get the feeling that they were being kept out of the policy loop at that time?*

BOGOSIAN: In a word, yes. First of all, it's almost presumptuous to say that Hillenbrand was kept out of the loop, but that's the feeling I got.

Q: *Well, it's not presumptuous, because the American ambassador in Moscow only learned about Henry Kissinger's first trip there on the third day of a four-day trip.*

BOGOSIAN: But the other thing you've got to realize is whereas in many other areas, our embassy probably can contribute information, the fact is - in contrast to the present - they couldn't get out to Ulan Ude and find out what was in the ground, and this was not an area where human intelligence contributed much. It was a highly educational job for me. This is where I learned how budgets were made, and I can tell you some stories. This is I think something I can tell. We worked on the national estimates. One of the issues at the time was whether the SA-5 had ABM characteristics, because it went 100,000 feet into the air, which is where the atmosphere ends. The intelligence community concluded that it did not have ABM characteristics; it was a surface-to-air missile, albeit a highly developed one. So we were working on the estimate for defensive missile systems for the Soviet Union, and the fellow from DIA said - the text read "It's highly

unlikely that this has ABM characteristics" - he said, "Why do we have to say, 'highly unlikely'? Why don't we just say 'unlikely'?" and the fellow from the CIA said, "Because you know if we say 'highly unlikely,' you can't get money to develop counter- measures; but if we say 'unlikely,' you can." And to a junior Foreign Service officer this was very revealing because it showed how things were done. When the Soviet Backfire bomber was developed, and the debate was whether it had strategic capabilities and an Air Force officer (with DIA) had to get up and make the case that it did not, somebody sitting with me along the wall said, "There goes his career in the Air Force."

Q: *Fascinating.*

BOGOSIAN: And frankly, the job provided opportunities for travel. I got to visit missile sites in North Dakota and Kansas and SAC headquarters and also went to the Apollo 11 space launch... To a junior officer, it exposed me in a way that I think few people have an opportunity to see how the intelligence community works, because that job provided not only analytical responsibilities but to some extent operational responsibilities. It provided insights into our relationship with certain countries that I wouldn't have known otherwise but which were very fundamental to why we had the kind of relationship we had with certain countries - plus, I had a wonderful boss in Frank Perez, who gave me tremendous opportunity to express my views on the issues of the day. One result was I got two quick promotions, and by then, of course, we were committed to the Foreign Service. I didn't explain how that happened, but by then we were.

I should note that another thing that happened was that I undertook to brief the new director and deputy director of the Political-Military Bureau, who were Ron Spiers and Tom Pickering, and that, in turn, proved to be an entrée into some of the more interesting policy developments of the period. So whereas the job came out of nowhere, it proved to be an extremely interesting and valuable job, although at the end of it, when Spiers said, "Would you like to specialize in political-military affairs? Maybe I can get you a job," I said, no, I want to do economics. And so I took the Econ course and went on to Kuwait as the chief of the economic section.

Q: *Dick, shall we talk a little bit about the economic training?*

BOGOSIAN: If you wish.

Q: *I'd like to. The year is 1972, and can you refresh the collective memory? How long was the economic training course in 1972?*

BOGOSIAN: Six months.

Q: *Six months. It's now a nine-month course.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes.

Q: *What did you think of it?*
BOGOSIAN: Well, it was a little like French training. It kind of exposed me to a whole new realm of intellectual life, as Tony Lake said to me once after studying economics at Princeton. I said, "Did you learn economics?" He said, "I'm not sure, but I can speak the language." And what I found from the economic course at FSI was it took me from zero knowledge of economics to a level where I could, if you will, hold my own adequately with business people and so forth. I literally had a situation in Kuwait where someone representing the Getty Oil Company engaged me in conversation and at one point stopped and said, "Oh, I see you know enough about economics that I can speak to you at a higher level."

Now it didn't make me a full-fledged economist, and it didn't mean that I could sit down with, say, a professor of economics in the academy, but it really did help give me a grounding that was highly useful in Kuwait, which was a post where there was a lot going on. There was the oil industry; there were financial movements, and all the rest. It permitted me to keep up to some extent with the literature. It gave me some understanding what it meant when a bond issue was issued and we were trying to figure out where the Kuwaitis were going in terms of their development in the world of finance. So it really was essentially like Arabic and French, in that it took me from zero to some level where I could function. I told you I had the grades to get into the University of Chicago Law School; I would note that I got 91st percentile on the law school admissions test. After six months of economics, when we all took the Graduate Record Exam (and I was not in the top quarter of my class - I think I was probably in the top third, but not in the top quarter), I got 91st percentile in the Graduate Record Exam for economics. So that suggests to me that they lived up to their deal, which was to give you the equivalent of a good undergraduate major.

Q: *A strong undergraduate major in economics in six months. Dick, then what? Then Kuwait?*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, then Kuwait.

Q: *What years were you in Kuwait?*

BOGOSIAN: We were in Kuwait from 1972 to 1976. Kuwait was, if you will, about as good and as exciting an assignment as the INR one was, and so in career terms that sort of back-to-back combination made a big difference in my career. When I was going to Kuwait, we were thinking in terms of this was the first time I was a section chief and so forth. There was no way of knowing that some of the things that were going to happen would happen in Kuwait, but in fact, it was a very tumultuous time. The 1973 War took place in those years. The quadrupling of oil prices, with all that that implied, took place in those years. While I was there, our exports increased 400 percent during the four-year period. Back then

we did commercial work, and by the time I left we were doing eight trade missions a year. The posts in the lower gulf opened around the time I got there. Our ambassador was accredited to five countries. He also was wonderful boss. Bill Stoltzfus was his name.

Q: *Bill Stoltzfus.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes. And Kuwait was one of the most exciting places to be in the Arab World, partly because in Arab terms it was relatively free. There was a vibrant press; there were people from all over the Arab world; there were organizations like the Kuwait Fund and the Arab Fund and the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Companies that were based in Kuwait, as well as some major new initiatives underway. So that there was an interesting mix of people. It was very cosmopolitan. In addition, they were pumping three million barrels of oil a day when I got there, and by the time I left, what with the rise in the price of oil, it was the classic small emirate that was just bringing in so much money that you couldn't ignore it any more.

Q: *One of the highest per capita incomes in the world.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes. I would note that while we were there the Iraqis threatened Kuwait. They attacked a border post. But interestingly enough the matter was quickly put down diplomatically.

Q: *The Iraqi claim to Kuwait goes way back.*

BOGOSIAN: I would note, though, that the Sabah family-

Q: *-goes way back.*

BOGOSIAN: -goes even further back.

Q: *1750s.*

BOGOSIAN: Something like that. I mean, Iraq itself has only existed in one sense since World War I. But you're right in saying that they claim a historical ownership of Kuwait.

Q: *Dick, in a sense you're describing a Kuwait that sounds somewhat more free than fun than it was 10 or 15 years later.*

BOGOSIAN: Well, I think it was. There were a couple of things that happened. In terms of fun, I think some of my predecessors had even more fun than I did, because there was a time when one of my predecessors taught the Kuwaitis how to do national income accounts. While I was in Kuwaitis took over ownership of the oil company.

Q: *From whom?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, from a Gulf-BP consortium. And in contrast to Baghdad, the manager of the Kuwait Oil Company was an American, and needless to say, we worked very closely with him. When we were in Kuwait, this was probably in the last 50 years one of the happiest times in the Arab World because, given the way they look at things, they feel they won the war in 1973, and at a minimum what they did was they overcame, at least to some extent, the shame they felt from the defeat in '67. This permitted them to be a lot more relaxed and open with the West, at least in Kuwait, plus with raising the price of oil, the money was just flowing in, and there was this sense that anything could be accomplished.

Q: *You say the oil price rose fourfold at that time? This was a catastrophic time in America, politically catastrophic.*

BOGOSIAN: We were in Kuwait, ha, ha.

Q: *Oil lines and coupons.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes.

Q: *What were U.S. interests in Kuwait? What were we trying to do there?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, needless to say, the one-word answer is "oil" - increasingly, oil plus money. Frankly, Vlad, what we were doing is the very thing that was at issue in the Gulf War. Kuwait is a place that we want to see in friendly hands. We want the oil to flow, and we want them to manage their affairs in a way that is the least disruptive to us. In fact, when I was in Kuwait, the oil minister in Saudi Arabia was Ahmad Zaki Yamani, who was a graduate of Harvard and clean-cut and things like that. And I used to say that Yamani caused more harm to the United States than Nasser ever dreamed of doing because of what he did in terms of raising... These difficult times in the United States were a direct result of what, in his cool way, Yamani did.

Q: *In OPEC.*

BOGOSIAN: And so you had a curious situation in Kuwait. When I was in Baghdad, the government was hostile, but they didn't move to take over the oil company, and the oil never stopped flowing. When I was in Kuwait, the government was quite friendly, and in fact, I knew, because Pete Hart told me during a visit in Kuwait, that their bottom line to the Americans was, are you going to help us if we ever are attacked?

Q: *By Iraq.*

BOGOSIAN: Well, the assumption is it's Iraq, but between you and me, they worried about Saudi Arabia and Iran as well.

Q: *They were not the most popular country in the world.*

BOGOSIAN: They are not the most popular. People don't like them because they're sanctimonious. We liked the Kuwaitis because they were very frank. Now we had Carl Albert come while I was there. He was Speaker of the House, and he met with Abdul-Rahman Salim Al-Ateeqi, who was the minister of finance and oil and one of the most important Kuwaitis, also a man very passionate on the Arab-Israeli question. And as the Kuwaitis did, he just raked the Americans over the coals, and as he was leaving, Carl Albert said to us, "I've never been through anything like that in my life." So when he was leaving at the airport, I was with a colleague, Arthur Houghton, who was an Arabist, who was accompanying him. They had been in Saudi Arabia. I said, "Arthur, why is he so amazed? You know the Saudis feel the same way the Kuwaitis do." He said, "Yes, but, Dick, they're so much more Olympian." And this is true. The Kuwaitis tend to tell you what's on their mind in a very direct way.

Q: *Interesting, yes.*

BOGOSIAN: And that means, if you're living there and working with them, there are two things. First of all, you're not trying to trick each other. On the other hand, you're living in a context where the more positive parts of the relationship are out there as well. But on the other hand, they would say to me things like, "Don't you want us to be frank?" and the short answer was no, we'd rather you didn't, actually. And that's one reason why the Kuwaitis were not particularly well liked.

Q: *Could one have anticipated a war with Iraq at that time, or the attack by Iraq on Kuwait?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, as I said, they attacked while I was there, but that's more a function of understanding Iraq than of understanding Kuwait.

Q: *Was that a punitive attack or a takeover?*

BOGOSIAN: I forget what the ostensible reason was. It was a border post and we, through diplomatic channels, including getting King Hussein to help, it sort of was pushed back in. I don't know. You know, after I left I believe that before he was the leader of the country, Saddam did some things in Kuwait that were in the nature of murder or I don't know what. I visited Baghdad from Kuwait. I had reason to go up there once, and there was a Kuwaiti I knew, and we were getting ready to come back, and he said, "I can't wait to get out of this country." They're so different in almost every way you can imagine, and the spirit of the two places is so radically different.

Q: *Did we work at all with the Kuwaitis on helping them invest their money?*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, we tried. First of all, as you can imagine -

Q: *They had a lot of money.*

BOGOSIAN: They had a lot of money, and one of our most frequent visitors was the assistant secretary for international affairs of Treasury. In that sense, in Kuwait - just to get back to the point you made at the beginning of our discussion of Kuwait - you said it was happier later, and there were three things that have happened that have made a big difference. One was a financial crisis they refer to as the *suq al-manakh*. In effect, it was a classic stock exchange situation that crashed. The reason it was traumatic for the Kuwaitis is they didn't think that should happen. To them, up, up, up. And that had a kind of a sobering effect on them. It kind of revealed some of the weaknesses of the way the private sector managed its money. By the way, typically the Kuwaiti government has always been extremely prudent in its investments, including always making sure a little bit was put away for a rainy day. The other thing, of course, was the war. There's no question that Iraq attacked and did what it did was traumatic. But the third thing was the environmental disaster of burning all those oil wells. And it's kind of like somebody -

Q: *We're talking about the recent war.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes. What I'm saying is those things have changed the atmosphere.

Q: *I was in Kuwait before the war, and my sense of it was not as relaxed and open and cheerful as what I got from you.*

BOGOSIAN: What year would that have been? Was it before or after the *suq al-manakh?*
Q: *This was* circa *'86-87.*

BOGOSIAN: I don't know what to say. I think the one thing I would say, though, Vlad, as the American economic officer and as one who knew just enough Arabic to sort of be able to shmooze a little bit, is that our ambassador had served twice in Kuwait, he knew everybody, he also was an Arabist.

Q: *Who was that?*

BOGOSIAN: Bill Stoltzfus. We simply had a wonderful relationship with a lot of Kuwaitis, and I don't think that many Americans had that kind of relationship. I mean, to be the economic officer in Kuwait when I was was simply a terrific place to be and to work, and it just wasn't that easy for the other people in the embassy because it's a town where business is what makes things go.

Q: *Absolutely. Anything else with Kuwait that we should touch on?*

BOGOSIAN: You know, I was there four years, and a lot happened in those four years, and the one thing that I think was interesting was that as the October War unfolded, there was quite a debate within the embassy as to whether the Kuwaitis would break relations with us. And the Ambassador and I said we didn't think they would. And in the event, they didn't, and what that showed was that the Kuwaitis valued their relationship with us even if they often took public positions that were somewhat antagonistic. And it's a very interesting thing, I guess, to serve in a Third World country, one which is as vulnerable as Kuwait is, when you feel that they look to you as their ultimate protector - because on the one hand it's kind of like a point beneath which your relationship is unlikely to go, because they value it so much, but it puts a burden on you that you may not wish to have.

Q: *Were we seen as a protector in that period?*
BOGOSIAN: I believe we were - when you say "seen," which is a lot different from treaties and things like that.

Q: *No, no, exactly, but indeed, through a certain amazing progression of American policy ten year later, we indeed became -*

BOGOSIAN: Well, I will tell you a story that I think is all right to tell. Pete Hart, as you know, used to be our assistant secretary for the Middle East. And he told me, he came to Kuwait as a private citizen, and we're both from Medford, Massachusetts, and we were chatting. And he told me about when the Emir visited in 1968, and you may remember that after the '68 election, but before the inauguration, Johnson let a lot of foreigners come and make state visits, and the Emir, as I said a little earlier, in his meeting with Johnson, he turned aside all his notes and said, "What I want to know is will you be there to protect us when the time comes?" And according to Hart, Johnson never really answered that question. I take it back - it wasn't with Johnson; it was with Rusk. But the point is, the question was made, and he wasn't told no. And of course, the proof of the pudding is what happened years later. So it wasn't formal, but when you say, well, were we *seen*, yes, I think almost everybody assumed that if it came to that we would help.

Q: *Dick, I think we're running to the end of Tape 1, so we'd better close it. This is April 1, 1998.*

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Wednesday, April 8, and this is Side A of Tape number 2. Dick, the last time we talked we went from sort of early family and personal recollections through entering the Foreign Service in 1962, and we left off with a very lively account of work in Kuwait. And right after that you embark on some really very heavy duty

work in the Sudan, and I wonder if you can sort of set the scene for how you started to go off to the Sudan, what you had on your mind, and what you thought was on your plate, because it was not an easy place to go to, as I recall at that time.

BOGOSIAN: There were two, if you will, lines leading to Sudan. One was personal, and one was, if you will, substantive. Substantively, in Kuwait, this period of the early '70s, particularly after the October War with Israel, which the Arabs deemed that they had won, and also following the quadrupling of oil prices, which meant a tremendous flow of money into the Arab world, there was a great feeling, if you will, of creativity in the Arab World. They felt that they could do things that were never possible before. And in that context, they looked upon Sudan kind of the way we looked at our West. It was open; it was virgin; and in contrast to much of the Arab World, it was or at least could be agriculturally productive.

Q: *Excuse me, when you say "they looked at it," who are you-*

BOGOSIAN: I mean the Arab World generally, and particularly those Arabs, like the Kuwaitis, who had money to invest. There were a couple of notions they had. One was they had money; the Sudan was a place where that money could be usefully invested - and I should note parenthetically that there was a sense in Kuwait and in some of the smaller Gulf countries that their own countries simply couldn't absorb all that they had to invest. They did start aid programs to the Third World. Of course, they wanted to invest in the developed world, but there was a sense that they should invest in the Arab World. And the problem was that many of the Arab countries were either unstable or were seen to be unfriendly to foreign investment, and so a country like Algeria, which was thought to be relatively stable, was not particularly friendly to foreign investment. It was not a capitalist country in the sense that they were looking for. Sudan, in contrast, was wide open. They wanted investment, and so forth. At the Kuwait Fund, which at that time was headed by Abdullatif al-Hamed, who was one of the most creative thinkers in the Arab World in economic terms, they were coming up with what they ultimately called the Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development (AAAID), which was meant to be a multi-billion-dollar investment scheme that would transform Sudan into what they called the breadbasket of the Arab World. And so I can remember in Kuwait as an economic officer talking to people like a man called Khalid Tahsin Ali, who was an Iraqi, at the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, which was based in Kuwait, and Khalid Tahsin Ali, who I might note was married to an American and who we had known in Baghdad when we were there, was a trained agricultural person - I think an agronomist, but some form or another of agricultural specialist - and he ran something called the Abu Gheib Dairy, and he was one of these Arab technocrats who was doing interesting things. And I can remember him pressing me - and you'll see later why I'm mentioning him - pressing me to urge Washington to pay attention to what was going on in Sudan. And the reason why that point is being

made is at the time we had very poor relations with Sudan. What happened was that in 1967 the Sudan was one of several Arab countries that broke with the United States. When Nimeiri came to power in 1969, he was backed by communists, and he was, if you will, left wing. He gradually became more moderate, and by the early '70s he was pressing for a resumption of relations with the United States. However, shortly after relations were resumed, our ambassador and our deputy chief of mission, Cleo Noel and Kurt Moore, were murdered in Khartoum. They were murdered at the Saudi embassy by a group that I think was called Black September in those days, a radical Palestinian group.

Q: *1973, isn't it.*

BOGOSIAN: I think it was '73. I think relations were restored in '72. Now Nimeiri wanted to attack the Saudi embassy. As far as we know, he had nothing to do with that. If anything, he was appalled by it. So, that it took place in Khartoum did not necessarily put the Sudanese in a bad light. Where Nimeiri made a mistake was having made promises, I understand, to us that he would keep the culprits in jail. I don't know all the details, but I believe what he did was release them to the Egyptians, who then put them in jail. But that cast a pall on our relations. What was happening around 1976, which is the period we're talking about, was that an American company - I think it was Tenneco - had some people in Eritrea who were kidnapped, and Nimeiri, who was supporting the Eritrean Liberation Front at the time, was able to use his contacts to secure the release of those hostages, and through various other means he began to appeal to the United States. Now I visited Khartoum on my way home from Kuwait in 1976 in May, and a fellow at the embassy said to me, "By the time you get here to begin your assignment in July, the last person in the embassy" - that is, the last American - "who was here when the murders took place will have left." And he said that sadness and negative feeling will then be gone. And while I was in Khartoum, in that week in May, a message came that said that President Ford was willing to receive Nimeiri in June of 1976, and what that meant was we were prepared to resume friendly relations with Sudan.

I'll get to that in a minute. In response to your initial remark, 1975 was the year that the State Department began what they called "open assignments," where they would send a list of all the assignments that were available. So among the assignments opening was Econ counselor in Cairo, where Herman Eilts was the ambassador. And I went to Ambassador Stoltzfus, and I said, "You were Eilts's DCM. Would you put in a good word for me?" He said, "Well, what is this?" And I explained to him what the open assignments situation was. And he went over the list and he said, "It says here DCM, Khartoum." I said yes. He said, "I know Bill Brewer, too" - who was ambassador - and I said, "But that's Africa." "Oh, Dick," he said, "you never turn down being a DCM." So I put in my bid for Khartoum, and then my question was whether I'd be promoted, because I was what was then called an FSO-4 and you had to be a 3. I did get promoted, and I always wondered if they wanted someone so badly in Khartoum that they were willing to promote

me just to get me there. As it happened, I got promoted, and that meant I could go to Khartoum.

Q: *That's an intriguing story. Open assignments openly arrived at, I remember.*
BOGOSIAN: That was the theory, with about as much success as that original notion.

Q: *But let me ask, you were not keen at that time to go to Africa, and the Sudan looked very different from Egypt as an assignment.*

BOGOSIAN: There was this notion that somehow Africa was over the edge, and frankly, in some ways it was. I made a speech last week in Fayetteville, North Carolina, where I admitted that I was uneasy about serving in Africa; but of course, having served there it looks different now, and in many ways the Sudan assignment was one of the most satisfying professionally.

Q: *Over the edge in what sense?*

BOGOSIAN: Dangerous, unpleasant. The other thing was - part of it was bureaucratic - Sudan is covered by the Bureau of African Affairs, and I thought of myself as a Middle East specialist, and therefore, I was a little nervous about getting away from my home bureau.

Q: *Sudan is a country of two cultures.*

BOGOSIAN: It's a country of many cultures.

Q: *There's an Arab culture, and there's a black African culture.*

BOGOSIAN: It's more complicated than that. It's got an African culture, it's got a Nilotic culture, it's got a Bantu culture - and in fact, that's part or the problem is it's ethnically very diverse, which is true about just about every African country.

In fact, just this morning I was with a very knowledgeable Mauritanian man. He said the Sudanese don't know where they are, and what he meant was they're both African and Arab and in some ways neither. And I think the way to realize some of the problems in Sudan: one time with Chet Crocker, who at the time was assistant secretary for African affairs - this was years later - I was in Khartoum, and President Nimeiri complained that the white Arabs, the Arabs from the Peninsula and so on, he says, "They call us *'abid*,' meaning 'slaves,' which is to say they look down on the Sudanese, and yet in the same conversation or another one soon thereafter, Nimeiri referred to the southern Sudanese and said, "You know, really, they like to sing and dance, and all they want is a car and a house; they're not interested in power."

Q: *That's what Nimeiri said.*

BOGOSIAN: That's what Nimeiri said. The fact is that in their own way the Sudanese were among the most respected Arabs. I know that from first-hand experience in Kuwait. That's because they were not troublemakers. Some of them were highly capable. The British developed what was called the Sudan Service, and the University of Khartoum in one of the oldest, if not the oldest university in sub-Saharan Africa. So the Sudanese had a developed civil service that was quite capable. The problem when I was in Sudan is they went through their own public school system, and then when the government of Sudan was ready to get a payoff, they'd go to Saudi Arabia and make a lot of money. And it was a classic brain drain situation.

Q: *Is there a special relationship with Egypt?*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, I would say the relationship between Sudan and Egypt is roughly analogous to that between the United States and Canada. Egypt is a more developed country. It's a bigger country. It's a more advanced country and so forth, and Sudan is a big, empty country next to it. And on the one hand, they share the Nile, they've got numerous historical, cultural, family, social connections, but on the other hand, there are times when the Egyptians are seen as somewhat overbearing on the Sudanese. And it's one of those things that as similar as they are, they're different as well, and there is a point where the Egyptians can't seem to comprehend certain aspects of the Sudanese character. And there are times when the Sudanese chafe under that; on the other hand, a Sudanese will tell you that "When I go to Cairo I feel like I'm still at home." So I think that's probably somewhat similar to the way a Canadian feels about the United States or some other small countries next to big countries.

Q: *I though Egypt ran Sudan for a big chunk of time.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, of course, you recall that in the colonial period it was referred to as the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and I think a more accurate way to say it is that it was run out of Cairo, but in effect you had the British over the Egyptians, or the Turks under the Ottoman régime. Ironically, in ancient times some of the pharaohs were from Sudan. So if you go back far enough, they each have run the other.

Q: *Right. What did you find when you arrived, Dick?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, the other thing about my arrival - I said that in June Nimeiri came to the United States and saw Ford, so in that sense, there was a significant event just before my arrival that turned our relationship around. Now it's interesting to note that at that meeting our Ambassador was not permitted to be in the meeting. I believe he sat outside the room, but what that meant was that nobody knew what happened and we had to rely on what the Sudanese told us.

Q: *Who was our ambassador at that time?*

BOGOSIAN: Bill Brewer.
Q: *Bill Brewer? Oh, the old heel-cooler.*

BOGOSIAN: The other thing, though, the Sudanese ambassador to Washington was Francis Dang, an incredibly cultivated man. He was a Dinka, which is to say, not Arab, but he was not from the southern Sudan in terms of the autonomous region; he was from Kordofan, which gave him a kind of in-between status. He spoke fluent Arabic, and Nimeiri used him at times to translate or to interpret. In addition, he was a graduate of Yale, with both a degree in anthropology and, I think, a degree in law. His wife is also American, by the way. Deng became Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, so as deputy chief of mission or chargé, I was often in touch with him. And he would tell me what Ford promised, and I was in no position to know whether he did or not. And so Francis Deng said, "Oh, yes, he agreed to expand the aid program, and he agreed to military assistance." And the fact is that is exactly what happened. And so when I got to Khartoum, our embassy consisted of 12 Americans, including one American in the AID mission, and no military people at all. By the time I left, we had the largest bilateral economic and military assistance programs in Africa. We also had a defense attaché and a security assistance office, a high-powered AID mission which had its own building, and so forth. So what that means is that during the time I was in Sudan, it was a period of simply excellent relations between the United States and Sudan, a period during which our assistance programs grew and our cooperation intensified.

Now there were two things I would note that, to some extent, set the stage for what happened while I was there. On July 2, 1976, about three weeks before I got there, there was an attempted coup that the Libyans were behind, and it was bloody. In fact, when I got to the embassy, there was a broken window. Our embassy was one floor higher than any other building, and where the Ambassador's office was was on that eighth floor. And they tried to get him. They shot through the window. My predecessor said to Ambassador Brewer, "Get down and duck behind the desk." And Brewer said, "Gee, my back is hurting," and Alan Berlin said, "For God's sakes, get down." So Brewer ducked just before the bullets went through the window behind his desk.

That was at a time when our concern over Libya was becoming very, very strong, so if you will, Sudan was on the front line of this effort to contain Qadhafi, who was at his worst at that time.

Q: *Was this Sadiq who was leading that rebellion?*

BOGOSIAN: He was implicated in it. He was implicated. I frankly can't remember just who was the ostensible leader of it. At that time Sadiq and the rest were out of town. But the other thing that happened - and this gets back to Kuwait

- I got there, and ten days later Brewer and his family left, after he had just been through the coup. And so one of the first things -

Q: *His back hurt.*

BOGOSIAN: One of the first things I did, which kind of shows you what you can do if you're a chargé - nobody asked for this, but I did it anyway - I wrote a cable defining what I thought was the strategic importance of Sudan, and the points I made were that it was the largest country in Africa; that it was the back yard of both Egypt and Saudi Arabia, where our relations were getting bigger and bigger in the aftermath of the oil crisis; the Arabs were planning to invest, we thought, billions in Sudan, and they wanted us to be there with them. I would note that Chevron had discovered oil in Sudan, and a serious exploration program was underway. I would also note that at that time there was peace in the country, and Nimeiri was one of the most respected leaders in Africa. The Sudanese took moderate positions on most of the issues we cared about, whether it was South Africa or the Arab-Israel issue, and of course the Saudis and the Kuwaitis and the Egyptians urged us to have good relations.
That meant that the stage was set for a good relationship, and then what I would note are two things. One, I think it was around that time - I may be wrong - but the Central Command was created, and there was this question -

Q: *This is the U.S. Central Command.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, the U.S. Central Command, based in Florida and it included in its area of operations Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya, as well as the Arabian Peninsula, as far as Pakistan. They had no base. There was no place where they could actually -

Q: *They still have that problem, Dick, as we know.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, so one of the questions was, where could they do certain things? And without getting into details, the Sudanese were prepared to be very cooperative. The other thing that happened was, in this period, '77-78, Anwar Sadat started to make increasingly public overtures to Israel, and he increasingly said he wanted peace. And at one point he made a speech where he said something like, "I'll even go to their Knesset." And as everybody knows, he did that, and that was a major breakthrough in the Arab Israel crisis. Most of the Arab World turned their back on Sadat, but not Nimeiri. And in fact, I was chargé when he said that he would support the Camp David process, and I had the pleasure of sending that cable to Washington. What that meant was that there were not only the potential economic benefits and then the geographic aspects of it and so forth, but you had a leader who, on the one hand, was highly respected - and I would note that during that period for a year he was the chairman of the OAU - but he was doing things we wanted. He was extremely cooperative in almost every area we cared about. Now he was no democrat, but by and large their human rights

performance wasn't bad. This was the Carter Administration by then, and so it was, to use this phrase, pushing on an open door, and the net result, as I said, were increasing programs.
Q: *You mentioned earlier that the AID program when you left was the largest one in Africa. How large was it?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, frankly, I can't remember how large it was, but there was-

Q: *A lot of people or a lot of money?*

BOGOSIAN: It was probably on the order of $100 million. In fact, I'll tell a little story. There was a period there when the mission was reporting that Nimeiri might be overthrown by a coup, and there was a little bit of nervousness in Washington, and they sent a cable saying "What do you think?" and "What's your recommendation?" And I sent a cable back that said, "I think there'll be a day when he's overthrown, but I don't think it's going to happen this week." In fact, it happened in 1985. But I said, "I think we need a gesture that demonstrates our support for Nimeiri." And so I was asked to go in and see him and pass a letter from President Carter. And there was some aid. There was food aid and I don't know what-all, some military assistance. And when one went to see Nimeiri, you sat in an outer office, and they'd usually offer you candy and coffee and things like that. And then you went in, and you sort of walked in and then turned left, and he would be waiting for you. Now the Sudanese have a way of greeting where they put one hand on one of your shoulders and you put one hand on one of their shoulders and you don't exactly kiss but you sort of pull each other towards each other. So I went in, and I wanted to be sure my suit was buttoned and everything, and by God, here's a television camera, and it's live, and I look up, I greet Nimeiri in Arabic, and here comes his hand for my shoulder, so of course I reach for his shoulder. And the next day, my Egyptian counterpart called. He said, "Well, we saw you embrace on TV." He says, "We figured that embrace was worth about $100 million." And I did a little arithmetic, and I said, "Yes, that's about right." The program was about $100 million.

Q: *That's wonderful. I'm getting at that because it had come from much less, right?*
BOGOSIAN: It came from virtually zero.

Q: *And that was in 1979.*

BOGOSIAN: Well, by then it was maybe '78.

Q: *And now what is it? Now we're in 1998 and it's virtually zero.*

BOGOSIAN: We have terrible relations, but what I was going to say a moment ago is - now that was roughly between '76 and '79 - I was a way from Sudan for three years and then I became director of East African Affairs, by which time, if

our period there was baroque, then by 1982, when I became director of East African Affairs, it had become rococo. I mean, it had become, frankly, absurd. We were at a point where we were providing assistance that was almost useless, tanks that couldn't move in the desert and so forth, because by then Nimeiri had developed such a reputation that there was almost no holding back, and by then there was this sense that-

Q: *Almost no holding back in what sense?*

BOGOSIAN: In the sense of the leadership in Washington wanting to help him - "Give him whatever he wants."

Q: *Yes, give him whatever he wants.*

BOGOSIAN: I would say the high point was probably around '81-82. Then different problems began to emerge, and I can get into that a little later. The other thing, though, to note about the Sudan during the period I was there was that the AAAID never quite got off the ground, and in a sense it was a victim of Arab politics. While we were in Khartoum, at one point Khalid Tahsin Ali, the Iraqi, came down, and we spent a day looking at houses because he said, "You know, I think I'm going to come and be put at the head of this." Now, Khalid Tahsin Ali was a U.S.-educated agricultural technocrat whose vision, if you will, was behind the whole AAAID idea. In fact, there was an interesting example of this Iraqi technocrat and the Kuwaiti financier, knowing about relations between Iraq and Kuwait, how if you could subtract the politics they could do great things. But at that point, I guess, in some inter-Arab organizations there were too many Iraqis, and so the Egyptians said, wait a minute, this has to go to one of our guys. And so some utterly forgettable Egyptian with simply no inspiration at all was picked for the AAAID, and as a result that spirit that Khalid Tahsin Ali gave it evaporated, and it never achieved its promise. And then, of course, as the political situation in Sudan unraveled, it simply - I don't think it exists any more. So in that sense, that was one of the first things that, if it didn't go wrong, at least it didn't go right. I mean, this promise that Sudan has has never been fulfilled. There was an economic officer in the embassy who had served in Latin America, and he began a report once that said something like this: "As they say in Brazil, Sudan is a country of the future - and it always will be." And in a way, that's part of the problem.

Q: *I bet they say that in Brazil quite rarely.*

BOGOSIAN: Well, I don't know about Brazil, but he claimed they did.

Q: *Very interesting account. Dick, what was going on then? What were other agencies doing in Sudan at that time?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, first of all, as I said, we had a big AID mission, and the thing

that was interesting about that was - as I say, when I got there the AID mission was very tiny and not doing much, and as we were there it expanded, and the ambassador at this point was Don Bergus - in our naïveté we thought what they'd do was come in and maybe build roads and do other things - high-profile projects - and the new mission director, a fellow named Gordon Pierson, who was an excellent officer - he had been in Jordan - he said, "Well, we don't do that any more; we do basic human needs now and integrated agricultural projects." The dilemma we had was that the Sudanese were pushing for demonstrable assistance because, as is true with many AID recipients, this was highly political - that is to say, in a domestic political sense. They needed to demonstrate that they had friends who were doing things that made a difference. AID, in its wisdom, had to study things, it seemed, for ever and ever and ever. And in fact, one day, on a rather minor project, I had a temper tantrum with the deputy AID mission director, and he opened up a book with very fine print, and it went down the whole page, and these were all things that they had to do, and he said, "Our hands are tied; we have so many steps we're simply required to go through." So it was frustrating for us that were looking for ways; on the other hand, there was a substantial amount of food aid, which could be delivered rather quickly. There were intermittent crises where you could come in with disaster assistance for flooding or what have you. And we were beginning to get a fair amount of economic support funds, which as you know is probably the most liberal type of assistance. So in that sense, it was a large enough program so that there was plenty to do.

We had a USIS office that did the things USIS offices do, the visitors and the exchange programs. As I said, we had a military assistance program. While we were there, we delivered the first C-130s. In fact, I was there when they sacrificed a sheep and a bull, I think, and the Sudanese military stuck their hand in the blood and then put the hand on the plane to bless it. We were talking about F-5 aircraft. We were talking about whether the Saudis would pay for them. Some F-5s were ultimately delivered.

Oh, I need to tell one little incident here, because I think it is kind of interesting, but first let me say that Ambassador Brewer said to me one day he wasn't sure whether it was a good idea to provide F-5s to Sudan. Mind you, at the time, Ethiopia was going increasingly communist, and there was what we thought was a genuine threat from Ethiopia, not to mention Libya on the other side of the country. And I said, "Well, do you know what the function of an F-5 is?" And he said, "No." In fact, it was a defensive aircraft, although Brewer was not altogether wrong in understanding the potential provocative nature of these planes. But I said to myself, here is an ambassador who is making a judgment on whether we do this plane, and he doesn't even know what it does. In short, what I was getting at was that as time moved on, I think it was incumbent on our ambassadors to have a more developed knowledge of such things as economics and so forth.

Q: *Very good point.*

BOGOSIAN: Now the thing that's interesting here is that as Brewer was leaving, and I believe he retired after this assignment, he said to me, "Dick," he says, "it's time to move on," and what he meant was the issues were becoming a little too complex.

What I wanted to say about military assistance was that the turning point occurred with a visit by Senator Javits. Senator Javits, from New York, was of course keenly interested in Israel, and he had heard that Sudan was, in effect, taking the right position, but he wanted to talk to Nimeiri himself, and he did, and he was satisfied that Nimeiri was sincere. And therefore, he went back to Washington and threw his weight behind supporting what they called "grant map," which is to say, money with no strings, virtually. And that was really the start of what became the really large military assistance program.

Q: *Which was actually a grant program.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes. I think we may have had some other programs. We certainly sent soldiers to the United States for training. Typically they did very well. They were happy with us. They had had assistance from the Soviets. They said it was very useless - the machines wouldn't work. So in terms of while I was there-

Q: *Dick, there's no comparison.*

BOGOSIAN: I would hope so, frankly. But the thing that's interesting is that, given how bad things have gone in Sudan, all I can say is during those years, '76 to '79, we didn't just have big programs; they really were a partner that you didn't have to apologize for working with. And frankly there were other times when that was evident more in the next assignment, the director of East African Affairs, but that period was very satisfying because it was such a positive relationship, and it permitted, frankly, great creativity.

The other thing that was interesting from a Foreign Service point of view was to be deputy chief of mission in an embassy where, when I got there, I gave the language tests for IMET, I helped with administration, I did the political reporting (because there was no political officer), I was the Ambassador's representative on the school board and the Ambassador's representative on the commissary committee and so forth and so on. What that also meant was that, in effect, I had direct dealings with virtually the whole embassy. But while we were there-

Q: *How big an embassy was it?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, originally it was just 12 Americans. I frankly don't know how many we were when we left, but by the time I left, AID was in a different building and I didn't know everybody who was in the AID mission. We had a political officer; we had a defense attaché office; we had a security assistance

office; and we had a very deep relationship with Sudan. And so it was a very different kind of job being DCM in that kind of a mission.

Q: *Was there a Peace Corps program?*

BOGOSIAN: No, the Arabs don't like Peace Corps.

Q: *How was mission management? How was managing a mission like that?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, first of all, it was very difficult. For all our good political relations, the fact is that Khartoum is deep in the interior of the country. It's not on some sea lane that we use much. Terrible electric power problems. We'd often go three to five days without electricity. When I was leaving, people said to me, we want to have a party for you but there's no meat in the city. This is a country that exports meat. There were times when the morale was terribly low because of the hardships. One man said to me there's no electricity, there's no kerosene, there's no water - how am I supposed to feed my family? Somehow we always managed, but you just never knew in Khartoum when the lights were going to go out. And sometimes they'd be on across the street. I would say that of all the assignments I've had, it was the most difficult in terms of day-to-day living. It was difficult on its own terms. There would be no water. You'd turn the faucet on. You'd forget it was on. Then the water would come, and your ceiling would fall because there was a flood upstairs. It was a hundred degrees or more. It was dusty. There wasn't much in the way of places to go or things to do. You wouldn't want to swim in the Nile because there were crocodiles. There was, you know, an alien culture, not a particularly attractive city. And so in fact, I'll tell you that the staff chafed under Ambassador Brewer. He liked a six-day week. They wanted a five-day week. So I managed to persuade him to change the hours so that it was a five-day week, and then everybody wanted to work overtime, and he got mad at me.

Q: *Everybody wanted to work overtime?*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, they asked for a five-day week, and then they said they had to work every Saturday.

Q: *Was there six days of work in a normal week?*

BOGOSIAN: In the beginning, but we went to a five-day week. We worked from seven to three without a break, and that's what people seemed to like. They'd grab a sandwich at the snack bar and so forth. But we played softball every Thursday in a place called Donkey Dung Stadium, and somehow we got through it.

Q: *Donkey Dung Stadium, right.*

BOGOSIAN: One of the other things that happened, Vlad, was when I began the

assignment, it was still unusual to have household effects and so forth flown in. There was still this notion that you had to ship it all the way to Port Sudan. And while we were there, that began to change. We had an interesting thing happen. At one point it became intolerable, the electric power problem, so the administrative officer said, "I think I'm going to get us generators." That was considered quite provocative. He said to me, "I know that the way I'm doing this is not allowed, but let's see what happens." So he sent in the cable. The answer was, "You know this isn't allowed, but we're going to let you have them anyway." So that, to me, was very imaginative management, and I would note that this guy's going to have a very good career.

Q: *That's very good. Who is this wonderful person?*

BOGOSIAN: Ted Strickler.

Q: *Good, yes.*

BOGOSIAN: He's now working for the under secretary for management.

Q: *Well, that's wonderful.*

BOGOSIAN: But that's what you had to do, frankly. This was one of the things about serving in Africa. It was hard. It wasn't easy. You were far away and all the rest. Now the African Bureau traditionally has always gone the extra mile to help its people, but whether it was getting them to fly things in from Antwerp, not from the States, or to give us generators, the first time you presented the idea it was kind of unthinkable, and then gradually they would do it.

Q: *Dick, you're by now an old Africa hand. Can you just comment, how was the Bureau equipped at that time with resources and with things to support programs and things to support people - then, as opposed to, say, now?*

BOGOSIAN: I think the Bureau has, over the years, had a succession of fairly good executive directors, who have, for one thing, managed money very carefully and, as a result, probably have a little more financial flexibility than otherwise. The notion that these are tough posts and you need to be sympathetic to them has become almost a philosophical fundamental. Those notions were present then. I don't know that they were quite as deeply embedded. As I think you know, there is kind of a perverse sense that you know where you're going, you've got to expect to suffer. This isn't the same thing, but in Kuwait - I was in Kuwait at a time when that post grew rapidly as well, and there were some real strains, and our administrative officer reported that, and the people in Washington said he's lying; "we were there two years ago, and we know it isn't that way." What Washington had difficulty understanding was what it's like at a post that's rapidly expanding. It's difficult to keep up with it. Even if they understand it, by the time you get the budget, by the time the money comes, by the time whatever it is

you've ordered gets there, it can be months and months and months. I had to entertain the dean of the diplomatic corps, the Nigerian Ambassador, who was leaving, at a time when the roof was leaking and we had pails all over the Ambassador's office.

In fact, one of the things I did was to select a new building for our chancery. We wanted to build a building, and the Sudanese wanted to build a building in Washington up on Van Ness, but it fell through, and we ended up renting. And I got a building that was rather nice, but in those days we weren't that concerned about security, and so it was right across the street from the University of Cairo in Khartoum, and the front was right on the sidewalk, and it's been a security nightmare ever since.

Q: *Very interesting account of the hardships at that post.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, it was a hardship post, and yet we had a school. It's funny. I remember the hardships. I remember literally reading cables by candlelight and various kinds of camping lamps and so forth. There was also a psychological strain. I mean, even if you had electricity, you didn't know how long it was going to last. If you had food, it spoiled, because after three days... So in a word it was tough. It really was. But I think Khartoum, even though in effect it's north, is one of the most difficult places in Africa to serve.

Q: *Intriguing.*

Thanks for that account of Sudan, and we're now in 1979, and you're about to go back to Washington, if I'm not mistaken. First, can we just go back to Sudan for a moment? Can you tell us a bit about what your family was doing and how they liked it or didn't like it?

BOGOSIAN: Well, this will, to use a modern word, segue into the next part.

Q: *Okay.*
BOGOSIAN: The thing about Sudan from a family point of view is, first of all, just in a word, they liked it well enough. I mean, like all of us, they didn't like it when the electricity went out, but our children were happy enough in Khartoum. As I said, we had a school there. It went to the eighth grade. My son was in the eighth grade the first year we were there, so he was there full time only one year. Now my son, at one time or another while we were there, worked for the embassy in General Services, and they'd go out on the truck and he'd want to be in back with the laborers, but they said, "No, no, Mr. David, you have to sit up front. You're the DCM's son." But he grew to find it very interesting to go to the houses where he met these rather comely Eritrean maids-

Q: *Oh, yes.*

BOGOSIAN: -and so, you know, every cloud has a silver lining, I guess. Anyway, David then spent the second year we were there in school in Rome, in Notre Dame, and the third year we were there he spent at Lawrence Academy in Groton, Massachusetts. My daughter, Jill, was seventh grade, so she did seventh and eighth and she spent her third year at Concord Academy in Concord, Massachusetts.

Q: *Not to put too much on it, but did your kids like the notion of going off to boarding school, or did they think they were being kicked out of their house?*

BOGOSIAN: Between you and me, I think they were sort of neutral. They just took it, I think they just understood it, as something that had to happen, and it was kind of understood that there was no adequate or appropriate school for them in Khartoum. Our daughter Catherine did three years there, so she did three years throughout the school, and she was very friendly with the daughter of the AID mission director, so that after her brother and sister left she was with them. Now we had a dog that we named Shaykha that we had from Kuwait. This dog was black, and the Ethiopians were petrified of black dogs. And most of the dogs just live in the street, and they're sandy colored. So this one day I was walking Shaykha in the neighborhood. There were these different vacant lots, and this Sudanese Arab came by and he said to me in Arabic, "Where's that dog from?" What he meant was we don't see too many black dogs around here. I said, "Well, he's from Kuwait." He said, "Oh, yeah, they're rich. You can get anything you want in Kuwait."

But on the children. I think the point I would make is - and I think many Foreign Service families have gone through this, this question of seeing a 14-year-old go off to another place far away - on the one hand, it can tear you to pieces. On the other hand, Concord Academy is one of the foremost schools in America, and frankly, my daughter loved it, to the point where a year later when we were home, we kept her there one more year. I used to get educational allowances that were three times my starting salary in the Foreign Service. It was an opportunity that was tinged with sadness. The interesting thing was many of us were in the same boat, and when those kids came home at Christmas, it was one of the most joyous times, and we were all waiting for the kids. And Mrs. Bergus, the Ambassador's wife, hands me this sign in English that says "Welcome Home," with all the kids names. And this Sudanese security guy came up to me and said to me in Arabic, "What's that sign say?" And he thought I was demonstrating against Nimeiri, and so instead of greeting my kid, I was sort of arguing with this security guy.

And then when they all left it was sad, and you'd feel down in the dumps. But the thing is that one of the things that was going on that whole time was what do we do with the kids, where do we send them, will it work, won't it work? Frankly, my son had some problems at both schools, and in that context, this was one of the most difficult times of our life. Now my wife said that we probably would have had problems no matter where we were, and I think it's that philosophy that

lets you get through it. Ours was not the only teenage boy that had a few growing pains in his mid-teens. To put it another way, it was difficult to be separated from the children at an early age, but it was not without its advantages, and if I accept my wife's philosophy, there probably would have been difficult times no matter where we were just because of their ages. The children themselves liked Khartoum. They made friends. They did things like go swimming and play tennis, and they had their parties and so forth. I don't think the children complained once about being in Khartoum, and so that's the way it was. I've been fortunate in having a wife and a family that simply liked the Foreign Service life.

By the way, they traveled around the country a little more than I did. They went to certain places and got involved in some things I didn't. As DCM I always felt I had to be around the embassy, and in fact, toward the end of my assignment, they made me go to Juba, just so I could see somewhere different from Khartoum.

Q: *Did you see any AID projects close up? Did you get any sense for it?*

BOGOSIAN: Right now I can't remember any. Vlad, I was kind of stuck in the office. Perhaps rightly or wrongly, I'm not turned on by African provincial towns, and I didn't go out of my way to travel - I'll be honest with you - plus, I saw my role as keeping the embassy running, and if the Ambassador was away, I had to be there because I was chargé, and if the Ambassador was there, I had to be there to kind of take care of him.

Q: *Right. What happened next? We're now in 1979.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes. It's interesting what happened next in the sense that by the end of the Khartoum assignment...

I should note one thing here. The assignment was a two-year assignment, and we got there and my wife said, "You know, we really ought to stay an extra year," because the idea was it was financially attractive - we were getting a 25 percent differential and so forth. Brewer left and Bergus came, and we were going to go home - this is 1977, we decided to go home and buy a house; that was the other big personal thing in those days - and the question was would he permit us to extend? And I asked him, I said, "Would you be willing to let us extend?" And he said, "Dick, I don't think that's a good idea." I later learned that he had been DCM in Ankara, and I later learned that he had promised that job to another person. Then, as it happened, the promotion list came out, and the other person didn't get promoted, and so he couldn't come. Then Bergus walked into my office, he said, "I want you to stay." And he said, "I'll never make that mistake again of making a promise before I know what I'm getting into." The net result was that we stayed a third year, and I turned down an opportunity to go to the National War College. I said I'll try it next year. They said, well, we can't be sure that you'd be offered it next year. So at the end of two years, I was offered the National War College; I turned it down, and Bergus agreed to our staying a third

year. So we had home leave in 1978 and came back for one year. During that final year, the country director for East African Affairs came out, and Ambassador Bergus said to him, "See what you can find for Dick." And the word was, "Nobody remembers you any more, and there's nothing for you."

Q: *You were the forgotten man.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes. At one point I was supposed to take over the Economic Policy staff in the African Bureau, and its incumbent, Carl Cundiff, was supposed to come and replace me. Carl chose not to go to Khartoum, and that particular deal fell through. What I didn't realize was that the senior deputy assistant secretary, Bill Harrop, felt that he owed me something, and without my knowing it, he kind of engineered an assignment - talk about open assignments - he engineered at least the offer of a job in the Economic Bureau. So I was home in March of 1979 because of something involving my son, and I called personnel and they said we have nothing for you, don't you worry, we'll take care of it. And then a few weeks later I was offered the job in Aviation. Of course, I had no idea what it was.

Q: *Dick, could you explain, what was the title of that job?*
BOGOSIAN: I was the chief of the Aviation Negotiations Division.

Q: *I see, and that was from 1979 to 1982?*

BOGOSIAN: Right. So in family terms, we came home to our home, which we bought while we were in Khartoum. This was the first time we were home in seven years, the first time we were in our own house. Ultimately, our children, David and Jill, were at the Gaithersburg High School, and Catherine entered junior high school. So there was all that went with starting a new life that way. And then I was put into this job, which was, of course, radically different from anything I had done before. It turned out to be, really, a very good job, in numerous ways. I've been fortunate in having three jobs that had a worldwide focus, and I think that can be very interesting, especially if you're in relatively out of the way places like Khartoum, to be kind of reintroduced to the whole world. In the job of chief of the Aviation Negotiations Division, I had two broad functions. One was to manage the office that staffed the negotiations, and one was to lead our delegation to some of the negotiations. There was my boss, whose name was Jim Ferrer, and there was the deputy assistant secretary, who was a political appointee named Boyd Height. The three of us divided the negotiating load, with Height doing the most important negotiations, and I doing sort of what was left, but that included some very interesting negotiations. Mind you, because of my management responsibilities, I had a hand in virtually ever negotiation, but really it was the staff that did most of the work and I provided general guidance. But it took a while for me to get going. The fellow I replaced stayed on a while, and he sort of was so much more advanced than I that he did some of the negotiations.

My first negotiation was with the Netherlands Antilles in Washington, and then I did one with Finland. Now in those days - this was in the early days of our effort to open up aviation - traditionally what had happened was we had a policy of exclusion, where you'd limit the number of airlines that could serve and you tried to keep people out. That was changing. There was a radical departure. Open skies was the notion, and the Civil Aeronautics Board existed, but it was known that it was going to go out of existence a few years hence. We were talking in terms of things like fifth freedom price leadership and terms that I simply didn't know what they meant. And I had been in the job about six months, and I had a couple of negotiations under my belt, and my boss said to me, "We don't think you know what you're doing." And he was right.

But then I began to finally catch on to the concepts, and the reason I mention this -

Q: *That's sort of a cheerful way to raise your morale.*

BOGOSIAN: One reason I mention this is there has always been a debate about whether Foreign Service people can handle some of the more technical issues, and I frankly don't have much patience with people who say we don't or Foreign Service people who say we shouldn't. There are two problems. I had done strategic intelligence, and this was aviation. And later I did Paris Club. The first thing is, we're not dumbbells, and with a little bit of time and help we can understand the concepts. But the other thing is our role is to bring the political dimension to these negotiations, and therefor we should have the courage of our convictions and go in, because there are people out there who can tell you what the technical aspect is. What they don't know is the politics. And frankly, we assume they do, because to us it's self-evident. But it isn't self-evident. So I, for one, was pleased with this job.

This job had two great attractions. One was that it gave me an opportunity to see places I never dreamed I'd get to: Argentina, New Zealand, Norway, Yugoslavia, Poland, Panama. I mean I served in the Middle East and Africa, and this got me to every other part of the world, including East Asia. So that was one thing. The other thing is it teaches you how to negotiate. Theoretically that's one of the fundamental elements of our profession, but we don't always get training in it - not that we're trained; it's more the experience you develop. But it was a most interesting assignment, and it had any number of specific things that happened while I was there that were of interest, and if you'll bear with me, I'll tell you some of them.

Q: *Absolutely.*

BOGOSIAN: I mentioned that my first couple of negotiations were with relatively small countries. One was with Netherlands Antilles. The agreement had been virtually negotiated, and I basically just finished it. One was with Finland.

One was with Poland. The first negotiation I did where I really began, I think, to put my own stamp on it was with Ireland. And what happened there, there's something in the nature of aviation negotiations where it's not unusual to take a very tough position, and my predecessor had been extremely tough with the Irish, to the point where they were very unhappy. So I took a different tack. I tried to inject humor into it. I had just read a book about the Celts, and in that book it said that the Celts would run screaming and naked into battle, and they'd frighten the Romans until the Romans realized that's all they did, so if you shot back you were going to win the war. So I thought I'd begin by injecting a little humor, and I said to the Irish, "I hope you don't operate like the ancient Celts," and they looked at me and said what is this guy talking about? Anyway, I later told them. They didn't think it was funny. So I was very accommodating, and so forth. My delegation said to me after a day, enough.

My point here is that any negotiation involved two negotiations. You had to hold your delegation together, and you had to prevail with the other side. And sometimes that was very difficult. There were some people who were bombastic or who otherwise second-guessed you, people from the industry, people from the other agencies. As a general proposition though, not counting the negotiation with Colombia, though, that was not a serious problem. In early 1980, I made my first trip overseas. We had some talks in New Zealand. Now to tell you our budgeting situation, we were supposed to go to Australia, but there wasn't enough money, so I went to New Zealand and then came home. And then the next week we met Australia in Washington.

Q: *They had more money.*

BOGOSIAN: I don't know. Anyway, in New Zealand, the issue was whether we could get Continental Airlines on a route that normally Pan Am had dominated. Without going through all the details, we worked out a deal. Part of the deal was that we would not designate any other airlines for five years. Now this was very commonsensical, because the route could barely handle two American carriers, and there was no one in my delegation that complained about that. So we signed the agreement. I felt very good. On the way home we stopped in Hawaii and San Francisco. I had never been to either place before, and I felt very good. I got home to find that the chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board wanted to renounce the agreement. What had happened was, they were all overseas on other negotiations. Apparently, I went against one of the fundamental rules, which is you never limit (the number of) U.S. carriers (that can be designated). We have an industry made up of many airlines, and it's intolerable for the government to say to any one of them, "You can't go here or there." On the other hand, my boss stood up for me, and the agreement stood. But that was a reminder that when you're out there negotiating, you can sometimes get carried away.

And indeed, one of the things that happens in negotiation like that is you can forget how the outside world looks at things, and there's always that question of

when do you push away from the table and say, “We can’t agree to this,” and the other thing of “When can I give in on a key point so I can have an agreement?” And of course, there’s no easy answer to that. Over time, I traveled to Uruguay, Argentina, Panama, Ecuador, Thailand, Malaysia, Taiwan, and so forth. I would say the most significant negotiations that I conducted were the ones with Taiwan and the ones with Poland, and to some extent with Yugoslavia.
In Taiwan, what was going on at this time was that we had entered into diplomatic relations with Communist China. One of the things that we had to do was break all of our treaties with Taiwan, one of which was the so-called U.S.-China Agreement of 1944. That meant it was one of the oldest bilateral agreements we had, and we understood that the Taiwan government would be very reluctant to abrogate that agreement because politically, as long as they were considered the Republic of China, it gave them some political status. So it was an emotional negotiation. We were negotiating in Washington. By this time there was what they called AIT, the American Institute of Taiwan, which was theoretically private, and there was a break in the talks, and to try to lighten the atmosphere I complimented the chairman of the Taiwan delegation on his cufflinks. “Oh, yes,” he said, “these commemorate the joint U.S.-China bombing squadron of World War II.” You know, in other words, we were allies once, and now you’re kicking me in the groin. So it was not easy. The question was, how are we going to get this negotiation won, and we had agreed with Beijing that we wouldn’t send officials to Taiwan, and the idea was that was the only way to do it, because this way the Chinese in Taiwan would save face. So what they did was, our superiors agreed that I could lead a delegation to Taiwan. We were given non-diplomatic passports, and we went, and we got the agreement we wanted. So by letting them save face... Of course, then that gave me an opportunity to see one of the finest collections of Chinese art in the world, which is in a mountainside in Taipei.

And also that got me to East Asia. We negotiated in Thailand and Malaysia. As I was going into the negotiations in Bangkok, our chargé, Mr. Levin, said, “Don’t make a fool of yourself.” And I said, “Oh, don’t worry. I won’t make a fool of myself.”

Q: *These colleagues of ours! They have just incredible confidence in you and others.*

BOGOSIAN: Well, the problem in Thailand was, the government was signing agreements that let these people have terrific rights. The key route in the Pacific is Tokyo-Los Angeles. Nothing compares to Tokyo-Los Angeles. And we were letting Singapore airlines... Under the agreement they had the right to fly Thai to Los Angeles via Japan, and our airlines were screaming because they couldn’t match that competition. So it said in plain English that they had that right, and I was to tell them that they couldn’t do it. And that’s not an easy task if you’re a negotiator. Now I don’t know if I made a fool out of myself, but we went around and around and around, and finally the head of the Thai delegation said, “Mr. Bogosian, even if you don’t allow it under the 1980 agreement” or whatever it

was, "we have it under the 1966 agreement. That was among the more difficult things to do, in effect to just simply say we won't let you do what you're plainly allowed to do because -

Q: *Because we're bigger.*

BOGOSIAN: - yes, because we're bigger - and we don't care as much as we used to back in Vietnam, when we needed this airport. I have no idea whether that's been overcome since, but that's what my marching orders were in that negotiation.

Q: *How about Poland?*

BOGOSIAN: The Polish negotiation was interesting in this way. I negotiated with Poland three times. The first time was in Washington, and it was not a particularly interesting negotiation. The next negotiation was, I believe, in August of 1981. Now there were two things going on in the aviation context. Pan Am was losing its shirt in the communist world, because the communists had, in effect, rigged the system that they somehow got all the money. And we were asked to negotiate arrangements that would give Pan Am a little more breathing room. I had done that in Yugoslavia, where it was a financial issue. It had to do with getting their money out and some of the more technical aspects. And in fact, the Yugoslav criticized me for interfering in internal affairs, and then the next day he said that what I had said was a brilliant suggestion, and he went to the banks and they permitted him to do it. But in effect what we were doing was we were telling these communist governments that they had to change some of their rules so that our airline could function.

By the time we were in Poland, in Warsaw, this negotiation was moving forward, but this was at a time when there were tremendous lines waiting to get food in Poland. There was tension between Poland and Russia. So that was the political context in which this was happening, and you could feel it. They gave us a dinner, and it was at a farm because the farms were private, and the chairman said to me, "This is the only way we can be sure of having enough food for you." The woman next to me had been an Olympic athlete for Poland, as had her husband. He worked for *Tribuna Rabochaya*, the leading newspaper, and she was in the DG of Civil Aviation. She started crying. She said, "There's all this food, and I don't have enough food at home to serve my baby."

We had a point in the negotiation where the Polish delegation caucused, and their avuncular leader came out with the delegation, and he said, "We have been debating whether to adopt the American position or the Polish position." And he said, "My own delegation doesn't know what we're going to do." And he said, and everybody was waiting, and he had his arm on the wrist of the person next to him, and he said, "We're going to" - and he paused - "do the American position." And everybody cheered, everybody was happy. I forget the specific point, but that

was an important breakthrough. And so then what happened was we agreed to meet again in December of 1981, and the negotiation took place, and it was moving forward and we were deadlocked. And the Polish ambassador said to me - that is their ambassador in Washington - he said, "What do you need to bring this negotiation off?" I said, I need such and such and such and such. He said, "All right, we'll do this tomorrow." The next day they agreed to what we wanted, and we had a breakthrough agreement. The only problem was a week later Jaruzelski marched into Poland, and President Reagan said we've got to renounce the agreement we just negotiated. So that was probably the most frustrating thing.

I'm going to tell you one little anecdote, though, about this. In those days, the Civil Aeronautics Board was told they couldn't accept any gratuities from the airline industry. So we had a negotiation in Panama, and we were going to have dinner or something at a beautiful golf club. And the Braniff guy was going to pay for it. And the member of the board, whose name I forget - Gloria Schaeffer was her name - she was a politician from Connecticut and a member of the staff - they pulled out, I don't know - $15 to pay the Braniff guy for lunch. He said, "What are you doing?" They said, "You know we can't accept your hospitality." So they had a big fight. Well a few weeks later we were in Yugoslavia, and we began, I think, on a Wednesday, and I introduced our team, as they did. And I said, "What do you think about meeting Saturday so we can kind of keep moving." He said, "Oh, no, we're all politicians. We go home over the weekend." He said, "Anyway, we're going to take you all to Dubrovnik." And I got knees from either side, from CAB Gloria Schaeffer and from DOT. She said, "Don't you dare turn him down." I said, "Gloria, two weeks ago you wouldn't let the Braniff guy buy you lunch." She said, "This is different."

So they flew us up to Dubrovnik, and the sad thing is that the first night we couldn't go because there were thunderstorms in Dubrovnik and they knew the airport wasn't safe, and that's where Ron Brown's plane crashed. And so when I was there the Yugoslavs knew enough that you don't fly into Dubrovnik Airport when the weather's bad. One of those vignettes from the Foreign Service life.

Q: *Wow.*

BOGOSIAN: So those, I think, were the most interesting negotiations. Now there was the negotiation where I was sexually harassed, but I don't know if you want to get into that.

Q: *By a male or a female?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, what it was, this was the Colombia negotiation. It was the single worst negotiation I had. Our delegation was like a herd of cats.

Q: *I think posterity would like to hear about how you were sexually harassed.*

BOGOSIAN: Anyway, it was a very tense day. We were getting nowhere, and the Colombian delegation was in the EB conference room. Anyway, there was some terribly difficult problem, and the delegation authorized me to go and meet privately with the Colombian delegation chief, and he spoke only Spanish, so we had this rather attractive woman, whose name I can't remember, who was one of the State Department translators. And if you've ever seen one of our simultaneous translators work it's one of the most beautiful things to watch, because they're utterly unobtrusive, and yet they speak the same time the other person's speaking. It's almost like two people speaking the same language, but of course, they have to be quiet, and that means they have to be awfully near you so that you can hear them. And this woman was with me from shoulder to knee. So of course being modest, I moved, but she moved with me. However, I chose not to make an issue out of it. But when I went downstairs, and one of the members of my delegation was on my couch with her knee raised and her skirt down, I said, "For God's sake, get up and get out of here."

Q: *Was that a member of your delegation?*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, at the end of a long day.
Q: *Oh, I see, just a casual pose.*

BOGOSIAN: She was in repose, yes.

Q: *Well, and you gave her some standards.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes.

Q: *Absolutely.*

BOGOSIAN: If you'll bear with me, there are two other anecdotes to mention that I can think of right now from the aviation days. We were negotiating with the Scandinavians. With the Swedes, Danish, and Norwegians being joint owners of SAS, they have a joint delegation. This particular negotiation was in Oslo, and I thought I saw a point where the Norwegians and the Swedes or the Norwegians and the Danes, I forget which, had a difference of view, based on a certain amount of cultural and political factors; and I started probing that, and their chairman stopped the negotiation. He took me aside and he said in so many words, "You have identified a point that is so sensitive among us that I will not continue the negotiations." And as a result I quickly moved away from that. But the thing that's interesting here is we tend to think of the Nordics as all the same - they're utterly civilized and all the rest - but once you're there with them, things are slightly different.

My other story involves the Israelis, and what happened here was my last negotiation was with Israel, and what we were trying to do was get improved rights for a company called Tower Travel, which was a charter company founded

by a couple of Israeli-Americans, who gave new meaning to the word *hardball*. When they were told that the Israeli Secretary General of Transport was being intransigent, they told me that they knew that he had been in a brothel in Jerusalem and he was a draft dodger, and they'd find ways to publicize that if need be. So this was a lot different from TWA keeping its 10 percent share. And the Israelis were nervous, because Tower Travel had a wonderful kosher service that was drawing a core market from them, the Orthodox Jews of Brooklyn.

But anyway, we were negotiating - and this was my last negotiation, but it would be clear that there would be other sessions after I left - and the head of the Israeli delegation said he wanted to have a private meeting with me before they left, and I said, well, what about lunch. He said fine. I said, "Well, I'll take you to our eighth floor dining room, would you like anyone to join you?" He said, "No, no, just you and me." So that's what the deal was. We reserved a table for two, and 15 minutes before we were to go to lunch, he said, "Do you mind if I bring three of my colleagues with me?" I said, "No, let me see if I can get a table." And I couldn't. I said, "Look, I don't know what to do. If you want we can go up to K Street." He said, "Mr. Bogosian, I don't care about the food. I just want to be with you for a few minutes." I said, "Would you mind going to our cafeteria?" "No," he said, "we'll go together."

So we went downstairs. I paid. You know, we got our trays and we went up. We were sitting down, and in comes Phil Habib and Nick Veliotes, who was assistant secretary for NEA - of course, this was '82, when a lot of those negotiations were going on -

Q: *"The old days."*

BOGOSIAN: -and I think the under secretary for economics was among the Israelis - and they all knew him, and of course Phil was a little gruff, out of Brooklyn, and he says, "Hi, how are you, my friend," and he looks at them, and he says, "What are you *doing* here?" And they said, very proudly, "Mr. Bogosian's taking us to lunch." And Phil said, "This is the best we can do for our Israeli friends?" And I wanted to say, "I wanted to take them upstairs, but..."

So that was the Israelis.

Q: *That's a lot of fun. So basically, let me just ask, what did you think of the role of the State Department in civil aviation?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, we were in kind of a nice role. We were institutionally in the chair. What that meant was that we, by definition, had a kind of role to play that in a sense you could lead if you chose to do so. Also there was in those days the Department of Transportation and the Civil Aeronautics Board. And frankly, it wasn't so much that we played one off against the other, but as my boss said we had a balance-wheel role to play. Some of the people at the CAB were really

radical in their desire to push for opening the aviation markets. DOT was more conservative. The real question, in a way, was more in-house. What role did the Desks want to play? And there were some that had no interest in getting involved. There were some, like the Japan Desk, that said you're dreaming if you think we're going to let you run this negotiation without our input, because trade was too important for Japan.

Q: *Good, good. We like Desks like that.*

BOGOSIAN: Well, they were rare, Vlad. Most of them were simply put off by anything that was not pure political. Now the Yugoslav Desk was frightened when they saw us playing hardball, but you had to do that. On the other hand, it was lots of fun to be able to work with all the different officers.

Q: *Our ambassadors in Yugoslavia played hardball, if I'm not mistaken.*

BOGOSIAN: Well, interestingly, we got there right after Larry Eagleburger left and before the next ambassador came.

Q: *Just the man I was thinking of.*

BOGOSIAN: Well he had left by the time.

Q: *It's his hobby.*

BOGOSIAN: The other thing is that the problem we had in those days was a rather weak aviation industry. I mean, I had been in Kuwait, where the oil industry managed to extract oil in the craziest places in the world, and they were huge companies. The biggest airline in America in those days was United, and it was a four billion dollar company, which was relatively small, compared to some other ends of the economic spectrum.

Many of the airlines, like United, like American, were really only then getting into international aviation. Pan Am was on its last legs. We had a company, Air Florida - also Braniff - they branched out and then collapsed. And so we had to go out and defend these companies. In Yugoslavia I was defending Pan Am, and the Yugoslavs complained about their inept marketing, and one guy said, "They don't even give us a calendar at Christmas, for God's sake," whereas Swissair, KLM were stealing the business away. KLM and Swissair derived a lot of their business on what they called "Sixth Freedom," which meant they would pick up a passenger somewhere and bring him to either Zurich or Amsterdam and then on to the United States. Who's going to Holland? Nobody's going to Holland. But they basically, without knowing it, invented the hub system. Now there's something going on that wasn't allowed then, which is code sharing, and so you can get on a Northwest Airline airplane now, and it says "Northwest-KLM;" or when I go to Nairobi, it says it's a United Flight, even though it's a Lufthansa

plane.

Q: *Well, Dick, the side benefit of all that is it allows us to fly on foreign airplanes while flying American.*

BOGOSIAN: Well, but that's from your point of view.

Q: *That's from my point of view.*

BOGOSIAN: The point is the American airline gets some benefit.

Q: *I suffer from that system... Look, I won't... That would be a digression.*

BOGOSIAN: Okay.

Q: *One comment. In a couple of minutes we're going to run out of this tape. Are we about finished with that particular incarnation in aviation negotiations?*

BOGOSIAN: As best as I can remember.

Q: *Good.*

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This is Thursday, August 21, 1998, and we're beginning session three with Richard Bogosian. Dick, thanks a lot for doing this one more time. We left off last time when you were chief of the Aviation Negotiations Division in the State Department Bureau of Economic Affairs, and that was a lively session. But today we move into a very different area. You are now the director of East African Affairs at State. How did you get into that job? How did you get into the East African Division.

BOGOSIAN: Vlad, as we've discussed already, I was deputy chief of mission in Khartoum from 1976 to '79. In 1981, in the fall of 1981, I was promoted into the senior Foreign Service, which made me eligible for certain jobs. In fact, I was wondering, I went to Personnel and inquired whether I might be named chargé in Ethiopia. The individual I was dealing with was Keith Wauchope, who had been our Sudan Desk officer. He said, "Dick, they want you to be director of AF/E," which is how the Office of East African Affairs is referred to. AF/E has always been considered a very interesting job, because it's in the African Bureau, but it deals with countries of East Africa that typically have a kind of Middle East character as well, especially Sudan. Three of those countries, Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia, are members of the Arab League. The Horn of Africa abuts the Red Sea and is next to the Arabian Peninsula, and this was at a time when our principal concern in the region was its close proximity to the Arabian Peninsula and all the strategic aspects that went with that. When I first got to Khartoum, we were just

emerging from a very difficult period in our relations, and I wrote a cable when I was chargé in those first months outlining what I thought were our strategic interests in Sudan - its size, its location, its potential wealth. By 1982, when I became director of AFE and after an absence of three years from the region, that set of criteria had become the defining element of our relations, particularly in Sudan. And while I was director of East African Affairs, particularly the first couple of years, we had extremely close and good relations with Sudan and also with Somalia and Kenya. In the case of both Sudan and Somalia, part of this was due to the situation in Ethiopia. In the mid-‘70s, the emperor, Haile Selassie, was overthrown, and by the late ‘70s, the Mengistu régime had become almost a puppet of the Soviet Union. It was one of the African countries most closely allied with the Soviet Union, which poured money into the country via arms. And Ethiopia, it appeared, presented a genuine threat to Sudan. Relations were tense. In addition, the relationship between Somalia and Ethiopia was traditionally very bad since Somalia claimed that East Ethiopia, referred to as the Ogaden, was really part of Somalia. It certainly is a Somali-speaking part of Ethiopia. So in the classic Cold War sense, as the Soviet relationship with Ethiopia waxed, its relations with Somalia waned, and we, in turn, stepped in and developed a close relationship with Somalia. In the case of Kenya, Kenya is a bit removed from the Horn of Africa, but among other things, the port of Mombasa is about the only port on the Indian Ocean that could service U.S. warships as a port of call. That is to say, it had both the size and facilities and the willingness to do so. One result of this was that we had very, very large programs, both economic and military, in those three countries. Our aid levels were well over $100 million each, and that was beginning to be of some concern, particularly on the Hill. So the principal character of our relationship with those countries, was the perception that we had a strong strategic interest in good relations, related in part to our relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. President Nimeiri had been very supportive of any number of issues of concern to us. In those days, just to cite a few examples which are now public (but at the time some of them were highly sensitive), Nimeiri and Sudan supported the Camp David peace process. They were one of the few Arab countries that were willing publicly to do so. Now that occurred while I was in Khartoum in the period ’76 to ’79, but the effect of that was felt while I was director of AFE. It was one reason why we had such a close relationship with Sudan. He permitted our new Central Command, so-called CENTCOM, to pre-position equipment in Sudan. Sudan welcomed well over a million refugees, mainly from Ethiopia, but also from Chad and Uganda, and in that way, they won the support of many countries who thought, at a time when in Southeast Asia the Vietnamese were being pushed around, this to be a very noble act. And in that connection, in what at the time was a highly secret effort, he permitted the evacuation of Falasha Jews from Ethiopia and, via Sudan, onward to Israel - which, as an Arab country, was almost unthinkable at the time.

So Sudan, for us, was not only just a good friend and not only a place of strategic importance, but the Nimeiri régime supported us in numerous ways, and the result was they were popular. They got a lot of aid, and we had excellent relations with

them. The problem in Sudan, though, was that by 1983, which is to say about halfway through my assignment, things began to unravel, and there were two elements to this which have since become very much reasons for our rather poor relations with Sudan. One was the growing Islamization of Nimeiri's policies. He increasingly adopted positions that he tended to articulate in terms of Islam. Now this is a country that has a large Christian and animist minority, and when you also work in the racial or ethnic differences with the Muslims being Arabs and the Christians being Nilotic or other Bantu elements, it clearly was exacerbating what were already the underlying tensions in the country. In addition, among the southerners themselves, which at the time had an autonomous region that was a result of the 1974 peace agreement, the so-called Addis Agreement, there were internal divisions, largely between the Dinka, the largest southern tribe, and other tribes, rather complicated political relationships among southerners. And there's a bit of a debate over whether Nimeiri exacerbated that consciously for his own political objectives or whether it was something that he just couldn't control. But at one point the southerners just started bickering among themselves, Nimeiri started pushing the Islamic angle, and one result was that the southern civil war, in fact, began again. And that all happened while I was director of AFE.

To give you an idea of what we were dealing with, during the three years I was director of AFE, I traveled to Khartoum four different times for one reason or another, and one time I went with our assistant secretary, Chet Crocker. We spoke with Nimeiri, who on the one hand complained bitterly about how the white Arabs looked down on the Sudanese - he said, "They refer to us as *'abid*," which means 'slave' in Arabic - but thought nothing of telling us that he wasn't worried about the southerners: all they wanted was a nice car and a house and, as he said, "You know, they like to dance a lot." He virtually said they'd just come out of the trees. And this was a man who was probably as friendly to the southerners as any northern Sudanese. So there was a tremendous perception gap there, and try as we might, we were not able to get Nimeiri to do the acts that would have stopped the problem. And so shortly before my tour ended in 1985, he was overthrown, ushering in another régime which has since led to further changes, and now we have a régime in Khartoum that is among the most unfriendly to the United States in the world.

But when I was director, it was a very good period. At one point, to give you an idea of the standing that the Sudanese had, their vice president came to the United States to brief Congress on what was going on in Sudan. This was around 1984. He came on what was sort of a rushed trip. The Sudanese ambassador here lined up a meeting in Congress that was attended by something like 14 senators, including Senator Kennedy. For those of us who tried to get meetings on the Hill, it was incredible that an African ambassador could get 14 senators in a room. But in fact, that's the kind of standing Sudan had in those days. The vice president gave a very frank briefing on what was going wrong in Sudan. He gave a very honest explanation, and I was waiting for the Senators to criticize Sudan. They had no questions that I can recall, and Senator Inouye of Hawaii said, "All I know

is you're receiving refugees in a way that we've never been able to do Southeast Asia, and I think you're wonderful." And the meeting broke up.

So that was how things were, and Nimeiri visited the United States in those days, and as I say, while he was here he was actually overthrown. Now the other countries of the region - we covered 10 countries, including Seychelles, the Islands of the Indian Ocean, Tanzania, and so forth - Julius Nyerere was president of Tanzania at that time. He still was essentially a socialist. This was the Reagan Administration. We had friendly relations, but clearly there were ideological differences. But Chet Crocker at that time, our assistant secretary, was pursuing what he called "constructive engagement" in southern Africa, and Nyerere was a key figure. And so a lot of what we cared about in Tanzania was really related to southern African issues, and I was not too deeply involved in that.

Similarly, we didn't have too many issues with the other countries of the region, although one by one things happened. We had some important meetings with the president of Madagascar, Ratsiraka, because he was shifting from being sort of very leftist to being more middle-of-the-road. We arranged for Vernon Walters, who had known him years before, to go have some frank talks. Interestingly, two things happened that helped us very much in our relations with Madagascar. One was what they call a cyclone, a hurricane, which damaged a coastal city. And the U.S. Navy came and did a lot to rebuild the city, and that was very popular in Madagascar. Similarly, when their ambassador here died, we arranged to get him home quickly in a casket because to the Malagasy it's very important that you get buried in your home region. And that was seen as a very generous act.

Q: *Did you arrange that, Dick?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, let's put it this way: our office did. In fact, it was the good work of a Desk officer, and I had some very good Desk officers in those days. We were a good office. We were thought to be the best office in the region, that is, in the Bureau, and the credit goes largely to our Desk officers. We were doing other things that at the time were new. Sudan was one of the first countries in Africa, if not the first, where we worked out what we referred to as a "structural adjustment program," which is to say a program of economic policy reform combined with important assistance from the World Bank, the IMF, and so forth.

But in addition to Sudan, we had some very difficult problems in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. I will just note that, as I said, we had a very large assistance program with Somalia. The problem in Somalia was always to get them not to cross the border and fight in Ethiopia. But we didn't have problems in Somali that emerged later on. There was a lot of skepticism about the Siad Barre régime, and we realized that. But I think one needs to recall that it was the Cold War and it was seen as very much an issue of Soviet-backed Ethiopia and our strategic interests in the region. But it was not as easy to get people to support Somalia as it was to get them to support Sudan. Sudan had a little more *gravitas*, and it was hard to

take Somalia seriously sometimes. And so, for example, we would have a meeting where we would agree in principle to do something, and then weeks later nothing would have happened. And I recall talking to a particular AID officer and saying why aren't you doing whatever it is we agreed to and having her reply, "I just don't like the Somalis." And that was the kind of atmosphere we were dealing with. All that said, we had a very large program. We had a new embassy under construction and so forth.

But we had some very difficult issues with Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya that I'll mention briefly. With the case of Ethiopia, as I say, it was seen to be a Soviet surrogate, but during these years there was a terrible famine in Ethiopia, and we came face-to-face with the traditional American policy of not letting politics get in the way of humanitarian assistance. And indeed, we provided considerable assistance to Ethiopia. But what was interesting in the Ethiopian context was how that played out domestically politically. There was a time when Mickey Leland, who was a Congressman from Houston and took a very strong interest in Ethiopia and who later died in a plane crash in Ethiopia, and Peter MacPherson, who was the head of AID, and I were on a C-Span panel, and Leland said that you must realize that there's terrible famine in Ethiopia. And at the time, it wasn't a hundred percent clear. And the Reagan Administration was very reluctant to get into a situation where it would have to pour aid in. And Leland virtually ridiculed the Administration position. Shortly thereafter, there was a report from one of our AID people in Ethiopia, a guy named Rick Machmer, who had been with me in Khartoum earlier, in which he described in the most excruciating detail how the Ethiopian government was treating people who were victims of the famine, just to get them out of the way. And I recall saying to my superiors, "We just can't hide this any longer." Now it isn't so much that we had information that we suppressed. It was more or less a problem of not looking as hard as we might because the Administration was [not engaged.]

Q: *Information on the famine or how the-*

BOGOSIAN: No, on the famine *per se*. Now I must say, once the evidence became unavoidable or incontrovertible, then we, in our traditional way, moved forward with very large assistance. But it was an example of how the domestic political issues got wrapped up in something like the famine.

It showed up another way. Around Christmas 1984 or New Year's 1985, Ted Kennedy made a highly publicized trip to Ethiopia, and so the question was what was the Reagan Administration going to do? And they felt they couldn't go to Ethiopia, so Vice President Bush went to Sudan, Niger, and Mali. And although this was coming down the road, one result of that was to tell the ambassador in Mali that it was all over and Bogosian was coming out as ambassador, in Niger I mean.

Q: *So you were being put into Niger, yes.*

BOGOSIAN: That was by ’85. Now the point about Ethiopia was that we had very unfriendly relations with them. There was one incident in which an American embassy employee was put in jail, and we were very worried that that was going to turn out to be something like the Hostage Crisis. In fact, that was never publicized, and the man eventually got out of jail. We had a tense relationship with Ethiopia, and yet Ethiopia is a fairly important country in that part of the world. But it was really the famine. What the famine did was require a large program of humanitarian assistance, and what that required was some presence to actually manage the program. And so we just simply couldn’t have a zero relationship with Ethiopia.

In Uganda, we had a somewhat different kind of problem. This was a period when Milton Obote was president, for the second time, following Idi Amin. And Uganda was not considered a country of great importance, but we did have the usual aid programs and so forth. What happened there was there was increasingly evidence of human rights violations by Uganda, and this was an example of how the public pressure developed, and increasingly it meant that we couldn’t have the kinds of programs we wanted there. There were questions of safety because of the anarchic character of the military. It may have happened earlier, but in the mid-‘80s this was a relatively new phenomenon, of a country where the human rights activists began to press the Administration to modify its policies because of human rights issues. Here, what happened was we were trying to preserve our aid program and maintain at least some measure of political relationship, and I had to go to the Hill and testify. And what I was finding was our views were not seen as sustainable. So in the case of Uganda-

Q: *Views meaning to have some supportive relationship with Uganda?*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, and you know, in a way, in retrospect, I don’t know why we cared so much about Milton Obote. Around the time I was leaving, Yoweri Museveni was leading a rebellion.

Q: *Would you repeat his name?*

BOGOSIAN: Yoweri Museveni. He’s the present president of Uganda. And Museveni would arrive in some town, and he would not pillage, and his soldiers would not rape, and so he became something of a white knight, you might say. And I would just note that he eventually overthrew Obote and is now president and is someone that we consider is one of the more impressive African leaders these days.

In Kenya we had yet a different kind of problem. Now Kenya is a little different from most of the countries of Africa in the sense that, for many Americans, these countries are just indistinguishable. Nobody knows much about them But Kenya is, quote-unquote, “The Real Africa.” There are lions there, and there’s beautiful

scenery. Of course, the movie *Out of Africa* had not been made yet, but enough people have been to Kenya that it has a kind of cachet that's a little different. But in fact, Kenya has lots of problems. It had at that time an extremely high fertility rate, the population pressures that were going to be very serious. It also is a country that, however beautiful the Rift Valley is, most of it is really desert of semi-arid. And yet we had an increasingly important strategic interest in Kenya because, as I said earlier, it was the one place where our ships in the region could go. And what we were finding was that, because of the problems in the Middle East, we had virtually constant naval presence in the region, and I can tell you, as one who served in the Persian Gulf, that's not exactly the kind of place a U.S. sailor wants to have shore leave. And about the only place they could was Mombasa, and in fact, at one point when we began to be worried about AIDS, the sailors were told not to get involved with prostitutes. And in fact, with the increasing number of females in the Navy, at one point, the Somali prostitutes of Mombasa protested that these "soft" sailors were not able to support their economic activities.

But the problem in Kenya was, like many African countries-

Q: *Somali prostitutes.*

BOGOSIAN: Well, it happens that... I'm using the term ethnically. They may have been Kenyan citizens, but they were at least perceived to be Somali.

Like many African countries, the Kenyans have economic policies that we thought were wrong, and also there was a pervasive problem of corruption. While I was director of AFE, one of our ambassadors was Admiral Jerry Thomas, and his economic counselor was Mark Johnson, who, as it happened, worked for me in Kuwait, and the two of them said they were going to go after corruption in Kenya.

Q: *That was the team in Kenya that you just described.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes. And they got nowhere. They made a very strong effort to highlight and to try to work against corruption. Chet Crocker was very nervous. He said, "What are those guys doing? Don't they realize the problems they might raise?" But in fact, they got nowhere because that corruption problem was pervasive. And so one of the dilemmas we had in Kenya was there was a feeling that to give them aid without structural adjustment was pouring money down a rat hole, but to withhold the aid would jeopardize our interests. And this became evident in a way that I had never seen either before or since.

The first ambassador in Kenya when I came into AFE was Bill Harrop, a very senior and highly qualified ambassador. His economic counselor was a guy named Duane Butcher, and about two days before Butcher's assignment ended, he sent in a Dissent Channel cable. It's the only Dissent Channel cable I've ever

seen. And what he said was, the ambassador is violating his own policy. And what he meant was that, having pursued a policy where we were withholding certain aid to Kenya pending their undertaking certain reforms, the ambassador in the end decided to release the money, but the reforms had not been implemented. So Butcher complained that the ambassador was violating his own policy, and it happens with Dissent Channel cables, they go to the Secretary, and in this case the ambassador is required to send in a response. And his answer, in so many words, was "there's more to life (in Kenya) than our structural adjustment objective, " and in effect what he said was he was worried that we wouldn't be able to get, say, port call rights in Mombasa. So that issue, of course, was with us virtually the whole time I was director of AFE.

Now what that means is that at any given moment there was some hot issue. There's one I remember that in the end nothing happened, but at the time we thought it was going to be a very big deal. We had gotten wind that Qadhafi was planning to bomb Sudan. Now you may remember that I got to Khartoum two weeks after a Qadhafi-inspired coup attempt, and he remained implacably opposed to Nimeiri the whole time, and he was still causing mischief in East Africa. Between the Sudanese and the Egyptians and the Americans there was this notion that what we should do was let the planes leave and head for Khartoum and then the Egyptian Air Force or the Sudanese - I forget which - would intercept them and Qadhafi would be exposed. Now I know parenthetically that some time after this he really did bomb. He bombed the radio station in Omdurman. So we were alerted to all of this, and we were going to spend the night in the State Department. In fact, I did spend the night in the State Department. But a fellow named John McWethy of ABC News picked this story up because we began certain aircraft movements of our own, and somehow people saw this. And in a word, he leaked all this. And as a result Qadhafi never did what he was going to do, and nothing happened. But that gives you an idea of what was going on, which is to say that whether it was Qadhafi or the famine in Ethiopia or the Egyptians being concerned, at any given moment there was some kind of action underway. And this was at a time when Chevron had discovered oil in Sudan and was moving toward building a 900-mile pipeline; this was at a time when the Arabs were still planning major agricultural investments in Sudan and we had hoped to get on with it. As I noted, we had a variety of military and political and diplomatic initiatives underway in the region, some of which were related to Ethiopia and the Horn, some of which were related to the Middle East. And the mere fact that we had these huge assistance programs in Sudan, Somalia, and Kenya gave AFE a kind of weight that was not necessarily the things that involved the kind of high-level public issues that others like, the Middle East, might have. But we were an office that always was working on issues that had a lot of interest within the government. As I mentioned, I visited the region fairly often. In three years, I made three full sort of swings through the region, visiting all the countries, including the Comoros Islands. I consulted often in Cairo or Riyadh or London or Paris. And so in that sense it was a very active period.

Q: *Dick, can I ask on a couple of things that come out? The two things I'd like to get your thoughts on are the Cold War in relation to our policy in Africa, one, and AID or assistance programs as a second thought. With the Cold War, Dick, is it fair to say that our policies were so Cold War driven in these countries that, absent the Cold War, we are stuck with no policies for those countries?*

BOGOSIAN: I don't think it's quite that simple. Certainly there were countries like Angola and Ethiopia. The Ethiopia under Mengistu clearly as a Cold War... And part of that was Mengistu. He simply went far toward becoming friendly toward the Soviet Union. But the Cold War by itself was not the only issue. You've got to recall that in '73 and '74, and then again in '79, there were energy crises that riveted our attention to the Middle East. And also by '79, there was the trouble in Afghanistan. So to the extent that the Horn of Africa was essentially the other side of the Middle East - and you know, let's face it, it's right next door to Saudi Arabia - whether it was port rights in Mombasa or pre-positioning rights in Sudan, that was all really with a Middle East focus. And keep in mind the kind of relationship we had with Egypt at that point. So the Cold War was a large part of it, but so was the strategic relationship to the Middle East. By the time we're covering here, as I said earlier, we had a lot of things going on with Sudan, so to the extent that Ethiopia represented a threat to Sudan, you could call it "Cold War," but it was a function there. Now if you removed the Cold War part of it - in fact, today it's kind of reversed - we're worried about a Sudanese threat to Ethiopia - the geography remains the same, and so the Horn of Africa is probably going to remain of strategic interest because of the Middle East. Now that probably doesn't raise the stakes quite as much as if the Shah were in Iran or if the Cold War still existed, but it's not completely absent either. And in that sense, there really is a difference between Ethiopia and, say, Niger, or Ethiopia and Uganda even.

Q: *There are other strategic interests.*

BOGOSIAN: Now to tell you the truth, if you go to the Pentagon, they tend to look at it a little differently - not that they don't consider the Horn of strategic value but they kind of come at it a little bit differently, and it's largely a function of its proximity to the Middle East.

Q: *Dick, with AID a couple of questions. What was your sense of the quality of our aid programs, which were numerous and expensive in the areas where you were working right now, and how was it to work with them?*

BOGOSIAN: Good question; I'm not sure I have a good answer. For an aid program to be successful (not counting humanitarian assistance, food, that sort of thing), you need time. And these countries have been so volatile that you start a program and somehow you can never really finish it. As for the quality of the people, I'm really not in a position to say. It's probably mixed. We had good AID directors and good staff and others that may not have been quite so good. I know

that there's often a debate in AID. For example when we resumed out AID program in Sudan, the Ambassador and I said let's build roads, and we were told, no, we deal with basic human needs. And it's true that over the years, AID sort of shifts from one flavor-of-the-month to another. In Sudan I think we broke some ground with our structural adjustment program, which then became the model in many other African countries as well. Certainly one has to admit that for all the money we poured in there's not much to show for it, and therefore, I suppose one could criticize it. I find it hard to do so because - one would have to go back a little more and see just what was done, but for example - when we were dealing with Uganda, the AID director was very upset because he had just about got going and then the pressure developed to cut back because of human rights; and what that meant, in some ways, was that AID people in Washington were just reluctant to do more in Uganda, and he felt stymied. Whatever they were doing - we're talking about till up to 1985, and by around 1990-91 Somalia fell apart - I think some of the things that may have worked out over the longer run if there hadn't been such volatility might have proven themselves. It's hard to say, looking back, what we can point to as we did *X*, *Y*, and *Z*, and as a result today things are better. But I need to say as well, I can't remember every single project that was done, and in a way it may be a little unfair to offer a blanket criticism. The best I can say is we did the best we could, given what we knew and under the circumstances, but there's no getting around the fact that for whatever reason, whether it's our inability to affect corruption in Kenya or the changing political circumstances in one of the countries or the other, there's not much to show for it. Now I think in another sense, though, we can make the point that in a country like Tanzania, which has been relatively stable, some of the discussions that we've had with them in the 1980s about the need to break away from the socialist model (a position that virtually all the donors, even including the Scandinavians, who are socialists themselves and main aid providers, share), we did affect policy there, which I think is now beginning to show some results. So that perhaps shows that if could have some stability you might be able to get somewhere. With all that said, some of those countries - the Comoros, the Seychelles, Djibouti - they're so small they're not likely to make a big splash, and yet Mauritius has been one of the great success stories in Africa. It's a thriving democracy. It's a free-enterprise system. And one result is it's had a fair amount of success in terms of its economics.

Q: *Dick, do you think we're ready to move on to the ambassadorship in Niger?*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, let's do that. There's probably more, I just can't remember it anyway, but those were the highlights.

Q: *We can come back if any inspiration strikes.*

Dick, we're about to reach your ambassadorship from 1985 to 1988 in the Republic of Niger. Can you tell us how that came about?

BOGOSIAN: Sometime during my assignment in East African Affairs, our ambassador to the Seychelles, David Fischer, was by, and he said something to me that I had never really thought about. He said, "You know if you want to be an ambassador, you've got to tell them." So one day I went to the senior deputy assistant secretary, Frank Wisner, and I said, "Am I supposed to tell you if I want to be an ambassador?" He said, "Yes." I said, "Well, all right, put me down." And during my assignment to East African Affairs, the first time they mentioned an embassy was when Jim Bishop, in 1984, asked me if I wanted to go to Somalia, because Bob Oakley, our ambassador, was going to be leaving early so he could become director of the counter-terrorism office. Now as it happened, Crocker said no, he wanted me to stay to be his director of AFE. But one or another embassy was mentioned from time to time, and then in December of 1984, at a time when my daughter used to come into Washington about once a week, she had come in - it was about 7 o'clock and I was in a car pool with Tom Niles at the time, who was a deputy assistant secretary in the European Bureau. I said, "I just need to poke my head into the front office. We'll go get Niles and go home." And when I poked my head into the front office, Jim Bishop was in with Chet Crocker, and they beckoned me in. And Bishop said, "How would you like to go to Niger as ambassador?" He said, "We need to know right away?" So my first question was, well, what's it like? Because he had been ambassador there. He said, well, it's like Khartoum, only further west, which was not exactly true, but he said we have a little military program and AID and Peace Corps. And I said, well, you know, let me check it out with the family. I went home, and at the dinner table, by a vote of 5-0, we all agreed I should go. So the next day, Hank Cohen, who was the number two in the Director General's office, called. He said, well, what about it? And I said, yes, I'd like to go. I said, "What's the rush?" He said, "Well, what we're doing is, we're nominating a bunch of career Foreign Service officers to replace Reagan political appointees. Now for me going to Niger, that wasn't that big a deal, but a number of -

Q: *Was there a political appointee in Niger?*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, I'll comment on that in a moment. The reason this was of sort of more than routine interest was that Reagan was "accused," quote-unquote, of putting ideologically right-wing ambassadors into Central America at a time when that was very much a highly emotional set of issues in the United States. And so if Cohen was right, what Secretary Shultz was trying to do was get a more professional group of ambassadors into Central America, and I was kind of caught up in that. The ambassador in Niger was a guy named Casey, who was from Colorado, and he was a mining engineer who had done some work in Niger and knew the country and positively loved it there. In fact, they asked me in December of 1984 - I think it was December 8, if I remember correctly - to be ambassador. I presented my credentials on October 11, and one reason it took so long was that Casey wasn't too keen to leave. He thought he was going to be there throughout the Reagan Administration, and in fact, at one point, in 1985, we had lunch together in Washington, and he was telling us what it was like to be there.

And then he said he was going to resign officially that afternoon and would I like to come to the ceremony? Which we did. And he introduced me to his son. He said, "This is Richard Bogosian. He's going to replace us in Niamey." And the son said, "You mean we're not going back?" So that family had a little difficulty getting itself torn away.

Niamey, for us, was probably as nice an introduction to being ambassador as one could have. It was, to be frank, a relatively quiet assignment. There are a couple of things that happened that were of interest, but by and large it was a quiet assignment, in contrast to Chad, virtually no crises. As I say, we had plenty of time to get ready to go out. We were anticipating leaving in the summer. At one point we thought we wouldn't be able to have hearings, but at that time Chad was in crisis, and we wanted to get John Blaine out as ambassador, and so the Senate Foreign Relations Committee quickly put together a hearing and three or four others of us were able to go up. And we had a quick meeting with President Reagan, and in those days, President Reagan had the practice of calling ambassadors on the phone. And so you would always say to some colleague, "Did you get your phone call yet?" And this one, I think it was, Friday afternoon, I was told he was going to call, probably about five or five-thirty. Now usually in our office people worked late, but this one day everybody was gone but my secretary, who wasn't about to leave if the President was going to call. And at one point the phone rang and this voice said, "Mr. Bogosian?" I said, "Yes." He said, "Just a minute," and then the familiar voice of Ronald Reagan got on the phone. And if I remember correctly, he said, "Mr. Bogosian," and I was struck that he pronounced it right, "would you mind being my ambassador in Niger?" And I said, "Why no, not at all." No, no. He said, "Is this a bad time to call?" I said, "No, not at all."

Q: *That's wonderful.*

BOGOSIAN: And then he asked me if I'd be an ambassador, and he said, "Well, I guess that's it then." And I said, "Well, I guess so." And that was my call from President Reagan.

Q: *So he asked if it was a bad time to call to [announce] your appointment to be ambassador. Dick, that's an absolutely wonderful story.*

BOGOSIAN: Reagan made the phone call, and then all the different things fell into place, albeit over a long period. In fact, at one point, I wasn't sure it was going to happen, and I nosed around for other jobs, and they even asked if I wanted to be a deputy chief of mission in Riyadh, but by that time the Niamey assignment was coming through.

So we arrived in Niamey in October of 1985, and we stayed pretty much the full three years. And this was a period during which our two daughters when we left were at Wellesley College, and my son was living on his own. In fact, it was - I don't know how typical this is of the Foreign Service, but we kind of had to kick

our son out. He was living with us, and we were leaving. During this period, he decided to go to art school, and so, in a word, while we were in Niger, our children were in one stage or another of their college life. And there were certain moments where life was difficult. One of our daughters had some trouble at school, and she left school for a while and changed schools. And needless to say, putting three kids through private school was expensive, and so in that sense, we were still, if not consumed, somewhat preoccupied with family matters.

The embassy in Niamey was interesting in a couple of ways. First of all, it was a superb physical arrangement. We were out of town - that is to say, we were not downtown. We had 17 acres on either side of a road. When we first got there it wasn't heavily or densely populated. We were right next to the French embassy, which had a similar arrangement. We looked out on the Niger River. The residence was on one side, with beautiful grounds and innumerable birds. It was essentially on a flyway, and so at any time of the day you saw beautiful birds, and for about six months of the year there were these storks that would just walk back and forth eating the bugs, looking like waiters in their black - they were about three feet tall, these birds. So it was quite an introduction to Africa in that regard. The embassy itself was designed to be an embassy, and the whole time we were there we were putting up a new AID building on the compound. The Marines moved to a residence just next door to the embassy, and we had our American school, which was a lovely school. And over the time we were there, that school added two or three buildings to its operation. So it was a period of, on the one hand, a very nice physical arrangement that was fairly secure and so forth, even though during this period we spent several million dollars to build state-of-the-art walls all around the compound. We had, in fact, two swimming pools, one on either side. We had a large open lot, on which we could play softball, and so forth. That was the first thing to note.

The second thing to note about the embassy was it was fairly large. And again, what you had was a stable country, so that over time, the programs were able to grow. We had a sizable Peace Corps operation, with over a hundred volunteers, and that meant about four times a year a new group would come in. We had a good-sized AID mission with a seemingly endless variety of contractors and others who were with the AID mission. We had a small military office and, of course, USIA. So from an ambassadorial point of view, I had a nice little operation. There was plenty there to keep me busy from a management point of view. And by and large, the programs were smooth in operation, and I'll mention one or two others that we had a little problem with.

In West Africa there is this tradition of softball tournaments, and the one in Niamey is every year on October 12th, on Columbus Day weekend.

Q: *Who takes part in these?*

BOGOSIAN: In that year we had teams up from Ouagadougou and Bamako, and

I think we had a team from Abidjan that year also. And then the Japanese might put a team together and so forth. And it's frankly a lot of fun.

Q: *Government people?*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, from our embassies mainly. The Niamey tournament was always called the NUTS, the Niamey Universal Tournament of Softball; the one in Dakar was called WAIST, the West African Invitational Softball Tournament; and so forth. That's always on Washington's birthday, and the one in Ouaga is always on Memorial Day. So these are big events in West Africa. And so the first thing we did there was to entertain numerous visitors. Our ambassador from Ouagadougou wanted something to read, and there wasn't one book in the whole house, but perhaps the most memorable moment was when he complained to our dog for barking at the Tuareg guard and said to the dog, in English, "After all, you're partners in security."

Q: *Who was our ambassador in Ouagadougou?*

BOGOSIAN: Nard Neher.

Q: *Nard Neher.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, N-e-h-e-r, Nard Neher. There were a few things, of course, that happened in Niamey while we were there. I would note, by the way, that we had visits from our defense attaché periodically, and they had a plane, and this permitted us to travel over what was a rather large country. We went up to Agadez, which is essentially in the desert; we went to the uranium mines near Arlit; we went to Diffa and Nguigmi over on the Chad border, virtually a thousand miles away; and various other places. So that was something I never got to do in Sudan, and with the attaché planes it made travel around the country much easier than would otherwise be the case.

Q: *Excuse me, where was the attaché based?*

BOGOSIAN: In Abidjan, and they had a C-12 aircraft. Now it happened that Niger, with its uranium money, had built a beautiful road system, so we were able to travel that way as well. Now typically what we would do in Niamey was, in terms of our work, like any post, you have the various visitors who come and go, and you have the different subjects you're following. The main thing that was going on in those days that we cared about was usually something in one of the neighboring countries. There was always this concern about Libya. Typically Nigeria was in one state or another of turmoil. During these years there was a little war between Burkina Faso and Mali. Niger itself, in those years, was very stable. In fact, the political situation was almost inert. The leader of the country was Seyni Kountché, a typical African dictator, in the sense that he was a military man; but Kountché was also a very remarkable person. He was not particularly

large, but he was clearly a dominant person. Impeccably dressed, shoes shined, pants creased, slim but with a military bearing, he took power in the mid-'70s at a time of famine, when he was no longer able to tolerate corruption in terms of delivering food assistance. So he was fairly honest as well. A little like Nimeiri, he was a good friend of the United States and a strong supporter of things we cared about. For example, AID was pursuing programs in family planning. Now this is a country that's 90 percent Muslim. There was, and indeed later was even stronger, resistance, but Kountché, in a meeting I attended, asked a room full of AID representatives whether they thought it was better to have abortions in Nigeria or toss little babies in barrels rather than have family planning. He was quite graphic. And so he was conservative - he was very careful about even contraception, let alone abortion - but he was willing to permit family planning; and that was something we cared about. On the other hand, the country when I got there was just coming out of a severe drought and famine conditions. We had, of course, provided a lot of assistance. They were worried about desertification, and the minister for environment asked the AID director if there was anything we could do. And the AID director was not very forthcoming, and as we left the meeting, I said to the AID director, a guy named Peter Benedict, who was a very good person, "Why weren't you willing to help him?" He says, "We don't know how to combat this problem." And in fact, the Chinese ambassador told me that they had planted something like a billion trees in China. He said it had no effect. So desertification is one of those problems that may be in the "too hard" category.

Now while we were in Niger there are several things that happened that are worth noting. In one of the far-off parts of the country, a place called Dirkou, which is kind of in east-central Niger but essentially in the desert...

Q: *I spent several wonderful days in Niger once upon a time.*

BOGOSIAN: When was that?

Q: *In 1967. I had a wonderful time. But, Dick, these countries don't change.*

BOGOSIAN: Well, Niger had uranium, and they had a boom.

Q: *A wonderful boom. I spent all my time with a French sociologist and psychoanalyst.*

BOGOSIAN: In Niamey?

Q: *He lived in Niamey, and he worked with witch doctors; and I spent several days with him. He took me to meet all of the leading tribal medicine leaders in that area, wonderful people, very interesting people, and he was a very interesting guy. And I had a grand time there. I went swimming in the river, did various things like that, drove to Gao-*

BOGOSIAN: That's Mali.

Q: *I know.*

BOGOSIAN: Although it's not.

Q: *- drove to Gao with the AID director from Niamey. The deputy chief of mission told me to take him. He said this guy's been here for three months, he hasn't been out of town. Anyhow, do you feel -*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, let's go.

Q: *Wonderful.*

BOGOSIAN: There were several things going on in Niger when we were there. Unlike, say, in Washington, where there were big policy issues that you grapple with, these were more in the nature of sort of discrete things that happened, but they all kind of added up to the further education of Richard Bogosian. For example, in Dirkou, which, as I say, is in a remote part of east-central Niger, the French had built an airstrip, probably in the 1950s. And at a time when we were looking for ways to kind of show our support for Kountché in a military way, some people - this was before I got involved - came up with the idea of repaving the airstrip in Dirkou. This turned out to be an incredibly difficult undertaking in many ways. First of all, as I said, it was in a terribly remote area, and it kind of showed a little bit the hubris that Americans have on the "Well, we can do anything." But after all is said and done, to get construction equipment up there proved to be extremely difficult. There's constant wind and sand. It's a little hard to put concrete and do some of the other things. But the other thing that happened here was to find myself constantly bickering with the U.S. military because of their unwillingness to support our attaché office, which had the task of trying to get this thing done. And so I would send what I thought were confidential and narrow-channel cables to various people complaining about EUCOM, the office in Europe that oversaw this, only to find the general lecturing me on "Dick, you don't do it that way." The point here is, on the one hand, I found myself enmeshed in intra-Pentagon bureaucracy, trying to find out where you go to get something done, and to find that on the one hand I had a defense attaché who was, frankly, not well qualified to handle this, and on the other hand I had general who wasn't used to having people challenge them. And for my part, I realized that I could be right and still lose the war if I get some general mad at me. And in effect, what happened was the project went on for years; it was over budget; it was late; but as a matter of pride the U.S. military was determined ultimately to get it done. And my recollection is at one point we had to practically go back to the beginning and start all over again. In a way, it became a kind of bad joke, that with all our supposed technological capabilities it was awfully hard to just pave an airstrip in the middle of nowhere in Africa. And it was a kind of an object lesson on being a little more modest and humble in terms of what we're getting into. In another

sense, the significance of Dirkou was that for virtually my whole assignment in Niamey, there was something that involved me with the American military in what proved to be an awfully uncomfortable thing. They didn't like to admit that they had screwed up, and in the end they built a beautiful airstrip that everybody agreed was a job well done, and when they finally got the right equipment, the right people, it was done - but it took a couple of years to do something that we thought was going to be done in a couple of months.

Another area that came up while I was there was what I refer to as the Tufts project. Now I'm a graduate of Tufts College. The president of Tufts University at that time was Jean Meyer, who was a world-renowned nutritionist and apparently had fought in the Resistance in France and so forth.

Q: *Jean Meyer.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes. And he established a school of nutrition and he established a veterinary school. And this was a program in livestock management, and among other things what they were developing was a vaccine for rinderpest that would not require refrigeration - which would have tremendous application through much of Africa, for all these herders off in the middle of nowhere. Now the Tufts connection was an interesting one. For one thing, we had a dog that developed something called Cushing's syndrome, and because all these veterinarians were there they worked on the dog. But more than that, the dog had research value for them, and so they benefited from that.

Q: *They collected bits of information about the dog?*

BOGOSIAN: I don't know, they kept that dog going a couple of years longer than would have been the case otherwise.

But the other thing was Meyer came out. The problem was that AID didn't like this project. They were not sure it was going well. Meyer came out to try to save the project, and he was a man of some ego - after all, he had done a lot. He explained how the French were unhappy when he became an American. But we were waiting for something to happen, and we were just looking over the garden in the back yard, and in my stupidity I tried to connect with him by telling him that I had gotten a good grade in biology, and I said to him that I got an A in botany. And he says, "Yeah, I got an A, too." And he was this world-renowned nutritionist who sort of lived that way. But the real problem with Meyer - and I used to see him in Medford because I'm from Medford and I'd go up and meet with him at Tufts - and this was over a year or two period, this relationship, when AID was getting ready to scuttle the program, he phoned me and said, "Dick, what can you do?" And I had to come face-to-face with my responsibilities as ambassador and supporting the AID mission and my natural desire to help my alma mater, and I said, "I'm sorry, President Meyer, there's really just nothing I can do. The program is going to have to be stopped." "All right," he said, and that

was that. I put the phone down, and I said to my wife, "There goes the honorary degree." So that was one of those things that personally was rather disappointing.

One of the things that happened while I was there was a summit of Air Afrique. Now Air Afrique is an airline that's owned by several West African countries, and it was in trouble. And so the presidents of the owner countries came to Niamey, and there was a meeting that the diplomatic corps was invited to - I guess it was their closing meeting - and one by one the different presidents came out. Sankara of Ouagadougou had a pistol on his hip and he wore fatigues. And the audience gave polite applause until Houphouet Boigny came out. Now he was about five feet tall. He wore a pork pie hat and he looked like a little frog, but this man clearly was the most charismatic of the group, and the audience just erupted in applause. That was the only time I ever saw him, but it was a very interesting object lesson in the stature he had. And in that part of Africa, typically, he was looked upon as the elder statesman of them all.

Q: *From the Ivory Coast.*

BOGOSIAN: That's right. There was one major political even while I was there that I can recall, and that was the death of Kountché. Now as I said, there were no political parties; there were not opposition groups; there were no secret groups that were at all significant. After I left Niamey, they went far toward creating a democracy, and the political life became much more vibrant. And then there was a coup that snuffed the democracy out. But while I was there it was very inert. Kountché was somewhat of a stern person. When I presented my credentials - I think it was a Friday or whatever - he said, "Come, let's get together next week and have a good talk." So within a week I had a real substantive meeting with him, and I felt very good about it. But shortly thereafter, the next two times I wanted to have a meeting with him, I couldn't get it. One was with Meyer, and he wouldn't see Meyer, and one was with one of the Department people. So I felt pretty depressed, and Jim Bishop told me not to worry, that it would work out, and it did. After that initial period I was able to see Kountché virtually any time I wanted, and that meant that every couple of months I would have a meeting with him.

We would review just about all the subjects. The one subject he was very careful about was relations with France. He would talk about Libya; he would talk about all of Niger's neighbors; he would explain to me relationships; but when we came up to France he tended to be much more cautious.

Q: *Because he was closely affiliated with France.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes. Clearly he didn't want to get into that with me, which revealed that he had a delicate relationship with France. Now in Chad, Idriss Deby often complained about the French in a way that Kountché never would. Kountché was much more discreet. Now keep in mind that the French essentially kept Niger

afloat, not only by all the ways it did everywhere else, but by being the principal buyer of Nigerian uranium. And I later learned from a senior French official was one of the keys to the French relationship with Niger, in terms of Uranium, was that the certain terms of the agreements - to buy or whatever - were such that Nigerien uranium could be used for military purposes. In other words, if they bought uranium from Canada or the United States or Australia, there would be clauses in the sale that would require the uranium to be used for peaceful purposes, whereas the Nigerien uranium didn't have that. So the French would always want to keep the Nigerien uranium mining industry afloat. That said, from purely economic point of view, the uranium industry was in deep trouble. It was too expensive, and the boom times were clearly over by the time I got there.

Q: *Dick, can I ask how was the weather when you were there? You mentioned desertification. Was it a drought time?*

BOGOSIAN: Not really. There was a serious drought in the mid-'80s that was ending around the time we got there. The period we were there it was normal, which meant some rain. I can't remember that it was particularly excessive, but it wasn't drought conditions. The problem is the country, just geographically, is mainly desert, and there is a sort of desertification. So even under the best of circumstances, and even compared to other Sahelian countries, Niger is not well situated geographically.

So I had a good relationship with Kountché. He was a man that I frankly had great admiration for. He was a man of tremendous personal integrity. People thought his wife was a crook, but he himself was considered honest and so forth. He was dour. When he died, very few people shed any tears. There were rumors that he wasn't doing well. And then on December 31, 1986, typically he would receive the diplomatic corps, he would receive various groups of people. The DCM and I showed up at about five in the afternoon only to see Kountché carried out on a stretcher. And so throughout most of 1987 he was sick and out of the country, and then he died, I think, in November of that year. He had come back; we had one more meeting with him; and he was very unstable physically. So I think he had, they referred to it as a cyst on his brain. Whether it was a brain cancer tumor, I'm not sure what it was, but he effectively was out of commission from January 1, 1987, on.

He was replaced by Ali Seibou, who was a very popular soldier, a military man, much more garrulous, known to like drinking (in this Muslim country), and in a word more popular. And it was Ali Seibou who gave a little more momentum to what was a rather slow movement toward democratization. But that was mainly after I left.

We had one interesting thing happen. We had a couple of things happen that really were kind of tests one has to face as an ambassador, not huge crises, but particularly, I guess, when you're new, there is some concern that your authority

be respected. And what I found is very often this is a function of the personal relationships you develop. I said to the AID director when I got there, "I have a letter from the President that says I'm in charge," more or less. He said, "Yes, I know, and I have a letter from the AID director in Washington, who says I'm supposed to report to him." And I realized that no matter how loyal any of these people were to me, the other agency heads all had a requirement to report to their home agency, so one of the things I made an effort to do was to enlist their allegiance. And that mean usually supporting them against their home agency. In other words, the problems that arose in the field were not so much State versus AID but AID Washington versus the AID director or the Pentagon versus the defense attaché, and so what I was able to do as ambassador was to be their advocate with their own agency. And often that made the difference between their being treated badly and not being treated badly. So that was the way I could be sure of their allegiance.

But even so, there were times when it got a little tricky. For example, Ali Seibou was an old soldier. He liked being with soldiers. And he had a mess every Friday, or a happy hour or whatever they called it. We had a captain at that point who was our senior military person, although he himself was a junior military person but he was the head of our little office. And Seibou invited him to attend his weekly meeting, his weekly happy hour. And I said to the DCM, what do I do here? I'm the Ambassador, and he's going to see the president every week. And the DCM, who was Joe Saloom, later ambassador to Guinea, who had worked with me in the office of aviation - and he was my second DCM in Niamey - he said, "Well, do you want to give up the chance of having this regular contact with the president?" And we agreed that that probably was not a good idea, so the issue became setting down some ground rules, which I was confident the captain did observe, and in a word what it was was "Don't get beyond your brief of military affairs, and if you hear anything interesting let me know." The point is, on an organization chart it's not supposed to work that way, and I think there are ambassadors that would not have permitted this to happen, but I chose to let it happen and I don't think we had any problems.

Similarly, the AID director was in some ways the most important American in town because this was not a place where you had American companies. When I was in Kuwait, you could argue that the American manager of the Kuwait Oil Company was much more important than the ambassador. But in Niger there was no American company; there were no other activities; so the AID director probably had more money to hand out to people than anyone else around, and as a result, of course, he had some importance. And it was interesting the way this showed up. First of all, in terms of people, AID almost certainly had more children going to our school than any other element of the embassy, and therefore, it was AID, both through their students and through the money that they put into the school, that made that school possible. But it was a wonderful school, and it was one of the things that made the quality of life in Niamey what it was.

So there was something that came up, and I can't remember what it was, but the AID director was very upset, and he said if you don't do *X*, I'm going to pull out of the school. Now we had a generally good relationship, but he was playing hardball on that issue. And I'll be honest with you, I can't remember how we resolved it except he stayed with the school. But my point is that when you're an ambassador, even when you are nominally in charge, you have to work all the time at enlisting the loyalty of your team, and it is possible that there are times that it can be put under great strain.

Now there was another battle that came up, and the AID director and I were allies, but we lost the battle. When I got to Niamey, we had what was referred to as a Joint Administrative Office, and so the JAO, as it was called, handled administration for all AID and State, and needless to say, a lot of the resources came from AID because they comprised such a large proportion of the embassy. But the head of the office was a State officer, and a fairly senior officer, which is to say, someone who knew her way around Washington. Now the AID director had no problem with that, but AID Washington wanted to get out of these JAO's. They claimed that they were being cheated in places like Cairo and elsewhere. And we said that's stupid in Niamey. You know, we have one truck. Are you going to divide the truck? And the AID director and I tried very hard, and I wrote to Ron Spiers, who was our under secretary for management. I felt that Washington really let us down on that because they were unwilling to battle AID in any meaningful way. And I think it was too bad for all concerned because then what we had was two separate offices, neither of which was that strong. Because our office was smaller, we couldn't have it headed by a senior person. That's another example of the battles you win and the ones you don't.

Q: *Dick, let me stop this side of the tape.*

This is August 21, 1998, Part A or Tape number 4 with Richard Bogosian. Dick, thanks, we are still in Niger, and we have just left one of the AID projects.

BOGOSIAN: Well, actually, I think there were just a couple of other little anecdotes to mention about Niger. In some ways this was the least tumultuous of our different assignments, and as I pointed out, we had Peace Corps and AID and so forth, and a lot of our attention was to the community. We used to regularly visit Peace Corps volunteers in the field. We would attend their swearing-in ceremonies three or four times a year. I did try to learn a little bit of the Hausa language while I was there, and one time, when we were near Zinder, in the middle of the country, a Peace Corps volunteer took me to her village, and she said, "They're all excited about your coming." I greeted the group in Hausa and said a few words in Hausa. They were very excited. She said, "They don't really know what an ambassador is." And she said, "They don't really know where the United States is." I said, "Did you tell them that it's across the water?" She said, "They don't know what the water is." She said, "Their one question was is it near Mecca?" And so that was revealing, that these villagers in the interior of the

country probably had very little idea what the United States was all about. One of the people we saw in Zinder was the so-called Sultan of Zinder, and he lived in a mud house, probably 300 years old, bats flying around, with his four wives, who lived in equal apartments, to meet the Islamic requirement that they all be treated equally - sort of a touch of medieval life. They have these so-called *Griots*, people who spend the whole day simply singing the praises of the Sultan, and we saw them.

But two things to know. One is that in a place like Niamey, you obviously have your representational requirements, and we would invite a Nigerien over and we could seat 18 people at our table, and my wife would be at one end with the men who were the guests of honor, and their wives would be down at my end, according to protocol. They tended to be very pretty, very attractive, very well dressed, and *mute.* And I would try to engage them in conversation - you know, how many children do you have? One. Do you work? No or yes. And then I later learned, too late to do much about it, that to a Nigerien woman, you're not supposed to talk. That's not considered ladylike -

Q: *This was in French, Dick.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, in French. So at one point I said to my wife, "I'm not going to miss out on all the fun. We'll sit across from each other. At least that way I can talk to the men while these women sit there mute." Now when we went to Chad, right next door, we found quite the opposite, where the women were lively and outspoken and much more fun to be with.
My wife was very busy running the household, making sure that our grounds were kept up. We grew all kinds of food for ourselves. And she, as I said, mother-henned the Marines and the Peace Corps and so forth. One of the things that I tried to do there was get the Marines and the Peace Corps to interact a little more with each other, and it was not easy at first. I would tell the Marines and the Peace Corps that they were very similar to each other, and they would kind of look at me wondering what I meant. And I would say, "Each of you in your own way undertakes a challenge that most of the rest of us couldn't meet." And that would seem to spark something. But I've got to admit that one reason the Peace Corps and the Marines worked so well in Niamey was that an individual Marine named Amos Diaz, from Puerto Rico, understood what I was getting at, and he made a major effort to bring the Marines closer to the Peace Corps, and it worked. And he did things like wear some of the bright African what they call *panyas*, these fabrics. That was almost unthinkable for a Marine, and it was very interesting to see how one person could cross a kind of psychological boundary and maintain his credibility with his own group and bring the rest of them along with him. And just like having good people in the embassy proper, one marine like Amos Diaz did a lot to help us in our work there.

My wife organized a tennis tournament every year that turned out to be one of the social events of the year, and she took the money and used it for a local charity,

helping people who were disabled or helping to build cribs - not cribs, but little beds - for children in the hospital. And it turned out these things didn't exist, and it took a lot of work to get the local people to, in effect, let her help them. So that was kind of an all year event for her, and she got help from some of the other members of the embassy community.

I mentioned that our school was one of our more successful endeavors, and while we were there, the chairman of the school board, who was a fellow named Marshall Pittman, whose wife was a civil service employee on an excursion tour there as a budget and fiscal officer. He was chairman of the school board, and this event occurred on an evening when the people had come from outside of Niamey to look over the school to determine whether it should be accredited and certified - which in the end they did. And so Marshall wanted to appeal to them. He wanted to give them a good impression, so he put together in the common room of the school what was a fairly fancy dinner. In Niger almost everybody dressed casually all the time, but this was suit and tie and everything and tablecloths. And he arranged for a chicken dinner to be made, and there was salad and chicken and mashed potatoes and some other stuff. At the head table we got served first, and these beautiful golden brown half chickens. So there was lively conversation, and it was a rather pleasant evening, and I started cutting the chicken, and it wouldn't cut. So I had a little mashed potato and a little peas and carrots or whatever, and I tried again, and it wouldn't cut. I tried to break it, and it wouldn't break. And I watched as, one by one, everybody in that room could not penetrate the chickens. And at one point Marshall says to me, "I think everybody's enjoying themselves, don't you?" And I said, "Yes."

Q: *Was it guinea hen or something?*

BOGOSIAN: No, it was just local what we would call range fed. Anyway, they were a little tough. You've got to boil them first or something. So that was life in Niamey. At any given moment we were busy with this or that, but it was a relatively stable time for the country. We had good relations with Niger at that time. At any given moment we were wondering whether the military program would continue because of budget cuts and so forth; the same with AID; but it was a period during which I cannot recall any crisis. And at any given moment we were busy or we were grappling with one problem or another - as I say, the most significant development was the death of Kountché, which really ended an era for Niger, but in terms of my work on a day-to-day basis it had very little impact. There was some reporting to be done at that time, and there was some concern that there was a funeral and some events that people had to come to. But it was not a period of either tremendous new initiatives or tremendous changes, and as a restful, looking back, it was if not dull at least quiet.

Q: *It sounds delightful.*

BOGOSIAN: It does?

Q: *I've been to the country. I thought it was a delightful country. Dick, we're getting very near where you're going to go and switch gears abruptly and become director of monetary affairs for the State Department at an exciting time in monetary history, if I remember correctly, the years 1988 to 1990.*

BOGOSIAN: Well, Monetary Affairs was a change indeed. When I was leaving Niamey, my wife said to me, "What are the chances of another ambassadorial assignment." I said, "You know, they give one to a customer, and you really can't assume you're going to get anything more. The idea is to provide an opportunity for others as well." I inquired in Washington and was told that I was being considered for three or four posts, but in each case, for one reason or another, another person went. In one case there was an officer who had come up to the time you're allowed to stay in Washington, and they had to get him out of there. In another couple of case it was, frankly, an affirmative action thing. In the case of Chad, they put Bob Pugh in because Pugh had had military experience, and that was considered important at that time, so he went to Chad. Now I'm theoretically an economic officer, and around the time I was leaving Niamey, I had to fill out a so-called bid list, and I included an office in the department called the Office of Development Finance, to be director of that office, and the deputy assistant secretary in the Economics Bureau who was responsible for that was Bill Milam. And he called me on the phone. He said, "Do you want that or do you want monetary affairs?" And I said, "Well, you know, what's what." He said, "Well, Development Finance works mainly with the World Bank and AID, and Monetary Affairs works with the IMF and Treasury." Or as Joe Saloom said to me, "Do you want to wear a leisure suit or a pencil-stripe suit." I said, "Well, I've always wanted to wear a pencil-stripe suit." He said, "Then you want OMA." So I did that.
Milam had a little bit of a scheme in his mind where he had me assigned as director of ODF with the understanding that if a certain person that he wanted for OMA was not available, then he wanted me in OMA. And to make a long story short, ultimately, I was assigned as director of OMA.

Now OMA is one of those offices in the Department that traditionally has a very high reputation. Milam himself had headed that office at one time. It's probably the most prestigious office for economic officers, and the staff of OMA typically has people who have either done extremely well in the economic course or are much more developed in economics in terms of their economic training. I had a superb staff. My deputy when I got there was Melinda Kimball, who has gone on to other things. She's now an acting assistant secretary. And I had other people who were very good, so it was an excellent staff. I also had a terrific boss in Bill Milam, who knew these issues inside and out, and I mention that because, frankly, there was no way I could handle the level of economic analysis that that job required, but I was able to bring the management that they wanted, and they particularly wanted someone who had been an ambassador so that I could, in effect, trade on that status.

The job involved working closely with the Treasury Department, and the Treasury Department is an agency that is not always easy to work with. Melinda said you've got to think of it as the foreign ministry, meaning in effect almost like a foreign country. But because Milam had his own standing there, and because there were some good people who were not as hidebound as some of the people in Treasury, that problem was not as bad as it might have been. The other thing was simply the institutional arrangement. The main thing we did was Paris Club negotiations, and *ex officio*, either Milam or I would be in the chair in Paris for the U.S. delegation. And that meant that whether Treasury liked it or not, and that meant that in preparation for the meetings, one way or another, they had to come to us. So the combination of good staff, institutional arrangements, and Milam meant that some of the bureaucratic problems that might have existed were not as bad as they would have been otherwise.

The office was set up a little bit like the Office of Aviation in the sense that there were about five people, I think, working for me who had geographic responsibilities. This was at a time when Latin America in particular had a serious debt crisis, and as a result, a lot of what we did in Latin America was for people working on Latin America a very high-profile issue. There was tremendous inflation in countries like Argentina and Brazil, and there was a certain amount of tension between the Bureau of American Republic Affairs, which had its own economic office, and our office. That battle was carried out largely at the staff level, but it meant that I got involved in Latin American in a way that I would not normally, particularly with Bolivia and similarly with other countries that would go to the Paris Club.

The main work in OMA in those days had two dimensions to it. One was to go to Paris and to represent the United States at the Paris Club meetings. Typically a lot of the analytical work was done either by my staff or by Treasury or by the French what they called the Trésor, where the French technical people did the basic statistical work, and it was always done correctly, and it isn't as though we got into big battles over that. The French were, frankly, extremely good at what they did, which was running the Paris Club. The individual country issues would come up. We'd see people like Wisner, who by then was ambassador to Egypt, where typically there would be a situation which was reaching critical proportions and the countries didn't see how they could possibly adopt the IMF or World Bank structural adjustment programs, and we would agonize over what would happen. In that regard, someone like Melinda Kimball, who had served in the Arab World and who knew economics was just perfect at trying to work the issue. In fact, she went on to become country director for Egyptian affairs. And there was very interesting economic reporting coming out of Cairo. There was an ambassador who was following the issue closely. The Middle East Bureau was. In other words, there was a group of people who followed these issues, and to some extent, we were breaking new ground when we began to talk about certain forms of relief that at that point were not policy. I got into that to some extent.

Now as a manager, I would say probably more even than in the Office of Aviation, I managed - that is to say, I wasn't doing the analytical reports; I wasn't doing the papers; I was providing guidance to the staff and supporting them in whatever way was necessary and then handling other issues as well, so that I can't take credit for some of the things that were done. But this was also a period just before the collapse of the Soviet Union, when, for example, the Poles would come to us and say that they were serious about moving into a freer economy. And so there were many times we met with the Poles in particular, with a view to gauging how serious they were. By the same token, we had people who again could do a level of analysis that in this case was much better than the European Bureau, and yet the European Bureau, as you can imagine, was reluctant to give up any of its policy-making functions.

And the other thing, as I say, was going to Paris for the Paris Club, where the meetings were somewhat mechanical. Usually, by the time you went to the Paris Club, it was - at least the meetings I went to - almost foregone conclusion that at the end of the day you'd work out an agreement. But you did have to go through the steps, and so in that sense it's hard to say I remember the time we did such and such. For one thing, Milam took the more difficult cases, like Brazil. And at the top of my head I can't recall too many things that happened at that time that are truly memorable, but I can think of two that are probably worth mentioning. One of the things we did in the Paris Club was the French office that handled it was referred to as the Trésor, which was essentially a policy office within the Ministry of Finance. And the head of the office was a brilliant man who is now the head of the Banque de France. Jean-Claude Trichet is his name. He was a very personable man as well, and he would have these breakfasts. At that time, at least in the first couple of years, their office was in the Louvre, and you'd go into this dark building at about eight in the morning before it was open -

Q: *These people live well.*

BOGOSIAN: Well, they've changed. They're now in -

Q: *I bet they ate well.*

BOGOSIAN: They're now in Bercy, which they don't like. But anyway, he would have what he called a G-5 breakfast, and that was France, Germany, the UK, Japan, and the United States. And these were theoretically very confidential discussions of difficult issues that we couldn't get into in the larger Paris Club. And the one I think that's worth mentioning - I mean, at any given moment there was any country - Mexico, Argentina - where there was a real problem and the issue was what are we going to do about this? - but the one that I find most interesting was Iraq, because in those days - this was during a period of the Iraq-Iran War, and the United States, frankly, had fairly good relations with Iraq. We were selling them wheat. But the other interesting thing was the Iraqis were

paying for everything, so we didn't have a large Iraqi debt, but most of the other key Paris Club countries were selling a lot to Iraq on credit, and they were building up tremendous loan accounts. And the issue was what to do, because the Iraqis were adamant in not going to the IMF, and usually you can't get a Paris Club debt rescheduling agreement without an IMF agreement. And these European countries and Japan were seeing the loans getting bigger and bigger and bigger. They were getting worried. They were reluctant to make an issue out of it; they wanted that business. And had we had large loans, we would have had to have taken a position, but since they didn't owe us anything because they paid us, we said, well, we really have nothing to say on this issue - because along with everything else we also wanted to keep selling to Iraq, mainly food. And in light of what's happened since, that's taken on sort of an interesting appearance now.

The other was Russia. Now while I was doing the Paris Club, the Soviet Union still existed, but even they had come to recognize that things were changing and that they also had to change, and toward the end of my assignment, for the first time, the Paris Club met informally with the Soviet delegation where they told us that they had come to realize that they just couldn't continue to do business as they had done. And my recollection is they also said that they didn't know quite how to get into the new world, and this was new to them. And that was more a case of having an opportunity to witness what was one of the turning points in history.

Q: *That's very interesting, a very interesting time.*

BOGOSIAN: Indeed, as you know, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the changes in Eastern Europe, there has been this discussion of why didn't the intelligence community know what was going on? And I was in a number of meetings in this period of '88 to '90 where there was discussion. I mean, we would say things like, "The Poles are coming to us and telling us that they're changing." And my recollection is - and I can't profess to have had exposure to all the intelligence, but my impression is that the intelligence community as a whole was reluctant to go on record as predicting the kind of changes that happened. I don't know if that's because -

Q: *The change in Russia or the changes in Poland and elsewhere?*

BOGOSIAN: Both. Of course, Eastern Europe was changing faster. I mean at that point -

Q: *Possibly. It's possible. I mean, it's a digression, but I'm not sure that the intelligence community was terribly relevant there. The community of American and European experts on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was so profound at that time that it was in many ways much more important than the intelligence community.*

BOGOSIAN: Well, to put it another way, in the meetings I attended, which was my exposure to this issue, you may by right that the intelligence community was a day late and a dollar short, and as a result was irrelevant because, irrespective of which community you're talking about, there were situations on the ground that were happening.

Q: *That's right. The full communities were reluctant to foresee the collapse of the Soviet system, which to many people was viewed as self-sustaining. It sustained itself badly for 70 years.*

BOGOSIAN: Again, though, again, in terms of what I was doing in those days, you had countries like Poland and Hungary, for example, that had reached a point where there was enough trade and enough interaction with the West that such prosaic issues as debt were emerging. I mean, Poland was a major holder of Western debt, and if I'm not mistaken, mainly official debt, so that we, as a matter of policy, had to grapple, what do you do with these countries? And the other thing was that, whatever we knew or didn't know, it was clear that it was part of a large phenomenon that was underway. So I would say that one of the values to me of the assignment... I've considered myself to have been lucky to have had three assignments: one in INR between '69 and '71, one in Aviation, and the one in Monetary Affairs. As someone who has spent most of his career in the Middle East and Africa, these assignments gave me a chance to see events on a much broader world-wide canvas, and whether it was the debt crisis in Latin America or what was going on in Eastern Europe, these were things that I normally wouldn't have had any exposure to, and so I considered myself lucky.
The one other thing I've got to mention about the assignment in Monetary Affairs was that I had a terrific staff, I had a good boss - Al Larsen was the senior deputy, fine man - but the assistant secretary was Gene McAllister, who was one of the worst people I've ever worked with. And the reason I mention that is that, on the one hand, my staff despised him. Melinda would come back - he liked her - and she'd say, "I hate that man." And one day I said to the staff, "We need to be loyal," and they said, "But if we can't complain to you, who can we complain to?" As a result, it was one of the things we had to deal with, whether it was Milam or Melinda or my staff, they would just be emotionally exhausted because of the way McAllister ran things. He was utterly ineffectual; he had no respect around town; and so on those occasions when we were looking for support at that level, it was nonexistent. But the other reason I mention that is that around the time I was being asked to go to Chad, Milam was in line to become ambassador to Bangladesh, and Joe Saloom, who then was concluding his assignment in Niamey, said, "You take Milam's place, I'll take your place, and we'll all be happy." And indeed, they wanted me to take Milam's place, and I had wanted to be a deputy assistant secretary - I would have loved that job because it also dealt with development finance and investments and intellectual property - it was a big job. But the Chad job became available, and part of it was Claire's desire to go overseas again and so forth, but also at that point, I decided I just really wanted to get away from McAllister. And that's the only time I can think of in my Foreign

Service career that I had a boss who was so incompatible that I just wanted to break away.

Q: *Is he still doing anything in government?*

BOGOSIAN: I have no idea. I've lost contact with him. But in that sense, the Chad thing, sad to say, it's because -

Q: *If you could just introduce for a minute, tell us a little about Bob Pugh.*

BOGOSIAN: Well, what happened there, of course, was that the Libyans blew up a plane that his wife was on, and he told me - he was in Washington, and I had just heard about it - and he told me that he didn't want to go back under those circumstances. Pugh was indeed a military person at one point, and I don't know all the details. He was our DCM in Beirut at a time of terrible trouble there. I think maybe when the embassy was bombed he was our DCM. So he had handled some rough times, and his wife was deeply loved for what she had done in Beirut, but when she was killed and he decided he didn't want to stay there any longer, I said to myself I wonder if maybe Chad still might be a possibility. And I went to my office and the phone rang, and they asked if I'd be interested in going to Chad. And I called my wife, and she said, "Fine, let's do it." So in that regard, given that we had decided that we would like another ambassadorial assignment, when Chad was offered, both the appeal of going out and the sort of push of getting out of EB was very strong. And one result was that the EB assignment, the OMA assignment, was one of the shortest I had, because I think I broke off from that office around spring sometime to get ready to go to Chad, and as a result I don't think it was two full years.

Q: *What time did you go to Chad?*

BOGOSIAN: We went to Chad in the summer of 1990 and stayed three years. I don't know how you want to do this. That's a fairly extensive issue.

Q: I think it's probably-

BOGOSIAN: Time to break.

Q: *Structurally I think it is, don't you? We're going to break off here. We will resume another time. Thank you.*

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Thursday, October 8. And this is an interview with Dick Bogosian. Dick, the last time, we covered the sad circumstances that led Bob Pugh to leave Chad. That was the death of his wife. And then we covered the request for you to go to Chad, and basically where we are in the cycle right now is that you are about to arrive

in Chad to serve as the American ambassador, and the year is 1990.

BOGOSIAN: There are a couple of things to say about Chad as a sort of preliminary. First of all, on a personal basis, we - that is to say, my wife and I - sort of assumed it was going to be like Niamey, like Niger. The two countries are next to each other. They're both Sahelian. They're both Francophone, both poor, and so forth. But in fact, Chad and the Chad assignment turned out to be very different. It ended up being just about our favorite assignment. As we go on I'll mention the things that made it different. The other things was, of course, our involvement in Chad and what we had been doing in Chad prior to my arrival. In the late 1970s there was a terrible civil war in Chad, something like 11 different militias fighting each other, and this had given the Qadhafi régime an opportunity to pursue what may be regarded as its irredentist designs on Chad. To jump forward, just around the time I left Chad in 1993, the two countries had gone to the international Court of Justice, where ultimately the court found in Chad's favor regarding something called the Aozou Strip, which was a northern part of the country claimed by Libya. So in other words, somewhere between the mid '70s and the mid '90s, Libya claimed virtually all of Chad. At one time they bombed N'Djamena. There was fighting in the north of the country. And yet at the end of this 20-year period the countries had resolved their differences in a way that nobody had every thought possible.

I got to Chad, if you will, at the end of that period, but prior to my arrival the United States had determined that it was important - this was during the Reagan Administration - almost literally to draw a line in the sand and say to Qadhafi: no more. My sense is (although I wasn't involved in that at the time, although having served in Niger and having served in the Sudan, where, if I remember correctly, we talked about Qadhafi attempting to overthrow Nimeiri) I was well aware of the danger that Qadhafi posed to his neighbors, but I had not been involved in the Chadian thing. What I knew was that the United States had played a leading role in, if you will, blunting the Libyan advance. I was not privy to everything that had happened in Chad in this context. I also knew - let's say it was "common knowledge," quote-unquote - that the Reagan Administration had seen Qadhafi as one of those demonic leaders who needed to be stopped and, if you will, the corollary of that was that Habre, as the leader of Chad, was one of the heroes.

And one of the things that made Habre different was his courage, his willingness to stand up and fight, in an environment, particularly in the 1970s, when so many of the Third World leaders were either buffoons, like Idi Amin or Bokassa in the Central African Republic, or would just try to squirm out from under any commitment. Habre stood up and fought, and in fact, he was spectacularly successful in defeating Qadhafi and the Libyans.

As a result of all that had gone on before, there were two or three things that, if you will, were in place by the time I got to Chad. One was an important French military presence, what they called the Epervier Force, which meant, I think,

'nighthawk' or some kind of hawk, I forget the exact translation [*épervier*='sparrow hawk']. It was their name for it. It was about 1,000 French troops, including some aircraft, that were based in Chad. And that, of course, on the one hand, if you will, anchored the French connection even more than in other Francophone countries and, in another sense, meant that if things really got tough in Chad, the French military were there, and that made a very big difference. Secondly, by the 1980s, we were very much involved with Chad. We had an important AID program. We had economic support funds, which is one of the measures of political relationship, substantial amounts of money. We had provided military assistance and a close political relationship. Prior to my arrival, Habre had visited the United States and had had a state visit and so forth. The third thing, though, was that by the time I got there, first of all the country was more or less at peace - it had been at peace for close to 10 years by then - but the rebuilding effort after the civil war was still underway. There were still parts of N'Djamena that were damaged, and there were still rebel groups here and there of one type or another. In that sense, it was not truly stable. But two things had happened. To my surprise - mind you, this is the Bush Administration - when I started getting briefed on Chad, I was told that the Bush Administration wanted to somehow separated itself from Reagan in Chad. In short, I think the Bush Administration had concluded, without actually making a big point about it, that the battle had been won and it was time to turn our attention to other matters.

Now in 1990, during the time I was getting ready to go there, the Bush actions regarding Iraq and Somalia had not yet taken place. That was later in 1990 and 1992. Perhaps there were rumblings in the Middle East that I was unaware of, but certainly while I was doing the Paris Club, which was really at the time when I was told to go, we frankly had what we thought were very good relations with Iraq, and in fact, in the Paris Club, because we were not a creditor (because the Iraqis paid their bills to us), we were not forced to agonize over Iraqi debt as most of the other key Paris Club countries did, and we were able to avoid joining that issue and, at the same time, maintain food sales, among other things. So the crisis in the Persian Gulf and the crisis in Somalia came while I was in Chad. But in any event, the idea of maintaining the kind of posture that was true under Reagan was changing, and I don't think that was so much that we were stopping aid programs - although some of the programs, like ESF, were beginning to come to an end - rather, the idea of lionizing Habre and making him into a hero began to diminish. Frankly, I don't know quite what the reasoning was, but I got the feeling, based on the way I was told, that it was more of a desire by the Bush Administration to find ways to distinguish itself from Reagan and Chad was one of the places where that was being done.

But the other problem was that by 1990 it was increasingly impossible to ignore Habre's human rights record. There were allegations of thousands of people in unspeakable conditions in jail, literally across the street from the AID mission - which was later proven to be true - and we were less and less comfortable dealing with them. Now in the real world, those things don't just begin and end. There

were people who still either had a stake in Habre's success or continued to admire him for one reason or another. There was, if you will, a certain momentum to our relationship. But at the same time, different groups, particularly Amnesty International, were very upset about this. They were beginning to complain about the administration not being willing to take up human rights with Habre. And as you recall, in the early 1990s in the West generally, there was a growing feeling that democracy and governance were places that deserved our attention. What that means is that as I was getting ready to go to Chad, on the one hand I was looking forward to the positive environment, to having a mission that had several programs underway, but I also knew that one way or the other I had to tackle the human rights issue.

What I did was I made it a point to visit Amnesty International to engage them in dialogue, and I did that throughout the three years I was there. Also in my swearing in speech and when I presented my credentials, when I did an interview for the Voice of America, I mentioned the fact that human rights were among the things we cared about. The idea was to begin to let Habre know that I was not going to avoid the human rights issue. Now that said, I wasn't exactly sure how to do this and at the same time establish a workable positive relationship with him.

In any case, we arrived in Chad in July. We were 12 hours late. The embassy staff was there to meet us, my wife and I and our dog; and we were able to get going fairly quickly. We received a warm reception by the Chadians in the embassy community.

Q: *Dick, may I just ask, when you're 12 hours late arriving in Chad, aren't the arrivals usually in the evening?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, that was the reason. In fact, we arrived at 2 a.m.

Q: *That's what I was getting at.*

BOGOSIAN: Let's put it this way: we weren't supposed to arrive at 2 a.m. In any event, I presented my credentials to Habre within a week - I forget the exact amount of time - and, in fact, that turned out to be my only meeting with him. And in that meeting I mentioned human rights, which he sort of didn't have much to say about. He, in turn, raised the issue of some C-130 planes that evidently we were supposed to provide - I forget the details. He was a person of some presence, not a particularly large man, but someone who, like Kountché in Niger, you know you were with someone who was special. He had a kind of charisma in that sense of the term. That was in July. Between then and the time he was overthrown, as I say, I had no other meetings with him, but I did meet often with some of his key people. I'm sorry to say I can't remember their names, but he had somebody who was secretary-general, in effect, his chief-of-staff. And I did engage him on the human rights issues, and I made the point that it was very important for them to at least acknowledge that they had problems. And he showed me a telex from

Amnesty International Germany in which several individuals were identified as being in prison. And I said, well, answer it, and if some of them are in prison, admit it, and if not.. I mention this because he seemed to be willing to work with me, and he seemed to want to at least begin to deal with that issue. And in that sense, I had felt that I was beginning to make some progress, although I recognize that it was going to be a long time before we really could move on that, and I was also, frankly, uncertain of what levers Habre would attempt to use to undercut me.

The whole thing became moot fairly quickly. The next part of the story is, at one and the same time, the turning point of my three years in Chad and one of the most exciting and interesting periods of my whole Foreign Service career. By the early 1990s, there was a group based in western Sudan led by Idriss Deby. They were mainly Zaghawa tribesmen from the far east of Chad. Deby had been one of the two or three military figures who helped push the Libyans out. Again, I'm sorry I forget some of the names, but there were two or three Zaghawa military officers who were the real leaders on the ground in the military campaign. They were fearless; they were effective. One of them had died by then. But there was a falling out. Somebody said what it was all about was division of the spoils, and Habre was a Gorane from Tibesti, and Deby was a Zaghawa from the northeast. They were both from the north. They were similar, but they were somewhat different, and in any event, Deby had taken up arms against Habre. The previous year there was a real scare - that is, the year before I got there. Deby had crossed into Chad, and Habre had gone east and rallied the troops, and they pushed Deby out again. On Veterans' Day, 1990, the secretary-general -

Q: *Which was October?*

BOGOSIAN: Veterans' Day - November 11, 1990. I was asked to come to the Presidency, as was the French ambassador and maybe one or two others. We met separately. And what we were told was that Deby's forces had crossed into Chad. Now Deby was thought to be supported by the Libyans, so clearly our inclination was to support Habre, our friend, against this Libyan-backed person. For the next couple of weeks, there was fighting in eastern Chad, in Biltine Province particularly. And one by one, the government tended to lose these battles. It wasn't clear what was going to happen, because the assumption was that we'd been through this before, and at one point the national army would prevail. Habre went to the east, but instead of rallying his troops, he was nearly caught by Deby, and he literally had to run out of there to save his skin. In some ways that was clearly the beginning of the end. We began to learn that among his most important troops, they either had been diminished through losses of one kind or another - by then they had been fighting a lot, and between those Zaghawa who had gone over to Deby and others who were lost in the fighting, his best troops were becoming weakened, and we began to learn that the other troops were losing any appetite for fighting - we were beginning to realize that the situation was not going well. Now, this is essentially through the month of November of 1990, and in a sense, we were doing two things, other than just reporting to Washington how we thought

things were going. We were talking mainly to the French to see if they continued to support Habre, and their ambassador, who had previously been consul general in San Francisco and who had been very warm and friendly to me upon my arrival, assured me that France backed Habre. Now it's generally well known that the French relationship with Habre was never as comfortable as ours. There was a sense that they resented how close we were to Habre. Another thing to keep in mind is that at this time an international consortium, led by Exxon, that included Chevron, had discovered oil. They were exploring for oil, and it was beginning to look pretty interesting, and there was a notion that the French resented that. Now, in fact, the French had had many opportunities to get in on the oil exploration, and they had turned it down; nevertheless, there was a popular perception that somehow part of the American relationship with Habre translated into oil concessions. And so there was a feeling that we had this special relationship with Habre, and in a zero-sum game notion, that meant that the French connection... Now it goes beyond that. There was a famous incident many years earlier where Habre, when he was a rebel in the bush, murdered some French person - I think it was a woman, Madame... I forget her name now, but this was one of those incidents that the French had not forgotten. In short, notwithstanding the presence of French troops and all the rest, that relationship was quite complicated. And it was obviously essential to know where the French stood, and we were told that they backed Habre.

Q: *May I just ask, Richard, in your opinion, when the ambassador told you that, was that also his belief?*
BOGOSIAN: I won't answer that right now.

Q: *Okay.*

BOGOSIAN: One of the things we noticed was that Radio France Internationale seemed to have awfully good information about where Deby was and what he was doing, and normally you wouldn't expect an international radio to have a correspondent in Biltine with this ragtag rebel group. The fact is that I remained convinced that the French aided and abetted Deby's arrival in Chad, and all I can say is some years later in Paris, when I saw that ambassador, he turned his face away and didn't talk to me.

Q: *In awkwardness.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes. It's conceivable, it wouldn't surprise me, that he was not told that he could have plausible deniability, but on balance I think he probably knew.

Q: *It's an important question.*

BOGOSIAN: Well, it is a question. I'm not sure there's an answer. I think the government of France, as a government, however, decided it was time to throw in their support for Deby, and perhaps to blunt the Libyan connection, I don't know.

The interesting thing was when he finally did take over, they immediately had planes ready to evacuate us, and they put us in touch with Deby immediately - so it was clear that they had a relationship. Deby, of course, had studied in France and had given blood to a French soldier. Just as there was a complex relationship with Habre, there was a set of relationships with Deby that made it more than just another rebel coming to power.

Q: *Could you spell Idriss Deby for us, please?*

BOGOSIAN: Idriss is spelled I-d-r-i-s-s, and Deby is D-e-b-y. Now, as I say, it was beginning to look rather bad for Habre, and I was new in Chad, so I didn't understand the implications of every single thing that happened. The fighting was limited to a rather small part of far eastern Chad on the Sudanese border, 600-700 miles away. And it was clear that Habre was in trouble. We had intelligence, and just watching these events on a day-to-day basis made it clear. But what was not clear to me, what I was not able to understand until very late in the day, was how bad it was. And what happened was we were getting concerned, and by late November it was bad enough so that we had authority to evacuate the post. We had what was called permission for an authorized departure. What that meant was everybody didn't have to leave, but those who wanted to or those who were not needed could go, as distinct from an ordered departure, where everybody had to go.

And of course we kept in touch with the American community, and on November 30th we had a meeting at about 5 o'clock; and I conveyed the best information and analysis we had, which was that we thought the end was coming, but we thought we still had a few more days. About 9 o'clock, the defense attaché came and said to me that he was told by an important contact that Deby had reached Om Hadjer, which is about three or four hundred miles from N'Djamena. And the defense attaché's contact, who was a high government official, said, "It's over." In other words, in the history of Chad, the rebellion always begins in the east, and by the time they're as far as Om Hadjer it's over.

Q: *I see.*

BOGOSIAN: He understood that, and I did, of course, after the events. Now, what happened then was that the Goranes, which is Habre's people, understood it was over, and they started to leave town, and what they did was they trashed the city. They unlocked the jails; there was shooting all night; there were stolen vehicles. Our house had a common wall with the local Toyota place, where there were dogs to protect it. And during the evening we heard them shoot the dogs. We heard them break into the cars to leave. It was sheer pandemonium. Now for safety reasons, I didn't leave the compound, but we were told that the streets were white with documents that had been poured out of files. As I say, the jails were emptied and so forth, and of course, what that meant was that the Habre régime, which had been in power about 10 years and our good friend and everything,

ended.

Now Washington literally had military planes with military assistance on the tarmacs ready to fly, and we had to tell them don't bother, it's too late.

Q: *Dick, why was it too late?*

BOGOSIAN: He was overthrown.

Q: *He was overthrown.*

BOGOSIAN: When it finally happened, it happened very quickly.

Q: *Planes ready to fly with Habre, you mean.*

BOGOSIAN: No, no. U.S. cargo planes with military assistance ready to come to help save it, but they literally wouldn't have gotten there in time.

Q: *Can you share a little more on that? What would the planes have done? Brought in equipment?*

BOGOSIAN: Yes. I failed to say that over the preceding weeks they urged us to provide them with all different kinds of military equipment and that the political decision in Washington was that this guy was worth saving. Now in one sense, from the day Deby crossed until he entered Chad was about three weeks, and therefore, theoretically, we might have done something.

I should say that many of us in the embassy were new and therefore we simply hadn't judged that he would collapse so quickly. Part of that was based on our assessment that the French would support him, which in turn was based on the ambassador's assurances. They other thing was that until the very end his troops were way off in the eastern edge of the country. They really hadn't penetrated. But when it finally happened, it happened very fast. Now I told you that I briefed the American community on our best information. After this happened there were two things we learned. One was that the wife of the French defense attaché called my wife, and she seemed very nervous and ill-at-ease and wanted to know if we were all right. And in retrospect we think they knew what was going to happen and, in effect, she was almost trying to signal to us to make sure we were protected. But the other things was there was an AID contractor, who was Senegalese, who happened to be in town, and he attended our town meeting and didn't say anything. And later he told people that he had heard Goranes in town saying that they were leaving. And we said, well, why didn't he say something, and he said, "Well, of course, I couldn't contradict the American ambassador. That would be rude."

Q: *Dick, one moment. Could you spell Gorane for us?*

BOGOSIAN: G-o-r-a-n-e. It's a tribal group in Chad. And that was Habre's tribe.

Q: *Dick, you're very candid about this. Was this a difficult time professionally?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, yes and no. It was difficult, obviously, in understanding what to do. It was, on the one hand, extremely exciting, just in the sense that your adrenaline was rushing. When it happened, of course, we were up all night. There were a couple of things to note. One is that the staff was simply superb. Everybody worked their heads off. Everybody did extremely good work. The whole unit just simply came together and functioned as smoothly as one would have wanted. We normally would have had two communicators, but we only had one. The other fellow had not come yet to begin his assignment, and so our one communicator, a fellow named McInturff, who was also with me in Somalia, we didn't even go on minimize, because he just worked all the time. The same with the defense attaché, the regional security officer, all the other people in the embassy. The French, in fact, did have airplanes ready, and the next day about 100 people left, but those who remained stayed on the compound. My wife and one or two ladies that were left fed them every day. About 70 people would eat in the residence.

Q: *Who were these 70 people Dick?*

BOGOSIAN: Those Americans who somehow were left.

Q: *Official Americans?*

BOGOSIAN: Official and AID types and Peace Corps volunteers.

Q: *Regular American community as well?*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, the community. Now maybe my number is inflated, although I thought that was the number. Maybe it was more like 30 or 40. But certainly in those initial days people were sleeping in the residence and so forth. As you know, at a time like that, particularly in hardship posts, people come together, and in one sense there's incredible bonding, incredible mutual loyalty, and it's very exciting.

Now the first part of this was the evening of November 30-December 1, when the Goranes left and Habre was overthrown. And of course, the question was was this just going to degenerate into anarchy? And the short answer was no. The first 24 hours were chaotic and anarchic, and we were on the phone to Washington and everything, but over the next day or so things calmed down. Now I did not leave the compound because of security reasons. Certainly the situation was extremely delicately balanced. But for example, at least for those couple of days, there was enough food to go around, and things quieted down enough to just conduct

normal - well, not to conduct normal business, but at least to run the embassy and be in touch with Washington.

The next question was Deby. When was he going to come to town? What were we going to do?

Q: *Before we get there, can we go back? You mentioned that U.S. aircraft were poised to move and deliver supplies, and you also said that the U.S. had concluded that Habre was worth saving. Was this one of these rather agonized, slow decisions that could have been taken much earlier?*

BOGOSIAN: I wouldn't put it that way, first of all, in one sense, because Deby attacked on Veterans' Day. Conceivably, if we had quickly concluded that the end was in sight, maybe we could have done something. But once it looked like Habre really was on the ropes, I think the U.S. government moved pretty fast. It's just that once he did begin to go, he went very fast. I'm not totally aware of what debate took place in Washington, but my recollection is there wasn't much of a debate. He still had that kind of standing in Washington.

Q: *Before we leave Habre, could you describe a little, in Washington, how the debate was going? I vaguely remember that there were people very critical of Habre at that time on human rights violations.*

BOGOSIAN: Indeed.

Q: *Can you describe how different parts of the government worked and thought on this subject?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, I think it would be better if I can go a little further, because that will help to answer your question, I think.

Q: *Fine.*

BOGOSIAN: What I can say is that whatever discussion and debate took place, the bottom line is that he was worth saving. To partially answer your question, once he left, there was not much thinking about what do we do with him now? In that sense, you can either say we were cynical or pragmatic. Once it was over, it was over. And this is what I was getting to.

Habre left on the first of December. I saw Deby, if I remember correctly, on the 3rd. In effect, what happened was - and I think this must have been worked out by the French, because you'll notice there was no battle for N'Djamena, and what I didn't tell you was that as the situation was unraveling, some of the people who had been through this before in Chad, some of our locals and other employees, were very worried about what would happen if there was a battle for N'Djamena. And I remember saying to a woman, it's possible they'll work out a deal to save

the capital, and she said it never happened before. But in fact, that is what happened.

Q: *Save it from what?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, a battle in the city.

Q: *Oh, a battle in the city.*

BOGOSIAN: Again, this is one reason why I think the French had a role to play, because what I think happened was somehow or other, around the 30th of November, the Habre people understood that they had lost the support of the French and they could not maintain their position any longer, and they concluded that what they should do was steal everything they could, all the money in the banks, all the money in the treasury and just get out. And that's what they did. And they went into Cameroon and wherever they ended up. I should note that eventually many of them returned, and Habre went into exile in Senegal.

Deby, once he started across the country, he could move as fast as the wheels on his vehicles could turn, and so he got to the outskirts of N'Djamena on the 2nd. Maybe I saw him on the 4th. I just can't remember, but whatever it was, at one point he entered N'Djamena triumphantly, but no bullets were fired. He simply came and took over. Now there are a couple of things that affected the atmosphere. We had persuaded ourselves that he was effectively an ally of the Libyans, and therefore there were questions about what his attitude would be towards the United States. In addition, these were people that had been in the desert. They were rebels, and we literally didn't know what we were going to be dealing with. Fairly early on, the French let it be known that they could arrange for me to see him, and so I saw him - I thought it was the 3rd but it may have been the 4th of December, but it was soon after he arrived, not immediately, but soon after he arrived - and just to show how things had changed, we were fortunate in having a fellow in the AID mission who was a native Arabic speaker, Sami Zoghbi, because you couldn't get anywhere talking French. One had to speak Arabic to get through the switchboards and whatever.

Q: Was that because of lack of language skills or because someone didn't want to be speaking French who could speak it?

BOGOSIAN: These people didn't speak French. They were from Sudan. Now I can tell you an anecdote that occurred a year or so later when I was crossing in front of the Presidential Palace and this man aimed his gun at me, and he had no notion of what the American flag was flying on the car or anything, and I suspected he couldn't speak French - these people were referred to as Sudanese by the Chadians because the Zaghawa tribe straddles Sudan and Chad - and I said to him in Arabic, "I'm the American ambassador." And he said in English, "Oh,

alright then, go ahead."

Q: *That's wonderful.*

BOGOSIAN: Many Chadians speak Arabic. It's essentially a second language, along with French. But there was a soccer match shortly after Deby took over between Sudan and Chad, and the word was there were more people standing up for the Sudan national anthem than the Chadians'. And indeed, to this day, I'm sure there are many Chadians who resent the Zaghawa as essentially foreigners.

In any event, Sami Zoghbi helped set up a meeting for me with Deby, and my recollection is that it was at their military headquarters, and the only thing I can say is that the atmosphere was electric, everything from boy soldiers to military vehicles covered with dust - this kind of Arabic quality to it all.

Q: *We have about five minutes left.*

BOGOSIAN: So we entered. The Libyan ambassador, who was there at the time also trying to have a meeting, looked at me - after all, we had no contact with the Libyans, and their protégé, or so we thought, had arrived - and he didn't know what to say, and he says in French, "*Mes respects, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur*." My respects, Mr. Ambassador. Anyway, so I had my first meeting with Deby, and it turned out he was slightly built, as many of those people are, wiry - which is to say I was much bigger than he. He had sneakers on and military clothes. He had two other people with him.

There was a kind of "what do we do now?" atmosphere. So we exchanged greetings, and it was clear that he wanted to be civil and signal to us that he was prepared to work with the Americans. And I basically asked him two or three questions. I said, "My top priority is the safety of the American community, and I want to know whether I have your support." And he said, "Yes." And I said, "My second question is do you affirm Chad's international commitments?" He said yes. Now the last few days we've learned that Chad has sent troops to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and he claims that under their mutual assistance pact, which Habre and Mobutu negotiated, they still have to come to DROG's [Democratic Republic of Congo) aid, even though times have changed. So you can blame me for getting them to assume Chad's-

Q: *He sent troops to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, now in 1998.

Q: *And what does that have to do with Mobutu?*

BOGOSIAN: Because under the Mobutu régime, Mobutu and Habre were very close, and they signed a mutual defense treaty - and, indeed, Zaire had sent troops

to help Chad when they were fighting Libya.

Q: *Right.*

BOGOSIAN: So now, their successors, Deby and Kabila, each of whom respectively despise Habre and Mobutu, are citing the mutual defense treaty.

Q: *Did he send troops to Zaire or to Congo Brazzaville?*

BOGOSIAN: No, Deby, now today, has his troops in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - Kinshasa. Zaire doesn't exist any more.

Q: *We're back in -*

BOGOSIAN: - in 1998. Back then -

Q: *- he went into Zaire. Okay.*

BOGOSIAN: No, no, no. Mobutu sent Zairean troops to Chad. That was in 1980 or thereabouts. Now in 1998-

Q: *Okay, thank you. You may want to review a transcript of this when it comes back. Let's break for just a moment.*

Dick, you were meeting for the first time with Deby, and we were getting to the third question that you asked him.

BOGOSIAN: Now I think it was the third. Whether there was a fourth or not, I don't know, but there was another matter that was of great, great importance and urgency to us, and this also requires a little background.

I mentioned that in the Reagan era, in the 1980s, there was this major effort to thwart Libya and that Chad was one of the places where that effort was made and was thought to be successful. Somehow, and I'm not able to get into too many details, but there was in Chad at that time a group of Libyans who opposed Qadhafi, and they were, if you will, a military unit. I think they were called the Libyan Salvation Army or something like that. They were supported by a number of countries, including Iraq under Saddam Hussein. I never actually met any of those people. I frankly chose not to meet any of them, but they were there.

Once it was clear that Habre was leaving, our fear was that if Deby, in fact, was pursuing a Libyan agenda, as we thought he might, then he may attempt to move against this group, and in turn, if they feared that was what would happen and they had enough military hardware, it could be very bloody. So the question was

what do we do? And among the things that I had to take up with Deby was that issue. And in effect, the first thing was to get out in the open that they were there, that we felt we could be helpful in getting them out of Chad, but that would mean he needed to give us the time to do it, and that we felt it was very important to avoid a bloodbath in the capital, and we feared that if Deby's forces moved, that the other group would fight, because they had nowhere to go. So I raised that with him, and his answer, in so many words, was, "We agree. There should not be a bloodbath, and we want to avoid a bloodbath, and therefore go ahead and find a way to take care of this problem."

So then the question was how to do it. And I worked with my staff, including the military attaché, and with the French. Deby said they had to be disarmed, so the question was to disarm them, and how do you do that and also have security? And in effect what happened was we agreed to get them out of there. The French agreed to provide what amounted to perimeter security. And our defense attaché, either foolishly or courageously, depending on how you think, one by one disarmed this whole group.

Q: *Amazing.*

BOGOSIAN: It is amazing. He was a very experienced attaché. He had served in many countries. He spoke French. And he just simply did it.

Q: *Were he based only in Chad?*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, that was his... I mean, he had been elsewhere, but that-

Q: *He sounds like a hotshot.*

BOGOSIAN: No, he was a very cool... He wasn't a hotshot.

Q: *I meant that in a good way.*

BOGOSIAN: He was an effective person on that particular matter. In fact, I will tell you - this isn't him so much, but the evening that Habre and his people were leaving, some of Habre's soldiers went to the defense attaché's house with a view of looting it, and the Chadian guard pulled out a knife and said, "You can kill me, but I'll take at least one of you down with me." And they went away. That was the kind of atmosphere that was going on that night. And the thing you need to know is throughout all this we were in constant contact with Washington, and in fact, this exercise, to get rid of these people, the climax of it came a week after Deby took over. So Friday, December 1, I was up all night, and Friday, December 7th or 8th or whatever it was.

So there are a couple of questions. One was logistic, and somehow or other the U.S. government managed to get some C-141s. Now the thing is, what you need

to know is, because it was at the airport, this was all in the public eye, and it was reported in the press. The Libyan ambassador was watching the whole thing. And Jeff Davidow, our principal deputy assistant secretary, and Hank Cohen, the assistant secretary, were sort of at the other end of the phone line; and the first evening they said that Nigeria would accept a planeload of these people. So we sent them to Nigeria. Davidow called me. He said, "I want you to know that the Nigerians won't take any more of these people. Don't worry, we'll work out something." And 24 hours later, or whatever it was, he said, "All right, they're going to go to Zaire. Mobutu has agreed to take them." But then the idea was, by then the tension had reached such levels that we were told they just all had to get out. Now I chose not to be at the airport, but I gather that two planeloadfuls were put on one plane. They either stood up or I don't know what they did, but there were heroic efforts to get them out of there.

One of the things that happened was that, strictly speaking, prisoners of war, and the one sort of group that had wanted contact with them was the Red Cross. We had worked out an arrangement whereby the idea was that the Red Cross would interview them once they got out of town, that it was too dangerous to do that in N'Djamena - it would slow the process down. I thought we had this all worked out with the International Committee for the Red Cross in Geneva and with the French and everyone else, but at the eleventh hour the Red Cross representative said this violated every rule of the Red Cross, and in a word, we simply did it. To be honest with you, I was not that knowledgeable of the rules, and I just felt we had to get them out. We really were worried what would -

Q: *What was the Red Cross's concern?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, they felt - and I gather this is the case - that you don't just pick up a prisoner of war and move him. At a minimum, they should have a right to interview him and make sure that that person was willing to go and that they weren't just being dragooned. You could argue that in fact that's what we did. Now I will say, that once they were in Zaire, they were all interviewed, and in fact, some of them ultimately went back to Libya. They actually ended up in Kenya for a while as well. The thing that drove us was our conclusion, which Deby shared, that if this thing was not handled correctly and very quickly, there would be major fighting in N'Djamena, with untold consequences. So that's what drove us, and that's what Washington agreed we should do.

Now by then this is the end of the first week of December, and by then it was clear that the Deby régime was willing to work with us. There were a couple of other things that were happening that affected the overall atmosphere. Our defense attaché told us, or he said, as the change took place from Habre to Deby, he said there'll be an initial feeling of euphoria as the tyrannical Habre régime ends and the new régime begins. He said, what you'll find is that after a couple of weeks there will be a lot of score-settling done and various other problems will emerge. And in word, he was right, and by Christmas there was shooting all the

time. And in fact, at some times over the next two years or so, it became very tense, and a couple of times we thought there was going to be a civil war in N'Djamena. And so whereas there was this euphoria after the collapse of Habre, at one point there was, for one reason or another by one group or another - not necessarily Habre loyalists - problems - let's put it that way - and throughout our assignment in Chad, there was fighting, or I should say shooting, very often. It was very unstable and at times very dangerous, and particularly around that Christmas. On the other hand, one of the things Deby did soon after arriving was to promise a more democratic country and more freedom. And once again, in a word, he fulfilled that promise - not perfectly and not immediately, but one of the *Leitmotifs* of Deby's period was to, at times reluctantly, put into place a new form of government so that now there's a parliament, there have been elections. I'm sure they don't satisfy people who are looking for true democracy, and I'm sure that Deby in some ways is still a *de facto* dictator, but the fact is, it is no longer the kind of totalitarian régime that existed under Habre. Frankly, it's a much more ineffective régime. Deby doesn't have the personal skills that Habre had. He doesn't have the education Habre did. Habre had advanced degrees.

Q: *He stayed in, Dick?*

BOGOSIAN: He's still in power. But he did open it up, and one thing that happened was there was much more of a free press, and what this meant was it all of a sudden meant that one needed to know what was in the newspapers, one needed to know what was on the radio and the TV, because whereas before it was just the government line, now you had independent voices. There were cartoons in the paper that were scurrilous making fun or criticizing Deby.

There were a couple of things that happened as a result. What I found was, in those first days, if I called on Deby or some other important official, the television cameras were there because they wanted to have it known that the American ambassador was calling on these leaders. So after a while I thought I'd better wear a blue shirt, and what I found was that they weren't always there any more so it didn't make any difference whether I wore a blue shirt or a white shirt. One time I had met the vice president in what, in fact, was an important meeting, and as I left, the television journalists were there, and they asked for a statement. I said that we spoke about bilateral relations and international affairs - which would have been satisfactory under Habre. They said, "You're going to have to do better than that, Mr. Ambassador." But what happened was that -

Q: *They had picked up some experience.*

BOGOSIAN: What that meant was - and for me this was new, this didn't exist in Sudan or Niger or until then in Chad - we could think about what public role I should play. Now my philosophy was that because of my size and appearance and because I represented such a big powerful country, I did not want to be in the newspapers or have an aggressive public policy, but what happened in Chad was

there were times when what I said made a difference. There was one time in that early period, and I forget exactly when, when the situation was very tense, and my staff came to me and said, "You need to say something." And we talked about it, and I said, "Alright." And the DCM, Barbara Schell, proceeded to write some remarks, and the public affairs officer arranged a press conference, and I made a statement urging people to stay calm and urging the government to continue its commitment to democracy and - whatever I said. And the next day, the president called me and thanked me, and his opposition called me and thanked me - and that was something new in my experience, and for the first time, I had some sense of what public diplomacy could be. And again, I had a staff that everything from identifying an opportunity to helping to prepare the actual words to pulling the thing together, and as an ambassador, it was a very satisfying experience, both in terms of a smooth-running effective operation and to think that one could make a statement and have that effect. So those were exciting times to be in Chad.

I mentioned that this was our favorite assignment, and one reason was that the Chadians, as people, were very warm and very interesting. They had opinions, quite different from the Nigerians, who were quite reserved. The Chadian women were interesting people. Many of them had had to play a public role during the civil war. Many of them lost husbands, brothers, sons, and they had to play a role; and for my wife, in particular, this made Chad a very interesting place to work. She would give these coffees and invite people like the deputy mayor and the minister of this who was female. And my deputy was Barbara Schell, and we asked her if she'd like to go to the coffee my wife was giving for these Chadian women. She said, "Well, if you're inviting me as the deputy chief of mission, I'll go, but if you're inviting me as a woman, no." So we had to deal with that as well.

One of the things that happened that December was that the vice president, who was of the Hadjerai ethnic group - and in Chadian politics that's always a group that doesn't fit in right, and so he had an important position, but he also wanted to show that he was an important person - and so he had the American ambassador come, but in fact he raised an issue that was important. This was in December of 1990. The new government wanted to send a delegation to Washington, and would we accept them? And so I recommend that they agree to that, and Washington did agree to it, and so I went to Washington in January of 1991 to be there for that particular matter. There were two or three things that happened during that time that make it memorable.

One evening I had dinner with friends, and when I got back to the hotel, my son called, and he said, "Dad, the war has begun." And what he meant was Desert Storm. Like many American, I turned the TV on and watched the war live from Baghdad, and you recall that our first assignment was in Baghdad and we had also served in Kuwait, so that had a lot of resonance with us too. Secondly, on that evening, the DCM felt she should stay on the compound, but because we had so many people staying at the residence, my wife said, "Well, you can stay, but you're going to have to sleep in my husband's bed." And the DCM said all right.

Now earlier on, I had asked my first DCM in Niger, Al Fairchild, I said, "You know, I never took the DCM's course. What do they teach you?" He said, one thing they teach you is not to play with the Ambassador's toys when he's away, like his men's room or his soap. Barbara Schell said, given that, "What do you think they'd say if you said the DCM slept in the Ambassador's bed while he was away?

But the third thing that happened that week was a story that was kind of interesting. One of the things we did for Chad when Habre was in power was to provide Stinger missiles. And when I got to Chad, the defense attaché said to me one day, "I have to go to Bardai," which is in the far north of Chad, near Libya. He said, "You know, we've provided Stinger missiles to them, and we have an obligation to actually check every once in a while and make sure that they're there." So when this trouble began, along with everything else, one of the questions was where are those Stinger missiles? So when I got to Washington, the under secretary for security assistance, Reg Bartholomew, told me that it was crucially important to get these missiles now. I guess I'd known that before the trip, but I had a meeting with him where he explained that recently some had been lost somewhere else, and there was this general feeling that those missiles actually had the ability to knock down American aircraft, so it was highly dangerous to have them in the wrong hands. And apparently we had not agreed to provide those Stinger missiles to some of our closest allies, and I'm told that when Secretary Baker heard that there were Stinger missiles in Chad, he said, "What the hell did we give Stinger missiles to Chad for?" And that gives you some idea of the notion that Habre had in those days, that we were willing to provide Stinger missiles for him.

Q: *He got them from us.*

BOGOSIAN: He did. Not only that, he bought them; he owned them.

Q: *He got them from us, and not through some international black market.*

BOGOSIAN: That's right. So one of my tasks, when Deby took over, was to assure the safety of the American community and to assure that our relationship was one that could continue. One of the tasks was to get the Libyans out of there, and one of the tasks was to get these Stinger missiles. So I went back to tell the vice president, after I returned, that it was absolutely essential to get those Stingers. I don't remember how many there were - 10, 12, whatever it was. And he was a little nervous. He said, well, why are you picking on us? And I was able to tell him that we had refused to provide them to I don't know how many countries and that we would buy them back, which would have been $2 million. And they needed money more than they needed the missiles. He says, all right, we'll get them to you. And in fact, somehow the French got a hold of them and got them out of Chad, and so it was one more problem taken care of.

What that meant was that by the end of January, the kind of problems that immediately rose to the surface - the Libyans, the safety issue, and so forth - had essentially been taken care of, and the more positive thing was that Deby had committed himself to much more palatable civil rights and democracy program. The negatives were that he represented a tiny minority in the country. It was almost certain that those soldiers would not be any less cruel than Habre's, although I don't think he ever put people in jail, at least not while I was there, the way Habre did. And we had lost a special friend, and the simple fact was Deby was not Habre, nor did Deby do what Habre did. Deby did what Habre did when he was with Habre. He was one of the fighters. But, you know, things change. Budgets aren't the same; attitudes aren't the same. And so the U.S. was simply not prepared to have the kind of relationship with Deby that we had had with Habre.

There was another factor, though, and that was that by 1991 it became increasingly evident that Exxon had found a significant amount of oil. The thought was that there were about a billion barrels of oil reserves in Chad. The oil situation led to what I called "the four billions." There was a billion oil barrels (reserves) in Chad. This level of reserves would permit a production that would bring to Chad about a billion dollars a year in income, which was vastly more than they had. It would require an investment of a billion dollars by the consortium, and it would cost another billion to build a pipeline to Douala or the Douala area of Cameroon. In terms of private investment in Africa, this was going to be one of the biggest, and certainly one of the biggest American investments in Africa. It also meant that the oil situation was going to transform Chad, if in fact they ever did begin to produce. Now there were three reasons why the *if*-clause was significant. First of all, because of the inherent instability of Chad, you never quite knew whether the political situation would be calm enough for the companies to choose to move forward. Secondly, one never quite knew whether the oil companies, even under stable conditions, would make the investment. And the third thing was whether the pipeline project could move forward. Now I would note that these issues are all still there, but what seems to be the case is that the oil companies have made a commitment.

Q: *Is there oil there?*

BOGOSIAN: Oh, yes.

Q: *In large amount?*.
BOGOSIAN: Well, a billion barrels.

Q: *Is any of it coming out?*

BOGOSIAN: Not yet. I mean, they've got oil out of the ground, but it's not in production yet. There's no pipeline.

Q: *There's no bonanza yet.*

BOGOSIAN: There's no pipeline, yes, partly because of the financing, which involved the World Bank, and of course, there are environmental issues. It's going to go through primeval forest and all kinds of things. But the policy decision, both in Chad and in Cameroon, and also by the companies, is to do it. Now, what I will say is - a couple of little footnotes - is the consortium when I got there was Exxon, Chevron, and Shell - two-thirds American and one-third Dutch-British. Chevron chose to leave; they wanted to put all their eggs in Kazakhstan. And finally, at that point, the French wanted in, and so ELF now is the third partner, the French oil company. And that's fine with us. I mean, Exxon and ELF are together in Niger as well. If the pipeline is built, then it's very likely to permit Nigerien oil also to be exploited and come through Chad.

Two other things to note. While I was there, Sunoco also looked for oil in northern Chad. I think there's oil there, but they said it wasn't worth pursuing now. I understand that there still may be companies looking in northern Chad, just as there are in northern Niger. So there was some exploration while I was there, but nothing happened. There is oil immediately to the north of Lake Chad. Now the oil Exxon is working with is in the southern part of Chad, and It's waxy, they say it's waxy.

Q: *That means it's not good?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, it's not the best. The oil north of Lake Chad is so fine that it almost needs no refining. It looks like honey. It's light and amber in color. The amount of it isn't that much to attract everybody, but the point is simply that there is oil there, and there are implications of this. One of the things I did over the three years I was there, particularly after Deby came in and particularly after Chad and Libya were taking their case to the International Court of Justice, was to say the Libya angle is not of prime importance any more to the United States. The most important thing is oil. This is an American company making the investment, and what it does is, on the one hand, raise issues that we have to deal with and, on the other hand, potentially transform Chad. And after about two years, Washington agreed. When we had the policy meeting in Washington that kind of endorsed that policy, where we defined oil as our principal interest in Chad, the military representative at the meeting said, "Well, that's fine with us if oil is the most important thing in our relationship. We're not going to argue that. But don't expect the U.S. military to go to Chad to save the oil fields. And we all said, yes, we understand that. And it was around that time that the French started saying they wanted to get in and replace Chevron. And the French ambassador - this was a different French ambassador - said to me, "You know that if it came to that, we [meaning the French military] would come in to save the oil fields." So that's another angle. I think one of the things about the French in Chad is Chad has an emotional connection to France that, at least for the last 50 years, has rested on the fact that General LeClerc left from Chad to go back and retake North Africa

for the Free French. And they tell me that that has resonance in France. It's one of the things that link them.

Now I said the thing that transformed the assignment in Chad was what happened in December of 1990. What that meant was that over the remainder of my assignment in Chad there were certain, sort of, themes. One was safety. The country was very unstable. I mentioned that there was shooting off and on in Chad. On October 13, 1991 (I think that was the date), there was shooting in Chad and two of our residences took missile hits. Nobody got hurt. In one case the family was away.
Q: *What kind of missiles?*

BOGOSIAN: Probably Frog. I don't know. We evacuated a second time. There was a third time when Washington wanted us to evacuate, but we chose not to. So the whole remainder of the time we were there, it isn't so much that you couldn't function, but it was a very tense environment. At times, that took an emotional toll on the people who were there. Interestingly, the people who were most upset were the ones who did leave. It's quite an emotional strain to leave, especially if, say, your husband or someone else is left behind. Another thing that happened was this effort to keep them honest in terms of a free press, no human rights violations - things like that - moving towards a more democratic system. And indeed, over the period we were there, for example, they permitted political parties, and so there was a lot of political activity in that regard. And many of them would come to us and ask us to help them one way or the other, so that it was a very exciting and positive -

Q: *Were we able to help nurture democracy there?*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, mind you, a lot of it was what you might call moral - what's the phrase?

Q: *"Suasion" or "leadership"?*

BOGOSIAN: Moral support. I mean, they had this perception that if the Americans, for example, kept the pressure on Deby, that made a difference, as distinct from providing a lot of money to political parties. On the other hand, one of the things that happened while we were there, during our third year, was what they called a national conference. I don't know that we've had anything quite like that in the United States, but it was becoming kind of common in Francophone Africa. There was one in Zaire; there was one in Congo-Brazzaville; there was one in Benin, I believe. What happened was, you got a broad cross-section of people who come together for a week or a month or whatever it is and basically sort out all the issues of the day. That's particularly important in a country like Chad, which had been through a civil war where there were 200 tribes or 200 language groups, where there were a lot of mutual suspicions. So to get together and have an honest discussion was very important. And the French, I think they

paid something like a million dollars for security, and we paid $75,000, if I remember correctly, so that the proceedings could be broadcast live to the nation. And while that happened, everywhere people had their radios on. We were traveling in the countryside, and even if we had an official meeting, the official would have a radio on his coffee table. And so in that way, we were able to convey to the nation in a whole what was going on in N'Djamena. We had numerous, numerous meetings with people on the politics and trying to keep the people who were looking for a more liberal system not to lose faith, to keep the pressure on Deby. And at times he got angry with me, and at times he, as I said, would call and thank us.

Q: *I think we've got about 10 minutes left on this tape. Should we try to wrap up the Chad experience?*

BOGOSIAN: Right this minute I think we can, yes. I'm not going to go over "and then this happened and then that happened."

Q: *Do if you wish. I have a couple of questions?*

BOGOSIAN: Go ahead. I may have forgotten some things.

Q: *Well, I was struck by the quality of your staff in general and the quality of the defense attaché. Did you find him an extremely useful member of the country team?*

BOGOSIAN: Yes.
Q: *Did you find him extraordinarily well informed compared to others?*

BOGOSIAN: Yes. Keep in mind that when he was assigned there, we had major activities going on in Chad and it was a very military type place. Now without getting into a lot of details-

Q: *We're trying to get the feeling.*

BOGOSIAN: -without getting into a lot of details, I will tell you that, prior to my arrival, an embassy colleague of his tried to arrange to get him PNGed. That is to say, prior to my arrival, he had a very poor relationship with another member of the embassy community.

Q: *A civilian member or a military member?*

BOGOSIAN: A civilian. That person was replaced, and it was quite clear that his successor was told, you work it out. So in other words, had I arrived there, say, when Pugh did, I might have had a major problem on my hands by these two individuals who had to work together and couldn't. On the other hand, if anything, I had a young, bright person who in his organization has moved up the

ladder quite a bit, and it was understood that we were going to work together and make it work. So I certainly used whatever influence I had to make that happen, but they were prepared to do it as well. We had a terrific regional security officer when I first got there. His successor was nowhere near as good, so to some extent it was the luck of the draw.

One of the most emotional things that happened while we were there was there was a somewhat junior officer (I mean it was his third assignment). He was political and consular. He arrived right around the time Barbara and I did. We arrived together, Barbara Schell, within weeks of each other. And very early on, Barbara was very upset with this fellow's performance. It was quite substandard. Then what we discovered was that - he had responsibility for consular affairs - he had never had the consular course. And then it became evident we had to teach him. So we worked it out with the regional consular officer and some others, and we kind of helped him reorganize the consular function, and we taught him how to do political work. He ended up staying four years. During his third year I nominated him for an award, and he got a promotion; but his first year, his efficiency report was so poor that Washington called us. They said, "You can't say that." And we said, "Why can't we?" So as a management challenge - it was a management challenge. And there's a case where the guy stayed around long enough so that he was able to improve.

We had some good people. I think the events drew the best out of them. We had one woman - I won't get into the details, but she had a sensitive position - and we found out that she had an intimate relationship with a French person, and her supervisor and I agreed she had to get out because she had a sensitive position. This happens in those places. People end up getting divorced and who knows what all. And at times it was difficult for the people involved. We had a school where, as time went on, it became apparent that the principal was not satisfactory. By the time we had reached that conclusion, he was leaving and, in that sense, nothing actually happened while he was there. But this was a person who, I think, among other things, had difficulty coping with that difficult security environment. Needless to say, we also had many happy times there. We had a pool and a little restaurant. The people would go out of their ways to figure out ways to improve morale and so forth.

Q: *I think your wife had mentioned once in a conversation with me that she found it was just a very enjoyable experience.*

BOGOSIAN: She enjoyed it. I think she felt, and indeed she did, I think she felt she made a major contribution. Part of that was literally care and feeding of the embassy community.

Q: *Literally.*

BOGOSIAN: Literally. But part of it was her reaction to the Chadian women.

They were so much fun and so exciting, that she had a group, in this case, of Chadians that she could interact with that was not possible in Niger because of the personality character of the Nigerien woman.

Q: *Dick, let me ask you, with regard to Washington, you were real far away. You were ambassador in Chad. Did you feel that anyone was listening? Did you feel that people there knew what was going on and getting support and wisdom and leadership?*

BOGOSIAN: I felt that they listened to the degree they had to. When we had our major crisis, when Habre was overthrown and everything, Jeff Davidow, our principal deputy assistant secretary, and Hank Cohen were there. There was one point when there was a very delicately balanced situation, and it happened that Cohen came to town and he was able to do some very good work, and that got us over that particular problem. But they weren't intrusive, and they didn't get in my way. Bob Pringle was the country director for Central African affairs, and most of what I had to get into he was able to deal with in a way that took care of what I needed. In those days we were able to maintain our AID program. Shortly after I left, AID in it's wisdom decided to end the program. Why were we able to do it while I was there? I don't know. I don't know whether somehow we just had enough momentum behind us and we had some good people, but after I left... But I don't know. In the case of AID, it went bad after I left. In the case of the defense attaché, it was bad before I got there.

We had a good team. We had some things happen that could have been disastrous. We had a storm one night, May 14, I think, 1993, it would have been - almost like a tornado. And there were two people in the AID mission, one was the wife of the defense attaché, who was working for AID, and the other was another AID employee, who were working late. They were going to stay a little later, and they said, well, let's go home. And the roof fell in. They would have been killed.

Q: *Amazing. Dick, we're very near the end of this tape. Shall we-*

BOGOSIAN: Call it a day?

Q: *Shall we call it a day on Chad, and then we'll resume with Somalia and a number of other issues?*

BOGOSIAN: What I think I'd like to do is - who knows when we'll get together again?

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Q: *Today is Thursday, October 15, and this is Richard Bogosian. Dick, we were talking last time about Chad, and you gave us quite a wonderful account of it. And we'd just gotten to the point - I think - after the session ended, you said you*

wanted to say a few words about the Peace Corps in Chad.

BOGOSIAN: Well, what I wanted to do was to tell a little what you might call Peace Corps anecdote. We had, if I remember correctly, in Chad in those days about 40 Peace Corps volunteers at any given moment, in contrast to Niger, where we had over a hundred for most of the time I was there. In Niger we had our own training facility, and there were probably three or four new classes a year of maybe 20 or 30 Peace Corps volunteers, and typically I would go to the opening ceremony, which was held at the training facility. In Chad, though, there was only one new class a year, and it was about 30 or 40 people each time. And my wife and I always attached great importance to the Peace Corps and what they were doing. We tried to visit the volunteers, that sort of thing. The first year that we were there, when it was time for the swearing-in ceremony of the trainees, we asked the director of the Peace Corps whether he would like to do that at the residence. He was new, and I think he was a little diffident. There is a certain element of thinking in the Peace Corps that puts great importance on its independence, which, as you know, is, if you will, part of the bargain when the Peace Corps was established, that it would be independent. On the one hand, I think they're happy to part of the American community, and the Peace Corps director is part of an ambassador's country team, but at the same time, they want to be independent. So he said, no, he'd rather do it at Peace Corps headquarters in N'Djamena. And we said fine. So that evening (I forget the exact date, but it was early in our tour), we went there, and it was kind of Spartan, and we were inundated with huge locusts. (They call them "crickets" in French, and I was trying to think of the English word.) So the evening was not as festive as it might have been, and it was kind of dusty, and if I remember correctly, the electricity went off from time to time.

So the next year, when we offered to have the Peace Corps swearing-in ceremony at the residence, by which time with my wife's hard work we had a rather lovely garden and a pool, the Peace Corps director said, "Why, yes, that would be very kind, Mr. Ambassador. Let's have it at the residence." So we did, and among other things, the media were there to watch this, and of course, there is nothing quite like a Peace Corps swearing-in ceremony, because from the volunteers' point of view, this shows that they've been through the rigorous training and now they're ready to become a volunteer, which means a lot to them. But to the other people, it was also interesting, and what happened was - I forget the exact order, but if I remember correctly - the Peace Corps director made a little speech, and he introduced me, and I made a little speech. But then there were three speeches by the graduating volunteers. One was in English, one was in French, but then one was in Sara, which was the language of a good part of Chad, and this was just astounding to the Chadians. In our lingo, we blew their minds. They couldn't believe that these foreigners had learned their own language. So it was quite exciting. And of course then we had a nice dinner and dancing and fun, and it was a very festive occasion.

As I say, the media were there, so a year later, when it came time to do this for what was our third and last time, there was no question but that we do it at the residence, and everything was all set up. I believe it was to have begun at six-thirty. And at six o'clock there was a downpour. There was just a deluge, and I believe that evening some trees had been knocked over, so we weren't sure how much it was going to rain, so when the rain let up somewhat, we decided we'd better go ahead and have our swearing-in - that's the real thing. And the media hadn't arrived yet, but there was just no way we could wait. So one by one, we did the same thing, with the same results. And as we were finishing, the TV crew arrived. They said that a tree had knocked over and they couldn't get there, and so I guess I must have been a little irritated or something, and they said, "Do you mind running through the ceremony one more time?" And I said, "I'm not going to go through this again. They've had their swearing in." But the volunteers said, yeah, sure, we'll do it. So the Peace Corps director made a speech, and I did not make a speech, and then they made their speeches and they went through the motions of being sworn in. And that was a Saturday.

The next night we were all at the AID director's house for a dinner or something she was giving. And somebody said, "Hey, everybody, the news is on, and they'll have last night's swearing in." And I was kind of curious as to how they were going to do this. And so what they did, what Chadian television did, was they recorded all the interviews they did, and they put in the speech that I gave the year before that they had taken, and nobody knew the difference. It was essentially the same substantive speech. So that was my little Peace Corps story.
Q: *I'm very glad you did that. The Peace Corps loves... They wouldn't feel right if you hadn't done that, you know that.*

BOGOSIAN: Well, anyway, it was always a big night, and again, their willingness, which I think even other Peace Corps-like organizations don't do - to learn the local language really, that and living, of course, out among the people. In those posts, the Peace Corps really, in a way that no one else does, really shows the flag, and as you know, they're very much admired.

By that third swearing-in, of course, we'd been in Chad close to three years; we had been through a very tumultuous time; and, needless to say, it was evident that our assignment was coming to an end. By then, although Chad was still certainly unstable, it had been pretty much through most of the really difficult time that followed in the wake of the Deby coup, but the one thing I think we could say with some satisfaction is that certainly there was no true democracy in Chad, but there was much greater level of freedom. He had lived up to its commitment to permit a freer press. In fact, the real constraint on the press was financial. The newspapers simply couldn't make it financially. The economy was too small to support it, so there was only one paper, called *N'Djamena Hébdo*, which was able to sustain itself and to remain an often harsh critic of the government. In fact, they didn't like it because Deby would take copies of *Hébdo* to prove to people that he was permitting a free press, and they thought they were being used.

There was the national conference, out of which came a general agreement that put at least some limits on the president's power, while at the same time working out a pragmatic deal that permitted him to remain in power, permitted him to remain commander-in-chief of the armed forces, but also installed a prime minister with greater powers and what eventually was to become a parliament. Now some of that happened after I left, but there was a sense that, on the one hand, the Chadian political situation, while unstable and while Deby was certainly not a popular leader, there really was greater freedom than under Habre. Unfortunately, the quality of administration had deteriorated.

The other thing, of course, that happened over that time was that the prospects of oil were much more real. Over three years there was no question that Exxon and its partners had discovered what for Chad would be a substantial amount of oil, which meant that our policy would much more likely be tied to oil than it had been earlier. So as we were leaving there was, needless too say, a certain sadness but also a feeling that things had moved on and it was time to leave.

Now, what was happening during that last few months in Chad, other than family things like my wife visiting our daughter next door in the Central African Republic, where she was a Peace Corps volunteer, was that I was trying to organize my next assignment. It was clear that I was not going to be an ambassador anywhere, but I was in touch with the assistant secretary of economics and business, Dan Tarullo, who, as it happened, his parents were from my home town, which had absolutely nothing to do with the substance of our discussion. Tarullo wanted a new deputy assistant secretary for transportation, which is the person that would be in charge of aviation negotiations and other transportation-related issues, which he felt were moving into a very important stage. Because I had done aviation negotiations, he asked me to join his staff. Now this was the result of exchanges. I visited Washington; he interviewed me; and so forth. But in July, and we were leaving in July, he phoned, and asked me "to be part of his team," as he put it, and I was happy to do so. This was economics, which was my sort of other bureau, other than Africa. It would have been my third assignment there. It was a step up for me to be a deputy assistant secretary. And Tarullo, who was new, made it sound like this was an important job. So when we left Chad, I had understood that I was going to become a deputy assistant secretary for transportation.

The only thing was, I had committed myself to chair a selection board, which is a promotion panel, and that was going to take a good part of August and September. In fact, Tarullo asked if I could break that because he wanted me in there right away. And as you know, that's not easy to do, and so I told him I couldn't do that. During the month of August, I believe, he came to me and he said, "Dick, there's a problem. The White House wants to put a political appointee in that job." Well, when he first told me, it looked like maybe it could be worked out, but over the next several weeks it became increasingly apparent that that job was not going to

be available. Now curiously, having done that, the White House never nominated anybody, and the career Foreign Service officer who was in the job remained another two years or whatever.

But what that also meant was that in September, or by the end of September, when the promotions panel was over, I essentially was out of a job, and so they asked me to be what's referred to a "over-complement" in the African Bureau. And then at one point they wanted me to be the acting director East African Affairs, which I had done previously. I think the two low points of that period for me were when my wife put up a list of key phone numbers, and I didn't make the list because I had no phone number. I had become a non-person in the family. And one day when I was walking back from trying to get my watch fixed, a young Desk officer said to me, "You really are walking the hallways, aren't you?" So I was pretty discouraged. The EB job had fallen through. Nothing was going on out there, and it wasn't clear what was going to happen. With all that, one day my daughter was back home. She had concluded her assignment in the Peace Corps. It was a beautiful, beautiful fall day. I happened to be home. It was a Friday. And we had an errand to do, and I said, "Catherine, isn't it great to be home? It's just so beautiful here." And she said, "Yes." And we pulled into the driveway, and my wife said, "Hurry up, Peter Tarnoff wants to talk to you." I couldn't imagine why Peter Tarnoff, who was under secretary for political affairs, would want to talk to me, so I went up to the bedroom, and I phoned the number that I was given. And the woman said - this was in October 1993 - "Well, you haven't got Peter's office," she said, "but let me tell you what he wants. He wants to talk to you about going to Somalia."

Now what had happened here was that on October 3, 1993, in a battle in Mogadishu, I think it was 18 Americans were killed, and what's more, one of our soldiers was dragged through the streets, and there was this awful picture of a captured American with just this look of fear in his eyes. They were rangers that had dropped from helicopters, and in a word they were slaughtered, in Mogadishu. And this occurred at a time when there was growing pressure for us to do something about Bosnia, but in fact we had not made a commitment to go in. And just around the same time, the USS Harlan County had gone with troops to Haiti and there was a demonstration on the pier, and it was turned around rather than go. And so all of a sudden it looked like the United States, in Nixon's words, was "a helpless pitiful giant."

Now the way that affected me was in the aftermath of the debacle -

Q: *Dick, can we just go back for a sec. Can you, in a couple of thoughts, sketch in what had been going on in Somalia until October?*

BOGOSIAN: All right. What had happened in Somalia was that in 1991 the régime of Siad Barre, the dictator who had been ruling Somalia, collapsed. In effect, there was a civil war, but two things happened in Somalia, the first of

which was the civil war, to use that phrase, somewhat like Chad, deteriorated into numerous militias led by warlords. It wasn't just group A against group B; it was numerous groups of warlords fighting each other with a kind of kaleidoscopic set of alliances. It was never clear who would be with whom the next day. Among the things they did was to, in effect, steal emergency food aid, so that it never got to the people who needed it. And by 1990-1991, there was this just incredible famine throughout much of Somalia. And the pictures were on TV. In fact, I was in Chad at the time - this was around the time of Desert Storm - and I said to myself, I'm glad I'm not in Somalia.

But the humanitarian relief community was beginning to put pressure, and I distinctly remember one of these people on televisions saying, "Why doesn't the United States do something?" meaning military action. So somewhat to everyone's surprised, President Bush authorized the deployment of troops to Somalia.

Q: *When was that?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, the election was in 1992, and this was after he was defeated.

Q: *This was when he was a lame duck.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes.

Q: *So this was probably in late 1992.*

BOGOSIAN: Right. He went to Mogadishu at Christmas time to visit the troops. Now the thing to note is that prior to Siad Barre's overthrow, or prior to the collapse, the country had been at war in one way or another, and by the time Bush made his move, it wold have been at least a year since there was anarchy in the country. And what had happened was that, on the one hand, there was this terrible, terrible famine - which wasn't the first time in Somalia, but it was very bad, one of the worst anyone had ever seen in Africa - but the point was, if you couldn't control these warlords, particularly Aideed and Ali Mahdi - they were rivals but between them they essentially ruled Mogadishu, which was the main port and the main airport of the country - then no matter how much food aid you gave, it never got to the people who needed it. So the judgment was made that if you sent a military force, and it was international -
Q: - *which would escort food aid* -

BOGOSIAN: - which would escort food aid, then you could feed the people and so forth.

Q: *Right.*

BOGOSIAN: Now of course one of the new things was the TV cameras followed

it every step of the way.

Q: *That's good background.*

BOGOSIAN: So by, say, spring of 1993, the way to resolving the famine had essentially been worked out, and indeed we were ready to pull our troops out and to turn it over to a UN organization. Now the UN operation for Somalia is referred to as UNOSOM. The initial group had no real political agenda. It essentially was there to get the food to the people who needed it. Under UNOSOM, there was this sense that something should be done to resolve the political problems. Now there's been a lot of debate about that. It's been called a mistake, but the idea behind it was until and unless you work out a political settlement, you have no long-term solution to the humanitarian problem, and of course that's bedeviled everybody ever since, because that has not happened yet.

One of the things that happened under UNOSOM was that a Pakistani contingent, in June, I think it was, of '93, was slaughtered by Aideed's people, and the U.S. took the position that that couldn't be permitted to stay, and so Aideed was depicted, essentially, as enemy number one. He was the kind of person that it was easy to demonize. They referred to him as having a crocodile smile - i.e., the smile was utterly mirthless. And it was Aideed that they were trying to either capture or subdue when, in fact, that mission on the 3rd went terribly wrong.
Q: *We were succeeding in making Aideed a national hero, in my opinion.*

BOGOSIAN: Well, I think that overstates it, but he told us later that they never dreamed that they could win a military victory against the United States. And in our naïveté, I guess we had problem of hubris.

Q: *We let them do it.*

BOGOSIAN: Well, these fellows were put into an extremely difficult position. If you fly over where they were, it's very congested, very compacted, utterly hostile, and all the rest. And I was told that there were other aspects of the mission, such as the fact that they had done it several times. That's the kind of mission you do once for its surprise value. You don't do it five, six times. In any event, it was a political debacle, and so in Washington's wisdom they decided to do three things in October of 1993. They decided to replace Bob Gosende, who had been the head of our diplomatic presence there - what we referred to as the U.S. Liaison Office-Mogadishu, USLO, because there was no government to which we were accredited, but otherwise it was essentially the U.S. embassy. And indeed, we were on the grounds of our embassy, which was 80 acres, but it was also where the UN was headquartered as well. I was asked to replace him. Also Jim Dobbins, who had been at one time our ambassador to the European Union and deputy chief of mission in Bonn, was asked to become the coordinator for Somalia in Washington itself. And Bob Oakley was asked to do some diplomatic legwork in Somalia - that is, he didn't live there, but he would come and go.

That phone call to Tarnoff, of course, was asking me to go. And I looked at my wife - this was before we actually reached Tarnoff, when I knew that's what they were going to ask me - and I said, "What should I do?" because going to a war zone was not exactly what I had bargained for. She said, "You'll have to make that decision." And I said to myself, I didn't fight in Vietnam, and I was too young for Korea, and this is the first time in 30 years that they've actually asked me to do something. So I said, "I'll go." And it was the first time in our married life that we were separated for any length of time. So I got dressed and went into the Department and had my meeting with Tarnoff. And I said, "What is it you want me to do?" And I later had a similar conversation with Dick Clarke on the NSC staff. And what Tarnoff said, in so many words, was, "In the aftermath of the debacle of October 3rd, we're going to pull our troops out, but we're going to do it gradually, and they're scheduled to be out by the end of March. And so what we want you to do is sort of to oversee that process as our chief diplomat in residence in Mogadishu." And the other thing he said was that these events have badly damaged the reputation of the United Nations, and he said, "You should do what you can to prop up the standard of the UN." I said, "Well, how long do you want me there?" and he said, "Well, if you could stay into next summer, that would be fine with us." Now what Clarke added was a much more political thing. He said, "No more embarrassments, no more surprises." So that was my *de facto* mandate in going out to Mogadishu.

Q: *Can I ask, on that latter point, "no embarrassments, no surprises," what did that mean?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, I think what it meant was no serious damage to the U.S. military, no defeats.

Q: *Had there been preventable embarrassments and surprises before?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, I don't know. I'll tell you of an incident a little later on which could have easily... I mean, we were always on the edge. We were within sniper range of Mogadishu, but I think if you could let me go on, you might want to ask that question a little later.

So, without really knowing what I was getting into, I agreed to go to Somalia. It took a couple of weeks to actually get me there, and I believe it was the 9th of November by the time I got there.

Q: *And you went as ambassador, Dick, is that correct?*.

BOGOSIAN: Well, I went as chief of mission, in the sense that they called me Ambassador, I was the chief of mission, I had all the kind of authority an ambassador has, but strictly speaking, I was the coordinator of the U.S. Liaison Office, or something like that.

Now this was a very brief but extremely intense assignment, and it was unlike anything I'd ever done. And I literally didn't know what I was getting into, and so the first thing was to get to Nairobi and then get on an attaché C-12 to Mogadishu. I had been there twice while I was director of AFE, but I really couldn't remember it very well. We landed at the airport, which is on the beach, and all of a sudden I realized I was in a highly military environment, not just our troops - we had 20,000 in Somalia - but all kinds of other troops. There were men with machine guns pointing in each direction protecting me. I immediately had a helmet and a flak jacket put on me, and the next thing I knew I was in a helicopter and we were going to the compound. Well, this was pretty exciting, and like I say, I had never done anything quite like that. But that turned out to be the way it was, and after a while I got pretty used to it. I had an Air Force officer on my staff. I said, "When would it be all right to take a helicopter down to the airport or to take a C-12 to Nairobi?" He said, "Anytime you want, Sir."

Q: *Good, good.*

BOGOSIAN: So when I got there, it was the largest deployment of U.S. troops in the world at that time, and among the people there was General Montgomery, who was the deputy commander of UNOSOM and the head of the U.S. forces, which for legal reasons was not part of it because they had to be under U.S. command. The actual commander was a Turkish person. The other key person, who was the senior UN person there, was Admiral Jonathan Howe. Now Jonathan Howe is an American, and he was at one time the head of the Political-Military Bureau, but in Mogadishu he was the senior UN man.

Q: *He had been deputy chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as I recall.*

BOGOSIAN: Could be, yes. So there was no question that the Americans were kind of running the place.

Q: *My recollection was that Jonathan Howe was often very strongly at odds with U.S. policy when he was over there.*

BOGOSIAN: I was going to phrase that somewhat differently.

Q: *That was simply my recollection from reading the newspapers.*

BOGOSIAN: Well, what I was going to say is... This was, again, like I say, unlike anything I've ever done. Now since then, of course, we've had the different operations in Haiti and Bosnia and so forth, and maybe there's more institutional understanding of how this is done, but back then this was a rather unusual arrangement. Now in Washington, Dobbins had the job of coordinating everything, and to tell you the truth, I didn't get too involved in that, but in the field, what you have is a situation where an ambassador does not have authority

over troops that are under the command of a theater command. So certainly Montgomery didn't answer to me, but as a practical matter, I looked to him for advice on the military situation, and he looked to me for advice on the diplomatic situation, and we worked very closely together.

Q: *You got along well with him.*

BOGOSIAN: Absolutely. I found him to be one of the finest people I ever came across. Now the interesting thing is Montgomery was supervising other generals who didn't have as complete an understanding of the political realities as Montgomery did. Now I may have mentioned previously that in a place like Niamey, it wasn't me against the AID director; it was the AID director and I against AID Washington. So often it was Montgomery and I who understood a situation, whereas his generals didn't; and Montgomery had to kind of sit on them, and occasionally they wanted to end-run him and talk to me. And to give you a specific example, we had some really heavy equipment there. We had Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles, and these things can blow you to kingdom come, and there was one general there, whose name I forget, who said, "All right, you got a problem with Aideed blocking this road? We'll open it up for you." And Montgomery said, "Wait a minute," and he referred to collateral damage, because essentially they were talking about the equivalent of a city, not a street so much as an avenue. But, you know, in my continuing education, I had never been exposed to this before. We actually sat down and you had to do military planning. The embassy compound was separated from Aideed's neighborhood by a field. And we had what are called "fast Marines," 40 of them, who were under my command, there to protect us, and Aideed's people could shoot at us. And there was one incident while I was there where they came to me, and I forget the specifics, but for the first time in my life I was asked to issue an order to kill. And I said, in so many words, "If the situation is as you describe it, and you need to, go ahead, shoot to kill." And for our garden-variety Foreign Service officer who's never been in the military, that's a rather sobering responsibility.

What I would say is when I got there in those early days of November and December, there were sort of three or four things going on. For one thing, just living in trailers, where most people had one room and shared a bath in something that looked like a mobile home - our officer were in trailers; we were working essentially 18 hours a day; we were still very newsworthy, CNN and ABC News and all the rest - to be just put into that was quite a startling experience. On the other hand, I had a superb staff and a group of people who had been there through some of the more difficult days when mortars were being fired. Now while I was there that never happened, but it was only days before I got there that it did happen, and it was also understood that it could happen at any time. So it was a highly dangerous environment, although I never really had any problem. I think I was in more danger in N'Djamena than I was in Mogadishu, and one of the things I noted when I got there... Of course, the other thing was this highly military

environment, with AFN, armed forces radio, we had Brown and Root essentially doing the catering, and-

Q: *Excuse me, Brown and Root doing the catering?*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, they're the ones who provided the food and oversaw the people who cleaned our rooms and things like that.

Q: *And Brown and Root is a company?*

BOGOSIAN: Brown and Root is a Texas-based construction company, did lot of oil field work, and you had those kind of people around. Again it was just this surreal environment we were in. Obviously, you'd have no families there. We were on the American embassy compound, which is to say on a beach, surrounded by walls. But as I said, I had 40 combat Marines under my control. When I got there, at the beginning, this was the largest military operation in the world. It was the largest UN program in the world. We were continuing a major relief program. That still was going on. At the time, we had the only U.S. police assistance program, outside of Latin America. Mind you, we were beginning to try to facilitate national reconciliation. I'll talk a little bit more about that later. But almost from the day I got there, we were also withdrawing U.S. troops, and the idea was not to have any accidents, any sniping, anything like that going on. And the hope was we could get a government reestablished. So part of it was just reacting to this radically new and different environment. Part of it was trying to understand our military's needs and to make sure that to the extent I could help, they could get out of there all right. And keep in mind that it was a multinational operation and there was a UN angle and there were Pakistani troops and Egyptian troops and so on and so forth. And very often I was involved with them in one way or the other.

But the other thing that happened, which gave that initial period some of its character, was that for all the trouble with Aideed, the decision was made that we should sit down and talk to him. So within a week of my arrival, Oakley arrived and we had our first meetings with Aideed. Now any time you sit down with someone who's been demonized, you expect to meet a demon. And on the one hand, we had all these soldiers and marines and ships off the coast and everything else, and on the other hand, when we went to have our first meeting with Aideed, we drove... You know, when I traveled in Mogadishu, the whole time I was there, if I left the compound on land, as distinct from by helicopter, I had three armored personnel carriers protecting me.

Q: *Imagine.*

BOGOSIAN: And not to mention driving in an armored station wagon. So we would go with all these APCs to the Ethiopian embassy, where we'd leave them. And they had what they called "technicals," which were like Toyotas with guns

on them, full of these wild tribesmen, who were there to protect us. Now these are the guys that killed our soldiers, and I will just tell you that that takes some internal organizing to deal with emotionally. The other thing that happened is we went all over this labyrinthine town and got a hold of Aideed. Mind you, in the car we had a global positioning satellite mechanism, and they knew where we were at every moment, and if need be, they were ready to move; but in fact, our meetings with Aideed were uniformly civil, and he had his list of what he wanted to talk about, and he made his points, and we made ours. The main thing we were saying is okay, let's talk. And so the whole time I was there, notwithstanding what happened before I got there, we met with Aideed and his people, frankly, routinely, after that meeting. But that first meeting was one of those electrically charged emotional moments of my career. The other thing about those initial meetings was that, Aideed being the mini-dictator that he was, whereas less than a month, less than two weeks before I got there his people were desecrating American soldiers, he had thousands of his people out there to cheer us as we drove through there.

Q: *Was Bob Oakley with you?*

BOGOSIAN: Yes.

Q: *How is Bob Oakley to work with?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, of course, he was our ambassador to Somalia when I was director of East African Affairs, and so he and I get along pretty well. He's one of our most distinguished and capable diplomats. He had, of course, headed the initial operation when it was very successful, and he had people like General Zinni, who's now the commander of the Central Command, among his people there, and at least on one of those occasions, General Zinni was with him. So he had some awfully good people working with him.

The main point of Oakley was to get this whole relationship with Aideed from being confrontational to being one where we could talk. Now that didn't mean that we supported everything he did, and frankly, it was not easy. It took a long time to get him, for example, to be willing to work with the United Nations. That's what we were trying for the whole time, because he bitterly resented the United Nations. We had a meeting in Addis Ababa in December, and I think it was at that meeting where Aideed didn't want to go because he was frightened. And Oakley arranged for the U.S. military to drive him to the airport.
Q: *Which is safer than having technicals drive him to the airport, or what?*

BOGOSIAN: Yes. This caused an uproar in some quarters of the United States. But Oakley said if it was for the cause of peace it was worth it. In fact, they had called me before I left Mogadishu, but Oakley was the one in the end who decided. But again, that was the environment we were working with in those early days in Mogadishu.

Q: *Was Admiral Howe involved in any of this?*

BOGOSIAN: Yes and no. I mean, we consulted closely with Howe, and I know for a fact that the White House was in touch with him because one day I got a call from the White House, they said, "Oh, wrong number, we want Admiral Howe." I mean, he was in the next what they called "hooch" down the road. But Howe was not directly involved in our bilateral diplomacy, but Howe was obviously involved in the broad UN program. See, Howe had three broad responsibilities, other than just managing this huge UN operation. One was the military, although as a practical matter Montgomery was the key figure there. Now Montgomery, I suspect, consulted with Howe, but I was not necessarily involved in that. One was the humanitarian operation. Now there was a lot of criticism of the humanitarian operation - the feeling that too many of these guys spent too much time in Nairobi, but that's where a lot of the NGO's (non-governmental offices) and other donors were. Also, in fact, there are times it's easier to get from Nairobi to, say, Kismayu, than from Mogadishu to Kismayu, or things like that.

But the third thing was political. And what they were trying to do in their - I don't know what word to use - in their desire to do the right thing, was to break the back of these warlords by creating district councils that were democratically put together; and the problem was it wasn't working. And I think there was a certain level of either hypocrisy, where people said you've got to do it, and then when it didn't work they criticized him for trying to do it.
Q: *Yes.*

BOGOSIAN: And one of the dilemmas of Somalia is that the warlords can justifiably be criticized for making the mess, but their argument is you can't bring peace without us. And we've never really been able to work that out. You can't ignore them, but they'll undercut you every time. And so I was going to say that when I heard I was going to Somalia I was talking to some of my colleagues, and on the one hand a fellow like Joe O'Neill, who at the time was DCM in Asmara, he said, "Dick, Somalia is a poison chalice." On the other hand, you had Ted McNamara, who had been ambassador in Colombia. He said, "Dick, you're going to have a ball." And then you had people like Ed Djerejian, who was consoling me. He said, referring to our policy, he said, "Dick, it's a muddle." And to some extent that's true. We never were quite sure what we wanted to do in Somalia. And part of that was we thought we knew, but after those soldiers were killed, that political support just wasn't there, and there was increasing antagonism towards Boutros Boutros Ghali, who was the Secretary General of the United Nations, and I guess the way to put it is we were "conflicted."

I was in Somalia really only for about seven months, maybe closer to eight months, from November to June. In fact, during that time I was able to get home to the United States twice, and we had to go to Nairobi often as well as to travel within the country. So in that sense, as I say, it wasn't a very long assignment, but

it was very intense.

It had, sort of, four periods to it. There was the initial period from when I got there in November until January, when we really had, in a sense, all 20,000 or so of our troops. There was still, at least in the early days, serious thought given to what would have been serious military engagements, although in fact, as I pointed out earlier, we never really had any serious military activity after that. Also, in terms of sheer excitement, that was a particularly creative time. We engaged Aideed; we engaged some of the others. And we pretty much began to rev up the diplomatic track and start talking about winding down the military track.

Then from January to the end of March, the main thing happening was our troops were leaving, and that attracted a lot of media attention, the home town newspapers and so forth, and it was a big logistical exercise for the military. And in fact, it went off without a hitch. But it was a major thing that happened. Over a 20-week period, 20,000 troops left, and the whole atmosphere changed. The third period in the late winter and early spring was one where we worked awfully hard to see if we could help develop some kind of national reconciliation. It was at that time that we could meet with various groups, either in Nairobi or somewhere else, and one individual, John Howe's successor, who was a Guinean diplomat named Lansana Kouyate-

Q: *Could you just say that again, Dick: Lansana Kouyate?*

BOGOSIAN: Yes. Now Lansana Kouyate was, as I say, a Guinean diplomat. He had been their ambassador in Cairo. He spoke English, French, and Arabic, which made him particularly able to communicate. He simply is a superb diplomat. He was Muslim and, therefore, could relate to the Somalis, but he was from West Africa and so wasn't a threat. He is presently the Secretary General of ECOWAS, the Economic Commission of West African States, and for a while he was a senior political officer in New York with the UN. And he and I worked very closely with each other, and the whole notion was to try to fashion some sort of political reconciliation among the Somalis. It didn't happen, but that's what we were trying to do during that period. And then, by the late spring, it became increasingly clear that they weren't serious. Now as it happened, Washington had agreed to my leaving in June, and I just rounded out my assignment. My successor, Dan Simpson, concluded that it didn't make sense to stay there, and shortly after he got there, he recommended that our mission be closed, and that recommendation was accepted.

There were a couple of things I wanted to mention. One was that in January of 1994 there was what was the most serious incident that took place while I was there, and a little while ago you raised this issue. This is something that didn't get as bad as it might have gotten, but it could have been very bad. And what was happening was the following. By the way, this happened while I was on my way to Nairobi for one of these meetings with Somalis, and I left - I don't know - nine or ten in the morning, whatever it was, and I got to Nairobi probably about two

hours later, and as I was checking into the hotel, they said, "Did you hear what happened in Mogadishu?" And so this happened while I was in transit. And what was happening was that as - what by then was essentially routine - two of my staff were going for a meeting with Aideed's people, and that meant that they had to go by a place called K-4, which was one of the most congested - well, it wasn't so much that it was congested but it was congested in the sense that many major roads came together at K-4 - and like me, if I was traveling, they had the three army personnel carriers manned by these combat Marines, the Fast Marines. As they were going by K-4, some food was being distributed, probably by a Saudi relief organization, and somebody shot at the Marines. And then what happened, apparently, was that the bullets started flying from every direction, and our Marines returned fire. Now they got out of there in minutes, and none of our men were injured - and in that sense it wasn't as bad as it might have been - but some people did get killed. First of all, this was the kind of news that was reported back home, but in Mogadishu itself they came to me, including Westerners, and said, "Why do you use such heavy equipment? That's excessive force." So, on the one hand, I had to admire the way our people got out of there with a minimum of damage. On the other hand, even that damage that occurred raised public perception problems. What bothered me more in the aftermath of that incident - because it occurred while I was away, so when I got back I was trying to find out, well, what is it that happened. And it turned out that the young man who was in charge of the Marines had never checked with what they called the JTF, the Joint Task Force, which was essentially our military unit, as far as I could tell, mainly out of disdain - he didn't think they were worth much - but as a result, he didn't know that this food delivery was going to occur at K-4. If he did, he never would have gone there, because it's understood that those are extremely tense times because the people still wanted the food, and if they thought someone was going to get in the way of it, everybody had a bodyguard, and everybody had guns.

Q: *Was it a spontaneous shooting which had nothing to do with other-*

BOGOSIAN: It was never clear whether they were aiming at the Marines or not.

Q: *Were the Marines seen as stopping access to food?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, I don't know. It could be either that it was premeditated or that, as you are suggesting, someone got frightened and misinterpreted what was going on. What it did show was how highly inflammable the situation was and that when things went wrong people died. And that is what gave Mogadishu it's character at the time. And indeed, we got danger pay and I think everybody in that mission got a reward for valor, because it was a highly dangerous situation. And this leads me to another thing I wanted to say. As I told you, the under secretary for political affairs, Peter Tarnoff, said he wanted me to go out there, and he explained why. The under secretary for management, Richard Moose, kept saying, "Why are you there?" He thought it was madness to have a diplomatic mission in Mogadishu. And I said to Tarnoff, "Well, what do I do?" And he said,

"You pay attention to me." But it was one of the most difficult things I had to do out there, was to walk some kind of a line between two under secretaries who had radically opposing views of what we should be doing in Somalia.

Q: *And one of them had been assistant secretary for Africa in the Carter Administration.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, Dick Moose.

Q: *Dick Moose.*
BOGOSIAN: The way this worked out, however, was as follows. Now one of the things you have to understand is that our diplomatic facilities in Mogadishu - that is to say the embassy before everything fell apart - was one of the most impregnable in the whole world. In the aftermath of earlier terrorist events, it had been one of those embassies that was brand new and had all the latest security devices, so the buildings were quite safe, or at least relatively safe, as were the walls and all the rest. What I found was that the great majority of Somalis who wanted to see me, and many did, would come to me, which meant they had to come inside the walls. And when I did travel, it was either by air to the airport on the sea or to one other part of town. I mean, I've had Nigerian troops protecting me, but I was always protected by some kind of military unit. So the other thing was I felt I could do my work. In other words, I wasn't just sitting in my office unable to communicate with anybody. And our people didn't leave the compound. It wasn't that kind of a thing. You were in the compound the whole time. So I said to Moose that I understood that it was unsafe, but I also felt, on the one hand, that I was protected and my staff was protected and, on the other hand, we could get our work done.

Now that was fine, but toward the end of my tour, the safety in Mogadishu generally was breaking down and there was less and less payoff. I thought that between Kouyate and me we were making progress. We thought they were going to have a national conference and so forth; it's just that it never happened.

Q: *The payoff was getting less in the American presence or the UN presence?*

BOGOSIAN: Well the American presence, in terms of military, after the end of March -

Q: - *was fading out.*

BOGOSIAN: It just ended.

Q: *It ended.*

BOGOSIAN: It was zero, not counting us in the compound. Now the payoff was some kind of national reconciliation that would have helped put the country back

together again, and in effect, we thought that could happen throughout much of the spring of 1994. What we found by the late spring, and what my successor determined was, they're not serious; therefore, why risk being in this dangerous place if you can't accomplish anything? So while I was there -

Q: *They're not serious, meaning many warlords.*

BOGOSIAN: Meaning the warlords were not willing to do what they had to to bring peace to the country. And that remains the case today.

Q: *Let me ask, those two under secretaries who didn't agree with each other, I have two questions. One is did their bosses know that the two under secretaries didn't agree on this thing, and if so, what did they do about it? And secondly, which of them was right in hindsight?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, I'd have to assume that their bosses knew, but I don't think that's particularly relevant, because I don't think the bosses - well, I mean in one sense, that we stayed in Mogadishu meant that Tarnoff won the battle, at that point, and when I sent in a telegram to both of them saying I understand your concerns, but also we have a job to do here, and I think we can do our work and be safe, they accepted that as analytically the final word. And in that sense, at least in the beginning, Moose did not make an issue out of it. But whenever I was in Washington, he harped on this, and he sent out special envoys to look at the situation and so forth. He was never comfortable with it.

I don't think it was a case that one or the other was right. I think it was a case that by midsummer, by the time Dan Simpson was there, the cost-benefit ratio had shifted so that Moose was right, quote-unquote, whereas earlier Tarnoff was right. But it wasn't that one was right and one was wrong, it was that the relative costs and benefits shifted. And the way I put it was, if I remained in Mogadishu, I like to think that I would have reached the same conclusion Simpson did. Simpson was the one who reached that conclusion, but I think I was probably heading in that direction myself.

Q: *What conclusion did he reach, and what happened?*

BOGOSIAN: His conclusion was that it wasn't worth keeping a mission in Mogadishu any longer, that to the extent there was any diplomatic or humanitarian work to be done, you could use Nairobi as your base.

Q: *And fly in and fly out.*

BOGOSIAN: Whatever. And the answer was, yes, we agree.

Q: *How much time was that after you left, Dick?*

BOGOSIAN: Months. Keep in mind that when Tarnoff asked me to go out, he said we want you to stay into next summer. And I think what he meant was, we could get our troops out by then (and in fact, they were out by the end of March) and by then it wouldn't appear that the United States left Somalia with its tail between its legs because of the people who were killed. This gets back to the no more embarrassments. By the summer of 1994, the Clinton Administration could say honestly, we gave it our best shot, it's just not working. And we're not stopping humanitarian assistance, which was the real bottom line of what this was all about. I mean, the other thing to note: I have a meeting tomorrow to talk about Somalia. It isn't as though we've given upon on Somalia. Our ambassador in Addis Ababa has a meeting this week with his colleagues to talk about Somalia. There are efforts underway. Let's just say there's a more realistic sense of how difficult it's going to be, whereas in the early months of 1994, I think between Kouyate and me we thought we were going to have some success. There were news reports that Ali Mahdi and Aideed shook hands, and we thought we had gotten over the hump. But it wasn't that simple, and one of the problems was that these folks had become beholden to their troops, to these guys that ran around in these technicals and shot at people. They needed to pay them, and the way they enriched themselves was by looting and by controlling things like the port and the airport.

The other thing was, of course, that although the troops there were under Chapter 7 authority, which means that they could engage in a military action, none of the troops were willing to fight, and my recollection was some Nepali troops were murdered in the spring, and one by one, one incident after another, the international community just was disenchanted. And then in the UN there were these various votes about how long to extend UNOSOM. And there was a point where the notion was why bother? Now keep in mind that by then the humanitarian crisis just wasn't a crisis any more. Right now today, there are people worried about malnutrition or what have you in Somalia, but by the middle of 1994, the kind of problems that existed a year and a half before, they weren't there any more. In fact, toward the end of my tour, I was going by helicopter from somewhere to somewhere else, and it was just lush, it was beautifully green across the whole country. So in a sense, the situation evolved to a point where the decision to pull out was not as traumatic as it would have been had it been done earlier.

So those were the main elements of Somalia.

Q: *The highlights of the Somalia experience. God, that was difficult. Okay, then, this was the Somalia experience.*

BOGOSIAN: Well, the thing that occurred to me after Somalia was that, having gone through those exciting days of December 1990 in Chad, it never dawned on me that there would be a second feature, and that's what happened essentially in December and November of 1993. That was the really exciting thing, the idea of

that first meeting with Aideed, and all that went with it, simply is one of the most exciting moments of my career, and I emerged from it with no physical damage and with some very exciting times. Needless to say, I was quite ready to leave Somalia when the time came. I was very upset at the thought of the Somali people, in a sense, in a situation that did not promise to get any better soon because, typically, you begin to relate to the people you meet, and the ones who want peace and the ones who wish there was a way out from under their dilemma. I returned to the United States, and by the way, just to note, in the late spring of 1994, one of the members of my staff said, "Did you hear about the helicopter incident?" And I immediately thought one of our troops had been shot or something, but what he was referring to was that incident over northern Iraq where U.S. helicopters shot down another U.S. helicopter that had Barbara Schell among its passengers, and she had been my first deputy chief of mission. And as it happened, I was able to be home for her memorial service, but that was a very sad event for me.

Anyway, I left Mogadishu in mid-June and came back to the United States, and my new assignment was to be the dean of the senior seminar at the Foreign Service Institute. Prior to that my wife and I took a little bit of a vacation where we went to places like Levels, West Virginia, and Pittsburgh, and also Toronto and Ottawa and Montreal and New England. So we saw a lot of old friends and some places we had never been, and it was the perfect way to ease back into the United States. The senior seminar, which for me turned out to be a one-year assignment, was simply wonderful.

Q: *Dick, can you share a bit with posterity, what the Senior Seminar is and why it is, just so that we know what it is.*

BOGOSIAN: All right. Well, the Senior Seminar is meant to be an academic year for a class of about 30 people who are what I call junior senior officers. They tend to be military officers who are likely to become general officers and Foreign Service people who may have just been promoted into the senior levels of the Foreign Service. The year I was dean there was a class of 30, of which 15 were Foreign Service officers from the State Department and then there were one or two civil service people from State, two from USIA, one from AID, one from Commerce, one each from Army, Navy, Air Force, National Guard, Coast Guard, and a few others, so that several federal agencies were represented, military, civilian. Typically, many of them have gone on to be ambassadors or other high-ranking people.

And the notion is that these people probably have been at it about 20 years and its time for them to stop and, first of all, reintroduce themselves to the United States. So the whole focus is the United States. But the other is, if you're in the military, to get a better understanding of what your diplomatic colleagues are doing; if you're in the Foreign Service, to find out a little bit about what some of your other agency and military colleagues are doing. And the interesting thing is that's

exactly what happened. The Marine member was quite forthright in saying he never knew the different things he learned over these months. Some of it was just the interaction of the people themselves. The way the program is run - it was run this way the year I was there, and I think that's typical - there's a lot of travel, and I'll talk about that in a moment, but there are also, over the course of the year, numerous speakers of special interest. For example, in that nine-month period, we had meetings - and I mean really good meetings, intimate, where the individual spoke; it wasn't just some *pro forma* - with four Secretaries of State, with Secretaries Christopher, Shultz, Baker, and Eagleburger, over the course of the whole year. Larry Eagleburger was our last speaker. We met Sandy Berger. Mind you, at the time he was the number two at the National Security Council, but he's still Sandy Berger, and now he's the head of it. We met business people. We met Patricia Ireland, the head of the National Organization for Women. We met a man whose name I can't remember but he heads one of these very strong anti-abortion groups. We met a man whose name I can't remember but we met him the day after the 1994 elections where he gave the most interesting analysis of what happened. You remember that was the year the Republicans took over Congress. We met leading journalists like David Broder and numerous other people who gave us a very rich exposure to numerous, numerous ideas and so forth. We met a fellow from the Russian embassy. This was right after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In addition, the individual students did a number of things. They spent a week doing charity-type work. They did a month on their own, and one fellow who had served in Vietnam went to North Vietnam, to Hanoi. One fellow went to Palau in the Pacific. I can't even remember what he did there. One fellow worked with the Fairfax County Public Schools - John Tefft, now our DCM in Russia, just picked DCM of the Year this year. And so forth. They did all kinds of interesting things. I found one of the most interesting a fellow named Keith Brown, who's now the AID mission director in Addis Ababa. He's from Memphis, and he's African-American, and he spent the month of February 1995 in Memphis and came back and did an analysis of how Memphis had changed after desegregation. And what he found was a city that was more segregated than before segregation, and he explained why. I won't go into it here, but these were very interesting personal projects. And then a few other individual projects.

The core activity, and the thing that gave the seminar its special character, were the trips. And there were some regional trips and some military trips.

Q: *Dick, did you try to shape the seminar at all, or did you find that it shaped itself?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, the short answer is no, and the reason is that by the time I came in to the seminar in early August, the program for the first couple of months had already been done, because arrangements had to be made; but then the whole notion is that the students themselves shape the course. I mean, we tell them that, you know, you're going to have a Northeast trip and Midwest trip and so forth, but then they decide where to go. We advise them, obviously. As a graduate of the

University of Chicago Law School, I undertook to make arrangements to visit the university in the Midwest trip, but that was because the group that was putting the Midwest trip together agreed that that would be a useful thing to do. The first little trip was to Chesapeake Bay. It was a mini-exposure to environment, but the first trip was to Alaska, and that was simply spectacular. We had the use usually of National Guard... Air National Guard aircraft. That's the reason there's a National Guard guy in the course. But we went all over Alaska in a trip that you couldn't buy. I don't think you could buy that trip because we went well above the Arctic Circle. We went to Barrow, the northernmost point of the United States; to the oil fields, and we saw both the beginning and the end of the Alaska Pipeline; to Valdez; and so forth. And I was so smitten with Alaska I haven't gotten over it yet. In fact - no, that was yesterday's Alaska flag. And then, of course, in these places we met local officials-

Q: *Great people.*

BOGOSIAN: For example, we were briefed by people who wanted to get the gold fields in Juneau going again in the Tongass National Forest because, they said, "Look, you know, we need the economic benefits." And we also heard from someone who was almost on the verge of tears when he thought that that pristine forest was going to be spoiled. We made other trips all over the United States - East Coast, West Coast, North, South, you name it.

Q: *That covers what -*

BOGOSIAN: The Senior Seminar?

Q: *No, I just wanted posterity to know what the Senior Seminar was. So you stayed with it for one year as the coordinator.*

BOGOSIAN: Well, as the dean. And of course, that was also in our new National Foreign Affairs Training Center, which is quite an interesting place. I had been a student at the old FSI, but that experience was new for me. It was the first time I was in a part of the system that was part of the management group, as distinct from a functional or geographic office. It was certainly a pleasant place, in that campus atmosphere, and it was perhaps the most... Well, it was just a very nice assignment for a year, and indeed, the Director General of the Foreign Service said to me, "This is your reward for going to Somalia."

Now the interesting thing was that it was a two-year assignment, and in June of 1995, by which time that class that I had been with had graduated and moved on and we were getting ready for the next year, a friend from Chad had phoned with some juicy gossip that she told my wife. And so I wanted to go see the Chad Desk officer the next day to ask about this gossip, and that's in the Office of Central African Affairs, and the head of that Office was Arlene Render, who at present is our ambassador to Zambia. She said, "Is that Bogosian?" She said, "I need you."

And she said, “We want you to be the coordinator for Rwanda, and we’re going to add Burundi to it, too.”

Now Ambassador Townsend Friedman, sometime earlier, had been coordinator for Rwanda, and in the spring of 1995, he had a heart attack while cycling along the Canal and fell in and drowned. So that’s why they needed a coordinator. And I told you that when I was in Chad I was glad I didn’t have to be in Somalia; but when I was in Somalia I was glad I didn’t have to be in Rwanda. Well, they asked me to take on that coordinator job, and I said to myself, you know, the seminar was great, but I thought the next year would be more of the same; and I guess, like some old war horse, I couldn’t resist the temptation to get back into what looked like it could be an interesting job. Now keep in mind that I knew virtually nothing about Rwanda and Burundi, but I agreed to become coordinator. And that’s what I did as my final assignment as a Foreign Service officer, and that lasted until December 31, 1997.
The thing about Rwanda was that in 1994 there was one of the most horrible tragedies of the 20th century, the genocide of Rwanda, where several hundred thousand people were killed. But the thing that gave it its special quality as a subject for us to deal with was that there was a broad perception that the international community failed to respond. Now the principal deputy assistant secretary in the African Bureau at that time was Prudence Bushnell, now our ambassador in Kenya, and shortly after I started working we were having lunch together one day, and I said, “What is it about the Great Lakes of Africa?” which is the way one refers to that set of countries and what’s gone on there. She said, “It’s two things.” She says, “It’s guilt and frustration - guilt over what we failed to do and frustration that we don’t really know what to do.” And that, indeed, is the underpinning of what makes that job what it is because there are many places in the world that have serious crises; but either we don’t get involved, like Tajikistan, or we do get involved, like the Middle East. But in the Great Lakes, the magnitude of what happened in Rwanda in 1994 gives it a moral dimension that not all political crises have, particularly since it’s occurring around the same time as what’s happening in Yugoslavia, where there’s also a moral element to it and where we also weren’t sure of whether to get in and how to get in and so forth.

The other thing about the Rwanda crisis is that it has generated new institutions. And I said to the new Rwanda Desk officer, who came on board about the time I did, “You’re getting into cutting-edge diplomacy. There are things about the way we deal with Rwanda and Burundi and the other elements of that that are different.” There was a UN peacekeeping force there. Now that wasn’t the first UN peacekeeping force, but that’s still a relatively new way of doing business, and we’re not sure what we want to do about it. It was called UNAMIR. And at one point UNAMIR ended, but since then, from time to time, we’ve had to determine whether to have other peacekeeping forces, and it’s a dilemma for the United States. And there’s what I call the “Somalia Syndrome” and the “Rwanda Syndrome”: the Somalia Syndrome says don’t get involved because you’re going

to get hurt, and the Rwanda Syndrome says if you try to stay out you'll be damaged politically, you can't avoid these issues.

Q: *Do you think there was a political damage in the case of Rwanda?*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, certainly in the views of the Rwandans - and many others. There is a sense that we were too timid; we were unwilling to admit that a genocide was taking place; and by the time we reacted to it... There are other things afterwards that -

Q: *Dick, let me just pursue this. If it had been perceived differently, what realistic reactions could one have taken?*

BOGOSIAN: Oh, I think we could have had a much more vigorous military action by UNAMIR. You wouldn't have gotten to the root of the problem, for sure, but you might have prevented the magnitude of the bloodshed, because, you see, that's part of it. The present régime in Rwanda feels that because UNAMIR existed before the genocide, but what happened was when the genocide began they pulled the troops out, and to a Rwandan this is immoral, the very reason you were there, you left when the going got tough. The other part of this, though, is that the people who committed the genocide, the radicals of the Habyarimana régime-

Q: *The radicals of which régime?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, the previous régime in Rwanda.

Q: *The Javier Romano.*

BOGOSIAN: Habyarimana - that's the president's name. They're referred to as *génocidaires*. They dominated, in terms of political organization, the refugees who were just across the border in Zaire. They continued their military engagements -

Q: *We're talking about Tutsi refugees.*

BOGOSIAN: No, no. Hutu.

Q: *Hutu refugees.*

BOGOSIAN: Not all Hutus were refugees, but those refugees were Hutus, and not all of them were *génocidaires*, but the *génocidaires* effectively ran that operation and they basically were financed by the Western countries that provided hundreds of millions of dollars of aid. So to a Rwandan survivor of the genocide, he says, first of all you pulled your troops out. They were actually there, and you pulled them out at the very time they were needed most because you were too timid to

admit that a genocide was going on. But then you provided hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars of aid to refugees who were essentially criminals. And so there's a kind of an international guilt that overhangs this whole Rwandan account.

Q: *I can't debate that, but I'm not aware that that's a widely felt guilt in the United States.*

BOGOSIAN: You may be right. It's a widely felt guilt in Rwanda. And I think, Vlad, it really does underlie our policy, because maybe the public at large doesn't feel it, but surely the people that deal with these issues - the NGO community, political commentators - are well aware of it, and indeed President Clinton, when he was in Rwanda, essentially acknowledged it.

Q: *He did, and raised a lot of eyebrows over why he had to make one more apology on a trip full of apologies, in a way. Let me-*

BOGOSIAN: Well, I can only speak for Rwanda.

Q: *Absolutely. No, because I . . . and this is not a . . . this is not to get in the way of a train of thought, but one of the terrible dilemmas, to me, of Rwanda is that there isn't a good action there, there isn't a good or a winning or an intelligent action that one can take in the face of it, looking back on it. It's a terrible dilemma.*

BOGOSIAN: Well, that may be, and we're faced with it right today in Congo, but in terms of my own job, this is the situation with which I was presented. And the other thing I need to say is that by the time I got involved in this - first of all there was great concern about what was going to happen in Burundi, where there was great tension, and the same elements exist there, and as a result, there was a fear that there could be that. But however it's articulated, in fact, what drives our policy in that region of the world is that there should be no more genocides. So we support the international criminal tribunal for Rwanda. We support a close relationship with Rwanda itself, even though it's become somewhat controversial. There's a Uganda angle to this. And so forth.

Now in terms of my own job, from the summer of 1995 until the summer of 1996, I was the coordinator for Rwanda and Burundi, and there was no one else doing anything like that. After that '96 period we also had Howard Wolpe as the special envoy, and I'll talk about that later. Around the time I got involved, there were two or three things going on. One was a round table - the UNDP round table on Rwanda and the international community beginning to figure out how it should aid Rwanda. This gets complicated, because in the aftermath of the genocide, Rwanda, which is essentially a Francophone country and had been very close to France and that part of Francophonie and all that, the present régime is bitterly opposed to the French because they see them as having helped the previous

régime. And so since we and the French are allies, sometimes that gets very complicated. And when I got going they were bitterly opposed to Zaire and Mobutu, who they felt was abetting all of this, and that was part of the general landscape. As I said, we were concerned about the situation in Burundi. You'd had some very violent ethnic cleansing going on in Bujumbura, the capital, where it was the Tutsis pushing the Hutus around, so this goes in both directions. And there was fear that it was getting out of control.

What I did was, on the one hand, to travel frequently to the region and have high-level meetings with the people involved and then to try to coordinate and manage the account back in Washington. And that got to be rather difficult at times. I crossed the Atlantic 18 times in the first six months of 1996, and we got into the issue of whether UNAMIR should be extended, and I would meet with Paul Kagame, the key leader in Rwanda, and find that they were tough people to deal with. And then all the usual things. We had an embassy in Kigali that people criticized for being uncritical of the régime there. The embassy in Kigali, which was physically the closest to the refugee camps, even though they were in Zaire, was well aware of some of the scandalous development, and they reported it, and there were a lot of people that didn't want to hear this. It was a very emotional subject, I found.

The other thing that was new for me was that the non-governmental organizations, the NGO's, were somewhat more structured than in any other subject I had dealt with, and so they actually had what they referred to as the Burundi Policy Forum. Later it became the Great Lakes Policy Forum. And indeed, just today I was with them again, and they meet regularly. And the humanitarian aid community has kind of a big stake in that, and in '95, they were on both sides of the border because they were still trying to bring Rwanda back from its near collapse, plus the refugees in Zaire. And sometimes they became advocates or partisans for one side or the other.

Q: *Dick, we're in the thick of things right now in the very difficult business of being special coordinator for Rwanda and Burundi.*

BOGOSIAN: There's several things to think about when one talks about this subject, and I'll try to see if I can remember.

By the way, when I refer to the Great Lakes, the lakes they are referring to are essentially Lake Kivu, which is between Rwanda and Zaire (Congo), and also Lake Tanganyika, which is between Burundi and Tanzania on one side and Zaire (Congo) on the other side. And then there are some other lakes, Lake Victoria, Lake Edward, and so forth. The main countries involved are Congo, as it's now called, on the west, and Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania on the East. Now then what happens is that as political developments get underway involving one or the other of these countries, then other countries like Zambia, which is at the southern end of Lake Tanganyika, or Kenya or one of the other neighboring

countries gets involved. In fact, now, in the Congo, you have seven or eight or nine countries involved. But when they say the Great Lakes, that's what they mean.

When in 1995, as Rwanda was emerging from the events of 1994, there was a lot of talk about a Great Lakes Conference, and the notion was if we could have some large political conference that would deal with all the related problems, particularly the refugee problem, that would be the thing to do. And so a certain amount of my time and effort at that stage of the game was on that issue, and in that connection I went to New York from time to time. And at that point, Lansana Kouyate, who had been in Somalia, was the senior person in the Africa part of the DPA, the Department of Political Affairs. And of course, Kofi Annan was in charge of peacekeeping operations and they also had a humanitarian office. I should note that the UN reputation is very bad in the Great Lakes region, and that comes up from time to time now, and there is a general perception among the countries in the region that the UN has dropped the ball. So that's just something to know. Now at the time, there was a diplomat from Cape Verde, and his last name was Jesus, and he was asked to take a look at whether or not one of these Great Lakes Conferences could be put together. And what he found was that the Rwandans didn't want one, and neither did the Ugandans. So while diplomatically we were pushing to have it, in effect, the Rwandans and the Ugandans scuttled it. So then the question was, well, what could be done? And that was the year of the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, and of course, all the world leaders came to New York for that, among them President Museveni of Uganda and President Mobutu of Zaire, who were considered arch-rivals. What emerged was their request that Jimmy Carter play a role in this, so for a good portion of the next year or so, we worked with Jimmy Carter and his people on what might be done in the Great Lakes. Carter had close links with Mobutu in particular, and he was able to get in touch with Mobutu in one way or another, and so off-and-on we would talk to Carter about whatever his latest meeting was, and his staff, in turn, would consult with us about what the latest developments were. And at times it got a little tense. I myself had meetings with him in Atlanta on two or three occasions, and also saw him in Washington, and on one of those occasions he was quite upset over what he thought was not adequate recognition by the Clinton Administration.

Q: *Of his contribution?*

BOGOSIAN: I think it was almost more a human thing: I'm a former President; I'm a Democrat; I deserve a little respect. I forget what he had done, but some letter that was written that he should have gotten was hung up in the Secretariat.

Q: *Was his involvement warmly welcomed by the White House?*

BOGOSIAN: The way I would characterize it was the U.S. government in general and the White House in particular was ambivalent. There was a feeling that he

probably could make a contribution. My sense was that they also saw it as something of a complication. It certainly wasn't negative, but it was not undiluted positive either.

Q: *Do you remember, was this before or after his famous mission to Haiti?*

BOGOSIAN: It was sort of during. I mean, there was also Sudan, there was Korea, there was any number of things going on, and my impression was that there was a kind of grudging willingness to admit that maybe he had done something; but there was also this kind of freelancer who was inserting himself on any number of high-profile issues.

But what Carter did do was he helped organize two conferences, one in Cairo in December of 1995 and one in Tunis in, I think it was, March of '96. And the idea was to get these half dozen leaders together and hope that some form of conflict mitigation could occur. In the event, he really was not able to get much done, but one of the things he did do was to name Julius Nyerere to mediate the Burundi crisis, and that has continued to this day. In that sense, Carter did make a difference. And I think the other thing to say about Carter is once Ambassador Jesus concluded there was no hope for a Great Lakes Conference sponsored by the UN, there was a kind of a void, and what Carter did was to keep the diplomatic ball in the air for a while; and you know, in that part of the world, that's better than people shooting at each other.

Q: *It sure is.*

BOGOSIAN: Now the problem is that at that point in time, keep in mind that I was not responsible for our relationship with Congo, with Zaire, but they were very much part of this, and indeed, at one point I went between Kigali and Kinshasa in an effort to try to improve communications between them because each side was totally misinterpreting at least what the other side's stated position was. But in the long sweep of things I don't think that made much difference. But we were very worried about the situation in Burundi. There were these youth gangs that were, as I say, committing ethnic cleansing in Bujumbura, including at the university.

Q: *These were Tutsi gangs.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, Tutsi gangs. And indeed, as I said, we were very concerned. I mean, the phrase they used was "Burundi might blow up," and there was this fear that they were going to see what happened in Rwanda happen all over again. And one day I said to Kouyate in New York, I said, "We're very worried about Burundi." He said, "Dick, as long as you have a million Rwandan refugees in Zaire, that's the real issue, that's the real area of danger." I mention that because the thing to keep in mind is that these things were going along at the same time. It isn't as though Rwanda happened and then Burundi happened, but they also were

somewhat separate as well. Mind you, when I started there were still tens of thousands of Rwandan refugees in Burundi. There were half a million in Tanzania, but there were over a million in Zaire. And one of the issues was whether the refugees could return, and the Rwandans kept telling us that they can come back, but the leaders of the refugees intimidated them and would not permit them, and they tried to frighten them, saying you'll all be killed and everything. And we were very frustrated because we didn't know what to do, in the sense that military action was not seen as feasible, and the government of Zaire was simply not able to meet its own responsibilities. There was talk of moving the refugees deeper into the interior. That was financially impossible, and so in a sense, we were kind of - what's the phrase? - we were paralyzed, if you will.

Now something happened in the early spring of 1996 that I think in the long run was very important. The two provinces that border Rwanda and Burundi are North Kivu and South Kivu, and in North Kivu there's the so-called Masisi Plain. And in the Masisi region there was a community of Tutsis, Zairean Tutsis; and in the local lingo they refer to them as *Banya Masisi,* 'people of the Masisi.'
Q: *Can you say that again, Banya Masisi?*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, Banya Masisi. What we refer to as the "Ex-FAR Interahamwe;" that is the remnants of the military and the militia of the old Habyarimana régime, was doing its own ethnic cleansing inside Kivu. And so they started pushing these Tutsis out, and they came into Rwanda. And the people who deal with refugee affairs said we're not permitted to help them because they're too close to the border. Now if I was a comic strip wearing a hat, my hat would go off my head, because this was *astounding*. The refugee camps in Zaire were within sight of the Rwandan border. Now they're not supposed to be that close. It was common knowledge that the rules were being abused, and yet they were unwilling to help the Masisi, the theory being we're not going to make the same mistake twice. The problem was that this was proof to Kagame that the international community would not help. You see, every time he thought the chips were down, the international community, he felt, would not do the right thing. And the reason that's important I'll get to later, but that problem existed in the spring. And in the meantime, the remnants of the old régime were attacking across Lake Kivu or incursions into the border and so forth, so that in the summer of 1996 Kagame came to Washington, and he said, "Look, if you're not able to help me, I'm prepared to do something myself." Now one way to interpret that is "if you don't do it I will"; another way to interpret is "if you're not willing to do it, maybe I can help and I'll do it." And that becomes important later on.

But the scene shifted in the summer if 1996 to Burundi because what happened in Burundi in 1996 was - and here I need to stop for a moment. The thing about Burundi that made it different was that in 1992 they adopted a modern constitution that permitted democracy. And in 1993, when Buyoya was the dictator-president, there was an election. He ran, he got 35 percent of the vote, which isn't bad for a Tutsi (which comprise about 15 percent of the population),

but it wasn't enough to win, so a fellow named Ndadaye won, but then he was murdered, and there was a coup attempt by the Tutsi soldiers. The point is that the Tutsis claim that the Hutus tried to commit genocide, and the Hutus claim that the military overthrew a democratically elected president. So there was this turmoil in Burundi.

By the time I came on the scene, there was something in place called the "Convention of Government," which had been worked out by a UN special representative named Ahmadou Ould Abdallah, who is a Mauritanian and presently heads up the Global Coalition for Africa here in Washington, another superb diplomat. Now the critics say that Abdallah's package favored the Tutsis, but on the other hand, at a time when Rwanda was blowing up, he kept that Burundi situation under control. Admittedly, there had been a bit of a bloodletting in Burundi in '93, and as one of our former ambassadors said to me, "I think that'll hold them for a while." But still, Abdallah put together a structure that kept the situation under control and essentially under the Convention of Government. You had a democratically elected parliament that was dominated by the principal Hutu party, although the principal Tutsi party was represented. You had a Hutu president and you had a Tutsi prime minister, but the military was essentially Tutsi, and the power structure was Tutsi.

What was happening in '95 and '96 was that it wasn't working. And as I pointed out, there was ethnic cleansing, there was violence and all the rest.

Q: *Ethnic cleansing here means moving people.*

BOGOSIAN: Killing a couple, kicking them out of the university, kicking them out of their neighborhoods, lots of violence, lots of killing. Now in the meantime, Hutu militias were conducting insurgency in Burundi as well, so everybody is fighting everybody, and lots of refugees, lots of internally displaced, all that kind of stuff.

In the summer of 1996, Buyoya, in effect, mounted a coup, more or less bloodless. In fact, what had happened was Tanzania and Uganda began to make noises of putting a military force in Burundi, with the agreement of the Burundians, in an effort to stabilize the situation. They thought this was all agreed to at Arusha in June of 1996, and in fact, I was in Bujumbura with Howard Wolpe to introduce him. By then he was our special envoy, and we had made numerous trips. Tony Lake, who was the National Security Advisor, George Moose, and I - I mean we had made numerous trips there trying to keep this Burundi thing under control.

Q: *George Moose, who was the assistant secretary for Africa.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, I should note that the day I agreed to take this job, our ambassador in Bujumbura was shot at in his car. So that was the level of danger

that existed there.

I should say that I was in the stadium on National Day when the president announced this plan, and the prime minister said to us, "He blew it." And not within a week or two he was overthrown. In fact, he sought refuge in our ambassador's residence and he stayed there for a year.

Q: *So you were in the stadium in which country, Dick?*

BOGOSIAN: Bujumbura, in Burundi.

Q: *When the President -*

BOGOSIAN: - announced that a deal had been worked out with Uganda and Tanzania. Anyway, Buyoya took over in the summer of 1996.

Q: *How do we spell Buyoya?*
BOGOSIAN: B-u-y-o-y-a.

Q: *Thank you.*

BOGOSIAN: In fact, prior to that he was at Yale. He was looked upon as one of the most admirable African leaders, who had permitted democracy, and he was running some conflict resolution group, and someone came up with a fellowship for him at Yale University. In fact, he was on the same plane that Wolpe and I were on going to Bujumbura. Two weeks later he pulled a coup.

The thing about the coup in Bujumbura was... A couple of things that should be mentioned. First of all, Tony Lake was extremely concerned about what this meant. He was very worried about what might happen, the perpetual fear of massive bloodletting, and in August of 1996, there was a meeting of principals that I happened to attend, where the issue was raised about what do we do about some kind of military force? And there were questions raised about American troops, and as you can imagine, nobody wanted to send American troops there. But in that meeting, following that meeting, Secretary Christopher turned to Peter Tarnoff and me - we were getting ready to ride back to the Department - and said in so many words, "Isn't there anything that can be done?" And one thing led to another, and we began to lay the groundwork for what initially was called the African Crisis Response Force and has since come to be called the African Crisis Response Initiative. And this is a U.S. effort that now is international in character that is meant to develop an African capability to send troops on these humanitarian military operations.

So my point is simply that arising out of the events in Burundi in the summer of 1996 and the dilemma we faced... I had spoken earlier to Congressman Lee Hamilton, where he was expressing concern at this situation, and I said, "Do you

want American troops to go?" He said no. I said, "Would you be willing to help train African troops?" He said yes. So with that in mind, those of us who were familiar with this general notion began to propose it somewhat more formally; and indeed, over the next few months, including the participation of Leon Panetta, who was chief of staff, this idea was essentially born. Now later, other people dealt with it. I didn't. I didn't get into it, although I made a couple of trips in connection with that.

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Q: *Today is October 22, 1998, and this is a continuing interview with Richard Bogosian. Dick, we were getting into the business of being the coordinator for Rwanda last time, and we'd love to hear your thoughts on that subject.*

BOGOSIAN: The day I was asked to be coordinator for Rwanda and Burundi, which I think was June 14, 1995, it happened that our ambassador in Burundi was on the road and some unidentified people shot at him, and in a way, that was emblematic of the kind of instability that existed in Burundi in the summer of 1995. Our ambassador was Bob Krueger, and he had been a congressman and a senator from Texas, also a professor in English specializing in Shakespeare at Duke. When Krueger was shot, there was some concern over his safety. He had become a controversial figure in Burundi, where the power was in the hands of the Tutsis, particularly the military, and where Krueger, in what I think one would have to say was a very courageous way, was unwilling to simply ignore what the various elements of the Tutsi power structure were doing. He said to me that he thought that 90 percent of the killing in Burundi was at the hands of Tutsis, and 90 percent of that was done by the army. Now this was just the reverse of what the problem was in Rwanda, where the Hutus were beating up on the Tutsis. Krueger had become controversial. I visited Burundi shortly after I took over, and I was there on July 9. And essentially I was there overnight because Krueger was leaving the next day to come home on some kind of leave, and he really never went back. I think he may have gone back very briefly to close out, but there was a general sense that it was not safe for him to return.

Q: *Excuse me, was he hit when he was shot?*

BOGOSIAN: No. The vehicle he was in was hit. He had a couple of American security people with him who managed to get him out of there very successfully. He was on some kind of mountain road. They later were rewarded for their ingenuity and so forth. It took some really skillful driving to back up and get him out of the dangerous situation he was in. It was never quite clear whether they realized what they were doing (i.e., the people who fired the shots), whether they were trying to get him or the Burundian who was with him.

Q: *Do we know who it was?*

BOGOSIAN: No, no, we don't - not for sure, anyway; in fact, I don't know if we know who did it. In the background of what I was doing over the next six months was Krueger constantly pressing to get back to Burundi, and the powers that be in the State Department finding one reason or another not to let him get back. And at the one meeting I attended between Krueger and Deputy Secretary Talbott, Talbott made it quite clear that we were worried that he might get killed, and that, of course, would be an incident. In fact, our whole embassy was in a dangerous situation.

On another visit to Burundi, I was sitting at Krueger's desk, and like many congressmen he had pictures all over the place. He has a wonderful picture of Senator Tower refusing to shake his hand and various other memories.

Q: *Why, he voted against Tower?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, Tower, I think, was a Republican and Krueger was a Democrat, I guess something like that. But among the pictures on Krueger's desk... You know, Krueger married a much younger woman, and he was in his 50s and she was, I think, still in her 20s. He told me that he saw her when she was about 15, and about seven or eight years later he finally married her, but whatever it was he knew that's who he wanted. But he had these very young children. In fact, one reason he went home was his wife was going to have a baby, and they knew the exact day and everything. But there was a picture of this gorgeous little blond child peeking out a doorway, and I said to him, "Don't you feel an obligation to her? Why would you want to return and put yourself in that risk?" He said, "Dick" - now this is a man who was a senator, congressman - "I've never done anything as fulfilling as being ambassador to Burundi." So the Foreign Service bug, I guess, hits even political appointees. As you know, he's now ambassador to Botswana.

So that's really just an anecdote. The other thing I would mention just as a kind of initial point to make is that upon becoming coordinator for Rwanda and Burundi, I found that what I was doing was juggling the coordinating function among numerous offices in the Department, numerous agencies that could be very fractions. It was not unusual to find that there was great controversy, either among U.S. government agencies or, say, between non-governmental organizations that were involved, the NGO community, and so forth. But I also had to travel. I traveled over that first year at least once a month. I visited a dozen different countries and a dozen different cities, and including in the United States, so that it was one of the most intense periods of my career. I went to Rwanda and Burundi both fairly often, also Brussels and Nairobi and so forth, for one reason or another. During this time I made one trip to Kinshasa as well, Cairo, Addis, Tunis, Atlanta, New York - it was an extremely intense period. So that's another background element.

When I took over, our principal immediate concern was Burundi, but I need to

mention that at any given time, Burundi may be the focus, Rwanda may be the focus. If this week we were worried about Burundi, Rwanda was really on our minds, and vice versa, so that the two, in one way or another, required independent attention, but at any given moment the two issues were at the forefront of our concerns. What was going on in Burundi in that summer of 1995, and one reason that we were so concerned, was that not only was there an insurgency led by Hutu rebel groups that had a rear area - there's a word I can't think of it right now, but a sanctuary in eastern Zaire - with the *de facto* cooperation of the Mobutu régime, and therefore they could attack the northwest of Burundi at will and conduct other operations, also from Tanzania but particularly from Zaire. There were these gangs of Tutsi youth, mainly in Bujumbura, that were allied to one or another political leader. They were gangs. They were called militias, but they were essentially gangs. And what they were doing, they were going into neighborhoods and beating up Hutus and, in effect, conducting ethnic cleansing. There were incidents at the university, which was dominated by the Tutsis. In fact, one form of discrimination was to permit only Tutsis to have higher education. And so it was a period of considerable tension.

Q: *That's a devastating form of discrimination.*

BOGOSIAN: It is indeed, because then, for example, another form of discrimination was in the military. And when we talked about this with the military, they'd say, well, we'd like to let the Hutus in, but they can't pass the test. And in a sense, that was true, but it was true because they were denied the same educational opportunities. So there was considerable tension in Burundi, and the overall atmosphere consisted of several elements. At one end, people like Tony Lake, who was very much concerned about the Burundi issue, who had a deep emotional attachment - as you may remember, he was assigned to Stanleyville, I think, or maybe Bukavu, to be our consul, and then Kissinger said, no, I want him in Vietnam - but for one reason or another Tony had a deep emotional attachment to this part of Africa.
Q: *He's a serious Africanist.*

BOGOSIAN: Evidently, yes.

Q: *He's written on it, he did his Ph.D. in that area, as I recall.*

BOGOSIAN: I see. I was not aware of that, but what I did know, of course, he was a National Security Advisor at this time, and Susan Rice was the senior Africanist on his staff, and they brought a great deal of intense emotion to this issue. You just mentioned there that his academic links and so on, but the other thing, of course, was the memory of the Rwandan genocide, and they were very much concerned that something like that might happen in Burundi.

Q: *As it has before.*

BOGOSIAN: Indeed. And on the other side of it were Krueger's concerns over the depredations of the Tutsis, his desire to stand up and say so publicly, to be seen to be supporting the Hutus. And as a result, in Washington, there were people who felt that he had committed the cardinal sin of not being objective. I think this presented one of the real dilemmas of trying to deal with this issue, because I admired Krueger's courage in stepping up and saying, look, this is the truth: the people who are running this country, in effect, are committing atrocities. The problem is, once you do that, it's virtually impossible to conduct the kind of diplomacy that is necessary to move the issue along. And so Krueger, as some people said, coming out of the Congress, acted as though he were in the Congress, where the most important thing to do is to take a public stance. And there were people who found this unhelpful. So in a sense, one of the issues we dealt with was Krueger, what do you do with Krueger? And because of the genuine concern over his safety, in effect, shortly after I took over he left Burundi and he was not really there, although he continued to play a role in commenting on the affairs, but our ambassador was not there. And so the task that fell to me, in the absence of an ambassador, on more than one occasion, was to go to Burundi and to try to urge the leaders of the country to keep talking with each other. I had one meeting in Addis Ababa, where I was to meet the prime minister, who was a Tutsi, and the day before, the foreign minister asked to see me privately, and under their so-called Convention of Government, which was the arrangement that a man named Ahmadou Ould Abdallah, the Secretary General's special representative, had worked out to kind of keep peace in the aftermath of the assassination. Well I think I mentioned last time that the democratically elected president had been assassinated, but then his replacement was in that plane that Habyarimana was in that crashed, so the way they worked that out was to come up with something they referred to as the Convention of Government, which was essentially a power-sharing arrangement. And the president, as the constitution dictated, was a Hutu, whose name was Ntibantunganya.

Q: *Can you say that again, Dick?*

BOGOSIAN: The president's name was Ntibantunganya.

Q: *Phonetically?*

BOGOSIAN: It's spelled just the way it sounds. You don't want me to write it down, do you?

Q: *For posterity. Someone has to transcribe it.*

BOGOSIAN: N-t-u-b-a-n-t-u-n-g-a-n-y-a. I think that's right. Some of these names are really not very easy. Anyway, the foreign minister said to me, "I want you to know that in the meeting tomorrow I'll have to keep quiet, but I don't agree with anything the prime minister's going to tell you." So that was the kind of environment that existed. And the prime ministers was considered a moderate.

There was a whole range of opinion and numerous political parties that existed, and so there was not only tension in Burundi over these issues, but there was enough, if not freedom of expression, at least enough public awareness of the positions that it fed that environment.

So I would go to Burundi from time to time and see all the leaders, and my message was you've got to keep talking and not fighting. And others went as well, including Tony Lake. In the spring of 1996, when it was getting particularly tense, he made a trip out there. George Moose made a trip that I accompanied him on.

Q: *George Moose was the assistant secretary for Africa.*

BOGOSIAN: The assistant secretary. Madeleine Albright, our ambassador to the UN, traveled there in February of 1996. So here's little Burundi, in that first year, not only did I make three or four trips, but a number of senior officials. Now that's while at the same time there was a general feeling that the so-called Seventh Floor, Secretary Christopher and Peter Tarnoff, frankly were not too interested in Burundi, so it was not the clearest-cut set of issues in Washington. Now I would say that from July of 1995, when I took the job, until July of 1996, that was what we were dealing with in Burundi, which is to say an effort to keep the two sides talking. And the tension between the Hutus and the Tutsis and the related political parties... These were the moderates. There were more radical people on either end of the equation.

And now while that was going on with Burundi, the situation with Rwanda was different at this particular time. The principal problem in Rwanda was the refugees. Now Rwanda itself was trying to get back on its feet after the events of 1994, and in '95-96, that process was underway. By and large, the country was, if you will, at peace, but clearly there was terrible trauma and suspicion, you know. The survivors suspected those who were linked to the Hutu community. The refugees were frightened of going back. There was certainly in the refugee community an effort by their leaders to heighten that fear and to demonize the régime in Kigali. In the meantime, thousands and thousands of people were being jailed. At that time it was about 30,000, and even that was terribly overcrowded. At one point it got up to about 120,000, and the prison conditions in Rwanda were just unspeakable. I visited a number of prisons in Rwanda during my time, and some of them were like black holes, particularly the local jails, as distinct from the prisons. In some cases, they literally were in boxes on top of each other, if you can imagine big packing boxes on top of each other. So that was one of the problems, and yet the government pointed out that these people were guilty of genocide, and they asked for help; and most of the donors were unwilling to help build jails. So there was a tension between the Rwandans, who felt that the international community let them down by looking the other way while the genocide was taking place, so they were upset that the international community was not helping the survivors while pouring money into the refugee camps, which in turn was misappropriated by the old *génocidaires*. The international

community was concerned about the human rights situation in Rwanda, such things as the jails, a judicial system that essentially was dysfunctional. And this atmosphere has continued up to the present. There was an international peacekeeping operation called UNAMIR, but from a Rwandan point of view it didn't do anything worthwhile, and one of my first tasks in December of '95, was to ask Paul Kagame, the leader, the vice president/minister of defense, to permit UNAMIR to stay for three more months. In fact, they did permit it, but they did it in a way that was chilling. I found in that first meeting Kagame to be kind of a cold fish. In fact, over time, I've developed more respect and admiration for him as a leader, and he has become a little more warm in our meetings, but I discovered that dealing with Rwanda they were in an extreme sense a no-nonsense group, and some of their people were utterly humorless.

Q: *The UN crowd.*

BOGOSIAN: No, no, no, the Rwandans themselves. And the fundamental problem in Rwanda, in that sense, was this deep distrust over the United Nations for one reason or another, while the international community was seen as excessively sympathetic and accommodating to the refugees, who in turn were linked to the *génocidaires*. And to a Rwandan this is terribly unfair and illogical. But just to note that that was a part of this.

And for me as a diplomat, this was all new. Mind you, I had dealt with a peacekeeping operation in Somalia, but in Rwanda we were doing things that were new. I don't think anybody had ever faced a genocide like this. No one had faced the kind of problems that went with the prison situation, where we were unwilling to help them, and yet we complained that they weren't doing more. And yet no one denied that these people probably were guilty of crimes. It's still an issue in Rwanda, and nobody's come up with an answer. The International Criminal Tribunal was a mess, and nothing much was happening at that stage, and yet it presumably was the symbol of international concern over genocide.

For the first time there was a human rights field operation in Rwanda, but it was ineffectual as well. So we were trying to do new and innovative things that were not immediately successful, and the government in the mean time wanted traditional aid, some of which they got, but they weren't satisfied with it. So there was a generally sour atmosphere.

Now that said, the U.S. was among the most accommodating to the Rwandans, and we were increasingly seen as Rwanda's patron. There was a recognition that Kagame, who for a time was in the Command General Staff College, had links to the United States, and it was an open secret that many people in the United States, including the U.S. military had great admiration for him as a soldier; and combined with the deep antipathy between France and Rwanda, over time, including later in 1977, people like Emma Bonino, the head of the European Community Humanitarian Organization, were openly critical of the United States,

and all kinds of allegations about our military assistance and all the rest - most of which is wrong. Our assistance is quite modest, but it became quite a symbol (and I'll mention this again a little later).

Now at the time when we were very worried about the Burundi situation, I had a meeting with Lansana Kouyate, who you remember was a colleague of mine in Somalia, and at this point he headed up the African part of the Department of Political Affairs in New York, and I would see him from time to time, and at one time I said we are worried about the Burundi situation. He said, "Dick, as long as there are a million refugees on the border of Rwanda, that's your most urgent problem."

Q: *Meaning? What does that mean?*

BOGOSIAN: What he meant was -

Q: *You can't do two things at once?*

BOGOSIAN: No, what he meant was that one way or the other there could be a war, and in that part of the world when you talk about war, you talk about the possibility of genocide. In effect, what the situation was was that, although the so-called RPA, the Rwanda Patriotic Army, had defeated the Habyarimana régime, they did so only in the sense that they got him out of Rwanda. But they still existed in the refugee camps, and therefore, in their point of view, the civil war continued; it was just that they were in the refugee camps and Kagame and company were in Kigali. So the threat of war and the threat of genocide continued. As a result, there was a feeling among many, including many in the United States, that some kind of international conference was needed; and the United Nations, in the latter part of 1995 - I think I mentioned this previously - took a look at this and, in a word, concluded that it wasn't going to work. Then at the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, Yoweri Museveni, the president of Uganda, and Mobutu, the president of Zaire, although enemies of each other, asked Jimmy Carter to take the lead in putting together a summit.

And so there was a summit meeting in Cairo in December of 1995, after which I went to Kigali, where I made the démarche on UNAMIR, and then on to Kinshasa, where I tried to urge the Zaireans to be more forthcoming with the Rwandans, having made the same démarche with the Rwandans. There was another summit meeting in Tunis, in March of 1996. The main thing that emerged in the end from these summits was to name Julius Nyerere to be the facilitator of Burundi peace talk.

Q: *Could you tell us who was at these summits?*

BOGOSIAN: The summits were attended by the presidents of Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, Uganda, and Tanzania, plus Jimmy Carter and there probably was someone

there from the UN - I can't remember now whether they were represented or not.

Now as we got into 1996, I mentioned the high level U.S. visitors, I mentioned the strains in Burundi, and I mentioned that the Convention of Government was under great strain; and around that time Abdallah left Burundi, which meant that one of the most important diplomats, the man who probably had an ability to keep things moving, was no longer present in Burundi, and his role has never really been repeated by anyone in Bujumbura. And gradually, Nyerere began to figure out how he would work some kind of mediation. In the spring of 1996, something happened that in the event had profound implications for the region. The Tutsis in North Kivu, in the Masisi Plain, were the victims of ethnic cleansing there.

Q: *Ethnic cleansing? You mean they were moved out.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, essentially by Rwandan Hutus who had done the genocide in Rwanda. They had become a military force in that part of Zaire.

Q: *And moved the Tutsis out.*

BOGOSIAN: Well, pushed. *Pushed* is the word. And they went to Rwanda to seek sanctuary. And the international refugee establishment decided that they could not be given assistance because they were too close to the border. Now this outraged the Rwandans, who had seen hundreds of millions of dollars given to the Hutu refugees within sight of the border. The thinking by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and those in the United States responsible for refugee policy was, we don't want to make the same mistake twice; but in the context it was absurd. This occurred at a time when there were beginning to be incursions by insurgents across lake Kivu into Rwanda for the purpose of committing what amounted to guerilla attacks.

On our side, during the spring of 1996, many of us were beginning to conclude that the refugee situation was becoming intolerable. The under secretary for global affairs, Tim Wirth, who had some responsibilities, among other things felt that the cost, the financial cost, was unsustainable. He also worried about the food that had to be provided. We therefore attempted to see if there was any way we could get around the problem. Now the thing to keep in mind was, as Mrs. Ogata, the UN high commissioner for refugees, has pointed out, no political entity, nor the United Nations as such, was willing to undertake the security aspect of this. The UNHCR paid some Zaireans to perform police functions, and in fact, it worked reasonably well, but the kind of going in there and disarming the refugees nobody was willing to do. Nor was anybody willing to come up with the money to move the refugees farther away from the border. And the international community had somehow gotten in to a case of suspended animation where these refugees were concerned. They were willing to put up the money to feed them and run the camps, but the camps as they existed violated most of the rules. There was political activity, there was military activity, it was an open secret they were too

close to the borders. But whenever anybody tried to think of what to do, nothing happened.

So in the spring of 1996, we thought something had to be done, and we began to examine what might be done, and we developed some ideas of our own. We consulted with the European Union, who had a special envoy named Aldo Ajello-

Q: *Would you repeat that, Aldo Ajello?*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, A-j-e-l-l-o. That's how you spell Ajello, an Italian politician who had done very good work in Mozambique and was the EU special envoy for the Great Lakes.

Q: *Dick, can you just share for a minute, when you say, "We did this," can you explain-*

BOGOSIAN: We the U.S. government.

Q: -*who the* we *was?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, it was an interagency group. It was the African Bureau, the Refugee Bureau, the National Security Council, AID - the different people who tried to develop. . . and it was nothing heroic. It was almost like a work to rule, in other words, start applying some of the UN rules, do a census. There was a feeling that there was an exaggeration of the number of refugees. Our embassy in Kigali was reporting that a number of abuses and violations of refugee rules, and not everybody wanted to pay attention to the reporting. And in fact, the embassy was being criticized for being overly supporting of the Rwandan position. Of course, the embassy in Congo was in Kinshasa, which was very far away, and they really weren't able to provide the sort of close-up view that one might have wanted. We, as I say, consulted with the UNHCR as well. In short, during this period where in the spring there was lots of work going on and consultations with a view toward trying to get this refugee situation off dead center, in fact, nothing happened, but I'll explain later what did happen, but at least there was an effort underway to do this.

Now I'll just note, going ahead a little bit, that in May there were three meetings in Geneva. There was something that we put together called the Rwanda Operational Support Group, which was essentially all the governments and international agencies that were involved coming together at our request to discuss what to do. There was a UNDP roundtable on Rwanda, and there was also another meeting on Burundi; and at that meeting we explained that we felt something had to be done on the refugee issue and we intended to move a little more vigorously. And indeed, some people were rather upset that we were pushing that issue. I think the most significant event, though, in the context of which I'm speaking, was in the August of 1996, when Kagame came to the

United States and said, in effect, as he later said publicly, "You need to do something about this refugee situation. We cannot tolerate it." It was a direct threat to the national security of Rwanda. And we gave an answer that was, from his point of view, equivocal. And then he said something that can be interpreted, too, as... "He said, in effect, "If you don't want to do it, we will." Now what he may have meant was, "If you don't care to do it, maybe you'd like to have us do it." Or he may have said, "If you don't do it, damn it, I'm gonna do it."

But I'll leave that there for the moment, because what happened after the May meeting was that the situation in Burundi began to unravel. There was increasing tension, and the new development in the Burundi context was that Uganda and Tanzania, and to some extent Kenya, began to talk about putting their own troops in Burundi, not as an invasion force but as an effort to help the Burundians pull themselves together. And they met at Arusha and put forward a plan. And the Burundians, at first blush, appeared to accept it, both the Tutsis and the Hutus, that is to say, both Ntibantunganya, the president, and the Tutsis prime minister. And around that time, Howard Wolpe, who by then had been named our special envoy for Burundi negotiations, and I visited Bujumbura.
Q: *Wolpe with a* W.

BOGOSIAN: Yes, the former congressman. We were at the stadium in Bujumbura, where the president, on a National Day (I think it was July 1, but I may have the dates wrong), said in effect that they had just been in Arusha and they accepted the Ugandan-Tanzanian plan. Now traditionally it has been anathema to the Tutsis that any foreign military will set foot in Burundi. You know, the crowd basically didn't respond much one way or the other, but later, we talked to the prime minister, and he said to us that the president had blown it, and he was very worried about what would happen. And in fact, shortly thereafter, he (the president) was threatened physically in a provincial town, and that was the signal for a change of government. And Ntibantunganya sought refuge at the U.S. ambassador's residence, where he stayed for nearly a year.

Q: *Who was the U.S. ambassador at that time?*

BOGOSIAN: His name is Morris Hughes, "Rusty," as everybody -

Q: *Morris N. Hughes.*

BOGOSIAN: I don't know if there's an *N* there.

Q: *Rusty Hughes.*

BOGOSIAN: Rusty Hughes. In fact, he had just gotten there very shortly before this.

Q: *So he had a guest.*

BOGOSIAN: He had a guest. But Buyoya, who been the president that permitted the democratic takeover, in effect, mounted a bloodless coup, and that caused great concern in Washington, because what happened then were two things. The neighbors of Burundi - Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zaire - met at Arusha and decided to impose economic sanctions on Burundi. They said they could not tolerate a military takeover of a democratically elected government, or at least the legitimate successor of a democratically elected government - which in the context of African development is an amazing development, that the Africans themselves, on their own, made that statement, which was later endorsed by the OAU.

The other thing that happened, though, was that again in Washington, particularly Tony Lake became very concerned about the Burundi situation. No one quite knew what was going to happen in the aftermath of the coup in Burundi. Everybody worried that there might be military activity of one kind or another, and Lake, at a meeting in August at the White House, raised the issue of some kind of peacekeeping presence, and he made the point that if no one else did it maybe the Americans should do it. It became quite clear that other principals had no desire to do that.

Q: *"Other principals" meaning who?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, the Secretary of State, the chief of staff of the armed forces - who didn't say no, but it was fairly evident that there was little enthusiasm.

Q: *Can you tell me, what kind of things was Tony Lake looking for? What kind of involvement?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, in effect, what Lake was saying was there was a crisis brewing in Burundi, and it was intolerable to stand by and watch another genocide happen; and he posed questions about what could be done, and in the absence of any existing peacekeeping capability, the issue inevitably turned to, well, would the Americans go in? Now the matter never came to a vote in the meeting.
Q: *Do you have the impression that he favored that the United States should go in?*

BOGOSIAN: No, that's really not my impression, but my impression was that if all else failed, he was willing to give that serious consideration. And the issue then became what recommendation to make to the President, and I think what was perhaps a little more relevant here was that secretary Christopher was quite concerned about the implications of that conversation, in part because around that time there was also a discussion about what should be done in Bosnia, and he was concerned that whatever actions were taken with respect to Burundi might have some negative spillover vis-à-vis Bosnia. From our own conversations we were pretty sure that Congress was not interested in sending U.S. troops to Burundi, so

the dilemma was, well, then what do you do, what can be done? Whereupon Secretary Christopher turned to Peter Tarnoff and me and said, in effect, "What might we do?" And we both mentioned that there had been some notion of training Africans to do the peacekeeping role, and there were some precedents for that in one way or another. And Secretary Christopher said, in effect, all right, do some thinking about that. And when we got back to the Department, Peter Tarnoff charged me with coming up with the first paper on that, and in a word my staff fleshed out the idea of what soon came to be called the African Crisis Response Force, or the ACRF.

Q: *Dick, who was your staff?*

BOGOSIAN: I had at that point three Foreign Service officers. Don Heflin was the Rwanda Desk officer. Alex Laskaris was the Burundi desk officer; and Susan Keogh was the somewhat more senior person who covered everything that somehow-

Q: *Susan Keogh, spelled-*

BOGOSIAN: -K-e-o-g-h.

Q: *How about Susan Rice? Was she involved in this?*

BOGOSIAN: She was involved, because she was at the White House, but she wasn't assistant secretary at that time.

Q: *George Moose was the assistant secretary. Thanks.*

BOGOSIAN: But the point here is to note that over the late summer - July, August, into September - Burundi was at the top of our attention, and in the fall of 1996, George Moose and Susan Rice went to Africa to sell the ACRF idea, and I accompanied some other White House official, Nancy Soderberg and others, to Europe, to try to sell the idea. And it turned out to be not that easy. Many of our interlocutors were not too keen to see something that didn't have a UN or an OAU label, and in Paris, at the Elysées Palace, a senior official named Dupuch said, "I'm happy to talk about this, but don't say the word Burundi."

Q: *Ah, that's* courage *for you.*

BOGOSIAN: So that's what we were dealing with. Now I would just note that that idea has gradually developed into something which we now call the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). So that was into the fall of 1996, and then something happened that in effect diverted our attention yet again, in terms of what, if you will, was almost the climax of my two-and–a-half year assignment. I had mentioned that the Masisi Tutsis had fled and, in effect, the international community left them high and dry. In fact, the UNHCR did help them a little bit,

but they had to do it surreptitiously, because officially they weren't supposed to help. John Shattuck, who was our assistant secretary for human rights and humanitarian affairs, and I visited that camp in Rwanda in the spring of 1996. But in the late summer and early fall of 1996, another Tutsis group, from South Kivu, who were referred to as the Banya Mulenge, and who have been-
Q: *The BanyaMulenge?*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, it means 'the people of Mulenge.' One of them is *Omanule*Mulenge, but several of them are *Banya*Mulenge.

Anyway, these are Tutsis who have been living in Congo, Zaire, for a couple of hundred years, and there's always been this issue of their citizenship.

Q: *For a couple of hundred years - am I right that the Congo, Ruanda, and Urundi were all under Belgian control, and there still is a citizenship problem, even though these people were -*

BOGOSIAN: Well, it has to do with Zairean citizenship, where evidently some Zairean Congolese do not consider them real Congo Zaireans. But they thought they had the citizenship, and then some time in the summer of 1996, I believe the deputy governor of South Kivu, in effect, told them they had to leave. But the difference between the Banya Mulenge and the Banya Masisi was that they said, no, no, no, and they fought. And what they did was they responded with guns, and the first thing they did was to take over the town of Uvira, which is on the western shore of Lake Tanganyika, immediately opposite Bujumbura, and then they moved north and took over Bukavu, and ultimately they took over Goma on Lake Kivu. And in the process, they began to radically disrupt what I referred to as the "refugee gulag," these refugee camps all along that eastern frontier of Zaire. And it became apparent that a major change was underway and our own plans were becoming obsolete by the moment. One of the things that happened is that in, I think, October some of us met in New York. Mrs. Ogata, the head of the refugee agency, I believe also Carol Bellamy of the World Food Program - or Bertini, I think is the World Food Program - happened to be at this meeting - a lot of UN people and Phyllis Oakley, who headed our refugee office, and I. And we agreed that this was the time to make a major move on the refugee issue. By that time, virtually all the Rwandan refugees who had been in Burundi had returned, with no great disruption, and the government of Rwanda had said that the refugees could come home and they would not be attacked or anything. There was skepticism, but the Burundi example suggested that they were being honest. So at the New York meeting we concluded that this was the time to get the refugees home, and there was a feeling that if they could get to Rwanda they would be all right, but they needed protection in Zaire, which was anarchic, and we began to talk about some kind of multinational force, or an MNF. Shortly thereafter, I went to Kigali, in November of 1996, and the notion was, initially, that I would shuttle between Kigali and Kinshasa in an effort to get the two countries to work together. In fact, I never went to Kinshasa on that trip, but I briefed Kagame on what we were

going to do. He in turn said to me, are you - you, the international community - is your MNF going to be willing to - and I should note that we were asking to have staging rights in Kigali as well as in Entebbe up in Uganda - and he said, "Are you willing to disarm the refugees?" And under instructions I said, "Well, no, we're not." And that proved to be a critical point in the story.

Q: *Dick, could you elaborate on that? Why was this such an important issue, the disarming of the refugees, and why were you under instructions?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, our instructions were that we were unwilling to enter into a combat situation. What we were doing was we had been prepared in principle to provide military elements for humanitarian purposes, which is to say the return of the refugees - quasi police, in UN parlance, Chapter Six authority. And I guess the assumption was that in the destruction of the refugee camps that had taken place, the refugees would go home, and if there was an international force there the armed elements would refrain from attacking. We simply didn't have the authority to agree to that. What happened *de facto* was that Kagame concluded that the international community was unwilling to take the actions that would once and for all destroy the ex-FAR military capability. And so he undertook to do it himself. Now what you had was an alliance in fact that included Rwanda, Uganda, and the Banya Mulenge. I was about ready to come home. I was at the airport in Kigali. I think it was a Friday. As I was just about ready to board the plane, the embassy expediter got a phone call, and he looked at me and he said, "You're not getting on." And George Moose instructed me to stay in Kigali. As I was leaving, I saw someone from the World Bank, and they said, "We understand 40,000 refugees have crossed back into Rwanda." I said, "I think you must be mistaken, because that sounds like an exaggeration," because hardly any refugees had returned. But in fact, this was the beginning of a massive return of about a million refugees between mid-November and the end of January, first from Zaire and then from Tanzania, where there were about 500,000. And it was one of the most dramatic movements of people that had ever been seen. What had happened also was that a military force, presumably including Rwandans, attacked - I think it is - the Mulenge Camp, which is one of the largest of the camps, and there was a major battle. And then, as they say, the rest is history, because what happened was initially the Banya Mulenge and their allies one by one took over parts of the Kivu, which border Rwanda and Uganda, but then they went on, and they took Kisangani, and even though Mobutu kept saying we're going to mount an offensive, a counter-offensive, and they brought in mercenaries, including Serb mercenaries, in fact the Zairean army, the Forces Armées Zaïroises, or the FAZ, just simply evaporated. I don't think they fought one real battle, and over the next six months, from November of '96 till May of '97, this group crossed Zaire, essentially on foot, and one by one took over every major city in the country until, ultimately, Mobutu was overthrown. Now in Kigali-

Q: *How did Kabila join with this group?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, I was going to say, in Kigali at that time, Kabila was present, and I believe I was the first American official to be authorized to have a meeting with him. We met one-on-one in the ambassador's residence, and he came in, he had on casual clothes and a baseball cap. And I said to myself, he looks like Louis Armstrong, which after the severe, austere attitude of the Rwandans seemed strange.
Q: *Jovial.*

BOGOSIAN: Now what Kabila said to me was that he thought Mobutu was a crook. He thought everybody else, all the other political class were corrupt, and that his aim was to overthrow Mobutu. So in that sense, Kabila-

Q: *Just told you flat out.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes. I had two meetings with Kabila while I was in Kigali. Now of course, we also talked about human rights and all that, but what was clear was that Kabila had a political objective that required Mobutu to go, because what Kagame had said was that he didn't think it was up to the Rwandans to determine who should rule Zaire, but he would take actions to preserve the national security of Rwanda, which meant ultimately and finally defeating the ex-FAR, who were in Zaire, but were Rwandans.

And the point here is that that particular set of circumstances had a Rwandan dimension, but it had a Zairean dimension, and certainly after the takeover of Kisangani, it was really the Zairean dimension that was the dominant one. Now this situation, what you might call the Banya Mulenge revolt (ultimately they referred to themselves as the ADFL, the-

Q: *The ADFL.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes.

Q: *I remember the Forces Liberation-*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, of Congo-Zaire, is what they called it.

Q: *We can plug that in later.*
BOGOSIAN: It ultimately led to the collapse of Mobutu and the installation of Kabila, who originally was just the spokesman of a small group. He was not the leader, but he kind of - took it, and they let him take it. He was their front man, but ultimately he became the president.

As I said, over a million refugees returned to Rwanda, and one result of that was that among them were enemies of the régime, and the insurgency inside Rwanda, particularly in the northwest, which is where Habyarimana was from, resumed, and it's still going on.

Q: *It's still going. Dick, can I ask, you met with Kabila early on. You were the first American.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, in this incarnation.

Q: *In this incarnation of Kabila, the first American to meet with him. Can you tell us a little about the man? How did he strike you as a person?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, around the time this was going on, our ambassador in Kinshasa, Dan Simpson, who you'll recall replaced me in Mogadishu, he said, "This man is a buffoon. Nobody takes him seriously." And I didn't know what to make of him, because his physical appearance, as you said, was sort of jovial. There was an inclination to maybe ascribe a level of joviality that didn't exist. But if you took the words he said, there was nothing remarkable. He made it quite clear that he had a political objective, that he had been a lifelong opponent of Mobutu. We knew that he had a Marxist background. He, obviously, said things that we wanted to hear: you know, I'm for human rights and democracy and so forth. It was hard to know whether he was serious. I think in a sense it wasn't so much what he was like, but we were working under the assumption that he was, if not under the control of Kagame and Museveni, at least subject to their views as well.

Q: *In what way? Did he strike you as a buffoon at all?*

BOGOSIAN: No, not necessarily, not at that time - but, again, I wouldn't try to profess that in those two meetings... Now I had two meetings with him in Kigali; I had one or two phone conversations with him some months later. But of course, I haven't had anything to do with him in the recent past.

The Banya Mulenge revolt, as I've said, led to the collapse of Mobutu and so forth, the return of the refugees. The other thing we need to note is in those six months or so, when that ABFL was crossing Zaire, without question there were terrible human rights violations and probably war crimes, and certainly allegations of terrible war crimes, and some investigation of them. And as we speak, that issue has never really been satisfactorily resolved.

Another thing that came out of that was, particularly in papers like *The Financial Times*, a kind of a popular sense that there was new kind of African, and many of us who know the people they speak of, who include Kagame and Museveni and Meles of Ethiopia and Isaias of Eritrea, they link Kabila with them. Kabila is not a "new African." If anything, he's an old African. He's out of the 1960s and so forth. At one point, these names began to be linked with a so-called "African renaissance," which by 1998 has become something of a stale phrase, in the light of some problems that exist now. But there was a period there with the overthrow of Mobutu and the kind of decisive action that people like Kagame took, where

you began to say, boy, these guys, there's something about them that's exciting. Whether people still feel that way, I'm not so sure.

One of the things that happened as a result of that six-month episode was, first of all, the French picked the wrong side in Zaire, and evidently it led to some real introspection on the part of the French. Because now, in addition to Rwanda, they had apparently "lost, " quote-unquote, Zaire, which is the second-largest French-speaking country in the world. I'm not in the position to comment much more than that, but it was an element, certainly one of the things that contributed to the atmosphere. As I mentioned before, there was severe criticism of the behavior of the Rwandan troops in some quarters, and that translated into bitter criticism of the reporting coming out of our embassy in Kigali. Intense, extremely - I don't want to say "violent" because I don't think any punches were thrown, but - serious disagreements over just how many refugees there were and how many returned to Rwanda and, therefore, how many were killed or lost during this. And our embassy in Kigali started with the assumption that the number the UNHCR used was obviously inflated, and therefore its conclusion of how many refugees came back, and therefore of how many were left, was much smaller than the number used by the Europeans and some others. So there was a lot of criticism of the United States. We were seen as too supportive of the Rwandans, unwilling to call them for their human rights violations.

Q: *Dick, can I ask, was there any sense of whose figures were the more accurate?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, we think ours are, and the French say, look, the numbers we used, that we have to use, are the UNHCR numbers. You might not like them, but nobody has a more authoritative number.

Q: *And the criticism of the embassy in Kigali was by whom, Dick?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, you name it. By the refugee community. When Peter Whaley, our political officer-

Q: *But not within the U.S. government.*

BOGOSIAN: Oh, yes, indeed.

Q: *Can you enlighten?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, when Peter Whaley was given AFSA's award for courageous reporting, Lionel Rosenblatt, the head of Refugees International, wrote a letter bitterly critical of this action.

Q: *Who's Peter Whaley, from the embassy?*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, he was our political officer, who had earlier, when he was in

Kinshasa, got a reporting award. I think it's fair to say that virtually the entire community and UNHCR, the NGO's dealing with the refugees - not the ones in Rwanda, but the others, the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration-

Q: *In the State Department.*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, they were bitterly critical of Peter Whaley.

Q: *I see, so they were bitterly critical of the embassy in Kigali.*

BOGOSIAN: Also Ambassador Gribbin.

Q: *What was the ambassador's name?*

BOGOSIAN: Gribbin. G-r-i-b-b-i-n.

Q: *Right, right.*

BOGOSIAN: And what they did was they reported the facts as they understood them, but those facts led to conclusions that the refugee program in Zaire was terribly abused and corrupt and mishandled, with the result that the criticism was levied against the UN High Commission for Refugees, and so forth. And that was a very controversial issue that we dealt with in those days.

Now I would just note that this issue took us into the spring of 1997, and I would say that by that time I was coming toward the end of my assignment. Now there were a couple of other things that happened in '97 that I might mention. In February and March of 1997, for the first time, the government of Burundi and the main opposition, that is, insurgent group (referred to as the CNDD, and don't ask me what that stands for - I think the DD stands for *development and democracy* - but they're the ones that had the most significant military group), they sat down in Rome, under the auspices of a group called Sant'Egidio, which is a lay Catholic conflict resolution group, for some talks. And because Howard Wolpe was not able to be there, I attended those meetings for the U.S. government. And the significance of those meetings was that it was the first time - and at the time they were secret; they later were publicized - that the government sat down with the rebels in an effort to negotiate their differences. In fact, the meeting was not particularly successful, but it was an important breakthrough for each side. In May of 1997, I along with John Shattuck chaired a meeting in Geneva where we took a hard look at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which had been doing a very poor job, and the UN inspectors were very critical of it. And we met separately with the Rwandan delegation and a group of people from the Tribunal, including the new prosecutor, Mrs. Abour, as well as a private meeting among the donors to say, look, you've got to clean up your act. And in fact, I think that meeting did lead to some improvements in the Tribunal.

But in fact, by the summer of 1997, my empire was drifting away. By then the issue - Kabila and all of that - it was a Congo issue, and our director of Central African Affairs, Mark Baas, was-

Q: *Mark who?*
BOGOSIAN: Baas, B-a-a-s. Howard Wolpe was the special envoy for Burundi negotiations. He was the one who was mainly in touch with both the Burundians and the Nyerere. The ARCF/ACRI issue had become so big that Ambassador Marshall McCallie was brought in to head a whole office dealing with that. We had a new front office team, with Susan Rice as the assistant secretary and Johnny Carson as her principal deputy. And Susan, to use Johnny Carson's word, "permitted" me to be part of the inner cabinet, but in fact, my responsibilities were changing as various others took on some of these special tasks. I should note that over the course of the previous two years, an effort was made to permit me to extend, because my official resignation was to have been September of 1996 and George Moose wanted me to stay on. And the personnel system came up with something called a limited non-career appointment, which permitted me to stay a year after my resignation. Then Susan and George asked that it be extended another year, and the system said no, but they did permit a three-month extension, and so my final day was December 31, 1997. And then seven weeks later I was transformed into an AID contractor essentially doing the same thing, sitting in the State Department working on the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative and continuing to perform some of the functions of a coordinator.

I would just say that there were maybe two or three other final notes during that last period. During that last half of 1997, there were two or three things that were going on. One was in the aftermath of the war crimes, the UN system put together an investigation of what had happened, and it was star-crossed from the beginning. It never really got going, it was fairly inept, plus it didn't get much cooperation from the Congolese. In fact, my last conversation with Kabila was to urge him to cooperate, and it was clear he had no great desire to do so. One of the things that happened was that, as the criticism of the Rwandans intensified, some members of Congress or their staffs became critical of our modest military assistance program. And whereas I had testified after I returned in late 1996, they called me up in informal meetings and said, in effect, you said everything was going to be all right and it isn't all right. And one of them said, "In the light of everything that's happened, don't you think you should review your policy to Rwanda?" And in fact, we did, but that effort got only so far because in December of 1997, Secretary Albright went to the region, and then in early 1998, the President went to the region. And really, it's out of those trips, where the President went to Rwanda and apologized for the failure to act earlier at the time of the genocide, and one of the last things that I was able to get started at least was something called the Great Lakes Justice Initiative, where we began to think that maybe what we needed to do was make a special effort to improve the justice systems in those three countries of Rwanda, Burundi, and Congo. For one reason or another, we have not been able to get too much done on that. There are certain

legal and other impediments to having an assistance program in either Congo or Burundi. We do have a lot of justice programs in Rwanda, and it will be the focus of our action. I'm not sure how much funding is available. But as my assignment ended, those were the things we were working on, and at one point, it ended, as did my career in the Foreign Service.

Q: *Dick, this is fascinating. Can I ask a couple of things? One is sort of historical As one of the last things you did, you set up a Great Lakes Justice Initiative for three countries, primarily.*

BOGOSIAN: Well, I said I set in train a policy that hopes to achieve that.

Q: *Primarily for three countries. These three countries were three Belgian colonies* - the *three Belgian colonies in Africa. Do you think Belgium is a cause of this astonishing insensitivity and instability in those three countries, which really exceeds that elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa?*

BOGOSIAN: My sense from what I've read and from such discussions as we have had is that, first of all, there were certain objective factors. It may have been fine for a while for the Tutsis, who were herdsmen in an area where cows are wealth, to in effect have the upper hand; and maybe that was, quote-unquote, "the natural way of doing things." It's no longer tolerable, and that's not only in that part of Africa, it's all around the world. But I think probably what has happened is two things that are a function also of the time. When the Germans and then the Belgians were ruling in this part of the world, they had certain racial notions that tended to favor the Tutsis. They had persuaded themselves that these people were really Hamitic, and therefore not quite as Negroid as the Hutus. They were, in fact, something of a royal or regal people. They are, in fact, in many ways, impressive, physically and otherwise.

Q: *Mentally.*

BOGOSIAN: And so forth. For example, in Burundi, with all its problems, the Tutsis over the years have developed a rather high reputation of financial management, relatively honest, relatively clean, and all the rest. There is a general perception that if the Hutus took over it would be nowhere near as clean. So it's hard to get over those things. I would say that there was something about the way the Belgians thought and administered their colonies that was contributorily negligent to this problem, and the most vivid case is when they brought into being in Rwanda the idea that on your identity card you should be identified as a Hutu or a Tutsis. That simply wasn't done before. And so, I think, the raw material was there, but I think the Belgians exacerbated it by their [racism].

Q: *Let me ask another one and, Dick, maybe - you do whatever you like - you'll see a transcript of this; you may just want to throw these things out if they don't fit in with the rest of the transcript - but you mentioned a while back that you and*

Tim Wirth had made a trip, under secretary for global affairs-

BOGOSIAN: No, John Shattuck.

Q: *I'm sorry, John Shattuck and you had made a trip, and earlier you had mentioned that Wirth had taken an interest in this. Can you comment a bit on whether Tim Wirth in the under secretaryship for global affairs was helpful to you?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, when I came into the position, I was told that I should report to Wirth.

Q: *By whom, by Wirth?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, the Secretary or his office put out a list of all the special coordinators and the vast majority of them were reporting to Peter Tarnoff. I think maybe one or two reported to the under secretary for economics. But I think there were two, possibly three, reasons. First of all, the issues in Rwanda and Burundi really revolved around human rights, refugees, and humanitarian affairs - our interests were largely humanitarian - and that really was between the human rights bureau, DRL, the refugee bureau, PRM; those were under Wirth's domain, so there was a certain logic to it. Secondly, there was this idea that if Tarnoff already had half a dozen reporting to him, give one to Wirth, because it didn't make sense to just load them on Tarnoff - although Tarnoff's office, as did Talbott's, kept close tabs on what was going on. And then the less charitable one was this is Africa, so who gives a damn, give it to Wirth because no one cares anyway. You know, the Supreme Court, if it can avoid deciding on Constitutional issues, does so, and you don't have to get that far to conclude that it was logical and sensible to give it to Wirth.

Q: *Was he helpful?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, let's put it this way -

Q: *Eventually he got out of that business, or it was taken away from him, wasn't it?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, he left at one point. I'd be reluctant to get into too much of a thing about Tim Wirth because I was just part of what he did. He certainly was very good to me, in the sense that I had no trouble seeing him, he encouraged me in my work, he was eager to be helpful. The situation was intractable. But as I pointed out, at one point he was one of the people that pushed us to do something a little more imaginative with refugees. I think he may have been frustrated. I think that it was one of those things where - take Burundi and the issue of peacekeepers. That's political. It goes right to the top. I mean, some of those decisions are made by the President. These issues are both complex and controversial, and so it's not surprising that in Washington, there are either

differences of opinion where the NSC sees things one way, the rest of the community sees it another way. The Defense Department tended, at least in 1995, to be more sympathetic to Kagame, and the Refugee Bureau didn't. They would point out that when the people ruling Rwanda were refugees they did things that weren't altogether kosher. And indeed, one of my responsibilities as coordinator was to try to keep this thing moving and not to get mired down in bureaucratic battles.

Q: *Dick, is this the end of our discussion?*

BOGOSIAN: I think so.

Q: *Well, thank you very much. It's been delightful, and you should look forward to getting a transcript of this. Thank you very much.*

End of Interview