

Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

NILES W. BOND

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is April 29, 1998. This is an interview with Niles W. Bond. This will be done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. I wonder if we could start at the beginning. Could you tell me when and where you were born and something about your family?

BOND: I was born in West Newton, Massachusetts on February 25, 1916. My father was a CPA.

Q: Certified Public Accountant.

BOND: Certified Public Accountant, yes. When I was almost two years old, we moved to Canada. My father was then working for a lumber company in Boston. They had acquired a large acreage of timber on the Restigouche River and needed someone to open it up. He was a Vermonter and had a lot of rural experience so they sent him up there with his family. The only place we had to live was on an Indian reservation. As I recall, it was the St. Anne de Beupre Reservation. We spent a year and a half there and then came back to West Newton. When I was four years old, we moved to Lexington, Massachusetts; and I grew up there.

Q: Can you tell me a little about your schooling?

BOND: I went through all of the schools in Lexington -- elementary school, junior high school, and high school.

Q: What sort of education did you get?

BOND: Well, the school system in Lexington was one of the best. I got, I think, a very good education. Most important, from the point of view of where I ended up, I had a very fine history teacher, Miss Bertha Haywood, when I was in high school. She believed that diplomacy was the highest of all possible callings: above the church, the law, and medicine. I don't think she was trying to talk me into anything but she did. I became interested and decided that's what I wanted to do.

Q: That is quite an early age. Most people don't even know what diplomacy is until they get out of college.

BOND: Yes, that's right. I was 14 or 15.

Q: What about reading? What sort of books did you like?

BOND: History and poetry, mostly. I left New England to go to college. I went to Chapel Hill in North Carolina. The reason for that, simply put, was that I had a falling out with my family over the Sacco-Vanzetti case.

Q: My God! Could you explain just briefly what the Sacco-Vanzetti case was?

BOND: The Sacco-Vanzetti case arose out of a payroll holdup and murder in Massachusetts back in the early 1920s.

Q: Braintree, was it?

BOND: I think so, yes. East Braintree, I believe. The two suspects who were arrested were both illegal immigrants from Italy. They were untutored, largely. They both claimed to be anarchists. They were finally brought to trial and condemned to death, despite their denials of the charges. I was, I guess, eleven years old when they were executed. Yes, eleven years old. I remembered later that the attitude of my parents was that the sooner these men were executed the better. Nothing about their guilt or innocence, but only that they were aliens and dangerous, and “we don’t want that sort of person in this country.” I wasn’t old enough to really argue with them. Then, when I was in high school, I read Felix Frankfurter’s book on the case. It was the first book to be published on the subject. I was so horrified by the very evident miscarriage of justice involved that I spent the following summer in the Boston Public Library reading the complete stenographic record of the case.

Q: You’re talking about 10 or 15 feet of legal tomes?

BOND: Yes, at least. I would read all day and then take notes of things that I thought would persuade my family. I would read those to them at dinner, and it did nothing at all for my father’s digestion. *(Laughter)*

My mother wanted me to go to Dartmouth. My father was from Vermont and was in favor of Middlebury. My cousins all went to Harvard. I told my parents that I would not go to school in New England. I would not stay in New England. I wanted to get out of New England because I wanted nothing to do with any area that would allow what happened to Sacco and Vanzetti. So I ended up at Chapel Hill, because I’d had no idea where I wanted to go outside New England. My best friend all through school was going to Chapel Hill. He was the son of the head of the Philosophy Department at Harvard. He was a wonderful old philosopher, C.I. Lewis.

Q: Not the C.S. Lewis.

BOND: No, C.I. Lewis, Clarence Irving Lewis. He was sending David to Chapel Hill. Dave Lewis and I had often talked about how nice it would be to go away to college together, and I knew my parents could not argue against the academic standing of Chapel Hill if the head of the Philosophy Department at Harvard was sending his son there. So

we went off together, and I spent four of the happiest years of my life at Chapel Hill.

Q: You would have been there from...

BOND: '33 to '37.

Q: '33 to '37. Was the depression having any effect? Was it noticeable?

BOND: It was very noticeable, yes. I had two sisters. Neither one of them got to college. They went to other types of girls' schools. My family was having a hard time sending me to school, but it was so inexpensive! The cost of going to school at Chapel Hill, including just about everything, with the possible exception of food, was \$90 a term. That's \$270 a year! And, in my sophomore year, I managed to get a job. I was working in publications: the daily newspaper, the humor magazine, and the literary magazine. I became, all of a sudden, the business manager of the humor magazine and got a very generous cut of all the advertising. The local advertising was negligible, but we had an inner front cover, and an inner and outer back cover, full page in color, by cigarette companies every month.

Q: Oh, yes. Winston-Salem. You were in cigarette country.

BOND: That's right and so I was able to put myself through school with what I got from that.

Q: What type of courses were you taking at Chapel Hill?

BOND: I was taking every sort of course I could on international relations. There weren't very many of them. I was not an outstanding student at Chapel Hill. It was all too easy for me, first of all because the North Carolina public school system had only 11 years of elementary and high school. And so all of my classmates who were from North Carolina tended to be a year younger than I was; and also a year dumber, I guess.

Q: But also, I assume that you're talking about the Lexington, Massachusetts school system, comparing it to the North Carolina school system, which would have made quite a difference, too.

BOND: Yes, that's right. As a matter of fact, I remember being told that the school of education at Harvard was monitoring Lexington and Newton schools at that time, as examples of what education at that level should be doing. At any rate, I made it through Chapel Hill. And despite the fact that I was a Yankee and a Bostonian, I ended up as president of the senior class. Then, I knew that I had to learn more about international affairs than I had learned there; so I applied to go to the Fletcher School. I could live at home because it was just a few miles from Lexington. I was admitted. My class was, I think, the fifth class in the history of the school.

Q: Yesterday, I started an interview with Winston Lord who was later ambassador to China, quite recently, with the Clinton administration and with Kissinger. He went to Fletcher and that's where he met his wife, Betty Bao Lord.

BOND: Yes. A lot of Foreign Service people went there. Then, when I finished my double major in international law and European diplomatic history-

Q: That would have been in 1938?

BOND: Yes, I graduated from Fletcher in 1938. I graduated from Chapel Hill in 1937.

Q: While you were at Chapel Hill and at Fletcher momentous things were happening in Europe and in Asia. Were these intruding at all? You were getting ready to be a diplomat. You had Japan invading China. You had Hitler getting ready to invade Poland. Mussolini was doing his thing. It was a period. I wonder how much of that news was filtering back to the university system?

BOND: As I recall, the big issue in the international field, when I was at Chapel Hill, was the Spanish Civil War. Everyone who read anything in the newspapers about the Spanish Civil War read Matthews in the New York Times. He was the only American correspondent who was following the anti-Franco troops, i.e. Abraham Lincoln Brigade and so forth, and so the feeling among students was clearly in favor of the Spanish Republic.

When I was in graduate school, Hitler was very much on our minds. One of my classmates was a German diplomat who was being sent to Fletcher by the Hitler government. Our chef, at the house where we lived and ate at Fletcher, was a German. He was strongly anti-Hitler and my classmate was the other way. He was pro-Hitler. Of course, we read everything about what was going on in the world and we subscribed to all sorts of newspapers. However, I don't remember the Sino-Japanese thing as being something that was talked about very much. We talked more about Europe.

Q: Had you made any effort to take the Foreign Service exam at all before you went to Fletcher or were you waiting until after Fletcher?

BOND: I had not done anything about it before except think about it, and try and prepare for it. I knew, when I got out of Chapel Hill, that I had to go to school another year or two in order to be able to pass the exams. After I got out of Fletcher, I realized that there were certain areas that one knew were going to be covered in the exam, which had not been touched upon in my manual of studies at Fletcher. So I spent the summer of '38 in the stacks at Widener Library and I had a carrel there and I went every day during the summer and read in all the areas. Maritime law was one of the areas that I learned more about. Far Eastern history and Arabian history and so forth.

Q: Economics? Was that one of them?

BOND: I was less interested in economics but I had to study it. I had taken economics courses from some very good teachers at Chapel Hill, so I knew the basic fundamentals. I

wasn't interested in following up on that, though. By the time I finished Fletcher, I knew I needed a little more help; and that's how I spent the summer. Then, in September, I took the examination. September of '38.

Q: This was probably a three-and-a-half-day exam or so?

BOND: Yes.

Q: Do you recall any of the things you were asked to display your....?

BOND: I don't, really. I didn't do brilliantly on the written exams. I was told by the Department that my grade was 75, which was just over the line. Then, there was the letter in which they invited me to come to Washington for the orals. So I went in December.

Q: The oral exam.

BOND: The oral exam was just before Christmas. I got a grade of 95.

Q: Do you recall any of the questions that you were asked on your oral exam? Also, how was the orals board composed?

BOND: The orals board was composed of one assistant secretary of State, and a couple of office directors, as I recall. It was a much higher ranking board than came to be the case later. I believe that the Assistant Secretary on my board was the great economist/eccentric, Adolf Berle. He later became ambassador to Brazil.

The questions had very little to do with the Foreign Service. There was one major question that I remember them asking. It was posed to me in the following way: "Would you give us the pros and cons of statehood for Hawaii?" And that was something to which I had given zero thought. *(Laughter)* So I had to keep on improvising. Then they asked the factual questions I had prepared for. I must have given a pretty good answer to that one because I did get a 95. I first learned from the Boston Globe that I had passed the exam.

Q: Oh, is that how you learned? (Laughter) Well, you entered the Foreign Service in 1939?

BOND: March of '39. I went to my first post, yes.

Q: Could you explain the procedure? Now, you come in and you have a training course and all of that. But in those days it was a different procedure, wasn't it?

BOND: Yes, that's right. We were all sent out absolutely unprepared. We were told not to proceed to our post by way of Washington. We were left so ignorant and I must have been the most ignorant of all. There was no mention made of getting a passport or anything like that. So I went off to my first post with no passport. *(Gales of laughter)*

Havana was my first post. I took the train from Boston to Miami and then took an overnight ferry across. I'd had a Cuban friend in Cambridge when I was doing all this studying in the summer. He was back in Cuba. He was the only one in Cuba, as it turned out, who knew I was coming. The post didn't even know I was coming. *(Laughter)* I'd been thinking about how great it would be. I was sure the consul general would be down at the pier to meet me with half of his staff. There might be a band playing and all that sort of thing. *(Laughter)* So, when we anchored, the aviso came out to the ship; they looked at the documentation and all that sort of thing. My Cuban friend was on board. Now this was very early in the morning, about 6:30. I wasn't up. He knocked on my door and I was very happy to see him. He said, "Let me have your passport because my uncle is the head of the passport office here." And I said, "I don't have a passport." He thought I was kidding. He said, "You have to have a passport. How did you get this far without a passport?" Then he said, "Give me something that identifies you." So I gave him a copy of my travel orders and I didn't see him again until we got in. Then he came back on board and said, "I persuaded my uncle to let you enter as a tourist because tourists don't require passports, so you are now a tourist here. You have no standing as a diplomat without a passport, except for the travel orders. Anyway, I have reserved a room for you in a hotel that's near the office of the consulate." And that was that I went in later in the day to present myself. At that time, there were approximately 25,000 visa applicants waiting to get American visas in Havana. They were mainly European Jews.

Q: Oh, yes.

BOND: People who were fleeing from Germany. At least 25,000. And about 20,000 of those would be outside the door every day trying to get information. The quota system was so overbooked. For example, if somebody was Hungarian-born, and therefore trying to get a visa under the Hungarian quota, there was a waiting period of 30 years! Anyway, on my first day there, I went up on the elevator and I got off and I had to fight my way through the crowd of visa applicants to get to the receptionist. She was not at all welcoming. She said, "What do you want?" I said, "Well, I'm assigned here." She said, "We have no information about anyone being assigned here. Let me see your passport." And I said, "I don't have a passport." And she said, "Oh my God!" And then "You must have travel orders. Let me see your travel orders." I didn't have them. I'd left them on the dresser in my hotel room. So then she said, "Look, I'm too busy. Get out of my way so I can wait on these other people." At that moment, a non-career vice-consul, a wonderful man named Tubby Marvin, who'd been there for donkeys years, saw that I was in some sort of trouble. He came over, took me by the arm, and said, "Come into my office." So I went in and I explained the situation, my predicament, to him. And he laughed and he laughed and he laughed. He thought that was the funniest thing he'd ever heard. He said, "Well, you know, we were informed months ago by the Department that we were getting another vice-consul, but they didn't say who it would be, and they didn't say when he was coming and so forth. So this comes as a surprise." Then he took me in to meet my boss, who took a fatherly interest in his junior officers.

Q: Oh, yes. Tell me something... I think it's a very important slice of American history to understand, because in the late '30's and even into the '40's dealing with Jewish and

other immigrants from what was happening in Germany. This was before the war started, just before, and nobody had any idea of the holocaust and what was going to happen, but our treatment of people coming in was quite restricted. I wonder if you could talk about what your orders were and how you dealt with it, not just you but how the office dealt with it?

BOND: The theory of a probationary vice-consul first assignment was that the new Foreign Service Officer would do a bit of everything in his first year. He moved from one section to another doing everything. But, in this case, 90 percent of the work was visa work and so I spent most of my time doing just that. We were very good with these people. I remember we had one unaccompanied Jewish woman. She was about 50 and had a relative in the States who had vouched for her and that sort of thing. But when it came to the literacy test, she couldn't read the cards in either Yiddish or Hebrew. That was a compulsory turn-down. But she said to my secretary, who was Irish but, for some reason, spoke Yiddish. "I can read. I can't read these, but if you can give me a Yiddish Jewish newspaper, I'll show you I can read." At that time, there was a Jewish newspaper being published in Havana. My secretary went out and got a copy of it and brought it back. She read and spoke Hebrew well, so she gave it to the woman and said, "Read." And the woman read everything and got it right. So I gave her a visa and explained that she was literate, although she had not been able to read the reading cards. She got to Miami and was turned down by Immigration for being illiterate.

The Department sent a very snotty telegram to the post saying, "Don't you know what you're doing? Don't you know what illiteracy is?" So, I drafted an answer back for my boss to sign saying that, "The meaning of literacy in this case does not mean the ability to read the reading cards." I'd looked at them and they were all either biblical or Shakespeare. "She is literate because she can read newspapers." The Department got it reversed and they let her in. So, I spent most of my time doing visa work and it was very instructive.

Another convenience we had in the office was a Cuban clerk, a very nice man in his 60s, I guess, whose name was Walter Washington. If I had a visa applicant who was arguing about something and said, "Ask the State Department about this," I would say, "All right," and then get on the phone and say to my secretary, "Let me speak with Washington." My secretary knew when I said that, she was to put me through to Walter Washington. And I'd have a little chat with Walter, and come back with the answer that I'd already given, and that I knew was right in the first place. Then, I'd say, "I have to accept that because that's from Washington." (*Laughter*)

Q: Did you get any feel for the attitude, because one of the charges that has been made against the State Department, Foreign Service, U.S. Government was that it was not welcoming, particularly to the Jewish refugees? This was in the '30s.

BOND: We had none of that in Havana when I was there. As a matter of fact, some of them used to apologize for being Jewish and I would give them a little lecture saying "You should be proud of being Jewish," and that sort of thing. No. They got the opposite of what you describe from those of us who were working the visa desk.

Q: Looking at Cuba at that time, how were the Jews who were coming? We had a very small quota and those that didn't have relatives...

BOND: Yes.

Q: How were the others living? Were they settling-in in Cuba?

BOND: Some of them were. A lot of them became residents and probably citizens of Cuba because they couldn't get in anywhere else, at least for the duration of the war. A colony had grown up with these people. They had taken over one of the low cost parts of town. Some of them were very wealthy. I had visa applicants whose relatives were millionaires. They were the least polite of all. They demanded to be given a gold-framed visa right away. But I never saw any anti-Semitism in our operation.

Q: What was your impression of the Cuban government and life in Cuba in those days?

BOND: I was there just a year and was the junior officer in the consulate, so I didn't have much of a social life. Unless you count the summer Sundays fishing for marlin with Ernest Hemingway, when my main job was mixing martinis. I met very few, if any, high-ranking Cuban officials. There was a period when I was taken off visas and put into the Protection of American Citizens section. I was kept very busy in that job for two months, during which 12 Americans died.

Q: Good heavens!

BOND: They hadn't had an American death for several years. All of a sudden, when I got the job, 12 people died! (*Laughter*) Two of them were suicides. One was a seaman who drank himself to death. There were others who just died of natural causes. They were Americans who'd been living there for years and years.

Q: I take it the consulate was in a different place from the embassy. Was there any real contact?

BOND: Very little contact between them. The embassy was a good distance away. We had a good career ambassador, Butler Wright, who died while I was there, and an excellent counselor (No. 2) named Willard Beaulac. Also, I joined the American Club in Havana, as was the custom, where I met people from the embassy. Some of them looked down on consular people, but most of them were all right, and occasionally invited bachelor officers to dinner. My boss, the consul general, was a first class officer. He had been consul general in Naples before he came to Havana. He brought a sailboat that he'd had built in Naples and a Neapolitan sailor to maintain and operate it.

Q: Who was the consul general?

BOND: Court Dubois. A wonderful man. He and his wife had just suffered a terrible tragedy. They had two daughters and, just months before I got there, sometime in '38,

these two girls were flying in a plane across the English Channel. They opened the door and jumped out, holding hands.

Q: Oh! Oh!

BOND: A terrible thing.

Q: The war broke out the 1st of September 1939 in Europe. Did that have any effect on what you all were doing?

BOND: Well, the most immediate effect and the one that caused the most indignation was that the price of Scotch whisky went up rather drastically.

Q: Such are the horrors of war.

BOND: Such are the horrors of war, exactly.

Q: You left actually, going back to the Department, in early 1940. Is that right?

BOND: March of '40, yes.

Q: Taking you past your screening?

BOND: Probationary year. As a matter of fact, the probationary year continued on through the schooling. We had three months of schooling in the Department.

Q: What sort of schooling was it?

BOND: It was run by a wonderful old lady named Cornelia Bassel. She had been running that school for years and years. It was said that she had been given the job because she was Woodrow Wilson's niece. She was like a mother hen to all the young Foreign Service Officers. Everybody loved her dearly. She loved us all, most of us anyway. She did almost none of the teaching but people came in from the Department. The visa section would come in to talk about visas. Passports would talk about passports. The people in accounting would talk to us about how to keep our books and all that sort of thing. It was very low key. There were 32 or 33 officers in my class. We were never given any tests that I can recall. We did have to make courtesy calls on the White House, the secretary of state, the under-secretary and the three assistant secretaries. We had to call on a person and, at least, leave a calling card. That's the way I got to know Under-Secretary Sumner Wells. I had my card out with the upper left hand corner turned down to show that I'd brought it in person. He was then living in what is now the Cosmos Club on Massachusetts Avenue, a wonderful house which belonged to his second wife. I had expected the butler to answer and so I got my card out, and Sumner Wells opened the door! He was very nice.

Q: Yes.

BOND: Anyway, he very kindly invited me in for tea. We went up and had tea together in a little room right above the front entrance. He was evidently about to have tea himself so he just invited me to join him. We had a good time and he couldn't have been nicer.

I also met Adolf Berle when I called on him. He and his wife came to the door personally and took me in. She gave me a tour of the house. But that was about all of the social life we had. We entertained among ourselves. I think most of us were unmarried at that time.

Q: This was, as a group, all male officers?

BOND: Yes. And there are a few of them still around. They were a good group. We saw each other a lot over the years. One of the most dramatic things that went on while we were in that course was the German invasion of the Low Countries. That was a terrible blow. The president made a speech about it, really, I think, arguing in favor of our joining the war. But that made a great impression on everybody. And as it came toward the end of the course, everyone started talking and worrying about where he was going to be sent next. Some people have very definite post preferences and others didn't know enough to have any preferences at all. I had asked for the Middle East because the only two Foreign Service Officers I knew when I took the exam were from my home town in Lexington. And at this time, they both happened to be on home leave at the same time, which had never happened before. One of them was Gordon Merriam and the other was Walworth Barber, who became ambassador to Israel. He lasted for 12 years, I think. Wally Barber's mother was one of my mother's best friends and the Merriams were the richest family in town. They were both Arabists and they talked me into that part of the world. I think at some point we had been asked to fill out something indicating our post preferences. So my first assignment after the course was to Baghdad -- but then I got married. As it turned out, the Department was not sending married officers to Baghdad because the American Minister there had just died of lockjaw; and for health reasons they were not sending any women. So I didn't go to Baghdad. It was out of the frying pan and into the fire: we were sent to Yokohama.

Q: This was in 19...?

BOND: This was in 1940.

Q: I've got you arriving there June 4, 1940.

BOND: Yes.

Q: How did you get there?

BOND: We took a ship, so-called. It was terrible. I forget the name of the line. They ran mainly in the Pacific, possibly exclusively.

Q: This wasn't the President line.

BOND: Yes. I think it was the President Line. That's right because it was the President Monroe. It was a terrible old tub. After I got out to Yokohama, I looked it up in Jane's books and it had a very spotted past. It had been built in 1911 or something like that, and belonged at one time to some Middle Eastern country that had since disappeared. It was terrible. Anyway, we had a pretty good trip out. My boss in Yokohama had asked me to bring all sorts of things along with me, which I didn't really appreciate, but he turned out to be a nice guy. We were housed in an apartment within the Consulate building. It was a new building, constructed after the earthquake, along the lines of the White House in Washington! It also contained an apartment for the Consul General and for the other vice consul. Just ten weeks after my wife and I arrived, all dependents were repatriated.

Q: When you arrived in Japan in 1940, from your perspective, what was the situation in Japan at that point?

BOND: The situation was that relations between the two governments were just about as bad as they could get. But the attitude of the Japanese people was that they were just as pleasant as they could be. The official policy was not reflected in the way we were treated by them at all. Of course, things got worse later on. Since our honeymoon had been so short, we wanted to get together for our first wedding anniversary. So I persuaded my boss, who turned out to be a very nice man, in spite of all the stuff I had to carry for him. He said I could take local leave, adding that where I went locally, he didn't even want to know about. He said "even if it means going up the gang plank of a Japanese ship." So, we arranged to meet in Honolulu for our anniversary, June 25, 1941.

The main consular business in Yokohama was crew list visas, mostly for Japanese ships. So I had a lot of dealings with the NYK line and, when I told them that I was doing this trip, they were very helpful. There was a ship going there that would get me there just in time. It was the flagship of their fleet, a very nice ship. They sold me a third class ticket but put me in first class. I ate and slept first class the whole trip.

We were about a week out to sea when the ship suddenly started making strange course alterations, around and around, back and around. I finally learned that they had just received news that the Germans had attacked the Soviet Union.

Q: June 22, 1941.

BOND: Yes. Our anniversary was on the 25th of June. So, I think it actually must have been a bit before the 22nd when they received this word. Obviously, it put them in a very dangerous situation. Japan was afraid of the Soviet Union and, with Germany as a Japanese ally attacking the Soviet Union, the Soviets were expected to strike Japan; which they never did. Anyway, the trip went on uneventfully after that. Then I picked up the same ship coming back a week or ten days later, I think. It had gone to Los Angeles and San Francisco. It was the last Japanese passenger ship to go to the West Coast of the U.S., the last one to return, the last to call at Honolulu. My wife returned to California, where she was living, and that was when I realized I was going back out of the frying pan

into the fire.

Q: You were the whole time in Yokohama, is that right?

BOND: In that period, yes.

Q: We had our embassy in Tokyo, so you were handling seaman and shipping?

BOND: Mostly that, yes. Mainly visas and passports, including crewlist visas. We only had a Consul General and two vice-consuls, of which I was the junior one. We had two or three Nisei clerks and two male American clerks. So we all did everything. Whatever there was to do, we did it. As time went by, more and more Americans left; after the State Department repatriated its women and children, others followed suit, business people and so forth. So it got to be more and more a stag party.

Q: Did you find that the Japanese government was making it difficult to be an American official there? Were you being followed or challenged or that sort of thing?

BOND: No, I didn't see any evidence of that. The governor or the mayor would occasionally give a big diplomatic party in the early part of World War II, and I remember the belligerents of either side standing at opposite ends of the big room with the neutrals wandering back and forth. But the Japanese were very polite to us at that point.

Q: By '41 you were taking this trip to Hawaii and back and so we're moving up toward the latter part of '41. Was it obvious to you that the tensions were getting worse?

BOND: Oh, very obvious. December 7, 1941 (a Sunday in Japan, but a day earlier in the U.S.) dawned sunny and unseasonably warm. I joined a dozen or so colleagues from the American Embassy in Tokyo at a beach house rented by the Embassy at Shichirigahama, a small fishing village on the coast south of Tokyo. Chip Bohlen came down, and others from the Embassy. Anyway, there were a dozen or so people there, and all we talked about was "when is it going to happen?" and "where will it happen?" Everybody knew it was going to happen: the Japanese had to make a move. They were running out of everything. They had already run out of steel. They were tearing down railings, light posts, all that sort of thing. They were very low on oil. Scrap iron was the thing they missed the most. When the U.S. cut off scrap iron shipments, we knew it was the end. So we knew something was going to happen. The consensus was that it would happen first in Southeast Asia, which it did, by a matter of hours. That was the day before Pearl Harbor.

If I could go back chronologically to the question of the Japanese attitude toward us: there was only one time that I ran into any unpleasantness. We had a new Consul General, Irving Linnell, who had just arrived. Yokohama was his last post. He was in his 60s and about to retire. One Sunday in October or November, before Pearl Harbor, I took him for a ride around the countryside so he could see his district. Yokohama was, at that time, part of a fortified zone because it was so close to the big naval base on the coast.

Ordinarily, getting into Yokosuka was very difficult, but if you were already inside the fortified zone, it wasn't. I took a wrong turn. All the signs were in Japanese, which I could not read. I ended up inside the Yokosuka Naval Base. No American had been inside that base in years, if ever. I had a plate on the car saying "American Consulate, Yokohama," so they knew who we were. The ship-building crew of the base was just getting out. This was about four or five in the afternoon. The workmen saw our license plate and got very abusive and started beating on the car. We were rescued by a Japanese Naval Patrol. They arrested us both and took us to a little headquarters kiosk that they had there. They asked us what we were doing there, and were not at all impressed by our story that it was a mistake. Finally, they called the Japanese Foreign Office and found out that we were real. Then they guided us out of the base and let us go. They were not very polite.

Q: No.

BOND: I remember also back in early '41 when I was taking a courier trip from Tokyo to Peking. It was in late January, early February and I was carrying six bags. I had a Marine guard along to help with the unwieldy pouches. We went from Tokyo to Shimonoseki on the south coast of Japan. Then we took a ferry across to Korea to what they called Fusan in those days. Then we got on the South Manchurian railway and went from Fusan the whole length of the Korean Peninsula across the Yalu River, across Manchuria, and then on past the Great Wall of China and into Tsing Tao and then Peking. The train was full of Japanese soldiers and they were very nasty toward us; we seemed to be the only non-Asiaties on the train. They had obviously been drinking a lot. There was no food on the train except cold rice, and the temperature at the station at Mukden when we passed through was 25 degrees below zero Fahrenheit, so that you couldn't get a drink of water through the water system or wash or anything.

Q: While you were in Japan were you kept abreast of what was known about Japanese troop movements in China? I'm not talking about the real military thing but the fact was that the Japanese weren't really doing that well. They thought they had taken over but they found themselves in a long hard war which they never really won.

BOND: No. I don't know to what extent the Embassy was privy to that sort of information. The only reading matter we had was the Tokyo English language newspaper. Since that paper was under government control, one didn't learn anything pejorative about the Japanese Government. So we were really pretty much in the dark about that.

Q: What happened when the attack came on Pearl Harbor? Let me ask you one question before that. As the gates were shutting, so to speak, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, did the visa business fall off and your regular work fall off?

BOND: Yes. By the time the war broke out, we were doing practically nothing but reporting to the Navy Department on ship movements. The Consulate in Yokohama is right on the bank of Tokyo Bay, so we had a wonderful view of the whole Bay. It was

very active with shipping. We had a telescope up on the roof and we used it. It used to be, when we first started, that the Japanese ships had the name in Japanese characters and also in Romaji, which we could read. Then, for security reasons, they painted out the Romaji, leaving just the Japanese characters on the ship. Then sometime before the war broke out, they painted those out, too. So we didn't have very much to go on. We had a set of...

Q: Silhouette books?

BOND: Yes. Silhouette books, and we could tell...

Q: ...what class they were and that sort of thing?

BOND: Yes, but that was it. The Japanese, as it turned out, knew about our spying on their ships because one of our American clerks who was a Nisei, with an American father and a Japanese mother, was working for the Kempeitai.

Q: This is the Japanese secret service.

BOND: I would describe them more as the equivalent of the German SS. They were the ones who, when we were interned, took us over. But you were asking about the day of the attack. When I got back from that day at the beach, I had dinner and went to bed fairly early. I was awakened about five o'clock in the morning by a telephone call from this same Nisei clerk who turned out to be working for the Kempeitai. He said, "I think you ought to turn your radio on, because there's something going on in Southeast Asia. The Japanese have sunk, I think, two British battleships."

Q: That was a little later. I think there were some previous attacks.

BOND: Yes. They had made a serious attack on the British fleet, including the Britannia; I think it was, the flagship of their fleet. He said that the fighting was apparently still going on and suggested that I turn on the radio. So I turned on the radio and I kept it tuned to an English language station in Shanghai, which had good music when it wasn't broadcasting news and had lots of news all the time when it wasn't playing music.

So I had that on and all of a sudden the news reader interrupted and said he had a special communiqué from the Imperial General Staff. Then he read the communiqué: the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor, and Japan was now in a state of war with the United States and Great Britain.

It was about five-thirty by the time I got that and so I woke my colleague, the other vice-consul. We had some things to burn. There was a good place out in the garden which was hidden by shrubbery so we were taking things from the secret files and burning them. After two or three hours of this, the Kempeitai arrived in force and took over everything. One thing we kept, at the Consul General's insistence (and he was right in a way.) He said, "The last things you want to burn are the code books, because we may get a coded

message from the Embassy that we will have to be able to read.” So we kept the code books and they were still there when the Japanese arrived.

The truckload of Kempeitai guards were commanded by a major. He made us go around and open all the files and show him what was inside and so on. He saw the code books. They were in a vault in the consul general’s office, but he didn’t touch them. He didn’t touch anything. He just closed them up and put a Kempeitai seal on them. Then he went on his way, and this was a mistake on his part. This was because my vice consul colleague, Jules Goetzman, and I decided that the thing at the top of our list was getting those code books back, out of the vault, and destroyed, before the Japanese got them and read them or used them. The code was still uncompromised at that time, as we learned later...

So, to make a long story short, there were two doors to the Consul General’s office, one of which opened into a hallway that led to our apartments upstairs. The other led to his secretary’s office which was now being used as a sleeping area for the guards. There were about a dozen guards sleeping in there, and more sleeping around the area.

Q: These were Japanese guards.

BOND: Yes. The vault that held the code books was right up against the wall on the other side of which they were sleeping. So we found one night that they had failed to shut tight the one door that we had access to. So we went upstairs and lit a fire in the fireplace and waited until about midnight. Then we went downstairs very quietly and carefully and opened the vault. Every time we turned the thing we heard this “clunk” inside. It sounded horribly loud to us, but nobody woke up. There was no movement from the next room. We took the books out and closed the safe very carefully. We didn’t lock it because that would have made more noise. We just closed it firmly. We had to break the Kempeitai seal, of course, to get in.

When we went upstairs and spent the rest of the night burning the two code books. We finished between five and six in the morning. Then we had a good, stiff drink and went to bed. About an hour later, someone knocked on my door: one of the subordinates of the guard detachment. He said, “The Major wants to see you downstairs right away.” He then went over to wake my colleague, and we were taken downstairs to where the Major was waiting.

The Major took us into the Consul General’s office, pointed to the broken seal on the safe, and asked if we knew anything about it. When we nodded, the Major ordered us to open the safe. Once it was open and he saw the empty space where the code books had been, he demanded that the books be returned to him at once. My colleague replied that they had already been destroyed and offered to show the Major the ashes. The Major, in a rage probably fueled as much by fear for his own head as anything, drew his sword and demanded an explanation. Recalling a discussion we had had the night before while burning the code books, Goetzman and I, in an inelegant mixture of English and Japanese, endeavored to explain the destruction of the codes in terms of *bushido*, the

traditional *samurai* code of loyalty and honor. We pointed out that Americans, too, had such a code of conduct and tradition of loyalty which demanded that we risk our lives to protect our country, in this case by protecting its codes. My colleague then asked the Major what he would have done in the same situation. The Major slowly sheathed his sword, drew himself to attention, and then quietly began to weep as he left the room. From that moment on, nothing more was heard from the Japanese about the incident - or about the Major, whom we never saw again. But the books were burned and I was told when I got back to Washington that they were still uncompromised at the time we destroyed them.

Q: Obviously, everyone at our Embassy in Tokyo was put in together. There are stories about how they played bridge and golf and all that...

BOND: Yes, that's right. They had it pretty easy, yes, but not that easy...

Q: But essentially, they weren't giving you territorial immunity.

BOND: No, they weren't. They also confiscated our cars. The complete guard detachment was changed each week. We were told by someone that they didn't want the guards to get too friendly with us. Then finally, in about late March or early April, when it began to warm up, one of the guards came to us and said, "Would you like to play some baseball?" We had a softball, they had a softball bat. So we played out in the garden. The rules were that if anybody hit the ball over the wall, it was an automatic out; he couldn't chase the ball unless he was a guard. (*Laughter*)

Q: You played with the guards?

BOND: We played several games with the guards and they were very nice. What they talked about most was "my cousin in California." They were all interested in going to visit their cousins or uncles in California. Things like that. There was no sign of animosity at all. But, for the first three months we were interned, the Kempeitai would not even allow the Foreign Office to see us. They wouldn't allow the Foreign Office to send a representative down. I think it was Sweden that was the...

Q: Protecting power.

BOND: Yes, the protecting power. They wouldn't allow anyone from the Swedish Legation to see us. So we couldn't get anything changed nor anything done. I don't know how it happened, but finally that situation changed. The Foreign Office sent a delegation down with many apologies. The Swedes came down, too.

One of the things that the Foreign Office persuaded the Kempeitai to do was to allow us to walk an hour each day in a little park that was across the street. It was exactly a mile long and it had been built with American funds after the earthquake.

Q: In 1923?

BOND: Yes, the 1923 earthquake. The park was built on the ruins. That was before the present consular building was built. Anyway, the Kempeitai allowed it. There had been several others sent down from Manchuria and Korea to be interned with us. Foreign Service people. So we were about 10 or 12 altogether.

They would take us walking with guards fore and aft along the park front, one time up, one time back. We were under strict orders not to speak to anyone. The weather was good and there were many Japanese walking, particularly on weekends. We never had the slightest show of animosity from any of the Japanese we passed.

One day, while we were walking, we had an interruption. There were benches every 50 yards or so and, sitting on one of them was a Caucasian-looking young man. It didn't ring a bell to me. I couldn't get a very good look at him but, as we got closer and were passing him, he jumped up and ran over to me. He put his arms around me and said, "Hello! Hello! Hello!"

As it turned out, when I was in Cuba, he had been a German vice-consul in Havana. He had subsequently been expelled from Cuba for espionage in 1940, and had been transferred to Panama. He was expelled from Panama almost as soon as he arrived there. The only way he could get back to Germany was through Japan and the Trans-Siberian Railway. But, while he was en route to Japan, Germany invaded the USSR, forcing him to remain in Japan, (*laughter*), so he didn't make it home.

Anyway, the guards were very upset over this interruption. They ran over and grabbed him. They pulled him away and demanded his identification. He showed them his German diplomatic passport. The guard called for his superior to come over and look at it. He said, "Look, this is impossible! These people are enemies! What are they doing hugging each other!?" He didn't believe it. But finally they accepted the fact that he was German and that we were pre-War friends. I don't know what happened to him. He had to spend the whole war there, I guess. I never saw him again.

Q: What about food? Did the Japanese supply it?

BOND: We had a bad time with food. The Japanese were under the impression that we had lots of food stashed away because we always shipped things in from San Francisco. The latest shipment from San Francisco was sitting on the dock at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. We had been told by the Japanese shipper that it was there, and we could actually see it. The shipper said it would be delivered but it never was.

We had lots of flour, lots of coffee, powdered milk. That sort of thing. Nothing really to eat. We finally convinced the Kempeitai that we really didn't have anything to eat. So they made an arrangement for the New Grand Hotel to send us meals. It was a very good hotel just down the street, the only good hotel in Yokohama. But it took a very long time to work out the details.

In the meantime, we had a variety of things to chew on from an unexpected source: our former Japanese servants. No longer allowed on the premises and obviously aware of our predicament, they hid tiny packets of edibles in the bushes behind the garage where they could not be seen leaving them, nor we retrieving them. Without their generosity, we might have starved.

At about the end of our first week of New Grand Hotel food, we found that we were eating cat. They were sending over cat. At first, we got chicken or some sort of fowl and seafood. Then, all of a sudden, cat. We drew the line at that. It was about then that the Foreign Office finally got through to us. They made an arrangement with a Swiss hotel and with the Kempeitai for us to have two meals a day at this little Swiss hotel, about two blocks from the Consulate. It was a very nice little hotel. The food was wonderful. The guards who took us over there were also fed.

As far as I know, the hotel never got paid for any of this. We couldn't pay. We didn't have any money. The Swiss owners were so pro-American they did everything they could for us. Gave us the best of everything while the guards were over in a corner eating sushi. That arrangement continued the rest of the time we were there.

Q: When did you finally leave? Were you ever united with the Embassy group?

BOND: Yes. What happened was that, I think about the first of June, we had a visit from a Japanese police official in uniform. I happened to be there when he came in and he asked to see the consul general. So I said, "He's somewhere around. I'll find him for you." He had come to invite the consul general to lunch with the local chief of police of the Prefecture. He was inviting the Consul General as well as the two officers assigned to Yokohama. The three of us were to lunch the following day at the New Grand Hotel. He said "Guards will be sent to bring you over."

The consul general was rather silly. He said, "Never would I accept such an invitation." The policeman, who spoke very good English, said, "Sir, you don't understand. This is not an invitation. This is a command. You will be there and your two subordinate officers will be there also. We will pick you up tomorrow at the arranged time."

So they came around and picked us up. The consul general was still in a huff. He wouldn't speak to anyone. The luncheon was in a private dining room with beautiful mahogany paneling. There were about 10 other Japanese officials there in addition to the chief of police, who sat at the end of the table. The consul general sat at the other end and we sat beside him. Other police officials, of various ranks, were also at the table.

Ever since I arrived in Yokohama, I'd had frequent dealings with the chief of police. Until Pearl Harbor. We had become good friends. I liked him very much. He was in his 60s and was on the verge of retirement. Anyway, when we went up there, the consul general wouldn't even look at him. He just stayed in his seat. Well, I went over and shook hands with him and we had a nice little chat. He had always been cooperative.

We sat down to lunch. Then the consul general rudely stood up and said to the chief of police, "I insist on knowing why you have brought us here." We had just started to eat the first course. The chief of police said, "We have a saying in Japan that 'One does not eat peanuts while making love.' We'll save the peanuts 'til after lunch." The consul general was very displeased.

Q: The chief of police was talking?

BOND: Yes. He then talked at some length about such innocuous subjects as Japanese painting and the ancient art of Japanese sword-making before turning to more serious matters. He spoke of his life-long admiration for the United States and his sadness that our two countries had to be at war with each other. Secondly, he stated that he was obliged to warn us that Japan, under the aegis of the Emperor, could never be defeated in war. He started to sit down but rose again and, in a lighter tone, addressed his American guests. He informed us in a by-the-way fashion that we would be leaving Japan the following week aboard the NYK liner Asama Maru, en route to our exchange point in East Africa.

On June 17, 1942, more or less in keeping with the chief of police's promise, the diplomats, journalists, businessmen, dependents, and other Western Hemisphere nationals selected for repatriation on this first exchange of enemy aliens were transferred by the Japanese to the pier where the Asama Maru was moored. The diplomats were boarded first and I managed to remain at the top of the gangplank from where I could watch for friends whom I had neither seen nor had news of since the war began. Many of these had been in prisons or concentration camps and some were down to skin and bones, some were almost unrecognizable. Others, good friends of mine, gave no sign of recognition when I greeted them, their only reaction a blank stare.

With everyone on board we expected to sail that night. But we didn't sail that night, nor the next. We were there another week. There were rumors all over the ship about, you know, "the whole thing's going to be called off; we're going back; we're going to be imprisoned somewhere; they're not going to exchange us after all." As it turned out, the delay was because the Emperor had a relative in the States who did not have diplomatic status, and he was trying to get him included. The State Department finally agreed and we sailed shortly after midnight on the 25th of June. And God, were we glad to go. Every morning for weeks we'd get up to see which side the sun was rising on.

Being very junior, my fellow vice consuls and I were relegated to the silk holds of the ship. To get to our quarters, we had to go down as far as you could go by stairs, and then by ladder. We were below the waterline in small compartments, oh, I'd say 12 by 14 feet, something like that. They had built six sleeping shelves into each one of those. So there were six of us in each compartment and we couldn't turn the light out because there was a cage around the only light bulb.

Our first stop was Hong Kong where we picked up colleagues from South China. They'd had a very hard time, a much harder time that we'd had. Journalist Joe Alsop was one of

those who got on there. Then on to Saigon. We went up the Saigon River and it was sort of like the Titanic trying to go through the Panama Canal. We just barely made it.

Q: Yes. It's not a very large river.

BOND: That's right. So we went up there, and spent the Fourth of July of 1942 in Saigon aboard a Japanese ship. We boarded the diplomats and some missionaries there. That was our only other pick-up stop. Then we went on to Singapore to refuel and take on water, and then across the Indian Ocean to Mozambique.

Q: I can't remember. Had the Doolittle Raid occurred?

BOND: Yes. It occurred while we were there. It was in April. I think we had just started eating at the Swiss restaurant. Anyway, we were walking back from the Swiss restaurant and all of a sudden this plane came flying very low from across the Bay. It was a B-25, a two engine and twin-tailed. None of us had ever seen a B-25 before because they weren't put into service until about 1942. We thought it was probably a Japanese Air Force exercise. There were American markings on the plane and we thought that might have been to make it seem more realistic.

Then we looked across the Bay. There were great clouds of black smoke coming up from the refineries. So then we thought maybe it was the real thing. We were just about to arrive at our Consulate. There was another plane that flew over at some distance but this one must have been barely 500 feet off the ground. The only thing they hit in Yokohama was the hospital and the reason they hit that was because there was an anti-aircraft gun on the roof.

Once the planes had gone, the head of the guard contingent called us all together and he was furious. He said, "What do you mean!? What do you mean by attacking us that way!? What do you mean?" He said, "If it happens again, there will be some serious repercussions, so don't let it happen again."

In the meantime, I remember, one of the American male clerks was tied up in about a half-mile of rope and then hung with signs all over him in Japanese. They paraded him through the streets of Yokohama. They didn't hurt him, they delivered him back and took off his ropes. That was the Doolittle Raid as we saw it. The clerk's name was Dick Child.

Q.: Could you see Yokohama Harbor when you were under incarceration?

BOND: Yes. It could be seen best from the roof, but that was off-limits to us during our internment. But we could see it even from downstairs. My own apartment looked out over the garden, but my colleague's second-floor apartment on the front of the building looked right out over the Bay.

Q: Were you keeping notes on what was happening?

BOND: For the last six months or so before Pearl Harbor, our principal official activity was reporting daily to the U.S. Navy Dept. in Washington on the movement of ships into and out of Tokyo Bay. We had managed to destroy or hide copies of our telegrams to the Navy Department before the first arrival of the Kempeitai. Once the Kempeitai arrived, they took away all of our writing materials, all our paper, all our radios, books, everything. The only thing they missed was a little portable phonograph we managed to hide, with one record: a wonderful jazz recording of "I Can't Get Started"...*(hums tune)* We did have that but, with no writing materials and constant searches, we couldn't keep notes. We did have one old copy of LIFE magazine and one of the things in it was a double page spread on different moustache styles. We decided to assign each of us one particular style and, when it grew in, we'd shave it off and start a different style.
(Laughter) Oh, God!

Q: Were you aware of the progress of the War while you were there?

BOND: We occasionally had Japanese newspapers discarded by our guards, which some of our Nisei employees could read. So from time to time we could see what the Japanese Government was saying about the war. No matter what the battle scene was, it was always a great victory for the Japanese. Then, sometime in April or May, there was the Battle of the Coral Sea, which we learned about from a newspaper thrown away by the guards. It carried a communique about this great battle. It don't remember how many American carriers it said had been sunk, but it admitted the loss of Japanese ships, including carriers. We took this unprecedented admission as a sign that they'd really had a bad time. As it turned out, that was a turning point of the naval war. But that's all we could get.

Q: You were talking about the summer of '42 when they brought you to Mozambique.

BOND: Yes, we arrived in Mozambique on July 23rd. The Gripsholm was already waiting.

Q: It was a Swedish ship, a neutral ship that was carrying exchanges of diplomats.

BOND: We boarded the Gripsholm as the Japanese were getting off. They then boarded our ship - the Asama Maru - which was not a bad ship, but definitely overloaded. There was a third ship there when we arrived: the Italian cruise liner, the Conte Verde. The Conte Verde had been seized by the Japanese in Shanghai and was being used for the transport of diplomats and others being repatriated from China. The only stop the Asama Maru made in China was in Hong Kong. All the rest of the repatriates in China were brought to Shanghai and put on the Conte Verde. We on the Asama Maru learned later that the passengers on the Conte Verde had fared much better than we had, since we were prisoners of the Japanese all the way to East Africa, but our opposite numbers on the Conte Verde had enjoyed the advantage of a European vessel with a sympathetic European crew, staterooms for all, swimming pools, etc. The Conte Verde had joined the Asama Maru in Singapore and we had traveled more or less together on the long voyage across the Indian Ocean.

Q: You arrived in New York?

BOND: We went from Mozambique to Rio where we offloaded the Latin American diplomats and missionaries. We had spent at least a week in Mozambique, a wonderful change. It was in the middle of winter and the weather was perfect, like today. This sort of weather. Everyone was being especially nice to us. Of course, the Portuguese are such nice people anyway. We were docked in Rio for only 24 hours and then sailed directly to Jersey City. We docked in Jersey City, not New York Harbor.

Then we couldn't get off the ship for another 24 hours, I think it was, because Naval Intelligence wanted to question everybody. They wanted to screen dubious people. My wife was there waiting for me; she had a sister who lived in Nyack, New York, and was staying with her. So I spent about a week there in Nyack, then some time in New York, where I was treated for "trench mouth," a souvenir of my Japanese internment. Then I went down to the Department, where I checked in, and was eventually reassigned.

Q: Did the Department do much in the way of debriefing you before giving you an assignment?

BOND: No, the Department didn't. We had a lot of that from Naval Intelligence before we left the ship, but I didn't get very much back in the Department.

Q: Where did you get assigned next?

BOND: To Madrid.

Q: You were there for how long?

BOND: I was there from the Fall of '42 until the Fall of '46. Four years.

Q: That was a very momentous time in Europe.

BOND: It was.

Q: How did you get there?

BOND: We took a Portuguese - well, almost a tramp steamer - a Portuguese ship called the Nyassa out of Baltimore to Lisbon, and then flew. We were taking a car with us, a convertible, which we intended to drive to Madrid. But they'd stowed it on deck on this coal-burning ship, right behind the stacks, so the top was literally burned off by the ashes. We had to leave the car in Lisbon to have a new top put on, so we flew to Madrid. We were en route at the time of the North African landings.

Q: That was in October of '42.

BOND: Yes, and when we left Baltimore, and we reached the mouth of the Chesapeake

Bay, we were held up by the Navy, or the Coast Guard I guess it was. We weren't allowed to proceed until further notice. It turned out that at that moment the North African landings were beginning and they weren't letting anybody out. So, we arrived in Madrid at a very crucial time, and I think Madrid was really the best of all the European listening posts.

Q: What was your job there?

BOND: I was just sent as a third secretary. I had expressed an interest in political work and that was my understanding of what I would do. The DCM there, or the counselor, as he was then called, was the same one who had been DCM in Havana when I was there, Willard Beaulac.

Q: Oh, yes. One of the great names of the Foreign Service, particularly of Hispanic affairs.

BOND: Willard and I had known each other very well in Havana. I had dated his sister-in-law a number of times there. So when we turned up together, it was very fortuitous for me. He knew I was interested in political work and he gave me a lot of very interesting work to do. He was the one who recruited me into an intelligence organization, which... I don't know how to describe it. It had no name. It never had a name, so that people couldn't talk about it. You have to have a name to talk about something, have to know what to call it. Willard Beaulac was in that group and he was the one who recruited me. It was a small outfit, nameless, as I said, set up by the founder of OSS...

Q: Bill Donovan, Wild Bill Donovan.

BOND: Wild Bill. Wild Bill had apparently reached the point where he felt that the OSS was getting so much publicity that the enemy must think that they were just a scarecrow, and that the work was being done somewhere else. He said, "The tragedy is that the work is not being done anywhere else." So he wanted to set up this organization which would have no name to do the things he thought OSS should do, but was not doing. And could not really be doing under their set-up at that time.

The man who was put in charge of it was a retired Army general named Jean Grombach. He was the son of the former French consul general in New Orleans. Grombach had been brought up in New Orleans, and had then joined the Army, and had become a general. His office in New York, the office of this organization, was on West 57th Street in the Steinway Building, the old Steinway Hall.

The whole staff consisted of General Grombach, a retired admiral whose name escapes me, and a secretary. That was it. We had our own codes and we communicated with the fourth member of the basic group, who was in the State Department. We would send telegrams to him in our code, which he could read. Then he would decode and send them on to West 57th Street. The State Department knew all about this but they couldn't read our messages. I stayed involved with that until about '54 or so. I was in Korea after the

end of the Korean War, when I got orders to burn all of our codes, records, and all that sort of thing.

Q: What were your responsibilities?

BOND: Well, I was in touch with a number of European contacts (unknown to each other) who had access to German sources in The Netherlands, France, and Germany, whom I would meet at irregular intervals in Lisbon. They would give me information about what the Germans were up to in those areas. But we also got involved in the plot against Hitler.

Q: This was July 20, 1944

BOND: That's when it blew up, yes. We were in it, I guess, for about a year before that happened. The way I got into it was... the head of Lufthansa Airlines in Spain, in Madrid, was a member of the group plotting against Hitler. As head of Lufthansa, he could come and go between Madrid and Berlin as he wanted, without expense and without calling attention to himself. His contact in Madrid was head of the German Department of the Spanish Foreign Office. The latter, in turn, was a very close friend of mine. You may have heard the name of the man who was the Madrid head of Lufthansa: Otto John.

Q: Oh, yes. He later became quite famous in the East/West conflict. He turned out to be a Soviet or East German agent in the West German government.

BOND: Something like that. In any case, Otto John told my friend in the Spanish Foreign Office that he wanted to establish contact with the U.S. to let them know what the plotters were doing. So the head of the German Department in the Spanish Foreign Office told Otto about me and said "You can do it through him." So we worked it out and I arranged an appointment with Willard Beaulac. We brought Willard up to date on it and I don't think I ever saw anything of Otto John after that. I don't remember how many weeks it was before the balloon went up.

So that was one of the things this crazy little no-name organization got into. The only reference to this intelligence operation that bore no name was in correspondence back to West 57th Street. We were instructed to refer to OSS always as "the lake," and to our own organization as "the pond." Those were the only two rules that I remember. But it was exciting and interesting. We never knew who else was a part of this. There was never a list that anyone knew about. I still don't know. Later on, I was the only one in Tokyo and Korea who was part of it, I'm sure.

Q: I would have thought that, when you arrived just during the invasion of North Africa, (Operation Torture, it was known as) this would have caused a real "earth change" in Spain. Before, Spain was trying to play both sides when all of a sudden a very powerful army was just to the south of them and obviously moving ahead. I would have thought that the Spanish government, led by Franco, would begin to open up towards the Americans more.

BOND: Well, the Germans reacted much more than the Spaniards. The Germans moved down to the Spanish frontier. The unoccupied zone of France suddenly became occupied, and our embassy had told Franco as much as they could about what was going to happen. They didn't go into details or dates or anything but they didn't want him to be taken by surprise. So he did have some idea of what was going to happen, and was not unprepared. The Allies could not be sure there would be no negative consequences at all; from him, certainly. The fly in the ointment there was Serrano Suñer, the pro-German Foreign Minister; but he was apparently kept "out of the loop." But this all happened before I got there.

Q: Yes. Did you find, when you weren't working for "the pond," that you were reporting on political developments in Spain?

BOND: Of course, that was my principal job, until I was put in charge of the Embassy's Refugee Program.

Q: Well, I was just wondering what one was seeing in Spain, because this was the time when the balance had begun to shift away from the Axis towards the Allies.

BOND: Well, yes, the shift had been gradual and became definitive when the Germans lost the Battle of Stalingrad in 1943. I wanted to continue doing political work, but Spain was developing a very serious refugee problem. This included an increasing number of American military refugees, people in uniform. Army Air Corps people, mainly.

Q: Shot down or crash landed in France.

BOND: Yes, and they were immediately taken in, as though through sheer coincidence, by friendly French peasants who would shelter them and then, by night, see to it that they reached the Spanish border. Anyway, the ambassador put me in charge of the embassy's efforts to help cope with the hundreds of refugees who arrived in Spain each week from all over Europe.

Q: The ambassador was who?

BOND: The Emeritus head of the History Department at Columbia University, Professor Carlton J.H. Hayes, a splendid ambassador with more knowledge of Spanish history than most Spanish historians. So from then on, for several months, I did refugee work. The first thing I was asked to do was in December of '42. I was instructed to move up to the French border area, the foothills of the Pyrenees, and look for American military fugitives. We were learning that a lot of them were crossing over and then being arrested by Spaniards and put in jail. So I chose to set up camp in Pamplona. It was everyone's favorite place, the running of the bulls and all that.

Q: Oh, yes.

BOND: So I took a room in the same hotel at which my old friend Hemingway had once lived and written. My job was to drive up every day to the little villages in the foothills of the Pyrenees and seek out the local jails. Then, I would ask whether they had any foreigners and, if so, I would interview them. Oddly enough, at that stage American military personnel had no instructions as to what to do if they were captured. None whatsoever. So a lot of these people were calling themselves Canadian or some other English-speaking nationality. They thought it would be dangerous to say they were American.

The Spanish were very cooperative in the handling of American military prisoners. I would get from each jail where they were, the name, rank, and serial number of each one and their real names. Then, I would phone that list into the embassy. The embassy would pass the names to the Spanish air ministry, which sent emissaries to all these places to release the American military personnel concerned, and remove them to comfortable quarters in Southern Spain, for onward travel (to join U.S. forces in North Africa) some months later.

Q: The Spanish just pushed them over to the Portuguese border, is that what they did?

BOND: I don't remember what the mechanics were... But they put no serious bars in the way of these people going over, despite constant protests from the Germans. Getting back to Pamplona. I don't know whether you've ever been there, but Pamplona was a lovely little town.

Q: No, I've never been there. Of course, it's known for the Running of the Bulls.

BOND: It was the historic capital of the Kingdom of Navarre as early as the 10th century, but had long since lost all the trappings of royalty. It did, however, have a consular corps, consisting of one, in the person of the honorary consul of Uruguay. He was in fact Uruguayan by birth, but had lived most of his life in Spain. He had apparently persuaded the Uruguayan Government to bestow on him the title of honorary consul, and the city of Pamplona to accept him, because he liked Pamplona. He was the entire Pamplona consular corps. I had not had the pleasure of meeting him until one morning, about three o'clock, as I was sleeping in the hotel. There was a banging on my door and, only half awake, I opened the door to a tall gaunt figure, all in black. He introduced himself, apologized for the hour, and asked if he could come in. Once inside, the Uruguayan consul proceeded to tell me the reason for his nocturnal visit and the urgency which prevented him from waiting until daylight to call on me.

He had just gotten word, through a contact of his up in the hills, that there was a group of five French officers who had crossed the border and were expecting to be received by an agent of British intelligence because they had papers for him. The British had never shown up. They had to get back before daylight and so they had called him and said, "See if you can get somebody up here; preferably, if he's not British, an American." So he called me.

Without further ado, I drove him up to this funny little town. When we got there, it was still dark. They were in a tiny bar. It was a cold night, a fire in the fireplace, and there was a general, a colonel, a major, and two lesser ranks, all French air force officers. They were carrying a bundle of papers, a big thing with black seals all over it. The Colonel repeated to me that they were supposed to deliver those papers to a British agent for forwarding to the Free French Command in Algiers. And he said, "But the British never showed up. We have to get back. You're our last hope." So they gave me the package without telling me anything about what was in it and said, "Take it back and somebody will come by your office in Madrid in a few days to pick it up." And I said, "Well, how am I to identify this person?" In response, the colonel took out a one-peseta note and tore it in two. "The one-peseta note has the serial number on both sides at different ends. So if you tear it in half, each side has the same number," he said, "This half is yours and the person that comes for the envelope, if he's the right one, will be carrying the other half."

So I took the bundle of papers back to Madrid and put it in the safe in the embassy. The following week, when I got to the office, my secretary said, "There's a weird looking Frenchman waiting to see you. He won't tell me what it's about." I asked her to bring him in. He was wearing a black trench-coat and a black beret, and was truly someone you wouldn't want to buy a used car from. (*Laughter*) He said, "I've come to pick up the package." I said "What package?" "You, know, the one that you were to deliver to me." I asked if he had brought his identification. He said, "Yes, I have it here." He poked around and pulled out half a peseta note. I checked it with mine and the number was wrong so I refused to give it to him.

He was absolutely infuriated. He said, "The people who gave you this will never forgive you for not giving me that package." I said, "Well, if you have the ...". Then he explained "I lost the real one and I thought you wouldn't notice, so I tore another one. I hoped you wouldn't check." Then he stamped out. We never heard from him again.

We sent the package by courier to Ambassador Murphy's office in Algiers and he passed it on to the head of the Free French. I was told later by a French diplomat in the Free French mission, which had since then been set up in Madrid, that those five officers were caught on the way back to France and that two of them were shot (I never found out which ones) and the other three arrested.

Q: How did we see the political situation in Spain at that time? Franco was in full control?

BOND: Yes, full control. Our instructions, simply stated, were to keep Franco from entering the war on the Axis side. That was the thing. And almost anything we had to do to accomplish that objective, the Department would accept. So all of this stuff that *PM Magazine* was publishing about the American ambassador being pro-Franco was and all such things, were off the mark.

Franco started doing things for us in '43. He may have begun before that, but not that I know of. He wanted no publicity for what he was doing because he had the Falange on

his back. That was his party, you know, and they were violently pro-German and anti-American. So he had to keep it from them. But he did things. One of the first things he did was to allow American military aircraft to over-fly Spain on their way to North Africa. Then finally, he allowed American military aircraft to land in Spanish airports if they were in danger of crashing, you know. Little by little, he increased what he was doing for us.

(By the way, early in 1944, our first child, a daughter -- Ellen -- was born in Madrid, delivered by the same surgeon who, a few years before, had delivered Don Juan, the son of the King and heir to the Throne. Our second daughter -- Nancy -- was born in Florida in 1947.)

At the end of the war, I wrote a 50-page memo to the State Department trying to set the record straight. At that time, there was a lot of pressure from the press, particularly in the States, and in England and France, but mainly in the States, pressure to throw Franco out. The State Department seemed to be falling for it. They did go so far as to join the British and French in withdrawing ambassadors from Spain, done against the advice of the U.S., British and French embassies in Madrid. This was a stupid reaction which guaranteed that Franco would not be thrown out any time soon. Almost everybody in Spain came to his defense, even those elements which hated him.

Q: The Spanish had a division in Germany, the Blue Division, which didn't fare very well.

BOND: It was terrible. It wasn't a trained group. It was a bunch of political prisoners and such. That was a disaster, both for the Spaniards and the Germans.

Anyway, I wrote this long memorandum to the Department setting forth what Franco had done against us, particularly in the early months of the War and what, later in the war, he had done for us. I was trying to get the State Department to realize that it wasn't a simple, one-sided thing: that he'd been our enemy all along - because he had not. One of my basic conclusions was that he was never either pro-Axis when he was doing things for them, nor pro-Ally when he was doing things for us. In both cases he was being pro-Spanish, which meant pro-Franco, and I still think that was exactly the situation, the way it was. And he managed to remain the dictator for another 30 or so years, until he died in 1975, at the age of 83.

Q: Hitler had one meeting with him and said he would never meet that man again because Franco just wouldn't give him a commitment; Hitler essentially wanted to move troops through Spain.

BOND: Yes. To Gibraltar. They wanted to take Gibraltar. Yes, Franco played fast and loose with Hitler. And we wanted to keep it that way.

Q: You left there in '46.

BOND: Yes.

Q: What was your next assignment?

BOND: After that, I went to Switzerland, assigned to the legation in Bern. I came home from Spain in the Fall of '46 and took home leave. I hadn't been out of the Iberian Peninsula for all of the four years I was assigned to Spain. And then I was assigned to Bern, and we had only been in Bern about five months when I was assigned back to the Department.

Q: Just a quick thing. What were you doing in Bern?

BOND: Well, I wasn't sent to do anything in particular. I just went as a member of the staff. I went as Second Secretary, was promoted to First Secretary while I was there. And then, when the Minister left on transfer, he left me as chargé d'affaires ad interim, although I was outranked by three or four other people on the staff. I was chargé for several months, until his successor came and I left. (Incidentally, I know of no Foreign Service colleague who served as chargé d'affaires to more countries than I: five in all.)

Q: Why did you serve such a brief time in Bern? Less than six months, I believe.

BOND: The reason I was transferred back... The one responsible for bringing me back was Walt Butterworth, who had succeeded Willard Beaulac as DCM in Madrid. He had just been made Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, and it had been decided that there should be a Desk Officer for Korea which, until then, there was not. Korea was just sort of dumped into Northeast Asian Affairs, which was basically Japan. So Walt Butterworth was looking for someone for that job. It came down to the fact that he remembered me, and that I was the only one in the Foreign Service that he knew who had ever been in Korea. It was that simple.

It was very inconvenient for us because we had finally found a house after living for four months in a hotel. We were still unpacking our effects when the transfer came through. I was ordered to return to Washington by way of Tokyo and Seoul. And I talked to General MacArthur in Tokyo and to Syngman Rhee in Seoul, and to other State and Army officials along the way. In those days before jets, it took me quite a while to get home.

Q: How did you get to Korea from Bern?

BOND: Well, I took a train to Ostend, I believe, from Switzerland.

Q: Belgium.

BOND: Yes. And then a ferry from Ostend to Dover. Then I went up to London, where made the arrangements for my trip. I had a very good friend in the embassy in London who had been in Madrid when I was there: Frances Willis. She was the first woman, career woman, to become an ambassador, I believe. So I spent a few days in London before I took off, and the trip took me six, seven weeks. I flew from London to Istanbul,

then Istanbul to Damascus, and Damascus to Calcutta. I had to stay in Calcutta. And, in Calcutta, I had to stay over awhile; this was on Pan American and they had a 36-hour layover there. That was the division between the East and West systems of Pan Am. So, if you flew out as far as Calcutta, you had to either turn around and go back or wait to catch an ongoing plane. So I was there for 36 hours. Then I flew to Tokyo by way of Okinawa. Then I spent about a week or 10 days in Tokyo and Seoul.

Q: Tell me, what were your impressions. First of all, we're talking about mid-1949?

BOND: No, this was '47. The Fall of '47.

Q: In Japan, what were you getting?

BOND: That was my first time back in Japan since the War. And I was amazed at the amount of war damage that was still unrepaired in Tokyo. It was a mess. All of my contact in Tokyo was with MacArthur and with the head of the political section who was Bill Sebald at that time.

I went to Seoul for three or four days and had dinner with Syngman Rhee and talked to the people in the embassy there and with the commanding general who was General Hodge. General MacArthur had asked me to come back to Tokyo and report to him on how I thought things were going in Korea, which I did. And then I flew back to Washington and took over as assistant director of Northeast Asian Affairs at the end of 1947.

Q: What was your impression of Korea and the situation there at that time?

BOND: Well, I was pretty well impressed. My previous two trips to Korea were going to and from Peking, so I never got off the train. I just passed through. I never really had a chance to judge. And at that time Korea was a part of Japan. It had been made a part of the Japanese homeland by that time. The Koreans were agreeable; I liked them very much. Seoul was a pretty city with the mountain in the background. Everybody was very nice over there. There didn't seem to be any friction between the U.S. military and Korean civilians. So I thought things looked pretty good. I was over there several times after that, when it didn't look so good.

Q: When you got back to Washington and you were doing Korean affairs?

BOND: Well, yes, I was doing both. I was assistant director of Northeast Asian Affairs. John Allison was director and, when he wasn't there, I did Japan as well as Korea. And then, a year or so later, they created an officer in charge of Korean Affairs - I think that was my title. Then I did a lot of traveling back and forth to and from Korea.

Q: Did Korea loom very large on the political scene in your impression during these waning years of the 1940s?

BOND: Well, it did for those of us who were working on Korea. I got back to that job, I

guess, in the late fall of '47 and things were still very unsettled. They were working on the idea of a Korean government and the idea was already being introduced in the UN. The proposal was that the two sides, the U.S. and the USSR, would withdraw their troops and let the Koreans vote on what they wanted, what sort of government. That was still in the planning stage.

All during the three years I was working on that, most of the time we were not fighting the Koreans; we were fighting the Pentagon! The Pentagon wanted to get their troops the hell out of there. The State Department had put it in to the UN to try to slow down U.S. withdrawal because the UN would have had a say as to whether the troops should go or stay. And so for me, in that job, Korea loomed very large indeed.

We finally came up with an NSC paper of which I did the final redraft because the people in State and the Pentagon who were negotiating this thing had come to hate each other so much they weren't getting anywhere. Anyway, we got an NSC paper that had in it the mechanics of setting up a government in South Korea if the Russians would not agree to pull out of North Korea.

Q: Well, when did the Russians pull out?

BOND: Well, we pulled out in '48, I think it was. And in '48 the South Korean Government was formed. The Russians never said they were withdrawing. They were still training the North Korean Army, and I think they wanted to wait until it was sufficiently trained to do the damage they wanted it to do. The Russians never did have a regular withdrawal of troops from North Korea.

Q: When the South Korean government was formed, were we concerned about Syngman Rhee trying to move north?

BOND: Well, there were people in the U.S. government who were concerned about that. I wasn't as concerned as some because I knew he couldn't do anything. The Army of the Republic of Korea didn't exist, really. If we had built up the army of the ROK, the way the Russians built up the army of North Korea, there would have been cause for concern. Then I might have worried about Syngman Rhee but, without an army, there was nothing he could do. He couldn't use American troops to move north. I think a whole series of developments, in terms of building up the South Korean Army, would have had to take place before anyone would have to worry about Syngman Rhee. I liked old Syngman Rhee and got along very well with him. Until I was appointed by the Department, sometime in '53, to revive negotiations between South Korea and Japan with a view toward the establishing of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Q: You say the date had to be...

BOND: '53 I believe it was.

Q: The Korean War had already happened.

BOND: Yes, that's right. The Korean War was over by that time or about to be over. Anyway, the Embassy was instructed to have me talk with both the parties, with Syngman Rhee and with the Japanese government, about a renewal of their efforts to recognize and accept each other.

As I said, Syngman Rhee had always been intensely anti-Japanese. We got along very well; I'd been to dinner at his house... Oh, this was the time when I was getting ready to leave South Korea so it was the fall of '53. But when I went around to pay my respects to him, he refused to see me. I was very surprised. It seems that he had heard from the Korean minister in Tokyo that I had been asked to do this, to bring Korea and Japan together. He hated the Japanese with such fury that he crossed me off his list. He never relented. I was there once later when he was still around and he still wouldn't see me.

Q: Let's go back. You went to the Air War College, is that right?

BOND: Well, I was assigned to it, but the Air War College was the only War College to close down during the Korean War. I went down there; drew quarters; took books out of the library but, when I came back, the course was canceled. So I never actually went.

Q: So, where did you go?

BOND: Where did I go? That would have been...

Q: I've got you going to Tokyo in August of 1950.

BOND: Yes, that's right. In 1950, I had had several other assignments that didn't work out, that were canceled because of the Korean War. I'd been assigned as DCM to Baghdad just before the Korean War broke out. My successor had already arrived in the Department and I was clearing things up when the Korean War broke out, and that canceled Baghdad and everything else. So I wrote to Dean Rusk. He was then either secretary or assistant secretary of the Far East. I wrote and said that, in view of my Korean background, I thought I should stay in that area, either physically or at least in terms of work. And that's how I was assigned as MacArthur's deputy political advisor.

Q: You went to Tokyo in August of '50 and you were there until '53. Is that right?

BOND: That's right.

Q: What was your job in Tokyo?

BOND: Well, Bill Sebald was the political advisor and was head of what MacArthur called the "diplomatic section." It was, in effect, the State Department mission to SCAP. Bill Sebald's deputy had just left and I replaced him. One of the reasons I was given that job was so that I could keep a watching brief on Korea, because they didn't have anyone in the political advisor's office who knew anything about Korea. I stayed there until after MacArthur was fired, until after the truce was negotiated. Then I went back to the

Department, if I remember correctly.

When I was in the political advisor's office, I didn't spend very much time worrying about Korea. I was available if anyone wanted to ask questions about it. The political advisor's office was a pretty busy place, not giving political advice, because MacArthur didn't take anyone's political advice. I said once in an interview that being political advisor to MacArthur was tantamount to being ecclesiastical advisor to the Pope. There might not have been much to do except that he used us for all sorts of other things. In his mind, the principal function of the Diplomatic Section, also called the Political Advisor's Office, was to keep the diplomatic missions accredited to him off his back. If he had complaints from the French mission, or anyone, he would have nothing to do with them. He would refer them to us. Eventually, the missions got so that they didn't bother him; they came directly to us.

So we had to handle all sorts of things. We acted as go-between diplomatic missions and the SCAP bureaucracy because the diplomatic missions were dependent for almost everything on the Army. You couldn't get a house; you couldn't get food; you couldn't get anything without going through SCAP. So we spent most of our time doing that. And then, as the peace treaty developed - it was already being drafted and re-drafted by that time - we got involved in that to some degree.

Q: Was Dick Snyder there at the time?

BOND: Yes, Dick was there.

Q: He was working on the Treaty, wasn't he?

BOND: I believe he was, yes. I remember seeing Dick... Is Dick still alive?

Q: No. No, he died about five years ago or so, rather suddenly.

BOND: Oh, did he? I'm sorry. Yes, I remember him... Foster Dulles was the President's chief negotiator on the Treaty and the chief State Department guy was John Allison. They both moved out to Tokyo to be closer to the Japanese negotiators. And so we got involved in some of that. I'd worked for John already and I'd worked for Foster Dulles so we all got along well, and finally got a Treaty.

There were other treaties being negotiated with which we got involved, inadvertently. For example, the Italians and the Japanese were trying to negotiate a peace treaty. They were stuck. There was a snag about the fact that Italy started out in the war as an ally of Japan and ended up as an enemy of Japan. The Italian and Japanese negotiators didn't know how to word that so they asked Bill Sebald if they could borrow me for a week to try to do something. Which I did. And that's the way that Treaty came about.

The Korean War was still going on for part of the time we're talking about. The peace treaty negotiations were starting. I was also involved in the negotiation of a "Status of

Forces” agreement with the Japanese for non-U.S./UN Forces based in Japan. I was still negotiating that at the time I was transferred to Korea but it was eventually finished up by my successor.

Q: You went to Korea, but first you went to Pusan in January of 1953. Is that right?

BOND: Yes, that’s right. That’s where the embassy was. That’s where the Korean government was. It was in the middle of winter. Korea is the coldest place I think I’ve ever been. God, it’s cold in winter! Living conditions in Pusan were abysmal. They were worse for the refugees, of course, but even for us... We shared a house with 48 rats. Big ones, you know, the size of cats! Pusan was the ‘arsehole’ [asshole] of the universe.

(Laughter)

Q: Yes, I’ll buy that.

BOND: When it’s raining, it’s mud up to your hips and when it was dry, there was dust everywhere. The ambassador there was Ellis Briggs. He decided to move up to Seoul at a certain point, while the war was still going on, and he asked me to come with him. Then we put the head of the political section in charge of the Pusan office. The negotiation of the Japanese Peace Treaty and the Korean Truce were handled by people sent in expressly to do that, so the staff didn’t have to do it, although we got called in occasionally to help.

Q: I guess you wouldn’t have been there during the Syngman Rhee release of prisoners from that island.

BOND: Cheju-Do.

Q: Cheju-Do, that’s right. I think you were in Japan.

BOND: I was in Japan, yes. Medical leave. You know, the Koreans have some very lovable qualities. Some British missionary back in the 19th Century referred to them as the Irish of the Orient.

Q: I’ve heard that, yes.

BOND: That’s a good description of them. The Japanese are so ritualistic and the Koreans are totally unritualistic. Absolutely. When I was in Tokyo walking along the street and an embassy driver came by, he would bow. If that happened in Korea, the driver would have given you a big Irish wave, you know. *(Laughter)*

Q: By the time you had arrived in Seoul in the middle of ’53, how did we see Syngman Rhee, particularly after he had released the prisoners? Did we see that this was going to be a problem?

BOND: No. By the time I got there, people weren’t even talking about that any more. We were pretty happy with Syngman Rhee and hoped he would have a long life because, as long as he was alive and well, he had no opposition. Once you open the door to elections

and so forth... They'd already had a terrible time getting stabilized. But Syngman Rhee was never a real concern. I didn't do much worrying about Syngman Rhee.

Q: What about the feeling about the truce negotiations that were going on?

BOND: Those were handled by people sent there for that purpose. Ken Young was one of them. The principal negotiator was a fellow from Wall Street. I forget his name. He was a friend of Foster Dulles'. He was very good. He did a fine job negotiating for the truce. But they did things their way... We saw them occasionally at dinner at the Embassy and so on, but they drafted their own telegrams to the Department and that sort of thing.

Q: Did we think of Korea as having any economic potential but that of a long term "basket case," a term that's so often used? What was our feeling at that point?

BOND: Well, I was not in on the economic side of it much but I think we were fairly hopeful. We had some very good people from ECA out there who had been with the Military Occupation and stayed on. They had good contacts with Korean economists and my recollection is that they were never very concerned about the economic situation.

Q: On Korea then, you left there in 1954.

BOND: Yes.

Q: You then went off to the office of UN Political and Security Affairs.

BOND: Yes, that's right. I was Director of the Office of UN Political and Security Affairs.

Q: Where did that office fit at that point in the Department of State?

BOND: Well, it was the main State Department liaison with the U.S. delegation at the UN in New York. It dealt with so many geographically varied areas that you had to work with the desk people from West Irian to Cyprus and God knows where. So we were a backup for the U.S. delegation in New York and in almost constant touch with them. There was a lot of to-ing and fro-ing going on. I'm trying to think of some issue that had been long-standing and troublesome but I can't at the moment.

Q: What about Israel?

BOND: No, I can't remember that it ever even came up.

Q: Well, you were doing this from August of '54 until, basically, until '56.

BOND: Yes. Was it August of '54 or '53?

Q: Let's see. I have you there from August of '54.

BOND: That's right, yes.

Q: Who was our ambassador in the UN at that time?

BOND: Henry Cabot Lodge, most of the time.

Q: How did you find him?

BOND: Well, I was not an admirer of Henry Cabot Lodge. He was very politicized, you know. Very political and had a lot of powerful political allies in Boston and other parts of Massachusetts. He brought domestic politics into the UN to a degree that I think was totally uncalled for. For example, if we were dealing with the Cyprus case, as we did every year... no not every year. It didn't come up that often. But every couple of years the Cyprus case came up. If there was an American election that year, we would always side with the Greeks. If there were no American election, then we would side with the British. And this was completely Lodge's doing. This was because of the Greek politicians in Massachusetts. His backing was from a very wealthy Greek-American family. No, I don't think he was particularly bright. He was mistaken in mixing domestic politics with UN affairs. I'm not an admirer of either one of the Lodge brothers.

Q: How were relations between the Department and Lodge at that time?

BOND: Well, I think they were fairly good. He could get on the phone and talk to the secretary anytime he wanted to, you know; and he could probably speak to the White House when he wanted. So he had to be handled rather carefully. There must have been times when he didn't get his way, but I can't think of one. I'm trying to remember when he left that job. I don't recall.

Q: Did you find yourself having to fight his position battles within the bureaucracy of the Department of State? Because, you know, when you have Cyprus you've got the NEA always doing it. Did you feel that if he decided to support the Greeks because it was election year, you had to support his position with the Near Eastern Bureau?

BOND: I don't remember having to fight either for or against any of Lodge's stands on these things. They were handed down to us as *fait accompli* and I don't think we really had very much to do with it.

When I was Coordinator of the Counter-Insurgency Course, Lodge had to attend because he was going out somewhere as ambassador.

Q: To Saigon!

BOND: Saigon. That's right. He kicked and screamed and said he wouldn't attend the counter-insurgency course, but he finally went. He didn't go every day. He's not my cup of tea.

Q.: I've never met the gentleman. However, I've heard it said that he was both imperious

and lazy.

BOND: Yes. I would buy that.

Q: Did you get any feel for how the United Nations was considered within the Department of State? Were the geographic bureaus thinking of you as being a minor nuisance or not?

BOND: I don't have that impression. I think there were times when we could be very helpful to them and my recollection is that we always had good relations with the desk officers. The UN was something that we all had to accept, like it or not. Some liked it and it helped some of the people some of the time, and helped others at other times. But I don't remember any big fights with the desks or with congressional affairs, as we sometimes got into that.

Q: What about the Soviet Union? How did we consider the Soviets' role in the UN at that time?

BOND: This was the Cold War and we were suspicious of everything the Russians did, and with good reason. But there were times when the Russians inadvertently did us great favors. The history of the Korean War would have been very different if they had attended the Security Council meetings on the 25th and 27th of June, 1950. If they had stayed and vetoed, the UN would have been out of it. That is one of the most vivid examples of institutional stupidity. I know they were boycotting the Security Council at the time, but over a minor procedural matter. I was at both those meetings and, each time the door opened, everyone looked up expecting to see the Russian delegate enter, but he never did. I don't understand the reasoning behind it. They could have done such damage.

Q: You left this UN job in 1956 and you went to Rome.

BOND: That's right.

Q: You were in Rome until '58.

BOND: Yes, 1958. Two years.

Q: What were you doing in Rome?

BOND: I was political counselor, number three in the official ranking after the Ambassador and the DCM. I was head of the political section and also the contact with the CIA. They were part of the political section but would never admit it in-house, of course. One might say that the CIA element in the embassy was in, but not of, the political section. We had trouble finding out what the CIA was doing because we had a station chief and a deputy station chief who were dedicated to keeping us in the dark about what they were up to. The only way we found out... I had daily meetings with the

political section and CIA finally started sending Bill Colby instead of the deputy stations chief. Bill Colby saw to it that we were kept *au courant* about CIA activities, to the extent that we needed to know.

Q: It was common fodder in the streets of Italy for years, from 1948 on. I'm thinking of those early years when the CIA was particularly paying off the CDU.

BOND: They still were, yes. They still were. The money was still being bagged in. We didn't have anything to do with that. I didn't want anything to do with it. But one of my best friends in the Foreign Office in Rome, who later became Ambassador in London, used to tell me stories about picking up the bag from the CIA guy and that sort of thing. I'm sure it was still going on when I was there. He was one of Fanfani's lieutenants. He was a career diplomat and a very good one. That's was when Mrs. Luce was Ambassador. Later, she was succeeded by David Zellerbach. You know, Zellerbach was not a great success, although he was a gentleman and a hard worker.

Q: No.

BOND: But he was aware of his own shortcomings as a diplomat and leaned heavily on his career staff for guidance.

Q: He was really a very small man.

BOND: Very small. He had been there about a month. I was DCM at the time because Jack Jernegan, who was the regular DCM, had been seconded to go to Cairo for some discussions out there. So the ambassador decided that he and his wife would take a little vacation. He called me and said, "We're going to Paris. We haven't been away from the post since we got here. You'll be in charge. There's just one warning I want to give you: don't let the Segni government be overthrown. Don't let it fall. We have to support the Segni government." He hadn't been in Paris two days when the Segni government fell and I got a really rude telegram from him saying, "I thought I told you not to let the Segni government fall!" (*Laughter*)

Q: How was Claire Booth Luce as an ambassador?

BOND: She was very good. Although, for political reasons, I was not enthusiastic about serving with her when it was first mentioned to me. She was the ambassador when I was assigned to Rome and, as she would not accept any senior officer candidates until she had talked to them personally, I had to stay on in Washington until she came back, but she used to come back fairly frequently. But I had a very pleasant session with her. She couldn't have been nicer and we agreed on things that I would have thought we'd have disagreed on. Yes, she was very good.

I hadn't been there more than a few weeks when she invited me to go to Venice with her. They were launching a NATO ship that was going to the Dutch and she had to go up for the inauguration. It was a Coast Guard type ship. It was going to the Dutch but had been

built with American money through NATO. Anyway, she had to deliver a speech there and she suggested that, since I hadn't been to Venice, I meet her there and attend the ceremony. She was giving a speech in Milan the night before, so I went up by myself.

She had to return to Rome as soon as the ceremony was over, and I was walking her back to the car. It was a Friday and she said to me "Why don't you stay in Venice over the weekend? There's a lot to see in Venice and you haven't had a chance yet, so why not stay here." I did, and had a wonderful weekend. She was nice that way and her staff really loved her. When she left, we gave a big party for her and re-wrote the words to the song "I've Grown Accustomed to Her Face..."

Q: From the musical "My Fair Lady."

BOND: Yes. We sang it for her, and she was pleased. After she left the job and went back to Washington, she lived at the Watergate. My wife and I were living just up the hill from there, in the Columbia Plaza. For several years afterwards, she gave a party every year in her apartment for those staff members who had been with her in Rome. It was a very nice gesture on her part, and brought back fond memories.

Q: How about when Zellerbach came? Did he bring anything with him?

BOND: I don't think so, no. He certainly wasn't stupid, but he wasn't experienced in the ways of diplomacy. But he was not like MacArthur as far as political advice was concerned. He asked questions and checked things with you: "Did you ever know President Segni?" Segni was called The White Mouse. He was about Zellerbach's size.

Q: We're talking about people not quite five feet tall or so?

BOND: Yes. Segni was thinner than Zellerbach. He was a very slim man with white, white hair and a white complexion. Everything about him was white. That's why he was known as The White Mouse. Before his government fell, he was in the Parliament one day and he got up to make a speech that nobody liked. They were booing him and calling him names, calling him "Nano, nano," the Italian word for dwarf. His son was there, at the back of the Prime Minister's box, a lad over six feet tall. So, when they were all yelling "Nano," he summoned the boy to the front of the box and pointed at him. At that, everybody started shouting, "Cornuto! Cornuto!" (*Laughter*)

Q: Meaning he wasn't the father?

BOND: Yes.

Q: Horns.

BOND: That's right. So he couldn't win either way.

Q: No..

BOND: It's a true story. The incident, I mean.

Q: You were in Rome until 1958.

BOND: Yes, until late summer of 1958.

Q: You were there at a very interesting time, during the dual crises; during the crisis of the Hungarian Revolution and the Suez Crisis.

BOND: Yes.

Q: How did this hit Italy and did we have any involvement in it?

BOND: It may be that the one for whom I was standing in as DCM had been called to Cairo about the Suez thing.

Q: Jernegan.

BOND: Jack Jernegan, yes. He was a Middle East type. What was the other thing you mentioned?

Q: The Hungarian Revolution. They both happened in October of 1956.

BOND: Yes. I remember more about the Hungarian revolution because the Hungarian chargé was a good friend of mine. But I don't remember getting involved in it politically in any way. We had a lot of Hungarians in Italy. I like the Hungarians.

Q: What about the labor union movement in Italy? Did that involve us at all?

BOND: Well, we had a couple of very active Labor attaché s while I was there, and I'm sure they were very much mixed up in it. One of them particularly. I'd known him for years and years. He used to go to labor union meetings and speak at labor union meetings. He was really too much involved in the labor movement. But I don't remember anything of crisis proportions resulting from that.

Q: What was your impression of all the consular posts in Italy? Did they serve much of a purpose?

BOND: Well, I visited Naples first. When were you in Naples?

Q: I was there from '79 to '81.

BOND: I forget who the consul general was. I met him in Naples, I guess he was the first one I met. I'd heard nothing but good about him. Then, we had a very good consul in Florence who was killed in an airplane crash not long after I knew him. I forget his name but his wife still works for the State Department. In Milan, I don't remember who the consul general was in Milan.

Q: I was wondering not so much about the people, but did you find it useful to have so many Consulates in Italy?

BOND: Yes. Of course, it was very convenient as you were traveling around Italy to have a consulate where you could hang your hat. I think they are useful if they are good people who are willing to go out and meet the local people and get to know them. There are such great differences between northern Italians and southern Italians. Their views are different. Their ways of looking at life are different.

The only consul I saw whom I really didn't think was worth his salt was the man in Venice. He had been a non-career vice-consul and then, after the 1956 change in rules and that sort of thing, he became a consul. He was there when I was in Rome. And I had met him previously when he was in Turin, I guess it was, as a clerk. He was handicapped by a terrible shrew of a wife. When I visited Venice that time with Mrs. Luce, they invited me to dinner on Saturday night after the ceremony. The wife did nothing but complain the whole evening. Shrieking complaining about never living in a good post because her husband never got a good post. He was in Venice, for God's sake! There is no better post! She was just terrible. She'd say how awful the Foreign Service was in the presence of foreign guests! So I hold it against her much more than I do him, poor guy.

Q: Well. You came back in '58 and you went to Harvard University.

BOND: I was called back to Washington to represent the State Department at the first session of the Harvard Seminar which was to be the guinea pig. I hated to leave Rome but there was no arguing. And I thought it would be very good for the family because our girls had missed the States and did not like having to make new friends and learn a new language every couple of years. Since Cambridge was within a reasonable distance of Lexington, where I was brought up, I was able to rent a house there for that year. My mother was still living in Lexington. She was very old and didn't have much longer to live. I hadn't seen much of her for years and years. So, from a personal point of view, it was a good thing. It was also interesting from a professional point of view. You know the format of the Seminar.

Q: No, I don't.

BOND: It was made up of 12 diplomats. They had to have been in international affairs jobs for at least 15 years. Of the 12, six were from foreign countries. Two were Foreign Service Officers. There was one from CIA and another from the Department of Agriculture or something like that. Anyway, everyone had to have been in international affairs for at least 15 years. The format was very loose. It was held in what used to be called the Semitic Museum, and Bob Bowie was running it.

Q: He had been head of policy planning for John Foster Dulles

BOND: Yes. He was the director of it and the assistant director was Henry Kissinger.

There was a third man for economics who used to be in the Department. I didn't know him nearly as well as I knew the others. You could work in one of three areas. One was international organizations, including NATO, with a big emphasis on Europe. There was a political military affairs area, which was where I worked. That was Henry Kissinger's area. The other area was economic development. There were seminars almost every day, but we were not required to attend if the subject was not relevant to our field. I found them very interesting. The only requirement was to write a paper of a certain length on a subject approved by our mentor, and have it finished by the end of the year.

So that was what we did and we had a lot of fun. As Research Fellows, we were technically members of the Faculty, which meant membership in the Faculty Club, a wonderful club. It was just a 20 minute drive from the house I'd rented, where one of my best friends had lived when I was a child, so I knew it well.

The subject of my paper was something to the effect of "Can Okinawa serve any useful purpose in the missile age as an American base?" Something like that. I wrote a pretty good paper. Henry wanted to get it published and we got the Pentagon's permission to do so, but the State Department turned it down for political reasons so it was never published. Anyway, that was how I spent that year.

Q: What was the contribution of the foreign diplomats in discussions? Where were they from and how did that work?

BOND: Well, we would all get together and discuss various and sundry topics, involving how things were done in one country or another. The foreigners were from the Netherlands, England, France, Italy, one from Latin America, and one from Cyprus. The Seminar is still going on, apparently. In 1983, I was invited back for, and attended, the 25th Anniversary of its opening.

It was a pleasant change of pace and I enjoyed the year very much. At the end of that time, the Department told me that I had been assigned to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.

Q: This would have been in '59?

BOND: That was in '59, yes.

Q: Had you had any experience in atomic energy?

BOND: When I was in that UN job we were responsible for everything about atomic energy in the State Department, and everything to do with another equally messy problem, which was disarmament. We were the Department's Office for Disarmament. But that was the only experience I'd had. I finished the Seminar in June of '59 and, as I said, was told I'd been assigned to Vienna. A couple of days later, I had a phone call from Jack Cabot. Did you know Ambassador Cabot?

Q: No.

BOND: Jack Cabot, one of the Massachusetts Cabots. This was in the summer. He was on home leave and said that he had just been assigned as ambassador to Brazil. Clare Booth Luce had been appointed originally but, when she encountered problems with the Senate hearings, her name was withdrawn. Jack Cabot had been asked to go instead. He was calling to ask if I would go as his DCM. I said "Well, you'll have to ask the Department because they have assigned me to IAEA in Vienna. He said "I've already asked them and you're free to go." So I agreed, and that turned out to be the best post of the lot.

Q: Where were you posted?

BOND: To Rio de Janeiro.

Q: Rio

BOND: Yes, he was going as ambassador to Brazil and I was going as DCM with the personal rank of Minister.

Q. And this was when?

BOND: This was in the summer of '59.

Q: You were in Rio, then, from 1959 until 1963.

BOND: That's right.

Q: What was the situation in Brazil in '59 when you arrived there?

BOND: In '59 Brazil was in good shape. They had a very good president who had done a lot for Brazil, including moving the capital out of Rio and up to Brasilia, which made sense, but was not viewed with any pleasure by either diplomats or bureaucrats. And the country was fairly well off economically.

Q: Vargas was in, wasn't he?

BOND: No, he was the wartime president. No, this was... Oh, Christ! *(Pause)* It was Juscelino Kubitschek. He was a good president but, more important, he had a wonderful idea man. This man was responsible for some of the best things Juscelino did, such as building a new capital in Brasilia. And his name I do remember: Augusto Frederico Schmidt. Schmidt was the very wealthy owner of what I would guess was the largest supermarket chain in Brazil. He was an ugly man. No personality at all. But he was also, for my money, the best poet in Brazil. That cut a lot of ice with me.

They had reached the point where they were having to look ahead to the next election -- Brazil's presidents serve only one five-year-term -- which must have been in 1961 -- and the favorite candidate was the former governor of São Paulo, previously mayor of the city

of São Paulo. His name was Janio Quadros. The election was won by this former governor of São Paulo. The system in Brazil at that time, as I recall, was that the man who won the election became president and the one who came in second, who was usually of a different party, became vice president. I took Adlai Stevenson once to visit President Janio Quadros. They discussed economics and economic development, and Adlai came away with the impression that Quadros was a brilliant man.

But this new president was also considered strange and possibly half insane. A lot of Brazilians thought he should have been in an institution. So there was a great deal of worrying as to what sort of president he would turn out to be. He came in on a good platform of "sweep out the crooks" (his symbol was a broom) but gradually, once he took office, he began grasping more and more powers.

Finally, Quadros went to the Brazilian Congress to demand even more power, which would have given him almost autocratic control over the country. And he let it be known that, if Congress did not agree to his demands, he would resign. He then left Brasilia to go back to São Paulo, and waited to announce his resignation until after Congress adjourned. But he mis-timed it! The members of Congress were still on their way to the airport to return to their homes when they heard about it. They turned around, went back to the Congress, and voted to accept his resignation. (At that time and for some years to come, while Brasilia was still "raw," members of Congress worked in Brasilia during the week, but returned to their Rio residences at government expense on week-ends and whenever Congress was not in session.)

So he resigned inadvertently. Now, under the Brazilian Constitution, in the case of the demise of a president, his resignation, or anything of that sort, the vice president assumes the presidency. And the vice president, Jango Goulart, was a very leftist candidate who was hated by the center and the right as well as by the army and the conservatives. This man stood in line to inherit the presidency; but he was such a bad character and so bad for Brazil at that time that many in the army said they would not permit him to become president.

The dilemma was that the military were responsible for supporting and defending the Constitution. This was something they took very seriously. They had always moved in if they thought the government was violating the Constitution. They would throw the offending government out, move in, set things straight, and then withdraw. But, in this case, defending the Constitution meant handing over the presidency to a man who presented such a danger to Brazil politically, that about half the army felt they should not let the Constitution work the way it was supposed to. At this point, Brazil came very close to civil war. The military divided in any political crisis in Brazil means danger. If the military are all on the same side, there's no problem, but if they are divided it can mean war.

So they arranged a Brazilian compromise: they would allow the former vice president to assume the presidency but they would reduce his powers to such an extent that he could do no damage. He took office on that basis, but from then on he continually widened his

powers.

It was getting to the point that the military as well as all the conservatives and middle-of-the-roaders were in great fear that he was going to take Brazil Communist. He was very strong with the labor unions. This was all about the end of '63, I guess. By the time I arrived back in Brazil, in São Paulo this time, in early '64, things were in that sort of state.

There were public demonstrations, particularly by the women of São Paulo, against the president. There were rumors of a revolution. And finally the revolution took place. One of the major armies of the Brazilian Army rose against the president. It spread from there and finally the whole Army was against him and he fled the country.

Q: What was our embassy doing at that time? This was when?

BOND: This was in 1964.

Q: Obviously, this was of great concern to us.

BOND: It was, indeed.

Q: Here is the major country of Latin America and it could become a Cuba.

BOND: That's right.

Q: What were we doing?

BOND: There is one area that I have skipped. I've got to go back to it.

Q: You were saying about this resignation...?

BOND: Going back to the question of the sudden and unexpected resignation of the president of Brazil in 1961... The president had been in office for less than seven months when he suddenly resigned for reasons that were not at first evident to the public. He had been elected largely on the basis of his fine record as mayor and then governor of São Paulo; his candidacy had received the support of conservative business interests, including at least the moral support of the American business community in Brazil.

Once in office, however, he had soon begun to pursue an independent and predominantly neutralist foreign policy oriented toward the Third World and away from Brazil's traditional friendship with the United States. His resignation was intended as a political maneuver designed to extract from the Brazilian Congress a grant of authoritarian powers which would enable him to carry out his vaguely defined program of reforms. But the Congress had called his bluff by accepting his resignation. The fact that the president had not really meant to resign did not alter the fact that Brazil was suddenly left without a president, and with a vice president who, in addition to being far to the left of the

resigned president was, at the time, absent from Brazil on a trip to Communist China.

During the afternoon rumors began to circulate in Rio suggesting that the president had been forced to resign by pressure from the United States. By late afternoon a menacing crowd, consisting mostly of young toughs, had begun to gather around the embassy chancery in downtown Rio, with little evident discouragement from the few police in the area. Calls from the embassy to both the Foreign Office and Police Headquarters, brought no appreciable police reinforcements.

The embassy building, while a fine example of contemporary urban architecture and an efficient and comfortable work place, was obviously not designed to be defended against external attack. The front doors were of glass with no protective grills or grating and, thanks to full length glass windows along the entire front of the embassy, the interior lobby was totally visible from the street.

Marine Guards, and the Embassy security staff inside the building were issued carbines and tear gas grenades with the customary admonitions concerning their use. At about six o'clock in the afternoon the crowd outside, which had grown to several thousand, started throwing rocks and other missiles at the windows of the embassy. They began to surge toward the front doors where the few police were concentrated.

Marine Guards stationed on the upper floors dropped tear gas grenades between the crowd and the embassy entrance. The demonstrators pulled back across the street and resumed their barrage of rocks. After several more abortive efforts to reach the embassy doors, and having apparently run out of rocks or windows or both, the crowd began to disperse just as a truckload of armed riot police arrived on the scene.

A bit later, as chargé d'affaires, I sat in my office dictating a telegram to the Department reporting on the afternoon's events. At that point, the secretary general of the Foreign Office called to express the regrets of his government over the attack on the embassy and state its willingness to pay compensation for the damages inflicted. After thanking the secretary general, I could not forbear expressing my disappointment over the failure of the Brazilian authorities, including the Foreign Office, to provide any sort of adequate protection for the embassy despite the latter's repeated requests.

The secretary general, departing from his usual formality, expressed his personal agreement in most undiplomatic terms, then asked if I could give him an estimate of the damage. I replied that the rough estimate we were sending to Washington was \$40,000 to which he responded, "My God! It would have been a lot cheaper to have protected the embassy!"

I had a meeting with my political officers later that afternoon at which we discussed the situation resulting from President Quadros' resignation and subsequent events. Certain basic facts were apparent: First, while the Congress had already named the speaker of the lower house as acting president, the person who would succeed to the presidency under Brazilian Constitutional law was the vice president. He was understood to be returning

directly from Communist China.

Second, it was the strong and persistent instinct of the Brazilian people, as well as the traditional and honored function of the Brazilian armed forces, to defend the Constitution and the constitutional process.

Third, the prospect of the succession to the presidency of a vice president who had been a political protégé of Getulio Vargas, and long noted for his demagogic leftist tendencies, was certain to be highly distasteful, to say the least, to Brazilian conservatives in general and the armed forces in particular.

Fourth, the conflict, therefore, which would be at the heart of this political crisis was the traditional devotion to the Constitution on the one hand and, on the other, distrust and abhorrence of the individual who was, inevitably, the beneficiary of that process. And the place where that conflict would be most acute and dangerous was in the military itself.

It was the consensus of the meeting that the posture of the United States should be one of scrupulous non-interference in what was clearly a Brazilian problem. Prognosis proved more difficult than diagnosis however. No agreement was reached on how the crisis was likely to be resolved. After agreeing on a telegram to the Department setting forth the preliminary analysis and recommendation, the meeting broke up for the night.

During the following week the lines of the conflict hardened. The three ministers of the Armed Forces came out publicly in adamant opposition to the succession of the incumbent vice president, and sought to mobilize the military leadership behind them. At the same time, other military and civilian leaders took strong positions in favor of the succession on constitutional grounds.

It was becoming increasingly evident to me and to my staff that Brazil was approaching the brink of civil war. My own numerous contacts with Brazilians during that period were convincing me that the Brazilian people in general, for all their misgivings about the incumbent vice president, were predominantly in favor of the constitutional solution.

On the other hand, I was finding myself under increasing pressure from anti-succession military leaders and their supporters - some of the most vehement of whom seemed to be in the American business community - to support their cause. But the Embassy continued to recommend, and the State Department to support a policy of strict neutrality.

Finally, after two weeks of crisis and tension and the country teetering on the edge of disaster, the Brazilian genius for compromise asserted itself. The incumbent vice president was to succeed to the presidency, but a weakened presidency stripped of many of its powers, under a newly compacted parliamentary form of government. In mid-October, 1962, a new ambassador arrived in Rio and I was able at last to pass the Chief of Mission responsibilities on to him.

Q: It was Lincoln Gordon, wasn't it?

BOND: Yes. Jack Cabot had left, having been declared *persona non grata* by the president. He had made a speech in which he went beyond the bounds of caution regarding Quadros, and the President took away his visa.

Q: Did you find yourself having a problem keeping the Embassy in line during this critical time?

BOND: No. I enlarged the meetings so everybody would be represented and could speak their mind. We had no problems with that at all.

Q: What about the military attachés?

BOND: The military attachés agreed with our point of view. They didn't want to get mixed up with it at all. They were under pressure from their Brazilian counterparts to do something, but the business community were really the strongest advocates of not carrying out the succession.

Q: Were you getting support or was Washington strangely silent, as it often is in times of this nature?

BOND: Washington was waiting to get the whole story which, finally, as a result of the meeting I just described, we sent to them. They came right back supporting the position we'd taken, that of non-involvement. I also received an Official Informal letter from the Brazilian desk backing that up. They thought we were doing just the right thing.

Q: When Lincoln Gordon came, how did he view the situation?

BOND: Well, you never know with Lincoln. You ask him what he thinks of something and he'll give you a 50 minute lecture, the way he does with his students. But he didn't take any exception to the embassy's handling of the crisis (so far as I am aware).

The Brazilians welcomed him and welcomed the fact that, when he arrived, he gave a little speech in Portuguese, which he'd learned in the past few weeks. Jack Cabot had never spoken any Portuguese at all. But Lincoln Gordon had quite a few Brazilian friends, one of them a Brazilian economist. He knew most of the good ones. But even his best friends there later told me they were fed up with his preaching to them as if they were his pupils. That was his way.

Q: He's still teaching, by the way, over at Brookings. I think he's still there.

BOND: Oh, is he?

Q: When did Vernon Walters arrive?

BOND: I don't remember the date. I was the one who suggested Vernon Walters for that job. He was perfect for it. It was after the succession crisis, because I remember that Linc

Gordon had been there only a few months when he was called back for consultation. We had just lost our defense attaché, who was an agreeable person but would have made a far better civilian than a military man. Linc asked me, "Is there anything that I should ask the White House for, or anyone else, when I go back?" So I said, "We badly need a good defense attaché. Please do everything possible to get Vernon Walters assigned to that job."

Q: Walters, who was in Rome and was dragged out most unwillingly! (Laughter)

BOND: I know! And I said to Linc that Dick Walters had just gone to Rome recently, and he was almost as well equipped for the job in Rome as he was for the job in Brazil because he had gone through the Italian Campaign as liaison with the Brazilian Division. The person with whom he had shared tents during that campaign, Marechal Castello Branco, was by this time about to be elected president of Brazil. So anyway, I begged Linc to try to work on that. He told me when he got back that he finally had to go to the White House to try to get that done.

Goulart was still president. He had his own clique of military officers who were always with him. Our own military attachés had no luck in penetrating that group at all. They couldn't get anything out of them. They were looked upon as enemies or, at least, adversaries. So we didn't know what the hell was going on with Goulart's military advisors.

As soon as Dick Walters arrived, Linc took him over to call on President Goulart. His office was in one part of the palace, and his military clique were a few rooms away. When the ambassador and Walters left Goulart's office (I think Walters and Goulart had met before) Linc asked me if I would take Dick down to meet the military clique, none of whom I knew personally.

I told Dick "You know, we've been having a problem getting to these people. I hope you'll know some of them." As we walked through the door I could see 12 or 15 people sitting around, all colonels and generals. They jumped up. "Walters! Walters!" They ran up to him and hugged him. It was amazing! *(Laughter)* From then on he had access to the whole military. It was really amazing.

I didn't know it was going to be that good but that was why I wanted Walters. It was striking, and his Portuguese is excellent. He's a wonderful linguist. I had first seen Dick Walters in action during the Eisenhower visit for the inauguration of the new capital, Brasilia. I flew up to Puerto Rico to meet Air Force One with the President on board, and flew back to Brazil with him. Milton was along also.

Q: Milton Eisenhower. The president's brother, an economist.

BOND: Yes, he was along. He was supposedly a Latin American expert. Actually, he was more of a Hispanic American than a Latin American expert. He didn't know much about Brazil. So I had to brief both of them on the way to Brasilia. Dick Walters was the

President's official interpreter, but he must have been on the other plane because I didn't meet him until later.

On that occasion, when the President of Brazil (this was the good president, Juscelino Kubitschek) gave a dinner at the Foreign Office for President Eisenhower, Dick Walters had interpreted. He did such a beautiful job of interpreting, and he knew so many people... That was why, in 1962, I put him down as someone who should be in Brazil - it was such an "iffy" time. And the Brazilians just loved him.

Goulart was thrown out by the Army in 1964, and Dick Walters' tent-mate from the Italian campaign was appointed president. The Armed Forces (who had appointed him) wanted to celebrate his inauguration with a big dinner party in his honor. The new president politely declined, saying "No, I want to have a quiet dinner." And then he called Dick Walters, and he and Dick dined alone together the night of his inauguration. The only person he wanted to talk to was Walters. So, from then on, the embassy knew pretty well what the president was thinking. That general made a very good president. A fine president.

Q: Cuanthro?

BOND: No. Castello Branco.

Q: Well, you left Rio sometime after Walters arrived, didn't you? Was it '63?

BOND: I left in '63, yes. The spring of '63. And then, as I was starting to say before, I ran into Dean Rusk who I think was secretary of state at that time.

Q: Yes, he would have been.

BOND: I ran into him in the hall on the seventh floor of the Department. He came up to me and he said, "I'm glad to see you. You're about ready to leave Brazil and, as you know, I want you in Washington to teach that Counter-Insurgency course." This was something we had discussed when I was in Washington on consultation in 1962; a pet project of Robert Kennedy's and something I was not keen to take on. Rusk went on to tell me "We will have two Latin American posts opening up when that course is over: Bolivia and Guatemala. At the end of your year here, I want you to go to one of them as ambassador." I was not particularly interested in either country, but I was interested in becoming an ambassador.

A couple of days later, I was walking along a Washington street and ran into the daughter of the then consul general in São Paulo. She told me that her father had just been assigned to Havana as sort of chargé of the American embassy there, although we had no diplomatic relations with Cuba. I asked her when, exactly, he was leaving São Paulo. She said she didn't know; he had just told her about the transfer on the telephone the night before.

I had loved Brazil so much that I immediately thought to myself that I would far rather be consul general in São Paulo than ambassador in Bolivia or Guatemala. Also, my wife wasn't well and I didn't want to expose her to the rigors of being first lady in an embassy. So I went back and thanked Dean Rusk and said, "I understand São Paulo is about to be open and, since I just returned from Brazil, and know everybody worth knowing in Brazil, as well as the language, I would really prefer to go to São Paulo as consul general." So he said, " 'S a' right!" And that is what happened.

Q: Well, before we talk about that, you did spend some time with that anti-terrorism seminar?

BOND: Yes. The Counter-Insurgency seminar. I spent about nine months as coordinator. It was for ten months but I think I got out in nine. That was in '63.

Q: What was that about?

BOND: When I thought I was being assigned back to the Department and then out, I knew about this course, and was afraid that I was going to have to take it if I were assigned to a Third World country. I was trying to think of some way to get out of it when I had a letter from the Department saying that I had been named coordinator of the thing, and that was even worse! But anyway, I've written various times about how I felt about that. I finally decided I couldn't get out of it, but I was so unenthusiastic, you know. I really tried to get out of it and pulled the few strings I had to pull. But at least they let me go to São Paulo afterwards, as I had requested.

Q: You did it for about nine months.

BOND: Yes.

Q: What was the thrust of what you were trying to do?

BOND: Well, what I was trying to do...I wasn't in sympathy with the purpose of the thing, or anything about it. I thought it was a bad idea, a waste of time. My whole effort was to shorten the course, to give them everything they were supposed to be getting, but in much less time. As I stated on another occasion, "It was not that I disagreed entirely with the objectives, or that I discounted the need for some effective response to communist exploitation of the underdeveloped areas of the world. My reaction was more a personal one -- born, perhaps, of a sense of culture shock triggered by transition from a society of culture and cultural values and the creation of beauty to an impersonal world of cold war and counter-revolution. From the beginning, my alienation from the latter world was so intense that the mere carrying out of my assigned duties at the Counter-Insurgency Seminar was a constant ordeal, a *crise de conscience*. But I had to serve my time in this detested job before I could hope to move to one more compatible. I channeled my energies into making the curriculum tighter and more concise, weeding out the irrelevant and redundant elements and instilling a sense of Vivaldian symmetry and logic which made it possible to shorten the course by 20 percent without sacrificing its content."

Q: Could you give a summary? What does this mean? What was the course supposed to do?

BOND: It was supposed to prepare people for fighting communism in various underdeveloped countries, and provide an alternative to what the communists provided in the way of help and spiritual sympathy and all of that sort of thing. It was very sketchy and there was no real description beyond such generalities as "unconventional war." Bobby Kennedy sometimes talked. He was sort of the spiritual father of the thing and he was fairly reasonable. He didn't make unreasonable suggestions or comments. We had a lot of very good speakers, but it just wasn't what I was interested in.

Q: You then went back to Brazil, to São Paulo, where you served from '64 to '69.

BOND: Well...yes...

Q: '68 maybe.

BOND: Yes.

Q: Today is the 30th of May 1998. You mentioned that poetry was a major theme in your life and I wonder if you could tell us how this has played in your life, particularly during the Foreign Service time.

BOND: I started writing poetry when I was in Spain, about the end of the War. I stayed in the closet for several years after that.

Q: Someone in later years might not understand what the term "closet" means.

BOND: Well, I was in the closet with it. In other words, I never showed my work to anyone. I didn't tell anyone. Even my wife didn't know I was writing poetry, until I got to Tokyo some years later, five years later or so. The British Embassy there had a poetry reading club and I joined that, and began to be more open about it. But it wasn't until I got to Brazil that I really admitted I was writing poetry. There used to be an old British saying: "Scratch a Persian and you find a poet." Well, it was that way in Brazil. Scratch a Brazilian and you find a poet. Once the poets and the writers and composers and so forth heard that I wrote poetry, they jumped in and said, "Let's see it!" and "We'll get it published for you!" and "We can translate it!" So I published two books in Brazil.

The first one was translated by an old man. I suppose he was in his mid-seventies. To me, at that time, he was old. And he had read some of my poems loaned to him by a mutual friend. He liked them and he sent word back that he would like to translate a book of the poems and get it published. I was very flattered by that and, of course, agreed to it. Part of the flattery arose from the fact that the "old man" referred to was not only himself a poet, but was Poet Laureate of São Paulo. He chose the poems to go into the book. As a

result, there were some poems included which I would rather not have published. Anyway, the book came out and it was very successful and also acted as an incentive for me to write more. Two years later I had another book ready, and it was published by the same very good publisher in São Paulo. In this case, the translation was done by the woman who, 19 years later, became my wife. The book-signing the second time was in the ballroom of a bank building and it was pouring rain that night, a terrible night. And seven hundred people showed up...

Q: Oh, my God!

BOND: ...for what they call the *lançamento*, the launching of the book. And that's how I really became serious about it. And being a poet was of incalculable value to me in every way in Brazil. It gave me entrée into areas that I would never have gotten into, including acceptance by quite a number of people who were on the CIA blacklist as anti-Americans to be avoided. They were very friendly and they were poets, they were artists and that sort of thing. And there were in the history of Brazil maybe a dozen presidents who were poets, and a poet in Brazil, I discovered, ranks second only to a soccer player.

Q: Ah!

BOND: That was proven in a poll that the *O Globo* newspaper did. The one question in that poll was, "Whom do you regard as the outstanding living Brazilian?" Well, it took them five years to get the poll done. They went to places that could only be reached by helicopter or dugout canoe on the small rivers. And number one, as everyone expected, was Pele, the World Cup soccer player.

Q: He was more or less the most admired soccer player in the world.

BOND: That's right. But Brazil's leading poet came in second. And that, I think, is a fair judgement. Poetry was exceedingly helpful to me. As I said, I got into circles I would not have if I hadn't written poetry. My poetry is completely non-political, but it served me very well.

My books in Brazil were published in '65 and '67. Then I published a book in the States, in '92. That was the first one published outside of Brazil. I've since then had one more published in Bulgaria. I'm working on another one that, I hope, will be published here. So that's the story of my life as a poet.

Q: It does point out that as diplomats, you have a profession. However, your profession is enhanced by outside interests and one can't calculate the best way to use them, and it has nothing to do with getting yourself ready to be a diplomat. It just happens that if you do have this interest it does open up fields that just aren't available anywhere else. A question or two, going back. You talked about being on this Japanese ship, being taken to Mozambique. I take it that this was arranged and that the ship was brightly lit.

BOND: Yes. The ship was brightly lit with great crosses painted on the sides and, up top,

a cross that I suppose was about 20 feet each way with bulbs in it that were lit up at night. When we were between Hong Kong and Saigon, the captain of the ship got very worried about being so conspicuous since it was known that there were American submarines nearby. So he turned off all the lights and the ship proceeded in darkness. We had a Swiss representative on board and, I think, a Swedish representative and they radioed to their home offices about this and the captain was finally ordered to turn on his lights. For about two nights we were absolutely in the dark. The Asama Maru was a passenger liner that also carried silk. We, who were way down the line rank-wise, ended up in the silk bins. It was not a very pleasant trip.

Q: The Gripsholm was also lit, I assume.

BOND: Oh, yes. The Gripsholm was a wonderful change. On the Japanese ship we had two meals a day, consisting of rice and chicken curry every meal, every day. I started out hating curry and I ended up trying to get seconds, I liked it so much. *(Laughter)* But then, when we got on the Gripsholm, it was like being in Heaven. We had clean sheets and real beds. The food was wonderful. The bar was wonderful. We hadn't had anything to drink on the Japanese ship.

Q: Moving to another subject, during this time that you were in charge of how to train people to stop revolutionary movements essentially; could you describe your impression of Robert Kennedy, the President's brother, who was attorney general at the time and who was taking a very strong interest in this? This was a very activist administration and Bobby Kennedy was one of the most active in it so I wonder if you could discuss your impression of him?

BOND: My impression of him during that period was good. He was interested in it. He didn't try to tell me not to do things I was doing or to do things I wasn't doing. He was apparently satisfied with the way things were going. He was in favor of one of my main efforts, which was to reduce the time. There was too much time allowed for the substance they got out of it so I was cutting it down. Each course ended up being a three-week course instead of four weeks -- so I took a week out of it. I had no problem with him. Later, I came to despise him. He visited Sao Paulo when I was there. He and Ethel were the two rudest people I've ever seen, rude to the Brazilians, rude to their hosts, rude to everyone. He was there for the weekend, and never stopped being rude to anyone outside the band of cronies who accompanied them.

Q: Why don't we talk now about the time you were in São Paulo. You were there from '64 until '68 or '69?

BOND: Yes. From very early in '64. I got there in January.

Q: São Paulo is often a post, as is right, that is used for somebody of essentially ambassadorial rank. It's of that importance.

BOND: Yes. My staff was much larger than a lot of embassy staffs. We had 125, I would

guess. I liked it because it was in Brazil and full of Brazilians. I arrived in São Paulo from Washington in either January or February. I had stopped over in Rio to discuss my new post with the Ambassador. Then I went on down to São Paulo with the rank of as Minister Consul General. The growing movement against the left wing president (Goulart) was much more evident in São Paulo than in Rio. The Brazilian women, particularly, were marching in protest in the streets of São Paulo.

Q: Why was this?

BOND: Well, I don't know why. I think that Rio is mainly of Portuguese-Brazilian makeup and São Paulo is full of nationalities of all sorts. There is a lot of Portuguese blood, of course, but in Rio the Portuguese form the basis of the upper classes. São Paulo has a great many Middle Easterners, particularly Lebanese and Syrians, and a very large Japanese population. There is, in the southern part of the state, a large colony of Germans. And, of course, a huge number of Italians, by and large northern Italians, not southern Italians. They were from Milan and they were, for the most part, wealthy. The Syrians and the Lebanese were very wealthy. So it was much more cosmopolitan than Rio, and more sophisticated politically than Rio was. At any rate, I found a much higher degree of interest and indignation about the new president in São Paulo.

Q: Well, had the new president begun to take hold? Was it Goulart?

BOND: Yes. Jango Goulart.

Q: He had been in the Far East. He came back. He was visiting China. And had he begun to take hold and make efforts to...

BOND: Yes, that's right. He had taken certainly taken over, was becoming bolder every week in his effort to move the country to the left, particularly through the Labor Movement which he pretty much controlled. Then he made one bad mistake. I'll just read this little note about it:

“During the week which followed, while I was in Rio consulting at the embassy, the deepening crisis was further exacerbated by the President's handling of a Naval mutiny in which a thousand sailors and marines rose against their officers and barricaded themselves in an armory in Rio. When the Navy minister attempted to quell the mutiny, the President dismissed him from office and allowed the trade unions to participate in the choice of a new Navy minister, whose first official act was to grant amnesty to the mutineers. Although the denouement was still some days away, the president had already sealed his fate.”

Q: You know, you don't mess with the military on that sort of thing. This is political science A101 or something like that. (Laughter)

BOND: So then I reported a couple of weeks later by telegram to the Department and the embassy that there were indications, which I thought reliable, that the Brazilian Army was about to make its move against the President.

The next day I called a meeting of the staff to review the consulate's emergency and evacuation plan. While the meeting was still in progress, word was received that the governor of the state of Minas Gerais (which is northwest of São Paulo) together with the army commander in that State, had finally raised the flag of revolt against the government. It was also reported that the Fourth Infantry Division was already on the move toward Rio from its headquarters in Minas Gerais. A short time later, word was received that the president had responded to the manifesto, relieving the army commander in Minas Gerais of his command and predicting prompt suppression of the revolt.

The anticipated next step was for the State of São Paulo and its powerful Second Army to join the revolt in support of Minas Gerais. But that didn't happen as expected because the commander of the Second Army had been very close to the President, to Goulart. In the early days of Goulart's presidency, the commander of the Second Army had been minister of defense, the Army minister. The revolt could not have succeeded without the support of the Second Army. He took overnight to make up his mind, with the tension growing all the time.

I was with the Governor of São Paulo during much of that day. The Governor, Adhemar de Barros, was one of the architects of the revolt against the president. Finally, a day or two later, just after midnight on a Wednesday morning, the commander of the Second Army went on the radio and announced that his army had joined the revolt in support of Minas Gerais against the president. Ninety minutes later the governor of São Paulo, speaking on television and radio, delivered himself of a confident and fighting speech in which he said that elements of the Second Army were already on their way to join the forces of Minas Gerais in their march on Rio. Later in the day it became evident that the units of the First Army sent out from Rio to oppose the forces from Minas Gerais and São Paulo would offer no resistance in opening the road to Rio. The same day the president decided that things were becoming too hot for him in Rio. He flew to Brasilia and from there to Rio Grande do Sul, in the south of Brazil, which was his native heath. When he left for the south of Brazil, the Congress declared that he had deserted the presidency and swore in an acting president.

The following day the deposed president announced from Rio Grande do Sul that he was still president and had the support of the loyal Third Army, and that he would return to power. But when it became apparent that he no longer enjoyed any effective military support he disappeared from sight, reappearing at the end of the week in Uruguay. At that point in Brazil a newly created military command took over control of the country.

Q: While this was going on, you say you were with the governor of the state. Wasn't this a problem? Here decisions are being made and the American consul general is observed consulting with an important figure in a political chess board there.

BOND: Yes, that's right. As it turned out, that was the interpretation of a number of books that were written about this period, which suggest that I was in on the planning of

the revolution. Actually, the appointment that I had with the governor had been made a week or so before to talk about something totally unrelated to Goulart. I forget what the subject matter was.

Once I got there, he just hung onto me and kept me informed about what he knew. He said that the troops in Minas Gerais had jumped the gun. They were supposed to move 24 hours later. That was the problem. He was on the phone with the commander of the Second Army off and on all day. He asked me to stay because he was all alone. He wanted company. Adhemar had always reminded me of Jim Curley when he was governor of Massachusetts. He stole from the rich to give to the poor, lived openly with his mistress, and that sort of thing.

Q: I'm told that this was rather Brazilian, wasn't it?

BOND: Yes, it did not have the same effect it would have had in this country, certainly.

Q: Incidentally, we're moving away. We'll come back to the revolt. But, of a social note, when you sent out an invitation, did you ask Mr. and Mrs. or Mr. and Mistress?

BOND: No, we always invited the governor and his wife but, almost without exception, he would turn up with his mistress. His wife was not to be seen. That was frowned upon, of course, so he didn't get very many invitations from the elite of São Paulo society. For example, we had a consular corps in São Paulo and I was president of it at that point, I think. The governor had let it be known that he would be pleased if the consular corps would give a dinner in his honor, and we'd been considering doing it anyway. So we went ahead, and that's what happened. We invited him and his wife and he came with his mistress. There were some "tsk tsk tsks." (*Laughter*) You know, he really was a rascal.

Q: Well, back to the revolt. I would have thought that as this thing was moving that one would...and I'm talking about at the American embassy and probably other embassies and I'm sure the Brazilians were all looking to the south for an example. I mean, this alliance with the labor union resembles that of Juan Peron in Argentina. Juan Peron was out of power by this time, wasn't he?

BOND: I don't know. I don't think he was.

Q: But he'd certainly driven the economy of Argentina down, where it's just recovering now in the 1990's. Was this something that people were talking about, looking at Goulart?

BOND: Oh, I think they were. After the episode with the mutineers I think it was generally assumed that the Army had no choice. They had to move in, and the Second Army was the most powerful Army in Brazil. There were, I think, four Army Zones. The Second Army in São Paulo was the largest and strongest army, stronger than the First Army which was based in Rio.

I had reported to the embassy what I mentioned a few minutes ago, that I had what I considered reliable information indicating that the Brazilian military were about to make a move. São Paulo had that before the embassy had it. The first reliable report that the embassy received was from us.

Q: Well, tell me, with the consulate general, what about your contacts with the military, with the Second Army there?

BOND: Our contacts were not very extensive. We saw the commander of the Second Army socially. The Second Army headquarters was right next to the governor's mansion. So we did see him and I knew him and liked him but we didn't have military attachés, of course. So there was nobody specifically designated to keep in touch with the military. The attachés in Rio were in and out of São Paulo fairly frequently: I think they were more or less *au courant*.

Q: During the time you were there, this was fairly early in your coming as consul general, wasn't it, the takeover?

BOND: Yes. I arrived to take over in January. The revolt went off in April of '64.

Q: What was the new military government called?

BOND: It was called the Supreme Military Command.

Q: You were able to see developments in the newly established government. Did this, the military command, make much of a change in Brazil at the time?

BOND: It didn't immediately. The ranking general at that time in Brazil was Humberto Castello Branco, a very good man who had fought with the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in Italy. He was the man who had shared a tent with Dick Walters in that campaign. He was the spokesman for the military and he became president not very long after and was a very fine president.

Q: It was not a major concern that one has about military governments: that they begin to work under essentially martial law and that type of thing?

BOND: Yes. Well, the Brazilian Army had a very good record. It had stepped in to defend the Constitution time and again. It had always turned the political power back to the civilians as quickly as possible, sometimes more quickly than they should have. I think that most Brazilians... I'm sure everyone had in the back of his mind the possibility that they would not turn the government back to the civilians this time.

As it turned out, as long as Castello Branco, Dick Walters' friend, was president there was no problem. He was succeeded by General Costa e Silva, a guerrilla type who looked the part. He always wore dark glasses. He had a lot of people arrested as subversives, including some of my friends. There was, in effect, a military dictatorship for the next ten years.

Q: While you were there, there were two civilian presidents?

BOND: Juscelino Kubitschek was President when I arrived and was President virtually all the time I was in the Embassy in Rio. He was succeeded by Janio Quadros, the man who inadvertently resigned, leaving the presidency to Goulart.

Kubitschek was a good president, but it was his idea man, Schmidt - the poet, whom I have already mentioned - who really came up with Kubitschek's greatest accomplishment, which was to build a new capital in Brasilia. Moving the capital away from Rio was not a new idea. I think it had been in the Brazilian Constitution since the 19th century that the capital should be moved away from the coast in order to make it more accessible to other parts of the country. So, although Kubitschek claimed that as his greatest accomplishment, it was actually Schmidt who was behind it.

Now that's an example of what poetry can do for you. When I was leaving for Rio in 1959, I went in to see Secretary Dulles about something, or to say goodbye to him, I guess. He and I shared a birthday and I'd been invited to a birthday party at his home one year, so we knew each other. As I was leaving he wished me well in Rio and said, "I want to warn you. There's one person in Brazil you should avoid like the plague. Keep away from him. He's no good. He's dangerous. He's rude. He's ugly. So don't have anything to do with him." And the man he was talking about was August Frederico Schmidt. I was told later by Dulles' secretary that the reason he hated Schmidt was because Schmidt had called on him in Washington some months before, and Dulles thought Schmidt had been rude to him. But Schmidt was rude to everyone. That was his way. His parentage was a mix of black and white and Jewish. He was an ugly, ugly man. He had great warts on his face. But he was a wonderful poet...

He returned to Brazil after his visit with Dulles feeling no more charitable toward Dulles than vice-versa. He would have nothing to do with America. Going down to Rio with that warning from Dulles in mind. I decided the thing I wanted to do first, after making my compulsory calls, was to look up Augusto Frederico Schmidt and see if he was as bad as Dulles had said.

I was told that he wouldn't see any Americans, especially anyone from the American embassy. But I was told of a young Brazilian lady who might be helpful. She was married to an American Foreign Service Officer stationed in London, and she had come back from London to visit her family, who lived across the street from Schmidt. Apparently, while she was growing up, she was Schmidt's favorite little girl. Someone I knew told me about her.

Meanwhile, we were giving a dinner for a senator and his wife. Senator Morse, I believe. This was the first big dinner we were giving in the house that we had moved into in Rio. One of the key ladies turned up ill and couldn't come, and we needed another lady. So I called this young woman. She was at home, staying with her mother. Her husband was still in London. I told her why we wanted her to come, and apologized for calling when I

had never met her, and inviting her to dinner with people she had never met. Anyway, I told her that it was all about Schmidt. She thought that was a great idea. She came and was a wonderful guest.

Anyway, she talked to Schmidt the next day, told him that I was a poet who was a great admirer of his poetry, and wanted very much to call on him. After mumbling about Americans and their lack of manners, he finally agreed to receive me the following evening. Our conversation began tentatively and stiffly, but warmed up as we delved into poetry and found that we agreed on many things. And so began a friendship that went on until I left. He was very difficult, he never was charming. But, after that, he sent me autographed copies of all of his books. And eventually I got to know him well enough so that we could talk about politics. I had access through him to corners of Brazilian thought and prejudices hidden from most Americans. So, poetry served me well there.

Q: How long did the first military president preside as president before he turned it over to the man you described as a "guerrilla?"

BOND: I don't remember how long Castello Branco was president. I would guess about two years. Sometime later, he was killed in a plane crash.

Q: It happened while you were there?

BOND: No, after I had left.

Q: I would think that the two groups that would be both influential and very unhappy with this state of affairs...I'm talking about the military takeover... would be 1) the students and intellectuals and 2) the trade unions. In São Paulo, did we have much contact with either of those groups?

BOND: We had a very active labor attaché in São Paulo who spent a lot of time with the labor leaders there. They liked him and they felt that he was honest and that he was not against them. So we were pretty well informed about them. They were just keeping quiet for the most part. They didn't want any problems with the military and the military didn't want problems with them, so it was a "live and let live" relationship- (end of tape)

Q: You were saying the students...

BOND: The students were, by and large, against the military government because many of them had been arrested, including some young friends of mine. They were arrested for stupid reasons and not held very long. There was a nervousness among the students that was very evident.

There was one person whom I knew very well, an artist. I have one of his paintings at home. He had the very un-Brazilian name of Wesley Duke Lee. His name dated back to after the American Civil War. The then Emperor of Brazil made a great effort to get Southern plantation owners, who had lost everything in the Civil War, to move to Brazil.

They were given free land and free transportation and so forth. Wesley Duke Lee was descended from this group, and was a painter of great talent. At any rate, I met him very soon after I arrived in São Paulo. I was invited to dinner at the house of a young woman, a Spanish writer who was living with a young American photographer. They were pretty representative of the young students and young intellectuals. The guest of honor was Wesley Duke Lee, who had just got out of prison that day. They set this all up on very short notice. This was the first time I'd met him, and he appeared straight from prison, cell number and all. Later, he painted a whole series on his prison term, including his cell, and all sorts of things. He had not been held very long.

The reason that he was held was that he had received a telegram about the birth of a nephew. His brother who was living in the States, I think, had just become the father of a son. He sent Wesley a telegram about the baby that was worded in a humorous way. The military were reading everything, all telegraphic traffic, and they thought it was in code, a code message. So they picked Wesley up and put him in jail. He was there for several months, and had gotten out that day. The celebration was pretty characteristic of the young people's feeling about the military government.

Q: I assume there is a University of São Paulo.

BOND: Yes, a very good one.

Q: The way I've understood it was that a good number of Latin American universities are sort of a power unto itself and the students who go through there are dominated by leftist teachers, and they come out and they enter the business community but they are pretty leftist while they are in the university.

BOND: Yes, I think there is some truth to that. I knew a number of professors, particularly in the law school, but I never knew any that were noted for their left leanings. I had heard of some, and I know there were professors who were leaning to the left. I think it's pretty true that the students, once they get out of the university, go and work for their fathers' companies and that sort of thing. But São Paulo University is a very good university with a fine medical school and a very good law school. I think it's possibly the best university in Brazil.

Q: What about the business community in São Paulo? This was the real reason why we were so interested in it, isn't it, because it's the business center?

BOND: That's right. It certainly was the financial center of the country. Sort of the New York City of Brazil, the Wall Street of Brazil. Most of the big corporations were headquartered in São Paulo. One of the biggest was in Rio but most of the big ones were in São Paulo. While I was in São Paulo, I was visited by Vice President Nixon, who was, I think, out of office at that time.

Q: Yes.

BOND: I had a call from the embassy saying that Nixon was coming to Rio first, then he wanted to come to São Paulo over the weekend. He was going to be there Saturday and Sunday. I was asked to arrange a luncheon for Nixon and this was at Nixon's request. Those who would be invited were the leading financial and economic tycoons in São Paulo. He stipulated that it would be very helpful if they all spoke English.

At any rate, I said to the embassy, "In São Paulo, on weekends, nobody stays in town at this time of the year." Virtually all of those men owned great "fazendas" where they spent their weekends. They were really working with the earth. That was one of their strengths, that they were so close to the earth. They raised cattle and horses and that sort of thing. So I said, "There's not going to be anybody in town unless I can lasso them and hold them down!" And they said, "Well, do what you can. He has to be there on the weekend. That's the only time he has."

So I went around and called personally on the dozen people I thought were the best. They all finally agreed to stay in town and to go to this luncheon. I think with some of it was curiosity. They were just curious to see what Nixon was really like. So the luncheon took place and was very fruitful, I think, on both sides. It was a good luncheon. We held it at what was then the leading hotel in São Paulo. Nixon asked a lot of the right questions and got honest answers. Then I had him on my hands for all day Sunday, too. I had traveled with him in the Far East before that. He was terrible to travel with.

Q: What was the problem?

BOND: He was rude. On that occasion, he was going to visit Korea. Since I was serving at that time as DCM in Seoul, I had to fly down to Taipei to meet him, fly back with him, and brief him on the way. Because commercial flights to and from Taipei were few and far between, I had to go about four days early in order to get back when they wanted me back. So I spent the four days in Taipei, and was invited to all the functions being given for Nixon. But I never got a chance to talk to Nixon and I never tried to talk to him about his Korean visit while he was tied up with his visit to Taipei. I went to the party given by Chiang Kai-shek in honor of Nixon. Other guests of honor included the Living Buddha, and the only living descendent of Confucius... Anyway, we finally got on the plane and were flying on to Seoul, the capital of South Korea.

Q: This was 1953 or '54?

BOND: Yes. I would say so. It was right after the truce, I believe. Nixon was given a chart of the route. Flying from Taipei, instead of going right up the Chinese coast which would be the direct, shortest route, we were to fly over Okinawa and from Okinawa up. Nixon raised hell about that. He said, "That's too long. I want to go the shortest route. I want to go right up the coast." We said, "You may be shot down if you do that. You may be forced down; all sorts of things could happen if you're that close to the Chinese coast." Finally, the pilot came back and said, "I have my orders and this is the route we're going to take."

Q: He was vice president at the time, wasn't he?

BOND: I think so, yes.

Q: He had to be, yes.

BOND: Yes, because he was flying in Air Force Two, the vice president's plane. Then, when we got that out of the way, I took out the schedule we had made up for Nixon and showed it to him. He went through it with a blue pencil and crossed off almost everything on it. He handed it back and said to me, "That's the worst goddamn schedule I've ever seen."

He had two aides with him, unlikely people to be with Nixon because they were not like him. One of them was Christian Herter's son, young Chris Herter; and the other was a similar fellow of the same stripe. They told me later, "He's said that about every schedule he's seen this trip. He's said the same thing: 'This is the worst goddamn schedule I've ever seen.'" He ended up by doing everything on the schedule! But he was nasty about it.

Mrs. Nixon, Pat Nixon, was with him. He was very rude to her on the whole trip. He sort of made an ass of himself. The staff were all lined up to greet him when he arrived at the embassy. He somehow got the idea- One of the Korean employees was a very distinguished looking Korean, quite old. I forget what it was he did at the embassy. Anyway, Nixon for some reason thought he was the president of Korea. *(Laughter)* He'd started down the line, he saw this man, and then he skipped everybody and went up to him said, "Mr. President, how are you?" and that sort of thing. Made an absolute ass of himself. *(Laughter)* That was my life with Nixon.

Q: Well, back in São Paulo, one thing I have heard from people who dealt with Nixon during this period when he had lost to Kennedy, and I think he'd made an attempt to be governor of California and lost there, he was considered off the circuit. He traveled around a lot and really made quite a practice of absorbing a great deal on these trips. These were not pleasure trips. This was working.

BOND: That's what the São Paulo trip was, yes.

Q: Did you find that he was trying to understand Brazil?

BOND: Oh, yes. He was all business. And you know, he remembered that we had traveled together in the Far East and he mentioned that and said, "Didn't we have fun!?" *(Laughter)* So anyway, all one day I took him around to places of interest. But I think that's true, understanding Brazil was what he was up to at that point.

Q: When you arrived there was there a new ambassador or was Lincoln Gordon still there?

BOND: No, Lincoln Gordon, I think, was gone. I think Jack Tuthill was ambassador, but I'm not sure. It may be that the one who was kidnapped...

Q: Burke Elbrick. I think he came-- No, because Burke Elbrick was my ambassador in Yugoslavia and he left in, I think, close to '68, so I think it would have probably been Jack Tuthill. Did you get involved in his project, Operation Topsy? Does that ring a bell with you?

BOND: It rings a bell, but only faintly.

Q: When Tuthill came to Brazil he decided he was going to cut down the American presence there and it was called Operation Topsy. Somebody I'm interviewing right now (I've already covered this period) is Frank Carlucci. I was wondering if you had any reflections on relations with the ambassador?

BOND: I was in São Paulo when Tuthill was ambassador in Rio. So I saw him. They had a monthly staff meeting to which I was invited and, occasionally, one other principal officer. I got to know Jack very well and I liked him very much. He liked coming to São Paulo.

Q: Yes. Well, how were business relations with the United States from the São Paulo point of view? Did we have a lot of American investment there?

BOND: Yes, I think it was very good. We had the automobile companies. We had the Ford factory and Kaiser-Frazer had a big... I forget the name of it... car they were making. They both had factories. Ford, General Motors, and Kaiser all had factories. There was a lot of American investment and relations seemed to be very good. They got along very well with each other. I used to have occasion to visit these factories which were about a half an hour's drive from São Paulo. I used to go out there fairly frequently. And Bendix was one of the big ones there, too. I always had the impression that the Americans and the Brazilians were getting along very well. Of course, the top officers were Brazilian in all of these companies, though not the top one.

Q: The Brazilian economy was such that you had to have a Brazilian component in it in order to work in Brazil?

BOND: That's right.

Q: The military took over in '64 shortly after you arrived. You were there until '68 or early '69. Were you noticing growing discontent with the military rule? Normally, they're supposed to take care of the matter and then go back to the barracks and they didn't go back to the barracks. From the São Paulo perspective, was this becoming more and more unpopular?

BOND: No doubt about it. Because the good one, Figueiredo, the man who succeeded Costa e Silva, the "guerrilla" president, stayed on and on for a long time. He would make an occasional gesture but things were not... It became a real military dictatorship at that time. Brazilians are not comfortable with dictatorships. Getulio Vargas was called a

dictator, but he was a dictator Brazilian style, which has a lot of looseness to it. So, the people didn't suffer, really, but they just didn't like the way things were.

Q: Did you find it difficult as the American representative? Was there the feeling more and more that you blame the Americans for this government, we were giving too much support to it? Was this a problem?

BOND: No, I don't think that was ever a problem. After the military had been in power for say five years, there was growing sentiment in favor of electing a civilian president, and there was more and more pressure on the military to do that.

I was told by a reliable military source that the president and the military leaders of the country had finally decided on a candidate for president who was a civilian, an aviator, a former Army pilot. He had been mayor of São Paulo and also governor. I was told by this source that General Figueiredo or one of his assistants had called this man, who was still living in São Paulo, and offered the him the presidency. He was asked to go to Rio to discuss it with General Figueiredo. He went to Rio and, apparently as a result of his excitement about the whole thing, had a heart attack and died. He would have been a fine president. I knew him well. He'd been rather a scandal as a pilot. He was known for flying his fighter plane under bridges, things like that, but he was a very good governor and mayor of São Paulo. Now I remember: his name was Faria Lima. So, when that fell through... It was never publicized. I don't think anyone ever knew about that - it was never in the papers, but I was told that that is what happened. I don't remember how the thing worked out. I guess I'd left Brazil by the time they came up with a civilian candidate for the presidency.

Q: Did you ever feel yourself under any threat?

BOND: No. But things were beginning to get worse around the time we left. For the first time there was a bomb thrown at the Consulate. It was thrown on the sidewalk right in front of the USIS Library. It exploded there and blew out all the windows and that sort of thing. That was the only violence against us. That was the beginning. If I had stayed on I might have felt some fear, but I left just as that was starting, just as terrorist activities were beginning to appear. I remember that, after I left, there was one businessman murdered, a very prominent businessman, as well as an American Army attaché (dragged from his car and shot before his young son). The Brazilians just went after the terrorists and killed them, and that was the end of it. They just rounded them up and killed them. I don't remember the date of Ambassador Elbrick's kidnaping. I was in Brazil at the time it happened, but had already retired. I had returned to Brazil for the São Paulo Bienal.

Q: You retired in early '69?

BOND: No, I left São Paulo in early '69. I retired at the end of '69. During my last year in São Paulo, probably late in 1968, my office received a widely circulated airgram from the Department of State setting forth the position of the U.S. Government regarding the war in Vietnam. Included in the message was the text of a speech to be delivered by the principal officer or other ranking member of the staff, to selected groups of nationals of

the host country, in the hope of gaining their understanding and sympathy for the U.S. position.

I did not have to read the suggested speech twice to decide that to deliver it myself, or to associate myself with its point of view, was out of the question, so contrary was it to my strong feelings against the Vietnam War.

As I recall, my reply to the Department's instruction, conveyed in an official informal letter to the Brazil Desk Officer, added that I might be able to find someone on my staff who could deliver the Department's speech without doing violence to his conscience.

I left São Paulo in early '69 but I stayed on in the Department of State as advisor to the Brazil Desk until the end of the year.

Q: What did you do with yourself after that? Just briefly, because we're going beyond the theme.

BOND: I was secretary of the Corcoran Gallery of Art for approximately thirteen years. I enjoyed the job. I resigned when my wife died, in 1986. After that I served for eight years as director of the Fee Arbitration Board of the DC Bar.

I observed that, among my colleagues whose wives had died - and whom I used to see at weekly DACOR lunches - the ones who seemed to have survived best were the ones who had re-married fairly soon after losing their wives. I had a good friend whom we had known in São Paulo. Her husband worked for me there. They had been divorced two years before my wife died. She had translated one of my books into Portuguese. She was living in Old Lyme, Connecticut, and we were married in September of '88.

Q: Oh! Well, I guess we're just about done anyway, so this is a good time to stop.

BOND: Good! Fine!

Q: Excellent!

End of interview