

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

C. ARTHUR BORG

Interviewed by: Hank Zivetz
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INTERVIEW

[Note: This transcript was not edited by Mr. Borg]

Q: This is an interview with C. Arthur Borg, held at his home on the 24th of June, 1991. The interviewer is Hank Zivetz. Buck, could you tell us a little bit about the circumstances that led to your becoming a Foreign Service Officer.

BORG: My background basically was originally military, Hank. I went to the military academy at West Point, graduated in 1948, and was in the Korean War. It was after my service in the Korean War that I became really interested in a diplomatic career. I resigned from the army, took the examinations for the Foreign Service, and was appointed in the mid 50s. I served for about 28 years.

Q: You served primarily in Europe, although you did have a stint in Tokyo back in 1961-63. Was there anything that happened in Tokyo during your tour there as a political/military officer that might be worth including on this tape?

BORG: Probably in the context of my dealing with the political/military problems while I was there. I was assigned to what was called the security section. Our principal concern was administering the US/Japan Security Treaty and principal headache was trying to whittle down the ungodly number of military bases that we still had in Japan in the early 1960s. Close to 135 as I recall. Some of them were one man weather stations, but nevertheless an over-whelming American military presence. One of my principal jobs was working to try to reduce the number of those bases.

Q: Was the Japanese population at that time as concern as they are at the present with the nuclear weapons issues--nuclear weapons on our vessels? In the more recent years they have had regular demonstrations as our carriers enter ports there.

BORG: I would say much more so in the sense that when I was serving there, which was in the early 1960s, the Japanese had an aversion toward anything nuclear--nuclear power as well as weaponry. I can remember in 1961, for example, I tried to organize a visit by about a dozen Japanese journalists to Guam to go aboard an American nuclear powered submarine. This did not involve nuclear weapons, just an atomic reactor powering the submarine. It was a good project, but unfortunately it never came to fruition because a typhoon intervened. But it was symptomatic that the Japanese were really very skittish

about anything to do with things atomic as compared today where they have a very active Tokamura power program.

Q: Was it our policy at that time to get the Japanese to increase their military? Some years later it became a part of our bilateral relations with Japan.

BORG: In terms of trying to get them to increase military spending? Not so much at that period. The goal that was set forth later of aiming towards at least 1% of GNP was quite a bit later. In the early 60s it was very much defense oriented the notion that the Japanese had to be restricted to the defense of the home islands.

Q: You went on some years later to Berlin with a stop in Stockholm as a political counselor. Is there anything in that period from 1968-71 that is worth noting, or should we go directly to Berlin?

BORG: I think the main thing of interest with regard to Stockholm was the marvelous bit of human nature that the Swedes were inversely moralistic to the problem with regard to the distance from its borders. They were giving us a terrible time about our policy on the Vietnam War, very moralistic. I remember about two months before I arrived there, for example, a very large demonstration where the then minister of education, Olaf Palme, whom you may remember was later assassinated when prime minister, participated in a huge march with the North Vietnamese ambassador from Moscow. It was conveniently timed so that virtually every window in our embassy was broken before the police conveniently arrived about 15 minutes too late. It was a very careful moralistic orchestration of their disapproval. That situation improved markedly as US policy towards the war changed. When Johnson instituted the partial bombing moratorium, for example, in 1968, the policy suddenly appeared in time to prevent the windows from being broken at the embassy.

Q: Did you have any problems with the young Americans who had in effect taken asylum in Sweden at that time?

BORG: That was one of the principal stopping points. We were put into some compromising situations, really setups, where people from the embassy were enticed into meeting so-called deserters away from the embassy with lots of cameras and media coverage designed to embarrass embassy people. The other noteworthy thing that I can recall is that there really were three main categories of these people that came under the heading of deserters. Very few of them were really deserters in the ideological sense. The great majority of them came up from Germany to Sweden. They had money problems, women problems, military discipline problems. A very small number were honestly opposed to war in Vietnam.

Q: Was there an official American policy against embassy personnel meeting with these people?

BORG: Initially no. We had a policy of being quite willing to meet with them virtually anywhere. Then that had to be modified when these setup situations took place so the policy was changed to being willing to meet with them at the embassy. Not away from the embassy where we could be manipulated.

Q: What was their objective in setting these meeting up?

BORG: In the early stage, it was primarily to serve as a propaganda weapon for some of their host friends in Sweden. That initial period was a pretty romantic one with these kids coming in outside the country being lionized by left wing Swedes. It wasn't until later, I would say a year or a year and a half, after one or two cold winters that the American kids began to get in trouble with the law. They were involved in bank robberies in an attempt to support themselves. They found it difficult to get jobs, couldn't learn the language, etc. But the initial period was an overly romanticized one.

Q: Earlier you mentioned broken windows in Stockholm which leads us, I think, almost naturally to Berlin in that period 1971-74 where you were Deputy Assistant Chief of our US Mission. What were the highlights of your tour in Berlin? What was happening that would be noteworthy for this tape?

BORG: Of course, there is just one noteworthy event and that was the negotiation of the Berlin Agreement. I was transferred on a speedup basis from my assignment in Stockholm to join the delegation in West Berlin in 1971, as it entering its closing marathon stage, if you will. Virtually all of my waking hours were devoted to that negotiation. I was a member of the delegation, note taker for the delegation, did a lot of the drafting of the reporting telegrams for the negotiating sessions. It was a tremendously busy period throughout the summer, fall and winter of 1971.

Q: What in your view, now looking back to that period, were the Soviets after? From our point of view, what was their objective and how did that relate to our objectives?

BORG: Well, I think their principal objective was the legitimization of East Berlin's status as the capital of something called the German Democratic Republic. They were in an ironic position because they were on the one hand still loyal, if you will, to their four power rights under conquest from World War II--the rights they shared with the British, French and us--and they were interested in preserving those rights in a certain way. But at the same time they were interested in enhancing the status of the GDR and promoting its standing as a new sovereign state with East Berlin as its capital. So there were some contradictory impulses there. Its negotiating posture essentially was to enhance the separate status of East Berlin and on the other side of to give sort of practical advantages to the West in terms of reducing disturbances on the autobahn, buzzing the air corridors, etc. making it easier for East Berliners to visit relatives and that sort of thing. Practical improvements for the West Berliners as opposed to submitting a logical improvement for their legal position.

Q: Were the three Allies, the British, French and ourselves, were we in accord in terms of granting this legitimization of Berlin as the capital of the GDR?

BORG: You have raised THE question and there are probably people better suited than I to give you an authoritative answer, because at the time much of this was being very, very closely held, discussed on a very guarded basis. There were conversations, for example, between Jimmy Sutherland, the German Desk officer, Henry Kissinger as National Security Advisor, about carrying out various aims of the basic National Security Directive. Those kinds of things I am sure you could get a much more authoritative answer from somebody like Sutherland. But it appeared from where I was sitting that there were differences among the Allies. The French, I think, were probably the most pristine in defending a legal position, a very Cartesian way of looking at their French world. The British were inclined to be pragmatic and it appeared that we were the most willing to be flexible in the interest of reaching an agreement especially under pressure from our West German friends who were extremely impatient with proceeding with their Ostpolitik with the Soviets and normalizing their relations with the Soviets. So they wanted a Berlin Agreement among the Allies with the Soviets in the worst possible way so that they could proceed with their normalization trade and other arrangements with the Soviets.

Q: Were the Social Democrats in power at this time?

BORG: Lets see, yeah.

Q: Or was this the grand coalition?

BORG: I can't remember now when Willy Brandt left. Egon Bahr was the chief negotiator and was a Social Democrat. I am not quite certain.

Q: As an observer did you feel that the Soviets were trying to take advantage of differences between ourselves and our Western Allies? Was their negotiating stance one that would try to divide...?

BORG: Yeah. Not in any really surprising way. One example perhaps, was the question of the extent of the right of West German officials to represent the rights of West Berliners. The Western side had a strong legal interest in enhancing that right--the right of the West Germans to speak for West Berliners whereas the Soviets had a very strong interest in trying to minimize that connection and to minimize the legal ties between West Berlin and West Germany. The Soviets did have an interest in exploiting those kinds of legal differences and perhaps found it easier to exploit the US impatience to reach an agreement.

Q: Could you characterize apart from that particular issue any specific issue that was a major hang up in terms of coming to an agreement?

BORG: It seems to me that really was the one that certainly received most of the attention coming down towards the end. The question of this right of this representation was a very important legal point in terms of the ties, as the Germans put it, between the two categories of Germans. In fact there was a great deal of argumentative discussion about the two different German words meaning ties--"Bindung" literally meaning ties such as tying a knot and "Verbindung", ties such as connections, train connections would be a "Verbindung." The Soviets had a vested interest in promoting the use of the word "Verbindung" to imply a much weaker, sort of organic relationship between the two parts of Germany, that is West Berlin and West Germany, then the Allies did. So that was an issue that went right up to the wire. I recollect that it was finally resolved by a set of letters addressed to various parties to sort of paper the thing over.

Q: If I remember correctly, wasn't this the issue that delayed the final signing and there was some question about our Ambassador's excuse for not being there?

BORG: I believe that is right.

Q: He was supposed to be sick and was out on the golf course. Anyway I remember there was an issue of that sort and I didn't recall if it was that one.

In the period in which you were involved in these discussions, was there a social side to the negotiations? Did the delegations have an opportunity to socialize with the Soviet delegates?

BORG: When I joined the negotiation, which was about June or July of 1971 and it was going into a pretty hectic phase, our negotiating sessions were going from fairly early in the morning. We would have delegation meetings before the formal sessions began. The delegation meetings would begin around 8 o'clock or so; go in to negotiations between 9 and 10; be at it all day, well into the evening; then come back to the Mission and do the reporting telegrams on these meetings. They were huge affairs since our working head of delegation was Jock Dean was one of those who had, some used to joke, orgasmic delight in overreporting so that these reports were 30-35 pages very often. So it was an all day and well into the night kind of affair. It didn't leave much time for socializing. There were meeting on the fringes during the course of the day. Very often some of the key players, such as Jock Dean on our side, and counterparts, on the Soviet side, would have conversations off on the fringes of a room, very private, trying to work up various deals. But I would say the social aspect took a back seat to the frenzy of the business.

Q: How might you characterize the Soviet representatives as negotiators? Were they effective, were they more hindrances than effectuators?

BORG: Well, we noticed things that had been observed by so many people writing about Soviet negotiating tactics. In the first place they do tend to have a great deal of patience, or they did at that time, not being under the constraints of democratically organized governments that have to be responsive to public opinion and that sort of thing. We

observed some of the techniques that many have written about. The tendency to advance a position and then if the other side takes issue with any one detailed aspect of that position to back off the entire deal and say, "All right, we have to start right at the very beginning again," which could become a very, very frustrating kind of proposition. They were skilled negotiators, very tough in hanging there and much more inclined to be patient and not feeling the need to respond to some sort of opinion outside their own government apparatus.

Q: I am curious, did one person do most of the talking for the Soviet side, or would other members of the delegation jump in when he or she felt compelled? Or did all the discussion go through a single individual or leader of the delegation?

BORG: The negotiating sessions were pretty well structured. I would say that that was true for all four parties. That is agendas were pretty much arranged in advance. We generally speaking knew what we were going to be addressing on a particular day. There was a certain program of work. There weren't in that sense too many surprises really. Positions would be presented in a fairly formal way. That is, very often in writing. We did make use of the German language for spoken interventions because German seemed to be the language that all four knew best. When proposals were laid on the table they were done invariably in writing, usually in English as one of the official languages. English tended to be use initially at least and then if some language began to obtain some status it would be reproduced in the other languages as well. It was a rather formal kind of thing. There was not a lot of individual give and take in that sense. Of course, there was a lot of whispering back and forth with advisers whispering in their ambassador's ear and that sort of thing. But most of the presentation in my recollection was left to the ambassadors.

Q: Am I correct in summarizing what you just said that the written proposals were at the start usually in English and then when they reach a higher plateau they were translated into Russian, French and other languages as well?

BORG: That is my recollection, Hank. Part of that may be due to the mechanics of the negotiation in the sense that in a way we were the demandeur, we wanted this agreement. So it was up to us, the West, to put things forward. The Soviets had the luxury of reacting. We wanted something here. We wanted to improve West Berlin's status. We wanted to open the way for German-Soviet relations to advance. So mechanically that tended to make us much more the presenter of proposals, if you will.

Q: We had a problem of reconciling the positions of two other Allies. When was this reconciliation made? When did the three Allies meet and agree on a respond to a Soviet response?

BORG: Primarily between negotiating sessions. At the end of each day's negotiation, the principal activity was to brief our West German and East German allies respectively. As need be, each of us, that is British, French, American and the West Germans, even though they were not a formal part, would go back to capitals to get approvals for revisions,

position and those, of course would come back in a day, two or three days later, whenever, and there would be another negotiating session with the Soviets to take it the next round.

Q: Were the sessions held in the same venue all the time, or did they move to the different sectors?

BORG: Almost entirely in the Allied Control Commission building.

Q: How big a delegation in terms of number of people were in a room?

BORG: I would guess, if you were including everybody, translators, etc., 30 or so.

Q: The translation was done through electronic means for everyone who wanted to pick up the language, or was it...?

BORG: No, it was done by each delegation. Each delegation had its own translators.

Q: Is there any other comment that you would like to make on your Berlin tour?

BORG: Well, I think the only thing that might, from my own point of view, was my personal involvement in the follow-up negotiations for the opening of a Soviet consulate general in West Berlin. That was one of the things that had been agreed to. It was in the Berlin Agreement itself and it was left to we, political advisers in West Berlin, of which, of course, I was the American, to negotiate the details of opening that consulate general. There were various restrictions on its activities. It was to be limited, if I remember correctly, to a total of 21 personnel. It was not supposed to engage in political activities.

This was really very interesting from my point of view because I was for the first time really an active negotiator and the head of my own little American delegation. We spent several months on this. We found ourselves, again though, with the same criticism that has been made of American negotiating techniques. We found ourselves rather quickly under pressure from Washington to conclude an agreement and not to hold an agreement up for what were alleged to be a number of nicks picking details. Just to get on with it in the greater interest of having the agreement and for opening the way for all the other German-Soviet arrangements.

I found it a straight forward negotiation, however. I found the Soviets in that particular case reasonable interlocutors. There was a lesser amount of ideological argument involved here, but there were practical things that had to be worked out about the activities of these people. Over a period of time we managed it out in a pretty sensible way.

Q: Did this agreement also involve the opening an American consulate general in East...?

BORG: No, that was a separate question.

Q: I see. Where did they ultimately open their consulate general?

BORG: It was in the American sector.

Q: Okay. Is there anything else about Berlin that you would like to comment on before we move on?

BORG: Can't think of anything, Hank.

Q: You went back to Washington after Berlin and took on an interesting job which many people know little about. Could you amplify a little bit on your title and the functions that you performed between 1975 -77?

BORG: Well, the Executive Secretary of the Department was essentially a post World War II invention. It has been described as the nerve center of the State Department. The nexus link between the principal officers of the State Department, all sitting on the 7th floor of the building, and the thousands of people working throughout the building. It acted as a paper central for paper coming in up towards the Secretary and his principal advisers and for orders, instructions, directives, etc. to go out to different offices of the Department. The job involves a tremendous amount of attention to detail. Very mundane in many ways of handing paper and action assignments in a very careful precise way so that balls don't get dropped, things don't get missed. If the Secretary of State wants something done, to make sure an assignment is made and followed up. A great deal of just back breaking work. Very sensitive in the sense of being privy to a high proportion of the most sensitive material being handled in the Department. The Executive Secretary probably was privy to about 90% (not 100% as some people mistakenly believe) of the sensitive documents, I guess, but nevertheless having a lot of responsibility for distributing documents to the right people, and maintaining very narrow distribution in the interest of the control of the materials. Long hours. A great deal of a sense of responsibility in making sure that mistakes were not made.

Q: Who was Secretary of State at that time?

BORG: Actually I served with so many different ones. The 1975-77 period was primarily Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance.

Q: What were some of the more exciting, if you will, issues that came across your desk at that time?

BORG: This will seem curious, but maybe it is a reflection of what the job really involves. The excitement really did not have to do with substantive issues. The Executive Secretary is involved in all kinds, virtually every issues coming across the Secretary's

desk and none particularly stands out as a personal excitement. That is not the nature of the job.

The thing that is of most interest is the relationship among the people involved. For example, what is the relationship between the Secretary of State and his Counselor? What considerations were involved in the choice of his Counselor? How did the Counselor relate with certain Assistant Secretaries? Not just the question of personalities and gossip, but very much a question of power relationships among the top people in the Department. How they interacted with each other. How we could make ourselves useful in operating among those people to try to see that things got done. That roadblocks didn't stand in the way.

Related to that one of the most interesting questions arose with the election of Jimmy Carter and the appointment of Cyrus Vance as Secretary of State, and more importantly of Brzezinski as Carter's National Security Advisor. The central issue for the Executive Secretary really is the nature of his relationship with the National Security Advisor. It is very much a one sided relationship. The Executive Secretary probably would like to think that it is a relationship pretty much on a par, but that is quixotic thinking. There is simply no comparison. He has no status comparable to the status, power, position that the National Security Advisor has with regard to the President.

I remember in the initial first weeks of making an appointment to call on Brzezinski, a courtesy call, and talking about some of the working relationships as I saw them from my point of view and finding out rather quickly that his view was not exactly shared by me. In a word, the center of gravity lay in the White House. It certainly didn't lie with the State Department.

Q: That was your relationship with the National Security Advisor. Would you say that attitude also applied to his relationship with the Secretary of State?

BORG: Yes, very much so. I will give you one example of that. You could get the story more directly from his then special assistant, Peter Tarnoff, who I guess now is with the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. It had become a source of frustration for Secretary Vance that he simply could not have the access to the President that Brzezinski. It was just a mechanical thing. Brzezinski was sitting in the West Wing basement of the White House seeing the President constantly--sort of the first thing in the morning and the last thing at night. Tarnoff and Vance devised the idea of having a daily report which would be typed up, sort of a summary of the day's activities and shipped over to the White House in the early hours of the evening, supposedly to be read directly and personally by the President. But the way those things work, of course it was intercepted by Brzezinski who put his own spin or covering memo on it destroying its purpose from Vance's view anyway. It tended to deteriorate into the news summary of the day. It couldn't be maintained on a daily basis with exciting, highly sensitive material. This is just one example where the personal contact between the National Security Advisor and the

President was so much more powerful than the institutional connection between the Secretary of State and the President.

Q: Now this question may be speculative in terms of your answer, but having served as Executive Secretary while Henry Kissinger was Secretary of State, could you imagine Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State and Brzezinski as National Security Advisor? How would that contest come out do you think? What I am really asking is how would you compare the method of performance Henry Kissinger with, say, Cyrus Vance?

BORG: I don't think that Kissinger would ever have allowed himself to have gotten himself into that kind of position. And, of course, he didn't in the sense that he first wore the hat as National Security Advisor and then came over to the State Department, for a while wearing both hats. And then assuring that he could have somebody as Secretary of State...when he was National Security Advisor, he could be very much in control of the agenda as seen by Secretary Rogers who was...the situation developed quite differently. Kissinger realized that there couldn't be two people occupying the one position in affect.

Q: Any other observation on Henry Kissinger, while we are on the subject, before we move on to your next assignment?

BORG: Only that in a personal sense he was a frustrating kind of guy. He seemed to take an inordinate delight in embarrassing his staff. People got used to this after a while, but he did tend to appear at the 8 or 8:30 staff meetings in the morning making some jesting or insulting remark about one of his assistant secretaries to sort of establish the question of who was in charge there and we would go on from there. People got used to it. But he was not very nice to his staff in that sense. My impression of him, which was not extensive, I saw him primarily at those morning staff meetings, was, as many have written, of a man with a very orderly mind pursuing an agenda that had a certain logic in terms of our relations with the Soviets. That detente should develop in a certain way and then fitting the ideas into that mold. A very logical kind of mind. Putting things into categories in a very, very orderly, rigorous way. Perhaps too rigorously at times, trying to make them fit the mold when perhaps they didn't.

Q: Lets move to Vienna. You went to Vienna in 1977 as DCM. Did you ask for this assignment or was it offered to you?

BORG: Well, when I came back from....let me get my years straight. I was at the Senior Seminar from 1974-75 and was with the Secretariat from 1975-77. Okay. When I had gone to the Senior Seminar many promises were richly made to those of us who were students about receiving senior assignments with great responsibilities, which all of us overfreely translated to mean, chief of mission. I was informed at some point at the beginning of '77 that, as Director General, Carol Laise put it, "it just wasn't in the cards for me to get a post at that time." So I was feeling rather frustrated about that and had been hoping to have my own embassy. The Vienna assignment came up as a possibility. It did intrigue me because Vienna, while technically a class-III embassy, is a rather large

embassy in terms of total personnel and breath of responsibilities. So when it was apparent I was not going to have my own mission, that seemed to be a reasonable way to go for an assignment and would take advantage of my fluency in German and knowledge of things German.

Q: Who was the ambassador then?

BORG: A political appointee named Wolfe.

Q: Did anything of great import happen in our relations with Austria or Austria's relations with other countries at that time?

BORG: The main thing of political interest was that the Austrian Chancellor, Bruno Kreisky, was playing games with the PLO and trying to develop a role for Austria to play in the Middle East situation. We at that time, of course, were under very strict rules not to become involved in this. You may remember Ambassador Andy Young losing his job in New York essentially over an unauthorized meeting with a PLO representative. Unfortunately, our ambassador in Vienna began to develop notions under the influence of Mr. Kreisky that perhaps he, the American Ambassador, could play a similar role. This was a pretty dangerous game. It involved a number of fairly shady, if not shady, questionable, contacts either PLO or close to the PLO residing in Vienna, Cairo, etc. In the end, nothing disastrous happened because I was able to avail upon the ambassador the importance of reporting to Washington any plans for any sort of meetings that smelled in any way of a contact with the PLO. So his record on paper, therefore, was kept pretty clean and he avoided some of the problems that Andy Young got in to. But it was a continuing problem for me as DCM because he was being tempted into a role that was simply unsuitable at that time and place.

Q: Was he ambassador through your entire tour as DCM?

BORG: Yes. In all honesty we had some personal problems and I in the end requested reassignment.

Q: This wasn't the time that Felix Block was in Austria was it?

BORG: No. Felix came later. I can't remember the name of the fellow I was succeeded by. Sol was his first name.

Q: Lets jump now to your last assignment as DCM in Finland from 1981-83. Who was ambassador in Finland at that time?

BORG: His name was Nyeborg. I get confused sometimes because we have the same last part of the name. Also a political appointee. No personal problems with him, however. I had a very cordial relationship with him throughout. I found him a very pleasant man to work with. I think he shared some of the shortcomings that many of political ambassadors

do--an inadequate knowledge of the inner workings of international politics. But he was a quick learner and willing to listen. He was married to a Finnish woman so that he had to be on guard against that problem of finding overly attractive anything that had to do with Finnish matters. But I found him a sensible person and one easy to work with.

Q: To sum up, a career that started as visa/political officer in Hamburg, Germany in 1955 and went through the end of 1983. Is there anything about the way the Foreign Service operates that you would attempt to change had you the influence and position to do so?

BORG: I think the greatest weakness the Foreign Service as an institution is its tendency not to be loyal down the chain of command. I found this in contrast to my six years as a career officer in the professional army where the army makes almost a fetish of the notion of loyalty running in both directions both up and down the chain of command. I found that my experience in the Foreign Service was that there was a shortage of loyalty down and an expectation of great fealty looking up. I had the feeling and felt it was confirmed not only in my own experience, in fact very little in my own experience, but in the experience of some good friends of mine, that the Service was not really loyal to its own. It did not stand up for its own. If they got into trouble for whatever reason, usually no fault of their own, the Service seemed to be afraid to stand by them, to give them the loyalty I felt they deserved. If a person had a problem of some kind in the Foreign Service he was normally pretty well written off for his career was pretty well, if not dismissed, pretty badly harmed. You had to have the appearance of things going well in order to maintain your standing with people in power in the State Department.

The other observation that I make is that I think a basic value system changed for the Foreign Service over the period that I served, and it caught a lot of people unaware. I am not sure that I know whether there would be any solution, but what I am saying here is that when I entered the Service in the 1950s, and this was true up into the 1960s, there was a very high premium paid on being a fine reporting officer. Some of the people who were the most highly regarded in the Foreign Service were people like Chip Bohlen, Walt Stoessel, and people of that caliber who were known primarily as exceptionally fine reporters and observers and analyzers of the diplomatic scene that they were assigned to. Their careers prospered on the basis of those insights, that knowledgeable, that ability to draft and present cogent ideas. I noticed as we came in to the 60s and certainly by the 70s that a tremendous change in the value system had occurred and it caught many people by surprise. That was that suddenly there was a very high premium on serving in Washington and that those who went on and received more desirable assignments with greater responsibility very often had done it by the geographic desk and became an office director and then, hopefully, a deputy assistant secretary of State. That seemed to be the way, i.e., moving in the Washington bureaucracy, as the means of advancing. To me it was quite a revolutionary change in the value system of the Foreign Service. I, for one, never learned how to play it properly.

Q: I think on that note we can end this report.

End of interview