The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

ERIC J. BOSWELL

Interviewed by: Edward Dillery
Initial interview date: November 4, 1998

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INTERVIEW

[Note: This interview has not been edited by Mr. Boswell]

Q: *This is Ed Dillery and we are very pleased to interview Eric J. Boswell. Tell us a little about how you got in the Foreign Service. I know that there is family connection and so tell us something about your childhood.*

BOSWELL: Sure, Ed. First I thought I should probably say that this is November 4, 1998 so we get it on the tape what day this is being recorded and I am Eric Boswell as you said. I am a Foreign Service brat. My father was an FSO [Foreign Service officer]. I am a second generation head of security, in fact I think maybe the only second generation head of security in the history of the State Department. He was director of what used to be called SY in the late ‘50s and I was assistant secretary for Diplomatic Security before I retired from the Foreign Service on March 31st, 1998. My dad as I said was a career FSO. I was born in Italy on May 31st, 1945 as my father was, as I understand it, essentially following the armies up the boot of Italy and helping to reopen posts as they went.

My parents had an extremely romantic story that I won’t tell in any great detail here except to say that my father met my mother at his first Foreign Service post when he was vice consul in Le Havre, France. They were separated by the war; they were not married. With great difficulty she managed to make her way in 1941 or 1942 I believe from southern Vichy France through Spain and Portugal to the United States. There were lots

of adventures involved in that story. In the U.S. she resided with my grandmother, my father's mother, while he continued his Foreign Service assignments during the war.

They were ultimately married in Lisbon, Portugal. They had been married perhaps a little bit illicitly before then because she was a national of an at least neutral, leaning toward Germany, country, Vichy France, and he was not permitted to marry anybody like that as an FSO. I think they did it, in fact I'm sure they did it one way or the other, and I'm the result. My parents had a very long and extremely happy career. If FSI [Foreign Service Institute] wants to interview the absolutely class-A perfect Foreign Service spouse of the old school, it is my mother, Jeannine Boswell, who is extremely loyal, devoted, grateful, and proud of her Foreign Service career as a spouse. You will have a little trouble understanding what the next generations complained about in terms of spousehood.

I was born in Italy and I spent much of my childhood as a Foreign Service child in various parts of Europe. It was a kinder, gentler Foreign Service. My father had a habit of creating a baby more or less around transfer time which prevented him from being transferred to the tougher places. As I result, I was born in Italy, and my brothers were born in Vienna, Paris, Washington, and Milan. It was a hell of a nice assignment pattern. Ultimately that's how I came to the Foreign Service, following a bit in his footsteps.

Q: *First of all what posts did you live in besides the places where your brothers were born?*

BOSWELL: I think I had a brother in just about every post that we lived in. We lived in Italy, Austria, France in the late '40s where my father was in the political section, and then returned to the States. My father went with his family to Italy in 1952, I believe it was, as administrative officer for Clare Booth Luce. He was the administrative officer during the famous incident where Ambassador Luce was concerned that she was eating lead paint, that she was contaminated by lead paint peeling off her bedroom walls. That must have been an interesting moment. I've been an administrative officer, too, so I can sympathize with that.

Q: *By the way her biography was on just last week on A&E [Arts and Entertainment, a cable television channel]*.

BOSWELL: Is that right?

Q: *That incident, though not your father's name, was mentioned. It was a very interesting biography I must say.*

BOSWELL: I hope I have some way of getting that on tape.

Q: *It will come back.*

BOSWELL: After Rome my father was transferred to Milan where he was consul general. That is another thing that doesn't happen much in today's Foreign Service. He was an administrative officer that made consul general Milan at the time, an extremely important, big consulate in post-war Italy. He did a total tour of six years in Italy which is also nice, if you can get it. Following that, he was assigned back to Washington where he went to the Senior Seminar and then became director of security, SY, as I mentioned before.

He had a very adventurous and troubled tenure as director at SY. There were a lot of things going on. There were the remains of McCarthyite commie hunting in the State department and various other incidents. He was the guy that told Nikita Khrushchev that he couldn't go to Disneyland on his visit to the United States because it was too easy for snipers to get at him. That caused a furor on the Soviet side.

In any case, after that, my father went to be DCM [deputy chief of mission] in Cairo, his first non-EUR [European Bureau] post since he had been a junior officer. I did not accompany him there because I was in college at that point. My father was DCM in Cairo from something like '62 to '65. He then returned to the States and ultimately retired in I believe '67 or '68. I joined the Foreign Service in 1972.

Q: *Tell me a little bit about the circumstances surrounding your joining the Foreign Service.*

BOSWELL: Nothing really remarkable there. I had graduated from Stanford in 1970 and was taking classes at California State College, I was married and I was still casting about for what career I was going to have. I had been in the army for two years as a draftee, fortunately not in Vietnam. I served in Alaska, a terrific tour, and got out of the whole experience unscathed which is not bad for the '60s which was a rough time for draft age males. I simply took the Foreign Service test one day as so many of us did. I took the Foreign Service test without any particular idea that I really wanted to join. It was the way to spend a Saturday morning kind of thing. I passed.

At my father's recommendation I traveled to Washington to take the orals which I passed. I'll never forget his face. He was waiting for me in the car outside of the orals and in those days they told you whether you'd passed within a few minutes of leaving the room. He was fully prepared with his condolence speech. I looked at him and told him I'd passed. It was a big moment in both of our lives.

Q: *How long did it take after the examination before you actually came into the Service?*

BOSWELL: It was pretty quick. I knew I had scored very high. The one piece of influence that I used in here was that my father found out where I was ranked because he was still associated in some way with the State Department that he could find this sort of stuff out. He found out where I was ranked because at the time I was in graduate school and I was trying to plan my life a little bit.

I passed in I think February of 1972 and I was invited to join a class in May of 1972, it was about a week before finals. It was one of these phone calls that you get from people who don't know about time changes, so I got it at 5:00 in the morning in California. They invited me to join a class that had begun a couple of days before; there had been a no-show in the A-100 class. Fortunately I knew that I was ranked high on the list so I was able to turn them down, finish my classes at California State College at Hayward, and take a long driving vacation across the United States with my bride reasonably confident that I was going to be invited to the next class, which I was. I started in August of 1972.

Q: *What were your impressions of the training, the orientation and all that sort of thing looking back if you can remember?*

BOSWELL: It's back a long way but I remember it quite well. I think most of us do remember, just like basic training in the army, we remember the A-100 course. I remained good friends with many of my classmates for the entire length of my career afterwards. We all watched each other's promotion records closely and so on and so forth. It was a nice friendly competition. As for the A-100 course itself, I think my first EER [Employee Evaluation Report] which was sort of a memorandum EER which came out of the A-100 course started with "Eric Boswell let the course wash over him as he went through it, perhaps because he was familiar with Foreign Service life." I think it said something like that. That was my very first report in the State Department, not a great start. I viewed the A-100 course more as a socialization experience and less as hard facts learned. I already had languages so I didn't have to go to school for that.

I was assigned to Dakar, Senegal. I thought it was an exciting process when you get your first assignment somewhere in the middle of the A-100 course. It was not my first choice. My first choice was Bujumbura, Burundi, but at the time, 1972, there was one of the periodic genocides going on in Burundi. I'm not sure if the post was in any kind of evacuation status or whatever they called it at the time, but it was felt that first tour junior officers should not go there. I ended up going to Dakar, Senegal, as general services officer in February or March of 1973.

Q: *Was it at that point that you decided what we now call cones?*

BOSWELL: I was coned on entering. That was a time when you did that which I still think is an extremely good idea and I hope we've gotten back to it. I know we've been moving in that direction. It was a very bad period when people were admitted without cones and then there was that extremely poor process for coning people especially for the administrative and consular cones, both of which suffered greatly I think during this process. I was examined as an administrative officer, and admitted as an administrative officer. I was asked to select my cone, I'm trying to remember whether it was on the written exam or on the oral. I think it may have been right at the beginning on the written exam. I didn't have any question what I wanted to be, I wanted to be an administrative officer.

I was doing a masters, which I never completed by the way, in public administration but I was always interested in how things worked and I wanted to be able to supervise early in my life. Being an administrative officer or consular officer was certainly the way to do it. I thought the career tracts for an administrative officer were probably better than for a consular officer and I think I was right, at least then. I came in as an administrative officer but unlike most others I came in as an administrative officer with my eyes wide open. I knew what administration was. My father had done administrative work. He was a generalist but he had done administrative work. I knew what I was getting into. I was very pleased to be an administrative officer.
That was a time when the assistant secretary of State for Administrative was a man named John Thomas who I very much hope gets called, or has been called, even though he was not Foreign Service because he really created the administrative cone the way we know it today. He is the guy as I understand it, who made a point of trying to identify good administrative officers even during the exam process and certainly as junior officers. He felt himself to be responsible for the cone and did a great deal to select, nurture, monitor and mentor junior officers who really wanted to be administrative officers, a fairly rare breed.

There was a habit at the time when officers of other cones were having problems with their careers, they would re-cone to administrative as a place where sort of anybody could do this work. It was a way to save officers with very, very mixed results for the cone. In any case, many of the administrative officers that came in during my year or right around then eventually made it to the very highest ranks of the Foreign Service to ambassadors, to assistant secretaries of Administration, and to other management jobs. This was really a good crop.

Q: *How did Thomas keep track of you?*

BOSWELL: I'm not entirely sure how he did, except that he was a man of enormous energy and he had a very talented staff at the time which included people like Chuck Bakey, Doug Laingen, Dave Mount, and I think Don Bouchard may have worked for him for a while. These people, some of them younger, some of them older at the time, kept an eye out for him. I'm not sure how he did it, but he trolled very successfully for good administrative officers and really did keep an eye on them.

Q: *I'm encouraged to think that our service is good enough that that kind of operation can work and should.*

BOSWELL: It takes a hell of a lot of effort. In fact I think it was John Thomas who identified a young security officer who is now the head of AID [Agency for International Development].

Q: *Atwood.*

BOSWELL: Brian Atwood. Brian told me this story, as a matter of fact, that I don't know how Thomas identified him, he either ran across him on a trip he was taking or something but it is not generally known that Brian Atwood was a security officer when he came in serving I think in Madrid on his second tour. I don't know if he was serving in Madrid as a security officer or whether John Thomas plucked him out and sent him to Madrid in an administrative job, I think that may have been more like it. In any case he identified him. That was the kind of hands-on work that John Thomas did.

Q: *Did you feel from the start that there was kind of a fraternity of administrative officers?*

BOSWELL: I didn't feel it in the A-100 course because we were all a very mixed bag, but I certainly started to feel it in FSI training after the A-100 course starting with the administrative core course and the general services course. There were people from my A-100 class, from a couple of classes on either side, and even a couple of people who had served somewhere else overseas. I made as good friends in the administrative core course almost as I did in the A-100 course, people that I have kept in touch with for many years afterwards.

Having said that, I didn't think administrative course was a whole lot better than the A-100 course except as a socialization and get to know you kind of place, and in the subcourses, in the GSO [general services officer] training. They washed over me as well because I didn't have any way of relating to the issues and problems that they were talking about. It would have been much better if I had had this course after, for example, rotating in a post overseas. We've never really been able to do that but the ideal I always thought was to go to your first post, work for two months, and be shipped at great expense back to the State Department for a few weeks of administrative and GSO training that would then be relevant because you knew what you needed to learn and what you needed to absorb.

Q: *Let's talk a little bit about Dakar. What was it like there?*

BOSWELL: You know Ed, in a sense it is pollyannaish but I absolutely loved every one of my overseas assignments, though I can't say the same about every domestic assignment. I have loved every one of my overseas assignments but you always have a special place for your first post. It was an extremely difficult post I thought. Dakar is a very nice capital city. It is very beautifully situated with all the amenities, and bells and whistles, and fresh mussels every day, if you want them flown in on Air France available at your local restaurant.

But it is still an African post and the administration was extremely difficult. It was a large embassy and I was the sole GSO. [When I arrived in February 1973], I had replaced a GSO who was a specialist. He was in his 50s and who knew everything there was to know. He was just a real sharp guy, I can't remember his name. I never met him but I lived in his apartment so I knew he was sharp because he had a great apartment. I really

felt completely at sea. I had an administrative officer who was relatively junior at the time as well who left post after four or five months. There was a gap of something like six months in administrative officers which I guess is the common story. I really did feel at sea.

I had a very good ambassador, Ted Clark, who had several AF [Bureau of African Affairs] tours as DCM and ambassador and who was very nurturing of his junior officers. He paid particular care to me but he didn't know anything about administration. I felt that I was learning very much as I went along. As I result I think I lost about 20 pounds; I wasn't heavy when I started. It was really a nerve racking assignment. Anybody who has been a GSO in the Foreign Service, particularly a junior GSO, has all kinds of stories that they can tell and I've exchanged them with many of my colleagues. We all view this as a hell of a testing ground and we never wanted to be GSO again. I felt that I had no serious preparation for the job, so it was really seat of the pants. Fortunately, I like administration and I wanted to do it but I found it very trying.

Q: *How many Americans were there in the whole administrative section?*

BOSWELL: I'm not sure that I could tell you but I know that there was an administrative officer, and I was the GSO. There was no budget officer. We were serviced out of the regional budget shop in Abidjan. We had communicators, but no security officer. I don't believe there was an American personnel officer. I think we were also served by a regional personnel officer. It was basically me.

Q: *You were the administrative officer.*

BOSWELL: For six months I really was the administrative officer except that the Department in its wisdom felt that a junior officer by himself really couldn't carry all this load. They sent a roving administrative officer out who became my friend, mentor, colleague, and a very good friend for many, many, many years afterwards and is now a career ambassador named Mary Ryan.

Q: *That's interesting.*

BOSWELL: That was the beginning of an association that lasted my entire career which I valued a great deal. Nevertheless even when she was there on TDY [temporary duty] I was doing most of the work since I was the guy really assigned to the post. We had a problem after that because the new administrative officer that came in was a man who got in deep, deep fraud problem trouble, fortunately after I left. He was a crook essentially. I didn't realize it when it was going on. He only supervised me for a few short months and I escaped it. I found out ultimately that somebody had blown the whistle on him.

There had been an IG [Inspector General] visit and they had found all kinds of problems. He was kiting checks. He had browbeaten his cashier into not cashing his checks, just gave him the cash but not passing the checks through for collection. There were various

other frauds that were going on and he left the Foreign Service under duress right after that assignment. It was not exactly great preparation for a junior officer, that's for sure. Fortunately the auditors didn't find anything wrong with what I did then, I guess, because I never heard anything about it. I was inspected while I was at post before this administrative officer was there and I had a good inspection. The head of the inspection team was a man named Jim Moran and I have a feeling that he had something to do with my being assigned to the Operations Center after this tour because otherwise I was completely lost.

My only contact with the personnel system was a letter from my CDO, my career [development officer]. I didn't know what a career counselor really did. He sent me a form letter saying would you send me some ideas of where you want to go on your next assignment. Like the dumbest possible junior officer I wrote him a letter back that said that I had been doing a good job here in outer darkest, I had worked extremely hard, felt myself prepared and I would welcome an assignment to either Paris, London or Rome in any order that they wanted. That was the extent of my first bid list. Having worked in personnel since then I knew what kind of response a letter like that gets, it really gets a glazing over of the eyes.

Nick Baskey, a person who ultimately became a good friend of mine, who was my career counselor in what was then the junior officer branch, wrote me back a letter that started "Dear Mr. Boswell" and I knew I was in trouble right there. "Dear Mr. Boswell: Thank you for the amount of thought that you've put into your next assignment." That was my first and last contact with the personnel counseling system. Fortunately I was selected through a mysterious process to go to the Operations Center. I think Jim Moran may have had something to do with putting in a good word for me. I was offered a job in the Operations Center which I jumped at.

Q: *Before you get to that, first of all, I think general services is the most difficult job with all of the responsibility you get. You are in charge of all the physical assets. The only thing you don't have is money, but you've got everything else. With your first tour, how did you get a feeling that that worked into the whole embassy itself?*

BOSWELL: You're perfectly right about how difficult a job it is and how vulnerable you are. There are a number of ways that you can go astray particularly in a country where there is a lot of fraud, a lot of corruption, where petty corruption is a way of life and where you really hadn't had any training and you're not getting any supervision really from anybody that knows anything about it. The rest of the embassy viewed administration as simply the provider of comforts and/or the obstacle to comforts as the case may be. A junior GSO was on the receiving end of just what seemed like perpetual demands, many of which I couldn't accommodate. For a guy who likes to please that was difficult. I didn't get the feeling of being treated as sort of a lesser being, that didn't happen. I think the ambassador and DCM both were careful not to allow that to happen and also as I said I was providing services that everybody wanted but it was not particularly fulfilling, that's for sure. It was not fulfilling. It was very, very trying.

In fact, and I think others who have been through the same thing at more or less the same time will have the same observation, I tended to divorce myself from the embassy community for the sake of my family and my own mental health. I made friends at first with French expatriates (I spoke French fluently; I had a French mother) though I found the French expatriates in Dakar to be an absolutely awful group. Many of them were transplanted Gevenois and very racist as colonists. I quickly got past that circle and got to know a few Peace Corps volunteers who were more my age. I got to know Senegalese and I got to know them through Peace Corps volunteers, not really through my job. These were Senegalese students and the young people of my generation. They were wonderful, wonderful people and we had a ball. Life in Senegal was lots of fun and very rewarding but life in the embassy was not particularly.

Q: *Did your outside contacts help you at all in what you did in the embassy?*

BOSWELL: No. In fact I didn't allow my embassy life to sort of carry over into my outside contacts. They did not. I had a certain number of outside contacts that were embassy contacts but mostly they were people that had something to do with the embassy: vendors, contractors, entrepreneurs of various kinds, less officials. I unfortunately didn't have a whole lot of contact with host country officials. General services officers should, though I didn't, because the FSNs [Foreign Service nationals - locally hired staff] tended to do it.

Q: *Which calls to mind, how many people did you supervise in that job?*

BOSWELL: I'm not sure but it was a lot. I've used varying figures I think over my life but about 60 to 70 is probably pretty close. This was at a time when virtually everybody I supervised was an FSN. These were not personal services contractors and your other kind of semi-FSNs which you could have, these were all direct hire [local] employees.

Q: *Had they been there a long time?*

BOSWELL: It varied. In Africa these embassies hadn't been opened forever. I think embassy Dakar had probably been open maybe 14 or 15 years by the time I got there. There were a couple of people who tended to be French, TCNs [third country nationals], who had been there a very long time. The Senegalese, and there were other Africans as well, had been there less time. I would say somewhere between six or seven years would be somebody fairly senior, and that was not a European expatiate of some kind.

Q: *What was the caliber of that, TCNs and FSNs?*

BOSWELL: TCNs were quite good though there were no real giants as I recall. They were basically clerks who did what the administrative officer said and they were not powers within their own rights. There weren't these kinds of very senior FSNs that would

really be the engine that kept the embassy running, they just didn't exist anywhere in Africa I don't think.

Q: *I was going to say you might have run into them in other places.*

BOSWELL: I certainly ran into them in other places in the world and most of them were extremely good and thank god we had them, though they were a power in their own right. You had to in a general way impose yourself.

Q: *This again just adds more pressure on the GSO or the administrative officer.*

BOSWELL: Exactly. I am sure there were all kinds of frauds going on at that post that I had no idea about. Some of them were found in subsequent inspections but I certainly wasn't equipped to find them out or to detect them so I'm sure it was going on, and not only by FSNs. There were problems with Americans as well including the AID director who subsequently I think resigned under duress and may have gone to jail for his activities in another post after Dakar. There was plenty of bad stuff going around and I'm sure plenty of waste and mismanagement going around but no real structure to it.
Q: *What was the position of the embassy in the whole community? Was it an important institution?*

BOSWELL: It was the second most important institution after the French embassy but there was an enormous distance in relative importance. The French embassy was by far, by far, the most important embassy in Dakar for obvious reasons. The French were pervasive in the administration of the ministries in Dakar and there was a major French military presence in the country. There may have been as many as 15,000 French residents in the city who simply did business there, that's very heavy. There was also a very large Lebanese presence. The French were really the powers and I think the U.S. ambassador was not a hugely important figure.

Q: *You didn't have any of the type of crises that we now?*

BOSWELL: Not the type of crises that we now experience and that I've experienced and that you've experienced so frequently with a breakdown of civil order, evacuations, emergencies. There was one huge crisis, an on-going crisis when I was there that took much of the attention of the embassy, and that was a major drought which affected the Sahel. I don't know if you will recall but in the early '70s in West Africa there was an enormous drought that was one of the worst that they had ever had. It particularly affected Senegal severely and it practically disintegrated Mauritania in terms of the Mauritania traditional nomadic society, it just disappeared in Mauritania. Mauritanians since then have lived in camps along roads as far as I can tell where they can get food handed out to them. The pastoral way of life in Mauritania essentially died with the death in the '70s by starvation of their herds of cattle.

This was a very striking thing and it impressed me a great deal about the activities at the American embassy because we were focused very much on drought relief, very much on aid. It was a major effort on the part of everybody and we could see the effect of what we were doing, which was very gratifying. We could also see the effect of the drought very easily and quickly. I will never forget seeing cows dropping dead from hunger in front of me, just collapsing in front of me. I remember going on a driving trip to The Gambia, that sliver of a state that penetrates up a river into Senegal and at the edge of Gambia is where the tropical forest zone begins. Even down there I remember seeing camels. Nomads had brought their camel herds down that far, way out of their normal range, to get fodder and food. It was really a horrendous experience. You didn't see it so much in the city. Dakar being the former administrative capital of West Africa was very urban and sophisticated, and even relatively prosperous at the time, but the countryside was completely devastated.

Q: *What kind of aid did we give?*

BOSWELL: My recollection was it was food aid, large amounts of food aid. There were various other projects. There were projects to build dams, and this and that and the other thing, but this was an emergency and food aid was really what was happening. Many of my Peace Corps friends were hired by AID at the end of their Peace Corps tour. They wanted to stay in Senegal and participate in this effort. Some of them even made careers in AID, as astonishing at that seems, because most Peace Corps volunteers view AID folks with a very jaundiced eye as basically bureaucrats interested in good living, being comfortable overseas. A very wrong image, but that's the way it was.

Q: *How did you find out about your next assignment?*

BOSWELL: You know I'm not sure, that gets a little fuzzy. I believe there was simply a cable informing me that my next assignment was the Operations Center. It may have been a cable that said do you accept this, but I don't remember that. I think it was just a cable informing me that I was going to be in the Operations Center. I was thrilled because I knew something about the Operations Center from A-100, we had a tour of it. It was considered an elite assignment, a very good assignment. It was not administrative. I had the end of my tour in sight which was not an insignificant thing. I was very, very pleased.

Q: *When did that happen?*

BOSWELL: I arrived in Senegal in February of 1973 and I left after a two year tour, so I left in February. I had a little bit of leave and went straight to the Operations Center, checking in in March 1975.

Q: *What was the Operations Center like in those days?*

BOSWELL: I don't think it was too dissimilar to what it is now. There are a lot more electronics in there now but the Operations Center basic function was the same. It was an alert center, a 24 hour a day shift work kind of place. My job as an operations assistant, I

think I was called, (it subsequently became junior watch officer I guess) was to sit in a chair with a lot of telephone lines in front of me and monitor those phone lines and also decide distribution on high precedent traffic that went through. I think there was probably a little less care and feeding of the principals of the Department than is done now by the Operations Center. There was a lot of call forwarding and call making and principals tracking. I remember the job as being more a traditional alert kind of function where you scan the traffic, accept the phone calls, and wake up whoever needed to be informed.

Q: *Which would not be the principals necessarily and probably was not.*

BOSWELL: It often was not and, in fact, there was an effort to try to identify the real...

Q: *Who was the Secretary then?*
BOSWELL: In 1975 it was Henry Kissinger. I don't know to what extent Kissinger's personal staff performed sort of an Operations Center-type function, I think they kind of did, but I never saw Henry Kissinger. I would occasionally see Henry Kissinger's marks on a morning summary that I had prepared which was extremely gratifying, it was actually feedback, but I never saw him. I don't think Henry really knew how to find any office in the State Department except his own elevator from the garage. We did see a lot of Henry's staff in the Operations Center, they did come around, particularly Larry Eagleburger who I subsequently went to work for after the Operations Center.

The time in the Operations Center was primarily interesting for one set of events that happened while I was there and that was the collapse in Southeast Asia. First operation was the evacuation from Cambodia and finally the evacuation from Vietnam itself. I was in the chair for the final hours of both of those. It used to be, a flash message meant World War III, but we were getting flash messages every few seconds. The amount of action, work and drama, I remember reading the last communication from the communicators at embassy Saigon saying they were closing down and the helicopters were taking off. It was a very, very dramatic moment. Very, very high tension in the Operations Center and I just loved it. There was a ton of action. Even though I didn't have any line responsibility, just watching and participating in all this stuff was very interesting.

Q: *I would think that work in the Operations Center would also give you a good view of how the Department really works.*

BOSWELL: That was one of the traditional advantages to working there. You certainly got a good view of how the seventh floor worked, and you also got a certain amount of visibility on the seventh floor. You got a good look at how the Department worked on certain urgent matters, but you didn't get a good look at the sort of more routine and important work that the Department does. [While you only] saw a piece of what the Department does but you did figure out how it was set up, how it was organized, and who did what. It was very, very valuable from that point of view.

Q: *Who was the head of the Operations Center at that point?*

BOSWELL: Maurice Elan was the first head, a guy I liked a great deal. I was a junior officer and he was like god. In fact he was then an FSO-3 but he was my god and he kept us all on our toes. He used to call at odd hours of the night and just say "What's going on?" You had to be ready to give him a very good briefing, a very comprehensive briefing. You knew that that call might happen at any time so it did keep you on your toes.

Q: *A good management tool.*

BOSWELL: Yes and he would ask that question of whoever picked up the phone. It could have been a junior clerk, it could have been a junior watch officer, a senior officer, it could have been anybody. It could have been the guy watching the news tickets. It could have been anybody, but they all had to be ready to brief him. He was a very good man, a very good boss.

Q: *Did you have any relations with the White House during that period?*

BOSWELL: I remember the occasional [liaison] with the NSC [National Security Council], with the sit [situation] room in the NSC, but otherwise the White House was a mysterious and distant entity. There was really no contact. I think the senior watch officer did but not the junior officers.

Q: *Essentially they probably were communicating directly with the secretary and his immediate staff, I assume.*
BOSWELL: That's right.

Q: *How long did that assignment last?*

BOSWELL: I think it was an 18 month assignment. I didn't serve 18 months because I was hauled out of there after something like nine or ten months to work as a staffer for Larry Eagleburger who at the time was then a deputy under secretary for Management and also executive assistant to the secretary. He had two hats and he basically did the management part with his left hand and Henry Kissinger with the rest of his soul. I was to assist him with the management part. He had another staffer, Wes Egan who is still in the State Department and until recently was ambassador to Jordan, who was the S [Office of the Secretary] staffer for Eagleburger. In essence though, we substituted for each other. We got along very well. It might have been Wes that originally recommended me to Eagleburger because Wes had worked in the Operations Center a little bit ahead of me. Probably the most interesting job I had in the entire Foreign Service was that year as Eagleburger's staffer.

Q: *This ought to be an interesting part when you tell us about Larry Eagleburger and how that worked?*

BOSWELL: Actually before I do Eagleburger, I just want to mention one thing about that time in the Operations Center and that is simply my strong impression at the time that the Department technologically was at a cutting edge. The Department was really a leader in the U.S. government in terms of its technology. I don't know who was in charge of what was then called OC [Office of Communications], it might have been Stu Branch, and if it was, that's the explanation for it. Under John Thomas and Stu Branch the Department's communications were just as good as it gets in the world I thought at the time. That's a situation that has eroded very dramatically over the ensuing years for budget and for other reasons, but I think it is worth mentioning at least that, at that time, the Department was at the forefront in this kind of technology.

Q: *That's interesting. I thought that even in word processing we were very early, that was part of our problem later on. What were the symptoms of that? What did we do wrong?*

BOSWELL: I just had the feeling that the hardware that we had for communications, we went through extremely high volume, high precedence stuff. I remember going to see the operations centers of various other U.S. government entities and I didn't feel that they were anywhere near where we were, including the NMCC [the Pentagon's National Military Command Center] which surprised me a lot. I just felt that we were more advanced in the technology that we got to work with. Even our phone technology and that sort of stuff. Certainly [the Secretariat offices which were] next to us, which was S/S-S, the line, and S/S-I (S/S-I [Office of Information Management] is actually what I really wanted to talk about) they were heavily computerized even in those very early days. Word processing, as you say, but there was a lot of advanced information management going on both in the bowels of the State Department and up on the seventh floor.

Q: *That's an important thing I think because we have been accused of not being on the cutting edge and it shows you that good managers can and have done it.*

BOSWELL: We definitely were. At the time I think we were viewed that way also by the rest of the community and there has been a very marked deterioration since. It is one of the Department's greatest failings right now.

Q: *Did we manage the totality of our communications at that time?*

BOSWELL: No, I think it was still a shared communications responsibility and probably had been for a while with the CIA, not very different from what it is now in that sense.

Q: *Tell us a little bit about the circumstances surrounding your transfer.*

BOSWELL: I was asked if I wanted to go to work for Larry Eagleburger. Of course as an administrative officer to work as a special assistant for the under secretary for Management was about as good as it gets and to have Larry Eagleburger thrown into the mix was really exciting. I remember however that while I was invited to go over there, it

was subject to a personal interview with Larry and I never could get the personal interview. There was no time on his schedule to get the personal interview. This was clearly not high on list who his junior officer was going to be. I finally called up my former colleague Egan and said, "Can you get me in to see him? I've never met him really. Otherwise this assignment isn't going to happen." He said, "Don't worry about it. I'll get it done right away."

In about a week I got called over to Eagleburger's office. Eagleburger was not there I was told at the time by his redoubtable and wonderful, wonderful secretary, Millie Leatherman. I was just asked to wait. I waited and waited because Eagleburger was with the secretary. When he finally came back to his office I had been waiting maybe an hour and I was worried because I was on shift and somebody was covering for me at the time back in the Operations Center.

Anyway, he finally showed up and he burst by me without even looking at me and went into his office. He called me in a few minutes later and in classic Eagleburger style he was seated on his couch with his legs up on his coffee table in the most laid back possible way. He put his hands behind his head and looked at me. I was scared to death because this was really a power. He said, "I understand that you want to work for me?" I said, "Yes, I do." He snorted and laughed and said, "You must be crazy." I don't remember much else about the interview except that I seemed to have passed.
I went to work there a couple of weeks later in January 1976 taking the place of a junior officer, Pat Theros, until recently ambassador to Qatar. I had a little bit of an overlap with Pat Theros and then went to work for Larry. That was, as I say, the most interesting time of my Foreign Service career because first Larry had a way... There was no level of supervision between Larry and his staffers. The executive assistant was considered more of an advisor and had no line responsibility. He would talk to Larry about ambassadorial appointments and things like that.

Q: *Who was that?*

BOSWELL: I was worried that you would ask that question. I know his name and it is absolutely stupid that I don't remember.

Q: *It will come back.*

BOSWELL: It will come back. A very nice man, a very good guy and perfect for that kind of role. He was not interested in operational paper pushing or any of that sort of stuff. He wanted to be an advisor and he was, and I think he was, an effective advisor.

Q: *Therefore not a layer to go through.*

BOSWELL: Not a layer at all. Both junior officers were the entirety of the rest of the staff except for the secretaries and one speech writer named Fred Spots; we were it for the immediate staff. It was a tiny staff as opposed to what it is now.

Q: *With huge responsibilities.*

BOSWELL: With enormous responsibilities. Part of my responsibility was to keep John Thomas happy downstairs so that he and Larry didn't get crossed wires. John Thomas was the real manager of the State Department. Larry was a phenomenal manager but was mostly taking care of crises with Henry.

Q: *That didn't bother Larry?*

BOSWELL: I think it would have bothered him if John Thomas would have been less effective but John really was effective. From time to time Larry would impose himself over John. He would make a decision that John didn't want at which point John would then call me up and say why did I allow him to do this, and so on. The two of them really got along very well together and in fact I saw Eagleburger very recently and he reminded me of that many, many, many years later and how wonderful John Thomas was.

Q: *Was this your first direct exposure to Thomas?*

BOSWELL: Yes, it was. Perhaps I had met him in the junior officer course or something, maybe we had had a moment, but I don't remember it. My first exposure was in that job. The job was absolutely fascinating because of the Kissinger end of it. This was at a time where I would say most of the Foreign Service probably detested Henry Kissinger but at least they knew that foreign policy was being made at the State Department and that's essentially what keeps the Foreign Service happy no matter what the personality of the secretary of State is. It was the same issue with James Baker who surrounded himself with his inner circle who were not FSOs. Nevertheless I think people were generally happy because they knew the action was in the State Department, no question about it.

Anyway it was that way with Kissinger, an extremely difficult person. Larry worked himself I think close to a breakdown in serving Kissinger. He certainly worked himself into poor health but Larry never took it out on his staff. He never, never took it out on his staff. He would come back from a meeting with Kissinger where Kissinger had just raked him for one thing or another and he never, never, took it out on his staff. He just sort of internalized it. Working for him was an absolute delight when you could get to him. There was always that problem but he would have the habit of collecting us all, the staff, about 8:00 at night. (John Thomas had the same habit by the way with his staff.) He would collect us about 8:00 at night in his office, maybe with classical music going on, and break open the bourbon. This was a time when the junior officer could really interact with the undersecretary or deputy undersecretary. It was a priceless magical time. We really felt like we knew what he was thinking, that we had good direction, and we knew what we were supposed to be doing.

Q: *Did you have to make decisions on your own at that point when you couldn't get to him?*

BOSWELL: I think yes. I think we both did. I can't remember any life or death decisions but we certainly took decisions that I believe to be at more or less assistant secretary level and here was the junior officer making decisions. The reason we were able to do that with some confidence is that we had a good idea what he was thinking mostly from these times with him after hours.

Q: *And he'd back you up I'm sure?*

BOSWELL: He certainly backed us up throughout. There was more than one occasion where I had to go to him and say, "Larry I signed this thing and John Thomas or somebody else is absolutely furious and I may have screwed up. What do you think?" sort of thing. Whether he thought I screwed up or not, he backed me.

Q: *What were the major issues that we had in management in those days? Can you remember any of those?*

BOSWELL: What I remember mostly is non-management issues.

Q: *Like?*

BOSWELL: Like for example what Bill Safire used to call the dead key scrolls, the incident that came to light of Kissinger both at the NSC and at the State Department subsequently having taped illicitly all of his telephone conversations and had them transcribed. When this information came out it was a huge issue. Halperin had been taped, many, many people had been taped and were furious. It was a big press issue. Bill Safire just hammered it, and hammered it, and hammered it in the press. There was a lot of congressional interest.

I remember when it first opened up Eagleburger called Egan and me into his office. He had a big stack of transcripts in front of him including some Dictaphone bands with transcripts attached to them. He said that this story had just erupted and Kissinger had asked him to please read all these things so he could remember what had actually happened before these transcripts were actually released. Eagleburger obviously doesn't have time to read all these things so he asked us to do it.

We had a set of little pins that we would be able to use to mark various pages. There was one pin for Henry being insulting and scurrilous, and we would put a red pin or something like that there. There would be another pin for big arguments. We would track various subjects by pin color. Some of this stuff was extremely revealing as you can imagine. These were unguarded conversations that people were having. That was one major, major item.

Q: *A little bit time consuming I take it.*

BOSWELL: It was very time consuming. We worked awfully hard in this office, many, many hours. I think my marriage suffered somewhat. My wife at the time, we had had our first child and she was alone with the child with a new baby. It must have been tough to have me available for something like six hours a day.

Q: *I was going to say what were your hours?*

BOSWELL: I lived in a house on 27th Street in Georgetown, one of these little tiny row houses, one of those museum kind of houses. The only time in my life that I've been able to afford living in Georgetown was as a junior officer when my family was this size. I would ride my bike to work in the morning. I would get to work about 6:00 or 6:30 in the morning and I'd work until 9:00 or 10:00 at night and ride my bike home, sometimes later than that. It was a very, very long day.

Q: *The weekends were free though.*

BOSWELL: No, I worked a lot of weekends. I worked an awful lot of weekends. In fact I worked most weekends. I tried to keep Sunday but not always successful. In terms of hours, I think that's probably the hardest I've worked in my whole life in the State Department. On the other hand, it was tremendously gratifying. While I was exhausted, I didn't feel put upon.

Q: *What time did Eagleburger come in?*

BOSWELL: I'm not absolutely sure, it was many, many years ago but I think he came in quite early. He was not one of these people who were in there at 5:00 in the morning. Some people have that kind of work style because that is quiet time and maybe they're insomniacs or maybe they're in bed by 7:30 at night or something. He's not one of those but I'd say he probably came in around 7:00 or 7:30 in the morning. He had to stay abreast of his boss, not always easy. I didn't always stay as late as he stayed. He would kick us out.

Q: *That's good that he made you go home.*

BOSWELL: From time to time, yes. We kind of resisted that because we didn't want to go home when he was still there.

Q: *You wanted to be in on things.*

BOSWELL: We wanted to be in on things and besides as I said in the evening that was the time to get to him. We could always sort of pop in on him. You knew he would be there and you could ask him a question.

Q: *You mentioned to me one of the most interesting people in the Foreign Service and that is Millie Leatherman.*

BOSWELL: Millie Lenneman, a person who is not only a supremely competent secretary but who is also supremely loyal to him. Somehow she managed to guard his gate and have everybody adore her at the same time. She really was an exceptional person. I remember one incident where Joe Craft, who wrote a national column, walked by her one Saturday morning when Larry was in his office with Bach playing at high volume. He walked by Millie and into the office. Millie who was as I say very Christian, and a very lovely person, did not forgive him. He must have spent a fortune on flowers subsequently. They arrived constantly for Millie trying to make amends for having walked by her and into Eagleburger's office.

Q: *She stayed with him for a long time.*

BOSWELL: She stayed with him. I think she had been Foreign Service at one time, perhaps not, but she became Foreign Service when he went to Yugoslavia. When he went to Belgrade as ambassador she went with him. I think that must have been a little hard on her. She had a child and a husband and all that but she did go with him. I think she stayed with him pretty much until she retired. She was not young when I knew her. She kept longer hours than anybody. She certainly was there whenever Eagleburger was there. She was there when I arrived at work in the morning, and she was there when I left at night. When I worked in the Operations Center we always used to know when the Department really was closing down and that was when Millie would bring her burn bag. It may have been 11 or 12 or one in the morning that she'd bring her burn bag to the Operations Center and leave it with us. We knew at that point that we were in charge.

Q: *How long were you with him?*

BOSWELL: I was with him for a year. The Republicans lost the election.

Q: *That was '76 then?*

BOSWELL: Yes. I was with him until '76. I've got my years sort of messed up. I wish I would have brought my page in the stud book. I know that I was in Senegal for two years, in the Operations Center for about eight or nine months, and working in M for I think it was a year. I was the transition staffer between Eagleburger and Dick Moose who came on board as the new M for the Democrats. I was the one that stayed for a little while.

Q: *He did that twice I guess?*

BOSWELL: Yes he did. The first one he didn't stay very long but he was there. Of course I had had my onward assignment nicely nailed down. Eagleburger was not shy about taking care of his staff, bless his soul. His special assistant very early on was Don Bouchard. Don and I worked together very briefly on the M staff. I hadn't mentioned him before. He had worked for the previous M before Eagleburger and stayed on. Don had gone off to Ottawa to be consul for administration.

Early in his tour in Canada he traveled to the various consulates around. He called me from Quebec and said, "Bos, have I got the assignment for you!" He described to me this consular job in a three person consulate. It was the middle officer of the three where there was very little serious consular work to do and it was all political because of the separatist situation in Quebec. He said, "This is the one for you." I bid on the job and got it. There was never any question that I was going to get it, even though I was the wrong cone. I think I was the right grade but I was certainly the wrong cone and it was a hotly contested job, a very attractive job. There was no question that I was going to get it.

Q: *Let me ask you to just go back for a second. Besides John Thomas, who were the other major players in State Department management at that time? Did you have a comptroller?*

BOSWELL: We did.

Q: *Or were they not important?*

BOSWELL: No, they were important. I'm just having trouble remembering their names. Danny Williamson?

Q: *But John Thomas was really it?*

BOSWELL: John Thomas was it. He had excellent deputies. The comptroller was a DAS [deputy assistant secretary] I think in A [Bureau of Administrative Affaires]. There was not a separate FMP [Bureau of Finance and Management Policy] at the time, it was really John Thomas. SY [Office of Security] was part of him, operations was part of him. Ray Hunt, you can't go without mentioning that towering figure in administration. I'm trying to remember who the head of SY was and it's not coming to me but it should. He was definitely an important figure though SY at the time was a much smaller and different kind of operation than today.

Q: *Was this before Crockett showed up on the scene?*

BOSWELL: After. Crockett was the M in the Dean Rusk days so this is probably ten years later. I don't remember for example any Crockett like huge management changes that went on during the year that I was there for Eagleburger. Eagleburger didn't have the time or particularly the inclination to do that. He was extremely active on State Department funding. He had terrific relationships on the Hill and was able to do deals, and that is an extremely important quality.

There are two crucial qualities in M to me. The first is that it be a person of sufficient stature to be able to negotiate a deal on the Hill, a necessary deal on the Hill on whatever subject. That's one, somebody with some Hill contacts that can really be exploited. And two, it is absolutely essential in my view that the M have the utter support of the secretary

of the State. If he doesn't seem to speak for the secretary, M has to make all sorts of nasty rough decisions and if it's not viewed that he speaks for the Secretary. Larry Eagleburger absolutely spoke for the secretary as Ben Reed did afterwards and a few, very few, other Ms. Eagleburger was able to be effective as M. Again it wasn't a time of an enormous [number] of management issues.

Q: *What was the relationship between M and personnel in those days?*

BOSWELL: Carole Laise was the DG [Director General]. I think the relationship was a little distant but I don't think that Larry really wanted to meddle in personnel things which is another good quality for an M. It's such a temptation to become sort of a super personnel officer to the Department and he didn't. He stayed clear of that. When he needed something done it was always done because he spoke for the secretary. I think Carole used to try to defend the integrity of the system loyally, but she would try to defend the integrity of the system at some times when the rules needed to be broken and they were.

Q: *There was no D [Deputies] committee or anything?*

BOSWELL: I don't remember anything like that. I remember it was much more an old boys club with Carole Laise, if you can describe it as that. It was much more of an old boys system, so no D committee. I do think that the negotiations with the White House over ambassadorial appointments were done by Eagleburger rather than by Carole Laise. I don't think she carried that particular [portfolio], I believe he did but I was not really a part of that.

Q: *That was the one part of the thing that you didn't do.*

BOSWELL: Yes. I didn't get into personnel stuff. In fact, the executive assistant, whose name I can't remember, definitely did.

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Q: *The date is November 18th. Eric Boswell is being interviewed. This is the second session. The interviewer is Ed Dillery. With that we will go back a little bit to last time and ask you to talk a little bit about the episode of the microwaves in Moscow.*

BOSWELL: You asked me in the last session what important events and issues that we had dealt with at the time I was staffer to Larry Eagleburger when he was deputy under secretary for Management in 1975, I guess the year was. An issue I neglected to mention and I want to bring up now is the issue of the alleged bombardment of embassy Moscow with microwaves of mysterious origin that were thought perhaps by staff in Moscow to be hazardous to their health. I remember that a former ambassador in Moscow had come down with cancer after his time there and that there had apparently been a number of

cancers of various kinds at embassy Moscow over the years. There was a feeling by the staff who knew of these microwaves that their health was being jeopardized.

This was of course an extremely sensitive issue for many, many reasons. Not only for the health of the staff but also because our knowledge of the microwaves and, perhaps, of their purpose, was highly classified and I think remains classified to this day. I remember that Eagleburger had to deal with this issue and he dealt with it by having to juggle the sensitivity of the information with, of course, our concern for the health of the personnel in embassy Moscow. It took up a tremendous amount of time.

I remember a great deal of extremely restricted telegraphic traffic between M and Moscow, sort of these burn-after-reading cables with only one record copy kept, with very, very, very limited distribution discussing how to deal with the microwave issue. It became much more open in the time after that but I remember that there was extensive medical testing, a lot of evaluation, and a lot of briefing of the staff. I don't think we ever totally, totally, put to rest people's fears, but I think the Department, both during that time and subsequently, made a very persuasive case that one, the level of microwave contamination was below government's standards and that two, there was no evidence that it had harmed the health of anybody in Moscow. There were various cancers in Moscow. There were I should say different kinds of cancers all of which presumably medically came from different sources. There was no common thread. Nevertheless this was an extremely neuralgic issue and it took up a tremendous amount of time. I just didn't think I should pass over that issue.

Q: *Was that at the time when the issue was public or before that?*

BOSWELL: I think it was at the time that the issue was becoming public. I don't exactly remember the sequence of events. I do know that some of this was going on before the issue became public. Some of this going back and forth and trying to decide how to deal with this issue given the sensitivity of it on both the intelligence side and the health side. How to make it public, how to handle it, where to involve the medical people, etc.

Q: *What about any congressional activity yet at that time?*

BOSWELL: I don't remember any. Bear in mind that this was 23 years ago but I really don't remember. That may not be born out by the facts if there is ever a careful reconstruction of the events but I don't remember that this was in the congressional domain at the time.

Q: *I just remember that there was a cause celebre in that some of the alleged victims never did believe, I think, that they were...*

BOSWELL: I think that is right and in fact I have seen it in other cases since then including in my new job outside of the Foreign Service where cancer scares seem to take on a life of their own. The level of trust in the organization drops to nil. It is very, very

difficult for the organization to bring that level of trust up or to ever satisfy people who are convinced that their health has been hampered by some occult, or some obscure, or nefarious source. It was very tough.

Q: *So now after your time with Eagleburger...*

BOSWELL: We had left Eagleburger. I think I was the only holdover staff in M during the transition to the new Jimmy Carter administration. I was kept on in M essentially to tell the new staff and my successor, a guy named Pat Kennedy who achieved some prominence in the State Department since then, where the keys were, how the safes opened, and where the files were. I did that for a couple of months. It was rather interesting. It was during the very, very brief tenure of Dick Moose as deputy undersecretary for his first tenure... I guess technically speaking it was his only tenure as deputy undersecretary for Management. I remember breaking in people as diverse as Pat Darien and Elliot Richardson and helping assist them in settling into the State Department. It was a very brief period. I grew to know and appreciate Dick Moose during that time, but really I was on my way out.

I had a brief down period and then went off to Quebec, an assignment that had been engineered with Larry Eagleburger's help. It was a reward assignment and certainly one of the nicest assignments I've ever had in the State Department. I went to Quebec in the summer of 1977, I guess it was. It was an extremely interesting time for one principal reason and that is that it was in the first months of the administration of the Parti Québécois [PQ] in Quebec, the first independentist government that had come to power in Quebec. They won the 1976 elections. I got there in the summer of 1977 when they were really just getting underway. It was a wonderful and fascinating time to be a U.S. diplomat in Quebec.

We had a very small consulate. The French consulate was much bigger and the French influence was substantial but in our small consulate we did what I thought was the meatiest work that you could do. We were the only source of any kind of reporting and analysis on Quebec in the U.S. government as far as I could tell. Basically there were two reporting officers, Terry MacNamara the consul general, a very, very political reporter with a very, very good sense of where things were in Quebec with excellent contacts, and myself as essentially a junior officer who had never done political work before and was getting my feet wet and enjoying it a great deal. My job was nominally consular but the work was really political. There was not a difficult consular work load in Quebec and I had a junior officer at the time who could do it.

We were able to report on and observe pretty much without interference the first years of this extremely interesting government. I was in Quebec for three years, virtually the entire tenure of the first term of the PQ government. Three years that led up to the famous referendum on what they called "sovereignty association," the softest possible question that they could devise on steps leading to independence. It's not supposed to be good for political officers to predict anything but we predicted a year ahead of time pretty much

exactly the outcome of the referendum. Perhaps it was a shot in the dark but I will always retain a great deal of satisfaction in it. It wasn't my call, it was Terry MacNamara's call and he was very accurate.

The yes side, that is the sovereignty side of the referendum, went down to defeat by 60 percent to 40 percent in some large degree because of the engagement in the last weeks of the campaign of the prime minister of Canada, Pierre Elliot Trudeau. He decided that there was some chance that this referendum was going to go the wrong way and that he had to take the political risk, a risk that is, that it would create a backlash and help the independentist, of engaging himself and he did. He was enormously popular in Quebec. It was sort of a love-hate relationship between the French speaking population and one of their own. I think his intervention was decisive and the referendum went down to defeat.

Q: *When you said that, what little trade craft or so, how did you go about finding this and what was your routine like?*

BOSWELL: We had a rather easy task of it because the Quebec government, the PQ government, was extremely open and accessible and easy to talk to. In fact they were anxious to talk to us because they wanted very much the understanding of the United States. They wanted to demystified their cause, at least to the U.S. government, and they spent a lot of time and effort on it. They made some bad steps in terms of P.R. [public relations] with the United States.

I remember rather early on, René Leveque made a trip to New York to speak to a forum of businessmen in New York City and he made some rather sharp comments down there about what he intended to produce in Quebec. I think he did it under a certain amount of hostile questioning. It got bad press in New York and Bill Safire was writing columns about this enormous gap in our defenses, the NORAD [North American Air Defense] defenses that were about to open up to the north of the United States. The PQ got some very bad press at the outset.

They were associated in the minds of some in the U.S. with the bomb throwers of the '50s who threw a few bombs, but were in fact terrorists. They had kidnaped a minister and killed him. They even set off a bomb in the front door of the U.S. consulate in Quebec City. The PQ government, of course, had nothing to do with that kind of movement. It is a mainstream movement that represents maybe perhaps a culmination or at least an evolution of a long history of nationalist sentiment in French-speaking Canada, and a very important government. In fact, they are in power now to this day. It was very easy to get to know these folks, because they wanted to talk to us. We think we had a very, very, very good inside appreciation of what they were up to. They wanted us to know this.

Q: *So even at a junior level you would have entree to senior members of the party?*

BOSWELL: I had entree to senior advisors of the party. I can't say I walked in on Leveque though I had dinner with him in the consulate along with my boss. It was a dinner incidentally that was memorable because one, it was the chief of state essentially coming to dinner which was awfully nice and two, we had a brand new chef that the consul general at the time, who was not Terry MacNamara but a man named George Yeager, had brought from embassy Paris who created a wonderful meal. He watched, I could see him, from a swinging door to the kitchen in absolute horror as René Leveque smoked cigarette after cigarette throughout the meal and when presented with this gorgeous wonderful fish dish, proceeded to reach for the black pepper and encrust the fish in black pepper all the while talking and smoking. It was probably a life changing experience for this chef but it was an awfully interesting dinner. I had access below the ministerial level pretty much anywhere I wanted, even as a junior officer, and press access as well. There was a lot of press interest.

Q: *What were the young PQ people like?*

BOSWELL: They were tremendously idealistic, imbued with their cause, smart as hell and far more interesting frankly than most Anglos that I ran into. Keep in mind that this was at a time when for example you could call the U.S. consulate in Montreal which was located in the Anglo part, in the business part of town, and have somebody answer the phone in English and not be able to answer you in French. This was at a time when there was a tremendous amount of the equivalent of white flight; it was Anglo flight from Montreal which had been the financial center of Canada. It never really recovered from that flight as a financial center. Much of it was transferred to Toronto and there was a tremendous amount of money that went with it.

This was not altogether unhealthy for Quebec. It left a vacuum which was rapidly filled by young active entrepreneurs and French speaking businessmen who did fill the gap. It was a tremendous transition, a tremendous change, in the kinds of functions that French speaking people went into in Quebec. They had in the past been the intelligencia, it had been a limited profession really, and were not in business. Now Quebec has an extremely vibrant business community. They are not all nationalists by any sense, but certainly [are different in a] French [way].

Q: *You mentioned the Anglos, what was their party line?*
BOSWELL: There was no Anglo party in Quebec, not really. There are not enough Anglos in Quebec to form a party and certainly not enough to win anything. The Liberal Party in Quebec which was the opposition to the Parti Québécois had a great number of Anglophone and what they called allophone which are other immigrants, not French speaking and not English speaking necessarily, but they tended toward the English speaking world. In Quebec City, however, there were almost none. In our consulate we had very little contact with this sector of society; it was in Montreal and the consulate in Montreal kept in touch with it, we felt almost by inclination as well as opportunity and we didn't really see them. We viewed them as less and less relevant in the political debate and I think that was a fact, I think that was true.

Q: *Quebec is almost like the embassy to the...*

BOSWELL: We had to walk a very careful line because we had to make sure that we were not dealing with the Parti Québécois on questions of government to government issues.

Q: *What were your relations with our embassy like?*

BOSWELL: Very good. The embassy was headed by Tom Enders, an extremely capable diplomat. He obviously was extremely interested in what we were doing. My ratings were written by the political counselor in embassy Ottawa. They also made sure to give us all the slack and the room that we needed. They thought we were doing a good job. We were doing a good job. We didn't get into any of these internal State Department debates about who reports to who. We reported to Washington with info to Ottawa and that was perfectly satisfactory.

Q: *They didn't have an Anglo bias?*

BOSWELL: I didn't see it. No, they didn't. I've followed Canadian events over the years as a matter of just personal interest and I think the embassy has always been extremely good at that. We didn't have a French bias, let me make that clear right off the bat. We felt, and I continue to feel, that the separation of Quebec would be a great tragedy for Canada and not in the interest of the United States. But it was our job to make sure that we knew the players and could explain what was happening to the U.S. government.

Q: *There were a lot of French people in Quebec who felt exactly that way.*

BOSWELL: Absolutely.

Q: *What kind of people were they?*

BOSWELL: I don't think you can single them out in any particular way. It was a real cross section of the population. Quebecers have always liked to play the nationalist card and keep a foot in the federalist camp and sort of do a balancing act which is I think common and good strategy for a minority.

Q: *Was there any leadership in that group?*

BOSWELL: Oh, yes. There was excellent leadership, mostly Francophone.

Q: *But they were Liberals?*

BOSWELL: The name of the party was the Liberal Party. There was good leadership and ultimately they even displaced the Parti Québécois some years later, I think in 1983 or

1984, and took power again and then subsequently lost it again. Now as I speak to you there is a new provincial election campaign. I think the election itself will take place in about three weeks and it is going to be a very close election between a Liberal candidate and the current prime minister of Quebec, Monsieur Lucien Bouchard. Both are Francophones. Obviously there is no way an Anglophone could sway anybody in Francophone Quebec. There have been Anglophone ministers. In fact, even the Parti Québécois government has some Anglophone adherents and some Anglophone members of the national assembly, parliamentarians.

Q: *One last question: what do you think of the Canadians' French?*

BOSWELL: You know I can say for this tape that if, God save us, Quebec ever becomes independent, my ambition in life is to be named the U.S. ambassador to Quebec. I think that one of my qualifications for it is that I have some knowledge of Quebec French, which always makes French people's hair turn white when they hear it. It is the real French in my opinion. In Quebec City they spoke something called Joual, which is a patois which they also speak in Montreal, in the two urban areas, that is extremely difficult to understand and I don't get it either. But I can speak with a Quebec accent and I can make my mother, who is French, also turn pale when she hears me.

Q: *What more about Quebec? Any other thoughts on that? Any thoughts on the role of consulates as opposed to embassies, that sort of thing?*

BOSWELL: Consulate Quebec had a very, very special and particular role. It was unique I think in the entire Foreign Service in that it was the second consulate in the province of Quebec. There was a great big consulate in Montreal and a little tiny consulate in Quebec City so you had two consulates in the same jurisdiction with what we hoped was a very clear division of labor between the two.

Consulate Quebec was almost exclusively just a political reporting post. It existed just to report on the Quebec government at that time, and continues to exist primarily for that function too; to have a relationship and to be able to observe and report on the Quebec government. There is no other reason for the consulate to exist. There is no American community in Quebec City. Quebec City is 95 percent Francophone. There are no retirees in the area. There was very little visa work load. There was little economic reporting to do. All that is done by the megaconsulate in Montreal.

Q: *Was there any problem of the consul general in Montreal thinking he was also the consul general in Quebec?*

BOSWELL: There were tensions between the two consulates from time to time. It depended on the personalities of the consul general to be able to manage those tensions. I thought Terry MacNamara managed them extremely well. I thought his successor George Yeager did less of a job. He was extremely paranoid, I thought, about overlapping jurisdictions. He used to complain any time the consulate in Montreal did any kind of

political reporting which he felt was exclusively his jurisdiction. There was room for disagreement. I don't think it ever got too serious. It was a little annoying with the junior officer in the middle.

Q: *How far back did the two consulate situation go, a long ways?*

BOSWELL: A very, very long way. I don't remember how old consulate Quebec is but consulate Montreal, I am sure, existed before then. The two are, I would say, easily 150 years old. It is a very old post. There used to be a lot of conflicts in Quebec because there were conflicts up on the border, in the border area. There were a lot on conflicts in places where no American has ever heard of, that they existed: Three Rivers, some of the border crossings near Maine, Vermont and New Hampshire. Now there are only two left and we are lucky to have those two left, no question about it.

Q: *What happened to you after Quebec and how?*
BOSWELL: Quebec was an extremely wonderful tour, a very enjoyable tour. I think I've been very lucky in that I've loved every tour I've had overseas, but Quebec really has a particular place in my life, no question about it. After Quebec, for personal and family reasons, I felt that it was time to return to the United States. I had two small children all of a sudden, one of them was born in Quebec, and it was time to go back to Washington. I got an assignment as a junior assignments officer in the NEA [Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs] assignments division in what was then called PER/FCA [Bureau of Personnel, Office of Foreign Service Career Assignments]. I was guided in that direction by my counselor, Mary Rand. I took up my new duties there in July 1980.

Q: *Tell us a little bit about the job. It always seems to me that under the various names that that office has had, that it really is one of most important activities in the whole Foreign Service, how people get from A to B and why they go to B and not C is very important.*

BOSWELL: I agree. I liked the job a lot. Not everybody who is in that job likes it, but I did. I found it very rewarding not only because I felt that what I was doing was important for the Department but because I was essentially serving a bureau that I had not known and which I came to admire greatly, the people in that bureau I came to admire greatly, and that's the NEA bureau.

It was always fun to work in FCA. There were various assignments panels during the week but the culmination was in the interfunctional assignment panel where all the really nasty, tough assignment cases and some of the best fights were hammered out. I liked the process. I liked the negotiations that led up to it. I thought that the people that were involved as assignments officers and counselors were good officers, conscientious, and for the most part rather hard working. I enjoyed the give and take leading up to a panel and I enjoyed going home on a Friday evening having, probably the only time in my Foreign Service career, been able to count my successes of the past week. In other words, I would bring to the panel X or Y number of assignment to make and I would get a

proportion of them, not all. There would be so-called shoot-outs and fights on the panel. I won more than my share I think. You went home being able to measure what you had done.

Q: *Were you the guy then that was responsible for both the place and the person?*

BOSWELL: No I wasn't, I was responsible to the bureau for the jobs. In other words I viewed my job as being able to assign the best possible officer to the position. I took it extremely seriously and I thought that particularly since NEA posts are such difficult posts and do such important work, I felt that I was really doing god's work in the sense of trying to find the best possible officers for the job. The other side of CDA [Office of Career Development and Assignments] and of FCA and the people that I had to work with were that the so-called CDOs, career development officers. They were the counselors who had a somewhat different mission. They were trying to assign the best possible, most career enhancing, best job for their client. My client was the bureau; their client was the individual officer. There was a sort of creative tension between the two and we had to work together to try to get the best possible outcome and I thought that was one of the joys of the job to be able to put that together.

Q: *So you don't think the system was too cumbersome?*

BOSWELL: I don't think that the system was too cumbersome. We could spend a lot of time on this tape talking about problems in the personnel system because everybody, everybody, has their own ideas about how the personnel system should work. On balance I thought that personnel at that time worked relatively well and that there were relatively few rules and regulations, relatively few impingements on stretch assignments or restrictions on these kinds of things and you were quite free to put together the best assignment that you possibly could.

I think subsequently personnel got very wrapped up in this process and became very legalistic. A lot of the power and responsibility of the assignments officers and others seemed to be swept away and they became more of a paper pushing kind of operation, there to enforce the sanctity of the central system which I thought was [counterproductive], I really did. The idea was to make the [best] assignment.

Q: *Did the bureau itself also have a personnel officer?*

BOSWELL: It did not. The bureau did not have a personnel officer. The then executive director of the bureau was a man named Sheldon Krys. He became a close friend subsequently throughout my Foreign Service career, a friend and a mentor in many ways. Sheldon was an extremely vigorous and powerful executive director. Like any good executive director he spoke for his assistant secretary and was able to make decisions on behalf of the bureau easily, and what I'm referring to are the people. He had very strong ideas himself.

I moved in mid-assignment from being the number two assignments officer who essentially took care of administrative and consular positions to taking over the division. Nobody asked Sheldon when they put me into that job and I think Sheldon was a little surprised that it was somebody with no NEA background or experience and relatively junior. But the real test of an assignments officer as far as he was concerned was how often they brought home the bacon for the bureau. I did a lot, so we had a very good and close working relationship to the point where I felt that I could make decisions on the panel without checking with the bureau as to how they feel about it. I could make a call on an assignment and then just go explain it to the bureau.

That is basically what a central system is supposed to do but it doesn't really work that was. I believe that the bureaus, and not just the regional bureaus, should have a much greater say in assignments than they do. They are where [the action is], they have to live with the consequences of the assignment whether it be a good one or a bad one and they should have a lot to say. [Central personnel] should obviously be the governor of the central system to avoid abuse, but really I believe assignments officers should be in the geographic bureaus and simply collect from personnel to...

Q: *Are they now?*

BOSWELL: I don't believe they are. Years later I was executive director of NEA...

Q: *I was going to say, we're skipping ahead but looking at that from the other perspective, how did that work?*

BOSWELL: When I was executive director I had a personnel officer who did nothing but make sure that our message was transmitted to PER about who we wanted where and to try to keep their nose to the wheel on this. I felt very strongly about it. There was no reason that there should be duplicate structure. Even if there was one person in the EUR bureau, I think it was several, that did assignments in the bureau, that officer did not have any role on the panel but simply back up the NEA assignments officer in personnel and try to make sure that...

Q: *Did that cause confusion?*

BOSWELL: It didn't cause confusion, it's just an unnecessary duplication. I didn't feel that personnel was very responsive to what we needed and as I said we had to live with the consequences so I had to make very sure that they knew where we wanted to be on things. There was not this same sort of openness and freedom that I enjoyed when I was working with Sheldon Krys.

Q: *For those who've never really been in personnel, it's a mystery. It appears that the kind of shifts between maybe the regionals and central, with central always trying to be it, did you find that sort of thing?*

BOSWELL: I did. I saw it over subsequent years. There was always a quarter that feels like a strong central personnel system, a strong central assignments system is essential because the geographic bureaus will abuse any other system and it won't be fair. I don't agree with that. I think there is certainly a role for a central system. I've seen both sides of it. I've worked in central system and I've worked in the bureau but I come out strongly in the corner of the bureaus. I felt that way when I worked in the central system during the period that we've been talking about. I really did. I think when the pendulum swings more strongly to the central system, assignments get wrapped up in all kinds of strictures and rules in an attempt to be fair and it ends up inefficient and just as unfair. It doesn't work any better, in fact I think it is worse, and it ties up perfectly good officers working in central personnel without any real freedom of action.

Q: *This may be a little bit far afield but I've noticed that even in that recent, just this last couple of weeks, in the CIFC-CSIS report of the Simpson commission, one of the things they've said was that indeed we have had too much generalization, that you should get people to specialize. If you did that then obviously the bureau would be watching after those people who are specialists in it's field.*

BOSWELL: That's absolutely right. I hadn't seen anything but the news accounts of those reports that you've been talking about, but I certainly agree with it. Overemphasis on multi-functionality and less attention paid to specialists particularly because the Foreign Service doesn't just need multi-functional, it doesn't just need DCMs. It needs area specialists and language specialists and beyond that, it needs the kinds of other specialists that we really never did pay much attention to: environmental specialists, science officers, people like that.
Q: *I can't say that I paid attention to them either. The whole entrance procedure, and as you said whenever the central gets involved in it, it almost operates against that.*

BOSWELL: You have to have in the Foreign Service system a home for the specialists. You have to have a nexus and a locus that has some power and to watch out for them. Geographic bureaus have usually been able to do that for political officers and in some cases economic officers as well, but the other functional bureaus have never been able to do that. They have never had any real power, never had any real say in assignments except for the labor cone and that wasn't really a bureau, that was a office. You had a department of three people that would watch out for them for the labor officers and because of politics on the Hill, had a tremendous amount of clout far beyond the real merits of a labor cone or the real needs of the Foreign Service. With that little aberration aside, none of the other specialists really had the backing organizationally that they needed.

Q: *Who were the directors general during that time?*

BOSWELL: I'm trying to think.

Q: *Or were they so far removed?*

BOSWELL: No, they weren't so far removed it's just I'm having senior moments and when I review this tape I'll be able to fill in the names of the directors general. I can tell you that the directors general were not removed and, in fact, then as now, I think there was always a deputy who was the principal deputy who had direct oversight responsibility over FCA, now CDA. That guy was Andrew Seidman at the time. I thought he was a remarkably good officer.

There were times when the director general had to overrule the panel in so-called directed assignments. Anybody would understand why that has to be but it always sort of ruffled the panel and if done too often it could undermine the effectiveness of the panel and the integrity of the system such as it was. I remember that Andy Seidman was always extremely good. When the director ever overruled an assignment action or directed an assignment action, he personally came down to the panel to explain why. Some of the explanations were no more than the secretary wants it this way and the secretary has the right to do that. But he always explained to us and I think that was very successful. The stratospheric powers up there actually rather rarely interfered in the work of the assignments. They may have torn their hair out but they rarely interfered and I thought that was very good.

Q: *Anything more on that assignment?*

BOSWELL: Nothing more on that assignment beyond as I said that I enjoyed the hell out of it and made a little cottage industry out of telling people how I think PER has gone to the dogs since then. Incidentally one of my colleagues at the time is now the director general of the Foreign Service, Skip Gnehm, who was the head of the junior officer division. I liked him a lot and we worked very well together in making assignments for junior officers. NEA may be the only bureau that cared anything about the junior officers that went to its posts. Keep in mind that this was during the time of the hostage crisis. There were a lot of evacuations, there were posts that were closed, and there were posts under great stress. I paid attention to every single assignment that was made to these posts including junior officers. Skip and his colleagues and I worked very well together.

Q: *How about the role of junior officer, and senior officers, were they more of a problem than...*

BOSWELL: If you mean the role of the junior officer and senior officer assignment divisions...
Q: *Yes.*

BOSWELL: The senior officer division then as now was not an effective organization. It was largely peopled by folks whose careers were essentially over anyway. They were doing jobs that largely counseled people to retire and that's not fun. Otherwise they just pushed paper. I didn't find them playing any significant role other than actually making

assignments for senior officers. Those assignments were made elsewhere in the department; they were not made in personnel by the senior officer division.

Q: *Was that okay?*

BOSWELL: I think that was probably okay, yes I do. You can have a great debate about that, but if you're going to have assignments made in personnel, there has got to be people who care about those assignments and who really want to make themselves felt in making those assignments. We didn't have so much of that and there has never been that in the senior officer branch.

In fact I can say here that I was on a promotion panel for promotion from FEOC to FEMC [minister counselor rank] a couple of years ago and many of the candidates that we had to rank had worked in the senior officer division. That was not career enhancing for them. We [low] ranked several officers that happened to be working in the senior officer division which gives you an idea of the quality of people. I'm not saying everybody because there were some very, very good officers in the senior officer division. But as a rule, on balance, the ones who were good were looking out for officers in the more obscure areas such as administrative or senior specialists of various kinds. Hence the powers that be in the building cared a little less about those and personnel had a little more freedom and you could be a good assignments officer for that but not for the others.

The junior officer division is a totally different story. The junior officer division had less power then than it has now. Now as I understand it, the junior officer assignment and counseling division is all one piece and they have almost total power over the first couple of tours for the junior officer. The bureaus and all the other extraneous offices don't get involved or to a very, very limited degree and I think that is probably good. I think we do a good job and I think a junior officer division may be one of the better places in PER to work because you are in power. You really have the ability and the authority to make decisions and affect people's paths and to do it without too much oversight. I think that is the bottom line of pretty much any good job.

Q: *Later on when you were a senior administrator and were the beneficiary of these kinds of actions, it didn't bother you?*

BOSWELL: No, it didn't, because I thought they did a good job. The truth is I thought the junior officers that came out to my part of the world tended to be good and I thought the central system operated very reasonably and efficiently in assigning them. There was a shortage of quantity, when I was executive director in [NEA]. They were going through a very reduced intake of junior officers and a junior officer was a prized flower so we wanted to have good relations with the junior officer assignment/counsel branch. I think they did a good job.

Q: *It is really interesting, one little thing you pointed out that has struck me is that you can't tell anything by titles what is a good job. There are places like that which somebody*

might not think is, and it is a really potent power, and there are other ones that have a lot fancier sounding names that don't do anything.

BOSWELL: I've been in both kinds of jobs and as you say the best jobs are the ones where you have responsibility and a certain freedom of action. I felt that way in Quebec, and I felt that way in personnel. I also felt that way working for Larry Eagleburger in a staff job which was a very sexy sounding staff job but Eagleburger gave me a lot of responsibility. I basically could sign for him in certain places and I felt pretty good about that.

Q: *So far that's three in a row up to where we are.*

BOSWELL: I was very lucky, very lucky.

Q: *What happened then?*

BOSWELL: I had been promoted a couple times in the process and I was now getting into mid-career. After working three years in personnel, I was selected for senior training. I was selected, I guess, for the National War College, which I never went to, but that was my assignment. I remember leaving personnel, going on vacation and getting a call on the beach in Maine somewhere from a man named Dick Bowers who was the executive director of the European Bureau. He told me that he was leaving the European Bureau and that Mary Ryan was coming in as executive director. His deputy, Doug Laingen, had been hijacked out of the bureau to be deputy in a brand new office of foreign missions and they wanted me to be deputy executive director of EUR. EUR was the biggest and most powerful bureau and had been on the opposite side of many of the fights I'd had in PER. I thought it was a wonderful opportunity, so I accepted but I said also "I'm assigned and you have to find some way to un-assign me." He said, "I'll take care of that."

I never heard anything more so at the end of my vacation I came back to Washington and walked into Personnel to see the director of CDA, Ambassador Art Tienken, another very, very good man. I said, "Where am I going?" He said, "You're going to senior training." I said, "What about this EUR thing?" He said, "No, no, no, you're going to senior training." I called up Dick Bowers in EUR/EX and said, "Thanks for thinking of me. I guess it didn't work but I appreciate it." He said, "What? You're coming here." There was a flurry of phone calls over the next day or so and EUR won. I was broken out of senior training. I never went to the War College, to my great regret by the way. I never have gone to any kind of long-term training in my entire career in the State Department and I really feel the lack, no question.

[In August 1983], I went to EUR as deputy executive director to Mary Ryan. It was a very interesting tour that I won't go into in any great length here because there were no great events that happened during that tour. I enjoyed very much working for Mary but it was largely a demanding management job. I can say however that the management job was

made easier because we had a lot of money. It is pretty easy to manage when you've got a lot of money. If you've got a problem you can throw some money at it.

Life changed in the State Department not too long after that, but at that time EUR was a very flush bureau. This was before the enormous problems caused by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the requirement to build a whole bunch of new embassies and staff them in places where there had never been embassies before. This was a period of relative calm in my career. It was busy, but not tremendously stressful.

About a month after I came to EUR/EX, I was up in the office of then assistant secretary for I guess Administration but it might have been Diplomatic Security, Bob Lamb, and the executive director of NEA, a man named Mac Erlack, was talking to me. We were up there to celebrate the promotion of some administrative officers. Embassy Beirut had just been blown up about three days before and he asked me if I would go out there on TDY to help out, and I agreed. It was quite an experience. It was the first of many, many trips to Beirut during the course of my career. This was right after, as I say, the second bombing of embassy Beirut. It was a very deadly one; not quite as deadly as the first one but still very deadly.

Q: *Who was the ambassador?*

BOSWELL: Reg Bartholomew was the ambassador. I started to say it was the first of many trips and it was the first of many helicopter trips into Beirut from Cyprus. I've done it many times since. That's a whole story in itself but I remember arriving on the helicopter at a time of extremely high tension. I was the only passenger. I was hauled off the helicopter by a U.S. Army special forces officer who had been there on a training mission. He was hauled in from the countryside along with all his colleagues to provide some sort of security to what was left of the U.S. embassy. He hauled me out of the helicopter; the helicopter hovered, it never touched down. He sort of basically threw me to the ground and then dragged me into the nearby building which was the hulk, the remains of the embassy. This was quite an introduction.

I got to walk through the building. It was totally shattered with glass everywhere. It looked like a bomb had hit it, as a matter of fact. I learned a lot in that trip about the physics of a bomb and what it does to a building. It causes as much damage going in from the back side of the building as from the front. Bloody hand prints were everywhere on the staircases as people evacuated the building. It was quite a scene, a very difficult thing.

I remember going into one office and being handed a purse that belonged to, I believe her name was Yvonne Ray who was the personnel officer at the embassy. She had been severely injured and medevaced and this was her purse that had been found in her office. Apparently it had been lying on a safe, a file cabinet, next to her desk when the bomb went off. This purse was utterly shredded; it looked like fishnet. I remember bringing that home to NEA at the end of this TDY to give to Yvonne Ray who I think lost the sight of

one eye at least. It had been very, very damaged. I remember what it was like to carry that purse.

It was explained to me by the engineers that essentially the inside of those offices had turned into a sort of Roto Rooter of flying glass and worse than that, flying staplers, drawers and pieces of furniture and everything else. That's what caused all the casualties. It wasn't the bomb itself it was all this other stuff flying around. It gave me a great appreciation for mylar, reduced fenestration, and various other things that I became involved with afterwards.

Q: *Does that really help?*

BOSWELL: Yes, it certainly does. Reduced fenestration really helps. Of course the only thing that helps utterly is setback. Mylar doesn't help much when the bomb is going off right outside the window and it may not have helped much in the case of that particular explosion but it certainly helps in other cases. The reason for the number of casualties at el-Khobar some years later was that it was just glass flying around the building. I think that was one of the major significant oversights on the part of defending those airmen who died, that there was no protective film applied to the windows.

Q: *That's a fairly simple thing.*

BOSWELL: It's a very simple thing and, in fact, I've just had it done at PAHO [Pan American Health Organization] where I work now. I don't think that there is going to be any threat of a terrorist attack on the Pan American Health Organization, don't get me wrong, but we are right across the street from the State Department and we are a building that is entirely glass. If there is ever a significant bomb attack on the State Department, that's where we are going to get hurt. We are going to get hurt from the peripheral effects of the explosion and I want to minimize those.

Q: *What did you do on that trip to Lebanon?*

BOSWELL: I really didn't do much of any great significance. Joe Melrose, the executive director of NEA, and I were there. We were both pretty high level TDYers, senior-ish administrative officer, but we were mostly just helping to clean up and really trying to provide a sense of Washington support. I ended up moving furniture around with a bunch of bearded Shiite laborers who had come to the embassy to work. They had crossed the Green Line in the process at probably extremely great risk. They showed up more or less for work every day and were my construction team and my moving team. I supervised them and they were awfully good workers. I think any administrative officer in Beirut will tell you that the Shiites are the best laborers, the best workers.

Q: *What did you leave when you left?*

BOSWELL: Most of the clean up and the putting it back together was being done by embassy staff that were still there, not by we TDYers. The embassy staff were naturally in something of a state of shock but they also had sort of a gallows humor which I think was healthy in terms of helping them deal with an explosion which after all had injured a great many of their colleagues and killed about ten people. I remember for example the first day I was there coming out of the shattered hulk of the embassy and looking at the enormous crater that had appeared in front of the embassy which is where the Chevy Suburban full of explosives had gone off. It was quite a nightmare scene. Anyway the GSO, Mike Fink, had brought in a truckload of white sand from somewhere and dumped it in the bottom of this crater just to cover the bottom of the crater. There was a charred palm tree, or what was left of a palm tree at the edge of the crater. He put a beach umbrella in the crater and was having pictures taken of the staff in the bottom of the bomb crater. Make what of that what you will but it is a way of dealing with the shock and the horror of the moment. I thought that that was a hell of a courageous group of people who were working there.

At that time spouses were still allowed in Beirut but they were removed after that bombing. There were no children but there were spouses. That event probably had more of an effect on morale at the embassy than anything else. Spouses did not want to leave. The husbands certainly did not want them to leave. The spouses were part of the deal, they felt part of the deal. They were all working in one way or another, officially or unofficially, and to be evacuated to Cyprus and to leave the employee behind was extremely difficult. I think morale plummeted after that decision. Having said that, that is the decision I would make in that situation though I saw what the affect was.

Q: *Let's go back to EUR again. It's obviously a unique institution in the Department. It is a bureau that is not exactly like any other one. Do you have any thought on your experiences there?*

BOSWELL: The assistant secretary for EUR at the time I was there was a man named Rick Burt who was probably in his late 30s and fortunately had some gray hair otherwise he would not have had any credibility at all. He was a very smart man. He was a rather abrasive person but a very, very smart individual. He presided over this big empire the way it should be presided over. He was a very prominent person in the State Department and had a direct pipeline to the secretary which I think at least regional assistant secretaries ought to have, not go through a layer. EUR operated very much under its own power. It had enormous influence, as you just said Ed. It had a huge budget which was where a lot of the influence comes from and it operated its own fiefdom; other bureaus really didn't get in the way.

Now there are bad sides to that. It was to some degree a closed shop. To the extent we could, Mary Ryan and I spent a lot of time trying to open it up, to diversify it, with some success. We assigned administrative officers at least, which was our purview, coming out of all kinds of rough posts, not only EUR circuit, and we took a lot of pride in that. We assigned women. We assigned minorities. It was pretty hard to crack certain parts of EUR

like the German circuit, the Central European circuit. It was really a closed shop and essentially you couldn't get an assignment there unless you were born wanting to be German desk officer and riding that particular circuit. I think we did open it up. The bureau has gone through various phases. It is a very different bureau now because it has had to learn to staff tough posts and to really be out there and to suffer from greatly, greatly diminished resources. It is not the powerhouse that it was but it certainly was at the time.

Q: *When you were trying to do these diversification efforts, did you run into established groups within the bureau who resisted that?*

BOSWELL: Yes. Usually the German as I mentioned.

Q: *You were talking about the administrative officers. Was there a group of EUR administrative people who...*

BOSWELL: There were some very powerful administrative officers in EUR and they just moaned and groaned when somebody that they didn't know got an assignment over their hand-picked choice, but it wasn't too bad. I think we had a lot of credibility with those folks, people like Larry Russell in London and others. Mary is extremely highly skilled and has always been the premier personnel officer the last 20 years I think. She is just about the only person I've ever known whose career skyrocketed after having been a counselor in PER and I think it was because she did it so well. Many other careers have tanked after being a counselor in PER because counselors run afoul of powerful people.

Q: *What's the secret to her success?*

BOSWELL: Hard work and knowledge. Mary essentially had her mind pretty well made up at the opening of an assignment cycle of who she wanted to put where and she knew why she wanted to do it. She had done the work, put in the time, while everybody else was still putting together vacancy lists. She did the footwork that is the coalition building to make these assignments work. All of what she did made good sense and so she had a lot of credibility. She was not afraid to [stand put], but at the same time not afraid to cut a deal. She was absolutely brilliant at this and she essentially served as the guru to the administrative cone the way I believe an assistant secretary for administration should. She did it, and she is now the guru to the consular cone, and, I think, one of the most stunningly successful assistant secretary for Consular Affairs that there has ever been. As EUR executive director she had the same skills, she had the same frustrations in dealing with some closed parts of the bureau, but she was the executive director, she was all powerful.

Q: *That would illustrate what you said before, the proper role of the bureau in making those kinds of assignments.*

BOSWELL: Yes, absolutely. She was not Eurocentric as EUR executive director, she had come out of the central system. She simply wanted to get the best possible people in her jobs and also to provide a measure of fairness as well to folks who had never worked in EUR.

Q: *Any special problems in EUR with ambassadors who weren't exactly sure what the role of an ambassador was, or had big ideas about what the role of an ambassador was?*

BOSWELL: You know we had many but I don't think I can remember specific anecdotes. We had very powerful ambassadors.

Q: *But basically no problem?*

BOSWELL: No enormous problems. I may kick myself in listening to this tape or reading this transcript sometime in not remembering it, but there are not any that leap to mind. We did have some terrorism problems which is a little unusual for EUR. Paul Hamie was shot in Strasbourg and almost killed. There were various terrorist threats against other individuals. I don't remember the names exactly but I remember that we acted very quickly unilaterally. We never talked to DS [Diplomatic Security] or anybody else, we just pulled the officer out and put him on leave and paid him. We did that on one or two occasions for sure. We had a strong sense of taking care of our people.

Q: *What was your relation with the mission at NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]?*

BOSWELL: I didn't have much to do with them.

Q: *They were support by PM [Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs]*.

BOSWELL: They were supported by EUR/RPM [Office of European Security and Political Affairs] as well.

Q: *So they were nothing special?*

BOSWELL: Nothing special. My concern obviously was the running of the joint administrative operation but I don't remember anything particular or unusual about that. That's a very tough job for any administrative officer. He or she has to work for three ambassadors. But you know I didn't view the administrative problems in Europe as being particularly endless.

After EUR-EX I went to embassy Amman as administrative counselor. It was time to go overseas. I was a five-year rule person. I never thought I would be a five year rule violator but I was close and I wanted to go overseas. I wanted to go to NEA. I wanted to go to a hardship post. Amman was a nice hardship post. It was at the time a critical high threat post. I didn't realize how high threat until I got there. My predecessor as administrative

counselor was Johnny Young. During his last year there they at one point were getting a bomb a month aimed at some U.S. facility: Citibank, a warehouse, a car, a truck, something. It was a bad situation. I remember Johnny telling me the great feeling of relief he had when the wheels of the airliner he was on lifted off the Amman tarmac and that he had made it through two years without losing anybody. I felt the same way about it two years later.

That was my first time in the Middle East. We had an extremely vulnerable embassy from a security point of view. We were in the process of trying to nail down a site for a new embassy. Johnny had done most of the work and I finished up on it. The new embassy is now up and running, and while not exactly Inman standard embassy because it predates Inman, it nevertheless has a lot of Inman features that were built into it. We are awfully glad we have that embassy. [Editor's note: reference here is to The Inman Report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Panel on Overseas Security. Retired Admiral Robert Inman headed the commission. See www.fas.org/up/threat/inman]

It was another extremely interesting tour and I think it was less successful in terms of an administrative officer. I didn't quite have the relationship that I wanted to have with my DCM and my ambassador. I had awfully good help in the embassy but I didn't speak Arabic. It was the first time I had ever been assigned to a post where I didn't speak the language. You don't really need to speak Arabic in Amman but I missed it. I missed not being able to converse in the local language.

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Q: *Today is January 11th. We'll begin with picking up his assignment to Amman, Jordan as administrative officer.*

BOSWELL: I arrived in Amman in [July] 1985 and was administrative officer for Ambassador Paul Volker. It was my first tour as an administrative officer. Even though I'm an administrative cone officer I spent most of my middle career in non-administrative or interfunctional jobs. This was the first time in many, many years that I had gone back to the field as an administrative officer. I may be repeating myself a little bit here if we've talked about Amman to any degree before but I think the most significant thing about embassy Amman was that it was my first exposure to an extremely high threat post. Amman was in the critical threat range and there were only about 11 such posts in the world.

In the year preceding my arrival there had been a whole series of terrorist incidents aimed at the U.S. embassy and other U.S. personnel in Amman. I called it a bomb a month. That may not be entirely accurate but it was pretty close. The embassy water truck was blown up and there was a bomb attempt against Citibank. There were various other attempts including a bomb attempt against just an ordinary AID family where an alert spouse woke up in the morning and found in her driveway a garbage bag that didn't look like she put it there. She called the bomb squad and the bomb squad came along with the embassy RSO

[regional security officer]. In fact it was a bomb. Security absolutely dominated the tour from an administrative and every other point of view.

[This was] a time when Embassy Amman was very much active in the peace process and there was a big problem with the location of the chancery. The chancery in Amman was in the world's most vulnerable place, particularly in a critical threat environment. It was on a main street and there was no setback. Heroic efforts had been done by the previous administrative officer, Johnny Young, and the RSO, David Haas, to protect what was essentially an indefensible building. They protected it and we maintained the protection while I was there with enormous walls of sandbags that went up two stories reinforced with I-beams and things like that to keep it in place. I think the RSO got a Ph.D. in sandbag architecture. It was impressive looking to the uninformed [eye], but it would not really have done a hell of a lot of good against a major truck bomb as we've just seen [used] in recent years. Nevertheless, it was the best we could do. They closed the street behind the embassy to the great concern of the local merchants on that street. We managed to do just about everything that we could, given the location. The government of Jordan was extremely cooperative and we had very visible and strong police presence including jeeps with M-50 caliber machine guns in them parked in front of the embassy.

Nevertheless, we had to find a new chancery. The new location had been found, but I had to complete the negotiations for a couple of missing parcels of the property. It was to be one of the first of the new chanceries, not built according to Inman standards because it had been designed before Inman standards but it incorporated a lot of Inman standards. You couldn't call the new chancery in Amman now an Inman embassy but it is very close. It is built out of town on a very large parcel of land with the setback, with anti-ram barriers, and all the rest of the bells and whistles. During the course of my tour I completed the purchase of that property but I didn't really see the cornerstone laid. I've been back many times since, in my capacity as NEA/EX and as DS assistant secretary. I saw the embassy under construction and I was there for the ribbon cutting. It was very gratifying.

As I say, security and embassy construction pretty much dominated my tour. I was acting DCM, in fact chargé, for a fairly substantial period toward the end of my tour. There continued to be a host of security incidents but no fatalities and nothing went off. We found bomb parts including a briefcase on the walkway leading up to the political officer's residence; this was the political officer that covered the PLO [Palestinian Liberation Organization]. We made sure he got out of there. He changed residences and we thought for a while of removing him from the country, but essentially he laid low and changed residences.

We found an unexploded grenade that had been heaved over the wall of the embassy commissary. If it had gone off, and at the right time, there would have been casualties for sure because this was a place where families shopped and there were children there. There were a series of threats against the American community school, a school that was mostly Jordanian in student body but that was where all the American kids also went. We

had some pretty good intelligence about attempts that were going to be made originating from dissident groups in Syria in which the school was going to be targeted. Fortunately we felt pretty good that these attempts were going to fail because of cooperation from extremely effective Jordanian intelligence organs and counter-intelligence organs as well.

While we put a lot of Jordanian security around the school for a period of time, it was interesting that people didn't seem to be too alarmed by it. High security was a way of life in Jordan. I think in retrospect, in light of what we know now, we might have been thinking about evacuating dependents. We never really did. We simply kept on keeping on and there were very little complaints from the embassy families. People were used to security. My kids would glance under the car every morning before they got in. They were alert for surveillance. They would occasionally tell me about somebody that had been hanging around my residence suspiciously. We would call it in and it was always investigated. The embassy community in general was I think very, very security aware.

That is pretty much all I wanted to say about that tour except that I absolutely loved Jordan and the Jordanians. I am full of admiration for the king and for what he did, and has kept doing, under the most difficult possible circumstances.

That takes us to 1987 at which time I was transferred to embassy Ottawa, my second tour in Canada. I had served in Quebec many years before. I was transferred to Ottawa as minister counselor, as it turned out, working for Ambassador Tom Niles and DCM Dwight Mason. It was a home leave and transfer from Amman, another overseas tour, and a senior position. I think I had been promoted to the senior Foreign Service by that time. I think I was promoted while I was in Jordan and [since December 1985 was an] FEOC.

I went to Ottawa and again while the important work in Ottawa didn't involve security, it was more a big management job involving a large embassy and a lot of consulates. We were also in the process of acquiring a new embassy. Much of the tour was spent in an unsuccessful search for the right kind of property. The chancery in Ottawa was located directly across the street from the Parliament Hill. Essentially the fourth side of Parliament Square happened to be the American side and the Canadians, not unnaturally, wanted to get it back.

There had been a 30 year process of trying to find a new chancery which had culminated I think in 1985 or so with the selection of a site in downtown Ottawa. It was more than the selection of the site, it was the selection of the site and the design of the building. In other words a couple of million dollars had been spent already but it was a downtown site with no setback. The first thing the new assistant secretary for Diplomatic Security at the time, Bob Lamb, would have had to do is waived the brand new Inman standards for this embassy. Not surprisingly he wasn't ready to do that even in the lowest of all low threat posts, embassy Ottawa.

That sent us all back to the drawing board to the great shock of the Canadians. We had to start over in a search for a new embassy that went on for many years including some false

starts. We agreed on an embassy site out of town and then at my urging actually, Tom Niles reneged and told the Canadians that we wouldn't take it. It simply wasn't a good enough site. It wasn't prestigious enough. It met all the security standards but it just wasn't a good site for a U.S. embassy, out in a field in a suburb.

Ultimately, after I left Ottawa, a new site was selected. It was the site of the old agreed site and setback was waived given the very, very low threat post. It is a very prestigious site right off Parliament Hill, an excellent site, but without setback. Nevertheless there was incorporated into the design of the building a lot of the security features and minimal windows and things like that. The building was designed and approved but it is a little bit ironic that it was only years later that the Department felt that it could approve an embassy on that site. That embassy is under construction now and I think it is going to be finished this summer. It is a beautiful new embassy.

I think if we had been going through site selection now in the wake of the Nairobi and Tanzania bombings, that site would never be built. As assistant secretary I signed some of the waivers for it. Not the setback waiver but a couple of other little waivers that had to be done late in the design phase. I do think that it is the kind of place and the kind of building that we can build without as much of a setback as we want though I have to tell you that I'd think about it awfully hard now in light of what we've seen.

Q: *When we get to the point of your assistant secretaryship I'm going to really grill you on things like the recent bombings and the very interesting report by the accountability review board, but we'll do that later.*

BOSWELL: I'll look forward to talking about that later in this case. There we are in Ottawa where I spent three years as administrative counselor, an extremely enjoyable tour. I had some personal problems there. My marriage was falling apart but the tour itself was very good. I worked for Tom Niles, a superb ambassador, and Dwight Mason, a superb DCM. I had a very good relationship with both of them.

Tom was eventually replaced by Ambassador Ed Ney, a political appointee. He was an advertising whiz, former head of Burson and Marsteller, a major New York advertising firm and very much a friend of George Bush. He was an absolutely wonderful man. I liked him a lot. On substance of course he was nowhere near Tom Niles but on political instincts he was very strong. He was a very, very smart guy who took administration seriously and supported me in what I did. I liked the tour.

Q: *You said your ambassador and DCM were superb, what qualities does that mean they had?*

BOSWELL: I'm referring mostly to their management skills. They both paid a lot of attention to management. Dwight Mason of course had come out of the M area. Though he was a political officer his own predilections and interests were management to a large degree. They very much supported their administrative officer. It was a little bit different

from what I'd seen in my previous posts. We instituted a certain number of changes in allowances, housing, and in education policy. We did a lot of work in supporting the consulates particularly in getting new buildings for the consulate in Vancouver and the consulate in Montreal, both large consulates. I always felt that I could always count on both my ambassador and my DCM in that regard, and I could. They were very, very supportive and interested in my work without looking over my shoulder too much. They did what every good manager does which is to empower his or her subordinates and I felt good about that.

Q: *One more question about that is, with all the consulates, as the administrative minister counselor, what kind of different challenge did they present?*

BOSWELL: One is the challenge of distance. Almost all of those places, or the largest ones, have their own administrative officers and I was the reviewing officer for those people. Canada is an enormous country. It is several thousand miles from one end to the other, from Halifax to Vancouver, and it was hard to stay on top of what was going on in the consulates. The consulates were huge. Toronto and Montreal were as large as the embassy I think. They had large consular operations with huge visa crowd control kinds of problems that the embassy did not have. There were big management issues in each of those and it was hard to stay in touch. I should have probably spent more time on the road than I did. That was one big challenge.

I suppose the other biggest challenge was that since they were large consulates they felt like running their own show, like any constituent post always feels like doing. They wanted their own budget and while this never became a real point of contention we had to keep them happy without micro managing them, so that was a balancing act.

Q: *You got your turn at what the ambassador did for you.*

BOSWELL: That's right. We had mixed success I think. We had an inspection just before I left Ottawa. It was an extremely good inspection report on every post in Canada including embassy Ottawa, including from the administrative side, except for one and that was consulate Montreal. There were serious problems involving the consul general; problems of management style and problems of possible conflict on interest. That consul general eventually had to retire before the end of his tour. We just flat missed it and Montreal isn't that far away. We missed it in my three years. I had been to Montreal a couple of times and so had the ambassador and the DCM and we just didn't pick up just how bad it really was. It seemed like a lot of people just held their fire until the inspectors came and then they really did it. They were right basically. I think they were proved right. That was a flaw in an otherwise good performance.

Q: *I would take it from that that you think inspections are a good idea?*

BOSWELL: I emphatically think that inspections are a good idea. In fact, I now work for a UN agency where the whole inspection function is something new and strange, and

foreign and evil. UN reform which is being pressed by the United States among others includes establishment of inspection functions in UN agencies. There is a brand new inspector general after years of U.S. pressure, a brand new and extremely capable inspector general at the UN in New York. My agency, the Pan American Health Organization has no inspection function and neither does the World Health Organization which is the parent. These organizations have doctors who don't believe that there is any inspector in the world who is competent to tell them how to do their work.

I miss it. I miss having inspectors. They perform an extremely valuable function as enervating and nerve-racking and irritating as they can be. You want inspections to be good of course and above all you want them to be there, you want to have them. They are a very, very important counterpoint and an outside look as well.

Q: *One last question on Canada and that was having served in both Quebec and Ottawa, what differences did you see between the two communities?*

BOSWELL: It was very easy to see the differences. I had a long-standing bet with two Anglo-Canadian friends, journalists, in Ottawa that Quebec would be independent by the turn of the century. I think I am going to lose the bet and I think they've forgotten about it. The stakes were very high, dinner at Maxim's in Paris including airfare. I think I am going to lose the bet and I'm very glad that I am. I think I was just wrong in terms of timing.

I think in the end Quebec will be independent or some form of independence that is a lot more than what they have now. I think it is largely because English Canada doesn't get it. They just flat don't get it. They don't get what Quebec nationalism is. They don't get what Quebec sympathies are. They don't get what Quebecers really want. In fact I kept hearing whenever I was in Anglo Canada, "What on earth do those guys really want?" Listen, they are the co-founding people and you've lived with them for many, many decades. If you can't figure out what they want there is something missing in your own attitudinal makeup.

I think that more than even Quebec nationalism per se, just the lack of response from English Canada is going to ultimately break apart that kind and gentle giant to our north. It will injure all of us including Canada when that happens though not greatly. Some form of Canada will continue and Quebec is certainly very viable as an independent country but I think it is a wonderful country as it is now and it's a shame to break it up.

Q: *What happens to the maritime provinces in that situation?*

BOSWELL: As everybody knows the maritime provinces are not particularly prosperous. They benefit greatly from their inclusion in Canada. They get a lot of money from the feds that they would not otherwise have. Some are better off than others. There are some that would be absolute basket cases, notably Newfoundland though Newfoundland has

now acquired offshore oil and gas and may be in a somewhat better position to take care of itself.

I don't know what would happen to those. Presumably they would remain in some sort of divided Canada. It is conceivable that they could split into province sized bites and some may even want to associate with the United States. I have my doubts about the U.S. Senate agreeing to any of these folks associating with the United States. The closest equivalent would be statehood for the District of Columbia which would mean absolutely certainly two Democratic senators and one Democratic congressman forever and I think the senate would have a little trouble with that. The same thing for Canadian provinces. They are far more progressive social democratic governments and orientation, more on the European mode than we have. Even the prairie provinces are far more liberal than most U.S. states.

Q: *Much more than the western U.S. states.*

BOSWELL: And much more than the western U.S. states including the blue-eyed sheiks in Alberta, the oil sheiks who are very conservative by Canadian standards but quite liberal by western U.S. standards. They are used to a different level of government involvement in their lives and they want to keep it going.

Q: *With that maritime thing, the geography escapes me, would it create kind of a West Pakistan, East Pakistan kind of thing?*

BOSWELL: Yes it would. Quebec separates the two halves of Canada and if you take Quebec out you have a big hole there that is several hundred miles across. Yes, they would be a West Pakistan, East Pakistan. Obviously they would work out some kind of arrangement but it would create a physical separation. Canada looks strange geographically. It is this enormous land mass but most of the population is clustered within a couple of hundred miles of the U.S. border. It is strung out horizontally so all access to the east has to go through Quebec, or the west.

Q: *It is going to be very interesting no matter what, I'm sure.*

BOSWELL: Whatever is worked out, and as I said I think it will be some form of separation, it will include ways to keep those two sides of Canada whole, they will try.

Q: *What about Canadian's attitudes toward the United States?*

BOSWELL: Again I would sort of separate Canadian into several parts because there is no monolithic Canadian attitude to the United States. Western Canada, that is British Columbia, looks very much to the Pacific Rim including Washington, Oregon and California as part of its sort of sphere of interest if you like, and sort of the Asian countries. British Columbia has always been sort of across the Rockies and in its own world. The plain states, even though as I mentioned before they differ somewhat in terms

of attitude from the American west, are also very like the American west. They are cowboy, ranching, oil kinds of states and I think they feel very close to the United States. They sound like Americans. Quebec is very close to the United States. The Quebecers feel the Americans feel more sympathetic to them in terms of their language thing but also don't feel threatened by America. America is separate.

It is Ontario where the bulk of the Canadian population is, where there is a certain amount of wariness of the United States, of being the mouse sleeping next to the elephant with the mouse being Ontario and the elephant being the United States; a term that Trudeau used. There is some feeling that, there is concern about being enveloped by the U.S. culture. It is where all the concern about the Canadian versions of Time Magazine and Newsweek taking over, and American TV programming taking over, and American attitudes taking over.

Many of my friends from Ontario when they discovered that I was being transferred back to Washington rushed to express their sympathies because they were sure that living in Washington I would have to go around fully armed at all time. They had this strange, a little bit strange, I don't want to make them sound unsophisticated because they are not unsophisticated but there is this wariness of us. Quebecers don't have that. It is a very striking thing. I occasionally found even a little anti-American sentiment where the kids in school would sometimes get a little harassed about being Americans. It was nothing remotely serious and not enough to upset them but it would happen from time to time.

Q: *Anything more on Canada?*

BOSWELL: No. I left Canada in the summer of 1990. I was getting divorced. The marriage had terminally fallen apart, unfortunately. I was assigned to Washington as executive director of the NEA bureau, a job that I had long sought. I always viewed NEA as the greatest bureau in the State Department; anybody in NEA usually does I think. I had always wanted to be their executive director. It had been a long-term career goal that I had looked forward to. It was always fun to sit in the same seat that Sheldon Krys had sat in remarkably for so many years during such a difficult period in U.S. foreign policy. I was very happy to be his successor by two or three.

I went to Washington in July of 1990 and I had a very interesting start to my tour as executive director. After home leave I had been in the job about a week when Jack Covey, the PDAS [principal deputy assistant secretary] for NEA, called me up to his office one afternoon and said, "You know Eric, I want you to go up to the Operations Center to look at the task force areas because Saddam is moving his troops now and there is just a chance," (none of us really believed this was going to happen) "that he may make some move on Kuwait. If he does it we are going to have a task force. Would you please go up there an take a look around?"

I remember going up to the Operations Center, a place I was very familiar with, that had big new highly developed task force area in it. I went with the official who was

responsible for those areas and looked around. There were several task forces in operation, a Trinidad and Tobago task force, I think a Liberia task force, and I forget what else. There were various crises that were going on. I said, "If we need a task force space where are we going to sit?"

The official took me out of the Operations Center and down the hall to a little conference room that was used for the U.S. Moscow hot line. It was a little room that I've never seen since actually. It had a little table with about 12 chairs in it, a few phones, and that was about it. It was just a standard State Department type conference room with more phones than usual. He said, "This is where you will be." I looked at him and said, "Read my lips, this is not going to be. If it goes down tonight, we take the whole thing, everything. You are going to have to kick out all of these other task forces." I planted that little seed and I went home at the end of the day.

I was in the process of looking for a new place to live and I remember my real estate agent calling me up, she was the wife of a Canadian diplomat, and saying, "Are you watching the tube?" I said, "No." At that moment another call interrupted me and it was from the Operations Center. Saddam was indeed marching on Kuwait. We immediately ejected all the other task forces and took over that task force area. That began a year's worth of task force operations that completely dominated at least my first nine months in NEA/EX. I spent the next couple of weeks organizing sort of off-the-cuff, scratching together a permanently staffed large task force to coordinate and monitor U.S. diplomatic operations important to the military. That task force stayed in operation for almost a year.

At first it was manned by FSOs from NEA who would do it in their off time. I never have more admired a group of officers than I did then. These were people, desk officers and others, who had full-time jobs and were working pretty hard on the war as it was from their desks, and then they would do an evening shift or a midnight shift afterwards. Obviously that couldn't go on very long but that's the way we operated for the first several weeks of this.

Ultimately we turned that task force into a permanently staffed operation. We recruited people who did nothing but that. I had tremendously good help in doing that. NEA/EX had a great staff, a post-management staff headed by Reginald Welsch, who is now a DAS in the DG's office and who was absolutely superb along with all her staff in just putting everything together. It was a monumental operation.

In the end as we moved closer to war in January and February of 1991, the threat to U.S. facilities in the NEA area and elsewhere including Africa grew and grew. There was no question that Saddam was planning to attack, through terrorist groups, U.S. facilities. A major effort was made by U.S. intelligence agencies to disrupt that but the threat level was very, very high. In the course of November, December, January, NEA had 28 out of its 33 posts in the bureau in some form of evacuation. There were over 2,000 employees and dependents back in Washington during that time. This was a huge operation. It

certainly surpassed the evacuations that took place following the Tehran hostage incident in 1979. It took up most of the efforts of NEA/EX.

Q: *That's the responsibility of the bureau to take care of those people?*

BOSWELL: It was the responsibility of the bureau. There were other outfits that shared in that responsibility, the Family Liaison Office, and the DG's office, but it was really the bureau that felt that it had the responsibility to take care of these folks. It was the bureau that organized virtually everything. We certainly coordinated everything.

Q: *Did you increase your own staff during that period?*

BOSWELL: We didn't, except to add the permanent staff to the task force. NEA is sort of a monastic culture. They believe that they can handle any crisis by simply working harder. I suspect you've experienced some of that in connections with NEA. I remember one DAS, David Mack, who during the course of the whole Iraq crisis as far as I could tell was at work 19 or 20 hours a day. He confessed to me that he would go home at 11:00 at night, collapse, sleep for four hours, run in the dark between three and four in the morning, and then go to work. It was just absolutely amazing. Not everybody worked that hard, but everybody worked very, very hard.

I remember also for example from a previous time in NEA when there had been the first of the crises in Lebanon, the Lebanese desk officer worked about 20 hours a day. I later found out that during the Salvadorian and Nicaraguan crises at the end of the Carter administration, or whenever that happened, ARA [Bureau of Inter-American Affairs] added about five desk officers to handle Salvador. NEA never added a desk officer for Lebanon. They just kept going with this one junior to middle grade officer and that's the way we operated during the Gulf War.
I thought it was the finest moment for any bureau in a long time even though there has been a lot of controversy about the leadership of the bureau. John Kelley was the assistant secretary. There has been a very critical book put out about his tenure. I thought that both John Kelley and Jack Covey did superb jobs in pulling together a bureau under the most acute strain imaginable. My hats are off to them. I think they were excellent.

Q: *What kind of cooperation did you get from central management on that?*

BOSWELL: I think the State Department responded extremely well. We got help from personnel in getting people and we got all the waivers that we needed to spend money and things like that. We got a lot of cooperation from the military through those organs in the State Department that take care of the military. There was no Pat Kennedy at the time, he was in Cairo as administrative counselor. Pat has made his career by dealing with these kinds of crises, but there was no Pat Kennedy. Nevertheless I thought the Department responded very well. There was a very acute sense that NEA was the point of the spear, if you like, on this and the Department vented its efforts to support the bureau.

I think what was different then from what may be now is that there was a very clear understanding that NEA was lead bureau in all aspects of dealing with the war, from running the task force, to all the administrative support. There was no other bureau in the Department that sort of took over to do it, NEA did it. It was a proud time. It was an extremely dangerous time for many of our people. We spent a tremendous amount of time in the task force, I managed to stop smoking because I couldn't leave the task force area for long enough to step outside and smoke a cigarette, a very healthy thing, so I stopped smoking.

Of course, we had a large staff and private American citizens that were essentially imprisoned in Kuwait in the embassy compound at that time and also at our embassy in Baghdad under Joe Wilson. It was a very small embassy but it was continuing to function. Ambassador April Glaspie, ambassador to Iraq, was back in the States. She had the tremendous misfortune of being out of the country at the moment Saddam moved and she wasn't able to go back. Joe Wilson ran the embassy with extraordinary distinction under great pressure until they were eventually evacuated. We kept an open phone line at all times to Embassy Kuwait and Embassy Baghdad. I remember Embassy Baghdad used to man their phones at night with interns who were stuck there and couldn't get out. They were 19-year-olds, the males, who would monitor the phones at the other end.

Q: *Nobody tried to cut you off?*

BOSWELL: Nobody tried to cut us off; it was very strange. Nobody tried to cut us off. As a sideline, sometime later after the war the Iraqi PT&T sent us the phone bill, which if you could imagine for 24 hour operations over a period of something like five months, was a massive phone bill. I don't think the bill was ever paid. Some scholar some day will find out whether we ever paid that bill. We maintained these communications.

Embassy Kuwait wasn't particularly blessed and totally cut off from any kind of outside support, except what it was getting from us over the phone. There was no food, no water, no nothing. Their electricity had been cut off. They were operating on generator power and they had to be very careful.

Somebody ought to interview Barbara Bodine for this project or Nat Howe, but particularly Barbara Bodine I would say, or Wayne Logsdon who was the administrative officer. Wayne arrived with his wife something like three days before Saddam crunched away. He could have lots of interesting insights. So will Barbara who is currently ambassador to Yemen, about how they managed, how they operated during that time. Another great person to talk about the whole period from the Washington end would be Reginald Welsch who certainly did much of the logistical work in supporting these places and did an absolutely marvelous job. There are lots of stories to tell about trying to keep that embassy running for five months.

I think they were eventually evacuated in December 1990 as we approached war when they were eventually allowed to leave. During those four or five months they were

completely cut off from anything, no electricity. They operated entirely within their own resources. I remember we were sending them recipes for 1,000 ways to use tuna fish because at one point they were running out of food and almost all they had left was canned tuna fish, lots of it. They dug wells on the compound. They experimented with obscure ways of charging their batteries, obscure ways of using whatever fuel they had.

I remember at one point they were discussing ways to harness the power that went through a phone line to ring the bell on that phone, to be able to charge batteries. I don't think we actually did it but we thought about making dozens, and dozens, and dozens, and dozens of phone calls to them over days to try to get that little bit of power into their battery. There were all sorts of stories like that. It was a very, very interesting time.

Of course, at first, there were women and children trapped in the embassy. Ultimately, Saddam allowed them to leave in a sort of harrowing convoy complete with pets, God help us. They were allowed to go to Baghdad. It must have been a terrifying experience for them. They didn't know if they were going from the frying pan into the fire but they did go to Baghdad and spent a little bit of time in Baghdad. They ultimately were allowed to leave via road after a couple of false starts. I remember many of them started in a convoy on the way to Amman and were not allowed to leave after a big desert crossing to the frontier. They had to go back, which must have been a horrible, horrible experience. Ultimately they made it out by road into Turkey, a big convoy of Americans, mostly dependents of various kinds, some tourists and others that had been caught there. They came back to the United States. I remember welcoming the C-130 that brought them in. There was a lot of that kind of activity that went on.

As we got closer and closer to war, tensions grew higher and higher. I remember for example spending a lot of time on the phone to embassy Tel Aviv, this was before the Scuds started to drop. I kept being assured by embassy Tel Aviv that the community was calm, that they all knew that war was coming but were prepared for it, and so on, and so on. Then as we got closer and closer to combat the airplanes stopped flying. The commercial flights to Tel Aviv began to be curtailed and people began to get the sense that their escape route was being cut off. There was an enormous American population in Israel and the anxiety level skyrocketed. Ultimately we had an evacuation of Israel.

There are all sorts of other extremely interesting things involving evacuations, the political signals that an evacuation would send, the toing and froing between the embassies and the Department about whether to have an evacuation, when to have an evacuation, what size, how would this be treated in terms of public affairs and statements. It is a very interesting subject in its own right.

Q: *What about other support for other embassies in the region during that period? What did that require or did you neglect them?*

BOSWELL: I wouldn't say that we neglected them, but we were very heavily focused on Kuwait and Baghdad. We also spent a lot of time on the other embassies but mostly from

a security point of view. Threats were out there. Bad guys were moving around and we were very, very concerned about terrorist attacks on those embassies. As I mentioned earlier ultimately most of those embassies were evacuated in one way or the other. We supported those evacuations, helped to organize them, and took care of the evacuees when they were back here.

There were very few posts that were not evacuated. I remember embassy Cairo insisted that it would not be evacuated and made it absolutely clear from the beginning of the conflict that they could take care of themselves and they could take care of their people. It was a huge embassy in the area that was never seriously considered for an evacuation. We evacuated Riyadh, Jeddah, Dhahran, [Khartoum], Islamabad, several of the consulates in India, Bangladesh. We were concerned about not only terrorists of course but civil disorder and disturbances. Embassy Islamabad had already been burned down and just barely averted an- (end of tape)

Q: *Now let's turn from the actual crisis, but if things come up, just stick them in. Some things you've said really illustrate the importance of the regional bureau and how it manages things, but also of bilateral relations. Here what I have in mind is those recent reports that have suggested that we should concentrate less on bilateral relations, i.e., don't le the regional bureaus have so much influence. I happen to think that is wrong and I'm not supposed to talk but what are your thoughts on that?*

BOSWELL: I certainly agree with that and I've been in both a regional bureau and a functional bureau throughout my career. As assistant secretary for DS I was responsible for a very important functional bureau. I was on the other side of that kind of philosophical argument in the sense that (and maybe we'll talk about this when we get to the DS part) I felt like I wanted to have control over all security officers, and, in fact, I did have control over the security officers in terms of the money, where they got stationed, where they got posted, and who they reported to in the circumstances of their work.

Having said that, I'm a very strong regional bureau advocate. I think the performance of NEA in a crisis, or in fact over the years, illustrates very strongly the importance of a regional bureau. NEA, as I say, has been one of the most successful ones. It has declined I think in recent years due to two things. The reasons, number one, is that on my watch as NEA executive director, and something I'll never forgive myself for, it was split into two bureaus; into an absolutely stupid bureau called the South Asia Bureau which is too small to have any particular clout, but it also reduced NEA in a significant way. It is in fact true that there was some rationale for this independent bureau. It is in fact true that NEA people tended to concentrate more on the Arab-Israel issue and perhaps not devote enough attention, there was one DAS that devoted policy attention to the Asian subcontinent. The outcome which was to create a new bureau, basically left two bureaus that were too small to operate compared with all the other bureaus in the State Department.

The second [reason] that has greatly damaged the Middle East Bureau is the existence of the Middle East peace program. Without taking anything away from that office the fact is that it took responsibility for Middle East peace out of NEA and into a special office. There is more and more of that going on around the Department and I think that is a mistake. It diminishes the bureau. I think from a policy point of view, the main effort at the NEA Bureau for the last several years has not been Middle East peace because they haven't been a part of Middle East peace, it has been the Iraq issue, the Kurdish issue. All of that is fairly fringe, important enough in its own right but fairly marginal compared to the central issue which is not in the bureau at all.

In the beginning there was very close cooperation between S/MEC [Office of the Special Middle East Coordinator in the Office of the Secretary] and NEA and then it sort of deteriorated. I don't know now what kind of coordination there is now. The assistant secretary for NEA, Martin Indyk, is a former sort of participant in the S/MEL operation from his time at the NSC but I don't know how central he is and if the bureau feels like it is back in the picture in terms of the Middle East peace effort. I think that was very damaging. I'm a very strong proponent of the power and the responsibility of the regional bureau. After all, with responsibility goes accountability for issues and when you have a regional bureau that's responsibility, it's very clear, who is accountable, I think you get better policy as a result.

Q: *It turns out that special coordinators, while they do the negotiations, really don't have the infrastructure underneath to be accountable in a sense. They are free of that because they can't implement anything, they can only talk.*

BOSWELL: They have the advantage of being free from a lot of bureaucratic constraints that go with operating as a regional bureau, and maybe that's the idea. But as you say they also don't command the logistical infrastructure and really the hearts and minds which is what's most important of the people that are operating here and dealing with the issue. As effective as S/MEC has been intermittently, there is just no institutional home for the Middle East peace process now, outside of three or four people, and that shouldn't be.

Q: *It being the very most important issue for the bureau, if not one of the top three or four for the whole Department. That brings me to another kind of general question, you said that being the executive director of NEA was a long-time goal, how do you see the role of executive directors?*

BOSWELL: I think the executive directors, like the regional bureaus, have been in something of a decline. You can always say that after us there was a decline, and I have to be careful about that, but I don't see and I haven't seen for several years except perhaps in EUR still the kind of giants in the administrative cone who were executive directors and who went on to be assistant secretaries like Sheldon Krys and others. I haven't seen executive directors play the kind of central role that they did in the past and that was going on when I was executive director. The functional bureaus gathered more and more money and power and direct action responsibility over the years and I think the jury is

still out. I'm going to waffle on this one. I think the jury is still out as to whether that is a good thing or a bad thing, I've seen it on both sides as I say. I tend to think that it's a bad thing even though I was part of trying to steal away some of that power when I was in DS.

You have now a couple of bureaus that are in real major crisis. AF with all those bombings and the sort of coup of the month that happens in there, I think they have a very strong executive director now who plays as I understand it the classic important role in running that bureau. Maybe the pendulum is shifting back a little bit. If I were the assistant secretary for AF I think the most important job over which I have control would be executive director given the kinds of problems that afflict the bureau. So that's one.

EUR has always played a major role and has had highly variable quality of executive directors. It has a very good one now, a guy who understands power, Don Hayes. It has had to deal with this incredible problem of the newly independent states and to some degree the emergence of new economies in Eastern Europe. That has been a sort of distilling, defining moment for the EUR Bureau. Now it is split into two essentially in all but fact.

Q: *Boxes on the chart.*

BOSWELL: Right. And enormous challenge for the executive director of EUR/EX supporting S/S as well. That has moved that bureau back into the spotlight. A lot of it however is certainly a question of the personality of the executive director and there have been good ones and not so good ones like anywhere else.

Q: *I know that formally the executive director doesn't have the title of deputy assistant secretary, but should they?*

BOSWELL: Formally it doesn't. It used to be a DAS equivalent but it is no longer a DAS equivalent. I had a DAS certificate for my wall in a frame. At the outset of Clinton one, Christopher one, that was removed as part of a general effort to reduce the number of DASs, an effort that has not had great success and probably was not wise. I was part of that too, implementing it at least. I really don't think it makes any difference whether an executive director has a DAS title or is a DAS equivalent or not. I do think however that it is crucial that an executive director report directly to the assistant secretary and I think that is where the power is seen. In other words not to the P/DAS or any other DAS but to the assistant secretary. They should be named by the assistant secretary, not by M or anybody else like that, but they should be named by the assistant secretary and should be the assistant secretary's chief operating officer. I think that is very important.

Q: *I had not worked in management but I came to the realization of how important the executive director is in the real operations of the Department. There is that kind of dual culture in the Foreign Service, although you served in both, between those people who work on non-management things and those who work on management. There are people like Dwight Mason and others, but many never see the other side of things.*

BOSWELL: I've seen both sides and particularly in personnel operations, which we talked about several tapes ago, I saw the situation from the point of view of central personnel and from the point of view of the bureau. Subsequently in DS and to some degree in OFM [Office of Foreign Missions] I saw both sides of the operations and I remained a very strong supporter of the primacy of the regional bureau in my heart.

Q: *Again this maybe should come later, but at this point what do you think of the management structure of the Department in the central form?*

BOSWELL: That's kind of a broad question and I'm not sure exactly what you're mean?

Q: *What I mean to say is, do we have too much super structure in our centralized M operations or do we have to have it because of the way the modern world is?*
BOSWELL: I think we definitely have to have it. I really think we have to have it. We need a big administrative bureau. The DG's office isn't all that huge but you need a central personnel operation. Now you need an information management bureau.

Q: *Certainly you need a chief financial officer.*

BOSWELL: You do have to have it. There is no regional director that can put together a proper information system for the State Department. In fact one of the problems of the current State Department is that they did cobble together for want of any central focus, it has been cobbled together by a lot of executive directors and others over the years. You absolutely have to have a large, important, centralized chief financial officer [CFO] operation.

Q: *Do you think that the way we've got it arranged is pretty effective, roughly speaking?*

BOSWELL: There has been an awful lot of effort over the years to move some of these boxes around particularly IM, the information management function. The security function was taken out of another bureau and in fact the CFO bureau was taken out of the administrative bureau. I'm not much of a rearranger of boxes. I think the present structure for better or for worse is probably adequate and I don't think we should spend a whole like of time trying to reinvent and rearrange. It's like every new undersecretary for management automatically feels that they have to reinvent the personnel system. That's a mistake. Likewise reinventing these boxes is probably wrong, though I do think it was appropriate and wise to create an IM bureau. You need to give the IM Bureau the kind of leadership and tools that it needs to succeed. It is definitely a function that has arisen over the last couple of decades that can't be handled by any other bureau; it needs its own bureau.

Q: *Do any other thoughts strike you about your NEA executive director days?*
BOSWELL: Well, of course, after the war and the successful outcome of the war there was a tremendous amount of effort put into sorting back to where we were. We needed a

new embassy in Kuwait, and a caretaking power in Baghdad. We selected the Poles which is interesting. This was a country that was barely out of the Warsaw Pact that was our representative in Baghdad and actually they did a pretty good job in Baghdad. They went back into our embassy and determined to the extent that they could that the Iraqis had pretty much left that embassy alone in Baghdad. Everything was covered with dust and there weren't any fingerprints anywhere or foot marks anywhere. They seemed, now it will take a bunch of experts someday, to have left it alone. They seemed not to have tried to penetrate it. Of course we always assumed that it was penetrated. We had to assume that.

The Poles were essentially caretakers, a conduit to deliver messages to the Iraqi government, or one of the conduits, but also to look out for residual U.S. interests including some problems that may affect Americans. It was an interesting initiative to put the Poles in charge and it was very much welcomed by the Poles; they absolutely loved it. It was a sign of their having arrived as a Western nation to be put in charge of that in 1991 which was just as the Soviet empire was breaking up. So that happened and as I say we lost the SA Bureau, the South Asia Bureau. That really, really caught us napping bureaucratically.

Q: *That was a congressional...*

BOSWELL: It was a congressional initiative. It was pushed by two people, one on the Senate side, Senator Moynihan, and one on the House side, Steve Solarz. It was Solarz more than anybody else who was an extremely effective game player in this regard. There had been serious efforts for years to try to create a SA Bureau, mostly pushed by Solarz, but this time he found the right moment and the right vehicle. I don't remember exactly what it was but all of a sudden we woke up one morning and found that we had a new bureau. There had been some testimony over it and when it was created, but nobody was really paying a lot of attention and there it was.

Q: *What do the people in SA itself think? Would they rather still be part of NEA?*

BOSWELL: I really don't know and the SA Bureau, defying logic but probably in accordance with the laws of bureaucracy, once you create such a thing it is very hard to undo it. It achieves a sort of life of its own. I don't know if you would find people in the SA Bureau saying they should be back in NEA. I tend to doubt it. Nevertheless it doesn't make sense bureaucratically to have a bureau responsible for five countries, including a very major one. It is supported by one executive office, the same executive NEA/EX now known as NEA/SA/EX so I suppose that's okay but it really should not continue and I hope someday...

Q: *Maybe one of these reorganizations will take care of it?*

BOSWELL: Maybe it will. Who knows what can happen as we try to integrate USIA and [ACDA - Arms Control and Disarmament Agency] and maybe ultimately AID. State may also take opportunities to reinvent that.

Q: *Any special interesting problems regarding Iran or were we just totally so out of it that it required no effort at all?*

BOSWELL: It didn't require a lot of time because we were out of it. The only effort I really knew was to try to keep some sort of residual Farsi expertise and ability in the State Department. We kept track of the language designated positions in Farsi that were in other bureaus. We even thought about creating a Farsi speaking position in Dushanbe. The Tajiks speak Farsi or almost Farsi, but we never really got that off the ground largely because Dushanbe is so damned dangerous that it was not the kind of place that you wanted to assign a political officer that sort of belonged to another bureau and was largely there to develop language capabilities. We had such positions in the Gulf as well. As I remember Abu Dhabi and Dubai, particularly Dubai is the Iran watching post. There are Farsi positions in Istanbul and I think a couple of other consulates in Europe but that was really pretty much it. Obviously there was an office in the State Department, Iran-Iraq, and a very active office dealing with Iraq and Iran but there were no real initiatives going on during my time; it was more of a holding pattern.

Q: *You mentioned the help of the military in the period of evacuations and so forth, what was the relationship like during the actual war itself?*

BOSWELL: I think the relationship was good. My only exposure to it was when the military really helped us out in terms of...

Q: *Did we do things for them?*

BOSWELL: We certainly did including...

Q: *We found bases for them?*

BOSWELL: Ultimately yes, absolutely. I always found the relationship very good. I got into some problems with the military later in other [arenas], particularly the new definition of who was responsible for what in terms of security that took place last year. It was a major effort to sort of clear out gray areas and things like that. I had some problems with them then and I think the military handled the post-Dhahran bombing poorly, understandable a little bit, but poorly. They completely overreacted and panicked basically. Force protection has become such a mantra that the military was almost immobilized when there are potentials for casualties and they greatly overreacted.

Anyway, during the Gulf War and in that period the relations with the military were absolutely excellent. I would say parenthetically that some of the evacuations that took place, primarily the ones in North Africa, created a lot of controversy. The families did

not want to go. They did not feel threatened and they did not want to go. Those evacuations were probably done more because Norman Schwarzkopf and the military wanted us to do them. It is entirely understandable. They wanted to clear the decks for their assault on Iraq and they did not want to be distracted by having to evacuate families in the event of civil disorder or terrorist attacks somewhere to their rear.

Q: *They didn't want to have to commit resources.*

BOSWELL: They didn't want to have to commit resources. In fact as I said, with a lot of controversy they evacuated those places. Nevertheless in the days leading up to the war there was a military extraction from a post, not in NEA but from Mogadishu when the embassy was invaded. Essentially helicopters from a helicopter carrier, a relief force of marines, got to the embassy in Mogadishu as the ladders were being placed against the wall. It was a very close thing. My understanding is that General Schwarzkopf was absolutely furious at having had to do this in the first place. This was distracting from his mission. He was taking an important ship and important marines away for a period of time and he was furious. I think he had every reason to be furious. I wasn't a player in that evacuation but clearly it was called too late. Clearly somebody missed the call.

Q: *That raises an interesting question, the timing of a post in recommending evacuations. If you do it too soon you look funny like you really were panicking and if you do it too late you have bad results.*

BOSWELL: My inclination is usually to go with the guy in command on the ground but there had been numerous examples of guys in command on the ground who reacted too late. The guys in command on the ground are thinking only of their mission there. They are not thinking of sometimes the larger context. I don't mean the protection of life, I mean where the activities of that mission fit in the grander scheme of things. The call on evacuations are ultimately made by the undersecretary for management as delegated by the secretary of State and I think that is appropriate because there have been times where they have been just too slow.

Q: *How about ever too fast?*

BOSWELL: I can't think of too many. But I'm a DS guy and I tend to be pretty fast on the evacuation front. I suppose if I sat here for a while I might think of some but there are none that immediately leap to mind.

Q: *Basically the problem is too slow.*

BOSWELL: Too slow, yes. They don't want leave. It is a tremendous disruption of their lives. It's a tremendous disruption of the functioning of what they are supposed to be doing. When they evacuate they lose a big support structure and there are huge morale problems that result as well.

I think I mentioned this on a previous tape but I was in Beirut in the wake of the second major bombing. I was there just a few days after the bombing. The only dependents there were spouses at the time and the spouses were part of the team. There were no kids and there were few spouses but those spouses were part of the team and were working. While I was there the word came down that they were to leave. The embassy was already in shock but recovering and acting appropriately to recover from the devastating effects of the bombing, and the affect on the embassy of having the spouses leave, spouses were dressed in cammies and definitely in full crisis mode, definitely fully integrated in the operations of the embassy, that was really tough. It was probably the right decision but that was really tough on the embassy staff.
Q: *Shall we move to your next assignment?*

BOSWELL: We move out of NEA/EX. When I was in NEA/EX the position of undersecretary for Management in the Department changed and a guy named John F.W. Rogers became undersecretary for Management; a guy who in my opinion was the best undersecretary we ever had. He was a controversial fellow and was not beloved by everybody. He was an extremely good manager. Unfortunately he was rather young and that was always tough because you want some gray hair in your under secretaries and maybe you want some lost hair and girth as well. John Rogers was a brilliant manager.

Not long after he came on board he asked me to be the director of the Office of Foreign Missions which was an assistant secretary position with the rank of ambassador. I thought it was an absolutely wonderful job and I accepted. That was in something like August of 1992 so I guess I only did two years as NEA executive director, a little less than the normal three years though there have been executive directors who've stayed for seven, I think, like Sheldon. I was offered OFM so I gave up NEA/EX.

Because this was a presidential appointment and because the election was coming up we had to move fast to get my nomination forward [through congressional wickets]. My nomination fell afoul, as so many presidential nominations do, of some shenanigans on the Hill and I never was acted on by the Senate before they went out of session in September of 1992, of course an election year. Once that went out of session I was in some ways beached. Rogers intended to maintain my nomination, if Bush was reelected, and he said so, but we didn't know if Bush would be reelected so Rogers asked me [that September] to be his executive assistant on a sort of interim basis until the election and basically we would see what would happen.

Obviously as we all know Bush lost the election, Clinton came in and I helped in the transition to welcome the new undersecretary for Management who was a guy named Brian Atwood. As it turns out he was undersecretary for Management for about a week and then he was named director of USAID. I helped the transition to Atwood but then got out of it. The Democrats decided to carry forward my nomination for OFM. It was essentially a career position and it was not particularly controversial. I went through the process. I was nominated by President Clinton, confirmed in April of 1993, and became

director of the Office of Foreign Missions [in May]. It is a position in a little organization which I liked a lot and an assistant secretary job which I liked a lot.

OFM was changing pretty dramatically with the end of the Cold War. OFM is an interesting office of its own. Its genesis is interesting and its activities are interesting. It was created years ago by passage of the Foreign Missions Act which I think George Mason had plenty to do with when it was passed. It was essentially a creation of the Congress, not of the administration, to establish an office that to some degree mimicked the [Soviet Union's] UPDK [Uprovlenia po Diplomaticheskom Korpusom - Office of the Diplomatic Corps] and similar organs behind the Iron Curtain. In other words it was an office that could administer benefits or withdraw benefits on a very, very, very closely attuned reciprocal basis for foreign missions in the United States. We wanted an office that could regulate the activities of these missions, so it had a Cold War genesis. It was aimed at the Chinese, the Cubans and the Soviets. There was a significant intelligence component to it, but the focus of its work was on the Soviets.

By the time I got to it, it was becoming a very different kind of organization. The intelligence component was still there but it was much less important. We didn't have large numbers of people deciding on restricted travel zones for Soviets. I remember the OFM had published, (the amount of work it must have taken was unbelievable) a Rand McNally atlas of the United States with very carefully delineated off-limits places with highway corridors going through them that not only had substantive counterintelligence reason for being, in other words we wanted to keep the Soviets away from SAC [Strategic Air Command] bases and things like that, but also was designed to in some ways mimic the areas of the Soviet Union that were off-limits. This was quite a production and to keep track of all of this was quite a production as well.

OFM had been moving from that into a much more general kind of administration of benefits to the diplomatic corps. They were much more involved in obtaining reciprocity, not for security or intelligence reasons but for financial reasons and to benefit our people. I transformed the office to some degree to reflect that. I put a lot more emphasis on tax and customs, trying to find ways to recoup value added taxes or prevent us from being taxed. There were perhaps hundreds of millions of dollars that the Department was spending in what we felt was illegal taxation and we spent a lot of time on that and a lot less time on the Soviets.

The old OFM functions nevertheless continued to be valid. I remember making a trip to Cuba for example when I was asked to by the director of our interest section there, Joe Maguire, who said various aspects of our State Department life in Cuba were being interfered with by the Cuban bureaucracy, probably intentionally. He asked me to come down there and take a look around, which I did. I was certainly the highest ranking American diplomat to come to Cuba for years, and years, and years, which is interesting in its own right even though my functions were very limited. I was not a policy guy but I did go to Cuba and I met with Cuban officials.

I met with my counterpart, the head of the Cuban UPDK equivalent, I've forgotten the name of the organization. He was a very powerful individual who not only regulated the activities of foreign embassies but also the activities of foreign companies, foreigners basically, in Cuba. This guy spoke a language that I understood, and I spoke a language that he completely understands. Basically in the course of a very friendly but guarded conversation, I made it clear to him that we were having problems in the running of our embassy. I delineated what the problems were, acquisition of real estate, clearing things through customs, all sorts of things, and if these problems weren't solved, the Cuban missions to the United States, basically Washington and New York, would experience a lot of problems that were very similar. I could make sure that the Cuban mission in Washington had to purchase every paper clip that it used, and anything else that it used, from OFM to which we would add our customary 15 percent management fee as well as a certain amount of paperwork. He understood that absolutely perfectly and to my intense gratification after that our problems, while not disappearing, were a lot less. It was a very fruitful and interesting visit. It was also very interesting to see Havana under Fidel which not too many Americans have done, certainly not official Americans [outside an Interests Section staff]. That kind of Cold War function continued to go on.

OFM however was also the outfit that became a sort of Department of Motor Vehicles for the State Department. We issued the drivers licenses and the plates to all these diplomats. The idea behind that was to ensure that they had insurance and the only way we could make sure that they had car insurance, liability insurance, was to regulate who was able to drive and to put the plates on their cars. The reason for that was that we had a lot of problems in the past with diplomats who would get involved in wrecks and injure people, and would hide behind immunity. We wanted to make sure that they couldn't do that or that it wasn't so easy to do, so this large program of becoming a DMV for the diplomatic community was established. It had a certain intelligence benefit because there was an awful lot of information available about these diplomats just from the drivers license application which otherwise had been so difficult to get.

There was some intelligence component to it but mostly it was simply an effort to protect the U.S. public, an effort that was popular with the Congress. There were many other ways in which we protected the public. We regulated where they could put their embassy buildings and where they could acquire property and this, that and the other. We used that on a reciprocal basis to leverage change in notably China.

The biggest event that happened, [in terms of hitting] the papers, was the famous case of a Georgian [diplomat], a drunk driver, who killed a young girl late [one] night after driving 80 miles an hour down Connecticut Avenue and smashing into her car in Dupont Circle. That required immediate action. It was a cause celebre and a particularly grotesque accident, a particularly egregious accident. Because we had some information that they were trying to get this diplomat out of the country, I remember calling in the Georgian ambassador almost right after the accident and wagging my finger at him telling him that in the interest of relations between our two countries we wanted him to waive immunity

and we wanted to keep this diplomat in the country to be tried. They did waive it, he was tried, and he is in jail right now.

It was a very, very difficult decision. We had to look at the reciprocal side of it. Is that what we would expect to do in countries overseas? It was a dicey decision. It went to the secretary of State. Secretary Christopher in fact intervened and called Mr. Shevardnadze himself, the Georgian head of state, to press the same point that I made. Anyway as I said I think the Department got kudos from the public for having acted appropriately. [Later, as could be expected, the Georgians retaliated against an American who, although he was not driving, was cited for a serious traffic accident].

Q: *That really does raise a very interesting question. I remember being in on the beginning of OFM from the M, central management point of view, and taking some functions out of protocol. It's a totally different world, and it does raise the whole question of immunity. Of course, the size of the diplomatic establishments, both others and ours, is so huge now that it's a totally different kind of ball game than it was. Can we operate in that way or what constraints does that place on diplomats? That is to say some denigration of immunity.*

BOSWELL: I don't think there was any denigration of immunity really. I think that diplomats in general have come to view OFM as more of a service and support organization rather than the guys in the black hats. OFM can get them a driver's license cheaply, quickly, and conveniently.

Q: *Much better than the DMV in DC.*

BOSWELL: Better than the DMV in DC or Virginia or some place like that. Part of the idea behind OFM was to assist foreign embassies, not just to regulate, but to administer benefits, to assist them when they were looking for property, when they were trying to get property applications through to various bureaucratic DC and National Capital Commission steps in order to acquire property. We supported foreign missions in court when there were court cases having to do with property. But we also regulate them. We told them where they were not going to be. We would give them informal advice about places to avoid because the neighbors were particularly active or something like that. I think in general the foreign missions viewed us as a good thing rather than a bad thing.

They were a little confused about the difference between OFM and protocol. Protocol maintained many diplomatic services functions particularly the accreditation function. I think that in an ideal world all of that belongs in OFM. Protocol should be visits and dignitaries but not the care and feeding and regulation of the diplomatic corps including accrediting. But, it is not a huge problem. Both protocol and OFM did not work well together at first and they had great fights as you would expect. Some initial OFM personnel were drawn from protocol. There were big fights between the two outfits but now the two outfits work rather well together and I don't think we need to really rearrange any boxes as long as nothing is broken.

Q: *How about the impact on American diplomats overseas? Do you see any effort by other countries to mimic what we've done?*

BOSWELL: Yes, they do. It is a two edge sword. But what they don't have, most of them don't have an OFM and they don't have a Foreign Missions Act, one of the most brilliantly drafted pieces of legislation that I know which gave OFM all kinds of power and discretion and authority unique to itself without reference to other... The Foreign Missions Act overrode many other pieces of legislation so OFM has a remarkable tool, legislative authority, to do what it is supposed to do. Foreign diplomats do not have that back in the foreign office in Brazil. They don't issue the drivers licenses to Americans. They can't tell the Ministry of Finance what to do. We can. We can tell the Department of Treasury what to do in situation x or situation y.

While others try to play the reciprocity, they are not really as equipped to do it as we are. Only the old Cold War countries have OFM type organs today that function. The Chinese certainly do. Russia does though UPDK now also runs golf courses, has a mineral water bottling factory, and all sorts of private enterprises. I met several times with my counterpart, Yuri Prochen, the head of UPDK in Russia and I remember the first time I met him, he was a standard old Soviet era, bad suit, table thumping bureaucrat. When I met him years later, he was still a table thumping bureaucrat but he would expound very proudly on the business ventures that UPDK was in, and he wore a lot better suits. It was a remarkable change.

Q: *Do the other former communist countries still have those?*

BOSWELL: I don't think so. Perhaps a couple of them to some degree. Bulgaria I think still may have such a thing, but I don't think the others do.

Q: *Do you know who the congressmen were who were responsible for it?*

BOSWELL: I do not know who were the angels who were there at the creation of OFM. It was in 1983 and the first head of OFM was a retired FBI guy. The State Department wanted to put the usual FSO like me in their as the head but the Hill got wind of that and said no way, the purpose of this thing among other things is to bypass and override the stripe pants cookie pushers unwilling to ruffle foreign embassies when the going gets tough. They therefore put into it a former FBI guy who was remarkably successful. He was a bureaucratic black belt and he carved out OFM's space and authority. When the legal advisor wouldn't play ball with some of the things that he wanted to do, he simply hired a lawyer out of L and created his own mini legal division and kept going. He was a remarkable man. He established OFM as a real presence to the horror of much of the rest of State Department, particularly the European Bureau. EUR as a rule was very concerned about this. But basically OFM was right. It was conceived correctly, it acted properly, and it has greatly served the State Department's interest.

Q: *How about any comments on the current state of relationships between OFM and the regional bureaus?*

BOSWELL: I think they are very good. I think the regional bureaus over the years have become accustomed to OFM and don't view it as a problem, as a bull in the china shop. It likes the kinds of tools that OFM has and the relations between the bureaus and OFM are mostly (not always) very, very good. OFM is a quieter operation than it used to be. Agitating on tax issues is a lot less sexy than some of the stuff that they used to do. Nevertheless they perform an important function.

OFM is no longer an independent bureau equivalent; I brought them into DS. This was at a time early in the Clinton administration when in addition to the exercise where they were reducing the number of DASs, they were also trying to reduce the number of bureaus and to simplify the structure of the State Department. The State 2000 project had come out and OFM was a very visible and obvious target. I said before that the South Asia Bureau was too small to be a bureau. OFM I think in total had 60 direct hire employees, had bureau status with a director of assistant secretary rank with a title of ambassador named by the president and confirmed by the Senate. I was very concerned with OFM being essentially- (end of tape)

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Q: *It is January 11, 1999, and we're continuing on OFM.*

BOSWELL: I was director of OFM. I started in April of 1993 and in 1995, after two years in OFM I was asked by Dick Moose, then undersecretary for Management, if I would be assistant secretary for DS. I, of course, agreed. DS is another dream job. I said I would have loved to have been executive director of NEA and I looked forward to that. DS was another job that I thought was absolutely a great job for a State Department administrative officer.

Q: *Following once again in the footsteps of Sheldon.*

BOSWELL: Following in the footsteps of Sheldon, but also following in the footsteps of my father who had been director of SY in the early '60s. He was a State Department generalist, a Foreign Service officer. That was when SY was not a bureau. It was part of, I guess, Consular Affairs at the time. In any case, I was a second generation head of the security function at the State Department. It gave me great pleasure and it gave DS actually great pleasure too, I think. Anyway I was asked to do that.

A very long interim period followed because I was part of a daisy chain of assignments. Tony Quainton was to move from DS to be the DG, and the director general at the time, Genta Hawkins, was to be moved to another assignment. All of this was part of a daisy chain and all of it involved the White House and the Senate. It was very long and complex. It took something like a year to actually happen. I'm trying to remember when I became assistant secretary for DS. It was January of 1996, almost a year after I was cast

to do this. It was a very long process that many ambassadors had undergone as well. It had nothing to do with the substance of any one of the people in the chain, it was just the actions of the Congress and of the White House.
I don't want to talk about DS on this tape. I want to stop real quick and then we will resume taking about DS. I do want to mention that I took with me to DS, OFM. I retained the position of director of OFM. I integrated the two. We had to get the approval of the Congress to do it. There was approval from the Congress and OFM is now a DAS-ship, a sub-unit of DS, and the assistant secretary of DS is also director for OFM and has the ambassador title; the only assistant secretary in the State Department that carries that title by law.

Day-to-day operation at OFM rests in a deputy director of OFM who is a Foreign Service officer. By law it has to be somebody from the intelligence community or the Foreign Service, depending on what the director is, the number one guy. The number two guy has to be the opposite by law. The number one guy now is the DS assistant secretary, Dave Carpenter, who comes from the Secret Service and that fits of bill of being an intelligence background, a law enforcement background kind of person. The number two, the deputy director, is a Foreign Service officer. I think it is very important that one of the two be Foreign Service and ideally the number one be Foreign Service. OFM gets into a lot of issues that are not law enforcement and not security, but definitely policy, and an FSO needs to be in there to be part of that.

I think the integration of OFM was fairly seamless. There were a few people in OFM that really resisted it. OFM had a sort of culture that had sort of grown up around the first director, a culture of apartments from the rest of the Department, of omission from the rest of the Department and I think that was appropriate when it was first created. That was disappearing, as I said earlier. Nevertheless there were a few people in OFM that remembered the so-called glory days and didn't want this idea much of integrating into another bureau.

It is still an open question as to whether DS is the right bureau. It was integrated into DS largely because I knew I was going to DS. I could take OFM with me and protect it because I thought OFM was a very important tool of the Department. It would be too easy to break it up and break up its functions, and unnecessary. I wanted to protect it and so I brought it with me to DS. I think in practice the integration has been very easy, it has been quite seamless. I tried to bring about as little change as possible in OFM. We didn't even change the letterhead. It remained the Office of Foreign Missions.

The most important practical effect that it had, of course, was in the work of the director. The director was also an assistant secretary for DS, and while I had been doing OFM full time I was now doing OFM with about five percent of my time, or less. Day-to-day management of OFM is now much more in the hands of the deputy and I think that is okay. I don't really think OFM needs the full-time attention of an assistant secretary. It needs an assistant secretary with the title who can weigh in, who can call in an important ambassador or the ministerial level visits, but not the day-to-day operations of OFM.

I think the merger has been very successful. It is a merger of different cultures. I think DS hardly noticed that OFM was not part of it. DS which had been diminishing in size over the years (we'll get to that on the next tape) now had a new component and therefore was a bit bigger, and a new DAS position, that was good too. Aside from having that new DAS in my daily morning staff meetings, OFM and DS talked rather little to each other and that was fine. DS provided some administrative support to OFM but OFM had its own budget and planning function. This remained in OFM. Just a couple of people, that's all that was needed, and it never was integrated into DS in that way. That is pretty much all I want to say about OFM.

Q: *I was just going to ask you, what is the makeup of the staff? How many Foreign Service officers are among the 60?*

BOSWELL: There are more Foreign Service officers in OFM than there were when I took over but it's still very few. I'm not sure I could count them. As I say the deputy director is an FSO. He is assisted by the former deputy director who has an FBI background who is now on contract as a special advisor. The head of OFM's most important unit, the unit of vehicles, tax and customs which occupies most of an annex out at the Van Ness International Center, it has its own building basically, is an FSO, an FSO-1. The head of the tax and customs unit is an FSO-2. There is another FSO position in the tax and customs unit which is unfilled at the moment. It had been filled by a GS excursion. I think that is all the FSO positions in OFM except for some of the directors of the regional OFM offices.

OFM has a very large office in New York taking care of the UN missions as well as the enormous consular corps in New York. That office is headed by an FSO-2. Our office in Los Angeles is headed by a Foreign Service FSO-2. In San Francisco and Chicago they are headed by civil service. Those are the field offices split between Foreign Service and civil service. I think it is a close call as to which it should be.

Q: *I was going to say are there problems since the office is so heavily made up of civil servants that is there a Foreign Service/civil service friction?*

BOSWELL: I don't really think so. I haven't really noticed it. Maybe it was because I was a little distant from it. I don't know, but I haven't felt anything like that. OFM always operated with its own sense of mission and uniqueness the way NEA did. It was a high morale kind of operation because it felt that it had a special function a little apart, a rather different function, and I think it has been able to maintain that even with the change of the nature of the operation. I don't think there really has been a schism or separation between the Foreign Service and civil service components.

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Q: *This is Monday, March 8th and we're interviewing Eric Boswell. This is Edward Dillery, the interviewer. Eric, we left the saga the last time when you were just leaving OFM. What happens to you next?*

BOSWELL: I guess this takes us to about January of 1996. I had been nominated to be assistant secretary for DS and also to maintain my OFM title, so I didn't really leave it, to maintain my OFM responsibilities. I was actually asked to take the DS job something like two years before it eventually came open. It was part of a long (two years is too long) daisy chain of assignments. Tony Quainton, my predecessor, was going to the DG's office. The DG, Genta Hawkins Holmes, was going to another assignment and she ended up eventually in Canberra. All of this, sort of one depended on the other and my nomination also got held up for a fairly long time in congressional shenanigans. It had nothing to do with my own nomination but in any case, after a very, very long process I was sworn in as assistant secretary for DS in early January 1996 as I mentioned.

DS had a long tradition of having FSOs in charge; a long tradition as long as DS had been in business which was about ten years at the time. There had always been FSOs in charge. I think that's a good tradition, though there had been pressure on the Hill to put a so-called cop at the top of DS. Various of DS allies on the Hill, fed I think in part by sentiment from the agents themselves, were pushing to have a cop at the top. The feeling in DS was that FSOs, the black dragons as they call them, didn't have sufficient concern or dedication to security and it was felt DS' budget was being inordinately targeted. DS' budget was getting trimmed along with everybody else's budget and was viewed as an exceptionally large target because it had been an exceptionally large budget when [the] Inman [Report] first came in. I know that it was not being inordinately targeted. It was being shaved back like the outer part of an onion like every other budget in the State Department. There was a widespread perception in DS that we were being unfairly targeted and it was felt that a cop at the top, a law enforcement type heading DS, would be better able to uphold DS' mission and save DS' funding. In fact, there were people who felt that DS should get fenced-off funding that would be immune from the cuts that affected the rest of the State Department budget.

I made it very clear to the folks when I came in that I didn't feel that way and that I felt very strongly that while my job was to fight for as much of DS funding as I thought was justifiable, it was not to protect DS from inordinate budget cuts which weren't in fact going on anyway. I think my job in DS was the most fun I had in my career in the State Department and that was actually a pretty good way to leave the State Department as I did a couple of years later. DS had been in fact severely underfunded in my opinion over a period of years, like everything else, but when you underfund DS you start playing around with life and safety. After a couple of months as head of DS, I felt that DS had been almost dangerously underfunded.

By way of example there had been almost no intake of any DS officers at all for a period of something like four or five years and no intake plan. The DS agent corps was older, grayer, fatter, working too much overtime, exhausted. There were too many people in

their late 40s and early 50s that were still standing shifts outside hotel rooms with wires in their ear, spending too much time away from their families. It was a very tired, and I thought, rather dispirited group of people. That, in and of itself, is dangerous.

The funding for security improvements at missions around the world had also declined. We were faced, in particular I thought in the former Soviet Union, with some very insecure buildings. We were faced with terrorist threats around the world but no successful terrorist attack in years, ten years almost. It is a factor that will be important in subsequent events. We were particularly vulnerable I thought to criticism for susceptibility to technical penetration. We had not been spending as much money (we didn't the money to spend) as we should in protection from that kind of penetration in addition to physical protection particularly in the former Soviet Union. We were coming under a lot of criticism from the agencies.

Listeners to this tape may recall that when Secretary Baker decided to establish a U.S. embassy in every republic of the former Soviet Union, it was decided that this would be done out of State Department's hide. The State Department had no special funding for this at all and had to eat all that went to it. This meant that it was policy that these be very small embassies, usually SEP posts, special embassy program posts, with no DCM, very few agencies represented, no marines, a very limited intelligence component. That was the idea. That went by the wayside very quickly. There was immediately a lot of pressure from various part of the intelligence community to set up, and they did. The various strictures and controls eroded away and the security didn't follow up, didn't keep pace. So that was a real problem that I dealt with. Dealing with that was a major problem through much of my first couple of years.

Q: *Just to go back a little bit to the budget thing, I know also there seemed to be the impression before you arrived, really when Inman was at its height, that the enhanced security budget at that time was kind of being viewed by the rest of the Department as a cash cow to be used for anything that might even be suggested to be security.*

BOSWELL: I'm not saying that skillful administrative officers and GSOs didn't find imaginative ways (I did myself as a matter of fact in the field) to use Inman money, but I think that is a distortion as to what was really happening. What really happened was there was never as much money appropriated as was authorized. In fact something like a third or even a quarter of the money was appropriated and that money was I think properly used largely for physical security improvements. It was also used to create DS as an organization, to staff DS as an organization, and to build a certain number of Inman buildings.

I think the total number of Inman buildings that we have now is somewhere in the low 20s. They may not all be perfect Inman buildings but there are a large number of chanceries built to Inman standards or close to it; chanceries that may have been in the construction process when Inman was enacted and had subsequent improvements made to them during the course of the design to come close to Inman standards though they may

not be entirely Inman standards. I'm thinking of embassy Amman as one, one that I'm very familiar with. I think that is the major achievement of Inman was building a lot of big un-apologetic fortress type buildings.

Q: *Can you describe Inman standards in 125 words or less for people who don't know?*

BOSWELL: For people who don't know, the most important Inman standard and the one that you hear about all the time that you will have heard about in connection with the Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam embassy bombings in the summer of 1998, is the 100 foot setback requirement. The 100 foot setback requirement required that there be 100 feet between the embassy perimeter which was a reinforced wall built with anti-ram standards, anti-riot standards, and everything else, and the edge of the nearest building which would house Americans. In other words you could have other buildings within the 100 foot standard like a garage or something like that but anything that was an office building housing Americans had to be 100 feet back from the property. That caused a revolution in the way embassies were located and designed.

It applied by the way to all new construction. It did not apply, it could not apply, to existing embassies. There was no way for example to get a 100 foot setback in Grosvenor Square in London, or in Paris, or in many, many, many other places which is the source of the frequently heard criticism that most U.S. embassies do not meet Inman standards. In fact, they don't. Those standards were grandfathered for obvious practical reasons. All new embassy construction, and there was quite a lot of it, had to meet the standards. That 100 feet was the most important factor.

There were many other things in the standards. There were requirements for blast resistance, as I mentioned requirements for the wall, limitations on the amount of fenestration, that is window space that could be on the building, etc. The standards were meant to protect U.S. embassies from car bomb attacks, from blasts.

It is interesting, and I think we'll probably get into it later in this tape, that the accountability review board that reviewed the Nairobi embassy and Dar bombings criticized the embassies for not having made any particular provision to protect against vehicular bomb attack. I found this puzzling frankly because while I can't comment directly on Nairobi and Dar (I wasn't there, though I read the report) certainly protection against vehicular bomb attack was at the forefront of everybody's mind in DS. When we thought about a terrorist incident we were much more concerned about that than anything else. There was a car bombing of a U.S. military installation in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia just before I took over DS that caused a couple of deaths and then of course the famous truck bombing at el-Khobar Base near Dhahran [in June 1996] which caused a lose of life of... I think it was 14 American airmen and a huge number of other casualties. Car bombs are the what we were fixated with; that was what we were most concerned about. Anyway, the standards were designed to protect against large car bombings.

Q: *What about the dichotomy between trying to have something that's open, accessible, and promotes communication, as opposed to that which provides security? How do we deal with that?*

BOSWELL: It's a terrible dilemma and it remains a dilemma now. There are large parts of the Foreign Service who still feel strongly that we are essentially paid to go out there to communicate and interact with a host country government and people, and who resent the kind of security measures that need to be taken to keep people safe. The Department as a matter of policy has come down in favor of the standards. That's all it can do and I think that's appropriate.

In fact, I've seen many so-called fortress embassies as in Amman, a frequently criticized one, as in Lima, Peru, as in Bogota, Colombia, and, believe me, I think the people that work in those embassies are just delighted that they are there. I mean, it does cramp style, there is no question of that, and they look imposing, almost threatening, but they do the job and there has never been a successful attack against any such embassy.

Q: *Essentially you still are of the opinion that we can do our business and get out of the building even if we have these kinds of buildings? What would your advice be to a non-security person who is going out to an embassy on how they should conduct their personal life in terms of making sure their family is secure and so forth?*

BOSWELL: That's a pretty big subject and I think I would deal with it just by saying that every new person in an embassy gets an individual security briefing from the RSO as part of his or her in-processing and I am sure that they pay a lot more attention to those briefings than in past years. There is just too much of a track record of both American facilities and people being targeted.

Of course, one of the theological debates that takes place is, as you fortify an embassy, does it not expose less hardened facilities to attack? By less hardened facilities I mean residences, vehicles. There have been attacks against U.S. personnel in vehicles. I don't know if that is because whoever the bad guys were decided that the building was too tough. There were attacks for example in Karachi against vehicles which caused some deaths. RSOs pay a lot of attention to that possibility.

There is also the possibility that terrorists will shift to other softer targets like a non-U.S. government, but U.S., facility and that is something that is always a concern. Nevertheless, the symbolic value as we have seen of taking out a U.S. embassy in a big way dwarfs any other possible target and I think it is entirely appropriate that the main emphasis from a security point of view be placed on protecting the facility itself.

Q: *How about a comment on, you kind of alluded to it, the relationship between the security community, mostly DS, and the rest of the Department? We talked about that in the defense case, how about with DS?*

BOSWELL: DS of course is responsible for the protection of American lives, American property, and American information; it is that side of security that it is responsible for. It is also a law enforcement outfit. It has certain law enforcement responsibilities that are laid out in the statute, in the Diplomatic Security Act. It is the only outfit in the U.S. government that is responsible for prosecuting visa and passport fraud. DS agents are badged, armed, credential carrying law enforcement officers. It is something that is very much a part of their identity and which existed only after the 1980 act. (Or was it 1986? I've lost the date of the act.)

The rest of the security community is other agencies. I had extensive interaction through the NSC process, and otherwise, with other agencies involved in anti-terrorist efforts. There is also the unit in the State Department which is the ambassador for counter-terrorism. At the time I was in DS, it was Ambassador Phil Lokaiz who had the responsibility of coordinating the U.S. government's anti-terrorism effort. There is a link there to DS but not overlapping responsibility. His was very much anti-terrorism policy and mine was protection from terrorists. I thought the working relationship between S/CT, as it's called, and DS while it occasionally got a little strained in the trenches as is understandable, I think overall it worked rather well; we didn't step on each other's toes.

Q: *What are the problems for career security officers in the Department? I'm thinking of promotions, assignments, that sort of thing.*

BOSWELL: The problems are several. First there are probably more slots for them in the States than there are for them overseas; a dirth of overseas assignments though that may be changing now. This means that your average DS special agent who is a Foreign Service specialist, is recruited similarly to FSOs, though they don't pass an FSO exam. Many of them have masters degrees. There is quite a high quality of personnel that is brought into DS these days.

They face spending the first five years of their assignment (this may not be the case now but it was the case when I was assistant secretary) in domestic assignments. Domestic assignments means probably not in Washington which leads to a sort of an estrangement to a degree, or at least a lack a familiarity with the system or to the rest of the Foreign Service which they are a part. They usually work in field offices in the States and the work in field offices is criminal investigations, it's law enforcement, it's catching crooks, it's breaking down doors to catch criminals. It is quite a shock for them to move from that, to work as a Foreign Service person in an embassy. Nevertheless I think they achieve the transition but it leads to a certain internal schizoid personality among DS agents.

DSers are divided in a way between those who want to be diplomats and those who want to catch crooks. There are many who prefer not to go overseas at all; who would rather stay stateside to catch crooks but who find that their careers suffer if they do that, and it's true. Any DS promotion board at the upper-mid levels pays a lot of attention to how a DS agent does in the field overseas. That's appropriate and that's as it should be, but it leads to problems.

Because of a lack of intake over the years, DS has been suffering from extremely slow rates of promotion. You tend to have a glut of officers at the FS-3 and FS-2 levels who aren't going any farther than that, which causes a problem. I think that is a general problem among the specialists, but it is a problem. Very, very few DS officers make it into senior positions. Those that do are exceptional officers. Some of them have even made it to chief of mission or to generalist jobs, including administrative minister counselor, consul general, principal officer at post, and as I say ambassador but that is very, very, very few. Most of them top out at the FSO-2 or perhaps the FSO-1 level.

There are two problems. There are problems of compression and there are problems of identity within DS and that is just something that the DS corps has to live with. There is a certain us-against-them feel within DS and a lot of what the assistant secretary should do in my opinion is to try and bridge that.

Q: *Would there be other ways? Are there ever exchanges in which you have non-DS officers serving in security positions and the other way around? You mentioned that at the senior level it happens, but does it happen at a lower level?*

BOSWELL: There have been attempts of that kind, particularly among the engineers which is sort of another issue entirely, but there have been excursion tours. Mostly it's DS officers going out to other jobs including in the administrative cone in particular. The pattern has been when that happened, for the officers to stay out, to re-cone and to do something else. As we all know, re-coning in the Foreign Service is not easy. It requires several assignments by the rules and usually the only way a DS agent can get an excursion tour as an administrative officer is to be ready to go to Sierra Leone or someplace like that. There are a few that are willing to do that, but it takes a very special kind of person. We all know DS agents that have moved into other cones and a few who have just had excursion tours in other cones and come back, but that is relatively rare.

There hasn't been any attempt that I know of to move FSOs into DS slots for the simple reason that DS agents are law enforcement; they are trained at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Brunswick, Georgia. As I mentioned they carry guns and wear badges. FSOs don't do that. There are very, very, very few FSOs who have ever been assigned in DS below the level of assistant secretary. I think I was one of two FSOs in DS. The other one briefly being an administrative officer who worked in the executive office of DS, but I was it, really.
Q: *Does anything about the current system need changing?*

BOSWELL: I don't think there is a lot you can do about this sort of us-versus-them thing. I think that is just part of the nature of the beast. You can minimize its effects to some extent but you are never going to be able to do away with it.

In terms of the other problems, what DS has needed above anything else (and I think it is one of my achievements to have gotten started toward it) is a regular up and out system

like the rest of the Foreign Service, like the officer corps. Above all it needs regular intake, predictable intake. It is an article of faith among FSOs in the director general's office that if you interrupt the intake significantly of FSOs, the cascade affect is very profound and dramatic. There is nobody around to do the junior officer consular work, promotions are affected up and down the line, assignments are affected for years. It is an article of faith that you provide some minimal level of intake in the officer corps. You have to have that in DS as well.

DS has suffered from the feast or famine mentality. It is in the feast zone now. When I was there in was in the famine zone and I think my achievement was to persuade the management of the State Department to reverse itself and to permit the intake of DS officers. We got in over 100 agents in the second year of my administration and that was in the face of flat budgets. That was a significant internal battle within State that was won and it was done over the strong opposition of both FMP and the DG's office who were faced with having to deal with cuts everywhere.

Q: *The easiest way to save money is to not hire new people.*

BOSWELL: That's exactly right. And not to give the Foreign Service test and things like that. We got over 100 new agents and we had a commitment to a long-term regular intake of about 40 to 50 agents. That's what I think we needed and that was good. Since I've left, of course, there was the dramatic events in East Africa and an enormous supplemental that has been voted. There was an accountability review board that recommended much, much, much more than that supplemental which is still being debated within the administration, I gather.

In any case, it is clear that DS will have substantial new resources. Those come from tragedies. The very large initial funding for DS, the creation of DS, was in response to tragedies in Beirut and Kuwait. Then there are long fallow periods in which nothing happens and DS' capacities erode, then another tragedy, and another injection of people and funds. It makes it extremely difficult to manage DS when you have these great bubbles that percolate through the system and distort the system. Anyway, that is a challenge for new management in DS.

I am happy that I was able to get increased resources at a time of no tragedy. I was just able to make the case that it made good management sense to do that. I think that was viewed as a tremendous step forward in DS. Without wanting to pat myself too much on the back, when DS saw the Department's commitment to DS being expressed in a tangible form, regular intake, I thought that had a dramatic affect on the morale of the agents who were essentially hanging on by their fingernails. As I mentioned they were doing too much overtime, they were exhausted, and help arrived.

Q: *Are there any anecdotes about your period that you can talk about?*

BOSWELL: I'm never very good at anecdotes. I could probably think of a million between two and four o'clock this morning in response to that question. I did manage to make it through two years without losing anybody and that was nice. It's just lucky really, but I managed it. I spent a tremendous amount of time on the road seeing places from a vantage point that was perhaps unique. The secretary one time showed me the confidence to send me to Lebanon. She had come under a lot of pressure and she was considering whether to remove the prohibition of the use of U.S. passports for travel to Lebanon. She asked me to go to Lebanon which at the time was one of the most ultra secure, batten down embassies; it had been for years because of bitter experience there.

Q: *They flew in by helicopter, didn't they?*

BOSWELL: Until June of '98 when this changed as a result of my mission, the standard security practice for years was that the embassy in Lebanon was in an absolute hair trigger. They were ready to be evacuated entirely on 12 hours notice. All travel in and out of Beirut was by helicopter through an air bridge that was maintained at great expense operating out of Cyprus. I had taken that bridge many times over the course of the years, not just with DS but with NEA and others.

The embassy compound was heavily fortified. There were somewhere between 250 and 550 guards, essentially a small private army paid for by us plus significant Lebanese military units devoted to just the protection of the compound and its area. There was virtually no movement off the compound by anybody except the ambassador and perhaps the DCM on official business. When the ambassador traveled he traveled in an armored convoy that makes the presidential convoy here in the States look pretty low rent. It is really, really quite spectacular.

These extreme security measures were in place even at a time when Lebanon was arguably getting safer. Other embassies, including embassies who had been victimized like us by bombings ten years ago, were operating completely differently without these kinds of restrictions. The U.S. always felt that it was a particular target and that there were plenty of terrorists still operating in Lebanon, and therefore it operated in this style.

I made a trip to Beirut to evaluate that, but also to evaluate the general security situation for Americans in Lebanon as part of the secretary's evaluation of what she should do about this policy. This policy came up for annual renewal. Every year she had to think hard about whether to renew it, and every year she did renew it. It gets harder and harder to change a policy when that happens. She sent me to Lebanon to look at it.

I recommended to her when I got back that we lift the ban, that we have a hair raising travel advisory which I think there still is and that's appropriate, but that we not prohibit travel to Lebanon. That made a huge difference I think in Lebanon. We also have begun to change the way the U.S. embassy defends itself to gradually move into a slightly more liberal regime, always ready to batten down the hatches if the intelligence says that it should. I think that has made a change in the way that embassy...

Q: *It has to. Now here is an embassy that's the ultimate in the separation from the world so to speak. What do they do and why are they there? Who am I and why am I here?*

BOSWELL: That's interesting. The reason they are there is because Lebanon is a front line state and part of the peace process with Israel, otherwise I don't doubt for a moment that that embassy would have been closed for many years. The U.S. closed its embassy in Lebanon, I can't remember the year but I think it was 1993, when it decided that it couldn't protect the people there; the armed guards were not reliable. The embassy was closed and evacuated within something like 12 hours, overnight. It was closed for almost a year and a half. It was not really closed because it operated with FSNs but there were no Americans. There was a little office in Cyprus of Americans that sort of managed it from a distance but basically it was managed by FSNs.

The decision to go back in was made by Secretary Baker. It was part of the Madrid process. He made the decision himself. I remember he initialed the action memo and dated it next to his initials because he knew he was taking on a hell of a responsibility. It was very, very possible that we could have a bad accident in Lebanon. He did that precisely because we were from one State [Department].
Having said that, most of the presence in Lebanon has until relatively recently been largely symbolic. It has been an ambassador, and a DCM who substitutes for the ambassador. There has been a very small military component, a very small other intelligence component, no consular work, no commercial work really, a large security presence. There may have been a political officer or half a political officer. You essentially had a very large security presence protecting a very small number of substantive officers to maintain what was largely a symbolic presence. I don't want to say entirely symbolic because I think the activities of the embassy have been instrumental-
(end of tape)

As a result of my trip, the embassy in Beirut is now becoming more of a fully functional embassy. The restrictions on travel are somewhat less, and consular work has begun. Assistant Secretary of Consular Affairs Mary Ryan traveled there a few weeks after I did making the same recommendation. It is becoming more of a normal embassy though still very batten down.

It could be. It would be hard to justify spending the amount of money that it takes to maintain that kind of presence in a country unless there was some real overriding political reason for it. That debate incidentally is taking place now about our presence in various parts of the world.

For example during my time in DS I think we evacuated embassy Dushanbe several times. It is an extremely high risk embassy, a very small one, but in a very difficult place. There was sort of constant tension between the political side of the house, the EUR Bureau, and DS, and other parts of State, about keeping that embassy open. The political side of the house wanted to keep it open for an assortment of reasons but mostly because

it doesn't like to close any embassy. DS would argue repeatedly, strongly, that we couldn't adequately protect our people there. FBO finally did a study of what it would cost to provide a small sort of prefab embassy that could come somewhere close to Inman standards. It was going to cost 11 million dollars for a very, very basic kind of embassy, plus it would require a large number of Americans in the country during the construction. We were always on the horns of a dilemma about Dushanbe. I think by the way that as I speak Dushanbe is closed. There was a lot more readiness to close embassies after the Nairobi/Tanzania bombings.

I also spent a tremendous amount of time in DS worrying about the "collapse of the month" in Africa. Many, many embassies closed in Africa for security reasons because of civil disorder. I can mention Embassy Freetown, Sierra Leone, Embassy Brazzaville, Congo, Embassy Kinshasa in then Zaire, Embassy Bangui, Central African Republic, and I know there were others. We had Embassy Bujumbura down to a very, very, very small number of people; and there were others. There was constant pressure to reopen even though it was pretty difficult from a strictly security point of view to understand the reason to maintain an expensive and risky U.S. presence in those countries. That's a debate that goes on now and will continue to go on. The Crowe Commission that reported on Dar Es Salaam and Nairobi recommended, I believe, that many U.S. embassies, in Africa in particular, be closed because they are simply impossible to adequately protect.

Q: *Speaking of this and it's a bit technical, but what do you think of our ways of evaluating bombings after the fact? I'm thinking specifically of the accountability review boards which were clearly imposed on the Department by the Congress. DS I assume does its own evaluations after an incident and I'm sure other agencies do it as well. How about that process, is it too complicated?*

BOSWELL: I don't think so. I rather like the accountability review board process. It gives a sort of outside look to great tragedies and to some degree provides the Secretary of State with a certain degree of impartial cover, if you like. I think it is a good thing. I think the members have been distinguished and I don't take issue with any of the reports that I have been involved in. I have testified in front of two accountability review boards, one for the bombing in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and the other for of course Nairobi and Tanzania. I agree with the bulk of the conclusions of the Crowe report. It is a little tough to take, but it is, I think, a fact that the only way to adequately protect our people overseas is the way Crowe recommended and that is to spend a vast, vast amount of money to build more of these embassies. That is a very controversial position within the State Department but I'm very, very comfortable with it and I believe that's the right road. I think Crowe reached the right conclusion.

Q: *From the outside it appears that the Department doesn't oppose that conclusion, it just cannot visualize how they could possibly get the resources to do it.*

BOSWELL: Well you've got to ask.

Q: *And they don't seem to be.*

BOSWELL: You've got to ask for it. I can tell you right here for this memoir that one of the things I regret most from my time in DS is that I was absolutely convinced that building more secure embassies was the only way to go. Keep in mind that I had this conviction in the face of 10 years of virtually no assaults against a U.S. embassy so it was really a tough position to try to defend but I felt it and I still feel it. I never really got [this position] on paper. I never really wrote a memorandum to the secretary or the undersecretary for Management saying that I thought our capital account was grossly underfunded. We all knew that, because there was no money in the capital account in FBO for anything, except perhaps a little for Beijing and certainly for Berlin and Ottawa. Our capital account was grossly underfunded and this imperiled people. That's the point I'd want to emphasis, that we needed new buildings to protect our people, and I never did that. I never did that because I thought it would be just hopeless; I thought it had no chance of success.
Crowe faults the administration both within State, and I think accurately, within OMB, and within Congress for not having stepped up to the plate on that one. I think all of us in DS knew that something like Nairobi and Dar would happen at some point. We didn't know it would be Osama bin Laden and we didn't know it would be Nairobi but we knew that particular hammer was going to fall somewhere because we were just so vulnerable in so many places. I would have predicted that it would fall not in Africa but perhaps in the former Soviet Union somewhere. I didn't catch the Africa call. I thought the great danger in Africa was what we were dealing with at the time which was civil disorder, riot and chaos, not terrorism particularly.

Q: *The interesting thing is that that seemingly immutable situation where you feel you can't have resources comes up against another immutable fact which is that being the country that we are, we've got to have embassies. There is a gulf there that needs to be addressed by our whole nation I think. Who do we want to be? It's kind of a spearhead of that issue which is what is the role of the United States in the world?*

BOSWELL: I agree with that and I certainly think that the funding could be made available for such a huge program and *should* be made available for such a huge program even though it is huge, even though it does distort the budget of the State Department. I think the game is worth that particular candle and I earnestly hope that this administration pursues it.

Q: *Having read the reports on Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam, do you have any other observations or reflections on that?*

BOSWELL: As I mentioned before, I thought the reports were largely accurate from what I knew of it. There was certainly something of an intelligence failure. We find this in almost any one of the incidents of this kind. It is so difficult to produce the essential piece of information from the welter, the enormous amount of intelligence information, threat information, that we deal with every day. I would sit in my office at 8:00 every working

morning of the week for a meeting at which my staff would go over the events of the previous day with particular attention to the intelligence. There was a constant stream of rather hair raising reports. The ones that we felt were the most valid, we did something about them. But it was awfully, awfully difficult to separate the wheat from the chaff and there is a certain amount of sort of dullness that comes over you. You get hardened and you can make mistakes.

There was intelligence about Nairobi, not about Dar Es Salaam, but there certainly was intelligence about Nairobi. It was questionable. It had been debunked by the CIA or at least part of it had. There was an increasing background noise in Nairobi and I think the embassy there took steps, as did the Department, to deal with it. But the only way to really deal with it was the way that Pru Bushnell had recommended, which was to get a new embassy. She was right to raise it and she raised it forcefully but the Department was not in any kind of position to respond appropriately. Having said that, even if we had ticked "yes" on a new embassy it would not have helped her in her current situation, but she was right to do what she did.

There were others, by the way, who sent the same kinds of cables in to me and to whom I had to, and FBO had to, reply, "Sorry, the money isn't there for this kind of stuff." It was always hard to do that. There are other Nairobis that are out there. Several other ambassadors, some of whom were justified, some of whom I felt were less justified, but all of whom were trying to do whatever they could to protect their people.

Q: *It's kind of too bad that you're the one whose name has to appear on the message saying that we can't do it.*

BOSWELL: That is too bad and I didn't do it lightly, believe me. I think my response to Ambassador Bushnell was the last piece of paper I signed as assistant secretary for DS. It was on my last day in the office, and it was "no." It was, "We are sending a team out to look at your situation and we will help you in every way we can but you are not high enough on the scale as a medium threat post to warrant a new embassy." What we didn't say was that nobody was high enough on the scale to warrant a new embassy because there simply wasn't any capital budget for embassy construction.

Q: *Any other thoughts on DS or from whence you left our ranks?*

BOSWELL: DS has gone through the fire since I left. I left DS on January 31, 1998 and left the Department on April 1 because I had been offered a job with the Pan American Health Organization and was looking for a second career. This was a good opportunity to do it. I always felt it's nicer to leave the State Department under your own steam at a time of your own choosing. I left it with great regret but it was definitely the time to do it. I was relatively young and wanted a full time second career. I could see that possibility working for the Pan American Health Organization.

DS has been through the fires, as I say, since because Nairobi and Tanzania occurred a couple of months after I left and with all the fallout that came afterwards. My successor, Dave Carpenter, a former senior Secret Service officer, has had his hands absolutely full. He is an extremely capable person and I think he has done, and will continue to do, very well in the job. I continue to think, for the record, that this should be a Foreign Service slot.

Q: *Which he is not.*

BOSWELL: He is not. He is career law enforcement, he is a career security type person but from the Secret Service. He is a cop at the top, not a Foreign Service officer. I do think that there is an important policy link between the Foreign Service officer corps and DS that is best made by an FSO at the top.

Q: *How did issues of information security, computers, e-mail, the State Department system of double units, and that sort of thing affect you in DS?*

BOSWELL: Tremendously, because the State Department which had been at the cutting edge of technology for many, many, many years, and in the last 15 years because of budget cuts and everything like that, was going from the cutting edge to the trailing edge of technology at the same time as the information age was upon us and the Internet, and e-mail, and the web were upon us. The demands and the pressure on DS, and A, and IM, to do something about that so that the State Department could move into the information age or better, was quite intense. It never really got dealt with while I was in DS. We just essentially held off the wolves.

It's been a revelation for me to go to an organization where unclassified information technology is an essential part of day-to-day life and connections with the outside world are an essential part of day-to-day life. Somehow, somewhere, the State Department is going to have to find a way to manage both classified and unclassified, unclassified without restriction. Whether that is through some technological improvement or what, I don't know, but they're going to have to do it because otherwise they will become irrelevant.

Q: *I know you've been gone for a year now, but do you have the feeling that they have not yet been about to figure that out?*

BOSWELL: I really don't know where the Department is on that. I gather that there is more availability of unclassified communications at the desktop than there was when I was there but I really don't know what it's really like. All I know is that it was a dramatic change when I went from the Department to the outside world. I had a lot to learn and I viewed the folks in the Department as completely deprived on this.

Q: *Is that our last word?*

BOSWELL: That's our last word, they're deprived on information.

Q: *Could we maybe continue a little bit and ask you about your new job and what you do there and what are the differences between international organizations and the State Department?*

BOSWELL: There are big differences and are big similarities. Along the similarity front, I am essentially M for this organization. That is, the equivalent of the undersecretary for Management, the senior administrative official in the organization. My job is to provide administrative support for a widespread set of offices that range all over the Western Hemisphere, so that is very familiar to me. Those basic administrative functions are very similar. The accounting is very similar to the State Department.

The culture is radically different. This is a Latin dominated organization and it's a UN organization. It's taking some time to learn that. Nevertheless everything that I bring from the State Department is useful except unfortunately I didn't have Spanish and I'm trying to learn Spanish. It is always interesting trying to learn a new language when you're 53 years old. I enjoy the job and I like the new culture. It enables me to travel to Cuba, for example, legally which was not so easy to do before.

Q: *Have you traveled to Cuba?*

BOSWELL: I'm about to in a few weeks.

Q: *You haven't done it yet?*

BOSWELL: I haven't done it yet.
Q: *I was going to ask you about your impressions of it.*

BOSWELL: Actually I went to Cuba with State several years ago as OFM. I came back with very strong impressions, that I'm sure wouldn't change a bit, of a country in terminal decline. When it finally collapses into the hands of the exiles in Miami, when they go back to their homes, they will find very little there. I don't view Cuba as having a lot of investment potential for the United States or for the rest of the world, aside from tourism, simply because the infrastructure is so badly eroded. It would take a vast injection of capital that has got to come from somewhere to put that country back on its feet. It's not going to be a little effort, it is going to take years, and years, and years.

Q: *It would be interesting to see if you see any change from this trip, but that's in the future. Of course we're going to have baseball there.*

BOSWELL: We're going to have baseball in a couple of weeks in Havana. I think the physical appearance will not have changed at all except perhaps for the worse.

Q: *You didn't do Latin America before that time and now you're doing it, what's your first impression of Latin America and the culture and our relationships with it even though you're coming from an international organization rather than the United States?*

BOSWELL: I don't think these impressions are going to be awfully profound but I'm enjoying very much dealing with an organization that is largely composed of Latins. It's an organization of physicians and public health people who are do-gooders, what can I say, and that's good. They are dedicated and good workers. You always have to deal with they know where you're coming from. They know you are the U.S. and they know I'm in my job because the U.S. pays 60 percent of our budget through the OAS mechanism and it suits the directors of the Pan American Health Organization to have an American, it's always been an American, in the top administrative job for that reason.
You always have to be sensitive to how the U.S. is perceived. I've made an effort, for example, to hire non-Americans in senior administrative jobs which have been pretty much totally an American purview in the past. I've been making some efforts in that direction and I think that's important at least for symbolic points of view. I've traveled a fair amount in Latin America though not as much as I want and I find it enormously interesting. Since I've spent most of my time in the Middle East you can't ever be a real optimist about the Middle East, but I am an optimist about Latin America. With all its problems, I think that this is an area that is taking off, has taken off, and has made enormous strides in the right direction. It still is dealing with enormous problems including deeply ingrained problems, structural problems, attitudinal and cultural problems, but which is going in the right direction.

Q: *What's your typical post like?*

BOSWELL: A little bit like an embassy. There is what is called a PWR, a PAHO World Health Organization representative, who has pretty much total power within his or her particular sphere; in other words like an ambassador. The PWR deals primarily with a certain minister, like an ambassador does. An ambassador deals mostly with a foreign minister and the PWR deals with the health minister mostly, not exclusively. They run an office that can range from three or four professionals and a lot of equivalent of FSNs, to very large offices.

In fact during the Haitian embargo, the PWR in Haiti, our office in Haiti, acted essentially as the health minister. There was nothing else that was functioning in Haiti and went beyond normal health considerations. The PWR in Haiti was designated by the UN and those who maintained the embargo, as the designated office to receive all of the fuel that went to Haiti and distribute it. It's an unusual function for a health organization.

It does these kinds of things and as I say the structure and the setup is very reminiscent of a U.S. embassy complete with PWRs who are suspicious of e-mail because it goes around normal accepted communications channels.

Q: *That you very much. We've appreciated getting this interview.*

End of interview