The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training  
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

**SAMUEL D. BOYKIN**

*Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy*  
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INTRODUCTION

INTERVIEW

Q: Today is May 7, 1991. This is an interview with Samuel D. Boykin concerning his career. It is being done at his home in Silver Spring.

Mr. Boykin I wonder if you could tell us when you were born, where you were born and your background prior to entering government service?

BOYKIN: I was born in Montgomery, Alabama on July 2, 1905 at St. Margaret's Hospital. At that time very few people were born in a hospital. I was raised in Montgomery up to the time I was in high school. I went to a private Catholic school run by sisters identified with the Catholic Church of St. Peters in Montgomery. From there I went to a private school in Montgomery which was known as the Barn School. It was a very good school which went through high school and prepared, to a degree, for college. I went there for two years.

My family for a number of years when I was a youngster would go to New York for the summer and would take me. I would stay in New York for the summer and come back to Montgomery for school. At that time in the summer we would live in a very select boarding house at Park Avenue and 35th Street in the Murray Hill section of New York. As a youngster I used to play on the roof of that house. It was a tremendous house with a marble stairway all the way up to the third floor with elevators. It belonged to the Robb family which was a very wealthy family that had decorated that house, particularly in the dining rooms with hand-painted ceilings. I had no friends there so my father put a tent on top of the house and I used to stay up there in the summer and fly kites from there. I would try to put kites on top of the spire of the 71st Regimental Armory on 34th street.
But getting back to Montgomery, in the summer down there as a youngster I would go down to my family's plantation which was in Tilden, Alabama, about 86 miles from Montgomery and 36 miles from Selma, Alabama. It was an old Civil War plantation home which had not been burned down by the Yankee forces when they came through burning down all the plantation houses. I would go down there and stay with my aunts and uncles, on my father's side, and have a good time. Some of my friends would come down and spend the summer with me.

When I got to be in the second year of high school, my family decided that they wanted to move to New York. They put me into a military school outside of the Bronx which was known as Clason Point Military Academy. I went there for two years. It was run by the Christian Brothers. I graduated from there in 1922.

From there I went back south with my family and hoped to go to the University of Alabama. But at that time the University was more or less a country club, academically it didn't stand too well, and my father decided that was not the place for me. The next thing I knew he had gotten me accepted at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia. I had never been to Philadelphia and knew nothing about the University. However, he had gone down to the local bank and asked for a good business school and they recommended the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. I graduated in 1926 with a B.S. in economics.

After graduation I went to New York--my father had died in my senior year--and got a job with a company known as the Retail Credit Company. They were investigators of applicants for life insurance. Every applicant for life insurance had to be investigated. This was back in 1926 during prohibition and there were a lot of gangsters all around New York and New Jersey. Here I was wet behind the ears investigating that type of people. It was a wonder I survived.

Anyway, I was there for two years as an investigator. I worked from 42nd Street in New York all the way up to 142nd Street, including the theatrical district. So I got to know New York thoroughly. I covered Brooklyn, the Lower East Side and practically all over the city investigating.

Then I became employed with the Bank of America at 44 Wall Street. I worked there in the credit department for two or three years, through 1929. That was when we had the depression as you know, the Market dropped to nothing. There was a run on the bank but we were in good financial condition. It was a Gianini bank. At that time Gianini owned the Bank of Italy in California. But he had the name of this small bank, we had about $400 million in deposits, Bank of America. So he changed the Bank of Italy to the Bank of America and there you have the Bank of America in California.

In 1931 I got married. The day I got married I heard on the radio that my bank had been taken over by the National City Bank of New York. I didn't know whether I had a job or not. As it turned out I did have a job. I went back after the honeymoon and the day of the
merge of the bank we had to go down to the banking floor of the Bank of America to find out whether we would be employed by the National City Bank of New York or whether we were not going to be employed. Just having been married, I was quite concerned about whether I had a job or not. I hesitated going up to the cashier's desk where he had a big box full of envelopes and you gave him your name and he would hand you the envelope and you would open it and find out whether you were employed or not. I walked around the bank floor for quite a while. Some people were smiling and others were very unhappy. Finally I got the envelope, went over to a corner and opened it and I had been accepted. So I went back home with the good news. We lived on 97th Street at that time in a small apartment where the rent was $60 a month.

I stayed with the National City Bank until 1941. I had a friend who was with the Guaranty Trust Company. The Chairman of the Board of US Steel, Ed Stettinius, was looking for an assistant. The Guaranty Trust Company recommended my friend as his assistant and he hired him. Later on my friend came to Washington with Stettinius and called me up and said that he wanted to know whether I would be interested in working with Stettinius. I said, "I certainly would." Stettinius had been asked by Roosevelt to come down to Washington and work in the Office of Production Management in charge of priorities.

So I came down to Washington and was interviewed by five or six of his associates and finally went into his August presence and he said, "I want you." I said, "I would be delighted." He said, "But before I take you on I have to get permission from your bank to let you go." Well I was working in the basement of the bank and I didn't have an important job and I was reluctant to have him call up the Executive Vice President of the National City Bank to ask about some clerk in the basement of the bank. But he felt he had to do it.

I waited and waited. The next thing you know I was invited by the Executive Vice President of the Bank, William Gage Brady, a very austere man, extremely capable, as you would imagine, but very full of himself. You kind of felt you had to genuflect as you passed by his desk. He said that he had received this call from Mr. Stettinius and that I had a great future in the bank, but he wanted to know how I felt about leaving the bank. The bank of course wanted me to stay, but they would not object if I decided I wanted to leave. However, I would always be welcome to come back. Well, I told him that I thought it would be in my best interest to go with Mr. Stettinius.

So I came down to Washington in 1941. At that time my family and I were living in Westchester at Scarsdale, New York and I used to commute everyday to the bank. Well, I came down here and worked in Priorities as one of his assistants. His top assistant was Mr. Robert J. Lynch, and my friend was Mr. Hayden Raynor. I was the third man on that staff. I worked there doing most anything that they wanted done--more or less to do with, not any of his personal affairs, but his operations.

The war broke out after Pearl Harbor and Stettinius was asked by the White House to become the Lend-lease Administrator. So he brought his staff to the Lend-lease
Administration at 515 22nd Street in North West Washington, right next to where the State Department is now. We had an apartment house there. I worked as one of his assistants there handling all of the communications with Lend-lease and the Lend-lease representatives abroad. I was also in charge of taking care of the placement, arranging the administrative details of the assignment of Lend-lease representatives--to various Lend Lease posts abroad, such as Australia, Africa, India, Latin America, all over the world. The top assistant at the White House at that time, Harry Hopkins insisted that all the overseas communications involving the operation of the civilian agencies in Washington be handled through Lend-lease. So I was the key man where all these agencies would send these communications. Then I would see that each one of them was transmitted and a copy was sent to the White House for Mr. Hopkins' information. He didn't interfere with them going out, he just wanted to know what was going on. So I handled that.

Q: At that time this was very new for Americans to be doing. Did you have a feeling at the time or even in retrospect that this was still sort of a makeshift, amateur operation?

BOYKIN: Well, it certainly was to a degree, because I don't think anything like that had ever existed before. I think it was primarily Harry Hopkins idea of having this done. He was very demanding. We had to have a White House telephone attached to the Administrator's office. Stettinius used that in communications with the White House.

Q: How did Stettinius and Hopkins get along?

BOYKIN: Fine. Hopkins had a great liking for Stettinius. Stettinius had a personal charm about him. He was very hard to dislike individually. Roosevelt liked him. He gathered around him a group of top business executives--our total Lend-lease Administration was about at most 5 or 6 hundred people. That was the total thing and we were spending millions of dollars. We were doing it through other agencies--the Defense Department being the principal one. We had around us millionaires that had volunteered. One was Phil Reed, Chairman of the Board of General Electric. Fred Ecker, Chairman of the Board of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Of course, Harriman--although he was sort of off by himself in London as the Lend-lease representative. We had Arthur Van Buskirk who was the Executive Vice President of the Mellon Securities interest in Pittsburgh and Tom McCabe, Chairman of the Board of the Scott Paper Co. of Chester, Pennsylvania. McCabe was the Deputy Administrator of Lend Lease. Men of that type all volunteering, a dollar-a-year men--the top salary in the government at that time was $8,000.

We had very good luck with our dealings with the Hill. Always had excellent presentations before Congress and got most any money we wanted.

Q: What was our attitude towards the Soviet Union at that time, in your role?

BOYKIN: Very close. The head of the operation in Lend-lease in the Soviet Union (I can't think of his name now), was Vice President of the Chase National Bank and his
number two man was a fellow by the name of John Hazzard who was a Soviet expert. We worked very close with the Soviet Union at that time; we were good friends. We were spending million of dollars shipping all types of materials through the Persian Gulf, Iran to the Soviet Union. We had no difficulty whatsoever with them.

Continuing, Lend-lease was eventually taken over by another agency of the government and in the meantime Roosevelt asked Stettinius if he would go into the State Department as Under Secretary of State under Cordell Hull. Stettinius agreed to do that. At that time Roosevelt was very disenchanted with the State Department's administrative operations. He wanted Stettinius to see what he could do to start a reorganization of the Department.

I went along with the group of his staff. I was not then directly attached to him, I was attached to the Assistant Secretary of Administration for a while to assist in this reorganization. I worked there as an executive officer working on the budget of the Department with others as the secretary of a committee that had been formed in the Department to handle reorganization.

Of course, the State Department since then has had about ten reorganizations. Nobody has ever been happy with them.

Anyway we put through the reorganization and then Hull left and Stettinius was then asked to be Secretary of State. He was approved by the Senate with only one vote against him and that was the Senator from North Dakota. So he became Secretary of State. I still stayed in the administrative side, although very close to him and to the operations.

Dr. Paslovsky, had been working with Secretary Hull on the beginning of the drafting of a charter for the UN. So Stettinius got in that with Paslovsky carrying it through Dumbarton Oaks for the first American draft of the Charter and then later to San Francisco as the head of the delegation for the UN. But before all that happened, Stettinius went to Yalta with Roosevelt and brought back the Yalta agreement. On his way back he was going to go through Mexico City for a meeting there of the Latin American Economic Conference, headed by Nelson Rockefeller. (When Stettinius became Secretary of State he brought in a whole new group of secretaries, and assistant secretaries which included James Dunn with European Affairs and Nelson Rockefeller with Latin America Affairs. The new head of Administration was a retired general, Julius Holmes, who later became an Ambassador to Iran.)

Stettinius was coming back and I got word through the conference head in the State Department that he wanted me to go to Mexico City. So I was assigned to that conference with our delegation. Word came to me that Stettinius wanted me to handle and receive all of his communications after I got to Mexico City—keep them in the Embassy for me to control. When I got down there, Mr. Messersmith was Ambassador, I was just a little fellow, I went in to see him. He said he had received that communication and that up to this time there hadn't been anything for the Secretary. Well, I thought that was very odd, but I hung around and went back every day and was told there was nothing for the
Secretary. Finally, Stettinius came with the Charter and the FBI had sent men down there
to guard the Charter and when Messersmith met him he had a large stack of
communications which gave to Stettinius so the ambassador kept the communications to
himself to handle personally--consequently he had taken over and I did not feel I should
be the one to handle the communications. As a matter of fact the delegation was in the
Geneva hotel and the FBI made a complete security survey of the American suites in the
hotel. The Secretary didn't want to stay in the Embassy. He wanted to stay in the hotel.
They had a room set off just for the Charter with a man watching it constantly. So the
conference came off fine. Stettinius went on to Cuba on his way back and I went directly
to Washington. Of course, I wasn't an important fellow there by any means. He later came
back with his staff.

While we were getting ready for the UN, Roosevelt died in 1945 just before the San
Francisco conference. Truman became President. We got out to San Francisco, I was on
the delegation, and we had an administrative office in the Hotel Fairmont on Knob Hill
which we kept open 24 hours a day. At that time the Secretary General of the American
Delegation was Alger Hiss. I worked with Jack Ross who was also an assistant of Hiss on
the administrative side of the conference. That went along fine until the time for the
conference to end and the Charter was finally drawn up. At that time President Truman
was coming out to close the conference. Word had reached Stettinius that he was no
longer to be Secretary of State and that the President was going to notify him of that fact
when he came out to the conference. As a matter of fact, what I understood to be the
reason (this is the story and I don't know how true it is) was that Truman, at the
nominating Democratic convention at which Roosevelt had been nominated again for the
Presidency, and he for Vice President, had been supported very strongly by James Byrnes.
Truman had told Byrnes that if he by any chance became President, he would make him
Secretary of State. Stettinius had heard this too, and knew he was going to be relieved of
his office.

In the meantime, in order to get ready for the President to come out I was sent, as a State
Department representative, back to Washington to work with the White House for the
President's visit to San Francisco. That meant the administrative side of it. So I came back
to Washington and Dean Acheson took me over to the White House and introduced me to
the head of the Secret Service. I was to come back with him, Jim Rowley to San
Francisco and then arrangements would be made for the President's visit. I was to be there
to help Rowley in making arrangements for the President's entry into San Francisco.

I flew back from Washington in a special plane, a C-54, with a number of the Secret
Service and some other people from the State Department. We got to San Francisco and
then started the preparations for the President's visit. Well, he was to come into Hamilton
Field and there was going to be a big parade and there was going to be all kinds of police
protection and he was going to stop off at the Veterans' Hospital to pay his respects to the
injured G.I.s on his way in, planes would be flying over while the parade was taking
place. Details had been worked out very carefully by the Secret Service, I was just
accompanying them to keep the Secretary informed of all the plans so that his office
would know exactly what was going to happen--when the President was going to come in and where the President was going to stay. A special floor was taken over in the Fairmont Hotel where special communications had been set up for the visit. After this was all done, lo and behold, a man appeared by the name of George Allen. George Allan said he had been sent by the White House to look over the plan for the President's visit.

Q: He was sort of known as the Court Jester wasn't he?

BOYKIN: He was the one that wrote the book entitled The Presidents Who Have Known Me and he was very shrewd. He wasn't a dumb bell by any means. He was a country boy from Mississippi. He later headed up the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. He was very close to Truman. So he came out. He looked over the plans and he said, "Oh my god, this won't work at all, you have to change everything." So I said to Rowley, "Who in the hell is this guy?" He said, "He is one of the President's closest friends and we do what he says to do." So we finally changed the plans to meet Mr. Allen's wishes. He had made a good suggestion which worked out very well. He also told me, "I am here to tell you that the President wants to talk to Stettinius about his position." I said, "George, the Secretary knows about this and you can see him any time." The Secretary had already arrived and was at the hotel. He said, "I hate to do this." I said, "It is all right, he understands exactly the whole story." He said, "Well, the President will talk to him when he arrives. I won't say anything then." I said, "Well, that is up to you."

The President goes somewhere in the State of Washington on his way to San Francisco at the close of the conference. I never did think that George was close to the President. I thought he was just one of the little people. I really didn't know at that time how close he really was. He said, "Well, I am going up to tell the President all about this." And I thought to myself, "Well, he will probably see an assistant." Anyway, he said, "I am going to go up there and tell the President all about these plans and then I will call you and let you know whether he approves them." I said, "Fine."

I was over at a party at Mark Hopkins across the street from the hotel when I got this call to come to the White House communication center. George Allen was on the phone. He said, "Sam, I am sitting here with the President and we are drinking Muhlbach bourbon and we are having a wonderful time. I have told him all about the program that has been set up and what a wonderful job you have done, etc. The President is very pleased." I said, "Oh, George." He said, "I am sitting right here with him. Just a minute." And the President came on. I almost fainted. He said, "Mr. Boykin, Mr. Allen has told me about the wonderful job you have done and I want you to know that we are very happy with everything." I almost died because I didn't think George was really that close. But he really was.

The President comes in. They had a parade (the Secret Service wanted to bring him in very quietly, but George said you had to have a parade), everybody went out, the planes were flying over, bands were playing. The President was met at the plane, stopped by the Veterans' Hospital to shake hands with the veterans and wish them well and comes into
San Francisco with the flags flying, and thousands of people were on the route to meet him.

After arriving at the hotel there was a big political reception that night which they called the Marching Chowder club. The President and Stettinius were in the receiving line. I came up and the President started laughing. He said, "Oh, you are Mr. Boykin. You have done a fine job."

The conference went off very well. During that time the President met with Mr. Stettinius for the big meeting. Stettinius had his representative at that meeting to discuss his leaving and what his future was to be, Isaiah Bowman, who was head of Hopkins University. They met and worked out a deal where the President said he wanted Stettinius to be the US Representative to the UN. He would have his own plane and all kinds of various amenities—a desk in the White House, etc. In the meantime he would resign as Secretary of State and James Byrnes would be appointed as Secretary.

So the conference came to an end, the President made a wonderful speech, Stettinius signed the Charter for the Department, and it was a very well handled operation. Everybody went back to Washington. In the meantime, Stettinius' top assistant was leaving and he said, "I want you to take Bob Lynch's place and be my top assistant." I was very flattered about that and of course accepted. So I became Stettinius' top assistant in connection with his being identified as US Representative to the UN.

We came back to Washington and had offices in the Old State Department Building now the Executive Building. At that time it was occupied almost entirely by the State Department although it was the War Building at one time.

Preparations were being made for the first meeting of the UN in London. Adlai Stevenson was sent over by the President to London to head up the preparatory commission for the first meeting of the UN. He was the representative of the State Department for that purpose. Stettinius had been approved as the US Representative to the UN. I have forgotten the dates of this first meeting. We went to England on the Queen Elizabeth which had been a troop ship. It had some quarters that were very deluxe. Senator Vandenberg of Michigan, Tom Connally of Texas and Abe Fortes, among others, were on the delegation.

We were located in Claridges Hotel, the fancy hotel of London at that time. It was near Grosvenor Square where our Embassy was located. Stettinius had an office in one of the buildings on the Square and stayed at Claridges. I had a small room with another member of the staff also at Claridges. I would eat with him once a day, usually around 5:00. We would have a drink and talk over whatever he wanted to talk about. I had to go down and see about what arrangements had been made, where the American delegation was going to sit, where Stettinius was going to be, the whole administrative side. Mrs. Roosevelt was a member of the delegation too. She also stayed at Claridges.
The meeting went off very well.

The first time the meeting was to take place, I went to Stettinius and said, "I am making a suggestion to you that you invite Mrs. Roosevelt to accompany you for the first meeting." He thought it was a great idea. So he did. The meeting was a grand success. It lasted forever.

A very interesting thing happened to me personally during this meeting. One night when I arrived back at Claridges around 10:00 after going to a movie or something, and went into the room and into the bathroom and looked in the tub and here was an enormous rat running around inside the tub. I went to the phone and said, "I have a request to make. There is a rat in my bathtub and I wish you would come up and get rid of it." Well, the guy thought I was drunk. He listened to what I had to say and then said, "Oh, Mr. Boykin that couldn't happen." I said, "Well it is here and I wish you would do something about it." I waited and waited and nothing happened. So, I called up again and said, "I am waiting for somebody to come up here and get rid of this rat." Finally he comes up with his cutaway coat and collar and I show him the rat. "Oh, my god, what are we going to do?" I said, "It is very simple. We will just stop up the tub, turn the water on and drown him." "Oh, that is a wonderful idea." And that was what we did. Then he had to send up somebody to take the rat out. From that time on I could write my ticket at Claridges. Everybody was more then delightful to me. So that was just a little side experience that I had at Claridges. What had happened was that it was right after the war and a lot of places were bombed out and rats had gotten into the hotel.

The conference finally came to an end. It was very long and tedious. The question they were handling was the Azerbaijan case with the Russians about to take over Azerbaijan. That went on and on and on. Everybody was getting impatient. Finally it ended.

It came time to get the American delegation back to Washington. Stettinius said the President had promised him a private plane and he wanted me to get a C-54 over to take the whole delegation back, including Mrs. Roosevelt. I said, "I want to caution you, you know the war is over and things are not so good as they used to be with these planes." I realized that this was going to be a difficult thing to do, to get him to change his mind, but the expense of the thing was about three times what it would cost commercially. Finally he said, "All right, we won't go on a government plane if you think it is dangerous. We have all these people and Mrs. Roosevelt here so I don't want you to say that I think it is dangerous or anything, but get a Pan American plane." So I met with the Pan American representative in London and talked about a plane to fly over and take the American delegation back.

Connally was not going to fly back, but the rest of them were. The Pan American representative to whom I talked said, "Oh no, we can't do that. We have no landing rights." I said, "I think we can handle the landing rights with the British government. Don't worry about that." He said, "Well, we just can't do it." I said, "All right." So I dealt with the American Airlines. At that time they had a representative there in London. No
commercial flights were running. Bournemouth was the landing field for other European commercial planes. He said, "Yeah, we will handle it." He wasn't negative at all. So that night I went in as usual to Stettinius' suite at Claridges. He said, "Have you gotten a plane?" I said, "Yes, I have a plane." He said, "Great. What is it?" I said, "American Airlines." He said, "American Airlines. Are you crazy? I can't go on American Airlines. My brother-in-law is Juan Trippe and he is Chairman of the Board of Pan American." I said, "I know that, but I didn't know that you wanted me to go that far." He said, "You tell that guy that we want a Pan American plane here or I am in the soup with my family." His sister had married Juan Trippe.

I got back to the Pan American fellow and said, "Look, I have always been told not to mention Stettinius' name in connection with any attempts to get anything done, but in this instance you had better get that plane because Stettinius is the brother-in-law of Juan Trippe who is Chairman of the Board of Pan American and I am sure if you don't you may not have a job. That, of course, is just my personal opinion." He said, "Whoa, he said, well..." We got the plane right away.

The plane sat down in Bournemouth for three or four weeks without anything happening because of this delay in the conference. Finally the conference ended and the delegation had to move from London to Bournemouth. They called up the police and anybody who had a regular caravan to take everybody down to Bournemouth who was going on this plane. We got down there and the plane couldn't leave because the weather had turned bad and the captain didn't want to take any chances with such an important group of people. Mrs. Roosevelt at that time was in Ireland.

So we had to put up this delegation in Bournemouth. The hotels had all closed and we had a terrible time, but finally we got a place for the members of the delegation and other passangers to spend the night. The next day we left and flew to Ireland to pick up Mrs. Roosevelt. She had a lot of baggage and I had to be the one to ask volunteers to leave the plane and allow Mrs. Roosevelt and her group to come on. Mrs. Roosevelt and her party got settled.

We finally started out and got over to Newfoundland and the plane froze up, ice all over it. It couldn't fly. So we had to put up the delegation at Gander. There was a hospital that had been closed and we opened that and they had blankets and beds, no sheets, and the delegation spent the night there. I stayed up all night and played pool with a 4 star general, Mathew Ridgeway. He didn't want to stay at the hospital. The next morning they finally got the plane de-iced and we loaded it up again and flew on into New York. The general said, "I have a private plane that is going to meet me and I would like to invite Mr. Stettinius and you and a few other people to fly down to Washington with me. The rest of the delegation was going down by train. That was what we did. We flew down to Washington which was fogged up on arrival. But the general said, "Land this plane," and the pilot did, beautifully.
That was the end of the UN trip from London. Later on we went on to New York and had to try to find a spot for the first meeting of the UN in New York. That was finally worked out at Hunter College. We had U.S. delegation offices at 57th Street off Broadway. We had a whole floor there. But we had a terrible time trying to get room for the other UN delegations. Stettinius said, "You go see Nelson Rockefeller and see what he can do." I had known Mr. Rockefeller who had always been very friendly to me. I went to see him. He said, "Ah ha, you want to move these delegations to Radio City. I don't think they have room for them, but I will help you." He got spaces for any number of them and some were located in the Empire State Building.

In the meantime the United Nations located temporarily at Hunter College in the Bronx--I think it is in the Bronx. Later on the UN was moved from Hunter College to Lake Success where they had a great big building. The American delegation was still at 57th street off Broadway. I stayed with Stettinius at the same hotel which was the Savoy Plaza on 57th Street and Fifth Avenue. You know the Savoy was across from the Plaza Hotel, itself. A very nice hotel. I had to stay there because I never knew from one minute to the next whether Stettinius would get an idea to do this or that. And he always did. Sometimes it would be at 2:00 in the morning and my phone would ring with a request to see me. He was very interested and completely sold on the UN in every way and he worked hard at it.

One time the phone rang and he said, "Sam, I am reading the paper"--he couldn't sleep sometimes and it was about 1:30 in the morning--"and I see where the aircraft carrier Roosevelt is down here in the harbor and I have an idea. I want you to get a yacht. I want to invite the Security Council on the yacht. What I would like to do is go up the Hudson River to West Point and come back down and around the harbor and then, you get permission from the Navy so I can take them on board the aircraft carrier Roosevelt."

I had no idea in the world where I was going to get a yacht. I began to stew around trying to think what to do. I had called the Navy and they didn't have anything like that right away. One of my colleagues said, "Say, why don't you call the Army transport service at the Brooklyn Navy Yard. They transport civilian Army dependents all over. They may have something." So I called over there and my god they did have a yacht. They said, "We will be delighted to let you have it. We will stock it, will have food and service." Of course, I puffed up.

So I went back to Stettinius and said, "I have the yacht and everything." "Well, get out the invitations." He didn't say thank you or anything. I was quite deflated. Anyway, we got the invitations out. The yacht was supposed to pull up on Riverside Drive around 92nd Street or some place like that and the UN representatives had accepted and were told to meet at this dock.

Earlier I had gotten in touch with the Navy about the aircraft carrier and they were delighted, but they wanted to have press representatives on board. Well, Stettinius nearly hit the ceiling. He said, "We don't want to publicize this group of peacemakers going on
board a war ship. I don't want that. Get the Navy to keep them away." The admiral refused. He said, "If you want to come on this ship you are going to have the press here." So Stettinius said to call up and cancel it. So I had to call the Navy and apologize for there not going to be a visit to the carrier. That was just one side issue of getting the preparations for this trip on the yacht up the Hudson.

The day comes and I get over to the dock where the yacht is. It is very nice looking. All the delegations are there. Stettinius is there and he is walking up and down the place and says, "It is time to leave and the Chinese representative, Wellington Koo has not arrived. Do something." Well, what could I do. He was all upset. He said, "We are delayed and will be late, you have to get him. Do something." I said, "He will be here most any minute." "Get going." I was really frustrated not knowing what to do. Finally I saw the police and went over there and said, "You have a boat here?" "Oh, yeah." "The Ambassador, Wellington Koo, has not arrived. We will have to leave, but if he does arrive will you be willing to bring him up the Hudson to our ship?" "Well, we will be delighted." So I go back to Stettinius and say, "I have made arrangements. The police will wait for Ambassador Koo and when he comes they will bring him up the Hudson and catch us."

So we start out and are going up the Hudson and everything is fine. I look down and here comes the police boat just flying up there with Ambassador Koo. I go to Stettinius and say, "Here is the Ambassador, he is coming." "Stop the boat right now." I said, "Yes, sir." Of course you can't. The police boat catches up with us and just as they come around to the side to get on the yacht Ambassador Koo's hat flies off in the middle of the Hudson so he loses his hat. He gets on board and we continue our trip. We didn't get on the aircraft carrier, but it did work out to be a great success.

The next thing you might be interested in was the fact that Stettinius and Byrnes didn't get along in my opinion.

Q: Well, I don't think many people got along with Jimmy Byrnes.

BOYKIN: Byrnes seemed to be a very ambitious man. He had no regard for Mr. Stettinius. He put Don Russell in as his Assistant Secretary in charge of administration. He would pay very little attention to Stettinius. As a matter of fact when Byrnes came over for the first meeting of the UN, he accused Stettinius of having too big a staff and spending too much money, etc. They had quite an argument about it.

I got word that a draft of a paper is being prepared which would delineate the sphere in which the US Representative could operate, limiting him considerably over what the original agreement had been with the President. I knew that Stettinius would not like that at all. I knew it was being prepared in Alger Hiss's office. I told Stettinius that this was coming up. He said, "I don't believe it." I said, "Well this is what I have been told." I went to Washington and in my own way I got a copy of the preliminary draft. I took it up to him and showed it to him. I said, "This might not be the final one but this is what you are
going to get in effect." Stettinius said, "If I get that, I resign." So I said, "Well there is a strong possibility that this will be sent up by the Secretary of State."

In the meantime Stettinius started conferring with his various close friends about this situation. People he knew were important and good advisors like John Pratt, at one time one of the single largest stockholders in General Motors. The general feeling was that if he did get something like that, he should resign. He did get the final paper which was similar to what I had previously shown him. He said, "All right I am resigning, but I want to write this resignation out and I want you to take it down to Virginia to John Pratt and get him to look it over. Then I am meeting with the President and will hand him the resignation. I will meet you at the Memorial Bridge. If Pratt approves this I will take it over to the White House."

So, he did meet me and Pratt had approved the resignation without any changes. I gave it to him and he went on over to the White House where he met with the President. I do not know whether Byrnes was present or not. I think he was. Stettinius handed in his resignation and said something about his authority being so limited--at that time he was not a member of the Cabinet or anything like that, that all came later for the US Representative--that he felt that he could not carry on the job and was submitting his resignation to the President. He said that he had no more authority than the President's cook under this draft. But they parted good friends. The President said that he regretted the resignation, hated to lose him, etc.

Q: I wonder if you could talk a bit about Stettinius--your evaluation, how he operated? In reading history of the time, Stettinius is sort of portrayed as a lightweight. I recall before the UN went to San Francisco someone said that his main concern was the backdrop of the stage on which they would be. This is the sort of thing one gets. But here you were very close to him and you are talking about a very active, concerned, informed man.

BOYKIN: Well, there wasn't any question about that. Stettinius, I would say, was not a brilliant man. He had an ability to gather around him top flight people who were loyal to him and on whom he relied for advise and guidance. Like Jimmy Dunn, for example, who was the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, whom he would use as an advisor with others before anything he would do. I do feel that Stettinius was not brilliant. But he had a personal charm about him and an ability to get things done. He was a dedicated American patriot. He had his foibles such as he wanted the corridors of the State Department painted a certain color, etc. But he could utilize other people extremely well. He got things done. He got the Charter through. That is my feeling about it. I never felt he was brilliant and he had certain little idiosyncrasies such as...I don't know about the backdrop, but he was concerned about security on the stage of the Opera House in San Francisco. I know he was concerned about that, but I think it was purely from a security point of view. He was not brilliant but had the ability to utilize other people's brains.

Q: All right. Could you give us your experiences with the McCarthy period in the State Department?
BOYKIN: After Stettinius resigned, I left because he was being replaced by Senator Warren Austin of New Hampshire, so I had to resign. I came down to Washington and worked for Tom McCabe in the Office of Foreign Liquidation. I worked there in an administrative capacity because I had no other place to go. Tom was deputy to Stettinius in Lend-lease. He was Chairman of the Board for Scott Paper Company. He was one of those millionaires I was telling you about. I worked with him and then he left. Then Jack Peurifoy, who was close to Acheson and who also had done a beautiful job in San Francisco setting up the UN conference and handling the relationship with the mayor of San Francisco, became Assistant Secretary of State in charge of administration. He was a good friend of mine. He called me at the Office of Foreign Liquidation and said, "Since it is going out of business I want you to come up and work for me as my assistant." I was very flattered to do that and was happy because the agency was going out of business.

So I went up and became assistant to Jack Peurifoy. Under Jack there was an office called the Office of Consular Affairs. That office had under it passports, the licensing of munitions, security, visas and consular services--those five offices. The head of that was a fellow by the name of Hamilton Robinson. Ham was getting in trouble on the Hill. That group of offices were very difficult to handle. The Visa Office was outside the Department in a building close to the Hill. They were not getting good administrative service. They were unhappy, they weren't getting promotions, and the whole place was in that sort of situation.

Q: Run by a sort of dictator, Ruth Shipley.

BOYKIN: Well, Ruth was her own boss, she didn't work for anybody, you worked for Ruth.

So Ham had trouble on the Hill. He had a cousin or somebody that was accused of being a communist and they raked Ham over the coals terribly on this. He finally resigned. Then Jack said to me, "You go over and take this job." Well, hell, I knew I would be getting into an awful mess. I had good contacts with the FBI and I knew that there were a lot of dissatisfied people in the organization I was to take charge of.

Q: This was from 1949-53 that you were in that job.

BOYKIN: Yes, that is right.

I went down and talked to Ed Tam [phonetic], who was deputy to J. Edger Hoover, and some more of my friends. They said, "Go ahead take the job, we will support you." The support of Ed Tam was very important to me. So I took the job.

Well, it was a tough one. We had to satisfy people who hadn't been promoted for years. The Visa Office you know had to administer laws and communists couldn't come into this country under the law. In some cases you could make exceptions for political reasons.
They would oppose that and would be overridden in the Department. So it was an unhappy bunch I think.

The Security Office was under the control of Tom Fitch and Tom was getting old. He was a wonderful gentleman and I had the greatest admiration for him. But his time had come. He had to leave and we had to replace him. I brought him down and put him on my staff. I got an ex-FBI man, Don Nickelson to take over his job. Then we started on the security.

Skipping all that we will start with McCarthy. The first thing that happened was on Lincoln's birthday when all the Republicans go out and make speeches to all their constituents. McCarthy had gone into Wheeling, West Virginia and made a speech. In the speech he said that the State Department was full of communists and that he had in his hand the list of 84 communists now in the State Department. He raked us over the coals.

This got big play in the news media and McCarthy utilized it to the utmost degree having press conferences, making public statements all over the place about the State Department. It became a very serious situation.

Well, to give you a little background about those 84 communists he had, when Marshall was Secretary of State he agreed with Congressmen Taber who was the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, to allow some representatives from that committee to come into the State Department and look over the security files. These gentlemen came in and looked over the files and picked out the names of 80 people that had been mentioned in the files that had criticisms against them, but not in anyway proven that they were communists. But had been criticized and accused...you know you get all kinds of allegations from people. They made excerpts of that and brought them back to the Appropriations Committee of the House. Some way these names were turned over to Senator McCarthy. He used that for the background for his statements that the State Department was full of communists. We sent a man down to Wheeling and it checked out that those were the names he was using.

Well, it turned out that of the 84 names, 4 or 5 of them were never employed by the State Department, they had just applied.

The Hill got excited about this and the Tydings Committee of the Senate decided they would investigate this. They asked the State Department to turnover these names to the committee. Well the State Department consulted with President Truman who said, "No, I am not going to do it." But later the President was informed that the House Appropriations Committee had already had the names so there wasn't any reason why they shouldn't be made available to the Tydings Committee and that the file could also be made available because Representatives of the House had already seen them, so there wasn't any basis of turning them down for the Senate.

So the President then agreed to allow these 84 files to be brought over to the White House, to the Cabinet room and kept in a safe there. The Tydings Committee could come
and review those files in the Cabinet room in the presence of representatives of the State Department who would be there to answer questions.

I was one of the State Department guys to be present when any of these Senators wanted to examine the files. The Tydings Committee was Senator Tydings, Brian McMahon of Connecticut, Hickenlooper of Iowa, Lodge of Massachusetts, Senator Green of Rhode Island and I have forgotten who the others were. They were the ones that met to review the files. We had taken the files over and I had to ride in a truck with the head of the Security Office, Don Nickelson, over to the White House, put them in the safe over there, have the safe combination in our hands and be available to help the Senators review them anytime they wanted to look at them.

Well the first meeting was held and present at that meeting was my boss, Jack Peurifoy, to me one of the most outstanding men I ever knew, Payton Ford from Justice was there, Don Nickelson was there.

So, we had the raw files there and they were free to look at those. We also had made a summary of each file for the use of the committee, because some of the files were very thick, but the committee was not interested in the summaries because they wanted to examine the complete files. The raw files were there for them to look over.

So they started looking. This was the first meeting. Senator Lodge, this is a little aside, looked at the files and said, "These files are the worst organized files I have ever seen. They are impossible and I just can't fool with this. I cannot read these." He did, but was griping all the time. So Payton Ford, who was the deputy attorney general was there and he was a very rough talking guy straight from the shoulder. He said, "Senator, the trouble with you...you remind me of a story. Jimmy Barnes used to have a plantation and he grew some potatoes on that plantation. He had this old colored man dig up the potatoes and put good potatoes in one bag and bad potatoes in another bag. After a couple of days the old colored man came to him and said, 'I have to quit.' Jimmy said, 'Why are you quitting? What is wrong?' He said, 'I don't mind picking up these potatoes but making the decisions kill me.'" He said, "That's your trouble Senator, you don't want to make the decision so you are blaming the files." He was that straight with him. I almost fainted. Lodge hit the ceiling, but Payton Ford didn't back down one inch.

So, Lodge didn't review all the files and none of the Senators did. But old Senator Green would be there and he would call up on a Sunday. I would have to go down to the White House and sit there while he would read these files.

Later on they had a hearing on the Security Office, itself, which Senator Green and Senator Lodge conducted. I was one of those that testified at that hearing. They just went over the operations of the Security Office. We testified to that. Don Nickelson, Chief of the Security Office, did most of the testifying.
But with all the hullabaloo that was going on over all this, we had established in the
government a loyalty and security program. The State Department was in the midst of
that. We had a Loyalty and Security Board appointed within the Department to hold
hearings on people who were accused or brought up on the question of being security
risks or disloyal to the United States. The allegations would be drawn up by the Loyalty
and Security Board in the Department. They would be presented to the person to whom
the allegations were made and he could have a lawyer and have a hearing. Then he would
have full opportunity with his own counsel there to present his defense. The hearings
would be held.

The Security Office had nothing to do with that at all. We did have something to say
about the appointment of people to serve on the Board, but not the final say. We could
make recommendations, but the final say was made by the Assistant Secretary for
Administration of the Department. After the hearings were held, the decision would be
made by the Board and then that decision would be given to another board which was
headed up by ex-Senator Bingham of Connecticut, who was chairman of the Loyalty,
Security Review Board. They would review the decision.

So that was the way the program was conducted. In the meantime, we were appearing
before Congress on the appropriations side. We would be asked all kinds of questions
about security in the Department. We would answer.

Senator McCarthy was not a member of the Tydings Committee. Tydings and McCarthy
couldn't stand each other. However, McCarthy had his own committee, I have forgotten
the name of it now (something like operations committee) He was being fed information
by someone in the Department. So it happened that we had a representative of the
Security Office in the Personnel Office of the Department. His name was Matson. He was
a security man, an investigator. Apparently we had assigned him to foreign personnel in
the Personnel Office...I think Bob Woodward was heading that up at that time. Matson
was feeding information out of the files to McCarthy, or at least that was the feeling. He
was threatening, so we were told, people within the Personnel Office about themselves.
He had them all scared to death. Morale was going to hell. The head of the Security
Office had, without consulting anybody, except an assistant in the Under Secretary's
Office--had not consulted me--had transferred Matson from the Personnel Office out.

Well, when that happened, Senator Mundt got wind of this and he called Carl Humelsine
who was the Under Secretary of State for Administration. I reported to him as he was my
boss. Mundt said, "What is going on? What are you doing to Matson? You are trying to
hide things." Carl was about to be appointed the director of Williamsburg, he was on
leave in the Department, he was going to be hired by the Rockefellers down in
Williamsburg and he didn't want to get into a lot of publicity, so he called me. He said,
"Will you take this on? I know it is going to be a tough one." I said, "Sure, I will go down
and talk to Mundt."
So I went down to Senator Mundt and laid it on the line. I said, "We have this man who is being transferred and the reason he is being transferred is because he has got everybody in that place scared to death [I didn't mention that we knew he was feeding information], and the morale is so low there that we felt that without injuring him we would transfer him to another position without any reduction in salary at all. But we felt it was in the interest of the Security Office and in the interest of the man, himself, and in the interest of the people in the Personnel Office, that he not be allowed to work in the personnel department anymore. We had plenty of other jobs for him to do. He was not being fired. He was not being mistreated in any way."

Well Mundt said to me, "You had better put him back." I said, "I don't know whether we could do that. I don't have final decision on that." The result was that we didn't put him back.

The next thing I know the telephone rings and it is the McCarthy committee wanting me to come up for a hearing. Well, I knew with television McCarthy was going to raise hell. So I get down there and there is the whole committee with McCarthy. He has got a representative from the Legislative Liaison Office for the Department of State department, Ben Brown, sitting up there with him. He starts jumping on the State Department and then on me. I tell him exactly what I just told you. He said, "That is incompetent. I am telling your representative here, Mr. Brown, to call the Secretary of State and I want you fired by the end of the day."

Prior to going up to testify I went to see the Under Secretary, Don Lowrie, who was a new man. He had married the daughter of the head of the Quaker Oats Company. He was a very nice fellow, very inexperienced. Before I went up to testify before McCarthy, I told him exactly what I was going to say. He said, "Good, go ahead. I approve what you are doing." So McCarthy had called him to fire me.

I went back to the Department, and sure enough I got a call from Mr. Lowrie. I had another fellow as a witness with me when I saw Lowrie before testifying. So I went in to Mr. Lowrie and he said, "Sam, I think you have got to resign." I said, "Mr. Lowrie, I am not going to resign, you will have to fire me. And I don't think you have a basis for firing me. That is up to you, but I am not quitting. If I quit I will be branded a communist and will be vilified by the press and everybody else. I am not quitting. So it is up to you." So he said, "Well, let's not move too fast. Give me time, we will review everything." So I sat around.

In the meantime, Scott McLeod, who was a protégé of Senator Bridges from New Hampshire, who was at that time Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, was taking over my job. I wasn't being fired but I was being taken out of the job I was holding as Head of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. Well, I knew Scotty and he knew me. We were not close, but I knew he was close to McCarthy and played the game to the limit. So he called me up and said, "Sam, I want you to come over. I am taking your job and am going to be sworn in, do you mind being present?" I minded, but I said, "No, I
will come." So I went over. It was just Scott, myself, and Arch Jean from the Personnel Department. Scott was sworn in and then picks up the phone and calls McCarthy and says, "I'm in. You know I am walking on the same side of the street you are. We will get along."

That was that. They didn't fire me but he took over the job. I was assigned to a job to prepare a place for the State Department to move in case of an atomic attack. There was an agricultural station down in Front Royal and that required me to go down to Front Royal, so I wasn't depressed sitting around the Department.

The funny thing about it really was that I found out who my friends were. People who I didn't think were very friendly to me were extremely friendly and supported me 100 percent. People who I thought were close to me would hardly speak to me. It was a funny thing.

Q: It is quite an illuminating experience.

BOYKIN: So I was able to go down to Front Royal and we would set up equipment down there--communications set up. I was a representative on an interdepartmental committee on the atomic attack planning. So I was free to do anything I wanted to.

In the meantime I was waiting to hear what was going to happen to me while Mr. Lowrie was doing this so-called review. Well, it seemed that he had appointed somebody to go over the whole situation. The guy, whoever he was, went over everything and said I was 100 percent loyal and there shouldn't be any action against him at all.

Things were dying down then. McCarthy was in trouble with the Defense Department. A Defense Department from Boston [Joseph Welch] had crucified him at the hearings about the Defense Department.

Q: This was during the McCarthy hearings when he was on Defense.

BOYKIN: So things were dying down. In the meantime I had no other job. I could do anything I wanted. Nobody bothered me. However, the time was coming when something had to be done.

One thing I might mention to you is that during the hearings before the McCarthy committee, Stu Symington from Missouri, was wonderful. The reason for that was that during the course of the hearings, my Senator who I had known all my life and who knew me, Senator Lister Hill from Alabama, had called me and said, "Sam you are in trouble and I want you to know that I want to help you. Now what can I do?" I said, "Well, Lister, I just don't know what to tell you. I am before a committee, I don't know any of them except Carl Mundt and he isn't too friendly to me. I just don't know."
He said, "Well, you leave it to me." So he called Stu Symington and told him about me and my background and how he had known me all my life. He knew my family and there was no possibility that I could ever be a communist." So Symington was very good to me during the hearings. He said to me, "Where were you born?" I gave him all that. He said, "Where did you go to school." I told him that. He said, "Well, now, you are up there in the Department and you have something to do with security, I want to ask you are you a communist?" I said, "Who, me?" And everybody laughs. I said, "I will be glad to answer that question. Absolutely no." He said, "Well, that is what I expected." He said, "Well, I want to ask you, if you held a very important job in the Department of State and you supported Alger Hiss and endorsed him for an appointment to the Carnegie Foundation, would that mean you were a communist?" I said, "No." He said, "That is what I think. I don't think a man who supported Hiss for a job actually knew whether he was a communist or not. I agree with you." He was talking about the Secretary of State--Dulles.

Q: Before we leave this particular thing, what was your impression of the investigations and the type of material and the people involved in these things? Obviously you must have poured over these things and looked up...

BOYKIN: I felt the investigations all done by the FBI were thorough, they didn't evaluate them, they only reported what people said. Hoover never allowed any of his officers to evaluate investigative reports. He said, "We are an investigative agency, we don't evaluate. That is something for someone else to decide. We give them the information and let them decide." So the FBI did a thorough job, but they would not pass on anything.

The investigations contained everything. If I didn't like you I could accuse you of being a communist and they would write it down. But that didn't mean that you were. Or a man's ex-wife could give him holy hell in the investigation, but that doesn't mean it was true. So that is the kind of thing the FBI had in the files. You had to look at those reports and you had to say based on what you could judge you had to make the evaluation.

Q: Well, who were the evaluators?

BOYKIN: The evaluators were in the Security Office. We had a group that passed on people who were applying for positions in the State Department. Everybody had to be investigated not by the FBI, but by our own investigation group. So we had those evaluators.

The evaluators later on were the ones who sat on Loyalty Security Board. They were the ones who took the files. They were the ones that brought out the charges and they were the ones who conducted the hearings. They did the evaluation.

Q: What was your impression of looking at the 84 and the other files.
BOYKIN: Well, a lot of it was hearsay information. There may have been one or two in there that were questionable, but none of them were in the Department anymore. None of those people who were in that 84 list were employed in the Department. They were all gone. Four of them had never been employed in the Department. So I would say that the whole Loyalty Security Board was an excellent idea.

We also had, and I don't know whether I should tell you this, at one time, I don't think it is down now, there was suspicion on the Hill that there were communist Americans employed in the UN. Well that is an international organization and they can employ anybody they want. They can be communists or anybody. The suspicion was that some of the Americans were communists. Well, the security office was asked to make checks of those people, not investigations, but just FBI name checks. The FBI would send in whatever information they had in their files on these people. We would then send that along to people in the Department dealing with the United Nations. They would evaluate it. But none of them were very conclusive in any way. There were allegations, yes. I don't know if the UN let anybody go or not. But we did not evaluate those because they were not thorough investigations. All they were was just whatever the FBI had in their files which would be allegations rather than investigations.

Q: Back to this hearing with McCarthy, what was he accusing you of other than being incompetent?

BOYKIN: He was accusing me of removing a loyal security man because he was anti-communist. I was a communist and responsible for taking good people who were fighting communism out positions in the Department.

Q: What happened to the man?

BOYKIN: He stayed on and finally resigned.

Q: This wasn't Optepka?

BOYKIN: No, Optepka was part of it but he came after my time. He was employed there as an evaluator, as a matter of fact. He came, I knew Otto, not well but had ridden with him in a car pool. This was after I had left security. I think he had been accused of feeding members on the Hill too. But I don't know that to be a fact.

Q: Well, then you were sort of in limbo for a while?

BOYKIN: No job, other then this so-called job down in Front Royal. Then I was asked to take on the job as head of the division of biographic intelligence in the Office of Intelligence in the Department of State. The division of biographic intelligence was responsible for gathering information on important political people throughout the world. The Foreign Service would send biographical reports on say, the Minister of Commerce of Turkey, and give a complete report on background, where he stands, etc. Top people in
the various governments of the world. Reports would be sent in from the Foreign Service offices.

Q: Biographic information was an important element of any Foreign Service operation overseas.

BOYKIN: We had a regular requirement for reporting of biographical intelligence. This would be sent in and filed and kept available. Also we would get reports on people who would likely become important in the governments of these various countries, so that in the event any of them were appointed we immediately had a complete background report that we could feed out to the top people in the Department of State and the government. So that was what the biographical intelligence office did.

Q: You were there from 1953-56. Then you went to Cape Town as Consul General.

BOYKIN: Yes, that is another story. I had been inducted into the Foreign Service but not assigned abroad. I stayed there for that period of time you mentioned. I had not been assigned because my mother was seriously ill and I didn't feel I could leave right away. She died and the time came for me to go abroad. I was looking forward to that. You could express your interest of where you would like to go. I had a good friend in a position in the Department who I knew had something to do with assignments and I went to see him and said that I would like to go to South Africa. I said, "There is a very interesting situation down there and it is something I would like to do. I have never been assigned abroad before and would like to get into that." He said, "Well, we will see what we can do."

So he got me appointed as Consul General to Cape Town. I went down there and served from 1957 until 1961. It was one of the best assignments I ever had in my life. The life was marvelous. The problems were interesting. The reporting was great. The people were very friendly. It was just a wonderful assignment. I had a beautiful house, gardeners, everything that a person could possibly want in a position. It was a marvelous climate. Everything about it was grand.

Well, I knew I would have to leave. An inspector came down, Spence King, to inspect my operation. He said, "Sam I would sure like to have this job." I said, "You have a darn good job as an inspector in the Inspector General's office." He said, "I have been doing this too long. I want to get out and be down here." Well the next thing I knew I got a letter from the personnel office saying that I had been nominated for the Inspection Corps in the State Department and would I accept it. Well, you don't turn down such an offer, you have to accept it. "Of course," I wrote back, "I would be delighted."

So they made me an inspector in the Inspector General's office of the Department, but before I went into that as a preparatory thing they assigned me to the promotion panels to examine the files of the class 2 officers to promotion to class 1. There were about 2 or 3 hundred of them, I guess. I sat on that promotion panel examining those files and we
finally made recommendations for promotion of the top ten percent—the lower ten percent were automatically fired or turned loose.

Q: There was a complicated formula. Essentially they would be considered for selection out or given warnings.

BOYKIN: Well, in my days it was selection out. We were limited to the number of promotions by limitation of funds. I sat on that panel for 2 to 3 months before being assigned as an inspector for Sri Lanka, India, Iran and Iraq and Afghanistan. So I went abroad as an inspector from that year for ten months with a junior inspector, Pete Skoufis. We inspected in all of Sri Lanka, and India, then to Afghanistan, on to Iran and finally in Iran and then came home—this took ten months. All in a hardship area. We could take our wives.

The following year they assigned me as an inspector to Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.

My career was coming to an end. I was reaching the age limitation with about a year to go so there wasn't any use assigning me any other place. So they put me in the Personnel Office for retirement purposes. They didn't really have any job for me so later they made me the chairman of a group of officers giving oral examinations to applicants for the Foreign Service. I did that for about six months traveling to various parts of the country conducting oral examinations. Later they put me in a position where I found jobs for people who were leaving the Department or being selected out. Well, that was a fascinating job. I had had a lot of business experience before with banks and had some good business contacts through Stettinius and Lend-lease. So I took on that job and lo and behold when the time came for retirement the Under Secretary for Administration, Mr. Crockett said, "I don't want you to retire."

Q: William Crockett, Under Secretary of State for Administration.

BOYKIN: He said, "We will make an exception." He kept me on for two years. I was glad to do it because it meant more retirement pay for me. I stayed on until I had to leave.

Q: I wanted to go back to one phase of your Cape Town tour. You were there in 1957 before Kennedy came in. How did we view the situation at that time with apartheid, etc.?

BOYKIN: We had a policy of being against apartheid from the beginning. We had no influence other than what influence we could put on the government by persuasion at that time we were not thinking about boycotts, no one had even thought about boycotts, but we as a government were opposed to apartheid. We would pronounce it apart "hate"; apart "tate" was the Afrikaners pronunciation, not apart "tide". We would express ourselves vocally at every opportunity as being opposed to this. And trying to influence them to make changes in their operations. But they weren't listening to anything. They are wonderful people. They were friendly, nice, love Americans until you got talking about race. Then the fists were up. But I made it a point to know these top people as much as I
could possibly get to know them, although I was only a consul general. The embassy was in Pretoria and the legislative branch met in Cape Town. So I would have the embassy during the legislative sessions. I got to know the top cabinet people and were friendly with them. I got along fine with everybody in South Africa. I would have blacks privately, not publicly. I would also have coloreds. I made a point to know them all. I also got to know the opposition well too. So I began to get a good feeling of this whole situation. I knew that something would have to eventually be done. And it has been done.

I was there first under Hank Byroade and then Phil Crowe and finally Joe Satterthwaite. They were all good men. All capable. The prima dona, I would say, would be Phil Crowe. But he was a very capable fellow. He stood on protocol and loved to be admired. One had to just play up to him. But I liked him. I got along with him. He could be tough. I got along with all of them.

And I hated to leave the Cape Town because I knew so many people of all points of view.

So after the stint of finding jobs, I had to retire and they gave me a party up in the diplomatic reception room of the Department. There were lots of people, the family was there, there were pictures, and many said very nice things and then they bid me goodbye.

Q: Thank you very much. I really enjoyed this. It was fascinating.

End of interview